INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

UMI[®]

**GENDER AND CITIZENSHIP:
DEMOCRATIZATION AND WOMEN'S POLITICS IN CHILE**

by

SUSAN FRANCESCHET, B.A., M.A.

**A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of**

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

August 2001

copyright ©, 2001 Susan Franceschet

**National Library
of Canada**

**Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services**

**395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada**

**Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada**

**Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques**

**395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada**

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-67019-8

Canada

**The undersigned hereby recommend to
The Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
acceptance of the thesis**

**GENDER AND CITIZENSHIP: DEMOCRATIZATION AND
WOMEN'S POLITICS IN CHILE**

submitted by

Susan Franceschet, M.A.

**in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

Chair, Department of Political Science

Thesis Supervisor

External examiner

**Carleton University
October 5, 2001**

Abstract

This dissertation examines how women's political participation changes through processes of democratization. Through an analysis of the Chilean case study, I challenge previous research findings which conclude that women's participation declines following transitions to democracy. I argue that such negative conclusions derive from a failure to conceptualize women's post-transition activities as *political*, and a tendency to conceive of movement unity and solidarity as the comparative norm for women's movements. My own study of women's political participation in Chile is situated in a feminist theoretical framework which, by definition, adheres to an expansive definition of politics, and, instead of taking male politics as a conceptual norm, looks for the variety of ways that women participate politically. I further situate the project in feminist citizenship theory, focusing mainly on the dichotomy between the "formal" and "informal" political arenas to explain women's political marginalization. Women's citizenship is undermined largely because of their different ways of participating politically, most notably, the *location* of their activism in the "informal" political arena.

Women's citizenship is potentially transformed during democratization, a time when political processes are more open and the boundary between the "formal" and "informal" arenas is (temporarily) blurred. The Chilean case yields considerable insights into these processes. I show how democratization affects women's participation by re-constructing the boundary between "formal" politics—once again dominated by male-led political parties—and "informal" politics, where women continue to predominate. I analyze women's participation in Chile in the three areas where women currently struggle to expand their citizenship: electoral politics; bureaucratic politics (mainly in women's policy machinery created after the transition); and in movement politics in civil society. The problem for women today is not re-igniting their activism—women continue to actively participate—but forging strategic linkages among women who participate in these three arenas. I argue that there are currently both gender and class factors that undermine women's citizenship. While middle-class and professional women enjoy greater access to "formal" political arenas, popular sector women do not, and continue to try to resolve collectively their problems in the "informal" arena. Constructing linkages between women active in the two arenas is the main challenge in post-transition Chile.

Acknowledgements

Over the course of researching and writing this dissertation, I have accumulated many debts. Laura Macdonald, who supervised the dissertation, is also responsible for initially awakening my interest in processes of democratic transition in Latin America. Working with her over the years also inspired me to explore how and why gender is central to any understanding of democratization specifically and politics more generally. In addition to helping to shape the ideas that eventually became this dissertation, Dr. Macdonald provided crucial advice, encouragement, and the practical tips necessary to undertaking field work in Latin America. Working with Dr. Macdonald has been a truly rewarding experience.

I am also grateful to Miriam Smith who agreed to supervise a reading course on social movements for me. The weekly discussions that formed the course provided me with numerous insights that shaped how I addressed my dissertation research. Dr. Smith has contributed in important ways to my work, especially by always pushing me to think about my subject in broad, comparative terms.

Jill Vickers also contributed immensely to this dissertation. I am grateful that Dr. Vickers shared her vast knowledge of the women and politics literature with me and how she prodded me to see the Chilean case in ways that I may not have otherwise seen it. I feel this dissertation benefited considerably from her involvement.

The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council provided me with a Doctoral Fellowship and the International Development Research Centre of Canada a Doctoral Research Award, both of which I gratefully acknowledge.

In carrying out the research for the dissertation in Chile, I was fortunate to be affiliated with FLACSO-Chile, where I had the opportunity to learn a great deal about what was going on in Chile from Teresa Valdés. There were numerous other women in Chile who shared time, insights, and resources with me. I am especially grateful to Marcela Ríos and Fabiola Oyarzún for helping me understand what had happened and what was happening in the Chilean women's movement. Ximena Velasco and Magaly Ortiz provided both friendship and a better understanding of Chilean culture and politics. I also thank Magaly Ortiz for transcribing my interviews. Patricia Richards, whether in the US or in Chile, has helped me by reading and commenting on my work, and also by helping me locate articles and documents after I left Chile. Finally, while too many to name here, to all the women I interviewed and who invited me to visit their organizations, and in some cases, their homes, I owe an immeasurable debt. Their generosity to a foreigner was often overwhelming.

Numerous friendships have been forged as a graduate student and I am especially grateful to Marella Bodur and Ann Field for commenting on my work and providing lots of encouragement.

My greatest debts are to my family. My parents have supported and encouraged me in important ways over my many years as a student. But most of all, my husband Antonio has served as an inspiration to me, both intellectually and personally. I could not have undertaken such a project without his unwavering support and this dissertation is dedicated to him.

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
Chapter 1 – Democratization and Women’s Citizenship in Chile	26
<i>Women and Democratization.....</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>Feminist Citizenship Theory</i>	<i>44</i>
Women’s citizenship and neoliberalism in Latin America.....	52
<i>The Chilean Historical and Political Context</i>	<i>59</i>
Democratization in Chile: 1932-1973.....	62
Women’s citizenship in Chile.....	67
Chapter Two – Historical Legacies: First-Wave Feminism, Party Politics, and Women’s Incorporation as “Mobilized Mothers”	79
<i>First-Wave Feminism.....</i>	<i>83</i>
<i>The Context for First-Wave Feminism in Chile.....</i>	<i>88</i>
<i>Women Mobilize for Change: 1884-1949.....</i>	<i>92</i>
The suffrage movement	94
<i>Women as Citizens: “Mobilized Mothers”: 1950-1973</i>	<i>102</i>
The Centros de Madres	106
“Mobilized mothers” under Allende: 1970-1973	112
<i>Conclusion</i>	<i>120</i>
Chapter Three – Military Rule and the Transition to Democracy: Women’s Movements, Feminism and the Reconstruction of Political Space.....	122
<i>Women Under Military Rule.....</i>	<i>126</i>
<i>Women Mobilize as “Militant Mothers” and Feminists.....</i>	<i>137</i>

<i>Consolidation of a Women's Movement</i>	148
Women's Citizenship Demands in the 1980s	153
<i>Women's Movements and Political Parties: "Autonomy versus Double Militancy".</i>	157
The Concertación de las Mujeres Por la Democracia (CNMD)	166
<i>Conclusion</i>	169
Chapter 4 – Women in "Formal" Politics in Post-Transition Chile	174
<i>Women in Politics in Chile in the 1990s: Negotiating a Party-Dominated Arena...</i>	181
Barriers to women in "formal" politics: structural factors.....	186
Barriers to women in "formal politics": cultural stereotypes and a weakening women's movement	190
<i>Strategies for Promoting Women in "Formal" Politics</i>	195
SERNAM's role.....	198
Quotas	201
Informal strategies	205
<i>Do Women Decision-makers Promote "Women's Interests"?</i>	207
<i>Conclusion</i>	217
Chapter Five – States and Women's Citizenship in Post-Transition Politics: "State Feminism" in Chile?	220
<i>Theoretical Overview: Women, States, and "State Feminism"</i>	222
SERNAM and state feminism in Chile.....	228
<i>The Politics of Establishing SERNAM</i>	233
<i>SERNAM's Organizational Form</i>	239
SERNAM's programs.....	246

Legal reforms and executive-legislative relations	251
Equal opportunity plans	253
<i>Conceptions of the State's Role in Promoting Equality</i>	259
<i>Conclusion</i>	263
Chapter Six – Women's Movements in the 1990s	266
<i>Women's Movements in Latin America</i>	269
<i>Socio-Political Context: Neoliberalism and Movement Demobilization</i>	279
<i>Women's Movements in the Contemporary Context</i>	283
Grassroots organizing among women.....	285
Feminist NGOs	294
<i>Future Possibilities: Re-articulation and Mobilization around "Citizen Control" ...</i>	296
<i>Conclusion</i>	305
Conclusion – Women's Politics in Chile in Comparative Perspective	308
<i>The "Politics of Difference"</i>	308
<i>"Autonomy" versus "Double Militancy"</i>	312
<i>Women and Transitions to Democracy</i>	315
<i>Women and States</i>	318
Appendix	322
References	325

List of Abbreviations

AD	Alianza Democrática	Democratic Alliance
ANAMURI	Asociación de Mujeres Rurales y Indígenas	Association of Rural and Indigenous Women
CEDAW		Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CEM	Centro de Estudios de la Mujer	Women Studies Centre
CIDEM	Centros de Información de los Derechos de la Mujer	Women's Rights Information Centres
CNI	Centro Nacional de Información	National Information Centre
CNMD	Concertación de las Mujeres por la Democracia	Coalition of Women for Democracy
CNS	Coordinadora Nacional Sindical	National Coordinating Syndicate
CODEM	Comité de Defensa de los Derechos de la Mujer	Committee for the Defense of Women's Rights
COPACHI	Comité de Cooperación para la Paz de Chile	Cooperation Committee for Peace in Chile
CPD	Concertación de los Partidos por la Democracia	Coalition of Parties for Democracy
DF	Departamento Femenino	Women's Department
DINA	Directorio de Inteligencia Nacional	Directorate for National Intelligence
DOS	División de Organizaciones Sociales	Division of Social Organizations
EPF	El Poder Femenino	Feminine Power
FECHIF	Federación Chilena de Instituciones Femeninas	Chilean Federation of Feminine Institutions
FLACSO-Chile	Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales-Chile	Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences-Chile
FMS	Federación de Mujeres Socialistas	Federation of Socialist Women
MDP	Movimiento Democrático Popular	Popular Democratic Movement
MEMCH	Movimiento Pro-Emancipación de la Mujer Chilena	Movement for the Emancipation of Chilean Women
MF	Movimiento Feminista	Feminist Movement

MIDEPLAN	Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación	Ministry of Planning and Cooperation
MIR	Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria	Revolutionary Left Movement
MOMUPO	Movimiento de Mujeres Populares	Popular Women's Movement
MUDECHI	Mujeres de Chile	Women of Chile
OEP	organización económica popular	popular economic organization
OTEC	Organismo Técnico de Capacitación	Technical Training Agency
PC	Partido Comunista	Communist Party
PDC	Partido Demócrata Cristiano	Christian Democratic Party
PEM	Programa de Empleo Mínimo	Minimum Employment Program
PFCH	Partido Femenino Chileno	Chilean Feminine Party
PPD	Partido Por la Democracia	Party for Democracy
PRODEMU	Promoción y Desarrollo de la Mujer	Promotion and Development of Women
PR	Partido Radical	Radical Party
PS	Partido Socialista	Socialist Party
REMOS	Red de Mujeres de Organizaciones Sociales	Network of Women from Social Organization
SENCE	Servicio Nacional de Capacitación y Empleo	National Service of Training and Employment
SERNAM	Servicio Nacional de la Mujer	National Women's Service
SOL	Solidaridad y Organización Social	Solidarity and Social Organization
SNM	Secretaría Nacional de la Mujer	National Women's Secretariat
UCHM	Unión Chilena de la Mujer	Chilean Union of Women
UP	Unidad Popular	Popular Unity

Introduction

In 1983, at the height of political repression under General Pinochet's rule, ten thousand Chilean women gathered at the Caupolicán Theatre in Santiago, in an act of opposition to the dictatorship. Since the return of democracy in 1990, events to celebrate International Women's Day, or to protest women's marginalization or sexist discrimination, attract only small numbers of committed activists. In the absence of mass rallies of women, the few protests or campaigns that women do organize receive little or no media coverage. This situation has prompted observers both within and outside of Chile to conclude that since the transition to democracy, there is no longer a women's movement in the country. Because these scenarios of mass public activism under authoritarianism and smaller and less visible campaigns by women under democracy have been played out in a host of democratizing countries, both in Latin America and beyond, an even more troubling conclusion drawn by some researchers is that democratization has not been beneficial to women. I think these conclusions are problematic.

Many scholars of gender politics in Latin America focus on the emergence of women's movements under authoritarianism and subsequently blame the apparent decline of movement activity on democratization.¹ The effects of democratization on the

¹ Although the terms "democratization" and "transition to democracy" are often used interchangeably, there are some differences. Transitions to democracy occur wherever authoritarian regimes—whether military or civilian—give way to regimes characterized by democratic practices, such as competitive elections in which all citizens can participate, and greater respect for citizens' civil rights and liberties. The term "democratization" is, in my view, preferable because it implies a continual *process* of extending democracy. This allows for a fairly substantive understanding of the *ideal* of democracy, i.e., where democracy is associated with both high levels of equality and

participation of women as a group is further presumed to be the same as the demobilizing effects on the women's movement itself. That is, researchers have concluded that women's political participation increases under authoritarianism and declines following the transition to democracy. In this dissertation I call these conclusions into question. Through an analysis of the Chilean case, I argue that the negative conclusions reached by previous scholars stem from a failure to conceptualize many of the forms of women's post-transition activism as *political*. This occurs because they continue to take patterns of male politics as the norm or standard by which women's participation is measured.² Democratization has not resulted in substantial increases in the number of women in

participation (to use Robert Dahl's [1971] standards), coupled with an understanding that such an ideal is unlikely to exist in reality. Hence, in practice, most actually existing democracies conform to a more minimalist conception of democracy (or, to use Dahl's term, "polyarchy"), in which all citizens possess at least formal equality and have the opportunity to participate. Actually existing democracies, however, can always be further democratized, and, indeed, this is often the goal for a variety of movements, and especially feminist movements.

² The literature on women and democratization is extremely diverse. Although much of it is rooted in feminist analysis, some authors nonetheless make problematic assumptions about what women's participation should look like. Georgina Waylen, for example, while contributing immensely to our understanding of the gendered aspects of democratization, notes that following transitions, "women find it hard to convert their activities into political representation once conventional political activity resumes" (1994, 353). She does not address, however, the fact that very few women *do* try to convert their "informal" activism into "formal" political representation. Likewise, Nikki Craske, while also providing a gendered analysis of women and politics in Latin America, writes that "women have been absent from political participation to a greater extent than men" (1999, 3), equating "political participation" with the institutional arena. Elisabeth Friedman (1998, 87-88; 2000, 5-6) and Michelle Saint-Germain (1997, 75) explicitly state that women's participation declines following transitions to democracy. Friedman explains that throughout Latin America, "women mobilize politically under even the most repressive forms of dictatorship, but in the transition to democracy, they demobilize" (1998, 87). As evidence of their demobilization, Friedman notes the small percentage of women in parliaments and political executives in the region, implying that participation in "formal" politics is the measure of political participation or mobilization.

political parties, parliaments or in government decision-making posts; these arenas continue to be dominated by men. But the lack of women participating in “formal” politics, defined by political parties, elections, and the day-to-day operation of government, does not mean that women are not participating politically. Indeed, most women participate where they have always tended to participate—in the “informal” political arena, the space where day-to-day issues are brought forward through community or local activism, activism that is often organized and carried out by women.³

Women’s political participation appears to decline because of the shifting boundary between the “formal” and “informal” political arenas that accompanies transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule: under authoritarianism, the “formal” political arena is either closed or tightly controlled, conferring greater visibility and importance to the “informal” political sphere where opposition activities take place. When movement activity and opposition to dictatorships seemingly “exploded” throughout Latin America in the 1980s, the attention of both national publics and outside observers was on these activities taking place in the “informal” political arena. Through democratic transitions, however, the “formal” political arena was re-constructed, shifting the attention of national publics and researchers alike to activities which define that

³ The conceptual distinction between “formal” and “informal” politics, when analyzed *in practice*, especially at the local level, operates more as a continuum than as a dichotomy. As I employ the terms in this dissertation, the “formal” political arena refers to those activities taking place within the state(s)—both national and municipal—both of which, in the Chilean case, are dominated by partisan politics. The “informal” political arena refers to all those activities that take place beyond or outside of partisan politics and the arenas of the state. It is at the local level where the distinction blurs considerably in practice, because it is at this level where grassroots women’s organizations interact with municipal state agencies, with both actors often pursuing common goals.

arena. The problem for women is that dominant understandings of “politics” are often limited to activities taking place in the “formal” arena, thus rendering women’s participation invisible and assumed to be “non-political”.

In order to challenge the negative conclusions reached by earlier scholars, I situate my research on women and democratization in Chile in a feminist framework. Feminist research, by definition, takes an expansive view of “politics,” therefore viewing women’s activism, whether in “formal” or “informal” arenas as fundamentally political. In the dissertation, I draw particularly on feminist citizenship theory. There are a number of good reasons for framing the issue of women and democratization in terms of citizenship. First, throughout Latin America and other societies undergoing authoritarianism and transitions to democracy, the demands of popular movements, women’s movements, and human rights movements have been framed in terms of “rights,” particularly the rights associated with citizenship (Foweraker 1998; Jelín 1996; Richards 2000). The framing of movement demands in terms of citizenship rights has led to greater scholarly attention to citizenship studies as a way to understand current struggles and state responses to popular demands. But much of the literature draws on T.H. Marshall’s (1950) evolutionary theory which distinguished among civil, political, and social rights. According to Marshall, the acquisition of citizenship began with civil rights (especially individual autonomy and freedom), from which political rights were granted (including the right to participate in elections and government), and which would ultimately lead to the extension of social rights that would entitle all citizens to maintain a certain minimum threshold of welfare deemed necessary for the very exercise of citizenship (Marshall 1950). Latin Americanists, however, have criticized Marshall’s

historical model, noting that the granting of citizenship rights in that region has not followed this trajectory (Jelin 1996; Richards 2000). For example, in a number of Latin American countries, social rights were extended as part of corporatist arrangements that essentially denied political rights to citizens. Their criticisms of Marshall's model notwithstanding, many scholars continue to use his categories, especially political and social rights, as a way to criticize the contemporary neoliberal model of citizenship in Latin America which denies the importance of social citizenship rights (see especially Schild 1997; 1998; 2000a; 2000b). While focusing on the problematic absence of social citizenship rights, these same scholars, however, rarely situate their studies in feminist citizenship theory to account for women's current marginality and political invisibility.

This raises the second good reason to use a citizenship framework to study women and democratization. Drawing on feminist citizenship theorists, such as Ruth Lister (1997), Carole Pateman (1992), and Sylvia Walby (1996; 1997), we can get to the main cause of women's marginalization. Citizenship has historically been conceived as both a status (endowing the citizen with certain rights and obligations) and a practice (through which citizens act in a "public" sphere that is separated from the "private" sphere of family) (Lister 1997). Either way, citizenship is connected to political participation—it is only citizens who have the right and, in some conceptions, the obligation, to participate politically. Feminist citizenship theory holds that women's "difference" has resulted in different ways of participating politically, most importantly, in focusing activities in a different arena: the "informal" political sphere. Women's participation in community and movement politics stems from their sexual "difference" and the roles, particularly the social and economic roles, associated with it. Because the

sexual division of labour and the gender ideology that underpins it assign women exclusive responsibility for the tasks of social reproduction, their political participation is conditioned (namely, limited) by these roles. Women's activism often evolves out of struggles to fulfil their social roles (for example, organizing for better health care or community services). But women are also more likely to participate in the "informal" political arena because such activism is more flexible (i.e., it can be adapted to women's schedules) and is normally less demanding in terms of time and material resources, both of which women often lack. Of course, class and race also play important roles. Women from marginalized class and race groups are even less likely to enter the "formal" sphere of politics which is nearly universally monopolized by members from dominant race groups and the middle- and upper-classes. Moreover, women from marginalized groups are likely to have even less time and resources to contribute to "formal" political participation.

Focusing on the dichotomy between the "informal" and "formal" political arenas is useful because it allows us to avoid using the more problematic and highly contested distinctions between the "political" and "social" arenas or the "public" versus "private" spheres. While all of these dichotomies are inter-linked and overlapping to some degree, it is much less ambiguous and contentious to separate "formal" from "informal" politics because the distinction need not rest on normative assumptions. In contrast, the distinction between the "social" and the "political" is not only ambiguous, but because many accounts privilege "political" activity or "social" activity, the relationship between the two is hierarchical. The same goes for the "public" versus "private" sphere. According to feminist theorists, "politics" is privileged over "social" activism in large

part because it is monopolized by men and inhospitable to gender issues. Likewise, the “public” arena is associated with men’s roles while women’s roles and responsibilities are linked to the “private” sphere. Consequently, the bulk of feminist struggle is about making “social” and/or “private” issues, such as violence against women, “political” and therefore “public”. Precisely because the goal for many women activists is to politicize such concerns, it is problematic to depict their activism as “social,” or to characterize women’s movements (which aim at the politicization of gender issues) as “social movements”.⁴ By substituting the dichotomy between “informal” and “formal” political activity, we can conceive women’s activism in either arena as *political*, thereby avoiding a great deal of confusion. It is important to point out, however, that while we as researchers can define activism in “informal” politics as *political*, it may not be perceived as such by the actors themselves or by those whose actions are required to respond to activist demands (for example, governments).

This raises a third benefit to using a citizenship framework. Perceptions about the meaning of the boundary between the “informal” and “formal” political arenas are not constant, but shift over time. Because the “formal” arena is often closed under authoritarianism, “informal” activities are more likely to be perceived as political, whereas under normal conditions (i.e., when the “formal” political arena is open), they are not. Because citizenship status and practice has traditionally been bound up with

⁴ Although referring to women’s movements as “social movements” runs the risk of de-politicizing them, i.e., designating them as “social” rather than “political” actors, many of the “new social movement” theorists acknowledge the political impact of such movements (see, for example, Alvarez and Escobar 1992; Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998).

acting politically rather than with fulfilling one's social (gendered) roles, women's activism may be considered an expression of citizenship in one context (when "informal" activities are perceived as political) and a non-political expression of women's "private" or "social" responsibilities in another context (when only "formal" activities are deemed political). Seen this way, women's political participation does not necessarily decline following transitions to democracy. Rather, transitions to democracy result in perceptions that women's participation is not political. Thus, existing research has drawn the conclusion that women's political participation has declined because it relies on a traditional masculine-defined conception of "politics" in which the content of politics is exhausted by the activities of the "formal" political arena.

A final advantage to using a citizenship framework to study the effects of democratization on women's participation is that the reconstruction of the "formal" political arena results in changes in women's participation. Under authoritarianism, women's movements organized to demand citizenship rights in all their forms, civil, political, and social, and often did so through mass movements that were multi-class in nature. After the transition, movements often divide, especially along class lines, as women are confronted with greater choices about where to focus their activism. While most women continue to play out their activism in the arena which is most hospitable, that is, the community or local arena, other women choose to enter the "formal" political arena. I argue in the dissertation that women's choices about where to participate are shaped by both gender as well as class factors. Transitions to democracy provide professional (normally middle-class) women with opportunities to move into "formal" politics, mainly into electoral or bureaucratic politics. These opportunities often stem

from women's roles in the opposition movements that brought about democracy. Many of the opposition parties that become post-transition governments perceive electoral gains from inviting (the very limited) representation of women and gender issues because of the success women's movements had in putting gender issues on the transition's public agenda. Even more significantly, many post-transition governments create women's offices and ministries as a way to incorporate gender issues.⁵ But while professional women face greater opportunities to access arenas of "formal" politics, poor and working-class women do not, and are likely to continue to focus their activism on the "informal" arena. The issues promoted in the "informal" political arena often relate to the dismal material conditions in which many popular sector women live in Latin America.

Because women's participation takes different forms following transitions to democracy, we need to change the way we study women's participation. Earlier research lamented the fragmentation and demobilization of the strong, multi-class women's movements that emerged under authoritarianism. Again, democratization was seen as having a negative effect on women's movements. I argue, however, that it is problematic to take the form of women's movements under authoritarianism (a "crisis" period) as the norm by which post-transition movements are measured. Divisions among activists along class lines and over strategic and partisan issues are the norm in established democracies, and hence, as democratization proceeds in Latin America and

⁵ As of 1994, nineteen Latin American states have in place women's policy machinery. Many of these women's offices or ministries, such as Argentina's, Brazil's, and Chile's, result from demands of women's movements in the 1980s (Valdés and Gomariz 1995, 185).

elsewhere, we should expect to find greater divisions among movements. Instead of achieving permanent cross-class unity, most women's movements struggle to forge strategic alliances across segments of movements on key issues.

In the dissertation, the above arguments are developed through an analysis of women and democratization in Chile using the citizenship framework outlined. The Chilean case exemplifies a number of the patterns described above. A broad-based and multi-class women's movement emerged under authoritarianism in the 1970s and 1980s and politicized issues normally confined to the "informal" arena. The restoration of democracy in the 1990s brought with it claims that a women's movement no longer exists. Today, women who participated in the dictatorship-era movement can be found in political parties, the *Servicio Nacional de la Mujer* (SERNAM, the women's office established by the first post-transition government), and women's movements in the "informal" political arena. Other women have ceased to be politically active in favour of returning to families or careers delayed by their opposition activities.

There are other ways in which Chile differs considerably from other democratizing countries in Latin America. The sheer brutality and duration of the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-90) helped to produce an opposition movement (of which the women's movement was an integral part) that was considerably more unified than elsewhere. This makes the current fragmentation of popular movements and women's movements seem more dramatic. Another way in which Chile differs is the strength of its competitive political party system. While party systems throughout Latin America seem to be weakening, Chilean parties remain fairly strong and disciplined. Of course, Chilean parties were greatly weakened following the repression of the 1970s, but they

were able to re-build and take a leading role in the process of transition in the late 1980s. This created both advantages and disadvantages for the women's movement. While it gave women the potential to ally with influential public actors (to help put women's issues on the public agenda), it also brought partisan conflict and divisions into women's organizations. Many women describe these conflicts as extremely bitter and partially responsible for weakening a strong movement. A final way in which Chile differs from other cases of democratization in Latin America is in the form that neoliberalism has taken there.

An extreme model of neoliberalism was implemented following the 1973 coup, a model which emphasized privatization, state withdrawal from the economy and social sphere, export promotion, and the elimination of the capacity for organized labour to combat any of the negative effects of economic restructuring. Since then, the Chilean economy has been based on the export of resources (mainly copper, fruit, forestry, and fish). While unemployment was initially high as industrial jobs were lost, since the mid-1980s the Chilean economy has grown significantly and unemployment has been low.⁶ This was the case until the late 1990s when the negative effects of the "Asian crisis" hit Chile, bringing higher unemployment and somewhat lower growth rates. Under authoritarianism, economic restructuring and the privatization of social welfare contributed to growing poverty rates.⁷ While post-transition governments have displayed

⁶ Between 1975 and 1982 unemployment was never less than 10.4 percent and hit a high of 19.4 percent in 1982 (Edwards 1985, 229). From the early to mid-1990s, unemployment was around 5 percent (Hojman 1996, 78).

⁷ In 1970, 28.5 percent of families in Santiago were poor, but by 1976 the figure reached 56.9 percent of families (V. Montecinos 1997, 225).

a commitment to maintaining the broad outlines of the neoliberal model, such as fiscal restraint, export promotion, and an emphasis on market solutions to poverty, they have also sought to repay the “social debt” of the dictatorship by making some efforts to reduce poverty and reform the repressive Pinochet-era labour code. They have been successful, as poverty has declined from 38.6 percent in 1990 to 23.2 percent in 1996 (Oppenheim 1999, 257). Labour code reform has been much more contentious, although some improvements have been made (Loveman 1995). Government commitment to “growth with equity”—the slogan for the last two *Concertación* governments, means that neoliberalism in Chile differs from elsewhere in the region where persistent economic decline and instability have doomed attempts to seriously reduce poverty. Despite successes in Chile, however, poverty persists, and according to analysts, the poverty that remains is proving much more resistant to elimination (Hardy 1997). More importantly, while poverty has been declining, inequality has been increasing (Hojman 1996; Weyland 1997). This situation makes material deprivation a very real concern for Chile’s poor, a group in which women—especially women heads of households, are over-represented.⁸

But the neoliberal model affects women in other ways, too. Neoliberal ideology, especially in Chile, draws a sharp boundary between what it considers “political” versus “social” issues. Discourse of successive *Concertación* governments indicates that it considers “social” issues such as housing, employment, and welfare, to be best resolved by communities themselves, in conjunction with the private sector, NGOs, or other

⁸ Up to 40 percent of Chilean households are headed by women who face gendered barriers to accessing well-paying and secure employment. Partly for that reason, women-headed households are far more likely to be poor (V. Montecinos 1994; SERNAM 1998a).

community actors rather than by the state acting on behalf of society. In contrast to the wide range of “social” issues to be addressed by citizens acting collectively in the “informal” community arena, “political” issues such as law and order are to be addressed through “formal” politics by government (partisan) actors. The ideology and discourse underpinning Chile’s neoliberal model, therefore, undermines women’s movements’ attempts to politicize many issues relating to gender, class, and race inequality.

The similarities and differences described above make Chile a useful case with which to study women and democratization. In that context, Chilean women have engaged in important struggles, both to gain civil, political, and social citizenship rights, and also to make these rights more meaningful to women. My overarching argument in the dissertation is that women have been marginalized as citizens in Chile because the main forms of participation they practice, namely community and local activism in the “informal” political arena deriving from their motherhood roles, are not conceived as “political”. Chilean women have made the most gains in terms of citizenship rights when the “formal”/“informal” boundary is blurred, thereby allowing organized women to put gender issues on the public agenda. This occurred during the struggle to restore democracy, especially in the 1980s. Since the return of democracy in 1990, the “formal”/“informal” dichotomy re-emerged and the content of “politics” is monopolized by political parties. In this context, women activists face enormous challenges to politicizing their citizenship demands.

The dissertation also uses the Chilean case to show what happens to women’s participation following transitions to democracy. I make an important contribution to the literature on women and democratization by focusing on the different ways women

participate politically once the political context is again shaped by the separation of the “formal” and “informal” political arenas. I argue that women’s political participation (through which their citizenship demands are expressed) takes three main forms following transitions: women participate in electoral politics; bureaucratic politics (mainly in women’s offices or ministries created by post-transition governments); and movement politics. In order to fully understand how democratization affects women’s participation, each arena requires separate analysis. But while women’s activism in each of these arenas is to some extent distinct, the connections (or absence of connections) among these spheres shape the broader goal of expanding women’s citizenship. I argue in the dissertation that women’s citizenship is undermined today by the lack of linkages between women active in “formal” and “informal” politics. Chilean feminists who moved into electoral or bureaucratic politics have not maintained sufficient linkages to women’s movements operating in the “informal” arena. This is where class and race factors come into play. Popular sector, rural, and/or indigenous women tend to organize in the “informal” arena where they are struggling to respond to the negative effects of neoliberalism. Because of the lack of linkages to women in the “formal” political arena, where gender policy is made, the issues of concern to these women are not raised in the public arena. Thus, their citizenship is undermined precisely by their lack of access to “formal” politics.

I carried out research for the dissertation in Chile between June and November 1999. In carrying out the field work, I employed qualitative methods, primarily formal and informal semi-structured interviews with organized women in each of the three arenas with which I was concerned. I began by conducting 16 informal interviews,

mainly with other academics, researchers, and some movement activists. The main goal was to obtain sufficient “background” information to begin the formal interview process. Once I felt I had a good understanding of the context, I began formal interviews. In total, I interviewed 29 women of which 7 participate in electoral politics; 5 in women’s policy machinery; 2 elsewhere in government; and the remaining 15 in “informal” political arenas such as grassroots women’s groups and networks, NGOs, and labour organizations. The women I interviewed were selected based on a number of criteria, but mainly on recommendations by women who are themselves involved in women’s politics in Chile. I wanted to ensure that I heard from women who participate in a variety of arenas, and who occupy a variety of positions. Some of the women were obvious choices due to their lengthy histories of activism in the women’s movement; while others are well-known feminists in “formal” politics. In these cases, I sought interviews through FLACSO-Chile where I was affiliated. But I also wanted to interview women activists outside of the well-known networks in order to learn the kinds of challenges faced by grassroots women’s groups without access to “formal” politics. In these cases, I began by making contact with NGOs that work with grassroots women’s groups. Most of these contacts were also initially made through FLACSO-Chile, with Teresa Valdés, a sociologist and director of the gender studies section at FLACSO, herself active in movement politics, recommending names of people with whom I should arrange meetings. Through these contacts, I obtained names of community activists I should interview. I additionally attended a number of meetings and workshops of a variety of women’s groups through which I had an opportunity to observe first-hand the challenges and opportunities women in these groups confront in pursuing their goals. All of these

activities were supplemented by informal conversations with organized women in a variety of settings. All of the above activities were oriented by the goal of allowing organized women to “tell their story”—why and how they participate and what they think the main goals, challenges, and opportunities are in the present context. A list of interview questions is in the appendix.

Much of the information gained through interview and observation activities was confirmed through archival research. There are currently a host of women’s research NGOs in Chile, along with SERNAM, that maintain documentation centres holding a wide variety of studies on particular issues, such as gender policy impact and women’s perceptions of gender policy in Chile. Finally, a number of women’s organizations shared with me whatever printed material they had, such as pamphlets and manifestos that outlines the aims and purposes of their organizations.

The findings of my research and the arguments of the dissertation about how women’s participation changes through democratization are developed in greater detail throughout the dissertation. The first chapter further situates the project in the comparative literature on women and democratization and in the theoretical literature on women and citizenship. I believe that the effects of democratization on women (and vice versa) are most usefully investigated through the lens of citizenship because transitions to democracy are mainly about (re)extending citizenship rights in a context where the boundary between the “formal”/“informal” political arenas is shifting. Likewise, understanding women’s struggles for citizenship is usefully approached through the lens of democratization because of the potentially greater openness of political processes in these periods. Chapter 1 concludes with an overview of relevant Chilean political

history, focusing especially on women's struggles for citizenship within the context of democratization.

Chapters 2 and 3 place Chilean women's current struggles to expand their citizenship in historical perspective. In Chapter 2, I outline the "first wave" of feminism in Chile in the context of "populism" and party politics. I show the development of the maternalist framework and describe how the discourse fit the Chilean context at that time, thereby serving as a useful strategy. I further show how the first-wave women's movement laid the groundwork for women's eventual incorporation into the political system, as voters in 1949, and as party supporters and a mobilized social group in the 1960s and early 1970s. In brief, male political elites, through intensifying partisan competition, manipulated Chilean gender ideology to mobilize and incorporate women almost exclusively on the basis of their roles as mothers. A political and social context dominated by political parties proved inhospitable to gender equality claims, and women's subordinate citizenship status was not seriously challenged even after women gained formal citizenship rights.

As elsewhere in Latin America, most notably in Brazil, a dictatorship paradoxically produced a context in which a broad-based multi-class women's movement emerged with political demands for democracy, gender equality, and social citizenship rights. This development, and the role of this movement in the transition to democracy are the subjects of Chapter 3. I show the continuity with women's movements in the previous period, noting how women strategically drew on the same maternalist mobilizing frame employed in the suffrage struggle. But in the 1970s and 1980s, women's movements also developed in an environment without political party

competition due to Pinochet's banning of parties.⁹ In this context, many feminists who had been party militants enjoyed an environment more conducive to developing gender-based critiques of politics, and to initiating contacts with other women's groups to spread feminist consciousness. Many feminist groups in this period enjoyed support from international funding agencies which often financed their activities with organized women from the poor and working classes. The result of these interactions in the broader context of dictatorship and the emergence of an opposition movement in pursuit of democracy, created the conditions for a multi-class women's movement which played an important role in de-legitimizing the dictatorship, ultimately paving the way for a transition to democracy.

Chapter 3 also shows how this movement was ultimately marginalized in the process of democratization, largely because of the reconstitution of political parties. This occurred for a number of reasons: women's groups were divided by partisan conflict (especially over strategy); the women's movement was more concerned with placing women's policy demands on the opposition's agenda than activists were with securing access to political arenas as individuals; and the politicized motherhood framework reinforced women's maternal identities which parties used as the main basis for women's exclusion from "formal" politics. In brief, the women's movement had not succeeded in redefining "politics" to make it amenable to women's forms of participation in "informal" politics and to raise the issues that organized women wanted to politicize.

⁹ Parties continued to operate "underground," and they did exert some influence over women's groups in this period. Their influence, nonetheless, was drastically reduced due to the extent of political repression following the military coup which severely crippled party structures.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 address women's attempts to expand their citizenship in the post-transition setting. After 1990, as indicated, the multi-class movement developed under authoritarianism splintered and women pursued their interests in different arenas, mainly the electoral arena, the bureaucratic arena, and the civil society arena. These chapters argue that not only is women's citizenship in Chile today undermined by a model of citizenship that draws a sharp boundary between "formal" and "informal" political arenas, but that there is a class dimension to this as well. The women's movement had succeeded in convincing the incoming democratic government to promote gender equality, mainly through women's policy machinery at the executive level. The creation of SERNAM has led to improvements in women's status and in their lives (for example, equality before the law; laws criminalizing domestic violence; and programs targeted at "vulnerable" groups such as low-income women heads of households). This development created a bureaucratic arena staffed by women (many feminists and former activists) to carry out the state's gender agenda. In Chapter 5, I refer to this as "state feminism".¹⁰ The numerous women's NGOs in Chile serve as a source of policy advice and project implementation for the state. In Chapters 5 and 6, I uncover both the positive

¹⁰ For the purposes of this thesis, I employ Dorothy McBride Stetson and Amy Mazur's definition of state feminism as "activities of government structures that are formally charged with furthering women's status and rights" (1995, 1-2). While the concept was initially deployed in reference to the industrialized democracies, the concept is increasingly applied to developing countries (Craske 1999; Hatem 1994; Mama 1995). While there may be debate about the appropriateness of the concept when applied to developing states, I use the term in a fairly limited manner to refer to any substantive attempts by states to address inequality between men and women. The increased deployment of this concept, however, signals a need for further work in the area. Although the concept of "state feminism" stands in need of greater conceptual clarification and comparative investigation, I do not take up such a task in this dissertation.

and negative consequences of this development from the standpoint of expanding women's citizenship. In both chapters, I make the point that professional and middle-class women enjoy greater access to "formal" arenas of politics while poor and working-class women (many of whom are "clients" of the state's gender policies) organize primarily in the "informal"/community arena. It is the lack of linkages between these two spheres and the failure to conceive of the community arena as "political" that undermine particularly popular sector women's citizenship.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are linked by the overarching claim that dominant conceptions of "politics" as an activity in Chile marginalize women in a party-dominated political context and by a neoliberal economic ideology which draws a sharp boundary between the "political" and the "social". But each chapter also makes more specific arguments concerning the challenges and potentials women face in acting through electoral, bureaucratic, and civil society politics.

In Chapter 4, I examine women's struggles to improve their access to formal politics now dominated by political parties. This is the arena in which women have made the fewest gains. The first post-transition government contained only one woman in the executive (the director of SERNAM), and women held only 5.8 percent of seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 6.4 percent of seats in the Senate (Valdés and Gomariz 1992: 102). I argue that the lack of advances in this realm result largely from the movement's strategy during the transition of making demands for gender policies (for women as a collective) while not making demands for institutional changes, such as quotas for women in decision-making, that would facilitate (individual) women's access to decision-making arenas. This strategy, furthermore, was linked to the movement's

maternalist mobilizing framework which inhibited women's demands for political *power* for themselves due to the negative (masculine) association with the pursuit of power. Chilean women, however, have become aware of their previous tactical errors, and are currently pursuing strategies to improve their access to political institutions, for example, through quotas for women. These strategies, along with their successes and failures, are also elaborated in the chapter. The final issue taken up in Chapter 4 is the struggle women in formal politics confront in pursuing feminist goals through political institutions. My main argument is that women are currently disadvantaged by an extremely conservative moral and social context in Chile (where the voice and moral authority of the Catholic Church is tremendously influential), but they are also disadvantaged by women's own adherence to a politics of difference which sometimes complicates demands that are seen as "individualistic" and therefore inconsistent with women's identities as carers and nurturers.

In Chapter 5, I turn to the topic of "state feminism" in Chile and analyze SERNAM's role in expanding women's citizenship. In the chapter, I employ Stetson and Mazur's (1995) framework for uncovering the potentials and obstacles to promoting gender equality, focusing on the politics of establishment, organizational form, conception of the state, and the form of women's movement. I argue that the main strength of SERNAM is its location within the executive, which, in the Chilean presidential system, affords it important opportunities to successfully introduce women's rights legislation. SERNAM officials enjoy access to resources that women parliamentarians do not. But in terms of "gendering" public policy, which is a main goal of state feminism according to Stetson and Mazur, Chile's SERNAM is weakened by its

lack of power and influence within the state overall. This is a problem faced not only by SERNAM, but also by other state agencies created after the transition to deal with previously marginalized social groups (for example, indigenous peoples and youth) in an integrated, cross-sectoral manner. These institutions, while central to the neoliberal state's "targeted" social welfare strategies, are disadvantaged within a highly centralized state dominated by traditional ministries not accustomed to developing horizontal cross-sectoral relationships.

Another goal of state feminism is for women's policy machineries to generate access to the state for women's movements. I conclude in Chapter 5 that SERNAM, to date, has failed in this area, although recent changes indicate improvements. SERNAM has failed to establish channels for women's movements in civil society to access the state, where key policy decisions are made, because there continues to be too great a division between women's "formal" and "informal" political strategies. This is how class divisions within Chilean women's movement are manifest. SERNAM officials are more likely to invite middle-class and professional women in the NGOS to participate than they are to build relationships and establish linkages between SERNAM and poor, working-class, rural and/or indigenous women's movements.

Chapter 6 addresses women's movements in civil society and women's "informal" political strategies. The argument here is that women's movements in Chile are weakened by the lack of strategic linkages among women of different class and race groups. The main division today is between women who enjoy access to the state and women who do not. Women who participate in "informal" arenas with little or no access to the state feel frustrated by the failure of SERNAM to develop strategies that would

invite their participation in a meaningful sense. There are some recent developments, however, elaborated in Chapter 6, that indicate a more positive future. The last few years have witnessed the formation of a number of network organizations whose aim is to link up previously isolated groups in order to pressure the state to fulfil its commitments to women.

I argue that these developments indicate a degree of “normalization” in Chile’s women’s movements. That is, I conclude that the multi-class women’s movement of the 1970s and 1980s cannot serve as a model for how women’s movements under “normal” (democratic) conditions operate. It has taken a number of years, however, for organized women to adapt their strategies to the immense institutional changes that occurred after 1990. Once democracy was restored, women lost a main theme around which to mobilize and to build alliances with other groups. Another important change is the existence of a state that is (at least rhetorically) committed to gender equality such that a discourse of women’s equality as citizens emanates from state officials. Women are now beginning to draw on and mobilize around this discourse, especially around the concept of “*control ciudadana*” (citizen control) suggesting that the role of women’s movements will be to monitor the state and pressure it to comply with its commitments to women. In so doing, women’s movements are beginning the task of converting themselves into the kinds of lobby organizations found in other established democracies. It is still too soon to tell how effective this strategy will be in Chile, especially in the context of social conservatism and neoliberal economic policy, but it does indicate progress. At the very least, women are establishing links across movements in civil society and setting goals for expanding women’s citizenship. In fact, organized women have made greater

progress in this respect than have other movements. The popular sector movement that emerged in the 1980s has not shown signs of recovery and the labour movement continues to be fairly weak because of the dictatorship's policies of destroying the political capacities of organized labour. In this context, women's movements, especially popular sector women's movements, have few alliance possibilities to strengthen their demands for socio-economic justice.

The conclusion to the dissertation places the Chilean case and its main findings in comparative perspective. In addition to shedding light on a major issue of comparative politics—namely democratization—the Chilean case advances our understanding of key themes in the study of women and politics, including the advantages and disadvantages of a “politics of difference,” the benefits and drawbacks of movement “autonomy” over “double militancy,” and whether states can ever be allies to women's movements in their pursuit of gender equality. Women's movements in Chile, both first-wave and dictatorship-era, employed a “politics of difference,” appealing to women's maternal identities to justify their demand for women's citizenship rights. While some scholars argue that a “politics of difference” is problematic because it does not challenge but reinforces prevailing stereotypes, I show in the dissertation that the strategy can actually produce a variety of outcomes. In fact, I find that it is possible for women's movements to make feminist demands that challenge conservative gender ideology and the sexual division of labour while using a maternalist mobilizing framework. Regarding the

strategic dilemma of movement “autonomy” versus “double militancy,”¹¹ I show how women’s strategies are shaped by the broader political context, especially whether political parties are in a position to monopolize the public arena. I find that movement autonomy is critical to the formulation of feminist demands to restructure gender and class relations, but that double militancy gives feminists important political resources to put these demands on the public agenda. Finally, my findings regarding the Chilean case show the importance of the (changing) role of the state. Most importantly, following Sylvia Walby (1997), I find that the state can indeed be an important “ally” for women’s movements in periods of “restructuring” when political processes are more open to changes in power relations. Since 1990 and the transition to democracy, Chilean women have gained in terms of women-friendly legislation and policies. Despite these gains, there are limitations to “state feminism.” and, indeed, to the extent that SERNAM is failing to provide access to women’s movements to “formal” political arenas, it is proving difficult for women’s movements to make further gains. Also, should a Centre-Right government come to power, women may face significant difficulties defending the gains they have already made.

¹¹ This dilemma revolves around whether movements need to remain independent from other political actors (whether parties, governments, or movements) in order to set their own goals and strategies, or whether they should try to bring their feminist politics into other organizations (such as parties, government agencies, or other movements).

Chapter 1 – Democratization and Women's Citizenship in Chile

Women in Chile have gained through democratization in terms of policy outcomes—i.e., promoting gender equality through public policies and legal changes have formed part of the post-transition agenda—but women have also failed to substantially increase their political power—both in terms of having more women in “formal” politics and in linking the “formal” and “informal” realms of politics. The nature of their successes and failures indicates the importance of 1) not taking male political patterns as the norm; and 2) looking at where women *do* participate (Vickers 1997) by separating out the different kinds of politics in which women engage after transitions. These focuses are absent in much of the literature, which, as noted in the Introduction, often take male politics and unified movements as comparative norms. In this chapter, I show that there are a number of problems with the existing literature on women and democratization that can be resolved by integrating greater theoretical attention to citizenship and the variety of ways women seek to exercise it and women's movements pursue it as a goal.

Through a review of existing research on women and democratization, I argue that it ultimately reaches negative conclusions (for example, that women's activism declines following transitions) precisely because it fails to conceive of many of the forms of women's activism in post-transition settings as expressions of *political* citizenship. In other words, much of the literature falls into the trap of (at least implicitly) taking male politics as the norm, rather than, as Jill Vickers urges, “starting from where women are” (1997, 156). The problem women face after transitions, however, is not re-igniting their activism, but finding new and creative ways to make their activism evident as

affirmations of their identities as citizens. This is one reason I argue for the integration of the literature on women and democratization with a feminist approach to citizenship. The feminist critiques of citizenship are useful in highlighting why women are marginalized as citizens, and point to the causes of women's continued marginalization in the new democracies. Another good reason for combining the insights of these two bodies of literature is the simultaneity of democratization and neoliberal economic restructuring, both of which dramatically affect women's citizenship, although often in contradictory ways.

This chapter has three sections. In the first, I review earlier literature on women and democratization, elaborating on some of the weaknesses described in the Introduction. The second section further lays out the feminist citizenship framework used in the dissertation to investigate the ways in which women are marginalized as citizens and the importance of the shifting boundary between "formal" and "informal" politics. In the final section I show how Chile is a useful case to study women's citizenship through democratization. I outline the political and historical context in which women's citizenship struggles have been played out in Chile and provide the necessary background to develop the subsequent arguments of the dissertation.

Women and Democratization

The "third wave" (Huntington 1991) of democratization that began in the 1970s and intensified in the 1980s generated heightened awareness of women's crucial roles in political processes, especially in developing countries and the former communist states.

While the mainstream literature on transitions to democracy focused on elites and traditional political actors, among whom few women could be found (Mainwaring *et al* 1992; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991), another literature emerged which focused on social movements and their role in democratizing civil societies (Mainwaring and Viola 1984; Alvarez and Escobar 1992; Oxfhorn 1995a). Although researchers of social movements often noted the preponderance of female participants, they have rarely analyzed the phenomenon from a gendered perspective (Waylen 1993, 576; Schild 1994, 61).

It fell to feminist researchers to emphasize the deeply gendered nature of democratization processes and to show the numerous ways women's movements affected and were affected by transitions to democracy. It became apparent that women were exploiting the opportunities posed by democratization when political processes are more open to place their gender-based demands on the public agenda. Thus, democratization generates potential opportunities for women. As Jane Jaquette and Sharon Wolchik note, "because transition politics are periods of crisis and thus of intense politicization, they bring new ideas and institutions into political life" (1998, 4). To a certain extent, therefore, we can view transitions to democracy as one of the "rounds of restructuring" (Walby 1994, 384) that can profoundly affect women's citizenship. This is especially so, as we shall see later, since democratic transition often coincided with neoliberal economic restructuring. Consequently, the framework of the dissertation draws from both the democratization and the feminist citizenship literatures.

The "third wave" of democratization generated a large body of literature exploring women's roles in these processes (Alvarez 1990; Basu 1995; Friedman 1999;

Jaquette 1989; Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Rai 2000; Waylen 1994). Despite the widely varying circumstances under which women organize and pursue change, a number of similarities have been observed. Where human rights movements develop, women often emerge as the main actors due to their social responsibilities for defending their families (Ali 2000; Blacklock and Macdonald 2000; Jaquette 1989). Women's activism tends to be at its height when traditional actors, including political parties and unions, are in crisis or banned altogether, allowing women to formulate gender-based interests without subordinating them to class, ethnic, or national liberation struggles. Once "normal" politics resume and male-dominated parties, unions, and political elites re-assume their central place, women's organizations tend to be displaced or co-opted into state bureaucracies where their gender goals are often subordinated to government goals that may not be consistent with a women's rights agenda. In the East Central European cases, the collapse of state socialism led to the rapid erosion of support (at both the state and society level) for feminist goals that became tainted by their association with the communist period (Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Rueschemeyer 1994).

In some cases, such as Brazil, Chile, and South Africa, because women's movements were crucial actors during struggles for democratization, they enjoyed (temporary) privileged access to the male-dominated political class (Alvarez 1990; Frohmann and Valdés 1995; Siedman 1999; Zulu 2000). In these situations, organized women succeeded in inserting their gender-based demands into the re-constructed political process. Some of these demands included the creation of women's portfolios to promote gender equality, quotas for women in parliament and decision-making positions in government, or legislative changes to expand women's rights. In other cases,

however, women's movements were unable to take advantage of emerging opportunities. In post-1989 Germany, for example, women's movements in the East did not ally with the most influential actors—political parties. But by maintaining “autonomy,” they failed to exert influence over the process of state unification and the result was actually considerable losses for women's citizenship rights (Beckwith 2000; Lemke 1994; Rueschemeyer 1994).

In all cases, however, women's organizing and their demands are shaped by their domestic, regional, and transnational contexts. The concrete benefits women realize from democratization, therefore, vary considerably. Where movements are strong and democratization is relatively meaningful (for example, post-Pinochet Chile and post-apartheid South Africa), women can gain considerably. Where women's mobilization is limited and the transition to democracy less of a decisive break with a past regime (for example, Pakistan after 1988 and Nigeria after 1999), women's gains are relatively weaker. Women's gains are also linked to the discursive and political strategies that movements pursue, strategies that are themselves influenced by the existing political discourse in that country. Where organized women can draw on an existing political discourse (democracy, national liberation, or Islam) and make gender-based demands from within its parameters, they are more likely to realize gains from democratization by politicizing their gender interests. The extent to which women can do so, however, is influenced by existing political discourse, gender ideology, and the existence of broader socio-political movements (with which women can ally) in a particular national context. Where broad opposition movements do not emerge, however, women's movements lack influential allies necessary to launch their own political demands.

It is therefore critical to study democratization processes because of the potential opportunities they offer to challenge unequal gender relations and women's traditional exclusion from arenas of political power. Despite the significant variation of women's experiences with transitions to democracy, the existing case study literature suggests a fairly generalized pattern: women's participation increases significantly in the period leading up to the transition and then rapidly declines as "normal" democratic practices resume (or are brought into existence for the first time). Based mainly on the case study literature on women and democratization, I have separated out four distinct types of explanation for this perceived pattern of women's declining political participation following transitions. Following a brief description of each explanation, I discuss some of the problematic assumptions embedded within it and offer some insights that help to clarify the relationship between women and democratization.

1. *Once the goal (democracy) is achieved, women return to their homes.* This explanation accounts for the general decline of social movement activity following the return (or implementation) of democracy. The heightened activity of civil society actors during opposition movements cannot be expected to persist as it is oriented by a single goal—the exit of an authoritarian regime (Alvarez 1990; Frohman and Valdés 1995). Many of those researching the virtual explosion of civil society activism in Latin America and other parts of the world in the 1980s expressed hope that new forms of politics were being constructed (Alvarez and Escobar 1992; Mainwaring and Viola 1984). Such high levels of mobilization, however, are clearly unsustainable. When opposition movements achieve their goal of re-establishing

democracy, an overall drop in activism can be expected. Many women who participate actively in women's movements and pro-democracy movements put off other activities to which they return once the overarching goal has been achieved. Other women stop participating due to "mobilizational fatigue" (Craske 1999, 137). In brief, this explanation conceives of women's movements as "social" movements which demobilize once democracy is established.

2. *Dominant understandings of "politics" and "the political" are transformed through transition processes, inviting women's participation under authoritarianism, while inhibiting it under democracy.* The boundary between the public sphere of politics and the private sphere of day-to-day life is significantly blurred during periods of dictatorship. This is because formal arenas of politics are either closed or sharply constrained and regulated, leading to the politicization of the arena of civil society (Foweraker 1998). In the process, day-to-day issues become the stuff of politics.¹ This has an enormous impact on women, who are responsible for meeting their families' and communities' day-to-day needs. Under authoritarianism, when women's capacities to fulfil their social responsibilities are undermined (through state repression and/or economic policies that negatively affect living standards), women's gender roles also become politicized (Jaquette 1989; Alvarez 1990). Because women

¹ This is especially true in those cases where economic crisis and opposition movements to authoritarianism emerge simultaneously, as they did in most of Latin America. In these cases, the economic hardships experienced by the poor, and in some cases even the middle-classes, were politicized and used as a way to mobilize opposition to authoritarian governments.

are charged with the tasks of social reproduction, they are normally the main actors in the movements that emerge to oppose the dictatorships that threaten family survival. But women's activities in these civil society movements are not always *perceived* as political, which is exactly why they are often permitted by regimes that otherwise repress political activity. According to Elisabeth Friedman (1998, 89), "women can mobilize precisely because their gender is not associated with political life, and therefore their supposedly non-political identity disguises their political actions".² As transition processes unfold, however, traditional actors such as political parties re-assume their central role and a formal political arena is re-constructed and (once again) sharply delineated from the private sphere. When that happens, women's activism fades into the (invisible) private arena largely "because their link to private life has been relied upon rather than broken during the time of political repression, [and thus] many women as well as men do not expect women's involvement in the public world of politics to continue once the crisis has passed" (*ibid*; see also Feijóo 1989.). In sum, women's political participation rises and falls according to how "political" activity is defined. Because it is rare for women's movements to succeed in permanently redefining "politics" to include issues of daily life, women's political activism appears to fall after transitions.

² The most well-known example of this is the activism of Argentina's *Madres de la Plaza de Mayo* who explicitly appealed to their maternal identities and rejected association with political actors. While this initially "protected" them from the state repression visited on other activists, leaders of *Las Madres* were eventually subjected to similar treatment (Navarro 1989, 252).

3. *Following transitions women's movements suffer division and fragmentation due to their institutionalization, and/or co-optation by traditional political actors.* As political activity becomes more formalized during processes of democratization, all social movements must make strategic decisions about whether to focus their participation in political or civil society. Women activists are often faced with the choice between (re)joining political parties or maintaining the autonomy of their feminist organizations. Throughout Latin America, the debate over "autonomy" versus "integration" has been divisive and has split many women's movements (Alvarez 1999; Beckwith 2000; Muñoz 1996; Serrano 1990; Waylen 1993).³ But overall, the "integrationist" strategy seems to have been preferred by a number of activists in Latin America, especially in countries like Brazil, Chile, and Nicaragua. Sonia Alvarez explains that, "[i]n the 1980s, the professionalization or 'NGOization' of significant sectors of Latin American feminist movements represented a strategic response to the return of electoral politics and (fragile and uneven) processes of democratization" (1999, 182). Some feminists moved into political parties, especially those on the Left, with whom alliances had been forged during the anti-dictatorship

³ In some cases, the debates were more divisive than others. For example, in the Brazilian case, discussed in Alvarez (1990, 137-60), there was much greater debate and divisions within women's movements than in Chile, which is very likely due to the different nature of authoritarianism in the two countries. In Chile, parties were completely banned, and the excessive repression visited upon partisan actors greatly weakened party structures. In Brazil, government-sanctioned political parties continued to function throughout the period of authoritarianism. Another major difference between the two cases is that repression in Brazil was less severe than in Chile, and whereas a lengthy period of "decompression" was initiated by the military government in Brazil, the Chilean military government was far more intransigent, thereby necessitating a unified opposition movement if there was to be any hope of dislodging the dictatorship.

and/or revolutionary struggles. Additionally, many new democratic governments, following pressure from transnational women's movements, set up women's policy machineries within the state to address gender equality issues. Many women previously active in grassroots women's movements migrated into these (and other) bureaucratic arenas to promote gender equality. Finally, following transitions to democracy, many women's groups converted themselves into NGOs. This happened largely due to shifts in the nature of international funding. Under authoritarian regimes, international donors often directly supported women's groups, but after the transition, funding was either diverted to needier countries or was channelled through governments. In this situation, feminist NGOs largely owe their survival to the work they carry out for governments—for example, research and project implementation. Taken together, these developments have led to the “institutionalization” of women's movements whether in the state or in NGOs that work closely with the state. According to many scholars, this has the effect of weakening women's movements by depriving the base of crucial leadership, while also diluting feminist goals that are subversive of the status quo (Alvarez 1999; Matear 1997; Waylen 1996). According to Alvarez, “NGOs are most often consulted as experts who can evaluate gender policies and programs *rather* than as movement organizations that might facilitate citizen input and participation in the formulation and design of such policies” (1999, 192).

4. *The mobilizing frame of “politicized motherhood” or “militant motherhood” that developed under authoritarianism is ill-suited to making feminist claims in a*

democratic context.⁴ Throughout Latin America, women mobilized in opposition to repressive and/or exclusionary regimes, drawing on their maternal identities to justify activism in defence of their families and communities. This was a useful strategy under authoritarianism because it both cloaked the *political* nature of their claims (making women somewhat less likely to be targets of repression), and it also rendered their demands less threatening to the status quo. According to Helen Icken Safa, “when women’s demands are confined to domestic issues like child care, communal kitchens, or even human rights, they pose less of a threat than when women attempt to gain leverage in men’s power structures such as political parties or unions” (1990, 367). The politicized motherhood strategy is less useful in the post-transition context, according to some authors (Craske 1999; Feijóo 1989; Jaquette 1994). Feijóo, for example, commenting on the Argentine case, explains that the legacy of *Las Madres* is problematic because of its “appeal to women based on the most conservative aspect of feminine identity” (1989, 88). Jane Jaquette argues that the “moral voice” or “heroic politics” model which places women *above* politics rather than squarely within political processes, can undermine the pursuit of feminist goals of gender equality (1994, 339). She explains that the kinds of issues that can be raised within this discourse are too limited: “‘militant mothers’ could organize communal kitchens or demonstrate for health care, but could not demonstrate for women’s reproductive rights, which might be seen as placing the interests of women as individuals over the

⁴ This explanation applies more to the Latin American cases than to other regions where democratization has occurred, largely due to the historical legacy of the maternal mobilizing frame and the gender ideology of *marianismo*.

needs of the family” (*ibid.*, 338). Nikki Craske (1999, 138) insists that “[f]or the longer-term political fortunes of women, the development of the female political subject needs to move beyond militant motherhood....the political identity of women cannot be limited to this field of action”. Regarding the Chilean case, Patricia Provoste and Patricia Silva (1998) note that women have a weaker sense of citizenship, to the extent that they do not perceive of themselves as “subjects of rights”. Women’s tendency to act for others rather than for themselves, translates into a non-autonomous identity, which is, in large part, responsible for the return of many women to their homes after democracy was regained (*ibid.*, 28).

The above four explanations represent some of the most common accounts for women’s apparent declining political participation following transitions to democracy. These types of explanation lead to the conclusion that democratization has a negative effect on women’s participation. But there are a number of problems with these existing explanations. Most importantly, there appears to be some confusion over what is meant by “women’s participation,” and what the conceptual norm for women’s movements ought to be. Indeed, it may be inaccurate to say that women’s participation “declines” or that women “demobilize” after transition processes as a number of authors do (Craske 1999; Friedman 1998, 87; Friedman 2000, 5-6; Saint-Germain 1997, 77-78; Waylen 1993). Instead, it seems more accurate to note that women’s participation *changes* fundamentally following transitions. The primary difference is that in most cases, under authoritarianism, women participated in broad, multi-class movements that positioned themselves against states. Women from diverse social locations with different political

trajectories united in pursuit of an overarching political goal—democracy. While many groups were faced with immediate choices about which networks or umbrella organizations to ally themselves with, and often had to choose between more moderate and more radical (even violent) forms of opposition, there tended to be only one broadly-defined arena for action. That is, because the “formal” political arena was closed, the “social” sphere, which I define in the dissertation as the “informal” political arena, was the primary site for activism. Through transitions, however, “formal” political arenas are reconstructed, offering women choices about where to channel their participation. Women’s choices, however, are greatly influenced by gender ideology, class, and various other factors that lead them to pursue activities in particular arenas.

Because there are multiple arenas for activism following transitions, the claim that women’s movements demobilize or that women’s participation declines needs to be critically scrutinized. Indeed, I believe the terms of debate themselves need to be reformulated. Instead of asking why women’s participation declines after transitions to democracy, it is more fruitful to ask *how* and *where* women participate after transitions and to consider whether the forms of participation they develop do or do not contribute to a more meaningful citizenship for women. This is especially important given that the “institutionalization” of movements within the state has invited middle-class and professional women’s access to “formal” arenas, while poor and working-class women continue to be active in the “informal” arena (but with fewer links to women who participate in other arenas). In order to understand *both* the class and gender dynamics, the location of women’s participation must be taken into account.

Because much of the existing literature does not do this, there is too much ambiguity about what is meant by “women’s participation”. This lack of clarity inhibits a fuller understanding of how democratization affects women’s struggles for citizenship. Elisabeth Friedman, for example, argues that “the institutionalization of politics during the transition impedes the forms of organization that women developed under the previous regimes and their subsequent *political incorporation into democracy*” (1998, 88, emphasis added). She goes on to explain that while the meaning of “political” is clearly contested, she takes it “to mean active participation in the decision-making levels of *formal political structures or conscious demands for inclusion in public life*” (*ibid.*, emphasis added). Her research reveals the barriers to women’s participation in the formal political arena, barriers such as political parties and a masculine conception of “politics”. Waylen, too, limits her focus to women’s participation in “formal” politics, noting that the main goals of women in transitions to democracy were “to increase the number of women involved in politics, particularly at national levels either as elected representatives in legislatures or within political parties; second to achieve the implementation of women-friendly policies often through institutional measures such as the establishment of women’s machineries” (2000, 769). This focus fails to problematize a number of issues surrounding women’s “political incorporation” and their presumed main goal of entering “formal” politics. While some of the women active under authoritarianism do have this as a goal, other women, especially popular sector women, may be less concerned with entering “formal” politics than with continuing to organize in the “informal” arena around material goals such as housing, health care, and community safety. Because women have different interests and therefore different goals that shape

their participation, we need to look at the variety of ways that women participate politically.

A preoccupation with formal politics is also problematic because it produces the kind of “barriers research” which Vickers insists does not always “challenge the division of society into public and private spheres or the division of labour that assigns to women physical or social responsibility for reproduction and the care of the old and infirm” (1997, 57). It further reduces the significance of the class factors that shape women’s participation. In order to understand the variety of ways women act politically, I look at women’s efforts to expand their presence in “formal” politics (Chapter 4) in addition to women’s activism in their communities and their efforts to establish linkages among women’s movements in the “informal” arena to strengthen their political impact (Chapter 6).

Other authors take “women’s participation” to mean organization in feminist movements. Instead of analyzing barriers to women’s entrance into formal (electoral or bureaucratic) politics, they focus on the barriers to making political demands from civil society. There is an important difference between “women’s participation” (in formal politics) and “women’s *movements*’ participation” (which involves making political claims from civil society). Jaquette and Wolchik, for example, claim that the main challenge for women after transitions is “whether women can stay organized and sufficiently united to maintain and transform the political space they gained during the transitions” (1998, 6). Jaquette also raises the problem of converting “social” movement politics—which were effective under authoritarianism—to interest group politics—which are more effective under democracy (1994, 339). Scholars such as Verónica Schild

(1998; 2000a) and Sonia Alvarez (1998; 1999) are likewise concerned with the decline in women's movements' political capacities. They focus on the extent to which women's movements are co-opted and/or institutionalized, thereby decreasing the public visibility of movements and diluting their capacities to contest gender (and other) inequalities. Alvarez and Schild are somewhat less overtly concerned with individual women's capacities to participate in electoral or party politics.

Being more clear about exactly what is being analyzed—women's participation (as individuals either in formal or informal arenas) or women's movements' participation—is crucial to the task of sorting out how women's citizenship is potentially transformed through democratization and to understanding how class intersects with gender to influence women's citizenship. Consequently, in this thesis I separate out and address specifically the three main arenas in which women participate and pursue their interests following transitions:

1. the “formal” political arena where women act mainly through political parties;
2. the bureaucratic arena where gender equality is sought through women's policy machineries;
3. the “informal” political arena where women's organizations seek to build broader movements capable of developing and placing their political demands on the public agenda and where popular sector women's organizations continue to organize around community and economic survival goals.

In each of these areas, women (both individually and collectively) confront opportunities and obstacles to forwarding gender- and class-specific interests. The opportunities and obstacles women face in electoral politics are very different, however, from those faced

by women in “informal” politics, and for this reason, each arena requires separate analysis prior to arriving at more general conclusions about the effects of the new democratic context on women’s citizenship.

Separating women’s political participation in “formal” and “informal” arenas is crucial when studying women’s politics, given the predominance of women in the informal arena. Indeed, women’s political invisibility often stems from a failure to recognize the informal arena as “political”. But it is even more crucial to investigate women’s participation in informal politics in the present context, that is, following transitions to democracy and the turn to neoliberalism. It is frequently noted that women’s roles in sustaining communities are crucial to the construction and functioning of neoliberal market economies, both in Latin America, where (limited) welfare states have been dismantled and replaced by an ideology of “self-sufficiency,” (Craske 1998; Schild 1998; 2000a; 2000b) and in East Central Europe where the new market economies rely on women’s reproductive roles in the private and community spheres. Regarding the former communist countries, Barbara Einhorn notes that state retreat “rests on the assumption that the welfare gap which arises from state withdrawal will automatically be filled by the unpaid (and largely unacknowledged) caring labour of women” (2000, 111-12).

Addressing women’s participation in electoral, bureaucratic, and civil society politics separately also overcomes the problems inherent in Craske’s and Jaquette’s claims that women need to develop a new discourse and strategy with which to forward their gender interests. While they are both correct in pointing out the limitations of a “militant motherhood” discourse, it is less a case that the discourse needs to be

transformed or abandoned than it is a case that the discourse needs to be (re)connected to women's *political* claims for citizenship. A politicized motherhood or a maternal identity can lead women in many different directions, some conservative and supportive of the status quo and some radical and subversive of existing power relations (Strange 1990). Under dictatorships, women drew strategically on their motherhood identities to launch very *political* challenges to regimes that were violating human rights and creating material hardships for great numbers of citizens. Today, the challenge for organized women is to use this same identity (given its historical legitimacy in Latin America) to make political demands *for women themselves* (as a group and as individuals) as well as for others (their families and communities). Most importantly, the arena in which women are operating (such as civil society or the state) will shape women's strategy and the discourses they employ.

While some authors are sceptical about the potential for a feminist politics to be rooted in a maternal identity, there is nothing really preventing this development. Women can make demands for inclusion into the public sphere of politics based on their social roles and further argue that the (masculine-derived) "rules of the game" in politics need to be reconfigured to accommodate women's "difference". Indeed, this is one of the key insights of feminist scholars who have exposed the bases of the (gendered) exclusion inherent in traditional notions of citizenship. This argument, and its implications for women's strategies, are further developed below.

Feminist Citizenship Theory

Feminist theorists have challenged traditional conceptions of citizenship, arguing persuasively that “the definition of citizenship is derived from the representation of the behaviour of a group with particular race, gender, and class characteristics (white, male elites) as the model of citizenship for all individuals” (Jones 1990, 784). More than anything, feminist scholars have uncovered the “false universalism” at the heart of traditional citizenship theory and practice. Ruth Lister (1997) argues that in both the liberal (citizenship-as-status) and republican (citizenship-as-practice) versions of citizenship theory, the proclaimed universalism is false. The liberal conception of citizenship-as-status rests on the view that citizens are “autonomous” agents, thereby excluding women due to their “dependent” status on male heads of households. Additionally, as Sylvia Walby (1997, 175-76) points out, in T.H. Marshall’s evolutionary theory of citizenship, many women have not even achieved civil citizenship rights given the emphasis on “liberty of the person” on which these rights are based. As long as women lack control over bodies in reproduction and in sexual relations, they do not enjoy the bodily autonomy considered necessary for civil citizenship.⁵ In the republican tradition of citizenship-as-practice, women are essentially excluded due to their responsibilities for reproduction, leaving them little time to engage in citizenship

⁵ This is one of the reasons that feminists have been critical of Marshall’s evolutionary theory of citizenship where the extension of civil citizenship rights leads to political rights which, in turn, culminate in the extension of social citizenship rights. Walby argues that while this model may have been true for White men in many countries, it is less true for women, who gained civil citizenship rights only after achieving political suffrage (1997, 175).

practices (Lister 1997, 69; 133). Carole Pateman (1992) emphasizes that the republican tradition has also associated citizenship with soldiering activities (i.e., citizens must fight and be willing to die for their countries), an activity that has historically excluded women in most cases despite the fact that, as Jean Bethke Elshtain (1987) has noted, women play (gendered) roles that are integral to the construction of war.

In both the liberal and republican traditions of citizenship, women's effective exclusion is maintained through the dichotomy between the public and private realms wherein the activities and qualities associated with the "private" sphere are constructed as "incompatible with the exercise of citizenship in the 'public'" (Lister 1997, 69). The public sphere, the space for citizens, is associated with qualities such as rationality, impartiality, and independence—all assumed to be fundamentally "masculine" characteristics. The private sphere is designated as a space for particularistic rather than universal relationships, and is associated with "feminine" qualities such as irrationality, partiality, and dependence (*ibid.*, 70). As Lister explains,

In a classic double bind, women are banished to the private realm of the family, either physically or figuratively, because they do not display such qualities and because of their association with that realm, they are deemed incapable of developing them (1997, 71).

In any event, as long as that which occurs in the private sphere is excluded from "politics" in the public sphere, women, and many of their concerns, are likewise excluded from citizenship. This is true even after women have been accorded the formal rights of citizenship such as "liberty of the person" and political suffrage.

Referring to Marshall's theory of citizenship, feminists have also criticized the extent to which women's social citizenship (in those cases where social citizenship rights

are extended) rests on their (dependent) relationships to male breadwinners. The culmination of the citizenship project for Marshall was the extension of the social rights associated mainly with the post-World War Two welfare states of the industrialized democracies. But these rights were accorded to citizens based on their status as workers. Given the sexual division of labour predominant in most countries, where, in principle at least, men work outside the home while women maintain the family, women's social rights are dependent upon their relationships to male workers. According to Verónica Schild, "[w]omen, it turns out, in their capacity as mothers and homemakers, have no legitimate basis for claiming entitlements in their own right, but are dependent on employed men or on the state" (2000a, 280). While the ideal of the male breadwinner and the female homemaker tended to be limited to those of a particular class and race (i.e., white and middle-class), it nonetheless served as a regulative ideal which ultimately worked to lower women's wages by assuming that women were merely contributing "a little extra" to the family income while also effectively excluding women from accessing social rights *as women* rather than as spouses of male workers.

Another problem for women is that, whether or not they are engaged in paid labour outside the home, the main responsibility for family care-taking continues to fall to them, leading to the "double-burden" that many women confront. This further complicates women's access to citizenship where the duties of citizenship demand active political participation. Adding political activism to women's caring and work responsibilities leads to a "triple burden" for women (Phillips 1991). Lister argues that the sexual division of labour exerts a powerful influence over how women participate as citizens. Due to their more extensive caring responsibilities, from which "time-off" is

unlikely, women tend to focus their participation in arenas that allow for greater flexibility. This will normally take the form of participation in “informal” politics rather than the formal political arena (Lister 1997, 137). But there are class and race dimensions at work here too, because wealthier women can afford to hire domestic servants to fulfill their domestic responsibilities. Poor women do not have the resources to exercise this option.

Women’s relationship to citizenship—the bases of their exclusion and their tendency to practice citizenship in different arenas—presents an additional problem: On what basis should women demand inclusion? Should women demand inclusion based on their “equality” or based on their “difference”? In other words, should women seek a “gender-neutral” or a “gender-differentiated” citizenship (Lister 1997, 91-92)? A gender-neutral model of citizenship would grant equal citizenship status to men and women based on their fundamental equality as individuals acting as citizens in the public arena. In a gender-differentiated model, in contrast, women would gain citizenship rights based on their particular behaviour and concerns “and [would] value their responsibilities in the private sphere” (*ibid.*, 92-93). There are potential conflicts inherent in both models.⁶ Most importantly, a gender-neutral model, focusing on men and women’s “equality” in the public sphere, ignores women’s (gendered) responsibilities in the private sphere, which can both inhibit active participation in the public sphere and shape the issues

⁶ Feminist citizenship theorists tend to approach the “equality-difference” dilemma conceptually whereas, in practice, women’s movements tend to “choose” strategies which are 1) shaped by the prevailing political context; and 2) often blur the distinctions between “equality” and “difference”. These issues are further elaborated throughout the dissertation because of the importance of a politics of difference to Latin American women’s movements.

women bring to public life. Others point out that the main flaw in the gender-neutral model is that it requires women to act like men to become citizens (Lister 1997, 93; Pateman 1992). Elshtain (1998) argues that this model also fails to challenge the idea that issues relating to particularistic (family) ties are inappropriate bases for acting as citizens.

A gender-differentiated model of citizenship has been criticized for essentializing women, thereby denying or significantly downplaying relevant class, race, and ethnic differences among women, and also of “trap[ping] them in the private sphere” (Lister 1997, 93; see also Dietz 1998). Lister argues that there is a way around the problematic “equality-difference” dilemma, a solution that begins with a recognition that these two concepts have been misrepresented as incompatible opposites (*ibid.*, 97). This entails recognition that “equality” does not mean “sameness” and consequently can encompass the relevant political differences among women while also highlighting women’s difference from men. Seen in this light, women can be both different *and* equal. Women’s roles as mothers can, therefore, be a basis for equal political rights and duties as men.

A more important recognition that Lister makes is that any *political* claim that emerges from either an “equality” or a “difference” position is necessarily contingent and specific (1997, 97). In other words, depending on the political and historical context, a strategy focusing on either equality or difference will be more useful for achieving women’s goals. First-wave feminists from the 1890s until the First World War in a number of Western countries appealed to women’s “difference” (i.e., their motherhood roles) to demand political rights. Feminists demanded political rights by appealing to

women's moral (and sometimes spiritual) superiority. In Latin America, first-wave feminism lasted until World War Two, and in a number of cases, women were enfranchised by conservative governments believing that women's "natural" concern for traditional family structures would mean support for conservative parties in an era when Leftist parties were gaining adherents among the working-classes. Women's "difference" as a political strategy in Latin America was also useful during the 1970s and 1980s when women mobilized as (private) mothers because mobilizing as (public) citizens was proscribed under the dictatorships that existed throughout most of the region (Jaquette 1989; Safa 1994; Craske 1999). Due to the high public visibility and recognition that women achieved through their mobilization as mothers, it made sense to demand citizenship rights on this same basis.

As the preceding discussion illustrates, citizenship is bound up with political participation. Women's exclusion from citizenship consequently flows from their *different* ways of participating politically—ways of participating that are not perceived as political. Due to the dichotomy between the "formal" and "informal" political arenas, women's participation in the latter is not always perceived (sometimes even by the women themselves) as political, and thereby an expression of citizenship. The public/private dichotomy mirrors the dichotomy between "formal" and "informal" politics, and in many cases, main features of women's "difference" are the location and content of their participation. Women are more likely to participate in "informal" arenas and raise issues related to family and community well-being. The problem is that these arenas (and the issues raised within them) have been constructed as non-political.

Women's activism within these spheres and their mobilizations around "informal" political issues are not, therefore, seen as expressions of political citizenship.

Because of the importance of the "formal"/"informal" dichotomy to women's marginalization as citizens, the recent transitions to democracy are illuminating and useful in studying women's citizenship. This is also why the study of women and democratization is most usefully approached through the lens of citizenship. By exploring democratization processes, we see in a very concrete way how the boundary between "formal" and "informal" politics (and the public/private dichotomy on which it is based) is constructed and reconstructed, and, through these shifts, provides opportunities for women in one instance while putting up obstacles in the next.

As transition processes unfolded, many observers optimistically believed that "politics" would subsequently be practiced differently in the new democracies, led by women's (and that of other popular movements') styles of activism in civil society. Many believed that the politicization of the "informal" arena, and the day-to-day issues that were publicized within it, would be maintained after the transitions to democracy were completed. This did not happen, however, thereby revealing the likely failure of Lister's proposed solution to one of the problems of women's citizenship. Lister urges a "revaluing" of the sphere of "informal" politics where women politicize "private" issues, thereby subverting both the formal/informal and the public/private dichotomies (1997, 153). She further emphasizes that valuing the "informal" as political would lead to valuing women's "different" styles of participation: "as the pioneers of alternative modes of political organization, within and beyond the nation-state, women, working within the

spaces where public and private collide, are providing new role models for active political citizenship” (*ibid.*, 153).

There are two problems with this strategy, one of which is recognized by Lister herself. She notes that we must avoid reinforcing the economic division of labour with a political one whereby men continue to monopolize “formal” politics while women’s “natural” concerns are expressed primarily in the “informal” political arena. Lister insists that however important women’s activism in “informal” politics may be in changing women’s consciousness, women must also seek power in “formal” politics in order to effect substantive changes to power relations that disadvantage women (Lister 1997, 154-55; see also Phillips 1998). Barbara Einhorn (2000) worries that in the former communist states of East Central Europe, women’s participation is being increasingly tied to the “informal” political arena, producing what she calls the “civil society trap,” which keeps women so busy in civil society that men’s monopolization of power in “formal” politics continues without serious challenge. The main concern here, recognized by both Lister and Einhorn, is that there are few substantive linkages between the “formal” and “informal” arenas, which largely precludes women’s concerns from being placed on national political agendas. The other problem with Lister’s position is addressed extensively in the Latin American literature on citizenship in today’s neoliberal democracies.

Women's citizenship and neoliberalism in Latin America

The notion of women forging new participatory styles and values through their activism in “informal” political arenas is today being deployed by neoliberal states to harness women’s energies into serving the purposes of states and of global capitalism in ways inconsistent with women’s equality or with citizenship in a meaningful sense (i.e., in a sense of inviting women’s voices to be heard in arenas of power). This argument has been made most forcefully by Verónica Schild, who argues that the practices and empowerment discourses of women’s movements have been appropriated by states for their own purposes. According to Schild,

In Latin America today democratization is taking place as part of a neoliberal modernizing project. Central to this project is a renewed concern with “citizens” and a discursive project to recast citizenship as the active exercise of individualized responsibilities which include economic self-reliance (1998, 245).

In this context, women’s movements that emerged to collectively resolve economic hardships are being cast as the model on which citizen behaviour should be premised. Women’s movements (and other popular movements) are held up as exemplars of “private” community action in response to problems of poverty, responses which are preferable to citizens expecting states to respond to poverty issues. Neoliberalism in Latin America is often expressed through efforts to de-politicize social and economic problems. Tomás Moulian notes that the neoliberal state “generates pressures towards greater de-politicization, favouring strategies of an individual sort instead of associative ones, privileging technical decisions above political ones, and

criticizing mobilization as disorder” (1997, 44). De-politicization is accomplished by transferring social welfare issues to the local arena, a sphere that is not considered “political” (Craske 1998; Taylor 1999). Indeed, given that the municipal or local arena is often characterized as a *casa grande* (big house)—i.e., an extension of the family or the home, its portrayal is imbued with “feminine” characteristics, thereby reinforcing its non-political status.⁷

While women’s caring and reproductive roles have historically been unacknowledged as relevant to national economies by state elites, the de-politicization of social problems which is part of neoliberal discourse further adds to women’s caring roles in their communities. Women are not only expected to take care of themselves and their individual families but are being called upon to contribute more substantively to the new (flexible and gendered) labour forces in the region (Craske 1998, 106) and to engage in collective action to resolve community problems. Thus, according to Craske, neoliberal states in Latin America tend to engage in discourse that reinforces women’s roles in the traditional family “without undermining their availability for the labour market to provide low-wage competition” (*ibid.*, 114). The main problem, of course, is that extra burdens are thereby being imposed on women which further undermine their capacities to engage in political activism in other spheres.

These developments are manifest in the “new social policy” found throughout Latin America today. According to Schild, it is through social policy that “market

⁷ Fiona Macaulay observes that in Chile under Pinochet “[l]ocal government was completely de-politicized, either as a site for party patronage or as a site for political contestation, and reconstructed as a locus for ‘good housekeeping’” (1998, 98).

citizens” are constructed and their responsibilities discursively established (2000a, 276). “Market citizens,” according to Schild, are “empowered clients...who as individuals are viewed as capable of enhancing their lives through judicious, responsible choices as consumers of services and other goods” (*ibid.*). Social policy contributes to the marketization of citizenship primarily through poverty alleviation programs which are targeted rather than universal, and normally involve notions of “co-responsibility” between state and program beneficiaries (Craske 1998, 107; Hardy 1997, 126; Schild 2000a, 276). Co-responsibility, where beneficiaries are responsible for contributing at least some of their own resources to particular programs, is intended to produce a sense of “stake-holdership” amongst program beneficiaries, and is modelled on the survival-oriented activities of social movements and NGOs (Craske 1998, 108). But most importantly, it is intended to instill in citizens the sense that they are responsible for themselves and for alleviating their material problems. Unlike the classic Latin American “populist” state, where the state portrayed itself as the suitable agent for resolving the nation’s social and economic problems, the neoliberal state portrays poverty as a social problem to be solved by the poor themselves, with the state providing only the minimally necessary degree of technical expertise.

Women’s movements are deeply implicated in these processes, according to Schild. “Market citizens” are not constructed by some monolithic and unitary “state,” but rather, are constructed on many levels through the agency of variously situated women (both as “gender experts” in states and NGOs, and as “clients”) (Schild 2000a, 277-78). The discourse of empowerment (*desarrollo personal*, or “personal development”) employed by women’s movements as a consciousness-raising strategy is now being used

by states themselves, although clearly to a different end. Neoliberal states aim to empower women as self-sufficient economic agents, capable of providing for themselves and their families. Poverty alleviation programs target poor women who are “excluded” from the labour market and “empower” them through social programs intended to deliver “marketable” skills with which they can incorporate themselves into the labour force. Middle-class professional women are involved in the process through the “expertise” they provide, either working directly in women’s policy machinery in states or through NGOs that provide the “gender expertise” on which state policy is based (Alvarez 1999; Schild 1998; 2000a).⁸

This discussion indicates the contested nature of social citizenship rights in today’s neoliberal democracies in Latin America. Both states and movements express concern with “citizenship” while investing it with different meanings. Throughout Latin America, the popular movements that emerged under authoritarianism sought both political and social citizenship rights (Barrig 2001). Indeed, the economic crisis brought about by the global debt crisis of the 1980s was one of the main sources of popular sector mobilization (including women’s mobilization). Collective action emerged around material goals and, in many countries, economic hardships were politicized and linked to authoritarian and unaccountable regimes. Given the extent of state repression and

⁸ There is debate within the literature about the consequences of this situation, with some authors (such as Verónica Schild) far more pessimistic than others (such as Sonia Alvarez). My own view is that Schild (1998; 2000a) is too dismissive of the potential for women linked to the state to bring about positive changes. Alvarez (1999), on the other hand, points to the recognition of women in the feminist NGOs of their contradictory location, and of their attempts to find the necessary space to pursue more substantive transformation.

complete absence of political rights in many of the region's dictatorships, it is not surprising that popular struggles were forged in pursuit of "citizenship". Issues of justice and access to socio-economic rights, given the context of economic decline and crisis in the 1980s, were also part of the popular struggle for citizenship.

Once authoritarian regimes collapsed and gave way emerging civilian democracies, the discourse of citizenship was also picked up by states, but deployed in a rather different way. Joe Foweraker explains that as newly democratizing regimes seek to legitimate themselves, especially vis-à-vis the social movements that contributed to the collapse of their authoritarian predecessors, "citizenship becomes an identity that is defended and disseminated by the state against all class and regional differences and against the specific identities and claims of social movements" (1998, 282). This occurs largely because the social justice demands of popular movements are deemed potentially destabilizing and incompatible with the economic reform agenda. Emphasis on the universal and homogenous aspect of citizenship is a way for neoliberal states to deflect demands by marginalized groups for social rights. The differences among citizens based on race, gender, ethnicity, and class are deemed irrelevant to the exercise of citizenship, especially when citizenship rights are cast almost exclusively in terms of negative liberties rather than positive rights. Lucy Taylor argues that a fundamental shift has occurred, "whereby social rights are translated into civil liberties; the emphasis here is on the freedom to choose rather than access to social benefits" (1998, 62). This conception of citizenship is inconsistent with the view that socio-economic rights are crucial in order for citizens to exercise their political rights. This view is also inconsistent with the struggles of popular movements which held a more substantive view of citizenship

(including ideals of social justice). Maruja Barrig (2001), for example, notes that Latin American women's movements in the 1980s pursued *both* political and socio-economic rights because of the numerous interactions between middle-class and professional activists and poor and working-class members of the movement. Because of these relationships, women realized that prevailing poverty and economic inequality would render the extension of legal rights less effective without socio-economic measures to address poverty.

The neoliberal conception of citizenship further undermines the extension of social rights by drawing a sharp delineation between the "political" and the "social" sphere. While citizens are encouraged to "participate" in both arenas, their participation takes different (and deeply gendered) forms. Political citizenship is exercised in a sharply circumscribed arena, defined primarily by the state and populated by traditional partisan actors. In this arena, citizens are defined by their "equality" (sameness) in that each individual possesses the same degree of negative liberty and autonomy of choice. The "social" arena is defined by community and family relationships where individuals are enmeshed in relations of positive duties and obligations. Individuals have (gendered) roles to play in this arena, mainly the provision of social welfare and participation in the labour force. Here, citizens have duties to look after both themselves and the collective (the community). When neoliberal states encourage citizen participation, they mean participation in the community arena to engage in paid labour and to provide social welfare to community members. It is significant that in the political sphere, citizens are defined by their autonomy (i.e., individualism is desirable), while in the social sphere citizens are defined by their relationships with others (i.e., individualism is problematic).

In this conception, demands for social rights are kept out of the political sphere by a discourse that casts the community as the main provider of social rights. Because social welfare is the concern of the (“non-political”) community/local arena, issues of social rights are de-politicized.

The emphasis on this type of citizenship coheres with state withdrawal from the provision of social services and state decentralization, both key features of neoliberalism in Latin America today. As many feminist scholars have observed, neoliberal models of citizenship rely on the gendered division of labour by having women perform the crucially necessary but unpaid and unacknowledged reproductive labour while also serving as a flexible and low-wage labour force to bolster the economy’s competitive edge (Craske 1998). This can undermine women’s citizenship in a number of ways. First, given the dichotomy between “public” and “private” (which is mirrored by the political/social dichotomy), the main activities in which women are engaged are not considered activities worthy of political citizenship. Second, women’s activism in the “informal” is often around issues relating to this sphere (for example, struggles for health care or community services). In the present context, however, these are viewed by state elites as “social” issues to be resolved by communities themselves rather than “political” issues to be presented to governments. Consequently, women’s roles in sustaining their communities are not considered expressions of political citizenship. Third, women’s burdens are increasing due to state withdrawal. For example, as states cut back on day-care or on school lunch programs, women must find creative ways to fill the gaps. State decentralization in Latin America, while often portrayed by governments as a path towards “modernization” and “democratization,” compounds the above problems because

it essentially amounts to off-loading service delivery to local governments without providing finances to carry out these activities. The result is even more massive disparities between wealthy neighbourhoods and the poor shantytowns that surround most Latin American cities.

In sum, democratization is largely about the (re)extension of citizenship rights, and it is crucial to link the effects of democratization on women's participation (as individuals and through women's movements) to their struggle for a more inclusive citizenship. But linking democratization to citizenship is even more important given that most transitions to democracy were accompanied by economic reform, with significant implications for how women's citizenship is conceived and practiced. In the next section I address the specificity of how these issues have played out in the Chilean context.

The Chilean Historical and Political Context

Chile is an important case study for analyzing women's citizenship struggles through democratization for a number of reasons. First, women have made considerable gains in terms of achieving greater gender equality through their activism and presence during the democratization process. Given the variability of outcomes for women in democratization, it is important to understand how and why such gains were achieved by Chilean women. Second, these advancements notwithstanding, women's movements today appear less able to maintain and expand upon their earlier achievements, and it is important to learn how Chilean women are responding to the changed context. Third, the context of Chilean politics is one that contains features of both industrialized democracies

and of developing countries. Chile has a strong and stable multi-party system—somewhat uncommon in developing countries—with which women must negotiate if they are to exert influence. Thus, some of Chile's political patterns are similar to those found in countries of the North. The existence of a strong competitive party system in Chile has magnified the importance of the “autonomy” versus “double militancy” dilemma for women's movements, and has allowed women allied with the Centre and Left parties opposed to Pinochet's dictatorship to make a number of gains through the Chilean transition to democracy. In other Latin American countries, where parties tend to be more weakly institutionalized, women have made fewer gains (see Waylen 2000a).

On the other hand, Chilean women confront problems very similar to women elsewhere in Latin America, problems that emerge from their country's subordinate position in the global political economy. While Chile's economic indicators today are enviable by the standards of Latin America's and Africa's poorest countries, its economy is highly sensitive to external fluctuations given its dependence on the export of natural resources. The agricultural sector maintains a competitive advantage through the construction of a gendered worker—the *temporera* (female seasonal worker)—employed mainly during the harvesting season (Barrientos 1997; Bee and Vogel 1997; Matear 1997b). Additionally, patterns of wealth distribution in Chile mirror those found in developing countries rather than in the North. While poverty rates in Chile have been decreasing since the return of democracy in 1990, rates of inequality have been increasing (Hojman 1996; Weyland 1997).

There is a gendered dimension to Chile's political economy of development expressed through the need for a flexible and low-wage labour force (comprised mainly

of women), and through the “feminization of poverty”. Both poverty and unemployment rates vary significantly by region, class, and sex (SERNAM 1998a). Women’s unemployment is consistently higher than men’s and the gap widens during periods of high unemployment. For example, in 1986, male unemployment was 10.9 percent while women’s was 15.1 percent; the gap lowered in 1996, when men’s unemployment was 5.6 percent and women’s was 7.8 percent (*ibid.*, 40-41). Unemployment is the highest at the lowest income level (26 percent) and lowest at the highest income level (only 2 percent) (*ibid.*, 42). In rural areas, gaps are even wider: in 1994, women’s unemployment stood at 10.4 percent while men’s was only 4.7 percent (SERNAM 1996a, 49). The labour market in Chile is also highly segregated by sex, with women dominating the service sector (where roughly half of women are employed) and small business and workshops where employment is most precarious (SERNAM 1996a, 15; Vogel 1995). A large pool of low-wage (female) labour has also translated into enhanced opportunities for middle-class women since the availability of domestic servants facilitates their entrance into the labour force without challenging the sexual division of labour in the home.

In addition to shaping the content of women’s equality demands, the political economy of development in Chile exacerbates socio-economic divisions among women which, in turn, has undermined the task of alliance-building to promote gender equality. There have only been two instances in which women (temporarily) forged cross-class alliances to pursue a common goal: during the struggle for suffrage in the first half of the twentieth century (discussed in Chapter 2); and during the struggle for democracy in the 1980s (the subject of Chapter 3). But in these instances women’s activism was also

shaped by the nature of Chilean politics more generally. The two features noted above, a strong party system and a developing political economy, exerted a powerful influence over the emergence of women's movements and their potential to mobilize across class lines around gender interests. As I discuss below, the party system in Chile, especially prior to 1973, reflected and ultimately exacerbated class divisions, which, in the context of a dependent and developing economy, led to heightened political and social conflict among classes (see A. Valenzuela 1978). These two features interacted to produce a third important characteristic of Chilean politics: two distinct periods of democratization (1932—1973 and 1990—) interspersed with a (lengthy) period of authoritarianism (1973—1990). In each period women's citizenship was conceived differently, thereby affecting women's strategies for expanding their rights. In the remainder of this section, I briefly discuss these features of the Chilean political system and show how they are linked to women's struggles for citizenship.

Democratization in Chile: 1932-1973

Democratization began in earnest in Chile following the collapse of the "oligarchic" state in 1932. Although Chile gained independence from Spain in 1810—1818, the nation was largely dominated by an oligarchic elite led by landowners (*latifundistas*) and the mining sector until changes in the underlying social and economic structure produced a political crisis in the 1920s which led to more meaningful democratization (Oppenheim 1993; Oxhorn 1995a). Chile's victory over Bolivia and Peru in the War of the Pacific (1879—83) led to the acquisition of the resource-rich Atacama Desert in the North of the country,

and mineral (mainly nitrate) exports subsequently dominated the economy until the 1920s when copper exports gained predominance. The growth of the mining economy produced two corresponding political changes: the expansion of the state (in terms of managing access to, and the rents from, these resources); and the growth of a middle class (largely employed by the state) and a working class, both of which challenged the hegemony exercised by the oligarchy. The victory of Arturo Alessandri of the *Partido Radical* (PR) reflected these underlying structural changes and his presidency (1932—1938) “[laid] the foundations for four decades of widening democracy” (Collier and Sater 1996, 226). A new Constitution took force, establishing a strong executive branch and a bicameral Congress (a 100 member Chamber of Deputies and a 50 member Senate), but more importantly, Alessandri’s victory represented the defeat of the oligarchy and the parties that traditionally represented their interests (the Liberals and the Conservatives).⁹ The PR emerged precisely to represent the interests of the growing middle- and working-class sectors. Hence, Alessandri’s term saw the beginning of a welfare state in Chile, with the implementation of social security and the adoption of a labour code (Oppenheim 1993, 12-13).

Analysts have characterized Chile’s problem as that of political “over-development” and economic “under-development” (Oxhorn 1995a, 42; see also Garretón 1995, 182). From 1932 until 1973, the role of the state expanded and the state served as

⁹ These two parties both moved to the Right of the political spectrum after the emergence of the Radical Party, merging in 1967 to form the National Party (PN), representing landowners, business and financial interests, parts of the middle class (mainly small business and entrepreneurs), and the peasants, whose votes were still controlled by landlords (Oppenheim 1993, 15).

the main referent for the demands of social groups. Unlike elsewhere in Latin America, a strong and stable political party system emerged to mediate the relationships between social groups and the state. As political power grew increasingly centralized in the national state, Chilean political parties responded by developing highly centralized party structures that linked social groups, through local “political brokers” to centralized party structures (A. Valenzuela 1978; Oxhorn 1995a, 46). This led to what Manuel Garretón (1989) refers to as the “backbone” of Chilean politics: the overlap between party structures and social organizations. Political parties penetrated all social organizations, even local sports clubs, and all demands expressed in the “formal” political arena were mediated through political parties. While this system contributed to an enviable level of stability (at least compared to other countries in the region), it also contributed to an under-developed civil society (Oxhorn 1995b).

The over-developed nature of the Chilean political system eventually led to a severe crisis because it was matched by an under-developed economic structure (Oxhorn 1995a, 42; 59). The “compromise” state which replaced the “oligarchic” state after 1932 contained a number of internal contradictions (Garretón 1989; Oxhorn 1995a; A. Valenzuela 1978). The “compromise” refers to the incorporation of the middle- and working-classes through the political party system and the satisfaction of their interests through the state as “benefactor” (Serrano 1995). The state provided employment as it increased its role in providing social services and welfare, but also as state-led industrialization was adopted, replacing the emphasis on resource exports. According to Garretón, the Chilean political system in this era was defined by three tightly inter-related elements: “import-substituting industrialization with increasing state intervention in the

economy; substantive democratization that was gradually incorporating diverse social sectors into the political system and improving their standards of living; and a democratic political regime” (1989, 3). But, as noted, there were fundamental contradictions within the terms of the “compromise”: it rested upon maintaining a number of the oligarchy’s key economic interests, which implied a lack of progressive social change in the countryside. Chilean peasants, therefore, were excluded from the terms of the “compromise”¹⁰ as was the urban marginal sector inhabiting the shantytowns that ringed the periphery of Santiago (Garretón 1989, Oxhorn 1995a, 44). In brief, while democratization after 1932 included aspects of both political and social citizenship, the exclusion of key social groups (peasants and urban marginal sectors, and, as I discuss later, women) meant that the project was ultimately incomplete.

The terms of the “compromise” began to unravel when the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) replaced the Radical Party as the main Centre party and, as part of its governing project (1964-70), began to incorporate formerly excluded social groups. The PDC directed most of its attention to mobilizing the poor in the shantytowns (*poblaciones*). This was done through the creation of community organizations—the *Juntas de Vecinos* (Neighbourhood Councils) linked to the PDC mandate of *Promoción Popular* (Popular Promotion).¹¹ Through citizens’ participation in the Neighbourhood

¹⁰ For example, rural unionization remained illegal until 1967 (A. Valenzuela 1978, 26).

¹¹ The term “popular” refers to the “popular sectors,” a group much broader than the poor or the working-class. In addition to implying a group that suffers some degree of material deprivation and lower life chances, it also has a normative basis—it is often deployed to refer to “the people,” as the authentic inhabitants of a nation. According to Oxhorn, “‘popular’ becomes associated with all that is indigenous to a society: traditional cultures, values, art forms and beliefs, and so forth. While not rejecting all that is

Councils they would be tied to the PDC and mobilized around its ideology (a kind of Christian “communitarianism” that aimed at being neither Left nor Right) (Oppenheim 1993, 16). The other main goal of PDC president Eduardo Frei Sr. was the incorporation of the peasants (within the framework of the US-led Alliance for Progress). But agrarian reform and extending rights to rural workers were bitterly opposed by the political Right, who had supported Frei in the 1964 elections.¹²

The growing politicization of Chilean society, divided into Left, Centre, and Right, produced an extremely close presidential race in 1970. Allende’s coalition, *Unidad Popular* (UP, Popular Unity), won a bare plurality with 36.2 percent of the vote.¹³ The UP coalition sought to expand the earlier reforms and bring about a complete socio-economic transformation of Chilean society. They intended to do so, however, within the parameters of the country’s Constitution. But Allende ran into problems almost immediately given the complete refusal of the opposition to support his reforms. Due to such intransigent opposition, Allende was forced more and more to employ executive actions, eroding established Chilean political traditions of negotiation with

‘foreign,’ influences from the developed industrialized nations tend to be associated with the ‘privileged’ sectors and the popular sectors often see themselves as reservoirs of national identity” (1995a, 301).

¹² Frei decisively defeated the Leftist candidate Salvador Allende in the 1964 elections only because the Right, fearful of splitting the anti-Allende vote, decided to withdraw their candidate and support Frei. When Frei began to implement reforms opposed by conservative elites, political conflict escalated and any alliance between Centre and Right fell apart. The PDC itself became increasingly divided over reform issues—especially agrarian reform—as Leftists in the party wanted reforms to go further. This led to the breakaway of a number of Leftist members to form their own party in 1969—*Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria* (MAPU, Movement for United Popular Action), which, in 1970, allied with the Allende forces (Oppenheim 1993, 20).

¹³ The Rightist candidate got 34.9 percent and the Christian Democratic candidate received 27.8 percent (Oxhorn 1995a, 60).

Congress (Oxhorn 1995a, 61). The growing conflict at the elite level was reproduced at the societal level, which is unsurprising given the dominance of political elites over civil society. This led to open conflict among social groups outside of the institutional arena of politics—something that was extremely rare in Chile. All political parties were mobilizing groups to either support or protest the UP and this led to workers taking over factories, peasants seizing control of landed estates, trade associations (*gremios*), especially the truckers' associations, organizing crippling strikes, and women demonstrating against the lack of food through the famous "March of the Empty Pots". Taken together, these mobilizations de-legitimized the democratic regime and the normal channels of institutionalized political competition. Ultimately, support for a military solution grew. On September 11, 1973, Chile's process of democratization was brutally terminated by a military coup. According to some, the crisis which ended democracy grew out of the tension between increasing political and social democratization in a developing economy ill-equipped to cope with the expanding political and social demands (Oxhorn 1995a). Others emphasize the role of the political parties in escalating the levels of conflict (A. Valenzuela 1978).

Women's citizenship in Chile

Although not mentioned by authors such as Garretón, Oxhorn, or Arturo Valenzuela, there were gendered dimensions to political and social democratization in the 1932-73 period. Women's citizenship was not exercised on the same terms as men's, and women were simply excluded in many ways. Women were not enfranchised as political citizens

until 1949, after a lengthy and hard-fought campaign by women's movements. Even after women were granted formal political rights, they were incorporated and subsequently mobilized politically around their social roles as mothers, as I describe in Chapter 2. This translated into women's exclusion from positions of power and therefore women were unable to exercise their identity as citizens effectively. A gender ideology that associated women exclusively with their maternal roles made it difficult for women to participate in political parties in any capacity beyond a supportive role. Because access to arenas of influence was managed by the political parties, women's subordination in the parties resulted in few women in decision-making arenas. Between 1952 and 1992, only seven women held executive office, compared to 509 men, and women's representation in the Chamber of Deputies in the same period averaged only 4.5 percent and 2.2 percent in the Senate (Valdés and Gomariz 1992, 101; 103). The absence of women from "formal" politics, combined with a class-based model of politics, meant that women's gender interests were not promoted in the public arena (Kirkwood 1986).

Nor did women as individuals benefit from Chile's expanding welfare state in the 1932-73 period. Women's social citizenship rights were dependent on their relation to male workers and the emphasis on women's care-taking responsibilities failed to recognize the productive labour (in both the formal and informal sector) performed by poor, rural, and/or working-class women (see V. Montecinos 1997, 226). Claudia Serrano (1992, 199) notes that social security coverage was never universal largely because the extension of benefits depended on how much pressure a social group could bring to bear on the state through political parties. Women, the youth, and the elderly were largely left out because these groups were rarely organized by political parties.

Even Allende's government (1970-73) did not design programs to address the needs of working-class women until it had been in office for two full years (Power 2000, 290). Although Chile can be classified as having a "strong state" (Rai 1996) that could presumably have responded to women's gender interests if it so chose, women's marginalization from party politics meant that gender issues were kept out of the public arena.

Women benefited from social policy only indirectly, according to Serrano, because the "state- as-benefactor" model in Chile was never designed to challenge gender inequality. When policies and programs were designed to integrate women, they also "permit[ed] the coexistence of a cultural patriarchal model and the egalitarian integrative spirit that characterized the era" (Serrano 1992, 199). This feature is best illustrated in the *Centros de Madres* (Mothers Centres), which served as the main vehicle for organizing and incorporating women as part of Eduardo Frei's *Promoción Popular*. Indeed, the *Centros de Madres* along with the *Juntas de Vecinos* were the main pillars of the PDC platform for incorporating the previously excluded popular sectors. In the *Centros de Madres*, women were mobilized around their care-taking roles, learning traditionally feminine skills to supplement family income, and gaining organizational capacities that would help them develop in their capacity as community care-givers, although community decision-making was to occur in the male-dominated *Juntas de Vecinos*. During Allende's presidency, the number of *Centros de Madres* increased significantly, and they again served as the main vehicle for mobilizing women around the revolution's goals. It has often been noted that Allende seemed unable to develop a coherent and effective strategy for integrating women in a more gender-egalitarian

manner (Chaney 1974; Power 2000). In 1972, the UP government established communal laundries in poor neighbourhoods, set up child-care facilities in factories, and delivered hot meals for female workers to take home to their families (Power 2000, 291). Margaret Power explains, “the Allende government failed to challenge the belief that women were fundamentally mothers and housewives whose primary responsibility was to take care of their family” (*ibid.*). The UP’s inability to effectively incorporate women and to challenge the prevailing gender ideology led to their availability for mobilization in the conservative-led anti-Allende movement. Women, mostly from the middle- and upper-classes, but also from the popular sectors, participated in mass protests against the UP government (Bunster 1988; de los Angeles Crummet 1977; Mattelart 1976; Power 2000).

The authoritarian period (1973-90) that followed the 1973 military coup had important consequences for women’s citizenship. During military rule, certain aspects of the gender ideology were reinforced and manipulated to form part of the doctrine of national security in which women were cast as the “bearers’ of the values of the Fatherland” (Bunster 1988, 487-88). In speeches and in the writings of those associated with the military government, there was a constant analogy drawn between the family and the country as a whole. “*Familia y patria*” (family and fatherland) or “*hogar y patria*” (home and fatherland) were firmly linked together through the roles that women played in inculcating Chilean values and tradition in their children (Molina 1989, 62). According to Natacha Molina, “[g]overnment programs towards women show an almost perfect fit between the traditional role of women and the consolidation of authoritarianism” (*ibid.*, 61).

Following the coup, all Chileans were prevented from exercising their political citizenship. General Pinochet immediately closed Congress and declared all political parties to be “in recess”. He also employed a rhetoric that was extremely anti-political, declaring politics and those who engaged in politics responsible for the crisis which the military was now “solving” (Garretón 1989, 71). Because of women’s “private” identities, they were conceived as more “pure” and thus their “non-political” nature was idealized, further undermining their capacities to exercise a political citizenship identity. In brief, a gender ideology that exclusively focused on women’s maternal roles was reinforced through state discourse and policy (Munzaga and Letelier 1988).

Unlike other countries in Latin America where the authoritarian state transformed social and political relations but did not systematically re-orient the economy, the Chilean economy underwent complete transformation after 1973. The (incomplete) social democratization that had accompanied political democratization between 1932 and 1973 was halted and even reversed. State-led industrialization ceased and the role of the market given priority. The economy was re-oriented around primary and natural resource sectors and emphasis on industry was basically abandoned (Garretón 1989, 125; 135; V. Montecinos 1994, 162). The “shock therapy” policies that were implemented had severe effects: unemployment increased significantly due to privatization and public sector cutbacks; and the removal of price controls had a negative effect on the poor who had depended upon them to survive. Per capita consumption only returned to pre-1973 levels in 1981 (only to decline again after the 1982-83 economic collapse) (V. Montecinos 1994, 163).

The social citizenship rights extended first under Frei and then Allende were also removed through the project of social “modernizations” implemented by the Pinochet regime. Instead of conceiving of health care, education, and social security as universal entitlements of citizens (or at least male citizens, with women accessing these goods through their relationships with male workers), most aspects of the welfare state in Chile were privatized and transferred to the local (“non-political”) level to be administered. According to Garretón, social modernization involved “attempting to transfer the principles of the market to new spheres” (1989, 134). The state would only act in those areas where the market was failing, i.e., the state would provide services to those who were entirely excluded from the market (Serrano 1992, 204). But in these instances, the state provided services or direct benefits to *individuals* who could not access services through the market, not to collective actors (*ibid.*). This targeting of social welfare services led to a significant decline in state social spending, from 25 percent of GDP in 1971 to only 14 percent of GDP in 1981 (*ibid.*, 205).

Women’s citizenship was affected in important ways by these changes, and a fuller description of these changes and their effects on women is contained in Chapter 3. Here it suffices to say that women of all classes were confronting fundamental contradictions that ultimately generated a women’s movement in pursuit of democracy and women’s citizenship. Popular sector women experienced the contradiction between the ideal of womanhood embedded in Chilean gender ideology and promoted through the

dictatorship's social policies towards women¹⁴ and the daily realities of their lives. There was a fundamental tension here because while the gender discourse emphasized a role for women that was limited to the (private) family and community sphere, many women from the popular sectors were compelled to work outside this sphere given the prolonged male unemployment provoked by the regimes' economic policies (Molina 1989; Munzaga and Letelier 1988). Middle- and upper-class women faced a contradiction that grew out of their high levels of education¹⁵ that failed to translate into easy access to professional employment. While women's participation in the labour force had grown in the 1960s, the discourse of Pinochet's regime reinforced the prevailing sexism in the (male-dominated) professional world by urging "the return of the woman to family life" (Munzaga and Letelier 1988, 533).¹⁶ Finally, women from all classes experienced the contradiction between a public discourse that valorized both women and their nurturing roles and the reality of a dictatorship that was daily violating these principles through its policies of terror, "disappearances," and repression. Women, therefore, were the backbone of the human rights movements that emerged almost immediately, re-claiming "political" space and bringing to it "private" concerns.

In sum, the contradictions embedded in the total transformation of Chilean politics, economy, and society, produced a multi-class women's movement which,

¹⁴ The military regime basically continued to utilize the *Centros de Madres* as the main vehicle for delivering goods and services to poor women.

¹⁵ Chilean women enjoyed considerable access to higher education compared to other countries in Latin America (Munzaga and Letelier 1988, 532).

¹⁶ Unlike in Chile, the Brazilian state under authoritarianism actually expanded, creating numerous professional jobs for women. When large numbers of educated working women confronted the blatant sexism in the labour force, the seeds were sown for the emergence of a feminist movement (Alvarez 1990).

although different segments began mobilizing for different reasons, ultimately came together with a single goal: the return of democracy. But within the Pinochet-era women's movement, feminists initiated the task of re-thinking what democracy had meant for women and concluded that under the previous democracy, women's citizenship had been incomplete. Thus, the women's movement demanded a democracy in which women would enjoy a more meaningful citizenship. The movement made creative use of slogans such as "*¡democracia en el país y en la casa!* (democracy in the country and in the home), and "*¡si la mujer no está, la democracia no va!*" (if women aren't there, democracy won't work).

The women's movement that emerged under authoritarianism in Chile secured a number of its goals, as I show in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. One of the reasons they enjoyed a degree of success, especially compared to other countries that underwent transitions from authoritarianism, was their participation in the wider movement to re-establish democracy in Chile. The Pinochet dictatorship completely destroyed existing political patterns, namely the relationship between the social and political aspects of democratization. Even since democracy was restored in 1989-90, democratization has proceeded in the political arena, while the social and economic arena continue to be governed primarily by market principles which are, to a large degree, inimical to full democratic citizenship. The causes of this outcome, according to Garretón (1995), are linked to the fact that the economic crisis of 1982-83, created by the global debt crisis, was not sufficient to dislodge the dictatorship. By the time a transition occurred, the economic crisis had been resolved and economic growth restored (see Haggard and Kaufman 1995).

The economic crisis of the early 1980s produced the first mass protests against the regime, but these protests were not sufficient to cause the collapse of the regime largely because the opposition was still divided. The political crisis that ended democracy in 1973 and the brutality of the repression that followed were so severe as to practically incapacitate opposition political actors (especially the political parties). While other authoritarian regimes, notably Brazil, maintained the façade of functioning democracy by keeping parties running and Congress open, the Chilean Congress remained closed and parties banned for 17 years. The previously strong labour movement was effectively destroyed as a social and political force through the process of de-industrialization and labour code revisions which severely weakened the power of unions. Overall, the extensive relationships between civil and political society suffered major damage, although parties continued to operate underground. In addition to the severing of links between social organizations and parties, the bitterness and blame-laying surrounding the Allende years and the events of September 11, 1973 inhibited partisan actors from acting effectively in establishing the necessary alliances to defeat the dictatorship (Garretón 1991). It was not until 1986 that opposition parties began to work together to launch a serious challenge to the regime. Once working together, the opposition was successful in further de-legitimizing the regime, although much of this work had already been carried out by the human rights and women's movements. What is most important for the purposes of women's citizenship in democratization processes is that the women's movement enjoyed important opportunities to influence the process because it could act as part of the wider pro-democracy movement, and, as an important public actor in the

movement, it could insert gender-based demands into the demands of the broader movement. This process is described in fuller detail in Chapter 3.

In 1988 Chileans voted to put an end to Pinochet's rule. They were afforded the opportunity to do so because the 1980 Constitution written by Pinochet's regime contained a clause specifying a plebiscite to be held in 1988 on the continuation of Pinochet's rule for another eight years. The plebiscite was free and fair largely because of the pressure from the pro-democratic opposition to make it so, and because Pinochet mistakenly believed that he would win. When the "No" forces won the vote, it became clear there would be a transition to democracy, and elections for President and Congress were scheduled for the following year. In the interim, negotiations took place between the outgoing military regime and the pro-democratic opposition. The 1980 Constitution was made somewhat more democratic, while also maintaining certain "authoritarian enclaves".¹⁷ The subsequent elections, both Congressional and presidential, were won by the *Concertación de los Partidos por la Democracia* (CPD, Coalition of Parties for Democracy), which was the same alliance of Centre and Left parties that had organized opposition against the dictatorship and had campaigned for the "No" side in the referendum. President Patricio Aylwin, of the Christian Democratic Party (which was the largest party in the *Concertación*), was inaugurated as Chile's first democratic president since Allende in March 1990.

¹⁷ Some of the authoritarian features include the lack of civilian control over the Armed Forces; measures to ensure that the civil service (staffed with Pinochet supporters) could not be removed by the incoming democratic government; seven "designated" senators (which ensured the political Right an effective veto power); and a flurry of appointments (of Pinochet supporters) to the judiciary (Garretón 1995, 113).

The recovery of democracy meant the re-extension of political citizenship to all Chileans. Although women still face immense obstacles in exercising their political citizenship rights, the women's movement succeeded in challenging the inherently masculine conception of political citizenship, enough so that women's identities are now considered to be a mixture of their social roles (largely as mothers) and their political roles. What is important, and what I show in the thesis, is how women's citizenship after the transition has been shaped largely by the strategies and discourse the movement pursued during the authoritarian and transition periods. Women mobilized around a discourse of "politicized motherhood," a discourse that made sense for many reasons. First, it was part of the historical legacy of previous women's movements which emerged to struggle for suffrage. First-wave feminism in Chile was a "maternal feminism" that emphasized women's "difference" and the potential value of its contribution to the political arena. It ultimately failed to allow women to exercise fully their political citizenship, however, especially in the male-dominated political parties that monopolized political space. But the mobilizing frame of women's "difference" was effective in organizing women and thus was put to use again under authoritarianism. Of course, it also worked because the context proscribed "political" activity, so women were well-served by appealing to their "non-political" maternal identities. Throughout the years of mobilizing (for both political and economic goals) during authoritarianism, the maternal frame was also employed to demand women's political citizenship rights.

In sum, Chilean women have made gains through democratization, but still have a long way to go in order to exercise their citizenship identities effectively to fully achieve the rights that citizenship entails. The argument that I develop to explain this focuses on

those features of the Chilean context discussed above, namely the predominance of political parties and the political economy of development, but also focuses on the strategic choices made by women in different arenas (political parties, the state, and civil society). Women's citizenship in Chile today continues to be undermined by the monopolization of politics by political parties that operate according to masculine norms and the dichotomy between the "formal" and "informal" political arenas.

Chapter Two – Historical Legacies: First-Wave Feminism, Party Politics, and Women’s Incorporation as “Mobilized Mothers”

In order to understand women’s struggles for citizenship rights in the 1980s and 1990s, we need to look at how women were incorporated into Chilean politics. In this chapter, I show how women’s political incorporation as “mobilized mothers” resulted from the nature of first-wave feminism in Chile. An analysis of first-wave feminism and its outcomes also allows us to draw important comparisons between the various strategies movements have employed, and, in so doing, to challenge existing ideas about their efficacy. Both first-wave feminists and the dictatorship-era women’s movement used a “politics of difference” strategy to forward citizenship demands, but with very different results, showing that a maternalist framework can lead women in various directions.

This chapter outlines the development and consequences of first-wave feminism in Chile in the context of an expanding state and party politics. Like elsewhere in Latin America, and as with first-wave feminism more generally, first-wave women’s movements in Chile organized to pursue social reform and female suffrage by appealing to women’s maternal identities as a basis for political and social rights. In Ruth Lister’s (1997) terms, women pursued a “gender-differentiated” model of citizenship. In Latin America, the “politics of difference” strategy of first-wave women’s movements was a response to the gender ideology of *marianismo* and to the prevailing political and economic context. These women’s movements, and the strategies they pursued, laid the groundwork for women’s subsequent limited incorporation into the Chilean political system. But the prevailing political and economic context, shaped by democratization, intensifying partisan and class competition, and state-led industrialization, also

influenced the terms of women's incorporation and their exercise of citizenship. In this chapter I explain that women were integrated on the basis of their social roles as mothers into a political system dominated by male-led political parties organized around class identities. Consequently, women's citizenship, once granted, was exercised according to the ideal of "mobilized mothers," an identity that kept women on the margins of Chile's class-based politics. In this context, women's incorporation into the political system did not lead to any substantive transformation of the political arena or of unequal gender relations.

This chapter's discussion of first-wave feminism and its outcomes in Chile is an important basis for understanding subsequent developments addressed in later chapters. In this chapter, I show why women's formal citizenship rights did not produce major changes to the political system and only limited changes to gender relations. In the absence of substantive transformation following first-wave women's movements, the task fell to feminists in the 1970s and 1980s to launch gender-based critiques of Chilean political practice, and especially of the political parties which monopolized political space. But perhaps even more importantly, this chapter highlights the importance of the "politics of difference" strategy which Chilean women's movements pursued again in later years, unlike second-wave movements elsewhere (notably North America and parts of Europe). Indeed, the legacy of first-wave women's movements and their maternal feminism mobilized women again during the Pinochet dictatorship. But there is an important difference, however: Chilean women's citizenship demands in the 1980s went beyond "integration" into the existing system and instead called for significant changes to

be made to the system so that women could truly exercise their citizen identities—identities that went hand-in-hand with their maternal identities.

Throughout this chapter, I argue that there are three central features of women's incorporation into politics which are crucial for understanding later developments in Chile. First, because women demanded to enter politics based on their difference, i.e., they insisted that women would bring something to politics that was lacking, women had a difficult and complex relationship with the political parties that dominated Chilean politics right from the beginning. The political parties initially could not merely incorporate women's issues into politics because women themselves framed their issues as being outside of, even above, the realm of partisan politics. Most women's organizations in this early period sought autonomy from the world of traditional politics monopolized by the parties. While many groups clearly had allies within the progressive forces of the Left, most women refused to frame their issues in Left-Right terms. Once women were given the vote, women's groups and women's political parties had a hard time maintaining their autonomous position, however, and found that it was impossible to practice their own style of non-partisan politics. Women's parties and organizations soon collapsed and women who wanted to practice electoral politics joined the traditional parties. Once in the parties, women felt compelled to focus on the issues that dominated Chilean politics, that is, class and partisan issues.

Second, women's participation was institutionalized by the state in a way that reinforced collective identities rooted in women's care-taking roles. In other words, women's citizenship was expressed in their mobilization as mothers. As soon as the Chilean state started to take on a role in delivering social services, women became the

link through which citizens were tied to the state as beneficiaries of state services. By 1964, this role was institutionalized in the state-directed *Centros de Madres*. While women's social roles formed the basis around which they were organized and mobilized in the *Centros*, it was through these very roles that women were constructed by the state as a collective actor and were increasingly brought into Chile's intensifying partisan conflict. That is, the party organizations that operated through community organizations such as the *Centros de Madres* appealed to women as mothers, and, moreover, as mothers whose interests were "above" the narrow politics of class.

Finally, how women emerged as a collective actor and how they were incorporated into politics set up both the institutional infrastructure and certain "repertoires of collective action" that facilitated the emergence of the women's movement as a crucial actor in the anti-Pinochet movement of the 1980s. Moreover, the legacy of maternal feminism and the "mobilized mother" ideal of citizenship expressed in the *Centros de Madres* served as bases for the mobilizing frame of "militant mothers" defending and protecting their families and communities from the dangers posed by the dictatorship.

This chapter has four sections. The first discusses first-wave feminism in general and shows how the Chilean case is consistent with these movements more generally. The second section briefly describes the political and historical context in which first-wave movements emerged in Chile. The third section elaborates the nature of women's mobilizations for social and political reform, highlighting the relationship between women's organizations and traditional political parties. The fourth section discusses the consequences of women's attainment of formal citizenship status (i.e., suffrage), and

describes how women were incorporated into the intensifying partisan competition of the era as “mobilized mothers.”

First-Wave Feminism

Chile fits the general model of first-wave women’s movements which, on the whole, did not substantially contest existing (unequal) gender relations, but rather, argued for social reform or greater rights for women from within the parameters of existing gender ideology which identified women almost exclusively with their mothering and care-taking roles. Janet Saltzman Chafetz, Anthony Gary Dworkin, and Stephanie Swanson (1990), based on a study of twenty-nine cases, identify industrialization and urbanization as processes that inspired first-wave women’s movements. These processes, taken together, expanded women’s roles, leading more women to enter the “public” sphere of education and labour-force participation. These changes further led to greater contact and communication among women who subsequently formed clubs and organizations which were conducive to the emergence of women’s consciousness of the inequality suffered by their gender. According to the authors, women’s movements emerged because of “social-structural strain—that is, ambiguities, tensions, conflicts, discriminations, and discrepancies within a social order characterized by inequality” (Chafetz, Dworkin and Swanson 1990, 304). They argue that first-wave women’s movements rarely produced radical change, however, because of structural factors: the tensions emerging out of women’s “role expansion” associated with early industrialization produced merely reformist or ameliorative women’s movements because

there was still no serious demand for women's labour (*ibid.*). Thus, the mostly middle-class women who participated in the movements pursued changes that would allow women to be better mothers and citizens rather than pursuing changes that would radically alter women's main responsibilities for the "private" sphere of family in order to become "public" beings (either in the workforce or in politics). More radical demands to alter gender relations (i.e., those which challenged the gendered division of labour) only emerged under second-wave feminism when advanced industrialization provoked a greater need for women in the labour force.

While this explanation for the reformist rather than radical demands of first-wave women's movements is compelling, Latin American movements were not exclusively, nor in some cases even primarily, composed of middle-class or elite women. Working-class women's organizations and socialist feminism were important aspects of first-wave feminism in Latin America, especially in countries like Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. Asunción Lavrin, in her study of the origins of Southern Cone feminism, notes the flexibility of feminism in the early twentieth century, and the lack of serious conflict between socialist and liberal feminists (1995, 20-1). Also, first-wave feminism in Latin America emerged around the turn of the century, which is slightly prior to the region's promotion of industrialization as a development strategy in the 1930s. The movements' emergence appears to be more connected to the decline of oligarchies and the emergence of "populism" as a means of responding to the social issues of the era. These developments did coincide, however, with the first stirrings of industrialization, which expanded the working-class and brought attention to workers' rights and the need to expand the suffrage.

Throughout Latin America, women's organizations in the early twentieth century emerged out of the "new middle-sectors" which were largely linked to the expansion of states. Women in this sector were mainly teachers, clerks, and government employees (Miller 1995, 192). The organizations women formed in this era were above all concerned with social reform issues such as health and hygiene, education, literacy, working conditions (especially for women), and mothers' welfare (*ibid.*). Women's suffrage was less central to Latin American feminists than to their North American or European counterparts because universal male suffrage was rarely the norm; change and progressive reform was not often achieved through the ballot box; and social and economic concerns tended to be more pressing (Miller 1994, 157). Throughout the region, women's organizations held conferences, published newspapers, journals, and periodicals, and a number of high-profile women participated in international conferences where the theme of women's suffrage was raised. Indeed, it was Latin American feminists who urged the creation of the Pan American Association for the Advancement of Women, which, at its 1922 conference in Baltimore, proclaimed women's suffrage to be a key goal (*ibid.*, 158).

When women's suffrage was achieved in Latin America, it was under very different conditions, and, in some cases, suffrage was extended to women in the absence of significant movements (Chaney 1979; Craske 1999, 58; Miller 1994, 168-9). Table 1. lists the years of women's enfranchisement in Latin America.

Table 1.

Country	Year Suffrage Extended to Women
Ecuador	1929
Brazil	1932
Uruguay	1932
Cuba	1934
Dominican Republic	1942
Guatemala	1945
Panama	1946
Argentina	1947
Venezuela	1947
Chile	1949
Costa Rica	1949
El Salvador	1950
Bolivia	1952
Mexico	1953
Colombia	1954
Honduras	1955
Nicaragua	1955
Peru	1955
Paraguay	1961

Source: Adapted from Valdés and Gomariz 1995, 139.

In some Latin American countries, women were enfranchised by conservative governments or military leaders who believed that women would constitute an important base of support. For example, Peruvian women obtained suffrage in 1955, “not [as] a result of women’s pressure but of the efforts of a military leader, General Manuel A.

Odría, to obtain women's votes" (Vargas and Villanueva 1994, 579). Likewise, in Ecuador, which was the first Latin American country to give women the vote (1929), suffrage was extended by a conservative regime which believed that women would be a major support base and thus a bulwark against the growth of socialist parties (Miller 1995, 195-6). Women were excluded as citizens in the revolutionary Mexican Constitution (1917) because it was believed that their religiosity and conservatism would undermine the Revolution's goals (Chaney 1979, 68; Craske 1999, 58).

To varying degrees throughout the region, the dominance of Catholicism produced a gender ideology containing stereotypes about women's "natural" inclinations towards conservatism. Ideals of femininity were very much influenced by Catholicism's worship of the Virgin Mary—the "ideal mother". The gender ideology resulting from this has been described as "*marianismo*," which, according to Evelyn Stevens (1973), is "the other face of *machismo*". While *machismo* refers to male virility and exaggerated aggressiveness, *marianismo* refers to women's spiritual superiority and their capacity for self-sacrifice (Stevens 1973). Above all, "womanhood was synonymous with motherhood" (Lavrin 1995, 32). This gender ideology has reinforced notions of women's inherent conservatism by portraying women as more religious, but even more importantly, by exclusively identifying them with their family roles. Jane Jaquette has raised the argument that women's conservatism in Latin America may indeed stem from their fear of losing their only source of power—their roles in the family: "Women themselves have a stake in the family as a strong institution in which they have power (socialization of children, the enforcement of social sanctions against women and men who deviate from accepted behaviour patterns, and the preservation of moral and spiritual

values that are still a part of the Latin American cultural heritage)” (1976, 229). This stereotype of women’s “natural” conservatism has led Leftist parties and movements to treat women with ambivalence and even suspicion.

Elsewhere in Latin America, women were enfranchised as part of “modernizing” or reformist governments that came to power displacing oligarchic elites. In some cases, such as Brazil, a mass suffrage movement existed in the 1920s, with support from elites in the anti-oligarchic faction. But women were enfranchised in 1932 only after the oligarchy was finally defeated and a “modernizing revolution” underway (Tabak 1994, 130). In other countries, such as Costa Rica, Chile, and Argentina, women’s suffrage movements had to struggle for 20-30 years, as part of reformist movements and as supporters of reformist governments, before finally gaining the vote (González-Suárez 1994; Lavrin 1995). While women’s suffrage was achieved for a variety of different reasons and under very different conditions, the justification that women used to demand political rights was everywhere the same: women pursued suffrage as “the means to a more moral society within a platform that emphasized the social motherhood issues and peace more than gender equity” (Miller 1994, 169).

The Context for First-Wave Feminism in Chile

Feminism emerged in Chile as women pursued reforms to improve social conditions (for women, children, and the working-class) and as women challenged their gender-based subordination and lack of civil and political rights. Women’s subordination was reflected in the Civil Codes, which, enacted throughout Latin America in the nineteenth century,

converted married women into dependents of their husbands. According to Virginia Sánchez Korrol, “[m]atrimony continued to be the institution that accorded husbands administrative control over their wives’ properties...women could not enter into legal contracts, work, or utilize their wages without their husbands’ approval” (1999, 68-9). Additionally, *patria potestad* gave fathers exclusive authority over their children, with the exception of children born outside of marriage. In such cases, the mother exercises parental rights unless the father recognizes the child as his own (Lavrin 1995, 196). The status of women expressed in Chile’s 1855 Civil Code established women as completely subordinate to their husbands (Fries and Matus 1999, 78; Lavrin 1995, 193). The Code was extremely patriarchal, and denied married women any control over their bodies, their assets, or their children, and further obliged the wife to obey her husband (Covarrubias 1976, 617). The husband determined the couple’s residence, and held total administrative control over property owned before and acquired after marriage (Lavrin 1995, 194-5). Married women, due to their subordination to their husbands, were deemed “*incapaz*” (incapable) of legal actions. Lavrin notes that,

[t]he loss of control over their persons, their property, their movements, their ability to exercise their own will, and their children was the main source of discomfort for married women at the turn of the century. Gender and civil status, not class, placed all women in the same circumstances. Whether factory workers or university professionals, married women were equally restricted by the law (1995, 197).

Women’s subordination was, of course, linked to the prevailing gender ideology which exclusively associated women with the “private” domain of the family. The social roles associated with motherhood came to form the basis of the gender ideology in Chile. Women, as mothers, are expected to act *for* others, mainly their children, but women’s

caring responsibilities often extend to their communities as well. The feature that is most closely bound up with the motherhood identity and *marianismo* is the woman's supposed boundless capacity for self-sacrifice and for putting the needs of others before her own. According to Elsa Chaney (1979, 47), "the characterization of women as sacrificial mothers sums up what Latin Americans consider the most positive aspect of the image of woman". A Chilean newspaper article in 1915 noted that "the greatest merit of the woman throughout the ages is her capacity to love and her maternal instinct, qualities which the Chilean woman greatly demonstrates" (cited in Gaviola *et al* 1986, 21).

The emergence of women's activism in this period is also linked to the major social and political changes that were occurring, changes which had significant impact on women and their subsequent organization in pursuit of progressive reform. The key change was the expansion of the state which followed the collapse of the oligarchy and the emergence of a reformist government under Arturo Alessandri in 1932. During this period, a (limited) welfare state emerged and the public sector took control of large portions of the economy. Women became "public" actors in the first few decades of the twentieth century because the changing economic and social landscape increasingly necessitated their entrance into the labour force (Covarrubias 1976, 621). A mainly rural economy was gradually being transformed into an urban industrial economy, a transformation which resulted in a prolonged period of rural to urban migration.¹ In many of these displaced families, women played the main subsistence role, earning

¹ Urbanization actually began in the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1859, twenty per cent of the population lived in cities, but by 1895 this figure had risen to forty-six per cent (Covarrubias 1976, 618).

income through domestic service, selling food, drinks, and handicrafts, or renting out parts of their dwellings as shelter for other new migrants (Gaviola *et al* 1986; Valdés and Weinstein 1993). Women from the middle-classes began to see a “professionalization” of their social roles as care-givers as the state began to take a greater interest in the health, education, and well-being of its citizens. The emergence of the populist welfare state meant that the state took on the role of providing social services, at first in a limited way, but these services expanded over time. Prior to the state taking on this role, upper-class women had performed these tasks through charity work, caring for the sick, the elderly, and the very young. When state social services displaced charity, women often continued to play the same roles, but did so now as professionals—as teachers, nurses, and social workers (Lavrin 1995, 296). Women’s (private) social roles were now being performed in the public domain.

Perhaps the key defining feature of the political system in this period was the exaggerated importance of the state, which, according to Arturo Valenzuela “consisted of an awesome set of structures and institutions” (1978, 13). As the state expanded to play greater social and economic roles, middle-classes and the bourgeoisie began to develop links to the state to pursue their economic interests. According to Garretón, this feature of Chilean politics is responsible for the type of party system that evolved in Chile, that is, one where parties became the key vehicles for organizing civil society, in turn stifling the capacity of autonomous civil society organizations (1989, 12; see also Oxhorn 1995b). Consequently, “the dominant mode of political action consisted of organizing a social base in order to bind it to party structures and thus exert pressure on the state, at times demanding fulfilment of claims and at other times seeking to take control of the

state” (*ibid.*). The importance of political parties to Chilean politics cannot be overstated. Political parties in Chile organize more than just formal politics, they also extend deep into local community and social organizations. One commentator has noted that prior to 1973, “Chile’s party system was everywhere, not only determining the political recruitment process for important national posts but also structuring contests in such diverse institutions as government agencies, professional and industrial unions, neighbourhood organizations, and even local high schools” (A. Valenzuela 1978, 3). As we shall see, this feature of Chilean politics has exerted a powerful influence over how women exercise their citizenship.

Women Mobilize for Change: 1884-1949

When women began to organize and pursue change, they appealed to women’s “difference” as justification. Because of the importance of Chilean gender ideology, women asked for citizenship rights based on their identities as mothers. Lavrin describes Chilean feminism of this era as “compensatory feminism,” because it does not challenge women’s social roles but only challenges the deprivation of women’s political rights based on their social functions. Compensatory feminism “created a gendered social space where the woman-mother’s ‘spiritual equality’ was recognized and legal reforms repaired previous inequities” (*ibid.*, 40). The kind of equality sought by Chilean women is evident in leading feminist Amanda Labarca’s comments in a magazine:

We do not ask for our civil equality in a tragicomic effort to be exactly like you [men]. We know that our functions are different...but our spirit is equal, and our ideals for the redemption of humankind are identical. We only wish to reside harmoniously with you at the same level of

spiritual equality. We dislike equally the man who feminizes himself and the woman who adopts the deportment of a man (cited in Lavrin 1995, 38)

The Chilean gender ideology and its emphasis on women's "difference," i.e., their maternal identities, prescribe for women behaviour that keeps them in the "private" sphere of the home and the family. This reinforces a sexual division of labour in which men are political or "public" actors and women are restricted to the tasks necessary to the reproduction of the private sphere. This is neatly captured in the popular Spanish saying "*la mujer en la casa, el hombre en la calle*" (the woman in the home, the man on the street) (cited in Chaney 1979, 49). By the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, however, this saying had ceased to hold literally, as the boundaries of *la casa* (private) and *la calle* (public) were more symbolic than real. This is because women began to undertake activities that, while clearly relating to the "private" realm (for example, children's education and health, women's working conditions), the pursuit of these issues required that women be more visible and often required them to act publicly. What is important is that in pursuing the interests that motivated them, women strategically drew on the images of woman-as-mother (Chaney 1979; Lavrin 1995; Miller 1991). Moreover, even when a coherent feminist identity began to emerge in Chile, it celebrated rather than rejected women's maternal roles. Chilean suffragists, for example, insisted that Chilean women "could never surrender the sense of motherhood that surrounds and penetrates our understanding of life" (cited in Lavrin 1995, 298)

The suffrage movement

In the 1870s, various actions were taken by women which challenged their exclusion and marginalization from politics. Initially, these challenges were carried out by elite women from the educated middle-and upper-classes. Women from these classes were the most likely to be familiar with the liberal political ideals that were spreading throughout Europe and North America. But it was not just women who began to note the contradictions between professing liberal and progressive values of a just social order while tacitly accepting precepts that severely limited women's educational opportunities and maintained their subordinate and nearly child-like political status. Many leading male intellectuals of the era supported the idea that women should be educated and be granted, at least formally, the same equality conferred to men (Lavrin 1995). In 1877, the Amunátegui Decree granted women the right to enter the universities. Through this decree, Chile became the first Latin American country to grant women access to superior education. Chilean elites, however, were unwilling to extend any political rights to women. In 1884, a group of women from San Felipe, a small town slightly north of Santiago, challenged their exclusion by registering themselves to vote in the upcoming elections. They argued that they should have this right because there was nothing in the Chilean Constitution that specifically denied suffrage to women. The government's response was to amend the Constitution with a clause that did just that—it explicitly stated that the right to vote was specific to men (Covarrubias 1976; Gaviola *et al* 1986, 19). It would be well over sixty years before suffrage was extended to women. But the issue was only on the agenda of a small segment of middle- and upper-class women.

Nonetheless, as early as 1873 a conference on the theme was organized and one of the women involved highlighted the contradictory logic at play:

It has been said and is repeated often that we are not prepared for this [voting]. What preparation is it that the most humble of men has save for the fact of being a man, which we cannot achieve? Without any preparation we are delivered to marriage, to be mothers, which is the greatest of all our duties and for that neither the Church nor our parents nor our husband demands anything other than accepting it... (cited in Gaviola *et al* 1986, 19).

In their detailed history of the Chilean suffrage movement, Edda Gaviola *et al* (1986, 39) note that the period between 1913 and 1925 is characterized by the awakening of the “associative spirit” of women. During this period a number of explicitly feminist organizations were founded and women came to constitute themselves as a collective actor demanding social, political, and economic rights. Moreover, during this period women’s collective action began to illustrate a pattern that would come to form a part of women’s collective historical imagination. Years later, women would again draw on styles of mobilization that were developed in the early years of the twentieth century. The “pioneers” of Chilean feminism were the *Centros Femeninos Belén de Sárrago*, which took their name from a popular intellectual of the era who promoted ideals of free thinking and anti-clericalism (Kirkwood 1986, 96-7). These centres were established in the north of the country, first in Antofagasta and later in Iquique. According to Gaviola *et al*, the north produced the early feminist movement because of women’s important mobilizing roles in the broader popular movements of the region, especially those linked to labour conflicts in the mining area (1986, 32). Women’s organizations were also flourishing among urban middle- and upper-class women as well. By 1915 in Santiago

there were two women's organizations—the *Club de Señoras* and the *Circulo de Lectura*—whose ends were mainly cultural. But in addition to discussing poetry, art, and literature, these groups organized discussions on women's political rights (Gaviola *et al* 1986, 34). Most organized women wanted Civil Code reform, especially greater control over marital assets for married women.

Despite women's formal exclusion from exercising political citizenship, political parties were concerned with mobilizing women, and many of them established separate women's wings to that end. The *Partido Radical* recruited women members as early as 1888 and set up a women's wing in 1934 (Chaney 1979, 93). Leading feminist Amanda Labarca was an active member of this party. Women were active in the *Partido Comunista* (PC) since its inception in 1911, but the party has never (and still does not) organize women into separate organizations. The *Partido Socialista* (PS), on the other had, established a women's wing in 1933. The main parties on the Right—the *Partido Conservador* and the *Partido Liberal*—both created separate women's wings. According to Gaviola *et al*, because of assumptions about women's "natural" conservatism, the parties of the Right made greater efforts to attract women members than did the Leftist parties (1986, 47). The Conservative Party's women's wing (created in 1941) served mainly as a vehicle for women's charity work with the poor (Chaney 1979, 94). While women therefore had a presence in political parties, their separation into women's wings kept them marginalized and out of the parties' decision-making structures. The main goals of the parties were to get women involved in supportive activities and to mobilize the vote. Valdés and Weinstein (1993, 45) note, however, that due to the emergence of feminism and women's activism around social issues, by the 1930s all political parties

had some position on women's issues. Many parties were beginning to view women as future voters, and therefore sought to gain their allegiance.

Although women activists and feminists often had links to traditional political parties, many of them sought to portray themselves—and women overall—as *apolitical* and above partisan politics. Women's movements of this era opted for a strategy of "autonomy" over "integration," but not necessarily out of a fear of co-optation. Rather, they opted for autonomy because their "politics of difference" led them to draw a sharp distinction between masculine "politics" (a corrupt affair that was all about the pursuit of power for partisan purposes) and feminine activism which sought neither power nor prestige but the betterment of society. This position shaped the nature of the women's organizations formed to pursue female suffrage in Chile. Many Chilean feminists, as elsewhere in the region (Brazil and Argentina) shunned traditional politics by forming their own political parties. Lavrin explains that "within the female parties women felt comfortable and free from masculine influence in determining their course of action and their goals" (1995, 46). Prior to achieving suffrage, female parties "were exercises in organization and mobilization to lobby for political rights and other causes" (*ibid.*). In Chile, two women's parties were formed in the 1920s, the *Partido Cívico Femenino* and the *Partido Democrática Femenino*. The women who formed these parties placed a high value on autonomy and believed that women needed to remain above traditional partisan conflicts. For example, the *Partido Cívico Femenino* declared its independence from any political or religious groupings in its statutes (Covarrubias 1976, 628). María de la Cruz, the party's founder, believed that women must be able to pursue their aims independently of men and needed their own party to do so (*ibid.*, 639).

In addition to the creation of female parties, the 1930s also saw the formation of a host of women's groups and networks whose primary goal was women's suffrage. The most important of these was the *Movimiento pro-Emancipación de Mujeres de Chile* (MEMCH), formed in 1935 by women, mostly on the Left, who proposed radical social change to improve women's situation. In its declaration principles, MEMCH described itself as "a wide organization of national character that groups women of all ideological tendencies that are disposed to struggle for the social, economic, and juridical liberation of women" (cited in Gaviola *et al* 1986, 43). MEMCH was the first women's organization to organize women massively through large rallies and public events. The organization linked women's political struggles to other social issues of the day: peace, unemployment, and the high cost of living (*ibid.*). It also drew on existing progressive Leftist discourse and was a strong promoter of the rights of working women. Despite the influence of Leftist ideology on MEMCH, it consciously avoided the prevailing language of politics—i.e., the language of class struggle (Lavrin 1995, 310). Although MEMCH was founded mostly by women from the Left, women in the organization, like those in the women's parties, aimed at autonomy from the "corrupt" world of masculine politics. Its founder, Elena Caffarena explains, "the fact of being apolitical doesn't deny that women be trained for and enter into the political parties, but it is an error to give to MEMCH a political tendency. Each group has its function: the class struggle is for the parties, and for the feminine struggles, the feminine organizations like MEMCH" (cited in Covarrubias 1976, 632). By these words, it is clear that women's struggles were not considered "political," which was a concept monopolized exclusively by parties.

Their claims of autonomy notwithstanding, MEMCH worked closely with the parties of the Left, especially those that came to form the *Frente Popular* in 1936. In fact, according to Gaviola *et al*, MEMCH eventually became the “feminine arm” of the *Frente Popular* (1986, 44). MEMCH’s preoccupation with the issues of working-class women and their families ultimately generated tensions with middle-class women. Partisan tensions seriously undermined MEMCH by the late 1940s when the Communist Party was outlawed by the Chilean government. When MEMCH and its members mobilized against this form of political exclusion, they came to be seen as too closely allied with the Communists, which resulted in their own exclusion from Chilean politics (Gaviola *et al* 1986, 45).

The struggle for suffrage finally gained a mass following in 1944, when MEMCH, along with another umbrella group created that same year, the *Federación Chilena de Instituciones Femeninas* (FECHIF), began to mobilize massively for women’s political rights. In the campaign, organized women emphasized the special qualities that women would bring to politics because of their social functions. They claimed that women would bring a “moral voice” to politics and would focus attention on day-to-day issues related to the difficulties so many families faced, but were not sufficiently addressed by the existing political class. Women argued that they would bring to politics values they naturally acquired in their roles as mothers. It is evident that Chilean feminists who argued for women’s inclusion into “formal” politics believed women had a particular role to play in politics—not that men and women were motivated by the same concerns. Lavrin explains that,

The extensive use of an ideology of social mission based on gender functions and attributes helped early twentieth century feminists as they tried to raise themselves by their own bootstraps and make a case for their participating in public life. Women used the appeal of culturally safe images to carve out a niche in politics (1995, 13).

In their struggle for female suffrage, women had a number of allies within the male political elite. In March 1934 a bill was finally passed to allow women to vote in municipal elections, which would serve as sort of a “testing ground” to determine if women were “ready” to vote in national elections. According to Gaviola *et al*, the municipal arena was seen as little more than a “*casa grande*” (big house) and thus women would simply extend their traditional roles somewhat by participating in municipal affairs as both voters and candidates (1986, 59; 63). Perhaps the most important outcome of the municipal elections of 1935 was the confirmation of what many male elites had suspected: women tended towards conservatism. While the number of women who voted was small, they tended to support the parties of the Right, in large part because these parties made greater efforts to appeal to women in their campaigns (*ibid.* 61). Likewise, most of the women candidates who won represented the Conservative Party. There were 98 women candidates in these elections, and 25 women won. Of these, 16 were from the Conservative Party (*ibid.*). Where women participated as candidates, the administration of the municipality was depicted as analogous to running a home (*ibid.*, 63). This election conditioned the subsequent behaviour of Chilean political parties towards women. Since then, the Right has tried actively to appeal to women by emphasizing their moral duties and appealing to women’s “natural” desire for order,

while the parties of the Left, assuming women are conservative, have very little to say to women (Gaviola *et al* 1986, 61; Lavrin 1995, 317).

The right to vote and be elected nationally was finally granted to women in 1948 when a bill was finally passed. The timing had less to do with massive opposition to women's suffrage than with the fact that legislation on women's suffrage was continually put on the back-burner and was never considered a high priority by Presidents or Congress. One of the suffrage movement's biggest supporters was President Pedro Aguirre Cerda of the *Frente Popular*, who introduced a bill on women's suffrage in 1941. Unfortunately, he died soon after, thus depriving the movement of one of its strongest supporters while the bill languished in the legislative process, not even to be discussed for another four years. Legislation often takes years to make its way through the Congress and committee system in Chile, however, one of the executive's most important powers is the capacity to declare certain bills "urgent," which requires their discussion within a specified time period. The Chilean executive, therefore, has important "agenda-setting" powers. Women's rights legislation, however, was seldom declared urgent. After a new bill on women's suffrage was introduced in 1945, it, too, was making its way through Congress very slowly. It was ultimately sped up when it received a "simple urgency" classification from the president (Gaviola *et al* 1986, 73).

By this time, the movement was becoming much more militant in demanding equal rights. In part, they were spurred on by what was going on internationally, especially the fact that, after World War Two, women received the vote in a number of countries. Additionally, Chile had signed on to a number of international agreements which dealt with equal rights for women. Thus, even one of Chile's Conservative

Senators, Horacio Walker, argued that Chile's laws needed to be reformed to conform with international agreements, and those of other Western democratic countries (*ibid.*).

Women's organizations, especially FECHIF and MEMCH organized massive rallies mobilizing for women's suffrage. Most importantly, they continued to emphasize the importance of allowing women's "moral voice" to be heard as women's activism was framed as fundamentally different from men's. In this spirit, the *Partido Cívico Femenino* insisted that women were needed to "purify" politics. It also declared itself to be neither Left nor Right, saying that, "*los hombres se dividen por la idea, nosotras nos unificamos por el sentimiento*" (men are divided over ideas, we women are unified by feelings) (cited in Gaviola *et al* 1986, 73). Soon, all women's organizations were working together, pursuing a dual strategy of mobilizing women and pressuring political leaders in Congress (*ibid.*, 46). Finally, in December 1948, women's suffrage became law.

Women as Citizens: "Mobilized Mothers": 1950-1973

After women's formal political citizenship was granted, women were increasingly incorporated into the Chilean political process, as actors with a particular set of interests and concerns deriving from their social roles as mothers. In part, this derives from the strategies discussed above that women's movements employed to achieve their political rights, but these strategies themselves emerged out of Chilean gender ideology and the prevailing political context. There are two important consequences of first-wave feminism that are relevant to explaining subsequent developments: first, women's

relations with and in political parties; and second, the nature and role of the state- and party-linked organizations created to incorporate women as “mobilized mothers” acting primarily in the “informal” political arena.

As noted earlier, feminists and women’s leaders created their own political parties as part of their “politics of difference” strategy for achieving citizenship. This insistence on autonomy from traditional political actors, however, led to a number of problems for women. Lavrin notes the ambiguous and contradictory nature of women’s parties in this period. Female parties were clearly engaging in the political process, while claiming to be “apolitical” (1995, 46-7). This essential contradiction contributed to the problems women confronted after they were enfranchised. As Lavrin explains, “refusing to accept politics on the same premises as men perpetuated the idea of female political leaders as oddities and lessened their potential for exerting power in national politics” (*ibid.*). In a similar vein, Valdés and Weinstein explain that once women entered the messy world of politics, they “felt incapable of carrying forward their own form of doing politics” (1993, 51-2). In framing their motivations as “morally pure,” women were, in effect, putting themselves, and the issues they pursued, above politics. This strategy backfired, however, ultimately leading to the collapse of women’s parties.

Prior to winning the vote, women’s parties worked at mobilizing women and pressuring political leaders to pass female suffrage. After 1949, these parties participated in elections, and the leader of the *Partido Femenino Chileno* (PFCH), María de la Cruz, was elected to the Senate. Through this party, Chilean feminists believed they could practice an autonomous form of politics, rooted in women’s political nature (example, more moral, less prone to corruption, and not limited to the Left-Right ideological

divisions that organized traditional politics). When women were confronted with having to practice politics in the political arena, however, they opened themselves up to greater scrutiny and criticism because of the high standards they had set for themselves. As Kirkwood explains, “starting from the moment in which it began to act in ‘politics’ the PFCH had to confront adversaries, make alliances, endure internal divisions, [and] initiate ideological debates with other feminist groups and politicians” (1986, 153). Ultimately, the party fell apart after María de la Cruz became embroiled in a scandal. Both the party and its leader were being attacked by the Left and the Right. Three women parliamentarians from outside the party presented charges of “dishonourable conduct” against Sra. Cruz, claiming that she was involved in an illicit and illegal business scheme. The leader of the only women’s political party gave up her Senate seat in disgrace.

The end of the PFCH signalled the end of an autonomous feminist politics and even in subsequent decades, the strategy of women’s parties has not been re-visited. Kirkwood argues that the fall of María de la Cruz led to the majority of women abandoning the “formal” political arena, amidst a public opinion that saw the scandal as proof that women were still not prepared for the world of politics. Ultimately, the majority of women reverted to a more passive role—they would vote, and even be militants in parties, but they would never again try to form their own political party or try to practice an autonomous form of politics that was neither Left nor Right (Kirkwood 1986, 153-4). Hence, from 1950-73, women’s citizenship was almost exclusively expressed through activities in the “informal” political arena.

As elsewhere, after achieving suffrage, first-wave women's movements began to dissolve. In Chile, the organizations comprising the suffrage movement lost visibility and internal articulation (Covarrubias 1976; Gaviola *et al* 1986; Kirkwood 1986; Valdés and Weinstein 1993). Especially after the failure of a women's political party, women began to enter the existing parties, where class and partisan issues took priority, and women's issues were increasingly marginalized (Kirkwood 1986, 162-63). The movement as a whole fell prey to partisan divisions. MEMCH grew weaker, mainly as a result of internal disputes between those who wanted it to be primarily a working-class women's organization and those who wanted it to pursue a broader set of alliances. But after 1949, many of its members also departed for the political parties (Gaviola *et al* 1986, 45). FECHIF, the mass network linking women's organizations in the suffrage struggle, "became an organization of feminine institutions without institutions" (*ibid.*, 79). In addition to losing members because the main goal (suffrage) was achieved, many members withdrew from the organization over its indifference to the 1948 law banning the Community Party in Chile. Members felt the lack of action on the part of FECHIF indicated that the organization was not sufficiently committed to democratic principles (*ibid.*).

Once women moved into the traditional political parties, women's issues were ignored. Consequently, Gaviola *et al* (1994, 21) refer to this period as the "illusion of integration," and Kirkwood (1986, 77) calls it the period of "feminist silence". As feminists increasingly moved into political parties, especially those on the Left, they entered a masculine world where they were inhibited from discussing their particular concerns (i.e., those arising from their social positions as women).

The Centros de Madres

Another important effect of women's formal citizenship status was related to their growing importance as voters. The nature of the Chilean political process, centred as it was on the organization of various sectors of society by political parties, led to the parties' growing interest in organizing and mobilizing women. What is important is how this was done. Women were organized and mobilized around their social roles as reproducers of the social sphere of family and community through state-led organizations linked to political parties.² Thus, women's incorporation as citizens was historically bound up with their social roles as reproducers of the private realm. Women's citizenship was expressed through their identity as "mobilized mothers" in organizations that were not autonomous, but firmly linked to the objectives of the government of the day.

Women's incorporation into politics occurred as the populist state was expanding its role, especially in the sphere of social services. Populism in Chile differed from the type of corporatism that was common elsewhere in Latin America, particularly Brazil and Argentina in the inter-war years. Instead of arrangements whereby social groups—normally organized labour—were linked to the state and mobilized around a single populist leader like Brazil's Getúlio Vargas or Argentina's Juan Perón, Chilean politics

² The intensifying process of partisan competition in Chile during this period meant that the state-led social organizations of the era were never free from partisan control. Thus, the aims of the state (and, by extension, the organizations it initiated) cannot be separated from the aims of the party that occupied it.

continued to be dominated by political parties that competed for the allegiance of social groups such as organized labour, peasants, and the urban popular sectors. In the post-war period and up until 1973, party competition in Chile intensified as parties that formed governments used the expanding state's organizations to bind social groups to the state, but more importantly, to whichever party occupied the state at a particular time.

In this context, women became the link through which citizens were connected to the state. One of the most important means by which the state began to address poverty, for example, was by organizing popular sector women. This set in motion a pattern that would continue in Chile: the state delivered services to families, especially to poor families, through women who were organized around their care-taking responsibilities. The first such program emerged in 1947 when the government created the *Asociación de Dueñas de Casa* (Housewives' Association), under the direction of the First Lady. This program aimed at "preparing women of scarce resources to better fulfil their roles as housewives and as consumers, to prepare them to struggle against the high cost of living; on the other hand, to initiate their interest in other aspects of the institutional life of the country, such as labour and political participation" (Valdés and Weinstein 1993, 47). The program had both social and political aims: to address poverty through women's care-taking roles (example, enabling them to stretch family budgets a little further); but also to mobilize women politically around the PR government of González Videla (Gaviola *et al* 1986, 73).

A similar undertaking in the 1950s was the *Ropero del Pueblo* (People's Closet), also under the direction of the First Lady, in which middle- and upper-class women participated, through the state, in charity work aimed at providing clothing to popular

sector women. During this period, the patterns of women's relationship to the state became more entrenched and formalized. Middle- and upper-class women were organized to act "charitably" towards women in the popular sectors; while the latter were increasingly becoming linked to the state through its provision of services to them as mothers in poor and working-class families.

During the presidency of Eduardo Frei Senior (1964-70), social participation became even further institutionalized and mediated through state agencies. This development, however, must be situated in the context of the intensifying partisan competition that accompanied the emergence of the *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (PDC) as the main centre party (replacing the PR). In this context, partisan competition among Left, Centre, and Right increased, as the PDC, unlike the PR, was less pragmatic and therefore less likely to act as a pendulum to reduce ideological competition. Consequently, all parties increased their efforts to mobilize support among various social groups, with the PDC focusing its efforts on previously excluded groups—the urban poor in the *poblaciones* and women. Hence, the state agencies designed to foster and promote the organization and participation of various social groups cannot be separated from the goals of the party that formed the government. The PDC's strategy for incorporating marginalized groups was to create community organizations through which citizen participation could be channelled and, most importantly, linked to the party. According to Oxhorn, President Frei's program of *Promoción Popular* "served as a mechanism for attempting to increase [PDC] support in the *poblaciones* through the establishment of patron-client relations" (1995, 52). The programs and organizations that were created (the *Centros de Madres*, youth centres, sports clubs, and *Juntas de Vecinos*), created

networks that tied the community organization and its members to state bureaucrats and local party officials (*ibid.*). The main mechanism for mobilizing women was the *Centros de Madres*.

The origins of the state-directed *Centros de Madres* are in the Catholic Church-affiliated charitable organizations created in 1935, in which mainly middle- and upper-class women worked with women in the *poblaciones*. Some of the organizations used the name *Centro de Madres*. Their purposes included providing spaces for poor women to gather and learn “feminine” skills, but also to impart “moral learning,” to “teach [the women] to be exemplary mothers and wives” (Valdés and Weinstein 1993, 44-5).

The importance of the *Centros de Madres* to the construction of women as a collective actor cannot be overstated. Gaviola *et al* claim that participating in the *Centros* “was the source of the maturation of women” (1994, 34). Valdés and Weinstein (1993) see the *Centros* as crucial to the formation of a new collective consciousness among popular sector women that ultimately sowed the seeds for the massive organizational capacity displayed by these women during Pinochet’s dictatorship. While the *Centros* may have seemed to be primarily about reinforcing women’s social responsibilities and training them to expand their economic potential, they were also meant to be “vehicles of women’s political formation” (Valdés and Weinstein 1993, 48). In keeping with President Frei’s program of *Promoción Popular*, the *Centros* aimed at fostering a spirit of solidarity and a participatory consciousness among women. In 1964 the *Centros de Madres* were institutionalized as the *Central Relacionadora de los Centros de Madres* (CEMA), and all *Centros* were incorporated into this institution. The *Centros*, therefore, ceased to be autonomous from the state and the party that controlled it. CEMA itself was

part of the *Consejería Nacional de Promoción Popular* which directed the workings of all social and community organizations. The stated objective of CEMA was to deliver skills training to women in their communities so that they could begin to carry out some form of remunerated work from their homes. By participating in CEMA, therefore, women were participating in the process of Chile's development. In this sense, women's citizenship was changing. Political parties attributed to women the role of actively supporting them (a partisan but nonetheless political role) through their activities in the "informal" political arena of the community. Women were also seen as economically relevant—their participation in productive and reproductive activities was deemed necessary to Chile's development. But neither of these activities challenged women's (exclusive) association with the "informal" political arena or prevailing unequal and hierarchical gender relations. A woman did not have to abandon her traditional social role, but merely spend a few hours in a community centre, where she received training in "productive" activities. CEMA established agreements with other state agencies through which women could acquire the necessary equipment or materials they needed, or alternatively, through which purchases of the women's products were arranged. For example, women sewed school uniforms which were, in turn, purchased by the state. During Frei's 1964 presidential campaign, he promised "to each Chilean woman, a sewing machine" (cited in Valdés and Weinstein 1993, 57).

Between 1964 and 1970 the numbers and the importance of the *Centros de Madres* grew substantially. This process formed part of the state's growing control over social organizations. In 1968 the government created a Ministry of community organizations to be able to further direct and control local social organizations, including

the *Juntas de Vecinos* and the *Centros de Madres*. Valdés and Weinstein explain that, “based on their institutionalization, the *Centros de Madres* acquired a formal organizational character, with a hierarchical structure and a stable link to the government” (1993, 59). The increasing institutionalization of these organizations and their links to the government structure led all parties to view them as sites for community mobilization around partisan goals. Consequently, community organizations were key in distilling the ideological orientation of the governing party, in this case, the Christian Democrats. Chilean Christian Democratic ideology was inspired by Christian humanitarianism, which tried to steer a middle way between unbridled capitalism and socialism. The PDC believed that Christian social justice could be achieved within the bounds of a capitalist system (Oppenheim 1993, 16-7).

But perhaps the most important effect of the *Centros* was the effects they had on the women themselves. In 1970 an evaluation of CEMA was carried out determining that there were four principle effects: first, women were feeling a sense of personal triumph and a greater civic consciousness; second, women’s participation in the economic activities concretely expanded family income, further contributing to women’s sense of accomplishment; third, CEMA was organizing women, and expanding their formal involvement in solving community problems; fourth, it gave women greater political importance due to their higher levels of formal organization, i.e., women had more clout as a social force capable of determining the outcomes of elections and political contests (Valdés and Weinstein 1993, 59-60). By 1970, there were over nine thousand *Centros*, incorporating almost half a million Chilean women. Each *Centro* had about thirty to forty members (*ibid.*, 63).

"Mobilized mothers" under Allende: 1970-1973

Between 1970 and 1973, women were further incorporated into the political struggle of the period, a period in which class conflict accelerated and culminated in the brutal 1973 coup. In 1970, the coalition of Leftist parties, *Unidad Popular* (UP), led by socialist Salvador Allende, won the elections with a very slight plurality of the popular vote.³ The 1970-73 period saw a massive increase in social organization, but one that was directed "from above," that is, through the state. Women became increasingly involved in the political and social struggles, as both Left and Right tried to win their support through appeals that drew on and reinforced women's maternal identities.

The UP government continued to organize women primarily through the *Centros de Madres* in the absence of any other strategy for addressing the "woman question". Kirkwood argues that the UP failed to recognize women's distinct political or social contributions, addressing women simply as wives, mothers, daughters or sisters of the workers (1986, 40-41). Likewise, Chaney argues that the Left simply did not know how to mobilize women during this period, leaving women open to the eventual massive mobilization of the Centre and Right-wing anti-UP forces. As noted earlier, a large part of the problem was that women were already assumed to be "naturally" conservative, an assumption that owed to women's tendency to vote for the parties of the Right or the

³ Allende received 36.2 per cent of the popular vote, the candidate of the Right received 34.9 per cent, and the Christian Democratic candidate received 27.8 per cent (A. Valenzuela 1978, 40).

Centre. In fact, it was well known that if women had not voted in the 1958 elections, Allende would have won the presidency in that year (Chaney 1974, 268). It should be noted, however, that political leaders themselves manipulated these stereotypes by appealing to women through exaggerated campaigns about the “danger” of Leftist forces. For example, when the PDC and the Rightist parties combined forces against Allende in the 1964 elections, they targeted female voters with a “Scare Campaign,” “consist[ing] of a series of radio and newspaper ads telling women that if Allende was elected he would take their children from them, turn them into agents of the communist state, and sever the bonds that existed between mother and child” (Power 2000, 292). More women voted for Frei (62.8 percent) than did men (49.3 percent) (*ibid.*). In 1970, only 30.5 per cent of women voted for Allende, compared with 45 per cent of men (Mattelart 1976, 281-2).

Allende knew therefore that he had to try to win the allegiance of women for the project of radical social change promoted by the UP government, however, he did very little to actually involve women in the upper echelons of power. It was only after two full years in office that he appointed a woman to his cabinet. While he did send a bill to Congress to create a Ministry of the Family, to address women’s and family issues, he subsequently allowed it to languish in the legislative process without ever declaring it urgent (Chaney 1974, 269). In 1972, through a presidential decree, Allende created the *Secretaría Nacional de la Mujer*, which was supposed to have aided the government in devising policy regarding women’s issues and also propose changes that would promote women’s equality. By the time of the coup, however, the bill was still in the process of being re-worked (Valdés and Weinstein 1993, 66). Ultimately, the UP relied mostly on expanding the *Centros de Madres*, which were further institutionalized and placed under

the purview of the *Consejería Nacional de Desarrollo Social* (which replaced Frei's *Consejería Nacional de Promoción Popular*).

By 1973 the numbers of Mothers' Centres and the number of women participating in them had more than doubled from the 1970 figures. They became even more important to popular sector women due to the economic crises that emerged during the UP government. Its economic and social policies seriously threatened the class interests of the conservative Right. The response of the Right was to try to undermine the UP's project by, for example, hoarding and disrupting the internal transport of goods which resulted in chronic shortages and a growing black market. Women were confronted with these crises on a daily basis because they were the ones who did the household shopping. Thus, it was women who had to wait in line for hours, and find creative ways to replace items that could no longer be purchased. Women's "natural" honesty was also deployed by the UP government which called on women to act as monitors of the government's price control policies, and to report any black market activity. Women were also recruited for other UP programs such as education, health, and literacy campaigns. Even though the activities of the women mobilized by the UP government did little to challenge traditional gender roles, and even reinforced them, the experiences women gained were significant. Women were participating in a transformative political project, and they clearly felt they were part of an important historical task. The president of one of the *Uniones Comunes de Centros de Madres*, describes the goals of the women participating:

We want an end to the idea that women get together in the *Centros* just to knit and gossip. Enough of that. We want to incorporate ourselves into culture, to learn many things. To know what's happening in the world, in

other countries where there are women just like us. To learn what was denied to us until now (cited in Valdés and Weinstein 1993, 67).

What was important is that even though women were organized around their traditional gender roles, leaving their homes to participate in collective activities had important effects on the women. The simple fact of overcoming the isolation to which many women were previously subject was a crucial stepping-stone to making further changes in their ways of looking at the world, and, more importantly, of acting in the world. The *Centros de Madres*, along with the other community groups in which women participated, contributed to women's changed consciousness and greater understanding of their roles, given the political importance of these organizations to the overall transformatory project of Allende's government. Even when the women were only concerned with the economic aspects, they still felt pride in contributing to their family's income.⁴ But most importantly, the *Centros de Madres* were instances of formal organization, which were targeted by all the parties in their increasingly polarized battles for the hearts and minds of all Chileans. While all of the *Centros de Madres* were linked to the state through the *Consejería Nacional de Desarrollo Social*, the UP did not necessarily control the internal allegiances of each one. Many of them still maintained strong links to the Christian Democrats, who used these organizations to foster anti-Allende opposition activity. As noted earlier, social and community organizations were never autonomous from partisan actors but were always firmly linked through local party officials to the national party organization. This meant that social organizations were key

⁴ Under the UP government, the productive role of the *Centros* grew, and in many cases, they were converted into true workshops where women worked a few hours a week (Valdés and Weinstein 1993, 68).

sites for the party's battles for citizens' allegiances. Women's roles in the growing partisan conflict that would ultimately end Chilean democracy were becoming increasingly important.

Women's roles were gaining importance because while the Left in Chile appeared to be incapable of mobilizing women or appealing to women as anything other than as wives or *compañeras* of the workers, the Right seemed to enjoy somewhat greater success by mobilizing women around their roles as defenders of the family. The 1970-73 period witnessed the first massive mobilization of women since their struggles for suffrage. A number of conservative women's organizations were formed, such as the *Frente Democrática de Mujeres*, *El Poder Femenino*, and the *Organización Cívico-Familiar "Solidaridad, Orden y Libertad"*. Immediately following the election of Salvador Allende as president, small groups of women engaged in public acts indicating their opposition to a socialist government. One small group of women, dressed entirely in black, led a funeral procession around the presidential palace, *La Moneda*, to signify what it perceived as the "death" of democracy (Mattelart 1976, 282). But one of the most important mobilizations was the December 1, 1971 "March of the Empty Pots" in which over 5,000 anti-Allende women participated (Power 2000, 294). This massive event was organized by the *Frente Democrático de Mujeres* which brought together women from the National Party (of the Right) and some of the Christian Democrats opposed to the UP government. The demonstration became a weekly event, in which mainly middle- and upper-class women left their homes and marched together, banging on empty pots and pans to signify the lack of food under Chile's socialist government. This was a mobilization that drew symbolically on women's traditional social roles as providers of

food for their families. Their stated motivation for acting publicly was their inability to fulfil adequately their social responsibilities. Their citizenship was being expressed, therefore, as “mobilized mothers”.

What is noteworthy about women’s activism in this instance is that, although these women were clearly defending their class interests, which were under significant threat by the UP government, their protests were framed as being *above* the narrow politics of class interests. Once again, women’s activism as citizens was being cast as *apolitical*. In a period of intense class conflict, women were being deployed to represent the interests of *all* citizens, and not just a narrow social base, whether of the Left or the Right. Michele Mattelart argues that this was, in fact, a strategy of the Right: “The Right was able to camouflage the defence of its class interests behind the protests of women, behind demands that, since they have to do with subjects traditionally of marginal political interest (home, familial organization, care and education of children),...[appear unconnected to] a class strategy” (1976, 288). The Right was more successful in mobilizing women, precisely because it called on them as “non-political” actors. This image appealed to many women who considered politics a brutal, dirty, and corrupt business. The women themselves reinforced this image in their calls to mobilize other women to participate, and in trying to frame their activism as representing all Chileans and not just members of a particular class. In a newspaper article that called on women to participate in the weekly “March of the Empty Pots,” a woman wrote, “We are the people! Every child in this land has come from our wombs” (cited in Mattelart 1976, 288). Another woman, a PDC leader, reminded women in a newspaper that “you are the

light and defence of your children, you must defend your home and your physical and spiritual liberty” (cited in Power 2000, 296).

It was also clear that the Right wanted to use women’s activism to expand the opposition to Allende’s government, and, ultimately, to gain wider support for a military coup. *El Poder Femenino* (EPF), one of the most important anti-Allende groups, worked closely with the *gremios* (small business associations) which were also virulently opposed to the UP government. Through meetings between women’s groups like EPF and the *gremios* it was decided that women’s public acts “should serve as a catalyst to invoke the anger of their male counterparts” (de los Angeles Crummet 1977, 105). One of the main strategies of the EPF was to mobilize around and to instill the fear that the family was under threat, and that family life was deteriorating (*ibid.*, 111). Given the importance of the family to Chilean society, this proved quite successful.

The most important aspect of women’s activism in opposition to the socialist project was its reinforcement of the “non-political” identity of women and the notion that women act publicly only in extreme circumstances. Margaret Power notes that many women who organized anti-Allende marches were militants in the PDC and Right-wing parties, but “they took great pains to downplay the extent and depth of their political involvement...They ignored their organizational ties and instead emphasized only that they were women” (2000, 296). The implication is that women’s activism is necessarily temporary, and even something extreme and distasteful in itself. As Mattelart (1976) explains, the Right was very careful in its strategy for mobilizing women because they wanted to ensure that in mobilizing women to participate, they did not overturn the gender stereotypes that normally left politics to men. The Right did not want women’s

activism to challenge the traditional images of women, but rather, to conform to them. Thus, a commentator in a magazine explained that, “by an ‘historic crusade of the empty pots’ women found a way of demonstrating to the government that...if it should prove necessary, she would leave her cozy kitchen in order to devote her energy to warfare” (cited in Mattelart 1976, 293). Women’s activism, therefore, was something that women were pushed into by necessity. Their activism responds to crisis situations, and is therefore not a regular expression of political citizenship.

After the 1973 coup, that is, once the crisis had passed, from the perspective of the Right, women were expected to withdraw from public visibility and return to their traditional roles in the private sphere. María de los Angeles Crummet (1977) explains that many of the women who participated in EPF were confused and angry at how quickly they were expected to revert back to passive roles after the coup. Many women felt that they had finally left behind their lives of isolation in their homes, and had entered a world where they helped to shape the conditions around them. According to one member of EPF, “we were let down after the coup in this respect as the junta disbanded EPF as if it were a political party” (cited in de los Angeles Crummet 1977, 112). This was an indication of things to come for women under the dictatorship of General Pinochet. The rhetoric of the military regime reinforced an extremely conservative gender ideology, along with an explicitly anti-political view. Women’s subsequent actions responded to this particular context, and the crises it created. This is the subject of Chapter 3.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to outline the development of first-wave feminism in Chile and its “politics of difference” strategy for advancing citizenship claims. Like many other first-wave feminists, women’s movements in Chile demanded citizenship rights on the basis of their social roles as mothers. In Chile, this strategy emerged out of the prevailing gender ideology (*marianismo*) and the value it placed on women’s motherhood identities. But the “politics of difference” strategy affected women’s relationships with traditional political actors, namely, political parties. First-wave feminists and the suffrage movement initially sought autonomy from the parties, not for fear of co-optation, but because women’s “difference” led them to shun what they perceived to be the corrupt world of political parties. Women’s movements of the first half of the twentieth century in Chile did not cast themselves as *political* actors despite the fact that they elaborated political goals, for example, the right to vote and be elected; peace; improved social welfare; and an improvement in women’s status. Instead, women’s movements in this period depicted women’s activism as being *above* politics. This, combined with political party monopolization of the “formal” political arena, led to women’s continued exclusion from “formal” politics even after their enfranchisement in 1949.

Because first-wave feminism did not challenge the male elites’ monopolization of political space, or the essentialization of women based on their maternal identities embodied in their difference strategy, women as a social group were available for subsequent mobilization by political elites around their social roles as mothers. As

democratization proceeded (i.e., as previously excluded segments were brought into the political process) greater political competition among parties and their social bases emerged. Women were brought into these contests as “mobilized mothers” outside of or above the class and partisan politics which dominated political practice. In this context, women were organized “from above,” (mainly through the *Centros de Madres*). While the main historical legacy of first-wave feminism and the incorporation of women into the Chilean political process was women’s mobilization as mothers, their state-directed organization through the *Centros de Madres* also laid the organizational infrastructure for the emergence of a women’s movement during the Pinochet years, a movement that was not only autonomous from the state, but that organized primarily around its opposition to the authoritarian state. These developments are analyzed in the next chapter.

Chapter Three – Military Rule and the Transition to Democracy: Women’s Movements, Feminism and the Reconstruction of Political Space

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the (re)emergence of women’s movements in Chile during the period of authoritarianism (1973-90), highlighting the relevant continuities and divergences from the first-wave movements discussed in the previous chapter. In terms of continuities, it is significant that when women mobilized in the 1970s and 1980s, they retained a “politics of difference” strategy, drawing mainly on their motherhood roles as the basis for their public activism. But within this strategy there were important differences from the previous era, largely shaped by the very different context under authoritarianism.

The two most notable differences are the relative absence of political parties and the closing of the formal political arena to partisan activity. In this context, the traditional dichotomy between “formal” and “informal” politics was dissolved as the “informal” arena in which women’s activism predominated became the main site for politics. Women’s activism, therefore, emerged in a context in which politics, as traditionally practised, had ceased to exist and people had to invent other forms of collective action to pursue their goals. Women were the earliest collective actors in this context because they could draw on both infrastructure that facilitated collective action (i.e., the *Centros de Madres*) and a repertoire of collective action which was part of women’s historical experience. Ultimately, women’s activism grew in this period because the “informal” arena was the only arena for collective action under military rule. Because of the relative absence of traditional political actors, this arena was fertile

ground for the consolidation of a broad-based and multi-class women's movement that began to challenge the way Chilean democratic traditions inhibited women's citizenship.

In contrast to the previous era, the women's movement in this period began to critically evaluate Chilean democracy as traditionally practiced. This process was not undertaken during first-wave women's movements in which feminists first sought autonomy from traditional political actors, placing women (and their concerns) above politics, and later, when that strategy failed (after achieving female suffrage), feminists simply entered existing parties and abandoned a feminist politics. In the Pinochet era, the feminist movement, in contrast, emerging in an arena with few traditional political actors, began to critically assess the political process and the ways in which women's gender-based concerns were marginalized within it. When feminists began working with the opposition movement they struggled not just for democracy, but also for a democracy that was more open to women's styles of participation and citizenship.

In documenting the emergence of a women's movement under authoritarianism in Chile, this chapter shows the advantages derived from movement autonomy. With few partisan actors, Chilean feminists could develop a woman-centred critique of traditional political practices and elaborate a set of demands for expanding women's citizenship in a future democracy. The relative autonomy of women's movements (and other popular movements) in the early years of the dictatorship was not entirely a result of strategic choices, however, but rather, occurred because parties were disbanded by the military regime and forced underground. As a result of severe repression, most parties were seriously debilitated, at least for a while. Parties gradually regained their strength however, and after 1983, re-assumed a central role in the opposition movement. Once

that happened, all movements were presented with a strategic choice to make: “autonomy” versus “integration”. Waylen poses the question in the following way: “[s]hould women’s movements work with the new institutions and parties and risk being co-opted and losing autonomy, or should they remain outside, preserving their independence but risking marginalization and loss of influence as power shifts toward the political parties?” (1994, 339-40).

In Chile, the “autonomy” versus “integration” dilemma led to partisan divisions which weakened and fragmented many organizations. What is significant is that many leading feminists in this period made the choice of integration into political parties to pursue a “double militancy”—i.e., to be part of both the feminist movement and a political party. This decision allowed feminists to place their gender-based demands on the public agenda of the transition to democracy. For example, women demanded the creation of national policy machinery to promote gender equality and programs to improve women’s lives. In achieving these goals, women succeeded in “gendering” the transition.

Unfortunately, there were other, less positive, outcomes for women’s citizenship of the transition process, and women’s strategic choices within it. The “double militancy” strategy was not an unqualified success because many feminist citizenship demands (such as quotas for women in decision-making and reproductive choice) were considered too radical by political parties and therefore not adopted as part of the transition’s agenda. Also, the formerly united women’s movement was increasingly divided so that the feminists in the main opposition parties could not adequately represent the movement as a whole. Finally, as political parties re-emerged and a “formal”

political arena was reconstructed, women were once again marginalized within it because Chilean gender ideology had not been transformed. Hence, women's citizenship continued to be idealized as "mobilized mothers" acting primarily in the "informal" political arena unless extraordinary circumstances called for their activism in the "formal" political arena. The class and gender-based divisions between "formal" and "informal" politics was not effectively undermined.

The issues raised in this chapter are crucial to understanding the post-1990 struggles by women to exercise their citizenship. The limited access women have to "formal" politics and the difficulties they face in promoting feminist goals are rooted in the events described in this chapter. Likewise, the difficulties women's movements face in the post-transition context in terms of mobilizing women and putting their goals on the public agenda are also linked to the ways in which the movement fragmented over partisan and strategic issues during the transition process.

The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section outlines the key features of the social, economic, and political context which generated women's mobilization following the 1973 military coup. The second section outlines the emergence of women's activism and how various types of organizations came together to form a united movement with a common set of goals. The third section discusses women's movements demands, emphasizing how they went beyond the limited citizenship demands of first-wave feminists in Chile. The final section outlines the role of women's movements in the Chilean transition to democracy, focusing especially on how various women's organizations confronted the "autonomy versus integration"

dilemma, and its consequences for promoting women's citizenship during the transition process.

Women Under Military Rule

The coup of September 11, 1973 put a swift end to the heightened climate of politicization and extreme class confrontation that had been building steadily since the 1960s. While the initial goal of the four-man military junta was to restore order, General Augusto Pinochet eventually consolidated his own power and initiated a project of massive social, economic, and political change.¹ Eventually the military regime, with Pinochet at its head, saw its role differently. They were no longer there just to intervene as restorers of the Chilean political process itself, but rather, they began to believe that the democratic political process was deeply flawed and that politics, society, and the economy needed to be radically reconstructed. According to María Elena Valenzuela, "the regime defined politics as a greedy, manipulative activity in which people seek earthly power" (1991, 164).

The discourse of the regime, and of Pinochet in particular, illustrates that women had a crucial role to play in healing a society that had become "sick" due to an excess of

¹ According to statements by the military following the coup, they clearly perceived their role as temporary—they were needed to forcibly restore order, rid the country of the Marxist "threat," and then restore the institutions by turning them over to the nation's more "responsible" political leaders. Also, it was clear that their initial intentions were to govern as an institution, that is, under the joint command of the army, navy, air force and the *Carabineros* (national police). In fact, in a magazine in 1974, Pinochet is quoted as saying, "I have no aspiration but to serve my country. As soon as the country recovers, the junta will turn over the government to whom the people desire" (cited in A. Valenzuela 1991, 27).

politics. Women were depicted as the models of apolitical passivity, one of the highest virtues in the national project of reconstruction. In a speech to the women of EPF in April 1974, Pinochet stated, “[w]omen wanted the fall of the marxist government, which symbolized slavery for her children, but she also wanted a new order: she sought the protection of a strong and severe authority, that would restore order and the moral public sphere in our society” (cited in Molina 1989, 64). The ideals promoted by the military—apoliticism and an unwavering obedience to authority—were ideals that, according to the military’s rhetoric, were embodied by women. Women were seen as apolitical by nature and respecting of the exalted role of male authority figures (fathers, husbands, priests, and now, Pinochet himself). Moreover, women embodied the capacity for self-sacrifice and abnegation that was to serve as a model for all citizens to follow. The way the family functioned, i.e., in a hierarchical manner with a clear line of authority between husband/father and wife, mother, and children, was the model for how the nation should function. Pinochet was the symbolic father and all citizens were to obey his authority (Molina 1989, 65). A statement by one of the members of Pinochet’s Constitutional Committee² neatly encapsulates the gender ideology of the military regime:

All human organizations must be hierarchical and contemplate the existence of an authority that, in a patriarchal civilization likes ours, resides in the father. To distribute responsibility among all parts of a conjugal society, that is, among men and women, would be equal to inviting anarchy into the family (cited in *ibid.*, 65).

The activism of conservative women in the Allende period led the military to see women as a crucial support base for their regime. To increase their support among

² The Chilean Constitution was revised in 1980.

women, and, more importantly, to control the organization and participation of women, the military government oversaw the re-organization of the *Centros de Madres*, and set up the *Secretaría Nacional de la Mujer* (SNM). The SNM was part of the state, and its role was to design and implement policy for women. According to Ximena Bunster, the SNM was explicitly “political” to the extent that its core purpose was to spread the values and ideals of the government regarding women’s roles in society (1988, 487). The SNM was created in 1976 with the First Lady as its official director. The law that created it elaborated the following objectives: “to integrate women into the social, cultural, and economic development of the country,” through training courses that would also aid in “disseminating family values...emphasizing the importance of women” which would serve in “their enhanced performance as mothers, wives, and home-makers”.³ The SNM relied upon a massive core of volunteers (mainly wives of military officers) to implement many of its programs, specifically its campaigns of civic awareness, literacy drives and other education or awareness campaigns. The volunteers, many of whom were professional women from the middle and upper classes, gave talks and speeches to audiences of women in parent-teacher associations, *Juntas de Vecinos*, and even women in the civil service (Bunster 1988, 489). Most volunteers were wives of military officers, whose key role was to transmit the values of the regime and the ideals of feminine virtue and behaviour to others (especially other women). According to Bunster, “through this ideological process the woman volunteer becomes a public mother” (1988, 489).

³ “La Secretaría Nacional de la Mujer del Gobierno de Chile: Fundamentos, Objetos. Programas,” reproduced in Covarrubias and Franco 1978, 845-49.

While the SNM promoted the gender ideology of the military regime through its core of middle- and upper-class female volunteers, popular sector women continued to be organized through the *Centros de Madres*, but their role and purposes changed a great deal under the Pinochet regime. Under both the Frei and Allende governments, the *Centros* aimed at integrating women into social and political processes and mobilized women around the partisan ends of government. Under Pinochet, however, they actively sought to demobilize and de-politicize women and became mechanisms for control, or even “disciplining” according to some authors (see Munzaga and Letelier 1988; Molina 1989; Valdés and Weinstein 1993). This was part of the dictatorship’s project of de-politicizing and demobilizing a society that had been increasingly organized and mobilized by the previous two governments. As we saw in the last chapter, under both Frei and Allende, the *Centros de Madres* had the clear political purpose of incorporating women into the social and political projects of the country. Their participation in the *Centros* was active, even though, for many women, the main benefit of their participation was the extra income they earned in the workshops.

Once the *Centros* were re-organized under Pinochet, however, women’s participation was clearly meant to be passive and was completely de-linked from the partisan ends of any other social organizations. The *Centros* therefore, like all other social and community organizations, were purged of leaders with connections to the UP government. New directives were appointed for all social and community organizations (Valdés and Weinstein 1993, 75). While social and community organizations under Frei and Allende had clear links to the state, they also had formed part of broader social networks with links to Church, party, or other social groupings. After the coup, the

dismantling of these social networks was a key priority. Consequently, the *Centros*, like all remaining community organizations, were tightly controlled, and forced to sever links to other organized groups. One example of the forcible dismantling of existing social networks was the government's insistence that women volunteers in the *Centros de Madres* could not participate in any other group, including Church groups. For years, the *Centros* had frequent association and links to *Cáritas-Chile*, a Church affiliated organization, with whom they co-ordinated many projects. In 1976, however, volunteers in the *Centros* were told they must choose one or the other. What many women did was to continue working secretly with *Cáritas-Chile* so that they could continue to share the goods and materials to which they had access through *Cáritas-Chile* with other members of the *Centros de Madres* (Valdés and Weinstein 1993, 77).

There was some continuity in the *Centros de Madres* of the Pinochet era with the goals of the Frei and Allende governments, for example, women continued to receive training in activities revolving around their social roles, choosing from courses in cooking, sewing, macrame, hairstyling, and handicraft production. Members could also join *talleres laborales y artesanales* (productive and handicraft workshops) through which they received a regular salary. The products made in the *talleres* were either sold to the state (for example, school or hospital uniforms) or, in the case of handicrafts, were sold through galleries, stores, or businesses with agreements to sell CEMA-Chile products. These activities, and the benefits they brought to women members, did not differ significantly from what the *Centros* did in previous periods. What was different, however, was the "carrot-and-stick" approach used by CEMA-Chile under the dictatorship. Membership in the *Centros* brought certain concrete benefits to women

beyond the skills they learned or the income they earned in the *talleres*. Women who were members of CEMA-Chile received identification cards that entitled them to claim benefits, which included scholarships for themselves and their families, access to clinics and day-care spots, the right to shop in special stores with reduced prices, and a number of other benefits. These benefits or “rewards,” however, could be revoked for a number of reasons. For example, attendance at meetings or workshops in the *Centros* was mandatory and if a woman missed a number of meetings, her identity card would be revoked, thereby depriving her of the benefits. Members were also required to attend events organized by the military such as parades, celebrations, or visits by Pinochet or other high-ranking officers, supposedly showing the extent of popular support for the regime (Valdés and Weinstein 1993, 114). The de-politicization of the *Centros* were evident in the censorship exerted as women were inhibited from initiating discussions which had any “political” overtones (*ibid.*).

The “carrot-and-stick” approach of CEMA-Chile led some authors to argue that its key purpose was social control and therefore was primarily a means through which women were compelled to internalize the values and gender ideology of the military regime (Munzaga and Letelier 1988). Natacha Molina, for example, writes that the *Centros* were “an instrument of social control and a hiding of unemployment, useful for maintaining a network of direct communication between women and the government, necessary for the reception of the official discourse and eventually for the action of defending the regime” (1989, 68). She concludes that women’s obedience was demanded in exchange for the privileges and benefits to only which members were entitled. Valdés and Weinstein (1993) argue, however, that while CEMA-Chile clearly had a degree of

“disciplining” logic at work, we must not over-emphasize this element. They insist that there was a large gap between the social control that the military may have wanted to impose through CEMA-Chile and the level of control that they actually achieved. Through numerous interviews with women who were members of CEMA-Chile, they conclude that women found ways around the rules: for example women found creative reasons for not attending events aimed at transmitting the ideology of the military. Additionally, the “carrots” offered by CEMA-Chile were not all that significant when one considers the magnitude of the deprivation that women in the popular sectors experienced. The paltriness of the benefits combined with the fact that they were actually difficult to obtain, even for members, undermined the effectiveness of the carrot-and-stick strategy.⁴

It cannot be denied, however, that CEMA-Chile did aim at transmitting the values traditionally associated with women’s motherhood roles, and at ensuring that women remain apolitical and passive in their communities. This was also a means for dealing with the growing crises associated with the economic restructuring underway. Through their participation in the *talleres*, women supplemented the family income in a way that did not challenge their traditional roles as home-makers. According to Valdés and Weinstein, “the training delivered to women did not aim at the development of a labour force or its insertion into the labour market, but at the perfecting of the exercise of the

⁴ Women explain that the benefits were difficult to obtain because, for instance, they would have to fill out mountains of paperwork in order to receive scholarships or places in clinics or day-care centres. Or, they would have to wait in line for hours in order to receive medical attention or make purchases in special stores (Valdés and Weinstein 1993).

traditional roles of the woman-mother and home-maker” (1993, 109). But this had consequences likely not intended by the military government. While the incomes women were earning were small in comparison to their need in the face of severe economic crisis, the simple fact that women were contributing to the survival of their families gave them an added sense of self-confidence. Women tended to view their participation in the *Centros* as extremely positive, despite the attempts of the military to use CEMA-Chile as a mechanism for control and indoctrination. According to Valdés and Weinstein (1993) and Molina (1989), women valued their participation in the *Centros* because they learned new skills which helped them contribute to the family income and it gave them legitimate reasons to leave their homes (and the isolation they experienced there) to work in groups with other women in similar situations.

The most important legacy of the *Centros de Madres* is that it ultimately created the organizational infrastructure necessary for the re-emergence of women’s movements in Chile. But there are three other crucial features of the Chilean context in this period that led to the mass mobilization of women: first, the repression involved in carrying out the project of depoliticizing society; second, the negative impact of the regime’s project of neoliberal socio-economic transformation; and third, the relative absence of political parties. The repression was at its most severe in the months immediately following the 1973 coup. Anyone associated with “politics” but especially those associated with the UP coalition or the labour unions were targets. Thousands of individuals were arrested, sent to concentration camps, tortured, and executed. Many more were exiled (or chose exile), either internally or abroad. According to Philip Oxhorn, the repression during this early period, lasting until June 1974, “was characterized by its arbitrary nature and lack

of any moral or legal limitations” (1995a, 65). After 1974 the Directorate for National Intelligence (DINA) was created as a centralizing body of national security forces and its director maintained constant contact with General Pinochet. In this phase repression was less arbitrary and more selective, and also entirely secret and “hidden”. “Disappearances” were common, spreading fear throughout the population (*ibid.*, 66). After August 1977 a new phase was initiated that corresponded to the regime’s attempts to institutionalize and legalize itself. DINA was replaced by the National Centre for Information (CNI) and the latter no longer operated without legal limits. The main objective was to contain opposition (*ibid.*, 67). Repression continued to be quite severe, however, resulting in a population whose capacity to organize and act politically was severely undermined.

The limited and imperfect welfare state that had accompanied political democratization in Chile until 1973 was entirely dismantled by the military regime. The military’s project of socio-economic transformation has been referred to as a “radical conservative experiment” in neo-conservative economics (Foxley 1983) and “radical neoliberalism” (Silva 1991). The project’s central architects have come to be known as the “Chicago Boys” due to their training at and the influence of the University of Chicago. The project involved a dramatic reduction of the state’s economic and social roles through privatization and a series of “social modernizations” that applied strict market principles to the delivery of social services in the areas of health, welfare, and education, eventually transferring responsibility for their delivery to the municipalities; an opening up of the economy to international competition by devaluing the peso,

adopting a low and uniform tariff,⁵ and abandoning the industrial strategy of import-substitution; and freeing up the domestic economy by eliminating price controls, liberalizing capital markets, and revising the labour code to curtail the power of the unions (Oxhorn 1995a, Silva 1991, Montecinos 1994).⁶

The effects of this transformation were overwhelmingly negative for the popular sectors. Between 1975 and 1981 unemployment averaged 18 per cent, and in 1983, during the height of the recession, it had climbed to 31.3 per cent.⁷ The number of Chileans living in extreme poverty, defined as the inability to meet their minimum dietary needs, tripled between 1970 and 1985, and the consumption level of the poorest 20 percent of Chileans fell by over 30 percent (Oxhorn 1995a, 69-71). Amidst the growing unemployment and falling living standards brought about by economic restructuring, the state's welfare system was dismantled. The state was also increasingly decentralized, as more and more areas were turned over to the municipalities. Also, the number of municipalities or *comunas* more than doubled (Silva 1991). Starting in 1979, the *campamentos*, or squatter settlements, began to be eradicated by the government. Inhabitants were physically transferred to new places within the city. The most common pattern was to remove squatters from the "good" neighbourhoods (the wealthier *barrios*)

⁵ Tariffs were 94 per cent in 1973 and were cut to 10 per cent by 1979 (Oxhorn 1995a, 72).

⁶ In 1979 the military replaced the Labour Code of 1931. The new Code severely limited strikes and collective bargaining and made it far simpler to dismiss workers. Many of the protections in place for working women were eliminated, and consequently, pregnant workers could be dismissed. While union membership was at 41 percent of the population in 1972, it had dropped to just 10 percent by 1987 (Chuchryk 1989a, 154).

⁷ There are studies that put the unemployment rate at 80 percent in some of the poorest *poblaciones* (Chuchryk 1989a, 152).

to the poor neighbourhoods (the *poblaciones*). Approximately 30,000 families were re-located (Valdés and Weinstein 1993, 74). Municipal reform, therefore, resulted in the “spatial segregation of poverty”.

Processes of economic restructuring are rarely gender-neutral in their consequences. In Chile women experienced the effects of this transformation more acutely than men. For example, women’s unemployment increased more than male unemployment.⁸ Women were also particularly affected because during periods of economic crisis and high (male) unemployment couples are more likely to separate, leaving women to struggle to cope as “heads of households”. By the end of the 1980s, “more than 40 percent of poor families were headed by women” (V. Montecinos 1994, 164). This, combined with higher female unemployment, partially explains the greater participation of women in the government programs designed to alleviate the worst effects of the economic restructuring. The government developed the *Programa de Empleo Mínimo* (PEM) to absorb some of the unemployed, but it paid only 40 to 60 percent of the minimum wage (Oxhorn 1995a, 73). The program ran from 1974 to 1988 and normally covered between 2 to 6 percent of the economically active population. In the crisis of 1982-83 it rose to 13 percent (Valdés and Weinstein 1993, 73). Women comprised 75 percent of participants (V. Montecinos 1994, 169).

⁸ Between 1980 and 1984 women’s unemployment practically doubled, from 10.7 per cent to 19 percent. Male unemployment increased less than 3 percent, from 12.1 percent in 1980 to 15.9 percent in 1984 (V. Montecinos 1994, 168). Women workers were also particularly affected by the shrinking of the public sector—over 130,000 public sector employees were dismissed—and women represent a large portion of public sector employees. Also, when schools were privatized and transferred to the municipalities in 1987, over 8,000 teachers lost their jobs. Teaching is overwhelmingly a female occupation in Chile (*ibid.*).

The third defining feature of the post-1973 context is the relative absence of political parties, primarily due to repression. Immediately following the military take-over, the UP was declared illegal, and all other parties, including those of the Right, were declared “in recess”. By 1977, all parties were disbanded. The repression of the parties of the Left was the most severe: party leaders were tortured and/or killed, and former UP government officials were rounded up and sent to Dawson Island, which was converted into a concentration camp (Oppenheim 1993, 174). Even members of the centrist Christian Democratic Party were targeted, for example, there was an assassination attempt on Bernardo Leighton (while in exile in Europe), a high-profile Christian Democrat who spoke out against the military regime. Ultimately all parties were driven underground and while they continued to exist, they were significantly weakened. Chilean parties, with the exception of the Communist Party, banned in 1948, had virtually no experience maintaining clandestine networks and party organization (*ibid.*). Because Chilean civil society was traditionally dominated by political parties, thereby possessing few autonomous capacities for mobilization, the intense repression of parties severely undermined the immediate emergence of opposition to the dictatorship.

Women Mobilize as “Militant Mothers” and Feminists

Women’s activism emerged in this context, marked by extreme political repression, economic crisis, and the relative absence of partisan actors,. The earliest groups formed to respond to the repression and extreme levels of human rights violations. Support from the Catholic Church was key: within a month of the coup, in October 1973, the

Archbishop of Santiago set up the *Comité de Cooperación para la Paz de Chile* (COPACHI) to initiate legal actions on the behalf of the thousands of political prisoners and workers fired for political reasons. Over the next two years, COPACHI also set up soup kitchens and health clinics in the poor neighbourhoods.⁹ In 1975, however, COPACHI was dissolved under pressure from the military regime. The Archbishop responded by setting up the *Vicaría de la Solidaridad*, which would operate under his direct control, and which could not, therefore, be interfered with by the military. Under the *Vicaría de la Solidaridad*, the Church expanded its role in aiding human rights victims and those suffering the effects of the regime's economic policies. The Archbishop also set up the *Academia de Humanismo Cristiano* which acted as an umbrella for a number of independent research centres (Lehmann 1990, 111-12).¹⁰

The first group specifically for women was the *Agrupación de Mujeres Democráticas*, formed just months after the coup, consisting mainly of middle-class women, professionals or housewives, who wanted to do something in response to the repression and violation of human rights.¹¹ Their work involved carrying out solidarity

⁹ David Lehmann claims that over 300 lawyers, social workers and medical personnel were engaged in the Church's efforts in this regard (1990, 111).

¹⁰ The current research NGO *Centro de Estudios de la Mujer* (CEM) has its origins in the *Academia de Humanismo Cristiano* founded by the Archbishop of Santiago. It was originally the *Círculo de Estudios de la Mujer*, and it operated under the *Academia* between 1977 and 1983, when it began having disputes with the Church (Chuchryk 1989a, 165).

¹¹ According to Gaviola *et al*, most of the women who formed the *Agrupación*, came from the middle-class Santiago neighbourhoods of Ñuñoa, La Reina, and Providencia. Some had been militants in political parties, but many others had no political experience, but wanted to carry out solidarity work with those who were suffering from the effects of the repression. They helped the families of prisoners by bringing them food and other necessities, helping out with child-care, and helping them in their studies (1994, 67).

projects with the political prisoners and their families (Chuchryk 1989a, 157-58; Valdés and Weinstein 1993, 131). As elsewhere in Latin America, women's human rights groups were the first actors to publicly denounce dictatorships and their actions. According to M. Valenzuela, their rhetoric played on the inherent contradiction between the military's discourse and its actions: the military claimed to place the highest value on the family—the very foundation of the social order—yet their repression violated the integrity of the family in a very extreme manner. Women in the human rights groups, pointing to this contradiction, said they, not the military, were the real defenders of the value of the family (M. Valenzuela 1991, 167; see also Alvarez 1990; Blacklock and Macdonald 2000; Craske 1999; Jaquette 1989). There were a host of different women's human rights groups, and in some of them, priority was given to partisan issues over women's issues, given the close links between the underground political parties, whose members were the main targets for repression, and the human rights organizations

Women's activism in the human rights groups, however, clearly grew out of their roles as mothers. As during the first-wave movements, women used the discourse of motherhood to justify their actions, and to mobilize other women to join in their efforts. According to Chuchryk, who interviewed numerous women from the *Agrupación de Familiares de Detenidos-Desaparecidos*, women were motivated to act because they felt an obligation as wives, mothers, sisters, and daughters (1989b, 140). Their male family members were being targeted for repression, and, despite their fear of getting involved in politics, they acted according to the norms defined by the gender ideology—they put their concern for their families over and above the concern for their own well-being, and they acted, at times, publicly, in defence of their families.

In addition to women's involvement in the human rights movements, women organized in response to economic hardships. Again, in a pattern common throughout Latin America, women's maternal roles served as the main basis for activism in the subsistence organizations in poor neighbourhoods (see Safa 1994). Subsistence organizations have been defined as groups of people inhabiting the same geographical area who contribute small amounts of resources but mostly their own labour to collectively resolve unmet necessities (Valdés and Weinstein 1993, 141-42). Subsistence organizations have come to be known as *organizaciones económicas populares* (OEPs). The OEPs emerged in the context of the economic crisis described above which hit the inhabitants of the *poblaciones* the hardest. There were numerous types of OEPs, including *talleres productivos* (productive workshops), *ollas comunes* (collective kitchens), and *comprando juntas* (purchasing collectives). Many of these initiatives emerged and grew significantly in the months and years immediately following the coup, but decreased in the late 1970s when the economy began to recover. Their numbers dramatically increased again during the economic crisis of 1982-83, when even official unemployment was over 30 percent.¹² During this same period, a number of natural disasters (heavy rainstorms and floods) exacerbated the problems of daily survival in the

¹²

OEPs (in Santiago)	1982	1985
ollas comunes	34	232
comprando juntas	57	232
total numbers of OEPs	495	1,125

source: Chuchryk, 1989a, 154.

poblaciones.¹³ The membership of the OEPs was overwhelmingly female in part because they emerged out of the previous organizational experiences of popular sector women in the *Centros de Madres* (Valdés and Weinstein 1993, 145).

Many authors argue that these organizations collectivized the problems of poverty created by the neoliberal economic model imposed by the dictatorship (Chuchryk 1989a, 155; Dandavati 1996, 76-7; Schild 1991; Valdés and Weinstein 1993, 147;). Collectivizing these issues was the first step in “politicizing” the members. Gaviola *et al* interviewed one woman who explains that when she first started attending one of the *talleres* in her neighbourhood, at the urging of her mother, she was not really sure what the group’s purpose was. She went because “there was nothing else to do”. Soon, however, she realized that “really the purpose of the group is to make us begin to feel like persons, to be able to show that we are capable, that there is a world out there where the woman has lots to say and lots to do.” Most importantly, it is in this context that women learn that “the problems they have within their house are not just theirs, but are the problems of all women” (cited in Gaviola *et al* 1994, 80). As women became aware of the extent to which their own problems of day-to-day survival were shared by other women, they also began to resolve these problems collectively. As we saw in Chapter 2, popular sector women could draw on a historical legacy of collective action in the face of social and economic crises.¹⁴

¹³ By 1990 there were 1,370 *talleres productivos* in Santiago alone and in 1989 there were 279 *ollas comunes* which benefited around 30,000 people in the capital city (Valdés and Weinstein 1993, 141-55).

¹⁴ Many of the women from the popular sectors with whom I spoke speak proudly of their capacities to mobilize in the face of crisis. There seems to be a shared history among

The context created by the dictatorship was considerably different from previous instances in which popular sector women undertook collective action, however, because this time, women's goals expanded as they linked their daily problems with the dictatorship and a society that subordinated women. According to M. Valenzuela, the women's groups based in the *poblaciones*, who were at first mainly concerned with survival issues, were also more autonomous than some of the other women's groups (human rights and political groups with links to parties), and hence, more likely to be critical of traditional Chilean political practice (1991, 170). Many of the OEPs expanded their activities, developing workshops on sexuality, family relations, and personal development (*ibid.*). This is partly because contributing collectively to confronting the crises in which these women were living gave them a sense of accomplishment and self-esteem. According to Molina, "the crisis transforms women into mothers-providers, which produces, as has occurred in many cases—a feeling of self-esteem and personal security that authorizes women to struggle for themselves in defence of their own" (1989, 75). Verónica Montecinos argues that gender relations in low-income groups were also changing in this period: "The hierarchy of the patriarchal family was challenged as women became more involved in community activities and their contributions as family providers increased" (1997, 228).

Another important source of women's changing consciousness in this period is the interaction that began to take place among women from different classes and with different partisan identities. With the political parties in a weakened state, and male

these women in which women, rather than men, are seen as the ones who *act* when crisis hits, while men "sit around and wonder what to do".

leaders dead, in jail, or in exile, female militants created their own organizations, some with links to the underground parties and others more autonomous. In the groups with links to political parties, women enjoyed a degree of autonomy from the parties because the repression was hitting traditional political actors the hardest. These groups were not always formed at the behest of the parties, but in some cases emerged from the desire of the women to do something and not just accept the closure of political spaces.¹⁵ Other women, who had never had the opportunity to be political leaders, stepped in to fill the leadership roles vacated by the men who were either dead, imprisoned, in exile, or who stopped participating because of the danger involved. Some examples of women's groups with links to political parties or actors are: *Comité de Defensa de los Derechos de la Mujer* (CODEM), created by women from the *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (MIR); *Mujeres de Chile* (MUDECHI), formed by women with links to the *Partido Comunista* (PC); *Unión Chilena de Mujer* (UCHM), created by women from the *Partido Socialista* (PS). In their early years, these groups served as a mechanism for reconstructing relationships between political leaders and their social bases, relationships that the dictatorship wanted to destroy completely. In this sense, women's groups were crucial in taking the first steps towards rebuilding a sense of active citizenship in a

¹⁵ Gaviola *et al* relate the story of one woman who argued with her husband over how to respond to the situation brought about by the coup and the repression. Both had been politically active during the Frei and Allende years but he was now saying that “*la política se acabó*” (politics is over), and there was nothing more to be done. She argued back that the situation demanded action, especially by women who were not yet suspected of being politically active, and therefore were not targets of repression. She argued that women were “safe” because “the men thought we women were all silly and if we were in a political party we obeyed the men and therefore we were not responsible nor capable of raising ourselves against them” (cited in Gaviola *et al* 1995, 54).

country where passivity was a virtue according to the government. The important role that women's organizations were playing in this context contributed to an expanding notion of "politics" in this period. Women's activity was politicized because the "formal" political arena traditionally occupied by political parties was closed. Hence, according to M. Valenzuela, "under military rule, the organizations of civil society became a substitute political arena that contributed to the politicization of the private and social spheres" (1991, 170). Women's activism in this period was conceived as an expression of citizenship because the boundary between "formal" and "informal" politics, a boundary which normally undermines women's citizenship, was (temporarily) blurred.

Women also took on leading roles in risky and illegal labour union activity. Women with links to the *Coordinadora Nacional Sindical* (CNS)—wives and/or mothers of leaders or leaders themselves—formed a Solidarity Committee immediately following the coup. Within a year they expanded and evolved into the *Departamento Femenino* (DF). During this time, women's presumed distance from all matters political made it easy for women to establish contact among leaders and their bases. But, according to some women involved in the DF, while the women gathered and relayed information at great risk to themselves, the men continued to take all the decisions. This was one motivation for the women to initiate their own action *as women* and *for women*. Thus, the DF was formed in order to be more autonomous and to work particularly for women (Gaviola *et al* 1994, 87-88). According to Chuchryk, another goal of the DF was to mobilize the wives of the male union members: "by encouraging the wives of workers to participate in the trade union movement, the Women's Department was addressing two very important issues: the development of a partnership of women and men in class

struggle, and the assumed political conservatism of women, particularly housewives” (1989a, 159).

In this context—the relative absence of political parties and women’s increasing organization—it is not surprising that eventually women’s groups emerged in the popular sectors that defined themselves as feminist. Popular sector women made a key distinction, however, between feminism in general and their particular kind of feminism—*feminismo popular*, given that prevailing stereotypes depicted “feminism” as middle-class and anti-male. An important example is *Movimiento de Mujeres Populares* (MOMUPO) which formed in the Santiago *población* of Renca in 1979. The women who initially formed the group had been participating in mixed organizations but started to feel that they were marginalized as women. While they began meeting to resolve economic issues, they soon started holding consciousness-raising and personal development workshops (Chuchryk 1989a, 164). They started to hold their meetings in the community church, where they invited women from neighbouring parishes to join them. They later received funding from an international NGO which allowed them to pay for their own meeting place and for transportation for members to and from meetings.¹⁶ The women of MOMUPO aimed at constructing an identity rooted in both

¹⁶ One of the most pressing problems for women’s groups in the *poblaciones* is finding a meeting place and meeting the transportation costs of members. During the dictatorship many women’s groups received foreign funding to address this problem. Since the return of democracy, however, there is much less foreign funding available to women’s groups, and many groups have ceased functioning partially due to their inability to find a place to hold meetings. Many of the groups with whom I had contact told me that it is a constant struggle to find funding or to find places to meet. The costs of public transportation can also be prohibitive, especially in times of economic crisis. Given that the costs of bus

their sex and class position (Valdés and Weinstein 1993, 167; Gaviola *et al* 1994, 139-42). MOMUPO worked hard at remaining independent and autonomous from political parties and tried to relate only with other women's groups. Although some of the members of MOMUPO were party militants, others left the party because they wanted to avoid having parties interfere with MOMUPO's activities (Gaviola *et al* 1994, 140).

This period also witnessed the rebirth of a feminist movement in Chile. Many explanations have been offered for why feminism (re)emerged in such a presumably hostile setting. Valdés and Weinstein (1993) credit the initiation of the United Nations (UN) Decade for Women (in 1975) with re-igniting Chilean feminism by focusing attention on women's issues in development and for making international funding available. The number of NGOs in Chile expanded rapidly under authoritarianism as professionals in the government and in universities lost their jobs and responded by creating NGOs. Given the concern with gender issues sparked by the UN Decade for Women, international aid agencies favoured NGOs that devoted specific attention to women's concerns. This gave women academics the space and freedom needed to work on gender issues and to carry out projects specifically for women. By 1987, there were 87 NGOs or other support agencies that had a gender focus (either academically or in terms of social services) (Valdés and Weinstein 1993, 194-95). Other authors emphasize the importance of the exile experience, particularly for political women (Chuchryk 1989; Gaviola *et al* 1994, Serrano 1990, Valenzuela 1991). Many women who had been politically active in the Frei and Allende years were exiled in Europe where they came

fare to attend meetings is roughly equivalent to the costs of buying bread for the day, women confront a stark choice.

into contact with feminist organizing and ideas. Another important explanation for the appearance of feminism in this period is the weakness of the political parties, which gave women activists the necessary “space” to initiate critical reflections on traditional political practice. Feminists such as Julieta Kirkwood began to argue that democracy had never really existed for women in Chile. Kirkwood explained that Chilean democracy’s proclaimed values of equality, non-discrimination, and liberty were never experienced by women who, relegated to the “private” sphere, were subjected to the undisputed authority of the male head of household. Hence, “the daily experience for women is authoritarianism” (Kirkwood 1988, 19-20, emphasis in original).

One of the first feminist groups was the *Círculo de Estudios de la Mujer*, formed in 1977 and incorporated into the *Academia de Humanismo Cristiano*, set up by the Archbishop of Santiago in 1979. Chuchryk explains that it formed with the dual purpose of generating knowledge about women’s history in Chile and fostering a feminist consciousness. She notes that, “[f]or a long time, the *Círculo* was feminism’s only public face in Chile” (1989b, 146). In 1983 tension grew between the Church and the *Círculo* and the Church stopped supporting it. A member of the *Círculo* explained, “the Church was progressive on the question of human rights, but in these [women’s] questions it was conservative as always” (cited in Gaviola *et al* 1994, 128-29). Eventually two different groups emerged, *Centros de Estudios de la Mujer* (CEM), whose main aim was research

on women's issues, and *La Morada*, which focused more on dissemination of information and consciousness-raising.¹⁷

Consolidation of a Women's Movement

We can speak of a united, broad-based and multi-class women's movement at this point because organized women in this period shared an overarching common goal—the defeat of the dictatorship—but also because a common outlook was emerging among women about the particularities of their condition as women. Their common goal led women's groups to come together to form larger networks, and their common outlook led to the elaboration of a set of demands that went beyond merely the return of democracy to include the promotion of a women's rights agenda. Women began to think critically about how democracy had been practised in Chilean politics, and to argue for a more inclusive democracy to be established. As we shall see, however, this period was not without significant conflict that ended up fragmenting the movement even as it was coming together. Both aspects are crucial to explaining what happened to the movement after the return of democracy.

During the first ten years of dictatorship, Chilean women organized collectively in response to the social, political, and economic dislocations the dictatorship was producing. After 1983, however, a more united women's movement developed and gained significant public visibility through its opposition to the dictatorship. In this

¹⁷ Both of these organizations continue to exist as NGOs, which is important, given that most other organizations formed in the 1970s or early 1980s have ceased to function.

section, I discuss the nature of this movement, and especially its strategies and the conflicts that were generated between it and traditional political actors—the political parties. It is significant that when confronted with the “autonomy versus integration” dilemma, many feminists in this period rejected the autonomy strategy and opted instead for a “double militancy” strategy as a means of placing gender issues on the agenda of the transition. Double militancy meant working with traditional political actors—namely political parties—as feminists and trying to insert feminist aims into the partisan aims of traditional political actors.

While members of many social organizations had maintained links with the underground political parties, once parties could operate more or less freely again, greater tensions emerged between parties and movements. Movements were often weakened by partisan conflict among members, especially because Leftist and Centrist parties held competing views about how best to defeat the dictatorship and bring about democracy. By the mid-1980s, the democratic opposition had firmly split into two factions: the more Centrist *Alianza Democrática* (AD) and the more Leftist *Movimiento Democrático Popular* (MDP). Both of these opposition networks wanted the support and mobilizing capacity of women’s groups (M. Valenzuela 1991, 172). The two groupings were fundamentally divided over strategy. The AD felt that the best strategy was to negotiate with the dictatorship and utilize the small opening afforded by the 1980 Constitution.¹⁸

¹⁸ The Constitution established a timetable for moving towards a very restricted form of democracy. There was to be a referendum in 1988 on whether Pinochet should continue in office for a further eight years. Then, rules were spelled out for (nominally) democratic elections, in which Pinochet (or a hand-chosen successor) was expected to win.

This strategy centred on using social mobilization only to get the military to the negotiating table, after which political elites would arrange the terms of the transition. The MDP, on the other hand, believed that only sustained popular mobilization would provoke the collapse of the dictatorship. As it became more clear that the defeat of the dictatorship was imminent, the AD took centre stage, marginalizing the PMD whose members refused to take part in the AD's strategy. Women's groups which sided with the PMD were consequently marginalized as well. Other women, upon seeing their political parties ally with the moderate opposition of the AD, dominated by the Christian Democrats, withdrew from women's groups and/or parties in protest.¹⁹

What was most significant about this period was the relationships and links forged among variously situated women. These relationships were initiated largely because middle-class and professional women working in the NGOs received international funding to carry out work (including conscious-raising activities) with poor and working-class women in the *poblaciones*. Feminists organized workshops (*jornadas*) and various types of sessions for interchange and *conscientización* (consciousness-raising) with *pobladora* women. Through these interchanges, women's groups in the popular sectors began to expand their own activities, and most groups added workshops on sexuality, personal development, and family relations to their schedule of activities. In this way, according to Valdés and Weinstein, a "feminist curriculum" spread throughout women's organizations; a curriculum that addressed day-to-day issues from a feminist perspective

¹⁹ Many socialists were opposed to the alliance with the Christian Democrats, who were still being blamed for the coup in 1973.

that included an awareness of the gendered bases of the struggles of popular sector women (1993, 196).

Unlike in North America where second-wave feminism abandoned a “politics of difference” and maternal feminism, the Chilean women’s movement in the 1980s displayed both similarities and striking differences from the first-wave movement. The most significant similarity was the maintenance of the maternal mobilizing frame. As we shall see, however, in this period, a maternalist mobilizing frame or a “politics of difference” led women’s groups to make fairly radical demands to restructure gender relations and reorganize political space to include women. The analysis contained in this section indicates that maternal feminism does not have a fixed content, but can lead women to make a variety of citizenship claims. The emphasis on women’s motherhood as the source for public activism was in fact an important element of the common outlook being forged among organized women in this period. Valdés and Weinstein explain that “maternity is located at the centre of women’s mobilization symbolized in the theme of ‘Life’” and in this period, “there is a resignification of maternity as a point of departure for collective action” (1993, 188). This resignification was taking place among *pobladora* women, organizing at first to provide for their families, as well as middle-class women, organizing in the human rights organizations and the feminist groups. The main differences between the Pinochet-era women’s movement and the first-wave movement are revealed in the nature of the demands emanating from various women’s organizations and in their relationships with political parties.

Some of the most important groups to emerge in or after 1983 were: *Mujeres por la Vida* (Women for Life); *Movimiento pro-Emancipación de la Mujer Chilena* '83

(MEMCH '83); and *Movimiento Feminista* (MF). *Mujeres por la Vida* emerged primarily in response to human rights violations, yet it differed from other human rights groups because its members were political women who were not necessarily relatives of the victims; although some members had been victims of arrest and/or exile themselves due to their own political activities. The women who formed the group were also responding to the inability of the democratic opposition to overcome partisan divisions to struggle *effectively* for democracy (Gaviola *et al* 1994, 153). Throughout the 1970s, military had been extremely successful at pacifying the population and thus there was very little public protest activity during the first ten years of dictatorship. This changed after the economic crisis of 1982-83. The forces opposed to the dictatorship were extremely fragmented, however, and the political parties seemed incapable of overcoming partisan differences to work together for the common goal of democracy. A number of women militants from different parties united to reflect on the disarray of the opposition and to do something about it. They organized a women-only event, with the aim of illustrating that it was possible to work collectively despite partisan differences. On December 29, 1983 at the Caupolicán Theatre in Santiago, ten thousand women joined together in an act of opposition to the dictatorship, despite the fact that a significant police presence waited outside. The success of this event led the women who organized it to form *Mujeres por la Vida* (*ibid.*, 154). The motivations for forming this group clearly emerge out of women's distinct way of practising politics. The women believed it important to transcend partisan differences and act collectively in pursuit of an *ideal*—in this case, democracy. It is significant that the first *political* event in which members from different parties participated together was convened, and exclusively

attended by women. According to M. Valenzuela, *Mujeres por la Vida* was formed “to recover the traditional sense of women’s contribution to politics” (1991, 172). In organizing the event, women were not pursuing *power* or a class-based agenda; but rather were overcoming political differences to act collectively.

Women’s Citizenship Demands in the 1980s

In 1986, *Mujeres Por la Vida* presented a statement of women’s demands to the *Asamblea de la Civilidad*, an opposition event hosted by a pro-democracy network, and women’s demands formed part of the *Pliego de Chile* (Chilean People’s Charter). This was the first time that women’s demands formed such an integral part of the public agenda. In the document, women insisted that “[i]t is not possible to conceive of a truly democratic society without the real democratization of the condition of women”.²⁰ Women’s demands for democracy included: respect for human rights; better wages; the creation of “dignified” jobs and an end to unemployment; and access to education, housing, and health care. They called for free contraception on demand, divorce legislation, and more equal relations within the family. Regarding access to the political arena, they called upon the state to promote women’s participation in all social and political organizations and within the state itself. Moreover, they appealed to women’s “different” styles of practicing politics as justification: “[women’s] participation will

²⁰ The document, *Pliego de la Mujeres* (Women’s Charter) is reproduced in Gaviola *et al* 1994, 244-47.

generate a political renovation, with non-authoritarian styles of debate, organization, and direction”.

MEMCH ‘83 was formed primarily by women from the Leftist parties as an umbrella group, and at its highest point had twenty-six member organizations. MEMCH ‘83 also worked at elaborating women’s demands, and in 1983 they prepared a document for the preparatory meeting for the 1985 Nairobi conference which ended the UN Decade for Women. The women’s platform elaborated by MEMCH ‘83 is remarkably similar to that of *Mujeres Por la Vida*. They, too, argued that “[a] truly democratic society is not possible without the active incorporation and protagonism of women in the struggle to achieve it”.²¹ In terms of specific demands, they call for an end to gender discrimination in the labour force, in health care, and through education. The platform includes a section on sexuality, demanding respect and assurance for women’s right “to know and decide about her own body”. In terms of political participation, they demand training for women to improve their access to decision-making and an increase in the number of women in public positions, but they stop short of demanding specific institutional reforms to achieve the goal. It is evident from the demands of both *Mujeres Por la Vida* and MEMCH ‘83 that women’s movements in this period, unlike those of the 1940s, were calling for significant changes to gender relations in order that women be able to exercise their political citizenship. This shows that maternal feminism need not be conservative as some of its critics have argued.

²¹ This document, “Principios y Reivindicaciones que Configuran la Plataforma de la Mujer Chilena,” is reproduced in *ibid.*, 238-43.

Movimiento Feminista (MF) formed in 1983 by women drawn from the *Círculo de Estudios de la Mujer*, who wanted to participate in the democratic struggle and the National Days of Protest organized by the pro-democratic opposition specifically as feminists (Chuchryk 1989a, 166). MF was responsible for the first public demonstration of women as feminists: in August 1983 the group gathered on the steps of the National Library in downtown Santiago under a large banner that demanded “Democracy Now”. It was signed, “Movimiento Feminista” (Gaviola *et al* 1994, 131). The group elaborated a *Feminist Manifesto* in 1983 and in 1988 published “Women’s Demands of Democracy,” a set of demands that signalled a turning point because women’s demands were being promoted as prerequisites for democracy, rather than something that could be delayed until after democracy was established (Valdés and Weinstein 1993, 138). Valdés and Weinstein claim that the demands of MF were the most substantive in terms of containing a critique of traditional democratic practice in Chile; proposing measures to promote women’s participation as citizens, mothers, and workers (1993, 229). In their *Feminist Manifesto* they claim:

Chilean feminism has shown that authoritarianism is more than a political problem, it has origins and deep roots in the whole social structure. Many elements and contents which have not been considered political due to their links to private daily life must be questioned and rejected.²²

Feminists in this group went much further in their critique, not just of “politics,” but also of the “private” sphere—a critique not developed by first-wave feminists:

²² This document, along with “Women’s Demands of Democracy,” are reproduced in *ibid.*, 234-47 and 251-56.

We affirm that the family is authoritarian, that the socialization of children—the future—is authoritarian, rigid in the assigning of stereotypical sexual roles; that education is authoritarian and subject to censorship; that the factories, offices, intermediate organizations, political parties, have all been constituted in an authoritarian manner.

In terms of specific demands, however, the MF's demands were similar to those of MEMCH '83 and *Mujeres Por la Vida*. The state was called upon to improve the material conditions of life for women through the provision of social services and access to jobs and education, however, the Manifesto makes no concrete proposals for political reform.

In 1988, around the time of the plebiscite on Pinochet's continued rule, the Feminist Movement issued "Women's Demands of Democracy," calling on Chilean women to make their gender-based demands heard at a crucial juncture in their nation's history. In their statement, they asked that all Chilean women work together to pose "to political parties, social and labour organizations, religious institutions, and to the Chilean Commission of Human Rights, that women's demands acquire a commitment, that they be contained in the democratic system that all Chilean men and women are constructing." The specific demands of the Feminist Movement in this document went well beyond any earlier demands of women's organizations, in terms of specificity and substantiveness. For the first time, feminists called for the creation of women's policy machinery to devise policy for women and to ensure women's participation in all areas relevant to national life. They proposed quotas for women in government and parliament. Regarding motherhood, they claimed, "we value our maternal role and we exercise it with great commitment and responsibility, but our realization as persons is not exhausted by it." In

perhaps the most radical departure yet, the document states that “women’s liberty to choose whether to be mothers or not must be respected”. Unfortunately, as we see in the next section, the more radical demands of feminists (such as quotas and reproductive rights) were dropped from the transition’s agenda by women’s groups who pursued a strategy of “double militancy”. The strategy led to feminists dropping demands considered to be too radical by the parties forming the pro-democracy opposition.

Women’s Movements and Political Parties: “Autonomy versus Double Militancy”

After 1983, popular protest against the dictatorship exploded, ignited initially by the call of the Copper Workers’ Union for a National Day of Protest. Eventually, the protests became regular, weekly events and political parties re-emerged to take a leading role in organizing and directing the protest and opposition to the dictatorship. Hence, the relative autonomy of social actors from political parties and organizations was short-lived. By the early 1980s, especially after 1983 and the emergence of a more visible and public democratic opposition, political parties began to intervene more directly and more forcefully in the workings of movements. Movement organizations, however, resented the erosion of their autonomy that came with the expansion of partisan of activities.

According to M. Valenzuela,

Because political parties had no channels for expression during the first decade of military rule, they tended to function through social organizations. Once the parties began to reconstruct their own spaces for action after 1983, they tried to control and co-opt the social organizations—including women’s groups—that had developed autonomously (1991, 167).

In this context, women's organizations became more divided over strategy (i.e., "autonomy versus integration"), and over partisan differences among members. MEMCH '83, for example, was plagued by partisan conflict among its members. Paulina Weber, MEMCH's current director explains that because MEMCH '83 was formed by women mostly drawn from the Leftist parties, these "parties sought in MEMCH a place for expression."²³ This period witnessed growing tensions between the more partisan aims of party members and the aims of other collective actors, especially *poblador/a* actors. As traditional political actors began to re-construct a "formal" political arena, the content of "politics" was once again monopolized by the political parties with a resulting loss of public visibility for social organizations. Hence, the struggles that were played out in MEMCH '83 and in the other organizations of this period illustrate the conflict between the women's movement and the political parties and, more profoundly, the conflict between "formal" political activism and "informal" political activism (as perceived by the actors themselves). While many women wanted to participate in the political struggle for democracy, some were wary about allying too closely with the political parties. Other women believed that party militancy was key, and that there was no problem in participating in the parties as feminists. Yet other women wanted to avoid politics altogether, and focus on activities with and for other women; activities that emphasized first and foremost the socio-economic problems they experienced as women. For these women, "formal" politics was an arena irrelevant to their daily problems largely because partisan actors traditionally ignore such issues.

²³ Interview, October 21, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

As political activity shifted back towards the political parties, there were two main causes of conflict within women's organizations, similar to the conflicts experienced within the popular movement more generally (see Oxhorn 1995a). First, there were tensions within organizations between the grassroots members and the leaders. Many of the organizations in the popular sectors at this time were led by those with links to political parties; or who were part of network organizations whose leaders had such links. Problems often emerged over whether to prioritize the concrete material needs of the members—access to housing, health care, and employment, etc, or to favour the political struggle against the dictatorship. The leaders, with links to the parties, often emphasized the political struggle, while the members were more concerned with the day-to-day material struggles that the policies of the dictatorship were creating (Valdés and Weinstein 1993, 204-13). Additionally, many members of the community organizations in the *poblaciones* viewed “politics” in an unfavourable light.²⁴ According to Valdés and Weinstein, “there also existed the problem of ‘elitization’ of political leaders in the measure that politics was transformed into a ‘professional world’ far removed from the concrete perceptions of the *población*” (1993, 213). These problems, which plagued the popular movement in general, were even more sharply felt within the women's movement, given the parties' traditional unwillingness to deal with the specificities of women's demands and situations.

²⁴ It should be kept in mind that many of the women in the *poblaciones* had likely participated at some point in the *Centros de Madres* of the Pinochet era. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the discourse promoted in the *Centros* depicted “politics” as an extremely negative activity, and, moreover, one in which women should not participate.

The other main cause of conflict emerged more directly out of the partisan divisions within the opposition. After 1983, when women's activism became more public, the parties began to realize the power of women to mobilize. This meant that the parties became more interested in women's groups. According to one feminist:

The women's movement pioneered the struggle, they organized before any other and had a strength not only numerically but a very strong moral force. Therefore the political parties were very nice, were very kind, instrumentalizing the women's movement. There was not a bad relation with them—on the contrary, they had to look after us.²⁵

In a similar vein, one of the founders of *Mujeres por la Vida* notes that the parties also sought to direct the mobilizational capacities of women. She explains that after the 1983 event which drew over ten thousand women, "then began this difficult thing with the parties. the realization that we represented important social capital, tremendously strong, and they exerted pressure on us as a social organization so that we would do those things that they wanted as a party" (cited in Gaviola *et al* 1994, 155). Eventually *Mujeres Por la Vida* became paralyzed by partisan conflict and tensions especially after the 1986 assassination attempt on Pinochet, when the group sharply disagreed over strategy. They ceased acting shortly thereafter (Muñoz 1996, 9). A number of women with whom I spoke, women who had been active in feminist groups in the 1980s, recall the bitter and acrimonious divisions of the late 1980s when a number of women stopped participating altogether in order to avoid such bitter disputes. These kinds of tensions were occurring in almost all of the various women's groups that comprised the women's movement. MEMCH '83 lost most of its members over the partisan tensions that grew more intense

²⁵ Interview with Sandra Palestro, October 7, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

throughout the 1980s and the number of member organizations decreased from twenty-six to only seven (Gaviola *et al* 1994, 151).

As mentioned earlier, women party militants had created many women's organizations, especially among *pobladora* women.²⁶ But many of these groups ultimately fragmented, as members left who did not like having the party ultimately direct the strategy of the group and the issues that could be raised within it. For example, MUDECHI, with its strong links to the Communist Party, suffered serious fragmentation in the mid-1980s when the opposition movement as a whole was divided over strategy. The leaders of the Communist Party sought to interfere directly with MUDECHI's activities and direct their positions on the issues confronting it, leading to tensions within the group and anger from women who resented this attempt at control (Valdés and Weinstein 1993, 162). Likewise, a woman in a group formed initially by women militants from the MIR explains that many of the members were more interested in gathering to discuss women's issues and engaging in consciousness-raising activities. They were not terribly motivated to carry out "politics" in the traditional sense as understood by the parties. With respect to the protests, marches, and mobilizations organized by the party, she explains that "we never liked that, but I always had the idea that you had to do it, like a duty" (cited in Gaviola *et al* 1994, 118). She further explains the tensions that were ultimately generated between militants and feminists: "much

²⁶ The role of party militants in either creating or sustaining social organizations in this period supports Judith Hellman's (1992) contentions that too much emphasis is placed on the "autonomy" of social movements in the Latin American "new social movement" literature.

energy was spent trying to practice feminism in a political party that is not feminist, and that, even worse, is against feminism” (*ibid.*).

The above comments illustrate an essential problem for women’s politics: the dichotomy posited between “formal” (“big-P”) politics and “informal” (“small-p”) politics. The actions of traditional actors such as political parties and new actors such as women’s movements reinforced the dichotomy in this period, thereby maintaining the stereotypes about who acts in which realm and what types of issues can be raised in either realm. The dilemma for women is to try to convey their “small-p” political issues into the “formal” political arena, even if they themselves do not want to participate in the activities there (such as electoral politics). Often, this dilemma figures into strategic debates over autonomy versus integration. That is, how can women’s issues be placed on the public agenda if women themselves do not seek entry to put them there? What sort of links can/should there be between “autonomous” feminists and women party militants?

The above dilemmas are reflected in the nature of women’s demands in this period, especially in the demands of popular sector women as compared to women from the political class. Valdés and Weinstein (1993) argue that popular sector women were making demands for *citizenship*, i.e., they were demanding access to education, housing, health care, and to dignified jobs, but were also demanding that their motherhood roles be respected and valued. Most of their demands were directed at the state—popular sector women believed the state should play a crucial role in expanding women’s citizenship through the provision of services and resources for women, and through reinforcing laws that favour women. But it is significant, according to Valdés and Weinstein, that popular sector women were *not* demanding to be part of the political system (1993, 231-32).

Rather, women conceived their participation as occupying a space in between the “formal” political arena and the “private” sphere, i.e., the “informal” political arena. Because women were demanding policies that favoured women and improved their lives, rather than demanding to be part of the political system, the scant relevance of political parties to many women of this sector is understandable. Valdés and Weinstein explain:

In this sense, it would seem that the *pobladora* groups did not propose a new form of linkage to the state; rather they continued to perceive it as a bureaucratic structure that delivered necessary benefits, without demanding mechanisms for channelling their concerns and demands (*ibid.*, 232).

The absence of demands to enter the state, or to create mechanisms through which gender issues could enter the political arena, would become a problem for popular sector women in the post-1990 context. After the return of democracy, popular sector women continued to express their citizenship primarily in the “informal” political arena, however, there are too few linkages between this arena and the “formal” political arena where women’s gender and class concerns could be raised, thereby resulting in gender- *and* class-based exclusion for popular sector women.

Not all women were opposed to working with the political parties. Some feminists believed the primary mistake of the feminist movement in the 1940s was that they had tried to remain above politics. When that strategy failed, women simply moved into the parties without trying to bring to them a feminist politics. This time, while some women continued to view party politics negatively and sought to maintain their autonomy from partisan politics, others believed pursuing women’s interests required their presence in the parties. Kirkwood explains that the main difference between the “*feministas*”

(autonomous feminists) and the “*políticas*” (political women) is that the *políticas* prioritized the democratic struggle, arguing that “there is no feminism without democracy,” while the *feministas* placed a premium on the feminist struggle, insisting “there is no democracy without feminism” (1988, 19). What is important, however, is that there were a number of feminist party militants that believed they could pursue feminism within the parties, in other words, employ a strategy of “double militancy”.

What were the outcomes of the “autonomy versus integration” dilemma and the decision by many feminists to pursue “double militancy”? On the one hand, the role of women in the parties clearly had positive consequences in terms of “gendering” the transition. This led some women to belatedly realize the value of engaging in the partisan processes of the period. For example, a woman whose group withdrew from MEMCH ‘83 over partisan conflict reflected that,

I think we made a mistake in being very defensive of the professionals and the parties, we wanted to build a movement with its own direction, but it was a period in which the presence of external agents was so strong that one ended up disadvantaged before other groups that had more systematic support (cited in Gaviola *et al* 1994, 142).

Adriana Delpiano, currently SERNAM’s director, was active as a feminist in the *Partido por la Democracia* (PPD). She explains that the good thing about the women’s movement in the 1980s was that it “was a movement that had a connotation of gender, but also was linked to the political struggle of the moment—it didn’t marginalize itself from the political struggle.”²⁷ Adriana Muñoz, currently a parliamentarian from the PPD

²⁷ Interview, September 9, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

discusses women's roles in the debates about how to reform socialism.²⁸ She explains that women's roles in the opposition movement and their roles in "practicing politics" at the time put them in a good position to exert influence on the debates about the future of socialism in Chile: "it was we women who were very linked to all of the social world and from there we could incorporate very strongly our gender demands."²⁹ The *Partido por la Democracia* (PPD), which has had one of the highest number of women in positions of responsibility, is a new party, created during the transition to democracy.³⁰

Two of the main parties comprising the opposition (the Christian Democrats and the Socialists—Núñez faction) had women working within them to elaborate proposals for women's issues. The Christian Democrats formed a Technical Department, composed principally of professional women, to study and diagnose areas of concern to women, for example, the family, legislation, and health. Some of their proposals included: democratizing family relations; more knowledge for women about their sexuality and their bodies; greater social value for domestic labour; and, in terms of political participation, "greater access to and equality in political parties". The latter proposal did not specify a mechanism by which this goal would be achieved, however

²⁸ During the 1980s there were serious debates among socialists over their role in bringing about the coup. The debates were also influenced by the experiences of those who had been in exile in Europe where debates were also taking place about how to renew socialist politics. Eventually, the party split into two factions—the Núñez faction and the Almeyda faction. The Núñez faction, otherwise known as the "Renovated" Socialists were more moderate and participated in the Centrist opposition strategy.

²⁹ Interview with Adriana Muñoz, November 2, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

³⁰ The PPD was initially created by those who wished to participate in the 1989 elections but were members of banned parties (such as the Socialist Party). The PPD outlived its earlier instrumental purpose, however, and continued to function even after other Leftist parties, such as the Socialist and Communist Parties, became legal political parties (Oppenheim 1999, 238).

(Molina 1989, 93-105). The proposals of the party that later became the PPD were initially elaborated by the *Federación de Mujeres Socialistas* (FMS) from the Núñez faction of the Socialist Party. The feminists who formed the group pursued a “double militancy” strategy, believing that feminism must be practiced within the parties because parties were key actors in a democracy, making them a legitimate and necessary space for feminist politics (*ibid.*, 117). The gender-specific proposals of the FMS included increased participation of women in all major areas of decision-making that affect them, recognizing the value of domestic labour, non-sexist forms of education, and social justice and redistribution. They also called for greater reproductive freedoms for women and the de-criminalization of abortion (*ibid.*, 120-23). It is significant in both cases that women party militants made fairly radical proposals for equalizing gender relations. In the end, however, many proposals were not adopted by their political parties in the official election platforms. Women’s roles in the parties and the prominence of the women’s movement, nonetheless, led all political parties to express concern with women’s gender issues during the 1989 election campaigns.

The Concertación de las Mujeres Por la Democracia (CNMD)

In this period, women also used their public visibility to mobilize other women to vote “No” in the 1988 plebiscite on the continuation of Pinochet’s rule. During the campaign for the “No” vote, women were extremely active, and once again they were able to use their “moral voice” to persuade Chileans to vote to put an end to a regime that violated human rights, and therefore threatened the integrity of the family. In keeping with the

maternal frame, women continued to be presented as entirely gendered actors during the campaign, and their support as voters was often sought by appealing to their traditional concern for the family. For example, a Christian Democratic campaign pamphlet said, “all Pinochet has to offer is that women will not have enough money to provide meals [for their families]. Thus they will have to take on work that leaves the family uncared for and destroys the home” (cited in M. Valenzuela 1991, 181).

Perhaps the most critical effort by women to place women’s particular demands at the centre of the opposition’s platform came after the 1988 referendum on Pinochet’s rule. The opposition won the referendum with a vote of fifty-four percent against Pinochet. The opposition now had to prepare for presidential and parliamentary elections in 1989 and to this end they formed the *Concertación de los Partidos por la Democracia* (CPD). As candidate lists were prepared and platforms elaborated, women noted with growing concern that they were being marginalized in the process. Few women were being nominated as candidates. Their mobilizational capacities and their moral voice were employed strategically by the opposition in the plebiscite campaign, but it seemed that now that a more traditional style of party politics was returning, there was little space for women or their concerns. Women’s response was to create the *Concertación Nacional de las Mujeres por la Democracia* (CNMD), formed by women militants of the CPD, feminists, and women from NGOs. Their main aim was to prepare a government program for women, and to support women candidates (Valdés 1994, 309). They were not, however, intended to be merely women supporters of the *Concertación*. According

to Josefina Rossetti, executive secretary of the CNMD, “we did not aim to be the feminine arm of the *Concertación*.”³¹

The CNMD was critically important because of the access that some of the leaders of the women’s movement had to party leaders (Frohmann and Valdés 1995, 288). Thus, the *Concertación*’s program included a chapter on women, and, most importantly, a commitment to promote women’s equality through an executive-level agency (Concertación, 1989). *Concertación* presidential candidate Patricio Aylwin also integrated the women’s movement’s slogan of “democracy in the country and in the home” into his campaign. Frohmann and Valdés argue that this was “an important ideological breakthrough for the women’s movement” because no presidential candidate had ever implicitly accepted the link “between oppression in the public sphere and oppression in the private sphere” (1995, 288). Unfortunately, due to the need to maintain opposition unity, any potentially divisive issues, such as abortion and divorce, were left off the agenda (Muñoz 1996, 13).³² The movement’s most radical and substantive demands, encapsulated in the 1988 “Women’s Demands of Democracy,” presented by the Feminist Movement, were rejected by the pro-democracy opposition parties. The demands, which included quotas for women in government, the equal

³¹ Speech at the *Encuentro de la Concertación de las Mujeres por la Democracia*, Santiago, Chile, 1990.

³² Opposition unity was important because the 1980 Constitution implemented a new electoral system to replace the proportional representation system that Chile had previously used. The binomial majoritarian system that was imposed favoured a two-party system, and, in fact, gave a significant advantage to the party that got the second-highest number of votes in each district. This system will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter as it is often cited by women as a key cause of their marginalization in seeking their parties’ nominations for elected positions.

sharing of domestic work among men and women, and reproductive freedom, were not part of any opposition proclamation. In fact, political parties expressed their displeasure at this list of demands, saying that it would provoke controversy and disunity at a time when opposition unity was crucial (Frohmman and Valdés 1995, 286). This shows that the male political elite still viewed women's concerns as very much secondary to the overarching struggle for democracy and their unwillingness to restructure politics to include women.

Many of these demands were also absent from the CNMD's policy proposals. So while the CNMD represents an enormous success for the women's movement by placing women's demands firmly on the agenda of the incoming government and showing the potential gains to be made from the strategy of "double militancy," it cannot be considered an unqualified success. First, the CNMMD's demands stopped short of a restructuring of political spaces to promote women's entrance and second, many women's groups were not represented. Women's organizations linked to parties outside of the *Concertación*, notably those linked to the MIR or the Communist Party, did not find expression in the CNMD (Matear 1997, 89).

Conclusion

The events in the period analyzed in this chapter are crucial to understanding how women's political participation changes after the transition to democracy in 1990. Under authoritarianism, the "formal" versus "informal" boundary is blurred so that women's activism is viewed as an expression of political citizenship. But, as the transition

proceeds, the boundary is re-constructed, with significant implications for women's participation and citizenship.

This period is also significant because it sheds light on two key themes in the study of women and politics: the “politics of difference” and “autonomy” versus “double militancy” strategies. Regarding the politics of difference, my analysis in this chapter shows how the first-wave movement's maternalist mobilizing frame was maintained by the dictatorship-era movement, but with key differences. While the latter movement displayed a similarity to the feminism of the first-wave movement in terms of retaining the maternal frame as a mobilizing referent, the feminist critiques undertaken and the challenge to existing political practice and gender relations diverged significantly. In a context defined by repression, economic crisis, the relative absence of political parties, and an extremely conservative gender ideology promoted by the dictatorship, Chilean women mobilized as “militant mothers” and as feminists to demand a return to democracy—but, a democracy that included women. Through an analysis of different women's groups' citizenship demands, I showed here that women used a maternal framework to demand a re-organization of political space to fully include women as citizens. The movement's citizenship model further recognized the important roles that women played as mothers, but also demanded that women's identities not be exhausted by these roles.

The re-emergence of political parties, however, had a number of consequences for the movement, most importantly, it raised the long-standing dilemma for feminists of “autonomy” versus “integration”. Maxine Molyneux explains that “from the earliest moments of women's political mobilization, women activists in political parties, trade

unions and social movements have argued that they needed a place within which to elaborate their own programs of action, debate their own goals, tactics and strategies, free from outside influence” (1998, 255-56). For the Chilean women’s movement in the 1970s, autonomy was not entirely a strategic choice, but rather a conjunctural feature of the political context: parties were severely weakened by the political repression and were operating underground. When they resumed their place at the centre of Chilean politics, only then did movements face an important strategic choice. Debates about autonomy versus double militancy seriously fragmented the movement, leading a number of feminists to stop participating altogether. But, as I argued in this chapter, it is significant that a number of feminists sought to work closely with the parties, and endeavour to place feminist demands on the transition’s agenda. The success of this strategy is most visible in terms of the platform of the pro-democracy parties: they included some of women’s demands, most notably the demand to create women’s policy machinery within the state. The Chilean case, in this sense, confirms the evidence from other cases of transition, such as Brazil, Spain, and South Africa, where feminists also gained in terms of policy changes by allying with pro-democracy forces that became the government following the transition. Hence, as Karen Beckwith notes, comparative evidence “suggests that there are circumstances where feminists, allied with progressive opposition parties, dramatically increase their policy influence under conditions where the political opportunity structure shifts” (such as transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule) (2000, 441).

We must take care, however, not to overstate the extent to which the Chilean case demonstrates the gains achieved through their choice of double militancy. This is

because feminists' demands for the transition—demands that ultimately were put to the pro-democracy parties—emerged while the movement enjoyed greater autonomy from political parties. In this sense, movement autonomy was a necessary condition for elaborating a feminist critique of Chilean democracy and thereby “gendering” the transition. It is clear from the nature and evolution of the women's movement's demands that the more radical demands came from the more autonomous feminists (the MF) rather than those pursuing a double militancy strategy (the CNMD). The latter group did not make demands (such as divorce and abortion) that the pro-democracy parties considered too potentially divisive (and that hence would cost them votes in the 1989 elections).

Notwithstanding the less radical demands of the “integrationist” segment of the movement, the fact that Chilean feminism emerged in relative autonomy confirms Karen Kampwirth's (1998) findings regarding the advantages and disadvantages of movement autonomy. Kampwirth compares the role of feminism in the first set of post-civil war elections in Nicaragua and El Salvador. She attributes the more significant role of feminists in the Salvadoran case to the greater autonomy the movement enjoyed from political parties, concluding that “social movements had a harder time influencing these parties from within” (1998, 274). The greatest significance of Kampwirth's findings for the Chilean case concerns the reasons for the Salvadoran feminists' greater autonomy. Kampwirth explains that in Nicaragua, where the feminist movement emerged within the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) during the guerrilla war there, when the FSLN subsequently formed the government after 1979, “the Sandinista party had enough political and economic power to keep possibly threatening feminist currents submerged” (*ibid.*, 270). In the Salvadoran case, in contrast, the revolutionary Farabundo Martí

National Liberation Front never held power, and hence “was forced to reach out to its feminist base during the first post-civil war election campaign through ideological appeal” (*ibid.*). These findings are highly significant for the Chilean case, where the pro-democracy forces with whom the feminist allied now form the government. The extent to which the parties can be pressured from the “inside” to promote feminist goals under various circumstances is analyzed in the next two chapters. The effects of the “double militancy” strategy on the movement as a whole is discussed in Chapter 6. Indeed, what Kampwirth’s important research does not reveal are the effects of the autonomy struggle on the feminist movement as a whole. A feminist explained to me what happened during the Chilean transition:

I think the movement divided into three major currents: one is the *pobladora* organizations that didn’t have power, that didn’t aspire to and never even took account of what to do with power. They returned to their base-level organizations and they carry out their work in the *poblaciones*. Another current is the nucleus of professionals—some feminist and others not—that entered into the institutionality of the state, with positions and public posts. A third group is the women political party militants who returned to their parties and practically cancelled their organizations—their exclusively women’s organizations.³³

Women continue to struggle for citizenship in each of these “currents” in ways that are largely shaped by events, debates, and strategies pursued in the 1973-90 period. The remainder of the dissertation addresses these struggles.

³³ Palestro interview.

Chapter 4 – Women in “Formal” Politics in Post-Transition Chile

The purpose of this chapter is to account for the barriers experienced by those women who seek entry into “formal” politics following the transition to democracy. Even though there are fewer women than men seeking to participate in government and electoral politics, those that do seek entry face gendered obstacles to their participation. In no case of transition to democracy have women dramatically transformed the “formal” political sphere to make it more amenable to women’s participation and the issues women want to politicize; however, countries that have undergone transitions display a number of differences in terms of women’s participation rates in “formal” politics. In the former communist countries, women’s presence in parliaments radically declined as quota systems for women in parliament were dismantled. South Africa, on the other hand, represents a rare exception to the pattern; the number of women in parliament has increased since the implementation of a quota for women in parliament, a mechanism demanded by women’s movements for post-apartheid democracy. Nonetheless, concerns remain in South Africa that women continue to be excluded from the most important decision-making arenas, especially in the executive branch (Kemp *et al* 1994). Among the Latin American countries we encounter differences: some countries, for example, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru, have legislated quotas for women in electoral contests, although in most of these example the quota applies only to sub-national bodies rather than to national parliaments (Htun 1998). Many other countries, like Chile and Mexico, have not legislated quotas. Even in the countries with quotas, however, this particular mechanism for expanding women’s political presence was not a

direct outcome of transition politics.¹ In countries without quotas, women's presence in the "formal" political arena remains woefully low.

One common explanation for women's low numbers in formal politics following transitions to democracy in Latin America is the "politics of difference" strategy women employed to mobilize resistance to dictatorships. This explanation holds that "militant motherhood" reinforces a gender ideology that conceives of men as "political" actors and women as family and community care-takers (Craske 1999; Feijoó 1989). As a result, women's participation is viewed as crisis-driven, hence, the return of "normal" politics (i.e., democracy) will not lead to more women in "formal" politics. Rather, it results in women "returning to their homes". Improved access to "formal" political arenas where important decisions that affect women's lives are taken was a demand of many women's movements, however, and hence, we cannot simply accept the argument that a "militant motherhood" strategy leads to women returning to the "private" sphere once democracy is restored. Indeed, as I argued in the previous chapter, a militant motherhood strategy can lead women in a number of directions and in the Chilean case, women's movements in the 1980s used a maternalist mobilizing framework to forward a number of feminist demands, including improved access to decision-making arenas.

¹ Argentina's quota law for women candidates (at the national level) was Latin America's first, and was passed in 1991, eight years following the transition to democracy. Brazil passed a quota law for women on candidate lists for municipal elections in 1995, ten years after democratization (Rodríguez 1998, 10). More comparative research on this issue is greatly needed. It is still unclear why quotas have been adopted in some countries and not in others, and what the overall effects of the quotas are on policy-making on women's issues.

Why is women's under-representation in "formal" politics a problem? There are normally two answers given to this question. The most common argument, according to Anne Phillips, is that simple justice dictates that more women are needed in "formal," electoral politics because "it is patently and grotesquely unfair for men to monopolize representation" (1998, 229). The "injustice" of women's marginalization from positions of power must be linked to a feminist analysis of the structural sources of women's exclusion (for example, the sexual division of labour and its accompanying gender stereotypes that associate "politics" with men and "private" issues with women). But the justice argument is weakened somewhat once we acknowledge the distinction between representative and direct democracy, a distinction which undermines the requirement of strict equality of representatives. Instead, equality of *participation* is a requirement for representative democracy. As long as all citizens have equal opportunity to participate (for example, as voters), theorists conclude there is no blatant inequality requiring rectification. According to Phillips, "[r]epresentative democracy claims, for example, to represent the competing interests of capital and labour by giving each of us an equal right to vote, and this is said to encourage a variety of parties to emerge that will speak to our different concerns" (1998, 232). This means that as long as women participate as voters, the sex of their representatives should not matter.

But it *does* matter, at least to many feminists, that representatives are mostly male. Joni Lovenduski writes that there are two dimensions of political representation: "the presence of [a group's] members in decision-making arenas...[and] the considerations of its interests in the decision-making process" (1993, 2). These two dimensions are normally linked. Hence, the second main argument for more equal numbers of women in

“formal” politics is that women are needed to represent “women’s interests”. This argument is much more complex (and contentious) than the justice argument, and, at first glance, rests on three assumptions: “that women have a distinct and separate interest as women; that this interest cannot be adequately represented by men; and that the election of women ensures its representation” (Phillips 1998, 234). The problem with this set of assumptions, however, is the idea that women share common interests simply by virtue of being women; that is, regardless of their other differences such as class, race, and sexual orientation. The claim that women are needed to represent “women’s interests” risks essentializing women and ignoring crucial differences, by, according to Maxine Molyneux, positing “gender [as] the principal determinant of women’s interests” (1985, 231). To avoid essentializing women and ignoring the multiple sources of women’s inequality, a number of feminist scholars have taken up Molyneux’s use of the term “gender” interests “to differentiate them from the false homogeneity imposed by the notion of women’s interests” (*ibid.*, 232). Molyneux further proposes a distinction between “practical” and “strategic” gender interests: practical gender interests “arise from the concrete conditions of women’s positioning within the gender division of labour,” but pursuing those interests “do not in themselves challenge the prevailing forms of gender subordination, even though they arise directly out of them.” Strategic interests, on the other hand, are more closely bound up with “feminist” politics that arise “from the analysis of women’s subordination and from the formulation of an alternative, more satisfactory form of arrangements” which would include, for example, abolishing the sexual division of labour (*ibid.*, 232-33). Others (Alvarez 1990; Kampwirth 1998) make a similar distinction between “feminine” and “feminist” interest. Feminine interests, like

practical interests, do not necessarily challenge women's sex/gender roles, although they clearly emerge out of them. Feminist interests, in contrast, represent a challenge to the unequal power relations between men and women.

In order to justify the presence of women in "formal" politics on the grounds that they are needed to promote women's gender interests (whether feminine or feminist) we further need to assume that women *do* promote these interests. Indeed, there may be barriers to women promoting feminist interests in their capacities as parliamentarians or decision-makers in other arenas. Clearly, the extent to which women in "formal" politics can promote women's gender interests is an empirical question which is further dependent on a host of other contextual factors. For example, increasing the number of women parliamentarians is less significant in systems in which the executive is extremely powerful (see Waylen 2000a). Likewise, women appointed to government or elected to parliament may not identify with feminist goals, and, in some cases, may even be opposed to an agenda that alters gender relations. Despite the numerous intervening factors that affect policy and legislative outcomes, however, increasing women's representation remains a goal of most women's movements because they believe that women representatives are more likely to pursue issues of concern to women.

Women's movements' demands to expand women's "formal" political presence notwithstanding, there continue to be both "supply" and "demand" problems that lower the number of women in legislatures and governments in the new democracies. Indeed, the Chilean case is similar to other transitional democracies in Latin America where few of the popular sector women active under authoritarianism have sought entry into "formal" electoral politics (see Craske 1999, 65; Caldeira 1998). Because of the division

of labour between men and women, and the gender ideology that underpins it, many women choose to play out their activism in arenas, such as the community sphere, where their participation is encouraged and productive. This point is extremely relevant following transitions to democracy. Despite opportunities to enter the re-opened political arena, many women who were active in the anti-dictatorship struggle continue to play out their activism in arenas traditionally deemed “non-political”. Because the gender ideology defines women’s roles as “private” and/or “social,” women may be predisposed to channel their energies into activities that are considered non-political. That is, while women do face barriers to participation in electoral politics, many also choose activism in the “informal” arena. In the Chilean case, there is evidence to support this dynamic. Few women occupy leadership positions in formal politics: in 1998, women held a mere 8.9 percent of seats in Congress and 11.1 percent of key government positions. In contrast, at the community level, women held 36.6 percent of leadership positions in the *Juntas de Vecinos* (Neighbourhood Councils), which continue to be the main community organizations in Chile (SERNAM 1998, 9-15). To a large extent, therefore, many women select themselves out of “formal” politics. This does not mean, however, that women active in their communities or in civil society are not exercising citizenship. One of their main struggles is to have their activism conceived as expressions of political citizenship, through, for example, the construction of linkages between the “informal” and “formal” political arenas so women’s demands can be conveyed to government and placed on the public agenda. This challenge, and how women’s movements are approaching it, is taken up in Chapter 6.

In this chapter, I make two general arguments. First, where women's movements do not demand institutional reforms during the transition period—a time when movements enjoy influence and parties are in flux—then the barriers to women in political institutions re-emerge. In Chile, the fact that women did not take advantage of the opportunity provided by the transition to demand institutional reforms is partly linked to the broader strategy of the movement to make citizenship demands based on women's "difference," but also to the double militancy strategy. A second, related argument of the chapter is that women's "difference" politics is also hindering women in formal politics from promoting feminist goals in the current context defined by neoliberalism and social conservatism. The neoliberal model promoted by successive post-transition governments draws on and reinforces women's "difference" based on their care-taking roles. Indeed, women's unpaid reproductive and care-taking labour serves crucial functions as the state increasingly withdraws from the social sphere. It is increasingly difficult for women in formal politics to challenge this model within the contours of a dominant partisan discourse that largely accepts the basic countours of the prevailing neoliberal model.² Hence, challenging the neoliberal model and its negative impact on women's citizenship is left to organized women in "informal" politics. In addition to working within the parameters of neoliberal discourse, women in "formal" politics also operate in the context of social conservatism which has defined Chilean politics since the transition. This has kept a number of feminist issues off the political agenda in an effort to maintain popular

² Currently, the only parties that seriously challenge Chile's neoliberal model are the Communist Party and the Humanist Party. Due to Chile's current electoral system, discussed later in the Chapter, these parties are themselves marginalized and have not achieved representation in Congress.

support for the governing coalition, especially in recent years when the political Right has been gaining strength.

The chapter has three sections. In the first section I elaborate the barriers to women's participation in "formal" politics, and explain how some of these barriers emerge out of the women's movement's strategies during the transition. In the second section I outline some of the strategies women are pursuing in order to reverse the discrimination they confront. The final section discusses the challenges women parliamentarians face in trying to promote feminist interests in the climate of social conservatism and movement fragmentation that characterizes Chilean politics today.

Women in Politics in Chile in the 1990s: Negotiating a Party-Dominated Arena

What does the Chilean case tell us about the potential to expand women's presence and a feminist agenda in post-transition politics? I suggest here that, overall, transitions to democracy present rather narrow windows of opportunity for women to challenge fundamentally gender relations in the formal political sphere. The experiences of political women reveal that parties in Chile will respond favourably to feminist demands only insofar as they benefit—or believe they will benefit—from doing so. Women's expanded public visibility during transition processes made it worthwhile for parties to treat women—especially organized women—as a voting constituency. Parties began to formulate their appeals to women in a fundamentally different way, based on women's

movements' demands for equal citizenship.³ Male elites within political parties, however, have not proven themselves willing to share *power* with women because doing so is a direct challenge to the dominance of men in the parties.

Comparative research on some industrialized democracies reveals that gender equality in political institutions tends to follow successful claims for equality in other spheres (Lovenduski 1993, 5). But the Chilean case demonstrates that even where a movement is successful in achieving many of its goals, increasing women's representation in formal politics is unlikely because it requires displacing men who aspire to political office. Valeria Ambrosia, a SERNAM official, pointed out that men are even less willing to jeopardize their access to political positions in developing countries where politics and the bureaucracy are viewed as important career paths for professional men, especially those on the Left for whom careers in business are less likely.⁴ This confirms Joni Lovenduski's claim that "the most intense opposition [from parties] will occur when the inevitable claim for an increased presence in the national legislatures is made. Seats in the legislature are the political prizes towards which party politics is directed, hence access to them is usually carefully guarded" (1993, 12). The findings of the Chilean case confirm Pippa Norris' (1993) contention that where legislative competition is strong, women confront greater barriers to entry. Competition for elected positions in Chile is

³ Regarding the Brazilian case, Sonia Alvarez explains that under authoritarianism Brazil had the largest and most radical feminist movement in the region, and by the time of the transition, all the political parties were trying to speak to women in terms of some of the feminists' demands in an effort to increase their votes (1989, 18). In Chile, the first post-dictatorship president, Patricio Aylwin, also appealed to feminist demands during the electoral campaign (Frohmman and Valdés 1995, 288).

⁴ Interview, October 5, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

especially fierce, a situation noted by all of the women with whom I spoke. This feature, combined with a majoritarian electoral system, make it difficult to improve women's political representation.

A notable exception to the pattern of women's continued marginalization from "formal" politics following transitions is South Africa. The different outcome in this case illustrates the importance of women's *strategies*. According to Gay Siedman, South African women's movements were concerned with constructing "gendered institutions through which women could actively help shape new policies" (1999, 300). Women also struggled "to ensure that there would be individual women in decision-making bodies" (*ibid.*). The resulting 30 percent quota rule on electoral lists produced a post-transition parliament in which women held 26.5 percent of the seats.⁵ A similar strategy was not pursued in Chile by the *Concertación Nacional de las Mujeres por la Democracia* (CNMD) in part because, as I explained in the last chapter, demands for radical restructuring of power relations were considered too divisive by the pro-democracy parties and thus not incorporated in the demands of an opposition movement dominated by partisan actors. According to Adriana Muñoz, a feminist who is currently a parliamentarian from the centre-left Party for Democracy (PPD),

We were very astute in defining strategies so that our program would be a reality and that the government of Don Patricio Aylwin would incorporate it into the government's program. We did great things, had great strategies and programs. But we didn't use this strength we had to acquire

⁵ Although women's presence in elected positions has expanded, Amanda Kemp *et al* note that "the top layers of the new government remain bulwarks of male power" (1995, 154). These authors also raise other problems that South African women confront, for example, not all women in representative positions promote a feminist agenda, which potentially weakens the promotion of gender equality (*ibid.*).

a strategy of saying ‘we want this many [female] ministers, this many [female] deputies, this many leadership posts, etc’. We didn’t have a strategy for power.⁶

Why did Chilean feminists not demand *power*, especially through institutional reforms such as quotas? One important reason is the double militancy strategy of one segment of the feminist movement. The CNMD lacked the autonomy to push the *Concertación* parties harder on a feminist agenda, and therefore issues that had been on the feminist agenda earlier, such as quotas and reproductive rights, were ultimately left off the CNMD’s list of demands for democracy. But feminist strategies were also shaped by their “politics of difference”. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, women’s citizenship demands in Chile, as in Latin America more generally, have historically been rooted in their “difference,” leading women to demand policies and programs that derive from their responsibilities for others, rather than demanding inclusion for themselves as *individuals*. For example, Adriana Delpiano, currently SERNAM’s director, explained to me that, while she did not want to idealize women’s nature, she believed “women are motivated more by collective concerns, by emotional collective appeals, rather than by the struggle for individual power.”⁷ María Ester Férez, Director of Labour, explained to me that “men dispute power in a form distinct from women. We must understand it, but we must not copy men’s styles, because they aren’t good. We women must humanize politics”.⁸ The emphasis on women’s maternal, nurturing roles, in some cases, can lead women away from making demands based on self-interest. Demands for positions of

⁶ Interview, November 2, 1999, Valparaíso, Chile.

⁷ Interview, September 9, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

⁸ Interview, August 25, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

power may be seen as both too narrow and also as conforming to a masculine-defined model of politics, which the Chilean women's movement rejected through its style of "difference" feminism and politicized motherhood. The politicized motherhood identity promotes the ideal that politics is about acting selflessly and acting *for* others. In this view, politics cannot be about *power*, as traditionally conceived.

At the same time, however, women's emphasis on their difference (and therefore of their different interests) plays an important role in women's struggles for a greater political presence. While women's "difference" can act as a barrier to women's participation in a sphere defined as masculine, it can also serve as a *justification* for their presence because women's different voices are needed precisely in order to expand the content of politics and to promote those interests—especially women's—that are normally excluded. But it was not until Chilean women realized their roles in the pro-democracy struggle were not leading to improved access to political space that they began to press harder for reforms, such as quotas, in response. Their justifications for entering politics revolve around the need for women to promote issues that male political leaders have ignored. María Ester Férrez argues that *because* women are needed "to humanize politics, to humanize society, to humanize the economy," positive discrimination (example, quotas in decision-making arenas) are needed because men are unwilling to concede power.⁹ Likewise, SERNAM argues that the advantages of expanding women's participation in formal politics would be "the incorporation of new themes on the public agenda" and "the improvement of the quality of political action"

⁹ *Ibid.*

(SERNAM 2000, 31). Lily Pérez, a parliamentarian from the moderate Right *Renovación Nacional* (RN), explains that, “I would say that women’s motivations [to participate in politics] derive from family issues, to be able to raise issues more related to day-to-day realities and more concrete issues of society. I think that from that point of view, it is desirable that there are more women.”¹⁰

Barriers to women in “formal” politics: structural factors

The institutional features of political life, most notably, electoral systems and party systems, exert a powerful influence over women’s attempts to improve their representation (Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Reynolds, 1999; Rule 1987; Rule and Zimmerman 1994). Wilma Rule, for example, writes that “favourable societal conditions will not substitute for unfavourable electoral systems for women to reach their optimal representation in parliament and local legislatures. But unfavourable contextual conditions—including cultural biases and discriminatory practices—can be overcome to a great extent by alternate electoral systems” (cited in Reynolds 1999, 554-55). According to Norris, three features of electoral systems are key: ballot structure (single candidate or party list); district magnitude (how many seats in each district); and degree of proportionality (allocation of votes to seats) (1993, 313). Based on comparative research, she concludes that, “all other things being equal, women tend to do best under multi-member constituencies with a high number of seats per district” (*ibid.*). Other

¹⁰ Interview, October 1, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

authors have also concluded that systems based on proportional representation (PR) are more “women-friendly” than systems based on majoritarian rules (Chowdhury *et al* 1994, 17). Kathleen Staudt claims that, based on 1994 data, women’s representation is below the global average in seventy-four single-member systems, but is above the global average in forty-six proportional representational systems (1998, 36).

The Chilean electoral system clearly undermines the goal of improving women’s representation (Valdés 1998). The system established by the 1980 Constitution replaced the country’s traditional PR system with a binominal majoritarian one. The electoral system establishes two-member voting districts. But in order for a party list to win both seats, it must double the amount of votes received by the second-largest vote getter. Where it does not, the second seat goes to the party receiving the second highest number of votes. The system was designed to overcome Chile’s “three-thirds” historical tendency—where the electorate was more or less evenly divided amongst Centre, Left, and Right (Rabkin 1996, 340-41). The designers of this system wanted to foster coalition-building, believing that it would moderate party platforms and make Chilean democracy more stable. But the system was also designed to favour the political Right by giving an advantage to the party that garners the second highest number of votes. An important consequence of this system for women is that it compels parties to put forth candidates that have a very high chance of winning majorities. Due to the need for majorities, women candidates are often passed over in favour of men. In this context, it is not surprising that a large number of women who are named as candidates are “*mujeres de*,” (women of), that is, wives or daughters of high-profile male politicians (Valdés 1998, 485).

An unfavourable electoral system is compounded by party dominance of the “formal” political arena and intense competition for political posts (both seats in congress and positions in government). Consequently, since the transition to democracy, political parties have again become the main barrier to women’s participation in “formal” politics. As indicated throughout the dissertation, parties in Chile monopolize politics and control all access to spheres of decision-making. Due to the parties’ monopolization of “formal” politics, there is a popular perception that any activity that is non-partisan is also non-political. For example, many locally active women with whom I spoke insist that they are not politically active since they are not party militants. Likewise, Gloria Marín, a union activist and militant in the Christian Democratic Party explained to me that she considers her union activities “social” rather than “political” because “these are problems not only of Christian Democrats, but for all workers equally”.¹¹

Political parties determine access to spheres of power in Chile. They not only control national and local electoral slates, but are key in determining decision-making posts within government, given the practice of allocating government posts according to party representation in Congress. Parties normally submit their list of recommendations for appointments to decision-making posts to the president. Consequently, women who wish to be in the decision-making sphere must participate in and advance in the political parties.

When it comes to electoral contests and candidate selection, an extremely important barrier that women confront is the lack of access to support networks that male

¹¹ Interview, August 23, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

politicians enjoy, especially for financing electoral campaigns. In Chile there is no public financing of campaigns, making it difficult for candidates, especially those on the Left—where most women candidates are found. Parties on the Right may have links to business and thus more access to financing (Oppenheim 1998, 15). Teresa Valdés (1998) argues that the parties have not helped their female candidates financially. María Anonieta Saa explains that the lack of access to financing hits women harder than men because “men will take risks, they will sell the family house...but a woman is not going to put her family at risk.”¹² Adriana Muñoz adds that,

being a candidate is difficult for a woman because you need to have a lot of money. We have little help economically. Men have access to circles or networks where money is lent—they are friends with bank managers. But we are not supported this way. For us, it's pretty complicated, this arena of power and money....Because even if the party accepts you and you are a candidate, how do you get elected if you have no money? How do you make a campaign? Where is the support of the party?¹³

According to Muñoz, without the economic resources to campaign effectively, women end up relying on the goodwill of the party to put them in districts where they have high chances of winning. Muñoz credits her own seat to the support of the party president who placed her in a district where she was sure to win.

If you don't have the party president supporting you, they are going to give a district that won't help you, that you'll never win, even if you invest ten million dollars you are not going to win. We [women] are very exposed to that, despite our advancement in public representation. [We will succeed] only if there is a conscious will in the party that they want, for example, seven women deputies—*deputies* not candidates—and the party supports you by giving you districts you can win.¹⁴

¹² Interview, September 29, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

¹³ Muñoz interview.

¹⁴ Ibid.

Barriers to women in “formal politics”: cultural stereotypes and a weakening women’s movement

Women also face barriers to “formal” politics that derive from prevailing practices and gender ideologies, associating women with the “private” sphere rather than the “public” arena of politics. Women are marginalized in the parties by a number of factors that emerge out of the sexual division of labour and the gender ideology that underpins it. One overwhelming factor that disadvantages women is that party activism, for example, attendance at meetings, involves double or even triple days for women. This is particularly problematic for women parliamentarians in Chile because although Santiago remains the nation’s capital (and houses all government activity), the Congress is located in Valparaíso, a two-hour drive from Santiago (where over one-third of the population lives). Political meetings have traditionally been held in the evenings, reflecting male preferences, schedules, and wifely or maternal supports. One woman explained to me that Chilean men love to go out at night and attending political meetings is a good excuse to escape their homes. This presents difficult choices for women in a society that places a premium on women’s roles in the family. Women often need to choose between attending meetings or spending time with their families. Delia Del Gato, of the PDC, explained that it was only when there was a large number of women present at a particular committee meeting that they were successful in pressuring the men to hold the

next meeting over the lunch hour rather than in the evening.¹⁵ Most women admit to experiencing guilt over the time they must spend away from their families. This is particularly problematic because even when women are motivated to public activism by concerns for their families' and communities' well-being, there remains a negative connotation associated with activity that takes women away from what they believe are their main responsibilities—looking after their families. For this reason, women's public activism continues to be viewed as a transgression; that is, women who spend too much time away from their families are considered to be acting selfishly by pursuing their individual interests over those of their families.¹⁶

Chilean gender ideology places different expectations on the behaviours of men and women and therefore another problem for women is the *style* of politics practised in the parties. Women describe political practice as aggressive and conflictual, and, even more importantly, full of implicit rules and norms of which women, being relative newcomers, are unaware. Women's styles of speech and comportment appear out of place in this environment which often means that they are "invisible" at meetings and cannot make their voices heard. María Rozas, currently a parliamentarian of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), and the first woman to head the Central Union of Workers (CUT), explains that at political meetings, "there is a tendency not see you when

¹⁵ Delpiano interview and interview with Delia Del Gato, August 20, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

¹⁶ Victoria Hurtado (1997) writes about women's attitudes towards public activism based on her work with women in leadership training workshops in Santiago. She notes that women take immense pride in the fact that they do things *for* others: "*todo por los demás, nada por una misma*" (everything for others, nothing for oneself). Given this predisposition, any activity that undermines a woman's commitments to others—especially to her family—is seen as selfish and therefore negative.

you ask to speak, not to look at you when you do speak, therefore they don't hear you and your proposals are not taken. In order that they do listen to you, women have to shout or swear, but that means adopting masculine behaviour, and it should not be like that."¹⁷

Part of the problem is that women have been socialized to behave in ways at odds with current political practice, which is overwhelmingly masculine, or, as Chilean women insist, "*machista*". When women refer to politics as "*machista*" or complain of "*machismo*" in the political parties, they refer to an extremely aggressive or competitive style of speech and a condescending or patronizing attitude towards women. For example, Cristina Girardi, mayor of Cerro Navia, one of Santiago's poorest municipalities, explains that many people think that a woman who participates in politics "must to be treated as *pobrecita* (poor little thing!)," making women less likely to be treated as equals or taken seriously.¹⁸ Adriana Muñoz adds that, "if we want to do things as we are, to intervene in an assembly with our soft voices and our manner of analyzing concrete things, with few philosophical or doctrinaire theories, it is more difficult to have them listen than if we adopt a loud or strong voice and try to bang on the table and bring up more difficult concepts".¹⁹

¹⁷ Interview with María Rozas, published in *La Tercera*, October 23, 1999.

¹⁸ Interview, October 27, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

¹⁹ Muñoz interview. Many women argue that female political leaders have a more concrete style of speech than men, and that women use concise language while men tend to frame issues in a more abstract and theoretical manner.

Most women agree that the parties are the most important barrier to women's representation in "formal" politics.²⁰ Adriana Delpiano claims that "the parties are the main filter [and reason] for why women do not assume greater responsibilities in public decisions".²¹ María Antonieta Saa, feminist and parliamentarian from the PPD, explains that many women who had been active in the women's movement have avoided formal politics due to the "power games" and intense competition that characterize the arena. Women, she explains, are neither prepared for, nor adept at, these kinds of struggles.²² One author explains that women's gendered socialization accounts for women's problems in adapting to the competitive struggles that politics involve: "it is demanded of women that they be sweet and nice, in a world like that of politics, in which competition is especially strong and hard" (Astelarra 1991, 89). The stereotypes about women's appropriate behaviour in Chile are especially strong and make it difficult for women to advance in political parties. This leads to both a "supply" and "demand" problem: some women simply leave the parties, not wanting to adapt their behaviour—this is what María Antonieta Saa claims is a key problem in attracting feminist activists to party politics—and other women remain less visible in the parties where male behaviour and male voices are accorded greater recognition. Parliamentarian Lily Pérez explains that internal competition in the parties is very tense and ends up "privileging men in the [decision-

²⁰ All of the women with whom I spoke cited the parties as the main cause of women's low presence in politics. Lois Oppenheim's (1998) study of women in politics since the return of democracy in Chile reports similar findings.

²¹ Delpiano interview.

²² Saa interview.

making] posts. It's something very cultural, where the codes and norms of power are still mostly masculine".²³

The institutional factors and cultural stereotypes that inhibit women's entry into "formal" politics in Chile today is compounded by another problem political women face: the fragmentation (and weakening) of women's movements has undermined their capacity to mobilize support for women candidates (women who would promote feminist goals). Muñoz and Wojciechowski (1996) explain that organized women had no strategy for the 1989 elections. In part, they attribute this to the effects of the political parties' resurgence on the women's movement in the mid-1980s. The re-emergence of political parties, as we saw in the last chapter, fragmented the movement by introducing partisan divisions and also creating a division between the *feministas* (autonomous feminists) and the *políticas* (political women). This left the movement with no strategy for the first set of elections in 1989. Consequently, "the few women that became candidates, and the fewer who were elected, did so through their own strength and personal risk, in the absence of effective support from the women's movement, which appeared divided before distinct political options" (*ibid.*, 32). The lack of support from organized women and lack of strategy among women party militants continued, and prior to the 1993 elections, competition for candidate selection was fierce and women again lacked a strategy for promoting other women as candidates. In the end, these contests even saw some women competing against each other for their party's nominations (Muñoz and Wojciechowski 1996, 34; Oppenheim 1998, 14).

²³ Pérez interview.

Given women's difficulties in the parties and the marginalization they often must struggle against, it is not surprising that many women decide to avoid formal politics in favour of participating in social or community organizations. This is especially the case for popular sector women and those who are outside of the elite political class. One of these women, Fabiola Oyarzún, active in her community of La Florida and in many women's organizations, decided to seek a post in the Socialist Party, in which she had long been a militant. She explains, "I soon withdrew from competition because the men [in the party] impede us [women] and I wasn't prepared in strengthening myself for that post...It's complicated because the men let you advance, but only so far, only to a certain point and no more. So I withdrew."²⁴ She remains extremely active in community women's groups and in the popular women's movement. Other women, too, complain that decision-making and representative posts within the political parties tend not to be awarded based on service to the party organization, but rather, are achieved through negotiation and strategizing. This puts women at a disadvantage, given that they have less experience in these areas (Molledo 1998, 24).

Strategies for Promoting Women in "Formal" Politics

Joni Lovenduski identifies three main strategies that have been employed in advanced industrialized democracies to increase women's representation in political parties: first, "rhetorical" strategies on the part of political leaders which highlight the importance of

²⁴ Interview, November 18, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

women's participation at all levels of politics; second, "positive or affirmative action strategies" such as training female candidates or encouraging their participation by offering them financial support; and third, "positive discrimination" such as quotas for women in decision-making bodies or on candidate slates (1993, 8). Of these strategies, she concludes that rhetorical commitments invoking the importance of women's inclusion and representation are the least successful in improving the number of women in politics, while establishing quotas for women on candidate lists or decision-making posts is the most successful, but, obviously, the most contentious and controversial (*ibid.*, 8-11).

In Chile, women believed their role in bringing about the return of democracy would result be sufficient to expand their presence in "formal" politics. Many women felt that their highly visible activism had overcome the stereotypes that women were not public actors and not suited to political life. By the time of the first elections (1989), however, women realized that they needed more concrete strategies to increase their numbers in decision-making positions. Two of Chile's most prominent feminist parliamentarians, both of the PPD, Adriana Muñoz and María Antonieta Saa, argue that the women's movement committed a strategic error during the transition to democracy. Muñoz explains that not demanding political power "was our weakness at the moment when we were the strongest," while Saa notes that "we [the movement] lacked the strategies for bringing more women to posts of power, because, I think, we didn't recognize our own leadership".²⁵ Thus, although the movement was extremely

²⁵ Muñoz and Saa interviews.

successful in securing a commitment by the *Concertación* to promote women's equality, a commitment manifested in the creation of SERNAM, they lacked a strategy for acquiring more *power*. In other words, Saa and Muñoz contend that when the women's movement was at its strongest in terms of public visibility, internal unity, and coherence, women did not pursue a strategy which would have resulted in their increased presence in decision-making positions in politics. According to Muñoz, "we achieved success with our program but we did not achieve the success of political power in representative positions, and now we no longer have the force or the unity [that we had before]. The political moment has passed".²⁶

As I argued earlier, there are two reasons for the absence of demands for institutional reform. First, the "double militancy" strategy reduced the autonomy of feminist party members and their demands stopped short of anything perceived by the parties as too divisive (such as quotas for women in decision-making and abortion). Second, the movement's "politics of difference" strategy—at least at that point—led women to be more concerned with proposing policy than with demanding power (as individuals). It was only when women realized the extent to which they were being excluded that demands have been made for institutional reform. It is, as Muñoz notes, much harder to achieve these goals now that "the political moment has passed".

Political women are now aware of the need for new strategies to promote women's access to formal politics. In this section, I discuss the three main strategies women have employed to increase their political representation since 1990: 1) using

²⁶ Ibid..

SERNAM to promote women's participation; 2) promoting policies of affirmative action, specifically quotas; and, 3) "informal" strategies such as support groups for women in political office, and pressuring male leaders to promote women.

SERNAM's role

It is significant that the Chilean state, through SERNAM, believes it to be its responsibility to promote women's participation in both "formal" and "informal" arenas. Thus, SERNAM has taken up the task of promoting women's political participation, but, to date, has not been very successful. SERNAM's objectives and priorities along with the strategies for achieving them are set out in the two Equal Opportunity Plans (1994-1999; 2000-2010).²⁷ Both Plans identify increasing women's participation in decision-making positions as a crucial priority.²⁸ It is also significant that SERNAM recognizes both "supply" and "demand" problems, i.e., they are aware that many women choose to play out their activism in the "informal" political arena:

Women participate in [social, community, or religious] organizations, which they often initiate themselves, as a consequence of socialization processes that they have experienced, which lead them to identify their interests with areas linked to the needs of others (SERNAM 2000, 31-2).

²⁷ The Equal Opportunity Plans for Women have been SERNAM's main vehicle for promoting gender equality in post-transition Chile. The first Plan was incorporated into the mandate of President Frei's government, and the current Plan forms part of the Lagos government's program.

²⁸ Another document, "Informe Comisión Participación" (1998a) also sets out the problem of and proposed solutions to women's low participation rates in formal politics.

In terms of barriers to women in formal politics, SERNAM identifies cultural stereotypes that associate men with “politics” and women with the “private” sphere, and the “double-days” (full-time work and looking after families) that leave little or no time to participate politically (*ibid.*, 33) as key to explaining women’s marginalization from formal politics.

SERNAM’s proposals for promoting women’s political participation demonstrate its awareness of the distinction between “social” (“informal”) and “political” (“formal”) participation. Most of SERNAM’s concrete proposals involve strengthening women’s “social” participation, through, for example, a Civil Society Fund which makes resources available to local women’s groups to carry out projects that strengthen their organizations.²⁹ Where SERNAM’s proposals are most vague is in promoting women’s access to formal political arenas. In the Equal Opportunity Plan’s “objectives” and “lines of action,” they say that increasing the number of women in decision-making arenas will be promoted through “developing mechanisms of positive discrimination that increase women’s effective participation in posts of popular election” (SERNAM 2000, 35). No mention is made of what these mechanisms are or how they would come into existence. To date, SERNAM has not proposed legislation to reform political institutions in such a way as to make them more open to women.

SERNAM is proving to be rather effective, however, in developing strategies to promote women’s exercise of citizenship in the arena in which Chilean women have always been most active: the community or “informal” political arena. Even more significant is their recognition of the need to create linkages between women active in

²⁹ Ambrosio interview. When explaining the purpose of the Fund, Ambrosio described it as “one of the strategies for greater social participation of women”.

their communities and the “formal” political arena. SERNAM has done this through hosting workshops, roundtables, and regional parliaments (*ibid.*, 29). I discuss these initiatives (and their effects on women’s organizing) in greater detail in subsequent chapters.

While all these initiatives are important, they do little to overcome the gendered barriers to women’s entry into “formal” politics; or to undermining the gendered division of labour between “formal” and “informal” politics. Indeed, while SERNAM appears to have an awareness of this problem, most of its proposals end up reinforcing women’s participation in the “informal” (or “social”) arena. For example, SERNAM also has developed “leadership training programs” to increase women’s participation in decision-making spheres. Yet, these programs tend to strengthen women’s activism in their communities more than in formal politics. Most of the women who participate in these workshops transfer the skills they learn to their activism at the community level. In 1998, almost two thousand women participated in leadership training courses offered by SERNAM, but only seventy-five of these women identified themselves as “political leaders” and another eighty as union leaders. The remainder identified themselves as social or community leaders or leaders in “different arenas” (SERNAM n.d.[b]). To date, it does not appear that supporting or training women as political leaders has been a priority for SERNAM. A SERNAM official noted that SERNAM was considering implementing projects to help women candidates in elections.³⁰ The lack of more concrete strategies for institutional reform may result from SERNAM’s lack of autonomy

³⁰ Informal interview, August 11, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

from the partisan aims of the government itself. Indeed, there have been criticisms that SERNAM officials have stronger links to the political class than to the feminist movement (Macauley 1998; Matear 1997). If so, SERNAM is unlikely to initiate proposals that call for restructuring political institutions along more gender-egalitarian lines.

Quotas

When it comes to getting political parties to adopt certain measures that advance women's position within them, comparative research reveals that women fare better in those situations where the party system itself, or particular parties within the system, are in a period of crisis or transformation (Beckwith 2000). For example, in the 1980s in many industrialized democracies, political parties were trying to "modernize," and improving women's representation within them was part of the challenge (Lovenduski 1993, 10). In Chile, the political Left underwent a period of "modernization," or, as it is termed in Chile, "renovation," in the late 1980s. At that time, the Socialist Party (PS) split into two parties, with the Party for Democracy (PPD) representing the "renovated" faction. Women have fared better in the PPD partly due to opportunities afforded by its newness and due to the influence women had when it was formed. According to Adriana Muñoz, because the PPD was formed at the height of the struggle against the dictatorship, when women's influence and visibility was high, they succeeded in promoting women's equality within the party: "because in that era it was women who were doing politics in

Chile, it was women who were linked with the social world, and from there we could incorporate our gender demands from the beginning, from the party's formation."³¹

The most crucial strategy women party militants promoted was the use of positive measures such as quotas for internal decision-making positions within the party. The issue of quotas was raised at the first National Council meeting of the PPD in August 1988. Although the proposal was received with hostility by many of the men in the party, a 20 percent quota for women in the party's internal decision-making posts was adopted (Muñoz and Wojciechowski 1996, 27). Since the initial adoption of a 20 percent quota, the quota has been increased to 40 percent (Molledo 1998, 30-1). The Socialist Party (PS) also has adopted a system of quotas for internal decision-making positions within the party. In 1989 it approved a 20 percent quota, and in 1996 it was raised to 30 percent. Women in the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) have had a more difficult struggle in achieving even internal quotas. Women in the party began to discuss the idea in 1988-89, but the party's male leadership was extremely hostile to the idea. In fact, even the Women's Department of the party, charged with analyzing "women's" issues such as domestic violence and divorce, rejected the idea of quotas (*ibid.*, 17). It was only when a woman, Marta Cruz Coke, was head of the Technical Policy Commission in 1995 that a formal proposal was written and presented at the PDC's annual meeting. Due to a technicality, however, the resolution had to wait until the following year's meeting to be

³¹ Muñoz interview.

passed.³² Over the next year, women in the party mounted an intensive lobbying campaign to increase support for the quota resolution. In the end, however, it was the support of the party's male leadership that mattered. Party president Alejandro Foxley supported the idea and ensured its acceptance (*ibid.*, 17-18). The statute adopted states that no section or unit within the party can have more than 80 percent of its members drawn from one sex.

There is agreement among feminists in Chile that these internal quotas have worked.³³ More women are found in decision-making positions in parties that have adopted quotas than in those which have not (see Table 2). There also is evidence that having more women in internal decision-making positions leads to increases in the number of women in representative positions (see Table 2). The parties with quotas in 1996 (the PPD and PS) had more women in decision-making positions in the party and also had more women deputies. Those parties without quotas, the PDC (where quotas were not in place in 1996), and the two main parties of the Right, the *Renovación Nacional* (RN) and *Unión Democrática Independiente* (UDI), had far fewer women in decision-making posts and few or no women in the Chamber of Deputies.

³² The party's rules require proposals to be presented at least 60 days before the annual meeting. The quota resolution was not presented 60 days prior to the meeting and therefore had to wait until 1996 (Molledo 1998).

³³ Del Gato, Delpiano, Muñoz, and Saa interviews, and interview with Denise Pascal, August 18, Santiago, Chile.

Table 2.

	Percentage of women in the political commission (1996)	Percentage of women deputies (1996)	Quotas as of 1996
PPD	20	20	yes
PS	20	12.5	yes
PDC	0	2.7	no
RN	6.9	6.5	no
UDI	6.6	0	no

Source: Adapted from Muñoz and Wojciechowski 1996, 52-54.

Women, of course, would like to see quotas used to determine access to representative posts as well. To this end, a group of women parliamentarians proposed legislation for quotas in March 1997.³⁴ The bill has yet to be discussed, however, and is unlikely to be a priority for the government in the near future.³⁵ So far, the only party to have voluntarily adopted quotas for representative posts is the PPD, and they will be tested for the first time in the December 2001 Congressional elections. María Antonieta Saa predicts fierce battles within the party when it comes time to apply the quota—especially given the nature of the electoral system, which makes candidate selection extremely contentious. Because the number of women on candidate lists will need to rise dramatically to reach the 40 percent quota, Saa notes that, “there is a generation of young

³⁴ The proposed legislation states that women must comprise 40 percent of the candidates on party lists for municipal and national elections, and on the decision-making bodies of all political parties.

³⁵ It is interesting to note that the PPD declared itself to be in favour of the quota law on its website (www.ppd.cl Retrieved June 11, 1998), but since occupying the presidency, Lagos has not issued any “urgencies” that would result in debating the issue in parliament.

men that want to be deputies and see that women are blocking them, therefore it's very vicious, very strong, this struggle with the quota."³⁶

There is significant evidence, however, that quotas are effective in increasing the number of women in elected positions. Countries that use quotas invariably have more women in elected office. Quotas have gained remarkable popularity in Latin America in recent years and many countries have already adopted some form of quotas while in many other countries women are trying to promote the idea.³⁷ Internal quotas in the parties of Chile's *Concertación* are helping women expand their presence in the decision-making bodies of the parties, and there is some evidence that this will lead (slowly) to more women in elected positions.

Informal strategies

Given the low probability of a quota law being passed in the near future, women also are pursuing more "informal" strategies to expand their presence in decision-making positions. For example, in 1995 women in high-ranking government positions constructed a "support network". These are women from different parties who regularly

³⁶ Saa interview.

³⁷ Argentina was the first country in the region to adopt a law on quotas for women in the national legislature (Jones 1996). The results have been impressive: in 1991 women only made up 5 percent of the lower chamber but in 1995 they comprised 28 percent (*ibid.*, 76). Women in Ecuador have also made substantial gains in increasing their representation through quotas. The law in Ecuador, however, only applies quotas (30 percent) at the municipal and provincial levels. Since the adoption of the law, women represent approximately 25 percent of municipal and provincial elected positions, which is the highest proportion in the region (*Noticias Aliadas* 2000, 2).

meet to exchange information and share experiences and strategies for succeeding in a male-dominated environment.³⁸ Women who participate emphasize the importance of these meetings and the support they receive and provide for each other. María Ester Férrez explains that soon after beginning these meetings, women began to realize that they all share similar experiences, and they “began to suggest to each other how to confront these problems.”³⁹

Another strategy has been for women to pressure male leaders to promote women to decision-making positions in government and the bureaucracy. To facilitate this process, a group of women set up a computer data base with names of women and their relevant experience so that when positions come available, the names of qualified women can be immediately forwarded to the person in charge of making appointments. According to Valeria Ambrosio, this has been a successful mechanism to get women into decision-making positions. Prior to the existence of a data base of qualified women, “the men would say that the names of women just didn’t occur to them”.⁴⁰ Appointing women to decision-making positions also has a “contagion” effect to the extent that these women are themselves likely to promote and appoint other women, wherever possible. Adriana Delpiano was a Minister in Eduardo Frei’s government and when she arrived there were no women in positions of responsibility in her ministry. When she left,

³⁸ Férrez and Ambrosio interviews and interview with Elena Ovalle, August 25, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

³⁹ Férrez interview.

⁴⁰ Ambrosio interview.

women held over 40 percent of the posts.⁴¹ María Ester Férrez also noted that women in decision-making positions are far more likely to promote the careers of other women.⁴²

Pressuring male leaders to promote women to decision-making positions has been rather successful in Chile, evidenced by a continual increase in the number of women in the executive since 1990. While Aylwin's government contained only one female minister, Frei's government contained three, and the current government of Ricardo Lagos contains five, comprising 30 percent of executive posts, an all-time high in Chile.⁴³ Nevertheless, this should not be considered an unqualified indication of success for women, since these gains can be reversed at any time. Women cannot merely rely on the goodwill of male leaders to promote women to decision-making positions. Aware of this, women continue to promote more formal mechanisms, such as quotas, to expand their political influence.

Do Women Decision-makers Promote "Women's Interests"?

To what extent are political women pursuing women's gender interests in Chile? What are the potential obstacles to doing so? In this section I focus on women in parliament. I reserve the question of SERNAM's role for the next chapter.

It is significant that women parliamentarians, whether self-described feminists or not, perceive themselves to be representing women. For example, when María Antonieta Saa served as vice-president of the Chamber of Deputies (1997) she explained that "if I

⁴¹ Delpiano interview.

⁴² Férrez interview.

⁴³ *El Mercurio*, January 24, 2000.

do it poorly, they will say that women in Congress do it poorly.”⁴⁴ Women further justify their presence in politics by the need to promote women’s issues because, for numerous reasons, male parliamentarians have generally failed to raise them. According to María Antonieta Saa,

[women] are carriers of new themes—all those themes of women that are related to the private world—those that have been promoted by women in parliament and in government, for example, the Paternity Law, Criminal Code reform (making rape a particular type of crime), domestic violence, divorce. Although we worked with men, we have been the ones who pushed the bill on divorce. It is basically we who bring these issues to the Chamber of Deputies.⁴⁵

Likewise, Adriana Muñoz explains that in her first term as Deputy, she had an agenda to promote twelve bills “that came directly from the [women’s] movement. I had it very clear”.⁴⁶ Even women who have no links to the women’s movement believe their role is to promote what they believe to be women’s interests. For example, Lily Pérez, a deputy for the moderate Right party *Renovación Nacional* (RN), has risked the anger of her party to support women’s rights, including supporting the 1995 Beijing Platform. Pérez also insists that she is much less partisan than many in her own party and more prone to cross-party alliances on issues (including women’s issues). She explains, “I have much more in common in cultural themes and values with the women of the PPD and the PS that are of my way of thinking”.⁴⁷ Pérez supports the divorce bill, for example, although the position of her party is opposed to such legislation. This illustrates that increasing the

⁴⁴ Cited in *La Tercera*, August 8, 1997.

⁴⁵ Saa interview.

⁴⁶ Muñoz interview.

⁴⁷ Pérez interview.

number of women in political institutions is important even in those cases where women do not identify themselves with the feminist movement.

Despite the willingness of women in Congress to promote women's gender interests, the Chilean context, marked by neoliberalism, social conservatism, and class-divided women's movements, poses a number of significant obstacles to such representation. In Chile, the neoliberal model of democracy and citizenship being constructed confront women with a particularly acute dilemma. This model, as outlined in Chapter 1, contains inherent contradictions between its emphasis on atomistic individuals competing in a narrow and rigidly bounded political arena and a social sphere in which individuals survive through their familial and community networks of shared responsibilities for each others' collective well-being. Such a model rests on a sexual division of labour in the social sphere where women perform crucial reproductive and care-taking responsibilities. What is significant here is that the *neoliberal* model of citizenship and democracy does not challenge but reinforces a social and moral *conservatism* based on the maintenance of traditional sex/gender roles. Promoting feminist goals that challenge traditional gender relations, consequently, is extremely difficult in this context. During the dictatorship, women raised feminist issues within a larger critique of authoritarianism based on their "different" identities as mothers. Now that a form of democracy and economic stability have returned to Chile, it is far more difficult to raise feminist issues because the feminist critique of gender and existing power relations appears to be a direct challenge to prevailing moral codes and social relations.

The contours of a neoliberal citizenship model shape how women promote both feminine and feminist interests and the justifications to which they appeal for greater access to formal political institutions. Because that model not only does not challenge conservative gender ideas but also reinforces the public/private and “social”/“political” dichotomies, it tends to reinforce the sexual division of labour in “formal” politics, leaving women to promote issues related to the “social” realm while men continue to deal with the “political” issues. Indeed, evidence of the sexual division of labour in formal politics can be found in President Lagos’ appointments of women to executive office: of the five women he appointed as Ministers of State, only one of them holds a clearly “political” portfolio—that of Foreign Affairs. The other women appointed head the Ministries of Health, Education, Co-operation and Planning (which houses many of the social programs), and, of course, SERNAM. Appointing women to “social” posts is common, since the “political” ones are viewed as more prestigious. According to Valeria Ambrosio, the “social” positions to which women are appointed “are those that, even though they are decision-making positions, are those that are less valued, with lower pay”.⁴⁸

In Chile, women in politics have been more likely to promote “feminine” interests and where “feminist” goals get raised at all, they are framed in ways that are ultimately less challenging to the status quo. The weight of conservatism in Chile contributes to this phenomenon. All matters related to sexuality, the family, and women’s participation in the workforce or in politics are dealt with in an extremely conservative way by both the

⁴⁸ Ambrosio interview.

media and by the Catholic Church, with its immense cultural force (Molina and Provoste 1997, 157).⁴⁹ Democratization in Chile has not led to more progressive views on social or moral issues. Indeed, some claim that because the Church gained increased respect through its role in the struggle for human rights during the dictatorship it may be using its position to promote its more conservative cultural and moral values. Simon Collier and William Sater, for example, note the possibility of a “reclericalization” of Chilean society precisely due to the Church’s role in the anti-Pinochet struggle (1996, 386).

The cultural sway of the Church and the overall conservatism of Chilean society place limits on the behaviour of feminist parliamentarians. This is nowhere more clear than in these women’s attempts to bring about women’s rights legislation. Women parliamentarians have succeeded in achieving legislation that promotes women’s interests. But it has proved harder to get legislation which challenges gender inequality or promotes feminist goals. Much of the legislation achieved in the last ten years deals with women’s rights as mothers (for example, rights to day-care or rights of pregnant high-school students to continue their studies rather than being expelled from their schools) or women’s rights as working mothers (such as rights to maintain employment despite pregnancy and rights to maternal leave). Legislation that would challenge women’s social roles *as* mothers has failed in Chile to date (like divorce, abortion, and anti-sex discrimination).⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Most of the women that I interviewed or with whom I had informal discussions also pointed out the importance of the Catholic Church and an overwhelmingly conservative media in setting the parameters of moral debate in Chile.

⁵⁰ See Blofield and Haas (2000) for a classification of 22 bills that relate to women’s rights.

Even when the intent of legislation is clearly to promote feminist interests and more equal gender relations, those supporting the bill must often try to frame it as fitting into a pro-family agenda. The clearest examples here are the Paternity Bill (which came into force in 1999) and the Divorce Bill (still in parliament). The Paternity Law (*Ley de Filiación*) finally abolished all legal distinctions between “legitimate” children (born within marriage), “natural” children (born outside of marriage but recognized by both parents), and “illegitimate” children (born outside of marriage and not recognized by one or more parents). Prior to the elimination of these distinctions, men who fathered illegitimate children had no legal responsibilities to the children, leaving the mother wholly responsible for the care of the child. The bill can be considered “feminist” to the extent that it challenges the notion that children are the exclusive responsibility of their mothers and makes men responsible for all children that they father. Given the lack of divorce in Chile, a considerable percentage—estimated at 40 percent—of children are born outside of marriage (SERNAM, December 1998). The Paternity Bill was quite controversial and the political Right initially opposed it on the grounds that it was anti-family (Blofield and Haas 2000, 17). An information pamphlet released by SERNAM shortly after the bill was given its final approval by the president, devotes most of its attention to how the bill equalizes and protects children, especially by guaranteeing them rights to financial support and inheritance (SERNAM, December 1998).

Divorce legislation, a goal of most feminists in Chile and a high priority for parliamentarians, has also been extremely controversial in Chile, and, indeed, still has not passed, despite being introduced into parliament three times since 1990 (Zavala 1997). There are indications that Chileans overall support the idea of allowing for some kind of

legal divorce—polls put support for legislation at around 75 percent. Yet Congressional bills have provoked extremely negative reactions from both the Church and the political Right. When a divorce bill was presented to Congress for the second time, in July 1991, the Episcopal Conference’s Doctrinal Committee sent the legislature a position paper that firmly stated its opposition to the legalization of divorce (Fleet and Smith 1997, 174). Given the opposition of the Catholic Church it is not surprising that the first two bills introduced also did not have much support among the Christian Democrats (who dominated the first two post-dictatorship coalitions). The Christian Democratic Party holds deeply traditional pro-family values (Aylwin and Walker 1996). The third bill introduced has been able to gain support among both conservative Christian Democrats and even some members of the political Right because it is framed in a more pro-family manner. For example, the bill extends the waiting period for divorce and awards judges the power to deny requests. According to one of the PDC sponsors of the bill, “it’s not a divorce bill, it’s a marriage bill” (cited in Blofield and Haas 2000, 21). The Church, however, continues to voice its strong resistance to any legislation that would allow for the dissolution of marriage. In August 2000, a church spokesperson insisted that divorce is “against Divine Law and the common good of the nation”.⁵¹

The bill now has passed one main hurdle—it has been approved in the Chamber of Deputies—but it still has not been discussed in the Senate. Despite President Lagos’ declaration of support for divorce legislation during the 1999 presidential campaign, he has indicated the issue’s low priority for the government by failing to attach any sort of

⁵¹ Quoted in *El Mercurio*, August 18, 2000.

executive urgency to the bill. While before his election, Lagos indicated that divorce legislation would be dealt with in his government, in May 2000, when he announced which bills would receive executive urgencies in the extended Congressional sitting, the divorce bill was not among them.⁵² What is interesting, though, is the way he framed his own support for the idea: he claimed that divorce legislation was one of the most important matters that “relates to the protection of the family” and that “we are all against divorce, but separations occur and the children end up without protection”.⁵³

In Chile’s conservative climate, it is obviously easier to gain support for issues that are feminine rather than feminist. Valeria Ambrosia of SERNAM explains, “it is easier when you raise issues that have to do with pretty extreme situations [such as domestic violence] or that have to do with poverty. These are easier to put on the public agenda. The problem is in placing other issues on the public agenda.”⁵⁴ There are many issues, however, that are ambiguous, issues that can be promoted publicly in a way that fits with prevailing political discourse, while also being promoted by feminists as a challenge to the gender hierarchy. For example, one of the themes of Lagos’ presidential campaign was “*crecer con igualdad*” (to grow with equality). The issue of child-care was fit into this theme by promoting women’s incorporation into the labour-force as a means of creating equality through poverty reduction. In this sense, the issue is “feminine,” but it is also “feminist” according to Adriana Delpiano, the deputy director of Lagos’ presidential campaign and current director of SERNAM. She argued that more

⁵² *La Tercera*, May 17, 2000.

⁵³ *La Segunda*, August 26, 1999.

⁵⁴ Ambrosio interview.

women in the labour force means more women with “modern” views because there is evidence that “housewives” tend to hold more traditional gender beliefs than working women. She explains that, “in this sense, the link between women and the labour market has many advantages, in the first place for the woman herself—her dignity, her ability to rely on her own resources, [but also] for the issue of overcoming poverty”.⁵⁵

Another barrier to promoting women’s gender interests in parliament are the institutional constraints on women parliamentarians. First, as indicated earlier, the Chilean presidential system is one in which the executive determines the legislative agenda (Siavelis 2000; Bickford and Noé 1997). The executive can declare bills “urgent” to expedite their discussion and passage, and the President can call “extraordinary sessions during which time the Congress can consider only proposals put forth by the executive” (Bickford and Noé 1997, 32; Siavelis 2000, 16-19). In addition to the Congress’s relative weakness in setting the legislative agenda, it is also severely under-resourced. Parliamentarians have very few resources such as researchers, assistants, or advisors who could assist them in preparing ambitious legislation (*ibid.*; see also Valdés 1998). Furthermore, as Peter Siavelis notes, “unlike ministerial staff, members of the Chamber and the Senate must also concern themselves with the demands of their constituency and reelection (with the exception of designated Senators), which limit the time and resources than can be devoted to the study and formulation of legislative proposals” (2000, 22). The situation is somewhat improved since the creation of a Family Commission in the Chamber of Deputies at the urging of women parliamentarians, which

⁵⁵ Delpiano interview.

has allowed greater attention and resources to studying (and strengthening) bills related to women's family issues (including divorce, domestic violence, the distribution of parental authority and marital assets) (Valdés 1998). But there is still no equivalent committee in the Senate, which means bills often get slowed down there.

Another factor that reduces women parliamentarians' attempts to promote feminist goals is the lack of stable and strong linkages between parliamentarians and women's movements in Chile. While a number of feminist parliamentarians were part of the broader women's movement in the 1980s, many linkages have been lost, and some women complain that feminist parliamentarians such as Adriana Muñoz and María Antonieta Saa no longer spend as much time with organized women, for example, they seldom accept invitations to events or speak at workshops, especially for popular sector women's groups. In large part, this is due to the very demanding schedules of parliamentarians and the lack of resources and support available for fostering such linkages with women's movements. But it is also indicative of the growing class fragmentation of the movement, a factor discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

The relative absence of linkages between organized women and feminist parliamentarians combined with the fragmentation of the movement—especially along class lines—also means women parliamentarians lack a clear sense of what women's movements want them to promote. The class divisions within the movement and their significance for movement organizing and objectives as a whole are elaborated in fuller detail in Chapter 6. For now it is important to note the absence of a clear feminist agenda, even for self-described feminists in parliament. Adriana Muñoz, for example, admits that while she had a very clear idea of what to do in her first term as deputy, a

purpose that emerged directly from the women's movement of which she was a part, in her current term (1997-2001), "I haven't proposed any bill because I don't have clear what is important for women today. I don't have it clear...I know that the question I have to ask myself is, for which women do I want to legislate, i.e., *temporeras* or middle-class women, etc.?"⁵⁶ It is evident that a feminist agenda in parliament is therefore linked to women's movements' capacities to make their voices heard by women parliamentarians and that this has not been happening in Chile since the transition. Greater attention to the reasons for this is contained in Chapter 6.

Conclusion

Through an analysis of women's struggle to enter formal politics in post-transition Chile, I have argued in this chapter that transitions to democracy produce relatively narrow openings for women to bring about substantial changes to the gender hierarchies in political institutions. The Chilean women's movement did not act decisively when the moment was most auspicious, that is, when the movement enjoyed public visibility and when parties were still in flux and just beginning to re-establish themselves as the crucial mediators between state and civil society. Once parties regained their dominant role in monopolizing "politics" and in determining access to decision-making arenas, women once again faced a hostile environment in which to pursue their interests.

But it is important to connect the movement's strategy and the absence of concrete demands to enter political institutions as individuals to the overall ideological

⁵⁶ Muñoz interview.

nature of the women's movement in Chile. First, the movement became more divided over the issue of "autonomy" versus "integration" and the "double militancy" strategy pursued by many feminists reduced the likelihood of demands for radical restructuring of political institutions to make them more "women-friendly". Demands such as quotas were considered too divisive by political parties to be included. But second, the movement made citizenship demands by emphasizing women's "difference," rooted in their link to the domestic and community realm and the care-giving roles they played within these spheres. Because of these roles, women's identities were centred on their being *for others*. This model of activism is in tension with the traditional (masculine) model of politics where participation is conceived as the pursuit of power in individual terms. Women in Chile constantly stress that they enter the political arena to fight for others, whereas men enter politics to pursue power.⁵⁷ The politicized motherhood identity, at least during the initial stages of the transition, predisposed women to make demands of the political parties to promote women's interests, while inhibiting women from demanding their inclusion into politics *as individuals*. It was not until later that women realized that without demands for institutional reform (example, quotas), they would continue to be marginalized. Despite the constraints outlined in this chapter, it is clear that women are slowly making gains. The fact that all of the parties of the *Concertación* have implemented internal quotas is an important indicator that parties are starting to be more responsive to women's demands. The Congressional elections in

⁵⁷ This sentiment was expressed in practically every conversation I had with organized women.

2001 will, therefore, be an important test to determine how much progress women are making in accessing spaces on candidate lists.

A more serious concern is that those women who achieve positions in formal politics are inhibited from promoting feminist issues that challenge the existing gender hierarchy. While this is connected to their strategy of militant motherhood (because that is partially what justified their entrance into politics), it is more clearly a result of moral conservatism in Chile, and the nature of women's movements and their relations (or lack of) with women in parliament. Women's issues are dealt with in an extremely conservative manner and any perceived challenge to traditional family values is met with strong resistance not only from the Church, but also from the political Right and even conservative elements of the Christian Democratic Party. For this reason, having more women in formal politics is insufficient to alter dramatically existing gender relations. Launching a strong and sustained challenge to the gender hierarchy in Chile also requires a strong women's movement, with fluid links to women in the political arena, in order to promote gender equality both in the state and in civil society.

Chapter Five – States and Women’s Citizenship in Post-Transition Politics: “State Feminism” in Chile?

One of the most interesting features of transitions to democracy is the potential opportunity they pose for restructuring gender (and, in some cases class and race) relationships. Aside from the variations across countries, there are a number of differences within countries once we start to separate out the distinct arenas in which, and through which, women seek to expand their citizenship. In the last chapter we saw that Chilean women have made relatively few gains in improving their access to political institutions; access still controlled by political parties unwilling to concede their monopoly of access to decision-making positions. In the next two chapters, I turn to another area in which opportunities have been generated by democratic transitions: the opening of bureaucratic state structures to a gender-equality agenda.

Throughout Latin America, transitions to democracy have altered the relationship between states and women’s movements (and between states and women in general). Above all, the state is no longer the unambiguous “enemy” of women it was during the dictatorships. Instead, the pro-democracy parties that brought about transitions in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile incorporated a number of gender-based demands promoted by women’s movements, one of which was the creation of women’s policy machineries to promote women’s interests through the state.¹ In the next two chapters, I will assess the effects of this development on women’s citizenship in Chile,

¹ The creation of state policy machinery to promote women’s interests was also promoted by the United Nations and formed a part of the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

and develop some generalizations from the Chilean case concerning these developments for women in new democracies.

There are two separate questions to be addressed. First, I will explore the opportunities and obstacles to pursuing women's gender interests through state policy machinery. Second, I will explore the effects on women's movements (and their citizenship goals) of women's policy machineries. In many ways, these two questions are inextricably linked because there is clear evidence that strong and relatively autonomous women's movements create greater pressure on women's policy machineries to pursue feminist goals, for example, by mobilizing displays of civil society support for women's issues (see Alvarez 1997, 82). Likewise, it is very difficult to understand the changes in women's movements without taking into consideration the effects on the movement of the "institutionalization" of gender politics represented by the creation of women's policy machineries (Alvarez 1999; Matear 1997; Schild 2000). But it is also helpful to separate the two questions, at least analytically, in order to examine each issue in its specificity. I do this by dividing the question into two separate chapters. In this chapter, my main purpose is to analyze SERNAM and its role in expanding women's citizenship through legislative initiatives that expand women's rights and equality and policy initiatives aimed particularly at the gendered sources of women's marginalization (for example, poverty alleviation measures targeted at certain groups of women). In particular, my aim is to understand the opportunities and obstacles that SERNAM confronts in promoting women's citizenship through these initiatives. SERNAM can contribute to women's citizenship in two ways: first, by introducing legislation aimed at gender equality; and second, by serving as a bridge between women who participate in

the “informal” political arena and those who make policy in the “formal” political arena. My main goal is to understand the opportunities and obstacles SERNAM faces in fulfilling these roles.

The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section sets out the conceptual framework of “state feminism,” borrowed from Stetson and Mazur (1995), within which I analyze Chile’s SERNAM. In the second, third, and fourth sections, I employ three of Stetson and Mazur’s variables for assessing state feminism: the politics surrounding its establishment; the organizational form(s) it takes; and the society’s attitudes towards the state’s role in ameliorating inequality.

Theoretical Overview: Women, States, and “State Feminism”

An overarching argument of this chapter is that the role of states in promoting or inhibiting women’s citizenship is ambiguous rather than clear; moreover it is changing rather than constant. Furthermore, the relationship between states and women’s movements is reciprocal; that is, movements have an impact on states (for example, state institutions can be brought into existence or considerably transformed as a result of movement mobilization in certain instances) but state-level changes also influence the nature and strategies of movements (see Walby 1997). During transitions to democracy, as in most kinds of state restructuring, a number of issues are more open to discussion and politicization compared to more stable periods, and this is exactly what makes them potential openings for the re-negotiation of citizenship. As we saw in Chapter 3, through women’s public opposition to the dictatorship in Chile, women’s demands for democracy

and their demands for women's citizenship were creatively merged through slogans such as "without women, democracy won't work!". Eventually, pro-democracy political parties picked up on the movement's discourse and issued their own commitments to promote gender equality through state policy. In this sense, once the pro-democracy parties formed the government, the states they inhabited became "allies" in the struggle for women's citizenship.

This scenario occurred in a number of Latin American countries, most notably, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Committing state resources to gender equality signalled new practical considerations for feminists, many of whom had traditionally been wary of states, depicting them as thoroughly patriarchal and inimical to women's equality goals. Indeed, throughout Latin America today, many "*autónomas*" still consider states to be vehicles for women's subordination rather than tools to be employed in the struggle for equality.² But these developments also signal the need for new theoretical considerations and conceptual tools for researchers.

While much early feminist theorizing tended to ignore the state, since the 1980s there has been significant attention devoted to the role of states in reinforcing patriarchy or as potential sites for feminist struggles for gender equality. Since the state was "brought back in" to political science around the same time, feminist theorizing has contributed substantially to debates about the "relative autonomy" of the state in reproducing class, gender, and race subordination. These debates have taken feminist state theorizing well beyond the tripartite distinction of liberal feminism, socialist

² See Maruja Barrig (2001) and Ericka Beckman (2001) for discussions of the recent issues in this debate.

feminism, and radical feminism, each of which held rather simplistic views of the state's relation to gender hierarchies.

By the 1980s, many feminist theorists started to re-think the relationship between gender and states, especially in light of growing evidence that, in many parts of the world, women's policy machineries within states—in some cases outcomes of movement lobbying—were having a positive impact on women's lives. Other feminist scholars were pointing to the heterogeneity of women's experiences globally, a heterogeneity that could not be theorized within existing feminist theory. Liberal, socialist, and radical feminism's accounts of the relations between women and states tended to universalize the experiences of particular women (i.e., white, western women). This dissatisfaction with existing feminist theory gave rise to a new body of literature that explored in historical and comparative perspective the relations between gender and states, relations which, according to Jane Jenson, “are more appropriately classified as a matter for empirical investigation than as theoretical statements” (1986, 11).

Most feminist theorists today would agree that states are not monolithic agents that act solely in the interests of a particular social group, whether male elites or the capitalist class. Instead, states are viewed as a series of arenas which are both the product of earlier social struggle and appropriate sites for the continued contestation of gender, class, and racial hierarchies (Pringle and Watson 1998). In this view, there is no *necessary* or structurally determined relationship between states and gender inequality, or any other form of inequality for that matter. That is, states possess at least relative autonomy from the social structures of capitalism, racism, and patriarchy. According to Sonia Alvarez:

the State is relatively autonomous of patriarchal or male interests not because it is independent of those interests but because its legitimacy is partially derived from its ability to conceal the genderic, racial, and class interests represented within the pact of domination by granting some concessions to the subordinate groups and classes that increasingly press their political claims upon it (1990, 31).

This means that states can be pressured to promote the interests of marginalized social groups in certain instances. In the case of women as a social group, the transitions to democracy which produced women's policy machineries present feminists "with a new conjuncture in gender politics" (Alvarez 1997, 60). Alvarez borrows the concept of "political conjuncture" from French Marxists and Latin American theorists who employ it to refer "to the correlation and articulation of social and political forces, within a given social formation, at a specific historical moment" (*ibid.*, 95). Hence, while it assumes there are certain historically determined instances in which state arenas can be important sites for transforming unequal gender relations, this view also recognizes that states are, to a great extent, colonized by the interests of the more powerful social groups. What is important is that the hegemony of any particular social group within states is continually being re-negotiated as other social groups find ways to contest their subordination.

An important aspect of this view is that states are not unitary, thus implying that there can never be a strict coherence of interests between the state and capital or the state and the male-dominated political elite (Pringle and Watson 1998, 213). Because states are composed of a series of institutions which change over time, there are various access points through which social groups can press their claims. Where this view differs from pluralist theory is in its claim that the relationship between state and society is reciprocal. That is, where pluralists only see society influencing the state, this view aims at

uncovering ways state institutions influence the formation and behaviours of social groups. Pringle and Watson explain, “the state does not simply reflect gender inequalities but, through its practices, plays an important role in constituting them” (1998, 214). At the same time, however, the institutions that make up the state are themselves an outcome of social forces.

The above view is consistent with the historical institutionalist perspective which has recently become quite prominent in political science. According to Thelen and Steinmo, “[i]nstitutionalists are interested in the whole range of state and societal institutions that shape how political actors define their interests and that structure their relations of power to other groups” (1992, 2). But what is most useful about the historical institutionalist approach is its view of the reciprocal relationship between states and social actors. In positing this relationship, the institutionalist view does not strip women of their agency as did earlier strands of feminist theory which cast women merely as subjects of patriarchal and capitalist states. As Thelen and Steinmo explain, while institutions shape the strategies of social groups, “they are themselves also the outcome (conscious or unintended) of deliberate political strategies, of political conflict, and of choice” (*ibid.*, 10). The view of the relations between women and the state posited by post-structuralists and historical institutionalists points to a feminist strategy that is multi-faceted. The state becomes an appropriate arena for promoting feminist goals, and the construction and maintenance of strong women’s movements capable of both pressuring the state and challenging everyday practices in civil society retains the importance it always had.

The historical institutionalist view of states is most useful in understanding the opportunities and constraints to promoting women's gender interests through states and also to investigating the effects of women's policy machineries on women's movements. An even more precise conceptual framework for investigating the post-transition context is the "state feminism" framework of Dorothy McBride Stetson and Amy Mazur (1995). The authors make a distinction between "women's policy machineries" as "state structures established to advance the status of women," and "state feminist women's policy machineries [which] are those agencies that concretely achieve their formal charge in some way" (*ibid.*, 5). Stetson and Mazur's framework for investigating the extent to which state agencies are state feminist assumes many of the premises of recent feminist state theorizing (such as Pringle and Watson) and historical institutionalism discussed above. For example, the authors claims that they do not view "the state as a single monolithic entity, but rather as a site of a variety of internally differentiated structures and processes" (1995, 273). Most importantly, they assume it *is* possible, at least in some instances, to promote gender equality through states, while further emphasizing the reciprocal relationship between states and movements—i.e., movements can bring into existence or transform state institutions while these institutions in turn can shape movements and their strategies.

The usefulness of Stetson and Mazur's state feminism framework for investigating recent developments in Chile is that it elaborates useable definitions and a list of variables, based on comparative research, which have proven relevant in determining the extent to which policy machineries are indeed state feminist. Agencies can be comparatively assessed as state feminist according to two further features: 1)

policy influence: the extent to which they influence feminist policy; and 2) policy access: the extent to which they open up access to societal actors (like women's movements) (Mazur and Stetson 1995, 14; 274). The framework is flexible because it avoids pre-determining the meaning of "feminism" to recognize cross-national differences in the term's deployment. Their stipulative definition specifies that "[a]n ideology, policy, organization, or activity is feminist to the extent that it has the purpose of improving the status of women as a group and undermining patterns of gender hierarchy" (*ibid.*, 16).

SERNAM and state feminism in Chile

For the purposes of exploring the extent to which Chile's SERNAM is an instance of state feminist policy machinery, I am concerned with its overall influence on feminist policy goals (i.e., policies that seek to improve the status of women and equalize gender relations) and with the extent to which it is creating access points for women's movements in civil society. Both of these goals are key to women's citizenship. By opening access to women's movements in civil society, SERNAM can link the "formal" and "informal" political arenas, allowing women who participate primarily in the "informal" arena to convey their demands to those in the "formal" arena. Increasing gender equality and enhancing women's access to "formal" politics are both stated goals of SERNAM. For example, SERNAM's recent Equal Opportunity Plan states that,

with the creation of the *Servicio Nacional de la Mujer* in 1991 and the formulation of the first Equal Opportunity Plan 1994-1999, the *Concertación* governments have sent to society a clear signal regarding the role of the State in the construction of more equitable gender relations, through policies, programs, and legislative reforms, that specifically

consider the situation of women and their differences with men in the distribution of social benefits and responsibilities (SERNAM 2000, 6-7).

SERNAM further emphasizes that the purposes of the Equal Opportunity Plans are “to produce a substantive change in the relations between men and women” (*ibid.*). SERNAM has also declared its intentions “to favour the citizen participation of women in the process of elaborating public policies,” by, for example, “fostering dialogue between State and civil society and creating possibilities for citizen control of gender policies and programs” (*ibid.*, 64).

To what extent does SERNAM meet these goals? Overall, SERNAM is not considered successful in terms of policy influence (Craske 1999, 185-6; Matear 1995; Waylen 1996), and my research confirms that it faces profound obstacles to exerting influence within the state apparatus as a whole. I also believe, however, that previous researchers have overlooked the extent to which SERNAM is well-placed, especially vis-à-vis feminists in parliament, to initiate gender-egalitarian legislation. This is due to the executive (of which SERNAM is a part) dominance of the political system as a whole in Chile. In terms of opening policy access to societal actors (i.e., women’s movements), Nikki Craske categorizes SERNAM as a case of “high access” (1999, 185-6). Other authors (most notably Schild 1997; 1999; 2000a; 2000b) are more sceptical about how much access is being created for non-state actors. In this chapter and the next I argue that SERNAM is undertaking a number of well-intentioned steps to involve women’s movements in the policy process, but that the success of these endeavours has been limited. While feminists in NGOs have relatively easy access to the state, many note that their autonomy to press for feminist goals is being compromised in the process. There

are also complaints that base-level women's groups are being left out of the process, or are being invited to participate as "clients" in such a way as to limit their real impact on the policy-making process. Schild, for example, describes the "clientelization" of poor and working-class women who participate in SERNAM's programs. She argues that "the clientelization of some poor and working-class women carried out by others in the name of advancing the causes of women, is in effect undermining the possibility of poor and working-class women coming together to articulate their own needs" (Schild 1997, 614).

In the remainder of this chapter I explain the above outcomes, i.e., the relatively low policy influence of SERNAM and the ambiguous nature of opportunities for women's movements to access policy-making channels through SERNAM, by applying Stetson and Mazur's comparative framework and the variables they identify: 1) the politics of establishment; 2) organizational form; 3) conception of the state. Their fourth variable, form of women's movements, is addressed in the next chapter. In the section on the "politics of establishment" of women's policy machinery within the Chilean state, I show that some of the obstacles that SERNAM faces stem from the political controversy surrounding its creation. While there was widespread support for women's equality within government circles, important and vocal opposition to the establishment of SERNAM came from the political Right and the Catholic Church. The controversy generated led the government to water down the earlier mandate of SERNAM that had largely come from feminists in the women's movement and to disassociate the creation of SERNAM from an overt feminist political agenda.

In the section on SERNAM's organizational form I show both the advantages and disadvantages for pursuing gender equality derived from its institutional structure. While

SERNAM's director has ministerial status, the agency is instead embedded within another ministry—the Ministry of Co-operation and Planning (MIDEPLAN), which houses most of the government's social programmes. While this significantly weakens the influence SERNAM exerts over state policy in general, the fact that SERNAM is part of the executive also affords it greater opportunities for legislating on women's issues. This is due to executive dominance of the legislative agenda in the Chilean political system, and the greater resources that the executive commands relative to legislators. What is most important in terms of effects of policy on women, however, is that SERNAM is itself part of a state in the process of “modernization,” which in Chile means decentralization (basically “off-loading” to municipal governments) and contracting out to third parties. This makes the delivery of SERNAM's programs highly uneven. The extent to which women benefit from SERNAM's efforts depends, in large measure, on where they live, because many programs are administered through municipal governments which vary considerably in levels of commitment to gender equality and access to resources to effectively deliver gender policy.

In the section looking at Chilean political culture, or, more specifically, the attitudes held regarding the role of the state in ameliorating inequality, I show the conflicting views concerning the most desirable role of the state. Post-dictatorship governments have consistently sought to shrink the “formal” political arena and depoliticize “social” issues to maintain the overall neoliberal orientation of the state, thereby weakening the notion that the state should contribute to equality. At the same time, however, the discourse of governments supports the idea that the state has an important role to play in fostering a more participatory civil society, especially regarding

women's participation and women's capacity to organize themselves. This factor is precisely what has allowed SERNAM to generate access for women's movements to the state. For example, SERNAM has inserted participatory aspects to various social programs that seek to gather input from the targeted group in future policy design. While these goals are important, they have not been unambiguously successful.

The extent to which women's machineries generate access for women's movements to state institutions is bound up with the form of women's movements, as Stetson and Mazur's fourth variable posits. In the new democracies, however, this question is much more complex than in the established democracies. Transitions to democracy, especially in Latin America, affected the form of women's movements because in the period leading up to the transition, movements were united around a common goal—democracy—and displayed considerable cross-class linkages. Movements fragmented considerably during and after the transition because, on the one hand, the main goal was achieved, but also because the political context changed so dramatically. Perhaps the most significant change has been the creation of women's policy machineries which have taken feminist politics into the state. Given the complexity of the effects of this on women's movements, I devote an entire chapter to this issue rather than addressing it here. This chapter, therefore, addresses the first three variables while Chapter 6 deals exclusively with the changing forms of women's movements in Chile since 1990 and how their struggle for citizenship has been affected by the institutionalization of gender politics within SERNAM.

The Politics of Establishing SERNAM

The creation of SERNAM was one of the main demands of the women's movement in the late 1980s, although this demand was itself largely a product of an emerging international feminist movement and an outcome of the UN Decade for Women. When the *Concertación de Mujeres por la Democracia* (CNMD) formed in 1989 to formulate gender-specific policies for the incoming democratic government, one of its main recommendations was the creation of national policy machinery to promote women's equality goals (Alvear 1990, 19; Matear 1995, 93). The establishment of SERNAM, therefore, responded to a "bottom-up" or societal demand, thereby giving the institution much greater legitimacy than where policy machinery was created at the urging of external actors or governing elites in the absence of societal pressure.³ This particular demand of the CNMD was given further legitimacy because it is one of the recommendations of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which Chile ratified in 1989. Additionally, similar agencies had been created in neighbouring Latin American countries which had also undergone democratic transitions. Brazil's democratic government created the

³ Amy Mazur credits the weakness of women's policy machinery in France to the fact that it came into being almost entirely through "the feminist politics of the governing party rather than through any society-based demands" (1995, 84). In the case of Nigeria, the creation of women's policy machinery in the state had been a demand of societal actors, namely a rather small group of feminist academics and professionals. Upon creation, however, it was immediately taken over by the wife of then-military leader General Babangida, resulting in the exit of feminists and a ministry geared towards the self-interest and enrichment of a small group of elite women rather than women's equality (Mama 1995).

Conselho Nacional dos Direitos da Mulher (CNDM) at the urging of the women's movement, and Argentina created the *Consejo Nacional de la Mujer*.

The demand to create a state agency responsible for promoting women's interests was not a new one, but fits within the larger historical legacy of Chilean women's movements. The demand had, in fact, been a part of women's movements' demands in earlier historical periods. Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 2, during Salvador Allende's presidency (1970-73), legislation to create such an agency had been introduced, but had not been passed by the time of the military coup that ended his presidency. The creation of SERNAM, however, indicates a crucial shift in the way that women's citizenship was conceived both by the women who demanded its creation and by the government that brought it into existence. As explained in Chapter 2, women's citizenship during the Frei and Allende periods was promoted by mobilizing women around their social roles, most notably in the *Centros de Madres*. There was little attention paid to how these very roles constrained women's capacities to exercise citizenship and to fully participate in setting and achieving the goals of development.

The creation of SERNAM and its mandate to bring about gender equality thus reflects considerable shift in the way the Chilean state tries to include women as citizens. It is important to note, however, that the demands of the women's movement regarding the creation of SERNAM, were not translated directly into an agency with a mandate that reflected the women's movement vision. Because the changes within women's movements about the role of women in Chilean society and politics were not matched with broader societal changes in the prevailing gender ideology, the government's intention to create a national state agency to promote women's equality generated

widespread controversy. The political Right and the Catholic Church explicitly opposed the creation of SERNAM. While there existed significant political will within the pro-democracy political class to respond to women's concerns, male political leaders were not eager to respond to women's demands in those cases that they perceived their own hold on power to be threatened. Hence, the opposition from conservative social forces led to a watered-down mandate for SERNAM.

The creation of SERNAM must be placed in the wider context of the transition to democracy in Chile. Terry Lynn Karl refers to Chile as a "pacted" or "negotiated" transition (1990). General Pinochet and the conservative political Right maintained considerable power, for example, through the constitutional provision for nine "designated" senators, ensuring that the Right held the balance of power in the upper chamber. The over-representation of the political Right in Chile has led to demands of other social groups, for example, organized labour, being unmet as well. Various legislative goals of the *Concertación*, such as reforming the Pinochet-era labour code, have remained unrealized due to the power of the political Right to block such initiatives. While the first post-transition president, a Christian Democrat, was committed to responding to the concerns of women that had been raised by the CNMD, he was also committed to a path of peaceful transition that emphasized reconciliation and moderation. When the bill to create SERNAM was introduced into Congress on May 14, 1990, it generated opposition from the political Right which did not favour state promotion of gender equality. The two main parties of the Right, *Renovación Nacional* (RN) and the *Unión Democrática Independiente* (UDI), are sceptical about the concept of women's equality. A parliamentarian from the RN Party stated that while men and women are

equal in so far as they are both children of God, “our biology, psychology, and emotional particularities derive from each different gender. These differences explain why the same qualities are not given in a completely equal manner [to men and women]. [These differences] are distinct and complementary” (cited in Grau *et al.* 1997, 85). For the political Right, women’s most important roles are those of *madre* and *dueña de casa* (mother and home-maker).

Given the controversy that the bill to create SERNAM unleashed, President Aylwin compromised by limiting the scope of SERNAM and inserting language into the bill that effectively gave SERNAM a potentially contradictory mandate: to promote women’s equality while also protecting and strengthening the traditional family. Thus, the law creating SERNAM states that the purpose of the agency is “to collaborate with the executive in studying and proposing general plans and measures intended to ensure equality of rights and opportunities for women,...respecting the nature and particularities of women that derive from natural differences between the sexes, including adequate concern for family relations” (cited in Loveman 1995, 325). SERNAM’s first minister, Soledad Alvear, publicly stated that SERNAM would not concern itself with issues such as divorce or abortion (which would threaten the traditional family), but instead, would be concerned with protecting and strengthening the Chilean family (Grau *et al.* 1997).

There are two reasons why the first *Concertación* government was unwilling to push harder for a women’s rights agenda that generated opposition from both the Catholic Church and the political Right. Firstly, one of the most important legacies of the seventeen years of dictatorship was psychological: a fear of confrontation in the public realm that could potentially lead to heightened political tensions and a repeat of

September 11, 1973. This fear led *Concertación* political leaders to chart an extremely moderate course of transition. Consequently, the 1989 electoral campaign focussed on “social peace, tolerance, and rebuilding consensus” (Loveman 1995, 305). President Aylwin’s top advisor stated that “as long as severe polarization is avoided, the risk of authoritarian regression or a military coup is slight” (cited in *ibid.*).

The second reason for the conciliatory approach to a women’s rights agenda is the power of the Catholic Church following the transition (also discussed in Chapter 4). While the Church acted in progressive ways during the long years of dictatorship, in the post-transition period it reverted to its former role of being Chile’s moral voice on personal and social issues. As Fleet and Smith explain in their study of the Catholic Church in the transition and consolidation of democracy in Chile, “since 1990, the Chilean bishops have devoted much of their attention to personal and social moral issues. These include divorce, abortion, premarital sex, educational reform, and the growth of evangelical Protestantism” (1997, 172). The Church has been outspoken in its opposition, first to SERNAM’s existence, and later to many of its projects. At one point, when SERNAM’s first deputy-secretary, Soledad Larraín, became involved in a public debate with the Church over the issue of whether a “moral crisis” existed in Chile (she denied that such a crisis existed), she became an unacceptable figure to the government and was compelled to resign from her position (Grau *et al* 1997, 87).

What is most clear about the politics surrounding SERNAM’s establishment is that *Concertación* leaders took great pains to disassociate the agency’s creation from any sort of feminist political agenda. In a speech made upon signing into law the creation of SERNAM, President Aylwin explained,

I want to expressly state that this project is not determined by ideological considerations, it does not respond to a philosophy about woman's role in society. It responds to the necessity of considering the problems that are affecting women in modern society and of listening to, preferably, the voice of women themselves to solve these problems (Aylwin 1990).

Given the *Concertación's* unwillingness to pursue policies that they knew would be divisive, SERNAM came into existence with a potentially irresolvable tension at its core: to pursue women's equality while strengthening the (traditional) family. The support for SERNAM by key political leaders allowed it to embark on a fairly ambitious policy agenda, but the nature of the negotiated transition and the potential for conflict with the political Right has meant that women's rights policies have to "fit" within the broad outlines of social policy. This is why a number of programs are situated within a social welfare or poverty alleviation framework which, unlike previous social policy aimed at reducing poverty, takes into account the gendered sources of poverty.

In sum, the politics of SERNAM's establishment limit, to some extent, both its policy influence and the policy access it affords organized women's movements. Given the negotiated transition in which the pro-Pinochet political Right maintained considerable power, the Aylwin government chose to steer a moderate course avoiding potential confrontations with conservatives. This led the government to downplay, at least rhetorically, the feminist aims of SERNAM, even though many of SERNAM's policies and programs clearly seek to undermine gender inequality. This ultimately led to a somewhat lower profile (and prestige) for the institution, decreasing its overall policy influence. Likewise, the moderate stance of SERNAM (especially regarding sexuality and reproduction) also undermined its status in the eyes of some feminists. Most

importantly, the controversy surrounding SERNAM's creation affected its organizational features, outlined in the next section.

SERNAM's Organizational Form

SERNAM was established by law "as the body responsible for working with the Executive to devise and propose general plans and measures designed to ensure that women enjoy the same rights and opportunities as men."⁴ This mandate is achieved through: inter-sectoral coordination, legal reforms, training public servants in a gendered perspective on public policy; designing social policy; increasing women's social and political participation; international cooperation; research aimed at producing knowledge and statistics that reveal women's situation; and strengthening equal opportunities at the community level.⁵ In terms of programs, SERNAM has focused most of its attention on particular segments of women. Its main programs are: *Mujeres Jefas de Hogar de Escasos Recursos* (Low Income Women Heads of Households); *Mujeres Trabajadoras Temporeras* (Women Seasonal Workers); *Prevención Violencia Interfamiliar* (Domestic Violence Prevention); *Prevención Embarazo Adolescente* (Teen Pregnancy Prevention). The only major program not targeted at a specific group of women is the *Centros de Información de los Derechos de la Mujer* (CIDEM, Women's Rights Information Centres), with an office in each of Chile's thirteen regions. Most of the programs (with the obvious exception of CIDEM) involve cross-ministerial coordination, often through

⁴ www.eclac.cl/espanol/investigacion/series/mujer/directorio.htm Retrieved February 4, 2000.

⁵ www.sernam.cl/linea.htm Retrieved May 31, 1999.

the creation of inter-ministerial committees such as the Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Prevention of Family Violence and the Coordinating Committee for the Women Heads of Household. SERNAM also has agreements with other ministries, including agriculture, education, and health to initiate programs with attention to gender equity.⁶ In the remainder of this section, I highlight the main strengths and weaknesses of SERNAM's structure.

The first thing that is relevant to note about SERNAM is that it was created by law rather than by presidential decree. This is significant because it makes SERNAM a permanent part of the state structure in Chile and therefore makes it more difficult to reduce its role should a more conservative government come to power. Argentina's *Consejo Nacional de la Mujer*, for example, was established through presidential decree. President Carlos Menem's early support for women's rights meant that the agency had a broad mandate and generous funding. When controversy over women's rights emerged in Argentina surrounding the 1995 Beijing Conference, President Menem sided with conservative forces and drastically curtailed the *Consejo's* activities and its budget (Waylen 2000a). A true test of SERNAM's durability would be a change in government from the Centre-Left coalition, which has governed Chile since the transition, to a more conservative government opposed to a gender equity agenda.⁷

⁶ www.eclac.cl/espanol/investigacion/series/mujer/directorio.htm

⁷ In France, the Socialist government of Francois Mitterand created the Ministry of Women's Rights in 1985. The ministry was entirely bound up with the partisan aims of the Socialist Party and the Mitterand government and thus its power and influence did not survive the switch to the conservative government of Jacques Chirac (Mazur 1995, 81-2). In Australia, state agencies have survived, but feminists have had to struggle to defend many of their gains, and have seen significant cuts to the budgets of state feminist

It is also significant that SERNAM is not a ministry in its own right, but is housed within the Ministry of Planning and Co-operation (MIDEPLAN), which is responsible for the majority of Chile's social programs. The nature of MIDEPLAN itself, a post-transition creation, tells us something about the underlying organizational philosophy guiding SERNAM. MIDEPLAN embodies the post-transition government's approach to addressing poverty and social exclusion in Chile. The agencies within MIDEPLAN are those dealing with Chile's socially marginalized groups—women, indigenous peoples, youth, and the urban and rural poor. The latter group's exclusion and poverty are addressed through the *Fondo de Solidaridad e Inversión Social* (FOSIS, the Solidarity and Social Investment Fund). What is significant about all of MIDEPLAN's agencies is that they are not intended to execute policy, but, rather, to design and fund projects executed by other state ministries and agencies, or by private entities like NGOs or social organizations (Hardy 1997). Clarisa Hardy notes a fundamental problem at the heart of MIDEPLAN's mandate: these crucial social programs are implemented by ministries far more powerful and autonomous, hence they have their own interests to pursue and may be less interested in devoting their energies to programs that originate elsewhere in the state (*ibid.*, 123). Virginia Guzmán explains that in implementing gender equity policy, the original aims of policies can be blocked or diluted because many different state actors are involved, not all of which are working towards similar goals (1998, 66).

While some have argued that being embedded within another ministry weakens SERNAM's potential to promote gender equality and programs that improve women's

agencies since the neoliberal government of John Howard came to office in the mid-1990s (Johnson 2000).

status, according to Soledad Alvear, a member of the CNMD and the first director of SERNAM, there were strategic reasons for creating SERNAM in this manner. She explains:

In the working group [of the CNMD] where the project [of creating SERNAM] was conceived, it was concluded that the creation of a Ministry would make it more difficult to execute actions. We didn't want to create a ghetto or separate entity...We wanted the creation of an entity that crosses various ministries, enabling us to act in each of them, and in this form women would be integrated into the development process (1990).

Although SERNAM does not have status as a ministry, its director has the rank of Minister of State and therefore can participate in cabinet meetings (Matear 1995, 95). The director, the deputy director and all of the regional directors are appointed by the president (Alvear 1990). SERNAM has a somewhat decentralized structure; along with the national office, it has offices in each of Chile's thirteen regional administrations. SERNAM's staff participates in regional coordinating bodies to insert gendered perspectives into regional development policy planning. As part of the wider state project of decentralization, SERNAM has also been transferring more aspects of its programs to the municipal level. Most *municipios* (municipal governments) currently have an *Oficina de la Mujer* (Women's Office) which are technically dependent on the municipal government, although they maintain some links with SERNAM. But they are entirely financed with resources from the municipal government (Matear 1995, 96), which, of course, results in extremely disproportional capacities between the *Oficinas* in the wealthy communities and those in the *poblaciones*.

Mazur and Stetson find that a centralized cross-sectoral approach to gender equity in public policy is most successful, but to be effective in terms of policy influence,

agencies must be powerful in their own right and capable of coordinating gender policy with other institutions for an integrative approach. Centralized agencies that lack the ability and the authority to work across other agencies are less effective, as are dispersed agencies without “a respected and influential central coordinating office” (Mazur and Stetson 1995, 288). The Chilean case confirms this finding—it is neither powerful in its own right nor does it have the authority to influence the agendas of other state agencies. One of the consequences of SERNAM not being its own ministry is that it is prohibited by law from implementing its own programs. Instead, SERNAM is charged with proposing and designing policy for other ministries or agencies to implement. The only projects SERNAM can directly carry out are pilot projects, which, once proven effective, are turned over to the relevant ministry or agency for future implementation. The stated advantage of this institutional design is that SERNAM is supposed to be able to coordinate gender policy planning and promote a gender perspective throughout the state, however, this has not happened to date. According to Ann Matear, “the [cross-] sectoral area within SERNAM has been largely underdeveloped, despite being the essence of SERNAM’s functions within the state apparatus” (1995, 96). Waylen explains that the key problem is the lack of concrete mechanisms for inter-sectoral co-operation. SERNAM does not have a sufficiently high profile or influence within the state to ensure that high-ranking officials in other ministries will be predisposed to co-operating or giving sufficient attention to gender policy issues (1996, 110-11). One of the consequences of the lack of formal mechanisms of coordination is that such coordination that takes place owes to the personal relationships or connections between SERNAM officials and officials in other parts of the state. According to Fiona Macauley,

SERNAM's influence on the work of other Ministries—who must execute gender policy—“is still dependent on the strategic location of feminist sympathizers who act as gatekeepers to facilitate access” (1998, 102).

Personal relationships have been quite crucial, therefore, much as they are in party politics, discussed in the previous chapter. For example, SERNAM's first director and deputy director were spouses of the leaders of the Christian Democratic Party and the Socialist Party respectively (Macauley 1998). That being said, however, the deputy director was also a known feminist, who was ultimately compelled to resign due to some of her more outspoken views. And, of course, as in other agencies of the state, high-ranking officials in SERNAM are appointed based on party affiliation (i.e., to balance the representation among the parties of the *Concertación* coalition). Links to the wider women's movement are not a key factor in making appointments (Macauley 1998; Waylen 1996, 113). This means that SERNAM policy cannot be separated from the partisan ends of the ruling party and explains why issues of divorce and abortion have never been taken up by SERNAM. In fact, the latter has not been raised by SERNAM at all because, according to one SERNAM official, “as we are part of the government, in that sense we have to be within the framework of the government's programme.”⁸

Due to the controversies surrounding SERNAM's creation, its budget, scope and size were reduced. As a consequence, despite the drive towards decentralization in Chile, budget constraints led to a rather centralized institution rather than one with large staffs and resources at the municipal, regional, and national level. This contrasts with Brazil's

⁸ Ambrosio interview.

three-tiered Women's Councils (with separate municipal, state, and national structures) which, according to Fiona Macauley, allow for greater "feedback" from women at each level (1998). Chile's SERNAM has a regional structure, but no municipal structure. At the municipal level, SERNAM relies on local governments and NGOs to carry out its mandate. A further consequence of SERNAM's reduced budget, especially at the outset, was that it affected the design of key programs and their ultimate effectiveness. Because of a reduced staff and budget, when SERNAM's main programs were being designed, there was only one person to act as co-ordinator with each relevant ministry (Valenzuela 1994, 196). This person was supposed to have expertise in the corresponding policy area as well as knowledge in gender policy planning (Matear 1995, 96). But their counterparts in the corresponding ministry do not necessarily have any expertise, nor interest in, a gendered approach to policy. Hence, the success of an initiative hinges on the interest or commitment of the staff in the ministry that is working with SERNAM (Valenzuela 1994, 196). While part of SERNAM's mandate is training civil servants in a gender policy perspective, participation is voluntary. Consequently, of the 2000 civil servants trained in 1998, the overwhelming majority were women; only 452 men voluntarily attended workshops (Salinas 1998, 90).

Consequently, while the idea of "mainstreaming" gender policy through an agency charged with co-ordinating public policy with the ministries is a good one, the absence of formal and authoritative mechanisms to structure coordination undermines its effectiveness. Natacha Molina, a committed feminist and former deputy director of SERNAM, explains that the overall structure and organization of the Chilean state is not conducive to cross-sectoral coordination and this is an important reason why SERNAM

“has yet to establish an easy working relationship with the rest of the state apparatus” (1998, 132).

In sum, SERNAM’s organizational features undermine its policy influence within the overall Chilean state. This could be improved through the development of more stable and authoritative mechanisms for coordination between SERNAM and other ministries. With such mechanisms in place, the importance of personal (and mostly highly partisan) relationships would decline, and the policy influence of SERNAM would be less dependent on the existence of well-placed individual sympathizers. The opportunities and obstacles to expanding women’s citizenship in Chile through SERNAM are evident in the three main strategies that have been pursued since 1990: i) social programs; ii) legislative reform; and iii) Equal Opportunity Plans.

SERNAM’s programs

Some of the problems SERNAM has faced in cross-sectoral co-operation are evident in what is, perhaps, SERNAM’s most ambitious program, the program for *Mujeres Jefas de Hogar* (Women Heads of Household). The program itself emerged out of the recommendations of the CNMD and is based on the view that the causes of poverty are gendered (Valenzuela 1994). There is clear evidence to support the claim that women suffer more poverty and greater obstacles to enter the formal labour market to overcome

poverty.⁹ The *Jefas de Hogar* program is contained within the larger *Plan Nacional de Apoyo a Mujeres Jefas de Hogar* (National Support Plan for Women Heads of Households). The Plan involves actions that target the multiple sources of female poverty. It focuses on legal reforms to establish the full legal capacity of married women to access and manage family resources,¹⁰ and legal reforms surrounding paternity, to make men responsible for all the children they father. Additionally, the Plan involves programs and inter-sectoral coordination across many ministries including Education, Housing, Health, Labour, and Welfare. For example, the Labour Ministry is charged with designing training programs for women heads of household to gain the skills to compete in the labour market; the Housing Ministry assists women in accessing affordable housing; and the Education Ministry devises child-care assistance programs. María Elena Valenzuela, who has carried out extensive studies of the Plan and its implementation, explains that the scope of the Plan and the need for co-operation across so many ministries have caused problems. She points to “the absence of stable linkages between SERNAM and the rest of the ministries,” the fact that there are no precedents at the executive level for an approach that spans numerous ministries and sectors, and,

⁹ While poverty has declined in Chile, the effects of the decrease in poverty rates have not been spread out evenly. Currently, the most persistent poverty is to be found in rural areas and among women heads of households. Additionally, women’s unemployment is consistently higher than men’s, especially among those in the lower income segments (SERNAM 1996a).

¹⁰ Many women heads of household are legally married but, given the unavailability of divorce in Chile, the husband is absent and the couple is separated “in fact”. In these cases, the husband maintains his control over marital property and *patria potestad* (parental authority) over the children. The Civil Code was only changed in the mid-1990s, upon SERNAM’s recommendations, to give women greater control over family assets in certain cases and to share parental authority over children with the husband.

finally, the absence of knowledge of women's issues and a gender policy perspective outside of SERNAM (1994, 195).

More recent studies conducted by SERNAM on the program reveal a number of shortcomings. One recent study explored the intersectoral coordination in carrying out the labour training aspect of program, key because the entire philosophy guiding the *Concertación*'s approach to poverty alleviation assumes poverty results from insufficient integration into the market (Roberts 1997; Schild 2000b, 27). Consequently, the answer to alleviating female poverty is seen as facilitating women's entry to the formal labour market. As part of the *Jefas de Hogar* program, SERNAM has worked with smaller agencies in the Labour Ministry, the most important of which is the *Servicio Nacional de Capacitación y Empleo* (SENCE, Employment and Training Service). The main responsibility for training women now rests with SENCE.¹¹ But the study conducted by SERNAM reveals that within SENCE, commitment to taking into account the *gendered* obstacles to women's employment varies greatly (SERNAM 1999, 8).

A further problem is that SENCE itself divides up its tasks and contracts out aspects of labour training. For example, SENCE does not design or propose the courses and training programs it offers. This is carried out by the *Organismos Técnicos de Capacitación* (OTECs, Technical Training Agencies) at the municipal level. SENCE, therefore, can only select courses from those proposed by the OTECs in a given community, and at this level, there is little consideration of the needs of women heads of

¹¹ In fact, the funding for this aspect of the program, since 1998, also rests with SENCE. The goal of many of SERNAM's programs is to increasingly transfer both the funding and implementation of the programs to the agencies that will be directly responsible for them.

households (*ibid.*). Furthermore, as Patricia Provoste notes, the problem with the state contracting program implementation to third parties like the OTECs is that these agencies cannot be forced to adopt as their own the gender-equity goals that inform SERNAM's perspective. She explains that women are often excluded from certain training programs because there may not be a women's washroom on site, or no place for women to leave their children while attending (Provoste 1997, 54).

A further problem is that none of the programs were designed to combat the gender discrimination that pervades the private sector. Women will continue to face gendered obstacles to employment as long as employers legally can ask applicants to supply information concerning their sex, age, and marital status. In demanding such information, employers simply continue the practice of not hiring married women in their fertile years. Even more problematic, many job applications ask the applicant to attach a photograph, and advertisements for jobs often call for persons "*de buena presencia*" (presentable), which, for women, usually means young, white, and attractive. The discrimination women face in the job market is evidenced in the figures from a job placement program (part of the *Jefas de Hogar* program) in 1993: in the 18-25 age group, there were 116 women registered in the job-placement program and 33 of them found jobs; for men, 161 were registered and 163 placed in jobs (Provoste 1997, 48).

As mentioned earlier, a crucial feature of SERNAM's organizational structure is that it is embedded within a state in the process of decentralizing. Indeed, decentralization in Chile is portrayed as a fundamental aspect of state modernization and democratization (Garretón 1995). In this context, SERNAM has been progressively decentralized as well, and is increasingly transferring aspects of its programs to the

municipal level. One of the justifications for this is that women are the primary users of municipal services and hence it should be at that level where gender-policy planning is executed.

Research carried out by SERNAM into the implementation of the *Jefas de Hogar* program at the municipal levels reveals a number of problems. A main problem is that the effectiveness of the program at the local level depends greatly on the level of commitment exhibited by the mayor and other high-ranking local officials. Without strong support, the resources budgeted to the program are easily diverted to other “emergency” areas, and municipal officials will not feel compelled to give adequate attention to implementation or monitoring of the program (SERNAM 1996, 14). This problem is obviously more pressing in poorer communities with fewer resources, smaller staffs, and smaller budgets. Another problem is related to the level of inter-sectoral coordination demanded by the program. Officials complain that maintaining contact and a working relationship with so many other departments—health, labour, education—is far too time demanding given their already hectic schedules (*ibid.*, 21). There is a sense among local officials that the program (and all the extra work that goes along with it) are externally imposed. As Patricia Provoste explains, “the civil servants always see it [promoting gender equity] more as SERNAM’s problem rather than something essential to their own task” (1997, 49). Consequently, without very firm support from the mayor and strict directives from the mayor’s office to adequately implement and monitor the program, these tasks will be ignored or carried out in a half-hearted manner (SERNAM 1996, 40). According to SERNAM’s study, the most important weakness “has to do with the characteristics of the design of the program. The focus on horizontal coordination

(inter-disciplinary, inter-departmental, and of an integral character) is the exact opposite of the traditional functioning of the *municipios*: sectoral, vertical, and self-referential” (*ibid.*, 40).

In sum, perhaps the greatest problem with increasingly decentralizing social programs is the unevenness of result this engenders. Decentralization in Chile (as elsewhere in Latin America) is essentially off-loading service delivery to municipal governments whether or not these governments have the resources to deliver services effectively. It is not just that effective program implementation depends on the commitment of the mayor and other key officials, but that the resources of communities vary considerably. Women do not, ultimately, benefit equally from SERNAM’s initiatives due to the massive inequalities between the wealthy and poor communities.

Legal reforms and executive-legislative relations

One area where SERNAM has been fairly successful is in bringing about legislative changes, which is a crucial aspect of its mandate and in which its organizational form (as part of the executive) gives it an advantage. SERNAM has introduced numerous bills that have expanded women’s rights. Labour code reforms include removing the prohibition on women taking certain jobs, providing time away from work to care for sick children (a benefit which can be claimed by either parent), protecting women from being dismissed for becoming pregnant, and prohibiting the administration of pregnancy

tests as a condition of employment.¹² Other legal reforms introduced by SERNAM include the criminalization of intra-family violence, and constitutional change that explicitly establishes women's and men's equality before the law (SERNAM n.d.[b]).

Both SERNAM and a number of women parliamentarians have taken up the task of legislating women's equality, but SERNAM clearly enjoys the lead role. As indicated in the previous chapter, the post-transition Chilean political system is one in which the executive dominates the legislative agenda through its capacity to prioritize bills by attaching varying levels of "urgency" to a bill in Congress and through the president's capacity to call extra sessions of parliament during which time the executive entirely determines the priorities of the legislature (Bickford and Noé 1997, 32; Siavelis 2000, 17-19). A second source of executive dominance is the ample access to resources (advisory staff and crucial information) enjoyed by executive agencies. According to Siavelis, "[t]he executive branch can rely on a vast network of attorneys, experts, and advisors within each of its ministries who are charged with particular subject areas, enabling it to elaborate proposals of a much higher quality than the legislative branch" (2000, 21). Another source of executive power is its access to parliamentary committees where bills are being debated. Parliamentarians who are not on a particular committee do not enjoy such access, nor do organized groups in civil society (Haas 1998, 8; see also Bickford and Noé 1997).

¹² Failures, however, have been attempts at reform of the labour code that expand the rights of domestic servants, the group that is least protected under the current labour code.

These biases in favour of the executive mean that executive bills are much more likely to succeed than are bills introduced by parliamentarians. During Aylwin's administration (1990-94), only 8.2 percent of the legislation passed had originated in the legislative branch. Under Frei's term (1994-2000), the percentage rose to 24.9 percent, still reflecting considerable executive dominance (Siavelis 2000, 24). This tendency is also evident in the area of women's rights legislation. Blofield and Haas (2000) found women's rights bills introduced by SERNAM were more likely to pass than bills introduced by parliamentarians. While the institutional structure of executive dominance in the Chilean system gives SERNAM the upper hand in terms of legislating women's equality, Haas points out the potential problem inherent in these arrangements. That is, SERNAM has, to date, been part of a government that supports the expansion of women's rights, but if a more conservative government assumed office in Chile, SERNAM, as part of a powerful executive, could be used to weaken parliamentary initiatives to promote women's rights (Haas 1998, 9).

Equal opportunity plans

Since 1994, the main tools for promoting gender equality in Chile are the *Plan de Igualdad de Oportunidades Para la Mujer, 1994-1999* and the *Plan de Igualdad de Oportunidades Entre Mujeres y Hombres, 2000-2010*. The extended time period of the second Plan was a conscious strategy to try to make the plan embedded in the state rather

than merely a mandate of the current government.¹³ According to SERNAM, the second Plan (2000-2010) represents the third stage in SERNAM's history: during the first stage (1991-1994), "SERNAM legitimated before the state and society some of the themes associated with overcoming the problems that women face" (SERNAM 2000). The second stage coincides with the launching of the first Equal Opportunity Plan (1994-2000), which formed part of the mandate of Chile's second post-transition government. With the Plan forming part of the government's agenda, "the importance of incorporating equal opportunities into the whole set of government policies was confirmed" (*ibid.*). The third stage began in 1999 with the work of elaborating a second Plan which would not only build upon and consolidate the advances made to date, but also take into account the ways in which the institutionalization of gender equity concerns in policy formulation are still weak and fragile (*ibid.*).

The purpose of both Plans is to identify priorities and goals which the relevant ministries can then be encouraged to incorporate into their own goals, practices, and frameworks: "SERNAM, in its role of public policy co-ordinator, is responsible for the evaluation of the Plan's measures, but it will be the task of each one of the respective ministries to include the measures in their annual goals, and to achieve these targets" (SERNAM 1994). The first Plan identified eight priority areas: legal reforms, families, education, culture and communication, women's access to the labour market, women's health, social and political participation, strengthening of public institutions, and gender

¹³ Del Gato interview. According to Del Gato, this idea came from Spain, where having a longer-term plan in place meant that when a Centre-Right government came to power, replacing the Centre-Left government, the previous government's plan for promoting gender equality continued to be implemented.

equity implementation and evaluation. The second Plan narrowed these eight areas into six overarching themes: culture, promoting women's rights and their capacity to exercise them, participation in decision-making arenas, economic autonomy and poverty alleviation, quality of life, and gender in public policy. Both Plans are fairly similar in style and content. Both set out goals and objectives for achieving gender equity in a particular area, and identify some methods for realizing these goals.

The problem with the Plans, however, is that the recommendations are often rather vague, and sometimes merely point out the need for more research, or specify that SERNAM will make proposals in certain areas. For example, in the chapter devoted to women's economic autonomy and poverty alleviation, one of the stated objectives is the elimination of obstacles to women's access to economic resources. The recommendations for achieving the objective include "initiating measures to reduce the current salary gap between men and women" (SERNAM 2000, 43). It is not clear, however, how SERNAM would accomplish this. Other recommendations include proposing legal changes, for example, changes to the civil code to give married women greater control over marital assets, and reforms that allow women access to the economic resources of their "de facto" partners, (i.e., couples who co-habitate but are not legally married). Such legal reforms are unlikely, however, because any changes to the "traditional" family hierarchy are still strongly opposed by the conservative Right and the Catholic Church. In fact, there have been frequent attempts to expand women's rights in marriage and to guarantee support and maintenance for women whose non-legalized relationships terminate, but to date they have not been successful.

How are the Equal Opportunity Plans viewed by women in Chile? Molina and Provoste (1997) argue that the first Plan was crucial in enhancing the visibility and the legitimacy of gender equity in public policy. They explain that the Plan responded to the demands of women's movements and that despite gaps (for example, no mention is made of reproductive freedom), it represented an important advance in the pursuit of women's equality in Chile (Molina and Provoste 1997, 155). They further note that the Plan firmly placed gender equality on the public agenda—more information was now available for policy-makers and women's issues were no longer “private” matters (*ibid.*). Another key *potential* advantage of the Plan that they identify is that “it offers a model of interlocution that can be contrasted with women's demands to negotiate the type and contents of the Government's commitment and to establish the points of convergence and divergence with it, and, in this way, contribute to the movement's own profile” (*ibid.*, 159). In other words, women's movements can potentially use the Plan as an instrument to legitimate their demands. The Plan could serve as a basis for women's further organization and mobilization. The extent to which this is happening in Chile is discussed in the next chapter, which deals more specifically with women's movements.

In 1996, one of the women's research NGOs in Chile, ISIS International, carried out an evaluation of the first Plan, interviewing women leaders in the Plan's thematic areas (health, education, labour, etc.), as well as beneficiaries of the Plan (i.e., women who are participants in programs that the Plan initiated). An overall criticism is that much of the Plan is ambiguous and vague in terms of goals and recommendations, rather than specifying concrete measures to be taken (ISIS 1996). This makes the Plan's effectiveness difficult to gauge, as there are no concrete targets laid out which can then be

empirically measured to determine whether the Plan is meeting its goals (*ibid.*).¹⁴ The report's authors also point to an overall lack of knowledge about the Plan, sometimes of its very existence and in other cases of its exact contents. Lack of knowledge is evident even among professional women in those areas targeted by the Plan. In some areas, such as health, there is much greater awareness of the Plan in the public sector than in the private system (*ibid.*, 58). This indicates the difficulty in having external actors in the private sector adopt gender equity goals where there are no mechanisms for enforcement in place. But the lack of knowledge among the Plan's beneficiaries of the Plan is even more disturbing. Interviews conducted as part of the study reveal that women know very little about the legal changes that have occurred since 1991; reforms which expand women's rights before the law (*ibid.*, 143). According to one woman interviewed, "nobody prepares women for claiming their rights" (*ibid.*).

SERNAM is making efforts, however, to disseminate information to women concerning their rights, believing knowledge about women's rights is the first step to "empowerment" (Weinstein 1997). SERNAM has established *Centros de Información de los Derechos de la Mujer* (CIDEM, Women's Rights Information Centres), and more recently launched a campaign called "*Mujer con Derechos, Mujer Ciudadana*" (Woman with Rights, Woman Citizen). Administered through SERNAM's thirteen regional offices, the CIDEMs are intended to provide women with information about their rights

¹⁴ Indeed, one of the recommendations of the UN Special Committee to the Chilean government concerning its compliance with CEDAW was to ensure their next report included concrete indicators and information about the implementation of the Equal Opportunity Plan (*Mujer/Fempress*, August 1999).

and how to fully exercise them.¹⁵ The aim of the information campaign *Mujer con Derechos, Mujer Ciudadana*, launched in May 2000, is to increase women's knowledge of their rights through information workshops held around the country. Workshops are organized jointly through SERNAM's regional offices, the Family Foundation, PRODEMU, the Justice Ministry, police, and municipal governments.¹⁶ The workshops address themes such as family law, labour law, and information on programs to support community and social organizations.¹⁷

In sum, the organizational structure of SERNAM has burdened it with a number of weaknesses that emerge principally from the lack of formal mechanisms for inter-sectoral co-operation. Nonetheless, SERNAM has succeeded in legitimating itself and introducing gender equality in public policy. This has enabled it to elaborate fairly ambitious Equal Opportunity Plans. While the Plans would be stronger if they contained more concrete measures for promoting women's rights, they have achieved one important goal—putting women's rights squarely on the public agenda and incorporating their promotion into the state structure. The extent to which the women's movement has mobilized around this agenda is taken up in the next chapter.

¹⁵ SERNAM website, www.sernam.cl/linea2.htm retrieved May 31, 1999.

¹⁶ The Family Foundation and PRODEMU (Foundation for the Promotion and Development of Women) are semi-private organisms that are dependent on the First Lady.

¹⁷ SERNAM website, www.sernam.cl/noticias01.htm, retrieved May 14, 2000.

Conceptions of the State's Role in Promoting Equality

Mazur and Stetson argue that the most successful cases of state feminism exist where the state is viewed as the proper vehicle for addressing social inequality (1995, 288). In the Chilean case, there are two relevant trends with respect to this variable. First, the extent to which the state is viewed as responsible for ameliorating inequality is undergoing significant transformation. The contemporary political discourse of neoliberalism stresses the importance of societal rather than state solutions to poverty and inequality. Second, both state and societal actors see it as entirely legitimate that the state facilitate the strengthening of civil society organizations in the pursuit of greater equality and democracy. Political discourse currently depicts poverty and social inequality as stemming from a lack of organization on the part of civil society. Consequently, a number of government programs involve participatory components, with the justification that this is the way to foster a more "self-help"-oriented society. Regarding poverty alleviation, the *Concertación*'s view is that:

[t]he alleviation of poverty is a responsibility of the country. It requires the mobilization of the poor themselves in the process of improving their quality of life, to which must be added the support of civil society plus the contribution of those who have more" (Concertación, June 1999).

While there are a number of problems with this approach, it clearly creates opportunities for "femocrats" in SERNAM to foster women's organizing in civil society and potentially generate policy networks around women's equality issues. This latter development would contribute to the generation of policy access for women's

movements while also indicating that there is societal support for the state's gender equity goals.

The state clearly views promoting gender equality as part of its role: "in countries with democratic institutions, the State can and must assume an active role in the promotion of rights...making more equitable the relations of power between men and women" (SERNAM n.d.[c]). But in Chile, as elsewhere in Latin America, gender equality has been pursued as part and parcel of attempts to reduce poverty by expanding employment opportunities. In other words, addressing the gendered sources of poverty, for example, by incorporating women into the labour market under equal conditions, is considered key to reducing the number of households living in poverty. Consequently, achieving women's equality in Chile is often synonymous with expanding their labour force participation rates. This contributes simultaneously to two of Chile's goals: women's equality and greater economic competitiveness. In President Lagos' first annual presidential address, he addressed the theme of gender inequality by highlighting the fact that Chile lags behind other countries in terms of women's labour force participation (36 percent). He insisted, "[w]e have to confront this form of backwardness".¹⁸

Poverty alleviation in Chile today, however, is being attempted in a manner that differs fundamentally from previous (pre-1973) periods in Chile where both state and societal actors viewed the state as the appropriate agent to direct the economy, pursuing both development and the redistribution of the benefits of economic growth. Today,

¹⁸ "Mensaje Presidencial," reproduced in *El Mercurio*, May 22, 2000.

while there are subtle differences among the parties in the governing coalition regarding the appropriate scope of the state's role, there is consensus that the market should play the primary role in allocating resources. Even the Socialist Party agrees: "the [Socialist] Party's strategy for alleviating poverty in Chile relies more heavily upon the employment-generating effects of economic growth than governmental redistribution of income or assets" (Roberts 1997, 331). Even more importantly, most of Chile's post-transition social programs depart from earlier programs by focusing on specific target groups such as women, indigenous peoples, youth, etc. Since 1996, over two-thirds of Chile's social programs are of this type. Moreover, almost all of these programs contain an emphasis on incorporating program beneficiaries as active participants (Hardy 1997, 125-26).

The focus on citizen participation began near the end of President Aylwin's term (1990-94) and was a key feature of President Frei's mandate (1994-2000). The *Concertación's* main goal has been to promote equality through the "modernization" of the state, a component of which is fostering citizen participation. The *Concertación's* program for its third term claims that "citizen participation must be a central basis in the new State that modernization aims at constructing" (Concertación, June 1999).

How is SERNAM attempting to increase citizen participation? Since 1997, increasing women's participation and their "associative capacities" has been an important priority, manifested in the creation of the Participation Program within SERNAM.¹⁹ According to a study of SERNAM's efforts at initiating greater state-society

¹⁹ Del Gato and Ambrosio interviews.

interlocution, SERNAM officials believe that it is their duty to create networks between the institution and women's groups in civil society (Guzmán *et al* 1999, 33). It appears, however, that while there have been some successes, the links between women inside and outside of SERNAM are still weak and fragile. To date, the links between SERNAM and the NGO community are the most solid, with a number of women moving between the two realms. But few links have emerged between SERNAM and grass-roots women's groups. One study found that 70 percent of SERNAM's links to non-state actors are to NGOs or educational institutions, while less than 10 percent are to grass-roots women's organizations (Guzmán *et al* 1999, 51). Thus, the policy access being generated by state feminism is limited largely to one segment of the movement.

Links between SERNAM and grassroots women's groups are sporadic and have not seemed to develop regular patterns of interaction. SERNAM officials themselves recognize that there is still a long way to go in fostering links between organized women and SERNAM. Delia Del Gato, for example, admits that despite SERNAM's expanded efforts in this area in the last two or three years, most of the contact has been with NGOs and not with base-level women's movements. As she explains:

In the last two or three years there's been a little more emphasis on how to build relationships [with women's movements]. I think it's been insufficient, and I think it's one of the self-criticisms we make of ourselves as an institution, that is, the absence of spaces being opened.²⁰

Another SERNAM official, Valeria Ambrosio, says much the same thing:

²⁰ Del Gato interview.

We should create more mechanisms [for interaction], make it a permanent policy. What happens now, rather, is that in certain moments we call on people, but they don't come because they feel instrumentalized or used. Although I think that the truth is that there is always a good attitude on SERNAM's part.²¹

Leaders of base-level women's groups and women in the NGO community have a good deal more to say about this, and their perceptions and strategies are discussed in the next chapter. In sum, the conception of the state's role in promoting equality in Chile is rather contradictory: on the one hand, the prevailing view is that poverty and socio-economic inequality are best left to the market and the private sector to resolve, thereby preventing policies that substantively address the variety of sources of women's inequality. On the other hand, current political discourse stresses "citizen participation," thereby opening up opportunities to feminists in SERNAM to generate access to policy-making channels for women's movements outside the state. The problem, however, is that to date this access only exists for one segment of the movement.

Conclusion

This chapter has addressed the role of the state in promoting women's citizenship using Stetson and Mazur's state feminism framework. The comparative framework assesses state feminism according to two main features: policy influence and policy access. In the case of Chile's SERNAM, I have shown that its policy influence is limited—both the politics of its establishment and its organizational form reduce its capacity to

²¹ Ambrosio interview.

authoritatively coordinate gender policy across state institutions. But I have also argued here that SERNAM enjoys greater opportunities than feminist parliamentarians to legislate improvements to women's citizenship status. SERNAM's location in the executive in Chile's executive-dominated political system affords it greater resources and influence to promote women's rights through legislative reform. Most of the bills that expand women's rights were introduced by SERNAM rather than parliamentarians (Blofield and Haas 2000).

In terms of policy access, I have shown that, due to a conception of the state which sees the state as key to fostering citizen participation, SERNAM has been able to devise mechanisms for women's movements to access arenas of policy-making. To date, however, access exists for organized women in the NGOs, but not for grassroots activists, further fragmenting an already divided women's movement. This theme is analyzed in the next chapter.

What do the above findings concerning SERNAM tell us about the relationship between gender, states, and citizenship more generally? The Chilean case demonstrates how dramatically the relationship can alter in certain instances, especially in periods of state restructuring. In the 1970s and 1980s, various state arenas in Chile undermined women's equality and the women's movement depicted the state, through its social and economic policies, as an important cause of their marginalization. Since 1990, important segments of the women's movement have looked to the state as an ally and have worked through the state to expand women's citizenship. Most importantly, since 1990 gender equality has been pursued with some success through various state arenas. The successes of Chile's SERNAM show that it is possible and desirable that movements focus their

attention on state institutions and seize on opportunities they pose at certain political conjunctures. Despite some failures, SERNAM has produced legislation that improves women's status as equal citizens.

The case of SERNAM also shows, the limits to this strategy, however, limits especially pressing in the new democracies. SERNAM has not succeeded in improving women's citizenship by serving as a link between the "formal" and "informal" political arenas. The potential weakness of state feminism in new democracies emerges out of the nature of women's movements in countries that have undergone transitions. Movements tend to be weaker precisely due to transition processes that fragment and "institutionalize" segments of the movement in a period of rapid and far-reaching political change. New democracies, therefore, normally contain women's movements that have undergone divisions over strategies (example, whether to ally with political parties or remain autonomous) and have lost an important unifying goal (i.e., democracy). In this context, the "institutionalization" of gender politics within state agencies can have a further de-mobilizing and fragmenting effect. These issues are addressed in greater detail in the next chapter.

Chapter Six – Women’s Movements in the 1990s

The purpose of this chapter is to look at women’s struggles for citizenship through movement politics in the contemporary context. It is important to look at women’s movements because it is through movement activities that participants’ consciousness potentially is transformed and issues of concern to women are publicized, for example, through public awareness campaigns. While women in political parties (discussed in Chapter 4) and state feminists (discussed in Chapter 5) seek change primarily through the “formal” political arena, movement activism tends to be concentrated in the “informal” political arena where it takes a variety of forms, from consciousness-raising workshops to self-help and survival-oriented activities. Feminists who participate in electoral politics and bureaucratic politics may also consider themselves part of the broader women’s movement, however, and hence, movement politics are played out in a variety of arenas, even though the bulk of activity takes place in civil society.

Because of the gendered distinction between the “formal” and “informal” political arenas, one challenge for women’s movements is to have their activism in the “informal” arena seen as an expression of political citizenship. Traditionally, the “informal” political arena is constructed as the domain where women fulfil their social responsibilities as family and community care-takers; a view reinforced by neoliberal social and economic policy which relies on women’s productive *and* reproductive labour to fill the ensuing “welfare gap” left by state withdrawal from the social sphere (Craske 1998; Einhorn 2000). Neoliberal state discourse reinforces the gendered distinction between “formal” politics and the “informal” social arena where women are responsible for family and

community well-being. According to Lucy Taylor, neoliberalism has fundamentally *de-politicizing* effects on citizen participation, for example, by transferring welfare issues to the “informal” or community arena (1998, 171). Issues that were previously a part of “formal” political discourse—issues of socio-economic justice, for example—have no place today in the “formal” political arena. Instead, welfare, and social rights are relegated to the sphere of “informal” politics where presumably self-sufficient citizens are expected to take care of themselves and one another. In this context, many of the activities of women’s movements are de-politicized as well; hence a main challenge for organized women is to place their gender and class interests on the public agenda.

Throughout this chapter I look at what shapes women’s movements’ strategies for pursuing their goals and the main opportunities and obstacles they confront in doing so. I make two main arguments. First, women’s movements’ strategies are shaped by: 1) the outcome of the transition to democracy, particularly the absence of a common unifying theme (the demand for democracy); 2) the context of neoliberalism which makes material issues key for poor and working-class women while simultaneously making it extremely difficult to politicize these issues; and 3) state feminism which has brought gender politics into the state. Second, in terms of opportunities and obstacles for women’s movements, I argue that state feminism is slowly opening up opportunities to women’s movements by initiating a new discourse around which movements can potentially mobilize, and that it is opening up some channels of access for movement groups to the state. At the same time, however, these opportunities are limited, namely by the lack of linkages among women’s groups and especially the lack of access for popular sector women’s groups to policy-making arenas. Most importantly, class today plays an

important role in determining the degree of access to policy-making arenas. Professional and middle-class feminists who mainly work in NGOs enjoy access to state feminists, often on the basis of personal relationships (Guzmán *et al* 1999). Popular sector women's groups, to date, do not enjoy such access, and, in fact, are rather resentful of their exclusion from the policy networks being constructed by state feminism. Ultimately, the fact that many organized women remain outside of these networks undermines the potential of women's movements to expand women's citizenship, because it signifies a lack of stable linkages between "formal" and "informal" political arenas, the absence of which is, as I have argued throughout the thesis, a key barrier to women's exercise of citizenship. It is only through the construction of these linkages that the demands of women active in the "informal" arena are heard by those in the "formal" political arena and therefore more likely to have some impact on gender policy and, ultimately, on women's lives.

The chapter has four sections. The first section situates the analysis in the recent literature on women's movements in Latin America, arguing that researchers need to shift their comparative focus to one that conceives of greater divisions among women's movements as the norm, rather than assuming the high degree of cross-class unity achieved under authoritarianism is the normal state for women's movements. In the second section, I outline the socio-political context which all movements in Chile confront today. I argue that the democratization and neoliberal projects pursued since 1990 have enormous implications for how movements frame their demands and the strategic options available to them. The third section analyzes the effects of this context on women's movements, showing the way state feminism and neoliberalism have

disarticulated the strategic linkages that had been forged through the 1980s, leaving popular sector women's groups excluded from gender policy networks. Today, too many women's organizations operate in isolation from one another in a socio-political environment that makes sheer survival of the group an immense challenge. The lack of strategic linkages further undermines the construction of a collective actor with *political* demands. The final section of the chapter looks to the possibilities for the future, outlining some recent developments that indicate a possible re-mobilization of movements around gender and class issues. Most importantly, a number of network organizations have recently emerged to challenge the more limited "official" women's rights agenda of SERNAM, while also seeking to develop channels of participation through SERNAM to expand women's gender-based demands. Most importantly, these women, mainly from the popular, *campesino*, and indigenous sectors, (re)insert socio-economic issues into debates about citizenship. This is critical given the current dominance of neoliberal discourse in Chile.

Women's Movements in Latin America

Throughout Latin America, women's movements emerged under authoritarianism in the 1970s and 1980s. These origins have exerted a powerful impact not only on the trajectories of the movements themselves, but also on how they have been analyzed. One of the problems is that the public visibility of movements, often on the front-lines of the anti-dictatorship struggles, and the cross-class linkages forged when movements had a common enemy (the dictatorships) and a common goal (democracy), has led to the view

that movements today no longer exist, or, where they do, that they are less effective because they have less solidarity. Holding up the dictatorship-era movements as the “norm” is highly problematic however, because the unity achieved in that period was bound up with the existence of authoritarianism and the struggle for democracy. Now that a form of democracy, albeit limited, has been achieved in the region, we must consider the “norm” for women’s movements to be that in evidence in other democracies where movements are seldom unified and conflict among segments of the movement over strategy and over ideology is common. According to Maxine Molyneux, “a women’s movement does not have to have a single organizational expression, and may be characterized by a diversity of interests, forms of expression, and spatial location” (1998, 224).

Defining a “norm” for women’s movements is difficult, however, largely because the term “women’s movement” itself is elusive and has not yet been rigorously defined in the comparative literature on women and politics (Beckwith 2000, 434). Some authors only include activism and groups that are “feminist,” as they define that, while others prefer the term “women in movement” (Rowbotham 1997) to encompass women’s activism in general, both in women-only or mixed organizations. But while limiting the scope to “feminist” groups makes the analysis too limited, studying “women in movement” casts the net too widely. Sonia Alvarez specifies the condition of “autonomy” in defining what a women’s movement is (1990, 23). By this definition, women’s movements are autonomous from other political or social organizations. In this sense, state-directed organizations (for example, the Mothers’ Centres in Chile under Frei and Allende) and women’s wings in political parties are not women’s movements,

although women in these structures may participate in women's movements and women's movements may develop out of state-directed or party-dominated organizations. To some extent, women's movements must be capable of determining their goals and strategies in a relatively autonomous manner. Karen Beckwith's definition of women's movements implies some degree of autonomy: for her, women's movements are "a subset of socio-political movements that are characterized by the primacy of women's gendered experiences, women's issues, and women's leadership and decision-making" (Beckwith 2000, 437).

Movements also involve some degree of public visibility and ability to mobilize for change. According to Molyneux,

To speak of a movement...implies a social or political phenomenon of some significance, that significance being given both by its numerical strength but also by its capacity to effect change in some way or another whether this is expressed in legal, cultural, social, or political terms (1998, 224).

In this sense, most Latin American countries today have women's movements, even though their capacities to effect change have varied considerably over time as a result of democratization and the intensification of neoliberalism. What is important, however, following Molyneux's criteria, is that movements need not be singular, nor unified in nature. Indeed, the women's movements that existed in Latin America during authoritarianism were unique in the degree of unity achieved across class, ethnic, and race differences. Movements of that era, as mentioned above, were united in pursuit of common goals, namely democracy. According to Taylor, in Chile, "[w]hile each group pursued its own work in relation to feminism and to women, the *movement* was created

not by their common adversary, patriarchy, but by their common enemy, Pinochet” (1998, 109). When dictatorships withdrew and the goal of democracy was (more or less) achieved, greater fragmentation has replaced unity as segments of movements face different opportunities to participate in the re-opened political arenas. According to Rosana Ceorino of the Chilean NGO Tierra Nuestra,

As a women’s movement before the 1990s, it was very united—diverse in all its expressions, but unified from all parts, rural women, indigenous women, party militants, professionals from the NGOs, radical feminists, institutional feminists, all of us....But what happened is that when the transition arrived and the movement began to disarticulate, the state began to capture the main leaders of the movement.¹

The movements that exist today in Latin America, therefore, are expressions of a “normalization” of movement politics. Women of different class, race, ethnic, and regional positions face the challenge of finding ways to forge some common goals (and even strategies for achieving them) while also recognizing women’s different, even competing, interests. The Chilean women’s movement today is far more fragmented than it was in the 1980s; a product of the transition, neoliberalism, and state feminism. While this fragmentation may reflect a more “normal” state of affairs (i.e., it is likely to endure as differently situated women in a democratic context not only have different ways of pursuing their interests but also have different interests), the challenge for organized women is to find issues and strategies through which common goals can be promoted and achieved. For example, despite women’s differences, there is a common interest in themes such as domestic violence, women’s health, and achieving juridical equality with

¹ Interview, October 6, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

men (as expressed in the Civil and Criminal Codes for example). How these issues are prioritized, however, may be a contentious matter among differently situated women.

The study of movement politics in Latin America expanded significantly during the 1970s and 1980s when most countries in the region were enduring military dictatorships. During this period, popular movements became the primary actors in the struggle for human rights, equality, and democracy. By the 1990s, however, most students of Latin American politics were commenting on the demobilization of movements in the wake of transitions to democracy (Oxhorn 1994a, Hipsher 1998). Most authors place the blame for movement demobilization and fragmentation on the political parties (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986), while others place the blame on the region's embrace of neoliberalism, and government policy that seeks to tame potentially destabilizing movement demands by co-opting the organizations (Oxhorn 1994b).

Much of the popular participation and protest that emerged under authoritarianism was led by women, however, (Jaquette 1989, Schild 1994), and feminist researchers have noted a gendered dimension to movement demobilization. Nikki Craske explains that, in fact, women have been demobilized to a much greater extent than men in recent years because neoliberalism involves re-asserting the public/private or political/social distinctions blurred under the dictatorships when political arenas were closed and day-to-day (social) issues became politicized (1998, 111). Craske argues further that neoliberalism raises greater obstacles to women's activism because, by reinforcing women's "traditional" care-taking responsibilities in the home and the community, it adds burdens to women, leaving them even less time for political activism (*ibid.*, 114).

Observers of women's movements in Latin America also argue that since the transitions to democracy, women's activism has become increasingly "institutionalized" or contained within women's state agencies and the NGOs and research institutions that work closely with the state, with negative effects on the movements as their leaders are drawn into the institutional arena, thereby depriving grassroots groups of leaders (Matear 1997; Waylen 1996). Paulina Weber, director of MEMCH, an NGO that works with grassroots women's groups with the aim of constructing a "social movement of women," explains that many women who became active during the dictatorship took the experience they had gained and entered the state: "therefore, there was a migration from the social organizations to the state".² Rosana Ceorino of *Tierra Nuestra*, an NGO that works with popular sector women in Santiago's southern *poblaciones*, stresses that "the co-optation of the leaders of the women's movement that comes from the state is something very real in Chile, it is very effective [in disarticulating the movement]".³

This phenomenon is extensive in Latin America, and has been addressed at great length by researchers such as Alvarez, Schild, and Waylen. Alvarez notes that while Latin American women's movements were always characterized by professionalized segments (who worked in NGOs during the dictatorships) and by feminist collectives and associations, the difference today is in what professional activists *do*: instead of "popular education, political mobilizations, and poor and working-class women's empowerment," they are involved in "gender-policy assessment, project execution, and social services delivery" (Alvarez 1999, 182). Alvarez argues that feminist NGOs in the 1980s were

² Interview, October 21, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

³ Ceorino interview.

successful (in terms of putting feminist issues on the agenda and achieving important goals) precisely because of their *hybrid* nature: they acted as *both* gender policy experts and advocates of feminism through movement activities (*ibid.*). In the contemporary context, feminist NGOs are increasingly employed by Latin American states, as part of neoliberalism's "New Policy Agenda" to carry out research and even implement social programs. According to Alvarez, this trend potentially undermines the potential of feminist NGOs to "advocate feminism".

Schild is also critical of the "institutionalization" and "professionalization" of feminism and women's movements. She argues that women within the state are contributing to the construction of gendered "market citizens" who are "enterprising agents, consumers *and* producers, whose aim is to maximize their quality of life as individuals within small communities, for example, neighbourhoods, schools, or health clinics" (Schild 2000a, 276). This is happening because a key aspect of the Latin American states' "new social policy" relies heavily on intermediaries such as NGOs and, in effect, re-directs their work to cohere with the ends of states (*ibid.*, 277). In other words, feminist NGOs, along with state feminists, are effectively working for the state and executing its neoliberal social and economic agenda. According to Schild, in the Chilean case, "women as agents are at the heart of the efforts to transform those who are 'excluded' from the benefits of an empowered life in the market, into active, responsible citizens" (*ibid.*, 278).

Alvarez and Schild place the developments described above in the context of transition to democracy and neoliberalism. They do not place these developments in the context of state feminism, however, I believe that these processes are in part the outcome

of state feminism—especially in the new democracies in developing countries. State feminism in these cases creates opportunities for (professional) women’s gender policy expertise to be put to use. Especially in Latin America where movements were strong, gender equality discourse has been employed as a legitimating tactic by post-transition governments. Employing feminist NGOs is part of the contracting-out and decentralization features of Latin American states (as we saw in the last chapter). Combined with the loss of international funding for NGOs, this has meant that NGOs spend most of their time carrying out projects for states. Alvarez’s research reveals that between 10 and 25 percent of feminist NGO budgets in Chile are made up of state funds, while the comparable figure for Colombia is between 40 and 50 percent. The figure in Brazil is far lower (only 3.2 percent as of 1993) (Alvarez 1999, 196). The research and project agendas of NGOs, therefore, are being determined to a significant extent by governments, and the autonomy of NGOs is potentially undermined.

It is commonplace in the literature on Latin American women’s movements to note the fragmenting effect of the “NGOization” or “institutionalization” of feminism and segments of the movement. Few researchers, however, have looked at how movements themselves are responding to the new context. Indeed, while extensive attention has been devoted to women in state agencies and feminist NGOs, an in-depth study of women’s movements at the grass-roots level remains to be done. I believe that some of the findings presented in this chapter point to directions for future research in this area. For example, are the recent strategies adopted by various segments of the movement viable responses to the new context? Can state feminism promote gender policy networks that incorporate popular sector women’s movements in the new democracies?

Some researchers argue that women's movements in Latin America need to adapt, not merely their strategies, but also their discourse, to the new post-transition context. Jane Jaquette, for example, argues that the "militant motherhood" and "heroic politics" model that worked so well for women under authoritarianism is ill-suited to the current democratic context (1994). Thus, she argues that women need a new discursive framework and political strategy to pursue their interests. Women's citizenship demands, in other words, need to be framed differently. While her argument is extremely important, it does not address the key question of where these discursive frameworks come from and how/why they may change or endure. In Chapter 2, I argued that the political motherhood frame emerged in the early 20th century as women began to organize and demand equality. The maternal frame was at once the product of the gender ideology (*marianismo*) but also a creative strategy of politicizing this ideology developed by movement actors. Women's rights, to vote, for example, were more likely to be granted by appealing to women's "difference" and the likely enhanced benefits political rights would bring to women's social roles. This discourse was maintained and even strengthened during the dictatorship as women acted in defence of their families and communities. This discourse, however, also allowed women to make *political* demands—manifested in the movement's slogan, "Democracy in the country and in the home!". Organized women challenged an otherwise conservative discourse by linking it to their political goals. Once the overarching political demand was achieved, i.e., a return to civilian democracy, the discourse seemed to lose much of its subversive capacity to challenge the gender hierarchy. Is it possible to (re)radicalize it or replace it with another

discourse with which women's movements can make political demands for an expanded citizenship?

The maternalist discourse has deep roots in Chile, and practically all the women with whom I spoke mentioned that women's motivations for activism emerge out of their responsibilities as care-givers. Nonetheless, there is also evidence that a new discourse is emerging, one that potentially could re-mobilize women around a women's rights agenda. Among some of the newly emerging networks linking previously fragmented women's groups, there is a discourse of "*control ciudadana*" (citizen control). This term aims at "empowering" women collectively by charging women's groups with the task of controlling the state, i.e., monitoring and pressuring the state to fulfill its commitments to expanding women's citizenship. It seems that this is a discourse around which Latin American women could re-mobilize, while not abandoning a maternalist frame. A potential problem, however, is that the concept of "citizen control" is one that originated in part within the state (as indicated in Chapter 5). Can a discourse "from above" be deployed effectively by societal movements—especially movements with fairly radical demands? In other words, can a discourse of "citizen control" be radicalized by women's movements in Chile?

The fact that the "citizen control" discourse originates from the state further indicates just how blurred the boundary between civil society and the state is today, thereby complicating any straightforward study of movement politics. According to Schild (1997), the post-transition Chilean state has usefully deployed the discourse of women's movements to construct women's citizenship in a way that fits with the neoliberal agenda. Chilean women's movements in the 1980s were engaged in

“consciousness-raising” (*desarrollo personal* or personal development), a strategy that is now employed by the semi-public agency—*Escuela de la Mujer—Fundación PRODEMU* (Women’s School—PRODEMU Foundation). PRODEMU organizes small workshops for women, especially in the popular sectors. Through PRODEMU, women can take courses in marketable skills (handicrafts, baking, sewing.), but also workshops on *desarrollo personal* and leadership training. Schild argues that, in these workshops, women are being instructed to become productive economic agents with a sense of individual or market empowerment rather than an expanded sense of citizenship based on their (gendered) membership in a community (1997). If states can absorb social movement discourses and de-radicalize them, can movements absorb state discourses and radicalize their meaning? This is an important question, but it may be too early to tell whether the discourse of *control ciudadana* can effectively re-mobilize women’s movements and forge some strategic links across the class, ethnic, and gender concerns that divide women’s movements in Chile.

Socio-Political Context: Neoliberalism and Movement Demobilization

Numerous analysts of Chilean politics have noted the decline of social movements since the transition to democracy (Garretón 1995; Hipsher 1998; Oxhorn 1995a; Roberts 1995). The political and economic environment in Chile since the transition to democracy appears to militate against an expanded role for social movements. The main reason for this is the role of traditional actors such as political parties which have dominated post-transition politics. As shown in Chapter 4, unlike elsewhere in Latin America, the well-

entrenched and highly competitive party system established in Chile in the early twentieth century regained its historical prominence following the 17-year dictatorship. While political parties largely acted through the social movements in the 1970s and much of the 1980s, as soon as parties were allowed to organize once again, they rapidly eclipsed social movements, co-opting leading activists, and subordinating movement organizations within party structures (see Oxhorn 1995a). This has implications for women's movements because it deprives grass-roots women's organizations of potential alliances with other collective actors. With popular movements in an overall weakened state, women's movements too face fewer opportunities for mobilization.

Other factors that inhibit activism by non-party actors emerge out of neoliberalism (which pre-dates the transition to democracy but has been continued by the *Concertación*). The first *Concertación* government of Patricio Aylwin (1990-94) had an interest in ensuring that political parties monopolized politics. Their thinking was that parties, aiming to gain support from the middle-classes, would *moderate* politics, while movements led by the popular sectors might destabilize the negotiated transition with demands that were simply unrealizable within the (narrow) parameters of the transition. Part of the negotiated transition in Chile was the democratic opposition's acceptance of the neoliberal economic model initiated after the 1973 military coup. According to Kurt Weyland, leaders in President Aylwin's government "feared that inequality and poverty would prompt a wave of demands for immediate benefits that would endanger sound economic policy" (1997, 40). Consequently, successive post-transition governments have taken measures to demobilize movements and encourage the moderation of demands emanating from the poor and working-class sectors. This departs significantly

from the pre-dictatorship era when political parties competed by mobilizing movements around partisan ideals. Of course, as shown in Chapter 2, this meant that movements in Chile were never very autonomous from the parties.

Post-transition governments in Chile have devised a variety of mechanisms to demobilize popular movements. Oxhorn explains that Aylwin's government created the *División de Organizaciones Sociales* (DOS—Division of Social Organizations) to serve as a channel between government and community organizations to transmit a message of patience and to lower society's expectations concerning economic justice (1994b, 743). Citizens were encouraged to organize at the community level and to turn their attention towards community solutions to poverty rather than expecting the state to provide solutions. What this meant, ultimately, is that community organizations—often the very same ones which had participated in the popular movement against Pinochet—were now being encouraged to lower their social and economic expectations of democracy by moderating their demands.

As I have argued throughout this dissertation, neoliberal discourse in Latin America draws a sharp boundary between “political” and “social” issues in an effort to limit the kinds of issues and demands that can be voiced in the “formal” political arena. Resolving the material concerns of citizens is seen as an issue best left to the market, and collective citizen action in their communities. While President Aylwin did promise to repay the “social debt” of the dictatorship by developing specific anti-poverty programs, the nature of these programs limits government involvement to co-ordinating the activities of program recipients and civil society organizations or NGOs contracted to execute program delivery. Government discourse has also asserted that the main bases of

the demands of popular sector groups—poverty and inequality—were *social* (community) problems and not *political* (government) problems. Today, “modernization” of the state means increasing citizen participation, but not necessarily in broad-based movements that make political demands of government. Instead, citizens are encouraged to participate in their communities—arenas that are increasingly constructed as non-political (see Taylor 1998).

Gustavo Rayo and Gonzalo de la Maza, Chilean researchers of urban popular movements explain:

While it is true that since the reinstatement of democracy, social policies have been enriched and made more extensive; social expenditures have increased; innovative organizations focusing on specific subjects (women, youth, and indigenous peoples) have been created; and regional territories have been further empowered; there has been no alteration of the underlying stimulus that would encourage citizens to renew old patterns of collective or community action (2000, 412).

In accounting for the lack of movement activity, the authors point to the role of the state in organizing communities and providing groups with opportunities to participate at the local level in competing for (self-help) project funding. This shifts the emphasis to activity that yields concrete results, rather than activity aimed at constructing a collective actor capable of mobilizing to challenge existing power relations. Consciousness-raising activities are abandoned in favour of “technical” projects to improve communities. The authors explain, “their [community organizations’] principal concern is rooted in *doing* something, and not in *representing* anything...none of the organizations seek to represent increasingly large territorial spaces; they are more interested in constructing networks focusing on specific topics” (*ibid.*, 449-50). While during the years of dictatorship

neighbourhood groups initially emerged with material or survival concerns, they were ultimately drawn into larger popular movement networks making political demands—not only for democracy but for social justice and equality as well. In this environment, a collective identity was forged that served as the basis for political mobilization (see Oxhorn 1995a) and among women a feminist consciousness emerged (see Gaviola *et al* 1994). Today, with the political parties of the governing coalition pressing for moderation of social demands and government-initiated programs leading community groups to compete with one another for project financing, there are no longer broader networks or political issues around which to mobilize, despite the growing inequality that crosses Chilean society.

Women's Movements in the Contemporary Context

Women's movements are not like other social movements because there *is* automatically a broader issue around which to mobilize: gender inequality. This issue, however, needs to be taken up by movements and translated into more concrete issues that resonate with the lived experiences of women in various social locations. This is one of the main challenges of women's movements today. Women's movements confront a somewhat more favourable environment for this because of the existence of SERNAM and a public discourse that emphasizes the need for women's rights and gender equality. This allows local women's movements to participate in a broader discourse that seeks to expand women's citizenship. In brief, women's movements enjoy opportunities for politicizing

their demands that are not enjoyed by most other social movements, particularly among the popular sectors.

Women's movements in Chile today, nonetheless, face enormous challenges, most importantly, to forge strategic linkages among groups divided by class and ethnic inequality. An important division today, one that is largely based on class and ethnicity, is between organized women with access to the state and those outside of gender policy networks. The women's groups on the "outside" are aware of and somewhat resentful of their exclusion as they struggle to maintain their organizations in the face of many obstacles, especially the lack of resources.

I address these issues here by showing the problems organized women face, drawing mainly on interviews with popular sector activists and at the grassroots level and in NGOs that work with base-level organizations. Women's movements face various problems including: the loss of a common objective (i.e., democracy) and a corresponding decline in solidarity; a neoliberal model that inspires government programs that induce competition among women's groups, further undermining solidarity; and the loss of funding (from the Catholic Church and international agencies) and the corresponding material obstacles to keeping groups alive. On the positive side, one notable trend is that while women's groups outside of policy networks face all of the above challenges, they share a common concern with women's citizenship (understood broadly to include socio-economic rights) and women's "right to have rights". The fact that even rather isolated women's groups use this language indicates the legacy of the women's movement of the 1980s and the success of state feminist initiatives both of which make available to women a discourse of women's rights and citizenship.

Grassroots organizing among women

Despite perceptions that women in Chile have ceased to be active following the transition to democracy, women remain remarkably active within their communities. Indeed, Rayo and de la Maza remark, “[i]n all the cases we have seen during the course of [our] study, it is women who are the protagonists, representing a focal point around which the interests of the community and women’s aspirations come together” (2000, 423). Later, they conclude “the community space, with the sole exception of the athletic clubs, is definitely the domain of women” (*ibid.*, 438). But women’s community roles and their activism on behalf of others in their communities takes place in a context very different from that of the 1970s and 1980s. While in earlier decades women’s activism was motivated by material deprivations associated with the dictatorship’s economic policies and the repression required to maintain them, women could also draw strength from many support networks to sustain their organizations and their activities. As shown in Chapter 3, the Catholic Church was key to the maintenance of popular sector social organizations, as was the work of middle-class and professional feminists whose activities were funded by international aid agencies.

Today, women’s organizations have little support. The Church, as discussed earlier, has returned to its more traditional concerns of spirituality and morality. Likewise, the funding from international donors has been diverted, either to the government or to countries deemed needier than Chile. The loss of international funding was a constant theme in my conversations with organized women in Chile, especially

among those also active during the dictatorship who remember the (relative) ease with which resources from abroad were obtained for the struggle for democracy, freedom, and gender equality. At one of the largest gatherings I attended, where over fifty women from communities within one of the poorer municipalities in Santiago gathered for a weekend retreat in Cartagena, a number of women who had all been extremely active during the dictatorship began to reminisce about those years and to comment on the different challenges they face today. Some of the women insist that the high levels of social solidarity forged during the anti-dictatorship struggle and the economic crisis of the early 1980s have disappeared. In those years, they explain, people would share everything they had with their neighbours, and everyone could be expected to participate in some form of community activity. With the current neoliberal model, they say, people are less willing to share, and less willing to participate, even though poverty has not diminished that much from their point of view. They place much of the blame for this on a changing political culture fostered by neoliberalism which stresses values of individualism and consumerism, values which undermine the ideals of solidarity and concern for one's community.

One of the popular sector women's organizations that illustrates the particular problems faced by poor and working-class women's organizations is the *Coordinación de Mujeres Alicia Toledo*, (Alicia Toledo Coordination of Women) a network of four women's workshops from La Pintana, a poor neighbourhood in the south of Santiago.⁴ The organization initially formed in 1973-74 to work with popular sector organizations

⁴ The following information is drawn from an interview with two of the group's leaders, Myriam Gonzáles and María Molina, on October 20, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

suffering from repression and the economic downturn, and their activities were at their highest point during the campaign for the “No” side in the 1988 plebiscite. Throughout this period, their activities were heavily supported by the Catholic Church, especially through the *Vicaría de la Solidaridad*. Each week the Church distributed packages to participants containing cooking oil, milk, sugar, and cheese. After the plebiscite was won and a transition to democracy took place, the *Coordinación* lost the material support of the Church and many of the member groups dropped out. One of the group’s leaders explained to me that because of the practice in those years of members receiving food packages, women continue to expect material benefits for attending meetings. At its largest, the *Coordinación* had 28 groups (with about 25 members in each one). Today, only 4 groups remain, with about 15-20 members each. The group’s leaders attribute decline to the fact that “we achieved the triumph—we got democracy which was what we wanted” (*ibid.*).

Since the return of democracy the organization faces two overwhelming challenges: first, finding the resources to continue meeting; and second, setting out broad goals and objectives around which to mobilize. In terms of resources, the organization’s leaders explain that while they used to rent a small house in which they both held meetings and conducted workshops and other activities, since losing a key source of funding, they no longer have meeting space. Indeed, they told me that this was the main problem they were presently confronting. They explain that while they have many good ideas for projects, they lack the physical space in which to carry them out. In terms of their other main challenge, setting out goals and objectives, the leaders explain:

In women's organizations right now, we don't have the objectives so clear, at best, they're clear to us—the leaders—but not so much for the other women. Many come simply to take tea because it's the afternoon and they get together to chat because it's the only break [in their days] for them....Before, in the "No" campaign [for the 1988 plebiscite] our objective was clear—to defeat the government of Pinochet, that's why there were so many women, so many workshops. But once that was achieved, women said, "mission accomplished" and they left. Therefore, the objective was lost.⁵

Similar problems exist in another popular sector women's group that I visited, this one much newer. *Mujeres de Hoy* (Women of Today) was formed in 1997 in the community of Renca, after a number of women from the neighbourhood had participated in a workshop in *desarrollo personal* conducted by PRODEMU.⁶ This group faces the same problems as the *Coordinación de Mujeres Alicia Toledo*: a lack of resources, most notably the lack of meeting space; and second, the lack of clear goals and objectives to ensure the group's continued functioning. The lack of meeting space is a crucial obstacle and at the meeting I attended, a full half-hour was spent discussing the issue. Indeed, on that day, the meeting was held in a small local church, a last-minute arrangement because they were having problems with the (male) president of the *Junta de Vecinos* over access to the local community centre. The group's members complained about their treatment by the president of the *Junta de Vecinos* who has refused to recognize their right to utilize the community centre for meetings, a right granted to all community groups with *personalidad jurídica* (legal status). Indeed, the group dutifully applied for their

⁵ González and Molina interview.

⁶ The following information is drawn from observations from my attendance at a meeting of the group on October 21, 1999, and an interview with two of the group's leaders, Laura del Carmen Veloso and Tatania Escalera, November 8, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

personalidad jurídica in order to be able to use the community centre in addition to being eligible to apply for community projects from the *municipio*.

Another problem the group faces, according to Tatiana Escalera, is to move beyond the economic and social incentives for women to participate. The main economic incentive for members is the funds the group has won from the *municipio* to carry out an income-generating project. They applied for and won financing to purchase a large oven to bake *pan amasado* (home-made bread) which they then sell, distributing the earnings to the group's members. The other main motivation for women is social: attending meetings provides women, who are mainly home-makers, with the opportunity to leave their houses and get together to have tea with their neighbours. Escalera insists that the group must move beyond these concerns and begin to mobilize around themes relating to gender equality. What is most interesting is that she employs the language learned in PRODEMU and SERNAM's workshops. She explains that the most important issue for women today is "the right to have rights. Everything else, education, health, family, poverty, basically begins from one's having rights."⁷

Another problem for women which has not changed since the years of the dictatorship is combining participation with their responsibilities as mothers and wives, and overcoming the stereotypes (and, in many cases, the anger of husbands) that women belong in their homes. Escalera explains, "the first struggle begins at home—with your husband—because he is the first one to put up obstacles for you, first, because socially we are raised like this [to believe women should stay at home]"(*ibid*). Likewise, Myriam

⁷ del Carmen Veloso and Escalera interview.

González explains that in order to participate, one has to be extremely organized and complete all the necessary household tasks before attending meetings: “if you organize and order your home first and then you do your things outside, then you’re doing okay...[for example] on the days I have activities for the group, I have to get up really early and do everything, including leaving a meal for my husband.”⁸ Of course, this is a problem that only confronts women of a particular class—the poor and working-class. In Chile, most women in the upper- and professional classes can “buy” their way out of this problem by hiring domestic servants. Indeed, most of the women active in “formal” politics told me that they have been able to combine a life of politics and family responsibilities because of their “*empleadas*” (domestic servants). Women without resources face a more stark choice, a choice that sometimes results in marital breakdown when women choose activism over husbands that are too resistant to their activities.⁹

The final problem for women’s groups at the base is their sense of exclusion, particularly their marginalization within a movement dominated by SERNAM and professional women’s NGOs. As shown in the previous chapter, SERNAM has recently been trying to expand the role of grassroots women’s groups in the policy-making process, for example, by inviting their participation in town-hall meetings and workshops. To date, however, there are complaints that these initiatives are purely cosmetic and not very genuine. For example, Ana María Ordenes of *Solidaridad y Organización Social* (SOL), an NGO that works with popular sector women’s groups, explains “there was no relationship [between SERNAM and grassroots groups].

⁸ González and Molina interview.

⁹ This was the case for at least one of the women I spoke with.

SERNAM wasn't going to the organizations and that was a very great frustration for these women".¹⁰ Mercedes Montoya of the *Red de Mujeres de Organizaciones Sociales* (REMOS), a network of popular sector women's organizations says that "relations [between women's movements and SERNAM] only extend to a certain point and no further. They only go to NGOs and that's all."¹¹ Relations have not extended to grassroots women's organizations. For example, SERNAM had come under heavy criticism because the first Equal Opportunity Plan had been entirely written by one women's NGO—the *Centro de Estudios de la Mujer* (CEM) (Matear 1997). Consequently, SERNAM wanted to make the elaboration of the second Plan more "participatory".¹² But the participatory process that SERNAM initiated did not satisfy women's groups. First, SERNAM held "town-hall" meetings and invited representatives of women's movements to voice their concerns and demands. In an informal discussion with one woman who attended, I was told that SERNAM officials simply heard the issues raised by participants, then closed the meeting and left. The women who had attended expected a "dialogue" and hence were quite disappointed by SERNAM's actions. Second, many groups were excluded from the process. Mostly it was women's NGOs who were invited to give their input in face-to-face meetings, while grassroots and popular sector groups were merely sent questionnaires. The questionnaires were sent to municipal governments who in turn distributed them to women's groups registered with them. Myriam González and María Molina of the *Coordinación de Mujeres Alicia*

¹⁰ Interview, August 23, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

¹¹ Interview, October 4, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

¹² Del Gato and Ambrosio interviews.

Toledo explain that “we didn’t even know about the Plan, we found out the moment the questionnaire arrived.”¹³ Tatiana Escalera and Laura del Carmen Veloso of *Mujeres de Hoy* say they knew of the Plan’s existence, but not its contents. They also said that popular sector women see the Plan as “very far from their own reality.”¹⁴

The fact that popular sector women feel this way indicates the problem SERNAM faces in adequately representing women where there are too few linkages among the variously situated women’s organizations that make up the broader women’s movement in Chile. González and Molina explain that they do not feel represented by the Equal Opportunity Plan because,

what happens is that this Plan is composed of all that is, shall we say, government, and a government that [employs women to write it] who have not a single idea of what happens in the community or what happens in the organizations, and it is they who make [policy].¹⁵

Of even greater concern is that popular sector women’s sense of being on the “outside” is reinforced through their interactions with professional women, whether in the NGOs or in the state. For example, González and Molina explain that when popular sector women participate in workshops offered by NGOs or the state (mostly through the *municipio*), they are given certificates for their participation. But these certificates are worthless because they do nothing to enhance the chances of finding jobs. They complain that not even the *municipio* (who offers the courses) will hire the women afterwards. Worse, even if a women’s organization applies for funding to carry out a

¹³ González and Molina interview.

¹⁴ Del Carmen Veloso and Escalera interview.

¹⁵ González and Molina interview.

project, most popular sector women cannot use the funding to draw a salary for themselves even though the work they do is considerable. This is because the rules are structured so that only women with professional accreditation (example, social workers and educators) can be paid a salary. This practice, according to González and Molina, “has led community women to quit the workshops and withdraw” (*ibid.*). In effect, this practice reinforces the exclusion of popular sector women, thereby contributing to the divisions within the movement between professional women and women activists without professional credentials.

A telling story is revealed in Schild’s (1998) research with popular sector women’s organizations. An organization of *pobladora* women had presented a project to the municipal Women’s Office. Their project was rejected but soon after the project’s central purpose—a “Training School for Women Leaders”—was appropriated by the Women’s Office and delivery of the project was “put to public tender to attract educators, social workers, and other qualified professionals” (Schild 1998, 242). The group’s members, lacking the professional accreditation to carry out the leadership training aspects of the program, were instead offered positions by the municipal government that houses the Women’s Office “as technical experts in those aspects of the project involving training in handicrafts” (*ibid.*). Schild explains, “[t]he women were incensed. After ten years of taking part in workshops offered by [an NGO in the community], they felt perfectly qualified to teach other women what they had learned” (*ibid.*). This tendency to “professionalize” workshops that engage in “personal development” (the most popular form of consciousness-raising in Chile today) is further undermining the development of strategic cross-class linkages by fostering resentment among non-professional activists.

Feminist NGOs

Feminist NGOs in Chile, staffed mainly by professionals, face a different set of problems than women in popular sector organizations. The problem for women in NGOs is maintaining their autonomy from SERNAM while trying to serve as channels for interlocution between grassroots women's groups and the state—to which NGOs have privileged access. NGOs in Chile today are particularly hard hit by the drastic reduction in international funding. According to Teresa Valdés of FLACSO-Chile, a research NGO which has a gender program, and which is also a member of the *Grupo Iniciativa Chile*, the reduction in international funding has generated significant conflict within the women's movement as a whole and especially between organizations with access to (scarce) resources and those without such access.¹⁶ Valdés concludes that partly owing to the struggle to obtain funding, the “NGOization” of feminism contributes to its moderation:

When you have an NGO that has cost you so much time to maintain and everything, the protection, sustainability, and maintenance of the NGO takes up much energy in acquiring resources, versus a logic of “movement” which is much more confrontational, with its own agenda. That's how something as concrete as financing generates such great tensions...(ibid).

Valdés also points out that the autonomy of NGOs in Chile is being lost because of their need for state contracts simply to survive: “if NGOs had their own resources, the

¹⁶ Interview, November 3, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

discussions around autonomy would be totally different than when you have to go presenting bids to SERNAM". She notes that NGOs that have been too critical of SERNAM or the government have been marginalized (*ibid*). This tendency is not limited to Chile. Alvarez's comparative research on Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru shows that these concerns are prominent among NGO workers everywhere: "NGOs that refuse to play by the rules of the game or whose discourses and practices run counter to the official orthodoxies of the day may be losing out in the gender projects market and are often silenced or marginalized from the public debate" (1999, 198).

Other women are even more critical of SERNAM and charge it with trying to co-opt NGOs. Rosana Ceorino of *Tierra Nuestra* explains,

They [SERNAM] wanted to convert NGOs into intermediaries, between the *pobladoras* of civil society in this case and the State, and it was very manipulative, in other words, they would send a fax saying "come here women". And in the end we were getting bored with that intermediation which was ultimately a manipulation or utilization on the part of the State to capture the people it wanted to capture for its events. From there I would say things began to cool off, and I say this with lots of knowledge because a little while ago I went to a meeting that SERNAM convoked for us (NGOs) for a "Citizens' Town-Hall" and all the NGOs there were criticizing SERNAM. We said [to them] "you call us only when you need us, making a mockery of citizenship, participation and democracy".¹⁷

Francisca Rodríguez of the *Asociación Nacional de Mujeres Rurales e Indígenas* (ANAMURI), is also critical of SERNAM and its attempts to co-opt NGOs and grassroots women's organizations. ANAMURI (discussed further in the next section) takes immense pride in its autonomy from the state, despite the fact that "it is a constant

¹⁷ Ceorino interview.

struggle to seek financing for our activities".¹⁸ But, she explains, while they may seek funding from SERNAM they will not carry out projects *for* SERNAM:

We are not going to run behind this merry-go-round of being summoned for projects, because that is the characteristic of the subsidiary state, which every day is summoning for different projects and the whole world chases after these projects because of a problem of resources and ends up applying the policies of the State and abandoning the political proposals and the plans of their organization (*ibid.*).

Rodríguez raises an extremely important point: women's organizations and NGOs are in danger of *de-politicizing* their goals if they become too engaged in carrying out government projects. Although a women's movement may include actors located both within and outside of the state, the non-state aspect of the movement must have the necessary autonomy and organizational strength to continue to make the political demands deemed necessary to expanding citizenship for women from diverse social locations.

Future Possibilities: Re-articulation and Mobilization around "Citizen Control"

A preparatory report for the 1994 Beijing Conference quotes one woman as saying, "in our Region [Bío-Bío] we can sustain that there does not exist a women's movement that has identity and interlocution. We have various and dispersed organizations of women: feminists; neighbourhood groups; church groups, volunteer groups, and labour groups.

¹⁸ Interview with Francisca Rodríguez, August 31, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

But there is no meeting point among them”.¹⁹ The disarticulation of women’s movements is problematic because it has undermined the possibility of publicizing women’s issues through, for example, mass events to raise public awareness and put pressures on governments. During my stay in Chile, on the few occasions where events were held (example, an event to celebrate rural women and another to protest an extremely sexist ad campaign for a Santiago radio station), the events were poorly attended and received scant media attention. According to Paulina Weber, of MEMCH, “if you don’t have a strong social force of women, they [the government] are not going to pay any attention to you”.²⁰

Many organized women realize this, and consequently, there are a number of NGOs and grassroots organizations which identify as their main goal the fostering of a broader-based women’s movement capable of pushing forward the public agenda on women’s rights and equality. Indeed, this is the main objective of MEMCH, which it seeks to accomplish through its “Citizenship School” for popular sector women. According to Weber:

We are trying to give voice to women who normally don’t speak out because they are not trained to, not socialized for that... We offer training to foster communicators who will speak out on what’s happening to women, for example, [the issue of] domestic servants, and can express it so society knows what’s happening.... But we are also training women who will be capable of expressing women’s demands to their communities” (*ibid.*).

¹⁹ “Informe del Encuentro Regional Sobre las Situaciones de las Mujeres de la Región del Bío-Bío”. Concepción, June 1994.

²⁰ Weber interview.

In terms of re-building a broader women's movement, an important development at the grass-roots level of civil society is the formation of two umbrella organizations: *Red de Mujeres de Organizaciones Sociales* (REMOS) and *Asociación Nacional de Mujeres Rurales e Indígenas* (ANAMURI). Both networks emerged in the last five years and their leaders believe that what is needed is a reconstituted women's movement capable of bringing pressure to bear on the state to move forward to promote women's equality.²¹

REMOS emerged precisely because a number of organized women were concerned that, while popular sector women remained active, they did so in small, isolated groups with little awareness of each others' activities. Thus, there was little capacity for large-scale mobilizations that could bring government and societal attention to their problems, most notably, lack of adequate housing, decent employment opportunities and poor access to health care. One particular NGO, *Solidaridad y Organización Social* (SOL), was especially concerned with the lack of linkages among popular sector women's groups and has worked since 1989 to support grass-roots organizations and to foster coordination among them (Órdenes, 1998). SOL received funding from SERNAM's Civil Society Fund which it used to offer leadership training and citizen control strategies to leaders of popular sector women's groups. It was out of this interaction between SOL and popular women's organizations that REMOS emerged. The funding from SERNAM was running out, but the women wanted to continue meeting

²¹ The following information on REMOS and ANAMURI is drawn from interviews with Mercedes Montoya, director of REMOS, October 4, 1999, Santiago, Chile, and Francisca Rodríguez, first president of ANAMURI, August 31, 1999, Santiago, Chile.

as a group. Eventually, the decision was reached to form an umbrella organization that could represent popular sector women's groups. REMOS formed in 1996, initially with thirty member groups, but today has over fifty. It is composed of popular sector women's groups from at least three of Chile's thirteen regions. The main goal of REMOS upon formation was to strengthen the organizational capacity of particularly popular sector women and to overcome the isolation in which their groups operated. According to Mercedes Montoya, "the first objective was to strengthen ourselves as an organization, or, rather, not that one [group] would be over here, the other over there, and the other way over there. We have to know how to find each other and strengthen ourselves. Interchange was what was needed".²²

REMOS' other main aim is "to serve as a channel for interlocution with public and private institutions" and "to promote popular sector women's participation in public spaces".²³ Members of REMOS, therefore, are aware of and making very real use of the institutional and discursive transformations that have occurred over the past decade especially the existence of SERNAM and the discourse of "citizen control" initiated by SERNAM. They believe that, in order to yield further results, they need to pressure the state to fulfil its commitments. When asked what the relationship between the state and REMOS should be like, Mercedes Montoya explains that, "we have to take part in actions that the government carries out and we have to follow and watch. In other words, we'll be saying to them, 'listen, what's happening with this, or what's happening with that

²² Montoya interview.

²³ These aims are stated in a pamphlet inviting popular sector women's groups to join REMOS.

law?...Here, we as an organization are carrying out our goals of being an organization that concerns itself with the government's plans."²⁴ To carry this out, REMOS holds monthly or bimonthly meetings where the member groups select issues relevant to their communities (such as health, education, or other municipal services). The constituent groups then pursue these issues by monitoring their municipalities' compliance with aspects of the Equal Opportunity Plan or other programs of SERNAM that relate to these issues which are implemented at the municipal level.

The second network, ANAMURI, which is rooted in rural women's organizing, also emerged due to concerns over the lack of linkages among organized women, and a frustration that even though the state employed a discourse of women's equality, it was paying little attention to the particular needs of rural and indigenous women. ANAMURI formed in June 1998, initially representing fifty base organizations and regional networks of rural or indigenous women. It is firmly rooted in both the *campesino* movement and the women's movement. Consequently, their objectives are to incorporate gender issues into the world of rural organizing and to ensure that the particularities of rural and indigenous women are addressed when discussing women's issues.²⁵

Like REMOS, ANAMURI prizes its independence, yet sees interaction with the state as crucial to realizing its aims. ANAMURI is critical of the extent to which the specific needs of rural and indigenous women have been ignored by SERNAM, a lack of concern evident in their complete absence in the first Plan. At the same time, however,

²⁴ Montoya interview.

²⁵ A statement of these objectives is found on the program for their first meeting, held June 11-13, 1998, Santiago, Chile.

they recognize the advantage of having an agency such as SERNAM. For example, Francisca Rodríguez explains that it is important that SERNAM is there because women “now have a point of departure that is different.” She adds that women must now use this institutional space to push for greater attention to their particular concerns. Thus, like REMOS, ANAMURI employs the discourse of “citizen control” and pressuring the state to fulfil its commitments to women’s equality. As Rodríguez explains,

The state could continue sending beautiful plans and projects without any intention of fulfilling them, while civil society is not demanding and not controlling to see that they are fulfilled. Therefore, our political role is to carry out citizen control. A good part of our training is destined towards that—to citizenship with full rights. We reviewed the Equal Opportunity Plan and we said that this Plan doesn’t represent us as *campesinas* and indigenous women.... So, we brought a lot of attention to this aspect and we’ve had results, for example, we constituted a commission to review the Plan to see what were the deficiencies and through that we pressured [SERNAM] and they had to name a rural sectoralist [for SERNAM] and we said to ourselves, “we won”.²⁶

Another network that emerged recently indicates changes for the future of the movement as a whole. This network, however, is very different from REMOS and ANAMURI because it is composed of NGOs staffed by professional women, most of whom are feminists. *Grupo Iniciativa Chile* is an umbrella organization composed of eleven such NGOs. The women involved, however, are well aware of the privileged access to the state they enjoy. Due to their access to the state, they see their role as gathering the demands of women within civil society and presenting them to the state. The initial motivation to form *Grupo Iniciativa Chile* emerged during the preparations for the Beijing Conference, when they co-ordinated the activities of Chilean NGOs. After

²⁶ Rodríguez interview.

the conference, however, they decided to maintain their organization and expand their activities. The *Grupo Iniciativa* was aware of and concerned about the lack of spaces for women to participate in the formulation of the policy agenda of the government, and thus sees its current role as a facilitator and bridge for such contact. They argue that the Chilean women's movement needs to pursue a multi-faceted strategy for pursuing gender equality in which women's organizations in civil society play a much bigger role. One of their documents explains that, "today, many of the actions carried out have been focused on elaborating and presenting demands to the state, neglecting both the strengthening of the women's movement, and the construction of its own discourse which could permeate all of society" (Grupo Iniciativa Chile 1994, 29). Moreover, as Paulina Weber of MEMCH (an NGO member of *Grupo Iniciativa*), explains, "we are convinced that SERNAM cannot be a substitute for civil society," especially because there are many issues (like abortion) that SERNAM will not raise.²⁷

The *Grupo Iniciativa* is perhaps the first women's lobby group that has emerged since the transition to democracy. Their main strategy is to monitor state actions and to lobby the state to fulfil commitments to women that are embodied in international agreements such as CEDAW and the national Equal Opportunity Plans. To this end, in 1997, they successfully lobbied the government of Eduardo Frei to sign an "Act of Commitment" to implement and to follow through on the commitments made at Beijing, especially to expanding the presence of women in spheres of decision-making. The public signing of this Act in the presence of key government officials was the first part of

²⁷ Weber interview.

the *Grupo Iniciativa*'s National Forum for the Following of the Beijing Accords. In signing the Act, the government committed itself to both abstract goals, such as eliminating discrimination against women in their access to the state, as well as to concrete measures such as assigning resources to women, and especially to maintaining the Civil Society Fund to which organized women can apply for financing for projects that further the goals of their organizations (Grupo Iniciativa 1997, 6-7).

More recently, the *Grupo Iniciativa* has developed concrete "tools" for carrying out "citizen control", which, like REMOS and ANAMURI, they see as one of their main tasks. One of the key criticisms of SERNAM has been the difficulty of actually measuring or evaluating the extent to which it is effective.²⁸ Thus, the *Grupo Iniciativa*—which is composed of many research-oriented NGOs like FLACSO and CEM—elaborated the "*Indice de Compromiso Cumplido*" (Index of Fulfilled Commitments), which includes a system of indicators through which they can measure the state's compliance with various international agreements and SERNAM's Equal Opportunity Plan. (Grupo Iniciativa, 1999a). One of the benefits of this system is that evaluations of government initiatives can be somewhat more objective than previous evaluations which relied on subjective indicators such as interviews with program beneficiaries and opinion polls of citizens. Teresa Valdés explains that increased objectivity can also lead to greater autonomy for the *Grupo Iniciativa* in its dealings with the state.²⁹

²⁸ This point was made in Chapter 5.

²⁹ Valdés interview.

Another key priority of the *Grupo Iniciativa* has been to articulate the demands of the women's movement as a whole, using public spaces such as the media. For example, the *Grupo* elaborated the *Nueva Agenda* (New Agenda) of the women's movement for the new millennium and published it as a supplement in one of Chile's newspapers, "hop[ing] to contribute to the strengthening of civil society's role in the construction of democracy" (Grupo Iniciativa 1999b, 2). This document is important for two reasons. First, because it emanates from civil society, the demands for women's equality are more radical than those made from within the state, either in the Equal Opportunity Plan or embodied in legislation proposed by SERNAM or women parliamentarians. The *Nueva Agenda*, therefore, could and did raise the issue that women's sexual and reproductive rights are key to women's equality. They could also highlight the growing inequality among women produced by the state's neoliberal policies, and strongly denounce the massive inequality suffered by indigenous, rural, and popular sector women.

The document was also important because the process which brought it into being. The *Grupo Iniciativa*'s more privileged access to international financing allowed it to organize meetings throughout the length of the country in which the needs and demands of differently situated women could be gathered, and later organized into a coherent set of priorities. In writing the *Nueva Agenda*, each NGO in the organization worked on a particular section, dealing with a specific topic, such as women's health, environmental concerns, or women's access to decision-making spheres. The final document was sent to organized women's groups, including REMOS and ANAMURI. Once the *Grupo Iniciativa* had gathered and incorporated the suggestions of women outside of the NGOs into the document, they presented the *Nueva Agenda* as the set of

demands emanating from the Chilean women's movement as a whole. In sum, the Grupo Iniciativa, REMOS and ANAMURI, are indicators of the movement's reconstitution. Their existence means that the isolation of smaller women's groups is slowly being overcome, and that by working together, a more coherent set of women's demands can emanate from the movement.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that women's movements have been affected in important ways by democratization, neoliberalism, and state feminism. The impact has been mostly negative, to the extent that the movement appears to have lost much of its capacity to mobilize around a political agenda for women's citizenship—a citizenship that includes socio-economic rights. The transition to democracy left the movement without an overarching goal that could strategically link diverse segments of the movement. Therefore, a major challenge today for organized women is to find themes and issues to bring together diversely situated women in mobilizations or campaigns around women's issues.

Another problem for the movement is the neoliberal social and economic model which has a demobilizing effect on all social movements in Chile (and Latin America in general). The loss of funding from the Church and international agencies has led community organizations and women's movements to look to the state for resources. This has induced competition among groups, further undermining solidarity, especially between activists with professional credentials and those without. It has also renewed

debates about “autonomy,” this time not from political parties but from the state. NGOs which rely heavily on income from government contracts fear that they are losing their capacity to be critical advocates for feminist policy goals (Alvarez 1999). I have argued in this chapter that these conflicts in women’s movements today are an outcome of state feminism in new democracies where feminists have new opportunities to put their gender policy expertise to work.

It is clear that the nature of women’s movements in the new Latin American democracies is closely bound up with state feminism. The opportunities and obstacles faced by organized women in Chile also confront their counterparts in Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Argentina (see Barrig 2001). One of the most important opportunities presented by state feminism is that feminists within the state can open up channels of access to women’s movements. In the Chilean case, however, while access exists for NGOs, it does not extend to popular sector women’s groups, fostering resentment among them. The distinction between who is “inside” and “outside” of gender policy networks is largely based on class—professional women enjoy opportunities that non-professional activists do not.

The trends described above potentially undermine women’s citizenship because the boundary between “formal” and “informal” political arenas is reinforced rather than broken down. As I argued in Chapter 1, a key impediment to women’s exercise of citizenship is that much of their activism takes place in the “informal” arena of their communities. Because communities and local arenas are constructed as “non-political”, women’s activism there is not conceived as an expression of citizenship. In this sense, the demands of women that emanate from this arena (demands that, due to neoliberalism

and state withdrawal from the social sphere, are increasingly linked to welfare issues), are considered non-political, and, given the absence of linkages between the “informal” and “formal” arena, are not expressed in the public sphere. While SERNAM potentially can build these linkages, it has yet to do so in a viable manner. Pressuring SERNAM to do this, as well as pressuring the state as a whole to fulfill its promises to women, however, are goals of Chile’s newest network organizations. It is still too soon to tell, however, how successful they will be.

Conclusion – Women’s Politics in Chile in Comparative Perspective

The purpose of this dissertation has been to analyze women’s citizenship struggles in Chile in the context of democratization. In addition to showing the opportunities and obstacles to expanding women’s citizenship through democratization, my purpose in undertaking this project was to shed light on patterns of women’s political participation more generally. I believe that my analysis of the Chilean case contributes to four major themes in the comparative study of women and politics:

1. the “politics of difference”: What are the consequences of pursuing citizenship rights based on women’s differences, differences deriving from their motherhood roles?
2. the “autonomy” versus “double militancy” dilemma: Should women’s movements maintain their independence from other political actors or attempt to exert greater influence by bringing feminist politics to political parties, the state, or other political organizations?
3. transitions to democracy: What factors affect the outcomes of transition politics for women?
4. women and states: Should women view states as potential allies in the goal of expanding women’s citizenship?

This concluding chapter addresses each of these questions separately using the findings drawn from my analysis of the Chilean case.

The “Politics of Difference”

Ruth Lister notes that “[w]omen’s exclusion from citizenship has, both historically and today, elicited two main responses: either to demand inclusion on the same terms as men or to press the case for the recasting of citizenship’s premises so as to accommodate

women's particular interests" (1997, 91). The "equality versus difference" dilemma presents feminists with the choice between arguing that women are fundamentally similar to men in their capacities to be citizens or that women are fundamentally different than men but that their very difference should be the basis of their citizenship. Chilean women's movements, both first-wave and dictatorship-era, employed a maternal frame both to mobilize other women and to justify citizenship demands. Feminists pursued a "gender-differentiated" model of citizenship, to use Lister's (1997, 92) terms; that is, women's maternal identities, i.e., their "difference," were to serve as a basis for their citizenship identities. During feminism's first-wave, as discussed in Chapter 2, Chilean feminists claimed women's motherhood roles gave them qualities greatly needed in the political arena. Women, they argued, would bring a moral voice and a greater concern for others to an arena that was corrupt and populated by self-regarding actors. First-wave Chilean women's "politics of difference" also led women's organizations to pursue autonomy from male-dominated political parties, not for fear of co-optation, but rather, because women's "difference" demanded it. Women's activism was depicted as being "above politics" and therefore women's organizations rejected a strategy of working within political parties. Instead, women formed their own women-only political parties, first to wage the struggle for suffrage and later to compete in elections. Women's parties, however, were always depicted as fundamentally "different" from traditional male-dominated parties.

First-wave feminists' rejection of traditional party politics in favour of autonomy and depiction of women as "above politics," in the end, did not serve women well. Within a few short years of women's enfranchisement and participation in electoral

politics, women's parties crumbled, other women's organizations divided and fell apart over partisan differences, and a feminist movement basically ceased to exist. A number of women activists entered traditional political parties, especially those on the Left. The overwhelming dominance of class and partisan issues and a severely weakened women's movement meant that gender issues were virtually absent from public discourse.

When women's movements re-emerged under authoritarianism (1973-90), they once again appealed to their maternal identities to justify their activism and to make demands for a more inclusive democracy in which women could fully exercise their citizenship. But the context in which women made citizenship demands and formulated strategies to pursue them was very different from the one which confronted first-wave feminists. Most importantly, the "formal" political arena was closed and political parties were banned, driven underground, and therefore seriously weakened. In this context, the meaning of "politics" was changing, allowing women to challenge traditional understandings that excluded women and their concerns from being considered "political". Soon, women began to depict their activism as fundamentally *political* instead of being "above politics". Consequently, the Chilean case demonstrates that the citizenship claims that emanate from a "politics of difference" take different forms according to other factors that define the context, notably, whether or not the meaning and context of "politics" is open to challenge.

In terms of the outcomes of a "politics of difference," some authors, (Feijoó 1989; Craske 1999) have indicated that the "difference" politics or "militant motherhood" identity of Latin American women's movements place too many limits on the advocacy of feminist goals that challenge gender inequality. The Chilean case, however,

undermines this thesis. While first-wave feminism did little to challenge women's exclusion from political citizenship by depicting women as "above" politics, the dictatorship-era women's movement forwarded a number of feminist goals based on women's maternal roles and the movement achieved many gains by framing their demands in terms that resonated with Chilean political culture's exaltation of women's motherhood identities. Feminists argued that motherhood and citizenship were not only compatible, but that the state needed to make efforts to ensure that women could exercise their citizenship identities (for example, expanding public day-care and providing an adequate level of social welfare so that all families could live in dignity and women could participate fully beyond the "private" sphere).

But the Chilean case also points to some potential shortcomings of the "politics of difference" strategy. I argued in Chapter 4 that the goal of fundamentally restructuring "formal" politics to include women was not achieved in part due to a "militant motherhood" strategy that undermined the forwarding of demands for *power* for women in favour of demands for policies to promote the interests of women as a group. Focusing on women's "difference" meant rejecting the traditional model of politics which feminists saw as being all about the struggle for "power" with masculine behavioural norms dominating the struggle. According to the movement's portrayal of women's "difference" women did not enter politics to pursue "power" in individual terms, but rather to fight for others. As the transition to democracy unfolded, however, and women realized the extent to which they were being marginalized in candidate selection and decision-making arenas more generally, they began to formulate demands for affirmative action, such as quotas for women in decision-making.

In sum, the Chilean case shows that a “difference” politics can take a variety of forms and lead women in various directions, thereby undermining criticisms that such a strategy is inherently conservative because it focuses on women’s “private” roles. In fact, women’s demands for political citizenship are often based on the need for women to enter politics to fight for groups whose “private” concerns are seldom heard in “formal” politics.

“Autonomy” versus “Double Militancy”

Women’s movements everywhere face the issue of whether to maintain the “autonomy” of their organizations from traditional political actors such as parties and unions, or pursue a “double militancy,” through which activists seek to bring their feminist politics to political parties (or other sites) and, vice versa, to bring their partisan (or other) positions into feminist organizations. The Chilean case provides several valuable insights about the advantages and disadvantages of either strategy.

Firstly, the choice of “autonomy” or militancy in both feminist and partisan politics cannot be separated from the nature of the women’s movement overall and the broader political context in which it emerges. As I argued in Chapter 2, first-wave feminists’ choice of “autonomy” stemmed from their “difference” politics and their belief that women’s organizations were not *political* in the same way parties were. In the 1970s, in contrast, feminism re-emerged in Chile in the relative absence of political parties, thereby reducing any immediate need for feminists to make the choice of “autonomy” or “double militancy”. It was not until political parties re-gained their historical dominance that women’s organizations were confronted with the very serious

dilemma of whether to remain autonomous or work through parties to achieve their goals. In brief, the Chilean case shows that the very nature of the “autonomy” versus “double militancy” issue is determined by the political context (especially the role of traditional political actors) and the type of movement that exists (i.e., whether it is pursuing a gender-differentiated or gender-neutral model of citizenship).

Second, the Chilean case shows that the strategies of “autonomy” versus “double militancy” are both useful, but *at different points* in the emergence of movements and the elaboration of movement demands. In Chapter 3, I argued that it was, in large part, the relative autonomy of the women’s movement from political parties that allowed women to assemble a feminist critique of traditional Chilean political practice for its marginalization of women. This critique was crucial to the elaboration of a set of feminist demands of democracy. But for feminist demands to form part of the public agenda, women’s movements need to adopt a “double militancy” strategy. If key segments of the Chilean women’s movement had not chosen to work within the broader pro-democracy movement, it is highly unlikely that feminist goals would have formed part of the agenda for the transition to democracy. Movement autonomy, therefore, is a crucial resource when movement demands are being formulated—in the absence of pressure from male-dominated organizations, feminists are more free to challenge practices that reinforce masculine monopolization of political space. But if movements remain autonomous, their very autonomy can mean the issues they raise also remain marginalized and absent from the public arena. Thus, a “double militancy” strategy through which feminists insert their goals into party policy is more likely to realize the goal of putting feminist issues on the public agenda.

Third, the extent to which non-feminist organizations such as political parties are open to feminist politics itself depends on a variety of other factors. In the Chilean case, women were the first actors to publicly challenge the dictatorship. By the time political parties regained their prominence, the women's movement had gained considerable power, demonstrated mainly by its capacity to mobilize and organize mass public events. The political parties that formed the pro-democracy coalition adopted many of the women's movements' demands and its discourse as a way to increase their own public support. In other words, the parties gained by adopting a number of the feminists' goals. Not all goals were adopted, however. While "autonomous" feminist organizations called for quotas for women in politics and reproductive freedom, organizations opting for "double militancy" dropped these demands, which were seen by the parties as too radical and therefore potentially divisive. Due to the premium placed on opposition unity, and the prominence of the Christian Democratic Party within the opposition, feminist goals such as divorce and abortion were not raised by women's organizations allied with the opposition parties.

Movement autonomy is, therefore, a crucial resource at certain conjunctures; especially when movement demands are being formulated. But "double militancy" is also crucial if feminist demands are to form part of the public agenda. The extent to which feminist demands are integrated into party politics or other non-feminist movement platforms, however, will largely depend on other features of the political opportunity structure, namely, the extent to which feminist goals will be accepted by competing political actors and whether or not political parties or other political actors perceive benefits or losses from adopting feminist goals.

Women and Transitions to Democracy

Jaquette and Wolchik argue that “because transition politics are periods of crisis and thus of intense politicization, they bring new ideas and institutions into political life” (1998, 4). Transition politics, therefore, have been more open to feminist politics than have periods of “normal” politics. The Chilean case demonstrates the potential gains that women can realize from processes of transition. Indeed, the Chilean women’s movement, along with Brazil’s, achieved considerable policy successes, compared both with other movements in Latin America and the gains (and considerable setbacks) experienced by women in Eastern and Central Europe through the process of transition to both market economies and very limited forms of democracy.

I believe the main reason the Chilean women’s movement succeeded in “gendering” the transition was the relative autonomy it enjoyed during its formative period allowed the formulation of feminist demands for a reconstructed democracy, and the subsequent strategy of “double militancy” ensured that at least some of these demands made it onto the agenda for the transition. These two factors led to the creation of SERNAM, along with other state policies to promote gender equality in Chile.

The Chilean case also demonstrates that the political opening presented by a transition to democracy is extremely narrow. The period of “flux” in Chile only lasted as long as political parties were relatively weak; once they regained prominence, they again largely determined the content of politics. As I argued in Chapter 4, the absence of demands for institutional reform to make “formal” politics more woman-friendly during

the crucial juncture led to women's continued marginalization in this arena.

Perhaps the most important insight gained from studying the Chilean case is that the boundary between "formal" and "informal" politics which was almost completely erased during Pinochet's dictatorship, can be reconstructed rapidly and serve once again to undermine women's citizenship. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, the main barrier to women's exercise of citizenship is that the arena where most women act, the "informal" or community arena, is depicted—through public discourse and government policy—as "non-political" in contrast to the "formal" political arena populated by (male-dominated) political parties. Under authoritarianism, the "formal" political arena was closed thereby politicizing the activities of the "informal" arena, where women are normally the primary actors. The politicization of daily life, however, only lasts as long as traditional political actors (such as parties) are relatively powerless. Despite the extent of closure of "formal" politics (i.e., Congress remained closed for the entire 17-year duration of the dictatorship) and the strength of the women's movement and its politicization of "private" issues (for example, family welfare), feminists did not succeed in redefining politics to invite permanently the participation of women and their "private" concerns. The strength and historical dominance of political parties in Chile, however, may explain why parties have been so successful in re-monopolizing politics and excluding non-partisan issues from the realm of "formal" politics.

Since the 1980s, transitions to democracy have involved global economic changes, manifested in structural adjustment programmes and neoliberalism that together make up the "New Policy Agenda" being adopted in most developing countries. Although neoliberalism was first implemented under Pinochet in Chile, successive post-

transition governments have not deviated from this general model—a model which has important gender consequences. The Chilean case shows how a neoliberal policy agenda and political transition to democracy can undermine feminist citizenship goals. I argued in the dissertation that the distinction between the “formal” and “informal” political arenas reflects both gender and class subordination. The “opening” represented by the transition to women’s expanded political participation has resulted in greater access for professional (normally middle-class) women to the “formal” political arena. Poor and working-class women, however, continue to be active in “informal” politics. The main problem, as I argued in Chapters 5 and 6, is the lack of linkages between the two arenas. Given the absence of channels of access for poor and working-class women activists to “formal” arenas where gender policy is made, the particular concerns of these women are not heard, and their activism tends not to be viewed as an expression of their political citizenship.

The depiction of women’s participation in the “informal” arena as “non-political” is further reinforced by neoliberal discourse which draws a sharp boundary between the “political” (big-P issues) and the “social” (small-p issues). In Chile, the content of “politics” is narrowly conceived through government and party discourse to prevent demands for social justice and income redistribution that are perceived by political elites to be potentially destabilizing and disruptive of the “success” of the Chilean economic model. Women’s care-giving and reproductive roles in the “informal” or community arenas are discursively established as “natural” expressions of their maternal identities rather than crucial underpinnings of the social and economic order. Any celebration of women’s activism in “informal” politics in the current era of neoliberal restructuring

must be tempered with the realization that unless there are some linkages between women's community organizations (often geared towards economic survival) and policy-making arenas, women's "informal" activism is politically invisible and therefore unlikely to bring about long-term changes to either gender or class inequalities. The growing gap between professional feminists and non-professional activists in Chilean women's movements demonstrates very clearly the potential negative effects of the simultaneity of neoliberal restructuring and political transition to democracy.

Women and States

The Chilean case sheds considerable light onto the (changing) relationships between women and states. Most importantly, it demonstrates the importance of transitions to democracy for, at least potentially, transforming the relationship. In Chile, the state was the clear "enemy" for women's movements in the 1970s and 1980s and movements depicted the state as the source of their marginalization and material deprivation. Since the transition, in contrast, most segments of the women's movement look to the state as a potential "ally". As I argued in Chapter 3, the parties that formed the pro-democracy opposition movement occupied the state following the withdrawal of the dictatorship and, due to the women's movement's strategy of "double militancy," they succeeded in convincing the parties to create national policy machinery to promote gender equality. The subsequent creation of SERNAM at the executive level has resulted in important legislative and policy successes for Chilean women. SERNAM's initiatives to improve women's citizenship in Chile have included: criminalizing domestic violence; Civil Code

reform that allows women to exert greater control over marital assets; expanded rights for women workers; social programs that target the gendered sources of poverty; and programs to improve women's knowledge and access to information about their rights and how to exercise them. These successes show the utility of state-focused strategies for women's movements in certain instances.

The Chilean case also shows some of the limits to a state-focused strategy. First, there is the problem raised in the previous section—a neoliberal policy agenda is inconsistent with feminist goals of politicizing gender and class inequality and the material hardships that emerge out of class, gender, and ethnic discrimination. While the state may address the gendered sources of poverty through social policy, my research on the Chilean case shows how state feminists respond to the problems they identify may actually undercut the goal of expanding women's citizenship, because feminists within states make and implement policy in a particular context. In Chile, a context defined by neoliberalism and decentralization conflicts with feminism's egalitarian goals because women do not benefit equally. Neoliberalism focuses almost exclusively on women as "market citizens," to use Schild's term, and decentralization in Chile essentially involves "off-loading," often to local governments with inadequate resources to deliver gender policy effectively.

Second, I argue in the dissertation that while state feminism can yield a number of positive gains for women in some contexts, it may have negative implications for women's movements in new democracies. In transitional democracies, where women's movements are already weakened by factors such as the loss of a unifying goal (i.e. democracy) and class, partisan, and strategic differences, the institutionalization of

gender politics in the state can have further de-mobilizing effects on movements. State feminism creates opportunities for professional feminists to access the state and put their gender expertise to work in policy-making. Activists who lack professional accreditation, and who are excluded from emerging policy networks will likely feel resentful of their marginalization from these circles. The evidence drawn from the Chilean case indicates that many poor and working-class activists feel resentful that their organizations are excluded from channels of policy-making and their concerns, therefore, not adequately dealt with. Instead, gender policy is devised by “experts” with little or no real knowledge of the daily experiences of popular sector women who confront class, gender, and quite often, ethnic discrimination. The result is that the dichotomy between women’s “formal” and “informal” participation is reinforced rather than challenged thereby continuing to act as a barrier to women’s citizenship.

I think that it is here, on the question of women and states, that further study of the Chilean case is warranted in order to make future contributions to the comparative study of women and politics. More work is needed on the evolving relationship of SERNAM to movement actors and to other institutions within the state. Are the relationships that have been forged since SERNAM’s creation now frozen or are they open to further transformation? Specifically, can grassroots organizations, especially as represented by networks like ANAMURI and REMOS, make their voices heard by SERNAM and achieve their goals of opening up more space for currently excluded movement actors?

As Chilean democracy consolidates and political practice “normalizes,” a number of other interesting questions arise. To date, each post-transition election has been won

by the same Centre-Left coalition of parties, and governments have been relatively open to a gender-equality agenda. What will be the fate of SERNAM and state feminism in Chile when (and surely it is a question of when, not whether) a coalition of Rightist parties assumes power? Will the gains made by Chilean women's movements be maintained? Will state feminists in SERNAM be able to continue their work of trying to create policy access for women's movements? What will be the fate of the numerous feminist NGOs that rely on the state for contracts to carry out research or gender policy implementation? These questions indicate that Chile will continue to offer crucial questions for researchers of women and politics.

Appendix

Interview Questions¹

For women in "formal" politics:

1. What is your present position?
2. Which party are you affiliated with?
3. Do you occupy any position in your party?
4. Do you have or have you had relatives active in politics?
5. How did you become active in politics? For example, what were your motivations?
6. In order to access public positions, did you rely on the help of other people, for example, was there anyone who oriented you or gave you advice?
7. Can you tell me a bit about any other organizations in which you participated?
8. Do you think that women have different qualities, values or motivations than men (which orient them in political or social arenas)?
9. Do you think it is more difficult for a woman to occupy a post like the one you have now? Why or why not?
10. Have you experienced any particular obstacles in your trajectory or in the position you hold now? Can you give me any examples?
11. How does being active politically affect your family relations? (do you have children? if so, how old are they?)
12. Is it difficult to combine your public roles with your personal ones? If so, what has enabled you to do so?

¹ All interviews were conducted in Spanish but for the present purposes, I have translated the questions into English.

13. Do you think there are enough women in politics? If not, what do you think the obstacles are?
14. What measures could be taken or have been taken to increase the number of women in politics? What about in your party? Which measures have been successful?
15. Have you helped other women so that they can access decision-making arenas?
16. Do you feel that it is your task to represent Chilean women in general? If so, how do you try to do so?
17. What do you think the main issues of importance to women today are? Are these issues sufficiently addressed in your view?
18. Have you tried to promote these issues in your present position? If so, what are the opportunities and obstacles to doing so? What strategies have worked best?
19. What do you think have been the main achievements for women in the past decade?
20. What been the main contribution of the women's movement in these achievements?
21. Is there a women's movement in Chile today? What has been happening?
22. What kind of relationship do you think exists today between women in "politics" and the women's movement? What kind of relationship do you think *should* exist?

For women in "informal" politics:

1. What is the name of your organization/group?
2. Can you tell me a bit about the history of the group? When did it form, how has it changed over time?
3. How and why did you become active in the spaces in which you find yourself? What

were your main motivations? Can you tell me a bit about your past experiences? Did you participate in other organizations?

4. How does your activism affect your family life? Do you have children? If so, what allows you to combine motherhood with your other activities?
5. Do you think women have different motivations for engaging in political or social activism? Do you think they have different capacities or do they behave differently?
6. Can you tell me about the goals of your organization? How do you try to achieve these goals?
7. What strategies have been most or least successful in achieving your goals? What kinds of opportunities or obstacles does your organization confront?
8. Are there other organizations or groups with whom you have relationships? What kind of organizations and what is the nature of the relationship?
9. Has your group had any interactions with SERNAM or PRODEMU? What was the purpose of the interaction?
10. What do you think about SERNAM?
11. Do you think the issues of concern to your group are being addressed by political leaders? by political parties? by SERNAM?
12. What do you think is happening right now with the women's movement in Chile?

References

Primary Sources:

- Alvear, Soledad. 1990. *Ideas para la Acción, Informe Final de la Concertación de Mujeres por la Democracia*. Santiago: El Canelo do Nos.
- ANAMURI. 2000. *Mujeres Rurales e Indígenas en Marcha hacia un Nuevo Milenio*. Santiago.
- Aylwin Azócar, Patricio. 1990. "Discurso del Presidente de la República" In *Transiciones: Mujeres en los Procesos Democráticos*. pp. 146-147. Santiago: ISIS Internacional.
- Bickford, Louis and Marcela Noé. 1997. "Public Participation, Political Institutions, and Democracy in Chile: 1990-1997". Santiago: FLACSO-Chile.
- Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia. 1989. Programa de Gobierno.
- Concertación. 1999. "Iniciar el siglo XXI con más democracia y más derechos" Bases programáticas de la Concertación.
- Grupo Iniciativa Chile. 1994. "Mujeres: Ciudadanía, Cultura y Desarrollo en el Chile de los Noventa" Santiago.
- Grupo Iniciativa Chile. 1997. "Acta de la Primera Sesión: Las Mujeres en el Ejercicio del Poder y la Toma de Decisiones" Foro Nacional Para el Seguimiento de Los Acuerdos de Beijing. Santiago.
- Grupo Iniciativa Mujeres. 1999a. "Índice de Compromiso Cumplido: un Instrumento de Control Ciudadano para las Mujeres" Santiago.
- Grupo Iniciativa Mujeres. 1999b. "Propuesta Política de las Mujeres para el Tercer Milenio" *La Nación*. November 12. Santiago, Chile.
- Grupo Iniciativa Mujeres. 1999c. "Encuesta Nacional Opinión y Actitudes de las Mujeres Chilenas Sobre la Condición de Género" Santiago.
- Guzmán, Virginia, Eugenia Hala and Marcela Ríos. 1999. "Interlocución Estado y Sociedad en la Implementación del Plan de Igualdad de Oportunidades para las Mujeres" Santiago: CEM.
- ISIS Internacional. 1996. "Evaluación Cualitativa del Plan de Igualdad de Oportunidades Para las Mujeres 1994-1999: Percepciones de mujeres líderes de opinión y beneficiarias del Plan Región Metropolitana y Región del Maule" Santiago: ISIS Internacional.
- Lagos, Ricardo. 2000. "Mensaje Presidencial" Reproduced in *El Mercurio*, May 22.
- MEMCH '83. 1985. "Principios y Reivindicaciones que Configuran la Plataforma de la Mujer Chilena" Reproduced in Edda Gaviola, Eliana Largo and Sandra Palestro. *Una Historia Necesaria: Mujeres en Chile, 1973-1990*. pp. 238-243. Santiago: Akí y Aora Ltda.
- Molledo, Cecilia. 1998. "Experiencias de Participación de las Mujeres Chilenas en los Partidos Políticos: 1990 a 1998" Santiago: Instituto de la Mujer.

- Partidos Políticos: 1990 a 1998” Santiago: Instituto de la Mujer.
- Montecino, Sonia and Josefina Rossetti (eds) 1990. *Tramas para un Nuevo Destino: Propuestas de la Concertación de Mujeres por la Democracia*. Santiago: Concertación de Mujeres por la Democracia.
- Muñoz D’Albora, Adriana and Scarlett Wojciechowski Levine. 1996. “Importancia de Una Ley de Cuotas en Chile” Santiago: Fundación Ideas.
- Movimiento Feminista. 1983. “Demandas Femenistas a la Democracia”. Reproduced in Edda Gaviola, Eliana Largo and Sandra Palestro. *Una Historia Necesaria: Mujeres en Chile, 1973-1990*. pp. 234-237. Santiago: Akí y Aora Ltda.
- Movimiento Feminista. 1988. “Demandas de las Mujeres a la Democracia”. Reproduced in Edda Gaviola, Eliana Largo and Sandra Palestro. *Una Historia Necesaria: Mujeres en Chile, 1973-1990*. pp. 251-256. Santiago: Akí y Aora Ltda.
- Provoste, Patricia. 1994. “¿Cómo Llegan las Políticas Sociales a las Mujeres?” Santiago: Instituto de la Mujer.
- REMOS. n.d. Information Pamphlet, (mission, objectives, and member groups).
- SERNAM. 1994. *Plan de Igualdad de Oportunidades Para las Mujeres*. Santiago.
- SERNAM. 1996a. “Pobreza, Género y Exclusión Social en Chile” Santiago: SERNAM working document number 54.
- SERNAM. 1996b. “Seguimiento Evaluativo de la Implementación Municipal del Programa de Apoyo a Mujeres Jefas de Hogar” Santiago: SERNAM working document number 43.
- SERNAM. 1998a. *Desigualdad en Cifras*. Santiago: SERNAM.
- SERNAM. 1998b. “Participar es un Derecho de las Mujeres y una Responsabilidad Ciudadana: Estadísticas, Argumentos, y Propuestas” Santiago: SERNAM.
- SERNAM. December 1998c. “Filiación: la Nueva Ley” Santiago: SERNAM.
- SERNAM. 1999. “Evaluación y Seguimiento del Programa de Habilitación Laboral para Mujeres de Escasos Recursos Preferentemente Jefas de Hogar” Santiago: SERNAM working document number 65.
- SERNAM. 2000. *Plan de Igualdad de Oportunidades Entre Mujeres y Hombres, 2000-2010*. Santiago: SERNAM.
- SERNAM n.d.(a) “Reformas Legales a Favor de la Mujer y la Familia” www.sernam.cl.
- SERNAM. n.d.(b) Cuadro 1, “Inserción organizacional de mujeres líderes por región.
- SERNAM. n.d.(c) Planificación—Programa CIDEM, 1999. Santiago.
- Tierra Nuestra. n.d. Information pamphlet, (history and objectives).
- Tierra Nuestra. 1999. “Escuela de Capacitación para Mujeres Líderes” Oficina de la Mujer, San Ramón.

Mujer, San Ramón.

Weinstein, Marisa. 1996. "Estado, Mujeres de Sectores Populares y Ciudadanía"
Santiago: FLACSO-Chile.

Weinstein, Marisa. 1997. "Políticas de Equidad de Género y Participación de las
Mujeres" Santiago: FLACSO-Chile.

Informal Interviews (not taped):

Eugenia Hola, researcher at Centro de Estudios de la Mujer (CEM) (feminist research NGO)	July 27, 1999
Claudia Núñez, Fundación Ideas (NGO)	July 28, 1999
Lisette García, SERNAM	July 29, 1999
Verónica Matus, La Morada (feminist NGO)	July 29, 1999
Sandra Palestro, sociologist, feminist	July 29, 1999
Carmen Delia and María Angelica Garrido, PRODEMU	August 2, 1999
Maricel Sauterel, Fundación Ideas	August 3, 1999
Eliana Largo, feminist	August 4, 1999
Julia Medel, researcher at CEM	August 4, 1999
Caty Orellano, PRODEMU	August 5, 1999
Alejandra Valdés and Victoria Hurtado, organizers for women's leadership training workshops	August 6, 1999
Angélica Marín, SERNAM	August 11, 1999
Cecilia Peñaloza, SERNAM	August 11, 1999
Rosana Ceorino, Tierra Nuestra (women's NGO)	August 18, 1999
Nuria Núñez, director, Instituto de la Mujer (feminist research NGO)	August 19, 1999
Aida Moreno, Casa de la Mujer, Huamachuco	August 27, 1999

formal interviews (tape recorded):

Sofía Prats, mayor of Huechuraba	August 10, 1999
Denise Pascal, regional governor, Melipilla *	August 18, 1999
Ximena Rincón, PRODEMU	August 24, 1999

Delia Del Gato, SERNAM	August 20, 1999
Gloria Marín, CONTAVECH (labour union)	August 23, 1999
Ana María Ordenes, SOL (NGO that supports popular sector women's groups)	August 23, 1999
María Ester Férez, Directorate of Labour	August 25, 1999
María Elena Ovalle, councillor, Central Bank of Chile	August 25, 1999
Felisa Garay and Raquel Romo, CODEMU (labour union)	August 26, 1999
Rosa González, deputy (independent)**	September 2, 1999
Francisca Rodríguez, ANAMURI	August 31, 1999
Adriana Delpiano, (vp) in charge of presidential campaign for Ricardo Lagos, 1999, currently minister of SERNAM.	September 9, 1999
María Antonieta Saa, deputy (Party for Democracy)	September 29, 1999
Lily Pérez, deputy (National Renovation Party)	October 1, 1999
Mercedes Montoya, REMOS	October 4, 1999
Valeria Ambrosio, SERNAM	October 5, 1999
Rosana Ceorino, Tierra Nuestra	October 6, 1999
Sandra Palestro	October 7, 1999
Myriam González and María Molina, pobladora women's organization	October 20, 1999
Cristina Girardi, mayor of Cerro Navia	October 27, 1999
Adriana Muñoz, deputy, (Party for Democracy) **	November 2, 1999
Teresa Valdés, sociologist, FLACSO, Grupo Iniciativa Mujeres	November 3, 1999
Tatiana Escalera and Laura del Carmen Veloso, pobladora women's organization	November 8, 1999
Eliana Largo	November 11, 1999
Fabiola Oyarzún, PRODEMU	November 18, 1999

All interviews took place in Santiago.

*interview took place in Melipilla

**interviews took place in Valparaíso

Secondary Sources:

Ali, Shaheen Sardar. 2000. "Law, Islam and the Women's Movement in Pakistan" In Shirin Rai (ed.) *International Perspectives on Gender and Democratization*. pp. 41-63. London: Macmillan Press.

- Alvarez, Sonia E. 1989. "Women's Movements and Gender Politics in the Brazilian Transition", In Jane S. Jaquette (ed.) *The Women's Movement in Latin America: Feminism and the Transition to Democracy*, pp. 18-71. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- Alvarez, Sonia E. 1990. *Engendering Democracy in Brazil: Women's Movements in Transition Politics*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Alvarez, Sonia E. 1997. "Contradictions of a 'Women's Space' in a Male-Dominant State: The Political Role of the Commissions on the Status of Women in Postauthoritarian Brazil" In Kathleen Staudt (ed.) *Women, International Development, and Politics: The Bureaucratic Mire*. Second Edition. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. pp. 59-100.
- Alvarez, Sonia E. 1998. "Latin American Feminisms 'Go Global': Trends for the 1990s and Challenges for the New Millennium" In Sonia Alvarez, Evelina Dagnino, and Arturo Escobar (eds) *Cultures of Politics, Politics of Culture: Re-Visioning Latin American Social Movements*, pp. 293-324. Boulder: Westview Press
- Alvarez, Sonia E. 1999 "Advocating Feminism: The Latin American Feminist NGO 'Boom'" *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 1(2): 181-209.
- Alvarez, Sonia E. and Arturo Escobar (eds) 1992. *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Alwyin, Mariana and Ignacio Walker. 1996. *Familia y Divorcio: Razones de una Posición*. Santiago: Editorial Los Andes.
- Astelarra, Judith. 1991. "La Cultura Política de las Mujeres" In *Presencia Política de las Mujeres*. pp. 71-91. San José: FLACSO-Costa Rica.
- Barrientos, Stephanie (1997) "The Hidden Ingredient: Female Labour in Chilean Fruit Exports" *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 16 (1): 71-81.
- Barrig, Maruja. 2001. "Latin American Feminism: Gains, Losses and Hard Times," *NACLA Report on the Americas*, 34 (5): 29-34.
- Basu, Amrita (ed.) 1995. *The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women's Movements in Global Perspective*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Beckman, Ericka. 2001. "The Eighth Encuentro" *NACLA Report on the Americas*, 34 (5): 32-3.
- Beckwith, Karen. 2000. "Beyond Compare? Women's Movements in Comparative Perspective" *European Journal of Political Research*, 37: 431-468.
- Bee, Anna and Isabel Vogel (1997) "Temporeras and Household Relations: Seasonal Employment in Chile's Agro-Export Sector" *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 16 (1): 83-95.
- Blacklock, Cathy and Laura Macdonald. 2000. "Women and Citizenship in Mexico and Guatemala" In Shirin Rai (ed.) *International Perspectives on Gender and Democratization*. pp. 19-40. London: Macmillan Press.

- Blofield, Merike and Liesl Haas. 2000. "Legislative Dynamics in Chile: Exploring Left Influence on Policy, 1990-1998". Paper presented at the 2000 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Miami, Florida, March 16-18.
- Bunster, Ximena 1988 "Watch Out for that Little Nazi Man that All of Us Have Inside: the Mobilization and Demobilization of Women in Militarized Chile" *Women's Studies International Forum* 11 (5): 485-491.
- Caldeira, Teresa P. 1998. "Justice and Individual Rights: Challenges for Women's Movements and Democratization in Brazil" In Jane S. Jaquette and Sharon L. Wolchik (eds) *Women and Democracy: Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe*, pp. 75-103. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Carrasco Gutiérrez, Maritza and Consuelo Figueroa Goravagno. 1998. "Mujeres y acción colectiva: participación social y espacio local" In *Proposiciones 28: Sociedad Civil, Participación y Ciudadanía Emergente*. pp. 37-60. Santiago: SUR Ediciones.
- Chafetz, Janet Saltzman, Anthony Gary Dworkin, and Stephanie Swanson. 1990. "Social Change and Social Activism: First-Wave Women's Movements Around the World" In Guida West and Rhoda Lois Blumberg (eds) *Women and Social Protest*. pp. 302-320. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Chaney, Elsa M. 1974. "The Mobilization of Women in Allende's Chile". In Jane Jaquette (ed.) *Women In Politics*. pp. 267-280. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Chaney, Elsa. 1979. *Supermadre: Women in Politics in Latin America*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Chowdhury, Najma, et al 1994. "Redefining Politics: Patterns of Women's Engagement from a Global Perspective" In Barbara Nelson and Najma Chowdhury (eds) *Women and Politics Worldwide*. pp. 3-24. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Chuchryk, Patricia M. 1984. "Protest, Politics and Personal Life: The Emergence of Feminism in a Military Dictatorship, Chile 1973-1983". Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, York University, Canada.
- Chuchryk, Patricia M. 1989a "Feminist Anti-Authoritarian Politics: the Role of Women's Organizations in the Chilean Transition to Democracy" In Jane Jaquette (ed.) *The Women's Movement in Latin America: Feminism and the Transition to Democracy*. pp. 149-184. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- Chuchryk, Patricia M. 1989b "Subversive Mothers: the Women's Opposition to the Military Regime in Chile". In Sue Ellen M. Charlton, Jana Everett, and Kathleen Staudt (eds) *Women, the State, and Development*. pp. 130-151. New York: The State University of New York Press.

- Collier, Simon and William F. Sater. 1996. *A History of Chile, 1808-1994*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Covarrubias, Paz 1978 "El Movimiento Feminista Chileno". In Paz Covarrubias and Rolando Franco (eds) *Chile: Mujer y Sociedad*. pp. 615-648. Santiago: Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para la Infancia.
- Craske, Nikki. 1998. "Remasculinization and the Neoliberal State in Latin America." In Vicky Randall and Georgina Waylen (eds) *Gender, Politics and the State*. pp. 100-120. London: Routledge.
- Craske, Nikki. 1999. *Women and Politics in Latin America*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.
- Dandavati, Annie G. 1996 *The Women's Movement and the Transition to Democracy in Chile*. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc.
- de los Angeles Crummet, María 1977 "El Poder Femenino: the Mobilization of Women against Socialism in Chile" *Latin American Perspectives* 4 (4): 103-113.
- Dietz, Mary G. (1998) "Context is All: Feminism and Theories of Citizenship" In Anne Phillips (ed.) *Feminism and Politics*. pp. 378-400. London: Oxford University Press
- Edwards, Sebastian. 1985. "Stabilization with Liberalization: An Evaluation of Ten Years of Chile's Experiment with Free-Market Policies, 1973-1983" *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 33 (2): 223-254.
- Einhorn, Barbara. 2000. "Gender and Citizenship in the Context of Democratization and Economic Transformation in East Central Europe" In Shirin Rai (ed.) *International Perspectives on Gender and Democratization*. pp. 103-124. London: Macmillan Press.
- Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1987. *Women and War*. New York: Basic Books.
- Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1998. "Antigone's Daughters" In Anne Phillips (ed.) *Feminism and Politics*. pp. 363-377. London: Oxford University Press.
- Feijóo, María del Carmen. 1989. "The Challenge of Constructing Civilian Peace: Women and Democracy in Argentina" In Jane Jaquette (ed.) *The Women's Movement in Latin America: Feminism and the Transition to Democracy*. pp. 72-94. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- Fleet, Michael and Brian H. Smith. 1997. *The Catholic Church and Democracy in Chile and Peru*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Foweraker, Joe. 1998. "Social Movements and Citizenship Rights in Latin America" In Menno Vellinga (ed.) *The Changing Role of the State in Latin America*. pp. 271-297. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Foxley, Alejandro. 1983. *Latin American Experiments in Neoconservative Economics*. Berkley: University of California Press.

- Friedman, Elisabeth J. 1998. "Paradoxes of Gendered Political Opportunity in the Venezuelan Transition to Democracy" *Latin American Research Review* 33 (3): 87-135.
- Friedman, Elisabeth J. 2000. *Unfinished Transitions: Women and the Gendered Development of Democracy in Venezuela, 1936-96*. Pennsylvania Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University.
- Fries, Lorena and Verónica Matus. 1999. *El Derecho. Trama y Conjura Patriarcal*. Santiago: LOM Ediciones/La Morada.
- Frohmman, Alicia and Teresa Valdés. 1995. "Democracy in the Country and in the Home: The Women's Movement in Chile" In Amrita Basu (ed.) *The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women's Movements in Global Perspective*. pp. 276-301. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Garretón, Manuel Antonio. 1995. *Hacia una Nueva Era Política: Estudio sobre las Democratizaciones*. Mexico, D.F. and Santiago: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Garretón, Manuel Antonio. 1989. *The Chilean Political Process*. Translated by Sharon Kellum in collaboration with Gilbert W. Merckx. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- Gaviola Edda, Eliana Largo and Sandra Palestro. 1994. *Una Historia Necesaria: Mujeres en Chile, 1973-1990*. Santiago: Akí y Aora Ltda.
- Gaviola, Edda, Ximena Jiles, Lorella Lopresti, Claudia Rojas. 1986 *Queremos Votar en las Próximas Elecciones: Historia del Movimiento Femenino Chileno, 1913-1952*. Santiago: co-edición de La Morada, Fempress, ILET, ISIS, Librería Lila, PEMCI, CEM.
- Gissi Bustos, Jorge. 1976. "Mythology about Women. With Special Reference to Chile" In June Nash and Helen Safa (eds) *Sex and Class in Latin America*. pp. 30-45. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- González, Sandra and María Sabel Norero. 1989. *Los Derechos de la Mujer en las Leyes Chilenas*. Santiago: CESOC Ediciones.
- González-Suárez Mirta. 1994. "With Patience and Without Blood: The Political Struggles of Costa Rican Women" In Barbara J. Nelson and Najma Chowdhury (eds) *Women and Politics Worldwide*. pp.174-188. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Grau, Olga, Riet Delsing, Eugenia Brito, and Alejandra Fariás. 1997. *Discurso, Género, Poder: Discursos Públicos: Chile, 1978-1993*. Santiago: La Morada, Universidad ARCIS, Lom Ediciones.
- Guzmán, Virginia. 1998. "La Equidad de Género como Tema de Debate y de Políticas Públicas." In Eliana Largo (ed.) *Género en el Estado, Estado del Género*. pp. 55-70. Santiago: ISIS Internacional.

- Haas, Liesl. 1998. "The Effects of Institutional Structure on Policy-Making: An Examination of Women's Rights Legislation in Chile, 1990-1998". Paper delivered at the XXI Conference of the Latin American Studies Association. Chicago, Illinois. September.
- Haggard, Stephan and Robert Kaufman. 1995. *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hardy, Clarisa. 1997. "Las Políticas Sociales en Chile." In *Chile '96: Análisis y Opiniones*. 119-135. Santiago: FLACSO-Chile.
- Hellman, Judith. 1992. "The Study of New Social Movements in Latin America and the Question of Autonomy" In Sonia Alvarez and Arturo Escobar (eds) *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy*. pp. 52-61. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Hipsher, Patricia L. 1998. "Democratic Transitions and Social Movement Outcomes: The Chilean Shantytown Dwellers' Movement in Comparative Perspective" In Marco C. Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly (eds) *From Contention to Democracy*. pp. 149-167. Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Hojman, David E. 1996. "Poverty and Inequality in Chile: Are Democratic Politics and Neoliberal Economics Good for You?" *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 38 (2/3): 73-96.
- Htun, Mala. 1998. "Participación, Representación y Liderazgo Político de la Mujer en América Latina". Report Prepared for the Inter-American Dialogue.
- Htun, Mala. 2000. "Democratic Transitions and Women's Family Rights in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile". Paper Prepared for Delivery at the Latin American Studies Association. March 16-18. Miami, Florida.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press.
- Hurtado, Victoria. 1997. "Identidad Femenina, Liderazgo y Conflicto" In Guadalupe Santa Cruz (ed.) *Veredas por Cruzar*, pp. 139-148. Santiago: Instituto de la Mujer.
- Jaquette, Jane. 1976. "Female Political Participation in Latin America" In June Nash and Helen Icken Safa (eds) *Sex and Class in Latin America*. pp. 221-244. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Jaquette, Jane S. (ed.) 1989. *The Women's Movement in Latin America: Feminism and the Transition to Democracy*. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- Jaquette, Jane S. 1994. "Women's Movements and the Challenge of Democratic Politics in Latin America" *Social Politics* 1 (3): 335-340.

- Jaquette, Jane S. and Sharon L. Wolchik (eds) 1998. *Women and Democracy: Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press
- Jelín, Elizabeth. 1996. "Citizenship Revisited: Solidarity, Responsibility, and Rights" In Elizabeth Jelín and Eric Hershberg (eds) *Constructing Democracy: Human Rights, Citizenship and Society in Latin America*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Jelín, Elizabeth. 1997. "Emergent Citizenship or Exclusion? Social Movements and Non-Governmental Organizations in the 1990s" In William C. Smith and Roberto Patricio Korzeniewicz (eds) *Politics, Social Change and Economic Restructuring in Latin America*. pp. 79-101. Miami: North-South Center Press.
- Jenson, Jane. 1986. "Gender and Reproduction: or, Babies and the State" *Studies in Political Economy* 20 (Summer): 9-46.
- Johnson, Carol. 2000. "The Fragility of Democratic Reform: New Challenges to Australian Women's Citizenship" In Shirin M. Rai (ed.) *International Perspectives on Gender and Development*. pp. 182-201. London: Macmillan Press.
- Jónasdóttir, Anna G. 1988. "On the Concept of Interest, Women's Interests, and the Limitations of Interest Theory" In Kathleen B. Jones and Anna G. Jónasdóttir (eds) *The Political Interests of Gender: Developing Theory and Research with a Feminist Face*, pp. 33-65. London: Sage Publications.
- Jones, Kathleen B. 1990. "Citizenship in a 'Woman-Friendly' Polity" *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 15 (4): 781-812.
- Jones, Mark P. 1996. "Increasing Women's Representation Via Gender Quotas: the Argentine Ley de Cupos" *Women and Politics* 16 (4): 75-98.
- Kampwirth, Karen. 1998. "Feminism, Antifeminism, and Electoral Politics in Postwar Nicaragua and El Salvador" *Political Science Quarterly* 113 (2): 259-279.
- Karl, Terry Lynn. 1990. "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America" *Comparative Politics* 23: 1-21.
- Kemp, Amanda, Nozizwe Madlala, Asha Moodley, and Elaine Salo. 1995. "The Dawn of a New Day: Redefining South African Feminism" In Amrita Basu (ed.) *The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women's Movements in Global Perspective*. pp.131-162. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Kirkwood, Julieta. 1986. *Ser Política en Chile: las Feministas y los Partidos*. Santiago: FLACSO-Chile.
- Kirkwood, Julieta. 1988. "Feministas y Políticas" In *Mujeres Latinoamericanas: Diez Ensayos y Una Historia Colectiva*. pp. 17-27. Lima: Flora Tristán, Centro de la Mujer Peruana.
- Lavrin, Asunción. 1995. *Women, Feminism, and Social Change in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, 1890-1940*. Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press.

- Lehmann, David. 1990. *Democracy and Development in Latin America: Economics, Politics, and Religion in the Post-war Period*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Lemke, Christiane. 1994. "Women and Politics: the New Federal Republic of Germany" In Barbara Nelson and Najma Chowdhury (eds) *Women and Politics Worldwide*, pp. 261-284. New Haven: Yale University Press
- Lister, Ruth. 1997. *Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives*. London: Macmillan Press.
- Loveman, Brian. 1995. "The Transition to Civilian Government in Chile" In Paul W. Drake and Iván Jaksic (eds) *The Struggle for Democracy in Chile*. pp. 305-337. Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press.
- Lovenduski, Joni. 1993. "Introduction: the Dynamics of Gender and Party" In Joni Lovenduski and Pippa Norris (eds) *Gender and Party Politics*. pp. 1-15. London: Sage Publications.
- Macaulay, Fiona. 1998. "Localities of Power: Gender, Parties and Democracy in Chile and Brazil" In Haleh Afshar (ed.) *Women and Empowerment: Illustrations from the Third World*. pp. 86-109. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Mainwaring, Scott and Eduardo Viola. 1984. "New Social Movements, Political Culture, and Democracy: Brazil and Argentina in the 1980s" *Telos* 61: 17-52.
- Mainwaring, Scott, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds) 1992. *Issues in Democratic Consolidation*. Indiana: Notre Dame University Press.
- Mama, Amina. 1995. "Feminism or Femocracy? State Feminism and Democratization in Nigeria" *Africa Development* 20 (1): 37-58.
- Marshall, T.H. 1950. *Citizenship and Social Class*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Matear, Ann. 1995. "The Servicio Nacional de la Mujer (SERNAM): Women and the Process of Democratic Transition in Chile 1990-1994." In David E. Hojman (ed.) *Neo-Liberalism with a Human Face? The Politics and Economics of the Chilean Model*. pp. 93-117. Liverpool: Institute of Latin American Studies.
- Matear, Ann. 1997a. "Desde la Protesta a la Propuesta: The Institutionalization of the Women's Movement in Chile." In Elizabeth Dore (ed.) *Gender Politics in Latin America*. pp. 84-100. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Matear, Ann. 1997b. "Gender and the State in Rural Chile" *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 16 (1): 97-105.
- Mattelart, Michele. 1976. "Chile: the Feminine Version of the Coup D'Etat" In June Nash and Helen Icken Safa (eds) *Sex and Class in Latin America*. pp. 279-301. New York: Praeger Publishers.

- Mazur, Amy G. 1995. "Strong State and Symbolic Reform: the Ministère des Droits de la Femme in France" In Steton and Mazur (eds) *Comparative State Feminism*. pp. 76-94. London: Sage Publications.
- Miller, Francesca. 1994. "The Suffrage Movement in Latin America" In Gertrude M. Yaeger (ed.) *Confronting Change, Challenging Tradition: Women in Latin America*. pp. 157-176. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc.
- Miller, Francesca. 1995. "Latin American Women and the Search for Social, Political, and Economic Transformation" In Sandor Halebsky and Richard L. Harris (eds) *Capital, Power and Inequality in Latin America*. pp. 185-206. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Molina, Natacha. 1989. "Propuestas Políticas y Orientaciones de Cambio en la Situación de la Mujer". In Manuel Antonio Garretón (ed.) *Propuestas Políticas y Demandas Sociales Vol. III*. pp. 33-171. Santiago: FLACSO-Chile.
- Molina, Natacha. 1997. "De la Denuncia a la Construcción de la Igualdad: nuevas articulaciones entre ciudadanía y género." In *Veredas por Cruzar*. pp. 181-202. Santiago: Instituto de la Mujer
- Molina G., Natacha. 1998. "Women's Struggle for Equality and Citizenship in Chile" In Geertje Lycklama à Nijeholt, Virginia Vargas and Saskia Wieringa (eds) *Women's Movements and Public Policy in Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean*. pp. 126-142. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.
- Molina, Natacha and Patricia Provoste. 1997. "Igualdad de Oportunidades Para Las Mujeres: Condición de la Democracia" In Guadalupe Santa Cruz (ed.) *Veredas por Cruzar*, pp.151-173. Santiago: Instituto de la Mujer
- Molyneux, Maxine. 1985. "Mobilization Without Emancipation? Women's Interests, the State, and Revolution" *Feminist Studies* 11 (2): 227-54.
- Molyneux, Maxine. 1998. "Analyzing Women's Movements" *Development and Change* 29: 219-245.
- Montecino, Sonia. 1991. *Madres y Huachos: alegorías del mestizaje chileno*. Santiago: Editorial Sudamericana.
- Montecinos, Verónica. 1994. "Neo-Liberal Economic Reforms and Women in Chile" In Nahid Aslanbeigui, Steven Pressman and Gale Summerfield (eds) *Women in the Age of Economic Transformation*. pp. 160-177. London: Routledge.
- Montecinos, Verónica. 1997. "Economic Reforms, Social Policy, and the Family Economy in Chile" *Review of Social Economy* 55 (2): 224-234.
- Moulian, Tomás. 1997. "El Chile Actual y su Secreto" In *Chile '96: Análisis y Opiniones*. Santiago: FLACSO-Chile.

- Muñoz, Adriana. 1996. "Mujer y Política: Complejidades y Ambivalencias". Santiago: CEPAL.
- Navarro, Marysa. 1989. "The Personal is Political: Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo" I Susan Eckstein (ed.) *Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements*. pp. 241-258. Berkeley: The University of California Press.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo and Phillippe C. Schmitter. 1986. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Oppenheim, Lois Hecht. 1993. *Politics in Chile: Democracy, Authoritarianism and the Search for Development*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Oppenheim, Lois Hecht. 1998. "Democratic Theory and Women's Participation in Politics: the Chilean Case" Santiago: ECLAC.
- Oppenheim, Lois Hecht. 1999. *Politics in Chile: Democracy, Authoritarianism, and the Search for Development*. Second Edition. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Órdenes, Ana Maria. 1998. "Nuevas Formas de Organización." In "Barreras y Potencialidades del Movimiento de Mujeres en Chile." Seminario, November 27. Santiago, Chile.
- Oxhorn, Philip. 1994a. "Where Did All the Protestors Go? Popular Mobilization and the Transition to Democracy in Chile" *Latin American Perspectives* 21 (3): 49-68.
- Oxhorn, Philip. 1994b. "Understanding Political Change after Authoritarian Rule: the Popular Sectors and Chile's New Democratic Regime" *Journal of Latin American Studies* 26: 737-759.
- Oxhorn, Philip D. 1995a. *Organizing Civil Society: the Popular Sectors and the Struggle for Democracy in Chile*. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Oxhorn, Philip D. 1995b. "From Controlled Inclusion to Coerced Marginalization: the Struggle for Civil Society in Latin America" In John A. Hall (ed.) *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison*. pp. 250-277. London: Polity Press.
- Pateman, Carole. 1992. "Equality, Difference, Subordination: the Politics of Motherhood and Women's Citizenship" In Gisela Block and Susan James (eds) *Beyond Equality and Difference: Citizenship, Feminist Politics, and Female Subjectivity*. pp. 18-31. London and New York: Routledge Press.
- Perelli, Carina. 1989. "Putting Conservatism to Good Use: Women and Unorthodox Politics in Uruguay, from Breakdown to Transition" In Jane S. Jaquette (ed.) *The Women's Movement in Latin America: Feminism and the Transition to Democracy*. pp. 95-113. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- Phillips, Anne. 1991. *Engendering Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Phillips, Anne. 1998. "Democracy and Representation: Or, Why Should it Matter Who our Representatives Are?" In Anne Phillips (ed.) *Feminism and Politics*. pp. 224-240. London: Oxford University Press.
- Power, Margaret. 2000. "Class and Gender in the Anti-Allende Women's Movement: Chile 1970-1973" *Social Politics* 7 (3): 289-308.
- Pringle, Rosemary, and Sophie Watson. 1998. "'Women's Interests' and the Post-Structuralist State" In Anne Phillips (ed.) *Feminism and Politics*. pp. 203-223. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Provoste, Patricia. 1997. "Los Servicios Públicos y los Derechos de las Mujeres: Hacia una modernización democrática de la gestión pública." In *Veredas por Cruzar: 10 Años/Instituto de la Mujer*. pp. 43-64. Santiago: Instituto de la Mujer.
- Provoste, Patricia and Patricia Silva. 1998. "Acciones de Interés Público por la no Discriminación de género" In Felipe González and Felipe Viveros (eds) *Ciudadanía e Interés Público: Enfoques desde el Derecho, la Ciencia Política y la Sociología*. pp. 9-61. Santiago: Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Diego Portales.
- Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rabkin, Rhoda. 1996. "Redemocratization, Electoral Engineering, and Party Strategies in Chile, 1989-1995" *Comparative Political Studies* 29 (3): 335-356.
- Rai, Shirin M. 1996 "Women and the State in the Third World: Some Issues for Debate" In Shirin Rai and Geraldine Lievesley (eds) *Women and the State: International Perspectives*. pp. 5-22. London: Taylor and Francis.
- Rayo, Gustavo and Gonzalo de la Maza. 2000. "Urban Action: Collective Efforts at the Grassroots Level," In Cristián Toloza and Eugenio Lahera (eds) *Chile in the Nineties*. pp. 409-454. Stanford University Libraries.
- Revilla Blanca, Marisa. 1995. "Las Organizaciones de Mujeres en Chile: Participación e Integración en el Marco de las Políticas Sociales Neoliberales" *Síntesis*, 23 (January-July): 109-132.
- Reynolds, Andrew. 1999. "Women in the Legislatures and Executives of the World: Knocking at the Highest Glass Ceiling" *World Politics* 51 (4): 547-572.
- Richards, Patricia. 2000. "Reviving Social Rights in Latin America: The Potential Role of International Human Rights Documents" *Citizenship Studies* 4 (2): 189-206.
- Roberts, Kenneth M. 1995. "From the Barricades to the Ballot Box: Redemocratization and Political Realignment in the Chilean Left" *Politics and Society* 23 (4): 495-519.

- Roberts, Kenneth M. 1997. "Rethinking Economic Alternatives: Left Parties and the Articulation of Popular Demands in Chile and Peru" In Douglas A. Chalmers, Carlos M. Vila, Katherine Hite, Scott B. Martin, Kerianne Piester, and Monique Segarra (eds) *The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America: Rethinking Participation and Representation*. pp. 313-336. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rodríguez, Victoria E. 1998. "The Emerging Role of Women in Mexican Political Life" In Rodríguez (ed.) *Women's Participation in Mexican Political Life*. pp.1-20. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Rowbotham, Sheila. 1992. *Women in Movement: Feminism and Social Action*. New York: Routledge.
- Rueschemeyer, Marilyn. 1994. *Women in Politics of Postcommunist Eastern Europe*. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.
- Rule, Wilma. 1987. "Electoral Systems, Contextual Factors, and Women's Opportunity for Election to Parliament in Twenty-Three Democracies" *Western Political Quarterly* 40: 477-486.
- Saint-Germain, Michelle A. 1997. "Mujeres '94: Democratic Transition and the Women's Movement in El Salvador". *Women and Politics* 18 (2): 75-99.
- Salinas Alvarez, Raquel. 1998. "Chile: Una Experiencia de Aprendizaje en el Sector Público" In Eliana Largo (ed.) *Género en el Estado, Estado del Género*. pp. 84-94. Santiago: ISIS Internacional.
- Sapiro, Virginia. 1998. "When are Interests Interesting? the Problem of Political Representation" In Anne Phillips (ed.) *Feminism and Politics*. pp. 161-192. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schild, Verónica. 1990. "The Hidden Politics of Neighbourhood Organizations: Women and Local Level Participation in the Poblaciones of Chile". *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*. pp. 137-157.
- Schild, Verónica. 1994. "Recasting 'Popular' Movements: Gender and Political Learning in Neighbourhood Organizations in Chile". *Latin American Perspectives* 21 (2): 59-80.
- Schild, Verónica. 1997. "New Subjects of Rights? Gendered Citizenship and the Contradictory Legacies of Social Movements in Latin America" *Organization* 44 (4): 604-9.
- Schild, Verónica. 1998. "Market Citizenship and the 'New Democracies': The Ambiguous Legacies of the Contemporary Chilean Women's Movement" *Social Politics* 5 (2): 232-249.

- Schild, Verónica. 2000a. "Neo-liberalism's New Gendered Market Citizens: The 'Civilizing' Dimension of Social Programs in Chile" *Citizenship Studies* 4 (3): 275-305.
- Schild, Verónica. 2000b. "'Gender Equity' without Social Justice: Women's Rights in the Neoliberal Age" *NACLA Report on the Americas* 34 (1): 25-28.
- Scully, Timothy R. 1995. "Reconstituting Party Politics in Chile" In Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully (eds) *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*, pp. 100-137. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Serrano, Claudia. 1990. "Entre la Autonomía y la Integración". In *Transiciones: Mujeres en los Procesos Democráticos*. pp. 99-105. Santiago: ISIS Internacional.
- Serrano, Claudia. 1992. "Estado, Mujer y Política Social en Chile" In Claudia Serrano and Dagmar Raczynski (eds) *Políticas Sociales, Mujeres, y Gobiernos Locales*. pp. 195-216. Santiago: CIEPLAN.
- Siavelis, Peter M. 1997. "Executive-Legislative Relations in Post-Pinochet Chile: A Preliminary Assessment" In Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart (eds) *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. pp. 321-362. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Siavelis, Peter M. 2000. *The President and Congress in Post-Authoritarian Chile: Institutional Constraints to Democratic Consolidation*. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Siedman, Gay W. 1999. "Gendered Citizenship: South Africa's Democratic Transition and the Construction of a Gendered State" *Gender and Society* 13 (3): 287-307.
- Silva, Eduardo. 1991. "The Political Economy of Chile's Regime Transition: from Radical to 'Pragmatic' Neo-liberal Policies". In Paul Drake and Iván Jaksic (eds) *The Struggle for Democracy in Chile, 1982-1990*. pp. 98-127. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Staudt, Kathleen. 1998. "Women in Politics: Mexico in Global Perspective" In Victoria E. Rodríguez (ed.) *Women's Participation in Mexican Political Life*. pp. 23-40. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Steston McBride, Dorothy and Amy G. Mazur (eds) 1995. *Comparative State Feminism*. London: Sage Publications.
- Stevens, Evelyn P. 1973. "Marianismo: The Other Face of Machismo in Latin America" In Ann Pescatello (ed.) *Female and Male in Latin America*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

- Strange, Carolyn. 1990. "Mothers on the March: Maternalism in Women's Protests for Peace in North America and Western Europe, 1900-1985" In Guida West and Rhoda Lois Blumberg (eds) *Women and Social Protest*. pp. 209-224. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Tabak, Fanny. 1994. "Women in the Struggle for Democracy and Equal Rights in Brazil" In Barbara J. Nelson and Najma Chowdhury (eds) *Women and Politics Worldwide*. pp. 127-141. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Taylor, Lucy. 1998. *Citizenship, Participation and Democracy: Changing Dynamics in Chile and Argentina*. London: Macmillan Press.
- Thelen, Kathleen and Sven Steinmo. 1992. "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics" in Kathleen Thelen et al(eds) *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*. pp. 1-32. Cambridge University Press.
- Valdés, Teresa. 1994. "Movimiento de Mujeres y Producción de Conocimiento de Género: Chile 1978-1989". In Magdalena León (ed.) *Mujeres y Participación Política: Avances y Desafíos en América Latina*. pp. 291-318. Bogota: Tercer Mundo Editores.
- Valdés, Teresa. 1998. "Entre la modernización y la equidad: mujeres, mundo privado y familias" In Cristian Toloza y Eugenio Lahera (eds) *Chile en los Noventa*. pp. 471.
- Valdés, Teresa and Marisa Weinstein. 1993. *Mujeres que Sueñan: las organizaciones de pobladoras en Chile 1973-1990*. Santiago: FLACSO-Chile.
- Valdés, Teresa, and Enrique Gomariz. 1995. *Mujeres Latinoamericanas en Cifras: Tomo Comparativo*. Spain: Instituto de la Mujer.
- Valenzuela, Arturo. 1978. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Valenzuela, Arturo. 1991. "The Military in Power: the Consolidation of One-Man Rule". In Paul Drake and Iván Jaksic (eds) *The Struggle for Democracy in Chile, 1982-1990*. pp. 21-72. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Valenzuela, María Elena. 1991. "The Evolving Roles of Women Under Military Rule" In Paul W. Drake and Iván Jaksic (eds) *The Struggle for Democracy in Chile: 1982-1990*. pp. 161-87. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press.
- Valenzuela, María Elena. 1994. "El Programa Nacional de Apoyo a Jefas de Hogar de Escasos Recursos." In María Elena Valenzuela (ed.) *De Mujer Sola a Jefa de Hogar: Género, Pobreza, y Políticas Públicas*. pp. 187-214. Santiago: SERNAM.

- Valenzuela, María Elena. 1998. "Women and the Democratization Process in Chile" In Jane S. Jaquette and Sharon L. Wolchik (eds) *Women and Democracy: Latin American and Central and Eastern Europe*. pp. 47-74. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Vargas, Virginia and Victoria Villanueva. 1994. "Between Confusion and the Law: Women and Politics in Peru" In Barbara J. Nelson and Najma Chowdhury (eds) *Women and Politics Worldwide*. pp. 575-589. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Vickers, Jill. 1997. *Reinventing Political Science: A Feminist Approach*. Halifax: Fernwood Publishing.
- Vogel, Isabel. 1995. "Gender and the Labour Market" In David E. Hojman (ed.) *Neoliberalism with a Human Face: The Politics and Economics of the Chilean Model*. pp. 82-91. Liverpool: Institute of Latin American Studies.
- Walby, Sylvia. 1994. "Is Citizenship Gendered?" *Sociology* 28 (2): 379-395.
- Walby, Sylvia. 1997. *Gender Transformations*. London: Routledge Press.
- Waylen, Georgina. 1994. "Women and Democratization: Conceptualizing Gender Relations in Transition Politics" *World Politics* 46 (3): 327-354.
- Waylen, Georgina. 1996. "Analysing Women in the Politics of the Third World" In Haleh Afshar (ed.) *Women and Politics in the Third World*. London: Routledge.
- Waylen, Georgina. 1997. "Women's Movements, the State and Democratization in Chile: The Establishment of SERNAM" In Anne Marie Goetz (ed.) *Getting Institutions Right for Women in Development*. pp. 90-103. London: Zed Books.
- Waylen, Georgina. 2000a. "Rights, Gender, and the Institutional Arena" Paper presented at the 2000 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association. Miami, March 16-18.
- Waylen, Georgina. 2000b. "Gender and Democratic Politics: A Comparative Analysis of Consolidation in Argentina and Chile" *Journal of Latin American Studies* 32: 765-793.
- Weyland, Kurt. 1997. "'Growth with Equity' in Chile's New Democracy?" *Latin American Research Review* 32 (1): 37-67.
- Zavala San Martín, Ximena. 1997. "El Divorcio como Condición de Pluralismo y Libertad" In Guadalupe Santa Cruz (ed.) *Veredas por Cruzar*. pp. 255-264. Santiago: Instituto de la Mujer.
- Zulu, Lindewe. 2000. "Institutionalizing Changes: South African Women's Participation in the Transition to Democracy" In Shirin Rai (ed.) *International Perspectives on Gender and Democratization*. pp. 166-181. London: Macmillan Press.