1

National Library
of Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

CANADIAN THESES
ON MICROFICHE

THÈSES CANADIENNES
SUR MICROFICHE

0-315-04863-8

52757

NAME OF AUTHOR/NOM DE L'AUTEUR JOEL ELLIOTT BROOKS

TITLE OF THESIS/TITRE DE LA THÈSE SOCIO-ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN DEVELOPED DEMOCRACIES:
POLITICO-ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES

UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITÉ CARLETON UNIVERSITY (OTTAWA)

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/
GRADE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE PH. D.

YEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DE CE DEGRÉ 1981

NAME OF SUPERVISOR/NOM DU DIRECTEUR DE THÈSE DR. Leo Panitch

Permission is hereby granted to the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF
CANADA to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies
of the film.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the
thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or other-
wise reproduced without the author's written permission.

L'autorisation est, par la présente, accordée à la BIBLIOTHÈ-
QUE NATIONALE DU CANADA de microfilmer cette thèse et
de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

L'auteur se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la
thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés
ou autrement reproduits sans l'autorisation écrite de l'auteur.

DATED/DATE Sept. 4, 1986 SIGNED/SIGNÉ Joel Elliott Brooks

PERMANENT ADDRESS/RÉSIDENTIE FIXE 9125 Copper Ave., N.E. (APT. 225)
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87123
U. S. A.

National Library of Canada
Collections Development Branch

Canadian Theses on
Microfiche Service

Bibliothèque nationale du Canada
Direction du développement des collections

Service des thèses canadiennes
sur microfiche

NOTICE

The quality of this microfiche is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us a poor photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this film is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1970, c. C-30. Please read the authorization forms which accompany this thesis.

THIS DISSERTATION
HAS BEEN MICROFILMED
EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

AVIS

La qualité de cette microfiche dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de mauvaise qualité.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, examens publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de ce microfilm est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30. Veuillez prendre connaissance des formules d'autorisation qui accompagnent cette thèse.

LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ
MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE
NOUS L'AVONS REÇUE

SOCIO-ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN DEVELOPED DEMOCRACIES:
POLITICO-ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES

Ph. D. Dissertation

by

JOEL ELLIOTT BROOKS

July 1981

Political Science Department
Carleton University
Ottawa, Canada

The undersigned recommend to the Faculty
of Graduate Studies acceptance of the thesis.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN DEVELOPED DEMOCRACIES:
POLITICO-ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES

submitted by Joel Elliott Brooks, M.A.,
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Thesis Supervisor

Chairman, Department
of Political Science

Carleton University

August 1981

ABSTRACT

This dissertation provides a theoretical and empirical (cross-national) analysis of the major determinants and consequences of socio-economic inequality in the developed democracies of Western Europe and North America (circa 1950-1970). A typology of the four major dimensions of "equality" utilized throughout this dissertation is provided in Chapter I. These are: (1) "meritocratic" — focusing on equality of opportunity through primary reliance upon achievement criteria; (2) "welfarist" — focusing on equality of basic economic rights through government provision of social welfare services and employment; (3) "emancipatory" — emphasizing socio-proportional equality (for sexual, ethnic, and racial groups) in relation to privileged societal positions through primary reliance upon ascriptive criteria; (4) "egalitarian" — focusing on equality of income distribution through redistributive policies (the dimension least compatible with advanced capitalism).

The politico-economic determinants of inequality which are examined include the degree of Social Democratic party rule, "left-wing" opposition influence, and trade union power (these three variables forming a composite index termed "left-wing mobilization"). In addition, the economic scope of the state, liberal corporatism, consociationalism, the level of economic development, and external

ABSTRACT (continued)

economic dependence are considered. Regarding the consequences of inequality, political participation and instability, economic growth and industrial strife, crime and ethnic/racial militancy are examined. The sixth and seventh chapters provide empirical results and analysis of the hypothesized relationships involving determinants and consequences of inequality. In brief, some of the most important findings are: (1) there have been modest increases in socio-economic equality from circa 1950-1970 — with gains greatest for meritocratic (i.e., educational equality of opportunity) and smallest for egalitarian (post-tax income equality) dimensions; (2) "left-wing mobilization" is not positively associated with greater egalitarian equality; (3) liberal corporatism is positively associated with greater welfarist and income equality; (4) increases in ethnic/racial equality are correlated with increases in ethnic/racial violence; (5) increases in equality are generally associated with decreases in economic growth.

On balance, the findings lend credence to a view which perceives severe politico-economic constraints in the ability to increase substantially those dimensions of socio-economic equality which are not highly compatible with the interests of advanced capitalism.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>page</u>
ABSTRACT	i
LIST OF TABLES	v
LIST OF FIGURES	viii
PREFACE	ix
I. INTRODUCTION	1
A. Ideological Battle over Legitimation of Inequality	3
B. Typology of Socio-Economic Equality	11
C. Conclusion	23
II. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF INEQUALITY	25
A. Does Politics Matter? (Social Democratic rule)	26
B. Other Forms of Left-Wing Mobilization	37
C. The Capitalist State: Functions and Structures	44
D. Economic Scope of the State	47
E. Liberal Corporatist State	55
F. Consociational State	62
G. Economic Environment	66
H. Conclusion	73
III. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSEQUENCES OF INEQUALITY	75
A. Political Consequences	76
B. Economic Consequences	87
C. Social Consequences	93
D. Conclusion	101
IV. CRITIQUE OF CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH ON INEQUALITY	103
A. Treatment of the Variable "Inequality"	104
B. Studies of the Determinants of Inequality	111
C. Studies of the Consequences of Inequality	119
D. Conclusion	122
V. METHODOLOGY	124
A. Research Design	124
B. Operational Definitions	138
C. Conclusion	161

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

	<u>page</u>
VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS: INEQUALITY AND ITS DETERMINANTS	165
A. Descriptive Examination of Inequality	166
B. Explanations for Changes in Equality (bivariate)	187
1. Left-Wing Mobilization	187
2. Economic Scope of the State	203
3. Liberal Corporatism	216
4. Consociationalism	227
5. Economic Development	240
6. External Economic Dependence	250
C. Explanations for Changes in Equality (multivariate)	260
D. Conclusion	275
VII. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS: CONSEQUENCES OF INEQUALITY	278
A. Political Participation	278
B. Political Instability	292
C. Economic Growth	306
D. Industrial Strife	318
E. Crime	332
F. Ethnic/Racial Militancy	346
G. Conclusion	357
VIII. DENOUEMENT	360
A. Comparison with Past Research and Public Policy Implications	361
B. Overall Conclusions	379
STATISTICAL APPENDIX	383
A. Statistical Measures and Abbreviations	383
B. Multicollinearity	384
C. Treatment of Outliers	388
D. Problems with "Change" Data	388
E. Heteroscedasticity	392
F. Nonlinear Regression	392
SUBSTANTIVE APPENDIX	395
A. Disaggregation of Welfarist Equality	395
B. Disaggregation of Economic Scope	411
BIBLIOGRAPHY	418

LIST OF TABLES

<u>number</u>	<u>page</u>
1.1: Typology of Socio-Economic Equality	13
6.1: Meritocratic Inequality	167
6.2: Welfarist Equality	170
6.3: Ethnic/Racial Equality	174
6.4: Sexual Equality	176
6.5: Inter-Class Inequality	179
6.6: Intra-Class Equality	181
6.7: Summary of Relative Equality Performance	184
6.8: Left-Wing Mobilization	188
6.9: Statistical Summary — Hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2	189
6.10: Economic Scope of the State	204
6.11: Statistical Summary — Hypothesis 2.2	206
6.12: Statistical Summary — hypothesis 2.1	208
6.13: Liberal Corporatism	217
6.14: Statistical Summary — Hypotheses 3.1-3.3	219
6.15: Consociationalism	228
6.16: Statistical Summary — Hypotheses 4.1 and 4.2	231
6.17: Economic Development	241
6.18: Statistical Summary — Hypothesis 5	242
6.19: External Economic Dependence	251
6.20: Statistical Summary — Hypothesis 6	252
6.21: Multiple Regression — Meritocratic Inequality	261
6.22: Multiple Regression — Welfarist Equality	263
6.23: Multiple Regression — Sexual Equality	264
6.24: Multiple Regression — Inter-Class Inequality	266
6.25: Multiple Regression — Intra-Class Equality	268

LIST OF TABLES (continued)

<u>number</u>	<u>page</u>
6.26: Multiple Regression — Summary	269
7.1: Political Participation	280
7.2: Bivariate Relationship — Hypotheses 7.1,7.2	282
7.3: Multiple Regression — Political Participation	283
7.4: Political Instability	293
7.5: Bivariate Relationship — Hypotheses 8.1-8.3	296
7.6: Multiple Regression — Political Instability	298
7.7: Economic Growth	307
7.8: Bivariate Relationship — Hypothesis 9.1,9.2	309
7.9: Multiple Regression — Economic Growth	310
7.10: Industrial Strife	319
7.11: Bivariate Relationship — Hypotheses 10.1-10.3	321
7.12: Multiple Regression — Industrial Strife	322
7.13: Crime	333
7.14: Bivariate Relationship — Hypothesis 11	335
7.15: Partial Correlation — Controlling for Economic Growth	336
7.16: Multiple Regression — Crime	337
7.17: Ethnic/Racial Militancy	347
7.18: Bivariate Relationship — Hypotheses 12.1,12.2	348
7.19: Multiple Regression — Summary	358
A.1: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables (VI)	386
A.2: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables (VII)	387
A.3: Multiple Regression Test for Multicollinearity	389
A.4: Regression Effect for Equality Data	391

LIST OF TABLES (continued).

<u>number</u>	<u>page</u>
A.5: Heteroscedasticity	393
A.6: Welfare Spending (description)	397
A.7: Unemployment Rate (description)	398
A.8: Welfare Spending (dependent variable)	400
A.9: Unemployment Rate (dependent variable)	401
A.10: Welfare Spending (independent variable)	405
A.11: Unemployment Rate (independent variable)	406
A.12: Central Government Expenditures (description)	412
A.13: Public Ownership (description)	413
A.14: Government Expenditures (independent variable)	415
A.15: Public Ownership (independent variable)	416

LIST OF FIGURES

<u>number</u>	<u>page</u>
4.1: Inadequacy of the Gini Index	110
5.1-5.6: Schematic Models of Equality	130-35
6.1-6.6: Scattergrams — Left-Wing Mobilization	197-202
6.7-6.12: Scattergrams — Economic Scope	210-15
6.13-6.18: Scattergrams — Corporatism	221-26
6.19-6.24: Scattergrams — Consociationalism	234-39
6.25-6.30: Scattergrams — Development	244-49
6.31-6.36: Scattergrams — Dependence	254-59
7.1-7.6: Scattergrams — Participation	286-91
7.7-7.12: Scattergrams — Instability	300-05
7.13-7.18: Scattergrams — Growth	312-17
7.19-7.24: Scattergrams — Strikes	326-31
7.25-7.30: Scattergrams — Crime	340-45
7.31-7.36: Scattergrams — Ethnic Militancy	351-56
8.1: Meritocratic Equality Model	362
8.2: Welfarist Equality Model	365
8.3: Ethnic/Racial Equality Model	368
8.4: Sexual Equality Model	371
8.5: Inter-Class Equality Model	373
8.6: Intra-Class Equality Model	377
A.1 : Scattergram — Welfare Spending	402
A.2 : Scattergram — Unemployment	404
A.3 : Scattergram — Welfare Spending	407
A.4 : Scattergram — Welfare Spending	409
A.5 : Scattergram — Unemployment	410

PREFACE

The writing of a dissertation fosters the ability to take as well as give criticism — hopefully leading to greater knowledge and a healthy level of humility. In this regard, I wish to thank Leo Panitch, Michael Dolan, and George Roseme for their encouragement, guidance, and patience in the supervision of this thesis.

While every effort has been made in this dissertation to examine "objectively" the issue of socio-economic inequality in advanced capitalist states, this analytical neutrality should not be mistaken for indifference. I believe it is important for writers to state explicitly their subjective orientation when considering a controversial subject. Thus, I wish to make it clear that as one who believes in egalitarian, democratic socialism, I am appalled and outraged at the rationalizations for and levels of inequality in the "developed democracies" under examination. However, the goal of this thesis is not polemical in nature. Rather, it is to provide a better understanding of the determinants and consequences of socio-economic inequality. This is the essential first step in the long-term struggle to achieve greater equity in the distribution of political and economic resources.

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Few terms of political discourse have had as long a life and as important a role in the making of modern history as the idea of equality. From the earliest outcropping of social controversy to the clash of ideologies in our own day it has continued to arouse great expectations and grave apprehensions. 1

All ... are equal, but some are more equal than others. 2

For at least two dozen centuries, the contentious concept of "equality" has engrossed the minds and passions of demagogues and democrats, philosophers and propagandists. From Aristotelian "just inequalities" and Marxian egalitarianism through Rawlsian "distributive justice" and Orwellian "newspeak", attempts have been made to justify or condemn the presence of political, social, and economic inequality. The question of socio-economic disparity in a society is at the heart of politics. Emphasis on this issue is linked to some of the most fundamental questions of political analysis: In whose interest does the state (in advanced industrial societies) work? Does the partisan nature of the government in power really matter (vis-a-vis the level of societal inequality)? How does the distributive pattern in a nation affect its economic performance and political stability?

1 Sanford Lakoff, Equality in Political Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U. Press, 1964), p.1.

2 George Orwell, Animal Farm (N.Y.: Harcourt & Brace, 1946), p. 112.

Despite the importance of these and related issues regarding inequality, the state of the relevant theoretical literature is generally incomplete, unstructured, and contradictory. As Robert Jackman has lamented: "The literature does not imply any overall theoretical structure concerning the determinants of social equality, but instead, different writers imply (at best) discrete hypotheses pertaining to various aspects of the process."³ In addition (as is made clear in Chapter IV), the quantitative literature in this area is deficient in regard to basic research design and operational procedures utilized. Consequently, the objective of this dissertation is to attempt an integration and clarification of the existing theoretical morass vis-a-vis inequality (Chapters II and III) and an evaluation of the empirical validity of the theoretically derived hypotheses (Chapters VI and VII) while improving upon the inadequate methodological procedures of past studies (Chapter V).

Specifically, this dissertation provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the major determinants and consequences of socio-economic inequality in all major developed democracies (defined and listed on pages 124-25) for the two decades from circa 1950 to 1970. This first chapter will proceed to consider the contemporary ideological battle over the legitimization of inequality. It also will provide a typology (page 13) of the four major equality perspectives utilized throughout this study: meritocratic, emancipatory,

³ Robert Jackman, Politics and Social Equality (N.Y.: Wiley, 1975), pp. 205-6.

welfarist, and egalitarian. The second chapter discusses the theoretical foundations for (and linkages between) hypotheses concerning politico-economic determinants of inequality. This entails consideration, inter alia, of the importance of Social Democratic rule, left-wing opposition, and union power. These three factors are combined to form a composite concept termed "left-wing mobilization". Also considered is the theoretical literature concerning the economic scope of the state, liberal corporatism, consociationalism, economic development, and external economic dependence.

Chapter III focuses on the theoretical bases for (and linkages between) hypotheses concerning political, economic, and social consequences of inequality. The impact of equality upon political participation and instability, economic growth and industrial disputes, crime and ethnic/racial militancy is considered.

Chapter IV presents a critique of previous cross-national quantitative research in this area and thus provides a rationale for this additional empirical study of the issues noted above.

The fifth chapter outlines the research design, operational definitions, and data sources utilized in this dissertation in an attempt to improve upon past efforts. Chapters VI and VII consist of both bivariate and multivariate quantitative analysis of the hypothesized determinants and consequences of inequality. A comparison of results with previous empirical studies, exploration of public policy implications, and overall theoretical conclusions are provided in the final chapter.

A. The Ideological Battle over the Legitimation of Inequality

Two points of view concerning socio-economic inequality have predominated from ancient to contemporary times. One is

4

basically supportive of the status quo, viewing the existing distribution of societal rewards as equitable, just, and frequently also inevitable. The other is highly critical, rejecting the distributive system as essentially unjust and unnecessary. Lenski refers to the first of these viewpoints as the "conservative thesis" and the second as the "radical antithesis". These "terms seem fitting since historically the major controversies over social inequality have been essentially dialogues between proponents of these two schools of thought." ⁴ However, it is not the purpose of this section to delineate in detail the various normative arguments (from those of classical Greek philosophers to modern theorists) regarding equality. This has been ably done elsewhere. ⁵ Instead, the focus will be on briefly establishing the contemporary ideological milieu within which the battle over legitimizing inequality occurs.

Most modern theories of inequality can be classified according to Lenski's dichotomous categories noted above. Two prominent examples derived from the "conservative tradition" (using this term as does Lenski) are the "functionalism" of Parsons and the "theory of justice" of Rawls. Talcott Parsons and his former student Kingsley

⁴ Gerhard Lenski, Power and Privilege: a Theory of Social Stratification (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 5.

⁵ For example, see Lakoff; Francis Wilhoit, "A Survey of Theories of Equality", in his Quest for Equality in Freedom (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1979), pp. 11-52; John Rees, Equality (London: Pall Mall, 1971); Bernard Williams, "The Idea of Equality", in Laslett and Runciman (eds.), Philosophy, Politics and Society (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), pp. 110-31.

Davis approach the issue of inequality from the perspective of society at large, viewing it as a necessary feature of any properly functioning system. Davis captured the functionalist perspective in a single sentence when he wrote: "Social inequality is thus an unconsciously evolved device by which societies ensure that the most important positions are conscientiously filled by the most qualified persons."⁶ This is the essence of the functionalist position in this regard:

Stratification arises basically out of the needs of societies, not out of the needs or desires of individuals.... Since all positions can never be of equal importance, nor all men equally qualified for the more responsible positions, inequality is inevitable. Not only is it inevitable, it is necessarily beneficial to everyone, since the survival and well-being of every individual is contingent on the survival and well-being of society. 7

One of the most provocative presentations in recent years is Rawls' conception of "justice". Like Plato in The Republic, Rawls is basically concerned with the primacy of justice in the good society and with the two most important elements of justice: freedom and equality. Writing in the social contract tradition, Rawls posits "principles of justice" that free and rational individuals

⁶ Kingsley Davis, Human Society (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1949), p. 367.

⁷ Lenski, p. 15. Also see Talcott Parsons, "Equality and Inequality in Modern Society", Sociological Inquiry, Spring 1970, pp. 13-72.

would supposedly accept in an initial position of equality in a hypothetical state of nature.⁸ Operating under a "veil of ignorance" in which rational persons concerned with advancing their own interests do not know how the various alternatives will affect their particular situation, two "principles of justice" would supposedly emerge. These are: (1) "each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others"; (2) "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity." These principles are to be arranged hierarchically with the first superior in importance to the second.⁹ Thus, Rawls places higher value on "freedom" than "equality". Indeed, his principles of "justice" have been attacked as being capable of justifying "gross and pervasive" inequalities of wealth.¹⁰

In contrast to the contemporary proponents of the "conservative thesis", others (e.g., neo-Marxists) who

⁸ John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U. Press, 1971).

⁹ Ibid., pp. 60-61, 83.

¹⁰ See Brian Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice: A Critical Examination of the Principle Doctrines in "A Theory of Justice" by John Rawls (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 141; Norman Daniels (ed.), Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls' Theory of Justice (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1975).

have their roots in the "radical tradition" stress the inequities, contradictions, and potential conflict arising from socio-economic inequality. "Where the functionalists emphasize the common interests shared by the members of a society, conflict theorists emphasize the interests which divide. Where functionalists stress the common advantages which accrue from social relationships, conflict theorists emphasize the element of domination and exploitation."¹¹

In providing a "radical" response to the Rawlsian position, Macpherson has written:

Rawls proposes and defends his principles of justice as criteria for judging the moral worth of various distributions of rights and income only within a class-divided society. His explicit assumption is that institutionalized inequalities which affect men's whole life-prospects are "inevitable in any society".... It may be that the difference between us here is about what is necessarily involved in the existence of classes unequal in income or wealth. Rawls ... thinks they are consistent with a substantial equality in liberty and personal rights, in any society, including a capitalist market society. I have argued, on the contrary, that these are inconsistent in a capitalist market society, where class inequality of income or wealth is the result and the means of an inequality in power which reaches to the liberties, rights, and essential humanity of the individuals in those classes. ¹²

¹¹ Lenski, pp. 16-17. See Leon Lindberg et al. (eds.), Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism: Public Policy and the Theory of the State (Toronto: D.C. Heath, 1975).

¹² C. B. Macpherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (London: Oxford U. Press, 1973), pp. 87-94.

The ideological differences briefly outlined above provide the environment within which the struggle for mass legitimation of inequality takes place. In this struggle, "One of the central aims of any dominant class is to make the rules governing the distribution of rewards seem legitimate in the eyes of all, including those who stand to gain least from such rules."¹³ The dominant value system endorses the existing structure of inequality and is a concept derived from Marx's famous statement that "the ideas of the ruling class are, in every age, the ruling ideas." This proposition is based on the assumption that those groups in society which occupy the positions of greatest power and privilege also will tend to have the greatest access to the means of legitimation.¹⁴

However, the dominant value system has competition. Two competing perspectives are: (1) a "subordinate" value system entailing adaptive rather than oppositional responses to the status quo, and (2) a "radical" value system promoting an oppositional interpretation of class inequalities. As Parkin explains:

In so far as it is possible to characterize a complex set of normative arrangements by a single

¹³ Frank Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order (London: Paladin, 1971), p. 48.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 82. Regarding the socialization process of legitimation, see Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Quartet, 1969), chps. 7 and 8.

term, the subordinate value system could be said to be essentially accommodative; that is to say its representation of the class structure and inequality emphasizes various modes of adaptation, rather than full endorsement of, or opposition to, the status quo.... The radical value system purports to demonstrate the systematic nature of class inequality, and attempts to reveal a connectedness between man's personal fate and the wider political order. The social source of this meaning-system is the mass political party based on the subordinate class. The party's interpretation of the reward structure draws upon a set of precepts — typically of a socialist or Marxist variety — which are fundamentally opposed to those underlying the institutions of capitalism. 15

Thus, although there is a factual and material basis to socio-economic inequality, there are many ways in which it can be interpreted. Between an objective condition of inequality and the response of a disadvantaged person lie the perceptions, evaluations, expectations — i.e., the psyche — of the individual. To the astonishment and dismay of "... activists who struggle to rouse a disadvantaged group to oppose its lot, the human psyche does not invariably impel those who are deprived of equality to seek it, or sometimes even to want it." 16 This is reflected, for example, in the results of Lane's study regarding the American worker's "fear" of equality. 17

¹⁵ See Parkin, pp. 88 and 97; Richard Hyman and Ian Brough, Social Values and Industrial Relations: A Study of Fairness and Equality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), ch. 7.

¹⁶ See Robert Dahl, Pluralism: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, Conn.: Yale U. Press, 1971), p. 95.

¹⁷ See Robert Lane, "The Fear of Equality", American Political Science Review, March 1959, pp. 35-51.

T. H. Marshall has argued that contemporary democratic industrial society is historically unique in attempting to sustain a system of contradictory stratification values.

"All previous societies had class systems that assumed inequality, but they also denied citizenship to all except a small elite. Once full and equal political (manhood suffrage) and economic (trade union organization) citizenship was established, the equalitarian emphasis inherent in the concept sustains a continuing attack on many aspects of inequality." ¹⁸ Marshall has stressed the concept of "mass citizenship" which arose with the industrial revolution and the gradual growth of civil, political, and socio-economic rights over the last two centuries. This process can be viewed as posing a challenge to the legitimacy of present class inequalities by implying that all are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which this status is endowed. "Societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed. The urge forward along the path thus plotted is an urge towards a fuller measure of equality." ¹⁹

¹⁸ Quoted in S. M. Lipset, "The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary European Politics", Daedalus, Winter 1964, pp. 293-4.

¹⁹ T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1950), pp. 29-30.

While the establishment of recognized political and legal equality provides some of the normative and structural prerequisites for attaining a greater degree of economic equality, it also accentuates the inherent tension and contradiction in Western democracies between the inequalities of an economic system which is capitalist and the formal equality of a political system which is liberal-democratic. This schizophrenic character can result in severe strain on the perceived legitimacy of such systems.²⁰ As Lipset has observed: "The predominant character of modern industrial democracy ... is in part a result of the chronic tensions between the inherent pressures toward inequality and the emphasis in democracy on equality."²¹ It is within this context that this study examines the struggle between equalitarian and unequalitarian forces in Western societies.

B. Typology of "Socio-Economic Equality"

In this dissertation, the term "socio-economic equality" is viewed as a multi-dimensional concept. Unfortunately, the normative, empirical, and theoretical literature is often confused or incomplete in its treatment of the distinct

²⁰ See Alan Wolfe, The Limits of Legitimacy: Political Contradictions of Contemporary Capitalism (N.Y.: Free Press, 1977).

²¹ Lipset, p. 294.

equality perspectives (see discussion in Chapter IV). Thus, it is necessary to clarify and differentiate the four major dimensions encompassed within this concept: meritocratic, egalitarian, welfarist, and emancipatory equality (see discussion below and Table 1.1, next page).

Meritocratic equality is concerned with equality of opportunity for valued societal positions. This perspective takes a market-oriented economy as a given and merely attempts to ensure that all individuals have a relatively equal chance — based upon merit — of altering their income and status. Society-wide income differentials remain as large as ever.²² This version of equality "discriminates" between individuals on the basis of their innate capacities and performances. The full implementation of the meritocratic doctrine would tend to produce "a class system with a low degree of self-reproduction through time, corresponding to Durkheim's vision of the ideal society in which 'social inequalities exactly express natural inequalities'."²³ It would present the "paradigm case" of a society in which the dominant class would be more dedicated to the defense of a particular conception,

²² See Sylvia Bowlett, "Inequality and It's Implications for Economic Growth", in Irving Horowitz (ed.), Equity, Income, and Policy (N.Y.: Praeger, 1977), p. 34.

²³ Frank Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory: a Bourgeois Critique (N.Y.: Columbia U. Press, 1979), p. 66.

Table 1.1: Typology of Socio-Economic Equality

Type. of Equality Perspective	Primary Goal	Primary Focus	Primary Approach	Public Policy Examples	Relative Theoretical Compatibility With Advanced Capitalism
MERITOCRATIC	equality of opportunity for privileged societal positions	individual merit	social mobility through reliance upon achievement criteria	programs to increase access to higher education	most compatible
WELFARIST	minimum standard of living guarantee	economic "citizenship rights"	government provision of social welfare services and jobs	national health insurance, full employment	moderately high compatibility
EMANCIPATORY (a) ethnic/racial variant (b) sexual variant	socio-proportional equality vis-a-vis privileged societal positions and income distribution	sociological groups	social mobility through reliance upon ascriptive criteria	quotas and "affirmative action" programs	moderately low compatibility
EGALITARIAN (a) inter-class variant (b) intra-class variant	equality of economic reward: (a) between, (b) within (working class) societal positions	economic class	reallocation of property and/or income through modification of market forces	nationalization, income redistribution programs	(a) least compatible (b) moderately low compatibility

of distributive justice than to its own particular immortality. "The duty of the state would be to set up conditions to ensure that class succession went to the gifted and deserving, on the grounds that only this system of inequality has any prospect of capturing the affection of all the people, including the least rewarded." ²⁴

However, as Parkin has observed: "The meritocratic interpretation ... is perfectly compatible with a modern capitalist order. Indeed, its emphasis on the most efficient use of talent would in many ways make a positive contribution to such an order." ²⁵

Warning against the "dangers" of meritocracy, Miller and Roby have argued that meritocratic thinking provides a rationalization for the existing distribution of economic rewards. Inequalities in income are explained as resulting from basic differences in ability — not from structural advantages and disadvantages. Thus, existing salary and wage differentials for different jobs are legitimated as emanating from educational and skill differences. However, it is the feeling of ~~some~~ that "the meritocratic society is not the good society. For in the meritocratic society, deep inequalities can exist, only their justifi-

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Parkin, Class Inequality..., p. 123.

cation has shifted from divine right to educational prowess. Even the achieving of high rates of social mobility does not diminish the important differences among strata." ²⁶

The egalitarian interpretation of equality is concerned with eradicating privileges, not (as in meritocratic equality) with simply changing the means by which they are allocated. Egalitarianism (in its "inter-class variant") raises objections to the wide disparities of income and power accruing to different "classes" or social positions. "On what grounds, it is asked, is it morally legitimate to give greater economic and social benefits to one set of occupations than to another, when each in its own way contributes to the social good?" ²⁷ The egalitarian perspective rejects the use of the market as a distributive mechanism. Differences in reward can only be justified by differences in social need, not by economic power. This egalitarian view is more radical than the meritocratic perspective in so far as it embodies principles which are opposed to the present system based on private ownership of productive property and a "free market" economy. ²⁸ However, the "intra-(working) class variant" of egalitarianism narrows its

²⁶ S. M. Miller and Pamela Roby, "Social Mobility, Equality, and Education", Social Policy, May-June 1970, p. 39.

²⁷ Parkin, Class Inequality..., p. 13.

²⁸ See discussion in Ibid., pp. 123-24.

focus to economic inequalities within the working class. As such, this significantly more limited perspective ~~is~~ more compatible with a capitalist society. Nevertheless, the capitalist need to maintain wage differentials for an "orderly and efficient" job market plus the danger of a "spillover effect" by admitting the legitimacy of egalitarianism (even within only the working class) suggest that intra-class equality is less compatible with advanced capitalism than meritocratic or welfarist perspectives. The implications of this "doctrine of socialism in one class",²⁹ are explored in the discussion of corporatism (in Chapter II) and "relative deprivation" theory (in Chapter III).³⁰

Between the extremes of meritocratic and egalitarian equality exist two intermediate dimensions — welfarist and emancipatory (sexual and ethnic/racial variants) equality. The term "welfarist" represents the equality perspective of the welfare state. As Wilensky

²⁹ See Leo Panitch, Social Democracy and Industrial Militancy (N.Y.: Cambridge U. Press, 1976), p. 244.

³⁰ Those who oppose egalitarian equality and support the "politics of productivity" stress the maximization of economic growth and technological development as means to increase the absolute size of everyone's income. For example, see discussion in Robert Isaak, European Politics: Political Economy and Policy Making in Western Democracies (N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1980), p. 169. The relationship between equality and growth is discussed in detail in Chapter III.

describes it: "The essence of the welfare state is government-protected minimum standards of income, nutrition, health, housing, and education, assured to every citizen as a political right, not as charity.... It represents a general strategy for constructing a floor below which no one sinks." ³¹ The welfarist version of equality involves the provision of economic security for the overwhelming majority of the population through a large and growing public sector. "It is a state democratic in form, interventionist by inclination, and eager to manage the capitalist economy to achieve steady economic growth and maintain full employment." ³²

It is argued that attempts to remedy inequality by the welfarist approach bring about relatively little disturbance of the stratification system. As a consequence, it is deemed generally to be compatible with an advanced capitalist society. ³³ For example, Cy Gonick argues that the "vast proportion of public expenditures" subsidizes the business community through "blue chip socialism" such as favorable tax concessions. ³⁴ Others, in this same vein,

³¹ Harold Wilensky, The New Corporatism. Centralization, and the Welfare State (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976), pp. 8-9.

³² John Logue, "The Welfare State: Victim of Its Success", Daedalus, Fall 1979, pp. 69, 74.

³³ Parkin, Class Inequality...., p. 127.

³⁴ See Cy Gonick, "Sociology and the Economics of Growthmanship", in Lapierre (ed.), Essays on the Left (Toronto: U. of Toronto Press, 1971), p. 139.

contend that education spending can be viewed as a subsidy to business by socializing the costs of training manpower and that welfare spending subsidizes the failure of the private market system.³⁵ Marxists, such as O'Connor, Panitch, and Gough explain the welfare state as a necessary concession which is made in order to ensure continued dominance by the ruling class — as a means of fulfilling the "legitimation function" of the state.³⁶

Parkin suggests that the allocation of welfare benefits to the less privileged segments of society serves to undermine potential radical or revolutionary movements. From this perspective, the expenses incurred by the provision of welfare services are more than offset by the prevention of more drastic types of equalitarian policy. It is also argued that welfarist equality may be acceptable to the dominant class because it can result in increased efficiency of the work force. Workers who enjoy good housing, health care, and basic education can be more productive than workers who live in squalor, disease, and ignorance. In addition, payment for and utilization of social services which are available in the typical welfare

³⁵ See discussion in Richard Simeon, "Studying Public Policy", Canadian Journal of Political Science, Dec. 1976, pp. 564-65.

³⁶ See James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1973); Leo Panitch, "The Role and Nature of the Canadian State", in his The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power (Toronto: U. of Toronto Press, 1977), pp. 3-27; Ian Gough, "State Expenditure in Advanced Capitalism", New Left Review, July-Aug. 1975, pp. 53-92. Also see the discussion in Chapter II of the functions and structures of the capitalist state.

state do not necessarily result in a net advantage for the subordinate class. "Social security contributions in most welfare states tend to be either regressive, by requiring a flat rate payment, or proportional to income. The effect of this is to impose a relatively greater burden on lower-income groups than does direct taxation."³⁷ It appears that much of the redistribution which does occur is of a "horizontal" rather than "vertical" nature. That is, it consists of contributions from groups like the young or unmarried which are largely subsidizing payments to the elderly or the sick or those with large families. In other words, it is a form of "life-cycle" transfer which does not necessarily entail much movement of financial resources from one social class to another.³⁸

The emancipatory equality perspective focuses on alleviating structured inequalities arising from either ethnic/racial or sexual cleavages in developed societies.³⁹ This type of equality is concerned with proportional representation of nonassociational groups in all valued societal

³⁷ Parkin, Class Inequality ..., pp. 124-25..

³⁸ Ibid., p. 125

³⁹ Regarding the "sexual variant" of emancipatory equality, see Cynthia Epstein, "Sex: Ascribed Inequality", in Thielbar and Feldman (eds.), Issues in Social Inequality (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), pp. 597-609; John Moroney, "Do Women Earn Less Under Capitalism?", in his Income Inequality (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1979), pp. 141-60. Regarding the "ethnic/racial variant", see John Grove, "Ethnic Socio-Economic Redistribution", Comparative Politics, vol. 12, Oct. 1979, pp. 87-98; Christopher Hewitt, "Majorities and Minorities: A Comparative Survey of Ethnic Violence", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Sept. 1977, pp. 150-60.

positions and equality in average income for all relevant sociological groups. As such, this perspective is clearly distinct from egalitarianism. Douglas Rae explains:

Emancipatory equality leads not to a reduction or eradication of simple or direct inequalities in allocation but to an equalized incidence of these inequalities over races (or sexes, ethnic groups, and the like). It is a logical and empirical possibility that the state may successfully pursue emancipatory equality without any commitment to simple or direct equality [i.e., egalitarianism]. And pursuit of simple or direct equality need not be associated with any progress toward emancipatory equality, except insofar as it reduces the importance of the struggle for privileged roles. 40

There also is a basic distinction between the meritocratic and emancipatory views of equality. With the emancipatory approach, the basis of job placement is not solely merit. Instead, ascriptive traits play a significant role in the process. In a sense, this reliance upon ascription by some advanced industrial societies amounts to turning the (Parsonian; Lipset et al.) modernization "ascriptive-achievement dichotomy" on its head. As Offe has observed:

Vigorous social movements have emerged in the last decade or so which have defined themselves in terms of ... collective identities attached to such "naturalistic" categories as sex, age, race, and region. Such movements ... are an embarrassing proof of failure of a whole school of social science which for decades has claimed that, in the course of "modernization", so-called "ascriptive" social roles and conflicts lose their significance and are replaced by criteria of "achievement". 41

40 Douglas Rae, "The Egalitarian State: Notes on a System of Contradictory Ideals", Daedalus, Fall 1979, pp. 43-44.

41 Claus Offe, "The 'Ungovernability' of Liberal Democracies", Studies in Political Economy: A Socialist Review, Spring 1980, p. 15.

According to the emancipatory perspective, less qualified individuals can be hired if they are members of a "disadvantaged group" which is underrepresented in the particular occupational category under consideration. This contradicts the positive contribution to capitalism (noted earlier) of the meritocratic approach. Thus, emancipatory equality's theoretical compatibility with advanced capitalism is lower. Of course, though this approach may reject the meritocratic criterion of ability vis-a-vis minority and majority applicants for a job vacancy, the criterion of merit is not ignored when selecting which minority-group member among those available is eligible for the valued position. However, what is important is the second-order (rather than first-order) priority given to merit in the emancipatory approach.

Emancipatory equality, especially in its "ethnic/racial variant", has been vehemently attacked as undesirable and unworkable. The question raised is: How far may society go in providing special help — called "affirmative action" by some and "reverse discrimination" by others — to minorities that have suffered from past discrimination? For example, the United States Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of a 1977 federal law which specified that out of \$ 4 billion to be spent helping states and localities finance public works, at least 10% had to go to contracting firms owned 50% or more by citizens who

are (according to the statute) "Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts". In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens noted that if race could be a criterion for receiving public funds, the government would have to spell out who belongs to what race. He bitterly suggested as a model the Nazi law defining who was considered to be a "Jew" under the Third Reich.⁴² In addition, Rae argues that in a pluralist society, with its rich array of divisions, there are very many possible "emancipations". Why not equalize between (in the American context) Anglo and Hispanic, Northerner and Southerner, Catholic and Protestant, etc. The trouble, of course, is that equalizing the incidence of inequality over one such cleavage will not necessarily equalize its incidence across another. "And how is the juridicial apparatus of government to set priorities among competing emancipationist demands? Can it say (with a straight face) that such demands for equality are unequal? If not, an intractable tangle of emancipatory demands will ensue."⁴³

Supporters of emancipatory equality argue that its critics are using a double standard. Lester Thurow contends that if one looks at revealed social preferences, Western

⁴² "Four Big Court Decisions", Time, July 14, 1980, pp. 8-10.

⁴³ Rae, p. 44.

societies certainly cannot claim to focus consistently on individuals rather than groups.

Affirmative action and quota programs for minorities and women may be on the defensive, but programs for the elderly and farmers both abound and are expanding.... It is easy to conclude that society invokes the principle of individuality only when it comes to dealing with groups that have suffered from discrimination. In other cases it is willing to use the principle of group as opposed to individual welfare. ⁴⁴

Yet, it is argued, the use of group criteria for discrimination in the past necessitates the state utilize group criteria to alleviate the effects of discrimination in the present. "To insist on an individual focus is to de facto insist that the effects of discrimination linger for a very long time after positive discrimination has ceased to exist." ⁴⁵

C. Conclusion

The discussion of issues introduced in this first chapter — the battle over legitimation of inequality and the differences between various perspectives of equality — provides a foundation for the theoretical consideration

⁴⁴ Lester Thurow, "A Theory of Groups: Which Age, Sex, Ethnic, and Religious Groups Are Relevant", in Moroney (ed.), Income Inequality (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1979), pp. 180-81. Also see Vernon Van Dyke, "The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory", World Politics, April 1977, pp. 343-69.

⁴⁵ Thurow, p. 181.

of the potential determinants and consequences of inequality in the next two chapters. For example, in assessing the impact of the partisan composition of government (one of the determinants of inequality discussed in Chapter II), should one expect different results for those dimensions of equality least — as opposed to most — theoretically compatible with advanced capitalism (according to the typology proposed)? In examining the consequences of inequality (Chapter III), does the accommodative value system (discussed earlier in relation to the legitimation of inequality) mitigate the impact of inequality upon the variables considered and contribute to a "socialized passivity" among the masses? These are among the issues addressed in the two chapters which follow.

CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF INEQUALITY.

Question: What is the difference between Capitalism and Socialism?

Answer: Under Capitalism man exploits man; under Socialism it's the other way around. ¹

One popular [though apocryphal] story in the Soviet Union tells of Party Boss Brezhnev inviting his mother to his elegant villa in the Crimea. He shows her the lavish furnishings, his yachts, art treasures, and fleet of foreign cars he has received as gifts from visiting heads of state. After a table-groaning banquet, he asks: "Well, Mama, what do you think? Not bad for your little boy?" To which the old woman replies: "My son, it's very impressive. But what if the Communists come to power?" ²

This chapter examines the theoretical basis for hypotheses concerning major determinants of socio-economic inequality. After an initial consideration of the putative impact of Social Democratic rule, attention will turn to other forms of "left-wing mobilization" (i.e., opposition and trade union strength), the economic scope of the state, liberal corporatism, consociationalism, economic development, and external economic dependence.

¹ Paraphrase of Russian saying which appears in Gerhard Lenski, Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 297.

² "Socialism: Trials and Errors", Time, March 13, 1978, p. 27.

A. Does Politics Matter? (the impact of Social Democratic rule)

Behind the jocular hyperbole of the quotations above lies a very serious question: To what extent (and in what manner) does the partisan nature of the government affect the degree of socio-economic inequality in society? Many of the theories offered by economists, sociologists, and political scientists to try to explicate the degree of inequality either ignore the role of politics or conclude that it has little (or no) significance. One can discern four major schools of thought regarding the impact of the type of government (Social Democratic vs. liberal/conservative or "bourgeois") on the level of equality:

(1) Functionalist, (2) End of Ideology, (3) Democratic Class Conflict, (4) Constrained Socialism. The first two schools deny the importance of party politics vis-a-vis inequality. The latter two schools of thought contend that politics matters — though they differ on the constraints imposed upon possible socialist reforms.

As discussed briefly in Chapter I (p. 5), the Functionalist view argues the inevitability and necessity of socio-economic inequalities which arise out of the "needs of society."³ Thus, this school of thought contends that political ideology can have no significant or lasting

³ See Kingsley Davis, Human Society (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1949); Talcott Parsons, "Equality and Inequality in Modern Society", Sociological Inquiry, Spring 1970, pp. 13-72.

impact on the stratification system of industrial society. It suggests that the "needs" or "demands" of a modern technological order inherently lead to a certain type of social structure — irrespective of governmental philosophy. According to this school, the present structure of inequalities has important functions for the motivation and recruitment of individuals to different social positions in the most efficient manner. Any attempt to tamper with this (e.g., because of a doctrinal commitment to egalitarianism) is likely to run counter to the innate "logic" of modern industrialism.⁴ Thus, the political coloration of governments is viewed to be more or less irrelevant to the structure of inequality.⁵ As Goldthorpe states:

It is notable that in spite of possibly different origins, American interpretations of the development of industrial societies often reveal marked similarities. Basically, they tend to be alike in stressing the standardizing effects upon social structures of the exigencies of modern technology and an advanced economy. These factors which make for uniformity in industrial societies are seen as largely overriding other factors which may make for possible diversity, such as different national cultures or different political systems. Thus, the overall pattern of development which is suggested is one in which, once countries enter into the advanced stages of industrialization, they tend to become increasingly comparable in their major institutional arrangements and in their social systems generally. In brief, a convergent pattern of development is hypothesized.⁶

⁴ See Clark Kerr et al., Industrialism and Industrial Man (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U. Press, 1960).

⁵ See discussion by Frank Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order (London: Paladin, 1971), pp. 104-5.

⁶ John Goldthorpe, "Social Stratification in Industrial Society", in Lipset and Bendix (eds.), Class, Status and Power, 2nd ed. (NY: Free Press, 1966), pp. 648-49.

Regarding intervention of the state in economic affairs (e.g., public ownership or social welfare programs), "the tendency is to see behind this action not a particular complex of socio-political beliefs, values, or interests but rather the inherent compulsions of 'industrialism' itself."⁷

The second school of thought (epitomized by the writings of Bell and Kirchheimer) argues that there has been an "end" (i.e., significant decline) of ideologically-based politics in the post-war era. Given the development of what Kirchheimer termed the "catch-all party", the partisan composition of the government is of little relevance vis-a-vis inequality.⁸ As Heisler explains:

The decline of ideology hypothesis refers to either one of two propositions: (1) a relative modulation over the last two decades of the ultimacy with which ideological goals are stated, or (2) a relative attenuation of the emotive intensity with which ideological goals are pursued. The hypothesis does not suggest the total disappearance of ideologies. The notion of an "end" of ideology is simply a euphemism. What the hypothesis does convey is an ending of "apocalyptic", "total", or "extremist" ideologies — that is to say, a decline of

⁷ Ibid., p. 650. For a critique of this school of thought, see Richard Scase, Social Democracy in Capitalist Society (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1977), pp. 10-13; Francis Castles and Robert McKinlay, "Public Welfare Provision, Scandinavia, and the Sheer Futility of the Sociological Approach to Politics", British Journal of Political Science, April 1979, pp. 157-71.

⁸ See Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960); Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party System", in LaPalombara and Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U. Press, 1966), pp. 177-200; Mostafa Rejai (ed.), Decline of Ideology? (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971).

ideology. 9

The most important changes in societies manifesting a decline of ideology revolve around economic development and its alleged consequences: an increasing broad-based affluence; an increasing reliance upon expertise and science; an increasing attenuation of class conflict resulting from the emergence of a vast, homogeneous middle class; a transformation of laissez-faire capitalism into the welfare state; and a gradual institutionalization of stable political processes for resolution of political controversies.¹⁰ In its most recent incarnation, the End of Ideology school has surfaced in discussions of the supposed "ungovernability" of modern democracies. For example, Offe argues that the contemporary inability of political parties to fulfill their governing function stems, in part, from "the over-extension of the strategy of the 'catch-all' party which tries to win votes from wherever they come, denying any class-specific base of its programme and politics..., where a condition prevails that in the late 1950s was celebrated as the 'end of ideology'...."¹¹ According to this view, conflicting class-interests remain, but fail to be expressed through the traditional channel of the party system.

⁹ Martin Heisler (ed.), Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes in Some Postindustrial Democracies (N.Y.: David McKay, 1974), p. 40.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 41.

¹¹ Claus Offe, "The 'Ungovernability' of Liberal Democracies", Studies in Political Economy, Spring 1980, pp. 10-12.

In contrast to the previous two schools of thought, there is a body of literature (the Democratic Class Conflict school) which contends that politics — specifically the type of party in office — can have a significant impact in terms of "performance traits". Thus, Groth argues that "we could more readily gauge some specific allocations of resources in a given society if we knew that it was, for example, Communist than if we knew its Gross National Product, its level of urbanization, or any of its ethnic or geographic characteristics." ¹² Alford writes that where the relative power of left-wing parties is greater, "lower income groups are able to secure more of the national product than where the Left has less power." ¹³ Rejecting the End of Ideology perspective, this school contends that important ideological distinctions exist between socialist and "bourgeois" parties in relation to inequality. As Parkin observes:

In all industrial societies political movements have emerged with the express aim of changing the reward structure to the advantage of the working class. With the partial exception of the United States, creation of an industrial workforce has everywhere brought in its wake the creation of socialist or communist parties committed to changing the existing arrangements of power and privilege, whether by revolutionary or constitutional means.... It would be incorrect to say that ideological differences on the problem of inequality no longer

¹² Alexander Groth, Comparative Politics: A Distributive Approach (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1971), p. 21.

¹³ Robert Alford, Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), p. 300.

exist between socialist and bourgeois parties in capitalist societies. The former parties still derive their mass support from members of the subordinate class, and it is to the material and social improvement of this section of society that socialist parties are still nominally committed. ¹⁴

Scase argues that among Social Democratic parties, there appears to have been a deradicalization of means rather than ends. "In the latter part of the nineteenth and the first two decades of the twentieth century, the Party emphasized the necessity of dismantling capitalism as a means whereby egalitarian ends could be achieved. However, from the 1920s onwards, Party leaders have stressed that egalitarian goals can be achieved by the adoption of welfare-reformist policies within the context of capitalism as a socio-economic system." ¹⁵ The deradicalization and flexibility of means to attain egalitarian goals have been viewed as enlightened and politically pragmatic — indicating a shift to "functional socialism". ¹⁶

The issue of socialist ideology is posed in its most acute form when supposed working-class parties are elected to political power in democratic, capitalist societies. The Democratic Class Conflict school assumes that in highly centralized states, the national government has the power to create fundamental changes in the stratification system.

¹⁴ Parkin, p. 103.

¹⁵ Scase, pp. 79-80.

¹⁶ Ibid. Also see Francis Castles, The Social Democratic Image of Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978); William Paterson and Ian Campbell, Social Democracy in Post-War Europe (N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1974).

As a consequence, when the presumed political representatives of the subordinate class come to office, social and material advantages should be redistributed on a more equal basis than when the party representative of the dominant class is in power. This is the major assumption underlying the view that elections in Western countries represent a "democratic translation of the class struggle".¹⁷ Lipset writes that in most Western nations, "the more deprived strata, in income and status terms, continue to express their resentment against the stratification system... by voting for parties which stand for an increase in welfare state measures and for state intervention in the economy to prevent unemployment and increase their income vis-a-vis the more privileged strata."¹⁸ It is important to stress that in light of this view, the shape of the stratification system is open to manipulation by the governing party.

Even though many political parties renounce the principle of class loyalty or conflict, an analysis of their electoral support and campaign appeals indicates that they do reflect (at least superficially) the interests of different socio-economic groups in society. As Lipset suggests:

¹⁷ See discussion by Parkin, p. 104.

¹⁸ S.M. Lipset, "The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary European Politics", Daedalus, vol. 93, Winter 1964, p. 279.

More than anything else the party struggle is a conflict among classes, and the most impressive single fact about political party support is that in virtually every economically developed country the lower-income groups vote mainly for parties of the left, while the higher-income groups vote mainly for parties of the right.... The simplest explanation for this widespread pattern is simple economic self-interest. The leftist parties represent themselves as instruments of social change in the direction of equality; the lower-income groups support them in order to become economically better off, while the higher-income groups oppose them in order to maintain their economic advantages. 19

The assertion "votes are more equally distributed than pound notes" could serve as the basic credo of the Democratic Class Conflict school. However, the questions begged by this assertion are those also begged by this school of thought. Upon what basis can it be assumed that the state will be more responsive to "votes" than to the other conflicting pressures imposed upon it — pressures to maintain the existing patterns of inequality? How likely is it that votes, however equally distributed, will be used to demand and obtain the pursuit of equality? 20 The Constrained Socialism school addresses these and related issues. This neo-Marxist literature contends that in contemporary capitalist society, the dual factors of a market economy and political pluralism make significant redistributive efforts extremely difficult

¹⁹ S.M. Lipset, Political Man (N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 230-39. Also see Douglas Hibbs, "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy", American Political Science Review, Dec. 1977, pp. 1467-87.

²⁰ See Colin Crouch, "Introduction to Part II", in Lindberg et al. (eds.), Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism: Public Policy and the Theory of the State (Toronto: D.C. Heath, 1975), p. 163.

— if not impossible. Parliamentary attempts to offset the massive inequalities generated by the market generally can be nullified by the counter-actions of those whose material position is endangered by such redistributive measures. Given a pluralist system, it is argued, government is only one locus of power among many. The result is that a government attempting to initiate economic and social reforms intended to benefit the subordinate class is bound to be confronted by multiple groups within the dominant class offering strong opposition.

The argument outlined above suggests that ~~inter-class~~ egalitarianism is not readily compatible with a pluralist political system of the Western type. If this is true, significant egalitarian equality would require a political order in which the state is capable of continually holding in check those occupational and social groups which might otherwise try to claim a disproportionate share of society's rewards. Historically, a dilemma arose for socialists over the commitment to political liberty, which originated in the struggle for emancipation of the working class, and whether it was to be extended with respect to the dominant class. That is, should socialists provide the same political rights to the socially and economically privileged as they had once demanded for the underprivileged — including the right of the former to oppose changes in the socio-economic system? The division in the European socialist movement into Social Democratic and Communist wings was largely the consequence of different responses being given to this question. "The Social Democrats have committed themselves to a political system which gives

rights to the dominant class to prevent wherever possible the redistribution of class advantages. This commitment has proved to be at the expense of traditional socialist goals and principles relating to equality."²¹ Thus the Constrained Socialism school contends that:

The pluralist structure of modern capitalist society ensures that there are many sources of institutional power outside Parliament; since most of these are based on the dominant class they impose effective restraints on governments which seek to change the rules governing the allocation of rewards. Socialists' commitment to parliamentary methods really entails acceptance of the limited powers of socialist governments to change the system of inequalities. Governments based on the underclass party are thus in a sense constrained to adopt moderate rather than radical programs by their very awareness of the limitations placed on their actual political power. In this situation, socialist governments or parties can still advocate reforms, but they will tend to define as "realistic" only those reforms which can be carried through within the framework of a modern capitalist order.²²

Additional factors have been suggested which supposedly lead to a de-radicalized, constrained variant of socialism among Social Democratic governments.²³ These include: (1) the electoral necessity of winning a portion of the middle-class vote, (2) the restraints imposed by often governing in a coalition situation with non-socialist parties, (3) the in-

²¹ Parkin, p. 184; see his general discussion of this issue, pp. 181-85.

²² Ibid., p. 134. Also see Andrei Markovits and Samantha Kazarinov, "Class Conflict, Capitalism, and Social Democracy", Comparative Politics, April 1978, pp. 373-90.

²³ See Adam Przeworski, "Social Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon", New Left Review, Oct. 1980, pp. 27-58; Scase; Gerard Braunthal, "The Policy Function of the German Social Democratic Party", Comparative Politics, Jan. 1977, pp. 127-45; Leo Panitch, "Ideology and Integration: The Case of the British Labour Party", Political Studies, 1971, pp. 184-200; William Paterson and Alastair Thomas (eds.), Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe (London: Croom Helm, 1977). Cf. Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1977).

creasingly middle-class leadership and embourgeoisement of party leaders, and (4) the adoption of an integrative ("national interest") as opposed to a class-conflict ideology. As a result, it is believed that only those socialist measures which are compatible with (or at least not inimical to) a modern capitalist society can or will be enacted by Social Democratic governments. Utilizing the typology of equality perspectives presented in Chapter I, it will be remembered that meritocratic and welfarist (and to a lesser extent emancipatory) conceptions of equality can be accommodated within the values and necessities of a modern capitalist state. Thus, from the Constrained Socialism viewpoint, a Social Democratic governments' attempt to confront socio-economic inequality should emphasize these, ~~not inter-class~~ egalitarian, perspectives. Given egalitarian equality's emphasis on redistribution, which in large doses is antithetical to the present reward structure and therefore a threat to the established capitalist order, the Constrained Socialism school would predict the unattainability (to any significant extent) of this variant of equality. As Parkin argues:

Labour governments cannot radically improve the position of the subordinate class because they are tolerated in power only so far as they refrain from making serious inroads into the privileges of the dominant class.... Without too much exaggeration we could in fact say that whether or not socialist approaches to inequality become politically acceptable depends on whether or not they confer advantages on the dominant class, or at least an important section of it. Welfare and meritocratic reforms do carry such advantages on the grounds already stated. Egalitarian reforms designed to change the rules of distribution or ownership do not. It is not particularly surprising, then, that the former interpretation of socialism is accepted as politically

legitimate, while the latter is regarded as "irresponsible" or "utopian". ²⁴

To summarize, based upon the preceding analysis of the four schools of thought regarding the impact of the partisan composition of government upon inequality, the following propositions can be derived: (1) According to the Functionalist and End of Ideology schools, there should be no relationship between the length of Social Democratic rule and the level of socio-economic equality; (2) According to the Democratic Class Conflict school, the greater the length of Social Democratic rule, the greater is the degree of equality — in respect to all four dimensions (meritocratic, welfarist, emancipatory, egalitarian); (3) According to the Constrained Socialism school of thought, the length of Social Democratic rule may be positively associated with those forms of equality which are highly compatible with advanced capitalism — though not with inter-class income equality (the least compatible variant). These propositions will be restated in the form of testable hypotheses following the discussion (below) of related factors involved in "left-wing mobilization" and their putative impact upon equality.

B. Other Forms of "Left-Wing Mobilization"

It has been argued that Social Democratic or other left-wing parties do not necessarily have to attain office in order to have an important influence on public policy. Once left-wing parties begin to gain significant legislative strength, opposing parties may decide to adopt parts of their programs

²⁴ Parkin, pp. 105 and 127.

in an attempt to undercut their political support. The classic instance of this strategy is Bismarck's attempt to weaken the German Social Democrats in the late nineteenth century.²⁵ In this regard, when Duverger used the phrase "contagion from the left", he was referring to the phenomenon whereby the political right in its own self-defense and as a method of maintaining its position of influence and power is persuaded to mirror the left.²⁶ Political innovations are thus possible without changes of government. Duverger had in mind primarily those changes in party ideology or organization which the right must make in order to sustain its competitive position. **But as Chandler points out:**

This long-standing basic issue of the impetus for organizational changes has a direct policy analogue. Power holders (governments) who perceive opposition threats to their power and influence may use their control of the policy process to blunt and even undermine the popular appeal which is the basis of opposition strength. Those in power may accomplish this by adopting in part or in whole the policy positions of their opposition, thus destroying the appeal of the opposition. When this happens the government is pursuing the policy of its enemies, and the policy impact of opposition forces can be said to be, in Duverger's sense, contagious.²⁷

The issue of policy "contagion" involves more than differences in the decisions associated with a particular party in power. It specifically refers to the policy impact

²⁵ See discussion by Robert Jackman, Politics and Social Equality (N.Y.: Wiley, 1975), pp. 125-26.

²⁶ See Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, trans. by B. and R. North (N.Y.: Wiley, 1954), p. xxvii.

²⁷ William Chandler, "Canadian Socialism and Policy Impact: Contagion from the Left?", Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 10, Dec. 1977, p. 755.

of partisan opposition threats or pressures. In this sense, "contagion" raises the general issue of the policy significance of party systems and, particularly, of government-opposition relationships.²⁸ The possibility of "contagion" is premised upon two conditions: (1) the insecurity of the governing party, and (2) the policy distinctiveness of the opposition.²⁹ Downs' proposed model of party competition also would predict the type of behavior suggested above. The apparent willingness of many parties of the center and right to adopt welfare state orientations for much of the post-war era is consistent with Downs' position.³⁰ Therefore, from the discussion above, one could contend that the stronger the left-wing political opposition in a country, the greater the probability and degree of equality-oriented public policies.

One cannot discuss the potential effect of "left-wing mobilization" on the degree of inequality without also considering the impact of trade unions. This is manifested in three ways: (1) through the influence and organizational ties

²⁸ See Robert Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale U. Press, 1966).

²⁹ Chandler, p. 756. Insecurity has typically been the implicit motivational foundation for the widely tested relationship between party competition and resulting public policy in the American state analyses. See Richard Dawson and James Robinson, "Inter-party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States", Journal of Politics, vol. 25, 1963, pp. 265-89; Brian Fry and Richard Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution", American Political Science Review, vol. 64, June 1970, pp. 508-22.

³⁰ Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1957).

between unions and Social Democratic parties, (2) through the influence of unions on the degree of market wage inequality by means of collective agreements with employers, (3) through the negotiation and support of "social contracts" with the state. (This last point is discussed later in this chapter in the section on liberal corporatism.)

In regard to the relationship between unions and Social Democratic parties, Andrew Martin asks:

Under what conditions can a party, or parties, capable of serving as a mechanism for subjecting a capitalist economy to democratic control exist? The answer proposed in the argument is that organized labor is the single most important source from which such a party could draw the resources needed to mobilize support, and that only where organized labor provides it with sufficient resources can such a party compete successfully with a party that can rely on business for most of the needed resources.... Impelled into the political arena by purposes ranging from organizational survival, through social and economic policies directly geared to member interests, to far-reaching social change that may be conceived in terms of Left ideologies, unions tend to channel their activity through political parties with which they establish durable links, whether formal or informal. 31

The labor unions, themselves, tend to function as political organizations in attempting to mobilize the electoral participation of their members and in utilizing their own personnel in the mobilization of potential support in the wider electorate. Through common partisan identifications, union members can be linked to a larger mass movement —

³¹ Andrew Martin, "Is Democratic Control of Capitalist Economies Possible?", in Lindberg et al. (eds.), Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism (Toronto: D.C. Heath, 1975), p. 19.

sharing a political sub-culture that encourages a distinctive frame of reference in which the political meaning of socio-economic experience can be understood (see discussion of value systems in Chapter I). "Thus, labor movement parties can provide counter-elites with the financial, organizational, and psychological resources with which to maximize the mobilization of people toward the lower end of the scale of economic power, wealth, and status." ³² More specifically, Lenski suggests that labor unions (in conjunction with Social Democratic parties) have contributed in a major way to more equalitarian societies. For example, he attributes differences regarding inequality between the United States and Sweden to the greater strength of the unions in the latter country. ³³ Some empirical support for Lenski's view comes from Pryor's analysis, which indicates a significant and positive relationship between the relative strength of trade unions and the extensiveness of social insurance coverage for a cross-section of 19 nations. Pryor argues that this result reflects both the power of unions as an institutionalized political

³² Ibid., p. 20. For details on national variations in links between unions and Social Democratic parties in Western Europe, see Adolf Sturmthal, Comparative Labor Movements: Ideological Roots and Institutional Development (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1972); Rainer Deppe et al., "The Relationship between Trade Union Action and Political Parties", in Crouch and Pizzorno (eds.), The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe Since 1968, vol. II (N.Y.: Holmes & Meier, 1978), pp. 177-96; Eric Jacobs, European Trade Unionism (London: Croon Helm, 1973).

³³ Lenski, pp. 319-24; also see Jackman, p. 121.

force and the extent of political interest and mobilization of workers. ³⁴

In regard to the influence of unions on the degree of market wage inequality through collective bargaining, Logue argues that "where unions are particularly strong, as in Scandinavian countries, they have reduced market wage inequality by raising the wages of the most poorly paid, particularly the unskilled and women, relative to the well paid." ³⁵ Indeed, Swedish collective bargaining has been based, in part, on the principle of the "solidarity wage policy". This aims at raising the wages of the lowest-paid workers' groups more than the average. ³⁶ On the other hand, it is argued by some that trade union policy is reflective of "an uneasy compromise between rejection and full endorsement of the dominant order". While unions do pursue an improvement in the material conditions of their members, the strategies they adopt in collective bargaining "imply a general acceptance of the rules governing distribution". Pressure for increased wages and salaries forms a portion of an "accommodative response to inequality.... Collective bargaining does not call into question the values underlying

³⁴ Frederick Pryor, Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations (Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, 1968), pp. 473-75.

³⁵ John Logue, "The Welfare State: Victim of Its Success", Daedalus, vol. 108, Fall 1979, pp. 71-2.

³⁶ See Sturmthal, p. 42.

the existing reward structure, nor does it pose any threat to the institutions which support this structure."³⁷ This position is similar to the Constrained Socialism school of thought presented earlier. In effect, unions are perceived as being constrained in the degree to which they can (or desire to) create substantial re-ordering of market wage inequality between (rather than simply within) classes.³⁸

Given the highly interrelated nature of the three major variables discussed so far in this chapter (Social Democratic rule, left-wing opposition, and trade union strength), their combined impact will be represented by the use of a composite index termed "left-wing mobilization". (An operational definition of this index will be provided in the methodology chapter.) Based upon the preceding analysis, the following hypotheses can now be stated:³⁹ ($H_{1.1}$) the greater the left-wing mobilization, the greater is the degree of socio-economic equality (in respect to all dimensions); ($H_{1.2}$) the degree of left-wing mobilization is positively associated with all but inter-class income equality. Empirical confirmation of hypothesis 1.1

³⁷ Parkin, pp. 91-2. Also see Richard Hyman and Ian Brough, Social Values and Industrial Relations: A Study of Fairness and Equality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975).

³⁸ The results of various empirical studies on the impact of unions on wage inequality have been conflicting. For example, see H.G. Lewis, "Labor Unions: Influence on Wages", in Silks (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 8 (NY: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 540-46; Robert Ozanne, "Impact of Unions on Wage Levels and Income Distribution"; Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1959, pp. 177-96.

³⁹ All hypotheses formulated in this dissertation are based upon the standard assumption of ceteris paribus. See the discussion in the methodology chapter and Julian Simon, Basic Research Methods in Social Science (NY: Random House, 1969), pp. 47-9.

would be supportive of the Democratic Class Conflict school of thought as well as arguments suggesting positive union and left-wing opposition impact on equality. Lack of empirical verification of this hypothesis (i.e., no meaningful relationship indicated) would lend support to the Functionalist and End of Ideology schools. Hypothesis 1:2 is premised upon the arguments of the Constrained Socialism school and its variants.

C. The Capitalist State: Functions and Structures

It has been suggested that the modern capitalist state serves at least two essential functions: "accumulation" and "legitimation". This means:

The state must try to maintain or create the conditions in which profitable capital accumulation is possible. However, the state also must try to maintain or create the conditions for social harmony. A capitalist state that openly uses its coercive forces to help one class accumulate capital at the expense of other classes loses its legitimacy and hence undermines the basis of its loyalty and support. 40

The term "legitimation" within this context refers to "concrete state activities such as welfare measures, anti-combines legislation, redistributive taxation, union protection, and governmental consultation with labour representatives. We are speaking of policies directed at the in-

⁴⁰ James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1973), p. 6.

tegration of the subordinate classes in capitalist society."⁴¹

In so far as legitimation is concerned, there are several structures through which (it is claimed) the co-operation or at least passivity of the working class may be achieved. For the purposes of this analysis, the two key mechanisms are: (1) liberal corporatism and (2) consociationalism.

In the former structure, the existence of social classes is acknowledged and both moderated and manifested through the party-trade union system. "Through these institutions limited bargaining takes place between the classes, resulting in the winning of intermittent concrete 'welfare state' gains for the working class but also its cooptation through 'social compacts', economic planning boards and the like."⁴² In the consociational structure, the existence of classes and the supposed class role of the state is sublimated and obfuscated through selective articulation, diffusion, and incorporation of ethnic, racial, religious, and regional interests by the various state institutions.⁴³

In regard to the two functions of the modern capitalist state noted above, one must also consider the state's role as

⁴¹ Leo Panitch, "The Role and Nature of the Canadian State", in Panitch (ed.), The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power (Toronto: U. of Toronto Press, 1977) p. 19.

⁴² Henry Milner, "The Decline and Fall of the Quebec Liberal Regime: Contradictions in the Modern Quebec State", in Panitch (ed.), The Canadian State, pp. 107-8.

⁴³ Ibid. For a discussion of the alleged similarities between liberal corporatist and consociational approaches, see Kenneth McRae, "Federation, Consociation, and Corporatism", Canadian Journal of Political Science, Sept. 1979, pp. 517-22; Heisler, pp. 42-54. Cf. Ilija Scholten, "Does Consociationalism Exist? A Critique of the Dutch Experience", in Rose (ed.), Electoral Participation (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1980).

an independent decision maker as well as the major agent in the gradual displacement of the market as the prime locus for the allocation of society's resources. This involves discussion of the growth of the economic scope of the state as it attempts to fulfill these functions and the state's alleged "relative autonomy" vis-a-vis any class — including the bourgeoisie. This latter point does not imply that advanced capitalism has arrived at a "classless state", but exactly the opposite. It is argued that the state in modern capitalism extends beyond the traditional Marxist notion of "the executive committee of the ruling class" by fulfilling functions and roles which may be contrary to the manifest short-term interest of individual bourgeois units of power as well as the collective bourgeoisie, but which in the long term view serve to perpetuate the larger system of bourgeois domination.⁴⁴ Thus, as Claus Offe suggests:

The capitalist state has the task of protecting capital as far as possible from itself, i.e., from the results of a short-sighted, narrow and incomplete articulation and pursuit of its interests.... The state apparatus has to execute its class-bound functions under the pretext of class neutrality and to provide its particular exercise of power with the alibi of the general interest.... The structural problem of the capitalist state that results from this is that the state must at the same time practice its class character and keep it concealed.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Markovits and Kazarinov, p. 374. Also see discussion by Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: Sheed & Ward, 1973), Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (London: Verso, 1978).

⁴⁵ Quoted in Markovits and Kazarinov, p. 374.

Within the context of the preceding discussion, the following analysis of the impact of the state upon inequality will focus on three distinct variables: (1) the economic scope of the state, (2) the liberal corporatist state, and (3) the consociational state.

D. The Economic Scope of the State

As used in this dissertation, the term "economic scope" encompasses two dimensions: (1) the degree of public ownership of the economy and (2) the size of the government sector of the economy in budgetary terms (as a percentage of GNP).⁴⁶ The notion of public ownership of industry is centuries old. For example, the Athenian state was said to have made a handsome profit from the silver mines of laurium. However, the modern belief in public ownership of the economy began as a reaction to the excesses of the Industrial Revolution and the momentous socio-economic transformation which followed. A fundamental doctrine of socialism became the necessity of the public ownership of the means of production, distribution, and consumption in order to equalize wealth, to reduce the inequality in political power which flowed from private ownership, to promote democracy in the work place, and to permit the public (i.e., democratic) control of the economy. Thus, as

⁴⁶ While the theoretical literature discussed in this chapter is applicable to both central and sub-central government ownership or expenditures, the empirical analysis later in this study focuses upon the central government (for reasons provided in Chapters IV and V).

former British Labour Party Prime Minister Clement Attlee proclaimed: "The evils that capitalism brings differ in intensity in different countries but the root cause of the trouble once discerned, the remedy is seen to be the same by thoughtful men and women. The cause is private property; the remedy is public ownership."⁴⁷

It is argued that in the portion of the post-war era under consideration (circa 1950-70), Social Democratic and Labour parties based on the working class successfully mobilized mass, left-wing political support in the electoral arena, gained (or at least shared) control of the state in many countries, and in accordance with their ideological orientation significantly expanded the economic scope of the state — through increased public ownership as well as the enlarged budgetary outlays of the so-called "welfare state". "This historical development in the political economy of distribution in these societies represented a massive shift of power away from business interests and their middle-class allies to the 'organized working class'."⁴⁸ One alleged result has been an increase in equality within these countries.

However, during this period (i.e., the time of "high Keynesianism" discussed in Chapters VI and VIII), there was major support within Social Democratic parties for a less doctrinaire

⁴⁷ Quoted in Samuel Beer, British Politics in the Collectivist Age (N.Y.: Knopf, 1966), p. 134.

⁴⁸ Douglas Hibbs, "On the Political Economy of Long-Run Trends in Strike Activity", British Journal of Political Science, April 1978, pp. 166-67.

approach to the issue of public ownership. Greater flexibility and variety in state intervention were recommended (i.e., the shift to "functional socialism" noted earlier in this chapter). The divisions of the late 1950s and early 1960s and the current split in the British Labour Party provide examples of the disagreement within socialist circles regarding the efficacy of further public ownership. As former British Labour Party leader Hugh Gaitskell suggested:

The vital question is how far greater social and economic equality can be achieved without more nationalisation and public ownership.... We regard public ownership not as an end in itself, but as a means — and not necessarily the only or most important one, to certain ends — such as full employment, greater equality and higher productivity. We do not aim to nationalise every firm or to create an endless series of State monopolies. 49

A further complicating factor is the argument that public ownership of certain sectors of the economy is consistent with (and even beneficial to) advanced capitalism. Thus, while nationalization of industrial enterprises has been one of the traditional objectives of the socialist movement in Europe, not all nationalization measures that were enacted were the result of socialist governments or pressures. Nationalized enterprises have existed in various European nations for many years prior to the rise of a socialist mass movement. For example, mercantilist policies resulted in government ownership of some enterprises in France; the German

⁴⁹ Quoted in R. Kelf-Cohen, Twenty Years of Nationalization: the British Experience (N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1969), pp. 291 and 296.

railroad system has been nationalized practically since its inception; in Britain, broadcasting, the Port of London, and in some degree the transmission of electrical power had been nationalized long before the first majority Labour government.⁵⁰ Indeed, in today's mixed economies, all the developed democracies have some degree of public ownership. The non-socialist rationale for this condition includes one or more of the following: (1) to cover the difference between commercial and social costs and benefits (e.g., in declining industries such as railways), (2) to drain excess profits from the exploitation of a scarce resource (e.g., petroleum), (3) to redistribute employment from one region of the country to another, (4) to manage economic contraction in troubled industries with less social pain (e.g., steel or shipbuilding), (5) to finance investment problems in infant industries or middle-aged ones in need of major technological changes, (6) to increase exports or cut imports, (7) to preserve or create a strategic industry deemed essential to national security.⁵¹

In regard to fulfillment of the accumulation function of the modern capitalist state, Panitch argues that, for example, in the Canadian context, the bourgeoisie "...has not shied away from considerable public ownership as an acceptable means whereby the state could perform the accumulation function.... Canadian capitalists have been good at distinguishing between

⁵⁰ See David Coombes, State Enterprise: Business or Politics? (London: Allen and Unwin, 1971), p. 101.

⁵¹ See "Governments Being Enticed Further Into Business World", (Toronto) Globe and Mail, March 3, 1979, p. B2.

a large state with major accumulation functions and a socialist state." ⁵² In discussing the case of Ontario Hydro, Nelles suggests:

From the outset the crusade for public power was a businessmen's movement.... By the phrase "the people's power", the businessmen meant cheap electricity for the manufacturer and it was assumed that the entire community would benefit as a result. The socially and politically influential manufacturers turned readily to public ownership primarily because the private electric companies at Niagara refused to guarantee them an immediate, inexpensive supply of a commodity on which they believed their future prosperity depended.... If public functions such as the distribution of hydro-electricity were to the advantage of industry, this expansion of political control was eagerly sanctioned; whereas, if businessmen resented interference (mineral royalties and forest protection regulations, for example), then the scope of government intervention narrowed. ⁵³

A final point to be made is the distinction between the socialist goals of public ownership outlined earlier and the goals of public enterprises run by officials in a "business-like" manner. The subordination of an enterprise to the dictates of profitability occurs in the most extreme form when the industry is privately owned. However, by itself, public ownership does not necessarily alter this situation in a fundamental way. In many countries, the nationalized industries are explicitly mandated to adopt the criterion of profitability, and are by this constraint firmly integrated into the basic structure of the capitalist economy. ⁵⁴

v

⁵² Panitch, "The Role and Nature of the Canadian State", pp. 15-16.

⁵³ Quoted in Ibid., p. 16.

⁵⁴ See Richard Hyman, Strikes (London: Fontana, 1972), p. 88.

As a result of these conflicting positions regarding the source and consequence of public ownership in developed democracies, three alternative propositions can be formulated. First, it can be contended that "left-wing mobilization" does yield greater public ownership and that such ownership provides the means by which greater socio-economic equality is achieved. Second, it can be argued that while "left-wing mobilization" may yield greater public ownership, because of the restraints outlined by the Constrained Socialism school the result is no significant gain in equality. Third, it can be contended that public ownership is largely the result of non-socialist forces and motivations, is consistent with (possible even beneficial to) the modern capitalist economy, and therefore does not measurably affect the degree of inequality. The partial resolution of this disagreement awaits an empirical test of hypotheses to be stated following consideration (below) of the second dimension of the economic scope of the state.

While the public sector's share of the GNP increased in virtually all countries during the post-war period, it is contended by some that the most dramatic increases in public sector expenditures occurred primarily as a result of Social Democratic government policies. With the creation of the modern "welfare state", an enormous portion of the national income passes through the public sector. As a consequence:

The "social wage", in the form of collective consumption and personal transfers, looms large in relation to the private "market wage" in determining the economic security and wellbeing of a great part of society. The political process dominates the final allocation (though not necessarily the initial production) of the national product. Put somewhat differently, political competition and conflict between left-wing and right-wing parties in the electoral arena (the political marketplace) have to a great extent replaced industrial bargaining and conflict

between labor and capital in the private sector (the economic marketplace) as the process shaping the final distribution of national income.... The principal locus of the distribution of national income has shifted from the private sector, where property and capital interests enjoy a comparative advantage, to the public sector, where the political resources of the organized working class are more telling. 55

By way of contrast, it is argued that in nations governed more or less continuously by parties of the center and/or right, the state budget remains comparatively small and the private market continues to dominate the allocation and production of resources.

Alternative explanations have been advanced for the general expansion of the public sector's share of the GNP over the last 30 years. For example, the Functionalist school sees this expansion as the logical outcome of the forces of "industrialism". Wagner's "law" claims that citizen's demands for government services are income elastic and therefore tend to increase with the general increase in societal affluence. If this "law" is valid, one would find that the greater the increase in general economic affluence of a nation during a given period, the greater the expansion of the public economy. However, Bird and Musgrave found that any positive cross-national relationship between economic growth and government share in the economic product disappeared when analysis was confined to the wealthier nations of the world. 56

55 Hibbs, pp. 165-67.

56 See Richard Bird, "Wagner's 'Law' of Expanding State Activity", Public Finances, vol. 26, Jan. 1971, pp. 1-26; Richard Musgrave, Fiscal Systems (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1969).

Wildavsky contends that the degree of expansion in the scope of the public economy varies inversely, instead of directly, with economic growth. In cases where national affluence increases very rapidly, any increased demand for public funds supposedly can be met by the added revenues garnered by applying a constant public share to a larger economic product. ⁵⁷

Nevertheless, the bulk of the more traditional literature focuses upon a two-step process. While a high level of national resources under public control may not be a sufficient condition for greater equality, it may well be a necessary condition. ⁵⁸ It is suggested that the economic scope of the state represents a "leverage point" by which governments can, if they choose, attempt to reduce inequality. "If one considers the explanation developed here in causal terms, it is apparent that the process is driven by politics: the partisan composition of government influences the degree of expansion of the scope of the state, and that, in turn, influences the degree of economic inequality in society." ⁵⁹

⁵⁷ See discussion in David Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy", American Political Science Review, vol. 72, Dec. 1978, pp. 1243-61.

⁵⁸ See Ibid., p. 1258; Castles, p. 60; John Dryzek, "Politics, Economics, and Inequality", European Journal of Political Research, vol. 6, Dec. 1978, p. 402; Steven Stack, "The Effect of Direct Government Involvement in the Economy on the Degree of Income Inequality", American Sociological Review, vol. 43, Dec. 1978, pp. 880-88.

⁵⁹ David Cameron, "Inequality and the State: A Political-Economic Comparison", paper delivered at annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Sept. 1976, pp. 18, 36.

As a result of the preceding arguments, two hypotheses can be derived: ($H_{2.1}$) the greater the left-wing mobilization, the greater ~~is the~~ economic scope of the state; ($H_{2.2}$) the greater the economic scope of the state, the greater is the degree of socio-economic equality. Thus, a "developmental sequence" — as opposed to a spurious correlation — is predicted among the three variables "left-wing mobilization", "economic scope", and "equality" (see methodology chapter for details). Empirical verification of these hypotheses would provide support for the view that public ownership and the size of the government sector of the economy do have a positive impact upon equality and are an important area of distinction between types of government (Social Democratic vs. bourgeois). Lack of empirical confirmation would substantiate those arguments discussed above which reject the direct importance of the economic scope of the state on the level of inequality and minimize the relevance in this area of the partisan composition of the government.

E. The Liberal Corporatist State

The state's formal role in the past in wage negotiations often has been limited to that of passive mediator — an obligation enshrined in the labor legislation of a number of countries to this day. However, to an increasing extent, the role of the advanced capitalist state has become that of actively enforcing restrictions in wage bargaining consistent with established national economic policy. Wage determination has become a matter for political decision. In nations where

the government-union nexus is strong, the political decision can be made with union cooperation (e.g., Sweden). Where it is weak (e.g., during the Heath government in Britain), the state sometimes turns to coercion. For example, recent British elections have been fought, to a large extent, over the issue of which party is capable of integrating the unions into national economic policy — Labour through persuasion or Conservatives through coercion. The informal consultation of the pre-war era between interest organizations and government has developed into the former's formal integration into the structure of political decision-making. This process is epitomized by the Harpsund meetings in the 1950s during which Sweden's economic policy for the following year was decided in conjunction with representatives of the major economic organizations. Interest organizations had to some extent assumed the representative functions of parliament. There was considerable merit in the claim that this represented a new form of corporatism.⁶⁰

The term "liberal" or "societal corporatism" refers to a political structure within advanced capitalism "which integrates organized socio-economic producer groups through a system of representation and cooperative mutual interaction at the leadership level and of mobilization and social control

⁶⁰ See Logue, pp. 81-82.

at the mass level." ⁶¹ More important, from the perspective of this dissertation, is that this neo-corporatism regulates the conflict of social classes in the distribution of national income and the structure of industrial relations.... In particular, income policies appear to constitute a core domain of liberal corporatism. A 'co-operative' variety of income policies is common to virtually all systems to which this label may be applied." ⁶²

The extension of state activity into controlling what had previously been autonomous spheres of behavior has increased the power of those wielding the levers of central authority and has politicized new aspects of social and economic life. Consider state-union ties: with a Social Democratic government, the prospect of trade union influence on decision-making regarding state control over prices, profits, and wages (i.e., the distribution of income) offers a tempting inducement to union cooperation in wage restraint. ⁶³ It is suggested that the overt aim of Social Democratic governmental-trade union collaboration in this situation is to achieve a more equitable distribution of goods and services by improving the position of the weakest members of society. This is done

⁶¹ Leo Panitch, "The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies", Comparative Political Studies, vol. 10, April 1977, p. 66. Also see: Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?", Review of Politics, vol. 36, Jan. 1974, pp. 85-131; Schmitter, "Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Societal Change in Western Europe", Comparative Political Studies, vol. 10, April 1977, pp. 7-38.

⁶² Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Liberal Corporatism and Party Government", Comparative Political Studies, April 1977, pp. 95-6.

⁶³ See Logue, pp. 82-3; Panitch, "Development of Corporatism...", p. 78.

by giving them an increased share in the growth in national income, while leaving untouched the existing distribution of income, wealth, and power.⁶⁴ It is argued by some that this state intervention is generally egalitarian in nature. In this view, "a state incomes policy certainly disrupts the balance achieved between capitalism and trade unionism in collective bargaining, but it does so in the direction of increasing equality."⁶⁵ A crude and limited egalitarianism can be achieved by concentrating on the extremes of the income hierarchy. This includes measures to tax or restrain higher incomes and concentrations of private wealth, with fiscal and other policies to help the lowest paid. In the case of Britain, this formed an important part of the rhetoric of incomes policy during the 1964-70 period. In practice, the body responsible for administering the policy did not give priority to this aspect. However, it is contended that towards the end of the period, low pay did become a political issue and more purposeful government action was taken. Low pay was permitted as a criterion⁶⁶ for exceptional wage increases and encouragement was provided for pay settlements that concentrated raises on the lowest paid workers.

⁶⁴ Logue, p. 83

⁶⁵ Colin Crouch, "The Drive for Equality: Experience of Incomes Policy in Britain", in Lindberg et al. (eds.), Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism, pp. 218-19.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 219.

A variant of this position sees the pressure for greater equality coming not necessarily from the incomes policy itself but from reactions to it. As Crouch explains:

It is argued that the process of throwing income distribution open to political debate will increase the salience of the overall structure of that distribution; people in subordinate positions will become more aware of inequality, and will seek to reduce it.... It involves a politicization of industrial relations issues that may contribute to an intensification of union militancy; and it may make the contours of the incomes hierarchy more evident and vulnerable to political action. 67

From the view of neo-corporatism briefly portrayed above, one could hypothesize: (H_{3.1}) liberal corporatism is positively associated with inter-class egalitarian equality.

However, seen from a different perspective, these incomes policies are neither capable nor intended to produce a redistribution of income between classes. The ability of the state to administer an incomes policy neutral in its application to labor and capital is open to doubt. Wages are easily controlled, since it is in the employers' interest to do so; prices are extremely difficult to manage. Furthermore, Hyman and Brough argue: "A policy which requires that wages and salaries rise no faster (or even more slowly) than total production, and that individual increases should be subject to a more or less uniform norm, takes for granted the equity of the prevailing inequality." 68

67 Ibid., pp. 219, 224. The same argument is presented by John Goldthorpe, "Social Inequality and Social Integration in Modern Britain", in Wedderburn (ed.), Poverty, Inequality and Class Structure (London: Cambridge U. Press, 1974), p. 228.

68 Hyman and Brough, p. 106.

In addition, Panitch has referred to:

the innately conservatizing effects of incomes policy, which by its very nature in tying wage increases to productivity growth, seeks to remove the question of inter-class income differentials from the concern of the unions.... The distorting effect all this produced in terms of Labour's need to be seen to pursue social reforms for the working class, was not the abandonment of the equality theme altogether, but the transference of it, in the context of incomes policy, to a concern with narrowing income differentials within the working class. This is what we have called the doctrine of socialism in one class — seeking to concentrate workers' concerns with inequality, not on the highly privileged, but on others in a similar class situation to their own. 69

Thus, one could hypothesize: (H_{3.2}) liberal corporatism is positively associated with intra-class egalitarian equality.

In explaining the latter assessment of the incomes policies associated with liberal corporatism, it is argued that this is the result of the effort to control inflation in the context of managing a predominantly private enterprise economy. This entails securing — in the "national interest" — wage restraint from trade unions. Such "restraint" translates into an agreement by the organized working class not to seek wage increases exceeding the projected rate of economic growth. This would allow profit levels to be maintained without compensating for wage increases by price increases. Thus, inflation would be lowered and everyone would supposedly benefit. The establishment of such an incomes policy has been termed "an integrative operation without peer.... Incomes policy involves the explicit acceptance by the organized working class of the claim that there is a community of interests

⁶⁹ Leo Panitch, Social Democracy and Industrial Militancy (N.Y.: Cambridge U. Press, 1976), p. 244.

within existing society, that the harmony between classes posited by a national integrative political party does in fact exist."⁷⁰ Thus, the superficially puzzling propensity toward liberal corporatist structures under Social Democratic regimes can be explained, in part, by the "dominant ideological strain within social democracy which rejects the notion of the class struggle as the dynamic of social change."⁷¹ This tendency for socialist parties and/or trade unions to redefine their obligation as the protector of the chimerical "national interest" serves to undermine their role as class representatives. As Parkin contends:

To withdraw pressure for redistribution in favor of some other abstract principle is to confer an advantage on the dominant class. Clearly, in a class-stratified society the very notion of a "national" interest is highly problematic. In terms of income distribution, what does not go to the subordinate class goes to the dominant class instead. The adoption of this type of outlook is particularly likely when underclass leaders are incorporated into the management of the state.⁷²

In addition to the lure of reduced inflation, it has been suggested that extended social welfare ~~benefits~~ and full employment policies have been offered as further inducements for trade union cooperation in these programs.⁷³ Thus, it also can be hypothesized: (H_{3.3}) liberal corporatism is positively associated with welfarist equality.

⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 3-4.

⁷¹ Panitch, "The Development of Corporatism...", pp. 72-73; also see Panitch, "Ideology and Integration...".

⁷² Parkin, p. 135.

⁷³ See Harold Wilensky, The New Corporatism. Centralization, and the Welfare State (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1976); Logue, pp. 82-84.

F. The Consociational State

The existing literature indicates that "consociationalism" has been approached from three basic perspectives: (1) as a pattern of social structure, focusing on the extent of ideological, religious, cultural or linguistic segmentation in society; (2) as a pattern of elite political behavior and mass-elite relationships, focusing on the processes of decision-making and conflict regulation; (3) as a fundamental characteristic of the political culture arising from historical circumstances prior to the period of mass politics.⁷⁴ For Lijphart, the consociational state is defined in terms of four principles — all of which deviate from the traditional Anglo-American model of majority rule: (1) grand coalition, (2) mutual veto, (3) proportionality, and (4) segmental autonomy. The most important of these are the complementary principles of grand coalition and segmental autonomy.⁷⁵

The term "grand coalition" refers to a system in which political leaders of all the segments of a plural society jointly govern the country. It is also termed the "principle of power-sharing". This procedure contrasts vividly with the government-versus-opposition pattern of the majority rule

⁷⁴ See Kenneth McRae (ed.), Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1974), p. 5.

⁷⁵ See Arend Lijphart, "Consociation and Federation: Conceptual and Empirical Links", Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 12, Sept. 1979, pp. 500-501.

paradigm. The principle of segmental autonomy refers to a system of decision-making authority which is largely delegated to the separate segments. In comparison with majority rule, it can be characterized as "minority rule over the minority itself in matters that are the minority's exclusive concern. It complements the grand coalition principle: on all issues of common interest, the decisions are made jointly by the segments' leaders, but on all other issues, decision-making is left to each segment." 76

The third consociational principle outlined by Lijphart is that of the mutual or minority veto. While the grand coalition rule provides each segment with a share of power at the central political level, this does not constitute a guarantee that it will not be outvoted when its perceived vital interests are at stake. The role of the mutual veto is to provide such a guarantee. Contrasting this with majority rule, it may be termed "negative minority rule" — a principle synonymous with Calhoun's "concurrent majority". Fourthly, the provision of proportionality serves as the fundamental standard of civil service appointments, political representation, and the allocation of public funds. Two variants of this principle entail the overrepresentation of small minorities and parity of representation. These alternatives to exact proportionality are often used when a plural society is divided into segments which are highly unequal in size. 77

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid. Cf. Val Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies", Comparative Politics, vol. 3, Jan. 1971, pp. 141-75.

There is sometimes an important corporatist element interacting with consociationalism (e.g., in the Netherlands) ⁷⁸ which may produce the previously hypothesized results (see H 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3) regarding welfarist and egalitarian equality. However, an analysis of the general operation of consociationalism, per se, vis-a-vis inequality reveals an emphasis on the provision of ethnic parity — often at the expense of the other dimensions of socio-economic equality. The separation of the different societal segments and the autonomy they have to run their own affairs have an impact upon equality in at least two ways. First, "consociational democracy is more concerned with the equal or proportional treatment of groups than with individual equality.... Proportionality as a standard of recruitment to the civil service entails a higher priority to membership in a certain segment than to individual merit." ⁷⁹ Thus, meritocratic equality is sometimes sacrificed given the priority pursuit of emancipatory equality in these circumstances. Second, given the ethnocentric weltanschauung which consociationalism encourages and legitimizes, "segmental isolation and autonomy may be obstacles to the achievement of society-wide equality." ⁸⁰ On the other hand, it is argued that "segmental

⁷⁸ See Scholten.

⁷⁹ Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale U. Press, 1977), pp. 48, 51.

⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 48-49.

separateness is not at all incompatible with segmental [i.e., ethnic-emancipatory] equality. As a matter of fact, the Catholic, Calvinist, and Socialist subcultures and their organizations in the Netherlands are often described as 'emancipation' movements." ⁸¹

Though consociationalism is often referred to as "consociational democracy", it can be strongly criticized as being far less democratic (and therefore less potentially equalitarian) than the majority rule, government-versus-opposition system. ⁸² Given the postulated importance of a strong left-wing opposition (provided earlier in this chapter), consociationalism ensures (through its grand coalition principle) a relatively weak and small opposition or the absence of any formal opposition at all in the parliament. An additional criticism is the "structured elite predominance" and, conversely, a deferential and passive roll of all non-elite members. This involves the larger issues of democratic quality and stability (discussed in Chapter III). As Lijphart recognizes: "The government-versus-opposition pattern has the advantage that dissatisfied citizens can cast their vote against the government without voting against the regime. In consociationalism, government and regime coincide.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² See Brian Barry, "Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy", British Journal of Political Science, Oct. 1975, pp. 490-501.

Dissatisfaction with governmental performance therefore quickly turns into disaffection from the regime." ⁸³

Based upon the arguments provided above, it will be hypothesized: (H_{4.1}) the greater the degree of consociationalism, the greater is the ethnic/racial equality; (H_{4.2}) there is a negative relationship between consociationalism and non-ethnic/racial dimensions of equality.

G. The Economic Environment

The political and state variables discussed so far in this chapter operate within a specific economic environment. Attention will now turn to an analysis of this economic milieu as represented by two variables: (1) the degree of economic development and (2) the degree of external economic dependence.

Many writers have argued that the richer and more industrialized the economy of a nation, the more equal the distribution of material goods within it, because these societies have larger surplus products. For example, Cutright examined the relationship between levels of economic development on the one hand, and social security expenditures and income equality on the other. He argued that development

results in greater socio-economic equality because of the new economic surplus it produces.⁸⁴ It is assumed that in a highly developed and growing economy, the elite can afford and will desire to redistribute income by decreasing its relative share while, at the same time, increasing the absolute size of its income. As Lenski claims:

In an expanding economy, an elite can make economic concessions in relative terms without necessarily suffering any loss in absolute terms.... If we assume that the majority of men would willingly make modest relative concessions for the sake of substantial absolute gains, and if we also assume that leading members of the elites in industrial societies have an awareness of the benefits they can obtain from concessions, then we can only predict that they will make them.⁸⁵

The proposition of positive, linear effects of economic development in relation to equality has not gone unchallenged. A curvilinear process is postulated as an alternative. For example, Kuznets has suggested an inverted "U" hypothesis — i.e., with increasing economic development, income inequality initially increases (due to the uneven pattern of capitalist development in various sectors of a developing economy), then becomes stable, and finally decreases.⁸⁶ Oshima has argued that countries pass through four stages — undeveloped, underdeveloped, semi-developed, and fully

⁸⁴ Phillips Cutright, "Inequality: A Cross-National Analysis", American Sociological Review, vol. 32, Aug. 1967, pp. 562-78. Also see Harold Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality (Berkeley, Calif.: U. of California Press, 1975) pp. 15-17.

⁸⁵ Lenski, pp. 314-15.

⁸⁶ Simon Kuznets, "Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations: the Distribution of Income by Size", Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 11, Jan. 1963, pp. 1-80.

developed — and that income inequality increases during the second and third stages but declines during the first and last stages.⁸⁷ However, since this dissertation is concerned only with the group of most highly developed (and democratic) nations, both the linear and non-linear perspectives would predict the following within this context: (H_5) the higher the economic development (among developed states), the higher is the degree of socio-economic equality.

An alternative viewpoint which rejects this hypothesis is provided by Jackman, Goldthorpe et al. After the initial stages of industrialization, they see further economic development leading to more equality. However, at advanced stages, a threshold is thought to be reached where continued economic expansion does not produce more equality.⁸⁸ For the most developed nations, this "threshold" proposition contradicts the hypothesis of positive, linear effects postulated above.

Economic development theories of equality have been criticized because they are based upon the implicit assumption that countries represent separate systems of economic production, so that all nations are assumed to be able to

⁸⁷ Harry Oshima, "The International Comparison of Size Distribution of Family Incomes", Review of Economics and Statistics, Nov. 1962, pp. 439-45. For a detailed summary of the literature in this area, see Felix Paukert, "Income Distribution at Different Levels of Development", International Labour Review, vol. 108, Aug.-Sept. 1973, pp. 97-125; William Cline, "Distribution and Development: A Survey of the Literature", Journal of Development Economics, vol. 1, 1975, pp. 359-400.

⁸⁸ See Jackman, ch. 3; Goldthorpe, "Social Stratification in Industrial Society".

achieve full development. The external economic dependence model discussed below makes at least two different assumptions.

First, it is assumed that it is not the effects of wealth or economic production per se that affect inequality; but rather, it is the social control and organization of production that determine the distribution of income. Second, this model assumes that countries do not represent separate systems of production; but rather, that all countries are part of a single system of production which contains multiple political units within it. 89

A country with a high degree of trade and capital dependence is indicative of what has been termed an "open economy". Such nations are exposed to pressures which are transmitted from other nations and international actors. "The concept of the 'open' economy is applicable, in varying degrees, to almost all of the advanced capitalist societies. The most important political consequence of an 'open' economy is the constraint it imposes..." upon the effectiveness and choice of national public policies. 90 Just as a high level of dependence on the international economy for markets for export industries can limit a government's ability to manage aggregate demand and to control levels of unemployment and

89 Richard Robinson, "The World Economy and the Distribution of Income Within States", American Sociological Review, vol. 41, Aug. 1976, pp. 638-39. An attempt has been made in the literature to distinguish between: (1) "dependence" as external reliance on other actors, probing asymmetries among these actors, and (2) "dependency" as the process of incorporation of less-developed countries into the global capitalist system and the structural distortions resulting therefrom. See James Caporaso, "Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the Global System", International Organization, vol. 32, 1978, pp. 13-43.

90 Cameron, "Expansion of the Public Economy", pp. 1249-50.

capital formation, a high level of penetration of the domestic market by external producers" also reduces the control by the government over the economy. A high degree of imports tends to transfer decisions regarding the production and pricing of goods for domestic consumption to external actors. In addition, a high level of imports can contribute to balance of payments deficits, the solution of which often requires the funding of debt with foreign borrowing, devaluation, and the implementation of austerity programs — sometimes dictated by external entities (e.g., IMF).⁹¹ The EEC and the maturation of multi-national enterprises have served to further increase the "openness" of most Western economies.

This increased interdependence has resulted in the loss not only of economic ~~autonomy~~ but also of political ~~autonomy~~ — a decreased latitude for governments to act to achieve their desired domestic social goals.⁹² As Martin apocalyptically argues:

As a result of such trends, the capitalist economic process may have become transnational to such an extent that no national governments can control its operation effectively within their own jurisdictions, short of closing their borders and attempting autarky. If this is so it no longer matters whether the configuration of power within a national political arena meets the requirements for subjecting capitalism to democratic control.... Even if national governments are controlled by counter-elites, democratic control of the capitalist economic process has become im-

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² See discussion by Edward Morse, "Crisis Diplomacy, Interdependence and the Politics of International Economic Relations", in Tanter and Ullman (eds.), Theory and Policy in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U. Press, 1972), pp. 146-47; Richard Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1968), ch. 4.

possible if national governments can no longer serve as instruments through which such control can be exercised; and there is no transnational political authority coterminous with the decision-making domain of capitalist firms, not to speak of one whose uses can be determined through a democratic political process. 93

The asymmetrical nature of the interdependence within advanced capitalism has important implications. This allows an extension of some theories of imperialism from an exclusive concern with the First-Third World nexus of dependence relations to the dependencies between advanced capitalist states themselves. As Poulantzas observed: "While we are beginning to understand clearly the effects of contemporary imperialist domination on the dominated and dependent social formations, its effects within the imperialist metropolises themselves have received much less study.... Relations between the imperialist metropolises themselves are now also being organized in terms of a structure of domination and dependence within the imperialist chain." 94 Galtung has suggested that one could extend his simplified, dichotomous model of imperialism portraying either Center or Periphery nations to include a continuum between the "extreme Center" and "extreme Periphery" states. He has theorized that there are several gradations, "several chains of nations", which could constitute intermediate states in the imperialist

93 Martin, p. 52.

94 Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, pp. 38, 47.

structure. They would play the role of Center state vis-a-vis one nation and Periphery state vis-a-vis another. Thus, a Center state in the global perspective may become a Periphery state within the narrower context of developed capitalist nations. Galtung claims:

Such a nation could, in fact, serve as a go-between. Concretely, it would exchange semi-processed goods with highly processed goods upwards and semi-processed goods with raw materials downwards. It would simply be located in between Center and Periphery where the degree of processing of its export products is concerned.... And needless to say: the intra-national centers of all these nations would be tied together in the same international network, establishing firm ties of harmony of interest between them. 95

External economic dependence of the type described above supposedly maintains or increases inequalities through "structural distortions" providing obstacles to full economic development and "by linking national elites in the periphery to the interests of the transnational corporations and the international economy."⁹⁶ Coupled with the alleged inability of counter-elites, if they do attain political power, to institute substantial equalitarian policies due to the significant loss of economic and political autonomy noted earlier, this literature suggests the following hypothesis: (H6) the degree of external economic dependence is negatively associated with socio-economic equality.

⁹⁵ Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", Journal of Peace Research, vol. 8, 1971, pp. 104-5.

⁹⁶ Christopher Chase-Dunn, "The Effects of International Economic Dependence on Development and Inequality", American Sociological Review, vol. 40, Dec. 1975, p. 736. Also see discussion by Wallace Clement, Continental Corporate Power: Economic Linkages between Canada and the United States (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1977), pp. 20-26.

H. Conclusion

While the hypotheses formulated in this chapter are not derived from a single, over-arching theory of inequality, they can be linked and categorized as falling into one of two competing weltanschauungs. On the one hand, hypothesis 1.2 (based upon the Constrained Socialism school), the discussion of the ~~two~~ putative functions of the capitalist state, the rejection of hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2 (regarding the economic scope of the state), hypothesis 3.2 (indicating, at best, an association only between corporatism and intra-class egalitarian equality), and hypothesis 6 are all premised upon a general neo-Marxist orientation. Such a perspective sees severe limitations within a capitalist economic environment for the opportunity to reduce significantly the degree of inequality (especially in regard to inter-class egalitarianism) by a change of the partisan composition of government or utilization of various state structures designed to increase legitimation.

On the other hand, hypotheses 1.1 (derived from the Democratic Class Conflict school), 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.3, 4.1, and 5 are all premised upon the view that national governments have the power to create fundamental changes in the degree of socio-economic inequality. This orientation manifests an abiding faith in the equalitarian possibilities of parliamentary democracy and economic development —

even within a capitalist economic milieu. A decision as to which one of these perspectives more accurately characterizes the determination of the level of socio-economic inequality in developed democracies awaits the empirical analysis in Chapter VI.

CHAPTER III: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSEQUENCES OF INEQUALITY

Throughout this study, we have focused on social equality as a dependent variable. However, the model developed in this book is clearly part of a larger model or social process, which means that it could be elaborated to include an evaluation of the impact of inequality on other factors. For example,... it is quite possible that the degree of social equality may have a subsequent impact on levels of both democratic performance and political violence.... 1

One major area of internal politics which, lamentably, has been excluded from the present analysis deals not with the causes of inequality, but rather with the effects of varying levels of inequality upon other social processes within the polity. It is a question of overwhelming importance: What are the consequences of high levels of inequality? 2

As the quotations above suggest, analysis of the consequences of socio-economic inequality constitutes a vital, though too often neglected, area of research. So as not to repeat the omission of previous studies, this chapter will consider the theoretical basis for hypotheses concerning

¹ Robert Jackman, Politics and Social Equality (N.Y.: Wiley, 1975), pp. 205-6.

² Michael Ward, The Political Economy of Distribution: Equality versus Inequality (N.Y.: Elsevier, 1978), p. 171.

the potential impact of inequality upon: (1) political (participation and instability), (2) economic (growth and industrial disputes), and (3) social (crime and ~~ethnic~~/racial militancy) variables.

A. Political Consequences

The study of political participation involves at least three elements ³: (1) the decision to take any political action or not to act, (2) the intensity and duration of the action ⁴, and (3) the ideological direction of the action. The focus in this context will be on the first element as manifested by the decision to engage in "spectator" level participation (e.g., voting). The literature on political participation provides two alternative views as to the motivating factor behind the decision to participate — both based upon the alleged impact of mass "(dis)satisfaction". The "concept of satisfaction is of particular interest given the conflict between the elitist contention that low levels of citizen participation reflect satisfaction with government, and the opposing point of view that inactivity re-

³ See Lester Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p.6.

⁴ See Milbrath's discussion of "spectator", "transitional", and "gladitorial" activities, Ibid., p. 18.

flects dissatisfaction combined with cynicism and despair."⁵

From the elitist perspective, low voting turnout is interpreted as a sign that the system is functioning properly, that the masses are relatively contented.⁶ The rejection of the active participant concept of democracy, and the embracing of a milquetoast, closet participant as the ideal, is exemplified by the orientation expressed in The Civic Culture.⁷ The view of democracy expounded by Almond and Verba (borrowing heavily from Kornhauser's discussion of elite autonomy and limited mass participation) presumes that the finding of a lack of significant participation by the masses is beneficial to "democratic" government. This supposedly provides the ruling elite with maneuverability in order to formulate public policy without "interference" from the non-elites. More recently, fears of "societal overload", an "excess of democracy", and "systemic ungovernability" have prompted calls (e.g., by Huntington, Bell, McCracken) for even further reductions in the means and degree of (and responsiveness to) mass political participation.⁸

⁵ William Mishler, Political Participation in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1979), p. 79.

⁶ For example, see the concluding chapter of Bernard Berelson et al., Voting (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1954), and Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism (Boston: Little Brown, 1967).

⁷ See Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little Brown, 1965).

⁸ For a discussion of this neo-conservative perspective, see Amitai Etzioni, "Societal Overload: Sources, Components, and Corrections", Political Science Quarterly, vol. 92, Winter 1977-78, pp. 607-31.

For adherents of the elitist doctrine, a significant increase in political participation is interpreted as an unhealthy sign for a "democracy" — indicating a de-stabilizing dissatisfaction on the part of the masses with particular decisions or specific aspects of life (combined with general feelings of efficacy).⁹ If one assumes that the degree of socio-economic equality (in a society is one determinant of mass "satisfaction", then it follows from this axiom that mass political participation is inversely related to equality. Dissatisfaction with socio-economic conditions (i.e., high inequality) motivates political activity, whereas satisfaction with socio-economic circumstances (i.e., high equality) yields complacency and low participation. The exception, from this perspective, would be increases in educational (i.e., meritocratic) equality which are presumed to motivate greater participation (see discussion below). Thus, it can be hypothesized: (H_{7.1}) the higher the socio-economic equality (excluding the meritocratic dimension), the lower is the rate of political participation.

The alternative position proposed in the literature is that dissatisfaction (coupled with low efficacy) results in a withdrawal from politics; alienation and apathy prevail. Conversely, high levels of satisfaction (e.g., produced by high educational attainment and/or economic wellbeing) yield high political participation rates.¹⁰ Regardless of how the concept "class" is measured, most studies indicate that "upper-class" individuals (e.g., high education or income) are more likely to

⁹ See discussion in Giuseppe DiPalma, Apathy and Participation (N.Y.: Free Press, 1970), pp. 44-46.

¹⁰ See Lester Milbrath and M.L. Goel, Political Participation, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977), pp. 64-69.

participate in politics than lower-class persons.¹¹ As Di Palma explains: "Extreme poverty, coupled with inequality of wealth, severely limits the ability to participate.... It is accompanied by stringent social norms against low-status participation, and it fosters strong feelings of powerlessness and rejection."¹² An extremely large proportion of those who have the most justification for discontent do not feel that they can have any meaningful influence over political decisions. Such an attitude, in addition to a dearth of resources, leads them to abstain from participation and their very abstention makes their low sense of political efficacy a self-fulfilling prophecy. As Miliband suggests:

Political deprivation is less immediately visible than other forms of poverty. On the surface, the poor are as much in possession of civic and political rights as anybody else.... In real life, however, and against the background of other forms of deprivation, this equal citizenship is, in political terms, very largely robbed of its meaning. For the deprived not only lack economic resources, they also, and relatedly, lack political resources as well. Economic deprivation is a source of political deprivation; and political deprivation in turn helps to maintain and confirm economic deprivation. In other words, the different elements of the "network of deprivation" reinforce each other.¹³

¹¹ Ibid., p. 92; also see S. Verba and N. Nie, Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1972).

¹² Di Palma, p. 167.

¹³ Ralph Miliband, "Politics and Poverty", in Wedderburn (ed.), Poverty, Inequality and Class Structure (London: Cambridge U. Press, 1974), p. 183.

Form and Huber agree with Miliband. They argue that voting and other acts of political participation "reflect differential degrees of participation in and control of the organizational life of the society of which the polity is only one part." Thus, those who participate most often "... believe that politics and government function according to their conception of the democratic ideology which, incidentally, favors them. Those who vote less have a lower sense of ... political efficacy and see politics and government as favoring other strata." ¹⁴ Thus, participation and "satisfaction" are viewed as being positively, not negatively, related. The following alternative hypothesis can be derived from this latter school of thought: (H_{7:2}) the higher the socio-economic equality, the higher is the rate of political participation.

Turning to consideration of political instability (i.e., domestic political protest and violence), one can discern ~~four~~ conflicting schools of thought. Starting from the value orientation of "equality", one can note the pervasive inequality in Western societies and attempt to explain why most systems "succeed" — i.e., why they are so relatively stable. As Parkin claims:

¹⁴ W. Form and J. Huber, "Income, Race, and the Ideology of Political Efficacy", The Journal of Politics, vol. 33, Aug. 1971, pp. 662-63.

Because upper, relatively advantaged strata are fewer in number than disadvantaged lower strata, the former are faced with crucial problems of social control over the latter. One way of approaching this issue is to ask not why the disadvantaged often rebel against the privileged but why they do not rebel more often than they do. In this way we can examine some of the social mechanisms which stabilize the stratification order and help to maintain the system of inequalities intact. 15

This perspective is the foundation for what can be termed the Socialized Passivity school of thought. This school would not predict significant fluctuations in political instability as a consequence of differing levels of inequality. The success in Western capitalist societies of the legitimation-socialization process is emphasized. As a result of an accommodative value system (see Chapter I) and the state's efforts at legitimation (see Chapter II), a socialized passivity among the masses is deemed to be the predominant response to inequality. Goldthorpe explains:

Through their socialization into this culture from childhood onwards, it is held, the majority of citizens come to feel a sense of unfanatical, but generally unquestioning, allegiance to the established political order, and one that is unlikely to be seriously disturbed by any grievances they may have over the distribution of social power and advantage. Such grievances do not lead to alienation from the political system since there is wide acceptance of the "democratic myth" — the myth that the individual can influence political decisions and outcomes — and the system itself is not therefore

¹⁵ Frank Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order (London: Paladin, 1971), p. 48.

seen as exploitive. Moreover, attitudes towards the political elite tend to be ones of trust, if not of deference, and the exercise of governmental authority is generally accepted as legitimate.... The political culture effectively inhibits the radical political action which marked social inequality might otherwise be expected to generate. ¹⁶

A second school of thought regarding the relationship between political instability and inequality can be termed the Absolute Deprivation school. It believes that socioeconomic inequality is always a potential source of political and social instability. In the words of Aristotle: "The desire for equality is the mainspring of sedition."¹⁷ Russett suggests that "no state can long maintain a stable, democratic form of government if the major sources of economic gain are divided very unequally among its citizens."¹⁸

It was suggested earlier that for most conventional forms of participation, alienation can result in political inactivity. The Absolute Deprivation school would argue that this is not true for some of the less conventional forms. Specifically, in the case of political protest, alienation can contribute to activity — especially among dissatisfied members of society with a high political consciousness and a radical sense of efficacy (i.e., a belief in the effective-

¹⁶ John Goldthorpe, "Social Inequality and Social Integration in Modern Britain", in Wedderburn (ed.), Poverty, Inequality and Class Structure, pp. 220-21.

¹⁷ Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle, trans. Warrington (London: Everyman's Library, 1959), p. 135.

¹⁸ Bruce Russett, "Inequality and Instability", in Feierabend et al. (eds.), Anger, Violence and Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 134-35.

ness of protest or violence, though not of voting or other more conventional forms of participation).¹⁹ Jackson and Stein suggest:

Dissatisfaction expresses itself in the form of political protest because the economically dissatisfied... look to political decision-makers for improvements in the economic situation. The government is seen as the arbiter of the economy and the only force powerful enough to combat the economic giants responsible for disparities and unfilled expectations. In addition, the government itself is often identified as the prime agent of unsatisfactory economic conditions.²⁰

This Absolute Deprivation school of thought would anticipate, as does Hibbs, that "the degree of inequality in the distribution of socio-economic resources bears an important causal relation to mass political violence."²¹ Thus, it can be hypothesized: ($H_{8.1}$) the higher the socio-economic inequality, the higher is the degree of political instability.

The opposite view is held by the Rising Expectations school of thought. It may be understood by de Tocqueville's notion that socio-political unrest is most likely to occur when conditions are improving. As he expressed it:

People who have endured patiently and almost unconsciously the most overwhelming oppression often burst into rebellion against the yoke the moment it begins to grow lighter.... Evils which are patiently endured when they seem inevitable become intolerable when once the idea of escape from

¹⁹ See Mishler, p. 80.

²⁰ Robert Jackson and Michael Stein (eds.), Issues in Comparative Politics (N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1971), pp. 269-70.

²¹ Douglas Hibbs, Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis (N.Y.: Wiley, 1973), pp. 196-7.

them is suggested. 22

It can be argued that when "rising expectations" (created, in part, by relative increases in equality) are confronted by the reality of still high levels of inequality, this may produce frustration and political unrest. Thus, this Rising Expectations school would hypothesize: (H_{8.2}) the greater the increases in socio-economic equality, the greater the increases in political instability.

An intermediate position between the Socialized Passivity and Absolute Deprivation schools is the Relative Deprivation school of thought. Like the Socialized Passivity view, the Relative Deprivation approach asks: "Why is it that, given the prevailing degree of social inequality, there is no widely supported and radical opposition to the existing socio-political order, and that at all levels of the stratification hierarchy attitudes of acceptance, if not of approval, are the most commonly found?"²³ Like the Absolute Deprivation school, the Relative Deprivation approach considers socio-economic inequality a potential source of political instability. However, it emphasizes the importance of the socio-psychological factor which supposedly affects the perception of the degree of inequality. As Crosby explains:

The theory of relative deprivation refers generally to the proposition that the emotion of deprivation is not simply a function of an individual's objective status. The theory of relative deprivation attempts

²² Alexis de Tocqueville, quoted in Jackson and Stein (eds.), Issues in Comparative Politics, p. 371. Note that it is not necessary, according to this view, that there be a specific economic reversal as suggested by the J-Curve theory. Cf. Abraham Miller et al., "The J-Curve Theory and the Black Urban Riots", American Political Science Review, Sept. 1977, pp. 964-82; James Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", American Sociological Review, March 1962, pp. 5-18.

²³ Goldthorpe, p. 219.

2

to specify the conditions under which objective (absolute) deprivation eventuates in subjective (relative) deprivation and to describe the ways in which felt deprivation results in various behaviors (e.g., violence, apathy). 24

Two of the well-known researchers in this area are Gurr and Runciman. The former suggests that "the necessary precondition for violent civil conflict is 'relative deprivation', defined as actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their environment's apparent value capabilities." 25 Runciman's argument is that to account for the discrepancy between the objective (absolute) degree of inequality and the actual awareness and resentment of this situation, consideration must be given to the reference groups in terms of which individuals in the lower socio-economic strata identify. These are groups with which the subordinate class habitually compares itself in evaluating rewards, opportunities, and social deserts generally, and in relation to which its expectations and aspirations are formed. It is argued that if, as appears usual, the reference groups adopted by the lower strata are located comparatively close in the stratification hierarchy to its own position, then the degree of perceived inequality is likely to be

²⁴ Faye Crosby, "Relative Deprivation Revisited", American Political Science Review, March 1979, p. 104.

²⁵ Ted Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence", World Politics, Jan. 1968, p. 248.

quite slight, regardless of the overall range of objective inequality in society. Runciman's own research, using both historical and survey methods, indicates that among the British working class reference groups are, and generally have been, rather restricted in scope. Consequently, the disruptive potential which socio-economic inequality might be thought to hold, remains suppressed. Social integration is enhanced through these perceptual limitations. ²⁶

In a similar vein, Dahl has argued:

When a person does compare himself or his "own" specific group with other individuals or groups, he is likely to make the comparison with others who are, socially speaking, not distant but quite close or adjacent to him. To the skilled worker, for example, the income and privileges of the company president are likely to be less relevant than those of semi-skilled workers just "below" him or his foreman just "above" him, or skilled workers in other plants. ²⁷

Thus, according to the Relative Deprivation school, a strong sense of grievance — resulting in political protest or violence — is to be anticipated only if there is perceived a considerable degree of inequality vis-a-vis the reference groups chosen. Since this literature emphasizes the restricted selection of these groups along the stratification hierarchy, intra-class (rather than inter-class).

²⁶ See W. G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice (Berkeley, Calif.: U. of California Press, 1966); discussion by Goldthorpe, pp. 219-20.

²⁷ Robert Dahl, Pluralism: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, Conn.: Yale U. Press, 1971), pp. 96-97.

inequality appears to be of greater importance. Therefore, it will be hypothesized: (H_{8.3}) the higher the intra-class inequality, the higher is the degree of political instability.

B. Economic Consequences

In the theoretical literature as well as in the actual practice of economic planning a conflict is often believed to exist between the two goals of growth in per capita income and equity of income distribution. On the one hand, the more traditional economic theorists — supported by neo-conservative politicians embracing the innocuous-sounding "supply side economics" — hold that an uneven income distribution stimulates growth by providing incentives for investment. On the other hand, more progressive-minded economists and politicians have suggested that severe inequality constitutes a barrier to economic growth by excessively restricting demand.²⁸ For developed capitalist societies, the literature contains no specific quantitative evaluations of the impact which differing degrees of income equalization have on economic growth.²⁹ "Only with such

²⁸ See discussion in William Cline, Potential Effects of Income Redistribution on Economic Growth (N.Y.: Praeger, 1972), pp. 3-6.

²⁹ A number of simulation studies in regard to Third World countries indicates that redistribution of income would have a largely neutral impact on economic growth. See William Cline, "Distribution and Development: A Survey of Literature", Journal of Development Economics, vol. 1, 1975, pp. 359-400.

empirical estimates can there be a valid basis for determining what weight should be given in policy formulation to arguments against redistribution on grounds of growth sacrifice or favoring redistribution on grounds of growth stimulation."³⁰

Hewlett explains the relationship between equality and growth as follows:

Market economies are based on inequality, inasmuch as differentials of income constitute a structural necessity serving as incentives, rewards, and penalties that are instrumental in promoting efficiency in the use of resources and contribute towards generating a growing national product.... Inequality, rather than a "weakness", is functional to the workings of a market economy.... Finally, it is important to remember that the inequality-efficiency relationship constitutes a tradeoff. The maximization of growth rates and a dramatic narrowing of income differentials would appear to be incompatible under capitalism, but precisely how much equity is sacrificed for how much growth is a political choice.³¹

It is argued by conservatives that steeply progressive tax rates (from which comparatively greater equality supposedly results) deaden incentives to save, invest, and take entrepreneurial risks. Instead of using their savings for productive investments, too many upper-income individuals seek tax shelters. Touting a "reverse Robin Hood" creed, it is suggested that to spur investment and growth (which ultimately would help the poor and unemployed), one must cut the tax rates of the rich (yielding relatively greater inequality). If the incentives of wealthy individuals and investors and their financial institutions (which have a monopoly on the supply of private capital) are impaired, it is argued that

³⁰ Gline, Potential Effects..., p. 4.

³¹ Sylvia Hewlett, "Inequality and Its Implications for Economic Growth", in Horowitz (ed.), Equity, Income, and Policy (N.Y.: Praeger, 1977), pp. 30, 46.

the supply of investable funds will evaporate with a resultant negative impact upon economic growth.³² Thus, it can be hypothesized: ($H_{9.1}$) the higher the economic (i.e., welfarist and egalitarian) equality, the lower is the degree of economic growth.

As noted earlier, a conflicting position contends that income redistribution would stimulate economic growth "because consumption would increase and buoy up investment in an otherwise stagnant economy."³³ This alternative perspective also criticizes the motivational and theoretical assumptions made by the traditional economic school.

As Hyman and Brough argue:

A criticism which must be levelled against economic interpretations of inequality is their subordination of the analysis of income distribution to that of productive efficiency. A particular structure of rewards is explained (and hence, implicitly or explicitly, justified) as the necessary outcome of market forces in allocating factors of production in the most efficient manner. Leaving aside the various criticisms which may be made of the conventional economic conception of "efficiency", it may still be questioned why a large volume of national production distributed in a highly unequal manner must necessarily be preferred to one which is smaller but more equal.³⁴

In addition, this alternative viewpoint asks the question: Even if some incentive payments are necessary to sustain

³² See James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1973), pp. 204-5.

³³ See Cline, Potential Effects..., pp. 20-25, 191-3.

³⁴ Richard Hyman and Ian Brough, Social Values and Industrial Relations: A Study of Fairness and Equality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), pp. 140-41.

investment and economic growth within the capitalist context, do the huge present differentials reflect incentive requirements alone? It is contended that, on balance, a move toward greater economic equality will spur demand more than it may impair incentives. Thus, it can be hypothesized: ($H_{9.2}$) the higher the economic (i.e., welfarist and egalitarian) equality, the higher is the degree of economic growth.

Turning to a consideration of industrial disputes, Douglas Hibbs has observed: "Labor strikes have long held the interest of economic historians, social scientists, and industrial relations specialists. The reason is that the movements and short-term fluctuations in strike activity are an invaluable source of quantitative information about the state of labor-capital relations, working-class militancy, and general socio-economic unrest." ³⁵ Variants of the four schools of thought discussed in relation to political instability can be applied to a consideration of the relationship between inequality and strikes. From the Absolute Deprivation perspective, one could hypothesize: ($H_{10.1}$) the higher the economic (i.e., welfarist and income) inequality, the higher is the degree of industrial strife. Hibbs suggests: "At the macro-theoretical level strikes are most usefully viewed as instruments of collective working-class action.... Strike activity is one manifestation of an ongoing struggle

³⁵ Douglas Hibbs, "Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies", American Political Science Review, vol. 70, Dec. 1976, p. 1033.

fer power between social classes over the distribution of resources, principally (though not exclusively) national income." ³⁶ It can be argued that the less equitable that distribution, the more the discontent and strike activity among the working class. As Allen contends: "Industrial conflict is inherent in the structure of capitalism.... The conflict over distribution exists over every additional increment of revenue. If productivity increases there is no law or custom which will guarantee that its proceeds will be shared out in a pre-determined manner." ³⁷

According to the logic of the Rising Expectations school, once the possibility of significantly less economic inequality is perceived to be attainable (due, in part, to moderate gains over the recent past in equality), industrial militancy will increase. Thus, one could hypothesize; ($H_{10.2}$) the higher the increase in economic equality, the higher the increase in industrial strife.

From the Relative Deprivation perspective, it is argued:

There exists a naive theory that within an "affluent society", with the extreme economic deprivation of the past no longer the lot of most working people (though by no means eliminated), pressure for increased income should diminish. But what is important is not absolute but relative deprivation: the gap between the income a man receives and that to which he feels he can reasonably aspire.... The idea that industrial disputes would disappear if

³⁶ Douglas Hibbs, "On the Political Economy of Long-Run Trends in Strike Activity", British Journal of Political Science, April 1978, p. 165.

³⁷ V.L. Allen, Militant Trade Unionism (London: Merlin, 1966), p. 113.

only the output of wealth were doubled, and everyone were twice as well off, not only is refuted by all practical experience, but is in its very nature founded on an illusion. For the question is one not of amounts but of proportions. 38

Industrial conflict is predicted in instances where income fails to match a group's evaluation of its own status. Wages can constitute a source of discontent when workers compare their situation with that of others in similar positions. "If wages represent a badge of status, the principle of 'fair comparisons' is assumed to require equivalent remuneration for workers in analogous occupations; where the pay of any group appears out of line, the situation will be perceived as 'unfair'." 39 Such relative comparisons would suggest the following hypothesis: (H_{10.3}) the higher the intra-class inequality, the higher is the degree of industrial strife.

An extension of the Socialized Passivity school, postulating no significant relationship between societal inequality and strikes, contends:

Social values may serve to moderate and contain conflict. It would seem that the prevailing beliefs and values of a society, in their most basic and general form, tend naturally to reinforce the material dominance of those with economic power;

38 Richard Hyman, Strikes (London: Fontana, 1972), pp. 89, 172. Also see D. Katz, "Satisfactions and Deprivations in Industrial Life", in Kornhauser et al. (eds.), Industrial Conflict (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1954).

39 Hyman, pp. 118-19.

and that there exist a range of institutions through which values conducive to social stability can be inculcated. Within the context of industrial relations, the main burden of our analysis has been that the dominant framework of normative assumptions serves to legitimize a political economy based on the private ownership of the means of production and the associated forms of massive social inequality.... Because massive inequalities in the rewards and deprivations associated with work are conventionally regarded as natural and inevitable, major disparities between and within classes are not a serious and persistent source of discontent. 40

Thus, lack of empirical confirmation of a relationship between economic inequality and industrial strife would provide support for this Socialized Passivity school of thought.

C. Social Consequences

Discussions of poverty and its alleged connection with such undesirable consequences as vagrancy and crime have occurred for centuries. In addition to ideological controversies, these discussions have generated numerous attempts to demonstrate empirically that crime is associated with poverty. Many of these attempts have focused on variations in economic conditions to see if they correspond to variations in crime rates. If criminal activity is "caused" by poverty, so the reasoning goes, then there should be more crime in periods of economic depression and less in times of economic prosperity. There have been dozens of

⁴⁰ Hyman and Brough, pp. 229-32.

studies published in North America and Europe in which a relationship between economic conditions and criminality has been considered.⁴¹ Almost from the beginning, however, there has been disagreement in findings and debate as to whether the conclusions drawn were justified.

In this area there is conflict between alternative assumptions regarding the relationship that may exist between criminal activity and the state of the economy. On the one hand, it is suggested that this relationship is inverse, i.e., when economic conditions are good the amount of crime should be low. On the other hand, it is argued by some that the relationship is positive, i.e., "that criminality is an extension of normal economic activity (a criminal fringe, as it were), and that therefore it increases or decreases in the same manner and at the same time as normal economic endeavor." If this position is valid, "the amount of crime should increase and be at its highest point when conditions are good, and it should decrease when conditions are bad."⁴² This latter position represents the so-called "law of criminal saturation".

⁴¹ Many of the more important studies are reviewed and evaluated in George Vold and Thomas Bernard, Theoretical Criminology, 2nd ed. (N.Y.: Oxford U. Press, 1979), ch. 8.

⁴² Ibid., pp. 172-73.

originally offered by the Italian criminologist Enrico Ferri.⁴³ In considering the opposing positions outlined above, Gurr found partial support for both of these viewpoints.⁴⁴ Due to conflicting results from a number of studies, the inference drawn by many is that the general relationship between economic conditions and crime is so indefinite that no clear conclusion can be made. Hence, "there is a general tendency to accept the position that economic conditions represent only one of a large number of environmental circumstances."⁴⁵ As Mannheim claims:

While the older school of crimino-sociology could easily point to crime as the natural consequence of the misery of the great masses, the new affluent society had, it was believed, every right to expect a wholesale reduction in economic crime as the result of the universally improved standard of living. When such a reduction failed to appear the only conclusion to be drawn was, it seemed, that economic factors did not matter or, in more popular terms, that poverty was not a cause of crime.⁴⁶

However, the "affluent" society ~~is~~ not the same as the "equal" society. A high general standard of living

⁴³ See Enrico Ferri, Criminal Sociology (N.Y.: Appleton, 1900).

⁴⁴ See T. R. Gurr, Rogues, Rebels, and Reformers (Beverly, Calif.: Sage, 1976).

⁴⁵ See Vold and Bernard, p. 179.

⁴⁶ Hermann Mannheim, Comparative Criminology, vol. 2 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 573. Also see Marvin Wolfgang, "Urban Crime", in Wilson (ed.), The Metropolitan Enigma (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U. Press, 1968), pp. 245-81.

within a country and a corresponding high crime rate do not necessarily refute the possible relationship between degree of societal inequality and crime. It can be argued that this shift of focus from general levels of affluence to the distribution of such affluence provides a more appropriate perspective for testing the importance of economic factors vis-a-vis criminality. As Bongers argued: "It is not the total wealth of a country that matters, but rather the way in which its wealth is distributed.... The manner in which the resources of a country are distributed is no doubt of great influence on its crime rate."⁴⁷ Considering a different dimension of socio-economic inequality, Hirschi and Rudisill suggest:

The most prestigious and influential theories of delinquency in American sociology... emphasize differences in opportunity among social groups, especially socio-economic classes. All of them suggest that these differences stem from the social structure rather than individual characteristics. Equality of opportunity, then, is the surest cure for crime. ⁴⁸

Thus, one can hypothesize: (H_{11}) the higher the socio-economic inequality, the higher is the degree of criminal activity. In addition, to take into consideration the arguments

⁴⁷ Willem Bongers, Criminality and Economic Conditions (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana U. Press, 1969), pp. 11, 91. Also see Ian Taylor et al., The New Criminology (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1973) and Critical Criminology (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975).

⁴⁸ Travis Hirschi and David Rudisill, "The Great American Search: Causes of Crime, 1876-1976", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Jan. 1976, p. 21.

of the more traditional literature discussed above (regarding the impact of general economic conditions upon crime), hypothesis 11 also will be tested controlling for changes in economic growth. However, based upon the preceding arguments, it is anticipated that controlling for this third variable will not substantially alter the hypothesized (bivariate) relationship between inequality and crime.

Consideration now turns to the relationship between ethnic/racial militancy and ethnic/racial inequality. This involves analysis of separatist political movements and/or strife concerning societal groups distinguished by ascriptive characteristics and whose members feel solidarity with other members of their group and different from those of other groups (a "we-they" feeling). Conflict involving such groups is an important and wide-spread phenomenon. One estimate indicates that worldwide, almost one-third of all domestic violence (in 1961-65) was between ethnic, racial, and/or religious groups.⁴⁹ In addition, separatist movements in the post-war era have threatened the integrity of a number of the developed democracies. These realities are in contradiction to what many Marxist and non-Marxist theories of development hypothesized:

⁴⁹ See Christopher Hewitt, "Majorities and Minorities: A Comparative Survey of Ethnic Violence", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Sept. 1977, pp. 150-60; Hugh Graham and Ted Gurr (eds.), Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (Washington: National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 1969), pp. 454-57; Harold Isaacs, Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change (NY: Harper & Row, 1975), p. 3.

that the political and social repercussions of inequality in advanced capitalist societies would be linked to class — not ethnic or racial — differences. It was thought that "the imperatives of industrialization, urbanization, secularization, and nationalism would create organizations, roles, and values that would downplay and eventually extinguish the relevance of the ethnic group." ⁵⁰ Many American writers, perhaps influenced by the "melting pot" ideal of American society, also have assumed that ethnic conflicts are less fundamental and enduring than economic conflicts. The persistence or actual growth of conflicts of the former type has been viewed as a manifestation of residual loyalties destined to fade away, or has been characterized as basically a form of economic conflict — even though the participants do not necessarily recognize it as such. ⁵¹

The Ethnic Integration school of thought, based upon the perspective noted above, contends that modern industrial societies possess or are capable of achieving cultural homogeneity and social assimilation of various ethnic components. Racial or ethnic groups which are unequal in resources to the dominant group (due to past discrimination, neglect as indigenous isolates, or recent immigration) are

⁵⁰ Raymond Corrado and Bert Rockman, "Welsh Nationalism and Subregional Inequality", in Grove (ed.), Global Inequality: Political and Socioeconomic Perspectives (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1979), p. 198. Cf. John Saul, "The Diagnostics of Class and Tribe", Studies in Political Economy, Spring 1979, pp. 1-42.

⁵¹ See Anthony Birch, "Minority Nationalist Movements and Theories of Political Integration", World Politics, April 1978, pp. 325-26.

believed capable of being brought into the societal mainstream through evolutionary processes involving cultural exposure, ecological dispersion, economic incorporation, and "social mixture". As Smoocha and Peres explain, the arguments of this school:

Various processes of modernization — especially industrialization and the introduction of a welfare state — bring about not only greater social equality, but also, indirectly, greater ethnic equality. Industrialization tends to equalize training and to provide considerable social mobility. The welfare state has a more equitable distribution of resources as its prime goal, and promotes equality by extending civil rights, public services, labor and consumer legislation, provision of material assistance to the poor and other measures. Modernization is believed to be a tremendous ethnic leveler. Social stratification, being functional, persists to ensure adequate utilization of talents; but ethnic stratification, being dysfunctional, vanishes. 52

Thus, the Ethnic Integration school of thought predicts diminished ethnic inequality and therefore reduced ethnic tensions as these groups are integrated into the mainstream of society.

A conflicting theoretical perspective, the Internal Colonialism school, foresees the continued importance of ethnic and/or racial cleavages. First adumbrated in Lenin's discussion of the development of Russian capitalism and later in Gramsci's discussion of the Italian South, this perspective contends that the relationship between members

⁵² S. Smoocha and Y. Peres, "The Dynamics of Ethnic Inequalities", Social Dynamics, June 1975, p. 63.

of the core community and those of the peripheral communities in a society is characterized by exploitation.⁵³

The core community, having acquired an advantage over the outlying communities in the period of state building or in the early period of modernization, uses its political and economic power to maintain its superior position. The cultural and ethnic differences between the communities do not disappear, however, and in certain circumstances they may form the basis of demonstrations and separatist agitations by members of the peripheral communities.⁵⁴

In direct contradiction to the Ethnic Integration school, Glazer and Moynihan have suggested that the modern social welfare state heightens group awareness since the ethnic or racial group provides a representational basis for the struggle over the spoils of social welfarism.⁵⁵ In addition, Walker Connor advances the position that regional ethnic nationalisms are further inspired — not diminished — by the process of modernization and inter-group interactions.⁵⁶ Thus, the Internal Colonialism school of thought predicts continued (possibly growing) ethnic/racial inequality and therefore continued ethnic/racial tensions.

⁵³ See Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism (Berkeley, Calif.: U. of California Press, 1975).

⁵⁴ Birch, p. 326.

⁵⁵ See N. Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, Ethnicity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U. Press, 1975).

⁵⁶ See Walker Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism", Journal of International Affairs, vol. 27, 1973, pp. 1-21; Corrado and Rockman, pp. 198-99.

The proposition that inequality results in ethnic/racial militancy is supported by a number of researchers. For example, Hewitt found: "Violent multi-ethnic societies are marked by severe political and economic inequality.... Peaceful multi-ethnic societies are characterized by economic parity between the ethnic groups." ⁵⁷ As Corrado and Rockman suggest: "Material inequalities in the presence of modernizing secular values can lead to attitudes favorable to ethnic militance and claims for redress of existing inequalities." ⁵⁸ Thus, it can be hypothesized: ($H_{12.1}$) the higher the socio-economic inequality, the higher is the ethnic/racial militancy. On the other hand, using the previous arguments of the Rising Expectations school, one can hypothesize: ($H_{12.2}$) the greater the increases in socio-economic equality, the greater the ethnic/racial militancy.

D. Conclusion

Unlike Chapter II, the theoretical literature on the consequences of inequality does not fit neatly into Marxist and non-Marxist "camps". However, there are theoretical links and common elements among the varied topics discussed in this chapter. Is socio-economic inequality an important factor in explaining strikes, protest, crime, political

⁵⁷ Hewitt, p. 150.

⁵⁸ Corrado and Rockman, p. 204.

and ethnic violence? A negative answer in these instances is premised upon acceptance of variants of the Socialized Passivity perspective. Alternatively, if socio-economic equality is a relevant factor in explaining such activities, the issue arises as to whether greater equality (yielding "rising expectations") or inequality is the more important catalyst. If the answer is "inequality", then a further question is raised: Is it simply the absolute level of societal inequality which is the key explanatory variable, or is a more complicated process at work? The latter view — the Relative Deprivation school — suggests that only a segment of the (and not the entire) stratification hierarchy is relevant in relation to the consequences considered. A partial resolution and clarification of the importance and operation of socio-economic inequality vis-a-vis the political, economic, and social variables examined will be provided by the empirical results and discussion in Chapter VII.

CHAPTER IV: CRITIQUE OF CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH ON INEQUALITY

- Q. Mr. Arbuthnot, I understand that you have undertaken a career as a social scientist.
- A. That statement conforms in a high degree to its truth value in terms of reality testing.
- Q. What's that again?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Just what do you do as a social scientist?
- A. Oh, many things. Some of us hypothesize and others hypothecate....
- Q. But now tell me something of how you do all this.
- A. Through specific and concrete investigations that employ relevant methodologies leading to the integration of substantive areas and appropriate conceptualizations.
- Q. In your studies I suppose you collect a lot of interesting information.
- A. It may be interesting, but it isn't information. It's data. Or, to be more precise, they are data.
- Q. I suppose the data prove a lot of things.
- A. Well, they don't always exactly "prove" things. Usually they "suggest", "indicate", "reveal", or "reflect". Sometimes, of course, they aren't even statistically significant.
- Q. By that, I suppose you mean they aren't important.
- A. No. You see, there is "statistical" significance, and then there is, well, as you say, importance.
- Q. It must be difficult to keep all these matters correlated.
- A. Correlated! Why, I didn't know you are a social scientist.
- Q. I guess I meant keep them all together in your mind.
- A. Oh, it's not so hard when you have a systematic theory of component hypotheses.
- Q. I should think not. Do you?
- A. No. But then, no one does. 1

The state of the existing quantitative literature on socio-economic inequality (delineated below) provides an illustration of the situation satirically referred to in

¹ Bernard Berelson, quoted in Robert Dubin, Theory Building (N.Y.: Free Press, 1969), pp. 259-61.

the passage above. This chapter addresses the question: In light of previous cross-national empirical research in the area of inequality, is there a justification for an additional study? An affirmative answer rests upon demonstrating the inadequacy of the existing body of literature. This chapter is divided into three sections: (1) treatment of the variable "inequality", (2) studies of the determinants of inequality, and (3) studies of the consequences of inequality. Each section of this chapter will begin with a discussion of research design flaws and then proceed to a consideration of operationalization criticisms.

A. Treatment of the Variable "Inequality"

Examining the treatment in the literature of the term "inequality", numerous gaps and problems are revealed. To begin with, no single quantitative study deals with all four dimensions of inequality discussed in Chapter I.²

² This applies to all the major cross-national studies: e.g., Phillips Outright, "Inequality: a Cross-National Analysis", American Sociological Review, Aug. 1967, pp. 562-78; Frank Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order (London: Paladin, 1971); Robert Jackman, Politics and Social Equality (N.Y.: Wiley, 1975); David Cameron, "Inequality and the State: A Political-Economic Comparison", paper delivered at annual American Political Science Association meeting, 1976; Christopher Hewitt, "The Effect of Political Democracy and Social Democracy on Equality in Industrial Societies", American Sociological Review, June 1977, pp. 450-64; Michael Ward, The Political Economy of Distribution: Equality versus Inequality (N.Y.: Elsevier, 1978); John Dryzek, "Politics, Economics and Inequality: a Cross-National Analysis", European Journal of Political Research, Dec. 1978, pp. 399-410; Steven Stack, "The Political Economy of Income Inequality", Canadian Journal of Political Science, June 1980, pp. 273-86.

Consideration of the emancipatory perspective is particularly sparse. Thus, Grove wrote in 1979:

This lack of systematic work on ethnic or racial distribution patterns is especially surprising when one considers that ethnic or racial cleavages in many parts of the world are as important as class cleavages.... What do we know about the world's ethnic and racial distribution patterns? The answer is very little.... The number of studies conducted on ethnic and racial income distributions can be counted on one hand, and none is comparative. ³

While in an earlier period it might have been argued that such divisions and conflicts between communal groups were peripheral to the overwhelming reality of class antagonism (and could justifiably be relegated to the theoretical sidelines), "now that racial, ethnic, and religious conflicts have moved towards the centre of the political stage in many industrial societies, any general model of class or stratification that does not fully incorporate this fact must forfeit all credibility." ⁴

Even those few attempts to quantify cross-national emancipatory equality have failed to address the issues considered important in this dissertation. For example, Grove's study does not test whether the partisan nature

³ John Grove, "A Partial Test of the Ethnic Equalization Hypothesis", in his Global Inequality: Political and Socio-economic Perspectives (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1979), pp. 135-36.

⁴ Frank Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory: a Bourgeois Critique (N.Y.: Columbia U. Press, 1979), p. 7.

of the government has any impact on distribution patterns.⁵ Moroney's research on sex-based inequality of income fails to analyze the source of the cross-national differences within capitalist countries. He focuses solely upon comparison of differentials between communist and non-communist states.⁶

Turning to the operationalization of "inequality", an important problem is that almost all studies utilize, only pre-tax income distribution data when measuring levels of economic equality. Within the context of attempting to determine whether political and state variables have an impact on the level of income distribution, this measure precludes consideration of the possible redistributive role of direct taxes. For example, the most recent contribution to the literature stresses that political theories of income inequality have emphasized efforts to reduce inequality "through such action as progressive income taxation."⁷ Yet, Stack then proceeds to use pre-tax data which are incapable of capturing such political efforts to achieve equality. This is especially important in

⁵ See Grove, pp. 135-37.

⁶ See John Moroney, "Do Women Earn Less Under Capitalism", in Moroney (ed.), Income Inequality (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1979), pp. 141-60.

⁷ Stack, pp. 275, 279-80.

Social Democratic dominated countries where the tax system is supposedly the main redistributive tool. Thus, utilization of pre-tax income data can result in a systematic underestimation of the impact of political factors on equality of income distribution. Where the impact of the tax system on inequality has been studied in a cross-national context, the conclusions drawn are sometimes questionable due to the exclusion of indirect taxes from consideration.⁸

A second problem associated with the operationalization of "inequality" is reliance upon inter-sectoral income distribution data.⁹ Sectoral income inequality is a measure developed by Kuznets.¹⁰ It is computed by dividing the percentage of total domestic product produced in eight economic sectors (mining, manufacturing, agriculture, etc.) by the total number of workers in each sector. Though this computation only gives the distribution of per worker product across economic sectors, it has been used as a proxy for personal income — without

⁸ See Edward Tufte, Political Control of the Economy (Princeton U. Press, 1978). For a detailed critique of Tufte's study, see Joe Oppenheimer, "Small Steps Forward for Political Economy", World Politics, Oct. 1980, pp. 121-51.

⁹ For example, this was used by Jackman and Cutright in their studies.

¹⁰ See Simon Kuznets, "Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations, VIII: the Distribution of Income by Size", Economic Development and Cultural Change, Jan. 1963, pp. 1-80.

sufficient acknowledgement of the dangers of such a procedure. Utilizing sectoral income data for this purpose assumes that the income within each production sector is equally distributed among all the economic actors within the sector. This assumption is highly unrealistic.¹¹ In addition, use of such data is inadequate because it reflects not the distribution between individuals in the country or within various sectors, but instead, the distribution of income between sectors. As a consequence, it reflects differences among sectors in productivity. These differences are primarily a function of the degree to which the sectors differ in the extent to which production is labor or capital intensive. Partly for this reason, such a measure is (as Jackman and others have discovered) closely associated with the degree of economic development in a country.¹² In a related problem, Parkin measures inequality of income distribution by the ratios of the average earnings of different occupational groups (e.g., managerial vs. unskilled labor).¹³ Two inadequacies

¹¹ See discussion in Richard Robinson and Dan Quinlan, "Democracy and Social Equality: A Re-Analysis", American Sociological Review, Aug. 1977, pp. 614-15; C. T. Husbands and Roy Money, "The Cross-National Study of Inequality: A Research Note", American Sociological Review, June 1970, pp. 319-25.

¹² See critique of inter-sectoral income data in Cameron, footnote 50.

¹³ Parkin, Class Inequality..., p. 118.

arise in using data of this kind: (1) occupational classifications vary between countries; (2) income differentials within occupational categories are ignored.

A third problem is that almost all studies have relied upon single indicators of income distribution (usually ratios of inequality or Gini coefficients). Sole dependence upon a ratio of inequality (e.g., top decile/bottom decile) is inadequate because it ignores important differences that may exist between societies among middle income earners. Alternatively, reliance solely upon the Gini index is inadequate because different distributions of income may share identical Gini values. This can occur whenever two Lorenz curves (the geometrical representation of cumulative income distributions) intersect. In such an instance, the Gini coefficient would violate one of the most important conditions required for comparison of distributions — that any measure be sensitive to every transfer which reduces inequality by shifting income from richer to poorer individuals.¹⁴

In figure 4.1 (next page) Lorenz curves L_1 , L_2 , and L_3 all include the same area and therefore have the same Gini coefficient) but significantly different

¹⁴ See A.B. Atkinson, "On the Measurement of Inequality", Journal of Economic Theory, June 1970, pp. 244-63; H.R. Alker and Bruce Russett, "On Measuring Inequality", Behavioral Science, June 1964, pp. 201-18; Ward, pp. 18-20; D.G. Champernowne, "A Comparison of Measures of Inequality of Income Distribution", The Economic Journal, Dec. 1974, pp. 787-816; Cameron, footnote 50.

Figure 4.1: Inadequacy of the Gini Index ¹⁵

types of inequality. Curve L_1 indicates inequality distributed more or less evenly over all income levels. Curve L_2 reveals a relatively high degree of equality among middle and upper-income levels, but significant inequality to the detriment of the lowest income groups. Curve L_3 indicates inequality favoring mostly a small layer at the top. ¹⁶ The implications of these differing types of income distribution are important. Yet, one would not be aware of such distinctions by relying upon

¹⁵ Adapted from Karl Deutsch, Politics and Government, 2nd ed., (N.Y.: Harper, 1974), p. 137.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 136-39.

the Gini index alone.

Finally, some researchers have used bizarre (and highly questionable) indicators in an attempt to capture more than the traditional measures of equality. Ward's use of the number of universities and Hilton hotels as a measure of "societal affluence" deserves special mention in this regard.¹⁷ Castles' use of gross domestic product per capita as a "measure of welfare state provision" merits top prize.¹⁸

B. Studies of Determinants of Inequality

Almost all cross-national studies of the political and economic determinants of equality are purely synchronic in nature.¹⁹ They generally use "level of inequality" rather than "change in inequality" data. While in many instances this research design decision has been dictated by the absence of available data of the latter type, researchers have been negligent in not acknowledging the shortcomings of this situation. This creates special

¹⁷ Ward, p. 31.

¹⁸ Francis Castles, The Social Democratic Image of Society (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 65.

¹⁹ Regarding the relative merits of diachronic as opposed to synchronic analysis, see Johan Galtung, "The Social Sciences: An Essay on Polarization and Integration", in Knorr and Rosenau (eds.), Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U. Press, 1969), pp. 243-85.

problems when, for example, attempting to establish the impact of Social Democratic governments upon inequality. To compare nations at one point in time regarding their level of equality and correlate this with length of socialist rule over a specified period ignores the degree of equality which prevailed prior to the period considered — i.e., prior to the supposed impact of the partisan nature of the government. To take a hypothetical case, while a nation may have a comparatively high degree of equality measured in 1970, it may have had approximately the same (or even higher) level in 1950. In such a case, it would clearly be incorrect to attribute the 1970 level of equality as being predominantly the result of Social Democratic rule over the previous 20 years. What is needed, at a minimum, is a "before" and "after" comparison. This would entail comparing equality levels in nations circa 1950, prior to the putative influence of the partisan composition of government (for the 20-year post-war period chosen), and circa 1970, after such an alleged impact, and correlating the change in level with length of Social Democratic rule during the two decades. Unfortunately, no previous study has done this. However, such a procedure is utilized in this dissertation (see Chapter V for details).

An elementary canon of methodology is that putative

"cause" must precede effect; the independent variable must come before (and not after) the dependent variable. Cameron's study is an illustration of the violation of this rule. The dates of his income distribution data (his measure of inequality and dependent variable) range from 1964 (for West Germany) to 1971 (for Canada); the average date is 1969.²⁰ Yet, his data for partisan composition and economic scope of the government (his two major independent variables) cover the 18-year period from 1956 through 1973. How can the existence of Social Democratic rule in the 1970s have a retroactive effect on the degree of equality measured for most countries in the 1960s? This is especially important in regard to West Germany. Obviously, the degree of equality in 1964 cannot be attributed to Social Democratic rule which occurred only after this period. Thus, Cameron's conclusion ("We find that the partisan composition of government is associated with the degree of economic equality.... That is, the greater the proportion of time between 1956 and 1973 that Social Democrats and their allies possessed governmental majorities, the lower was the level of economic inequality.")²¹ is based upon an

²⁰ Cameron, footnote 48.

²¹ Ibid., p. 16.

inappropriate and misleading methodological procedure.

An additional design problem with all studies considering the importance of the partisan composition of government vis-a-vis inequality is the lack of attention paid to subnational governments. For example, previous research in this area has ignored the issue of the possible impact of Social Democratic or Communist governments at provincial, regional, or municipal levels in countries which have not experienced socialist rule at the national level.

Until recently, most studies of public policy and inequality in developed democracies have been confined to an analysis of domestic, or internal, "causes" and consequences. Consideration of the linkage between the international economy and domestic policy has been lacking. "The predominant image implicit in most policy studies is that of political autarky — of autonomous states whose policy processes are wholly insulated from external influences." ²² Galtung, who does attempt to confront this linkage issue regarding developed as well as underdeveloped states, draws unwarranted conclusions from his empirical analysis. ²³ Of the 60 nations (cases) which Galtung uses in his quantitative work, no Gini

²² David Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy", American Political Science Review, Dec. 1978, pp. 1259-60.

²³ See Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", Journal of Peace Research, Jan. 1971, pp. 81-117.

coefficient (one of his two indicators of inequality) is reported in 43 of the cases. Data also are missing for 25 of the 60 cases regarding equality of land distribution (his other indicator of inequality). Any conclusions drawn from correlations obtained with such a high proportion of missing data are highly speculative and open to significant error.

A prevalent research design in the study of determinants of inequality is to base the analysis between (rather than within) major levels of economic development or "democratic performance". Comparisons are made between countries across a wide range of levels of development or democracy. Regarding the impact of economic development (when operationalized as per capita GDP), the "error" made by some researchers is based upon the failure to take into account the ramifications of the huge variation or gap in per capita incomes between high-income and low-income nations.²⁴ As Castles and McKinlay have argued:

This gap results in a major discontinuity in the distributions of per capita GDP. The distribution of countries along this variable is in fact bimodal. The majority of low-income countries, ranging in per capita GDP from \$100 to \$1000, are separated by a huge gap from the majority of high-income

²⁴ This criticism applies, for example, to Cutright; Jackman; Ward; and Harold Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality (Berkeley, Calif.: U. of California Press, 1975).

countries, ranging in per capita GDP from \$4000 to \$7000. The problem in regressing any variables onto per capita GDP for a population containing both high-income and low-income countries is essentially a variant of the outlier problem: in this situation we are dealing basically with two groups of outliers. It is very easy to find a significant regression equation precisely because the huge gap in per capita GDP between high-income and low-income countries cancels out any variation that may exist within each of these two groups.²⁵

These researchers have assumed that what is true for a large sample of countries at diverse economic levels is also true for substantial sub-samples, such as the high-income countries. However, within the "high" and "low" subsets, the empirical relationship may "wash away". For example, using Wilensky's data for the group of advanced countries he examines (i.e., excluding the low-income group of nations), one finds an insignificant and negative correlation of -0.16 between economic development and welfare provision (versus +0.67 when utilizing the entire sample of nations).²⁶ In other words, Wilensky's own data illustrate that (contrary to his conclusion) economic development is not an important explanation of welfare spending in high-income countries. It should be noted that

²⁵ Francis Castles and Robert McKinlay, "Public Welfare Provision, Scandinavia, and the Sheer Futility of the Sociological Approach to Politics", British Journal of Political Science, April 1979, pp. 165-66.

²⁶ See Ibid.; Wilensky, p. 24.

almost all of the studies on the relationship between democracy and inequality are subject to the same criticism as expressed above regarding the literature on economic development — i.e., a failure to check whether relationships found in a large sample composed of highly democratic and highly undemocratic nations is confirmed within the former subset of countries.²⁷

Turning to the operationalization of the variable "Social Democratic rule", some authors have used an overly-simplistic dichotomy between countries which have had Social Democratic governments and those which have not — ignoring the differences in number of years of such rule.²⁸ Others have measured the length of time that Social Democratic parties were members of national governments — though not necessarily in control of such governments.²⁹ Under this procedure both Sweden and Switzerland receive identical scores. To the extent that Social Democratic parties are represented in government only as minority members (e.g., Switzerland), the Hibbs measure will distort the possible consequences of such participation.³⁰ Other researchers, in an attempt

²⁷ See Jackman; Stack; Dryzek; Robinson and Quinlan.

²⁸ See Parkin, Class Inequality..., chp. 4.

²⁹ Douglas Hibbs, "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy", American Political Science Review, Dec. 1977, pp. 1467-87.

³⁰ See criticism offered by Cameron, "Inequality and the State...", pp. 9-10.

to measure "left-wing strength", have used as their indicator the percentage of "non-Communist socialist vote" (or the number of legislative seats). ³¹ This, of course, ignores the impact of large Communist parties and results in Canada being ranked barely below France and Italy in Hewitt's measure of left-wing political clout.

In determining how to categorize the American Democratic party, Cameron resorts (in part) to "policy-oriented" evidence — i.e., a comparison of policy performance with that of European Social Democratic parties. However, use of "policy" criteria to distinguish the U. S. Democrats from Social Democrats is tautologous reasoning. Since "policy" is the variable under investigation, one should not use policy performance as a criterion for categorizing parties. Otherwise, the hypothesis regarding partisan composition of government becomes true by definition. All parties which have "progressive" policies are deemed Social Democratic and therefore one finds Social Democratic parties produce more "progressive" policies! ³²

³¹ Hewitt, pp. 457-58; Jackman, p. 119; Steven Stack, "The Effects of Political Participation and Socialist Party Strength on the Degree of Income Inequality", American Sociological Review, March 1979, pp. 168-71; Robert Gilsdorf, "The Welfare State Syndrome in Western Europe", paper presented to European Politics Group Workshop, London, Dec. 1979.

³² See Cameron, "Inequality and the State...", footnote 45.

C. Studies of Consequences of Inequality

In considering a critique of quantitative research on the consequences of socio-economic inequality, the major point to be stressed is that most studies have simply not dealt with inequality as an independent variable — even though some have acknowledged the value of such an approach.³³ The most heavily researched consequence of inequality is "political instability". However, as with the equality-democracy nexus,³⁴ there is disagreement as to whether the level of socio-economic inequality should be treated as a dependent or independent variable. For example, Jackman has used political stability as an independent variable which affects the degree of equality.³⁵ Hibbs, citing lack of available data, decided not to consider the role of inequality in relation to political violence even though admitting: "We would anticipate intuitively that the degree of inequality in the distribution of socio-economic resources bears an important causal relation to mass political violence."³⁶ However, the bulk of the cross-national

³³ See Ward, p. 171; Jackman, pp. 205-6; p. 75 of this dissertation.

³⁴ See discussion by Robinson and Quinlan.

³⁵ Jackman, chp. 5.

³⁶ Douglas Hibbs, Mass Political Violence: a Cross-National Causal Analysis (N.Y.: Wiley-Interscience, 1973), pp. 196-97.

literature on instability does consider the potential impact of inequality (or "economic deprivation") on the level of political unrest.³⁷

An important problem with these studies is the prevalent and inappropriate use of "monolithic" measures as indicators of economic inequality (and hence, "deprivation"). Gurr, Davies, and others have utilized GNP growth rates and inflation as measures of "short-term deprivation."³⁸ Miller, Bolce, and Halligan are blunt in their critique of this procedure:

Societies cannot be viewed as monoliths. It is imperative that specifications and distinctions be made for various groups.... Relative deprivation-based theories that treat societies as monoliths may well conceal as much if not more than they reveal. If statements such as "revolutions are most likely to occur when things get better" are to have any theoretical meaning, then it must be demonstrated for whom things have gotten better. Is it indeed the revolutionary

³⁷ See I. Feierabend et al., Anger, Violence, and Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972); Robert Jackson and Michael Stein (eds.), Issues in Comparative Politics (N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1971), chps. 3-5; T.R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U. Press, 1970); Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence", World Politics, Jan. 1968, pp. 245-78; Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife", American Political Science Review, Dec. 1968, pp. 1104-24; Gurr and R. Duvall, "Civil Conflict in the 1960s", Comparative Political Studies, July 1973, pp. 135-69; James Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", American Sociological Review, March 1962, pp. 5-18; Fay Crosby, "Relative Deprivation Revisited", American Political Science Review, March 1979, pp. 103-12; Jack Nagel, "Inequality and Discontent", World Politics, July 1974, pp. 453-72; Bruce Russett, "Inequality and Instability", in Feierabend, pp. 125-35.

³⁸ See Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife"; Davies; Douglas Bwy, "Political Instability: the Cross Cultural Test of a Causal Model", in Feierabend, pp. 223-41.

class? When unspecified data demonstrate that things improved for the society as a whole, can we be sure that things did not get simultaneously worse for the revolutionary class?... The monolithic approach cannot assist the student of revolution in resolving such questions and may well lead to deceptively simple answers. 39

An additional problem can be found in the studies of Russett and Nagel. They both utilize a questionable measure of inequality — distribution of land. While possibly appropriate if concerned solely with Third World (and predominantly agricultural) countries, use of equality of land distribution as an indicator of inequality for highly industrialized, urban nations⁴⁰ is certainly a dubious procedure.

³⁹ Abraham Miller et al., "The J-Curve Theory and the Black Urban Riots: an Empirical Test of Progressive Relative Deprivation Theory", American Political Science Review, Sept. 1977, p. 981.

⁴⁰ See Russett, pp. 127-29; Nagel, pp. 455-57.

D. Conclusion

John Locke once wrote: "It is one thing to show a man he is in error, and another to put him in possession of truth."⁴¹ As a graduate student, one learns how relatively easy it is to criticize the work of others — to point out the errors — but how difficult it is to provide alternative approaches that can withstand similar critical analysis. The purpose of this chapter has been to demonstrate the inadequacy of the existing cross-national literature on inequality. This has necessitated an emphasis on the faults — rather than the virtues — of previous quantitative research in this area. As such, the false impression could be created of an army of incompetent social scientists engaging in research of dubious value. Instead, a more balanced view would reveal an approach (quantitative, cross-national research) which has promised more than it has been able to deliver. An all too prevalent unwillingness to explicitly acknowledge the limitations of a particular research design, operational procedure, or data base is evidence not of incompetence, but of avoidance of the painful truth of the sometimes inherent restrictions and relative in-

⁴¹ Quoted in John Somerville and Ronald Santoni (eds.), Social and Political Philosophy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), p. 203.

adequacy of the tools with which we operate. Thus, the methodology chapter which follows is not presented in the hubristic delusion of being able to remedy all the problems which have plagued a generation of researchers. Rather, it is a modest attempt to improve upon and learn from (where possible) the "mistakes" of past researchers within the context of the limitations discussed above and in the next chapter.

CHAPTER V: METHODOLOGY

There are two ways to approach science. On the one hand, it can be viewed as "a body of knowledge", on the other as "a method of obtaining it".... Knowledge is not knowledge until it has been empirically and systematically substantiated using the procedures which have been labeled "scientific method".... 1

Disraeli once said that there were three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics.... In a society that is perhaps overly impressed with the aura and trappings of science, it is good to be reminded that numbers in themselves do not make for truth. Thus, we should examine an argument that uses numbers and statistics just as critically as we would an argument expressed only in words. 2

A. Research Design

The coverage of this dissertation extends to all "developed democracies" for the two decades from (circa) 1950 to 1970. This term can be nominally defined as nations which on a comparative basis have a high standard of living and which allow voters a free choice (at regular

¹ Alan Isaak, Scope and Methods of Political Science (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1969), pp. 25, 56-7.

² Frederick Herzon and Michael Hooper, Introduction to Statistics for the Social Sciences (N.Y.: Thomas Crowell, 1976), p. 1.

intervals) between two or more political parties competing for the right to form a government. "Developed democracies" is operationally defined in this dissertation as those countries with a level of GNP per capita (circa 1970) in excess of \$2,000 (U.S.) and with a continuous history of free elections (as described above) since 1950. Lack of data availability necessitates the elimination of mini-states (i.e., countries with less than $\frac{1}{2}$ million population) which meet this definition (e.g., Iceland, Luxembourg). This results in the inclusion of the following 19 nations (listed alphabetically): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (West), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Excluded by the definition provided, for example, are four OECD nations: Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey. Thus, this study includes the virtual universe of what are generally acknowledged to be the "advanced capitalist states" or "developed democracies" of the post-World War II era.

These countries constitute a reasonable disaggregation of the world community and allow for the application of the "most similar systems" design — a perspective considered more appropriate given some of the criticisms of previous studies in Chapter IV. As Heisler describes this approach:

From a broad analytic perspective, European-type systems seem to provide promising material for a "most similar systems" design.... They confront similar human and physical environmental problems; and most important, many of them appear to have similar political structures. Further, most of these countries are intimately associated with each other in both intergovernmental and supranational agencies, and such associations possess the potential for reinforcing existing similarities. Similarities among systems selected for study serve two important heuristic purposes. First, they provide the comparative analyst with a degree of control over unknown or unspecified variables. Second, they can serve as a pre-theoretic core, around which theories for the system type can be generated. 3

Przeworski and Teune have observed that the "pre-dominant view" among social scientists has been to opt for the strategy of "concomitant variation". Such studies are premised upon the belief that "systems as similar as possible with respect to as many features as possible constitute the optimal samples for comparative inquiry.... Although these designs rarely have been formulated rigorously, their logic is clear. Common systemic characteristics are conceived as 'controlled for', whereas inter-systemic differences are viewed as explanatory variables." 4

In keeping with the hypotheses formulated in Chapters II and III, the level of analysis utilized in this dis-

³ Martin Heisler, Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes in Some Post-Industrial Democracies (N.Y.: David McKay, 1974), pp. 19-20. Also see Theodore Meckstroth, "Most Different Systems" and "Most Similar Systems": A Study in the Logic of Comparative Inquiry", Comparative Political Studies, vol. 8, July 1975, pp. 132-57.

⁴ Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (N.Y.: Wiley, 1970), pp. 33-34. It should be noted that these authors have a less favorable view of this approach than I have (see pp. 34-39).

sertation is the society. This means that generalizations will be applied on a societal and not individual basis. Thus, for example, while a high level of inequality in a society may result in a high degree of political instability, this does not necessarily mean that one can conclude that the poorer the individual, the more likely he will be to engage in political violence.⁵

While the empirical analysis in the chapters which follow is predominantly cross-national in nature, to some extent a configurative approach also is utilized. Unfortunately, a stark dichotomy is usually drawn between these general paradigms of comparative research. For example, Gillespie and Nesvold write: "Whereas the configurative approach does not have the capacity of immediate empirical generalization, since it is an example of single-case analysis, the cross-national approach loses much of the indepth analysis of the configurative approach, but it provides for empirical generalization."⁶ However, these approaches can be compatible — each compensating for the inadequacies of the other. Following the two-variable linear regression analysis for each of the hypothesized relationships will be a brief configurative

⁵ See discussion of "level of analysis" in Ibid., Ch.3.

⁶ See John Gillespie and Betty Nesvold, Macro-Quantitative Analysis (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1971), pp. 14-18.

examination of unexplained variance (which, of course, is measured by deviations from the estimated regression line — such deviations known as residuals). Utilizing scattergrams, the most "deviant" cases will be examined. Analysis of such cases forms the basis of the configurative portion of the dissertation. Such an inspection of the residuals of cases that are poorly predicted may lead to a consideration of what other variables might be relevant for future cross-national study. In addition, if the configurative literature can help "explain" why some countries might have scores other than would be predicted from the regression analysis, it is (in effect) explaining residual deviation and thereby reducing unexplained variance.⁷ It should be noted that in addition to a test of the specific bivariate relationships hypothesized in Chapters II and III, multiple regression analysis (combining and comparing the impact of all the independent variables) also will be used.

Rather than a simple synchronic analysis focusing upon the static level of the dependent variable at one point in time (a prevalent and misleading procedure criticized in Chapter IV), this dissertation utilizes data on the change in the dependent variable (i.e., "before" and "after" snapshots) between circa 1950 and

⁷ See Francis Anscombe and John Tukey, "The Examination and Analysis of Residuals", Technometrics, 1963, pp. 141-60.

The data utilized in this dissertation certainly are not selected on a random basis nor do they constitute a sample. In almost all instances, the complete universe of developed democracies is being studied. Herzon and Hooper observe:

In political science it is not infrequent to find that data have been gathered upon an entire population.... There is no sample involved in these situations, and thus there is no statistical inference to be made from the sample to a population. Since the entire population is measured, whatever the results in the data, they are true, period. Because a sample is not involved and because there is no experimenter making random assignments, there is no formal random mechanism present to be evaluated by a hypothesis test. 10

In addition, given the small "N" in this study, undue emphasis upon statistically significant findings could lead to the inappropriate rejection of substantively significant results. Nevertheless, some social scientists feel cheated without the presentation of statistical significance results. Thus, they will be presented, but treated with benign neglect. No alpha level (i.e., the maximum value of probability considered small enough to reject the null hypothesis) will be established for the reasons provided above. It will be left to the reader to make his own judgment in this regard.

¹⁰ Herzon and Hooper, pp. 228-29. Also see similar statements by Bruce Russett, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven, Conn.: Yale U. Press, 1964), p. 263; Hanan Selvin, "A Criticism of Tests of Significance", American Sociological Review, vol. 22, 1957, pp. 519-27. Cf. Robert Winch and Donald Campbell, "Proof? No. Evidence? Yes. The Significance of Tests of Significance", in Morrison and Henkel (eds.), The Significance Test Controversy (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), pp. 199-206.

Fig. 5.1: Meritocratic Equality Model

Fig. 5.2: Welfarist Equality Model

Fig. 5.3: Emancipatory (Ethnic/Racial) Equality Model

Fig. 5.4: Emancipatory (Sexual) Equality Model

Fig. 5.5: Inter-Class Egalitarian Equality Model

Fig. 5.6: Intra-(Working)-Class Egalitarian Equality Model

Regarding the hypothesized "developmental sequence" (hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2 concerning the economic scope of the state), the prediction equation is $r_{zy \cdot x} = 0$.

A basic supposition for the evaluation of such a "causal" model is that if "z" is an indirect cause of "y" whose effects are mediated by an intervening variable "x", then if "x's" effects are controlled the resulting partial correlation between "z" and "y" should be approximately zero. For the alternative possibility of a spurious correlation, the prediction equation is $r_{xy \cdot z} = 0$.⁸

Turning to the issue of statistical significance, Gurr has suggested (in a situation similar to the one in this dissertation): "Since this analysis is concerned with what is, effectively, the entire universe of politics, all the correlations are in one sense 'significant'."⁹ The level of significance properly applies to a statistic obtained from a random sample of data from a larger universe.

⁸ See discussion by T.R. Gurr, Politimetrics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 166-68.

⁹ T.R. Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife", in Feierabend et al. (eds.), Anger, Violence and Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 203.

The data utilized in this dissertation certainly are not selected on a random basis nor do they constitute a sample. In almost all instances, the complete universe of developed democracies is being studied. Herzon and Hooper observe:

In political science it is not infrequent to find that data have been gathered upon an entire population.... There is no sample involved in these situations, and thus there is no statistical inference to be made from the sample to a population. Since the entire population is measured, whatever the results in the data, they are true, period. Because a sample is not involved and because there is no experimenter making random assignments, there is no formal random mechanism present to be evaluated by a hypothesis test. ¹⁰

In addition, given the small "N" in this study, undue emphasis upon statistically significant findings could lead to the inappropriate rejection of substantively significant results. Nevertheless, some social scientists feel cheated without the presentation of statistical significance results. Thus, they will be presented, but treated with benign neglect. No alpha level (i.e., the maximum value of probability considered small enough to reject the null hypothesis) will be established for the reasons provided above. It will be left to the reader to make his own judgment in this regard.

¹⁰ Herzon and Hooper, pp. 228-29. Also see similar statements by Bruce Russett, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven, Conn.: Yale U. Press, 1964), p. 263; Hanan Selvin, "A Criticism of Tests of Significance", American Sociological Review, vol. 22, 1957, pp. 519-27. Cf. Robert Winch and Donald Campbell, "Proof? No. Evidence? Yes. The Significance of Tests of Significance", in Morrison and Henkel (eds.), The Significance Test Controversy (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), pp. 199-206.

B. Operational Definitions

"Meritocratic equality"¹¹ is operationally defined in terms of access to higher (i.e., post-secondary) educational opportunity in relation to social origin. While the attainment of higher education does not assure social mobility or the achievement of a privileged societal position, it is generally acknowledged to be a crucial precondition. The argument is that the closer a society is to the goal of meritocratic equality outlined in Chapter I, the more equal will be the opportunity for students of similar ability to achieve a higher education regardless of social background — merit (rather than other criteria) becomes the basis of social mobility. The assumption made is that innate intelligence and capability are not special traits of any socio-economic group or stratum in society but are uniformly distributed within all classes. While it is recognized that a "better" socio-economic background provides socio-psychological as well as economic advantages regarding the ability and desire to seek a higher education, it is felt that the educational component of equal opportunity is more susceptible than others to the impact (if there is any) of corrective government action. As Parkin argues:

¹¹ See pp. 12-15 of dissertation for a nominal definition and discussion of this equality perspective.

The education system is particularly suitable as an instrument of social change in so far as, in most countries, it is directly under the control of the state. Unlike many other aspects of a reward system governed by market forces it is, therefore, more responsive to political decrees. Thus, if we are concerned with exploring the relationship between stratification and ideology, national variations in the structure of educational opportunity should be a source of enlightenment. ¹²

The specific measure to be utilized is the "ratio of educational inequality index". ¹³ In order to compute this, one begins by classifying socio-economic groups into two strata — with one stratum consisting of upper and upper-middle class individuals such as professionals, managers, entrepreneurs, and higher-level administrative workers, and the other stratum consisting of lower-middle and working-class individuals such as clerical and sales workers, skilled and unskilled manual workers. To control for the differing sizes of these strata, the percentage of higher education students with backgrounds from these socio-economic categories is divided by the percentage of active workers in the labor force within the same strata. This yields the "selectivity ratio" for each of the two strata. The "ratio of educational inequality index" consists of computing the ratio of the "selectivity ratio" for the two social categories — i.e., the selectivity index of the upper stratum is divided by that for the lower stratum. In terms of a formula, where "A" = % of

¹² Frank Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order (London: Paladin, 1971), p. 109.

¹³ This index was devised by Georg Busch, "Inequality of Educational Opportunity by Social Origin in Higher Education", in Education, Inequality, and Life Chances, Vol. I (Paris: OECD, 1975), pp. 159-81.

upper stratum students, "B" = % of lower stratum students, "C" = % of upper stratum workers in labor force, "D" = % of lower stratum workers in labor force, and "E" = ratio of educational inequality: $E = \frac{A}{C} : \frac{B}{D}$. The higher the ratio, the greater is the meritocratic inequality.¹⁴ As with all measures of equality utilized in this dissertation, it is the percentage change from circa 1950 to 1970 that is utilized in the empirical analysis. This index of change is calculated as follows: $(1970 \text{ score} - 1950 \text{ score}) \div 1950 \text{ score}$.

In operational terms, "welfarist equality" has two distinct measures designed to reflect the theoretical discussion in Chapters I and II.¹⁵ The first refers to total government (i.e., central and sub-central) expenditures on social welfare programs as a percentage of gross national product at factor cost. Factor cost of GNP is used instead of market price GNP to make more valid comparisons between countries that vary in their reliance on indirect taxes.¹⁶ The definition of "social welfare programs" utilized includes: compulsory

¹⁴ The sources of data used for this measure were: Busch; Group Disparities in Educational Participation and Achievement, Conference on Policies for Educational Growth (Paris: OECD, 1971); Tertiary Education in Australia (Canberra: Government of Australia, 1964).

¹⁵ See pp. 16-19 of dissertation for nominal definition and discussion of this equality perspective; see Substantive Appendix for separate consideration of component parts of this composite index.

¹⁶ The data are from the ILO as presented by Harold Wilensky; The Welfare State and Equality (Berkeley, Calif.: U. of California Press, 1975), pp. 30-31; The New Corporatism, Centralization, and the Welfare State (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1976), p. 11.

social insurance, old age pensions, family allowance schemes, special schemes for public employees (e.g., alternative retirement plans), public health services, public assistance, and veteran's benefits. "In all cases welfare and health programs which have been instituted by legislation are included in the expenditure figures used." ¹⁷

As emphasized in Chapter I, the welfarist perspective also includes a commitment to full employment. Thus, the second measure of "welfarist equality" is the "employment rate." ¹⁸ This consists of 100% minus the "unemployment rate" as defined by the Eighth International Conference of Labour Statisticians and adopted by the United Nations in its statistical procedures. ¹⁹ The total amount of "welfarist equality" is computed by adding the "social welfare" spending percentage to the "employment rate". The higher the number (the possible range being 0 to 200), the greater is the welfarist equality. The change in this number from circa 1950 to 1970 is utilized in the empirical analysis.

As discussed in Chapter I, "emancipatory equality" has two separate dimensions: (1) "ethnic/racial" and (2) "sexual" equality. ²⁰ The degree of "ethnic/racial"

¹⁷ Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality, p. 125.

¹⁸ Data are from the United Nations Statistical Yearbook (N.Y.: U.N., 1951 and 1972).

¹⁹ See Supplement to the Statistical Yearbooks (N.Y.: U.N., 1979), pp. 39-40.

²⁰ See pp. 19-23 of dissertation for nominal definitions and discussion of this equality perspective.

equality is measured by adding two indicators: (1) average subordinate group income as a percentage of superordinate group income and (2) the percentage of white-collar workers in the subordinate population as a proportion of the percentage of white-collar workers in the superordinate population.²¹ The higher the number (with parity being a score of 200), the greater is the degree of equality.²²

As with the measure of "sexual" equality discussed below, the change from circa 1950 to 1970 is utilized in the quantitative analysis.

Comparable data are available for the following subset of countries and ethnic/racial groups:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Superordinate</u>	<u>Subordinate Groups</u>
Australia	Whites	Aborigines
Belgium	Walloons	Flemish
Canada	English	French
Finland	Swedes	Finns
Israel	Ashkenazim	Oriental Jews; Arabs
New Zealand	Europeans	Maoris
Switzerland	French	Germans
United Kingdom	English; Protestants (N. Ire.)	Welsh, Scots; Catholics (N. Ire.)
United States	Whites	Blacks, Hispanics

²¹ Classification of groups into subordinate or superordinate categories as well as inequality data are from: John Grove, "Ethnic Socio-Economic Redistribution: A Cross-Cultural Study", Comparative Politics, Oct. 1979, pp. 87-98; Baldev Singh, "Measuring Cross-National Ethnic and Racial Inequality", in Grove (ed.), Global Inequality: Political and Socio-Economic Perspectives (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1979), pp. 163-81; Christopher Hewitt, "Majorities and Minorities: A Comparative Survey of Ethnic Violence", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Sept. 1977, pp. 150-60.

²² It should be noted that ethnic/racial inequality data exclude consideration of foreign (migrant) workers.

In nations with more than one prominent subordinate group, the scores are averaged to attain an overall "ethnic/racial" equality measure for each country.

In selecting a measure of "ethnic/racial" inequality, Singh explains:

At the group level, the basic normative issues under consideration are the effect of: (1) estimating inequality in relation to the societal mean, and (2) estimating inequality in relation to the highest scoring group. These two conditions reflect two quite different views of inequality. The first view is that equality is a state where all groups have the same property status, and will always be equal to the societal mean. The focus is on the societal mean as the point of parity; inequality is measured as a function of the deviation from that point. The second view reflects the contention that groups, rather than viewing themselves in relation to a societal mean, focus instead on their position relative to the superordinate group in each respective society. In this instance, inequality is a measure of the distance between each subordinate group and the highest scoring group in each country. 23

It is the latter position which is adopted in this dissertation. This is because the concept of a "societal mean" is artificial; it is a statistical artifact. In this context, it does not portray any group's real position. As Hewitt claims: "There are very few societies where one community does not complain about its economic situation relative to the other." 24 Thus, it is the extent of this

²³ Singh, p. 164.

²⁴ Hewitt, p. 154; see his discussion on this point, pp. 154-56.

relative ethnic deprivation that is the focus of the measures chosen.

The degree of "sexual" equality is determined by adding the scores for two measures: (1) average female income as a percentage of male income and (2) female presence in white-collar occupations as a percentage of male presence.²⁵ The definition of "white-collar" occupations, as provided by the ILO, includes all those employed in the following categories: Professional, technical and related workers; administrative, executive and managerial workers. As in the case of "ethnic" equality, this index of "sexual" equality reflects the two elements of importance within the emancipatory perspective (discussed in Chapter I): proportional representation in valued societal positions and equality in average income for relevant sociological groups.

"Egalitarian equality"²⁶ refers to equality of income distribution — with "income" operationalized as the sum total of wages and salaries + entrepreneurial income + property income + public and private transfer payments, minus direct taxes and social security contributions. This is termed "post-tax income" throughout this thesis. The definition utilized excludes income-in-kind and includes farm income. The definition of "income receiving unit"

²⁵ For data sources, see: John Moroney, "Do Women Earn Less Under Capitalism?", in his Income Inequality (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1979), pp. 141-60; ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics (Geneva: ILO, 1971 and 1974).

²⁶ See pp. 15-16 of dissertation for a nominal definition and discussion of this equality perspective.

(i.e., a "household") refers to an economic consumption unit for which income is pooled and joint decisions on consumption are taken. This is the definition recommended by the European Commission for Europe (to include one-person and multi-person households).²⁷ It should be stressed that unlike most previous studies, this dissertation uses post-tax income distribution data for reasons provided in Chapter IV. An "inter-class egalitarian inequality index" will be computed (circa 1950 and 1970) by adding the Gini coefficient to the proportion of income of the top minus the bottom decile of income recipients. The higher the resulting number, the higher is the inequality of inter-class income distribution. The decision to combine the Gini index and the top-bottom decile figure was dictated by data availability constraints as well as the belief that this procedure partially compensates for the inadequacies of single measures of inequality (as discussed in Chapter IV).²⁸ An important element of inter-class

²⁷ For a detailed discussion of the controversy over a "theoretically correct" definition of "income" and the attempt to achieve data comparability in this area (as well as the main source of income data utilized in this dissertation), see Malcolm Sawyer, "Income Distribution in OECD Countries", OECD Economic Outlook, July 1976, pp. 3-36. Other data sources are: John Dryzek, "Politics, Economics and Inequality: A Cross-National Analysis", European Journal of Political Research, vol. 6, Dec. 1978, pp. 399-410; Shail Jain, Size Distribution of Income: A Compilation of Data (Wash., D.C.: World Bank, 1975); Bruce Russett et al., World Handbook...

²⁸ Subtraction of the bottom from the top decile (as opposed to a ratio of top to bottom decile) was chosen to provide relatively equal weighting to both components of this inequality index. A ratio of inequality, on the other hand, would produce a number from 20 to 50 times greater than the Gini index and therefore would dwarf the latter component in any combined inequality measure. Separate consideration of the Gini and decile measures is not justified given their very high positive intercorrelation ($r = .88$).

egalitarian inequality is the extent to which there is a disproportionate amount of income received by those in the highest stratum of society. Thus, it seems relevant to develop a measure which — while reflecting the overall level of inequality (the Gini index) — is also sensitive to the share of national income received by the top as compared to the bottom group of income recipients.

The term "intra-working-class inequality" is a variant of the egalitarian dimension of equality discussed in Chapter I (pp. 15-16). It refers to inequality of income distribution — though applied on an intra rather than inter-class basis. This entails focusing on income as distributed within the "working class."

There is significant controversy surrounding the definition and boundaries of the "working class". The term "class" has been viewed objectively as a manifestation of the relationship between individuals and the production process, as a reflection of differences in income or status, or (in its subjective form) as a self-conscious identification (i.e., class consciousness). As Parkin has observed:

In so far as there is any sort of tacitly agreed model of class among western social theorists it takes the form of the familiar distinction between manual and non-manual labour... Paradoxically, however, although the manual/non-manual model is felt to be highly serviceable for research purposes, it is not commonly represented as a model of class cleavage and conflict. That is to say, the two main social categories distinguished by sociology for purposes of class analysis are not invested with antagonistic properties comparable to those accorded to proletariat and bourgeoisie in Marxist theory. This seems to reveal an awkward contrast between the empirical model of class and the general conception of

capitalist society... The post-war expansion of the public sector has given rise to an ever-increasing assortment of non-manual groups... that cannot in any real sense be thought of as the tail-end of a broad managerial stratum aligned against a manual workforce. 29

Thus, traditional manual/non-manual distinctions are clearly inadequate.

Compounding the definitional problem, cross-national availability of data in this specific area is sparse. Thus, an indirect, approximate measure must be utilized. This can be accomplished by examining the composition of income by decile, i.e., determining the proportion of income of each decile derived from wages and salaries, entrepreneurial income, investment income, and social transfers. The assumption is that those obtaining a major share of their income from entrepreneurial and/or investment sources can be excluded from consideration as part of the "working class". Based upon OECD data for the developed democracies, a general pattern emerges. ^{29a} For those income recipients within deciles 1 and 2 (i.e., the two lowest categories), "social transfers" constitute the overwhelming source of income (over 70%) — indicating marginal attachment to the work force. For deciles 3-5, wages constitute the majority source of income (over 70%). Beginning with decile 6 (through 10),

²⁹ Frank Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory: a Bourgeois Critique (N.Y.: Columbia U., 1979), pp. 11-12. Cf. Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (London: Verso, 1978).

^{29a} See Sawyer, pp. 21-22.

entrepreneurial and investment sources provide a larger share of income than social transfers. This latter situation can be interpreted as the operational dividing line between the working and middle "classes". In so far as the data given provide an indication of intra-working-class income distribution, it would appear that we are constrained to focus upon deciles 3 - 5 — i.e., those income recipients whose majority source of income is wages and not social transfers (unlike deciles 1 and 2) yet who receive a higher proportion of income from social transfers than entrepreneurial and investment sources (unlike deciles 6 - 10). This focus upon the third to fifth deciles will exclude an undetermined number of workers (e.g., those in the auto industry) who earn enough to fall within deciles 6 or above. Nevertheless, the measure chosen provides a rough indication of inequality within a major portion of the working class. In addition, by avoiding the manual/non-manual dichotomy, the indicator selected offers advantages over previous measures. Thus, the proportion of income received by the third decile as a percentage of income obtained by the fifth decile provides the measure of intra-working-class equality.

Turning to the independent variables, the term "left-wing mobilization" will be considered first. As discussed in Chapter II, the variables "Social Democratic rule", "left-wing opposition", and "trade union strength" are so interrelated that it is appropriate to create a composite index to capture their combined impact upon socio-economic equality.³⁰ To achieve this goal,

³⁰ See pp. 25-44 of dissertation for nominal definitions and discussion of these variables.

an index termed "left-wing mobilization" is created by adding the scores for these three distinct dimensions. The score for "Social Democratic rule" is the proportion of the 20-year period between Jan. 1, 1950 and Dec. 31, 1969 in which self-proclaimed Social Democrats (thereby excluding the American Democratic party) and allies (i.e., Socialists and/or Communists) controlled a majority of cabinet positions in the national government.³¹ This percentage figure is multiplied by "2" to provide a weighting of the index which reflects the importance of this dimension. The score for "left-wing opposition" is obtained in two steps: (1) determination of the average combined national vote of self-designated Social Democratic, Labour, Socialist, and Communist parties for the years between 1950 through 1969 in which these parties did not constitute a majority of the cabinet of the national government; (2) multiplication of this percentage by the fraction of the 20-year period in which these political parties were in opposition.³² The degree of "trade union

³¹ The sources utilized were: The Statesman's Yearbook (London: Macmillan, 1950-70); The Europa Yearbook (London: Martins, 1950-70).

³² The data sources are: Thomas Mackie and Richard Rose, The International Almanac of Electoral History (London: Macmillan, 1974); Arthur Banks and William Overstreet (eds.), Political Handbook of the World (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1980).

strength" is operationalized as the average percentage of the civilian work force that was unionized over the 20-year period under consideration. This is obtained by calculating the mean of the unionization scores for (circa) 1950, 1960, and 1970.³³ Thus, the formula for obtaining the degree of "left-wing mobilization" (LWM), where "SD" is the percentage of Social Democratic rule, "OV" is the percentage of left-wing opposition vote, "PO" is the proportion (as a fraction) of the period in which left-wing parties were in opposition, and "U" is the average percentage of the work force which is unionized, can be stated as follows: $LWM = (SD \times 2) + (OV \times PO) + U$. The scores which result can range from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 300 points.

The "economic scope of the state" is operationally defined as the sum of the scores for two dimensions³⁴: (1) the size of the government sector of the economy in budgetary terms and (2) the percentage of state ownership of key sectors of the economy. For the first dimension, central government expenditures as a percentage of national income (circa 1950 and 1970) are utilized.³⁵ Since this dissertation focuses only upon national "left-wing mobilization" and its impact on the economic

³³ The data sources are: The Europa Yearbook; Gordon Smith, Politics in Western Europe (N.Y.: Holmes & Meier, 1973); Adolf Sturmthal, Comparative Labor Movements (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1972).

³⁴ See pp. 47-55 of dissertation for nominal definition and discussion; see Substantive Appendix for consideration of each component of the composite index.

³⁵ The data are from the United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1952 and 1971.

scope of the state (hypothesis 2.1), the size of central (rather than total) government expenditures was selected as the more appropriate measure. For the second dimension, the average percentage of state (central and sub-central) ownership (circa 1950 and 1970) in the following ten sectors is utilized: telecommunications, electricity, gas, oil production, coal, railways, airlines, auto industry, steel, and ship building.³⁶ The unavoidable inconsistency of inclusion of sub-central state ownership as well as the choice of particular sectors examined were dictated by constraints in data availability. Nevertheless, it is felt that this is less tainted than a decision to seek consistency by including both sub-central expenditures and public ownership (thus magnifying the distortion in the name of consistency). In addition, compared to those studies which make no attempt to separate central from sub-central government expenditures and which ignore the potential role of public ownership, the procedure utilized is thought to be preferable.

For reasons discussed in Chapter II, "economic scope" is treated as a dependent variable in hypothesis 2.1. Thus, as noted earlier, it is more appropriate to consider the change in (rather than simply the level of) this variable. In addition, previous analyses of the relationship between the economic scope of the state and inequality have focused upon the dynamic growth in the government sector of the economy over the post-war period.³⁷

³⁶ The sources for the data are: Chris Cook and John Paxton, European Political Facts, 1918-73 (London: Macmillan, 1975); The Europa Yearbook; "Governments Being Enticed Further Into Business World", Globe and Mail, March 3, 1979, p. B 2.

³⁷ See David Cameron, "Inequality and the State: A Political-Economic Comparison" paper delivered at annual APSA meeting, Sept. 1976; Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy", APSR Dec. 1978, pp. 1243-61.

The degree of "liberal corporatism" ³⁸ will be determined by the addition of three measures: (1) a voluntary "incomes policy" score, (2) a "union centralization" score, and (3) a general "corporatist tendencies" score. As emphasized in Chapter II, an incomes policy is the most relevant component of a liberal corporatist state for the purposes of this dissertation. Thus, a separate indicator, giving greater weight to this component of the overall corporatism measure, is appropriate. As Headey suggests:

A government is considered to have a wages policy if, instead of permitting collective bargaining to be entirely a matter for unions and employers, it regularly and directly confronts the labor market groups through its representatives and attempts to influence the level at which wages are set.... A politically successful wages policy may be defined as one that the government has persuaded the groups involved to accept for an extended period of time. ³⁹

It should be noted that this would exclude mandatory programs instituted against the expressed wishes of the parties affected. The "incomes policy" score will be calculated by providing 2 points for each year of a wages policy implemented over the 20-year period under consideration.

Headey and others argue that "for a wages policy to be feasible it is necessary for national trade-union movements to be highly centralized...." ⁴⁰ Lehmbruch claims that effective corporatist structures "...pre-suppose some particular structural characteristics of the trade union

³⁸ See pp. 55-61 of dissertation for nominal definition and discussion.

³⁹ Bruce Headey, "Trade Unions and National Wages Policy", Journal of Politics, vol. 33, 1970, pp. 409-10.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 420.

organization. Above all, a high degree of centralization and concentration seems to be required." ⁴¹ Thus, a measure of labor union centralization is warranted. Such an indicator can be created by examining the following characteristics of labor federations: (1) their influence on collective bargaining, (2) their control of strike funds, (3) number of staff at federation headquarters per 100,000 members, and (4) their finances (i.e., the amount of dues collected by the federation). Each of these elements of labor federations has been rated by Headey and Wilensky as "low" (to be given 1 point), "medium" (to be given 2 points), or "high" (to be given 3 points). ⁴² Adding the points for each of these four characteristics provides the "union centralization" score (maximum = 12 points).

As Panitch acknowledges:

...Corporatist structures need not necessarily be confined only to the central organizations of capital and labour or to incomes policy areas.... It is entirely possible to conceive of corporatist structures developing in particular industrial sectors (conceived broadly to include even such sectors as health or education) where the state, the owning or managing authorities and the unions in these sectors interact in policy making. This is entirely consistent with a definition of corporatism in terms of the interaction of functional socio-economic producer groups based directly on the division of labour. ⁴³

⁴¹ Gerhard Lehbruch, "Liberal Corporatism and Party Government", Comparative Political Studies, April 1977, p. 110.

⁴² See Wilensky, The New Corporatism..., pp. 48-50; Headey, pp. 431-32.

⁴³ Leo Panitch, "Recent Theorizations of Corporatism: Reflections on a Growth Industry", British Journal of Sociology, vol. 31, June 1980, p. 178.

To capture this broader range of neo-corporatism (as well as to reflect somewhat the diversity and lack of consensus in the literature), it is appropriate to include an additional measure beyond those focusing strictly on incomes policy and union centralization. This is achieved by utilizing an indicator termed "corporatist tendencies". It is derived from Gilsdorf's classification (on a scale of "high", "medium", or "low") of post-war developed democracies according to the presence of general "liberal corporatist tendencies" based upon criteria equivalent to Schmitter's.⁴⁴ Countries ranked by Gilsdorf in the "high" category will receive 15 points, those in the "medium" category 10 points, those in the "low" category 5 points. Thus, the maximum total score for the three measures of liberal corporatism = 67; the minimum = 9 points.

"Consociationalism" will be measured according to the four criteria of consociational democracy discussed in Chapter II: (1) grand coalition, (2) mutual veto, (3) proportionality and (4) autonomy.⁴⁵ A country will receive

⁴⁴ See Robert Gilsdorf, "The Welfare State Syndrome in Western Europe", paper presented to the European Politics Group Workshop, London, Dec. 1979; Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?", Review of Politics, Jan. 1974, pp. 85-131. It should be noted that Schmitter's definition of "corporatism" (and thus Gilsdorf's classification) extends beyond "producer groups" to encompass all interest groups in a system of interest intermediation perceived as the opposite of pluralism. The implications of this broader approach to "corporatism" are discussed (and criticized) by Panitch, Ibid., pp. 166-78.

⁴⁵ See pp. 62-66 of dissertation for nominal definition and discussion.

10 points for meeting each of these conditions over the majority of the 20-year period under consideration. For what Lijphart terms "semi-consociational" states (i.e., nations which partially fulfill some of these criteria) 5 points per category will be assigned. Thus, a minimum score is zero; a maximum score is 40 points. ⁴⁶

Regarding the independent economic variables, the degree of "economic development" ⁴⁷ is operationally defined as average energy consumption (expressed in terms of coal equivalent) per capita (in metric tons) for the 20-year period. ⁴⁸ This is obtained by calculating the mean of scores for (circa) 1950, 1960, and 1970. This indicator has been utilized by other researchers — though generally not in regard only to the developed democracies. ⁴⁹ It is considered appropriate because it reflects the emphasis in the literature (cited in Chapter II) on the alleged equalitarian impact of the industrialization process in advanced capitalism.

⁴⁶ The sources utilized in this determination were: Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven, Conn.: Yale U. Press, 1977); Val Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies", Comparative Politics, Jan. 1971, pp. 141-75; Kenneth McRae, Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1974).

⁴⁷ See pp. 66-68 and 27-29 of dissertation for nominal definition and discussion.

⁴⁸ Data are from the United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1951, 1961, 1971.

⁴⁹ For example, see Robert Jackman, Politics and Social Equality (N.Y.: Wiley, 1975).

The degree of "external economic dependence" ⁵⁰ is calculated by adding scores for three dimensions: (1) average total trade, (2) average trade dependence, and (3) average foreign direct investment. These averages are obtained by computing the mean of scores for (circa) 1950, 1960, and 1970. The first dimension is operationalized as the value of all imports + all exports as a proportion of GNP. This reflects the "open economy" concept discussed in Chapter II. ⁵¹ The second dimension is operationalized as the value of raw materials exported + processed goods imported as a percentage of total exports and imports combined. ⁵² As Jackman argues:

While it is true that total trade does measure involvement in the international sector, it is unfortunately not sensitive to the dominance or asymmetrical element associated with dependence relations. In other words, data on total trade do not reflect the potentially exploitative nature of trade for some countries, although this is clearly implied as a critical component of dependence.... A more direct alternative which is sensitive to these considerations has been proposed by Galtung. Instead of focusing on total trade figures, Galtung examines trade composition data to gauge the types of goods imported and exported.... This index defines as "exploitative" those countries whose imports are largely raw materials and whose exports are primarily manufactured goods. ⁵³

⁵⁰ See pp. 69-72 of dissertation for nominal definition and discussion.

⁵¹ See Cameron, "Expansion of the Public Economy", pp. 1249-50; Richard Robinson, "The World Economy and the Distribution of Income Within States", American Sociological Review, vol. 41, Aug. 1976, pp. 638-39.

⁵² This is a variant of Galtung's "trade composition index"; see Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", Journal of Peace Research, vol. 8, 1971, pp. 81-117. The source of data for the first two measures is the United Nations Yearbook for International Trade Statistics (N.Y.: UN, 1951, 1964, 1971).

⁵³ Robert Jackman, p. 176.

The third dimension of "external economic dependence" is operationalized as the value of foreign direct investment (in U.S. dollars) per capita.⁵⁴ The alleged negative results of such investment include a "truncated" economy and threats to political sovereignty.⁵⁵

Turning to the dependent variables discussed in Chapter III, "political participation"⁵⁶ refers to voter turnout. It is operationalized as the change in average percentage of eligible voters casting ballots in the two national elections circa 1950-54 compared with the two elections circa 1966-70.⁵⁷ Those countries with "compulsory" voting requirements during this period (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and New Zealand) will be excluded from this portion of the quantitative analysis. An alternative measure such as party membership was rejected because of the relatively unreliable nature of data from private organizations of this type and the lack of comparability of the term "political party mem-

⁵⁴ The sources for data in this regard are: the International Monetary Fund Balance of Payments Yearbook, vols. 13 and 25 (Wash.; D.C.: IMF, 1962 and 1974); International Capital Movements in OECD Countries (Paris: OECD, 1970-73).

⁵⁵ For example, see A.E. Safarian, "Foreign Direct Investment from a Canadian Perspective", in Axline et al. (eds.), Continental Community? Independence and Integration in North America (Toronto: McClellan & Stewart, 1974), pp. 274-301.

⁵⁶ See pp. 76-80 of dissertation for nominal definition and discussion.

⁵⁷ Data sources are: Mackie and Rose; Stein Rokkan and Jean Meyriat, International Guide to Electoral Statistics, vol. 1 (The Hague: Mouton, 1969); Cook and Paxton.

bership".⁵⁸

Borrowing from the work of Hibbs and Gurr on political instability and violence,⁵⁹ a composite index of "political instability"⁶⁰ will be utilized to reflect both its magnitude (i.e., number of protest demonstrations, riots, and terrorist attacks) and its intensity (i.e., number of deaths). The first component of this index, number of "protest demonstrations", is defined as non-violent gatherings of people organized to protest the policies, ideology, or actions of a government. The second measure is number of "riots" (multiplied by "2" to provide greater weight to this more serious form of instability) — defined as unorganized violent disturbances involving a large number of people and characterized by bloodshed and/or property damage. The third measure is number of "terrorist attacks" (multiplied by "2") — defined as acts of violent political conflict executed by an organized group with the apparent objective of weakening or destroying

⁵⁸ See Maurice Duverger's extensive discussion of party membership in his Political Parties, trans. North (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1959), pp. 61-132.

⁵⁹ See Douglas Hibbs, Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis (N.Y.: Wiley-Interscience, 1973); Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices", in Feierabend et al., Anger, Violence, and Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 184-222.

⁶⁰ See pp. 80-87 of dissertation for nominal definition and discussion.

the power exercised by the government or other organized groups. The fourth measure is number of "deaths from domestic political violence" (per 10 million population) — defined as the number of persons killed in events of domestic political conflict.⁶¹ The scores for each of these four measures will be averaged over two time periods: (circa) 1950-54 and 1966-70. To calculate the "index of political instability", the scores for the first three measures will be added and this "magnitude" figure will be multiplied by the score of the fourth measure (plus "1" to prevent "0" scores). In terms of a formula, where "PD" is the average number of protest demonstrations in a time period, "R" is the average number of riots, "TA" is the average number of terrorist attacks, and "D" is the average number of deaths per 10 million, then the index of political instability = $[PD + (R \times 2) + (TA \times 2)] \times (D+1)$. The change in the resulting score between the first and second time periods is the number utilized in the quantitative analysis.

Regarding the two economic dependent variables, "economic growth"⁶² will be operationalized as the change in the average annual rate of growth of per capita gross domestic product at constant market prices for the period

⁶¹ Data sources for these four measures include: Charles Taylor and Michael Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 2nd ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale U. Press, 1972); Hibbs; Gurr; New York Times Index.

⁶² See pp. 87-90 of dissertation for nominal definition and discussion.

(circa) 1950-54 versus the period (circa) 1966-70.⁶³

"Industrial strife"⁶⁴ is composed of three dimensions:

(1) frequency — number of strikes per 100,000 members of the work force, (2) size — the average number of strikers per work stoppage, (3) duration — the average number of working-days lost per striker. The index of "industrial strife" utilized in this dissertation is obtained by multiplying (1) by (2) by (3).⁶⁵ The change in the average total score from the period 1950-54 to the period 1966-70 is the specific measure used in the empirical analysis.

Turning to the two social variables, "criminal activity"⁶⁶ is measured by an index composed of two elements: (1) homicides per 100,000 population⁶⁷; (2) "serious thefts" (i.e., major forms of burglary and robbery according to the INTERPOL classification system) per 100,000 population.⁶⁸ To prevent

⁶³ The data source is the United Nations Yearbook for National Accounts Statistics, 1961 and 1971.

⁶⁴ See pp. 90-93 of dissertation for nominal definition.

⁶⁵ This is equivalent to the index used by Douglas Hibbs, "Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies", American Political Science Review, vol. 70, Dec. 1976, pp. 1033-58. The data source is the International Labour Office Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1956 and 1971.

⁶⁶ See pp. 93-96 of dissertation for nominal definition.

⁶⁷ The data source is the United Nations Demographic Yearbook (N.Y.: U.N., 1952, 1968, 1971).

⁶⁸ The data sources are: INTERPOL and FBI crime statistics published in Crimes of Violence, staff report submitted to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, vol. 11 (Wash., D.C.: U.S. Government, 1970), pp. 126-22; FBI Uniform Crime Report (Wash., D.C.: U.S. Government, 1970).

the smaller homicide rates from being dwarfed by the much larger "serious thefts" rates, the percentage change from circa 1950 to 1970 will be calculated separately for each of these two measures. These percentages will then be added to provide the total "crime rise" score for each country in this study.

The degree of "ethnic/racial militancy" ⁶⁹ is measured for the same subset of countries (noted earlier) for which ethnic/racial inequality data are available. This variable consists of three indicators: (1) an "ethnic tension" score — based upon an assessment of non-violent ethnic/racial relations on a six-point scale (1 = lowest hostility, 6 = highest hostility) originated and calculated by the Feierabend group of researchers; ⁷⁰ (2) an "ethnic separatism" score — providing 2 points for nations with a separatist party receiving at least 5% (to 15%) of the ethnic vote in national or regional elections, 4 points for a separatist vote of 16-25%, and 6 points for a vote over 25%; (3) an "ethnic violence" score — defined as deaths per 10 million population from ethnic, racial, and religious-oriented conflict. ⁷¹ Each of these three in-

⁶⁹ See pp. 97-101 of dissertation for nominal definition and discussion.

⁷⁰ See I. Feierabend et al., study published in Assassination and Political Violence, staff report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, vol. 8 (Wash., D.C.: U.S. Government, 1970), pp. 146-54.

⁷¹ The data sources are: Christopher Hewitt, pp. 150-60; John Schwarz, "The Scottish National Party: Nonviolent Separatism and Theories of Violence", in Feierabend et al., Anger, Violence and Politics, pp. 325-41; New York Times Index.

dicators is averaged for the time periods (circa) 1950-54 and 1966-70. The overall degree of "ethnic/racial militancy" is calculated by adding (1) + (2) and then multiplying this figure by the "ethnic violence" score (plus "1" to prevent "0" scores). The change in this overall index for the two periods constitutes the specific measure in the empirical analysis.

c. Conclusion

In comparison with the quantitative research criticized in Chapter IV, this dissertation attempts specific improvements in research design and operationalization in (at least) the following ten ways: (1) by considering all four (rather than generally only one or two) major perspectives of equality outlined in Chapter I, (2) by using "change" (rather than "level") data regarding "equality" and other dependent variables, (3) by considering (rather than ignoring) the potential consequences of inequality, (4) by analyzing within (rather than between) major levels of economic development, (5) by considering international linkages (rather than only internal "causes") regarding inequality (i.e., external economic dependence), (6) by increasing the number of developed democracies analyzed (as compared to others who have also focused upon such nations),⁷² (7) by rejecting use of

⁷² This dissertation utilizes almost 50% more cases than Cameron's 1976 study and more than double the number of countries in Parkin's analysis.

misleading inter-sectoral income data, (8) by using post-tax (rather than pre-tax) income distribution data, (9) by utilizing a multiple rather than single indicator of income inequality, (10) by using a more appropriate indicator of "partisan composition of government" than those discussed in Chapter IV. This list of changes does not mean that all major problems noted in the literature are solved. Furthermore, the techniques and indicators selected for this dissertation raise additional vexing questions — some of which are discussed below. Nevertheless, it is contended that the combined impact of the methodological changes outlined above represents an improvement over (though not a panacea for) the research criticized in the previous chapter.

It is recognized that the bivariate relationships to be tested in the following chapters stretch the *ceteris paribus* assumption to the limit. Other, unspecified variables may be at work in these situations. However, four points should be made in this regard. First, there are methodological limits to the prudent number of independent variables that can be examined given the small number of cases in this study. Second, the limitation of this analysis to the "developed democracies" is an attempt to control partially the effects of unknown variables — if one accepts the arguments of supporters of the "most similar

systems" design strategy. Third, the configurative portion of this analysis will provide an opportunity to consider additional independent variables within the specific national contexts. Fourth, the multiple regression analysis goes beyond simple bivariate relationships.

An additional problem in cross-national comparisons of the type attempted in this dissertation is that of obtaining reliable and comparable data. While international agencies, such as the UN and OECD, have exerted a growing pressure and ability to provide uniform statistical measures, there are important gaps in some crucial areas of potential analysis. As Castles observes:

The situation in respect of adequate data for comparative social policy investigation is generally poor, nasty, brutish, and fragmentary. This situation frequently forces the researcher into a "second best" strategy in which he assembles the best evidence available, rather than pursuing the hopeless search for the optimum data for his specific purposes. It should be pointed out that the "second best" strategy is, in reality, the only strategy that is possible under the circumstances, and to criticize its use per se is to reject the possibility of a comparative study of anything but the most trivial matters. ⁷³

Thus, even though certain cross-national data fall far short of the properties of perfect reliability and comparability, it does not follow that such data should be avoided. What does follow, as Gillespie and Nesvold suggest:

⁷³ Francis Castles, The Social Democratic Image of Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 57-8.

... is that analyses using these data should be viewed as tentative. That is, no single research can be viewed as conclusive given the variety of methodological problems that arise in any analysis, but only upon replication, with analyses using differing data sources and analyses using differing methods, can more conclusive findings be generated. 74

CHAPTER VI: EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS — INEQUALITY AND ITS DETERMINANTS

This chapter addressess two fundamental questions. First, what was the pattern of socio-economic inequality in the developed democracies for the twenty-year period under consideration (circa 1950-70)? Second, do the theoretical explanations provided in Chapter II adequately account for the changes¹ in equality which occurred? The first section of this chapter focuses on a descriptive examination of the level and change in all dimensions of equality for each of the nations in this study. The second part of this chapter considers whether the bivariate hypotheses derived from the theoretical literature are confirmed or refuted by empirical evidence. This entails analyzing the relationship between changes in equality and each of the six independent variables outlined in Chapter II (left-wing mobilization, economic scope of the state, liberal corporatism, consociationalism, economic development, and external economic dependence). This analysis is then carried further, in the final

¹ As noted in Chapter V, it is the change in the level of equality from circa 1950-70 that is utilized in the quantitative analysis. Considering methodological issues of concern in the use of "change" data, see the discussion in the Statistical Appendix.

section of this chapter, by considering the combined impact of the independent variables through an application of multivariate (i.e., multiple regression) analysis.

A. Descriptive Examination of Inequality

The typology of socio-economic equality in Chapter I differentiated between the following dimensions of inequality: meritocratic, welfarist, emancipatory (ethnic/racial and sexual variants), and egalitarian (inter-class and intra-working class variants). This section attempts to provide a concrete reality to each of these abstract categories. In doing so, consideration will turn first to meritocratic inequality (see Table 6.1). It will be remembered that this concept was operationally defined in terms of access to higher educational opportunity (in relation to social origin). Due to the particular measure utilized, the results express the degree of educational inequality. Thus, a reduction in the score of a country from (circa) 1950 to 1970 indicated a movement toward greater equality.

On a comparative basis, the results indicate that the United States began the period with the highest level of educational equality (i.e., the lowest inequality score) of all countries considered. Approximately twenty years

Table 6.1: Meritocratic Inequality

Country(N=19)	% Change* (rank)	1950 (rank)**	1970 (rank)
U. K.	-79 (1)	6.8 (10)	1.4 (1)
Austria	-68 (2)	11.8 (19)	3.8 (9)
Italy	-41 (3)	9.8 (15)	5.8 (14)
Sweden	-40 (4)	5.3 (8)	3.2 (5)
Canada	-39 (5)	5.9 (9)	3.6 (8)
France	-38 (6)	8.1 (13)	5.0 (12)
Japan	-35 (7)	9.3 (14)	6.0 (16)
Finland	-31 (8)	4.9 (6)	3.4 (7)
Germany	-30 (9)	4.7 (5)	3.3 (6)
Israel	-28 (10)	3.9 (4)	2.8 (3)
New Zealand	-25 (11)	6.8 (10)	5.1 (13)
Australia	-25 (11)	7.9 (12)	5.9 (15)
U. S. A.	-24 (13)	2.9 (1)	2.2 (2)
Netherlands	-22 (14)	10.9 (18)	8.5 (17)
Denmark	-14 (15)	3.5 (2)	3.0 (4)
Ireland	-12 (16)	10.4 (16)	9.2 (18)
Switzerland	-12 (16)	10.7 (17)	9.4 (19)
Norway	-04 (18)	5.1 (7)	4.9 (11)
Belgium	+24 (19)	3.7 (3)	4.6 (10)

Mean = -29%

Range = 103

Standard Deviation = 22.2

*The larger the negative percentage change, the greater is the reduction in educational (i.e., meritocratic) inequality.

**based on degree of inequality (lowest to highest)

Data sources: see footnote 14, Chapter V

later it had dropped to second position — experiencing only a small increase in the degree of equality. Britain occupied the highest rank circa 1970 — rising from tenth place in 1950. Another nation which experienced a notable shift in rank was Austria — jumping from last (19th) to ninth place. On the other hand, Belgium registered a sharp decline in relative position (third to tenth). It is interesting to note that two of the Scandinavian countries (Denmark and Norway) fell in their comparative rankings. Though each experienced a net increase in educational opportunity from circa 1950 to 1970, on a relative basis this was not sufficient to maintain their original ranking in the top half of the 19 countries considered. Thus, countries with **supposedly** quite distinct social structures (Britain, the United States, and Israel) ranked highest in the level of educational equality circa 1970.

Examination of the left-hand column in Table 5.1 (% Change) indicated that all nations (except Belgium) experienced an increase in educational opportunity (i.e., a decline in meritocratic inequality). Most notable is Britain's 79% change. In addition, other countries devoted considerable effort toward reducing inequality in this area even though it is not reflected in the comparative ranks. For example, Canada and France registered sharp declines in equality (both close to 40%) though

their relative positions barely changed. Japan displayed a 35% decrease in this dimension of inequality yet its rank fell from 14th to 16th. These three countries outperformed the United States (the former educational opportunity leader) in the degree of decline in this dimension of inequality. However, given its initial position, the level of educational equality was still greater in the United States in 1970.² In conclusion, the dominant trend during this era was clearly toward reducing impediments to equal educational opportunity pertaining to social background. The average reduction of 29% for this dimension of inequality is an appropriate summary statistic reflective of the general condition regarding this variable.

The results for welfarist equality (operationalized in terms of the employment rate and expenditures on social welfare programs as a percentage of GNP) are provided in Table 6.2. Note that in this instance the larger the positive percentage change, the greater is the increase in equality. In essence, this dimension reflects the effort to achieve equality through the "welfare state" approach. At first glance, it may be surprising to observe France's top position circa 1950 given this country's reputation as one of the most unequal in Western Europe.

² These are illustrations of the important differences that can result from a research design decision to utilize "change" rather than "level" data (see discussion in Chapters IV and V).

Table 6.2: Welfarist Equality

Country(N=19)	% Change*	(rank)	1950	(rank)**	1970	(rank)
Denmark	+22	(1)	99	(18)	121	(3)
Italy	+20	(2)	100	(16)	120	(5)
Belgium	+17	(3)	101	(14)	118	(8)
Netherlands	+16	(4)	106	(5)	123	(1)
Austria	+15	(5)	105	(6)	121	(3)
Germany	+15	(5)	104	(9)	120	(5)
Sweden	+14	(7)	107	(4)	122	(2)
Norway	+13	(8)	105	(6)	119	(7)
Finland	+10	(9)	105	(6)	115	(10)
U. S. A.	+08	(10)	99	(18)	107	(17)
Canada	+07	(11)	103	(12)	110	(12)
Israel	+07	(11)	101	(14)	108	(15)
Switzerland	+06	(13)	104	(9)	110	(12)
Ireland	+06	(13)	100	(16)	106	(18)
France	+05	(15)	110	(1)	116	(9)
Australia	+04	(16)	104	(9)	108	(15)
U. K.	+03	(17)	109	(2)	112	(11)
Japan	+02	(18)	103	(12)	105	(19)
New Zealand	0	(19)	109	(2)	109	(14)

Mean = +10%

Range = 22

Standard Deviation = 6.4

*The larger the positive percentage change, the greater is the increase in welfarist equality.

**based on degree of equality (highest to lowest)

Data sources: see footnotes 16, 18 in Chapter V

Note, however, its decline to ninth rank by 1970 (showing only a small net increase in its level of equality). Without pre-judging the analysis to follow later in this chapter, France's high relative performance at the beginning of the time period under consideration must be viewed in historical context. The existence of the socialist administration of Léon Blum in the mid-1930s and the presence of Communists in the early post-war French governments constitute plausible reasons (consistent with the hypothesized impact of left-wing mobilization) for the leading position of France on this variable in 1950. In a similar vein, one could argue that Britain's second-place position in 1950 is a reflection of the well-known welfare-state policies implemented by Attlee's Labour government in the immediate post-war era (e.g., the National Health Service).³ As with France, Britain drops significantly in rank — to 11th in 1970. (Whether changes since these 1950 levels of welfarism are associated with the partisan composition of government is examined in detail later in this chapter.) By showing no change whatsoever, New Zealand fell to 14th position by 1970. On the other hand, the country making the most noticeable improvement in rank is Denmark — rising from 18th to third. Observe, however, that two other Scandinavian

³ See Richard Titmus, Commitment to Welfare (London: Allen and Unwin, 1968).

nations (Norway and Finland) decline in relative position — displaying only moderate net gains in welfarism. This is contrary to the conventional (and some academic) wisdom regarding the growing welfare state of the 1950s and 60s being epitomized by Scandinavia.⁴ Indeed, a non-Scandinavian country (the Netherlands) occupied the top position in welfarist equality in 1970.

Comparing the results in Table 6.2 with those noted in the first table, one finds that nations which had comparatively high levels of educational equality registered low degrees of welfarist equality (e.g., the United States ranked 17th, the United Kingdom 11th circa 1970). Unlike the previous findings, Belgium experienced a comparatively large (and Britain a relatively small) increase in welfarist equality (ranking third and 17th, respectively). In general, all nations (except New Zealand) registered increases in welfare state equality. Denmark and Italy showed the greatest gains while Britain and Japan displayed the least increase in welfarism. In conclusion, while an enlargement of the social welfare approach toward equality was experienced in virtually all developed democracies during the twenty-year period examined, the modest average (10%) increase would suggest that it was not the explosive ex-

⁴ See Francis Castles and Robert McKinlay, "Public Welfare Provision, Scandinavia, and the Sheer Futility of the Sociological Approach to Politics", British Journal of Political Science, vol. 9, April 1979, pp. 157-71.

pansion decried by many right-wing critics.

As indicated in Chapter V, data on ethnic/racial equality are limited to the nine countries listed in Table 6.3. This variant of emancipatory equality was operationally defined in terms of subordinate group income and presence in white-collar occupations as a proportion of superordinate group income and occupational presence. The higher the score (with parity being a value of 200), the greater is the degree of ethnic/racial equality. On this basis, Switzerland displayed the highest level of equality — nearing ethnic parity by 1970. **Belgium ranked second in this regard, while Australia and Israel lagged far behind.** What is most striking is the lack of significant shifts in rank from circa 1950 to 1970. In fact, no nation moves more than one rung up or down the relative equality ladder. However, the comparative stability between the ranking of nations in 1950 and twenty years later does not mean ~~there~~ was no movement within the various countries. As indicated in the "% Change" column, all nations experienced an increase in ethnic/racial equality — ranging from a minimal 2% change for Switzerland to a more substantial 24% for the United States. This latter case must be viewed in the historical context of the civil rights revolution in America which occurred during this period. However, despite this increase for the United States, its score of 108 (in 1970) represented a situation in which black

Table 6.3: Ethnic/Racial (Emancipatory) Equality

Country(N=9)	% Change*	(rank)	1950	(rank)**	1970	(rank)
U. S. A.	+24	(1)	87	(8)	108	(7)
Canada	+16	(2)	139	(5)	161	(4)
Australia	+12	(3)	78	(9)	87	(9)
U. K.	+10	(4)	144	(4)	158	(5)
Finland	+06	(5)	161	(3)	171	(3)
New Zealand	+04	(6)	111	(6)	115	(6)
Israel	+04	(6)	99	(7)	103	(8)
Belgium	+03	(8)	178	(2)	183	(2)
Switzerland	+02	(9)	187	(1)	191	(1)

Mean = +9%

Range = 22

Standard Deviation = 7.3

*The larger the positive percentage change, the greater is the increase in ethnic/racial equality.

**based on degree of equality (highest to lowest)

Data sources: see footnote 21, Chapter V

Americans (the major subordinate group) had achieved a position equal to only 54% of racial parity (i.e., 108/200). For Canada, a 16% increase (second highest) resulted in a level of ethnic equality for French Canadians approximating 80% of parity in 1970. Interestingly, the three countries experiencing the largest rise in this dimension of equality were the non-European, predominantly English-speaking nations in this study: Australia, Canada, and the United States. The average increase of 9% for all countries would indicate a modest gain in the level of ethnic/racial equality over the twenty-year period.

Results for the sexual variant of emancipatory equality are provided in Table 6.4. It will be remembered that this variable was operationally defined in terms of average female income as a percentage of male income and female presence in white-collar occupations as a proportion of male presence. As with ethnic/racial equality, a score of 200 equals parity. As conventional wisdom would suggest, Denmark came the closest to reaching this goal (with a 1970 score of 162). It also ranked first twenty years earlier. Countries experiencing the greatest shift in relative position were Japan (from 19th to 11th) and Switzerland (from 10th to 19th). In 1970, all the Scandinavian countries were among the top eight nations in sexual equality. Conversely, the major English-speaking countries in this study all ranked in the bottom third.

Table 6.4: Sexual (Emancipatory) Equality

Country(N=19)	% Change*	(rank)	1950	(rank)**	1970	(rank)
Japan	+42	(1)	79	(19)	112	(11)
Sweden	+24	(2)	116	(8)	144	(4)
Norway	+23	(3)	105	(12)	129	(8)
Israel	+17	(4)	124	(6)	145	(3)
Denmark	+13	(5)	144	(1)	162	(1)
Italy	+08	(6)	124	(6)	134	(6)
Netherlands	+07	(7)	100	(17)	107	(14)
New Zealand	+06	(8)	106	(11)	112	(11)
Germany	+06	(8)	102	(15)	108	(13)
Australia	+06	(8)	101	(16)	107	(14)
Finland	+04	(11)	135	(4)	140	(5)
U. K.	+04	(11)	99	(18)	103	(16)
Austria	+03	(13)	143	(2)	147	(2)
Belgium	+03	(13)	112	(9)	115	(10)
Canada	-02	(15)	104	(14)	102	(17)
Ireland	-05	(16)	139	(3)	132	(7)
France	-07	(17)	130	(5)	121	(9)
U. S. A.	-07	(17)	105	(12)	98	(18)
Switzerland	-10	(19)	107	(10)	96	(19)

Mean = +7%

Range = 52

Standard Deviation = 12.6

*The larger the positive percentage change, the greater is the increase in sexual equality.

**based on degree of equality (highest to lowest)

Data sources: see footnote 25, Chapter V

of nations in the provision of male-female parity. In 1970, Australia ranked 14th, the United Kingdom 16th, Canada 17th, and the United States 18th.

On an overall basis, sexual equality increased in 14 of the 19 nations considered. The largest gains occurred in Japan (42%), Sweden (24%), and Norway (23%). There was an actual decline in this dimension of equality (represented by negative "% Change" scores) for five countries: Canada, the United States, Ireland, France, and Switzerland. Switzerland's performance (ranking last in 1970 with a 10% decline over the 1950 level) is consistent with its dismal record regarding other aspects of sexual equality. Most notable in this regard is the fact that full female suffrage was not permitted in this country until 1971. The wide range of scores makes the 7% average increase somewhat deceiving. Nevertheless, the predominant pattern to emerge is that sexual equality increased in the majority of countries — prior to the rise to prominence of the "women's liberation" movement in the early 1970s.

Turning to a consideration of equality of income distribution, it will be remembered that there are two distinct dimensions to be examined: (1) "inter-class egalitarian inequality" — operationalized in terms of post-tax income distribution as measured by the addition of the Gini coefficient to the proportion of income of top minus bottom deciles of income recipients; (2) "intra-

working-class egalitarian equality" — operationalized in terms of the proportion of income received by the third decile as a percentage of that obtained by the fifth decile. The results for the first dimension are presented in Table 6.5. Note that due to the particular measure utilized, the degree and change in inequality is presented. Thus, the larger the negative percentage change, the greater is the reduction in inequality of inter-class income distribution. As some might anticipate, Sweden ranks highest in the degree of (inter-class) income equality circa 1970. Another Scandinavian country (Norway) is in second place. However, Denmark and Finland rank 16th and 19th, respectively. This large discrepancy within the Scandinavian nations is an important finding which will be discussed in detail in the conclusion to this chapter. Following the top two Scandinavian countries are three English-speaking nations. Britain ranks third while Australia and New Zealand are tied for fourth spot. The two North American cases declined in relative position — Canada falling to ninth and the United States to 12th place. Countries making the largest positive shifts (i.e., increases in relative equality) were Sweden (ninth to first) and Japan (14th to seventh). The greatest relative declines in rank were for Finland (12th to 19th) and Israel (first to 11th).

On average, the countries in this study experienced

Table 6.5: Inter-Class (Egalitarian) Inequality

Country(N=19)	% Change*	(rank)	1950 (rank)**	1970 (rank)
Sweden	+25	(1)	.65 (9)	.49 (1)
Japan	-19	(2)	.69 (14)	.56 (7)
New Zealand	-15	(3)	.62 (7)	.53 (4)
Netherlands	-14	(4)	.70 (15)	.60 (10)
Germany	-12	(5)	.75 (18)	.66 (14)
France	-11	(6)	.80 (19)	.71 (18)
Norway	-09	(7)	.56 (3)	.51 (2)
U. K.	-07	(8)	.56 (3)	.52 (3)
Canada	-06	(9)	.63 (8)	.59 (9)
Australia	-05	(10)	.56 (3)	.53 (4)
Belgium	-05	(10)	.59 (6)	.56 (7)
Italy	-05	(10)	.73 (16)	.69 (15)
Ireland	-04	(13)	.68 (12)	.65 (13)
Switzerland	-04	(13)	.73 (16)	.70 (16)
U. S. A.	-02	(15)	.65 (9)	.64 (12)
Austria	+04	(16)	.53 (2)	.55 (6)
Denmark	+04	(16)	.67 (11)	.70 (16)
Finland	+13	(18)	.68 (12)	.77 (19)
Israel	+47	(19)	.43 (1)	.63 (11)

Mean = -4%

Range = 72

Standard Deviation = 15

*The larger the negative percentage change, the greater is the reduction in inequality of inter-class income distribution.

**based on degree of inequality (lowest to highest)

Data sources: see footnote 27, Chapter V

a slight increase (only 4%) in inter-class income equality. Sweden, Japan, and New Zealand made the largest percentage gains. On the other hand, income inequality increased in four nations; Israel, Finland, Austria, and Denmark — with the largest rise occurring in Israel (47%). While the range of scores is rather large (72), a majority of the 19 countries registered limited changes in income inequality within a narrow range of +4% to -7%. Thus, with the few exceptions noted above, there was relatively little change in inter-class income equality from circa 1950-70.

The results for the second income distribution dimension (intra-working-class equality) are presented in Table 6.6. Note that in this instance the larger the positive percentage change, the greater is the increase in intra-working-class equality. In 1970, Japan ranked first on this measure of equality. (This is in stark contrast to Japan's poor performance regarding welfarist equality — ranking 18th in "change" and 19th in 1970 level.) It was followed by Australia (in second place), Ireland and Belgium (tied for third position). Canada and the United States exhibited lower ranks on this dimension of equality than the inter-class variant discussed above (17th and 19th rank, respectively). The Scandinavian countries again exhibited an inconsistent pattern. Sweden and Norway were in the top half of nations examined but Denmark and Finland ranked in the bottom third of countries.

3

Table 6.6: Intra-Working-Class (Egalitarian) Equality

Country(N=19)	% Change*	(rank)	1950 (rank)**	1970 (rank)
Japan	+15	(1)	.66 (8)	.76 (1)
Belgium	+8	(2)	.66 (8)	.71 (3)
Germany	+6	(3)	.64 (12)	.68 (8)
Netherlands	+6	(3)	.64 (12)	.68 (8)
Switzerland	+5	(5)	.57 (17)	.60 (15)
Ireland	+3	(6)	.69 (5)	.71 (3)
Sweden	+3	(6)	.68 (7)	.70 (5)
Norway	+3	(6)	.66 (8)	.68 (8)
Italy	+2	(9)	.63 (15)	.64 (13)
Canada	+2	(9)	.57 (17)	.58 (17)
U. K.	0	(11)	.69 (5)	.69 (7)
France	0	(11)	.59 (16)	.59 (16)
U. S. A.	-2	(13)	.57 (17)	.56 (19)
Austria	-3	(14)	.72 (4)	.70 (5)
Denmark	-3	(14)	.66 (8)	.64 (13)
Australia	-4	(16)	.75 (2)	.72 (2)
New Zealand	-8	(17)	.74 (3)	.68 (8)
Finland	-9	(18)	.64 (12)	.58 (17)
Israel	-16	(19)	.79 (1)	.66 (12)

Mean = +0.42%

Range = 31

Standard Deviation = 6.9

*The larger the positive percentage change, the greater is the increase in intra-working-class equality (of income distribution).

**based on degree of equality (highest to lowest)

Data sources: see footnote 27, Chapter V

As was true regarding inter-class equality, Israel ranked highest in 1950 in the level of intra-working-class income equality yet declined to a middle rank by 1970.

In general, income equality within the working class increased for ten countries, remained unchanged for two nations (France and the United Kingdom), and declined for seven others (Australia, Austria, Denmark, Israel, New Zealand, Finland, and the United States). Consistent with the results for inter-class inequality, Israel experienced the greatest decline in intra-class equality (-16%). However, Sweden and New Zealand did not display the same trend toward equality as indicated in Table 6.5. Sweden's minimal increase (only 3%) contradicts the alleged goal of Swedish collective bargaining during this period — i.e., the so-called "solidarity wage policy" which supposedly aimed at raising the wages of the lower-paid workers' groups more than the average.⁵ The largest increases in working-class equality occurred in Japan (+15%), Belgium (8%), Germany and the Netherlands (6% each). Excluding the two extreme cases (i.e., Israel and Japan), changes in this dimension of income equality were limited to a narrow range of +8% to -9%. As the mean "% Change" score indicates (+0.42%), on average there was virtually no change in income equality within the working class

⁵ See Adolf Sturmthal, Comparative Labor Movements: Ideological Roots and Institutional Development (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1972), p. 42.

from circa 1950 to 1970.

Having examined each of the specific dimensions of socio-economic inequality, it would be informative to obtain an overall measure of relative equality for the countries in this study. Table 6.7 presents a summary measure of overall performance by comparing the average rank of scores on all dimensions (except ethnic/racial equality) ⁶ circa 1950 versus 1970. The larger the average rank, the greater is the relative inequality. Therefore, the larger the negative percentage change, the greater is the increase in overall equality relative to the other nations considered. Utilizing this overall measure, Israel ranked first in equality in 1950 but had dropped to seventh position by 1970. Switzerland holds the dubious distinction of ranking last in both 1950 and 1970. Other countries displaying low relative degrees of equality in 1970 were the United States (18th rank), France (17th), and Canada (16th). On the other hand, three Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway, and Denmark) were among the top four nations in 1970 (the other country being Austria), in relative overall equality. However, there was significant variation within the Scandinavian bloc. For example,

⁶ Consideration of ethnic/racial equality is excluded in this instance due to the availability of data for only nine of the 19 countries (as indicated in Table 6.3). Note also that inclusion of intra- and inter-class dimensions of income inequality provides, in effect, a double weighting for the egalitarian perspective in this overall measure of equality.

Table 6.7: Summary of Relative Equality Performance

Country (N=19)	%Change	(rank)	Prefer- ential dimen.**	Circa 1950		Prefer- ential dimen.	Circa 1970	
				Average rank, all dimen.**	(rank)		Average rank, all dimen.	(rank)
Sweden	-53	(1)	welfarist	7.2	(4)	inter	3.4	(1)
Netherlands	-25	(2)	welfarist	13.4	(16)	welfar.	10.0	(9)
Austria	-24	(3)	sexual, inter	6.6	(2)	sexual	5.0	(2)
Germany	-22	(4)	merit.	11.8	(14)	welfar.	9.2	(8)
Italy	-21	(5)	sexual	13.6	(18)	sexual, welfar.	10.8	(12)
Japan	-19	(6)	intra	13.4	(16)	intra	10.8	(12)
Denmark	+08	(7)	sexual	8.0	(7)	sexual	7.4	(4)
Belgium	-05	(8)	merit.	8.0	(7)	intra	7.6	(5)
Norway	0	(9)	inter	7.2	(4)	inter	7.2	(3)
U. K.	0	(9)	welfarist	7.6	(6)	merit.	7.6	(5)
Canada	+05	(11)	inter	12.0	(15)	merit.	12.6	(16)
Ireland	+13	(12)	sexual	10.4	(11)	intra	11.8	(15)
Switzerland	+17	(13)	welfarist	13.8	(19)	welfar.	16.2	(19)
Australia	+19	(14)	intra	8.4	(10)	intra	10.0	(9)
France	+19	(14)	welfarist	10.8	(12)	welfar.	12.8	(17)
U. S. A.	+20	(16)	merit.	11.4	(13)	merit.	13.6	(18)
Finland	+45	(17)	sexual	8.0	(7)	sexual	11.6	(14)
New Zea.	+52	(18)	welfarist	6.6	(2)	inter	10.0	(9)
Israel	+69	(19)	intra, inter	5.2	(1)	merit., sexual	8.8	(7)

*dimension of equality in which country ranked highest (ethnic/racial equality excluded — see text)

**The larger the average rank, the greater is the relative inequality.

***from lowest to highest average rank

Sources: Tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6

both Sweden and Norway had identical average ranks circa 1950 (7.2). Twenty years later, Norway's relative overall equality score remained unchanged while Sweden's had declined to 3.4. The greatest increases in relative equality were registered by Sweden (53%), the Netherlands (25%), and Austria (24%). The largest decreases were experienced by Israel (69%), New Zealand (52%), and Finland (45%).

Returning to the typology of socio-economic equality discussed in Chapter I, the empirical results examined above (in Tables 6.1 - 6.6) generally support the characterization of the various equality perspectives according to their relative theoretical compatibility with advanced capitalism. Of those dimensions of equality considered most compatible with capitalism (i.e., meritocratic and welfarist equality), in only one out of 38 cases (Belgium's increase in educational inequality) did inequality increase. The results for the equality perspective with less theoretical compatibility with advanced capitalism (i.e., emancipatory — with ethnic/racial and sexual variants) indicate five out of 28 cases in which inequality increased (Canada, Ireland, France, U.S.A., and Switzerland — all regarding sexual equality). For the type of equality considered least compatible with advanced capitalism (i.e., egalitarian — with inter and intra-class variants),⁷ inequality increased in the largest

⁷ As noted in Chapter I (pp. 15-16), of the two variants of egalitarianism, inter-class is less compatible with capitalism than intra-class equality. Nevertheless, both variants are deemed to be less compatible than either welfarist or meritocratic perspectives.

number of cases (11 out of 38).⁸ Comparison of the mean increases in equality also supports the typology presented in Chapter I. The average increase for meritocratic and welfarist perspectives was 19.5%. This contrasts with an average gain of 8% for emancipatory and only 2% for egalitarian dimensions. Thus, the greater the relative theoretical compatibility of an equality perspective with advanced capitalism, the greater was its actual increase over the portion of the post-war era under consideration.

⁸ For inter-class income equality the countries were: Austria, Denmark, Finland, and Israel. For intra-class equality the countries were: Australia, Austria, Denmark, the United States, New Zealand, Israel, and Finland.

B. Explanations for Changes in Equality (bivariate analysis)

1. Impact of Left-Wing Mobilization

The first of the independent variables to be considered is "left-wing mobilization". As may be remembered, this composite index is composed of three dimensions: Social Democratic rule (most heavily weighted), left-wing opposition, and trade union strength. The degree of left-wing mobilization for each country is presented in Table 6.8. As one would anticipate, Israel and the Scandinavian countries rank highest on this measure while Canada and the United States rank lowest. Only Israel and Sweden had Social Democratic governments for the entire period under examination. In addition, they had (and still have) the highest rate of union membership. The hypotheses (from Chapter II) under consideration are: (H 1.1) the greater the left-wing mobilization, the greater is the increase in socio-economic equality (in respect to all dimensions); (H 1.2) the degree of left-wing mobilization is positively associated with all but inter-class dimensions of equality.⁹ A summary of statistical measures of the relationships postulated in hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2 is provided in Table 6.9.¹⁰

⁹ In the scattergrams (placed at the end of each subsection), the following country abbreviations are used: Australia (Al), Austria (Au), Belgium (B), Canada (C), Denmark (D), Finland (Fin), France (F), Germany (G), Ireland (I), Israel (Is), Italy (It), Japan (J), Netherlands (Nl), New Zealand (NZ), Norway (N), Sweden (S), Switzerland (Sl), United Kingdom (UK), United States (US).

¹⁰ In all tables presented, "N" refers to the number of cases (i.e., countries) under consideration. An explanation of each of the statistical measures (and their abbreviations) is presented in the Statistical Appendix.

Table 6.8: Left-Wing Mobilization

<u>Country (N = 19)</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>(rank)*</u>
Israel	270	(1)
Sweden	260	(2)
Norway	207	(3)
Denmark	192	(4)
U. K.	142	(5)
Finland	111	(6)
Austria	95	(7)
New Zealand	93	(8)
France	84	(9)
Belgium	83	(10)
Australia	76	(11)
Germany	70	(12)
Italy	68	(13)
Switzerland	67	(14)
Netherlands	62	(15)
Japan	53	(16)
Ireland	48	(17)
Canada	47	(18)
U. S. A.	22	(19)

Mean = 108

Range = 248

Standard Deviation = 72.4

*Countries are ranked from highest to lowest degree of left-wing mobilization.

Data sources: see footnotes 31-33, Chapter V

Table 6.9: Statistical Summary -- Hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2
(Impact of "left-wing mobilization" on equality)

Equality Dimension	r	HD*	r ²	St. Er.	B	St. Er. of B	F	N
Meritocratic inequality	-.04	(-)	.002	22.8	-.014	.074	.033	19
Welfarist equality	.21	(+)	.043	6.41	.018	.020	.781	19
Ethnic/Racial equality	-.49	(+)	.244	6.79	-.050	.033	2.25	9
Sexual equality	.48	(+)	.233	11.36	.084	.036	5.18	19
Inter-class Egalitarian inequality	.36	(-/0)	.129	14.42	.074	.046	2.53	19
Intra-working-class Egalitarian equality	-.42	(+)	.176	6.44	-.039	.020	3.62	19

*Hypothesized direction of relationship

From the results, it appears that there is virtually no bivariate relationship between left-wing mobilization and meritocratic (i.e., educational) inequality (r is almost zero). The findings are supportive of the Functionalist and End of Ideology schools (discussed in Chapter II) which predicted no relationship between left-wing mobilization and the various dimensions of equality. The scattergram (Fig. 6.1) indicates the lack of any discernible relationship. For all scattergrams in this chapter involving meritocratic inequality, countries below the regression line (i.e., with negative residuals) are those which displayed greater than predicted educational equality.¹¹

Turning to welfarist equality, a low positive relationship (as hypothesized) exists with left-wing mobilization ($r = .21$). The scattergram (Fig. 6.2) suggests that this minimal positive correlation is largely the reflection of the Scandinavian countries. Sweden, Norway, and Finland are all just slightly above the regression line. This raises the issue of whether a threshold level of left-wing mobilization must be reached before it can have a significant impact (see later discussion). In contrast to these cases are those countries with negative residuals — i.e., nations below the regression line with less than predicted increases in welfarist equality. Note that all

¹¹ The "deviant" case of Belgium's increase in educational inequality is discussed later in this chapter when considering the impact of consociationalism.

of the non-European countries in this study have negative residuals. Conversely, all but four of the 13 European nations considered have values on or above the regression line (i.e., greater than predicted welfarism).¹² In general, the results noted are only somewhat supportive of the hypotheses.

Contrary to what was anticipated, a moderate negative relationship appears to exist between left-wing mobilization and ethnic/racial equality. However, caution should be exercised in this regard due to the small number of cases and the contradictory indications derived from Fig. 6.3.¹³ On the one hand, a positive relationship (see dotted line) can be seen for Switzerland, Belgium, New Zealand, Finland, and the United Kingdom. On the other hand, a negative curvilinear relationship appears to exist for the five countries above the regression line (four of which are non-European nations). Generally, one can conclude that left-wing mobilization does not have the hypothesized impact upon ethnic/racial equality.

In contrast, the hypotheses are supported vis-a-vis sexual equality. A moderate positive correlation and the scattergram reveal this relationship. In Fig. 6.4 (as

¹² This fits the welfare-state pattern suggested by Heisler's "European Polity" model; see Martin Heisler, Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes in Some Post-Industrial Democracies (NY: McKay, 1974), ch. 2.

¹³ For all scattergrams in this chapter involving ethnic/racial equality, countries with positive residuals experienced larger than predicted increases in this dimension of equality.

in all scattergrams in this chapter involving sexual equality), countries with positive residuals experienced larger increases in this dimension of equality than predicted by the regression equation. Two of the most "deviant" cases are Switzerland (commented upon earlier, p. 177) and Japan. The latter country's much greater than anticipated increase in sexual equality (i.e., its large positive residual) may be a reflection, in part, of the unique circumstances of rapid westernization (during the post-war era) of a nation which had a traditional view toward women which relegated them to an extremely subservient role in society.¹⁴

The findings reported in Table 6.9 reveal a moderate inverse relationship between left-wing mobilization and both dimensions of income equality. This result is not as hypothesized. Examination of the scattergrams (Figs. 6.5 and 6.6)¹⁵ calls attention to the special case of Israel — the country with the greatest decrease in intra and inter-class income equality despite having the highest left-wing mobilization score. This result necessitates detailed consideration. At least four plausible explanations for such an outcome can be offered. The first relates to the minority nature of Israeli Labour governments. Not only have such governments had to contend with the constraints imposed by important non-social democratic "partners" but the Labour "party" itself is really a coalition of often disparate factions.¹⁶

A second possible explanation concerns the substantial influx

¹⁴ See Edwin Reischauer, The Japanese (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U. Press, 1977), ch. 1.

¹⁵ In Fig. 6.5 (as with all scattergrams involving inter-class inequality), countries above the regression line experienced less than predicted increases in equality. In Fig. 6.6 (and for all scattergrams concerning intra-class equality), nations below the regression line registered less than anticipated increases.

¹⁶ See D. Zohar, Political Parties in Israel (NY: Praeger, 1974).

of Oriental Jews into Israel over the period of time considered — resulting in an expansion of this subordinate group as a proportion of the total Israeli population. The increased presence of this disadvantaged segment would tend to be reflected in the reduced equality figures noted in Tables 6.5 and 6.6. As Smoocha and Peres explain:

The Jewish population of Israel is divided into two major groups: Orientals originating from the Middle East and North Africa, and Ashkenazim originating from Europe and America.... If we include in the Oriental (non-Ashkenazi) group all foreign-born from Asia and Africa and their descendants, their proportion had grown to about 52% of all Israeli Jews by 1970. In spite of their numerical preponderance, Orientals are a subordinate group. They suffer from the disadvantages of late arrival in the state, poor skills, and inexperience in living in an industrial, democratic society. The positions they occupy are lower on the average than those held by Ashkenazim.... Ethnic inequalities in Israel should be regarded as appreciable. The disparities in allocation of resources between the two main Jewish ethnicities are roughly of the same magnitude as those between ethnic or racial groups in the U.S.A.¹⁷

This conclusion is consistent with the findings in this dissertation (see Table 6.3) which indicate Israel's level of ethnic inequality is closer to that of the United States than any other country.

A third possible explanation lies in the unique, garrison-like nature of the Israeli state. As Stack argues, the degree of stratification in a society can be determined, in part, by the extent to which a society is orientated toward war. A key measure of this is the "military participation ratio", or the relative proportion of persons serving in the armed services.¹⁸ At comparatively lower levels of economic development, a high military participation

¹⁷ S. Smoocha and Y. Peres, "The Dynamics of Ethnic Inequalities: The Case of Israel", Social Dynamics, June 1975, pp.65-66.

¹⁸ See Steven Stack, "The Political Economy of Income Inequality: A Comparative Analysis", Canadian Journal of Political Science, June 1980, p. 277.

ratio¹⁹ can impede egalitarian distribution policies. "...given that elites in such situations have very little leeway when it comes to decisions on income inequality. The size of the economic surplus is so small that income redistribution cannot be tolerated."²⁰ It can be argued that the economic and social distortions resulting from Israel's military priorities and its perpetual siege mentality lead to a diminished capacity to sustain its earlier egalitarian achievements.

A fourth possible explanation for the Israeli case lies in the significant decline in importance of the kibbutz in the period of rapid industrialization covered by this study. As noted earlier, Israel ranked first circa 1950 in both measures of income equality. This result is consistent with the important role played by the kibbutz at that time. Grounded in the heritage of socialist Zionism, the kibbutz was based on a vision of the new society, providing a model for an egalitarian, socialist and democratic Jewish community. However, as Israeli society became more industrialized and urbanized, and with the massive influx of immigrants, the relative impact of the kibbutz — both economically and ideologically — drastically declined. As Michael Curtis has observed:

Membership of the 232 existing kibbutz constitutes a diminishing percentage of Israel's total population: it is now only 2.8% of the total.... In a society

¹⁹ Israel ranks last among the countries in this study in the level of development circa 1950-70 (see Table 6.17). It would rank first in the relative proportion of persons serving in the armed forces or of GNP devoted to the military. See Charles Taylor and Michael Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven, Conn.: Yale U. Press, 1972).

²⁰ Stack, p. 277. Cf. Amos Perlmutter, Military and Politics in Israel (N.Y.: Praeger, 1969), ch. 1.

which has rapidly increased its population from heterogeneous sources, developed economically and seen its private sector controlling 47% of industry and 82% of trade and services competing with the public sector, and taken over the functions of absorption, defense, social welfare and technological development, the kibbutz has seen change in both its internal organization and in its role in society.... The kibbutz is troubled by the tension within itself between socialist ideology and the requirements of economic growth as well as by the seeming reduction of that socialist ideology and pioneering spirit in society as a whole, with the changing composition of the population, the need to attract foreign capital, and the growth of private investment. 21

Exclusion of the "aberrant" case of Israel would reduce the extent of the inverse relationship between left-wing mobilization and income equality. The moderate negative correlation between left-wing mobilization and intra-class egalitarianism would drop to $-.28$ and the positive correlation with inter-class inequality would decrease to $.18$ (i.e., closer to zero in both instances). Regardless, these findings clearly contradict the Democratic Class Conflict school of thought (as represented by H 1.1). The results are most consistent with the Constrained Socialism (H 1.2) as well as the End of Ideology and Functionalist schools. These schools of thought predict no positive relationship between left-wing mobilization and egalitarian measures of equality.

In summary, except for the sexual and (to a lesser

²¹ Michael Curtis, "Utopia and the Kibbutz", in Curtis and Chertoff (eds.), Israel: Social Structure and Change (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1973), pp. 107-8. Also see Bruno Bettelheim, "Some Reflections on the Kibbutz", in Curtis and Chertoff, pp. 95-101.

extent) welfarist dimensions, there is no clear positive relationship between the degree of left-wing mobilization and increases in the level of socio-economic equality. Thus, hypothesis 1.1 is not generally confirmed by the findings. This results in broad support for the End of Ideology and Functionalist viewpoints and more limited support for the Constrained Socialism perspective (H 1.2). However, it should be stressed that these are tentative conclusions based upon a bivariate assessment of the impact of left-wing mobilization under the tenuous ceteris paribus assumption. The next sub-section considers, inter alia, the effect of this variable when controlling for the economic scope of the state. In addition, the multiple regression analysis later in this chapter examines the relative impact of left-wing mobilization when controlling for all of the other independent variables. Thus, a caveat is in order regarding premature overall conclusions.

Fig. 6.1: Scattergram of (down) Meritocratic Inequality and (across) Left-Wing Mobilization

Fig. 6.2: Scattergram of (down) Welfarist Equality and (across) Left-Wing Mobilization.

Fig. 6.3: Scattergram of (down) Ethnic/Racial Equality and (across) Left-Wing Mobilization

Fig. 6.4: Scattergram of (down) Sexual Equality and (across) Left-Wing Mobilization

Fig. 6.5: Scattergram of (down) Inter-Class Inequality and (across) Left-Wing Mobilization

Fig. 6.6: Scattergram of (down) Intra-Class Equality and (across) Left-Wing Mobilization

2. Impact of Economic Scope of the State

The second of the independent variables to be considered is "economic scope of the state". This was operationalized as the change in two dimensions: (1) the size of the government sector of the economy in budgetary terms and (2) the percentage of state ownership of key sectors of the economy. As indicated in Table 6.10, all countries experienced an increase in "economic scope" — the lowest being 6% for Switzerland. In 1970, Austria and the United Kingdom had the highest level of "economic scope"; Japan and the United States registered the lowest level. Interestingly, the Scandinavian countries did not rank particularly high on the 1970 level of this variable. In fact, Sweden ranked sixth, Norway seventh, Denmark 14th, and Finland 16th. However, three of these countries did experience relatively high increases in the economic scope of the state (Sweden and Norway 22%, Denmark 44%). Note that there were only minor changes in rank from 1950 to 1970. For example, even though the United States registered a 28% increase, its relative position (19th) remained unchanged due to its low initial position. The average increase of only 15.5% is lower than most findings in other research on the growth of the state. This is probably due to the inclusion in this instance (unlike many other studies) of the extent of public ownership in addition to the traditional measure involving government

Table 6.10: Economic Scope of the State

Country(N=19)	% Change*	(rank)	1950 (rank)**	1970 (rank)
Denmark	+44	(1)	45 (16)	65 (14)
U. S. A.	+28	(2)	25 (19)	32 (19)
Sweden	+22	(3)	81 (7)	99 (6)
Norway	+22	(3)	78 (8)	95 (7)
Ireland	+20	(5)	60 (13)	72 (12)
Canada	+20	(5)	45 (16)	54 (17)
Japan	+18	(7)	39 (18)	46 (18)
Israel	+17	(8)	86 (5)	101 (5)
Belgium	+15	(9)	73 (10)	84 (9)
Australia	+15	(9)	65 (12)	75 (11)
Germany	+12	(11)	75 (9)	84 (9)
Italy	+09	(12)	104 (3)	113 (3)
Finland	+09	(12)	56 (15)	61 (16)
Austria	+08	(14)	121 (1)	131 (1)
U. K.	+08	(14)	113 (2)	122 (2)
France	+08	(14)	102 (4)	110 (4)
Netherlands	+08	(14)	86 (5)	93 (8)
New Zealand	+07	(18)	59 (14)	63 (15)
Switzerland	+06	(19)	67 (11)	71 (13)

Mean = +15.5%

Range = 38

Standard Deviation = 9.3

*The larger the positive percentage change, the greater is the increase in "economic scope".

**based on degree of "economic scope" (highest to lowest)

expenditures as a proportion of GNP.

The hypotheses (from Chapter II) under consideration are : (H 2.1) the greater the left-wing mobilization, the greater is the increase in economic scope of the state; (H 2.2) the greater the increase in economic scope of the state, the greater is the increase in socio-economic equality. The bivariate relationship between "economic scope" and equality (H 2.2) will be examined first (see Table 6.11 and Figs. 6.7 - 6.12).²²

The results indicate a mild inverse relationship between educational equality (i.e., a positive correlation between inequality) and economic scope of the state. This finding clearly does not support hypothesis 2.2 for this dimension of equality. In contrast, there is a mild positive relationship between welfarist equality and "economic scope" ($r = .33$). As was true previously (regarding left-wing mobilization and welfarist equality), all non-European countries have negative residuals (i.e., less than predicted increases in welfarism) and all Scandinavian countries have positive residuals. These results are supportive of the hypothesis.

Regarding ethnic/racial equality and "economic scope", there is a strong positive relationship ($r = .79$) confirmed by the scattergram (Fig. 6.9). This compares with the

²² An examination of the scattergrams (excluding Fig. 6.9) reveals the distorting impact of Denmark due to its outlier position. Thus, the statistics in Tables 6.11 and 6.12 were recalculated to compensate for this condition. This involved "Windsorizing" the outlier (see Statistical Appendix).

Table 6.11: Statistical Summary — Hypothesis 2.2
(impact of "economic scope" on equality)

Equality Dimension	r	HD*	r ²	St. Er.	B	St. Er. of B	F	N
Meritocratic inequality	.31	(+)	.094	21.7	.725	.545	1.77	19
Welfarist equality	.33	(+)	.108	6.19	.223	.155	2.05	19
Ethnic/Racial equality	.79	(+)	.625	4.78	.804	.180	11.6	9
Sexual equality	.26	(+)	.070	12.5	.356	.314	1.28	19
Inter-class Egalitarian inequality	.09	(-)	.008	15.4	.140	.386	.131	19
Intra-Working-class Egalitarian equality	-.01	(+)	.0001	7.09	-.009	.178	.003	19

*Hypothesized direction of relationship.

A negative relationship between left-wing mobilization and this dimension of equality discussed earlier. On the other hand, the sexual dimension of emancipatory equality appears to have only a low (though positive) correlation with "economic scope".

Examining egalitarian dimensions of equality, there seems to be virtually no relationship with economic scope of the state. The correlation coefficients are close to zero and the scattergrams are consistent with this interpretation (regardless of Denmark's position). Thus, the hypothesis is strongly supported only in relation to ethnic/racial equality. It is only mildly confirmed for welfarist and only slightly for sexual equality. However, an increase in "economic scope" did not lead to an increase in educational or income distribution dimensions of equality. Such findings are most in accord with those arguments (presented in Chapter II) which contend that public ownership and an increased share of the government's portion of GNP are consistent with (possibly even beneficial to) the modern capitalist economy, and therefore do not greatly alter the degree of inequality.

Turning to the relationship between left-wing mobilization and economic scope of the state (H 2.1), Table 6.12 reveals a rather low positive correlation ($r = .31$). Only 10% of the variation in "economic scope" is explained by the degree of left-wing mobilization. Examination of

Table 6.12: Statistical Summary — Hypothesis 2.1
relationship between economic scope ("X"), left-wing mobilization ("Z"), and equality ("Y")

Product-Moment Correlation (X with Z):										
		r	t	r ²	N					
		.31	.098	.096	19					
Partial Correlation										
(with Z, controlling for X) H*		r	D**	r ²	t (with X, con- (controlling for Z))	H***	r	D	r ²	t
Meritocratic inequality										
(0)		-.15	+.11	.023	.27	(0)	.34	+.03	.116	.08
Welfarist equality										
(0)		.12	-.09	.014	.31	(0)	.28	-.05	.078	.13
Sexual equality										
(0)		.44	-.04	.194	.04	(0)	.14	-.12	.020	.29
Inter-class inequality										
(0)		.35	-.01	.123	.07	(0)	-.03	-.12	.001	.46
Intra-class equality										
(0)		-.44	+.02	.194	.04	(0)	.14	+.15	.020	.29

*Hypothesized result for developmental sequence ($r_{zy \cdot x} = 0$) — see p. 136 for details

**This represents the difference between the partial correlation and the original bivariate correlation as reported in Tables 6.9 and 6.11.

***Hypothesized result for spurious correlation ($r_{xy \cdot z} = 0$) — see p. 136 for details
NB: the computer could not calculate meaningful results for ethnic/racial equality given the small number of cases for this dimension (9).

the partial correlation coefficients indicates only minimal changes occur when controlling for either of the two independent variables. The negative correlation between left-wing mobilization and educational inequality increases slightly (i.e., the opposite of the hypothesized result) though its magnitude is still quite low. For welfarist equality, the low positive correlation with left-wing mobilization presented in Table 6.9 (.21) is reduced somewhat closer to zero when controlling for "economic scope". When controlling for left-wing mobilization, the low positive correlation between sexual equality and "economic scope" is reduced almost in half. On the other hand, a very small positive correlation emerges for intra-working class equality and "economic scope".

In general, none of the previous conclusions derived from the bivariate analysis needs to be substantially revised. One can conclude that hypothesis 2.1 receives only slight support. The notion of a substantial "developmental sequence between left-wing mobilization, "economic scope", and equality (see p. 136 for details) is not confirmed. Instead, the findings are more consistent with the view (expressed above and in Chapter II) which minimizes the importance of the economic scope of the state on the change in inequality and the relevance in this area of the partisan composition of the government.

Fig. 6.7: Scattergram of (down) Meritocratic Inequality and (across) Economic Scope

there is a low positive relationship — close to, but distinct from, the zero relationship anticipated.

In contradiction to hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2, there is no bivariate relationship between liberal corporatism and either inter or intra-class dimensions of income equality. Both correlation coefficients are almost zero. These results are supportive of the more radical view of liberal corporatism as a mechanism of control over the working class which is neither capable nor intended to produce a redistribution of income. However, as indicated above, increases in a type of equality more compatible with advanced capitalism (i.e., welfarist) are positively correlated with neo-corporatism. This is consistent with the view (expressed in Chapter II) of extended social welfare programs as an inducement for trade union "cooperation" (i.e., cooptation) in corporatist policies. These tentative conclusions are, of course, subject to revision based upon the multiple regression analysis later in this chapter.

Fig. 6.9: Scattergram of (down) Ethnic/Racial Equality and (across) Economic Scope

Fig. 6.10: Scattergram of (down) Sexual Equality and (across) Economic Scope

Fig. 6.11: Scattergram of (down) Inter-Class Inequality and (across) Economic Scope

Fig. 6.12: Scattergram of (down) Intra-Class Equality and (across) Economic Scope

3. Impact of Liberal Corporatism

The third independent variable to be considered is "liberal corporatism". As will be remembered, this concept was operationalized in terms of three measures:

(1) a voluntary incomes policy score (2) a union centralization index and (3) a general "corporatist tendencies" score. The first element was most heavily weighted in this composite index. The overall degree of corporatism for each country is presented in Table 6.13. As can be seen, the countries fall into three discernible categories which are in accord with the configurative literature: (1) five nations with extremely high corporatism scores (the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Austria); (2) five nations with moderate scores (Finland, Switzerland, Britain, Israel, and Belgium); (3) nine countries with relatively low scores (France, Germany, Australia, Canada, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States). Notice that five of the six non-European countries are in the lowest category, while three Scandinavian nations are among the top four in overall corporatism scores. It should be remembered that the minimum possible value for this variable is 9 points (the maximum = 67).

The hypotheses (from Chapter II) under consideration are: (H 3.1) liberal corporatism is positively associated with increases in inter-class income equality; (H 3.2)

Table 6.13: Liberal Corporatism

<u>Country (N = 19)</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>(rank)*</u>
Netherlands	66	(1)
Norway	65	(2)
Sweden	65	(2)
Denmark	62	(4)
Austria	58	(5)
Finland	39	(6)
Switzerland	30	(7)
U. K.	30	(7)
Israel	21	(9)
Belgium	20	(10)
France	15	(11)
Germany	15	(11)
Australia	10	(13)
Canada	9	(14)
Ireland	9	(14)
Italy	9	(14)
Japan	9	(14)
New Zealand	9	(14)
U. S. A.	9	(14)

Mean = 29

Range = .57

Standard Deviation = 22.7

*Countries are ranked from highest to lowest degree of liberal corporatism..

Data sources: see footnotes 39, 42, 44 in Chapter V

liberal corporatism is positively associated with increases in intra-working-class income equality; (H 3.3) liberal corporatism is positively associated with increases in welfarist equality. No relationship is postulated with other dimensions of equality.

As anticipated (see Table 6.14), virtually no relationship exists between corporatism and educational (i.e., meritocratic) inequality. In addition, there is a clear positive relationship (as predicted by hypothesis 3.3) between welfarist equality and corporatism. This is revealed by a correlation of .54 and the regression line in the scattergram (Fig. 6.14).

Contrary to what was expected, a moderate negative relationship is indicated vis-a-vis ethnic/racial equality. However, examination of the scattergram (Fig. 6.15) reveals four of the nine countries (the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) with virtually identical corporatism scores yet quite different ethnic equality values. In general, the data are poorly described by this linear regression model due to an apparent curvilinear pattern. Nevertheless, to the extent that ethnic/racial equality is lower in countries with moderate or high corporatism scores, it could be argued that a corporatist emphasis focuses attention on class rather than ethnic or racial divisions in society. Regarding the other dimension of emancipatory equality (i.e., sexual),

Table 6.14: Statistical Summary — Hypotheses 3.1-3.3
(impact of "liberal corporatism" on equality)

Equality Dimension	r	HD*	r ²	St. Er.	B	St. Er. of B	F	N
Meritocratic inequality	-.03	(0)	.001	22.8	-.033	.236	.019	19
Welfarist equality	.54	(+)	.296	5.50	.152	5.71	7.15	19
Ethnic/Racial equality	-.51	(0)	.262	6.71	-.331	.104	2.48	9
Sexual equality	.27	(0)	.074	12.5	.151	.129	1.36	19
Inter-class Egalitarian inequality	-.04	(+)	.002	15.4	-.029	.160	.033	19
Intra-working-class Egalitarian equality	-.01	(+)	.0001	7.09	-.002	.073	.001	19

*Hypothesized direction of relationship

there is a low positive relationship — close to, but distinct from, the zero relationship anticipated.

In contradiction to hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2, there is no bivariate relationship between liberal corporatism and either inter or intra-class dimensions of income equality. Both correlation coefficients are almost zero. These results are supportive of the more radical view of liberal corporatism as a mechanism of control over the working class which is neither capable nor intended to produce a redistribution of income. However, as indicated above, increases in a type of equality more compatible with advanced capitalism (i.e., welfarist) are positively correlated with neo-corporatism. This is consistent with the view (expressed in Chapter II) of extended social welfare programs as an inducement for trade union "cooperation" (i.e., cooptation) in corporatist policies. These tentative conclusions are, of course, subject to revision based upon the multiple regression analysis later in this chapter.

Fig. 6.13: Scattergram of (down) Meritocratic Inequality and (across) Corporatism

Fig. 6.14: Scattergram of (down) Welfarist Equality and (across) Corporatism

Fig. 6.15: Scattergram of (down) Ethnic/Racial Equality and (across) Corporatism

Fig. 6.16: Scattergram of (down) Sexual Equality and (across) Corporatism

Fig. 6.17: Scattergram of (down) Inter-Class Inequality and (across) Corporatism

Fig. 6.18: Scattergram of (down) Intra-Class Equality and (across) Corporatism

4. Impact of Consociationalism

The fourth independent variable to be examined is "consociationalism" (see Table 6.15). This concept was operationalized in terms of the four criteria outlined by Lijphart: (1) grand coalition, (2) mutual veto, (3) proportionality, and (4) autonomy. The maximum score is 40 points; the minimum is zero.* Four countries receive top scores: Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. In the configurative literature, these countries are generally acknowledged to have the highest degrees of consociationalism. The two nations with intermediate scores (Canada and Israel) are often referred to as semi-consociational countries.²³ Three other countries have a low degree of consociationalism (the United States, Finland, and New Zealand). Because these nations are generally ignored in the consociationalism literature, a brief explanation for the scores received by these three countries is in order. The score for the United States represents semi-consociational features in two areas: (1) the separateness (i.e., "autonomy") of the black segment of American society — notable in politics (in terms of black central city versus white suburban political control), in education (regarding the de facto apartheid in elementary and secondary public education), and in the job market (in terms of the disproportionate

²³ See Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale U. Press, 1977), pp. 124-34.

Table 6.15: Consociationalism

<u>Country (N = 19)</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>(rank)*</u>
Austria	40	(1)
Belgium	40	(1)
Netherlands	40	(1)
Switzerland	40	(1)
Canada	20	(5)
Israel	20	(5)
U. S. A.	10	(7)
Finland	5	(8)
New Zealand	5	(8)
Australia	0	(10)
Denmark	0	(10)
France	0	(10)
Germany	0	(10)
Ireland	0	(10)
Italy	0	(10)
Japan	0	(10)
Norway	0	(10)
Sweden	0	(10)
U. K.	0	(10)

Mean = 12

Range = 40

Standard Deviation = 16.3

*Countries are ranked from highest to lowest degree of consociationalism.

Data sources: see footnote 46, Chapter V

presence of blacks in lower skill jobs — i.e., job ghettos); (2) the recognition and application in some areas of de facto quotas (i.e., "proportionality") regarding, for example, the federal cabinet and Supreme Court, higher education, and some federal government grants (see discussion of emancipatory equality in Chapter I).²⁴ The minimal score for New Zealand represents this country's partial recognition of the "proportionality principle" vis-a-vis the Maoris. In this regard, four of the 80 seats in New Zealand's parliament are reserved for (and voted on by) only Maoris. The minimal score for Finland reflects de facto acceptance of the "proportionality principle" vis-a-vis the representation of Swedes in both the parliament and cabinet. Finally, note that ten countries exhibited no meaningful degree of consociationalism and thus received scores of zero (Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Britain).²⁵

The hypotheses (from Chapter II) are: (H 4.1) the greater the degree of consociationalism, the greater is the ethnic/racial equality; (H 4.2) there is a negative

²⁴ Cf. Ibid., pp. 113-14.

²⁵ As a result of the fact that a majority of the countries have zero scores, there is a violation of one of the assumptions of regression analysis (in relation to lack of common variance of the error term). Therefore, the decision was made to include in the statistical analysis only the nine countries which exhibited some degree of consociationalism. Due to the low number of resulting cases, this necessitated excluding consociationalism from the multiple regression portion of the analysis.

relationship between consociationalism and non-ethnic/racial dimensions of equality. The results (provided in Table 6.16) indicate (as hypothesized) a positive correlation between educational inequality and the degree of consociationalism — i.e., an inverse relationship between increases in educational equality and consociationalism. However, the magnitude of the correlation is rather low. The "deviant" case of Belgium observed in Fig. 6.19 (and other scattergrams involving meritocratic inequality) deserves special attention at this point. As noted earlier, Belgium is the only country registering an increase in educational inequality over the period considered. It was argued in Chapter II that a high commitment to consociational principles (especially "proportionality") often "... entails a higher priority to membership in a certain segment than to individual merit."²⁶ Since the measure of meritocratic inequality focuses upon educational opportunity (within the post-secondary context), a closer examination of consociational practices specifically within the educational sphere of activity may be more appropriate in this instance. The configurative literature suggests that among the four most consociational countries, Belgium exhibits the highest degree of "segmented pluralism" (i.e., the degree to which a sphere of

²⁶ Lijphart, p. 51.

Table 6.16: Statistical Summary — Hypotheses 4.1 and 4.2
(Impact of "consociationalism" on equality)

Equality Dimension	r	HD*	r ²	St. Er.	B	St. Er. of B	F	N
Meritocratic inequality	.17	(+)	.029	23.3	.241	.525	.211	9
Welfarist equality	.54	(-)	.301	5.47	.212	.131	2.59	9
Ethnic/racial equality	-.38	(+)	.149	7.38	-.180	.192	.881	7
Sexual equality	-.11	(-)	.013	13.4	-.090	.301	.090	9
Inter-class inequality	-.17	(+)	.029	15.8	-.165	.356	.215	9
Intra-working-class equality	.66	(-)	.442	5.81	.311	.131	5.64	9

*Hypothesized direction of relationship

activity is organized along the lines of segmented cleavages) in the educational area — especially post-secondary education. For example, Lorwin is quite specific in assessing "segmented pluralism" in 14 spheres of activity for Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. His conclusion (cited approvingly by Lijphart and McRae) regarding the post-secondary educational sphere of activity is that alone among these countries, Belgium exhibits a "high" degree of "segmented pluralism".²⁷ Consistent with the reasoning behind hypothesis 4.2, Belgium's increase in educational inequality can plausibly be explained by its especially high degree of consociationalism within the post-secondary educational sphere of activity — the most relevant area of consideration vis-a-vis meritocratic inequality.

Contrary to what was hypothesized, there is a moderate positive correlation between welfarist equality and consociationalism. Among the four most consociational nations (in Fig. 6.20), three have positive residuals (i.e., more welfarism than predicted by the regression equation). In addition, there is an unexpected negative correlation between consociationalism and ethnic/racial equality. Caution should be exercised in this regard, however,

²⁷ See Val Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies", Comparative Politics, Jan. 1971, pp. 141-175; Kenneth McRae, Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), p. 246; Lijphart, pp. 104-5.

since data for two of the highest scoring consociational countries (the Netherlands and Austria) are not available for this dimension of equality. As hypothesized, there is a negative (though very low) correlation between consociationalism and sexual equality.

Turning to the two dimensions of income inequality, there is a negative correlation with inter-class inequality (i.e., the greater the consociationalism, the less the increases in income inequality between classes). Note, however, that the magnitude of this correlation is low. In addition, it should be observed that three of the most consociational countries (the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Belgium) have negative residuals vis-a-vis inter-class inequality (in Fig. 6.23) — i.e., decreases in inequality greater than predicted by the regression line. Regarding intra-class equality, the findings indicate (contrary to the hypothesis) a high positive relationship. Again, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland exhibit greater than predicted increases in equality (i.e., they have positive residuals in Fig. 6.24).

In conclusion, the results do not support hypothesis 4.1. There is no positive relationship between consociationalism and ethnic/racial equality. In addition, there is only slight support for hypothesis 4.2 in relation to meritocratic and sexual dimensions of equality. Results for welfarist, and both income equality dimensions are inconsistent with the postulated relationships.

Fig. 6.19: Scattergram of (down) Meritocratic Inequality and (across) Consociationalism

Fig. 6.20: Scattergram of (down) Welfarist Equality and (across) Consociationalism

Fig. 6.21: Scattergram of (down) Ethnic/Racial Equality and (across) Consociationalism

Fig. 6.22: Scattergram of (down) Sexual Equality and (across) Consociationalism

Fig. 6.23: Scattergram of (down) Inter-Class Inequality and (across) Consociationalism

Fig. 6.24: Scattergram of (down) Intra-Class Equality and (across) Consociationalism

5. Impact of Economic Development

The fifth independent variable to be considered is "economic development" (see Table 6.17). This term was operationally defined as average energy consumption (expressed in terms of coal equivalent) per capita. The United States and Canada rank highest — with scores significantly greater than for any of the other countries. At the other extreme, Italy and Israel rank lowest on this variable.²⁸ Three Scandinavian nations (Sweden, Norway, and Denmark) rank in the top third of all countries. The hypothesis (from Chapter II) under consideration is: (H 5) the higher the economic development, the higher is the increase in socio-economic equality.

Contrary to the hypothesis, the results (in Table 6.18) indicate virtually no linear relationship between economic development and meritocratic as well as welfarist dimensions of equality. In addition, there is a low negative relationship with sexual equality.

In contrast, a very strong positive relationship appears to exist between ethnic/racial equality and level of economic development ($r = .70$). This result is consistent with the Ethnic Integration school of thought

²⁸ An examination of the scattergrams (Figs. 6.25-6.30) visually portrays the outlier positions of Canada and the United States on this variable. Thus, as was the case with Denmark vis-a-vis "economic scope", the regression statistics were recalculated to compensate for this condition. This involved (as before) "Windsorizing" the outliers (see Statistical Appendix).

Table 6.17: Economic Development

<u>Country (N = 19)</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>(rank)*</u>
U. S. A.	10.0	(1)
Canada	8.8	(2)
Sweden	5.3	(3)
Belgium	5.1	(4)
U. K.	5.1	(4)
Australia	4.6	(6)
Denmark	4.6	(6)
Norway	4.6	(6)
Germany	4.3	(9)
Austria	4.2	(10)
Netherlands	4.0	(11)
Japan	3.7	(12)
France	3.3	(13)
Finland	3.1	(14)
Switzerland	2.9	(15)
New Zealand	2.6	(16)
Ireland	2.4	(17)
Italy	2.1	(18)
Israel	1.9	(19)

Mean = 4.3

Range = 8.1

Standard Deviation = 2.0

*Countries are ranked from highest to lowest degree of economic development.

Data sources: see footnote 48, Chapter V

Table 6.18: Statistical Summary -- Hypothesis 5
(Impact of "economic development" on equality)

Equality Dimension	r	HD*	r ²	St. Er.	B	St. Er. of B	F	N
Meritocratic inequality	-.04	(-)	.002	22.8	-.445	2.59	.029	19
Welfarist equality	.02	(+)	.0004	6.56	.060	.746	.006	19
Ethnic/Racial equality	.70	(+)	.490	3.39	2.34	.580	30.1	9
Sexual equality	-.18	(+)	.032	12.7	-1.08	1.45	.554	19
Inter-class Egalitarian inequality	-.22	(-)	.049	15.1	-1.61	1.71	.890	19
Intra-working-class Egalitarian equality	.16	(+)	.025	7.0	.526	.797	.435	19

*Hypothesized direction of relationship

(discussed in Chapter III) which views development as providing the conditions for reduced ethnic inequality. Also consistent with the hypothesis are the findings for egalitarian dimensions of equality — although the magnitude of the correlations is quite low.

Therefore, the hypothesis regarding development and equality is greatly supported for ethnic/racial and slightly confirmed for egalitarian dimensions. On the other hand, the findings contradict the hypothesized relationship for educational, welfarist, and sexual equality. Only in the case of ethnic/racial equality is there a strong and positive correlation with economic development. This lends credence to the criticisms of the "development theories" of equality posed by the dependence literature (in Chapter II) and supports the critique of quantitative research regarding development and equality (in Chapter IV).

Fig. 6.25: Scattergram of (down) Meritocratic Inequality and (across) Development

Fig. 6.26: Scattergram of (down) Welfarist Equality and (across) Development

Fig. 6.27: Scattergram of (down) Ethnic/Racial Equality and (across) Development

Fig. 6.28: Scattergram of (down) Sexual Equality and (across) Development

Fig.: 6.29: Scattergram of (down) Inter-Class Inequality and (across) Development

Fig. 6.30: Scattergram of (down) Intra-Class Equality and (across) Development

6. Impact of External Economic Dependence

The last of the independent variables to be examined is "external economic dependence". This concept was operationalized as a composite index composed of three elements: (1) average total trade as a proportion of GNP, (2) average trade dependence (a variant of Galtung's measure described in Chapter V), and (3) average foreign direct investment per capita. The data in Table 6.19 reveal that Australia ranks highest while Japan and the United States (as one might anticipate) rank lowest on this variable. The Scandinavian nations exhibit moderate dependence scores. Although Canada's score is above the mean, it ranks no higher than seventh on this variable.

The hypothesis (from Chapter II) under consideration is: (H 6) the degree of external economic dependence is negatively associated with socio-economic equality. Examination of the scattergrams (Figs. 6.31-6.36) reveals an apparent nonlinear relationship in most instances. This curvilinearity was tested by use of the polynomial regression procedure (see pp. 392-93 in Statistical Appendix). The results for both the standard bivariate and the polynomial regressions are presented in Table 6.20. After passing an initial threshold level, dependence has a positive association with meritocratic inequality (as hypothesized). In addition, there are generally

Table 6.19: External Economic Dependence

<u>Country (N = 19)</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>(rank)*</u>
Australia	148	(1)
Netherlands	139	(2)
New Zealand	138	(3)
Switzerland	136	(4)
Ireland	127	(5)
Denmark	126	(6)
Canada	122	(7)
Norway	116	(8)
Belgium	111	(9)
Finland	102	(10)
Israel	101	(11)
Sweden	98	(12)
Austria	94	(13)
Italy	66	(14)
France	65	(15)
U. K.	65	(15)
Germany	58	(17)
U. S. A.	51	(18)
Japan	39	(19)

Mean = 100

Range = 109

Standard Deviation = 33.6

*Countries are ranked from highest to lowest degree of dependence.

Data sources: see footnotes 52, 54 in Chapter V

Table 6.20: Statistical Summary -- Hypothesis 6
(Impact of "external economic dependence" on equality)

Equality Dimension	r	HD*	r ²	St.Er.	B	St.Er.of B	F	N	BD**	BD ² ***	R ²
Meritocratic inequality	.43	(+)	.182	20.6	.281	.144	3.78	19	-.168	.601	.19
Welfarist equality	.03	(-)	.001	6.55	.005	.045	.011	19	3.02	-.302	.19
Ethnic/racial equality	-.51	(-)	.264	6.70	-.114	.070	2.51	9	---	---	---
Sexual equality	-.22	(-)	.049	12.6	-.083	.088	.890	19	-.978	.763	.06
Inter-class inequality	.09	(+)	.008	15.4	.040	.107	.143	19	2.87	-2.77	.18
Intra-class equality	-.25	(-)	.064	6.86	-.051	.048	1.16	19	-2.59	2.33	.19

*Hypothesized direction of relationship

**Beta for "dependence" variable in polynomial regression (see pp. 392-93 in Statistical Appendix)

***Beta for "dependence squared" variable in polynomial regression

moderate to low negative relationships (as hypothesized) with ethnic/racial, sexual, and intra-working-class equality. Note, however, the nonlinear components in these relationships represented by the beta scores for the "dependence squared" variable. This is especially noteworthy for meritocratic inequality. Contrary to what was anticipated, there is virtually no relationship with welfarist and inter-class dimensions of equality. Thus, one finds that for a majority of the dimensions there is a mild negative relationship between dependence and equality — although this is complicated by the nonlinear pattern noted above. This would indicate that there may be a threshold level of dependence necessary before its negative impact upon equality is manifested.

Fig. 6.31: Scattergram of (down) Meritocratic Inequality and (across) Dependence

Fig. 6.32: Scattergram of (down) Welfarist Equality and (across) Dependence.

Fig. 6.33: Scattergram of (down) Ethnic/Racial Equality and (across) Dependence

Fig. 6.34: Scattergram of (down) Sexual Equality and (across) Dependence

Fig. 6.35: Scattergram of (down) Inter-Class Inequality and (across) Dependence

Fig. 6.36: Scattergram of (down) Intra-Class Equality and (across) Dependence

C. Explanations for Changes in Equality (multivariate analysis)

Having considered the bivariate relationships between inequality and each of the six independent variables, two obvious questions arise: (1) What is the combined effect of these putative determinants? (2) What is the impact of any one of these variables controlling for all the others? Given the often tenuous validity of the ceteris paribus assumption, the move toward multivariate analysis is an attempt to reflect the more complex and real world where variables act in combination — rather than in isolation.²⁹ While "adjusted R^2 " may be a more appropriate measure in this regard (see p. 384 in Statistical Appendix), most of the comparable studies cited in Chapter IV have utilized the unadjusted R^2 value.³⁰ Thus, for purposes of rough comparison with previous research, R^2 and adjusted R^2 are reported in the tables which follow.

Attention will turn first to meritocratic inequality (Table 6.21). Using the more conservative measure (adjusted R^2), the four independent variables account for almost one-quarter of the variation in the dependent variable (versus over 40% for unadjusted R^2). "Economic scope" is the most important of the variables while left-wing mobilization has the least impact.

²⁹ Given the incomplete data for ethnic/racial equality, it was necessary to exclude it from this portion of the analysis. Regarding inclusion of independent variables, this was determined according to the theoretical arguments presented in Chapter II. The issue of multicollinearity is dealt with in the Appendix.

³⁰ For example, see Steven Stack, "The Political Economy of Income Inequality", Canadian Journal of Political Science, June 1980, pp. 273-86. His unadjusted R^2 value was .37 for four variables: economic development, democratic performance, dependence, and military participation.

Table 6.21: Multiple Regression — Meritocratic Inequality

Summary Statistics	R	$\overline{R^2}$	St.Er.	F	N	R^2
	.648	.241	19.3	2.35	19	.42
Independent variables*	Beta	B	St.Er. of B	F	HD**	
(1) Economic Scope	.620	2.16	.956	5.10	(-)	
(2) Dependence	.487	.321	.142	5.07	(+)	
(3) Development	-.404	-4.33	3.06	1.99	(-)	
(4) Left-wing mobilization	-.294	-.089	.071	1.57	(+)	

*ranked according to relative importance vis-a-vis dependent variable as indicated by beta coefficient

**Hypothesized direction of relationship

NB: $\overline{R^2}$ is R^2 adjusted for loss of degrees of freedom

As hypothesized, left-wing mobilization and economic development have a negative impact upon meritocratic inequality (i.e., an effect conducive to greater equality). Also as predicted (H 6), dependence is associated with greater inequality. However, contrary to the hypothesis (2.2) — though consistent with the bivariate results — "economic scope" has a positive association with educational inequality.

Table 6.22 reveals that the independent variables account for approximately 18% of the variation in welfarist equality (unadjusted $R^2 = .28$). According to the beta coefficients, corporatism is the most important and left-wing mobilization the least important of the variables. As hypothesized, corporatism (H 3.3) and "economic scope" (H 2.2) have a positive impact upon the welfarist dimension. Consistent with hypothesis 6, dependence has a negative (though minor) effect upon welfarist equality. However, contrary to the hypotheses, economic development and left-wing mobilization have a negative — though comparatively low — impact upon this type of equality. Though differing from the specific bivariate results for this dimension of equality (see Tables 6.9 and 6.18), these findings are consistent with the tentative conclusions which rejected these two variables as major positive determinants of equality.

Turning to sexual equality (Table 6.23), the five variables account for approximately 23% of the variation (unadjusted $R^2 = .41$). In this instance, left-wing mobilization is the most and development the least important variable vis-a-vis this dimension of equality. Supportive of the hypotheses are the results for left-wing mobilization, dependence, and

Table 6.22: Multiple Regression — Welfarist Equality

Summary Statistics	R	$\sqrt{R^2}$	St.Er.	F	N	R^2
	.527	.177	5.67	1.79	19	.28
Independent Variables*	Beta	B	St.Er. of B	F	HD**	
(1) Corporatism	.579	.154	.079	4.21	(+)	
(2) Economic Scope	.507	.344	.194	3.15	(+)	
(3) Economic Development	-.295	-.909	.829	1.20	(+)	
(4) Dependence	-.272	-.051	.045	1.29	(-)	
(5) Left-wing mobilization	-.251	-.022	.025	.736	(+)	

*ranked according to relative importance vis-a-vis dependent variable as indicated by beta coefficients

**Hypothesized direction of relationship

NB: $\overline{R^2}$ is R^2 adjusted for loss of degrees of freedom

Table 6.23: Multiple Regression — Sexual Equality

Summary Statistics	R	$\overline{R^2}$	St.Er.	F	N	R^2
	.642	.231	11.0	2.28	19	.41
Independent variables*	Beta	B	St.Er. of B	F	HD**	
(1) Left-Wing Mobilization	.378	.066	.043	2.24 (+)		
(2) Dependence	-.302	-.113	.093	1.48 (-)		
(3) Economic Scope	.249	.334	.399	.700 (+)		
(4) Development	-.247	-1.50	1.71	.776 (+)		

*ranked according to relative importance vis-a-vis dependent variable as indicated by beta coefficient.

**Hypothesized direction of relationship

NB: $\overline{R^2}$ is R^2 adjusted for loss of degrees of freedom.

"economic scope". Only the results for economic development are contrary to the predicted direction (though consistent with the bivariate results in Table 6.18).

The results for inter-class income inequality are provided in Table 6.24. One finds that the independent variables (in combination) explain approximately 18% of the variation in this dimension of equality. Left-wing mobilization is the most consequential and dependence the least important of the variables. Supportive of hypothesis 3.1, corporatism has a comparatively strong positive impact upon income equality between classes (i.e., a negative beta vis-a-vis inequality). Similarly, the relationship between development and inequality is consistent with hypothesis 5. In addition, (as predicted) dependence is related to greater inequality. However, results for the other two variables are inconsistent with the hypothesized relationships. "Economic scope" displays an impact conducive to inequality. Most striking is the strong relationship between left-wing mobilization and inter-class inequality. This result is in the same direction as the bivariate correlation coefficient (in Table 6.9) and clearly contrary to the theoretical expectations represented by hypothesis 1.1 (the Democratic Class Conflict school). More will be said later about this finding.

Table 6.24: Multiple Regression — Inter-Class Egalitarian

Summary Statistics	R	$\overline{R}^2$	St.Er.	F	N	R^2
	.640	.184	13.5	1.81	19	.41
Independent variables*	Beta	B	St.Er. of B	F		HD**
(1) Left-wing mobilization	.584	.121	.075	2.64		(-/0)
(2) Corporatism	-.411	-.271	.223	1.48		(-)
(3) Economic Scope	.316	.506	.461	1.20		(-)
(4) Development	-.279	-2.02	1.96	1.05		(-)
(5) Dependence	.117	.052	.118	.194		(+)

*ranked according to relative importance vis-a-vis dependent variable as indicated by beta coefficient

**Hypothesized direction of relationship

NB: $\overline{R}^2$ is R^2 adjusted for loss of degrees of freedom.

Turning to intra-working-class equality (Table 6.25), the variables explain approximately 16% of the variation. Left-wing mobilization has the greatest and economic development the least impact upon this variant of egalitarianism. The results for corporatism, dependence, and "economic scope" are supportive of the hypothesized relationships. On the other hand, the negative impact of development is contrary to the predicted direction. As was the case with inter-class inequality, left-wing mobilization has a strong impact on intra-class equality opposite to what was anticipated by the hypothesis — i.e., conducive to more and not less inequality. The negative (rather than zero) relationship is also different from that predicted in hypothesis 2.1 (see concluding comments below).

In summary, of the five dimensions of equality considered, meritocratic and sexual equality are best predicted by the hypotheses proposed in Chapter II. The results for welfarist equality as well as both variants of income inequality are less in accord with the hypothesized relationships. Table 6.26 provides a comparison of the hypothesized versus the actual direction of the impact of the independent variables on each dimension of equality. In total, out of a combination of 23 "tests" for the hypotheses using multiple regression analysis, the actual and hypothesized results were in accord in 15 instances (slightly over 65%).

Table 6.25: Multiple Regression — Intra-Working-Class Egal.

Summary Statistics	R	$\overline{R}^2$	St.Er.	F	N	R^2
	.659	.162	6.93	1.53	19	.43
Independent variables*	Beta	B	St.Er. of B	F	HD**	
(1) Left-Wing mobilization	-.688	-.065	.031	4.48	(+)	
(2) Corporatism	.415	.126	.095	1.75	(+)	
(3) Dependence	-.325	-.066	.054	1.49	(-)	
(4) Economic Scope	.185	.136	.233	.341	(+)	
(5) Development	-.116	-.387	.996	.151	(+)	

*ranked according to relative importance vis-a-vis dependent variable as indicated by beta coefficient

**Hypothesized direction of relationship.

NB: $\overline{R}^2$ is R^2 adjusted for loss of degrees of freedom

Table 6.26: Multiple Regression — Summary of Comparative Importance
of Independent Variables (direction and beta rank)

Independent variables	Average rank*	Merit. (BR)**	Welfarist (BR)	Sexual (BR)	Inter (BR)	Intra (BR)
Corporatism	1.6	---	+(1)+	---	-(2)-	+(2)+
Left-Wing mobilization	2.4	-(4)-	-(5)+	+(1)+	+(1)-/0	-(1)+
Economic scope	2.6	+(1)-	+(2)+	+(3)+	+(3)-	+(4)+
Dependence	3.2	+(2)+	-(4)-	-(2)-	+(5)+	-(3)-
Development	3.8	-(3)-	-(3)+	-(4)+	-(4)-	-(5)+

*mean of beta ranks for multiple regression analysis in Tables 6.21-6.25

**Beta Rank

NB: The sign (+/-) to the left of the Beta Rank is the direction of the relationship found in the multiple regression analysis. The sign to the right of the Beta Rank is the hypothesized direction of the relationship.

Table 6.26 also summarizes the comparative importance of the independent variables in the multiple regression analysis. On a relative basis, corporatism is the most important variable in explaining socio-economic equality (for the three dimensions in which it was considered: welfarist, inter-class, and intra-class). It has the top average beta rank and is one of the two independent variables for which actual and hypothesized results coincide in all instances. Note that this conclusion conflicts somewhat with the tentative one made earlier based upon bivariate, rather than multivariate, analysis (see comments in concluding section).

In contrast, economic development appears to be the least important variable. Its average beta rank is 3.8 and it ranks last in importance in relation to sexual and intra-working-class equality. Note that its actual relationship is in the hypothesized direction for only two out of five dimensions (meritocratic and inter-class). Though dependence ranks fourth in relative impact, the actual and hypothesized results are in agreement for all instances. This provides substantial support for the theoretical literature (cited in Chapter II) regarding the effect of economic dependence upon inequality. It also indicates the inadequacy of traditional economic development explanations for equality. "Economic scope"

has the hypothesized impact upon welfarist, sexual, and intra-class equality. However, it has an unexpected effect (conducive to inequality) in relation to meritocratic and inter-class dimensions. These latter findings provide some support for the distinctions noted in Chapter II between a large state with major accumulation functions on behalf of capitalist interests versus a "socialist state" (see pp. 50-51).

Turning to left-wing mobilization, its beta ranks indicate it is the most important independent variable in relation to three out of five dimensions of equality (sexual, inter- and intra-class). However, there is agreement between hypothesized and actual results in only two instances: meritocratic and sexual equality. These latter findings would tend to refute the Functionalist and End of Ideology schools which predict no relationship between left-wing mobilization and any dimension of equality (see pp. 26-9). The lack of a positive impact upon egalitarianism would provide support for the Constrained Socialism school (see pp. 33-37) as opposed to the Democratic Class Conflict view (see pp. 29-33).

Regarding left-wing mobilization's negative effect on income equality, the following points should be made. First, as noted earlier, the special case of Israel inflates the degree of these negative relationships. Second,

it can be argued that these results may be due to the decision to create a composite index incorporating the degree of Social Democratic rule, left-wing opposition, and unionization. It may be that inclusion of the latter two components tends to exaggerate the power of the "organized left" — especially in countries which have never experienced Social Democratic rule. To consider this point further, one can examine those nations which had Social Democratic governments for a majority of years of the period covered: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Israel. All of these countries experienced increases in meritocratic, welfarist, and sexual equality — often of significant magnitudes (see Tables 6.1 - 6.6). Note that this situation is consistent with both hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2. However, Denmark and Israel registered declines in both dimensions of egalitarianism. On the other hand, Norway and Sweden experienced increases in equality of income distribution between and within classes. Indeed, as discussed earlier, these two countries ranked first (Sweden) and second (Norway) in the level of inter-class income equality in 1970. In addition, Sweden displayed the largest increase in inter-class income equality of any nation in this study. Furthermore, utilizing the overall measure of relative equality (Table 6.7), Sweden registered the greatest decline in inequality and the highest average equality rank in 1970. These findings

raise the issue (briefly noted earlier) of a possible threshold level of left-wing mobilization being necessary to achieve significant increases in equality — especially regarding egalitarian dimensions. In relation to this point, it is important to remember that Sweden is the only country (except Israel) to have had a Social Democratic government for the entire period of time under consideration. However, it was unfettered by the restraints noted in regard to Israel (a huge military complex, a factionalized party structure, a large influx of immigrants, significant non-Social Democratic participation in coalition governments). This would suggest that social democracy can lead to greater income equality if it attains a position of relative hegemony within the political system. This threshold level of left-wing mobilization was most clearly achieved in Sweden (and to a lesser extent in Norway) over the twenty years under examination.³¹

In addition, there may be another explanation for the general negative (as opposed to the hypothesized neutral) impact of left-wing mobilization upon income equality. Given only "before" and "after" measures of equality, it is not possible to determine whether increases in inequality attributed to countries which had Social Democratic governments for a portion of the years between

³¹ See Richard Scase (ed.), Readings in the Swedish Class Structure (Toronto: Pergamon, 1976); Earl Fry and Gregory Raymond, "Scandinavia: The Experiment in Social Democracy", in their The Other Western Europe: A Political Analysis of the Smaller Democracies (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Clio Press, 1980), pp. 163-202.

1950 and 1970 were a result of egalitarian policies being reversed by liberal/conservative governments when they came to office or a consequence of Social Democratic policy making itself. Indeed, if a Social Democratic government's impact upon inter-class income equality were nil (as hypothesized according to the Constrained Socialism school) and a conservative administration during this period retreated slightly in regard to this dimension of equality, then the overall result would be a decrease in income equality in a country which had experienced Social Democratic rule. Given the existing data limitations, it is not possible to determine what proportion (or direction) of change in inequality of income distribution occurred under particular governments within the twenty year period (e.g., in Britain). The only "pure" case of hegemonic Social Democratic rule (i.e., without "contamination" of "bourgeois" party rule or the unique circumstances of Israel) is Sweden — the country which led all others in change and level of equality.

D. Conclusion

Returning to the categorization of hypotheses suggested in the conclusion to Chapter II, those premised upon a general neo-Marxist orientation (i.e., acceptance of hypotheses 1, 2 and 6; rejection of hypotheses 2, 3, 4.1, and 5) receive more empirical support in this chapter than the non-Marxist group. This is especially true regarding left-wing mobilization (H 1.2) and dependence (H 6) and to a lesser extent in relation to the economic scope of the state (H 2). In addition, the findings for economic development provided little support for hypothesis 5 while consociationalism did not lead to greater ethnic/racial equality (i.e., rejection of H 4.1). However, the results were not totally one-sided. The arguments forming the basis of hypotheses 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 regarding liberal corporatism (see pp. 57-60) were substantiated in the multiple regression analysis (contrary to the expectations of the neo-Marxist perspective). This would suggest that voluntary schemes of this type are not conducive to maintaining or increasing inequality — in part, due to the increased saliency of the incomes hierarchy under a corporatist framework (see p. 59). It must be stressed that non-voluntary modes of income restraints (e.g., government imposed wage-price "freezes or "controls") — the kind of state action most likely to directly reduce income equality — were excluded from the definition of liberal

corporatism.

On balance, the findings lend credence to a weltanschauung which perceives severe restrictions (within the politico-economic milieu of the developed democracies) in the ability to increase substantially those dimensions of socio-economic equality which are not highly compatible with advanced capitalism. Most important, in addition to the constraints imposed by the commitment to parliamentary methods, the involvement in minority governments, the electoral necessity to appeal beyond the working class, an integrative as opposed to class-conflict ideology, and the embourgeoisement of the party hierarchy (see Chapter II), social democracy's general commitment to the maintenance of capitalism (through its rejection of major nationalization and its embrace of Keynesianism) dooms even its "reformist" capabilities. In circumstances short of political hegemony, rather than simply being constrained by the factors listed above, social democracy has become an agent of constraint vis-a-vis egalitarian equality — the dimension least compatible with advanced capitalism. As Przeworski explains:

Certainly a just distribution of poverty was not the socialist promise, and to enhance general affluence social democrats had to focus their efforts on increasing productivity. But without nationalization of the means of production, increases of productivity require profitability of private enterprise.... Having made the commitment to maintain private property of the means of production, to assure efficiency, and to mitigate distributional effects, social democracy ceased to be a reformist movement.... Reformism always meant a gradual pro-

gression toward structural transformations.... The policy of social democrats by its very logic no longer permits the cumulation of reforms. When in office they are forced to behave like any other party, relying on deflationary, cost-cutting measures to ensure private profitability and the capacity to invest. 32

In a similar vein, Markovits argues that through fostering the development of mature capitalism, social democracy becomes "the latter's political guarantor, structural supporter, and ideological legitimizer." 33

The questions raised by this conclusion are: What are the consequences of the constraints described above? How do the changes (or lack thereof) in socio-economic inequality (resulting, in part, from the determinants discussed in this chapter) affect the degree of political participation and instability, strikes and economic growth, crime and ethnic militancy? The empirical results and analysis in the next chapter address these issues.

³² See Adam Przeworski, "Social Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon", New Left Review, Oct. 1980, pp. 53-54.

³³ Andrei Markovits and Samantha Kazarinov, "Class Conflict, Capitalism, and Social Democracy", Comparative Politics, April 1978, p. 373.

4

CHAPTER VII: EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS — CONSEQUENCES OF INEQUALITY

This chapter (organized into six major sections — one for each of the dependent variables) provides an empirical assessment of the hypothesized relationships discussed in Chapter III. The focus is on the consequences of the change (or lack of change) in each of the dimensions of socio-economic equality outlined in the previous chapter vis-a-vis six areas of concern: political participation, political instability, economic growth, industrial strife, criminal activity, and ethnic/racial militancy.¹

A. Impact upon Political Participation

The concept "political participation" was operationally defined in terms of change in voter turnout in national elections (excluding referenda votes). It should be repeated that those nations with "compulsory voting" requirements for the period were excluded from consideration

¹ Assuming the goal to be the explanation of the greatest proportion of the variation in the dependent variable with the fewest independent variables (and based upon the discussion in Chapter III), the most theoretically relevant combination of variables to be used in the multiple regression portion of the analysis consists of those constituting "economic" (i.e., welfarist, inter-class, and intra-class) dimensions of equality. In light of the small number of cases² for ethnic/racial equality, no multiple regression analysis involving this variable is provided.

so as not to "contaminate" the results (see Chapter V). This resulted in the elimination of six countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. As expected, all six nations had participation rates higher than the highest non-compulsory voting country. Of the 13 remaining nations (Table 7.1), Denmark had the greatest increase and Switzerland the largest decrease in participation. In total, seven of the nations experienced an increase in this variable (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Canada, and Israel). Three countries registered no change (France, Ireland, and the United States) while political participation rates declined in three other nations (Japan, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland). While the Scandinavian countries consistently ranked high in both time periods (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden occupied the top three positions circa 1950-54 and 1966-70), the United States ranked last on each occasion. Switzerland maintained its next-to-last rank while declining the most in voter turnout (12%). The average participation rate for these countries was 77% (circa 1966-70). In fact, only two nations had average voting turnouts below 70% — Switzerland (60%) and the United States (53%).

The hypotheses under consideration (from Chapter III) state: (H 7.1) the higher the equality (excluding meritocratic), the lower is the political participation; (H 7.2) the higher the socio-economic equality, the higher is the

Table 7.1: Political Participation

<u>Country (N=13)</u>	<u>%Change*</u>	<u>(rank)</u>	<u>1950-54</u>	<u>(rank)**</u>	<u>1966-70</u>	<u>(rank)</u>
Denmark	+11	(1)	80	(2)	89	(1)
Finland	+ 9	(2)	76	(8)	83	(5)
Germany	+ 8	(3)	79	(5)	85	(3)
Sweden	+ 6	(4)	81	(1)	86	(2)
Norway	+ 6	(4)	80	(2)	85	(3)
Canada	+ 6	(4)	71	(11)	75	(9)
Israel	+ 5	(7)	77	(7)	81	(6)
France	0	(8)	79	(5)	79	(7)
Ireland	0	(8)	76	(8)	76	(8)
U. S. A.	0	(8)	53	(13)	53	(13)
Japan	- 5	(11)	74	(10)	70	(11)
United Kingdom	- 8	(12)	80	(2)	74	(10)
Switzerland	-12	(13)	68	(12)	60	(12)

Mean: +2%

Range: 23

St.Dev.: 60

*The larger the positive percentage change, the greater is the increase in voting turnout.

**Countries are ranked from highest to lowest degree of participation.

Sources: see footnote 57, Chapter V.

political participation. The first hypothesis is representative of the "elitist" and the second of the "non-elitist" perspective discussed in Chapter III.² Supportive of hypothesis 7.2, the results (see Table 7.2) indicate that welfarist equality has a strong positive relationship with political participation ($r = .61$). There are also positive, though low, correlations involving ethnic/racial and sexual (i.e., the two variants of emancipatory) equality. However, in contradiction to these results (though also refuting the "elitist" position) are the findings for meritocratic (i.e., educational) equality. On the other hand, the results for inter and intra-class income equality support hypothesis 7.1 — indicating an inverse relationship between equality and participation.

Turning to the multiple regression analysis (Table 7.3), welfarist equality has the strongest impact of all dimensions — a positive beta of .873. This is consistent with the bivariate finding and supports the "non-elitist" view of participation and "satisfaction" as being positively, not negatively, related (see pp. 78 - 80 in this dissertation). Regarding the income dimensions, inter-class inequality now has a low, though negative, impact upon participation. This is also in accord with

² An initial examination of the scattergrams (see end of this section) revealed outliers in the following instances: the U.K. in Fig. 7.1, Japan in Fig. 7.4, Israel in Fig. 7.5, and Japan in Fig. 7.6. These outliers were "Windsorized" as described in the Statistical Appendix. The results in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 reflect this data change.

Table 7.2: Bivariate Relationship -- Hypotheses 7.1 and 7.2
(Impact of equality upon "political participation")

Equality Dimension	r	HD* (7.1, 7.2)	r ²	St. Er.	B	St. Er. of B	F	N
Meritocratic inequality	.26	(0, -)	.07	7.00	.096	.091	.805	13
Welfarist equality	.61	(-, +)	.36	4.81	.930	.218	.14.0	13
Ethnic/Racial equality	.19	(0, 0)	.04	7.63	.190	.466	.148	6
Sexual equality	.20	(0, 0)	.04	7.11	.090	.163	.458	13
Inter-class inequality	.22	(+, -)	.05	7.07	.087	.136	.575	13
Intra-class equality	-.40	(-, +)	.16	6.66	-.372	.278	2.07	13

*Hypothesized direction of relationship

Table 7.3: Multiple Regression — Political Participation

Summary Statistics	R	$\bar{R}^2$	St. Er.	F	N	R^2
	.841	.849	2.69	23.5	13	.71
Independent Variables*	Beta	B	St. Er. of B	F	HD**	
					(7.1, 7.2)	
(1) Welfarist equality	.873	.952	.125	57.2	(-, +)	
(2) Intra-working class equality	-.803	-.810	.169	22.9	(-, +)	
(3) Inter-class inequality	-.391	-.181	.076	5.53	(+, -)	

NB: $\bar{R}^2$ is R^2 adjusted for loss of degrees of freedom

**Hypothesized direction of relationship

*ranked according to relative importance vis-a-vis dependent variable as indicated by beta coefficient

the "non-elitist" position (H 7.2). Only an increase in intra-working-class equality has an adverse effect upon voting — as predicted by the "elitist" school (H 7.1).

This would suggest that equality's relationship with participation depends upon whether the former's increase directly affects the situation within the working class. In this instance, increased intra-working-class "satisfaction" (i.e., equality) has the result postulated by the "elitist" position — reduced participation. However, increases in more broadly-based equality dimensions (i.e., welfarist and inter-class income equality) would appear to induce the opposite effect. In combination the three dimensions of equality explain approximately 45% of the variation in political participation ($R^2 = .449$).

In Figs. 7.1 - 7.6, countries above the regression line experienced greater than predicted increases in participation while nations below the line registered less than anticipated participation rates. The most striking element in examining these scattergrams (other than the outliers noted in footnote 2) is the consistently "deviant" case of Switzerland (with the largest negative residuals). Switzerland's large decrease in voting turnout and its overall low participation rate may be attributed to two special factors in Swiss democracy: (1) the reduced salience of federal parliamentary voting given the form of "permanent collegial government" of the

Federal Council;³ and (2) the major role played by, and greater salience of, direct democracy.⁴ In regard to the latter point, there is greater use of referenda and initiative options at the national level in Switzerland than in any other country in this study. Given the availability of means to directly affect public policy through citizen-sponsored initiatives, the comparative importance of parliamentary elections (with the pre-ordained "balance" in the Federal Council) could be diminished in the eyes of the electorate. This would explain the lower voting rates in these traditional representative (as opposed to direct democracy) elections.⁵

³ See Harold Glass, "Consensus and Opposition in Switzerland", Comparative Politics, April 1978, pp. 361-72.

⁴ See David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds.), Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory (Wash., D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978).

⁵ Participation rates are generally much higher in referenda votes in Switzerland. For example, a 1970 referendum aimed at sharply restricting immigrant labor (which was defeated) had a 74% voter turnout — a higher participation rate than in any of the elections to the National Council from 1950-70. See Gordon Smith, Politics in Western Europe (NY: Holmes & Meier, 1972), pp. 146-50, 374-76.

Fig. 7.1: Scattergram of (down) Participation and (across) Meritocratic Inequality

Fig. 7.2: Scattergram of (down) Participation and (across) Welfarist Equality

Fig. 7.3: Scattergram of (down) Participation and (across) Ethnic/Racial Equality

Fig. 7.4: Scattergram of (down) Participation and (across) Sexual Equality

Fig. 7.5: Scattergram of (down) Participation and (across) Inter-Class Inequality

Fig. 7.6: Scattergram of (down) Participation and (across) Intra-Class Equality

B. Impact upon Political Instability

The term "political instability" was operationalized as a composite index incorporating the number of protest demonstrations, riots, terrorist attacks, and deaths from domestic political violence. The change in the average scores from circa 1950-54 to 1966-70 is the specific measure utilized in the statistical analysis. As can be seen in Table 7.4, the United States experienced a phenomenal increase (4455%) in political instability — rising from sixth to first place. This reflects the unique convergence in the later time period of massive urban race riots plus the protests and violence associated with American participation in the Vietnamese war. The data sources utilized do not permit the latter instances of instability in the United States from circa 1966-70 to be separated from the former. As a consequence, it is not possible to know how much instability could be attributed to the independent variable (i.e., inequality) and how much to the uncontrolled third variable of Vietnamese war participation. This is a clear instance in which the ceteris paribus assumption is known to be invalid — i.e., an important third variable is "contaminating" the results. In addition, the difference between the "percentage change in instability" for the United States versus all other countries is so large as to represent a clearly special case. Thus, further analysis

Table 7.4: Political Instability

Country(N=19)	%Change*	(rank)	1950-54	(rank)**	1966-70	(rank)
U. S. A.	+4455	(1)	49	(6)	2232	(1)
Canada	+ 677	(2)	9	(12)	70	(7)
Israel	+ 600	(3)	46	(7)	322	(2)
U. K.	+ 320	(4)	40	(8)	168	(4)
France	+ 288	(5)	70	(4)	272	(3)
Netherlands	+ 150	(6)	4	(14)	10	(11)
Norway	+ 150	(6)	2	(18)	5	(17)
Ireland	+ 140	(8)	5	(13)	12	(10)
New Zealand	+ 133	(9)	3	(15)	7	(15)
Australia	+ 100	(10)	3	(15)	6	(16)
Sweden	+ 67	(11)	3	(15)	5	(17)
Switzerland	0	(12)	2	(18)	2	(19)
Germany	- 10	(13)	107	(2)	96	(6)
Finland	- 46	(14)	15	(11)	8	(14)
Belgium	- 55	(15)	60	(5)	27	(9)
Italy	- 59	(16)	365	(1)	150	(5)
Japan	- 60	(17)	74	(3)	29	(8)
Denmark	- 72	(18)	32	(10)	9	(13)
Austria	- 75	(19)	40	(8)	10	(11)

Mean (excluding U. S. A.): +125%

Range (excluding U. S. A.): 752

St.Dev. (excluding U. S. A.): 222

*The larger the positive percentage change, the greater is the increase in instability.

**Countries are ranked from highest to lowest degree of instability.

Sources: see footnote 61, Chapter V

of the relationship between instability and inequality will exclude consideration of the United States and focus instead on the other 18 countries.

Excluding the U. S. A. , there was an average increase of 125% in political instability. Canada and Israel experienced the largest increases. However, seven nations displayed reductions in this variable — i.e., increases in stability (Germany, Finland, Belgium, Italy, Japan, Denmark, and Austria). The largest shift in ranks occurred for Canada (12th to 7th), Israel (7th to 2nd), and Japan (3rd to 8th). In the latter time period, Israel, France, and the United Kingdom experienced the most instability. This compares with Italy, Germany, and Japan circa 1950-54. This finding may be reflective, in part, of the difficult transitional circumstances in these three former Axis (and Fascist) nations in the early post-World War II era. Note that the Scandinavian countries ranked in the bottom third of nations circa 1966-70. However, Norway and Sweden did experience net increases in instability (while Denmark and Finland registered decreases).

The hypotheses under consideration are: (H 8.1) the higher the socio-economic inequality, the higher is the political instability; (H 8.2) the greater the increases in socio-economic equality, the higher is the political

instability; (H 8.3) the higher the intra-working-class inequality, the higher is the political instability. While the first hypothesis is representative of the Absolute Deprivation school of thought, the second hypothesis applies to the Rising Expectations perspective. The third hypothesis is reflective of the Relative Deprivation school. Very low or virtually no relationship between inequality and instability would be supportive of the arguments presented by the Socialized Passivity viewpoint.⁶

The results (in Table 7.5)⁷ indicate low correlations for meritocratic and sexual dimensions. These findings are most consistent with the Socialized Passivity school. The rather high association between ethnic/racial equality and instability is supportive of hypothesis 8.2 — the Rising Expectations school. It should be remembered that it is not necessary, according to this view, that there be a specific economic reversal as suggested by the J-Curve theory.⁸

For the dimensions of "economic" equality (i.e., welfarist, inter-class and intra-class income equality),

⁶ See pp. 80 - 86 of this dissertation for a discussion and differentiation of these four schools of thought regarding instability.

⁷ An initial examination of the scattergrams revealed outliers in the following instances: Belgium in Fig. 7.7, Japan in Fig. 7.10, and Israel in Fig. 7.11. As in previous cases, these outliers were "Windsorized" with the results in Tables 7.5 and 7.6 reflecting this transformation.

⁸ Cf. James Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", in Jackson and Stein (eds.), Issues in Comparative Politics (N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1971), pp. 370-85.

Table 7.5: Bivariate Relationship — Hypotheses 8.1-8.3
(Impact of equality upon "political instability")

Equality Dimension	r	HD* (8.1,8.3/8.2)	r ²	St.Er.	B	St.Er.of B	F	N
Meritocratic inequality	-.20	(+/-)	.04	224	-2.00	2.45	.700	18
Welfarist equality	-.42	(-/+)	.18	208	-14.3	7.91	3.43	18
Ethnic/racial equality	.53	(-/+)	.29	202	30.9	10.4	2.42	8
Sexual equality	-.16	(-/+)	.02	226	-2.77	4.35	.399	18
Inter-class inequality	.35	(+/-)	.12	215	5.00	3.47	2.19	18
Intra-class equality	-.36	(-/+)	.13	214	-11.3	7.52	2.38	18

*Hypothesized direction of relationship

the results are supportive of a moderate inverse relationship between equality and instability (i.e., as predicted in hypotheses 8.1 and 8.3). Focusing on the multiple regression findings (Table 7.6), the results are consistent with those noted above for welfarist and inter-class dimensions. However, intra-working-class equality has virtually no impact in the multivariate analysis ($\beta = -.040$). Thus, these latter findings are more supportive of the Absolute (H 8.1) than the Relative Deprivation school of thought (H 8.3).

In Figs. 7.7-7.12, countries above the regression line experienced greater than predicted increases in instability while nations below the line registered less than anticipated unrest. In examining these scattergrams, note that the relationship involving meritocratic inequality (Fig. 7.7) is inordinately determined by three cases: Belgium, Austria, and Britain. In addition, Israel and Canada emerge as two of the most unusual cases (i.e., with the largest positive residuals). A probable explanation for Israel is that the data include Palestinian terrorist activity which could be considered international rather than domestic in character.¹⁹ In Canada's case, the results largely reflect Quebec's increased separatist activity (both violent and non-violent) of the late 1960s. Whether such acts were

¹⁹ See Christopher Hewitt, Majorities and Minorities: A Comparative Survey of Ethnic Violence", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Sept. 1977, p. 160.

Table 7.6: Multiple Regression — Political Instability

Summary Statistics	R	$\bar{R}^2$	St.Er.	F	N	R^2
	.568	.115	209	1.55	18	.32
Independent Variables*	Beta	B	St.Er. of B	F	HD**	
					(8.1, 8.3/8.2)	
(1) Welfarist equality	-.40	-14.0	8.32	2.83	(-/+)	
(2) Inter-class inequality	.334	4.95	5.12	.934	(+/-)	
(3) Meritocratic inequality	-.114	-1.14	2.42	.223	(+/-)	
(4) Intra-class equality	-.040	-1.31	11.4	.013	(-/+)	

NB: $\bar{R}^2$ is R^2 adjusted for loss of degrees of freedom

**Hypothesized direction of relationship

*ranked according to relative importance vis-a-vis dependent variable as indicated by beta coefficient

related to socio-economic inequality will become clearer after consideration of the section (later in this chapter) on ethnic militancy.¹⁰

¹⁰ For a perspective of that period, cf. H. Guindon, "Social Unrest, Social Class, and Quebec's Bureaucratic Revolution", Queen's Quarterly, Summer 1968; David Kwavnick, "The Roots of French-Canadian Discontent", CJEPS, November 1965.

Fig. 7.7: Scattergram of (down) Instability and (across) Meritocratic Inequality

Fig. 7.8: Scattergram of (down) Instability and (across) Welfarist Equality

Fig. 7.9: Scattergram of (down) Instability and (across) Ethnic/Racial Equality

Fig. 7.10: Scattergram of (down) Instability and (across) Sexual Equality

FIG. 7.11: Scattergram of (down) Instability and (across) Inter-Class Inequality

Fig. 7.12: Scattergram of (down) Instability and (across) Intra-Class Equality

C. Impact upon Economic Growth

The variable "economic growth" was operationally defined as the change in the average rate of growth of per capita gross domestic product at constant market prices for the period 1950-54 versus 1966-70. Japan and Israel displayed the highest level of economic growth in the latter period while Japan and Germany registered the best growth rates circa 1950-54 — reflecting, in part, the aftermath of World War II. In contrast, Switzerland and the United Kingdom experienced the lowest growth from 1966-70 while Canada and the United States ranked 19th and 18th (respectively) in the earlier period. The Scandinavian countries did not rank high in economic growth in either era. Australia and Ireland experienced the largest increases in growth rates (over 100%) when comparing the two periods. The average change in growth rates was +37% — with only four countries displaying a decline in economic growth (Britain, Austria, Switzerland, and Germany).

The hypotheses (from Chapter III) are: (H 9.1) the higher the economic (i.e., welfarist and income) equality, the lower is the economic growth; (H 9.2) the higher the economic equality, the higher is the economic growth. The first hypothesis represents the "conservative" position toward the equality-growth nexus. On the other hand, the second hypothesis reflects the views of the "progressive"

Table 7.7: Economic Growth

Country (N=19)	%Change*	(rank)	1950-54	(rank)**	1966-70	(rank)
Australia	+116	(1)	1.9	(16)	4.1	(6)
Ireland	+111	(2)	1.8	(17)	3.8	(8)
Canada	+106	(3)	1.5	(19)	3.1	(15)
U. S. A.	+ 88	(4)	1.6	(18)	3.0	(16)
Belgium	+ 80	(5)	2.0	(15)	3.6	(10)
New Zealand	+ 73	(6)	2.2	(13)	3.8	(8)
Japan	+ 60	(7)	7.2	(1)	11.5	(1)
Norway	+ 57	(8)	2.3	(12)	3.6	(10)
France	+ 50	(9)	3.2	(7)	4.8	(4)
Denmark	+ 35	(10)	2.6	(11)	3.5	(12)
Netherlands	+ 24	(11)	3.4	(6)	4.2	(5)
Finland	+ 14	(12)	2.9	(8)	3.3	(14)
Israel	+ 12	(13)	5.0	(5)	5.6	(2)
Sweden	+ 7	(14)	2.8	(9)	3.0	(16)
Italy	0	(15)	5.2	(4)	5.2	(3)
U. K.	- 19	(16)	2.1	(14)	1.7	(19)
Austria	- 29	(17)	5.6	(3)	4.0	(7)
Switzerland	- 32	(18)	2.8	(9)	1.9	(18)
Germany	- 44	(19)	6.1	(2)	3.4	(13)

Mean: +37%

Range: 160

St.Dev.: 50

*The larger the positive percentage change, the greater is the increase in economic growth.

**Countries are ranked from highest to lowest degree of growth.

Sources: see footnote 63, Chapter V

perspective on this matter (discussed in Chapter III).¹¹

The bivariate results (see Table 7.8) for meritocratic and welfarist dimensions support the "conservative" school of thought — i.e., equality and increases in growth are inversely related in advanced capitalist societies. The same is true for the multiple regression findings (Table 7.9) — i.e., support for hypothesis 9.1. However, it should be noted that the hypotheses did not stipulate a relationship vis-a-vis non-economic dimensions of equality. The results for meritocratic inequality suggest that the "conservative" school's approach ought to be extended to this equality perspective. It can be argued that the increased public expenditures (and taxes) used to finance the significant expansion of educational opportunity during the 1950s and 1960s were counterproductive to overall economic growth. This provides an interesting contradiction in light of the discussion in Chapter I regarding meritocratic equality's supposed contribution to advanced capitalism.

Turning to other dimensions, intra-class and sexual equality show virtually no bivariate relationship with growth. However, in the multiple regression analysis, intra-working-class equality displays a negative (though still low) impact. This is again consistent with hypothesis 9.1. It should be stressed that not all results are

¹¹ An initial examination of the scattergrams revealed (as it should have) the same three outliers as noted in relation to instability: Belgium (vis-a-vis meritocratic inequality) in Fig. 7.13, Japan (vis-a-vis sexual equality) in Fig. 7.16, and Israel (vis-a-vis inter-class inequality) in Fig. 7.17. These outliers were "Windsorized".

Table 7.8: Bivariate Relationship -- Hypotheses 9.1 and 9.2
(Impact of equality upon "economic growth")

Equality Dimension	r	HD* (9.1, 9.2)	r ²	St. Er.	B	St. Er. of B	F	N
Meritocratic inequality	.44	(0,0)	.19	46.6	.990	.496	3.97	19
Welfarist equality	-.33	(-,+)	.11	48.9	-2.61	1.80	2.08	19
Ethnic/Racial equality	.51	(0,0)	.26	46.2	3.89	2.23	2.51	9
Sexual equality	-.05	(0,0)	.002	51.7	-.216	.967	.050	19
Inter-class inequality	-.12	(+,-)	.015	51.4	-.415	.807	.264	19
Intra-class equality	.02	(-,+)	.0004	51.8	.161	1.77	.008	19

*Hypothesized direction of relationship

Table 7.9: Multiple Regression — Economic Growth

Summary Statistics	R	$\bar{R}^2$	St. Er.	F	N	R^2
	.648	.255	43.5	2.53	19	.42
Independent Variables*	Beta	B	St. Er. of B	F	HD	**
					(9.1, 9.2)	
(1) Meritocratic inequality	.578	1.31	.490	7.20	(0, 0)	
(2) Welfarist equality	-.413	-3.27	1.67	3.79	(-, +)	
(3) Inter-class inequality	-.298	-1.00	1.03	.937	(+, -)	
(4) Intra-working class equality	-.245	-1.79	2.30	.607	(-, +)	

NB: $\bar{R}^2$ is R^2 adjusted for loss of degrees of freedom

**Hypothesized direction of relationship

*ranked according to relative importance vis-a-vis dependent variable as indicated by beta coefficient

supportive of the "conservative" perspective. Though the magnitude is low, the direction of the relationship between inter-class inequality and growth (in both bivariate and multiple regression findings) is consistent with hypothesis 9.2. In addition, the moderate positive correlation involving ethnic/racial equality also supports the perspective of the "progressive" school. On balance, however, the "conservative" view of the equality-growth nexus receives the most support. Finally, observe that (in combination) meritocratic and economic dimensions of equality account for over 25% of the variation in economic growth (i.e., $\overline{R}^2 = .255$).

In examining Figs. 7.13-7.18, countries above the regression line experienced greater than predicted increases in economic growth rates while those below the line displayed less than anticipated growth. As indicated in the previous section, for meritocratic inequality (Fig. 7.13) the relationship is inordinately determined by three cases: the United Kingdom, Austria, and Belgium.¹²

¹² Belgium's value was "winsorized" to reduce the outlier problem (see footnote 11).

Fig. 7.13: Scattergram of (down) Growth and (across) Meritocratic Inequality

Fig. 7.14: Scattergram of (down) Growth and (across) Welfarist Equality

Fig. 7.15: Scattergram of (down) Growth and (across) Ethnic/Racial Equality

Fig. 7.16: Scattergram of (down) Growth and (across) Sexual Equality

Fig. 7.17: Scattergram of (down) Growth and (across) Inter-Class Inequality

Fig. 7.18: Scattergram of (down) Growth and (across) Intra-Class Equality

D. Impact upon Industrial Strife

The term "industrial strife" is operationally defined as a composite index composed of three dimensions: (1) frequency of strikes, (2) size of strikes, (3) duration of strikes (see details in Chapter V). The change in the average total score from circa 1950-54 to 1966-70 is the specific measure used in the empirical analysis. The results in Table 7.10 indicate that Italy and Canada ranked first and second (respectively) in the level of industrial strife circa 1966-70. In contrast, Austria and Switzerland experienced extremely low levels of strike activity during both time periods. The Scandinavian nations also registered relatively low degrees of industrial strife. Denmark ranked 15th, Sweden 16th, and Norway 17th for the 1966-70 period. In the early 1950s, Belgium ranked first and the United States second in strike activity. The largest shifts in relative position occurred for Sweden (8th to 16th), Belgium (1st to 8th), and Israel (13th to 7th). In general, ten nations experienced increases in industrial strife from the early 1950s to the late 1960s: Israel, Canada, Britain, Denmark, Italy, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, the United States, and Norway. The largest increase was 329% for Israel. In contrast, the remaining countries experienced a decline in strike activity — ranging from -14% for West

Table 7.10: Industrial Strife

<u>Country(N=19)</u>	<u>%Change*</u>	<u>(rank)</u>	<u>1950-54</u>	<u>(rank)**</u>	<u>1966-70</u>	<u>(rank)</u>
Israel	+329	(1)	9.1	(13)	39.1	(7)
Canada	+214	(2)	25.7	(7)	80.7	(2)
U. K.	+149	(3)	17.8	(9)	44.4	(6)
Denmark	+132	(4)	1.9	(17)	4.4	(15)
Italy	+129	(5)	40.9	(5)	93.8	(1)
France	+122	(6)	10.4	(12)	23.1	(10)
Ireland	+ 73	(7)	45.8	(4)	79.3	(4)
Netherlands	+ 34	(8)	4.1	(15)	5.5	(14)
U. S. A.	+ 25	(9)	3.7	(2)	79.6	(3)
Norway	+ 7	(10)	2.9	(16)	3.1	(17)
Germany	- 14	(11)	8.7	(14)	7.5	(12)
Austria	- 18	(12)	1.1	(18)	0.9	(18)
Australia	- 19	(13)	56.5	(3)	46.0	(5)
New Zealand	- 26	(14)	33.6	(6)	24.8	(9)
Switzerland	- 30	(15)	0.66	(19)	0.46	(19)
Finland	- 34	(16)	16.8	(10)	11.1	(11)
Japan	- 41	(17)	12.8	(11)	7.5	(12)
Belgium	- 53	(18)	77.4	(1)	36.5	(8)
Sweden	- 79	(19)	18.9	(8)	3.9	(16)

Mean: +47

Range: 408

St.Dev.: 106

*The larger the positive percentage change, the greater is the increase in industrial strife.

**Countries are ranked from highest to lowest degree of strikes.

Sources: see footnote 65, Chapter V

Germany to -79% for Sweden. Notice that, while (as indicated above) the Scandinavian nations displayed relatively low levels of industrial strife, they registered distinctly different performances regarding changes in strike activity. While Denmark was experiencing a 132% increase, Norway was showing only minimal change (+7%) and Finland was registering a decline of 34%. The average result for all countries was a 47% increase in strike activity from circa 1950-54 to 1966-70.

The hypotheses under consideration are: (H 10.1) the higher the inequality, the higher is the industrial strife; (H 10.2) the higher the increase in equality, the higher is the industrial strife; (H 10.3) the higher the intra-class income inequality, the higher is the industrial strife. As explained in Chapter III, the first hypothesis is reflective of the Absolute Deprivation school while the second hypothesis represents the Rising Expectations viewpoint. The third hypothesis is derived from the Relative Deprivation perspective. Lack of an empirical relationship between strike activity and equality will be interpreted as support for the Socialized Passivity school of thought.¹³

The bivariate findings for egalitarian dimensions of equality support hypotheses 10.1 and 10.3 — i.e., the view that income inequality and industrial strife are positively correlated. The multiple regression analysis (Table 7.12),

¹³ An initial examination of the scattergrams revealed (as before) three outliers: Belgium in Fig. 7.19, Japan in Fig. 7.22, and Israel in Fig. 7.23. These outliers were "Windsorized" in the previously described manner.

Table 7.11: Bivariate Relationship — Hypotheses 10.1-10.3
(Impact of equality upon "Industrial strife")

Equality Dimension	r	HD** (10.1.10.3/10.2)	r ²	St.Er.	B	St.Er.of B	F	N
Meritocratic inequality	-.24	(0)	.056	106	-1.14	1.13	1.02	19
Welfarist equality	-.05	(-/+)	.002	109	-.751	4.04	.034	19
Ethnic/Racial equality	.14	(0)	.018	112	2.52	5.45	.130	9
Sexual equality	-.12	(0)	.014	108	-1.01	2.03	.248	19
Inter-class inequality	.44	(+/-)	.194	86.6	4.33	1.35	10.2	19
Intra-class equality	-.34	(-/+)	.115	98.3	-6.79	3.36	4.09	19

*Hypothesized direction of relationship

Table 7.12: Multiple Regression — Industrial Strife

Summary Statistics	R	$\bar{R}^2$	St.Er.	F	N	R^2
	.616	.256	91.8	3.06	19	.38
Independent Variables*	Beta	B	St.Er. of B	F	HD**	
					(10.1, 10.3/10.2)	
(1) Inter-class inequality	.639	4.52	2.13	4.48	(+/-)	
(2) Welfarist equality	-.072	-1.20	3.49	.118	(-/+)	
(3) Intra-working class equality	.033	.513	4.70	.012	(-/+)	

NB: $\bar{R}^2$ is R^2 adjusted for loss of degrees of freedom

**Hypothesized direction of relationship

*ranked according to relative importance vis-a-vis dependent variable as indicated by beta coefficient

however, indicates that the Absolute, rather than the Relative, Deprivation school (i.e., H 10.1) provides the better explanation. Note that inter-class inequality maintains its positive association with strikes while (controlling for the other variables) the intra-working-class dimension has virtually no impact upon the equality-strike nexus ($\beta = .033$).

Turning to the other dimensions, there appears to be almost no relationship between strikes and welfarist, sexual, or ethnic/racial equality. The relationship with meritocratic inequality is also rather low — though in the direction predicted by hypothesis 10.2. These findings would suggest that the Socialized Passivity perspective best describes the low relationship between strikes and non-income distribution dimensions of equality. In regard to income equality, however, there appears to be a meaningful association between inter-class income inequality and strikes (supportive of H 10.1). In addition, notice that income and welfarist equality (combined) account for over 25% of the variation in industrial strife.

In Figs. 7.19-7.24, countries above the regression line experienced greater than predicted increases in strike activity while those below the line displayed less than anticipated industrial strife. Examining these scattergrams, Israel and Canada appear as the most unusual cases — experiencing the largest positive residuals. For Israel, the following explanation can be offered for the greater than anticipated increase in strikes. First, no country had a larger proportion of its work force which was unionized during this period than Israel. An overwhelming majority of Israel's citizens are members of Histadrut — the all-encompassing Israeli labor federation. Histadrut

unions represented over 80% of the country's employed population during the 1966-70 period of strike activity.¹⁴ This provided the organizational basis for greater industrial unrest. Second, before the early 1970s, strikes during the term of an existing contract were legal. This encouraged protest strikes by local officials and members who objected to the willingness of Histadrut leaders to accept wage freezes and tax increases "for the good of the country". As Loewenberg observed: "The close political ties between the leadership of Histadrut and the national government resulted in Histadrut supporting government economic policies unpopular with large parts of its constituency."¹⁵ As indicated in Chapter VI, Israel experienced the greatest decline in income equality of any country in this study — providing the economic motivation (consistent with the hypotheses) for the large increase in strikes. In combination, these factors could account for the substantial increase in industrial strife indicated for Israel.

Similarly, Sweden's top position in the reduction of strikes (reflected in its large negative residuals in the scattergrams) is also consistent with the hypothesized effects of inequality. Recall that Sweden displayed greater increases in equality than any other nation under consideration. Thus, one would expect (according to hypotheses 10.1 and 10.3) that it would register the largest decline in strike activity. (However,

¹⁴ J.J. Loewenberg, "Histadrut: Myth and Reality", in Curtis and Chertoff (eds.), Israel: Social Structure and Change (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1973), p. 252.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 254.

it should be noted that Sweden's industrial strife increased shortly after the period under consideration — although this still resulted in a comparatively low level of industrial conflict.)

Regarding Canada's performance (i.e., its 214% increase in industrial strife), note that this brought the level of strike activity circa 1970 to approximately the same as that in the United States (although the latter country experienced only a 25% increase over the period). In explaining Canada's dramatic increase in strikes during the 1966-70 period, one must consider two important factors. First, while membership growth in the trade union movement had been relatively static from the mid-1950s to 1964, between 1964 and 1968 membership grew by over one-half million (a 25% increase).¹⁶ Second, this increase in union numerical strength occurred at a time of a strongly expansionary economy. This provided an opportunity to utilize the new-found strength in the favorable context of relative full employment. This heightened economic bargaining power encouraged industrial militancy.¹⁷

¹⁶ David Wolfe, "The State and Economic Policy in Canada, 1968-75", in Panitch (ed.), The Canadian State (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), pp. 261, 186-87. It should be noted that the increase in industrial strife in Canada was not evenly distributed but was concentrated in a few key sectors — especially part of the public sector (which had just been granted collective bargaining rights).

¹⁷ See Ibid., p. 262; Stuart Jamieson, Industrial Relations in Canada (Toronto: U. of Toronto, 1973), pp. 96-101.

Fig. 7.19: Scattergram of (down) Strikes and (across) Meritocratic Inequality

Fig. 7.20: Scattergram of (down) Strikes and (across) Welfarist Equality

Fig. 7.21: Scattergram of (down) Strikes and (across) Ethnic/Racial Equality.

Fig. 7.22: Scattergram of (down) Strikes and (across) Sexual Equality

Fig. 7.23: Scattergram of (down) Strikes and (across) Inter-Class Inequality
• IS

Fig. 7.24: Scattergram of (down) Strikes and (across) Intra-Class Equality

E. Impact upon Criminal Activity

The variable "criminal activity" is operationally defined in terms of homicides and serious thefts per 100,000 population. Rates for both categories of crime are reported in Table 7.13. As one might anticipate, the United States experienced the largest increase in crime and ranked first in homicide and serious theft rates for both (circa) 1950 and 1970. Canada ranked second in both categories in 1970 — registering a 200% rise over 1950 levels. The rates of crime for these two countries — especially in relation to "serious theft" — dwarf those of all other nations. Three Scandinavian countries displayed increases in crime over 100% (Sweden, Finland, and Norway). However, Denmark experienced only a 13% rise. The country with the lowest theft rate was Japan (in both 1950 and 1970). Norway had the smallest average homicide rate circa 1970. Only one country (Belgium) registered a slight decline in overall crime (resulting from a decrease in homicides) — though it still displayed an increase in serious theft rates (of 25%). The average increase in criminal activity for all countries was 129%. While every nation experienced increases in serious theft, eight displayed decreases in homicides (Belgium, Denmark, Switzerland, Italy, Japan, Austria, Norway, and Finland).

Table 7.13: Crime

Country (N=19)	Total % Change*	(rank)	1950**		1970	
			Homicide	Theft	Homicide	Theft
U.S.A.	+316	(1)	5.8 (1)	51 (1)	8.2 (1)	191 (1)
Australia	+278	(2)	.9 (12)	.8 (15)	1.5 (4)	2.5 (15)
U.K.	+209	(3)	.5 (16)	.8 (3)	.9 (12)	11 (3)
Netherlands	+209	(3)	.3 (18)	.7 (16)	.5 (18)	1.7 (16)
Canada	+200	(5)	1.0 (9)	25 (2)	2.2 (2)	.45 (2)
Ireland	+191	(6)	.3 (18)	1.9 (12)	.7 (17)	3.0 (12)
Sweden	+165	(7)	.8 (14)	3.8 (5)	.9 (12)	9.6 (4)
Finland	+122	(8)	3.4 (2)	1.0 (14)	2.4 (3)	2.6 (14)
New Zealand	+118	(9)	1.1 (8)	.6 (18)	1.3 (6)	1.2 (17)
Germany	+115	(10)	1.0 (9)	2.7 (9)	1.3 (6)	5.0 (8)
Norway	+112	(11)	.5 (16)	.9 (6)	.4 (19)	5.8 (6)
Israel	+109	(12)	.9 (12)	1.7 (13)	1.3 (6)	2.8 (13)
France	+104	(13)	.6 (15)	.7 (16)	.8 (15)	1.2 (17)
Austria	+ 80	(14)	1.2 (7)	2.8 (7)	1.0 (9)	5.5 (7)
Japan	+ 67	(15)	2.1 (3)	.4 (19)	1.4 (5)	.8 (19)
Italy	+ 34	(16)	1.8 (4)	2.3 (11)	1.0 (9)	4.1 (9)
Switzerland	+ 21	(17)	1.0 (9)	2.6 (10)	.9 (12)	3.4 (11)
Denmark	+ 13	(18)	1.3 (5)	4.6 (4)	1.0 (9)	6.3 (5)
Belgium	- 13	(19)	1.3 (5)	2.8 (7)	.8 (15)	3.5 (10)

Mean: +129%

Range: 329

St.Dev.: 88

*The larger the positive percentage change, the greater is the increase in crime.

**rates per 100,000 population ; ranks are in parentheses

Sources: see footnotes 67 and 68, Chapter V

The hypothesis under consideration is : (H 11) the higher the socio-economic inequality, the higher is the criminal activity. In addition, to take into consideration the arguments of the more traditional literature on the economic determinants of crime discussed in Chapter III (regarding the impact of general economic conditions), hypothesis 11 also will be tested controlling for changes in economic growth rates (using data presented earlier in this chapter). If (as anticipated based on the discussion in Chapter III) this latter variable has little effect upon the crime rate, then there should be no substantial change in the bivariate correlation coefficients when controlling for economic growth. ¹⁸

The bivariate results for welfarist, intra-working-class, and sexual equality all provide low to moderate support for the hypothesis — i.e., an inverse relationship between equality and crime. The partial correlation results (controlling for economic growth) in Table 7.15 do not change the findings to any substantial extent for these three dimensions. In addition, the multiple regression analysis (Table 7.16) shows intra-working-class-equality to have the largest (and negative) impact of any variable upon criminal activity. Welfarist equality is also shown to have a negative effect on crime — as hypothesized.

¹⁸ An initial examination of the scattergrams revealed (as before) three outliers: Belgium in Fig. 7.25, Japan in Fig. 7.28, and Israel in Fig. 7.29. These outliers were "Winsorized" in the manner described in the Appendix.

Table 7.14: Bivariate Relationship — Hypothesis 11
(Impact of equality upon "criminal activity")

Equality Dimension	r	HD*	r ²	St. Er.	B	St. Er. of B	F	N
Meritocratic inequality	-.28	(+)	.077	87.9	-1.11	.934	1.42	19
Welfarist equality	-.41	(-)	.164	83.6	-5.66	3.09	3.35	19
Ethnic/Racial equality	.87	(-)	.761	46.3	13.1	2.24	22.4	9
Sexual equality	-.21	(-)	.043	89.5	-1.47	1.67	.773	19
Inter-class inequality	-.10	(+)	.010	91.0	-.618	1.42	.187	19
Intra-class equality	-.18	(-)	.033	89.9	-2.35	3.07	.587	19

*Hypothesized direction of relationship

Table 7.15: Partial Correlation — crime and equality
(controlling for economic growth)

Equality Dimension	r	Diff.*	r ²	t	N	HD**
Meritocratic inequality	-.54	-.26	.29	.01	19	(+)
Welfarist equality	-.32	+.09	.10	.09	19	(-)
Ethnic/Racial equality	.85	-.02	.72	.004	9	(-)
Sexual equality	-.20	+.01	.04	.21	19	(-)
Inter-class inequality	-.06	+.04	.004	.40	19	(+)
Intra-class equality	-.21	-.03	.04	.20	19	(-)

* This represents the difference between the partial correlation and the original bivariate correlation as reported in Table 7.14.

**Hypothesized direction of relationship

Table 7.16: Multiple Regression — Crime

Summary Statistics	R	$\bar{R}^2$	St.Er.	F	N	R^2
	.520	.063	86.1	1.30	19	.27
Independent Variables*	Beta	B	St.Er. of B	F	HD	**
(1) Intra-working class equality	-.383	-4.93	4.55	1.17	(-)	
(2) Inter-class inequality	-.369	-2.18	2.04	1.14	(+)	
(3) Welfarist equality	-.310	-4.33	3.32	1.69	(-)	
(4) Meritocratic inequality	-.130	-.523	.970	.291	(+)	

NB: $\bar{R}^2$ is R^2 adjusted for loss of degrees of freedom

**Hypothesized direction of relationship

*ranked according to relative importance vis-a-vis dependent variable as indicated by beta coefficient

For inter-class income inequality, bivariate and partial correlation results indicate almost no relationship. However, in the case of multiple regression, inter-class inequality has an impact upon crime contrary to what was hypothesized. The same is true for educational equality — with a relationship low in magnitude in its bivariate form and much larger when controlling for economic growth. Additionally, ethnic/racial equality has a very strong positive correlation with crime. The indication that criminal activity increases as equality increases for inter-class, meritocratic, and ethnic/racial dimensions may possibly be explained by the Rising Expectations argument referred to previously when discussing political instability. It should be noted that for both instability and crime, the highest positive correlation with equality was for the ethnic/racial dimension.

In summary, the findings are partially supportive of hypothesis 11 (for welfarist, intra-class, and sexual dimensions) and partially supportive of the Rising Expectations school (for inter-class, meritocratic, and ethnic/racial equality). Controlling for economic growth has a major impact on only one dimension — meritocratic inequality. This would tend to refute the theoretical claims of the "general economic conditions" school of thought discussed in Chapter III.

In Figs. 7.25-7.30, countries above the regression line experienced greater than predicted increases in crime while those below the line displayed less than anticipated

criminal activity. Examining these scattergrams, the special case of the United States is evident (with large positive residuals). As noted earlier, the United States ranked first in the level of both categories of crime considered for circa 1950 and 1970. Thus, a high degree of criminal activity is not a sudden aberration but a continuing phenomenon within American social life. While the search for the "causes" of the especially high American crime rate is ongoing, the configurative literature suggests unique historical and sociological factors (e.g., the violence associated with the western frontier tradition, severe racial discrimination, and the constitutionally sanctioned presence of a massive arsenal of firearms in private possession).¹⁹ In addition, one must consider the migration of southern blacks into northern ghettos and the deterioration of the American central cities over the period examined. Finally, the increasing urbanization of the United States during the post-war era exacerbated the crime problem. As Marvin Wolfgang argues;

There are forces within an urban community that generate conditions conducive to criminality. Urban living is more anonymous — it releases the individual from community restraints and gives him more freedom to deviate.... Urban areas, with mass populations, greater wealth, more commercial establishments, and more products of our technology, also provide more frequent opportunities for theft. Victims are impersonalized, property is insured, and consumer goods in more abundance are vividly displayed and are more portable. 20

¹⁹ See special issue of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, "Crime and Justice in America: 1776-1976", Jan. 1976.

²⁰ Marvin Wolfgang, "Urban Crime", in Wilson (ed.), The Metropolitan Enigma (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 268. Note that this argument is also applicable to Canada's rapid urbanization in the 1950s and 60s. This might account, in part, for the increase in crime experienced by Canada. Cf. W.K. Greenway, "Crime and Class in Canada", in Harp and Hofley (eds.), Structured Inequality in Canada (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1980), pp. 247-65.

Fig. 7.25: Scattergram of (down) Crime and (across) Meritocratic Inequality

Fig. 7.26: Scattergram of (down) Crime and (across) Welfarist Equality

Fig. 7.27: Scattergram of (down) Crime and (across) Ethnic/Racial Equality

Fig. 7.28: Scattergram of (down) Crime and (across) Sexual Equality

Fig. 7.29: Scattergram of (down) Crime and (across) Inter-Class Inequality

Fig. 7.30: Scattergram of (down) Crime and (across) Intra-Class Equality

F. Impact upon Ethnic/Racial Militancy

"Ethnic/racial militancy" was operationalized in terms of three indicators: (1) a non-violent "ethnic tensions" score, (2) an electorally-oriented "ethnic separatism" measure, and (3) an "ethnic violence" score. In the early 1950s, Israel ranked first and the United Kingdom second in the level of ethnic militancy. In the late 1960s, these countries had reversed positions. In third place during both periods was the United States. On the other hand, both New Zealand and Finland consistently exhibited the lowest levels of ethnic/racial unrest. While the United States and the United Kingdom experienced the greatest increases in ethnic militancy, there was no change whatsoever for Australia, Finland, and New Zealand. While Canada registered a 150% increase in this variable, it maintained its fifth rank (out of nine countries) in both periods.

The hypotheses under consideration (from Chapter III) are: (H 12.1) the higher the inequality, the higher is the ethnic/racial militancy; (H 12.2) the greater the increases in equality, the higher the ethnic/racial militancy. These hypotheses are representative of the Absolute Deprivation and Rising Expectations schools, respectively. A finding of little or no relationship between equality and ethnic militancy will be considered supportive of the Socialized Passivity perspective.²¹ As was the case with political instability and crime, ethnic/racial equality is positively correlated (though at a low level) with ethnic/racial militancy. This

²¹ An initial examination of the scattergrams revealed the following outliers: Belgium and the U.K. in Fig. 7.31, and Israel in Fig. 7.35. These outliers were "Windsorized".

Table 7.17: Ethnic/Racial Militancy

Country(N=9)	%Change*	(rank)	1950-54	(rank)**	1966-70	(rank)
United Kingdom	958	(1)	10	(2)	108	(1)
U. S. A.	+328	(2)	7	(3)	30	(3)
Belgium	+253	(3)	5	(4)	18	(4)
Canada	+150	(4)	4	(5)	10	(5)
Israel	+ 81	(5)	54	(1)	98	(2)
Switzerland	+ 33	(6)	3	(6)	4	(6)
Australia	0	(7)	2	(7)	2	(7)
Finland	0	(7)	1	(8)	1	(8)
New Zealand	0	(7)	1	(8)	1	(8)

Mean: ~~223~~Range: ~~980~~St. Dev.: ~~383~~

* The larger the positive percentage change, the greater is the ethnic/racial militancy.

** Countries are ranked from highest to lowest level of ethnic militancy.

Sources: see footnotes 70 and 71, Chapter V.

Table 7.18: Bivariate Relationship — Hypothesis 12
(impact of equality upon "ethnic/racial militancy")

Equality Dimension	r	HD* (12.1/12.2)	r ²	St. Er.	B	St. Er. of B	F	N
Meritocratic inequality	-.58	(+/-)	.341	273	-6.88	4.35	3.62	9
Welfarist equality	-.07	(+/-)	.005	335	-4.82	18.5	.038	9
Ethnic/Racial equality	.26	(-/+)	.067	324	11.2	15.6	.509	9
Sexual equality	-.06	(+/-)	.003	335	-2.22	9.41	.022	9
Inter-class inequality	-.20	(+/-)	.039	329	-3.38	7.75	.288	9
Intra-class equality	.29	(+/-)	.081	322	12.0	16.5	.624	9

*Hypothesized direction of relationship

provides some additional support for the Rising Expectations school of thought (i.e., H 12.2).

Turning to other dimensions, there is virtually no relationship between ethnic militancy and welfarist equality. This is consistent with a Socialized Passivity explanation. However, there is a fairly high correlation involving the meritocratic dimension (indicating educational equality and militancy are positively associated). There is a similar relationship (though of lower magnitude) vis-a-vis inter-class inequality. These results, combined with the low positive correlation for the intra-class dimension of equality, provide further support for the Rising Expectations school of thought. In fact, for no dimension is there an indication of the inverse relationship between equality and ethnic/racial militancy postulated in hypothesis 12.1.

In Figs. 7.31-7.36, countries above the regression line experienced greater than predicted increases in ethnic/racial militancy while those below the line displayed less than anticipated ethnic or racial unrest. In examining these scattergrams, the largest negative residuals are for Australia, New Zealand, and Finland. The minority groups in these countries constitute a smaller proportion of the population than for any of the other nations considered. This suggests that there may be a threshold below which the minority group is too small to create a considerable impact in this area. The country with the

largest positive residual is the United Kingdom. This is reflective of the expanded IRA activity in Northern Ireland during the latter portion of the 1966-70 period examined. The rather unique historical circumstances (including the presence of a neighboring country friendly to the goals, if not the specific means, of the IRA terrorists) make the United Kingdom a special case in this context.²²

²² See Liam DePuur, Divided Ulster (N.Y.: Penguin, 1970); Ronald Terchek, "Conflict and Cleavage in Northern Ireland", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Sept. 1977, pp. 47-59.

Fig. 7.31: Scattergram of (down) Ethnic Militancy and (across) Meritocratic Inequality

Fig. 7.32: Scattergram of (down) Ethnic Militancy and (across) Welfarist Equality

Fig. 7.33: Scattergram of (down) Ethnic Militancy and (across) Ethnic/Racial Equality

Fig. 7.34: Scattergram of (down) Ethnic Militancy and (across) Sexual Equality

Fig. 7.35: Scattergram of (down) Ethnic Militancy and (across) Inter-Class Inequality

Fig. 7.36: Scattergram of (down) Ethnic Militancy and (across) Intra-Class Equality

G. Conclusion

A summary of the relative importance of the various dimensions of equality as independent variables in the multiple regression analysis is provided in Table 7.19. Welfarist equality emerges as having the greatest impact upon the five dependent variables considered (average beta rank = 1.8) while intra-working-class equality has the least average impact. Inter-class and meritocratic inequality display an intermediate effect on the dependent variables examined. To summarize: as welfarist equality increases, instability, strikes, crime, and economic growth decrease (while participation increases). As inter-class income inequality increases, instability and strikes increase while participation decreases (i.e., consistent with welfarist equality's impact). However, inconsistent with the welfarist dimension, inter-class inequality is associated with decreases in growth and crime. Considering the other two dimensions, as educational inequality increases, instability and crime decrease while growth increases. As income equality within the working class increases, instability, crime, economic growth, and participation decrease while strikes increase.

As discussed in the conclusion to Chapter III, the common link between most of the hypothesized relation-

Table 7.19: Multiple Regression — Summary of Comparative Importance of Independent Variables (direction and beta rank)

Independent Variables	Aver. rank*	Particip. (BR)**	Instab. (BR)	Growth (BR)	Strikes (BR)	Crime (BR)
Welfarist equality	1.8	H7.1/7.2 +(1)-/+	H8.1/8.2 -(1)-/+	H9.1/9.2 -(2)-/+	H10.1/10.2 -(2)-/+	H11 -(3)-
Inter-class inequality	2.2	-(3)+/-	+(2)+/-	-(3)+/-	+(1)+/-	-(2)+
Meritocratic inequality	2.7	—	-(3)+/-	+(1)0/0	—	-(4)+
Intra-class equality	2.8	-(2)-/+	-(4)-/+	-(4)-/+	+(3)-/+	-(1)-

*mean of beta ranks for multiple regression analysis

**Beta Rank

NB: The sign (+/-) to the left of the Beta Rank is the direction of the relationship found in the multiple regression analysis. The sign(s) to the right of the Beta Rank is (are) the hypothesized direction(s) of the relationship.

ships regarding the consequences of inequality is based upon the application of the Absolute Deprivation, Relative Deprivation, Rising Expectations, and Socialized Passivity schools of thought. In assessing the empirical results of this chapter, one can conclude there is no major support for the Relative Deprivation school (e.g., see results for hypotheses H 8.3 and 10.3) and some support for the Socialized Passivity perspective (mainly in regard to strikes and non-egalitarian dimensions of equality). There is moderate confirmation for the Absolute Deprivation school vis-a-vis income inequality and strikes as well as various dimensions of equality and political instability and crime. However, especially in regard to ethnic/racial militancy (and to a lesser extent criminal activity, strikes, and instability) the Rising Expectations perspective receives significant support. The finding that increases in certain types of equality are associated with more — rather than less — crime, strikes, political protest and instability raises profound public policy and political implications. This is one of the issues to be considered in the next (and concluding) chapter.

CHAPTER VIII: DENOUEMENT

I have written, and then thrown away, several endings to this book. Over all of them there hung that fatality of last chapters, in which every idea seems to find its place, and all the mysteries, that the writer has not forgotten, are unravelled. In politics the hero does not live happily ever after, or end his life perfectly. There is no concluding chapter, because the hero in politics has more future before him than there is recorded history behind him. The last chapter is merely a place where the writer imagines that the polite reader has begun to look furtively at his watch. 1

In addition to providing a brief summary of the empirical results (through use of the schematic models initially presented in Chapter V)², this chapter will address four questions: first, how do the quantitative findings in the last two chapters compare with those of the cross-national research criticized in Chapter IV? Second, what are the public policy implications of the empirical results?

¹ Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1961), p. 411.

² In these models, the direction of the empirical association is presented in parentheses. In cases of conflict in direction between bivariate and multivariate results, the latter are utilized. Correlation coefficients of a magnitude less than +/- .10 are considered as indicating a zero relationship. Note that to provide similarity of interpretation and presentation, Figs. 8.1 and 8.5 reflect meritocratic and inter-class equality (respectively). This necessitated reversing the direction of results from Chapters VI and VII which reflected the relationship with inequality for these two dimensions. As noted in Chapter V, no direct relationship is implied between the determinants and consequences of equality depicted in these models.

Third, what are some of the limitations of these findings?

Fourth, what are the overall conclusions to be drawn from the preceding analysis?

A. Comparison with Past Research and Public Policy Implications

Turning to a consideration of meritocratic equality (Fig. 8.1), the results are in the hypothesized direction for all determinants except economic scope of the state. Thus, while left-wing mobilization and economic development are positively related to greater equality of educational opportunity, dependence, consociationalism, and "economic scope" have an inverse relationship with this variable. Turning to the consequences of this dimension of equality, the Rising Expectations school is consistently supported. In other words, increases in meritocratic equality are positively correlated with increases in political instability, strikes, crime, and ethnic militancy. The "elitist" position is not supported regarding political participation while the "conservative" perspective is substantiated vis-a-vis economic growth.

Among the limited cross-national studies of the political determinants of educational equality, Hewitt's and Parkin's are most relevant. Parkin concluded (consistent with the finding for hypothesis 1.1) that Social Democratic governments have made greater progress toward achieving

Fig. 2.1: Meritocratic Equality Model

equality of educational opportunity than liberal/conservative (i.e., "bourgeois") governments.³ On the other hand, Hewitt concluded the exact opposite. He suggested that his finding might be explained by Lipset's argument concerning the inverse relationship between a concern with economic egalitarianism and a concern with achievement (or equality of opportunity). "Socialist countries stress the former, while the more 'liberal' countries emphasize the latter."⁴ However, Hewitt's measure of "socialist strength" was criticized (in Chapter IV) as being misleading. In addition, his indicator of educational opportunity was different from the one used in this dissertation. Thus, Hewitt's results could differ from Parkin's and this study's for these reasons.

The public policy implications of the findings for meritocratic equality are two-fold. First, the decision to pursue consociationalism must be weighed in light of the apparent negative impact this has upon equality of educational opportunity (though consociationalism has a positive effect upon welfarist and income equality — see Figs. 8.2, 8.5, 8.6). Second, the correlation between increases in meritocratic equality and increases in politi-

³ Frank Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order (London: Paladin, 1971), pp. 109-113.

⁴ Christopher Hewitt, "The Effect of Political Democracy and Social Democracy on Equality in Industrial Societies", American Sociological Review, June 1977, p. 459.

cal, industrial, and social strife is in conflict with the contention (in Chapter I) that equality of educational opportunity makes a positive contribution to capitalism.⁵ While meritocratic values may be most easily subsumed within the stratification-oriented societies of advanced capitalism, the impact of greater educational equality appears to serve as a destabilizing factor. Thus, a contradiction exists between a perspective of equality most theoretically compatible with and (as shown in Chapter VI) most widely practiced in advanced capitalist countries being associated with the type of instability most abhorred by these same societies. To policy-makers, the options in regard to increasing meritocratic equality present a true dilemma.

Turning to the welfarist dimension of equality (Fig. 8.2), the results indicate that in four out of six instances, the determinants have the hypothesized impact (i.e., for H 2.2, 3.3, 5, and 6). While corporatism, consociationalism, and the economic scope of the state contribute to greater welfarism, left-wing mobilization, economic development, and external dependence are inversely related with welfarist equality. Regarding the consequences, the Absolute Deprivation school is supported

⁵ For a discussion of the broader issue of education's role in political unrest, see Thomas Greene, Comparative Revolutionary Movements (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), pp. 149-51.

Fig. 8.2: Welfarist Equality Model

vis-a-vis political instability, strikes, and crime (while there is virtually no relationship with ethnic militancy). In relation to participation and growth, the findings are consistent with the "non-elitist" and "conservative" positions (respectively).

Two major studies (cited in Chapter IV) of the determinants of the welfare state have reached opposite conclusions. On the one hand, Wilensky found a high positive relationship between economic development and commitment to the welfare state.⁶ This conclusion is inconsistent not only with the finding in this study (note the negative relationship for hypothesis 5) but also with Castles and McKinlay's research. They found that economic development did not lead to greater welfarist equality.⁷ While this latter study concentrated solely upon the developed democracies, Wilensky considered a much broader range of countries (including Communist and third-world states). Thus, as discussed in Chapter IV, the failure to focus upon the potential differences within the most highly developed nations could explain why Wilensky's finding is different.

From a policy perspective, the results indicate (inter alia) that the decision to pursue corporatist or conse-

⁶ Harold Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality (Berkeley, Calif.: U. of California Press, 1975), p. 22.

⁷ Francis Castles and Robert McKinlay, "Public Welfare Provision, Scandinavia, and the Sheer Futility of the Sociological Approach to Politics", British Journal of Political Science, vol. 9, April 1979, pp. 157-71.

ciational patterns is consistent with greater welfarism. One does not need to sacrifice one to attain the other. In addition, such increases in welfarism appear to be conducive to less political and social unrest. On the other hand, increased welfarist equality has a negative impact upon economic growth. Thus, policy-makers must weigh the conflicting consequences of increased or decreased welfarism — i.e., greater political unrest and growth or greater stability and reduced economic output. Finally, the public policy option of responding to ethnic/racial militancy with increased welfarist equality seems to be devoid of measurable impact.

For the ethnic/racial variant of emancipatory equality, the results (see Fig. 8.3) regarding its determinants are in accord with the hypotheses in three out of six instances. As anticipated "economic scope" and economic development contribute to greater ethnic/racial parity while dependence has a negative impact. Unexpectedly, left-wing mobilization, consociationalism, and corporatism also have a negative effect. The consequences of ethnic/racial equality are consistently supportive of the Rising Expectations school. Political instability, strikes, crime, and ethnic militancy are all positively correlated with increases in ethnic parity. The "non-elitist" perspective regarding political participation and the "progressive" view in relation to economic growth also

Fig. 8.3: Emancipatory (Ethnic/Racial) Equality Model

are affirmed.

These results are inconsistent with both Grove's and Hewitt's research in this area.⁸ In examining the role of economic development, Grove found no direct relationship between it and greater ethnic equality. This is contrary to the finding for hypothesis 5. The difference could be explained, in part, by Grove's analysis of nations at varying levels of development rather than an examination of distinctions solely within the highly developed states. In studying ethnic militancy, Hewitt found inequality (rather than increases in equality) correlated with ethnic strife. His use of "level" as opposed to "change" data could be an important difference in this regard.

There are several noteworthy public policy implications from the results for ethnic/racial equality. First, the pursuit of consociationalism — if intended, in part, as a palliative for ethnic or racial inequalities — appears to be misguided. However, if consociationalism is meant to be a means by which ethnic/racial inequalities (and therefore divisions) are sustained so as to maintain cleavages within the working class, then this policy goal may be succeeding. Second, increases in ethnic/racial parity have not resulted in less militancy on the part of the subordinate groups. This finding raises severe doubts as to the efficacy of policies to reduce ethnic or racial tensions by modest decreases in the degree of inequality

⁸ See John Grove, "A Partial Test of the Ethnic Equalization Hypothesis", in his Global Inequality (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1979), pp. 148-53; Christopher Hewitt, "Majorities and Minorities: A Comparative Survey of Ethnic Violence", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Sept. 1977, pp. 150-60.

between superordinate and subordinate segments of society. Indeed, for all of the dimensions of equality (see Figs. 8.1 - 8.6), ethnic militancy increases or remains the same as equality increases. Thus, the small gains in equality described in the first section of Chapter VI have not dampened ethnic/racial militancy. For the policy-maker, this situation presents a true dilemma. While modest increases in equality are correlated with militancy and violence, the "J-Curve" theory (untestable given the data in this dissertation) would suggest that an attempted reversal after the gains made would also precipitate a violent outcome.⁹

Turning to the sexual variant of emancipatory equality (Fig. 8.4), the results for the determinants of this dimension are in the hypothesized direction in four out of six instances (i.e., for H 1.1, 2.2, 4.2, and 6). Left-wing mobilization, "economic scope", and corporatism have a positive impact upon sexual equality while consociationalism, economic development, and dependence have a negative effect. As for the consequences, increases in sexual equality are associated with increases in participation and decreases in political instability, strikes, and crime (while having no impact upon ethnic militancy).

⁹ See Abraham Miller et al., "The J-Curve Theory and the Black Urban Riots", American Political Science Review, Sept. 1977, pp. 964-82.

Fig. 8.4: Emancipatory (Sexual) Equality Model

As anticipated, there is no discernible relationship vis-a-vis economic growth. Unfortunately, there are no cross-national studies which can be used to compare with the results of this dissertation.¹⁰

Regarding political and public policy implications, support for left-wing political parties (see H 1.1) would appear to be appropriate for women's organizations and others dedicated to the achievement of greater sexual equality. Unlike ethnic/racial equality, increases in female-male parity are associated with decreases in political instability. Thus, the dilemma (noted above) facing policy-makers regarding the former type of equality is not applicable to increases in sexual equality.

For inter-class income equality (Fig. 8.5), the findings are in the hypothesized direction for three out of the six determinants (see H 3.1, 5, and 6). While corporatism, consociationalism, and economic development are positively associated with this variant of egalitarianism, dependence, "economic scope", and left-wing mobilization have a negative impact. Increases in inter-class equality are correlated with increases in crime and ethnic militancy (consistent with the Rising Expectations school) but decreases in strikes and political instability

¹⁰ For example, Moroney's study is concerned with differences in sexual equality between capitalist and communist societies (rather than within advanced capitalist states). See John Moroney, "Do Women Earn Less Under Capitalism?", in his Income Inequality (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1979), pp. 141-60.

Fig. 8.5: Inter-Class Egalitarian Equality Model

(supportive of the Deprivation schools). The "progressive" perspective regarding growth and the "non-elitist" view in relation to participation are also supported.

Of all the dimensions of equality, the greatest quantity (though not necessarily the highest quality) of research concerns inter-class income distribution. Regarding the role of left-wing parties, the results of this dissertation are in accord with Jackman's and Parkin's findings — i.e., the lack of a positive correlation between socialist strength and income equality.¹¹ However, three other studies criticized in Chapter IV arrived at the opposite conclusion.¹² The results of the dissertation are also in conflict with Cameron's findings regarding the scope of the state. These differences could result not only from the specifically criticized procedures of Cameron's study (see Chapter IV), but also from more general distinctions in methodology: e.g., the use of post-tax (rather than pre-tax) income distribution figures, utilization of "change" rather than "level" data, use of a multiple (rather than single) indicator of income inequality. Regarding the role of dependence vis-a-vis this dimension

¹¹ See Robert Jackman, Politics and Social Equality (N.Y.: Wiley, 1975), p. 134; Parkin, ch. 4.

¹² See Hewitt, p. 459; John Dryzek, "Politics, Economics and Inequality: A Cross-National Analysis", European Journal of Political Research, Dec. 1978, pp. 399-410; David Cameron, "Inequality and the State: A Political-Economic Comparison", paper presented at meeting of the American Political Science Association, Sept. 1976.

55

OF / DE

of equality, the results of this dissertation are only in partial agreement with Stack's and Jackman's conclusions.¹³ While they found a simple inverse relationship between income inequality and economic dependence, this study discovered a curvilinear relationship — suggesting a threshold effect. In relation to economic development, the results are inconsistent with Ward and Jackman who found no linear relationship between development and equality.¹⁴ As suggested previously, these studies failed to differentiate between distinctions within the group of highly developed capitalist states which are the focus of this dissertation. On the other hand, Cameron's study (limited to a portion of the advanced capitalist nations) found a discernible (though low) "...tendency for the nations with the highest levels of economic affluence... to have lower levels of economic inequality."¹⁵

Regarding public policy implications, increases in liberal corporatism or consociationalism are not inconsistent with greater inter-class income equality. A second important implication is in relation to economic growth. Those policy-makers concerned with maintaining or increasing the rate of growth

¹³ See Steven Stack, "The Political Economy of Income Inequality", Canadian Journal of Political Science, June 1980, pp. 273-86; Jackman, Ch. 7.

¹⁴ See Michael Ward, The Political Economy of Distribution: Equality versus Inequality (N.Y.: Elsevier, 1978), ch. 3; Jackman, ch. 3.

¹⁵ Cameron, pp. 14-15.

in a nation's economy cannot argue (based upon the results of this study) that greater inter-class equality would be detrimental to that goal. In fact, increases in economic growth are actually associated with modest increases in income equality between class (i.e., supportive of the "progressive" school outlined in Chapter III). Thus, there would appear to be a false dichotomy in suggestions that policy-makers must choose between greater income equality or growth — i.e., the belief that these goals are inherently incompatible. A third important policy implication is in relation to political instability. While increases in other types of equality may be conducive to greater instability, increases in equality of income distribution between classes have the opposite effect. Thus, for political decision-makers, the cost of greater political stability in a society appears to be linked, in part, to modest gains in inter-class equality.

Turning to intra-class income equality (Fig. 8.6), the results are in the hypothesized direction for three out of six determinants (i.e., for H.2.2, 3.2, and 6). While "economic scope", corporatism, and consociationalism apparently contribute to greater income equality within the working class, dependence, economic development, and left-wing mobilization have a negative impact. Greater working class equality is associated with less political instability and crime but more strikes and ethnic militancy.

Fig. 8.6: Intra-(Working)-Class Egalitarian Equality Model

The "elitist" position regarding participation and the "conservative" view regarding growth are affirmed by the results.

Though there has been no cross-national research on the political determinants of working-class income equality, the "relative deprivation" literature is relevant regarding many of the consequences of this variant of egalitarianism.¹⁶ The results for political instability are in the direction predicted by the hypothesis and consistent with the Relative Deprivation school discussed in Chapter III. However, the findings for industrial strife are not in accord with the anticipated relationship. It should be remembered that (as discussed in Chapter IV) other studies of "relative deprivation" theory have utilized significantly different measures of inequality (i.e., society-wide indicators of deprivation). This could explain the overall lack of substantial support for the Relative (as opposed to the Absolute) Deprivation school noted in Chapter VII.

Regarding public policy implications, the pursuit of consociationalism and/or corporatism does not lead to reductions in working-class income equality. Thus, the decisions of unions or other groups to participate in

¹⁶ For example, see Faye Crosby, "Relative Deprivation Revisited", American Political Science Review, March 1979, pp. 103-112; T.R. Gurr, "Sources of Rebellion in Western Societies", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Sept. 1970, pp. 128-44; T.R. Gurr and R. Duvall, "Civil Conflict in the 1960s", Comparative Political Studies, July 1973, pp. 135-69.

such programs should be considered in this light. In addition, the finding that increases in strikes are associated with increases in working-class equality would suggest that removal of traditional wage differentials within the working class are conducive to greater industrial strife.

B. Overall Conclusions

To the solemn strains of the Marseillaise, a Socialist President of France (with a majority in Parliament) triumphantly greets his followers — his hand not shaped in the form of a militantly clenched fist but delicately holding a rose. In Britain, to more discordant notes, the Labour Party formally splits — with its right-wing "social democratic" faction riding high in the public opinion polls. In the United States, an administration comes to power with a weltanschauung ensconced in the laissez faire era of Spencer, Sumner, and social Darwinism — cutting social welfare programs with a militant fervor.

As these recent events suggest, the quotation from Lippmann at the beginning of this chapter is apropos: "In politics... there is no concluding chapter." All one can do is examine the past for indications — not mechanistic predictions — as to what the future may hold for equality in the developed democracies.

In this regard, there are limitations to the analysis

in this dissertation which must be frankly acknowledged. First, the findings are confined to a narrow period of history (circa 1950-70) in which Keynesianism was king (among socialist and many non-socialist parties) and prior to the significant stagflation and fiscal "crisis" of the capitalist state which have dominated political-economic debate over the last decade. Therefore, whether the results are applicable to the post-1970 era is open to question (though see discussion below). Second, by opting for a predominantly quantitative and cross-national approach in an attempt to derive broader generalizations, the individual distinctions pertaining to particular nations could be dealt with only for the most special (or "deviant") cases. Third, the correlational analysis cannot establish causality. For example, one could argue that if ethnic militancy and equality are positively correlated, it is not because such increases in equality raise expectations which cannot be fulfilled, but rather because such militancy leads to economic concessions from authorities in an attempt to placate such subordinate groups. Thus, according to this latter view, increases in equality would be the consequence and not the "cause" of ethnic militancy. Finally, (as noted in Chapter VI) given the data limitations, analysis of changes in equality occurring within the time period considered was not possible. For example, with the constraints of a "before" (circa 1950) and "after" (circa 1970)

research design, one cannot be sure how particular Labour and Conservative governments in Britain between 1950 and 1970 specifically affected inequality. Nevertheless, these shortcomings are felt to be less than those discussed (in Chapter IV) regarding previous research in this area.

From the analysis presented in this dissertation, it is believed that the most important finding to emerge is the inability of left-wing mobilization to have a positive impact upon a majority of the dimensions of equality — especially regarding income distribution. The discussion of constraints imposed upon Social Democratic parties when in office has been provided previously (see Chapters II and VI). What is important to emphasize are the consequences of the decision to reject major nationalization (and thus the increased this component of the economic scope of the state) and accept Keynesianism as the path of social democracy in the era covered by this study. In accepting Keynesianism:

Social Democrats defined their role as that of modifying the play of market forces.... The successful application of Keynesian instruments was seen as the demonstration that nationalization — full of problems and uncertainties that it proved to be — was not only impossible to achieve in a parliamentary way but was simply unnecessary.... The theoretical underpinning of this new perspective was the distinction between the concept of property as the authority to manage and property as legal possession.... Instead of direct ownership, the state could achieve all the socialist goals by influencing private industry to behave in the general interest. 17

¹⁷ Adam Przeworski, "Social Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon", New Left Review, Oct. 1980, pp. 52-53.

It is this flawed analysis which is the culprit — largely dictating social democracy's relative failure vis-a-vis equality. The major exception noted in this study (Sweden) was an instance of left-wing mobilization passing beyond a threshold level where it attained temporary political hegemony. Yet, as events in the mid-1970s would suggest (when the Social Democrats lost power in Sweden), this hegemonic position could not be sustained within the confines of a predominantly capitalist order.

While some Social Democratic parties (e.g., British Labour) have recently moved to the left — i.e., toward more traditional socialist doctrine, this only raises the basic yet unresolved issue of the irreconcilability of left-leaning socialism and "bourgeois" democracy. As Przeworski suggests: "The recurrent question — one that has never lost its actuality — is whether involvement in bourgeois politics can result in socialism or must strengthen the existing, that is, capitalist order."¹⁸ While a definitive answer to this question is not possible, given the overall results of this study and the events of the last decade, one can only be pessimistic. A wilted rose full of thorns may be the appropriate symbol of social democracy — and its failure to achieve greater equality — in the developed democracies.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 342.

STATISTICAL APPENDIX

A. Statistical Measures and Abbreviations

In Chapters VI and VII, the following statistical measures (and their abbreviations) are utilized:

- (1) Pearson correlation coefficient (r) — a measure of association between two variables and an indicator of how closely the regression line fits the points on a scattergram¹;
- (2) coefficient of determination (r^2) — the proportion of the total variation in the dependent variable that can be accounted for (or "explained") by the independent variable;
- (3) standard error of estimate (St. Er.) — the standard deviation of the residual, i.e., the typical error in prediction regarding the regression line;
- (4) regression coefficient (B) — the slope of the regression line, indicating the amount by which the estimated score for the dependent variable changes for each unit change in the independent variable;
- (5) standard error of B (St. Er. of B) — a measure of the variance of the regression coefficient;
- (6) F statistic (F) — a measure of the significance of the regression equation representing more than mere chance;
- (7) Student's T (t) — the statistical significance test (one-tailed)

¹ The coefficient " r " may also be interpreted as the bivariate standardized regression coefficient. As such, it is identical to "beta" in two-variable linear regression analysis.

reported for partial correlation coefficients and the independent variables correlation matrix²; (8) multiple correlation coefficient (R) — a measure of the impact of two or more independent variables taken together upon a dependent variable; (9) coefficient of multiple determination (R^2) — analogous to r^2 ; (10) adjusted R^2 ($\overline{R^2}$) — R^2 adjusted for the number of independent variables in the equation and the number of cases³; (11) partial slope (B) — unstandardized regression coefficient, indicating how much a one-unit change in one of the independent variables will affect the dependent variable when all other independent variables are controlled; (12) beta coefficient (Beta) — standardized partial slope which can be used to assess the relative importance of independent variables on the dependent variable; (13) standard deviation (St. Dev.) — a measure of how widely sets of scores are dispersed around their mean; (14) mean — arithmetic average of scores.

B. Multicollinearity

In multiple regression analysis, the issue of multicollinearity arises. The term refers to the situation in

² For reasons delineated in Chapter V, the statistical significance measures are reported but ignored in the discussion of the empirical results.

³ This is a more conservative estimate of the percent of variance explained, especially when the sample size (as in this study) is not large. Adjusted R^2 may become negative when R^2 and/or the number of cases is very small. In such an instance, a "0" value will be displayed in the tables. See discussion in Norman Nie et al., Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, 2nd. ed. (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1975), p. 358.

which some or all of the independent variables are very highly intercorrelated. This can cause problems with respect to various aspects of multiple regression analysis.⁴ A correlation matrix is provided (see next two pages) for the independent variables used in Chapters VI and VII in order to check for multicollinearity. As can be seen in the first table (A.1), the low to moderate intercorrelations indicate that multicollinearity is not a severe problem in this instance. In fact, the highest correlation exists between corporatism and consociationalism (.56). Yet, it should be stressed, consociationalism is not used in the multiple regression analysis for reasons discussed in the text. Thus, among those remaining variables which are considered, there is no intercorrelation of a magnitude of .50 or higher.

In Table A.2, all the correlations are also in the low to moderate range. Not surprisingly, the highest intercorrelation (-.53) is between inter-class inequality and intra-class equality — the two variants of egalitarianism (i.e., income equality). However, this value is not so high as to create serious difficulties.⁵

A second (multiple regression) check for multicollinearity was performed by calculating the R^2 value for

⁴ See discussion in *Ibid.*, pp. 340-41.

⁵ The low to moderate intercorrelations between the dimensions of equality provide support for the decision made in this dissertation to disaggregate the concept "socio-economic equality" into its component parts.

Table A.1: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables (Chapter VI)

	LWM	ECONSCOP	CORP	CON	DEV	DEPEN
Left-Wing Mobilization (LWM)	---	.31 (.09)	.49 (.01)	-.10 (.39)	-.22 (.18)	.12 (.31)
Economic Scope (ECONSCOP)	.31 (.09)	---	-.07 (.38)	-.32 (.19)	.47 (.01)	-.14 (.28)
Liberal Corporatism (CORP)	.49 (.01)	-.07 (.38)	---	.56 (.05)	-.03 (.45)	.28 (.12)
Consocia- tionalism (CON)	-.10 (.39)	-.32 (.19)	.56 (.05)	---	-.14 (.35)	.30 (.21)
Economic Development (DEV)	-.22 (.18)	.47 (.01)	-.03 (.45)	-.14 (.35)	---	-.16 (.24)
Economic Dependence (DEPEN)	.12 (.31)	-.14 (.28)	.28 (.12)	.30 (.21)	-.16 (.24)	---

NB: numbers in parentheses are statistical significance scores.

Table A.2: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables (Chapter VII)

	MERIT	WELFAR	ETHNIC	SEXUAL	INTER	INTRA
Meritocratic inequality (MERIT)	---	.25 (.15)	-.31 (.20)	-.03 (.44)	.01 (.47)	.21 (.20)
Welfarist equality (WELFAR)	.25 (.15)	---	-.27 (.25)	.07 (.38)	-.03 (.44)	.01 (.48)
Ethnic/Racial equality (ETHNIC)	-.31 (.20)	-.27 (.25)	---	-.36 (.16)	-.21 (.28)	.07 (.42)
Sexual equality (SEXUAL)	-.03 (.44)	.07 (.38)	-.36 (.16)	---	-.10 (.33)	.22 (.19)
Inter-class inequality (INTER)	.01 (.47)	-.03 (.44)	-.21 (.28)	-.10 (.33)	---	-.53 (.01)
Intra-class equality (INTRA)	.21 (.20)	.01 (.48)	.07 (.42)	.22 (.19)	-.53 (.01)	---

NB: numbers in parentheses are statistical significance scores.

all combination of independent variables utilized in the regression analysis in Chapters VI and VII. The results provided in Table A.3 indicate no $\overline{R}^2$ value high enough to cause alarm.

C. Treatment of Outliers

Given the small number of cases in this study, where scattergrams revealed outliers which might distort correlation and regression statistics, these outliers were "Windsorized" — rather than removed from further analysis (thereby reducing the "N"). This involved setting the most extreme value on a variable to the next most extreme value — plus one unit.⁶ For example, regarding Denmark in Table 6.10, this involved changing its score from 44 to 29. Thus, the bivariate and multivariate results in the tables presented in Chapters VI and VII reflect this data modification procedure where appropriate. (This is always indicated in footnotes within the particular subsections of these two chapters.)

D. Problems with "Change" Data

Several problems can arise with the use of "change" data.⁷ While some of these hazards are not applicable to the procedures used in this dissertation, what may be

⁶ See Edward Tufte, Data Analysis for Politics and Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 102.

⁷ See R.J. Rummel, Applied Factor Analysis (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern U. Press, 1970), pp. 236-38.

Table A.3: Multiple Regression Test for Multicollinearity

Dependent Variable *	Independent Variables	$\overline{R}^2$
LWM	DEPEN, ECONSCOP, CORP, DEV	.36
ECONSCOP	LWM, DEPEN, CORP, DEV	.30
CORP	LWM, ECONSCOP, DEPEN, DEV	.21
DEV	LWM, ECONSCOP, CORP, DEPEN	.32
DEPEN	LWM, ECONSCOP, CORP, DEV	0
MERIT	INTRA, WELFAR, INTER	0
WELFAR	MERIT, INTRA, INTER	0
INTER	MERIT, WELFAR, INTRA	.36
INTRA	MERIT, WELFAR, INTER	.38

* abbreviations are those used in Tables A.1 and A.2

relevant is the so-called "regression effect" — i.e., where subsequent measures of a variable tend to gravitate toward the mean. This effect refers to the statistical tendency for very large initial scores to register smaller positive or even negative percentage changes and the opposite for very small initial values of X. The impact of this effect for the "change in equality" data can be assessed by comparing the mean percentage changes for countries in the bottom 40% of scores circa 1950 (i.e., small initial values) versus countries in the top 40% at that time (i.e., the large initial values). The results are presented in Table A.4. The average change for large initial values of equality for all five dimensions (for which there are complete data) = -1.15 versus -1.90 for small initial values. Note that for each of the specific dimensions the mean change is in the same direction for large and small initial values (with the minor exception of intra-class equality). Though there is a tendency for the changes to be somewhat larger for the small value sets, these findings tend to minimize the overall relevance of the "regression effect" on the change data used in this study. Whereas this effect predicts that the mean percentage change of large value sets should be significantly less than that for the small value sets, there is no major difference between the means.⁸

⁸ See discussion in Michael Dolan et al., "Foreign Policies of African States in Asymmetrical Dyads", International Studies Quarterly, Sept. 1980, pp. 429-30.

Table A.4: Regression Effect for Equality Data

	MERIT	WELFARE	SEXUAL	INTER	INTRA	AVERAGE
Mean change:						
large initial values	-18.4	+9.9	+7.1	-4.1	-.25	-1.15
Mean change:						
small initial values	-23.4	+11.1	+8.7	-6.6	+.70	-1.90

In specific instances where it appears that the "regression effect" may be at work, an attempt has been made (in the textual discussion) to check for substantive reasons for changes in order to "explain" (if possible) what might otherwise be interpreted as simply statistically predictable results. For example, see the discussion of Israel's performance regarding egalitarian equality (in the section on left-wing mobilization in Chapter VI).

E. Heteroscedasticity

A test for heteroscedasticity was conducted. This involved utilizing the values of residuals for each of the multiple regression equations in Chapters VI and VII and correlating these (using the nonparametric Spearman's correlation) with values for each of the independent variables in the corresponding regressions. Examination of the (two-tailed) significance levels indicated no significant correlations and thus no heteroscedasticity (see Table A.5).

F. Nonlinear Regression

All hypothesized relationships in this dissertation have assumed that the regression equation was linear in form. However, as Blalock points out:

There are instances when inspection of the scattergrams may clearly indicate a nonlinear relationship.... When such a nonlinear relationship does exist, the product-moment coefficient will obviously underestimate the true degree of relationship since this coefficient measures only the

Table A.5: Heteroscedasticity

Dependent Variable	Residual with left wing mob.	Residual with econ. scope	Residual with corp.	Residual with de-velop.	Residual with de-pendence
meritocratic inequality	-.04 (.85)*	.04 (.85)	---	-.05 (.83)	-.15 (.54)
welfarist equality	.06 (.80)	.18 (.43)	.14 (.55)	.13 (.59)	.02 (.92)
sexual equality	.05 (.83)	.04 (.85)	---	.15 (.51)	.23 (.34)
inter-class inequality	-.04 (.87)	-.008 (.97)	.19 (.43)	-.10 (.65)	.08 (.74)
intra-class equality	.07 (.78)	.11 (.62)	-.22 (.35)	.18 (.43)	-.14 (.55)

Dependent Variable	Residual with merit.	Residual with welfarist	Residual with inter-class	Residual with intra-class
participation	---	.09 (.69)	-.06 (.80)	-.15 (.54)
instability	.14 (.55)	-.13 (.59)	.24 (.33)	.03 (.89)
growth	---	.08 (.74)	.10 (.65)	.18 (.43)
strikes	-.16 (.51)	.02 (.92)	-.04 (.85)	.17 (.47)
crime	.12 (.60)	.01 (.94)	-.19 (.43)	-.25 (.31)

*significance level given in parentheses

goodness of fit of the best single straight line.⁹ This is the case with the "dependence" variable vis-a-vis equality in Figs. 6.31, 6.32, 6.34-36. One solution is to utilize a polynomial regression procedure. This entails adding a second independent variable to the original bivariate equation which consists of the squared value of the first independent variable (in this instance "dependence"). This "second-degree" equation describes a curve termed a "parabola" (i.e., a curve with one bend in it). To obtain a measure of goodness of fit to this parabola, one can use the multiple correlation between the dependent variable (equality) and the two independent variables ("dependence" and "dependence" squared). As Blalock explains: "The difference between the square of this multiple correlation and the square of the total "r" will give us a measure of the degree to which we have improved our ability to predict the dependent variable by using a second-degree equation rather than a straight line."¹⁰

⁹ Hubert Blalock, Social Statistics, 2nd ed. (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1972), p. 408.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 462.

SUBSTANTIVE APPENDIX

In an attempt to test the theoretical literature discussed in Chapters I and II, composite indexes of "welfarist equality" and "economic scope" were constructed and utilized in the empirical analysis (see operational definitions in Chapter V). These were justified on the basis that previous single indicators did not sufficiently reflect the multi-dimensional nature of the welfare state or the economic scope of the state. Nevertheless, one might legitimately question whether the particular combination of indicators is appropriate or whether separate consideration of the component parts of each index would yield similar results. This appendix is designed to respond to these questions by disaggregating the "welfarist equality" and "economic scope" indexes. The central issue is whether conclusions reached in the body of this dissertation need to be amended given the results in this appendix.

A. Disaggregation of Welfarist Equality

As described in detail in Chapter V, "welfarist equality" is operationalized in terms of government (central and sub-central) expenditures on social welfare programs as a percentage of GNP and the unemployment rate. The latter factor is included to reflect the relative commitment to "full employment" which constitutes an essential element of the

welfare state approach. The correlation between social welfare spending and unemployment is a modest $-.33$. This indicates a lack of redundancy and supports the decision to include both elements in an analysis which considers the welfare state as viewed by Marshall and reflected in the Keynesian emphasis upon employment (see discussion in Chapter I).

Turning first to the descriptive results, Tables A.6 and A.7 provide the scores for nations regarding their degree of and change in welfare spending and unemployment. For purposes of comparison with the composite index (i.e., "welfarist equality"), one should consult Table 6.2 (p. 170). While there are a number of minor differences, the general pattern is similar to that provided for the composite index. For example, Denmark maintained its comparatively high rank whereas New Zealand continued its low position. Sweden ranked 8th in welfare spending increase, 8th in unemployment decline, and 7th in overall welfarist equality (Table 6.2). Though all countries except New Zealand displayed an increase in the composite index of welfarist equality, seven nations experienced increases in unemployment (Israel, U.K., Canada, France, Finland, Australia, and New Zealand). On the other hand, all nations registered a gain in welfare spending.

Of prime importance are the results presented in Tables A.8 and A.9. They compare the findings for the composite

Table A.6: Welfare Spending (description)

Country(N=19)	%Change* (rank)	1950 (rank)**	1970 (rank)
Denmark	207 (1)	7.8 (10)	24.0 (1)
Israel	202 (2)	3.9 (19)	11.8 (14)
Norway	201 (3)	6.5 (12)	19.6 (8)
Netherlands	196 (4)	8.1 (9)	24.0 (1)
Italy	178 (5)	8.2 (8)	22.8 (5)
U.S.A.	166 (6)	4.4 (16)	11.7 (15)
Finland	165 (7)	6.2 (13)	16.4 (10)
Sweden	162 (8)	9.1 (7)	23.8 (3)
Canada	159 (9)	6.1 (14)	15.8 (11)
Australia	116 (10)	4.3 (17)	9.3 (18)
Austria	99 (11)	11.6 (3)	23.1 (4)
Switzerland	97 (12)	5.8 (15)	11.4 (16)
Ireland	76 (13)	7.2 (11)	12.7 (13)
Belgium	75 (14)	11.8 (2)	20.7 (7)
France	62 (15)	11.0 (4)	17.8 (9)
W. Germany	55 (16)	13.7 (1)	21.3 (6)
Japan	50 (17)	4.2 (18)	6.3 (19)
U.K.	37 (18)	10.6 (5)	14.5 (12)
N. Zealand	11 (19)	9.5 (6)	10.5 (17)

Mean = +122%

Range = 196

*The larger the positive percentage change, the greater is the increase in welfare spending.

**based on degree of spending (highest to lowest)

Data sources: see footnote 16, Chapter V

Table A.7: Unemployment Rate (description)

Country(N=19)	%Change*	(rank)	1950	(rank)**	1970	(rank)
W. Germany	-90	(1)	10	(18)	1.0	(2)
Belgium	-72	(2)	10.8	(19)	3.0	(15)
Denmark	-66	(3)	8.7	(16)	2.9	(13)
Italy	-64	(4)	8.7	(16)	3.1	(14)
Austria	-61	(5)	6.2	(14)	2.4	(11)
Switzerland	-55	(6)	1.8	(7)	.8	(1)
Netherlands	-48	(7)	2.1	(9)	1.1	(4)
Sweden	-46	(8)	2.6	(10)	1.4	(6)
Norway	-23	(9)	1.3	(6)	1.0	(2)
Ireland	- 5	(10)	7.6	(15)	7.2	(19)
U.S.	+ 2	(11)	5.0	(13)	4.9	(17)
Japan	0	(12)	1.2	(5)	1.2	(5)
Israel	+19	(13)	3.2	(11)	3.8	(16)
U.K.	+30	(14)	2.0	(8)	2.6	(12)
Canada	+79	(15)	3.3	(12)	5.9	(18)
France	+82	(16)	1.1	(4)	2.0	(9)
Finland	+90	(17)	1.0	(3)	1.9	(8)
Australia	+180	(18)	.5	(1)	1.4	(6)
N. Zealand	+300	(19)	.5	(1)	2.0	(9)

Mean = +13%

Range = 390

*The larger the negative percentage change, the greater is the reduction in unemployment.

**based on degree of unemployment (lowest to highest)

Data sources: see footnote 18, Chapter V

index and those for the two component elements of the index (treated as dependent variables). As can be seen, the direction of findings for "social welfare spending" is in accord with "welfarist equality" in five out of six instances. The magnitude of the positive relationship increases for left-wing mobilization, economic scope, development, and dependence — with a slight decrease for corporatism. Only for consociationalism is there a difference in the direction of the relationship found. Examination of the scattergram (Fig. A.1) reveals virtually no correlation between social welfare spending and consociationalism — a finding more consistent with the hypothesized relationship than the results for the composite index.

For the unemployment dimension, the direction of findings also is consistent with the composite index in five out of six cases. Note that due to the use of the unemployment rather than employment rate, consistent results are those with a sign in the opposite direction. Contrary to the results for welfare spending, the magnitude of the relationship decreases for left-wing mobilization and economic scope — with a greater decrease for corporatism (and no change vis-a-vis economic development). There is an increase in the relationship with consociationalism to a very high level — counterbalancing the decrease noted above in relation to welfare spending. Only for dependence is there a difference in the direction of the relationship found. As hypothesized,

Table A.8: Welfare Spending (dependent variable)

Independent Variable	r	HD*	PR**	r ²	St.Er.	B	St.Er.of B	F	N
left-wing mobil.	+.41	+	+.21	.17	59	.36	.19	3.5	19
economic scope	+.47	+	+.33	.22	57	3.2	1.4	4.9	19
corporatism	+.49	+	+.54	.24	57	1.3	.59	5.5	19
Consocialism	-.02	-	+.54	.00	68	-.08	1.5	0	9
development	+.17	+	+.02	.03	64	5.5	7.3	.56	19
dependence	+.21	-	+.03	.04	63	.41	.44	.85	19

*Hypothesized direction of relationship

**Previous relationship utilizing composite index of welfarist equality

Table A.9: Unemployment Rate (dependent variable)

Independent Variable	r	HD*	PR**	HD	r ²	St. Er.	B.	St. Er. of B	F	N
left-wing mobil.	-.10	-	+.21	+	.01	100	-.14	.32	.20	19
economic scope	-.23	-	+.33	+	.05	98	-.2.5	2.4	1.0	19
Corporatism	-.40	-	+.54	+	.16	92	-1.7	.96	3.3	19
consocialism	-.78	+	+.54	-	.61	65	-4.9	1.4	11	9
development	-.05	-	+.02	+	.001	101	-2.8	11.5	.05	19
dependence	+.29	+	+.03	-	.08	96	.86	.67	1.6	19

*Hypothesized direction of relationship

**Previous relationship utilizing composite index of welfarist equality. N.B.

for consistent results, this should be in opposite direction of present findings (due to use of measure of unemployment rather than employment)

Fig.. A.1: Scattergram of Welfare Spending (down) and Consociationalism (across)

dependence and unemployment are positively correlated (rather than the virtually nil relationship found with the composite index). The scattergram (Fig. A.2) reveals the relatively modest nature of this correlation.

Thus, out of 12 instances of comparison between the composite index and its two component elements, there is a similar finding (i.e., a correlation in the same direction) in 10 cases. The conclusion one must reach is that disaggregating "welfarist equality" (as a dependent variable) makes little difference in the overall results previously cited in this dissertation.

Turning to "welfarist equality" as an independent variable (see Chapter VII), Tables A.10 and A. 11 summarize findings for the two dimensions. The direction of findings is consistent with the composite index in 9 out of 12 instances. The relationship is virtually unchanged for political participation and welfare spending but decreases sharply for the unemployment measure. For instability, use of separate measures yields a reduction in support for hypothesis 8.1 (the Absolute Deprivation school). In fact, the relationship changes direction for welfare spending and political instability — providing support for the Rising Expectations school. The scattergram (Fig. A.3) substantiates the low nature of this relationship as well as the continued high positive residuals for Canada and Israel noted when using the composite index (see p. 297). Regarding economic growth, the results for welfare spending

Fig. A.2: Scattergram of Unemployment (down) and Dependence (across)

Table A.10: Welfare Spending (independent variable)

Dependent Variable	HD* (7.1/7.2)	r	PR**	r ²	St. Er.	B	St. Er. of B	F	N
participation	(-/+)	+ .62	+ .61	.39	5.6	.06	.03	7.0	13
instability	(8.1, 8.3/8.2) (-/+)	+ .14	- .42	.02	226	.50	.86	.35	18
growth	(9.1/9.2) (-/+)	- .06	- .33	.003	51	- .011	.19	.001	19
strikes	(10.1, 10.3/10.2) (-/+)	+ .32	- .05	.10	103	.53	.38	1.9	19
crime	(11) (-)	- .05	- .41	.002	91	.10	.33	.19	19
ethnic militancy	(12.1/12.2) (-/+)	- .34	- .07	.11	316	- 1.6	1.7	.91	9

*Hypothesized direction of relationship

**Previous relationship utilizing composite index of welfarist equality

Table A.11: Unemployment Rate (independent variable)

Dependent variable	HD* (7.1/7.2)	r	PR**	r ²	St.Er.	B	St.Er.of B	F	N
participation	(+/-)	-.09	+ .61	.008	7.2	-.012	.021	.004	13
instability	(8.1, 8.3/8.2) (+/-)	+.32	-.42	.10	217	.73	.53	1.8	18
growth	(9.1/9.2) (+/-)	+.47	-.33	.22	45	.24	.10	5.0	19
strikes	(10.1, 10.3/10.2) (+/-)	+.02	-.05	.001	109	.02	.26	.007	19
crime	(11) (+)	+.36	-.41	.13	85	.32	.20	2.5	19
ethnic militancy	(12.1/12.2) (+/-)	-.31	-.07	.09	319	-.84	1.1	.77	9

*Hypothesized direction of relationship

**Previous relationship utilizing composite index of welfarist equality. N.B.: for consistent results, this should be in the opposite direction of present findings (due to use of measure of unemployment rather than employment)

Fig. A.3: Scattergram of Instability (down) and Welfare Spending (across)

show a decline in support for H 9.1 (the "conservative" position) while the correlation with unemployment indicates an increase in support for this hypothesis. For strikes, the results regarding unemployment show virtually no change while the relationship with welfare spending indicates a shift in support toward H 10.2 (the Rising Expectations school). The scattergram (Fig. A.4) displays the moderate nature of this relationship between strikes and welfare spending and the prominent "deviant" position of Israel (discussed in Chapter VII). Regarding crime, the results for the composite index and unemployment are very similar. However, for welfare spending the findings show a reduction of the correlation to almost zero. Finally, the results for ethnic militancy show an increased negative relationship vis-a-vis welfare spending (i.e., consistent with H 12.1) but a similar increase in the opposite direction (i.e., consistent with H 12.2) for unemployment. This latter result is a shift in direction from that obtained using the composite index. The scattergram (Fig. A.5) illustrates the moderate nature of this relationship and the maintenance of Britain's position (i.e., a high positive residual) noted in Chapter VII.

The major overall effect of the shifts in direction and/or magnitude which occurred when considering welfare spending and unemployment as separate variables is to decrease support for the Absolute Deprivation school and in-

Fig. A.4: Scattergram of Strikes (down) and Welfare Spending (across)

Fig. A.5: Scattergram of Ethnic Militancy (down) and Unemployment (across)

crease support for the Rising Expectations perspective. Thus, the substantial support for the latter school noted in the conclusion to this dissertation is enhanced even further.

Disaggregation of Economic Scope

As outlined in detail in Chapter V, "economic scope" is operationalized in terms of total central government expenditures and public ownership of key sectors of the economy. The correlation between these two components is a low .16. This indicates the necessity of utilizing both measures to provide a complete picture of the economic scope of the state (as discussed in Chapter II). Of prime importance in the theoretical literature is the relationship between left-wing mobilization and economic scope. However, in empirical terms, a rather low correlation was found between these two composite indexes ($r=.31$). Correlations with left-wing mobilization for each of the two dimensions of economic scope yield similar results: .24 for public ownership and .43 for government expenditures.

Turning to the descriptive results (Tables A.12 and A.13), all nations registered increases in the composite index (see Table 6.10, p. 204) as well as public ownership. However, seven countries experienced no change or actual decreases in the proportion of central government ex-

Table A.12: Central Government Expenditures (description)

Country(N=19)	% Change*	(rank)	1950	(rank)**	1970	(rank)
Israel	+50	(1)	26	(7)	39	(1)
Denmark	+39	(2)	18	(14)	25	(10)
Sweden	+38	(3)	21	(2)	29	(7)
Norway	+30	(4)	23	(9)	30	(5)
Israel	+30	(4)	27	(6)	35	(3)
U.S.A.	+29	(6)	17	(16)	22	(12)
Australia	+22	(7)	18	(14)	22	(12)
Canada	+18	(8)	17	(16)	20	(16)
Japan	+12	(9)	17	(16)	19	(17)
Netherlands	+ 8	(10)	26	(7)	28	(8)
U.K.	+ 6	(11)	35	(1)	37	(2)
Belgium	+ 3	(12)	29	(5)	30	(5)
Austria	0	(13)	31	(3)	31	(4)
New Zealand	0	(13)	22	(11)	22	(12)
Switzerland	0	(13)	9	(19)	9	(19)
Italy	- 4	(16)	23	(9)	22	(12)
W. Germany	-15	(17)	20	(13)	17	(18)
Finland	-16	(18)	31	(3)	26	(9)
France	-29	(19)	34	(2)	24	(11)

Mean = 11.6

Range = 79

*The larger the positive percentage change, the greater is the increase in central government expenditures.

**based on degree of central government expenditures (highest to lowest)

Data sources: see footnote 35, Chapter V

Table A.13: Public Ownership (description)

Country(N=19)	% Change*	(rank)	1950	(rank)**	1970	(rank)
Denmark	+48	(1)	27	(16)	40	(14)
Finland	+40	(2)	25	(7)	35	(17)
France	+26	(3)	68	(4)	86	(3)
U.S.A.	+25	(4)	8	(19)	10	(19)
Belgium	+23	(5)	44	(12)	54	(11)
Japan	+23	(5)	22	(18)	27	(18)
Germany	+22	(7)	55	(9)	67	(7)
Canada	+21	(8)	28	(15)	34	(16)
Israel	+20	(9)	60	(5)	72	(5)
Norway	+18	(10)	55	(9)	65	(8)
Sweden	+17	(11)	60	(5)	70	(6)
Australia	+13	(12)	47	(11)	53	(12)
Ireland	+12	(13)	33	(14)	37	(15)
Italy	+12	(13)	81	(2)	91	(2)
N. Zealand	+11	(15)	37	(13)	41	(13)
Austria	+11	(15)	90	(1)	100	(1)
U.K.	+ 9	(17)	78	(3)	85	(4)
Netherlands	+ 8	(18)	60	(5)	65	(8)
Switzerland	+ 7	(19)	58	(8)	62	(10)

Mean = +19

Range = 41

*The larger the positive percentage change, the greater is the increase in public ownership.

**based on degree of state ownership (largest to smallest)

Data sources: see footnote 36, Chapter V

penditures (Austria, New Zealand, Switerland, Italy, West Germany, Finland, and France). The mean changes were +19% for public ownership versus +11.6% for central government expenditures.

Of primary importance are the results presented in Tables A.14 and A.15. They compare the findings for the composite index and those for the two component elements of the index. As can be seen, the direction of the findings is consistent in all 12 instances. For income equality, the results further substantiate the arguments previously presented regarding the ineffectiveness of left-wing mobilization and economic scope in enhancing equality of income distribution. The magnitude of the negative relationship between equality and economic scope increases for both intra and inter-class dimensions vis-a-vis government expenditures and public ownership. For sexual equality, the positive correlation increases regarding government expenditures and decreases for public ownership. Regarding ethnic/racial, welfarist, and meritocratic equality, the magnitude of the relationships is decreased when the composite index is disaggregated. This enhances the conclusion cited previously regarding the relative impotence of the economic scope of the state vis-a-vis the achievement of equality.

In general, the disaggregation of the two composite indexes does not substantially alter the results or conclusions provided in the body of this dissertation. Overall,

Table A.14: Central Government Expenditures (independent variable)

Equality Dimensions	r	HD*	PR**	r ²	St.Er.	B	St.Er.of B	F	N
meritocratic inequality	+0.19	-	+0.31	.03	22	.20	.25	.67	19
welfarist equality	+0.07	+	+0.33	.004	6.5	.02	.07	.07	19
ethnic/racial equality	+0.36	+	+0.79	.13	7.2	.12	.12	1.0	9
sexual equality	+0.36	+	+0.26	.13	12	.21	.13	2.6	19
inter-class inequality	+0.29	-	+0.09	.08	14	.21	.16	1.6	19
intra-class equality	-0.20	+	-0.01	.04	6.9	-0.06	7.8	.72	19
welfare spending	+0.52	+	----	.27	56	1.5	.63	6.3	19
unemployment	-.11	-	----	.01	100	-.55	1.1	.24	19

*Hypothesized direction of relationship

**Previous relationship utilizing composite index of "economic scope"

Table A.15: Public Ownership (Independent variable)

Equality Dimensions	r	HD*	PR**	r ²	St. Er.	B	St. Er. of B	F	N
meritocratic inequality	+.22	-	+.31	.05	22	.47	.49	.91	19
welfarist equality	+.31	+	+.33	.09	6.2	.18	.13	1.7	19
ethnic/racial equality	+.18	+	+.79	.03	7.6	.12	.25	.23	9
sexual equality	+.14	+	+.26	.02	12	.17	.28	.35	19
inter-class inequality	+.25	-	+.09	.06	14	.35	.33	1.1	19
intra-class equality	-.18	+	-.01	.03	6.9	-.12	.15	.62	19
welfare spending	+.31	+	----	.10	62	1.9	1.3	1.9	19
unemployment	-.07	-	----	.00	101	-.69	2.2	.09	19

*Hypothesized direction of relationship

**Previous relationship utilizing composite index of "economic scope"

in 31 out of 36 instances (86%) the findings were in the same direction whether using the composite or the disaggregated variables. Thus, it is not misleading to treat these variables in concert; little specificity is lost in doing so. Given this situation, it appears advantageous to combine the measures of welfarist equality and economic scope since this procedure allows a fuller test of the relevant theories in their multi-dimensional form.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abernathy, George. Idea of Equality. Richmond: Knox, 1959.
- Adelman, I. and C. Morris. Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1973.
- Alford, Robert. Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963.
- Alker, Hayward. Mathematics and Politics. N.Y.: Macmillan, 1965.
- Alker, H. and Bruce Russett. "On Measuring Inequality", Behavioral Science, vol. 9 (June 1964), pp. 207-18.
- Allen, V. L. Militant Trade Unionism. London: Merlin, 1966.
- Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba. The Civic Culture. Boston: Little, Brown, 1965.
- Amdur, Robert. "Rawls' Theory of Justice: Domestic and International Perspectives", World Politics, vol. 29 (April 1977), pp. 438-61.
- Anderson, Arnold. "A Skeptical Note on Education and Mobility", in Halsey et.al. (eds.), Education, Economy, and Society. N.Y.: Macmillan, 1961, pp. 164-79.
- Andreski, S. Military Organization and Society. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1968.
- Anscombe, Francis and John Tukey. "The Examination and Analysis of Residuals", Technometrics, vol. 5 (1963), pp. 141-60.
- Aristotle. "Justice", in Hugo Bedau (ed.), Justice and Equality. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971, pp. 13-29.
- Arrighi, G. "Towards a Theory of Capitalist Crisis", New Left Review (Sept.-Oct. 1978), pp. 3-24.
- Ashcraft, Richard. "Class and Class Conflict in Contemporary Capitalist Societies", Comparative Politics (Jan. 1979), pp. 225-44.
- Atkinson, A. The Economics of Inequality. London: Oxford University Press, 1975.

Atkinson, A. "On the Measurement of Inequality", Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 2 (June 1970), pp. 244-63.

----- The Personal Distribution of Income. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1976.

Bachrach, Peter. The Theory of Democratic Elitism. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967.

Banks, Arthur (ed.). Political Handbook of the World. N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1979 and 1980.

Barkin, S. (ed.). Worker Militancy and Its Consequences, 1965-75. N.Y.: Praeger, 1976.

Barry, Brian. "The Consociational Model and Its Dangers", European Journal of Political Research, vol. 3 (Dec. 1975), pp. 393-411.

----- The Liberal Theory of Justice: A Critical Examination of the Principal Doctrines in "A Theory of Justice" by John Rawls. Oxford: Clarendon, 1973.

----- "Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy", British Journal of Political Science, vol. 5 (Oct. 1975), pp. 494-504.

Bedau, Hugo (ed.). Justice and Equality. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971.

Beer, Samuel. British Politics in the Collectivist Age. N.Y.: Knopf, 1966.

Beitz, Charles. "Economic Rights and Distributive Justice in Developing Societies", World Politics (April 1981), pp. 321-46.

Bell, D. The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. N.Y.: Basic Books, 1976.

----- The End of Ideology. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960.

----- "Meritocracy and Equality", The Public Interest (Fall 1972), pp. 29-68.

----- "The Revolution of Rising Entitlements", Fortune (April 1975), pp. 98-103, 182, 185.

Benard, Cheryl. "Migrant Workers and European Democracy", Political Science Quarterly, vol. 93 (Summer 1978), pp. 277-99.

- Bendix, R. and S. M. Lipset. Class, Status, and Power (2nd ed.). NY: Free Press, 1966.
- Berelson, Bernard et al. Voting. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954.
- Birch, Anthony. "Minority Nationalist Movements and Theories of Political Integration", World Politics (April 1978), pp. 325-44.
- Bettelheim, Bruno. "Some Reflections on the Kibbutz", in Curtis and Chertoff (eds.), Israel: Social Structure and Change. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1973, pp. 95-101.
- Bird, Richard. The Growth of Government Spending in Canada. Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1970.
- "Wagner's 'Law' of Expanding State Activity", Public Finances, vol. 26 (Jan. 1971), pp. 1-26.
- Black, C.E. The Dynamics of Modernization. N.Y.: Harper, 1967.
- Blackburn, Robin and Alexander Cockburn. The Incompatibles: Trade Union Militancy and the Consensus. London: Penguin, 1967.
- Blalock, Hubert. Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1964.
- "Four-Variable Causal Models and Partial Correlations", in Blalock (ed.), Causal Models in the Social Sciences. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971, pp. 18-32.
- Social Statistics (2nd ed.). N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1972.
- Theory Construction. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969.
- Blondel, Jean. "Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies", Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 1 (June 1968), pp. 180-203.
- Bonger, Willem. Criminality and Economic Conditions (abridged edition with introduction by Austin Turk). Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1969.
- Bornschier, V. et al. "Cross-National Evidence of the Effects of Foreign Investment and Aid on Economic Growth and Inequality", American Journal of Sociology, vol. 84 (1978), pp. 651-83.

- Bottomore, T.B. Classes in Modern Society. N.Y.: Random House, 1966.
- Boudon, Raymond. Education, Opportunity, and Social Inequality. N.Y.: Wiley, 1973.
- Boulding, K. Redistribution to the Rich and the Poor. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1972.
- Bowen, Ian. Acceptable Inequalities. London: Allen and Unwin, 1970.
- Braunthal, Gerard. "The Policy Function of the German Social Democratic Party", Comparative Politics, (Jan. 1977), pp. 127-45.
- Brittan, Samuel. "The Economic Contradictions of Democracy", British Journal of Political Science, vol. 5 (April 1975), pp. 129-59.
- Bronfenbrenner, Martin. Income Distribution Theory. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971.
- Browning, Edgar. "The Burden of Taxation", in Moroney (ed.), Income Inequality: Trends and International Comparisons. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1979, pp. 87-110.
- Budd, Edward (ed.). Inequality and Poverty. N.Y.: Norton, 1967.
- "Postwar Changes in the Size Distribution of Income in the United States", American Economic Review, vol. 60 (May 1970), pp. 247-60.
- Busch, Georg, "Inequality of Educational Opportunity by Social Origin in Higher Education", in Education, Inequality, and Life Chances (vol. I). Paris: OECD, 1975, pp. 159-81.
- Bwy, Douglas. "Political Instability in Latin America: The Cross-Cultural Test of a Causal Model", in Feierabend et al. (eds.), Anger, Violence, and Politics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972, pp. 223-41.
- Cameron, David. "The Expansion of the Public Economy", American Political Science Review, vol. 72 (Dec. 1978), pp. 1243-61.
- "Inequality and the State: A Political-Economic Comparison", paper delivered at annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Sept. 1976.
- "Capitalism: Is It Working?", Time, April 21, 1980, pp. 34-49.

- Caporaso, James. "Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the Global System: A Structural and Behavioral Analysis", International Organization, vol. 32 (1978); pp. 13-43.
- Cartier, Allan. Redistribution of Income in Postwar Britain. N.Y.: Kenniket Press, 1973.
- Castles, Francis. The Social Democratic Image of Society. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978.
- Castles, F. and Robert McKinlay. "Does Politics Matter: An Analysis of the Public Welfare Commitment in Advanced Democratic States", European Journal of Political Research, vol. 7 (June 1979), pp. 169-86.
- "Public Welfare Provision, Scandinavia, and the Sheer Futility of the Sociological Approach to Politics", British Journal of Political Science, vol. 9 (April 1979), pp. 157-71.
- Champernowne, D.G. "A Comparison of Measures of Inequality of Income Distribution", The Economic Journal, vol 84 (Dec. 1974), pp. 787-816.
- Chandler, William. "Canadian Socialism and Policy Impact: Contagion from the Left?", Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 10. (Dec. 1977), pp. 755-80.
- Chase-Dunn, C. "The Effects of International Economic Dependence on Development and Inequality: a Cross-National Study", American Sociological Review, vol. 40 (Dec. 1975), pp. 720-38.
- International Economic Dependence in the World System. Ph. D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1975.
- Chenery, H. et al. Patterns of Development, 1950-70. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Redistribution With Growth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974.
- Clement, Wallace. Continental Corporate Power: Economic Linkages between Canada and the United States. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1977.
- Cline, William. "Distribution and Development: A Survey of Literature", Journal of Development Economics, vol. 1. (1975), pp. 359-400.
- Potential Effects of Income Redistribution on Economic Growth. N.Y.: Praeger, 1972.

Cnudde, Charles and Donald McCrone. "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States", American Political Science Review, vol..63 (Sept..1969), pp.858-66.

Cnudde, C. and Deane Neubauer (eds.). Empirical Democratic Theory. Chicago: Markham, 1969.

Collier, Ruth and David. "Inducements versus Constraints: Disaggregating 'Corporatism'", American Political Science Review (Dec. 1979), pp. 967-86.

Connor, Walker. "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?", World Politics, vol. 24 (April 1972), pp. 319-55.

----- "The Politics of Ethnonationalism", Journal of International Affairs, vol. 27 (1973), pp. 1-21.

Cook, Chris and John Paxton. European Political Facts, 1918-73. London: Macmillan, 1975.

Coombes, David. State Enterprise: Business or Politics? London: Allen and Unwin, 1971.

Cooper, Richard. "Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies", World Politics, vol. 24 (1972), pp. 159-81.

----- The Economics of Interdependence. N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1968.

Corrado, Raymond. The Politics of Ethnicity. N.Y.: Marcel-Dekker, 1979.

Corrado, R. and Bert Rockman. "Welsh Nationalism and Sub-regional Inequality", in Grove (ed.), Global Inequality: Political and Socioeconomic Perspectives. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1979, pp. 197-218.

Cromwell, Jerry. "The Size Distribution of Income: An International Comparison", Review of Income and Wealth (Sept. 1977), pp. 291-308.

Crosby, Faye. "Relative Deprivation Revisited", American Political Science Review (March 1979), pp. 103-112.

Crouch, Colin and Alessandro Pizzorno (eds.). The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe Since 1968 (vols. I, II). N.Y.: Holmes & Meier, 1978.

Crouch, Colin. "The Drive for Equality: Experience of Incomes Policy in Britain", in Lindberg et al. (eds.), Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism. Toronto: D.C. Heath, 1975, pp. 215-41.

- Curtis, Micheal. "Utopia and the Kibbutz", in Curtis and Chertoff (eds.), Israel: Social Structure and Change. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1973, pp. 101-114.
- Cutright, Phillips. "Income Redistribution: A Cross-National Analysis", Social Forces, vol. 46 (Dec. 1967), pp. 180-90.
- "Inequality: A Cross-National Analysis", American Sociological Review, vol. 32 (Aug. 1967), pp. 562-78.
- "Political Structure, Economic Development and National Social Security Programs", American Journal of Sociology, vol. 70 (1965), pp. 537-50.
- Dahl, Robert (ed.). Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
- Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.
- A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956.
- Dahl, R. and Edward Tufte. Size and Democracy. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973.
- Dahrendorf, R. "Recent Changes in the Class Structure of European Societies", Daedalus (Winter 1964), pp. 325-41.
- Daniels, Nerman (ed.). Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls' A Theory of Justice. N.Y.: Basic Books, 1975.
- Davies, E.H. "Welsh Nationalism", Political Quarterly, vol. 39 (July-Sept. 1968), pp. 322-32.
- Davies, James. "Toward a Theory of Revolution", American Sociological Review (March 1962), pp. 5-18.
- Davies, Margery and Michael Reich. "On the Relationship between Sexism and Capitalism", in Edwards et al. (eds.), The Capitalist System: A Radical Analysis of American Society. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972, pp. 123-45.
- Davis, Kingsley. Human Society. N.Y.: Macmillan, 1949.
- Dawson, Richard and James Robinson. "Inter-party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States", Journal of Politics, vol. 25 (1963), pp. 265-89.

- Deppe, Rainer et al. "The Relationship between Trade Union Action and Political Parties", in Crouch and Pizzorno (eds.), The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe Since 1968 (vol. II). N.Y.: Holmes & Meier, 1978, pp. 177-96.
- Derber, Milton. "Histadrut and Industrial Democracy in Israel", in Curtis and Chertoff (eds.), Israel: Social Structure and Change. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1973, pp. 257-80.
- Deutsch, Karl. Politics and Government (2nd ed.). N.Y.: Harper, 1974.
- Deutsch, Karl and Bruce Russett. "International Trade and Political Independence", American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 6 (March 1963), pp. 43-61.
- DiPalma, Giuseppe. Apathy and Participation: Mass Politics in Western Societies. N.Y.: Free Press, 1970.
- "Disaffection and Participation in Western Democracies: The Role of Political Oppositions", Journal of Politics, vol. 31 (Nov. 1969), pp. 984-1010.
- "Eurocommunism", Comparative Politics (April 1977), pp. 357-75.
- Dodge, David. "Impact of Tax, Transfer, and Expenditure Policies of Government on the Distribution of Personal Income in Canada", Review of Income and Wealth, vol. 21 (March 1975), pp. 1-52.
- Dolan, Michael et al. "Foreign Policies of African States in Asymmetrical Dyads", International Studies Quarterly (Sept. 1980), pp. 415-49.
- Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. N.Y.: Harper, 1957.
- Dryzek, John. "Politics, Economic and Inequality: A Cross-National Analysis", European Journal of Political Research, vol. 6 (Dec. 1978), pp. 399-410.
- Dubin, Robert. Theory Building. N.Y.: Free Press, 1969.
- Dunn, J. "The Revision of the Constitution in Belgium", Western Political Quarterly, vol. 27 (March 1974), pp. 143-63.
- Duverger, Maurice. Political Parties (trans. by B. and R. North). N.Y.: Harper, 1959.

- Eckstein, Harry. "A Theory of Stable Democracy", in Feierabend et al. (eds.), Anger, Violence, and Politics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972, pp. 98-107.
- Eckstein, Otto (ed.). Studies in the Economics of Income Maintenance. Washington, D.D.: Brookings, 1967.
- Edelman, Murray. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana, ILL.: University of Illinois Press, 1964.
- Eldridge, J.E.T. "Explanations of Strikes: A Critical Review", in Eldridge (ed.), Industrial Disputes: Essays in the Sociology of Industrial Relations. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968, pp. 12-67.
- Emmanuel, A. "Myths of Development vs. Underdevelopment", New Left Review (May-June 1974), pp. 96-112.
- Enloe, Cynthia. Ethnic Conflict and Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown, 1973.
- Epstein, Cynthia. "Sex: Ascribed Inequality", in Thielbar and Feldman (eds.), Issues in Social Inequality. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972, pp. 597-609.
- Epstein, Leon. Political Parties in Western Democracies. N.Y.: Praeger, 1967.
- Esman, M. Ethnic Conflict in the Western World. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977.
- Esping-Andersen, G. "Social Class, Social Democracy, and the State", Comparative Politics (Oct. 1978), pp. 42-58.
- Etzioni, Amitai. "Societal Overload: Sources, Components, and Corrections", Political Science Quarterly, vol. 92 (Winter 1977-78), pp. 607-31.
- The Europa Yearbook. London: Martins, 1950-70.
- Facts-on-File: World News Digest. N.Y.: Facts-on-File, 1950-70.
- Fallers, Lloyd. Inequality: Social Stratification Reconsidered. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973.
- Farley, R. "Trends in Racial Inequalities: Have the Gains of the 1960s Disappeared in the 1970s?", American Sociological Review, vol. 42 (April 1977), pp. 189-208.
- FBI Uniform Crime Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government, 1970.

Feierabend, Ivo et al. Anger, Violence, and Politics.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972.

----- Assassination and Political Violence. staff report
to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention
of Violence, vol. 8. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government, 1969.

Fesler, James. "Approaches to the Understanding of Decentrali-
zation", Journal of Politics, vol. 27 (1965), pp.536-66.

Finsterbusch, K. "Recent Rank Ordering of Nations in Terms of
Level and Rate of Development", Studies in Comparative
International Development, vol. 8 (June 1975), pp.52-70.

Fisher, Malcolm. Measurement of Labour Disputes and Their
Economic Effects. Paris: OECD, 1973.

Form, W. and J. Huber. "Income, Race, and the Ideology of
Political Efficacy", The Journal of Politics, vol.33
(Aug. 1971), pp. 659-88.

"Four Big Court Decisions", Time, July 14, 1980, pp. 8-10.

Fox, Thomas and S.M. Miller. "Economic, Political and Social
Determinants of Mobility: An International Cross-Sectional
Analysis", Acta Sociologica, vol. 9 (1966), pp. 76-93.

Frank, Andre et al. (eds.). Dependence and Underdevelopment.
N.Y.: Anchor, 1972.

Fry, Brian and Richard Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution",
American Political Science Review, vol. 64 (June 1970),
pp. 508-22.

Fry, Earl and Gregory Raymond. The Other Western Europe: A
Political Analysis of the Smaller Democracies. Santa
Barbara, Calif.: Clio Press, 1980.

Fuchs, Victor. "Redefining Poverty and Redistributing Income",
The Public Interest (Summer 1967), pp. 88-95.

Galenson, Walter (ed.). Incomes Policy: What Can We Learn from
Europe? Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973.

Galtung, Johan. "The Social Sciences: An Essay on Polarization
and Integration", in Knorr and Rosenau (eds.), Contending
Approaches to International Politics. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1969, pp. 243-85.

----- "A Structural Theory of Aggression", Journal of
Peace Research (1964), pp. 95-119.

----- "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", Journal of Peace Research, vol. 8 (1971), pp. 81-117.

Gans, Herbert. More Equality. N.Y.: Pantheon, 1973.

Giddens, Anthony. The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies. London: Hutchinson, 1973.

Gilder, George. Wealth and Poverty. N.Y.: Basic, 1980.

Gillespie, John and Betty Nesvold (eds.). Macro-Quantitative Analysis. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1971.

Gillespie, W.I. "On the Redistribution of Income in Canada", in Harp and Hofley (eds.), Structured Inequality in Canada. Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1980, pp. 22-53.

Gilsdorf, Robert. "The Welfare State Syndrome in Western Europe", paper presented to the European Politics Group Workshop, London, Ontario, Dec. 1979.

Girling, Robert. "Dependency and Persistent Income Inequality", in Bonilla and Girling (eds.), Structures of Dependency. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973, pp. 83-101.

Glass, Harold. "Consensus and Opposition in Switzerland", Comparative Politics (April 1978), pp. 361-72.

Glazer, Nathan. Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy. N.Y.: Basic, 1975.

Glazer, N. and Daniel Moynihan. Ethnicity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975.

Goldberg, M.P. "The Economic Exploitation of Women", Review of Radical Political Economics, vol. 2 (Spring 1970), pp. 35-47.

Goldthorpe, John. "Social Inequality and Social Integration in Modern Britain", in Wedderburn (ed.), Poverty, Inequality and Class Structure. London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, pp. 217-34.

----- "Social Stratification in Industrial Society", in Lipset and Bendix (eds.), Class, Status, and Power (2nd ed.). N.Y.: Free Press, 1966, pp. 648-59.

Gonick, Cy. "Sociology and the Economics of Growthmanship", in Lapierre (ed.), Essays on the Left. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971, pp. 137-52.

Gough, Ian. "State Expenditure in Advanced Capitalism",
New Left Review, vol. 92 (July-Aug. 1975), pp. 53-92.

"Governments Being Enticed Further Into Business World",
(Toronto) Globe and Mail, March 3, 1979, p. B2.

Graham, Hugh and Ted Gurr (eds.). Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives. Washington, D.C.: National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 1969.

Greene, Thomas. Comparative Revolutionary Movements. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974.

Greenway, W.K. "Crime and Class in Canada: Unequal Before the Law", in Harp and Hefley (eds.), Structured Inequality in Canada. Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1980, pp. 247-65.

Griliches, Z. et al. Income Distribution and Economic Inequality. Toronto: Wiley, 1978.

Groth, Alexander. Comparative Politics: A Distributive Approach. N.Y.: Macmillan, 1971.

Grove, John. "Ethnic Socioeconomic Redistribution", Comparative Politics, vol. 12 (Oct. 1979), pp. 87-98.

----- "A Partial Test of the Ethnic Equalization Hypothesis", in Grove (ed.), Global Inequality: Political and Socio-Economic Perspectives. Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1979, pp. 135-62.

Gurr, Ted. "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices", in Feierabend et al (eds.), Anger, Violence, and Politics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972, pp. 184-222.

----- Politimetrics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972.

----- "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence", in Jackson and Stern (eds.), Issues in Comparative Politics. Toronto: Macmillan, 1971, pp. 285-307.

----- Rogues, Rebels, and Reformers. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976.

----- "Sources of Rebellion in Western Societies", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 391 (Sept. 1970), pp. 128-44.

----- Why Men Rebel. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970.

- Gurr, T. and R. Duvall. "Civil Conflict in the 1960s: A Reciprocal Theoretical System with Parameter Estimates", Comparative Political Studies, vol. 6 (July 1973), pp.135-69.
- Hancock, M.D. "Productivity, Welfare, and Participation in Sweden and West Germany: A Comparison of Social Democratic Reform Prospects", Comparative Politics (Oct. 1978), pp.4-22.
- Haniff, G.M. "Politics, Development and Social Policy", European Journal of Political Research, vol.4 (1976), pp. 361-76.
- Harp, John and John Hofley (eds.). Structured Inequality in Canada. Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1980.
- Harris, Alice and B. Silverman. "Women in Advanced Capitalism", Social Policy, vol. 4 (July-Aug. 1973), pp. 16-22.
- Haveman, Robert. "Poverty, Income Distribution, and Social Policy", Public Policy, vol. 25 (Winter 1977), pp.191-212.
- Hawkes, Roland. "Some Methodological Problems in Explaining Social Mobility", American Sociological Review, vol. 37 (1972), pp. 394-400.
- Headey, Bruce. "Trade Unions and National Wages Policy", Journal of Politics, vol. 32 (1970), pp. 407-39.
- Heclo, Hugh. Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974.
- Hechter, Michael. Internal Colonialism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.
- Heidenheimer, Arnold et al. Comparative Public Policy. N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1975.
- Heisler, Martin. "Ethnic Conflict in Belgium", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 433 (Sept. 1977), pp. 32-46.
- Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes in Some Postindustrial Democracies. N.Y.: McKay, 1974.
- Heller, Celia (ed.). Structured Social Inequality. N.Y.: Macmillan, 1969.
- Herzon, Frederick and Michael Hooper. Introduction to Statistics for the Social Sciences. N.Y.: Crowell, 1976.
- Hewitt, Christopher. "The Effect of Political Democracy and Social Democracy on Equality in Industrial Societies", American Sociological Review, vol. 42 (June 1977), pp.450-64.

----- "Majorities and Minorities: A Comparative Survey of Ethnic Violence", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 433 (Sept. 1977), pp. 150-60.

Hewlett, Sylvia. "Inequality and Its Implications for Economic Growth", in Horowitz (ed.), Equity, Income, and Policy. N.Y.: Praeger, 1977, pp. 29-48.

Hibbs, Douglas. "Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies", American Political Science Review, vol. 70 (Dec. 1976), pp. 1033-58.

----- Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis. N.Y.: Wiley, 1973.

----- "On the Political Economy of Long-Run Trends in Strike Activity", British Journal of Political Science (April 1978), pp. 153-76.

----- "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy", American Political Science Review (Dec. 1977), pp. 1467-87.

Hirschi, Travis and David Rudisill. "The Great American Search: Causes of Crime 1876-1976", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Jan. 1976), pp. 14-22.

Huntington, Samuel. "The Democratic Distemper", The Public Interest, vol. 41 (Fall 1975), pp. 9-38.

----- Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Husbands, C.T. and Roy Money. "The Cross-National Study of Inequality: A Research Note", American Sociological Review, vol. 35 (June 1970), pp. 319-25.

Hyman, Richard. "Industrial Conflict and the Political Economy", Socialist Register (1973), pp. 101-32.

----- "Occupational Structure, Collective Organisation and Industrial Militancy", in Crouch and Pizzorno (eds.), The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe Since 1968 (vol. II). N.Y.: Holmes & Meier, 1978, pp. 35-70.

----- Strikes. London: Fontana, 1972.

Hyman, R. and Ian Brough. Social Values and Industrial Relations: A Study of Fairness and Equality. Oxford: Blackwell, 1975.

- ILO. The Cost of Social Security. Geneva: ILO, 1972, 1976.
- Yearbook of Labour Statistics. Geneva: ILO, 1971, 1974.
- Ingham, G. Strikes and Industrial Conflict. London: Macmillan, 1974.
- Inglehart, R. et al. "Party Identification, Ideological Preference, and the Left-Right Dimension Among Western Publics", in Bridge and Creive (eds.), Party Identification and Beyond. N.Y.: Wiley, 1976, pp. 143-56.
- IMF. International Monetary Fund Balance of Payments Yearbook (vols. 13, 25). Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1962, 1974.
- International Financial Statistics. Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1972.
- INTERPOL. "International Crime Statistics", in Crimes of Violence, staff report submitted to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (vol. 11). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government, 1969, pp. 126-29.
- Isaacs, Harold. Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change. N.Y.: Harper, 1975.
- Isaak, Alan. Scope and Methods of Political Science. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1969.
- Isaak, Robert. European Politics: Political Economy and Policy Making in Western Democracies. N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1980.
- Jackman, Robert. "Political Democracy and Social Equality", American Sociological Review, vol. 39 (March 1974), pp. 29-45.
- Politics and Social Equality. N.Y.: Wiley, 1975.
- Jackson, Robert and Michael Stein (eds.). Issues in Comparative Politics. N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1971.
- Jacobs, Eric. European Trade Unionism. London: Croon Helm, 1973.
- Jain, Shail. Size Distribution of Income: A Compilation of Data. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1975.
- Jamieson, Stuart. Industrial Relations in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983.
- Jencks et al. Inequality. N.Y.: Basic, 1972.
- Kassalow, Everett. Trade Unions and Industrial Relations: An International Comparison. N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1969.

- Katz, D. "Satisfactions and Deprivations in Industrial Life", in Kornhauser et al. (eds.), Industrial Conflict. N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1954.
- Katznelson, Ira. "Considerations on Social Democracy in the United States", Comparative Politics (Oct. 1978), pp.77-98.
- Kaufman, Robert et al. "Preliminary Test of the Theory of Dependency", Comparative Politics, vol. 7 (1975), pp.303-31.
- Kelf-Cohen, R. Twenty Years of Nationalization: The British Experience. N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1969.
- Kerr, Clark et al. Industrialism and Industrial Man. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960.
- King, Anthony. "Overload: Problems of Government in the 1970s", Political Studies, vol. 23 (June-Sept. 1975), pp.290-95.
- Kirchheimer, Otto. "The Transformation of the Western European Party System", in LaPalombara and Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. 177-200.
- Kolko, Gabriel. Wealth and Power in America: An Analysis of Social Class and Income Distribution. N.Y.: Praeger, 1962.
- Kondor, Y. "Value Judgements Implied by the Use of Various Measures of Income Inequality", Review of Income and Wealth, vol. 21 (Sept. 1975), pp. 309-21.
- Kravis, Irving. "International Differences in the Distribution of Income", Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 42 (Nov. 1960), pp. 408-16.
- "A World of Unequal Income", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 409 (Sept. 1973), pp. 61-80.
- Kuznets, Simon. "Economic Growth and Income Inequality", American Economic Review, vol. 45 (March 1955), pp.1-28.
- "Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations, VIII: The Distribution of Income by Size", Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 11 (Jan. 1963), p.1-80.
- Lakoff, Sanford. Equality in Political Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964.
- Lane, Robert. "The Fear of Equality", American Political Science Review, vol. 53 (March 1959), pp. 35-51.

LaPalombara, J. "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation", American Political Science Review, vol. 60 (March 1966), pp. 5-16.

Lehmbruch, Gerhard. "Consociational Democracy, Class Conflict, and the New Corporatism", paper presented to the International Political Science Association, Jerusalem, 1974.

----- "Liberal Corporatism and Party Government", Comparative Political Studies, vol. 10 (April 1977), pp. 91-126.

Leibfried, S. "Public Assistance in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany: Does Social Democracy Make a Difference?", Comparative Politics (Oct. 1978), pp. 59-76.

Lenski, Gerhard. Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification. N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1966.

Lewis, H.G. "Labor Unions: Influence on Wages", in Sills (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (vol. 8). N.Y.: Macmillan, 1968, pp. 540-46.

----- Unionism and Relative Wages in the United States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.

Lewis, Michael. Culture of Inequality. Amherst: University of Mass. Press, 1978.

Lijphart, Arend. "The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research", Comparative Political Studies, vol. 8 (July 1975), pp. 158-77.

----- "Consociation and Federation: Conceptual and Empirical Links", Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 12 (Sept. 1979), pp. 499-515.

----- Democracy in Plural Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.

Kindberg, Leon et al. Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism: Public Policy and the Theory of the State. Toronto: D.C. Heath, 1975.

Lindblom, Charles. Politics and Markets: The World's Political Economic Systems. N.Y.: Basic, 1977.

Lippmann, Walter. Public Opinion. N.Y.: Macmillan, 1961.

Lipset, S.M. "Changing Class Structure and Contemporary European Politics", Daedalus, vol. 93 (Winter 1964), pp. 271-303.

- . Political Man. N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960.
- . "Social Mobility and Equal Opportunity", Public Interest (Fall 1972), pp. 90-108.
- . "Some Social Requisites of Democracy", American Political Science Review, vol. 53 (March 1959), pp. 69-105.
- Lipset, S.M. and R. Bendix. Social Mobility in Industrial Societies. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959.
- Lissak, M. Social Mobility in Israeli Society. Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1969.
- Loewenberg, J.J. "Histadrut: Myth and Reality", in Curtis and Chertoff (eds.), Israel: Social Structure and Change. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1973, pp. 249-56.
- Logue, John. "The Welfare State: Victim of Its Success", Daedalus, vol. 108 (Fall 1979), pp. 69-87.
- Lorwin, Val. "Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies", Comparative Politics, vol. 3 (Jan. 1971), pp. 141-75.
- Love, Roger and Michael Wolfson. Income Inequality: Statistical Methodology and Canadian Illustrations. Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1976.
- Lucas, J.R. "Against Equality", in Bedau (ed.), Justice and Equality. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971, pp. 138-51.
- Lustick, Ian. "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Con-sociationalism versus Control", World Politics, vol. 31 (April 1979), pp. 325-44.
- Lydall, Harold. "Some Problems in Making International Comparisons of Inequality", in Moroney (ed.), Income Inequality: Trends and International Comparisons. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1979, pp. 21-38.
- Machin, H. "The French Left Under the Fifth Republic", Comparative Politics (Oct. 1977), pp. 35-66.
- Mackie, T. and Richard Rose. International Almanac of Electoral History. N.Y.: Free Press, 1974.
- Macpherson C.B. Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval. London: Oxford University Press, 1973.
- . The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy. NY: Oxford University Press, 1977.

- Mahon, R. "Canadian Public Policy: the Unequal Structure of Representation", in Panitch (ed.), The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977, pp. 165-194.
- Mannheim, Hermann. Comparative Criminology (vol. 2). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965.
- Manzer, R. Canada: A Socio-Political Report. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1974.
- Marchal, Jean (ed.). The Distribution of National Income. N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1968.
- Markovits, Andrei and Samantha Kazarinov. "Class Conflict, Capitalism, and Social Democracy", Comparative Politics (April 1978), pp. 373-90.
- Marshall, T.H. Citizenship and Social Class. Cambridge: University Press, 1950.
- Class, Citizenship and Social Development. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1965.
- Martin, Andrew. "Is Democratic Control of Capitalist Economies Possible?", in Lindberg et al. (eds.), Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism. Toronto: D.C. Heath, 1975, pp. 13-56.
- Mayer, Kurt and Walter Buckley. Class and Society (3rd ed.). N.Y.: Random House, 1970.
- McRae, Kenneth (ed.). Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974.
- "Federation, Consociation, Corporatism", Canadian Journal of Political Science (Sept. 1979), pp. 517-22.
- Meckstroth, Theodore. "'Most Different Systems' and 'Most Similar Systems': A Study in the logic of Comparative Inquiry", Comparative Political Studies, vol. 8 (July 1975), pp. 132-57.
- Merritt, Richard and Stein Rokkan (eds.). Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
- Michels, Robert. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. N.Y.: Free Press, 1962.

- Mieszkowski, Peter. "Tax Incidence Theory: The Effects of Taxes on the Distribution of Income", Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 7 (Dec. 1969), pp. 1103-24.
- Milbrath, Lester. Political Participation. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965.
- Milbrath, L. and M.L. Goel. Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics (2nd. ed.). Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977.
- Miliband, Ralph. "Politics and Poverty", in Wedderburn (ed.), Poverty, Inequality and Class Structure. London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, pp. 183-94.
- The State in Capitalist Society. London: Quartet, 1969.
- Miller, Abraham et al. "Communications: Reply to Crosby", American Political Science Review, vol. 73 (Sept. 1979), pp. 818-21.
- "The J-Curve Theory and the Black Urban Riots: An Empirical Test of Progressive Relative Deprivation Theory", American Political Science Review, vol. 71 (Sept. 1977), pp. 964-82.
- Miller, S.M. "Comparative Social Mobility", Current Sociology, vol. 9 (1960), pp. 1-89.
- Miller, S.M. and Martin Rein. "Can Income Redistribution Work?", Social Policy (May-June 1975), pp. 3-18.
- Miller, S.M. and Pamela Roby. "Poverty: Changing Social Stratification", in Townsend (ed.), The Concept of Poverty. N.Y.: Elsevier, 1970, pp. 124-45.
- "Social Mobility, Equality, and Education", Social Policy (May-June 1970), pp. 38-40.
- Milner, Henry. "The Decline and Fall of the Quebec Liberal Regime: Contradictions in the Modern Quebec State", in Panitch (ed.), The Canadian State. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977, pp. 101-32.
- Milner, Murray. Illusion of Equality: The Effect of Education on Opportunity, Inequality, and Social Conflict. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1972.
- Mishler, William. Political Participation in Canada. Toronto: Macmillan, 1979.

- Mishra, Ramesh. "Welfare and Industrial Man: A Study of Welfare in Western Industrial Societies in Relation to a Hypothesis of Convergence", Sociological Review, vol. 21 (1973), pp. 535-60.
- Mitchell, Edward. "Inequality and Insurgency: A Statistical Study of South Vietnam", World Politics, vol. 20 (1968), pp. 421-38.
- Moroney, John. "Do Women Earn Less Under Capitalism?", in Moroney (ed.), Income Inequality. Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath, 1979, pp. 141-60.
- Morrison, D.E. and Ramon Henkel. The Significance Test Controversy. Chicago: Aldine, 1970.
- Morse, Edward. "Crisis Diplomacy, Interdependence, and the Politics of International Economic Relations", in Tanter and Ullman (eds.), Theory and Policy in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.
- Mosteller, F. and Daniel Moynihan. On Equality of Educational Opportunity. N.Y.: Vintage, 1972.
- Musgrave, Richard. Fiscal Systems. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969.
- Nagel, Jack. "Inequality and Discontent: A Nonlinear Hypothesis", World Politics, vol. 26 (July 1974), pp. 453-72.
- Nettler, Gwynn. Explaining Crime (2nd ed.). N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1978.
- Nicholson, J.L. "Distribution and Re-distribution of Income in the United Kingdom", in Wedderburn (ed.), Poverty, Inequality, and Class Structure. Cambridge: University Press, 1974, pp. 234-56.
- Nie, Norman et al. "Social Structure and Political Participation", American Political Science Review (June 1969), pp. 361-78.
- Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (2nd ed.). N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1975.
- O'Connor, James. The Fiscal Crisis of the State. N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1973.
- OECD Secretariat. Education, Inequality, and Life Chances (vols. I & II). Paris: OECD, 1975.

- . Group Disparities in Educational Participation and Achievement. Paris: OECD, 1971.
- . International Capital Movements in Selected OECD Countries. Paris : OECD, 1970-73.
- . National Accounts Statistics of Member Countries. Paris: OECD, 1968-71.
- Offe, Claus. "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation", in Lindberg et al. (eds.), Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism. Toronto: D.C. Heath, 1975, pp. 125-44.
- . "The 'Ungovernability' of Liberal Democracies", Studies in Political Economy (Spring 1980), pp. 5-16.
- Okun, Arthur. Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975.
- Oppenheimer, F.E. "Egalitarianism as a Descriptive Concept", American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 7 (1970), pp.143-52.
- Oppenheimer, Joe. "Small Steps Forward for Political Economy", World Politics (Oct. 1980), pp. 121-51.
- Orwell, George. Animal Farm. N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace, 1946.
- Oshima, Harry. "The International Comparison of Size Distribution of Family Incomes", Review of Economics and Statistics(Nov. 1962), pp. 439-45.
- . "The Share of Government in Gross National Product", American Economic Review, vol. 47 (June 1957), pp.381-90.
- Ozanne, Robert. "Impact of Unions on Wage Levels and Income Distribution", Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 73 (May 1959), pp. 177-96.
- Paglin, Morton. "Measurement and Trend of Inequality: A Basic Revision", American Economic Review, vol. 65 (1975), pp. 598-609.
- Paige, Jeffrey. "Inequality and Insurgency in Vietnam: A Re-Analysis", World Politics, vol. 23 (Oct. 1970), pp.24-37.
- Panitch, Leo (ed.). The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977.
- . "The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies", Comparative Political Studies, vol. 10 (April 1977), pp. 61-90.

- . "Ideology and Integration: The Case of the British Labour Party", Political Studies, vol. 19 (1971), pp. 184-200.
- . "Recent Theorizations of Corporatism: Reflections on a Growth Industry", British Journal of Sociology, vol. 31 (June 1980), pp. 159-87.
- . Social Democracy and Industrial Militancy. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
- Parkin, Frank. Class Inequality and Political Order. London: Paladin, 1971.
- . Marxism and Class Theory -- A Bourgeois Critique. N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1979.
- Parsons, Talcott. "Equality and Inequality in Modern Society, or Social Stratification Revised", Sociological Inquiry, vol. 40 (Spring 1970), pp. 13-72.
- Pateman, Carole. Participation and Democratic Theory. London: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
- Paterson, William and A. Thomas (eds.). Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe. London: Croom Helm, 1977.
- Paterson, W. and Ian Campbell. Social Democracy in Post-War Europe. N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1974.
- Paukert, Felix. "Income Distribution at Different Levels of Development", International Labour Review, vol. 108 (Aug.-Sept. 1973), pp. 97-125.
- Pechman, Joseph and B. Okner. Who Bears the Tax Burden? Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1974.
- Perlmutter, Amos. Military and Politics in Israel. N.Y.: Praeger, 1969.
- Peters, B.G. "Income Inequality in Sweden and the United Kingdom", Acta Sociologica, vol. 16 (1973), pp. 108-20.
- Peters, B.G. et al. "Types of Democratic Systems and Types of Public Policy", Comparative Politics (April 1977), pp. 327-54.
- Poulantzas, Nicos. Classes in Contemporary Capitalism. London: Verso, 1978.
- . Political Power and Social Classes. London: Sheed & Ward, 1973.

- Presthus, Robert. Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics. Toronto: Macmillan, 1973.
- Pryor, F. Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations. Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, 1968.
- Przeworski, Adam. "Material Bases of Consent: Economic and Politics in a Hegemonic System", Political Power and Social Theory, vol. 1 (1980), pp. 21-63.
- "Social Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon", New Left Review (Oct. 1980), pp. 27-58.
- Przeworski, A. and H. Teune. The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. N.Y.: Wiley, 1970.
- Radner, D.B. and J.C. Hinricks. "Size Distribution of Income in 1964, 1970, 1971", Survey of Current Business, vol. 54 (Oct. 1974), pp. 19-31.
- Rae, Douglas. "The Egalitarian State: Notes on a System of Contradictory Ideals", Daedalus, vol. 108 (Fall 1979), pp. 37-54.
- Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971.
- Rees, John. Equality. London: Pall Mall, 1971.
- Reischauer, Edwin. The Japanese. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977.
- Rejai, Mostafa (ed.). Decline of Ideology? Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971.
- Remba, Oded. "Income Inequality in Israel: Ethnic Aspects", in Curtis and Chertoff (eds.), Israel: Social Structure and Change. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1973, pp. 199-214.
- Reynolds, Morgan and E. Smolensky. "The Post-Fisc Distribution in 1961 and 1970", National Tax Journal, vol. 27 (Dec. 1974), pp. 515-27.
- Roberti, Paolo. "Income Distribution: A Time-Series and a Cross-Section Study", The Economics Journal, vol. 84 (Sept. 1974), pp. 629-38.
- Rokkan, Stein and Jean Meyriat. International Guide to Electoral Statistics. The Hague: Mouton, 1969.

- Rose, Richard. Electoral Behaviour: A Comparative Handbook. N.Y.: Random House, 1974.
- Rose, R. and Unwin. "Persistence and Change in Western Party Systems Since 1945", Political Studies (Sept. 1970), pp. 415-35.
- Ross, Arthur and Paul Hartman. Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict. N.Y.: Wiley, 1960.
- Rubinson, Richard. "The World Economy and the Distribution of Income Within States", American Sociological Review, vol. 41 (Aug. 1976), pp. 638-59.
- Rubinson, R. and Dan Quinlan. "Democracy and Social Equality: A Re-Analysis", American Sociological Review, vol. 42 (Aug. 1977), pp. 611-23.
- Rummel, R.J. Applied Factor Analysis. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970.
- Runciman, W.G. Relative Deprivation and Social Justice. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.
- Russett, Bruce. "Inequality and Instability", in Feierabend et al. (eds.); Anger, Violence, and Politics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972, pp. 125-35.
- Russett, B. et al. World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964.
- Safarian, A.E. "Foreign Direct Investment From a Canadian Perspective", in Axline et al. (eds.), Continental Community? — Independence and Integration in North America. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1974, pp.274-301.
- Santos, R.D. "The Structure of Dependence", The American Economic Review, vol. 42 (May 1970), pp. 231-36.
- Saul, John. "The Dialectics of Class and Tribe", Studies in Political Economy (Spring 1979), pp. 1-42.
- Sawyer, Malcolm. "Income Distribution in OECD Countries", OECD Economic Outlook (July 1976), pp. 3-36.
- Scase, Richard (ed.). Readings in the Swedish Class Structure. Toronto: Pergamon, 1976.
- Social Democracy in Capitalist Society. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1977.

- Scheuch, Erwin. "Cross-National Comparisons Using Aggregate Data: Some Substantive and Methodological Problems", in Merritt and Rokkan (eds.), Comparing Nations. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, pp. 131-67.
- Schmitter, Philippe. "Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Societal Change in Western Europe", Comparative Political Studies, vol. 10 (April 1977), pp. 7-38.
- "Still the Century of Corporatism?", Review of Politics, vol. 36 (Jan. 1974), pp. 85-131.
- Schnitzer, Martin. Income Distribution. N.Y.: Praeger, 1974.
- Scholten, Ilja. "Does Consociationalism Exist? A Critique of the Dutch Experience", in Rose (ed.), Electoral Participation: A Comparative Analysis. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980, pp. 34-74.
- Schregle, J. "Labour Relations in Western Europe: Some Topical Issues", International Labour Review, vol. 109 (1974), pp. 1-22.
- Schwarz, John. "The Scottish National Party: Nonviolent Separatism and Theories of Violence", in Feierabend et al. (eds.), Anger, Violence, and Politics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972, pp. 325-41.
- Selosse, J. "Statistical Aspects of Violent Crime", in Violence in Society, vol. 11 of Collected Studies in Criminological Research. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1974, pp. 1-60.
- Selvin, Hanan. "A Critique of Tests of Significance", American Sociological Review, vol. 22 (1957), pp. 519-27.
- Sewell, William. "Inequality of Opportunity for Higher Education", American Sociological Review, vol. 36 (1971), pp. 793-809.
- Shannon, Robin. "Inequality in the Distribution of Personal Income", in Education, Inequality and Life Chances (vol. I). Paris: OECD, 1975, pp. 109-58.
- Shatz, Eunice. Defense of Socially Structured Inequality. Waltham, Mass.: Brandeis University Press, 1972.
- Shonfield, Andrew. Modern Capitalism. London: Martins, 1965.
- Shostak, Arthur. Privileges in America: An End to Inequality? Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973.

Simeon, Richard. "Studying Public Policy", Canadian Journal of Political Science (Dec. 1976), pp. 548-80.

Simon, Herbert. "Spurious Correlation ; A Causal Interpretation", in Blalock (ed.), Causal Models in the Social Sciences. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971, pp. 5-17.

Singh, Baldev. "Measuring Cross-National Ethnic and Racial Inequality: Alternative Perspective", in Grove (ed.), Global Inequality. Boulder, Cl.: Westview, 1979, pp. 163-181.

Sleeman, J.F. The Welfare State: Its Aims, Benefits, and Costs. London: Allen & Unwin, 1973

Smith, Gordon. Politics in Western Europe. N.Y.: Holmes & Meier, 1973, 1980.

Smolensky, E. et al. "Postfisc Income Inequality", in Moroney (ed.), Income Inequality. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1979, pp. 69-82.

Smooka, S. and Y. Peres. "The Dynamics of Ethnic Inequalities: The Case of Israel", Social Dynamics, vol. 1 (June 1975), pp. 63-79.

"Socialism: Trials and Errors", Time, March 13, 1978, pp. 18-31.

Soltow, Lee. "Distribution of Income Related to Changes in Distribution of Education, Age, and Occupation", Review of Economic Statistics (Nov. 1960), pp. 432-46

Somerville, John and R. Santoni (eds.), Social and Political Philosophy. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963.

Stack, Steven. "The Effect of Direct Government Involvement in the Economy on the Degree of Income Inequality", American Sociological Review, vol. 43 (Dec. 1978), pp. 880-88.

----- "The Effects of Political Participation and Socialist Party Strength on the Degree of Income Inequality", American Sociological Review, vol. 44 (March 1979), pp. 168-71.

----- "Internal Political Organization and the World-Economy of Income Inequality", American Sociological Review, vol. 43 (1978), pp. 271-72.

----- "The Political Economy of Income Inequality: A Comparative Analysis", Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 13 (June 1980), pp. 273-86.

- Sturmthal, Adolf. Comparative Labor Movements: Ideological Roots and Institutional Development. Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth, 1972.
- Sullivan, John. "A Note on Redistributive Politics", American Political Science Review, vol. 66 (Dec. 1972), pp. 1301-5.
- Tawney, Richard. Equality (4th ed.). London: Allen & Unwin, 1964.
- Taylor, Charles and Michael Hudson. World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (2nd ed.). New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972.
- Taylor, Ian and Paul Walton (eds.). Critical Criminology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975.
- . The New Criminology. N.Y.: Harper, 1973.
- Terchek, Ronald. "Conflict and Cleavage in Northern Ireland", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 433 (Sept. 1977), pp. 47-59.
- Tertiary Education in Australia (Martin Report). Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1964.
- Thielbar, G. and Saul Feldman. Issues in Social Inequality. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972.
- Thurow, Lester. "Analyzing American Income Distribution", American Economic Review, vol. 60 (May 1970), pp. 261-69.
- . "Education and Economic Inequality", Public Interest (Summer 1972), pp. 66-81.
- . "A Theory of Groups: Which Age, Sex, Ethnic, and Religious Groups Are Relevant?", in Moroney (ed.), Income Inequality. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1979, pp. 169-82.
- Tinbergen, Jan. Income Differences: Recent Research. N.Y.: Elsevier, 1975.
- Titmus, Richard. Commitment to Welfare. London: Allen & Unwin, 1968.
- . Essays on the Welfare State. Boston: Beacon, 1963.
- . Social Policy. London: Allen & Unwin, 1974.
- Tobin, James. "On Limiting the Domain of Inequality", Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 13 (Oct. 1970), pp. 263-77.

- Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America. N.Y.: Vintage, 1954.
- Townsend, Peter (ed.). The Concept of Poverty. N.Y.: Elsevier, 1970.
- Tufte, Edward. Data Analysis for Politics and Policy. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974.
- Political Control of the Economy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978.
- United Nations. Demographic Yearbook. N.Y.: UN, 1950-70.
- Incomes in Postwar Europe: A Study of Policies, Growth, and Distribution. Geneva: U.N., 1967.
- Statistical Yearbook. N.Y.: UN, 1950-70.
- Supplement to the Statistical Yearbooks. NY: UN, 1979.
- Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. NY: UN, 1950-70.
- Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics. N.Y.: UN, 1950-70.
- Van Dyke, Vernon. "The Individual, The State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory", World Politics, vol. 29 (April 1977), pp. 343-69.
- Verba, S. and N. Nie. Participation in America. N.Y.: Harper, 1972.
- The Modes of Democratic Participation: A Cross-National Comparison. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1971.
- Vold, George and T. Bernard. Theoretical Criminology (2nd ed.). N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1979.
- Ward, Michael. The Political Economy of Distribution: Equality versus Inequality. N.Y.: Elsevier, 1978.
- Wedderburn, Dorothy. Poverty, Inequality and Class Structure. London: Cambridge University Press, 1974.
- Wilensky, Harold. The New Corporatism, Centralization, and the Welfare State. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976.
- The Welfare State and Equality. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.
- Wiles, Peter. Distribution of Income. N.Y.: Elsevier, 1974.

- Wilhoit, Francis. Quest for Equality in Freedom. Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1979.
- Williams, Bernard. "The Idea of Equality", in Laslett and Runciman (eds.), Philosophy, Politics, and Society. Oxford: Blackwell, 1962, pp. 110-31.
- Williamson, J.B. and J.J. Fleming. "Convergence Theory and the Social Welfare Sector", International Journal of Comparative Sociology, vol. 18 (Sept. 1977), pp. 242-53.
- Wilson, Frank. "French-Canadian Separatism", Western Political Quarterly, vol. 20 (March 1967), pp. 116-32.
- Wilson, G. Unions in American National Politics. N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1979.
- Winch, Robert and Donald Campbell. "Proof? No. Evidence? Yes. The Significance of Tests of Significance", in Morrison and Henkel (eds.), The Significance Test Controversy. Chicago: Aldine, 1970, pp. 199-206.
- Wolf, Preben. "Crime and Social Class in Denmark", British Journal of Criminology, vol. 13 (July 1962), pp. 15-17.
- Wolfe, Alan. "Has Social Democracy a Future?", Comparative Politics (Oct. 1978), pp. 100-125.
- Limits of Legitimacy. N.Y.: Free Press, 1977.
- Wolfe, David. "The State and Economic Policy in Canada, 1968-75", in Panitch (ed.), The Canadian State. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977, pp. 251-88.
- Wolfgang, Marvin. "Urban Crime", in Wilson (ed.), The Metropolitan Enigma. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 245-81.
- Wright, Erik Olin. "Class Boundaries in Advanced Capitalist Societies", New Left Review, vol. 98 (1976), pp. 3-42.
- Class Structure and Income Determination. N.Y.: Academic Press, 1979.
- Wright, E.O. et al. "Modes of Class Struggle and the Capitalist State", Kapitalistate (Summer 1976), pp. 186-220.
- Wright, E.O. and L. Perrone. "Marxist Class Categories and Income Inequality", American Sociological Review, vol. 42 (Feb. 1977), pp. 32-55.
- Zohar, David. Political Parties in Israel. N.Y.: Praeger, 1974.

END

3	0	H	0	8	H	8	2
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

FIN