

“From the Orange revolution to Euromaidan? Political culture of Ukrainian society from 2004 and 2014.”

by

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Abstract

This thesis is focused on the study of the political culture of Ukraine between the Orange revolution and Euromaidan.

The main cause of Euromaidan and the subsequent social revolution that took place in Ukraine in 2013-2014 has been the subject of vigorous debate and inquiry. Scholars, politicians, and experts on Ukraine engaged questions on the similarities and differences between the Orange revolution and Euromaidan. Why was the former peaceful and short-lived, while the latter was violent and enduring? More importantly, what motivated Ukrainian citizens to protest?

This dissertation posits that although the Orange revolution does not fall within the definition of a classical social revolution, it started a process of transformation of the political culture of Ukraine. Utilizing the classical approaches to the study of the political culture combined with the literature on political identities in the post-communist countries, this thesis submits that some components of the political culture of Ukrainians transformed during the studied period. The biggest changes occurred regarding citizens' orientations towards others and towards oneself in the political process. Although a low level of confidence in the political institutions and the political regime as the whole, Ukrainians increased their support for such democratic values as protection of human rights, fair and consistent enforcement of the law as well as intolerance towards the presence of corruption. Younger and more educated Ukrainians increased their trust and tolerance towards "others"- people that you meet for the first time, people of another nationality and religion.

The most important findings were about political competence and political actions. The presence of free media during the initial years after the Orange revolution combined with an increase in alternative forms of social interaction and activity such as online discussion groups and blogging, allowed citizens to freely communicate and express their opinions without fear of being punished. This, in concert with an increase in interpersonal trust, created favorable conditions for a new form of political socialization, interaction, and collaboration. It also was correlated with an increased in alternative forms of political actions, including political protests.

However, other aspects of political culture have not changed - low confidence in the main political institutions; low membership in political and non political organizations, low political efficacy. Hence, Ukrainians participation in alternative political activities increased in the absence of confidence in traditional forms of political activities such as elections.

Acknowledgements

The work on this thesis started many years ago, prior to Euromaidan in 2013-2014.

Visiting Ukraine after the Orange revolution in 2008 and 2012 and speaking privately to many Ukrainians, I wondered how many of them expressed their dissatisfaction with politicians and institutions, without any consideration of future actions. The violent events of 2013-2014 and a subsequent visit to Ukraine in October 2014, increased my interest in citizens' motivation not only to protest and support others but rescue their life in their protest. I wanted to understand what made Ukrainians take these actions. And so, this project was born.

I want to thank my supervisor Dr. Andrea Chandler, who agreed to work with me on this ambitious project in the earlier stages of my research when I did not know yet how events in Ukraine would develop after the Euromaidan. I appreciate your support and patience during all these years and gently guiding me through some difficult times.

This thesis would not happen without support from my committee members Dr. Joan DeBardleben and Dr. Stephen White. Dr. DeBardleben from the days of my masters' thesis at Carleton was always supportive in my academic journey by stimulating my curiosity and engendering my confidence in my study. Your intellectual precision and inquisitiveness are widely admired.

Dr. Stephen White, whose love for quantitative methods surpasses even mine, was always there to spend unlimited hours with me to answer all my questions and to help me become a better political scientist and researcher. I appreciate your willingness to challenge me as well to provide solutions for my questions.

This thesis would not happen without the support from Mr. Sharma from International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES) whom I met during the 2014 IPSA

Congress and who was willing to accommodate me with access to data files for this research.

I would like to say special thank you to three of my Ph.D. friends: Jillian Curtin, Andrea Wagner and Ania Gora, who were always there to listen to me and offer their support and encouragement when I needed it through all these years. I will miss our time together.

To my family, I cannot say thank you enough for all the support that you provided me while I was working on my doctorate. To my husband Andrew, who was my strongest and most vigorous proof-reader and who learned about Ukrainian politics and Ukrainian names more than he intended. Your support and sense of humor made this process less stressful. To my mom, who was always there to make sure that everything was taken care at home when I was away doing my research and who always demonstrated to me what is unconditional love is. To my dearest boys, Nic and Henry, whom I often felt were deprived of mommy's time, when I was at the library or at the office working during the weekdays and weekends all these years.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to the people of Ukraine, whose sacrifice, including for some their lives, during the cold months of Euromaidan of 2013-2014, and who strongly believed in the power of citizens to change their own future.

List of Abbreviations

BYT- Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko

CANADEM - Canadian Election Monitoring

CANEOM - Canadian Election Observation Mission

CECU - Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine

ENP - European Neighborhood Policy

EU- European Union

IFES - International Foundation for Electoral Systems

IOM - International Organization for Migration

LGBT - Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender

NGO - Non-Government Organization

OSCE- Organization for Security and Cooperation

Our Ukraine- Bloc Viktor Yushchenko Our Ukraine

PCA -Partnership and Co-Cooperation Agreement

PR- Proportional Representation

Rada- Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine

SMD- Single-Member Electoral District

UN - United Nations

UPA - Ukrayins'ka Povstanches'ka Armiya (Ukrainian Insurgent Army)

WTO - World Trade Organization

Note on transliteration

For this thesis the author adopted transliteration according to Resolution No 55 “On Normalization of Transliteration of the Ukrainian Alphabet by Means of the Latin Alphabet” adopted on January 27, 2010 by the Cabinet of Minister of Ukraine.

Ukrainian	Romanization	Ukrainian	Romanization
Аа	Aa	Мм	Mm
Бб	Bb	Нн	Nn
Вв	Vv	Оо	Oo
Гг	Hh	Пп	Pp
Ґґ	Gg	Сс	Ss
Дд	Dd	Тт	Tt
Ее	Ee	Уу	Uu
Єє	Ye (initial position) Ie (other positions)	Фф	Ff
Жж	Zh zh	Хх	Kh kh
Зз	Zz	Цц	Ts ts
Ии	Yy	Чч	Ch ch
Іі	Ii	Шш	Shsh shch
Її	Yi (initial position) I (other positions)	Юю	Yu (initial position) Iu (other positions)
Йй	Y (initial position) i (other positions)	Яя	Ya (initial position) Ia (other positions)
Кк	Kk	Ьь*	‘
Лл	Ll		

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INTRODUCTION

The problem, research questions

In mid-February 2014, across the world, many newspapers' front pages published disturbing images of burning buildings and spreading fires in the historic central area of Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine. In the following days, more pictures emerged of protesters who were shot by gunmen on 21 February 2014. The world's attention returned once again to Ukraine, the country of 44 million people in Eastern Europe, as it had been ten years earlier during the Orange revolution in 2004.¹

Not many were aware that these violent events had roots in political manoeuvring two months earlier, on the 22nd of November when President Yanukovich refused to sign a long-anticipated Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union. This refusal came despite the many previous months and years of preparations and negotiations between the EU and Ukraine to achieve this agreement. The day following the President's announcement approximately 200 people (mostly students) went to Kyiv's central square, Maidan Nezalezhnosti, to protest. They were beaten by the police, resulting in widespread anger among the population.² The number of protesters in Euromaidan³ continued to grow each month, reaching a peak of approximately one

¹ The Orange revolution refers to the peaceful political protest of 2004 during the second round of presidential election. Pro-government candidate Viktor Yanukovich was declared as a winner of the second round, despite the results of exit poll that demonstrated a victory of Viktor Yushchenko, the opposition candidate. The supporters of Yushchenko started the protest that led to the reelection of the second round and victory of Viktor Yushchenko.

² Oksana Grytsenko, "Ukraine's bloody crackdown leads to call for sanctions," 01 December 2013, *The Guardian*, accessed August 09, 2018.

³ Euromaidan got its name from the combination of two words – Europe which represents the association agreement between Ukraine and the EU and Maidan – the main central square in Kyiv where many political events including the Orange revolution of 2004 took place.

million citizens during the coldest months of January and February 2014.⁴ The Yanukovich government used military force against its people in Maidan to end the growing protest. These actions did not deter the protesters but emboldened them - the protest widened and hardened. Moreover, the political elite within the government and some Ukrainian oligarchs under pressure from protests withdrew their support for President Yanukovich who later fled for exile in Russia.⁵

Many questions and much debate arose on the causes and origins of the Euromaidan phenomenon and the subsequent social revolution early in 2014. Neither political observers, academics nor the media had predicted these events. Furthermore, promptly following Euromaidan, scholars, politicians, and experts on Ukraine posed questions on the similarities and differences between the 2004 Orange revolution and the Euromaidan ten years later.⁶ Why was the first one peaceful and short-lived, while the second one was violent and enduring? Which one was more successful and why? Was

⁴ Olga Onuch, "Maidan Past and Present: Comparing the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan" in *Ukraine's Euromaidan: Analyses of a Civil Revolution*, ed. David R. Marples, Frederick V. Mills (Stuttgart: Ibidem Press, 2015), p. 27.

⁵ Henry Meyer, Kateryna Choursina, Daryna Krasnolutska "Ukrainian Tycoons' Shifting Loyalties" *Bloomberg News*, December 19, 2013 <http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-12-19/ukraines-oligarchs-may-switch-sides-over-abandoned-eu-trade-deal>, accessed March 27, 2015.

⁶ Iryna Solonenko, "Ukrainian Civic Society from the Orange Revolution to Euromaidan: Striving for a New Social Contract" IFSH, OSCE Year book, 2015, pp. 219-235. https://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/14/Solonenko-en_S.pdf, accessed November 14, 2017. Mridula Ghosh, *In Search of Sustainability. Civil Society in Ukraine*, (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2014). Taras Kuzio, "The Orange and Euromaidan Revolutions: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives" *Kyiv-Mohyla Law & Political Journal*, 2, 2016. kmlpj.ukma.edu.ua/article/download/88183/83977, accessed November 14, 2017. Irina Khmelko, Yevgen Pereguda, "An anatomy of Mass Protests: The Orange Revolution and Euromaidan Compared", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 47, 2014, pp. 227-236. Maria Popova, "Why the Orange Revolution was Short and Peaceful and Euromaidan Long and Violent" *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 61, No. 6, November–December 2014.

Euromaidan a by-product of the Orange revolution?⁷ Others focused their attention on the post-Euromaidan events and their consequences.⁸

This doctoral thesis is dedicated to a study of the political culture of Ukrainian society in the aftermath of the 2004 Orange revolution until the eve of Euromaidan in winter 2013-2014.

The study of political culture is important because “political culture forms an important link between the events of politics and the behaviours of individuals in reaction to those events.”⁹ Political culture can explain not only citizens orientations and values but predict their future behaviour based on their orientations. Furthermore, as previous research on political culture has suggested a “specific type of political culture seems to be an essential precondition to effective democracy.”¹⁰ And although a multitude of research was conducted on the Orange revolution, its cause and consequences, much less has been focused on the study of Ukraine’s political culture.¹¹ Even among those who

⁷Irina Khmelko, Yevgen Pereguda, “An anatomy of Mass Protests: The Orange Revolution and Euromaidan Compared.” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol.47, 2014, pp. 227-236.

⁸In March of 2014, Russia annexed Crimea. It was followed by the military conflict in the Eastern Ukraine in April 2014, which is still ongoing. Olga Onuch & Gwendolyn Sasse “The Maidan in Movement: Diversity and the Cycles of Protest” *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 68, No. 4, 2016, pp. 556-587. Volodymyr Kulyk, "National identity in Ukraine: impact of Euromaidan and the war." *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 68, No. 4, 2016, pp. 588-608. Anastasiya Ryabchuk, “Right revolution? Hopes and Perils of the Euromaidan Protest in Ukraine” *Debate: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, Vol. 22, No.1,2014. Joanna Szostek, “Revolution in progress? Continuity and change in Ukrainian politics” 2017, *East European Politics and Societies*. Taras Kuzio, "Competing Nationalisms, Euromaidan, and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict." *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Vol.15, No. 1, 2015, pp.157-169. Horvath, Robert. "The Euromaidan and the crisis of Russian nationalism." *Nationalities Papers*, Vol.43, No.6, 2015, pp.819-839. Mikhail Minakov, "A Decisive Turn? Risks for Ukrainian Democracy After the Euromaidan." *Carnegie Endowment*” (2016). Hale, Henry E., and Robert W. Orttung, eds. *Beyond the Euromaidan: Comparative Perspectives on Advancing Reform in Ukraine* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016).

⁹ Sidney Verba, “Comparative Political Culture” in *Political Culture and Political Development* ed. Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 516.

¹⁰ Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. "Political culture and democracy: Analyzing cross-level linkages." *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No.1, 2003, pp. 61-79, p.65.

¹¹Hans van Zon “Political culture and neo-patrimonialism under Leonid Kuchma.” *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 52, No.5, 2005, pp.12-22. Taras Kuzio, “Political culture and Democracy. Ukraine as an

studied Ukrainian society and the mass mobilization of people before and after the Orange revolution, the focus was more on the national level, on institutions or as a comparative perspective with other countries.¹² Still, others have inquired into the importance of particular cleavages in Ukraine after the Orange revolution and Euromaidan.¹³

Although sound and informative, they have not focused on people's attitudes, orientations and actions. Citizens' political actions do not happen in a vacuum; they are based on their systems of norms, values and beliefs.¹⁴ Ukrainian citizens' willingness to unite and collaborate in 2013-2014 cannot be solely explained by the nature and character of Ukraine's political institutions, regional or language differences. Citizens should possess particular orientations, beliefs and grievances upon which they will act.

For this reason, it is important to study the political culture of Ukrainian citizens. By inquiring into the political culture of Ukrainian society, this research will try not only to define the political culture of Ukrainian citizens between 2004 and 2013 but explain its

Immobile State" *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 25, No.1, 2011, pp. 88-113. Taras Kuzio. "Soviet conspiracy theories and political culture in Ukraine: Understanding Viktor Yanukovich and the Party of Regions." *Communist and post-communist studies*, Vol.44, No.3, 2011, pp.221-232. Karina V. Korostelina, "Ukraine twenty years after Independence: Concept models of society" *Communist and Post-Communist studies*, Vol.46, 2013, pp. 53-64.

¹²Olga Onuch, *Mapping Mass Mobilization. Understanding Revolutionary Moments in Argentina and Ukraine* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Dieter Fuchs, and Jan Zielonka, eds. *Democracy and political culture in Eastern Europe*. (New York: Routledge, 2006). Lucan Way, *Pluralism by Default. Weak Autocrats and the Rise of Competitive Politics* (Baltimore; John Hopkins University Press, 2015). Henry Hale *Patronal Politics Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

¹³Volodymyr Kulyk, "National identity in Ukraine: impact of Euromaidan and the war." *Europe-Asia Studies* 68.4, 2016, pp. 588-608. Volodymyr Kulyk, "The Age factor in language practices and attitudes: continuity and change in Ukraine's bilingualism" *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 283-301. Ivan Katchanovski "Regional political divisions in Ukraine in 1991–2006." *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 34, No.5, 2006, pp. 507-532. Lowell Barrington and Regina Faranda "Reexamining Region, Ethnicity, and Language in Ukraine" *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 25, No.3, pp. 232-256.

¹⁴Russell J. Dalton, "Citizenship norms and the expansion of political participation." *Political studies* Vol. 56. No.1, 2008, pp.76-98. Max Kaase. "Interpersonal trust, political trust and non-institutionalized political participation in Western Europe." *West European Politics*, Vol. 22, No.3, 1999, pp.1-21.

possible connection to the political participation of citizens during Euromaidan. This project will attempt to answer two *research questions*:

Q1- Did Ukraine's political culture change between 2004 and 2014 and if so, how?

Through consideration of the classical and modern approaches to political culture and literature on post-communist countries, this project will examine the political culture in Ukraine to gain a better understanding of its content and specifics in and between different regions and socio-demographic groups. In the classical definitions of Almond and Verba, citizens' political activity depends on political competence, political efficacy and political loyalty.¹⁵ The more citizens are informed and competent, the more politically efficient that they will be. Higher political efficacy will lead to higher political activity. Importantly, citizens should pose some degree of loyalty to their political regime and institutions for the system to be functional and not overloaded with citizens political demands.¹⁶

Supporters of critical and assertive citizens argue that democratic citizens can be politically active without trust in the main political institutions.¹⁷ As long as they are politically informed and politically efficient, their activity through non-traditional forms of political participation will keep the government accountable and alert which is

¹⁵ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic culture. Political attitudes and democracy in five nations* (Newbury Park: Sage Publication, 1989).

¹⁶ Ibid p.18.

¹⁷ Pippa Norris, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), Russell Dalton and Christian Welzel *The Civic Culture Transformed. From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). Pierre Rosanvallon and Arthur Goldhammer, *Counter – Democracy. Politics in an Age of Distrust* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

beneficial for democracy.¹⁸ Simultaneously, the “social distrust can encourage a salutary civic vigilance and thus oblige the government to pay greater heed to social demands, yet it can also encourage destructive forms of denigration and negativity.”¹⁹

Recent research suggests that many modern citizens are “standby” citizens who possess a high level of interest in politics and have low levels of political activity from day to day, but they are ready to become active if the situation is required.²⁰ Others argue that citizens in advanced industrial societies are not confident or assertive, but disenchanted, alienated and cynical.²¹ Their occasional participation in political protests is more based on the work of political activists and media and is not indicative of their high level of political engagement.

“Citizens are a passive audience to be talked to about particular campaigns through the media and occasionally galvanised to send in letters or cards of support or join a public demonstration based often on rather a simplistic message. The occasional engagement by a wider group of citizens in a protest event or rally is in danger of a more lifestyle statement than a serious engagement with political debate.”²²

The author will try to assess the specifics of the political culture of Ukrainians across different regions and socio-demographic groups to evaluate their level of political loyalty, political competence, political efficacy and political activities. The project will try to determine whether or not Ukrainian citizens are civic citizens, critical citizens, assertive citizens, disenchanted or they are “standby citizens” who are ready to protest

¹⁸ Russell Dalton and Christian Welzel *The Civic Culture Transformed. From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 305.

¹⁹ Pierre Rosanvallon and Arthur Goldhammer, *Counter – Democracy. Politics in an Age of Distrust* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 24.

²⁰ Erik Amna and Joakim Ekman, “Standby citizens; diverse faces of political passivity” *European Political Science Review*, Vol. 5, Issue 02, May 2014, pp, 261-281.

²¹ Gerry Stoker, “Explaining Political Disenchantment: Findings Pathways to Democratic Renewal” *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 77, No. 2, April-June 2006, pp. 184-194.

²² *Ibid*, p. 189.

when needed while being passive in the meantime.”²³ Based on the main findings of the research about different components of political culture in Ukraine across regions and socio-demographic groups the author will try to answer a second research question:

Q2 – Could these hypothetical changes in Ukraine’ political culture had contributed to the Euromaidan in 2013 and if so, how?

This project will demonstrate that the political culture of a society can change despite many factors that would suggest otherwise. Ukraine’s circumstances revealed that citizens could take political actions such as political protests while missing important preconditions of high political efficacy. After the Orange revolution Ukrainians level of political competence, an essential characteristic of active civic citizens,²⁴ increased from before that seminal event. At the same time, Ukrainians maintained a high level of distrust in the main political institutions, which was a continuation of their views from the previous years. Furthermore, their confidence in the Presidents and Prime-Ministers was regionally distributed, indicating fragmented political loyalty, which is associated with an environment that is more susceptible to political conflicts.²⁵

Unsupported citizens are more likely to protest than are satisfied citizens when they also possess high levels of political efficacy.²⁶ In Ukraine, the level of political efficacy was low across a period studied, while citizens willingness to collaborate with others increased together with their readiness to protect their country. Citizens also expressed increased levels of national identity as being Ukrainian, despite their language

²³ Erik Amna and Joakim Ekman, “Standby citizens; diverse faces of political passivity” *European Political Science Review*, Vol. 5, Issue 02, May 2014, pp. 261-281.

²⁴ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic culture. Political attitudes and democracy in five nations* (New Jersey:Princeton University Press,1963), p.31.

²⁵ Walter A. Rosenbaum, *Political Culture* (New York: Praeger Publishers,1972).

²⁶Henril Serup Christensen, “All the same? Examining the link between three kinds of political dissatisfaction and protest” *Comparative European Politics*, pp.781-801, p. 794.

at home, while having less pride in their citizenship. Thus, Ukrainians expressed their loyalty to their country as their motherland, but not to the governing political regime and its institutions. This was especially evident among younger and more educated Ukrainians, suggesting the generational changes in citizens political orientations.

Comparative analysis of citizens understanding of democracy between 2004 and 2014 demonstrated that higher numbers of citizens emphasized the protection of human rights and the rule of law - post-materialist, self-expression values, which are important for maintaining democracy.²⁷ Nonetheless, they sustained their preferences for such materialists' values as "having a job", which is associative with economic instability. When testing citizens' orientation towards the rules of game or norms of reciprocity, Ukrainians demonstrated low levels of intolerance towards such unjustifiable actions as accepting a bribe, not paying taxes, not paying transport fare and claiming government benefits for which are you are not entitled. The level of intolerance slightly increased between 2000 and 2006, but it decreased in 2011. Therefore, the author concluded that Ukrainians express their aspiration for democratic rights and freedoms while lacking support for unwritten norms and rules of democratic society.

This project will show that despite citizens' low level of participation in traditional forms of socio-political organizations, which should be associated with low interpersonal trust,²⁸ Ukrainians' level of interpersonal trust increased significantly. Younger and more educated individuals expressed the highest increase. Moreover, an

²⁷ Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel "Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross level Linkages" *Comparative Politics*, Vol.36, No.1, 2003, pp. 61-79.

²⁸Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone. The collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).

increase in the level of interpersonal trust was combined with an increase in alternative forms of political participation such as signing a petition, contacting or visiting politician, using social media to express political views, writing blogs to express political opinions. Thus, Ukrainians were involved in different forms of social activity with other members of society, based on their common interests rather than their membership.

Overall this project will show that Ukrainians experienced changes in political culture, particularly regarding citizens' political competence, interpersonal trust, new forms of political socialization²⁹, interactions and actions that could contribute to their political actions during Euromaidan.

This study will contribute to existing research on political culture in the post-communist countries by showing that citizens' political participation can occur notwithstanding the absence of expected preconditions of high political competence and political efficacy.³⁰ This project will illustrate that the political culture of post-communist countries is not static, but volatile, despite the popularly held perception about the difficulties of change occurring in these countries.³¹ Furthermore, Ukraine's experience demonstrated that previous approaches on political culture had some shortcomings in their classification of different political cultures due to their focus on established democracies in its majority.

²⁹ Political socialization is defined as a process by which people form their political ideas and values. See: Jonh Street, "Political culture – From civic culture to mass culture" *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 24, No. 1, Jan 1994, pp.95-113.

³⁰Howard J.Wiarda, *Political Culture, Political Science, and Identity Politics* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2014), Russell Dalton and Christian Welzel *The Civic Culture Transformed. From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

³¹The political culture is considered one of the most difficult aspects of the political life to be changed rapidly due to its dependence on country's cultural myths, traditions and beliefs. See: Detlef Pollack, *Political culture in post-communist Europe. Attitudes in new democracies* (London: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003).

This thesis demonstrates that citizens can be disenchanting in their orientations towards political system and their role in it, but they are willing to sacrifice their life for their country. They could be very inactive in socio-political groups but have high levels of trust in other people. Moreover, they acknowledge the importance of collaborating with others to achieve common goals, while possessing low individual political efficacy. Thus, citizens' political actions can take place when they have a strong sense of obligation and attachment to their country and its citizens, while simultaneously having low levels of confidence in the political institutions and politicians to be able to address their interests.

The period of study

The period between 2004 and 2014 was chosen because Ukraine's Orange Revolution was the first peaceful political revolt, since independence in 1991 to result in a change of the government during the 2004 Presidential election. Two leading candidates competed for the post of the President in the second round of the election - Prime-Minister Viktor Yanukovich and an opposition candidate former Prime-Minister Viktor Yushchenko.³² The official release of the results of the second round of the 2004 presidential election showed a narrow victory by Yanukovich of 49% versus 47% for Yushchenko, despite the results of the exit polls showing the victory of Yushchenko.³³ Soon after, numerous people went to Maidan Square to protest. Under pressure from

³² Yushchenko was dismissed as Prime-Minister in 2001 due to his opposition to President Leonid Kuchma. Askold Krushelnycky, "Ukraine's reformist leader is ousted." *Telegraph* April 27, 2001 www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/1317470/Ukraines-reformist-leader-is-ousted.html, accessed July 28, 2018.

³³ The second round of the Presidential election was recognized internationally as not fair and free with many frauds. Ukraine, Presidential Election, 31 October, 21 November and 26 December 2004: Final Report. *OSCE*, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/14674>, accessed March 26, 2015.

citizens and the opposition, the Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine (CECU) and the regional Court of Kyiv declared the results of the second-round invalid. This led to the repeat of the second round on December 26, 2004, which was recognized as free and fair and brought to power President Yushchenko and the Orange team.³⁴

A ten-year period is generally not considered sufficient time to trace the changes in the political culture of society. However, some authors conducted the study of political culture during ten years within one country and demonstrated significant changes within this period.³⁵ In the Ukrainian context this thesis argues, this period is important, considering that country experienced two different social protests- one short, peaceful and elite-driven and the second one long, violent and mass driven.³⁶

Outline of the thesis

The Introduction identifies the problem statement, provides a definition of the main objectives of the project, and states the two research questions that this thesis would like to answer. It explains the significance of the research on Ukrainian political culture between the Orange revolution and Euromaidan, while also identifying the limitation of the study.

Chapter 1 provides an analysis of the theoretical background of the problem of political culture and its importance in studying the transformation of societies. It identifies the main approaches to political culture, their strength, weakness and applicability to this

³⁴ The name Orange came from the color that Viktor Yushchenko used during his campaign. The three main political leaders that comprised the Orange team were Viktor Yushchenko, Yuliya Tymoshenko and Oleksandr Moroz.

³⁵ Neil Nevite conducted the studies of changes in established democracies during the 10-year period, See Neil, Nevite, *Decline of Deference* (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1996). Ivan Katchanovski conducted research on Ukraine and its regional divisions between 1991-2006. See Ivan Katchanovski, "Regional Political Divisions in Ukraine in 1991-2006" *Nationalities Papers*, Vol.34, No. 5, November 2006.

³⁶ The Orange revolution lasted 3 weeks whereas Euromaidan three months.

research project. This chapter will also examine the literature on the color revolutions in post-communist countries. The chapter concludes that the main approaches to political culture although valid were created before the Internet and social media were widely used. For that reason, a new approach to political culture should include such components of political culture as the use of modern technologies (Internet), globalization (citizens' mobility) as well as the impact of external factors (in the case of Ukraine the most relevant are the European Union (EU) and Russia). The second part of the chapter provides the methodology of the current research thesis and identifies the main methods that were used in measuring the political culture in Ukraine during the studied years.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the history of Ukraine in order to better understand the specifics of Ukrainian society, especially regarding its regional, religious and language cleavages. The chapter also describes the political culture of Ukraine in the years leading to the Orange revolution. The chapter posits that some aspects of political culture started to change in Ukraine prior to the Orange revolution. Ukrainians experienced social mobilization during the political protest "Ukraine without Kuchma" in 2000-2001. The evidence of the President's involvement in the disappearance and killing of the opposition journalist Georhiy Gongadze, as well as imprisonment of the opposition leader Yuliya Tymoshenko, united citizens and political opposition during the protest. Although unsuccessful at that time to change the President, the action was the first form of political protest in Ukraine against its highest political official. It also provided Ukrainians with an example of alternative ways of influencing the political regime.

Chapter 3 examines the first aspect of political culture - orientations towards government structure, "rules of the game" and perception of democracy. The chapter

finds that the majority of the citizens in Ukraine had a low level of confidence in the main political institutions and did not perceive the Ukrainian state as democratic.

Corruption was identified as the main reason for Ukraine not being a democracy. The analysis of the composition of the political elite during a period study showed that it was very exclusive and difficult to join for political outsiders. Ukrainians across all regions identified the protection of human rights, fair and consistent enforcement of laws and no official corruption as the main components of the meaning of democracy; however, it was combined with such characteristic as “having a job.” Ukrainians high support for democratic rights and freedoms was combined with citizens’ high levels of tolerance for unjustifiable actions such as accepting bribes, claiming government benefits for which you are not entitled, not paying transport fare and cheating on taxes. Respondents from younger age groups expressed the highest tolerance which was unexpected.

Chapter 4 examines the second component of political culture - orientations towards others in the political system and membership in socio-political organizations. The chapter posits that despite the low level of membership in socio-political organizations, Ukrainian citizens’ understanding, and support for NGOs increased significantly across all regions. More importantly, Ukrainians across all regions and all social groups showed an increased level of interpersonal trust, which is indicative of democratic changes. A level of tolerance towards minority groups such as Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) as well as towards gender equality also increased during the studied years, thus making Ukrainians more inclusive towards “others” in society. The chapter also shows that Ukraine experienced specific urbanization from East to West during the

period studied, that made Ukrainian society more ethnically and religiously heterogeneous than before.

Chapter 5 studies the third component of political culture - orientation towards one's political role and political activity. The chapter concludes that the majority of Ukrainians were politically aware and informed. However, an analysis of citizens' main source of information discovered that a majority of Ukrainians continue to rely on traditional sources of information such as TV and local newspapers. The regional differences were observed in the coverage of political events by local newspapers that were analysed.

Nevertheless, Ukrainians, especially those in the younger age groups, reported using the Internet as their main source of information, which is indicative of generational changes in political awareness of Ukrainians and their political socialization. The usage of the Internet as the main source of information was positively correlated with political efficacy. Younger and educated citizens, who reside in urban areas of the country, and speak the Ukrainian language at home, also possessed a higher level of belief in their ability to solve problems in their community and country in comparison to other groups.

Regarding citizens' political activity, Ukrainians participated in elections during the studied years in high numbers, while simultaneously not believing in voting as the main instrument of influence on the decision-making process. Simultaneously, Ukrainians across all regions reported engaging in alternative forms of political actions such as signing petitions, contacting or visiting an official, participating in protests and demonstrations. Younger and educated citizens reported using social media to express their political views in higher numbers than all other groups.

Chapter 6 analyzes the role of the European Union and Russia and their soft power in Ukraine during the studied period. The chapter concludes that not the European Union, but rather Presidents Yushchenko and Yanukovich as well as Ukrainian media actively promoted Europeanization in Ukraine. The results of data analysis reveal that citizens who expressed a higher level of confidence in the EU before and after the Orange revolution expressed more democratic political orientations such as higher political awareness, higher political efficacy, higher political trust, and political activity.

Regarding Russia's soft power, the chapter concludes that Russia was active in the Russian speaking regions of Ukraine. By promoting the policy of *Russkiy Mir* in Ukraine through the Russian Orthodox Church and Russian media, which had a high level of confidence among Russian speaking regions, Russia was successful in creating a feeling of "otherness" among Ukrainians who resided in the South and East of the country. It also may have contributed to their alienation from the rest of Ukraine which may contribute to future tensions between the regions.

The Conclusion provides the results of the research project, summarizes the main findings and discusses the recommendation for future research about political culture. It concludes that the political culture of Ukraine changed between 2004 and 2014; however not necessarily in an expected way. Positive changes were observed in citizens' political competence, tolerance towards gender equality and homosexuality, interpersonal trust and political activity. Ukrainians levels of political competence increased after the Orange revolution from the years leading up to it. An increased in political competence was combined with the usage of new forms of political communication such as the

Internet and social media. Furthermore, the usage of the Internet as the main source of information correlated with higher levels of political efficacy.

Ukrainians increased their participation in non-traditional forms of political participation such as signing petitions, contacting public officials and using social media to express political views, while still taking part in elections in higher numbers. These findings were different than existing theories that suggest that citizens' use of alternative forms of political participation is combined with low participation rates in traditional elections. The project shows that citizens can have opposing characteristics such as low political efficacy and maintain a strong obligation to protect their country. They can be very distrustful of their political institutions but increased their trust in other people. Ukrainians did not become civic citizens in the classical definition of the term; nevertheless, they became civic "aspirants" in their political orientations.

Limitations of this project

This project is a single case study; this constrains the making of general assumptions about the political culture of all societies. What may apply to Ukraine may not apply to other states, including post-communist countries. Hence, to conduct the study over the ten years at the national and regional levels, the author's inquiry was limited by the survey questionnaires' parameters and the use of microdata. Although this study provides a unique and deep understanding of the political culture of Ukraine during a specific period and across different regions, it is limited in its ability to make causal claims between the changes in political culture and the political actions. Furthermore, this research focused mostly on citizens' orientations, values and actions based on their demographic (region, age, education, language at home, rural/urban) rather than their

economic characteristics. Although these cleavages are very salient in Ukraine, it is possible that may produce biased results, considering that economic variables can play an important role in citizens' political preferences, orientations and actions.

CHAPTER 1 Theory and Methodology

This research project is interested in the study of the political culture of Ukrainian society between the Orange revolution and Euromaidan across different regions and social groups. The purpose is to understand whether attitudes of Ukrainian citizens showed a shift in their system of values and beliefs and, more importantly, their perceptions of their role in the political process over the ten years before the Euromaidan. To undertake this analysis, the author will review different definitions of political culture and outline the most significant academic approaches to studying and operationalizing political culture. It will allow the author to posit herself within the existing literature as well as to identify the main gaps in the literature on studying the political culture of transitional societies. The chapter will also review the main approaches to the color revolutions, their cause, and consequences to understand the role of the Orange revolution in Ukrainian political culture. The methodology part of the chapter is focused on the research design of this project. It explains the main methods that were applied in the process of conducting this research as well as the process of data collection.

1.1. Political Culture as a Concept

Debate and difference of opinion have surrounded the definition and operationalization of the concept of political culture since its rise in popularity during the 1960's until today.¹

The opinions ranged from defining political culture as the cause or precondition of

¹ Richard W. Wilson, "The many voices of political culture: Assessing Different Approaches" *World Politics*, Vol. 52, No. 2, January 2000, pp. 246- 273. Ronald P. Formisano, "The concept of Political Culture" *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Winter 2001, pp. 393-426. William M. Reisinger "The Renaissance of a Rubric: Political culture as Concept and Theory" *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, Vol, 7, No.4. 1995, pp. 328-352. Ruth Lane, "Political Culture: Residual category or General Theory?" *Comparative Political Studies* 1992; Thomas Denk and Henrik Christensen, "How to classify political cultures? A comparison of three methods of classification" *Quality and Quantity*, Vol.50, 2016, pp. 177-191.

democratic government² to referring to political culture as a residual category or an ambiguous concept that cannot be measured.³ One researcher found that there are more than 164 definitions of the term culture itself.⁴ So what is political culture?

The term political culture has its roots and origin from in the field of cultural anthropology which defines culture as “the sum of the morally forceful understandings acquired by learning and shared with the members of the group to which the learner belongs.”⁵ Culture is a guide for human behavior and an influence in shaping peoples’ judgments and perceptions.⁶

Adherents of cultural theories of the study of political culture⁷ suggest that “culture acts as a filter through which the world is experienced.”⁸ They support the

² Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *Civic Culture. Political attitudes and democracy in five nations* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1965). Gabriel Almond and Lucian Pye, *Political culture and Political Development* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967). Walter Rosembaum, *Political Culture*, 1972; Aaron Wildavsky, “A cultural Theory of Preference Formation” in *Political Culture and Public Opinion*. Ed., A. Berger (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1985); Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997). Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel “Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross level Linkages” *Comparative Politics*, Vol.36, No. 1, 2003, pp. 61-79; Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1993). Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone. The collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).

³ R. Jackman and R. Miller “A Renaissance of Political Culture? *American Journal of Political Science*, XI, 1996. David Laitin “The Civic Culture at 30” *American Political Science Review*, LXXXIX, 1995; David L. Elkins and Richard, B., Simeon, “A Cause in Search of its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?” *Comparative Politics*, XI 1979; Glen Gendzel, “Political Culture: Genealogy of a Concept”, *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, XXVIII, 1997; William M. Reisinger, “The Renaissance of a Rubric: Political culture as Concept and Theory” *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, Vol.7, No. 4; James Jonson, “Conceptual Problems as obstacles to progress in political science: four decades of political culture research” *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol.15. No.1, 2003, pp.87-115.

⁴ Aaron Wildavsky, *Culture and Social Theory* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998), p.1

⁵ Marc J. Swartz and David K. Jordan, *Culture: The Anthropological Perspective* (Toronto: John Wiley&Sons, 1980), p. 52.

⁶ *Ibid*, p.79.

⁷ Richard R Fagen, *The transformation of Political Culture in Cuba* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969). Robert C. Tucker, “Culture, Political Culture and Communist Society” in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 88, No.2, June 1973, pp. 173-90. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1973). David Kertzer, *Politics and Symbols* (Yale University Press, 1996). Aaron Wildavsky, *Culture and Social Theory* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998), p.1

⁸ Richard Ellis, *Culture Matters. Essays in honor of Aaron Wildavsky*, 1997, p.93.

notion that political culture is a part of the term culture. Culture is perceived as beliefs and practices that are passed from generation to generation, is distinctively human and something that people are born into. Hence, they view the “political system of society in cultural terms, i.e., as a complex of real and ideal culture patterns, including political roles and their interrelations, political structures and so on.”⁹ According to these assumptions political culture is the result of cultural traditions, norms and symbols of society, patterned ways of life and action as well as the states of mind that sustain and condition these patterns.¹⁰ This approach to political culture focuses on the socially constructed nature of knowledge, ideologies that social groups create and share. The analysis considers the “discourse and the political culture as a discursive practice and its performative productivity.”¹¹ It traces the creation of myths, rituals, and symbols within society and the evolution of new political identities that they produce. Political culture is "a culture" of groups of people sharing and their way of relating to each other.¹² This approach seeks to identify the public commonness and moral reasoning among particular groups rather than in the state as a whole.¹³ It looks for commonality before bestowing the name "culture" on a collectivity. This approach to studying political culture can provide the researcher with a “thick description”¹⁴ of the phenomena.

⁹ Robert C. Tucker, “Culture, Political Culture and Communist Society” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 88, No. 2, June 1973, pp. 173-90.

¹⁰ Richard R Fagen, *The transformation of Political Culture in Cuba* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 5.

¹¹ Kirk S. Kidwell, “Politics, Performativity, Autopoiesis: Toward a Discourse Systems Theory of Political Culture” *Cultural Studies/ Critical Methodologies*, Vol. 9, No. 4, August 2009, pp. 533-558.

¹² Stephen Chilton “Defining Political Culture” *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 41, 1988 September, pp. 419-445.

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 430.

¹⁴ I use Geertz’s definition here. See Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, Ch. 1. Thick description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1973 1973).

The most common definition of political culture in the field of political science is the one that views culture as “deep-seated ideas, beliefs, values and behavior orientations that people have, or carry around in their heads, toward the political system.”¹⁵

Supporters of this definition of political culture frequently use public opinions surveys as the main instruments in measuring citizen’s orientations and preferences¹⁶ as well as their political behavior.¹⁷

However, even within this broad definition of political culture, different authors perceived and measured political culture differently.

1.1.1. Civic Culture

For the authors of *The Civic Culture*, Almond and Verba, political culture was defined as “the particular distribution of orientation towards political objects among members of the nation.”¹⁸ The authors argued that the values, opinions, and beliefs of individual citizens towards the political system and its institutions could indicate and predict their capacity to take actions in the political process, to be active or passive actors towards the government.

¹⁵ Howard J. Wiarda, *Political Culture, Political Science, and Identity Politics* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2014), p.1.

¹⁶ Coleman, Powell, Pye, 1965, Walter Rosenbaum, *Political Culture* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton University Press, 1997). Inglehart, R&C. Welzel “Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Crosslevel Linkages” *Comparative Politics*, Vol.36, No.1, 2003, pp. 61-79. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy*, 2005; Pippa Norris *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Pippa Norris *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Russell Dalton and Christian Welzel *The Civic Culture Transformed. From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

¹⁷ Richard R Fagen, *The transformation of Political Culture in Cuba* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969). Robert C. Tucker, “Culture, Political Culture and Communist Society” in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 88, No. 2, June 1973, pp. 173-90, Stephen White, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics* (London: Macmillan: 1979), Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). Russell Dalton “Citizen Attitudes and Political Behavior” *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 6/7, pp. 912-940.

¹⁸ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic culture. Political attitudes and democracy in five nations* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1965), p.13.

Almond and Verba, based upon their studies of five countries¹⁹, identified three types of political culture – parochial, subject and participant.²⁰ They argued that citizens in parochial and subject cultures were passive, in contrast to the active citizens found in participant cultures. They identified and considered *three elements* of political culture: the political orientations of individuals, their knowledge of the political system, and their perceptions about his/her roles in that system. In a parochial political culture, individuals (outside the elite) did not play significant roles within the system; and their political orientations were subordinated to their religious and social orientations. Individuals in the parochial system expect nothing from the political system and are not active participants themselves. In a subject political culture, individual citizens will show more political orientations and attitudes towards the system; however, their political knowledge and participation levels will be just as low as in parochial political culture. Finally, in a pure participant political culture, individual citizens will show greater political activity and more defined political orientations towards the system. Thus, they are not only motivated towards active participation but more importantly, they respect law and authority, and they are active members of different professional and social groups.²¹

According to Almond and Verba, the closer the political culture is of the participant type, the more democratic the society is.²² The authors suggest that their classification does not imply that all democratic political cultures are homogeneous.

¹⁹ The authors conducted interviews between 1959 and 1961 in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Mexico.

²⁰ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture. Political attitudes and democracy in five nations* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), p.17-21.

²¹ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture. Political attitudes and democracy in five nations* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1965), p.18.

²² *Ibid*, p.338.

Countries can have a combination of parochial, subject, and participant orientations among different individuals within the polity.²³ They also note that various political subcultures may be found within any society and can co-exist with each other even if their orientations towards political structures differ.²⁴

Almond and Verba's work is significant because of their view that the political institutions of any state can only be accountable if society puts pressure on these institutions to do so. The citizens' willingness and ability to participate and cooperate in the political process of the country and their ability to do so are necessary to ensure that the institutions are representative and accountable. This ideal type of political culture is called *civic culture*. Civic culture, according to Almond and Verba, is the pluralistic culture that based on communication and persuasion, consensus and diversity, a culture that permits and moderate change.²⁵ They argue that ideas and values influence the development of institutions as much as institutions influence the system of values and The theory and typology put forth by Almond and Verba recognizes the importance of social interaction as a part of political culture that influences the democratization of society and its institutions. Their theory also posits that society will have less polarization between groups if citizens are more educated, tolerant, politically aware and active. It states that for a society to achieve a high level of liberal democracy,²⁶ citizens

²³ Ibid, p.19.

²⁴ Ibid, p.26.

²⁵ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic culture. Political attitudes and democracy in five nations* (Newbury Park: Sage Publication, 1989), p.7.

²⁶ For this thesis the term democracy will be used as the liberal democracy which is defined as the political system that support three main rights of the liberalism – right to participate, freedom of religion and freedom of expression. The term electoral democracy will define Ukraine as the democratic state due to the presence of free and fair election and will not include the absence of strong civil society and the rule of law.

should be politically aware and active with high levels of political knowledge and the ability to influence the political processes of the state.

Pye and Verba completed further studies of political culture, especially about political development.²⁷ Pye defined political culture as attitudes, sentiments, and cognitions that inform and govern political behavior in society.²⁸ Instead of classifying types of political culture, the authors listed four specific values that could be studied in any society: trust and distrust in the institutions and private individuals; equality and hierarchy (moral justification for hierarchical relationship); liberty and the faith in power of liberty, and; loyalty and commitment (parochial identification versus generalizable identification).²⁹ The authors suggested that for a society to become more democratic or, in their words, politically developed, citizens should have a high level of trust in political institutions as well as in their fellow citizens within the society. They should support equal opportunities for all citizens of societies and have a strong preference and support for different forms of liberties. They also should possess more generalized identification such as belonging to the nation-state instead of a parochial identification with family, a community or a religion, which is more typical for underdeveloped society.

Walter Rosenbaum³⁰ built upon the approaches of Almond, Verba, and Pye. He defined political culture as “the collective orientation of people towards the basic elements in their political system.”³¹ Rosenbaum argued that more democratic societies would possess higher levels of confidence in political institutions, as well as higher levels

²⁷ Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, *Political culture and Political Development* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965).

²⁸ *Ibid*, p.7.

²⁹ *Ibid*, p.22.

³⁰ Walter A. Rosenbaum, *Political Culture* (New York: Praeger Publishers,1972).

³¹ *Ibid*, p.4.

of interpersonal trust and tolerance. They also will have citizens who are politically knowledgeable and politically active. He identified three main aspects of a political culture that should be studied: orientation towards government structures (regime orientations and orientations towards governmental inputs and outputs); orientation towards others in the political system (political identification and political trust) and orientation towards one's political activity (political competence and political efficacy).

The main commonality between the above approaches is that they all agree that the character of the political culture of a society can define the level of democracy in a country. "... [A] successful democracy requires that citizens be involved and active in politics, informed about politics and influential."³²

Although the above approaches remain valuable in the study of political culture, they were based on research completed in the 1960s and predated significant recent and relevant historical events. The Cold war ended, and the Soviet Union collapsed. The manner and nature of political protests around the world require reconsideration of the study of political culture.³³

1.1.2. Social capital

Political scientist Robert Putnam in his seminal twenty-year study³⁴ of ten regions in Italy continued *Civic Culture* in his effort to uncover the conditions for creating strong, responsive, effective representative institutions.³⁵ His study differed from the earlier

³² Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), p. 338.

³³ Sidney Verba mentioned this in his article about the 50th anniversary of the civic culture. Sidney Verba "The 50th Anniversary of the Civic Culture" *German Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2015, pp. 234-248.

³⁴ Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 6.

studies of political culture insofar as Putnam analyzed the political culture of the regions within one country as opposed to previous studies that compared two or more countries.

Putnam concluded that the democratic performance of local governments was based not only on institutions but rather on the presence of historically rooted democratic political values among its residents. He concluded that the northern regions of Italy historically possessed higher levels of association among citizens, higher levels of political awareness and thus higher political participation. Putnam demonstrated that the performance of regional governments depended on their regional political cultures, which were rooted in their history. Putnam emphasized that *social capital*, which he defined as norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagements among members of societies outside of the political system, is a strong indicator of civil society³⁶ and democratic government.³⁷ According to the author, citizens volunteering collaboration requires the presence of high interpersonal trust among its members which in turn can indicate citizens' willingness to cooperate in the future towards political institutions as well. Putnam stated that any spontaneous cooperation is based on the presence of trust, which can arise from two related sources — norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagements.³⁸ These norms are created and sustained by socialization among different members of society or by sanctions. In a democratic society, norms of reciprocity will be volunteering accepted by its members through the network of civic engagements that facilitate communication and trustfulness. Thus, the more citizens are involved in a

³⁶ Civil society is defined as citizens groups and organizations working in the interest of citizens, but outside of the government. *United Nations* www.un.org/en/sections/resources-different-audiences/civil-society/, accessed September 01, 2018.

³⁷ Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.167.

³⁸ *Ibid*, p.171.

horizontal network of civic engagement, the more they will trust others and the more they will be willing to cooperate with them in the future.³⁹ Putnam paid attention to such important components as historical membership in local organizations (reading, sports clubs, neighborhood watch groups), level of readership, school attendance and meeting with public officials. Thus, he included citizens' behavior (participation) in his study.

In his later study of American society, Putnam concluded that those citizens who are more involved in their local community are more trustful of others and more politically active.⁴⁰ More importantly, they possess a higher level of social trust in their neighbors, friends, colleague, people that they meet for the first time and people as a whole. Education, according to Putman, was a strong predictor of high levels of social capital. Thus the more educated a society is, the more its citizens will be able to make informed decisions to cooperate with other members.⁴¹

1.1.3. Critical citizens

Ronald Inglehart and later Pippa Norris, as well as Russell Dalton and Christian Welzel, further developed the study of political culture.⁴² In 1989 Inglehart began conducting public opinion surveys in different countries and discovered that citizens' political orientations could predict their political behavior. Inglehart concluded that

³⁹ Ibid, p.180.

⁴⁰ Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone. The collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), p.339.

⁴¹ Ibid, p.300.

⁴² Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel "Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross level Linkages" *Comparative Politics*, Vol.36, No. 1, 2003, pp. 61-79. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Pippa Norris, *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), Christian Welzel, *Freedom Rising: Human Empowerment and the Quest for Emancipation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Russell Dalton and Christian Welzel *The Civic Culture Transformed. From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

countries in which higher numbers of citizens possessed self-expression values (such as tolerance of diversity, support for liberty and gender equality, high interpersonal trust and life satisfaction), were more likely to become democratic than those in which citizens expressed preferences for more traditional values such as religion, family ties and deference to authority.⁴³ Inglehart argued against previous studies that the presence of these self-expressed values is a better predictor of democratic political culture⁴⁴ than confidence in political institutions or “lip service” support for democracy.

Later Pippa Norris in her *Critical Citizens and Critical Citizens revisited*⁴⁵ asserted that citizens’ negative evaluation of political institutions is not necessarily an indicator of non-democratic political culture but rather signals their critical assessments of these institutions. She argued that if these critical citizens possess a desire for democratic rights and freedoms, which are combined with their understanding of them, then democracy can flourish. Hence, Norris suggested that critical citizens are politically interested and aware, but they are involved with political institutions through different forms of political activities. Critical citizens switched from the more traditional institutionalized elections to non-traditional types such as political protests, demonstrations or online blogging.⁴⁶ More importantly, critical citizens believe in their

⁴³ Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel “Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross level Linkages” *Comparative Politics*, Vol.36, No.1, 2003, pp. 61-79, p.68.

⁴⁴ Democratic political culture is defined as the culture of tolerance, inclusiveness and high political participation.

⁴⁵ Pippa Norris, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Pippa Norris, *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

⁴⁶ Pippa Norris *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

ability to challenge and influence political institutions. Thus they have a high sense of political efficacy.

Norris suggested that research should focus on citizens' orientations towards the rule of law, freedom of speech and press, gender equality and tolerance of minorities, which she asserted are the main characteristics of democratic political culture.⁴⁷ Furthermore, Norris underlined the importance of studying the role of news media in modern societies. News media is the main source of information that citizens use to shape their perceptions about politics and government.⁴⁸ By analyzing different news media and their content as well as the level of the freedom of the media within the country, we will be able to understand citizens' level of political awareness and competence, according to Norris.⁴⁹

The most recent studies of political culture suggest that its study should concentrate on two sets of orientations: allegiant and assertive.⁵⁰ The allegiant orientations are those that connect citizens' loyalty to their society and institutions. Three main allegiant orientations are institutional confidence, philanthropic faith (trust in others, belief in democracy and interest in politics) and norm compliance.

Simultaneously, assertive orientations are postures that encourage people to be critical and to voice their concerns. A more assertive public will be able to place more demands on the political process. Thomas Denk, Henrik Serup Christensen, and Daniel

⁴⁷ Ibid, pp.142-168.

⁴⁸ Ibid, p.15.

⁴⁹ Ibid, pp.169-187.

⁵⁰ Russell Dalton and Christian Welzel *The Civic Culture Transformed. From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 291. Thomas Denk, Henrik Serup Christensen and Daniel Bergh. "The Composition of Political Culture- A study of 25 European Democracies." *Studies in Comparative International Development*, No. 50, 2015, pp. 358-377.

Bergh identified three elements of assertive orientations: individual liberties (perception about the acceptability of homosexuality, abortion and divorce), equal opportunities (perception about women equality) and people voice (believes that people should have a voice in collective decisions).⁵¹ In the authors' view, the allegiant culture is conducive to effective governance while the assertive culture is beneficial to the accountable government.⁵² It is best when both cultures are strong in society. By analyzing and measuring these two types of orientations, according to the authors, we will be able to identify the political culture of citizens in different societies, despite their historical preconditions or experiences with democratic government. The authors concluded that, contrary to the Almond and Verba's main assumptions in *The Civic Culture* relating to democratic political culture, citizens in contemporary democracies are becoming less loyal and more skeptical of state authority and institutions but are more willing to assert their views.⁵³

1.2. Political culture of post-communist countries

Many early scholars of communist and post-communist studies applied the historical approach to the studies of the political culture of post-communist societies due to its reliance on behavior patterns, which are often rooted in the history of the country.⁵⁴ For example, Archie Brown in his work on political culture in communist societies

⁵¹ Thomas Denk, Henrik Serup Christensen and Daniel Bergh. "The Composition of Political Culture- A study of 25 European Democracies." *Studies in Comparative International Development*, No.50, 2015, pp.291-292.

⁵² Russell Dalton and Christian Welzel *The Civic Culture Transformed. From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p.304.

⁵³ *Ibid*, p.395.

⁵⁴ Bernhard, Michael H., and Jan Kubik, eds. *Twenty years after communism: The politics of memory and commemoration*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Archie Brown, ed., *Political Culture and Political Changes in Communist States* (Holmes' Meier Pub; 2nd edition, 1979). Stephen White, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics* (London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 1979).

defined political culture “ as the subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification and loyalty, and the political knowledge and expectations which are the product of the specific historical experience of nations and groups.”⁵⁵ Soviet society, according to these theorists, was characterized by weak representative institutions, a centralized governing style, a personalized attachment to authority combined with a low level of political knowledge and experience.⁵⁶ These political culture characteristics were rooted in the institutional differences between pre-revolutionary Russia and Europe. Pre-revolutionary Russia was still a despotic country, with a tradition of autocracy, which made it a society apart from within the European community.⁵⁷ Many characteristics of a democratic society such as the rule of law, equal political participation, and freedom of speech were absent in pre-revolutionary Russia. This had an impact on the political culture of the Soviet Union and the political culture of many post-communist states for a long time after the collapse of the Soviet Union.⁵⁸ Many citizens in these states, according to this view, would continue to possess low levels of political efficacy, knowledge and political trust due to their Soviet past.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Archie Brown, ed., *Political Culture and Political Changes in Communist States* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1979), p. 1.

⁵⁶ Archie Brown, ed., *Political Culture and Political Changes in Communist States* (New York: Holmes & Meier Pub; 2nd edition, 1979). Archie Brown, “Political culture and Democratization” ed. Detlerf Pollack, Jorg Jacobs, Olaf Muller and Gert Pickel, *Political culture in Post-Communist Europe* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 18.

⁵⁷ Stephen White, “Soviet political culture reassessed” in A. Brown, ed, *Political Culture and Communist Studies* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. Armonk,1984), p.71.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p.82.

⁵⁹ Mary McAuley, Political Culture and Communist Politics, in A. Brown, Ed. *Political Culture and Communist Studies* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. Armonk,1984), p.18.

Another scholar of soviet politics, Stephen White, defined political culture as the “behavioral and attitudinal matrix within which the political system is located.”⁶⁰ White argued against previous research on political culture suggesting that “we shall be concerned with changing patterns of political behavior as much as with the political beliefs and values associated with them.”⁶¹ The inclusion of political behavior in political culture, according to White, permits further analysis to determine if citizens’ values and orientations lead to their actions. White studied the political culture of the Soviet Union in the 1970s, suggesting that “the fact that a particular form of political behavior maybe effectively prohibited, moreover, does not, in fact, prevent all citizens from engaging in it.”⁶² The author studied voluntary forms of activity which were different from mandatory socialist or communist activities. It included “attendance at meetings and conferences, membership of a factory or trade union committees, the editing of “wall newspaper” at one place of work, lecturing within the party education system.”⁶³ Robert Tucker supported White, by suggesting to embrace behavior together with beliefs in the study of political culture, which he called “a cultural approach to politics.”⁶⁴ By doing this, according to Tucker, we can distinguish between real culture patterns that exist in society and ideal cultural patterns that are based on citizens’ perceptions.⁶⁵

⁶⁰ Stephen White, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics* (London: Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press, 1979), p. 84.

⁶¹ Ibid, p. 84.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid, p. 89.

⁶⁴ Robert C. Tucker “Culture, Political Culture and Communist Society” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 88, No.2, Jun.1973, pp.173-190, p.182.

⁶⁵ Ibid, p.177.

Later Stephen Whitefield stated that the political culture of many post-communist countries, other than Russia, had a higher likelihood of transformation towards a more democratic system of values after the collapse of the Soviet Union.⁶⁶ In his view, citizens of the newly independent states identified themselves less with the Soviet identity than did Russian citizens, because they were not ethnic Russians in their majority. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 the former Soviet republics became new independent states. They not only had to rebuild their political institutions but to create a new system of national values and beliefs - these required some degree of alliance and trust among citizens to support their new independence.⁶⁷

Recent works on the concept of political culture in post-communist societies demonstrate that the political culture of post-communist societies is a combination of many factors and that it is not limited to its past communist regime.⁶⁸ Studies of the countries of the former Soviet Union demonstrated that their citizens' perceptions of democratic values do not differ from those in established democracies.⁶⁹ At the same time, according to Dalton and Klingemann, if "in old democracies, citizens are moving from conventional to unconventional politics, in new democracies citizens often toppled authoritarian regimes by revolutionary upheavals and have now to learn the routines of conventional participation."⁷⁰ Thus, when studying the emerging democracies, one should compare citizens' conventional participation in elections with unconventional

⁶⁶ Stephen Whitefield, *Political Culture and Post-Communism* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, p. 6.

⁶⁸ Stephen Welch, *The Theory of Political Culture*, James Alexander, *Political Culture in Post-Communist Russia* (London: Macmillian Press LTD, 2000). Rebecca McKee, Adrianna Murphy, Erica Richardson, Bayard Roberts, Christian Haerpfer and Martin Mackee, "Do citizens of the former Soviet Union Trust state institutions and why?" *East European Politics*, Vol.29, No.4, 2013, pp.377-396.

⁶⁹ Russell Dalton and Hans-dieter Klingemann, "Citizens and Political Behavior" *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, August 2007, pp.1-29.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, p.15.

actions such as signing a petition, participating in demonstrations, protests or revolutions.

Modern studies of nationalism and national identities of the post-Soviet countries have generally acknowledged that these countries developed pseudo-identities, due to the absence of internal social boundaries that define nations, in the years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.⁷¹ In Ukraine, some authors argued, these identities were primarily attached to the EU and Russia supra-national identities.⁷² Martha Finnemore wrote, “states are embedded in dense networks of transnational and international social relations that shape their perceptions of the world and their role in that world.”⁷³ The international system can change state actions not by constraining states, but rather by changing their interests, preferences, and values.⁷⁴ Sidney Verba himself stated on the 50th anniversary of the *Civic Culture* that “... the world has changed. Political culture now exists in a global world- of population movements of a communications revolution.”⁷⁵

Milada Vachudova suggests that the role of the EU and other international actors (OSCE, NATO) was significant within the countries-candidates to the EU.⁷⁶ She

⁷¹ Jeffrey Pridham, “Ukraine, the European Union and the Democracy Question” *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, Vol. 18, 2011. David Lane, “Identity formation and political elites in the post-socialist states.” *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.63, No.6, 2011, pp. 925–934. Karina V. Korostelina, “Mapping national identity narratives in Ukraine” *Nationalities Papers*, Vol.41, No.2, 2013, pp. 293-315. Andrew Wilson, “Elements of a Theory of Ukrainian Ethno-National Identities” *Nations and Nationalism*, No.8, 2002.

⁷² Edith Clowes, *Russia on the edge: Imagined Geographies and Post-Soviet Identity* (2011). Inna Melnykovska, Rainer Schweickert, & Tetiana Kostiuhenko, T., “Balancing national uncertainty and foreign orientation: Identity building and the role of political parties in Post-Orange Ukraine.” *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.63, No.6, 2011, pp.1055–1072. Taras Kuzio, “Nationalism, identity and civil society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution.” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol.43, No.3, 2010, pp. 285–296. Mykola Riabchuk, “Ukraine’s ‘muddling through’: National identity and post communist transition.” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol.45, No. 3–4, 2012, pp. 439–446.

⁷³ Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p.2.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p.6.

⁷⁵ Sidney Verba, “The 50th Anniversary of the Civic Culture” *German Politics*, Vol.24, No.2, 2015, pp.234-248, p.237.

⁷⁶ Milada Vachudova, *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage & Integration After Communism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

differentiated between active and passive forms of leverage that were used by the EU in promoting its values within the countries-candidates to the EU.⁷⁷ At the same time, other authors have argued that the EU in Ukraine was not able to use the membership incentives after the EU enlargement of 2004.⁷⁸ Instead, the EU promised Ukraine after the Orange revolution the possibility of creating the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and the Association Agreement.⁷⁹ According to Kubicek, the EU applied democratic conditionality in Ukraine after the Orange revolution, which was built upon a commitment to common values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law.⁸⁰ More importantly, the EU continued to promote its conditionality under Yanukovich, despite his weak commitment to democracy.⁸¹ Others stated that the EU increased its soft power in Ukraine after the Orange revolution by switching towards a values' based foreign policy strategy and through the investment in cultural and academic exchanges.⁸² At the same time, Dimitrova and Dragneva stated that the EU was limited in its initiatives due to the interdependence between Ukraine and Russia in trade, energy, security, and

⁷⁷ Passive leverage is built on an idea of attraction of EU membership without any concrete program for its implementation. Milada Vachudova, *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage & Integration After Communism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 63.

⁷⁸ Antoaneta Dimitrova & Rilka Dragneva, "Shaping Convergence with the EU in Foreign Policy and State Aid in Post-Orange Ukraine: Weak External Incentives, Powerful Veto Players" *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.65, No.4, 2013, pp. 658-681, p.660.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Paul Kubicek, "Dancing with the Devil: Explaining the European Union's Engagement with Ukraine under Viktor Yanukovich" *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 25, 2017, pp. 143-162, p. 144

⁸¹ Ibid, p. 149.

⁸² Emily Jarview, "The limit of the EU soft power in Ukraine" *Euroscope* <http://euroscopeworld.mediajungle.dk/2017/03/07/the-limit-of-eu-soft-power-in-ukraine/>, accessed October 10, 2018.

foreign policy.⁸³ Popescu and Wilson⁸⁴ stated that Russia in the post-Orange Ukraine was more effective than the EU in applying its soft power⁸⁵ by employing the rhetoric of fraternity of Slavic brotherhood and through visa-free policies, political values, and media. “Drawing its lessons from the central role played by civil society groups and NGOs in the Orange Revolution, Russia began developing a rival “counter-revolutionary” ideology, supporting “its” NGOs, using web technologies, and exporting its brand of political and economic influence.”⁸⁶ Victoria Hudson, in her study on the role of Russian Orthodox Church as an instrument of Russian Soft power in Ukraine, supported this argument by demonstrating that Russia was an active player in Ukraine after the Orange revolution, especially in the country eastern regions.⁸⁷ Thus, one should study the role of the EU and Russia together in the post-Orange Ukraine to understand their influence or not on political orientations, values, and actions of Ukrainians across different regions and groups.

⁸³ Antoaneta Dimitrova & Rilka Dragneva, “Constraining external Governance: Interdependence with Russia and the CIS as Limits to the EU’s rule transfer in Ukraine” *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.16, No.6, 2009, pp.853-872.

⁸⁴ Nice Popescu & Andrew Wilson, “The limits of enlargement-lite: European and Russian power in the troubled neighborhood”, *European Council on Foreign Relations*, p.3
<http://alleuropolux.org/files/2009/35/ECFR-Policy-Report.pdf>, accessed October 10, 2018.

⁸⁵ The soft power is defined according to Joseph Nye definition as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideal and policies.” See Nye Jr, Joseph, *Power in the Global Information Age* (London: Routledge, 2004), 76-88, p.77.

⁸⁶ Nice Popescu & Andrew Wilson, “The limits of enlargement-lite: European and Russian power in the troubled neighborhood”, *European Council on Foreign Relations*, p.29
<http://alleuropolux.org/files/2009/35/ECFR-Policy-Report.pdf>, accessed October 10, 2018.

⁸⁷ Victoria Hudson, “Forced to Friendship”? Russian (Mis-)Understandings of Soft Power and the Implications for Audience Attraction in Ukraine.” *Politics*, Vol. 35, Issue 3-4, pp. 330 – 346.

1.3. Political culture as a product of political institutions

Supporters of this approach contend that the state and institutions often shape the social system of values and orientation of the citizens.⁸⁸ For example, Robert Dahl developed the argument that the process of political development towards democracy⁸⁹ requires high levels of inclusion for all political actors that compete for power.⁹⁰ To achieve this condition, the institutions of the country should be conducive to democratic political participation. Thus, the political culture of the nation cannot be seen in isolation from institutions, which influence orientations and sentiments of its citizens. Subsequently, Samuel Huntington argued that the process of democratic development involves the cultural conditions, economic equality and the institutions that support them.⁹¹ Without the democratic institutions that support and promote a democratic system of values, citizens will not be able to have an impact on the political process. However, irrespective of his preference for institutions as the main instrument of democratization, Huntington in his seminal work *The Clash of Civilizations*⁹² acknowledged that differences in cultures between nations are the main explanatory variables for political stability. He addressed the difference between Orthodox Eastern and Uniate Western Ukraine as the hinge of possible future civil conflict including the severing of the state

⁸⁸ Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy. Towards Consolidation* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 169. Richard Rose, "A divergent Europe" *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.12, January 2001, pp. 93-106. Robert A. Dahl., eds., *Political Opposition in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1969). Samuel, P., Huntington, *The third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twenties Century* (Oklahoma City: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

⁸⁹ Dahl defines democracy as an association where all members are equally entitled to participate in the associations' decisions about its politics. Robert A., Dahl, Ian Shapiro, *On Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 35

⁹⁰ Robert A. Dahl., eds., *Political Opposition in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969).

⁹¹ Samuel, P., Huntington, *The third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twenties Century* (Oklahoma City: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

⁹² Samuel, P., Huntington *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon&Schuster, 1996).

along this axis.⁹³ Thus, Huntington, the institutionalist, later admitted that culture is as an important explanatory variable together with institutions.

Larry Diamond in his later work on developing democracy in transition countries argued that high levels of democratic legitimacy,⁹⁴ such as confidence in the regime and its institutions, prevent regime breakdown and encourage stability.⁹⁵ High levels of democratic legitimacy ensure that mass political dissatisfaction leads to reform to be enacted legislative and electoral channels, rather than by extra-constitutional means such as coups and revolutions. Citizens who acknowledge the legitimacy of democracy is less likely to subvert the democratic process. Richard Rose further developed this argument by stating effective democracy requires not only a presence of the rule of law within a country but “elite integrity,” political behavior that supports these rules.⁹⁶ Thus, political culture, in this definition, includes different behavior patterns of elite combined with institutions and subjective orientations.⁹⁷

1.4. The political culture of Ukraine between 2004 and 2014

Despite differences in opinions on the concept of political culture, an emerging consensus of academics, including the institutionalists, concur that political culture is an important factor in explaining political phenomena.⁹⁸

⁹³ Ibid, p.37.

⁹⁴ Democratic legitimacy refers to generic beliefs on the legitimacy of a given regime and its democratic character. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). *Electoral systems and democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).

⁹⁵ Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy. Towards Consolidation* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 169.

⁹⁶ Richard Rose, A divergent Europe” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.12, January 2001, pp. 93-106.

⁹⁷ William M. Reisinger, “The Renaissance of a Rubric: Political culture as Concept and Theory” *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, Vol.7, No. 4. p.330.

⁹⁸ Samuel, P., Huntington, *The third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twenties Century* (Oklahoma City: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). Samuel, P., Huntington *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon&Schuster,1996). Pippa Norris *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Pippa Norris *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Howard L. Wiarda, *Political culture, Political Science, and Identity Politics* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2014).

For this research project, *political culture* will be defined as *patterns of political orientations, beliefs and behaviors (actions) among different social groups (regions) towards political institutions, towards themselves and others in the political system.*

This definition will allow studying not only citizens' orientations and beliefs as was conducted before, but their actions across regions and different socio-demographic groups in Ukraine. Although all earlier studies provided very sound theories on the study of political culture, they were largely based upon the western model of democratic development and established democracies such as the USA and UK. At the same time, the studies of post-communist countries generally focused on the national political culture of those countries with special emphasis placed on their Soviet past.

In Ukraine's circumstances, the limits of these earlier studies are apparent; it is over 25 years after independence and the collapse of the Soviet Union. A new generation of citizens was born and raised since then. Moreover, we are interested in the political culture of the country that experienced two different forms of political revolts and protests within a ten-year period with various degrees of support across different regions and socio-demographic groups. Limiting observation and examination to citizens orientations towards political institutions and their political competence will not necessarily explain the whole process of changes in their political culture. It is important to look at the political actions of modern citizens as well as at their orientations towards institutions and other citizens. At the same time, modern studies of the political culture of Ukraine should test if regional and linguistic cleavages are present and associated with political orientations and actions. Furthermore, it is important to consider the influence of contemporary external actors. In Ukraine's case, this includes the EU and Russia.

For that reason, the author will look at specific aspects of political culture that can provide a better understanding of Ukrainian citizens' orientations and actions across various regions and groups. The following components of the political culture of Ukraine will be studied: the political orientations towards government structures, the perception of the rules of the game and the meaning of democracy; orientations and actions towards others in the political system; orientations towards oneself role in the political system and political behavior (actions). To start with, the author will provide explanations and definitions of different components that will be studied in this project. The methodology section will describe the main methods that were applied to measure these components.

1. Orientations towards political institutions, the rules of the game, the perception of democracy.

As was defined earlier by all authors, citizens who have a high level of confidence in political institutions will be willing to delegate their political demands through more traditional and institutionalized form of political actions such as elections.⁹⁹ By contrast, if citizens do not have confidence in their institutions and in the official mechanisms of influencing them; they will be more likely to participate in non-traditional forms of political actions and participation such as protest, boycotts or political revolts.¹⁰⁰

Considering that Ukraine has a mixed political system (parliamentary- presidential), we are interested in studying citizens' confidence in the Parliament, President, Prime Minister and political parties. This will be complemented with an analysis of the citizens'

⁹⁹ Jacquelin van Stekelenburg and Bert Klandermans, "In politics we trust ... or Not? Trusting and Destructing Demonstrators Compared." *Political Psychology*, Vol.39, No. 4, 2018. Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy. Towards Consolidation* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 169.

¹⁰⁰ Jacquelin van Stekelenburg and Bert Klandermans, "In politics we trust ... or Not? Trusting and Destructing Demonstrators Compared." *Political Psychology*, Vol.39, No.4, 2018.

confidence in the courts, which are the central representation of the rule of law in the country.

Furthermore, it is important to compare citizens' evaluation of their political institutions with their perception of democracy and meaning of democracy.¹⁰¹ As was stated by Norris, citizens, who do not have confidence in their political institutions or so-called critical citizens, are not necessarily undemocratic. In fact, they may be critical of their institutions because they do not fulfill these citizens' expectations for democracy. In the case of Ukraine, we are interested to know if Ukrainians considered Ukraine a democracy and what their understanding of democracy is?

Hence, as was stated earlier by Inglehart, Dalton and Welzel and others¹⁰² one should study citizens' views about the *rules of the game* or norm compliance. These rules of the game can be defined as the informal, unwritten rules that citizens may obey, or choose to disobey. These subjective preferences may or may not be consistent with prevailing law and other norms of civic conduct.¹⁰³ The democratic rule of law should be supported by unofficial rules and norms that everyone agrees to follow and that strengthen the official rules. These unofficial rules can be defined as citizens' orientations towards their obligations such as paying transport fares, paying taxes, cleaning up garbage and not accepting bribes.¹⁰⁴

2. *Orientations towards others in the political system, membership in socio-political organizations.*

¹⁰¹ Pippa Norris *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Russell, J. Dalton. *Citizens Politics. Public opinions and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Washington: CQ Press, 2006), p. 260.

¹⁰² Thomas Denk, Henrik Serup Christensen and Daniel Bergh. "The Composition of Political Culture- A study of 25 European Democracies." *St Comparative International Development*, No.50, 2015, pp. 358-377.

¹⁰³ Walter A. Rosenbaum, *Political Culture* (London: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p.9.

¹⁰⁴ Howard, Elcock, *Political Behaviour* (London: Methuen &Co Ltd, 1976), p. 74.

Citizens of any society must interact with other members within it on a daily basis. A civic citizen is a citizen who actively involved in the social-political life of his/her community, society, and the nation. Citizens' membership and engagement in different social-political organizations or any volunteer non-government organizations can provide understanding about their orientations towards others in the political system.¹⁰⁵

According to classical approaches to political culture, active members of the community who are engaged with others in any joint activity will be more willing to collaborate and help others outside their organizations as well.¹⁰⁶ In the case of Ukraine, this project seeks to determine if Ukrainians became more active members of different organizations, including political parties, religious groups, trade unions, and NGOs. Hence, as was stated by Inglehart and Norris, it is important to distinguish between traditional forms of citizens' participation (such as religious groups) and modern forms of civic participation (such as environmental groups, international NGOs or interests' groups). In a modern developed society, citizens engage with others outside their close circles, such as their family, church or their friends. Considering that Ukraine is linguistically and religiously diverse, we will analyze the language and religious preferences of citizens belonging to various and residing in different regions.

At the same time, as was discovered by Putnam, any voluntary activity and collaboration among citizens require a presence of trust among its participants, which

¹⁰⁵ Mark E. Warren, ed., *Democracy and Trust* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.208-248.

¹⁰⁶ Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp.163-185. Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, *Political culture and Political Development* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965). Walter A. Rosenbaum, *Political Culture* (London: Praeger Publishers, 1975).

itself comes from citizens' engagement in common activities.¹⁰⁷ Thus, we should study both in order to understand specific of citizens' orientations and actions towards others. Inglehart stated that the presence of high social trust¹⁰⁸ is conducive to democracy¹⁰⁹. Social trust should be present not only in friends, family, and relatives but "others" as well.¹¹⁰ These others may be the people that they see for the first time, people of another religion or ethnicity, and people as a whole. If citizens have a high level of trust towards these "others", then it will be easier for them to be involved with them in common activities, including political activity such as protests or demonstrations.

Furthermore, we are interested if Ukrainians become more tolerant of minority groups such as LGBT groups. According to Inglehart, citizens in the civic and inclusive society should be supportive of equal opportunities for all without any exception.¹¹¹ This can provide insights into whether Ukrainians, especially younger and more educated, became more inclusive and acceptive of others, which is indicative of a more egalitarian and democratic political culture.

3. Orientations towards one's political activity as well as political activity.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, p. 340.

¹⁰⁸ Social trust is defined as the type of trust that individuals have with colleagues, friends, neighbors, and fellow citizens, either directly or within an institutional setting. See: Synthia M. Horne, *Building Trust and Democracy: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Countries* (Oxford University Press Online, 2017), p.239.

¹⁰⁹ Ronald Inglehart, "Trust, Well-being and democracy" in *Democracy and Trust*, ed. By Marl. E. Warren, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 89.

¹¹⁰ Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 22. Peter J. Katzenstein, "Confidence, Trust, International Relations, and Lessons from Smaller Democracies" in *Disaffected Democracies. What's troubling the trilateral countries?* Ed. By Susan J Pharr and Robert D. Putnam, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp.121-148.

¹¹¹ Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997. Russell Dalton and Christian Welzel *The Civic Culture Transformed. From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p.291.

Also, it is important to understand how citizens perceive themselves and their role in the political system. As was stated by Almond and Verba, politically active citizens should be politically informed in order to make informed decisions.¹¹² Moreover, we want to understand not only whether they are interested and informed about politics, but from which sources they receive their information. The news media shape citizens' perception and understanding of politics, and for that reason, it is important to examine Ukrainian citizens' main sources of information. Did they rely on more traditional sources as national TV and newspapers, or from the Internet? Did they differ in their choice based on their region, age, and education? We are particularly interested in the usage of the Internet among younger and more educated groups. The usage of the Internet is associated with an increase in political efficacy; therefore, it will be important to study if this can apply to Ukraine as well.¹¹³

In addition to citizens' political awareness and competence, citizens' political efficacy will be studied as well. Political efficacy in this context is defined as one's belief in his/her ability to have an impact on the decision-making process.¹¹⁴ The modern civic citizen is not only informed, politically aware and active, but he/she believes that their actions will have an impact on political institutions as was discussed earlier. If citizens do not believe that their actions can have an impact, they will be less willing to take these actions to place demands on institutions.

¹¹² Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp.230-257.

¹¹³ Kate Kenski & Natalie Jomini Stroud. "Connections Between Internet Use and Political Efficacy, Knowledge, and Participation" *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, Vol.50, No.2, 2006, pp.173-192, DOI: [10.1207/s15506878jobem5002_1](https://doi.org/10.1207/s15506878jobem5002_1), accessed August 06, 2018.

¹¹⁴ Walter A. Rosenbaum, *Political Culture* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p.7.

Furthermore, according to modern studies of democracies, “citizens now have many ways of expressing their grievances and complaints other than voting.”¹¹⁵ Thus, it is important to study not only citizens’ perception about possible political actions, but different political activities - from traditional forms of political participation such as elections or alternative forms of political expressions such as signing a petition, contacting a public official, participating in the political protest, etc. As was stated by scholars of post-communist societies, in emerging democracies citizens often rely on non-traditional forms of political actions because the traditional ones are not fully trusted or institutionalized yet.¹¹⁶ In the case of Ukraine, we are interested if Ukrainians take part in official elections and how they perceive them combined with their participation in alternative forms of political actions.

4. External factors

This thesis will analyze the role of Russia and the EU and their soft power in Ukraine. The soft power is defined according to Joseph Nye’s definition as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideal and policies.”¹¹⁷ Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others.¹¹⁸ Nye identified three main primary sources of a country’s soft power: its culture (in the places where its attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad) and its foreign policies

¹¹⁵ Pierre Rosanvallon and Arthur Goldhammer, *Counter – Democracy. Politics in an Age of Distrust* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.19.

¹¹⁶ Russell J. Dalton and Hans-dieter Klingemann, “Citizens and Political Behavior” *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, August 2007, pp.1-29.

¹¹⁷ Joseph S. Nye Jr. "Soft power." *Power in the Global Information Age* (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 76-88, p.77.

¹¹⁸ Joseph S. Nye Jr "Public diplomacy and soft power." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol.616, No.1, 2008, pp. 94-109, p.95.

(when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).¹¹⁹ The Russian government was an active player during the Orange revolution by supporting the pro-government candidate Viktor Yanukovich in the 2004 presidential election. Russia also did not recognize the legitimacy of President Yushchenko after his victory in December of 2004.¹²⁰ For that reason, it will be important to look at the official Russian policy towards Ukraine (foreign policy) and its unofficial soft power, especially in Russian speaking regions bordering with Russia. The policy of *Russkiy Mir*¹²¹ and the role of Russian Orthodox Church as the main instrument of its implementation will be analyzed together with an analysis of the Russian media (newspapers), which are popular in the country south-eastern regions.

The thesis will also look into the role of the EU in Ukraine during the studied years and its soft power in Ukraine between 2004 and 2014. As was stated earlier, after the Orange revolution the EU employed the passive leverage in Ukraine, built on democratic conditionality such as commitment to common values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law.¹²² Considering that Euromaidan started in 2013 as a protest against Yanukovich's decision to postpone the signing of Association Agreement with the European Union, the EU was important to some Ukrainians before the events of

¹¹⁹ Ibid, 96.

¹²⁰ Andriy Karatnycky, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution" *Foreign Affairs*, March- April 2005, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2005-03-01/ukraines-orange-revolution>, accessed January 08, 2017.

¹²¹ The *Russkiy Mir* started as the pro-government organization to promote the Russian culture and Russian language abroad in June of 2007 by Decree of President Putin. *Russkiy Mir* <http://ruskiymir.ru/fund/the-decree-of-the-president-of-the-russian-federation-on-creation-of-fund-russian-world.php#1>, accessed November 03, 2016.

¹²² Paul Kubicek, "Dancing with the Devil: Explaining the European Union's Engagement with Ukraine under Viktor Yanukovich" *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 25, 2017, pp.143-162, p.144.

November 2013.¹²³ Citizens' perception and confidence in this institution across all regions and different socio-demographic groups will be studied. We are especially interested in measuring if confidence in the EU correlates with changes in political orientations, values and actions of Ukrainians that were identified earlier.

1.5. Color revolutions (Orange revolution)

The term color revolutions refers to the political revolts in post-Soviet states of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan that occurred following contested presidential and parliamentary elections between 2003 and 2005. They led to the changes in the personnel of government and re-election of the new government and presidents. This thesis will refer to the main approaches to the color revolutions by authors Lucan Way, Henry Hale and Valerie J. Bunce & Sharon L. Wolchik.¹²⁴ Scholars have different explanations for the cause and effect of the color revolutions.

1.5.1. Color revolutions and stability of the authoritarian regime

According to this approach, the success or failure of color revolutions in post-communist countries was based on whether or not the authoritarian regime was stable.¹²⁵ Two factors were crucial: the strengths of a country's ties to the West and the strength of the incumbent regime's autocratic party or state.¹²⁶ Countries of color revolutions in the

¹²³According to Olga Onuch, who interviewed 1304 protesters between 26 November 2013 and 10 January 2014 in Kyiv, the early protesters solely focused on supporting closer EU ties. Olga Onuch, "Who were the protesters?" *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.25, No.3, July 2014, pp.44-51, p.47.

¹²⁴ Lucan Way, "The Real Cause of the Color Revolutions" *Journal of Democracy*, No3, July 2008, pp. 55-69. Henry Hale, "Democracy or autocracy on the march? The colored revolutions as normal dynamics of patronal presidentialism" *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol.39, 2006, pp. 305-329. Lincoln Mitchell, *The Color Revolutions* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012). Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-communist Countries* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

¹²⁵Success or failure of revolutions is defined by the change or not of incumbent presidents by the opposition political parties.

¹²⁶ Lucan Way, "The real Cause of the Color Revolutions." *Journal of Democracy*, No. 3, July 2008, pp. 55-69, p. 60.

early 2000s, according to Way, resembled the political protests of the 1990s in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Serbia. Leaders of non-government organizations from these countries were actively involved in training the local protesters in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, according to this approach, the strengths and vulnerabilities of the incumbent political regime itself and the degree of popular support played a more important role than the political mobilization of protesters.¹²⁷

The Orange revolution, according to Way, took place because the regime of President Kuchma did not have stable party support prior to the 2004 presidential election and was very unpopular due to the Kuchmagate scandal.¹²⁸ Thus, it was already expected that Yushchenko, a former Head of the National Bank of Ukraine, would be a strong candidate during the upcoming presidential election in 2004. Yushchenko had support for his campaign from the West¹²⁹ and popular support within some regions that assisted in the mobilization of protesters during the Orange revolution.

Although this approach is valid, it is arguable that without local citizens' desire to take part in political protests, the Orange revolution would not have taken place. As was stated by the former American Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul, external factors

¹²⁷ Ibid, 62.

¹²⁸ Kuchmagate scandal referred to a period when one of the former security guards of the President Kuchma, published secretly recorded tapes from the office of Kuchma. They proved President involvement in the disappearance of the opposition journalist Georhiy Gongadze and Kuchmas' government illegal supply of military equipment to Iraq.

¹²⁹ According to A. Wilson, the West (mostly USA) was not directly involved during the Orange revolution; however, the USAID supported many NGOs in Ukraine before and after the Orange revolutions. Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution, NGOs and the Role of the West" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol.19, No. 1, March 2006, pp. 21-32.

can stimulate unity among the opposition; however, the main actors of unity will always be local actors.¹³⁰

1.5.2. Color Revolutions as a process of Patronal Presidentialism

Henry Hale argues that the real causes of color revolutions were not necessarily democratic changes within the states, but rather they were a part of the cycle of patronal presidentialism.¹³¹ Hale states that the regime of patronal presidentialism is characterized by a cycle of a democratic wave after the changes of incumbent Presidents and the temporary elite support for a newly elected President. Hale emphasizes the role of uncertainty where elites do not know who the successor will be so become divided and mobilize the population.¹³² Hale suggests that the high political mobilization among specific groups of citizens during the color revolutions seemed like a mass mobilization of the respective nations' people. However, Hale posits that the color revolutions took place under specific conditions: the guaranteed final term of the incumbent, his unpopularity and election-related expectations of changes.¹³³ Hale deemphasizes international influence, state weakness, regime resources, opposition unity, and strengths.¹³⁴ Hale attributed the cause of the Orange revolution to the political elite's shift in support from Kuchma's successor, Yanukovich, to Yushchenko. Hale predicted that if the newly elected President did not stop the cycle of patronal presidentialism, then a new wave of mass protests could occur again in Ukraine.¹³⁵ According to this approach,

¹³⁰ Michael McFaul, "Importing Revolution" in *Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Post communist world*, ed. V. Bunce, M. McFaul and K. Stoner-Weiss (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 219.

¹³¹ Henry E. Hale, *Patronal Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p.180.

¹³² *Ibid*, p.426.

¹³³ *Ibid*, p.180.

¹³⁴ *Ibid*, p.180.

¹³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 326. The shift of elites took place during the Euromaidan as well, but it happened after Euromaidan had already started by regular citizens, rather than by elites as in 2004.

real revolutions can take place under conditions where power shifts from the president to parliament. In these circumstances, Hale argues, the post of the President will be less desirable. As a result, the political competition will be between political parties that will make the regime less patronal.

1.5.3. Color revolutions as products of Regime vulnerability/International diffusion

Bunce and Wolchik took a different approach to the causes of successful color revolutions. In their analysis of successful and unsuccessful revolutions in post-communist countries, they identify important preconditions that lead to a change in government: regime vulnerability, international diffusion and the presence of civil society groups. According to the authors, oppositions that had never won power before had some advantages leading up to elections.¹³⁶

The main difference in this approach, in comparison to Way and Hale, is the strength of civil society groups before the revolutions. Like other authors, they observed the role of global civil society groups particularly from the countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Serbia, and Lithuania.¹³⁷ The authors found that support for Ukrainian democratic transition was an important factor for these states during the Orange revolution. Many of them were strengthening their democracies and institutions by promoting democratic values and ideas in their neighboring states.¹³⁸ The authors

¹³⁶ Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L Wolchik, *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist Countries* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p.38.

¹³⁷ Jacek Kucharczyk and Jeff Lovitt, *Democracy's New Champions: European Democracy Assistance After EU Enlargement* Prague: PASOS, 2008. Tsveta Petrova, "How Poland Promotes Democracy" *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 23, No. 2, April 2012, pp.133-47. John Keane, *Global Civil Society?* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

¹³⁸ As of March 25th, 2015, Poland announced to ease the visa regime for Ukrainian citizens that will allow them to receive 5 years multivisas instead of one time 6 months ones. *Europeyska Pravda*, 25th March 2015 <http://www.euointegration.com.ua/articles/2015/03/25/7032246/>

found that in Ukraine prior to the Orange Revolution, more than 30,000 non-government organizations and civic groups were registered.¹³⁹ Their main role was to educate citizens about their rights as voters and to promote fair and free elections. Thus, the success of the Orange revolution was the result of the organization of local NGOs and the citizens' willingness to participate in demonstrations.

Based on the above approaches to the color revolutions, the Orange revolution is defined as an important historical event that started a transformation process of Ukrainian society, but not a social revolution itself. For this particular thesis, the author will define the Orange revolution as a *significant historical event* that started changes within Ukrainian society. Although it was not a revolution, according to a classical definition, this event was important for Ukrainians.¹⁴⁰ It gave many Ukrainians, those who participated in it and those who grew up learning about it, experience and knowledge about the possibility of political change.

¹³⁹ Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L Wolchik, *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-communist Countries* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p.128.

¹⁴⁰ According to Theda Skocpol, Social revolutions are fast paced foundational transformations of society's state and class structure. Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolution. A comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

Methodology

It is just as difficult to operationalize the measurement of changes in political culture as it is to define the concept.¹ This thesis is an idiographic inductive single case study, with the main objective of measuring, describing and explaining political culture in Ukraine during a specific period - between 2004 and 2014.² This bottom-up approach will allow the detailed examination of the political culture of Ukraine after the Orange revolution and before the Euromaidan without any specific expectations or assumptions. Therefore, the author will not suggest any specific hypotheses, but rather will pose questions to be answered. The author will study various aspects of political culture across regions and socio-demographic groups in order to provide insights into the specifics of the political culture of Ukraine by the previously mentioned theoretical approaches.

A combination of different methods was applied to measure different aspects of political culture that were defined in the previous section. The main method for studying and analyzing the political orientations, values and political actions of Ukrainians between 2004 and 2014 was a quantitative method using a cross-sectional and longitudinal research design. Based on the main components of political culture that were identified earlier, the following sets of variables were included in the study of the political culture of Ukraine:

1. Orientation towards Government Structures (Chapter 3)

- Confidence in the main political institutions (Confidence in the President, Parliament, Political parties and Courts)
- Perception of the rules of the game (perception of the following actions: accepting bribes, not paying taxes; not paying public transport fare);

¹ Paul, Nesbitt - Larking "Methodological Notes on the Study of Political Culture" *Political Psychology*, Vol. 13, No.1, March 1992, pp.79-90.

² Jack S. Levy, "Case studies: types, Designs, and Logic of Inference" *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 25, No.1, 2008, pp.1-18, p.3.

- Evaluation of Democracy and Meaning of democracy
2. Orientation towards others in the political system (Chapter 4)
 - Political Identifications (ethnic, language and religious affiliation, pride in nation, membership in political parties, professional organizations, trade unions, non-government organization; support for NGOs;)
 - Social trust (trust in people in general, trust in people of other religion, ethnicity, your family, neighborhood, people that you meet for the first time; tolerance of LGBT groups; support for gender equality)
 3. Orientation towards one's political activity and political activity (Chapter 5)
 - Political competence (interest in politics; main sources of information)
 - Political efficacy (beliefs in the possibility to influence the decision-making process)
 - Political behavior (activity) (election participation; political actions recently done: signing a petition, contacting a public official, participation in the political protest, writing a blog, using social media)

Considering the importance of regional, language and religious cleavages in Ukraine, the author used the following Independent variables when applicable:

- Region (East, West, South, Central, Kyiv, Crimea)
- Education
- Age
- The language spoken at home (Ukrainian/Others)
- Religion affiliation (Orthodox Christianity/Others)³

All these components were tested using public opinion surveys results by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) between 2004 and 2013 in Ukraine and World Value Survey (WVS) between 1996 and 2011. As was stated by Russell J Dalton “surveys enable people to describe their political views in their own words, and thus survey research offers a tremendously valuable research tool for social

³ The Original variable had seven categories: 1- Ukrainian Orthodox, 2- Russian Orthodox, 3- Orthodox Christianity, 4- Roman Catholic, 5- Greek Catholic, 6- Protestant, 7- Muslim. For the statistical tests the variable was recoded in two categories: 0 – Orthodox Christianity (Ukrainian Orthodox, Russian Orthodox and Orthodox Christianity) and 1- others (Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic). All other categories were excluded due to their small values.

sciences.”⁴ The data files were provided by IFES exclusively for this research by Chapter 2, Art. 2.3 of Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans.⁵ The sample size for the survey was 1,512 respondents (each year) representing the voting-age population in Ukraine (18 years+). The margin of error is $\pm 2.52\%$ within a 95% confidence interval, assuming a pure, random sample. The surveys were conducted in all of the administrative divisions of Ukraine; 1,262 observations were allocated proportionately at the national level with an over-sample of 125 observations in Kyiv and 125 in AR Crimea.

The author used Statistical Software for Social Sciences (SPSS) to conduct descriptive and inferential statistical tests including crosstabs, correlations, Chi-Square test of independence and Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions. To test the impact of all of the independent variables (region, education, age, religious affiliation, language at home, employment) on specific dependent variables, the author used the multivariate regression analysis. The author recoded nominal variables such as religion, language at home, urban/rural in dichotomous variables in order to include them in regressions. For the variable region, the dummy variables were introduced. The coding can be found in Appendix 4.

Qualitative methods

Official documents

To support the results of public opinion surveys and validate their main findings, qualitative methods were applied as well.

⁴ Russell J. Dalton. *Citizens Politics. Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Washington: CQ Press: 2006), p. 3.

⁵Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans, *Tri-Council Statement*, Chapter 2, Art. 2.3, p. 17, Panel on Research Ethics, *Government of Canada*, <http://www.pre.ethics.gc.ca/eng/policy-politique/initiatives/tcps2-epts2/Default/>, accessed March 02, 2015.

As was stated by Robert Putnam himself about his approach in *Bowling Alone*:

“we need to look for convincing proof, not in a single pair of polls, or even a single series of surveys, but instead, for convergence across a number of different series, each carries out by different researchers. And where possible, we should look for change not merely in poll data, but in institutions and behavior.”⁶

Others state that we “need to study individuals in context, including multiple and converging data collections: social context, media content, party actions, and other elements of the total process.”⁷ For this thesis, the author used the qualitative methods to provide the content to the public opinion surveys results during the studied years.

The analysis of the official documents and publications permitted to have more evidence for this research. To explain citizens’ orientations towards main political institutions such as President, Prime-Minister and Parliament, the texts of the Constitution of Ukraine in 1996, 2004 and 2010 were compared, specifically relating to the changes in 2004 and 2010.⁸ It allowed understanding if citizens’ views of the main political institutions were related to those changes. The author also analyzed the longevity of each Prime-Minister during the temporal boundaries of the study and examined it alongside citizens’ confidence in those leaders.⁹ The official results of parliamentary elections of 2006, 2007, 2012 from the *Central Electoral Commission (CEC)* in Ukraine were analyzed,

⁶ Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone. The collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), p.415.

⁷ Russell J. Dalton and Hans-dieter Klingemann, “Citizens and Political Behavior” *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, August 2007, pp.1-29, p.19.

⁸ In 2004 Ukraine adopted the parliamentary- presidential system as the result of the Orange revolution. In 2010, under President Yanukovich. these amendments were declared unconstitutional. Ukraine reinstated a semi presidential system of 1996 Constitution. Gwendolyn Sasse, “Constitution Making in Ukraine: Refocusing the Debate” *Carnegie Europe*, April 12, 2016. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Constitution_Making_in_Ukraine_Sasse.pdf, accessed October 04,2018.

⁹ During a period studied, Ukraine had 5 Prime Ministers. Ukraine has had 16 Prime Ministers since independence in 1991, with an average time in the office of 12 months.

to measure the volatility of political parties and compare this with citizens' confidence in the political parties. This comparison allowed not only for describing but explaining the circumstances under which political orientations of citizens towards main political institutions took place.

To study the presence of particular discourse in Ukraine about the EU, the Inaugural speeches by the President Viktor Yushchenko in 2005 and President Yanukovich in 2010 were analyzed together with annual presidential addresses to the Parliament between 2005 and 2011. The main purpose was to identify the main themes in the speeches of the Presidents, particularly in promoting collaboration with the European Union. The author used the NVivo program to calculate the frequency of the words "Europa" (Europe), "Eurosoyuz" (European Union), "europeyskyy" (European) and "Eurointegratsiya" (Euro-integration) among the top 1000 frequent words in each speech.

The official statistics from State Statistics Service of Ukraine *Ministerstvo Statystyky* were used to demonstrate changes in the migratory flow of Ukrainians during the studied years. This official information provided valuable insights about the character of political orientations, values, and actions of Ukrainians, regarding their level of trust towards people of another religion, ethnicity, and people that you meet for the first time.

To assess the Russian soft power in Ukrainian politics during the studied years through its official foreign policy, texts of official annual speeches by the Russian Presidents Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev at the *Federalnoye Sobraniye* between 2004 and 2013 were used for this research. The focus of the review was to identify the reference to the policy of *Russkiy Mir* and the Russian Orthodox Church in their official speeches. This analysis permitted to explain if Russia changed its official foreign policy

towards Ukraine in order to promote particular political identities or orientations, especially in the Russian speaking regions of the East and South.

Content and discourse analysis of media

In order to compare political awareness of Ukrainians across the regions besides their self-reported political awareness in the surveys, the author completed qualitative and quantitative content analysis of newspapers. Two regional newspapers were chosen: Russian language *Vecherniy Donetsk* (Eastern Ukraine) and Ukrainian language *L'viv ska Gazeta* (Western Ukraine). The author chose each newspaper as the most popular newspaper in the region. For the analysis, all articles that were published during November in 2013 by two newspapers (833 in total) were chosen and analyzed manually. The month of November 2013 was chosen as the month of the beginning of Euromaidan. This allowed the author for a deeper understanding of the regional cleavages in Ukraine and their possible impact on citizens' political awareness.

In order to analyze political media discourse about the EU in Ukraine (Chapter 6) during the studied period, the author conducted a content analysis of the weekly newspaper *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia* (Mirror Weekly). This newspaper was chosen because it considered relatively neutral by academics with expertise in the media environment in Ukraine.¹⁰ The period chosen was inclusive of 2005 and 2013 (50-52 issues per year, front pages, section 1, titles of the articles). The author manually analyzed the articles to identify the frequency and the tone of coverage of the topic of EU by Ukrainian national

¹⁰ This national newspaper was generally considered neutral during 2004 and 2013-2014 events. It also publishes in Russian and Ukrainian languages respectfully. See Lucan Way "Civil Society and Democratization" *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 25, No. 3, July 2014, pp.35-43, p.38. Joanna Szostek, "Russian and the News Media in Ukraine: A Case of Soft Power?" *East European Politics and Societies and Culture*, Vol. 28, No. 3, August 2014, pp. 463-486.

newspaper during the studied period. The search words were the same as for the analysis of the Presidential speeches: “eurosoyuz” (European Union), “Europa” (Europe), “europeyskiy” (European) and “Eurointegratsiya” (euro integration).

To further explore Russia’s soft power in the Russian speaking regions through its media, the author analyzed the articles by the Russian language newspaper *Argumenty i Fakty*. The newspaper was chosen due to its high popularity and circulation in Russia and Ukraine, especially in the Eastern and Southern regions.¹¹ The years analyzed were 2005, 2010 and 2013 (51- 52 issues for each year, titles of the articles). 2005 was selected as the first year after the Orange revolution and after President Yushchenko came to power. 2010 was the year of the presidential election in Ukraine which brought Viktor Yanukovich to power. 2013 was the year of the Euromaidan. The articles were selected based on the presence of the words “Ukraine,” “Orange revolution,” “Yushchenko” and “Yanukovich” in their titles. The program ProQuest was used for selecting the articles. This analysis allowed to see if Russian language media tried to promote or create particular political or national identity in Russian speaking regions after the Orange revolution.

Interviews

To analyze the orientations and values of participants of the Euromaidan, the author used the published interviews of participants in Euromaidan. This allowed comparing the attitudinal changes that were observed in the surveys with opinions

¹¹ The newspaper has the highest circulation of the weekly newspapers in Russia as of 2008 (3 mln). The circulation in Ukraine as of 2006 was between 600 000- 1 mln. See: Juliane Besters- Dilger *Language Policy and Language Situation in Ukraine: Analysis and Recommendations* (Frankfurt: PeterLang, 2009), p. 253.

(stories, memories) of those Ukrainians, who took real actions. The Ukrainian Institute of National Memory conducted the interviews in 2015 as part of the bigger project – *Oral history of Ukraine*.¹² The total number of published self-selected unstructured interviews was 45, including journalists, students, lawmakers, coordinators, volunteers, politicians, and religious leaders.¹³ Although they represent the opinions of the participants of the Euromaidan and may not be representative of the whole of society, they can provide important information about those Ukrainians who took real actions in 2014.

Observation

The material for this research was also collected during the author's two visits to Ukraine as an International Election Observer in October 2012 and October 2014 for two weeks each time. During the 2012 parliamentary election, the author was deployed in the city of Rivne, Western Ukraine. The author had meetings with members of Ukrainian NGOs in Ukraine such as *Opora* and *Ukrainian Committees of Electors* before and after the election. During the early 2014 parliamentary election in Ukraine, the author was deployed in Odessa, the southern city on the Black Sea. To show a level of political corruption in Ukraine under President Yanukovych, the photos of the residence of the former President Viktor Yanukovych, which became available for public visits in 2014, were included in this thesis. The author visited the residence in October 2014 during the tour of the residence. The results of the official reports by organizations that conducted the observations (CANADEM and CANEOM) were used for this project to illustrate the evaluations of the elections by international organizations.

¹² *Maidan Museum* www.maidanmuseum.org/uk/storinka/maydan-usna-istoriya, accessed August 14, 2018

¹³ Tetyana Kovtun, Tetyana Pryvalko, *Maidan, Vid pershoi osoby, 45 istorii revolutsii hidnosti* (Maidan, From the first person, 45 stories of the revolution of dignity) (Kyiv: Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, 2015).

Table 1. 2 Methodology of the thesis

Components of Political culture	Variables	Indicators	Source:
Orientations towards government structure and the rule of the game	Confidence in the main political institutions	Survey data: Level of confidence in the President, Parliament, Prime-Minister, Political Parties and Courts. Official documents: Elected political parties (percentage of newly created political parties)	IFES, WVS, CEC, The Constitution of Ukraine, Presidential Decrees (2005, 2010), Interviews of the participants of the Euromaidan, Personal observation
	Perceptions of the rules of the game	Survey data: Perceptions about the meaning of democracy; Orientations towards unjustifiable actions	IFES, WVS, Euromaidan participants published interviews.
Orientations and actions towards others in the political system	Political identification	Survey data: Language, ethnic and religious affiliation Membership in political parties; NGOs, trade unions, professional organizations. Level of National pride Perception about unity Perception about the importance of NGOs	IFES, WVS, Euromaidan participants published interviews.
	Interpersonal trust	Survey data: Trust: people you meet for the first time; people of another religion; people of another nationality; your family; you compatriots; your neighbors. Tolerance of LGBT groups; Opinions about gender equality Official documents: % of women MPs in the Parliament	WVS, IFES Euromaidan participants published interviews.
Orientations towards oneself role in the political system and political activity	Political interest and political competence	Survey data: How interested in politics; Self -reported political awareness Main source of information Media content analysis: local newspapers from East and West	IFES, Local newspapers: “L’viv skya Gazeta” and “Vecherniy Donetsk” (November 2013), Euromaidan participants published interviews.
	Political efficacy and political activity	Survey data: Beliefs about influence on decisions of the government Recent political actions Perceptions about fairness of elections Official documents: Voter turnout	IFES, WVS, CEC, Euromaidan participants published interviews.
External Factors			
EU soft power		Official documents: EU – Ukraine negotiations Content analysis: Topic of the EU in Ukrainian media and Political Speeches Survey data: Confidence in the EU; Correlations between confidence in the EU and Political orientations/Actions	EU-Ukraine Progress Reports Annual presidential speeches to Parliament <i>Dzerkalo Tyzhnia</i> (Mirror Weekly) (2004-2013) WVS, IFES,
Russia soft power		Official documents: Policy of the <i>Russkiy Mir</i> ; Role of the Russian Orthodox Church Media Content Analysis: Russian language media in Ukraine Survey data: Confidence in Russian media. Citizens perception about relationship with Russia.	Annual Speeches by Russian President to the Federalnoye Sobraniye <i>Argumenty i Fakty</i> (2005, 2010, 2013) Public opinions about Russia (IFES and WVS) Affiliation with Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)

PART I

CHAPTER 2 History of Ukraine. The Orange revolution

Introduction

As was discussed earlier, scholars of political culture in post-communist societies, suggest that its historical preconditions can explain society's contemporary values, beliefs, and traditions.¹ Furthermore, different subgroups may have different experiences. Thus the study of political culture should be conducted without any assumption regarding the unity of the political culture of the society as the whole.² The political culture of a society is not constant; rather it is a changing phenomenon that continually occurs in different periods in history.³

Chapter 2 will provide a brief history of Ukraine and its regions prior to Ukraine's independence in 1991 to understand the importance of regional, religious and language cleavages in Ukraine during the period studied. It will also explore whether changes in political orientation and behavior took place in Ukraine between 1991 and the Orange revolution. It will focus on citizens' trust in the main political institutions, their political competence, efficacy and political activity.

The chapter will briefly survey different regional historical experiences. It will show that residents in various Ukrainian regions differ in their perception of their national identities from those in other regions. Inhabitants in the Western region

¹ Bernhard, Michael H., and Jan Kubik, eds. *Twenty years after communism: The politics of memory and commemoration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). Archie Brown, ed., *Political Culture and Political Changes in Communist States* (New York: Holmes & Meier Pub; 2nd edition, 1979). Stephen White, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics* (London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 1979).

² Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993).

³ Stephen Welch, *The Concept of Political Culture* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1993).

identified themselves with the history of Kievan Rus, the Kingdom of Poland and Poland-Lithuanian Saxony; whereas people in the East and South expressed connection with a Slavic national identity, such as Russia and Belarus.

Regarding Ukraine's early years of independence and its political culture, it was observed that Ukrainians across all regions supported the Act of Declaration of Independence.⁴ Concurrently, citizens' trust in political institutions was very low. This was notably clear between 1999 and 2003, during the second term of President Kuchma. The evidence of the President's possible involvement in the disappearance and killing of the opposition journalist Georhiy Gongadze united citizens with the political opposition during the protest "Ukraine without Kuchma" in 2000-2001.⁵ Although unsuccessful at that time, the action was the first form of political protest against the President of Ukraine.

Ukrainians expressed a high level of interest in politics which was combined with low levels of self-reported political competence and political efficacy. At the same time, the period between 1999 and 2003, the second term of President Kuchma, was characterised by citizens increased willingness to take actions against government decisions that encroached on people's interests. Citizens also increased their support for alternative political actions such as taking to the streets to protest against a decrease in their standard of living between 1994 and 2003. These public sentiments aligned with political opposition incentives to replace President Kuchma.

⁴ The turnout was 84.18%, based on the results of the official protocol of the results of the referendum. Derzhavna Arkhivna Sluzhba Ukrayiny, *Ukrainian Official State Archives* http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/25_Nez/index.php?69 accessed April 05, 2017.

⁵ "Suspect Says Kuchma Ordered Gongadze Killing" *Radio Free Europe*, August 31, 2011 www.rferl.org/a/suspect_says_kuchma_ordered_gongadze_killing/24313724.html, accessed August 27, 2018.

The attempt by President Kuchma and his administration to influence the outcome of the 2004 presidential election in favor of Prime Minister Yanukovych further mobilized both the elite and the wider citizenry against the old political regime. All these factors culminated in the mass protests of the Orange Revolution.

2.1. Early History of Ukraine

The territory within contemporary Ukraine has been ruled and divided numerous times by various powers since its earliest times.⁶ Between the tenth and twelfth centuries, the territory of modern Ukraine (as well as part of Russia and Belarus), was ruled by the Prince of Kyiv, Volodymyr, the Great, who came to power in 980 and brought Christianity to the territory of Rus.⁷ Kievan Rus⁸ had four main principalities: Galicia-Volhynya (modern Western Ukraine), Vladimir-Suzdal (modern Russia), Novgorod-Uzdal (modern Russia) and Chernihiv (modern North Ukraine).⁹ The invasion of Mongolians in 1238 into the territories of Rus weakened the unity among the principalities. The Mongolian power over the territory of the Vladimir-Suzdal principality endured until the end of the fifteenth century, whereas it ended in the mid-fourteenth century in the territories of Galicia-Volhynya.¹⁰ This factor had a significant impact on the future identities of residents of both principalities.¹¹ The principality of Galicia-Volhynya imported the German model of governing by introducing Magdeburg

⁶ The first traces of Ukrainian people are traced to the tribes of 980 BC. See Paul Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine. The land and its people* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010).

⁷ The word “Rus”, according to historians, has Scandinavian roots and meant “men who row”. See Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), p. 25.

⁸ Kievan is the original name of the Rus. The city of Kiev is the Russian version of the word Kyiv in Ukrainian.

⁹ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), p.50.

¹⁰ Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine. A History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), p. 63.

¹¹ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), p.53.

Law, according to which, cities had their system of governing, independently from the Prince.¹² The city of L'viv, the capital of Western Ukraine, was founded and built on this model in 1256.

Between the 14 and 16th century the territory of modern Ukraine was divided between Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Poland, Moscow and Tatars. Under Polish influence, the residents of Galicia accepted the authority of the Roman Pope and Catholicism for two hundred years.¹³ Meanwhile, in the south, the independent and adventurous settlers who called themselves Cossacks were creating forts called "Sitch" in Zaporizhia.¹⁴ Cossacks were known for more than their revered warrior ethos, they were recognized for promoting the value of the Orthodoxy on their territory. This religious activity contributed to tensions between the Roman Catholic Kingdom of Poland and Cossacks Hetmanate (the Cossack independent state).¹⁵ Cossacks wanted recognition of independent states and acknowledgement of their religion within Polish- Lithuanian society, neither of which they achieved.¹⁶ The leader of Cossacks, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, although of Polish descent, united all the Cossacks. However, to succeed against the Poles, Khmelnytsky needed support from other armies.¹⁷ Hetman Khmelnytsky sought support from Moscow, recognizing the growing power of Tsar Aleksei Romanov. The Union of Pereyaslav was signed in 1654, which guaranteed the

¹² Ibid, p. 129.

¹³ Maria Snegovaya, "Religious Affiliation and Individual Economic and Political Attitudes in Ukraine" in *Culture Matters in Russia- and Everywhere*. Ed by. Lawrence Harrison and Evgeny Yasin (London: Lexington Books, 2015), pp.145-163, p.149.

¹⁴ The word Cossack is Turkic in origin meaning a guard, a freeman or freebooter. Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), p.75.

¹⁵ Serhii Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.310.

¹⁶ Paul Magocsi, *A history of Ukraine. The land and its People* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2010), p. 197.

¹⁷ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), p.102-103.

Cossacks their recognition in exchange for their loyalty and support to the Tsar. The union was the foundation of close relations between Russia and Ukraine.¹⁸

The Cossack state within tsarist Moscovy was called “Little Russia,” while the Cossacks state on the Right Bank under the Polish Kingdom, was called “Ukraine.” The most vibrant years of the independent Cossack state took place under Hetman Mazepa, an important historical figure in modern Ukraine. Being from the Right Bank of the River Dnieper, Mazepa moved to the Left Bank after the Union of Pereyaslav because of its political stability.¹⁹ However, circumstances changed during the battle of Poltava in 1709, when Swedish king Charles decided to attack Moscovy and the Cossacks switched to the side of Charles against their former patron, the Tsarist Moscovy. The subsequent defeat of the Swedish Army in Poltava was the end of the Cossack state and the beginning of a new powerful Empire with its new emperor - Tsar Peter the Great.²⁰

By 1711, the territories of modern Ukraine were divided between Moscovy (Tsarist Russia since 1721), the Polish- Lithuanian Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire.²¹ There were notable change and upheaval for those living in Ukraine in the period between 1762 and 1796, during the reign of Catherine the Great. Two years after coming to power, Catherine assimilated the remaining Cossacks within the Russian Empire by making them members of the Russian Military. It was also during Catherine’s rule that the Crimean Peninsula became a part of the Russian Empire in 1783 after the Russo-

¹⁸ Paul Magocsi, *A history of Ukraine. The land and its People* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 2010), Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine. A History* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2000).

¹⁹ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), p.123.

²⁰ Ibid p.124.

²¹ Paul Magocsi, *A history of Ukraine. The land and its People* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2010), p. 277.

Turkish War of 1768- 1774. This expanded the power of the Russian Empire to the east and south of the territories of modern Ukraine.²² On the western borders of the Russian Empire, neighbouring Prussia and Austria claimed their authority over the territories of Galicia. The partition of Poland in 1793 led to the division of lands between Austria and the Russian Empire.²³ Galicia and the Polish city of Cracow went to Austria while Volhynya became a part of Russian Empire. The politics of Russification during Russian Empire which lasted between 1721- 1917 had a strong impact in Ukraine, where local ethnic languages and culture were forbidden.²⁴ Russification led to the formation of Russian speaking Ukrainians with a limited cultural attachment to Ukraine.²⁵

Reactions to the end of the Empire varied widely in Ukraine. Ukrainians in the central and South-Eastern regions were not willing to cut their ties to Russia.²⁶ The sentiments were markedly different in the North and West. In Kyiv, the Ukrainian Central Rada was formed in March of 1917. The members of the Rada desired autonomy within Russia and claimed the authority and jurisdiction over territories of the regions of Kyiv, Podillia, Volhynia, Kharkiv, Poltava, Chernihiv, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson and Tavrida.²⁷ Later that year the Rada announced its first Universal (Official Declaration), of temporary autonomy of Ukraine.²⁸ However, this led to Bolshevik protests in the

²² Zenon E. Kohut, *Making Ukraine, Studies in Political Culture, Historical Narrative, and Identity* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2011), p.144.

²³ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), p.124.

²⁴ Viktor Kozlov, *The Peoples of the Soviet Union* (London: Hutchinson Education, 1988), p. 173.

²⁵ David Saunders, *The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture 1750-1850* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1985).

²⁶ John-Paul Himka, "The Basic Historical Identity Formations in Ukraine: A typology" *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1-4, 2006, pp.483-500, p. 487.

²⁷ George O. Liber, *Soviet Nationality. Policy, Urban growth, and identity change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923-1934* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.16.

²⁸ *Dokumenty Ukrainskoho Komunizmu*, (New York: Prolog, 1962), p. 38.

Russian-speaking Donbass region who attempted to declare the independent Donbass-Kryvyi Rih Republic, to include the cities of Kharkiv and Ekaterinoslav (modern Dnipropetrovsk) and the city of Rostov (Modern Russia).²⁹

Independent Ukraine and its Central Rada government were short-lived; they did not possess sufficiently broad public support, and the Bolsheviks assumed power over Ukrainian territory.³⁰ The Communist Party of Ukraine was established in 1918, which was followed later by the creation of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1922, which Ukraine joined.

2.2. Soviet Ukraine, 1922-1990

The Ukrainian Soviet Republic was created in December 1922 and included the Central, Eastern and Southern regions of modern Ukraine except for the regions of Galicia and Transcarpathia (modern Zakarpattia oblast), which joined the USSR in 1944, and Crimea, which became part of Ukraine in 1954. A central policy of the new Soviet government, which was declared in the First Constitution of 1923, was the urbanization of the Soviet population, particularly in Ukraine, then a country with a largely rural and illiterate population.³¹

The intensive urbanization of the Soviet Union also led to changes in the demographics. Between 1926 and 1939, the population of Ukraine increased from 37,686,600 citizens to 40,468,800 (Table 2.2.1). During this time the proportion of urban population increased from 18.1% in 1926 to 33.5% in 1939, almost double. In 1979 in Ukraine within the

²⁹ George O. Liber, *Soviet Nationality. Policy, Urban growth, and identity change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923-1934* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.20.

³⁰ Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine. A History* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2000), p. 375.

³¹ Corliss Lamont, *The People of the Soviet Union* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1945), p.13.

population of 49,754,600 citizens, 61.3% were urban. By the end of 1945, Ukrainian SSR had 151 higher educational institutions (university and college) with more than 472 faculties.³² More than 10,000,000 Ukrainians became literate.³³

Table 2.2.1 The population of Ukraine, urban-rural, 1897- 1989

Census	Population, thousand people			Urban population, %
	Urban	Rural	Total	
1897	3 716,1	25 144,0	28 860,0	12,9
1900	5 495,6	30 404,0	35 899,6	13,3
1926	9 835,0	30 851,6	37 686,6	18,1
1939	13 569,0	26 899,8	40 468,8	33,5
1959	19 147,4	22 721,6	41 869,0	45,7
1970	25 688,6	21 437,9	47 126,5	54,5
1979	30 511,5	19 243,1	49 754,6	61,3
1989	34 578,6	17 119,1	51 706,7	66,9

Source: *Ukrainian Census*, database,

http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/MULT/Dialog/view.asp?ma=000_0201&ti=%D0%EE%E7%EF%EE%E4%B3%EB+%ED%E0%FF%E2%ED%EE%E3%EE+%ED%E0%F1%E5%EB%E5%ED%ED%FF+%E7%E0+%F2%E8%EF%EE%EC+%EF%EE%F1%E5%EB%E5%ED%FC&path=../Quicktables/POPULATION/02/01/&lang, accessed April, 05, 2017.

Among the Ukrainian cities of the Soviet Union, the cities of Kyiv, Kharkiv, Stalino (modern Donetsk) and Luhans'ke (modern Luhansk) experienced the highest growth.

For example, the Northeastern city of Kharkiv had a population of 285,213 in 1925 of the permanent and present residents.³⁴ By 1934 the city's population increased to 635,395 residents. The greatest increase in population occurred in the city of Stalino (modern Donetsk), from 38,100 present and permanent residents combined in 1920 to 288,407 permanent residents only in 1934. In the city of Luhans'ke the percentage of residents more than doubled between 1920 and 1934.³⁵ Furthermore, the Soviet government financially invested in the urbanization of the republic by paying salaries to city workers

³² *Kulturne budivnytstvo v Ukraini'skii RSR, 1941-1950*, Official documents and publications (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka: 1989), p. 250.

³³ *Soviet Ukraine*, Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia (Kyiv: Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 1969), p. 359.

³⁴ Source: George O. Liber, *Soviet Nationality. Policy, Urban growth, and identity change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923-1934* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.51.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

that were four to five times those of the rural farmer.³⁶ The consequence was that many industrial cities in Eastern Ukraine experienced a demographic and economic boom in the 1930s as many rural residents left their villages for the cities to escape from poverty.³⁷

2.2. Political culture in Soviet Ukraine

Scholars in Soviet political culture have characterized it having weak representative institutions, a centralized governing style, a personalized attachment to authority combined with a low level of political knowledge and experience.³⁸ The Soviet government's primary objective was to create a united Soviet identity for all citizens of the Soviet Union, irrespective of ethnicity and local language. "Political indoctrination in the Soviet Union begins in kindergarten and continues through the educational system and indeed through the life."³⁹ This was achieved by the centralized system of government, access to free education and universal health care.⁴⁰

The percentage of the titular nationality of Ukrainians in the USSR decreased from 80.6% in 1926 to 73.6% in 1979.⁴¹ The percentage of other ethnic groups within the territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic also decreased by almost half from 10.2%

³⁶ George O. Liber, *Soviet Nationality. Policy, Urban growth, and identity change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923-1934* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.20.

³⁷ Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), p. 49.

³⁸ Archie Brown, ed., *Political Culture and Political Changes in Communist States* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979). Archie Brown, "Political culture and Democratization" ed. Detlerf Pollack, Jorg Jacobs, Olaf Muller and Gert Pickel, *Political culture in Post-Communist Europe* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 18.

³⁹ Frederick C. Barghoorn, "Soviet Russia: Orthodoxy and Adaptiveness" in Lucian W. Pye, Sydney Verba, *Political culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 450- 512, p. 505.

⁴⁰ *Soviet Ukraine*, Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia (Kyiv: Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 1969).

⁴¹ Viktor Kozlov, *The Peoples of the Soviet Union* (London: Hutchinson Education, 1988), p. 81.

in 1926 to 5.3% in 1979.⁴² In contrast, the percentage of ethnic Russians more than doubled, increasing from 9.2% in 1926 to 21.1% in 1979.⁴³ Russian settlement in Ukraine was not distributed evenly nationally but localized in the southern and eastern regions, largely in the eastern industrial cities and Crimea. In 1979, Russians represented 43% of the population of Donetsk region, 68% in Crimea and 26% in Odessa.⁴⁴ The Russian language's presence, as the official language of the Soviet Union, led to the Russification of these regions with a high percentage of Russian ethnic groups. John Armstrong noted that "in a large number of cities in the Donbass, including Slavyansk, Artemovsk (Bachmut), Debaltsevo, and Snezhnoe, the Russians succeeded in establishing a cultural ascendancy without, however, it's taking on much political significance."⁴⁵

From the 1930s to the 1980s, Sovietization expanded across all Ukrainian regions.⁴⁶ This was accomplished "by the physical destruction of Ukrainian elites in the 1930s and 1940s or their forced emigration."⁴⁷ Hence, the Ukrainian language and culture were portrayed as provincial, rural, and incompatible with urbanization and industrialization.⁴⁸ This led to the creation of a Soviet citizen, who was loyal to its institutions, active when instructed by officials and distrustful of others.⁴⁹ This is how Steven White described Soviet political culture:

⁴²According to the results of the census, other ethnic groups in Ukraine included Jews, Belorussian, Moldavians and Poles. Viktor Kozlov, *The Peoples of the Soviet Union* (London: Hutchinson Education, 1988), p. 87.

⁴³ Ibid, p. 81.

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 89.

⁴⁵ John Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), p.272.

⁴⁶ Paul D'Anieri, Robert Kravchuk and Taras Kuzio, *Politics and Society in Ukraine* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), p.55.

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 55.

⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 55.

⁴⁹ Landon Pearson, *Children of Glasnost. Growing Up Soviet* (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys;s Limited, 1990), p.460.

“Representative institutions were weakly articulated and ineffective; levels of popular participation and representations were low, and governing style was centralized and bureaucratic and highly authoritarian.”⁵⁰

The political culture started to change in the 1980s during the period of *perestroika* (*rebuilding*) and *glasnost* (*openness*). Among many specialists in the study of post-communist countries, the period of *perestroika* and *glasnost* in the USSR was a source of optimism and inspiration.⁵¹ These commentators wrote glowingly of Gorbachev’s reforms during these years as the transition from communism to capitalism. These reforms were perceived less optimistic by many Soviet citizens, including Soviet Ukrainians.⁵²

The tragic event of Chernobyl⁵³ in April of 1986 is considered by many as the turning point in modern Ukrainian history as its propelled Ukraine’s movement towards its independence from the Centralized Soviet government.⁵⁴ This ecological disaster, as well as neglect by the Soviet leadership, united the intellectual elite of the Ukrainian Republic in 1986 against the Soviet regime in Moscow. “Chernobyl was the first event to

⁵⁰ Stephen White, “The USSR: Patterns of Autocracy and Industrialization” ed. Archie Brown and Jack Gray *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist State* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc, 1979), p. 34.

⁵¹ Lawrence. W. Lerner and Donald W. Treadgold, *Gorbachev and the Soviet Future* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988).

⁵² David Lane, *Soviet Society under Perestroika* (London: Routledge, 1992). David Mandel, *Perestroika and the Soviet People*, (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1991).

⁵³ On April 26, 1986 during the planned test on the fourth last reactor of the nuclear plant, the reactor exploded due to neglect by the operators who ignored the automatic warning and continue with the test. According to the witnesses of that event the Soviet leadership refused to inform Ukrainians about the danger of the radiation. Jim T. Smith and Nicholas A. Beresford, *Chernobyl- Catastrophe and Consequences* (Chichester: Praxis Publishing, 2005), p. 3. Tomasz Goban-Klas “Gorbachev's Glasnost: A Concept in Need of Theory and Research” *European Journal of Communication*, Vol. 4, Issue 3, 1989, pp. 247-254.

⁵⁴ Tatyana Vorozhko, “Chernobyl speed up the collapse of USSR, according to historians.” 26 April 2011 *Voice of America* <https://ukrainian.voanews.com/a/chornobyl-ussr-04-26-2011-120721109/240298.html>, accessed June 09, 2017.

inspire what in the end would grow into a popular national movement.”⁵⁵ Many Ukrainian activists and poets such as Borys Oliinyk, Ivan Dziuba, Ivan Drach and Iurii Andrukhovych addressed the extent and impact of this tragedy for the future of Ukraine through their work.⁵⁶ The Ukrainian Culturological Club was established in Kyiv in 1987.⁵⁷ The members of the club sought to unite Ukrainians in protest against the Soviet leadership whose failure to respond to the incident jeopardized the lives of Ukrainians in danger by ignoring the danger of radiation and misinforming the public about it. The organization Rukh (Movement) for Ukraine’s independence with its leader Viacheslav Chornovil was created in Lviv in 1989. The Rukh movement became very popular in the Western and Central regions of Ukraine. The leaders of the Rukh, Chornovil and Lukyanenko were also the authors of the Ukrainian Constitution after the country’s independence in 1991.

Political activities also took place in other regions. In the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, different movements were created to support the unity of the Soviet Union. The groups such as “United Society for the Protection of the Russian Language Populations in Donbass” and “Democratic movement of the Donbass” were created in the early 1990s.⁵⁸ They demanded the Federalization of Ukraine or an autonomous Donbass within a federal Ukraine. They were comparably smaller with less support than the movements working towards independence and were therefore not as influential. Overall, citizens’

⁵⁵ Roman Solchanyk, *Ukraine: From Chernobyl to Sovereignty*, (London: Macmillan, 1992), xiii.

⁵⁶ Romana M. Bahry, *Echoes of Glasnost in Soviet Ukraine*, (Toronto: Captus University Publication, 1989).

⁵⁷ Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine. A History* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2000), p. 535.

⁵⁸ Taras Kuzio and Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence* (New York: St. Martin Press, 1994), p. 197.

political activities in Ukraine increased in the years leading to Ukraine's independence of 1991.

2.3. Ukraine between 1991 and 2004

The Declaration of the Sovereignty of Ukraine was adopted by the Parliament of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic on 16 July 1990.⁵⁹ The text of the Declaration expressed Ukrainian nationhood as follows: "Citizens of Republic of all nationalities are the people of Ukraine. The people of Ukraine are the only source of power in the Republic."⁶⁰ The Ukrainian Parliament passed the Act of Declaration of the Independence of Ukraine on August 24, 1991, as a response to the failed political coup attempt that had taken place in Moscow five days earlier on August 19.⁶¹ The Declaration was an instrument to secure the states' border and citizens' rights.⁶² The declaration of the Independence of Ukraine was followed in September of 1991 by the Declaration of Independence of the Sovereign State of Crimea as a constituent part of Ukraine.⁶³

The national referendum on the Act of the Declaration of Independence took place on December 01, 1991 across Ukraine. 28,804,000 Ukrainians participated in the

⁵⁹ Declaration of the Sovereignty of Ukraine, *Declaratzia pro Derzhavnyy Suverinetet Ukrayiny Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy*, 16 .07. 1990 N 55- XII <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/55-12>, accessed March 31, 2017.

⁶⁰ Art. II of the Declaration, *Declaration on the Sovereignty of Ukraine, Declaratsia pro Derzhavnyy Suverinetet Ukrayiny Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy*, 16 .07. 1990 N 55- XII <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/55-12>, accessed March 31, 2017.

⁶¹ The eight-man junta of leaders of the government, Military and Security apparatus unsuccessfully tried to assume power from Michael Gorbachev. This coup was a direct response to the Union Treaty, which would have devolved more powers to the Soviet republic, including Ukraine. See Michael Mandelbaum, "Coup de Grace: The End of the Soviet Union" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 1, 1991/92, pp. 164-183.

⁶² The Act of Independence made Ukraine a sovereign state; whereas the Act of sovereignty kept Ukrainian Soviet Republic within the USSR.

⁶³ *Gosudarstvennyy Sovet Respubliki Krym* http://crimea.gov.ru/o_gossovete/istoriya_sovremennost, accessed April 10, 2017.

referendum, which was an 84.18% turnout rate nationwide.⁶⁴ Among them, 90.32% supported the Act of Declaration of independence of Ukraine.⁶⁵ The highest support was in the Western region, where 98.67% in Ternopil'ska oblast and 97.46% in L'viv'ska oblast supported the Independence. However, the Eastern and Southern regions also supported the independence in high numbers. In Donetsk oblast, 83.90% of citizens supported the independence, followed by 83.86% in Luhans'ka oblast. In the southern city of Odessa, 85.38% of the citizens supported the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine. In Crimea, 54.19% and Sevastopol, 57.07% of the citizens supported the Independence of Ukraine, which is more than the majority.

Table 2.3.1 Results of the National Referendum, 1991

Oblasts	Voter Turnout, %	Votes "Yes", millions	Votes "Yes", %
Crimea	67.50	561,496	54.19
Vinnits'ka	91.41	1,242,244	95.43
Volyn'ska	93.20	684,834	96.32
Dniprope'trovs'ka	81.80	2,127,089	90.36
Donets'ka	76.73	2,481,157	83.90
Zhytomyr'ska	90.53	950,976	95.06
Zakarpats'ka	82.91	657,678	92.59
Zaporizh'ska	80.59	1,135,271	90.66
Ivano-Frankiv'ska	95.73	960,281	98.42
Kyiv'ska	88.02	1,202,773	95.52
Kirovograd'ska	88.07	764,053	93.88
Luhans'ka	80.65	1,410,894	83.86
L'viv'ska	95.24	1,866,921	97.46
Mykolajiv'ska	84.10	732,179	89.45
Odess'ka	75.01	1,205,755	85.38
Poltav'ska	91.87	1,145,639	94.93
Rivnens'ka	92.99	726,575	95.96
Sums'ka	88.41	878,196	92.61
Ternopil'ska	97.10	825,526	98.67
Harkiv'ska	75.68	1,553,065	86.33
Herson'ska	83.40	679,451	90.13
Hmel'nyts'ka	93.44	1,019,813	96.30
Cherkas'ka	90.17	999,603	96.03
Chernivets'ka	87.68	544,022	92.78
Chernigiv'ska	90.78	908,904	93.74
Kyiv	80.35	1,428,001	92.88
Sevastopol	53.74	111,671	57.07
Total	84.18	28,804,071	90.32

Source: the author created the table based on the results of the official protocol of the results of the referendum. *Derzhavna Arkhivna Sluzhba Ukrayiny, Ukrainian Official State Archives* http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/25_Nez/index.php?69, accessed April 03, 2017.

⁶⁴ Based on the results of the official protocol of the results of the referendum. *Derzhavna Arkhivna Sluzhba Ukrayiny Ukrainian Official State Archives* http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/25_Nez/index.php?69 accessed April 05, 2017.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

Thus, the official results of the Independence referendum, show that Ukraine's citizens from all regions supported future independence.

To promote the newly created independent state of Ukraine, the political elite of Ukraine adopted new symbols of the sovereign state. The yellow and blue national flag was adopted as the official standard of Ukraine by Parliament on January 28, 1992.⁶⁶ This was the same flag that had been adopted earlier in Ukraine's history by the Central Rada during a brief period of independence in 1918.⁶⁷ Another symbol of Ukrainian independence that was introduced was the coat of arms of Ukraine from the times of Volodymyr the Great, the Prince of Kievan Rus.⁶⁸ The *Tryzub* (Trident) was used in the coat of arms of Ukraine during the time of the Ukrainian National Republic in 1918. For the text of the Ukrainian National Anthem, a poem "Ukraine Has Not Yet Died" by Ukrainian author Pavlo Chubynsky was chosen.⁶⁹ The poem was published for the first time in 1860 in Galicia, Western Ukraine. It was used in 1918 as the anthem of the Ukrainian People's Republic, and in 1939 as the anthem of Trans-Carpathian Republic (Western Ukraine).⁷⁰ The same can be said about Ukrainian national currency *Hryvna*, the name of which was adopted from the days of Ukrainian Peoples' Republic of 1918-1919.⁷¹ Thus, although very nationalistic, patriotic and evocative to the majority of

⁶⁶ Postanova Verkhovnoyi Rady Pro Prapor Ukrayiny from 28. 01. 1992 N 2067- XII *Verkhovna Rada Ukrayiny* <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2067-12>, accessed April 05, 2017.

⁶⁷ Central Rada did not include the territories of Eastern Ukraine.

⁶⁸ *Ukrayinsky Instytut Natsional'noyi Pam'yati Ukrainian Institute of National Memory* <http://www.memory.gov.ua/publication/derzhavnii-gerb-ukraini>, accessed April 07, 2017.

⁶⁹ Chubynsky was originally from Central Ukraine which was considered a symbol of Unity for all Ukrainians. *Ukrayinsky Instytut Natsionalynoyi Pamyaty Ukrainian Institute of National Memory* <http://www.memory.gov.ua/publication/derzhavnii-gerb-ukraini>, accessed April 07, 2017.

⁷⁰ *National Library of Ukraine* <http://www.nbuv.gov.ua/node/536>, accessed April 10, 2017.

⁷¹ *National Bank of Ukraine* https://bank.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=36714, accessed April 14, 2017.

Ukrainians, Ukrainian national symbols did not resonate with all Ukrainian citizens. It is suggested that symbols of Ukraine were rooted in the history of central and western Ukraine in its majority. This potentially could lead to future tensions among the regions especially those with a high percentage of Russian minorities.⁷²

The establishment of an independent political system of government was set out in the Constitution of Ukraine of 1996,⁷³ which defined Ukraine's political system as a unitary republic (Ch. I, Art. 2). The President of Ukraine has conferred the title of the Head of State (Ch. V, Art, 102). The President had the power of legislative initiative, to appoint the Prime-Minister of Ukraine, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Defence (Ch. V, Art. 106, S. 1-10). The President was given the power to dismiss the Parliament, as well as to appoint the Head of the National Bank and the Head of the National Television Council (Ch. V, Art.106, S. 12-13). The parliament was defined as the main legislative institution of Ukraine (Ch. IV. Art. 75). However, according to the text of the Constitution, the Parliament did not have the power to appoint the Prime Minister, but the power to confirm the appointment of the Prime Minister and his/her cabinet (Art. 85, S. 12). The Constitution provided for a presidential-parliamentary system of government, which is considered less democratic for transition country than the parliamentary system of government.⁷⁴ The separation of executive and legislative

⁷² Rumer, Eugene B. "Eurasia Letter: Will Ukraine Return to Russia?" *Foreign Policy*, No. 96, 1994, pp. 129–144.

⁷³ The text of the Constitution of Ukraine was adopted only 5 years after the Declaration of Independence in 1991.

⁷⁴ Henry Hale in details explains the character and consequences of these systems in the post-communist countries. Henry Hale, *Patronal Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).


branches of power, which is one of the fundamental principles of a democratic political system,⁷⁵ was not a feature in government in Ukraine in the early days of Independence.

2.3.1. The political culture of Ukraine between 1991 and 2004

The citizens of post-Soviet Ukraine, according to Kuzio and co-authors, still possessed the Soviet sense of political helplessness, a culture of victimization, political intolerance, deep distrust of authority, and political passivity.⁷⁶ It was due to the Soviet totalitarian system that destroyed all vestiges of already weak civil society.⁷⁷

Despite high public support for Ukraine's independence during the national referendum in 1991, the new political and economic reality was objectively less promising. The turbulent changes in all aspects of the life of the Ukrainian society had an impact on its demographic composition. As Figure 2.3.1.1 illustrates, between 1992 and 2004, the population of Ukraine declined from 51.7 million in 1992 to 47.4 million in 2004. This decline happened for numerous reasons: the birth rate fell, while the death rate increased; labor migration of citizens in search of employment increased as well.⁷⁸

Figure 2.3.1.1 Population of Ukraine (in millions), 1992-2004



Source: author created the graph based on the official statistics. *Russia/ NIS statistics publications, 15 let*

⁷⁵ Persson, Torsten, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabellini. "Separation of powers and political accountability." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112. No 4, 1997, pp. 1163-1202.

⁷⁶ Paul D'Anieri, Robert Kravchuk and Taras Kuzio, *Politics and Society in Ukraine* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), p.7.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, p. 141.

⁷⁸ *Russia/ NIS statistics publications, 15 let Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv. 15 Years of the Commonwealth of Independent States (1991-2005)* <https://dlib-eastview-com.proxy.library.carleton.ca/browse/publication/39753>, accessed March 08, 2017.

The post-Soviet environment was changing, and citizens reacted to changes in the political environment in different ways. During the Soviet years many Ukrainians were enrolled in professional forms of training that were provided by the technical college. After 1991, the number of technical colleges decreased from 754 to 505 in 2005-2006 so did the number of students from 739,000 in 1991 to 505,000 students in 2005 (Table 2.3.1.1).⁷⁹

Table. 2.3.1.1 Number of educational institutions/ student enrolment in Ukraine, 1991- 2005

Years	Day-time general educational schools		Secondary specialized education institutions		Higher education institutions	
	Number of schools, thous.	Number of pupils, thous.	Number of institutions, thous.	Number of students, thous.	Number of institutions, thous.	Number of students, thous.
1991/1992	21,4	6918	754	739	156	876
1995/1996	21,9	7007	782	618	255	923
2000/2001	22,0	6647	664	528	315	1403
2004/2005	21,4	5301	606	505	345	2204

Source: *Russia/ NIS statistics publications, 15 let Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv. 15 Years of the Commonwealth of Independent States (1991-2005)* <https://dlib-eastview-com.proxy.library.carleton.ca/browse/publication/39753>, accessed March 08, 2017.

By contrast, student enrolment in higher education increased from 156,000 in 1991 to 345,000 in 2005. The number of students increased from 876,000 to 2,204,000.

What is the connection between these changes and Ukraine’s political culture? A higher level of education is a strong indicator of political awareness and participation of the citizens.⁸⁰ Thus, it is posited that as more young Ukrainians attend higher educational institutions, they became more politically active and aware. Higher levels of education provide them with more knowledge and skills to survive during periods of

⁷⁹ Ukrainian workers have experienced the biggest decline among all post-Soviet countries. Mandel, David. *"Labour after communism." Auto workers and their unions in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2004), p. 172.

⁸⁰ Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman and Henry Brady, *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

political and economic instability. Furthermore, higher education is associated with higher civic participation.⁸¹ As we know, students were the most active protesters during 1993, 2004 and 2014 protests.

Changes also were observed in the distribution of public versus private sector employment among Ukrainians between 1994 and 2004.

Table 2.3.1.2 Type of employment among Ukrainians (%), 1994-2003

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Public sector	51.2	45.4	42.7	39.9	37.2	35.3	31.8	30.4	29.7	27.8
Private Sector	6.1	11	9.6	9.4	11.7	12	13.8	15.2	19.1	20.2
Both sectors	1.8	1.3	1.8	1.4	2	1.9	1.5	2.3	2.4	2.6
I'm not employed	39.3	42.1	45.9	48.9	50.7	52.9	51.9	46.8	48.8	45.2
No answer	1.6	0.2	0	0.3	0.1	0	0.2	2	0.6	0.3

Source: Author created the table based on the results of a public opinion survey in Ukraine. Natalya Panina, ed., *Ukrainian society 1994- 2004: Sociological Monitoring*, Institute of Sociology, National Initiative Foundation p. 46.


By the time of the Orange revolution in 2004, the percentage of those who were employed in the public sector had decreased to 27.8 %. The percentage of those who were employed in the private sector increased from 6.1% in 1994 to 20.2% in 2003.

Unfortunately, the highest percentage of respondents between 1994 and 2003 were those who were not employed at all (39.3% and 45.2%). This information supports the proposition that most Ukrainians were not satisfied with their socio-economic situation. The results of public opinion surveys lend further support to this assumption (Figure 2.3.1.2). Across all years between 1994 and 2003, more than 60% of Ukrainians expressed their dissatisfaction with their position in society. The highest percentage of discontent was in 1998 (77.5%), the year of economic crisis in Russia, which impacted

⁸¹ Joseph E Kahne and Susan E Spote. "Developing Citizens: The Impact of Civic Learning Opportunities on Students' Commitment to Civic Participation." *American Educational Research Journal*, Vol.45, No.3, 2008, pp.738-766.

the post-communist countries.⁸² Thus, despite country new independence, most of its citizens were dissatisfied with their position in society.

Figure 2.3.1.2 Satisfaction with a present position in society (%), 1994-2003



Source: the author created the figure based on the results of a public opinion survey in Ukraine. Natalya Panina, ed., *Ukrainian society 1994-2004: Sociological Monitoring*, Institute of Sociology, National Initiative Foundation p. 24. The question was asked: Are you generally satisfied with your present position in society?

Citizens' dissatisfaction with their position in society was combined with their distrust towards main political institutions. Less than 10% of respondents answered that they trust Verkhovna Rada. The lowest level was in 2001 when only 6.7% of respondents expressed trust in the Rada.

Table 2.3.1.3 Trust in the Verkhovna Rada and government (%), 1994-2003

		1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Verkhovna Rada	Trust	9.7	9.5	8.7	6.9	7.3	7.5	7.1	6.7	7.4	7.1
	Distrust	51.2	60.6	62	64.3	65	62.5	62	64.2	65.1	63.1
Government	Trust	11.4	15.9	13	9.5	8.6	9.8	13.7	11.6	9.6	7.3
	Distrust	50.8	49.5	54.3	58.2	61.6	61.9	49.4	56.5	58.8	58.6

Source: the author created the table based on the results of a public opinion survey in Ukraine. Natalya Panina, ed., *Ukrainian society 1994- 2004: Sociological Monitoring*, Institute of Sociology, National Initiative Foundation p.20. The question was asked: How much trust do you have in the government? How much trust do you have in the Verkhovna Rada?

Low levels of trust in government was also observed. Surprisingly, citizens' level of trust toward the nonelected government was higher than towards the elected parliament.⁸³ The highest level of trust in the government was observed in 1995 (15.9%) and 2000 (13.7%).

⁸² Brian Pinto and Sergei Ulatic, "Financial Globalization and the Russian Crisis of 1998" Policy Research Working Paper, *The World Bank* <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/3797/WPS5312.pdf>, accessed March 29, 2017.

⁸³ Prior to 2004, the government and the candidacy of the Prime Minister was proposed by the President to the Rada for the confirmation.

In 2000, Viktor Yushchenko, the future leader of the Orange revolution was appointed as the Prime Minister. Yushchenko was perceived as a reformer at the time of his appointment.⁸⁴

Citizens' distrust in the country's main political institutions could be related to the specifics of the political elite in independent Ukraine. Many new political leaders were representatives of the former Communist Party of Ukraine.⁸⁵ The composition of the inaugural Ukrainian Parliament after Independence, which was elected in March of 1994, reflected the prior Soviet elite. The particularities of the electoral law meant that only 338 seats out of 450 were filled during the election.⁸⁶ Among them, 96 were representatives from the Communist Party of Ukraine, 20 from the National Movement of Ukraine, 18 from Ukrainian Peasant Political Party and 14 from the Socialist Political Party of Ukraine and 168 without any party affiliation.⁸⁷ Furthermore, the mean age of the composition of the Ukrainian Parliament of 1994 was 45.⁸⁸

The same can be said about presidents of independent Ukraine. For example, during the first presidential election in Ukraine in December of 1991, six candidates competed for the post of the President. Among them, three candidates were former

⁸⁴ "Viktor Yushchenko, Ukraine's faint hope" *The Economist* May 22, 2000 <https://www.economist.com/europe/2000/05/04/viktor-yushchenko-ukraines-faint-hope>, accessed January 10, 2019.

⁸⁵ Kramer, Mark. "Special Issue: The Collapse of the Soviet Union (Part 2): Introduction." *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol.5, No. 4, 2003, pp. 1-42, p. 6.

⁸⁶ During the 1994 parliamentary election, Ukraine used the majoritarian SMD electoral system, meaning that a candidate has to obtain more than 50% of votes in order to be elected.


⁸⁷ Communist party was still present in every convocation of Ukrainian parliament until the election of 2014, after the Euromaidan.

⁸⁸ The calculation was performed by author based on the date of birth of the members of Parliament of second convocation, 1994-1998. *Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy* http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/radan_gs09/d_index_arh?skl=2, accessed April 08, 2017.

Soviet dissidents - Viacheslav Chornovil, Levko Lukyanenko, and Yuriy Yukhnovsky.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, the winner of the first presidential election was Leonid Kravchuk, a former high-ranking official of the Ukrainian Communist Party.⁹⁰ Kravchuk received 61.59% of support nationwide with 84.32% voter turnout.⁹¹ The Leader of Ukrainian National Movement Viacheslav Chornovil took second place with 23.27%.

Political trust in the President was low as well (Figure 2.3.1.3). In 1994 52.8% of respondents distrusted the first President of independent Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk. The second President, Leonid Kuchma, who was elected in October of 1994,⁹² enjoyed a higher level of citizens' trust in 1995, with 33.3% expressing trust. However, in the following years, citizens trust towards President Kuchma declined. In 1999, the year of his re-election, which did not meet international standards of fair and free elections, 57.9% of respondents distrusted the President.⁹³ Citizens' trust in the President declined even further in 2002 and 2003 when 59.2% and 60% expressed their distrust.

Figure 2.3.1.3 Trust in the President (%), 1994-2003



Source: author created the figure based on the results of public opinion in Ukraine. Natalya Panina, ed.,

⁸⁹ Bogdan Harasymiw, *Post- Communist Ukraine* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2000).

⁹⁰ “Vybory v Nezalezniy Ukrayini” *Visnyk Centralnoyi Vyborchoyi Komissii*, N1 2007, http://www.cvk.gov.ua/visnyk/pdf/2007_1/Page93.pdf, accessed April 10, 2017.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² Kuchma won in the second round of the election against incumbent President Kravchuk with 52.14% of the votes. “Vybory v Nezalezniy Ukrayini” *Visnyk Centralnoyi Vyborchoyi Komissii*, N1 2007, http://www.cvk.gov.ua/visnyk/pdf/2007_1/Page93.pdf, accessed May 05, 2017.

⁹³ The election failed to meet a significant number of the OSCE commitments according to the report by the OSCE. See “Ukraine, 31 October and 14 November 1999 presidential elections. Final report” *OSCE* <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/15000?download=true>, accessed April 12, 2017.

Ukrainian society 1994- 2004: Sociological Monitoring, Institute of Sociology, National Initiative Foundation, Kyiv, 2004, p. 20.

The low level of trust in the President may be correlated with events that took place in Ukraine at that time. In 1999, the leader of the Ukrainian National Movement Viacheslav Chornovil, who was a potential presidential candidate, died in a suspicious car crash.⁹⁴ Many considered him to be a powerful opponent against Kuchma in the upcoming election. The period of 1999-2000 was also when journalist Georhiy Gongadze, an open critic of Kuchma, was brutally killed.⁹⁵ This horrific event gave impetus to the opposition movement against Kuchma. Soon after, the Socialist party leader, Oleksandr Moroz, who was running as a Presidential candidate in 1999 election and took the third place, held a conference where he publicly released the secret tapes by Major Melnychenko, one of the security guards of President Kuchma.⁹⁶ Moroz instructed Melnychenko to collect information against the incumbent President.⁹⁷

The tapes recorded in total more than 50 hours of the President's private conversations in his office. The President's involvement in the murder of journalist Georhiy Gongadze, illegal arms sales, and corruption, prosecution of the opposition was revealed.⁹⁸ They also disclosed that the President's entourage was not united around him.

⁹⁴ The 13 years long investigation did not bring any results; however; journalists suspected that it was a murder. "13 let bez Chornovila: delo o DTP s pryznakamy ubiystva" *Segodnya* 24 March 2012 <http://www.segodnya.ua/politics/power/13-let-bez-chornovila-delo-o-dtp-c-priznakami-ubijctva.html>, accessed March 30, 2017.

⁹⁵ The beheaded body of the journalist was found outside of Kyiv in November of 2000, two months after his disappearance. For the chronology of the event see: "Georhiy Gongadze: A horrific Crime" *Kyiv Post*, September 27, 2010 <https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/georgiy-gongadze-murder-a-horrific-crime-82723.html>, accessed April 14, 2017.

⁹⁶ Taras Kuzio, "Oligarchs, Tapes and Oranges: 'Kuchmagate' to the Orange Revolution" *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2007, pp. 30-56, p. 44

⁹⁷ Oleg Bazalyuk, *Corruption in Ukraine: Ruler's Mentality and the Destiny of the Nation, Geophilosophy of Ukraine* (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), p.102.

⁹⁸ Hans van Zon, "Political Culture and Neo-Patrimonialism under Leonid Kuchma" *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.52. No.5, September/October 2005. p.16.

The Office of the General Prosecutor later confirmed the authenticity of the tapes based on the results of the technical analysis.⁹⁹

Citizens' low level of trust in the main political institutions was combined with their high level of interest in politics. Between 1994 and 2003, the majority of respondents chose the option of "somewhat interested" (Table 2.3.1.4). This category increased from 62.5% in 1994 to 70.2% in 2003, the highest among all years.

Table 2.3.1.4 Interest in Politics (%), 1994-2003

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Very interested	9.8	10.7	9.3	9.1	9.4	9.3	10.9	10.2	12	11.6
Somewhat interested	62.5	59.7	60	62	63.2	63.9	67.1	65.4	68.5	70.2
Totally uninterested	27.2	29.2	30.4	28.7	27.2	26.7	21.9	24.2	19.2	18


Source: the author created the table based on the results of a public opinion survey in Ukraine. Natalya Panina, ed., *Ukrainian society 1994- 2004: Sociological Monitoring*, Institute of Sociology, National Initiative Foundation p. 12. The question was asked: To what extent you are interested in politics?

Thus, before the Orange revolution Ukrainians expressed a high interest in politics. At the same time, this high interest in politics was combined with low political competence. Looking at citizens' responses about their level of political knowledge, a minority reported having "sufficient" political knowledge between 1994- 2003. This shows that although Ukrainians in higher numbers expressed their interest in politics, only a small number admitted their high political competence. This pattern is unexpected, as usually citizens who expressed high interests in politics also report high political competence and awareness.¹⁰⁰ In Ukraine, we observed that citizens had a high interest in politics, but low political competence.

⁹⁹ "The voices on the tapes by Melnychenko are authentic – stated the General Prokuratura" *Ukrayinska Pravda* February 02, 2001 <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2001/02/2/2981786/>, accessed April 12, 2017.

¹⁰⁰ Pippa Norris, *Democratic Deficit, Critical Citizens Revisited* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 143.

Figure 2.3.1.4 Political knowledge (%), 1995-2003



Source: the author created the figure based on the results of a public opinion survey in Ukraine. Natalya Panina, ed., *Ukrainian society 1994- 2004: Sociological Monitoring*, Institute of Sociology, National Initiative Foundation p. 27. The question was asked: Do you feel that you sufficiently possess the contemporary political knowledge? The figure represents the category “sufficient”.

Ukraine’s media environment may also explain citizens' low political competence at that time. Although Ukrainian media experienced less censorship in the early years of independence, it increased during Kuchma’s presidency starting in 1994 and especially after 1999.¹⁰¹ What was unique for Ukraine that “The establishment was not trying to promote an ideology since it had none, but rather was limiting the amount of information circulating so that people would not know really what was going on, creating information vacuum.”¹⁰²

And although independent opposition media started to appear in Ukraine before the Orange revolution, they were very limited.¹⁰³ Only 0.043% of the population used the Internet in 1994¹⁰⁴. This percentage increased to 3.489% in 2004, but it was still extremely low.¹⁰⁵ If citizens had limited information about political events in Ukraine, they would be less competent or biased in their interpretation of the events. It also could impact their political actions.

¹⁰¹ Marta Dycsok, “Breaking Through the Information Blockade: Election and Revolution in Ukraine 2004” *Canadian Slavonic Paper/ Revue Canadienn des Slavistes*, Vol. XLVII, No. 3-4, September-December 2005, pp.241-264, p.245.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³The most notable was Channel 5 which started to broadcast on September 01, 2003. Anecdotally, Petro Poroshenko, the current President of Ukraine, was one of the first owners. *Channel 5* <https://www.5.ua/about/istoriya>, accessed January 06, 2019.


¹⁰⁴ “Individuals using the Internet, % of population. Ukraine.” *The World Bank* <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS?locations=UA>, accessed January 06, 2019.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

Political efficacy and political activity

Regarding citizen's political efficacy, it was low in the years leading to the Orange revolution. As we can see, only a small percentage of Ukrainians expressed their willingness to take actions against government decisions that encroached on people's interests. Nevertheless, we can see an increase in the number of those who were willing to take any actions between 2000 (4%) and 2002 (7.3%). In 2003 it declined to 5.6%. But it was still higher than in 2000. We may conclude that starting in 2000, Ukrainians, although in very small numbers, were more willing to take actions against government decisions that encroached on peoples' interests.

Figure 2.3.1.5 Willingness to take actions against the government (%), 1994-2003



Source: the author created the figure based on the results of a public opinion survey in Ukraine. Natalya Panina, ed., *Ukrainian society 1994- 2004: Sociological Monitoring*, Institute of Sociology, National Initiative Foundation p. 17. The question was asked: If the Ukrainian government made a decision that encroached on people's interest, would you take some kind of action against this decision? The figure represents the percentage of those who answered. "Yes, I would."

The question is which type of actions they were willing to take? Official or unofficial?


Looking at the citizen's participation in elections, we can confirm that all elections in independent Ukraine had a high level of voter turnout. These numbers were comparable or higher to the countries of established democracies.¹⁰⁶ The highest voter

¹⁰⁶ The average voter turnout in Canada during the last five federal elections was 62,76%. "Voter Turnout at Federal Elections and Referendums" *Elections Canada* <http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?dir=turn&document=index&lang=e§ion=ele>, accessed April 10, 2017.

turnout was observed during the first election in independent Ukraine in 1991 - 84.32%.

The lowest voter turnout was during the 2002 parliamentary election, the last one prior to the Orange revolution. 69.39% of eligible Ukrainian voters participated in the 2002 election.

Figure 2.3.1.6 Voter turnout (%), 1991- 2004




Source: *Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine*. <http://www.cvk.gov.ua>, accessed April 10, 2017. For 1994 and 2004 presidential, % of voter turnout represented for the second round.

Did this indicate that Ukraine was or was becoming a democratic state? As will be discussed, this high political participation rate was not necessarily the result of the democratic transformation in Ukraine, but the result of high levels of political instability, economic crisis and a desire to change political personnel in power.

An interesting dynamic was observed regarding citizens' opinions towards taking part in political protests. Citizens' high level of dissatisfaction with their position in society between 1994 and 2003 was combined with an increase of the number of Ukrainians who agreed that it is important to protest the significant decrease in standard of living in Ukraine. As Figure 2.3.1.7 illustrates, between 1994 and 2003, the percentage of those who agreed with this statement, increased from 22.7% to 46.8 %. Citizens' opinions started to shift between 1994 and 1998. In 1999-2000, the percentage of those who agreed that it is important to protest slightly decrease to 34% and 30.6%. Between 2001 and 2003 it increased again. In 2003, 46.8% of respondents stated that it is better to protest actively the decrease in standard of living than keeping peace and order at any cost.

Figure 2.3.1.7 Support for protest, Ukraine (%), 1994-2003



Source: author created the figure based on the results of public opinion survey in Ukraine. Natalya Panina, ed., *Ukrainian society 1994- 2004: Sociological Monitoring*, Institute of Sociology, National Initiative Foundation p.18. The question was asked: In your opinion, which is better- endurance of material difficulties of any kind as to keep order, peace, and harmony in the country or, in the case of a significant decrease in standard of living, take to the streets in protest? The figure does not include a category of “difficult to say.”

Importantly, citizens’ support for taking to the street to protest a significant decrease in the standard of living coalesced with real political protests. As we know, in 1999 Leonid Kuchma was elected for the second term as the President of Ukraine. The election did not meet the international standard of electoral integrity.¹⁰⁷ The disappearance of the opposition journalist Georhiy Gongadze took place in September of 2000.¹⁰⁸ The protest movement “Ukraine without Kuchma”, the first political protest in independent Ukraine against a sitting President, started in 2000.¹⁰⁹ The leaders of the protests were the future leaders of the Orange revolution: Yuliya Tymoshenko and Oleksandr Moroz. Then-Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko did not join this opposition movement.¹¹⁰ In his

¹⁰⁷ The election failed to meet a significant number of the OSCE commitments according to the report by the OSCE. See “Ukraine, 31 October and 14 November 1999 presidential elections. Final report” *OSCE* <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/15000?download=true>, accessed April 12, 2017.

¹⁰⁸ Gongadze disappeared in September of 2001. The beheaded body of the journalist was found outside of Kyiv in November of 2000, two months after his disappearance. For the chronology of the event see: “Georhiy Gongadze: A horrific Crime” *Kyiv Post*, September 27, 2010 <https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/georgiy-gongadze-murder-a-horrific-crime-82723.html>, accessed April 14, 2017.

¹⁰⁹ Pavlo Solodko, “2001: masovi sutychny z milititsia – apofeos “Ukrayina bez Kuchmy” *Istorychna Pravda*, 09 March 2011 <http://www.istpravda.com.ua/videos/2011/03/9/30212/> accessed March 24, 2017.

¹¹⁰ Yushchenko only joined the opposition in 2002, after his dismissal and prior to the parliamentary election of 2002. See Taras Kuzio- "From Kuchma to Yushchenko Ukraine's 2004 Presidential Elections and the Orange Revolution." *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.52, No.2, 2005, pp. 29-44, p.31.

memoir, Kuchma noted this. He commented that Yushchenko was playing a double game of simultaneously being the President's supporter then moving to oppose him.¹¹¹

Yushchenko stated that his relationship with Kuchma started to deteriorate during the period of Gongadze's disappearance.¹¹²

According to the participants in those events, "Ukraine without Kuchma" was the first mass political protest before the Orange revolution, which united some of the political elite with regular citizens in a movement against the President.¹¹³ They also mentioned that "Ukraine without Kuchma" was vital to the "psychology" of the people to show them "another way."¹¹⁴ And although only a small percentage of the population participated in "Ukraine without Kuchma" and the protest was brief, we can attest that political opposition and political activists were active in the years prior to the Orange revolution. "The late 1990s and early 2000s were periods when interaction- direct and indirect, negative and positive- between activists and the politico-economic elite intensified."¹¹⁵

The Kuchma regime swiftly punished the political opposition; Yuliya Tymoshenko was imprisoned in February of 2001 and charged with forging customs documents and smuggling gas during her presidency of United Energy Systems of

¹¹¹ Leonid Kuchma, "Posle Maidana, Zapiski Prezidenta" Official website of Kuchma Foundation "Ukraine" www.kuchma.org.ua/upload/iblock/303/posle_maidana_2005_2006_zapiski_prezidenta.pdf, accessed March 24, 2017.

¹¹² Viktor Yushchenko *Ne derzhavny tayemnutsy (Non-state secrets)* (Kyiv, 2015), p. 27.

¹¹³ Pavlo Solodko, "2001: masovi sutycky z militicia – apofeos "Ukrayina bez Kuchmy" *Istorychna Pravda*, 09 March 2011 <http://www.istpravda.com.ua/videos/2011/03/9/30212/> accessed March 24, 2017.

¹¹⁴ Tammy Lynch, "Building a revolution: Elite Choice and Opposition Tactics in Pre-Orange Ukraine" in Paul D'Anieri, ed., *Orange Revolution and Aftermath* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2011), p.56.

¹¹⁵ Olga Onuch, *Mapping Mass Mobilization. Understanding Revolutionary Moments in Argentina and Ukraine* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 119.

Ukraine.¹¹⁶ Prime Minister Yushchenko lost a confidence vote in the pro-presidential Rada on April 26, 2001, despite his popularity with the public.¹¹⁷ Soon after that, he joined the opposition and created his political party, which in the 2002 parliamentary election gained the highest percentage of votes, 23.57% nationwide.¹¹⁸ It was also around that time that Yushchenko started to plan his presidential 2004 campaign to replace the political regime of President Kuchma.¹¹⁹

Thus we can conclude that prior to the Orange revolution, Ukrainians already had previous experience in ousting the chief executives in 1990, 1993 and in protesting the President in 2000-2001 during the “Ukraine without Kuchma” political movement.¹²⁰ It may be suggested that citizens’ support for taking to the streets to protest in 2003 (46.8%) combined with high level of distrust in the President (60%) and their experiences with political protests created a favourable situation for potential protest. This opportunity arrived in 2004 during the presidential election.

2.4. The Orange Revolution

The presidential election of 2004 was supposed to be very competitive because the incumbent President Kuchma was not able to run as a presidential candidate in the election due to the constitutional limits of the presidency in Ukraine to two terms.¹²¹

¹¹⁶ Andrew Wilson, *The Orange revolution* (Yale University Press: London, 2005), p. 49.

¹¹⁷ “Dismissal of Yushchenko cabinet will lead to instability in Ukraine” *Radio Free Europe*, 13 April 2001 <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/873953.html>, accessed June 14, 2018.

¹¹⁸ Results of the 2002 parliamentary election, *CEC Central Electoral Commission* <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vd2002/WEBPROC0V6>, accessed May 16, 2018.

¹¹⁹ Andrew Wilson, *The Orange revolution* (London: Yale University Press, 2005), p. 69.

¹²⁰ In September of 1990, student protesters in Kyiv ousted then Primer Vitaly Masol and in 1993, protests by miners from Eastern Ukraine led to the early presidential election in 1994. See Nadia M. Diuk, *The Next Generation in Russia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan. Youth, politics, identity and change* (Maryland: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, 2012), p.33-65.

¹²¹ Art 9, s. 3 of the Law of Ukraine on the Election of the President of Ukraine, “Zakon pro Vybery Prezidenta Ukrainy” <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/474-146>, accessed March 30, 2017.

However, Kuchma proposed a controversial bill “About changes to the Constitution” in the name of separation of powers between the President and the Parliament one year before the election.¹²² The biggest changes included those to the Art. 103, the responsibility of the President of Ukraine, particularly section 5 of the Art. 103, which provided that the President is elected for a five-year term by a national election. The Bill proposed to eliminate the popular election of the President and to transfer power to the Rada to appoint the President. Thus, in the name of the political reform, the incumbent president attempted to secure his political future by empowering his loyal Prime-Minister Yanukovich. The bill passed in February of 2004, without any announcement to all members of parliament, which violated the Rada’s voting rules. Based on this violation, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) stated the violation of voting procedure in the Ukrainian parliament.¹²³ The controversial bill was cancelled that April, under the pressure of the international community and the opposition.¹²⁴

The election was scheduled for October 26, 2004, and had 26 registered presidential candidates.¹²⁵ According to the Law of Ukraine on the Election of the President of Ukraine (Art. 84, s.3), the candidate had to gain more than 50% of the of the votes to be elected in the first round.¹²⁶ If none of the candidates won a majority, the two leading candidates would participate in the second round runoff vote (Art.85, s. 1-3). The

¹²² Bill N 4105 from 04.09.2003 “Proekt Zakony pro zminy do Konstytutsyy Ukrainy” *Verkhovna Rada* http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=15751, accessed June 12, 2018.

¹²³ Resolution N 1364 (2004) PACE <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=17189&lang=en>, accessed June 12, 2018.

¹²⁴ Results of the voting, *Verkhovna Rada Ukrayiny*, 08 April 2004 http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/radan_gs09/ns_arh_golos?g_id=1157404&n_skl=4, accessed June 13, 2018

¹²⁵ *Central Election Commission* <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011>, accessed March 24, 2017.

¹²⁶ Law of Ukraine on the Election of the President of Ukraine”, “Zakon pro Vybery Prezydenta Ukrainy” <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/474-146>, accessed April 10, 2017.

result of the first round of the presidential election identified two leading candidates, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, and former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko. Viktor Yanukovich gained 39.26% of the votes nationwide, and Viktor Yushchenko received 39.90%.¹²⁷ The second round was scheduled for November 21, 2004.

Regarding electoral support across the regions prior to the election, Viktor Yushchenko was popular in Western and Central Ukraine, while Viktor Yanukovich had strong electoral support in Eastern and Southern Ukraine (Table 2.4.1).

Table 2.4.1 Support for Yanukovich and Yushchenko, October 2004¹²⁸

Would vote for:	Western	Western-Central	Eastern – Central	Southern	Eastern	Total
Yushchenko	77.7	61.7	39.8	18.8	4.5	42.4
Yanukovich	8.9	19.3	42.1	60.5	81.7	40.7
Against all	2.9	7.2	4.5	4.1	4.8	4.9
No answer	10.5	11.8	13.6	16.5	9.0	12.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: *Democratic Initiative Foundation*

<http://dif.org.ua/uploads/pdf/109481822357bc672b19c025.11105884.pdf>, accessed March 24, 2017. The question was asked: if during the second rounds the two candidates were Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovich and the election was today, who would you vote?"

However, both candidates had very similar levels of nationwide support with Yushchenko holding a small lead of 1.7%. Yanukovich, who was born and raised in Donetsk and was the Prime Minister of Ukraine during the election, was also supported by the Ukrainian government and President Kuchma as well as Russia.¹²⁹ Former Prime-

¹²⁷ *Central Electoral Commission* <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011>, accessed March 30, 2017.

¹²⁸ Western Region – Volynska, Rivnenska, Lvivska, Ivano-Frankivska, Ternopilka, Zakarpattia Chernivetska oblasti. Western- Central – Hmelnytska, Zhytomyrska, Vinnytska, Kirovohradska, Cherkaska, Kyivska ta Kyiv; Easter- Center –Dnipropetrovska, Poltavska, Sumska, Chernihivka; Southern – Odeska, Mykolayivska, Khersonska, Zaporizhska, Krym; Eastern – Kharkivska, Donetska ta Luhanska.

¹²⁹ Stephen Shulman and Stephen Bloom, “The legitimacy of foreign intervention in elections: the Ukrainian response” *Review of International Studies*, Vol.38, 2012, pp. 445–471. Michael McFall, ‘Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution’, *Inter-national Security*, Vol. 32, 2007, pp. 45–83.

Minister Viktor Yushchenko was the opposition candidate during the election and was considered more pro-western oriented.¹³⁰

During the second round of the election, support for the candidates was still regionally concentrated (Table 2.4.2). At the same time, Yushchenko with 52.9% nationwide support, was leading by 8% against Viktor Yanukovich's 44.2%.¹³¹

However, when the Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine announced the results of the second round on November 23, 2004, Viktor Yanukovich was declared the winner of the second round with 49.46% in comparison to 46.61% by Yushchenko.¹³²

Table 2.4.2 Results of exit-poll and CEC, Ukraine, November 2004

Regions	V. Yushchenko			V Yanukovich			Sum of differences
	Exit-poll	CEC	Difference	Exit-poll	CEC	Difference	
Ukraine	52,9	46,6	6,3	44,2	49,5	5,3	11,6
Western	89,4	84,3	5,0	9,5	13,3	3,8	8,9
Central West	79,7	70,2	9,5	17,8	25,5	7,6	17,2
Central East	54,9	48,8	6,1	39,8	45,7	5,9	11,9
Southern	29,3	23,8	5,5	66,8	66,8	0,0	5,5
Eastern	12,8	8,1	4,7	84,5	89,0	4,5	9,2

Source: http://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/ukr/NSD58_2004_ukr.pdf, p. 31, accessed March 30, 2017.

Reports by OSCE international elections' observers attested that the second round of the presidential election was "neither fair not free."¹³³ The opposition, represented at that time by Viktor Yushchenko, Yuliya Tymoshenko, Oleksandr Moroz and later Petro Poroshenko (current President of Ukraine) asked for Ukrainians to come to the main square in Kiev, Maidan, to protest the results of the second round. They were later joined

¹³⁰ Andrian Karatnycky, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution" *Foreign Affairs*, March 01, 2005, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2005-03-01/ukraines-orange-revolution>, accessed March 30, 2017.

¹³¹ The results of other exit-polls showed the victory of Viktor Yushchenko as well. "Presidetsky vybory ta Pomarancheva Revolutsiya" Kyiv, 2005. http://www.fes.kiev.ua/Dokument/election_ukr.pdf, accessed April 10, 2017.

¹³² Resultaty holosuvanya po Ukrayini. Povtorne holosuvanya, November 21, 2004. *Central Electoral Commission*, <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011>, accessed March 30, 2017.

¹³³ OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final report, "Ukraine. Presidential Election 31 October, 21 November and 26 December 2004." *OSCE* <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/14674?download=true>, accessed March 14, 2017.

by politicians such as Evgen Marchuk, the former head of the SBU (Ukrainian equivalent of the Central Intelligence Agency), Kyiv Mayor Oleksandr Omelchenko and the Governor of Zaporizhskya oblast Evgen Chervonenko. The Minister of Defence Oleksandr Kuz'muk made a public statement respecting the peaceful protest in Ukraine.¹³⁴ This indicated to the protesters that the Army, as well as Interior Ministry, would not use force against the protesters.¹³⁵ Within the days, more than one million Ukrainians, many of them from Kyiv and Western regions of Ukraine, came to Maidan to protest the results of the second round.¹³⁶ The Orange revolution had begun.

Supporters of Viktor Yanukovich also arrived by train from Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, numbering approximately 30,000.¹³⁷ Importantly, on November 28, the Governor of the city of Kharkiv (north-east) with the support from the Mayor of Moscow, held a conference, which demanded the independence of the South-Eastern People's Republic as a way of protesting Yushchenko's victory or a referendum on the federalization of Ukraine.¹³⁸ This indicated that support for the Orange team was not unanimous and future tensions could rise.

The nonviolent political protest in Kyiv was in its third week when under the pressure of the opposition and public, the Ukrainian Supreme Court of Ukraine ruled that

¹³⁴ *Kabinet Ministriv Ukrayiny* 24 November 2004

http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/news_article?art_id=10287863, accessed April 03, 2017.

¹³⁵ Hans van Zon, "Political Culture and Neo-Patrimonialism under Leonid Kuchma" *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.52, No5, September/October 2005, p.17.

¹³⁶ Mark R. Beissinger, "The semblance of democratic revolution: coalitions in Ukraine's orange revolution." *American Political Science Review*, Vol.107, No.03, 2013, pp. 574-592, p. 581.

¹³⁷ Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution* (Yale University Press, 2005), p. 133.

¹³⁸ *Ibid*, p. 145.

the results of the second round of the Presidential election were invalid.¹³⁹ All 18 eighteen judges signed the text of the judicial ruling. This was a turning point during the revolution as it indicated that judicial branch of power had withdrawn their support for President Kuchma and Prime-Minister Viktor Yanukovich.¹⁴⁰

On December 08, 2004, the Parliament of Ukraine implemented the Law on the re-election of the second round of the Presidential Election in Ukraine in 2004.¹⁴¹ President Kuchma signed the law. However, it took place under a special condition demanded by President Kuchma – the enactment of changes to the Constitution of Ukraine that would limit the Power of the future President (Art. 90) and increase the power of Parliament (Art.85) to appoint the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.¹⁴²

The re-election of the second round was scheduled December 26. 9,260 international election observers were deployed across the country to monitor the election.¹⁴³ The results of the re-election of the second round declared Viktor Yushchenko, the winner of the Presidential election with 51.99% of the votes nationwide in comparison to 44.20% by Viktor Yanukovich.¹⁴⁴ 29,068,309 Ukrainians participated in the re-election of the second round out of 37,613, 685 registered voters with a 77.28%

¹³⁹ Rishennya shchodo spravy za scarhoyu na ryshennya, dii ta bezdiyalnist Centralnoi Vyborchoi Komisii 03.12.2004 *Verkhovna Rada Ukrayiny* <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0090700-04>, accessed April 07 2017.

¹⁴⁰ According to Ukrainian law, President and Parliament appoint the judges of the Supreme Court, thus the judges represented different political groups.

¹⁴¹ Zakon Ukrayiny pro Osoblyvosti zastosuvannya Zakonu Ukrayiny Pro Vybory Prezydenta 08.12.2004 N 2221-IV. *Verkhovna Rada* <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2221-15>, accessed April 07,2017.

¹⁴² Zakon Ukrayiny Pro Vnesennya Zmin do Konstytutsii Ukrainy 08.12.2004, N 2222-IV *Verkhovna Rada Ukrayiny* <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2222-156>, accessed April 07, 2017.

¹⁴³ *Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine* <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011>, accessed April 07, 2017.

¹⁴⁴ Resultaty holosuvannya po Ukraini, Vybory Prezydenta Ukrayiny, povtorne holosuvanya 26.12.2004. *Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine* <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011>, accessed March 30, 2017.

turnout nationwide.¹⁴⁵ Yushchenko was sworn in as the third President of Ukraine on January 25, 2005. Yuliya Tymoshenko, the leader of a parliamentary majority, became the Prime-Minister of Ukraine. The Orange revolution ended as the new government began its work. Scholars who interviewed participants of the Orange revolution discovered that many of them admitted a need for “order” as their main motivation during the protest of 2004. The second most popular answer was “to live like people” (zhyty yak lyudy), meaning to have employment and economic stability.¹⁴⁶

2.4.1. Institutional changes of the Orange Revolution

The repeat of the second round of the Presidential election of 2004 led to changes to the Constitution of Ukraine authorized by the incumbent President Kuchma. These changes were implemented on December 8, 2004 and changed the presidential-parliamentary system of government to the parliamentary-presidential. More importantly, the President would no longer appoint the Prime Minister. The position would be filled by the Parliamentary coalition with the President’s approval. Thus, despite achieving the Presidency, the Constitutional power of newly elected President Yushchenko was not comparable to his predecessor Kuchma. Simultaneously, as the influence of Parliament increased, so did the competition for the position of the Speaker of the Parliament. The leaders of the Orange Revolution, through their respective blocs, gained the majority of the seats in the 2006 parliamentary election, the first one following the Presidential election in 2004. However, they were not able to create a united parliamentary coalition

¹⁴⁵ “Ukraine: Presidential Elections 2004 and the Orange Revolution” *Kyiv international Institute of Sociology* <http://www.kiis.com.ua/materials/articles/president%20election%20in%20ukraine%202004.pdf>, accessed April 10, 2017.

¹⁴⁶ Anna Fournier, “Ukraine’ Orange Revolution: Beyond Soviet Political Culture” in Paul D’Anieri, ed., *Orange Revolution and Aftermath* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2011), p.56.

because of their disagreement on who should fill the position of the Speaker of Parliament. As Yushchenko wrote in his memoir “The only thing that united the Orange team was anti-Kuchmism (against Kuchma), nothing else. We did not have any united ideology.¹⁴⁷ This disagreement led to the election of the leader of the Socialist party, Oleksandr Moroz, as the Speaker of Parliament. Viktor Yanukovych, the leader of the newly created parliamentary coalition, became the Prime Minister. Thus, less than two years after the Orange revolution, Viktor Yanukovych returned as the Prime Minister and with more authority than before. Yushchenko explained his decision to support Yanukovych’s candidacy as a way to unite the East and West of Ukraine.¹⁴⁸ Soon after Yuliya Tymoshenko, Yushchenko’s former ally moved into opposition to the President and his new cabinet. President Yushchenko, whose power was significantly diminished as compared to his predecessor due to the constitutional changes, was effectively outside the political decision-making process. His attempts to apply his constitutional power to appoint the Minister of the Foreign affair and the Minister of Defence failed, as he was unable to obtain the required approval from Parliament.¹⁴⁹

Table 2.4.1.1 Timeline of the Orange Revolution and after

DATE	EVENT	CONSEQUENCES
08 December 2004	Constitutional changes implemented as a condition of the re-election of the second round	More power to the Prime-Minister; Less power to the President Tension within the Parliament
Jan.2005	The Presidential Inauguration	Yushchenko became the President of Ukraine
Jan. 2005	Yuliya Tymoshenko became the Prime-Minister	Majority of MPs supported her candidacy
July 2005	Yuliya Tymoshenko was dismissed as the Prime-Minister by President Yushchenko	Yuriy Yehanurov, loyal to President Yushchenko, was appointed as the Prime-Minister
March 26, 2006	Parliamentary election. New electoral law (PR, 3% threshold)	The Party of Regions (leader Yanukovych) gained the highest percentage of votes nationwide (32.1%) The Orange parties gained in total the highest number of seats that could allow creating a parliamentary coalition.
June 2006	The Orange coalition collapsed	The Socialist party left the coalition
May-August 2006	The new parliamentary coalition was created	Viktor Yanukovych became a Prime-Minister. Oleksandr Moroz became the speaker of Parliament
April 2007	President Yushchenko dissolved the Parliament	The main reason was a violation of the Constitution by the Party of Regions. The party included in their coalition deputies instead of political factions.

¹⁴⁷ Viktor Yushchenko, *Nederzhavny Tayemnytsi (Not State Secrets)* (Kyiv, 2014), p.37.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p.43.

¹⁴⁹ Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine’s Orange Revolution* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005).

September 30, 2007	Early parliamentary election (PR electoral system, 3% threshold)	Pro-Yanukovych Party of Regions gained the highest percentage of votes (34.4%); however not enough to create a coalition.
Dec. 2007	The parliamentary coalition was created	Yuliya Tymoshenko became the Prime-Minister for the second time
Jan.2010	Presidential election Yanukovych became a President	Yuliya Tymoshenko took the second place. Viktor Yushchenko gained 5.5%
October 2010	The Constitutional Court of Ukraine overturned the 2004 amendments to the Constitution	President Yanukovych regained his significant constitutional power.
October 2011	Yuliya Tymoshenko was imprisoned	Tymoshenko was not able to participate in the upcoming parliamentary election of 2012. The EU and western Countries accused Yanukovych of political motives of Tymoshenko's imprisonment.
August 2012	President Yanukovych signed a new language Law	Language minorities with more than 10% of the population got rights to pass the law that would give their language the status of an official language. Implementation of the new school textbooks across regions.
October 2012	Parliamentary election (new electoral law- returned to the mixed electoral system)	Pro-Yanukovych party of Regions gained a majority Mykola Azarov (from Donetsk) became the Prime-Minister
November 2013	President Yanukovych postponed the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU	The first protesters (students mostly) went to protest on the main square in Kyiv- Maidan
November- January 2013- 2014	The Euromaidan began	Yanukovych left the country; the social revolution began

Source: created by the author.

Furthermore, permanent disagreement between the members of the Orange team and collapse of the Orange coalition less than two years after the Orange revolution resulted in citizens' dissatisfaction that extended beyond politicians to the political regime as the whole.

Conclusion

The history of Ukraine sheds light on both the differences and the similarities found among modern Ukrainians. From the early days of Kievan Rus to the days of the Orange revolution, Ukrainians had different historical experiences. Their historical experiences also impacted their perception of national identity. For Western Ukraine, their national identity was derived from the history and myths of Kievan Rus, followed by the Kingdom of Poland and Poland - Lithuanian Saxony. The Southern and Eastern regions identified more with Soviet identity as well as with Slavic nations such as Russia and Belarus.

The seventy-year experience of the Soviet Union (1922-1990) affected Ukraine and Ukrainians in various ways. The Ukrainian republic became more ethnically diverse,

as many ethnic Russians settled in the Eastern oblasts bordering with the Russian republic. The soviet government also created a Soviet citizen who was loyal to the government and had low political efficacy, indicating subject political culture. At the same time, the events of the late 1980s, especially the tragic event of Chernobyl catastrophe, led to the beginning of a political movement for Ukraine's independence among Ukrainian intelligentsia. They also demonstrated that some Ukrainians were becoming more politically active than before.

Independence in 1991 came to Ukraine peacefully, although suddenly. Citizens supported the independence of Ukraine in high numbers, and the leaders of newly independent Ukraine tried to create national symbols that would unite the nation. However, many symbols of the new state were linked to historical experiences from Western and Central Ukraine and did not resonate with Southern or Eastern Ukraine.

Regarding the political culture, we can confirm that prior to the Orange revolution Ukrainians had a low level of trust in the main political institutions such as President, Parliament and the government. The lowest level of trust was observed in President Kuchma during his second term. Citizens' distrust toward President Kuchma could be explained by the opposition's release of tapes of the private conversations of the President. They exposed the Presidents' possible involvement in the disappearance of the opposition journalist Gongadze. It also showed that the Ukrainian political elite was not united prior to the Orange revolution.

The release of the tapes led to the political movement "Ukraine without Kuchma" from 2000 to 2001. Although "Ukraine without Kuchma" was a short-lived political protest, it demonstrated that Ukrainians citizens together with Ukraine political

opposition were ready to take non- traditional forms of political actions to influence the government. The results of public opinion surveys also demonstrated that it was between 2000 and 2003 when Ukrainians increased significantly their support for protesting the decrease in standards of living instead of “keeping peace and order at any cost.” Citizens support for protests reached its highest, 46.8%, in 2003, one year prior to the 2004 presidential election which became the Orange revolution.

The Orange revolution demonstrated once more that Ukrainians preferred non-traditional forms of political actions to impact the government. The alleged attempt by President Kuchma and his government to falsify the results of the presidential election in 2004 led to mass political protests in Kyiv. Importantly, the political elite, including Supreme Court Judges and some Cabinet Ministers, joined the opposition, thus displaying their dissatisfaction with the regime of President Kuchma by the end of his presidency.

Support for the Orange Revolution and Yushchenko as the leader of the Orange revolution was regionally distributed, mostly in the Western and Central Ukraine. Supporters of his rival, Viktor Yanukovych, were primarily residents of Eastern and Southern Ukraine. Thus, the Orange revolution was perceived differently across Ukrainian regions and was not nationally supported. It is possible that regions that did not support the event of the Orange revolution were preparing alternative political actions in future.

Overall, we may conclude that Ukrainian political culture started to shift in the years prior to the Orange revolution. The biggest change was observed in citizens’ increased support for taking to the streets to protest a decrease in standard of living. Thus,

Ukrainians were willing to apply non-traditional forms of political activities to change the political institutions which they did not trust. This could indicate that they were becoming critical citizens.¹⁵⁰ At the same time, Ukrainians admitted to having low political competence and low political efficacy which placed them in the category of parochial or disenfranchised citizens.¹⁵¹

The second part of the thesis will examine political culture of Ukraine after the Orange revolution and before the Euromaidan. Three main components of political culture will be analyzed: citizens' orientations towards government structure, rules of the games and perceptions of democracy; orientations towards others in the political process; orientations towards one's role in the political process and political activity, in order to determine whether any changes occurred. The last chapter will explore the role of the EU and Russia and their impact on the political culture of Ukrainian citizens across different regions and groups.

¹⁵⁰ Pippa Norris, *Democratic Deficit, Critical Citizens Revisited* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 10.

¹⁵¹ Thomas Denk, Henrik Serup Christensen, "How to classify political cultures? A comparison of three methods of classification" *Quality and Quantity*, Vol. 50, 2016, pp. 177-191, p.181.

PART II

Introduction

The Orange revolution was the first successful and peaceful form of political protest after the student protest of 1993, and it was often described as a high point of Ukrainian democratization.¹ Ukraine received a newly elected President, Parliament and Constitution. The next step is to determine whether citizens' orientations, values, and political actions changed in the years after the Orange revolution and before the Euromaidan. Did they become more politically aware and politically active? Did they become trustful? Did they demonstrate a greater willingness to participate in the political process, and if so, how? The following components will be examined:

- citizens' orientations towards government structure, the rules of the game and perception of democracy;
- citizens' orientations towards others in the political system (membership in social groups, level of interpersonal trust; tolerance of LGBT people, gender equality);
- citizens' orientations towards their roles in the political system (political awareness, political efficacy, and political activity)

Chapter 3 will measure citizens' orientations towards government structure as demonstrated in citizens' level of confidence to main political institutions: President, Parliament, Prime Minister, political parties and courts. It will also analyze citizens' perceptions of democracy and the "rules of the game" within the country. Chapter 4 will study citizens' orientations towards others in the political system. The author will measure three components : 1) citizens' political identification (language preferences, pride in citizenship, membership in political parties, professional organizations, NGOs

¹ Robert K. Christensen, Edward R. Rakhimkulov and Charles R. Wise, "The Ukrainian Orange Revolution brought more than a new president: What kind of democracy will the institutional changes bring?" *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol.38, 2005, pp. 207-230, p.208.

and religious groups); 2) citizens' level of trust in different groups (neighbors, friends, family, people you meet for the first time, different religions and nations) and 3) level of tolerance towards gender equality and towards LGBT people. It will be further supported by an analysis of migration and urbanization patterns in Ukraine, as they may affect social trust within the country.

Chapter 5 will study citizens' orientation towards their role in the political system. This will be measured by looking at 1) citizens' political awareness (interest in politics; knowledge of political events; main sources of information); 2) political efficacy (beliefs to influence government decisions) and 3) political actions (voting in elections; participating in alternative political activities such as signing a petition, attending a peaceful protest, using a blog or social media). Citizens' self-reported political awareness will be considered concerning their main source of information. An analysis of two regional newspapers, *Vecherniy Donetsk (East)* and *L'viv ska Gazeta (West)* will be conducted to compare differences in political awareness of Ukrainians across regions.

Chapter 6 will evaluate the role of the European Union and Russia during the studied years and assess whether they could influence the political orientations and actions of Ukrainians.

CHAPTER 3 Orientations towards Government Structure

Introduction

As was explained earlier, trust in political institutions is an important component of a democratic political system. If citizens have confidence in institutions, they will see those institutions more representative of their interests and more accountable to the public.¹ In contrast, when citizens show a high level of dissatisfaction with political institutions, they can become detached from the political process in their society.

This chapter will analyze citizens' confidence in the main political institutions including the Office of the President, Prime Minister, Parliament, Political parties and courts. Hence, this study will determine whether the leadership of the government could be associated with the citizens' evaluation of political institutions, especially across different regions and groups. Furthermore, as Norris suggested in her work about critical citizens, it is important to study not only citizens' evaluation of the main political institutions but their perception and understanding of democracy.² In a modern democratic society, citizens become distrustful of the main political institutions because they do not meet their expectations about them. Thus, citizens' attitudes toward political institutions, as well as their perception of the meaning of democracy, will be analyzed to identify whether Ukrainians' political orientations shifted between 2004 and 2014.

The chapter will also determine whether citizens' orientations towards the informal rules or "rules of the game" changed.³ The chapter will analyze the following

¹ Sonja Zmeri and Marc Hodge, *Political trust. Why context matters* (Colchester: ECPR, 2011).

² Pippa Norris, *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

³ Guillermo O'Donnell, "Illusion about Consolidation" in *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies. Themes and Perspective*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc. F. Plattner (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 46.

characteristics: citizens tolerance of rule-breaking behavior such as claiming government benefits to which one is not entitled; avoiding a fare on public transport, cheating on taxes or accepting a bribe.⁴

3.1. Confidence in political institutions

Macro-cultural theories hold that a predisposition to distrust people is commonly found in authoritarian political cultures, such as those in Russia and most other post-Communist societies of Eastern and Central Europe.⁵ Such theories emphasize that authoritarian values are learned through socialization in an undemocratic regime and are likely to persist for a generation or more after the collapse of the old regime. To test this theory, we looked at citizens' level of confidence in the Presidents, Prime Ministers, Parliament, Political parties and Courts.

3.1.1. Confidence in the President

Figure 3.1.1 reveals that Ukrainians' level of confidence in each President reached its highest levels at once after each election. In 2005-2006, newly-elected President Yushchenko had 46.3% confidence nationwide. However, by 2008, 87.2% of citizens did not have confidence in Yushchenko. This level sustained in 2009, one year before the presidential election. A similar dynamic is observed in the level of confidence in President Yanukovich. At the beginning of his presidency in 2010, 46.1% of respondents nationwide expressed their confidence in him. In 2011 and 2013, 64.7% and 69% of the citizens did not have confidence in President Yushchenko. However, it was still below the levels of non-confidence expressed in Yushchenko in 2008 and 2009.

⁴ Howard Elcock, *Political behaviour* (London: Methuen & Co Ltd: 1976), p. 74.

⁵ William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Learning and re-learning regime support: The dynamics of post-communist regimes. *European Journal of Political Research*, No.41, 2002, pp.5-36.

Figure 3.1.1 Level of confidence in the President (%), 2004-2013




Source: author created the figure based on the results of public opinion surveys in Ukraine by IFES in 2004, 2005-2005, 2009, 2011 and 2013. The question was asked: "Please tell me how much confidence you have in them: President" The figure represents combined categories of "Great" and "Fair amount."

One explanation is that citizens had higher initial expectations for Yushchenko because of the high hopes they had after the Orange revolution. The data reveals that confidence in the president varied by region. In 2005-2006, after his election as President, Viktor Yushchenko received a level of confidence of 79.1% in the West, followed by Kyiv (60.3%) and Center (55%). At the same time, confidence in Yushchenko in the South was 37% and, in the East, only 25.7%. Disappointment with Yushchenko was evident in 2008 and 2009, one year before the Presidential election. In the West, where Yushchenko enjoyed the highest support in 2005-2006, his level of confidence declined to 32.5%. In Kyiv, only 8.9% had confidence in Yushchenko, while 91.1% of respondents expressed no confidence at all. In the South, East, and Crimea, more than 90% of respondents expressed no confidence in Yushchenko by the end of his presidency. President Viktor Yanukovych's support was strongest in the East and Crimea in 2011, one year after his election. However, it is noteworthy that he did not enjoy majority support. 44.1% of respondents in the East and 40.3% in Crimea expressed confidence to Yanukovych, while 56.9% in the East and 59.7% in Crimea did not have confidence in him. Thus, Yanukovych, in contrast to Yushchenko, enjoyed lower levels of confidence among citizens in the first year of his presidency. Consequently, expectations for his presidency were lower than for President Yushchenko. In 2013, the year of Euromaidan, a level of

confidence in Yanukovich decreased across all regions. Nevertheless, his support was higher than it was for Yushchenko at a comparable point during his presidency (in 2009). In the West, 13.7% of respondents had confidence in Yanukovich and Kyiv 11.8%. The highest support was in the East (36.4%) followed by the South (29.7%). The support in Crimea for Yanukovich declined to 28.7% from 40.3% in 2011. This suggests that citizens from all regions were much more disappointed-with the leader of the Orange team than they were with Yanukovich during a comparable period in his presidency.

Figure 3.1.2 Confidence in the President by region (%), 2004-2013



Source: the author created the figure based on the results of public opinion surveys in Ukraine by IFES in 2004, 2005-2005, 2009, 2011 and 2013. The sample size was 1500 respondents across the regions. IFES exclusively provided the data files for this research project. The question was asked: “Please tell me how much confidence you have in them: President” The figure represents responses of “great deal” and fair amount” combined.

One of the reasons for that was the level of perceived corruption. According to Olexandr Moroz, Yushchenko’s ally during the Orange revolution, corruption under the presidency of Yushchenko increased in comparison to his predecessor Leonid Kuchma.⁶ The presence of corruption in Ukraine is evident by looking at the “familyism” – a type of appointments in Ukraine that based on the presence of personal relationships between the President and appointees⁷. The table 3.1.1 represents some appointments by President Yushchenko and President Yanukovich during their Presidency. It is evident that many

⁶ “Yushchenko svaryat shcho habary btruchy bilshe nizh pry Kuchmi” 04 May 2005 *Ukrayinska Pravda* <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2005/05/4/3009429/>, accessed May 16, 2016.

⁷ Serhiy Kudelka, “The House that Yanukovich built” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.25, No. 3, July 2014, pp. 19-34.

appointees had some personal connection to the Presidents, as well as being members of the Presidents' political parties.

Table 3.1.1 Appointments by the Presidents, 2005-2014, Ukraine

Viktor Yushchenko (2005-2010)			Viktor Yanukovich (2010-2014)		
Position	Name	Relations	Position	Name	Relations
Prime-Minister	Yuliya Tymoshenko	Former ally during the Orange revolution	Prime-Minister	Mykola Azarov	Was born in Donetsk. Head of the Party of Regions
Prime-Minister	Yuriy Yehanurov	Member of the "Our Ukraine"	Vice Prime Minister	Serhiy Arbutov	Born in Donetsk, a friend of Yanukovich's son
Vice Prime Minister	Roman Bezsmertny	Head of the committee of the "Our Ukraine."	Minister of Finance	Yuriy Kolobov	A friend of Yanukovich's family
Head of National Security and Defense Council	Petro Poroshenko	Godfather of Yushchenko's children	Minister of Foreign affairs	Konstantyn Grishchenko	Worked under Kuchma regime
Minister of Defense	Anatoly Grytsenko	Member of the "Our Ukraine"	Minister of Defense	Pavlo Lebedev	Was born in Russia, had connections to Kremlin
Minister of Internal Affairs	Yuriy Lutsenko	Former Ally of the Orange team	Minister of Internal Affairs	Valeriy Zaharchenko	Was born in Donetsk
Minister of Health	Mykola Polishchuk	Member of "Our Ukraine"	Minister of Health	Raisa Bogatyryova	Was born in Donetsk
Minister of Education and Culture	Oksana Bilozir	Godmother of Yushchenko's children	Minister of Education and Culture	Dmytro Tabachnyk	Head of the President Administration under President Kuchma
Minister of social politics	Ivan Sahan	Worked under Kuchma regime	Minister of social politics	Natalya Korolevska	From Luhansk region (Eastern Ukraine)
Cabinet Minister	David Zvania	Businessman, a close ally of Yushchenko	Cabinet Minister	Nestor Shufrych	Party of Regions
MPs	Petro Yushchenko	brother	MPs	Viktor Yanukovich Jr	Son
Minister of Transport	Eygen Chervonenko	Businessman, head of security team of the presidential candidate Yushchenko during the 2004 presidential election	Governors	Mykola Prycyazhyuk (Zhytomyr); Vasyl Bertush (Rivne); Myhaylo Dopkin(Harkiv), est. 14 in total.	Members of the Party of Regions

Source: author created the table based on the information from the Almanac "Хто є хто в Україні?" and official information from the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and web newspaper *Ukrayinska Pravda*. <http://www.pravda.com.ua>.

Furthermore, an analysis of all decrees by Viktor Yushchenko during his first year of Presidency in 2005 reveals that 80% of the 1565 decrees concerned appointments.⁸

Viktor Yanukovich's activity was comparable, during the first year of his Presidency in

⁸ Calculation was conducted based on the analysis of all decrees in 2005. Ukazy Prezydenta Ukrayiny, 2005, *Verkhovna Rada Ukrayiny* <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/main/tt4003y2005>, accessed May 27, 2016.

2010. Out of 969 decrees by Yanukovych, only 30 were not related to appointments.⁹ Furthermore, by September of 2013, the year of the Euromaidan, representatives of Donetsk were 75% in the Ministry of Energy, 75% in the Ministry of sport, 66.7% in the Ministry of Social politics, 57.1% in the Ministry of Justice, 57.1% in the Ministry of Health and 56.7% in the Ministry of taxes.¹⁰

This familyism of Ukrainian politics undermines the principle of democratic and representative government and its effectiveness contributing to corruption. Yaroslav Koshiw, who wrote about abuse of power within the Presidency in Ukraine¹¹, attributes this in part to the shared modest upbringings of Presidents since independence. Growing up as “have-nots,” when they reached power they compensated for their previous poverty through the accumulation of wealth.¹² The pictures of the residency of Yanukovych, which the author took during a visit to Ukraine in October of 2014, demonstrate ostentatious and lavish taste combined with financial wealth.¹³ The familyism and corruption in Ukraine prevent the formation of a representative accountable government

⁹ Calculation was conducted based on the analysis of all decrees in 2010 Ukazy Prezydenta Ukrainy, 2010. *Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy* <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/main/tt4003y2010>, accessed May 27, 2016

¹⁰ *Mirror Weekly*, 20 September 2013 <https://zn.ua/internal/ya-b-v-doneckie-poshel-pust-menya-nauchat-.html>, accessed January 27, 2018.

¹¹ Jaroslav, V., Koshiw, *Abuse of Power. Corruption in the office of the President* (Berkshire: Artemia Press Ltd, 2013).

¹² Yanukovych’s residence Mezhygirya that he built on the territory of the National Park is estimated to cost more than 1 billion dollars. The residence includes its own pet zoo, underground shooting range and helicopter pad. See Appendix 2 for the pictures. “Inside the Palace Yanukovych did not want Ukraine to see” *The Telegraph* <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10656023/In-pictures-Inside-the-palace-Yanukovych-didnt-want-Ukraine-to-see.html>, accessed June 08, 2016.

¹³ For example, Yanukovych had a piano signed by John Lennon in his residency. He also had a private zoo with ostriches. See appendix 3 for pictures.

that could be trusted by society.¹⁴ And this was common not only for the Presidents but also for the Prime Ministers in Ukraine during the studied years.

3.1.2. Confidence in the Prime Ministers

The level of confidence in the Prime Ministers in Ukraine was low during the period of study (Table 3.1.2.1). The highest level of confidence was in Prime-Minister Yanukovych in 2006-2007, with 33.5% expressing “fair amount” and 15.8% expressing “a great deal.” The lowest level of confidence was in Mykola Azarov in 2013 (4%), the Prime Minister during the Yanukovych regime. However, the level of confidence in the Prime Minister varied across the regions (Table 3.1.2.2).

Table 3.1.2.1 Level of confidence in the Prime Ministers, 2004-2013

	Viktor Yanukovich 2004	Yuliya Tymoshenko 2005	Yuriy Yekhanurov 2005-2006	Viktor Yanukovich 2006-2007	Yuliya Tymoshenko 2008-2010	Mykola Azarov 2010	Mykola Azarov 2013
Great Deal	3.9	29.3	4.1	15.8	10.1	10.0	4
Fair Amount	26.9	28.1	29.6	33.5	22.4	26.5	15.1
Not very much	34.2	12.6	13.7	20.8	18.1	24.3	25.6
None at All	27.0	19.4	8.2	26.7	44.7	30.0	47
DN	7.6	10.4	42.2	6.5	4.1	8.4	7.7
Total	100.0	100.0	99.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: author created the table based on the results of the public opinion survey by IFES in Ukraine in 2004, 2005-2006, 2008, 2010 and 2013. The question was asked: “Please tell me how much confidence you have in them: Prime Minister.”

The surveys reveal that in 2004 Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, despite his low national level of confidence, had 53.4% support in the Eastern region, his home region. He also had 33.1% support in the Southern region. Regional support is also evident for Prime Minister Tymoshenko in 2005 and 2008. In 2005, when she was appointed as a Prime Minister for the first time, she possessed high levels of confidence from respondents in Western, Central and Kyiv region. Concurrently in the Eastern and

¹⁴ The current President Poroshenko was also accused of familyism by journalists. See Maiya Zhartovskaya and Roman Cravetz, “Orbits of Petro Poroshenko. Groups of influences in presidents’ surrounding” *Ukrayinska Pravda* 10 June 2016 <http://www.pravda.com.ua/cdn/graphics/2016/06/dva-goda-poroshenko/index.html>, accessed June 15, 2016.

southern region, the majority of respondents expressed low levels of confidence in Prime-Minister Tymoshenko.

Table3.1.2.2 Confidence in the Prime Minister by region, 2004-2013

	Western	Central	Southern	Eastern	Kyiv	AR Krym
2004(preelection) Yanukovych						
Great/Fair amount	12.9	25.2	33.1	53.4	27.6	n/a
Not very much/None at all	87.1	74.8	66.8	46.6	72.5	n/a
2005 (Tymoshenko)						
Great/Fair Amount	93.5	87.3	32.5	34.9	78.2	n/a
Not very much/None at all	6.5	12.7	67.5	65.1	21.8	n/a
2005-2006 (Yehanurov)						
Great/Fair Amount	70.1	16.7	63.8	62.4	57.1	n/a
Not very much/None at all	29.9	83.3	36.2	37.7	42.8	n/a
2007 (Yanukovych)						
Great/Fair Amount	20.4	46.2	69.1	70.9	42.3	
Not very much/None at all	79.6	53.8	30.9	29.1	57.7	
2008 (Tymoshenko)						
Great/Fair Amount	51.4	49.8	24.5	14.5	24.3	n/a
Not very much/None at all	48.6	50.2	35.4	85.4	75.7	n/a
2013 (Azarov)						
Great/Fair amount	9.6	17.6	26.1	32.2	6.5	29
Not very much/none at all	90.4	82.5	73.9	67.7	93.1	71

Source: Source: author created the table based on the results of the public opinion survey by IFES in Ukraine in 2004,2005-2006, 2008, and 2013. The question was asked: “Please tell me how much confidence you have in them: Prime Minister.”

In 2008, Tymoshenko still had 51.4% confidence of citizens in the Western region. This level contrasts with the 85.4% of respondents in the Eastern region and 75.7% in capital Kyiv who expressed no confidence in her at all. Only Prime Minister Yehanurov, who replaced Tymoshenko in 2005, had a comparable level of support across all regions. Thus, confidence in Prime-Ministers in Ukraine varied more by region than confidence in the Presidents during the years examined.

The level of confidence in the Prime Ministers may also be a function of their high turnover. Ukraine has had 16 Prime Ministers since independence in 1991, with an average time in the office of 12 months.¹⁵ During his time in office, President Yushchenko (2005-2010) had four Prime Ministers, including Yuliya Tymoshenko for two periods. Thus, efforts by Prime Ministers to achieve reforms have been frustrated by

¹⁵ The average was calculated by the author based on the list of Prime-Ministers in Ukraine and their time in office.

their truncated time in Office. President Yanukovich had only one Prime Minister, Mykola Azarov, to date the longest serving person in the office, 46 months. However, he had limited power in comparison to Prime Minister Tymoshenko after Ukraine returned to the presidential-parliamentary system of government in 2010. As some authors suggest, Yanukovich's more authoritarian system of government compelled a degree of cohesion within the government, because of his unlimited power.¹⁶

According to the Constitution of Ukraine (Art. 113, Part VI), the Prime Minister shares executive power with the President. He/she is appointed by the Parliament upon approval of a three quarters' majority of the Rada and has the power to appoint his cabinet (Art. 114, Part VI of the Constitution). However, the President (Art. 106, S. 10,11 of the Constitution) has the power to appoint the Minister of Defense, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prosecutor General, as well as members of the National Bank of Ukraine.

Moreover, according to the Constitution (Art. 106, s.29), the President can initiate and veto legislation. He/she can also initiate a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister on the advice of the Rada.¹⁷ This happened to Yuliya Tymoshenko during the Presidency of Viktor Yushchenko, who initiated a vote of no confidence in her cabinet. Thus, the constitutional structure in Ukraine created tensions in the relations between the President and the Prime Minister. We can also hypothesize that its undermined citizens' confidence in their principal political leaders.

¹⁶ Serhiy Kudelka, "The House that Yanukovich built" *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.25, No 3, July 2014, pp. 19-34. Henry E. Hale "Formal Constitutions in Informal Politics: Institutions and Democratization in Post-Soviet Eurasia." *World Politics*, No. 63, 2011, pp. 581-617.

¹⁷ The Constitution of Ukraine. *Конституція України* from 28.06.1996 N 254- 96. <http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254к/96-вр>, accessed June 19, 2016.

Another possible reason for the low level of confidence in the President and Prime Minister is the absence of mutual trust among and between political leaders themselves. President Yushchenko was elected in December 2004 and became the President in January 2005. Yuliya Tymoshenko, one of the leaders of the Orange revolution, was appointed the Prime Minister of Ukraine in February 2005. The conflict between President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko over the composition of the cabinet escalated soon after and Tymoshenko resigned as Prime Minister in September of the same year.¹⁸ Both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko accused each other of corruption, which further undermined citizens' trust in the Orange coalition and its leaders.¹⁹ Between January and July of 2009, President Yushchenko used his veto power fifty times to stop the legislative initiative of Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, the highest number among all the Presidents.²⁰ Furthermore, according to documents that recovered at the Yanukovich residence after his escape to Russia in 2014, Tymoshenko and Yanukovich signed an unofficial agreement in 2009, according to which they planned to alternate power for the next twenty years.²¹ In 2010 Yushchenko and Tymoshenko each competed in the 2010 presidential election: both candidates lost the presidential election to Yanukovich.²² After his defeat, during his last press conference

¹⁸ P. Kubicek, "Problems of post-post-communism: Ukraine after the Orange Revolution" *Democratization*, Vol. 16, Issue 2, 2009, pp.323-243, p.329.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 331.

²⁰ Serhiy Soroka, "Yushchenko: chronicle of rise and fall", 08, January 2010, *Ukrayinska Pravda* <http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2010/01/8/4589410/>, accessed June 17, 2016.

²¹ Roman Romanyuk, "From temnyky to Panama papers: the seven most well-known leaks of information" June 17, 2016. *Ukrayinska Pravda* <http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2016/06/17/7112132/>, accessed June 17, 2016.

²² Yushchenko gained only 4.5 % of the votes during the 2010 presidential election and Tymoshenko 25%. She competed against Yanukovich in the second round of the election and lost. *Центральна Виборча Комісія Central Election Commission* <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2010/WP00116> accessed June 15, 2016.

as the President of Ukraine in January of 2010, Yushchenko said that his biggest mistake was his alliance with Tymoshenko.²³ It may indicate that if political leaders do not trust each other, neither would citizens have confidence in them. The situation is not much different in reviewing the level of confidence in the Rada, the Parliament of Ukraine.

3.1.3. Confidence in the Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) and Political parties

Confidence in the Parliament (Rada) in Ukraine was low during the studied years, except in 2005, right after the Orange Revolution, when 60.2 % of respondents expressed confidence in the Parliament (Figure 3.1.3.1.). Thus, a level of confidence in the Parliament increased after the Orange revolution; however, it did not last long. The lowest level of confidence in the Rada was in 2008, 13.6% and in 2013 (18%), the year of the Euromaidan. The Orange team was not able to create an effective coalition government within the Rada after the 2006 parliamentary election.²⁴ As a result, Prime-Minister Tymoshenko was dismissed, and a new coalition was created, centered on the Party of Regions (led by Viktor Yanukovich) and former Orange ally Socialist party (led by Oleksandr Moroz). Soon after, President Yushchenko dismissed the Parliament, and a new early parliamentary election was scheduled in September of 2007. Viktor Yanukovich became the Prime-Minister of Ukraine since he was the leader of the parliamentary majority. Less than two years after the Orange revolution, which had started as a protest against Yanukovich, he returned to power as a Prime Minister with

²³ “Yushchenko: Tymoshenko was my biggest mistake” *TSN* 16 February 2010. <http://tsn.ua/ukrayina/yushchenko-tymoshenko-moya-naibilsha-pomilka.html>, accessed June 17, 2016.

²⁴ Viktoriya Thomson, MA Thesis, *Political Opposition in Ukraine and its effectiveness* (Ottawa: Carleton University, 2008).

more constitutional power than when he served before.²⁵ President Yushchenko personally recommended Yanukovych for the post of Prime Minister.²⁶ Across the regions, confidence in the Parliament varied (Figure 3.1.3.2).

Figure 3.1.3.1 Confidence in the Parliament (%), 2004-2013



Source: the author created the figure based on the results of public opinion surveys by IFES in Ukraine. The question was asked as follows: “Please tell me how much confidence you have in them: Verkhovna Rada.” The figure represents the percentage of “great/ fair amount” categories combined.

In 2005, after the Orange revolution, levels of confidence were high nationally, but lower in the Eastern and Southern regions, where a minority of citizens (45.3% and 28.7%) expressed confidence in the parliament. In 2007, the year after the 2006 parliamentary election that returned Viktor Yanukovych to power as the leader of the coalition, confidence in the Parliament declined; however, in the Southern region, it increased as 58.3% had confidence in the Parliament. A similar trend occurred in 2010 when Yanukovych won the presidency. The highest level of confidence in Parliament was found in the Eastern and Southern regions (39.8% and 29.5%). In the Western region at that time, only 21.3% had confidence, and in Kyiv, the level was 17.6%.


It is notable that in 2013 a low level of confidence in Parliament was evenly distributed across all regions, including the Southern and Eastern regions. One of the possible

²⁵ One of the demands of the Orange Revolution was to introduce changes to the Constitution that would limit the power of the President and increase power of Prime Minister. President Kuchma signed these changes in December of 2004.

²⁶ Serhiy Soroka, “Yushchenko: chronicle of rise and fall”, 08, January 2010, *Ukrayinska Pravda* <http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2010/01/8/4589410/>, accessed June 17, 2016.

explanations for a low level of confidence in the Parliament could be the presence of perceived corruption among parliamentarians.

Figure 3.1.3.2 Confidence in the Parliament by region (%), 2004-2013



Source: the author created this table based on the results of public opinion surveys by IFES in Ukraine. The question was asked as follows: “Please tell me how much confidence you have in them: Verkhovna Rada.” The figure represents the percentage of “great/ fair amount” categories combined.

For example, the NGO *Chestno*, which translates as *honestly*, compared the difference between MPs’ official income declarations and their unofficial spending as part of the process of fighting political corruption after the Orange revolution. The results revealed that none of the members of parliament could live on their official income.²⁷ Furthermore, comparative studies of the political culture in Eastern Europe suggest that a low level of confidence in political institutions in the countries of Eastern Europe can be explained by the economic disparity between the new political elite and the larger society.²⁸ As the political elite gets richer and richer, the public will have less confidence in its ability to act on their behalf.

Figure 3.1.3.3 shows Ukraine’s GINI index during 2004-2014.²⁹ One can observe that the index steadily declined from 28.9 in 2004 to 24.1 in 2014, meaning that


²⁷ Anders Aslund, “Oligarchs, Corruption and European Integration” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 25, No 3, July 2014, pp. 64-73.

²⁸ Fritz Plasser and Andreas Pribersky, *Political Culture in East Central Europe* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996).

²⁹ GINI index measures the extent of which the distribution of income among individuals or household within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. The index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality.

the inequality of economic distribution decreased. Surprisingly, in 2006, two years after the Orange revolution, the index increased to 29.8.

Figure 3.1.3.3 GINI index, Ukraine, 2004-2013



Source: World Bank estimate. GINI index. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=UA>, accessed January 08, 2018.

The decline of the GINI index during the studied years was combined with an increase in the numbers of Ukrainians who are on the Forbes list.³⁰ Specifically to Ukraine, among the top 10 wealthiest persons, eight holds or held positions at the government or in the Parliament of Ukraine (Table 3.1.3.1.).³¹ Hence, the richest 50 people in Ukraine controlled the equivalent of around 85% of Ukraine’s GDP as of 2013.³² For example, Konstantyn Zhevago (No. 8 on the list) has served as a Member of Parliament since 1998. Serhiy Tygypko (No. 10) has worked in the government since 1997 as Minister of Economics, Head of National Bank and Deputy Prime Minister. It is hard to imagine that one could accumulate the net worth of \$750 mln on the salary of a public servant.³³ According to the Law of Ukraine on the status of Members of

³⁰ Forbes list publishes the annual ranking of the world wealthiest billionaires. *Forbes* Ukraine, <http://www.forbes.com/places/ukraine/>, accessed May 18, 2016.

³¹ Nick Kochan, “Ukraine’s oligarchs: who they are, and which side are they on?” *The Guardian*, May 09, 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2014/mar/09/ukraines-oligarchs-who-are-they-which-side-are-on>, accessed May 09, 2016.

³² Tatiana Serafin, “Ukrainian billionaires play politics” *Forbes* <http://www.forbes.com/sites/tatianaserafin/2014/05/23/ukrainian-billionaires-play-politics/print/>, accessed May 09, 2016.

³³ The official salary of a Minister in 2015 was 81.7 thousand hryvna per year (\$3233). “Journalists revealed official information about salaries of public servants – ministers” 11 April 2016, *Novoye Vremya* <http://nv.ua/ukr/ukraine/events/zhurnalisti-oprijudnili-dani-pro-ofitsijni-zarplati-chinovnikiv-kabminu-infografika-109296.html> accessed May 18, 2016.

Parliament (Part IV, Art. 27, s. 2) the members of Parliament have immunity from the prosecution.³⁴

Table 3.1.3.1 The top 10 wealthiest persons in Ukraine, 2013

Rank	Name	Net worth in USD	Government Affiliation	Type of affiliation	Type of business
1	Rinat Akhmetov	\$9.3 billion	Yes	MP (2006-2009). An open supporter of Viktor Yanukovich and Party of Regions until the Euromaidan	Metinvest (mining&steel) DTEK (energy) Media Group Ukraine
2	Victor Pinchuk	\$3.2 billion	Yes	MP (1998-2006). The son in law of the former President Leonid Kuchma	East One Group(finance) Interpipe (metal) Start Light Media Fakty and Commentaries (newspaper)
3	Ihor Kolomoyskyy	\$3 billion	Yes	Governor of Dnepropetrovsk oblast (March 2014-March 2015). Supporter of Yuliya Tymoshenko.	UkrNafta (oil&gas) PrivatBank, 1+1 Media Group
4	Serhiy Kurchenko	\$ 2.4 billion	No	Connected to Yanukovich's family	Sepek (gas) Owner of the soccer team "Metallurg"
5	Henadiy Boholyubov	\$1.3 billion	No	Business – partner of Igor Kolomoyskyy	PrivatBank (partner with Ihor Kolomoyskyy)
6	Dmytro Firtash	\$1.2 billion	Yes	Co-Chairman of the National Tripartite Social and Economic Council under the President of Ukraine (NTSEC) 2012-2014 (under Yanukovich regime)	RosUKrEnergO (Gas Transport) Gaztek (gas) Ostchem (chemicals) InterMedia Group
7	Petro Poroshenko	\$1 billion	Yes	President of Ukraine (2014- current)	Roshen (confectionery) Leninska Kuzna (Shipbuilding) Kanal 5 (TV channel)
8	Kostyantyn Zhevago	\$1billion	Yes	MP (1998 – current)	Bank "Finance and Credit" Avto KraZ (engineering)
9	Yuriy Kosiuk	\$1billion	Yes	First Deputy Head of Presidential Administration (2014 -)	MHP (the largest agricultural holding in Ukraine)
10	Serhiy Tihipko	\$ 750 million	Yes	MP (2012-2014) Vice-Prime Minister (2010-2012) Minister of Economics (1997-2000) Head of the National Bank (2002-2004)	Privat Bank TAS-Commerzbank

Source: the author created the table based on the information from the Forbes list and from the article: "President versus oligarch" *The Economist*, March 28, 2015, <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21647355-building-nation-means-putting-plutocrats-their-place-president-v-oligarch>, accessed May 9, 2016. *Forbes* www.forbes.com/billionaires/#/version: country: Ukraine.

Many businessmen in Ukraine became parliamentarians to protect their business; Politics is a necessity to serve their business interests rather than the interests of citizens that they should represent.³⁵ Thus, the government is a form of business for many Ukrainian oligarchs used to strengthen their main business.³⁶

³⁴ The Law of Ukraine on the Status of Members of Parliament" from 17.11.1992 N 2790- XII *Verkhovna Rada Ukrayiny* <http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2790-12>

³⁵ Rosaria Puglisi, "The rise of the Ukrainian oligarchs." *Democratization*, Vol.10, No. 3, 2003, pp. 99-123, p. 109.


³⁶ Tatiana Serafin, "Ukrainian billionaires play politics" *Forbes* May 23, 2014 <http://www.forbes.com/sites/tatianaserafin/2014/05/23/ukrainian-billionaires-play-politics/print/>, accessed May 09, 2016.

Low confidence in politicians was also expressed by Euromaidan participants. Almost all of the 45 Euromaidan participants interviewed mentioned their disappointment with politicians in general. They stated that they protested not only against Yanukovich but the whole political regime in Ukraine. Natalya Sokolenko, journalist (1975 y.o.b) commented that: “When politicians came to Maidan, we did not let them speak. Why? Because the power of their words is strong, but their messages were confusing.”³⁷ Sofiya Borysko, a student (1993 y.o.b): “Students were protesting against Yanukovich and his regime as much as against the opposition.”³⁸

3.1.3.3. Confidence in Political Parties

As with the office of the President, Prime Minister, and Parliament, confidence in the political parties in Ukraine was low. As the figure 3.1.3.3.1 illustrates, the majority of respondents did not have confidence in the political parties. The level of confidence in political parties did not increase after the Orange revolution with only 17.3% of respondents showed confidence. In 2011, two years before the Euromaidan, confidence in the political parties slightly increased to 22%.

Figure 3.1.3.3.1 Confidence: Political Parties (%), 1996-2011




Source: the author created the figure based on data files by WVS: 1996 (2811), 2006 (2507) and 2011 (1500). The question was asked: I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? Political Parties. The figure represents a combination of “great deal” and “fair amount” combined.

³⁷Tetyana Kovtun, Tetyana Pryvalko, *Maydan, Vid pershoi osoby, 45 istorii revolutsii hidnosti* (Maidan, from the first person, 45 stories of the revolution of dignity) (Kyiv: Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, 2015), p.17.

³⁸ Ibid, p.50.

The parties' character can explain this low level of trust in them. A majority of political parties are clientelist political parties that are based on the voter-elite linkage through the personal charisma of political leaders or some material incentives.³⁹ They are not based on particular programs or social cleavages in society, as are many parties in established democracies. In Ukraine, they are created around the leader before the election. Many political parties do not exist past two election cycles. As figure 3.1.3.3.2 shows, among the elected political parties in Ukraine during the last six parliamentary elections, more than 50% of the parties were newly created.

Figure 3.1.3.3.2 The volatility of political parties in Ukraine, 2002- 2014



Source: the author created the figure based on the results of the parliamentary elections in Ukraine. *Central Electoral Commission in Ukraine, Центральна Виборча Комісія України*. <http://www.cvk.gov.ua>, accessed April 26, 2016.

Many blocs which ran in the election (appendix 1) were named after their leaders.

Examples include Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko (former Prime-Minister), Bloc Viktor Yushchenko (former Prime-Minister and President of Ukraine), Bloc Petro Poroshenko (President of Ukraine), Bloc Lytvina (Former Speaker of the Parliament), Bloc “Udar” Vitaly Klichko (Mayor of Kyiv). All these leaders named the political parties and blocs after themselves so that the electorate would easily recognize them since linkages between parties and constituents are weak.⁴⁰ In each parliamentary election, most of the

³⁹ Herbert Kitschelt, “Linkages between Citizens and Politician in Democratic Polities” *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 6-7, 2000, pp. 845-879, p. 845.

⁴⁰ These characteristics of weakly institutionalized party systems are common to many post-communist countries. See Frank. C. Thames, “A House Divided. Party Strength and the Mandate Divide in Hungary, Russia, and Ukraine” *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 38 No. 3, April 2005, pp. 282-303.

political parties and blocs were new. One exception to this practice was Yanukovych's Party of Regions, which participated three times under the same name. The bloc name was changed during the last early parliamentary election in 2014 to the "Opposition bloc," to disassociate itself from former President Yanukovych after his exile in Russia.

Since political parties lack reliable bases of votes, party leaders have few incentives to respond to constituencies. For example, Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko gained 22.29% of the voters in a nationwide district during the 2006 parliamentary election. However, due to the conflict between the leaders of the Orange team, they could not form a parliamentary coalition, and they lost the position of the Prime Minister to Yanukovych's Party of Regions. This political instability left many voters feeling betrayed by the political parties. If millions of Ukrainian citizens give their votes to political parties in the hope that they will represent their interests and those political parties dissolve within a short period, it leaves voters dissatisfied with the political parties and its leaders. It also suggests that political parties do not value their votes.

3.1.4. Confidence in the Courts

The strength of the rule of law in the country is one of the most fundamental principles of a democratic system. Every Constitution of any democratic state should guarantee the equality of citizens' rights.⁴¹ The recognized basic principles for judicial independence – security of tenure, financial security and administrative security – are fundamental tenets necessary to promote respect for the rule of law, and human rights and freedoms.⁴² The

⁴¹ Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - Art. 20 Equality before the Law; *American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man* – Art. 2 Right to Equality before the Law.

⁴² "Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary" *United Nations. Human Rights. Office of the High Commissioner*. <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/IndependenceJudiciary.aspx>, accessed June 20, 2016.

reform of the court system in Ukraine was a stated priority for the democratization of Ukraine since the early days of Independence.⁴³ The Law of Ukraine on the status of judges was implemented in 1991.⁴⁴ According to Article 3 of the Law, the courts of general jurisdiction create a united system with the Supreme Court as the highest level of the judiciary. Although Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada has passed many laws on judicial reform, few have been implemented. The corruption of the courts and its judges is one of the main and enduring criticisms of Ukraine's political regimes.⁴⁵ According to the data, confidence in the courts, in general, has declined across the years. The highest level of confidence in the courts was in 2004 prior to the Orange revolution.⁴⁶ Th

Table 3.1.4.1 Confidence in the courts, 2004-2013

	2004 (preelection)			2005-2006			2013		
	Great Deal/ Fair Amount	Not Very Much/ None at all	D/K	Great Deal/ Fair Amount	Not Very Much/ None at all	D/K	Great Deal/ Fair Amount	Not Very Much/ None at all	D/K
Constitutional Court	43.2	39.8	17	37.4	43.3	19.3	17.9	62.4	19.7
Supreme Court	43.4	38.8	17.8	37.7	43.2	19.1	19.4	61.4	19.2
Appeals Court	39.9	38.7	21.4	32.3	43.4	24.3	19.4	61.5	19.1
Local Courts	29.1	56.3	14.5	24.3	59.5	16.2	12	72.2	15.8

Source: the author created the table based on the results of the public opinion surveys in Ukraine by IFES in 2004, 2005-2006 and 2013 (1500). The question was asked as follow: "IFES exclusively provides the data files for this research project.

The lowest level of confidence among all courts is observed in local courts with the majority of Ukrainians admitted to having "not very much" or "none at all" confidence to the local courts. The decline in the level of confidence in the courts may be explained by

⁴³ Roman Woronowycz, "Ukraine's court system: The Court of General Jurisdiction" *Ukrainian Weekly*, 1997, <http://www.ukrweekly.com/old/archive/1997/139706.shtml>, accessed April 29, 2016.

⁴⁴ "The Law of Ukraine on Judicial System and the Status of the Judges" Verkhovna Rada Ukrayiny, 2010, № 41-42, № 43, № 44-45, Ст. 529 <http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2453-176> accessed May 05, 2016.

⁴⁵ Henry Hale, *Patronal Politics. Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2015), Maria Popova, "Ukraine's Legal Problems: Why Kiev's Plans to Purge the Judiciary will Backfire" *Foreign Affairs*, April 2014.

⁴⁶ As was stated earlier, the reelection of the second round of the presidential election in 2004 took place after the Supreme Court decision that the results were invalid.

the involvement of the executive branch of power to the work of the judicial branch in Ukraine as was confirmed by Henry Hale.⁴⁷ According to Hale, the majority of political leaders in Ukraine, including the leaders of the Orange team, used the courts to their advantage during the electoral process.⁴⁸ According to the Constitution of Ukraine (Ch. IV, Art. 103), the same person cannot be elected as the President of Ukraine for more than two consecutive terms.⁴⁹ During the Presidency of Leonid Kuchma, the Constitutional Court had ruled in December 2003 (one year before the election) that he could participate in the 2004 election because he had taken office in 1994 before the adoption of the constitution in 1996.⁵⁰ Thus his second term in office between 2000 and 2004 would be recognized as his first.⁵¹ The political opposition and experts highly criticized this decision.⁵² In the end, Kuchma did not take part in the presidential election of 2004. The presidential election of 2004 triggered the Orange revolution, which led Viktor Yushchenko became the President of Ukraine. Despite his “democratic image” Yushchenko tried to influence the court decisions of Judges. In 2007 when President Yushchenko dissolved the Parliament, some members of parliament appealed

⁴⁷ Henry E. Hale, *Patronal Politics. Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 334.

⁴⁹ *The Constitution of Ukraine*, from 28.06 1996 N <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254k/96-Bp/page2>, accessed May 23, 2016.

⁵⁰ The resolution of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine about the official explanation of section 2 Art. 103 of the Constitution of Ukraine (about the term of Presidency in Ukraine) No.1- 43 from 25 December 2003. *Verkhovna Rada Ukrayiny* <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v022p710-03>, accessed May 23, 2016.

⁵¹ Taras Kuzio, “Soviet conspiracy theories and political culture in Ukraine: Understanding Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions.” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol.44, 2011, pp. 221–232, p. 229.

⁵² Henry E. Hale, *Patronal Politics. Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 334.

his actions in the Constitutional Court.⁵³ As soon as the Constitutional Court started its public hearing, many judges publicly complained that the President was pressuring them to recognize his decree to dissolve a parliament as constitutional.⁵⁴ Without waiting for the final decision Yushchenko signed a new decree dissolving Parliament. Subsequently, during the process of hearing, Yushchenko dismissed three judges of the Supreme Court who had been appointed by his predecessor Leonid Kuchma. In the following year, Yushchenko did not fail any proceedings at the Supreme Court.⁵⁵

Under Yanukovych, the President's involvement in the work of the courts increased significantly.⁵⁶ In July 2010, six months after his election, Yanukovych introduced judicial reforms, which diminished the power of the Supreme Court and gave the president control over judicial appointments.⁵⁷ This is notable, since the Supreme Court on December 3, 2004, had over-turned Yanukovych's election in the second round of voting.⁵⁸ Moreover, in October 2010, the Supreme Court of Ukraine (not the Parliament), overturned the changes to the Constitution that were implemented after the Orange revolution.⁵⁹ Thus Yanukovych, by the decision of the Supreme Court, restored

⁵³ Alexei Trochev, "Meddling with Justice. Competitive Politics, Impunity, and Distrusted Courts in Post-Orange Ukraine" *Democratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, Vol.18, No. 2, 2010, pp. 122-147.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Maria Popova, "Ukraine's Legal Problems: Why Kiev's Plans to Purge the Judiciary will Backfire" *Foreign Affairs*, April 2014, https://www.academia.edu/16339330/Ukraine_s_Legal_Problems_Why_Kiev_s_Plans_to_Purge_the_Judiciary_Will_Backfire accessed June 15, 2016.

⁵⁷ Serhiy Kudelia, "The house that Yanukovych built" *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.25, No. 3, July 2014, pp.19-34.

⁵⁸ Maria Popova, "Why the Orange Revolution was Short and Peaceful and Euromaidan Long and Violent" *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 61, No. 6, November–December 2014, pp.64-70.

⁵⁹ Hanna Tkachenko. "Konstytutsiyniy Sud Skasuvav Konstitutsiyu. Shcho dali?" *UNIAN* 01 October 2010. <http://www.unian.ua/politics/408097-konstitutsiyniy-sud-skasuvav-konstitutsiyu-scho-dali.html>, accessed June 13, 2016.

the presidential- parliamentary model of government in Ukraine that had been in effect prior to the Orange revolution. This model gave significant power to the President. Yanukovich also used courts⁶⁰ to prosecute his political opponent Yuliya Tymoshenko, who was imprisoned in the fall of 2011 for seven years.⁶¹ He also gained the power to appoint governors of the oblasts⁶², which he used to place members of the Party of Regions even in western oblasts. The goal of these appointments was to gain control over the regions and suppress any possible opposition.⁶³ Thus, each Ukrainian President has used the power of the courts to his advantage to some degree.

Local courts, according to the previous analysis, elicited the lowest levels of confidence among the respondents. For that reason, this study should consider whether the low levels of confidence in the local courts are similar across the regions and among different age groups and levels of education. Table 3.1.4.2 (Appendix 1) shows that among the regions, the level of confidence in the local courts changed before and after the Orange Revolution. In 2004, the lowest level of confidence, 23.2%, was found in the Western region, followed by Kyiv with 24.7%. The following year, post-Orange revolution, in 2005-2006 saw that the Western region had the highest level of confidence in the local courts, 30.6%. The same region in 2013, the year of Euromaidan, possessed a 12.4% level of confidence in the local courts.

⁶⁰ Taras Kuzio, "Yanukovich's Selective Use of Justice" *Radio Free Europe*, September 12, 2011. http://www.rferl.org/content/commentary_yanukovich_selective_use_of_justice/24326007.html, accessed June 24, 2016.

⁶¹ Ellen Barry, "Former Prime-Minister Tymoshenko is jailed for 7 years" October 11, 2011. *New York Times* http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/world/europe/yulia-tymoshenko-sentenced-to-seven-years-in-prison.html?_r=0, accessed June 15, 2016.

⁶² Oblast - Regional administration.

⁶³ "Можливі губернатори Януковича" *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 24 February 2010, <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2010/02/24/4805612/6>, accessed June 19, 2016.

In contrast in the Eastern region, 29.9% of respondents expressed confidence in the local courts before the Orange revolution. In 2005-2006 this percentage declined to 13.4% with 75.7% stating that they did not have any confidence in the local courts, the highest level among all regions. Interestingly, the low level of trust in the local courts in the Eastern region was the second highest, after Kyiv, in 2011 and 2013, the years of the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych. Thus, residents of the Eastern region, supposedly loyal to Yanukovych, were very dissatisfied with the absence of the rule of law in the country before Euromaidan as much as citizens of other regions.

Among the age groups, the younger respondents (18-29) showed the highest level of confidence in the local courts across the years. The oldest age groups had the lowest level of confidence in the local courts, except the year of 2013, when the oldest group (60+) showed the highest level of confidence in the local courts, 13.8%. A particularly important is that in the period between 2011 and 2013, respondents between 30 and 44 years old had the lowest and second lowest level of confidence in the local courts. This is the same group that was 18-29 in 2004 and 2005-2006. This age group was also one of the most active during Euromaidan.⁶⁴

When one examines the variation of preferences according to the level of education, respondents with higher levels of education had correspondingly lower levels of confidence in the local courts before and after the Orange revolution. In 2004, 30.6% of respondents with a Bachelor's degree or higher indicated confidence in the local courts. By 2005-2005, only 22.3% of this educational group declared confidence to the local courts. In 2011 and 2013 this percentage declined to 18.6% and 10.1% respectively.

⁶⁴ Olga Onuch, "Who were the protesters" *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.25, No.3, July 2014, pp.44-51.

Thus, respondents with the highest level of education demonstrated the least confidence in the local courts in Ukraine, especially before Euromaidan. One participant of Euromaidan, Artem Yasnivsky (1986 y.o.b), a lawyer stated: “Courts together with the prosecution – they are castes. To become a member of these castes, you should become like them. Maidan demonstrated the real face of our judiciary.”⁶⁵

This low level of confidence in the courts, which are supposed to be the main institutions for ensuring fairness in society, may be attributed to the system of appointment of the judges of the courts and corruption. According to the Constitution of Ukraine (Art 85, s. 25-26), Parliament has the power to appoint and dismiss one-third of the judges in the Constitutional Court of Ukraine and to approve appointment and dismissal of the Prosecutor General by the President. The President (Art. 106, s. 11 of the Constitution) has the power to appoint and dismiss the Prosecutor General. The President also has the power to appoint and dismiss one-third of the composition of the Constitutional Court.⁶⁶ Furthermore, according to Article 66, Part II of the Law on the Status of Judges⁶⁷, the President has the power to appoint and dismiss judges for five years, and the parliament has the power to dismiss judges whom it has appointed for life (Art.76, Ch., III). This system of appointment undermines judges’ independence from the executive branch of power. Scholars have argued that the high competition over the

⁶⁵ Tetyana Kovtun, Tetyana Pryvalko *Maidan, Vid pershoi osoby, 45 istorii revoliutsii hidnosti* (Maidan, From the first person, 45 stories of the revolution of dignity) (Kyiv: Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, 2015), p.157.

⁶⁶ *Constitution of Ukraine*, from 28.06.1996 <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254k/96-вр> accessed June 13, 2016.

⁶⁷ “Law of Ukraine On Judiciary and Status of Judges.” No 2543-VI from 07.07.2010. *Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy* <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2453-17>, accessed June 13, 2016.

courts among the political elite is due to a high price of political victory in Ukraine.⁶⁸ Having power over the courts and their decisions can help incumbents to remain in power. The political elite, including the leaders of the Orange team, was not interested in implementing the reforms that increase the independence of the judiciary in Ukraine and thus limiting their power over it.⁶⁹ On a moment of writing this material, reforms of the court system have slowly taken place with some positive results.⁷⁰

3.2. Perception of Democracy and “Rules of the Game”

An appreciation of citizens’ confidence in the main political institutions necessitates an understanding of citizens’ perception of the meaning of democracy. By knowing how regular Ukrainians defines the meaning of democracy, we may explain their evaluation of political institutions. It is possible that citizens’ low levels of confidence in the main political institutions in Ukraine can be explained by institutions’ inability to meet citizens expectations of effective democratic government.

Citizens’ responses to questions “Is Ukraine a Democracy?” show that before the Orange revolution, 23.1% of respondents agreed with the statement that Ukraine is a democracy. In 2005-2006, this percentage slightly increased, to 25.7%. In 2010, the year of the Presidential election, 31.9% of Ukrainians agreed that Ukraine is a

⁶⁸ Alexei Trochev, “Meddling with Justice. Competitive Politics, Impunity, and Distrusted Courts in Post-Orange Ukraine” *Democratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, Vol.18, No.2, Spring 2010, pp. 122-147. Maria Popova, “Ukraine’s Judiciary after Euromaidan” *Comparative Politics Newsletter*, Vol. 25, Issue 2, pp. 32-36.

https://www.academia.edu/20109576/Ukraines_Judiciary_after_Euromaidan_Continuity_and_Change, accessed May 19, 2016.


⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ The Rada introduced changes to the Constitution on the June 1, 2016 to bring the changes to the Status of the Courts in Ukraine. Рада змінила конституцію *Ukrayinska Pravda* <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2016/06/2/7110522/>, accessed June 02, 2016. Peter Solomon, “Who judges the judges? on Success & Challenged of Legal Reform in Ukraine “ *Hromadske Radio* May 27, 2017 <https://hromadskeradio.org/en/programs/ukraine-calling/who-judges-the-judges-peter-solomon-on-successes-challenges-of-legal-reform-in-ukraine>, accessed January 23, 2018.

democracy, the highest during the period examined. In 2013, the year of Euromaidan, the percentage of respondents who agreed that Ukraine is a democracy decreased again to 19.8%, the second lowest during a period of study.

Across the regions, the responses varied. Between 2004 and 2005-2006, the percentage of respondents nationwide who agreed that Ukraine is a democracy increased. However, in the East and South, it decreased from 26.3% and 29.4% in 2004 to 16.5% and 14% in 2005-2006 respectively.

Figure 3.2.1 Is Ukraine a Democracy, 2004-2013



Source: author created the table based on the results of public opinion surveys in Ukraine by IFES in 2004, 2005-2006, 2009 and 2013. The Question was asked: “Is Ukraine a Democracy?” The figure represents only valid responses.

Concurrently, the lowest percentage of those who agreed that Ukraine is a democracy nationwide was observed in 2008 (16.4%). However, in the North and South, the numbers were almost the same as in 2005-2006 (28.4% and 14.6%).


In 2010, 31.9% of citizens agreed that Ukraine is a democracy, the highest across all years, but not in every region. Among the regions, three regions had the highest percentage of respondents who agreed that Ukraine is a democracy: Central (40.2%), Eastern (33.25%) and Southern (33%). Recall that in 2010 Viktor Yanukovich was elected as Ukrainian President. His electoral support was the highest in the Eastern and Southern regions.⁷¹ Thus we could suggest that these regions agreed that Ukraine is a democracy in higher numbers because their candidate won the election. At the same

⁷¹ Vybory Prezydenta Ukrainy. *Central Electoral Commission*
<http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2010/WP0011>, accessed January 02, 2019.

time, the Central region voted for Tymoshenko during the 2010 presidential election, which she lost. Their high perception in 2010 that Ukraine is a democracy in this region could be associated with other factors, such as fairness of the election, which was recognized as fair and free according to the international standards.⁷²

In 2013, the year of Euromaidan, the percentage of those who considered Ukraine a democracy declined in all regions. Opposite of that in the South, it increased from 20.2% in 2011 to 26.8% in 2013, the highest among all regions.

Figure 3.2.2 Is Ukraine a democracy by region, 2004-2013



Source: author created the table based on the results of public opinion surveys in Ukraine by IFES. The Question was asked: “Is Ukraine a Democracy?” The figure represents category “Yes.”


Interestingly, in the Eastern region in 2013, the percentage of those who answered that Ukraine is a democracy was the lowest across all regions - 10.9%. This is significant, considering this region supported the government of Viktor Yanukovich in 2010. The main reason for Ukraine not being a democracy, according to the results of public opinions by Democratic Initiative Foundation, was the presence of corruption at each level of government (11.4%), followed by the “rule of law is not observed” (10.2%), and the “lack of protection of people’s rights” (8.7%).⁷³

⁷²“Ukraine. Presidential Election, 17 January and 7 February 2010. Final Report” OSCE <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/67844?download=true>, accessed January 02, 2019.

⁷³ The results of the public opinion in 2008 (4 years after the Orange revolution) that was conducted by Democratic Initiative Foundation (DIF) illustrated that citizens perceived corruption of the political institutions as the main problems for democratic transitions between 2004 and 2008. *Democratic Initiative Foundation*. <http://2008.dif.org.ua/ua/poll/#2006>, accessed June 19, 2016.

The next step is to analyze Ukrainian citizens' understanding of the meaning of democracy (Figure 3.2.3). Between 2004 and 2013, the most popular answer for the meaning of democracy was “protection of human rights” - 62.8% in 2004 and 59.9% in 2013. “Having a job” was the second most popular answer in 2004 (50.8%), but not in 2013 (43.1%). In 2013, “fair and consistent enforcement of laws” (47.6%) and “no official corruption” (43.7%) were identified as the second and third most popular answers for the meaning of democracy. Simultaneously, support for categories of “state support for pensioners” and “state support of those unable to work” decreased from 44.8% and 36.2% in 2004 to 26.7% and 22.6% in 2013. The support for different freedoms, such as freedom of association, freedom of religion and freedom of press was low during all years.

Figure 3.2.3 Citizens' perception of the meaning of democracy, 2004-2013



Source: the figure created by the author based on data files from IFES. The question was asked: “Please pick any statement or statements that you think accurately define what it means for a country to be a democracy.”

What does it tell us about citizens' political culture? According to Inglehart, as society economic prosperity increases, citizens will shift their values from materialistic which give priority to economic and physical security to postmaterialist which give

priority to self-expression and individuals freedoms.⁷⁴ In Ukraine the economy was unstable during the period studied. GDP per capita was approximately 1,367.35 (US\$) in 2004 according to the World Bank report.⁷⁵ GDP per capita increased between 2004 and 2008 from 1,367.35 (US\$) to 3,068. 61.⁷⁶ And although numbers are much lower than in the countries of established democracies⁷⁷, this increase, according to Inglehart's theory, could hypothetically contribute to citizens' shift in their perception about the meaning of democracy. At the same time, citizens low priority for such freedoms as freedom of association, freedom of religion, freedom to vote, freedom of press and freedom of association, indicate that Ukrainians have not considered individuals freedoms as the basis of democratic society.

Among the participants of Euromaidan, plurality expressed support for the protection of human rights, freedom of speech and fair and consistent enforcement of laws. Sofia Borys'ko (1993 y.o.b), a student recalled: "Why did I come? I think that for all of us who came, firstly, it was a struggle against unfairness and injustice."⁷⁸ Kateryna Kuvita (1985 y.o.b), civic activist: "I personally liked one of the main slogans of Euromaidan – "Human rights above all."⁷⁹ Vasyl' Hascko (1982 y.o.b.), local politician: "It was not only about euro integration, but it was also about European

⁷⁴ See, Ronald Inglehart, "Globalization and postmodern values" *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2002, pp. 215-228. Ronald Inglehart *Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, economic and political change in 43 societies* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,1997), pp.131-159.

⁷⁵ GDP per capita (current US \$)" World Bank National Accounts Data, *World Bank* <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=UA>, accessed January 02, 2019.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ To compare, Canada GDP in 2008 was 46,596,336 (US\$). *World Bank* https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=UA-CA&name_desc=false, accessed January 10, 2019.

⁷⁸ Tetyana Kovtun, Tetyana Pryvalko, *Maidan, Vid pershoi osoby, 45 istoriy revolutsii hidnosti* (Maidan, From the first person, 45 stories of the revolution of dignity) (Kyiv: Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, 2015), p. 45.

⁷⁹ Ibid, p.235.

values – human rights and freedom.”⁸⁰ Serhiy Pytyk (1971 y.o.b.) a businessman said that: “Middle class are people who need more than to live and consume. They are people who buy a light bulb in the building or paint a bench or plant flowers for everyone to enjoy. Those who do things for others, not only for themselves. The salary is secondary.”⁸¹

Rules of the game

It is relevant to inquire into Ukrainians orientations towards unofficial rules and norms that they consider important to follow. In any democratic society, the formal rules should be followed by unwritten norms or “rules of the game”⁸² which citizens consider important to follow. “These subjective rules preferences may or may not be consistent with prevailing law and other norms supposed to govern civic conduct.”⁸³

This perception may be operationalized by citizens’ responses to questions whether certain actions were justifiable: claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled; avoiding a fare on public transport; cheating on taxes if you have a chance; accepting a bribe. Figure 3.2.4 shows that more Ukrainians said claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled was “never justified” in 2006 than in 2000, 55% versus 48%. However, in 2011, 46% said that claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled was “never justified.”


⁸⁰ Ibid, p.169.

⁸¹ Ibid, p.107.

⁸² *Rules of the games* can be defined, as an individual’s conception of what rules should be followed in civic life. Guillermo O’Donnell, “Illusion about Consolidation” in *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies. Themes and Perspective*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc. F. Plattner (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1997), p.46.

⁸³Walter Rosenbaum, *Political Culture* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 7.

Figure 3.2.4 Perception of the “rules of the game,” 2000-2011



Source: author created the figure based on the results of WVS in Ukraine 2000, 2006, 2011. The question was asked: Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card, where 1- never justified and 10 – always justified. The figure represents the percentage of those who chose 1 (never justified).

The same can be said about a question of justification of cheating on taxes, where the number of respondents who opined that it is never justified increased from 41% in 2000 to 52% in 2006 but decreased in 2011 to 48%. The intolerance towards accepting bribes rose from 64% in 2000 to 71% in 2006. In 2011 the intolerance towards accepting bribes decreased to 62%. The same changes were observed about a question of justification of avoiding a fare on public transport. The intolerance increased between 2000 and 2006 from 34% to 38%, but it decreased in 2011 to 33%.⁸⁴ Thus, citizens elevated levels of intolerance towards unjustifiable actions was time limited. If citizens have low levels of intolerance for unjustifiable actions or do not consider them unjustifiable, it is possible that they will conduct these actions themselves.

Across the regions, the Western and Eastern regions increased their level of tolerance of all four indicators between 2006 and 2011. In contrast, in the Central and Southern regions tolerance towards unjustifiable actions such as claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled; avoiding a fare on public transport; cheating on

⁸⁴To compare, in Netherlands (2012), the intolerance towards avoiding a transport fare was 62.6%. See *World Values Survey* <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSONline.jsp>, accessed January 09, 2019.

taxes if you have a chance and accepting a bribe decreased. Thus, inhabitants in different regions expressed different perceptions towards some unjustifiable actions.

Table 3.2.1 Perception of the rules of the game by region (% “never justified”), 2006-2011

REGION	Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled		Avoiding a transport fare 2006		Cheating on taxes 2006		Accepting bribes	
	2006	2011	2006	2011	2006	2011	2006	2011
Western	47	34.6	37.4	21.3	45.9	37	59.5	55.1
Eastern	47.4	41.1	31.6	29.1	43.5	43.5	67.3	59.8
Central	24.9	50.3	20.5	38.2	22	52.4	36.9	66
Southern	39.3	58	33.2	41.7	38	54.6	50.8	68.9
AGE								
18-29	29.5	36.1	22.9	24.3	25.6	36.7	45.8	49.8
30-49	38	46.2	29.7	33.6	34.9	46.1	51.7	60
50 and up	47.5	51.7	34.9	36.1	50.6	55.5	65.2	69.1

Source: the author created the figure based on the results of WVS in Ukraine (2006, 2011). The question was asked: Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card, where 1 - never justified and 10 – always justified. The figure represents the percentage of those who chose 1 (never justified).

Among the age groups, the youngest age group (18-29) expressed the lowest level of intolerance towards all four unjustifiable actions. The oldest age group (50 and up) expressed the highest level of intolerance. These findings are surprising, because if the younger generations of Ukrainians have low levels of intolerance towards unjustifiable actions such as accepting a bribe, avoiding public transport fare, not paying taxes, it will be difficult to build a society of high social trust, where citizens follow rules and norms because of their beliefs than rather by order.

In published interviews of 45 participants in Euromaidan protests, almost a third of them (fourteen) expressed opinions relating to the “rules of the game” or social norms that should be followed. For example, Serhiy Pytyk, a businessman (1971 y.o.b) stated: “There should be zero tolerance for unlawful wealth in the country. Everybody should start to act differently: do ourselves not throw a cigarette out of the window of your car; stop at the red light at the intersection; clean the staircase of your apartment building- we

should change first.”⁸⁵ Artem Yasynovsky, a lawyer (1986 y.o.b.) said: “It makes me angry when somebody says *that* country. I always ask: That country? It is your country.”⁸⁶ Mykola Myshovsky (1979 y.o.b.), a priest: “Unfortunately, in today’ Ukraine, when people get a job, they are interested not in how much they can make, but how much they can steal. This comes from our “bright socialist past.”⁸⁷

Thus, some participants of Euromaidan acknowledged the importance of making changes in citizens perception towards the “rules of the game” and meaning of democracy, despite a low level of intolerance towards unjustifiable actions on the national level. This indicates that Ukrainians who participated in Euromaidan, although in the minority, expressed their understanding of the rules of the game as those that built on the protection of human rights, enforcement of the rule of law and citizens personal responsibility.

Conclusion

After analysing the first component of political culture in Ukraine, citizens’ orientations towards main political institutions as well as their perception of democracy and rules of the game, the following conclusion can be made.

Citizens of Ukraine had low confidence in public institutions and perceived the Ukrainian state as undemocratic. This low level of confidence in the main political institutions was a continuation from the years before the Orange revolution. Interestingly, confidence in the President and the Prime-Minister was more regionally differentiated than confidence in other political institutions.

⁸⁵ Ibid, p.109.

⁸⁶ Ibid, p.69.

⁸⁷ Ibid, p.126.

One of the main reasons for this lack of confidence was perceived corruption of all political institutions in Ukraine, including a view that nepotism was present in Ukrainian politics. Author's analysis of political appointments by Presidents Yushchenko and Yanukovich during the first year of their presidencies demonstrated that in both cases they were not based on the merits, but rather on the proximity of the relationship between the President and appointee. Moreover, the composition of the Ukrainian political elite between 2004 and 2014 did not experience significant personnel turnover and was still very exclusive. This occurred within a system characterized by weak and volatile political parties, which often were built around political leaders. Once elected, they showed little regard for their electorate. Furthermore, repeated changes to the electoral systems had undermined the stability of political parties and Parliament, as well as public confidence in them.

The courts in Ukraine and especially the local courts had the lowest level of confidence among all political institutions, and this confidence declined further over time. Courts also were perceived as the most corrupt institutions in the state. The executive involvement in the work of the judiciary in Ukraine benefited the political elite in power, and for that reason, they were not interested in reforming the judiciary. Further analysis of the official documents showed that both Presidents used the power of the courts to his advantage, undermining the independence of the judiciary and possibly citizens' confidence in the courts. If citizens do not have confidence in the juridical institutions of the country, the rule of law cannot be stabilized and perceived as legitimate.

When analysing citizens' understanding of the meaning of democracy, the author discovered that the majority of them considered the protection of human rights and fair and consistent enforcement of laws as the most important democratic characteristics. Nonetheless, Ukrainians retained their preferences for such materialistic values as "having a job" which is associated with lesser developed democracies and unstable economies. Only a small percentage of Ukrainians considered the presence of individual freedoms as part of democratic society. It suggests that Ukrainians define a democracy as a mixed of materialist and post-materialist orientations, which is expected, considering that the country is not economically prosperous. As was stated by Inglehart, "societies at the early stages of the curve tend to emphasize economic growth at any price. But as they move beyond a given threshold, they begin to emphasize the quality of life concerns such as environmental protection and lifestyle issues."⁸⁸

Regarding citizens' perceptions of the rules of the game, the survey results confirm that mixed changes took place. Ukrainians temporarily increased their intolerance towards unlawful actions such as claiming not entitled government benefits, not paying public transport fares, accepting bribes and cheating on taxes between 2000 and 2006. Unfortunately, between 2006 and 2011 citizens' intolerance towards these unlawful actions decreased. The youngest age group expressed the lowest level of intolerance towards the unlawful actions in 2006 and 2011. These findings suggest that younger Ukrainians, despite their upbringing in Independent Ukraine, have not developed strong preferences for the normative rules and principles of obedience. As was stated by Kuzio "It is illusory to believe that young people who enter such a corrupt

⁸⁸ Ronald Inglehart, "Globalization and postmodern values" *Washington Quarterly*, Vol.23, No.1, 2002, pp. 215-228, p.219.

political system will begin to respect the rule of law because they are from a different, less “soviet,” generation.”⁸⁹

At the same time, Euromaidan participants expressed their support for the rule of law and rules of the game for all citizens, including the political elite. They expressed their desire and willingness to live in a country when citizens keep the government accountable. The majority of participants of Euromaidan extended their opposition to all political parties including the opposition ones.⁹⁰ Moreover, they identified their responsibility in making democratic changes within the country.

After the analysis of the citizens’ orientations towards government structure and rules of the game, the next chapter will examine citizens’ orientation towards others in the political system in Ukraine between the Orange revolution and Euromaidan.

⁸⁹Taras Kuzio, “Political Culture and Democracy. Ukraine as an Immobile State” *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 25, No.1, pp. 88-113, p. 94.

⁹⁰ The good illustration of this was the moment when freed from prison Yuliya Tymoshenko, who was one of the leaders of the Orange revolution arrived at the stage during Euromaidan. Majority of protesters were indifferent to her appearance on the stage. During the early 2014 presidential election, Tymoshenko received 12.8% of the votes. For details about old elite and their behavior during the Euromaidan see Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis. What it means for the West* (London: Yale University Press, 2014), p.152.

CHAPTER 4 Orientation towards Others in the Political System

Introduction

As was discussed earlier, citizens' perception of other people in the political system is a strong indicator of their political culture. Citizens who are actively involved in socio-political groups and organizations, and who are connected to social networks outside of the political system, will have a higher level of social trust.¹ In turn, an increase in social trust through social networks will lead citizens to be willing to collaborate with those who are outside of their small organizations. They will be more likely to join groups with other members of society to make demands upon political institutions.

The following orientations will be examined: political identification, interpersonal trust, and tolerance towards minority groups. The following characteristics of political identification will be analyzed: citizens' attitudes towards the political units and groups with which one is most often involved. Citizens' pride in their citizenship and their perceptions of the unity of citizens will be analysed as well. The level of interpersonal trust will be operationalized as the following variables: level of trust (relatives, neighbors, different religion, and nationality) and the total level of trust in people. Citizens' tolerance will be measured by their attitudes towards gender equality and LGBT people, as the important indicators of the inclusiveness and equity of any society.²

¹ Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 180.

² Ronald Inglehart and Daphna Oyserman, "Individualism, Autonomy, Self-expression" in Henk Vincken, Joseph Soeters and Peter Ester, ed. *Comparing Cultures. Dimensions of Culture in a Comparative Perspective* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2004), p.80.

The chapter will demonstrate that most Ukrainian citizens were not active members of social or political groups during the studied years, which was a continuation from previous years. However, citizens' awareness and positive appraisal of NGO groups significantly increased across all regions.

Ukrainians in higher numbers identified with Ukrainian national identity during the period studied. The youngest age group expressed the highest level of identification with a Ukrainian national identity, despite this group preferences for the Russian language at home.

Overall Ukrainians had a low level of general social trust between 2004 and 2014, Low social trust, according to previous research, is not conducive for development of participant political culture.³ In Ukraine, as the author discovered, Ukrainians had a low level of general social which was combined with positive changes in the level of interpersonal trust. Ukrainians increased their trust towards people of other ethnicity and religions, their neighbours, family and people that they know personally. An increase in acceptance was especially evident among more educated groups. Similarly, Ukrainians increased their support for gender equality and acceptance of LGBT people during the research period. Interestingly, the most pronounce increased in the tolerance of homosexuality was found not in young people or Kyiv residents, but people from the East.

An analysis of migration within Ukraine indicated that Ukraine became more linguistically diverse. There was a trend of East-to-West urbanization during the studied period, as residents of the eastern regions left local communities and cities and moved to

³ Francis Fukuyama, *Trust. The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: Free Press Paperbacks, 1996), p.27.

regions where Ukrainian was the main language of communication. Sometimes, they relocated to a region with a different dominant religion than their own.⁴

4.1. Political Identifications

How and with whom people identify themselves in society can provide information about their likelihood of collaborating. Some of the main indicators of political identification are membership in different political groups, ethnic, language-based or religious organizations. Citizens' perceived nationality and citizenship may also explain whether they identify themselves with the national state or with their local community or region.


4.1.1. Nationality, citizenship, and perception of unity

Data on the ethnic composition of Ukrainian society within the period of the study shows an increase in the percentage of citizens who identified themselves as Ukrainians. In 2004, 75.5% of respondents identified themselves as Ukrainians, a percentage comparable to the results of the last Ukrainian census that was conducted in 2001.⁵ By contrast, in 2005-2006, 79% of respondents identified themselves as Ukrainians. This dynamic continued through the years except 2010, when it was declined to 77.8%. In 2013, the year of the Euromaidan, 82.3% nationwide identified as Ukrainians. Figure 4.1.1.2 indicates that this trend is visible across all regions in varying degrees. In Kyiv, the percentage of those who identified as Ukrainians increased from 72.3% in 2004 to 91.7% in 2013. In the North, West, and Center, the percentage also increased between 2004 and 2013, although the levels were higher, to begin with.

⁴ Many cities of the Western Ukraine have Catholicism as their main religion.

⁵ According to the results of National Census in 2001, Ukraine was composed of 77.8% Ukrainians, 17.3% Russians and 0.6% Belorussian. In total, according to the results of the census, Ukraine had 33 other nationalities besides Ukrainian and Russian. The Government Service of Statistics of Ukraine. Ukrainian National Census. <http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/general/nationality>, accessed May 12, 2016.

Figure 4 1.1.1 Nationality, 2004-2013



Source: the author created this table based on data files from IFES in Ukraine. The question was asked as follow: “What is your nationality? Please pick the appropriate category.”

The Russian-speaking regions of Southern and Eastern Ukraine reveal interesting changes. In the South, the percentage of those who identified as Ukrainians decreased after the Orange revolution from 64.1% in 2004 to 58.5% in 2005, although it was still the majority of respondents. This level increased to its highest level of 79.5% in 2010.

In Eastern Ukraine, the total percentage of those who identified as Ukrainian increased as well from 68.5% in 2004 to 88.7% in 2013, which is significant, considering that Eastern region is predominantly Russian-speaking with many ethnic Russians. One of the participants of anti-Maidan or alternative Maidan, mayor of Luhansk (East) Serhiy Kravchenko said the following on 15 December 2013:


“We are also Ukrainians. We love our country. We want to be understood... We want European standards, European pensions, but we want to know at what cost this will be for Luhans’k... I’ll tell you honestly, for Luhans’k this will be a problem, we’ll lose 30,000 jobs immediately... It happens that our industrial production is geared towards Russia, that’s just the way it is [tak poluchylos’]”⁶

It may suggest that a citizen’s identification as “Ukrainian” is more civic than ethnic or linguistic in Ukraine. As was discovered by Volodymyr Kulyk about Russian speaking

⁶ Marta Dyczok, “Voices During the Maidan as Captured by Public Radio Ukraine” *Wilson Center*, April 01, 2015, www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/voices-during-the-maidan-captured-public-radio-ukraine, accessed December 29, 2018.

Ukrainians in the East and South “they have gradually been transformed from Soviet people into Ukrainians – and that without drastic changes in their language practice.”⁷

Figure 4.1.1.2 “Ukrainian” by region (%), 2004-2013



Source: the author created the figure based on data files from IFES in Ukraine. The question was asked as follow: “What is your nationality? Please pick the appropriate category.” The figure represents the percentage of those who answered “Ukrainian.”

Among the age groups, the youngest age group (18-34 in 2004 and 18-29 in 2013)

identified as “Ukrainian” in higher numbers than other age groups. This dynamic was the strongest in 2013, the year of Euromaidan when 89.9% of those who belonged to the age group of 18-29 years old identified themselves as “Ukrainian”. The age group of 30-44 followed the youngest age group, with 83.7% in 2013 identifying Ukrainian as their nationality. Many in the 18-34 years old age group in 2005 would become the 30-44 age group in 2013. Thus, citizens, who identified themselves as Ukrainians in 2005-2006, are still the second most active group regarding their identification with their Ukrainian nationality after the youngest group of those between 18-29 years old.

These changes in citizens’ national identification could indicate generational changes that took place in Ukraine. Citizens between 18-29 years of age in 2013 are those who grew up in Independent Ukraine. They had a different upbringing than the previous generation of citizens, especially those who grew up in the Soviet Union. They were not

⁷ Volodymyr Kulyk, “Identity in Transformation: Russian-speakers in Post-Soviet Ukraine” *Europe-Asia Studies*, 2017, pp.1-23, p.2. DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2017.1379054, accessed December 29, 2018.

socialized under communist regime during their formative years (between age 6 and 17), and for that reason, they identified with the state that they were born in higher numbers than other age groups.⁸ This is further confirmed when we look at the age groups that showed the lowest identification with Ukrainian. They are the middle-aged groups; those aged 35-54 in 2005-2006 and 45-59 in 2013. These citizens were born and raised in Soviet Ukraine. Many of them attended Soviet kindergartens and schools with the Russian language as the main language of instruction.⁹ Thus, they may have identified less with the Ukrainian nationality. Ironically, the majority of the political leaders of the Orange revolution, as well as Euromaidan, belonged to those age groups.¹⁰

Among those who identified themselves as Russian (16.9% in total in 2005-2006), 19.3% belonged to the age group of 55+, followed by 17.6% who belong to the 35-54 age group. The youngest age group was the least prone to identify themselves as Russian across all years, with the lowest percentage, 8.6% in 2013.

Table 4.1.1.1 Nationality by age groups, (%), 2004-2013

2004 (prelection)				
	18-35	36-55	56+	TOTAL
Ukrainian	76.5	76.1	73.8	75.5
Russian	18.7	18	22.8	19.8
Mixed	1.5	1.2	0	0.9
Bulgarian	0.3	1.2	0	0.5
Byelorussian	0.8	0.2	1.3	0.8
Moldovan	1.3	1.9	0.3	1.2
Other	1	1.4	1.8	1.4
2005-2006				
	18-34	35-54	55+	TOTAL
Ukrainian	85.1	75.7	76.6	78.8
Russian	13.4	17.6	19.3	16.9
Mixed	0.5	2.4	1.0	1.3
Polish	0.0	0.4	1.0	0.5
Bulgarian	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1
Byelorussian	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2

⁸ Grigore Pop_Eleches and Joshua. A. Tucker “Associated with the Past? Communist Legacies and Civic Participation in Post-Communist Countries,” *East European Politics & Societies*, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 45-68, p. 45.

⁹ Volodymyr Kulyk, “Identity in Transformation: Russian-speakers in Post-Soviet Ukraine,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, 2017, DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2017.1379054, accessed September 09, 2018.

¹⁰ Yushchenko was 50 years old in 2004 during the Orange Revolution, Yuliya Tymoshenko was 43. Petro Poroshenko, who was elected the President in 2014 was 50 years old. Arseniy Yatsenyuk, the leader of Euromaidan and Prime-Minister of Ukraine until his resignation on April 10, 2016, was 42, couple years younger than the age group of 45-59.

Tatar	0.0		0.9	0.7	0.6
Other	0.0		0.2	0.0	0.1
2013					
	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+	TOTAL
Ukrainian	89.9	83.7	76.8	79.1	82.3
Russian	8.6	12.4	18.1	18.7	14.6
Mixed	1.2	1.0	2.6	1.9	1.6
Polish	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Bulgarian	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.1
Byelorussian	0.0	0.5	0.3	0.0	0.2
Tatar	0.3	1.4	0.9	0.0	0.7
Other	0.0	0.5	1.1	0.2	0.5

Source: the author created the table based on the results of the public opinion survey in Ukraine by IFES, 2005- 2006, 2013 (sample size 1800). The question was asked: “What is your nationality? Please pick the appropriate category.”

In published interviews of student participants of Euromaidan, thus the youngest age group, almost all mentioned their “otherness” with the old generation of politicians.

Lubov Halan (1996 y.o.b.), a student at the National University Kyiv-Mohyla Academy:

“Maidan was divided in two: politicians on the European Square and us. Our “old friend” politicians told us that we would not be able to achieve anything without them.”¹¹

Sofia Borys’ko (1993 y.o.b), student, Kyiv National University: “To be honest, students were protesting against two groups: against Yanukovych and his regime and the opposition. Because the opposition worked according to a slogan “If you are not with us, you are against us.”¹² Thus, the new generation of Ukrainians, those who were born in Ukraine after 1991, who attended Ukrainian rather than Soviet schools, and grew up in a sovereign country, identified themselves as “Ukrainian” in higher numbers than all other groups.

Another aspect of political identification is an individual’s attitude toward his/her national pride. Citizens’ attitudes towards their citizenship and their feeling about belonging to their country or “national pride as the general dimension of system effect” are important indicators of national identity for all nations.¹³ Figure 4.1.1.3 shows that the


¹¹ Tetyana Kovtun, Tetyana Pryvalko, *Maidan, Vid pershoi osoby, 45 istorii revolutsii gidnosti* (Maidan, From the first person, 45 stories of the revolution of dignity) (Kyiv: Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, 2015), p.40.

¹² Ibid, p. 50.

¹³ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1965), p. 65.

percentage of Ukrainians that felt proud to be a Ukrainian citizen increased from 37.7% in 2004 to 53.6 % in 2005. However, citizens pride in their citizenship decreased in 2006 to 45.1%, the lowest across all years. The year of 2006 was when the Orange coalition collapsed in Rada. It is possible that Ukrainians were disappointed with their government at that time and as a result has less pride in their citizenship.

Figure 4.1.1.3 Pride in the Citizenship (%), 2004-2011



Source: the author created the figure based on the results of WVS in Ukraine: 2006 (2507) and 2011 (1500). The question was asked: "Are you proud to be a Ukrainian citizen?" The figure represents only valid answers. For the 2004-2010 years see V.Vorona and M.Shulga *Ukrainian society 1991-2010. Sociological Monitoring*. Kyiv, Institute of Sociology, NAS of Ukraine, 2010, p.607.


The second lowest percentage was in 2010, the year of the Presidential election when 49.4% of Ukrainians expressed to be proud of their citizenship. We can attest to some differences between Ukrainians perception of their nationality and their pride in their citizenship. More Ukrainians identify themselves as "Ukrainian" when asked about their nationality. At the same time, a smaller percentage of Ukrainians were proud of their citizenship. This is because pride in citizenship involves individuals' sentiments towards the nation-state and its rules, whereas national identity operates on a different level, combining ideology and individual sentiments towards people and territory.¹⁴ We can suggest that Ukrainians had a strong attachment to their country and its territory, but not to the political state and its leadership. As was stated by Verba "It is the sense of identity with the nation that legitimize the activities of national elites and makes it possible for them to

¹⁴Mikael Hjerm, "National identities, national pride and xenophobia: A comparison of four Western countries." *Acta Sociologica*, Vol.41, No.4, 1998, pp.335-347, p.342.

mobilize the commitment and support of their followers.”¹⁵ This was not observed in Ukraine. At the same time, an increase in the number of respondents who were proud of their citizenship between 2010 and 2011, from 49.4% to 67% may indicate that Ukrainians started to change their orientations.

Did they feel united as a nation? Figure 4.1.1.4 shows that the majority of Ukrainian citizens have not noticed changes in their unity. Only in 2005, year after the Orange revolution, and in 2008, the category of “no change” was in the minority (43% and 46.5%). In 2008, 44.2% expressed a declined in the unity of Ukrainians – the highest among all years.

Figure 4.1.1.4 Perception of Unity (%), 2005-2013



Source: the figure was created by author based on data files from IFES. Please tell me whether there have been 1- Great improvement, 2- Slight improvement, 3- No change, 4- Slight decline, 5- Great decline 9 – DK (was not included). The sample size was 1500 across the country. The data files were exclusively provided by IFES for this research project.

How were these orientations distributed among different regions and groups? Table 4.1.1.2 shows that citizens’ perception of the unity of Ukrainian citizens after the Orange revolution varied by region, language spoken at home and age. Respondents in the Western region were more likely to think that the unity of Ukrainian citizens increased ($\beta = -.095$ and $p=.003$), whereas citizens of Eastern region were more likely to think that the unity of Ukrainian citizens declined ($\beta = .185$ and $p=.000$) in comparison to the Central region (reference category). Citizens 55 years and older were more likely to think about

¹⁵ Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 529.

a decrease in the unity of Ukrainian citizens in comparison to those in the 18-34-year-old age group (reference group). Citizens who used Ukrainian as the spoken language at home were more likely to express that the unity of Ukrainian citizens increased in 2005-2006 ($\beta = -.208$ and $p = .000$).

Table 4.1.1.2 Perception of Unity, 2005- 2013

Model 1 (2005-2006)	Coefficients		Sig.	Model 2 (2013)	Coefficients		Sig.
	B	Beta β			B	Beta β	
(Constant)	3.207		.000	(Constant)	2.505		.000
Language at home	-.421	-.208	.000	Language at home	-.028	-.018	.646
Religion	.060	.028	.325	Religion	.052	.030	.251
Western	-.248	-.095	.003	Western	-.162	-.088	.008
Southern	.054	.021	.538	Southern	-.104	-.105	.002
Eastern	.448	.185	.000	Eastern	-.212	-.114	.002
Kyiv	-.078	-.018	.548	Kyiv	.057	.017	.548
Employment recoded	.052	.026	.428	Crimea	-.179	-.068	.036
35-54	.014	.007	.842	Employment recoded	.029	.019	.534
55+	.190	.088	.016	30-44	.068	.040	.226
Secondary	.043	.020	.663	45-59	.049	.027	.400
bachelor and higher	-.092	-.037	.417	60+	.069	.040	.249
Rural/Urban	-.013	-.006	.848	Secondary	-.151	-.095	.060
R square adjusted	.151			Bachelor and higher	-.286	-.169	.001
p-value for the model	.000			Urban/Rural	.033	.020	.477
				R square adjusted	.022		
				P value for the model	.000		

a. Dependent Variable: 42. D. Unity of Ukrainian citizens

Source: the author created the figure based on data files from IFES. The question was asked: Please tell me whether there have been 1- Great improvement, 2- Slight improvement, 3- No change, 4- Slight decline, 5- Great decline 9 – DK (was not included in regression). Because of the coding of the DV, negative relationship indicates an increase in unity. The sample size was 1500 across the country. IFES exclusively provided the data files for this research project

After looking at the results of a model 2 for 2013, the following changes observed. The relationships between a region and the perception of unity were statistically significant for all regions, except Kyiv. Citizens in all regions were more likely to see an increase in the unity of Ukrainian citizens in comparison to the Central region, with the Eastern and Southern regions showing the strongest correlation ($\beta = -.114$ and $\beta = -.105$). Those with the highest level of education also were more likely to hold the opinion that the unity of Ukrainian citizens increased in 2013 ($\beta = -.169$ and $p = .001$) in comparison to those who had the lowest level of education (reference group). The relationship between the language used at home and citizens' perception about their unity in 2013 were not statistically significant.

Euromaidan participants also voiced various opinions about citizens' unity, with 21 out of 45 commenting on the strong sense of unity among protesters. Serhiy Pytyk, a businessman, (1971 y.ob.): "We became as a nation. But not a nation in the sense of nationality; I mean a nation united by people with the same ideas, goals, and visions for the future of their children and grandchildren."¹⁶ Stepan Kubiv, Member of Parliament, (1962 y.o.b.): "During Maidan, we had a miniature Ukrainian nation-state. A nation-state that illustrated that we are strong as long as we are united."¹⁷ Students were more critical than other participants of the protesters' unity. Lubov Halan (1996 y.o.b): "We were, to be honest, very disappointed in the students' movement. The majority of them saw Euromaidan as PR [public relations]. Euromaidan was in fashion. They came, took a picture to show that they were on Euromaidan, and went home."¹⁸

4.1.2. Language identifications

Language is an important component of political identification, especially in countries where more than one language is recognized as an official language of the state. The studies on the role of language in Ukraine suggested that language is as important as the region or even the most important cleavage that define citizens identities since 1991.¹⁹

Since Ukraine's independence in 1991, only the Ukrainian language has been recognized as the official state language under the Constitution, even though the South and East contain a high percentage of Russian speakers.²⁰ Among the first reforms adopted after

¹⁶ Tetyana Kovtun, Tetyana Pryvalko, *Maidan, Vid pershoi osoby, 45 istoriy revoliutsii hidnosti* (Maidan, From the first person, 45 stories of the revolution of dignity) (Kyiv: Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, 2015), p.108.

¹⁷ Ibid, p.159.

¹⁸ Ibid, p.39.

¹⁹ Dominique Arel, "Language Politics in Independent Ukraine: Towards one or Two State Languages." *Nationalities Papers*, Vol.23, No.3, 1995, pp.597-621.

²⁰ Art 10, *Constitution of Ukraine*, 1990.

Ukraine’s independence was the adoption of the Ukrainian language in schools and Universities (except for Crimea and Eastern Ukraine).²¹ Thus, by the time of the Orange revolution in 2004, many students in schools and universities were studying in Ukrainian. And although it was a contentious process, especially in the Southern and Eastern parts of the country, Ukrainian became the national language of the country.²²

Table 4.1.2.1 The language of instruction in schools (%), 1991-2008

School Year	Preschools		Primary and secondary		Higher	
	Ukrainian	Russian	Ukrainian	Russian	Ukrainian	Russian
1991-1992	51	47	49	50	37	63
1998-1999	76	22	70	29	69	31
2006-2007	85	15	79	20	85	15


Source: Paul Robert Magosci, *A History of Ukraine. The land and its people*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), p.739. The table was reproduced with permission from the author.

Nonetheless, as a result of its favored status during the Soviet past many citizens still use Russian in everyday communication. Many citizens of the central regions, including the capital Kyiv speak “*surgyk*,” a mix of Ukrainian and Russian. For that reason, data was collected on citizens’ preferences for the language they used at home or considered convenient. Looking at Figure 4.1.2, we can see that the percentage of those who use Ukrainian at home was a stable, sizeable minority. The percentage of those who used the Russian language dipped right after the Orange revolution but increased to 44% in 2007. The percentage of those who used both languages declined from 14.8% in 2004 to 12.7% in 2013. The data on language preference among the regions between two revolutions revealed a clear division. West, North and Center demonstrated clear preferences for speaking Ukrainian at home.

²¹Art 10, *Constitution of Ukraine*. 1990. In Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, schools and university continued instructions in Russian language due to the presence of Russian speaking minorities in those areas.

²²Abel Polese “The formal and the informal: exploring ‘Ukrainian’ education in Ukraine, scenes from Odessa.” *Comparative Education*, Vol. 46, No.1, February 2010, pp.47–62.

Figure 4.1.2.1 Language at home (%), 2004-2013



Source: author created the graph based on the data from IFES.

By contrast, respondents’ in East and South as well as in the capital Kyiv largely spoke Russian at home. And although the use of the Russian language after the Orange revolution in Kyiv declined from to 41.4%, the use of surgyk increased to 35.7% in 2013. Respondents’ preferences for choice of language at home in 2013 did not change. The majority of 96.7% of respondents in West (96.7%), Center (75.8%) and North (61%) chose the Ukrainian language. All other regions and the capital Kyiv identified the Russian language as the main language at home.

Table 4.1.2.2 Language at home by age and regions, 2004-2013

2004						
REGION	Kyiv	North	Center	South	East	West
Ukrainian	21.9	66.7	83.1	15.9	9.6	98.1
Russian	62.5	13.3	8.1	61.5	69.3	1.4
Both	15.6	20	8.8	22	21.1	0.5
AGE	18-34	35-54	55+			
Ukrainian	42	44.2	50.9			
Russian	43.35	40.2	32.2			
Both	13.4	14.7	16.3			
2005-2006						
REGION	Kyiv	North	Center	South	East	West
Ukrainian	24.3	69.9	78.7	13.7	13.7	88.3
Russian	41.4	11.8	8.7	67.8	63.4	3.6
Both	31.4	18.3	12.7	16.4	21.3	7.8
AGE	18-34	35-54	55+			
Ukrainian	44.6	45.1	46.8			
Russian	39.9	35.6	34.9			
Both	14.4	17.5	17.8			
2013						
REGION	Kyiv	North	Center	South	East	West
Ukrainian	28.6	61	75.8	7.4	9.9	96.7
Russian	34.5	19.8	6.5	71.6	65.6	0.3
Both	35.7	18.7	17.7	17.9	24.1	3
AGE	18-34	35-54	55+			
Ukrainian	40.5	45.6	45.2			
Russian	40.9	37	35.6			
Both	17.6	16.8	18.9			

Source: the author created the table based on the results of public opinion surveys by IFES in Ukraine. The data files were exclusively provided for this project. The question was asked, “What is the main language you speak in your home?”

When looking at language preferences among the age groups, we can see that preferences for Ukrainian and Russian language are almost equal in 2013; however, Russian prevails as the most popular choice. The youngest age group expressed the highest level of preference for Russian across all years, except in 2005. These findings are similar to those by Volodymyr Kulyk who studied the age factor in language practices and attitudes in Ukraine between 2006 and 2012.²³ Kulyk stated, “that the youngest cohort was found to speak Russian, not less but more than older ones, partly due to the higher concentration of youth in the cities where that [Russian] language continued to predominate.”²⁴ As we discovered earlier, younger Ukrainians in higher numbers identified their national identity as Ukrainian in comparison to other age groups. They also increased their usage of Russian and mixed language at home in higher numbers than did other age groups. These findings are significant as they show that language at home or language of convenience in Ukraine was not associated with national identification for the younger generation of Ukrainians.

It also indicates that although many citizens identified themselves as Ukrainians and received education in the Ukrainian language, they preferred Russian as the language of everyday communication and convenience. One Euromaidan participant Yevgen Utkin (1958 y.o.b., born in Donetsk) stated: “We did not have any problems: who you are, which language you speak, everyone was united.”²⁵

²³ Volodymyr Kulyk, “The age factor in language practices and attitudes: continuity and change in Ukraine’s bilingualism.” *Nationalities Papers*, Vol.43, No.2, 2015, pp. 283-301.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 284.

²⁵ Tetyana Kovtun, Tetyana Pryvalko, *Maidan, Vid pershoi osoby, 45 istoriy revoliutsii hidnosti* (Maidan, From the first person, 45 stories of the revolution of dignity) (Kyiv: Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, 2015), p. 114.

4.1.3. Religious affiliation

In addition to language, religion is another strong indicator of citizen's political preference.²⁶ Longstanding religious traditions and levels of human development will have an impact on citizens social values and moral attitudes.²⁷ Societies in which citizens have strong religious attachments and identification are considered less susceptible for the development and maintenance of democratic political culture. In the post-communist countries as Ukraine, there were expectations of weaker religiosity due to the legacy of communism that undermined religious attendance.²⁸

In Ukraine, as of January 1, 2011, there were 33,977 churches and religious organizations.²⁹ More than 97% of registered religious communities in Ukraine were Christian. About half of them were Orthodox. The other half was split between Catholics and Protestants. Since the restoration of the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine after the Independence, this church became the dominant religion in the traditional territories of the Western region of Ukraine.³⁰ Despite a high number of religious organizations, citizens' membership in religious groups declined from 2.5% in 2004 to 0.9% in 2013. At the same time, religious affiliation with the Russian Orthodox Church increased from 11.5% in 2005-2006 to 19.6% in 2013. Opposite of that, the affiliation

²⁶ Paul D'Anieri, Robert Kravchuk and Taras Kuzio. *Politics and Society in Ukraine* (Colorado: Westview, 1999).

²⁷ Pippa Norris, "Macca or Oil?" *The Civic Culture Transformed. From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens*, ed. Russel J. Dalton and Christian Welzel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp.240-261, p. 245.

²⁸ Grigore Pop-Eleches, "Historical Legacies and Post-Communist Regime Change," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 69, No. 4, 2007, pp. 908-926.

²⁹ "Religions in Ukraine" Religious Information Service of Ukraine. *Ukrainian Catholic University*, <http://risu.org.ua/en/index/reference>, accessed April 18, 2016.


³⁰ During the Soviet time, Greek Catholic church was banned in Ukraine and its Metropolitan- Archbishop Myroslav Liubachivsky was in exile in Rome. See Paul Robert Magosci, *A History of Ukraine. The land and its people* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 2010), p.741.

with the Ukrainian Orthodox³¹ declined from 33.7% in 2005-2006 to 26.2% in 2013.

These changes are significant if we look at the role of religion in political life in Ukraine.

Ukraine was historically divided between a largely Catholic West and a predominantly Orthodox East, South, and Centre. Since independence, the Ukrainian Orthodox church was subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate, with Patriarch Filaret being appointed as the head of the church.³²

Figure 4.1.3.1 Religious Affiliation (%), 2004-2013



Source: the author created the figure based on the results of a public opinion survey in Ukraine by IFES; 2004, 2005 and 2013. The question was asked: “With which church or religious group do you identify yourself? Note: respondents were asked to mark all applicable answers.

However, Russian state influence on the church was so intense, extending to a denial of the use of the Ukrainian language during service, that Filaret left the church.³³ In 1992 he created the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate, in which Ukrainian became the main language of service. This separation led to even more disagreement between the Kiev and Moscow Patriarchate as they were competing for the historical land of holy places such as Pecherska Lavra and Saint Sofia Cathedral in Kyiv.³⁴ There are ongoing efforts and demands from Kyiv residents for the Moscow Patriarchate to leave

³¹ Ukrainian Orthodox in the survey refers to Ukrainian Orthodox (Kiev Patriarch).

³² Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine, Land and its People* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), p.740.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ As of today, the Caves Monastery belongs to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate and Sofia Cathedral to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kiev Patriarchate.

the historical site of Lavra where it is still located.³⁵ However, the Ukrainian *Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations*³⁶ states that religious institutions should have access to their former religious property from the Soviet time, whether by direct ownership or free access for services.³⁷ As a result, many historical and religious monuments in Ukraine fell under the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. All these things combined might explain an increase in supporters of the Russian Orthodox Church.

President Yushchenko was a supporter of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate; however, during religious holidays he would try to visit both churches. Yushchenko argued that Ukraine should have a United Orthodox Church.³⁸ Yanukovych was a long-time supporter of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. The Church, in turn, supported Yanukovych during the period of violence at Euromaidan by providing shelters to Yanukovych *tytushkies*³⁹ in the Lavra, while Saint Michael Cathedral (Kyiv Patriarchate) was a shelter for injured protesters.⁴⁰

Interestingly, the percentage of citizens who identified themselves as “Believing in God” increased from 69% in 2000 to 88% in 2010 which is significant. Thus, even

³⁵ The Lavra was founded in 1051 by Yaroslav the Wise and is protected by UNESCO as a world historical site. “Kiyanes demands to take back Lavra from Moscow Patriarchate” *News Ukraine* 04 May 2016 <http://www.newskraine.com.ua/кияни-вимагають-забрати-лавру-у-моско/>, accessed May 16, 2016.

³⁶ The Law of Ukraine on the freedom of consciousness and religious organizations” No 987-XII, 23 April 1991 *Verkhovna Rada Ukrayiny* <http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/987-12> accessed May 16, 2016.

³⁷ Mara Kozelsky, “Religion and the crisis in Ukraine” *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church*, Vol. 14, Issues 3, 2014. pp. 219-241.


³⁸ Lydia S. Tonoyan and Daniel P. Payne, “The Visit of Patriarch Kirill to Ukraine in 2009 and its Significance in Ukraine’s Political and Religious Life” *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 38, Issue 3, 2010, p. 261.

³⁹ *Titushkies*—are paid young males from the East, usually dressed in-track suits, who arrived by buses to support Yanukovych during 2004 and 2014 protests.

⁴⁰ Nicholas E. Denysenko, “Chaos in Ukraine: the churches and the search for leadership” *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church*, Vol. 14, Issue 3, 2014, pp.242-259.

when citizens did not participate in religious organizations as members, many nonetheless often expressed their attachments to religious beliefs and spirituality.

Figure 4.1.3.2 Believe in God (%), 2000-2010



Source: author created the figure based on the online analysis of the WVS in Ukraine. The data samples for Ukraine were as follows: 2000 (1207), 2006 (2507) and 2011 (1500). The question was asked as follows: “Do you believe in God?” The answers were recoded: 1- No, Yes-2, 3- N/A, 4- DK.

This tendency is common in many post-communist countries as research suggests.⁴¹

Because of the risks of participation in the religious organizations during the Soviet period, citizens remain resistant to becoming official members of any religious groups.⁴²

The contemporaneous increase in the number of people who agreed that they “believe in God” might be explained as a coping mechanism in dealing with social trauma. In the situations of uncertainty and instability, citizens turn to religion for hope.⁴³

This high belief in God was evident during the Euromaidan where many priests were present and where the prayer tents were created. Priest Petro Zhuk (1978 y.o.b.) mentioned: “Young boys and girls were preparing Molotov cocktails and bringing them to us to be blessed. And we blessed them without questions.”⁴⁴

4.1.4. Political units and groups

⁴¹ Larissa Titarenko, “On the Shifting Nature of Religion during the Ongoing Post-Communist Transformation in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine” *Social Compass*, Vol. 55, No.2, 2008, pp. 237-254.


⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ This study illustrates how economic development is correlated with religious disbelief. Nigel Barber, “A cross- National Test of the Uncertainty Hypothesis of Religious Belief” *Cross-Cultural Research*, August 2011, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 318-333.

⁴⁴ Tetyana Kovtun, Tetyana Pryvalko, *Maidan, Vid pershoi osoby, 45 istorii revolutsii hidnosti* (Maidan, From the first person, 45 stories of the revolution of dignity) (Kyiv: Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, 2015), p.108.

In a modern democratic society, citizens have social relationships with other members of society outside their family unit. They participate in political groups, organizations or civic groups. These types of relationships are a very important component of a democratic society because “by forming friendships beyond the family, individuals voluntarily extend their network of trusted associates.”⁴⁵ In Ukraine, surprisingly, the percentage of citizens who claimed that they did not belong to any civic organizations increased from 77.4% in 2004 to 85.2% in 2013.

Figure 4.1.4.1 Citizens who are not members of any organization (%), 2004 -2013



Source: author created the figure based on the results of public opinion surveys in Ukraine by IFES between 2004-2013. The question was asked as follows: “Can you tell me whether you are a member of any of the different types of civic organizations listed on this card?”

Among various types of civic organizations, the highest percentage of citizens belonged to trade unions – 12.6% in 2004. This number increased to 13.4% in 2005-2006. After 2008 and prior to Euromaidan in 2013, this number declined to 8.8%, reaching its lowest at 7% in 2012. According to the official website of the Federation of Trade Unions of Ukraine the country has 150 professional trade unions.⁴⁶ However, many of them did not actively promote the interests of their members. Some of the leaders of the trade unions were accused of lobbying for their interests.⁴⁷ The Head of Federation of Trade Unions

⁴⁵ Richard Rose, “Post communism and the Problem of Trust”, *Journal Of Democracy*, Vol. 5, No. 3, July 1994, pp.18-30, p.20.

⁴⁶ *Federation of Trade Unions of Ukraine*, <http://fpsu.org.ua/pro-fpu/chlenski-organizatsiji/vseukrajinski-galuzevi-profspilki>, accessed May 26, 2016

⁴⁷ Masha Mishchenko, “Trade Unions and trade unions oligarchs” *UNIAN 21 September 2010*. *UNIAN* <http://www.unian.ua/politics/403936-profspilki-i-profspilkovi-oligarhi.html>, accessed May 30, 2016.

in Ukraine Hryhoriy Osovyi admitted that trade unions did not exercise rights to go on national strike.⁴⁸ As some authors have argued, the decline in the membership in trade unions in post-communist countries may be a result of their continued subordination to the state and its interests, rather than strict service of the interests of the workers.⁴⁹

Membership in all other forms of civic organizations was low during the studied years. However, the membership in political parties increased from 1.9% in 2004 to 5.3% in 2005. And although this number is low, it was comparable to the levels of political party membership found in established democracies.⁵⁰ In subsequent years, membership in political parties declined, but it remained higher than pre-Orange revolution levels.

Table 4.1.4.1 Membership in civic organizations, 2004 -2013

	2004	2005-2006	2007	2008	2009	2011	2012	2013
Political parties	1.9	5.3	3.3	2.5	3.8	3	2.9	2.3
Trade Unions	12.6	13.4	13.7	13.3	11.6	10.8	7	8.8
Religious Association	2.5	1.2	1.6	1.1	1.6	0.7	1.1	0.9
NGOs	0.5	0.4	0.7	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.1
Artist- Science Association	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.2
Local self-government	0.6	0.7	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.4	0.2

Source: author created the table based on the results of public opinion surveys in Ukraine by IFES between 2004-2013. The question was asked as follows: “Can you tell me whether you are a member of any of the different types of civic organizations listed on this card?” The respondents had to choose all answers that applied.

Citizens’ self-reported participation in NGOs was low during the years researched. However, according to CIVICUS⁵¹ group reports on the civil society index

⁴⁸ “Report of the Head of the Trade Unions of Ukraine during the VII symposium” *Federation of Trade Unions of Ukraine* <http://fpsu.org.ua/nasha-borotba/novini-chlenckikh-organizatsij/216-nazustrich-vii-z-jizdu-fpu/9876-dopovid-golovi-fpu-na-vii-z-jizdi-2> accessed May 26,2017.

⁴⁹ Richard Rose, “Post communism and the Problem of Trust” *Journal Of Democracy*, Vol. 5, No.3, July 1994, pp.18-30, p.20.


⁵⁰ In Canada, for example, only 6% of the population belonged to political parties in 2000. In the USA (2011), 14.5 % of respondents admitted to being active member of the political parties. *World Values Survey*. <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSONline.jsp>, accessed March 30, 2016.

⁵¹ CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation in a non-government organization that promote citizen’s involvement around the world. <http://www.civicus.org/index.php/en/csi/40-general/csi-publications-europe/371-ukraine>, accessed April 04, 2016.

(CSI),⁵² the number of NGO organizations in Ukraine increased after the Orange revolution.⁵³ The report states that more than 40 000 NGOs are registered in Ukraine since the Orange revolution, but many of them were not active groups and had relatively few members.⁵⁴ In 2012 Ukraine implemented changes to its legislation on the process for the formation of NGO, aligning it with European standards.⁵⁵ This made the process of formation of NGOs in Ukraine much easier.⁵⁶

Despite their low level of membership in NGOs, Ukrainians positively changed their attitudes towards the importance of NGOs.

Figure 4.1.4.2 Attitudes towards NGOs (%), 2004-2013



Source: the author created the table based on data files from IFES. The question was asked “How necessary are non-governmental organizations, or NGOs, for Ukraine – essential, necessary, not very necessary or not at all necessary?” The figure represents categories of “Essential” and “Necessary” combined

In 2004, 56.9% respondents stated that NGOs in Ukraine are “essential” or “necessary.” This percentage consistently increased, reaching 90.2% in 2013, the year of

⁵² CSI assesses the entire spectrum of civic society experience across five dimensions: the organizational structure of civil society, civic engagement, perception of impact, practice of values and the enabling environment.

⁵³ CIVICUS, Country report, Ukraine. http://www.civicus.org/media/CSI_Ukraine_Country_Report.pdf, accessed April 04, 2016.

⁵⁴ Susan Stewart, “NGO development in Ukraine since the Orange revolution” in Besters-Dilger, Juliane (ed.), *Ukraine on its Way to Europe. Interim Results of the Orange Revolution* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009), pp.177-194.


⁵⁵ The biggest changes in the legislature were related to the process of formation of the NGOs in Ukraine. According to the new law (Part II, Art 7, s. 2.) the NGOs can be created by private individuals instead of juridical units as before.

See “The law of Ukraine on civic organizations” № 4572-VI from 22.03.2012, *The Parliament of Ukraine* “<http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/4572-17>, accessed May 30, 2016.

⁵⁶ Olesya Mandebura, “Volunteering movements in Ukraine as a new form of collaboration between the government and civil society” *Institute of Political and Ethnonational Research, National Academy of Science, Ukraine*. http://www.ipiend.gov.ua/?mid=12&action=article_detail&article_id=8, accessed May 23, 2016.

Euromaidan. Thus, although Ukrainians were not active members of NGOs, they acknowledged their significance and importance in Ukraine. Significantly, the support for NGOs increased across all regions (Figure 4.1.4.3), which is indicative of support for civil society as an important component of political life.

Figure 4.1.4.3 Attitudes towards NGOs by region (%), 2004-2013



Source: the figure was created by the author (IFES. 2004 – 2013). The question was asked “How necessary are non-governmental organizations, or NGOs, for Ukraine – essential, necessary, not very necessary or not at all necessary?” The figure represents categories of “Essential” and “Necessary” combined

By recognizing the importance of NGOs within the country, Ukrainian citizens across all regions acknowledged their responsibility for active citizenship, which is a characteristic of a democratic society. However, the fact that Ukrainians acknowledged the importance of NGOs without participating in them needs further discussion. According to Putnam, citizens who are involved in horizontal networks with others will be more politically active and trusting, because “compatriots who interact in many social contexts are apt to develop strong norms of acceptable behavior.”⁵⁷ While Ukrainians were not active members of non-government organizations, they nonetheless expressed high support for them. This suggests that Ukrainians positively changed their orientations towards the importance of the NGOs, but these orientations did not lead to citizens’ actions. They became “democratic aspirators,” but not participants.⁵⁸ Have they become trusting?

⁵⁷ Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 173.

⁵⁸ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 25.

4.2. Interpersonal trust

4.2.1. General and particularized trust

The idea of trust is fundamental to any community and organization. If people who work together with trust one another because they have the same set of common ethical norms and rules, doing business costs less.⁵⁹ The corollary is that if people or citizens do not trust each other, they will be willing to cooperate only when there are strict guidelines of formal rules and regulation. Generally, in societies with high levels of distrust, voluntary organizations are weak and spontaneous sociability is very low.⁶⁰ In Ukraine, as we discovered, citizens did not participate actively in voluntary associations. Thus, we should expect, based on political culture literature, that they will be less trustful towards other members of society.⁶¹

When looking at the level of interpersonal trust among Ukrainian citizens since 2000, one can observe that the general level of trust was low, with the average of 27.5% of citizens stating that “most people can be trusted.” However, right after the Orange revolution, the percentage of those who agreed with the statement that “Most people can be trusted” increased by 8% from 26% in 2004 to 34.6% in 2005. Between 2006 and 2011 it varied from 26% in 2006 to 26.9% in 2008 and to 23% in 2011. These findings are important because according to studies on social trust,⁶² it is important to understand

⁵⁹ Francis Fukuyama, *Trust. The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: Free Press Paperbacks, 1996), p.27.


⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p.29.

⁶¹ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., *The Civic Culture* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 284.

⁶² Eric, Uslaner, M. *The Moral Foundations of Trust* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Francis Fukuyama, *Trust. The Social Virtues and the Creation for Prosperity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995).

the difference between general social trust and particularized social trust. Generalized trust represents the trust in others in general, “an attitude of faith in humankind.”⁶³

Figure 4.2.1.1 General social trust, (%), 2000-2010



Source: the author created the figure based on the data set from the results of WVS and EVS in Ukraine. Ukraine, 2000, 2006(1800), 2008 (1147), 2011 (1500). The data for 2005 was used from “*Ukrainian Society 1994-2005. Sociological Monitoring*” Edited by Dr. Natalya Panina, Kyiv 2005.

Particularized trust refers to a trust of others whom one has met, or who are socially similar to the respondent. Those who demonstrate particularized trust tend to be suspicious of outsiders and people who are perceived as different.⁶⁴ Thus only a high level of generalized trust can produce more tolerant attitudes toward others, including members’ out-groups.⁶⁵


The general level of trust in Ukraine was low during the studied years. The next step is to test the level of particularized trust. As Figure 4.2.1.2 reveals, the level of trust increased among all categories. In 2006, 29% of respondents expressed trust in people of different religions. In 2011, this number increased to 45%. Thus almost half of the respondents identified that they trust people from other religions. When one considers the changes that occurred in the level of trust in people of different nationalities, it increased by 18% between 2006 and 2011.

⁶³ Robert Anderson and Tina Fetner, “Economic Inequality and Intolerance: Attitudes toward Homosexuality in 35 Democracies” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 52, Issue 4, October 2008, pp. 942–958, p. 943.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Eric, Uslaner, M. *The Moral Foundations of Trust* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

Figure 4.2.1.2 Trust in different groups (%), 2004-2011



Source: the author created the figure based on the results of WVS in Ukraine. The sample size was 1800 (2006) and 1500 (2011). The figure represents the percentage of two categories combined: “trust completely” and “trust somewhat.” Questions about trust to compatriots was adopted from *Ukrainian Society 1992–2010. Sociological Monitoring* / Revised by V. Vorona, and M. Shulga, – Ę.: Institute of Sociology, NAS of Ukraine, 2010 http://www.soc.univ.kiev.ua/sites/default/files/library/elopen/smonit_2010.pdf

This suggests that Ukrainian citizens became more tolerant and trustful towards others, despite a low level of general trust and low levels of participation in socio-political organizations. Furthermore, the level of trust in your neighborhood which is a strong indicator of social capital⁶⁶, increased from 39.4% in 2004 to 78% in 2011 which is significant. If people have high trust in their neighbors, they will be willing to help each other. Recent studies show that neighborhood organizations operate as crucial brokers, connecting people to other people, organizations and resources.⁶⁷ Moreover, the trusted neighborhood can work as “a local government that contributes to the development of public goods in a community, while promoting trust, sociability, and cooperation among neighbors.”⁶⁸ The level of trust in one’s compatriots increased from 30% in 2004 to 49 % in 2005 and stayed the same in 2006. It slightly decreased in 2011, to 45%. However, it was still higher than in 2004.

⁶⁶ Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling alone: The collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).

⁶⁷ Martin Ruef and Seok-Woo Kwon, “Neighbourhood Associations and Social Capital” *Social Forces*, Vol.95, No.1, 2016, pp.159-189, p.162.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

The increase in trust for people of other religion in Ukraine is salient considering the diversity of religious affiliation within the country. A participant of the Euromaidan, Archbishop Stefan (1942 y.o.b.) commented: “It did not matter if a priest was a Greek-Catholic, from Kyiv Patriarchate, from Autocephalous Orthodox Church or Muslim. We stood together and prayed together, and together were giving people Bibles.”⁶⁹ Table 4.2.1.1 illustrates the positive changes that took place across all regions regarding levels of interpersonal trust, although to different degrees. In the Western region, more than 50% of respondents expressed trust in people of another religion in 2006 and 2011 without any changes. In all other regions trust in people of another religion increased: in the Eastern region from 29.6% in 2006 to 42.5% in 2011; in the Central region from 34% in 2006 to 44.5% in 2011. The Southern region was the only region where trust in people of another religion decreased from 51.1% in 2006 to 41.9% in 2011.

Table. 4.2.1.1 Trust by region, age, and education, 2006-2011

REGION	Western		Eastern		Central		Southern	
	2006	2011	2006	2011	2006	2011	2006	2011
Family	98	98.3	99.8	99.7	95.7	98.8	98.8	98.6
People of another religion	52.1	52.1	29.6	42.5	34	44.5	51.1	41.9
Neighborhood	72.5	73.4	77.8	81.6	68.7	79.9	83.8	76.6
People you meet for the first time	25.3	24.7	20.4	29.2	13.7	31.6	28.4	23.7
People of another nationality	52.4	53	43.3	49.1	42.6	50.6	50	56.5
People you know personally	79.6	83.8	88.7	89.1	80.7	81.1	86.4	88.4
EDUCATION	Primary		Secondary		Bachelor and higher			
	2006	2011	2006	2011	2006	2011		
Family	100	100	99.8	98.1	97	98.2		
People of another religion	19.3	45	29.4	41.3	46.7	48.3		
Neighborhood	68.8	78.5	73.6	78.9	72.9	73.8		
People you meet for the first time	6.2	28.7	18.4	27.8	25.6	26.2		
People of another nationality	37.9	53.4	43.6	48.2	50.2	56.2		
People you know personally	93.9	91.7	82.5	86.5	86.2	83.8		
AGE	Up to 29		30-49		50 and up			
	2006	2011	2006	2011	2006	2011		
Family	97.1	99.2	98.9	99.2	97.8	98.2		
People of another religion	37.6	39	35.6	48.4	42.4	46		
Neighborhood	66.4	70.5	74.1	75.3	76.5	83.4		
People you meet for the first time	16.5	19.9	18.6	28.3	24.4	30.5		
People of another nationality	40.5	45.4	39.3	54.4	53.3	54.4		
People you know personally	80.7	84.1	84.4	83.3	85.7	87		

⁶⁹ Tetyana Kovtun, Tetyana Pryvalko, *Maidan, Vid pershoy osoby, 45 istoriy revolyutsii hidnosti* (Maidan, From the first person, 45 stories of the revolution of dignity) (Kyiv: Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, 2015), p.133.

Source: Table was created by the author based on data files from WVS, Wave 5 and 6. The table represents the percentage of those who answered, “trust completely” and “trust somewhat” combined.

Trust in people of another nationality increased as well across all regions.

Interestingly, trust in “people that you meet for the first time” increased in the Eastern and Central regions but declined slightly in the Western and Southern regions. Across the educational groups, those with higher levels of education possessed higher levels of interpersonal trust across all categories. Among the age groups, the highest increase in the level of trust in “people you meet for the first time,” from 18.6% to 28.3%, was observed in the middle age group (30-49), which was the most active group during the Euromaidan.⁷⁰ This group also demonstrated the highest increase in trust to people of another religion (from 35.6% to 48.4%) and another nationality (from 39.3% to 54.4%)

Among 45 interviewed participants of Euromaidan, 25 belonged to this age group. Volodymyr Vyatrovych (1977 y.o.b.), a historian recounted that: “During Euromaidan, I witnessed something that I remember from the Orange revolution – the extent of the people to be united.”⁷¹ Yevgen Nyshchyk, actor (1972 y.o.b.): “The presence of so many people and their desire and persistence that lasted for so long, requires exceptional sincerity, trust, and unity.”⁷² Oleksiy Hryscenko (1979 y.o.b.), IT manager: “Euromaidan had this unique self-organization and interaction, which would be desirable to have in the country as the whole.” At the same time, some younger participants also commented about trust. Oleksandr Romanchuk (1995 y.o.b.), a student: “I have not seen so much sincerity in people before. Everyone was ready to help each other just because they

⁷⁰ Olga Onuch, “Who were the protesters” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 25, No.3, July 2014, pp.44-51

⁷¹ Ibid, 84.

⁷² Tetyana Kovtun, Tetyana Pryvalko, *Maidan, Vid pershoy osoby, 45 istoriy revolyutsii hidnosti* (Maidan, From the first person, 45 stories of the revolution of dignity) (Kyiv: Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, 2015), p.88.

wanted to, not because they had to, or somebody ordered them.”⁷³ The increase in the level of interpersonal trust during a period of study may also be explained by an interesting dynamic that took place in Ukraine – internal migration.

4.2.2. Internal migration as a factor of interpersonal trust

Although the total increase of the urban population of Ukraine was only 2 % during the period studied, migration to the cities was very targeted.⁷⁴ The rankings of the 15 largest Ukrainian cities between 2001 and 2013 reveal that the capital city Kyiv’s population increased by 5.6%. The second greatest increase in population was in the city of Vinnytsia, (4.2 %), located in Western Ukraine. Furthermore, between 2001 and 2013 population increases occurred in the cities of Khmelnytsky (West), Rivne (West), Chernivtsi (West), Cherkassy (Center), Bila Tserkva (Center).⁷⁵ In contrast, there were population declines in the Eastern industrial cities of Donbass such as Makiyivka (9.2%), Luhansk (8%) and Donetsk (6.2%) after the closure of many mines created difficult economic and ecological situations in the region.⁷⁶ The southern cities of Dnipropetrovsk (9.6%) and Mariupol (6.2%) also experienced declines in their population. Thus, Ukrainians not only moved to the cities but specifically to the cities of Central and Western Ukraine.

⁷³ Ibid, p. 251.

⁷⁴ Romanyuk, A, E., Gladun O.M. “Demographic tendencies in Ukraine: past, present and future”, *Demografika ta social’na polityka* Vol.3. No. 25, 2015, pp. 21-42. <http://dse.org.ua/archive/25/2.pdf>, accessed April 05, 2016.

Ukrainian Census, database,

http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/MULT/Dialog/view.asp?ma=000_0201&ti=%D0%EE%E7%EF%EE%E4%B3%EB+%ED%E0%FF%E2%ED%EE%E3%EE+%ED%E0%F1%E5%EB%E5%ED%ED%FF+%E7%E0+%F2%E8%EF%EE%EC+%EF%EE%F1%E5%EB%E5%ED%FC&path=./Quicktables/POPULATION/02/01/&lang, accessed April 06, 2016.

⁷⁵ “Modern urbanization process: tendencies and regional differentiation” *Geograf* <http://www.geograf.com.ua/geoinfocentre/20-human-geography-ukraine-world/720-suchasni-urbanizatsijni-protseji-tendentsiji-ta-regionalna-diferentsiatsiya>, accessed May 24, 2016.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

Table 4.2.2.1 Ukraine's 15 largest cities, 2001-2013

City	Rank 2001	Rank 2013	Population 2001	Population 2013	Change 2001-2013	Oblast/region
Kyiv	1	1	2 611 327	2,757,900	5.6	Kyiv (capital)
Kharkiv	2	2	1 470 902	1,451,028	-1.4	East
Dnipropetrovsk	3	4	1 065 008	997,754	-9.6	South
Odessa	4	3	1 029 049	1,014,852	-1.4	South
Donetsk	5	5	1 016 194	953,217	-6.2	East
Zaporizhia	6	6	815 256	770,672	-5.8	South
Lviv	7	7	732 818	730,272	-0.3	West
Kryvyj Rih	8	8	668 980	656,478	-4.3	South
Mykolaiv	9	9	514 136	496,188	-3.5	South
Mariupol	10	10	492 176	461,810	-6.2	South
Luhansk	11	11	463 097	425,848	-8.0	East
Makiyivka	12	12	389 589	353,918	-9.2	East
Vinnysia	13	13	356 665	371,698	4.2	West
Sevastopol	14	14	342 451	342,580	0.0	Crimea
Simferopol	15	15	343 644	337,285	-1.9	Crimea

Source: *State Statistics Service of Ukraine*

http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/PXWEB2007/ukr/publ_new1/2015/naselen_2014pdf.pdf, accessed November 01, 2017

How does this migration pattern relate to interpersonal trust? According to the study of the relation between ecology and culture⁷⁷ migrations remove individuals from their in-groups. Migrants may become detached from the rules of the groups to which they belonged.⁷⁸ In the case of Ukraine, one can posit that this particular type of migration allowed many citizens to move to the cities and adapt to their way of life, including political life. The migration also allowed many young citizens, especially students, to be exposed to a more diverse and tolerant environment than their local communities. They felt more free and anonymous living in different urban areas, where they were exposed to different sources of information, than in their local communities.⁷⁹ More importantly, this migration suggests that the political culture of Ukraine is shifting from a collective culture (stable residence, low social class roles, homogeneous environment) to an

⁷⁷ Gerganov, E. N., Dilova, M. L., Petkova, K. G. and Paspalanova, E. "Culture-specific approach to the study of individualism/collectivism." *European Journal of Social Psychology*, No. 26, 1996, pp. 277–297.

⁷⁸ Henk Vinken, Joseph Soeters and Peter Ester, ed. *Comparing Cultures. Dimensions of Culture in a Comparative Perspective* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2004), p.34.

⁷⁹ As this thesis will illustrate in Ch. 5, the 54% users of Internet in Ukraine live in the urban areas. Moreover, residents of urban areas, especially Kyiv, have a higher rate of using foreign language media as the main source of information in comparison to other regions.

individualist culture (migration, education, leadership roles, heterogeneous environment), which is associated with democratization, according to the literature on political culture.⁸⁰

4.2.3. Tolerance towards different groups

Another aspect of the interpersonal political trust is the level of tolerance for different groups in society. As Inglehart and Welzel argue, in more democratic and tolerant society's survival types of values (economic and physical security) are gradually replaced with self-expressed values and post-materialistic attitudes.⁸¹ Because people do not have to worry about economic and physical security as the results of modern economic prosperity, they give a higher priority to nonmaterial needs, such as a sense of community and the quality of life.⁸² Some of the most important post materialistic attitudes are a preference for gender equality and tolerance of LGBT people.⁸³

4.2.3.1. Gender Equality

Citizens' attitudes towards male and female political leadership changed temporarily after the Orange revolution. In 1996 the majority of Ukrainians agreed with a statement that men make better political leaders than women. In 2006, 49% supported this statement. It is noteworthy that 2006 followed the accession of Yuliya Tymoshenko to the post of Prime Minister of Ukraine. Tymoshenko was Ukraine's first female Prime Minister,


⁸⁰ Henk Vinken, Joseph Soeters and Peter Ester, ed. *Comparing Cultures. Dimensions of Culture in a Comparative Perspective* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2004), p.38.

⁸¹ Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 131.

⁸² Ottar Hellevik, "Post materialism as a Dimension of Cultural Change" *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, Vol. 5. 1993, pp.211-233, p.212.

⁸³ Ronald Inglehart and Daphna Oyserman, "Individualism, Autonomy, Self-expression" in Henk Vinken, Joseph Soeters and Peter Ester, ed. *Comparing Cultures. Dimensions of Culture in a Comparative Perspective* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2004), p.80.

Figure 4.2.3.1 Attitudes towards male and female leaders (%), 1996-2011



Source: the author created the figure based on the results of online data analysis of WVS in Ukraine. 1996 (2811), 2006 (2507) and 2011 (1500). The question was asked: Men make better political leaders than women do. One - strongly agree, 2- agree, 3- Disagree, 4- strongly disagree. The answers “strongly agree” and “agree” were combined to the category, “agree.” The answers “strongly disagree” and “disagree” were combined into the category “disagree.” The figure represents only valid cases.

This fact could explain why more respondents saw women as political leaders in 2006 than previously. At the same time, a modest reversal of this change is evident in 2011, 52% of respondents once again agreed with the statement that men make better political leaders than women. This indicates that citizens’ perceptions of gender equality in Ukraine are different than in countries of established democracies.⁸⁴ Unless citizens understand the importance of the equal participation of men and women in the political process, the country cannot become democratic. Women represent 53.7% of Ukrainian society, and their involvement in political life is crucial to represent women’ interests.⁸⁵ Gender inequality between male and female in Ukraine is even more evident when one views the composition of the Ukrainian Parliament (Rada) during the studied years. Table 4.2.3.1 shows that women comprise a very small percentage of members of the Ukrainian parliament. During the IV Rada after the 2002 election, only 5.5% of members of the Rada were women. The low percentage of women MPs was also evident during V, VI, VII, and VIII Radas (2006-2014). In the current Rada, women represent 12.94% of the MPs. And although the total percentage of women in the Rada increased from 5.5% to

⁸⁴ For example, in the USA, more than 68% of respondents agreed with the statements that women having the same rights as men is the essential characteristic of democracy. *World Value Survey, USA, 2011.* <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSONline.jsp>, accessed April 08, 2016.

⁸⁵ According to the results of Ukrainian Census in 2001. *State Statistic Committee of Ukraine* <http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua>, accessed May 03, 2017.

12.94%, it is still low in comparison to established democracies. For example, in Canada, after the 2015 federal election women constituted 35.34% of the Members of Parliament.⁸⁶ The level of acceptance of gender equality is still relatively low, which is characteristic of a more traditional society with a parochial type of political culture.

Table 4.2.3.1 The composition of the Ukrainian parliament by gender, 2002-2014

	IV Rada 2002-2006		V Rada 2006-2007		VI Rada 2007-2012		VII Rada 2012-2014		VIII Rada 2014-	
Male	481	94.5%	441	91.3%	499	91.67%	432	90.38%	370	87.06%
Female	28	5.5%	42	8.7%	42	8.33%	46	9.62%	55	12.94%
Total	509		483		504		478		425 ⁸⁷	

Source: the author created the table based on the official composition of Rada between 2002-2014. *Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy*, http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/site2/p_deputat_list?skl=5, accessed April 09, 2016.

This fact can prevent more effective transition to the democratization of society with equal opportunity for each gender. An increase in the number of women at the Parliament would indicate that the gender gap in Ukraine is shifting towards more inclusion of women into political life.

4.2.3.2. Tolerance towards LGBT people


Tolerance of Lesbian/Gay/Bisexual/Transgender (LGBT) individuals in any given society are indicative of a general level of democratization of society. The more democratic a society is, the more tolerant its members will be towards different social groups. In the case of Ukraine, we can see the following results relating to citizens' perceptions of homosexuality.⁸⁸ Although the majority of Ukrainians did not consider homosexuality to be justifiable across the studied years, their percentage decreased. In 1996, prior to the Orange revolution, 71.4 % of Ukrainians considered homosexuality “never justified.” In 2006, two years after the Orange revolution, this percentage decreased to 57.2%.

⁸⁶ *Parliament of Canada*, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/Parliamentarians/en/members?currentOnly=true&gender=F>, accessed April 10, 2016.

⁸⁷ The total number of MPs in the current Parliament is lower since national parliamentary elections in 2014 were not taking place in Crimea and occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

⁸⁸ The data for all other groups was not available.

Figure 4.2.3.2 Tolerance of Homosexuality (%), 1996- 2010



Source: the figure was created by the author using online data analysis of the WVS surveys in Ukraine: 2000 (1207), 2006 (2507) and 2010 (1500). The question was asked: “Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between Homosexuality” The answers were ranked on a scale from 1 to 10 were 1 - never justified and 10 - always justified. The figure represents the values of 1- never justified.

In 2011, two years before the Euromaidan, 52.8% considered homosexuality “never justified.” Thus, tolerance towards LGBT people in Ukraine increased between 2004 and 2013, although it was still low in comparison to established democracies.⁸⁹

The distribution of responses varied across the regions. Citizens in the Eastern region had a higher level of tolerance of homosexuality than the rest of the country. 41.7% of respondents in the Eastern region agreed with the statement that “Homosexuality” could never be justifiable in comparison to 58.4% in the Central region, 54.4% in the Southern region and 54% in the Western region. These are surprising findings for this research, as there can be an expectation that the Western region would be more tolerant and have a higher level of post-modernist values and attitudes. However, a majority of the citizens in the Western region have a Roman Catholic religious affiliation; thus, it could affect their attitudes towards LGBT groups as in neighboring Catholic Poland.⁹⁰ Looking at the distribution of responses across the age group we can see that older groups are less tolerant of LGBT. Simultaneously, younger Ukrainians were more

⁸⁹ For example, in Canada, percentage of those who considered homosexually “always justifiable” was 22.3% in 2006. See www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp, accessed January 14, 2018.

⁹⁰ The same tendency is observed Catholic Poland, where the majority of citizens have a low level of tolerance towards LGBT. Ewa A. Goleblowska, *The Many Faces of Tolerance: Attitudes Towards Diversity in Poland* (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 141-166.

tolerant, with 47.8% in 2006 and 44.8% in 2011 choosing the option of “never justifiable,” which is a minority.

Table 4.2.3.2 Tolerance of homosexuality by region, age, and education (%), 1996-2010

1996							
REGION	West	East	Centre	South	Kyiv	Crimea	Total
Never justified	74	62.9	75.6	56.1	75.2	75.7	71.4
Always justified	-	0.4	-	2	3.4	1.8	1.3
AGE GROUPS	18-25	26-36	37-47	48-48	59-69	70+	
Never justified	55	64.8	70.4	75.9	81.2	85.4	
Always justified	2.5	2.2	0.7	0.9	1	0.5	
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor and higher				
Never justified	86.6	69.8	63.2				
Always justified	-	0.7	4				
2006							
REGION	West	East	Centre	South	Kyiv	Crimea	Total
Never justified	65.4	61.8	45.9	56.3			57.2
Always justified	1.9	0.8	1.3	-			1
AGE GROUPS	18-29	30-49	50 and up				
Never justified	47.4	49.1	70.5				
Always justified	1	2.1	-				
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor and higher				
Never justified	93.1	62.1	45.7				
Always justified	-	0.5	2.1				
2010							
REGION	West	East	Centre	South	Kyiv	Crimea	Total
Never justified	54	41.7		58.4	54.4		52.8
Always justified	0.2	0.6		-	1		0.4
AGE GROUPS	18-29	30-49	50+				
Never justified	44.8	48.7	59.9				
Always justified	1.3	0.4	-				
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor and higher				
Never justified	69.2	53	47.8				
Always justified	-	0.6	0.9				

Source: the author created the table based on the results of online data analysis of WVS in Ukraine, 1996, 2006 and 2010(1500). The question was asked: “Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between Homosexuality” The answers were ranked on a scale from 1 to 10 were 1 - never justified and 10 - always justified. The table represents those who chose 1- never justified and 10 – always justified.

Regarding education, it can be stated that citizens who possess a university degree and higher have more tolerant attitudes towards LGBT in comparison to those who have less level of education. Thus, younger and more educated Ukrainians showed an increased acceptance of homosexuality across the years, which indicates positive changes in Ukrainian society. Institutional changes to prevent discrimination in the workplace were adopted in November 2015, two years after the Euromaidan. The Rada passed a law that forbids discrimination against homosexuals in employment.⁹¹ The bill was passed as

⁹¹ Law of Ukraine “On implementation of changes to the Code of Ukraine about labour in order to prevent discrimination at the work place in accordance with the Law of European Union.” *Holos Ukrainy* (Voice of Ukraine) 25 листопада 2016.

a condition demanded by the EU to introduce an agreement for visa-free travel between Ukraine and EU.⁹²

Conclusion

An analysis of the second component of political culture, the orientation towards others in the political system leads to the following conclusions.

Ukrainians in higher numbers expressed their national identity as “Ukrainian” between 2004 and 2013. The highest levels of identification as Ukrainian were found among the youngest age groups (18-34 and 18-29). Citizens in the 18-34 age group in 2013 are those who were born or grew up in Independent Ukraine. Because of this their system of values and beliefs formed and matured under different conditions than those (including political elite) who grew up during the preceding period of Soviet Ukraine.

The research discovered that residents of the Russian speaking regions (East and South) also increased their identification with “Ukrainian”. This indicates that Russian – speaking Ukrainians perceive their national identity less about their language at home and more about their country and its territory. This is indicative of the civic national identity, where citizens recognize each other as belonging to the same nation based on standardized literacy, education and territory.⁹³

At the same time, the author found that an increase in the percentage of Ukrainians who identified themselves as “Ukrainian” was much stronger than citizens’ pride in their citizenship. Ukrainians’ pride in their citizenship increased but was not stable. Considering that pride in citizenship is more associated with political regime than

⁹² “Ukraine moves closer to visa-free EU travel as gay rights bill passes”, *The Guardian*, November 13, 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/13/ukraine-moves-closer-to-visa-free-eu-travel-as-gay-rights-bill-passes>, accessed April 22, 2016.

⁹³ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p.7.

with a territory, we can conclude that Ukrainians were more attached to their country territorially than politically.

Ukrainian citizens were not active members of social groups. The low membership in socio-political groups, according to political culture literature, is a characteristic of passive citizenship as well as the indication of low social trust.⁹⁴ In Ukraine, despite low involvement in the socio-political organizations, citizens' awareness of these groups and appreciation of their importance increased across all regional, educational and age groups. Also, the low level of membership in religious organizations, was combined with higher levels of belief in God during the studied years. This indicates a need for spiritual beliefs during the time of uncertainty and instability, as well as a presence of traditional orientations that are common to parochial and subject political cultures.⁹⁵

Although citizens of Ukraine did not participate actively in horizontal networks with each other, they increased their trust towards other groups in society, especially towards neighbors, strangers as well as other nationalities and religions. This increase was common to all regions, educational and age groups. Thus, the level of interpersonal trust, an important characteristic of a democratic society, increased in Ukraine. It also, hypothetically, could allow citizens to collaborate and more importantly “relate” with each other based on their interests than on their language, religion or region. Some participants of the Euromaidan expressed their desire and willingness to help each other and “others” during the protest - characteristics that require a high level of interpersonal

⁹⁴ Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, *Political culture and Political Development* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 535.

⁹⁵ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture. Political attitudes and democracy in five nations* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1965), p.18.

trust. At the same time, students expressed their disappointment with students' movements in the early days of Euromaidan.

Although the percentage of citizens who resided in urban areas increased only slightly, rural-urban migration took place mostly in the cities of Central and Western Ukraine. Mobilization creates a loose connection to the rules of the home and allows people to collaborate more spontaneously and freely. The freedom of movement allowed many Ukrainians to choose their place of residence based on their interests and jobs rather than a place of birth. This also made Ukraine more dispersed than previously assumed.

This research confirms that Ukrainians' support for gender equality only slightly increased after the Orange revolution and then declined again. Nevertheless, female representation in Parliament almost doubled during the studied period. A reported level of tolerance of homosexuality was still low during the studied years, although it increased. Specifically, younger and more educated Ukrainians expressed a higher level of tolerance, which is indicative of positive generational changes in Ukrainian society between two revolutions. Thus, a new generation of Ukrainians possessed a more democratic system of values that are permissive and inclusive of "others." It also could make them more willing to collaborate during political actions such as the Euromaidan. If a new generation of Ukrainians is tolerant towards "others", they will see them as "us" and not "them," meaning that they will be willing to cooperate and engage together in different activities outside of the political system.

CHAPTER 5 Orientation towards One's Own Role in Political System and Political Activity

Introduction

This chapter will examine whether citizens' view of their role in the political process and their political activities changed during the studied years. Three main components will be examined: political competence (interest in politics and political awareness); political efficacy (beliefs in one's ability to influence decision-making process) and political actions (frequency of voting, how often: contacted an official, visited peaceful demonstrations, and used social media to express political views).

The chapter shows that Ukrainians had a high level of interest in politics and high political awareness during the studied period. However, when asked about their main source of information, most respondents preferred traditional sources of information such as TV networks (Ukrainian and Russian language) followed by neighbors, friends and local newspapers. At the same time, Internet usage increased dramatically during the studied years among the younger and middle age groups. More importantly, Ukraine experienced little censorship, especially in the years after the Orange revolution. This allowed citizens to access a variety of sources of information, to exercise freedom of speech and to express their views and opinions.

Significant regional differences were found in citizens' sources of information. Respondents in the East, South, and Crimea relied on Russian-language TV (from Ukraine or Russia) as their main source of information, followed by Russian language radio and local newspapers. In contrast, residents of Western and Central regions used Ukrainian-language TV (state and private), newspapers and radio as the main source of information, followed by the Internet. The percentage of respondents who use foreign

media (other than Russian) as the main source of information was extremely low at 1.7% (2013). However, in Kyiv, foreign media was the main source of information used by 33.3% of respondents, followed by Western and Central regions. Citizens in different regions had varying sources of information about political developments in Ukraine prior to Euromaidan. For this reason, the range of information accessible to them may affect their perceptions of their political competence. An analysis of two regional newspapers from the Western and Eastern Ukraine suggested that citizens of these regions were exposed to different information about political events – ranging from total support of the Euromaidan in the West to its rejection or even the denial of its occurrence in the East.

Regarding political efficacy, Ukrainian citizens combined two opposing characteristics: a low level of belief in having an impact on political decisions by the government and a high level of civic obligation to fight for their country. At the same time, the majority of interviewed Euromaidan participants believed they had high political efficacy in comparison to the Ukrainian population as a whole.

An analysis of different forms of political activity shows that although Ukrainians participated in the elections in higher numbers, the majority of them did not believe that voting was effective in influencing the decision-making process. Furthermore, Ukrainians did not believe in the fairness of elections, with the sole exception being the re-election of the second round of the presidential election in 2004.

An analysis of different forms of self-reported political actions provided interesting findings. The percentage of Ukrainians who acknowledged taking actions such as signing a petition, contacting a national or local official increased. Significantly, Ukrainians reported new forms of political participation, such as writing a blog or using social

media, as a means of expressing political opinions. The highest increase was seen among those with the highest level of education. The importance of social media was also reported by participants of the Euromaidan in their interviews, who used Facebook and Twitter as main instruments of communication.

5.1. Political Competence

Political competence is a key component of the political culture of any society, as it can determine whether citizens play active or passive roles in the political process. Political competence can be defined as an individual's level of knowledge about the political process as well as his/her interests in political affairs. A competent citizen has a more active role in the formation of general policy and plays an active role in the decision-making process.¹ The two main components of political competence are interest in political affairs and an awareness of political events.²


5.1.1. Interest in political affairs

The level of interest in political affairs or politics among citizens can be a strong indicator of political competence of the Ukrainians during the studied period. As we can see from Figure 5.1.1, a majority of respondents claimed to have a high interest in politics across all studied years, between 57% and 65%. However, interest in politics varied over time. Interestingly, in 2013, the interest in politics was the lowest; 57.1% of respondents expressed interest in politics.

¹ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), p. 297.

² Thomas Denk, Henrik Serup Christensen and Daniel Bergh. "The Composition of Political Culture- A study of 25 European Democracies." *Studies in Comparative International Development*, No. 50, 2015, pp. 358-377.

Figure 5.1.1.1 Interest in politics (%), 2004-2013



Source: the author created the figure based on the data file from IFES (2004, 2005-2006, 2008, 2010 and 2013). The figure represents the percentage of those who answered, “very interested” and “somewhat interested” (combined).

The distribution of responses across regions shows that Kyiv (67.8%) and Western region (62.7%) expressed the highest interest in politics in 2004, prior to the Orange revolution, followed by the Eastern region (60.8%). In 2005-2006, Kyiv expressed the lowest interest in politics, with the Western region having the highest percentage (67.4%).³ After 2008, national interest in politics declined. The lowest interest in 2013 was seen in Eastern and Southern regions (53.9% and 48.1%).

To test further a multivariate regression analysis was applied to identify factors that might influence interest in politics.⁴ A review of the test for 2005-2006 (Model 1) and 2013 (Model 2) concludes that the results of both models are statistically significant ($p=.000$) with R square =.036 for 2005-2005 and R square = .068 for 2013, meaning that the independent variables explain 3.6% and 6.8% of the variance of the dependent variable.

The results of Model 1 show that religious affiliation is correlated with interest in politics in the two years following the Orange revolution. Citizens who had a religious affiliation other than Orthodox Christianity showed a higher level of interest in politics (β

³ See Appendix 1 for cross tabs.

⁴ Because variables region, language spoken at home and religious affiliation are nominal variables, I introduced dummy variables for regions and recoded variables language spoken at home and religious affiliation into dichotomous variables.

= -.068, p= .017).⁵ Considering that the majority of residents of Western Ukraine belong to Catholic religious denominations, it is assumed that Ukrainian Catholic citizens of the Western demonstrated a higher level of interest in politics during 2005-2006.⁶ When we look at the relationship between the variable Western region and interest in politics ($\beta = -.092$ and $p=0.04$) in 2005-2006, we can attest that residents of this region had more interest in politics in comparison to other regions.

Table 5.1.1.1 Interest in politics (DV), 2005-2006, 2013

Model 1 (2005-2006)	Coefficients (2005-2006)			Sig.	Model 2 (2013)	Coefficients (2013)			Sig.
	Unstandardized B	Standardized Beta β				Unstandardized B	Standardized Beta β		
(Constant)	3.163			.000	(Constant)	2.883			.000
Language at home	-.018	-.007		.858	Language at home	.018	.010		.794
Religion	-.200	-.068		.017	Religion	.022	.011		.667
Western	-.320	-.092		.004	Western	-.127	-.060		.066
Southern	.161	.047		.175	Southern	.135	.119		.000
Eastern	.103	.031		.386	Eastern	.086	.040		.279
Kyiv	.306	.052		.087	Kyiv	.020	.005		.849
Employment recoded	.031	.011		.729	Crimea	-.032	-.011		.742
35-54	-.015	-.005		.869	Employment recoded	-.081	-.045		.130
55+	-.146	-.050		.179	30-44	-.080	-.041		.208
Secondary	-.359	-.124		.007	45-59	-.311	-.150		.000
Bachelor and higher	-.679	-.198		.000	60+	-.489	-.250		.005
Urban/Rural	-.004	-.001		.968	Secondary	-.251	-.138		.000
					Bachelor and higher	-.679	-.200		.000
R square	.036				Urban/Rural	.037	.020		.488
					R square	.068			
p-value				.000	p values				.000
N	1263				N	1458			

Source: the author created the figure based on the results of public opinion survey by IFES in Ukraine (2005-2006) and 2013. The sample size was 1500 respondents across the country. IFES exclusively provided the data files for this research project.

Education was a statistically significant variable ($\beta = -.198$, $p=.000$).

Respondents with a higher level of education declared a higher level of interest in politics than citizens with only a primary degree (our reference group). Age did not have an impact on citizen's interest in politics in Model 1 (2005-2006). In Model 2, age,

⁵ In order to run the multiregression analysis, the religious affiliation was recoded as 1 - Orthodox Christianity (Including Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox) and 0- the others (Including Catholics, Protestants and others.)

⁶ Residents of Western regions were also the strongest supporters of the Orange revolution. See *Orange revolution and Aftermath. Mobilization, Apathy and the State in Ukraine*. Ed. By Pail D'Anieri (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010).

education and Southern region⁷ were statistically significant. Citizens between 45-59 years old ($\beta = -.150$, $p = .000$) and those over 60 years ($\beta = -.250$, $p = .000$) showed more interest in politics than citizens between 18-29 (reference group).⁸ Citizens with secondary education or higher ($\beta = -.138$ and $\beta = -.213$) revealed a greater interest in politics than citizens with a primary school level of education. Relationships between the level of political interest and the spoken language at home, employment status, and religious affiliation were not statistically significant ($p > .05$) in Model 2.

From all the regions that were examined in Model 2, residents of the Southern region, according to this model, showed less interest in politics than did the residents of the Central region (reference category). For all other regions the relationships were not statistically significant, indicating that there were no statistically significant differences in the level of interest in politics between those regions and the Central region (reference category). This is different than in 2005-2005 when the Western region expressed the highest interest in politics in comparison to the Central region. As we know, the main participants of the Orange revolution were mostly from Western Ukraine and Kyiv.⁹ Opposite of that, the participants of Euromaidan more regionally diverged.¹⁰

5.1.2. Awareness of political events

Another component of citizens' political competence is their awareness of political events. As we can see from Figure 5.1.2.1 the percentage of those, who identified as

⁷ In the multiregression model, the Central region was chosen as the reference category. For the age – the age group of 18-29 was chosen as the reference category, and for education the reference category was the primary school.


⁸ Since dependent variable was recoded as follows: from 1 (very interested) to 4 (not interested at all), the negative relationship will indicate that increase in age will lead to a higher level of interest (category 1).

⁹ Hans van Zon, "Why the Orange Revolution succeeded" *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol. 6. No.3, 2005, pp. 373-402.

¹⁰ Olga Onuch and Swendolyn Sasse "The Maidan in Movement: Diversity and the Cycles of Protest" *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 68, No. 4, 2016, pp. 556-587.

having a “great deal” a “fair amount” of information about political development in Ukraine varied. Between 2004 and 2005 political awareness declined by 6%, followed by a ten-point increase in 2007, followed by oscillation between 80-84% over the remaining years. The highest level of political awareness was in 2008- 2009, two years after the Orange coalition collapsed and after an early parliamentary election of 2007 which brought back to power the pro-Yanukovich Party of Regions and one year before the presidential election in 2010.¹¹

Figure 5.1.2.1 Perception of political developments (%), 2004-2013



Source: author created the figure based on data files from IFES between 2004 and 2013. The question was asked: “And how much information do you feel you have about political developments in Ukraine - a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?” The figure represents a combination of “great deal” and “fair amount” categories combined.

When testing for the relationships between language spoken at home, type of residence (rural and urban), age, education, region, employment and religious affiliation and level of political awareness about political events, it can be asserted that relationships in the models are statistically significant for Model 1 (2005-2006), $p=.000$, and for Model 2 (2013), $p=.000$. In 2005-2006, two sets of relationships were statistically significant-between education, religion (IVs) and level of political awareness (DV). People who attained a higher level of education had a higher level of political awareness ($\beta =-.176$ and $\beta =-.168$).¹² People who belonged to the Orthodox Christian¹³ group showed a higher level of political awareness than other religious groups ($\beta = -.102$). The other variables

¹¹ Lincoln A. Mitchell, *The Color Revolutions*. Ch. 6. Democracy after the revolutions (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012).

¹² The values of DV are coded as follows: 1- a great deal, 2 – fair amount, 3 – not very much, 4- none at all. Because of decreasing scale, the negative sign for Beta means positive relation between IV and DV.

¹³ The Orthodox Christian group includes Russian Orthodox and Ukrainian Orthodox (Kiev Patriarch).

(the language spoken at home, type of residence, age and employment) were not correlated with political awareness in 2005-2006. It is concluded that Ukrainian citizens' level of political awareness of political events did not differ significantly across the regions right after the Orange revolution. The exception was education and religious affiliation, which are often strong predictors of political preferences in many societies.¹⁴

Table 5.1.2.1 Perception about Political development (DV), 2005-2006, 2013

Model 1 (2005-2006)	Unstandardized Coefficients B	Standardized Coefficients Beta β	Sig.	Model 2 (2013)	Unstandardized Coefficients B	Standardized Coefficients Beta β	Sig.
(Constant)	3.500		.000	(Constant)	2.312		.000
Language at home	-.254	-.060	.117	Language at home	.002	.002	.968
Religion	-.458	-.102	.000	Religion	.097	.073	.005
Western	-.143	-.026	.427	Western	-.130	-.093	.005
Southern	.066	.013	.720	Southern	.051	.068	.046
Eastern	.149	.030	.421	Eastern	-.021	-.015	.693
Kyiv	-.528	-.058	.060	Kyiv	-.008	-.003	.915
Employment	.010	.002	.942	Crimea	-.229	-.113	.000
35-54	.054	.013	.710	Employment	-.079	-.067	.029
55+	-.271	-.061	.110	30-44	-.060	-.047	.162
Secondary	-.786	-.176	.000	45-59	-.130	-.095	.003
Bachelor and higher	-.868	-.168	.000	60+	-.145	-.112	.001
Rural/Urban	.177	.039	.218	Secondary	-.147	-.121	.018
Adjusted R square	.036			Bachelor and higher	-.140	-.109	.039
				Urban/Rural	-.038	-.031	.288
				Adjusted R square	.047		
p value			.000	P value			.000

a. Dependent Variable: 2. And how much information do you feel you have about political developments in Ukraine -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all? Source: the figure was created by author based on the results of public opinion survey by IFES in Ukraine (2005- 2006, 2013). The sample size was 1500 respondents across the country. The data files were exclusively provided by IFES for this research project.

The results of Model 2 illustrated changes in citizens' perceptions of their level of political awareness. The residents of the Western region and Crimea revealed a higher level of political awareness before Euromaidan ($\beta = -.093$ and $\beta = -.113$) than the Central region (reference category). In contrast, residents of the Southern region ($\beta = .068$) had a low level of political awareness in comparison to the Central region. Thus, we can say that citizens of different regions had differing levels of political awareness prior to Euromaidan. Also, citizens who belonged to the Orthodox Christian groups reported a lower level of political awareness than citizens of other religious affiliation ($p = .005$ and β

¹⁴ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), p. 297.

=.073). Ukrainian citizens who were employed showed a higher level of political awareness than citizens who were unemployed in 2013 ($p=.029$ and $\beta =-.067$). Age and education both had a significant relationship with the level of political awareness. Older citizens (45-60) expressed higher political awareness ($\beta =-.095$ and $\beta =-.112$) in comparison to our reference group (18-29). Higher education was correlated with higher political awareness ($\beta =-.109$). We can attest that Ukrainians professed high political awareness in 2013, but those levels varied across regions. The next question is from which source did Ukrainian citizens obtain their information about political events?

5.1.2.1. Main source of information

The literature on the relationship between sources of information and political awareness and political participation states that news media play an important role in system support “by priming citizens about the criteria that are most appropriate for evaluating the quality of democratic governance, as well as by framing whether the performance of the government is perceived positively or negatively.”¹⁵

Furthermore, previous analysis on the role of media during the Orange revolution identified a correlation between the source of information and citizens’ political preferences during the 2004 presidential election.¹⁶ Citizens from the Eastern and Southern regions who watched predominantly Russian language TV channel Inter or Russian TV channels voted for Viktor Yanukovich.¹⁷


¹⁵ Marc J. Hetherington and Thomas J. Rudolph, “Priming, performance and the dynamic of political trust” *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 70, No. 2, 2008, pp.498-512.

¹⁶ Marta Dycsok, “Breaking Through the Information Blockade: Election and Revolution in Ukraine 2004” *Canadian Slavonic Paper/ Revue Canadienn des Slavistes*, Vol. XLVII, No 3-4, September-December 2005, pp.241-264.

¹⁷Ibid, p.257.

After the Orange revolution, many Ukrainians continue to receive information from television sources, including private and state TV stations. The second most popular source of information was local media (newspapers and television), followed by national newspapers. Surprisingly, many Ukrainians mentioned relatives and friends as the main source of information, which indicates the parochial type of relations among citizens. In more traditional societies people rely on those from their inner circle to get information, including family and friends.¹⁸ Whereas in more developed societies people will have access to other sources of information outside their inner circle. An inquiry tracing the various sources of information based on region revealed that TV was the main source of information for all regions during the studied years followed by national newspapers. Local newspapers were preferred by 46.7% of the respondents in 2004, 49% in 2005-2006, 17.2% in 2008 and 28.4% in 2013.

Figure 5.1.2.1.1 The main source of information (%), 2004-2013



Source: the author created the figure based on the results of public opinion survey by IFES in Ukraine (2004-2013). The cumulative percent is higher than 100 as respondents were asked to choose all answers that applied. For 2008 and 2009 the question did not ask about Private TV.

In the Eastern and Southern regions, a plurality of respondents relied upon Russian TV as the main source of information (32.2% and 17.4%), followed surprisingly by the Western region (17%). The residents of Western and Central regions used

¹⁸ Walter A. Rosenbaum, *Political Culture* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972).

Ukrainian newspapers as the main source of information in higher numbers than the rest of the country (30.7% and 33.1% from those who use Ukrainian newspapers).

The studies of Ukraine's Media Landscape in 2010 indicated that the top seven most popular TV channels for the news and current affairs were Ukrainian channels Inter, 1+1, "Ukraine", STB, ICTV, Novy and UT-1.¹⁹ However, many of them were owned by Ukrainian oligarchs with political connections. "The most prominent media owners in Ukraine are industrial and financial magnates with good political connections."²⁰

For example, among the top seven TV channels that we mentioned earlier, three – STB, ICTV and Novy belonged to the StarLightMedia, whose owner is Viktor Pinchuk (son-in-law of the former president Kuchma). The most popular channel Inter was owned by InterMediaGroup with its owner Valeriy Khoroshkovsky who at different times held numerous ministerial positions.

Furthermore, according to the Ukrainian Institute of Mass Information, in 2011, 70% of the media market was controlled by four oligarchs; Valeriy Hodorkovsky (Party of Regions, the head of SBU under Yanukovich), Viktor Pinchuk (son in law of the former President Leonid Kuchma), Igor Kolomoysky (Former Governor of Dnipropetrovsk, loyal to Yanukovich) and Renat Akhmetov (the richest man in Ukraine, supporter of Yanukovich).²¹ Because of this, they used their media channels as an instrument of political influence.²² The studies on the roles of news media and democracy

¹⁹ Natalya Ryabinska, "The Media Market and Media Ownership in Post-Communist Ukraine" *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 58, No. 6, 2011, pp.3-20, p.8

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ "To whom belongs channels? Is a reform possible in the field of "special relations"? *Institute of Mass Information*, 08 August 2011 <http://imi.org.ua/analytics/32662-komu-nalejat-kanali-abo-chi-mojliva-reforma-v-sferi-osoblivih-interesiv.html>, accessed December 28, 2018.

²² Natalya Ryabinska, "The Media Market and Media Ownership in Post-Communist Ukraine" *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 58, No. 6, 2011, pp.3-20, p.10.

state that “regardless of the nature of the group that dominates the selection of that is to be published, democratic theorists agree that competition among diverse groups is essential.”²³ This was not the case in Ukraine, especially after 2010, when the censorship returned to the main TV channels.

For example, in April of 2010, three months after Yanukovich became the president, the secretary-general of the organization Reporters without Borders wrote an open letter to President Yanukovich after many journalists were barred from the press conference between Yanukovich and President Medvedev in Kharkiv.²⁴ According to the reports of Reporters without Borders, in May of 2010, two TV stations in Ukraine, 5 Channel, and TVi had their licenses canceled because of their criticism of the government.²⁵ In June 2010, TV journalists from three more stations, TSN, STB, and 1+1 complained about interference in their news programs.²⁶

However, positive changes took place in the usage of sources of information other than television. The most notable results relate to those who selected foreign media (other than Russian) as the main source of their information in 2013. Among the national total of 0.7% respondents who mentioned the foreign media as the main source of information – 33.3% were the residents of the capital Kyiv, followed by 25% in each of the Western and Central regions, the regions that were most active during the Orange revolution and Euromaidan. This could further explain why the events of Euromaidan were perceived

²³ Doris Graber, Denis McQuail and Pippa Norris, *The Politics of News. The News of Politics* (Washington: CQ Press, 1998) p. 2.

²⁴ “Open letter to the Ukrainian President” *Reporters Without Borders* <https://rsf.org/en/news/open-letter-ukrainian-president> accessed October 21, 2016.


²⁵ “TVi under surveillance?” *Reporters Without Borders* <https://rsf.org/en/news/tvi-under-surveillance>, accessed October 21, 2016.

²⁶ “TV journalists take united stand against systematic censorship” *Reporters Without Borders*, May 7, 2010 <https://rsf.org/en/news/tv-journalists-take-united-stand-against-systematic-censorship>, accessed October 21, 2016.

differently by people in different regions. If the information that citizens of Ukraine receive daily varies among the regions; their beliefs of the political events within the country might be different as well.

Reliance upon the Internet as the main source of information was low during the studied years in comparison to established democracies.²⁷ Nevertheless, the usage of the Internet as the main source of information increased from 3.4% in 2004 to 24.6% in 2013, which is more than seven times. The number of Internet users in Ukraine increased from 4.5% in 2006 to 41% in 2013.²⁸ This major increase in the usage of the Internet in ten years reflects the changing form of citizens' communication. This is significant as internet usage "could enhance external political efficacy because it enables citizens to interact with public officials and to hold them accountable."²⁹ The usage of the Internet as the main source of information increased significantly among the youngest group (18-29) between 2004 and 2008 from 10.8% to 50.8%.

Figure 5.1.2.1.2 Internet as the main source of information among age groups (%), 2004-2013



Source: the figure was created by author based on the results of public opinion survey by IFES in Ukraine (2004, 2008 and 2013).

²⁷ For example, the percentage of users as of 2013 in Canada was 85,8% and UK -89.8% respectively. *The World Bank*. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2/countries/UA?display=graph>, accessed January 25, 2016.


²⁸ "Internet users by country, Ukraine." *The World Bank*. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2/countries/UA?display=graph>, accessed January 25, 2016.

²⁹ Kate Kenski and Natalie Jomini Stroud, "Connections Between Internet Use and Political Efficacy, Knowledge and Participation" *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, Vol.50, No.2, 2006. pp.173-192, p.175.

More importantly, according to the 2012 Freedom House report, Ukraine had limited or no censorship on the Internet in the years after the Orange Revolution.³⁰ Euromaidan participant Natalya Sokolokenko, TV journalist (1975 y.ob.) observed: “During Yushchenko’s Presidency we developed freedom of speech in our newsroom. When Yanukovych came to power, the situation rapidly worsened.”³¹

After 2010, when censorship returned to main media, the Internet was “last reserve outlet for news and content that was prevented from being aired or published in traditional media.”³² And although 56% of Internet users in Ukraine reside in urban areas,³³ this allowed Internet users to participate in various online discussion groups and blogs without fear of being punished. This, in turn, could change social relationship among the citizens as social media, blogs, and online discussion groups gained popularity during the studied years.

Figure 5.1.2.1.3 Internet in Ukraine (%), 2002-2011



Source: “Ukrainian society – monitoring of social changes. 1992-2010.” Institute of Sociology, *Ukrainian National Academy of Science*.

³⁰ “Freedom on the Net. Country report, Ukraine. 2012” *Freedom House* <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2012/ukraine>, accessed February 4, 2016.

³¹ Tetyana Kovtun and Tetyana Pryvalko, (Maidan from the first person: 45 stories of the Revolution of Dignity) (Kyiv: Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, 2015), p. 14.

³² Natalya Ryabinska, “Media Capture in Post-Communist Ukraine” *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2014, pp.46-60, p.56.

³³ “Freedom on the Net. Country report, Ukraine. 2012” *Freedom House* <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2012/ukraine>, accessed February 4, 2016.

The Internet could enable individuals from different backgrounds to unite around a particular topic or issue. Hence, results of the correlation analysis showed that using the Internet as the main source of information in Ukraine was positively correlated with different forms of political activity such as signing a petition, joining in boycotts and participating in peaceful demonstrations in 2006 and 2011.³⁴

Could this explain the rapid response of the first protesters in Kyiv, the capital city of five million residents, to the tweet on November 21, 2013, by the journalist Mustafa Nayeem, who summoned people to come to Maidan?³⁵ Yes and no. According to Olga Onuch, who interviewed Euromaidan participants during the political protest between November 2013 and January 2014, social media and Internet news played an important role in diffusing information and motivating people, but not necessarily in mobilising them to protest.³⁶ Facebook was named as the second source for information after Radio and TV for where and when to take part in protest events.³⁷

At the same time, among 45 published interviews of the participants that the author used for this study, 22 mentioned their use of the Internet, Facebook and Twitter as their main instruments of communication and coordination. Andriy Kapustin (1957 y.o.b), a blogger, said: “Facebook is a real weapon. Against it, Yanukovych could not do

³⁴ See Appendix 1.

³⁵ The exact tweet was as follows: “RT!! Встречаемся в 22:30 под монументом Независимости. Одевайтесь тепло, берите зонтики, чай, кофе, и друзей.” “Repost!!! Meet at 22:30 near the Monument of Independence. Dress Warmly, bring umbrellas, tea, coffee and friends.” <https://twitter.com/mefimus/status/403599728904241153>. Mustafa is a member of parliament and has more than 574 000 followers on his twitter account, which is even more indicative of social activity of Ukrainian internet users. See: <https://twitter.com/mefimus>, accessed February 04, 2016.

³⁶ Olga Onuch, “Euromaidan Protests in Ukraine: Social Media Versus Social Networks” *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.62, No.4, 2015, pp. 217-235, p. 218.

³⁷ Ibid, p. 228.

anything. All our politicians were very far from it.”³⁸ Kateryna Kuvita (1985 y.o.b), a lawyer noted that: “Facebook and Twitter were our main instruments of communication and coordination.”³⁹ Taras Lohynov (1959 y.o.b), a paramedic commented that: “ The specifics of this revolution were that it was broadcast live – everything was filmed and streamed online.”⁴⁰ Yulia Pishta (1983 y.o.b.), volunteer: “Many things were solved through the Internet. Many people joined (volunteer groups) through Facebook.”⁴¹ Thus, we have mixed results relating to the use of the Internet as the source of information for the general public before the Euromaidan and the use of the Internet among participants of Euromaidan. We can infer that the use of the Internet and social media (Facebook, Twitter and others) was associated with citizens’ political awareness and participation, but we can not claim a causal relationship between them.

As was mentioned earlier, the local media (TV, radio, and Newspapers) were one of the most popular sources of information for Ukrainians during the studied years. Since regions have their local media, we would like to compare two regional newspapers in Ukraine from two regions - West (Ukrainian speaking) and East (Russian speaking).⁴²

5.1.2.2. Regional Newspapers, November 2013

To examine regional differences in the interpretation of political events in Ukraine, the author compared two regional newspapers: *Vechernii Donetsk*,⁴³ from Eastern Ukraine,

³⁸ Tetyana Kovtun, Tetyana Pryvalko, (Maidan from the first person: 45 stories of the Revolution of Dignity) (Kyiv: Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, 2015), p. 27.

³⁹ Ibid, p.232.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p.268.

⁴¹ Ibid, p.188.

⁴² The content of TV programs was unavailable for this research.

⁴³ *Vechernii Donetsk*, Archive, November 2013.

http://vecherka.donetsk.ua/index.php?id=3507&show=newsarchive&year_sel=2013&month_sel=11#.WYjbvMYZNEI, accessed March 07, 2016.

and L'viv' ska Gazeta⁴⁴ from Western Ukraine. The month of November 2013 was chosen as the month of the beginning of Euromaidan. This allowed the author for a deeper understanding of the role of media in Ukraine and its possible impact on citizens' political awareness during this important historical event.⁴⁵

Table 5.1.2.2.1 Regional newspapers coverage, November 2013

Newspaper	Total	Ukraine-EU	Euromaidan (political protests)	Local news/ sports	Historical events
Vechernii Donetsk	135	3	2	117	13
L'viv'skya gazeta	698	56	82	508	52

Source: the table was created by the author based on the analysis of the texts of the articles.

Of 135 articles that were published by *Vechernii Donetsk* in that month, only three dealt with the signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and EU and two with the political protests. The majority of articles concerned local transportation problems, salaries in the regions and sports. Thus, for the citizens of Donetsk in November of 2013, who read local newspapers, the events of Euromaidan would not seem as significant based on the coverage by the newspapers. Historical events, mostly from the days of Soviet Union were the subjects of 13 articles. For example, on November 1, the newspaper published the article “*Doroga k pobede*” (The road to victory) about the opening of the exhibit in Donetsk about the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1944. It focused on the role of the Soviet Red Army in the victory against fascism. Another article with a title “*Iskusstvo patriotizma*” (The Art of Patriotism) discussed the art exhibit of the artists from “Region Donbass” which according to the writer, include Donetsk, Lugansk, and Rostov (Russia) oblasts. Thus, the newspaper's coverage reflected a sense of shared cultural and historical experience with Russia. On November 6, the newspaper published articles related to the celebration of November 7, the anniversary of Russian October

⁴⁴ *L'viv ska Gazeta*, Archive, November 2013 <http://gazeta.lviv.ua/2013/11/page/20/>, accessed March 20, 2016

⁴⁵ The online archives for each newspaper were not available for the whole period of study.

Revolution of 1917. The article titled “*The road to victory*” argued that it was important to remember the date of the revolution. On the November 14, a newspaper published an article “*Desnitza Georgia Pobedonostzta v Donetske*” (The Relic of Saint George in Donetsk) about Saint George who is a particularly important historical figure in Russian Orthodox Church. On November 21, seven days before the official date of signing the Association Agreement between EU and Ukraine, the article “*Stimul dlya peremen*” (Stimul for changes) discussed the possible advantages and disadvantages of the Association Agreement.⁴⁶ The biggest concerns were raised in relation to local plants and factories such as “Nord,” Azovmash” and Hartsyskiy pipe plant that work very closely with the Russian market. The article suggested that the EU should take responsibility for employing the workers of the region in case they lose their jobs after the signing of the agreement.

On the November 26, the newspaper published the article “*Ukrainskie uchebniki: na oshybkakh uchimsia*” (Ukrainian textbooks: learning from mistakes) with a critic of Ukrainian textbooks, particularly those containing information about the “Orange revolution.”⁴⁷ On November 27, an article titled “*Nam nado iskat’ svoi puti*” (We should search for our own path) was published.⁴⁸ In it, the newspaper published the opinion of the Mayor of Donetsk Oleksandr Lukyanchenko, who suggested that Ukraine would be better off joining the Trade Union with Russia than with the EU. On November 30, one

⁴⁶ “Stimul dlya peremen” *Vechernii Donetsk* November 21, 2013
<http://vecherka.donetsk.ua/index.php?id=4647&show=news&newsid=106661#.WY3Mj44rLIU>, accessed March 2016.

⁴⁷ “Ukrainskie uchebniki; na oshybkakh uchimsia?” *Vechernii Donetsk* November 26, 2013
<http://vecherka.donetsk.ua/index.php?id=4647&show=news&newsid=106658#.WY0dnMYZNCa>, accessed March 22, 2016.

⁴⁸ “Nam nado iskat’ svoi puti” *Vechernii Donetsk* November 27, 2013
<http://vecherka.donetsk.ua/index.php?id=4647&show=news&newsid=106700#.WY31a47yvIU>, accessed March 22, 2016.

week after the beginning of the Euromaidan, the newspaper published the article “*Chto Porozhdaet Euromaidany?*” (What is the cause of Euromaidans?), in which local citizens of Donetsk were asked about Euromaidan. The majority expressed their opposition to the signing of the EU association agreement. At the same time, a student interviewed, Maria Lazan explained the Euromaidan in positive terms as the willingness of the youth to express their position.⁴⁹ That a youth expressed views different from the prevailing sentiments in the region and it was published by a newspaper, which is a notable fact.

By contrast, *L'viv ska Gazeta*, on November 1 published three articles dedicated to the anniversary of the Western Ukraine Independent Republic of 1918. One of them titled “*1 Listopad 1918 – tse bula moralna peremoha ukrayinstsiv*” (1 November 1918- it was a moral victory for Ukrainians) explained that this anniversary indicates that Ukrainian nationhood started much earlier on the territories of Western Ukraine.⁵⁰ On November 3, the newspaper published the article about an art exhibit dedicated to the friendship between Ukrainian and Polish nations.⁵¹ Interestingly, the first article about the EU and Ukraine association agreement was published on November 4. However, the article focused on the burning of the EU flag in Simferopol, Crimea, during the “Russian March” movement.⁵² At the same time, the newspaper published that the Ukrainian

⁴⁹ “Chto Porozhdaet Euromaidany?” *Vechernii Donetsk* November 30, 2013 <http://vecherka.donetsk.ua/index.php?id=4647&show=news&newsid=106706#.WY0aDsYZNcA>, accessed March 20, 2016

⁵⁰ “1 lystopada 1918 – tse bula moralna peremoha ukrayinstsiv” *L'viv ska Gazeta* November 01, 2013 <http://gazeta.lviv.ua/2013/11/01/listopada-roku-ce-bula-moralna-peremoga-ukrancv-storik/>, accessed April 02, 2016.

⁵¹ “Stary temy po novomu” *L'viv ska Gazeta* 03 November 2013 <http://gazeta.lviv.ua/2013/11/page/122/>, accessed April 02, 2016.

⁵² “Uchastnyky Rosiyskoho Marshu v Simveropoly namahalysya pidpalyty prapor EU” *L'viv ska Gazeta* 04 November 2013 <http://gazeta.lviv.ua/2013/11/page/122/>, accessed April 02, 2016. Russian Marsh is an annual Marsh on the 4th of November – national celebration of Russian national unity (was implemented in 2004).

World Congress supported Ukraine's desire to sign the Association Agreement with the EU.⁵³ An article about the enduring importance of recognizing the Holodomor as genocide against Ukrainians appeared on November 6.⁵⁴ On November 7, the newspaper acknowledged the Anniversary of the October revolution of 1918 by stating in the article's headline "*Komunisty svyatkuyut richnutsyu revolutsii* (Communists celebrate the anniversary of the Revolution).⁵⁵ By stating that only communists celebrate this anniversary, newspapers distanced the local citizens from this anniversary as "us" and "them." On November 14, two weeks prior to the date of the signing of the Association Agreement between EU and Ukraine, the newspaper published an article about the local initiative, "*Nash dim – Europa*" (Our home – Europe) to promote the EU Integration in Ukraine.⁵⁶ On the 19th of November, the newspaper reported that L'viv's City Hall placed a flag of the EU on its building to support the signing of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine.⁵⁷ The first mention of the potential protest against the government decision to postpone the signing of the Agreement was on November 21, the same day that Yanukovich government decided to stop the process that was to lead to the signing of the agreement.⁵⁸ The article reported that leaders of the

⁵³ "Svitoviy Congress Ukrayintsiv zaclukav pidtrymaty pidpysannya uhody pro assosiatsiyu mizh EU ta Ukrayinoyu" *L'viv ska Gazeta* 04 November 2013 <http://gazeta.lviv.ua/2013/11/page/121/>, accessed April 02, 2016.

⁵⁴ "Senate USA rposytymut ofitsiyno vyznaty holodomor Henotsydom" *L'viv ska Gazeta* 06 November 2013 <http://gazeta.lviv.ua/2013/11/06/senat-ssha-prositimut-ofejno-viznati-golodomor-genocidom/>, accessed April 02, 2016.

⁵⁵ "Komunisty svyatkuyut richnutsyu revolutsii" *L'viv ska Gazeta* <http://gazeta.lviv.ua/2013/11/page/107/>, accessed April 02, 2016.

⁵⁶ "Lviv vyhodyt na pidtrymku euvrointegratsiy Ukrayiny" *L'viv ska Gazeta* November 14, 2013 <http://gazeta.lviv.ua/2013/11/page/78/>, accessed April 05, 2016.

⁵⁷ "Na L'viv sky Ratushy vyvisyly baner-prapor Eurosousu" *L'viv ska Gazeta* November 19, 2013 <http://gazeta.lviv.ua/2013/11/page/57/>, accessed April 05, 2016.

⁵⁸ "Udar Sklykaye Maidan" *L'viv ska Gazeta* November 21, 2013 <http://gazeta.lviv.ua/2013/11/21/udar-sklika-majdan/>, accessed April 05, 2016.

opposition in Kyiv called for citizens to come to Maidan on November 24. On November 22, the Day of Freedom, dedicated to the Orange Revolution of 2004, which started on November 22 of 2004, the newspaper announced that L'viv's citizens had started the action Euromaidan in L'viv. The newspaper reported that based on discussions of the online social groups, the youth of the city decided to protest Yanukovich's decision.⁵⁹ L'viv's Mayor made a statement of his support for the protestors on the same day.⁶⁰ Within the last two weeks of November, the newspaper published materials about new organized online discussion groups where citizens could read about the development of Euromaidan, including the ability to sign up to join it. On November 23, the newspaper published an interactive information map of Euromaidan that was created by one of the participants, to see the cities across Ukraine and the world where there was support for Euromaidan.⁶¹ Within the last week of November, the newspaper published ten articles suggesting that the EU was still ready to sign the agreement with Ukraine.⁶² Titles such as the "EU will wait until 5 am on Friday", "EU is ready to give Ukraine up to 1 billion EUR per year" were published. The message from these articles suggested to the public that more pressure should be placed on the government to change its position prior to the meeting in Vilnius between the EU and Ukraine on November 28. On November 27, the newspaper reported that the Facebook Page of Euromaidan became the most popular in Ukraine, with 75 000 likes within five

⁵⁹ "Lvivyany vyhodyaty na Euromaidan" *L'viv ska Gazeta* November 22, 2013 <http://gazeta.lviv.ua/2013/11/22/lvvjani-vihodjat-na-vromajdan/>, accessed April 06, 2016.

⁶⁰ "Petro Kolodiy pidtrymav eurointegratsiyni initsiatyvy studentiv" *L'viv ska Gazeta* <http://gazeta.lviv.ua/2013/11/page/45>, accessed April 06, 2016.

⁶¹ "Dlya mitinguvalnykyv Euromaidanu stvoryly interaktyvnu mapu" *L'viv ska Gazeta* November 23, 2013 <http://gazeta.lviv.ua/2013/11/page/39/>, April 06, 2016.

⁶² "EU: propozytyiya pidpysaty Asotsiatsiyu z Ukrayinoyu dosy chynna" *L'viv ska Gazeta* November 25, 2013 <http://gazeta.lviv.ua/2013/11/page/31/>, accessed April 07, 2016.

days since the beginning of Euromaidan.⁶³ On November 29, the newspaper published three opinions of political experts with their analysis of the Euromaidan.⁶⁴ Many of them spoke about Euromaidan as a past event. On November 30, the day when the government started to use force against protesters, the newspaper published five articles with titles such as “*Euromaidan po-zviryachomu rozstrilyalu*” (Euromaidan was violently shot), “*V Ukrayini vidbuvsya antykonstytutsiyniy perevorot*” (In Ukraine an anti-constitutional coup took place), “*Kryvave poboyszche na holovniy ploschchy krayiny*” (Bloody battle on the country’s main square).⁶⁵

It is important to emphasize, that from the total of 52 articles published about different historical events *L’viv ska Gazeta* dedicated 27 articles to the anniversary of the Holodomor. This is significant, considering that the Holodomor had less effect on Western Ukraine than on other regions, including Eastern Ukraine. Thus, it demonstrated Western Ukraine willingness to remember this historical event, which signifies for many Ukrainians brutality of the Soviet regime in Ukraine.

This analysis suggests that Ukrainians across different regions were exposed to different kinds of information about political events in Ukraine prior to and during Euromaidan. Those who resided in Western Ukraine were exposed to detailed coverage of Euromaidan. They also were asked to participate and support the Euromaidan by local authorities, who encouraged locals to join the protesters in Kyiv. In contrast, the newspaper of the Eastern region of Donetsk had limited and brief coverage of the events

⁶³ “Storinka Euromaidany u Facebook bye rekordy” *L’viv ska Gazeta* November 27, 2013 <http://gazeta.lviv.ua/2013/11/27/stornka-vromajdanu-u-b-rekordi/>, accessed April 08, 2016.

⁶⁴ “Osnovan meta ne dosyagnuta, ale ghvoryry pro porazku Euromaidanu ne dovodytsya” *L’viv ska Gazeta* November 29, 2013 <http://gazeta.lviv.ua/2013/11/page/9/>, accessed April 08, 2016.

⁶⁵ *L’viv ska Gazeta* November 30, 2013 <http://gazeta.lviv.ua/2013/11/>, accessed April 09, 2016.

in Euromaidan. It was more skeptical of the political protests in Kyiv and the motivations of those who participated. Thus, it is probable that readers are drawing their information from this source would be less aware of the Euromaidan. Nonetheless, many citizens across all regions relied on the Internet as their main source of information. Thus, more and more citizens had access to a variety of online sources and relied less on their local newspapers. The next step is to determine whether citizens' political efficacy changed within the period studied.

5. 2. Political Efficacy

An important dimension of the individual's role in the political process is political efficacy. Political efficacy can be defined as a feeling or belief that individual political actions do have, or could have an impact on the political process;⁶⁶ efficacy also includes beliefs in the importance of civic activism and participation.⁶⁷ The level of political efficacy within society could increase the likelihood that citizens might take real political actions and participate in political mobilization.⁶⁸ For citizens to act upon political grievances, citizens must believe that their actions would have some effect.

In Ukraine, citizens' beliefs in their ability to influence decisions were not consistent during the period of analysis. As Figure 5.2.1 shows, in 2005, right after the Orange revolution, 30.4% of respondents agreed that they could have an impact on political decisions, the highest among all years.⁶⁹ The lowest percentage of respondents

⁶⁶ This classification was adopted from Walter Rosenbaum, *Political Culture* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 9.


⁶⁷ For example, research on political efficacy within established democracies illustrated that broad coalition governments depress efficacy which can discourage voter participation. See Jeffrey A. Karp and Susan A. Banducci "Political Efficacy and Participation in Twenty-Seven Democracies: How Electoral Systems Shape Political Behavior" *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol.38, Issue 2, 2008, pp. 311-334.

⁶⁸ "Hidden consequences of political efficacy: Testing an efficacy–apathy model of political mobilization." Osborne, Danny; Yogeewaran, Kumar; Sibley, Chris G.. *Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology*, Oct 2015, pp.533-540.

⁶⁹ Data for 2004 was not available.

who agreed that they could influence political decisions, 12.1%, was in 2008, one year after the dismissal of the Parliament and the collapse of the governing Orange coalition in 2006. In 2010, the year of the Presidential election, the number of citizens who agreed that they have an influence on the decisions by the government increased to 29.5%. In 2013, the year of the Euromaidan, 18.2% of citizens believed in their influence on the decisions by the government.

Figure 5.2.1 Beliefs to have an influence on the government (%), 2005-2013



Source: the figure was produced by the author based on data files from IFES. The question was asked as follows: Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statement: 30.B. People like you can have an influence on decisions made by the government. The figure represents the combination of "strongly agree" and "somewhat agree."

The multi-regression test finds that in 2005-2006 citizens of the Southern region ($\beta = -.083$ and $p = .016$) showed stronger belief in their ability to influence decisions made by the government than the Central region (reference group). A higher level of education was correlated with higher political efficacy ($\beta = -.121$ and $p = .008$). The results from Model 2 (2013) reveal changes in citizens' perceptions of their influence on decisions made by the government. Residents of the Western region showed a stronger sense of their influence prior to Euromaidan ($\beta = -.125$ and $p = .000$) than the Central region. By contrast residents of the Eastern region ($\beta = .136$, $p = .001$) demonstrated lower levels of belief in their ability to influence decisions made by the government in comparison to the reference group (Central region). People with secondary levels of education had lower political efficacy ($\beta = .133$ $p = .011$) than citizens with primary education (reference group). Older citizens (60+) expressed lower political efficacy ($\beta = .088$ $p = .000$) than

citizens of the 18-29 age group (reference group).⁷⁰

Table 5.2.1 Political efficacy, 2005, 2013

Model 2005-2006	Unstandardized Coefficients B	Standardized Coefficients Beta (β)	Sig.	Model 2 2013	Unstandardized Coefficients B	Standardized Coefficients Beta (β)	Sig.
(Constant)	4.114		.000	(Constant)	2.706		.000
Language at home	-.209	-.061	.111	Language at home	.202	.115	.004
Religion	-.081	-.022	.442	Religion	.058	.029	.288
Western	.223	.051	.117	Western	-.264	-.125	.000
Southern	-.362	-.083	.016	Southern	-.069	-.062	.081
Eastern	-.117	-.028	.436	Eastern	.286	.136	.001
Kyiv	-.128	-.017	.573	Kyiv	-.022	-.006	.842
Employment	-.004	-.001	.969	Crimea	.029	.009	.784
35-54	.026	.007	.828	Employment	.023	.013	.686
55+	.046	.013	.737	30-44	.025	.013	.712
Secondary	-.522	-.143	.002	45-59	.099	.048	.150
Bachelor and higher	-.518	-.121	.008	60+	.172	.088	.015
Rural/Urban	.018	.005	.876	Secondary	.243	.133	.011
				Bachelor and higher	.175	.090	.096
				Urban/Rural	.046	.025	.406

a. Dependent Variable: Q30. People like you can have an influence on decisions made by the government. The DV has a scale from 1 – strongly agree to 4 strongly disagree. Source: the tables were created by author based on the results of public opinion survey by IFES in Ukraine (2005-2006) and 2013. The sample size was 1500 respondents across the country. The data files were exclusively provided by IFES for this research project.

Language at home, which did not influence citizens' perception of their impact on the decisions made by the government in Model 1, showed a statistically significant relationship in 2013 ($\beta = .115$ and $p = .004$). Citizens who spoke Ukrainian at home expressed higher political efficacy.

We can conclude that Ukrainian citizens had overall a low level of political efficacy within the studied years, except for the Southern region in 2005-2006 and the Western region in 2013. The Orange revolution may have influenced the higher political efficacy in 2005. For example, results of crosstabulation and chi-square for 2005 demonstrated that 50.2% of those who took part in the Orange revolution agreed with the statement that people like them could influence the government decisions, in comparison to 26.8% who did not take part.⁷¹

⁷⁰ Negative relations mean that increase in education and age will lead to moving towards strongly agree category. At the same time, as mentioned earlier, the variable education may not be representative of the students, who are still studying. Because of that they wrongly may be placed in the category of low level of education.

⁷¹ See Appendix 1.

The following political events can explain the decline in political efficacy between 2010 and 2011. In February 2010, Viktor Yanukovich was elected as a President of Ukraine in an election that was recognized as free and fair by international observers.⁷² In September 2010, the changes to the Constitution by the Supreme Court⁷³ were introduced. These changes reversed the 2004 reforms and restated the Constitution to its 1991 version, including its presidential form of government which gives the President significant executive power.⁷⁴ In the fall of 2011, Yuliya Tymoshenko, one of the leaders of the Orange team, was controversially imprisoned for a seven-year term, following convictions for corruption.⁷⁵ The level of corruption in the country increased as well, alongside an increase in inflation and economic instability.⁷⁶

However, the majority of interviewed participants of the Euromaidan expressed different views about their political efficacy. Vasyl Gatsko (1982 y.o.b), a local politician: “We did not like what was happening in Kyiv. The fact that Yanukovich always closed roads diminished our dignity. We wanted to show that people are not

⁷² “Ukraine. Presidential Election, 17 January and 7 February 2010. Final Report” *OSCE* <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/67844?download=true>, accessed January 22, 2016.

⁷³ 18 members of the Constitution Court are appointed by the President, Parliament and the Advice committee of the Constitution Court. Prior to the changes of 2010, 12 out of 18 judges were loyal to Yanukovich. See Yarema Gorodchuk, “Suddiv yaki dopomahali yanukovichu uzurpuvaty vladu treba zvilnyty” *Delovaya Stolitsa News*, 20 April 2015 <http://www.dsnews.ua/politics/suddiv-yaki-dopomagali-yanukovichu-uzurpuvaty-vladu-mozhna-20042015193000>, accessed January 21, 2016.

⁷⁴ “Constitution Court illuminated reforms of 2004”. *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 01 October 2010. <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2010/10/1/5433558/6>, accessed January 21, 2016.


⁷⁵ The arrest of Tymoshenko was considered as political arrest since she campaigned against Yanukovich during 2010 Presidential election. Yuliya Tymoshenko was released from the prison in February 2014, during the Euromaidan. See Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine’s Crisis* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2014).

⁷⁶ According to the annual report by the Nations in Transit, Ukraine’s level of corruption increased since 2011 to the score of 6 and even higher in 2013(6,25). The score is based on a scale from 1 to 7 where the one represents the lowest level of corruption and the 7 the highest. See *Freedom House* <https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2015/ukraine>, accessed January 21, 2016.

afraid.”⁷⁷ Andriy Yermolenko (1974 y.o.b), an artist: “We should acknowledge that we must change everything by ourselves. Nobody will come and build “heaven on earth” for us here.”⁷⁸ Taras Prohac’ko (1968 y.o.b.), novelist: “Euromaidan took place because it showed that Ukraine has this critical number of people who are ready to make changes.”⁷⁹

In 2013, when asked if they agree or disagree with the statement that “I have a role to play in solving problems in my community/country,” Ukrainians predominantly disagreed (Figure 5.2.2). However, citizens had more confidence in their ability to influence the community, 41.2% than in their country, 24%. On the question about their perception towards people working together as a group to bring changes, 67.7% agreed. Thus, while many respondents did not believe in their influence in their community and country, they often saw group cooperation as important for making changes.

Figure 5.2.2 Influence in community/country, willingness to work together (%), 2013



Source: author created the table based on data files from IFES (2013). The questions were asked: “Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I have a role to play in solving problems in my community/country. People working together in a group or as part of a community can bring about needed changes.

Looking at citizens’ perception towards their political efficacy across different groups and regions, we can see that citizens agreed more about their influence in their

⁷⁷ Tetyana Kovtun, Tetyana Pryvalko, *Maidan vid pershoyi osoby: 45 istoriy revolyutsii hidnosti* (Maidan from the first person: 45 stories of the Revolution of Dignity” (Kyiv: Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, 2015) p. 168.

⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 213.

⁷⁹ Ibid, p.206.

community than in the country. Those who had higher education and belonged to the age group of 18-29 and 30-44, had a greater sense of their political influence in their country. Interestingly, among occupational groups, students believed most in their ability to influence their community and country (57.8% and 41.7%), followed by those who were employed full-time. As we know, many participants of Euromaidan were also employed and middle age.⁸⁰

Table 5.2.2 Political influence, willingness to collaborate. 2013

REGION	West	Center	South	East	Kyiv	Crimea
Influence in my country	36.1	17.8	27.2	14.9	16	32.2
Influence in my community	48.5	37.7	39.9	34	31.9	58.9
People working together can make changes	66.9	70.4	63.5	69.4	65.8	69
AGE GROUPS	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+		
Influence in my country	29.8	28	20.6	17.9		
Influence in my community	45.6	46.6	40.5	32.9		
People working together can make changes	72.7	62.9	68.7	67.7		
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor and higher			
Influence in my country	11.8	23.1	29.3			
Influence in my community	25.8	38.9	41.2			
People working together can make changes	72.6	64.5	73.1			
LANGUAGE AT HOME	Ukrainian	Russian	Both			
Influence in my country	24.5	25	20.7			
Influence in my community	39.3	47.6	32.8			
People working together can make changes	68.7	69.9	61.7			
EMPLOYMENT	Full time	Part-time	Student	Unemployed	Retired	Homemaker
Influence in my country	26.4	17.2	41.7	30.4	17.6	24.8
Influence in my community	46.3	36.2	57.8	39.7	34.3	43.6
People working together can make changes	65.6	77.8	90	60.6	68.7	68.5


Source: author created the table based on data files from IFES (2013). The questions were asked: “Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I have a role to play in solving problems in my community/ country. People working together in a group or as part of a community can bring about needed changes.”

The inquiry turns to whether or not citizens’ beliefs led to concrete activity during the period studied. It is important to examine whether citizens of Ukraine were willing to take actions to influence political decisions. An interesting trend is discerned about the citizen’s willingness to fight for their country. A majority of respondents in Ukraine (53%) among all the studied years agreed that they would fight for the country (Figure 5.2.3). The highest percentage, 56%, was in 2006. The lowest percentage, 40% was in 2011, one year after Yanukovich was elected as the President. As Natalya Sokolenko,

⁸⁰ Olga Onuch, “Who were the protesters?” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 25, No. 3, July 2014, pp.44-51

journalist (1975 y.o.b), a participant of the Euromaidan mentioned: “For me, the Euromaidan started with the Inauguration of President Yanukovich because we all realized what would happen next.”⁸¹

Figure 5.2.3 Willingness to fight for the country (%), 2001-2011



Source: author created the figure based on online analysis of WVS data files on Ukraine, 2001, 2006 and 2011. The question was asked as follows: “Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?” World Value Survey <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSONline.jsp>, accessed January 24, 2016.

Thus, Ukrainian citizens combine two opposing characteristics of political efficacy; a low level of belief that they can influence the decision-making process in their country, juxtaposed with a high level of civic obligation to fight for their country. This is surprising, as it does not easily reside in the conception of civic democratic culture. There is an expectation, according to classical theories on political culture, that a low level of political belief in the ability to make changes is associated with a low level of obligation to participate.⁸²

Citizens of Ukraine showed a low level of belief in their ability to play a significant role in the political process, especially on the national level, yet this occurred in combination with an expressed willingness to participate in protecting their country and collaborating with other people to make changes. This may help to explain why many citizens volunteered their time and skills to provide injured Euromaidan protesters

⁸¹ Tetyana Kovtun, Tetyana Pryvalko, “Maidan from the first person: 45 stories of the Revolution of Dignity” (Kyiv: Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, 2015), p. 14.

⁸² Almond and Verba called this type of political culture parochial.

with first aid, warm clothes, and food. Anatoliy Cherednichenko (1980 y.o.b), a businessman said: “Those people who said: “I take responsibility for myself and my country, I want changes”- they came to Euromaidan.”⁸³ Andriy Czhybal, (1993 y.o.b.), a student recalled: “Everyone was saying that we wanted in the EU. Yes, of course. But our motherland, our independent Ukraine was more important to us.”⁸⁴ At the same time, well known Ukrainian academic and philosopher Myroslav Popovych (1930 y.o.b) stated: “Personally, the biggest surprise was the fact that Euromaidan happened. Not long ago before Euromaidan we were sitting with sociologists and discussing the results of public opinion surveys: they showed very low activity among citizens.”⁸⁵ Thus, it seems that citizens political activity during Euromaidan were as surprising to Ukrainian academics who studied this subject prior to Euromaidan as it was to those outside the country.

5.3. Political Activities

Democratic citizens are not only should be politically competent and efficacious; they also should be politically active.⁸⁶ One of the most important indicators of political participation is the frequency of voting among citizens. Fair and competitive elections are the essential instrument within a democratic political system. Through their participation in an election, citizens exercise their fundamental democratic right - to select the government.


⁸³ Tetyana Kovtun, Tetyana Pryvalko, “Maidan from the first person: 45 stories of the Revolution of Dignity” Kyiv: 2015. *Ukrainian Institute of National Memory*, p. 228.

⁸⁴ Ibid, p.291.

⁸⁵ Ibid, p.307.

⁸⁶ Russell J Dalton, *Citizen Politics. Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Washington: CQ Press, 2006), pp. 35-62.

Figure 5.3.1 Self-reported Frequency of voting (%), 2004-2012



Source: author created the figure based on the results of public opinion surveys that were conducted in Ukraine by IFES between 2004 and 2014. The data files were exclusively provided for this research project.


Figure 5.3.1 reveals that Ukrainian citizens were active participants in elections during the ten-year period with an average of 75% voter turnout. This is one of the highest among the post-Soviet countries.⁸⁷ The lowest percentage of participation (71.2%), occurred during the early 2007 parliamentary election, which took place less than two years after the 2006 parliamentary election. In the 2006 election, the Orange coalition received the cumulative majority of votes cast; however, they fail to establish a workable government. The Party of Regions (led by Viktor Yanukovych) and the Socialist Party, a former member of the Orange team, formed a new coalition. President Yushchenko subsequently dismissed the Rada, and a new early parliamentary election was scheduled for 2007. Thus, citizens' low participation in 2007 might be attributed to voter fatigue and possible sentiments that the votes cast in the previous election in 2006 were ultimately futile.⁸⁸ The official results of the voter turnout in Ukraine during the years studied show that the highest turnout was during the second round of the Presidential election in 2004 (80.4%). These results were recognized as invalid due to fraud, leading

⁸⁷ The average is around 54%. See "Voter turnout, Eastern Europe, 2014" *IDEA* <http://www.idea.int/vt/field.cfm?field=221®ion=151>, accessed January 26, 2016.

⁸⁸ Although 2007 election was recognized as mostly fair and free, many manipulations were witnessed on the local level, especially in Donetsk. See for details: Mikhail Myagkov & Peter C. Ordeshook (2008) "Ukraine's 2007 Parliamentary Elections: Free and Fair, or Fraud Once Again?" *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.55, No.6, pp.33-41.

to the Orange revolution and the re-voting of that round. The second highest turnout was during this re-voting, 77.19%. The levels of voter turnout in Ukraine were high between 2004 and 2013.


Figure 5.3.2 Voter turnout (%), 2004-2012



Source: *Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine*, accessed January 13, 2018.

The next step is to examine whether they believed that elections were legitimate instruments of democratic governance. The data illustrated that prior to the Orange revolution, 50% of respondents believed in voting as an instrument that could influence decision-making, a rate that is comparable to established democracies.⁸⁹ In all other years, including in 2013, the majority of citizens disagreed with the statement that voting is an opportunity to influence the decision-making process.

Figure 5.3.3 Perception about voting (%), 2004-2013




Source: figure created by the author based on the data files from IFES. The question was asked: "Please tell me where you agree or disagree with the following statement: Voting gives people like you a chance to influence decision-making in our country."

Furthermore, when asked about their view of whether or not there was fairness in each election during the studied years, the majority of citizens did not perceive elections as

⁸⁹ According to the results of WVS in USA (2011), 53,2% of respondents agreed with the statement that "Elections are the essential characteristic of democracy." *World Values Survey* <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSONline.jsp>, accessed March 08, 2016.

being either fair or free. The exception to this pattern was the second round of the Presidential election in 2004 when 52.6% of respondents considered this round of the election to be fair and free. However, even though the Orange coalition was governing, citizens did not consider the next parliamentary elections in 2006 and 2007 to be fair and free. The same views were held with regards to the 2010 presidential election.

Figure 5.3.4 Perception about the fairness of elections (%), 2004-2013



Source: the figure created by the author based on the data files from IFES. The question was asked: “In your opinion how fair was each of the following elections?” For each election, the question was asked one year after the election.

Thus Ukrainians, notwithstanding the high level of voter turnout, did not have confidence that the voting process was an effective instrument of citizens’ influence on the decision-making process. As was argued by Dalton, Welzel and others, in a modern democratic society, citizens not only have to be assertive to keep the government accountable, but they should have allegiance to the main political institutions because it will make the government more effective.⁹⁰ If citizens have confidence in political institutions, they will be willing to delegate their interests to the political elite through legitimate instruments such as elections. In Ukraine, as we observed, citizens did not have confidence in the main political institutions nor elections.

⁹⁰ Russell Dalton and Christian Welzel *The Civic Culture Transformed. From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p.287. Thomas Denk, Henrik Serup Christensen and Daniel Bergh, “The Composition of Political Culture – A Study of 25 European Democracies” *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol.50, 2015, pp. 358-377, p. 361.

The analysis leads to the question of which type of political actions did respondents believe was effective. Further, which political actions have they undertaken? Among the five different forms of political actions, the data shows an increase in the percentage of those who contacted or visited a public official from 4.5% in 2004 to 17.5% in 2013. Although the percentage of those who signed a petition was low, it increased after the Orange revolution from 1.2% in 2004 to 7.8% in 2006. The same increase is visible concerning the numbers of those who have written a blog and used social media to express their opinion on a political or social issue.

Citizens participation in peaceful protests steadily decreased from 19.2% in 2006 to 10.1% in 2011. In 2013, the year of Euromaidan, it slightly increased from 2011 to 12.1%, but less than in all previous years. Among 45 interviewed participants of Euromaidan ten acknowledged their previous experience with political protests (Orange revolution). Volodymyr Vyatrovych, (1977 y.o.b.), a historian: “I took an active part in the events of 2004 and was one of the founders of the civic organization “Pora.”⁹¹ Ruslan Dobrovolsky (1968 y.o.b), a medical doctor: “Medical structure was organized on the same principles as in 2004. Because of this, our activity was very effective from the beginning.”⁹² Artemiy Yasynovsky (1985 y.o.b), a lawyer: “Why did I decide to join the protests? In those students, I saw myself. In 2003-2004, we “shook” the University of Shevchenko, the law school, do you understand?”⁹³ Taras Lohinov (1959 y.o.b), a paramedic: “I advised others how to organize (medical help) because in 2004 I was the


⁹¹ Tetyana Kovtun, Tetyana Pryvalko *Maidan, Vid pershoi osoby, 45 istorii revolutsii hidnosti* (Maidan, From the First Person, 45 stories of the revolution of dignity) (Kyiv: Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, 2015) p.79.

⁹² Ibid, p.261.

⁹³ Ibid, p.64.

head of the medical unit here.”⁹⁴ Considering that earlier statistical test (Appendix 1, Table 6) showed the association between taking part in the Orange revolution and higher political efficacy, we can propose that those Euromaidan protesters who had experience in the Orange revolution had a higher level of political efficacy that in turn contributed to their political actions.

Figure 5.3.5 Political actions (%), 2004-2013



Source: author created the figure based on the data from WVS and IFES. The question was asked: In the past year, have you made efforts to ensure that your rights/interests as a citizen are respected? [If Yes] How have you tried to ensure your rights and interests? [Mark all necessary items]

Political actions changed across the regions (Appendix 1, Table 9). In 2004, prior to the Orange revolution, the Western region was the most active in signing petitions (58.3%). The Eastern region was the most active in contacting public officials (47.1%). In 2006, two years after the Orange revolution, the Eastern region was still the most active in contacting public officials (18.8%). The Western region was most active in participating in peaceful protests (29.9%) followed by the Eastern region (28.1%) and Kyiv (20%). Therefore, political protests in 2006 took place across different regions. In 2013, Kyiv was the most active in attending political protests (19%), following by the Western region (18.2%) and Crimea (15.3%). The Southern region was the least active in attending political protests across all years.

⁹⁴ Ibid, 266.

Among age groups, citizens between 30-44 years of age in 2013 were the most active in expressing their views online and writing a blog to express their opinions on political or social issues (12.9%). This age group together with the older age group (45-59) were also more active in signing a petition (9.4% and 9.6%). These results support other authors' findings that the most active citizens of Euromaidan belonged to the middle age group of citizens with higher levels of education and employment.⁹⁵ Kateryna Kuvita (1985 y.o.b), a political activist noted: "The average Automaidan⁹⁶ participant- it was 100% people from the middle class and people who were not afraid to express their opinions."⁹⁷

Citizens in Crimea, Eastern and Southern regions (25.8%, 22.2%, and 15.3%) were more active than other regions in contacting and visiting public officials in 2013. They were also more likely than other regions to sign a written or email petition (10.9% of respondents in the Eastern region and 12.3% in Crimea).

As with other aspects of political efficacy one's ability to take actions, particularly taking part in a protest or demonstration, may be related to the respondents' age, education, region, type of settlement (Urban/Rural) and spoken language at home. After running the binary logistic regression analysis,⁹⁸ the following findings were observed for the year 2005-2006 and 2013. Table 5.3.1 shows that relations between DV and the IVs are statistically significant for both models ($p=.000$ and $p=.000$). In 2005-

⁹⁵ Olga Onuch, "Who were the Protesters?" *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.25, No.3, July 2014, 44-51.

⁹⁶ Automaidan was organized by citizens who owned a car to support protesters by delivering necessities as well as blocking roads from police.

⁹⁷ Tetyana Kovtun, Tetyana Pryvalko, Maidan, Vid pershoi osoby, 45 istoriy revolutsii hidnosti (Maidan, From the First Person, 45 stories of the revolution of dignity) (Kyiv: Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, 2015), p.79.

⁹⁸ The original dependent variable was coded as follows: 1 – "In the last 12 months", 2 – "Earlier". 3 – "No" and 8- "Do not know". To conduct the statistical analysis, the variable was recoded in binary variable with 1 – yes (combined categories of 1 and 2) and 0 – no.

2006 (model 1) residents of the Western region ($\beta = 2.050$ and $p = .000$) were more likely to take part in protests than residents in the Central region (reference category). By contrast, residents of the Eastern region ($\beta = -1.230$ and $p = .010$) were less likely to take part in the protests in comparison to the Central region. For all other variables, the relationships were not statistically significant.

Table 5.3.1 Taken Action in Protest (DV), 2005-2006, 2013

2013				2005-2006			
Model 2	β	Exp (B)	Sig.	Model 1	β	Exp (B)	Sig.
Urban/Rural	-2.357	.095	.004	Rural/Urban	.379	1.460	.358
Language/home	.818	2.267	.195	Language at home	-.845	.430	.086
Religion	-.250	.779	.555	Religion	-.198	.821	.577
Western	1.875	6.524	.017	Western	2.050	7.771	.000
Southern	.653	1.921	.151	Southern	-.810	.445	.150
Eastern	-.306	.737	.804	Eastern	-1.230	.292	.010
Kyiv	2.034	7.648	.021	Kyiv	3.035	20.797	.062
Crimea	1.351	3.861	.217	Employment	.121	1.128	.753
Employment	.388	1.474	.387	35-54	.061	1.063	.878
30-45	.218	1.243	.679	55+	-.431	.650	.356
45-59	.194	1.214	.721	Secondary	.695	2.004	.272
60+	-.370	.691	.600	Bachelor and higher	.628	1.874	.055
Secondary	16.218	11034212.8	.996				
Bachelor and higher	15.833	7517483.60	.996				
Constant	-18.908	.000	.996	Constant	-.2.517	.077	.000
p			.000				.000
R-Square	.175				.099		

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: labour, D9recoded, D10recoded, regdummy1, regdummy3, regdummy4, regdummy5, regdummy6, D4recoded, agegrouprecoded2, agegrouprecoded3, agegrouprecoded4, edudummy2, edudummy3, edudummy4.

In 2013 (Model 2) the Western region and Kyiv were more likely to take part in protest than the Central region (reference category) ($\beta = 1.875$ and $\beta = 2.034$). For all other regions the relationships were not statistically significant, indicating that they were not statistically different from the Central region in taking part in political protests. This is supported by other researchers, who stated that the Euromaidan was more nationally inclusive than the Orange revolution.⁹⁹ As one of the participants of the Euromaidan Sofia Borys’ko (1993 y.o.b), a student, remarked: “Vinnyt’sya was the most active, Ternopil’. You will not believe - Donetsk!”¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ Olga Onuch, *Mapping Mass Mobilization. Understanding Revolutionary Moments in Argentina and Ukraine* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 237-246. Olga Onuch, “Facebook Helped Me Do it”: Understanding the Euromaidan Protester “Tool-Kit” *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Vol. 15, No.1, 2015, pp.170-184.

¹⁰⁰ Tetyana Kovtun, Tetyana Pryvalko *Maidan, Vid pershoi osoby, 45 istorii revolutsii hidnosti* (Maidan, From the First Person, 45 stories of the revolution of dignity) (Kyiv: Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, 2015,) p.49.

Rural citizens were less likely to take part in protests than urban in 2013 ($\beta = -2.357$). Age and education, which were strong predictors of a respondent's beliefs on whether they can have an impact on the political process, did not influence citizens' participation in political protest and demonstration in 2005-2006 and 2013.¹⁰¹ The relationship between the language spoken at home and taking part in the political protest was not statistically significant for both models. Thus, Ukrainians self-reported participation in political protests in 2005-2006 and 2013 was to some extent associated more with their region (and place of residence in 2013), than with their education, age, language at home, religion or employment.

Conclusion

Overall Ukrainians had a high interest in politics and self-reported political competence. Among the regions, the Western region had the highest interest in politics in 2005-2006, 2010 and 2013, but not in 2004, when Kyiv had the highest interest. The Southern region had the lowest interest in politics in 2004 (54.8%) and 2013 (48.1%). The main factors that correlated with political awareness and competence were education and age. Higher education was positively correlated with political awareness and competence. Those who belonged to the youngest age group (18-29) had the lowest interest in politics which is similar to established democracies.¹⁰²

Analysis of citizens' main sources of information about political development revealed that Ukrainians chose traditional sources of information such as TV followed by neighbors or friends, newspapers and local media. Ukrainians in the Eastern,

¹⁰¹ The survey of protesters on Maidan revealed that the "median protester" was male, middle class, over 30 years old. See for details: Olga Onuch, "Who were the Protesters?" *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 25, No. 3, July 2014, pp.44-51.

¹⁰² "Most young lack interest in politics- official survey" *BBC*, 21 February 2014 <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-26271935>, accessed November 02, 2018.

Southern and Crimean regions relied on Russian language TV as their main source of information, followed by local media (newspaper and radio). By contrast, residents of the Western and Central regions relied primarily upon Ukrainian language TV and Ukrainian newspapers as the main source of information. An analysis of the two regional newspapers from Ukrainian speaking West and Russian speaking East on their coverage of the Euromaidan in November of 2013, illustrated clear differences in the coverage of political events in Ukraine.

Despite regional differences in their main source of information, access to the Internet in Ukraine increased from 4% in 2004 to 41% in 2013 nationwide. Furthermore, the Internet was the main source of information for a majority of the youngest age group (18-29) across the studied period. This shows that younger Ukrainians got information from a wide range of sources, including in languages different than Ukrainian or Russian. Furthermore, the usage of the Internet as the main source of information was positively correlated with citizens' political efficacy. This suggests that those Ukrainians who used the Internet as their main source of information had greater belief in their ability to influence the government. The Internet and Social media (Facebook, Twitter, VKontakte) were also mentioned as the important tools of communication during Euromaidan.

Some interesting conclusions were made on political efficacy. Although the political efficacy of Ukrainian citizens was low, which should indicate low political activity or stealth citizenry,¹⁰³ many Ukrainians expressed their willingness to fight for

¹⁰³ Thomas Denk, Henril Serup Christensen and Danieal Bergh, "The Composition of Political Culture – A study of 25 European Democracies" *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 50, 2015, pp. 358-377, p. 365. Gerry Stoker "Explaining Political Disenchantment: Findings Pathways to Democratic Renewal" *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 77, No. 2, April-June 2006, pp. 184-194.

their country and collaborate with other citizens. Thus, although Ukrainians did not believe in their ability to influence the government, in which they did not have confidence, they possessed a very strong sense of civic obligation to protect their country. This suggests that Ukrainians were very dissatisfied with the political regime and its institutions, but not with the country in which they live. This high sense of civic obligation to protect their country was an indication of their strong attachment to their state and its territory, but not to the politicians.

The analysis of Ukrainians' political activities found that high numbers took part in elections. Unfortunately, the majority did not consider that voting was the main instrument of political influence and did not believe in the elections' fairness. These findings were surprising because studies showed that citizenship perception about electoral fairness positively correlates with voter turnout.¹⁰⁴ In Ukraine, we observed the opposite dynamic – high voter turnout and low level of belief in the fairness of elections.

Simultaneously, Ukrainians increased their participation in alternative forms of political actions. Students were the most active in using social media to express their political views, followed by those who were employed full time. Citizens' participation in political protests dropped between 2006 and 2011, but not in 2013. In 2013, citizens' participation in political protests increased by 2% in comparison to 2011. The results of the regression demonstrated that the only variables that had an impact on the citizens' participation in political protests in 2005-2006 and 2013 were a region (West and Kyiv in 2005-2006 and West and East in 2013) and place of residence. For all other variables, the relationships were not statistically significant.

¹⁰⁴ Sarah Birch, "Perceptions of electoral fairness and voter turnout." *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol.43, No.12, 2010, pp. 1601-1622.

Among the age and educational groups, those who belonged to the middle and older age groups reported higher participation in political protests in 2013, but differences were not statistically significant.

CHAPTER 6 External Factors (EU and Russia)

Introduction

As was stated earlier, various theories posit that modern society's mass political culture is influenced by global institutions and these institutions' policies.¹ The European Union and Russia are of most relevance to Ukraine. Although they would not be defined as global institutions, they were influential in Ukraine, according to previous research.² This study will examine the European Union and Russia's soft power in Ukraine between 2004 and 2014 and their impact or not on the political culture of Ukrainians. According to Nye, soft power is "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideal and policies."³ Soft power rests on ability to shape the preferences of others through three main primary sources: its culture (in the places where its attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad) and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).⁴

The chapter will show that the EU gained passive leverage in Ukraine by promoting European values and culture, without necessarily taking active steps towards

¹ Lina Dencik, *Media and Global Civic Society* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). Jonh Keane, *Global Civil Society?* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

² Edith Clowes, *Russia on the edge: Imagined Geographies and Post-Soviet Identity* (2011). Inna Melnykovska, Rainer Schweickert, & Tetiana Kostiuhenko, T. (2011). "Balancing national uncertainty and foreign orientation: Identity building and the role of political parties in Post-Orange Ukraine". *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.63, No.6, pp.1055–1072. Taras Kuzio, "Nationalism, identity and civil society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol.43, No.3, 2010, pp. 285–296. Mykola Riabchuk, Ukraine's 'muddling through': National identity and post communist transition. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 3-4, 2012, pp. 439–446.

³ Joseph S, Nye Jr., "Soft power." *Power in the Global Information Age* (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 76-88, p.77

⁴ Joseph S., Nye Jr., "Public diplomacy and soft power." *The annals of the American academy of political and social science*, Vol.16, No.1, 2008, pp. 94-109, p.96.

bringing Ukraine into the EU.⁵ At the same time, Presidents Yushchenko and Yanukovich and the Ukrainian media intensively promoted Europeanization of Ukraine. This Europeanization influenced citizens' feeling of belonging to Europe. Data analysis showed that higher confidence in the EU was correlated with higher tolerance towards minorities groups, higher interests in politics, higher membership in political organizations. These findings suggest that Euromaidan was an especially important event for the segment of the Ukrainian population which already possessed democratic political orientations and a system of values.

Russia was more active in Ukraine by employing not only soft power but gaining active leverage between 2004 and 2014. The official policy of *Russkiy Mir*, established in 2007, was promoted in Ukraine through the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian media, two very influential institutions among Russian speaking Ukrainians.⁶ The number of supporters of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) in Ukraine during the period studied increased especially in the Russian speaking regions. The analysis of the Russian language newspaper *Argumenty i Fakty* demonstrated that it was more critical of Yushchenko than Yanukovich. It also cautioned Ukraine of close collaboration with the EU instead of Russia by referring to the EU as "foreign"

⁵ Passive leverage is defined as attraction of the EU membership without deliberate conditionality exercised in the EU's pre-accession process. Active leverage is defined as deliberate efforts by the EU to promote reforms in candidates' states moving towards EU membership. Milada Vachudova, *Europe Undivided. Democracy, Leverage and Integration after Communism*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 63.

⁶ The *Russkiy Mir* started as a pro-government organization to promote Russian culture and Russian language abroad in June of 2007 by Decree of President Putin. *Russkiy Mir* <http://russkiymir.ru/fund/the-decree-of-the-president-of-the-russian-federation-on-creation-of-fund-russian-world.php#1>, accessed November 03, 2016.

institutions, especially in the months leading to the signing of the Association agreement between the EU and Ukraine in November of 2013.

6. 1. The Role of the EU

Studies of the impact of the EU in post-communist states indicate that the EU pre-accession process significantly improved states' willingness to implement political and economic reforms.⁷ Moreover, the EU creates two sets of requirements for potential candidates – normative (or formal) and informal.⁸ The formal mandatory requirements for future membership include an established market economy, free and fair elections, and the rule of law. The informal ones are those that built on the idea of “we- feeling” and conforming to European values.⁹ For Eastern European states that joined the EU in 2004, the path to membership was formally stringent. However, these states' future as part of the EU was not in doubt, because of their European ideals and their acceptance of the shared system of values (Kubicek, 2009). For these states, the process of European integration was perceived as returning to the place where they belonged. This was different for the former Soviet republics, except for the Baltic states, which had been annexed by the USSR before the Second World War.

6.1.1. Formal rules of Europeanization

In Ukraine, since the early years of independence, opinions and knowledge about the EU varied according to the regional context of the country in question. Western Ukraine, due to its history and closer geographic proximity to the EU,¹⁰ was more sympathetic towards

⁷ Milada Vachudova, “Corruption and Compliance in the EU’s Post-Communist Members and Candidates” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 47, 2009, pp.43-62, p.60.

⁸ Flemming Splidsboel Hansen, “The EU and Ukraine: Rhetorical Entrapment” *European Security*, Vol.15, No.2, pp.115-135, p. 117.

⁹ *Ibid*, p. 118.

¹⁰ The region of Galicia (Western Ukraine) was part of Austro-Hungarian Empire and later Poland.

the EU and its institutions than other regions. The rest of the country, particularly Eastern and Southern Ukraine, historically belonged to the territories of the Russian Empire prior to the 1917 revolution, and to the Soviet Union after 1921. For that reason, citizens' perceptions of the EU were different. Table 6.1.1.1 reveals that among all oblasts¹¹ in Ukraine, in 1996, five years after Ukraine's declaration of independence, the highest level of confidence in the EU was in Khmelnytskyi oblast (Western Ukraine). 77.8%. Similarly, the lowest levels of confidence were expressed in the eastern oblast of Luhansk (15.4%) and northern oblast of Sumy (12.3%). In Donetsk oblast, 28.7% of respondents chose the option "quite a lot" on the question of confidence in the EU. In Crimea, 30.8% of respondents chose the option "quite a lot" in 1996. Notwithstanding these views, in 1996 the majority of Ukrainians declared they had limited knowledge about the EU. Among all the regions, the most popular answer to the question about confidence in the EU was "do not know," 42.3% of the total, followed by 30.6 % of respondents who chose the option "quite a lot."

Table 6.1.1.1 Confidence in the European Union (%), 1996

Oblast	Great Deal	Quite a lot	Not very much	None at all	DK
Cherkassy	6.2	27.5	22.5	8.8	35.0
Chernivtsi	-	56.5	37.0	-	6.5
Chernihiv	17.8	35.8	15.6	3.3	27.8
Crimea	6.9	30.8	15.4	2.3	44.6
Dnipropetrovsk	2.8	21.2	14.2	1.9	59.6
Donetsk	3.0	28.7	13.7	11.4	43.2
Hmelnytsk	2.2	77.8	17.8	2.2	-
Ivano-Frankivsk	6.7	23.3	6.7	-	63.3
Kharkiv	5.8	24.4	10.5	5.8	53.5
Kherson	29.5	36.1	13.1	11.5	9.8
Kirovograd	12.0	32.5	24.1	6.0	25.3
Kyiv oblast	7.3	28.7	15.9	8.5	39.6
Kyiv	9.0	29.9	26.1	11.9	23.1
Luhansk	2.7	15.4	14.8	7.4	59.7
L'viv	7.7	52.1	4.9	4.2	31.0
Mykolaiv	6.7	58.3	8.3	3.3	23.3
Odessa	3.0	27.8	26.3	7.5	35.3
Poltava	9.0	44.9	6.4	7.7	32.1
Rivne	5.5	30.1	15.1	11.0	38.4
Sumy	1.9	12.3	4.7	1.9	79.2

¹¹ Oblast is an administrative region in Ukraine. Ukraine has 27 oblasts (including Crimea and City of Sevastopol). Official *Website of the Parliament of Ukraine. Verkhovna Rada Ukrayiny*. See <http://static.rada.gov.ua/zakon/new/NEWSAIT/ADM/zmist.html>, accessed November 14, 2016.

Ternopil	5.8	23.2	8.7	4.3	58.0
Vinnytsia	4.3	46.1	7.8	0.9	40.9
Volyn	8.5	11.7	10.6	9.6	59.6
Zhytomyr	5.9	28.7	17.8	10.9	36.6
Zakarpattia	5.1	49.2	15.3	3.4	27.1
Zaporizhia	4.8	15.5	8.3	11.9	59.5
TOTAL	6.3	30.6	14.4	6.5	42.3

Source: the table was created by the author based on data files from WVS, Wave 3, Ukraine (1996), 2811 respondents. The question was asked: I'm going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? The European Union.”

Although the question of Ukraine's future membership in the EU was not discussed, in 1994 Ukraine signed the Partnership and Co-Cooperation Agreement (PCA).¹² The PCA entered into force in February 1998 for a ten-year period. Ukraine and the EU had a number of the EU-Ukraine summits, seven in total, prior to the Orange revolution.¹³ In 2003, Ukraine and the EU signed the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and implementation of its Action Plan.¹⁴ The main goal of the ENP was “to provide a framework for the development of a new relationship which would *not*, in the medium-term, include a perspective of membership or a role in the Union's institutions.”¹⁵ Since the EU was preoccupied with the future accession of ten new members,¹⁶ Ukraine was not a priority for that organization in the years leading up to the Orange revolution. The text of the ENP did not include any references to the prospect of membership in the EU. It created a list of criteria and requirements for Ukraine to promote European values

¹² “Partnership and co-operation agreement between the European Communities and their member states, and Ukraine” *European Union* http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/october/tradoc_111612.pdf, accessed June 29, 2016.

¹³ “Chronology of bilateral relations” *The Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine* http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/eu_ukraine/chronology/index_en.htm, accessed July 09, 2016.

¹⁴ “Wider Europe — Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors” 11.03. 2003 *Commission of the European Communities* http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf, accessed June 10, 2016.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ On May 01, 2004 eight countries of the Eastern Europe joined the European Union. On the details about the EU Accession in Eastern Europe see: Kristi, Raik, “EU Accession of Central and Eastern European Countries: Democracy and Integration as Conflicting Logics” *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 18, No.4, pp. 567–594.

within the country, and by the legal framework of the European Market and the World Trade Organization. Thus, the European Union used passive leverage in its relations with Ukraine, built upon an idea of the attraction of EU membership without any concrete program to achieve it.¹⁷ Democracy promotion was one of the most powerful discourses that were used by the EU in the process of assessment of future members.¹⁸ The EU enlargement in May 2004 when ten eastern European states¹⁹ joined the EU, raised hope in Ukraine for future membership in the Union, and in the country's potential for a democratic future. For some Ukrainians, this desire to join the EU was based on the belief that they are more European than Russian.²⁰ This European identity was reflected in the 2004 presidential election campaign of Viktor Yushchenko.²¹ Hence, soon after the Orange Revolution, newly elected President Yushchenko declared the Europeanization of Ukraine as one of his main priorities. In his inauguration speech in January of 2005, he declared:

“Our way to the future – is the way followed by United Europe. We are the people of the same civilization sharing the same values. History, economic prospects and the interests of people give a clear answer – where we should look for our fate. Our place is in the European Union. My goal is – Ukraine in United Europe.”²²

¹⁷ Milada Vachudova, *Europe Undivided. Democracy, Leverage and Integration after Communism*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 63.

¹⁸ Kristi, Raik, “EU Accession of Central and Eastern European Countries: Democracy and Integration as Conflicting Logics” *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 567–594.

¹⁹ In 2004 the following 10 states joined the EU: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. *European Commission* http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/5th_enlargement/index_en.htm, accessed November 15, 2016.

²⁰ Iryna Solonenko “External democracy promotion in Ukraine: the role of the European Union”, *Democratization*, Vol.16, No.4, 2009, pp. 709-731.

²¹ “Presidential Election in Ukraine, 31 October, 21 November and 26 December 2004, OSCE, ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final report”. *OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights*, May 2005 <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/14674?download=true>, accessed July 16, 2016.

²² “Inaugural address of the President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko to the Ukrainian people on Independence Square” 24 January 2005. *Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine* http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/en/publish/article?art_id=11100895, accessed June 22, 2016.

The following events can further describe the relationship between EU and Ukraine after between the Orange revolution and prior to Euromaidan. The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan was implemented in February 2005, one month after Yushchenko's inauguration speech. ENP contained two parts and a list of priorities for Ukraine for the next three years. These priorities included free and fair elections, reforming the judiciary and adopting a nuclear waste strategy.²³ The Ukraine-EU Action Plan was not in any way an association agreement, but rather a set of criteria and requirements that Ukraine would have to meet to be considered for potential membership in the future. Europe was absorbing its new states and recovering from the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands in 2005.²⁴ Ukraine's potential membership in the EU was not a priority for the union. Hence, Ukraine's desire to have a closer relationship with the EU after the Orange revolution, beyond the ENP action plan, worried the EU.²⁵

Moreover, Ukraine in 2005 did not meet the three Copenhagen criteria for accession: 1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; 2) market economy; 3) administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement the acquires and ability to take on the obligations of membership.²⁶ The market economy was only partially developed, the rule

²³ Kataryna Wolczuk, "Implementation without Coordination: The Impact of EU Conditionality on Ukraine under the European Neighborhood Policy" *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol, 61, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 187-211.

²⁴ Sara Binzer Hobolt and Sylvain Brouard "Contesting the European Union? Why the Dutch and the French Rejected the European Constitution" *Political Research Quarterly*, XX (X) 2010, 1-14.

²⁵ Derek Averre, "Russia and the European Union: Convergence or Divergence?" *European Security*, Vo.14, No.2, 2005, pp. 175-202, p. 187.

²⁶ "Accession criteria" *European Commission. European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations* http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.htm, accessed July 09, 2016.

of law was incomplete in Ukraine, and more importantly, the level of corruption was still high.²⁷ Nevertheless, the European Parliament passed a declaration calling for the European Council, the European Commission and the EU member states to speed up the process of Ukraine's integration and possibly future EU membership.²⁸

In December of 2005, the Council of the European Union granted Ukraine Market Economy Status.²⁹ The prospect for closer relations between Ukraine and the EU improved after the 2006 Ukrainian parliamentary election when the parties of the Orange team gained the majority of the seats. However, they failed to secure a parliamentary coalition and thus lost the position of Prime Minister to Viktor Yanukovich. Despite Parliament's adoption of legislation that could accelerate Ukraine's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2005, political infighting within Ukraine prevented curtailed this. The disagreement between the two main leaders of the Orange Revolution Viktor Yushchenko and Yuliya Tymoshenko over appointments to the government led to the dismissal of Yuliya Tymoshenko as Prime Minister in July 2005. So, the question of European Integration became a lower priority for the political elite at that time.³⁰

Ukraine joined the WTO only in 2008 when Tymoshenko became a Prime Minister for the second time. The EU-Ukraine Visa Liberalization Dialogue was launched on October 2008. However, this positive turn in the relationship in 2008-2009 may be attributed in part to another external event. Conflict broke on between Georgia

²⁷ "Ukraine: slow progress fighting corruption" *Transparency International*. The global coalition against corruption. http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/ukraine_slow_progress_fighting_corruption, accessed November 15, 2016.

²⁸ Flemming Splidsboel Hansen, "The EU and Ukraine: Rhetorical Entrapment?" *European Security*, Vol.15, No.2, 2006, pp. 115-135, p. 124.

²⁹ *Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine* http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/eu_ukraine/chronology/index_en.htm, accessed July 09, 2016.

³⁰ Kataryna Wolczuk "Implementation without Coordination: The Impact of EU Conditionality on Ukraine under the European Neighborhood Policy" *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.61, No.2, 2009, pp.187-211, p. 198.

and Russia in August of 2008 over the territories of Ossetia and Abkhazia. The hostilities compelled the EU to reconsider its future policies towards the post-communist countries. Taken by surprise by Russian aggression towards Georgia, the EU wanted to prevent future conflicts in other former Soviet republics.

As a result, the EU offered Ukraine the Eastern Partnership, which “was established in part as a response to the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008.”³¹ The Eastern Partnership, which was signed in May of 2009 provided Ukraine with the prospect of visa liberalization, signing of the Association Agreement and opportunities of establishing Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA) for partner countries.³² The main goal of the Eastern Partnership was “to create the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further economic integration between the European Union and interested partner countries.”³³ The EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council adopted the Association Agenda on November 23, 2009, which replaced the previous agreement.³⁴ However, some argued that the Association Agenda was a way for the EU to indicate that Ukraine did not have realistic prospects for future membership. “Both the European Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership avoided the question of potential enlargement to the states of this region. Instead, the EU offered ‘association’: closer political ties, deep and comprehensive free trade, and the possibility of visa

³¹ Nil MacFarlane and Anand Menon, “The EU and Ukraine” *Survival*, Vol.56, No.3, pp. 95-101, p. 96.

³² “Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit.” Prague, 07, May 2009. *Council of European Union*. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/107589.pdf, accessed August 24, 2018.

³³ *Ibid.* p. 4.

³⁴ “EU-Ukraine association agenda to prepare and facilitate the implementation of the Association Agreement” *European Union* http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/2010_eu_ukraine_association_agenda_en.pdf, accessed June 10, 2016.

liberalization”³⁵ The ENP and the Eastern Partnership, the two main policy instruments setting out the parameters of relations between the EU and Ukraine, were silent on potential membership for the states involved.

Furthermore, the European Commission’s many progress reports stated that Ukraine needed to undertake significant economic and democratic reforms prior to the consideration of a possible future application for membership.³⁶ The reform of the judiciary, as well as the need for new tax code and a new modern labor code, were identified as important prerequisites for Ukraine’s European future. Thus, except for the declaration of Ukraine’s desire to join the EU after the Orange Revolution, neither the Ukrainian government nor the EU took formal steps to advance the process of euro-integration.

Table 6.1.1.2 Membership in the EU (%), 2008

EDUCATION	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary complete	Secondary and specialized	University incomplete	University complete
Would vote in favor	20.3	40.7	44.7	38.4	46.4	45.1
Would vote against	23.2	23.1	30.9	27.3	30.4	28.3
AGE	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+		
Would vote in favor	45	41.2	41.7	35.7		
Would vote against	22.1	31.6	28.1	28.4		
LANGUAGE AT HOME	Ukrainian	Russian				
Would vote in favor	52.5	27.2				
Would vote against	17.3	38.6				
REGION	Western	Central	Southern	Eastern	Kyiv	
Would vote in favor	78.8	72	44.7	38.4	77.8	
Would vote against	21.2	28	55.3	61.6	22.2	

Source: table created by the author based on data files from IFES (2008).

Public opinion about the potential membership in the EU after the Orange revolution, revealed differences based on age, education, language at home and region of residence.


A majority of respondents with a higher level of education, and who spoke Ukrainian at

³⁵ Neil MacFarlane & Anand Menon, “The EU and Ukraine,” *Survival*, Vol.56, No.3, 2014, pp. 95-101.

³⁶ “1st Joint Progress Report on the negotiations on the EU-Ukraine New Enhanced Agreement, 2007 “EU Neighborhood Library. An ENPI project. <http://www.enpi-info.eu/library/content/ukraine-progress-report-2007>, accessed on July 08, 2016. “Communication from the commission to the European parliament and the council. Taking stock of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)”. Progress Report Ukraine, 2009. http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/eu_ukraine/chronology/index_en.htm, accessed July 09, 2016.

home supported the membership in the EU. The lowest support was observed in the Eastern and Southern regions and among those who spoke Russian as the main language at home. When asked the main reasons for joining the EU in 2008, the most popular answers among the respondents were higher standards of living, quality of life and economic stability. The simplification of the visa process was the third most popular answer. Only 2.1% of respondents chose “Democracy, protection of human rights” as the main reason for joining the EU. Even fewer respondents, 0.9%, chose the European identity as the main reason for joining the EU. Ukrainians in 2008 emphasized the economic benefits for joining the EU in higher numbers than the EU identity, democracy and protection of human rights – values which are defined as post-materialistic by Inglehart.³⁷ Interestingly that only 0.2% chose the answer “EU is better than Russia” as the main reason for joining the EU.

Figure 6.1.1.1 Main reasons for joining the EU (%), 2008



Source: Razumkov Center http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=123, accessed March 16, 2017.

³⁷ Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, economic, and political change in 43 societies* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp.76-77.

Relations between the EU and Ukraine could have improved and become closer if not for the 2010 Presidential election that brought Viktor Yanukovich to power.³⁸ The loser of the Presidential election in 2004, Yanukovich came first in the second round of the presidential election in 2010, gaining 48.95% of the votes nationwide with Tymoshenko coming second with 45.47%.³⁹ Despite some surprise from the opposition and a request from Tymoshenko that the results of the elections be found invalid, the election was recognized as fair and free by OSCE.⁴⁰ Once in power, Yanukovich instituted constitutional changes to strengthen his power, and he took steps to improve fractured relations with Russia.⁴¹ On April 21, 2010, Yanukovich signed the Kharkiv Agreement, which reduced the price of gas for Ukraine for the next ten years from Russia in exchange for an extension of Russia's lease of the Sevastopol Naval base for the next 25 years.⁴² The opposition highly criticized the Agreement which was perceived by many inside and outside Ukraine as acquiescence to subordination to Russia.⁴³ However, Yanukovich,

³⁸ Nicholas Ross Smith, "The EU and Russia's conflicting regime preferences in Ukraine: assessing regime promotion strategies in the scope of the Ukraine crisis" *European Security*, Vol.24, No.4, 2015, pp.525-540.

³⁹ Results of the 2010 presidential election in Ukraine. *Central Electoral Commission*, <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2010/WP0011>, accessed June 23, 2016.

⁴⁰ "Ukraine's Presidential Election, 17 January and February 7, 2010. Final Report" *OSCE*, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/67844>, accessed September 20, 2016. "Final Report of the Independent Canadian Election Observer Mission for the 2010 Presidential Election of Ukraine" *CANADEM* <https://canadem.ca/documents/Final%20Report%20Mission%20Canada%202010%20-English%20Version.pdf>, accessed September 20, 2016.

⁴¹ During 2004 presidential election, President Putin was one of the leaders who congratulated Yanukovich as an elected President, despite the massive electoral fraud that led to the Orange revolution and victory of Viktor Yushchenko.

⁴² Philip P. Pan, "Ukraine to extend Russian naval base lease, pay less for natural gas" *Washington Post* April 22, 2010 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/21/AR2010042103836.html>, accessed June 22, 2016.

⁴³ "Experts – plus and minus of Kharkiv Agreement between Yanukovich and Medvedev" *UNIAN*: <http://www.unian.ua/politics/353679-eksperti-pro-plyusi-i-minusi-harkivskih-ugod-yanukovicha-medvedeva.html> <http://www.unian.ua/politics/353679-eksperti-pro-plyusi-i-minusi-harkivskih-ugod-yanukovicha-medvedeva.html> accessed June 24, 2016.

acknowledging Ukraine's economic dependence on Russia, was determined to strengthen Ukraine's relationship with its eastern neighbor.

The annual assessment reports by the European Union on Ukraine in 2011 stated that Ukraine fell short of achieving Association Agenda priorities. For example, the final report from 2011 posited that the Ukrainian judicial system had still not been reformed after 20 years of independence.⁴⁴ Extensive corruption and an unfavorable environment for businesses were also cited as obstacles to Ukraine's future membership. Another factor which contributed to the postponement of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement was the EU condition that opposition leader Yuliya Tymoshenko be freed from incarceration, as the EU posited that she had been convicted for political reasons. This condition was a significant factor in Yanukovich's decision to delay the signing of the Association Agreement. The political elite control over the decision-making in Ukraine was not conducive to joining the EU.⁴⁵

6.1.2. Informal rules of Europeanization

Despite the EU passive role in Ukraine in promoting the topic of Euro-Integration and European identity, Euro-Integration was widely promoted by Ukrainian media. For example, the national weekly newspaper *Mirror Weekly*⁴⁶ extensively covered the topic of the EU and Ukraine's prospective membership in the first two years after the Orange

⁴⁴ "Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in Ukraine. Progress in 2011 and recommendations for action." Brussels, 15.5.2012 SWD (2012) final. *European Commission* http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/docs/2012_enp_pack/progress_report_ukraine_en.pdf, accessed June 24, 2016.

⁴⁵ Ryhor Nizhnikau, "Institutional change in the eastern neighborhood: environmental protection and migration policy in Ukraine" *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol.15, No.4, 2015 495–517.

⁴⁶ This newspaper together with newspapers Den' and Kommentarii is considered neutral and independent in its coverage of the political events in Ukraine. See Joanna Szostek, "Russia and the News Media in Ukraine: A Case of "Soft Power"?" *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures*, Vol.28, No.3, August 2014, pp. 463-486, p.467.


revolution (Appendix 3). Almost every issue from January to early July covered the EU, with generally positive coverage. Out of 51 issues in 2005, the EU was mentioned 23 times on the front pages. Terms including, “positive signal,” “membership,” “hope,” “the agreement,” “Community” were mentioned in the titles of the articles. This dynamic continued in 2006, when the words EU, Euro integration, and European were mentioned 28 times on the front pages. In 2007, we can see a decline in the coverage of the topic of the EU to 20 times. 2007 was the year when the Orange coalition collapsed, and the public was disappointed with the performance of the Orange team government. Titles such as “Asian EU,” “The end of Eurofederalism,” “Eurochaos” were published by the newspaper.

In 2008, the frequency of mentions increased to 27 times, almost to the level for 2006. Titles such as “Our future in the EU depends on ourselves,” “Ukrainians want into the EU,” “In support of the EU plans” and “Perspectives of the visa dialogue with the EU” appeared in connection to the euro integration. The coverage declined in 2009 and 2010 when the frequency was 25 and 16 respectively. The lowest frequency was observed in 2010, the year when Viktor Yanukovich was elected. The words EU and euro integration were mentioned 16 times in 49 issues. The tone of coverage also changed. The words as “warning,” “scary,” “readmission,” “concern,” “rethink” used in the titles of the articles about EU in the newspaper. Interestingly the word Russia was mentioned twice in the titles of the articles about EU in 2010. In the three years leading to the Euromaidan, the frequency of using the phrases EU and euro integration increased to 23, 19 and 26. However, it never reached the level of 2006. The coverage was also more critical of the Ukrainian government than previously. Titles such as “Yanukovich closed

a window to Europe,” “Europe gave Ukraine D for the fight against corruption,” “EU asked Kyiv to stop selective justice” appeared.

Interestingly the name of former Prime-Minister Tymoshenko, who was imprisoned in 2011, appeared four times in the titles of the articles about the EU. In 2013, the newspaper coverage of the EU was intensive, especially in the months leading to the EU summit in Vilnius. Titles “The right choice – EU,” “By foot to the EU,” “Subway to Europe,” “European parliament recommends to sign,” “In Europe step by step-from visa-free to the association” were published in the newspaper. Articles informed the public about the importance of signing the association agreement, thus increasing pressure on the government to sign it.

Figure 6. 1.2.1 The coverage of the EU by Mirror Weekly, 2005-2013



Source: the figure was created by the author based on the analysis of the frequency of the articles on the front pages of the newspapers. The articles for 2013 did not include the month of December when Euromaidan already started.

Thus, we can conclude that the Ukrainian media not only raised awareness of the “Europeanization” in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution, but they informed Ukrainians about the choices of the Ukrainian government concerning the EU. Hence, favorable coverage of the EU and Ukraine’s potential to join the EU may have influenced citizens’ perceptions of “belonging” to the EU after the Orange revolution. The negative and more pessimistic tone about Ukraine’s prospects in the EU in the years leading to the Euromaidan, combined with criticism of the government’s ineffectiveness, could make citizens more willing to unite against the government in 2013.

6.1.3. Annual Presidential address to the Parliament and Eurointegration

To further assess the importance of Eurointegration for Ukrainians during the period studied, the annual speeches of two Presidents on a presence of topic of Europe, European Union, and Euro integration will be analyzed for word frequency.⁴⁷ The highest frequency for the root word ‘Europe’ was in 2006, one year after the Orange revolution. President Yushchenko in his first official address to the Parliament mentioned 54 times the words Europe, European, Eurointegration. In 2007, the year after the Orange coalition collapsed, Yushchenko did not address the Parliament, in contravention of his constitutional obligation.⁴⁸ In 2008 and 2009, the frequency of the topic of Eurointegration significantly decreased to 24 and 27. The contexts surrounding the reference to the EU and towards integration was less optimistic as well.

Figure 6.1.3.1 EU and euro integration in Presidential addresses, 2005-2013



Source: the author created the figure. The figure represents the frequency of the words “Europe”, “European Union”, “eurointegration” and “European” in each presidential address among the top 1000 frequent words (using NVivo).

In his first official address upon his election in 2010, President Yanukovych employed the words EU, Europe, European and Eurointegration 38 times. This increased to 51 uses in 2011. Significantly the references to the topic of the EU and Eurointegration, was not limited to President Yushchenko, reputed to be pro-Western. Yanukovych referred to Eurointegration, Europe and the EU, in higher numbers in his annual speeches than his

⁴⁷ The author used NVivo program to calculate frequency of the words Europe, EU, eurointegration and European in the texts of Presidential addresses.

⁴⁸ The Parliament implemented a Decree about Yushchenko not following the Constitution of Ukraine. See Postanova Verkhovnoyi Rady “Pro Shchorichne Poslannya Presydynta” 2007, No.27, art. 378. <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1011-16>, accessed February 20, 2018.

predecessor. The following comments that he made in 2010 were representative of his official view:


“The most important priority in our foreign policy was and is Euro integration. Not only for the course of our foreign policy but as a vector of our overall transformation. The most important question in our relationship with the EU is the signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU, including the creation of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area and the implementation of a visa free regime.”⁴⁹

In 2013, the year of the Euromaidan, the frequency of the use of the words Eurointegration, Europe and the EU in his annual address approached 2006 levels at 52 times. Thus, both Presidents in their official annual addresses concentrated on the importance of Eurointegration and collaboration with the EU.

6.1.4. Citizens confidence in the EU

Citizens’ perceptions of the EU and their degree of identification with the EU differed over time over time. The percentage of citizens who had “a great deal or quite a lot” of confidence in the EU increased after the Orange revolution in comparison to 1999 from 43.5% to 48.5%. In 2008 confidence in the EU decreased by 10% to 38.5%, the lowest since 1996.

Figure 6.1.4.1 Confidence in the European Union (%), 1996 - 2008



Source: the figure was created by the author based on the results of an online analysis of the WVS (1996, 2006) and EVS (2008) in Ukraine. The question was asked as followed: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? The [European Union].

The Western region had the highest level of confidence in the EU before and after the Orange revolution (Table 6.1.4.1). All other regions also in the majority expressed

⁴⁹ “Annual Address of President Yanukovich to the Parliament and people of Ukraine” *Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy* <http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0003100-10> from 03.06.2010, accessed January 17, 2018.

confidence in the EU, except the Eastern region in 2006 (37.1%). Citizens in the youngest age group had higher confidence in the EU in 1996, but not in 2006.

Table 6.1.4.1 Confidence in the EU (region, education and age), 1996- 2006

1996					
REGION	Western	Eastern	Central	Southern	
A great deal/quite a lot	70.1	55.2	66.9	65.5	
AGE	18-25	26-36	36-47	48-58	59-69
A great deal/quite a lot	80.3	71.4	79.5	72.9	71.4
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	University complete		
A great deal/quite a lot	60.4	74.3	75.5		
2006					
	Western	Eastern	Central	Southern	
A great deal/quite a lot	82.8	37.1	57.7	53.6	
AGE	Up to 29	30-49	50 and up		
A great deal/quite a lot	54	61.4	54.6		
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	University complete		
A great deal/quite a lot	12.2	52.9	68		

Source: created by the author based on data from WVS. The question was asked as followed: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? The [European Union]. The table represent category “a great deal” and ‘Quite a lot” combined.

In 2006, the highest confidence in the EU was found in the 30-49 years old, (the group that was 18-24 in 1996). In terms of education, Ukrainians with the highest level of education expressed the highest level of confidence in the EU.

Interesting results were observed in answers to the question about EU integration as a national ideal for Ukraine. 47.3% of respondents in the West supported the notion that the EU could be a national idea for Ukraine. Contemporaneously 42.5% of respondents in the East and 57.3% in the South were against it.

Table 6.1.4.2 EU integration as a national idea, by regions, 2008

	West	Center	South	East
Yes	47.3	35.3	23.5	28.4
No	22.5	40.7	57.3	42.5
Difficult to say	30.3	23.9	19.2	29.1

Source: The question was asked: do you think that EU integration can be a national idea that can unite all regions in Ukraine? http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=123, accessed March 16, 2017.

The next step is to assess whether the citizens’ level of confidence in the EU was associated with their political orientations and actions. Table 6.1.3 illustrates that Ukrainians who expressed a prominent level of confidence in the EU reported higher levels of interest in politics, higher levels of interpersonal trust and more importantly a

higher level of political participation. They also had a higher level of national pride in comparison to those who did not have confidence in the EU. Higher confidence in the EU is also correlated with a higher level of intolerance for accepting bribes. These differences in political orientations of Ukrainians only increased in 2006. The results of the Chi-square test of independence indicate that these differences are statistically significant. Thus, Ukrainians who had confidence in the EU showed attitudes associated with a more democratic political culture in comparison to those who did not have confidence. This may help to explain the November 2013 protests following Yanukovich's decision to postpone the signing of the association agreement with the EU. Those citizens already possessed intolerance towards injustice and corruption combined with a high level of distrust towards the political regime and its institutions. For that reason, they choose protest as a form of political action.

Furthermore, the correlation test for 1996 and 2006 showed that confidence in the EU in 1996 was positively correlated with the following: trust in people of another religion and race, signing a petition, attending peaceful demonstrations and intolerance for accepting a bribe. In 2006, confidence in the EU was positively correlated with membership in different forms of organizations (labour unions, art clubs, charitable and professional organizations) as well as with interpersonal trust and participation in political activities.⁵⁰ These findings suggest that association between the confidence in the EU and political orientations of Ukrainians after the Orange revolution became stronger.

⁵⁰ See appendix 3.

Table 6.1.4.3 Confidence in the EU/political orientations, values and actions, 1996-2006

DV/IV	EU (a great deal/a lot)	EU (not very much/not at all)	Chi-square test p-value	EU (a great deal/a lot)	EU (not very much/not at all)	Chi-square test p-value
	1996	1996		2006	2006	
Interest in politics (very interested and somewhat interested)	49.4	39.1	.000	58.5	46.2	.001
How proud of nationality? (very and quite proud)	67.7	60.3	.009	80.2	68.4	.000
Membership of labor unions	36.6	37	.647	24.2	20.3	.310
Membership of political party	2.4	2.4	.310	10.8	4.7	.003
Membership of professional organizations	3.1	3.1	.262	8.4	6.4	.032
Membership of church or religious organization	9.8	9.4	.186	20.9	14.6	.035
Most people can be trusted	34.4	28.9	.026	36	23.6	.000
Trust: your family	n/a	n/a		97.8	97.4	.742
Trust: people you know personally	n/a	n/a		86.3	81.4	.151
Trust: people you meet for the first time	n/a	n/a		23.9	16.1	.043
Trust: people of another religion	n/a	n/a		51	29.5	.000
Trust: people of another nationality	n/a	n/a		55.5	34	.000
Justified: claiming government benefits for each you are not entitled (category 1- never justified)	42	42.7	.738	43	35	.417
Justified: avoiding a fare on public transport	27.8	27.9	.114	31.9	29.5	.209
Justified: cheating on taxes	41.3	39.8	.036	38.2	33.3	.322
Justified: someone accepting a bribe	72.7	67.4	.000	55.2	48.5	.032
Justified: homosexuality	68.3	67	.087	51.6	51.8	.232
Justified: abortion	30.4	27	.443	28.4	31.3	.020
Justified: divorce	16.9	18.6	.265	18.5	19.9	.066
Political action recently done: signing a petition	17.6	15.1	.000	8	8.1	.975
Political action recently done: joining in boycotts	4.8	5.7	.124	3.3	3.3	.982
Political action recently done: attending peaceful demonstrations	22	19.3	.005	23.3	12.6	.000
Men make better political leaders than women?	62.8	60.3	.013	53	50.5	.370
Having a strong leader is better	54.7	56.5	.002	66.5	63.7	.245
Education (complete university)	23.4	22.9	.839	35.6	25.6	.037
Number of cases	955	548		361	396	

Source: the table was created by the author based on the data filed from WVS (1996, 2006). The cases were selected in two groups: 1 (great deal and/ a lot), groups 2 (not very much, not at all). For a level of trust, percentage represent those who answered, “trust completely” and “somewhat” combined. For questions on Justifiability, percentage represent those who answered category 1- never. (the questions were recorded from 1 to 10, where 1 – never justified and 10-always justified)

This increase in support for EU integration in Ukraine after the Orange revolution could also be explained by the coverage of EU by Ukrainian media and Presidents Yushchenko and Yanukovych accentuation of Eurointegration in their annual speeches as we saw earlier. However, as was said earlier, support for EU was regionally distributed and was not a majority nationwide. Consequently, next step is to assess the role and influence of Russia, to determine whether it affected the political orientations and actions of Ukrainians.

6.2. The Role of Russia

The color revolutions in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan between 2003 and 2005 focused attention on the influence of diverse international institutions as well as the role of civil society on political protests within post-communist countries. The color revolutions also raised the question of Russia’s susceptibility to comparable

movements.⁵¹ From Russia's perspective, the color revolutions were seen as evidence of a diminution of Russian influence in the territories of the former USSR.⁵² Thus after the Orange revolution, the policy of Russia towards Ukraine changed. President Putin supported then-Prime Minister Yanukovich during the 2004 presidential election, which Yanukovich lost.⁵³ He sent many political advisors to help Yanukovich and extended financial support during and before the 2004 presidential election.⁵⁴ Putin was the first head of state to send official congratulations to Yanukovich after the second round of the election, which was later recognized to be fraudulent and falsified by OSCE.⁵⁵ According to former Putin adviser Illarionov, the Russian President has never considered Ukraine to be an independent state.⁵⁶ The Orange revolution only confirmed Putin's desire to strengthen Russia's position in the countries of the former Soviet Union and to prevent the spread of the ideas which might precipitate a color revolution in Russia.⁵⁷ Gleb Pavlovskii, an advisor to the Presidential Administration in Russia remarked at that time, "there was an underestimation [by Russia] and low level of cooperation between Russian

⁵¹ Sinikukka Saari. "European democracy promotion in Russia before and after the 'color' revolutions", *Democratization*, Vol.16, No.4, 2009, pp. 732-755.

⁵² Hiski Haukkala, "From Cooperative to Contested Europe? The Conflict in Ukraine as a Culmination of a Long-Term Crisis in EU-Russia Relations." *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol.23, No.1, 2015, pp.25-40.

⁵³ William Schneider, "The Ukraine's Orange Revolution. A victory for Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine would confirm the West's increasing influence there" *The Atlantic*, December 2004. <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/12/ukraines-orange-revolution/305157/>, accessed July 05, 2016.

⁵⁴ From the interview with Putins' former advisor Andrey Illarionov. Sergiy Leshchenko, "Former Advisor of Putin Andrey Illarionov: Putin thinks that a part of Ukraine should belong to Russia" Serhiy Lechshenko, *Ukrayinska Pravda* October, 10, 2013. <http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2013/10/10/6999733/>, accessed July 07, 2016.

⁵⁵ "Putin Congratulates Yanukovich on Presidential "Victory" *Radio Free Europe*, November 22, 2004, <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1056008.html>, accessed July 07, 2016.

⁵⁶ Sergiy Leshchenko, "Former Advisor of Putin Andrey Illarionov: Putin thinks that a part of Ukraine should belong to Russia" *Ukrayinska Pravda*, October, 10, 2013. <http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2013/10/10/6999733/>, accessed July 07, 2016.

⁵⁷ Thomas Ambrosio, "Insulating Russia from a color revolution: how the Kremlin resists regional democratic trends. *Democratization*, Vol.14, No.2, 2007, pp. 232-252.

society and Ukrainian NGOs. We will try to avoid such an underestimation in the future.”⁵⁸

In July 2005, Putin announced plans to limit the activity of international NGOs in Russia to prevent “the financing of political activity from abroad.”⁵⁹ The gas crisis followed it during winter 2005-2006 when Russia announced that it was going to increase the price of gas transferred to Ukraine. After unsuccessful negotiations, in early January of 2006, gas exports to Ukraine were cut off.⁶⁰ Exports were restored only under pressure from Europe who was also receiving gas transiting through Ukraine. Furthermore, in June of 2006, to pressure Ukraine, Russia placed economic sanctions on Ukrainian products.⁶¹ The Russian approach to gas pricing with Ukraine changed only after the 2006 parliamentary election in Ukraine that brought back Viktor Yanukovich as Prime Minister.⁶² Russia signed a new gas agreement with Ukraine for the price of \$130 per 1000 cubic meters, which was much less than the market price.⁶³

Ukraine strengthened its ties with Russia in 2010 following the victory of Viktor Yanukovich in the Presidential election. Yanukovich’s first official visit as President was to Crimea in March of 2010.⁶⁴ In April of 2010, less than two months after his

⁵⁸ Andrew Wilson, “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, NGOs and the Role of the West” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 19, No 1, March 2006, p. 22.

⁵⁹ Thomas D’Ambrosio, “Insulating Russia from a Color Revolution: How the Kremlin Resists Regional Democratic Trends” *Democratization*, Vol.14, No.2, 2007, pp. 32-252, p. 238.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Tatiana Zhurzhenko, *Ukraine’s Border with Russia before and after the Orange Revolution*, 2007, p. 80.

⁶² Yanukovich’s Party, Party of Regions, got the highest percentage of votes nationwide and could appoint the Prime-Minister. The parties of the Orange Revolutions gained most the seats combined; however, they were not able to create a parliamentary coalition due to their disagreement. See Viktoriya Thomson. *Political opposition in Ukraine and its effectiveness*, 2008, MA Thesis, Carleton University: Ottawa.

⁶³ “Yanukovich swears that will not give away anything to Russia for the gas” *Ukrayinska Pravda November*, 13, 2006 <http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2006/11/13/3176281/>, accessed September, 22, 2016.

⁶⁴ Valentina Sumar, “Until when can calculate Dsharty?” *Mirror Weekly* 19 March 2010 http://gazeta.dt.ua/POLITICS/do_skilkoh_dorahue_dzharti.html, accessed September 29, 2016.

inauguration, Ukraine extended the lease for Russia's Black Sea Fleet for 25 more years.⁶⁵ In return, Russia promised to reduce the price of gas transit to Ukraine.⁶⁶ Later, in 2010, Putin initiated the creation of the Custom Union between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, which became the Eurasian Custom Union in 2012.⁶⁷ Ukraine was expected to become one of the main members of the Custom Union. President Yanukovich found himself in a situation where he had to choose between entering Russia's Custom Union or signing the association agreement with the EU which would be freeing Yuliya Tymoshenko.⁶⁸ The offer from President Putin to offer Ukraine \$15 billion in aid to help to pay its debt, led Yanukovich to postpone the Association Agreement with the EU in November.⁶⁹

6.2.1. The policy of Russkiy Mir and Russian Orthodox Church

Less than three years after the Orange revolution President Putin announced the initiative of *Russkiy Mir* in 2007. A foundation with that name was created by presidential decree,⁷⁰ although its role was like an NGO. The main founders of the organization were Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Education on behalf of the Russian

⁶⁵ Clifford J. Levy "Ukraine Woos Russia with Lease Deal" *The New York Times*, 22 April 2010 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/world/europe/22ukraine.html?_r=0, accessed July 05, 2016.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Neil MacFarlane & Anand Menon, "The EU and Ukraine." *Survival*, Vol.56, No.3, 2014, pp.95-101.

⁶⁸ Freeing Tymoshenko was one of the main conditions from the EU in order to sign a political part of the Association Agreement. "EU urges Ukraine to act on Tymoshenko to reach trade agreement." 18 November 2013 *Deutsche Welle* <http://www.dw.com/en/eu-urges-ukraine-to-act-on-tymoshenko-to-reach-trade-agreement/a-17237098>, accessed August 06, 2016.

⁶⁹ "Putin offers Ukraine \$15B in loans and cheap natural gas in bid to trump EU deal" December 17, 2013. *National Post* <http://nationalpost.com/news/putin-offers-ukraine-15b-in-loans-and-cheap-natural-gas-in-bid-to-trump-eu-deal/wcm/9029c3f4-373b-4a4f-a25e-d9982039e5c5>, accessed July 05, 2016.

⁷⁰ "Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 26. 06. 2007 N 796 "О Создании фонда Русский Мир" *The official website of the President of the Russian Federation* <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/256896>, accessed November 05, 2016.

government.⁷¹ The foundation's stated purpose was to "promote the Russian language, as Russia's national heritage and a significant aspect of Russian and world culture, and [to support] Russian language teaching programs abroad."⁷² A central component of the policy of the *Russkiy Mir* foundation was the promotion of the united Russian Orthodox identity, to increase influence in the *near Abroad (blizhneye zarubezhye)*⁷³ as well as the promotion of "Spiritual Security"⁷⁴ through the Russian Orthodox Church. And Ukraine, the country with a high proportion of Russian speakers, was one of the initiative's main targets. President Putin announced the year of 2007, the "Year of Russian Language" emphasizing that the Russian language is the language of the multimillion-member community outside Russia. And this community, according to Putin, forms the "Russian world."⁷⁵ The Russian Orthodox Church became the main agent for promoting *Russkiy Mir* in the neighboring countries. An important goal of Russian diplomacy during the post-Orange years was to halt the unification of the Ukrainian Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox

⁷¹ *Russkiy Mir Foundation* <http://ruskiymir.ru/fund/the-decree-of-the-president-of-the-russian-federation-on-creation-of-fund-russian-world.php#1>, accessed November 05, 2016.

⁷² Robert C. Blitt "Whither Secular Bear: The Russian Orthodox Church's Strengthening Influence on Russia's Domestic and Foreign Policy," *The Journal of International Religious Liberty Association*, 2011, pp. 89-125, p.110.

⁷³ Near abroad refers to the former Soviet Union republics. Marcel H. Van Herpen, *Putin's Propaganda Machine: Soft Power and Russian Foreign Policy* (London: Rowman& Little field, 2016), p. 148.

⁷⁴ Spiritual Security is a term that was used in the 2001 National Security Concept by Putin's Administration. It built on an idea of state protection of cultural and spiritual traditions of all Russian people. Spiritual Security was part of 2007 Act of Canonical Communion of the Moscow Patriarchate and Russian Orthodox Church as an effort to consolidate the Russian World (*Russkiy Mir*). See Daniel P. Payne "Spiritual Security, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Russian Foreign Ministry: Collaboration or Cooptation" *Journal of Church and State*, Vol.52, No.4, 2010, pp.712-727. Marcel H. Van Herpen, *Putin's Propaganda Machine: Soft Power and Russian Foreign Policy* (London: Rowman& Little field, 2016).

⁷⁵ Послание Президента Российской Федерации Владимира Владимировича Путина Федеральному собранию 26 April 2007. http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_99072/9fa2a21b9d67d1f497d57386a6db6c1f6b97f514/6, accessed September 27, 2016.

Church.⁷⁶ In this endeavor, the Russian government in partnership with the Russian Orthodox Church promoted the building of new churches abroad. Such churches were to fulfill the “spiritual needs of the Russian Diaspora.”⁷⁷ In Ukraine, the number of the Orthodox Churches of Moscow Patriarchate reached 12,500 in 2013, exceeding the 4,500 churches of the Kyiv Patriarchate.⁷⁸ The number of supporters of the Russian Orthodox Church also increased from 11.5% in 2005 to 19.6% in 2013 as in Figure 4.3 (Chapter 4) illustrated.

Furthermore, the Ukrainian Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations⁷⁹ established that religious institutions should have access to their former religious property, whether by direct ownership or free access for services.⁸⁰ As a result, many historical and religious monuments in Ukraine fell under the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.⁸¹ One of them was the Sacred Historical Site, Pecherska Lavra, which was founded in 1051, and located in a historical part of the capital Kyiv.

The influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine increased further in 2008 when the Russian Orthodox Church elected its new head - Patriarch Kirill, who had

⁷⁶ Viktor Yelensky “Ukrainian Orthodoxy and the Ukrainian Project” *Pro et Contra*, Vol. 17, Issue 3-4, May 2013 http://carnegieendowment.org/files/PeC_59_all.pdf, (in Russian), accessed May 16, 2016

⁷⁷ “Russkiy Mir dlya vneshnego i vnutrennyego potrebleniya” *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, June 26, 2007 http://www.ng.ru/politics/2007-06-27/1_russian.html, accessed May 17, 2016.

⁷⁸ Viktor Yelensky “Ukrainian Orthodoxy and the Ukrainian Project” *Pro et Contra*, Vol. 17, Issue 3-4, May 2013 http://carnegieendowment.org/files/PeC_59_all.pdf, (in Russian), accessed September 27, 2016, p. 32.

⁷⁹ The Law of Ukraine on the freedom of consciousness and religious organizations “No 987-XII, 23 April 1991 The Parliament of Ukraine <http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/987-12> accessed May 16, 2016.

⁸⁰ Mara Kozelsky, “Religion and the crisis in Ukraine” *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church*, Vol. 14, Issues 3, 2014, pp. 219-241.

⁸¹ The Russian Orthodox Church is connected to the Russian Government. See Robert C. Blitt “Whither Secular Bear: The Russian Orthodox Church’s Strengthening Influence on Russia’s Domestic and Foreign Policy”, *The Journal of International Religious Liberty Association*, 2011, pp. 89-125.

much closer collaboration with Russian government than his predecessor Patriarch Alexey.⁸² Patriarch Kirill officially rejected the idea of independence of the Ukrainian Church (Moscow Patriarch from Moscow) by stating that “Kiev is the southern capital of Russian Orthodoxy. Kiev is our Constantinople and Jerusalem. It is the heart of our life.”⁸³ His first visit to Ukraine was in the summer of 2009.⁸⁴ Patriarch Kirill visited mostly Eastern Russian speaking regions of the country.⁸⁵

The head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) Filaret described Kirill’s visit to Ukraine as an attempt to promote Russian government policy of the *Ruskiy Mir* (Russian World) that strives to enlist the church and its leadership as loyal defenders of the Kremlin’s policies abroad.⁸⁶ Patriarch Kirill later returned to Ukraine to bless newly elected President Yanukovich in 2010 during his inauguration for which he had personally flown from Russia.⁸⁷ Yanukovich, on his part, openly supported the Ukrainian Church of Moscow Patriarch during his presidency by attending its services during religious holidays. Furthermore, to promote the policy of *Ruskiy Mir*, Yanukovich signed the controversial Language Law with the support of his

⁸² Robert C. Blitt “Whither Secular Bear: The Russian Orthodox Church’s Strengthening Influence on Russia’s Domestic and Foreign Policy” *The Journal of International Religious Liberty Association*, 2011, pp. 89-125, p. 91.

⁸³ Viktor Yelensky “Ukrainian Orthodoxy and the Ukrainian Project,” *Pro et Contra*, Vol.17, Issue 3-4, May 2013 http://carnegieendowment.org/files/PeC_59_all.pdf, (in Russian), accessed September, 27, 2016, p. 35.

⁸⁴ Steven Eke, “Russian Patriarch visits Ukraine” July 27, 2009, *BBC news* <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8169849.stm>, accessed May 16, 2016.

⁸⁵ Lydia S. Tonoyan and Daniel P. Payne, “The Visit of Patriarch Kirill to Ukraine in 2009 and its Significance in Ukraine’s Political and Religious Life” *Religion, State and Society*, Vol 38, Issue 3, 2010.

⁸⁶ Marcel H. Van Herpen, *Putin’s Propaganda Machine: Soft Power and Russian Foreign Policy* (London: Rowman& Little field, 2016), p 150.

⁸⁷ Lydia S. Tonoyan and Daniel P. Payne, “The Visit of Patriarch Kirill to Ukraine in 2009 and its Significance in Ukraine’s Political and Religious Life” *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 38, Issue 3, 2010, p. 261.

parliamentary coalition.⁸⁸ The Law allowed the use of regional languages (mostly Russian) in schools in the regions and oblasts where the proportion of citizens who use the language of the minority is higher than 10% (Part I, Art. 7 of the Law). In Ukraine, the policy enabled Eastern and Southern regions, where the majority of Russian-speaking Ukrainians reside, to change their school curriculum from Ukrainian to Russian. The law also allowed regional TV companies and newspapers to choose which language to use for their broadcasting and publications (Art. 20 of the Law). Other minority communities and lawmakers and academics in Ukraine protested the Law as discriminatory towards other minority groups.⁸⁹ Moreover, the Law was not specific about the procedures and definitions of identifying the citizens who speak the minority languages. It also did not specify if the linguistic minorities were required to use the official language of the state, which is Ukrainian.⁹⁰ The Language Law was repealed in 2014 by the Parliament soon after Yanukovich was dismissed as the President. Local authorities in the Eastern and Southern regions opposed the repeal of the law. They sent the official letter to the Ukrainian Parliament with a request to return the Language Law, considering it to be discriminative towards Russian speaking minorities.⁹¹ Then acting President Turchynov did not sign a bill.⁹²

⁸⁸ “The law of Ukraine on the principles of state language policy” N5029 from 03.07. 2012 Verkhovna Rada Ukrayiny *The Parliament of Ukraine* <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5029-176>, accessed September 28, 2016.

⁸⁹ “Regions” want to implement Russian language in half of the oblasts” 24 August 2011 *Tyzhden* <http://tyzhden.ua/News/29577>, accessed October 04, 2016.

⁹⁰ Dominique Arel, “Double Talk: Why Ukrainians Fight over Language” *Foreign Affairs*, 19 March 2014. http://socialsciences.uottawa.ca/ukraine/sites/socialsciences.uottawa.ca.ukraine/files/19march-double_talk_why_ukrainian_fight_over_language.pdf, accessed October 04, 2016.

⁹¹ “Donetsk obratilsya k Verkhovnoy Rade” *Vecherniy Donetsk* 28 February 2014 <http://vecherka.donetsk.ua/index.php?id=4647&show=news&newsid=107146>, accessed May 12, 2017.

⁹² “Turchynov refused to sign the repealed Language Law that was implemented by RADA.” “Турчинов відмовився підписувати рішення ради про скасування закону про мову” *Korrespondent March*

6.2.2. Russian media in Ukraine

To further explore Russian influence or not in Ukraine during the studied years, the coverage of Ukraine by Russian media in Ukraine will be analyzed. Russian media, even prior to the Orange revolution, was actively involved in Ukrainian politics and had considerable information penetration in Ukraine.⁹³ Many Ukrainian media broadcasted in the Russian language, and Russians partly owned some of them.⁹⁴ Moreover, it was less expensive for Ukrainian networks to broadcast the Russian content than produce their own. “Ukrainian TV channels willingly purchase Russian programs and serials, first, because viewers like them, and second, because they are cheap.”⁹⁵ One example was the Ukrainian political TV program *Prote*, equivalent of the popular Russian program *Odnako*. The program negatively portrayed the opposition candidate Yushchenko during the 2004 presidential campaign and had one of the prime-time slots on Ukrainian TV.⁹⁶

After the Orange revolution, the Russia media in Ukraine were subject to less censorship than what they experienced in Russia. The Freedom House report of 2005 identified Russia as Not Free (5.5) according to the Freedom in the World rating.⁹⁷ The

03,2014. <https://ua.korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3314338-turchynov-vidmovyvsia-pidpysaty-rishennia-rady-pro-skasuvannia-zakonu-pro-movy>, accessed September 03, 2018.

⁹³ Anthon Shynkaruk, “Mass media coverage of the Ukrainian political crisis” in the *Politics and Complexities of Crisis Management in Ukraine. A Historical Prospective*, ed. By Gregory Simons, Mykola Kapitonenko, Viktor Lavrenyuk and Erik Vlaeminck (New York: Routledge, 2018), pp. 138-188, p.141.

⁹³Natalya Ryabinska, “The Media Market and Media Ownership in Post-Communist Ukraine” *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.58, No.6, pp. 3-20, p. 12.

⁹⁴Marta Dyczok, “Ukraine’s Media in the Context of Global Cultural Convergence” *Demokratizatsiya*, Vol.22, No. 2, 2014, pp.231-254. p. 242.

⁹⁵Natalya Ryabinska, “The Media Market and Media Ownership in Post-Communist Ukraine” *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.58, No.6, pp. 3-20, p. 12.

⁹⁶ Anthon Shynkaruk, “Mass media coverage of the Ukrainian political crisis” in the *Politics and Complexities of Crisis Management in Ukraine. A Historical Prospective*, Edited by Gregory Simons, Mykola Kapitonenko, Viktor Lavrenyuk and Erik Vlaeminck, (New York: Routledge, 2018), pp.138-188, p.142.

⁹⁷ The rating goes from 1 = the best to 7= the worst. “Freedom in the World report. Russia 2005” *Freedom House*. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/russia>, accessed September 22, 2016.

Press Freedom Score for Russia in 2005 was 68 out of 100, which meant Not Free.⁹⁸ By contrast, during the same period, Ukraine moved from Partly Free in 2005 to Free in 2006 in the Freedom in the World rating list.⁹⁹ The Press Freedom Score for Ukraine increased from 68 (not free) in 2004 to 53 (partly free) in 2006.¹⁰⁰ This enabled Russian media to gain influence.

Many well-known Russian journalists and TV anchors¹⁰¹ moved to Ukraine to evade strong government censorship on the majority of media in Russia.¹⁰² As Russian is the primary language of communications for many Ukrainians, programs featuring Russian expatriate broadcasters gained popularity among Ukraine viewers. However, not all Russian TV expatriates were opposing Russia. A notable example was the well-known journalist Dmitriy Kiselev who worked in Ukraine on the National Channel ICTV from 2000 to 2005. His employment with ICTV ended in December of 2005 after a letter of complaint regarding Kiselev's bias in covering the events written by a group of journalists to the station's owner.¹⁰³ In December 2013, Kiselev headed the newly formed government news service Russia Segodnya (Russia Today) that replaced the

⁹⁸ "Freedom of Press report. Russia 2005." *Freedom House* <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2005/russia>, accessed August 12, 2018.

⁹⁹ "Freedom in the World report. Ukraine 2006." *Freedom House* <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2006/ukraine>, accessed September 22, 2016.

¹⁰⁰ "Freedom of Press report. Ukraine 2006." *Freedom House* <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2006/ukraine>, accessed August 12, 2018.

¹⁰¹ Dmytriy Kiselev, Savik Shuster, Pavel Sheremet, Evgeniy Kyselev, all moved to Ukraine in the last 10-12 years.

¹⁰² According to "Freedom on the Net" country report for 2015, the majority of topics such as criticism of authorities, conflict, corruption, political opposition, social commentary, LGBTI issues were censored in Russia. See *Freedom House, Country Report*. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2015>, accessed April 12, 2016.

¹⁰³ "Dmitriy Kiselev: a story of turnskin" *Fakty, ICTV* <http://fakty.ictv.ua/ua/svit/20150226-1543675/6>, accessed on October 20, 2016.

independent and respected RIA Novosti agency after 72 years of operation.¹⁰⁴ Kiselev's knowledge of Ukraine and Ukrainian viewers¹⁰⁵ well suited him to cover political events in Ukraine from the Kremlin perspective.

Freedom of the press was significantly restricted in 2010 after the election of Viktor Yanukovich. The censorship was especially evident in the Eastern oblasts of Ukraine and Crimea. For example, in July 2012, the only Ukrainian language program "Dva Kol'ory" (Two colors) on the local Crimea channel *Crimea* was canceled after its journalist Alla Petrova planned to comment on the demonstration against the Language Law.¹⁰⁶ In Donetsk in June 2012, according to the report, the journalist Maxim Kasyanov was physically attacked while trying to film the car of the head of the Donetsk regional government, Andriy Shyshtskyy.¹⁰⁷ The country score on the Freedom of the World scale declined to Partly Free after 2010.¹⁰⁸

The control of the media under the Yanukovich regime was beneficial for pro-Russian media in Ukraine. In April of 2010 Verkhovna Rada reduced the quota for the Ukrainian language in broadcast media to 25 percent.¹⁰⁹ The Russian language appeared on the State TV channel UT1 for the first time since independence.¹¹⁰ Many prominent

¹⁰⁴ Russian's Chief Propagandist" *The Economist* December 10, 2013

<http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/12/Ukraine>, accessed September 30, 2016.

¹⁰⁵ During his time in Ukraine, he was trying to create a project "Ukrainian national identity." "Dmitriy Kiselev: a story of turnskin" *Fakty, ICTV* <http://fakty.ictv.ua/ua/svit/20150226-1543675/6>, accessed October 20, 2016.

¹⁰⁶ "Setbacks to media freedom in run-up to elections" *Reporters Without Borders* <https://rsf.org/en/news/setbacks-media-freedom-run-elections>, accessed October 21, 2016.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ Freedom in the World, Ukraine, 2011 *Freedom House* <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/ukraine>, accessed October 20, 2016.

¹⁰⁹ Marta Dyczok, "Ukraine's Media in the Context of Global Cultural Convergence" *Democratizatsiya*, Vol.22, No.2, 2014, pp. 231-254, p. 249.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

journalists such as Andriy Shevchenko expressed their concerns and opposition to this decision by the government.¹¹¹

While not all media corporations were pro-Russian, an increase in Russian language TV programs, as well as Russian programs, was noticeable after 2010. For example, in 2011, the streams of the three biggest Russian state-controlled TV channels, Pervyy Kanal, RTR Planeta, and NTV Mir, were viewed weekly by 32.8%, 24,9% and 19.8% of the Ukrainian population.¹¹² Considering that some regions, especially in the east, south and in Crimea preferred TV channels from Russia as their main source of information, it is reasonable to suggest that Russia was able to impact these citizens' perception about political development in Ukraine. Did Ukrainians trust Russian Media?

Table 6.2.2.1 Trust in Russian Media (%), 2009-2013

	Fully trust	Rather trust	Rather mistrust	Fully mistrust	Difficult to answer
Jul. 2009	8.7	35.5	23.3	15.3	17.1
Oct. 2009	7.1	38.3	21.9	17.2	15.6
Apr. 2011	7.7	42.2	26.5	10.2	13.5
Sep. 2012	7	36.7	25.2	14.3	16.9
Mar. 2013	7.4	38.3	27.7	13	13.7

Source: results of a public opinion survey in Ukraine by Razumkov center. The question was asked: "Do you trust Russian media?" http://razumkov.org.ua/eng/poll.php?poll_id=86, accessed November 21, 2016.

Table 6.2.2.1 shows that the percentage of respondents who answered that they "truly trust" was not stable, averaging around 7.7% between 2009 and 2013. The percentage of those who chose the option "rather trust" the Russian media increased after Yanukovich's election from 38.3% in October 2009 to 42.2% in April 2011. However, it decreased to 36.7% in 2012. This may reflect that some Ukrainians who belonged to

¹¹¹ Andriy Shevchenko, "Vidmova Pershogo vid perekladu rosiiskomovnich sinkhroniv-pomilka" Detector Media April 02, 2010 <https://detector.media/withoutsection/article/52100/2010-04-02-andrii-shevchenko-vidmova-pershogo-vid-perekladu-rosiiskomovnikh-sinkhroniv-pomilka/>, accessed December 26, 2018.

¹¹² Joanna Szostek, "Russian and News Media in Ukraine: A case of "Soft Power?" *East European Politics and Society*, Vol.28, No.3, 2014, pp. 463-486, p.468.

“fully trust” category, no longer did. The percentage of those who “rather mistrust” increased from 23.2% in July 2009 to 27.7% in March of 2013.

To further test Russia’s soft power in Ukraine through its media, I will analyze one of the most popular Russian language newspapers, *Argumenty i Fakty*, and its coverage of Ukraine during a period of study.¹¹³

6.2.2.1. Argumenty i Fakty, 2005-2013

The difference in the tone and coverage of Ukraine by the Russian media can be illustrated through an analysis of the front pages of the most popular Russian language weekly newspaper *Argumenty i Fakty*¹¹⁴ in 2005, 2010 and 2013 (Appendix 2).

Ukraine was mentioned more frequently in 2005, the year after the Orange revolution than in 2010 and 2013. In 52 issues in 2005, Ukraine was mentioned on the front pages in 22 issues in comparison to 12 issues in 2010. The tone of coverage in 2005 was more critical and racist than in 2010. Phrases such as “Elephants in Orange”, “Black Panther will help Orange (in reference to Condoleezza Rice, then the Secretary of State), “Revolution on the March” were used in the titles of the articles. Two articles mentioned the names of oligarch Boris Berezovsky (N5, N9) and political leader Boris Nemtsov (N7) in connection to Ukraine. Both were known as critics of the Russian

¹¹³ The newspaper has the highest circulations of the weekly newspapers in Russia as of 2008 (3 mln). The circulation in Ukraine as of 2006 was between 600 000- 1 mln. See *Publicitas* <http://www.publicitas.com/germany/media-solutions/factsheet/mediadata/argumenty-i-fakty-russiamoscow-ed/?PARAM1=ANQAM2>, accessed October 19, 2016. See: Juliane Besters- Dilger, *Language Policy and Language Situation in Ukraine: Analysis and Recommendations* (Frankfurt: PeterLang, 2009), p. 253.

¹¹⁴ This newspaper was chosen over Ukrainian franchise *Argumenty and Fakty v Ukraine*, because Russian version is written exclusively by Russian journalists, whereas Ukrainian by Russian and Ukrainian journalists.

Government and its policies in Ukraine.¹¹⁵ Both of them are now dead; Berezovsky by suicide, Nemtsov by assassination.¹¹⁶

In 2010, Ukraine was mentioned less often. The topic of gas was mentioned more often in connection to Ukraine than others. A review of the topics in *Argumenty i Fakty* in 2010, suggests that Russia was preoccupied with the upcoming parliamentary election in 2011 and a mayoral election in Moscow in 2010. Furthermore, the election of Yanukovich in January 2010 was considered better aligned with Russian state interests than the earlier government. For that reason, the coverage of Ukraine was less frequent and negative than in 2005. In 2013, the year of Euromaidan, the coverage of Ukraine by *Argumenty i Fakty* did not increase; however, the discussion was more focused on the future of Russia-Ukraine in case of signing the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. Titles such as “What is Yanukovich thinking?” “What did Yanukovich think?” appeared in June and November of 2013. The articles also raised the questions of the necessity of introducing the border between Russia and Ukraine were Ukraine to join the EU (N42 issue). In December, after the beginning of Euromaidan, the tone of the articles was sarcastic such as “Innovalenky?”¹¹⁷ “To foreign monastery?” and “What is the buzz about in Kiev?” Interestingly, the word “foreign’ appeared twice in the titles of articles

¹¹⁵ “Nemtsov report Says More Than 200 Russian Soldiers Killed in Ukraine War” May 12, 2015, *Radio Free Europe* <http://www.rferl.org/a/russia-nemtsov-report-ukraine-war/27011532.html>, accessed October 20, 2016. Mohiuddin, Yasmeen. “Boris Berezovsky: Russia's First Billionaire and Political Maverick Still Has It in for Vladimir Putin.” *International Journal*, Vol. 62, No. 3, 2007, pp. 681–688.

¹¹⁶ Boris Nemtsov, the critic of the politics of Putin was shot in 2015 in Moscow. Boris Berezovsky who lived in exile in London, was found dead in his home in March of 2013. See “Russian politician Boris Nemtsov shot dead” February 28, 2015. *BBC* <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31669061>, accessed October 20, 2016. Eric Spitznagel, “The Russian oligarch was found hanged in his home on March 23, Was it foul play?” April 04, 2013 *Bloomberg* <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-04-04/the-mysterious-death-of-russian-oligarch-boris-berezovsky>, accessed October 20, 2016

¹¹⁷ Innovalenky is a combination of two words – innostranniy (foreign) and valenky (Galoshes). The word is refereeing to the foreign influence in Ukraine during the Euromaidan.

about Ukraine in December of 2013. Thus, for those Ukrainians that read *Argumenty i Fakty* during the studied years, cooperation with Russia was portrayed as the better option than collaboration with the European Union.


6.2.3. Public opinions and Russia

The citizens' perceptions of Russia changed during the studied years (Figure 6.2.3.1).

When asked, whether they believe there has been an improvement, decline, or no change in relations with Russia over the past year, most the citizens answered “declined” in 2005 and 2013. The higher percentage of respondents who viewed that relations with Russia declined was in 2008, 74.1%. Furthermore, when respondents were asked the question in 2008 “Do you think that Russian’s actions in Georgia indicate that Russia will be more or less aggressive in its relations with Ukraine in the future?”, majority of respondents answered, “much more aggressive” and “slightly more aggressive.”¹¹⁸

However, in 2010, after the election of Viktor Yanukovich, 65.4% of respondents thought relations with Russia had improved. Thus, the leadership changed impacted Ukrainian citizens' perceptions about Russia- Ukraine relations. However, between 2011 and 2013, the percentage of respondents who perceived an improvement in the relations with Russia decreased. Notably, during Yanukovich's Presidency, in 2013, 59.5% of respondents reported a decline in relations with Russia.

Figure 6.2.3.1 Relations with Russia (%), 2005-2013



Source: the figure was created by author based on data files from IFES. The question was asked as to follow: Please

¹¹⁸ See Appendix 1 for crosstabs.

tell me whether you believe there has been an improvement, decline or no change in each of these issues over the past year? Relations with Russia.

Observing the distribution of responses across regions, educational and age groups illustrates that in 2005-2006 the majority of Ukrainians across all regions posited that there was a decline in relations with Russia (Appendix 1). Only in the Western region and capital Kyiv did less than half of the respondents report a decline in relations. Citizens' opinions radically changed in 2010, after the election of Viktor Yanukovich. All regions in higher numbers reported an improvement in relations with Russia. The same dynamic was observed among age and educational groups in 2010. In 2013, the majority of respondents perceived a decline in relations with Russia. Even in the Eastern and Southern Russian speaking regions, the majority of respondents reported a decline in relations with Russia. Notwithstanding Viktor Yanukovich's Presidency, in 2013 most Ukrainians reported that relations with Russia had declined. Furthermore, when asked if they satisfied or not with President Yanukovich policy towards Russia in 2013, majority of respondents across all regions, all educational and age groups answered, "somewhat dissatisfied" and very dissatisfied" (Appendix 1).

Interesting results were seen in citizens' views of Ukraine's closer relations with Russia or Europe in 2013. The 2013 responses show that citizens' preferences concerning relations with Russia and the EU were influenced by respondents' education, region and age (Table 6.2.3.1). Younger people and those with higher education had stronger preferences for cooperation with Europe. Citizens in the Western region and Kyiv also in majority preferred close relations with the EU (67.7% and 57.1%). A plurality of older citizens and those in the regions bordering with Russia expressed their support for a closer relationship with Russia.

Table 6.2.3.1 Relation with Russia or Europe, 2013

REGIONS	Western	Central	Southern	Eastern	Kyiv	Crimea	TOTAL
Russia	5.7	24.5	47.1	49.4	11.9	73.9	37.3
Europe	67.7	36.7	22.1	15.3	57.1	10.1	39.1
Good relationship with both	13.6	17.4	15.9	20.3	21.4	21.3	23.6
AGE	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+			
Russia	24.3	32.8	33.4	41.8			
Europe	47.3	38.8	32.3	23.9			
Good relationship with both	13.9	18.7	16.9	17.1			
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor and higher				
Russia	50	33.2	16				
Europe	11.3	34.7	42.5				
Good relationship with both	30.5	16	17.6				

Source: the table was created by author based on data files from IFES. The question was asked as follows: Do you think Ukraine would be better off if it had closer economic relations with Europe or Russia? 1- Russia, 2- Ukraine, 3- Neither, 4- Good relations with both, 5 – Do not know, 6- No response. The table represents only a valid percentage.

Only in Crimea, a majority of respondents, 73.9%, supported closer cooperation with Russia. This illustrates once again that the younger generation, specifically the ones that were born in Independent Ukraine have a greater preference for a closer relationship with Europe. For that reason, the decision by President Yanukovich to postpone the signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and Europe was a crucial moment in Ukrainian history for the younger generation of Ukrainians.

The regional divisions are clear when queried in 2011 about granting the Russian language official status for court proceedings. In the Western region, 72.1% of respondents disapproved granting the Russian language official status for court proceedings. The majority in all other regions supported granting the Russian language status for this purpose. Respondents with the highest level of education supported in the majority, but less than two other groups. Urban respondents approved granting the Russian language official status in higher numbers than rural respondents (76.9% and 57.6%). Thus, the research shows that that language, particularly antagonism against the role of the Russian language, was not an issue for the majority of Ukrainians in the years leading to Euromaidan. Citizens' opinions of the European Union and Eurasian Customs Union with Russia and Belarus in September 2013 differed as well.

Table 6.2.3.2 Russian language official status for court proceedings, 2011

REGION	Western	Central	South	Eastern	Kyiv	Crimea	Total
Approve	26.9	59.9	92.6	98.7	62.5	84.1	70.2
Disapprove	72.1	40.1	7.4	1.3	37.5	15.9	29.8
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor or higher				
Approve	70.1	72.6	68				
Disapprove	29.9	27.4	32				
AGE	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+			
Approve	67.2	71.8	76.6	69			
Disapprove	32.8	28.3	23.4	31			
RESIDENCE	Rural	Urban					
Approve	57.6	76.9					
Disapprove	42.4	23.1					

Source: created by the author based on data files from IFES (2011).

In September of 2013 41% of respondents nationwide favored joining the EU.¹¹⁹ 35% of respondents favored joining the Eurasian Customs Union with Russia and Belarus. More importantly, 76 % of the respondents nationwide agreed that there should be a national referendum on membership in both Unions.¹²⁰ This suggests that many citizens wanted to participate in the policy-making decisions of the government prior to Euromaidan, which President Yanukovich did not allow them. This angered many citizens, although not all.¹²¹

Conclusion

The EU desire to cooperate with Russia and to prevents Russian’s increasing influence in a post-communist region can explain the EU actions in Ukraine after the Orange revolution. The changes in foreign policy of Russia after the color revolutions towards Georgia and Ukraine resulted in the EU making decisions that would halt the expansion of Russia’s power. At the same time, the EU refrained from the use of active

¹¹⁹ “Which path should use Ukraine – which union to join?” *Kyiv International Institute of Sociology* <http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=196&page=22>, accessed May 26, 2016.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ The results of the public opinion survey in Ukraine In February of 2014 showed 67.9% of respondents in Eastern region of Ukraine on the question of “Who is responsible for the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine?” chose the “opposition.” 80.3% of respondents of the Western regions and 58.1% of the Central region chose” The government of Viktor Yanukovich.” Source: “Attitudes of Ukrainians and Russians towards protests in Ukraine” February 2014. *Kyiv International Institute of Sociology*. <http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=231&page=1&y=2014&m=2>, accessed November 22, 2016.

leverage towards Ukraine, which would have required concrete programs and policies for the future implementation.

Instead, the EU promoted passive leverage in Ukraine. The European Union of 2004 was preoccupied with ten new states that joined the EU, and for that reason, Ukraine was not a priority for the EU. Later, between 2005 and 2007 the EU tried to strengthen relations with Ukraine; but political instability within Ukraine and conflict between the leaders of the Orange team prevented future collaboration between EU and Ukraine. The period of 2008- 2010 was more optimistic but short-lived. With the election of Viktor Yanukovych as the President of Ukraine in 2010, Ukraine's international policy turned toward close collaboration with Russia while trying to maintain cooperation with the EU.

The idealistic image of the EU and its prosperity was promoted equally by Yushchenko and Yanukovych and by the Ukrainian media as well. Both Presidents used the idea of Ukraine's future within the EU for political and electoral purposes. It was built on the ideas of European values and beliefs with the enticing practical possibility of visa-free travel to countries of the Schengen zone for Ukrainians. Younger citizens who possessed higher levels of education were more supportive of closer relations with the EU than older citizens with less education. A comparison of political orientations of Ukrainians based on their level of confidence in the EU showed that there was a correlation between confidence in the EU and more democratic political orientations. Those respondents who showed higher confidence in the EU had a higher level of interest in politics, higher membership in the socio-political groups, higher political participation, and tolerance, which is indicative of democratic political culture.

In comparison to the EU, Russia was more proactive in influencing public opinions in Ukraine by soft power. Subsequent to the Orange revolution Russia changed its policy towards Ukraine to prevent similar events in Russia and to increase its control and influence over the post-Soviet republics. This was promoted through the policy of *Russkiy Mir* in Ukraine as a part of the Kremlin's strategic project "Russians abroad" and promote the values of traditional Russian society in the countries of the former Soviet Union. In Ukraine, this was achieved by the Russian Orthodox Church as the main instrument of the policy of *Russkiy Mir* and through the pro-Russian media in Ukraine, especially in the Russian speaking regions. At the same time, the majority of Ukrainians across all regions admitted of decline in relations with Russia in the years leading to Euromaidan. They also expressed their dissatisfaction with Yanukovych policy towards Russia in much higher number than with his policy in addressing the status of Ukraine and the EU.

When asked about their preferences for collaboration with Russia or the EU, younger and more educated and those from the Western region and Kyiv, in the majority, expressed their preferences for closer cooperation with the EU. In comparison, Ukrainians of the Southern and Eastern regions expressed preferences for cooperation with Russia, although not in the majority, except for Crimea. Results of 2011 showed that respondents of all regions, but West supported granting the Russian language official status for court proceedings. Among all age and education groups, respondents in majority expressed their approval.

CONCLUSION

The classical approaches on political culture argue that in democratic societies citizens should possess three important characteristics: allegiant orientations towards political institutions, trustful orientations towards other members of societies, high political efficacy and participation.¹ Others claimed that in modern democratic societies, citizens are less allegiant towards political institutions, while simultaneously being more assertive, efficient and active.² Furthermore, in today's democracies assertive and critical citizens, according to these approaches, prefer and apply non-traditional forms of political actions to have an impact on the government.³ The circumstances in Ukraine demonstrated that existing classifications and approaches to political culture should be reconsidered when applied to post-communist countries. As the author discovered citizens could take political actions such as protests despite low political loyalty, moderate political competence and low political efficacy.

This thesis studied the political culture of Ukraine between the Orange revolution in 2004 and Euromaidan in 2013-2014. The main goal was to understand specifics of Ukrainian society, that could provide further explanations and propositions for citizens high political activities and mobilization during Euromaidan. The thesis tried to answer two research questions:

¹ Walter A. Rosenbaum, *Political Culture* (London: Praeger Publishers Inc., 1975) p. 44. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963).

Thomas Denk, Henrik Serup Christensen, "How to classify political culture? A comparison of three methods of classification" *Quality and Quantity*, Vol. 50, 2016, pp. 177-191.

² Pippa Norris, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), Russell Dalton and Christian Welzel *The Civic Culture Transformed. From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014),

³ Rierre Rosanvallon, *Counter-Democracy. Politics in an age of Distrust* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

a) Did the political culture of Ukrainian citizens across different regions, and socio-demographic groups change between 2004 and 2014, and if so, how? and

b) could these possible changes in political culture have contributed to the political behaviour of Ukrainians during the Euromaidan in 2013-2014, and if so, how?

The main purpose of this study was not to show causal relations between the Orange revolution and Euromaidan or test hypothesis about political culture and political protests. Rather, the author studied Ukrainian political culture during a specific period-between two important historical events to explain its particulars and further research on the political culture of post-communist countries. The uniqueness of this research is a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the political culture of Ukraine, its regions, as well as socio-demographic groups between two important historical events which were not conducted before.

The research showed that Ukrainians had a low level of confidence in the central political institutions during the period of study with some regional differences.

Yushchenko had a higher level of support in the Western and Central regions during the first years of presidency. Yanukovich had higher levels of support in the Southern and Eastern regions. These regional political loyalties to particular political leader indicated a presence of fragmented political culture where “one finds some social groups with strong regime loyalties while others are largely parochialistic.”⁴ Unfortunately, these types of political loyalties are the ones that can lead to future civil wars, coups and demonstrations.⁵

⁴ Walter A. Rosenbaum, *Political Culture* (London: Praeger Publishers Inc.,1975) p. 44.

⁵ Ibid.

Despite the changes in the government after the Orange revolution most Ukrainians did not consider Ukraine to be a democracy during the period of research; the predominant reason was the perceived elevated level of corruption within political institutions and the exclusiveness of political elite to outsiders. An analysis of the political parties elected to the Ukrainian parliament confirmed that the same leaders helmed the changing political parties and blocks. Moreover, a review of the presidential decrees by President Yushchenko and President Yanukovich in the first year of their Presidency showed that many political appointments in Ukraine were based on the appointees' proximity to the President rather than their professional merits.

At the same time, Norris and others argued that confidence in political institutions is not the best indicator of modern democratic society.⁶ Citizens' negative evaluation of the main political institutions may have a positive effect on democracy if citizens have strong preferences for democratic principles and values, have high political efficacy and activity.⁷ In this case, citizens' evaluation of the main political institutions reflect these institutions' undemocratic nature rather than the undemocratic character of citizens' political values, beliefs and orientations. If citizens have strong support for the rule of law within the country as well as for protections of various freedoms and rights, then their negative evaluations of institutions indicate that they did not meet citizens expectations of

⁶ Pippa Norris, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), Russell Dalton and Christian Welzel *The Civic Culture Transformed. From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), Thomas Denz, Henril Serup Christensen and Daniel Bergh, "The Composition of Political Culture. A study of 25 European Democracies" *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 50, 2015, pp. 358-377.

⁷ Pippa Norris, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.3.

them. This *democratic deficit* indicates the gap between aspiration and satisfaction with existed institutions and regime.⁸

In Ukraine, the author observed, despite low confidence in the main political institutions, Ukrainians expressed high interest in politics during a period of study which was a continuation of the previous years. The Western region had the highest interest in politics. The Southern region had the lowest interest in politics, as well as those who belonged to the youngest age group (18-29). Higher levels of education were correlated with the highest levels of interest in politics across all years. Ukrainians increased their political competence about political developments within the country, particularly between 2008 and 2013. This was different than in the years leading up to the Orange revolution when less than 20% of respondents reported having sufficient knowledge about political developments within the country. Residents of Crimea and the West expressed higher levels of political awareness than other regions. Highly educated Ukrainians claimed higher levels of political awareness across all years surveyed.

When asked about the meaning of democracy, the most frequent answer during the studied period was “protection of human rights” and “fair and consistent enforcement of laws.” Ukrainians’ strong emphasis on the protection of human rights and the rule of law approached the levels that are present among citizens from countries that are established democracies.⁹ Nonetheless, the second most frequent answer for the meaning of democracy was “having a job.” This is indicative that Ukrainians retained their preferences for materialist values while at the same time placing importance on post-

⁸ Pippa Norris, *Democratic Deficit, Critical Citizens Revisited* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 10.

⁹ Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernizations. Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p.325.

materialist values of equal rights. This pattern could be explained by Ukraine's unstable economy and absence of economic prosperity, which was not a focus of this thesis, but could have impacted citizens' political orientations and actions.

Regarding citizens perception towards the rules of the games or unwritten rules that citizens believe are important to follow, the following conclusions can be made. Overall citizens intolerance was much lower than in the countries that are developed matured democracies.¹⁰ Ukrainians intolerance towards unjustifiable actions such as claiming government benefits for which you are not entitled, not paying transport fare, cheating on taxes and accepting bribes was not stable. Citizens temporally increased their intolerance towards all four actions between 2000 and 2006; however, it decreased in 2011. The research confirmed that Ukrainians still lacking support for widely accepted norms of behaviour and reciprocity, which are important components for building social capital.¹¹

Contemporaneously, the data showed modest increases in stated tolerance of gender equality and homosexuality. These attitudes are associated with a population that is more accepting, which are indicative of democratic changes.¹² Younger, more educated and those from the Eastern region were more tolerant of homosexuality than others. Importantly, the level of women's representation in *Verkhovna Rada* more than doubled between 2006 and 2014, suggesting that Ukrainians became more acceptive of gender equality which is indicative of democratic changes.

¹⁰ To compare, in Netherlands (2012), intolerance towards avoiding a transport fare was 62.6%. See *World Values Survey* <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp>, accessed January 09, 2019.

¹¹ Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.171.

¹² Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel "Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross level Linkages" *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No.1, 2003, pp. 61-79, p.69.

Despite low intolerance towards the unjustifiable actions on the national level, the majority of the Euromaidan participants interviewed stated the importance of changing the “Rules of the game” in the country. They expressed their readiness to take a leading role in keeping the government accountable and awareness of their responsibilities in the political process. Those Ukrainians, although in the minority, became active and assertive citizens, who “combine a deep normative commitment to democratic ideals with the dissatisfaction of how governments fulfil these ideals.”¹³

Citizens’ participation in political and social organizations, which is fundamental for developing social trust among regular citizens, was low. The exception being membership in trade unions and political parties. Hence, an increase in the percentage of Ukrainians who professed a belief in God over the studied period indicated that Ukrainians still have parochial orientations and identifications, which are more typical for traditional underdeveloped societies.¹⁴ Simultaneously, Ukrainians across all regions showed increased support for the importance of NGOs within the country. This suggests that although Ukrainians are not yet actively engaged in horizontal social networks, they possess orientations and values about their importance. They became “democratic aspirants” who accept the norms of the participant political culture, but they do not practice it.¹⁵

¹³ Russell Dalton and Christian Welzel *The Civic Culture Transformed. From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p.287.

¹⁴ Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, *Political culture and Political Development* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 22.

¹⁵ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 25.

Low political participation in socio-political organizations was combined with low political efficacy. According to Putnam, citizens engagement in horizontal networks with other members of society will lead to higher interpersonal trust and higher political efficacy – two essential components of democratic political culture.¹⁶ Ukrainians in its majority did not believe that they can have an impact on the decisions made by the government. However, they supported the need to collaborate to achieve the common goal. This indicates that they were willing to join other citizens in common activities, despite their individual low political efficacy. The results of the statistical test demonstrated that participation in the Orange revolution was positively correlated with political efficacy. Those who admitted taking part in the Orange revolution expressed stronger beliefs in their ability to influence the decision-making process.

The presence of interpersonal trust, which is a strong indicator of citizens' willing to cooperate with others in the political process, increased.¹⁷ Ukrainians' levels of trust in their neighbours, people that they know personally, people of different religions and nationalities increased significantly.

An increase in the level of interpersonal trust was combined with increased involvement in alternative political activities. Ukrainians increased their participation in such activities as signing a petition, contacting an official, and using social media to express their political view. The highest increase was observed in contacting or visiting public officials, followed by signing a petition, particularly among the 30-44-year-old's

¹⁶ Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone. The collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), pp.134-148.

¹⁷ Cynthia M. Horne, *Building Trust and Democracy: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Countries* (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2017), p.29. Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp.163-185. Ronald Inglehart, "Trust, Well-being and democracy" in *Democracy and Trust*, ed. By Marl. E. Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 89.

(the most active group in Euromaidan). Students and those who were employed were the most active in using social media to express their political views. Citizens' participation in political protests decreased between 2005 and 2011, but not in 2013, when it increased by 2% in comparison to 2011. This could indicate that citizens were engaged in new forms of horizontal networks, which differed from the traditional form of associations; nevertheless could impact their political competence and participation.¹⁸

However, as the author discovered, they engaged in these alternative political activities while having little confidence in traditional forms of political activities such as elections. Ukrainians participated in the election in high numbers, but they did not believe in the voting as the instrument of influence. Their perception of the fairness of the election was low as well. These findings were surprising because, in the majority of the advanced democracies, the opposite process takes place - citizens believe in the importance of elections, but voting has been declining.¹⁹ It is possible that Ukrainians engage in non-traditional types of political activities because they do not have confidence in traditional forms of political participation such as elections, which is common to other post-communist countries.²⁰

Although citizens increased their self reported political competence, an examination of data on citizens' sources of information revealed that the majority of them still relied on traditional sources such as TV (state and private) and local media. What

¹⁸Recent studies showed the impact of Facebook Connections on political participation. See Michael Chan, "Social Sites and Political Engagement: Exploring the Impact of Facebook Connections and Uses on Political Protest and Participation" *Mass Communication and Society*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2016, pp. 430-451.

¹⁹ Russell J. Dalton, *Citizen Politics. Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Washington: CQ Press, 2006).

²⁰ Russell J. Dalton and Hans dieter Klingemann, "Citizens and Political Behavior" *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, August 2007, pp.1-29.

was specific for Ukraine, that many media corporations were owned by oligarchs who had political connections and therefore used media for political purposes.²¹

Nevertheless, reliance on the Internet as the main source of information increased significantly in Ukraine, particularly among those who were young, urban and educated. As was stated by Pippa Norris, the Internet makes access to political information very easy and affordable for many citizens that in turn lead to higher political awareness and competence.²² Ukraine experienced limited censorship in the first years after the Orange revolution. These two factors combined permitted Ukrainians freely express their opinions, without a fear of them or their views being disclosed to the regime or being punished. Internet and social media also allowed Ukrainians to express their opinion instantly, because “like and dislike is immediately apparent.”²³

Furthermore, the use of the Internet as the primary source of information was positively correlated with the conduct of different forms of political activities such as contacting officials, signing a petition, participating in peaceful political protests. Based on this we may posit that Ukrainians who used the Internet as the main source of information, could have been more informed and active during the Euromaidan.²⁴ These

²¹ Natalya Ryabinska, “The Media Market and Media Ownership in Post- Communist Ukraine” *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 58, No. 6, 2011, pp. 3-20.

²² Pippa Norris, *Democratic Deficit, Critical Citizens Revisited* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 10.

²³ Doris Graber, Denis McQuail, Pippa Norris, *The Politics of News. The News of Politics* (Washington: CQ Press, 1998), p. 245.

²⁴ These findings are supported by Olga Onuch who interviewed Euromaidan participants. See Olga Onuch “Facebook Helped Me Do it”: Understanding the Euromaidan Protester “Tool-Kit” *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Vol. 15, No.1, 2015, pp.170-184.

findings are similar to those observed in established democracies, where the usage of the Internet and social media correlates with higher political competence and participation.²⁵

An analysis of the EU and Russia' soft power in Ukraine showed interesting results. The Policy of *Russkiy Mir*, which was introduced by the Russian government in 2007 to protect Russia's interests in the Russian diaspora, was implemented in Ukraine through the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian media. This was noticeably evident in the Russian-speaking regions of Southern and Eastern Ukraine, where the majority of citizens expressed a high level of trust in the Russian media in Ukraine. Citizens affiliation with Russian Orthodox Church increased there as well.

The EU was less active in Ukraine during the studied period than Russia. Instead both Presidents, Yushchenko and Yanukovych as well as Ukrainian media, actively promoted collaboration with the EU, despite an absence of official progress in the relations between the EU and Ukraine. Nevertheless, a high level of confidence in the EU correlated with a higher level of interest in politics, higher levels of interpersonal trust, higher levels of tolerance and higher membership in socio-political organizations. It was also correlated with a higher level of political participation in activities such as attending peaceful demonstrations and joining boycotts. Thus, for this group of citizens, President Yanukovych's decision to postpone the signing of the association agreement was an important event contributing to the Euromaidan.

One of the possible explanations in changes in Ukraine's political culture could be generational or cohort changes. What does it mean? Ukrainians who were the most active

²⁵ Kate Kenski and Natalie Jomini Stroud, "Connections Between Internet Use and Political Efficacy, Knowledge and Participation" *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, Vol.50, No.2, 2006, pp.173-192, p.175.

during Euromaidan were those who belonged to the age group of 32-36 in 2013-2014 and younger (19-24).²⁶ They were born between 1980 and 1984, transitional years of perestroika, or after 1991. It also indicates that their formative years took place in Independent Ukraine after 1991. As the results of public opinion surveys demonstrated, the youngest and middle age groups expressed the highest identification with “Ukrainian” nationality, despite their region of residence and spoken language at home. The usage of the Internet as the main source of information was also the highest among the youngest and middle age group. The youngest groups also expressed higher tolerance towards homosexuality and gender equality.

All these combined may suggest that changes in the political culture of Ukraine have generational character. Citizens who were born after 1980 developed their values, orientations in Independent Ukraine - they attended Ukrainian language schools, they sang Ukrainian anthem, and they witnessed different forms of socialization. Most importantly they did not “live through communism”²⁷ as previous generations. These findings are similar to recent research on generational changes in citizen’s attitudes and behaviour in post-communist countries where socialization in the post-totalitarian phases of communism was associated with higher civic participation.²⁸

However, the author discovered, that younger citizens expressed the lowest intolerance towards such actions as accepting bribes, not paying public transport fare, cheating on taxes and claiming government benefits for which one is not entitled. They

²⁶ Olga Onuch, “Who were the protesters?” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 25, No. 3, July 2014, pp.44-51.

²⁷ Pop-Eleches, Grigore and Joshua Tucker, “Associated with the Past? Communist Legacies and Civic Participation in Post-Communist Countries” *East European Politics & Societies*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2013, pp. 45-68, p. 64.

²⁸ Ibid.

had these orientations, despite being a new generation of Ukrainians who grew up in Independent Ukraine. What these findings suggest that some orientations were developed through their experiences with political regime. “The logic of adaptive learning, however, is that people will learn to accept whatever regime is supplied by elites.”²⁹ Considering that majority of Ukrainians perceive the Ukrainian state as nondemocratic and corruptive, this could explain their resistance to follow unwritten rules within the state.

Overall, we may conclude that Ukrainian political culture is a combination of different subcultures where citizens have high dissatisfaction with political institutions, high political competence, but low political efficacy. Citizens expressed negative orientations towards political institutions and high political competence, which is a characteristic of critical citizens.³⁰ Simultaneously, they did not believe in their ability to have an impact on these institutions which indicates their low political efficacy or disenchanted political culture.³¹

The majority of Ukrainians did not belong to any political organizations but expressed strong orientations towards their importance, indicating their inspirations for participant political culture. An increased in interpersonal trust took place despite citizens low involvement in horizontal networks. At the same time, Ukrainians experienced changes in new forms of political socialization, interactions and actions that could contribute to their political actions during Euromaidan.

²⁹William Mishler and Richard Rose, “Generation, Age and Time: The Dynamics of Political Learning during Russian’s Transformation” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 51, No. 4, October 2007, pp. 822-834, p. 832.

³⁰Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963). Pippa Norris, *Democratic Deficit, Critical Citizens Revisited* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

³¹Thomas Denk, Henrik Serup Christensen, “How to classify political culture? A comparison of three methods of classification” *Quality and Quantity*, Vol. 50, 2016, pp. 177-191, p.181.

Generational changes were observed in citizens perception towards their nationality, tolerance of homosexuality and gender equality, political competence, but not in their perception of the normative rules of behaviors.

This research demonstrated that Ukrainians became more assertive citizens, to some extent, which is associated with a more accountable government, but they were not allegiant.³² Allegiance is linked to the more effective government and democratic stability because “democratic stability requires that some citizens trust the political system and therefor avoid overloading the system with political demands, preferring instead to passively obey laws and decisions without making demands.”³³ The case of Ukraine demonstrated that citizens possessed high political competence, high interpersonal trust and high allegiance to their country, but not to political regime and its institutions. If citizens do not develop their allegiance to their political regime and political institutions, they will continue to rely on non-traditional methods of political influence such as protests. Similarly, if political elite continues to ignore citizens interests and demands, they will not be perceived trustful.

Ukraine is still in transition. The changes to Ukrainian political culture are ongoing. In 2019, Ukraine is having presidential and parliamentary elections that could bring changes to the composition of the political elite.³⁴ If this takes place, it will be important to study the political culture of the Ukrainian political elite.

³² Russell Dalton and Christian Welzel *The Civic Culture Transformed. From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

³³Thomas Denk and Henrik Christensen, “How to classify political cultures? A comparison of three methods of classification” *Quality and Quantity*, No.50, 2016, pp. 177-191, p. 179.

³⁴ As of now, the second most popular presidential candidate is an actor Volodymyr Zelensky who is compared to Donald Trump for his populist rhetoric. “This Comedy Start Wants to be Ukraine’s’ Donald Trump” *Bloomberg* January 10, 2019 www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-01-10/volodymyr-zelensky-comedy-star-and-ukraine-s-donald-trump-wannabe, accessed January 16, 2019.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1

Table 1 Confidence in the Parliament by region, 2004-2013

	Western	Central	Southern	Eastern	Kyiv	Total
2004(preelection)						
Great/Fair amount	19.8	23.6	31.5	31.8	28.3	26.7
Not very much/None at all	80.2	76.4	68.5	68.2	71.7	73.3
2005						
Great/Fair Amount	89.6	84.2	28.7	45.3	67.2	60.2
Not very much/None at all	10.4	15.8	71.4	54.7	32.8	39.8
2007						
Great/Fair Amount	19.5	48.8	58.6	48.6	47.3	42.8
Not very much/None at all	80.5	51.2	41.4	51.4	52.7	57.2
2008						
Great/Fair Amount	7.5	24.2	12.2	9.7	11.5	13.6
Not very much/None at all	92.5	85.7	87.8	90.3	88.5	86.4
2010						
Great/Fair Amount	27.7	19.4	29.5	39.8	17.6	31.2
Not very much/None at all	72.3	80.6	70.5	60.2	82.4	68.8
2011						
Great/Fair Amount	15.9	17.1	21.2	17.8	24.7	19
Not very much/None at all	84.1	82.9	78.8	82.2	75.2	81
2012						
Great/Fair amount	21.3	16.5	32.5	31.9	6.4	24.1
Not very much/none at all	77.7	83.5	67.5	68.1	83.6	75.9
2013						
Great/Fair amount	16.5	19.6	19.8	16.1	18	18
Not very much/none at all	83.5	80.4	80.2	83.9	82	82

Source: the table was created by the author based on the data files from IFES. The question was asked: "How much confidence do you have in Parliament? The table represents only valid cases.

Table 2 Is Ukraine a democracy by region, 2004-2013

2004 (preelection)								
	Kyiv	North	Centre	South	East	West	Crimea	Total
Yes	30.3	14.6	19.5	29.4	26.3	14.7	N/A	23.1
NO	56.1	49	64.4	53.3	58.03	68.2	N/A	58.6
DK	13.6	36.5	16.1	17.2	15.2	17	N/A	17.1
2005-2006								
Yes	36.2	28.5	33.8	14	16.5	41.6	N/A	25.7
NO	49.3	45	41.9	67	59.8	36.1	N/A	49.9
DK	14.5	26.5	24.3	19	23.7	22.3	N/A	22.1
2009								
Yes	28.9	25.7	26.2	20.2	16.2	35.8	19.1	24.1
NO	50.6	41.3	33.9	57.4	61.5	37.3	59.5	49.4
Both	7.12	16.8	24.6	16	15.2	15.9	16.8	16.4
DK	13.3	16.2	15.3	6.4	7	11	4.6	10.1
2013								
Yes	13.4	25.4	22.3	26.8	10.9	18.1	29.1	19.8
NO	56.1	32.6	40.8	50.7	49.1	47.9	33.6	45.8
Both	9.8	10.5	8.3	7.6	15.3	15.4	13.4	11.7
DK	20.7	31.5	28.7	14.9	24.7	18.7	23.9	22.1

Source: the table was created by the author based on the data files from IFES. The question was asked: "Is Ukraine a Democracy?"

Table 3 Confidence in the Local Courts, 2004- 2013

2004						
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor and Higher			
Great Deal/Fair Amount	33.6	28.1	30.6			
Not very much/None at All	46.4	58.5	56.4			
DK	20.9	13.5	12.9			
AGE	18-35	36-55	56+			
Great Deal/Fair Amount	31.7	26.7	29.1			
Not very much/None at All	55.7	59.1	53.8			
DK	12.7	14.2	17.1			
REGION	West	Centre	South	East	Kyiv	
Great Deal/Fair Amount	23.2	37.4	29.4	29.9	24.7	
Not very much/None at All	64.5	51.7	52.2	58.7	53.9	
DK	12.3	10.9	18.3	11.4	21.5	
2005-2006						
REGION	West	Centre	South	East	Kyiv	
Great Deal/Fair Amount	30.6	24.7	29	13.4	27.2	
Not very much/None at All	49.3	54.3	61.5	75.7	54.3	
DK	20.1	21	9.5	10.9	18.5	
AGE	18-35	36-55	56+			
Great Deal/Fair Amount	28.5	23.5	21.3			
Not very much/None at All	57.4	65.1	55.3			
DK	14.1	11.4	23.4			
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor and Higher			
Great Deal/Fair Amount	20.3	23.5	22.3			
Not very much/None at All	54.2	59.7	62.3			
DK	25.5	14.8	15.5			
2010						
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor and Higher			
Great Deal/Fair Amount	14.6	13.5	18.6			
Not very much/None at all	53.8	70.4	69.1			
DK	31.6	16.1	12.5			
AGE	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+		
Great Deal/Fair Amount	22.1	10.4	14.8	13.5		
Not very much/None at all	63.2	74.2	71.5	68.3		
DK	14.6	15.5	13.7	16.9		
REGION	West	Centre	South	East	Kyiv	Crimea
Great Deal/Fair Amount	12.2	22	11.7	8.1	9.6	26.6
Not very much/None at all	73.2	58	68.1	75.4	80.7	60.4
DK	14.6	20.1	20.3	16.5	9.6	12.9
2013						
REGION	West	Centre	South	East	Kyiv	Crimea
Great Deal/Fair Amount	12.4	10.4	11.3	10.9	7.1	22.5
Not very much/None at all	71.9	70.6	72.4	72.9	89.4	64.5
DK	15.7	19	16.3	16.2	3.5	13
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor and Higher			
Great Deal/Fair Amount	18.1	12	10.1			
Not very much/None at all	58.1	71.9	77.7			
DK	23.8	16.1	12.2			
AGE	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+		
Great Deal/Fair Amount	11.9	11.7	10.5	13.8		
Not very much/None at all	70.4	76.3	74.6	67.6		
DK	17.7	12	14.9	18.6		

Source: the table was created by the author based on the data files from IFES. The question was asked: “How much confidence do you have in Local courts?”

Table 4 Religious affiliation by regions, 2004-2013

2004 (prelection)							
	Kyiv	North	Center	South	East	West	Crimea
Ukrainian Orthodox (incl. autocephalna)	22.7	58	33.8	18.9	17.7	30.3	n/a
Russian Orthodox	13.6	10.7	22.3	20.6	15.9	6.6	
Orthodox Christianity	40.9	15.3	13.5	33.9	38	15.6	
Roman Catholic	1.5	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	
Greek Catholic	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.3	35.5	
Protestant	3	0.0	0.7	0.6	1	7.1	
Muslim	1.5	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.3	0.0	
Other	1.5	2	0.7	1.1	1.3	2.8	
None	15.2	13.3	29.1	21.7	25.6	0.5	
2005-2006							
Ukrainian Orthodox (incl. autocephalna)	35.8	47.1	48.7	26.1	28.6	38.1	n/a
Russian Orthodox	4.3	15.7	7.3	15.2	13	8.5	
Orthodox Christianity	35.7	17.6	22	35.9	24.3	9.3	
Roman Catholic	0.0	0.0	2	0.5	0.0	1.4	
Greek Catholic	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	32.7	
Protestant	0.0	0.7	2.7	0.0	1.4	2.1	
Muslim	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.7	0.0	
Other	2.9	0.0	0.0	1.1	3.1	0.4	
None	21.4	19	16.7	20.1	28.1	7.5	
2009							
Ukrainian Orthodox (incl autocephalna)	64.2	36.4	24.9	25.8	12	38	10.7
Russian Orthodox	8.6	8.5	9.9	7.5	20.9	15.4	24.4
Orthodox Christianity	13.6	43.8	46.4	55.9	46	7.7	32.1
Roman Catholic	0	0.6	0	0	0.2	1.2	0.8
Greek Catholic	0	0	0	0	0	30.6	0
Protestant	0	0	0	1.1	1.6	0.6	0
Muslim	0	0	0	1.1	0	0	9.2
Other	1.2	0	0	0	0.4	0.6	0
None	12.3	9.7	18.8	8.6	18.7	5.6	22.1
2013							
Ukrainian Orthodox (incl autocephalna)	58.4	68.3	19.7	15.2	15.7	34.9	5.1
Russian Orthodox	10.7	13.3	8.2	35	22.9	18.7	52.6
Orthodox Christianity	11.9	8.1	60.4	30.9	34.6	8.7	24.8
Roman Catholic	0	1.2	0	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.7
Greek Catholic	1.2	0.6	0	0.4	0	34.3	0
Protestant	0	0.6	0	0	1	0	0
Muslim	0	0	0	4	0	0	6.6
Other	0	0	0	0	0.4	0.3	0
None	17.9	8.1	11.5	13.9	25.2	2.8	10.2

Source: the table was created by the author based on the data files from IFES. The question was asked: "With which church or religious group do you identify yourself?"

Table 5 Interest in politics by region, age and education, 2004-2013

2004						
REGION	Western	Central	Southern	Eastern	Kyiv	
Interested	62.7	55.1	54.8	60.8	67.8	
AGE	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	56+	
Interested	55.4	57	58.8	67.1	60.2	
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor and Higher			
Interested	56.3	52.8	71.5			
2005-2006						
REGION	Western	Central	Southern	Eastern	Kyiv	
Interested	67.4	64.6	53.3	55.4	50	
AGE	18-34	35-54	55+			
Interested	57.6	58.3	60.3			
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor and Higher			
Interested	44.9	57.6	70.9			
2008						
REGION	Western	Central	Southern	Eastern	Kyiv	
Interested	59.6	69.8	64.7	65.8	78.8	
AGE	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+		
Interested	49.5	64.8	73.1	74.5		
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor and Higher			

Interested	65.1	64.4	69.4				
2010							
REGION	Western	Central	Southern	Eastern	Kyiv	Crimea	
Interested	66.5	64.8	53.3	62.4	53	57.6	
AGE	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+			
Interested	50	58	72.8	70.8			
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor and Higher				
Interested	60.9	62.4	65.7				
2013							
REGION	Western	Central	Southern	Eastern	Kyiv	Crimea	
Interested	62.2	60.4	48.1	53.9	59.5	59.1	
AGE	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+			
Interested	48.9	49.9	63	65.7			
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor and Higher				
Interested	47.1	56.1	60.3				

Source: the table was created by the author based on data files from IFES. The table represents the percentage of those who answered, “very interested” and “somewhat interested” (combined).

Table 6 Taken part in the Orange revolution/ political efficacy, 2005

		“Have you ever taken part in these actions in the past?”		Total	
		Yes	No		
47.A. People like you can have influence on decisions made by the government.	Strongly Agree	Count	21	58	79
			11.3%	5.9%	6.8%
	Somewhat Agree	Count	80	226	306
			43.0%	23.2%	26.4%
	Somewhat Disagree	Count	57	378	435
		30.6%	38.8%	37.5%	
	Strongly Disagree	Count	28	313	341
			15.1%	32.1%	29.4%
Total		Count	186	975	1161
			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Pearson Chi-square		48.067		Significance	.000

Table 7 The main source of information by regions, 2004-2013

	West	Center	South	East	Kyiv	North	TOTAL
2004							
Ukrainian national newspapers	15.4	12.9	11.4	39.8	6.5	14	36.1
Local newspapers	19.3	13.9	11	40.1	4.6	11	46.7
Ukrainian state TV	16.1	11.2	16.1	38.3	4.4	13.9	38.3
Ukrainian private TV	15.8	15	16.5	35.3	5.8	11.6	73.6
Local government owned TV	13.3	16.6	21	36.2	5.2	7.7	12.7
Local private TV	14	15.1	13.4	46.4	9.5	1.7	20
Ukrainian state radio	20.5	16.9	7.7	35.3	3.9	15.7	16.6
Ukrainian private radio	15.9	15.9	8.2	39.4	7.1	13.5	7.2
Local government radio	19.9	22.8	4.4	36	5.9	11	8.8
Local private radio	17.1	14.5	5.3	50	7.9	5.3	4.7
Internet	5.4	10.8	13.5	32.4	35.1	2.7	3.4
2005-2006							
Ukrainian national newspapers	35.2	38.7	39.6	36.1	35.2	50	38.8
Local newspapers	50.2	41.3	51.6	56.4	38.6	35.7	49
Ukrainian state TV	53.2	75.3	47.8	50	47.9	51.6	53.5
Ukrainian private TV	71.3	90	62.4	65.3	85.9	72.7	71.3
Local government owned TV	6.7	16.7	20.4	20.8	18.3	14.9	16.2
Local private TV	5.7	6.7	9.7	11.6	4.3	9.8	8.9
Ukrainian state radio	22	37.3	16.7	20	18.3	26.8	22.7
Ukrainian private radio	7.1	18.7	7.5	9.2	11.3	13	10.2
Local government radio	6.7	4	7	8.7	11.4	4.6	7.1
Local private radio	6.4	2.7	8.1	5.2	9.9	4.6	5.8
Internet	3.5	1.3	1.6	3.1	5.7	2.6	2.9
2008							
National TV	21.5	24.6	26.4	21.8	5.6	n/a	95.3
National Radio	25.2	28.5	24.4	16.3	5.6	n/a	41.1
National newspapers	23.6	26.3	23.9	19.8	6.5	n/a	46.3
National magazines	14.1	22.5	19.7	29.6	14.1	n/a	5.6
Internet	15.3	16.1	25.8	22.6	20.2	n/a	9.9
Local media	19.4	22.7	29.2	24.1	4.6	n/a	17.2
Workplace	16.5	24.7	37.5	16.5	4.7	n/a	6.8
Relatives, friends, neighbors	19.3	27.9	35	13.6	4.3	n/a	22.4

	2010						
National TV	26.2	14	11.4	29.7	4.4	14.3	75.3
Private TV	22	16.4	11.4	35.7	5.1	9.4	57.3
Russian language TV (Ukraine)	12.3	8.5	18.1	51	5.8	4.3	38.6
Russian language Newspapers	4.5	4.5	19.8	55.7	6.6	9	27.9
National Radio	30	14.4	10.6	18.2	7.4	19.4	22.4
National newspapers (Ukrainian)	37.3	15.8	8	15	7.3	16.5	26.3
National magazines (Ukrainian)	34.7	6.1	6.1	16.3	12.2	24.5	3.2
Internet	19	5.3	24.7	21.1	20.1	10	12.4
Local media	24.9	12.4	18.5	32.7	3.4	8	40.3
Workplace	24.5	4.9	21.2	25.7	6.9	16.7	16.1
Relatives, friends, neighbors	23.5	15.3	18	27.2	5.5	10.5	43.9
	2013						
REGION	West	Center	South	East	Kyiv	Crimea	
Ukrainian TV channels	22.3	24.2	17.5	21.5	5.3	8.8	93
Russian TV channels from Russia	17	13.5	17.4	32.2	8.7	11.1	30.3
Ukrainian radio	29.7	34.5	12.2	12.2	8.3	0	15
Russian radio from Russia	4	28	16	28	24	0	1.6
Russian language radio (Ukraine)	15.2	30.3	12.1	9.1	27.3	6.1	2.2
Ukrainian newspapers	30.7	33.1	11.8	12.9	6.1	5.3	30.1
Russian newspapers from Russia	9.1	-	18.2	9.1	45.5	18.2	0.7
Ukrainian magazines	31	10.3	24.1	3.4	31	0	1.9
Foreign media (BBC, VOA, etc.)	25	25	8.3	-	33.3	8.3	0.7
Internet	22.3	21.4	16.6	16.9	9.4	13.4	24.6
Local radio or newspapers	21.5	35.2	8.3	18.8	4.9	11.3	28.4
Workplace	21.3	26.4	10.7	20.2	9.6	11.8	11.8
Relatives, friends, neighbors	23.7	27	15.4	20.3	8	5.6	36.3

Source: the figure was created by author based on the results of public opinion survey by IFES in Ukraine (2004, 2008 and 2013). The cumulative percent is higher than 100 as respondents were asked to choose all answers that applied.

Table 8 Internet as the Source of information/ political actions, 2006-2011

		Political action: Signing a petition	Political action: joining in boycotts	Political action: Attending peaceful demonstrations
(2006) Information source: Internet	Pearson Correlation	.106	.199	.159
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.001	.000	.000
	N	912	922	928
(2011) Information source: Internet	Pearson Correlation	.074	.095	.072
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.004	.000	.005
	N	1500	1500	1500

Source: the table created by the author based on WVS data files for 2006 and 2011.

Table 9 Political influence, willingness to collaborate, 2013

REGION	West	Center	South	East	Kyiv	Crimea
Influence in my country	36.1	17.8	27.2	14.9	16	32.2
Influence in my community	48.5	37.7	39.9	34	31.9	58.9
People working together can make changes	66.9	70.4	63.5	69.4	65.8	69
AGE GROUPS	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+		
Influence in my country	29.8	28	20.6	17.9		
Influence in my community	45.6	46.6	40.5	32.9		
People working together can make changes	72.7	62.9	68.7	67.7		
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor and higher			
Influence in my country	11.8	23.1	29.3			
Influence in my community	25.8	38.9	41.2			
People working together can make changes	72.6	64.5	73.1			
LANGUAGE AT HOME	Ukrainian	Russian	Both			
Influence in my country	24.5	25	20.7			
Influence in my community	39.3	47.6	32.8			
People working together can make changes	68.7	69.9	61.7			
EMPLOYMENT	Full time	Part-time	Student	Unemployed	Retired	Homemaker
Influence in my country	26.4	17.2	41.7	30.4	17.6	24.8
Influence in my community	46.3	36.2	57.8	39.7	34.3	43.6
People working together can make changes	65.6	77.8	90	60.6	68.7	68.5

Table 10 Political actions recently done, 2004 - 2013

2004							
	Western	Eastern	Central	South	Kyiv		
Wrote letter to public official	14.7	47.1	5.9	5.9	5.9		
Met with public official	45	21.7	6.7	13.3	5		
Attended public meetings	29.4	32.4	8.8	5.9	5.9		
Signed a petition	58.3	16.7	8.3	9.4	7.3		
AGE	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	56+		
Wrote letter to public official	10.3	10.3	10.3	17.9	51.3		
Met with public official	5.8	29	21.7	18.8	24.6		
Attended public meetings	5.3	26.3	10.5	26.3	31.6		
Signed a petition	14.3	28.6	7.1	21.4	28.6		
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Some/Complete University				
Wrote letter to public official	5.3	50	21.1				
Met with public official	1.5	33.8	36.8				
Attended public meetings	2.6	33.3	23.1				
Signed a petition	7.1	28.6	42.9				
LANGUAGE at HOME	Ukrainian	Russian	Both				
Wrote letter to public official	33.3	43.6	20.5				
Met with public official	63.2	26.5	8.8				
Attended public meetings	47.4	39.5	10.5				
Signed a petition	71.4	14.3	14.3				
EMPLOYMENT	Full time	Part-time	Student	Pensioner	Unemployed	Homemaker	
Wrote letter to public official	27.5	2.5	5	47.5	7.5	7.5	
Met with public official	40.6	17.4	-	26.1	10.1	5.8	
Attended public meetings	24.3	5.4	5.4	37.8	24.3	2.7	
Signed a petition	50	7.1	14.3	21.4	-	7.1	
2006							
REGIONS	Western	Eastern	Central	Southern	Kyiv	Total	
Attended peaceful protests	29.9	19.4	9.3	13.5	20	19.2	
Signed a petition	8.8	7.2	1.3	9.9	7.2	7.8	
Contacted or visited public official	11.8	18.8	7.3	10.9	5.8	13	
Send a text to express your views	2.2	2.1	0	4.3	11.5	3.1	
Written a blog to express opinions	1.5	1.4	0	0.5	1.4	1	
AGE GROUPS	18-34	35-54	55+				
Attended peaceful protests	18.5	23.7	14.9				
Signed a petition	6.1	9.7	7.4				
Contacted or visited public official	12.3	13.8	12.7				
Send a text to express your views	4.7	1.8	2.7				
Written a blog to express opinions	1.5	0.9	0.7				
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor and higher				
Attended peaceful protests	10.7	18.9	24.8				
Signed a petition	5.4	7.3	10.6				
Contacted or visited public official	12	11.7	18				
Send a text to express your views	0.7	2.9	4.8				
Written a blog to express opinions	1.3	1	1.2				
LANGUAGE at HOME	Ukrainian	Russian	Both				
Attended peaceful protests	18.6	20.8	19				
Signed a petition	6.3	9.2	9.2				
Contacted or visited public official	12.1	15.1	11.6				
Send a text to express your views	2.7	3.5	3.8				
Written a blog to express opinions	0.8	1.6	0.5				
2013							
REGION	Western	Eastern	Central	Southern	Kyiv	Crimea	Total
Attended peaceful protests	18.2	10.3	11.3	4.4	19	15.3	12.1
Signed a petition	6.7	10.9	6.4	4.4	9.6	12.2	7.7
Contacted or visited public official	14.9	22.2	14.2	15.3	19	25.8	17.5
Used social media ¹ to express views	4.6	5.6	4.7	5.9	7.4	0.8	4.9
Written a blog to express opinions	2.8	4.7	5.8	3.3	8.4	2.3	4.3
AGE GROUPS	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+			
Attended peaceful protests	14.1	13	14.2	7.8			
Signed a petition	7.5	9.4	9.6	4.7			
Contacted or visited public official	11.8	18.1	22.6	17.7			
Used social media to express views	7.5	7.3	3.8	1.2			
Written a blog to express opinions	5.5	5.6	4.9	1.5			
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor and Higher				
Attended peaceful protests	6.7	11.3	15.6				

¹ Facebook, Twitter, VK, Ondoklassniki.

Signed a petition	3	7.3	10.2			
Contacted or visited public official	16.3	16.1	21.5			
Used social media to express views	1	3.6	8.6			
Written a blog to express opinions	2	3.3	7.2			
LANGUAGE at HOME	Ukrainian	Russian	Both			
Attended peaceful protests	13.6	13.5	6.3			
Signed a petition	5.3	11.9	5.7			
Contacted or visited public official	14.4	21.4	17.5			
Used social media to express views	5	5	4			
Written a blog to express opinions	4.3	4.7	3.7			
EMPLOYMENT	Full time	Part-time	Student	Retired	Unemployed	Homemaker
Attended peaceful protests	15.2	22.1	15.7	8.9	7.8	10.1
Signed a petition	9.7	8.8	16	5.7	3.9	7.7
Contacted or visited public official	18.9	17.6	16	18.8	14.8	10.8
Used social media to express views	7.2	4.4	14.3	2	3.9	2.3
Written a blog to express opinions	5.8	7.4	6	2.2	3.9	2.4

Table 11 Relations with Russia, 2005-2013

2005-2006						
REGION	West	Centre	South	East	Kyiv	
Improvement	18.4	13.1	15.5	6.5	25.4	
No change	45.6	34.6	15.6	19.1	28.8	
Decline	35.9	52.3	68.9	74.4	45.7	
AGE	18-34	35-54	55+			
Improvement	13	13.3	11.4			
No change	29.4	29.8	29.3			
Decline	57.7	56.9	59.3			
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor and higher			
Improvement	6.6	14.6	8.8			
No change	32.5	27	36.7			
Decline	60.8	58.4	54.4			
2010						
REGION	West	Centre	South	East	Kyiv	Crimea
Improvement	60	69.2	74	75.9	60	90.8
No change	30.1	19.7	20.9	17.9	31.6	8.5
Decline	9.9	11.1	5.1	6.2	8.5	0.8
AGE	18-39	30-44	45-59	60+		
Improvement	68.1	71.8	73.1	71.9		
No change	24.8	19.6	20.2	20.7		
Decline	7	8.6	6.7	7.5		
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor and higher			
Improvement	62.7	73.1	69.5			
No change	29.9	19.7	22.3			
Decline	7.5	7.2	8.3			
2013						
REGION	West	Centre	South	East	Kyiv	Crimea
Improvement	1.3	4.1	9.2	6.2	4.1	3
No change	34.8	35	32.4	25.1	23.3	20.7
Decline	63.8	63.8	58.4	68.7	72.6	76.3
AGE	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+		
Improvement	4.9	4.4	5.5	4.6		
No change	32.4	30.7	26.2	31.4		
Decline	62.8	64.9	68.3	64.1		
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor and higher			
Improvement	3.6	4.9	4.8			
No change	37.3	30	29.3			
Decline	59	65.1	66			

Source: Table created by the author based on data files from IFES.

Table 12 Perception about Yanukovich's policy towards EU and Russia, 2013

2013 (Relations with Russia)							
REGION	Western	Central	Southern	East	Kyiv	Crimea	TOTAL
Satisfied	22.5	17.3	23.8	9.8	21.5	5.6	17
Dissatisfied	77.5	82.7	76.2	90.2	78.5	94.4	83
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor and higher				
Satisfied	21.3	17.2	15.7				
Dissatisfied	78.7	82.8	84.3				
AGE	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+			
Satisfied	17.4	19.5	12.5	19.2			
Dissatisfied	82.6	80.5	87.5	80.8			
2013 (addressing the status of Ukraine and the EU)							
REGION	Western	Central	Southern	East	Kyiv	Crimea	TOTAL
Satisfied	59.9	41	21.3	38.1	38	13.4	38.2
Dissatisfied	40.1	59	78.7	61.9	62	86.6	61.8
EDUCATION	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor and higher				
Satisfied	38.5	38.1	36.2				
Dissatisfied	61.5	61.9	63.8				
AGE	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+			
Satisfied	39.2	41.3	34.9	36.4			
Dissatisfied	60.8	58.7	65.1	63.6			

Source: the table was created by the author based on IFES data files. The question was asked: "Whether you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with President Yanukovich's handling of the following issues: relations with Russia; addressing the status of Ukraine and the EU."

Appendix 2 Pictures of the former President Yanukovich residence, taken by the author (October 2014)

Image 1 The main house



Image 2 Private zoo with ostriches



Image 3 Chrystal chandelier in the main hall



Image 4 Piano signed by John Lennon



Image 5 Street signs within the residence (these say “Museum of Cars” and “Putin’s house”)



Image 6 The View of the park from the residence (the park used to be a national park)



APPENDIX 3

Table 1. The coverage of the topic of the EU by *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya* (*Mirror Weekly*), 2005-2013

Date	Issue	Articles Title
2005		
2005-01-14	N1	Positive signal (EU)
2005-01-28	N3	Associated membership for Ukraine in EU before 2007 is real
2004-02-04	N4	Request for membership in EU: terms and options for Ukraine
2005-02-11	N5	French caprices
2005-02-18	N6	In Brussel with hope
2005-03-04	N8	Fifth element (plans for Ukraine in EU)
2005-03-11	N9	Association agreement with EU - is this a real need for it?
2005-03-25	N11	European recognition with African taste; Euro integration in salience
2005-05-06	N17	NATO and GUUAM prevent Ukraine Euro integration
2005-05-13	N18	Doctor, heal yourself; or the quality of Euro integrational policy of the new government
2005-05-20	N19	Europe is building a community house: it has architectures, but painters may be needed.
2005-05-27	N20	France is scared by Europe
2005-06-03	N21	Will France stop Ukraine on its way to Europe?
2005-06-10	N22	Ukraine between three. Will Ukraine's joining NATO prevent its future membership in EU?
2005-06-24	N24	European crisis: Ukrainian reflections
2005-07-08	N26	In Europe without visas: Do Ukrainians have perspectives?
2005-07-15	N27	European integration - looking up to Britain or Turkey?
2005-08-12	N31	Summit Ukraine-EC will take place in December
2005-10-07	N39	Strasbourg is waiting
2005-10-28	N42	The price of the visa question
2005-11-04	N43	Anniversary of (no) conclusions
2005-11-25	N46	Before the summit, Ukraine-EU: conclusions before prospective.
2005-12-29	N51	Europe is concerned.
2006		
2006-01-13	N 1	Ukraine-EU- on the way to a new agreement
2006-01-20	N2	European Choice- the gas test
2006-02-10	N5	In search of the best strategy toward EU integration
2006-02-17	N6	Ukrainian borders-European Standards
2006-03-03	N8	EU will help us. By Advising. EU will collaborate with any government after the election in Ukraine
2006-04-14	N14	On our way to Europe
2006-04-28	N17	In Europe by one jump? It will not work EU visa standards
2006-05-26	N20	Ways, leading to the EU
2006-06-23	N23	In Europe through Asia?
2006-06-30	N24	European absorption and Ukrainian prospective European and Ukrainian jurisdiction- in search of common language
2006-07-14	N27	Stop Contraband - European accent What should Europe do with Russia? The case of Gongadze under the lenses of the European Council
2006-07-21	N28	Europe is tired of waiting
2006-09-01	N 33	Where did euro integration disappear? Visiting EU countries will be easier The strong Union. Of European countries
2006-09-29	N37	Euro integration precedent
2006-10-13	N39	Effectiveness of Ukrainian court system- Ukraine in the mirror of the European Council
2006-10-27	N41	Euro-integration in slow motion
2006-11-03	N42	European Council will open its office in Kiev When friends can not find a solution - EU can not define the policy towards its eastern neighbours
2006-11-10	N43	Ukrainian court from the European perspective
2006-11-17	N44	Yellow light for the future in the EU
2006-11-24	N45	EU-Russia: strategic partners, competitors or opponents?
2007		
2007-02-09	N5	Asian "European Union"
2007-02-23	N7	To Berlin - for the phantom of membership in the EU
2007-03-16	N10	South Key to European doors
2007-04-20	N15	Where the "road map" of Euro integration lead Ukraine? "European" choice by Ukraine
2007-05-11	N18	Ukraine selects judges for European Court
2007-05-18	N19	European step for consensus
2007-06-22	N 24	Russia and EU- collaboration without mutual understanding European perception for Ukrainian defence Ukraine may join European space agency in 5-6 years
2007-07-13	N27	Slovenia will converge Ukraine and the EU

2007-08-31	N32	Our future in the EU depends on ourselves
2007-09-07	N33	European Union looks closely at Ukraine
2007-09-14	N34	Ukraine-EU: some thoughts before Kiev summit
2007-11-02	N41	European politics for losers
		The end of Euro-federalism
		Europe and its security.
2007-11-16-	N44	The European Council is ready to help us
2007-12-21	N49	Euro chaos
2008		
2008-01-11	N1	European intrigue by Tymoshenko's government
2008-02-28	N8	Minister of Foreign Affairs asked the EU to cancel visas for Ukrainians European Council reminds Ukraine about keeping promises
2008-03-21	N11	Commercial centres within embassies go against the EU laws Ukraine and EU move towards the association agreement
		Ukraine and European integration: success also depends on coordination EU or NATO- a change of priorities for Ukraine?
2008-04-25	N16	Ukraine and European integration: success also depends on coordination EU or NATO- a change of priorities for Ukraine?
2008-05-30	N20	Ukrainians want into the EU
2008-06-20	N23	Creation of the free trade zone with the EU should happen soon
2008-07-11	N26	"Eurovision" as vision of Europe Will the EU survive- Ireland said NO
		The system of PRO almost in the EU European Parliament: life on the three houses Perceptive of the visa dialogue with the EU We can become the leading coal mining country in Europe
2008-08-08	N29	Ukraine-EU: waiting for 2009
2008-08-29	N32	The system of PRO almost in the EU European Parliament: life on the three houses Perceptive of the visa dialogue with the EU We can become the leading coal mining country in Europe
2008-09-05	N33	In support of the EU plans
		Ukraine on the European map of migration: before the conference of the European Council
2008-09-19	N35	European perceptive for Kiev is blocked
2008-09-26	N36	Europeans are concerned with high politicization of Ukrainian society
		Romania supports Ukraine's desire for the EU and NATO
2008-10-03	N37	Europe disappointed with Ukraine
2008-10-31	N41	Ukraine between three trees: NATO-Russia-EU
2008-11-14	N43	Without the adaptation of Ukrainian jurisdiction - forget about the EU Lukashenko's integration
2008-12-12	N47	Euro-integration chooses the best
2009		
2009-01-30	N3	EU-Russia: time to talk
2009-02-27	N7	Neighbourhood- version2. EU introduced new rules for its Eastern neighbours Glory" of Ukraine- one of the strongest in Europe
2009-03-20	N10	Investors interested in Ukraine's euro integration
2009-03-27	N11	From dictator to Eurointegrator
2009-04-12	N12	By pipe into the Europe
2009-04-20	N14	The weakest link of Europe
2009-04-24	N15	In search of the lost time EU's visa policy in Ukraine- from deep freeze to the thaw
2009-04-29	N16	Eastern partnership- one more step closer to the EU
2009-05-15	N17	More than 70% of Poles support Ukraine's joining the EU
2009-05-12	N20	Ukraine and the EU- partnership- association- membership
2009-06-12	N21	Vitaliy Klichko: "The rights of Ukrainians and citizens of the EU- two big differences."
2009-07-03	N25	The force version of the EU
2009-07-10	N26	Europe turned right
2009-08-07	N29	Europe should speak the same language
2009-09-14	N30	Ukraine should find its brand to attract Europe
2009-09-04	N33	Tymoshenko, Yushchenko and Yatsenyuk: electorate want Ukraine's euro integration
2009-09-11	N34	EU contributed to Ukraine's illness. EU made a historical mistake by not giving Kiev prospective of the membership
2009-10-16	N38	Eurodeputy: the election in Ukraine will be a challenge for the EU USA and EU wort about Ukraine
2009-11-16	N40	EU after ratification of Lisbon agreement
2009-11-13	N44	Europe fights corruption
2009-12-11	N48	Ukraine-EU-NATO: myths and realities

2009-12-18	N50	Half -united Europe
2010		
2010-01-22	N2	Last European warning
2010-02-04	N4	Visa's story: about bureaucracy and human factors. German Embassy does not want to see Ukrainians in the EU
2010-02-19	N6	EU will continue being our main trade partner.
2010-02-26	N8	Europarlament is for Ukraine's membership in the EU
2010-03-12	N10	"If Ukraine thinks about its future membership in the EU, it should rethink a role of Bandera in its history."
2010-03-12	N10	Europarlament: political methodology of Bandera does not meet European values.
2010-03-12	N10	Europarlament: Ukrainians should concentrate more on the reforms than on the questions of Bandera.
2010-04-09	N14	EU "coded" Schengen visa
2010-06-04	N21	PAEU is concerned. In 2012-203 EU is planning to give Ukraine no less than 0.65billion EUR.
2010-06-18	N23	Ukraine-EU: strategic plan or facade integration?
2010-07-09	N26	New steps in collaboration about visa-free regime
2010-09-10	N33	Which price are we going to pay?
2010-09-17	N34	Ukraine+EU+Russia= synergy
2010-09-17	N34	Summit Ukraine-EU will be more productive than all previous.
2010-09-17	N34	Ukraine on the " visa map" of EU
2010-10-15	N38	Representative of the EU Drago Kos: " Ukraine does not show any intentions of fighting corruption."
2010-10-29	N40	Readmission is not as scary as it is portrayed. (EU and Ukraine)
2010-11-19	N43	To avoid null results in the game
2010-12-03	N45	Valdas Adamkus: Do not hope that Russia will calm down.
2010-12-10	N46	The thaw before the winter
2011		
2011-01-15	N1	Germany as the solo violin of the European politics: melody for Ukraine
2011-01-29	N3	Europe got more freedom
2011-02-19	N4	Ukraine as a European factor
2011-04-28	N16	EU tries to calm down the governing country
		European security: possible or impossible?
2011-05-13	N17	Ukraine's European function or how Ukraine can become "European factor."
2011-05-20	N18	Ukraine will not be open for Ukraine because of Africa
2011-05-27	N19	Four changes in Ukraine's eurointegration Deputies Eurovision
2011-06-03	N20	Europe gave Ukraine D for the fight against corruption
2011-06-10	N21	Eurofog
2011-07-15	N26	How to charm the EU in Moldova style
2011-07-22	N27	European Ukraine in Minsk
2011-08-12	N28	Pro and contra of the association agreement with the EU
2011-08-19	N29	European policy of the neighbourhood as a window of opportunity for the Eastern Partnership
		The case of Tymoshenko makes the collaboration between Ukraine and the Eu more difficult
2011-09-23	N34	Eurozone will get its new leader
2011-09-30	N35	Ukraine after 20 years of independence. Reforms are the key to close relations with the EU
2011-10-17	N36	European crisis: effect domino in politics and economics
2011-11-11	N41	Triangle" EU-Ukraine-Russia" and the future of the Eastern Europe
2011-11-16	N46	The EU thinks that the Eastern partnership summit was a success. A difficult road for saving Europe
2011-12-29	N 48	The initiation of the agreement with the EU will not happens during the summit Youth of Ukraine support the EU
2012		
2012-03-02	N8	No alternatives for eurointegration
2012-03-23	N11	Europrospected of Yuriy Lutsenko
2012-03-30	N12	Not to be ashamed in front of Europe
2012-04-13	N14	EU is Ukraine' last bastion
2012-06-15	N22	The progress of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and EU depends on Kiev Modernization, eurointegration, stability and equilibristic
2012-06-22	N23	EU will not change sanctions
2012-07-16	N24	Yanukovich closed a window to Europe
2012-10-05	N35	Is there an exit from Eurointegration dead end?
2012-10-12	N36	EU is losing its positions
2012-10-19	N37	European protection Merkel and Europe
2012-10-26	N38	EU sanctioned Lukashenko

2012-11-23	N42	European court took Tymoshenko's complain
2012-11-30	N44	EU, possibly customs union. Border security opened a dialogue with the EU
2012-12-17	N45	EU- tightening belt to stay together? Is the Europe of region possible? Ukraine, Europe and Rudeness or some thoughts about nothing Eurointegration: cannot speed up so slow so slowdown
2013		
2013-03-06	N9	Demographics slows down visa free regime with the EU
2013-03-12	N14	EU asked Kiev to stop selective justice
2013-03-19	N15	EU personal sanctions The right choice- EU
2013-04-26	N 16	In Europe step by step - from visa free to association
2013-05-17	N 17	German Ambassador Christopher Vail: " I wish that the association agreement will be sign in November 2013"
2013-05-24	N18	Ukraine and Europe' strategic plans
2013-05-31	N19	EU is looking for a reason to say "yes" to Ukraine
2013-06-06	N20	EU announced new round of fight against tax minimization
2013-06-26	N 24	EU-Ukraine: problems of integration
		Europe criticized Ukrainian law about referendum
		USA recommended to the EU not forgetting about Tymoshenko
2013-07-05	N25	Subway to Europe
		Gas from EU- jurisdiction reasons
2013-08-22	N30	EU: opened door for Serbia, but Croatia entered
2013-08-30	N 31	By foot to the EU
		Ukraine will meet all requirements of the euro commission
2013-09-06	N32	Yanukovich: " Ukraine should have a referendum about EU and custom union"
2013-09-13	N33	The law of Eurointegration
		European parliament disapproved Russian policy
2013-10-11	N37	Compulsion to the euro integration
2013-10-25	N 39	European parliament recommends to sign. IF...
2013-11- 01	N 40	Eurointegration and the popcorn effect
2013-11-08	N 41	Political poker around agreement between EU and Ukraine Foreign policy of the EU- challenge by Ukraine
2013- 11-22	N 42	Tymoshenko asks Yanukovich to sign association agreement with the EU

Table 2 Argumenty i Fakty, 2005 - 2013

DATE	ISSUE	TITLE
2005		
2005 – January 26	N4	Ukraine- Russia: Yushchenko in Moscow
2005- February 02	N5	Oligarchs: BAB (Berezovsky) will build a house in Kiev
2005- February 02	N5	Elephants in Orange
2005- February 09	N6	Ukraine: hassles and reforms
2005-February 16	N7	Ukraine: In Russia he is slow, in Kiev - he is a big man
2005- February 23	N8	Opposition: the fight for Orange leadership
2005- February 23	N8	Ukraine: Revolution on the March
2005- March 02	N9	Orange BATs- BATs
2005- March 09	N10	Ukraine: Na Kuchmu "povesily" one more dead body
2005- March 09	N10	Abhazhiya waits for Ukrainians?
2005- March 16	N11	In Kiev by Paris
2005- May 11	N19	Ukraine: secret "file of Gongadze"
2005-July 06	N27	EU- a deal for three?
2005-July 13	N28	Life of political subjects - to bother and not to steel
2005- July 20	N29	Ukraine: gas in a name of revolution?
2005- August 17	N33	Brothers by mind: Saakashvili amused Yushchenko
2005- September 21	N38	Ukraine: whom will Moscow support?
2005- September 28	N39	Ukraine: Tender of candidates
2005- October 05	N40	Russia- Ukraine: gas attack on Yushchenko
2005- November 30	N48	Yushchenko will leave Europe without gas?
2005- December 21	N51	The questions with a smell of gas.
2005- December 28	N52	Black panther helps Orange.
2010		
2010- January 20	N3	Ukraine: celebration continues
2010- February 03	N5	Tymoshenko is preparing for a scandal
2010- February 10	N6	What to expect from Yanukovych?
2010- February 10	N6	Ukraine: change of Victors
2010- March 03	N9	Yanukovych cheated with West?
2010-April 21	N16	Discount for a friend for 4 billion dollars?
2010-April 28	N17	What is more expensive for us: seaport or gas?
2010- May 19	N20	Friendship is friendship, but a gas pipe is separate.
2010- May 26	N21	Yanukovych wants to share something that does not belong to him.
2010- July 14	N28	Black lists will be deleted?
2010- September 22	N38	What did bring Pobeda?
2010- October 20	N42	Crimea will be connected to Russia
2013		
2013- March 06	N10	Ukraine is holding tight to the pipe.
2013- June 05	N23	What Yanukovych is thinking?
2013- July 31	N31	Which choice does Ukraine have?
2013- October 16	N42	The border with Ukraine is going to close?
2013- November 27	N48	What did Yanukovych bethink?
2013- December 04	N49	Innovalenky? (Foreign galoshes?)
2013 -December 04	N49	What is a buzz about in Kiev?
2013- December 18	N51	To foreign monastery?

Appendix 4 The variables coding

Questions	Scale
Confidence in political institutions	
<p>I am now going to ask you about several government institutions and leaders. For each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Verkhovna Rada • President Yushchenko (2004-2009) President Yanukovich (2010-2013) • The Prime-Minister • Constitutional Court • Local Courts • Supreme Court 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Great Deal 2. Fair Amount 3. Not very much 4. None at all 8. Do not know 9. Refused
Perception of democracy	
<p>1. Is Ukraine a democracy?</p> <p>2. Listed on this card are several statements. Please pick any statement or statements that you think accurately define what it means for a country to be a democracy. <i>Show Card; Multiple responses accepted</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Freedom of association • Freedom of religion • Freedom to vote • Everyone has work • Freedom of speech • Protection of human rights • State support of those unable to work • State support of pensioners • The system of checks and balances between different branches of government • No official corruption (in administrative bodies/people in power) • Freedom of Media • Fair and consistent enforcement of laws • 98 Don't know • 99Refused 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Yes 2.No
Membership in civic organizations	
<p>Can you tell me whether you are a member of any of the different types of civic organizations listed on this card? <i>[Show Card; Multiple responses accepted]</i>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trade unions • Political parties • Religious groups • NGOs • Artist unions/Scientist Unions • Local self-governance institutions • Student associations/groups • Condo association • Business association 	
<p>How necessary are non-governmental organizations, or NGOs, for Ukraine -- essential, necessary, not very necessary, or not at all necessary? *</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Essential 2. Necessary 3. Not very necessary 4. Not at all necessary 8. Don't know 9. Refused.
Social trust	
<p>I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all?</p> <p>People of different religion</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People of another nationality • People you know personally • Your family • Your neighborhood • Your compatriots 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 –Trust completely, 2- Trust somewhat, 3- Do not trust very much, 4- Do not trust at all.
Political competence	
<p>1. How interested are you in matters of politics and governments?</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1-Very interested 2-Somewhat interested 3- Not too interested 4-Not at all interested

2. How much information do you feel you have about political development in Ukraine?	8-Do not know 9-Refused 1-Great deal 2-Fair Amount 3-Not very much 4-None at all 5-Do not know 6-Refused 7-Not at all
<p>From which of the following sources do you get most of your information about issues affecting Ukraine? [Show Card; Multiple responses allowed] *</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ukrainian TV Channels • Russian TV channels • Ukrainian radio • Russian radio from Russia • Russian language radio (Ukraine) • Ukrainian newspapers • Russian newspapers from Russia • Ukrainians magazines • Foreign media (BBC, VOA, etc.) • Internet • Local radio or newspapers • Workplace • Relatives, friends and neighbors 	
Political efficacy	
<p>Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People like you can have an impact on the decision made by the government? • I have a role in solving problems in my community • I have a role in solving problems in my country • People working together in a group or as part of a community can bring about needed changes. 	1 -Strongly agree 2- Somewhat agree 3- Somewhat disagree 4 -strongly disagree 8- Do not know 9- Refused
Political Activity	
<p>Have you done any of the following to express your views?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contacted or visited a public official - at any level of government - to express your opinion? • Taken part in protest, march or demonstration? • Signed a written or email petition • Written on a blog or internet site to express your opinion on a political or social issue? • Using social media such as Vkontakte, Odnoklassniki, Facebook and Twitter to express your views on political issues 	1- Yes (over the past 12 months) 2 – Yes (earlier) 3 – No 1 and 2 categories were combined.
Demographic questions	
<p>What is the highest level of education that you received</p> <p>What is your age</p> <p>What is your religious affiliation?</p> <p>What is your type of residence?</p> <p>What is your employment status?</p> <p>What is the main language that you speak at home?</p>	<p>Recoded variables:</p> <p>Education: 1-Primary 2- Secondary 3- bachelor and higher</p> <p>Age: 18-29 30-44 45-59 60+</p> <p>Religion: 1- Orthodox Christianity 0-all others</p> <p>Type of residence: 1-Urban 0 – Rural</p> <p>Employment: 1-Employed, 0 – all others</p> <p>Language at home: 1-Ukrainian 0 – all others</p>

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