Precarious work, "harmonizing down" and economic anxiety:
Implications for citizenship and society

by

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Abstract

This paper examines precarious work, its historical origins and certain social consequences. I use the 2015 Canadian Election Study to analyze the relationship between work-related insecurity and economic anxiety with voting, non-voting political behaviour and attitudes toward equity-seeking groups. I propose a theory of “harmonizing down”, in which workers who were once able to access the benefits and status of the standard employment relationship have generally seen their opportunities for stable and secure work decline. This has resulted in economic anxiety for most workers. Results were mixed, suggesting that broad generalizations around economic anxiety are problematic. Insecurity and anxiety may reduce the likelihood of voting but may increase non-voting participation. Some aspects of insecurity and anxiety were related to negative attitudes toward equity-seeking groups, but the relationship is not clear. Gender and political party identity influence these attitudes.

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That's his philosophy as I understand it. I could be making a Type I error.

This thesis is dedicated to anyone who is overworked and underpaid. It should not be that way.

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Executive Summary

Precarious work is well-known, but its outcomes are not well understood. This paper seeks to describe the political-economic context of precarious work and analyze its outcomes. Much research has been dedicated to showing that precarious work exists, and the matter seems settled, as the “standard employment relationship” (SER) has been waning for four decades, and precarious work has been around longer than the SER ever was, roughly 1945–1973. Indeed, precarious work predates the SER and is one of the oldest forms of labour under capitalism.

The SER, characterized by stability, security, decent wages and access to social benefits, rose under very specific relations of production and declined when those conditions shifted to more a more flexible regime of capital accumulation, leading to flexible labour. But in its short existence, the SER became entrenched as the normative model of employment, culturally, legally and politically. Many institutions of the welfare state were and still are based on the SER, although the SER has eroded significantly. Not only does this mean that those without the support of standard employment—full-time, permanent and secure—lack access to some social rights and entitlements that depend on the SER, but the SER’s legacy remains intact in the general social relations of society, although they have shifted under neoliberalism. In this paper, I explore the political economy of precarious work, its current scope and its potential outcomes on society. To do this, I use the 2015 Canadian Election Study, an electoral survey which offers variables specific to job insecurity and labour market insecurity, as well as economic anxiety more generally. It becomes clear that precarious work defies such conceptual niceties as clarity or boundaries and the threat of precarious work has the power to permeate the attitudes and

behaviour of those who are still lucky enough to have a good, stable job.

In this paper, I propose the general theory of “harmonizing down,” suggesting that those workers who most benefited from the SER due to their privileged location in society, have seen their employment security downgraded closer to the level of historically marginalized groups, especially women. This harmonizing down has consequences for society, because it suggests that the decline of the SER may signal the decline of other rights: the civil, political and social rights on which citizenship is founded, in particular the social right to participate as a full member of the community on terms of equality.

When it comes to voting, personal economic anxiety, fear and anger about the economy, as well as job insecurity had a significant and negative effect in one sample, obtained through a web survey, although other factors were more important. Negative perceptions about Canada’s economy overall, and perceptions that one’s personal financial situation had gotten worse also had a significant and negative effect on voting in a second sample, obtained through a phone survey.

In terms of non-voting political participation, most forms of economic anxiety, including fear and anger about the economy, and the sense of a worsening personal financial situation, as well as job insecurity, had a positive impact on passive political engagement, which includes internet-mediated political discussion and social media use, among other activities. Being male was related to reduced passive engagement. Labour market insecurity was related to reduced

active participation, such as volunteering or attending meetings, along with a lack of hope and a lack of enthusiasm about the economy. Gender did not have an impact on active engagement.

In the second sample, active and passive engagement activities were combined in a general engagement variable. Only perceptions of federal policies relating to Canada's economy overall were significant in relation to general engagement. More negative perceptions indicated more participation, although being male had a negative impact. Partisan engagement did not appear to be impacted by economic anxiety, job or labour market insecurity, or gender.

Attitudes toward various equity-seeking groups in society were complex. In one sample, both job insecurity and labour market insecurity were associated with more negative views toward all groups combined in a complex variable, as was being male. Political ambivalence, alienation and Conservative Party identity were also associated with more negative views. An inability to "get by" for long on limited savings was associated with more positive views, suggesting the possibility of solidarity among those who feel marginalized. Attitudes toward only racialized outgroups, including racial minorities, immigrants and Muslims were negatively impacted by a sense of anger about the economy.

In the same sample, attitudes toward individual equity-seeking groups were also mixed. Attitudes toward the LGBT community were negatively impacted by job insecurity, ambivalence, alienation, Conservative Party identity and being male. Attitudes toward feminists were negatively impacted by a lack of hope about the economy, being male, Conservative identity and being self-employed, although employment status rarely had an impact. Again, ambivalence and alienation were strong indicators of more negative views of feminists. Attitudes

toward Indigenous groups were negatively impacted by job insecurity and labour market insecurity, but positively impacted by low savings. Higher incomes and younger ages were also negatively related, contrary to other results. Being male, Conservative Party identity and ambivalence were also associated with more negative views of Indigenous people. Attitudes toward racial minorities were negatively impacted by job insecurity, anger about the economy Conservative Party identity, being male, ambivalence and alienation. Attitudes toward immigrants were not impacted by any job or labour market insecurities, and the emotional economic anxiety variables provided mixed effects. Ambivalence, alienation, being male and Conservative Party identity, however, were correlated with more negative attitudes while speaking English was correlated with more positive attitudes than speaking French. In fact, speaking English was correlated with more positive attitudes for every category of outgroup except for the LGBT community. Attitudes toward Muslims living in Canada were very similar to attitudes toward immigrants, with the exception that job insecurity was related to more negative attitudes and a lack of savings was related to more positive attitudes toward Muslims living in Canada.

Overall, in the first sample, which was obtained through the web survey, job and labour market insecurity are consistently related to negative attitudes. More ephemeral emotional attitudes about fear, anxiety, lack of hope or lack of enthusiasm had unstable effects. But those with a sense of insecurity about their employment are more likely to espouse restrictionist attitudes toward equity-seeking groups. Conservative Party affiliation, being male and a sense of ambivalence (agreeing that “people who don’t get ahead should blame themselves, not the

system”) or alienation (agreeing that “the government doesn’t care about what people like you think”) were also consistently linked to poorer attitudes toward equity-seeking groups.

In the second sample, obtained through the phone survey, results were again mixed. Negative attitudes toward all outgroups, combined in a complex variable, were associated with labour market insecurity, but positive attitudes were related to a negative perception of one’s personal financial situation and low savings. Conservative Party identity, being male, ambivalence and alienation were correlated with negative attitudes toward all outgroups combined. Attitudes toward only racialized outgroups were similar, although Conservative Party identity had no effect.

When the dependent variable was attitudes toward individual outgroups, similar results were produced by each model. In most cases, job insecurity and labour market insecurity did not have a significant impact, but party affiliation did, with Conservative Party identity consistently associated with more negative attitudes toward various individual outgroups, along with being male, ambivalence and alienation. Conservative Party identity did not have an impact on attitudes toward immigrants or Muslims living in Canada. Unlike most other groups, attitudes toward immigrants were negatively associated job insecurity and low savings, with the latter contrary to other findings.

It should not be surprising that precarious work, with its many dimensions, reveals complex and at times contradictory outcomes for society and for citizenship. Precarious work may be a motivating force for the exercise of such rights as free expression and association, but a de-motivating force for the exercise of political rights such as voting, and a negative force for

social cohesion and inclusion, which may lead to the restriction of those groups from social rights obtained by participating as full members of society. It is clear that some forms of precarious work restricts social rights through certain objective indicators, such as lack of access to employment insurance, adequate wages and regulatory protections.

Overall, the main findings of this analysis were that job insecurity and labour market insecurity are related to decreased voting, some increased participation, and more negative views to equity-seeking groups. Variables that were based on more ephemeral emotions and assessments were unstable and potentially lack validity, suggesting that while some subjective or affective measures of precarious work relating to job and labour market insecurity were consistent in their impacts, others should be interpreted with caution.

Ambivalence, alienation, gender and party affiliation are important factors for restrictionist attitudes, suggesting that these social trends must be observed carefully, as there is a risk that equity-seeking groups could be prevented from obtaining full membership in the community if these attitudes manifest in policy choices, public or even private actions.

In sum, the findings of this analysis suggest that the decline of the good, decent job and the ascent of insecure, precarious work are related to a weakening of citizenship, especially through the downgrading of social rights. Social rights are considered a broad range of economic rights that encompass economic welfare and security, as well as the right to share to the full in the social heritage of a community. Most troubling is the finding that workers who express job insecurity and labour market insecurity are also more likely to express negative attitudes to equity-seeking groups that have historically found themselves at the lower end of the labour

market, toward which more privileged workers are now “harmonizing down”. This poses the urgent question of whether these workers would, if empowered or permitted, seek to restrict the social rights and citizenship of others as well.

Introduction and Framework

1.1 Introduction to precarious work

In winter 2019, the so-called “yellow vest” protesters descended on major Canadian cities. Ostensibly, their claims for redress were based on outrage at new taxes, at politicians in general, and Liberal Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in particular. The Canadian iteration of the yellow vest movement, which started in France after a gasoline tax came into effect and was perceived as exacerbating income inequality, manifested most in Western Canada, where longstanding frustration with energy politics—specifically, the delay in building a new pipeline—had peaked. The protests spread across Canada and they took on new dimensions. “Keep Canada Canadian,” read one sign; “No to the U.N. global compact,” read another, referring to an international migration treaty; “Make Canada Great Again,” read some headwear, riffing on American nationalist and protectionist sentiments sown by the U.S. president; one protester told a news outlet she was disappointed “you’re not allowed to say Merry Christmas anymore” and that “they’re changing our country and we’ve got to stand up and say something about it because this is our country. I was born here. My parents were born here ... It's wrong” (Hames, 2019).

In short, the yellow vest protests delved into “anti-globalism, nationalism, anti-government sentiment and xenophobia,” of a style and tenor rather unfamiliar to Canada in recent years (Mosleh, 2019). Observers rushed to explain there was “a prevailing sense that the country is changing and it’s working-class Canadians who will be left behind” and that a “core element” of the protest movement was perceived status loss: “There are certain people in society

that feel like they're falling behind other people in society who don't look like or aren't like them" (Mosleh, 2019). The protests were not just about pipelines.

Not so long ago, scholarship was dedicated to whether political discourse over immigration took place at all, leading some to observe the fact "that immigration has not been a noticeable and politically divisive issue in Canadian federal elections has been a passing curiosity for many decades," even at a time when Canada admitted more immigrants per capita than any other industrialized nation, and when immigration had become or remained a divisive and conflictual political issue elsewhere (Black & Hicks, 2008, p. 242). Just over a decade ago, there may have been insufficient political space for parties to leverage any anti-immigration tendencies, latent or otherwise, in a populace previously known for its tolerance and overall positive attitudes towards multiculturalism and its institutional and political supports. Attitudes to immigration were rarely activated during election campaigns, and apparently had no impact on voting (Black & Hicks, 2008).

Kymlicka (2005) argued that while liberal-democratic multicultural institutions were prevailing, especially in Canada, variations against this norm elsewhere were typically rooted in a sense of risk: risk to law and order or moralistic claims thereto, risk to liberal norms, and risk to the welfare state. But Kymlicka had "no doubt" that "support for multiculturalism would rapidly and dramatically decline in Canada" under three circumstances: if the state started confronting large numbers of illegal migrants; if a high rate of immigration from countries with illiberal, or more specifically, non-Judeo-Christians practices—in the West, Muslim immigrants are most perceived as carrying this risk—and if immigrants became seen as an economic burden

on the state (Kymlicka, 2005, p. 82). Thus, Kymlicka argued any “free-floating anxieties about diversity” had been too diffuse to gather into public opposition and political action in Canada at the time. While illegal migration has since come to bear with irregular border crossings, the phenomenon has only taken shape very recently. Immigration from Muslim countries has increased only subtly: in 2001, 2.0 % of respondents to the National Household Survey described themselves as Muslim and by 2011, this figure rose to 3.2% (Statistics Canada, 2011). (Religion was not addressed in the 2016 population census). Kymlicka contended “free-floating anxieties about diversity”, including racism and xenophobia, deserved attention, lest they be gathered into more specific fears that fed into mobilized public opposition. This argument did not take into account risks to the economy per se; rather, any economic burden was conceptualized as something an individual immigrant would or would not import as an individual at a time when immigrants were seen as net contributors to the Canadian welfare state. On the other hand, in the ongoing struggle in Western democracies between public values of tolerance and public fears about diversity, the “outcome often depends on specific and contingent assessments of the risks involved” (Kymlicka, 2005, p. 85).

In the past decade, much has changed, and I argue this change is not only the economy itself, but Canadians’ contingent assessments of the economy—and their place within it—that has led to a newfound restrictionism. As such, it is not immigration that is the focus of my analysis but rather those free-floating anxieties that have solidified in recent years. In this sense, I take restrictionism to mean not only a closed-borders mentality to immigration, but also

restricted citizenship as envisioned by T.H. Marshall and access to its attendant rights, especially social rights.

Most profoundly, what has changed in recent years is a deepening awareness that, for many if not most people, the neoliberal economic system has not played out the way it was promised. Harvey (1989) recognized that flexibility, especially in labour markets, had become capitalism's operating logic under neoliberalism. This flexibility represented a radical shift from the previous Fordist-Keynesian arrangement in its entirety, including labour control practices, technological mixes, consumption habits, and configurations of political-economic power that developed around the turn of the century, established themselves in the postwar years, and declined in the mid-1970s. Globally, "flexible accumulation" emerged, resting on flexibility with respect to labour processes and the labour market in general, and subcontracting and temporary and part-time work in particular. The enduring era of market volatility and global competition, along with narrowing profit margins have led employers to take advantage of the weakened position of organized labour and push or enforce more flexible working regimes (Harvey, 1989). The entrenchment of this system of labour market flexibility and the end of labour's previous social contract—subordination for stability—has led to economic dislocation and economic insecurity pronounced by Standing (2011) as the cause of "anger, anomie, anxiety and alienation" among a growing "precariat" class.

Precarious work is a labour market outcome of flexible postindustrial economies, including Canada's, that have witnessed a downgrading of labour security in the age of globalization and is associated with growing inequality worldwide. Precarious work is related to

narrow definitions of non-standard employment (temporary, contract and part-time work as opposed to permanent, continuous and full-time) but integrates more than the terms of work, characterized as it is by uncertainty, low income, limited social benefits and few statutory entitlements (Vosko, 2010). These non-standard forms of work have increased since the 1970s, accelerating after the 1990s. At the heart of precarious work is the downgrading of previously established employment norms and attendant social rights. Precarious workers are mired in insecurity, often lack an occupational identity or the ability to control either their work or free time even as they continue to depend on waged labour for survival; “precariat” is a neologism made mainstream by Standing that combines precarity and proletariat, and in this sense may be considered a new and fragmented class that, rather than engendering working-class solidarity in the marxian sense, rather foments social disruption instead.

Bourdieu (1998) argued not only that job insecurity was everywhere, but that precarity from the restructured labour market amounted to a new mode of dominance over the working class under capitalism and led to social disarray. The term “precarious work” has become shorthand for the gig economy, the Uber driver, the unemployed autoworker, the tech specialist working on contract, the migrant farm worker, the airport employee whose wages and collective bargaining rights disappear when his employer’s contract is retendered, the skilled tradesperson whose workplace moves offshore, the part-time office worker, the basement-dwelling millennial who can’t find a decent job after completing her graduate degree, all of which signal a systemic lack of connection to broader community and social life. Durkheim (1951) described a form of social disarray emerging from economic and occupational restructuring as “anomie” which, on

the individual level, suggested social detachment and an opposition to social regulation, and which, on the macro level, suggested a disruption in the previously accepted upper and lower bounds of aspiration for each social class (Marks, 1974). Temporary, or acute, anomie resulted from periods of crisis or transition in which society, for a time, lost its regulating influence, while chronic anomie resulted from economic and occupational shifts. In the crisis or transition version of anomie, “mere membership” in society is responsible for the difficulty, such that “anomie here cuts across all specific roles; it is a societal problem, not one occurring because of structural deficiencies at the level of specific groups”; eventually this concept of anomie shed its temporary status and became seen as a fundamental condition of capitalist society (Durkheim in Marks, 1974).

While the standard employment relationship cannot be understood apart from its exclusions—especially of women, racialized and otherwise marginalized groups—those exclusions have neither disappeared with the end of the stable job and predictable workweek (Vosko, 2010). In fact, Harvey (1989) recognized this fact decades ago, noting that the only parity achieved by the end of the labour market monopoly previously held by white male unionized workers was through these workers’ increasing marginalization alongside those already long excluded. It is well established that precarious work, at least some varieties including especially temporary agency work, is most often undertaken by women and vulnerable workers (Vosko, 2000; Vosko, 2010; PEPSO, 2015; Mitchell & Murray, 2017). And while some forms of precarious work have always existed, and have traditionally been performed by women, immigrants and racialized groups, recent evidence suggests it has spread to all levels and all

demographic groups, although women and racialized groups are still paid less, on average, than white men (PEPSO, 2015). As such, the end of the SER is best considered a “harmonizing down” of more privileged and protected workers to the level of the historically more marginalized and less protected precarious worker (Vosko, 2010).

Precarious work arose during the age of globalization and neoliberalism, roughly 1973–onwards. A central tenet of neoliberalism that crystallized in the 1980s was that economic growth depended on labour market flexibility, or “an agenda of transferring risks and insecurities onto workers and their families” (Standing, 2014, p. 9). Other contributing factors, such as the collapse of manufacturing due to changes in technology, are partly responsible for the decline, as the labour market has shifted from industries with high unionization rates to those less associated with unions with their benefits and wage premiums, such as services and retail. Yet for most, there are few alternatives to work. In a broad critique of post-industrial, “post-Fordist” labour conditions and the productivist work ethic in advanced economies, Weeks argues that the “precarious position that so many workers find themselves in echoes that of Weber’s Puritan, whose restless anxiety and uncertainty kept his nose to the grindstone” (Weeks, 2011, p. 69). In this sense, the threat of job loss, made more of a threat by contraction of the welfare state, not only reinforces workers’ reliance on the wage system but also their uneasy compliance. Yet cobbling together multiple part-time jobs, drifting from contract to contract, or finding oneself suddenly downsized and underemployed, seeking a new employer—these may constitute waged employment but are not conducive to building the meaningful bonds with a broader community

necessary to engender social and political engagement, except perhaps among the similarly disenfranchised. This latter outcome is the basis of Standing's provocative warning.

While many worry that the further entrenchment of automation, the deepening of capital and the possible end of work itself will serve to exacerbate precarity, fears which may be linked to the recent return of a universal basic income to public discourse, as well as the emergence of various forms of populism, there has been little rigorous empirical analysis of the political and social consequences if those predictions comes true (Brynjolfsson, McAfee & Spence, 2014).

Kalleberg and Vallas (2018) argue that the “democratization of insecurity” can be particularly destabilizing for society, as formerly privileged workers “may feel a sense of relative deprivation which can fuel reactionary and populist movements in various ways” (p. 17). This may seem like common sense but has not been proven.

While the PEPSO research group (2015) described the “precarity penalty” on voting and community and household wellbeing, few other studies have considered the democratic consequences of precarious work (Näsström & Kalm, 2015). Inequality is long recognized as integral or even necessary to capitalism and precarity is not new. But if its newer form is seen as a clawback of previously attained rights, whether through collective agreements or social contracts, then its outcomes require new attention.

It remains to be seen how precarious work affects Canadian society and social relations at this moment under capitalism. Precarious work comprises multiple industries, labour relations, social arrangements, educational contexts and even generations, and is not captured in official statistics as a standalone category. It's an admittedly amorphous category, but this shapelessness

poses its own problem: almost anyone can imagine themselves fitting in, either at the moment or eventually, and as such, is less about objective job status than subjective beliefs about job status. A new understanding becomes increasingly critical in the post-industrial economies of late capitalism in which the stable, standard employment relationship is unlikely to return.

1.2 Research question

Because precarious work is not a standalone category and is not captured in official statistics, it is difficult to assess much about this form of work on its own. Instead, I am interested in the anger, anomie, anxiety and alienation that may result, as well as a sense of employment insecurity, and how they influence public life and social cohesion. Therefore, three research questions follow from these concerns and from the data available:

How does precarious work, defined for the purposes of this analysis as both economic anxiety and job insecurity, influence voting?

How does precarious work influence non-voting political behaviour?

How does precarious work influence attitudes toward groups in society?

Chapter 2: Literature Review

The literature on precarious work is broad, although its social and political consequences are underexplored. This section covers four areas: broadly, the political-economic rationale of precarious work, its historical emergence, its current scope, and more narrowly, and more briefly, the concept of citizenship and social rights, which may be at risk in the process of “harmonizing down” in the new world of work.

2.1 The political economy of “job churn”

To Bill Morneau, Canada’s Minister of Finance, “job churn” from short-term contract and other forms of precarious work should be accepted as an economic reality (CP, 2016). Globally, the International Labour Organization of the United Nations sounded a more cautionary note: steady, full-time and permanent work now represents less than one in four jobs internationally, and the rise of contingent employment has contributed to the widening of income inequalities, all of which have been recorded in the majority of countries over the past two decades. Moreover, the global economy no longer creates sufficient jobs for full employment, and much job growth is now precarious (ILO, 2015). While Morneau suggested the Canadian government needed to somehow deal with the “things underneath” the disappearance of stable work, those “things underneath” reflect profound, long-term labour market shifts scholars agree are unlikely to reverse course (Vosko, 2010; Kalleberg & Vallas, 2018). The powerful levers of these labour market shifts can be understood as the shift toward flexible capital accumulation, supported by globalization and technological change. These shifts began with the end of the postwar boom, along with its Fordist labour processes and standard employment relationship

(SER), which arose and fell away in a remarkably short period of time, yet which remain the normative model to which precarious work is often and necessarily compared. This was a “golden era” for workers, offering stability, decent wages, and reasonable opportunities for training and advancement, and job security was complemented by benefits, pensions, new regulations against arbitrary dismissal, protections for those wanting to join or form a union, and social programs such as employment insurance, public health care and child benefits (Lewchuck, Procyk & Shields, 2017). While Fordist production has dwindled significantly, its legacy in terms of the regular workweek, predictable wages and time off, benefits to support the state-provided social wage, the indeterminate employment contract and a sense of occupational identity, not to mention social stability on which a robust welfare state first consolidated, remain intact in the public imagination as the normative model and for many, the most desirable form of waged work, perhaps made more valuable today by its elusive status.

2.2 The political-economic rationale of precarious work: Flexible capital accumulation

Harvey (1989) locates the end of the postwar era and subsequent onset of “postmodernity” with the first worldwide recession of 1973; in later work, Harvey would describe this incoming era as neoliberal (2007). Postmodernity and neoliberalism encompass a transition to a more flexible regime of capital accumulation from one initially seen as providing stability and growth, but later seen as bound up in rigidity. A regime of accumulation refers to some form of stability in the modes of consumption and accumulation, in the conditions of production and in the social reproduction of wage earners, and its materialization and stability require members of society and social processes to form the norms, habits, laws and networks to

ensure the unity of the process, including consistency in individual behaviours, for such a time as the regime remains intact and until it is supplanted by a new one (Harvey, 1989).

To Harvey (1989), any regime of accumulation rests on what he calls the total package of relations, “social and psychological propensities, such as individualism and the drive for personal fulfillment through self-expression, the search for security and collective identity, the need to acquire self-respect, status or some other mark of individual identity, all play a role in shaping modes of consumption and life-styles” (p. 123). The socializing forces of labour control that habituate workers to the waged labour process are many, and include education, training, persuasion, the mobilization of certain social sentiments, such as the work ethic, loyalty, national and local pride, in addition to those social and psychological propensities, and are “plainly mixed” with prevailing ideology (Harvey, 1989). During the postwar boom, lasting from 1945 to 1973 and generally known as the Fordist-Keynesian era, the regime of accumulation was based on industrial production and the \$5, eight-hour workday under Fordism, which was inaugurated in 1914 but galvanized after the war, and ushered in its own mode of living, thinking and feeling life (Gramsci cited in Harvey, 1989). The SER was settled as the ideal type, as it bolstered familial arrangements with a family wage set high enough to support dependents, provided a legal platform in the employment contract and forged a psychological contract based on employers’ and workers’ shared beliefs in mutual obligation and risk-sharing (Vosko, 2010). The notion of a compact, or settlement between labour and capital, has been linked with the social

contract of the rights and obligations arising from citizenship—the relationship between an individual and the state—in liberal democratic theory.

Liberal democratic state formation during the postwar period was generally concerned with full employment, economic growth and the welfare of all citizens. Governments invested in infrastructure, healthcare and education, extended the social wage, protected collective bargaining rights and adopted Keynesian monetary policies. Leaders held that that state power could and should be deployed to achieve these ends, financed if necessary through state expenditure and deficit spending to boost demand and consumption; in other words, market processes faced constraints, and it was these constraints that were undone in varying degrees by neoliberalism in the years following 1973 (Harvey, 2007).

The Fordist-Keynesian system, including the SER that brought so many blue-collar and later white-collar workers, led by white males, into the middle classes, was also a system of rigidity: of fixed exchange rates, of fixed capital costs, of fixed labour allocation and labour contracts. A period of stagflation ensued; states abandoned the principle of full employment while corporations entered a period of rationalization and restructuring of production processes, including automation and forays into less-regulated labour markets (Harvey, 1989). In general, these actions brought about a period of flexible accumulation: flexibility in relation to labour processes and labour markets, the financialization and mobility of capital, and technological and organizational innovation, including offshoring, downsizing and the rise of the service sector, which is local in nature and cannot be outsourced. In a regime of flexible accumulation, capital can exert its enhanced power over labour in its weakened oppositional position, and employers

pushed for more flexible labour contracts and work regimes, including an increased reliance on temporary and part-time work, subcontracting and a diminished “core” of full-time, permanent employees who are seen as central to the organization’s long-term future. The result was a widening pool of peripheral labour, providing numerical flexibility with little security in return, mostly there to benefit employers through costless layoffs after inflections of peak production. Many scholars have pointed out the exclusions of the SER resulted in a labour market dualism that was not solved by flexibility but was rather rearranged according to a new logic, as marginalized workers were not suddenly seen as core employees, but workers formerly seen as core employees were suddenly marginalized.

At the same time, formerly stable exchange rates were abandoned in favour of the flexible exchange system in 1973, submitting all nation states to “the mercy of financial disciplining” (Harvey, 1989, p. 165), signaling the end of Keynesian economics and any lingering commitment to the ideal of full employment. Since that time, Western governments have become more ideologically aligned with fiscal conservatism and non-intervention in markets, supported by the move from more collective norms and values engendered with Fordism to a more competitive individualism. Prevailing ideology under flexible accumulation has tended to be neoliberal, which rests on the principle that individual freedom is located in and guaranteed by the freedom of the market; the neoliberal state is one that protects the freedoms and interests of private property and capital, and the neoliberal labour market is rather free of regulation and state interference, meaning the labour-capital equilibrium under neoliberalism has

tilted toward capital, undoing the labour-capital compromise of the postwar period (Harvey, 2007).

Overall, the effect has been that the social contract and mode of labour control were transformed, although the contours of its newest iteration is less sharply defined. Labour control depends in part on powerful socializing forces that habituate workers to the waged labour process, and Harvey's "total package of relations" and its mode of living, thinking and feeling life suggest an enduring attachment to the SER's bygone norms and lifestyles that cannot simply be abandoned by workers with new forms of work (Harvey, 1989, p. 123). While Harvey provides a clear framework for understanding the rise and fall of the SER, and while he appropriately acknowledges its limits, drawing a link between those historically excluded from its rise and unrest in the form of the civil rights and feminist movements, there is little mention of the potential for social dislocation after its fall.

Weil (2014) offers a firm-level examination of how flexible accumulation, led by the financialization and mobility of capital and spurred by technological change, led to a "fissured workplace" and permitted the growth of precarious work in the U.S. and elsewhere. The fissured workplace is not predicated on actual production, but one based on restive capital markets that force companies to focus on profits and shareholder returns. In this conception, firms shed most of the activities deemed peripheral to their core competencies and competitive advantage, while maintaining their branding and quality standards through the intense monitoring of subcontracted, franchised or subsidiary business units. Weil suggests that about 80% of American jobs that were previously the responsibility of lead companies, such as hotels and

automakers, have now been subcontracted or otherwise offset through fissuring since the 1980s. By contracting out these services, such as janitorial, security and administration, and later, even management and manufacturing, firms require other, smaller companies to compete for contracts for those tasks and choose based on the lowest bid, which is typically obtained through the lowest labour costs; this amounts to a “hidden transformation of work” and the invention of new or renewed corporate forms such as franchises, subcontracting and global supply chains (Weil, 2014, p. 5). Whereas flexible accumulation may have taken off with globalized competition, the fissured workplace suggests intensifying domestic competition as well.

The results for workers are significant: downward pressure on wages, murkiness around which entity bears responsibility for the workforce, an increased incidence of labour standards violations and overall precarious working conditions, while boosting corporate profits (Weil, 2014). Labour standards in the U.S. and elsewhere, including Canada, are still based for the most part on a direct employer-employee relationships, but in the fissured workplace, risk is now shifted on to workers, often cast as “independent contractors”, who are nonetheless dependent on the subsidiary company for work and wages yet are left without labour protections or recourse for their violation. And ultimately, where lead companies once shared gains with their employees, these gains are today mostly shared by investors: “fissuring leads to growing inequality in how the value created in an economy is distributed” (Weil, 2014, p. 9). Weil suggests that most analyses of contingent employment, precarious work and worker insecurity are unsatisfactory in that they provide a list of culprits for the problem—international competition, technological change, financialization and mobility of flexible capital—but fail to

address why and how these factors led to the growing adoption of corporate practices and strategies to create precarious forms of work. For Weil, the two factors working in concert are both flexible capital markets and the technological innovations that permit coordination and monitoring. In short, mobile and financial capital and the “harsh stewardship of capital markets” beginning in the 1970s, forced corporations to focus on short-term profits, especially and often through the influence of “impatient” institutional investors and private equity firms that force restructuring on firms and in some cases, take control of operations, as well as performance-based executive compensation linked to stock prices: “the efficient market model of financial markets holds that the value of shares reflects the markets take on a company’s underlying value and future prospects”, a belief that has directed modern organizational and management norms (Weil, 2014, p. 45). Technological change has made distribution and coordination easier, leading to the advent of “just in time” inventory, app-based and internet-mediated services and the strict monitoring of standards. Here, firms “want to have it both ways” by increasing value and expanding profits, and decreasing costs through shrinking employment (Weil, 2014, p. 12). It is clear to Weil that technology is only a tool of flexibility and that the flexibility demands of capital are the true driving force behind the restructuring of labour control.

While it remains up for debate in some quarters whether the profit motive is myopic or efficient, it is true that the shift to mobile and financial capital under the regime of flexible accumulation led firms to an intense focus on core activities and incentives to downsize the rest. Meanwhile, labour is undertaken in isolation or smaller companies with less oversight, reducing or eliminating the possibility of collective action and the ability of workers to negotiate their

wages or working conditions. Large firms once employed a variety of staff, from cleaners and office workers to skilled technicians and shop-floor workers, with whom gains were shared, in part because perceptions around fairness have always impacted employee morale, retention and labour disputes. Fissuring, which began in the 1980s, eliminates this process for firms by converting labour costs from a wage-setting problem to a price-setting problem. It erases the worker from the calculation and with it, the need for concessions to labour.

Weil agrees that “the fissured workplace is here to stay. The ethos of fissuring has become embedded in how companies think and how markets operate” (2014, p. 287). But the analysis is preoccupied with labour regulation and standards at the policy level and neglects to consider how workers might think and operate, or the social consequences of the loss of previous gains from those collective actions and the labour-capital compromise; namely, stability and security.

2.3 Historical emergence of precarious work and decline of the SER: Same track, different directions

Much research on precarious work and the end of the SER has focused on simply showing whether and to what extent these changes are taking place. That much seems settled (Mitchell & Murray, 2017; Katz & Krueger, 2017; Vosko, 2000; Vosko, 2010). What is less well understood is the position of these forms of work in the history of capitalist labour markets, a position that clarifies the significance of both the emergence of precarious work and the decline of more stable and secure forms. The breakdown of the Fordist-Keynesian system brought about a period of rapid flux, uncertainty, new systems of production and marketing, more flexible

labour practices and markets and the global mobility of capital (Harvey, 1989). The SER must be understood as limited in time (roughly 1945–1973), place (industrialized capitalist economies) and social location (mostly white men). When it comes to contingent work and the so-called gig economy, which seems modern and unusual—imagine the novelty of ordering a taxi with a few taps on a touch-screen phone, then getting someone to deliver a parcel or build a website with the same device—should be considered not only the product of futuristic technology, but also recalled as a return to older, less protected forms of work and labour extraction that favoured capital in the labour-capital equilibrium: “these practices are as old as capitalism, perhaps even older [...] the reversion to more precarious or contingent forms of work can be understood as a response by employers to changed economic and social conditions within which that labour extraction function is performed” (Stanford, 2017, p. 383–384). Piece work, which is the basis of today’s gig work, predates even capitalism, but casual, seasonal, contract and day labour were the predominant forms of paid work as capitalism first took hold (Stanford, 2017). At the turn of the previous century, workers had virtually no protections. It is the SER itself that should be seen as an historical anomaly that only arose with a particular confluence of factors, such as postwar growth, the expansionist state, centralized production, and production-based capital accumulation, all of which have reversed course. Postwar growth was itself an historical anomaly (Piketty, 2014). The creation of centralized production under Fordism wrought social and legal reforms due to the necessity of stability and reciprocity between employees and employers at that historical juncture, due to the capital demands of intensified mass production requiring centralized labour control and coordination. In addition, Keynesian economic policies

precluded the underemployment that now permit the growth of a contingent workforce. Digital technology was not the catalyst for precarious work; it only made the SER simpler to undo. Stanford's case study is Uber, which is compared to the putting-out system in early capitalism in which a merchant would supply materials that would be crafted into textiles on-demand by a homemaker and returned to the merchant for sale. In both cases, the worker supplies the tools but the merchant owns the material necessary for the exchange. In both cases, the system of production displaced the one before, whether taxi cartel or guild system.

Stanford (2017) makes a compelling argument that the SER, though it offered a regularized, predictable arrangement of labour extraction, one more favourable for the economic security of those performing the labour necessary to its success, is the historical exception to the precarious, tumultuous world of work. But Stanford acknowledges that, over time, "labour market institutions evolved to reflect and reinforce the SER as the normative benchmark of employment practices" legally and politically, but also socially as workers' expectations around fair treatment, stable employment, entitlements and benefits continue to revolve around the SER and what is considered a good job (2017, p. 389). The gap between the normative benchmark and the type of jobs available to many workers today are exacerbated by labour market institutions that are still structured around the benchmark but do not encourage or require the benchmark to be met. And while as little as half of all production takes place within the bounds of the SER, it remains the normative benchmark because it reflects what Harvey called the "total package of relations" required to implement labour control under capitalism, and the mode of living, thinking and feeling life rooted in those relations. However, Stanford sees a new social

and psychological propensity emerging in these relations, one promoted by modern political culture, that having a job—any job—is a privilege. Others, such as Standing, predict a much more hostile trend.

In one of the first major Canadian analyses of precarious work, Vosko (2000) firmly locates its emergence in the underlying logic of capitalist labour markets as a form of work that predates the SER and always existed alongside the SER. Many scholars point out that the SER arose in under the Fordist-Keynesian regime of capitalism, but in a case study of the history and evolution of the temporary help agency, Vosko argues that the SER and precarious work have always run on the same track in different directions. Temporary help agencies emerged in the 19th century but gathered acceptance in the postwar era in a concerted effort to bring back into the labour market women who had been displaced from their wartime roles, and this form of work remained dominant for decades, initially staffing white-collar white women in clerical positions and later expanding to other sectors and even staffing entire departments. In this sense, the decline of the SER represents not only the casualization of work, but also the “feminization” of work.

Here, “women’s work” is recognized as caretaking as opposed to breadwinning, and although these gendered arrangements were surely integral to the SER, more importantly women’s work is classified in terms of its chief characteristics; that is, contingent, temporary and insecure. Thus, the entry of more workers into precarious work represents a “harmonizing down” of secure male workers into more feminized and casual forms of work in which both men and women are now reflected in labour market dualism and its expansion at the lower levels (Vosko,

2000, p. 39). While men became accustomed to the SER in the postwar era, this security was rarely granted to women, and while the decline of the SER amounts to qualitative changes in the conditions of work endured by many workers today, male and female, the “feminization” of employment norms more broadly refer to historically gendered positions in the labour market (Vosko, 2000). Recent empirical evidence suggests this is the case. Men’s tenure and job quality has declined relative to women’s, especially that of older white men, the group that was once most protected; in addition, the real wages of men in the U.S. fell or stagnated over three decades since the 1970s, although overall their wages and job quality remain higher than women’s (Kalleberg & Vallas, 2018; Kalleberg, 2011). By the 1980s, men’s wages in Canada were declining for the first time in seven decades (Vosko, 2000). Lewchuk, Procyk and Shields (2017) argue that this represents “a convergence in gendered patterns of employment precarity” in Canada; in the “heyday” of the SER, white men had greater access to secure employment, while women and racialized people generally entered the labour market in less secure jobs. But increasingly, men have found less security in manufacturing jobs and women have found more security in public sector jobs, which has narrowed the gap. The PEPSO (2015) study found men were more susceptible to precarity, likely for this reason, and while women have made some gains, racialized workers still remain more likely to find themselves in the most precarious forms of work (Shakya & Premji, 2017; Mitchell & Murray, 2017; Vosko, 2010).

Today, the feminization/casualization of work has become known as precarious work. Standing (1989) argued the “global feminization of labour” was characterized by not only women’s entry into the labour market, but also the increase in jobs with little occupational or

wage mobility in a more flexible workforce with lower fixed costs; this phenomenon was tied to the political-economic agenda of privatization, deregulation, trade liberalization and export-led industrialization that characterized the global economy at that time, especially in the Global South, and amounted to a relocation of labour; Vosko (2000) argues feminization of labour is in fact a reallocation of labour, domestically and internationally, to more casual forms of work that are low-wage, low-status and low-stability, forms which we would now consider precarious.

Because the SER did not just exclude women, but also racialized, immigrant and Indigenous workers of both genders, Vosko (2010) later takes up the analysis of these categories of exclusion, but mostly in the sense of transnational migrant workers whose access to social benefits are limited by their citizenship status. By hiring migrant workers, employers can externalize certain costs, including dismissal and payroll deductions for social benefits, through repatriation or its threat; in other words, employers can “use migrant labour to reduce labour costs directly through the provision of lower wages or indirectly through ‘organizational flexibility’ (e.g. ease of hiring and firing)” (Vosko, 2010, p. 12). In Europe especially, migrants form a growing mass of precarious workers who lack legal status, although Canada has been somewhat immune to this and has moved to restrict the number of workers who are neither citizens nor permanent residents, at least formally (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2017). I return to the citizenship argument below, but in light of this, it is perhaps best to

cast the theoretical process of casualization not as strictly feminization but rather as the “harmonizing down” of privileged workers toward the level of equity-seeking worker.

The key point is that historically, as states abandoned Keynesian economics and the goal of full-employment at a time when labour market rigidity was blamed for complex economic issues and flexibility was touted as the solution, this harmonizing down is associated with the rise of non-standard work in various forms—self-employment, temporary and part-time work along with income and occupational polarization that is one facet of labour market dualism—which began to outpace the SER in the 1970s. But “perhaps because of the lack of coherence among non-standard forms of employment, as well as the material and ideological force of the postwar welfare state’s mediation of central tensions in capitalist labour markets, the SER remains a pivotal reference point in defining non-standard forms of employment and their associated entitlements” (Vosko, 2000, p. 29); as such, they should not be seen as a new normative model but a deviation from the previous model, defined by what they are not. Despite its limited temporality, the SER remains the basis for labour legislation and regulation and social policy in Canada. In addition, a post-SER imaginary has not truly emerged in 2019, and only now are governments grappling with this issue (Mitchell & Murray, 2017; Government of Canada, 2019). Finally, it is conceptually tempting to perceive harmonizing down as impacting men to a greater extent, if the casualization of labour truly amounted to “more of the same” for most women, but clear gendered segregation remains in terms of occupations and wages and previous exclusions cannot be seen as irrelevant or de-centered from the discussion of precarious

work; however, it is also true that harmonizing down may render in men, particularly white men, a deeper or more precipitous sense of disenfranchisement that should not be ignored.

Public pressure is now inducing governments to make some incremental regulatory changes, such as prohibiting the misclassification of employees as independent contractors in order to avoid payroll deductions, although nearly all Canadian social policy, such as unemployment insurance, public pensions and labour standards remain embedded in the SER. But the SER remains embedded in many workers. While the SER was normative, not universal, its normative status suggests its enduring appeal. In harmonizing down theory, Vosko (2000) offers a framework through which to understand the processes that led to the creation of precarious work and erosion of the SER, although she does not posit a theory of their social and political consequences. However, Vosko does elaborate precarious work in the context of freedom in the wage relation and the loss of freedom through the commodification of labour power, which ultimately may bring about the social dislocation claimed by Polanyi (1957) as the “price of progress” in the transition to market society, but can also be presumed in the transition within market society. Indeed, the “second machine age” and digital revolution are predicted to have as wide-reaching and yet-unknown social impacts as the Industrial Revolution itself (Brynjolfsson, McAfee & Spence, 2014).

The tendency to commodify is inherent in capitalism, chasing as it does profits and accumulation, and this tendency is permitted to intensify with the decline of security and freedom in the wage relation, whether through collective bargaining or individual wage negotiations (Vosko, 2010). This has implications for the exercise of workers’ rights, especially

vis-à-vis the powerful regime of flexible accumulation under neoliberalism, which I have shown led to a labour market restructuring that is unlikely to be undone. While neoliberalism's roots are American and British, Canada has always been seen as an archetypical Anglo-Saxon liberal welfare state, which resists decommodification and effectively restrains the realm of social rights (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The impact of neoliberalism cannot be overstated, and should be seen not only as an ideology of market freedom, but an economic and policy doctrine that equates market freedom with human freedom and individual choice, opposing all collective arrangements that interfere with markets, including those that benefit or protect workers, and pressures states to weaken or permit the weakening of labour regulation and income supports, thus leaving workers all the more dependent on employers, if not traditional employment (Kalleberg & Vallas, 2018). By 1994, labour market flexibility became an integral part of the OECD's strategy to reduce unemployment in industrialized countries and mitigate against offshoring to more lax legal jurisdictions in the Global South. By pursuing flexibility, governments relaxed employment contract regulations, cut social benefits and modified collective bargaining rights, "favouring the individualization of employment relations" (Benach et al, 2014). This certainly has implications for the social rights of workers.

2.4 Current scope: The trouble with terminology

Definitions of precarious work abound, and conflate concepts of employment status, insecurity and class. Non-standard work is considered that which deviates from the standard employment relationship, in the form of part-time, fixed-term temporary, temporary agency, dependent self-employment and gig work masquerading as independent contracting. Vosko

(2010) has provided the most comprehensive definition of precarious work, which is characterized by some combination of uncertainty, low income, limited social benefits and statutory entitlements; it varies by and is shaped by employment status (employment or self-employment), form (hours, tenure and duration of work), dimension of insecurity (degree of uncertainty, degree of regulatory coverage, control over the labour process itself, working conditions, wages, and collective bargaining agreement coverage), social context (occupation, geography, industry) and social location (gender, social status, citizenship status). Not all non-standard work is precarious and analytically relying on objective employment status or form alone is likely to be misleading as it fails to incorporate a dimension of insecurity. On the other hand, individual subjective perceptions of insecurity may also mislead, as these are compounded by personal characteristics, social location and political context. Kiersztyn (2018) notes that these conceptual difficulties lead to measurement challenges and there remains considerable debate as to whether a precariat class, characterized by both objective and subjective insecurities, truly exists. Most empirical research attempts to capture either non-standard employment relations or subjective insecurity, but the concept of precarity remains abstract: “it appears to serve as a convenient catch-all word in current social critiques and political debate, rather than as a basis for systematic empirical analysis” (Kiersztyn, 2018, p. 93). Two separate strands of literature have developed, objective and subjective, but with few attempts to reconcile them; both

have tended to ignore the profound cultural changes brought about by the individualization of economic risk under these circumstances (Kiersztyn, 2018).

Standing (2011) has offered an evocative definition of precarity, one that acknowledges its multidimensions, but one that fails to empirically support his claim that a precariat class exists. He claims that a precariat class will soon find itself at the centre of Canadian life, and estimates it represents up to 40% of the Canadian adult population:

[The] perpetual part-timers, the minimum-wagers, the temporary foreign workers, the grey-market domestics paid in cash, the young Canadians who will never have secure employment, the techno-impooverished whose piecemeal work has no office and no end, the seniors who struggle with dwindling benefits, the Indigenous people who are kept outside, the single mothers without support, the cash labourers who have no savings, the generation for whom a pension and a retirement is neither available nor desired (Standing, 2015).

Standing (2011) also offers a seemingly endless number of disappearing securities: labour market security, or full employment; employment security, or hiring and firing regulations; job security, or retention and advancement; work security, or health and safety rules; skill reproduction security, or training and upgrading; income security, or assurance of a stable income and inclusion in the social safety net; representation security, or a collective voice and the right to strike. Precarious workers fare badly in most respects. A contract worker lacks full employment and may never advance or obtain a more permanent position; a part-time worker is unlikely to qualify for unemployment insurance or benefits, a temporary worker can be let go suddenly at no cost to her employer. All could receive wages below subsistence levels, none are likely to receive benefits or pensions, none can predict their employment status in a year, much less a decade. Young workers especially experience delays to achievement and life stages known

as “employment scarring,” such as putting off buying a home and starting a family (Worth, 2016).

The multifaceted nature of the phenomenon means the scope of the problem is difficult to quantify. No official agency tracks precarious work, but measures of temporary and part-time work and self-employment are illustrative. Kiersztyn (2018) found that non-standard employment increased the likelihood of affective job insecurity, or the belief one’s job could be lost within six months, and employment insecurity, or the combination of job loss and job replacement insecurity. Labour market insecurity, or the belief that a job could not be replaced with a comparable job, was reported equally by standard and non-standard workers, suggesting a lack of uniform effects based on employment status.

Statistics Canada began tracking temporary work in 1997, when 11.3% of jobs were considered temporary. In 2016, 13.6% of jobs were temporary, and within that category, seasonal jobs—once considered more predictable—have declined and casual and more irregular temporary jobs have filled the gap, especially in sectors such as culture, education, and food services. While permanent jobs remain more common, growth in temp work has outpaced regular work: 14.2% growth between compared to 3.8% growth 2009–2012. Young people 15–24 are three times more likely than older workers to hold temporary jobs (Grant, 2013; Statistics Canada, 2016). The number of men and women aged 25–53 engaged in full-time work declined

significantly between 2005–2015, from 63.3% to 56.2% for men, and from 46.4% to 43.7% for women (Johal and Yalnizyan, 2018).

Working less than 30 hours per week in Canada has increased from 12.5% in 1976 to 19.2% in 2016, statistics that mask the fact women work part-time at twice the rate as men, 26.4% versus 12.6 percent in 2016. Part-time work among youth 15-24 who are not students has also increased dramatically, from 21.1% in 1976 to 48.3% in 2016, which rose alongside youth unemployment generally. Women have always been more likely to work part time, but both men's and women's rates have increased in the past four decades. Male part-time work has doubled since 1976 to 11.9% (Statistics Canada, 2017). Women are also more likely to report self-employment and holding multiple jobs, which have both increased since the 2008 recession (Statistics Canada, 2017a).

Self-employment is difficult to measure with official statistics, as this category includes independent professionals such as physicians, as well as low-paid gig workers who are technically independent contractors. This distinction is evident in earnings: in 2005, nearly four out of five self-employed Canadian workers earned less than \$20,000 per year while 3% earned more than \$100,000 (Statistics Canada, 2009). Self-employment rose sharply in the 1980s, steadily through the 1990s and plateaued in the 2000s, and not only rose faster during recessionary periods but maintained those gains. The long-term rise is attributable to self-employed without employees, Statistics Canada's measure of independent contractors as opposed to true entrepreneurs, although neither is protected by labour standards as they are not considered employees (Statistics Canada, 2009). The self-employed without employees rose in

Ontario has nearly doubled in four decades, from 6% of the workforce in 1976 to 10.6% in 1997, and 10.9% in 2015 (Mitchell & Murray, 2017).

In terms of income concentration, the share of income accrued to top earners has risen for decades, although fell somewhat after the 2008 financial crisis. In Canada, the share of income earned by the top 1% rose from 7.6% in 1978 to 11.6% in 2014 (Statistics Canada, 2018).

Median income, minimum wage and average hourly earnings have changed little over the same period (Statistics Canada, 2016a; Statistics Canada, 2014). Real wages have also not kept pace with productivity. Between 1976 and 2014, median real hourly earnings grew by just 0.09% per year while labour productivity grew by 1.12 per year per year over the same period. This gap can be attributed to several factors: rising earnings inequality; rising relative prices for consumer goods and subsequent deteriorating of labour's purchasing power; and a decline in the labour share of income (Uguccioni et al, 2016). Uguccioni et al found that earnings inequality over this period is mostly attributed to "hollowing out the middle" with rising incomes at the upper and lower ends of the distribution and stagnation at the median (2016). At the same time, the top 1% of Canada's income earners have captured 37% of total income growth over the past three decades. A "prevailing sense of middle class malaise" may be attributable to wage growth that has failed to keep pace with labour productivity growth, especially when conventional wisdom and economic theory have created the expectation that labour productivity gains would also generate rising living standards for workers over time (Uguccioni et al, 2016, p. iii). The decoupling of real median wage growth and aggregate labour productivity growth has been observed across the OECD over the past two decades and this observed decoupling is partly

explained by declines in labour's share of the national income since the 1980s in most advanced economies (ILO & OECD, 2015). One significant outcome of these structural changes is labour market polarization, in which the labour market is "increasingly bifurcated between highly skilled, high-wage 'winners' and low-wage 'losers'" (Uguccioni et al, 2016, p. 20). A declining labour share of income also indicates increasing returns to capital relative to labour, which is associated with long run inequality, and also provides some evidence for the view that the return of less protected forms of work and labour extraction indeed favours capital in the labour-capital equilibrium.

In the analysis that follows, it becomes clear that current objective markers available in Canada are insufficient to capture precarity in its many subjective and objective dimensions. It is important to note that precarity in part implies a deprivation of rights, which many workers may not even comprehend until faced with a crisis or situation in which their labour rights, which are really legal rights, have been violated. Most empirical analyses have tended to follow the objective stream, since non-standard arrangements can be considered decent proxies for precarity; research has shown that temporary workers, for example, have been shown to be worse off in terms of wages and benefits than standard employees (Kiersztyn, 2018; OECD, 2015). Ideal survey measures would combine objective job specifics with some measure of insecurity and social location; these ideal instruments do not exist. The most appropriate Canadian instrument, the Canadian Election Study, is by no means ideal, although it does offer markers of affective insecurity associated with job loss and the ability to replace that job with a comparable

one, but does not adequately capture objective markers such as employment status or tenure. This is discussed in later sections.

In short, to better understand precarity, objective and subjective indicators of employment insecurity, which combines job and labour market insecurities, need to be explored with future research, along with research examining the social and political consequences of these insecurities. Individual-level impacts on well-being are well-documented, with precarious work shown to have deleterious impacts on mental and physical health, including high blood pressure, higher rates of workplace injury, working while ill and episodes of depression; it is now considered a social determinant of health (PEPSO, 2015; Benach, 2014).

Kalleberg and Vallas (2018) argue that the consequences of precarious work are not limited to the individual or the workplace, but there remains a wide gap between prevalence and understanding and questions related to the sphere of non-work, including the family, community and everyday life are in no way settled. Standing (2011) predicts worldwide upheaval through collective refusal, possibly followed by a utopian reconfiguration of social relations; Bourdieu (1998) predicts a sense of political quiescence through the eradication of any belief in a better future, which individuals require in order to rebel against present conditions. Both believe pervasive precarity in its internalized form could be revolutionary, but with dramatically different outcomes. The consequences of harmonizing down have yet to be documented.

2.5 Citizenship and social rights

Restrictionism derives from attitudes toward immigration, but in this analysis, I take restrictionism to mean the withholding or restriction of access to citizenship as conceived by

Marshall, especially social rights (1950/1992). Marshall claimed that democratic citizenship can be divided into civil, political and social rights, which historically rose chronologically and built on one another, based on different institutions: the courts, the political system and the welfare state. Civil rights include personal liberty, property rights, freedom of speech, freedom of association, and the right to work. Political rights include the right to participate in the democratic exercise of political power. Social rights, or the right to assert all rights on terms of equality, refer to a broad range of economic rights that not only facilitate access to the first two but also encompass “the whole range, from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security, to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (Marshall, 1950/1992, p. 16). Marshall saw rights as always existing, then recognized by some, usually men and the upper classes, and then recognized by all, usually women and the lower classes, in a process that can be seen as “harmonizing up”. He did not predict retrenchment, but rather saw the status of citizenship as “an urge toward a fuller measure of equality, an enrichment of the stuff of which the status is made, and an increase in the number of those on whom the status is bestowed” (Marshall, 1950/1992, p. 18). In this sense, citizenship’s full membership in the community is an expansionist, not restrictionist, ideal.

Marshall argues that social rights had sunk to a vanishing point in the 18th and 19th centuries and should be considered a 20th century phenomenon, which aligns with the historical progress of the labour market and SER outlined above. Citizenship as a system of equality only truly arose with the advent of capitalism, a system of inequality. Social rights were the project of

class-abatement, and Marshall argued that class inequality and citizenship were twinned but opposing forces, with social rights in their modern form representing the subordination of the market price to justice. While Marshall was skeptical of many forms of social welfare, he advocated for the abolition of hereditary privilege in favour of equality of opportunity, which he found largely in the sphere of education and by extension, occupation, as well as universal healthcare, housing and what we would recognize today as progressive social policies. To Marshall, the success of social rights at the time were evident in the decrease in income inequality; the expansion in the availability of a common culture in comparison to the early years of capitalism and before that, feudal society; and the broadening of the universal status of citizenship (Marshall, 1950/1992). Status differences were permitted, if they occurred in a fundamentally egalitarian society. Inequalities were seen as “dynamic”, creating incentives that spring from a sense of dissatisfaction; on one hand, this dissatisfaction could be applied to change and betterment of one’s social position if equality of opportunity was available, but if social stratification persisted, “social ambition ceases to be a normal phenomenon, and becomes a deviant behaviour pattern” (Marshall, 1950/1992, p. 44). In the end, Marshall predicted that citizenship would make inequality more difficult to preserve over time.

Marshall was concerned with equality and “real income,” which led workers to accept wage differentials in exchange for sharing in the social heritage and a civilized life. For most people, the labour market was and remains their sole source of access to real income. In fact, Marshall saw working, and working hard, as a duty, especially in the context of postwar

reconstruction and its conditions of full employment. (He also predicted an end to the desire to earn “big money”, which has clearly not borne out).

Marshall’s contribution to citizenship theory must be understood from the perspective of postwar reconstruction, Keynesian welfare economics and redistribution policies, all of which have been subsumed by the emergence of neoliberalism that created a new political framework “in which governments were no longer committed to the universalistic principles of social rights, a comprehensive welfare state, and full employment” in favour of a reduction in state intervention, freer trade and deregulation of the labour market (Isin & Turner, 2007). Today, while some social rights are secured outside the labour market in the welfare state, most are necessarily obtained through the economic system.

Marshall’s theory has been rightly critiqued for its centering of the white male citizen—not to mention the supposed drive to become a “gentleman”—and any modern analysis of citizenship that includes Marshall must go beyond Marshall (Turner, 1997). Today, a sociological approach to citizenship in the Marshallian tradition is concerned with the allocative function of citizenship; that is, sorting out “how the institutions of citizenship protect individuals and groups from the negative outcomes and unintended vagaries of the market in a capitalist society,” and, crucially, how “citizenship controls the access of individuals and groups to scarce resources in society” (Turner, 1997, p. 6), or the right to assert all rights on terms of equality.

Although Marshall mostly saw social rights as access to education and state entitlements, Turner (1997) describes social rights as uneven access to economic, cultural and political resources, conferred by economic, cultural and political rights, the recognition of which creates

from its inception an inclusion/exclusion model of allocation notwithstanding the democratic principles of egalitarianism and equality: “the first thing to emphasize about citizenship is that it controls access to the scarce resources of society and hence this allocative function is the basis of a profound conflict in modern societies over citizenship membership criteria” (p. 7). In other words, the allocation function of citizenship as it plays out within democratic societies is mediated by capitalism; under capitalism, citizenship and the economic, cultural and political resources stemming from its social rights are meted out based on inherently exclusionary criteria. Under Fordist-Keynesian relations, this was certainly true; under flexible accumulation, it has potentially become more true for more people as formerly privileged workers undergo the process of harmonizing down.

A second major critique of Marshall’s theory is that he proposed a citizenship that is always cumulative: once civil, political and social rights were obtained, these rights could not be rescinded or undone during future struggles. But Turner pointed out two decades ago that an emerging debate centered on “whether previous rights can be sustained in a society which is more and more dominated by the needs of the market-place under the rhetoric of economic rationalism” (Turner, 1997, p. 14). Notably, Marshall believed that the right to work, not just to toil but to follow the occupational path of one’s choosing in the place of one’s choice, was a civil right that developed with the end of the guild system and was essentially capitalist. Marshall did not predict the welfare state would override market freedom but would rather ameliorate the dangers of its unfettered form. The movement toward equality was a double one, operating partly through citizenship in its universal application, and partly through the economic system which

was necessarily structured on unequal grounds, or social justice combined with economic necessity (Marshall, 1950/1992).

This finds echoes in an argument later made by Polanyi (1957), though rooted in a different philosophy, that the development of capitalism required a “double movement”: as the market was extended for real commodities, the market for fictitious commodities, including labour, would have to be limited. Labour was a fictitious commodity because it cannot be produced and stored, only reproduced, and its human nature required some form of protection from the market, despite and because of its commodification under capitalism; this limiting of the labour market took the form of standards, regulation and social rights. The commodification of labour is seen as one of the central contradictions of capitalism; while labour power is bought and sold, it remains attached to the free person. Further contradictions emerge from labour’s disadvantage in the equilibrium with capital, as workers cannot control their supply and therefore cannot set the price of labour power, and more centrally, the need to reproduce the worker at a morally acceptable standard of living is always opposed to the drive for accumulation, a contradiction that is perpetually unstable and requires state intervention (Vosko, 2000). Mediating the contradiction of labour as a commodity is necessary not only to protect the worker, but to preserve the operation and legitimacy of the market. On this point, Marshall was clear: social justice must be combined with economic necessity.

But today, it is less clear that previous rights can be sustained such that the cumulative effect of citizenship can proceed in the way Marshall conceived, when the economic conditions underpinning his argument have so evidently shifted in the direction of commodification. Under

neoliberal conditions of precarious work, the operation and legitimacy of the market, or economic necessity, is secured at the cost of social justice and the egalitarian principles that support citizenship. On one hand, neoliberalism protects civil rights, especially property rights and the right to contract, but precarity downgrades the right to work. Political rights may be affected if precarious workers are less able to exercise political power effectively, including by voting and participating in community decisions through participation or collective action, which is circumscribed already by de-unionization. Social rights are diminished when precarious work blocks access to that modicum of economic welfare and security and the right to live as a full member of the community, according to the standards prevailing in society. It is this last point that bears the closest resemblance to the decline of the SER, which remains the normative model not only of work, but of the total package of relations conferred by the SER and its mode of living, thinking and feeling life established under the previous regime of production and accumulation.

Standing (2012) sees this diminishing of rights, which Vosko described as harmonizing down, as a backward transition, from full citizen to denizen, which in modern parlance is taken to mean not migrants with limited rights ascribed to them by a foreign government, but rather “groups who have lost rights within the country of their birth. The denizen is somebody who has a more limited range of rights, and weaker entitlement to them, than the citizen” (Standing, 2012,

p. 590). Of the rights potentially circumscribed under precarious working conditions, the right to live the life of a civilized being according to prevailing standards in society is most at risk.

It is useful to quote Standing (2012) at length here, while noting that his work is more polemic than theory:

Societies are emerging in which a growing number of people are denizens—insider outsiders—lacking basic social, political, cultural and economic rights. These trends accentuate civic privatism, a disengagement from social and behavioral norms, coupled with a grating anger towards the state, which is seen as letting them down, ignoring them or actively discriminating against them. (p. 598).

It is also empirically true that some precarious work prevents access to certain aspects of the welfare state. For example, qualification for unemployment insurance in Canada is determined by the number of hours worked, up to 700 in some regions, which is viewed as prohibitive to many temporary and part-time workers. This “leaves many claimants little choice but to accept precarious employment as a means of financial survival” (Grundy & Rudman, 2018, p. 809). The rationale of the favourably insurable worker who has worked more hours and is therefore more deserving of benefits is one based on neoliberal ideas that more progressive benefits produce rigidities in the broader labour market and is associated with 90s-era retrenchment of benefits in Canada. Grundy and Rudman (2018) argue such restrictive measures “aim to cultivate the attitudes and behaviours associated with neoliberal virtues of flexibility, entrepreneurialism and individual responsibility,” which are “increasingly central to the operation of low wage, precarious labour markets” (p. 812). On the other hand, workers who are classified as independent contractors are not considered employees and have no access to any

benefits, let alone pay into a pension, while welfare provides an unlivable wage. In terms of labour standards, many precarious workers either have no access, or no recourse for their violation (Weil, 2014). It is clear that precarious work is undertaken, for many people, without many of the forms of social protection that have come to be expected and even demanded, and that confer social rights onto the worker. This runs in the opposite direction of Marshall's original, more expansionist and more cumulative vision that was developed during a time when the market for labour was more limited, and therefore less commodified, by standards, regulation and social rights.

While some workers today still have protections and rights, including under the SER, they remain relatively unfree because of the commodity status of labour power; however, the degree of unfreedom in the wage relation is also measured by the ascribed rights of the worker—in other words, their level of protection from the free market (Vosko, 2000). This is why the rise of precarious work must be viewed in concert with the end of the SER: as protection from the free market has eroded in the past few decades, more workers have seen their rights diminish. Perhaps this is why so many fear immigrants taking their jobs; workers intuitively realize they are made less free in more precarious forms of work with little protection from the free market, and fear harmonizing down to those most precarious levels.

After all, precarity can be understood as both a material and psychological vulnerability, characterized by a general state of insecurity that cuts across traditional divisions of social class and status, and even pressuring those inside the protected sphere to guard their interests (Bourdieu, 1998). Citizenship, more broadly conceived, is at risk when citizens must subvert any

collective or community impulses in order to secure their own well-being, security and survival, leading to a competitive, protectionist and individualistic spirit (Näsström & Kalm, 2015; Standing, 2011). Further, the struggle over citizenship is no longer one of juridical status or finite economic and political resources, but a struggle over claims to identity and belonging in society, and such claims “[control] the access of individuals and groups to scarce resources in society” (Turner, 1997, p. 6).

Standing’s depiction of the precariat class was a call to action and mobilization, and an effort to convince disparate groups they were equally exploited; more specifically, one particular concern was to reveal to native citizens their security was not threatened by immigrant or migrant workers, but rather to see themselves similarly framed as victims of neoliberalism such that they could form collective action on this basis, rather than succumb to xenophobia (Näsström & Kalm, 2015; Standing, 2011). On the grounds that precarious workers who, due to their fragmented status, find it systemically difficult to work collectively toward a common goal, Näsström and Kalm (2015) conclude that precarious work is incompatible with citizenship.

However, the actual outcomes of such a reconfiguring of citizenship is unknown. If we think of citizens as gathered on an island with a productive land base ever diminished by a rising tide of inequality and joblessness, we can consider whether these citizens are likely to restrict or expand access to anyone wishing to step on shore, and permit or deny them the right to assert all rights on terms of equality. Will anyone be pushed back into the sea?

While individualism and self-protection and are the hallmarks of neoliberal society, work and citizenship are not a zero-sum game; neither is citizenship necessarily a scarce resource,

although it seems clear that we are not moving toward an ever-fuller measure of equality. But I am interested in the perceptions of those who feel anxiety over the size of the island and the scarce resources available there. It remains to be seen how the economic anxiety and job insecurity that arrive with precarious working conditions play out in the social health of the community or in political life. Another important question is whether those who fear harmonizing down will welcome not only outsiders but also the equity-seeking groups who may be perceived as harmonizing up. I turn to these issues in the following chapters.

Chapter 3: Data Source, Survey Design, Variables and Analytic Methods

3.1 Data source: Canadian Election Study, 2015

To address the research questions, several surveys were considered. It was necessary to select a relatively recent survey, because non-standard and precarious work are modern concepts that entered the North American vernacular around the 1990s. Crucially, any survey instrument employed in this analysis required three elements pertaining to Canadian voter data: voting and non-voting political behaviour; attitudes toward equity-seeking groups; and some combination of work status and job insecurity, employment insecurity and labour market insecurity indicators, as well as some measure of economic anxiety.

The 2013 General Social Survey (GSS) includes questions regarding political participation such as voting, expressing views, volunteering and attending a public meeting, but does not ask about work status and actually conflates employment and self-employment, which likely masks dependent contractors who may be misclassified in that role, or unwilling independent contractors who lack economic and job security in many dimensions. The 2013 GSS that covers volunteering, charitable giving and participation does make this distinction but does not ask about voting or non-voting political behaviour.

The 2016 GSS includes questions about non-standard employment, such as regular, seasonal, contract or casual work, as well as job insecurity indicators such as whether a respondent was looking for work, the possibility of finding a job in the next six months, and the experience of financial hardship or personal problems due to lack of work, as well as whether a respondent could find a new job easily if they lost their current one. The 2016 survey also

captures workplace identity and sense of pride or accomplishment doing useful work, as well as a sense of belonging through work. However, while it asks about cultural, sport and outdoor participation, but does not ask about voting and non-voting political behaviour. As such, these survey instruments were discarded. In fact, no state-administered Canadian survey links these concepts explicitly.

While the Canadian Election Study (CES) is an academic, not governmental, undertaking, it has been conducted regularly during election campaigns since 1965, and remains one of the primary sources of data on Canadian political behaviour, attitudes and preferences around the time of a general federal election.

The 2015 CES covers vote choice and voting behaviour as well as non-voting political behaviour, such as signing a petition, taking part in a rally and using the internet to express political beliefs. The survey probes whether the economy makes respondents feel fearful, angry, optimistic or enthusiastic, as well as attitudes toward various groups in society. The survey does not capture the breadth of non-standard employment relationships, but does ask about job and labour market insecurity, such as the likelihood of job loss in the next year and how easy or difficult this source of income would be to replace. In addition, the survey covers social sentiments, such as how a respondent “feels” about minority groups. Depending on the question and mode, there are approximately 4,000–7,000 valid responses. Because of these reasons, the 2015 CES was selected as the instrument for this analysis. The 2015 CES has an additional advantage: it was administered on the eve of the 2015 election, which took place before polarizing events including the election of U.S. president Donald Trump, before Brexit, before

the yellow vest protests, and even before university professor Jordan Peterson started his campaign against political correctness and “social justice warriors”, a relatively new catch-all phrase for equity-seeking groups and their supporters. If the CES captures a sense of restrictionism, this attitude will have been present even before any of these activating forces took hold.

3.2 Survey design

Johnston (2001) argues the CES is regarded as the prime site for the study of Canadian election campaigns. The CES is publicly funded but administered by academic political scientists, who determine the survey design. The instrument’s general panel design was established in 1988 and is based on several waves in which the first wave is really a number of smaller waves; the latter are created first by the random generation of enough phone numbers to meet a preordained number of telephone interviews during the campaign period, and second by their division into “replicates,” or subsamples of the main sample. The replicates may be contacted on any given day in the lead-up to the election and asked about vote intentions. The replicates mirror the total sample, and both are randomly selected, creating a “rolling cross section” (RCS) in which the variables can “tell a longitudinal story” for the purposes of capturing campaign effects while still providing a true cross section (Johnston, 2001, p. 156). A second wave takes place after the election among the same respondents to capture voter choice and other outcomes of the campaign. A third wave includes a post-election mail-back survey to more deeply probe certain topics, although those responses are not included in the dataset. The RCS design “presents itself as a sensitive gauge of factors operating in campaign time,” thus

delivering explanatory power to the factors influencing the rise and fall of governments (Johnston, 2001, p. 166). Over the decades, the CES has included more than 6,700 variables that primarily address the determinants of voting, but secondarily to address markers of social change, such as group association, attitudes toward the U.S, Quebec sovereignty, women in politics, “post-materialism,” social class, human rights and more, among many others (Kanji et al, 2012). Indeed, while the structure of the survey has changed little from 1988, questions are adapted to the times. In 2015, the CES for the first time employed a “mixed-mode” design that included both telephone and web respondents.

Beyond examinations of voter intention and voter choice, the CES can thus be utilized to study other elements present in the political atmosphere around an election, and provides a barometer, at least by proxy, of the issues with political salience at a time when voters and the otherwise politically aware are considering their political grievances, opportunities and choices. This is particularly critical to the task of discovering whether, if a disenfranchised precariat class exists, there are political implications for its appearance, as the voting ballot is the primary vehicle through which a member of the electorate performs their franchise.

The mixed-mode 2015 CES combined internet and phone surveys. Breton et al (2017) analyzed the quality of the data from the internet and phone modes of collection in the 2015 CES and found that the mode impacted the survey results across various measures, but that while the differences should be accounted for, the mixed modes rather canceled each other’s shortcomings and biases. This issue is discussed further below.

Breton et al (2017) examine the differences in survey mode across various dimensions, an aspect that becomes critical to this analysis. Despite the decline of landlines, only five% of the phone respondents completed the survey interview by cellphone. However, the sample among the cellphone users did not seem biased in favour of young or less politically engaged respondents (Breton et al, 2017). In addition, the proportion of web survey respondents without a landline (25.6% in 2015) likely closely matched the population as a whole (21% in 2013). Among web survey respondents, the average age was nine years lower (mean = 39) among non-landline users and political interest was estimated at a half-point lower (mean = 6.4).

Respondents for the telephone (random-digit dialing or RDD) and internet surveys were recruited independently, though access was purchased for both from private providers. The RDD dialing list does include cellphone numbers, though makes no attempt to be representative in the number of landline versus cellphone numbers distributed among the electorate. Interviewers used Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) terminals and using this method, typically experienced a response rate of around 40%, which is above the market-research industry norm of 10% and approaches the Statistics Canada response rate of 50% for RDD (Breton et al, 2017). The web survey used a sample from the company Survey Sampling International, now known as Dynata, which uses proprietary methods to recruit internet panelists and to weight the sample frame for “maximal representativeness” (Breton et al, 2017, p. 1009). Because the company offers multiple surveys at once to random respondents in its own panel, no response rate is available.

Breton et al (2017) did find that, after the creation of a kind of scorecard to measure the

rates at which web and phone respondents met a number of “failure conditions” such as spending inadequate time or failing to respond to certain key indicators, web survey data faced a discard rate of 13.1% and phone survey data faced a discard rate of less than 1%. The modes differed in other ways as well, including turnout estimates in the sample compared to actual electoral results (25 points above actual turnout for phone survey respondents, and 19 points above actual turnout for web survey respondents), though are indistinguishable on vote intention during the 2015 campaign period and vote recall from 2011. They posit that social desirability bias is stronger on the phone. Acquiescence and memory error may also contribute to inflated turnout results in electoral surveys (Holbrook & Krosnick, 2010).

Sentiments about various groups in society, measured on a 1–100 “thermometer” scale, did produce highly divergent results between the two modes. Again, the “obvious suspect” is social desirability bias, where respondents are more hesitant to reveal their negative feelings toward various groups to a live interviewer; yet, the fact that some thermometer average scores similar across modes does rule out the possibility that these differences are inherent to the survey mode, whether phone or web, and sample composition combined with social desirability bias are more likely explanatory factors (Breton et al, 2017, p. 1023).

Breton et al (2017) calculate the total error for both survey modes and found that web survey data had a lower mean squared error (MSE), but when pooled, both surveys had a very low MSE when measured against established benchmarks. They conclude that because neither mode can be considered more authoritative, it is impossible to determine which mode is more representative or incisive when it comes to campaigns, political engagement and attitudes, or a

better understanding of voter choice. As such, a mixed-mode design can be understood as each mode correcting the shortcomings of the alternate mode, with the web survey mode the likely future choice for political scientists due to the sharply reduced costs, greater sampling capability and statistical power. It is this mutual canceling of shortcomings that lead Breton et al (2017) to conclude that pooling the data from both modes is an acceptable approach. While this eliminates the representativeness of the phone survey data, Breton et al argue the divergences likely caused by social desirability bias illustrate the relative lack of representativeness in the first place. In this analysis, it was not possible to pool the data and necessary instead to distinguish between the modes as the overlap between questions was not complete, and because the different samples produced divergent results. The reader can judge whether the phone probability sample is more reliable than the web sample, which may have produced more honest responses.

Telephone mode

The CES phone data was collected by the Institute for Social Research at York University during three waves: during the 2015 campaign period, phone interviews were conducted with 4,202 Canadian citizens. The respondents to this Campaign Period Survey (CPS) were contacted after the election to complete a Post-Election Survey (PES) and 2,198 (71%) of respondents did so (Northrup, 2016). The CPS respondents were contacted daily using a random digit dialing procedure and rolling cross-sectional sample release as described above between Sept. 8 and Oct. 15, 2015. The PES respondents were contacted between Oct. 20, 2015, and Dec. 23, 2015.

The CPS sample was designed to represent the adult population of Canada that meet the following criteria: are Canadian citizens, are over 18, who speak one of Canada's official

languages, and live in a private home in one of the 10 provinces (Northrup, 2016). The CPS sample was clustered in order to reach adult citizens and stratified to correct for biases that would over-represent the smaller provinces. While an ideal sampling frame would comprise a listing of all residential landlines and personal cellphone numbers, this listing does not exist (Northrup, 2016). If more than one eligible adult was present in the home, the person with the next birthday was selected to ensure randomness. Unweighted estimates over-represent one-adult households and under-represent larger households. Thus, the samples must be weighted by province and household in order to obtain national probability estimates. Samples are also slightly biased by age and gender, in which females are over-represented and youth are under-represented, and weights are applied in this dimension as well. Only the CPS was weighted.

Web mode

The online survey was fielded by purchasing panel respondents SSI (now Dynata), a U.S.-based corporation, and directing those respondents to the survey managed by the company. In total, the web survey generated 7,412 internet response records (Fournier et al, 2015). Web survey data collection methods are proprietary, so it is not possible to assess probability. However, weights were provided. Potential issues with non-probability sampling is addressed below.

3.3 Variables, hypotheses and analytical methods

There are a large number of variables included in the dataset and in this analysis. In Chapter 4, voting behaviour is the unit of analysis. In Chapter 5, I turn to non-voting political behaviour. In Chapter 6, I consider attitudes and beliefs. In Chapter 7, I consider indicators of

economic anxiety and employment insecurity, which comprises job insecurity and labour market insecurity. In Chapter 8, I discuss the relationship between economic anxiety and voting; in Chapter 9, I discuss the relationship between economic anxiety and non-voting political participation; in Chapter 10, I discuss the relationship between economic anxiety and attitudes toward equity-seeking groups. I will mostly refer to “economic anxiety” as shorthand throughout the paper, unless specified otherwise, as specific job-related insecurities may not capture more diffuse concerns. In all cases, I consider the following for any r values: weak ($.3-.5$), moderate ($.5-.7$) and strong (> 0.7) and a p -value of $< .05$ for significance.

After applying the weights suggested by CES practitioners that correct for household size, province, gender and age in both web and phone samples, the first step, in accordance with Northrup (2016), is to discard the bad quality data, leaving 9,946 valid cases, or 86% of total responses. Data was considered bad quality if the respondent met one or more of the following criteria: did not complete the last five% of the survey; completed the campaign period survey in less than seven minutes; did not respond to “thermometer” questions; took less than 15 seconds on questions regarding traits of the party leaders; and refused, skipped or didn’t know two of the questions on education, democratic satisfaction, and economic retrospection; or completed the post-election survey in less than 10 minutes (Breton et al, 2017). This resulted in a 13.1% discard rate for web data and less than 1% discard rate for phone data, for a total of 1,574 discarded cases.

Because the CES is an electoral study, all respondents were Canadian citizens of voting age. Thus, I am not concerned with juridical citizenship, but rather the three-dimensional

citizenship characterized by access to rights, as described by Marshall. My hypothesis is that economic anxiety/work-related insecurity will reduce citizenship: internally, by reducing individual voting and non-voting political behaviour and the exercise of political rights, and externally, by espousing a restrictionism toward perceived outsiders or equity-seeking groups who, in recent years, have made inroads on the territory previously occupied by more dominant groups, especially in the labour market. Equity-seeking groups in Canada are typically understood to comprise women, Indigenous peoples, people with disabilities, members of visible minorities, members of the LGBT community, and other groups who have historically faced inequities and disadvantages; “equity-seeking” is preferred to “marginalized” in government and academia to indicate these groups are taking an active role in advancing more equitable social and economic arrangements than they have previously been subject to. These groups are also designated under Canadian employment and human rights legislation.

I proceed in several parts: voting, non-voting political behaviour, economic anxiety/employment insecurity and attitudes toward outgroups. Because work status in the CES includes the category “working for pay” without further clarification, this conflates all kinds of secure and insecure work arrangements, so I focus on the proposed characteristics of the precariat class as set out by Standing (anger, anomie, anxiety and alienation), as well as whether a respondent is at risk of job loss (job insecurity), whether it would be difficult to find a new job (labour market insecurity), and level of income and savings available if a job were lost (income insecurity).

I do not attempt to argue that a precariat class does in fact exist, only to interrogate how the proposed dimensions of this class may play out in society. The survey did not ask respondents directly whether they favoured certain restrictionist-type policy choices, such as limiting immigration or reversing same-sex marriage, but rather asked how respondents “feel” about, or how much they “liked” certain equity-seeking groups on a thermometer scale of 0–100. It should be noted that feelings do not necessarily indicate a willingness to restrict the political, civil or social rights of any group, but indicates areas where these sentiments could be activated or solidified by political or social actors, and are best considered a proxy for this willingness.

I first assessed all variables themselves and, in all cases except the dichotomous voting variable, constructed complex variables in order to calculate descriptive and inferential statistics. I then ran a discriminant analysis with voting as the dependent variable, and linear regressions with non-voting political behaviour and attitudes toward outgroups as the dependent variables.

In general, many forms of economic anxiety and employment insecurity were related to decreased voting; increased passive participation, including social media and internet-mediated discussion; decreased active participation; and more negative attitudes toward some equity-seeking groups. However, some forms of economic anxiety were actually related to more positive attitudes to equity-seeking groups and to participation. Political party affiliation emerged as an important explanatory variable, suggesting that in the future, political leaders will play an important role in shaping outcomes.

Chapter 4: Voting Behaviour

4.1 Descriptive statistics

In this section, I consider whether respondents did or did not cast a vote in the 2015 federal election, and the general characteristics of those respondents. As will be evident across the many units of analysis, the two modes provided divergent responses to multiple questions, including “Did you vote in the last election?” and are analyzed separately here and throughout this paper.

4.1.1 Descriptive statistics: Voting (web mode)

In the sample ($n = 3,782$), the voting variable was created by adding together the responses of two randomly-assigned versions of the basic question “Did you vote?” The mode response was “yes”, in which 3,444 or 91.1% of respondents said they voted in the 2015 election. Only 8.9% said they did not vote. The mode does not tell us much, only which response was the most common in the sample. See Table 1 for a crosstabulation of voters and non-voters with demographics known to influence turnout, such age, education, income, union status, marital status and work status, as well as gender and country of birth. The strongest indicators were age, income, education, interest in politics and voting in 2011. Union status did not seem to be significantly correlated. Work status was significantly correlated: those who were unemployed and looking for work, students and those who were ill, disabled or caring for a family, and those who were self-employed were less likely to vote than those who were employed or self-employed. This mode of questionnaire did not ask respondents whether they thought voting was a choice or a duty, which is a strong indicator in the phone sample.

4.1.2 Descriptive statistics: Voting (phone mode)

The mode response was “yes”, in which 2,710 or 93.6% of respondents said they voted in the 2015 election. Only 184 or 6.4% of respondents said they did not vote. See Table 2 for a crosstabulation of voters and non-voters with demographics known to influence turnout. Again, the strongest indicators were age, income, education, interest in politics and voting in 2011. Union status did not seem to be significantly correlated. Work status was significantly correlated: those who were unemployed and looking for work, students and those who were ill, disabled or caring for a family were less likely to vote than those who were employed or self-employed. Those who believe voting is a duty, not a choice, were far more likely to vote.

4.2 Inferential statistics

4.2.1 Inferential statistics: Voting (web mode)

First, I tested the hypothesis that voter turnout in the sample would be different from voter turnout observed in the general electorate in 2015. In the sample ($n = 3,782$), 91.1% of respondents said they voted, which is higher than the Elections Canada official turnout of 68.3%. To calculate the sampling error with the most conservative estimate and maximum variance, I used the calculation

$$\frac{\text{sample estimate} - \text{benchmark value}}{\text{sampling error}}$$

and a sampling error derived from:

$$\frac{\sqrt{(0.50 \times 0.50)}}{\sqrt{3782}} = 0.0081$$

thus the test statistic results in:

$$\frac{0.911 - 0.683}{0.0081} = 28.1481$$

The test statistic is far beyond the region of rejection of 1.96 at a 0.05 level of significance, so I can reject the null hypothesis and say that the estimate for turnout in the sample is indeed far different than the turnout benchmark value in the population. The estimate is more than 28 standard errors away from the benchmark value, presuming a normal sampling distribution centered on the benchmark; in this case, actual voter turnout. Since the actual voter turnout is known, it's clear that the survey sample likely represents a population that does not completely overlap with the population of actual voters who cast a ballot in the 2015 Canadian election, and also suggests bias in the sample.

To construct a two-sided, 95% confidence interval, I calculated:

$$\text{sample estimate} \pm \text{sampling error}$$

thus the confidence interval results in:

$$0.911 \pm 0.0081(1.96)$$

and a range of 0.8951 to 0.9269, or between 89.5% and 92.3%, which does not include the validated figure of 68.3%.

4.2.2 Inferential statistics: Voting (phone mode)

Again, I tested the hypothesis that voter turnout in the sample would be different from the voter turnout observed in the general electorate in 2015. In the sample (n = 2,710), 93.6% of

respondents said they voted, a much higher turnout than the Elections Canada official turnout of 68.3%.

To calculate the sampling error with the most conservative estimate and maximum variance, I used the calculation:

$$\frac{\text{sample estimate} - \text{benchmark value}}{\text{sampling error}}$$

with a sampling error derived from:

$$\frac{\sqrt{(0.50 \times 0.50)}}{\sqrt{2710}} = 0.0096$$

thus the test statistic results in:

$$\frac{0.936 - 0.683}{0.0096} = 26.354$$

Because this test statistic is far beyond the region of rejection of 1.96 at a 0.05 level of significance, I reject the null hypothesis and show that the estimate for turnout in the sample is indeed higher than the turnout benchmark value in the population. The estimate is 26.3 standard errors away from the benchmark value of actual voter turnout. As was evident in the web mode, the sample is not fully indicative of the general electorate.

To construct a two-sided, 95% confidence interval, I calculated:

$$\text{sample estimate} \pm \text{sampling error}$$

thus the confidence interval results in:

$$0.936 \pm 0.0096(1.96)$$

and a range of 0.9172 to 0.9548, or between 91.7% and 95.5%, which does not include the validated figure of 68.3%.

Discussion

This difference between the validated figure—the non-hypothetical benchmark of turnout—and the sample population must be addressed in relation to both modes. Systematic misreporting of voter turnout produces wide discrepancies that have been continuously documented in the literature and these discrepancies create distortions in the data that may be reproduced in attempts to explain the causes of turnout or its influencing factors (Holbrook & Krosnick, 2010). In addition, studies have suggested that pre-election surveys themselves may have the unintended consequence of influencing the turnout among survey respondents and have even demonstrated that being interviewed before an election increases the probability that a respondent will vote, although other studies have not found this effect (Holbrook & Krosnick, 2010).

In an analysis of the two modes used in the 2015 CES, Breton et al (2017) argue inflated turnout in the sample is a result of social desirability bias, and that this bias is especially prevalent on the phone. This effect becomes more evident on the mode-based differences in “thermometer” scales measuring self-reported attitudes toward various groups in society, including politicians, Indigenous people, immigrants, minorities, gay people and others; Breton et al (2017) conclude that the web mode measures these attitudes more accurately. Such evident bias certainly imputes the sample with non-random error a far distance from more ideal levels of accuracy; in addition, bias calls into question the reliability of measuring voter turnout in the

sample population. Similarly, while a large sample size normally provides a level of measurement precision, the confidence interval for the sample estimate of turnout is nowhere near the actual turnout levels observed in 2015.

Research has long shown that social desirability bias—the desire to portray oneself in admirable ways—in self-reported election survey data impacts accuracy in the sample and the validity of results, and self-reported survey estimates have historically overstated actual turnout by 10 percentage points or more in U.S. election studies (Holbrook & Krosnick, 2010). Question wording could potentially reduce social desirability bias, and in the 2015 CES, a long version of the question “did you vote” was randomly asked to web respondents, and may have allowed respondents to feel more free to acknowledge they did not in fact vote by framing the question as: “Some people are not able to vote because they are sick or busy, or for some other reason. Others do not want to vote. Did you vote in the recent federal election?” Respondents to the “long” version reported a turnout of 87.3%, compared to respondents assigned the shorter, “Did you vote?” question, who reported 90.9% turnout (CES, 2015). The longer version was asked only in the web survey and therefore offered a greater degree of anonymity than to a live interviewer on the phone and may have slightly reduced social desirability bias, consistent with other research comparing modes (Holbrook & Krosnick, 2010). It’s difficult to know whether social desirability bias or some other influence was at work, and respondents to both questions still significantly overreported the official turnout. This means the sample population likely did vote at a higher rate than the broader electorate and does depart from the general population of the electorate in some meaningful way, yet these two effects are difficult to untangle. On the

other hand, the documented prevalence of this phenomenon suggests that, while troublesome, it does not necessarily preempt reliance on the underlying data. As Karp and Brockington (2005) note: “The validity of self-reported turnout has been a problem confronting political scientists since the earliest election surveys,” and is evident across many countries and electoral systems, though there are disagreements as to the implications for researchers. Some argue that social desirability bias is a general human trait that affects most people equally, and does not suggest inherent differences in those who exhibit it compared to those who respond honestly that they did not vote, though others argue that the former respondents do exhibit characteristics of those highly disposed to vote in terms of education, partisan attachment and concern for electoral outcomes (Karp & Brockington, 2005). In a study comparing reported turnout across Britain, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the U.S., Karp and Brockington (2005) found that variation in overreporting within countries can be partially explained by the level of turnout in the previous election, which suggests that social desirability bias may be most active in political contexts where electoral salience and turnout social norms are traditionally high; in addition, they conclude this is most concerning for cross-national studies, although non-voters who overreport turnout do seemingly share the attributes that would make them predisposed to vote, such as partisanship, attentiveness, and education. The 2015 election revealed an uptick in turnout generally, from 61.1% in 2011 to 68.34% in 2015, indicating that electoral salience may have been especially high at the time of the most recent election and CES (Elections Canada, 2015a).

4.3 Inferential statistics: Vote choice

Table 3 and Table 4 show the frequency of votes by party in the 2015 election for both modes. On their own, these frequencies do not tell us much; standard measures of mean, median and mode could be calculated but are really irrelevant when considering such real, observed outcomes as vote choice by party and how they compare to the validated figures from the 2015 election.

Because of the large distance measured in standard errors between the actual turnout benchmark and the turnout estimate in the sample in both survey modes, I repeated the hypothesis test for political party vote choice for the three major parties in both modes. In the 2015 election, the Liberal Party of Canada captured 39.5% of the vote share; the Conservative Party of Canada won 31.9% of the vote; the New Democratic Party of Canada won 19.7% of the vote (Elections Canada, 2015).

4.3.1 Inferential statistics: Vote choice (web mode)

In the web sample, 40.4% voted for the Liberals, 27.0% voted for the Conservatives and 23.3% said they voted for the NDP. I tested the hypothesis that the proportion of voters in the sample who voted Liberal is different from the general electorate. Here, the test statistics show more accuracy.

In this sample ($n = 3,307$), I used:

$$\frac{\text{sample estimate} - \text{benchmark value}}{\text{sampling error}}$$

with a sample error estimate of:

$$\frac{\sqrt{(0.50 \times 0.50)}}{\sqrt{3307}} = 0.0087$$

therefore the test statistic becomes:

$$\frac{0.404 - 0.395}{0.0087} = 1.0344$$

As the test statistic of 1.0344 is not beyond the region of rejection of 1.96 at a 0.05 level of significance, I do not reject the null hypothesis; therefore, the estimate for Liberal Party vote choice in the sample is not different from the general population. For the Conservative Party, the test statistic becomes -5.6322 and for the NDP, the test statistic becomes 4.1379. These are beyond the region of rejection, therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, indicating the sample is different from the general population.

To construct a two-sided, 95% confidence interval, I calculated:

$$\text{sample estimate} \pm \text{sampling error}$$

thus for Liberal Party voter choice, the confidence interval becomes:

$$0.404 \pm 0.0087(1.96)$$

or a range of 0.3869 to 0.4211 or between 38.69% and 42.11%; therefore, the confidence interval does include the validated figure (39.5%).

For the Conservative Party, the confidence interval becomes:

$$0.270 \pm 0.0087(1.96)$$

for a range of 0.2529 to 0.2871, or 25.29% to 28.71%, which does not include the validated figure of 31.9%.

For the NDP, the confidence interval becomes:

$$0.270 \pm 0.0087(1.96)$$

for a range of 0.2159 to 0.2501, or 21.59% to 25.01%, which also does not include the validated figure of 19.7%. The validated figures of vote choice the Conservative and NDP parties are not found within the 95% confidence intervals of the sample, I conclude that these sample estimates do not meet the threshold of significance. For the Liberal Party, the sample estimates can be considered significant.

4.3.2 Inferential statistics: Vote choice (phone mode)

In the phone sample, 41.2% voted for the Liberals, 27.8% voted for the Conservatives, and 22.8% voted for the NDP.

Here, I test the hypothesis that the proportion of voters in the sample who voted for the major parties is different from the proportion of voters in the general electorate population who voted for the Liberal Party in the 2015 election. Again, the test statistics show more accuracy.

In this sample (n = 2,437) I used:

$$\frac{\text{sample estimate} - \text{benchmark value}}{\text{sampling error}}$$

with a sample error estimate of:

$$\frac{\sqrt{(0.50 \times 0.50)}}{\sqrt{2437}} = 0.0101$$

as such:

$$\frac{0.412 - 0.395}{0.0101} = 1.6831$$

Because the test statistic of 1.683 is not beyond the region of rejection of 1.96 at a 0.05 level of significance, I cannot reject the null hypothesis and therefore cannot show that the estimate for voter party choice for the Liberal Party in the sample is different from the general population. The same test can be repeated for the Conservative Party (-4.0594) and the NDP (3.0693), which are both beyond the region of rejection, indicating—as is obvious—that the sample estimates are indeed different from the general population.

To construct a two-sided, 95% confidence interval, I calculated:

$$\text{sample estimate} \pm \text{sampling error}$$

thus for Liberal Party voter choice, the confidence interval becomes:

$$0.412 \pm 0.0101(1.96)$$

or a range of 0.3922 to 0.4318 or between 39.22% and 43.18%; therefore, the confidence interval does include the validated figure (39.5%).

For Conservative Party voter choice, the confidence interval becomes:

$$0.278 \pm 0.0101(1.96)$$

or a range of 0.2582 to 0.2978, or between 25.82% and 29.78%, therefore the confidence interval does not include the validated figure (31.9%).

For NDP voter choice the confidence interval becomes:

$$0.228 \pm 0.0101(1.96)$$

or a range of 0.2082 to 0.2478, or between 20.82% and 24.78%; therefore, the confidence interval does not include the validated figure (19.7%). Because the validated figures of voter choice for the latter two parties, Conservative and NDP, are not found within the 95%

confidence intervals of the sample, I must conclude that the sample estimates do not meet the threshold of significance. For the Liberal Party, the sample estimates can be considered significant.

Discussion

The sample estimates do map onto the population estimates for voter choice with greater accuracy than turnout, giving some cautious optimism the sample estimates can be considered valid. However, because some validated figures for party support do not fall within the confidence interval range predicted by the sample, this indicates that the sample's construction and the underlying assumptions on which the model was based were deficient in some way. Social desirability bias may play a role in party choice; for instance, under-reporting votes for the losing Conservative government, which fell in 2015. But the sample itself may be biased with over-representation of respondents that depart in personality or tendency in some ways from the general population, as demonstrated in the over-reporting of turnout.

This may have implications for later analysis of non-voting political participation as well. Voting is a matter of demonstrable civic action on a volunteer basis, as is cooperating with a survey for research purposes, and both may indicate a greater willingness to interact with public life and a greater sense of civic responsibility.

Sampling

Sampling issues could also be linked to the data collection method, especially the web sample. Probability sampling is considered the gold standard, although recent research has shown that non-probability web samples, in general, not only increase statistical power through

larger yet less expensive samples, but produce estimates “remarkably similar estimates” when compared to telephone and mail modes asking the same questions, and although overall “mode effects” on Total Survey Error have been found to be small for common questions relating to public opinion and politics (Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2014, p. 286). In the first Canadian study to compare modes in the CES, Breton et al (2017) found that the web mode was slightly better at matching sample estimates to known population quantities and was able to overcome problems associated with the self-selection of more politically engaged and knowledgeable citizens in the phone sample, and with the social desirability bias relating to turnout and attitudes toward certain groups in society. These authors concluded that the combined modes should be considered acceptable to researchers. It should be noted that multiple studies have confirmed that probability sampling routinely produces more accurate results especially in relation to population estimates, even after adjustments such as post-survey weighting, compared to non-probability sampling (Yeager et al, 2011). There remains a lack of consensus among researchers as to the acceptability of opt-in web surveys (Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2014).

Yet Ansolabehere and Schaffner (2014) found mail, phone and non-probability web modes in surveys commissioned for the purpose of comparison fared similarly, using total survey error in terms of point values and correlational coefficients, along several dimensions in relation to each other and to well-regarded survey benchmark estimates derived from the U.S. census, the National Health Indicators Survey and the American National Election Studies. All modes showed varying levels of deviation in reported vote choice and the actual vote for president in the 2008 election by an average of three percentage points, which Ansolabehere and Schaffner

(2014) argue is within the realm of expected error for the sample size in question (1,000). For non-validated political measures such as opinions for which there are no benchmarks, some variation in all three modes was observed. When variables were combined to create a single standardized measure of political liberalism, the mail mode provided more liberal answers, followed by the phone and internet, though only the difference between mail and internet was statistically significant, and the size of the difference was small: one tenth of one standard deviation (Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2014). They conclude: “overall, it appears that researchers will not consistently get more accurate results, nor reach substantially different conclusions, when using one mode relative to another,” which may be related to the increasing sophistication of survey data collection (Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2014, p. 301). Because the web panel was convened by a private company using proprietary methods, it is impossible to assess the data collection methods in this case. For the phone mode, this is not an issue, although the sample estimates still do not map onto the validated turnout results.

4.4 Bivariate statistics: Voting

Who voted and who did not vote? Endless studies have attempted to estimate the predictive influence of different demographic factors on voter turnout, although the “jury is still out on what the foundations of micro-level turnout are” (Smets & von Ham, 2013, p. 345).

Multiple theories have been developed to explain turnout: Downs first postulated the rational choice theory in 1957, in which a voter makes a personal cost-benefit calculation and only votes if the expected benefits of voting outweigh the costs; the extended rational choice model includes civic duty as a motivation; resource theory suggests that voters with more personal resources

such as money, time and skill will vote more, and predicts that turnout is higher among citizens with higher socioeconomic status and knowledge; mobilization theories predict social norms and sanctions will guide voter behaviour; sociological theorists believe parental influence leads to voting habit formation; psychological models stress the importance of attitudes such as personal interest and partisan leanings; political institutional models posit turnout as a by-product of the political and institutional context in which a voter casts his or her ballot (Smets & von Ham, 2013). These competing theories show that multiple causal mechanisms may be at play during any given election. In a meta-analysis of 90 studies of individual-level voter behaviour in peer-reviewed political science journals between 2000–2010, Smets and von Ham counted 170 independent variables employed as explanatory control variables in national election studies. Resource and motivation theories were the most common theoretical approaches. Following these authors, I selected the control variables that are shown in the crosstabulations in Table 1 and Table 2 to use in later regression and discriminant analyses. Eight variables were revealed to be the “usual suspects” by Smets and von Ham (2013), who concluded that political science researchers should, at a minimum include the following: age, gender, income, education, race, marital status, political interest and party identification (p. 348). The meta-analysis was based on U.S. and European election studies where race may be more salient; in the Canadian political context, I exchanged race for country of origin (Canada/elsewhere) and language of interview (English/French). In addition, I included work status (employed/working for pay) and union membership as controls because these relate to my research questions, and because union membership has been shown to influence voter turnout here and elsewhere (Bryson et al, 2013).

Other variables shown in the crosstabulations are included as control variables later in regressions. Media consumption of news, past turnout and a sense of civic duty are known to have statistically significant impacts on voting, and when it comes to disaffection from the political system, alienation does not seem to impact turnout, while ambivalence seems to have a negative effect on individual level turnout in national elections (Smets & von Ham, 2013). In the CES, the variable “the government does not care much about what people like you think” can be seen as a proxy for political alienation, and the variable “people who don’t get ahead should blame themselves, not the system” can be seen as a proxy for political ambivalence.

Interestingly, neither voters’ evaluation of the national economic situation nor voters’ evaluation of their own economic situation predict turnout in most of the studies included in the meta-analysis but are included in this paper as independent variables for obvious reasons as they are integral to my research questions. Variables related to these concepts are therefore applied in later regressions and discriminant analysis for voting, non-voting political participation and attitudes toward outgroups. For the purpose of answering the research questions, the main independent variables measure economic anxiety, which is described in Chapter 7.

4.5 Validity and reliability of variables: Voting

The validity of the voting variable is not disputed—this is a straightforward question—although there remain issues of reliability. To address the relative lack of reliability stemming from the bias in the sample, I conducted a factor analysis that included the non-voting participation variables that are addressed in detail below, but added the vote variable. All were

standardized first. The web sample results are shown in Table 5 and phone sample results in Table 6.

In the phone sample, the voting variable loaded on the same component as other general political participation variables such as attending a protest or signing a petition, although the loading was weak. Because there is no reliability test for a single variable, I argue that this factor analysis shows that the voting variable can be considered reliable in the context of typical political behaviour, though this is more likely considered a predictive validity method of testing reliability. Adding the vote variable to a reliability test for a scale that would include non-voting participation variables alongside voting produced a Cronbach's alpha of .614, and while voting had the lowest item-total correlation ($r = .186$) the alpha would not improve by removing the voting variable. So, while a scale constructed with these variables would not pass the $\alpha = .7$ standard, I conclude that the voting variable as it stands alone is reliable this context.

For the web mode, the voting variable loaded on its own strong factor. Adding the vote variable to a reliability test for a scale that would include non-voting participation variables alongside voting produced a Cronbach's alpha of .797, and not only did voting have the lowest item-total correlation, the alpha would actually improve if this variable was deleted. It's unclear why the results would differ between the two modes, but one potential explanation is that the questionnaire offered different questions in either mode. In the phone mode, all political participation including voting loaded on the same "general engagement" component, while partisan engagement activity such as political party membership loaded on a separate factor. This is discussed further below. The web sample factor analysis produced two distinct engagement

factors, passive and active. The web survey did not ask about partisan activities but did ask about social media use and engaging in online debates. Perhaps the difference in questions can explain why voting loaded on its own strong factor in one, but not both, of the modes, and also some differences in the underlying sample population.

Chapter 5: Non-voting Political Behaviour

In this chapter, I consider non-voting political participation. The 2015 CES asked slightly different questions among respondents of each mode, with some overlap, regarding non-voting political behaviour. Responses were yes/no.

Have you done any of the following things in the last 12 months?

Web survey (9 items)

- Have you signed a petition?
- Have you bought products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons?
- Have you taken part in a march, rally, or protest?
- Have you used the Internet to be politically active?
- Did you volunteer for a group or organization like a school, a religious organization, or sports or community associations?
- Have you attended a meeting to discuss a local, national, or international issue?
- Have you spoken at a meeting of this kind?
- Have you participated in online discussion of a local, national, or international issue with people you don't know?
- Have you used social media to discuss political or public issues with people you do know?

Phone survey (7 items)

- Have you signed a petition?
- Have you bought products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons?
- Have you taken part in a march, rally, or protest?
- Have you used the Internet to be politically active?
- Did you volunteer for a group or organization like a school, a religious organization, or sports or community associations?
- Have you ever been a member of a federal political party?
- Have you donated money to a political party or a candidate?

For both modes, I constructed an unweighted scale of non-voting political participation using all available variables, with the exception of two. One eliminated variable was

administered to web respondents and which addressed whether, during a conversation about a public issue, there was disagreement. While all other variables are simple yes/no questions with no emotional valence, this disagreement variable colours the variable with a positive/negative hue that is unnecessary to the concept of interest and engagement. The second eliminated variable asked whether a respondent spoke in person about a public issue with someone known to them, which lacks clarity on the content of the discussion, and is unrelated to political activity specifically.

However, before proceeding to construct a scale, it was necessary to determine which variables are appropriate to include in this measure of political participation. So, I first conducted a factor analysis to make this decision.

5.1 Factor analysis: Non-voting political participation

To analyze the relationships among factors included in the non-voting political participation scales, I conducted a factor analysis using the principal components method of extraction on both phone and web modes. Factor analysis relies on the idea that measurable and observable variables can be reduced to a smaller number of variables that are unobservable but share common constructs; the purpose is to identify the underlying or internal constructs that influence the observed or “surface” variables (Yong & Pearce, 2013).

5.1.1 Factor analysis: Non-voting participation (web mode)

The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) value of .847 is strong enough ($> .7$) to indicate acceptability for factor analysis, explaining a cumulative 54.29% of the variance among all nine variables. Among these variables, the initial extraction values exceed the accepted low threshold

of $> .3$. After rotation, the factor analysis revealed one strong component with an eigenvalue of 2.685, explaining 29.84% of the variance among the variables. A second component was also revealed, with an eigenvalue of 2.201, which explains 24.48% of the variance. Table 7 shows the results of the principal components analysis. These values align with Kaiser's criterion, established in 1960, which is a general rule that suggests retaining only factors above the eigenvalue of 1 (Yong & Pearce, 2013).

Component 1, which I will call "passive engagement" seems to reveal an internal construct relating to a willingness to engage in the outside world of politics and civil society in the form of a demonstrable expression of views or beliefs, but only passively. For example, the strongest loadings on Component 1 ($> .7$) include only internet-mediated forms of engagement, such as using social media or participating in an online discussion. The other moderate loadings (.5 to .7) on Component 1 relate to signing petitions or buying products, which indicate political choices though not necessarily much effort in carrying them out. Component 2, which I will call "active engagement", seems to indicate a willingness to make the effort. The variables with a moderate or strong loading ($> .5$) relate to a more physical form of engagement, such as attending a rally, volunteering, attending a meeting, and speaking at a meeting.

5.1.2 Factor analysis: Non-voting participation (phone mode)

The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) value of .690 almost reaches the threshold ($> .7$) for analysis acceptability of these variables in a factor analysis. For that reason, and for the insight revealed by the two strong factors, I include them in this discussion. For all seven variables, only one extraction value, related to volunteering, did not meet the accepted low threshold ($> .3$), as

shown in Table 8. The factor analysis revealed one strong component with an eigenvalue of 1.930, explaining 27.57% of the variance among the variables and a second strong factor with an eigenvalue of 1.473, explaining 21.04% of the variance. The loadings on all variables explain a cumulative 48.62% of the variance.

Here, Component 1 seems to link the participation variables to an underlying engagement construct, similar to the web sample, but now with little difference between active and passive forms of engagement, as all demonstrate moderate or strong loadings on this component. For this reason, I determine Component 1 can be considered “general engagement.” Component 2 seems related to partisan attachment instead. Phone respondents were asked about membership in political parties and donating money to political parties. Both have strong ($> .7$) loadings on Component 2, which I will name “partisan engagement”. It is unknown whether this component could potentially be present in the web mode, as those respondents were not asked about political party donations or membership. The delineation of active and passive forms of engagement were more evident in the web respondents, suggesting the samples may differ along these dimensions.

5.1.3 Factor analysis: Use in regression

For both modes, factor analysis shows two strong components, meaning that these factors operate statistically independently of one another. For the purposes of later regression analysis, I constructed scales that only include the variables with strong loadings on each component. For web mode, that means the Passive Engagement Scale and Active Engagement Scale, and for phone mode, General Engagement Scale and Partisan Engagement Scale. To answer the research question, I will address the ways in which economic anxiety, as an independent variable, impacts

these activities as the dependent variables, but it's clear that any impacts may vary by type of participation.

5.2 Descriptive statistics: Non-voting political participation

5.2.1 Descriptive statistics: Non-voting political participation (web mode)

I constructed two scales, one for passive engagement and one for active engagement, from 0–1. The raw scores, statistics and frequency distributions are shown in Table 9 and Table 10. For the Passive Engagement Scale ($n = 3,443$), the mean was 0.3376, or 34.76% engagement, slightly higher than the median of 0.20, or 20%, indicating the distribution is positively skewed. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the response with the greatest frequency was 0, or no participation, at 19.9%. In only 5.5% of cases did respondents report participating in all five passive activities in the past year. At the 25th percentile, the passive engagement rate was still 0%, and the 75th percentile, the rate was 60%. The standard deviation of the sample ($\sigma = 0.33826$) is smaller than normal but approaches the 34.13% standard deviation assumed by the normal distribution model and indicates that one standard deviation from the mean captures about 33.82% of the scores. The positive skewness statistic of 0.662 and kurtosis statistic of -0.858 also show that the distribution does not fall along the normal curve.

For the Active Engagement Scale ($n = 3,614$), the mean was 0.2225 or about 22.25%, slightly below the median of 0.25 or 25%, indicating the distribution is negatively skewed. Again, the response with the greatest frequency was 0, or no participation, at 30.2%, and in only 2.9% of cases did respondents report participation in all four active activities in the past year. At the 25th percentile, the active engagement rate was still 0%, and at the 75th percentile, the rate

was the same as the mean at 25%. This is also not surprising, because attending a march or volunteering take a considerable amount of effort and are relatively unusual occurrences for most people. However, it's clear that more passive forms of engagement are more frequently reported than more active forms in the sample. The standard deviation of the sample ($\sigma = 0.28589$) is smaller than that assumed by a normal distribution, indicating that one standard deviation from the mean captures about 28.56% of the scores, so there is less variance than normal in the Active Engagement Scale. Again, the distributions do not fall along the normal curve, with a negative skewness statistic of 1.270 and a kurtosis statistic of 0.714.

5.2.2 Descriptive statistics: Non-voting political participation (phone mode)

Again, I constructed two scales, one for general engagement and one for partisan engagement, from 0–1. The raw scores, statistics and frequency distributions are shown in Table 11 and Table 12. For the General Engagement Scale ($n = 2,836$), the mean was 0.3857, or 38.57% engagement, slightly lower than the median of 0.40, or 40%, indicating the distribution is negatively skewed. Distinct from the other engagement scales, the response with the greatest frequency was .20 or 20% engagement, at 24.1% of the distribution, slightly higher than 19.2% of cases with zero engagement activities in the past year. At the 25th percentile, the general engagement rate was 20.0%, and the 75th percentile, the rate was 60%. The standard deviation of the sample ($\sigma = 0.28757$) is smaller than that assumed by a normal distribution and indicates that one standard deviation from the mean captures about 28.78% of the scores, so there is less than normal variance in the sample. The negative skewness statistic of 0.342 and kurtosis statistic of -0.827 also indicate that the distribution does not fall along the normal curve.

For the Partisan Engagement Scale ($n = 2,879$), the mean was 0.1473 or about 14.73%, well above the median of 0%, indicating the distribution is positively skewed. Again, the response with the greatest frequency was 0, or no participation, at 78.3% of cases, and in only 7.8% of cases did respondents report participation in both party membership and donating to a party in the past year. The partisan engagement rate was still 0% at the 25th and also at the 75th percentile, which is evident from the fact that less than 10% of cases showed engagement on both activities.

This is also not surprising, because party membership and party donation likely operate on an underlying structure of partisan attachment that was shown in the factor analysis to be distinct from volunteering or engaging in a political debate on social media, and require a special knowledge and interest in party politics than either of those activities and are much less frequently reported in the sample. The standard deviation of the sample ($\sigma = 0.30151$) is smaller than that assumed by a normal distribution, indicating that one standard deviation from the mean captures about 30.15% of the scores, so there is again less than normal variance in the Party Engagement scale. A positive skewness statistic of 1.893 and a kurtosis statistic of 2.292 also confirm the distributions do not fall along the normal curve.

5.3 Inferential statistics: Non-voting political participation

No scale exactly followed the normal distribution model, either in terms of their symmetry or in terms of their peaks. Following Bennett (1996) and Fisher in Cain et al (2017), I conducted a test for “normalness” of the sample population by creating statistics that can be

compared against the normal distribution using skewness and kurtosis statistics that can be found in Tables 9 through 12:

$$\frac{\text{skewness } G_1 \text{ or kurtosis } G_2}{\text{standard error of } G_1 \text{ or } G_2}$$

5.3.1 Inferential statistics: Non-voting political participation (web mode)

For the Passive Engagement Scale, the p-value for the test statistic of skewness = 15.7857 and the p-value of the test statistic for kurtosis = 10.3373. For the Active Engagement Scale, the p-value for the test statistic of skewness = 30.9756 and the p-value for the test of kurtosis = 8.8148. The skewness statistic should be negative, because the mean was lower than the median. In both cases, a test statistic greater than 1.96 at the 0.05 level indicates significant skewness, meaning that null hypothesis of normality is rejected and the underlying sample distribution is non-normal, especially in terms of skewness. The positive skewness indicates a longer right tail with more values than expected in the positive direction, and positive kurtosis indicates a more peaked distribution. Both characteristics can be seen in Figure 1 and Figure 2.

As the constructed non-voting political participation scales have no real-world benchmark, questions of accuracy and precision are addressed using a point estimate: the standard error of the mean. To construct a two-sided, 95% confidence interval, I calculated:

$$\text{sample estimate} \pm \text{sampling error}$$

For the Passive Engagement Scale, this becomes:

$$0.3376 \pm 0.00576(1.96)$$

or a range of 0.3263 to 0.3489 which does include the mean. The mean is really the average rate of passive engagement (33.76%), and is found within a confidence interval of 32.63% to 34.89%.

For the Active Engagement Scale, this becomes:

$$0.2225 \pm 0.00476(1.96)$$

or a range of 0.2132 to 0.2318, which does include the mean. The average rate of active engagement, 22.25%, is found within the confidence interval of 21.32% to 23.18%.

So, I can conclude that, 95 times out of 100, these confidence intervals would contain the true population value of the mean passive and active engagement rates (Bennett, 1996).

5.3.2 Inferential statistics: Non-voting political participation (phone mode)

For the General Engagement Scale, the p-value for the test of skewness = 7.4348 and the p-value for the test of kurtosis = -8.9891. For the Partisan Engagement Scale, the p-value for the test statistic of skewness = 41.1521 and the p-value for the test of kurtosis = 25.1867. In both cases, a test statistic greater than 1.96 at the 0.05 level indicates significant skewness, meaning that null hypothesis of normality is again rejected and that the underlying sample distribution is non-normal. The skewness statistic should be negative, because the mean was lower than the median. These characteristics can be seen in Figure 3 and Figure 4.

A two-sided, 95% confidence interval for General Engagement is calculated:

$$0.3857 \pm 0.00540(1.96)$$

for a range of 0.3751 to 0.3963, which does include the mean. The average rate of general engagement, 38.57%, is found within the confidence interval of 37.51% to 39.63%.

A two-sided, 95% confidence interval for the Partisan Engagement Scale is calculated:

$$0.1473 \pm 0.00562(1.96)$$

for a range of 0.1363 to 0.1583, which does include the mean. The average rate of partisan engagement, 14.73%, is found within the confidence interval of 13.63% to 15.83%, so that 95 times out of 100, these confidence intervals would contain the true population value of the mean general and partisan engagement rates.

Accuracy of a given statistic is generally defined as the extent to which the values of a sampling distribution for the statistic approach the population value for the statistic (Bennett, 1996). Based on this definition, I can conclude based on these inferential tests for all non-voting participation scales that these statistics are accurate. Each scale also has a relatively small standard deviation, meaning that there is no outside variance in the variables and the sample size is so large ($n > 2,000$ in all cases) that any variance would be statistically accommodated, and the risk of random error is lower than in a small sample. As mentioned above, the non-probability web sample may pose problems, but the statistical power of such a large sample size may overcome these threats. The estimators used in the sample can be considered precise. It also gives some optimism that, while the voting sample estimates may differ significantly from the general voting population, the sample does demonstrate other non-voting behaviour and attitudes that are generalizable to the population.

5.4 Validity and reliability of variables: Non-voting political participation

Questions addressing non-voting political behaviour are straightforward, and we can be relatively confident in their validity; that is, that they measure what they seek to measure. The issue of validity may be threatened by the same type of social desirability bias as voting turnout, but in the absence of a benchmark, this may be impossible to ascertain. The high frequency of cases of zero participation on all four non-voting political participation scales shows that respondents seem likely to be truly reporting their political participation without blurring the truth in the service of social pressures. In addition, political participation is not an overly personal or sensitive issue. Finally, validity is a greater problem when measuring fundamentally unobservable concepts but in the case of participation, attending a rally or donating to a political party is a concrete, memorable event.

To address reliability, I conducted an inter-item correlation reliability test for both sets of non-voting participation questions, web and phone mode. I combined the scales into one test for each mode. Because the Partisan Engagement Scale is so small with just two variables, it is not possible to assess their inter-item correlation in the same way as the other differentiated scales. While the factor analysis showed different underlying concepts influenced all types of engagement, the main purpose of this reliability test is to estimate the relationships between variables, especially for survey data. If some variables have weak relationships to the concept being considered, i.e. non-voting political participation, this will be evident from the results.

5.4.1 Validity and reliability of variables: Non-voting political participation (web mode)

Among web respondents ($n = 3,401$), Cronbach's alpha showed $\alpha = .814$, a strong result. Table 13 shows inter-item correlations, which are low to moderate with r ranging from .204 – .603. Table 14 shows that each item-total correlation is also moderate, with r ranging from .416 to .631. Based on these results, the reliability of non-voting political participation measures for web respondents is acceptable.

Inter-item correlations were weakest between very passive and very active forms of engagement. For example, signing a petition and speaking at a meeting have the lowest correlations ($r < .3$), similar to signing a petition and volunteering. Stronger correlations ($r > .5$) were found among passive, internet-mediated forms of engagement, such as using social media and participating in an online political discussion, and among very active forms such as attending a meeting and speaking at a meeting. This aligns with the components that emerged during factor analysis. Despite their both loading on the “active engagement” component, volunteering and attending a march are very weakly correlated ($r < .3$), possibly indicating that the type of person who goes to protest may have a different sensibility than one who volunteers—a much more sedate activity than a noisy protest. All item-total correlation statistics ranged from weak to moderate ($r < .3$ to $r < 0.7$) but the alpha would not improve by deleting any items.

2.4.2 Validity and reliability of variables: Non-voting political participation (phone mode)

Among phone respondents, Cronbach's alpha showed $\alpha = .611$, a weaker but still acceptable result. Table 15 shows inter-item correlations, which are all low, with r ranging from .058 to .448. Table 16 shows that each item-total correlation is again low, with r

ranging from 0.228 to 0.418.

Based on these results, the reliability of non-voting political participation for phone respondents seems acceptable, but it is evident that many items are distinctly only very weakly correlated, delineated by the components that emerged in factor analysis. For example, the weakest relationships are those between partisan engagement and general engagement, such as party membership and volunteering ($r = .058$). Of course, donating money to a political party and party membership are more strongly correlated ($r = .448$). Using the internet and signing a petition are moderately correlated ($r = .344$), suggesting that respondents in this sample make less sharp a distinction between internet-mediated engagement and more traditional forms of engagement. In addition, signing a petition and attending a rally are weakly correlated ($r = .297$), but with a strength that is greater than most other relationships. All item-total correlation statistics are relatively weak as well ($r < .5$) but the alpha ($\alpha = .611$) would not improve by deleting any items.

Chapter 6: Attitudes and Beliefs

A third dependent variable must be related to attitudes toward equity-seeking groups. The 2015 CES asks how respondents feel about various groups in society on a thermometer-type scale from zero or “cool” to 100 or “warm”. Social desirability bias is evident in the thermometer questions designed to determine how respondents “feel” about certain groups, including those considered traditionally belonging in Canadian society, such as politicians, Anglophones, Francophones and even the U.S., as well as those considered traditionally marginalized and therefore equity-seeking, such as Indigenous people, feminists, LGBT people, immigrants, racial minorities and Muslims living in Canada. Respondents in both modes were asked how they feel about such groups, but there were divergent responses, so each mode will be addressed below.

The web-administered CES survey randomly assigned the following two wordings to ask how web respondents feel about certain groups: “Zero means you really DISLIKE the country or group, and 100 means you really LIKE the country or group,” and “Zero means a very NEGATIVE score, and 100 means a very POSITIVE score.” These variables have been combined as they capture sentiments that are nearly identical.

6.1 Factor analysis: Attitudes and beliefs

6.1.1 Factor analysis: Attitudes and beliefs (web mode)

The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) value of .858 is a strong indicator that the variables are acceptable for factor analysis, which is shown in Table 17. Three strong factors were revealed, explaining a cumulative 64.30% of the variance. Seven variables had strong loadings on Component 1, “Attitudes toward outgroups.” These capture all six equity-seeking groups, as well

as Anglophones. It's possible that French respondents perceive Anglophones as outsiders, or that the underlying factor is attitudes toward groups in society in general. In addition, the Anglophone variable has the weakest loading on Component 1. Because the dominant variables are those addressing attitudes toward equity-seeking groups, I will continue to call this component "Attitudes toward outgroups" for clarity. While Indigenous groups, referred to as "Aboriginal" in the CES, are surely Canadian, they have been historically marginalized and in no way can be considered belonging to the traditionally dominant class. Attitudes toward Francophones and Quebec load on Component 2, "Attitudes toward Quebec," and these are the only variables on this component. Variables loading on Component 3, "Attitudes toward North America," include Canada, the U.S. and federal politicians in general.

6.1.2 Factor analysis: Attitudes and beliefs (phone mode)

A problem arose with the variable referring to how a respondent feels about Francophones. There were only 518 valid cases, and 1,557 (79.4%) missing cases. These missing values prevented a factor analysis on the attitudes and beliefs that included the Francophone variable. The Little's MCAR (missing completely at random) test was statistically significant ($p = .000$), so I must reject the null hypothesis that missing values are not missing at random. This means that data imputation is problematic. So, I proceeded with the factor analysis that does not include Francophones, knowing this may affect the results and reveal strong factors that might have been different if Francophones were permitted in the analysis.

Table 18 shows the results of the factor analysis on these 11 variables. Two strong factors emerge, explaining a cumulative 59.99% of the variance. On Component 1, "Attitudes

toward social groups,” the variables with the strongest loadings were associated with all six equity-seeking groups, as well as Anglophones and Quebec. On Component 2, “Attitudes toward North America,” the variables with strong loadings included Canada, federal politicians in general and the U.S. Based on the results of the web sample factor analysis, it seems possible or even likely that the inclusion of the Francophone variable would have resulted in a third component that included Quebec as well. In addition, the Quebec variable has the weakest loading on the “Attitudes toward social groups” component.

6.2 Factor analysis: Use in regression

Factor analysis shows multiple yet similar strong factors underlying the attitudes and beliefs variables in both modes, meaning that these factors operate statistically independently of one another. For the purpose of regression analysis, I constructed scales that include only the variables that load on the “Attitudes toward outgroups” component, as I am interested in how economic anxiety as an independent variable impacts these particular attitudes as the dependent variable. I created scales that included only attitudes toward outgroups, as these loaded on the same strong factor, and because the language groups had the weakest loadings. For web mode, this means an Outgroups-alone Attitude Scale as well as an Outgroups + Anglophones Scale; for phone mode, this means an Outgroups-alone Attitudes Scale as well as an Outgroups + Language Scale that includes Quebec and Anglophones. I include these in the discussion of descriptive and inferential statistics but did not apply them in later regressions. Feelings toward language groups,

the U.S., politicians, Quebec and language groups are interesting, but not integral to the research question. In addition, language was included as an explanatory variable in regression.

6.3 Descriptive statistics: Attitudes and beliefs

6.3.1 Descriptive statistics: Attitudes and beliefs (web mode)

Table 19 and Figure 5 show the mean “temperature” of attitudes toward each of the groups. Federal politicians have the lowest score, with a mean temperature of 43.12, followed by Muslims living in Canada, with a mean temperature of 54.57 and Quebec with 59.33. Canada had the warmest mean temperature of 85.51. The low mean temperature for Quebec suggests that language and cultural tensions may be alive and well in English and French Canada. In the creation of complex variables for these attitudes, I created a scale based on the “Attitudes toward outgroups” component identified above: one that includes Anglophones and one that does not, in order to clarify when these language and cultural tensions may be operating.

Figure 7 shows and Figure 8 show the distributions on this scale. Statistics and frequencies are shown in Table 21 and Table 22. For the Outgroups-alone Attitudes Scale ($n = 3,463$), the mean temperature was 63.44, slightly below than the median temperature of 63.64. indicating the distribution is slightly negatively skewed (-0.222). The scores come close to following the normal curve, with the exception of two peaks, but these account for a relatively small proportion of cases: 4.9% of cases scored 100 on each of the six included outgroups variables and 2.3% scored exactly 50. A small standard deviation ($\sigma = 21.29$) indicates there is less variance than predicted by the normal distribution model, and the kurtosis score of -0.487 indicates the curve is slightly flatter than normal.

For the scale that includes attitudes toward Outgroups + Anglophones ($n = 3,456$), the mean temperature was 65.46, slightly below the median of 65.86, indicating this distribution is very slightly negatively skewed (-0.174). There are two unusual peaks on the distribution as well, with 4.7% of cases scoring 100 on all seven groups and 2.1% scoring exactly 50. The small standard deviation ($\sigma = 19.78$) shows there is less variance than the outgroups-alone scale and less than predicted by the normal distribution model. The kurtosis score of -0.522 again shows the curve is flatter than normal.

While the mean temperature in the Outgroups + Anglophones scale is slightly higher than the outgroups-alone scale (65.46 versus 63.64), there are no other significant differences, perhaps surprisingly.

6.3.2 Descriptive statistics: Attitudes and beliefs (phone mode)

Table 20 and Figure 1 show the mean “temperature” of attitudes toward each of the groups, including Francophones. Federal politicians again have the lowest score, with a mean temperature of 55.01, followed by Muslims living in Canada, with a mean temperature of 73.03, which is more than 20 percentage points higher than web mode responses (54.57), and Quebec with 73.53, about 14 percentage points higher than web mode responses (59.33). Canada had the warmest mean temperature of 91.08, about five percentage points higher than the web mode response (85.51). Social desirability bias is observed in these divergent responses, with lower mean “temperatures” across the web mode. According to Breton et al (2017) in a discussion about this phenomenon, the “obvious suspect is a social desirability bias where respondents who

feel negatively about these groups are inclined to hide their feelings to a live interviewer” (p. 1023).

Figure 9 and Figure 10 shows the distributions of the scale that includes only attitudes toward outgroups and one that includes feelings toward Anglophones and Quebec. Statistics and frequencies are shown in Table 23 and Table 24. For the Outgroups-alone Attitudes Scale ($n = 2,501$), the mean temperature was 78.58, slightly below than the median temperature of 80.83, indicating the distribution is negatively skewed (-0.936). A small standard deviation ($\sigma = 18.12$) indicates there is far less variance than predicted by the normal distribution model, and the kurtosis score of 0.697 indicates the curve is more peaked than normal. This is evident in Figure 9. There are a large number of cases of the maximum positive response (358, or 14.3%), by far the most frequent single response, which may be related to the reluctance of a respondent to provide negative answers to the live interviewer. In addition, the bottom half of scores (i.e. all “dislike” scores or “cool” feelings toward these groups) were found at the bottom of the distribution, at the 10th percentile. In the web sample, these dislike scores were found at the bottom third of the distribution, around the 30th percentile.

For the Outgroups + Language Groups (Quebec and Anglophones) attitudes scale ($n = 1,977$), the mean temperature was 78.78, slightly below than the median temperature of 81.25, indicating the distribution is negatively skewed (-1.030). A small standard deviation ($\sigma = 17.68$) indicates there is far less variance than predicted by the normal distribution model, and the kurtosis score of 0.947 indicates the curve is more peaked than normal. Again, these characteristics are evident in Figure 10. There are a large number of cases of the maximum

positive response (144, or 7.3%). On this scale, the maximum positive response is also the most frequent single response. In addition, the bottom half of scores (i.e. all “dislike” scores or “cool” feelings toward these groups) were again found at the bottom of the distribution, at the 10th percentile.

6.4 Inferential statistics: Attitudes and beliefs

6.4.1 Inferential statistics: Attitudes and beliefs (web mode)

For the Outgroups-alone Attitudes Scale, the p-value for the test statistic of skewness = -5.2857 and the p-value for the test statistic of kurtosis = -5.8674. For the Outgroups + Anglophones scale, the p-value for the test statistic of skewness = -4.1428 and the p-value for the test statistic of kurtosis = -6.2891. In both cases, the p-value for the test statistic is greater than the significance value of 1.96 at the .05 level of significance, meaning that null hypothesis of normality is rejected and the underlying sample distribution can be said to be non-normal. The negative skewness on both scales indicates a long left tail with more values clustered in the negative direction, and the negative kurtosis indicates flatter distribution. These characteristics can be seen in Figure 7 and Figure 8.

Because the constructed attitudes scales have no real-world benchmark, questions of accuracy and precision are addressed using point estimates: the standard error of the mean.

To construct a two-sided, 95% confidence interval, I calculated:

$$\text{sample estimate} \pm \text{sampling error}$$

For the Outgroups-alone Attitudes Scale, this becomes:

$$63.4408 \pm 0.36180(1.96)$$

or a range of 62.7316 to 64.1499 which does include the mean. The mean is a temperature of feelings toward certain groups (about 63.44 “degrees”) and is found within the confidence interval of 62.73 to 64.19.

For the Outgroups + Anglophones Attitudes Scale, this becomes:

$$65.4600 \pm 0.33648(1.96)$$

or a range of 64.8005 to 66.1195, which does include the mean. The mean is a temperature of feelings toward a certain group (about 65.46 “degrees”) and is found within the confidence interval of 64.8 to 66.12.

So, I can conclude that, 95 times out of 100, the confidence interval would contain the true population value of the mean estimate for the attitudes scale in the web sample.

6.4.2 Inferential statistics: Attitudes and beliefs (phone mode)

For the Outgroups-alone Attitudes Scale, the p-value for the test statistic of skewness = -5.2857 and the p-value for the test statistic of kurtosis = -5.8674. For the Outgroups + Language Groups Scale, the p-value for the test statistic of skewness = -18.7272 and the p-value for the test statistic of kurtosis = 8.6090. In both cases, the p-value is greater than the significance value of 1.96, meaning that null hypothesis of normality is rejected for both scales and the underlying sample distribution can be said to be non-normal. Negative skewness indicates a long left tail with more values clustered in the negative direction, and positive kurtosis indicates more peaked distribution, as seen in Figure 9 and Figure 10.

Questions of accuracy and precision are addressed using point estimates: the standard error of the mean.

To construct a two-sided, 95% confidence interval, I calculated:

$$\text{sample estimate} \pm \text{sampling error}$$

For the Outgroups-alone Attitudes Scale, this becomes:

$$78.5778 \pm 0.36229(1.96)$$

or a range of 77.8677 to 79.2879 which does include the mean. If the mean is a temperature of feelings toward certain groups (about 78.58 “degrees”), this is found within the confidence interval of 77.87 to 79.29 “degrees”.

For the Outgroups + Language Groups Attitudes Scale, this becomes:

$$78.7842 \pm 0.39776(1.96)$$

or a range of 78.0046 to 79.5638, which does include the mean. The mean temperature (about 78.78 “degrees”) is found within the confidence interval of 78.0 to 79.56 “degrees”. Therefore, I can conclude that, 95 times out of 100, the confidence interval would contain the true population value of the mean estimate for both attitudes scales in the phone sample.

Overall, because the mean “temperature” for the scales are found within the confidence interval, I can say the sample estimates for attitudes and beliefs are accurate with respect to the general population and that the estimator is precise in both phone and web modes. This provides some reassurance these variables can be appropriately applied in other respects, such as linear regressions, and in relation to the general population, and that statistics derived from these variables can be considered accurate.

All attitudes scales have small standard deviations and large sample sizes ($n > 3,000$ for web mode and $n > 1,800$ for phone mode), so that any variance can be statistically

accommodated and the risk of random error is lower than in smaller samples, even non-probability samples, meaning that estimators used in these samples can be considered precise.

6.5 Validity and reliability of variables: Attitudes and beliefs

Variables based on questions of attitudes may have questionable validity. Here, the concepts ostensibly measured are “fundamentally unobservable,” (Bennett, 1996, p. 142). I have shown that these variables suffer from social desirability bias, most evident in the phone mode, which indicates that the questions do not necessarily reveal true feelings. One could argue about the validity of these variables if they are tainted by non-random measurement error, even if they are considered accurate from an inferential statistical standpoint. One could also argue about validity of measuring any political beliefs with ephemeral feelings, but it is also true that a sense of animus toward immigrants, Muslims living in Canada, LGBT people or other equity-seeking groups could indicate policy preferences as well, if those feelings were activated by a political party or other group.

On the other hand, questions addressing attitudes and beliefs are asked in plain language, using a simple thermometer to gauge how “warm” or “cool” a respondent reports feeling toward some group in society. The measurement of the reliability of these variables can be estimated, by conducting a reliability analysis on the items measuring these sentiments.

6.5.1 Validity and reliability of variables: Attitudes and beliefs (web mode)

This reliability analysis included all 12 variables ($n = 3,352$) that measure attitudes toward groups in society. Cronbach’s showed a strong level of reliability ($\alpha = .866$). Inter-item correlations, shown in Table 25, range from very weak ($r = .077$) to strong ($r = .796$). The

weakest relationship is between attitudes toward the U.S./Muslims living here, and the strongest relationship is between attitudes toward immigrants/racial minorities, followed by immigrants/Muslims living here ($r = .772$). Here as well, the gays and lesbians/feminists correlation is notable ($r = .645$). Attitudes toward federal politicians are only weakly correlated with any group with $r < .3$ in all cases except for Quebec ($r = .354$) and the U.S. ($r = .325$). Attitudes toward Canada are weakly correlated ($r < .3$) with all groups except for Anglophones ($r = .382$) and the U.S. ($r = .364$). Attitudes toward Francophones are only strongly related to attitudes toward Quebec ($r = .672$). Item-total correlations are shown in Table 26.

This mostly corresponds with the factor analysis that showed these sentiments toward Canada, the U.S. and federal politicians, and sentiments toward Quebec and Francophones are unrelated to feelings about other groups in society. In addition, the alpha would improve with the removal of the attitudes toward the U.S. variable, and would not change at all with the removal of attitudes toward Canada or federal politicians. Attitudes toward Canada, the U.S. and federal politicians also show the weakest item-total statistics. Attitudes toward language groups (Anglophones and Francophones) and Quebec have stronger inter-item relationships, with Quebec and Anglophones right on the border of moderate, and all weaker in comparison to attitudes toward equity-seeking groups in society.

While attitudes toward Anglophones loaded on the same strong factor as outgroups, its was among the weaker inter-item correlations. Based on these results, I determine that only some “How do you feel about...?” variables have acceptable reliability and will exclude attitudes toward Canada, the U.S., federal politicians and language groups from further analysis, as both

factor and reliability tests indicate that these sentiments are operating on other cultural ideas and sentiments. Attitudes toward language groups are therefore not included in the analysis of outgroups below.

6.5.2 Validity and reliability of variables: Attitudes and beliefs (phone mode)

In a reliability analysis (Table 27 and Table 28) that included all 11 variables ($n = 1,940$ as Francophones have been excluded due to missing data), Cronbach's alpha showed a strong level of reliability, $\alpha = .883$. Inter-item correlations take on a wide range, from very weak ($r = .119$) to strong ($r = .705$). The weakest relationship is between feelings toward Aboriginal people/the U.S., which makes logical sense, but other relationships between feelings toward Canada and other groups were similarly weak, such as Canada/Aboriginal people ($r = .199$), Canada/federal politicians ($r = .159$) and Canada/Muslims living here ($r = .183$). Strong relationships were found between feelings toward gays and lesbians/feminists ($r = .705$) and immigrants/Muslims living here ($r = .785$). Table 28 shows item-total correlations that align with the factor analysis: feelings toward the U.S., federal politicians and Canada have the weakest relationship to the total set of variables ($r < .5$) and the alpha would actually improve if those items were deleted. Outgroups as well as Anglophones have moderate to strong relationships to the total ($r = .628$ to $.777$), with feelings toward Quebec right on the border ($r = .589$), although the alpha would not improve if the Quebec item were deleted. Because the attitudes toward Francophones variable was missing values and was excluded, it is impossible to know how this would have interacted with the item-total and inter-item variables.

Based on these results, I accept that only some of the “How do you feel about...?” variables have good reliability and exclude attitudes toward Canada, the U.S. and federal politicians from further analysis, as both factor and reliability tests indicate that these sentiments are operating on other cultural ideas and sentiments. For clarity and because not all language groups were included in the reliability test and factor analysis I also exclude attitudes toward language groups.

Chapter 7: Economic Anxiety

The CES does ask several questions relating to economic anxiety and work-related insecurity. Here again, the web and phone modes differ in this regard, both in terms of the questions asked and responses provided. The survey asks two subjective questions directly related to job and labour market insecurity, as well as income insecurity, but does not ask about objective work status itself. As Kiersztyn (2018) argues, this combination would best solve the subjective/objective problem found in most studies of precarious work. Statistics derived from the more emotional variables may have less validity, which relates more to question design and logic than to measurement (Bennett, 1996). Again, subjective concepts are fundamentally unobservable, even if posed in plain language and cover generally common-sense topics such as job insecurity which, though respondents may hold subjective views, have commonly understood meanings; thus, “we must accept a bit of uncertainty in thinking about validity” (Bennett, 1996, p. 142).

Web survey (11 items)

- Over the past year, has your financial situation gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed the same?
- Have the policies of the federal government made your financial situation better, worse or not made much difference?
- Over the past year, has Canada’s economy gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed the same?
- Have the policies of the federal government made Canada’s economy

Phone survey (7 items)

- Over the past year, has your financial situation gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed the same?
- Have the policies of the federal government made your financial situation better, worse or not made much difference?
- Over the past year, has Canada’s economy gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed the same?
- Have the policies of the federal government made Canada’s economy

better, worse, or not made much difference?

- How likely is it that your income will be lost in the next year?
- If this income were lost, how easy or difficult would it be to find another source of income or a comparable job?
- If this income stopped completely, how long do you think you could get by on just your savings and investments?
- Over the past year, has the economy made you feel angry?
- Over the past year, has the economy made you feel enthusiastic?
- Over the past year, has the economy made you feel fearful?
- Over the past year, has the economy made you feel hopeful?

better, worse, or not made much difference?

- How likely is it that your income will be lost in the next year?
- If this income were lost, how easy or difficult would it be to find another source of income or a comparable job?
- If this income stopped completely, how long do you think you could get by on just your savings and investments?

7.1 Factor analysis: Economic anxiety

These items were inconsistently scaled, making comparisons difficult, even within modes. Some items had to be recoded (see Table 29) in order to make the lowest value an indicator of low anxiety and higher values an indicator of high anxiety. In addition, the questions relating to economic perceptions were asked at different points in the survey and it was not immediately clear whether it was appropriate to combine them into a single complex variable or scale. Perceptions of the economy can be based on a multitude of factors in no way limited to anxiety surrounding one's personal economic "pocketbook" concerns, or even general worries about Canada's general economic future or recent performance. All variables were standardized first.

7.1.1 Factor analysis: Economic anxiety (web mode)

A factor analysis of the 11 web mode variables (Table 30) was strong, with a KMO of .735 and three principle components explaining a cumulative 53.11% of the variance. The variables with the strongest loadings on Component 1, “Broad economic concerns,” relate to questions of federal policies and their impact on one’s personal financial situation and on the economy as a whole, as well as perceptions about Canada’s economic performance in the past year. The variables with the strongest loadings on Component 2, “Personal anxiety,” are related to perceptions of one’s personal financial situation over the past year, the possibility of income loss (job insecurity) and replacement (labour market insecurity), the ability to get by on savings and investments alone (income insecurity), and feelings of anger and fear about the economy over the past year. The strongest loadings are found on anger and fear, as well as income loss. On Component 3, the only strong loadings are on economic enthusiasm and hope, even after recoding, suggesting that these variables may capture some general emotional valence toward one’s economic prospects or potential for economic growth in Canada, not anxiety per se. As such, we can see that combining all of these variables into some scale of economic anxiety would be inappropriate as they do not capture the same sensibilities. Component 2 most clearly captures personal economic anxiety, both forward-looking in terms of income loss and related concerns, as well as retrospectively, in terms of changes to one’s personal financial situation over the past year and whether the economy made a respondent feel anger or fear in the past year. This measure also captures different forms of both anxiety and insecurity.

7.1.2 Factor analysis: Economic anxiety (phone mode)

A factor analysis of the seven phone mode variables (Table 31) almost meets the cutoff for factor analysis, with a KMO of .643. Three components explain a cumulative 59.80% of the variance. I will proceed with the factor analysis despite the lower than ideal KMO because it is necessary to isolate the strong factors for regression and discriminant analysis later.

Three components clearly emerge. The variables with the strongest loadings on Component 1, “Broad economic concerns,” were related to federal economic policies, both personal and general, and perceptions of Canada’s overall economic performance over the past year. This parallels the web sample factor analysis, though the loadings are not identical. Variables with the strongest loadings on Component 2, “Personal anxiety,” were related to one’s sense of their own economic situation over the past year, as well as the possibility of future income loss and the relative ease of replacing that income. This is similar to the second component in the web sample factor analysis, with the exception of the emotional variables, which were not part of the phone survey, and the exception of the savings variable, which here load on Component 3. In fact, the only variable with a strong loading on Component 3, “Savings,” or the ability of a respondent to get by on their savings and investments alone, likely indicates something about wealth.

In general, the components are similar across the modes, with the exception of Component 3 in both cases. Because phone respondents were not asked about their anger, fear, optimism or hope, there is no “Optimism” component for this mode, but savings seem to have their own underlying basis for economic concerns. On one hand, perhaps low savings add to

anxiety levels, while on the other hand generous savings may add a buffer against personal economic losses but also create the risk of greater losses in an economic downturn.

We can see that a scale combining the variables that load on these three components in any scale would be inappropriate as they do not capture the same sensibilities. For the purposes of this analysis, I am interested in personal economic anxiety and insecurity and how these might manifest in other behaviour, attitudes and beliefs. As such, for the following analysis I will focus on Component 2, “Personal anxiety”.

7.2 Descriptive statistics: Economic anxiety

7.2.1 Descriptive statistics: Economic anxiety (web mode)

The web mode included six variables ($n = 2,643$) that loaded on the “Personal anxiety” component, which I combined to create a Personal Economic Anxiety Scale using income loss, income replacement, getting by on savings alone, personal financial situation, economic anger and economic fear. This scale, then, combines economic anxiety and work-related insecurity. Frequencies and statistics are shown in Table 32. These were scored on three-point and four-point scales with a minimum score of 1 and a maximum score of 5, with low values indicating low anxiety and high values indicating high anxiety. The mean value (3.142) was slightly lower than the median value (3.167), meaning the distribution is negatively skewed (-0.072). There is a relatively small range of scores: 2.667 at the 25th percentile and 3.667 at the 75th percentile, as well as a very small standard deviation ($\sigma = 0.76976$). The distribution does not follow the curve predicted by the normal distribution model, as is evident in Figure 11. It is difficult to interpret the raw frequencies because they were scored differently.

7.2.2 Descriptive statistics: Economic anxiety (phone mode)

The phone mode provided just three variables ($n = 2,662$) that could be combined to create a scale of personal anxiety based on the strong factors that emerged. Frequencies and statistics are shown in Table 33. I added together only the variables that loaded on the “Personal anxiety” component: income loss, income replacement and personal financial situation, which again combined work-related insecurity and economic anxiety. These variables were scored on three-point and four-point scales with a minimum score of 1 and a maximum score of 5, with low values indicating low anxiety and high values indicating high anxiety. The mean value (3.3223) was slightly higher than the median value (3.0), indicating this scale is slightly positively skewed. Again, there is a relatively small range of scores: 2.3333 at the 25th percentile and 3.6676 at the 75th percentile, as well as a very small standard deviation ($\sigma = 1.08350$) but this is because there were very few possible scores in the scale. The distribution more closely follows a normal curve, as shown in Figure 12. It is again difficult to interpret the raw frequencies because they were scored differently.

7.3 Inferential statistics: Economic anxiety

7.3.1 Inferential statistics: Economic anxiety (web mode)

For the Personal Economic Anxiety Scale, the p-value for the test statistic of skewness = 1.5 and the p-value for the test statistic of kurtosis = -29.6842; the p-value for the test statistic of kurtosis is greater than the significance value of 1.96, meaning that null hypothesis of normality is rejected and the underlying sample distribution can be said to be non-normal. The negative

kurtosis indicates a flatter distribution, as seen in Figure 11. Even if the distribution is flatter than normal, there are also a large number of peaks, possibly because of the limited response options.

In the absence of a real-world benchmark, questions of accuracy and precision can be addressed using the standard error of the mean.

To construct a two-sided, 95% confidence interval, I calculated:

$$\text{sample estimate} \pm \text{sampling error}$$

For the Personal Economic Anxiety Scale, this becomes:

$$3.1421 \pm .01497(1.96)$$

or a range of 3.1128 to 3.1714, which does include the mean.

7.3.2 Inferential statistics: Economic anxiety (phone mode)

For the phone sample Personal Economic Anxiety Scale, the p-value for the test statistic of skewness = 4.7234 and the p-value for the test statistic of kurtosis = -1.6211; the p-value for skewness is greater than the significance value of 1.96, meaning that null hypothesis of normality is rejected and the underlying sample distribution can again be said to be non-normal. The positive skewness indicates a long right tail with more values clustered in the positive direction, as shown in Figure 12.

To construct a two-sided, 95% confidence interval, I calculated:

$$\text{sample estimate} \pm \text{sampling error}$$

For the Personal Economic Anxiety Scale, this becomes:

$$3.3223 \pm .02100(1.96)$$

or a range of 3.28214 to 3.36446 which does include the mean.

So, I can say that, 95 times out of 100, these confidence intervals would contain the true population value of the mean estimate for the economic anxiety constructed in both modes of the survey.

In both modes, accuracy and precision are difficult to demonstrate with certainty, because there are a low number of variables included in the scales, with non-uniform response categories included on the scales.

7.4 Reliability and validity: Economic anxiety

7.4.1 Reliability and validity: Economic anxiety (web mode)

A reliability test showed a strong enough alpha ($\alpha = .681$ or $\alpha = .749$ on standardized items) to proceed with the analysis and to support, at least hypothetically, combining the variables into a scale. Item-total correlations ranged from very weak ($r = .029$) to moderate ($r = .621$), as shown in Table 34. The lowest correlation was found between economic enthusiasm/income loss, followed by perceptions of policies affecting Canada's economy/getting by on savings and investments ($r = .041$). The strongest, although still moderate, correlations were found between economic hope/economic enthusiasm, followed by economic anger/economic fear ($r = .589$). Other moderate correlations were found between perceptions of Canada's economy/policies affecting Canada's economy ($r = .579$). Even the variables that were found to load on the same strong factor of personal economic anxiety (income loss and income replacement) were found to have weak correlations with all variables, even each other ($r = .079$), though slightly more strongly correlated with economic fear ($r = .214$) and economic anger ($r = .216$). The alpha would actually improve by removing income loss and savings and investments.

This suggests that different forms of work-related insecurity operate differently from one another, which intuitively seems questionable at first, but may be based on differences in work status, personal characteristics or social location that are not captured in the model.

Item-total correlations (Table 35) were all weak ($r < .5$) as well, with policies affecting personal finances showing the strongest relationship to the total ($r = .512$). This strongly suggests that any scale with all 11 variables would conflate various distinct sentiments toward such a complex and multifaceted issue as economic anxiety. I ran a second reliability test that included only the six variables identified by the factor analysis as loading on the “Personal economic anxiety” component, which produced an even lower alpha ($\alpha = .500$ or $\alpha = .602$ on standardized items). Although these items loaded on a single component in a factor analysis, this component only explained 17.81% of the variance. All inter-item correlations were low ($r < .3$) with the exception of economic anger/economic fear ($r = .579$). This indicates that economic anger and fear may not be linked to other perceptions of personal or general economic concerns, retrospective or potential, and should be analyzed separately or used in a regression as distinct variables.

7.4.2 Reliability and validity: Economic anxiety (phone mode)

A reliability test showed a weak alpha ($\alpha = .481$ or $\alpha = .544$ on standardized items) that indicates all seven variables should not be combined into a single scale. Indeed, item-total correlations ranged from very weak ($r = .029$) to weak ($r = .471$), as shown in Table 37. The lowest inter-item correlation (Table 36) was found between perceptions of Canada’s economy overall/getting by on savings and investments, followed by perceptions of one’s personal

financial situation/getting by on savings and investments ($r = .050$). The only correlations approaching even moderate were those relating to policies: policies affecting Canada's economy/perceptions of Canada's economy overall ($r = .471$) and policies affecting Canada's economy/policies affecting personal finances ($r = .358$). Income replacement was very weakly negatively correlated with getting by on savings and investments alone ($r = -.019$). Item-total correlations were also weak ($r < .5$) in all cases. Getting by on savings and investments alone had the weakest relationship to the total ($r = .076$), which corresponds to the factor analysis that showed the savings variable loaded on its own component and was independent of other economic sentiments. The alpha would actually improve by removing this variable; the same is true of income replacement (Table 37).

I ran a second reliability test on only those three variables identified by the factor analysis as loading on a "Personal economic anxiety" component. This produced an even lower alpha ($\alpha = .349$ or $\alpha = .373$ on standardized items). Inter-item and item-total correlations were very weak ($r < .3$) in all cases. Again, we can see that a scale combining all seven variables is inappropriate, and that a scale that combines all three variables may similarly be incapable as such of addressing the research question. Despite a factor analysis that showed these three items loaded on the same component, it is also true that this component only explained 19.9% of the variance. These results are similar across modes, and overall indicates that economic anxiety variables are best used in regression and discriminant analysis as distinct independent variables. In this way, it is possible to assess the individual impacts on different types of economic anxiety and work-related insecurity.

Chapter 8: Discriminant Analysis: Voting

The CES was administered slightly differently among the two modes, but my hypotheses are the same. The PEPSO research group found that workers in less secure employment are less likely to report voting than workers in secure employment, even after controlling for income and that moving from an insecure to secure form of employment increased the likelihood of voting by more than 20% (PEPSO, 2015). I predict economic anxiety and work-related market insecurities will have a similar effect.

Variables

All economic anxiety variables were recoded so that a low score indicated low anxiety and a high score indicated high anxiety. I therefore predict negative correlations between anxiety variables and attitudes. Several variables were converted into dummies, including employment status (working for pay and self-employed coded as 1, not working for pay coded as 0), language (English coded as 1 and French as 0), gender (male coded as 1, female as 0), birthplace (Canada including Quebec coded as 1, elsewhere as 0), union status (union member coded as 1, non-union as 0), voting in 2011 (yes coded as 1, no as 0), alienation (agreeing that the “government doesn’t care about what people like you think” coded as 1, disagreeing as 0). For the phone mode, voting as a duty was turned into a dummy (“voting is a duty” coded as 1, “voting is a choice” coded as 0). This question was not asked in the web mode. For the web mode, the voting variable was created by adding together the responses of two randomly-assigned versions of the basic question “Did you vote in the 2015 election?” In addition to the basic questions of whether respondents viewed their personal financial situation as getting better or worse in the past year

and whether they believed they could lose their income in the coming year, the web mode also included the more emotional concepts: “over the past year, has the economy made you feel angry/enthusiastic/fearful/hopeful?” with response options never/sometimes/very often.

8.1 Discriminant analysis: Voting (web mode)

Hypothesis 1: Economic anxiety will reduce voting

With voting in 2015 as the dependent variable, I conducted a unique canonical discriminant function analysis for each independent variable listed in column B of Table 38, controlling for variables in column A, and in all cases, using the two-tailed $p < 0.05$ level as the cut-off point for significant effects. Significant results are shown in Table 39 through Table 43. The factor score for the “Personal anxiety” component did not have a significant impact, but the Personal Economic Anxiety Scale that combined several economic anxiety variables was a significant ($p = .024$) predictor of voting behaviour in a canonical discriminant function with an eigenvalue of .199. The -.036 canonical discriminant coefficient on the Personal Economic Anxiety Scale indicates that more anxiety is weakly predictive of non-voting, even after controlling for other factors such as income. However, there were much stronger indicators, including general interest in politics (.232, $p = .000$), voting in 2011 (.862, $p = .000$), income (.215, $p = .000$) and education (.125, $p = .000$). In general, these results should be interpreted with caution, because employment was a significant predictor of non-voting (-.195, $p = .006$), contrary to phone mode results discussed below, and contrary to the cross-tabulation discussed above that suggest employment is actually a significant indicator of voting.

One's perceptions of their personal financial situation did not have a significant impact, nor perceptions of the economy overall or policies relating to either of these. Possibility of income loss (job insecurity) was a weakly negative but significant ($p = .026$) predictor of voting with a canonical discriminant coefficient of $-.026$ in a canonical discriminant function with an eigenvalue of $.212$. Again, there were much stronger predictors, especially interest in politics, voting in 2011, income and education. Employment had a significant and negative impact on voting.

Income replacement (labour market insecurity) did not have a significant impact, but lack of savings (income insecurity) did ($p = .000$) with a canonical discriminant coefficient of $-.043$ in a canonical discriminant function with an eigenvalue of $.214$. Feeling anger about the economy did have a significant and negative impact ($-.057$, $p = .024$) in a canonical discriminant function with an eigenvalue of $.202$. Feeling fear about the economy also had a significant and negative impact ($-.046$, $p = .043$) in a canonical discriminant function with an eigenvalue of $.197$. The same factors as above (age, education, income and interest in politics) were stronger predictors for both anger and fear. Again, and counterintuitively, employment had a significant and negative impact on voting. Curiously, although union membership is shown in the literature to have a positive impact on voting, it was not a significant predictor in this analysis. For all independent variables showing significant results, the discriminant function analysis correctly predicted better than 50% of original cases. The factor score for Optimism was not a significant predictor of voting behaviour, and neither were feelings of enthusiasm or hope in relation to the economy.

Discussion

It's clear that economic anxiety negatively impacts voting. The Personal Economic Anxiety Scale, the job insecurity, lack of savings, fear and anger all had weak but significant impacts on voting, although the same is true of employment, which is an unexpected outcome and should be interpreted with caution. In a discriminant analysis that includes only the "usual suspects", employment is still a negative and significant predictor of voting. It remains unclear why employment has this effect in the sample and may reflect underlying characteristics of the sample that are not addressed in the model. In addition, while inferential statistics indicated that the Personal Economic Anxiety Scale statistics could reflect values found in the general population, the scale itself may not have reliability. Income insecurity, fear and anger have the most reliable, and negative, effects on voting.

8.2 Discriminant analysis: Voting (phone mode)

Hypothesis 2: Economic anxiety will reduce voting

With voting as the dependent variable, I conducted a unique canonical discriminant function analysis for each independent variable listed in column B of Table 44, controlling for variables in column A, and in all cases, using the two-tailed $p < 0.05$ level as the cut-off point for significant effects. Significant results are shown in Table 45 through Table 46. As predicted, the Personal Economic Anxiety Scale that combined several economic anxiety variables was not a significant predictor of voting behaviour; the same is true of the "Personal anxiety" component.

Individual variables capturing job insecurity, labour market insecurity and income insecurity did not have significant effects.

Perceptions of Canada's economy overall was significant ($p = .014$) in a canonical discriminant function with an eigenvalue of .175. The -.165 canonical discriminant coefficient on the overall economy variable indicates that more negative perceptions of Canada's economy overall are more predictive of non-voting, even after controlling for the most common voting indicators such as income. However, there were far more powerful predictors, including previous turnout (.735, $p = .000$), interest in politics (.338, $p = .000$), education (.194, $p = .000$) and alienation (-.242, $p = .000$). Policies affecting Canada's economy overall did not have a significant effect. This discriminant function analysis correctly predicted 94.2% of original cases, although correctly predicted only 43.6% of actual non-voting cases. This result is not uncommon in samples where one group so clearly dominates: 93.6% of respondents said they voted.

Perceptions of one's personal financial situation was significant ($p = .000$) with a canonical discriminant coefficient of -.315 in a canonical discriminant function with an eigenvalue of .183, meaning that more negative perceptions of one's personal financial situation are more predictive of non-voting, after controlling for other predictors such as income and education. Only turnout in 2011 was a stronger predictor (.758). Policies affecting one's personal financial situation did not have a significant effect. This discriminant function analysis correctly predicted 94.4% of original cases, although correctly predicted only 42.3% of actual non-voting

cases; again, this is not uncommon where one group dominates—only 6.4% of respondents said they did not vote in 2015.

While it is possible that some people who believe their economic situation has declined in the past year may simply be too stressed or too preoccupied trying to find better work to vote, the discriminant analysis controlled for employment, which had a weakly positive and significant effect in both cases, pushing group members toward voting. For example, the canonical discriminant coefficient for perceptions of one's personal financial situation ($-.315$, $p = .000$) was much stronger a predictor than employment ($.109$, $p = .022$) or income, which did not have a significant effect.

Discussion

In this sample, different economic anxieties were related to non-voting, including negative perceptions of one's personal financial situation and of Canada's economy overall. In the phone sample, employment had a positive impact on voting. Work-related insecurity did not have an effect on voting.

It's clear that under certain circumstances and among certain people, economic anxieties are related to voting behaviour and may decrease the likelihood of voting. The different modes produced different results, suggesting that there are differences among the sample populations. In the web mode, the median year of birth was 1966, meaning the median voter was around 49 years old in 2015, consumed news on the internet five days a week, and rated themselves a six out of 10 for interest in politics. In the phone mode, the median year of birth was 1965, meaning the median voter was around 50 years old in 2015, consumed news on the internet four days a

week, and rated themselves a seven out of 10 for interest in politics. As noted above, only about 5% of phone respondents completed the survey via cellphone, and cellphone users were nine years younger on average than landline users. In general, the results were more robust for the phone mode, with stronger canonical discriminant coefficients, especially for perceptions that one's personal financial situation and the overall economy had worsened, although the discriminant function analysis predicted less than 50% of original cases.

It is also true that both modes either suffer from social desirability bias in terms of reported turnout and may differ from the general population in some way, meaning these results should be seen as tentative. The discriminant analysis model employed in both samples gives no indication as to why the same independent variables would not produce the same results. There is also some question as to whether voting in the web sample can be considered reliable, as the voting variable loaded on its own factor in isolation from other political participation variables, and in this sample may be based on a set of values or propensities that have not been captured in this analysis. In addition, the Personal Economic Anxiety Scale results may not be reliable. Because of this, some forms of economic anxiety and insecurity stemming from precarious work may lower the likelihood of voting, but this has not been shown conclusively.

Chapter 9: Ordinary Regression: Non-voting Political Participation

The PEPSO research group (2015) discovered a contradictory pattern in community participation, suggesting that while higher income groups participated in activities such as volunteering, attending meetings and other community events, insecure workers actually volunteered more often, suggesting that those workers either worked less to spend more time in their communities, or that they worked for free to network and seek meaningful job opportunities. The same study also found that, while low-income workers in less-secure jobs were less likely to attend a political meeting than high-income workers in secure jobs, employment security itself had only a small effect on political engagement after controlling for income. However, the PEPSO study also indicated that moving from insecure to secure work increased meaningful social interaction and support by 13%. I predict that economic anxiety will reduce political engagement based on a sense of social dislocation.

Variables

The same variables were used as explanatory variables and independent variables as in the discriminant analysis, with some additions. All economic anxiety variables were recoded so that a low score indicated low anxiety and a high score indicated high anxiety. Again, I predict negative correlations between economic anxiety variables and non-voting political participation. The participation activities included in the scales are discussed above, but it's important to note that there are no positive or negative connotations associated with the different activities; while one can likely assume volunteering is a socially beneficial activity, the same may not be true of online debates and using social media use for political purposes. A dummy variable was created

for alienation (agreeing that “government doesn’t care what people like you think” coded as 1, disagreeing coded as 0).

9.1 Ordinary linear regression: Non-voting political participation (web mode)

Hypothesis 3: Economic anxiety will reduce passive political engagement

A multiple linear regression was calculated to predict passive political engagement based on economic anxiety, using the two-tailed $p < 0.05$ level as the cut-off point for significant effects. Significant results are shown in Table 47 through Table 54.

In general, economic anxiety had a statistically significant impact on passive engagement, but not in the direction hypothesized. In fact, the majority of economic anxiety variables, including the “Personal anxiety” component, the Personal Economic Anxiety Scale and income loss (job insecurity), had a significant and positive impact on passive political engagement, with betas ranging from .61 to .65. None of the following were significant: perceptions of the economy overall, getting by on savings alone (income insecurity), income replacement (labour market insecurity), economic hope or economic enthusiasm. Among the independent anxiety variables that had significance, other explanatory variables consistently had a much stronger impact, including age, education, interest in politics and time spent consuming news online; in cases where gender was significant, being male was related to lower engagement. The strongest impact on engagement was perceptions of one’s personal financial situation ($\beta = .085, p = .000$). In addition, employment, while only significant in some cases, had a weakly negative impact, which is similar to its predictive influence of voting in the web sample. Perhaps

people with employment, whether gainful or precarious, are too busy or preoccupied to engage in such activities online.

Hypothesis 4: Economic anxiety will reduce active political engagement

A multiple linear regression was calculated to predict active political engagement based on economic anxiety, using the two-tailed $p < 0.05$ level as the cut-off point for significant effects. Significant results are shown in Table 55 through Table 63. Results were mixed.

While several economic anxiety variables had a significant effect, coefficients were both positive and negative. For example, the “Personal anxiety” component had a weakly positive impact ($\beta = .070$, $p = .008$), as did federal policies affecting one’s personal financial situation ($\beta = .046$, $p = .028$), income loss ($\beta = .080$, $p = .000$), economic anger ($\beta = .061$, $p = .003$), and economic fear ($\beta = .060$, $p = .003$). Income replacement had a weakly negative impact ($\beta = -.098$, $p = .000$), as did economic hope ($\beta = -.092$, $p = .000$) and economic enthusiasm ($\beta = -.120$, $p = .000$). Positive-sounding variables have been recoded, so the latter two variables suggest a lack of hope and enthusiasm. In general, variables with negative coefficients had larger betas. In addition, the control variable internet news consumption did not have a significant impact, unlike the Passive Engagement Scale, though age and education did. Interest in politics was consistently the strongest indicator with the highest beta for all regressions on active engagement, and strength of party identification also had a significant and positive effect on active engagement, so that stronger party identification was correlated with more engagement.

In a regression that included every independent economic anxiety variable with the Active Engagement Scale as the dependent variable, as shown in Table 63, similarly mixed

results emerge. Lack of economic enthusiasm had the strongest beta ($\beta = -.121$, $p = .000$), but economic fear had a positive impact ($\beta = .084$, $p = .006$). The possibility of losing one's income seemed to be a positive motivator ($\beta = .065$, $p = .013$), while a lower possibility of replacing lost income seemed to have the opposite effect ($\beta = -.099$, $p = .000$). The R-square shows that the model only explains about 11.5% of the variance. In a regression that included every economic anxiety variable as independent variables with the Passive Engagement Scale as the dependent variable, only economic fear ($\beta = .065$, $p = .029$) and personal financial situation ($\beta = .060$, $p = .035$) had a significant albeit weak impact in a model with an R-square of .214 (see Table 64).

In general, most of the R-squares are so low that each model explains less than 10% of the overall variance. The betas are low in most cases as well, indicating that, for example, as economic hope diminishes by one standard deviation, active political engagement diminishes by 9.2% of one standard deviation in a regression that only explains 9.1% of the variance. The mixed positive and negative impact of all economic anxiety variables follow this general pattern, and suggests an impact that is unstable, at least among web mode respondents.

Discussion

At first it seems curious that economic anxiety would increase political participation, but the complex variable for passive engagement included communicating about politics online, including via social media, and venting online seems like a natural outcome out economic anxiety.

Economic anxiety and work-related insecurity variables had both positive and negative influences on active political engagement activities. Because strength of party identification and

interest in politics are significant, it's possible that politically motivated groups respond to different perceived economic threats. It's also possible that there is some kind of split among citizens: in the face of economic anxiety, some become more motivated and others less, depending on personal characteristics that are not identified. On the other hand, the emotional variables may not have been interpreted by respondents in a way that aligns with the assumptions in the model.

It should also be noted that the Personal Economic Anxiety Scale may not be reliable, nor the factor score based on the same variables. Even with that in mind, several variables associated with anxiety and insecurity were correlated with more passive engagement: negative perceptions of federal policies affecting one's personal financial situation, negative perceptions of federal policies affecting the economy overall, job insecurity, the perception that one's personal financial situation had worsened, anger and fear about the economy, with impacts ranging from an increase of 6.1% to 8.5%. Job insecurity, anger and fear also increased active participation, with impacts ranging from 6% to 8%, but labour market insecurity, a lack of hope and a lack of enthusiasm all had a negative effect on active engagement, with impacts ranging from 9.8% to 12%.

9.2 Ordinary linear regression: Non-voting political participation (phone mode)

Hypothesis 5: Economic anxiety will reduce general political engagement

A multiple linear regression was calculated to predict general political engagement based on economic anxiety, using the two-tailed $p < 0.05$ level as the cut-off point for significant effects. Significant results are shown in Table 65 and Table 66.

Similar to the results of the discriminant analysis for voting among phone respondents, the Personal Economic Anxiety Scale that combined several economic anxiety variables was not a significant predictor of general engagement; the same is true of the factor score for personal anxiety and the single variable on perceptions of Canada's economic performance overall. However, perceptions of the federal policies affecting Canada's economic performance was significant ($p = .000$) and weakly positive ($\beta = .098$), after controlling for all explanatory variables. This suggests that when a citizen has more negative views of the policies that affect Canada's economy, they are more motivated to engage politically. However, other variables had stronger impacts on general engagement, including age, education, interest in politics, speaking English and the belief that voting is a duty. Interestingly, union membership had a positive and significant ($\beta = .106$, $p = .000$) impact on general engagement, while it did not impact voting. Controlling for perceptions of Canada's economic performance over all, while almost statistically significant on its own ($\beta = -.058$, $p = .053$), increases the impact of this policy variable ($\beta = .120$, $p = .000$).

Similarly, perceptions of one's personal financial situation did not have a significant impact, but perceptions of federal policies affecting one's personal financial situation did have a weakly positive ($\beta = .118$) and significant impact ($p = .000$). Other variables had again stronger impacts on general engagement, including age, education, interest in politics and speaking English. Controlling for the perception of one's personal financial situation, while not significant on its own, increases the beta on the policy variable ($\beta = .122$, $p = .000$). None of income loss, income replacement or savings had significant impacts on general political engagement. In a

regression that included every economic anxiety variable with general engagement as the dependent variable, only broad economic concerns were significant, including federal policies and Canada's economy overall (Table 67). Negative views of policies seemed to have a motivating effect, while negative perceptions of the economy were related to less engagement.

Hypothesis 6: Economic anxiety will increase partisan political engagement

A multiple linear regression was calculated to predict partisan political engagement based on economic anxiety, using the two-tailed $p < 0.05$ level as the cut-off point for significant effects. Factor scores for Personal Economic Anxiety Component and the Personal Economic Anxiety Scale had no significant impact. Perceptions of one's personal financial situation, of Canada's economy overall, and policies related to those sentiments had no significant impact. Income loss (job insecurity), income replacement (labour market insecurity) and getting by on savings and investments (income insecurity) had no significant impact. In a regression that included all economic anxiety variables with partisan engagement as the dependent variable, the same results emerge (Table 68). So, it is clear that among phone respondents in the 2015 CES, partisan engagement does not seem to be impacted by economic anxiety or work-related insecurity. Partisan engagement in the 2015 CES was measured by donating to political parties and party membership, which are likely either automatic and/or automatically renewed, or have more to do with specific candidates, electoral possibilities or the prevailing political context at the time. Even voting did not have a statistically significant impact on partisan engagement, although interest in politics and strength of partisan identification, age, education and income all did.

Discussion

It's clear that there is a weakly positive but significant impact of variables associated with economic anxiety on general engagement, although the relationship is only significant in relation to policies, not affect, in the phone sample. Citizens who are sufficiently aware of economic policy choices to have an opinion on whether they have improved Canada's economic performance or personal finances seem more likely to participate in general engagement activities, such as signing a petition, attending a meeting or choosing ethical products. But personal anxieties or work-related insecurities do not have a significant impact.

Overall, the effect of economic anxiety is unstable. In among web respondents, it actually increases engagement, especially the passive variety, although labour market insecurity appeared to dampen active general engagement. The explicitly emotional variables of fear, enthusiasm, anger and hope had contradictory effects. Among phone respondents, interpretations of economic policies seemed to have motivating effects and increased general political engagement, but neither economic anxiety nor work-related insecurities had any impact on partisan engagement.

Chapter 10: Ordinary Regression: Attitudes and Beliefs

In a political economy approach to immigration attitudes, the main focus in the literature has primarily been the economic impact of immigration on native citizens, and most theoretical approaches explain attitudes toward immigration in reference to distributional consequences to the labour market and government resources, with a focus on citizens' self-interest (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). In an approach that has been termed "sociopsychological", research has shown that attitudes toward immigration are related to more "symbolic concerns about the nation as a whole", which can be cultural or economic. A review of more than 100 studies on immigration attitudes revealed that the self-interest approach had a weaker empirical foundation (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). Often political economic studies of self-interest call on the factor proportion model, which posits that attitudes toward immigration are based on the anticipation that an influx of immigrants, especially low-skilled immigrants, will create downward pressure on wages for low-skilled native workers and upward pressures for high-skilled workers, and both types of workers adjust their attitudes accordingly; this theoretical approach persists despite empirical economic findings that suggest marginal or non-existent wage effects of immigration itself (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). In the context of public opinion surveys, these studies typically focus on the labour market position of the respondent—high-skill or low-skill—and fears of direct job or wage competition. Sociotropic concerns about national economic performance have proved influential and research has shown negative assessments promote "restrictionism"; this type of assessment has produced more robust empirical results than objective individual economic indicators. However, Hainmueller and

Hopkins (2014) found studies often failed to address partisanship and political ideology, “leaving important questions about the role of party cues in immigration attitudes unanswered” (p. 227). It must be noted that many of the studies reviewed were more than a decade old, and do not take into account very recent and perhaps unprecedented negative rhetoric about the future of work or the decline of previous social relations of work. These studies do not consider other outgroups, such as LGBT community members, Indigenous people or feminists, the equity-seeking groups that were previously excluded from privileged labour market positions in the past. My theoretical assumption is that formerly privileged groups have “harmonized down” to this level, but there has been little investigation of the social consequences of these labour market shifts.

Variables

The CES makes no distinction between low-skill and high-skill respondents, and the income variable refers to household income. However, the survey does ask questions that can be divided into self-interest and sociotropic economic concerns and asks respondents to rate how warm or cool they feel toward certain outgroups. In this regard, the web and phone modes produced different mean “temperatures”. Breton et al (2017) conclude the mode difference was mainly due to social desirability bias and that web mode measures attitudes toward various groups more accurately. As such, we can expect to see more honest results in the results of the web mode analysis.

Control variables were the same as discriminant analyses and participation regressions, with some further additions. I did not include policies in this regression analysis because federal policies are less integral to the analysis in this context. Following the critique of Hainmueller and

Hopkins (2014), a party identification variable was created by combining two randomly-assigned questions: “In federal politics, do you usually think of yourself as a Conservative, Liberal, NDP, Bloc Québécois, Green Party, or none of these?” and “In federal politics, do you usually identify with the Conservative Party, Liberal Party, NDP, Bloc Québécois, Green Party, or none of these?” These categories were turned into dummy variables for each party (NDP and Green Party were combined), with Bloc Québécois left out as the reference category. All categories of the job status variables were turned into dummies on their own, with a reference category of ill/disabled/caring for family full-time; in other words, not working but not looking for work. A dummy variable was created for ambivalence (agreeing that “people who don’t get ahead should blame themselves, not the system” coded as 1, disagreeing as 0), as well as alienation (agreeing that “government doesn’t care what people like you think” coded as 1, disagreeing coded as 0). Finally, while the CES does distinguish between respondents born in Quebec and the rest of Canada, as well as other countries, I created a dummy variable for those born in Canada including Quebec, because the language variable captures any attitudes specific to the French-Canadian identity and because some Quebecers may have responded they were born in Canada. Again, all economic anxiety variables have been recoded so that correlations with attitudes toward outgroups are hypothesized to be negative.

10.1 Ordinary regression: Attitudes and beliefs (web mode)

Hypothesis 7: Economic anxiety will lower attitudes toward outgroups

A multiple linear regression was calculated to predict attitudes toward outgroups based on economic anxiety, using the two-tailed $p < 0.05$ level as the cut-off point for significant

effects. I calculated a multiple regression for individual economic anxiety and work-related insecurity variables to capture self-interest effects, and then a second regression controlling for overall performance to identify the impact of sociotropic concerns. All results are shown in Table 69 through Table 76.

With attitudes toward all outgroups as the dependent variable, Speaking English ($\beta = .122, p = .000$) and having more education ($\beta = .111, p = .000$) were significantly related to more positive attitudes, as well as Liberal Party ($\beta = .091, p = .008$) and NDP/Green Party ($\beta = .091, p = .004$) identity and being a student ($\beta = .050, p = .044$). Conservative Party identity had a negative and significant effect ($\beta = -.135, p = .000$), as did being male ($\beta = -.192, p = .000$). Neither employment status nor income had a significant effect. In terms of economic anxiety, results were mixed. Income loss (job insecurity) ($\beta = -.052, p = .027$) and income replacement (labour market insecurity) ($\beta = -.057, p = .021$) both had weakly negative and significant effects, while low savings (income insecurity) had a weakly positive and significant effect ($\beta = .049, p = .041$). A lack of hope for the economy ($\beta = -.076, p = .007$) had a negative and significant effect but a lack of enthusiasm about the economy ($\beta = .069, p = .013$) had a positive and significant effect. Political ambivalence ($\beta = -.160, p = .000$) and alienation ($\beta = -.091, p = .000$) had negative and significant effects. Controlling for perceptions of Canada's economy overall did not have a significant effect and only very slightly adjusted the betas on other variables.

With attitudes toward racialized outgroups (immigrants, racial minorities and Muslims living in Canada) as the dependent variable, results were similar to the regression for all

outgroups. However, economic anger ($\beta = -.070$, $p = .010$) had a significant and negative impact in this model.

With attitudes toward the LGBT community as the dependent variable, results were somewhat different. Year of birth was significant and positive ($\beta = .109$, $p = .001$), with younger ages linked to more positive attitudes; being born in Canada was more positive than being born elsewhere ($\beta = -.070$, $p = .002$), while language had no effect. Males were significantly related to more negative attitudes ($\beta = -.199$, $p = .000$). Party affiliation had the same effects as above, with Liberal and NDP/Green Party identity more positive, and Conservative Party identity more negative. Ambivalence and alienation also had similar negative effects as above. In terms of the independent variables, possibility of income loss had a significant and weakly negative impact ($\beta = -.075$, $p = .002$) and lack of enthusiasm had a positive effect that disappeared after controlling for perceptions of Canada's overall economy, although this control increased the negative beta on income loss and also Conservative Party identity.

With attitudes toward feminists as the dependent variable, being male was strongly indicative of negative attitudes ($\beta = -.264$, $p = .000$). Only Conservative Party identity had a significant effect among party identities ($\beta = -.171$, $p = .000$), and self-employed workers were significantly though weakly correlated with more negative attitudes ($\beta = -.061$, $p = .025$). Lack of economic hope was significantly correlated with negative attitudes toward feminists ($\beta = -.077$, $p = .006$), even after controlling for perceptions of the economy overall, which only slightly decreased the beta on the hope variable, but positively increased the beta for students, which took on a significant impact ($\beta = .052$, $p = .032$).

When the dependent variable was attitudes toward Indigenous people, some surprising results emerged. First, the coefficient on year of birth was negative ($\beta = .085$, $p = .008$), suggesting that younger people had more negative attitudes. The coefficient on income ($\beta = -.093$, $p = .000$) was also negative, suggesting that people who made more money had more negative attitudes, yet employment status had no significant effect. Agreeing that “people who don’t get ahead should blame themselves, not the system” had a significant and negative impact ($\beta = -.118$, $p = .000$), which increased after controlling for perceptions of the economy overall. Two work-related insecurity variables had significant and weakly negative impacts: higher possibility of income loss ($\beta = -.074$, $p = .002$) and lower possibility of income replacement ($\beta = -.056$, $p = .028$) while low savings had a positive impact ($\beta = .105$, $p = .000$). These results suggest that while some forms of economic anxiety may be related to negative attitudes, there may be a possibility of solidarity among groups who perceive themselves to be marginalized. Controlling for perceptions of Canada’s economy overall increased the negative beta on Conservative Party identity and decreased the positive beta on Liberal Party and NDP/Green Party identity.

When the dependent variable was attitudes toward racial minorities, effects of economic anxiety and other explanatory variables were similar those in the regression predicting attitudes toward all outgroups. Liberal Party and NDP/Green Party identity were related to more positive attitudes with about the same strength as Conservative Party identity was related to negative attitudes and all were significant. Being male, ambivalence and alienation were significantly related to negative attitudes. Greater likelihood of income loss ($\beta = -.065$, $p = .008$) was related

to more negative attitudes, as was economic anger ($\beta = -.061$, $p = .028$), but a lack of enthusiasm was related to more positive attitudes ($\beta = .064$, $p = .026$). Controlling for perceptions of Canada's economy overall did not have a significant effect, although slightly reduced several of the betas in the original model.

When the dependent variable is attitudes toward immigrants, speaking English and having more education are related to more positive attitudes. Being born in Canada was related to more negative attitudes compared to those born outside Canada—not surprising, given the focus of the analysis was people born outside Canada. Income and job status did not have significant effects. Ambivalence ($\beta = -.126$, $p = .000$) and alienation ($\beta = -.100$, $p = .000$) were again negative and significant, with the highest betas of all variables. In terms of economic anxiety variables, only those with explicit emotional valence were significant. Anger ($\beta = .061$, $p = .027$) and lack of hope ($\beta = -.086$, $p = .003$) were related to negative attitudes toward immigrants, and lack of enthusiasm ($\beta = .077$, $p = .008$) was related to positive attitudes. Among partisans, only Conservative Party identity had a significant effect ($\beta = -.081$, $p = .021$). The self-interested insecurity variables relating to job loss did not have a significant effect, and neither did the more sociotropic consideration of the economy overall.

When the dependent variable is attitudes toward Muslims living in Canada, results are similar to attitudes toward racial minorities. Speaking English and having more education are correlated with more positive attitudes; being male with more negative attitudes. Ambivalence and alienation have a strong and significant effect. Job status and income are not significant, but in this regression, income loss had a weakly negative and significant effect ($\beta = -.056$, $p = .025$).

Economic anger and lack of enthusiasm had opposing but similar betas. Liberal and NDP/Green Party identity had positive and significant effects, and while Conservative Party identity had a negative effect, this disappeared after controlling for perceptions of Canada's economy overall.

Discussion

Table 77 shows the correlations between all measures of economic anxiety and attitudes toward all outgroups. In general, the regressions produced mixed results and partly confirmed the hypothesis that economic anxiety would be related to negative attitudes toward outgroups, and it is clear that political party affiliation, political ambivalence and alienation are critical to understanding attitudes toward all outgroups, not just immigrants. Being male was consistently correlated to more negative attitudes. A higher risk of income loss and a lower ability to replace income once lost are both consistently although weakly correlated with more negative attitudes, while a lack of savings was correlated with positive attitudes. It's possible that this latter variable is really a lack of wealth, which may lead economically insecure citizens to feel more empathy for marginalized groups.

The explicitly emotional variables addressing fear, anger, hope and enthusiasm produced contradictory results: a lack of hope often produced a negative coefficient, while a lack of enthusiasm produced a positive coefficient. These results do not easily permit a conclusion about their interactions with attitudes toward outsider groups, although anger about the economy was consistently associated with negative attitudes toward racialized outgroups, including immigrants, racial minorities and Muslims living in Canada.

Broad perceptions of one's personal financial situation, the economy overall, household income, objective job status and sociotropic assessments of the economy overall did not have significant impacts, contrary to previous findings in the literature. Yet self-interested work-related insecurities such as job insecurity and labour market insecurity were related to negative attitudes not only toward immigrants, but the LGBT community and Indigenous people. It is worth noting that a reliability test showed that attitudes toward LGBT people and feminists were moderately correlated ($r = .635$), indicating that these sentiments in fact linked, suggesting that negative attitudes toward feminists could further develop among those who reported negative attitudes toward LGBT people. It is also important to note that the mean "temperature" of feelings toward Muslims living in Canada was the lowest of all measured groups, and the model produced the highest R-square of all models measuring individual outgroups, suggesting that the effects of economic anxiety, party affiliation, ambivalence and alienation are likely to be felt most strongly among the members of this group.

In the web sample, perceptions of one's personal financial situation has no significant impact, but job and labour market insecurity were consistently significantly correlated with poorer attitudes toward outgroups. The explicitly emotional measures gave mixed results, where a lack of enthusiasm was associated with more positive attitudes, but anger and a lack of hope are associated with lower attitudes. Economic fears were never significantly associated. Interestingly, and contrary to previous literature, sociotropic assessments of the economy overall never had a significant effect. The most straightforward effects were on the measures of work-

related insecurity, such as income loss and the possibility of replacing lost income. Having low savings was consistently and significantly related to more positive attitudes.

10.2 Ordinary regression: Attitudes and beliefs (phone mode)

Hypothesis 8: Economic anxiety will lower attitudes toward outgroups

A multiple linear regression was calculated to predict attitudes toward all outgroups based on economic anxiety, using the two-tailed $p < 0.05$ level as the cut-off point for significant effects. Results are shown in Table 78 through Table 85. I calculated a multiple regression for individual economic anxiety variables to capture self-interest effects, and then a second regression controlling for overall economic performance to identify the impact of sociotropic concerns.

Results were mixed. When the dependent variable was a scale of all attitudes toward outgroups combined, as shown in Table 78, perceptions of one's personal financial situation had a significant and weakly positive impact ($\beta = .055$, $p = .025$), as did low savings (income insecurity) ($\beta = .064$, $p = .013$). Possibly those who are concerned about their own financial outlook feel socially marginalized and thus feel empathetic toward other groups who have historically been marginalized themselves. On the other hand, income replacement had a significant and negative impact ($\beta = -.054$, $p = .033$), suggesting that those who feel it would be more difficult to replace the income they have now with a comparable job are more likely to have "restrictionist" impulses. Employment status did not have a significant impact. Only Conservative Party identification had a significant impact ($\beta = -.137$, $p = .018$). Agreeing that "people who don't get ahead should blame themselves, not the system", and agreeing that

“government doesn’t care about what people like you think” both had significant and negative impacts and suggesting that both political ambivalence ($\beta = -.137, p = .000$) and political alienation ($\beta = -.115, p = .000$), push people toward restrictionism. Controlling for perceptions of Canada’s economy overall slightly increases the negative impacts of income loss and political ambivalence.

When the dependent variable was a scale of attitudes toward racialized outgroups (immigrants, racial minorities and Muslims living in Canada), economic variables produced similar results. Negative perceptions of one’s personal financial situation had a significant and positive impact ($\beta = .062, p = .010$) and difficulty in replacing income had a significant and negative impact ($\beta = -.059, p = .019$). This time, both Liberal Party ($\beta = .201, p = .001$) and NDP/Green Party ($\beta = .157, p = .002$) affiliation had positive and significant impacts. Ambivalence ($\beta = -.125, p = .000$) and alienation ($\beta = -.122, p = .000$) both had significant and negative impacts. Controlling for perceptions of Canada’s economy overall actually increased the beta on personal financial situation, but also had a negative and significant impact on its own ($\beta = -.052, p = .033$).

When the dependent variable was attitudes toward individual outgroups, similar results were produced by each model. Job insecurity and labour market insecurity did not have a significant impact, but party affiliation did, with Conservative Party identification consistently associated with more negative attitudes toward various individual outgroups, as well as ambivalence and alienation. The low savings variable had a positive and significant impact. Similar to the perceptions of one’s personal financial situation, it’s possible that this measure—

potentially a proxy for wealth, or lack thereof—leads people to feel financially insecure and empathize with other marginalized groups. When the dependent variable was gays and lesbians, racial minorities or Muslims living in Canada, difficulty in replacing lost income had a significant and negative impact. This suggests that when Canadians are worried about the possibility of finding a new job, “restrictionism” is not necessarily triggered only by immigrants. When Muslims living in Canada was the dependent variable, both income loss and income replacement had a significant and negative impact, and the personal financial situation variable had no significant effect. In all cases, alienation and ambivalence had consistently negative and significant effects. Income, education, age, being female, speaking English and being born in Canada typically had a positive and significant impact. The same is true of being a student, possibly because of the progressive environment and diverse student body on most university campuses.

Discussion

Table 86 shows the correlations between all measures of economic anxiety and attitudes toward all outgroups. In general, the linear regressions confirmed in part the hypothesis that economic anxiety would push people toward more negative attitudes toward outgroups. For instance, labour market insecurity is related to more restrictionism. On the other hand, income insecurity and a sense that one’s personal financial situation has gotten worse are actually associated to a similar degree with more positive attitudes toward certain outgroups in the phone sample. Conservative Party identity, ambivalence and alienation had consistently stronger and more negative impacts, with betas ranging from $-.115$ to $-.137$. Sociotropic concerns did not have

a significant impact, despite literature suggesting this factor would have a stronger effect. When the analysis was limited to racialized outgroups, Conservative Party identity did not have a significant impact, but Liberal and NDP/Green Party membership had a significant and positive impact. Conservative Party identity was also associated with negative attitudes toward Aboriginal people, as well as the LGBT community.

Labour market insecurity was associated with negative attitudes toward the LGBT community, indicating that restrictionism is not limited to immigration or racial motivations but did not seem to affect attitudes toward feminists or Canada's Indigenous people. Perhaps unexpectedly, while greater income had a significant and positive impact, job status did not have a significant impact in any model. Attitudes toward Muslims living in Canada were most impacted by work-related insecurity, including job insecurity and labour market insecurity.

Here as well, the inter-item correlation between gays and lesbians/feminists correlation is worth recalling and is even stronger in the phone sample ($r = .705$). There is a possibility that anti-feminist attitudes were not expressed in the thermometer scale for any number of reasons, including the social desirability bias that I have already established is problematic, but are indeed linked to anti-LGBT attitudes among respondents. In the phone sample, the mean "temperature" for attitudes toward feminists is nearly 20 percentage points higher than the web sample. In addition, the relative lack of ire directed at Indigenous people could be genuine but could also have simply been immaterial during the 2015 election. The winning Liberals campaigned on a platform of reconciliation, which was obviously effective for the majority of voters, but it is well-established that Indigenous people remain marginalized in multiple aspects of public life,

including health outcomes and political representation. This suggests attitudes toward Indigenous people may not necessarily be benign, let alone beneficent; they may simply be latent until such a time when this equity-seeking group is indeed successful in calls for economic reparations or restitution.

Conclusion

As I have shown, the relationship between economic anxiety, insecurity and various aspects of citizenship is not straightforward. Table 87 and Table 88 show an overview of the main economic anxiety independent variables and their impact on internal citizenship activities (voting, political engagement) and external citizenship (attitudes toward outgroups).

It should not be surprising that precarious work, with its many dimensions, reveals complex and at times contradictory outcomes for society. Precarious work may be a motivating force for democratic participation in the form of free expression and association, but a demotivating force for voting and a negative force for social cohesion and inclusion. Overall, the main findings of this analysis were that job insecurity and labour market insecurity are related to decreased voting, some increased participation, and more negative views toward equity-seeking groups. Ambivalence, alienation, gender and party affiliation are important factors for restrictionist attitudes, suggesting that these social trends must be observed carefully, as there is a risk that equity-seeking groups could be prevented from obtaining full membership in the community if these attitudes manifest in policy choices, public or even private actions.

In the web sample, some economic and employment insecurity—higher levels of personal economic anxiety as measured on a scale, a negative view of one's personal financial situation, possibility of job loss, difficulty in replacing lost income, feeling angry and fearful about the economy, and negative views of policies associated with personal and overall economic conditions—are positively associated with passive engagement. The same variables are positively associated with active engagement, with the exception of job insecurity, which is

related to reduced active engagement, revealing mixed impacts on democratic participation and the exercise of political rights. However, many of these same variables are associated with not voting, and with negative attitudes toward equity-seeking groups, which may ultimately impact the access of certain groups to social rights. When economic anxiety variables are analyzed in relation to individual equity-seeking groups, further divergences emerge. Perceptions of one's personal financial situation is never significant, and the same is true of economic fear. However, economic anger is significantly associated with negative attitudes toward only racialized outgroups: racial minorities, Muslims living in Canada and immigrants. Lack of enthusiasm about the economy was associated with positive attitudes toward outgroups, including racialized groups, while lack of hope was negatively associated with outgroups, including feminists and immigrants. Thus, the explicitly emotional variables do not provide a clear picture, and likely lack validity. A lack of savings was associated with positive attitudes, but job insecurity and labour market insecurity were associated with negative attitudes toward all groups together, and certain individual groups, including Indigenous people, LGBT people and racial minorities. No one group is immune from negative assessments.

Perceptions of the overall economy were never significant in relation to voting, participation or attitudes, but ambivalence and alienation were almost always significant in the negative direction and produced the strongest measures of association. The notion that "the government doesn't care about what people like you think," was consistently and negatively associated with voting (phone mode only), participation and attitudes. The one exception was a positive coefficient on passive engagement, which in the web sample included behaviour like

engaging in online debates and using social media to express political views; it is perhaps no surprise that this rather antisocial sentiment may be linked to airing grievances online. In addition, party affiliations play a role in these behaviours and beliefs, as well as gender: identifying with the Conservative Party was a consistently strong indicator of negative attitudes toward outgroups. This suggests that party ideology can play an activating role, and parties should be cautious about inflaming such tensions for political gain.

In the phone sample, which did not include explicit measures of emotional attachments to the economy, results were similar overall to the web sample, with the exception of participation. Alienation and ambivalence were consistently associated with negative attitudes toward all equity-seeking groups. Negative perceptions of one's personal financial situation and a lack of savings were consistently associated with more positive attitudes, but labour market insecurity was associated with more negative attitudes to racial minorities, Muslims and the LGBT community.

In almost all cases, negative perceptions of Canada's economy had no significant impact on attitudes, but did affect the likelihood of voting, as did negative perceptions of one's personal financial situation. In the phone sample, economic anxiety indicators, alienation and ambivalence had little impact on partisan or general engagement but did have a negative impact on both voting and attitudes toward outgroups.

While these results do not necessarily prove there is an emerging class characterized by anger, anomie, anxiety and alienation, certainly these class features do exist in the samples under consideration and are in many cases linked to restrictionism, particularly job insecurity, labour

market insecurity, ambivalence and alienation. Anomie is not a well-defined term. The sentiment “people who don’t get ahead should blame themselves, not the system” I initially termed ambivalence and, on one hand, can be seen as a drive toward bootstrapping individualism, but can also be seen as antisocial detachment and opposition to social regulation; for Durkheim, this individualism or “egoism” and anomie had a “peculiar affinity for one another” and both emerge from the economic structure (Durkheim in Marks, 1974). We can interpret this anomic sentiment as visible in this analysis and linked to restrictionism, along with anxiety and alienation. An opposition to “the system” can also be interpreted as an internalization of the individualist ethos of neoliberalism embedded in free market principles and suggests the acceptance of the neoliberal agenda of transferring risks and insecurities onto workers and their families, which has taken place, in part, through precarious work. The internalization of this ethos may be incompatible with citizenship and collective action and community spirit (Näsström & Kalm, 2015; Standing, 2011). Harvey (1989) suggests that any regime of accumulation and labour control rests on a total package of relations, including social and psychological propensities such as individualism but also the search for security and collective identity, which together play a role in shaping modes of production and consumption; in short, the mode of living, thinking and feeling life. Anomic individualism in isolation may be rooted in personal freedom but becomes problematic when restricting others’ access to security or collective action. Indeed, it was plainly shown that gender plays a large role attitudes toward outgroups, with males in almost all cases reporting more negative views. This is a critical if un-hypothesized finding, because it is males whose previously privileged position protected them from precarious work and who have been

most affected by harmonizing down. Because job insecurity and labour market insecurity negatively shape attitudes, perhaps the clearest impacts of precarious work are those related to the demise of the SER: once a good job is lost, it may not come back.

For Standing (2011), the warning sign of the consequences of an incompatibility between precarity and citizenship is political disengagement, and indeed this analysis shows that economic anxiety is negatively related to voting, suggesting that those in more precarious positions are less likely to exercise their political rights to vote. This analysis showed an unexpectedly positive correlation with some forms of economic anxiety and non-voting political engagement, although it is unclear whether that engagement, especially online, is prosocial or dysfunctional in its nature. On the other hand, labour market insecurity indicated reduced active non-voting political engagement, which are more likely to be socially beneficial, as this measure captured volunteering and attending community meetings.

Standing also argued that disengagement may ultimately descend into more dire outcomes: “a group that sees no future of security or identity will feel fear and frustration that could lead to it lashing out at identifiable or imagined causes of its lot” (2011, p. 28). But Standing also admits that, while competition and empathy are in constant tension and a society with members in incipient competition will lack empathy and conceal from one another resources and knowledge, empathy can also arise from a shared sense of alienation, insecurity, or even poverty—in short, a common set of vulnerabilities can unite citizens and others into an expansionist, not restrictionist, set of relations. This can be seen in the way that the same labour market insecurity is associated with more positive feelings toward outgroups; it’s possible that

there is a sense of shared vulnerability that mitigates against uglier or more active intolerance.

But we can also see that these attitudes are correlated with party affiliation, suggesting that political party messaging and priming is an important factor in how these anxieties, which seem certain to endure, are managed by public officials and members of society in the coming years.

Appendix

Table 1: Voting behaviour and selected demographics (web mode)

	Did you vote in the last election? No	Did you vote in the last election? Yes	Strength: Cramer's v	Significance: Cramer's v	Pearson's chi square significance	Strength: Gamma	Significance: Gamma
Year born: 1900-1925		100.0%	.151	.000	.000	-.390	.000
Year born: 1926-1945	2.3%	97.7%					
Year born: 1946-1965	7.2%	92.8%					
Year born: 1966-1985	10.6%	89.4%					
Year born: 1986-2005	17.9%	82.1%					
Female	9.3%	90.7%	.016	.002	.332		
Male	8.4%	91.6%					
Income: Less than \$29,999	14.3%	85.7%	.119	.000	.000	.290	.000
Income: Between \$30,000 and \$59,999	9.3%	90.7%					
Income: Between \$60,000 and \$89,999	5.9%	94.1%					
Income: Between \$90,000 and \$109,999	7.9%	92.1%					
Income: More than \$110,000	4.3%	95.7%					
Education: Up to some high school	19.3%	80.7%	.142	.000	.000	.285	.000
Education: Completed high school	12.3%	87.7%					
Education: Some college	10.5%	89.5%					
Education: Completed college	7.0%	93.0%					
Education: Some university	11.7%	88.3%					
Education: Completed university	5.2%	94.8%					
Education: Graduate or professional degree	3.7%	96.3%					
French	8.6%	91.4%	.005	.737	.737		
English	9.0%	91.0%					

Birthplace: Elsewhere	12.6%	87.4%	.034	.047	.047		
Birthplace: Canada or Quebec	8.7%	91.3%					
Married/Living with partner: No	11.4%	88.6%	.079	.000	.000		
Married/Living with partner: Yes	6.9%	93.1%					
Generally not interested in politics	15.8%	84.2%	.187	.000	.000		
Generally interested in politics	4.8%	95.2%					
Voted in 2011	41.2%	58.8%	.474	.000	.000		
Did not vote in 2011	3.1%	96.9%					
Non-union member	9.0%	91.0%	.024	.144	.144		
Union member	7.1%	92.9%					
Employment: Caring for family, disabled, ill, other	12.0%	88.0%	.122	.000	.000		
Employment: Self-employed	10.5%	89.5%					
Employment: Working for pay	9.4%	90.6%					
Employment: Retired	4.6%	95.4%					
Employment: Unemployed	15.6%	84.4%					
Employment: Student	18.3%	81.7%					
Consume news online: never	9.0%	91.0%	.066	.026	.026	.071	.079
Consume news online: 4 days a week	5.9%	94.1%					
Consume news online: daily	7.8%	92.2%					
Party identification: not strong	8.2%	91.8%	.050	.023	.023	-.104	.141
Party identification: very strong	5.6%	94.4%					
Government does not care about you: agree	9.5%	90.5%	.049	.004	.005		
Government does not care about you: disagree	6.5%	93.5%					

Table 2: Voting behaviour and selected demographics (phone mode)

	Did you vote in the last election? No	Did you vote in the last election? Yes	Strength: Cramer's v	Significance: Cramer's v	Pearson's chi square significance	Strength: Gamma	Significance: Gamma
Year born: 1900-1925	11.1%	88.9%	.103	.000	.000	-.292	.000
Year born: 1926-1945	4.1%	95.9%					
Year born: 1946-1965	4.5%	95.5%					
Year born: 1966-1985	7.5%	92.5%					
Year born: 1986-2005	12.2%	87.8%					
Female	4.9%	95.1%	-.057	.002	.002		
Male	7.7%	92.3%					
Income: Less than \$29,999	12.9%	87.1%	.090	.000	.000	.205	.001
Income: Between \$30,000 and \$59,999	7.0%	93.0%					
Income: Between \$60,000 and \$89,999	6.3%	93.7%					
Income: Between \$90,000 and \$109,999	5.8%	94.2%					
Income: More than \$110,000	5.0%	95.0%					
Education: Up to some high school	13.5%	86.5%	.153	.000	.000	.390	.000
Education: Completed high school	10.8%	89.2%					
Education: Some college	12.5%	87.5%					
Education: Completed college	5.8%	94.2%					
Education: Some university	4.2%	95.8%					
Education: Completed university	3.1%	96.9%					
Education: Graduate or professional degree	2.9%	97.1%					
French	8.0%	92.0%	.036	.053	.053		
English	5.9%	94.1%					
Birthplace: Elsewhere	8.8%	91.2%	.037	.045	.045		

Birthplace: Canada or Quebec	6.0%	94.0%					
Married: No	9.8%	90.2%	.097	.000	.000		
Married: Yes	4.7%	95.3%					
Generally not interested in politics	14.7%	85.3%	.209	.000	.000		
Generally interested in politics	3.3%	96.7%					
Voted in 2011	3.0%	97.0%	.397	.000	.000		
Did not vote in 2011	35.2%	64.8%					
Non-union member	6.8%	93.2%	.020	.386	.386		
Union member	5.7%	94.3%					
Employment: Caring for family, disabled, ill, other	14.6%	85.4%	.127	.000	.000		
Employment: Self-employed	6.4%	93.6%					
Employment: Working for pay	6.6%	93.4%					
Employment: Retired	2.9%	97.1%					
Employment: Unemployed	15.1%	84.9%					
Employment: Student	13.3%	86.7%					
Consume news online: never	8.7%	91.3%	.110	.000	.000	.226	.000
Consume news online: 4 days a week	12.4%	87.6%					
Consume news online: daily	3.8%	91.3%					
Party identification: not strong	8.3%	91.7%	.105	.000	.000	.361	.001
Party identification: very strong	2.4%	97.6%					
Voting is a choice	16.8%	83.2%	.247	.000	.000		
Voting is a civic duty	2.9%	97.1%					
Government does not care about you: agree	7.3%	92.7%	.057	.002	.002		
Government does not care about you: disagree	4.5%	95.5%					

Table 3: Vote choice (web mode)

Party	Raw frequency (adjusted)	Relative frequency	Cumulative frequency	2015 election turnout
Liberals	1336	40.4	40.4	39.5
Conservatives	894	27.0	67.4	31.9
NDP	771	23.3	90.7	19.7
Bloc Quebecois	163	4.9	95.7	4.7
Green Party	124	3.7	99.4	3.4
Other	16	.5	99.9	
None/did not vote	3	.1	100.0	
Total	3307	100.0		

Table 4: Vote choice (phone mode)

Party	Raw frequency (adjusted)	Relative frequency	Cumulative frequency	2015 election turnout
Other	20	.8	.8	
Liberals	1004	41.2	42.0	39.5
Conservatives	677	27.8	69.8	31.9
NDP	555	22.8	92.6	19.7
Bloc Quebecois	85	3.5	96.1	4.7
Green Party	91	3.7	99.8	3.4
None/did not vote	5	.2	100.0	
Total	2437	100.0		

Table 5: Factor analysis: Voting and non-voting political participation (web mode)

Communalities		Rotated component matrix		
	Extraction KMO = .847	Component 1: Passive Engagement	Component 2: Active Engagement	Component 3: Voting
eigenvalue/variance		2.680/26.801%	2.200/22.002%	1.024/10.238%
Did you vote in the 2015 election?	.920	.032	.033	.958
Have you signed a petition?	.445	.592	.185	.245
Have you bought products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons?	.407	.525	.331	.149
Have you taken part in a march, rally, or protest?	.393	.341	.523	.060
Have you used the Internet to be politically active?	.704	.825	.147	.031
Did you volunteer for a group or organization like a school, a religious organization, or sports or community associations?	.390	.136	.609	.029
Have you attended a meeting to discuss a local, national, or international issue	.716	.228	.814	.043
Did you speak at a meeting of this kind?	.668	.131	.806	-.021
Have you participated in online discussion of a local, national, or international issue with people you don't know?	.591	.725	.234	-.097
Have you used social media to discuss political or public issues with people you do know	.670	.801	.151	-.080

Table 6: Factor analysis: Voting and non-voting political participation (phone mode)

Communalities		Rotated component matrix	
	Extraction KMO = .703	Component 1: General Engagement	Component 2: Partisan Engagement
eigenvalue/variance		1.993/24.919%	1.470/18.372%
Did you vote in the 2015 election?	.108	.311	.106
Have you signed a petition?	.506	.711	.019
Have you bought products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons?	.384	.618	.044
Have you taken part in a march, rally, or protest?	.315	.556	.079
Have you used the Internet to be politically active?	.441	.637	.187
Did you volunteer for a group or organization like a school, a religious organization, or sports or community associations?	.268	.517	-.020
Have you ever been a member of a federal political party?	.732	.030	.855
Have you donated money to a political party or a candidate?	.709	.158	.827

Table 7: Factor analysis: Non-voting political participation (web mode)

Communalities		Rotated component matrix	
	Extraction KMO=.847	Component 1: Passive Engagement	Component 2: Active Engagement
eigenvalue/variance		2.685/29.839%	2.201/24.451%
Have you signed a petition?	.401	.601	.199
Have you bought products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons?	.397	.528	.344
Have you taken part in a march, rally, or protest?	.397	.343	.529
Have you attended a meeting to discuss a local, national, or international issue?	.712	.230	.812
Have you spoken at a meeting of this kind?	.658	.135	.800
Have you participated in online discussion of a local, national, or international issue with people you don't know?	.570	.721	.225
Have you used the Internet to be politically active?	.703	.826	.145
Did you volunteer for a group or organization like a school, a religious organization, or sports or community associations?	.392	.137	.611
Have you used social media to discuss political or public issues with people you do know?	.655	.790	.196

Table 8: Factor analysis: Non-voting political participation (phone mode)

Communalities		Rotated component matrix	
	Extraction KMO=.690	Component 1: General Engagement	Component 2: Partisan Engagement
eigenvalue/variance		1.930/27.57%	1.473/21.04%
Have you signed a petition?	.518	.719	.031
Have you bought products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons?	.385	.618	.055
Have you taken part in a march, rally, or protest?	.334	.571	.089
Have you used the Internet to be politically active?	.453	.643	.199
Did you volunteer for a group or organization like a school, a religious organization, or sports or community associations?	.270	.519	-.012
Have you ever been a member of a federal political party?	.733	.020	.856
Have you donated money to a political party or a candidate?	.711	.149	.830

Table 9: Passive Engagement Scale frequencies and statistics (web mode)

	Raw frequency (adjusted)	Relative frequency	Cumulative frequency		
.00	1191	34.6	34.6	N	3443
.20	732	21.2	55.8	Mean	.3376
.40	475	13.8	69.6	Std. Error of Mean	.00576
.60	385	11.2	80.8	Median	.2000
.80	329	9.6	90.4	Std. Deviation	.33826
1.00	332	9.6	100.0	Skewness	.663
Total	3443	100.0		Std. Error of Skewness	.042
				p-value of G ₁	15.7857
				Kurtosis	-.858
				Std. Error of Kurtosis	.083
				p-value of G ₂	10.3373
				25 th percentile	.0000
				50 th percentile	.2000
				75 th percentile	.6000

Figure 1: Passive Engagement Scale (web mode)

Table 10: Active Engagement Scale frequencies and statistics (web mode)

	Raw frequency (adjusted)	Relative frequency	Cumulative frequency		
.00	1806	50.0	50.0	N	3614
.25	1007	27.9	77.8	Mean	.2225
.50	366	10.1	87.9	Std. Error of Mean	.00476
.75	265	7.3	95.3	Median	.2500
1.00	171	4.7	100.0	Std. Deviation	.28589
Total	3614	100.0		Skewness (neg.)	1.270
				Std. Error of Skewness	.041
				p-value of G_1	30.9756
				Kurtosis	.714
				Std. Error of Kurtosis	.081
				p-value of G_2	8.8148
				25 th percentile	.0000
				50 th percentile	.2500
				75 th percentile	.2500

Figure 2: Active Engagement Scale (web mode)

Table 11: General Engagement Scale frequencies and statistics (phone mode)

	Raw frequency (adjusted)	Relative frequency	Cumulative frequency		
.00	545	19.2	19.2	N	2836
.20	682	24.1	43.3	Mean	.3857
.40	634	22.3	65.6	Std. Error of Mean	.00540
.60	509	17.9	83.5	Median	.4000
.80	339	12.0	95.5	Std. Deviation	.28757
1.00	128	4.5	100.0	Skewness	.342
Total	2836	100.0		Std. Error of Skewness	.046
				p-value of G ₁	7.4348
				Kurtosis	-.827
				Std. Error of Kurtosis	.092
				p-value of G ₂	-8.9891
				25 th percentile	.2000
				50 th percentile	.4000
				75 th percentile	.6000

Figure 3: General Engagement Scale (phone mode)

Table 12: Partisan Engagement Scale frequencies and statistics (phone mode)

	Raw frequency (adjusted)	Relative frequency	Cumulative frequency		
.00	2255	78.3	78.3	N	2879
.50	400	13.9	92.2	Mean	.1473
1.00	224	7.8	100.0	Std. Error of Mean	.00562
Total	2879	100.0		Median	.0000
				Std. Deviation	.30151
				Skewness	1.893
				Std. Error of Skewness	.046
				p-value of G ₁	41.1521
				Kurtosis	2.292
				Std. Error of Kurtosis	.091
				p-value of G ₂	25.1867
				25 th percentile	.0000
				50 th percentile	.0000
				75 th percentile	.0000

Figure 4: Partisan Engagement Scale (phone mode)

Table 13: Non-voting political participation inter-item correlation (web mode)

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix									
$\alpha = .814$ $n = 3,401$ mean = 2.5633	Have you signed a petition?	Have you bought products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons?	Have you taken part in a march, rally, or protest?	Have you used the Internet to be politically active?	Did you volunteer for a group or organization?	Have you attended a meeting to discuss a local, national, or international issue?	Have you spoken at a meeting of this kind?	Have you participated in online discussion of a local, national, or international issue?	Have you used social media to discuss political or public issues?
Have you signed a petition?*	1.000	.392	.319	.422	.209	.277	.204	.295	.332
Have you bought products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons?	.392	1.000	.340	.414	.251	.332	.275	.309	.320
Have you taken part in a march, rally, or protest?	.319	.340	1.000	.321	.238	.388	.342	.282	.293
Have you used the Internet to be politically active?	.422	.414	.321	1.000	.229	.320	.267	.524	.591
Did you volunteer?	.209	.251	.238	.229	1.000	.374	.291	.230	.223
Have you attended a meeting?	.277	.332	.388	.320	.374	1.000	.602	.389	.318
Have you spoken at a meeting of this kind?	.204	.275	.342	.267	.291	.602	1.000	.309	.282
Have you participated in online discussions?	.295	.309	.282	.524	.230	.389	.309	1.000	.582
Have you used social media to discuss political or public issues?	.332	.320	.293	.591	.223	.318	.282	.582	1.000

Table 14: Non-voting political participation item-total statistics (web mode)

$\alpha = .814$ n = 3,401 mean = 2.5633	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Have you signed a petition?	.476	.801
Have you bought products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons?	.512	.796
Have you taken part in a march, rally, or protest?	.481	.800
Have you used the Internet to be politically active?	.615	.782
Did you volunteer for a group or organization like a school, a religious organization, or sports or community associations?	.379	.814
Have you attended a meeting to discuss a local, national, or international issue?	.564	.789
Have you spoken at a meeting of this kind?	.485	.801
Have you participated in online discussion of a local, national, or international issue with people you don't know?	.572	.788
Have you used social media to discuss political or public issues with people you do know?	.578	.787

Table 15: Non-voting participation inter-item correlation (phone mode)

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix							
$\alpha = .611$ $n = 2,823$ mean = 2.2218	Have you signed a petition?	Have you bought products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons?	Have you taken part in a march, rally, or protest?	Have you used the Internet to be politically active?	Did you volunteer for a group or organization like a school, a religious organization, or sports or community associations?	Have you ever been a member of a federal political party?	Have you donated money to a political party or a candidate?
Have you signed a petition?	1.000	.263	.297	.344	.202	.071	.136
Have you bought products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons?	.263	1.000	.187	.263	.212	.092	.123
Have you taken part in a march, rally, or protest?	.297	.187	1.000	.231	.120	.074	.153
Have you used the Internet to be politically active?	.344	.263	.231	1.000	.185	.139	.205
Did you volunteer?	.202	.212	.120	.185	1.000	.058	.086
Have you ever been a member of a federal political party?	.071	.092	.074	.139	.058	1.000	.448
Have you donated money to a political party or a candidate?	.136	.123	.153	.205	.086	.448	1.000

Table 16: Non-voting participation item-total statistics (phone mode)

$\alpha = .611$ n = 2,823 mean = 2.2218	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Have you signed a petition?	.403	.544
Have you bought products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons?	.349	.566
Have you taken part in a march, rally, or protest?	.318	.579
Have you used the Internet to be politically active?	.418	.538
Did you volunteer for a group or organization like a school, a religious organization, or sports or community associations?	.262	.599
Have you ever been a member of a federal political party?	.228	.602
Have you donated money to a political party or a candidate?	.317	.579

Table 17: Factor analysis: Attitudes and beliefs (web mode)

Communalities		Rotated component matrix		
	Extraction KMO=.858	Component 1: Attitudes toward outgroups	Component 2: Attitudes toward Quebec	Component 3: Attitudes toward North America
eigenvalue/variance		4.143/34.524%	1.818/15.148%	1.755/14.627%
How do you feel about Canada?	.658	.214	-.075	.779
How do you feel about Muslims (living here)?	.702	.826	.113	.082
How do you feel about the United States?	.641	-.047	.240	.763
How do you feel about federal politicians in general?	.490	.098	.486	.494
How do you feel about Aboriginal peoples?	.521	.684	.183	.142
How do you feel about gays and lesbians?	.559	.719	.206	.016
How do you feel about feminists?	.544	.683	.278	.012
How do you feel about Francophones?	.754	.453	.740	-.028
How do you feel about Anglophones	.535	.548	-.061	.480
How do you feel about racial minorities?	.768	.854	.139	.141
How do you feel about immigrants?	.733	.825	.164	.161
How do you feel about Quebec?	.813	.197	.869	.137

Table 18: Factor analysis: Attitudes and beliefs (phone mode)

Communalities		Rotated component matrix	
	Extraction KMO=.894	Component 1: Attitudes toward social groups	Component 2: Attitudes toward North America
eigenvalue/variance		4.809/41.714%	1.790/16.275%
How do you feel about Canada?	.491	.144	.685
How do you feel about Muslims (living here)?	.717	.842	.088
How do you feel about the United States?	.664	.014	.814
How do you feel about federal politicians in general?	.334	.220	.534
How do you feel about Aboriginal peoples?	.554	.739	.088
How do you feel about gays and lesbians?	.583	.743	.174
How do you feel about feminists?	.616	.751	.228
How do you feel about Anglophones	.665	.779	.241
How do you feel about racial minorities?	.750	.850	.168
How do you feel about immigrants?	.755	.859	.130
How do you feel about Quebec?	.471	.548	.413

Table 19: Mean “temperatures” of attitudes toward groups (web mode)

	n	Mean “temperature”
How do you feel about Canada?	3750	85.5087
How do you feel about Muslims (living here)?	3581	54.5739
How do you feel about the United States?	3705	62.5664
How do you feel about federal politicians in general?	3717	43.1245
How do you feel about Aboriginal peoples?	3599	68.1172
How do you feel about gays and lesbians?	3591	66.8679
How do you feel about feminists?	3594	58.8545
How do you feel about Francophones?	3623	69.1859
How do you feel about Anglophones	3637	77.5575
How do you feel about racial minorities?	3596	67.6659
How do you feel about immigrants?	3618	64.1618
How do you feel about Quebec?	3679	59.3250

Table 20: Mean “temperatures” of attitudes toward groups (phone mode)

	n	Mean “temperature”
How do you feel about Canada?	2885	91.08
How do you feel about Muslims (living here)?	2702	73.03
How do you feel about the United States?	2833	68.60
How do you feel about federal politicians in general?	2835	55.01
How do you feel about Aboriginal peoples?	2726	79.24
How do you feel about gays and lesbians?	2731	80.78
How do you feel about feminists?	2764	75.96
How do you feel about Francophones?	518	80.79
How do you feel about Anglophones	2254	79.39
How do you feel about racial minorities?	2740	80.80
How do you feel about immigrants?	2762	78.72
How do you feel about Quebec?	2771	73.53

Figure 5: Mean “temperatures” of attitudes toward all groups (web mode)

Figure 6: Mean “temperatures” of attitudes toward all groups (phone mode)

Table 21: Outgroups-alone Attitudes Scale statistics (web mode)

Percentiles	
10	36.0000
20	45.2699
30	51.0000
40	57.1667
50	63.6747
60	70.4093
70	76.3333
80	83.1667
90	91.8333

n	3463
Mean	63.4408
Std. Error of Mean	.36180
Median	63.6747
Std. Deviation	21.29017
Skewness	-.222
Std. Error of Skewness	.042
p-value of G_1	-5.2857
Kurtosis	-.487
Std. Error of Kurtosis	.083
p-value of G_2	-5.8674

Figure 7: Outgroups-alone Attitudes Scale (web mode)

Table 22: Outgroups + Anglophones Attitudes Scale (web mode)

Percentiles	
10	40.2857
20	48.2857
30	53.5714
40	59.8571
50	65.8571
60	71.5714
70	77.5714
80	83.5714
90	92.2857

n	3456
Mean	65.4600
Std. Error of Mean	.33648
Median	65.8571
Std. Deviation	19.78111
Skewness	-.174
Std. Error of Skewness	.042
p-value of G_1	-4.1428
Kurtosis	-.522
Std. Error of Kurtosis	.083
p-value of G_2	-6.2891

Figure 8: Outgroups + Anglophones Attitudes Scale (web mode)

Table 23: Outgroups-alone Attitudes Scale statistics (phone mode)

Percentiles	
10	52.4921
20	64.1667
30	71.6667
40	76.6667
50	80.8333
60	85.8333
70	90.0000
80	95.8333
90	100.0000

n	2501
Mean	78.5778
Std. Error of Mean	.36229
Median	80.8333
Std. Deviation	18.11952
Skewness	-.936
Std. Error of Skewness	.049
p-value of G_1	-19.1020
Kurtosis	.697
Std. Error of Kurtosis	.098
p-value of G_2	7.1122

Figure 9: Outgroups-alone Attitudes scale (phone mode)

Table 24: Outgroups + Language Groups Attitudes Scale (phone mode)

Percentiles		n	1977
10	53.7500	Mean	78.7842
20	65.0000	Std. Error of Mean	.39776
30	72.5000	Median	81.2500
40	77.5000	Std. Deviation	17.68497
50	81.2500	Skewness	-1.030
60	86.2500	Std. Error of Skewness	.055
70	90.0000	p-value of G ₁	-18.7272
80	95.6250	Kurtosis	.947
90	98.7500	Std. Error of Kurtosis	.110
10	53.7500	p-value of G ₂	8.6090

Figure 10: Outgroups + Language Groups Attitudes scale (phone mode)

Table 25: Attitudes and beliefs inter-item correlation matrix (web mode)

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix												
$\alpha = .866$ n = 3,352	How do you feel about Aboriginal peoples?	How do you feel about Anglo-phones?	How do you feel about Canada?	How do you feel about feminists?	How do you feel about gays and lesbians?	How do you feel about immigrants?	How do you feel about racial minorities?	How do you feel about Muslims living here?	How do you feel about federal politicians?	How do you feel about Quebec?	How do you feel about the U.S.?	How do you feel about Franco-phones?
Aboriginal peoples?	1.000	.370	.237	.486	.449	.530	.554	.525	.219	.303	.123	.412
Anglo-phones?	.370	1.000	.382	.332	.361	.433	.477	.364	.192	.156	.245	.329
Canada?	.237	.382	1.000	.149	.176	.242	.252	.215	.256	.181	.364	.080
Feminists?	.486	.332	.149	1.000	.635	.484	.510	.490	.230	.310	.100	.438
Gays and lesbians?	.449	.361	.176	.635	1.000	.495	.554	.506	.177	.282	.087	.436
Immigrants?	.530	.433	.242	.484	.495	1.000	.796	.772	.266	.345	.154	.459
Racial minorities?	.554	.477	.252	.510	.554	.796	1.000	.721	.247	.324	.110	.475
Muslims living here?	.525	.364	.215	.490	.506	.772	.721	1.000	.232	.292	.077	.407
Federal politicians?	.219	.192	.256	.230	.177	.266	.247	.232	1.000	.354	.325	.248
Quebec?	.303	.156	.181	.310	.282	.345	.324	.292	.354	1.000	.244	.672
The U.S.?	.123	.245	.364	.100	.087	.154	.110	.077	.325	.244	1.000	.119
Franco-phones?	.412	.329	.080	.438	.436	.459	.475	.407	.248	.672	.119	1.000

Table 26: Attitudes and beliefs item-total statistics (web mode)

$\alpha = .866$ n = 3,352	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
How do you feel about Aboriginal peoples?	.612	.851
How do you feel about Anglophones?	.506	.859
How do you feel about Canada?	.340	.866
How do you feel about feminists?	.612	.851
How do you feel about gays and lesbians?	.608	.851
How do you feel about immigrants?	.739	.842
How do you feel about racial minorities?	.746	.843
How do you feel about Muslims living here?	.675	.846
How do you feel about Federal politicians?	.379	.866
How do you feel about Quebec?	.495	.860
How do you feel about the U.S.?	.249	.873
How do you feel about Francophones?	.604	.852

Table 27: Attitudes and beliefs inter-item correlation matrix (phone mode)

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix											
$\alpha = .883$ $n = 1,940$	How do you feel about Aboriginal peoples?	How do you feel about Anglophones?	How do you feel about Canada?	How do you feel about feminists?	How do you feel about gays and lesbians?	How do you feel about immigrants?	How do you feel about racial minorities?	How do you feel about Muslims living here?	How do you feel about federal politicians?	How do you feel about Quebec?	How do you feel about the U.S.?
Aboriginal peoples?	1.000	.507	.199	.527	.485	.591	.604	.557	.197	.398	.119
Anglophones?	.507	1.000	.244	.598	.555	.631	.662	.598	.264	.635	.168
Canada?	.199	.244	1.000	.276	.242	.228	.258	.183	.159	.242	.342
Feminists?	.527	.598	.276	1.000	.705	.564	.597	.556	.250	.420	.188
Gays and lesbians?	.485	.555	.242	.705	1.000	.546	.591	.564	.215	.387	.164
Immigrants?	.591	.631	.228	.564	.546	1.000	.805	.785	.271	.457	.160
Racial minorities?	.604	.662	.258	.597	.591	.805	1.000	.704	.236	.428	.210
Muslims living here?	.557	.598	.183	.556	.564	.785	.704	1.000	.267	.457	.123
Federal politicians?	.197	.264	.159	.250	.215	.271	.236	.267	1.000	.308	.253
Quebec?	.398	.635	.242	.420	.387	.457	.428	.457	.308	1.000	.252
The U.S.?	.119	.168	.342	.188	.164	.160	.210	.123	.253	.252	1.000

Table 28: Attitudes and beliefs item-total statistics (phone mode)

$\alpha = .883$ n = 1,940	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
How do you feel about Aboriginal peoples?	.628	.871
How do you feel about Anglophones?	.743	.863
How do you feel about Canada?	.335	.886
How do you feel about feminists?	.705	.865
How do you feel about gays and lesbians?	.671	.867
How do you feel about immigrants?	.771	.861
How do you feel about racial minorities?	.777	.862
How do you feel about Muslims living here?	.729	.863
How do you feel about Federal politicians?	.345	.888
How do you feel about Quebec?	.589	.874
How do you feel about the U.S.?	.264	.891

Table 29: Economic anxiety variables and recoding

Variable name	Original CES variable name/recoded name	Original values	Recoded values†
Economic anger ¹ (web mode only)	p_emecon_angr economy_anger	1 never 2 sometimes 3 very often	
Economic enthusiasm (web mode only)	p_emecon_enth economy_enthusiasm	1 never 2 sometimes 3 very often	1 very often 2 sometimes 3 never
Economic fear ¹ (web mode only)	p_emecon_fear economy_fear	1 never 2 sometimes 3 very often	
Economic hope (web mode only)	p_emecon_hope economy_hope	1 never 2 sometimes 3 very often	1 very often 2 sometimes 3 never
Income loss ^{1 2}	incl_stpr income_loss	1 very likely 3 somewhat likely 5 somewhat unlikely 7 very unlikely	1 very unlikely 3 somewhat unlikely 5 somewhat likely 7 very likely
Income replacement ^{1 2}	incl_stfn income_replacement	1 very easy 3 somewhat easy 5 somewhat difficult 7 very difficult	
Getting by on savings alone ¹	incl_stfn income_savings	1 < a few months 3 a year or more 5 a few years	1 a few years 3 a year or more 5 < a few months
Personal financial situation ^{1 2}	pers_ret personal_finances	1 gotten better 3 gotten worse 5 stayed the same	1 gotten better 3 stayed the same 5 gotten worse
Canada's economy	econ_ret economy_overall	1 gotten better 3 gotten worse 5 stayed the same	1 gotten better 3 stayed the same 5 gotten worse
Federal policies affecting personal financial situation	econ_fdpol policies_economy_overall	1 gotten better 3 gotten worse 5 not made much difference	1 gotten better 3 not made much difference 5 gotten worse
Federal policies affecting Canada's economy	pers_fdpol policies_personal_finances	1 gotten better 3 gotten worse 5 not made much difference	1 gotten better 3 not made much difference 5 gotten worse
†variables recoded so low scores indicate low economic anxiety			
¹ These six variables were added to create web-only Personal Economic Anxiety Scale			
² These three variables were added to create phone-only Personal Economic Anxiety Scale			

Table 30: Factor analysis: Economic anxiety (web mode)

Communalities		Rotated component matrix		
	Extraction KMO=.735	Component 1: Broad economic concerns	Component 2: Personal anxiety	Component 3: Optimism
eigenvalue/variance		2.202/20.018%	1.959/17.807%	1.682/15.287%
Personal financial situation	.409	.376	.500	.133
Federal policies affecting personal financial situation	.519	.635	.332	.079
Canada's economy overall	.636	.771	.019	.200
Federal policies affecting Canada's economy overall	.744	.855	.008	.115
Income loss	.428	-.081	.649	-.009
Income replacement	.241	.080	.390	.287
Getting by on savings alone	.235	-.096	.415	.233
Economic anger	.558	.371	.648	-.032
Economic fear	.536	.340	.648	-.016
Economic hope	.753	.178	.103	.843
Economic enthusiasm	.783	.157	.048	.869

Table 31: Factor analysis: Economic anxiety (phone mode)

Communalities		Rotated component matrix		
	Extraction KMO=.643	Component 1: Broad economic concerns	Component 2: Personal anxiety	Component 3: Savings
eigenvalue/variance		1.734/24.769%	1.393/19.896%	1.059/15.135%
Personal financial situation	.540	.299	.668	.071
Federal policies affecting personal financial situation	.483	.555	.384	.167
Canada's economy overall	.637	.796	.010	-.059
Federal policies affecting Canada's economy overall	.700	.835	.031	.036
Income loss	.457	-.038	.521	.429
Income replacement	.571	-.034	.721	-.222
Getting by on savings alone	.798	.053	-.079	.888

Table 32: Personal Economic Anxiety Scale frequencies and statistics (web mode)

	Raw frequency (adjusted)	Relative frequency	Cumulative frequency		
1.00	4	.2	.2	N	2643
1.17	4	.1	.3	Mean	3.1421
1.33	19	.7	1.0	Std. Error of Mean	.01497
1.50	10	.4	1.4	Median	3.1667
1.67	72	2.7	4.1	Std. Deviation	.76976
1.83	25	1.0	5.1	Skewness	.072
2.00	98	3.7	8.8	Std. Error of Skewness	.048
2.17	68	2.6	11.4	p-value of G ₁	1.5
2.33	182	6.9	18.2	Kurtosis	-.282
2.50	107	4.0	22.3	Std. Error of Kurtosis	.095
2.67	276	10.4	32.7	p-value of G ₂	-29.6842
2.83	154	5.8	38.5	25 th percentile	2.6667
3.00	297	11.2	49.7	50 th percentile	3.1667
3.17	142	5.4	55.1	75 th percentile	3.6667
3.33	273	10.3	65.5		
3.50	124	4.7	70.2		
3.67	243	9.2	79.4		
3.83	86	3.3	82.6		
4.00	173	6.6	89.2		
4.17	59	2.3	91.4		
4.33	99	3.8	95.2		
4.50	20	.7	95.9		
4.67	55	2.1	98.0		
4.83	16	.6	98.6		
5.00	37	1.4	100.0		
Total	2643				

Figure 11: Personal Economic Anxiety Scale (web mode)

Table 33: Personal Economic Anxiety Scale frequencies and statistics (phone mode)

	Raw frequency (adjusted)	Relative frequency	Cumulative frequency
1.00	60	2.3	2.3
1.67	233	8.7	11.0
2.33	464	17.4	28.4
3.00	581	21.8	50.3
3.67	670	25.2	75.5
4.33	371	13.9	89.4
5.00	170	6.4	95.8
5.67	86	3.2	99.0
6.33	26	1.0	100.0
Total	2662		

N	2662
Mean	3.3223
Std. Error of Mean	.02100
Median	3.0000
Std. Deviation	1.08350
Skewness	.222
Std. Error of Skewness	.047
p-value of G_1	4.7234
Kurtosis	-.154
Std. Error of Kurtosis	.095
p-value of G_2	-1.6211
25 th percentile	2.3333
50 th percentile	3.0000
75 th percentile	3.6667

Figure 12: Personal Economic Anxiety Scale (phone mode)

Table 34: Economic anxiety inter-item correlation matrix (web mode)

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix (unstandardized)											
$\alpha = .681$ (unstandardized) $\alpha = .749$ (standardized) n = 2218	Economic hope	Economic enthusiasm	Economic anger	Economic fear	Policies affecting personal finances	Personal finances	Policies affecting Canada's economy	Canada's economy	Income loss	Savings and investments	Income replacement
Economic hope	1.000	.621	.172	.158	.214	.196	.245	.260	.083	.122	.155
Economic enthusiasm	.621	1.000	.125	.140	.177	.179	.214	.263	.029	.105	.185
Economic anger	.172	.125	1.000	.589	.322	.278	.283	.246	.216	.142	.164
Economic fear	.158	.140	.589	1.000	.275	.266	.246	.265	.214	.107	.216
Policies affecting personal finances	.214	.177	.322	.275	1.000	.460	.474	.322	.154	.147	.175
Personal finances	.196	.179	.278	.266	.460	1.000	.256	.259	.248	.114	.259
Policies affecting Canada's economy	.245	.214	.283	.246	.474	.256	1.000	.579	.041	.085	.102
Canada's economy	.260	.263	.246	.265	.322	.259	.579	1.000	.070	.061	.173
Income loss	.083	.029	.216	.214	.154	.248	.041	.070	1.000	.131	.079
Savings and investments	.122	.105	.142	.107	.147	.114	.085	.061	.131	1.000	.099
Income replacement	.155	.185	.164	.216	.175	.259	.102	.173	.079	.099	1.000

Table 35: Economic anxiety item-total statistics (web mode)

$\alpha = .681$ (unstandardized) $\alpha = .749$ (standardized) n = 2218	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Economic hope	.361	.666
Economic enthusiasm	.329	.669
Economic anger	.455	.655
Economic fear	.444	.656
Policies affecting personal finances	.512	.631
Personal finances	.480	.632
Policies affecting Canada's economy	.430	.641
Canada's economy	.440	.641
Income loss	.223	.694
Savings and investments	.197	.692
Income replacement	.274	.680

Table 36: Economic anxiety inter-item correlation matrix (phone mode)

$\alpha = .481$ (unstandardized) $\alpha = .544$ (standardized) n = 2388	Policies affecting personal finances	Personal finances	Policies affecting Canada's economy	Canada's economy	Income loss	Savings and investments	Income replacement
Policies affecting personal finances	1.000	.355	.358	.220	.134	.083	.108
Personal finances	.355	1.000	.175	.193	.171	.050	.220
Policies affecting Canada's economy	.358	.175	1.000	.471	.075	.066	.068
Canada's economy	.220	.193	.471	1.000	.062	.029	.068
Income loss	.134	.171	.075	.062	1.000	.074	.100
Savings and investments	.083	.050	.066	.029	.074	1.000	-.019
Income replacement	.108	.220	.068	.068	.100	-.019	1.000

Table 37: Economic anxiety item-total statistics (phone mode)

$\alpha = .481$ (unstandardized) $\alpha = .544$ (standardized) n = 2218	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Policies affecting personal finances	.376	.404
Personal finances	.358	.393
Policies affecting Canada's economy	.336	.402
Canada's economy	.291	.421
Income loss	.187	.467
Savings and investments	.076	.524
Income replacement	.156	.492

Table 38: Discriminant analysis: Voting control and independent variables (web mode)

A Control variables	Variable name	B Independent variables	Variable name
Age	age_control	Economic anxiety (scale)	personal_anxiety_scale
Gender	gender_dummy	“Personal anxiety” component	FAC2_1
Income	income_control	Personal financial situation	personal_financial_situation
Education	education_control	Perception of Canada’s economy overall	economy_overall
Language	english_dummy	Possibility of losing income or job in the next year	income_loss
Birthplace	Canada_birth_dummy	Possibility of replacing income with similar income or job	income_replacement
Marital status	married_dummy	Possibility of getting by on savings and investments alone	income_savings
Political interest	politics_interest_control	Policies affecting Canada’s economy	policies_economy_overall
Party identification	party_identity_control	Policies affecting personal financial situation	policies_financial_situation
Union status	union_dummy	Over the past year, has the economy made you feel angry?	economy_anger
Employment status	employment_dummy	Over the past year, has the economy made you feel fearful?	economy_fear
Media consumption	internet_consumption_control	Over the past year, has the economy made you feel enthusiastic?	economy_enthusiasm
Past turnout (2011)	voted_2011_dummy	Over the past year, has the economy made you feel hopeful?	economy_hope
Government doesn’t care (alienation)	govt_doesnt_care_dummy		

Table 39: Discriminant analysis: Voting (web mode)

Dependent variable: Voted in 2015 election

Variable	Univariate significance	Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients	
Year of birth	.000***	-.048	
Education	.000***	.125	
Income	.000***	.215	
Gender (male = 1)	.515	-.066	
Language (English = 1)	.567	.026	
Place of birth (Canada = 1)	.912	.019	
Marital status (married = 1)	.108	-.063	
Interest in politics	.000***	.232	
Strength of party identity	.661	-.021	
Union status (member = 1)	.107	.099	
Employment status (employed = 1)	.006***	-.195	
Days/week consuming news online	.716	-.082	
2011 election turnout (voted = 1)	.000***	.862	
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.316	-.052	
Personal Economic Anxiety Scale (IV)	.024*	-.036	
* p < .05			
*** p < .01			
Classification results: 91.8% of original grouped cases correctly classified			
Predicted Group Membership			
Did you vote in 2015? (DV)	no	yes	total
Count no	49	36	85
Count yes	107	1551	1658
Count Ungrouped cases	0	5	5
% no	57.1	42.9	100.0
% yes	6.4	93.6	100.0
% Ungrouped cases	.0	100.0	100.0
Summary of Canonical Discriminant Function			
eigenvalue = .199			
Canonical correlation = .408			
Wilks' Lambda significance: .000			
Functions at group centroids			
Voted in 2015	Function 1		
no	-1.970		
yes	.101		

Table 40: Discriminant analysis: Voting (web mode)

Dependent variable: Voted in 2015 election

Variable	Univariate significance	Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients	
Year of birth	.000***	-.066	
Education	.000***	.107	
Income	.000***	.163	
Gender (male = 1)	.730	-.069	
Language (English = 1)	.959	.030	
Place of birth (Canada = 1)	.679	.008	
Marital status (married = 1)	.024*	-.008	
Interest in politics	.000***	.228	
Strength of party identity	.615	.016	
Union status (member = 1)	.074	.108	
Employment status (employed = 1)	.006***	-.154	
Days/week consuming news online	.381	-.023	
2011 election turnout (voted = 1)	.000***	-.047	
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.188	.876	
Income loss (IV)	.026*	-.026	
* p < .05			
*** p < .01			
Classification results: 91.9% of original grouped cases correctly classified			
Predicted Group Membership			
Did you vote in 2015? (DV)	no	yes	total
Count no	60	45	105
Count yes	122	1838	1960
Count Ungrouped cases	1	6	7
% no	57.4	42.6	100.0
% yes	6.2	93.8	100.0
% Ungrouped cases	16.1	83.9	100.0
Summary of Canonical Discriminant Function			
eigenvalue = .212			
Canonical correlation = .418			
Wilks' Lambda significance: .000			
Functions at group centroids			
Voted in 2015	Function 1		
no	-1.991		
yes	.106		

Table 41: Discriminant analysis: Voting (web mode)

Dependent variable: Voted in 2015 election

Variable	Univariate significance	Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients	
Year of birth	.000***	-.045	
Education	.000***	.100	
Income	.000***	.156	
Gender (male = 1)	.458	-.051	
Language (English = 1)	.635	.029	
Place of birth (Canada = 1)	.364	.055	
Marital status (married = 1)	.008***	-.003	
Interest in politics	.000***	.235	
Strength of party identity	.695	.023	
Union status (member = 1)	.088	.096	
Employment status (employed = 1)	.001***	-.189	
Days/week consuming news online	.771	-.039	
2011 election turnout (voted = 1)	.000***	.869	
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.186	-.054	
Getting by on savings alone (IV)	.000***	-.043	
* p < .05			
*** p < .01			
Classification results: 91.5% of original grouped cases correctly classified			
Predicted Group Membership			
Did you vote in 2015? (DV)	no	yes	total
Count no	63	46	108
Count yes	127	1788	1915
Count Ungrouped cases	0	7	7
% no	57.8	42.2	100.0
% yes	6.6	93.4	100.0
% Ungrouped cases	.0	100.0	100.0
Summary of Canonical Discriminant Function			
eigenvalue = .214			
Canonical correlation = .420			
Wilks' Lambda significance: .000			
Functions at group centroids			
Voted in 2015	Function 1		
no	-1.945		
yes	.110		

Table 42: Discriminant analysis: Voting (web mode)

Dependent variable: Voted in 2015 election

Variable	Univariate significance	Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients	
Year of birth	.000***	-.047	
Education	.000***	.110	
Income	.000***	.156	
Gender (male = 1)	.684	-.065	
Language (English = 1)	.886	.027	
Place of birth (Canada = 1)	.402	.061	
Marital status (married = 1)	.005***	.021	
Interest in politics	.000***	.241	
Strength of party identity	.378	.036	
Union status (member = 1)	.091	.086	
Employment status (employed = 1)	.008***	-.159	
Days/week consuming news online	.509	-.028	
2011 election turnout (voted = 1)	.000***	.870	
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.209	-.038	
Economic anger (IV)	.024*	-.057	
* p < .05			
*** p < .01			
Classification results: 91.3% of original grouped cases correctly classified			
Predicted Group Membership			
Did you vote in 2015? (DV)	no	yes	total
Count no	68	51	118
Count yes	143	1972	2115
Count Ungrouped cases	1	8	9
% no	57.0	43.0	100.0
% yes	6.8	93.2	100.0
% Ungrouped cases	12.9	87.1	100.0
Summary of Canonical Discriminant Function			
eigenvalue = .202			
Canonical correlation = .410			
Wilks' Lambda significance: .000			
Functions at group centroids			
Voted in 2015	Function 1		
no	-1.896		
yes	.106		

Table 43: Discriminant analysis: Voting (web mode)

Dependent variable: Voted in 2015 election

Variable	Univariate significance	Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients	
Year of birth	.000***	-.047	
Education	.000***	.116	
Income	.000***	.175	
Gender (male = 1)	.618	-.061	
Language (English = 1)	.930	.030	
Place of birth (Canada = 1)	.365	.067	
Marital status (married = 1)	.007***	.007	
Interest in politics	.000***	.242	
Strength of party identity	.327	.043	
Union status (member = 1)	.097	.084	
Employment status (employed = 1)	.010***	-.168	
Days/week consuming news online	.473	-.028	
2011 election turnout (voted = 1)	.000***	.866	
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.150	-.046	
Economic fear (IV)	.043*	-.046	
* p < .05			
*** p < .01			
Classification results: 91.3% of original grouped cases correctly classified			
Predicted Group Membership			
Did you vote in 2015? (DV)	no	yes	total
Count no	66	51	117
Count yes	143	1966	2109
Count Ungrouped cases	1	8	9
% no	56.6	43.4	100.0
% yes	6.8	93.2	100.0
% Ungrouped cases	12.9	87.1	100.0
Summary of Canonical Discriminant Function			
eigenvalue = .197			
Canonical correlation = .405			
Wilks' Lambda significance: .000			
Functions at group centroids			
Voted in 2015	Function 1		
no	-1.879		
yes	.104		

Table 44: Discriminant analysis: Voting control and independent variables (phone mode)

A Control variables	Variable name	B Independent variables	Variable name
Year of birth	age_control	Economic anxiety (scale)	personal_anxiety_scale
Gender	gender_dummy	Component 2 “Personal anxiety”	FAC2_1
Income	income_control	Personal financial situation	personal_financial_situation
Education	education_control	Perception of Canada’s economy overall	economy_overall
Language	english_dummy	Possibility of losing income or job in the next year	income_loss
Birthplace	Canada_birth_dummy	Possibility of replacing income with similar income or job	income_replacement
Marital status	married_dummy	Possibility of getting by on savings and investments alone	income_savings
Interest in politics	interest_in_politics 0-10	Policies affecting Canada’s economy	policies_economy_overall
Strength of party identity	party_identity_strength_control	Policies affecting personal financial situation	policies_financial_situation
Union status	union_dummy		
Employment status	employment_dummy		
Days/week consuming news online	internet_consumption_control		
2011 election turnout	voted_2011_dummy		
Sense of civic duty	duty_dummy		
Government doesn’t care (alienation)	govt_doesnt_care_dummy		
People should blame themselves (ambivalence)	blame_selves_dummy		

Table 45: Discriminant analysis: Voting (phone mode)

Dependent variable: Voting in 2015 election

Variable	Univariate significance	Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients	
Year of birth	.362	.179	
Education	.000***	.194	
Income	.783	-.189	
Gender (male = 1)	.279	-.147	
Language (English = 1)	.000***	.282	
Birthplace (Canada = 1)	.175	-.125	
Marital status (married = 1)	.792	-.042	
Interest in politics	.000***	.338	
Strength of party identity	.067	-.014	
Union status (member = 1)	.765	-.014	
Employment status (employed = 1)	.030*	.120	
Days/week consuming news online	.004***	-.046	
2011 election turnout (voted = 1)	.000***	.735	
Voting is a duty (agree = 1)	.000***	.138	
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.000***	-.242	
Economy overall (IV)	.014*	-.165	
* p < .05			
*** p < .01			
Classification results: 94.2% of original grouped cases correctly classified			
Predicted Group Membership			
Did you vote in 2015? (DV)	no	yes	total
Count no	19	25	44
Count yes	40	1027	1066
Count ungrouped cases	0	1	1
% no	43.6	56.4	100.0
% yes	3.7	96.3	100.0
% ungrouped cases	.0	100.0	100.0
Summary of Canonical Discriminant Function			
eigenvalue = .175			
Canonical correlation = .386			
Wilks' Lambda significance: .000			
Functions at group centroids			
Voted in 2015	Function 1		
no	-2.060		
yes	.085		

Table 46: Discriminant analysis: Voting (phone mode)

Dependent variable: Voting in 2015 election

Variable	Univariate significance	Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients	
Year of birth	.414	.160	
Education	.000***	.180	
Income	.801	-.232	
Gender (male = 1)	.280	-.176	
Language (English = 1)	.000***	.263	
Birthplace (Canada = 1)	.183	-.149	
Marital status (married = 1)	.805	-.011	
Interest in politics	.000	.294	
Strength of party identity	.069	-.017	
Union status (member = 1)	.790	-.019	
Employment status (employed = 1)	.022*	.109	
Days/week consuming news online	.004***	-.074	
2011 election turnout (voted = 1)	.000***	.758	
Voting is a duty (agree = 1)	.000***	.139	
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.000***	-.228	
Personal financial situation (IV)	.000***	-.315	
* p < .05			
*** p < .01			
Classification results: 94.4% of original grouped cases correctly classified			
Predicted Group Membership			
Did you vote in 2015? (DV)	no	yes	total
Count no	19	25	44
Count yes	37	1043	1080
Count Ungrouped cases	0	1	1
% no	42.3	57.7	100.0
% yes	3.4	96.6	100.0
% Ungrouped cases	.0	100.0	100.0
Summary of Canonical Discriminant Function			
eigenvalue = .183			
Canonical correlation = .393			
Wilks' Lambda significance: .000			
Functions at group centroids			
Voted in 2015	Function 1		
no	-2.120		
yes	.086		

Table 47: Linear regression: Non-voting political participation (web mode)

Model summary Adjusted R ² = .206	ANOVA df = 14 Sig. = .000	Dependent variable: Passive political engagement scale	
Variable	β	t	Sig. β
Year of birth	.194***	7.040	.000
Education	.130***	5.197	.000
Income	-.019	-.696	.486
Gender (male = 1)	-.076***	-3.181	.001
Language (English = 1)	.082***	3.461	.001
Birthplace (Canada = 1)	.004	.178	.859
Marital status (married = 1)	-.046	-1.832	.067
Interest in politics	.286***	11.422	.000
Strength of party ID	.032	1.351	.177
Union status (member = 1)	.037	1.531	.126
Employment status (employed = 1)	-.028	-1.019	.309
Days/week consuming news online	.175***	7.132	.000
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.032	1.305	.192
"Personal anxiety" component (IV)	.074***	2.964	.003
* p < .05 *** p < .01			

Table 48: Linear regression: Non-voting political participation (web mode)

Model summary Adjusted R ² = .202	ANOVA df = 14 Sig. = .000	Dependent variable: Passive political engagement scale	
Variable	β	t	Sig. β
Year of birth	.196***	7.696	.000
Education	.113***	4.881	.000
Income	-.009	-.362	.718
Gender (male = 1)	-.063***	-2.806	.005
Language (English = 1)	.080***	3.659	.000
Birthplace (Canada = 1)	.015	.687	.492
Marital status (married = 1)	-.038	-1.619	.106
Interest in politics	.297***	12.699	.000
Strength of party ID	.041	1.889	.059
Union status (member = 1)	.024	1.065	.287
Employment status (employed = 1)	-.030	-1.192	.233
Days/week consuming news online	.173***	7.570	.000
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.028	1.268	.205
Personal Economic Anxiety Scale (IV)	.073***	3.139	.002
* p < .05 *** p < .01			

Table 49: Linear regression: Non-voting political participation (web mode)

Model summary Adjusted R ² = .209	ANOVA df = 14 Sig. = .000	Dependent variable: Passive political engagement scale	
Variable	β	t	Sig. β
Year of birth	.208***	9.234	.000
Education	.124***	5.838	.000
Income	-.018	-.763	.446
Gender (male = 1)	-.070***	-3.433	.001
Language (English = 1)	.092***	4.549	.000
Birthplace (Canada = 1)	.019	.925	.355
Marital status (married = 1)	-.032	-1.490	.136
Interest in politics	.290***	13.579	.000
Strength of party ID	.028	1.384	.167
Union status (member = 1)	.037	1.831	.067
Employment status (employed = 1)	-.048*	-2.102	.036
Days/week consuming news online	.158***	7.564	.000
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.048	2.391	.017
Federal policies affecting personal financial situation (IV)	.068***	3.396	.001
* p < .05 *** p < .01			

Table 50: Linear regression: Non-voting political participation (web mode)

Model summary Adjusted R ² = .207	ANOVA df = 14 Sig. = .000	Dependent variable: Passive political engagement scale	
Variable	β	t	Sig. β
Year of birth	.216***	9.968	.000
Education	.124***	6.080	.000
Income	-.017	-.775	.438
Gender (male = 1)	-.045*	-2.318	.021
Language (English = 1)	.087***	4.528	.000
Birthplace (Canada = 1)	.019	.967	.334
Marital status (married = 1)	-.029	-1.395	.163
Interest in politics	.293***	14.291	.000
Strength of party ID	.029	1.527	.127
Union status (member = 1)	.036	1.863	.063
Employment status (employed = 1)	-.041	-1.852	.064
Days/week consuming news online	.156***	7.770	.000
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.031	1.594	.111
Personal financial situation (IV)	.085***	4.381	.000
* p < .05 *** p < .01			

Table 51: Linear regression: Non-voting political participation (web mode)

Model summary Adjusted R ² = .204	ANOVA df = 14 Sig. = .000	Dependent variable: Passive political engagement scale	
Variable	β	t	Sig. β
Year of birth	.214***	9.526	.000
Education	.118***	5.598	.000
Income	-.022	-.950	.342
Gender (male = 1)	-.034	-1.676	.094
Language (English = 1)	.090***	4.538	.000
Birthplace (Canada = 1)	.019	.966	.334
Marital status (married = 1)	-.033	-1.527	.127
Interest in politics	.282***	13.379	.000
Strength of party ID	.029	1.476	.140
Union status (member = 1)	.038	1.862	.063
Employment status (employed = 1)	-.045*	-1.967	.049
Days/week consuming news online	.160***	7.756	.000
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.033	1.683	.092
Federal policies affecting economy overall (IV)	.068***	3.439	.001
* p < .05 *** p < .01			

Table 52: Linear regression: Non-voting political participation (web mode)

Model summary Adjusted R ² = .208	ANOVA df = 14 Sig. = .000	Dependent variable: Passive political engagement scale	
Variable	β	t	Sig. β
Year of birth	.213***	9.147	.000
Education	.131***	6.151	.000
Income	-.033	-1.433	.152
Gender (male = 1)	-.051*	-2.498	.013
Language (English = 1)	.098***	4.848	.000
Birthplace (Canada = 1)	.007	.334	.739
Marital status (married = 1)	-.028	-1.321	.187
Interest in politics	.288***	13.359	.000
Strength of party ID	.029	1.468	.142
Union status (member = 1)	.028	1.350	.177
Employment status (employed = 1)	-.049***	-2.113	.035
Days/week consuming news online	.158***	7.509	.000
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.039	1.944	.052
Income loss (IV)	.061***	2.994	.003
* p < .05 *** p < .01			

Table 53: Linear regression: Non-voting political participation (web mode)

Model summary Adjusted R ² = .200	ANOVA df = 14 Sig. = .000	Dependent variable: Passive political engagement scale	
Variable	β	t	Sig. β
Year of birth	.203***	9.170	.000
Education	.122***	5.925	.000
Income	-.021	-.928	.354
Gender (male = 1)	-.048*	-2.422	.016
Language (English = 1)	.094***	4.802	.000
Birthplace (Canada = 1)	.015	.783	.434
Marital status (married = 1)	-.029	-1.417	.157
Interest in politics	.286***	13.838	.000
Strength of party ID	.029	1.494	.135
Union status (member = 1)	.030	1.515	.130
Employment status (employed = 1)	-.042*	-1.899	.058
Days/week consuming news online	.159***	7.851	.000
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.032	1.606	.108
Economic anger (IV)	.061***	3.072	.002
* p < .05 *** p < .01			

Table 54: Linear regression: Non-voting political participation (web mode)

Model summary Adjusted R ² = .203	ANOVA df = 14 Sig. = .000	Dependent variable: Passive political engagement scale	
Variable	β	t	Sig. β
Year of birth	.199***	9.004	.000
Education	.121***	5.867	.000
Income	-.023	-1.009	.313
Gender (male = 1)	-.050*	-2.551	.011
Language (English = 1)	.092***	4.715	.000
Birthplace (Canada = 1)	.016	.804	.421
Marital status (married = 1)	-.029	-1.376	.169
Interest in politics	.290***	14.032	.000
Strength of party ID	.032	1.634	.102
Union status (member = 1)	.031	1.546	.122
Employment status (employed = 1)	-.038	-1.686	.092
Days/week consuming news online	.163***	8.043	.000
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.030	1.516	.130
Economic fear (IV)	.079***	4.040	.000
* p < .05 *** p < .01			

Table 55: Linear regression: Non-voting political participation (web mode)

Model summary Adjusted R ² = .082	ANOVA df = 14 Sig. = .000	Dependent variable: Active political engagement scale	
Variable	β	t	Sig. β
Year of birth	.084***	2.877	.004
Education	.161***	6.120	.000
Income	.022	.736	.462
Gender (male = 1)	-.027	-1.058	.290
Language (English = 1)	.040	1.611	.107
Birthplace (Canada = 1)	-.004	-.173	.863
Marital status (married = 1)	.005	.187	.852
Interest in politics	.187***	7.068	.000
Strength of party ID	.050*	1.995	.046
Union status (member = 1)	.009	.340	.734
Employment status (employed = 1)	-.014	-.488	.625
Days/week consuming news online	.032	1.215	.225
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	-.008	-.314	.754
“Personal anxiety” component (IV)	.070***	2.675	.008
* p < .05 *** p < .01			

Table 56: Linear regression: Non-voting political participation (web mode)

Model summary Adjusted R ² = .088	ANOVA df = 14 Sig. = .000	Dependent variable: Active political engagement scale	
Variable	β	t	Sig. β
Year of birth	.099***	4.178	.000
Education	.163***	7.259	.000
Income	.018	.718	.473
Gender (male = 1)	-.027	-1.241	.215
Language (English = 1)	.043*	2.046	.041
Birthplace (Canada = 1)	-.008	-.354	.723
Marital status (married = 1)	.012	.540	.589
Interest in politics	.193***	8.573	.000
Strength of party ID	.055***	2.623	.009
Union status (member = 1)	.022	1.007	.314
Employment status (employed = 1)	-.031	-1.292	.197
Days/week consuming news online	.017	.762	.446
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.028	1.333	.183
Federal policies affecting personal finances (IV)	.046*	2.201	.028
* p < .05 *** p < .01			

Table 57: Linear regression: Non-voting political participation (web mode)

Model summary Adjusted R ² = .090	ANOVA df = 14 Sig. = .000	Dependent variable: Active political engagement scale	
Variable	β	t	Sig. β
Year of birth	.083***	3.381	.001
Education	.155***	6.978	.000
Income	.031	1.270	.204
Gender (male = 1)	-.011	-.529	.597
Language (English = 1)	.045*	2.111	.035
Birthplace (Canada = 1)	-.004	-.187	.851
Marital status (married = 1)	.022	.983	.325
Interest in politics	.190***	8.408	.000
Strength of party ID	.056***	2.643	.008
Union status (member = 1)	.021	.970	.332
Employment status (employed = 1)	-.027	-1.089	.276
Days/week consuming news online	.020	.925	.355
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.015	.705	.481
Income loss (IV)	.080***	3.739	.000
* p < .05 *** p < .01			

Table 58: Linear regression: Non-voting political participation (web mode)

Model summary Adjusted R ² = .094	ANOVA df = 14 Sig. = .000	Dependent variable: Active political engagement scale	
Variable	β	t	Sig. β
Year of birth	.081***	3.348	.001
Education	.155***	6.992	.000
Income	.006	.266	.790
Gender (male = 1)	-.022	-1.029	.304
Language (English = 1)	.040*	1.894	.058
Birthplace (Canada = 1)	-.011	-.536	.592
Marital status (married = 1)	.015	.663	.508
Interest in politics	.202***	9.026	.000
Strength of party ID	.049*	2.344	.019
Union status (member = 1)	.019	.913	.362
Employment status (employed = 1)	-.051	-2.104	.036
Days/week consuming news online	.013	.595	.552
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.022	1.056	.291
Income replacement (IV)	-.098***	-4.356	.000
* p < .05 *** p < .01			

Table 59: Linear regression: Non-voting political participation (web mode)

Model summary Adjusted R ² = .085	ANOVA df = 14 Sig. = .000	Dependent variable: Active political engagement scale	
Variable	β	t	Sig. β
Year of birth	.086***	3.721	.000
Education	.148***	6.855	.000
Income	.032	1.379	.168
Gender (male = 1)	-.005	-.266	.790
Language (English = 1)	.043*	2.095	.036
Birthplace (Canada = 1)	-.010	-.469	.639
Marital status (married = 1)	.015	.668	.504
Interest in politics	.193***	8.891	.000
Strength of party ID	.054***	2.681	.007
Union status (member = 1)	.024	1.163	.245
Employment status (employed = 1)	-.024	-1.050	.294
Days/week consuming news online	.018	.858	.391
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.010	.467	.640
Economic anger (IV)	.061***	2.925	.003
* p < .05 *** p < .01			

Table 60: Linear regression: Non-voting political participation (web mode)

Model summary Adjusted R ² = .085	ANOVA df = 14 Sig. = .000	Dependent variable: Active political engagement scale	
Variable	β	t	Sig. β
Year of birth	.087***	3.743	.000
Education	.145***	6.743	.000
Income	.031	1.333	.183
Gender (male = 1)	-.007	-.351	.726
Language (English = 1)	.039	1.916	.055
Birthplace (Canada = 1)	-.010	-.494	.621
Marital status (married = 1)	.017	.762	.446
Interest in politics	.198***	9.139	.000
Strength of party ID	.058***	2.858	.004
Union status (member = 1)	.026	1.270	.204
Employment status (employed = 1)	-.024	-1.028	.304
Days/week consuming news online	.020	.925	.355
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.012	.592	.554
Economic fear (IV)	.060***	2.931	.003
* p < .05 *** p < .01			

Table 61: Linear regression: Non-voting political participation (web mode)

Model summary Adjusted R ² = .091	ANOVA df = 14 Sig. = .000	Dependent variable: Active political engagement scale	
Variable	β	t	Sig. β
Year of birth	.106***	4.595	.000
Education	.154***	7.136	.000
Income	.024	1.016	.310
Gender (male = 1)	-.017	-.833	.405
Language (English = 1)	.035	1.725	.085
Birthplace (Canada = 1)	-.011	-.526	.599
Marital status (married = 1)	.015	.680	.496
Interest in politics	.184***	8.415	.000
Strength of party ID	.051*	2.519	.012
Union status (member = 1)	.033	1.594	.111
Employment status (employed = 1)	-.035	-1.520	.129
Days/week consuming news online	.018	.870	.385
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.028	1.347	.178
Economic hope (IV)	-.092***	-4.474	.000
* p < .05 *** p < .01			

Table 62: Linear regression: Non-voting political participation (web mode)

Model summary Adjusted R ² = .096	ANOVA df = 14 Sig. = .000	Dependent variable: Active political engagement scale	
Variable	β	t	Sig. β
Year of birth	.092***	4.005	.000
Education	.159***	7.405	.000
Income	.025	1.054	.292
Gender (male = 1)	-.020	-.982	.326
Language (English = 1)	.045*	2.215	.027
Birthplace (Canada = 1)	-.006	-.294	.769
Marital status (married = 1)	.011	.515	.607
Interest in politics	.183***	8.450	.000
Strength of party ID	.050*	2.462	.014
Union status (member = 1)	.031	1.504	.133
Employment status (employed = 1)	-.036	-1.545	.123
Days/week consuming news online	.015	.701	.484
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.028	1.401	.161
Economic enthusiasm (IV)	-.120***	-5.903	.000
* p < .05 *** p < .01			

Table 63: Linear regression: Non-voting political participation (web mode)

Model summary Adjusted R ² = .115	ANOVA df = 24 Sig. = .000	Dependent variable: Active political engagement scale	
Variable	β	t	Sig. β
Year of birth	.060	1.950	.051
Education	.176***	6.728	.000
Income	.005	.171	.864
Gender (male = 1)	-.035	-1.399	.162
Language (English = 1)	.057*	2.293	.022
Birthplace (Canada = 1)	.001	.054	.957
Marital status (married = 1)	.005	.184	.854
Interest in politics	.163***	6.207	.000
Strength of party ID	.043	1.738	.082
Union status (member = 1)	.022	.886	.376
Employment status (employed = 1)	-.036	-1.250	.212
Days/week consuming news online	.028	1.107	.269
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.001	.029	.977
Economic hope	-.036	-1.158	.247
Economic enthusiasm	-.121***	-3.867	.000
Economic anger	.015	.472	.637
Economic fear	.084***	2.769	.006
Federal policies affecting personal financial situation	.029	.952	.341
Personal financial situation	.024	.812	.417
Federal policies affecting Canada's economy overall	.041	1.264	.206
Canada's economy overall	-.041	-1.326	.185
Income loss	.065*	2.484	.013
Savings and investments	-.023	-.866	.387
Income replacement	-.099***	-3.562	.000
* p < .05 *** p < .01			

Table 64: Linear regression: Non-voting political participation (web mode)

Model summary Adjusted R ² = .214	ANOVA df = 24 Sig. = .000	Dependent variable: Passive political engagement scale	
Variable	β	t	Sig. β
Year of birth	.203***	6.941	.000
Education	.127***	5.042	.000
Income	-.027	-.947	.344
Gender (male = 1)	-.077***	-3.177	.002
Language (English = 1)	.082***	3.422	.001
Birthplace (Canada = 1)	.009	.384	.701
Marital status (married = 1)	-.043	-1.723	.085
Interest in politics	.280***	11.129	.000
Strength of party ID	.033	1.396	.163
Union status (member = 1)	.039	1.629	.104
Employment status (employed = 1)	-.025	-.898	.369
Days/week consuming news online	.168***	6.847	.000
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.034	1.390	.165
Economic hope	-.031	-1.026	.305
Economic enthusiasm	-.036	-1.195	.232
Economic anger	-.007	-.238	.812
Economic fear	.065*	2.182	.029
Federal policies affecting personal financial situation	.009	.318	.751
Personal financial situation	.060*	2.116	.035
Federal policies affecting Canada's economy overall	.050	1.607	.108
Canada's economy overall	-.011	-.361	.718
Income loss	.046	1.834	.067
Savings and investments	-.045	-1.743	.081
Income replacement	-.015	-.586	.558
* p < .05 *** p < .01			

Table 65: Linear regression: Non-voting political participation (phone mode)

Model summary Adjusted R ² = .284	ANOVA df = 15 Sig. = .000	Dependent variable: General political engagement scale	
Variable	β	t	Sig. β
Age	.208	7.440	.000***
Education	.155	5.510	.000***
Income	.043	1.470	.142
Gender (M)	-.141	-5.293	.000***
Language (English)	.114	4.277	.000***
Birthplace (Canada)	.022	.830	.407
Married	-.069	-2.449	.014*
Interest in politics	.278	9.429	.000***
Strength of party ID	.040	1.445	.149
Union membership	.106	4.041	.000***
Employed	.028	1.066	.287
Time spent consuming news online	.083	2.911	.004***
Voting is a duty	.121	4.620	.000***
Government doesn't care	.033	1.240	.215
Federal policies affecting Canada's economy overall (IV)	.098	3.762	.000***

* p < .05 *** p < .01

Table 66: Linear regression: Non-voting political participation (phone mode)

Model summary Adjusted R ² = .281	ANOVA df = 15 Sig. = .000	Dependent variable: General political engagement scale	
Variable	β	t	Sig. β
Age	.204	7.432	.000***
Education	.168	6.051	.000***
Income	.055	1.903	.057
Gender (M)	-.132	-4.957	.000***
Language (English)	.115	4.375	.000***
Birthplace (Canada)	.040	1.532	.126
Married	-.062	-2.211	.027*
Interest in politics	.280	9.670	.000***
Strength of party ID	.053	1.943	.052
Union membership	.099	3.810	.000***
Employed	.028	1.117	.264
Time spent consuming news online	.081	2.885	.004***
Voting is a duty	.107	4.146	.000***
Government doesn't care	.029	1.095	.274
Federal policies effecting personal financial situation (IV)	.118	4.530	.000***

* p < .05 *** p < .01

Table 67: Linear regression: Non-voting political participation (phone mode)

Model summary Adjusted R ² = .295	ANOVA df = 21 Sig. = .000	Dependent variable: General political engagement scale	
Variable	β	t	Sig. β
Year of birth	.190***	6.204	.000
Education	.142***	4.953	.000
Income	.043	1.392	.164
Gender (male = 1)	-.128***	-4.668	.000
Language (English = 1)	.099***	3.579	.000
Birthplace (Canada = 1)	.012	.438	.662
Marital status (married = 1)	-.056	-1.898	.058
Interest in politics	.277***	9.263	.000
Strength of party ID	.050	1.770	.077
Union status (member = 1)	.093***	3.454	.001
Employment status (employed = 1)	.022	.827	.409
Days/week consuming news online	.101***	3.430	.001
Voting is a duty (agree = 1)	.130***	4.859	.000
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	.031	1.152	.250
Personal financial situation	-.004	-.129	.897
Federal policies affecting personal financial situation	.104***	3.458	.001
Canada's economy overall	-.067*	-2.177	.030
Federal policies affecting Canada's economy overall	.099***	3.086	.002
Savings and investments	-.010	-.335	.738
Income loss	-.065	-2.388	.017
Income replacement	-.007	-.242	.809
* p < .05 *** p < .01			

Table 68: Linear regression: Non-voting political participation (phone mode)

Model summary Adjusted R ² = .209	ANOVA df = 21 Sig. = .000	Dependent variable: Partisan engagement scale	
Variable	β	t	Sig. β
Year of birth	-.231	-7.184	.000
Education	.122	4.058	.000
Income	.105	3.248	.001
Gender (male = 1)	.024	.842	.400
Language (English = 1)	.012	.408	.683
Birthplace (Canada = 1)	-.026	-.902	.367
Marital status (married = 1)	-.084	-2.728	.006
Interest in politics	.215	6.805	.000
Strength of party ID	.090	3.043	.002
Union status (member = 1)	-.041	-1.433	.152
Employment status (employed = 1)	-.040	-1.448	.148
Days/week consuming news online	.064	2.070	.039
Voting is a duty (agree = 1)	.041	1.438	.151
Government doesn't care (agree = 1)	-.041	-1.433	.152
Personal financial situation	.004	.121	.904
Federal policies affecting personal financial situation	-.008	-.256	.798
Canada's economy overall	-.047	-1.467	.143
Federal policies affecting Canada's economy overall	.016	.481	.630
Savings and investments	-.049	-1.588	.113
Income loss	-.011	-.389	.697
Income replacement	-.024	-.817	.414
* p < .05 *** p < .01			

Table 69: Linear regression: Attitudes toward outgroups (web mode)

	R ² .202 Adjusted R ² .192 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 24			R ² .201 Adjusted R ² .190 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 25		
	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
Year of birth	.024	.766	.444	.017	.541	.588
Language (English)	.122***	5.224	.000	.122***	5.196	.000
Education	.111***	4.891	.000	.115***	5.008	.000
Gender (male)	-.182***	-8.179	.000	-.181***	-8.093	.000
Born in Canada	.012	.541	.588	.012	.534	.594
Income	-.010	-.419	.675	-.013	-.560	.576
Liberal Party	.091***	2.663	.008	.086*	2.501	.012
Conservative Party	-.135***	-3.959	.000	-.136***	-3.930	.000
NDP/Green Party	.091***	2.864	.004	.084***	2.637	.008
Student	.050*	2.011	.044	.054*	2.206	.028
Self-employed	-.023	-.861	.389	-.025	-.910	.363
Working for pay	-.011	-.296	.768	-.016	-.403	.687
Retired	.031	.800	.424	.023	.588	.557
Unemployed	.002	.076	.940	.002	.067	.946
People should blame themselves	-.160***	-7.054	.000	-.158***	-6.933	.000
Government doesn't care	-.091***	-4.049	.000	-.092***	-4.047	.000
Personal financial situation (IV)	.014	.561	.575	.008	.343	.731
Likelihood of income loss (IV)	-.052*	-2.219	.027	-.057*	-2.397	.017
Getting by on savings (IV)	.049*	2.049	.041	.051*	2.111	.035
Possibility of replacing income (IV)	-.057*	-2.311	.021	-.053*	-2.132	.033
Economic hope (IV)	-.076***	-2.724	.007	-.075***	-2.673	.008
Economic enthusiasm (IV)	.069*	2.483	.013	.065*	2.308	.021
Economic anger (IV)	-.050	-1.884	.060	-.050	-1.865	.062
Economic fear (IV)	.013	.471	.637	.010	.372	.710
Economy overall				.015	.631	.528
DV: How do you feel about immigrants, racial minorities, Muslims living in Canada, gays and lesbians, feminists and Aboriginal peoples? (mean = 63.44 "degrees")						
* p < .05						
*** p < .01						

Table 70: Linear regression: Attitudes toward racialized outgroups (web mode)

	R ² .171 Adjusted R ² .160 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 24			R ² .170 Adjusted R ² .158 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 25		
	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
Year of birth	.060	1.885	.060	.053	1.665	.096
Language (English)	.141***	5.961	.000	.139***	5.814	.000
Education	.136***	5.899	.000	.138***	5.942	.000
Gender (male)	-.108***	-4.780	.000	-.108***	-4.749	.000
Born in Canada	-.009	-.431	.666	-.010	-.441	.660
Income	-.020	-.838	.402	-.021	-.853	.394
Liberal Party	.088*	2.540	.011	.083*	2.387	.017
Conservative Party	-.085*	-2.469	.014	-.080*	-2.294	.022
NDP/Green Party	.089***	2.795	.005	.082*	2.572	.010
Student	.055*	2.204	.028	.053*	2.128	.033
Self-employed	.004	.136	.892	.001	.051	.960
Working for pay	.019	.490	.624	.014	.363	.716
Retired	.068	1.725	.085	.060	1.488	.137
Unemployed	-.006	-.238	.812	-.007	-.273	.785
People should blame themselves	-.152***	-6.633	.000	-.152***	-6.560	.000
Government doesn't care	-.103***	-4.504	.000	-.104***	-4.546	.000
Personal financial situation (IV)	.013	.540	.589	.009	.359	.720
Likelihood of income loss (IV)	-.038	-1.605	.109	-.040	-1.659	.097
Getting by on savings (IV)	.033	1.344	.179	.034	1.387	.166
Possibility of replacing income (IV)	-.052*	-2.052	.040	-.049	-1.925	.054
Economic hope (IV)	-.068*	-2.420	.016	-.071*	-2.472	.014
Economic enthusiasm (IV)	.078*	2.765	.006	.072*	2.539	.011
Economic anger (IV)	-.070*	-2.594	.010	-.071*	-2.591	.010
Economic fear (IV)	.006	.225	.822	.000	.006	.995
Economy overall				.035	1.438	.151
DV: How do you feel about immigrants, racial minorities, Muslims living in Canada? (mean = 62.18 "degrees")						
* p < .05						
*** p < .01						

Table 71: Linear regression: Attitudes toward gays and lesbians (web mode)

	R ² .155 Adjusted R ² .144 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 24			R ² .155 Adjusted R ² .143 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 25		
	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
Year of birth	.109***	3.388	.001	.105***	3.274	.001
Language (English)	.007	.304	.761	.013	.530	.596
Education	.027	1.182	.237	.030	1.275	.202
Gender (male)	-.199***	-8.791	.000	-.196***	-8.581	.000
Born in Canada	.070***	3.164	.002	.071***	3.182	.001
Income	.039	1.614	.107	.032	1.299	.194
Liberal Party	.092***	2.645	.008	.088*	2.513	.012
Conservative Party	-.095***	-2.744	.006	-.101***	-2.897	.004
NDP/Green Party	.087***	2.702	.007	.084***	2.612	.009
Student	.009	.341	.733	.027	1.090	.276
Self-employed	-.021	-.740	.459	-.023	-.820	.412
Working for pay	-.029	-.746	.456	-.032	-.808	.419
Retired	.011	.280	.779	.006	.143	.886
Unemployed	-.002	-.058	.954	-.002	-.059	.953
People should blame themselves	-.106***	-4.601	.000	-.104***	-4.472	.000
Government doesn't care	-.053***	-2.328	.020	-.049*	-2.117	.034
Personal financial situation (IV)	.022	.872	.384	.016	.618	.537
Likelihood of income loss (IV)	-.075***	-3.145	.002	-.081***	-3.363	.001
Getting by on savings (IV)	.025	1.036	.300	.027	1.087	.277
Possibility of replacing income (IV)	-.046	-1.834	.067	-.042	-1.667	.096
Economic hope (IV)	-.035	-1.230	.219	-.032	-1.129	.259
Economic enthusiasm (IV)	.058*	2.050	.041	.055	1.907	.057
Economic anger (IV)	-.036	-1.313	.189	-.037	-1.339	.181
Economic fear (IV)	.020	.728	.467	.021	.771	.441
Economy overall				-.006	-.238	.812
DV: How do you feel about gays and lesbians? (mean = 66.87 "degrees")						
* p < .05						
*** p < .01						

Table 72: Linear regression: Attitudes toward feminists (web mode)

	R ² .169 Adjusted R ² .158 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 24			R ² .170 Adjusted R ² .158 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 25		
	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
Year of birth	-.087***	-2.735	.006	-.091***	-2.849	.004
Language (English)	.048*	2.053	.040	.050*	2.108	.035
Education	.083***	3.620	.000	.086***	3.715	.000
Gender (male)	-.264***	-11.781	.000	-.264***	-11.687	.000
Born in Canada	-.004	-.198	.843	-.005	-.211	.833
Income	.045	1.861	.063	.040	1.669	.095
Liberal Party	.030	.883	.377	.029	.845	.398
Conservative Party	-.171***	-4.984	.000	-.177***	-5.104	.000
NDP/Green Party	.037	1.148	.251	.034	1.075	.283
Student	.042	1.667	.096	.053	2.148	.032
Self-employed	-.061*	-2.241	.025	-.059	-2.131	.033
Working for pay	-.047	-1.200	.230	-.050	-1.295	.195
Retired	-.030	-.753	.451	-.033	-.837	.402
Unemployed	.010	.383	.702	.011	.435	.664
People should blame themselves	-.122***	-5.355	.000	-.119***	-5.172	.000
Government doesn't care	-.063***	-2.772	.006	-.064***	-2.788	.005
Personal financial situation (IV)	.002	.094	.925	-.005	-.191	.848
Likelihood of income loss (IV)	.018	.738	.460	.010	.419	.675
Getting by on savings (IV)	.015	.636	.525	.018	.757	.449
Possibility of replacing income (IV)	-.037	-1.460	.144	-.030	-1.182	.237
Economic hope (IV)	-.077***	-2.728	.006	-.075***	-2.637	.008
Economic enthusiasm (IV)	.040	1.428	.154	.040	1.411	.158
Economic anger (IV)	-.020	-.745	.457	-.018	-.679	.497
Economic fear (IV)	.030	1.132	.258	.032	1.189	.235
Economy overall				-.014	-.593	.553
DV: How do you feel about feminists? (mean = 58.85 "degrees")						
* p < .05						
*** p < .01						

Table 73: Linear regression: Attitudes toward Aboriginal peoples (web mode)

	R ² .148 Adjusted R ² .137 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 24			R ² .148 Adjusted R ² .136 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 25		
	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
Year of birth	-.085***	-2.645	.008	-.092***	-2.856	.004
Language (English)	.148***	6.242	.000	.148***	6.193	.000
Education	.051*	2.191	.029	.058*	2.462	.014
Gender (male)	-.111***	-4.887	.000	-.113***	-4.954	.000
Born in Canada	.012	.535	.593	.012	.543	.587
Income	-.093***	-3.822	.000	-.096***	-3.893	.000
Liberal Party	.087*	2.512	.012	.083*	2.381	.017
Conservative Party	-.141***	-4.068	.000	-.145***	-4.142	.000
NDP/Green Party	.091***	2.839	.005	.083*	2.576	.010
Student	.031	1.245	.213	.026	1.049	.295
Self-employed	-.027	-.953	.341	-.028	-1.006	.314
Working for pay	-.006	-.162	.871	-.007	-.171	.865
Retired	-.007	-.181	.857	-.012	-.310	.757
Unemployed	.032	1.209	.227	.032	1.209	.227
People should blame themselves	-.118***	-5.142	.000	-.120***	-5.178	.000
Government doesn't care	-.040	-1.725	.085	-.042	-1.828	.068
Personal financial situation (IV)	.000	-.007	.994	.002	.082	.934
Likelihood of income loss (IV)	-.074***	-3.061	.002	-.077***	-3.207	.001
Getting by on savings (IV)	.105***	4.297	.000	.105***	4.277	.000
Possibility of replacing income (IV)	-.056*	-2.198	.028	-.055*	-2.161	.031
Economic hope (IV)	-.056	-1.954	.051	-.050	-1.728	.084
Economic enthusiasm (IV)	.008	.274	.784	.008	.263	.792
Economic anger (IV)	.002	.077	.938	.005	.173	.863
Economic fear (IV)	-.004	-.149	.881	-.002	-.069	.945
Economy overall				-.014	-.562	.574
DV: How do you feel about Aboriginal peoples? (mean = 68.12 "degrees")						
* p < .05						
*** p < .01						

Table 74: Linear regression: Attitudes toward racial minorities (web mode)

	R ² .130 Adjusted R ² .119 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 24			R ² .129 Adjusted R ² .117 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 25		
	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
Year of birth	.042	1.289	.197	.036	1.113	.266
Language (English)	.095***	3.954	.000	.094***	3.857	.000
Education	.109***	4.636	.000	.110***	4.651	.000
Gender (male)	-.116***	-5.057	.000	-.116***	-5.005	.000
Born in Canada	.006	.257	.797	.006	.254	.800
Income	-.031	-1.264	.207	-.032	-1.289	.198
Liberal Party	.077*	2.186	.029	.071*	2.011	.045
Conservative Party	-.079*	-2.243	.025	-.075*	-2.123	.034
NDP/Green Party	.073*	2.247	.025	.066*	2.014	.044
Student	.062*	2.441	.015	.061*	2.385	.017
Self-employed	.001	.038	.970	.000	.016	.987
Working for pay	.036	.899	.369	.034	.840	.401
Retired	.060	1.483	.138	.054	1.326	.185
Unemployed	-.004	-.165	.869	-.004	-.155	.877
People should blame themselves	-.140***	-5.968	.000	-.138***	-5.866	.000
Government doesn't care	-.080***	-3.441	.001	-.082***	-3.480	.001
Personal financial situation (IV)	-.002	-.070	.944	-.006	-.224	.823
Likelihood of income loss (IV)	-.065***	-2.654	.008	-.067***	-2.723	.007
Getting by on savings (IV)	.037	1.480	.139	.038	1.525	.127
Possibility of replacing income (IV)	-.034	-1.330	.184	-.032	-1.245	.213
Economic hope (IV)	-.045	-1.565	.118	-.047	-1.606	.108
Economic enthusiasm (IV)	.064*	2.226	.026	.058*	2.006	.045
Economic anger (IV)	-.061*	-2.204	.028	-.062*	-2.208	.027
Economic fear (IV)	.026	.930	.352	.021	.742	.458
Economy overall				.033	1.341	.180
DV: How do you feel about racial minorities? (mean = 67.67 "degrees")						
* p < .05						
*** p < .01						

Table 75: Linear regression: Attitudes toward immigrants (web mode)

	R ² .126 Adjusted R ² .115 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 24			R ² .126 Adjusted R ² .114 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 25		
	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
Year of birth	.033	1.013	.311	.027	.813	.416
Language (English)	.095***	3.930	.000	.091***	3.743	.000
Education	.132***	5.589	.000	.134***	5.635	.000
Gender (male)	-.103***	-4.466	.000	-.103***	-4.453	.000
Born in Canada	-.044*	-1.968	.049	-.045*	-1.979	.048
Income	.006	.258	.797	.006	.225	.822
Liberal Party	.064	1.825	.068	.060	1.689	.091
Conservative Party	-.081*	-2.314	.021	-.076*	-2.150	.032
NDP/Green Party	.055	1.692	.091	.049	1.487	.137
Student	.042	1.646	.100	.038	1.507	.132
Self-employed	.002	.064	.949	.001	.026	.980
Working for pay	-.015	-.369	.712	-.017	-.432	.666
Retired	.053	1.310	.190	.046	1.129	.259
Unemployed	-.029	-1.105	.269	-.029	-1.098	.272
People should blame themselves	-.126***	-5.369	.000	-.125***	-5.292	.000
Government doesn't care	-.100***	-4.288	.000	-.102***	-4.373	.000
Personal financial situation (IV)	.020	.813	.416	.016	.627	.531
Likelihood of income loss (IV)	-.018	-.724	.469	-.019	-.787	.431
Getting by on savings (IV)	.021	.833	.405	.022	.874	.382
Possibility of replacing income (IV)	-.046	-1.803	.072	-.045	-1.724	.085
Economic hope (IV)	-.086***	-2.988	.003	-.089***	-3.038	.002
Economic enthusiasm (IV)	.077***	2.662	.008	.071*	2.440	.015
Economic anger (IV)	-.061*	-2.218	.027	-.061*	-2.197	.028
Economic fear (IV)	.000	.001	1.000	-.005	-.174	.862
Economy overall				.034	1.387	.165
DV: How do you feel about immigrants? (mean = 64.18 "degrees")						
* p < .05						
*** p < .01						

Table 76: Linear regression: Attitudes toward Muslims living in Canada (web mode)

	R ² .180 Adjusted R ² .169 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 24			R ² .179 Adjusted R ² .168 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 25		
	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
Year of birth	.079*	2.498	.013	.073*	2.283	.023
Language (English)	.182***	7.774	.000	.179***	7.594	.000
Education	.125***	5.469	.000	.126***	5.486	.000
Gender (male)	-.079***	-3.522	.000	-.079***	-3.503	.000
Born in Canada	.012	.536	.592	.012	.529	.597
Income	-.026	-1.089	.276	-.026	-1.082	.279
Liberal Party	.103***	3.029	.002	.100***	2.919	.004
Conservative Party	-.075*	-2.221	.027	-.067	-1.948	.052
NDP/Green Party	.115***	3.663	.000	.110***	3.482	.001
Student	.040	1.592	.112	.040	1.590	.112
Self-employed	.005	.200	.842	.001	.044	.965
Working for pay	.027	.692	.489	.019	.489	.625
Retired	.062	1.575	.116	.051	1.282	.200
Unemployed	.009	.338	.736	.006	.235	.814
People should blame themselves	-.145***	-6.388	.000	-.146***	-6.359	.000
Government doesn't care	-.101***	-4.475	.000	-.102***	-4.463	.000
Personal financial situation (IV)	.023	.956	.339	.018	.745	.456
Likelihood of income loss (IV)	-.028	-1.203	.229	-.029	-1.216	.224
Getting by on savings (IV)	.031	1.302	.193	.032	1.338	.181
Possibility of replacing income (IV)	-.056*	-2.237	.025	-.052*	-2.090	.037
Economic hope (IV)	-.051	-1.825	.068	-.054	-1.922	.055
Economic enthusiasm (IV)	.065*	2.325	.020	.059*	2.109	.035
Economic anger (IV)	-.063*	-2.339	.019	-.064*	-2.375	.018
Economic fear (IV)	-.015	-.553	.581	-.022	-.798	.425
Economy overall				.039	1.628	.104
DV: How do you feel about Muslims living in Canada? (mean = 54.57 "degrees")						
* p < .05						
*** p < .01						

Table 77: Impact of economic anxiety variables on attitudes toward outgroups (web mode)

Independent variable	All outgroups	+ Economy overall	LGBT	+ Economy overall	Feminists	+ Economy overall	Indigenous people	+ Economy overall	Racial minorities	+ Economy overall	Immigrants	+ Economy overall	Muslims in Canada	+ Economy overall
Ambivalence	-.160***	-.158***	-.106***	-.104***	-.122***	-.119***	-.118***	-.120***	-.140***	-.138***	-.126***	-.125***	-.145***	-.146***
Alienation	-.091***	-.092***	-.053*	-.049*	-.063***	-.064***	X	X	-.080***	-.082***	-.100***	-.102***	-.101***	-.102***
Personal financial situation	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Income loss	-.052*	-.057*	-.075***	-.081***	X	X	-.074***	-.077***	-.065***	-.067***	X	X	X	X
Lack of savings	.049*	.051*	X	X	X	X	.105***	.105***	X	X	X	X	X	X
Income replacement	-.057*	-.053*	X	X	X	X	-.056***	-.055*	X	X	X	X	-.056*	-.052*
Lack of hope	-.076*	-.075***	X	X	-.077***	-.075***	X	X	X	X	-.086***	-.089***	X	X
Lack of enthusiasm	.069*	.065*	.058*	X	X	X	X	X	.064*	.058*	.077***	.071*	.065*	.059*
Anger	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-.061*	-.062*	-.061*	-.061*	-.063*	-.064*
Fear	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Economy overall	-	X	-	X	-	X	-	X	-	X	-	X	-	X
* p < .05 *** p < .01 X = not significant - = not included in analysis ¹ included as control variable														

Table 78: Linear regression: Attitudes toward outgroups (phone mode)

	R ² .211 Adjusted R ² .200 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 20			R ² .209 Adjusted R ² .169 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 21		
	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
Year of birth	.066	1.928	.054	.073	2.109	.035
Language (English)	.168***	6.358	.000	.171***	6.382	.000
Education	.101***	4.021	.000	.101***	3.949	.000
Gender (male)	-.158***	-6.703	.000	-.155***	-6.491	.000
Born in Canada	.051*	2.186	.029	.053***	2.228	.026
Income	.073***	2.701	.007	.079***	2.874	.004
Liberal Party	.084	1.445	.149	.089***	1.510	.131
Conservative Party	-.137*	-2.376	.018	-.133*	-2.278	.023
NDP/Green Party	.069	1.370	.171	.071	1.400	.162
Student	.061*	2.017	.044	.060*	1.971	.049
Self-employed	.013	.332	.740	.015	.377	.706
Working for pay	.014	.252	.801	.015	.270	.787
Retired	-.001	-.030	.976	.003	.067	.947
Unemployed	-.010	-.385	.700	-.010	-.346	.730
People should blame themselves	-.137***	-5.696	.000	-.138***	-5.667	.000
Government doesn't care	-.115***	-4.912	.000	-.110***	-4.627	.000
Personal financial situation (IV)	.055*	2.237	.025	.065***	2.608	.009
Likelihood of income loss (IV)	.002	.083	.934	.003	.121	.904
Getting by on savings (IV)	.064*	2.497	.013	.066*	2.526	.012
Possibility of replacing income (IV)	-.054*	-2.130	.033	-.055*	-2.161	.031
Economy overall				-.024	-.984	.325

DV: How do you feel about immigrants, racial minorities, Muslims living in Canada, gays and lesbians, feminists and Aboriginal peoples? (mean = 78.58 "degrees")
 * p < .05
 *** p < .01

Table 79: Linear regression: Attitudes toward racialized outgroups (phone mode)

	R ² .193 Adjusted R ² .183 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 20			R ² .194 Adjusted R ² .183 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 21		
	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
Year of birth	.064	1.874	.061	.069	2.008	.045
Language (English)	.140***	5.389	.000	.145***	5.539	.000
Education	.137***	5.504	.000	.136***	5.392	.000
Gender (male)	-.103***	-4.399	.000	-.102***	-4.292	.000
Born in Canada	.018	.760	.447	.022	.918	.359
Income	.050	1.839	.066	.057*	2.093	.036
Liberal Party	.201***	3.448	.001	.206***	3.503	.000
Conservative Party	.022	.372	.710	.021	.365	.715
NDP/Green Party	.157***	3.111	.002	.160***	3.157	.002
Student	.081***	2.713	.007	.081***	2.677	.007
Self-employed	.020	.508	.611	.020	.499	.618
Working for pay	.024	.437	.662	.027	.497	.619
Retired	-.035	-.685	.494	-.031	-.607	.544
Unemployed	.013	.479	.632	.016	.567	.571
People should blame themselves	-.125***	-5.211	.000	-.125***	-5.165	.000
Government doesn't care	-.127***	-5.447	.000	-.122***	-5.159	.000
Personal financial situation (IV)	.062*	2.570	.010	.077***	3.115	.002
Likelihood of income loss (IV)	-.022	-.954	.340	-.020	-.834	.405
Getting by on savings (IV)	.043	1.682	.093	.045	1.728	.084
Possibility of replacing income (IV)	-.059*	-2.341	.019	-.058*	-2.317	.021
Economy overall				-.052	-2.135	.033
DV: How do you feel about immigrants, racial minorities and Muslims living in Canada? (mean = 77.76 "degrees") * p < .05 *** p < .01						

Table 80: Linear regression: Attitudes toward gays and lesbians (phone mode)

	R ² .157 Adjusted R ² .147 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 20			R ² .161 Adjusted R ² .150 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 21		
	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
Year of birth	.129***	3.750	.000	.143***	4.126	.000
Language (English)	.025	.959	.338	.032	1.191	.234
Education	.027	1.086	.278	.027	1.055	.292
Gender (male)	-.191***	-8.077	.000	-.189***	-7.914	.000
Born in Canada	.095***	4.040	.000	.097***	4.103	.000
Income	.143***	5.205	.000	.149***	5.378	.000
Liberal Party	-.001	-.023	.982	-.003	-.051	.959
Conservative Party	-.179***	-3.110	.002	-.183***	-3.164	.002
NDP/Green Party	.004	.079	.937	.003	.055	.956
Student	.018	.611	.541	.015	.507	.613
Self-employed	.013	.333	.739	.016	.397	.691
Working for pay	.001	.025	.980	.000	.008	.993
Retired	.051	.980	.327	.056	1.081	.280
Unemployed	-.049	-1.745	.081	-.048	-1.712	.087
People should blame themselves	-.080***	-3.327	.001	-.084***	-3.464	.001
Government doesn't care	-.053*	-2.261	.024	-.048*	-2.040	.042
Personal financial situation (IV)	.035	1.449	.148	.050*	1.978	.048
Likelihood of income loss (IV)	-.003	-.129	.897	-.001	-.032	.975
Getting by on savings (IV)	.049	1.911	.056	.045	1.734	.083
Possibility of replacing income (IV)	-.056*	-2.205	.028	-.060*	-2.354	.019
Economy overall				-.036	-1.462	.144
DV: How do you feel about gays and lesbians? (mean = 80.78 "degrees")						
* p < .05						
*** p < .01						

Table 81: Linear regression: Attitudes toward feminists (phone mode)

	R ² .153 Adjusted R ² .143 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 20			R ² .153 Adjusted R ² .142 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 21		
	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
Year of birth	.017	.506	.613	.025	.718	.473
Language (English)	.172***	6.526	.000	.166***	6.221	.000
Education	.043	1.712	.087	.043	1.682	.093
Gender (male)	-.156***	-6.600	.000	-.152***	-6.368	.000
Born in Canada	.098***	4.208	.000	.095***	4.019	.000
Income	.114***	4.149	.000	.115***	4.122	.000
Liberal Party	-.118	-2.053	.040	-.108	-1.868	.062
Conservative Party	-.310***	-5.439	.000	-.291***	-5.066	.000
NDP/Green Party	-.050	-1.019	.309	-.047	-.936	.349
Student	.024	.784	.433	.023	.758	.448
Self-employed	.012	.304	.761	.017	.419	.676
Working for pay	.023	.413	.680	.023	.422	.673
Retired	.047	.909	.363	.061	1.159	.247
Unemployed	-.036	-1.277	.202	-.037	-1.312	.190
People should blame themselves	-.111***	-4.617	.000	-.112***	-4.623	.000
Government doesn't care	-.058*	-2.487	.013	-.057*	-2.390	.017
Personal financial situation (IV)	.008	.347	.729	.005	.190	.849
Likelihood of income loss (IV)	.038	1.614	.107	.037	1.534	.125
Getting by on savings (IV)	.048	1.859	.063	.054*	2.062	.039
Possibility of replacing income (IV)	-.031	-1.212	.226	-.036	-1.420	.156
Economy overall				.044	1.795	.073
DV: How do you feel about feminists? (mean = 75.96 "degrees")						
* p < .05						
*** p < .01						

Table 82: Linear regression: Attitudes toward Aboriginal people (phone mode)

	R ² .121 Adjusted R ² .111 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 20			R ² .121 Adjusted R ² .109 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 21		
	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
Year of birth	.003	.082	.934	.007	.209	.834
Language (English)	.167***	6.171	.000	.168***	6.128	.000
Education	.044	1.706	.088	.045	1.740	.082
Gender (male)	-.144***	-5.994	.000	-.146***	-5.988	.000
Born in Canada	.014	.593	.553	.010	.426	.670
Income	-.042	-1.502	.133	-.039	-1.362	.173
Liberal Party	.037	.627	.531	.033	.552	.581
Conservative Party	-.118*	-1.996	.046	-.119*	-2.009	.045
NDP/Green Party	.007	.133	.894	.004	.077	.939
Student	.012	.381	.703	.015	.474	.636
Self-employed	-.039	-.967	.334	-.030	-.733	.464
Working for pay	-.036	-.653	.514	-.030	-.536	.592
Retired	-.045	-.858	.391	-.036	-.677	.498
Unemployed	-.021	-.763	.445	-.019	-.669	.504
People should blame themselves	-.108***	-4.381	.000	-.110***	-4.426	.000
Government doesn't care	-.075***	-3.135	.002	-.072***	-2.979	.003
Personal financial situation (IV)	.040	1.603	.109	.044	1.702	.089
Likelihood of income loss (IV)	-.003	-.107	.914	-.001	-.055	.956
Getting by on savings (IV)	.108***	4.104	.000	.104***	3.920	.000
Possibility of replacing income (IV)	-.002	-.063	.950	-.001	-.054	.957
Economy overall				.000	-.012	.990
DV: How do you feel about Aboriginal peoples? (mean = 79.24 "degrees") * p < .05 *** p < .01						

Table 83: Linear regression: Attitudes toward racial minorities (phone mode)

	R ² .154 Adjusted R ² .144 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 20			R ² .158 Adjusted R ² .147 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 21		
	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
Year of birth	.034	.976	.329	.046	1.325	.185
Language (English)	.106***	4.028	.000	.114***	4.277	.000
Education	.092***	3.639	.000	.090***	3.508	.000
Gender (male)	-.132***	-5.560	.000	-.130***	-5.435	.000
Born in Canada	.026	1.109	.267	.028	1.195	.232
Income	.081***	2.928	.003	.090*	3.221	.001
Liberal Party	.193***	3.316	.001	.194*	3.321	.001
Conservative Party	.055	.946	.345	.051	.873	.383
NDP/Green Party	.165***	3.299	.001	.168*	3.324	.001
Student	.075*	2.484	.013	.073*	2.391	.017
Self-employed	.061	1.520	.129	.061	1.509	.131
Working for pay	.033	.607	.544	.034	.619	.536
Retired	-.048	-.917	.359	-.044	-.832	.406
Unemployed	.002	.087	.930	.004	.159	.873
People should blame themselves	-.088***	-3.637	.000	-.091***	-3.733	.000
Government doesn't care	-.106***	-4.494	.000	-.101***	-4.261	.000
Personal financial situation (IV)	.070***	2.846	.004	.084***	3.370	.001
Likelihood of income loss (IV)	-.040	-1.678	.094	-.035	-1.470	.142
Getting by on savings (IV)	.063*	2.417	.016	.059*	2.250	.025
Possibility of replacing income (IV)	-.048	-1.903	.057	-.052*	-2.032	.042
Economy overall				-.050*	-2.048	.041
DV: How do you feel about racial minorities? (mean = 80.80 "degrees")						
* p < .05						
*** p < .01						

Table 84: Linear regression: Attitudes toward immigrants (phone mode)

	R ² .131 Adjusted R ² .121 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 20			R ² .129 Adjusted R ² .118 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 21		
	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
Year of birth	.062	1.770	.077	.063	1.777	.076
Language (English)	.105***	3.935	.000	.102***	3.786	.000
Education	.103***	4.029	.000	.109***	4.191	.000
Gender (male)	-.082***	-3.406	.001	-.078***	-3.200	.001
Born in Canada	-.025	-1.049	.295	-.022	-.909	.364
Income	.041	1.476	.140	.047	1.675	.094
Liberal Party	.123*	2.060	.040	.138*	2.290	.022
Conservative Party	-.019	-.316	.752	-.011	-.188	.851
NDP/Green Party	.104*	2.040	.042	.116*	2.244	.025
Student	.067*	2.201	.028	.068*	2.203	.028
Self-employed	.052	1.286	.199	.053	1.301	.193
Working for pay	.066	1.186	.236	.068	1.219	.223
Retired	.006	.117	.907	.012	.231	.818
Unemployed	-.003	-.109	.913	-.001	-.038	.970
People should blame themselves	-.113***	-4.593	.000	-.111***	-4.476	.000
Government doesn't care	-.127***	-5.303	.000	-.119***	-4.916	.000
Personal financial situation (IV)	.041	1.676	.094	.051*	2.019	.044
Likelihood of income loss (IV)	.013	.550	.582	.014	.573	.567
Getting by on savings (IV)	.016	.622	.534	.023	.859	.390
Possibility of replacing income (IV)	-.042	-1.617	.106	-.039	-1.499	.134
Economy overall				-.042	-1.696	.090
DV: How do you feel about immigrants? (mean = 78.72 "degrees")						
* p < .05						
*** p < .01						

Table 85: Linear regression: Attitudes toward Muslims living in Canada (phone mode)

	R ² .195 Adjusted R ² .185 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 20			R ² .195 Adjusted R ² .184 ANOVA Sig. .000 df 21		
	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
Year of birth	.074*	2.197	.028	.079*	2.328	.020
Language (English)	.150***	5.785	.000	.158***	6.038	.000
Education	.167***	6.765	.000	.162***	6.491	.000
Gender (male)	-.071***	-3.061	.002	-.071***	-3.034	.002
Born in Canada	.039	1.710	.087	.043	1.846	.065
Income	.023	.840	.401	.030	1.092	.275
Liberal Party	.203***	3.552	.000	.199***	3.456	.001
Conservative Party	.008	.133	.895	.001	.026	.979
NDP/Green Party	.148***	3.005	.003	.144***	2.910	.004
Student	.078***	2.624	.009	.078***	2.598	.009
Self-employed	-.031	-.788	.431	-.031	-.794	.427
Working for pay	-.016	-.292	.771	-.010	-.193	.847
Retired	-.043	-.845	.398	-.042	-.816	.415
Unemployed	.019	.714	.475	.021	.778	.436
People should blame themselves	-.132***	-5.572	.000	-.133***	-5.557	.000
Government doesn't care	-.103***	-4.457	.000	-.102***	-4.344	.000
Personal financial situation (IV)	.043	1.805	.071	.058*	2.373	.018
Likelihood of income loss (IV)	-.047*	-2.007	.045	-.044	-1.859	.063
Getting by on savings (IV)	.034	1.355	.176	.035	1.355	.175
Possibility of replacing income (IV)	-.056*	-2.249	.025	-.055*	-2.212	.027
Economy overall				-.043	-1.795	.073
DV: How do you feel about Muslims living in Canada? (mean = 73.03 "degrees")						
* p < .05						
*** p < .01						

Table 86: Impact of economic anxiety variables on attitudes toward outgroups (phone mode)

Independent variable	All outgroups	+ Economy overall	LGBT	+ Economy overall	Feminists	+ Economy overall	Indigenous people	+ Economy overall	Racial minorities	+ Economy overall	Immigrants	+ Economy overall	Muslims in Canada	+ Economy overall
Ambivalence	-.137***	-.138***	-.080***	-.084***	-.111***	-.112***	-.108***	-.110***	-.088***	-.091***	-.113***	-.111***	-.132***	-.133***
Alienation	-.115***	-.110***	-.053*	-.048*	-.058*	-.057*	-.075***	-.072***	-.106***	-.101***	-.127***	-.119***	-.103***	-.102***
Personal financial situation	.055*	.065***	X	.050*	X	X	X	X	.070***	.084***	X	.051*	X	.058*
Income loss	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-.047*	X
Lack of savings	.064*	.066*	X	X	X	.054*	.108***	.104*	.063*	.059*	X	X	X	X
Income replacement	-.054*	-.055*	-.056*	-.060*	X	X	X	X	X	-.052*	X	X	-.056*	-.055*
Lack of hope	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lack of enthusiasm	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Anger	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fear	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Economy overall	-	X	-	X	-	X	-	X	-	-.050*	-	X	-	X
* p < .05 *** p < .01 X = not significant - = not included in analysis † included as control variable														

Table 87: Effect of economic anxiety variables on all measures (web mode)

Independent variable	Impact on voting (canonical coefficient)	Impact on passive engagement (beta)	Impact on active engagement (beta)	Impact on attitudes toward all outgroups (beta) ²
“Personal anxiety” component	X	.074***	.070***	-
Personal Economic Anxiety Scale	-.036*	.073***	X	-
Personal financial situation	X	.085***	X	X
Perception of Canada’s economy overall	X	X	X	X
Possibility of losing income or job in the next year	-.026*	.061***	.080***	-.057*
Possibility of replacing income with similar income or job	X	X	-.098***	-.053*
Possibility of getting by on savings and investments alone	-.043***	X	X	.051*
Policies affecting Canada’s economy	X	.068***	X	-
Policies affecting personal financial situation	X	.068***	.046*	-
Over the past year, has the economy made you feel angry?	-.057*	.061***	.061***	X
Over the past year, has the economy made you feel fearful?	-.046*	.079***	.060***	X
Over the past year, has the economy made you feel enthusiastic?	X	X	-.120***	.065*
Over the past year, has the economy made you feel hopeful?	X	X	-.092***	-.075***
Government doesn’t care about what people like you think	X	.041 - .048 ¹	X	-.092***
People should blame themselves, not the system	-	-	-	-.158***
<p>* p < .05 *** p < .01 X = not significant - = not included in analysis ¹ included as control variable ² regression included all economic anxiety variables</p>				

Table 88: Effect of economic anxiety variables on all measures (phone mode)

Independent variable	Impact on voting (canonical coefficient)	Impact on general engagement (beta)	Impact on partisan engagement (beta)	Impact on attitudes toward all outgroups (beta) ²
“Personal anxiety” component	X	X	X	-
Personal Economic Anxiety (scale)	X	X	X	-
Personal financial situation	-.315***	X	X	.065*
Perception of Canada’s economy overall	-.165*	X	X	X
Possibility of losing income or job in the next year	X	X	X	X
Possibility of replacing income with similar income or job	X	X	X	-.055*
Possibility of getting by on savings and investments alone	X	X	X	.066*
Policies affecting Canada’s economy	X	.098***	X	-
Policies affecting personal financial situation	X	.118***	X	-
Over the past year, has the economy made you feel angry?	-	-	-	-
Over the past year, has the economy made you feel fearful?	-	-	-	-
Over the past year, has the economy made you feel enthusiastic?	-	-	-	-
Over the past year, has the economy made you feel hopeful?	-	-	-	-
Government doesn’t care about what people like you think	-.228*** - -.282*** ¹	X	X	-.110***
People should blame themselves, not the system	-	-	-	-.138***
* p < .05 *** p < .01 X = not significant - = not included in analysis ¹ included as control variable ² regression included all economic anxiety variables				

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