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REGULATING FISHERS: A CASE STUDY OF NON-COMPLIANCE

by

Thomas Richard Poetschke, B.A., M.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and research in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy
Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

May 16, 1997

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**The undersigned hereby recommend
to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
acceptance of the thesis,
"Regulating Fishers: A Case Study of Non-Compliance"**

**submitted by
Thomas Richard Poetschke, B.A., M.A.
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

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Abstract

This is a sociological case study of non-compliance in the context of a Canadian federal regulatory organization. We set out to understand why non-compliance had become normative behaviour. We expected to find that the nature of the organization's relationship with its participants would explain their resistance to its rules. Our strategy for identifying a more effective enforcement approach was to identify and analyse lower participant perspectives on how the organization ought to relate to its participants.

Previous research pays little attention to the impacts of a regulatory organization's nature on participant compliance. The literature on community-based policing comes the closest when it assumes that enforcement organizations that encourage more cooperative forms of social interaction between officers and clients will be more effective. However, this literature lacks a theoretical framework. We turned to sociological theory and found a theoretical location for our research objectives in the classical tradition of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. We fused some of their theories and those in a similar tradition by Robert Merton, Alvin Gouldner, Amitai Etzioni, and James Wilson into a theoretical framework.

In exploring the connections between the nature of the organization and non-compliance, we focus on the fit between participant and organization goals and means. We show how characteristics of its internal and external environment affect organization goals and means, and how these affect the orientations of participants. The regulation and enforcement of Canada's coastal fisheries is carried out by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canada. The research took place in two radically different field locations, thus adding a comparative dimension to the analyses. In one location the culture is anti-union, highly competitive and individualistic. In the other, it is pro-union and collectivistic.

Our findings demonstrate that this organization's goals, means, participant commitments, and enforcement approach are similar to those that are characteristic of coercive organizations. The organization's repressive structures alienate fishers and officers and shatter the organization's legitimacy. The organization operates without lower participant consent. Consequently, lower participants refuse to comply with the organization. Fishers and officers want their organization to be based on normative consensus. This finding together with many other characteristics they say would make their organization more effective, builds a picture of an ideal enforcement organization that appears to resemble what the literature refers to as community-based policing. We draw the conclusion that our theory and our results explain why this form of policing is emerging as the preferred way to organize enforcement activities. Our findings suggest that the normative organizational type may offer effective ways administratively to enforce public and private interests in a resource industry. We identify a strategy for normative fisheries enforcement.

Acknowledgements

This dissertation is the culmination of many years of study both in and out of the University setting. After five years of participation in the doctoral program in Sociology at Carleton University on full-time basis, in 1981 I left to join a Canadian government bureaucracy. I was conscious of the need to reality-test my theoretical knowledge. After twelve years of that sort of field work on a full time paid basis, I concluded there was a need to reconsider my theoretical foundation and apply it to explain the large collection of unanswered questions I had by then accumulated. I rejoined the doctoral program and this dissertation is the result.

My father and next youngest brother exercised the most significant influences on my interest in intellectual problems. I do not know from whom I inherited the need to ground my studies in empirical reality. My supervisor, Dennis Forcese, played the major role in the direction within Sociology that my interests have followed. Somehow he encouraged my work without imposing on it. Members of my Committee, Wallace Clement and Bruce Doern, also provided advice and direction for my work. It was “a dynamite committee”, and I am fortunate to have had their help.

My colleagues at work taught me more, of course, than I will ever be able to express about the nature of man, organizations and myself. I met many fishers and officers and other members of the fishing community while conducting this research. At times it seemed as though I was merely helping them to formulate questions that like my own, had been bothering them for years. It leads me to hope that differences in educational and professional backgrounds do not prevent most people from becoming deeply interested in the questions we explore in this study.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Many domestic inshore fishers increase their success using illegitimate means.¹ In some areas their non-compliance with the lawful means threatens Canada's renewable fishing resources. Although it is less well understood, non-compliance with their organization's norms also occurs among its paid employees. Our objectives are to explain why officers and fishers are non-compliant and identify the policy implications of this explanation.

The challenge for political organizations that regulate these types of activities is one of ensuring that resource extraction proceeds in an orderly manner. In this regard, common sense suggests that the regulator's approach must not offend the participants to such an extent that they reject its authority to regulate. When non-compliance is normative behaviour, it could signify that the approach of the regulatory organization has lost its legitimacy.

In some circles the appropriate strategy for regulatory bureaucracies is to redefine their roles and be more responsive at less cost. Bottom up management, and steering not

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¹A number of empirical studies identify domestic non-compliance as a significant problem in Canada and other fishing nations with coastal fisheries. For example according to Furlong's (1992:11) data on fishery officer perceptions, about 35% of the lobster in the Gulf Region in 1992 was landed illegally. In some parts of that Region, such as District 66, the situation was even more serious. Furlong (1992:12) found that 82% of the district catch was landed illegally, with from 19% to 67% of the fishers, depending upon the type of violation, committing these offenses. Similar trends in non-compliance in this Region are reported for violations relating to ground fish, herring and snow crab fisheries. Non-compliance is a problem in all of the department's Regions. Quantification of the extent of non-compliance is not a concern of this study, because existing studies, their imprecision notwithstanding, show that the situation is serious. Our main objective is to understand why non-compliance takes place.

rowing, and local empowerment are popular proposals for restructuring public bureaucracies in line with new values, means, and international competitiveness. Public organizations are told to align their values more with public needs, and use new ways to attain their goals. A central thrust of our research is to investigate the extent to which this normative alternative is gaining any ground among its participants.

This chapter begins by describing the research objective and approach. It introduces the players and their organizational and industry contexts. It states the problem and lists our main hypotheses. It concludes with an outline of each chapter.

Research Objective and Approach

The research objective is to explain why non-compliance with this organization's regulatory framework is occurring. We do this by relating the nature of the organization to the attitudes and other behaviours of organization participants. We will show how organization and participant behaviours are shaped by factors that are internal and external to the organization's environment. Since non-compliance with fisheries laws is an enforcement problem, we begin with a review of fisheries enforcement literature, and extend this review to other enforcement organizations and economic and social literatures on fisheries management issues. We note that most of these studies focus on only a small part of our research problem. Therefore, we look for and find a more relevant literature in the classical sociological tradition of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, and in subsequent elaborations by Robert Merton, Alvin Gouldner, Amitai Etzioni, and James Wilson, all of whom worked within that tradition. We merge these to form our theoretical framework.

Our theoretical approach does not dispute that non-compliance may be a complex function of offender characteristics and some degree of cost-benefit calculation that these

may at times perform. However, in circumstances where non-compliance is normative or even very common behaviour, it implies there is a fundamental difference in values between those who are to obey the rules and those whose responsibility it is to develop and enforce the rules. It leads us to question the nature of the organization's goals and its uses of its authority to achieve its goals, and to examine the compatibility of organization and participant goals and means. If they are incompatible, and given the "opportunity" to reject the rules without being detected is present, alienated participants would certainly have sufficient "motive". Our hypothesis is that non-compliance by fishers and officers results because their organization's nature is alienating. Non-compliance results when strong sentiments of alienation induce participants to substitute their own norms for those of the organization.

The Players²

The following provides some background on those whose interactions define the nature of this organization. These include the fishing industry, the organization and its enforcement component, enforcement officials, and fishers.

The Fishing Industry

Parsons (1993:2-11) overview of Canada's fisheries describes Canada as the leading exporter of fish products, with the longest coastline in the world, possessing a fishery that accounts for about one percent of the value-added and three percent of the employment in Canadian commodity-producing industries. In addition, the fishing industry is far more

---

²Further information about the respondents is provided in Chapter Three.

See also "Appendix E: Annotated Tables and Statistics" for descriptions of several respondent characteristics such as education, innovation, ambition, and adaptive strategy.

important in certain regional and sub-regional economies. For example, fisheries accounted for seventy-two and twenty-three percent respectively, of employment in goods producing industries in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. At the sub-regional or county level, such as SW Nova Scotia, the dependence on fishing employment is even greater.³

The federally managed Atlantic fisheries are grouped into three major categories of user group: commercial, recreational, and native food fisheries; and three major categories by species: ground fish, shellfish, and pelagic. In addition, aquaculture operations, some of which are federally managed, is another distinct user group. Our study is concerned primarily with the commercial fisheries.⁴ In 1988, shellfish accounted for fifty-five percent, ground fish thirty-seven percent, while pelagic species accounted for less than ten percent of the total value of commercial fish landed in Atlantic Canada.

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³While Poetschke (1984) found that there were over thirteen hundred small Atlantic fishing communities, over half of which were single sector, that picture is changing. Increasingly, the isolated community pattern is eroding and many communities now make up "clusters of communities", with employment, business, and social and cultural interaction stretching for as much as sixty kilometres along the coastline. In some cases, the most important geo-political unit from the fisheries perspective is arguably the county.

⁴The Atlantic recreational fishery is based on Atlantic salmon, and to a lesser extent, mackerel, pollack, cod and blue-fin tuna. Parsons (1993) notes that only about ten percent of the recreational fishing industry concentrates on marine resources. The remainder is inland. In terms of expenditures by tourists who participate in recreational fishing and employment in tourist services related to anglers, recreational fishing contributes significantly to the Atlantic economy. Aquaculture is a small industry in Atlantic Canada but it is growing rapidly. In the Atlantic provinces it is based mostly on Atlantic salmon, trout, mussels, and oysters, but scallops are being developed. For the approximately twenty thousand Aboriginals in the Atlantic provinces, fish are an important part of their way of life, and food fisheries help to sustain their cultural heritage.

There are wide differences among provinces in harvesting methods and species dependence. Newfoundland's fisheries are highly dependent on ground fish landings, while Nova Scotia is more dependent on shellfish (lobsters and scallops). Nova Scotia's ground fishery is more diversified. Its more favourable climate allows a year-round fishery, and much of it is accessible to fishers with vessels that are less than 35 feet in length. SW Nova Scotia has large offshore trawlers, a large mid-shore fleet of (40'-65') Otter Trawlers (draggers), a specialized scallop dragger fleet, a large fleet of herring purse seiners, and mid-shore long liners. In addition, there are a large number of inshore lobster and ground fish fishermen.

Three large vertically integrated fish companies, with plants scattered throughout the Atlantic coast, (Fishery Products International, National Sea Products, and Clearwater Seafoods), account for about fifty percent of the fish processed in fish processing establishments. The majority of fish processing establishments are in Nova Scotia (thirty-five percent). Newfoundland has twenty-five percent. Plants in SW Nova Scotia tend to be small to medium in size, and many of these produce high value added products and have their own market niche.

The Regulatory Organization

The duties, powers, and functions of the Minister of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canada include all matters over which Parliament has jurisdiction and not assigned to any other jurisdiction by Parliament relating to marine and inland fisheries, fishing and recreational harbours, hydrography, marine science, and policies and program coordination on behalf of the Government of Canada respecting Oceans, as well as other matters assigned to the Minister by law (DFO Fact Book, 1993:5).

The mission of the department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) is "...to assist its varied clientele in achieving their aspirations and goals in a framework established by Government and Ministerial policy (DFO Fact Book, 1993:5)." DFO is organized into three national program areas: Fisheries Operations (1200 Full time equivalents (FTE)), Regulatory and International Affairs (1300 FTE), and Science (2000 FTE). In addition there is a Corporate Management sector (1200 FTE), and a small Policy and Program Planning sector. The total number of FTE personnel in DFO in 1993/94 was approximately 5700 (Parsons, 1993:454).

Enforcement activities are carried out by the Enforcement Branch of the Regulatory and International Affairs Program. The mandate of the Branch is: "To ensure compliance with the legislation and policies and programs that relate to the conservation of Canada's fisheries resources and to ensure their best use by present and future generations (DFO Fact Book, 1993:13)." According to this book, compliance is promoted by information and education activities and enforcement programs that are delivered through air, sea, and land surveillance activities. The most direct expression of the compliance activities of DFO come from more than seven hundred and fifty fishery officers who enforce compliance in Canada's tidal waters, and in the inland waters of Canada, except Ontario, Quebec, and the Prairie Provinces where responsibility for ensuring compliance with federal legislation is delegated to provincial conservation officers.

In fiscal year 1993/94, there were approximately seven hundred and fifty federal fishery officers. Seventy percent of these were in the five Atlantic provinces. The Scotia-Fundy Region of DFO employed about 130 officers in that fiscal year.

Enforcement Officers and Their Managers

The formal image of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans is that of a legal-

rational bureaucracy. It appears to be staffed by people who hold positions they obtain on the basis of merit, where the responsibilities and authorities of ranked positions are encoded in writing, and where performance expectations are defined neither by individual experiences nor by participation in sub-groups within the organization. One of our research objectives is to identify the nature of the organization by investigating aspects of its nature that lie beneath the surface of the formal image.

The field research outside of Ottawa Headquarters was conducted in areas that are widely recognized as distinct cultural contexts. This provides an opportunity to consider the generality of our findings. In one setting, the society is traditional and collectivistic. That is the culture emphasizes deference to authority, and dependence on paternalistic and charismatic leaders, and all fishers regardless of gear type are members of the same Union. Although fishery officers in one location work within a bureaucratic setting, outside that organization they participate in the community cultures, and those are traditional. In the other location, the society is organized along the lines of independent commodity production. Individuals tend to be individualistic, anti-union, anti-authoritarian, success-oriented, and highly competitive. Fishers frequently clash with other gear types of loosely aggregated fisher sub-cultures.

Fishers

In 1988, there were about sixty-six thousand Atlantic fishermen; forty-five percent in Newfoundland, and twenty-five percent in Nova Scotia. Although it has been widely argued that fishermen are generally poor, a recent study of income and educational attainment of fishermen, plant employees, and other employees in the Atlantic provinces found (Poetschke:1993), that in 1985 fisher average incomes were higher than the average

income of all other Atlantic employees. However, in some parts of Newfoundland and Labrador, and in the North Shore of Quebec, fisher's average incomes were lower than all employees in those areas. Fishers in SW Nova Scotia earned the highest average incomes. They were more than one hundred and sixty percent of the average income of all employees in that area.

While these fishers may be described in general terms as rugged individualists, many have nevertheless been organized into unions (CSW; CBRT; CAW; MFU); or cooperatives (UMF); or associations of vessel owners (and sometimes crew members) such as the Southwest Seiners Association; and into a federation of associations (the Eastern Fisheries Federation (EFF)). The tension between associations, unions, and the federations of associations, was remarked by Clement (1984), who referred to the "inherent instability" and "particularism" of various factions in the fisheries. As he put it:

"Generally they struggle to maintain the status quo rather than see their vested interests erode since there is little common basis for directing social change. Whereas unions tend to be inclusive of various factions, sectors and regions, associations thrive on area, gear, and species divisions (Clement, 1984)."

The world of fishers is one of constant adaptation to competition, changing populations of fish, market demand, technology and regulation of fishing behaviours. All other things being equal, the crucial determinant of fisher financial success is the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Consequently, neither the enforcement officials or their fisher clients finds it easy to remain affectively neutral in their interactions with one another.

A wide range of differences in geography, resource strength and economic value, fishing practices, weather, fishing pressures, ethnic background, political sophistication, and dependence on fishing activities characterizes coastal areas of the Atlantic provinces. Sub-

cultural norms of “success” vary with the locality of the activity. Where local cultures emphasize financial success, fishers must juggle their drive to succeed and their fishing capacity with regulatory restrictions on their activities. Fishers pursue these interests, form alliances, and share collective experiences with those who face similar situations. These experiences shape each occupational group’s views of their entitlements relative to members and non-members.

One can easily imagine some of the most obvious difficulties fishers face. The logic of the regulatory regime is bureaucratic. Its rational-legal rules may directly affect fisher incomes, the penalties for violations and the extent and intensity by which the rules are enforced. In micro-managed fisheries, the rules are constantly changing and affecting the relative opportunities of groups of fishers. After numerous disagreements among them over the justice of the new rules, the relationship among fishers and between fishers and regulators may become strained.

The Problem

There are indications (Furlong:1992) that in some fisheries or localities a majority of fishermen do not comply with the regulations. The Minister of Fisheries and Oceans considered the decline of the ground fish stocks as a crisis and closed some areas where stocks were in jeopardy. Shellfish and pelagic stocks make up the other fifty percent of the value of the Atlantic fishery. Although these stocks are not as seriously threatened at the present time, levels of non-compliance are high in some cases, and unless the behaviour of the users of the resource changes, there is good reason to predict that other stock crises will

occur.⁵

Since fish population declines may have multiple causes, many fishers refuse to accept part of the responsibility for this problem. However, fish are disappearing. Non-compliance by domestic fishers is one cause. Unlike urban crime, most of which has individual victims, the effects of fisheries non-compliance are experienced by communities. Hundreds of small Atlantic communities depend on fishing activity for their livelihood. The problems that result from the accumulated effects of non-compliance have serious consequences for fishing dependent communities.

However, there are inherent forces in this "system" that seem to be generating some

---

⁵It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the main cause of stock declines. Non-compliance by domestic fishermen may be a major factor explaining the decline of certain stocks. Other factors that are involved include changes in the water temperature, biological cycles, pollution, certain types of harvesting technology, DFO mismanagement, a growth in certain predators in the food chain, and foreign overfishing. The competing gear sectors also blame the technology and harvesting practices of the other sectors for stock declines. DFO is often blamed for the declines. Aspects of its regulatory regime such as trip limits, which until January of 1993 encouraged discarding of fish over the allowed limits, was noted by many respondents. Other aspects of its regulatory regime are assigned blame, such as the regulation requiring that all trap-caught fish should be landed (this technology allows for live release of fish that are not targeted, and targeted ones can be retained); while, for other gear types such as Otter Trawl, the by-catch (which is usually dead) must be discarded. Although these regulatory measures were introduced at the request of the industry and with significant levels of input from some of the department's clients, some fishers find these policies confusing, and hold the department accountable for their effects. Departmental licensing policies that oblige fishers to "use or lose" their licences are also seen by some as a DFO-exerted pressure on over-taxed resources. Some fishers take some of the blame because they attribute their catches to areas with higher trip limits, when caught in other areas, a behaviour that reduces the accuracy of the stock assessment processes. Some processing plants also misrepresent the origin and volume of landings at times, thus interfering with projections of optimal harvest levels.

changes. Fiscal restraint is forcing individuals to find more effective ways to perform their duties. The concern over sustainable development is another value that intensifies the search for alternatives. The perception that the existing system is not fair and that it is not contributing to the development of a modern and productive industry adds to the desire to change the status quo. Another factor is the desire expressed by some individuals to have communities play more significant roles in enforcement matters. As the fish diminish faster than the capacity to catch them by legal or illegal means, the need for change takes on increasing importance.

Given the perceptions of low risk, an apparent habit of projecting the blame, and the complex causal web involved in accountability, the introduction of a preventative and voluntary enforcement approach is a challenge. On the other hand, if "Draconian" alternatives are politically or morally unacceptable, and assuming that in their absence enforcement can only affect a fraction of the problem, an increase in enforcement resources cannot fix the problem. It is possible that regional economic development could take some of the pressure off the fisheries as "the employer of last resort", but governments have been unable to develop regional economic development policies to achieve these goals. It appears that voluntary compliance needs to be given serious consideration.

Hypotheses

Our review of the research problem and its context leads to a number of hypotheses:

1. The nature of this regulatory organization provokes resistance from enforcement officials and fisher clients.
2. The organization alienates its enforcement officials and fisher clients.
3. The organization's approach is repressive.

4. Given the impossibility of coercively regulating individuals when sustained monitoring of their behaviours is impractical, effective compliance requires participants voluntarily to comply with rules.
5. Fishers and enforcement officials will believe that their organization needs to promote voluntary compliance.

Chapter Outlines

Chapter two reviews empirical literature on enforcement and other fisheries management issues. Economic and social research in these fields is examined for its utility in relation to our research questions. We locate a more comprehensive theoretical framework in classical sociology, particularly that of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, and subsequent theories in the same tradition that were developed by R. Merton, A. Gouldner, A. Etzioni, and James Wilson. We integrate many of their central arguments into a theoretical framework. The hypotheses we identified in Chapter one are restated in terms that connect them to the theory.

Chapter three describes how we connect our theoretical framework and our hypotheses about non-compliance to empirical reality. It outlines our research methods, specific operational research issues, rationales for choosing research sites and selecting respondents, data collection methods and types of data collected, and describes how obstacles that we had not anticipated were overcome.

Chapter four describes the nature of the organization and its structural congruence and the related issue of organizational effectiveness. Lower participant views are organized into a description of organization goals, means for obtaining compliance and the type of commitment lower participants display. The characteristics of each dimension of structure and findings about the properties of those structures are related to organization effectiveness.

Chapter five shows how the nature of this organization is shaped by two types of factors that we argue are "external" to the organization. One is the macro political context within which the organization is situated, the other is the micro community context of lower participants.

Chapter six shows how the organization is shaped by the operations of several "internal" factors. These effect the nature of consensus within the organization and include: recruitment, training, and socialization practices, scope and pervasiveness in the lives of lower participants, nature of lower participant work, rules, spheres of consensus and communication mechanisms.

Chapter seven presents an overview of our empirical and theoretical findings and conclusions and our suggestions for further research. The organization's nature is identified and the chapter shows why a normative type of organization may be a more effective way to regulate fisheries. We identify a strategy for a new type of fisheries enforcement organization along normative lines. Finally, we point to other areas where our theoretical merger may help to clarify the nature of public and private sector organizations.

Conclusion

This chapter described the research problem and the general approach to that problem. It identified organization and industry contexts and provided background information on selected characteristics of the organization's participants. It listed the main hypotheses and provided an outline of each chapter.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Exposition

This chapter reviews selected theoretical and empirical literatures on non-compliance and fisheries enforcement. It compares empirical findings from two “perspectives” on enforcement in fisheries. The “economic” perspective examines problems of non-compliance based largely on assumptions that are drawn from neo-classical economics. The “social” perspective examines non-compliance using assumptions about collective and/or individual behaviours that at times may transcend the boundaries of neo-classical economics.⁶ Because neither literature is sufficient to guide this research, we turn to more comprehensive theoretical formulations in the classical tradition of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, and to extensions to those theories by Alvin Gouldner, Robert Merton, Amitai Etzioni, and James Wilson. We merge these into a theoretical framework.

Economic and Social Perspectives⁷

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⁶We employ the term “social perspective” to refer to all those social scientific studies that are not clearly “economic” in the narrow sense of economics that seems to have dominated much of the published literature on fisheries enforcement issues.

⁷We could have amplified the discussion of existing literatures relating to our research questions by distinguishing among several of the more obvious social disciplines that approach these issues. These include: administration and fisheries management, the ecological perspective, anthropology, political science and political-economy. However, there was no obvious need for that type of theoretical analysis. Our review of the mixture of social literature on fisheries issues as “the social perspective” led us to conclude that none of the existing disciplines were sufficiently comprehensive for our research purposes. In retrospect, we note that because of the gap in the existing studies we had to look outside the existing social fisheries literature for our theoretical framework. As the reader will observe later on in this dissertation, the theoretical synthesis we applied actually integrates three dimensions/“disciplines” (economic, social, and political) of individual and organizational behaviour. Furthermore, it solves our theoretical and empirical problems because it incorporates several disciplines within the same framework.

Canada's fisheries problems are frequently attributed to a variety of factors that are consistent with explanations that follow from applications of the economic perspective. Many observe that most fisheries problems result because "there are too many fishers chasing too few fish." Many attribute non-compliance by fishers to the same cause. The non-compliance of other (paid) employees is attributed to the inefficiency of the public sector.

The pressures that single-sector fishing communities, their unions, and the plant owner sometimes place on politicians to sustain "unprofitable" fish plants and to extend fishing and fish plant employment for political reasons is one explanation of declining fish stocks and increasing levels of non-compliance. Another argument that finds support among economists is the idea that these problems are linked to the special unemployment insurance system available to fishers. This program is seen to create a dependency on public assistance and be a disincentive to those who might otherwise find non-fishing employment. Another explanation is the failure of regional development policies aimed at (among other things) generating alternative employment opportunities.

Economists will argue that the solutions to these problems are to ensure that market forces (rational factors) and not community pressures or any other social pressures on the political system ought to determine plant closures, limit numbers of fishers and plant employees and bring harvesting capacity in line with the limits of fishing resources. This view asserts that if certain political influences were removed and punitive measures, (whose severity makes non-compliance economically unrewarding), introduced, non-compliance with the regulatory framework would diminish. Removing political interference would allow rational economic factors to determine the nature of the industry, and the punishments would deter most of those who might cheat within that rational system.

The social perspective accepts that interference with market factors may cause non-compliance, but argues these are only part of the explanation. Non-compliance needs to be viewed against the background of the entire situation facing the participants in the regulatory organization. Non-compliance is a social, (not simply an economic) product. Through a wide range of social interaction processes, one's goals, powers, and orientations are woven into behaviour patterns. Non-compliance is one pattern.

The social perspective argues that to explain non-compliance and identify ways to encourage compliant behaviour patterns, there is a need empirically to identify the nature of certain important relationships. In addition, there is a need to identify that combination of goals, means, orientations and other relationships that might be acceptable to participants. The perspective may lead to a focus on social processes and the means, values and orientations of the participants in those processes. It is argued that an enduring shift toward compliance may require a corresponding change in the processes that trigger non-compliance. Therefore, to understand what is needed to "produce" compliance, differences in powers, goals, and orientations of individuals in contrast to those of the regulatory organization need to be clarified.

Economic Perspectives

Becker's (1968) economic theory of crime tends to dominate the empirical literature on fisheries enforcement. This literature (Furlong, 1985, 1991, 1992(a) &(b), 1993; Andersen and Sutinen, 1983; Andersen and Lee, 1986; Blewett E, Furlong, and Toews, 1987; Sutinen and Anderson, 1985; Milliman S.R., 1986), discusses enforcement's role in optimal management of resources, and makes a substantial contribution to considerations of enforcement costs in terms of discrete fisheries, and net benefits to society that result when

enforcement resources are applied. Sutinen addresses the question of enforcement in the context of the overall objectives of fisheries management. In this context, a common property resource, by its nature, is said to require some form of regulation to optimize its value and protect stocks from the "tragedy of the commons".

Studies in the field of resource economics discuss the relative merits of measures such as quotas, mesh sizes, limits on harvesting capacity and privatization (transferable or non transferable quotas). However, resource economists have only recently focused on implications of these management measures for enforcement. It is increasingly recognized that the value of any management regime is partly determined by its enforceability and its costs (compliance and/or non-compliance costs), to industry and the public.

A major theme of the 1992 OECD/FAO workshop on individual quota management was the question of how to enforce individual transferable quotas, and at what cost? The papers from this conference show that estimating compliance rates is a persistent problem. Estimates of enforcement cost-effectiveness and, therefore, the net benefits of this type of management regime are difficult to determine. The papers were supportive of individual transferable quotas because these privatize the resource and in theory would motivate optimal harvesting strategies based on the self-interests of the owners. However, they added that there is a need to address enforcement requirements for individual transferable quota management. In the extreme case of normative non-compliance and unenforceable regulatory regimes, it is clear that the transferable quota management would be unsuccessful.

The economic literature on fisheries enforcement examines factors associated with non-compliance. Becker's theory predicts that as rational maximizers of their utilities, fishers will cheat when the probability of detection, the pay-offs from cheating, the probability of

being convicted, and the magnitude of the fine or other punitive measure(s), is in their favour. Some data support some of their hypotheses and some do not. In addition to the weakness resulting from the inability to obtain reliable measures of rates of non-compliance, their data do not distinguish "serious" from "non-serious" offenses within the same offense category. Serious offenses may be defined as those with obvious negative impacts on conservation of fish, and the non-serious offenses are those with little obvious negative impacts.

The profile of the "typical violator" that emerges from applying the assumption that fishers are rational economic actors does not match the available evidence in respect to the magnitude of non-compliance. Furlong regressed selected variables against compliance rates and other variables. He found that the probability of violation is a function of low age, previous convictions, low income households, high unemployment households, and households where fishing activity is not the main source of earnings. The profile he developed of the "typical violator" bears a close resemblance to what is referred to as the "marginal fisherman". However, since the top twenty percent of fishers (none of whom are marginal) catch eighty percent of the fish, the impact of non-compliance by marginal fishermen must be relatively small. Furthermore, Furlong shows that illegal harvests in some fisheries and areas are more than one-half the magnitude of the legal harvest. The marginal violator cannot account for more than a fraction of the illegal catch.

Some economists express concerns about the net value of enforcement activities for achieving optimal levels of conservation and economic use of the resource. Sutinen, for example, leans toward a compliance-based approach, and expands his theoretical framework beyond that of the rational man and into dimensions of community, and legitimate and fair

use of authority. After modelling enforcement costs in a quota based Atlantic fishery, he finds that enforcement costs increase when the resource increases, but they also increase when the resource declines. He argues that since enforcement efforts can only affect as much as ten percent of the variance in non-compliance, it is the other ninety percent, or the factors affecting compliance, that offer greater potential for improvements to the effectiveness of enforcement. Some compliance factors include perceptions of the legitimacy of the management authority or government itself, the moral codes of the participants in the fisheries, and other underlying causes of non-compliance such as the perceived degree of fairness of the enforcement regime.⁸

Because the empirical work generally ignores the more inclusive social situation out of which non-compliance emerges, proscriptions for enhancing enforcement effectiveness are not always appropriate. As a guide to enforcement strategy, the economic perspective tells us to increase penalties, enforcement resources, conviction rates, and to exploit the public media value of those who are caught to create an impression that the probability of detection is high. And a straightforward application of Furlong's data would suggest that enforcement resources should be targeted on young marginal fishermen, even though we know they catch relatively few fish. The economic advice is also limited by its cost implications and the political acceptability of "hard" enforcement measures.

In addition to these weaknesses, these studies do not suggest ways to obtain better results with existing enforcement resources. They do not help us to identify or understand what could be done about the conditions that promote compliance, nor do they tell us what

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⁸Sutinen has not published any empirical work along these lines.

we can do about the range of factors that encourage non-compliance. The economic theory of crime seems to guide policies and activities toward adversarial, reactive and punitive types of enforcement actions. They do not show how to undo the existing patterns to prevent non-compliance patterns from developing.

Social Perspectives

Mathews and Phyne(1988) argue that the tragic view of the commons places too much emphasis on man's self-interest (utilitarianism) and denies the possibility of collective and cooperative (normative) action to regulate common property as an alternative to government control. Voluntary restriction of one's own appetites is an alternative to behaviours motivated by fear or by hope of economic reward. From the social perspective, maximizing individual utilities is one of a number of explanations for behaviours by individuals. In other situations, social norms (moral imperatives) may overrule economic imperatives. Non-compliance may also be stimulated by a perception that the behaviour of the regulator is illegitimate. Rebellion and/or innovation may result because the regulated see the rules as irrational, coerced, unjust, or misguided.

Some aspects of self-directed enforcement only make sense from a social perspective. It is only in this broader perspective that "the concept of the fox put in charge of the hens" is a logical possibility. That the concept is a part of existing community activities is illustrated by Phyne's(1990) observation that Davis(1984), Martin(1979), and Mathews and Phyne(1988) identified community based "regulatory", or "usufruct" measures that control some of the issues relating to "ownership" of particular territory or fishing rights.⁹

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⁹Furthermore, there is evidence to indicate that at least in the case of Lake Erie fishers, local control over fisheries is successful at introducing effective and tough measures.

The enforceability of management regimes and fisher involvement was addressed in two OECD papers on the fisheries. One noted the importance of support by fishers for the rules they are obliged to follow:

‘Fishermen are not easily persuaded of their own contribution to stock run downs, but ultimately it is all fishermen who are most affected by them. This can make them a receptive, if critical audience. Certainly their hearts and minds must be won over to new regulations to ensure general compliance, which cannot be achieved by enforcement alone (United Kingdom:1993; 9).’

The other submission argued that since penalties are not significantly deterring fisher non-compliance, perhaps they should be encouraged to police themselves. That is:

‘There are reasons to believe that control by police corps is less effective than the control exerted by fishermen themselves. In many cases the former is perceived as an external source of intervention and as such it could be perceived as a game between two players where resources are not considered any more. In the other case, whatever penalty imposed by the community group, it is the social blame on the guilty fishermen which is the true deterrent. While experience shows that other problems could arise if this approach is adopted, it is also true that advantages could reveal to be larger than disadvantages in artisanal fisheries (Italy:1993:18).’

Other types of enforcement agencies appear to be adopting these more social approaches in their attempts to grapple with crime. The enforcement literature over the past decade highlights community-based policing and problem-oriented enforcement. These call for new roles and responsibilities for field officers, citizens, and community leaders. Prevention is emphasized over knee jerk reactions to problems; service to clients, conceptualized as partners, contrasts with the more adversarial approach; and community interaction instead of professional detachment from the network of social and other

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Lake Erie fishers adopted restrictions on themselves that they had rejected when they were proposed by the provincial government. Lake Erie fishers closed fisheries at night and forced themselves to land at designated sites.

organizations that affect community attitudes toward compliance is emphasized. They call for less hierarchical structures and less bureaucracy.

James Wilson (1968) compared enforcement approaches among scores of police forces in the United States (watch, legalistic, and service), and related the ideal-types he identified to elements of their internal organization structures, nature of enforcement challenges faced, and level of community political and economic development. Hawkins (1984) studied pollution control by officers in Great Britain and found they operated in a legalistic bureaucratic context. Officers were obliged to adopt flexible policing styles to obtain voluntary support from those they regulated. Officer enforcement approach varied with their perceptions of the "type of polluter" encountered. Hawkins work, like so many other studies of bureaucracies and enforcement bureaucracies (Skolnick:1966, Ericson:1981&1982, Blau, etc.), leads us to expect such organizations to display formal images or masks to the public that may be quite different from their actual behaviour. Their public face may appear quite rational while their private face may not be so rational.

Phyne(1988) describes how organization and environment factors shape the roles of Fishery Officers in the Department of Fisheries and Oceans's Newfoundland Region. He found that Fishery Officers were decentralized, operated with a good deal of discretion, particularly on minor matters, and had some input into policy formation. Discretion was encouraged by their supervisors because the role of the officer brought him into direct contact with fishers, and the nature of their work required the exercise of judgment in resolving disputes based on substantive rather than legalistic justice. Another reason was that information from the fishers was needed for fisheries management purposes, and it was argued (implicitly) that Fishery Officer's use of discretion gave them some bargaining power

in this respect with the fishermen.

Phyne found the enforcement component was highly valued by the officers but was only one of seven major components. Resource management took precedence over enforcement. These aspects of Phyne's study suggest Fishery Officers operate like police officers in bureaucratic organizations, but deliver services much like those in police forces that emphasize community-based policing.

Wilson's(1968) study places law enforcement in community, organization, and political contexts. Although there is little literature on the fishing industry that explicitly carries out this type of analysis, some references to community attitudes toward the department's enforcement and fisheries management functions appeared in Fishing For The Future Workshops (1991), and in a study commissioned by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (Scotia-Fundy Region), entitled "A Review of the Consultative Process (1990)." Each of these Nova Scotia based studies found that community participants wanted more influence and input into the processes that determine departmental policies, including enforcement policies. The workshops concluded that fishers must police overfishing themselves, that policies need to be introduced to permit this, that all sectors of fishers must be involved in the determination of quotas, that fishers need more influence over regulatory processes, and that fisher and community involvement in decision-making processes should be increased.

The study found similar concerns among members of Fisheries Advisory Committees. Members questioned the point of processes in which the department appears to control all aspects of the meetings, and where only the most powerful players have

influence over Fish Management Plans.¹⁰

None of the studies that we reviewed link non-compliance, enforcement style, legitimacy of the regulator, dynamics of organization, and views of officials and clients into a coherent analytic narrative that explains the degree of non-compliance in these fisheries.

Classical Sociological Theories of Organizations

Weber and Durkheim were concerned with the question of how to maintain order in society, a question that in principle seems similar to that of maintaining orderly (lawful) fisheries. The rapid pace of social change in Germany (Weber), and in France (Durkheim), led each to theorize about the basis of cohesion, legitimate authority, and motives for complying with that authority. Weber went on to consider the role, nature, and efficiency of bureaucracy.

Weber identified three types of legitimate authority: traditional, legal and charismatic. Each type appealed to a different motive for those who belonged to the relationship. Traditional authority rests on an “unarticulated habituation to routine behaviour”, or custom; legal authority rests on the calculated interests or expediency of the person; and charismatic authority rests on affect, or the personal devotion of followers. He argued that these motives were not enough to keep the authority structures stable, and argued in addition that there was a need for the rulers and the ruled to believe the structures were legitimate. When an authority structure was shattered, it “would have far-reaching ramifications” (Weber in

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¹⁰ Among other things, these Plans set out the regulatory and enforcement frameworks for fisheries. The members of these committees are industry and community leaders, and include representatives from fishermen's associations, individual fishers, plant owners or their representatives, and provincial and federal officials.

Etzioni: 1961;4). He argued that the shattering of the belief in legitimacy only occurs when there are "...extraordinary misfortunes whether this extracts unusual demands from subjects in the light of tradition, or destroys the prestige or violates the usual formal legal correctness.(Weber:1961;13)."

Weber argued that each of his "ideal-types" of authority structure would have a fundamentally different sociological structure of executive staff and means of administration. He argued that the obedience of the governed in all those structures of authority "depended above all" upon the availability of an administrative staff and especially on its continuous operation to maintain order and (directly or indirectly) enforce submission to its rule. He added that the term "organization" means "...to guarantee the pattern of social conduct which realizes the structure of authority (Weber:1961;13)."

In his political sociology, Weber emphasized the importance of leadership of the state in steering Germany through the chaos resulting from its transformation from feudalism to industrialism without having first laid the foundation. He stressed the need for a "mature leadership", by which he meant one that placed the collective (national) interests above all. He believed it was necessary for the political leadership to lead the bureaucratic form of organization. That is, while bureaucratization brought rules and fair procedures into the actions of the state, and thereby enhanced democracy, it necessarily and increasingly divorced the workers from the material means of production, distribution, administration, academic research, and finance in general. Weber's concern was that decisions would become "administration" and be carried out according to the regularized views of experts, while the leadership role of politicians would fade away. He argued that to prevent their main role from being usurped by administrators, political leaders needed to possess the understanding

and capacity to place the political interests of the nation above all other considerations.

Our approach to our research problem starts with the recognition that fisheries non-compliance may be occurring because the legitimacy of this organization's authority has been lost. This leads us toward an examination of the basis of that authority in its decision-making mechanisms, its goals, its bureaucratic administrative structures, and the orientations of its lower participants to their organization. And this brings us to consider Durkheim's theories.

Durkheim argued that people obey customs either voluntarily or because they feel obliged to do so. In both cases this was seen as an inner-directed form of behaviour. In the case of obligation, the person restrains himself because he feels that the social system depends on his willingness to submit to community norms. Durkheim describes the process by which highly differentiated groups within the same occupational community in pursuit of economic self interests, enter into anomic relations and then into non-compliance.

He cautions social scientists to be aware that solutions to such moral questions do not lie in "ivory tower theories", but rather in identifying empirical "inherent forces" that require the emergence of a new morality. The decline of fish may an "inherent force" in Durkheim's sense. Applying his approach to questions about effective fisheries management suggests that solutions do not lie in any one realm. The whole community is involved in the problem, and the whole community and its transformative power with respect to the individuals within it, will supply the solutions. The role of the researcher is not to solve the problem, but to synthesize the facts into a coherent picture of the reality. This will clarify the situation for participants, who will be thus facilitated in their attempts to find their own solutions.

Other Theories

This section reviews some of the work of Merton, Gouldner, Etzioni, and Wilson. We show how each uses an ideal-typical approach that relates goals and means to the ways humans adapt to social situations. We present the main strands of their thinking in this section, and then bring them together in the final section of this chapter.

In his theory of social structure and anomie (developed out of Durkheim's work), Merton argues that conformity to societal goals and means (compliance) results when a culture places a high value on success and offers legitimate means for individuals and groups to attain those goals. However, when the culture values success but offers unequal or little opportunity for individuals to achieve those goals by legitimate means, other adaptations may result. Individuals may continue to accept the goals but find new and not necessarily legitimate ways to attain them. They may "innovate". Non-compliance is one form of innovative behaviour. They could also reject both goals and means and drop out or "retreat". They may reject the goals but "ritualistically" and obsessively comply, or they may become "rebels" and reject the means and/or goals and pursue reforms.

He further argues that when the use of illegal or quasi-legal means is successful, it stimulates others to engage in non-compliant behaviour. If enough follow this route, the situation becomes anomic. That is, where there is a significant and enduring clash between the values of success and the structure of legitimate means by which to attain the goals, and where this stress is widespread, anomie will result. As a subjective experience anomie is used here to refer to that sense of futility and normlessness, and lack of confidence in one's leadership or colleagues that occurs in regard to one's perceptions that positive change is possible.

In his method for examining the decision-making processes in industrial

bureaucracies, and the different types he identified on that basis, Gouldner's work is relevant to our task, since the dimensions he explores are central components of any bureaucracy, whether public or private sector. Gouldner argues that an organization is punishment-centred (coercive), representative (normative), or mock, depending upon how it decides the rules it applies, the values those rules reflect, the ways they are enforced, the interpretations of why people violate rules, and the status of those who break rules.

In coercive organizations the rules are set by a few elite groups and these impose the rules on all others. The other groups see that those rules are unfair. Rule enforcement supports the interests of the elite group and inflicts most of its punishments on non-elites. The status of successful cheaters among the majority may increase if they are perceived to be fighting back against an unfair system. Gouldner argues that if the coercive organization is a disciplinary organization, the retaliatory cheating may serve the same function as a "grievance". It protests the injustice. In contrast, normative (representative) organizations decide rules on the basis of consensus among all groups. The rules reflect the values of all groups, rules are perceived to be fair, rule enforcement offends no group's values since all support the rules, violators are generally perceived as those who through carelessness or ignorance mistakenly transgress, and those who violate for other reasons decline in social status.

Etzioni's (1975) theory of compliance and effective organizations links ideal-types of organization authority structures and goals to ideal-types of participant involvement. By comparing organizational congruence in each of these structural dimensions, Etzioni was able to identify three ideal-types of organizations. Those that apply force to maintain control or restrain dissidents are coercive organizations. Those based on property rights are

utilitarian, (or calculative organizations). Those based on voluntary, internalized value consensus are persuasive (or normative) organizations.

The goals of normative organizations appeal to ultimate values such as protecting the environment and managing renewable resources without abusing them, health concerns, educational or other culture goals. The goals of economic organizations are directed at production and profit. Property ownership determines what is valued and which class of citizens has control over the structures that emphasize those values. Coercive organizations such as prisons use force and restraint to maintain coherence and order in society. Their goal is to control deviants. They do this by segregating, fining or applying other punishments, or by some combination of segregation and punishment of deviants. Their secondary objective is usually to establish a form of discipline that makes deviant behaviour stand out against a background of compliance to rigorously enforced norms. The argument for the use of force is based on the assumption that left to their own devices, lower participant behaviours would destabilize the existing order.

Etzioni argues that an organization's boundaries may be defined by the range of its powers with respect to lower participants. He identifies three dimensions of participation that define an organization's boundaries: the nature of participant involvement, the degree of participant subordination, and the amount of obligation placed on participant performance. Organization participants are those who are high with respect to at least one of these. This allows us to:

‘...draw the line much "lower" than most studies of bureaucracies, which tend to include only persons who are part of a formal hierarchy: priests but not parishioners; stewards but not union members; guards, but not inmates; nurses, but not patients. We treat organizations as collectivities of which the lower participants are an important segment. To exclude them from the

analysis would be like studying colonial structures without the natives, stratification without the lower classes, or a political regime without the citizens or voters (Etzioni:1975:21).'¹¹

Etzioni (1975:3) defines power as "...a relationship in which an actor behaves in accordance with a directive supported by another actor's power, and to the orientation of the subordinated actor to the power applied." By "supported", he means that those who have power manipulate "means" that they command in such a way as to make submission to their directives rewarding, while resistance leads to negative sanctions.

He argues that power has three basic forms. These are a function of the way compliance is obtained.¹² Power is based on the application or threat of application of physical sanctions, or controlling through force the ability to satisfy basic needs. Remunerative authority is based on control over material resources and rewards through the allocation of salaries and wages, fringe benefits, services and commodities. Normative authority is based on the allocation and manipulation of symbolic rewards and deprivations through employment of leaders, manipulation of mass media, allocation of esteem and

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¹¹When these criteria are applied to the department's fisheries management organization, its participants include paid employees, fisher clients and their agents. The Department of Fisheries and Oceans enforcement officers and their managers (all of the former, and most of the latter) are lower employee participants. Client participants can be either higher or lower participants. Their status depends upon their actual (not the apparent) access to power and influence in the organization. Drawing the line lower leads us to conclude that instead of about 3000 participants across Canada who are exclusively employees in the fisheries management part of the regulatory organization, the organization has about 200,000. Most of these unpaid lower participants.

¹²Our study uses the term power to refer to the coercive form of authority only, and uses the term authority in the generic sense to refer to normative, economic, and coercive forms of authority.

prestige symbols, and the administration of ritual. These "...three forms of social control seem to be universals since they regulate behaviour with regard to three universal potential dysfunctions: interactions among actors who do not share ultimate values and solidary ties, the scarcity of means, and imperfect socialization (Etzioni;1975:xvi)."

Coercive organizations generally resort to power while normative organizations rely more on the use of influence to shape lower participant behaviours. Those that use their control over remunerative assets such as their resources or wages and salaries to manipulate compliance, have utilitarian compliance structures. In this respect:

‘Political organizations whose goal is the allocation of material rewards tend to emphasize, as the means of maintaining the commitment of their members and supporters, continuous allocation of products and services, referred to as "sharing the spoils", "pork barrelling", and patronage and the like. Some such practices are found in most political organizations, but this type tends to use allocation as its central control mechanism (Etzioni;1975:109).’

Finally, organizations that depend on their power to manipulate symbolic rewards and deprivations such as co-opting leaders, sharing administration of ritual, or participating in the definition of acceptable responses, have normative, that is, persuasive compliance structures.

Etzioni(1975:6) argues that "...organizations can be ordered according to their power [authority] structure, taking into account which [authority] is predominant, how strongly it is stressed compared with other organizations in which the same [authority] is predominant, and which [authority] constitutes the secondary source of control. He argues that organizations tend to specialize in one type of authority. This happens because the use of all three would tend to neutralize the effects of each, thus reducing organizational effectiveness.

Etzioni characterizes the involvement of subordinated actors by how they interpret

the legitimacy of their organization's authority structure. If the orientation of the subordinated actors to this use of power is positive, it is commitment. If their orientation is negative, it is alienation. Since involvement may vary in intensity, Etzioni restricts the term alienation to situations where subordinated actors are highly negative. Where their orientation is either mildly negative or mildly positive, it is calculative involvement. Finally, where the orientation is highly positive, it is moral involvement.

Alienated involvement is found in coercive institutions such as prisons. It is characteristic of orientations of merchants to one another in situations where trade is based on isolated acts of exchange, each side trying to maximize immediate profit, such as prostitutes toward their clients, or we might add, one gear type of fishers against another at one point in time on a fishing ground.

Calculative involvement refers to situations of ongoing "contractual" exchanges, such as workers in the employ of an organization, or customer-employee relations. Attitudes toward permanent clients are generally calculative, as are relations among entrepreneurs in modern capitalism.¹³ In its "pure" form moral involvement is based on inner-directed conformity. In its "social" form, it is based on other-directed, peer pressure conformity.

To discover the involvement of lower participants one must discover their attitudes to the organization's authority system. Alienation is produced by illegitimate exercise of authority and its frustration of needs, wishes, and desires. Reversing the direction:

'Commitment is generated not merely by directives which are considered legitimate, but also by those which are in line with internalized needs of the subordinates (Etzioni;1975:16).'

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¹³ The legal system maintains obedience to this contract.

Thus, one indicator of the type of participant involvement is lower participants perception of the legitimacy of their organization's uses of its authority. The other is the extent to which they view the organization as facilitating or hindering their own role performances. Etzioni argues that involvement is intermediate when either the legitimacy or the internal gratification is lacking, it is negative when both are lacking, and it is positive when both are present. This manner of analysing involvement and compliance takes "...into account the effects of the cathectic as well as the evaluative impact of directives on the orientations of lower participants (Etzioni;1975:16)."

Etzioni's "dynamic hypothesis" is that because organizations strive to be effective, they tend to develop involvements from lower participants that are congruent with the nature of their authority structure. Table one below shows the six incongruent and the three congruent possibilities for this relationship of authority structure and participant involvement. The three congruent possibilities include coercive authority combined with alienated involvement, remunerative authority with calculative involvement, and normative authority with committed involvement.¹⁴

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¹⁴The reason this indicator of organization type is determined by attitudes of lower participants and not higher participants, is that reward structures of organizations favour higher participants, and coercive punishments are rarely applied to organization elites. Since they receive numerous types of rewards including status rewards and are not usually coerced, elite involvements tend to be either moral or a combination of moral and calculative commitment. Consequently, differences among elites within the same organization, and between elites in different organizations, are usually relatively minor and therefore, uninformative. In contrast, the differences between and within organizations in how they motivate lower participants tells us more about the nature of the organization, because organizations usually reserve fewer economic rewards for lower participants than for higher participants, usually have fewer restrictions on the use of coercion to get them to comply, and because, at least in theory if not in practise, organizations could opt to apply normative rewards to lower participants to obtain the desired behaviour.

Table 1: Congruence and Incongruence: Authority Structure By Type of Commitment

AUTHORITY STRUCTURE	LOWER PARTICIPANT COMMITMENT		
	MORAL	CALCULATIVE	ALIENATED
NORMATIVE CONSENSUS	CONGRUENT	INCONGRUENT	INCONGRUENT
ECONOMIC MANIPULATION	INCONGRUENT	CONGRUENT	INCONGRUENT
COERCION	INCONGRUENT	INCONGRUENT	CONGRUENT

As an example of how the dynamic hypothesis might apply in a coercive organization, consider the following: When the organization uses force to control its lower participants it alienates them. The use of normative rewards in such circumstances would be ineffective because normative rewards appeal to lower participants who are highly committed. Persuasion is wasted on alienated participants since such participants do not generally value symbolic rewards offered by organizations that coerce them. Using remunerative rewards to motivate compliance from highly alienated lower participants is similarly wasteful because lower participants are inclined to disobey despite the remuneration. In this particular scenario, this leads Etzioni(1975:13) to suggest that :

‘Coercive power is probably the only effective [authority] when the organization is confronted with highly alienated lower participants. If, on the other hand, it is applied to committed or only mildly alienated lower participants, it is likely to effect adversely such matters as morale, recruitment, socialization, and communication, and thus reduce effectiveness. It is likely though to create high alienation, and in this way create a congruent

state.¹⁵

Similar logic applies to organizations with primarily remunerative authority structures. In such cases, an appeal to symbolic or idealistic rewards when lower participants have been conditioned to expect remunerative rewards may extinguish the behaviour of compliance.

Because of factors such as inadequate resources, the six incongruent possibilities, (such as for example, an alienated involvement together with a remunerative authority structure), may occur. Etzioni argues that since they are ineffective combinations, incongruent organizations experience pressures to become congruent. Etzioni explains incongruence in relation to social and cultural factors that shift the organization's goal orientations away from those it was designed to realize. This is why he cautions researchers to avoid treating organizations as if they were sociological islands, and why an analysis of non-compliance by organization participants needs to know how the social and cultural context of the organization affects non-compliance. That is, Etzioni notes that since not all of the factors shaping involvements of lower participants originate in the organization, pre-organizational factors that may affect lower participant behaviours need to be examined in addition to those emanating "entirely" from the organization. Pre-organizational factors include early socialization in family and community, basic personality structures of individuals, and their religious and other beliefs and memberships in non-work organizations. Organizational factors include ways participants are recruited, training and on

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¹⁵All other things being equal. That is, coercion would only be effective if the other aspects of the situation could be effectively controlled using this form of authority.

the job socialization, the organization's scope and pervasiveness for lower participants, the type of stratification system, the organization's emphasis on different dimensions of consensus, and the type of communication it uses with participants.

Etzioni's theory is concerned with three dimensions of organizations: authority structure, goals, and type of commitment of lower participants.¹⁶ Table 2 below illustrates the structural relationships that are empirically possible when organization authority structures are compared to their goals. Authority structures may be either coercive, remunerative, or normative(persuasive). Goals may be either order maintenance (political), production or delivery of services (economic), or they may be cultural (social) goals.

Table 2: Congruence and Incongruence: Authority Structure By Type of Goal.

AUTHORITY STRUCTURE	TYPE OF GOAL		
	CULTURAL SYMBOLIC	DELIVERY OR PRODUCTION OF SERVICES	ORDER MAINTENANCE
NORMATIVE	CONGRUENT	INCONGRUENT	INCONGRUENT
ECONOMIC	INCONGRUENT	CONGRUENT	INCONGRUENT
COERCIVE	INCONGRUENT	INCONGRUENT	CONGRUENT

Three combinations of goals and authority structures are congruent: coercive authority used to achieve order goals, remunerative authority to achieve economic goals, and

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¹⁶It is important to note that the defining characteristic of the organization is not its "official" view of its goals, compliance structure, or participant involvements. In the case of the involvement of lower participants, for example, it is the actual involvement of lower participants, and not some other representation of how they perceive the organization, that determines the organization's type. If lower participants are highly alienated, their organization is a coercive one, regardless of the organization's official perspective of the type of commitment it generates from its lower participants.

normative authority to achieve culture/symbolic goals. The remaining six combinations of authority structure and goals are incongruent, because their authority structures and goal orientations operate at cross-purposes and tend to cancel out the benefits of either structural dimension. The theory argues that incongruence makes organizations less effective, but the organization's external and internal environments pressure them to become effective. Consequently, congruence theory argues that where incongruence exists, the organization will experience pressure to have congruent authority and goal structures. As described above in Table one, the theory also postulates that organizations will strive toward congruent authority and commitment structures.

One of Etzioni's most important contributions to our research is his articulation of the relationship between Weber's types of authority structures and selected key aspects of an organization's operational environments. By elaborating on organization internal and external characteristics, he provided the framework for analysing the practical environment of the different ideal-types of organizations. To explain the origins of the structural nature of the organization, there is a need to identify the influence of pre-organizational and organizational factors on shaping the different types of lower participant commitment (alienated, calculative, and moral). Several causal factors precede participation in the organization, and several occur within the organization.

Lower participant attitudes to the organization's use of its authority is one side of "commitment". This includes their attitudes about the processes by means of which power is exercised, and the type of authority (normative, economic, coercive) that it uses. Another side of commitment is identified by Merton. When culturally-valued ends that are sought by participants are frustrated by the organization's failure to make institutionally legitimate

means available for their achievement, participants may become alienated. This suggests that to identify the nature of participant commitment, we may need to consider not only whether they support the organization's actions, but also whether they think their organization is a help or a hindrance in respect to their own role performances.

The nature of the work, the organization's emphasis on conformity to its rules, and tensions of selected types that are generated within the workplace as described by Gouldner, may also shape lower participant involvements. However, because paid officials and self-employed fishers are engaged in production activities whose differences may affect the nature of the pressures at work, this research anticipates a need for some flexibility in making comparisons between officers and fishers on dimensions of job stress.

On the one hand, all lower participants are affected by factors such as the amount of autonomy and initiative actually required to carry out their production tasks, the nature of the rules governing their work, the degree of close supervision, and the opportunities to participate in decisions affecting their working lives. On the other hand, some factors apply less well to fishers. For example, workplace tensions over issues such as a lack of clarity regarding the scope and nature of their responsibilities, workload pressures, conflicting demands on their roles, being deprived of information needed for official role performances, having to do things against their better judgement, and job interference with family life apply less well to vessel-owners, since in many cases these self-employed fishers make these decisions themselves.

Theoretical Merger

Our merger of the theories that are described above proposes first that humans have goals. They may be economic, political/power, social, or some combination of these goals,

but in their ideal-type there are only these three possibilities. Second, goal-oriented behaviour leads to social interaction. Third, one product of social interaction is the construction of organizations. Organizations are goal-oriented social products, and have the same three possible ideal-types of goals as their architects. Fourth, humans have means by which they attempt to reach their goals. In their ideal-type these means may be economic, social, or political. Fifth, organizations have the same three possible ideal-types of means by which to accomplish their goals. Sixth, humans reflexively formulate understandings about their goals and means and those of their organizations. These understandings are the products of more or less conscious reflection about their nature. Seventh, the behaviour of “organization person”, and of the organization itself, is the outcome of the reflexive interaction of individuals and their organizations.

To explain the behaviour of either individuals or their organizations, there is a need to determine the “fit” between the goals and means of individuals and those of their organizations. One way to do this is to investigate the understandings individuals develop about themselves in these respects, as well as those that they develop about their organizations.

In order to identify how the fit between individual and organizational goals, means, and commitments may be improved, using this “verstehen” approach, there is a need to explore the operational nature of the organization. This includes key aspects of the organization’s internal environment, as well as important effects on participant behaviour that can be traced to factors that lie outside the organization’s boundaries.

In addition, these internal and external factors need to be viewed against the backdrop of the principal purpose of the organization, or sub-cultures within the organization. Once

again, there are three ideal-types of purposes (economic, political/power and social). Since this is an enforcement organization, there is a need to outline the types of enforcement that would be found when enforcement is organised around each of these three themes. Fortunately, James Wilson (1968) completed some of this work, and we can incorporate his approach within our merger of theories. He identified three ideal-types of enforcement: “watch” (political), “legalistic” (economic), and “service-oriented” (social). He also described some patterns that he identified between enforcement approach and their political, organizational, and community contexts. His theoretical findings help to clarify areas for our empirical analyses of how the goals, means, orientations, and enforcement approaches of the individuals and the organization are shaped by internal and external environmental characteristics.

Hypotheses Linked to Theory

The hypotheses that were set out in the introductory chapter may now be linked to our theoretical framework.

Since it is known that the organization is ineffective at obtaining compliance from fishers, and since our theory argues that organizations that are incongruent are more ineffective than congruent organizations, one plausible explanation for the organization’s ineffectiveness may be that its structures of goals, means, participant orientations, and enforcement approach are incongruent:

- 1.0 The organization has incongruent structures of goals means, lower participant commitments, and enforcement approach.

The existence of widespread non-compliance suggests that organization participants may be rejecting its authority to make and enforce rules. They may be alienated from the

organization.

2.0 Lower participants are alienated.

Our theory predicts that the existence of widespread alienation among participants of organizations tends to be associated with the type of organization that relies on enforced obedience. Therefore, if lower participants are alienated, the organization's authority structure will be repressive:

3.0 The organization has a coercive authority structure.

In considering how this organization could become more effective, we know that our theory provides three theoretical options, and that all of them are congruent types since these are more effective than incongruent organizations. There are only three congruent possibilities. Applying the logic of the theory allows us to eliminate two of the three congruent possibilities, because our theory and common sense tell us that they too would be ineffective in this context. Using force to compel obedience is impractical because the monitoring challenge would require far more resources than are available to ensure an appropriate level of detection. Using fish as an economic reward is not feasible because it cannot be allocated with sufficient accuracy to ensure that it will be received by the one to whom the reward is offered. Therefore, the most effective structures are likely to be normative:

4.0 The only combination of goals, means, lower participant commitments, and enforcement approach that would improve this organization's effectiveness is the congruent normative combination.

The theory argues that the organization's environment pressures the organization to become more effective by aligning its structures so that they are more congruent. We extend this argument slightly when we include the substantive nature of those structures in these

dynamics. The organization's internal and external environment will pressure it to transform into the normative form. Furthermore, the organization's lower participants, being a part of the emergent reality that is being pressured, will perhaps be the first to appreciate what sort of nature would be most effective for their organization. Therefore we argue that lower participants will tend to believe that their organization would be more effective if it were to become a normative type of organization:

- 5.0 Lower participants will perceive the normative form of organization as the most effective type.

Conclusions

Economic (in a very narrow sense) and social (in a very broad sense) perspectives on fisheries enforcement and on enforcement in other contexts were reviewed and compared for their utility as theoretical guides for this research. We turned to the classical tradition of sociology and found the threads for a more coherent and complete theoretical framework. We outlined some of the basic arguments of Weber and Durkheim, and those of more recent sociologists working in the same tradition. We pulled these threads together in this chapter to produce a theoretical framework for this research. The chapter concludes by linking the hypotheses about non-compliance to our theory.

Chapter 3: Methods

This chapter outlines research issues and sites, procedures for selecting participants, selected characteristics of respondents by type, types of data collected and their relationship to the analyses that were carried out, and data collection methods. Problems encountered in implementing the research methods are identified. Their effects on the results are discussed.

Research Issues

The concepts that are required empirically to investigate the nature of this organization and its participants are derived from our theoretical merger. Our theory requires us to assess the attitudes and behaviours of organization participants in relation to organizational structures. It also requires us to show how the organization's internal and external environments are shaped by those attitudes and structures. These relationships are determined by describing organization structures of goals, means, and the commitment levels of its lower participants; assessing the extent to which those structures are congruent and effective; identifying social, cultural, political, and pre-organizational factors in the organization's external environment shaping attitudes of lower participants; and by identifying and describing internal factors that affect organization structure, participant behaviours, and organization effectiveness.

To obtain the required information, a detailed investigation of the views of selected participants was required. Data were required on respondent personal goals, powers to achieve goals, nature of their commitment to goals, and the nature of their enforcement approach. Our analyses needed to account for the origins of these views. This required analyses of factors external to the organization such as primary socialization processes in the field locations, and the nature of rural single-sector fishing community values. It also

required an exploration of several factors internal to the organization. These included its recruitment, training and socialization practices; its scope and pervasiveness in lower participant lives; organization effects on the nature of the work performed; functions of the organization's rules; communication mechanisms; and, ways the organization builds consensus among its participants.

Description of Respondents

The enforcement hierarchy was organized for these research purposes into two occupational statuses or tiers: officers and managers.¹⁷¹⁸ The fishery officer (with a public service classification of GT-03), is the field officer at the bottom of status system. His field supervisor or acting field supervisor (about one rank higher), and all other enforcement managers above the field supervisor including staff officers as well as the Director-General of Conservation and Protection, are included in the category of enforcement manager. All of these managers may be said to be indirect managers of field officers, and many are direct managers of staff officers. Since many regional, and all national Headquarters enforcement personnel, do not have "line authority" even in theory, over actions of the fishery officers, most of the "manager" respondents, by definition, do not directly manage field enforcement personnel. And staff officers in area, region, or national Headquarters, whose role it is to advise what are usually also staff officers (but termed Chief, Director, or Director-General),

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¹⁷See "Appendix E: Annotated Tables and Statistics", particularly Tables E1-E6 for comparisons between officers and managers in several key respects such as their ambition and adaptive strategies at work.

¹⁸Support staff were not interviewed

do not directly manage fishery officers, though they usually manage other staff officers. While their effect on field officers is indirect, these managers and advisors may have considerable impact on officer behaviour, but it is mediated through those who possess more direct control over field officers.

Table 3 below shows the type and number of respondents by their location. A total of one hundred and sixty-three respondents were interviewed using the formal questionnaires. One hundred and six of these were clients. Eighty-six of these were fishers, and the remainder were other members of the communities.¹⁹ Fifty-nine officials were interviewed, of whom thirty-two were officers and twenty-seven were managers.

Table 3. Type and Number of Respondents By Location

LOCATION	TYPE OF RESPONDENT		
	OFFICER	MANAGER	FISHER-CLIENT
OTTAWA	0	9	0
HALIFAX	3	9	0
SW NOVA	21	4	46
W COAST NFLD	8	4	40
TOTALS	32	27	86

In addition to these formal interviews, approximately one hundred other community members were informally interviewed to determine the extent to which other community member views were consistent with fishers. These included managers of financial institutions, elementary and high school teachers, a class of grade twelve students, RCMP

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¹⁹Our main analyses are based on fisher clients.

detachment commanders, fisher lobbyists, Bishops and community businessmen such as ship builders and owners of retail businesses.

At national and regional Halifax Headquarters, interviews were confined to enforcement managers and their staff. All of those who made themselves available for the interview (over 90% of that population) were interviewed.²⁰ Fishers were initially selected for interviews based on their positions as fisher representatives on committees that act as advisory bodies to the organization. In the early stages of data collection, some were interviewed because officers and their managers had identified them as fishers whom other fishers respected as their leaders. However, once initiated, the selection of subsequent respondents was determined by the respondents themselves. That is, those whom the fisher respondents identified as highly respected by a large number of other fishers in their community (for their opinions on fisheries issues) were interviewed. A snowballing series of interviews resulted. The interviews were terminated in a geographic area (cluster), when additional information received was consistently redundant.

Fishers were organized into three types. Their categorization was based on the nature of their fishing activity (either fixed or mobile gear) as well as the length of their vessels. Our categorization of our fisher respondents led us to identify three gear type groups of fishers: fixed gear fishers who utilize vessels of less than thirty-five feet (fixed gear small), fixed

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²⁰Although officials other than officers at times also have direct impacts on fishers, they were not interviewed. Limitations of time and resources, ruled out the possibility of interviews with managers and officers outside the enforcement sector.

gear fishers with larger vessels (fixed gear large, and mobile fishers.²¹²² Table 4 below shows the number and locations of fisher respondents by gear type group.

Table 4. Number and Location of Fishers by Gear Type Group.

LOCATION	GEAR TYPE GROUP		
	FIX(SMALL)	FIX(LARGE)	MOBILE
NOVA SCOTIA	1	31	14
NEWFOUNDLAND	25	5	10
TOTAL	26	36	24

Research Sites

The principal research sites included Ottawa Headquarters, Halifax Regional Headquarters, Shelburne County, Yarmouth County, and, West Coast Newfoundland from Trout River north to Eddies Cove East on the Great Northern Peninsula. Interviews were also held with enforcement officials in Corner Brook, Newfoundland Area Headquarters, and in Yarmouth, Nova Scotia Area Headquarters.²³

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²¹ Fishers with vessels over sixty-five feet in length were excluded (because our analyses are restricted to inshore and mid shore fishers)

²² See Tables E12-E14 in Appendix E for descriptions of several differences among the three types of fishers.

²³ Only two of the counties within the SW Nova Scotia Area, and only the northern part of West Coast Newfoundland were selected as research sites. Yarmouth and Shelburne Counties together account for most (63% in 1991) of the landings taken from the adjacent and rich fishing area called 4X (North Atlantic Fishing Area, Zone 4X), for all the SW Nova Scotia counties. Many of the fish stocks in 4X remain in reasonably good shape, yet some are damaged thus elevating fears of further damage to Canada's richest fishing grounds. One would expect conservation issues and conflicts to be dramatic in this area. West Coast Newfoundland is a stark contrast to the SW. Nova Scotia location, in part because the Newfoundland fixed gear fishers earn less on average in their short seasonal fisheries, and because everyone in that area expected the

The initial design of the study excluded Newfoundland, but the researcher was required to carry out a similar study for the department at this location, thus presenting an opportunity to add a comparative dimension to this research. This part of Newfoundland is dominated by fixed gear fishers, like in SW Nova Scotia, although it too has a significant small dragger fleet. On the other hand, the average incomes from fishing of SW Nova Scotia fishers exceed those in the Newfoundland location. Although there is relative similarity in the technology of the fleets in the two locations, they are distinctly different in their cultures. One union has a virtual monopoly on fisher collective bargaining in Newfoundland, and fishers in this location tend to be collectivistic in their orientation to one another. Individualism and anti-unionism is more characteristic of SW Nova Scotia fishers.

The "communities" in this study are fishers, their associations and unions, governments and their organizations, and community leaders. In most cases, officers and fishers live in single-sector communities with fewer than five hundred people. However, in Newfoundland and in the SW. Nova Scotia counties, the "real" social and cultural communities extended beyond the borders of the communities of residence of the respondents and fishery officers. Fishers and fishery officers think and act in terms of geographic areas where fishing seasons and practices, as well as cultural styles, are more or less homogenous.²⁴

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commercial cod fishery to soon be closed.

²⁴In the West Coast Newfoundland research site, respondents divide communities into four "community clusters", based on interactions between and among fishers and fishery officers and their offices. As one non-fisher, non-fishery officer respondent put it, "When you gets to another area you feel the difference right away. You knows you are somewheres else." In Shelburne county, there are three such clusters. This is also true of Yarmouth county. However, in the latter case, the majority of the communities fall into

Types of Data

The survey instruments are outlined in Appendix A: The Code Key. This lists four hundred and sixty-two questions. These constituted the Interview Schedule. Some are open-ended. The majority were closed-ended questions that were drawn from a number of social science scales. Appendix A also provides categories of responses to the open-ended questions.

Appendix B links each of the questions in the Interview Schedule to the dependent, independent, and intervening variables in this study. Among other things, one can cross-reference these Appendices to obtain operational definitions of the study's major variables, such as "fixed gear fisher".

The Interview Schedule was developed and pilot-tested in Ottawa and in SW. Nova Scotia for fishery officers and their managers. It became necessary to modify it slightly for some respondents. For example, Miller's scale battery of International Patterns and Norms was too abstract to be used in its original form with fishers, but worked for most fishery officers. All core research questions, (questions one to seventy-seven inclusive), were posed to all respondents, as applicable. In a few cases the respondents were unable to complete all of the questions because of time pressures, lack of interest, disagreement with the approach, or because they were unable to understand their meaning.²⁵

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one cluster whose main social and cultural characteristic is the absence of significant identification with communities in the wider geographic area.

²⁵There is little reason to believe that the gaps in information for these supplementary questions created significant problems for the research. First, the information was supplementary to the basic research agenda. Second, sufficient numbers of respondents completed those questions to identify the dominant patterns in their responses. While it is possible that those who did not complete some questions would have given substantially

The supplementary questions were drawn from existing batteries of social research questions and used as circumstances permitted. Most of these scales are not central to the dissertation.

A few of these scales were more central to the main analyses than others. For example, the type and degree of work-related stress, degree of formalization and autonomy in the workplace, political activism, and the group cohesiveness scales helped to provide details of the operational environments of fishers, officers and their managers. On the other hand, scales measuring powerlessness, community spirit, interpersonal relations, family responsibility to community, schools, churches, economic behaviour, local government, community tension areas, social life feeling scales, economic self-determination, and career concerns were not central to the main analyses.

This research did not pin its findings exclusively on any one source of information, although the core questions in the Interview Schedule were central to our analyses. These included perceptions of the legitimacy of the department in its normative, remunerative, and coercive uses of its authority and goals; opinions about the significance of certain types of violations, (in effect, their definition of what counts as non-compliance); opinions about the department's style of enforcement; perceptions of the degree of representativeness of the organization; personal information about education, age, occupation of respondents;

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different answers from their more verbally skilled fellow community members, the amount of consensus with respect to community values and attitudes shown by those who answered the questions was striking. This was particularly true for Newfoundland fishers. The existence of a significant group of fishers with different views on the supplementary questions is highly improbable for fishers in the Newfoundland research site. Fishers in the Nova Scotia research site displayed more heterogeneity with respect to their answers to the supplementary questions, but since most of them completed all the questions, this was not a problem for the research.

respondent personal definitions of success, main strategies to increase success, and their perception of the main obstacles in the way of success; their views of local norms with respect to trust and respect, volunteering, standards of honesty and integrity of government officials; and, community definitions of work and achievement.

However, these core questions were supplemented by a “triangulation” of data sources. The researcher kept journals in which he recorded field notes throughout the course of the research. These included observations of behavioural trends of fishers in Newfoundland and fishery officers at field levels and regional Headquarters as well as staff officers and managers at regional and national Headquarters, examples of what they did in specific circumstances and their rationales, tentative linkages made between theory and the emerging data, records of the informal interviews with other community members, and observations of developments in a number of community meetings, including an advisory committee meeting.

Notes were collected at fifteen community meetings in the West Coast Newfoundland research site. These highlight the practical issues fishers feel are important to resolve. Fishers were preoccupied with resource management issues (licensing, allocation, and enforcement), science sector issues, the consultative process, and the Union's role, as well as taking on more responsibilities for managing their fisheries. A Union survey of nearly four hundred fishers who attended the above-noted meetings was completed and analysed by Union officials.²⁶ Data collected over several years by the Department on the number of

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²⁶Fishers gave answers to questions on issues such as the extent of non-compliance they observed, their perception of its effect on their income, which group should play the major role in preventing non-compliance, the adequacy of the regulatory regime, which deterrent is the best, do fishery officers use adequate discretion, and can community-

prosecutions of fishers by fishery officers in Nova Scotia were analysed. A crude breakdown of similar prosecutions of fishers by fishery officers in the West Coast area of Newfoundland was obtained.

Finally, as a member of the organization, the researcher possessed insider information. Because respondents knew that their views would be communicated to National Headquarters, without first being filtered through the local and regional departmental sub-cultures, there was a strong incentive for many personnel at the field and regional levels, as well as fishers, to give frank answers to most questions.²⁷

Reflexive Methodology

The reflexive dimension was a significant factor in this research. It proved to be the only means by which to obtain comprehensive information in such a complex and unexplored sociological terrain. In addition, the researcher's manager had become convinced that the enforcement organization needed to move toward community-based policing. He saw this study as his means to explore that area, as well as to identify possible problems it might pose in relation to officials and fishers. Most respondents, (including the officers and their managers) were unaware of the community-based approach as an enforcement "technology". This meant that the researcher needed to introduce it before he could obtain their reactions to such an approach in the fisheries context. Since the elements of the approach existed in their behaviours in their enforcement contexts, the explanation was

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based policing work? Respondents were categorized as lobster, other fisher, plant employee or owner, or fishery officer, and grouped into four study clusters.

²⁷See Appendix C for further information on some of the reactions of participants to the researcher and this methodology, and for an outline of the sequence of interviews by location.

usually a matter of finding local examples of community-based policing, and elaborating on those. For example, nearly everyone had heard of “neighbourhood watch”, and this is a type of community-based-policing.

The researcher fed information back to respondents as it was obtained. This process affected some of the subsequent behaviours of some respondents. For example, the questionnaire assessing degree of organizational stress was administered to SW. Nova Scotia Officers, and a few weeks later, while conducting their individual interviews, he provided them with their own and the collective trends of their colleagues. Not only did this inform them of their colleague’s collective views, it also created an opportunity to obtain their explanations for the observed trends.

With this information in the background, as well as whatever time he had spent with them as a participant observer during their normal routines, the researcher conducted private interviews using the remaining core questions from the Interview Schedule. At the end of this process he arranged a meeting of managers and discussed the most obvious trends from the interviews. Personal identities were always protected. Since the discussions were about enforcement styles, perceptions of the characteristics of the department, standards of enforcement conduct, attitudes toward the organization, areas where the officers felt more emphasis was needed by their managers, the feedback to managers may have affected some manager’s subsequent behaviour to their staff.

A similar kind of interaction occurred in Ottawa. However, in addition to an overview of their own responses, the researcher introduced the findings from the Nova Scotia officers and managers. At a later date he organized a meeting of Headquarters officials and discussed highlights of observations obtained from field and Headquarters personnel. The

result of this interactive learning approach was that the interviewer was not only obtaining information, the information he provided was redirecting attitudes and behaviour of respondents. One significant influence of this reflexive method was its stimulation of respondent's thinking on the subject of community-based policing principles and their possible application to non-compliance problems in fisheries.

The reflexive approach was used to identify problems and understand their origins, and to find solutions and gauge the receptivity of departmental personnel to such solutions. The researcher needed to know how enforcement was conducted, and how the organization helped and/or hindered its officials. He also needed to inform those officials of alternative possibilities for their actions, as those were revealed through the interviews with previous respondents.²⁸

Conclusions

This chapter described the research issues that were generated by applying the theoretical framework to the main research questions. It provided a general description of the number, location (research sites). It described the many different types of data that were collected, the instruments for collecting them, and the relative importance of each type for

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²⁸ A similar approach was used with fishers. Where the possibility presented itself to provide feedback from fishery officers, their managers, and the views of other fishers in an anonymous manner, the researcher used it. He gave talks to gatherings of fishers at community meetings. He fed information back to their representatives, and in some cases he spent time with those representatives on several different occasions. In each case in the individual interview, where that respondent showed an interest in hearing about the findings, the interview process was more interactive. This occurred over several weeks with the officers while out on patrols, and it occurred in a similar fashion with fishers. The main purpose of the participant observation was to gain a fuller appreciation of their observations, frustrations, ambitions, and strategies, by seeing their behaviour in their daily routine. It also allowed the researcher to become reasonably well informed about their concerns in regard to their fisheries.

the analyses and conclusions of this study. The chapter concluded with a description of the reflexive methodology that was used.

Chapter 4: Organization Structure

This chapter identifies the organization's structural nature and type, and discusses some aspects of the relationship between an organization's structural nature and its effectiveness. The organization's type is determined by the nature of its lower participant's commitment and the authority structure and goals of the organization. Effectiveness is related to the congruence of the organization.

Our theory asserts that organizations may be defined in terms of their structures of compliance, goals, and kinds of commitments displayed by their lower participants. Each of these dimensions of organization structure may possess normative, utilitarian, or coercive attributes. In their ideal-typical form, each dimension of structure would be characterized by only one of these attributes. However, in reality such pure structures rarely exist. The more likely situation is a predominance of a certain attribute in any one dimension of structure. The same logic applies to the combination of all three structures. "Ideal-types" of organizations are congruent in all three dimensions, and mixed types are incongruent in some dimension(s) of their structure.²⁹

All organizations face internal and external pressures to be effective. Insofar as organizations with incongruent structures are less effective at achieving their purposes than congruent organizations, they experience "accountability pressures" that steer them toward greater congruence in their alignments of goals, authorities, and lower participant commitments. Etzioni's "dynamic hypothesis" is that organization incongruence stimulates

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²⁹However, even in congruent organizations there may be some mixture of structures, although it should be possible to identify the predominant attribute of an organization if it is truly congruent, as either coercive, utilitarian, or normative.

these pressures and these cause shifts in the nature of its goals, authorities, or lower participant commitments. Our theory argues that these shifts may cause the organization to become more congruent and therefore more effective.³⁰

Lower Participant Commitment

Lower participants may have one of three ideal-types of commitment toward their organization. They may be alienated, committed to it for reasons that relate to a calculation regarding its utilities to them, or they may be morally committed to the organization. Our operational definitions of the differences among these types of commitment rely on Robert Merton's theory that different types of adaptive behaviour result when individuals attempt to realize culturally valued ends but face limited means for their realization.

Our definition also incorporates Etzioni's observation that alienation has attitudinal and structural dimensions. Structural alienation is a negative orientation to the organization that results when "internalized needs" of lower participants are frustrated by the objective structure of the organization's constraints. We operationally define their internalized needs as the desire to be more successful at their work. Attitudinal alienation may intensify this structural alienation if, in addition to perceiving themselves to be blocked by this structure, participants feel that the directives that cause the blockage lack legitimacy.

Lower participants are fully alienated, and therefore negatively oriented to their organization when the line of action directed by the organization blocks their needs, and

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³⁰The theory makes no assumptions about the need for organization leaders to lead these changes to organizations. However, it would be helpful to examine the relationship between leadership approaches and ideal-types of organizations, because it would link the ideal-typical analysis to the concern's Weber expressed in regard to a lack of political leadership and its replacement by bureaucratic administrators.

when they believe that line of action is illegitimate. Their commitment to the organization is intermediate (calculating) when they are alienated in either one, but not both, of these senses. Their orientation to their organization is positive (moral), when they believe the organization's line of action facilitates their internalized goals and they accept that line of action as legitimate.

The following examines lower participant perceptions of their organization's constraints on their success and their perception of this organization's uses of normative, utilitarian (economic) and coercive forms of authority.

All but one official identified the organization as the main obstacle to improving success at work.³¹ Fishers are more inclined than officials to argue that their main barriers lie outside the department, but a majority of fishers agree with the officials that they lie within the department. Those fishers who do not identify the department as the main barrier say that it is a lack of fish, big fish companies that hog the fish, or selected gear sectors such as the draggers that also hog the fish. Since the department regulates the distribution of fish, all of the specific blocks fishers identify are the department's responsibility. Therefore, in its structural sense, all but one official and all fishers are alienated by the organization's blocks to their opportunities. However, in the attitudinal sense of alienation fishers are less inclined to see the obstacle as the result of official directives. Therefore, slightly more than one-half of fishers and all but one official are alienated in both senses. Those who are not highly alienated have calculating orientations to the organization.

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³¹See Appendix E, tables E5, E6, and E13 and E14 for more extensive analyses and description of these findings for both fishers and enforcement officials. See also the discussions in sections 1.5, 2.3, and 3.1 of that appendix.

Fishers who identify the department as their main obstacle view the substance of the problems in different terms than those of enforcement officials. Almost all fishers specified that the problems are in the fisheries management function, in the license, allocation, and other policies of that Branch. They saw the problem as poorly designed policies and programs. In contrast, only a few officials identified that branch as the main problem. Instead, most said that the department's "organizational structure" was their biggest obstacle. By structure, they meant inadequate resources, poor management practices, lack of information, micro-management, inconsistency in the application of policies, political interference in allocation decisions, lack of accountability of management, management's failure to delegate authority along with responsibility, raids on their operational budgets without notice or the right to refuse, rigidities caused by highly complex and sometimes contradictory rules, and inefficiencies produced by the organization's centralized and hierarchical command structure.

While fishers see the immediate policies that affect them as their concrete obstacle, many departmental officials also see those policies as problematic, but more say the obstacle is the organization's overall and repressive structure. They argue the poor policies are the result of the constraints the organization places on policies. They say that practically any directive the Fisheries and Habitat Management Branch produces will fail, not so much because its officials are incompetent at policy development, although some do not discount this explanation; but more suggest instead, that ineffectiveness is structured into the outputs of individuals in this Branch by the organization within which they labour.

Although the factors officials and fishers identify to explain how the organization blocks their attempts to be more successful are different in substance and level of abstraction,

they both challenge the organization's legitimacy. We define legitimacy as our measure of the "acceptability" our respondents attribute to those organization activities they associate with the three classical types of authority: using force to compel compliance (coercive power), using economic rewards to manipulate compliance (economic authority), and using persuasion to convince people to voluntarily comply (normative authority).

Coercive authority was defined as the use of enforcement officers to detect, prosecute, and assist in the delivery of fines and punishments to control non-compliance in the fisheries. Economic authority was defined as the capacity to allocate fish (economic wealth). Normative authority was defined as selected consultative or consensus-building mechanisms.

For the case of normative authority, the goal is empirically to identify lower participant perceptions of the acceptability of Fisheries Advisory Committees. Normative authority was also examined in terms of respondent perceptions of the department's active attempts to persuade fishers to comply by having fishery officers give talks at schools or at other locations to communicate, through these persuasive means, the importance of compliance with the rules.³²

About two-thirds of each group believe the advisory process is "not helpful". Not helpful responses included: "it is useless", "it is not representative", "it has too much say over the department", or "it does not communicate with enforcement". "Helpful" responses were conservatively defined to include: "It contributes to effective management of the resources", "it is of some good but it is not representative", "is improving", and, "it depends on who is

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³²See Appendix E, sections 1.7.1, 2.5.3 for more detailed analyses and discussions of these findings.

on the committee". Furthermore, most officials and fishers expressed the view that education activities on the benefits of compliance would increase compliance. Virtually all fishers and officials said the normative approach could or would have some degree of effectiveness, if it were carried out properly. Only a few fishers, compared to most officials, were aware that the department ever used this approach.³³ Although lower participants believe normative authority structures could be effective, most believe the existing advisory committees are unacceptable, and they are alienated by this use of normative authority.

Almost all fishers and officials believe the allocation processes are unjust.³⁴ Both fishers and enforcement officials conclude that the main effect of allocation decisions is the perception among gear type groups that they are being deprived relative to other groups. Not only are respondents alienated by the ways economic authority is used, but they say fishers retaliate because of it. That is, almost all officials and most fishers believe fishers cheat to obtain some measure of "rough justice". The retaliatory behaviour is not restricted to fishers. Officer alienation from their organization's unacceptable application of its economic authority (the "pork barrelling" allocation process) explains why some officers resist the bureaucratic nature of their organization, and adopt less bureaucratic and more charismatic ways to deal with enforcement issues.

Fishers attach more legitimacy to the department's use of its coercive authority than to any other dimension of authority.³⁵ A slight majority of fishers believe it is acceptable,

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³³This communication gap is larger than this fact might imply, since these respondents, being fisher opinion leaders, are more informed than most fishers.

³⁴See the sections of Appendix E referred to above for the basis of this statement.

³⁵See the detailed analyses of these issues in sections 1.7.3 and 2.5.3 of Appendix E.

compared to just under one-half of enforcement officials. The rest say either that enforcement does not help, or that it does not help under current conditions. Officers are more alienated from their use of force than the fishers they apply it to, but both groups are split more or less down the middle on the legitimacy of this kind of authority.

The success goals of non-cheaters are frustrated by cheaters, since the latter deprive them of opportunities to catch the stolen fish. Fishers who perceive that coercive enforcement deters cheaters are supportive of the use of force for these utilitarian reasons. On the other hand, if they feel that officer presence is meagre, its application uneven and inequitable across groups of fishers, and its effects largely confined to the impoverished and desperate but unskilled fishers who are not the "serious" cheaters, they are less supportive of this use of coercive power. We explain the greater alienation of officers from their own authority compared to the more positive commitment of fishers, by the fact that enforcement officials are in the best position to know how ineffective and inequitable are the measures they apply to protect the resource from those who cheat.

The same pattern of response exists for the question of whether the way the department is now catching violators makes others stop violating the rules, as well as the question of whether the current fines discourage fishers from cheating. Only a fraction of enforcement officials, compared to nearly one-half of fisher respondents, think that catching violators stops other fishers from violating. Similarly, fewer officials than fishers say that fines discourage fishers from cheating. Nearly two-thirds of the fishers say they have this effect, while fewer than half of the officials say this.

The above assesses the legitimacy of coercive enforcement from the perspective of existing directives governing the structure of enforcement. It ignores attitudes of officials and

fishers toward the potential legitimacy of coercive enforcement. Many respondents felt that it would be unfair to draw the conclusion that repressive and punitive enforcement need necessarily be ineffective, and wanted to qualify their answer. They said that coercive enforcement is ineffective now, but if certain conditions were met, an overwhelming majority of fishers and enforcement officials would say that coercive enforcement was an acceptable approach. These conditions included higher fines, increased ability to catch the serious violators, more time to spend on enforcement work, consensus from fishers that the rules being enforced made sense to them, and, more highly motivated (morally committed) officers. If these conditions were met, virtually all fisher and departmental respondents say that enforcement would help to conserve the fisheries, that catching cheaters would deter others, and that fines would deter cheaters.

This highlights the importance of distinguishing between the policy structure and the structure imposed on those who develop those policies. Many believe the coercive approach to enforcement is ineffective because of the constraints the organization imposes on how those activities can be carried out, not because they believe that approach is intrinsically ineffective. They argue that in addition to the conditions outlined above, the organization's attempts to standardize and control enforcement activities from the top and centre of the organization makes enforcement ineffective.

Neither fishers nor officials attach much structural or attitudinal legitimacy to this organization's current use of its normative, economic, or coercive authority, and in its normative and economic dimensions of its authority, respondents are highly alienated. The organization's structures antagonize respondents as well as block their gratification of needs. The commitment of lower participants to the organization's use of its authority in the

coercive form is stronger than for any other dimension of its authority. It is clear that were the nature of enforcement activities to change in the direction both groups recommend, all but a fraction of officials and fishers would be morally committed to the use of coercive authority.³⁶

Authority Structure³⁷

This section uses Gouldner's framework for the study of power in a bureaucratic organization as the theoretical basis for constructing empirical indicators of the nature of this organization's authority structure. Gouldner argues that an organization is punishment-centred (coercive), representative (normative), or mock, depending upon how it decides the rules it applies, the values those rules reflect, the ways they are enforced, the interpretations of why people violate rules, and the status of those who break rules. He argues that in coercive organizations, rules are set by elites and reflect their values. Those values are imposed on other groups. Consequently, the other groups perceive the rules to be unfair. In coercive organizations, rule enforcement supports the interests of the elite group and punishes other groups. From the perspective of the non-elite majority, non-compliance may

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³⁶This introduces some need to reiterate the point that the theory employs the methodology of ideal-types. The theory argues that in its purely normative form of organization, moral commitment is associated exclusively with persuasive or normative forms of authority, rather than power. In this instance, alienated lower participants are morally committed (in theory) to the use of force in enforcement activities. Since the methodology allows for such deviations from the pure form, this finding is not a challenge to the theory.

³⁷In the following analyses, the responses of enforcement managers (non-elites but of higher status than officers) are included in the department's responses. In addition, at least one of the fisher respondents was one of the true fisher elites. Perhaps the incorporation of these more elevated respondents may have introduced a conservative bias into the results.

increase the status of successful cheaters among the non-elite, since these may be perceived to be beating the unfair system. Gouldner argues that retaliatory cheating may serve the same function as a "grievance".

In contrast, normative organizations decide rules on the basis of consensus, and since these rules reflect the values of all groups, the rules are perceived to be fair. In normative organizations, rule enforcement offends no group's values since all support the rules. Violators are generally perceived as those who through carelessness or ignorance mistakenly transgress, and the status of those who violate for any other reason declines.

Our data on lower participant perceptions of each one of these dimensions of the exercise of power show that the compliance structure of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans is coercive. Taking all five dimensions into account simultaneously, only a tiny fraction of fishers or officials believe the department's compliance structure is normative. All others say either that it is coercive, or that it is a mixture of coercion with something else. Most respondents think it is purely coercive.

Almost all fishers and officials say the rules are made by a few elite groups and imposed on the rest.³⁸ About two-thirds of each group believe the rules are unfair. Most fishers and department respondents say that rule enforcement either hurts the honest fisher more than the others, (because they do not get the rewards the cheaters get away with and in addition they lose the opportunity to catch the fish taken by illegal means), or they say that enforcement is so ineffective that it hurts no one. Three-quarters of enforcement officials believe fishers cheat because of their uncontrollable appetites and greed, a motive Gouldner

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³⁸See the detailed analyses in sections 1.6 and 2.4 in Appendix E.

links to the mock form of organization. One-half of the fisher respondents also gave this response.

Durkheim's theory of the moral bankruptcy that results when so much emphasis is placed by the culture on utilitarian, material wealth issues, may explain the fact that so many fishers think the appetites of other fishers are uncontrollable. Both fishers and officials commented on their competitive and materialistic cultures, particularly in Nova Scotia, but also among the larger vessel fishers in Newfoundland. Their explanations of the motives behind the cheating may be a reflection of local values that consider the fishery as a resource to be "mined" until its gone, in the same way as they hunt deer, moose, ducks, etc., rather than a resource to be "managed" over time. Furthermore, the behaviour of many dragger fishers in both locations, and the larger fixed gear fishers in the SW. Nova Scotia location is more consistent with the "mining" than the "managing" approach to harvesting the resource. In the highly competitive and materialistic S.W. Nova Scotia location, conspicuous displays of wealth also proliferate in the form of "mansions", satellite dishes, paved driveways, recreational vehicles, other vehicles, etc. Similar tendencies are evident among the mobile fishers in the western Newfoundland location.

An exception to the portrait of the organization as coercive, based upon the dimensions Gouldner applied in his theory of industrial bureaucracy was found in fisher ratings of the social status of cheaters. One-half of the officials, but only a fraction of fishers believe cheaters are highly respected in their communities for their success at cheating. The view of enforcement officials explains the positive status of cheaters among fishers as hero worship for those who fight back against the corrupt system, but many others argued that the local culture values success by any means. The response fishers gave is difficult to explain.

A number seemed simultaneously to hold contradictory views. They admired cheaters and respected them for their success at fishing and the visible evidence of that success, but they also resent them. A number of respondents said they were envious of their success. Perhaps this explains why many said they do not respect them, but then appeared to behave as if they did. In one case, for example, a large fishing community gave "the fisher of the year award" to a lobster fisher more than once, after he had been caught, prosecuted, and fined several times for major cases of lobster overfishing.

On the other hand, perhaps the confusion results from different definitions of cheating. To most officers, overfishing lobster is cheating. At three in the morning, when this researcher was present to observe a fisher being charged for untagged lobster traps on his vessel, the fisher said to the officer: "Ok. You got me fair and square. But, what's the point? What have you done?" The officer said, "You broke the law. What if everybody did it, what would happen to the lobster?" The fisher laughed and said: "Everybody has been doing it for years, and the landings keep getting better and better." Then he said, "What conclusion do you draw from that fact?" Perhaps fishers believe there are only certain rules whose violation earns one negative status, and perhaps they gave their answers to the question about the status of cheaters with this more narrow conception of what constitutes a "cheater" in mind.

In most ways this organization's authority structure is perceived to be coercive. We note that coercive authority is congruent with alienated lower participant commitment. In these two structures, the organization appears to be congruent.

Goals

Being a political bureaucracy, this organization's goals are likely to be some function of the national political agenda. This requires some consideration of the effect of the larger

context on the organization's goals. The Minister of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans is one leader in a political party whose election to power is to some extent based on its policies. Since politically desirable organization goals are not necessarily compatible with the organization's basic structure or legislated mandate, the organization's congruence and effectiveness may be initiated, reduced, or amplified by demands to achieve certain other political goals. Also, the kind of authority an organization applies may depend upon the type and extent of resources it commands, and on its permission from the larger society to use those authorities. Organization goals may reflect the constraints of its social environment. The agents of those constraints include Industry Advisory Groups, Unions, Parliament and its Committees, as well as the voting public, the press, and various Voluntary Associations.

Our primary data regarding the organization's goals relate to the period during which the field research was conducted. There are some written records of the organization's goals with which our respondent's perceptions may be compared. In addition, several respondents made comments about the history of the department's goals, and these give some historical perspective on the organization's actual goals. The department's fisheries management goals may be organized into two relatively distinct periods: the early years before Canada's jurisdiction was expanded out to two hundred miles from the coastline, and the years subsequent to that expansion and prior to Canada's first federal down-sizing Budget in 1995. Our analyses are confined to these time periods.

In the years following the Second World War and leading up to the extension of Canada's two hundred mile fishing zone in the mid-70's, the organization's allocation function appears to have emphasized scientific rationale linked to customary concessions to the industry's elites. Scientists assessed the biological foundation of the stocks and provided

that advice to Ministers. These made their decisions, presumably on that basis, but it is certainly possible that political and economic considerations played major roles in those decisions. Little is known about the actual basis for the allocation decisions over this time period, although the Atlantic coast “fish aristocracy” and their open-door relationships with Ministers of Fisheries is so well known, that one is tempted to state the highly probable collusion among them over allocations, as though it were fact.

Fishery officers reported that during the era when the department’s allocations appeared to be based on custom or traditional respect for Science, the vast majority of fishers were law-abiding. Those who did not comply stood out from their fellow fishers, and were said to be viewed with contempt or pity. Compliance was an “habituated” response made by participants in a patriarchal traditional mode of authority. In the Newfoundland context, for example, an inshore fisher who cheated was seen as incompetent or lazy, since in most years even an average fisher could do reasonably well without having to cheat. In this context, maintaining order in the fisheries was relatively simple. The officers could count on the support of the majority of fishers. Most officers and fishers were on good terms, and some officers performed a service role, much like that of the community “constable”, for their clients.

This changed dramatically when larger capacity mobile gear vessels expanded into the fisheries following the extension of Canada's fisheries jurisdiction. At this time, the federal government encouraged greater capacity in harvesting and processing sectors. This was partly motivated by the need to defuse international tension by appearing to use fishing grounds from which Canada had evicted foreign fishing fleets. It was also part of the push for regional economic expansion and employment in the Atlantic provinces.

The resulting over-capacity in the primary and secondary sectors increased tensions among gear sectors and processors. These competed for shrinking stocks. The regulatory tools needed to manage these tensions multiplied, as limited entry licensing and vessel size restrictions and a host of other input restrictions were introduced into almost every fishery. One result was a highly complex rational-legal framework for fisheries management. Another was the decline of the traditional authority structure, including the status of Science within the department. In its place emerged a huge administrative bureaucracy composed of clerks, policy analysts, resource managers, economists, public administrators, and legal advisors. The traditional authority of this state bureaucracy was replaced by the legal form of bureaucratic authority.

In principle, scientific stock assessments are based on facts. In reality, the prohibitive costs of adequate sampling frames, and erroneous and misreported data on fish landings (mortalities) creates an imperfect world that compels scientists to interpret, assume, and make educated guesses to supplement the powers of their models. As long as political, economic, or social conditions did not produce challenges to scientific projections or to the legitimacy of the decision-making processes, allocations of fish could take virtually any form. That changed when the primary goal became employment and income maintenance based on fishing. It is difficult for example, for politicians to say no to excessive allocations when stock projections are admittedly subject to error, and when faced with processors and fishers whose representatives argue that their enterprises/members and their fishing dependent communities will soon be out of work.

The new approach emphasized rules and "consultative" process. This development is an example of what Weber referred to as the basic idea of legal authority, namely that "...

laws can be enacted and changed at pleasure by formally correct procedure. The governing body is either elected or appointed and constitutes as a whole and in all its sections rational organizations (Weber;1961:4-5).” Attempts were made to limit fishing effort by means of limited entry licenses and regulatory controls on fishing inputs.

However, there was little to indicate that the organization was making serious attempts to enforce those rules in an equitable manner. Throughout this process, enforcement officials were represented in the planning processes by individuals with little or no knowledge of enforcement. Resource allocation personnel would produce a management plan that might contain new regulatory requirements. These were drafted without input from enforcement officials, and according to these fisher respondents the whole process was dominated by a few elite fishers or fisher representatives and a small number of senior officials. At several community meetings this researcher attended in the Newfoundland research location, none of the fishers were even aware of the federal regulatory amendment process. About ten fishers out of approximately four hundred who attended those meetings indicated that they had read any part of the regulations pertaining to the lobster fishery, and in almost all cases, lobster had become by that time, their principal source of fishing income. Even the local Fishermen's Union representatives at those meetings had never heard of the pre-publication process for regulatory amendments in The Canada Gazette., the process that is designed to ensure citizens have opportunities to critique regulatory amendments before they take effect. In Nova Scotia, most fisher respondents were similarly unaware of the regulatory amendment process.

The low priority attached by Regional Headquarters to enforcement activities is illustrated by the way officer time is allocated to the enforcement of regulations. Based on

the Fishery Officer Weekly Enforcement Reports, it was determined that seventy-five percent of officer time is spent on a wide range of mostly clerical duties requiring their presence in the office. According to the National Director of Enforcement Operations, officers could not spend more than thirty percent of their time in the field, even if they were permitted to do so, because they cannot afford to gas up their vehicles for any longer periods of time. Most officer time is consumed by clerical office tasks in support of the licensing and administrative activities that emanate out of the legal rational regulatory framework by which the department appears to be regulating access to fishing opportunities.

The relative insignificance of conservation objectives at advisory meetings is illustrated by a dialogue between the department and fishers at an advisory meeting attended by this researcher. The meeting was chaired by the department. The fishers were pleading with the department's Science representative at that meeting to update the studies of the strengths of the stocks in certain geographic areas before allocating large quotas in those areas (the most recent data was about ten years out of date). The fishers were certain that the excessive allocations would cause them all to wipe out a stock that takes seven years to regenerate. The fishers offered to use their own vessels to ensure the studies would be completed before the allocations were decided.

The scientist rejected their offer. He argued they used a different type of fishing gear for that stock from those used by the department's scientists to measure catch rates for that stock. He said he didn't want to "contaminate" the results by using a different type of gear. Their reply was: "If you use a different type of gear, and you base our catch rates on it, then what good are your data?" He remained adamant about confining the testing to departmental vessels, but he then advised them that it was highly unlikely a research vessel could be

dedicated to the task before the fishery was opened. He said he would raise the question with his supervisor, but cautioned that his superiors would probably say they could not do the study.

Harvesting levels recommended by the department's scientists were routinely overruled by the authority of the Minister of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. One senior enforcement manager stated that in the period prior to Minister Tobin's leadership, Science recommendations for allowable harvests in the Atlantic fisheries were exceeded by the Minister in seventy-five percent of the cases. According to the 1994 testimony before a Ministerial Advisory Committee given by one senior departmental official who was responsible for Fisheries Management in one Atlantic Region, it was pointless even to raise the topic of essential restrictions at advisory committee meetings that he chaired, so he never raised them. The example he referred to was a restriction that would force fishers to use a mesh no smaller than a certain size, to permit small fish to escape and complete their reproductive cycle. Because this would reduce the gear sector's catch levels in the short run, they would not allow the restriction. The need for the restriction was recommended by Science officials, and industry representatives were also aware of the consequences of its absence for their future revenues. He was reported to have stated that: "I would not dare to introduce conservation issues such as these in those forums. The industry officials in the room would tear me to pieces."

If the goals of fisheries management did not relate to conservation, nor to fair allocation of economic wealth of the fisheries to participants, nor to effective enforcement of management plans, then to what objective did they relate? Most officials argue that allocation objectives are social, not economic. By "social", they mean the main goal of most

allocations is to ensure sufficient weeks of employment for fish plant employees and fishers to enable them to collect unemployment insurance benefits each year. Most officials also believe the excessive allocations are made to enable fish plant owners to maintain their profitability, and to prevent a loss of processing jobs in single-sector communities that would follow from a plant closure. In short, the main purpose of allocations is to support the role that fish have been assigned within the context of the Welfare State. This strategy was the anchor of Atlantic Regional Economic Development policies and subsidies.³⁹

In describing the nature of the patriarchal form of traditional authority, Weber noted that any codification of that authority embodies what he referred to as the “spirit of the welfare state”. This he described as a situation where: “A combination of social ethical with social utilitarian principles prevails, breaking through all rigour of formal law (Weber,1961:9). This conception of a welfare state corresponds to the basis upon which the decisions appear to have been made regarding the allocation of fish in this second time period that we have been discussing. We argue that it is significant that Weber refers to the way the welfare state in attempting to attain its goals, “violates all rigours of formal law”, since in effect when an organization does that while alienating its participants and using repressive means, the organization is no longer a legal bureaucracy. The basis of its authority becomes coercion, not law or legal processes.

By the mid-80's the capacity of harvesters and processing establishments was greater, and fishing efforts became micro-managed. Weekly and sometimes daily regulatory changes in scores of fisheries became routine. The complex and barely comprehensible rational-legal

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³⁹As one respondent stated, “This is “social”, spelled with a capital “P” for political”.

regulatory framework continued to self-destruct at the grass roots level because in many cases the department's own officials did not understand it, or failed to communicate their understanding to their own enforcement officials. In any event, the department had neither the capacity nor the political will to enforce most arrangements. In this context of dependence upon fishing employment, unemployment, and few employment alternatives for its uneducated fishing industry labour force, and faced with strong union, community and industry pressures, maintaining the lid on the inexorably explosive welfare state system became the organization's paramount but impossible objective.

Conclusions

Our theory argues that congruent organizations are more effective than incongruent organizations because the structures of incongruent organizations compete, contradict, or cancel out potential benefits that would otherwise result from the ways each dimension of structure is organised. Our analyses in this chapter demonstrated that under its official image of a utilitarian, legal-rational bureaucracy, this organization has congruent structures. However, they are coercive. That is, its goals are coercive (welfare state), its means are repressive, and its lower participants are alienated. The organization is congruent-coercive. Why then is it so ineffective?⁴⁰

This question is addressed in the next chapter. That chapter will show how organizational ineffectiveness results from the use of repressive means in a practical context where those who are coerced are also expected to use their initiative and/or voluntarily comply with rules that do not have their consent.

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⁴⁰We define it as an ineffective enforcement organization because non-compliance in some circumstances is normative behaviour.

Chapter 5: External Organization Factors

Our theory identifies several factors whose operation determine the organization's structure of goals, means, and lower participant commitments. Some are internal to the organization while others are external. That is, some operate "within" the boundaries of the organization, while others are "outside" the boundaries of that system. Our theory argues that both sets of factors may exert significant effects on the nature of an organization. This chapter concentrates on the external factors.⁴¹ Two types of external factors are examined: "political" factors at the federal level; and "community", or more micro local collective influences on attitudes and behavioural predispositions of individuals.

Political Factors

The most obvious external influence on political organizations results when citizens pressure Ministers to redirect the goals and means of the organizations they lead. Our theory argues that even when an organization has clear goals, appropriate authority structures, and positively committed lower participants, it can alienate its lower participants when such politically inspired changes force lower participants to comply with policies and practises they do not accept, particularly when they actively interfere with effective performance of their roles. Such alienation could undermine the organization's legitimacy and effectiveness.

How did cabinet pressures affect this organization over the period from 1980 to 1995? In response to the financial crisis in the Atlantic fishing industry in the early 1980's, the federal government commissioned the Task Force on the Atlantic Fisheries to review the situation and provide recommendations on how to lead the industry toward a more viable

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⁴¹Internal factors are addressed in Chapter 6.

situation. Its report, “The Kirby Report” (Kirby;1982:191), identified goals for the Atlantic fishing industry that served to guide the Department’s choice of goals and means for several years. The report argued that while preserving jobs in rural communities is important, not every job can be preserved by public subsidies. Consequently, it argued that the priority must be to make the industry economically viable so that it can produce secure employment. However, the report’s idea of economic viability did not mean maximum economic efficiency, regardless of the impact on employment objectives. Rather, it argued that economic efficiency and employment need to be jointly considered. The report stated that: ‘...our second objective should be to maximize the number of jobs in the fishery as long as the income received from these jobs can be considered reasonable...(Kirby;1982,p.191).’

When these social and economic goals were combined in practice in the fishery, decisions began to reflect the “social ethical and social utilitarian” principles of the system that Weber termed the welfare state. These broke the formal rules and undermined the rational basis of the organization’s authority. Numerous authors have pointed out that the fishing industry in Newfoundland, for example, cannot generate sufficient wealth to be the basis of a viable provincial economy.⁴² The dependence on fishing employment and unemployment insurance that became the basis of the “reasonable income” of many fishers, plant employees, and plant owners, was destined to fail. The Newfoundland Economic Recovery Commission(1992:46) identified several defects of the unemployment insurance/fishing employment combination: it discourages self-employment and small scale enterprise, undermines personal and community initiatives and the importance of education,

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⁴²See the Economic Council's (1980)Report entitled Newfoundland: From Dependence to Self-Reliance, for a description of why this is the case for Newfoundland.

distorts the effects of local development groups; creates disincentives to work and it impedes productivity for employers.⁴³

It also led to many abuses of the unemployment insurance system. In a background report for the Royal Commission on Employment and Unemployment, D. May & Hollit A.(1986:193) summarize some of the reports of unemployment insurance abuse they encountered in their research. They found that: people will work for nothing in order to get stamps for unemployment insurance, employees pay unemployment insurance premiums but do not receive a wage, individuals pay an employer to put them on the payroll so they can collect unemployment insurance, and plant owners collude with workers in the use of rotating lay-off schedules.

Unemployment insurance abuses are a community adaptation to weak single-sector economies and surpluses of otherwise unemployable labour.⁴⁴ This adaptation maximized community welfare but did it at the expense of other workers and communities. By continuing to fund this arrangement, the federal government gave its consent to these trade-offs. From the perspective of some lower participants, the behaviour of government was as irresponsible as it was desirable. There was little that those in such small communities would do to publicly protest this selective generosity, since they would alienate themselves from the social life of their community. It was a guaranteed annual income program specifically for fishing industry workers and plant owners. It obscured "normal" economic and social

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⁴³"Overview of the Impacts of the Income Security System on the Economy of Newfoundland and Labrador, March, 1992:46.

⁴⁴This merely states the well known fact that labour markets tend to favour employees who possess skills that these fishers and plant employees rarely possess.

pressures on communities to become viable and it intensified fishing effort, thus destroying some stocks of fish, and eroding the biological foundation of the income support program. At the same time, it perpetuated inequalities in the distribution of income support in those communities.

The key to the government's unemployment insurance strategy was to make it possible for fishers and plant employees to obtain sufficient weeks of insurable earnings in fishing and in plant work to leverage unemployment insurance payments for the remainder of the year. It forced the managers of the fisheries to be more concerned with distributing enough fish to each group of fishers than with the state of the stocks they allocated. The management cycle was self-defeating. The more the fish were allocated beyond the allocations necessary for stock recovery, the fewer harvestable fish were available for allocation in the following year. When the stocks collapsed, so did the basis of the federal approach to income maintenance in these fishing communities.

In his 1995 Budget, the Minister of Finance announced major cutbacks to certain federal organizations. The Department of Fisheries and Oceans was one of the most affected departments. In order to deliver its programs at less cost, the department is withdrawing from activities and programs with economic and employment objectives, and concentrating instead on the mandate of conserving fish stocks. It proposes to delegate a considerable amount of other management responsibility to local levels, where department/fisher partnerships shape the decisions that have economic and social impacts.⁴⁵

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⁴⁵ As we will show at several places in our presentation of our findings, as long as the department continues with its current consultative mechanisms and approach to administration, the attempts at "partnership" are unlikely to be successful.

Within the Department of Fisheries and Oceans as a whole, it is expected that the cuts will reduce the 1994/95 budget by 45% by fiscal year 1999/2,000. The enforcement budget is \$77 million, and it is expected to continue at that level until the Program Review Exercise (second edition) is completed.⁴⁶

Many of this organization's changes were driven by Cabinet priorities such as reducing government expenditures, and by the Minister's views on how the organization should behave.⁴⁷ This organization continues to transform its external appearance as well as its internal operations in response to these society-level external factors.⁴⁸

Community Factors

"Community" factors may affect organizations when they shape values, beliefs, and behaviours of the individuals who later carry these into the organization. These attitudes may affect their commitment to the organization and its policies. Some important community factors include the nature of their early socialization in rural fishing communities, family background, and religious beliefs.

Officers and fishers usually share similar community, if not family, backgrounds.

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⁴⁶DFO, 1993-1994 Conservation and Protection Resource Profile, Feb. 2., 1994, Financial Management Services, and DFO, Financial Administration Directorate, May 1, 1995. DFO 1995-1996 Allotment Overlay Reports of DM's'S Allocations, May 1995, Vol 2 of 2.

⁴⁷See Minister Tobin's speech to the St. John's Board of Trade on October 11, 1995. Appendix D is a critique of the proposals he made in that speech. It is a critical application of our theoretical perspective.

⁴⁸In addition to this political redirection, the department and the Canadian Coast Guard are merging into one larger organization. The Canadian Coast Guard has its own structures of goals, authority, and lower participant commitment. It is reasonable to expect that this superimposition will intensify the organization's problems.

Most fishers and officers come from fishing families, or other families who have lived for generations in single-sector fishing communities. Most officers work in the same geographic areas in which they were raised. Their religious backgrounds are similar to fishers, they attended the same schools as fishers, and their children play with fisher's children. The network of social relationships officers and fishers develop as they mature may be modified by their employment, but some aspects of their interactions with fishers are structured by their community backgrounds.

It is possible that their shared social and cultural experience and history produce a common consciousness with respect to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. The organization affects all families in single-sector fishing communities. Perhaps new participants to the organization, whether officers or fishers, join the organization with attitudes and pre-dispositions, including prejudices, that are structured by their community's culture? Perhaps their degree of commitment to the organization is determined before they even participate in the organization?

However, if each group of fishers and officers forms an identifiable occupational community of its own, then even if their values originate in their shared community awareness and attitudes to the organization, we know that those will be filtered through these production-based affiliations. If the communities are not homogeneous, their occupational diversity implies that the functional dynamics of each group's interaction with the organization, and not community factors, would carry more weight in determining lower participant perceptions and commitments to their organization. This means that community factors cannot be isolated from the strategies of occupational groups within the communities. These strategies develop as each group of fishers participates in the organization.

If the communities were perfectly homogeneous, perhaps the community culture might play the dominant role in determining the commitment of those who subsequently become organization participants. Under such circumstances perhaps community members would be alienated from the organization because they are members of a community that is alienated. However, the distinctiveness of different groups of fishers in SW Nova Scotia and in West Coast Newfoundland is well-known.⁴⁹ Therefore, we argue that these distinct occupation communities are participants in the regulatory organization, and each group plays major roles in shaping the attitudes and behaviours of its members.

However, despite their distinctiveness as occupational groups and the fundamental contrast between the competitive utilitarianism of SW Nova Scotia fishers compared to the collectivistic traditionalism of Newfoundland, we demonstrated in the previous chapter that most officers and fishers share similar perceptions regarding their organization. They see it as coercive, alienating, illegitimate, and ineffective. Since there is widespread consensus on these points among highly differentiated communities, localized community factors cannot explain the alienation and direction of lower participant commitment to the organization.⁵⁰

Conclusion

This chapter showed how the national political context of this organization shaped it into an organization with welfare state goals that were irreconcilable with the concrete biological base of the industry. Not only did these political external factors shape the nature

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⁴⁹See the profiles of each gear type group in section 2.2 of Appendix E.

⁵⁰The consensus about the nature of this organization implies there are broader external cultural influences, perhaps at the regional or national levels, that shape these resistances.

of the organization's goals, they also shaped the organization's ineffectiveness, since the goals were impossible to sustain over the longer term. This chapter also argued that community factors may play some role in shaping negative orientations toward the organization, but they are not the dominant influence.

Chapter 6: Internal Organization Factors

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the nature of this organization by mapping the interplay among a number of internal organizational factors. We concentrate on those types of factors that tend to shape the degree of integration or consensus of an organization. These include: the organization's approach to recruitment, its socialization practices, its scope and pervasiveness in the lives of its members, the nature of the work it requires participants to perform, the rules that organize the work, and the organization's approaches to building consensus and communicating with lower participants. Our theory asserts that an organization's type may be inferred from the nature of its integration mechanisms. Therefore, in identifying the organization's integration mechanisms we identify its type. Each of these factors is addressed below by relating our empirical findings to aspects of each consensus mechanism.

The skill mixes and attitudes of the people it recruits into the organization, how the organization "sells itself" to the recruits, and the ways they are trained and socialized into its corporate culture, affect the capabilities and responses of organizations. The extent to which that organization is pervasive in the lives of lower participants affects their behaviour to the organization and its corporate culture. The nature of work lower participants perform also shapes their behaviour toward their organization. Enforcement officers are often faced with the need to make judgements that may change other people's lives to a significant degree. And many fishers face life and death situations in the course of earning their living. The nature of officer and fisher work tends to require independence, courage, good judgement, and initiative, and these qualities may conflict with an organization's hierarchical structures of authority. Differences in the nature of the work performed in the field by

officers and fishers compared with work at Headquarters may create conflicts, and such conflicts may affect the integration of the organization.

Rules are the essence of legal bureaucracies, and the functions and dysfunctions of such rules affects lower participants. The nature of organization rules is particularly important for this research because of our focus on non-compliance. Finally, our theory argues that effective organizations require some degree of consensus in several spheres. This means that there has to be some communication with lower participants beyond their initial socialization in their recruitment phase, to align their beliefs, norms, and perspectives to the organization. Organizations may be typed as coercive, utilitarian, or normative depending upon the extent to which they build consensus in different spheres of consensus, and by their reliance on different methods for communicating with lower participants.

Recruitment

Applying recruitment criteria to select candidates produces candidates whose initial involvements could either support or conflict with organization goals and/or compliance structures. Consequently, lower participant recruitment can affect the type of commitment of lower participants.

Fishers are not yet required to satisfy rational selection criteria such as exams and interviews.⁵¹ They must satisfy local criteria that may range from normative to coercive, and any combination in between. Recruitment is often based on kinship and membership in

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⁵¹However, there is some movement in this direction which falls under the heading of "the professionalization of fishers", as this term is used by officials. In its essence, professionalization is an attempt by the department to give fisher organizations more direct control over recruitment, and to insist they meet certain standards (set by their organizations) with respect to training in navigation, etc., for their certification as craftsmen.

particular occupation groups within the fishing community. New fisher participants are required by law to register with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans by purchasing a "fishermen's registration". General statements regarding their compliance with *Fisheries Acts and Regulations* are outlined on the back of this card. One cannot say that fishing community institutions "sentence" fishers to membership in the regulatory organization for the same reasons that courts send inmates to prisons. Those who decide they want to fish must voluntarily join the organization and meet certain conditions to continue as fishers and to improve their fishing status.

Although these instrumental criteria are established by the organization, (often in "consultation" with fisher representatives), a fisher's ability to meet those criteria is often related to his ability to persuade other industry participants to employ him, or to finance his fishing activities. Thus, recruitment as well as "promotions" are controlled in principle by the organization, but in fact it is more often members of the local community who hold the real power. In this sense, it is local community processes and their reputation in the community, their fishing partners, and their source of loans, that structure fisher opportunities. The community recruits them; the organization polices them. This seems much like the situation in a coercive organization.

Except for its control over allocations of fish and its authority to establish the rules by which fishers increase their status to full time, the organization has little influence over the elevation of an individual's fishing status. This implies that a fisher's established involvement is likely to be calculative, if not moral commitment, to those upon whom he depends in his community, but his commitment to the organization is likely to be weak. The regulatory organization only requires fishers to submit themselves to its criteria and rules.

In this sense, the organization stands "above" the fishers, much like a patriarch, and demands their obedience on that basis. But since the organization has a minimal capacity to detect violations and rarely deprives even multiple offenders of their fishing privileges, when compared against the pull of local communities ties, the organization lacks the power to compel much commitment from fishers.

The pattern of fisher recruitment is therefore similar to that in most coercive organizations where recruitment is performed by external agencies and the organization has no control over who is recruited. New participants are obliged to submit themselves to the instrumental controls of the organization, and those who do not do so may be punished. Since most of the department's instrumental activity with respect to new as well as more established fisher participants consists of setting and enforcing rules, the organization's approach to the recruitment of lower participant fishers fits the coercive pattern for their initial and established involvement with the organization.

If the compliance structure that actually controls fisher behaviour is the same in principle as that structure by which they are recruited, then in theory the enforcement organization might be able to accomplish some limited enforcement objectives based on their organization's control over the rules. However, fisher occupational groups at local community levels have much more direct and efficacious controls over fishers than the organization.⁵²

In the case of its officers, the organization does the recruiting. The entrance criteria for competing for positions of fishery officer are minimal. The applicant must possess a valid

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⁵²This fact would be of practical significance in the event that enforcement partnerships between fishers and officers develop.

driver's license, have completed secondary school, pass a medical exam including a test of psychological stability, and obtain a security clearance. Those who meet these criteria must compete with other applicants on the basis of their performance in interviews and tests designed to compare their relevant skills and knowledge of substantive issues, their personal suitability, and their interpersonal skills. The criteria used to gauge these candidates may vary with the participants on each selection board, and with the competitiveness of the "cohort" of applicants, but some standardization is attempted by requiring certain, more senior individuals, to be on most selection boards.

These recruitment processes are similar to the rational evaluation processes used by most utilitarian organizations to establish some control over attitudes and behaviours of new participants. Rational performance assessments are combined with remunerative rewards to inspire calculative commitment.⁵³

Socialization

Effective socialization mechanisms align beliefs, norms, and perspectives of participants with those of the organization as required. The substance of socialization indicates how well lower participants are trained for their roles in the organization. The extent to which socialization is actually under the control of the organization is a function of internal versus external control over the courses and instruction. In addition, lower

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⁵³How can their alienation be explained, given the utilitarian way in which they were recruited? Part of the answer may be superficial calculative screening controls and strong financial incentives for individuals from depressed regional and community economies to fight for highly paid jobs by faking the required attitudes. On the other hand, new recruits may indeed be calculative in their commitments. Our data reflect the views of established officers, not recruits. Recruitment and wages can affect lower participant "initial" involvement, but other factors may have more influence over their "established" involvement.

participants may be informally socialized by more senior officers on the job.

Etzioni describes the profiles of coercive, normative, and utilitarian organizations in terms of the ways they socialize their lower participants. In normative organizations, expressive socialization predominates, and since participants are recruited for their intense commitments to the organization and that organization emphasizes consensus, socialization is limited to this role. Coercive organizations have very limited amounts of formal socialization, and expressive socialization is an exclusive inmate domain. Utilitarian organizations have more extensive formal socialization and emphasize technical training in instrumental matters. These organizations often rely on outsiders to train their lower participants. Since outsiders are not under their direct control, they may instill values which conflict with those of the organization. Utilitarian organizations carry out little expressive socialization, relying instead on the calculative orientations of their lower participants to maintain their motivation and morale.

The formal aspects of officer socialization fit the pattern of socialization in a utilitarian organization, but in its informal respects, socialization is predominantly expressive. New recruits must complete the two year Fishery Officer Career Progression Program before graduating from their probationary period with the rank of GT-03. They enter the program at the rank of GT-01, and are promoted to GT-02 upon completion of the classroom components and six months of field duties. The program combines on-the-job training for nineteen months, under the tutelage of a senior field officer, with three cycles of formal course instruction, for a total of nineteen weeks of courses. Their evaluations by field officers are reviewed periodically by a regional committee.

The first course is five weeks long, covers the mandate of the department, the role

of officers, administrative issues related to public service protocols, physical fitness issues, and communication skills. It is provided at the Canadian Police College in Ottawa or the training Centre at Cornwall, Ontario, and courses are given largely by the department's personnel. They return to the field where their behaviour is monitored (where feasible) in accordance with the Field Training Log. This log lists one hundred different types of tasks they may encounter in the course of their work, and provides space for their "trainer" to indicate his/her comments and evaluation of the officer's performance, on each task. This log is maintained until their two year period is completed.

They return to a seven week course that is given primarily by RCMP instructors, at the RCMP Depot in Regina. It has some similarities to socialization in the typical "boot camp" experience. The course is focused exclusively on enforcement issues. Most officers consider it the most formative of their formal socialization experiences. Many respondents indicated that they were strongly influenced by the "legalistic" emphasis which characterized the Depot at that time. After returning for more field duties, they take their final course training of six weeks at a Training Centre in their Region. This course is given by departmental staff and by outside experts as required, and covers several fisheries and habitat management issues.

Informal socialization, even during their probationary period is the longest period of socialization officers receive, and our data on the importance of their work group, and the extent to which that work group is characterized by alienation, suggest it has the most influence on their established involvement. While course instruction provides officers with some theoretical perspectives on the aims of the organization, it is minimal. Consequently, officers, like fishers, learn most of their skills and values on the job.

Because professionals are expected to behave differently from craftsmen, it is important to clarify that fishery officers, like their fisher clients, are members of a craft. That is, the way officers behave and are expected to behave toward their careers fits those found in craft occupations. Unlike professionals for example, officers do not enter the career having completed extensive formal education in the field of enforcement. They are not expected nor encouraged to read up on the latest developments in their field, or to take additional courses or write papers and present them at Symposia composed of like-minded colleagues, or to make other contributions to the advancement of their fields. Some training is provided to officers subsequent to the training program.⁵⁴ Officer performance is not subject to review by their peers, as is the case in all professional organizations. Officers work in line organizations and their performances are evaluated by their supervisors.

As is characteristic of members of crafts, officers receive the majority of their training on the job by more experienced officers. These latter play powerful roles in shaping the way new participants orient themselves to the organization. Since our data show that all experienced officers are alienated from the organization, we can appreciate that since these are the ones who shape the attitudes of newcomers to the organization, “on-the-job” socialization is likely to instill alienated attitudes among newcomers. Formal socialization processes could inspire at least some calculative or even moral commitment from the officers, but it is reasonable to expect that the informal processes would affect officer commitment to a much greater extent.

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⁵⁴Based on the information that was available on courses taken by officers, a generous estimate of training, including firearms training to meet the annual qualification requirements, is no more than one week per officer each year.

New entrants are trained as generalists in a wide range of courses taken over a period of a few weeks, a period that is interspersed with far more weeks that are spent in “on-the-job” training. Their formal socialization is highlighted by several weeks of “boot camp” training at the RCMP Depot in Regina. In spite of their informal socialization, or perhaps because unlike the rest of their training and experience, the Depot philosophy is consistent with the views of more experienced officers, that experience remains an importance influence on many officers. These continue to value the “crime fighting” approach to fisheries enforcement they acquired at the Depot.⁵⁵

However, many officers feel their organization has little interest in enforcement activities. There seems to be little fit between their formal socialization through the program, and the requirements of much of their work at the office. Since the crime-fighting emphasis has received little support from their organization, the most important of their formal socialization processes appears to have pitted them against the beliefs, norms, and perspectives of the organization.

The program has some of the characteristics of a utilitarian approach to socialization, but these are outweighed by the pre-eminence of on-the-job socialization in this craft

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⁵⁵It is somewhat ironic that the new emphasis that the RCMP places in their current training programs for recruits emphasizes community-based policing, which one might want to argue is the antithesis of a crime-busting approach. On the other hand, as we discovered, many fishery officers support both approaches. This suggests that some officers view the approaches as complementary, rather than antithetical. If officers were to be taught that community-based policing was the “best way to do the job” by instructors at the Depot, they would probably embrace that approach. However, they would still be alienated from their organization. This is because that formal training would lead them to think it should be applied on the job, and when they discover that the department devotes little interest to any kind of enforcement, they would resist the organization’s values.

occupation, as well as the stark contradiction between their enforcement training at the Depot and the lack of emphasis on enforcement that they feel characterizes the actual work. The formal socialization officers receive resembles the calculative type found in utilitarian organizations in some respects, but the expressive socialization of the informal "on-the-job" training seems to have a larger effect on their behaviours than most of their in-house formal training. Indeed, they even like some of their formal training. What alienates them is the fact that they are not allowed to implement that training. One could argue that in the final analysis, the type of socialization officers receive resembles the type one finds in coercive institutions, and their reactions to that socialization is equally characteristic of coercive institutions. Lower participants carry out expressive "counter-socialization" to ensure that the newcomers understand how the reality works in the field. This counter socialization is a form of non-compliance.

However, there is much to be gained from a close analysis of the strategies for effective enforcement that exist at the operational level of the field officer. Their counter strategy is motivated neither by calculation of personal interest, nor out of fear of punishment, but by what clearly appears to be a moral commitment to being more effective at their jobs.

In contrast, fishers receive little if any formal socialization from the department. They are socialized on the job by their family and/or fellow fishers/fisher employers in their communities. An exception to this is the "on the committee" socialization that a tiny fraction of fishers receive because they participate on Fisheries Advisory Committees. These committees are usually chaired by the department or "co-chaired" with industry participants. The meetings are organized along bureaucratic lines, and much informal socialization into

the world of the bureaucracy takes places by means of fisher participation.⁵⁶

For many fishers, socialization into fishing begins with their birth into the occupational fishing community. As they grow up, many fish during their holidays from school. Many leave school for permanent fishing jobs as soon as they are able to do so. Since their opportunities are limited by this amount of education, it may increase their attachment to fishing. As one might expect, since most new fishers have already been socialized by their family and occupational community, the involvement of these participants will likely reflect the views of those who socialize them, and not those of the organization.

The fixed(small) fisher gear type group in this study, almost all of whom are located in West Coast Newfoundland, differ from the other gear type groups of fishers we interviewed, in the way their Union mitigates their relationship with the department. The Newfoundland Fishermen's Union organized these fishing communities into a structure of local and regional committees, chaired by local fishers. The Union trains fisher leaders by means of its "education" activities, and these introduce them to political perspectives and activities on fishing matters. It brings fishers into contact with officials. These contacts tend to take place under the fraternal guidance of Union representatives.

The chairs of these committees hold meetings with Union members as required, and some information is exchanged at these meetings. Although there are often other executives

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⁵⁶On the other hand, according to these respondents, in some of the more important committees the regulatory organization has little or no control. They say it simply rubber stamps the wishes of the major players on the committees. The dynamics of these committees probably involve a range from total departmental control through to total control of the agendas by a small group of elite fisher/industry "representatives. Further empirical exploration of these committees in this department and others, could lead to some useful generalizations about the factors under which consensual versus oligarchic decision-making takes place.

elected on the committees, most of the work is done by the chair. Attendance is poor even during the most idle fishing months of winter, let alone in the height of the fishing season. During the community meetings field research phase in Newfoundland, at several meetings, blocks of fishers rose and left en masse, and explained as they did so that were going to their weekly games of darts. One union official observed that: "their entire futures are at stake and all they care about is darts."

Their union's informal socialization of these fisher leaders appears to buffer some of the impacts of the nature of this regulatory organization. This may explain why these fishers display their disgust with the organization when responding to many questions about the fairness of the rules, etc., but, show the least hostility toward the organization of the three gear type groups. Much of their animosity is directed at the Union. This may be because it is more accessible and more approachable to them, and because they have more personable contact with its representatives than with the department.

Full-time status gives fishers access to other opportunities, such as purchasing a limited entry licence from another fisher. In order to fish as skippers on their own vessels, they need to hold a limited entry license. Fishers may "purchase" these from other fishers who must then surrender their "entitlement" to fish for that species. Since the licenses are usually inseparable from the vessel, new entrants often have to purchase vessels solely for the license it carries. Consequently, fishers who wish to fish as independent fishers, often require significant amounts of capital. Most fishers who need this kind of "entry" capital obtain it from other fishers or plant owners in their community, since Banks will not count the licence (which in law is technically the property of the Crown), as collateral. The typical source of such capital is the local plant owner, and the arrangement usually entails additional

obligations (controls over their behaviours) of some types. Thus, to increase or even to maintain their fishing status, many, if not most fishers are controlled to some degree by locals. Since the controls these may exert over fishers can directly affect their fishing status, it is reasonable to assert that like the new officers and their more experienced officer evaluators, on-the-job socialization plays a key role in shaping fisher beliefs and values.

Furthermore, as we have shown, the organization does not make any serious attempt to encourage fishers to adopt values or beliefs that are compatible with organization goals. Consequently, there is little ideological competition for local values on the fishing grounds. Like other coercive organizations, the department does not formally socialize lower fisher participants; it instrumentally sets the rules and punishes/or ignores those who violate those rules, depending on the issue and the priorities in those instances.

Pervasiveness and Scope

In this context of small single-sector coastal fishing communities, nearly everyone is affected by this organization, although the effects can vary in type and intensity. Two ways to describe its effects on its participants are in terms of its "scope" and "pervasiveness". Scope refers to the number of activities in which organization participants are jointly involved. Pervasiveness refers to the number of activities inside or outside the organization for which the organization sets the norms.

In organizations with total scope, all activities take place in groups composed of organization participants. It can be argued that the social structure of small single-sector fishing communities along a stretch of coastline is similarly confining, because the dependence of those communities on fishing gives the regulatory organization, by definition, broad scope over fishers and officers. Many non-fishing activities of officers in the field,

including their social life outside work fall within the scope of the organization, because neither they nor the community can ignore the fact that, whether in or out of uniform, they are enforcement officers. Since there is much discussion in these communities about “who has” or “how to” successfully break fisheries or other regulations, and there is much ventilation of frustrations with the organization, the behaviour of officers in social situations with fishers, and vice versa, is often awkward. Because the officers therefore turn to one another for social support outside working hours, their organization is in some sense more “total” for officers than for enforcement managers in Halifax or Ottawa. In these locations, alternate outlets are available for the expression of emotional frustrations. Officers in this total scope situation have few outlets for emotional release, and tensions accumulate. Such tensions make it difficult for them to be affectively neutral to their organization.⁵⁷

An organization’s pervasiveness affects lower participant commitment. Etzioni argues that pervasiveness is low when organizations set norms only in instances where its elites can directly control the behaviour. Pervasiveness is high when organizations set a wide range norms that lower participants follow in the absence of direct control by elites. Etzioni argues that organizations may be high or low in pervasiveness and total or narrow in scope, and that organizations that are high in pervasiveness will be normative regardless of the direction of their scope. Those that are low in pervasiveness may be either coercive (total scope and low pervasiveness), or utilitarian (narrow scope combined with low

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⁵⁷The organization’s total scope may explain why many officers appear to have a stronger drive to be effective than one might expect from members of a craft. From a community-based policing policy perspective, this quality is valuable because it can become the basis for normative (non-monetary and non-coerced) commitment to the organization.

pervasiveness). The following examines fisher and departmental official perceptions of the organization's scope and pervasiveness and links these to the organization's type.

The organization has broad scope for most fishers. Although their participation in the organization may be limited to obedience to its rules, the decisions it makes affects their incomes and those of other members of their communities, as well as the non-fishing organizations that depend on support from fishing- related income sources. For this reason, the activities of the organization are highly salient and fishers are not affectively neutral about its functions. Some fishers participate in the advisory committees and help to develop the rules, discuss and advise on scientific reports relating to fish stocks, fishing plans, etc. For these, the organization has an even broader scope. Our study of fishers included those who participate and those who are informal leaders of fishers. Both types of fisher leaders are actively involved in discussions of a wide range of the organization's activities, but only those who are members of the advisory process directly influence those activities. Neither is affectively neutral toward the organization.

The extent of pervasiveness of the organization among fishers is more difficult to assess. It is probably less pervasive for SW Nova Scotia fishers than for the Newfoundland fishers. Most SW Nova Scotia fishers openly admitted they break the rules when they feel it is reasonable to do so, and some stated they break them whenever they can. In the Western Newfoundland location, the vast majority of small inshore fishers say they rarely break the rules in the lobster fishery, the dominant fishery in that area. This was confirmed by the fishery officers, although these latter also pointed to some communities as examples of widespread illegal fishing activities. Fisher respondents in those communities confirmed the officers' perceptions.

Most of the self-described law-abiding fishers say that the reason they do not break the rules is because they were taught to fish in a certain manner by their fathers, and they continue that tradition. The fact that they apply their own internal controls to their fishing practices is to some degree independent of the organization. Their family and other local traditions are highly pervasiveness for fishers, but in this location the organization has low pervasiveness. In fact, one may argue that the organization provokes some of them to retaliate with non-compliance by what many fishers consider to be nuisance and malicious prosecutions.

Fishers tend to be participants in an organization with total scope over their lives but it is low in pervasiveness. Were it not for the overwhelming and indirect importance of this regulatory organization for these coastal fishing communities, it is likely that the organization's scope would be narrow. However, because of their dependence on fishing, the total scope of the organization combines with its low pervasiveness to create a situation in which the organization fits the pattern of the coercive organization for most fishers. The norms of the organization have little or no moral force over participants, unless its "elites" are present to monitor and enforce the organization's controls over the fishers.⁵⁸

Partly because the organization's scope is total for officers and narrow for managers, who work in different geographic and bureaucratic culture contexts, officers have strong solidarity at the level of their local work group and more alienated attachment to the organization, while managers reverse these relationships. This illustrates some of the contrast that characterizes the organizational environments of the two "tiers".

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⁵⁸The powers of the peace officer having been delegated to the officers, they are, for this circumstance, direct representatives of the elites.

The total scope of the organization over officers, given their unwillingness to accept many of its policies, pits them against their organization.⁵⁹ At the same time, the total scope forces them to lean more heavily on their immediate work group for social support.⁶⁰ In locations such as Halifax or Ottawa where the organization has more narrow scope over participants, as we would predict, the reverse applies. That is, managers in these locations are more attached to their overall organization and less to their immediate work groups. Only a few managers in these locations feel included by the enforcement organization in only some ways but not others, while almost one-half of the officers feel included in only some ways but not others. And, in contrast to their managers, most officers think their work group is better than most in terms of the way people get along, the way they stick together, and the way they help one another on the job, while only a few managers feel this way and the rest think their group is about the same as other work groups in these respects.

Etzioni argues that where scope is total and work demands a high level of affective neutrality, rationality, and discipline, there will be few alternative opportunities to ventilate the tensions, and they will mount. On this basis we expected officers to be more affected by tensions over their work than managers. Our measure of tension, the "Job Related Tension Index", allows us to make some comparisons between managers and officers in the types and

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⁵⁹See for example, the lack of adherence by officers to the policy of "zero tolerance", shown in Table E9, and discussed in section 1.9 of Appendix E.

⁶⁰See the analyses in section 1.4 of Appendix E comparing officer and manager commitment to their work groups based on their scores on Seashore's Group Cohesiveness Index. See also the analyses of perceived formalization at work in section 1.2 of that appendix. Finally, section 1.3 compares findings about officer and manager perceptions of nine areas of "serious tension" they identify as characteristic of their work. These help to convey some of the practical significance of the pressures of pervasiveness and scope.

amounts of tensions they experience at work. In general, we found that managers were "seriously affected" by eight out of fifteen tension areas, while officers were "seriously affected" by seven of those areas. This suggests that the organization may have about the same degree of impact on the tension levels of managers as it has on officers.

Part of the explanation for the similarities in their tensions may be that both groups feel they are drowning in too much work, while believing they are without any promotion opportunities. That is, over one-half of managers and one-third of officers are rather often or nearly always troubled by their belief that they cannot finish the amount of work they have in a normal working day. And about one-third of both the officers and the managers feel this troubled by the lack of promotion opportunities.

Our data allow for comparisons between the two tiers with respect to the causes and degrees of tensions they experience. Our analysis seems consistent with the hypothesis that officers have a tension release mechanism related to their greater opportunity to ignore organization norms and follow informally established norms. It may be that because officers may use their own initiative at times when they are in the field, while managers are more subject to close scrutiny in the office environment in which they work, officers may have more opportunities for tension release than managers. That is, the organization is highly pervasive for enforcement managers but low in pervasiveness for officers.

There are several indications that while the organization attempts to set norms for both officers and managers, officers are less concerned than their managers about following them. Manager respondents in Headquarters locations stated they orient their behaviours to the immediate goals of their immediate superior. Norms based on their informal group solidarity do not compete with this command control structure. The main difficulty for

managers is to determine what their boss/the organization wants.⁶¹

Higher manager anxiety over the need to identify salient organization norms is illustrated by our finding that managers consistently found the following problems rather often or nearly always troubling more than officers: the scope of the job and the lack of clarity about their responsibilities, their inability to satisfy the conflicting demands of people over them, and their confusion over what it is that their co-workers expect of them.

Except where they are subject to direct control by supervisors or elites, officers are more concerned with fellow officer and fisher client perceptions than with perceptions of their organization's elites. This is illustrated by our findings that officers are consistently more troubled than their managers (rather often or nearly all of the time) by being unable to obtain the kind of information they need to do their jobs, and by their feeling that they must do things against their better judgements.

Officer actions are governed more by the norms of their local work group, and these "filter" the organization's norms through local values and concerns. The local interpretation of the norms may or may not be the same as the organization's. Where the interpretations differ, the probability is that unless officers are directly controlled by organization elites, local norms will prevail. Since the logistics of their work make it impossible to closely supervise them at all times, the organization's elites may set norms in the form of "rules", but

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⁶¹ An example of this is the way Ministerial correspondence and internal discussion papers are drafted by trying to imagine what the most senior official, or one's immediate superior, wants in the document. At the very least, the work begins by dismissing a whole range of possibilities even from consideration, on the grounds that the most senior official they have to deal with would probably disagree with that position. Expert knowledge or advice is screened out long before it would clash with the "company line".

these can be ignored. The organization is low in pervasiveness for officers, while the logistics of their office environment makes it more pervasive for managers.

Serious tensions characterize the work environments of officers and managers. One expects these tensions to intensify their feeling of alienation from the organization. Etzioni argues that where the organization's scope is total and pervasiveness is low, the organization is coercive. This is the situation for officers. Where organization scope is narrow and pervasiveness is high, it is a normative organization. This is the situation of their managers. Our analysis of scope and pervasiveness leads us to suggest that in these respects, the organization's environment might be producing alienated commitment from officers, and moral commitment from managers. The organization would be coercive in this sense for officers but normative for managers. The tiers would be in separate worlds within the same organization.⁶²

In coercive organizations, the scope of the organization over lower participants is total, but unless they are directly controlled by organization elites, it is the informal norms of the lower participants that set the norms for most of their behaviour. These norms are reinforced by social interactions among officers. In normative organizations, the organization is highly pervasive but the scope of the organization can be total or narrow, depending upon organization goals. Etzioni argues that normative organizations with a total scope over participants may use that scope to "tighten the psychological grip on its members", but the organization need not be total to obtain this grip. It can do it with pervasiveness.

This difference in how the organization's norms affect the two tiers illustrates how

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⁶²However, given the high levels of alienation displayed by both officers and managers, there is a strong probability that what many managers are displaying is ritual conformity.

deeply this and perhaps any similar organization's problems of ineffectiveness are buried in their structures of goals, means, and participant orientations. Officers behave as though the organization's bureaucratic environment and norms are those of a coercive organization. On the other hand, managers sometimes behave as though their environment in some ways is normative. Furthermore, our data show that all officers and all but one of the managers see the organization as their biggest obstacle, and consider it illegitimate and ineffective. This means that not only do the behaviours of managers and officers reflect opposite sides of the coercive-normative continuum in orientation to their organization, but also the managers contradict themselves. In some ways they act like they are morally committed, in other ways they act like they are alienated by their organization.

The Nature of the Work

The resistance of lower participants is partly shaped by the nature of the work. Gouldner discovered that the nature of work performed by miners compared to surface workers explained many of their differences in attitudes to bureaucratization. He argued that miners work imperatives led them to develop beliefs and practises that were incompatible with bureaucratic structures, while surface work was more suited to bureaucratization. The nature of the work performed by officers and fishers is much like that of the miners below the surface in the way it shapes their resistance to bureaucracy. And, enforcement and other officials in fisheries management at Regional and National Headquarters are like the surface workers in the way the tasks they perform lend themselves to bureaucratization. Conflict is structured into the relations between these two groups by the nature of their work in field and headquarters locations. These conflicts establish sub-cultural boundaries that divide the organization. One by-product of that conflict was the development of a relatively

autonomous field sub-culture.

Fishers and officers may face dangerous situations where they cannot be ordered to put themselves at risk, but where they may decide to do so. Gouldner argued that because of such danger, miners developed a belief in their right to decide some things about their work. They saw themselves, as he puts it, as "the stars of the show", and viewed everyone else much like its "stage-hands". They also placed more emphasis on their primary work group and on face to face expressive and informal relations among equals. These values and beliefs conflict with work that is organized along bureaucratic lines.

Fishers and officers share these characteristics with miners. As with Gouldner's miners, our findings suggest that issues of substance, or the life and death "depth issues" like those faced by miners, are frequently characteristic of the nature of the work of officers and fishers. The issues that seem to pre-occupy the organization's "surface workers" appear to be matters of "process" and not substance. Nor, unlike the field officers and fishers, are surface workers particularly concerned with results at the level of the field.

Officers and fishers may differ in the kinds and magnitudes of rewards they receive and in their ambitions and adaptive strategies for getting ahead. One expects to see more pressures on officers to conform rather than innovate and less pressure on officers to be ambitious. Their bureaucratic environment demands the appearance of conformity and yet they receive their bi-weekly pay regardless of their output. Fisher rewards are structured by a more complex array of factors including: the regulator, participants at advisory meetings who establish potential catch limits, their personal efforts and skills at sea, and by reproductive cycles of fish and the factors that affect these cycles. The financial rewards fishers receive are proportional to their efforts and abilities, while the relationship between

effort and ability and officer rewards are far less clear.

Although our empirical findings confirm that the level of ambition and the extent of conformity of officers compared to fishers is in the expected direction, the differences are relatively minor.⁶³ In fact, the most accurate generalization one could make is that when fishers are compared with officers, we find fishers are slightly more ambitious and slightly more innovative. In order to identify more marked differences, we have to distinguish between the different gear type groups of fishers. Even there, we do not find that much difference between the mobile gear and the fixed gear (small) fishers. The group that stands out is the fixed gear (large) group of fishers, most of whom are SW Nova Scotia fishers. Over three-quarters of these are in the most ambitious category, and far more of these fishers apply an adaptive strategy based on innovation compared to their more conformist colleagues.

Applying Merton's theory we argue that conforming fishers are more likely to limit their economic rewards to those that are available within the rules. Those who innovate may achieve greater rewards from some technological device or approach they use within the rules, or they may ignore rules. As Merton pointed out, cheating is a form of innovation, and one with a significant historical connection to the value orientations of successful American entrepreneurs in the United States. Since slightly over one-half of the fishers conform, even if all conformists were to abide by the rules, there are still enough fishers whose adaptive strategies could favour cheating to make cheating a serious problem, and within the one gear

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⁶³For data on the level of ambition and innovation of officers and managers see the analysis provided in section 1.1 of Appendix E. Our analyses of differences among fishers are presented in section 2.1 and 2.2 of the same appendix.

type group, it could be and probably is, normative behaviour.

Since one-quarter of officers are seriously disturbed by the absence of promotion opportunities, most may have abandoned any expectation of salary increases or promotions, and the effect of economic rewards on their adaptive strategy may now be relatively small. Furthermore, we showed that pre-organization factors and recruitment and the scope and pervasiveness of their organization exposes officers to strong anti-bureaucratic pressures. The relative absence of promotions, the desire to stay where they are located and not move, and their feeling that their work groups are better than most other work groups in other locations for the same pay, suggests that officer priorities regarding the nature of the work they perform may be significantly influenced by the desire to conform. But their conformity is not to organization pressures or for reasons related to their economic self-interest, but for social reasons that induce them to comply with the norms of their work group.

Etzioni makes an important link between the kinds of production activities that are usually performed by "blue collar" and "white collar" workers in industry, and the kinds of organizations in which these activities are located. He argues that these kinds of workers performs jobs that usually lack the sorts of qualities that could make a normative authority structures effective. He describes the nature of such work as follows:

'Its relation to ultimate goals is indirect; it is slow to come to fruition; the worker is segregated from the fruits; and activities are highly routinized, spread out over long periods of time, and evoke little public interest. Hence production as a rule cannot rely on the moral commitments of lower participants and the normative power of organizational representatives,...(Etzioni;1975:114)'

However, he argues that "services of a dramatic nature", meaning those that relate directly to ultimate values, can be organized effectively within normative compliance structures. Activities such as fighting fires, search and rescue, (and we may add police work

and fisheries enforcement in single-sector fishing communities), all have direct connections to ultimate values. Given the nature of their work and its relation to ultimate values, and given their sensitivity to their local community contexts, many officers develop their own brand of moral commitments to their work, even though they are alienated from their organization. Being a separate layer, if not "caste", within the enforcement sector buffers them from some of that organization's imperatives. This leaves them with some autonomy, and allows some to define their roles in normative terms. Furthermore, this normative orientation is reinforced by some of their clients, since many of these conceptualize officer roles in terms that relate to the ultimate value of resource protection for future generations.⁶⁴

Fishers and enforcement officers are sometimes required to make independent individual judgements in a wide variety of generalist situations, where they cannot be ordered to put themselves at risk, and where norms are inappropriate guides for their decisions. Fishers and officers operate at considerable geographic distances from close supervision. Officers have discretion. Fishers have choices. They can usually get away with cheating but the decision is theirs. Because of these characteristics, officers and fishers have a tendency to see themselves to some extent as their own bosses, and both groups tend to resist certain aspects of bureaucracy.

This resistance is sometimes functional for the officers since they can then perform their roles more enthusiastically and effectively than would be the case, were they to simply

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⁶⁴However, this characterization depends on the gear type group. Although there are some exceptions it was generally true that the mobile gear type group "looked down" on the officers, often describing them as glorified clerks in uniforms. In contrast, members of the other gear type groups tended to see the officer's roles as more important, and they frequently had high expectations of those roles.

"do what they were told". The resistance displayed by fishers to the bureaucracy is dysfunctional from the perspective of fisheries management, because their resistance frequently takes the form of retaliation against the punishment-centred organization by cheating. Viewed as their way to express their "grievance" with the organization's structure, this resistance may turn out to be functional, since it could catalyse processes that appear to be needed for the organization to become effective and legitimate.

However, many managers see officers and fishers as blue collar workers like workers on a production line. Their "engineering school of management" solution is to bring them under control by establishing standards of conduct through a proliferation of policy and procedure statements. Independent actions and decisions about goals or even means is cause for alarm for many managers, and since the logistics of field operations make direct supervision by managers more or less impossible, managers establish rules. We discuss the functions and dysfunctions of some of these rules in the next section.

The nature of the work fishers and officers perform is one part of the process that structures their resistance to the organization. Much of the work of officers and fishers is based on the informality of individual and community social relations. By attempting to tighten the formality of fisher and officer roles through increased bureaucratization, the organization imposes a layer of a logic that often has an "Alice in Wonderland" quality to lower participants, and it adds to their alienation. The formal imposition of unenforceable policies is offensive to those in the field, particularly since as we have shown, most believe the processes themselves are unfair.

There are some important differences between fishers and officers in the field and those at headquarters who develop and administer rule formation and enforcement processes.

The work of the latter is usually restricted to interactions with fellow bureaucrats in the same or different departments, at more or less the same rank in the organization. Only a few individuals actually deal with fisher clients, and when they do it takes place in formal meetings chaired by the department. The usual protocol at such meetings is for the Senior official at those meetings to take charge and other officials are expected to follow that lead. Dissent among officials in the context of meeting with their clients, or even other departments, is not tolerated. The department usually records the Minutes of these meetings. If the meeting is believed to have been a "sensitive" one, briefing notes are prepared and forwarded up the line. At each level of its upward journey, the note is reviewed, discussed, and edited.

Headquarters activity is abstract and tends to assume that lower participants are governed by standards that for the most part they are to apply mechanistically. In Headquarters units, the goal is not only to be informed about key events in one's area of specialization, but also to find and adopt the line of thinking of the most Senior Official in the organization on whatever topic is current. Usually it is the Regional Director-General at Regional Headquarters, and the Assistant Deputy-Ministers and their Director-General's at National Headquarters, who review the briefing material and decide, in conjunction with the Deputy Minister, the department's official position on an issue. Questions of fact are frequently subordinated to the "official line". In Headquarters locations, the "company man" behaviour of successful bureaucrats is well known, and if there is a role model for the ambitious to follow at headquarters, "company man" is that model.

Unlike officers in the field, whose activity as generalists requires them to spend most of their time interacting with all types of fishers, most Headquarters officials spend very little

time at work interacting with anyone but other officials. Fishery officer conversations are typically informal unless they are executing their peace officer roles. They rarely interact with true bureaucrats. In contrast, except for the more senior managers, most Headquarters officials are specialists and not generalists. They act as advisors to the generalists, and while a very few may attend meetings involving fisher clients, these take their cue from the Senior Official at that meeting. Unlike field officers, who work odd hours any day of the week because fisher non-compliance often takes place at night, Headquarters officials are not rotated in shifts, and although some work extended hours some of the time, their work day is relatively stable. When they go home, most go to residences in neighbourhoods where the fishing industry is a minor, or in the case of Ottawa, almost non-existent player in their local economy.

Not only the nature of their work at Headquarters, but also the way it is organized fosters formality and bureaucracy. Individuals operate out of fixed office locations. On formal duties, the culture tends to restrict their associations to interactions with others at the same (plus or minus one) rank. The close physical proximity of several layers of the organization in a single building, and the command control management interaction structure between layers tends to decrease rather than increase the normative commitment of most Headquarters personnel. Being in close proximity to the centre of the organization's formal power figures, one might expect Headquarters personnel to be more normatively committed to their work than field officers. However, as we will show later on in this chapter, there is little expressive downward communication.

Many officers pursue normative goals within an organizational framework they perceive as coercive, and that treats them more like inmates than valued resources. In

contrast, many Headquarters personnel pursue repetitive, utilitarian and means-oriented production tasks. In many respects, managers operate like "blue collar" workers in an industrial production organization. In other respects their roles are more complicated and more normatively demanding. Being able "to do what it takes" requires them to identify, often through their "connections", what higher participants want. Thus, the more ambitious need to keep up their interactions within "the company" in order to "take its pulse" and keep themselves in step with its dictates. They place more emphasis on identifying the "company line", within the context of their specific task than would be true of most blue workers. Thus, the more highly motivated Headquarters personnel function somewhat like blue collar workers who must, if they value their connections, pretend to be "zealots" and devoted "company men".

However, whether their task is to develop or control the implementation of a policy, justify budget requirements, draft briefing notes or letters for the Minister's signature, or attend a meeting on any of the above, the organization makes it clear that their initiative or judgement is not in demand. The organization's higher participants appear to assume that Headquarters officials will adopt their values and ultimate goals with respect to the organization. They also appear to assume that Headquarters personnel understand that they exist to ensure their bosses' outputs are valued by the organization. The value of one's work in this setting relates not to ultimate values, but to enhancing the career of one's boss.

Since the "goal setting job" in this political organization is held by the Minister, and in theory all others are to concern themselves with how to achieve the Minister's goals, managers are not recruited for their personal charisma. Consequently, many do not possess the kinds of skills that could help to foster enthusiasm for the work among their staff. While

a few of the higher participants may have duties that relate to ultimate values, these are usually someone else's values, and their role is to implement them, whether they agree or not. In the light of this discussion, it appears that their functions are similar to those of blue-collar workers in production organizations.

As we have shown, enforcement was not a major goal of the organization. The relationship of enforcement duties at Headquarters to the ultimate values as expressed at the field level is vague and indirect. Headquarters officials are segregated from the fruits of their work if, indeed, they bear any fruit. Activities are highly routinized and spread out over long periods of time. There is little public interest in those activities, and what interest there may be reaches the bureaucrat through official channels such as letters and requests for the preparation of briefing notes for others to use at meetings. For the more complex tasks, the results are painfully slow to come to fruition, and many respondents believe the department's problems are intractable.⁶⁵

It is reasonable to suggest this kind of work would generate a superficial, expedient, overt commitment to the organization. Were it not for the need to "be in step with the organization", there would probably be few displays of anything positive that would be

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⁶⁵Many have observed the following cycle: a problem emerges, is assigned, a product is produced, the issue fades away, the file is closed. Sometime later, the issue reappears, is assigned to a new person, the product is produced, the issue fades, the file is closed. This goes on year after year. Issues such as "defining enforcement effectiveness", producing a "national enforcement policy", finding the number of fishery officers in Canada by category of officer, determining the amount of ammunition needed for target practise each year, etc., reappear like mushrooms, and each time the organization acts like it is seeing the issue for the first time. The work at Headquarters often bears a close relation to a perpetual production line that has been completely mechanized and left running. It applies its processes to whatever comes down the conveyor belt. When the product is dropped in the out-basket, the issue is finished and the file is closed....

stronger than calculative commitment at Headquarters. We identified their responses to the organization's legitimacy, punishment-centred process characteristics, and the obstacles they feel the organization puts in their way, as alienation. The nature of this surface work at Headquarters is quite a contrast from the work on the ground performed by officers or fishers. Even situations that officers dread the most in the field, where they and their clients are locked in verbal combat in the office, are directly related to ultimate values, concern everyone's interests, the workers sees the fruits of his labour in a face to face, immediate, and concrete manner, and the situation challenges them, because every one is different.

Six Functions and Dysfunctions of Rules

Headquarters enforcement sector units view themselves as national or regional coordinators of officer activities regarding fishing rules. Because of geographic and workload factors, managers cannot physically supervise officers. Consequently, they attempt to control them as if by proxy through the establishment of general policies and procedures (rules). We examine six functions of organization rules that Gouldner used in his study of an industrial bureaucracy: screening, explication, remote control, apathy preservation, leeway, and punishment-legitimation. We characterize rule enforcement in terms of the three approaches identified by Wilson (1968): watch, legalistic, and service-oriented. In the watch approach, officers are neither law enforcers nor order maintainers, but try to keep scandals from entering the political spotlight. Under the legalistic approach, officers emphasize law enforcement. In the service-oriented (or community-based) approach, officers try to balance law enforcement and order maintenance activities in conjunction with active partners from the communities.

Gouldner (1954) argues that when role expectations are not being met, the

bureaucratic solution is to introduce more rules or to enforce old ones. He notes that where bureaucratic rules proliferate, there is no attempt to deal with the attitudes underlying resistance to those rules. The rules serve as guides for organizational participants, but they do not aim to resolve the problems that gave rise to the rules. In effect, they have shallow impacts. He argues that "...the proliferation of rules signifies that management has surrendered in the battle for worker's motivation." On this point, he quotes Cooley:

‘Underlying all formalism, indeed is the fact that it is psychically cheap, it substitutes the outer for the inner as more tangible, more capable of being held before the mind without fresh expense of thought and feeling. (Gouldner;1954:175)’

Rules may be used as screens behind which officers and others can protect themselves or the organization, by arguing for example: "Don't blame me. I don't make the rules. I just enforce them." Rules may also explicate situations by giving everyone a chance to preview the rules of the game. Rules may function to legitimate the use of aggression by the "fair warning" that failure to comply will provoke punishment, and this may deflect reprisals away from individuals and/or the organization. In their leeway functions, rules can be a source of control over the client, when their legitimate application to the client is withheld by the officer in exchange for greater control over the "violation". Managers could use them for the same purpose with respect to officers. Rules may also function to help to "preserve apathy", and stabilize a work environment where some exposure to apathy is unavoidable. That is, rules can set minimum standards for the behaviour of workers or clients, such that all an officer needs to do is that minimum, and they cannot be punished. Finally, the remote control function might reduce the time needed by a supervisor or an officer to check on his staff or clients. Spot checks might reveal the need (or not) for closer

supervision.

Gouldner argues that the existence of a bureaucracy is the outcome of a constant power struggle in which the pressures for bureaucratization clash with pressures against bureaucratization. In the previous section we identified how the nature of the work in the field and the nature of work at Headquarters caused precisely this kind of tension to develop. Gouldner argues that the basis of this power struggle is the assumption that people must be controlled to prevent them from taking advantage of situations. That is, rules are a logical extension of the premise that man cannot be trusted. When production is organized on this basis, the required monitoring and punitive activities initiate a self-perpetuating cycle of useless activities. The controls provoke resistance. Once initiated, the monitoring activities cannot be relaxed because workers will now cheat in retaliation for being monitored and punished, and the implicit assumption that they are dishonest.

Unless the situation is seen in terms of the whole cycle, the conditions the cycle reproduces make it look as though punishment-centred control is the best way to control the situation. The more the organization uses punishments instead of rewards to control its lower participants (whether this means controlling the officers or controlling the fishers by strict enforcement of the rules against fishers), the greater is the officer and/or fisher motivation to resist the rules, the greater the need for closer supervision or monitoring and the greater the perceived need to waste more resources. The dynamic cycle creates a perception that the situation is spiralling out of control. These perceptions create the impression that the organization is more and more needed, because without it, the problems would accelerate. This complex dynamic helps to ensure the organization's survival, even when it is the organization, and the assumptions governing it, that causes the problems.

1.0 Explicative Functions and Dysfunctions

In their "explicative" function rules may clarify areas where officers are obliged to act and cannot use their discretion, and clarify rules for fishers. In the Newfoundland location, only two percent of lobster fishers had ever read the rules pertaining to lobster, or had them read to them. There was no evidence to suggest that more SW. Nova Scotia fishers read them either. Furthermore, many fishers who had read them commented that they made little sense. The rules explicate very little for these fishers.

One example described by fishers is their perception that nearly every time the department attempts to apply effort restrictions in the lobster fishery, or any other fishery, that its rules always have the reverse effect. For example, in one community the community standard of lobster traps was two hundred per fisher. Some fished fewer traps but the average was about two hundred. The department introduced a regulation making it unlawful to fish more than four hundred traps, giving the argument that this would prevent further pressure on the resource from those who wanted to fish more than four hundred traps.

However, what these fisher respondents observed was that when the trap limit of four hundred was put in place, every fisher started fishing the maximum of four hundred traps, including those who had previously fished only, say one hundred traps. They did this in order to guarantee they would at least maintain their previous earnings. If everyone fishes two hundred traps then it only takes two hundred to make an average income. If some start fishing with four hundred traps it means that more than two hundred traps are needed to keep up with previous earnings. It gets still worse. Since those who are fishing four hundred traps require larger vessels to transport and pull the traps more efficiently, and since these have greater costs, it leads them to upscale their operations even further and to fish more than four

hundred traps, whether it is legal or not. The end result is an escalation of fishing effort.

In addition, all but the most fanatic of legalistic enforcers believes that lobster trap limits are unenforceable. It is impossible to enforce this rule because it takes all day to pull all four hundred of one fisher's traps and at the end of the day the officer could never be certain that he pulled all of that fishers traps. In any case, fishers are able to smuggle out traps which they do not tag, and these may be pulled by the officer if he happens to find it, but since it could not be attributed to a fisher, the most they could lose is forty dollars (for wire traps, a lot less for wooden traps), and since they can buy them back again for one dollar when confiscated traps are resold, they do not lose much by this illegal action. That one trap over the year, depending on the location in S.W. Nova Scotia, could bring in about four hundred dollars or more worth of lobster in one year. Such rules, being so highly debatable, explicate little for officer or fisher, and actually compound the problems of communication.

2.0 Screening Functions and Dysfunctions

Rules could provide a screen that protects officers as well as the organization from reprisals after rule enforcement actions have been taken. That is, the officers could say: "I don't make the rules, I just enforce them."⁶⁶ Similarly, rules could screen managers from criticism by officers since the officers might be led to believe that the problems lie with the rules (or the organization) and not with their managers.

The screening function of rules would be required more frequently in cases where

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⁶⁶In fact, the officers could hide behind the screen of the "consultative" processes the department uses in managing the fisheries. That is, they could say to a violator: "If you don't like the rules tell your representatives to get them changed in the appropriate consultative committee." However, few officers would say this because most think those committees are biased and unfair.

officers use a legalistic and adversarial enforcement approach, since this tends to precipitate retaliation more than others. Some officers and some managers were proponents of this approach. Many did view the situation as a “them versus us” issue, and some of these do hide behind those screens. In one extreme case, the officer stated that he likes being able to blame “his enforcement actions” on the higher authorities, and that he feels fishers will understand this fact. As he put it: “I likes the chain of command”. However, our interviews with his fisher clients revealed that this officer is not respected by the majority of fishers in his area. They see him, and not the rules, as the main problem, and they describe his approach as incompetent, abusive, vindictive, lazy, and lacking in respect for fishers.

However, most officers do not have the simple view that “the law is the law”. For example, almost all officers were troubled to some extent, and one-quarter were troubled “rather often” or “nearly always” by the feeling that they have to do things in their work that go against their better judgement. They do not accept that the “laws” are always sensible. Only a few managers were as concerned by this problem, even though they too are alienated by their organization. It is not the screens provided by the rules that buffer these managers from such concerns. It is their physical distance from field reality, and the culture on the surface of the organization that is relatively unconcerned by the consequences that their work has for relationships between clients and field officials. Officers are sometimes required to deal directly with angry fishers. In these circumstances, given that neither they nor their clients view the organization, its rules, and its processes for establishing rules as legitimate, the rules provide little protection for officers.

Some fishers do not blame some officers for the “unfair” rules, or for their enforcement actions taken against serious violations, but their reactions depend on how the

officer behaves, and the specific rules they enforce.⁶⁷ Some, particularly the more wealthy of the mobile gear fishers think officers are just clerks with guns, and some actually stated that fishery officers are beneath their consideration.⁶⁸ However, most fishers assess the officers on the basis of their attitudes, efforts, fairness, sociability, concern for the fishery versus their concern about keeping their jobs, and their technical knowledge of the fisheries as well as their technical knowledge of their own functions. Fishers may actually be elated when an officer enforces a rule, or pleased to see them being fanatically keen to catch a violator who is committing serious infractions that are harmful to everyone, especially when everyone knows it is being done with impunity.⁶⁹ In these communities, almost everyone knows who cheats in a serious way. For this reason, fishers do not hesitate to blame officers for apparent brutality, stupidity, and incompetence when that officer enforces a rule few accept as valid, or enforces it against someone whose actions could not possibly harm the resource, but who was merely “feeding his family”⁷⁰.

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⁶⁷See section 2.7 in Appendix E for fisher assessments of the officer’s approaches to enforcement. Table E19 provides a summary of the findings. See also section 1.10 and table E10 of that appendix for officer and manager views in relation to several dimensions of enforcement approach.

⁶⁸This view was echoed on a number of occasions by managers in other parts of the fisheries management organization. This attitude tends to prevail among resource managers and their advisors, many of whom openly chuckled at the idea of a fishery officers giving them advice on allocation decisions. As the National Director of Enforcement pointed out: “To the rest of the department, we are like the people who come in to the office at night to pick up our garbage.”

⁶⁹See the percentage of fishers who believe officers should charge fishers who cheat on certain rules all of the time or nearly all of the time, shown in table E18 in Appendix E for some convincing evidence on this point.

⁷⁰On a number of occasions fishers told me that they would do anything that was necessary to obtain “enough” to keep their family going. Furthermore, many also said

Rules do not protect officers from fisher criticism, nor do they protect their managers, or the organization. Their social connections in their communities make it impossible for all but the most socially isolated of officers to claim that all he can do is enforce the rules. It can be a different story for their managers in urban locations, and for perceptions that other Canadians might have of this organization. If neither the managers nor the organization chooses to treat the criticisms as credible, these latter are in effect, hiding behind those rules, or the rule processes. Thus, one could argue that given the physical and social distance between the culture of Headquarters, the general Canadian culture, and that of the field, the existence of the rules and their processes, flawed as they are, may well screen the managers and the organization from criticism, thus serving the function of allowing the organization to carry on, more or less as it has, indefinitely.

3.0 Remote Control Functions and Dysfunctions

In theory, the "remote control" function of sets of rules means that supervisors need only "spot check" to monitor obedience. However, there are thousands of rules related to licensing conditions and issues, vessel and gear requirements and restrictions, etc. Because of practical logistics, the rules cannot possibly be monitored even for their remote control function over hundreds of kilometres of coastline, extending out even two or three kilometres to sea, let alone the two hundred that many fishers are capable of fishing, on a twenty-four hour basis, in all weather conditions including fog and high seas. This does not include the hundreds of miles of inland recreational fishing activity that must also be patrolled.

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that someone who takes fish for that reason, rules or no rules, is no cheater. They said that no one would look down on them for that behaviour. Formal laws have a lower priority on their value scale. It seemed to be a basic local value.

In theory, rules can give higher participants more control over subordinates in the organization, and reduces the need for them to supervise them closely. While it is true that managers in this organization rarely monitor most or even much of the officer or client activities, it is not because the remote control function of rules has made it unnecessary. Perhaps they lack the time and resources to adequately supervise staff or fishers. Our interviews revealed that in one area, the supervisor spends about one day each year with each senior field officer in those remote locations. He might make another visit during that year to participate in a meeting with fishers on fisheries management issues. He may or may not involve the local officer. Most officers said they were never involved or even informed that such meetings were taking place. The remainder of the time the communication is by telephone or facsimile.

Although officers in the Nova Scotia location are more closely monitored, the difference from the perspective of “remote control” is insignificant. Since officers in both the Nova Scotia and Newfoundland research locations are geographically distributed over hundreds of kilometres of coastline, the logistics prevent their supervisors from performing rigorous spot checks for their observance of the rules. In some S.W. Nova Scotia locations the officers depend on one another constantly. Under this “buddy system”, the buddy comes before the supervisor. In some other areas, they work out of a field office with perhaps as many as five or six other officers. Their field work is rarely supervised by the field supervisor, since these are burdened with administrative and other chores and remain in their offices. Officer spot checks of fishers are far less frequent since there are only a few officers and thousands of fishers.

Our data show that there is little close supervision of officers. We asked officers a

number of questions designed to measure how much they were watched to ensure they comply with rules. Our analysis of that scale showed that almost all of them were at the extreme low monitoring end of the scale.⁷¹ Although that scale was inappropriate for use in the fisher work context, many of those respondents said that they rarely see the officer even once during an entire fishing season. Even those with larger vessels and mobile gear said they rarely (maybe once each year) see a patrol vessel or the surveillance aircraft during the year, and many mobile gear fishers said they never see the officers.

Even if coastal fishery officers had the appropriate vessels and equipment, which they say they usually do not, and even if the weather conditions were perfect for purposes of spotting and boarding vessels, full enforcement would be impossible. At present, less than one-quarter of their work time is devoted to patrols or other activities directly related to rule enforcement. The rest of their time is spent on paper work and licensing administration and clerical duties that require them to stay in the office. Of the time they are able to devote from their seven and one-half hour shift to enforcement work, much of that, particularly when it involves patrols at sea, may be spent in preparatory activities such as getting to the compound where the equipment is kept, hauling it to sea, putting it in the water, getting to the fishing grounds, and in reversing the process at the end of the day.

This leads to some absurd and even pathetic enforcement situations. Because of the shortage of officers, the skippers of patrol vessels often go out with only the skipper on board. This means they cannot board vessels, since their vessel would be left with no one at the helm. Therefore, they cannot lay any charges. They roam out to sea and back again and

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⁷¹See section 1.2 (formalization and rule observance) in Appendix E.

say they often do nothing more than "fly the flag" and hope it scares someone off. In some cases it can take the vessel one-half of the shift to reach the fishing grounds, and in this case even if they have another officer on board, they have to turn around without checking anyone, in order to reach the shore by the end of the shift. Shore based patrols often consist of officers driving their marked trucks from wharf to wharf to put in as much of a presence as possible. Occasionally a surveillance team is put together to watch some activity, or to engage in some specific enforcement activity, but there are literally thousands of choices for its deployment.

Even if the officers had fully adequate equipment and perfect weather, it would take at least four times the entire contingent of approximately one hundred field officers in the entire Scotia-Fundy Region, given holidays, shift rotations, the fact that only one-quarter of their time can be spent on enforcement work, given the need to work in pairs on board vessels, and the need to have officers on shore to patrol the numerous wharves; all this, to cover maybe as much as twenty kilometers of coastline in the active parts of S.W. Nova Scotia on a twenty-four hour basis. There could be as many as five hundred vessels travelling through that area on any given day, more in some locations and fewer in others, depending on the fisheries that are underway. Since there are hundreds of kilometres of coastline in the Scotia Fundy Region alone, the obstacles to full enforcement, or even slightly intimidating spot checks, are insurmountable.

This researcher went out on a patrol with six fishery officers. We used two hours getting ready (there was a delay because of an equipment problem) and one and one-half hours to pack up at the end of the day and get back to the office. For the other four hours, we motored around a small stretch of coastline in two little skiffs. Using a length of chain for

a drag, we combed the bottom of an area about the size of a football field in search of suspected lobster traps set by a poacher. The officers had been informed by a local that they were in that area. The dragging took about one hour. We found nothing. I was told that the whole area, meaning an area extending for kilometres along the coast (thousands of “football fields”), was a favourite poaching area.

The rest of the time was spent motoring around at slow speed with each of us peering over the side trying to spot illegal lobster pots in shallow water. One could not help being struck by the vastness of the ocean, the near impossibility of seeing anything through the water, and the absurdity of this as a technology for controlling poaching. Nevertheless, someone spotted a rope tied to a huge rock along the shore, exposed by the receding tide, so we pulled it and found two lobster traps that had been left there, without any bait in the traps, for a long time. One had a two pound lobster in it, which was released. The officers were elated and considered it a successful day. When asked why, they said that it was because the fishers in the area would spread out the word that the department was “cracking down” on poaching. These officers appeared to believe that this one instance of enforcement activity would serve the “remote control” function for poachers, and deter them. When asked in another context if this kind of activity helps to protect the resource virtually all officers would agree that it does not. There is a contradiction in their views of what counts as a successful piece of enforcement work. This contradiction is described below in terms of how the “apathy preserving” function of rules helps to set minimalist expectations in specific circumstances.

4.0 Apathy Preserving Functions and Dysfunctions

The existence of rules may function to establish minimum standards for

performance. Officers may be bored, apathetic, or even disagree with rules as long as they do the minimum amount that is expected by their organization's standards for enforcement. In some cases their activities need bear no necessary relationship to effective law enforcement or to conservation of the resource. This apathy-preserving function is consistent with a "watch" style of enforcement, where the objective is neither to conserve the fish nor enforce the law, but rather to "keep the lid on"; or in this case, to do enough enforcement so that it looks like their efforts inhibit some non-compliance by fishers. This kind of activity is associated with the goals of preventing enforcement issues from becoming politically embarrassing. The example given above of finding and destroying two lobster poacher pots out of the thousands that exist, is an example of rules that serve this function. Such enforcement behaviour satisfies enforcement success criteria that relate to logic at the surface of the organization.

These internal norms of success seem to reduce some of the officer's frustrations with respect to their overall effectiveness at protecting and conserving the resource. In addition, since our data show that many fishers believe their minimal enforcement activities are of value in reducing non-compliance, their limits on their enforcement may actually reduce non-compliance. However, most respondents said it would not affect the behaviour of serious violators. Since these have the most significant impact on conserving the resource, we argue that the apathy preserving function's main role in this case is to keep the officers and fishers from feeling as though the fishery is out of control. In this sense, we argue that the apathy-preserving function obscures the facts, and inhibits positive change.

The apathy preserving function also allows the department's enforcement officials to make their work a less important priority in their lives. Fishers, like other small

independent businessmen, at least in the busiest parts of the fishing season, cannot do this as easily. Our data show that officials are much less "centred on their jobs" than their fisher clients. That is, officers place greater emphasis than fishers on defining their success in life in terms that lie outside the job. On a scale where two is "lowest" occupational primacy or job-centredness, and where five is "highest", the mean official's response was slightly below the mid-point of the scale, while the mean response of fishers was in the high end of that scale.

The displacement of success goals to areas outside the job and the existence of rules permitting such limited practical definitions of success, are not effective at preserving apathy. This is illustrated by the fact that: one-third of the officers and over one-half of their managers said that they were rather often or nearly always troubled because they cannot possibly finish their workload in a normal work day; one-quarter of officers and managers were troubled to that extent by the way their workload interferes with the quality of the work they do; and by the fact that all of them are alienated from the organization. In this organization, it is difficult to be affectively neutral.

5.0 Leeway Functions and Dysfunctions

In their "leeway" function, the existence of formal rules and the peace officer status of fishery officers, puts them into a position where they have the authority they need sometimes to manipulate the desired behaviour from fishers. Because of the nature of their work, officers have many opportunities to use their discretion. They can apply the rules, but they may also decide to waive their application. This gives officers bargaining power they can use in persuading fishers to assist them to accomplish the broader objective of protecting the resource from serious violators.

Managers are generally more alarmed than comforted by their inability to monitor officer applications of the rules. Their reaction to any sense of loss of direct control over officers, given their assumption that they are either incapable of functioning effectively on their own or that they are not trustworthy, is to tighten the controls by tightening the rules. Higher participants who behave this way receive support for their emphasis on standardization and controls, in spite of their impracticality in these circumstances, because fishers sometimes complain that certain officers are biased. Although in some cases that may be true, much of this also results from fisher analyses of gossip about those who are charged for an offense in one location but not for "the same" offense in a different location, or gossip about unequal treatment within the same location by the same officer. Their comparisons lead to suspicions about certain officers and their managers.

Fishers talk to fishers. Officers talk to officers. And fishers sometimes talk to managers. What is missing is officers talking to fishers, and both of these talking eventually to managers. Because there is little or no dialogue between fishers and most officers regarding the limits of tolerance for certain violations, and officer respondents said there is not much more among officers and their managers, tensions and conflicts between officers and managers, and between officers and fishers, can develop when the "leeway" function of rules is used. On the other hand, one could argue that using the leeway function generates tensions, not because it is unfair or inappropriate, but because neither officers nor fishers are encouraged, permitted, or trusted to work with local fishers at the community level where they might jointly determine reasonable tolerance levels.

Some officers said they might ignore a violation in exchange for good conduct in more important areas, or in exchange for more important information regarding more serious

conservation violations, or because they feel some margin for human error is reasonable. When asked about their propensity to charge fishers for twelve types of violations that Atlantic Province chiefs of fisheries enforcement identified as major enforcement issues, officers distinguished three categories of violations: “administrative”, “serious”, and “very serious”.⁷² Each category reflects their perceptions of the increasing degree of impact those offenses have on conserving and protecting fish. For the first category of violation, about one-half of the officers would charge fishers all of the time or nearly all of the time. In the serious category, nearly three-quarters would do so, although it varied somewhat with the specific type of offense. For the very serious violations such as using liners in the cod end, or fishing in a closed area, almost all officers would charge the violator all of the time or nearly all of the time, although again it varied to some extent with the specific offense.

Most officers do not apply the official policy of “no tolerance” even for those types of violations that they and their clients would not normally tolerate. For example, although all officers said they would always charge someone who was in possession of a “berried lobster”, (a female lobster that is about to complete a reproductive cycle), many qualified this by stating conditions under which they would not lay charges. For example, if there is some reason to believe it resulted from human error or was unintentional, or if it can be used to “plea bargain” for information leading to charges against serious violators, some officers would not charge the fisher.

In the case of a fisher’s possession of one berried lobster in a one-hundred pound crate of lobsters, the officer might not charge the fisher if the weather was so bad that the

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⁷²See the analysis of their views in section 1.9 of Appendix E.

fisher may have been operating quickly to avoid freezing the lobsters, or if it caused a badly lurching vessel that caused him perhaps to miss seeing the eggs when he turned the lobster over at sea. In such cases, unless the officer knows the fisher has been doing it deliberately, and I was assured by both fishers and officers that some individuals will push those limits every time, many officers would not charge that fisher.

Some officers consider the possible conservation benefits they might achieve by using the leeway function, and its positive effects on good public relations, as more important than the strict application of the law. Some said that when they fine a fisher for a nuisance violation, or for what may have been a human error, they may do more harm than good. It may not only incite that person to engage in serious violations to pay off the fine and gain emotional retribution, but his kinship network may be carried into the non-compliant behaviour along with that fisher. In a world of perfect enforcement, one might argue that this does not matter. As we have seen, enforcement is not perfect.

The use of the leeway function of rules appears to be better suited to a service-oriented, or community-based approach to enforcement, than to legalistic enforcement approach. In fact, many officers said that their only real authority over many fishers results because they are able to persuade them to comply, using the strength of the working relationship that they developed over the years. Those officers who do not use the leeway function are generally more in favour with their managers, but their emphasis on "the law", and their use of the screening function of rules to protect themselves from retribution, may often be attained at the expense of effective enforcement.

Some fishers believe that "dumping", one of the very serious offenses, should never need to happen because there should be some legitimate mechanism for dealing with the

inevitable "overages" that occur when fishing by long line, or gill net. The lack of a mechanism, other than fines, for dealing with situations where a fisher catches more fish than his daily quota, is seen as a failure of the organization. No one wants to throw valuable fish away, or to be forced to cheat to prevent their waste. For this reason, even though most fishers do not approve of dumping, neither do they approve when that unimaginative rule is applied to them or anyone in their kinship network.

When a fisher brings his "overage" ashore, he is paid a very low price for the fish, but the weight comes off everyone's quota. This discourages all but the most antisocial of fishers from landing them. Most feel forced to either dump them or fillet them at sea, and hide them or transship them to someone else who sneaks them to land. Many fishers assured me that given how desperate plants are for fish, few indeed are wasted because of this rule. In effect, many argued that in the absence of a legitimate mechanism for dealing with an above-quota situation, cheating is not only justified, it is a responsible, and even conservationist approach.⁷³

In some locations supervisors or their managers place a heavy emphasis at times on the number of charges laid by officers. In such cases, officers are caught between the bureaucracy's need for statistics and their personal and community values. As long as their

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⁷³The counter argument to this is the assertion that failure to establish a line and charge those who cross it would cause all fishers to cheat. Where "overages" may have at first been true accidents before the relaxation of formal punishments, with the new flexibility, so this argument goes, everyone will soon have overages on every fishing trip. This illustrates the presumption of guilt and dishonesty that is the basis of most of the rules in the fisheries. Gouldner argues that this assumption is the essence of all bureaucratic rules and other repressive controls. Since this strategy has clearly not solved the problem, perhaps the only stability in this environment that the presumption achieves, as Gouldner observed, is the persistence of the organization whose repressive nature depends upon such presumptions.

supervisor is not around, they can use their discretion. Some managers are less supportive of this behaviour than others. In one location, the manager argued that he was trying to overcome a perception that his officers were "too close" (rum drinking buddies) to their clients. His strategy was to compensate for an historical situation by encouraging his officers to take highly bureaucratic and inflexible positions in rule enforcement.

The leeway function of rules may also be used by managers. The manager who allows his subordinate leeway in exchange for his commitment, can use it as a motivator. Our data provide some evidence that this occurs. As one would expect, it tends to be related to the age and therefore, the experience of officers. For example, over three-quarters of the youngest officers are troubled sometimes or more often by the feeling that they have too little authority to carry out their jobs, while only one-half of the older age groups of officers feel that way. It may also be of concern to their managers. The constraints on the leeway that managers are allowed bothers innovative managers more than conformist managers. Almost all of the innovative managers but less than one-half of the conformist managers, were troubled sometimes or more often by the feeling they lack the authority to carry out their work.

6.0 Punishment-Legitimizing Functions and Dysfunctions

In their "punishment legitimating" function, rules may legitimate punishments or other expressions of aggression directed toward someone who violates a clearly articulated rule. In such cases, one argues the violator is warned, and the punishment is deserved if he chooses to break the rule.

We found that officers and managers are less satisfied with this function of rules in this organization than their clients. Enforcement officers and managers have a consistent and

coherent theory of crime and punishment, but they argue that the organization frustrates the solutions they deduce from that theory when it fails to provide them with the tools they need to stop the crime. Their theory asserts that from sixty to eighty percent of fishers watch to see if the twenty percent of "hard-core cheaters" are being caught. If no, their theory argues that the rest will start cheating, and cheating will eventually become normative behaviour.

Only a fraction of managers and officers said their current efforts to catch violators were preventing others from violating the rules.⁷⁴ They gave several reasons. Fines are too low, and in many cases fishers treat them as a relatively minor cost of doing business. In most of those cases, officers rarely catch the business-oriented violators. They cannot do enough enforcement work to be an effective deterrent. Many fishers do not agree with the rules and they are motivated to break them on principle. And, some gave the reason that some officers are not highly motivated to catch violators. The punishment legitimating function of rules cannot be effective when the fishers do not accept the rules in the first place, or if the ones the officers catch are the ones whose activities do not affect the resource, while the ones who routinely escape detection are the dedicated thieves.

Furthermore, many fishers do not know or understand the rules. At times not even the officers can keep up with the changes in the rules. Nearly one-third of the officers said that they were troubled rather often or nearly always by the fact that they could not get the information they needed to do their job. The rules may change overnight. In some circumstances, officers stated they have signed the conditions of scores of fishers licenses,

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⁷⁴See the analysis of their views of the effectiveness of their coercive measures in section 1.7.3 of Appendix E. See also table E8 showing that the average officer successfully prosecutes 1.5 charges per year.

as instructed by the modified regulations, thus allowing fishers to fish say, X pounds of fish per week. The very next day they may be instructed to issue license conditions for the same gear type group and license category, but now modified so they could land X+Z pounds of fish per week. The result of such micro-management is that fishers in the same category, who had their license conditions signed on different days would be permitted to retain different amounts of fish.

When boarding vessels at sea, officers found it difficult to keep abreast of the latest changes. When they found the catch exceeded the amount on the license conditions, they were not certain that it was an offense. Lack of communication is sometimes the source of such problems. In one case, offshore officers boarded a vessel, found the skipper could not produce the required licence conditions and proceeded to lay charges. The fisher played them along for sport, and allowed it to go on until the officer was well into the charging process, at which point he told the officer that Halifax Headquarters had decided to let this fleet go out without any conditions because there was not enough time to do the paper work at local offices. The officer radioed in and was informed the fisher was correct.

The rapidly changing and sometimes poorly communicated rules do very little to reinforce the sense that punishments are legitimate. Officers reported that fishers would enter their office, state they did not like the existing limits, state they were going to have them changed by making a telephone call, leave the office to use their cellular telephone and then return in ten minutes to announce that the officer would be receiving a call. As predicted, the office telephone would ring, and the officer would receive instructions to do what the fisher requested. Officers compared the situation to that of a traffic constable, faced with unpredictable speed limits on a stretch of road, who is forced to ask the driver he is about to

charge what the speed limits is supposed to be for that day. Officers in SW. Nova Scotia said they obtained most of their advance information about policy changes from fishers or from reading The Chronicle Herald. Most of the Officers in the Newfoundland location said they received little advance information on any subject from their own organization.

Our data show that over the seven year period from 1986 to 1992, the average fishery officer in the Scotia-Fundy Region obtained an average of 1.5 convictions per year for fisheries offenses. At least one-half of these, and more in the Newfoundland location, are minor charges. Some of these offenses have fines that from the perspective of marginal fishers, are seen as excessive. One could argue that when officers enforce these nuisance charges, the punishments may provoke resentment and non-compliance and lower the legitimacy of both the fines and the organization. Our data reveal that almost three-quarters of the fisher respondents think that enforcement hurts the honest fisher more than the dishonest fisher. Department officials agree but they express it differently. Slightly fewer than one-third of officials gave this response, but another one-half of them said enforcement hurts no one, since it is ineffective. Several officers and managers pointed out that even when they do catch a serious violator, he simply makes the fine a cost of doing business, and intensifies his cheating until he pays off the fine. This observation was confirmed on several occasions by fisher respondents, some of whom openly confessed that they were serious cheaters.

Functions and Dysfunctions of Rules: Some Conclusions

The organization's formal rules may serve some functions in some cases for some officers, managers, and fishers, but they also are dysfunctional in most circumstances because the organization itself lacks legitimacy, and because it lacks the capacity to force

fishers to obey those rules en masse. Consequently the rules do not resolve the basic problems that give rise to the perception that rules are required in order to manage the fishery.

Furthermore, different officers place different emphases on the functions of the rules.⁷⁵ Some emphasize the "leeway" function and adopt more persuasive and normative approaches. Others operate as though the rules were sacred objects and adopt a legalistic style that emphasizes "screening" and "punishment-legitimizing" functions. Still others apply a watch style of enforcement and rely on the "apathy preserving" function to maintain their motivation. In some locations, officers who operate out of the same office emphasize different functions of rules because they have different enforcement styles. We argue that for all these reasons, the organization's "environment of rules" has none of the "positive" effects that managers intend, and probably does more than any other aspect of the organization's environment, to confuse, inhibit, and alienate lower participants.

The style of enforcement varies with factors such as personality differences among officers and the emphasis of their supervisors, and with Region and District location. In one location the officer acts like the town bully. He is perceived as arrogant and high-handed. This researcher's participant observation of that officer's interaction style confirmed fisher perceptions. He bullies the small inshore fishers and treats most of them with disdain. However, the more successful mobile gear type group fishers receive obsequious displays of respect. The marginal fishers expressed considerable fear of that officer's powers over such issues as their classification as full time fishers, being deliberately misled by the

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⁷⁵See table E10 and E19 in Appendix E.

licensing information he gave them, etc. As the officer explained it to me: "You knows for yourself there is two kinds of people. Its human nature." This was an example of the "watch" approach to enforcement. In his case, rules are selectively applied when he believes they are needed to maintain his "control" over marginal fishers. He holds control over this "class" of fisher by inspiring them with fear.

In other communities, the officer is sometimes seen as service-oriented, fair and reasonable, and as an important source of information for fishers. In still others, particularly in some of the SW. Nova Scotia locations, some officers are seen as legalistic and detached from their communities, like wage earners who have to do a job, and as being mostly motivated to catch violators, regardless of the rules they violate. From the perspective of many fishers, as long as the violations these legalistic officers detect have serious conservation impacts, the legalistic approach to enforcement is legitimate. On the other hand, one suspects that were they to know of the 1.5 per officer per year conviction rate, most fishers would probably lower their estimate of the value of that approach to enforcement.

The concern some managers display about beefing up their violations statistics, and their genuine belief that the confrontational approach is effective, has provided a nurturing environment for a few officers whose inclinations lie along the confrontational, we-they, legalistic lines. These have a mandate and a reputation for zealous "crime fighting". They often operate in other officer territories, and attempt to charge as many fishers as they can. Although "good convictions" were emphasized by field managers in some locations, in others, any conviction would do for the purpose of their statistics. Since officers obtained an average of 1.5 convictions per officer per year over a seven year period for the whole Scotia-Fundy Region, even when the zealot's contributions and the "nuisance" convictions included,

it is difficult to understand how managers could sustain their emphasis on the value of the hardhitting approach to enforcement. The fact that there is so much more that could be done to enhance enforcement effectiveness using more persuasive approaches to enforcement, seems to have completely escaped most of these officials.

Six Spheres of Consensus

We define organizational consensus as the degree to which lower participants accept the organization's position in six spheres of consensus: values, goals, means, participation, performance obligations, and definitions of "the facts". We describe our empirical evidence on the extent of consensus in this organization by comparing fisher, officer, and organization positions on: the basic state of affairs the organization tries to bring about, the means at their disposal, the kinds and extent of participation in the organization, the kinds of duties lower participants are obliged to perform, and "the facts" in certain important areas.

Etzioni argues that higher ranks in all organizations tend to support its cultural system, whereas lower participants may have different types and degrees of dissent, depending on the organization's type. This means that we need to examine the consensus and dissent among lower participants if we want to identify the nature of the organization. Coercive organizations require very little consensus from lower participants since even their participation and performance obligations, limited as they usually are, may be forced upon them. Utilitarian organizations require high consensus with respect to instrumental spheres that affect their production activities. This includes performance obligations, participation, and the definition of the facts. Since the relationship is contractual and based on remunerative rewards, Etzioni argues that utilitarian organizations can usually manage as long as they have consensus on procedures. Normative organizations can tolerate very little

dissent in any sphere because their compliance structure is based on internalized and voluntary self restraints, their goals are related to ultimate values, and participants need to be strongly committed to the organization if it is to be effective. Therefore, normative organizations must have high degrees of consensus on values, goals, and means to be effective at reaching their goals.

Since all officers and all but one manager say the biggest obstacle they face in being more successful at their work is the organization, we may conclude that they do not think that their organization shares their values or their goals, and that they disagree with the means, policies, and tactics of that organization in basic areas.⁷⁶ Over one-half of enforcement officials identified their biggest obstacle to being more effective as the department's "organizational structure". Responses in this category included: problems related to the command control hierarchy, lack of direction from management, management's lack of accountability, unwillingness to delegate authority, emergency raids on their budgets, their perception that enforcement has low status in the department's hierarchy of functions and sub-cultures, and their perception that they are out of the information loop in the department. Another one-third of these individuals said that their main obstacle was "fisheries and habitat management". Responses that were organized under this category included the department's mismanagement, allocation strategies, and poor licensing policies. Another one-fifth identified their lack of resources as the biggest block to being more successful at their jobs. Only one official said that his main obstacle originated outside the organization.

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⁷⁶See the analyses in support of these statements in sections 1.5, 2.3, and 3.1 of Appendix E.

Because of the nature of their work, fairness is an important value for many officers and managers. Thus, the finding that most officers and managers think the rules are unfair demonstrates that their values clash with those of the organization.⁷⁷ An example frequently used of unfair rules is a situation in which a large company's vessels were found violating the same rule that some smaller vessels had violated. Although the smaller vessels owners were prosecuted, the large company was not. The fact that nearly three-quarters of managers and over one-third of the officers think that the way enforcement is practised today benefits no one, also demonstrates that the organization emphasizes different values.

Officers and managers also disagree with other aspects of the organization. Over three-quarters of officers and managers think the advisory process has no positive impact on fisher compliance, and almost all managers and officers believe the allocation processes are unfair. Consequently, all managers and virtually all officers said that fishers cheat because they perceive the allocation processes are unfair. A part of the reason they believe those processes are unfair has to do with who is on the committees, and their perception that many meetings are dominated by a few industry leaders and/or departmental officials. Some of these leaders, say the officers, are "the worst crooks in the business". However, officers and managers would say that those processes were unfair even if they were examples of pure democracy, because they cannot enforce the plans those meetings generate. Nor, given the logistics of fisheries and the differences in the distances etc, travelled by different gear type groups in those fisheries, can they enforce them without bias.

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⁷⁷See table E7 and the discussion that follows in the same section of Appendix E (section 1.6). Section 1.6 also supports the statements that are made in the next paragraph about the other aspects of the organization with which officers and managers disagree.

Officers disagree with the kinds of participation their organization requires them to display. Three-quarters of the average officer's work time is spent on clerical and other office work. They resent most of this work because it is marginally related to their conception of what needs to be done to be more effective at preventing non-compliance. Not only do they feel it diverts them from their real jobs, but also many of them are troubled by their performance obligations. Almost all officers were troubled to some extent by those obligations.

Since almost everyone in any organization may be troubled to some extent by issues relating to their work situation, we restricted our presentation of our findings to issues where the officers were seriously troubled (that is, troubled rather often or nearly always). We identified six areas where from one-sixth to one-third of the officers were seriously troubled. These include: lack of clarity about the scope and responsibilities of their jobs, being unable to finish their workload in a normal working day, having the amount of work interfere with the quality of their output, being unable to obtain the information they need to do their work, feeling that they have to do things that are against their better judgement, and having their family life disrupted because of their work.

The differences in perceptions of what constitutes the facts for officers, managers and the rest of the department are exemplified by their views of the unfairness of the processes the department goes through in making its decisions, "together" with clients. The organization takes considerable pride in its consultation mechanisms but the officers, their managers, and most fisher leaders think those processes are inequitable, elite driven, and illegitimate. Thus, officers and managers disagree on the facts as they relate to the rules they are required to follow or enforce.

Officers and managers argue that allocation decisions are based on some combination of social, political, economic, and biological compromises among objectives. One week they seem to favour one group, the next week another. They argue that fishers compare their advantages to those of other groups, and every group feels relatively deprived. They argue that many cheat to achieve a kind of "rough justice". The Department's enforcement officials argue that in paying more attention to industry elites or their lobbyists, or to distributing the resource, many allocation decisions and management plans conflict with conservation objectives and undermine the legitimacy of their enforcement behaviour.

Our analysis shows that in every sphere of consensus we examine, the views of enforcement officials and the position of the organization are in conflict. They disagree on the facts, their participation obligations, the basic goals of the organization, the elite values it represents, and the policies, resources and tactics (means) at their disposal to perform their jobs.

Although the three gear type groups of fishers display some differences in some of the characteristics relating to their consensual integration with this organization, those differences are usually a matter of degree, not substance, and most of those differences are relatively minor. For example, fishers were asked to say whether they felt that government officials were honest and fair and work hard on behalf of their clients. One-third of the fixed gear fishers but only one-fifth of the mobile gear fishers attribute these qualities to government officials. Since a majority of the fishers in each gear type group are of the same opinion, it demonstrates that the values of most fishers differ in these respects from those of most government officials.

Most fisher respondents feel that the organization is the main obstacle to realizing

their goals, and most do not agree with the policies, means, and tactics of the organization.⁷⁸

However, the fixed gear small fishers are an exception in this respect since only one-third of them compared to a majority of those in the other two groups of fishers believe the department is the main barrier to their success. Furthermore, only a fraction of fix gear small fishers, compared to over one-half of the other two groups of fishers said that their biggest specific obstacle was the department's policies. All of the mobile gear type group fishers who identified the department as their main obstacle said the specific obstacle was the department's policies. The other types of fishers also identified the lack of departmental resources, a shared department/fisher blame for the problems, department organizational structure, or the need for better and more timely information to come from the organization.

In addition, there are some differences in dissent that are related to characteristics of individuals. Those who identify the department as the main barrier tend to be better educated, more ambitious, somewhat younger, and to participate in the advisory processes. The latter is particularly significant, since these obtained their understanding of how the organization causes their difficulties through their direct experience with the organization. It also suggests that if more fishers were to participate, more would develop that same understanding.⁷⁹

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⁷⁸The reader is referred to section 2.3 and 2.4 of Appendix E for detailed analyses that verify these empirical generalizations.

⁷⁹One explanation for the finding that fixed gear small fishers are less critical of the organization is the relative "non-participation" of even those who do "participate" in the department's committee processes. Most of this gear type group of fishers were located in Newfoundland, where most of the smaller vessel owners interact more with their union representatives than with the organization's (the department's) officials. The Union plays something of a buffering role between fishers and the department. It is likely that most fisher leaders, even those that do participate, simply do not have the same understanding of the organization and its advisory processes as fisher leaders in the other gear type groups.

Although the department emphasizes the “fact” that there are too few fish and too many fishermen, and rarely focuses on the need to develop more effective policies, this bureaucratic definition of the main policy problem differs from the definition of the problem given by most fishers. Fewer than one-fifth of the larger vessel owning fishers, and only two-fifths of the smaller vessel owning fishers accept that the main problem is either too few fish or too many fishers. Most fishers consider the department’s policies to be more problematic than lack of fish or number of fishers.

Respondents who identified the department as their main block were asked to specify which part of the organization was responsible for the block. Among those who said it was the department, there was near unanimity in the source of that block. The Fisheries and Habitat Management Branch was identified by virtually all of each type of fisher. Fisheries and Habitat Management included responses of “departmental mismanagement”, “allocation strategies”, and “licensing policies”. Among fishers who identified the department as the main block, allocation strategies and mismanagement together account for from one-half to three-quarters of fishers, depending on the gear type group and the geographic location. And allocation strategies account for much of this. In the Newfoundland location, allocation strategies accounted for one-half of the blocks identified by all three types of fishers. In SW. Nova Scotia, allocation strategies accounted for about one-third of the responses of all three types of fishers. Other focal concerns raised in each case by about one-fifth of these SW. Nova Scotia fishers included departmental mismanagement, enforcement activities, and license policies. They perceived enforcement as blocking their success largely because it does not prevent cheating, and this reduces the amount left for others to catch by legal or illegal means.

Almost all fishers believe that the rules arise in response to certain pressure groups and are imposed on the rest. Slightly under two-thirds said the rules are unfair. And almost three-quarters said that enforcement activities hurt the honest fisher, or fishers in general, the department's reputation, or only one group of fishers and not others. When their responses on several dimensions of organizational functions were considered, we found that the general picture of the organization they see is pre-dominantly punishment-centred. About three-quarters of the fishers responses could be grouped into this category while only a few fishers responses could be considered to attribute qualities too the organization that could make it a representative organization. The remainder of their responses fell into a mixture of types that included mock, representative, and punishment-centred. Every mix included punishment-centred.

When asked for their perceptions of the department's uses of its authority, fishers were generally dissatisfied. For example, over two-thirds believe that the normative, education-orientation to non-compliance issues would decrease non-compliance, but over four-fifths of them said that the department was not using it. About four-fifths of the fishers said that the advisory processes were not helpful in preventing non-compliance. For some reason, nearly two-fifths of the mobile fishers thought the advisory processes were helpful in this respect.

Nearly four-fifths of these fishers think the allocation processes are unfair, and more than four-fifths say that fishers break rules because they do not accept the inequitable allocations. Once again, the mobile gear type group stands somewhat apart from the other types of fishers, although a majority of these fishers agree with this assessment. Slightly fewer than two-thirds of mobile fishers gave this response.

These analyses show there are fundamental disagreements between the organization and fishers in the spheres of values, goals, means, policies, and tactics. They also disagree with the performance obligations that the organization imposes on them in the form of its rules. In many cases they reject the validity of the rules, and the processes used to establish those rules. And part of the reason they do this is that they disagree on the facts.⁸⁰

The absence of consensus in any of the spheres illustrates that the organization fits the profile of a coercive, or punishment-centred organization. Control over fishers or officers and their managers, or indeed almost anyone in any organization where the individual's job requires initiative is impossible. These conditions of work make the application of relatively primitive control techniques such as narrowly proscriptive rules, fines, punishments, and fear of authority, completely ineffective. Their application is the basis of the resistance that lower participants constantly express to the organization, and this resistance increases the problems of control.

Communication Mechanisms

The ways an organization communicates with its participants is "... of special importance because the large size, high degree of complexity, strain toward effectiveness and elaborate control structures of organizations all require extensive communication networks and roles, and mechanisms especially devoted to the flow of communication (Etzioni;1975:241)." When organizations face a crisis of legitimacy such mechanisms may

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⁸⁰There are other avenues, outside the organization, that may allow for their participation in shaping the decisions of the organization. These include, but are not limited to political channels that are in theory open to any citizen, union or association representations on their behalf, other paid lobbyists, etc. We prefer to consider these as aspects of communication behaviours. Our data on these behaviours are discussed under that heading in the concluding sub-section of this chapter.

take on even greater importance, either to prevent the spread of facts, or, in the case where the organization is being constructively reformed, to spread the new facts to all participants. And communication mechanisms are important for organizations that depend upon consensus, because these mechanisms structure the messages that flow through the organization

Organizations differ in the types of information they communicate through the organization and in the directions of those flows of information. Information may flow down, up, horizontally, follow some combination of these directions, or it may be withheld at one or more levels in the organization.⁸¹ In the latter, gaps in information result. The information gaps may be strategic or unintentional, but since information is power, its absence in key areas may signify the powerlessness of participants at that level of the organization.

The contents of the communications may be expressive, instrumental, or a combination of instrumental or expressive communications. Instrumental communications express policies or procedures, and are therefore, more concerned with "means" than "ends". Expressive communications are more affective, concern "ends", and "preach to" or "praise" participants. Since the commitment of lower participants is a function of the contrast between their values and goals, and those of their organization, the kinds of communication mechanisms that are permitted, used, and encouraged within an organization will affect the extent of integration or alienation of its lower participants. The gaps in information and obstacles to its detection that are deliberately built into an organization's communication

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⁸¹Our analyses focus primarily on ideal-types of communications.

mechanisms, as well as unintended gaps in knowledge affect the organization's internal coherence and this influences its overall structure. Communication gaps may play central roles in creating or solving problems that relate to organization effectiveness. The degree of coherence in an organization may affect the goals lower participants try to achieve when they misinterpret the organization's intention, cannot understand it, cannot discover it, do not agree with it, have no opportunity to express their views, or when they feel that the conditions they face do not permit them to achieve those goals. Furthermore, when higher participants are "deaf" to certain types of instrumental or expressive upward communications or misinterpret those communications, they may decide to institute additional controls. These may further alienate lower participants.

Etzioni argues that an organization's needs for internal communications depends on its nature. Communication structures in coercive organizations can be predominantly instrumental, since expressive communication would be wasted on alienated lower participants. In coercive organizations, there is little need for upward instrumental or expressive communications. On the other hand, in these organizations, expressive communications that flow horizontally among inmates are the main means for socializing new inmates and for reinforcing desired attitudes among the older ones. Since the coercive organization requires obedience rather than consent, there is little need to communicate much to the lower participants. Communication gaps tend to be characteristic of this type of organization.

Communication gaps are rare in normative organizations because elites are relatively undifferentiated, alienation is low, consensus is high, and the organization requires commitment from lower participants. An emphasis is placed on expressive downward

communications, although there may be some opportunity for upward expressive communication. Deliberate attention to the expression of instrumental communications is less essential because the organization's foundation is its consensus on means and goals.

In utilitarian production-oriented organizations, almost as much emphasis is placed on upward as on downward instrumental communication because:

'If the "centre" doesn't get performance reports, or if these are delayed or distorted, the effective operation of the organization is impaired. Much of the so-called red tape, the files and archives Weber saw as a central characteristic of bureaucracies in general, are an indicator of extensive instrumental communication, which exists mainly in utilitarian organizations (Etzioni; 1975:245).

To enable effective and efficient production, gaps in communications cannot occur with respect to specific instrumental procedures, although in complex organizations relatively autonomous units may not "need to know" what the other is doing. Vertical (up or down) expressive communications are limited in ideal-typical utilitarian organizations because lower participants are primarily motivated by the material rewards of their pay and benefits. Expressive communication networks tend to flow along horizontal lines, and they tend to develop where they reinforce the sub-culture of the work team. Expressive horizontal communication is not essential to the functioning of such organizations, but it may contribute to its effectiveness in certain cases.

Table 5 below presents ideal-typical organizations in relation to the communication mechanisms that each type requires. In the following analyses of this organization's communication mechanisms, we identify the nature of its communications by analysing lower participant responses to questions about the nature of communications within their organization. Then we relate the empirically-derived communications profile to its

theoretically-derived ideal-type of organization.

Table 5: Communication Mechanisms By Ideal-Type of Organization

COMMUNICATION MECHANISM	TYPE OF ORGANIZATION		
	COERCIVE	UTILITARIAN	NORMATIVE
Expressive-up	no	no	sometimes
Expressive-down	no	sometimes	yes
Expressive-horizontal	yes	sometimes	yes
Communication Gaps	yes	sometimes	no
Instrumental-up	no	yes	no
Instrumental-down	yes	yes	no

Communications Mechanisms Used With Officers

'We are supposed to be the "eyes and ears" of the Department, or at least that's what it says in the pamphlet they distribute for recruitment purposes. But, they almost never ask for our opinions, and when they do, they never listen to what we say. We are treated like mushrooms...kept in the dark and covered with shit (fishery officer, anonymous).'

One indicator of the overall environment of instrumental downward communication is the extent to which lower participants say their work is highly regimented by the organization. The work standardization sub-scale of the Haige and Aiken Formalization Inventory provides for a range of from two (lowest) to five (highest) regimentation. Officers were asked to say how accurate are statements about their jobs such as: "How things are done around here are left pretty much up to the person doing the work." The average score obtained by the officers being almost four, we argue that this is some indication that they perceive their work as highly regimented. They say their environment tolerates little

deviation from expected standards.⁸²

We used the Job Related Tension Index to diagnose major areas of tension among officers, and some of these strains were communications-related.⁸³ For example, many officers say they cannot get the basic information they need to be able to perform their work effectively (information gaps). They are troubled by the lack of clarity about the scope of their responsibilities and they feel they have too little authority to carry out their jobs (poor instrumental communication). Officers think their work is highly regimented, but they argue the organization does not communicate exactly what they are to do most of the time, nor does it provide them with the information they need to perform many of their regimented duties. This persistent situation is evidence of poor downward instrumental communication. It may also signify that the channels for upward communication are closed. Higher participants either do not agree with the feedback from these officers, or they are not listening to their input, or both.

There is no evidence to suggest that either expressive or instrumental upward communication channels are open, but the finding that all officers believe their organization is their biggest obstacle to being more effective in their jobs, implies they are closed.⁸⁴ If the instrumental upward channels are open they are clearly ineffective at bringing lower

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⁸²See section 1.2 in Appendix E for a more detailed description and empirical application of “formalization”, that is, the way the organization deals with rules.

⁸³See section 1.3 in Appendix E for the details of the analyses.

⁸⁴See the analyses provided on these issues in section 1.5 (officers), 2.3 (fishers), and 3.1 (fishers and officers), in Appendix E.

participants into line with the views of the organization. There is no evidence of downward expressive communications. This explains why officers are confused about the organization's true goals, and their own roles in those goals.

Officers believe the organization does not use its persuasive powers appropriately with clients.⁸⁵ They say their organization engages in very little normative persuasion (expressive communications), and when it does, (Advisory Committees), it does more harm than good. Our finding from Seashore's Index of Group Cohesiveness, that only slightly more than one-half of the officers feel included in most ways or better in their enforcement sector organization, suggests the organization is ineffective at building a sense of a "team" at the sector level.⁸⁶ Furthermore, officers owe their allegiance to their own work groups, while their managers lack this network of expressive, horizontal communications, and identified instead with the sector.

In summary, these analyses illustrate that officers receive downward instrumental communication but there are significant (and to the officers, costly) gaps in those instrumental communications. Upward instrumental and expressive channels are closed. It is clear expressive communications flow horizontally among officers. Viewed from their perspective, the organization's communication mechanisms correspond to those shown above in table 5 as attributes of coercive organizations.

If this organization fit the utilitarian type in respect to its mechanisms for

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⁸⁵See section 7.1 in Appendix E for the analysis of the organization's expressive communications from the perspective of the officers.

⁸⁶See section 1.4 for our analysis of commitment to work groups using Seashores' measures of attraction to the work group and resistance to leaving the group.

communicating with its lower participants, we would not have found that its lower participants: fail to receive the basic information they need to do their job effectively; are almost never consulted for their input into how to improve the organization's delivery of its services; feel they are being closely watched for their obedience to organizational norms and yet at the same time feel they do not know what the organization is expecting from them, or that they believe the organization has little interest in the goal of enforcement. Unlike a utilitarian organization, they do not believe their organization looks to them or even to their managers for feedback on its policies. Rather, they feel that the organization is indifferent to such instrumental upward communications.⁸⁷

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⁸⁷On the other hand, one could argue there is considerable upward instrumental communication. Much paper flows from the "field" to Headquarters. For example, work plans are routinely produced and sent "up the line". However, the upward flow of information does not necessarily mean there is upward instrumental communication, since communication requires someone to "use" the information that is received. We argue that the process of instrumental communication is largely "farce-like", in that it frequently neither describes the reality in the field nor is it employed at Headquarters to improve the effectiveness of enforcement policy.

That is, many Regional Headquarters officials are contemptuous of the importance of such information, and provide it to Ottawa Headquarters as a matter of bureaucratic routine. Although part of an annual planning process to which National Headquarters obliges them to contribute, few take them seriously. The regional view often reflects their knowledge that the year's enforcement activities cannot be predicted in advance. They also know that their budgets will be subjected to "raids" by their managers, causing them to radically reassess their priorities and plan "on the run". Consequently, they submit enforcement plans in over to satisfy the bureaucracy's need to be able to say it is in (remote) control. Thus, at the time this researcher left this department, in February of 1996, enforcement sector managers in Headquarters were still trying to get the Fisheries and habitat Managers in the Regions to seek the approval of enforcement officials for enforcement plans and to find ways to hold them accountable for those plans. No progress was made in that regard in spite of explicit written endorsement of this approach by the Deputy Minister.

At the other end of the organization, in Headquarters, the planning information is collected but rarely analysed or used to improve enforcement policy. For example, officers have been obliged to detail their activities in the Fishery Officer Weekly Reporting System for the past seven or eight years in the Scotia-Fundy and

Communication Mechanisms Used With Fishers⁸⁸

Although there are several opportunities for instrumental and/or expressive communications to flow down, up, or horizontally among fishers, our findings suggest that the pattern of communication with fishers tends to resemble the communications profile of coercive organizations. In addition, our data revealed that there are a select few, among the fisher and other industry sector leaders, with whom the organization's communications are far more extensive and diverse. These exceptions, and the fact that the vast majority are excluded from these privileges, intensify the organization's communication problems with its fisher clients.

Instrumental communications flow downward when Fishing Plans and policies are announced, when their regulatory amendments are published in *The Canada Gazette*, when new "conditions" must be attached to licenses, when special "mail-outs" are made to notify vessel owners of an impending change, when officers enforce the rules, and when fishers are informed of policies by "The Fishermen's Broadcast" or other local media programs.

Expressive and instrumental downward and upward communication opportunities

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Newfoundland Regions of the department. At the time of this research, those data were being examined for the first time. They were beginning to find out that officers are unable to leave their offices to do enforcement work. Data on fisheries violations have been collected for even longer. These data are occasionally used by Area Office managers to encourage local newspapers to apply social pressure on particular fishers. However, they have never been thoroughly or even partially analysed to determine trends in such basic factors as the types of violation and their frequency of occurrence. Our study used some of this information to determine the rate of conviction per officer per year in one Region of the organization, and that was the most extensive analysis to which these national data have been subjected.

⁸⁸See Appendix B for more extensive definitions of terms such as fishers and gear type groups of fisher, that appear in the following discussion.

sometimes occur when particular fishers or particular union or association representatives access political channels in person or in writing at any of the three levels of government. Expressive communications may occur more generally by fisher representatives at community meetings on fisheries issues, at meetings of Fisheries Advisory Committee and sub-committee meetings, from interactions between fishers and officers in the field or field office, where fishers often conduct business related to their license conditions and other matters; and, from individual networks of contacts between officials and fishers. These communication channels are in addition to the communications made by the Minister and his officials and reports on these that appear in the press or in other media.

At sea, expressive and instrumental horizontal communication occur among crew members and between skippers by radio and telephone. On land, horizontal communications occur at ad hoc gatherings at harbours where fishers spend many hours gearing up or down from fishing, and at meetings called by their associations and unions. In addition, in virtually every fishing community there is usually one (or more) fisher home or coffee shop where fishers gather to discuss the latest news.

In contrast to perceptions of organization officials, most fisher leaders are not politically active. On a political activism scale where zero represents no political activity and twelve is most active, even for the most politically active of the fisher gear type groups, (fixed gear large) had an average score of only four.⁸⁹ The other groups had still lower average scores. Few fisher leaders telephone, write, talk to political officials, work on their campaigns, or give money to their campaigns. Nor do they discuss or read about political

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⁸⁹See question 98b in Appendix A for our definition of political activism.

issues. Their lack of political activism is consistent with our finding that, for leaders, their alienation scores (sense of powerlessness) are average or slightly above average.⁹⁰ These findings suggest that fisher leaders will rarely express instrumental or expressive communications through political channels.⁹¹

Their main communication mechanism with the organization is through the Advisory Committee process. It is helpful to know something about the characteristics of those who sit on these committees, and the differences in their characteristics by gear type group.⁹² Two types of individual characteristics (ambition and adaptive strategy) form the basis for a comparison. Fewer of the fixed gear than mobile fisher participants in the advisory process were “ambitious”, when compared with leaders who refused to participate in that process. Ambition was determined by analysing their responses to the question: what does success mean in your work to you?⁹³ Almost four-fifths of the mobile fisher leader participants were ambitious compared to about one-fifth of the fixed gear fisher leader participants. One explanation for this finding may be that ambitious fixed gear fishers do not believe they can

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⁹⁰See questions 183 to 192a in Appendix A for a description of the scale used to measure powerlessness.

⁹¹Sometimes there appear to be good reasons for their reticence. One fisher who was the president of his association of fishers said he would not go over the local Regional Director-General's head and write to the Minister, on an issue that he described to this researcher, and that was clearly of fundamental importance to his members. He said that he was afraid it would cause the local Regional Director-General to retaliate with punitive measures on his gear sector.

⁹²See table E12 in Appendix E.

⁹³See Appendix A question 47 for the range of responses that were included in the categories of “ambitious” and “survivor”.

advance their ambitions as much by participating in the advisory process, as they can by staying away from it; whereas those in the mobile gear type group of fisher leaders see the advisory groups as a way to become more successful.

This finding may be a function of the relatively small number of mobile fishers (hundreds as opposed to thousands), and the relative ease with which they can organize and communicate with one another. In addition, mobile gear type group fishers tend to hire their own lobbyists. Perhaps these differences between the mobile and the fixed gear fishers explain mobile fishers' greater interest in participating in the advisory processes.⁹⁴

The other individual characteristic is their "adaptive strategy", or the way each person responded to the question: what do you do to try to be more successful in your work?⁹⁵ In all three gear type groups of fishers those who participate in the committees are more likely to be innovators (and/or rebels in the case of the larger fixed gear fishers). Those who do not participate tend to be conformists. Where legitimate opportunities are blocked, one solution that individuals with a capacity for innovation or rebellion might employ is to get on the committees where they may be able to shape the rules so that they provide them with greater

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⁹⁴Some respondents said that some mobile fishers appear to have more success with their upward expressive and instrumental communications than other types of fishers. In fact, according to comments made by respondents, the flow of information from some of the leaders in the mobile gear type group might be either horizontal or even downward to the department. Some fisher respondents and officers said that certain individuals have too much power over the organization.

⁹⁵In analysing respondent adaptive strategies we applied Merton's theory. Thus, innovative responses were those that indicated or implied that the respondent accepted the goals but rejected the institutionalized means. Conformist responses indicated or implied the respondent accepted both the institutionalized goals and means.

opportunities. However, if this were the motive, one would have thought that ambitious fishers in all three groups, and not mainly mobile fishers, would do this. Perhaps some of the mobile fisher leaders are members of the inner core of elite fishers, with whom the organization does communicate in most ways. For other types of fishers, a perception that the organization does not listen to their views, would explain why the more ambitious of these fixed gear fishers would not participate on these advisory committees to the same extent as the ambitious mobile fishers.

Perhaps expressive communications take place at advisory committee meetings. If they do, it is clear that they are not very satisfactory. Three-fifths of these fisher leader respondents said the advisory process is "not helpful". Not helpful responses included: it is useless, not representative, has too much say over the department, or it does not communicate with enforcement regarding enforceable fishing plans. The fact that almost all fishers said that the department makes very little use of its normative authority to persuade fishers to comply illustrates the organization's failure at downward expressive communication.

Information gaps were specifically identified as a barrier to success by a few fishers. However, the open-ended interview process elicited several examples of costly gaps in instrumental information, and fishers frequently stated that the department's communications were confusing. Many said sweeping changes are sometimes introduced at the beginning of a season, without giving them an opportunity to incorporate those changes to their fishing operations prior to the season opening. Some indicated they had difficulty understanding the directive. Others spoke of missing important pieces of licensing information, whose absence deprived them of access to certain fishing privileges.

When asked to identify the main obstacle to improving their effectiveness at fishing, a majority of the larger fixed gear and of the mobile gear said it was the department. However, only one-third of the small fixed gear fishers gave this response. The fishers (from any gear type group) who identified the department as their main obstacle tended to be better educated, more ambitious, and participants in the advisory process. Among those who identified the organization as the main obstacle, almost all fishers said that Fisheries and Habitat Management Branch is responsible for the difficulty⁹⁶. Within that Branch they identified three factors: resource mis-management, and poor allocation and license policies. It appears that gaps in downward instrumental communications are less important to fishers than the inability of the organization to produce sound fisheries management policies.

Fishers expressed concern over the way that decision-making processes are dominated by a few small groups of elites. This suggests there is some upward instrumental and expressive communication within these processes, but it is restricted to a privileged few. Over four-fifths of the larger vessel fishers and nearly three-quarters of the smaller fixed gear fishers said that the rule-making process are dominated by elites. When their responses to questions about the representativeness, punishment-centredness, or "mockness" of this organization's aspects of its decision-making authority were analysed, only two percent of these respondents viewed the organization as representative.⁹⁷ Nearly three-quarters perceived it as punishment-centred, and the rest perceived that it was a combination of

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⁹⁶See section 2.3 of Appendix E for further discussion of these findings.

⁹⁷See section 2.4 in Appendix E for a detailed analysis and description of these findings about respondent perceptions of the organization's nature.

punishment-centredness and one of the other types. Punishment-centred organizations consider the views of a fraction of organizational participants and ignore the rest.

Given most fishers have more contact with officers than most other officials, perhaps the way fishers and officers interact may shed some light on fisher perceptions of the organization as a two-way communicator. A related issue is that of fisher perceptions of the image projected by officers. If officers project the ("legalistic") image that all they care about is catching and punishing fishers, or the ("watch") image of avoiding key enforcement issues, and inequitably punishing those who challenge elite views, fishers may come to believe that the organization, as reflected by its officer representatives, may not be interested in listening to what the fishers have to say on enforcement issues.⁹⁸ Furthermore, if fishers believe officers are arrogant, lazy, or confrontational, they are likely to draw the conclusion that the communication channels are closed in the organization as a whole. In contrast, if fishers characterized the interaction style of officers as sociable, or if they said that they used their discretion fairly, and were service-oriented, perhaps fishers would perceive them, and by implication the organization, as open to two-way flows of instrumental and/or expressive information.

If fisher perception of the image and interaction style of officers were indicative of the organization's communication channels, our findings reveal that the organization matches the coercive profile. Although nearly one-third of the fixed gear large fishers rated the officer image and interaction style as service-oriented, while only a few of the other types of fishers attributed this image to the officers, the difference is small. Most fishers do not

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⁹⁸See section 2.7 in Appendix E for a more detailed presentation of our findings in regard to the way fishers see the enforcement approach of the officers.

think that the officers are service-oriented. Most think officers have either a confrontational or a relatively uncaring attitude toward the fishery. However, some said that there were some officers with whom it was possible to effectively communicate.

Nearly all fisher respondents stated that they would welcome opportunities for two-way exchanges of instrumental and expressive information.⁹⁹ Nearly all fisher respondents hope to see an enforcement approach that is more service-oriented, and where fishers and officers work together in partnerships. About one-tenth want traditional enforcement to be invigorated or to see enforcement practices continue along present lines. In contrast, over four-fifths want their in-group expressive and horizontal communications to include officers, and for information to be freely exchanged as though they are “partners in enforcement”.

According to officers and fishers, the organization’s communication mechanisms correspond to the pattern of coercive types of organization. In addition, we found that the organization engages in a much wider range of communications with a small elite. Thus, we were able empirically to identify an elite basis for the organization’s authority structure by analysing the organization’s manner of communicating with fisher clients. In addition, we found that this elite foundation conflicts with the values of most officers and fishers. These want their organization to communicate using two-way mechanisms that are based on normative consensus.

Conclusion

In this chapter we examined the nature of this organization by examining characteristics of its internal consensus mechanisms. We found that with a few minor

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⁹⁹See section 2.8 in Appendix E.

exceptions, each of its consensus mechanisms, (recruitment, socialization, scope and pervasiveness, nature of the work, rules, spheres of consensus, and communications), operate in the manner that our theory attributes to coercive organizations. We found that the preferences of fishers and clients is for an organization whose operations are based on normative consensus. Not only does the organization operate without consensus, but its coercive nature conflicts with the emerging reality of its lower participants. These findings explain why lower participants are non-compliant. They also explain the organization's ineffectiveness.

Chapter 7: Empirical Findings, Theoretical Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research

This chapter summarizes our empirical findings in relation to our research questions and hypotheses, outlines our theoretical results, and provides suggestions for further research.

Empirical Findings

We set out to explain why non-compliance with this federal regulatory bureaucracy was widespread, and to discover the relationship between its nature and non-compliance. We expected this would lead us to discover how the enforcement component of the organization could become more effective. We located a body of theory in the classical tradition of Sociology that offered the necessary theoretical infrastructure for these questions. Our theory led us to propose five hypotheses. They, and highlights of the findings that were presented in chapters 4-6 are identified below.

1. Since the organization is so ineffective at achieving compliance, its structures must be incongruent.

The organization is not ineffective because it is incongruent, although in its superficial appearance, its structures of authority, goals, and lower participant commitments are not consistent. For this reason the organization appears to be incongruent in its structures. Nevertheless, under its superficial appearance as a legal bureaucracy, the organization's actual structures of goals, means, and lower participant commitments are congruent. The organization is ineffective because it has the wrong configuration of structural attributes for the job. Its structures are all coercive.

The organization's coercive goals provide the wrong focus for the department's activities, and they mock its legal appearance. In trying to manage welfare state goals at the

expense of conserving the renewable resource, the department alienates its clients, and in some areas so badly mismanaged the resource, that the fish disappeared. Lower participants saw through the appearance of legal bureaucracy, and correctly identified the department's repressive, hierarchical, arbitrary, elite driven, punitive, patriarchal and traditional authority structure. Instead of accepting the artifice, lower participants quietly rebelled. They achieved a kind of rough justice by their actions. At the same time, their non-compliant behaviours helped to bring the scandals to the surface and exposed the organization's crisis of legitimacy.

2. Since normative non-compliance is a rejection of organizational authority, or a rejection of its legitimacy to apply its authority, lower participants must be alienated.

Our findings demonstrate that lower participants are alienated from their organization. Alienation is a negative orientation to the organization. It has structural and attitudinal dimensions. Structural alienation occurs when "internalized needs" of lower participants are frustrated by the objective structure of the organization's constraints on their activities. Attitudinal alienation exists when lower participants do not agree with fundamental directives of their organization. Our findings confirm that the organization blocks their attempts to improve their effectiveness in their work, and that lower participants believe the organization's uses of its normative, coercive, and remunerative authority are unacceptable. When an organization generates alienation in both dimensions, it faces a legitimacy crisis.

Most enforcement officials and fishers find the department's uses of its normative, economic, and coercive authority unacceptable. They believe that existing mechanisms such as the advisory process and other expressions of its "normative" authority are elite driven,

unjust, and compound the existing management problems. Almost all fishers and enforcement officials believe the department's allocation processes are unfair. Lower participants believe that many of the inner core of elite on those committees, "are the worst crooks in the industry". As Weber predicted, the "violation of the usual formal legal correctness" that these elite seem to get away with shatters lower participant beliefs in the correctness of the organization as a whole. On its surface the organization appears to be a legal-rational bureaucracy. Under that surface, its nature is coercive and repressive. Lower participants do not accept either the goals or the approach of this organization.

Ironically, the only dimension of authority for which lower participants appear to remain hopeful is the department's power to compel fishers to obey the rules. However, the majority of fishers and officers believe that the enforcement organization's present use of its powers, (whether enforcement is defined in terms of detecting violations, prosecuting or fining fishers), is unacceptable. The logistics of coercive enforcement produces inequities in detection and prosecution, and cannot, by itself, protect the resource. Fishers are more positive than enforcement officials about the effectiveness of such coercive measures, but they overestimate its effects. In part this is because the department actively tries to manage that impression. Furthermore, fishers are unaware of such basic facts as a 1.5 prosecution rate per officer per year in one of the busiest coastal fisheries in Canada. Furthermore, their ignorance of this and other facts related to enforcement effectiveness, exemplifies their alienation from the means by which the fisheries are regulated.

3. Since the organization alienates its lower participants, its authority structure is coercive.

On its surface the organization appears to be a typical legal bureaucracy. Rules and

consensus-building mechanisms abound. It has an enforcement organization ostensibly for protecting the collective good from the lawlessness of others. Under that surface the organization appears to obey no law, makes a mockery of the consultative process, and behaves as though it is not accountable for its repressive behaviours. We analysed how the organization makes its decisions, the nature of its consensus-building (in six spheres of consensus), its scope and pervasiveness in the lives of lower participants, its recruitment and socialization practices, six key functions of its rules, and the nature of its communication mechanisms. When all these facets of the organization are taken into account, there is no doubt that its nature is coercive. The organization is an example of what Michels referred to as a “democratic facade behind which rules an oligarchy”.

Our analysis of this organization’s authority structure shows that it does not resemble the representative or legal-rational utilitarian organizations with which such political bureaucracies are most often identified. The organization seems to have gone through a time warp and re-entered this time zone having retained organizational characteristics that were prominent centuries ago, under the “patriarchal” or “estate” forms of traditional authority as they were described by Max Weber. Although the former was based on slavery, and the latter on the existence of “freemen administrators”, each of those traditional organizations seems to have more in common with this organization’s sub-surface nature, than the formal image of a rational or legal bureaucracy.

4. The amount of initiative required of lower participants, the vast physical space for their operations, and the nation’s fiscal realities make it impossible to successfully enforce fisheries rules by force or economic reward. Lower participants need to be morally committed. Given the need for moral commitment, it follows that organization goals and authority structures must also become normative. Therefore, the most effective enforcement organization for this context is the normative (service-oriented and community-based) type.

Only goals that express ultimate values, and persuasion by means of moral consensus developed with clients as active enforcement partners, can lead lower participants voluntarily to commit themselves to this organization to the degree required for it to be effective at maintaining compliance. This is the only effective structural foundation for participants voluntarily to restrain themselves and refrain from activities that would destabilize the consensus. This enforcement organization must become a normative organization if it is to become legitimate and effective.

5. Because organizations are pressured by their environments to be effective, and since lower participants face the brunt of those pressures, our analyses of their views will reveal its more ideal and effective nature. Based on our hypothesis four, above, it is hypothesized that lower participants will identify the normative enforcement organization as the most effective type.

Our results show that enforcement officials and their clients believe their enforcement organization would be more effective if it were congruently normative in its structures of goals, means, and lower participant commitments.¹⁰⁰ A majority of officers and managers support the principles behind community-based approaches to enforcement. That is, they want the department to do more listening to fishers and officers and for fishers to take more responsibility for their fisheries, to work together with fishers, to be more service-oriented in their work, to start applying analytical techniques in focus groups together with fishers and officers to resolve specific enforcement problems, to deputize fishers in some circumstances, and, some refer specifically to the need to implement "community based policing" approaches. Almost all fishers identified the need for these kinds of community-based

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¹⁰⁰See table E11 and sections 1.11 and 1.12 in Appendix E for the analyses of enforcement official views on how their organization could be improved. For the same kinds of analyses of fisher views, see section 2.8 and 2.9. For a comparison of fishers and enforcement official views, see section 3.6 in that appendix.

approaches to enforcement.

Almost all managers and a majority of officers think enforcement partnerships with fishers will work, and about the same proportion of each think that equal partnerships will work. Among fishers, over two-thirds think partnerships are feasible, and most of the rest say that they might work. A majority of fishers also believe equal partnerships can work, one-quarter say they might be able to work as equals with the department in those partnerships, and some are sceptical. A majority of managers and officers think that concrete signs of partnerships are emerging or already in place. Fewer than one-half of the fishers were aware of existing arrangements that could be considered to be partnership-like.

Although scepticism over the feasibility of enforcement partnerships was a minority view, there is a need to explain its greater presence among officers and fishers than managers. Some forms of real authority and responsibility would need to be delegated down to the level of officers and fishers for community-based fisheries enforcement to have any concrete positive effects. These participants believe that a revolution in attitudes among higher participants would be required for such delegations to occur. Many cannot believe that higher participants would ever relinquish the authority needed to make community-based enforcement effective.

Theoretical Findings

In this section we describe our findings from applying our theoretical merger to this case study of non-compliance with a regulatory organization. Then we show how the theoretical merger may be extended to produce a theory of enforcement organizations.¹⁰¹

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¹⁰¹Since lower participants and our theory predict that the most effective enforcement organizations is likely to take the normative form, we provide an outline in

Findings from Applying the Theoretical Merger

Our application of the merger of theories of Merton, Gouldner, Etzioni, and Wilson answered our research questions. Our analyses showed what happens to the legitimacy and effectiveness of an organization that behaves contrary to its own superficial appearance, violates rules of fairness, and repressively and disingenuously dictates to its lower participants. It leads to an administrative nightmare of irrationality, confusion, and chaos. The refusal of its lower participants to obey its rules seems like rational behaviour.

We confirmed four out of five of our hypotheses, and partially confirmed the fifth. We provided a coherent explanation for the partially confirmed hypothesis. The organization's ineffectiveness is not the result of structural incongruence, although congruence is an important factor to consider. It results because there is an incongruence between the organization's appearance and its structural reality, and because the organization's true nature expresses values that clash with those of its lower participants. The organization can only become effective by its transformation into a normative form.

Our analysis of the organization's structural nature and internal operational dynamics led us to reject the utilitarian option as a way effectively to organize the enforcement activities of this organization. The nature of the work officers and fishers perform requires far more commitment (life and death activities, ultimate values), than the purely calculative sort, even if the fiscal situation could permit widespread use of promotions and other economic rewards as motivators for desired behaviours from officers. Fishers are more committed to their work than is typical of workers in utilitarian organizations. However,

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Appendix F of a strategic approach for transforming this organization's enforcement approach into the normative, or community-based form.

even if fishers could in principle be bribed with allocations of fish, in fact this cannot happen because fish cannot be allocated to individuals with the precision that is needed to make them effective motivators of individual behaviour.

We found that the organization occupies too large a presence in the lives of lower participants in these single-sector fishing communities for these to possess the kind of affectively neutrality that is possible in utilitarian organizations. At the same time, the localized recruitment and socialization processes tend to provide another set of standards of conduct from those of the organization. Since the logistics of monitoring and enforcing organization rules in respect to either officers or fishers are immensely more complicated than those in most utilitarian organizations, and the impulses to reject the organization's norms are so strong, the organization cannot possibly become more effective by restructuring its systems of control over the work performed by lower participants. The work they perform is not reducible to the kinds of controls that are employed on the shop floor of manufacturing companies. There is too much initiative and discretion required from both officers and fishers for bureaucratic-utilitarian rules and other forms of controls to be effective regulators of their behaviour. The operational environment is far too complex for a system of rules to work effectively without the voluntary self-restraint of lower participants and their strong commitment to the organization's goals. Utilitarian organizations cannot generate that degree of sustained commitment or self-restraint.

The goals of protecting and conserving the resource for future generations relate to ultimate goals that are typical of normative organizations more than to those calculations of personal interest and expediency that tend to characterize utilitarian organizations. Finally, lower participants do not want their organization to become a utilitarian organization.

Another theoretical finding was that Gouldner's theory of industrial bureaucracy is an effective complement to more broadly-based theories of bureaucracies. In the way decisions are structured, perhaps the differences between public and private sector bureaucracies are over-exaggerated in the literature. A close examination of private sector bureaucracies may reveal that many of these too, take the coercive form while giving the appearance of being legal-rational organizations.

We found a theory that can explain the emergence of community-based policing. That is, lower participants responded to their illegitimate organization's behaviours by proposing a structurally congruent and normative organizational alternative that resembles what is referred to in the enforcement literature as community-based policing. Community-based policing continues to be propelled by conditions that are remarkably similar to those facing this organization. Over twenty years ago police applied a coercive, "crime busting", "we-they" and paternalistic approach as their principal method for dealing with non-compliance. Allegations of corruption proliferated. Their legitimacy declined. Non-compliance rates rose. Citizens were alienated. It was only when police formed partnerships with citizens to redefine their goals and their means, that citizen commitment and support for police organizations was regained.

Our context for this research in its broadest sense is the search for a regulatory approach to productive activity in a renewable resource industry that can integrate the competitive enthusiasm and initiative of entrepreneurs and other risk takers into an organizational framework to which they will voluntarily commit, and for the sake of which they will cooperate and restrain their individual appetites. It is frequently asserted that a solution to this global problem is critical.

Our findings in this renewable resource context demonstrate that the emergent reality of these participants is neither coercive nor utilitarian. Although the new reality is emerging within a culture and a society whose values seem to emphasize the uses to which things may be put, the roots of a fundamentally different value orientation are evident in the preferences fishers and officers display for the normative form of organization. As a basis for regulating productive activities, and given this value orientation is emerging, normative organizations may offer one way to transcend the tensions that come between the individual and his/her collective's interests.

Extending the Merger: A Theory of Enforcement Organizations

This section outlines a theory of enforcement organizations and discusses its implications for effective enforcement. It uses elements of the theories of Merton, Gouldner, Etzioni, and Wilson's ideal-typology of enforcement organizations and produces a "four-structure" theory of enforcement organizations that shows how structures of goals, means, lower participant commitments, and enforcement approach are related to internal and external organization characteristics and organization effectiveness.¹⁰²

We describe how our analysis of our case study illustrates the nature of a congruent but ineffective enforcement organization. We discuss "ideal" pre-conditions in the environment of the society that is "external" to each congruent type, and explain why service-oriented or community-based enforcement organizations with normative goals, means, and lower participant orientations may be more effective than the watch-coercive or

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¹⁰²The first three structures are described in Chapter Two where Etzioni's theory was introduced. They include the organization's structures of goals, means, and orientations of lower participants. The fourth factor is "enforcement approach".

the legalistic-utilitarian types of congruent enforcement organizations.

Our merger of Etzioni, Merton, Gouldner, and Wilson begins with the proposition that lower participants and their organizations have goals and means. The adaptive strategies individuals use within their organization depends on the fit between their individual goals and preferences for certain types of means, and the goals and means that are legitimately available for them within their organizational context. The type of strategy employed by individuals in their relationship with their organization, or their type of orientation or commitment to those organizations may be positive (moral), negative (alienated), or neutral (calculative). The way participants, and particularly lower participants in an organization, commit themselves to their organization is a function of their attitudes to its goals and means but the organization's goals and means are in part established internally within the organization, and in part by the demands that the environment external to the organization makes on that organization. To understand the nature of any organization it must be examined as a system that is shaped by its internal and external environments.

The external factors in any organization's environment include what may be described as societal factors or the broad influences that the nature of a society as a whole may bring to bear on the way an organization develops. Those forces may be expressed through political channels, they may be expressed through the marketplace by consumer demand or lack of demand for certain outputs of an organization, or in normative ways that influence the shape of the organization. The other type of external factors are those that relate to communities within the society where the nature of family and community socialization, religious and family and class background experiences, may shape some important influences that are distinguishable from other communities. These may shape the

commitments and goals of lower participants prior to entry into the organization.

The key dimensions of any organization are their structures of authority, since these determine the means that are available, (force, economic manipulation, or persuasion); their goals, since these represent the valued ends that the organization is attempting to achieve, (ultimate values, livelihood or sustenance values, or maintenance of order and its implicit value on being free from disorder), and the orientations of the organization's lower participants to those organizational goals and means, since these will play major roles in shaping the types of commitment that lower participants display, (alienated, calculative, or morally committed), to either or both of the organization's goals and means.

Relating the three types of organization goals to the three types of means produces nine combinations of goals and means. Only three of them are congruent: coercive organizations use force to achieve goals that relate to maintaining a certain kind of order or stability in a system, utilitarian organizations use economic manipulation in combination with an emphasis on legal rules that support property relations, to achieve economic goals, and normative organizations use persuasive means to achieve goals that relate to ultimate values. Congruent organizations will tend to be more effective than those that are incongruent, because there are fewer points where the organization functions at cross-purposes that waste valuable resources, produce psychological and social tensions, and produce other situations that make the organization less efficient and less effective.¹⁰³

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¹⁰³We focus entirely in this theory on organizations that, in keeping with a flexible application and interpretation of the "boundaries" one imagines when using the methodology of "ideal-types", are more or less congruent in all four structures. However, the pure types probably do not exist. Extreme incongruence is a less likely scenario, and also theoretically and sociologically less interesting than the investigation of organizations that are congruent but ineffective, because in the latter case, the

Organizational congruence requires lower participant commitment to be congruent with means and also with organization goals. Relating the three types of commitment (alienation, calculative, and moral) to the three types of means (power, economic manipulation, and persuasion), similarly produces three congruent combinations out of the nine possibilities. These are: force and alienation (coercive organizations), economic manipulation and calculative commitment (utilitarian organizations), and persuasion and moral commitment (normative organizations). Using the same approach to relate lower participant commitment to organizational goals, the three congruent combinations are order and alienation (coercive organizations), economic goods goals and calculative commitment (utilitarian organizations), and ultimate value goals and moral commitment (normative organizations).

This three structure theory interrelates lower participant commitment, types of authority, and goals to produce three “ideal-types” of congruent organizations: normative organizations have goals that relate to ultimate values, means that involve the use of persuasive forms of authority, and morally committed lower participants; utilitarian organizations have goals that relate to attaining economic goods using legally entrenched rules relating to ownership of economic goods as the manipulative means upon which their authority rests, and whose lower participants are calculating in their commitment to those organizations; and finally, coercive organizations have goals that are related to the maintenance of order or stability within a system, using force or the threat of force to control

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ineffectiveness necessarily results from the way that organization relates to the larger society and communities in its external environment. Thus, the study of the organization is also a study of the society.

alienated lower participants.

As illustrated by our analyses to this point, enforcement organizations may adopt markedly different structures of behaviour when they execute the enforcement function. We identified these using Wilson's three types of enforcement structures. Table 6 below summarizes the differences among these three operational structures of enforcement, by relating each to the image it projects, degree to which politicians involve themselves in enforcement matters, concept of justice dispensed by officers, main enforcement emphasis, and the class structure of the communities where field operations occur.

Table 6: Organization Characteristics by Enforcement Approach

CHARACTERISTICS	WATCH	LEGALISTIC	SERVICE-ORIENTED AND COMMUNITY BASED
IMAGE	Confrontational, corrupt	Crime fighters, detached, adversarial	We aim to serve, citizen- officer partners
POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT	High	Low	Depends on issue
CONCEPT OF JUSTICE	<i>Distributive.</i> Enforcement action depends on violator characteristics	<i>Equality before law.</i> Enforcement action independent of violator characteristics	<i>Substantive.</i> Aim is to solve real problems using formal or informal means as appropriate
MAIN EMPHASIS	Maintain order-don't rock boat	Law enforcement	Law and Order
COMMUNITY CLASS STRUCTURE	working class	working, middle, or mixed classes	Highly homogeneous middle class

Because enforcement organizations could use any one of these enforcement structures, or any combination of them if the operations covered different geographic areas, and because those approaches may be incongruent with their organization's structures of goals, means, and lower participant commitments, then if we are to understand the nature and effectiveness of enforcement organizations, it is necessary to incorporate this fourth

structural characteristic into our theory. Table 7 below shows the three ideal-types of enforcement structures in relation to the three-ideal types of congruent organizations.

Table 7: Organizational Congruence By Type of Organization and Enforcement Approach

Organizational Types With Congruent Goals, Means and Commitments of Lower Participants	Enforcement Approach		
	Watch	Legalistic	Service- Oriented and Community Based
Coercive	congruent	incongruent	incongruent
Utilitarian	incongruent	congruent	incongruent
Normative	incongruent	incongruent	congruent

Out of the nine possibilities, six are incongruent and three are congruent. The three congruent possibilities are: watch-coercive, legalistic-utilitarian, and service-oriented and community-based-normative enforcement organizations. By matching their goals, means, participant orientations with their specific characteristics under each approach to their enforcement activities, as shown below, we identify a theoretical model of each type of enforcement organization.

In the watch-coercive enforcement type, lower participants are alienated from their organization. The confrontational use of officer authority gives the organization the image of corruption and incompetence. This image is buttressed by the high degree of interference by politicians in enforcement activities, and by the officer's inequitable and discriminatory (distributive) approach to justice, as well as their emphasis on "not rocking the boat" or on "keeping the lid" on situations to prevent scandal, and using repressive and inequitable means to accomplish this "order" objective. Officers do not try

to get to the bottom of the problem, but they do give some appearance of being an enforcement capability. If their enforcement activities were to dig into the true nature of the law-breaking activities, those activities would bring the deeply-entrenched inequities in the system that allocates economic goods into public view, and a scandal would erupt. The political sophistication of community members served by such enforcement organizations is generally too low effectively to challenge the nature of the organization. This mode of enforcement is closely related to the form of authority that Weber referred to as the traditional mode of authority, and which he linked to the welfare state.

In the legalistic-utilitarian enforcement organizational type, the officers detach themselves from their community contexts, thus setting up a we-they adversarial manner of relating to their clients. They are neither morally committed to their organization, nor are they strongly alienated from that organization. It is a job, and they continue to perform that job because their calculation of their personal interests inclines them to stay in the job. They apply an adversarial approach that emphasises catching and punishing violators by implementing the rule of law.

Officers are the legal-rational protectors of the economic system. The punishments are economic, and assume that the majority of potential violators will restrain themselves because of the economic costs of being detected. Officers are not concerned with the effects their adversarial actions may have on maintaining an orderly system. They are focused instead on the principle that all are equal before the law. This requires politicians to stay out of the enforcement activities, since their interference would introduce inequality into the system. However, officers do not consider the implications of a biased economic system or their own enforcement actions on its behalf,

for the pace of illegal activities that occur.

This type of enforcement approach could exist in any working class, middle class, or mixed community where the exposure of the inequities that were produced by the watch-coercive approach to enforcement created a scandal. The scandal led to the “solution” of tightening of controls over enforcement. On the surface, the legalistic approach gives the impression of a professional, adversarial, but fair approach to crime busting. This type of enforcement system is closely linked to the authority structure that Weber identified as the legal bureaucratic form of authority.

The service-oriented and community-based-normative enforcement organizational type places its emphasis on goals whose nature more or less transcend at times any narrow conception of either law or order. Officers are morally committed to their roles and develop their own charisma by finding ways in partnerships with their clients, to solve problems using flexible rather than rigid approaches. Persuasion and not economic manipulation nor force tend to be employed by the officers, and indeed by their clients, to bring those who violate the on-going consensus on what is considered legitimate activities into compliance. Lower participants develop the kinds of rules they will obey voluntarily, and their self-restraint, together with the social pressures available in such communities, leads to an orderly and fair system. Individual and/or minority group restraints are based on their perception that the system is legitimate because it supports such ultimate values as the preservation of their livelihood and that of future generations, using persuasive means that involve morally committed lower participants in the

decisions regarding the rules to which they are expected to comply.¹⁰⁴

In ideal-typical terms, Wilson argued that there would have to be widespread consensus on the definition of acceptable behaviour by virtually everyone in the community, and little class differentiation. In addition, he argued that community members would need to be homogeneous, middle class, and well-educated.¹⁰⁵ In Weber's classification of authority structures, this enforcement approach is closely linked to the charismatic type of authority.

Having identified the main structural characteristics of the three enforcement organizational types above by their structures of goals, means, lower participant commitments, and enforcement approach, the next step is to describe their external and internal environments. Wilson's description of the three types of enforcement organizations is extended by identifying their correlates at the level of the society and its communities and their effects on the organization. Then, the Etzioni/Gouldner systems theory merger is used to show how the internal characteristics of organizations shape their operational characteristics. The three types of enforcement organizations are

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¹⁰⁴This approach allows for the possibility that there may be a need at times to apply laws in their coercive or economic manipulation forms against those who challenge the legitimacy of the system the majority accept.

¹⁰⁵One could argue that if a middle class, well-educated population is required for a service-oriented approach, Atlantic fishing communities do not qualify. Furthermore, given existing long term trends in their education levels, they probably never will (Poetschke:1991). However, our data show that community members are relatively homogeneous even if, on the whole, they are poorly educated. In addition, even without much formal education, they already have a theory of how to make their organization more effective. They overwhelmingly identified the service-oriented and community-based approach. Consequently, we disagree with what amounts to a middle-class bias in Wilson's conception of the class basis for the service-oriented approach. Perhaps it results from his focus on urban rather than rural police forces.

compared in terms of their consensus and communication mechanisms, recruitment and socialization strategies, scope and pervasiveness in the lives of lower participants, functions of rules they apply, and the nature of their work and the conflicts it creates between the forces that favour bureaucracy and those that favour local initiative.

Since some of the influence of a society on its political organizations can be detected by examining the focus of its political leaders, one expects certain kinds of relationships to exist between the nature of enforcement organizations (or the administrative structure that enforce rules), and the issues that pre-occupy its political leaders. Similarly, one expects each type of enforcement organization to be associated with a different type of collective citizen activation, (or community empowerment) and a different type of community integration. Table 8 below outlines the enforcement types in relation to these societal and community characteristics in the organization's external environments.

Table 8: Enforcement Ideal-Types and Their External Environments

EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT	ENFORCEMENT TYPES		
	WATCH-COERCIVE	LEGALISTIC-UTILITARIAN	SERVICE-ORIENTED AND COMMUNITY-BASED-NORMATIVE
FOCUS OF POLITICAL LEADER'S ATTENTION	Welfare State. Deciding how problems at local levels are to be resolved	Bureaucratic Irrational-Legal State. Deciding on the legal tools for economic growth, while maintaining neutrality	Leadership State. Deciding the national interest, and offering encouragement in support of that strategy
NATURE OF COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT	Dependent. No collective initiative	Segmented. Those who control the rule processes control collective initiatives, those who do not are paralysed by bureaucratic rules	Elevated
COMMUNITY INTEGRATION	Groups in constant state of "war", unity occurs only on an issue-by-issue basis	Unity based on calculations of the unequal interests of elite and non-elite	Dynamic unity based on continuous consensus-building

Table 9 below models relationships among the variables that collectively account for most of the internal dynamics of organizations by type of enforcement organization.

Table 9: Enforcement Types and Their Internal Environments

Internal Characteristic and Sub-Characteristics	Enforcement Types		
	Watch-Coercive	Legalistic-Utilitarian	Service-Oriented and Community-Based Normative
Spheres of Consensus Required	none	performance and participation obligations, definition of the facts	All six spheres but values, goals, and means are key
Typical Communication Mechanisms	instrumental downward, information gaps, expressive horizontal	instrumental down and up, sometimes expressive horizontal	expressive down and sometimes up
Recruitment Strategy	not involved in recruitment	formal recruitment	extensive and protracted recruitment
Socialization Strategy	limited formal socialization	extensive formal socialization with emphasis on instrumental spheres	extensive expressive socialization to build consensus
Scope	total	narrow-limited to instrumental spheres	narrow or total depending on organization's function
Pervasiveness	low	moderate	high
Nature of Work and Relation to Bureaucratization	resistant to authority structure whatever form it takes because of their alienation	on-going tension. Resistant in some respects, dependent on rules and regulations in others	maximum resistance since emphasis is on getting the job done by innovative solutions in charismatic manner
Functions of Rules	apathy-preservation	screening, punishment-legitimation, remote control	explication, leeway

This four-structure theory is a result of our analysis of the fisheries enforcement

organization. Our empirical results show that the organization we examined in this case study corresponds to the watch-coercive type. However, even though this organization has essentially congruent structures, it contains all of the strains that Etzioni had attributed to ineffective organizations. It wastes resources, creates serious psychological and social tensions through its operations, is uncoordinated, and possesses other signs of ineffectiveness. Clearly, some types of congruent organizations are more effective than others for certain functions of organizations. Which type is likely to be the most effective for this enforcement organization?

If order (keeping the lid on the system without having the condition of “true order”) is the goal, and force is the means used to maintain compliance, our theory asserts that this combination of goals and means will produce alienated lower participants. Since alienated participants are by definition non-compliant, unless perfect enforcement is a feasible strategy (either because the coercive means exist to detect and discipline the majority of non-compliant individuals, or because individuals are habituated to comply as Weber described of traditional authority systems), this combination of goals and means will aggravate fishers and increase their non-compliance.

Since perfect enforcement is impractical, the key to compliance is to find a means-goal combination to which fishers will voluntarily commit themselves, and for which there will be no need to apply force or economic rewards to obtain compliance. Even at the current crude level of imperfect enforcement, actions that pressure participants to be even more non-compliant would increase the expense and inefficiency of enforcement, and escalate ineffectiveness. By itself, coercive enforcement cannot lead to orderly fisheries.

Another ineffective combination is remunerative means and order goals. This is

partly because the resource cannot be allocated with the precision required to be effective at motivating compliance or punishing non-compliance. But, even if it could be precisely allocated, the biological reality of an orderly fishery sometimes requires managers to close the fishery for extended periods of time. Therefore, there are times when remuneration is not available as a reward for compliance.

Furthermore, the nature of the industry is "boom and bust", but vessel overheads and operating expenses are continuous. An indeterminate reward schedule may alleviate the pressures to cheat in "good" times, but what would prevent fishers from cheating in "bad" times? Our theory argues that remunerative rewards build superficial calculative commitments. It is unreasonable to expect this intensity of commitment effectively to constrain those who would break rules and exploit opportunities for personal gain, at the expense of the larger community of which they are a part. Therefore, compliance cannot be achieved by manipulating remunerative rewards or punishments.¹⁰⁶

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¹⁰⁶One argument within the remunerative dimension of reward and motivation for compliance is the economic argument of "privatizing the commons". This limits a fisher's fishing opportunities to the magnitude of the quota he can afford to purchase. It is assumed it would be more in the self-interest of these "owners" of the resource to maintain orderly fisheries. We argue that there is little empirical evidence to support this view. First, fishers are only one of several species that harvest fish. Seals and other species, in addition to factors such as pollution, and temperature changes also diminish the size of the "owned" resource. If ownership were equivalent to control of the commons, and given perfect enforcement of the rules that are attached to this strategy, privatizing the commons might be a general strategy for managing orderly fisheries. However, neither of these conditions are realistic possibilities. Holders of quota will compete for fish with seals, cheaters, environment contaminants, etc. Instead of creating more orderly fisheries, a more probable scenario is that formerly independent fishers, who cannot afford to buy quota, will enter into arrangements like "share croppers" with those who are able to purchase large blocks of quota. Those whose terms of employment resemble that of "share croppers" would then have little choice when the real owners demand they cheat, and under those sharecropping agreements, few fishers would be able to earn enough to escape into independent operations. It is probable that privatization

The only goals that could possibly generate the intensity of commitment necessary for fishers voluntarily to restrain themselves from cheating is the appeal to their ultimate values regarding their "way of life", "local community values", "community", and the "maintenance of viable fisheries for future generations of fishers and their families". Similarly, the only goals that could generate sustained positive commitments from enforcement officers would be those appealing to their need to belong to a purposeful community of like-minded participants, who value the protection of resources, and feel empowered by their organization to apply their skills and community interaction networks, to help resolve conservation and protection problems.

The compliance structure that is congruent with these ultimate value goals and this inner-directed restraint on fisher cheating is persuasive or normative authority. This compliance structure begins by delegating the necessary authority to fishers and officers who would work in partnership. Delegation of this freedom to decide removes the constraints to individual problem-solving initiatives, and creates a "normative vacuum". This allows community values to come forward and become part of the frameworks they build for regulating the fisheries. Fishers and officers play significant roles under this scenario in

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would lead to oligopoly, where the few "owners" of the quota orchestrate professional anti-conservation behaviour by forcing their "share croppers" into non-compliance. These latter would take all the risks and face all the punishments. Furthermore, even if such property owners did not orchestrate such cheating behaviour in the fisheries for which they own significant blocks of quota, there is nothing to prevent them from orchestrating that behaviour by their "share croppers" in related fisheries where they have less, or no quota, or indeed, whenever they disagree with allocation decisions. This is not to argue against the possible applications of privatization in selected fisheries. It is only to show that privatization is not a strategy for making remunerative rewards a realistic basis for compliance and orderly fisheries.

determining what is acceptable. The existing values include those such as "strong traditions of independent fishing families/communities", "hard work", "cooperation", "mutual respect and community spirit", etc. At present, these values are suspended, or confined to members of each sub-cultural group, while the groups themselves are often at "war". Each of these groups presently attempts to create its own version of justice, in an imposed environment that is not only unjust and irrational, but punitive.

The substantive nature of an effective enforcement organization needs to be consistent with the factors that characterize the external environment of the organization at the community and societal levels. The congruent combination of normative goals, compliance structure and involvements needs to be based on a foundation of trust, respect and mutual cooperation, not only between the department and fishers, but also between different types of gear type groups of fishers. In the situation where fixed gear fishers fight against mobile gear type groups, and all groups against gill net fishers, big fish companies, etc., there is very little moral capital upon which to base any form of co-operation.

Congruence theory argues that organizations will be under external and internal pressures to be more effective at their goals. But, the same argument can be made in regard to their overall nature. That is, where the organization is congruent, effectiveness obviously does not lie in increasing its congruence, but in making fundamental changes to its structures. That is, organizations are subjected to internal and external pressures, not only to become congruent (that is, to reduce the unnecessary strains), but also to reduce strains that result from the substantive approach that is dictated by their structural natures.

Another approach to the question of which of the organizational types is likely to be the most effective, is the empirical solution proposed by Durkheim. Our empirical

investigation of emergent trends showed that a majority of fishers and enforcement officials believe that the organization needs to be organized along normative lines.¹⁰⁷

That approach to policing that is described as “community-based policing” is similar to the normative enforcement type. Community-based policing involves citizens in decisions about enforcement priorities, expenditures, etc, through the mechanisms of partnerships in enforcement. Thus, community-based policing is an application of the normative and congruent combination of compliance structure, goals, and participant involvement. To be an effective strategy, officers and their managers need to be morally committed to the goals so determined, and the organization needs to give them the necessary means including resources, responsibilities, authorities, and accountability, that their normative roles require.

The four-structure theory not only explains why community-based policing has emerged, but also explains why the other forms of enforcement emerged and are declining. In addition, our theory permitted us to model, in far more detail than has been provided up to now, the system characteristics of the three policing types. This was accomplished by showing how these relate to the nature of their external and internal environments.

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¹⁰⁷Note that the normative type does not exclude the use of either coercive enforcement measures or the use of positive or negative reinforcements to achieve compliance objectives. The type’s basic structures must rest on normative foundations, but the administrative processes are not limited to normative means, goals, and commitments. The service-oriented and community-based enforcement approach can include any combination of measures. As long as the relationships between coercive means and alienation are fully appreciated by participants, application, for example, of a heavy penalty to a fisher whom other fishers consider a menace to their fishery, is consistent with a normative approach, since the failure to prevent that fisher from destroying the resource would otherwise make a mockery of the system. The most important criterion is the “ownership” of the means of regulation by those who participate in the organization. Their system will then reflect their norms. Most people will voluntarily comply with their own norms most of the time.

Conclusions

We began this research by asking why so many fishers are breaking the laws, what their non-compliance had to do with the nature of the regulatory organization, and how could the enforcement organization be more effective? We looked for theoretical assistance from existing economic and social literature on fisheries management and fisheries enforcement, but found that it was of little help. We turned to the general enforcement literature. Although lacking a theoretical foundation, this literature did point to solutions that seemed to be effective at resolving the kinds of enforcement problems this organization faces. We turned to classical sociological theory and merged a number of theories in that tradition.

We found that the organization is facing a crisis of legitimacy. As fish stocks declined, the nature and extent of the department's controls came into focus. As the stocks declined, the organization began to micro-manage what was left. Increasingly, the organization entangled itself in the complexities of its own rules and punishments. To the extent that it was capable of acting in its external environment, it often appeared to behave like an irrational-legal bureaucracy. As "every fish began to count", inequities in their allocation assumed greater significance. Lower participants could not be bribed to follow the rules by new allocations or by the charisma of administrators or politicians. Lower participants decided the system was unfair, and this led them to cheat or to do whatever it took to ensure they could "feed their families".

On its surface, the organization looked at first like a typical rational-legal bureaucracy. Written rules in the form of regulations and other documents proliferate. The organization is hierarchical. Its positions appear to be staffed based upon the "merit"

principle. It seemed to be a somewhat typical legal-rational bureaucracy. However, under its formal surface, we found that the organization was coercive. It is coercive in its goals, its means, its alienated participants, and in its application of the watch form of enforcement activity. We found that enforcement and the fisheries in general are managed in accordance with principles of "the welfare state" as Weber described was typical of the traditional or coercive form of authority.

The department's goal is to provide the minimum needed to prevent otherwise displaced labour from becoming restless and threatening the organization itself. Since fish cannot vote, the organization's mission has been to allocate fish among various piranha-like gear types and sectors, and use federal programs such as unemployment insurance and Job Creation to compensate the losers (fishers and plant employees) for inequities in those allocations on the one hand, and for net reductions in the biological base of fish stocks that are the direct consequence of its failures to conserve fish, on the other.

The organization lost most of its legitimacy as regulator, allocator, and resource manager, and relies almost entirely on its coercive authority to dictate terms, and to impose punishments. The coercive nature of these actions are disguised by the appearance of "participation" as represented by the advisory committee process. We found that this process does not have the respect of the majority of its participants. Meanwhile, the department continues to devise rules and their punishments as though its inability to act on them matters very little.

It seems to us that the superficial resemblance of this institution to a legitimate legal-rational organization when it is coercive in all important respects, raises a number of serious questions? Why has the public sector evaluation process failed to discover the nature of these

organizational problems? Having failed to do so in this case, is there any reason to believe that evaluation procedures are more perceptive in their application to other public sector organizations? How widespread are the problems we identified? Are they found in other public and private sector bureaucracies?

Many other federal departments deliver services to the public. Unlike the management of the fisheries, where sooner or later the decline in fish stocks may signal the organization's ineffectiveness, many federal departments deliver intangibles. How are we to know if those organizations are effective? Are they similarly coercive by nature?

The department is considering alternatives to its current enforcement organization at this time, primarily because of fiscal pressures. Our findings show that fishers are more interested in the community-based enforcement approach than enforcement officials, but a significant majority of each support changes in this direction. They believe that the department's officials and fishers can work together in partnerships to achieve enforcement goals. Our findings suggest that a more effective approach to enforcement is not only desirable but feasible. We identified the service-oriented and community-based normative enforcement type as the most compatible with its external and internal environment, and outlined a strategy to take the organization toward that objective.

Not only did our theory lead us into this organizational analysis, it also led to our articulation of a four-structure theory of enforcement organisations that explains why community-based policing has developed. Furthermore, although our analyses of this organization's nature was based on concepts that were designed for studies of industrial bureaucracies, they helped to reveal the basic nature of this public sector organization. This leads us to suggest that the literature may over-emphasize the differences between public and

private sector organizations.

Finally, the larger context for this study is the global problem of how to exploit natural and other resources in a regulated sustainable context. The challenge is to find ways sociologically to balance collective and individual interests, without eroding either the moral capital in the social system or the legitimacy of the institutions of governance. In our examination of this organization's nature and potential for effectiveness, we identified one approach that offers a new way to regulate certain kinds of activities. It is congruent with an emerging view among lower participants in these study locations.

Suggestions For Further Research

There is little reason to suggest that the enforcement organization we studied is different in any fundamental respect from any other fisheries enforcement organization in any other economically prosperous country with a large fishing population. Other nations, such as Norway overfish some of their fisheries, and face similar enforcement issues. It would be useful to do a cross-national comparative study of fisheries enforcement organizations.

To test the generality of these findings for the entire organization, it would be useful to examine other components of the department of Fisheries and Oceans such as its Science Sector, to determine if it has a similar nature. It would be useful to gather further empirical data on perceptions of those involved in the allocation processes under varying conditions, to determine some of the antecedents to oligarchic and non-oligarchic decision-making processes.

We examined the department's structures using candid perceptions of lower participants, and found ourselves asking the question of whether other public bureaucracies

would be similar. Comparative studies of several public bureaucracies would address this question. In addition, such studies could shed some light on the possibility that political bureaucracies in general may need to be normative and decentralized to be legitimate and effective in democratic societies.

Furthermore, if public and private bureaucracies tend to be similar in their natures, we might be able to gain a deeper understanding of different types of private sector organizations by applying our theory and examining lower participant views. Such studies could, for example, measure the gap between the organization's surface and sub-surface natures and show how the differences affect its bottom line.

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**Appendix A: Code Key With Fields Identified
Background**

4	1.	DATE OF INTERVIEW: numeric: month/year
2	2.	AGE: numeric
1	3.	WAS OR IS ON ADVISORY COMMITTEE: was(2),is(3),no(4)
1	4.	WAS OR IS EXEC OF ASSOC OR UNION: " " "
4	5.	RESPONDENT ID#s--OTTAWA Headquarters(OO1 TO OO9), HALIFAX Headquarters(H01 TO H12), S.W.NOVA DFO(SW57 TO SW81), S.W.NOVA CLIENTS(NO01 TO NO50), NFLD DFO(NE01 TO NE11), NFLD CLIENTS(ON01 TO ON50)
7	6.	TELEPHONE: numeric--No AREA CODES
1	7.	PROVINCE: Ont(2),Ns(3), Nfld(4)
1	8.	COUNTY: OTTAWA(2), HALIFAX(3), YARMOUTH(4), SHELBURNE(5), CORNER BROOK(6), W. NFLD DISTRICT 9--(7), other(8)
2	9.	COMMUNITY CLUSTER: see attach
20	10.	COMMUNITY NAME: alpha
5	11.	COMMUNITY CODE: see attach
1	12a.	CATEGORY OF RESPONDENT: client(2),DFO(3)
1	12b.	IF 12a=2, THEN FISHER(incl retr, employee of proc eg. skip of dragger)(2), PROCESS, incl employee plus retr(3), OTHER(4)
1	12c.	IF 12a=3, THEN FO(2),FO MGR/SO OFF(3), OTHDFO(4)
1	12d.	IF 12b=2, THEN FIXED GEAR(2),MOBILE(3), both fixed and mobile(4)
1	13.	NUMBER OF YEARS IN FISHING (NUMERIC)
2	14.	NUMBER OF YEARS IN FISH PROCESSING: numeric
2	15.	NUMBER OF VESSELS: numeric
3	16.	LENGTH OF LARGEST VESSEL: numeric
1	17.	MAIN FISHING ACTIVITY: groundfish(fixed gear)(2), grdfsh (mobile)(3), lobster(4), other shell fish mobile(5), pelagic fixed gear(6), pelagic(mobile)(7), MIXED(8), other(9)
1	18.	SECOND FISHING ACTIVITY: " "
1	19.	NO. OF LICENCES HELD : numeric
1	20.	GROUND FISH (TRAWL): yes(2),no(3)
1	21.	GROUND FISH (LONGLINE): " "
1	22.	GROUND FISH (HANDLINE): " "
1	23.	GROUND FISH (GILLNET OR COD TRAP): " "
1	24.	LOBSTER: " "
1	25.	TUNA: " "
1	26.	SWORDFISH: " "
1	27.	HERRING: FIXED YES(2),MOBILE YES(3)
1	28.	MACKEREL: FIXED YES(2), MOBILE YES(3)
1	29.	SCALLOP: YES(2), NO(3)
1	30.	OTHER: yes(2),no(3)

- 3 31. IF PROCESSOR, NO. OF JOBS IN PLANT (PEAK): NUMERIC
 2 32. LAST COMPLETED GRADE IN SCHOOL: NUMERIC TO 12,
 POSTSEC=13
 1 33. HOME OWNERSHIP STATUS: OWNS(2),MORTG(3),RENTS OR
 OTH(4)

Violations--Apply same codes below for 34 TO 46

- 1 34. PERS COM FISH LICEN: ADD 1 TO NUMBER INDICATED ON CODE
 SHEET SO THAT NEVER(2),RARE(3),SOME(4),OFT(5),NEARLY
 ALWS(6)ALWAYS(7)
 1 35. MISREPORT AREA QUOTA: "
 1 36. EXCEED TRIP LIMITS OR DAILY QUOTA: "
 1 37. FISH IN CLOSED AREAS: "
 1 38. VESSEL MARKINGS (CFV#S): "
 1 39. WRONG MESH SIZE OR USE OF LINERS: "
 1 40. WRONG QUANTITY OF GEAR: "
 1 41. SPACING OF GEAR: "
 1 42a. PLACEMENT OF GEAR: "
 1 42b. MARKING OF LOBSTER BUOYS--NFLD ONLY) "
 1 43. EXCEED FISH SIZE LIMIT: "
 1 44. DUMPING: "
 1 45. TRANSHIPPING: "
 1 46. TAKING BERRIED LOBSTER: "

Persuasive, Economic, and Coercive policing

- 2 47. WHAT DOES SUCCESS IN YOUR WORK MEAN TO YOU? Catching
 violators(2), working all year, sense of accomplishment/doing a good job(3),
 being at the top, recognition &/or respect of peers(4), putting in a
 presence/showing flag/getting through the day(5), economic survival, enough
 weeks to qual for UI(6), making a good living, good profit margin, enough
 so don't have to take UI(7), help to maintain reasonable level of
 compliance(8), having ps effect on clients(9), don't know(10), enjoying the
 work or day(11), other(12), satisfy his boss(13)
 SKIP 48. HOW DO YOU DEFINE SUCCESS THESE DAYS? "
 2 49. WHAT IS THE MAIN THING YOU DO TO TRY TO BE MORE
 SUCCESSFUL IN YOUR WORK?: work harder(2), use new
 technology/new ideas, trying to get new info (3), trad enforcement, patrols,
 do routine, get through day, put in presence(4), nothing you can do(5), take
 action to change/reform things(6), communicate with others(7), patrols plus
 communicate w others(8), diversify, invest in better gear(9), maintain
 existing gear(10), be more efficient,cut costs(11), reduce effort(12),

- nothing(13), use comon sense(14), build a good team(15), set priorities(16), maximize UI(17).
- 1 49b KIND OF RESPONSE: innovator(2), conform/ritualist(3), retreat(4), reform/rebel(5), other(6)
- 2 50a WHAT ARE THE MAIN THINGS PREVENTING YOU FROM BEING MORE SUCCESSFUL?: Price/Lack of fish(2), fisher behavior/too many fishers(3), need more resources(4), DFO organization barriers(5), DFO & fishers(6),no barriers(7), politics(8), other(9), DFO policies(10), fear of being caught cheating(11), big companies(12), otter trawlers(13), lack of nat standards(14), comb. of factors(15), need more and better info(16), staying honest(17)
- 1 50b KIND OF INVOLVEMENT: alienated(2), calculative(3), moralistic(4), don't know(5), other(6)
- 1 50c SOURCES OF BLOCK: personal(2), external to self(3), internal and external(4), don't know(5), other(6), no block(7)
- 1 50d IF SOURCE OF BLOCK IN 50c IS EXTERNAL TO SELF: the resource base(2), DFO(3), other fishers(4), combinations(5), other(6), no block(7), big companies(8), poacher-other fishers(9)
- 2 50e IF 50d IS DFO or if DFO is implicated in response: Problems w DFO management(2), DFO allocation strategies(3), DFO licensing policies(4), the organization of DFO(5), lack of resources in DFO(6), DFO Science(7), other(8), poorly motivcated officers(9), DFO enforc(10), politics(11), comb(12), poor communicaton of necesary info by DFO to fishers(13)
- 1 51. WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THE WAYS THAT DFO TRIES TO GET FISHERMEN TO GO ALONG WITH THE RULES IN THE FISHERIES? (E.G. EDUCATION ABOUT HOW IMPORTANT IT IS TO CONSERVE FISH FOR THE FUTURE)? worth doing/like them(2), not heard of it/not done(3), not very helpful(4), other(5)
- 1 52. WOULD THEY HELP TO REDUCE NON-COMPLIANCE. yes(2), maybe(3),no(4), yes, a little(5), don't know(6), yes, if DFO were credible(7)
- 2 53. WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THE ADVISORY PROCESS? helpful(2),useless/not effective or representative(3), has too much say over DFO(4), other(5), depends on who is on committee(6), is of some good, but not representative(7), does not communicate w enforcement(8), don't know about it(9), is improving(10)
- 1 54. HAS IT STOPPED PEOPLE FROM CHEATING? I.E. DOES PARTICIPATION IN ADVISORY COMMITTEE WHEREBY PEOPLE BECOME ARCHITECTS OF THE RULES, STOP THEM FROM CHEATING ON THEIR OWN RULES? yes(2), maybe(3), no(4), don't know(5), yes, a little(6), other(7)
- 1 55. DO YOU THINK THAT THE WAY DFO HAS DIVIDED UP THE FISH - EG: BY GEAR TYPE/INSHORE OFFSHORE, LENGTH OF SEASON, ETC., HAS BEEN DONE IN A FAIR WAY? yes(2), maybe(3), no(4), don't know(5), other(6), some fair some not(7)
- 1 56. DO YOU THINK THAT FISHERMEN MAY HAVE BROKEN SOME

RULES

BECAUSE THEY FELT DFO WAS UNFAIR? yes(2),maybe(3). no(4), don't know(5), oth(6)

- 2 57. DO YOU THINK IT HELPS TO HAVE FISHERY OFFICERS CATCHING PEOPLE DOING SOMETHING WRONG? yes(2), yes but on condition that fines are higher(3), yes on cond that they catch the cons prob cases(4), yes if spend more time in field or are more FOs(5), no(6), helps a little(7), don't know/maybe(8), don't catch the serious violators(9), other(10), not sufficient by themselves(11), only when fishers agree w rules(12), yes if the FOs would do the work(13).
- 2 58. DOES IT MAKE PEOPLE STOP BREAKING RULES? "
- 2 59. DO YOU THINK THE FINES(OR SANCTIONS) SCARE PEOPLE SO THEY DON'T BREAK THE RULES? "

Community Policing

- 1 60. DO YOU THINK FISHERMEN AND FISHERY OFFICERS AND DFO IN GENERAL CAN SIT DOWN TOGETHER AND FIGURE OUT BETTER WAYS TO WORK OUT SOLUTIONS TO FISHERIES PROBLEMS, LIKE HOW TO STOP FISHERMAN FROM CHEATING ON QUOTAS, MISREPORTING, HIGHGRADING, FISHING TOO MANY LOBSTERS POTS, AND SO ON? yes(2), Its possible, maybe, or in some cases(3), no(4), don't know(5),other(6), yes if DFO attitudes change(7), yes if DFO and fisher attitudes change(8)
- 1 61. DO YOU THINK ITS POSSIBLE TO WORK AS EQUAL PARTNERS WITH DFO TO STOP REALLY SERIOUS CHEATING FROM HURTING EVERYONE? "
- 1 62. DO YOU SEE ANY SIGNS OF IT ALREADY? "
- 2 63. WHAT WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE? change fish management so DFO listens, and so fishers take more responsibility(2), work together, change in DFO and Fishers attitudes, ie. take more responsibility for problem(3), change in fisher attitudes(4), change of FO toward service-orientation(5), some effort made together(spec or unspecified type)(6),small groups of fishers work with local fishery officers, focus grps, community meeting w FOs(7), change in DFO style toward com based policingand partnerships(8), better communication(9), done by neutral party(10), don't know(11), tougher trad enforcment(12), other(13), solve foreign first, then draggers, then partnerships(14), deputize fishres/self-enforcment(15), stop persecuting individ fishers who express dissonant views(16), include enforc in adv. committees(17), set policy nationally and comm downwards at com mtgs to fishers(18), fishers inform on one another(19),give real author to FOs(20), fair & equal treatment(21)

Organization Type

- 2 64. WHO MAKES THE RULES IN THE FISHERIES THESE DAYS?

- everyone(2), elite bureaucrats(3), politicians(4), elite fishers/union and DFO incl Min(5), clients/elite clients(6), DFO(7), no one(8) don't know(9)lg companies(10), the union/fishers(11), DFO & Union(12), Otter Trawl(13), Union & MIN(14)
- 1 65. DO YOU THINK THE RULES ARE FAIR? yes(2), some are but some are not(3), no(4), don't know(5), other(6), process is fair results are not(7)
- 2 66. WHO DO YOU THINK IS BEING HURT BY THE WAY ENFORCEMENT IS CARRIED OUT THESE DAYS? the violator(2), everyone(3), the honest fisher(4), fishermen(5), DFO(6), the fish(7), DFO & fishers(8), no one(9), other(10), the industry(11), only one group of fishers(12), gov't(13), don't know(14)
- 2 67. WHY DO YOU THINK FISHERMEN BREAK THE RULES(main reason)? greed(2), opportunity(3), greed plus other(s)(4), dislike rule(5), social status and competition(6), ec necessity(7), ignorance(8), other(9), its the norm(10)
- 1 67a to 67h Respondent listed each of the following as a reason? Yes(2), no(3):
- a. greed
  - b. opportunity
  - c. dislike rule
  - d. social status and competition
  - e. economic necessity
  - f. ignorance
  - g. its the norm
  - h. other
- 1 68. HOW MUCH RESPECT DO YOU THINK MOST FISHERMEN IN YOUR COMMUNITY HAVE FOR SOMEONE WHO BREAKS THE RULES AND BECAUSE OF THAT EARNS A LOT OF MONEY? high(2), med(3), low(4), depends on rule(5), don't know(6), other(7), depends on person(8), depends on gear sector(9)
- 1 69a. HOW MUCH RESPECT DO FISHERMEN IN YOUR COMMUNITY HAVE FOR FISHERMEN WHO NEVER BREAK THE RULES, BUT ARE ONLY ABLE TO MAKE A DECENT, NOT A WEALTHY LIVING FOR THEMSELVES AND THEIR FAMILIES? "
- 1 69b. Type of organization-Etzionni: representative(2), punish-centred(3), mock(4), mixture(5), don't know(6)
- 1 69c. If 69b=5, mock+punish(2), mock+represent(3), represent+punish(4), mock + rep+ punish(5), don't know(6)

Policing Style

- 1 70. WHAT KIND OF IMAGE DO THE FISHERY OFFICERS YOU KNOW CONVEY TO YOU? WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THEM? service-oriented(2), legalistic(3), watchman(4), all types-mixed(5), don't know(6), licensing clerks(7)
- 1 71. DO YOU THINK THAT FISHERY OFFICERS TREAT ALL FISHERMEN

- THE SAME? yes(2), maybe(3), no(4), don't know(5), depends on officer(6), other(7), depends on circumstances(8)
- 2 72. HOW DO FISHERY OFFICERS TREAT FISHERMEN WHEN THEY INTERACT WITH THEM? profess and respectful or polite(2), fairly/with appropriate discretion(3), confrontational, lazy, w/o respect unprofess/arrogant or mean(4), unfair, unequal & biased treatment(5), sociably and service-oriented(6), detached, remote & impersonal(7), don't know(8), depends on officer(9), other(10), don't abuse authority, just do job as best they can(11), lack competence(12)
- 1 73. IF OFFICERS CATCH SOMEONE CHEATING ON FISHERIES, THEY WILL CHARGE THEM NO MATTER WHO THEY ARE? yes(2), some will some won't--depends on officer(3), no(4), don't know(5), depends on their connections(6), other(7), depends on situation(8)
- 1 74. OFFICERS VERY RARELY CHARGE ANYONE UNLESS THE ABUSE IS REALLY BAD; SOMETIMES JUST CHARGE THE PEOPLE THEY DON'T LIKE? "
- 2 75. WHAT DO FISHERY OFFICERS CARE MOSTLY ABOUT? catching violators(2), conservation, or the resource, ie protecting the resource and conserving it(3), providing services to clients(4), its just a job, or their paychecks(5), depends on officer(6), themselves/egos(7), don't know(8), punishing fishers they don't like(9), mixtue of things(10), other(11), rec fishery(12)
- 1 76. DO YOU THINK THERE IS ANY POLITICAL INTERFERENCE IN WHAT FISHERY OFFICERS DO? yes(2), maybe(3), no(4), don't know(5), not at officer level but at higher levels(6)
- 2 77. HOW CAN A FISHERY OFFICER EARN YOUR RESPECT?(or if FO responding, how can you earn fishers respect): catching violators(2), enforce the laws, putting out good effort, showing they care(3), being respectful of fishers(4), being helpful with information and other services, become service-oriented(5), get in field and get to know/talk to us sociably(6), involve fishers more/communicate(7), redesign fisheries mangmt principles in support of enforcement(8), nothing FO can do(9), catch the worst violators(10), give more power/author to FOs(11), other(12), take off guns(13), being fair or competent(14), continue to do what they do(15), fishers must change first(16), both DFO & fishers have to change attitudes(17), keep police "props"--guns etc(18), emphasize cons & service to clients(19), relocate offices frequently(20)

Dimensions of Community Life--79 to 98 use same code as shown below for 78

- 1 78. DO YOU THINK MOST PEOPLE IN YOUR COMMUNITY HAVE A LOT OF CONCERN FOR OTHERS? RESPECT ONE ANOTHER AND TRUST ONE ANOTHER? yes(2), not most but some(3), no(4), don't know(5)
- 1 79. DO YOU THINK THAT MOST PEOPLE IN YOUR COMMUNITY DON'T

CARE ABOUT OTHERS, NOR TRUST THEM NOR RESPECT THEM?
"

- 1   80.   DO YOU THINK MOST PEOPLE IN YOUR COMMUNITY SPEND A LOT OF MONEY ON CARS AND OTHER THINGS TO SHOW OFF TO THEIR NEIGHBOURS, THINK THEY ARE BETTER THAN THOSE WHO CAN'T BUY SUCH THINGS? "
- 1   81.   DO YOU THINK MOST PEOPLE IN YOUR COMMUNITY PAY NO ATTENTION TO DIFFERENCES IN WHAT THEY OR THEIR NEIGHBOURS OWN, EVERYBODY IS SEEN AS EQUAL TO EVERYONE ELSE, ENTITLED TO JUST AS MUCH RESPECT? "
- 1   82.   DO YOU THINK MOST PEOPLE IN YOUR COMMUNITY BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE TO WORK HARD AND THEY HAVE TO GET AHEAD IN LIFE? "
- 1   83.   DO YOU THINK MOST PEOPLE IN YOUR COMMUNITY BELIEVE WORK IS SOMETHING YOU HAVE TO DO TO FEED YOUR FAMILY & AS LONG AS YOU GET ENOUGH TO LIVE ON, THAT IS ALL THAT MATTERS? "
- 1   84.   DO YOU THINK THAT A LOT OF PEOPLE WORK AS VOLUNTEERS TO GET THINGS DONE FOR THE COMMUNITY? PEOPLE FEEL THEY SHOULD HELP THEIR COMMUNITY TO PROSPER? "
- 1   85.   DO YOU THINK THERE ISN'T MUCH VOLUNTEERING GOING ON SINCE EVERYONE THINKS THE MAIN REASON PEOPLE VOLUNTEER IS TO GET SOMETHING FOR THEMSELVES? "
- 1   86.   DO YOU THINK GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE HONEST AND FAIR AND WORK HARD ON BEHALF OF PEOPLE? "
- 1   87.   DO YOU THINK THAT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE GENERALLY CORRUPT AND UNFAIR? "

Political Activism--88 to 98a use same code key as shown below

- 1   88.   DID YOU VOTE ONCE IN THE LAST FOUR YEARS? yes(2), no(3)
- 1   89.   DID YOU VOTE TWO TO FIVE TIMES? "
- 1   90.   DO YOU INFORM YOURSELF FROM MORE THAN ONE SOURCE ON PUBLIC ISSUES? "
- 1   91.   DO YOU DISCUSS PUBLIC ISSUES FREQUENTLY WITH MORE THAN ONE PERSON? "
- 1   92.   DID YOU WRITE OR TALK TO YOUR MHA/MLA OR ANY OTHER PUBLIC OFFICIAL - LOCAL OR NATIONAL TO EXPRESS YOUR VIEWS ONCE IN THE PAST YEAR? "
- 1   93.   DID YOU WRITE OR TALK TO YOUR MHA/MLA OR ANY OTHER PUBLIC OFFICIAL - LOCAL OR NATIONAL TO EXPRESS YOUR VIEWS TWO OR MORE TIMES IN PAST YEAR? "
- 1   94.   DO YOU BELONG TO ONE OR MORE ORGANIZATIONS THAT TAKE STANDS ON PUBLIC ISSUES? "
- 1   95.   DID YOU DISCUSS THE QUALIFICATIONS NEEDED FOR THE

- OFFICES ON THE BALLOT? "
- 1 96. DID YOU WORK FOR THE NOMINATION OF A CANDIDATE BEFORE THE ELECTION ONCE IN THE LAST FOUR YEARS? "
- 1 97. DID YOU WORK FOR THE ELECTION OF A CANDIDATE ONCE IN THE LAST FOUR YEARS? "
- 1 98a. DID YOU CONTRIBUTE MONEY TO A PARTY OR CANDIDATE ONCE IN THE LAST FOUR YEARS? "
- 2 98b. INDEX OF POLITICAL ACTIVISM: numeric--number of times respondent answered yes to questions 88 to 98a inclusive.

Organization's Climate of Decision-Making--use same codes for all but 103b, 105b, 113b below--note you have to add 1 to the number appearing on questionnaire.

- 1 99. I AM MY OWN BOSS IN MOST MATTERS? def true(2), more true than false(3), more false than true(4), definitely false(5)
- 1 100. A PERSON CAN MAKE HIS OWN DECISIONS HERE WITHOUT CHECKING WITH ANYBODY ELSE? "
- 1 101. HOW THINGS ARE DONE AROUND HERE IS LEFT PRETTY MUCH UP TO THE PERSON DOING THE WORK? "
- 1 102. PEOPLE HERE DO ALMOST AS THEY PLEASE? "
- 1 103a. MOST PEOPLE HERE MAKE THEIR OWN RULES ON THE JOB? "
- 2 103b. Index of Job Autonomy-- see attach
- 1 104. THE EMPLOYEES ARE CONSTANTLY BEING CHECKED ON FOR RULE VIOLATIONS?
- 1 105a. PEOPLE HERE FEEL AS THOUGH THEY ARE CONSTANTLY BEING WATCHED TO SEE THEY OBEY THE RULES?
- 1 105b. INDEX OF RULE BOUNDEDNESS--see attach
- 1 106. THERE IS NO RULES MANUAL? "
- 1 107. THERE IS A WRITTEN JOB DESCRIPTION? "
- 1 108. WHATEVER SITUATION ARISES, WE HAVE PROCEDURES TO FOLLOW IN DEALING WITH IT. "
- 1 109. EVERYONE HAS A SPECIFIC JOB TO DO? "
- 1 110. GOING THROUGH THE PROPER CHANNEL IS CONSTANTLY STRESSED? "
- 1 111. THE ORGANIZATION KEEPS A WRITTEN RECORD OF EVERYONE'S JOB PERFORMANCE? "
- 1 112. WE ARE TO FOLLOW STRICT OPERATING PROCEDURES AT ALL TIMES "
- 1 113a. WHENEVER WE HAVE A PROBLEM WE ARE SUPPOSED TO GO TO THE SAME PERSON FOR AN ANSWER? "
- 2 113b. INDEX OF JOB SPECIFICITY--see attach

Trust, Activism, Work and Family Scales--use same key as shown below for 114 to 133,

except for 119b, 126b, 130b, and 133b

- 1 114. IT IS NOT A GOOD IDEA TO LET YOUR RELATIVES KNOW EVERYTHING ABOUT YOUR LIFE BECAUSE THEY MIGHT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF YOU? disagree much(2), disagree a little(3), agree a little(4), agree much(5)
- 1 115. IT IS NOT GOOD TO LET YOUR FRIENDS KNOW EVERYTHING ABOUT YOUR LIFE FOR THE SAME REASON? "
- 1 116. PEOPLE WILL REPAY YOUR KINDNESS WITH INGRATITUDE? "
- 1 117. MOST PEOPLE ARE FAIR AND DO NOT TRY TO GET AWAY WITH ANYTHING? "
- 1 118. PEOPLE HELP THOSE WHO HELPED THEM, NOT BECAUSE IT IS RIGHT BUT BECAUSE IT IS GOOD BUSINESS? "
- 1 119a YOU CAN ONLY TRUST PEOPLE WHOM YOU KNOW WELL? "
- 2 119b INDEX OF TRUST--SEE ATTACH
- 1 120. MAKING PLANS ONLY BRINGS UNHAPPINESS BECAUSE THE PLANS ARE HARD TO FULFIL? "
- 1 121. IT DOESN'T MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE IF THE PEOPLE ELECT ONE OR ANOTHER CANDIDATE FOR NOTHING WILL CHANGE?"
- 1 122. WITH THINGS AS THEY ARE TODAY, AN INTELLIGENT PERSON OUGHT TO THINK ONLY ABOUT THE PRESENT WITHOUT WORKING ABOUT WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN TOMORROW? "
- 1 123. WE NEWFOUNDLANDER/NOVA-SCOTIANS DREAM BIG DREAMS, BUT IN REALITY WE ARE INEFFICIENT WITH MODERN INDUSTRY? "
- 1 124. THE SECRET OF HAPPINESS IS DO NOT EXPECT TOO MUCH OUT OF LIFE, AND BE CONTENT WITH WHAT COMES YOUR WAY? "
- 1 125. IT IS IMPORTANT TO MAKE PLANS FOR ONE'S LIFE AND NOT JUST ACCEPT WHAT COMES? "
- 1 126a YOU OUGHT TO KNOW CLEARLY IN ADVANCE YOUR PLANS FOR THE FUTURE? "
- 2 126b INDEX OF ACTIVISM(GENERAL)--see attach
- 1 127. THE JOB SHOULD COME FIRST EVEN IF IT MEANS SACRIFICING TIME FROM RECREATION? "
- 1 128. THE BEST WAY TO JUDGE A MAN IS BY HIS SUCCESS IN HIS OCCUPATION? "
- 1 129. THE MOST IMPORTANT QUALITIES OF A REAL MAN ARE DETERMINATION AND DRIVING AMBITION? "
- 1 130a THE MOST IMPORTANT THING FOR A PARENT TO DO IS TO HELP HIS CHILDREN GET FURTHER AHEAD IN THE WORLD THAT HE DID? "
- 2 130b INDEX OF OCCUPATIONAL PRIMACY--see attach
- 1 131. WHEN LOOKING FOR A JOB, A PERSON OUGHT TO FIND A

POSITION IN A PLACE LOCATED NEAR HIS PARENTS, EVEN IF THAT MEANS LOSING A GOOD OPPORTUNITY ELSEWHERE? "

1 132. WHEN YOU ARE IN TROUBLE ONLY A RELATIVE CAN BE DEPENDED UPON TO HELP YOU OUT? "

1 133a IF HAVE CHANCE TO HIRE AN ASSISTANT IN YOUR WORK, IT IS ALWAYS BETTER TO HIRE A RELATIVE THEN A STRANGER? "

2 133b INDEX OF OBLIGATIONS TO EXTENDED FAMILY--SEE ATTACH

Community Scales--use the code key shown below for 134 to 173a inclusive; --173b to 173l will be used for indices to be created from combinations of the answers to those questions

1 134. REAL FRIENDS ARE HARD TO FIND IN THIS COMMUNITY? Def untrue(2), Untrue(3), Not decided(4), true(5), very true(6)

1 135. OUR SCHOOLS DO A POOR JOB OF PREPARING YOUR PEOPLE FOR LIFE?

1 136. LOCAL CONCERNS DEAL FAIRLY AND SQUARELY WITH EVERYONE?

1 137. THE COMMUNITY IS VERY PEACEFUL AND ORDERLY?

1 138. A LOT OF PEOPLE HERE THINK THEY ARE TOO NICE FOR YOU?

1 139. FAMILIES IN THIS COMMUNITY KEEP THEIR CHILDREN UNDER CONTROL?

1 140. THE DIFFERENT CHURCHES THERE COOPERATE WILL WITH ONE ANOTHER?

1 141. SOME PEOPLE HERE "GET BY WITH MURDER" WHILE OTHERS TAKE THE RAP FOR ANY LITTLE MISDEED?

1 142. ALMOST EVERYONE IS POLITE AND COURTEOUS TO YOU?

1 143. OUR SCHOOLS DO A GOOD JOB OF PREPARING STUDENTS FOR COLLEGE?

1 144. EVERYONE HERE TRIES TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF YOU?

1 145. PEOPLE AROUND HERE SHOW GOOD JUDGEMENT?

1 146. PEOPLE WON'T WORK TOGETHER TO GET THINGS DONE FOR THE COMMUNITY?

1 147. PARENTS TEACH THEIR CHILDREN TO RESPECT OTHER PEOPLE'S RIGHTS AND PROPERTY?

1 148. MOST OF OUR CHURCH PEOPLE FORGET THE MEANING OF THE WORD BROTHERHOOD WHEN THEY GET OUT OF CHURCH?

1 149. THIS COMMUNITY LACKS REAL LEADERS?

1 150. PEOPLE GIVE YOU BAD NAME IF INSIST ON BEING DIFFERENT?

1 151. OUR HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES TAKE AN ACTIVE INTEREST IN

MAKING THEIR COMMUNITY A BETTER PLACE IN WHICH TO LIVE?

- 1 152. A FEW PEOPLE HERE MAKE ALL THE DOUGH?
- 1 153. TOO MANY YOUNG PEOPLE GET INTO SEX DIFFICULTIES?
- 1 154. THE COMMUNITY TRIES HARD TO HELP ITS YOUNG PEOPLE ALONG?
- 1 155. FOLKS ARE UNCONCERNED ABOUT WHAT THEIR KIDS DO SO LONG AS THEY KEEP OUT OF TROUBLE?
- 1 156. THE CHURCHES ARE A CONSTRUCTIVE FACTOR FOR BETTER COMMUNITY LIFE?
- 1 157. THE MAYOR AND COUNCILLORS RUN THE TOWN TO SUIT THEMSELVES?
- 1 158. I FEEL VERY MUCH THAT I BELONG HERE?
- 1 159. MANY YOUNG PEOPLE IN THE COMMUNITY DO NOT FINISH HIGH SCHOOL?
- 1 160. THE PEOPLE HERE ARE ALL PENNY PINCHERS?
- 1 161. YOU MUST SPEND LOTS OF \$\$ TO BE ACCEPTED HERE?
- 1 162. THE PEOPLE AS A WHOLE MIND THEIR OWN BUSINESS
- 1 163. MOST PEOPLE GET THEIR FAMILIES TO SUNDAY SCHOOL OR CHURCH ON SUNDAY?
- 1 164. EVERY CHURCH WANTS TO BE BIGGEST & MOST IMPRESSIVE?
- 1 165. A FEW HAVE THE TOWN POLITICS WELL SEWN UP?
- 1 166. MOST STUDENTS HERE LEARN TO READ AND WRITE WELL?
- 1 167. PEOPLE ARE GENERALLY CRITICAL OF OTHERS?
- 1 168. LOCAL CONCERNS EXPECT THEIR HELP TO LIVE ON LOW WAGES?
- 1 169. YOU ARE OUT OF LUCK HERE IF YOU HAPPEN TO BE OF THE WRONG NATIONALITY?
- 1 170. NO ONE SEEMS TO CARE MUCH HOW THE COMMUNITY LOOKS?
- 1 171. IF THEIR CHILDREN KEEP OF THE WAY, PARENTS ARE SATISFIED TO LET THEM DO WHATEVER THEY WANT?
- 1 172. OUR CHURCHGOERS DON'T PRACTICE WHAT THEY PREACH?

1 173a THE TOWN COUNCIL GETS VERY LITTLE DONE?

22 173b to 173 L--INDICES--see attach

Occupation Scale--use ff codes for 174 to 182a

- 1 174. THERE IS TOO LITTLE VARIETY IN MY JOB? true(2), Not decided(3), false(4)
- 1 175. I TEND TO GET BORED ON THE JOB? _____

- 1 176. THERE MUST BE BETTER PLACES TO WORK? _____
- 1 177. I WOULD LIKE MORE FREEDOM ON THE JOB? _____
- 1 178. I HAVE TOO SMALL A SHARE IN DECIDING MATTERS THAT
AFFECT MY WORK? _____
- 1 179. MY JOB MEANS MORE TO ME THAN JUST MONEY? _____
- 1 180. I AM SATISFIED WITH THE WORK I DO? _____
- 1 181. MY JOB GIVES ME A CHANCE TO DO WHAT I DO BEST? _____
- 1 182a PEOPLE FEEL LIKE THEY BELONG WHERE I WORK? _____
- 2 182b Index of Job Satisfaction--see attach

Political Alienation--same codes for 183 to 192a below

- 1 183. THE PUBLIC HAS LITTLE CONTROL OVER WHAT POLITICIANS DO
IN OFFICE? _____
- 1 184. THE AVERAGE PERSON CAN GET NOWHERE BY TALKING TO
PUBLIC OFFICIALS? _____
- 1 185. THE AVERAGE CITIZEN HAS CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE ON
POLITICS? _____
- 1 186. THE AVERAGE PERSON HAS MUCH TO SAY ABOUT RUNNING
LOCAL GOVERNMENT? _____
- 1 187. PEOPLE LIKE ME HAVE MUCH TO SAY ABOUT GOVERNMENT? _____
- 1 188. THE AVERAGE PERSON HAS A GREAT DEAL OF INFLUENCE ON
GOVERNMENT DECISIONS? _____
- 1 189. THE GOVERNMENT IS GENERALLY RESPONSIVE TO PUBLIC
OPINION? _____
- 1 190. I AM USUALLY INTERESTED IN LOCAL ELECTIONS? _____
- 1 191. BY TAKING AN ACTIVE PART IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
AFFAIRS THE PEOPLE CAN CONTROL WORLD EVENTS? _____
- 1 192a TAKING EVERYTHING INTO ACCOUNT, THE WORLD IS GETTING
BETTER? _____
- 2 192b INDEX OF POLITICAL ALIENATION--SEE ATTACH

Economic Self-determination Scale--use same codes for 193 to 197a below

- 1 193. INDIVIDUALS ARE POOR BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF EFFORT ON
THEIR PART? _____
- 1 194. ANYONE CAN RAISE HIS STANDARD OF LIVING IF HE IS WILLING
TO WORK AT IT? _____
- 1 195. MOST PEOPLE HAVE A GOOD DEAL OF FREEDOM IN DECIDING
HOW TO LIVE? _____
- 1 196. POOR PEOPLE COULD IMPROVE THEIR LOT IF THEY TRIED? _____
- 1 197a OUR COUNTRY HAS TOO MANY POOR PEOPLE WHO CAN DO
LITTLE TO RAISE THEIR STANDARD OF LIVING? _____

- 2 197b Index of economic self-determination--see attach

Stress Scale--for 198 to 203a use the ff codes

- 1 198. OFTEN WAS MONEY ON YOUR MIND IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS? Often or sometimes(2), not decided(3), seldom or not often(4)
- 1 199. HOW OFTEN WAS WORK ON YOUR MIND IN LAST FEW WEEKS? _____
- 1 200. HOW OFTEN WAS MARRIAGE ON YOUR MIND IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS? _____
- 1 201. HOW OFTEN WAS GETTING AHEAD ON YOUR MIND IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS? _____
- 1 202. HOW OFTEN WAS BRINGING UP CHILDREN ON YOUR MIND IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS? _____
- 1 203a HOW OFTEN WAS THE FUTURE ON YOUR MIND IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS? _____
- 2 203b Index of General Life Stress--see attach

Organizational Stress Scale--use ff codes for 204 to 218a

- 1 204. FEEL YOU HAVE TOO LITTLE AUTHORITY FOR RESPONSIBILITIES: never bothered(2), rarely bothered(3), sometimes bothered(4), rather often(5), nearly always(6), does not apply(1)
- 1 205. BEING UNCLEAR ON SCOPE AND RESPONSIBILITIES ARE _____
- 1 206. NOT KNOW OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADVANCEMENT OR PROMOTION _____
- 1 207. FEELING TOO HEAVY WORKLOAD, ONE CAN'T POSSIBLY FINISH _____
- 1 208. THINK NOT ABLE TO SATISFY CONFLICTING DEMANDS OVER YOU _____
- 1 209. FEELING NOT FULLY QUALIFIED TO HANDLE JOB _____
- 1 210. NOT KNOWING YOUR SUPERVISOR THINKS YOU, HE EVALUATES YOU _____
- 1 211. FACT CAN'T GET INFO NEEDED TO CARRY OUT JOB _____
- 1 212. HAVING TO DECIDE THINGS AFFECT LIVES OF INDIVIDUALS _____
- 1 213. FEELING NOT LIKED AND ACCEPTED BY PEOPLE YOU WORK _____
- 1 214. FEELING UNABLE TO INFLUENCE IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR'S DECISIONS _____
- 1 215. NOT KNOWING PEOPLE YOU WORK WITH EXPECT _____
- 1 216. THINKING AMOUNT OF WORK MAY INTERFERE WITH QUALITY _____
- 1 217. FEELING HAVE TO DO THINGS ON JOB AGAINST BETTER JUDGMENT _____
- 1 218a FEELING JOB INTERFERES WITH FAMILY LIFE _____
- 2 218b INDEX OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRESS--SEE ATTACH

Alienation scale--short form-use ff codes for 219 to 232a

- 1 219. I THINK WE HAVE ADEQUATE MEANS FOR PREVENTING RUNAWAY INFLATION? TRUE(2), NOT DECIDED(3), UNTRUE(4)
- 1 220. THERE'S VERY LITTLE WE CAN DO TO KEEP PRICES FROM GOING

HIGHER? _____

- 1 221. PERSONS LIKE MYSELF HAVE LITTLE CHANCE OF PROTECTING
OUR PERSONAL INTERESTS WHEN THEY CONFLICT WITH THOSE
OF STRONG PRESSURE GROUPS? _____
- 1 222. I FEEL THAT WE HAVE ADEQUATE WAYS OF COPING WITH
PRESSURE GROUPS? _____
- 1 223. A LASTING WORLD PEACE CAN BE ACHIEVED BY THOSE OF US
WHO WORK TOWARD IT? _____
- 1 224. THERE'S VERY LITTLE WE CAN DO TO BRING ABOUT A
PERMANENT WORLD PEACE? _____
- 1 225. THERE'S VERY LITTLE PERSONS LIKE MYSELF CAN DO TO
IMPROVE WORLD OPINION OF CANADA? _____
- 1 226. I THINK EACH OF US CAN DO A GREAT DEAL TO IMPROVE
WORLD OPINION OF CANADA? _____
- 1 227. THIS WORLD IS RUN BY THE FEW PEOPLE IN POWER, AND THERE
IS NOT MUCH THE LITTLE GUY CAN DO ABOUT IT? _____
- 1 228. THE AVERAGE CITIZEN CAN HAVE AN INFLUENCE ON
GOVERNMENT DECISIONS? _____
- 1 229. IT IS ONLY WISHFUL THINKING TO BELIEVE THAT ONE CAN
REALLY INFLUENCE WHAT HAPPENS TO SOCIETY AT
LARGE? _____
- 1 230. PEOPLE LIKE ME CAN CHANGE THE COURSE OF WORLD EVENTS
IF WE MAKE OURSELVES HEARD? _____
- 1 231. MORE AND MORE, I FEEL HELPLESS IN THE FACE OF WHAT'S
HAPPENING IN THE WORLD TODAY? _____
- 1 232a I SOMETIMES FEEL PERSONALLY TO BLAME FOR THE SAD STATE
OF AFFAIRS IN OUR GOVERNMENT? _____

2 232b Index of powerlessness--see attach

Most Successful Fishers-alpha for 233 to 262 below-20 fields each

- 20 233. NAME: _____
- 20 234. COMMUNITY: _____
- 20 235. NAME: _____
- 20 236. COMMUNITY: _____
- 20 237. NAME: _____
- 20 238. COMMUNITY: _____
- 20 239. NAME: _____
- 20 240. COMMUNITY: _____
- 20 241. NAME: _____
- 20 242. COMMUNITY: _____

Most Respected Fishers

- 20 243. NAME: _____
- 20 244. COMMUNITY: _____

- 20 245. NAME: _____
 20 246. COMMUNITY: _____
 20 247. NAME: _____
 20 248. COMMUNITY: _____
 20 249. NAME: _____
 20 250. COMMUNITY: _____
 20 251. NAME: _____
 20 252. COMMUNITY: _____

Worst Outlaws

- 20 253. NAME: _____
 20 254. COMMUNITY: _____
 20 255. NAME: _____
 20 256. COMMUNITY: _____
 20 257. NAME: _____
 20 258. COMMUNITY: _____
 20 259. NAME: _____
 20 260. COMMUNITY: _____
 20 261. NAME: _____
 20 262. COMMUNITY: _____

No. of Convictions (guilty pleas plus found guilty)/year--86 to 92

- 2 263. IN 1984: ____ SKIP ____
 0 264. IN 1985: ____ SKIP ____
 2 265. IN 1986: _____
 2 266. IN 1987: _____
 2 267. IN 1988: _____
 2 268. IN 1989: _____
 2 269. IN 1990: _____
 2 270. IN 1991: _____
 2 271. IN 1992: _____
 0 272. IN 1993: ____ SKIP ____

Additional Questions Posed to Fishery Officers

273. FEELINGS ABOUT RANGE OF RESP RE CHARGING. _ SKIP ____
 274. WHAT IS Non-compliance? ____ SKIP ____

Seashores index of commitment to organization--note three different scales below

- 1 275. DO YOU FEEL PART OF WORK GROUP? YES(2), MOST WAYS(3),
 SOME WAYS(4), NO(5), DON'T WORK IN GROUP(6)

- 1 276. SAME WORK & PAY --HOW FEEL RE MOVING. WANT VM(2), RATH
MOV(3),NO DIFF(4), RATH STAY(5), WANT STY VM(6), NA(1)
- 1 277. PEOPLE GET ALONG TOGETHER COMPARED. BETTER THAN
MOST(2), SAME AS MOST(3), LESS GOOD THAN MOST(4), NOT
ASCERTAINED(1)
- 1 278. WAY PEOPLE STICK TOGETHER--COMPARED. "
- 1 279. WAY PEOPLE HELP ON JOB-COMPARED. "

Rating of County of Work--apply same codes to 280 to 289a below

- 1 280. EDUCATION GOOD(2), FAIR(3), POOR(4)
- 1 281. HOUSING & PLANNING "
- 1 282. RELIGION "
- 1 283. EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY "
- 1 284. EC. DEVELOPMENT "
- 1 285. CULTURAL OPPTS "
- 1 286. RECREATION "
- 1 287. HEALTH & WELFARE "
- 1 288. GOVERNMENT "
- 1 289a COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS "
- 3 289b INDEX OF QUALITY OF COUNTY OF WORK--GOOD=10 PTS,FAIR=5
PTS,POOR=0 PTS--SUM OF POINTS --OUT OF 100

Social class characteristics

- 5 290. PUBLIC SERVICE CLASSIFICATION--ALPHA NUMERIC
- 0 291. EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT--DUPLICATED--SKIP
- 0 292. HOME OWNERSHIP STATUS--DUPLICATED--SKIP

Hagoel's Friendship Value Scales-- use same codes for 293 to 324a

- 1 293. FRIENDS OUGHT KNOW WHAT ANOTHER DOES MOST OF TIME
VERY STRONGLY AGREE(2), SA(3), A(4), D(5), SD(6), VSD(7)
- 1 294. FRIENDS IMPORTANT, ONE CAN BORROW MONEY FROM THEM
"
- 1 295. UNDERSTANDING OF FRIENDS MORE IMP THAN MATER HELP
- 1 296. FRIENDS OUGHT TO HELP AND SUP IN BAD TIMES
- 1 297. FRIENDS ARE PEOPLE WE FEEL VERY CLOSE TO
- 1 298. I WOULD LIKE FRIENDSHIPS LAST LIFE-TIME
- 1 299. WOULD NEVER MAKE FRIENDS WITH DIF RELIG BELIEFS
- 1 300. FRIENDS OUGHT KNOW ABOUT ONE ANOTHER'S PAST
- 1 301. GOOD FRIENDS DO NOT NECES HAVE TO FEEL CLOSE
- 1 302. I WANT TO FEEL CLOSE TO MY FRIENDS
- 1 303. NOT LIKE MAKE FRIENDS PEOPLE ARE MUCH OLDER

- 1 304. I WANT MY FRIENDS TO FEEL CLOSE TO ME.
 1 305. FRIENDS SHOULD KNOW MUCH ABOUT OTHER'S LIVES
 1 306. SINGLE PEOPLE CANNOT GOOD FRIENDS WITH MARRIED
 1 307. FRIENDS SHOULD SHARE THEIR SECRETS WITH ME.
 1 308. GOOD FRIEND SOMEONE WHO UNDERSTANDS MY PROBLEMS
 1 309. BLACKS AND WHITES NOT MAKE BEST OF FRIENDS
- 1 310. WON'T BE FRIENDS WITH WHO DON'T RETURN FAVOURS
 1 311. CLOSE FRIENDS SHOULD BE SAME RELIGIOUS BELIEF
 1 312. FRIENDSHIPS EXIST NOW, NO REF TO PAST OR FUTURE
 1 313. NOT FRIENDS WITH DIFFERENT POLITICAL VIEWS
 1 314. GOOD FRIEND PROVIDE ADVICE WHEN NEED IT
 1 315. A MAN AND A WOMAN CAN BE GOOD FRIENDS
 1 316. IMP THING ABOUT FRIENDS THEY RELAX OTHER'S COMP
 1 317. WHETHER OR NOT A FRIEND IS MARRIED IS UNIMP
 1 318. FRIENDS IMP CAUSE OF "CONNECTIONS" PROVIDE
 1 319. WOULD NOT LIKE FRIENDS WITH MUCH YOUNGER
 1 320. FRIENDS HAVE CLEAR IDEA OF OTHER'S PLANS
 1 321. GOOD FRIENDS SHLD HOLD SAME POLITICAL VIEWS
 1 322. BLACKS AND WHITES SHOULD NOT BE FRIENDS
 1 323. GOOD FRIENDS CAN BE DIFF ETHNIC (NAT) BACKGROUNDS
 1 324a I EXPECT FRIENDS TO RET THE FAVOURS "
 22 324b 11 INDEXES OF FRIENDSHIP AT 2 FIELDS EACH--SEE ATTACH

Ohio--skip from 325 to 338

- 0 325. INSPECTION OF THE ORGANIZATION. _____ SKIP _____
 0 326. INVESTIGATION AND RESEARCH. _____
 0 327. PLANNING. _____
 0 328. PREPARATION OF PROCEDURES AND METHODS. _____
 0 329. COORDINATION. _____
 0 330. EVALUATION. _____
 0 331. INTERPRETATION OF PLANS AND PROCEDURES _____
 0 332. SUPERVISION OF TECHNICAL OPERATIONS. _____
 0 333. PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES. _____
 0 334. PUBLIC RELATIONS. _____
 0 335. PROFESSIONAL CONSULTATION. _____
 0 336. NEGOTIATIONS. _____
 0 337. SCHEDULING, ROUTING AND DISPATCHING . _____
 0 338. TECHNICAL AND PROFESSIONAL OPERATIONS _____

For the following (354 to 442) use the scale shown below--except for the "b" items which appear at the end of each group of questions--see attach for these--all excepts the Indexes have 1 field--the indexes (the "b") items, have 2 fields.

Schuessler's scales**Doubts about self-determination**

- 1 354. THERE ARE FEW PEOPLE YOU CAN TRUST, GET RIGHT TO IT
TRUE(2), NOT DECIDED(3), FALSE(4)
- 1 355. WHAT HAPPENS LIFE IS LARGELY A MATTER OF CHANCE "
- 1 356. IF ODDS AGAINST YOU, IMPOSSIBLE COME OUT ON TOP ____
- 1 357. LITTLE INFLUENCE OVER THINGS THAT HAPPEN TO ME ____
- 1 358. FEEL HAVE LITTLE CONTROL OVER DIRECT MY LIFE ____
- 1 359. NOWADAYS HAS TO LIVE TODAY, LET TOMORROW CARE OF IT ____
- 1 360. I'VE HAD MORE THAN MY SHARE OF TROUBLES ____
- 1 361. FOR ME ONE DAY IS NO DIFFERENT FROM ANOTHER ____
- 1 362. THE WORLD IS TOO COMPLICATED FOR ME TO UNDERSTAND ____
- 1 363. I REGRET HAVING MISSED SO MANY CHANCES IN THE PAST ____
- 1 364. IT'S UNFAIR CHILDREN INTO WORLD WAY THINGS LOOK ____
- 1 365. FUTURE UNCERTAIN FOR A PERSON TO PLAN AHEAD ____
- 1 366. I FIND DIFF BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT ANYTHING NOWADAYS ____
- 1 367a NO RT OR WRG WAYS MAKE MONEY, ONLY EASY AND HARD ____
- 2 367b DOUBTS OF SELF-DETERMINATION--SEE ATTACH

Doubt about trustworthiness of people

- 1 368. HARD TO FIGURE OUT WHO CAN TRUST THESE DAYS ____
- 1 369. FEW PEOPLE YOU CAN TRUST, WHEN DOWN TO IT ____
- 1 370. MOST PEOPLE CAN BE TRUSTED ____
- 1 371. STRANGERS CAN GENERALLY BE TRUSTED ____
- 1 372. MOST ARE FAIR IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH OTHERS ____
- 1 373. MOST DON'T CARE WHAT HAPPENS TO THE NEXT FELLOW ____
- 1 374. TOO MANY ARE OUT FOR SELVES, DON'T CARE FOR ANYONE ____
- 1 375a MANY ARE FRIENDLY CAUSE THEY WANT SOMETHING ____
- 2 375b DOUBT OF TRUSTWORTHINESS OF PEOPLE--SEE ATTACH

Feeling down

- 1 376. I FEEL THAT I'M NOT A PART OF THINGS ____
- 1 377. I FEEL SOMEWHAT APART EVEN AMONG FRIENDS ____
- 1 378. I SOMETIMES FEEL FORGOTTEN BY FRIENDS ____
- 1 379. AT TIMES I FEEL THAT I AM A STRANGER TO MYSELF ____
- 1 380. CAN'T HELP FEELING MY LIFE IS NOT VERY USEFUL ____
- 1 381. VERY LONELY OR REMOTE FROM OTHER PEOPLE ____
- 1 382. DEPRESSED OR VERY UNHAPPY ____
- 1 383. BORED. ____
- 1 384. SO RESTLESS YOU COULDN'T SIT LONG IN A CHAIR ____
- 1 385a VAGUELY UNEASY ABOUT SOMETHING WITHOUT KNOWING
WHY ____
- 2 385b INDEX OF FEELING DOWN--SEE ATTACH

Skip

Faith in citizen involvement

- 0 386. PUBLIC HAS LITTLE CONTROL OVER POLITICIANS DO ____
 0 387. AVERAGE PERSON GET NOWHERE TALKING PUBLIC OFFICIALS ____
 0 388. AVERAGE CITIZEN HAS INFLUENCE ON POLITICS ____
 0 389. AVERAGE PERS HAS MUCH SAY RUNNING LOCAL GOVT ____
 0 390. PEOPLE LIKE ME HAVE MUCH TO SAY ABOUT GOVERNMENT ____
 0 391. AVERAGE PERS HAS GREAT INFLUENCE ON GOVERNMENT ____
 0 392. GOVERNMENT IS GEN RESPONSIVE TO PUBLIC OPINION ____
 0 393. I AM USUALLY INTERESTED IN LOCAL ELECTIONS ____
 0 394. ACTIVE POL AND SOC AFFAIRS, PEOP CONTR WORLD EVENTS ____
 0 395a TAK EVERYTHING, WORLD IS GETTING BETTER ____
 0 395b INDEX OF FAITH IN CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT--SEE ATTACH

Feeling up

- 1 396. SOMETIMES I HAVE LITTLE CONTROL OVER DIRECTION LIFE ____
 1 397. WHEN MAKE PLANS, CERTAIN I CAN MAKE THEM WORK ____
 1 398. I WAS HAPPIER AS A CHILD THAN I AM NOW ____
 1 399. I COULDN'T BE MUCH HAPPIER ____
 1 400. I GET A LOT OF FUN OUT OF LIFE ____
 1 401. SATISFIED WITH THINGS ARE WORKING FOR ME ____
 1 402. THE FUTURE LOOKS VERY BRIGHT TO ME ____
 1 403. THINGS GET BETTER FOR ME AS I GET OLDER ____
 1 404. I HAVE A GREAT DEAL IN COMMON WITH MOST PEOPLE ____
 1 405. I SEEM TO ME MARKING TIME THESE DAYS ____
 1 406a THERE IS MUCH PURPOSE TO I AM DOING AT PRESENT ____
 2 406b INDEX OF FEELING UP--SEE ATTACH

People cynicism

- 1 407. WHERE EVERYONE OUT FOR SELF, DISTRUST ONE ANOTHER ____
 1 408. MOST PEOPLE KNOW WHAT TO DO WITH THEIR LIVES ____
 1 409. PEOPLE ARE JUST OUT FOR SELVES DON'T CARE ELSE ____
 1 410. MANY ARE LONELY AND UNRELATED TO FELLOW BEINGS ____
 1 411. MANY ARE FRIENDLY CAUSE THEY WANT SOMETHING ____
 1 412a MANY PEOPLE DON'T KNOW WHAT TO DO WITH THEIR LIVES ____
 2 412b INDEX OF PEOPLE CYNICISM--SEE ATTACH

Disillusionment with govt

- 1 413. MOST SUPERMARKETS ARE HONESTLY RUN ____
 1 414. WE ARE LOSING OUR FREEDOM TO THE GOVERNMENT ____
 1 415. POLITICIANS INTERESTED IN SELVES THAN PUBLIC ____
 1 416. HAVE LITTLE CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT TODAY ____
 1 417. THE GOVERNMENT IS RUN BY A FEW PEOPLE IN POWER ____
 1 418. LITTLE USE WRITING TO PUB OFFICIALS RE PROBLEMS MAN ____
 1 419. PUBLIC OFFIC WORK FOR PEOPLE NOT FOR THEMSELVES ____
 1 420. OUR LOCAL GOVT COSTS TAXPAYER MORE THAN IT WORTH ____

- 455. DEFINITION OF WORK AND INDIVIDUAL ACHIEVEMENT ____
- 456. CIVIC PARTICIPATION AND VOLUNTARY ACTIVITY ____
- 457. DEFIN OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY ____
- 458. STANDARDS OF HONESTY & INTEGRITY OF GOVT OFFIC'S ____
- 459. POL INFL OF FOREIGN ENTERPRISE ON HOST GOVERNMENT ____
- 460. ENCOURAGEMENT OF FOREIGN ENTERPRISE. ____
- 461. DEGREE OF NEPOTISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL LIFE ____

- 462. DEGREE OF EXPECTED RECIPROCITY IN FAVOURS AND REWARDS ____

Appendix B: Connections Between Major Variables And Empirical and other Sources of Information

Independent Variables

Fixed gear fisher. Any fisher using gear that is fixed in the water and retrieved later. (12d).

Mobile gear fisher. Those fishing with gear which that is towed through the water, such as Otter trawlers, purse seiners.(12d).

Mixed fisher. Those who self-identify as users of fixed and mobile gear. (12d).

Other DFO clients. Includes processing plant staff and owners, and other community members with an interest in the industry.(12b).

DFO clients. All the above. (12a)

Fishery officer. DFO employee designated as fishery officer, who is neither a field supervisor nor a fishery officer manager. Includes offshore officers. (12c)

Enforcement manager. DFO employee in enforcement sector other than fishery officers and administrative staff.(12c)

Geographic Location

West coast Newfoundland area. For the purposes of this study it is from Corner Brook to Eddies Cove East on the Great Northern Peninsula.

West coast Newfoundland community clusters. Plum Point, Port au Choix, Cow Head, and Deer Lake. Clusters identified by DFO and union officials and linked to the territory covered by sub-district officers and offices.

Scotia-Fundy regional DFO headquarters. Halifax.

SW Nova Scotia area. For the purpose of this study the relevant counties are Shelburne and Yarmouth counties.

SW Nova Scotia Community Clusters. Shelburne county has three. They are Lockeport, Shelburne town, and Barrington. It is made up of the territory covered by fishery officers who work out of those offices. Yarmouth County has three clusters made up of the Pubnicos, Wedgeport, and the remaining Yarmouth communities. Based on the assignment of officers to these areas and on the finding that "the remaining" Yarmouth communities shared a sense of not being a part of any larger cluster.

DFO headquarters. Ottawa.

Socio-cultural Context Variables

West coast Newfoundland. Background studies, field notes, dimensions of community life (78-98), political activism(88-98), trust, activism and family scales(134-173), doubts about self-determination (354-376), trustworthiness of people(368-375), feeling down(376-385), faith in citizen involvement(386-395), feeling up(396-406), people cynicism(407-412b), disillusionment with government (413-425), future outlook(422-433), feeling demoralized (434-442b), Millers scales (443-462)

SW. Nova Scotia. Same as above.

West coast Newfoundland community clusters. Field notes on perceptions of styles of fishery

officers and on Union approach and reasons for grouping communities into three clusters for their purposes, as well as DFO Corner Brook and local officer perceptions of the distinct differences in the territory they are supposed to cover. See also all of the questions on how DFO functions in these areas (34-77). In addition see all the questions that address the organization of DFO in terms of its use of power within the organization to control its staff: organizational climate of decision-making(99-113b), occupational scale(174-182b), stress (198-203b), organizational stress (204-218b), Seashore's index of commitment to organization(275-279).

Shelburne and Yarmouth counties and their clusters. Same as above.

DFO headquarters. As above, plus organizational climate of decision making(99-113b), occupational scale(174-182b), stress(198-203b), organizational stress(204-218b), Seashore's index of commitment to organizations(275-279).

Other Socio-cultural Factors

Attitudes toward success as a key value or goal. What does success mean to you?(47)? What is the main thing you do to be more successful(48)?

Perception of blocks to goal achievement. What are the things preventing you from being more successful(50a)? Source of block(50c and 50d)?. Relation of block to DFO(50e)?

Attitudes and perceptions of strains between values and means to achieve them. Political alienation(183-192), stress(198-203b), organizational stress (204-218b), alienation (219-232b--powerlessness), all Scheussler's scales (354-442b).

Perception of legitimacy of DFO:

Normative. Questions on violations (34-46), What counts as a violation?, what do you think of persuasive approach of DFO (51&52)? Of the advisory process(53&54)?.

Remunerative. What do you think of the ways DFO allocates fish(55&56)?

Coercive. What do you think of the emphasis on catching fishers cheating(57,58,and 59)?

Perception of DFOs bureaucratic type(punishment-centred, representative, or mock). Who makes rules(64) Are they fair(65)? Who is hurt by enforcement(66)? Why break rules(67)? Status of rule observers/breakers(68&69)? Plus 69b and 69c.

Perception of coercive approach. (70-77). What image do fishery officers create? Equal treatment for all? How treat fishers? Charge equally? Concerns of officers over political interference? What is needed to gain the respect of fishers.

Attitudes to community-based policing. Can DFO and fishers work together to solve enforcement problems? Partnerships? Changes you would want,(60 to 63), plus how can fishery officer earn your respect(77)?

Age at time of interview.(2).

Education.(32).

Home ownership status.(33)

Marital status. No consistent data collected on this subject but observation was that over ninety percent of officials and clients were married.

Dependent Variables

Perceptions of non-compliance. Views of fishery officers and fishers and other community members recorded in field notes; secondary sources of data estimating non-compliance(eg. Furlong's studies), other sources such as newspapers.

Numerical indicators of non-compliance. DFO data on number of fisheries charges (1992) in Western Newfoundland by category of charges; no of fisheries charges that resulted in guilty pleas or in guilty verdicts in Nova Scotia, Shelburne County and Yarmouth county, (1986-1992).

Perceptions of compliance with organization. Range of scores regarding violations between and among groups of fishery officers, (34-46). What is main strategy to improve success(49)? What does success mean to you(47)? Blocks in their way(50a to 50e)? Perceptions of role of fishery officer stopping non-compliance(57-59)? What kind of change is needed in way DFO relates to fishers on enforcement issues(63)? All questions on policing style(70-77): image projected by fishery officers, equal treatment, how treat fishers, charge equally, what do fishery officers care about?

Attitudes to Community-Based Policing

Questions on community policing, working together, partnerships, changes needed(60-63).

Appendix C: Reactions of Participants to Interviews

There were some differences in the reactions of the respondents to the research. Halifax regional headquarters personnel seemed to be extremely cooperative, although in one case the individual flatly refused and then later changed his mind, apologized, and emphasized how stressed he was because of Regional-Headquarters enforcement related interactions. Most expressed the feeling that the crisis required an immediate solution, and anything, including community-based policing, was worth examining for its potential to remove organizational constraints to effective action.

The researcher had piloted his approach with a few S.W. Nova Scotia officers (as well as ex-fishery officers in the Ottawa Headquarters) in the early fall and returned later in November to carry out participant observation and interview the officers. As with the Newfoundland officers, the officers met as a group and each filled out his answers to the closed-ended questions. The researcher then spent time with a selected number of fishery officers prior to the interviews. The interviews with Yarmouth officers took place by appointment at the Yarmouth Area office. Each interview took from two to three hours and began with the researcher giving them some feedback on their own and their group's collective responses to the survey questions. The interviewer set up appointments with the Shelburne county officers in a similar way, but the interviews took place at the Barrington Passage office. In each Nova Scotia site, the officers worked in a buddy system, or in a combination of a buddy system and a strong face to face linkage with their field supervisor at a local office. They did not operate in physical isolation from their field supervisor, unlike fishery officers in the Newfoundland location.

There were expressions of discomfort about the research from some individuals in both Nova Scotia counties. Although one or two of the Shelburne county officers were reluctant at first to confide in the researcher, and were suspicious of his purposes (fearing personnel cuts), it did not appear to result in any obvious withholding of information. At the group meeting with Yarmouth county Fishery Officers, the discussions at times seemed more like they were rebelling than cooperating, but they excused themselves by stating that they had been "shafted by similar research before". Perhaps the subtle resistances they showed were expressions of local cultural norms. Many said that the same contrast in openness was true of fishers in the two different counties. Shelburne fishers are apparently more open, while Yarmouth fishers are generally more closed.

After finishing his interviews with fishery officers in Nova Scotia in late December, the researcher returned to Ottawa. He completed the interviews with Ottawa headquarters enforcement personnel. In February, 1994, he completed the interviews with Halifax headquarters personnel, and discussed some of the results of the SW Nova Scotia, and Ottawa interviews. Later that month, he was sent to Newfoundland, where he remained until the end of March, working with union coordinators, doing participant observation of fishery officers, and carrying out interviews with fishers and fishery officers.

At the field level, the introduction of researcher to respondents was different in Newfoundland from S.W. Nova Scotia. In the case of fishers, this was because the researcher worked closely with the Newfoundland fisher's representatives on a client-led initiative, "Ocean Watch", before he began interviewing the fishers. By the time interviews were in full

swing, most of the fishers he interviewed had either met him at community meetings, or knew of him and the research from discussions with fellow fisher representatives or other fishers.

The identification of fisher leaders in Newfoundland started with the fisher-chairs of the union fishing committees for each community (or sub-group of communities), as defined by the union, and was extended to other (some non-union) leaders, as defined by those who were interviewed using this snowballing interview technique. Everyone was cooperative. No one refused the interview. Some found some of the closed-ended questions too abstract in spite of the revision of some of them into less technical language, based on input from some of the fishers who were also union officials. This pattern occurred in Nova Scotia but less frequently.

The researcher met all West Coast Newfoundland fishery officers at an initial meeting in Corner Brook, Newfoundland, where they completed the detailed surveys (the closed ended questions were not read to the officers), and it was not until two or three weeks later that he began to spend time with them and completed in-depth interviews on the open-ended questions. In contrast to the way fishery officers were interviewed in Nova Scotia, Newfoundland Fishery Officers were interviewed on their own "turf". The researcher met with each of them at their local office, where unlike in S.W. Nova Scotia, each was the only officer in that office at that time of the year. They each gave him a guided tour and overview of their territory. Each officer outlined his main problems with respect to each fishery, and the internal organizational obstacles, as they perceived them. This occurred prior to the more in-depth interviews.

In May, he returned to Nova Scotia where he remained until July, interviewing Nova Scotia fishers in the two counties. The interviews began with positional leaders (members of fisher advisory committees to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and moved to reputational leaders they identified. In Shelburne county, the interviews were facilitated by the support he received from leaders of fixed gear fishers. Their obvious explicit public endorsement of the research caused many respondents to offer the researcher as much of their time as he needed. Although fisher respondents in Yarmouth county were also cooperative, it was only in the Pubnico cluster, where the mobile gear sector is strong, that a form of endorsement was provided. This is possibly because leadership is scattered among numerous individuals in the other fishing communities. In effect, there did not appear to be an obvious fisher leadership among fixed gear fishers north of Arcadia in Yarmouth county, whose endorsement would have been very helpful beyond its own community borders.

Several attempts at arranging interviews with key ground fish mobile gear sector fishers in the Yarmouth cluster failed. They were always "out fishing". These individuals were considered some of the most influential with respect to the department by officials and fishers.

Appendix D: An Emerging View of An Improved Organization

Since the field work for this study was completed, Minister Tobin's initiatives regarding the foreign fisheries seem to indicate his intention to lead the organization in a different direction from his predecessors. He captured the attention and support of Canadians by launching the department's offshore enforcement capability against the Spanish. At the same time, he appears to be winning his appeal to other nations for the goal of more orderly fisheries. In that offshore and international fisheries enforcement context, he appears to be leading the department's enforcement capability down the coercive path.

This study is focused on domestic and coastal fishing concerns. In this context, Minister Tobin appears to be leading the organization down the normative path, although it is not clear exactly where he stands on each of the dimensions of organization structure. In his speech to the St. John's Board of Trade on October 11, 1995, he stated there are three fundamental problems which must be dealt with in order to rebuild the resource. Overcapacity of the industry has to be balanced with the capacity of the resource, and industry's capacity will be reduced. Second, government can no longer alleviate low and unstable incomes of fishers and plant employees. Third, he wants to focus the core mandate of the department on effective management of the resource itself. He states:

"I've come to the conclusion after two years on the job that the one thing we may be able to do well, if we focus hard, we may be able to manage effectively,--because that's our core mandate--the resource. But it's insanity for a Minister of Fisheries to believe that he can micro-manage, or for the department to believe that we can micro-manage fishing fleets, fishing sectors; that we can micro-manage fish plants. For too long the currency of a Minister of Fisheries, the only currency that he had to spend was fish. That day has to be over. We can't manage regional expectations. We can't manage fish plants or the expectations of bankers, and we can't manage, and we have to acknowledge it--the individual enterprises of fishermen. What we can manage if we do it well is the resource itself (p.7)"

He identifies six principles for reforming fisheries management:

"One, conservation comes first; Two, industry capacity must be balanced with resource capacity; Three, the fishery must be prosecuted by professionals; Four, access to the resource should be through multi licensed enterprises while recognizing the reality of certain specialized fleets; Five, Government and industry must operate in partnership and I mean real partnership with legally binding contracts signed between both parties; and Six, aboriginal rights must be respected (p9)."

In articulating these principles, he identifies conservation as an order goal and as the primary goal. However, he also identifies the goals of making fishers more "professional" and forming partnerships with fishers; these seem more like normative goals. He emphasizes balancing resource capacity and industry capacity, taking aboriginal rights into account, and multi-licensed enterprises and specialized fleets. These appear to be economic and legal

goals.

It is not clear what type of compliance structure he intends the organization to use to achieve any of these goals, although he removes the use of "fish as currency" from the options for motivating compliance to the organization goals. In this fiscal climate other remunerative options appear unlikely. This seems to suggest the compliance structure would be either normative or coercive. Although he praises its coercive enforcement activities, since taking the lead in this Department, its enforcement sector's budget has been reduced.

When based on normative principles and not forced alliances, "partnerships" may represent the form of the compliance structure he wants to achieve, but this is not clear from his speech. In specifying that the working arrangements will be partnerships between government and industry, he implies they will be based on structures of legal rational agreements of reciprocal rights and obligations. This suggests law enforcement in its bureaucratic rational legal, if not coercive, form.

He does not specifically address the question of the type of commitment the organization will aim to engender among its lower participants. He may be thinking of commitment based on moral or calculative involvement with the organization. However, budgets are decreasing, thus shrinking the basis for the organization to deliver any form of compliance, including moral commitment. Given alienated lower participants, our theory suggests that the application of charisma by itself is unlikely to engender moral commitment among lower participants, particularly when the organization has mixed goals, some of which oblige some lower participants to restrain themselves while other lower participants are not similarly restrained. Furthermore, the reinforcement schedule for those who comply, in whatever currency it is delivered, is unpredictable. Finally, the whole system is impossible to enforce on coercive grounds.

It seems as though the organization is not yet directly facing its contradictions and the problems of effectiveness which result when it pursues multiple goals, using mixed structures of compliance, with lower participants who are alienated from the organization. Perhaps this failure to face these issues has continued to characterize this organization's management for so long, because they do not understand how the organization's inappropriate structures force the organization to fail at its objectives.

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Appendix E1: Officers and Managers

1.1 Level of ambition and adaptive strategy

Level of ambition was determined from responses to questions designed to find out how each respondent personally defined the meaning of success at work. Those responses are organized into two categories: "drivers" express views that indicate an interest in excelling such as the desire to be "at the top", make a "good" living, or get the recognition and respect they believe they deserve from their peers, or obtaining a sense of accomplishment from work; "survivors" express less ambitious views such as being satisfied if they survive, or "just get by", or "putting in the day", its pensionable time, or satisfying their bosses demands. The term "driver" is borrowed from its common usage among South West Nova Scotia fishers where the term describes extremely ambitious fishers. "Survivors" is used to describe those who seem to persist but whose work does not usually excel.

Adaptive strategy is derived from answers obtained to questions about what respondent's do to try to improve on their levels of success. These responses are organized according to their rejection or acceptance of mainstream goals and/or their institutionally legitimated means. Although categories of responses are identified that could be termed "retreat", "rebel", and "other", there were too few of each for numerical analysis. Two strategies emerge with sufficient frequency to permit consistent quantitative analyses. Conformists attempt to improve their success while accepting existing success goals and means to achieve those valued ends. Innovators accept prevailing definitions of success, but reject or modify the range of legitimate means available to achieve success. Examples of conformist responses include working harder, trying to minimize costs and being more efficient, or carrying out traditional enforcement practices. Innovators give responses such as using new technology, doing trial experiments with new approaches such as community relations, and, bending the laws so they make sense.

Table E1: Number and Percent of Fishery Officers and Managers and Total by Level of Ambition.

TIER	DRIVERS		SURVIVORS		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
FO	13	43.3	17	56.7	30	53.6
FOM	18	69.2	8	30.8	26	46.4
TOTAL	31	55.4	25	44.6	56	100.0

Table E2 below shows that managers tend to be somewhat more innovating than fishery officers: 60% of the fishery officers are conformists and only 23.3% are innovators, while 46.2% of the managers are conformists and nearly as large a percentage are innovators at 42.3%.

Table E2: Number and Percent of Fishery Officers, Managers, and Total by Type of Adaptive Strategy

TIER	CONFORM		INNOVATE		OTHER*		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
FO	18	60.0	7	23.3	5	16.6	30	53.6
FOM	12	46.2	11	42.3	3	11.5	26	46.4
TOTAL	30	53.6	18	32.1	8	14.3	56	100

While managers strategies are relatively less conformist than fishery officers, almost one-half of the managers choose to improve their success within the organization by conforming, and almost one-third define success in terms of surviving rather than driving their way to success.

Table E3 below shows that among the less ambitious respondents (the survivors), conformity is the strategy chosen by 70.6% of the fishery officers and 62.5% of their managers.

Table E3: Percent of Fishery Officer and Manager Drivers and Survivors By Type of Adaptive Strategy

TYPE OF ADAPTATION	FISHERY OFFICER		MANAGER	
	DRIVERS	SURVIVORS	DRIVERS	SURVIVORS
CONFORM	46.2	70.6	38.9	62.5
INNOVATE	38.5	11.8	44.4	37.5
OTHER ¹⁰⁸	15.4	17.6	16.7	0.0
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Even among more ambitious fishery officers a larger percentage conform (46.2%) rather than innovate (38.5). Among managers, those who are more ambitious tend only slightly more often to be innovators (44.4%) than conformists (38.9%). Many ambitious managers are conformists. Three managers out of 26 are reformer/rebels. Note that although 38.5% of the fishery officers who are drivers are also innovators and 44.4% of the managers who are drivers are also innovators, as a percentage of the total number of officers and

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¹⁰⁸Fishery officer others = 4 with a retreat strategy and 1 "other"; manager others = 3 reformers/rebels.

managers in each tier, only 16.7% of fishery officers or 5 out of 30, and 30.8% of managers or 8 out of 26, are driver-innovators. The organization appears to provide a small amount of room for visibly ambitious and innovative individuals.

1.2 Formalization and rule observance

"Formalization", or the way the organization deals with rules, is measured in two ways by this study: the degree of work standardization as measured by the "Hage and Aiken Formalization Inventory" (Miller:1991), and the latitude within the organization for behaviour that deviates from standards, or the "rule observation" scale in that same inventory. The work standardization questions ask respondents to say how accurate are statements about their jobs such as: "How things are done around here is left pretty much up to the person doing the work". The rule leniency or rule observation scale asks respondents for their opinion of the accuracy of these statements: "the employees are constantly being checked on for rule violations", and "people here feel as though they are constantly being watched to see they obey the rules". Previous research has found that the higher the degree of formalization, the greater the likelihood of alienation from work. Extreme rule observance scores are strongly associated with dissatisfaction with work.

Both tiers perceive their jobs as regimented. Fishery officers perceive their jobs as more regimented (mean = 3.93, n = 29), than managers (mean = 3.78, N = 20), on a scale where 2 is lowest job regimentation and 5 is highest. The mean for all respondents (including clients) who answered this question was lower than either DFO group (mean = 3.64, n = 100). Consequently, DFO employees in either tier feel more regimented than their clients. Level of ambition does not affect the perceptions of the fishery officers, but managers who are drivers perceive themselves to have less codified jobs than managers who are survivors. Adaptive strategy does not affect either managers or fishery officers perceptions of the degree of regimentation in their jobs.

Fishery officers perceive themselves to be more constantly watched for their compliance with the organization's rules (mean = 4.2, n = 29), than managers (mean = 4.42, n = 20), but given the scores they have on this scale (a mean of 2 is high rule observance, a mean of 5 is low), neither tier appears to feel constantly watched to make sure they obey the rules of the organization.

1.3 The job-related tension index

The job-related tension index provides additional information of a numerical nature on the type and perceived tensions which may be attributable to formalization. Delbert Miller (1991: 412) states that "...the index purports to measure the amount of tension expressed by an individual as a result of his or her job." He notes that tests of the index's reliability and validity were carried out successfully, and suggests that its best attribute may be its ability to diagnose major tension areas. This study uses the index as a diagnostic tool.

Respondents were asked to say how much they are bothered by each of fifteen statements about different kinds of conflict situations in the workplace. There are five possible responses, but for analytical purposes these were later grouped into three categories: never or rarely bothered, sometimes bothered, and rather often or nearly always bothered.

The category that is of particular interest below is the extreme response of "rather often or nearly always bothered", since it could signify a serious problem when a significant proportion of the respondents choose that response. It could be argued that it is normal for people to be "sometimes bothered" by these types of conflicts. Since we are not concerned about conflicts which are never or rarely a problem, our analysis is focused on the number and percentages of officers and managers who choose the rather often or nearly always bothered response. The "cut-off" required at least 20% of either tier to have given this extreme response. Nine of the fifteen issues met these criteria. Table E4 below describes the serious issues and the number and percent of officers and managers who indicated each issue was "rather often or nearly always" troubling.

Table E4: Number and Percent of Officers and Managers by Serious Issues Identified

DESCRIPTION OF ISSUES	OFFICER, N = 31		MANAGER, N = 20	
	freq	%	freq	%
Jobs scope & responsibilities unclear	5	16.1	5	25
No promotion opportunities	8	25.8	6	30
Can't finish workload in normal day	10	32.8	11	55
Can't satisfy conflicting demands	3	9.7	6	30
Can't get information needed for job	10	32.3	3*	15.8
Don't know what co-workers expect	1	3.2	4	20
Amount of work interferes with quality	8	25.8	6	30
Feel must do things against better judgement	8	25.8	1	5
Feel job interferes with family life	6	19.4	4 ¹⁰⁹	21.1

The job-related tension index analysis in table E4 confirms the findings from the unstructured parts of the interviews. In addition it shows that managers are stressed by more tension areas than officers: in only two of the 9 items did managers have less tension (as measured by these criteria) than officers: 15.8% of the managers versus 32.3% of the fishery officers say that they are rather often or nearly always bothered by being unable to obtain the information they need to carry out their jobs; and, only 5% of the managers compared to 25.8% of the fishery officers are this often bothered by feeling they have to do things against their better judgement.

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¹⁰⁹Only 19 managers answered this question.

Although managers were always proportionately more troubled by the other areas, on four of the items in the job related tension index, a significant percentage of managers and officers agree that the issues are serious. Thirty percent of the managers, and 25.8% of the fishery officers are rather often or nearly always troubled by lack of promotion opportunities. And the same percentages of managers and officers feel this often that the amount of work may interfere with how well it gets done. Fully 55% of the managers and 32.8% of the fishery officers feel, rather often or nearly always, that the workload is too heavy and can't possibly be finished in an ordinary working day. Almost equal percentages of officers (21.1%) and managers (19.4%) feel rather often or nearly always that the job interferes with aspects of their lives devoted to their families.

There are nine serious areas of tension in the organization, and a larger percentage of managers than officers are troubled rather often or nearly all of the time by all but one of them. The most serious issue is workload pressure: 55% of managers and 32.8% of officers are troubled by this rather often or nearly all of the time. In addition, large percentages of fishery officers feel that they can't get the information they need to do their jobs, that the kinds of things which they are told to do are rather often or nearly always against their better judgement, and that they do not see any possibilities of being rewarded for doing a good job. Significant percentages of managers feel they can't satisfy the conflicting demands of people over them, that they are overwhelmed by the volume of the work they have to do, that they are not sure what the scope and responsibilities of their jobs are, and that there are no rewards for success.

1.4 Commitment to their work groups

Seashore's Group Cohesiveness Index was used to provide numerical information about degree of attraction to the group or resistance to leaving (Miller:1991,375) describes the test as consisting:

"...of three questions: "Do you feel that you are really a part of your work group?" If you had a chance to do the same kind of work for the same pay, in another work group, how would you feel about moving?" and "How does your work group compare with other work groups [at Midwest --deleted in this study] on each of the following points?" -"the way people get along together, the way people stick together, and the way people help each other on the job."

A larger percentage of officers than managers feel excluded from their work groups, but a majority of each tier feels included in at least some ways. When asked whether they feel they are a part of their work group, 70% of managers but only 56.7% of fishery officers feel they are either really a part of their work group, or feel included in most ways. One manager feels he is not at all included, but only twenty-five percent feel they are included in some ways but not others, while 43.3% of the fishery officers feel included in some ways but not in others.

Large majorities of officers and managers do not want to leave and do the same work for the same pay in another work group in another location. That is, 70% of officers and 70.6% of managers say they would rather stay where they are, or would very much want to

stay where they are. Moving or not moving makes no difference to only 16.7% of officers, and 17.6% of managers; and even fewer officers (13.3%) and managers (11.8%) would rather move than stay, or would want very much to move. Most managers and officers are committed in the sense of feeling a part of their work groups and wanting to stay.

Fishery officers tend to think their work group is better than most in terms of the way people get along, the way they stick together, and the way they help one another on the job. In contrast, managers typically think their work group is about the same as other work groups in these respects. That is, 69.2% of the officers say people get along in their work group better than most but not one manager feels that way. And, 81.8% of the fishery officers think people stick together better in their work group than in others but only 14.3% of managers feel this way. Finally, 61.5% of officers say their work group is better than most with respect to the way people help one another on the job but only 11.1% of managers say this.

Officers are clearly committed to their work units but they have some tendency to feel excluded from the enforcement sector as a whole. It is harder to understand manager views. On the one hand, managers say they feel included in their work groups and they want to stay in their jobs. On the other hand, they do not think their work groups are any better than elsewhere.

The most committed managers are the youngest and the oldest: 100% of the youngest want to stay and 100% of them feel they are a part of their work group. The oldest managers also feel more included than the middle age group of managers, but only 40% of the oldest group of managers want to stay where they are located. A larger percentage of better educated managers (75%) feel part of their work unit than less well educated (57.1%). A larger percentage of survivor managers than drivers feel a part of their work group: 80% of survivor managers compared to 66.7% of driver managers. Finally, a larger percentage of conformist than innovative managers feel a part of their work group and want to stay. A "profile" of a more committed manager is one who is either young or old but not middle age, more highly educated, more likely to aim for mediocrity than excellence, and with a tendency to conform rather than innovate.

Age does not affect fishery officer's feelings of inclusion, but it does affect their feelings about staying. The older they are, the more they want to stay where they are: 64.3% of the youngest group wants to stay where they are compared to 80% of the oldest group. Education and level of ambition have only slight effects on fishery officer feelings of inclusion or on their feelings about staying. Their choice of adaptive strategy seems to be most closely related to their feelings of inclusion and wanting to stay: 85.7% of the innovative fishery officers compared to 66.7% of the conformists want to stay, and a similar though weaker result occurs for feelings of inclusion. A profile of "the more committed fishery officer" is one who is more innovative than conforming in behaviour, and who may be of any age (although older ones are more likely to want to stay in their present locations), and of any education or level of ambition.

Despite their dissatisfactions, most DFO respondents are committed in some respects to their work groups. Officers express a strong commitment to their work unit and a less stronger attachment to the sector, while managers express more commitment to the sector and less to their work groups.

1.5 Obstacles to success

All respondents were asked to describe the biggest obstacle they face in improving their success. Table E5 below shows that all officers and all but one manager say their biggest obstacle is DFO, or some aspect of DFO combined with another factor.

Table E5: Number, Percent of Officers and Managers, and Totals, By Main Obstacle to Success

DESCRIPTION OF OBSTACLE	OFFICERS		MANAGERS		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
TOO MANY FISHERS	0	0	1	4.0	1	1.9
NEED MORE RESOURCES	5	18.5	4	16.0	9	17.3
DFO IS BARRIER	12	44.4	18	72.0	30	57.7
DFO PLUS FISHERS	5	18.5	1	4.0	6	11.5
POLITICS	4	14.8	0	0	4	7.7
STANDARDS NOT APPLIED UNIFORMLY	0	0	1	4.0	1	1.9
BETTER INFORMATION COMMUNICATED	1	3.7	0	0	1	1.9

Respondents who described some aspect of DFO as the block were asked to specify which part of DFO blocks their attempts to be more successful. Table E6 below shows the categories of response and the percentage of officers and managers in each category.

Table E6: Number, Percent, and Total of Officers and Managers by Part of DFO That Blocks Their Success

PART OF DFO	FISHERY OFFICER		MANAGER		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
FISHERIES & HABITAT MGMT	9	34.6	1	4.2	10	20.0
ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE	9	34.6	19	79.2	28	56.0
LACK OF RESOURCES	6	23.1	3	12.5	9	18.0
UNMOTIVATED OFFICERS	1	3.8	0	0	1	2.0
COMBINATION OF FACTORS	1	3.8	1	4.2	2	4.0
TOTAL	26	52.0	24	48.0	50	100.0

This table reveals that 56% of the DFO respondents identify "the structure of DFO", 20% "fisheries and habitat management", 18% "the lack of resources", and 6% specify other types of DFO blocks. The highest percentages of officers identify "Fisheries and Habitat Management" (38.5%) and "DFO organizational structure" (34.6%) as the main DFO block. In contrast, only 4.2% of their managers identify "Fisheries and Habitat Management" as the main block, but 79.2% of the managers say the main block is "DFO organizational structure".

"Fisheries and habitat management" types of responses include: DFO mismanagement, allocation strategies, licensing policies, poorly motivated officers, and DFO enforcement. Responses included in "organizational structure" are: those referring to the command-control hierarchy as the obstacle, the lack of direction from management, the inability to wrest decision-making authority from management, management lack of accountability, the futility of planning given the certainty their budget will be raided by their superiors without notice, the "garbage collector" status they perceive others ascribe to enforcement in DFO, and the fact that enforcement is out of the "information loop" in the department, a fact that leads to considerable embarrassment at the field level.

These findings are relatively stable for fishery officers and their managers. Except for the point outlined immediately below and level of ambition, neither officers nor managers of different ages, education levels or adaptive strategies hold very different views on the kinds of internal barriers they identify. One exception is that those with higher education in the manager tier are far more likely to point to "Fisheries and Habitat Management" as the main obstacle: 26.7% of those with between grade 10 and grade 12 levels of education point to this as the main block, compared to 62.5% of those in the most highly educated group. Among officers it is the drivers (41.7%) more than the survivors (28.6%) who see the block as DFO organizational structure. The same effect but much stronger is found for managers: 88.9% of the drivers but only 50% of the survivors identify the main block to the improvement of their success as DFO organizational structure.

1.6 Identifying the organization's type

By examining officer and manager perceptions of the way power is used across several dimensions of use, DFOs "organization style" or "type" is identified. The approach is based on Gouldner's (1954) work on bureaucracy. In that work he identifies several important dimensions of the use of power in bureaucracies, and sets out criteria for each dimension by which one may distinguish its type. Collectively, these "add up" to a characterization of the organization's type.

The dimensions are: Who are the rule initiators? Whose values legitimate those rules? Whose values are excluded? When rules are violated, which groups values are compromised? Which are not? Does rule violation raise or lower the status of violators? Finally, what is the standard explanation people give for why others break such rules? Answers to these questions are organized into characterizations of DFO organization as "mock", "representative" or "punishment-centred", by applying Gouldner's criteria for distinguishing those styles.

Table E7: Percent of Officers and Managers By Dimension and Organizational Type

DIMENSION	REPRESENTATIVE		PUNISHMENT-CENTRED		MOCK	
	% Offic	% Manag	% Offic	% Manag	% Offic	% Manag
Who makes rules?	10.0	26.9	90.0	69.2	0.0	3.8
Are rules fair?	24.1	34.6	69.0	57.7	6.9	7.7
Enforcement hurts whom?	16.7	15.4	43.3	11.5	40.0	73.1
Why do fishers cheat?	0.0	0.0	16.7	30.8	83.3	60.0
Rule breakers respected?	36.7	66.7	63.3	33.3	0.0	0.0

Who Makes The Rules? Respondents were asked: "Who is making the rules in fisheries these days?" Responses were organized into "mock" (neither management nor officers see themselves as participants or view the rules as their own), "representative" (both groups view the rules as their own and initiated them), or "punishment-centred" (the rules are seen to arise in response to other pressures and are imposed upon officers and managers). Table E7 reveals that 90% of officers, and 69.2% of managers identified DFO as punishment-centred for this dimension of the use of power.

Are The Rules Fair? Respondents were asked: "Do you think the rules which DFO sets for the fishers are fair?" Responses were sorted into five categories: "yes", "the process is fair but not the results", "some rules are fair and some are not", "no", and "don't know". The first three were grouped into the representative category (rules are fair, but after all no system is perfect), punishment-centred (no), and mock (don't know). A majority identified DFO as a punishment-centred organization for this dimension: 69% of fishery officers and 57.7% of managers do not think the rules are fair. Examples of unfair rules include situations where natives do not have to obey the same rules as non native commercial fishers; or ways wealthy fishers cheat and continue to cheat when caught to cover their losses, but less well off fishers who are caught lose their livelihood for life; or ways companies appear to have charges against them dropped, when smaller vessel owners must go to court and pay fines for the same alleged offenses.

Enforcement Hurts Whom? Respondents were asked: "Who is being hurt by the way that enforcement is carried out these days? Those who said that enforcement of the rules hurts the ones who cheat were classified as "representative"; that is, punishment violates the values of cheaters as it would in a democratic or just society. Those who said that it hurts one group in most cases but not others were classified as "punishment-centred" responses, because the punishment is perceived to be inflicted in an unjust and therefore punitive manner. Finally, those who said that enforcement hurts everyone, in the sense that no one

benefits from the way it is being carried out were classified as "mock". In terms of this enforcement dimension, most managers and many officers believe DFO is a mock organization: 73.1% of the managers and 40% of the fishery officers think enforcement as practised today benefits no one.

Why Do Fishers Cheat? Respondents were asked: "Why do you think fishers break the rules?" Their responses were classified as "representative" (they cheat because of ignorance or well-intentioned carelessness), "mock" (they cheat because they are driven by uncontrollable needs for more), or "punishment-centred" (cheating represents a deliberate intent to break the rules and make money). DFO is perceived to be a mock organization for this dimension: 83.3% of fishery officers and 60% of managers say fishers cheat because of uncontrollable desires.

Are Rule Breakers Respected? Respondents were asked: "How much respect do you think most fishers in your community have for someone who breaks fisheries rules and because of that earns a lot of money?" The options were: high, medium, and low respect, but several respondents said that it depended on the person, the rule, or the gear sector. "Low respect" responses were categorized as representative, because it indicates the rule breaker's social status declines. Those who gave any other response were categorized as punishment-centred responses because they indicate that a rule breaker's status either would or could be enhanced. Fishery officers characterize DFO as punishment-centred for this dimension, but managers characterize DFO as representative for this dimension: 66.7% of managers (few of whom actually live in these communities) believe communities do not respect law breakers, but 63.3% of officers believe fishers who cheat are respected in their communities for their success at fishing.

DFOs Organizational Type. All recorded comments including those pertaining to the above questions were used as the basis upon which to categorize each respondent's characterization of DFOs style, or mix of styles. Seventy percent of fishery officers characterizations are predominantly one type; punishment-centred. The remaining 30% are mixed characterizations. All mixes include punishment-centred plus some other style: 88.9% of the mixes characterize DFO as both representative and punishment-centred, the remainder as mock and punishment-centred. No fishery officer characterized DFO as solely representative.

Managers have more mixed views than officers: 34.6% characterize DFO as punishment-centred, and 15.4% characterize DFO as representative. One-half of managers characterize DFO as a mixture of styles, and 92.3% of these mixtures include "punishment-centred" in the mixture.

1.7 Organizational legitimacy

One explanation for fisheries non-compliance emphasized by fisheries enforcement literature is that "regulators" are perceived as "illegitimate" by the "regulated". Given there is a great deal of non-compliance in the fisheries one expects DFO to lack legitimacy. How legitimate is DFOs use of persuasive, economic, and coercive forms of authority?

Persuasive or normative authority is based on a "common ground" of values. By linking values to means, persuasion may convince others of the value of the goals and voluntarily to refrain from using means which contradict the goals. Under ideal conditions

this approach would be self-enforcing, based as it is on the person's own value system. In principle, "education activities", could be a way to use DFOs reservoir of accumulated respect to persuade fishers to comply. The success would depend in part on the amount of respect for the "resource manager". It must be sufficient to capture the genuine attention of fishers and focus them on conservation goals and means. If and only if that occurs, the resource manager can appeal with some chance of success to fisher sentiments, both rational and irrational, regarding those values and their DFO legitimated means.

In addition to explicit education activities, an implicit form of persuasion is participation by fishers in committees that advise DFO on fisheries management issues. Assuming the conditions outlined above exist, if the dominant ideology both "preached and practised" at such meetings were conservation, then by a genuine sharing of the decision-making with DFO under that guiding principle, fishers would eventually accept those values and ends. Under normal circumstances these would be internalized, and they would fish as though being conservation-minded was the only sane and reasonable way to fish. They would also come to believe that those whose fishing practises threaten the resource were "odd", and bring local social pressures to bear on violators. Under the social interaction microscope of small, rural fishing communities, these could be powerful sanctions.

DFO also has considerable potential to use economic authority to achieve compliance with conservation objectives. That authority results from federal legislation which delegates allocation decisions in most major Canadian fisheries to the Minister of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Allocating access to fish is for all intents and purposes like allocating money. As "wealth allocator", DFO has the potential to make allocations conditional upon certain behaviour by those who enjoy the privilege. By orchestrating these conditions in support of conservation objectives and means, DFO could in principle engineer fishers compliance. This form of authority is more instrumental than normative authority. It does not require fishers to believe in any conservation premises behind those conditions nor even respect the regulator. If compliance is rewarded with access rights and non compliance is punished by withdrawal of access rights, in theory economic power, properly handled can produce compliance.

Finally, DFO has the right to apply force if necessary to make fishers comply when they do not want to do so. Fishery officers, under the authority of *the Fisheries Act, other Acts*, and *regulations* made pursuant to them, have "peace officer powers" for the purposes of enforcing fisheries laws. They can arrest, detain, and prosecute fishers who are in contravention of selected laws. The courts may levy fines and other punishments including imprisonment, depending upon the type of offence. Coercive authority is based strictly on the principle of punishment, not reward and punishment. Compliance with rules is not attained by explicit or implicit education activities, nor by economic manipulation but by punishing the violator.

DFO may persuade people to comply, economically reward compliance and punish non compliance, and/or force fishers to comply. How "legitimate" are its actions as perceived by its enforcement officers and managers?

1.7.1 Normative

Respondents were asked to say what they thought about the ways DFO attempts to

persuade fishers to comply with the rules by educating them about their significance with respect to conservation goals, the impacts on the communities, etc. Responses were organized into three categories: "DFO does not do it", "I approve", or "It is not helpful". One quarter of the fishery officers said DFO never engages in those activities. Seventy-five percent of the fishery officers gave a different response and of these, 76.1% said they approve of that approach, while 24.9% said it does not help. Only 16% of the managers thought it was not being done. Of the remaining 84%, a large majority (86.4%) said it is a helpful approach.

Respondents were also asked if they thought such education activities by DFO would help to decrease non-compliance. Their responses were grouped into three categories: those who said "yes", or yes, a little; those who said "maybe" or "if DFO were credible"; and those who said "no". Exactly the same percentages of each tier gave the same responses: 84% said yes, 12% said no, and 4% said maybe.

Respondents were asked what they thought of "the advisory process". Their responses are organized into three categories. "Helpful or at least of some help" responses are those who said it contributes to effective management of the fisheries, is of some good but not representative, is improving, or it depends on who is on the committee. "Not helpful" responses are those stating it is useless, not representative, has too much say over DFO, or it doesn't communicate with enforcement. The last category was "don't know". A majority of officers (69%) and managers (61.5%) believe the advisory process is not helpful and only 19.2% of officers and 34.6% of their managers believe it helps at all.

Respondents were asked if fisher participation in the advisory process has had any positive effect on their compliance. Even with a "generous" classification of "yes" responses as those where the answer was yes, yes, a little, or maybe, 76.2% of officers and 80% of managers said "no". Only 15% of managers and 19% of fishery officers felt fisher participation had positive effects on compliance.

1.7.2 Economic

Respondents were asked to give their opinions about the fairness in the way DFO allocates fish among gear sectors. Responses to this question are classified into three groups: "yes, or at least there is some fairness to the allocation process" is composed of "yes", "maybe", "some fair, some not". "No", and "don't know" are the other two categories of response. Almost all managers (92.3%), and slightly fewer officers (86.2%) say the allocation process is unfair. They cite reasons such as the allocations are made without enforcement input and are frequently too complex to be achievable in a fair way, have objectives which are aimed at income distribution for specific groups but discriminate against others and in any case are unenforceable, or worse, are only enforceable against certain types of fishers, leaving others to cheat with impunity. They cite cases of inconsistent treatment of big company trawlers caught fishing in closed areas and let off, while smaller vessels are charged for the same offence. Respondents were asked: "Do you think that fishers might have deliberately broken some of the rules because they perceived the allocation process as unfair?" All managers and 91.3% of officers said "yes".

1.7.3 Coercive

Most managers and officers have a theory of non-compliance. Their theory argues that between 10% and 20% of fishers never cheat, another 10% to 20% always cheat, and the remaining 60% to 80% watch what happens to cheaters. Their theory asserts that watchers will become cheaters if cheaters are successful. Under these conditions cheating eventually becomes normative behaviour. Their theory puts the role of "detection" and "punishment" out in front, thus genuinely reflecting their enforcement values.

Most officers said they rarely catch any "serious cheaters" by which they mean those whose cheating has significant impacts on conservation of the resource. This is because they cheat where actual observation of the offense is difficult if not impossible such as offshore "highgrading", or they "employ" others under the table to cheat for them and cannot be traced, and they are often highly skilled and better organized and equipped than DFO, etc. Instead of targeting serious cheaters, there is a tendency to go after the "watchers". They are easier to catch with fewer scarce resources, and are at least some indication to others that they might get caught, thus being a deterrent of sorts to the large middle group. In addition, by going out and trying to catch someone they put in a presence, which most of the officers and managers believe helps to deter violators.

Given this background, respondents were asked to say whether fishery officers were helping to protect the resource by catching violators. Responses were classified into three categories: "yes" composed of "yes" and "maybe"; "no" composed of "no" and "don't catch the serious violators"; and "conditional yes" composed of responses saying they would say yes if fines were higher, if they could catch the problem cases, if they could do more enforcement work, if fishers agreed with the rules, if fishery officers were more motivated. The conditional yes category is a "wish list", and knowing today's fiscal climate and DFOs attitude to enforcement, few respondents believe these conditions will ever exist.

When "conditional yes" responses are excluded, 19.2% of managers but a slight majority (56.7%) of fishery officers think the traditional approach to enforcement supports conservation objectives. If their wishes were met, these figures jump to 88.5% and 96.7%, respectively. Respondents were asked whether catching violators makes other fishers stop violating the rules. The same categories of responses as above were used for this case. Without considering their wish lists, only 3.8% of the managers and 13.3% of the fishery officers said that their current efforts in this direction are helping to deter potential violators.

Respondents were asked whether fines scare people from violating. In this case, the "yes" response is composed of "yes", "helps a little", and "maybe"; while the other two categories are the same as the previous two questions. Fishery officers are slightly more positive about the deterrent value of fines than their managers: 43.3% of officers and 34.6% of managers said yes. In addition, roughly 50% of each group would say yes if their conditions were met. Assuming the status quo but depending on the question, between 13.3% and 56.7% of officers, and from 3.8% and 34.6% of their managers believe the coercive approach is effective.

1.8 Rates of conviction

DFO maintains a "violations system" on a DFO-Region basis. It shows the number of charges laid, warnings, cases where charges are withdrawn, cases pending, fines or court sentence if applicable, number found guilty, number of guilty pleas, etc. Some Regions have

been producing their version of this system electronically for years, while in other regions or sub-regions such as West Coast Newfoundland, the information is in hard copy only. The Scotia-Fundy Region is reputed to have one of the best of the regional violations systems, and data on violations from 1986 to 1992 inclusive were obtained from that source. Table E8 below provides data on the total charges laid per year in that Region and compares this with the total number of convictions in each year and the estimated number of officers, and calculates an estimate of the conviction rates per year, per officer (full time equivalents, (FTE)).

TABLE E8: Number of Charges and Convictions and Rate of Conviction In DFOs Scotia-Fundy Region 1986-1992.¹¹⁰

YEAR	TOTAL CHARGES LAID ¹¹¹	TOTAL CONVICTIONS ¹¹²	CONVICTION RATE ¹¹³
1986	249	160	0.64
1987	232	167	0.72
1988	377	291	0.77
1989	196	127	0.65
1990	189	146	0.77
1991	115	86	0.75
1992	72	52	0.72
TOTAL	1430	1029	0.72

Although the number of officers in that region has varied somewhat between 1986 and 1992, the National Enforcement Training Unit estimates that there were approximately 125 fishery officers (FTEs) employed by DFO over that period of time. They also advise that approximately 10% of these were senior officers, most of whom rarely lay charges. For the sake of obtaining a rough estimate of the average number of charges laid by each officer in each year, it was assumed that only 100 of these would be expected to lay charges at least

¹¹⁰Source: DFO Violations System(29/09/94).

¹¹¹Excludes those who were warned, where charges were later withdrawn, cases pending, and "no charges laid".

¹¹²Number found guilty plus those who pleaded guilty.

¹¹³Ratio of charges to convictions.

some of the time in each year.

Table E8 shows the total number of charges increased until 1988 and then began to decline. The average officer laid an average of 3.8 charges in 1988, and this declined to an average of 0.7 charges in 1992. The average officer obtained an average of 2.9 convictions in 1988 and this declined to 0.5 convictions in 1992. Over this 7 year period, the average fishery officer charged an average of 2 people, and obtained an average of 1.5 convictions. The conviction rate per year per officer is far below one percent of the probable violations. By this standard, officers do not dispense much punitive justice.

1.9 Attitudes to laying charges by type of offence

Do officers apply the official policy of "zero tolerance"? Or, do they distinguish between "lesser" and "more important infractions", by charging those who violate the serious ones, and using their discretion and more leniency with "lesser" offenses? Do officers and their managers have similar views on which types of violations are serious?

Table E9 below presents these comparisons for twelve types of violations DFOs Atlantic chiefs of enforcement considered serious violations. Respondents were asked whether they thought fishery officers should always, nearly always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never charge fishers when they find them in violation of each type of offense.¹¹⁴ This analysis focuses on the combined category of those who said officers should "always or nearly always charge" by type of violation. The table is organized from lowest to highest percentage of officers giving this response. Percent differences between officers and managers are identified for each type of violation.

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¹¹⁴Extensive comments were received from many respondents on caveats regarding the conditions which would need to exist in order to lay charges all of the time or nearly all of the time. These comments could easily be the subject of another dissertation.

Table E9: Percent of Officers and Managers Who Would Charge "All or Nearly All of the Time" And Their Differences By Violation Type

TYPE OF VIOLATION	% OF OFFICERS WHO CHARGE ALWAYS OR NEARLY ALWAYS	% OF MANAGERS SAYING OFFICERS SHOULD CHARGE ALWAYS OR NEARLY ALWAYS	DIFFERENCE (%)
spacing of gear	48.0	52.6	+4.6
Vessel markings	50.0	50.0	0.0
Placement of Gear	56.0	55.6	-0.4
Trip limits/daily quota	70.4	73.7	+3.3
Dumping	73.1	94.7	+21.6
Quantity of Gear	74.1	73.7	-0.4
No PCFL	74.1	70.0	-4.1
Transshipping	83.3	78.9	-4.4
Mesh Size/Liners	85.2	80.0	-5.2
Misreport Area Quota	88.9	94.7	+5.8
Fish in closed area	96.0	94.0	-2.0
Berried lobster	100.0	90.0	-10.0

Managers and officers appear consistent for all but two types of violations: dumping, where officers are 21.6% less likely to want to charge all of the time or nearly all of the time than managers, and "berried lobster", where fishery officers are 10% more likely to charge to this degree. Three types of "lesser" violations emerge: spacing of gear, vessel markings, and placement of gear. In these cases only about one-half of each group would charge all of the time or nearly all of the time. The rest of the violations were seen as more "serious", since from 70% to 100% of officers and managers would want to charge all of the time or nearly all of the time, depending upon its type.

1.10 Enforcement approach

The following table was adapted by this author from Wilson's (1968) descriptions of enforcement styles used by American police forces. The three styles are "legalistic", "watch", and "service-oriented". Five dimensions of enforcement approach are described in the table. These are: image of the unit (folksy, crime fighters, or citizen/officer partnerships),

involvement of politicians (high, low or mixed), concept of justice dispensed (distributive, equality before law or substantive), main emphasis of enforcement (order, law, or law and order), and community class structure (working class, any class or combination and homogeneous middle class).

Table E10 shows the percentage of officers and managers whose responses to the questions were organized into service-oriented, legalistic, or watch categories for each dimension.

Table E10: Officer and Manager Views of Their Enforcement Approach, By Dimension

DIMENSION OF STYLE	SERVICE		LEGALISTIC		WATCH		APPROACH
	%FO	%Mgr	%FO	%Mgr	%FO	%Mgr	
How officers interact w fishers ¹¹⁵	85.2	76.5	11.1	11.8	0.0	11.8	Service
Politics changes officer behaviour	NA ¹¹	NA	NA	NA	92.6	72.2	Watch
Concept of justice dispensed	NA	NA	59.3	58.8	NA	NA	Legalistic
Officer's main emphasis	48.1	41.2	44.4	41.2	7.4	17.6	Service, legalistic
Community context	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	Service, legalistic & watch
Image conveyed by officers	21.4	21.1	53.6	68.4	25.0	10.5	Legalistic

Officer interaction style with fishers. Respondent perceptions of the ways officers interact with clients are organized into four categories: "service-oriented", "legalistic", "watch", and "don't know". "Service-oriented" includes "officers treat fishers fairly and with an appropriate amount of discretion", or "treat them sociably and are service-oriented", and "it depends on the officer's use of discretion". "Legalistic" includes "officers are detached" or "remote and impersonal", or "they maintain a professional and polite distance". "Watch" includes officers are "confrontational", "lazy",

¹¹⁵Percentages do not add to 100% for officers in this row because 3.7% of them gave a "don't know" response and this is not shown in the table.

¹¹⁶NA means that the residual percentage of officers and managers could apply to this category or the other NA category in this row.

"arrogant", "without respect", "mean", "unfair", "biased", "incompetent", or "they just do a job". Table E10 shows that for this social interaction dimension, 85.2% of the fishery officers and 76.5% of their managers describe their style as service-oriented.

Political Interference. Answers to the question of whether politics interferes in enforcement decisions by officers are sorted into three categories: "yes", "no", and "don't know". "Yes" includes "yes", "maybe", or "at higher levels than fishery officers but it still effects their behaviour". The other categories stay as they are. Table E10 shows that almost all DFO respondents believe enforcement behaviour in the field is effected by political interference: 92.6% of the fishery officers believe this compared with 72.2% of their managers. On this dimension their style appears to be that of the "watchman" type. That is, officers are sensitive to key political connections within their community and take enforcement actions on that basis.

Concept of Justice. Officers who emphasize "equality before the law" have a legalistic style. Their principal objective is upholding the law. In the extreme version of this style, officers lay charges for "petty" offenses which may actually cause clients to increase their non-compliance. Respondents were asked whether officers charge everyone equally, without regard to circumstances? A majority of each group said yes: 59.3% of officers and 58.8% of managers say their style is legalistic with respect to this dimension. Justice is dispensed according to the principle of "equality before the law".

Enforcement Emphasis. Respondents were asked to say what they thought officers really cared about: catching violators, conserving fish, both, or none of these? Are they mainly focused on the watch goal of conservation through "keeping the lid on"; a legalistic enforcement of laws (catching violators); or, do they emphasize service to their clients by concerning themselves with both conservation impacts (order maintenance) and catching violators (law maintenance)? Those who said they care mostly about: "providing services to clients", "a mixture of things", that is, "conservation and protection both", or "other", were classified as service-oriented. Those who placed their emphasis on law enforcement, ie. "catching and punishing violators" were classified as legalistic. Finally, those who said "its just a job", "all they care about is their pay checks", or "it depends on the officer", were classified as placing an emphasis on neither law enforcement nor service to clients, and were categorized as the watch type of officer.

Respondents were split in their views for this dimension of enforcement approach: 48.1% of officers and 41.2% of managers think the main emphasis combines law and order, (service-oriented); another 44.4% of officers and 41.2% of managers think strict attention to law enforcement is the primary emphasis (legalistic); and only 17.6% of managers and 7.4% of officers described their style as watch-like in this sense.

Community Context. Neither tier was systematically asked about the class structure of their communities, or their homogeneity with respect to education, law abiding behaviour, etc. Several respondents did provide views on these subjects. Fishers are described as generally poorly educated but often highly intelligent individuals. They describe fishers as culturally homogeneous in many if not most respects, but in most of S.W. Nova Scotia they are sharply divided into classes based almost entirely on wealth and its conspicuous display.

Out of about 50 West Coast Newfoundland communities within this study's parameters, only 2 or 3 show obvious class differences based on the value of their homes, vessel size and gear type, etc. In the majority of these communities the main goal appeared to have been "to feed one's family", and community norms either support cheating for this purpose, or they do not oppose them. Only those who cheat on "economic laws" out of what the community defines as "greed", are seen as "deviants". But, "greed" is vaguely defined and since most respondents think many

people are themselves cheating in some areas, although not necessarily in the fisheries, few openly condemn others for such behaviour.

Except for a small mobile gear fleet, most of Newfoundland's West Coast fishers are small fixed gear fishers, who are not generally viewed as much of a threat to the resource. In contrast, most S.W. Nova Scotia fishers are seen by DFO as a threat to the resource because of their relatively more powerful technology, and their competitive culture of accumulation. Significant exceptions to these generalizations occur in either provincial location. Norms with respect to obedience or non-compliance with fisheries and many other "economic crimes" such as poaching wildlife, unemployment insurance abuse, welfare abuse, tax evasions, etc., are seen by respondents as variable by "stretch of coastline", or even "community".

The class structure of SW. Nova Scotia communities is more sharply divided and takes a form commonly associated with a legalistic approach to enforcement. In contrast, except for Port au Choix, social classes are difficult to identify in most Newfoundland West Coast communities on the Great Northern Peninsula. Community "class structure" resembles those where the enforcement approach tends to be the "watch" approach.

Image of Fishery Officers. Officers and managers were asked about the image they felt they convey. Most say they have a legalistic image: 53.6% of officers and 68.4% of managers gave this response. However, 21.4% of officers and 21.1% of managers say their image is "service-oriented". Another 25% of officers identify their image as "watch", but only 10.5% of their managers give this response.

1.11 Preferred approach to enforcement

Table E11 below shows officer and manager responses to the question of changes in their enforcement approach. Their responses are organized into two general categories: those which imply or specify there is a need for partnerships, service-orientation, and less hierarchical structures, or what collectively could be termed community-based enforcement; and those desiring a status quo with small improvements, a top-down, legalistic, or what may be termed a punishment-centred approach to enforcement.

Table E11: Percent of Officers and Managers By Item of Enforcement Type They Want To Change And Its Relation to Enforcement Approach

ENFORCEMENT APPROACH & ITEM	% OF OFFICERS	% OF MNGRS	% OF TOTAL
COMMUNITY BASED STYLE			
DFO must listen more to fishers and fishers must take more responsibility	13.8	0.0	7.3
Work together but both have to change	17.2	3.8	10.9
DFO must become more service-oriented	0.0	3.8	1.8
Work together to resolve problems	13.8	11.5	12.7
Have "focus groups" of officers and fishers solving problems(POP)	3.4	7.7	5.5
Community based style needed	20.7	30.8	25.5
Deputize fishers to do some enforcement work	0.0	3.8	1.8
SUB-TOTAL COMMUNITY BASED STYLE	68.9	61.4	65.5
TRADITIONAL ENFORCEMENT STYLE			
Fisher attitudes have to change	10.3	3.8	7.3
communication must improve	3.4	15.4	9.1
Neutral party must do enforcement	10.3	0.0	5.5
Tougher traditional forms of enforcement	6.9	3.8	5.5
Include enforcement in advisory committees	0.0	7.7	3.6
Set national policies for all regions	0.0	7.7	3.6
TRADITIONAL ENFORCEMENT STYLE SUB-TOTAL	30.9	38.4	34.6
GRAND TOTAL	99.8	99.8	100.1

Table E11 shows that 68.9% of officers and 61.4% of the managers would like to see a

respondents want to stay with a more traditional form of enforcement.

1.12 Attitudes to partnerships

Officers and managers were asked whether they felt that in certain really difficult non-compliance issues such as "misreporting", "high grading", etc., they could work together with fishers and to find better ways to deal with these problems. They were then asked to say whether they felt it was possible to share real power with those clients. Lastly, they were asked to say whether they felt that this kind of an approach was already in place or emerging in some areas. Working together to solve problems, or partnering, is something eighty percent of managers and only 56.7% of officers believe is possible. However, another 3.8% of the managers and 23.3% of the officers say "maybe". One fifth of the fishery officers, and 15.4% of the managers say "no, it is not possible to work together to solve these kinds of problems through partnerships". Over three-quarters of managers think "equal partnerships" are possible: 76% of the managers and 46.7% of officers say "yes", and another 16.6% of managers and another 33.3% of officers say "maybe". Only 8% of managers, but 20% of officers, say equal partnership would not work.

Slightly over two-thirds of managers, (68%), and 56.7% of officers see concrete indications of such relationships with clients. They made comments such as: "We get a lot more fishers expressing fear about the effects of cheating on their future incomes and wanting to do something about it themselves", "there are signs of vigilante action", "fishers are more willing to supply the kind of information which allows us to catch the serious offenders", and "fishers appear to be more willing to take on roles to reduce non-compliance through education activities with fellow fishers, such as Ocean Watch". However, 32% of managers and 43.3% of officers could not identify any signs of these kinds of partnerships at the time of the study.

Who are the officers and managers with the more positive views about partnerships? What are their characteristics? Fishery officers who see signs of partnerships tend to be the least well educated and are in the oldest age group: 100 % of those in the 50+ group see signs of partnerships compared to about 44% in the other two age groups; and 72.2% of the officers in the grade 10 to grade 12 education group say they see some signs of partnerships, compared to only 37.5% of the more highly educated officers. These perception do not vary by level of ambition or type of adaptive strategy among officers.

Managers with a tendency to see signs of partnerships were of any age, the most highly educated, more ambitious, and either innovators or "other adaptors". That is, 90.9% of the managers with the highest levels of education, 72.2% of the drivers, 100% of the other adaptors, and 80% of the innovators see signs of partnerships. In contrast, only 33.3% of those in the grade 10 to 12 education group, 57.1% of the survivors, and 50% of the conformists identify some indicators of existing partnerships.

Appendix E2: Fishers

2.1 Education, age, ambition, adaptive strategy, and participation on advisory committees

When compared with most other occupational groups in literate nations, many of these fisher leaders are poorly educated. Only 2.4% have had any post secondary education, and 55.4% only completed grade 9 at best. They are an older group, as one expects of leaders by reputation and position: only 31.6% are less than 41 years of age. A slight majority(56%) are drivers. One-half of the respondents say their main strategy to improve their success is conformity, slightly over one-third (34.5%) say innovation, and 15.5% say rebellion or reform of the system. Given they were selected by their membership on committees, or by their reputation as opinion leaders and/or highly successful fishers, it is not surprising that 59.8% of them were or are on at least one advisory committee.

2.2 Profiles of each gear type group

Fixed gear (small) There are 26 fishers in this group and they constitute 30.2% of all fisher respondents. All but one of them is from Newfoundland. Only 46.1% of them completed grade 10 or more. They tend to be relatively young compared to the other fishers leaders: 73.1% of them are in the two younger age groups. Compared to the other fisher leaders they have lower levels of ambition. Only 42.3% are drivers. Their main adaptive strategy is conformity(61.5%), then innovation(34.6%), and only one is a rebel/reformer. Among the survivors, 80% are conformists, while among the drivers, 36.4% are conformists and the remaining 63.6% are innovators. Their level of ambition declines with age, from 55.6% of the youngest group who are drivers down to 28.6% in the oldest group. They become more conformist as they age: only 44.4% of the youngest age group of fixed gear fishers are conformists, compared to 71.4% in the oldest group. Their level of education does not effect either their level of ambition or their adaptive strategy. A large percentage participate(ed) on advisory committees: 69.6% were or are on at least one advisory committee. The percentage of drivers among the participators is slightly lower (37.5%) than the non-participators (42.9%), but the percentage of innovators among participators is far higher (43.8%) than for non-participators (14.3%).

Fixed gear(large) The 31 respondents in this gear type group make up 41.9% of the total fisher respondents. Most (86.1%) are from SW. Nova Scotia, but 13.9% are from west coast Newfoundland. Although only 54.5% of them have completed grade 10 or more, they are the most highly educated group of fishers. They tend to be older than the others, with 75% in the two oldest age groups. They are the most ambitious group, with 71.4% expressing the desire to excel at their fishing activities. They are the most innovative(47.2%) and the most rebellious(25%), and only 27.8% of them choose conformity as their way to improve on their success. Their level of ambition has only a small effect on their choice of adaptive strategies. A larger percentage of drivers choose innovation(48%) and rebellion(28%) more than survivors(40% and 20% respectively), while a larger percentage of survivors(40%) choose conformity then do drivers(24%). Although all age groups are ambitious, the youngest age group is the most ambitious with 77.8% being drivers compared to 70% in the oldest group. The older fixed gear

(large) fishers have a higher percentage who are innovative (54.5%) compared to the youngest(44.4%). They become slightly less ambitious and slightly more innovative with age. A majority (63.9%) of fixed gear (large) fisher leaders have participated or are participating on advisory committees. Among those who participate, 69.5% are drivers while 75% of non-participants are drivers. The rebels/reformers tend to be participators: 30.4% of participants are rebels while only 15.4% of the non-participants are rebels.

Mobile gear type group There are 25 mobile fisher respondents, or 27.9% of all fisher respondents. They are a mix of Newfoundland(41.7%) and Nova Scotia(58.3%) fishers. They are the least well educated group of fishers. Only 29.2% of them completed grade 10 or more. They tend to have an age distribution that is younger than the fixed gear(large) and about the same as the fix gear(small). About the same percentage are drivers(47.8%) as for the least ambitious group of fishers, but those with more education have a higher percentage of drivers(66.7%) than those in the lowest education group(43.8%). Mobile gear fishers have the highest percentage of conformers(72.7%), the lowest percentage of innovators(13.6%), and very few are rebellious(13.6%). All of the survivors adopt a conformist strategy, but drivers have a greater variety of adaptive strategies: 30.2% of the drivers are conformists, 30% are rebels, and 39.8% are innovators. The percentage of mobile fishers in the oldest group who are ambitious is less(42.9%) than in the youngest group(55.6%). The percentage of conformists in the oldest group is greater(85.7%) than in the youngest and middle age groups(66.7%). These fisher leaders have the lowest percentage of participators: only 43.5% are or were on at least one advisory committee. However, unlike the other two types of fishers, 77.8% of the mobile fishers who participate are drivers while only 23.1% of those who do not participate are drivers. Only 50% of participators are conformists, compared to 92.3% of non-participants, and 25% of participants are innovators compared to only 7.67% of non-participants.

Table E12 below compares the three gear type groups of fishers for each of the above characteristics.

Table E12: Selected Characteristics by Gear Type Group

ATTRIBUTE	FIX(SMALL)	FIX(LARGE)	MOBILE
geographic location	Newfoundland	Nova Scotia	Nfld & N.S.
Age	youngest	oldest	next youngest
education	low	highest	lowest
ambition	survivors(low)	drivers(high)	survivors(low)
adaptive strategy	high conformity	innovator & rebel	highest conformity
participation	highest	next highest	lowest
effect of age on ambition	declines	relatively stable	declines
effect of age on adaptive strategy	more conforming	more innovative	more conforming
effect of education on ambition	no effect	increases ambition	increases ambition
effect of education on adaptive strategy	none	small	not known
effect of ambition on participation	decreases participation	decreases participation	increases participation
effect of adaptive strategy on participation	innovators participate more than others	rebels and innovators participate more than others	innovators participate more than others

2.3 Obstacles to success

Each respondent was asked to identify what prevents them from being more successful. Fishers identified six factors that are considered non-DFO barriers because they did not attribute direct blame to DFO when giving their response: the existence of otter trawlers, lack of fish, too many fishers, fear of being caught cheating, their own desire to remain honest, and big companies in control of the fisheries. Since many of these non-DFO barriers are within DFOs authority to regulate, it is instructive to investigate what differentiates those who blame DFO from those who do not. Other fishers gave responses which attributed direct responsibility for the obstacles to DFO and these included: DFO has too few resources to protect the fisheries, DFO acts as a barrier to improving their situation, DFO policies block their success, politics blocks effective decision-making, DFO and fishers do not operate effectively together, and DFO does not provide enough good quality information. Table E13 below shows the percentage of fishers by gear type group

by non-DFO and DFO barrier.

Table E13: Percentage of Fishers by Gear Type Group and Type of Barrier They Perceive to Success

BARRIERS	% of FIX(S)	% of FIX(L)	% of MOBILE
Non DFO:			
No fish	34.6	5.7	9.1
Too many fishers	7.7	14.3	9.1
No barriers	0.0	5.7	4.5
Fear of being caught	0.0	2.9	0.0
Big Companies	15.4	2.9	22.7
Otter Trawlers	11.5	5.7	0.0
Sub-total	69.2	37.2	45.4
DFO Barriers:			
DFO needs resources	7.7	5.7	0.0
DFO is barrier	0.0	8.6	0.0
DFO + fishers	7.7	5.7	0.0
DFO policies	11.5	42.9	54.5
Better information	3.8	0.0	0.0
Sub-total	30.7	62.9	54.5
Grand Total	99.9	100.1	99.9

This table shows that 52.5% of all fisher respondents identify DFO as their main barrier to success. A larger percentage of fix(large) fishers attribute the responsibility to DFO than fix(small) or mobile fishers: 62.9% of the fix(large) fishers, 54.5% of mobile fishers, and 30.7% of fix(small) fishers identified DFO as the main impediment to their success. Among fixed gear respondents the major non DFO blocks are the lack of fish (34.6%), big companies hogging the political spotlight and the fish(15.4%), Otter Trawlers whose alleged fishing practices and greed are believed to effect fixed gear catches(11.5%). Only 7.7% (or 2 out of 26) thought it was because there are too many fishers. The main DFO block perceived by fix(s) fishers is inadequate policies(11.5%), but the attitudes of both DFO and fishers(7.7%), DFOs lack of resources to do its job(7.7%), and its poor provision of information for fishers(3.8%), are also perceived as blocks

by these fishers.

Only 34.3% of fix(l) fisher respondents see the blocks as attributable to something other than DFO. Among these fishers, 14.3% say there are too many fishers, 5.7% blame it on the state of fish stocks, 5.7% say there are no blocks of any kind, 5.7% blame the draggers, 2.9% blame big companies for hogging the resource, and 2.9% say the only thing in the way of being more successful is their fear of being caught cheating. A total of 62.9% say that DFO is the block. They identify DFO policies(42.9%), DFO in general(8.6%), the need for DFO to be adequately funded to carry out its duties(5.7%), and a problem of the poor attitudes of DFO and fishers(5.7%), as the specific kinds of blocks.

The only DFO barrier identified by the mobile gear type group fisher respondents is DFO policies. However, 54.5% of them identify that block. As a group, 22.7% say its the big companies who destroy the resource, 9.1% identify the lack of fish without accounting for its loss through blame, and another 9.1% say the problem is too many fishers. Only 4.5% say there is no block to their success. Looking at this mobile group on a provincial basis reveals some difference in perception. Among Newfoundland mobile fishers, 62.5% say the main block is DFO policies, 25% say the problem is the lack of fish, and the remaining 12.5% blame the big fish companies for destroying the resource. Only 50% of the Nova Scotia mobile fisher respondents see DFO as the main block. They also see the block as big fish companies(28.6%) and too many fishers(14.1%). The remaining 7.1% say there are no barriers.

The tendency to identify DFO as the main block varies with age, education, and participation on advisory committees. The youngest and middle age groups identify DFO as the block (51.9% and 58.1%, respectively), more than the oldest age group of fishers (45.5%), except for fix(large) fishers where 80% of the middle age group blame DFO, compared to only 55.6% of those in the youngest and oldest age groups. Larger percentages of the more highly educated in each gear type group identify DFO as the barrier more than the less well educated. Those who have participated on advisory committees tend to fix the responsibility on DFO slightly more than those who have not, except for the fix(large) group where participation does not affect this finding. Table E14 below shows the effect of ambition on fisher perceptions of blocks to their success.

Table E14: Percentage of fisher by Gear Type Group, Level of Ambition, and Type of Block Identified

BARRIERS	FIX(S)		FIX(L)		MOBILE	
NON-DFO	% of Drivers	% of Survivors	% of Drivers	% of Survivors	% of Drivers	% of Survivors
No fish	18.2	46.7	0.0	10.0	10.0	8.3
Too many fishers	18.2	0.0	8.3	30.0	10.0	8.3
No barriers	0.0	0.0	8.3	0.0	0.0	8.3
Fear of being caught	0.0	0.0	4.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Big Companies	27.3	6.7	4.2	0.0	10.0	33.3
Otter Trawlers	0.0	20.0	8.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sub-total	63.7	73.4	33.3	40.0	30.0	58.2
DFO BARRIERS						
DFO needs resources	0.0	13.3	4.2	10.0	0.0	0.0
DFO is barrier	0.0	0.0	8.3	10.0	0.0	0.0
DFO + fishers	0.0	13.3	8.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
DFO policies	27.3	0.0	45.8	40.0	70.0	41.7
Better information	9.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sub-total	36.4	26.6	66.6	60.0	70.0	41.7
Grand Total	100.1	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0	99.9

Table E14 shows that for all gear types groups, a larger percentage of the more ambitious fishers perceive DFO as the main barrier than do less ambitious fishers in each group. The most dramatic example of this is mobile fishers where 70% of the drivers, compared to 41.7% of the survivors, identify DFO policies as their biggest barrier. Drivers in Fix(l) and drivers and survivors in the mobile gear type group do not attach much importance to the blocking effects of the lack of fish or the competitive pressures of too many fishers. On the other hand, about 40% of fix(l) survivors and fix(s) drivers and survivors identify the block as either a lack of fish or too many fishers.

When innovators and conformists within each gear type group are compared for their tendencies to identify DFO over other obstacles to their success, the type of adaptation they make

does not effect fix(large) fishers, but it does effect the other two groups. Among fix (small) and mobile fishers innovators identify DFO as the block more than conformists: among fix(small) fishers, 18.9% of conformists compared to 44.4% of innovators identify DFO as the block, while 56.7% of conformists and 66.7% of innovators among mobile fishers identify DFO as the block.

Respondents who identified DFO as the block were asked to specify which part of DFO was responsible for the block. These responses were grouped into three categories: Fisheries and Habitat management (composed of "DFO management", "allocation strategies", "licensing policies", "poorly motivated officers", and "DFO enforcement"); DFO organizational structure (composed of responses regarding "command control structure"), and other DFO, (composed of "lack of resources", "politics", "DFO Science", "poor communication", and combinations of the above). Among those who identified DFO as the barrier there was near unanimity in the source of the block: Fisheries and Habitat Management was identified by 94.4% of the fix(s), 81.3% of fix(large), and 94.4% of the mobile fisher leaders.

It is important to be more specific about the DFO blocks these respondents identify. DFO management practices vary by DFO region. Since gear type group and DFO region are not mutually exclusive, regional differences in management practices is controlled below by presenting the data at the provincial level. Table E15 below shows the blocking factors attributed to DFO by gear type group and province.

Table E15: Percent of Fishers By DFO Block Identified By Gear Type Group and Province

BLOCK/ FACTOR	% of FIX(SMALL)		% of FIX(LARGE)		% of MOBILE	
	N.S.	Nfld	N.S.	Nfld	N.S.	Nfld
DFO mismanagement	n.a.	17.6	21.4	25	33.3	0.0
Allocation strategies	n.a.	47.5	28.6	50	33.3	50.0
License Policies	n.a.	17.6	10.1	25	16.7	50.0
Organization structure	n.a.	0.0	7.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
DFO science	n.a.	0.0	7.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
DFO enforcement	n.a.	11.8	17.9	0.0	8.3	0.0
Politics	n.a.	0.0	7.1	0.0	8.3	0.0
Poor Communication	n.a.	5.9	0	0.0	0.0	0.0

This table shows that three factors account for most of the blocking: DFO mismanagement, allocation strategies, and license policies. In the Nfld research location, DFO allocation strategy is the main block for all three gear type groups, followed by license policies and DFO mismanagement. Given the depleted state of the fisheries at the time of this study, it is interesting that none of the Nfld mobile gear type group leaders attributed the barrier to DFO

mismanagement, compared to 25% of fix(large) and 17.6% of fix(small) fishers. In the SW. N.S. research site among fix(large) fisher leaders, the main blocks were DFO allocation strategies, DFO mismanagement, and DFO enforcement. Among mobile gear type group fishers in N.S., DFO enforcement is a more minor block compared to license policies. Among those fishers who identify DFO as the main block, allocation strategies and mismanagement together account for from 50% to 75% of the blocks fishers perceive, depending on the gear sector and geographic location.

2.4 Identifying the organization's type

Answers that fisher respondents gave to questions covering several dimensions of the ways power is used by DFO are organized into characterizations of DFO as "mock", "punishment-centred", or "representative", by applying Gouldner's criteria for those types of organizations. Table E16 below summarizes the findings.

Table E16: Percent of Fishers By Dimension, Organizational Type, and Gear type Group

DIMENSION	REPRESENTATIVE			PUNISHMENT-CENTRED			MOCK		
	% of FixS	% of FixL	% of Mobile	% of FixS	% of FixL	Mobile	% of FixS	% of FixL	Mobile
Who makes rules?	19.2	8.3	4.2	73.1	88.9	83.3	7.7	2.8	12.5
Are rules fair?	50.0	26.5	39.1	50.0	73.5	60.9	0.0	0.0	0.0
Enforcement hurts whom?	4.2	13.9	8.7	79.2	66.7	69.6	16.7	19.4	21.7
Why fishers cheat?	8.0	0.0	0.0	32.0	58.3	50.0	60.0	41.7	50.0
Rule breakers respected?	88.0	72.2	82.6	12.0	27.8	17.4	0.0	0.0	0.0

Who Makes The Rules? Respondents were asked: "Who is making the rules in fisheries these days?" Responses were organized into "mock" (respondents did not know who made the

rules), "representative" (respondents feel that "everyone"; or, in Newfoundland only, "DFO and the Union membership", view the rules as their own and initiated them), or "punishment-centred" (respondents feel that rules arise in response to certain pressure groups and are imposed upon the rest). Over 80% of the fisher respondents identified DFO as punishment-centred for this dimension of the use of power. Table E16 shows the differences between groups: 88.9% of fix(l), 83.3% of mobile, and 73.1% of the fix(s) see DFO as punishment centred with respect to their involvement in rule development. Only 4.2% of mobile gear fisher leaders perceive DFO as representative in this respect, compared to 8.3% of fix(l) and 19.2% of fix(s).

Are The Rules Fair? Respondents were asked: "Do you think the rules which DFO sets for the fishers are fair?" Responses were sorted into five categories: "yes", "the process is fair but not the results", "some rules are fair and some are not", "no", and "don't know". The first three were grouped into the representative category (rules are fair, but after all no system is perfect), punishment-centred (no), and mock (don't know). Table E16 shows that a majority identified DFO as a punishment-centred organization for this dimension: 62.7% of these fishers do not think the rules are fair. However, table E16 shows the groups had substantially different views: 50% of fix(s) but only 39.1% of mobile and 25.5% of fix(l) think that the rules are fair.

Enforcement Hurts Whom? In order to find out whose values were violated when rules were enforced respondents were asked: "Who is being hurt by the way that enforcement is carried out these days? Those who said that enforcement of the rules hurts the ones who cheat were classified as "representative"; because the ones who violate the rules are the ones who are punished for those violations. Only 9.6% of the fisher respondents in total identified DFO as representative in this respect. Those who said that it hurts the honest fishers, fishers in general, DFOs reputation, only one group of fishers, or government's reputation are classified as "punishment-centred" responses, because they perceived the punishment as unfair. Finally, those who said that enforcement hurts everyone, DFO and fishers, the fish, no one, and the industry, were classified as "mock". Table E16 shows that almost one fifth of the respondents identified DFO as mock for this enforcement dimension of the way the DFOs use of its authority.

Why Do Fishers Cheat? Respondents were asked: "Why do you think fishers break the rules?" Their responses were classified as "representative" (cheating takes place because of ignorance or well-intentioned carelessness), "mock" (they cheat because they are driven by uncontrollable needs for more wealth), or "punishment-centred" (cheating represents a deliberate intent to break the rules because they do not like the rules, opportunity to cheat is there for the taking, social status and competition, economic necessity, or its the norm to cheat). Practically none of the respondents give the representative response. About one-half of them say that fisher motivation for cheating correlates with an organization which is punishment-centred, while the remainder say their drive to cheat correlates with a mock organization. The fix(s) has the greatest percentage(60%) who identify DFO as mock in this respect, while the fix(l) has the greatest percentage (58.3) who identify DFO as punishment-centred in this dimension.

Are Rule Breakers Respected? Respondents were asked: "How much respect do you think most fishers in your community have for someone who breaks fisheries rules and because of that earns a lot of money?" The options were: high, medium, and low respect, but several respondents said that it depended on the person, the rule, or the gear sector. "Low respect" responses were categorized as representative, because it indicates the rule breaker's social status declines. Those who gave any other response were categorized as punishment-centred responses because they indicate that a rule breaker's status either would or could be enhanced. Fishers identify DFO as

representative in this respect: 79.8% say rule breakers are not respected and the remainder say they are respected.

The organization's overall type All recorded comments including those pertaining to the above questions were used as the basis upon which to categorize each respondent's characterization of DFOs style, or mix of styles. Table E17 below provides the findings by gear type and total.

Table E17: Percent and Number of Respondents By Gear Type Group and Total By Their Perceptions of the Organization's Type

TYPE	FIX(SMALL)		FIX(LARGE)		MOBILE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
REPRESENTATIVE	1	3.8	0	0	1	4.2	2	2.3
PUNISHMENT	19	73.1	27	75.0	17	70.8	63	73.3
MIXED	5	19.2	8	22.2	5	20.8	18	20.9
DON'T KNOW	1	3.8	1	2.8	1	4.2	3	3.5

Based on responses obtained for all dimension of DFOs use of power, almost three-quarters of respondents or 73.3% identify DFO as a punishment-centred organization, less than 3% as representative, and about one-fifth as a mix of organizational types. All those who identify DFO as a mix of types include punishment-centred in the mixture: 15 say the mix is punishment and representative, 2 say mock and punishment, and 1 believes it is a combination of the three types.

2.5 Organizational legitimacy

Based on our theory, we expected the organization's legitimacy to have worn thin. The fact that there is so much non-compliance in the study-area's fisheries, and that we found that so many fishers perceive DFO as a punishment-centred type of organization provide further evidence in support of this hypothesis. However, there are several kinds of authority (normative, economic, and political), and it is possible that in one or more of these dimensions the organization may have retained some legitimacy. Fisher perceptions of its legitimacy could vary with the type of authority and the specific problems each gear type group has with respect to that type of authority.

2.5.1 Normative

Respondents were asked to say what they thought about the ways DFO attempts to persuade fishers to comply with the rules by educating them about their significance with respect to conservation goals, the impacts on the communities, etc. Responses were organized into three categories: "DFO does not do it", "I approve", or "It is not helpful". Over eighty-two percent of fisher respondents say it is not being done. There was little difference between gear type groups in this respect: 88.2% of fix(l), 84.6% of fix(s), and 82.1% of mobile fisher leader respondents

say it is not being done.

Respondents were also asked if they thought such education activities by DFO would help to decrease non-compliance. Their responses were grouped into three categories: those who said "yes", or yes, a little; those who said "maybe" or "if DFO were credible"; and those who said "no". Most respondents (71.4%) feel education activities would help to decrease non compliance but 11.7% say no, and 16.9% say maybe. The mobile and fix(s) gear type group have exactly the same percent in each category and they are more positive about education activities than the fix(l) group, where 20% feel that education activities would not help to decrease non-compliance, 14.3 say maybe, and 65.7% believe they would help.

Respondents were asked what they thought of "the advisory process". Their responses are organized into three categories. "Helpful or at least of some help" responses are those who said it contributes to effective management of the fisheries, is of some good but not representative, is improving, or it depends on who is on the committee. "Not helpful" responses are those stating it is useless, not representative, has too much say over DFO, or it doesn't communicate with enforcement. The last category was "don't know". A majority (59.2%) believe the advisory process is not helpful, 10.5% don't know whether it is helpful or not, and 30.3% think it is helpful. Most of the "don't know" responses came from the fix(s) (Newfoundland) respondents: 20% of this gear type group gave this response. There is not much difference between the gear type groups in their opinions: 33.3% of mobile, 31.8% of fix(s), and 27.3% of fix(l) say the advisory process is helpful.

Respondents were asked if fisher participation in the advisory process has had any positive effect on compliance. Even with a "generous" classification of "yes" responses as those where the answer was yes, yes, a little, or maybe, 72.9% of fisher respondents say "no", 5.1% don't know, and only 22% say "yes". Mobile fisher respondents believe the advisory process has prevented compliance more than the other gear type groups: 44.4% of the mobile, 13% of fix(l), and 11.1% of fix(s) give this response.

For all gear type groups, the percentage of fishers who identify the advisory process as helpful is slightly higher for those who participate on the advisory committees than for those who do not. That is, 33.3% of fix(s) who participate, compared to 14.3% of those who do not, found the process helpful. The comparable figures for the fix(l) fishers are 26.7% and 13.3%, and for mobile fishers they are 66.7% and 60% who find the advisory process helpful.

2.5.2 Economic

Respondents were asked to give their opinions about the fairness in the way DFO allocates fish among gear sectors. Responses to this question are classified into three groups: "yes, or at least there is some fairness to the allocation process" is composed of "yes", "maybe", "some fair, some not". "No", and "don't know" are the other two categories of response. Most fishers do not think that the fish are allocated in a fair manner: 77.6% say no, 21.2% say yes, and 1.2% say they don't know. Among gear type groups, mobile fishers have the highest percentage who think that the allocation process is fair (25%) followed by fix(l) at 22.2%, and fix(s) at 16%.

Respondents were asked: "Do you think that fishers might have deliberately broken some of the rules because they perceived the allocation process as unfair?" 82.1% of fisher respondents say fishers break rules because of inequitable allocations of fish: 100% of fix(l), 63.6% of mobile fishers, and 78.6 of fix(s) fisher respondents say this.

2.5.3 Coercive

The DFO officer and manager enforcement theory of non-compliance asserts that between 10% and 20% of fishers never cheat, another 10% to 20% always cheat, and the remaining 60% to 80% watch what happens to cheaters. Watchers will become cheaters when cheaters get away with cheating.

Respondents were asked to say whether fishery officers were helping to protect the resource by catching violators. Responses were classified into three categories: "yes" composed of "yes" and "maybe"; "no" composed of "no" and "don't catch the serious violators"; and "conditional yes" composed of responses saying they would say yes if fines were higher, if they could catch the problem cases, if they could do more enforcement work, if fishers agreed with the rules, and/or if fishery officers were more motivated. When "conditional yes" responses are excluded, 59.3% of fisher respondents say that this approach does help. If their conditions were met, another 29.1% believe that catching violators would help to protect the resource. The strongest unconditional support for the coercive approach is in the fix(l) group, where 77.8% feel this way. Mobile fishers are next with 66.7%. However, fix(s) fishers are more conditional. Only 26.9% of these fisher respondents feel that the traditional approach helps, while another 53.8% feel that it would help if their conditions were met.

Respondents were also asked whether catching violators makes other fishers stop violating the rules. The same categories of responses as above were used for this case. The percentage of fishers in each gear type group who feel unconditionally that the traditional approach actually prevents violations is lower than for the previous question. Only 46.5% say it would stop cheaters. Another 43% of fisher respondents say it would stop cheaters if their conditions were met. Among gear type groups, fix(l) fishers show the strongest unconditional support for the coercive approach: 55.6% say yes unconditionally, compared to 45.8% of mobile fishers and 34.6% of fix(s) fishers. Only 4.2% of mobile fishers say no, compared to 19.2% of fix(s), and 8.3% of fix(l).

Respondents were asked whether fines scare people from violating. In this case, the "yes" response is composed of "yes", "helps a little", and "maybe"; while the other two categories are the same as the previous two questions. A majority (64.6%) of fisher respondents believe fines scare off potential violators, 24.4% think they would under certain conditions, and only 11% do not think they have that effect. However, 19.2% of fix(s), 12.1% of fix(l), and none of the mobile fishers believe fines have this effect.

2.6 Attitudes to laying charges by gear type group and participation on advisory committees

Table E18 below compares attitudes of gear type groups toward prosecution for fourteen types of fisheries violations. Respondents were asked whether they thought fishery officers should always, nearly always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never charge fishers when they find fishers in violation of each type of offense.¹¹⁷ Our assumption is that the most useful category for

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¹¹⁷ Although this issue was not covered systematically, comments were received from many respondents on the conditions they feel should exist before laying charges all or

this analysis would be a combination of the "always" and the "nearly always" responses. Our classification of types of violations shown below is based on the assumption that if a small percentage or number of fishers gave the more extreme category of response, then the majority either consider it less serious, or think it should be dealt with without prosecuting. The table is rank ordered from least to most serious, based on the percentage of the fisher respondents in total who gave the most extreme category of response.

Table E18: Percent of Fishers by Type and Total Saying "Charge All or Nearly All of the Time", by Violation Type

VIOLATION TYPE	% OF FIX(S)	% OF FIX(L)	% OF MOBILE	% OF TOTAL
MINOR OFFENSES				
No PCFL	8.0	8.6	18.2	11.0
Mark Lobster Buoys	18.2	0.0	11.1	13.9
Placement of Gear	27.8	42.9	33.3	32.4
Vessel Markings	40.0	29.4	31.3	33.3
SPECIAL OFFENSE				
Trip limits/Daily Quota	66.7	81.5	60.0	71.2
MAJOR OFFENSES				
Dumping	95.8	90.6	90.7	92.3
Transshipping	100.0	92.9	92.3	92.9
Misreport Area Quota	92.0	96.9	91.7	93.8
Qty of Gear	92.0	96.0	100.0	95.7
Fish Size Limit	91.3	100.0	94.7	96.1
Mesh Size/Liners	88.0	100.0	100.0	96.2
Closed Areas	95.7	100.0	100.0	98.7
Berried Lobster	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

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nearly all of the time. In general, most fishers feel this route should be used when deliberate and unequivocal attempts to break a rule occur, and where that infraction has significant implications for protecting the resource for others.

Three types of offenses are revealed by Table E18: "minor offenses", those where fewer than one-third of fisher respondents give the extreme response; "special offense", where 71.2% give the extreme response, but nearly one-third did not thus indicating that something other than prosecution is at issue; and "major offenses" where over 90% give the extreme response. The different types of fishers display consistent attitudes for these three categories of offenses as well as each specific offense.

The minor offenses include those situations where the fisher has:

- I. a personal commercial fishing license (PCFL), but has forgotten it at home and cannot produce it upon being boarded at sea;
- ii. failed to ensure that his CFV number is clearly marked on his buoy for his lobster traps at sea
- iii. failed to ensure that his CFV number is appropriately displayed on his vessel; or has
- iv. placed his gear too close to another such as with cod traps.

Many fishers argued that these offenses are administrative and have little if anything to do with protecting the resource. Others argued that in most cases warnings would be sufficient incentive for the fisher to comply, but should they fail to produce compliance, prosecution would be then be appropriate.

Major offenses are defined as those for which over 90% of fishers believe violators should be charged all or nearly all of the time if they are caught in a clear and deliberate attempt to commit those violations. Fishers believe the resources need to be protected from these types of offenses. Within this category of major offenses there is a sub-type identified by many of the fisher respondents. Many argued that for berried lobster, putting liners in the cod end and fishing in areas that have been closed to fishing, fishers should lose their license for at least six months. In some cases (berried lobster) several fishers stated that violators should lose all fishing privileges, forever.

At first, the special offense category seems to stand alone. Many fishers argue there is no need to charge fishers for fishing over their daily quota or their trip limits. They argue that a more innovative way of managing the resource would make it unnecessary to need to prosecute those who go over the limit. They give examples of having the option to provide the fish to another fisher whose quota is unused, or taking it off their next quota, etc. However, the principle of eliminating the need for prosecution by through imaginative management also surfaced in many fishers comments about other types of violations. The only violations for which at least some comments of this sort were not received were for the taking of berried lobster, fishing in closed areas, and using liners. In these cases fishers want DFO to prosecute to the limit.

But in many other cases fishers want new management plans instead of prosecutions. Fishers expressed their disgust at the requirement that they throw away valuable fish, for example. That is, a swordfish fisher who catches a blue fin tuna as by-catch to his swordfish catch, despite the fact that it could be worth up to \$25,000 and is dead by the time he retrieves his long line, must discard it at sea or face a heavy fine. Similarly, a man fishing for say, haddock, next to his brother, and who catches more than his quota is not allowed to tranship the excess to his brother. Only recently was he given the option of bringing it ashore, but that weight of fish is taken off the other fishermen's quota, and he risks punitive and other forms of censure from fellow fishers if he lands the fish. Newfoundland cod trap fishers who catch salmon as by-catch in their cod traps must discard them even though they are worth a great deal of money and are usually dead. Many fishers want to see some mechanism by means of which this waste could at least benefit

their "community".

2.7 Enforcement approach

Five questions, each of which explores a dimension of enforcement style, were posed to each fisher respondent. Using Wilson's (1968) framework, as described below, the following analyses their responses to determine their assessment of DFOs enforcement behaviour as either legalistic, watch, or service-oriented. Five dimensions of enforcement and their associated criteria for his three types are as follows: image of the unit (folksy, crime fighters, or citizen/officer partnerships), involvement of politicians (high, low or mixed), concept of justice dispensed (distributive, equality before law or substantive), main emphasis of enforcement (order, law, or law and order), and community class structure (working class, any class or combination and homogeneous middle class).

Table E19 below shows the percentage of fishers within each gear type group who categorize DFOs enforcement as service-oriented, legalistic, or watch, by dimension of enforcement.

Table E19. Percent of Fishers by Gear Type Group, and Dimension and Type of Enforcement¹¹⁸

DIMENSION	SERVICE ¹¹⁹			LEGALISTIC			WATCH		
	F(S)	F(L)	MOB	F(S)	F(L)	MOB	F(S)	F(L)	MOB
Officer interaction	23.1	30.6	16.7	42.3	33.3	41.7	34.6	36.1	37.5
Politics interferes	N/A	N/A	N/A	46.2	25.0	33.3	38.5	69.4	62.5
Justice concept	N/A	N/A	N/A	54.2	60.0	50.0	N/A	N/A	N/A
Main emphasis	34.6	33.3	25.0	42.3	44.4	45.8	23.1	22.2	29.2
Image of Officers	19.2	28.6	8.30	50.0	51.4	58.3	30.8	20.0	33.3

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¹¹⁹NA means that the residual percentage is split to an unknown extent among the other styles in that row.

Officer interaction style with fishers Respondent perceptions of the ways officers interact with clients are organized into four categories: "service-oriented", "legalistic", "watch", and "don't know". "Service-oriented" includes "officers treat fishers fairly and with an appropriate amount of discretion", or "treat them sociably and are service-oriented", or "it depends on the officer's use of discretion". "Legalistic" includes "officers are detached" or "remote and impersonal", or "they maintain a professional and polite distance". "Watch" includes officers are "confrontational", "lazy", "arrogant", "without respect", "mean", "unfair", "biased", "incompetent", or "they just do a job". Table E19 shows that for this social interaction dimension, most fishers describe DFO as either legalistic or watch in its approach to enforcement. Only 16.7% of mobile and 23.1% of fixed(small) fishers see DFOs enforcement style as service oriented while 30.6% of fixed(large) fishers say it is service-oriented in the way it interacts with fishers.

Political Interference. Answers to the question of whether politics interferes in enforcement decisions by officers are sorted into three categories: "yes", "no", and "don't know". "Yes" includes "yes", "maybe", or "at higher levels than fishery officers but it still effects their behaviour". The other categories remain as they are. Table E19 shows that fixed(small) fishers believe there is less political interference in enforcement actions than others. Only 38.5% of the fix(small), compared to 69.4% of fix(large) and 62.5% of mobile fishers believe that politics effects enforcement behaviour at the field level. However, nearly three times as many fix(small) fishers as the others, or 15.4%, gave a don't know response to this question. A majority of fixed(large) and mobile fishers, and more than one-third of fixed(small) fishers share the perception that officers are sensitive to key political connections within their community and will take enforcement actions on that basis. This is a classic characteristic of the watch style.

Concept of Justice. Officers who emphasize "equality before the law" have a legalistic style. Their principal objective is upholding the law. In the extreme version of this style, officers lay charges for "petty" offenses which may infuriate clients and actually increase their non compliance. Respondents were asked whether officers charge everyone equally, that is, without regard to circumstances. Because of the way the question was worded it is not possible to separate the respondents who said "no" (because it is a service orientation) from those who said "no" (because they perceive it as a watch approach). Responses are thus coded as either legalistic or other. Table E19 shows that 60% of fixed(large), 54.2% of fixed(small) and 50% of mobile fisher respondents say their style is legalistic for this dimension.

Enforcement Emphasis. Respondent's were asked to say what they thought officers really cared about: catching violators, conserving fish, both, or none of these? That is, are they mainly focused on the watch goal of conservation through "keeping the lid on", a legalistic enforcement of laws (catching violators), or do they emphasize service to their clients by concerning themselves with both conservation impacts (order maintenance) and catching violators (law maintenance). Those who said DFO officers care mostly about: "providing services to clients", "a mixture of things", that is, "conservation and protection both", or "other", were classified as service-oriented. Those who placed their emphasis on law enforcement, ie. "catching and punishing violators" were classified as legalistic. Finally, those who said "its just a job", "all they care about is their pay checks", or "it depends on the officer", were classified as placing an emphasis on neither law enforcement nor service to clients, and were categorized as watchman. Table E19 shows that over 40% of each type of fisher believes that officers are legalistic in that they emphasize catching violators. The remainder are split between a service and watchman characterization. Mobile fishers have a slightly greater tendency to say DFOs enforcement

emphasis is the watch approach. Other fishers emphasize the service orientation slightly more than mobile fishers.

Image of Fishery Officers. Table E19 shows that 58.3% of mobile, 51.4% of fixed(large) and 50.0% of fixed(small) fishers believe DFOs enforcement image is legalistic. That is, they believe that it is detached and remote from clients and that it emphasizes law enforcement. However, nearly one-third of fisher respondents perceive the enforcement image is watch. That is, the image is one of neither enforcing the law nor maintaining order in the fisheries. It is an image of "keeping the lid on." Furthermore, except for fixed(large) fishers, among whom 28.6% perceive DFOs enforcement image as service oriented, few other fishers perceive DFOs enforcement image as service oriented. Only 8.3% of mobile gear fishers and 19.2% of Newfoundland's west coast fixed(small) fisher respondents think DFOs enforcement image is service oriented.

A summary of the above findings is provided in Table E20 below. It shows the percentage of all fisher respondents by dimension of enforcement and style.

Table E20: Percentage of Total Fisher Respondents by Dimension and Enforcement Type

DIMENSION	SERVICE	LEGALISTIC	WATCH	DON'T KNOW
Officer interaction	24.4	38.4	36.0	1.2
Political interference	N/A	33.7	58.1	8.1
Concept of Justice	N/A	55.7	N/A	1.3
Enforcement emphasis	31.4	44.2	24.4	-
Image of officers	20.0	52.9	27.1	-

Table E20 shows that over one-third (36%) of fisher respondents characterize the interaction style of enforcement officials as either confrontational, lazy, arrogant, without respect, mean, unfair, biased, incompetent, or just concerned about receiving their salaries. Slightly more, or 38.4% characterize it as remote and impersonal or as maintaining a professional and polite distance. Not quite one-quarter of the fisher leader respondents say officers treat fishers fairly and with appropriate discretion, or say they are sociable and service-oriented.

It is significant that 58.1% of fishers believe enforcement actions at the field level are influenced by political decisions, or conversely that only 33.7% of fisher respondents appear to believe that law enforcement is not manipulated to some extent by political interference. On the other hand, a slight majority(55.7%) of fisher respondents believe that the guiding concept of justice used by the officers is that of "equality before the law". Furthermore, this latter finding is consistent with fisher responses to the question about enforcement's main emphasis, about which 44.2% say it is "catching and punishing violators". Another 31.4% say that officers have a broader perspective than just punishing violators, and that they are service oriented. All of this seems to suggest that many fisher respondents believe that some officers try to make the system work in a legalistic and fair manner and some even try to be service oriented.

This somewhat positive view of officers may or may not be present in their views of the image which officer's project. A majority, (41.2%) say that officers are remote, detached from the community, and impersonal in their approach, 30.6% say they have an image of service to their clients, and 28.2% say they project an image of being unable to prevent violations or to maintain any semblance of order in the fisheries.

Table E19 shows the differences among gear type groups in their perceptions of DFOs enforcement style. Mobile gear type fisher respondents are toughest on DFO enforcement. Only 8.7% of them perceive officer image as service-oriented, and only 16.7% of them say that officer's interact in service-oriented manner. In these two dimensions of "image" and "interaction with clients", mobile fishers tend to view DFO enforcement as largely incompetent, or at least as more like the watch type than do fix(large) fishers. Fixed(small) fishers share the mobile group views, while fixed(large) fishers generally tend to perceive DFO more as service-oriented and less as watch.

A lower percentage of fixed(small) fishers believe there is political interference than fixed(large) or mobile fishers. Perhaps this difference results from fixed(small) fishers relative lack of awareness of the decision making processes, their acknowledged tendency to down load their personal responsibilities to their leadership including that of being involved in the decisions which effect them, and the buffering effect of the Union, which has assumed that responsibility.

In their descriptions of DFO enforcement's main emphasis, all three types of fishers show a similar pattern. A majority see the emphasis as catching and punishing violators, about one third see it as maintaining both law and order, and about one-quarter of each gear type group think it has no emphasis on anything important.

Given the above what can we say about DFO enforcement approach? It does not do much law enforcement, nor maintain much order. It emphasizes equality before the law but there is widespread agreement that there is little equal treatment. With the level of resources devoted to it, and the political interference in its actions one could conclude that its style of enforcement is more watch than legalistic type. However, many fishers say the enforcement style is legalistic. Why do they say this?

In describing the three styles of policing, (watch, legalistic, and service-oriented), Wilson (1968) gives a brief outline of what could be a developmental theory of policing styles. Wilson argues the watch style can usually continue until there is some sort of scandal, one that forces the police chief or agency responsible for the force to change it's basic law enforcement strategy. Given the political corruption that has been exposed, Wilson argues that the obvious tendency would be for the chief to promote its opposite, the legalistic, detached, professional, crime-fighter approach to policing. The next developmental leap, to the service-orientation, is propelled Wilson suggests, not by scandal but by a change in the class composition of the community. He argues that in homogeneous middle class communities, partnerships with the police force, conceptualized as the citizen's police force, can take root because law abiding behaviour is the norm. One could almost say that in those circumstances the police force is really an expression of their collective will.

Our analyses show that DFOs enforcement approach is watch, despite the fact that many fishers (and officers) perceive it as legalistic. As Wilson suggests for his case studies, we might argue that DFO is attempting to promote an enforcement presence that emphasizes the ideology of "legalism", precisely because of the on-going scandals and concerns about DFOs abuse of power and political biases that we have revealed in this study. However, while many officers have

the postures and mannerisms of that style of enforcement, and training at the RCMP depot in Regina from the days when that was the philosophy it expressed, they lack the resources, control, and other enforcement tools that the legalistic approach requires.

2.8 Preferred approach to enforcement

Table E21 below describes gear type group responses by gear type group to the question of what they would like to see changed in the way DFO conducts its enforcement. Their responses are organized into two general categories: those which imply or specify there is a need for partnerships, service-orientation, and less hierarchical structures, or what collectively could be termed community-based enforcement; and, those implying the need for the status quo with small improvements, or a top-down, legalistic, or punishment-centred approach to enforcement.

Table E21: Number and Percent of Fishers by Gear Type Group, Type of Enforcement Preferred, and Totals

GEAR TYPE GROUP	COMMUNITY BASED ENFORCEMENT		TRADITIONAL STYLE OF ENFORCEMENT		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Fix(S)	23	88.5	3	11.5	26	31.0
Fix(L)	30	88.2	4	11.8	34	40.5
Mobile	21	87.5	3	12.5	24	28.6
TOTAL	74	88.1	10	11.9	84	100

Table E21 shows that 88.1% of fisher respondents want to see a change of the type that would lead toward community based enforcement. There is practically no difference among gear type groups in these aggregate views. Furthermore, when the views of those who participated on DFOs advisory committees were compared with those who had never participated on those committees, the tendency to favour the community based approach was slightly greater for the participants (89.4%) than for non-participants(81.6%).

Fisher respondents were also asked to identify what they felt the officers needed to do in order to gain more respect from fishers. Their detailed responses to this question are organized into two sub-headings (legalistic and service-oriented). "Service-oriented" responses included: be more respectful of fishers, be more service oriented, talk with us more, involve fishers more, give authority to Fishery Officers, remove guns, be fair and competent, emphasize service to clients and conservation of fish. "Traditional enforcement" responses included: catching violators, enforce laws better, redesign fisheries management, nothing a Fishery Officer can do, catch the worst violators, continue as they are, fishers must change, keep wearing guns, and relocate Fishery Officers frequently. Table E22 below provides their views in aggregated form.

Table E22: Percent of Fishers and Totals by Gear Type Group and Way Officers Could Gain Their Respect by Enforcement Type

GEAR TYPE GROUP	SERVICE BASED ENFORCEMENT		LEGALISTIC ENFORCEMENT		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Fix(S)	19	73.1	7	26.9	26	30.2
Fix(L)	21	58.3	15	41.7	36	41.9
Mobile	11	45.8	13	54.2	24	27.9
TOTAL	51	59.3	35	40.7	86	100.0

Table E22 shows that 59.3% of fisher respondents believe that fishery officers could gain more respect from fishers if they would do the sorts of things that are associated with a service-oriented approach to enforcement, and that 40.7% feel they would gain more respect by being detached and impersonal and more oriented to law enforcement. The tendency to prefer a service-oriented type decreases as the degree of capitalization of the fishing enterprise increases.

Participation on advisory committees has a slight positive effect on the preference for gaining respect through a service-orientation: 73.8% of those who participated on committees emphasized a service oriented way to increase respect for officers compared to only 63.2% of non-participants. Out of 15 participants on advisory committees whose response was categorized as "legalistic", 12 said they felt the officers could earn fisher respect if they would enforce the laws more effectively. In the case of non-participants, 6 out of the 14 who gave legalistic responses said officers needed to enforce the laws more effectively.

2.9 Attitudes to partnership

Fishers were asked whether non-compliance problems such as "misreporting" and "high grading" could be dealt with by working together with officers. Working together to solve problems, or partnering, is something which 68.6% of fishers believe is possible. Another 17.4% say "maybe", and 14% say "no". Almost exactly the same percentage of each gear type group say "yes". The only gear type group difference is in the "maybe" and "no" category, where mobile fishers are more unconditionally negative. Fully one-quarter of mobile fisher respondents say these problems cannot be solved with partnership arrangements, compared to 7.7% of fixed (small) and 11.1% of fixed (large).

They were also asked whether it was possible to share real power and work together as equal partners in solving enforcement problems. A somewhat lower percentage of fishers(57.0%) feel that this could work, while 25.6% say "maybe", and 17.4% say "no". Only 50% of fixed(small) and mobile fishers think it could work, compared to two-thirds of fixed (large) fishers. As in the previous question, mobile fishers are the most negative: 29.2% say no, compared to 13.9% of fixed (large) and 11.5% of fixed (small) fishers. Finally, fishers were asked whether they were aware of any of these arrangements actually in place at this time. Less than one-half (48.7%) say "yes", 3.8% say "maybe", and 47.4% say "no". Fixed(small) fishers are the

most negative: 56% say "no", compared to 50% of mobile fishers and 38.7% of fixed(large) fishers.

Fixed(large) fishers are more optimistic about working out new enforcement arrangements and they tend to see signs of them being already in place more than other fishers. This group consistently shows evidence of having relatively high regard for DFOs enforcement officials. While fixed(small) fishers and mobile fishers are more negative about these possibilities, we suspect they are negative for significantly different reasons. Mobile fishers, whether in the Newfoundland or the Nova Scotia study location, tend to have little contact with DFO enforcement officials. Many mobile respondents think of them as overpaid clerical staff with guns, and view them as their inferiors. They would prefer to work with those in the department whom they may feel are more equal in status to them. On the other hand, fixed (small) fishers often remarked that officers make them feel small, or act in a superior and arrogant manner toward them. Many of these West Coast Newfoundland fixed(small) gear respondents remarked that fishery officers "look down on them". Many want more respect from officers. Perhaps their negativity comes from their belief that officers would abuse more cooperative arrangements because of their perceived need to "be in charge", or to "look down on" fixed(small) fishers.

One would think that the fishers who participate with DFO on the advisory committees, and who are part of the political decision-making processes, might feel more optimistic about change. Table E23 below shows the effects of participation on attitudes of each gear type group toward working together on a more equal footing.

Table E23: Percent of Fishers by Gear Type Group and Participation in Advisory Committees Who Say Yes To "Working out Problems", "as Equal Partners", and "See Signs of It Now"

QUESTION	PARTICIPANTS(YES)			NON-PARTICIPANTS(YES)		
	%Fix(S)	%Fix(L))	%Mobil e	%Fix(S)	%Fix(L)	%Mobi le
Can we work out problems together?	68.8	69.9	50.0	57.1	69.2	76.9
Can we work as equal partners?	43.8	65.2	40.0	42.9	69.2	53.8
Any signs of it working?	43.8	57.9	25.0	33.3	58.3	53.8

Table E23 shows that among mobile fisher respondents, those who participate in the committees where they work together with DFO, learn the bureaucratic processes, and share in the decision making have the lowest percentage of their members who feel that problems can be solved by working together, who feel that equal partnerships are possible, and who see any signs of such arrangements at this time. Participation makes little difference to the views of fixed(large) fishers, but it has some effect on fixed(small) fishers. In this group, participants are more likely to say that they can work with DFO to solve problems, work as equal partners, and see signs of these arrangement in place, then non- participants. What is it about the political experiences these gear type groups gain in dealing with DFO on their advisory committees that might explain these results?

Our analysis of fisher perceptions of DFO show that fishers see DFO as their main obstacle. They single out the Fisheries and Habitat Management Branch, the Branch which would be responsible for making the changes, as their biggest obstacle. The analyses also show fishers believe DFO is poor at policy development. Fishers perceive that DFO uses its powers in a punishment-centred manner in virtually all dimensions of its use. These analyses show that DFO has lost its legitimacy with respect to its allocation of the resource and that fishers perceive the department neglects its persuasive and coercive authorities. They have some respect for the enforcement function, perhaps more than they should given the facts provided above, but this respect is fractured by their recognition that DFO enforcement is not able to carry out its enforcement function effectively with limited resources and no serious focus on conservation. Since those who participate on the advisory committees have the opportunity to view these "imperfections" directly, those observations probably account for participants lower levels of confidence in attempts to re-engineer DFO enforcement by means of partnerships with them.

What are the characteristics of fishers who have more positive views about partnerships?

Table E24 below shows the percentage of fishers by gear type group, age, education, level of ambition, and adaptive strategy for improving their levels of success who answered "yes" to the question: Can DFO and fishers work together in partnerships to resolve problems of non-compliance?

Table E24: Percent of Fishers by Gear Type Group, Age, Education, Level of Ambition and Adaptive Strategy Who Say "yes" to Working in Partnerships with DFO to Resolve Non-Compliance Problems

CHARACTERISTIC	FIX(S)	FIX(L)	MOBILE
Less than 40 yrs	77.8	55.6	55.6
41-49 yrs	70.0	81.3	62.5
50+ yrs	57.1	63.6	85.7
Less than grade 10	71.4	66.7	70.6
More than grade 10	66.7	76.5	50.0
Driver	81.8	76.0	63.6
Survivor	60.0	50.0	66.7
Conformist	68.8	50.0	62.5
Innovator	77.8	70.6	66.7
Other	-	88.9	100.0

Table E24 shows that age effects each gear type group differently. The percentage of fix(small) fishers expressing positive views declines with increasing age. Among mobile fishers, the reverse occurs. The middle age group of fix (large) fishers are more positive about the possibilities of working with DFO in partnerships to resolve non compliance problems than either the youngest or oldest members of their group. Education has little effect on fix (small) fisher positive views of these possibilities, but a larger percentage of the better educated fix (large) fishers express positive views than the less well educated members of their gear type group. However, among mobile fishers, the more highly educated display the opposite tendency. Level of ambition does not have much effect on positive views of mobile fishers, but for both types of fixed gear fishers, the more ambitious have a clear tendency to be more positive about these possibilities than the less ambitious members of their groups. In all three gear type groups, conformists are less positive about the possibilities than innovators.

In summary, fix (small) fishers who tend to express more positive views tend to be younger, less well educated, ambitious, innovators. Fix(large) fishers with a tendency to have these views are middle aged, better educated, ambitious, innovators or rebels. And mobile fishers

with more positive views tend to be young, less well educated, survivor oriented, innovators and rebels. It may help to express these findings in reverse format. That is, fix (small) fishers who tend to express more negative views about the possibilities for working in partnership with DFO to resolve enforcement problems tend to be older, better educated, survivor, conformists. Among fix (large) fishers they tend to be young, less well educated, survivor conformists. And among mobile fishers they are young, better educated, ambitious, conformists.

These data show that the tendency to be positive about enforcement partnerships varies with gear type group, but that as one might expect for all three groups the conformists are less positive about these possibilities than innovators or other adaptors(rebels). It is clear that many of those who express positive views are the more ambitious, better educated, more experienced, and more innovative fishers. It may have policy significance and thus it is worth noting that the characteristics of supporters differ to a large extent by gear type group. This suggests that any attempt to develop partnerships using a simplistic pattern applied in the same way to all three groups is likely to meet with some forms of resistance.

Appendix E3: Enforcement Officials and Fishers

3.1 Obstacles to success

Fishers are more inclined than DFO officials to argue that their main barriers lie outside DFO, although a slight majority (52.5%) believe they lie within DFO. Almost all DFO respondents (98.1%) say DFO is their main barrier. Those fishers who do not see the problem as DFO tend to see it as either a lack of fish, or big fish companies, or selected gear sectors such as the draggers. Even those fishers who do identify DFO as the problem see that problem in different terms. While 88.2% of the fishers who see DFO as their biggest obstacle identify the problem as license, allocation and other policies of the Fisheries and Habitat Management Branch, only 22.2% of DFO officials see that branch as the problem.

The majority of these DFO enforcement officials, (56%) see the "organizational structure" of DFO as their biggest obstacle. By this they mean a number of aspects including inadequate resources, poor management practices, lack of information, micro management, inconsistency in the application of policies, political interference in allocation decisions, the lack of accountability of management, its failure to delegate authority as well as responsibility downward in the organization, the lack of control they have over their budgets once these have been established, their lack of authority to make decisions, and rigidities that result from highly complex and sometimes contradictory rules and the hierarchical command control bureaucratic structure. In contrast to DFO officials, fishers are largely unaware of those issues. Only 2.9% of them identify DFO organizational structure as the main obstacle.

3.2 Identifying the organization's type

Fishers identify DFO as a punishment-centred organization more than do DFO officials, but the differences are a matter of degree more than substance. On the whole, 73.3% of fishers and 53.6% of DFO officials say DFO is a punishment-centred organization. Only 2.3% of fishers and 7.1% of DFO officials say it is a representative organization. The rest say it is a mix of punishment centredness and some other approach. Most of the mixes include representative along with punishment-centred.

In all but one dimension of organizational type, fishers either attribute more or about an equal degree of punishment-centredness to the organization's political style. The exception is fisher's degree of respect for those who cheat. While 50% of DFO officials say that fishers who cheat are highly respected by fellow fishers, only 20.2% of fishers say this. In the dimension of "who makes the rules?", 82.6% of fishers and 80.4% of DFO officials say the rules are made by a few strong pressure groups and imposed on all the rest (in spite of the consensual "appearance" of the advisory committees). Over 60% of both groups say the rules are unfair: 62.7% of fishers compared to 63.6% of DFO officials say the rules are unfair.

With respect to the enforcement dimensions of the organization, most fishers (71.1% of fishers compared to 28.6% of DFO officials) say that enforcement hurts the honest fisher more than the others. However, in this case 55.6% of DFO respondents say enforcement hurts no one, since it is structured in ways that prevent it from being effective. From the perspective of each group's attitude to enforcement actions, it is significant that 48.2% of fishers compared with only

23.2% of DFO officials believe that fishers cheat out of a deliberate attempt to break the rules and gain from it. In contrast, 76.8% of DFO officials compared to only 49.4% of fishers believe that fishers cheat because they are driven by "uncontrollable greed". Neither group blames cheating on well- intentioned carelessness or ignorance.

3.3 Organizational legitimacy

With respect to the organization's persuasive authority, fishers (71.4%) and DFO officials (84%) say that it would help to reduce non-compliance if DFO would exercise that authority. However, 82.1% of the fisher respondents said they had never heard of DFO officers going to schools or attending public meetings to give talks aimed at persuading fishers to comply with the rules. In contrast, only 18.9% of DFO officials said they had not heard of this being done. This discrepancy points out one of the drawbacks of the organization's failure to comprehend what its fisher clients are saying.

The advisory committees present the organization with other opportunities to use persuasive authority. However, 59.2% of fishers and 65.4% of DFO enforcement officials say the advisory process is not helpful. Fishers are slightly more positive about the process than DFO: 30.3% of fishers compared to 26.9% of DFO say the advisory process is helpful. On the other hand, neither believes it has much effect on non-compliance: 22% of fishers compared to 17.1% of DFO enforcement officials believe that it may have stopped some people from cheating.

DFO has lost most of its economic legitimacy: 77.6% of fishers compared to 89.1% of DFO officials say the allocation process is not fair. Only 5.5% of DFO officials and 21.2% of fishers say that the allocation process is fair. Only 15.4% of fishers and 2.5% of DFO officials say fishers have not broken rules because of the unfairness in the allocation process, while 82.1% of fishers and 95% of DFO officials say that they have.

The only dimension of authority to which a significant percentage of both fishers and DFO officials attach legitimacy is enforcement. However, DFO officials are more conditional in their views. For example, while only 11.6% of fishers and 7.1% of DFO officials say that it does not help to have officers out catching violators, 29.1% of fishers compared to 53.6% of DFO officials say it would help if certain conditions were met to the way enforcement was conducted. Thus, only 39.2% of DFO enforcement officials compared with 59.3% of fishers say that it helps and attach no conditions to their positive statement.

The same pattern occurs with the question on whether catching some violators stops others. In this case only 8.9% of DFO officials say yes but 46.5% of fishers say yes, but 80.4% of DFO officials give a conditional yes and only 43% of fishers give this response. With the question on the effect of fines on non-compliance, again 64.6% of fishers give an unconditional yes, while only 39.3% of DFO respondents say this.

3.4 Attitudes to laying charges by type of offense

Table E25 below summarizes fisher and DFO officials views about prosecuting fishers for three types of offenses: minor, special, and major. The offenses are rank-ordered by the percent of fishers (from lowest to highest), giving the extreme response. The extreme response is that officers should prosecute all of the time or nearly all of the time.

Table E25: Percent and Number of Fishers and Enforcement Officials Giving the Extreme Response, by Offense, In Rank-Order From Low to High Fisher Responses

VIOLATION TYPE	FISHERS(%)	FISHERS(N)	DFO(%)	DFO(N)
MINOR OFFENSES				
No PCFL	11.0	9	72.0	34
Mark Lobster Buoys	13.9	5	-	-
Placement of Gear	34.2	11	55.8	24
Vessel Markings	33.3	27	50	23
SPECIAL OFFENSE				
Trip limits/Daily Quota	71.2	47	71.7	33
MAJOR OFFENSES				
Dumping	92.3	72	82.2	37
Transshipping	92.9	39	81.4	35
Misreport Area Quota	93.8	42	91.3	42
Quantity of Gear	95.7	66	73.9	34
Fish Size Limit	96.1	73	66.7	28
Mesh Size/Liners	96.2	75	83.0	39
Closed Areas	98.7	76	95.5	42
Berried Lobster	100.0	80	95.7	45

There is a need to clarify some aspects of the DFO side of this table. A total of 58 DFO respondents were interviewed, but the table shows that from 23 to 45 DFO respondents, depending on the type of offense, provided answers that could be included in the table.¹²⁰ Many could imagine so many special circumstances that could apply, and found it difficult to select any option or even to articulate all of the variations they experience with respect to any type of offense.

The interviews revealed that many officers use "rules of thumb" in deciding how to react

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¹²⁰Some of the more senior managers simply refused to answer this question, arguing that it was pointless and useless, and a waste of their valuable time. This problem rarely occurred in the interviews with fishers.

to certain types of violations. For example, suppose the officer found a fisher in violation of fish size limits, in respect to recreational trout fishing. If the daily possession limit is 10, he might not charge him for having 11 nor even give him a verbal warning. It is easy to make an error when counting fish swimming in a pail of water. He might give a verbal warning for 12, a written warning for 13, and charge him for 14 or more. This example is for the purposes of illustrating a principle, and not necessarily what any officer stated.

The interviews revealed that officers in one area might apply this formula, but officers in an adjoining or other area might use a different formula or charge whenever the limit is exceeded even by 1 fish. This was true for most types of offense, if not all types. Respondents stated that meetings where these kinds of issues are discussed among officers are rare, and those that do occur lack the depth officers would like. Many officers indicated they would welcome the opportunity to thoroughly discuss such standards. However, they also asserted that they need to have "discretion". By discretion they seem to mean that there are circumstances where the overall goals of conservation and protection are better served by not charging even when the fisher may have for example, 14 trout. It may have to do with "plea bargaining", or say a fisher who is known to have extremely poor vision, or a large and starving family in an area where the stocks are very healthy. Many assured this interviewer that special circumstances occur frequently.

The fact that so many fishery officers and their managers had trouble with this question, that there is little dialogue with one another let alone their clients on how to decide on exceptions, etc., given what we now know about both the fisher and DFO official's beliefs about political interference in the fisheries, leads one to suspect that this "little problem" is probably an enormous problem for fishers. This background helps to explain why fishers are more adamant than DFO about every single offense in the major offense category.

It is in the minor offense category that another conflict between DFO and fishers is revealed. Fishers consider offenses that have little or no impact on the resource as nuisances, and when DFO charges for these violations it is seen as extremely punitive and mean. For example, few fishers believe anyone should be charged for forgetting to bring their Personal Commercial Fishing License with them on the day when the officer boarded their vessel and asked for it. Few officers believe it either, but there is a policy of "zero tolerance", and many of them apply it (but allow for discretion).

The placement of gear is another issue that many fishers do not think is any of DFO's business, and is a matter between two fishers, unless the result is damaged gear and a need for redress through the courts. The marking of lobster buoys is one which upsets practically all West Coast Newfoundland lobster fishers in the area covered by this study. Fishers put their CFV numbers on their buoys but the ice, salt, wind, sun, and sea gull droppings wear it off in a few weeks. To take them out and replace them with others, and take them back to shore where the numbers can be properly inked on the buoys is a major undertaking. Few do it. One fisher, who has fished next to another all his life told me about his case, one that happened in the previous year. His friend was charged and fined for this offense. However, in order to get to that fisher's gear the officer had to pass by hundreds of other unmarked buoys set out by other fishers. That fisher asks himself why the officer picked on him? The fine was \$500.00, and I was told that represented about one-half of his take-home pay for that lobster season (about 10 weeks).

The manifest purpose of the CFV numbers is to prevent fishers from setting more than the legal number of lobster traps. All that the CFV number is used for, say the officers, is to get an idea of whose traps belong to whom. In order to charge anyone for the "real offense from a

conservation perspective", untagged lobster traps, they would have to pull all of his traps, and inspect each one for its unique tag, for which DFO has records linking it to that fisher. If it did not have a tag, then it could be identified as belonging to that fisher, and he could be charged. Otherwise, unless they caught him in the act of hauling the untagged traps with say marked lobsters in them, then he could not be charged.

However, most fishers told me, and the officers confirmed it, that in this Newfoundland location, that officers consider themselves fortunate if they can get out more than once a year to patrol about 100 kilometres of coastline to inspect traps. They never haul and inspect all of anyone's traps. They do not have time. Furthermore, DFOs fisheries biologists argue that trap limits are required as a conservation measure, but are applied in order to distribute the resource more equally to fishers, some of whom are more ambitious than others, and would otherwise take more than "their share" of lobster. The biologists insist that conservation is maintained as long as the lobster carapace size is above a certain threshold, and as long as fishers carefully replace "berried" females back in the water after finding them in their traps. Given these well known (to fishers) facts, most fishers have great difficulty grasping the significance of putting their CFV numbers on their buoys.

Finally, most fishers use small vessels that are not monitored by aircraft surveillance. Consequently, there is no enforcement purpose to be served by having these inshore fishers mark their CFV numbers on their vessels in a manner that permits them to be viewed from aircraft. This is needed for mobile and larger fixed gear vessels. Many fishers were angered by the way the requirement for vessel markings was introduced. For example, when the need for vessel markings was introduced in West Coast Newfoundland, fishers were given two weeks notice. After about two years they were still confused about what DFO wanted in terms of the size of the letters in relation to the size of their vessels, etc. DFO issued confusing instructions and changed its instructions at least twice, according to several respondents. Most fishers see this as a nuisance charge, and as punitive rather than helpful.

It is a labour intensive process to determine the exact reason for each DFO prosecution. In the Newfoundland study area, data are not in electronic form, and in The Scotia-Fundy Region, the electronic data set only allows one to identify the regulation under which the charge was laid. However, making some assumptions about those regulations, a crude analysis of the Scotia-Fundy data suggests that over 50% of their prosecutions are for administrative violations. An unknown percentage of the remainder have a direct relationship to conservation of the resource. The DFO area office in Corner Brook, Newfoundland provided its data for one year to the local newspaper, and that published the numbers by category of offense. From their descriptions, it appears that about 75% of the prosecutions in Western Newfoundland for that year were for offenses that fit our definition of minor.

3.5 Enforcement approach

Table E26 below compares fisher and DFO views on five dimensions of enforcement style.

Table E26: Percent of Fishers and Officials by Dimension and Enforcement Type¹²¹

DIMENSION	ENFORCEMENT TYPE					
	% OF FISHERS*			% OF DFO OFFICIALS		
	SERVICE	LEGALIS	WATCH	SERVICE	LEGALIS	WATCH
Officer Interaction	24.4	38.4	36.0	81.8	11.4	4.5
Politics interfere ¹²²	N/A	N/A	58.1	N/A	N/A	84.4
Concept of Justice	N/A	N/A	41.0	N/A	N/A	13.6
Main Emphasis	31.4	44.2	24.4	45.5	43.2	11.4
Image of Officers	20	52.9	27.1	21.3	59.6	19.1

In their interaction style with clients, only 24.4 of fishers compared with 81.8% of DFO say officers are service-oriented, and 36% of fishers say it is watch, compared to only 4.5% of DFO officials. Another area of disagreement is the concept of justice dispensed by the officers. Only 13.6% of DFO officials say that officers will not charge anyone "unless they are abusive or they don't like them", but 41% of fishers give this response.

In two of the remaining three dimensions of enforcement style, DFO and fishers differ in degree. That is, a majority of DFO officials and fishers say there is political interference in what fishery officers do, but 84.4% of DFO officials say this compared to 58.1% of fishers. Similarly, while a majority say the main emphasis of fishery officers is the legalistic focus on law enforcement, more than twice as many fishers as DFO officials (24.4% to 11.4%) say it is the

¹²¹Rows do not total to 100% because "don't know" responses are not included in this table.

¹²²In two dimensions (politics and concept of justice), the question that was asked permitted the determination of one style for sure but the percentages for the other two styles could not be apportioned. That is, respondents were asked whether politics interferes to effect the actions of enforcement officers, and the answers were "yes", "no", and "don't know". The "yes" is equivalent to the watch type, but the other responses could have been either service, legalistic, or a combination of types. Similarly the answer of "yes" to the question measuring their concept of justice (Is it that officers will not charge anyone unless they are abusive to them or they don't like them?), is obviously the watch type, but the other answers could be any of the other possibilities.

watch type.

With respect to their image, there is little difference between fisher and DFO official views. Most see that image as legalistic. However, for fishers the next largest percentage say it is a watch image, while for DFO, the next largest percentage, say it is service-oriented.

It is clear that there are some areas where there are differences in perception regarding DFOs enforcement approach. DFO officials tend to think officers interact more sociably and with more of a service-orientation than do their clients. Over a third of these latter compared to only 4.5% of DFO respondents say the social interaction style of the officers is either arrogant, mean, biased, vindictive, detached, and/or impersonal. DFO officials tend to see their main emphasis as service-oriented (they say they care as much about maintaining order as they do about enforcing the laws), and legalistic, but fishers see their behaviour as legalistic first, and service-oriented second.

3.6 Preferred approach to enforcement

Enforcement alternatives are examined in relation to what changes fishers and DFO officials say they want to see, expressed in terms of either a community-based and service-oriented style of enforcement or as its alternative, legalistic enforcement. They are also examined in terms of respondent's perceptions of what officers would need to do in order to gain more respect from fishers, whether respondents feel they can work together in partnerships, or equal partnerships to resolve enforcement problems, and in terms of whether they have ever seen any indications of these kinds of approaches to enforcement in the fisheries.

Since neither group expresses any desire to see changes that would lead toward a watch approach, only two types were identified from their responses to the question of what changes in the enforcement approach do you want to see? Examples of responses that were categorized as community-based included: both DFO and fishers have to change their attitudes and work together; give real authority to fishery officers; introduce a community based enforcement style; carry out focus groups on enforcement problems along problem-oriented policing lines with officers and fishers working together; change DFO into a service orientation; etc. Responses that were organized into the legalistic type included: have enforcement done by a neutral party; be fair and equal in the treatment of clients; implement tougher traditional enforcement (higher fines, more officers, etc.); fishers have to change their attitudes (that is, the problem lies entirely with fishers); etc.

Although the majority of DFO officials and fishers are in agreement, fishers are more strongly in favour of changes in the direction of a community based approach than DFO officials: 88.1% of fishers compared to 65.5% of DFO officials favour this approach. As a check on these answers, the question was put to respondents in a different form at a different point in their interview. In the context of having reviewed their views on how enforcement is being conducted, they were they asked: "How could officers gain more respect from fishers? Their responses were organized into two categories: service-oriented and legalistic. Service-oriented responses included the following: be more service-oriented, talk with us more, be more sociable, involve fishers more, give authority to officers, take off guns, emphasize both conservation and service, show more respect for fishers, and be fair and competent. Legalistic responses included: catch violators, enforce the laws better, redesign fisheries management so the officers can do more enforcement, catch the worst violators, continue as is, there is nothing a lowly officer can do, fishers must

change, keep police "props", and relocate officers frequently to help him to maintain social distance from community.

Answers to this question tended to place less emphasis on the community-based approach than the first question. In this case, 59.3% of fishers and 24.4% of DFO officials say they believe officers can gain respect from fishers by engaging in community-based forms of enforcement. The remainder of each group say they can gain respect from fishers by being more legalistic. These responses demonstrate at least two things. First, most DFO officials misinterpret what fishers want to see and what they need to do in order to gain respect from their clients. However, these comparisons also show that neither fishers nor DFO officials want to see the "heavier" prosecution side of DFOs enforcement mandate replaced by an exclusive focus on the "lighter" form of service-oriented enforcement. The logical conclusion is that, in the view of DFO and its clients, community-based enforcement with its closer ties to clients and arrangements for working together does not replace detection, prosecution and punishing those who step outside of certain boundaries; rather, it adds new tools for resolving enforcement problems.

3.7 Attitudes to partnerships

Respondents were asked if they could work together as partners to solve enforcement problems. A majority in both groups believe this is possible: 68.6% of fishers say yes and another 17.4% say maybe, while 67.9% of DFO officials say yes and 14.3% say maybe. However, given their views that DFO is a punishment-centred, paternalistic organization, and that some proponents of community-based policing argue enforcement partnerships must be equal to be effective, it is also necessary to know whether DFO officials and fishers believe they could work as equals in those partnerships. A majority of each group say they can work as equals (57% of fishers and 60% of DFO officials), another 25% of each group say they might be able to work that way, while only 17.4% of fishers and 14.5% of DFO officials say they could not work as equal partners on enforcement projects.

Since these are hypothetical questions, we wanted to see if their views were based on their experiences with prior or existing partnership arrangements. It is possible that their views are completely based on sentiments of hope, desperation, and faith in progress toward better working relationships. In response to the question: Do you see any signs of these kinds of partnership, 48.7% of fishers say "yes" compared to 61.8% of DFO officials, 47.8% of fishers say "no" compared to 38.2% of DFO officials, and 3.8% of fishers say "maybe", compared to zero DFO officials. This is at least some evidence to suggest that more than sentiment lies behind their desire to see new forms of relationships in fisheries enforcement.

Appendix F: A Normative Enforcement Strategy

The following sets out a strategy for transforming this enforcement organization into the service-oriented and community-based type. Our theory argues that all four structures of the enforcement organization need to take the normative form. That is, the organization needs to be fundamentally oriented to ultimate objectives, using persuasive means, involving morally committed lower participants, and these would have to work together using the approach we have described as the service-oriented and community-based approach. That approach has to project the image of a unified team in which everyone aims to serve the “community” in order to attain their collective and personal ultimate goals. The justice that is dispensed by this organization takes the form of substantive justice because dramatic successes in operations are required to keep the charisma in the system alive. It emphasizes both order maintenance and law enforcement, but at the same time it emphasizes more than just the sum of these two principles, and the specific emphasis will depend on the actual situation and the trade-offs these entail.

The organization’s external environment at the political level has to be supportive of local initiatives, on the one hand, but it has to be effective and legitimate in its own right in its articulation of the national goals of the society. At the same time it needs to “support” those local initiatives that correspond to that vision. Politicians “steer” in this conception of leadership, they do not “row”. This is because that is the only kind of leadership that can stimulate the required degree of initiative and unified collective action at the community level that the organization must have in its external environment, if it is to be successful.

The organization is a system of administration. The normative type of enforcement organization requires consensus in all of the six spheres that we analysed in this study, but consensus is particularly necessary in the spheres of values, goals, and means, since consensus is the basis of its success. This type’s communications need to make strong use of expressive downward communications to energize and catalyse the initiatives that are required from lower participants. Recruitment into the organization needs to be based on a protracted and extensive regime to maximize the moral commitment of participants. There is a need for extensive expressive socialization to build consensus. The organization’s norms need to be adhered to in the absence of a higher participant monitor, and this requires that the organization be pervasive in the lives of participants. The scope of a fishery enforcement organization is, by virtue of the single-sector nature of most fishing communities, one that is total in scope, and this helps to magnify the drama and real life value of the work that is performed. The work needs to be performed largely at the local level by lower participants to whom the appropriate authority is delegated so that they can take the initiative and be creative and charismatic in their partnership relationships with others who similarly search for solutions. Rules are important in this context, but in general rules should be used to explicate situations, or to provide officers and fishers with the leeway they need to more effectively carry out their roles. Since the basis of the system is co-operation and mutual trust, rules in the normative enforcement type are seldom used to monitor the compliance of lower participants.

To implement this approach the organization needs to begin by working with the communities to define the objectives that are to be the organization’s ultimate goals. As we have identified, these goals need to relate to ultimate objectives that have meaning for the lower participant officials as well as their clients. In this particular case the objectives should relate in some way to the unique community lifestyle and to the protection of the resource for this and

future generations. The next task (again in partnership with clients), is to identify a means (partnerships) that is likely to lead toward the ultimate objective. The following is one suggestion: "In partnership with communities, establish and maintain "compliance" with fisheries management plans."

To ensure that the commitment of lower participants remains strong, there must be an operational framework that encourages and supports local initiatives and that delegates the responsibility for developing community-based initiatives to the lowest possible level, taking care to ensure it is as close to the officer level of responsibility, as is possible. To ensure that this does not get out of hand, there is a need to revisit this framework from time to time. This can be done by establishing third party mechanisms to evaluate the effectiveness at achieving compliance by community based partnerships.

In the initial implementation phases three goals and their associated means stand out as important to consider. First, mechanisms and processes need to be developed through which communities may become partners and/or shareholders, and participate fully in resolving non-compliance problems while recognizing the diversity of the communities explicitly in the partnership arrangements. Second, the organization must apply its expertise in ways that help to focus on the real problems. Third, there is a need to increase the legitimacy of the organization.

Building partnership mechanisms requires organizational participants collectively to work out a number of issues:

- define "community", not on ideal constructs of a planning process, but rather on conceptualizations that emerge from meaningful interactions of the organization and its clients. Examples include gear type groups, clusters of communities, and bureaucratic sub-cultures of managers, officers, and others as appropriate;
- determine how communities define the problems and include their definitions in the ultimate objective;
- support new forms of interaction between and among organization officials and client communities;
- take steps to encourage communities to value those who contribute to their compliance objectives; and
- adopt practices that increase the quality and quantity of social interactions between organization officials and their clients and communities in order to:
  - show the organization's interest in listening to their expressions of their goals;
  - find out what they want, and what they think and say about the existing situations;
  - redraft and simplify the rules;
  - catalyse problem solving processes;
  - communicate realistic expectations of enforcement activities;
  - mobilize community leadership; and
  - consult with other agencies.

The identification of non-compliance problems by means of these consensus-based and service-oriented processes obliges the organization to take certain actions:

- establish community enforcement advisory committees at local levels to identify core causes of non-compliance in those areas;
- hold regular public consultations on compliance issues;
- establish baseline surveys of opinions about enforcement effectiveness at appropriate levels of community, and thereafter conduct similar surveys on a regular basis;
- establish working groups on special non-compliance problems; and
- apply "problem-oriented" policing methods to such problems (that is, document, conduct analyses, propose and implement solutions, and monitor, analyse and evaluate results).

Finally, because our theory argues that in its present context, the organization can only become legitimate by becoming a normative organization in all four structural respects, and because the hierarchical authority structure of this organization prevents more persuasive techniques from developing as alternatives to a disciplined authoritarian structure of authority, a number of changes to the authority structure of the organization are required. Some of these include the following:

- reform decision making at local levels;
- decentralize organization controls where feasible ("store fronts" eg. fisheries centres);
- delegate significant amounts of autonomy and responsibility to field offices and officers;
- shift activities and resources away from certain types of punishment-centred patrols and toward information gathering, analysis, and action in partnership with, and in service of the community;
- establish rewards for personnel that motivate their use of initiative, innovation, and practical ability to motivate, serve, and mobilize community members in support of conserving and protecting the resources;
- train officers and clients in service-oriented compliance strategies and in problem-oriented policing techniques, and encourage and facilitate their use of these methods; and
- conduct frequent sessions with communities to encourage compliance. At these sessions, present and discuss analyses of such issues as the projected differences over several years in expected income by type of fishery, given certain levels of reduction in non-compliance.