

“Gendering” the Transitions: Women’s Movements in the Spanish and Portuguese Transitions to Democracy

By Andrea Simoes, B.A

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Masters of Arts

Department of Political Science
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
Canada

©Andrea Simoes, 2006



Library and
Archives Canada

Bibliothèque et
Archives Canada

Published Heritage
Branch

Direction du
Patrimoine de l'édition

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file *Votre référence*
ISBN: 978-0-494-18298-7
Our file *Notre référence*
ISBN: 978-0-494-18298-7

NOTICE:

The author has granted a non-exclusive license allowing Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, communicate to the public by telecommunication or on the Internet, loan, distribute and sell theses worldwide, for commercial or non-commercial purposes, in microform, paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright ownership and moral rights in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

AVIS:

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public par télécommunication ou par l'Internet, prêter, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, sur support microforme, papier, électronique et/ou autres formats.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur et des droits moraux qui protègent cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms may have been removed from this thesis.

Conformément à la loi canadienne sur la protection de la vie privée, quelques formulaires secondaires ont été enlevés de cette thèse.

While these forms may be included in the document page count, their removal does not represent any loss of content from the thesis.

Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant.


Canada

ABSTRACT

Long suppressed under Fascist rule, democratization set the stage for the resurgence of the women's movements in both Spain and Portugal. Democratization transformed the political space in which the movements could manoeuvre, and the dynamics of each transition shaped the political opportunities, discourses and strategies available to the women's movements. Women, however, were not passive actors, reacting to the changes occurring in the political opportunity structure. In turn, they attempted to "gender" the Spanish and Portuguese transitions. I compare the dynamic relationship between Spain and Portugal's paths to democracy and the women's movements. What were the political and discursive opportunities available to the women's movements at the different stages of democratization, and how did the women's movements respond to these opportunities?

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To my parents who have always supported me, thank you.
And to Alex, for all those Saturdays spent driving me to Portuguese school.

To Frank, for your strength through my darkest hours.

I would like to thank all those persons who helped me along the way. In particular, I want to express my gratitude to Dr. Vickers, without whom I wouldn't be here.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	ii
Acknowledgements	iii
Table of Contents	iv
Introduction	1
Methodology	4
Chapter Outlines	7
Chapter 2: Women's Movements and Democracy: Building a Conceptual Framework	
Introduction	9
Defining Women's Movements	10
Democracy and Civil Society: Conceptual Clarification	13
Democratization Theory	17
Civil Society, Social Movements and the Democratization Process	28
Social Movement Theory	30
Where are the Women?	39
Gender Regimes, Gender Orders and Rounds of Restructuring	40
Women, Women's Movements and the State	43
Women and Democratization	46
Chapter 3: Fascism and the Iberian Women's Movements	
Introduction	47
Authoritarian Legacies	48
Authoritarianism and Women's Movements	51
The Early Women's Movements in Spain and Portugal	53
Fascism Under Salazar - The Portuguese Case	57
Fascism Under Franco - The Spanish Case	66
Women in Portugal	73
Women in Spain	77
Final Comparisons	80
Chapter 4: Women's Movements and the Breakdown of Authoritarianism	
Introduction	82
Women's Movements and the Breakdown of Authoritarianism	84
The Decline of the Authoritarian Regime in Spain	90
Women's Activism in Spain during the Breakdown	97
The Decline of the Authoritarian Regime – Portugal	108
Women's Activism in Portugal	116
Final Comparisons	123

Chapter 5: Women's Movements in the Transition to Democracy	
Introduction	126
Women's Movements and Transitions to Democracy	128
The Portuguese Transition – The Revolution of the Carnations	137
The Women's Movement and the April 25 th Revolution – A Window of Opportunity	141
The Limits of the Portuguese Revolution	147
The Defeat of Popular Power and Counter-revolution	152
The Window of Opportunity Closes - Women and the Counterrevolution	153
The Spanish Transition – Transition by Transaction	156
Women's Movements and the Spanish Transition – Restricted Opportunities	162
The Catalan and Basque Women's Movements	170
Women's Movements and the Constitutional Drafting Process	176
Final Comparisons	182
 Chapter 6: Conclusion	 186
Women's Movements Under Iberian Fascism	187
Women's Movements During the Breakdown of Authoritarianism	190
Women's Movements During the Democratic Transitions	192
Implications of the Transition Phase	194
Theorizing the Spanish and Portuguese Women's Movements	201
 Glossary	 204
 Bibliography	 205

Introduction

On April 25th 1974, Portuguese women took to the streets in support of the Revolution of the Carnations. A military coup formally brought decades of fascist rule to an end, setting Portugal on the path towards democracy. Shortly afterwards, the death of Franco initiated Spain's own transition to democracy. Spanish women's participation in the Democratic Opposition helped propel democratization forward. Spanish and Portuguese women's movements attempted to stake a claim in their countries' transition. The relationship between women, women's movements and democracy in Spain and Portugal has been under-theorized.

The transitions to democracy in Portugal and Spain, along with Greece, marked the beginning of the Third Wave of Democratization. Upheld as successful examples of democratization, the political transformations in Southern Europe have generated significant scholarship on the dynamics of democratization. Mainstream democratization literature explores various aspects of democratization in Spain and Portugal, from the breakdown of the authoritarian regimes to the voting patterns of the newly consolidated democracies. Generally elitist, they often minimize the role of collective action and movement activity. Moreover, most democratization theorists ignore the gendered dimensions of these processes. The allocation of political rights to women, while acknowledged as a signpost of democracy, has failed to draw further scrutiny. Women are largely invisible in studies of the Spanish and Portuguese transitions.

As the countries of Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe democratized, feminist scholars, in turn, have problematized questions of women and democracy. Their focus on women's organizing in newly democratizing countries also corresponds to the

current scholarly interest in the relationship between social movements, civil society and democracy. Feminist research on democratization has helped introduce a bottom-up perspective, shifting the narrow focus of mainstream literature away from elite actors to also incorporate movements and civil society. Feminist literature on democratization, however, also counters male-centric social movement research, which tends to ignore the gendered aspects of civil society and movement activity. By applying a gender lens to democratization, feminist literature theorizes both the impact of democratization on women's lives and on women's organizing, and examines the role of women in the transition processes, notably through women's movements.

Feminist scholars exploring the gender dynamics of democratization, however, have largely ignored the cases of Spain and Portugal. Due to the weakness of the women's movements in Spain and Portugal, and the newness of their Women's Studies programs, only recently has academic research on women and women's movements expanded there. Nonetheless, most of the Spanish and Portuguese feminist research has not theorized the democratization period. In Portugal, especially, there has been little in-depth analysis of the relationship between the women's movements and the transition to democracy. Meanwhile, most Western feminists focus on more recent cases of democratic transition, particularly in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Very few English-language resources have examined the Spanish transition to democracy, and fewer, if any, such resources exist on the Portuguese women's movement.

Women's movements in Spain and Portugal have generally been under-researched and under-theorized by Western feminists. When the transitions to democracy took place in the mid-1970s, Spanish and Portuguese women had endured decades of Fascism. As

semi-peripheral states, both experienced low-levels of socioeconomic development, and low levels of women's mobilization. Western liberal values, including feminism, had just begun to penetrate Spanish and Portuguese society. Consequently, women's transitional experiences do not fit into studies of Western European women, nor do Iberian women qualify as women in the developing world. Grouped under the category of Southern European women, along with Italy and Greece, the Spanish and Portuguese women's movements are often overlooked.

Although women's organizing in these countries is weak, it is not non-existent. Indeed, with regards to the connections between democratization and the mobilization of women, there are parallels with other transitions and lessons to be drawn from these two examples. Through a comparison of the Spain and Portugal, my thesis addresses this gap in the academic literature. Specifically, my thesis examines the dynamic relationship between the transitions to democracy in Spain and Portugal, and the women's movements therein. Democratization transforms the political space in which movements arise, and consequently the opportunities available to the women's movement. Women's movements are not passive actors; they attempt to shape the outcome of the transition. Their capacity to "gender" the transition processes, however, is constrained by the political context in which they develop. At each stage of the transition to democracy, women's movements face different political opportunity structures, resources, discourses and collective action frames, which may facilitate or hinder women's mobilization. Transitions may also transform the dominant gender regime, further impacting women's activism. By analyzing the dynamics of the transitions to democracy in Spain and Portugal, my thesis demonstrates why the Spanish and Portuguese women's movements

played limited roles in their democratic transitions. I further examine how the minority women's movement in the Spanish regions of Catalonia and the Basque faced a women-friendlier opportunity structure.

Moreover, the Revolution of the Carnations in Portugal and the *ruptura-pactada* in Spain exemplify two divergent paths to democracy. By comparing the Spanish and Portuguese women's movements, I address how different modes of transition present women with contrasting opportunity structures. The Revolution of the Carnations, with its focus on Popular Power, offered the Portuguese women's movement a window of opportunity for political change. The Revolution, however, did not succeed, and the window of opportunity shut before the women's movement could fully achieve its goals. By contrast, the breakdown of authoritarianism had enabled greater levels of women's activism. Furthermore, although Spain's negotiated transition offered women fewer opportunities for women's mobilization in the short-run, the transition established a friendlier democratic opportunity structure.

Methodology

I qualitatively compare the women's movements in Spain and Portugal through a feminist lens. The comparative historical analysis of the democratic transitions empirically grounds my theoretical inquiry. I am approaching my thesis primarily from a feminist position, and as such I am centrally concerned with the contextuality of experiences. In order to understand the relationship between democratization and the women's movement, the focus is on understanding the context in which democratization occurred. A comparative analysis allows me to examine the specific experiences of

Spanish and Portuguese women, and to identify the shared facets of the transitions to democracy and their impact on the women's movements.

By drawing on mainstream democratization literature, social movement theory and feminist literature, I build a conceptual framework that allows me to theorize the various dimensions of the relationship between the women's movements and the transitions to democracy in Spain and Portugal. Democratization literature offers insights into the nature of the democratization, while social movement theory provides me with the conceptual tools to assess how the processes of the transition promoted or hindered women's mobilization. These male-stream approaches, however, are gender-blind. By incorporating a gender lens, I explore the gendered dynamics of democratization and movement activity. Moreover, a gender lens allows me to address how women's organizing is conditioned by the dominant gender regime.

In order to assess the gendered connections between women's mobilization and the Spanish and Portuguese women's movements, I draw on existing feminist literature on women and democracy. When drawing comparisons with other cases of democratization, the historical legacy of Iberian fascism both on the transitions to democracy and on the women's movements, raises a number of challenges. Salazar and Franco ruled over Portugal and Spain for over three decades. Moreover, their fascist ideology relied on the demobilization of the masses rather than on populism. As such, comparisons with the experiences of German and Italian women pose challenges. Both Italian and German women experienced a briefer, populist brand of fascism, and they democratized in the post-World War period. Although, the Spanish and Portuguese transitions took place in the same years as the Greek transition, and the states shared

similar levels of socioeconomic development, there are points of contrast. For one, at the time of the transitions, Greek women had stronger histories of mobilization, particularly tied to their nationalist movements, and they had more recent experiences of democracy. Also, years of political instability precluded widespread demobilization as experienced in Spain and Portugal. Moreover, comparisons with Greek women are hindered by the similar under-theorization of their transitional experiences.

Consequently, I draw primarily on feminist literature on women's movements in Latin America. Again, important distinctions exist between the Iberian and the Latin American experiences. Most military authoritarian regimes in Latin America were of shorter duration. Women's movements had stronger histories of mobilizing both in democratic and authoritarian contexts. Most Latin American countries also democratized in the 1980s, in the context of neo-liberalism and globalization. This period was also marked by intense women's transnational networking and United Nations Women's Conferences. Despite these differences, there are some points of convergence between them. The Conservative Catholic gender ideologies of the military authoritarian regimes closely resembled those of Franco and Salazar. Catholicism and the Catholic Church also figured prominently in Spain, Portugal and Latin America. Moreover, the transitions to democracy in Latin America and Iberia, concurred with the Capitalist-driven restructuring of gender relations, as higher numbers of women entered the work force.

Latin American women have not experienced uniform transitions to democracy. Feminist researchers on Latin American democratizations have engaged in analyses of the relationship between women's movements and democratization across various contexts. Feminist researchers have subsequently identified a number of common themes

and issues facing women's movements in Latin American transitional contexts. These issues are also relevant in the Spanish and Portuguese transitional experiences. Moreover, the key points of difference between Latin America and the Spanish and Portuguese movements, may offer insights into the overall weakness of Iberian women's mobilizing.

Chapter Outlines

This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter two builds my theoretical framework. I explore democratization literature and social movement theory, and introduce a feminist critique of these male-centric approaches. This chapter also examines key concepts such as women's movements, democracy, civil society and gender regimes.

Chapter three compares how and why fascism in both Spain and Portugal suppressed women's mobilization, and stunted the development of the early women's movements. By examining the nature of the fascist regimes, especially their gender ideologies and their political opportunity structure, the chapter offers insights into the limited capacity of women to organize under Iberian fascism, as compared to other authoritarian regimes. This chapter also provides a background on the key features of the fascist regimes, which then influenced democratization.

Chapter four explores how the breakdown of authoritarianism fostered the reemergence of the women's movement. As new mobilizing structures emerged and as the regimes became unstable, women had new opportunities to mobilize, both in the general opposition movements and in women specific organizations. A comparison of the

Spanish and Portuguese contexts reveals that women in Portugal had fewer opportunities to mobilize, and consequently a weaker women's movement emerged.

Chapter five examines the dynamics of the transition phase of democratization Spain and Portugal. I argue that due to the mode of transition, women in Portugal faced a more favourable political opportunity structure than the Spanish women's movement. Portugal's revolution promoted the development of civil society while Spain's *ruptura pactada* attempted to curb mass mobilization in favour of elite politics. Unfortunately, the defeat of Popular Power closed the window of opportunity available to the women's movement.

The conclusion reviews the previous three chapters. After briefly comparing the Spanish and Portuguese women's experiences during fascist, during the breakdown of authoritarianism, and during the transition to democracy, I explore the implications of these experiences in the women's movements in the post-transitional democracies.

Chapter 2: Women's Movements and Democracy - Building a Conceptual Framework

When Portugal and Spain democratized, the dynamics of democratization conditioned the nature of their newly democratic states, and also shaped the nature of civil society. Insofar as women's movements are located within civil society, changes in the socio-political context also shape women's mobilization. To understand the relationship between democratization and women's movements in Spain and Portugal, I lay out a conceptual framework grounded in democratization literature, social movement theory and feminist literature. Each of these theoretical approaches provides valuable insights into a particular dimension of the relationships between women's movements and the processes of democratization. Mainstream democratization literature focuses on institutional transformations during the democratization processes. Democratization theory conceptualizes changes to the formal political context, particularly the central state's political opportunity structure. "Social movement theory", on the other hand, offers a sociological account of movements, and how they interact with the larger political context in which they emerge. Neither of these approaches, however, recognizes how gender permeates social relations, ignoring how political processes and social movements are gendered, and how dominant gender relations and beliefs affect the mobilization of women. By applying a gendered lens, feminist accounts theorize the gender dimensions of the political opportunity structure. Together these approaches frame a comprehensive analysis of the women's movements in Spain and Portugal. By integrating these three strands of theory, I link the development of women's movements to the broader transformations in the political context during transitions to democracy.

This chapter lays out my conceptual framework in five sections. The first section provides definitions of key concepts including women's movements, civil society and democracy. In the second section, I outline aspects of democratization theory I will use to address the Spanish and Portuguese cases. Section three, drawing on "Social Movement Theory," examines how key components of the political process affect, and are affected by social movements. This section establishes links between social movements, civil society and democratization. In the fourth section, I introduce a gender lens. Employing Sylvia Walby's concept of a gender regime¹, I theorize relationships among women, women's movements and states. The final section of the chapter builds on the previous sections to provide a theoretical account of relationships between women and democracies. Drawing from feminist analyses of transitions to democracies, I develop the framework I will use in successive chapters. Little of the existing feminist literature on women and democratization focuses on the experiences of Iberian women. Nonetheless, analyses of cases in which women's movements played significant roles in the democratization process, and where women mobilized in strong numbers, in particular, can help explain why the Spanish and Portuguese women's movements remained relatively weak.

Key Definitions

Defining Women's Movements

A comparison of the Spanish and Portuguese women's movements necessitates definitional clarity about what constitutes a *women's movement*. During the democratization processes in Spain and Portugal, women participated in various

¹ Sylvia Walby, *Gender Transformations* (London: Routledge, 1997).

movements and collective demonstrations. However, not all women's social and political activism is part of a women's movement.² Women participate in social movements that don't specifically address women's interests. When women mobilize around non-gender specific issues, such as in opposition to authoritarian rule, even if they do not immediately question gender roles, their activism may become a catalyst for self-organization around gender issues, or for further participation in existing women's movements. Through their shared experiences within these movements, female participants may begin to develop a gender consciousness. Moreover, public activism, by its very nature, undermines women's traditional domestic roles and their relegation to the private sphere. Accordingly, it may unwittingly transform women into political actors. Women active in mixed-sex social movements can also use this mobilization to pursue gender justice. Therefore, women's mobilization, even outside of women's movements, by challenging conventional gender roles, and public/private distinctions, can indirectly further the status of women. Although women's activism in these movements is important, this activism should not be conflated with activism in women's movements.

It is also important to recognize that women's movements are not necessarily feminist movements. Feminist movements are "distinguished by their challenge of patriarchy,"³ thereby excluding women's organizing that does not consciously and explicitly challenge gender roles and hierarchies. Maxine Molyneux distinguishes between 'strategic' and 'practical' gender interests, which roughly correspond to the distinction between feminist and non-feminist goals. 'Practical' gender interests "are those based on needs arising from women's placement within the sexual division of

² Karen Beckwith identifies the risks of this conflation. See Karen Beckwith, "Beyond Compare? Women's movements in Comparative Perspective," *European Journal of Political Research* 37 (2000) 431-468.

labour; and ‘strategic’ interests, those involving claims to transform social relations in order to enhance women’s position...”⁴ Her dichotomy between strategic and practical gender interests however is much critiqued.⁵ Many goals do not fall neatly into either category, while many activists pursue both types of interests. Moreover, many women do not have the means to pursue only their strategic interests. As well, creating a distinction between practical and strategic interests ignores the subversion of gender relations that may result from activism centred on women’s practical interests. Women’s movements and feminist movements are conceptually distinct and distinguishable, but in practice they are interrelated and overlapping. To consider only women’s activism that fits within the narrow boundaries of defined feminist activity ignores much of women’s organizing, and diminishes the valuable role their activities may play in improving the lives of women.

Beckwith’s definition of women’s movements as, “characterized by the primacy of women’s gendered experiences, women’s issues, and women’s leadership and decision making” is useful.⁶ Accordingly, “movement definition, issue articulation, and issue resolution are specific to women, developed by them with reference to their gender identity”.⁷ In this thesis, therefore, the term women’s movement thereby encompasses a broad array of groups and sub-movements, including feminist movements, all of which pursue gender-related goals. I assume that women’s movements vary in their degree of

³ Ibid 437.

⁴ Maxine Molyneux, *Women's movements in international perspective: Latin America and beyond* (New York: Palgrave, 2001) 153.

⁵ See such authors as Molyneux, *Women's movements in international perspective*; Elisabeth J Friedman, *Unfinished Transitions* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000) and Nikki Craske and Maxine Molyneux, “The Local, the Regional and the Global: Transforming the Politics of Rights” in *Gender and the Politics of Rights and Democracy in Latin America* Eds. Nikki Craske and Maxine Molyneux (New York: Palgrave, 2002) for more detailed critiques.

⁶ Quoted in Beckwith, “Beyond Compare? Women’s movements in Comparative Perspective” 437.

cohesion and organization, that “women’s” issues and interests vary across and within local and national contexts, and that movements themselves constitute sites of struggle over meaning, strategies and even interests. Given that women’s movements’ “politics, practices and outcomes [are] contingent on the broader social context and political meaning that [are] given to it,”⁸ conceptual tools are necessary to understand that framework.

Democracy and Civil Society: Conceptual Clarification

Authoritarianism is a political regime-type characterized by non-responsibility, limited political pluralism, and without extensive political mobilization.⁹ Citizenship is restricted, and decision-making power is arbitrarily controlled in the hands of a few leaders. Under an authoritarian regime, civic life is repressed, as the state uses violence against its defenceless populace. Authoritarianism, however, is more than a form of government; it is the embodiment of patriarchal power. Manifested in everyday practices, authoritarianism exists in the home and the community. Gender hierarchies allow men to exercise their power over women and children. The more authoritarian political regimes become, the more patriarchal everyday practices become.¹⁰

Democracy, in theory, is an ideal type, the meaning of which remains highly contested.¹¹ In practice, democracy is a regime type. Democracy is founded on the

⁷ Ibid 437.

⁸ Molyneux, *Women's movements in international perspective*.

⁹ Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996).

¹⁰ Najima Chowdhury and Barbara J. Nelson, “Redefining Politics: Patterns of Women’s Political Engagement from a Global Perspective,” in *Women and Politics Worldwide*. Eds. Barbara J. Nelson and Najma Chowdhury (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994) 12.

¹¹ Democracy has never been fully achieved, as even long-established democracies have undemocratic dimensions. Furthermore the meaning of democracy continues to be challenged and extended, depending on one’s theoretical perspective. As neither democratic states nor the meaning of democracy are static, it is possible to conceive of democratic states as continually in the process of becoming more or less

premise that 'the people' play a decision-making role, that they self-determine their governments and that the governments are responsible to the people. As Helena Catt indicates, "[i]deas of individual rights, autonomy and equality are central to theoretical arguments about democracy."¹² Democracy refers to a mode of governance, but also involves a set of practices and beliefs. Along with decisions about who constitutes the citizenry ('the people') and how collective decisions are made, a functioning democratic state necessitates decisions about how citizens are to be free and equal.¹³ Accordingly, there is no single manifestation of democracy and various models have emerged. Three main variants of democratic decision-making have been identified: participatory democracy where all members of the polity make decisions through consensus, direct democracy where all citizens vote directly on decisions, and representative democracy where citizens elect officials who then make decisions for all.¹⁴ The liberal model of representative democracy is the most common. By limiting decision-making to a select few, this model restricts citizens' participation in governance.¹⁵

At a minimum, representative democracy requires free and fair elections. Periodic elections, however, are insufficient indicators of a democratic regime. Along with free and fair elections, democratic theorists have identified democracy's minimal requirements to include "universal suffrage, accountability of the state's administrative organs to the elected representatives, and effective guarantees for freedom of expression

democratic. See John Markoff, *Waves of Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 1996).

¹² Helena Catt, *Democracy in Practice* (London: Routledge, 1999) 6.

¹³ Ibid 13.

¹⁴ Ibid 13.

¹⁵ See Catt, *Democracy in Practice* 13.

and association as well as protection against arbitrary state action.”¹⁶ Democracy, based in notions of equality and self-determination, requires mechanisms that allow all citizens to participate in the decision-making process. Constitutional rule, civil rights and democratic institutions thereby constitute central components of democratic governance.

Democratic forms also require democratic substance, such that democratic norms and a democratic culture must underlie democratic institutions. Formal political institutions that marginalize or exclude groups of citizens, notably women, are neither representative nor truly democratic. As feminists have emphasized, “Democracy without women is not democracy.”¹⁷ Democracy further involves a social and economic dimension, as wide economic disparities and social inequalities deny individuals political equality, and limit their participation in decision-making.¹⁸ Like authoritarianism, democracy manifests itself outside of politics, in everyday practices and relations. Without democratic gender relations, a society will not be fully democratic.¹⁹ Democratic political culture begins with democracy in the home.

Many democratic theorists believe that democratic functioning requires a vibrant civil society.²⁰ Civil society provides vital linkages between a democratic state and its

¹⁶ Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens, “The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory, and Social Dimensions,” in *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 29, No. 3, (Apr., 1997) 323.

¹⁷ Chowdhury and Nelson, “Redefining Politics: Patterns of Women’s Political Engagement from a Global Perspective” 18.

¹⁸ Huber et al, “The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy” 132. Feminist scholars have further emphasized this connection. For example, see Georgina Waylen, “Women and Democratization: Conceptualizing Gender Relations in Transition Politics,” *World Politics* 46(3) (1994) 327-354.

¹⁹ Elisabeth Friedman, “Paradoxes of Gendered Political Opportunity in the Venezuelan Transition to Democracy.” *Latin American Research Review* 33(3)(1998) 128.

²⁰ As Michael Walzer writes, “Only a democratic state can create a democratic civil society; only a democratic civil society can sustain a democratic state.” Michael Walzer, “The Idea of Civil Society,” in *Civil Society and Democracy*. Ed. Carolyn M. Elliott (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003) 79.

citizens.²¹ Civil society defines “that arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests.”²² Relatively independent, it is a space between the state, the family and the market. Civil society has also been distinguished from political society. Political society entails “that arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus.”²³ Political society draws on civil society, and in turn civil society influences the political society. Political society often attempts to control and circumscribe civil society, yet a political society that monopolizes civil society threatens the very quality of democracy. Individuals and organizations within civil society can hold both state apparatus and political society accountable. However, just as democratic theorists continue to debate the meaning of democracy and the best democratic arrangements, the appropriate role of civil society in a democratic polity is also disputed. Nonetheless, it is widely accepted that a dense, active civil society can provide a valuable check on political society and the power of the state.²⁴

Despite the value attributed to civil society, it is important to establish that civil society must also become democratic. Not all groups within civil society support democratic values, particularly in a newly democratic state. Civil society can thus threaten a democratic state. Moreover, as will be shown in later chapters, civil society is

²¹ This position draws largely from Robert Putnam’s work. See Carolyn M. Elliott, “Civil Society and Democracy - A Comparative Review Essay” in *Civil Society and Democracy*. Ed. Carolyn M. Elliott (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003).

²² Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* 8.

²³ Ibid. According to Linz and Stepan, political society is responsible for managing state apparatus, and for drawing the rules of law (see page 9). In liberal democracies, political parties usually dominate political society.

²⁴ Gideon Baker, *Civil Society and Democratic Theory: Alternative Voices* (London: Routledge, 2002).

not a monolithic entity.²⁵ Not all citizens can participate equally in civil society, nor do all groups hold the same level of prominence and influence.²⁶ Feminist scholars have shown that civil society is not gender-neutral. Civil society “is a space structured by gender relations of unequal power and its institutions (...) are male-dominated.”²⁷ Civil society may be as patriarchal, if not more patriarchal, than state structures. Furthermore, civil society may be as inaccessible to women as formal political institutions. Consequently, only by disaggregating civil society is it possible to access which “segment[s] of civil society actually challeng[e] authoritarian and hierarchical ways of doing politics.”²⁸

Democratization Theory

Democratization, as I employ the term here, is the process of regime change from authoritarian (or totalitarian) rule to democratic rule, concluding when democracy is consolidated.²⁹ Most mainstream democratization literature takes the ‘rooting’ of a liberal democratic model of democracy, in which the minimal formal requirements are met, to mean that democratization is complete. For insights into the Spanish and Portuguese transitions, I draw primarily on genetic approaches to democratization. Genetic theories

²⁵ Jude Howell and Diane Mulligan, “Editorial,” *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 5(2) (2003) 158.

²⁶ As various theorists of civil society have postulated, “unequal economic, social and cultural resources shape the contours of civil society itself.” Jean Grugel, *Democratization: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Palgrave, 2002) 94.

²⁷ Barbara Einhorn and Charlotte Sever, “Gender and Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe,” *International Feminist Journal* 5(2) (2003) 167.

²⁸ Nadjie S. Al-Ali, “Gender and Civil Society in the Middle East,” *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 5(2) (2003) 225-226.

²⁹ I employ this definition of democratization for practical purposes. Democracy is an ideal-type, the meaning of which is continually being redefined. Even established democratic regimes that meet the minimal requisites of democracy, can undergo democratic deepening. Because democracy refers to practices and beliefs about decision-making, other spheres of power in a polity can also democratize. In *Reinventing Democracy* Ed. Paul Hirst and Sunil Khilnani. (Cambridge, MA.: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), Tony Wright identifies the ‘terrain’ and ‘techniques’ of democracy. These terms are conceptually useful when examining democratization, both as new spaces become democratized, and the techniques of democracy are developed and improved upon.

“centr[e] attention on the dynamics of the process [of democratization], and provid[e] conceptual references for assessing individual cases of regime change.”³⁰

Increasingly, democratization is theorized as comprising three phases: the breakdown of authoritarianism, a transition phase and a consolidation phase. Although these three phases of democratization are analysed separately from one another, they constitute an integrated whole. Each involves a different set of forces and processes, yet remains closely linked to the others, frequently overlapping.³¹ Moreover, events in each phase impact the following phase. To fully grasp the dynamics of democratization, its multi-stage character should be recognized.³² Path dependency highlights the interconnectedness of these three phases, and examines democratization as the product of these three processes. This dynamic relationship constitutes the path to democracy. By acknowledging that there are different paths to democracy, this approach takes a historical perspective, seeking to contextually explain the differences between national settings. At each stage, the social and economic frame of society sets the ‘confining conditions’ within which political action takes place. As well, as choices are made, certain path possibilities are closed off. How political actors respond to, and interact with

³⁰ Geoffrey Pridham, *The Dynamics Of Democratization: A Comparative Approach* (London: Continuum, 2000) 9. Pridham identifies three streams of democratization theory: functionalist, transnational and genetic. Genetic theories are predominantly process-oriented approaches. By contrast, functionalist theories, which dominated the democratization literature in the 1960s, focus on those structural factors or preconditions thought necessary for democracy to emerge, e.g. economic development. While structural variables matter, and will be examined in the proceeding chapters, functionalist theories, do not provide a framework for examining the actual nature of the democratization process, and thus they cannot provide a foundation for then examining the impact of those processes on the women’s movements, or their role therein. I also do not focus on literature on the international spread of democracy. Although transnational trends may have provided some impetus for democracy, in and of themselves they provide limited explanations for the actual path taken towards democracy. Transnational factors cannot be discounted in Spain or Portugal, particularly when analyzing the character of the new democracy. They should not however be overemphasized in relation to endogenous factors.

³¹ Graeme Gill, *The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society, and the Transition Process*. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000) 8.

³² Pridham, *The Dynamics Of Democratization: A Comparative Approach* 17.

these conditions determines the path towards democracy.³³ When analyzing democratization, “the task is to trace and explain these processes.”³⁴

Democratization literature is limited by its elite-oriented, gender-blind approach, which assumes that elites determine the path to democracy. This approach focuses on the strategies and choices made by political elites, often ignoring the role of social movements, and mass mobilizations as a political force. Even where studies acknowledge the importance of mass mobilization, those within this approach usually consider only how elites respond to pressures from below. The impact of social movements at each stage of democratization, thus, tends to be discounted. Democratization theorists have begun to acknowledge the importance of collective action and mass movements, but they continue to relegate the impact of these movements to how it effects the decisions of elites. Underlying democratization literatures’ focus on elite decision-making is a narrow definition of politics. Politics is “defined narrowly to include only the upper institutional echelons of the public sphere.”³⁵ Social movement and grassroots activities, in which higher numbers of women take part, are seen as non-political, and are subsequently overlooked. Given women’s exclusion from institutional political power in both authoritarian and democratic states, women are rendered invisible.³⁶ Mainstream democratization literature’s gender-blind approach assumes the male experience as the norm, and thereby ignores the gendered dynamics underlying the democratization processes. Moreover, it’s narrow definition of the ‘political’ obscures its own gender biases, and marginalizes the significance of gender relations. Democratization literature,

³³ Geoffrey Pridham, “Southern European democracies on the road to consolidation: a comparative assessment of the role of political parties,” in *Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe* (London: Routledge, 1990).

³⁴ Grugel, *Democratization: A Critical Introduction* 58.

however, does not have to be rejected in its entirety. I agree with feminist scholar Elisabeth Friedman, who recognizes that democratization literature can help us understand the context in which women's mobilization occurs.³⁷ The gender biases in democratization literature reflect many of the gender biases of political elites and political institutions.

The elite-oriented nature of democratization literature is particularly evident in discussions of the breakdown of authoritarianism.³⁸ It concludes that breakdown occurs when the continued existence of the authoritarian regime becomes untenable. The breakdown of authoritarianism is a crucial and necessary phase of democratization, which despite sometimes being conflated with a transition, does not necessarily result in a transition to democracy.³⁹ The breakdown of an authoritarian regime may result in another authoritarian regime, not an inevitable progression towards democracy.⁴⁰

Democratization literature maintains that the breakdown of authoritarianism, barring foreign invasion, stems from an internal regime crisis. O'Donnell and Schmitter write, "there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence – direct or indirect – of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between hardliners and softliners."⁴¹ Aside from regime disunity, the two other central determinants of regime crisis are economic crises and political

³⁵ Waylen, "Women and Democratization" 333.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Friedman, "Unfinished Transitions."

³⁸ Diane Ethier, "Processes of Transition and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical Indicators," in *Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia* (London: Macmillan Press, 1990).

³⁹ The breakdown of authoritarianism is also distinct from liberalization, the opening up of the authoritarian regime. Breakdown may follow liberalization, but regimes may liberalize without undergoing democratization.

⁴⁰ This is not to say that the two periods are not closely related, nor that there is always a clear division between the two stages.

mobilization.⁴² Attempts to address these two factors often results in further conflicts between elites; regime disunity, on the other hand, can exacerbate an economic crisis or propel further political mobilization. Faced with these conditions: regime conflict, economic crisis and rising political mobilization, political actors must make choices about the future of the regime. How elites respond to the regime crisis, and whether the sources of the crisis can be successfully addressed, determine whether the regime can survive, or whether the regime collapses.⁴³ For some political actors, democracy must emerge during the breakdown as a preferable alternative to the status quo.⁴⁴ The nature of the breakdown and the responses of political actors to the regime crisis must therefore be examined within their particular context, especially insofar as they impact the course of transition.

By emphasizing elite responses to crises, democratization literature downplays the importance of political mobilization. Moreover, “it misspecifies the dynamics of that mobilization- when it appears and who makes it up.”⁴⁵ “[C]ivil society activism under authoritarianism is a gendered phenomenon.”⁴⁶ Often deemed ‘non-political’, women’s ‘social’ activities may escape state repression. This has allowed women to take leading roles in the protests against some military dictatorships, and to destabilize those regimes. Yet the ‘non-political’ nature of women’s activism has also led theorists to overlook

⁴¹ Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986).

⁴² The degree to which either of these factors matters depends on the case in question. As well, the nature of political mobilization and economic crisis will vary across cases.

⁴³ At this stage, elites attempting to resolve the crisis frequently attempt to liberalize the regime (i.e open up the regime). Once liberalization begins, elites divide over how much to liberalize (the hardliners vs. the softliners mentioned above). As well, they may find themselves unable to control the process, further undermining the regime.

⁴⁴ Adam Przeworski, “Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy,” in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

⁴⁵ Friedman, *Unfinished Transitions* 17.

women's early roles in opposition movements. Their activities have not fallen into expected opposition categories.⁴⁷ For example, women's human rights organizations in Argentina, particularly the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, were the first to sustain protests against the military government, which then helped propel the breakdown of the regime. Democratization literature consequently overstates the importance of elite negotiations, and ignores the gendered nature of both opposition activity and elites politics. Despite the shortcomings of democratization literature, the role of elite conflicts and choices in the breakdown of authoritarianism should not be understated. Transformations at the level of elite politics, as well as economic crises and traditional opposition activities also shape women's activism. These determinants of regime stability must be examined through a gendered lens.

According to democratization literature, the transition phase involves the construction of a new regime, beginning when the authoritarian regime has broken down, and concluding with "the establishment of a relatively stable configuration of political institutions within a democratic regime."⁴⁸ The beginning of the transition phase marks a period of uncertainty, as the former rules of the game are no longer applicable. New arrangements and agreements must be formulated and new rules established, but the outcome of these processes is still unclear. In contrast, democratization theorists describe the latter stages of this phase as "a closing end-game, necessarily dominated by elites establishing rules for the actual transfer of power and designing the institutions of new

⁴⁶ Susan Franceschet, "Women in Politics in Post-Transitional Democracies," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 3(2) (2001) 210.

⁴⁷ Friedman, *Unfinished Transitions* 18.

⁴⁸ Richard Gunther et al. "Introduction," in *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995) 3.

democracies.”⁴⁹ The mode or type of transition marks how this period of uncertainty becomes the installation of a democratic regime. Modes of transition are distinguished by the identity of the actors who initiate the transition, and the strategies they employ.⁵⁰ Although there are several possible scenarios, modes of transition fall into three main categories: transitions by abandonment of power, transitions by transfer of power and transitions by transaction.⁵¹ In transactions by abandonment of power, regime leaders are no longer able to maintain their grip on power, and regime opponents take power, and propel the transition forward. In transitions by transfer of power, faced with growing opposition, governing elites transfer power to the pro-democratic forces. Last, during transitions by transaction, regime elites negotiate with opposition leaders the transition to democracy, setting the terms for democratization. The Portuguese transition exemplifies a transition by abandonment of power, whereas the Spanish transition occurred through transaction.

Mainstream democratization literature on the transition phase emphasizes the political manoeuvrings and strategic choices of elite actors. Once the transition has been initiated, decisions and agreements must be reached on the nature and structures of the new democracy. Yet, during this phase, it is possible to identify the emergence of new elites, usually drawn from the pro-democratic opposition, although the leaders of the pro-authoritarian forces (predominantly the military and the Church) and economic elites may

⁴⁹ Ruth Berins Collier and James Mahoney, “Adding Collective Actors to Collective Outcomes: Labor and Recent Democratizations in South America and Southern Europe,” in *Transitions to Democracy*. Ed. Lisa Anderson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) 99.

⁵⁰ Gerardo L. Munck and Carol Skalnik Leff, “Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective,” in *Transitions to Democracy*. Ed. Lisa Anderson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) 193.

⁵¹ Theorists have developed various typologies of democratization. Alfred Stepan for example, has identified 8 paths towards democratization. Ethier identifies these three main typologies, “Processes of Transition and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical Indicators” 8.

also be involved. As the political space is reconfigured during the transition, previously banned political parties increasingly dominate the transition game. “Special attention has been given in the elite focus to elite pacts and settlements, and the concept of ‘political crafting’ in the way of conducting affairs.”⁵² O’Donnell and Schmitter define a pact as “an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a set of actors which seeks to define (or, better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of those entering into it.”⁵³ Of varying durations, pacts are usually intended to minimize elite conflict and competition, as participants are forced to moderate their positions. Pacts not only reduce the instability of the transition period, they may play a crucial role in the long-term by serving as the basis for new institutional arrangements. Pacts may define the standard operating procedures, shaping future relations between the state, political parties and civil society.⁵⁴ Foundational pacts, however, also risk institutionalizing the political exclusion of particular groups, while guaranteeing the interests of traditionally dominant groups (e.g business elites).⁵⁵ Therefore, although pacts may facilitate the transition in the short-term, they may ultimately hinder democratization.

Mainstream democratization literature does not address the gendered implications of the mode of transition, pacting processes or the return of political parties. The mode of transition and the role of the Opposition therein shapes the role women’s movements have in the transition to democracy. If a transition involves a shift in power from one set of elites to another, then social movements, including the women’s movement, risk

⁵² Pridham, *The Dynamics Of Democratization: A Comparative Approach* 137.

⁵³ O’Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* 37.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

becoming the casualties of the transition.⁵⁶ Furthermore, as the flux of the early transition gives way to more conventional politics, where do women's movements fit into the new rules of the game? Once male-dominated, political parties assume a central role in the transition, other forms of organizing decline. Women's movements are slowly squeezed out.⁵⁷ Pacting further excludes women from transition processes, and reinforces a narrow, elitist definition of politics. Women risk being marginalized as non-political actors within the new democratic structures. Democratization literature ignores the gendered nature of the transition; however, by applying a gendered lens to this literature (e.g. on pacting), it can reveal some of the obstacles and opportunities facing women's movements over the course of the transition.

The transition phase concludes when democratic institutions have been established, constitutional arrangements made, and a democratic government freely and fairly elected. Once the transition to democracy concludes, democratization is yet to be complete. Consolidation "refers to the achievement of substantial attitudinal support for, and behavioural compliance with the new democratic institutions and the rules of the game which they establish."⁵⁸ Consolidation is the rooting of democracy, and its structures, within a state. When a democracy has become consolidated, however, is not readily measured, such that consolidation is the least precise phase.⁵⁹ How then, to

⁵⁵ Grugel, *Democratization: A Critical Introduction* 59; Gill, *The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society, and the Transition Process* 54. See also Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 23(1) (1990) 7-18.

⁵⁶ Friedman, "Gendered Opportunities in the Venezuelan Transition" 94.

⁵⁷ Ibid; Franceschet, "Women's Politics in Post-Transitional Societies" 210.

⁵⁸ Richard P. Gunther, Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jurgen Puhle, "Introduction," in *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995) 3.

⁵⁹ There is theoretical debate among democratization scholars over the actual meaning, and by extension, the conceptual value of the term consolidation. See *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies Themes and Perspectives*. Eds. Larry Diamond et al. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1997).

determine, when democracy is consolidated? Linz and Stepan theorize three dimensions of consolidation: behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional. Behaviourally, a democracy is consolidated when “no significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic [sic] regime or turning to violence or foreign intervention to secede from the state.”⁶⁰ Attitudinally, the majority of the public accepts and supports democratic governance. Constitutionally, both governmental and non-governmental forces are subjected to rule of law, as conflict resolution takes place within the boundaries of the democratic process.⁶¹

During the consolidation phase, the form of democracy becomes institutionalized. Formal political structures are established and informal political practices become routinized. The uncertainty of the transition phase gives way to a more permanent political opportunity structure. New and old actors must find their places in the consolidating democracies.⁶² Literature on the consolidation phase focuses primarily on institutional arrangements, not on elite behaviour. Carey states, “Why is institutional analysis of particular importance to the consolidation of new democracies? Because formal rules, through their impact on party systems, can affect both the acceptance of new regimes and the governability of the system.”⁶³ Democracy becomes politics as

While consolidation necessitates a degree of political stability, this does not preclude an eventual breakdown.

⁶⁰ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* 6. There is some contention as to who constitutes a politically significant actor. In Spain, for example, does ETA constitute a significant actor? If so, has Spain yet to consolidate? This definition is an ideal type, consequently Spain may be the exception to the rule.

⁶¹ *Ibid* 8.

⁶² It should be noted that not all political actors (collective and individual) dominant during the transition phase continue to play a role during consolidation.

⁶³ John M. Carey, “Institutional Design and Party Systems,” in *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies Themes and Perspectives*. Eds. Larry Diamond et al. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1997) 68.

usual, and parties, having re-emerged during the transition phase, tend to become the central actors in the consolidated democracies.⁶⁴ Subsequently, the consolidation of the party system is closely attributed to the consolidation phase.⁶⁵

Democratization literature on consolidation emphasizes political institutions, and their potential to stabilize a democratic regime. By employing narrow definitions of democracy, citizenship and politics, theorists assume that once democratic institutions meet the minimal standards of democracy, democratization is complete. Democracy, citizenship and institutional politics are again treated as gender neutral. However, women do not have equal access to citizenship or to democratic decision-making. The challenge then, is to address the gendered nature of the new democratic institutions and citizenship practices that democratization literature elaborates on.

Political arrangements that emerge during the consolidation phase are “conditioned by transition and (...) somewhat by the form of pre-transition developments and how the earlier regime collapsed or disintegrated”.⁶⁶ The permanence of consolidated political arrangements, however, renders them of long-term importance for the development of civil society and movements. Controlled and suppressed under authoritarianism, movements resurge during democratization.⁶⁷ As the public and political space is restructured during democratization, previously depoliticised and

⁶⁴ This is the pattern in most liberal democracies.

⁶⁵ Pridham and Lewis, for example, maintain “the relationship of parties with society is the ultimate test of how democratic consolidation is beginning to develop.” Geoffrey Pridham and Paul Lewis. “Introduction: Stabilising fragile democracies and party system development,” in *Stabilising Fragile Democracies* (London: Routledge, 1996) 20. See also Geoffrey Pridham, “Southern European democracies on the road to consolidation: a comparative assessment of the role of political parties,” in *Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe* (London: Routledge, 1990).

⁶⁶ Pridham, “Southern European democracies on the road to consolidation: a comparative assessment of the role of political parties” 2.

⁶⁷ O’Donnell and Schmitter define this as the resurrection of civil society. O’Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* 48.

demobilized masses begin to freely organize and participate in civil society. By the consolidation phase, the configuration of civil society, and its role in the new democracy becomes established. Indeed, theorists such as Linz, Stepan, and Ethier, consider civil society to be one of the central arenas of democratic consolidation.⁶⁸ Yet, the institutional focus of mainstream democratization literature fails to adequately theorize civil society, movements or to gender these processes.⁶⁹ If an active civil society is an important component of a consolidated democracy, how do the processes of democratization shape its development? What is the role of civil society at each phase, and how do the dynamics of these phases condition the overall configuration of civil society? More specifically, for the purposes of this essay, how are women's movements shaped by democratization? Insofar as the previous regime, the regime breakdown and the transition to democracy condition the consolidation of democracy, how do they impact the development of women's movements and consequently their role in the consolidated democracy?

Civil Society, Social Movements and the Democratization Process

Recent democratization literature increasingly acknowledges the failings of elite-centric accounts of democratization. Greater focus has shifted to the role of political mobilization as a driving force in democratization.⁷⁰ Although the role of social movements and civil societies depends on the country being examined, their impact

⁶⁸ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* 7; Ethier, "Processes of Transition and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical Indicators" 16.

⁶⁹ Even authors such as Philippe C. Schmitter who recognize that civil society may contribute to democratization, reject political mobilization as the main determinant of democratization during any of the three phases. Moreover, they are wary of the negative potential of civil society to derail democratization. See O'Donnell and Schmitter; and Philippe C. Schmitter. "Civil Society East and West," in *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies Themes and Perspectives* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1997).

⁷⁰ Part of the emphasis on social movements and civil society reflects the radical challenges to the liberal versions of democracy. If (participatory) democracy is not centred in the state, but in civil society, democratization and the functions of civil society need to be reconceptualized. See Baker, *Civil Society and Democratic Theory*.

should not be underestimated. “Even if at one level they are secondary to the role of regime elites, they are actually fundamental to the structuring of the actions of those regimes elites and to explaining them.”⁷¹ The ‘popular upsurge’⁷², while perhaps limited in its ability to set the terms of democratization or the form of the new democracy, may nonetheless force elites actors to stay the course of democratization. As Garretón succinctly states, “[c]ivil societies alone do not remove institutionalized dictatorships; neither do political leaders alone.”⁷³

Despite the importance of civil society, not all groups and movements assume the same role in the democratization process. As Gill points out, regime elites choose with whom to negotiate.⁷⁴ Moreover, as civil society undergoes its own transformation during democratization, the roles of the various segments within civil society continue to change. Collective action (the popular upsurge) isn’t sustained evenly throughout democratization. Previously dominant within the opposition forces, movements often demobilize during the latter stages of the transition and the consolidation phase.⁷⁵ Recognition of the importance of social movements has fostered new inquiry into individual movements and democratization. In order to understand how movements, including the women’s movement, relate to changing political environments, these analyses draw from social movement theory. While democratization theory provides

⁷¹ Gill, *The Dynamics of Democratization* 127.

⁷² Coined by O’Donnell and Schmitter, political upsurge defines the coming together of various social groups in support of democracy. O’Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* 51-52.

⁷³ Manuel Ant3nio Garret3n, *Incomplete Democracy: Political Democratization in Chile and Latin America* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003) 82.

⁷⁴ Gill, *The Dynamics of Democratization*

⁷⁵ Patricia Hipsher, “Democratization and the Decline of Urban Social Movements in Chile and Spain,” *Comparative Politics* 28(3) April 1996; Philip Oxhorn. *Organizing Civil Society: the popular sectors and the struggle for democracy in Chile* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).

insights into the dynamics of transitions to democracy, social movement theory provides insights into movement dynamics.

Social Movement Theory⁷⁶

Within social movement theory, various approaches to social movements have emerged.⁷⁷ Movement activism has several dimensions; accordingly, the insights provided by one perspective do not preclude the applicability of other approaches. Rather, the integration and reconciliation of the various conceptual tools may contribute to a fuller account of a movement. Culture and structure, agency and identity do not exist independently of one another. An integrated approach allows for an examination of the interplay of each of these dimensions when analyzing a given movement. This section outlines the central concepts of RMT, POS, NSMT, framing processes and "repertoires of action", which are then applied to the women's movements during democratization.

Resource mobilization theory and the concept of mobilizing structures focus on the process of mobilization, the resources and conditions necessary to mobilize individuals into collective action. According to RMT, the mobilization is "motivated, coordinated and facilitated by shifts in resources."⁷⁸ Resources refer to money and labour, as well as material and technical resources, legitimacy and public support; these are required for movements to exist and to operate⁷⁹. The availability of resources also shapes the strategies and tactics of movements. Resources are drawn from within a

⁷⁶ I use the term social movement to refer to both social and political movements. Most movements, like the women's movements, are comprised of both a social and political dimension. Hence, to distinguish between social and political movements creates a false dichotomy.

⁷⁷ RMT, POS, Social Constructionism, New Social Movement theory constitute the main variants of SMT. Micromobilization/Social Psychology perspectives will not be addressed.

⁷⁸ Nick Crossley, *Making Sense of Social Movements* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2002) 79.

⁷⁹ John D. McCarthy, "The Globalization of Social Movement Theory," in *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997), and John D.

movement's constituency and from various external sources, domestic and international. "Because resources are necessary for engagement in social conflict, they must be aggregated for collective purposes.... requir[ing] some minimal form of organization."⁸⁰ Organizations constitute elements of the mobilizing structures. Mobilizing structures "include the more or less formally organized everyday life patterns upon which movements build collective action".⁸¹ As the vehicles that enable participation in social movements, mobilizing structures range from informal networks, such as friendship networks, where collective action may be generated, to formal movement organizations, purposely established to pursue movement goals. The concept of "[m]obilizing structures usefully aggregates all of these many varieties of enabling institutional configurations."⁸² During democratization, the resources and the mobilizing structures available to social movements undergo transformations, especially as authoritarian controls collapse and new forms of organizing become possible. At each phase, then, it is possible to address what these changes are and how these shifts transform the ability of movements to organize and to engage in collective action. A key resource and mobilizing structure, especially relevant throughout the stages of democratization, is popular mobilization in the form of pro-democratic movements. These movements facilitate women's

McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory" *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (1977) 1216.

⁸⁰ McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory" 1216.

⁸¹ McCarthy, "The Globalization of Social Movement Theory" 249.

⁸² John D. McCarthy, "Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting, Adapting and Inventing," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings*. Eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Elisabeth Friedman describes mobilizing structures as 'organizational infrastructure'. See E.J. Friedman, "Gendering the Agenda: The impact of the Transnational Women's Rights Movement at the UN Conferences" *Women's Studies International Forum* (26) 4 (2003) 315.

mobilization, and they provide key sources of learning for burgeoning women's movements.

Mobilizing structures are significantly shaped by the broader political structures within a given polity.⁸³ Also known as the political process model, the political opportunity approach addresses these structures of power. By emphasizing the institutional level, the political opportunity approach conceives of "the timing and fate of social movements as largely dependent upon the opportunities afforded insurgents by the shifting institutional structure and ideological disposition of those in power."⁸⁴ The character of formal structures within a political system, along with the "informal structures of power relations"⁸⁵ therein, determines the accessibility of the political process to social movements, and consequently the political opportunities available to those social movements. Conceptions of political opportunities, however, vary significantly. Sidney Tarrow identifies four dimensions of political opportunities for movements: "the opening up of access to power, shifting elite alignments [i.e. electoral realignments], the availability of influential allies, and cleavages within and among elites."⁸⁶ In addition to these dimensions, it is possible to differentiate at the institutional level between political input structures, those that shape access to policy-making, and outcome structures, those that shape the implementation of policies.⁸⁷

⁸³ Mayer N. Zald, "Culture, ideology and strategic framing," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

⁸⁴ Doug McAdam, "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems and Future Direction," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings*. Eds. Doug McAdam et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 23.

⁸⁵ Ibid 26.

⁸⁶ Sidney Tarrow, "States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 54.

⁸⁷ Herbert Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies" *British Journal of Political Science* 16(1) (1986).

Although certain aspects of the political environment are more stable, political opportunity structures are neither unchangeable nor limited to central-state. Democratization marks a crucial restructuring of the political opportunity structure. The breakdown of authoritarianism involves the collapse of the previous political opportunity structure. The transition period is characterized by an unstable and indeterminate political opportunity structure. By the consolidation phase, a new democratic political opportunity structure emerges and solidifies. The formal dimensions of the political opportunity structure become institutionalized, while behavioural norms and practices also are learned. Consequently, social movements face a different POS at each phase, as shaped by the broader processes and dynamics of democratization. Democratization also extends beyond the central-state, as local and regional structures may be democratized. The central-state may strongly influence the reconfiguration of the local and regional political opportunity structures and the division of powers, which in turn may provide social movements key points of access.

Democratization involves the reordering of the political opportunity structures, as authoritarian structures are dismantled and democratic structures created. The breakdown of all or some authoritarian structures marks the opening of previously closed points of access.⁸⁸ Koops argues, “expanding political opportunities stand at the basis of the processes that drive the expansion of protest waves,” thereby “allow[ing] new contenders, tactics, and demands to enter the scene.”⁸⁹ Democratization, at least during the breakdown and transition phases, can provide a ‘window of opportunity’ for

⁸⁸ Consider Tarrow’s four dimensions of opportunity. As identified in the previous section, the breakdown of authoritarianism can involve all 4 dimensions. In particular, from among these, democratization theorists have identified elite divisions as a central, defining feature of breakdowns.

movements. The dismantling of previous political structures means that social movements can target political actors; more fundamentally they can attempt to shape the character of political structures. Yet, all protest waves eventually end; as democratization theorists note, popular mobilization declines in the latter stages of transition and during the consolidation phase. The political opportunity structure begins to congeal. Points of access, such as institutional channels and elite alignments, continue to be available, but movements must adapt to these more regularized forms, rather than reshaping them.

Political opportunity structures shape social movement's strategic choices and constrain their impact in each of these arenas. Thus, while resource mobilization theory and mobilizing structures address mobilization, political opportunity concepts explain the strategies available to movements, and their potential impact on the political context in which they exist. The POS approach only addresses the political context, excluding those opportunities in the social and cultural contexts. An emphasis on formal politics marginalizes the significance of informal political activity, and sustains a false dichotomy between the social and the political realm. As women's movements show, the two exist on a continuum. Women's activism challenges social values as well as political practices.⁹⁰

New social movement (NSM) theory and social constructionism, on the other hand, address the cultural dimension of collective action and the role of identities. NSM theorists "relate macrostructural changes in western societies to new cultural orientations

⁸⁹ Ruud Koopmans, "Protest in Time and Space," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*. Eds. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004) 32.

⁹⁰ Maggie Humm, "Feminisms and Women's Movements in the 1990s," in *Feminisms and Women's Movements in Contemporary Europe*. Eds. Ann Bull, Hanna Diamond and Rosalind Marsh (London: MacMillan Press, 2000).

in these societies."⁹¹ Structural transformations shape the symbolic interactions, cultural practices and collective identities of individuals. Although the macrostructure limits and constrains the actions and identities of social actors, these are continuously constructed and negotiated. Consequently, NSM theory "focuses upon the ways in which social movements seek to achieve change in cultural, symbolic and sub-political domains".⁹² This approach emphasizes macro-structural changes over meso-level structures, which, in themselves, cannot fully address the impact of democratization on the Portuguese and Spanish women's movements. By emphasizing identity politics as non-political, NSM theory also sustains a false dichotomy between the political and social realm. It ignores how cultural and symbolic change is political. NSM theory cannot provide insights into the political dimensions of women's activism, nor address the interconnectedness of "sub-political" and "political" activities. Nevertheless, NSM is relevant, as it draws attention to the importance of cultural values, and identity politics in movement dynamics. Cultural contexts, as well as the political environment, mediate social movement activity. Women's movements in particular, are influenced by their cultural contexts, as cultural norms and practices affect women's strategic and practical positions. Furthermore, culture influences the path to democracy. Political actors do not exist in isolation from their culture context. Moreover, political bodies develop their own sub-cultures and norms: the new Spanish and Portuguese democracies are not just polities; they also constitute symbolic spaces.

Social constructionism also recognizes the importance of the socio-cultural realm. This approach further introduces an ideational component to social movement theory: the

⁹¹ Marco G. Giugni, "Structure and Culture in Social Movement Theory," *Sociological Forum* 13 (1998) 368.

concept of framing. Framing is the construction of meaning. Frames allow individuals to render events intelligible and meaningful.⁹³ Framing is not limited to social movement activity; rather it is a component of everyday life. On a larger scale, discourses and master frames set the interpretive framework for groups and individuals within a given society. They are grounded in the cultural context and social belief system.⁹⁴ Movements construct collective action frames, drawn from the existing discourses and cultural stock of meanings, to mobilize support and to legitimate their activities. Movements may also borrow existing frames from abroad. While existing social contexts shape the framing processes of social movements, these contexts are not fixed. Political meanings and dominant discourses can be reinterpreted. Social movements not only contest existing cultural frames and discourses, they may also serve as the source of new cultural meanings.⁹⁵ Movement frames, however, face continual challenges from alternative frames, which may be generated inside or outside of the movement. Other social actors put forward competing frames, whilst within movements themselves, struggles emerge over meanings. Hence, framing is an ongoing process that social movements engage in.⁹⁶

Frames, nonetheless, are bounded by the larger political opportunity structure, as well as by the social structures and the discourses therein. Whereas interpretative processes are crucial in the mobilization of a movement, movements must contend with

⁹² Crossley, *Making Sense of Social Movements* 152.

⁹³ Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment" *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000) 614.

⁹⁴ Master frames exist on a larger scale than collective action frames, although social movements may also put forward an alternative master frame. Discourses are "broad systems of communication that link concepts together in a web of relationships through an underlying logic." Myra Marx Ferree and David A. Merrill "Hot Movements, Cold Cognition: Thinking about Social Movements in Gendered Frames," *Contemporary Sociology* 29 (3) (2000) 455.

⁹⁵ Ibid 629. See also Mayer N. Zald, "Culture, Ideology and Strategic Framing," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings*. Eds. Doug McAdam, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

⁹⁶ Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment" 628.

existing structures. Problems and solutions must be framed, along with political opportunities and strategies in contextually appropriate ways. Collective action frames are bounded by the cultural environment and existing frames.⁹⁷ Social movements then disseminate their frame to the public, the media, and in the political realm, attempting to generate attention and new support. Frame resonance refers to the 'fit' between the dominant discourse and the social movement frame. Social constructionist theorists argue that the success of social movements is largely determined by the degree of resonance. The term "discursive opportunity structure" has been used to denote "the symbolic opportunities that determine what kind of ideas become visible for the public, resonate with public opinion and are held to be 'legitimate' by the audience."⁹⁸ According to theorists, framing processes thus play a crucial role determining how movements mobilize, how they pursue their goals, and whether they achieve their goals. Resources, mobilizing structures, political opportunity structures and cultural contexts set the boundaries for social movement activity, but frames and collective identities shape social movement choices. Democratization, insofar as it involves changes to the former, alter the boundaries of social movement activity. But, democratization also entails changes in the dominant discourses and master frames. Movements, including the women's movement, respond to the changing discursive boundaries. They must develop frames that fit and resonate with the changes taking place, while similarly challenging the emergent discourses of democratization.

⁹⁷ Social movements attempt to reshape their culture environment; nevertheless 'boundaries of the legitimate' circumscribe their frames and actions. See Rhys H. Williams, "The Cultural Contexts of Collective Action: Constraints, Opportunities, and the Symbolic Life of Social Movements," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*. Eds. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004) 103.

Closely related to the concept of framing processes are repertoires of action. Repertoires of action (or contention) are the "routine mix of strategies and tactics [social movements] employ."⁹⁹ Within a given political context, populations and policymakers recognize certain tactics as appropriate and legitimate forms of activism. The resources available to movements, the existing mobilizing structures, and the political opportunities, however, limit strategic choices. Moreover, strategies are mediated by the movement's identity and must fit the core beliefs and values of its members. Correspondingly, repertoires of action are "highly contingent upon framing choices."¹⁰⁰ Repertoires of action are not static. As the political context undergoes transformations, political opportunities expand, and as movements adapt to these changes, repertoires of action also evolve. The three phases of democratization, therefore, see movements adopt new repertoires of action.

The concept "repertoires of action", as it draws from the various approaches, shows the importance of having an integrated approach to the empirical study of movements. Each approach contributes to our understanding of the relationship between democratization and the Spanish and Portuguese women's movements. We can conceptualize each stage of democratization as involving a transformation of the POS. Besides changes to the political process, democratization also brings new mobilizing structures, discourses, frames and repertoires of action. Movements attempt to shape the array of changes taking place, but they also respond to them. They adapt strategies, frames and demands to the political context. Even movements that emphasize cultural

⁹⁸ Hanspeter Kriesi, "Political Context and Opportunity" in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*. Eds. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2004) 72.

⁹⁹ McCarthy, "The Globalization of Social Movement Theory" 257.

activities, as some streams within women's movements do, do not operate in a vacuum isolated from the political realm.¹⁰¹ In the following chapters, I integrate the conceptual tools provided by social movement theory and democratization literature into my analysis of the interaction between the women's movements and the processes of democratization.. Neither framework, however, addresses the crucial component of gender.

Where are the Women?

Although democratization, like movements, is gendered, this point is rarely acknowledged by mainstream (or malestream) literature. Democratization literature generally ignores women altogether. Elite-centric approaches, in particular, discount women's roles in promoting democratization. Dismissive of the effects of mass mobilization, they do not separate out women's participation in mass mobilizations; and few women are members of the political elite. Couched in gender-neutral terms, democratization literature universalizes the male experience of democratization and democracy as the norm, ignoring the gendered relations of power. Neither systematic male dominance and privilege, nor and the gendered nature of the state, both in its authoritarian and democratic form, is recognized. Further, the possibility of differing effects of democracy on men and women is not addressed.¹⁰² Mainstream social movement literature also ignores the gendered nature of movement activity. Social movement theory has acknowledged the existence of women's movements and women's

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Women's movements are not homogenous, rational actors behaving in a purely instrumental manner. Nonetheless, movement participants consciously and unconsciously respond to their political environments, making judgments about whether, and how to engage their environment. Additionally, as discussed in greater depth below, they are not unaffected by 'conventional' politics.

participation in other movements. However, “[s]ocial movement theory does not incorporate gender as a category of analysis, instead subsuming women’s actions in non-gender-specific discussions of mobilization.”¹⁰³ The social constructionist and NSM perspectives posit the importance of culture, identity and discursive practices, but fail to address the gender beliefs, norms and symbols prevalent in society and in all movements, except those women control. Gender pervades all social relations, yet the gendered dynamics of movements and democratization are ignored. To overcome the gender-deficiencies of masculinist, mainstream approaches, feminist theorists have applied a gender lens, but have not succeeded in getting their insights inserted into the mainstream. In order to conceptualize the significance of gender as it pertains to democratization, and frames women’s movement activism in a modern European state, I define Walby’s concept of ‘gender regime’.

Gender Regimes, Gender Orders and Rounds of Restructuring

Albeit based in sex functions, gender is socially constructed. Men and women “continually recreate and reinforce the distinction between masculinity and femininity.”¹⁰⁴ Gender relations are relations of power that sustain and are sustained by social, political and economic structures and practices. Gender relations and inequalities, however, exist in a range of forms and patterns. Sylvia Walby uses the term ‘gender

¹⁰² Democratization theorists who address women, usually only acknowledge that (in most cases) women acquire equal political rights in the new democracy. There is no questioning of whether said formal rights bring substantive change.

¹⁰³ Elisabeth J. Friedman. *Unfinished Transitions* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000) 15.

¹⁰⁴ Lisa D. Brush, *Gender and Governance* (Lanham: Altamira Press, 2003) 10. There is debate among feminist theorists over understandings of sex and gender. See for example, Jill Vickers, “Notes toward a Political Theory of Sex and Power,” in *Power/Gender: Social Relations in Theory and Practice*. Eds. H. Lorraine Radtke and Henderikus J. Stam (Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage, 1994). For the purposes of this essay, I accept that gender is grounded in biological differences pertaining to reproduction, but I focus primarily on the ways in which the identities of ‘men’ and ‘women’ are socially defined. When using ‘gender’ as a

regime' to refer to the "system of interrelated gender relations."¹⁰⁵ She identifies in gender regimes associated with modern Western Capitalist societies six structures of patriarchy: paid work, patriarchal relations in the state, male violence, patriarchal relations in sexuality, and patriarchal relations in cultural institutions. Gender regimes are the "result of different articulations and combinations of these structures."¹⁰⁶ Gender regimes range on a continuum from private to public. "In the domestic form women are relatively excluded from the public domains of employment and the state. In the public form women enter these public domains, though not, at least yet, on equal terms."¹⁰⁷ Structures reflect and reinforce the dominant gender regime. The term gender regime thus encapsulates the substantive inequalities faced by women at a particular time and place, but also denotes the discourses and norms upon which these inequalities are founded and legitimized.¹⁰⁸

Gender regimes are spatially and temporally located, such that it is possible to identify a dominant gender regime within a given polity.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, gender regimes are neither static nor uncontested. Within a given polity, "tensions among gender regimes operative in the institutions of family, market and governance make 'lived contradictions' a common experience."¹¹⁰ Women are not passive actors, but contest existing gender

category of analysis, this definition avoids essentializing 'women', while also acknowledging that women's gendered identities are based on certain commonalities of experience.

¹⁰⁵ Sylvia Walby, "Gender, Nations and States in a Global Era," *Nations and Nationalism* (6)4 (2000) 528. The term gender regime, as employed by Walby, is based in the western European model of the state. It does not apply to 'soft' states in which weak state structures cannot penetrate society

¹⁰⁶ Walby, *Gender Transformations* 6.

¹⁰⁷ Sylvia Walby, "From gendered welfare state to gender regimes: National differences, convergence or restructuring?" (2001) 18. www.sociology.su.se/cgs/Walbypaper.doc

¹⁰⁸ Walby primarily addresses the tangible manifestations of unequal gender relations, however the ideological dimension of gender relations is crucial to the maintenance of a particular gender regime.

¹⁰⁹ Walby. *Gender Transformations*.

¹¹⁰ Jane H. Bayes, Mary E. Hawkesworth and Rita Mae Kelly, "Gender, Globalization and Gender Regimes," in *Gender Globalization and Democratization* Eds. Rita Mae Kelly, Jane H. Bayes and Mary Hawkesworth (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001) 1.

relations. Women's movements advance practical and strategic gender interests, challenging the existing gender order and promoting a more woman-friendly, egalitarian regime. Because gender regimes are embedded in multiple structures, movements are more likely to achieve reforms within a particular structure than to transform the entire regime.

Gender regimes are deeply rooted in society, nonetheless gender regimes undergo key transformations.¹¹¹ Walby's concept 'rounds of restructuring' refers to the fundamental transformations that may take place in terms of economic, national or state projects. Although the foundations laid by previous projects remain (and continue to shape future practices), these periods of political/economic restructuring potentially lead to the implantation of a new gender regime.¹¹² As established bases of authority are destabilized, so too existing gender regimes can face crises of legitimacy, opening the possibility for both new political and gender regime configurations.¹¹³ Democratization may constitute one such 'round of restructuring'. In particular, democratization redefines citizenship. Citizenship is one of the primary vehicles by which gender is ordered; gaining citizenship rights may give women a political basis for promoting gender justice. Democratization also restructures aspects of the state, which in turn defines and regulates a range of social relations.

¹¹¹ It is conceptually important to remember that the form of gender regime does not equate with degree of inequality. Transformations in the dominant gender regimes may simply change the nature of inequality.

¹¹² Walby, *Gender Transformations*. For example, Walby identifies state modernization projects and market transformations as the central factors in the transformation of private gender regimes into public ones. Walby, "From gendered welfare state to gender regimes: National differences, convergence or restructuring?"

¹¹³ R.W. Connell. "The State, Gender and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal," in *Power/gender: Social relations in theory and practice*. Eds. H.L.Radtke and H.J. Stam. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994) 161.

Women, Women's Movements and the State

The state, in Western capitalist societies, plays a central role in establishing and maintaining the dominant gender order. In analyzing the relationship between women's movements and democratization, it is conceptually important to distinguish why the changes taking place at the level of state institutions matter to women and to women's movements. Social movement theory emphasizes the importance of the political context to the mobilization of movements without considering gender. Feminist theorists, by contrast, have attempted to link women, women's movements, politics and the state. They consider how "the activities of different women and women's movements impact on state and are in turn impacted on by the state."¹¹⁴

R.W. Connell asserts, "[a]s the central institutionalization of power the state has a considerable, though not unlimited, capacity to regulate gender relations in society as a whole."¹¹⁵ Because states embody gendered power, women's movements cannot ignore them. Moreover, the actions and strategies of women's movements "cannot be understood outside of the structures that constrain them."¹¹⁶ Although the ability of women to effect change through engagement with patriarchal institutions remains the subject of contention among feminist theorists, it is dangerous for women to assume that

¹¹⁴ Georgina Waylen. "Gender, feminism and the state," *Gender, Politics and the State* (London: Routledge, 1998) 1.

¹¹⁵ Connell, "The State, Gender and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal" 155.

¹¹⁶ Waylen, "Gender, feminism, and the state" 2.

they can ignore the state.¹¹⁷ States, therefore, deserve significant attention in analyses of women's movements.¹¹⁸

States should not be theorized as monoliths, but rather as complex, multi-level entities composed of heterogeneous, sometimes competing, institutions and interests. Each institution contains its own structures, interests and legitimizing ideas. Indeed, state structures "act under contradictory pressures which often result in ambivalent [gender] policies."¹¹⁹ "The nature of the state is not fixed and it has no necessary relationship to gender relations, but this relationship is evolving, dialectic and dynamic."¹²⁰ Therefore, states are sites of struggle with regards to gender relations. Recognition of states' multi-faceted, multi-institutional character indicates that state, as a category of analysis, must be disaggregated.

Disaggregating states into their institutional configurations and political actors corresponds to the meso-institutional focus of the political opportunity approach. Theorists of women's movements have adapted this approach by adding a gender lens,¹²¹ which allows us to conceptualize the various ways in which political opportunities may be gendered. Consequently, a gendered approach to political opportunity recognizes the dominant gender regime, but also recognizes that gender relations and male dominance

¹¹⁷ See Jane S. Jaquette. "Women and Democracy: Regional Differences and Contrasting Views" *Journal of Democracy* 12(3) (July 2001) and Jane Mansbridge "Anti-statism and Difference Feminism in International Social Movements," *Journal of Democracy* 12(3) (July 2001).

¹¹⁸ State structures are patriarchal, however civil society is not necessarily friendlier to women or women's activism. Civil society is not politically, ideologically or gender neutral. Nor can feminists ignore the role that the state plays in the ideological and substantive construction of civil society. See Barbara Einhorn and Charlotte Sever. "Gender and Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe," *International Journal of Feminist Politics* 5(2) (2003) 163-190, and Jane S. Jaquette, "Feminism and the Challenges of the Post-Cold War World" *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 5(3) (2003) 331-354.

¹¹⁹ Connell, "The State, Gender and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal" 143.

¹²⁰ Waylen, "Gender, feminism, and the state" 7.

¹²¹ See such authors as Friedman, *Unfinished Transitions*, Sonia Alvarez, *Engendering Democracy in Brazil: Women's Movements in Transition Politics* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990) and

are not encoded uniformly across state and social structures. Institutions involve their own gendered dynamics, and may promote their own particular set of gender values, practices and interests. Furthermore, gender configurations within a given institution are subject to contestation from actors within, and from without. As such, institutions vary in how exclusionary of women, and to women's movements' demands, they are. Similarly, actors across state structures may be more or less favourable to women's movements, and to a particular gender regime. Within a political process, it is possible to identify the opportunities and constraints placed on women's mobilizing by the gendered political opportunity structure across different institutions. These opportunities and constraints, in turn, shape the possibilities of women's mobilizing, and the strategies available to them. In turn, women's movements employ political opportunities to challenge existing gender relations within these institutions, and to create new opportunities.¹²²

States, do not merely reflect gendered power, they may also regulate and reproduce gender relations. This role has further consequences for the mobilization of the women's movements. Social movement theory emphasizes the importance of resources, mobilizing structures, frames and discourses. The resources and mobilizing structures available to the women's movement are directly and indirectly shaped by the dominant gender regime, especially as reinforced by the state and its policies. Additionally, states may play a key role in the construction and dissemination of gender beliefs and discourses. So, by advancing a gender ideology, states can influence the discursive opportunity structures and the collective action frames available to women's movements.

Louise A. Chappell, *Gendering Government: Feminist Engagement with the State in Australia and Canada* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002).

¹²² Louise Chappell, "Interacting with the State," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 2 (2) (2000) 248.

The likelihood of women's movements successfully problematizing issues or of achieving their goals (at the state and societal level) may be also affected by the resonance of their claims with the dominant gender discourse.¹²³

Women and Democratization

Democratization is a 'round of restructuring' of the political process. State structures and institutions are reconfigured following to the democratic project. Alongside transformations to the political opportunity structure, democratization potentially establishes a new gender regime. Democratization can, thus, shape women's movements and women's mobilization in gender-specific ways. But, women can also play an important role in the democratization process. How, then, is democratization gendered? What is the interrelationship between democratization and the development of the women's movement? By integrating democratization theory, some aspects of social movement theory and feminist theory, I develop a conceptual base with which to compare the relationship between democratization and the women's movements in Spain and Portugal. Each phase of democratization comprises its own set of gender dynamics, which must be theorized. Friedman asserts the importance of "a gender-sensitive analysis of the relation between political opportunity structures and different regime types and stages."¹²⁴ In the subsequent chapters, I outline and draw on feminist literature on women and democratization, addressing the gendered dimensions of democratization at the different stages of democratization.

¹²³ I do not suggest the state alone determines the actions, frames and successes of women's movements, especially as regards their grassroots and cultural activities. Instead, I clarify the diversity of ways in which the state can influence women's movements.

¹²⁴ Friedman, "Paradoxes of Gendered Political Opportunity in the Venezuelan Transition to Democracy" 98.

Chapter 3: Fascism and the Iberian Women's Movements

In 1928 Salazar came to power in Portugal, and by 1939 Franco had taken control of Spain. These fascist dictators successfully maintained strangleholds over Portugal and Spain for decades, long after the tide of fascism in Western Europe had waned. Their enduring regimes left a legacy of fascism that continues to influence Iberian society, politics, economics and especially gender relations. The effects of these dictatorships can also be seen in the Spanish and Portuguese women's movements. Insofar as movements are constrained and shaped by the political opportunity structure in which they emerge, the Francoist and Salazarist regimes provide a common experience for the development of the women's movements in Spain and Portugal, and their role during democratization.

At the beginning of the 20th century, women's movements in Spain and Portugal were burgeoning. Although significantly weaker than other First Wave European movements, they were nonetheless beginning to take shape, especially in Spain. Once the fascist dictatorships took hold, however, these new movements crumbled. Facing repressive, highly patriarchal regimes, the early women's movements in Spain and Portugal largely demobilized and disbanded. For the duration of authoritarian rule, women's activism was forced underground, virtually destroying women's movements on the peninsula. By the 1960s, the women's movements had begun to re-establish themselves, however, they remained relatively weak. As Second Wave feminism spread across Western Europe, women in these two Southern European states, along with Greece, remained under the yoke of fascism. Until these regimes collapsed, women still required the permission of their fathers or husbands to carry out such mundane activities as drive, own a passport, and even to work outside the home. This chapter explores how

and why fascism in both Spain and Portugal suppressed women's mobilization, and demonstrates how fascist rule stunted the early women's movements. By examining the nature, especially the POS and dominant gender ideology, of the fascist regimes, I offer insights on the limited capacity of women to organize under Iberian fascism in contrast to under other authoritarian regimes. I also outline the key features of the authoritarian regimes that subsequently shaped democratization, some of which continue to influence present democratic functioning. This legacy of authoritarianism still influences the present women's movements, their strategies and identities.

Authoritarian Legacies

The concept of authoritarian legacies allows us to conceptualize how authoritarian regimes continue to affect post-authoritarian democracies. An emerging issue in the mainstream democratization literature, authoritarian legacies are those features of authoritarian regimes that remain in place after the implementation of democracy. The long, continuous duration of both the Francoist and Salazarist regimes meant that authoritarian practices, values and gender arrangements became deeply embedded in society. While not unique to post-authoritarian regimes, these alter the functioning of a new democracy.¹²⁵ Cesarini and Hite define authoritarian legacies as “those rules, procedures, norms, patterns, practices, dispositions, relationships, and memories originating in well-defined authoritarian experiences of the past that, as a result of specific historical configurations and/or political struggles, survive democratic transition

¹²⁵ For example, the demobilization of the masses under the fascist regimes created a generalized apathy. While apathy is not unique to post-authoritarian regimes, in a newly democratic states apathy threatens the consolidation and functioning of those democracies.

and intervene in the quality and practice of postauthoritarian [sic] democracies.”¹²⁶ Authoritarian legacies are not restricted to the formal realm of politics, they are also located in society at large. Although not explicitly addressed by Cesarini and Hite, gender ideologies and arrangements constitute key dimensions of authoritarian legacies. Women’s movements must contend with authoritarian legacies, which shape politics and society. Moreover, they must contend with the internal manifestations of these legacies. The strong ideological component of the Francoist and Salazarist regimes entails a gender-specific component of the authoritarian legacy. The women’s movements must also address the continuing after-effects of the regimes’ gender ideologies and gender regimes.

It is important to examine the origins of authoritarian legacies.¹²⁷ Authoritarian regimes do not take shape identically, so they too must be contextualized. Feminist theorists identify the importance of disaggregating states, as they are neither monolithic nor homogenous. Regime types matter, but classifying states by type alone obscures fundamental differences among authoritarian regimes. While the differences among democracies are recognized, differences among authoritarian regimes often go overlooked. Fascist regimes are one subtype. Authoritarian regimes are repressive by their very definition, restricting the political freedoms and political participation of both men and women. Authoritarian regimes rely on closed structures for their self-preservation, narrowing the channels by which individuals can access the state. With power and access to power limited to the few, and always to men, political opportunity

¹²⁶ Paola Cesarini and Katherine Hite, “Introducing the Concept of Authoritarian Legacies,” in *Authoritarian Legacies and Democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe*. Eds. Katherine Hite and Paola Cesarini (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004) 4.

¹²⁷ Ibid 5.

structures of authoritarian regimes are more closed than in democracies. Nonetheless, opportunities vary across political contexts. Key differences exist in terms of which groups have access to power, levels of repression, ideology and even state capacity. While the structures of authoritarian regimes tend to be more static than democracies, or at least political elites often would like them to remain so, these regimes undergo changes over their existence.

Consequently, in order to understand impact of authoritarianism on the mobilization of the women's movements in Spain and Portugal, the character of the authoritarian regime must be examined before addressing the dynamics of democratization. Firstly, the nature of authoritarian regimes shapes the nature of the subsequent democratizations. Which actors partake in the democratization process, especially during the breakdown phase, reflects the nature of the regime. Authoritarian regimes structure the relationship between the state and society, affecting the subsequent quality of civil society. How social relations are mediated by the state, the ideological features of the regime, and the degree of repression imposed on society each affect the mobilization of the masses and the associational life of the populace. Accordingly, the degree to which civil society can organize under authoritarian rule shapes the subsequent role it can play in the demise of authoritarianism. Authoritarian regimes control civil society, but not all groups and movements are controlled in the same manner, or to the same degree. The ideologies of regimes determine their responses to activist groups. For the purposes of this investigation, I will assess how the Francoist and Salazarist regimes affected the emergence of the women's movements, and the part they would play in the breakdown of authoritarianism. With their closed political opportunity structures and

Conservative, private gender regimes, the fascist dictatorships severely hindered the emergence of civil societies and women's movements in Spain and Portugal.

Authoritarianism, Gender Regimes and Women's Movements

Mainstream, masculinist literature generally posits that authoritarian regimes are detrimental to the mobilization of civil society, emphasizing democratization as the key to mass mobilization. The assumption is that authoritarian regimes repress actors and movements in the same way, and that democratization, at its various stages, opens new political spaces in which movements form, organize and participate in the reorganization of political structures. Feminist theorists of democratization in Latin America have challenged these assumptions by identifying how authoritarian regimes offer gender-specific spaces in which women can mobilize. As Waylen maintains, "authoritarianism did allow one section of the population, women, the space to mobilize, and in the absence of conventional politics allowed them to develop new ways of 'doing politics' and achieve greater visibility."¹²⁸ This is not to suggest that authoritarian regimes are good for women, rather that some authoritarian regimes can provide women's movements with opportunities to organize and to mobilize, and that in many cases these opportunities recede during democratization, as men take over political spaces.¹²⁹

Women employ the discourses of regimes to mobilize themselves and to challenge the contradictions between regime rhetoric and the reality facing women. The highly conservative, military regimes of Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela extolled the virtues of domesticity and motherhood (much like the Fascist regimes in Spain and Portugal).

¹²⁸ Georgina Waylen, "Women and Democratization: Conceptualizing Gender Relations in Transition Politics," in *World Politics* 46(3), April 1994, 327-354.

¹²⁹ Along with Waylen, see such authors as Friedman, *Unfinished Transitions*, and Franceschet "Women's Politics in Post-Transitional Societies."

“Family, God, and Liberty” constituted the foundations of these military regimes.¹³⁰ The moral superiority of women was exalted, making women responsible for the reconstruction and protection of the fatherland.¹³¹ The regimes’ praise for domesticity and motherhood, however, conflicted with their social and economic policies. Whilst praising the family, their repressive measures tore families apart, when husbands, sons and husbands went missing. Neoliberal economic policies threatened the livelihood of families, forcing mothers into paid work. Previously demobilized, apolitical women unwittingly began to mobilize and to develop strategies for their families’ survival.¹³² Mobilization was originally based in women’s practical needs, but women became increasingly critical of the military dictatorships. As women became politically aware, they developed a new gender consciousness, prompting the mobilization of the Latin American women’s movements.

In these Latin American regimes, women, and women’s activism continued to be defined as non-political by military rulers, who at first did not see women’s demonstrations as threatening. While men who opposed the government faced the threat of severe repression and were forced to act clandestinely, women could initially mobilize relatively openly, without similar threat.¹³³ Since the authority of the military dictatorships was partially premised on the protection of the family and society,

¹³⁰ Sonia Alvarez, *Engendering Democracy in Brazil*. (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990) 8.

¹³¹ Annie Dandavati, *The Women's Movement and the Transition to Democracy in Chile* (New York: Piet Lang, 1996).

¹³² Sonia Alvarez, “Contradictions of a “Women’s Space” in a Male Dominant State: The Political Role of the Commissions on the Status of Women in Postauthoritarian Brazil” in *Women, International Development, and Politics: The Bureaucratic Mire*. Ed. Kathleen Staudt. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990) 59; and Nikki Craske, “Remasculinisation and the Neoliberal State in Latin America,” in *Gender, Politics and the State* (London: Routledge, 1998).

¹³³ As Waylen writes, the military government’s “often did not see women’s activities as dangerous enough to warrant repression.” “Women and Democratization: Conceptualizing Gender Relations in Transition Politics”, 338. The relegation of women and women’s activities to the “non-political” by authoritarian

criticisms of their policies on families, undermined their discourses and their authority to rule. The authoritarian regimes, therefore, provided new opportunities for the mobilization of the women's movement.

The experience of Latin American women under authoritarianism raises questions about the conditions under which authoritarian rule may promote women's mobilization with maternal frames. Women in Spain and Portugal faced a similar gender ideology and discourse as Latin American women, yet comparable women's movements did not emerge. Questions that arise when considering the absence of mobilization by women under Iberian Fascism are 1) Did a similar space exist for women's mobilization in Spain and Portugal; and 2) Why or Why not? Which aspects of the POS, dominant discourses, available resources and mobilizing structures shaped their mobilization or lack thereof?

The Early Women's Movements in Spain¹³⁴ and Portugal

The origins of the Spanish and Portuguese women's movements lie in the early 20th century, although key feminists and activists did emerge in the late 19th century.¹³⁵ At the turn of the century, Spain and Portugal were largely illiterate, rural, underdeveloped states. Political instability, a weak civil society and a small middle class marked both countries. Under these conditions, women's movements were slow to

rulers parallels the presumptions underlying social movement and democratization scholarship. Men alone are viewed as political actors, women's activism remains 'invisible'.

¹³⁴ Reference to the Spanish women's movement encompasses all women's gender-specific activism. However, it is important to recognize that Spain is a multinational state. This multinationalism is reflected in the women's movements, as divergent variants of feminism and the women's movements exist in the historical regions of the Basque Country, Catalonia and to a lesser extent Galicia. These movements should not be conflated with the majoritarian Castilian women's movement. Conflicts over Castilian hegemony and their nationalist ties have led these movements to develop their own distinct characters and to maintain a degree of separation from the Castilian movement.

¹³⁵ For example, in Portugal, the women's magazine "A Voz Feminina" supported feminist positions, calling for equality between the sexes. Darlene Sadlier, *The Question of How: Women Writers and New Portuguese Literature* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989) 114.

mobilize. The women's movements did not achieve a widespread following in either country; rather, the women's movements remained primarily upper-middle class movements disconnected from the majority of women. In Portugal, the first women's rights organization, the *Liga Republicana de Mulheres Portuguesas* (the Women's Republican League) was founded in 1909, closely tied to the Republican Party. Women's activism at this time focused on gaining women the suffrage, promoting democratic values among women, women's education and improving the working conditions of women.¹³⁶ The women's movement was also closely tied to the republican and freemasonry movements in Portugal.¹³⁷ The republican movement, however, remained antagonistic to the many of the rights demanded for women, such as political equality. Although family laws were revised in 1910 reforms left female republican activists dissatisfied.¹³⁸ Because Republicans believed women would vote conservatively, they opposed women's suffrage.¹³⁹ The republican movement shared the same patriarchal values as the Conservative forces. The First World War interrupted attempts by the women's movement's to achieve further legal reforms from the new Republican government,¹⁴⁰ however, it also prompted greater women's organizing, especially supporting the war effort. In 1914, the National Council of Portuguese Women, an

¹³⁶ Along with the Liga Republicana, the other early organization was the Associação de Propaganda Feminina, and the Conselho Nacional das Mulheres Portuguesas. João Esteves. "A Liga Republicana das Mulheres Portuguesas. Uma organização política e feminista" (CIDM: Lisboa, 1991). <http://clio.revues.org/document248.html>

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Reforms include the legalization of divorce, and the revision of adultery laws to punish men and women equally, and to prevent women from being forced from their home. Darlene Sadlier, *The Question of How: Women Writers and New Portuguese Literature* 117.

¹³⁹ Republicans had passed an electoral law restricting the vote to heads of household, with the intention of excluding women. Women heads of household briefly won the vote when a 1911 judicial ruling decided that the gender-neutral term included women. Victory was short-lived, as immediately following the 1912 election, republican leaders revised the electoral law to specifically designate men.

¹⁴⁰ Karen Offen, *European Feminisms, 1700-1950: A Political History*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000) 312.

umbrella organization uniting Portuguese women's groups from across the political and social spectrum, was established.¹⁴¹ The war caused little direct damage to Portugal; nonetheless participation in the war further destabilized the political situation and strained the economy. Although the women's movement made advances during the war, it continued to be marginalized. When Salazar came to power, following a military coup, the women's movement remained restricted to a small set of women.

By comparison, the Spanish women's movements faced a friendlier political environment during the 2nd Spanish Republic (1931-1936). Especially in Catalonia, the most industrially developed region of Spain, a stronger feminist movement had developed with close connections to the regional nationalist movement.¹⁴² The Spanish Left had succeeded in mobilizing wider support among the masses, a reflection of Spain's greater industrial development than Portugal. Amidst the Leftist forces, women's organizations emerged within the anarchist, socialist and communist movements.¹⁴³ These organizations sought to improve women's working conditions and address inequalities in the home. Because of their focus on women's rights, these groups came under criticism from other activists. Many male activists did not accept their positions on gender relations, and some women activists critiqued women's projects for detracting from the overall movement.¹⁴⁴ Nonetheless, the 2nd Republic saw the women's movement achieve a number of landmark changes. During the 2nd Republic, a broad coalition of leftist and regional nationalist groups came to power, among them three prominent feminists: Clara Campoamor, Victoria Kent and Margarita Nelken. After much

¹⁴¹ Sadlier, *The Question of How: Women Writers and New Portuguese Literature* 118.

¹⁴² At this time, the Basque women's movement was not as well developed.

¹⁴³ *Mujeres Libres* was the most prominent Anarchist women's groups.

parliamentary debate, the 1931 Constitution extended the suffrage to all women.¹⁴⁵ As part of the ruling government's modernizing project, various progressive legal reforms accompanied the 2nd Republic, including the legalization of divorce. Despite the weakness of the Spanish women's movement overall, the movement found valuable support for its goals in the republican government.¹⁴⁶

The legal changes introduced by the Spanish Republican government were short-lived. A devastating Civil War began in 1936, sharply dividing the country into two camps: the Republican forces and a coalition of conservative, Catholic Nationalist Forces. The Nationalist forces viewed the Republican government, and its secular, modernizing project as a threat to the Spanish nation, and its traditional values. During the war, women mobilized extensively. In the Nationalist camp, women were responsible for caretaking activities and social services on the warfront, tasks connected to their traditional roles as wives and mothers.¹⁴⁷ Among Republicans, women participated in a range of war-time activities that took them out of the home.¹⁴⁸ Republican women fighters fought in the Civil War, the most prominent of whom was Dolores Ibarruri, *La Passionaria*. A communist feminist, she became the symbol of the Republican front. This period of intense women's mobilizing, however, did not translate into a vibrant women's

¹⁴⁴ Martha A. Acklesberg, *Free Women of Spain. Anarchism and the Struggle for the Emancipation of Women* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991) 91.

¹⁴⁵ As in Portugal, women were associated with the Conservative vote. Consequently, feminists tied to the Left, like Kent and Nelken opposed the extension of suffrage. See Gerard Alexander. "Women and Men at the Ballot Box: Voting in Spain's Two Democracies," in *Constructing Spanish Womanhood: Female Identity in Modern Spain*. Eds. Victoria Lorée Enders and Pamela Beth Radcliff (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999).

¹⁴⁶ Nonetheless, patriarchal attitudes persisted among Leftists. Reforms, however, were justified in terms of the need to modernize, Europeanize and secularize Spain. Liberals thus aligned themselves with feminist demands. Offen, *European Feminisms, 1700-1950: A Political History* 322.

¹⁴⁷ E.g. Washing soldiers uniforms, caring for wounded soldiers and children.

¹⁴⁸ War-time activities ranged from working in factories to cultural activities. See authors such as Ackelsberg, Mary Nash, *Defying Male Civilization: Women in the Spanish Civil War* (Denver: Arden

movement. After a bloody three-year war, the Nationalist forces were victorious, and the reactionary Francoist regime was installed. Women's legal and Constitutional advances from the 2nd Republic were reversed, as Franco imposed a Conservative Catholic gender regime, and women on both sides of the war returned home.

Fascism Under Salazar – The Portuguese Case

Prior to Salazar's rule, Portugal had been governed by a series of unstable, corrupt republican governments. Republican rule failed to improve the living conditions of Portugal's peasant population, and failed to set Portugal on a path of socio-economic development.¹⁴⁹ The Republic's antimonarchist and anti-clerical stances had originally alienated Right-wing groups; its weaknesses then alienated early supporters and Leftist forces (especially the Labour Movement). In 1926, a military coup installed a dictatorship. Faced with an economic crisis, the junta leaders turned to the economist Dr. António de Oliveira Salazar to address the Republic's economic mismanagement. Salazar positioned himself as the only right-wing figure capable of salvaging the economy, and saving the Portuguese nation. By 1928, he had successfully manoeuvred himself into a position of near total power within the regime; these powers were then institutionalized in the 1933 Constitution. Salazar transformed a military junta into his own personal dictatorship. Salazar's rule was widely accepted among Conservative forces, as his *Estado Novo* (New State) promoted their goals and interests.¹⁵⁰ The failings of Republic

Press, 1995), Aurora G. Morcillo, *True Catholic Womanhood: Gender Ideology in Franco's Spain*. (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2000).

¹⁴⁹ António de Figueiredo, *Portugal: Fifty Years of Dictatorship* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1975).

¹⁵⁰ Certain Monarchist groups did object to Salazar's rule, but they could not seriously contest him. The Right in Portugal had been largely fragmented, and prior to the military coup unable to achieve and maintain power. Salazar provided a unifying figure. Tom Gallagher, "From Hegemony to Opposition" in *In Search of Modern Portugal: The Revolution & Its Consequences* Eds. Lawrence S. Graham and Douglas L. Wheeler. (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983) 84.

had weakened and disillusioned many Republicans, so that they mounted no serious resistance to his dictatorship, and the early labour movement was still too weak to challenge him successfully.¹⁵¹ Meanwhile, the alienated masses, disappointed with liberal Republicanism's failure to deliver economic change and political stability, widely endorsed Salazar's rule.¹⁵²

The 1933 Constitution created a quasi-presidential system, in which Salazar as Prime Minister had all governing authority. When Salazar consolidated near-total control of the state under his control, he presented his dictatorship as a reaction against the dangers of republicanism. His rule was expected to avert the decadence, instability and mismanagement attributed to the Republic. Furthermore, his regime would curtail any mass political activity, which he considered to be a destabilizing force. Salazar's central preoccupation was restoring law and order. Salazar viewed all forms of civil society, apart from the Church and state-sanctioned groups, as a threat to political stability. Consequently, civil society was to be strictly monitored and controlled for fear of its destabilizing potential. Unlike the Fascist regimes of Germany or Italy, there was no attempt to mobilize mass support. Mobilizing a disillusioned, predominantly illiterate, rural populace would entail great effort. Moreover, Salazar viewed mass support as menacing and possibly subversive. Salazar's political manoeuvrings within the military dictatorship precluded his need to rally popular support to gain personal power or to maintain his regime. Instead, Salazar suppressed or controlled civil society, restricting political support for himself to a generalized, passive consent by the masses. Participation

¹⁵¹ D.L. Raby, *Fascism and Resistance in Portugal* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998).

¹⁵² Salazar enjoyed a degree of popular support in public opinion. A popular referendum on the Constitution affirmed this support (though results from the vote are questionable). Philippe C. Schmitter,

was channelled into state-controlled venues, resulting in a depoliticised and demobilized population. Salazar prevented subversive activity through repression, but also the politics of corporatism.¹⁵³

To preserve passive acceptance by the populace, Salazar developed a nationalist, ideological base to justify and maintain the *Estado Novo*. He coalesced the regime under the moral imperative of ‘regeneration’, and of institutionalizing Portugueseness.¹⁵⁴ The *Estado Novo*, with Salazar at the helm, would defend the Portuguese nation from the internal threats of Communism, Freemasonry and modernism. The glory of the Portuguese Nation rested on an idealized vision of the Portuguese peasant, and the glories of Portuguese Empire. Only a conservative Catholic corporatist state could restore and preserve the true Portuguese values, and maintain Portugal’s overseas territories. Individual and group interests were to be subordinated for the good of society and in the national interest. This vision of Portugal further required strict governmental controls over the economy, politics and society. Once controls had been established, the goal of the regime was to impose stasis.

Salazar’s fascist ideology was highly gendered. As enshrined in the Constitution, the Catholic family underpinned the Portuguese nation. The hierarchical family mirrored and reinforced the paternalistic, hierarchical state. Article 12 of the Constitution affirmed: “The State shall ensure the constitution and protection of the family as the source of preservation of the race, as the first basis of education, discipline and social harmony, and

“The regime d’Exception that became the rule” in *Contemporary Portugal*. Eds. Lawrence S. Graham and Harry M. Makler. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979).

¹⁵³ According to D.L. Raby, “The apparatus of the corporate state was necessary therefore to mainly ensure passive support for, or acceptance of, and to suppress the limited challenge of the working class movement and the old bourgeois politicians.” Raby, *Fascism and Resistance in Portugal 4*.

¹⁵⁴ See Ana Paula Ferreira, “HomeBound: The Construct of Femininity in the *Estado Novo*” in *Portuguese Studies* (1996) 133.

as the foundation of all political and administrative order...”¹⁵⁵ Women were mothers, responsible for the family and by extension, the nation. The health of the nation depended on women’s fulfillment of their duties. The regime exalted women’s domestic and maternal roles, while confining them to the home. As A.P. Ferreira writes, Salazar’s “plan of regenerated nationhood depended upon mechanisms of control exercised in the (supposedly) private moral sphere, and most particularly on women.”¹⁵⁶ Women were depicted as morally superior to men, but could also be the source of decadence and perversion. Women who transgressed gender boundaries forfeited their femininity, and their moral authority. They also put the well-being of the nation at risk; consequently, the Salazarist regime reinforced the public/private divide. Women were relegated to the home, their proper sphere. Within the private sphere, women were equally subordinate to their fathers and husbands. The Constitution granted all citizens equality, but legally codified women’s natural difference. Women’s subordination was further reinforced in family law, which restricted women’s autonomy. Men were the head of the family, and wives and children were legally expected to obey them. Accordingly, women could not hold bank accounts, passports, etc.

The Salazarist regime did grant women certain rights. Women with university degrees and women heads of households were allowed to vote (even if elections were not free or fair), and some token women served as deputies in the National Assembly. These concessions targeted Conservative, upper-class women, from whom the regime drew support. Women named to the National Assembly, extolled the authoritarian rhetoric, and served as mouthpieces for the regime.

¹⁵⁵ *Political Constitution of the Portuguese Republic*. (Lisbon: S.N.I., 1957)

¹⁵⁶ Ferreira, "Home Bound: The Construct of Femininity in the Estado Novo" 135.

Salazar sought to turn Portugal into “an organic-statist authoritarian [regime] which he saw as natural and necessary, ordained by God, based on natural groupings such as families, parishes, municipalities and the like.”¹⁵⁷ In keeping with the Estado Novo’s corporatist ideology and the 1933 Constitution, corporative bodies were formed at the local, regional and nation-state level, while independent labour unions and federations were disbanded. Corporations and syndicates at the state level were intended to allow “workers, managers and owners to exist in harmony and equality.”¹⁵⁸ Participants from all socio-economic bodies and groups were to then voice their interests in the Corporative Chamber (one of the legislative chambers). Theoretically, through representation in this Chamber, citizens would participate in government and policymaking. But, while the formal apparatus for corporate representation existed, organic corporatism was largely a sham, as these bodies were hierarchically controlled and top-down. Corporations had little decision-making authority, and certain groups such as the army and the universities were never integrated into the corporate system. Corporations remained bureaucratic agencies of the state, while corporatism became a vehicle for clientelism. Instead of enabling citizen input, the Corporative Chamber rubber-stamped government policies. The regime’s refusal to establish real, representative corporatist bodies meant that linkages between the state and the citizenry were non-existent.¹⁵⁹ Without corporate channels, individuals and civil society had little access to the state.

Authority under Salazar was concentrated in the government’s ruling class. The 1933 Constitution established a presidential system with a bicameral legislature. Neither

¹⁵⁷ Walter Opello, *Portugal's Political Development: A Comparative Approach* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985) 54.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid* 55.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid*.

the President, the National Assembly (the 2nd legislative chamber), or the Corporative Chamber, had any real power. The legislative chambers merely approved government policies, and the president's sole power was to dismiss the prime minister. Members of the National Assembly and the President were elected by popular vote, in tightly controlled elections dominated by Salazar's National Union Party, which reinforced Salazar's control over government.¹⁶⁰ Real power was vested in the prime minister's office, Salazar's post, and in his appointed cabinet. Indeed, the other governing structures were largely window-dressing, as Salazar and his cabinet frequently ruled by direct decree. The Cabinet was dominated by technocratic elites, charged with balancing the budget and running the administrative state.

Three groups upheld the Salazarist regime: the military, the Church and the economic oligarchy. These groups sustained the regime's grip on power, and in turn, Salazar served their interests. Economically, Salazar was fiscally conservative and highly protectionist. Seven families monopolized the economy, and Salazar's policies protected their monopolies from labour, and from foreign competition. The colonies provided guaranteed markets and sources of capital accumulation, reducing the need for internal modernization.¹⁶¹ Small capitalists, however, also profited from Portugal's low wages and low levels of development. Portugal's economic elite, from the large landowners to the monopolistic families, thus profited from economic stagnation. With their endorsement, Salazar's policies reinforced the status quo, Portugal's state of

¹⁶⁰ Elections, though periodically held, were never free or fair. From 1933 to 1945, only candidates from Salazar's party, the National Union, could run. After 1945, under pressure from the West, other (token) candidates could run. Opposition candidates were tightly controlled, and government-friendly candidates, continued to win. Salazar was also able to call off elections, and after 1958 presidential elections were cancelled altogether.

¹⁶¹ John L. Hammond, *Building Popular Power: Worker's and Neighbourhood Movements in the Portuguese Revolution* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988) 33.

underdevelopment. Portugal's economy remained dominated by latifundias in the South, barely self-sustaining minifundias in the North, with a few pockets of industrialization in the cities. Economic stasis imposed by the regime reinforced Salazar's private gender regime. Low levels of development restricted women to the home and to the farm, as there were few opportunities for paid employment.

Catholicism provided one of the central ideological bases of the regime - Salazar coined "*Deus, Pátria, e Família*" (God, Homeland and Family) as the regime's dictum. Highly religious, Salazar, established close links with the Church, signing a Concordat with the Vatican in 1940. Although the state and the Church were formally separate, civil laws were brought in accordance with Catholic precepts. The 1934 Civil Code reversed secular reforms to family law that had occurred during the Republican period. Civil marriages were no longer recognized, and divorce was banned. These reforms were highly gendered as they maintained Catholic vision of the patriarchal family and femininity on the whole society through state laws.

The Church was also given a central role in the social affairs of the state. High church officials participated in the government. At the local level "clerics, especially village priests, functioned as noncoercive agents of social control,"¹⁶² monitoring citizens' activities especially to prevent the emergence of working class awareness, and a feminist consciousness. Catholic officials promoted obedience to religion and the state. As protectors of the Catholic family, they also scrutinized women's moral character, and promoted their obedience to their fathers and husbands. Religious authorities justified the peasantry's low standards of living, emphasizing the moral superiority of the poor and

¹⁶² Diamantino P. Machado, *The Structure of Portuguese Society: The Failure of Fascism* (New York: Praeger, 1991) 91.

discouraging resistance to the status quo. Catholic Conservatism was an important tool for regime legitimation. The state promoted Catholic dominance, believing religiosity depoliticized the masses.¹⁶³ The Church also undertook the provision of many social services, promoting support for itself and divesting the state of responsibility for social welfare.

The military also played a key role in the *Estado Novo*. The military brought the regime to power, and it was the only force strong enough to challenge Salazar's rule.¹⁶⁴ Appeasing the military became a key issue for the regime, and the ideology of the *Estado Novo* further reinforced militarism. The military was represented as a force for law and order in society, the protector of the Portuguese nation and its overseas territories.¹⁶⁵ The strength of the military was portrayed as a barometer of the strength of the nation and the virility of the *Pátria* (Fatherland)¹⁶⁶. A large percentage of the budget was devoted to military spending, at the expense of social development. Once the regime became embroiled in the Colonial War, about 40% of its budget was annually spent on the military.¹⁶⁷ Militarism, thus, diverted government spending from Portugal's socio-economic development. While real power was vested in Salazar, and his technocratic advisors, the military played an influential role in state politics.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶³ Religiosity, manifested in the Cult of Fatima, would distract the masses from political affairs.

¹⁶⁴ Prior to the Revolution of the Carnations, the regime had subverted several plots against the regime from military officials, such as Humberto Delgado's failed coup attempt. Douglas Wheeler suggests that, due to the multiple factions within the military, there were multiple armed forces. Douglas Wheeler, "The Military and the Portuguese Dictatorship, 1926-1974: 'The Honor of the Army,'" in *Contemporary Portugal*. Eds. Lawrence S. Graham and Harry M. Makler. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979).

¹⁶⁵ Internal threats to the regime were not the responsibility of the military, rather PIDE, the regime's secret police, dealt with any real or perceived internal opposition or subversive forces.

¹⁶⁶ Militarism fostered a hypermasculinized vision of the state.

¹⁶⁷ Douglas Wheeler, "The Honor of the Military." Some estimates suggest this number reached as high as 80%. "The Nato Presence in Portugal," *Women of the Whole World 2* (1973) 54-56.

¹⁶⁸ For example, the president usually was a military officer close to the regime.

The *Estado Novo* constituted a closed political opportunity structure, with few opportunities for political participation, if any. To reinforce its dominance and control of the population, the state also created numerous repressive mechanisms. The paramilitary organization *Guarda Nacional Republicana* became the protector of the regime.¹⁶⁹ The GNR was largely responsible for maintaining internal order, breaking up strikes and demonstrations. The regime's secret police, PIDE, was charged with the internal defense of the state from all subversive elements. Writes Machado, "The reactionary coalition's secret police were undeniably the most effective and reliable instrument of class domination and subjugation."¹⁷⁰ All repressive measures were justified as protecting the nation. Communist activities were most vilified by the regime, however individuals could be charged for any activity deemed "damaging the interests of society."¹⁷¹ The *Estado Novo* created an oppressive climate of fear, as friends and neighbours were encouraged to monitor each other and report any suspicious activities. The regime further constrained civil society by banning political parties (apart from the regime's National Union) and limiting associational activity.¹⁷² With civil society monitored and confined to acceptable fora, opposition to the regime was forced underground or into exile.

The Salazarist regime successfully demobilized and depoliticised most of Portuguese populace. Faced with a closed political opportunity structure, the regime's ideological hegemony and repressive mechanisms, the Portuguese populace languished under the fascist dictatorship for nearly fifty years. Socio-economic underdevelopment left the majority of the population, including women, struggling to survive. Poor, afraid,

¹⁶⁹ Machado, *The Structure of Portuguese Society: The Failure of Fascism* 79.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid* 92.

¹⁷¹ Article 9.Clause 10.1 Political Constitution of the Portuguese Republic.

¹⁷² Associations could be arbitrarily disbanded by the state

and often illiterate¹⁷³, the politically alienated masses did not defy Salazar's rule or the rhetoric of the regime. Beyond their struggle for daily subsistence, the regime kept the masses perpetually distracted with "*Fado, Football and Fátima*." Meanwhile, the Portuguese elite generally accepted Salazar's rule, complicit in the regime's imposed state of stasis.

Fascism under Franco – The Spanish Case

The Civil War that ravaged Spain from 1936 to 1939 played a defining role in establishing the new regime's political opportunity structure. The Civil War was a battle between two Spains. The Republican forces united a range of groups supporting a modern, secularist, and decentralized vision of Spain. The Nationalist forces, on the other hand, united a range of conservative, pro-Castilian, religious factions: from monarchists to fascists. These groups were united in their opposition to the perceived threat of Anti-Spain¹⁷⁴, those forces that espoused secular, liberal values and would grant autonomy to the minority nations. To the Nationalist forces, the 2nd Republic was a period of national degeneration and moral decadence, while the Civil War embodied a victorious counter-revolutionary crusade. "For its entire existence, the politics and frequently the policies, of the [new] regime were conditioned by this struggle to control the destiny of Spain..."¹⁷⁵ General Francisco Franco emerged as the all-powerful leader of the crusade, and the new state, the man responsible for the salvation of Spain. Accordingly, Franco and his winning coalition obtained almost unqualified power, permitting him to institute his national project. To achieve his mission, a strong state was needed to protect his

¹⁷³ In 1974, half of the Portuguese population was illiterate.

¹⁷⁴ Michael Richards, "From War Culture to Civil Society." *History and Memory* 14(1-2) (Fall 2002).

¹⁷⁵ Jean Grugel and Tim Rees, *Franco's Spain*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997) 3.

regime's hold on power, and to restore and protect the Spanish nation.¹⁷⁶ Moreover, the restoration of Spain required the elimination of the forces of Anti-Spain.

Franco had led a broad coalition to victory. Francoist ideology attempted to bridge the many factions, but was primarily based in the Falange's fascist thought. Salazar and Mussolini also influenced the rhetoric of the *Nuevo Estado*. Franco's Spain was Catholic, conservative and anti-democratic. He unified the Nationalist forces around "National Catholicism", an ideology that fused Spain's national identity with Catholicism. Francoist ideology rejected any claims of multi-nationalism, or tolerance for minority nationalisms. The Spanish nation-state was seen as an organic, hierarchical whole, and any devolution of powers from the central state to the regions threatened the unity of the Spanish nation. The Fascist ideology of Corporatism was also emphasized

National Catholicism, as in Portugal, advocated a strictly privatized gender regime based in traditional Catholic values. The family was constructed as the core institution of the Spanish nation, to be protected by the state. "True Catholic womanhood" defined women's proper place as in the home. Above all, women were expected to fulfill their duties as wives and mothers. By performing their domestic, maternal roles, women would be serving both the family and the Spanish nation. After the Civil War, with its devastating effects on the Spanish population, it became imperative that women reproduce new citizens to perpetuate the nation.¹⁷⁷ Responsible for the moral education of young children and transmitting traditional values, all mothers were to be producers of good Spanish citizens, defenders of the regime and the *Patria*. Besides their maternal roles, the discourse of 'Honour and Shame' further relegated

¹⁷⁶ Ibid 23.

¹⁷⁷ Aurora Morcillo, *True Catholic Womanhood: Gender Ideology in Franco's Spain* 33.

women to the Private sphere.¹⁷⁸ As the moral markers of the nation, protecting women's virtue was imperative. As long as good Christian women stayed in the home, performing their domestic responsibilities, their honour and virtue were safe from moral corruption. Venturing into the public sphere, and engaging in "male" activities placed a woman's reputation and her family's honour at risk..

This glorification of motherhood and domesticity was accompanied by legislation that strictly limited women's rights and freedoms. The legal gains of the 2nd Republic were reversed, and the previous Civil Code was reinstated. This Code "mandated women's unqualified obedience to their husbands."¹⁷⁹ Their subordination and relegation to the home was codified in laws resembling those of the Salazarist regime. Without their husband's permission, women were prohibited from traveling, working outside the home, and owning property. Francoist legislation aimed to preserve the natural order, but also to protect women's virtue.

Franco created an authoritarian state in which power remained vested in his person, as both Head of State and Head of Government.¹⁸⁰ Having obtained power through military victory, he did not draft a Constitution to legitimize his authority. Instead, Franco's regime governed through a series of Fundamental Laws, which provided him with greater leeway to rule. Fundamental Laws could be adopted and amended on an *ad hoc* basis, as needed to preserve Franco's near total grip on power. Political structures, accordingly, underwent various transformations. Members of the

¹⁷⁸ Victoria Lorée Enders and Pamela Beth Radcliff, "Introduction," in *Constructing Spanish Womanhood* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1999) 22-23.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid 22.

¹⁸⁰ Franco finally appointed a separate head of government in the latter stages of his dictatorship, in preparation for his succession.

Cortes, a “rubber-stamp parliament,”¹⁸¹ were appointed as representatives of corporative bodies. His cabinet, the Council of Ministers, ran the affairs of the state under his close watch. Franco also rejected universal elections, whether free or controlled.

Formally, Spain was a Corporatist, Capitalist state. Corporatism, however, was never fully implemented. Twenty-seven vertical syndicates were created to replace labour unions, into which virtually all employees and employers were incorporated, but in which few labour interests were represented.¹⁸² Local governments were organized around the ‘natural’ groups in society (e.g. the family), but power was rigidly centralized under Franco. Decision-making was top-down, and the interests of ‘natural’ groups were determined from above, as were choices of who would represent those interests. Political activity was supposed to be channeled into the corporatist structures, but many social and state-sponsored groups were never incorporated, and, as in Portugal, few linkages were created between the citizenry and the state. The ideology of Corporatism, in both Spain and Portugal, was not put into practice and remained a sham. Nonetheless, Franco’s regime was not a unified whole. Franco mediated between the political families that dominated the Nationalist coalition. By aggregating the interests of various elite groups, from the Falange to rich landholders, the regime gained a semblance of pluralism.¹⁸³ No group could dominate policymaking. Nonetheless, the regime remained a very closed system, with access restricted to very few men. The Council of Ministers provided the main venue for representation among these political families,¹⁸⁴ and access was restricted

¹⁸¹ José Magone, *Contemporary Spanish Politics* (London: Routledge, 2004) 14.

¹⁸² Richard Gunther, José Ramon Montero and Joan Botella, *Democracy in Modern Spain* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).

¹⁸³ Groups spanned the Conservative spectrum, ranging from Falangists to pro-Monarchists, to rich landholders. Grugel and Rees. *Franco's Spain*, 42.

¹⁸⁴ Gunther et al, *Democracy in Modern Spain* 66.

exclusively to men. Thus, even Right-Wing women had little access to the Francoist regime.¹⁸⁵

Originally, a pillar of the regime was the Fascist party, the Falange. Formally, the Falange was the single party of the regime and the provider of Fascist ideology, yet it became increasingly irrelevant as political force and rarely shaped policymaking.¹⁸⁶ Eventually, Franco forced the Falange to merge with other loyal forces into the National Movement to ensure that no challenges to his personal authority emerged from within the coalition.¹⁸⁷ The other two political forces underpinning the regime were the Church and the military.

The Catholic Church strongly supported the Francoist regime, and the regime reinforced the Church's role in Spanish society.¹⁸⁸ The ideology of National Catholicism gave the church a virtual monopoly on morality.¹⁸⁹ Family law thus reflected the Church's conservative stances, and school curricula emphasized religious instruction.¹⁹⁰ The close symbiosis between the Francoist regime and the Church led Franco was reinforced when technocrats from Opus Dei¹⁹¹ took over much of the regime's political and economic planning. The Church legitimized Francoism, and Catholicism fulfilled a similar depoliticising role as in Portugal. Moreover, the Church helped enforce the gender ideology of True Catholic Womanhood.

¹⁸⁵ The most powerful right-wing woman was Pilar Primo de Rivera, head of the Fascist *Sección Feminina*, and member of the *Cortes* (as representative of *Sección*).

¹⁸⁶ See Stanley G. Payne, *Fascism in Spain 1923-197* (Madison WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999).

¹⁸⁷ Magone, *Contemporary Spanish Politics* 14.

¹⁸⁸ Unlike Salazar, Franco went so far as to ban all other religions from Spain.

¹⁸⁹ Grugel and Rees, *Franco's Spain* 36.

¹⁹⁰ Gunther et al, *Democracy in Modern Spain* 66.

¹⁹¹ The Opus Dei is an elite, highly conservative Catholic organization, composed of both clergy and laypersons.

Franco, the Caudillo, came to power as the Commander of the victorious armed forces, hence the military buttressed his grip on power. The Armed Forces largely receded from the daily affairs of the regime, however, and it did not intervene in the political sphere. Franco admitted military officials to advisory positions but to prevent the consolidation of power under any one (competing) military figure, Franco then rotated leadership positions. The military was further kept satisfied through strong funding and minimal government interference in its operations. “[T]he armed forces also provided much of the symbolism and ideals in official propaganda and thus reinforced the ideological basis and justification of the system.”¹⁹² As Guardians of the Nation, a strong military was necessary to protect the True Spain against those internal and external forces threatening its God-given Destiny. Franco’s militaristic ideology idealized masculinized power and strengthened patriarchal gender relations. Responsible for state security, the military became one of the regime’s central repressive mechanisms. Peace and order would be imposed. Once the Civil War came to end, Franco sought to eliminate his enemies, constructed as the elements of Anti-Spain. High levels of repression marked the early years of the regime. Men and women with ties to the Republican forces faced imprisonment or death. According to Grugel and Rees, “[a] police state was now in place along with a network of informers controlled by the army, the paramilitary, civil guards and the secret police.”¹⁹³ Although the levels of repression diminished, eternal vigilance for the forces of Anti-Spain was necessary. Only state-sanctioned or church organizations

¹⁹² Stanley Payne, “The Role of the Armed Forces in the Spanish Transition to Democracy” in *Spain in the 1980s: the democratic transition and a new international role*. Eds. Robert P. Clark, Michael H. Haltzel (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Pub. Co., 1987).

¹⁹³ Grugel and Rees, *Franco's Spain* 27.

were legal; strikes and mass demonstrations were outlawed. Opposition forces were eliminated whilst other repressive measures curtailed the development of new resistance.

Franco's greatest concern was maintaining his hold on power. Aggressive measures intended to eliminate opponents depoliticised the population. During the Civil War, the Nationalist Forces had mobilized extensive support. After the Nationalist victory, the regime tried to maintain high levels of support through parades and other displays of regime grandeur, but these attempts gradually faded.¹⁹⁴ Instead, the regime moved to depoliticise the masses. Stripped of their functions, even state-party organizations were depoliticised.¹⁹⁵ The negative experiences of the Civil War, the high levels of state repression and the economic struggles faced by the Spanish masses led previously mobilized individuals to withdraw from politics. Spaniards, aware of the destructive potential of sharp political divisions feared further political conflict. Memories of the Civil War, penalties for activism, and the lack of channels for real political participation all contributed to an apathetic populace, and an underdeveloped civil society.

The repressive, demobilizing character of the Francoist regime resembled that of the Salazarist regime. Other parallels between these regimes can also be identified. In both regimes, power was concentrated in the hands of the dictators and their close political advisors. Both regimes catered to a small group of political and economic elite, while expounding the corporatist nature of the state. Ideologically, Salazar and Franco embraced National Catholicism which legitimized their rule, and guaranteed Military and

¹⁹⁴ Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain" in *Politics and Society in Twentieth-century Spain*. Ed. Stanley G. Payne. (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976) 174.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid* 173.

Church support. The dictatorships further emphasized the need for hierarchical order and peace, thereby rejecting change and social conflict.

The gender regimes in both regimes were also very similar. Promoting National Catholicism, they espoused traditional Catholic gender ideologies. Women's gender roles were in the home, as wives and mothers; these roles were defined as natural, sanctioned by biology and by God. Mothering was a national responsibility, guaranteeing the physical and social reproduction of the nation. Franco and Salazar promoted a private, highly patriarchal gender regime, imposed through laws that relegated women to the private sphere and subordinated them to men. The Salazarist and Francoist gender discourses and their political opportunity structures parallel other military authoritarian regimes, in which women's mobilization did occur. The following section examines the development of the Spanish and Portuguese women's movements under fascism, and identifies the decisive factors that hindered women's mobilization.

Women's Mobilization under Salazar

The experiences of Latin American women suggest that authoritarian regimes may provide women with new opportunities to mobilize.¹⁹⁶ Women successfully used the contradictions between the policies and the discourse of the regimes to challenge them. The experiences of Portuguese women under the *Estado Novo* reveal striking contrasts. Women under Salazar, did not encounter opportunities to mobilize. Despite some women's activism (which should not be discounted), fascism did not provide the catalyst for the mobilization of the women's movement. Women lacked the resources, mobilizing

¹⁹⁶ As early as the 1950s, women in Venezuela mobilized against the Jiménez dictatorship. See Friedman, *Unfinished Transitions*, and "Paradoxes of Gendered Political Opportunity in the Venezuelan Transition to Democracy."

structures and opportunities needed to mobilize. Although women faced a similar gender discourse as Latin American women, they could not use this discourse to mobilize.

Salazar came to power under conditions of limited opposition. Forces on the left were too weak and divided to counter his political manoeuvrings. Salazar did not encourage active demonstrations of support. Instead, he sought to depoliticize the masses. Keeping the masses alienated from politics would maintain order and prevent any possible destabilizing effects of mass mobilization. Salazar was suspicious of any popular activism. All associative activity outside Church or state-sanctioned groups was monitored. Thus, women's organizing around maternal, non-political issues did not preclude repression. Relatively few mobilizing structures had existed before Salazar's dictatorship, then Fascism dismantled existing structures, and the repressive mechanisms of the regime constrained the materialization of new structures. The regime created and sustained a repressive environment. Over the years, as the regime and its repressive mechanisms became institutionalized, the repressive climate they created also became further entrenched, hindering mobilization. Legal measures that subordinated women to men and relegated them to the home specifically hindered women's mobilization by limiting their freedom of movement and association in gender-specific ways.

Women in Portugal also lacked important resources to mobilize. When the regime came to power, Portugal was rural, underdeveloped and largely illiterate. Salazar attempted to maintain the status quo by avoiding modernization. Popular education was viewed as threatening,¹⁹⁷ so the majority of the population received minimal, if any, education. Most women remained illiterate. Industrial development was minimal, and

curtailed insofar as it threatened the interests of economic elites. The small bourgeoisie, including upper-class women, was co-opted into the ranks of the regime while the majority of the populace struggled to survive. The conditions that had impeded the development of Civil Society under the First Republic continued. The rural majority lived on isolated farms, barely able to meet daily needs. Women's essential, informal labour on these family farms was considered part of their domestic duties. Peasant women, occupied on the family farm, had neither the time nor the material resources needed to mobilize. Even grassroots organizing remained virtually impossible under the circumstances. In the latifundias of the South, and in the few industrial centres, labourers did strike around wage, food and housing demands. Nevertheless, poor working and living conditions did not favour widespread mobilization. When protests did take place, even those led and organized by women, they were quickly suppressed by police and paramilitary forces.¹⁹⁸ Such demonstrations were seen as threats to the public order, to which all else was subsumed.

Women also had few political opportunities under the new regime. The pillars of the regime were all male, or male-dominated, and antagonistic to any women's movement. The military was a highly masculinized institution that embodied patriarchal oppression. Economic elites that benefited from economic underdevelopment were averse to raising wages and improving working conditions, much less providing social services. Their interests stood directly counter to women's interests. Last, the male-dominated Church was directly involved in the construction and propagation of the regime's gender

¹⁹⁷ Ben Pimlott and Jean Seaton, "Political Power and the Portuguese Media" in *In search of Modern Portugal: The Revolution and its consequences*. Eds. Lawrence Graham and Douglas Wheeler (Wisconsin, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1983) 44.

order, and the in the depoliticisation of the masses. Few women participated in the regime, and those that did were token figures drawn from the ruling classes who endorsed the regime's policies and its gender ideology.

The discourse of the regime further constrained women's mobilizing. Salazar promoted a traditional Catholic gender ideology. Yet the regime also exalted the rural peasant, especially the peasant mother. The regime's idyllic vision of peasant life emphasized the moral superiority of the lower classes. Peasants were expected to accept their situation in life contently, not to question the existing social order. Women's duties as housewives included learning to make do. Feminist claims that challenged traditional gender roles were discredited by the regime, and by the Church. Furthermore, challenges to social inequalities, including those based in women's maternal roles, also conflicted with the regime's discourse.

At first the women's movement had some space in which to organize. The National Council of Women was not banned immediately when Salazar took power. In the early years of the regime, the Council did not call for the fall of the regime. Instead, it focused on petitioning the government and the National Assembly for educational reforms, and legal reforms regarding women's "natural" difference.¹⁹⁹ During World War Two, the Council saw a rise in membership and activities. In 1936, the Portuguese Women's Association for Peace was formed. As opposition to Salazar increased at this time, Salazar cracked down on any sources of criticism, including women's organizations. The National Council was widely denounced in the press as an instrument

¹⁹⁸ Catarina Eufémia, a young, pregnant mother became a symbol of resistance and state repression, when during a labour protest on a Latifundia, she was shot and killed by the GNR.

¹⁹⁹ Anne Cova and Antonio Costa Pinto, "O Salazarismo e as Mulheres," *Penelope* 17 (1997) 87.

of Communist Propaganda.²⁰⁰ Women were not exempt from repression, as women who participated in any movements or demonstrations transgressed gender boundaries. They lost the protection of femininity. Order and the survival of the regime mattered above all else, rendering any unsanctioned women's organizing a threat. Women's legal activism was eventually reduced to state and church groups such as the *Mocidade Portuguesa Feminina*, the Portuguese Female Youth, and the *Obras das Mães*, Mother's Works.²⁰¹ These groups were intended to help women learn their domestic roles and to carry out their maternal responsibilities.

Women's Mobilization under Franco

Women in Spain also faced numerous obstacles that prevented women's mobilization under Francoism. Originally, the women's movement in Spain was more pronounced than in Portugal. The Civil War had also increased levels of women's activism. Ultimately, the experiences of the Civil War, however, left women with few resources, mobilizing structures or political spaces in which to mobilize. The post-war exhaustion led women, and society at large to demobilize. Franco then institutionalized that demobilization. The economic difficulties created by the Civil War only exacerbated the situation. Although Spanish economic development surpassed that of Portugal, the post-war years were marked by food shortages and dire economic circumstances for the majority of the populace. Little political will existed to oppose the regime. In this context, women were too busy surviving to develop a feminist consciousness. Nor did women have the resources or mobilizing structures to organize in the post-war context. When the economy began to improve, the population was alienated and apathetic to politics. As

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

well, memories of the Civil War loomed in Spaniards minds; they did not want to risk further conflict. Fear of state repression, and fear of political conflict deterred political activism. By this time, improving living standards reinforced the legitimacy of the regime, and moderated the need for change.

The end of the Civil War marked the beginning of large-scale repression. Franco attacked 'Anti-Spain's' bases of support, which also constituted the same groups from which the early women's movements were drawn. Franco cracked down on the middle classes²⁰², the main source of feminist activism. Secondly, the regime cracked down on the labour, anarchist and socialist movements, and women supporters therein. Communism was delegitimized, and the Communist Party targeted by the state. Similarly, Franco retaliated against the growing minority nationalist movements in the Basque Country and Catalonia,²⁰³ suppressing Basque and Catalan women's movements that were tied to them. The Catalan women's movement had been the most active women's movement during the 2nd Republic, under Franco, its members faced severe repression.

In the Francoist backlash against the moral vacuity of the 2nd Republic, women emerged as the prime target. Feminism and the liberalization of women's roles exemplified everything the new regime stood against. The regime's traditional gender ideology was used to unite political factions within the ruling class. Franco employed legislation, similar to that of Salazar, to impose a gender regime and to prevent women's mobilizing. Women's associations were illegal from the onset. The Civil War had shown

²⁰¹ Antonio Costa Pinto, *Salazar's Dictatorship and European Fascism* (New York: SSM-Columbia University Press, 1995).

²⁰² See Grugel and Rees.

that women were important political actors. Consequently the regime limited women's activism to the *Sección Feminina* and to Church groups. Women who challenged the regime's gender ideology, and those women who questioned the regime's policies were branded leftists and discredited by the regime.²⁰⁴

The political opportunity structure of the Francoist regime resembled that of the *Estado Novo*: access was rigidly closed and structures similarly gendered. The Church and the Military strongly supported and sustained Franco's conservative gender regime. Economic elites in Spain represented more, and often competing, interests. Despite differences, elite actors shared the dominant gender ideology. They also did not support the interests of the lower classes, or the women therein.

One point of access for women into the political structures of the Francoist regime was the *Sección Feminina*, the women's wing of the Falange, which played a prominent role in the Civil War. In recognition, Franco gave the *Sección Feminina* an important place in the new regime.²⁰⁵ Composed of right-wing women, the *Sección Feminina* met many of the criteria of a women's movement. With a degree of autonomy from the regime and the Falange, the organization undertook activities to improve women's living conditions and to help them to fulfill their maternal roles.²⁰⁶ Activities ranged from promoting women's education to providing care for pregnant mothers. The *Sección Feminina* also indoctrinated women about the regime, and its gender ideology. The *Sección Feminina* could have provided an important mobilizing structure for the women, however it soon experienced political demobilization. Although young women continued

²⁰³ Efforts to eradicate Basque and Catalan nationalisms ranged from bans on the use of Basque and Catalan languages to repression of nationalist leaders.

²⁰⁴ Edward Moxon-Browne, *Political Change in Spain* (London: Routledge, 1989).

²⁰⁵ Pilar Primo de Rivera, leader of the *Sección Feminina* sat on the Council of Ministers.

to perform obligatory social services for the regime through the *Sección*, the organization's membership sharply declined. The political influence of the *Sección Feminina* was also limited. It pressed women's issues within the regime, but women's issues were accorded little priority.²⁰⁷

Final Comparisons

Neither the Francoist nor the Salazarist regime created opportunities for the mobilization of the Spanish and Portuguese women's movements. In general, the regimes had strong demobilizing effects on the majority of the population, including women. As the regimes' duration lengthened, the structures and features of both regimes became increasingly embedded in society. Repression and demobilization continued to characterize the Spanish and Portuguese states. Moreover, the regimes' ideological hegemony meant that the dominant gender discourse remained firmly in place. In Portugal, a previously weak women's movement became virtually non-existent. In Spain, the devastation and repression wrought by the Civil War repressed a burgeoning movement.

Franco and Salazar's main goals were to stay in power and to minimize change. By the late 1950s and 1960s, however, the regimes could not prevent the wider socio-economic transformations from taking place. Spain began to undergo widespread socio-economic development. Meanwhile Portugal became embroiled in a Colonial War, and also to modernize. Opposition to authoritarian rule began to grow. Gender roles also began to change. Women increasingly participated in the opposition movements and

²⁰⁶ Kathleen Richmond, *Women and Spanish Fascism* (London: Routledge, 2003).

²⁰⁷ For example the SF succeeded in achieving reforms on domestic workers' pensions. *Ibid.*

mobilized around gender issues. The following chapter addresses the decline and breakdown of authoritarianism, and the impact on the women's movements.

Chapter 4: Women's Movements and the Breakdown of Authoritarianism

The reactionary Francoist and Salazarist regimes aimed to curtail political and socio-economic change. By the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, macro-structural transformations were taking place that could not be checked. In Spain, rapid industrialization brought the end of Spain's isolation and the influx of new money and European ideas. In Portugal, the beginnings of economic development happened just as it became embroiled in colonial wars. While modernization brought economic growth, the wars drained the state of resources, its young-men, and its national pride, and did not bring Portugal any closer to victory. Neither Franco nor Salazar could prevent the changes that led both regimes into decline. Forced to adapt to changing international and national circumstances, the responses of the dictatorships shaped how and why their regime broke down, and the nature of democratization.

As the regimes faced the pressures for change, the opposition forces in Spain and Portugal began organizing in greater numbers. Although opposition to authoritarianism was never fully extinguished in either country, the transformations taking place brought new resources and new opportunities for mobilization. As the breakdown, the first stage of democratization, began, opposition activity expanded. The rise of the opposition movements saw a growing number of female activists. Moreover, as women participated in the opposition movements, they also began to mobilize around gender-specific issues. Both Spain and Portugal saw a resurgence of feminism and the women's movements.

Women's movements that arise in the context of growing oppositional activity may be difficult to recognize as such. Einhorn and Sever identify two reasons why women's movements may be hidden. For one, movements are not organized around what Western, stand-alone feminists consider 'women's issues'. Second, writing about

socialist breakdowns, they argue “the civil society that did occur was denied the political language and legitimacy to articulate programmes and objectives.”²⁰⁸ Both reasons apply to the experiences of the women’s movements in Spain and Portugal, where women organized primarily for democracy, for socialism and for national recovery. In neither movement were ‘stand-alone’ women’s issues the central focus of activities. Rather, women’s equality was a by-product of the greater goal, the demise of the authoritarian state. Women were increasingly aware of gender discrimination, but they continued to face pressing, practical needs. In the housing demonstrations, working strikes and demands for peace, we can identify the informal dimensions of women’s movements. Moreover, the discourse of fascism, as well as the repressive measures imposed by the two regimes, had restricted the development of civil society. These regimes discredited any unauthorized women’s activism as part of the Communist menace, or as threats to public order. In this context, the women’s movements lacked the legitimacy to articulate an alternative gender regime. As the regimes declined, however, their own legitimacy came under attack. Regime breakdown paved the way for opposition movements to protest against authoritarian policies and the regime itself. Nonetheless, the dominant opposition discourses did not question gender relations, and the objectives of the women’s movements were often dismissed as frivolous by opposition forces. Consequently, in this chapter I recover Spanish and Portuguese women’s, often unseen, activism.

In this chapter, I explore ways the breakdown of authoritarianism fostered greater mobilization of women and the resurgence of the women’s movement. I focus on how the

²⁰⁸ Barbara Einhorn and Charlotte Sever, "Gender and Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 5(2) (July 2003) 163-190.

context of the breakdown created new resources and mobilizing structures for women's activism, as well as how the breakdown created new opportunities for the rise of the women's movements by destabilizing the regime's control on power, The breakdown of authoritarianism did not result in comparable opportunities for all social movements. Opportunities were gendered, and the mobilization of women remained limited in comparison to other movements. Moreover, a comparison of the Spanish and Portuguese contexts reveals that the nature of the breakdown matters: because of differences in the breakdown, women in Portugal had fewer opportunities to mobilize than their Spanish counterparts. Consequently, women's movements remained weaker in Portugal than in Spain. The first section of this chapter outlines women's movements in relation to breakdowns of authoritarianism and the theoretical implications of this relation. I then examine the dynamics of the breakdown in each case, and how women participated in the breakdown. The chapter concludes with a final comparison of the role of the women's movements in Spain and Portugal during the breakdown of authoritarianism.

Women's Movements and the Breakdown of Authoritarianism

A potential breakdown of authoritarianism occurs when there is a "breakdown in the consensus of political actors controlling or supporting the political regime."²⁰⁹ The sources of this breakdown are an interaction of internal and external factors, which are context-specific.²¹⁰ These factors trigger a decline in the regime by revealing its weaknesses. If the regime cannot contend with these events, it "moves towards disintegration and loss of control, its legitimacy becomes less plausible, and the scene is

²⁰⁹ Ethier, "Processes of Transition and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical Indicators" 6.

²¹⁰ Pridham, *The Dynamics Of Democratization: A Comparative Approach* 61.

set for impending collapse, opening the way for transition.”²¹¹ Political actors, individually and collectively, respond to the crisis by making strategic choices about the regime’s survival. Eventually, some actors conclude that the status quo is no longer feasible, or that democracy is a preferable alternative. Nonetheless, the outcome of the breakdown remains uncertain. The dynamic relationship between political actors, and social, political and economic factors shapes the nature and outcome of the breakdown of authoritarianism.

Mounting political dissatisfaction with the regime manifests itself outside the regime’s ruling groups. As the regime’s weaknesses become apparent, opponents are prompted to act, placing new pressures on the regime, and heightening the crisis. Although oppositional movements may not necessarily instigate the regime’s decline, nor cause the final collapse, opposition within civil society helps destabilize the regime, and may result in further divisions within the regime, as conflicts among elites emerge over the best strategy for addressing popular opposition. Furthermore, authoritarian regimes that rely on depoliticization to survive, faced with growing popular dissent, begin to lose their central means of control. The regime’s repressive mechanisms may suppress opposition activity, but they cannot eliminate the dissent.²¹² Political apathy ends, marking the beginning of the ‘invisible transition’.²¹³

As an authoritarian regime declines, conditions arise that further facilitate grassroots mobilization and social movement activity. Moreover, contentious activity, whether successful or simply destabilizing, can propel further movement mobilization.

²¹¹ Ibid 62. The decline of the regime is also known as authoritarian deconsolidation.

²¹² Gill, *The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society, and the Transition Process* 31.

and protest. Movements and organizations learn from one another.²¹⁴ With citizens increasingly cognizant of the new opportunities available and the authoritarian regime's weaknesses, a cycle of protest begins. Movements can thus play central roles in the demise of authoritarian regimes. Even when they do not call for immediate democratization, by existing, they challenge authoritarian structures and modes of politics, and apathy as normative. Women's activism, in particular, highlights the contradictions of authoritarianism, and how authoritarianism stands counter to women's interests and equality.

The changing conditions and opportunity structures that mark the breakdown of authoritarian regimes are gendered. Consequently, the dynamics of each breakdown impact, and are impacted by, the development of women's movements and the role they play in gender-specific ways. Feminist and social movement literature has demonstrated the key role women's movements played in Latin America and elsewhere during this phase. The Latin American women's movements provide a valuable analytical referent with which to examine the comparative experiences of the Spanish and Portuguese movements.²¹⁵ The important role Latin American women's movements played within the opposition meant that they could demand democracy, moreover, demand a democracy more open to women's citizenship.²¹⁶

²¹³ Garreton, *Incomplete Democracy: Political Democratization in Chile and Latin America* 80. Garreton employs the term 'invisible transition' to the phase when a previously depoliticised civil society once again engages in criticism and protest.

²¹⁴ International waves of activism (successful democratizations, feminist movements) are an important source of learning.

²¹⁵ Despite the fact that democratization in Latin America took place at a later date, and reflected the context of neo-liberalism and globalization, there are some comparisons to be drawn.

²¹⁶ See for example Susan Franceschet, "Gender and Citizenship: Democratization and Women's Politics in Chile." (PhD Dissertation. Carleton University, 2001) 123.

Despite the historical differences between the Latin American and Iberian regime breakdowns, there are factors that facilitated Latin American women's activism that can be compared and contrasted to the experiences of the Spanish and Portuguese women's movements. First, however, the duration and the historical legacy of the authoritarian regimes in Latin America emerge as a key distinction between the Iberian and Latin American movements. As explored in the previous chapter, Latin American women's movements were successfully able to mobilize under authoritarianism. Political spaces opened up to the women that were not available to traditional (male) political actors. The relatively short duration of the regimes, as compared to Franco and Salazar's rule, allowed a degree of continuity. Having mobilized throughout the regime's life, Latin American women could take leading roles in the popular opposition against the regime. Moreover, the experiences of democracy in the pre-authoritarian regimes were still relatively recent when the decline began.²¹⁷ Unlike the Francoist and Salazarist regimes, the shorter duration of military authoritarianism, and a longer prior history of democracy limited the Latin America authoritarian regimes' ability to successfully implement their "foundational" projects²¹⁸ and to embed their ideological values. While Latin American women were active throughout the duration of authoritarianism, the fascist regimes in Spain and Portugal had successfully imposed their repressive controls and ideological hegemony for decades. A protracted period of demobilization, and a weaker history of prior activism, meant the Iberian women's movements had to reinvent themselves.

²¹⁷ Philip Oxhorn identifies previous democratic experiences as a central factor in grassroots mobilization. Additionally, women's movements, particularly in Chile, had a long history of activism prior to the instauration of authoritarianism from which to draw on. See *Organizing Civil Society: The Popular Sectors and the Struggles for Democracy in Chile* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1995).

²¹⁸ Foundational project refers to dictatorships' attempts to reshape society and state/society relations. Maria del Carmen Feijoo, "Democratic Participation and Women in Argentina" in *Women and Democracy*. Eds. Jane S. Jaquette and Sharon L. Wolchik (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998) 33.

Beyond this, other crucial factors have been identified as making possible Latin American women's mobilization during the breakdown phase. These factors pertain to the political opportunity structure, the mobilizing structures, the discourses and the collective identities that fostered Latin American women's participation in the breakdown of authoritarianism. The presence or absence of similar factors during the Spanish and Portuguese breakdowns may offer insights into the development of the Iberian women's movements. In Latin America, for one, traditional political actors, particularly political parties, had not fully re-established themselves, hence movements and grassroots organizations could dominate the oppositional forces. The weakness of political parties in the political opportunity structure permitted organized women to assert more radical demands for democracy in society and the family.²¹⁹ As parties began to reorganize, some of these demands were incorporated into party agendas to recruit women. Another factor theorized as facilitating women's organizing was the relative strength of the opposition movement during the breakdown phase. The opposition attempted to mobilize intensively the urban popular classes, politicizing greater numbers of women, and creating ties between militant women in the opposition and neighbourhood groups.²²⁰ The opposition movement provided an organizational base and a mobilizing structure for subsequent women's activism. The strength and nature of the opposition, thus, play an important role in the mobilization of women. Regime liberalization was also an important dimension of the breakdown.²²¹ As levels of repression decreased, the more open political opportunity structure permitted the women's movement new spaces to

²¹⁹ Susan Franceschet, "Explaining Social Movement Outcomes: Collective Action Frames and Strategic Choices in First- and Second-Wave Feminism in Chile," *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (5) (2004) 513.

²²⁰ Alvarez, *Engendering Democracy in Brazil* 262.

²²¹ *Ibid.*

organize, in particular since women continued to be viewed as apolitical by regime leaders.²²² The Church in Latin America also served as an important ally and shelter for the women's movement and other opposition groups. Insofar as the women's movement mobilized around women's maternal roles and domestic needs, not feminist demands, the Church assisted in the organization of clubs such as mother's groups and soup kitchens, and protected groups from state coercion.²²³ The opening of the POS through liberalization, and the presence of new allies, such as the Church, both influence the capacity of women to mobilize and the strategies they employ. In particular, given the importance of the Church under Franco and Salazar, the attitude of the Church towards women and the opposition mattered. Lastly, another factor feminist theorists discern in the rise of the women's movements is women's changing family roles.²²⁴ Partly attributable to the regimes' neoliberal economic policies, in Latin America, women's employment and education levels rose significantly.²²⁵ Changing gender roles transformed women's identities, increased levels of politicization, and helped women to mobilize as a strategy for survival. Consequently, the gradual shift from a private to a public gender regime also permits a greater degree of women's activism. As the Spanish and Portuguese authoritarian regimes broke down, and the POS opened up, did women have access to similar allies, resources, mobilizing structures and collective action frames as the Latin American women's movements? Moreover, did a shift in the gender regime occur, and how did this impact upon women's organizing?

²²² Ibid; Waylen, "Women and Democratization: Conceptualizing Gender Relations in Transition Politics".

²²³ Helen Icken Safa, "Women's Social Movements in Latin America," *Gender and Society* 4(3) (1990) 358.

²²⁴ Ibid 358; Maria Elena Valenzuela, "Women and the Democratization Process in Chile" in *Women and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998) 49-50.

²²⁵ Ibid 37; Rosa M. Canadell and John F. Uggen, "Chilean Women's Organizations: Their Potential For Change," *Latin American Research Perspectives* 20 (4) 1993.

The Decline of the Authoritarian Regime in Spain

After the Civil War, and the Second World War, Spain was isolated from Western Europe. Franco focused on establishing his regime and strengthening his grip on power. In response to post-War economic blockades, the regime adopted autarkic policies intended to satisfy Franco's base of economic elites and the Falange. By the 1950s, the limits of autarky were increasingly evident, and the Francoist regime ceded the primacy of fascist ideology to economic development.²²⁶ Falangists continued to cling to an idealized vision of an agrarian Spain, yet the regime began to move towards economic liberalization and development. "For the Opus Dei technocrats led by the Minister of Commerce, Alberto Ullastres, the solution to all Spain's problems lay in its full integration in Western capitalism."²²⁷ Despite tensions between the elites over economic liberalization, the 1960s were marked by strong economic growth. The boom in tourism, in particular, brought new prosperity.

Economic liberalization was not accompanied by political liberalization however; repression continued. Nonetheless, economic development resulted in numerous social changes that the regime could not control. Industrialization brought urbanization, as peasants, especially men, moved to the cities in search of employment. Economic growth raised the standards of living of the industrial working classes. Moreover, new prosperity created a burgeoning middle class. In order to meet the needs of an industrial society, some educational reforms were implemented. As a result, Spain saw rising literacy rates, and increasing numbers of secondary and post-secondary students, including more

²²⁶ Edward Malefakis, "The Political and Socioeconomic Contours of Southern European History," in *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*. Eds Gunther et al. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995) 73.

²²⁷ Paul Preston, *The Triumph of Democracy* (New York: Methuen, 1986) 8.

women students.²²⁸ These changes introduced new resources and mobilizing structures that could facilitate collective action. Urbanization and economic modernization provided segments of the previously isolated rural peasantry physical spaces in which to organize and develop a collective conscience. The workplace and the university campus especially were sites for mobilization because the regime could not fully control the circulation of ideas in them. The rising incomes brought by economic growth also led to new resources, which further enabled movement organization.

Although the Francoist gender ideology remained relatively unchanged, the dominant gender order was increasingly undermined by socio-economic development. For one, new job opportunities and rising consumerism propelled increasing numbers of women to the paid work force.²²⁹ The regime justified women's participation in the labour force as necessary for the economic well-being of the nation.²³⁰ All women could now participate in the workforce, but the regime's thesis was that they would be predominantly single, and would abandon their jobs once married to fulfill their domestic duties. Married women might seek employment out of economic necessity, but the regime's ideal woman remained the stay-at-home mother. Nonetheless, growing numbers of married women did begin to work, even in the middle classes.²³¹ Gender roles and gender beliefs thus began to change, as working women publicly challenged the image of the passive, deferential Spanish housewife. The regime's feminine ideal increasingly

²²⁸ Grugel and Rees, *Franco's Spain* 150.

²²⁹ Socio-economic development introduced Western European standards of women as consumers, and saw increasing levels of consumption. See Morcillo, *True Catholic Womanhood*.

²³⁰ Forced to respond to the changing social reality, in 1961 the regime adopted the "Ley sobre derechos políticos, profesionales y laborales de la mujer" afforded women new employment rights, such as the right to equal pay for equal work (though only on paper), while continuing to enshrine women's natural difference.

²³¹ Kerstin Sundman, *Between the Home and the Institutions: The Feminist Movement in Madrid, Spain* (Goteborg, Sweden: ACTA Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1999).

contradicted lived experiences. The dominant gender regime was shifting towards a private gender regime, and the erosion of the traditional public/private divisions, as women took on new roles, allowed women access to the mobilizing structures of the workforce and the university. Changing gender values and new expectations also led women to recognize the discrimination they faced, facilitating the rise of a gender consciousness.

Western European tourism brought both economic growth, and social and attitudinal change.²³² The introduction of foreign media (in part brought by tourists), exposed Spanish men and women to new gender perspectives, including feminist thought. The 'western' concepts that entered Spanish society also pertained to society and government. Notions of freedom, equality and democracy equated with the modern life stood directly counter to the Francoist regime. The rise of secularism further undermined the moral authority of the regime and the Catholic Church.²³³ Liberal values influenced the Spanish intelligentsia and opposition activists, and began to infiltrate society at large. State censorship could no longer prevent the introduction of new ideas. While the regime's official discourse about Conservative Catholic Spain remained, this discourse no longer corresponded to the social reality for much of the Spanish population. The authoritarian state and its gender ideology became increasingly out of touch with the emerging modern Spain. As the master frame of Spanish society underwent transformation, the opposition frame gained new resonance. Moreover, elites within the regime began to be influenced by Western ideals, and to recognize the intrinsic

²³² Edward Malefakis, "Spain and Its Francoist Heritage," in *From dictatorship to democracy: coping with the legacies of authoritarianism and totalitarianism*. Ed. John H. Herz (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1982) 217.

²³³ *Ibid* 218.

limitations of authoritarianism. Lastly, the tourism industry limited the state's capacity for overt repression. Malefakis states, "As the largest single source of foreign earnings during the entire period of development, (...) tourism could not be endangered by repressive policies."²³⁴ Tourism proved provided economic and ideational resources, and limited the degree of state repression.²³⁵

International economic pressures required that the regime embark on the path of modernization. Yet, by opening the way for economic development, the regime paved the way for its own slow disintegration.²³⁶ The result was a piecemeal breakdown as internal conflicts threatened the regime. The regime divided over economic issues those who favored continuing protectionism, such as the traditional class of large landholders, and those seeking closer ties and integration into European economy, especially the new industrial classes.²³⁷ Economic liberalization promoted further divisions over political liberalization between the *inmovilistas*, the hardliners, and the *aperturistas*, the openers. The openers hoped to adapt the existing Francoist structures to be less repressive and reactionary, moving Spain closer to Western Europe. Questions of succession further intensified the conflict, as Franco's age and frail health became increasingly apparent.²³⁸ Regime decision-making increasingly revolved around strategic decisions about the Post-Francoist regime.

²³⁴ Ibid 218.

²³⁵ Although repressive measures continued, especially in the Basque Country, the regime was forced to show some restraint for fear of alienating tourists.

²³⁶ Preston, *The Triumph of Democracy* 7.

²³⁷ For a more detailed account of these divisions, see Nicos Poulantzas, *The Crisis of the Dictatorships: Portugal, Greece, Spain* (London : NLB, 1976).

²³⁸ In 1969, Franco designated a return to the monarchy by naming Prince Juan Carlos, grandson of King Alonso XIII and heir to the throne, his successor as Head of State. (Franco considered Juan Carlos' exiled father too liberal for the title.) How the post-Franco monarchy would function remained unclear.

As conflicts within the regime continued, it began to lose key bases of support. Many industrial elites “began to realize that it [the regime] was becoming a handicap to further growth, especially as its very existence precluded entry into the EEC.”²³⁹ Moreover, the new industrial classes did not need the regime to regulate labour relations. Second, the loyalty of the Church weakened, and the Church itself became divided. At the grassroots level, priests sympathized with the opposition movement, especially in light of the regime’s continued use of repression. In the Basque and Catalan regimes, clerics were active supporters of the nationalist opposition movements. Even the Vatican and the Bishops slowly moved away from the party line.²⁴⁰ Ultra-rightist militia squads, supported by the hardliners, targeted liberal and leftist priests, further deteriorating Church-regime relations.²⁴¹

The instability of the regime created a cycle of alternating moderation and repression. Pushed by the *aperturistas*, the regime adopted liberalizing policies, which then resulted in growing opposition to the regime. As strikes and protests increased, the regime would crack down, shutting down any liberalization. Repressive measures, however, could no longer quash the growing opposition, resulting in new attempts by the *aperturistas* to open up the regime. The cycle of moderation and repression revealed the inability of the regime to address the opposition. It could neither return to its previous state, nor adapt to the changing circumstances.

The opposition to the regime that marked the 1960s and 1970s played a crucial role in the breakdown of authoritarianism. Opposition activity highlighted the contradictions between the regime and the new modern Spain, as well as the failure of the

²³⁹ Malefakis, “Spain and Its Francoist Heritage” 73.

²⁴⁰ Preston, *The Triumph of Democracy* 15.

regime to eradicate the minority nationalisms. Proponents of modernization in the regime had hoped that economic growth would quell anti-francoist sentiment. Early on, the prosperity that accompanied the growth of tourism offered the regime some respite as the depoliticised majority focused on consumption rather than on political change.²⁴² The regime went so far as to permit non-political associations, which helped revive civil society.²⁴³ As socioeconomic development continued, opposition to the regime intensified. Attempts to transform the dictatorship into a *dictablanda*²⁴⁴ under Carlos Arias Navarro, the Franco-appointed Minister of Governance and then Prime Minister, failed to appease proponents of democracy.²⁴⁵ When repression increased in response to opposition activities, the costs of maintaining the regime grew. “The fact that, despite economic modernization, the government was forced to rely ever more on repression drove increasing numbers of Francoists into the opposition.”²⁴⁶

Three broad types of movements dominated the Spanish opposition forces during the breakdown phase: the workers’ movement, the student movement and the nationalist movements. During the breakdown phase, political parties in Spain, the traditional political actors, had yet to reorganize after decades of regime repression. The first of the opposition movements, labour, had slowly emerged over the previous twenty years.²⁴⁷ Though development raised wages and standards of living, these remained low compared

²⁴¹ Ibid 28.

²⁴² Ibid 11.

²⁴³ The 1964 Law of Associations permitted non-political associations, but associations could be arbitrarily shut down.

²⁴⁴ *Dictablanda* refers to a “soft” dictatorship in most civil liberties are guaranteed, and repressive measures are curtailed.

²⁴⁵ Collier and Mahoney, “Adding Collective Actors to Collective Outcomes: Labor and Recent Democratization in South America and Southern Europe” 73.

²⁴⁶ Preston, *The Triumph of Democracy* 36.

²⁴⁷ The Communist Party did establish a strong base of support in the labour movement, but its overall weakness limited its capacity to direct the movement.

to Western European nations. Workers began to develop a class consciousness, and demonstrations and strikes became politicized.²⁴⁸ The movement took advantage of existing corporative structures, infiltrating the regime's workers commissions to mobilize support while simultaneously creating parallel, clandestine unions. The Communist and Socialist parties became increasingly active through these *Comisiones Obreras* (Workers' Commissions). 'Apolitical' Catholic groups also provided key refuges for working-class activists, as priests became aware of their living conditions. Catholic associations also provided a protective umbrella for the student movement to organize.²⁴⁹ Although not as damaging economically as the rounds of labour strikes, "student protest created a climate of mobilization and an image of widespread rejection of the dictatorship which made it impossible for the regime to control society."²⁵⁰

Perhaps the most damaging opposition forces were the regional nationalist movements, especially the Basque group ETA. Nationalist opposition threatened the regime's ideological foundations: the restoration of the unified Spanish nation. Despite post-Civil War suppression of the nationalist minorities, including the executions of dissidents and the banning of the minority languages, the regime had failed to eradicate regional nationalist identities. Rather, Francoist repression fueled nationalist sentiments and Francoist resentment. Higher levels of development in Catalonia and the Basque Country further promoted the nationalist movements.²⁵¹ The nationalist movements in Catalonia and the Basque country sought to revive their national cultures in the public

²⁴⁸ Preston, *The Triumph of Democracy* 15.

²⁴⁹ Philip Oxhorn identifies the existence of a protective umbrella organization as central factor facilitating base-level organizing. *Organizing civil society: the popular sectors and the struggle for democracy in Chile* 7-8.

²⁵⁰ Grugel and Rees, *Franco's Spain* 93.

²⁵¹ Galicia was predominantly rural and underdeveloped. It also had the weakest history of nationalism. Hence, the Galician nationalist movement was not as active as the Basque or Catalan movements.

sphere, and the return of democracy.²⁵² The most violent and hence visible nationalist group ETA, (Basque Homeland and Liberty), pursued full Basque independence through militant revolutionary tactics. As of 1968, the group stepped up its violent strategies, initiating waves of bombings and assassinations. The regime responded with further repression of the Basque people and executions, but it could not control or eliminate the threat of ETA. Basque violence created a climate of fear, while regime's indiscriminate response engendered new ETA supporters. Moreover, the continued violence raised questions about the regime, and the state's capacities to maintain internal security. Violence from ETA thus challenged the continuation of the regime.

The opposition movement heightened the regime's internal crisis, creating new divisions among elites over the future of the regime. By the early 1970s, ruling elites increasingly recognized that Francoism would not survive without Franco. When Franco died in 1975, the existing regime collapsed. Franco had named King Juan Carlos, as his successor, effectively returning Spain to a monarch and putting an end to Spanish Fascism. As the transition phase began, the question that emerged was what would replace Francoism.

Women's Activism in Spain during the Breakdown

The Francoist regime had successfully demobilized women through the repression of civil society and through its gender ideology. As noted, socio-economic development played a key role in women's activism by slowly eroding the traditional, private gender regime. Women entered the universities and the workplaces in greater numbers. Modernization, in turn, introduced new gender beliefs and loosened sexual mores,

²⁵² Cultural subversion rather than armed struggle dominated the Catalan nationalist movement. Montserrat Guibernau, "Catalan Nationalism and the democratization process in Spain." in *Ethnicity and*

especially as women's religiosity declined.²⁵³ Development did not eliminate gender inequalities however, rather it changed their form.²⁵⁴ Women continued to be responsible for domestic responsibilities, as well as becoming workers and consumers. Indeed, freedom to consume epitomized the new vision of the modern woman.²⁵⁵ The overall percentage of women in the paid workforce remained low, especially of married women.²⁵⁶ In many cases, development and urbanization actually increased married, unemployed women's dependence on their partners. Women who left their small farms had to then rely on husband's salary for survival. Traditionally patriarchal values and practices also persisted despite changes.

Although, socio-economic development did not remove gender inequalities, it did facilitate the emergence of a women's movement. For one, a growing number of women questioned their relegation to the private sphere, and the regime's gender ideology. Moreover, once the regime's discourse began to lose legitimacy in society at large, its gender ideology also seemed an anachronistic feature of authoritarianism. Images of women's lives abroad demonstrated alternatives to the traditional Catholic model. Furthermore, women became aware of the discriminatory conditions they faced in the workplace and in society at large. Urbanization also facilitated new grassroots activity and collective action previously impossible on isolated farms. The workplace and the

Democratization in the New Europe. Ed. Karl Cordell (London; Routledge, 1999).

²⁵³ Sundman, *Between the Home and the Institutions: The Feminist Movement in Madrid, Spain* 33.

²⁵⁴ As Walby has noted that the shift from a private to a public gender regime does not eliminate patriarchy, rather it changes its form and intensity. See *Gender Transformations* and "From gendered welfare-state to gender regimes".

²⁵⁵ *Ibid* 33; Morcillo, *True Catholic Womanhood*.

²⁵⁶ In 1975, sixty percent of working women were single, widowed or separated. As women got older, the percentage of working women also declined. Although about a quarter of the women's population worked in 1975, 39% of 20-24 year old women worked, but under 16% of women between 30-49. Claudia Ottolenghi. *Women in Spain Supplement No.8 to Women of Europe*. (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 1981) 12

university campus further provided women with key spaces to organize and to mobilize new participants. Modernization thus provided women with key mobilizing structures and resources. Just as socio-economic development facilitated the emergence of the democratic opposition, it enabled women to participate in these movements. As the conditions of the breakdown led to greater oppositional mobilization, women also took part in greater numbers. Women were active in each of the main opposition movements, and as they did, they further developed new gender awareness. Women consequently, began to mobilize specifically as women and to target 'women's issues'.

The conflicts within the regime and the demands of the modern economy forced the Francoist regime to loosen legislation physically restricting women to their homes and Churches. Along with guarantees of equal salary for equal work, the 1961 "*Ley sobre derechos políticos, profesionales y laborales de la mujer*" protected from discrimination in the work place. Aimed at expanding women's post-secondary education, further legislation in 1970 removed discriminatory measures that impeded women's university attendance.²⁵⁷ Single and married women could thus pursue professional careers, although the family code remained intact, and married women still required their husband's permission to work. By removing the legal obstacles to the public sphere, the regime unwittingly gave women access to new spaces, and enabled new forms of women's activism.

Demands from within the regime for liberalization had also led to new legislation pertaining to associations. Under the declining Franco regime, associations with cultural and professional goals were permitted. Radcliff writes, "[c]reated as a way of channelling the energies of a society on the move, the government did not intend to promote the

creation of independent organizations, but the law created new spaces that the regime could not in the end control.”²⁵⁸ The law of associations permitted housewife and neighbourhood associations, and professional groups to organize. Neighbourhood associations played key roles in the opposition to Francoism and the fight for citizen’s rights.²⁵⁹ Women, primarily responsible for neighbourhood challenges like water and housing shortages, played leading roles in the organizing and running of neighbourhood associations. These women began to question gender relations.²⁶⁰ Housewife associations also helped to mobilize women and to recreate civil society. Although most housewife associations were loyal to the Franco regime, others opposed to authoritarianism emerged. Through housewife associations, which were outside the reach of the male-dominated opposition movement, women could become politicized around women’s issues and roles in democracy. Professionally-oriented associations, also permitted by the new law, provided another important channel for women’s activism. “They introduced and spread, to a limited extent, new ideas and values to counteract the Supremacy of Francoist national-Catholic ideology about women and the family.”²⁶¹ Legalized in 1971, the Spanish Association of Women Lawyers was one of the most influential groups to emerge under Francoism, actually forcing the regime to address

²⁵⁷ Sundeman, *Between the Home and the Institutions* 32.

²⁵⁸ Pamela Beth Radcliff, "Citizens and Housewives: The Problem of Female Citizenship in Spain's Transition to Democracy." *Journal of Social History* 36(1) (2002): 79-80.

²⁵⁹ Pilar Folguera writes “La lucha vecinal sera sin duda la pionera de posteriores movilizaciones por parte de otros colectivos sociales.” (Without a doubt, the neighbourhood struggle was the pioneer of later mobilizations by other social collectives. My translation.). “El Siglo XX,” in *Las Mujeres de Madrid Como Agentes de Cambio Social*. Ed. Margarita Ortega Lopez. (Madrid: Instituto Universitario de Estudios de la Mujer, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 1995) 224.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid* 226.

²⁶¹ Maria Teresa Gallego Mendez, “Women’s Political Engagement in Spain,” in *Women and Politics Worldwide*. Eds. Barbara J. Nelson and Najma Chowdhury (London: Yale University Press, 1994) 663.

gender discrimination.²⁶² The legalization of ‘apolitical’ associations was, nonetheless, a difficult process, leading many groups to operate extra-legally, and clandestinely as before. Permits could be revoked at will by the government, and members of legal associations (including Housewife Associations) were arrested. Writes Threlfall: “as far as the authorities were concerned, women organizing for change were just as much a threat to them as any other type of grassroots organisation.”²⁶³ The limited, and often conflicting, nature of regime change, therefore, restricted the new opportunities available to the women’s movement.

The progressive elements of the Church also helped mobilize women. While the Church hierarchy resisted the gender transformations introduced by socio-economic development, progressive clerics broke with regime’s doctrine; clergy members responded sympathetically to the opposition, even to women’s activism.²⁶⁴ Clerics helped women in the neighbourhood associations. Catholic groups emerged that specifically sought to improve women’s conditions, indeed some of the earliest expressions of the resurgent women’s movement were connected to the Church. Founded in 1960, the *Seminario de Estudios Sociológicos sobre la Mujer* (Seminar of Sociological Studies on Women) addressed women’s discrimination and attempted to modernize women’s place in society.²⁶⁵ Women’s groups also existed within such Catholic organizations as the *Movimiento Apostólico Social* (Social Apostolic Movement) and the *Hermandad Obrera de Acción Católica* (Worker’s Brotherhood of Catholic Action). The banner of

²⁶² Monica Threlfall, “Gendering the Transition to Democracy,” in *Gendering Spanish Democracy*. Eds. Monica Threlfall, Christine Cousins and Celia Valiente (New York: Routledge, 2005) 19-20.

²⁶³ Ibid 19.

²⁶⁴ The humanist strand of Catholicism coincided with the 2nd Vatican Council (1962-1965), which saw a move away from Church dogma, and greater liberalism in Church doctrine.

²⁶⁵ Anny Brooksbank Jones, *Women in Contemporary Spain* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997) 3.

Catholicism protected women participating in these groups from state repression, and offered them new legitimacy.

The opposition movement provided a central organizational base for the development of the women's movement. The student movement demanded democracy, and the protection of basic rights and freedoms. Through venues such as the *Sindicato Democrático de Estudiantes* (Democratic Student Union), women students were incorporated into the anti-Francoist struggle. As they became politicized through the student movement, they also mobilized around women's issues. Groups such as the *Asociación Española de Mujeres Universitarias* (Spanish Association of University Women) took up the attainment and defense of women's rights.²⁶⁶ Additionally, it was within women's university associations that the first feminist groups emerged.²⁶⁷ Women in academia were exposed to the Western intellectual trends, including Second-Wave feminism. As feminist books, such as Betty Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique*, became available in Spain, their influence on the women's movement expanded.

Between 1970 and 1974, 1.5 million women joined the workforce,²⁶⁸ and by the mid-1970s they constituted about twenty-five percent of Spain's total working population.²⁶⁹ As growing numbers of women became paid workers, the worker's movement further proved an important vehicle for women's activism. Women became involved in the clandestine workers commissions, and in the left-wing parties tied to the workers' movements. Arrests of movement participants, moreover, politicized the wives

²⁶⁶ Pilar Folguero Crespo, "El Franquismo. El Retorno a la Esfera Privada (1939-1975)" in *Historia de las mujeres en España*. Eds. E. Garrido et al. (Madrid: Síntesis, 1997) 547; Folguera, "El Siglo XX" 235.

²⁶⁷ Judith Astelarra, "Spanish Feminism: Historical Perspectives" *Canadian Woman Studies* 6(1) (1985) 72.

²⁶⁸ Rosa Montero, "The Silent Revolution: The Social and Cultural Advances of Women in Democratic Spain," in *Spanish Cultural Studies: An Introduction*. Eds. Helen Graham and Jo Labanyi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 382.

and mothers of those arrested. The relative organizational strength of the labour movement thus facilitated women's activism in the opposition. Women participants' discussions moved from general issues of democracy to gender-specific problems, generating a new gender awareness. Women's emancipation was viewed as tied to democratization.²⁷⁰

The Communist Party's dominance of the workers cooperatives resulted in many prominent feminist activists developing close ties to the Party. As the Party attempted to widen support, it attempted to increase its numbers of women members. Consequently, in 1965, the *Movimiento Democrático de Mujeres* (Women's Democratic Movement) was formed. The MDM "arose out of the Communist Party, due to greater political consciousness, superior organization and facility of contact."²⁷¹ Closely tied to the Communist Party, the MDM grouped Communist women and independent activists. Over the course of the next twenty years, the MDM became the most important women's organization. The aim of the MDM was to "mobilize women by departing from and creating a link between their everyday problems and the struggle for democracy."²⁷² In its attempts to politicize women and to address their more practical needs, the MDM organized a range of activities in the urban neighbourhoods. The MDM also tried to reach housewives, and to operate legally, by infiltrating and establishing Housewife Associations. The Communist Party, however, continued to have strong influence over the movement. Antagonism within the leftist opposition towards feminist claims created

²⁶⁹ Anny Brooksbank Jones, "Work, Women and the Family: A Critical Perspective" in *Spanish Cultural Studies: An Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 386.

²⁷⁰ Temma Kaplan, *Taking Back the Streets: Women, Youth and Direct Democracy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004) 191-192.

²⁷¹ Maria-José Rague-Arias, "Spain: Feminism in Our Time," *Women Studies International Quarterly* 4(4) (1981) 471.

²⁷² Sundeman, *Between the Home and the Institutions: The Feminist Movement in Madrid, Spain* 39.

reluctance on the part of the MDM to problematize gender relations. They did not want to risk their position in the opposition, or to be ostracized by the Party.²⁷³ The organization thus rejected the feminist label. Members found themselves caught between following the party line and advocating feminist goals, an issue which created growing divisions within the group.

The nationalist movements also provided an important organizational base for women's movements to mobilize in Catalonia and the Basque country.²⁷⁴ Basque and Catalan nationalist movements privileged women's domestic and maternal roles, emphasizing women's centrality in the persistence of the nation, as both biological and cultural reproducers. Decades of Francoist repression highlighted the importance of the family and motherhood as sites for the transmission of language and culture, since under Franco this could only take place in the home or in face to face communities. The women in the nationalist movements had a long history of playing support roles (based in their responsibilities) in the nationalist movements, but increasingly they took part as full activists in the movements.²⁷⁵ As for other Spanish women, modernization and changing gender roles had opened new possibilities for women outside of the home.²⁷⁶ Nationalist women did not reject their maternal roles, rather "young female nationalists looked to

²⁷³ Kaplan, *Taking Back the Streets: Women, Youth and Direct Democracy* 194.

²⁷⁴ Since the Galician nationalist movement was weaker, women's mobilization in the movement was also low. Furthermore, the Galician women's movement was not well established during the breakdown phase. Second, it should be noted that the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements were closely tied to the worker's movements in the regions, including the communist and socialist parties.

²⁷⁵ For example, women played key support roles during Civil War years. As well, in the post-War years women took care of male militants that had gone into hiding.

²⁷⁶ Catalonia, especially, saw the highest levels of regional development.

both the old and the new in order to forge identities for themselves in a society which had confined them discursively and to a large extent physically, to the home.”²⁷⁷

Women activists first had to overcome gender discrimination in their own nationalist movements. The Catalan movement, by embracing modernization and Europeanization, and by adopting a more egalitarian version of nationalism, facilitated women’s activism. Women were recognized as mothers, workers and as equal citizens. In Catalonia, a more progressive clergy assisted women’s mobilization at the grassroots level.²⁷⁸ Women mobilized in numerous Catholic Catalan groups like the *Unió de Mares Catòliques* (Union of Catholic Mothers) and *Acció Catòlica* (Catholic Action). Through these organizations, women developed a gender consciousness rooted in their nationalist identities.²⁷⁹ Basque ethno-nationalism, by contrast, idealized a vision of the rural, Catholic Basque family and of the Basque past, and despite its high levels of industrialization resisted the encroachment of the modern as an assault on the Basque community.²⁸⁰ Accordingly, many male activists, including Basque Church officials, viewed changing gender roles as part in parcel of the slow disappearance of the Basque nation.²⁸¹ Women activists encountered an environment less receptive to new gender roles or to feminist claims, which hindered the development of the women’s movement.

²⁷⁷ Carrie Hamilton, “Changing Subjects: Gendered Identities in ETA and Radical Basque Nationalism,” in *Contemporary Spanish Cultural Studies*. Eds. Barry Jordan and Rikki Morgan-Tamosunas (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 226.

²⁷⁸ Again, the Church predominantly supported women’s activism that fell within their domestic responsibilities; but also their role in protecting Catalan culture.

²⁷⁹ Emili Ferrando Puig, *La Dona a Badalona Cent Anys de Protagonisme Invisible (1897-1997)* (Barcelona: Editorial Mediterrania, 2000) 117-118.

²⁸⁰ The image of the Basque Citizen is male, while women are the markers of the nation. See Begonia Echevarria, “Privileging masculinity in the social construction of Basque identity” in *Nations and Nationalism* 7(3) (2001): 339-363.

²⁸¹ Carrie Hamilton, “Changing Subjects: Gendered Identities in ETA and Radical Basque Nationalism” 226-229. The Church in the Basque Country, tied to the nationalist movement, facilitated cultural revival activities that involved men and women. Given women’s maternal roles, women’s participation in these activities was very critical for the survival of Basque language and culture.

Nonetheless, nationalist women overcame restrictions in Basque nationalism by participating in the nationalist movements. Their activism in the nationalist opposition challenged gender hierarchies, women's relegation to the private sphere, and the dominant conception of the nation. Even within ETA, women constituted about ten percent of militant activists.²⁸²

For women who participated as activists, whether as militants in ETA or activists in the Catalan associations, "becoming politically active required a rejection not only of the oppressive gender politics of the Francoist states, but also of the more local constraints of the family, church and community."²⁸³ In this context, women began to develop feminist identities, although based in difference feminism. Slower to develop in the Basque Country, it was in Catalonia, with its stronger history of feminist activism, that the strongest women's movement in Spain emerged. Prominent Spanish feminists such as Maria Aurelia Capmany, were from Catalonia and had ties to the nationalist movement. It was in Barcelona that the first worker's commissions emerged, and the first women's assemblies tied to these commissions.²⁸⁴ Even the origins of the *Movimiento Democrático de Mujeres* (Women's Democratic Movement) lay in Barcelona.

From the 1960s onward, the Spanish women's movement began to re-establish itself in Spanish society. Apart from the above-mentioned associations, a few feminist collectives also emerged, centred primarily in Barcelona and Madrid. Largely influenced by American and European feminist literature, these collectives emphasized

²⁸² Ibid 231.

²⁸³ Ibid 228.

²⁸⁴ Pilar Folguero Crespo, "El Franquismo. El Retorno a la Esfera Privada (1939-1975)" in *Historia de las mujeres en España*. Eds. E. Garrido et al. (Madrid: Síntesis, 1997) 547.

consciousness-raising. They theorized women's oppression and began to question the relationship between the women's movement and other political actors (i.e. issues of double and single militancy).²⁸⁵ As repression loosened in the 1970s, feminist groups had a new opportunity to work in semi-clandestine groups.²⁸⁶ Women's groups from across the spectrum began to build networks and organize coalitions. Events were organized to mark International Women's Day and the United Nations International Women's Year. In conjunction with the Housewives Associations, the Platform of Feminist Organisations (a coalition of 28 organizations) organized a boycott of food markets to protest rising food costs.²⁸⁷ Brooksbank Jones asserts, "[b]y the early 1970s, as opposition to the regime became more open, wives of striking workers, prisoner support groups, women lawyers, university and other women's organisations, feminist and other activists all organised to demonstrate their solidarity with the opposition agenda, and to ensure that it included their own demands."²⁸⁸

Because of the growth of the opposition, modernization and the internal contradictions of Francoism, conditions arose that provided women with new opportunities to mobilize. Overall, however, the women's movement did not play a central role in the breakdown of authoritarianism like the minority nationalist or the worker's movements. Women were increasingly gender-conscious, yet the discourse of Francoism and of the opposition dismissed many of their demands. The opposition

²⁸⁵ Judith Astelarra, "The Transition to Democracy in Spain," in *Women and Counter-Power*. Ed. Yolande Cohen. (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1989) 55; Rague-Arias, "Spain: Feminism in Our Time" 472. Double militancy feminists advocate working within male-dominated parties and movements to achieve change. Single militancy feminists doubt the potential for change of activism in male-dominated, patriarchal structures, and question whether feminists in male-stream parties and movements can avoid being co-opted.

²⁸⁶ Threlfall, "Gendering the Transition to Democracy" 24.

²⁸⁷ The 28 organizations were then banned by the regime. Ibid 24-25.

²⁸⁸ Jones, *Women in Contemporary Spain* 6.

viewed feminist claims as trivial and secondary to the goal of defeating Francoism. The women's movement had to contend with patriarchal attitudes both on the left and the right.²⁸⁹ Channels for political participation were still limited under the Francoist state, and women activists continued to be hampered by the regime's repressive measures. Nor, did the women's movements, outside of Catalonia and to a lesser extent the Basque Country, successfully mobilize widespread support amongst the Spanish population. Accordingly, the decline of authoritarianism helped revive the women's movements, but only to a limited extent.

The Decline of the Authoritarian Regime - Portugal

In the 1950s, Portugal was the poorest Southern European nation.²⁹⁰ Recognizing international economic pressures, the regime's technocratic elites began moving Portugal towards industrial development, joining the European Free Trade Association in 1960. The move towards industrial development, however, created tensions among the regime's economic elites. Some of the monopolistic families favoured closer ties to Europe, while others favoured directing trade towards Portugal's colonial markets,²⁹¹ resulting in inconsistent, half-hearted policies towards economic development. Modernization, took off in the 1960s, but with uneven results. Agriculture lost its overall predominance in the Portuguese economy, although a majority of the population continued to live rurally and to work on farms. The regime failed to implement any agricultural reforms in a sector that continued to be dominated by small, technologically backward farms. Rather than modernizing farms, the regime's agricultural policies were characterized by

²⁸⁹ Ibid 4.

²⁹⁰ Machado, *The Structure of Portuguese Society: The Failure of Fascism* 15.

²⁹¹ See Poulantzas, *The Crisis of the Dictatorships: Portugal, Greece, Spain*.

immobilism.²⁹² The regime had no ideological or economic incentive to improve the lives of the rural majority living on the minifundias of the North. Industrialization thus heightened “the contradiction characterizing the Portuguese situation: on the one hand a modernizing, developing country with a colonial empire, and on the other hand a country with a backward, oppressive, protectionist, traditionalist, and reactionary economic, political and social structure.”²⁹³

In 1966, the regime finally committed itself fully to economic development,²⁹⁴ primarily to fund the colonial wars. By this stage, Portugal lagged significantly behind Spain, which hindered the revival of a civil society and opposition movement like in Spain during the 1960s and early 1970s. Fewer mobilizing structures and resources were available to facilitate collective action, or politicize the populace. For one, the middle classes in Portugal, although growing, were much weaker than their Spanish counterparts. Universities remained highly elitist, and the failure to make university more accessible reflected the general insufficiency of Salazarist educational reforms. Consequently, levels of illiteracy also remained high. Portugal lagged behind Spain in the building social infrastructure and the implementation of social services. Urbanization followed economic growth, leading to severe housing problems in the cities. When neither the public nor private sphere responded to the housing needs, shantytowns sprang up in the cities.²⁹⁵ Standards of living and wages were also below those in Spain. Portuguese workers provided a source of cheap labour. Though the technocrats embarked on economic

²⁹² Machado, *The Structure of Portuguese Society: The Failure of Fascism* 23.

²⁹³ Ibid 17.

²⁹⁴ Ferreira and Marshall, *Portugal's Revolution: Ten Years On* 72.

²⁹⁵ Hammond, *Building Popular Power: Worker's and Neighbourhood Movements in the Portuguese Revolution* 56.

development, they did little to improve the working conditions of farmers, rural labourers or industrial workers, including women.

The slower pace of modernization also impacted the spread of modern 'Western' values. As modernization took place, the peasant majority continued to struggle in relative isolation. Although much of the Spanish rural population was also largely disconnected from 'Modern' Spain, urbanization in Spain was more extensive. Portugal thus remained further outside the influence of Western Europe. Given the decades long depoliticization of the Portuguese masses, the slower pace of macro-structural changes hindered the development of civil society and the opposition. Liberal, secular and pro-democratic values had limited influence on the population at large. More specifically, new gender beliefs and feminist values were slower to take root. Consequently, the pro-democratic opposition forces could not readily draw on Western ideals to mobilize new supporters.

Colonial wars broke out on three fronts, beginning in 1961: Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea. The regime had ideologically constructed the overseas territories as an integral part of Portuguese National identity.²⁹⁶ Loss of these Portuguese territories constituted a loss of the nation's honour. To accept military defeat was inconceivable to the regime, and to the ever-important military. By appealing to nationalist sentiment, the war temporarily neutralized opposition, including potential military dissent. Politically, the regime could not relinquish the colonies without risking the loss of support from one of its power bases: the monopolistic families that relied heavily on the colonial markets. When the military proved unable to suppress the colonial independence movements, the lengthy wars began to take their toll on the regime. The colonial wars became

increasingly costly, as a growing percentage of the state's budget was spent on the military, and the fiscally conservative regime was forced to take a number of international loans to finance military expenditures.²⁹⁷ By focusing the regime's resources on the war, resisting the global wave of decolonisation, the regime hindered socio-economic development. The regime opened Portugal's borders to foreign direct investment as a way of generating capital, prompting the entry of multinational companies into Portugal. Foreign investment, however, reduced dependence on the colonies, and the economic incentives for maintaining the wars. Reliant on global capital, the regime also became more susceptible to increased international pressures to end the colonial wars.

The low levels of development, coupled with the colonial wars placed further strains on the economy by draining the labour force of young men, as they emigrated to avoid the draft, or went in search of better living standards. Officially, more than a million persons emigrated between 1961 and 1972, and another 100,000 draft-eligible men illegally fled the country.²⁹⁸ Temporarily, legal and clandestine emigration allowed the regime to ignore the issues of unemployment and underemployment, particularly in the rural countryside.²⁹⁹ It also benefited from emigrants' remittances. The regime, thus, could forestall investing in socio-economic development. In the long run, however, the

²⁹⁶ The colonies were actually defined in the Constitution as Portuguese territories.

²⁹⁷ Machado, *The Structure of Portuguese Society: The Failure of Fascism* 18.

²⁹⁸ Hammond, *Building Popular Power: Worker's and Neighbourhood Movements in the Portuguese Revolution* 56.

²⁹⁹ Machado, *The Structure of Portuguese Society: The Failure of Fascism* 29.

loss of skilled and unskilled labour, not to mention the failure to modernize extensively, hurt the national economy and by extension, the regime.³⁰⁰

The colonial wars and the impact of emigration had direct implications for women and the gender regime. As thousands of men fought (and died) in the Colonial Wars, while others emigrated to avoid the draft or search for work, women were left behind to care for the family and the home. Women increasingly became responsible for the economic survival of their families. Without the traditional breadwinner available to support the family, women either assumed responsibility for the farms, or supported their families by entering the paid workforce (increasingly working in textile and other factories). Although the official rhetoric of the regime upheld the ideal of the housewife and peasant mother, in reality traditional gender roles were increasingly undermined by the regimes own policies because women experienced the double burden of work and domestic duties. Most women's labour took place on the minifundias of the North where the loss of male hands worsened the struggles on the poor, outdated farms, and barely permitted self-subsistence. The public/private divide began to erode; women gained access to the public sphere but at a high cost.

With no end in sight to the war, dissatisfaction over the regime's colonial policies began to surface, and the legitimacy of the regime came under threat. A popular opposition emerged against the war, and some in the military grew dissatisfied. Internal regime conflicts emerged over the regime's colonial policies. Meanwhile, as the costs of war mounted, and Portugal moved towards modernization, tensions between the

³⁰⁰ Manuel de Lucena, "The Evolution of Portuguese Corporatism under Salazar and Caetano," in *Contemporary Portugal: The Revolution and Its Antecedents*. Eds. Lawrence C. Graham and Harry M. Makler. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979) 77.

economic elites seeking modernization and closer ties to Europe, and those seeking protectionist policies were not resolved.

In 1968, Salazar suffered a debilitating stroke, dying in 1970. Marcello Caetano, assumed power as the new Prime Minister. Faced with the elite conflicts and growing popular unrest he embarked on a period of political liberalization, and attempted to intensify industrial development as favoured by the Europeanist segment of the hegemonic ruling classes.³⁰¹ Caetano loosened restrictions on political activity, relaxed censorship, and the democratic opposition was allowed to campaign more freely for the 1969 National Assembly elections.³⁰² Political liberalization resulted in an expansion of political opposition. The Communist Party, and to a lesser extent the Socialists and Catholic Leftist groups increased their activities among workers. They attempted to infiltrate and gain control of corporatist worker organizations, since Caetano's policies had loosened the regime's top-down controls on these bodies.³⁰³ Strikes also increased. Threatened by the implications of liberalization, Caetano reversed the new freedoms in 1971, returning to repressive measures. Progressive elites in the National Assembly effectively were forced out of government. The regime's turn towards the right, and the failure to commit fully to modernizing reforms split the progressive wings of the ruling elites away from Caetano and the hardliners. "The regime was incapable of reforming itself from within; Salazar had just died, and yet his ghost was already returning to haunt his successor."³⁰⁴

³⁰¹ Machado, *The Structure of Portuguese Society: The Failure of Fascism* 141.

³⁰² Hammond, *Building Popular Power: Worker's and Neighbourhood Movements in the Portuguese Revolution* 58. Election results were still tightly controlled.

³⁰³ Workers were granted greater freedom to choose their organization leaders. Ibid 59.

³⁰⁴ Ibid 60.

Further propelling the regime into decline was Caetano's inability to resolve the colonial wars. Over a decade of wars had been costly, economically and legitimacy-wise. As a pillar of regime support, the military was not subject to the same repressive measures as the civilian population. The relative independence of the military allowed officers to oppose the colonial wars and to organize against the regime.³⁰⁵ Overextended and unable to achieve victory, the military saw the colonial wars as tarnishing its honour. Some 25,000 desertions took place over the duration of fighting.³⁰⁶ Once it became apparent that Portugal could not win, military officers wanted to recover the military's 'manliness'.³⁰⁷ The wars had also changed the composition of the military, generating further unrest. New officers increasingly were drawn from middle-class, not elite families. These young, university educated *milicianos*, threatened the traditional military hierarchy.³⁰⁸ Divisions appeared within the officer's ranks, as a group of progressive junior military officers recognized the anachronisms of the authoritarian regime, and questioned the colonial war. Dissatisfaction within the military, however did not entail a commitment throughout the military to democracy.

Popular opposition, post-Salazar, was also revived. Propelled originally by Caetano's reforms and by socio-economic development, the opposition movement gained momentum. Nonetheless, the opposition movement played a lesser role in the breakdown of authoritarianism than the Spanish movements, as fewer mobilizing structures and resources were available. The weak impact of development was most readily evident in the comparative weakness of the university movement, since the universities remained

³⁰⁵ The military establishment thus constituted the protective umbrella for oppositional activities.

³⁰⁶ Ferreira and Marshall, *Portugal's Revolution: Ten Years On* 27.

³⁰⁷ Raby, *Fascism and Resistance in Portugal* 161-163.

notoriously elitist. Most students displayed political ignorance, and disinterest, even after the fall of the regime.³⁰⁹ Nevertheless, some student protests occurred in the late 1970s, particularly in response to the continuing colonial wars.³¹⁰ The worker's movement, the central opposition force in Portugal, was also weaker than the in Spain. Moreover, unlike Spain, the Communist Party in Portugal dominated the worker's movement, and more generally the opposition movement, as the main opposition organization, the *Movimento Unido Democrático* (the United Democratic Movement) was closely tied to the PCP. As the only political party to have survived the Post-World War II repression, the PCP's dominance reflected the lack of other organized opposition. The Party had survived through a small, clandestine network of members, which led to elitism in the party; there was little working class representation across party ranks, and there were no attempts to draw peasant support. Rather than attempting to mobilize workers to overthrow the regime, "the PCP actually replaced radical syndicalism with, at best, reformist activities and long-term plans and strategies."³¹¹ Nonetheless, the party was vilified by the Catholic Church, disconnecting the masses and women from it, and thereby delegitimizing the opposition movement.³¹²

³⁰⁸ Hammond, *Building Popular Power: Worker's and Neighbourhood Movements in the Portuguese Revolution* 66.

³⁰⁹ Machado, *The Structure of Portuguese Society: The Failure of Fascism* 155.

³¹⁰ Daniel Nataf, *Democratization and Social Settlements: The Politics of Change in Contemporary Portugal* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995) 38.

³¹¹ Machado, *The Structure of Portuguese Society: The Failure of Fascism* 126. Bill Lomax suggests collusion between the PCP and the regime, as the Party accepted the status quo at the expense of the masses. "Ideology and Illusion in the Portuguese Revolution: The Role of the Left" in *In Search of Modern Portugal: The Revolution & Its Consequences* Eds. Lawrence S. Graham and Douglas L. Wheeler. (Madison, WI.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983) 107.

³¹² Divisions had erupted in between the Church and the regime. However, insofar as the PCP controlled the working class movement, the Church did not provide a protective umbrella for the movement's mobilization. Moreover, as became evident during the transition phase, the Church feared the Communist party as a threat to its position and continued to exploit this fear among the rural peasantry.

When Caetano adopted liberalizing policies, opposition activism had expanded. His return to repressive measures did not stop the growth of the opposition movement. In the 1970s, new opposition groups formed. Although the PCP remained dominant, militant leftist-marxist groups also emerged. As well, the Socialist party began to organize further, developing ties to the Socialist International. These groups, nonetheless, remained small.³¹³ Caetano's regime did see greater campus activism. The protracted war also saw the rise of anti-war demonstrations and groups. Moreover, as the regime continued to go into decline, the opposition intensified its activities. In 1973, a wide coalition of opposition, especially workers', groups met openly and defiantly in Aveiro. The opposition did not bring about the collapse of authoritarianism, yet its growing activities revealed the regime's incapacity to address the problems it faced.

Women's Activism in Portugal

A women's movement also re-emerged in Portugal during the breakdown of the authoritarian regime. After decades of repression and the demobilization, the nature of the breakdown, however, hindered any widespread mobilization of women. Women lacked the same level of opportunities and resources as the Spanish movements. The degree of modernization that characterized the phase of regime decline lagged behind Spain's. Levels of urbanization, education and industrialization remained below Spain's. Whereas the school and workforce provided key spaces for women's mobilization in Spain, fewer women in Portugal had access to these spaces.

After a slow start, women were increasingly working outside the home by the late 1960s, to replace missing male workers and to respond to the needs of multinationals

³¹³ Hammond, *Building Popular Power: Worker's and Neighbourhood Movements in the Portuguese Revolution* 62.

seeking cheap labour.³¹⁴ By 1970, 19% of the women were employed in the formal labour force.³¹⁵ Slower economic modernization resulted in many women taking over small, backwards family farms, however, rather than urban forms of employment. Rural women did not obtain access to the same resources and mobilizing structures as women in factories or even the latifundias of the south. Their isolation impeded the politicization of most women. Even in the cities, the half-hearted attempts at modernization impacted the development of the women's movement. The colonial wars placed extra burdens on the women left behind, yet social programs were not implemented to assist women forced into the labour force. For example, women faced a shortage of crèches.³¹⁶ The double burden placed on women hindered women's associational capacities. After finishing both their paid and unpaid jobs, women lacked the time and energy necessary to be politically active.

Although the colonial wars and the beginnings of economic development also began to transform the dominant gender regime, the influence of liberal values was slower than in Spain, and underlying gender beliefs and practices went relatively unchanged. In particular, in the rural villages of the North, the Church had not lost its moral authority. As the central figures in village life, priests upheld the traditional Catholic gender ideology, and passive support for the regime. Alternative gender models were not as readily available to counter the traditional model. Moreover, the strength of Catholicism legitimized the regime's gender ideology. Feminist claims, thus, found limited resonance among the majority of society.

³¹⁴ Madelena Barbosa, "Women in Portugal," *Women's Studies International Quarterly* 4(4) (1981) 477.

³¹⁵ Many women who worked on the family farm were not included as part of the working population. Maria Manuel Stocker de Sousa and Maria Cristina Perez Dominguez. *Women in Portugal Supplement No. 11 to Women of Europe* (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 1982) 13-14.

In Spain, the progressive elements of the Catholic Church provided an important protective umbrella and organizational base for the women's movement. The Church in Portugal remained Conservative, especially regarding any political activism. As Fields contends, "the Church in Spain far exceeded the Portuguese Church in social and political action on behalf of its people. Fear of communism was an overriding principle guiding the behavior of individual clerics and the conservative policies of the hierarchy."³¹⁷ Even after the Second Vatican Council, the Church hierarchy in Portugal discouraged change.³¹⁸ Progressive groups did emerge within the Church that tried to help women meet their practical needs. The most important women's association tied to the Catholic Church was GRAAL. Originally begun in Holland, the group emphasized women's education and improving living conditions. GRAAL was one of the few Portuguese women's groups to work extensively in the rural communities.

The brief attempts at liberalization and the demands of the modern capitalism led the regime to remove barriers to women's participation in the workforce. Despite never being put into practice, employment legislation guaranteed men and women equal salaries. The 1967 Constitution removed a number of restrictions on women's day-to-day activities, and women no longer needed their husbands' permission to work. As part of Caetano's brief liberalizing reforms, 1968 legislation granted men and women political equality (still based ideologically in their natural difference), and reaffirmed the principle of equal pay between men and women.³¹⁹ These legislative changes marked the gradual shift towards a public gender regime. Women were no longer relegated to the home and

³¹⁶ Monica Warnenska, "Hard Struggle for the Future" *Women of the World 3* (1975) 33. (Pgs 30-33)

³¹⁷ Rona M. Fields, *The Portuguese Revolution and the Armed Forces Movement* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976) 58-59.

Church, thereby expanding women's capacity to mobilize. The Caetano regime further allowed women to vote in the 1969 National Assembly elections. It viewed women as more conservative than men, and hoped to gain support from women.³²⁰ By allowing women to vote, and by allowing the opposition to campaign with greater freedom in the 1969 elections, more women were politicized during the electoral campaign. The opposition specifically targeted women's support. The 1969 elections thus sparked new oppositional activity and women's organizing. Caetano suspended future elections, however, removing the political space that the vote had made available to women.³²¹ Moreover, by giving women new political and economic rights, Caetano removed women's issues from the opposition movement's agenda.³²² Liberalization did not result in a law of associations as in Spain. Instead, associations existed extra-legally. As the regime vascillated between repression and liberalization, women's associations outside Church and state organizations, were not exempt from oppression. Caetano's regime thus had contradictory effects on women's activism, creating new, but restricted, opportunities for women to mobilize.

The comparative weakness of the opposition movement during the breakdown period in Portugal meant that women had fewer venues for political activism in Portugal, and lacked the organizational base provided by the opposition movements. Women in Portugal were also slower to develop a gender consciousness. The elitism of Portuguese

³¹⁸ Thomas C. Bruneau and Alex Macleod, *Politics in Contemporary Portugal* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986) 99.

³¹⁹ Irene Pimentel, "Cem Anos de Vida das Mulheres em Portugal," *História* 34 (2001) 12-34.

³²⁰ Cova and Pinto, "O Salazarismo e as Mulheres" 79.

³²¹ Elections were again held in 1973, but campaigning was restricted and the outcome of which continued to be controlled.

³²² i.e. Women's rights were not a priority in the opposition movement's agenda because they had already been granted rights under authoritarianism. Maria Belo argues that the Caetano government was even more

universities meant the majority of women students had Conservative upper-class backgrounds. As of the 1960s, women made up over thirty percent of university students³²³, but in 1970 less than two percent of women over the age of twenty had obtained post-secondary education.³²⁴ Second-wave feminist literature circulated in the universities, but few women had access to the university environment. Unlike Spain, the earliest explicitly feminist groups did not arise in the universities.³²⁵ Nevertheless, the university environment did spawn the more progressive Church organizations, once the student movement took off in the late 1960s.³²⁶ The absence of regional nationalist movements also precluded similar mobilization as in Spain. Women in Portugal lacked key opportunities that regional nationalism offered to Basque and Catalan women. As such, women participated in the opposition forces primarily through the worker's movement and the Communist Party.

Women in Portugal had long participated in the clandestine Communist Party and the *Movimento Unido Democrático*, but mainly in support roles, such as caring for male cadres in hiding, that were based in traditional gender divisions.³²⁷ This early activism served to reinforce gender roles. As women joined the labour force, however, they became more active in the ranks of the party and movement, taking part in the strikes and labour demonstrations. In the primarily female textile industries, groups of women

misogynistic than Salazar. "A Hero of Portuguese Women," in *Femmes et contre - pouvoirs (Women and counter-power)*. Ed. Yolande Cohen (Montréal : Black Rose Books, 1989) 171.

³²³ Virginia Ferreira. "Women in Portugal – Situation and Paradoxes" *Babel*.
<http://www.lxxl.pt/babel/biblioteca/women.html>

³²⁴ In 1970, 92.1% of women over the age of 20 had not gone beyond primary school education. De Sousa and Dominguez, *Women in Portugal*, 30.

³²⁵ The Grupo de Mulheres da Associação Académica de Coimbra (Women's Group of the Coimbra Academic Association), the first major university women's group was founded in 1979, after the collapse of authoritarianism. Manuela Tavares, *Movimentos de Mulheres em Portugal: Nas Décadas de 70 e 80* (Lisboa: Livros Horizonte, 2000) 68.

³²⁶ Cova and Pinto, "O Salazarismo e as Mulheres" 86.

³²⁷ Raby, *Fascism and Resistance in Portugal* 53.

workers organized strikes.³²⁸ Women workers in the movement also grew more aware of women's specific gender issues, and subsequently organized women's groups within the opposition. In 1973, women's groups participated in the 3rd Congress of the Democratic Opposition, including the Democratic Women's Group of the Setubal District and the Group of Women Labourers of Guimarães, and placed women's issues on the agenda of the democratic opposition. Although they emphasized capitalist exploitation of women, they also drew attention to women's exploitation in the family, and to gender discrimination by male workers. They also addressed women's double burden as a cause of women's lower levels of participation in unions and civil society.³²⁹ Women's groups within the worker's movement saw women's emancipation as coinciding with the end of capitalist exploitation.³³⁰

Women's participation in the opposition occurred mostly after 1968. As part of the opposition's 1968 electoral campaign, women's commissions were set up by the Communist Party to garner women's votes. As a result of these commissions, the *Movimento Democrático de Mulheres* (Democratic Women's Movement) was formed. As in Spain, the MDM was closely tied to the Communist Party, and played a leading role among women's organizations. The MDM's program was not specifically feminist, but included women's issues in its general anti-authoritarian struggle.³³¹ The MDM became a target of PIDE and the GNR, thereby restricting its activities. In 1970 the

³²⁸ Strikes revolved around salary demands and working conditions. However, they demonstrated working women's growing politicization. Women's strikes also drew attention to women specific problems such as the need for daycares. Tavares, *Movimentos de Mulheres em Portugal* 24.

³²⁹ Encarnação Coelho and Marília Vilaverde Cabral, "Trabalho da Mulher, Condições de Vida, Condições de Trabalho e Desigualdade de Tratamento," in *3º Congresso da Oposição Democrática, Aveiro, 4 a 8 de abril 1973* (Lisboa: Seara Nova, 1973) 99.

³³⁰ Ibid 105.

³³¹ Tavares, *Movimentos de Mulheres em Portugal* 59.

MDM organized a picnic in the park to commemorate Women's Day, but the police quickly broke up the event by force, and arrested participants.³³²

Other forms of women's oppositional activism emerged. Women organized against the colonial war, and in sympathy with political prisoners. Women mobilized in neighborhood associations, drawing attention to women-specific problems.³³³ Repressive measures and the continued political alienation of most women, however, minimized the impact of these activities. Women did not take a major role in the opposition. As in Spain and Latin America, Portuguese women had to contend with patriarchal attitudes within the opposition movements themselves. Moreover, low levels of women's activism meant that women's issues did not figure prominently with the opposition parties. Few women held any leadership positions within the new parties, so they had little influence in the opposition movements.³³⁴

The 1972 publication of the *Novas Cartas Portuguesas* (New Portuguese Letters) by the Three Marias marked the rebirth of Portuguese feminism. According to Pintassilgo, the book was the "first Portuguese Public Act denouncing the global system of patriarchal oppression."³³⁵ In it, the three authors discuss and denounce gender discrimination, revealing a growing feminist consciousness in Portugal. The regime charged the women with pornography, unintentionally drawing international and domestic attention to the book and to the conditions the authors described. The trial of the Three Marias, (Maria Teresa Horta, Maria Isabel Barreno and Maria Velho da Costa) raised new gender awareness, and prompted many women to mobilize in the authors'

³³² Ibid; "We Protect Our Red Carnation", *Women of the World 2* (1978) 52-53.

³³³ Tavares, *Movimentos de Mulheres em Portugal* 25.

³³⁴ Maria Belo, "A Hero of Portuguese Women" 171.

defense. On the eve of the transition, the Portuguese women's movement was still relatively weak but was establishing itself. The movement, however, would find greater opportunities to develop in the next stage of democratization.

The most important actor in the breakdown of authoritarianism in Portugal was the military. Popular opposition played a limited role, failing to mobilize a broad citizen's movement. Popular opposition helped destabilize the regime, but it was the military's dissatisfaction that led to collapse. The military was a patriarchal institution to which women had no access or influence. It reinforced traditional gender values. The April 25th 1974 *golpe*, coup d'état, struck the final blow to the regime, women's activism figured little in the lead up to this event.

Final Comparisons

The Spanish and Portuguese women's movements both resurfaced during the decline of authoritarianism. The long duration of Iberian fascism, and the authoritarian regimes' suppression of civil society stunted the development of the women's movements. Therefore, in contrast to the Latin American women's experiences, the women's movements played minor roles in the breakdown of the dictatorships. They were just beginning to re-establish themselves when the regimes collapsed. A comparison of the Spanish and Portuguese women's movements, however, demonstrates that the breakdown context in Spain did provide the women's movements with more opportunities to mobilize. Different levels of socio-economic development played a definitive role: development provided new mobilizing structures and resources to women and to the opposition. In Spain, modernization promoted liberal values, displaced and

³³⁵ Maria de Lurdes Pintassilgo, "Daring to be Different," in *A rising public voice: women in politics worldwide*. Ed. Alida Brill (New York : Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 1995) 128.

delegitimizing the traditional, authoritarian discourse of the regime. Modernization also began to change the traditional gender regime. Spain's more advanced socio-economic position was reflected in its levels of women's activism. Particularly in Catalonia and the Basque Country, where along with the nationalist movements, levels of development were highest, women mobilized prominently within the opposition. Portugal's involvement in the Colonial Wars presented another obstacle to social development, and to women's activism.

In both countries, liberalization led to an expansion of oppositional activity that the regimes could not control. As the regimes vacillated between liberalization and repression, neither was able to suppress dissent. In Portugal, however, the opposition never attained the same levels of mobilization as Spain. To the extent that the opposition movement provided a valuable organizational base for women's activism, levels of oppositional activity impacted the development of the women's movements. Through participation in the opposition forces, especially the regional nationalist movements in Spain, activists became aware of gender-specific problems. The comparative weakness of popular opposition in Portugal thus hindered women's participation in these. The Church in Spain proved more progressive, and therefore provided a wider protective umbrella for civil society than the Portuguese Church. In Catalonia and the Basque Country, clerics actively supported the nationalist movements. Consequently, Church support facilitated women's activism in Spain, particularly in minority regions, to a greater extent than Portugal. With few allies within the Church, the Portuguese women's movement lacked legitimacy, especially in the rural North.

Women did not play leading roles during the breakdown of authoritarianism in either country. With the exception of the nationalist movements in Catalonia and the Basque country, neither breakdown involved widespread grassroots activity. Social movements did not dominate the opposition. Political parties (especially the Communist Party in Portugal) took leading roles in the opposition. The breakdown helped the clandestine political parties to organize, so the parties shaped opposition demands. With political parties dominating the opposition movement, the women's movement and other grassroots activists found less space to set the opposition's goals than in some Latin American cases.

Ch. 5 – Women’s Movements in the Transition to Democracy

Over the course of the Francoist and Salazarist dictatorships, women in Spain and Portugal had joined the opposition movements against the authoritarian regimes, especially once the regimes began to collapse and the anti-authoritarian struggles intensified. The broad goal of democracy united an array of groups within the society, among them women’s, including feminist, associations. For the burgeoning women’s movements, patriarchal structures were directly tied to authoritarian structures. Democratization represented not just the possibility of transforming the political system, but also of redefining the meaning of politics, and transforming gender relations. Women’s movements thus had a stake in the outcome of the transition process. By late 1975, both Portugal and Spain’s fascist regimes had collapsed, and the transition to democracy had begun. With the demise of the authoritarian regimes, the women’s movements had high expectations for change. The fluidity of the political opportunity structure offered new opportunities for women’s activism. As both Spain and Portugal moved towards the installation of democracy, the women’s movements thus attempted to influence the outcome of the transition.

On April 25th, 1974, the Movement of the Armed Forces (MFA) staged a *golpe* (coup) in Portugal, initiating the revolutionary transition to democracy. The MFA intended to bring decolonisation, development and democracy to the Portuguese state. The Revolution of the Carnations, as the events of April 25th came to be known, engendered ‘Popular Power’. The Portuguese masses mobilized for the first time, demanding a role in their own governance, and an egalitarian democracy. Officers and citizens accordingly stood up against the exploitative features of Portuguese capitalism,

which were tied to the Fascist regime. The revolutionary character of the Portuguese transition subsequently served as a lesson to the Spanish elites. When Franco died late in 1975, King Juan Carlos and other political leaders sought to avoid the political upheavals and uncertainties of Portugal's Revolution. They attempted a *ruptura pactada*, a negotiated break, from Francoism. Moderation and consensual politics dominated the Spanish transition.

Spain and Portugal present two distinct models of transition. The Spanish case involved a transition by transaction, whereas the Portuguese transition took place through revolution. These contrasting models of transition provided different opportunities for women's activism. The revolutionary transition in Portugal created a *tabula rasa* for future politics. The discourse of authoritarianism was discredited, and authoritarian structures dismantled by the revolution's leaders, the Captains of the MFA. By contrast, in Spain, the transitional leaders attempted to employ existing Francoist mechanisms to move legally towards democracy. The goal was less the removal of authoritarian actors, than their appeasement through negotiations. These divergent paths towards democracy thus involved different discourses, actors and structures. As a result, social movements, including the women's movement, came to play different roles in their respective transition processes.

This chapter explores the dynamics of the transition to democracy in the Spanish and Portuguese contexts. I argue that due to the nature of the transition, early on, women in Portugal faced a more favourable political opportunity structure than the Spanish women's movement. Portugal's revolution promoted the development of civil society while Spain's *ruptura pactada* (negotiated break) attempted to curb mass mobilization.

Although Portugal's revolution ultimately failed, it did hold the promise of new type of democracy. The defeat of "Popular Power" closed the window of opportunity available early on to the women's movement. The failure of the Revolution resulted in an unstable political situation that hindered the development of future opportunities. This chapter begins with a theoretical overview of transitions to democracy and the roles of women therein. I then delve into the dynamics of the Portuguese transition, and the relationship between the women's movement in Portugal and the nature of the transition. In the next section, I explore the Spanish case, again assessing the dynamics of the transition and the connections between the nature of events and the development of the Spanish women's movements. Special attention is given to the minority, national movements of Catalonia and the Basque Country.³³⁶ The chapter then concludes with a brief comparison of the opportunities available to Spanish and Portuguese women during the transition to democracy, and the implications of these two distinct modes of transition on Iberian women's activism.

Women's Movements and Transitions to Democracy

In mainstream democratization literature, the transition phase "designates an *interval* between an authoritarian and a democratic regime".³³⁷ The breakdown of the authoritarian regime creates uncertainty as to what will follow, what regime change will bring. The breakdown of authoritarian political arrangements and structures creates a fluid, indeterminate and temporary opportunity structure, as the terms of democratic politics are being resolved. The transition phase thereby refers to those processes

³³⁶ As noted in the previous chapters, the Galician women's movement, like the Galician regional nationalist movement, was virtually non-existent during the authoritarian regime, and remained weak over the course of the transition.

³³⁷ Ethier, "Processes of Transition and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical Indicators" 4.

involved in the creation of a new regime, and a new political opportunity structure. The transition stage lays the foundations of the new democracy.³³⁸

Transition literature emphasizes that political actors must make choices about the new regime, particularly the regime's institutional arrangements (the formal dimensions of the new political opportunity structure). Institutional design involves "obtaining agreement and making decisions on different institutional arrangements involving macro-choice (the type of political regime), meso-choice (structural variation within regime type...) and micro-choice (defining the 'rules of the game' for the institutions, including procedures)."³³⁹ Along with the formal dimensions of institutional design, political actors also shape the discourse of the transition, framing the meaning of democracy. As such, a key factor in the overall character and outcome of the transition process is who initiates, and who controls the transition.³⁴⁰ Other actors are then included in decision-making and in the restructuring of the POS, yet their roles over the course of the transition process continue to be circumscribed by the transition leaders. The transition literature emphasizes the mode of transition, the strategies employed to instigate the transition, as the other defining variable in the transition.³⁴¹ How actors set the transition in motion, such as by revolution or negotiation, shapes the nature and the potential outcome of the transition.

³³⁸ If a democratic bargain is not achieved, transitions can still lead to an alternative regime being established.

³³⁹ Pridham, *The Dynamics Of Democratization: A Comparative Approach* 98.

³⁴⁰ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*.

³⁴¹ See for example Munck, "Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective"; Karl, "Dilemma of Democratization"; Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*.

Transitions by abandonment of power, or transitions by replacement³⁴², initiated by an uprising of civil society, an armed revolution, or military coup, usually tend toward the establishment of provisional governments. The question that emerges in such cases is whether the new provisional government acts as a neutral caretaker, implementing democracy, or whether the provisional government assumes a mandate to govern, including the authority to postpone democratic elections.³⁴³ Does the provisional government also behave in a non-democratic way? Transitions by abandonment of power lead to situations of greater uncertainty, and may slow democratization. Nonetheless, transitions by abandonment of power, provide a sharper break with the past authoritarian regime. As previous elites are forced out of power, spaces open up for new actors. By discrediting authoritarianism, the rupture with the past regime may also provide the opportunity for more radical demands and discourses to emerge.

Transitions by transaction, or negotiated transitions, are initiated by actors from within the authoritarian regime. Accordingly, regime elites dominate the early stages of the transition, setting the pace and terms of democratization. There is a degree of continuity between the authoritarian regime and the construction of new democratic institutions. Through negotiation, the liberal faction of the regime elites can prevent a backlash by authoritarian hardliners. Furthermore, regime elites can co-opt the opposition forces into the process, usually through negotiations and pacts.³⁴⁴ Therefore, transitions by transaction usually result in a more stable, orderly transition; however, the continuity

³⁴² The authoritarian regime is replaced by another set of political actors, often the military, but possibly drawn from the Opposition forces.

³⁴³ Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan and Richard Gunther, "Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, with Reflections on Latin America and Eastern Europe", in *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*. Eds. Richard Gunther, Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jürgen Puhle. (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1995) 87.

³⁴⁴ Gill, *The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society, and the Transition Process* 69.

that characterizes them limits the possibility for change from the previous regime. Authoritarian elites may guarantee their continued place in the new democracy, and restrict the type of democracy that emerges. Without a clean break from the past regime, many of its features and dimensions remain intact throughout the transition phase.³⁴⁵

Popular mobilization, which increases during the breakdown of authoritarianism, continues during the transitions phase, “pushing the transition further than it otherwise would have gone.”³⁴⁶ The shared goal of democracy prompts collective action, while opportunities expand within the political environment of the transition. Social movements and other collective actors demand inclusion in the transition process, and attempt to influence the terms and meaning of democracy. Depending on the mode of transition, and the strength of popular mobilization, the role of civil society during the transition varies. Yet, even when regime elites, or state actors such as the military, control the transition, civil society activism shapes their choices and behaviours. Civil society may keep the transition moving towards democracy. Popular mobilization, however, begins to wane over the course of the transition. Once the goal of democracy is within reach, the opposition movement begins to divide over objectives. Democratization loses its salience as a collective action frame. Fatigue sets in. As the indeterminacy of the early stages of the transition gives way to a more defined, restricted political processes and structures, the opportunities available to social movements begin to close. Moreover, political parties tend to dominate the latter stages of the transition, often attempting to co-opt and constrain collective action.

³⁴⁵ See chapter two for further examination, and critiques, of the transition literature.

³⁴⁶ O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* 56.

All transitions are gendered processes. In the previous chapter, I addressed the expansion of women's activism during the breakdown of authoritarianism, and the rebirth of the women's movements. The transition continues to provide women with opportunities and frames with which to mobilize. Ergas writes, "Women's entry into politics is facilitated when politics itself is in a state of disarray, when the rules of the game and the roles of traditional actors are already being challenged by emerging forces."³⁴⁷ The transition phase embodies one such period of contestation, when the very meaning of politics is being redefined. Women potentially can create a more woman-friendly state, and transform the gender regime. Relationships between transitions and women's movements depend on the nature of the transition, and how a women's movement adapts to the changing political environment. As the transition progresses, however, women's mobilization declines, and women's movements, like other opposition movements, lose their prominence. Nonetheless, "however restricted, [transitions] represent propitious moments for making interventions into the state, because the state is potentially more fluid during such transformations than at other times."³⁴⁸ Post-authoritarian settings also provide gender-specific opportunities for women. During democratic transitions, leaders and governments attempt to distance themselves from the previous authoritarian regime, and consequently from the authoritarian gender order. Addressing women's issues becomes a means of gaining legitimacy, and distancing oneself from the authoritarian discourse. Moreover, women are often viewed as

³⁴⁷ Yasmine Ergas, "1968-1969. Feminism and the Italian Party System: Women's Politics in a Decade of Turmoil," *Comparative Politics* 14 (3) (1982) 254.

³⁴⁸ Shahra Razavi, "Women in Contemporary Democratization," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 15(1) September 2001, 215.

barometers of democratic functioning. At a minimum, contemporary Western discourses about democratization recognize women's political citizenship and legal equality.

Attempts to "gender transitions" in Latin America, and elsewhere, have met with varying degrees of success. Transitions must be examined contextually, as their specific dynamics shape the opportunities available to women movements. First, in assessing the impact of transitions on women's movements, the mode of transition matters. The mode of transition establishes key actors, and points of access to the state. Is the transition an elite-driven process, or does popular mobilization instigate democratization? In transitions by transaction, initiated within the regime, what role does civil society play, including the women activists therein? The transition process' degree of openness to different groups affects the participation of the women's movement. How receptive are dominant political actors to social movements and collective action? How are their goals and agendas incorporated into negotiations (and pacts) that characterize the transition? Do elites exclude particular actors, and why?³⁴⁹

Connected with the mode of transition is the discourse of the transition. The leaders of the transition set the terms of democratization, defining what democracy will mean. Even if social movements and other collective actors, including women, challenge elitist discourses with counterframes, their overall influence on the formal transition process may be limited. Demands for more participatory democracy may give way to the re-valorization of formal politics, and electoral democracy. As well, if democracy is defined only as a set of institutional arrangements, then socio-economic claims will be

³⁴⁹ For example, as Friedman reveals, movements tied to the Left and to the Communist Party in Venezuela were marginalized by military elites from the transition. Women's groups associated with the Communist Party were subsequently excluded. See Friedman, "Paradoxes of Gendered Political Opportunity in the Venezuelan Transition to Democracy".

overlooked during the transition process. Movements and organizations centred on social or economic issues may subsequently be marginalized, including women's community-based groups. Although civil society may play a central role in the transition, not all groups within civil society can participate in the transition on equivalent terms.

Consequently, how do actors respond to the specific demands of women's movements? Women's movements develop discursive and political strategies, but the success of these strategies is tied to existing discourses,³⁵⁰ particularly gender discourses, and to gender regimes. Women's issues are often viewed as divisive, and women's activism as a threat to negotiations, and the pacting process.³⁵¹ Accordingly, transition leaders often dismiss women's issues as secondary to the 'greater goal' of democratization. Additionally, women themselves may be viewed as non-political actors, especially in contexts where women had based their activism during authoritarian rule on their non-political, maternal identities. The transition phase, as an attempt to reconstitute the political, can further marginalize apolitical women. Transition processes reflect, and often reinforce existing gender values and relations, rather than changing them.

Part of the mode of transition, is the duration of the transition phase. The pace of the transition impacts the ability of women to mobilize. Where the women's movements are well-established, the effects of the duration of the transition on women's mobilization are not as extensive. If, however, women's movements have just begun to mobilize, a quick transition will hinder organizational efforts. For example, in Eastern Europe, the rapid speed of transitions hampered the development of organized women's

³⁵⁰ Philomina E. Okeke-Ihejirika and Susan Franceschet. "Democratization and State Feminism: Gender Politics in Africa and Latin America," *Development and Change* 33(3) (2002) 442.

movements.³⁵² Meanwhile, no matter what the level of mobilization, the pace of the transition impacts movements' capacity to respond to political circumstances. Transitions may provide windows of opportunity for women's activism, but women's movements must recognize the opportunities, and react before that window shuts. Quick transitions force women's movements to adapt quickly to changing structures and opportunities, or they risk being left out altogether. The quicker women get their foot in the door, become involved in the transitional processes (especially constitution-writing), the better.³⁵³

Political parties, in particular, have been identified as decisive factors, impacting women's activism during the transition phase. Political parties often emerge during the transition as the central actors, while movements decline. The rise of political parties can be detrimental to the women's movement. For one, a united women's movement may split along different party affiliations.³⁵⁴ Internal divisions, especially where movements are small, can hinder cooperation and weaken the movement's ability to achieve its goals.³⁵⁵ Moreover, the question of 'autonomy or integration' divides women's groups into those who choose single and double militancy. Since parties come to dominate the political process, organizations that choose autonomy may also find themselves marginalized within conventional politics. Groups tied to parties, on the other hand, according to some feminist analysts, risk co-option and loss of autonomy.³⁵⁶ Parties'

³⁵¹ Friedman, "Paradoxes of Gendered Political Opportunity in the Venezuelan Transition to Democracy" 116; Franceschet, "Explaining Social Movement Outcomes Collective Action Frames and Strategic Choices in First- and Second-Wave Feminism in Chile" 524.

³⁵² Waylen, "Women and Democratization: Conceptualizing Gender Relations in Transition Politics" 351.

³⁵³ Alexandra Dobrowolsky, "Women, Constitutionalism and Contestation: Some Tentative Conclusions" in *Women Making Constitutions* Ed. Alexandra Dobrowolsky (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) 239.

³⁵⁴ Maria Elena Valenzuela, "Women and the Democratization Process in Chile," in *Women and democracy: Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe*. Eds. Jane S. Jaquette and Sharon L. Wolchik (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998) 56-57.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid* 57.

³⁵⁶ Waylen, "Women and Democratization: Conceptualizing Gender Relations in Transition Politics" 340.

receptiveness to women's participation varies. In certain cases, where women mobilized extensively as part of the opposition movement, parties attempted to secure women's votes by meeting the demands of the women's movements.³⁵⁷ Taking on women's claims brought parties greater legitimacy.³⁵⁸ Feminist activists therefore succeeded in placing women's issues in party platforms, and achieved goals through party politics. Conversely, political parties have also attempted to circumscribe collective action, and to demobilize movements. As political parties rise, women's movements risk becoming the casualties of a return to elitist, establishment politics.³⁵⁹

Though the success of women's movements in transitional settings depends partly on the nature of the transition, women's movements themselves determine how they engage the transition processes. Women's movements make choices over strategies, goals and frames that shape their involvement, and success during the transition. Do women's groups cooperate and share common goals, or do they divide over strategies and issues? Do they choose autonomy or integration within political parties? What type of activities do women's movements focus on – do they engage political institutions, or do they emphasize cultural and grass-roots activities?

The following sections address the characteristics of the Portuguese and Spanish transition, and the dynamic relationship between each transitions and women's movement. Special focus is placed on the constitution-writing process. Completed regime transitions involve the drafting and ratification of a new Constitution. A new Constitution formally marks a state's commitment to democratic rule and democratic

³⁵⁷ Razavi, "Women in Contemporary Democratization" 204.

³⁵⁸ Alvarez, *Engendering Democracy in Brazil* 11.

³⁵⁹ Friedman, "Paradoxes of Gendered Political Opportunity in the Venezuelan Transition to Democracy" 94; Waylen, "Women and Democratization: Conceptualizing Gender Relations in Transition Politics" 70.

practices. The Constitution also establishes the formal gender order within the new democracy. By providing an institutional and symbolic break from the previous authoritarian regime, Fiona Macaulay contends that, “[t]he process of women’s mobilization and public debate around the drafting of a new constitution often marks high points of networking and common cause amongst women’s movements.”³⁶⁰ What facilitated or hindered the mobilization of women around the Constitution in Spain and Portugal? Which obstacles and opportunities did the political opportunity structure present the women’s movement during mobilization? I examine the Constitutional drafting processes in Spain and Portugal, establishing how the women’s movement participated in this process, and the impact of the Constitution-writers’ dominant discourses.

The Portuguese Transition – The Revolution of the Carnations

The dissatisfaction of the military ranks with the Caetano regime culminated in the April 25th *golpe*, the Revolution of the Carnations. The coup initiated a turbulent transition, a lengthy struggle over the form of the new government and of Portuguese society. The period from the coup to the July 1976 elections involved six provisional governments, three elections and two more failed coup attempts. The Portuguese transition’s revolutionary beginnings heralded a window of opportunity for the women’s movement. Over the course of the transition, its radical character and populist discourses began to turn right, slowly limiting access to the transitional POS.

The April 25th coup, led by the Movement of the Armed Forces (MFA), a group of captains, took place with little violence and resistance. The regime had little support

³⁶⁰ Fiona Macaulay, “Taking the Law into their Own Hands: Women, Legal Reform and Legal Literacy in Brazil,” in *Gender and the Politics of Rights and Democracy in Latin America*. Eds. Nikki Craske and

remaining. Having taken over Portuguese radio and television, the MFA declared its intentions to the Portuguese people: to liberate the Portuguese people from fascism. The Junta of National Salvation, composed of military leaders, along with a group of appointed civilians would form the Council of State, to function as the provisional governing body and caretaker of the revolution.³⁶¹ The programme of the MFA promised universal elections within a year. The elected Constituent Assembly would then hold elections within another year. The programme of the MFA laid out goals to decolonize, democratize and develop Portugal. Freedoms would be restored, and political associations permitted.³⁶² Political parties could freely and openly organize once again. A clean break with the authoritarian past did not restrict the revolution.

The popular response to the Revolution was immediate.³⁶³ People took to the streets in high numbers supporting the revolution and the MFA. Freedoms granted by the MFA facilitated renewed mobilization, as did the dissolution of the authoritarian regime's secret police, PIDE. The military had discredited fascism, and the long-suppressed masses finally rose up to demand a more just society. The spontaneous popular upsurge that followed the coup was unexpected by the military, and the Communist Party (the leading civilian Opposition force). Both wanted a controlled transition, but the strength of the mass movement after the revolution forced each to respond to, and to "chase" the masses.³⁶⁴ The strength of the mass movement kept the Revolution on course, and

Maxine Molyneux (New York: Palgrave, 2002) 88.

³⁶¹ The Council of State ruled with a mandate of the MFA, and its role remained largely to carry out the programme of the MFA. The Coordinating Committee, the governing body of the MFA, remained the "power broke[r] of the revolution." Douglas Porch, *The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution* (London: Croom Helm, 1977) 95.

³⁶² Later, the government passed a law recognizing all political parties with over 5000 members.

³⁶³ Predominantly in the urban centres, and later on the large landholdings of the South.

³⁶⁴ Ferreira and Marshall, *Portugal's Revolution: Ten Years On* 201.

prevented the expelled Caetano regime from challenging the MFA.³⁶⁵ The popular upsurge gave way to a wave of strikes and demonstrations. *Saneamentos*, cleansings, took place, purging private and public institutions of authoritarian figures. Housing and land occupations also followed. 'Popular Power', as it came to be known, spawned a number of populist structures such as neighbourhood committees, trade unions and other popular organizations. Workers commissions replaced capitalist management, with self-management. Popular Power represented the possibility of a new form of democracy, based on popular participation and self-government.

Stemming from the relative weakness of Portuguese political parties, and the removal of authoritarian figures from the structures of power, the military and its various military organizations, dominated the formal processes of the transition phase. The MFA cooperated with political parties, but parties played a limited role in the first provisional governments. Immediately after the revolution the power struggles began within the military. Conflicts arose within the MFA, the Junta and Council of State. The military was ideologically divided between the reformists, the moderates, radical pro-communists, and populist radicals.³⁶⁶ The military's heterogeneity produced competing visions and discourses within the transitional government as to future of the Portuguese state. Early on however, the revolution turned to the left, as radical forces within the MFA gained strength. The radical factions within the military drew support from the Communist Party, and other left-wing groups.³⁶⁷ Nonetheless, internal divisions and contradictions created a largely ineffective government and state. Continual changes in government hampered attempts to address Portugal's socio-economic difficulties. The military-led

³⁶⁵ Ibid 183.

³⁶⁶ The populist leftists supported the populist uprisings, and sympathized with the ultra-leftist parties.

governing bodies could not implement coherent policy-programmes. Meanwhile, the cleansing of the old administration from various institutions, created a lack of experienced political leadership. The new parties further lacked the political experience to run the government, or to deal with political issues.

Faced with the paralysis of state apparatus that resulted from internal military power struggles and the cleansing of authoritarian leaders from state structures, worker and neighbourhood self-management gained new relevance. Popular mobilization continued to expand into 1975. The first provisional government “discovered that the tap of the revolution, once turned on was difficult to turn off.”³⁶⁸ The popular movement and the military mutually reinforced the revolution’s turn left. The popular movements strengthened the leftist wings of the military, while support from within military ranks prompted continued activism. COPCON³⁶⁹, having become increasingly politicized, frequently intervened in the land and housing occupations increasingly on the side of the people. COPCON thus became identified with Popular Power.³⁷⁰ Although it often responded after the fact, the MFA also legalized purges, legitimizing radical collective action. The MFA further reinforced the connection between the military and the *povo* (the people) by adopting a programme of *dinamização cultural* (cultural revitalization). This programme aimed to spread the revolution across the country, to overcome the detrimental effects of Salazarism on Portuguese society, and to promote civic action. The MFA thereby strengthened the discourse of socialism and participatory democracy. A

³⁶⁷ The establishment of Stalinist-style state socialism loomed as a possibility.

³⁶⁸ Porch, *The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution* 96.

³⁶⁹ COPCON was “the centre of operations for all the armed forces and was a loosely based structure with representatives from all three branches of the [military] services.” Ferreira and Marshall, *Portugal’s Revolution: Ten Years On* 187.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid* 191.

more egalitarian, democratic society, and not just an electoral democracy, seemed attainable.

The Women's Movement and the April 25th Revolution – A Window of Opportunity

The revolutionary stage of the Portuguese transition provided impetus for women's mobilization, serving as "a source of new energies and experiences for the renewal of social and citizen participation."³⁷¹ For many women, largely relegated to the private sphere under fascism, the revolution symbolically allowed them to "breach the barriers" segregating them from public life and political participation.³⁷² Women immediately took to the streets in support of the revolution. Indeed, for women, freed from authoritarian repression, the streets became their stage.³⁷³

The Portuguese transition, via the April 25th Revolution, allowed for a clean break with the authoritarian past, including its gender regime. There was no need to negotiate with authoritarian actors, thereby facilitating the removal of the legal obstacles to women's citizenship and activism. The MFA recognized men and women's equality in its programmes; accordingly the provisional government formally recognized women's equal status. Whereas legal reforms affording free speech and freedom of association made women's participation in civil society possible, it was the break with the previous regime and the removal of authoritarian actors from the structures of power that allowed civil society and collective action to play a more meaningful role in the transition process. The rejection of fascism and its discourses further enabled civil society and popular movements to press for more radical demands. By discrediting fascism, the

³⁷¹ João Arriscado Nunes and Nuno Serra. " 'Decent Housing for the People,' Urban Movements and Emancipation in Portugal" *South European Society* 9(2) 2004. 51.

³⁷² Manuela Tavares, "Romper o Cerco: O 25 de Abril e os Movimentos de Mulheres," *História* (1999) 18.

³⁷³ Quoted in Tavares, "Romper o Cerco: O 25 de Abril e os Movimentos de Mulheres" 18.

revolution also rejected its conservative gender ideology, opening the way for a new more woman-friendly gender regime. Women's citizenship and women's political equality became intrinsic dimensions of democratization. Moreover, as the revolution embraced social and economic dimensions, women's claims regarding both domestic needs and socio-economic inequalities fit within the revolution's discourse. Women's struggles were intricately connected to the broader process of societal change necessary for triumph of the revolution.³⁷⁴

Women played a central role in Popular Power. Popular Power, to a large extent, emerged out of necessity, rather than ideological motives. Poor working and living conditions had not been addressed by the hierarchical fascist regime. The shortage of adequate housing and sanitation directly undermined women's capacity to meet their families' needs. Consequently, as the ones primarily responsible for the domestic sphere and family caretaking, women became widely involved in the neighbourhood and housing commissions. Through neighbourhood commissions, housewives and working-class women raised concerns and demands over the lack of housing, rent control, and poor sanitation in the cities. Independently, as well as through housing commissions, women demonstrated and fought for daycares, healthcare facilities and other social amenities. Neighbourhood and housing commissions met with varying degrees of success, but they did improve physical infrastructure. The commissions did establish numerous daycares, and provided neighbourhoods with key welfare services that directly improved the lives of women. The *saneamento* of public services further led women of different classes to take over schools and other public facilities.³⁷⁵ Driven by practical

³⁷⁴ Pintassilgo, "Portugal: Daring to be Different" 129.

³⁷⁵ Sadlier, *The Question of How: Women Writers and New Portuguese Literature* 124.

need, on April 30th 1974, women initiated the first of the revolution's housing occupations. As the occupations continued, women remained at the forefront of the seizures.³⁷⁶

Worker's commissions also provided women with an important venue for activism. Through worker's commissions women demanded higher wages, safer working environments, child labour restrictions and daycares. Equal pay for equal work became a central concern for women workers. They joined newly formed unions, took part in strikes and demonstrations, and made their demands heard.³⁷⁷ Faced with the threat of closures, resulting from the flight of corporate managers and owners, women responded by taking over their enterprises. Particularly in the textile industry, women occupied and managed firms abandoned by their capitalist bosses. As Hammond writes, "Women active in workers' commissions, subjected to years of oppression in a highly sexist society, found that their worlds and their consciousness opened up."³⁷⁸

Popular Power became "to a large extent, women's power."³⁷⁹ It allowed working and middle-class women to voice their needs and to take meaningful roles shaping their own well-being. Through the commissions and through self-management, they assumed new tasks and responsibilities, and achieved new potential. Popular Power also allowed women to make connections with other women, and men. New social networks were

³⁷⁶ Tavares, "Romper o Cerco: O 25 de Abril e os Movimentos de Mulheres" 18. The women occupied unused, often abandoned, buildings that owners had refused to rent out at affordable prices.

³⁷⁷ For example, 2000 female workers went on strike against Timex demanding *saneamento*, equal pay, and company compensation for the costs of childcare. See Tavares "Romper o Cerco: O 25 de Abril e os Movimentos de Mulheres"; and *Movimentos de Mulheres em Portugal* for detailed accounts of women's numerous labour actions.

³⁷⁸ Hammond, *Building Popular Power: Worker's and Neighbourhood Movements in the Portuguese Revolution* 206.

³⁷⁹ Pintassilgo, "Portugal: Daring to be Different" 129.

built.³⁸⁰ The experiences of political participation provided valuable skills and learning to the women involved. Commissions generated new political consciousness, including awareness of women's specific needs and gender discrimination. Popular Power thus gave rise to important mobilizing structures and resources, which facilitated the mobilization of the women's movement. The paralysis of the state in the revolutionary setting placed new importance on local action. As the state could not meet practical needs, women and men established community groups and commissions that could. The state, thereby, unwittingly fostered further autonomous organizing and self-management. The locus of politics and power shifted from formal politics at the central state, to the local community. Popular Power, based in grassroots organizing, appeared to present a viable alternative to the bourgeois state.³⁸¹ The MFA and the provisional government's *ad hoc* responses to the popular movements served to reinforce this shift. As an alternative political arrangement, Popular Power granted women new political opportunities; grassroots organizing offered a more accessible channel for political participation than formal state structures. This transformation of the political opportunity structure, along with the new resources, discourses and mobilizing structures brought by the revolution, opened a window of opportunity for the Portuguese women's movement. The revolution held the promise of a new type of democracy in which women could be full participants, and in which the women's movements could play a substantial role.

In May of 1974, the Three Marias were found not guilty on the charges of pornography, and offending public morality with their book *Novas Cartas Portuguesas*.

³⁸⁰ Hammond, *Building Popular Power: Worker's and Neighbourhood Movements in the Portuguese Revolution* 206.

³⁸¹ Charles Downs, *Revolution at the Grassroots: Community Organizations in the Portuguese Revolution* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 106.

Over the course of the trial, women domestically and internationally rallied in support of the authors. Their trial helped foster the development of the women's movement in Portugal, and helped to place gender discrimination on the national stage. The verdict of not guilty confirmed the incompatibility of the previous gender ideology with the revolutionary context.

After the April 25th Revolution, already existent groups, namely GRAAL and the *Movimento Democrático de Mulheres* expanded their activities. Reflecting its ties with the PCP, the MDM focused on women's rights as worker-citizens. Initiatives emphasized 'equal pay for equal work,' building crèches, increasing women's employment opportunities, but also building international links.³⁸² GRAAL, at this stage, continued to target rural women, and worked towards achieving equal educational and work opportunities for women.³⁸³ The Association for Family Planning, which also predated the revolution, worked to improve women's sexual and reproductive health and education. After the revolution, it worked towards women's sexual rights and helping women gain access to birth control.³⁸⁴ The revolutionary period also saw the emergence of new women's organizations, the most prominent of which was the *Movimento de Libertação das Mulheres* (Women's Liberation Movement). Formed in May of 1974, the MLM promoted radical feminism.³⁸⁵ More than any other group, the MLM theorized gender relations, drawing attention to the structural dimensions of patriarchy.³⁸⁶ A number of other new women's organizations emerged after April 25th, including the

³⁸² Tavares, *Movimentos de Mulheres em Portugal*; Beatrice D'Arhuys, *As Mulheres e o 25 de Abril* (Porto: Afrontamento, 1976).

³⁸³ Tavares, *Movimentos de Mulheres em Portugal* 58,70-71.

³⁸⁴ *Ibid* 60-61.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid* 90.

³⁸⁶ D'Arhuys, *As Mulheres e o 25 de Abril* 83.

Feministas Revolucionárias, and the Movement for Free Birth Control and Abortion.³⁸⁷

The majority of women's groups in Portugal were ideologically tied to the left.³⁸⁸

As the women's movement gained momentum, women's demands began to shape institutional politics. Women's mobilization and participation in Popular Power, led the government to establish the *Comissão para a Condição Feminina* (CCF - Commission for the Status of Women) in 1975.³⁸⁹ Placed under the Ministry of Social Affairs, the CCF was charged with gathering information on women, protecting and informing women of their rights, and providing assistance to grassroots initiatives.³⁹⁰ Women's organizing also helped legalize divorce, and restrictions on women's employment within various bureaucratic agencies.³⁹¹ By 1975, contraceptives were legalized, and in 1976 family planning centres had been set up across the country. Internal divisions within the MFA limited further changes to the legal code, but political parties also took on women's issues.

As electoral competition increased, political parties held assemblies raising social issues, many of which pertained to women's interests.³⁹² In the 1975 elections, women's issues appeared on a number of party platforms. Even the main centre-right parties, the PPD and the CDS acknowledged women's equality, thereby distancing themselves from

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ According to Manuela Tavares, a liberal current of Portuguese feminism only surfaced again in the late 1980s. See *Movimentos de Mulheres em Portugal*.

³⁸⁹ In 1973, Caetano had created the Commission for Social Politics Relative to Women, though this body had little impact on social policies. D'Arthuys, *As Mulheres Portuguesas e o 25 de Abril* 83. The Commission was institutionalized under the Council of Ministers in 1977.

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

³⁹¹ Caetano's 1968 reforms had already recognized women's political equality and their right to vote in national elections. Legislation passed by the MFA in 1974. A 1976 Decree Law allowed women to vote in local elections as well. De Sousa and Dominguez, *Women in Portugal* 46.

³⁹² Downs, *Revolution at the Grassroots: Community Organizations in the Portuguese Revolution*.

the previous fascist regime.³⁹³ Women's demands within the housing and workers' commissions simultaneously reinforced women's domestic roles, and validated women as citizen-workers. Party platforms reflected these two facets of women's demands, recognizing women as workers, but also promoting family provisions and protections. Political parties thus targeted women voters by, at least formally, supporting women's issues, and a new, more modern gender regime.³⁹⁴

The Limits of the Portuguese Revolution

The first stage of the Portuguese transition opened a window of opportunity for women's activism. However, the revolution did not remove all obstacles facing the Portuguese women's movement. The political opportunity structure and the discourse of the revolution limited the opportunities available to the women's movement. First, the military's dominance of the transition process limited the openness of political structures to the women's movement. For one, the military's relationship with Popular Power remained uneasy. The military, accustomed to order and discipline, stood at odds with the disorderly masses. Except among the populists, support for collective action was half-hearted.³⁹⁵ Similarly, despite the formal recognition of women's equality by the MFA, the military remained a highly-gendered, patriarchal institution. Women were excluded from military ranks, moreover the institution continued to be highly masculinized. Traditional gender beliefs were not changed within military ranks, but continued to be perpetuated by the institution itself. The MFA placed little priority on women's rights,

³⁹³ The CDS, the party of the liberalizing faction within the Caetano regime, however, maintained its focus on the family, emphasizing the need to protect motherhood. The PPD, on the other hand, supported both creating opportunities for women's employment, and the promotion of the family. See D'Arthurys for a detailed account of the party policies towards women during the 1975 elections.

³⁹⁴ The importance of women's activism, and the women's vote, can be most prominently see in the Socialist Party's platform, which went so far as to call for the decriminalization of abortion.

³⁹⁵ Ferreira and Marshall, *Portugal's Revolution: Ten Years On* 185, 200.

and was largely dismissive of the women's movement. Although numerous cultural groups had been assigned offices in previously Fascist buildings, women's groups were not given any space. This exclusion led women to protest, but they still did not get office spaces.³⁹⁶ Issues such as pornography were not addressed, given its significance among soldiers.³⁹⁷ The military, thus, did not serve as a valuable ally or point of access to the women's movement.

Political parties, although not as prominent as the military during Portugal's revolutionary stage, still played a role in movement activity. Downs asserts, "[p]arties were certainly important in mediating the role of the movements in national political debates; their militants were involved in the daily affairs of movements, and their actions and interactions had a major impact on the evolution of individual CMs [Housing Commissions]."³⁹⁸ Political parties further limited the opportunities available to women's activism. Although a number of the main women's groups forged ties with the PCP and the other leftist parties, these parties were not reliable supporters of women's goals within the political opportunity structure. For one, the Communist Party attempted to circumscribe men's and women's political activism, and to tame the revolution.³⁹⁹ The party repeatedly appealed for moderation from the masses. Strikes were denounced as threatening, and workers were warned to lower expectations, all for the good of the transition and the economy. Communist leaders, who maintained a centralized hierarchy within the party, further attempted to bring worker's commissions, unions and housing commissions under party control, with varying success. Not just adverse to Popular

³⁹⁶ Phil Mailer, *Portugal The Impossible Revolution* (London: Solidarity, 1977), 80; see also Barbosa, "Women in Portugal"

³⁹⁷ Mailer. *Portugal The Impossible Revolution* 345.

³⁹⁸ Downs, *Revolution at the Grassroots: Community Organizations in the Portuguese Revolution* 86.

Power, the PCP was reticent towards autonomous women's organizing. The MDM and the Unitary Women's Commissions, though seemingly autonomous, remained largely obedient to the party. Organizationally, they mirrored the hierarchical party, "emphasiz[ing] structural inequalities to the detriment of internal organizational democracy."⁴⁰⁰ Meanwhile, the party itself remained a male-dominated institution, wherein gender discrimination and patriarchal attitudes were manifest. Proponents of the revolution still displayed traditional gender attitudes.

The discrimination that women faced within the PCP was found in the other parties as well. The demands of the women's movement were often dismissed in the revolutionary context as secondary to the needs of building a democracy. Although the parties did address women's issues, they not figure prominently on party platforms. Indeed, women often met with outright hostility within parties. By focusing on women's issues, women's groups were seen to be divisive of men and women.⁴⁰¹ Even in the smaller, women-friendlier parties of the left that emerged after April 25th, men and some women continued to view women's emancipation as less important, and a distraction from the central aim of the revolution, the creation of a socialist society.⁴⁰² The assumption, shared by many Marxist women's groups, and reflected in the leftist political parties, was that women's oppression was rooted in capitalism, so that the defeat of capitalism would liberate women.⁴⁰³ Women in the Socialist states were held up as models.⁴⁰⁴ Feminism, per se, was critiqued as an elitist, bourgeois movement.

³⁹⁹ At least in the earlier stages of the transition, before the 'Hot Summer' of 1975.

⁴⁰⁰ Virginia Ferreira, "Engendering Portugal: Social Change, State Politics and Women's Mobilization," in *Modern Portugal*. Ed. A. Costa Pinto (Palo Alto: Spoo, 1998), 183.

⁴⁰¹ See Annie Cohen. "Un Mois Au Portugal" *Les Temps Modernes* (October 1974) 158.

⁴⁰² Parties such as the AOC (the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party) and the FSP (Popular Socialist Front).

⁴⁰³ Tavares, "Romper o Cerco: O 25 de Abril e os Movimentos de Mulheres" 22.

⁴⁰⁴ Tavares, *Movimentos de Mulheres em Portugal* 98

Women were largely absent from positions of leadership at all levels. The first and only woman appointed to the provisional government was Maria de Lurdes Pintassilgo, named Minister of Social Affairs under the 2nd and 3rd Provisional Governments. Women made up fifteen percent of candidates and only eight percent of deputies to the first elected Constituent Assembly.⁴⁰⁵ Women were not allowed in the ranks of the military, and men dominated the leadership of the political parties. Within trade unions, women held about a fifth of all leadership positions, mainly in women-dominated industries.⁴⁰⁶ Even though women figured prominently in the neighbourhood and housing commissions, men also ran the majority of these.

The rapid social transformations, and the leftist discourses of creating a progressive society, therefore, did not dislodge existing gender values and hierarchies. Women faced sex discrimination within state, parties and grassroots structures. In the unions and worker's commissions, for example, women's demands for equal wages met with hostility from men, and were subsequently rejected.⁴⁰⁷ Despite recognition of women's citizenship and legal equality, much of the dominant gender order remained intact. The discourse of feminism was discredited, even by the 'progressive' left. A Women's Day Demonstration, organized by the radical Women's Liberation Movement, at which participants burned bras, brooms and other symbols of women's oppression, was summarily attacked by men, across party lines and in the press.⁴⁰⁸

⁴⁰⁵ De Sousa and Dominguez write, "Within the party machinery, women are still relegated to subordinate roles and have no real power at the levels at which decisions are reached and policy formulated." *Women in Portugal* 47; Tavares, *Movimentos de Mulheres em Portugal: Decadas de 70 e 80* 33.

⁴⁰⁶ Tavares, "Romper o Cerco: O 25 de Abril e os Movimentos de Mulheres" 21.

⁴⁰⁷ Hammond, *Building Popular Power: Worker's and Neighbourhood Movements in the Portuguese Revolution* 219.

⁴⁰⁸ Virginia Ferreira states that women participants met with verbal and physical aggression from the men who protested against the demonstration. Ferreira, "Engendering Portugal: Social Change, State Politics and Women's Mobilization" 182.

The relative weakness of the women's movement also limited its capacity to seize the opportunity afforded by the revolution. Prior to the revolution, the women's movement was weak, and just beginning to form. Without a strong history of women's organizing, the rapid pace of events hindered the women's movement's ability to respond to the opportunities they faced during the transition. The revolution led to women's spontaneous collective action, but not to the systematic mobilization of a widespread, organized movement. The number of women active in the women's movement, and even who participated in Popular Power, constituted a small fraction of Portuguese women. The rural, northern majority of women were seen as traditional, subservient and highly religious; there were limited attempts to mobilize them. Domestic responsibilities further hindered women's ability to meet regularly and participate in the popular movements. Instead of addressing the underlying roots of discrimination, women's activism focused primarily on the practical issues in women's lives. While their activities had positive effects on women's lives, a broader feminist consciousness was slow to materialize. When addressing local, grassroots needs, groups and associations also failed to develop strong ties with each other, and to pursue coordinated, unified strategies. Localized efforts did not translate into a strong women's movement. Rather than building broad-based coalitions that could incorporate more Catholic, Conservative women into the movement, women's groups also found themselves ideologically divided. The weakness of the women's movement limited its legitimacy in speaking for women, and its capacity to press for change. Just as new women's groups were emerging, and the women's movement intensifying its activities, the revolution was overturned. The window of opportunity closed.

The Defeat of Popular Power and Counter-revolution

Nunes and Serra write, “[o]ver a period of a year and a half, industrial, agricultural and service workers, neighbourhood movements, students, intellectuals and the military carried out an extremely rich and unprecedented range of experiments of mass mobilization, grassroots organization and participatory democracy.”⁴⁰⁹ As the revolution proceeded, the PCP and the radical military faction moved to contain Popular Power, bringing the worker and housing commissions under party control. They aimed to create a highly centralized socialist state, led by the vanguard elite. Mass mobilization and popular participation in politics were seen as potentially dangerous, and requiring direction from above. The MFA also began a program of nationalization. The nationalization of enterprises and farms removed the need for self-management, and for collective action through strikes, effectively curtailing much grassroots activism.⁴¹⁰

The radicalism of the Portuguese transition also met with opposition from within the military and society at large. Portugal was regionally polarized between the conservative North (dominated by small landholders), and the leftist South (the day-labourers on the latifundias), and the ideologically heterogeneous cities. The first democratic elections to the Constitutional Assembly reflected these regional divisions. The moderate Socialists and right-wing PPD won the majority of the popular vote in the North, with the Socialists winning the most seats of all parties nation-wide. The results of the election indicated that a majority of the Portuguese electorate endorsed a moderate democracy, rather than a full-fledged revolution.

⁴⁰⁹ Nunes and Serra, “ ‘Decent Housing for the People,’ Urban Movements and Emancipation in Portugal” 51.

⁴¹⁰ See Hammond for an analysis of the defeat of popular power.

The results of the first elections created ideological contradiction between the elected assembly and the MFA. Faced with a moderate Constituent Assembly, the MFA did not relinquish its role. Rather, the MFA radicalized further, forging closer ties with the Communist Party. Counter-mobilizations occurred in the North. The Church increased its denunciations of the Communist, left-wing forces. The peasantry, the majority of whom owned their small plots of land, felt threatened by the land occupations. They also feared the disintegration of their Catholic values by Communism. Encouraged by Catholic officials, mobs attacked Communist party offices.

On both sides, political leaders moved towards extremes. While the leftist factions radicalized, the conservative and moderate forces began to reorganize themselves. The moderates within the military and the MFA consolidated their position, and successfully thwarted the possibility of a Communist state. After November 1975, the revolution was over. Portugal embarked on the path towards liberal democracy, with neither the expectations of the left or the right fully met.

The Window of Opportunity Closes – Women and the Counterrevolution

The decline of the revolution coincided with a diminished role for the military, and the rise of the political parties. As the pendulum swung right, Popular Power also declined. Political parties began to dominate the transition, just as fatigue and disillusionment set in. High levels of mobilization could not be sustained, and the possibility of a broad-based participatory democracy in Portugal dissipated. Democratization became conventional politics – hierarchical, institutionalized and male dominated, only now set within a democratic state. Civil society and grassroots activism

would play a circumscribed role within the new democratic setting.⁴¹¹ Women's activism, both autonomous and within the housing and worker's commissions, lost significance within the new political opportunity structure. Women, virtually absent from party leadership, found themselves on the political 'outside'. Moreover, as Popular Power declined, the women's movement lost important mobilizing structures in the worker's and housing commissions.⁴¹² As women returned home, the women's movement encountered difficulties mobilizing women, and faced a less open political environment.

The Counterrevolution transformed the master frame of the next phase of the transition. The radical discourse of people's power and social transformation gave way to calls for moderation. Although the end goal of social democracy officially remained, in order to placate the leftist factions of the armed forces, the new democratic discourse sought to bridge the extreme positions of the left and right. Feminism, and the MLM had already been perceived as extreme, and were marginalized during the revolution. The failure of the revolution meant that women tied to the Communist and extreme left parties, also found themselves, and their parties, marginalized as too extremist.⁴¹³ During the post-revolutionary transition stage, women's issues such as abortion were topics of contention between the left and right, and men and women.⁴¹⁴

⁴¹¹ Hawkesworth maintains "By valorizing institutions at odds with women's hopes for participatory politics and long associated with the exclusion of women as the key components of democratization, public space is symbolically reclaimed as male space." Mary E. Hawkesworth, "Democratization: Reflections on Gendered Dislocations in the Public Sphere" in *Gender, Globalization and Democratization*. Eds. Rita Mae Kelly, Jane H. Bayes, Mary E. Hawkesworth and Brigitte Young (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001) 233.

⁴¹² Not only did participation decline, these institutions also increasingly bureaucratized.

⁴¹³ The Communist party participated in the drafting of the 1976 Constitution, but otherwise it was removed from all positions of state power. For centrist and right-wing forces, the PCP was held as the enemy of democracy. Bruneau and Macleod, *Politics in Contemporary Portugal* 51.

⁴¹⁴ The Counterrevolution demonstrated the continuing influence of the Catholic Church on politics and on the masses.

Women's demands, were portrayed as divisive, and so did not fit within the new discourse of moderation. They were largely excluded from the transition negotiations. The discursive emphasis on democratic functioning, and building consensus constrained the women's movements potential to transform gender relations.

The limited opportunities available to women's movement were evident during the Constitutional drafting process. The Constitution drawn up by the Constituent Assembly reflected a compromise between the military and the political parties. Social movements and popular organizations were not included in the drafting process. The first steps towards the drafting of the new Constitution began with the MFA-Party Pacts that guaranteed a continued role for the military in the new democracy, later entrenched in the Constitution in the positions of the Presidency and the Council of the Revolution.⁴¹⁵ As a result of the pacts, the Constitution also rhetorically guaranteed the continued creation of a classless state, and a socialist economy. These inclusions did not stem from the moderate parties' commitment to the revolution, but a stalemate between radical left and moderate forces, civilians and democrats.⁴¹⁶ Power in the new democracy was diffused, in a hybrid, semi-presidential system.

The women's movement was not a direct participant in the pacting or drafting processes. Instead, the political parties mediated between the women's movement and the constitutional process. In their platforms, the political parties had already recognized women's formal equality. For party leaders, this was a necessary symbol of Portugal's modernization. The restructuring of the politico-juridical framework thus updated the

⁴¹⁵ The president, until a Constitutional revision, would be a military official; and the Council would act as an advisory organ, with power to determine the Constitutionality of legislation.

⁴¹⁶ Tom Gallagher. "The Portuguese Socialist Party: The Pitfalls of Being First," in *Southern European Socialism* Eds Tom Gallagher and Allan Williams (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989) 14.

dominant gender regime, bringing it into line with other Socialist nations.⁴¹⁷ Women were granted equal political rights, and equal rights as workers in the new Constitution.⁴¹⁸ The Constitution further declared the importance of motherhood to society, and commitments were made to the protection of the family, and the support of mothers.⁴¹⁹ However, the Constitution did not address how it would substantively protect motherhood, or guarantee women's political and economic equality. Because the Constitution was ratified solely by a Parliamentary vote, there was no accountability to the population at large. Following the 1976 Constitution, a revised Civil Code was implemented. This code undid the last of the Salazarist discriminations against women, removing discriminatory adultery laws and provisions that established men as the heads of households. Beyond formal recognition of women and men's equality, domestic gender relations were not addressed during the transition, and none of the main political parties were willing to challenge the Church on the issue of abortion.⁴²⁰ The issue of abortion is unresolved to this day.

The Spanish Transition – Transition by Transaction

Democratization theorists often uphold the Spanish transition as the paradigmatic model of democratic transitions.⁴²¹ After the death of Franco in November of 1975, regime elites began negotiating a transition to democracy. Elites, including Franco's

⁴¹⁷ Later the government moved to bring the gender regime in line with European Union member countries. Ferreira, "Women in Portugal – Situations and Paradoxes."

⁴¹⁸ The gender regime, as entrenched in the Constitution, reflected the existing tensions and stalemate between Moderates, Rightists and Leftists. The Socialist Party and the other moderate, and right-wing parties advocated universal equality, while the Communist Party endorsed women's equality as workers. See Ferreira, "Engendering Portugal: Social Change, State Politics and Women's Mobilization".

⁴¹⁹ De Sousa and Dominguez, "Women in Portugal" 46.

⁴²⁰ The women's movement itself largely failed to mobilize women and campaign around issues of gender discrimination beyond discrimination in the workplace, and the pro-abortion movement only gained momentum in the 1980s. Tavares, "Romper o Cerco" 22; Tavares, *Movimentos de Mulheres em Portugal* 115-116.

designated successor, King Juan Carlos, recognized the impossibility of continued authoritarian rule in Spain. The Revolution and Counterrevolution in neighbouring Portugal highlighted the possible dangers of an internal failure to democratize. Having witnessed the radicalization of events, and the popular upheaval in Portugal, liberalizing elites sought to tightly control the transition and to contain popular mobilization. Lingering memories of the Civil War further compelled elites to negotiate, to compromise the terms of democratization to prevent violence by pro- and anti-democratic factions.⁴²² Elites hoped that through a series of moderate reforms, democratization would be controlled, and an authoritarian backlash avoided. Accordingly, authoritarian power structures were not removed immediately. Rather, elites used the Francoist framework to transform the regime legally.

King Juan Carlos expressed his intentions to work towards a “free and modern” society. His first appointed government, however, under the continued presidency of Arias Navarro, was slow to enact reforms. Political aspirations had run high after Franco’s death, but the lack of substantive reforms, and the timetable for change, generated widespread discontent among the opposition forces, disillusioning even moderate reformers.⁴²³ A wave of strikes and protests paralysed the country, and the violence in the Basque Country, which marked the late Francoist regime, increased. The two broad coalitions of opposition forces united in March of 1976 to form a single opposition front, the Democratic Coordination.⁴²⁴ The escalating oppositional activity propelled the transition process forward. Finally in April of 1976, Arias presented a plan

⁴²¹ The Spanish transition is praised for the stability of change, and the moderate positions of political actors. See for example Linz and Stepan; O’Donnell and Schmitter.

⁴²² Jordi Solé Tura, “The Spanish Transition to Democracy” *Spain in the 1980s*. Eds. Robert P. Clark and Michael Haltzel (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing, 1987) 26.

for reforms to the Cortes, which once approved, would be subject to a general referendum. Arias, thus, affirmed that the transition would remain tightly under the control of the governing elites.

Nonetheless, the pace of political reforms remained slow, as the Cortes delayed approving changes. For example, political meetings were finally legalized, but membership in a political party remained a criminal offense. Worsening economic conditions were also inadequately addressed, further aggravating the situation. In July of 1976, at the monarch's request, Arias resigned and Adolfo Suarez was installed as President. Suarez began to break with the Francoist past, appointing a new generation of leaders, without ties to Franco, into his cabinet. Suarez and Juan Carlos undertook the creation of new institutions to democratize Spain, but ones which pro-Francoist political forces, especially the military, would also accept. Unlike Portugal, state institutions, ranging from the military to the bureaucracy to the Courts, remained staffed by supporters of the previous regime.⁴²⁵ No *saneamientos*, purges of authoritarian officials, took place. As there was no clear, definite rupture with the Francoist regime, Suarez' transition discourse did not discredit Spanish fascism outright. Rather than acknowledging the crimes of the past regime and demanding accountability, memories of the brutal civil war led elites to avoid dealing with the past altogether in their efforts not to repeat it. Appeasing the Right thus became a central element of democratization, as did a collective forgetting.⁴²⁶

⁴²³ John Coverdale, *The Political Transformation of Spain After Franco* (New York: Praeger, 1979) 38.

⁴²⁴ *Ibid* 39.

⁴²⁵ Tura, "The Spanish Transition to Democracy" 27.

⁴²⁶ Paloma Aguilar and Carsten Humlebaek, "Collective Memory and National Identity in the Spanish Democracy: The Legacies of Francoism and the Civil War" *History & Memory* 14(1-2) (2002) 121-164.

After negotiating with the Cortes, and consulting with the opposition leaders, Suarez successfully passed his plan for political reform through the Cortes. His plan outlined the formal structures, and the electoral system of the new democracy. He then submitted the plan to a national referendum. Critiqued by some opposition forces for its elitist origins,⁴²⁷ it was nevertheless overwhelmingly approved by the Spanish people. The approval of the masses legitimized Suarez' leadership, and the negotiated nature of reforms. Suarez then committed himself to elections by the following year, as well as a popular vote on the new constitution. In preparation for the elections, political parties were legalized. After much hesitation, and opposition threats, the government finally legalized the Communist party. Political freedoms were finally being restored.

In the early stages of the transition, civil society played a valuable, but constrained role within the transitional POS. Existing in a state of semi-legality, the opposition forces had continued to face repressive measures. Repression thus hindered collective action. Nevertheless, the opposition forces successfully mobilized themselves, and strikes and demonstrations forced the elites to remain on the path towards democracy.⁴²⁸ In society at large, the opposition gained legitimacy as an important political force. Government elites also began to acknowledge the opposition leaders.

Despite demands for a cleaner break with the Francoist regime, the opposition was not capable of setting the terms of democratization. Neither could the opposition bring down the government, as popular support for democratization did not translate into the widespread mobilization of the Spanish people. Along with continuing repression,

⁴²⁷ Ibid 51.

⁴²⁸ Joseph M. Foweraker, "The Role of Labor Organizations in the Transition to Democracy in Spain," in *Spain in the 1980s*. Eds. Robert P. Clark and Michael Haltzel (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing, 1987) 108.

memories of the Civil War, as well as the prevailing discourse of moderation discouraged popular mobilization and collective action. Moreover, memories of the Civil War, and the continuing antagonism of the military, led even the opposition leaders to accept the need for moderation, and elite accommodation. Social movements and political groups making moderate claims found more receptive audiences among governing elites and wary citizens, further propelling a moderation of the opposition. The Communist Party, accordingly, abandoned any revolutionary claims, opting instead to be seen as a legitimate party. In contrast to their Portuguese counterparts, the Spanish working classes moderated their demands, seeking democracy and higher wages but never challenging capitalist structures. In this context, the transition to democracy took on a more stable, yet exclusionary character.

Regardless of the wide-ranging acceptance of a negotiated democratic break, workers' strikes continued throughout the transition phase.⁴²⁹ Moreover, levels of violence steadily increased, even after the 1976 referendum.⁴³⁰ Regional nationalist movements, particularly ETA, and radical right-wing groups felt disaffected by the Castilian-controlled transition process. They resorted to violent activities which then garnered the disapproval of the masses, with the exception of continued Basque support for ETA. Unwittingly, violent measures actually reinforced the discourse of moderation, as well as the elitist nature of the transition.⁴³¹

⁴²⁹ Strikes often took place in spite of opposition elites' demands for moderation.

⁴³⁰ Nancy Bermeo, "Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict During Democratic Transitions," in *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 29, No. 3, Transitions to Democracy: A Special Issue in Memory of Dankwart A. Rustow (Apr., 1997), 126.

⁴³¹ The threat posed by ETA spawned fears of a military backlash. Moreover, violence hindered the break with the previous Francoist regime. According to Maxwell and Spiegel, "this terrorist threat facilitated the integration of the security and intelligence services of the old regime into the new democratic structures, since the existence of the terrorist threat helped legitimize the security services and the paramilitary

Upon Franco's death, political parties had begun to organize and slowly to consolidate their role within the opposition. Over the course of the transition, political parties, especially the PSOE (the Spanish Socialist Party), and the PCE (the Spanish Communist Party), slowly took over as the dominant actors within the opposition. Originally calling for a 'democratic rupture,' both the Communists and the Socialists rejected this strategy, accepting the need for an elite-driven, negotiated break to appease the Francoist forces. The results of the referendum in support of Suarez' reforms reinforced their moderate stance.⁴³² Once elections were called, and the Right also began to organize into political parties, the centrality of parties in the new democratic system was established. Moreover, as opposition elites, especially party leaders, accepted a negotiated break, they began calling for restraint, driving popular mobilization into decline.⁴³³ The definition of democracy adopted by the main political parties narrowly defined democratic rule in terms of institutional arrangements.⁴³⁴ It also assumed political parties to be the central democratic actors and vehicles for political participation. Since, state-wide parties were increasingly controlled from the top-down, and dominated by a Madrid-based technocratic leadership,⁴³⁵ participatory democracy through the political parties was not encouraged.⁴³⁶ Rather, the main parties lacked a strong popular base, and leaders did not prioritize building up their party membership.

forces..." Kenneth Maxwell and Steven Spiegel, *The New Spain: From Isolation to Influence* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Book, 1994) 19.

⁴³² Hipsher, "Democratization and the Decline of Urban Social Movements in Chile and Spain" 290.

⁴³³ See for example Hipsher, "Democratization and the Decline of Urban Social Movements" 291.

⁴³⁴ In the PSOE, for example, supporters of Social Democracy constituted the minority. Richard Gillespie, "Spanish Socialism in the 1980s" in *Southern European Socialism: Parties Elections, and the Challenge of Government*. Eds. A.M. Williams and Tom Gallagher (Bristol: University of Bristol, 1989) 61-62.

⁴³⁵ Ibid 60; Tom Gallagher, "Democracy in Portugal Since the 1974 Revolution," in *Conflict and Change in Portugal, 1974-1984* Eds. Eduardo Ferreira and Walter C. Opello Jr. (Lisboa: Teorema, 1985) 66.

⁴³⁶ Regional parties tended to be less hierarchical and more internally democratic.

After the 1976 elections, the newly elected Suarez government and the other main political parties in the Cortes controlled the constitutional drafting process⁴³⁷, thereby formally elaborating the terms of the new democracy. Since Suarez and his centre-right party, the *Unión de Centro Democrático* (UCD), won the majority of seats in the newly democratic Cortes, he successfully maintained his emphasis on moderation and consensus. The constitutional arrangements were thus the result of further pacts between the political parties. Radical demands, and divisive issues were excluded from the Constitutional debate. Trade unions and business elites were also consulted, resulting in the Moncloa Pacts, an economic agreement setting the terms of the relationship among labour, business elites and government. The outcome of the Constitutional arrangements and Moncloa Pacts was a liberal democratic, quasi-federalist vision of Spain. A referendum in December of 1978 approved the new Constitution and marked the completion of the transition phase.

Women's Movements and the Spanish Transition – Restricted Opportunities

Women's activism in the democratic opposition persisted over the duration of the transition phase, through the worker's movements, the trade unions, the regional nationalist movements and the clandestine political parties. Women were also involved in the neighbourhood and citizens' movements that emerged as part of the transition.⁴³⁸ Women demonstrated for the amnesty of political prisoners, as well as for equal rights.⁴³⁹ Nonetheless, the elite-driven, consensus-driven nature of the transition deterred widespread popular mobilization, including that of women. The obstacles faced by civil

⁴³⁷ A multiparty parliamentary committee was charged with drafting the Constitution.

⁴³⁸ The 'citizen' movement viewed itself as a social facet of workers' mobilization, and raised the issue of direct democracy. Radcliff, "Citizens and Housewives: The Problem of Female Citizenship in Spain's Transition to Democracy" 92.

society during the transition, both institutionally and discursively, also hindered women's mobilization. Meanwhile, specifically gendered obstacles further limited women's activism within the opposition, and any attempts to introduce women's issues into the opposition's democratic demands.

First, the various opposition forces largely viewed women's issues as secondary to the more pressing needs of democratization, especially given the slow pace of reforms, and the risk of a right-wing backlash.⁴⁴⁰ Within the male-dominated trade unions, women's issues were largely misunderstood or excluded. Spain's economic downturn during the transition further minimized the importance of women's issues within the Leftist forces. Given the high levels of male unemployment, women's employment was seen by many as taking jobs away from men. Also within the opposition, the 'citizen' movement and the neighbourhood associations, which were closely tied to the PCE, focused on citizens as workers, without acknowledging that the majority of women did not participate in the paid workforce. Neighbourhood groups attempted to draw clear distinctions between public and private issues, and to distance themselves from housewife associations, which they associated with the private sphere. Rather than forging ties with housewives, they dismissed their focus on private concerns.⁴⁴¹ Within the leftist political parties, women's issues began to creep onto party agendas. Nonetheless, they were not a priority, and party women faced widespread anti-feminism across party ranks.⁴⁴² Gender discrimination and traditional gender beliefs were thus

⁴³⁹ Threlfall, "Gendering the Transition to Democracy," 28.

⁴⁴⁰ Edward Moxon-Browne. *Political Change in Spain* (London: Routledge, 1989) 76.

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid* 92.

⁴⁴² Jones, *Women in Contemporary Spain* 7-8.

prevalent within the male-dominated opposition. Activists attempting to raise women's issues found themselves acting as the opposition within the opposition.⁴⁴³

Participation in the broader opposition forces resulted in greater awareness of gender specific problems that were not addressed by the Opposition. This prompted women activists on the left to mobilize around gender issues. During the breakdown of authoritarianism, the Spanish women's movement re-emerged; over the course of the transition the movement continued to expand.⁴⁴⁴ Increasingly, women's groups and organizations adopted feminist positions. Despite the women's movements' expansion, the political opportunity structure of the transition constrained women's participation in, and the impact of the women's movement on the transition processes. The elitist nature of the transition, the discourse of moderation, and the dominant definition of democracy all limited the opportunities available to the movement. Despite their organizational superiority relative to the Portuguese women's movement, the Spanish women's movement did not encounter a similar window of opportunity during the transition.

The Spanish women's movements responded immediately to Franco's death. In December of 1975, barely two weeks after Franco's death, the women's movement organized the Conference for Women's Liberation to mark the United Nation's Year of the Woman (although planning had begun in the months prior to his death). A semi-clandestine event, circa 500 participants from fifteen state-wide groups met in Madrid. Coinciding with the conference, a collective manifesto, the 'For Women's Liberation: Programmes of the NGOs of the Spanish State', signed by 79 legal groups, was

⁴⁴³ M.A. Duran and M.T. Gallego, "The Women's Movement in Spain and the New Spanish Democracy" in *The New Women's Movement*, Ed. Drude Dahlerup (London: Sage Modern Publications, 1986).

⁴⁴⁴ Gallego and Duran identify 1975-79 as a stage of growth, years that correspond with the transition phase, *Ibid*.

released.⁴⁴⁵ This early conference and manifesto demonstrated the vibrancy of the young women's movement, the capacity of groups to coordinate activities and to cooperate on shared goals. From the onset, women's groups recognized the importance of unified action.⁴⁴⁶ The conference, however, also exposed the deep ideological divisions within the movement. Participants found themselves divided over strategy, primarily between those who advocated single and double militancy. Meanwhile, ideological disagreements between socialist feminists and radical feminists, and between Castilian and non-Castilian groups⁴⁴⁷ were also evident at the conference.

The various women's groups and organizations that emerged during the transition reflected the range of ideological positions. Activists who prioritised partisan politics and double-militancy forged ties with leftist political parties, among them the *Asociación Democrática de la Mujer* (Democratic Association of Women), which had close ties to the Worker's Party.⁴⁴⁸ Women's committees within the Communist, Socialist and other left-wing parties were formed. The *Movimiento Democrático de Mujeres*, on the other hand, moved to distance itself from the PCE, renaming itself the MDM-MLM.⁴⁴⁹ Other Socialist feminists, critical of the mainstream opposition parties and double-militancy, formed the Feminist Party. Radical feminists, on the other hand, rejected institutional politics, viewing these as expressions of patriarchal power.⁴⁵⁰ Among Radical Feminists,

⁴⁴⁵ Threlfall, "Gendering the Transition to Democracy" 26.

⁴⁴⁶ At the Conference, the Federation of Feminist Associations of the Spanish State was formed.

⁴⁴⁷ Basque and Catalan women's movements rejected the hegemonic position of the Castilian women's movement, while also expressing their own distinct concerns. These are discussed below.

⁴⁴⁸ Celia Valiente. "The Feminist Movement and the Reconfigured State in Spain (1970s-2000)" in *Women's movements facing the reconfigured state*. Ed. Lee Ann Banaszak, et al (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 33.

⁴⁴⁹ *Movimiento Democrático de Mujeres – Movimiento de Liberación de Mujeres*

⁴⁵⁰ The attitudes of radical feminists stemmed from the Francoist legacy, which created a deep mistrust of the state. Celia Valiente. "The Power of Persuasion: The *Instituto de la Mujer* in Spain" in *Comparative State Feminism* Eds. Amy Mazur and Dorothy Stetson (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1995) 223-224.

the largest organization was the Antiauthoritarian Struggle of Antipatriarchal and Revolutionary Women (LAMAR). Other key radical feminist groups included small, autonomous Collectives in all of the major cities. Women's groups without explicitly feminist affiliations also proliferated, such as the Association of Divorced Women. Membership in Housewife Associations expanded during the transition, but they too found themselves ideologically divided between those associations that focused on meeting practical needs, addressing specific government policies rather than political institutions as a whole, and those associations that wanted to shape the transition, making "the link between democratic rights and specific demands."⁴⁵¹ Through demonstrations, conferences and seminars, women's activism thus steadily increased across the spectrum of associations. Women's groups also helped establish advice centres, shelters and family planning clinics through local and regional governments, and through local party initiatives.⁴⁵² The comparatively slow pace of democratic reforms provided the women's movement with a longer time frame in which to mobilize. The scope of the movement exceeded the Portuguese women's movement. Nevertheless, the number of participants in women's groups and committees only represented a small percentage of the population.

Notwithstanding the women's movement's ideological diversity, in the early Post-Franco environment, women's groups shared a number of common objectives: the reversal of discriminatory Francoist legislation, and the release of political prisoners, including amnesty for women charged with sexual and other gender-specific crimes.⁴⁵³ "Feminists put forth the message that women condemned on the basis of patriarchal laws

⁴⁵¹ Radcliff, "Citizens and Housewives: The Problem of Female Citizenship in Spain's Transition to Democracy" 86.

⁴⁵² Threlfall, "Gendering the Transition to Democracy," 31, 33.

should also be considered political prisoners.”⁴⁵⁴ Their attempts to redefine gender-specific crimes as ‘political’ crimes met with a number of obstacles and resistance during the transition. Early amnesty declarations completely overlooked women prisoners charged with such crimes as abortion and adultery. Suarez and the Cortes failed to recognize the ‘political’ nature of gender-specific crimes. As the women’s movement mobilized to demand the release of women prisoners, they encountered new state repression. Demonstrations were shut down, and participants assaulted by police.

The negotiated transition did not provide the clean break necessary to immediately discredit the regime’s gender discourse or its patriarchal legislation. Although the women’s movement demanded that abortion and birth control be decriminalized, and that adultery laws be reversed, there was little political will to effect change among elites in the early stages of the transition. For the regime elites, altering the Francoist legal code was not viewed as a priority concern for democratization. Democratic arrangements and the economic downturn took precedence over the issues raised by women. Attempts to appease the Right, including the Catholic Church, further compelled leaders to avoid the contentious topics of abortion and birth control. Whereas Church officials within the regime had direct input into the negotiations, the women’s movement had no access to the transition elites. Without the levels of mobilization of other opposition movements, and without a commitment to women’s issues on the part of that opposition, the women’s movement failed to place most of their demands on the transition agenda.

⁴⁵³ Astelarra, "The Transition to Democracy in Spain" 56-57. Francoist law identified married women’s adultery as a crime. Also, abortion and the use of contraceptives were illegal.

Only after the first parliamentary elections, and well after the Constitutional drafting process had begun, did the Cortes begin to address the discriminatory measures of the Francoist legal code. At first, existing legislation remained in place, and continued to be enforced by the Courts. Cases of adultery and abortion were tried over the course of the transition despite the women's movements protests. Since the transition by transaction brought no *saneamiento* of state institutions, Francoist officials with conservative gender beliefs remained in power. These gender attitudes were reflected in Court decisions, and in police actions.⁴⁵⁵ Finally, a new Civil Code was introduced in late 1978, after the Constitutional drafting process was complete. The new Civil Code reversed Francoist adultery laws, and removed restrictions on women's freedoms.⁴⁵⁶ Women were no longer under their husband's authority, they were granted equal legal status in the home. Women's efforts also helped legalize the sale of contraceptives, despite the objections of right-wing parties.⁴⁵⁷

Despite the closed opportunity structure of the early transition, the growth of the women's movement and the efforts of women activists within the left-wing parties led these parties to pay greater attention to the movement and to include women's issues on their party platforms.⁴⁵⁸ Attempts to woo women voters even led the PSOE to position itself as 'the women's party'. For the feminists supportive of double militancy, the political parties represented possible allies within the political opportunity structure, and party politics as a venue for change. The elections thus heralded a new possibility for

⁴⁵⁴ Judith Astelarra, "Women, Political Culture, and Empowerment in Spain," in *Women Transforming Politics: Worldwide Strategies for Empowerment*. Ed. Jill M. Bystydzienski (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992) 45.

⁴⁵⁵ See Temma Kaplan, for detailed cases of continued prosecutions over the course of the transition.

⁴⁵⁶ Women no longer needed their husbands permission to work, travel, etc.

⁴⁵⁷ As a compromise to the Conservative forces, the law decriminalized the sale of contraceptives, but sales had to take place under regulated conditions. Threlfall, "Gendering the transition to democracy" 33.

transforming the POS, and achieving the goals of the women's movement. When 22 female deputies were elected to the first Congress of Deputies, approximately six-percent of the total elected, double-militancy feminists held great expectations of change. Socialist women, in particular, established female caucuses and developed strategies to work inside the parties. At a minimum, they aimed for a consultative role in policymaking.⁴⁵⁹

The parties, however, did not challenge the discourse of moderation and consensus. As the transition progressed, they did not actively encourage the mobilization of civil society nor did they challenge the elitist terms of democratization. Rather, in spite of their party platforms, the newly elected members of the Congress failed to raise many of the women's issues they had declared their support for during the elections. For example, it was the UCD that introduced divorce legislation in 1978 (which failed to pass)⁴⁶⁰, not the supposedly women-friendly parties of the Left. The PSOE, in particular, moderated its position in order to appease conservative groups and to portray itself as an alternative party to the UCD.⁴⁶¹ The Socialist Party did not take on the cause of workers or women in such a way that would threaten conservative business elites or other conservative factions, and risk its future electoral success. Moreover, because the Cortes continued to operate under existing Francoist Laws, executive dominance under Suarez persisted,⁴⁶² thereby providing limited space for individual women MPs to pursue the objectives of the women's movement. Rather, the demands of Constitution-writing provided a continuing motive for the exclusion of women's issues.

⁴⁵⁸ Duran and Gallego, "The women's movement in Spain," 209.

⁴⁵⁹ Threlfall, "Gendering the transition to democracy" 31.

⁴⁶⁰ Divorce was finally legalized in 1981.

The Catalan and Basque Women's Movements⁴⁶³

The experiences of the Basque and Catalan women's movements during the transition period do not correspond to the experiences of the mainstream Castilian movement. In Catalonia and the Basque country, the women's movements had emerged closely linked to regional nationalism, and this affiliation continued throughout the transition process. The nationalist movements served not only as allies for the women's movements, but also defined their character and strategies. Accordingly, women's feminist identities emerged as inseparable from their national identities.

After decades of targeted Francoist repression and dominance by Castilian interests, Basque and Catalan women were wary of Castilian hegemony, both in the democratization process and within the broader Spanish women's movement. Consequently, women from the regional minorities hesitated to engage the central state during the transition, as they continued to see it as a repressive force rather than as means to achieve their goals. Instead, their transitional goals emphasized national and local politics. Nonetheless, the nationalist and nationalist women's movements recognized that their regional aspirations required a restructuring of state power.

⁴⁶¹ Jonathan Hopkin, "From Consensus to Competition: The changing nature of democracy in the Spanish transition," in *The Politics of Contemporary Spain*. Ed. Sebastian Balfour (London: Routledge, 2005).

⁴⁶² Ibid. See also Heywood, *Politics and Policy in Democratic Spain: No Longer Different?*

⁴⁶³ Although regional nationalism existed in Galicia, it was much less developed than in the Basque Country or Catalonia. Galician nationalists had little influence on the transition process, and issues of Galician regional autonomy did not figure into the democratic considerations. There was no Galician Question equivalent to the Basque or Catalan question. Galician nationalist affiliation was weak, and accordingly, the nationalist women's movement was also weak. Lack of industrial development in this predominantly agrarian, traditional Catholic society had hindered the development of both nationalism and women's activism. Existing women's groups also adopted a much more moderate position than their Basque and Catalan counterparts. The Asociación Galega da Muller, for example, made no reference to national autonomy. The Association also emphasized practical women's demands, such as the need for access to education and employment. "Programa provisional de la Asociación Galega da Muller" in *El feminismo en España hoy: bibliografía completa y documentos*. Ed. Anabel Gonzalez (Bilbao: Zero, 1979) 172-173.

Thus, the definition of democracy that arose in Catalonia and the Basque Country did not equate with the prevailing discourse in Castilian Spain. True democratization was seen to necessitate more than a democratically elected government. Rather democratization required a new, decentralized arrangement of powers between the central state and the regions, and national revival. Through their national projects, women aimed to construct their own national gender regime. The transition phase thus offered the possibility of state decentralization, and regional autonomy. Additionally, Francoism was discredited and rejected in the two regions. To achieve democracy, the national movements demanded a clean break with the authoritarian past. This political break, structural and discursive, destabilized the Franco-era POS and offered the women's movement the possibility of attaining both a friendlier POS and gender regime.

In Catalonia, the women's movement experienced levels of mobilization unparalleled in the rest of Spain. Shortly after the first state-wide Women's Conference, the First Catalan Women's Conference was held. Over four thousand women attended the conference in May of 1976, demonstrating the greater extent of women's mobilization in Catalonia. New groups like the Catalan Association of Women and the Barcelona Women's Coordinating Committee were formed.⁴⁶⁴ Women's groups were also very active in the regional parties and in the Worker's Commissions.⁴⁶⁵ Throughout the transition phase, levels of activism continued to rise. Catalan feminists took a leading role among Spanish feminists. Catalan women formed the *Vindicación Feminista*, a periodical devoted to feminist issues across Spain.⁴⁶⁶ Catalan women were not exempt from the ideological divisions that marked the Castilian movement, yet they were united in their

⁴⁶⁴ Rague-Arias, "Spain: Feminism in Our Time" 473.

⁴⁶⁵ Puig, *La Dona a Badalona* 125; Gonzalez, *El Feminismo en España* 41.

Catalan nationalist sentiments. Catalan women's groups, consequently, cooperated across party and ideological lines, and acted as chiefly unified movement.⁴⁶⁷

The Catalan nationalist movement provided a central, but partial ally for Catalan women activists. On the one hand, Catalan elites accepted the discourse of moderation and consensus put forth by Suarez. Moreover, the Catalan nationalists, and many Catalan women, prioritized their national aspirations above all else. The Catalan national project, however, advocated an egalitarian, participatory version of democracy. This discourse of democracy encouraged grassroots activism and social movement activity, unlike the highly centralized, elitist version of democratization promoted by Suarez and state-wide leaders. Catalan nationalism also promoted modernization and closer ties to Europe.⁴⁶⁸ This involved bringing the gender regime in line with other European countries, and rejecting Franco's traditional gender ideology. Additionally, Catalan nationalism valued both motherhood, and women's economic role in society. Both roles were viewed as crucial to the post-Francoist restoration and the ultimate success of the Catalan nation. Thus, the nationalist discourse was friendlier to women's mobilization and to the demands of the women's movement. Nationalist groups and parties endorsed women's grassroots activism, and supported many of the women's movement's demands. Nonetheless, political pragmatism and the supremacy of nationalism placed women's issues aside during the course of the transition. For many Catalan activists, once the

⁴⁶⁶ Puig, *La Dona a Badalona* 124.

⁴⁶⁷ Empar Pineda interviewed in Anabel Gonzalez, *El Feminismo en España* 43-44.

⁴⁶⁸ See for example Montserrat Guibernau "Images of Catalonia," *Nations and Nationalism* 3(1) 1997, 89-111 for a discussion of Catalan nationalism and its modernizing tendencies.

democratization of Spain and the attainment of Catalan autonomy had been achieved, then women's issues could be addressed.⁴⁶⁹

For Catalan women, the 2nd Republic's Generalitat (1932-1936) served as a reference point for the possible restructuring of power between Catalonia and the Spanish state. Moreover, it exemplified the friendlier gender regime promoted by Catalan nationalism, and the developments possible through a Catalan regional government.⁴⁷⁰ During its brief existence, the Generalitat had not only afforded women greater political equality, it had gone so far as to grant them economic and reproductive rights.⁴⁷¹ Thus, for women activists, regional national political structures, especially regional parties and movements constituted a key dimension of the political opportunity structure. As democratization initiated the restructuring of regional national political structures, women activists again began to face new political spaces and more open points of access to the POS not available to the majoritarian women's movement. As shown by the Generalitat, continued strengthening of these structures could create a friendlier state for women, and more open POS. Catalan nationalism and the Generalitat provided important symbolic resources that activists could draw upon for their collective action frames. Both could be used to draw support among the Catalan people and to create allies within the regional political opportunity structures.

⁴⁶⁹ Improving women's conditions, at home and in the work force, would be part of the long-term national project. In the short run, Catalan nationalists needed to achieve the conditions that would allow them to implement this project.

⁴⁷⁰ In its program, the Associació Catalana de la Dona made direct reference to the Generalitat and the rights lost under Franco. In *El feminismo en España hoy: bibliografía completa y documentos*, Anabel Gonzalez Ed., 197-198.

⁴⁷¹ The Generalitat, as part of its modernizing project, had legalized abortion, opened pregnancy termination centres and promoted the use of birth control. Ottolenghi, *Women in Spain Supplement No.8 to Women of Europe* 3.

For Basque women, nationalism also took precedence. Unlike the Catalan national movement, Basque nationalists did not accept the discourse of pragmatism and consensus. They wanted a clean break with the Francoist past.⁴⁷² Throughout the transition, the Spanish state continued to impose repressive measures on the Basque people, to address the ETA threat. As a result, state measures furthered nationalist sentiments and support for Basque activities. Repressive measures over the course of the transition also alienated the Basque people and the Basque leaders from the democratization process, and incited more extremist positions from Basque nationalists. Similarly, the state's repressive measures propelled women's support for nationalist activities, and strengthened the women's movement's national affiliation.⁴⁷³ Repressive measures highlighted the importance of the Basque national project.

Although women activists saw their goals as intrinsically tied to the Basque national project, regional politics did not provide as many opportunities for the Basque women's movement, as it did for the Catalan women. Basque nationalism also promoted a more egalitarian, participatory vision of democracy that encouraged social movement activity and the reconstruction of civil society⁴⁷⁴, yet the political climate was not as friendly to the women's movement. First, any political demonstrations in the Basque country risked reprisals if associated with Basque extremist groups like ETA. The continued violence in the Basque country relegated women's issues to secondary distractions. Neither political leaders, nor the Basque people, including most Basque women, saw gender-related issues as central features of the democratic struggle. For

⁴⁷² Ian Gibson, *Fire in the Blood – The New Spain* (London: Faber & Faber, 1992) 140.

⁴⁷³ When two prominent Basque feminists were arrested for abetting ETA, other feminists rallied to their support. They saw the state's actions as an attempt to discredit Basque nationalism and feminism. James M. Markham, "Spain Seizes Three Linked to Basques" *New York Times* 23 October 1981, A15.

many, the women's movement held limited relevance in the transition climate, and the women's movement lacked the strength of its Catalan counterpart. Furthermore, although Basque groups and leaders did not moderate their positions to fit within the central state's discourse, they did not act as central allies to the women's movement. Basque nationalism continued to advance a traditional gender order, and to uphold women as reproducers of the nation.⁴⁷⁵ Nationalist leaders, with their traditional gender beliefs, not only dismissed women's issues as secondary, but many were also hostile to many of the demands of the women's movement and even to women's political activism.⁴⁷⁶ Nevertheless, Basque feminists and other women activists, sought to achieve their goals through the realization of their national projects.⁴⁷⁷ For women activists, they were not incompatible. Rather, Basque nationalism fostered women's activism, and as a consequence ultimately challenged traditional gender roles. Moreover, participation in nationalist groups led women to also mobilize around women's issues.⁴⁷⁸ The nationalist movement thus ultimately brought more supporters and allies to the women's movement. Until the Basque people had been freed from state oppression, Basque women would not be free.

⁴⁷⁴ Luiz Núñez Astrain, *The Basques: their struggle for independence* (Wales : Welsh Academic Press, 1997).

⁴⁷⁵ Hamilton, "Changing Subjects" 230.

⁴⁷⁶ The Basque nationalist movement did not seek to Europeanize the Basque country or to modernize its gender regime. Rather, the majority of groups sought to preserve and to restore traditional Basque structures, including the Basque family. Ibid 231.

⁴⁷⁷ The Asamblea de Mujeres (Women's Assembly) united Basque nationalist women's groups. Folguera, "El Feminismo en España Hoy," 121.

⁴⁷⁸ Cynthia Irving documents how participation in ETA and *Herri Batasuna* led activists to participate in other movements, including the feminist movement. Cynthia Irving, *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999)

Women's Movements and the Constitutional Drafting Process

The new Constitution redefined the dominant gender order at the central-state level. Consequently, once the constitution-drafting process began after the 1977 elections, shaping the Constitution became a major concern for women's movements (even in the Basque and Catalan regions). The channels available to the women's movements over the course of the drafting process were limited to the political parties. Representatives from the women's movement had no direct access to the negotiations, and therefore had to rely on indirect influence. Leaders did not consider the women's movement to be sufficiently significant to be involved in the process. Even the role of women did not fall into the major questions addressed by the Constitution-drafting elites.⁴⁷⁹ More significantly, Right-wing forces continued to view the women's movements and their demands as radical.⁴⁸⁰ Accordingly, women's groups and their issues were excluded from the Constitutional process because they threatened the discourse of Consensus.⁴⁸¹ The Constitution-drafting process, thus, privileged the male norm.

Popular participation in the drafting process was not encouraged. Rather, the constitutional process took place under very controlled, clandestine conditions, as it reflected the elitist nature of the Spanish transition. The closed nature of the process has been acknowledged by such elites as Martínez who writes, "We worked in secret so that

⁴⁷⁹ A Constitutional Committee of 7 men was entrusted to draft the Constitution. According to one member, Gregorio Peces-Barba Martínez, the four major questions faced by the Committee were the religious question (i.e the role of the Catholic Church in the Spanish democracy), the question of peripheral nationalisms, the form of the new state, and the social question. The social question consisted of the role of the working class, and did not tackle gender relations, especially outside of the workplace. Gregorio Peces-Barba Martínez, "The Constitutional Consensus and the Basque Challenge," in *Consensus Politics in Spain: Insider Perspectives*. Ed Monica Threlfall (Bristol: Intellect Books, 2000) 64.

⁴⁸⁰ Anabel Gonzalez, "Introduccion", *El feminismo en España hoy: bibliografía completa y documentos* 12.

the media would have no access to the details of the negotiations.”⁴⁸² The secretiveness was an attempt to facilitate consensus. It allowed elites to make concessions without external pressures or accountability, and to curtail disagreements by avoiding issues and points that could not be agreed upon. Political elites successfully maintained control over the discursive parameters of the drafting process, and thereby the tone and scope of the new Constitution. Social movements and groups without clout could rely only on indirect influence, as popular demands and expectations were kept at bay. With limited access to the process, women’s issues were not among the priorities set by the male political elites.

Nevertheless, the Constitutional process required elites to renegotiate women’s citizenship, and subsequently a new gender regime. Pamela Beth Radcliff writes, “Although it lurked below the surface of more high-profile debates about the integration of workers or Catalans into the nation, the relationship between women, the nation and the new democracy was a powerful theme in the general political discussion over the shape of the ‘new Spain’.”⁴⁸³ The creation of a ‘New’ Spain necessitated the formal rejection of the old Francoist gender order, one modernization had already begun to render obsolete. For transition leaders, the Francoist ideal of the *ama de casa*, the dutiful wife and mother relegated to the home, consequently embodied the Old, backward Spain, and its authoritarian legacy.

Instead, the transition leaders wanted to construct a ‘new’ Spain, that would be modern, European and liberal-democratic. In order to achieve the New Spain, the state’s dominant gender order also had to be brought in line with those of other Western

⁴⁸¹ Pamela Radcliff, "Imagining Female Citizenship in the 'New Spain': Gendering the Democratic Transition, 1975-1978." *Gender & History* 13(3) (November 2001) 509.

⁴⁸² Martínéz, "The Constitutional Consensus and the Basque Challenge," 64.

European countries. From the onset, the Constitutional discourse reflected the belief that a legitimate democracy cannot exclude women from 'the people', nor legally deny them access to decision-making, so transition leaders accepted women's formal political equality as a basic element of a democratic Spain.⁴⁸⁴ The Constitution drafted formally entrenched the legal equality of all citizens, including women. Key liberal rights, such as the right to vote, were extended to both men and women, and any discriminatory restrictions on women's political status were removed. The Constitution further prohibited any form of discrimination, including gender-based discrimination.

What did equality as defined by Constitution mean? Transition leaders endorsed a liberal version of democracy. Accordingly, the model of citizenship that informed the Constitution drafting process defined equality in terms of negative rights. Moreover, the Constitution was purposely vague to facilitate consensus.⁴⁸⁵ In effect, the rights granted to women under the Constitution did not guarantee women any substantive equality. The Constitution also failed to address the obstacles that would hinder women's full and equal participation in a liberal democracy. Subsequently, positive social rights were not included in the scope of the Constitution.⁴⁸⁶

The Constitution, thus, afforded Spanish women new citizenship rights and opportunities, which improved their overall standing in society. Yet, as Pamela Beth Radcliff states, "the emerging democratic discourse was full of contradictions and

⁴⁸³ Pamela Radcliff, "Imagining Female Citizenship in the 'New Spain': Gendering the Democratic Transition, 1975-1978," 499.

⁴⁸⁴ This mirrored the discourse of Spain's 2nd Republic (1931-1936) in which the extension of the suffrage to women was considered a necessary part of Spanish democracy.

⁴⁸⁵ Ruth Rubio-Marin, "Women and the Cost of the Transition to Democratic Constitutionalism in Spain", *International Sociology* 18(1) 2003, 240.

⁴⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 243.

conflicts between equality and difference-based frames of reference."⁴⁸⁷ Liberal models of citizenship prioritize the public sphere over the private sphere. Transition leaders advocating a liberal democratic project, replicated this distinction. Francoism had successfully quashed and contained the public sphere to state-sanctioned channels. Meanwhile, Franco had elevated the private sphere and the family unit as the foundational elements of the Francoist state. Transition leaders, on the other hand, dismissed the private sphere, and women's roles therein. Rights were granted to worker-citizens, leaders did not address the question of access to the work force. The majority of Spanish women at the time of the transition did not participate in the labour market, and thus according to this citizenship regime did not constitute productive citizens. Domestic roles were devalued, but women were still expected to carry out their domestic functions. The prioritization of the public sphere, meanwhile, excluded 'private issues', like domestic gender relations, from the Constitutional debate.

Reflecting elitist and party control of the Constitutional drafting process, the Constitution upheld political participation, but defined and encouraged parties as the main channel for this participation. By entrenching the political party as the sole vehicle for political activism, the Constitution rejected a more direct participatory version of democracy.⁴⁸⁸ By upholding the supremacy of the political party, the Constitution ignored the fact that men and women did not participate equally in political parties, and the obstacles faced by Spanish women across party lines and party ranks.⁴⁸⁹ Parties remained masculinized, hierarchical institutions. The majority of party members were

⁴⁸⁷ Radcliff, "Imagining Female Citizenship in the 'New Spain': Gendering the Democratic Transition, 1975-1978" 519.

⁴⁸⁸ Mass mobilizations that occurred during the Civil War were used as warnings of the dangers of mass mobilizations. Radcliff, "Imagining Female Citizenship in the New State," 508.

men, as were the majority of leaders setting party agendas. Meanwhile, grassroots and social movement activism, which offered greater opportunities for some women's participation,⁴⁹⁰ were not promoted. Transition leaders thus continued to endorse a more passive model of citizenship, which hindered the development of the women's movement. By reinforcing the political party, the Constitution compelled the (Castilian) women's movements to find allies within political parties.

One central, and contentious 'women's' issue that did arise during the transition process was abortion.⁴⁹¹ The Constitutional Committee did not directly address the abortion debate, even though PSOE and the PCE claimed to support abortion rights. Instead, these parties supported an early draft of the Constitution that affirmed, "Every person has the right to life." Since personhood was granted under the Criminal Code twenty-four hours after birth, the early wording of the Constitution left open the possibility of legalizing abortion. Representatives from the parties of the Right, however, united in their opposition to this wording and its possible implications on abortion law. Despite their formal support for legalized abortion, the PSOE backed down and accepted the article rewritten as "Everyone has the right to life." This wording appeased the conservatives, who took the generic term 'everyone' to include the unborn foetus,⁴⁹² and in doing so, put the abortion issue on hold for years to come.⁴⁹³ The women's movement, lacking a presence at the negotiations and the political of the Conservative right, had little

⁴⁸⁹ Celia Valiente. "An Overview of the State of Research On Women and Politics in Spain," *European Journal of Political Research* 33 (1998) 467.

⁴⁹⁰ This is not to say that grassroots activism did not pose its own obstacles, as evidenced by Portuguese women's experiences of People Power.

⁴⁹¹ The women's movement had been actively campaigning for the legalization of abortion with little success. Abortion cases continued to be tried.

⁴⁹² Martinez, "The Constitutional Consensus and the Basque Challenge" 65.

say in final wording. The voices of women, who faced the repercussions of this decision, were never heard.

This debate, thus, demonstrated both the centrality of the constitution drafting process and the closed opportunity structure that the women's movement faced at the centre-state during the transition. The content of the Constitution had a clear impact on women's lives, in this case, keeping Franco-era abortion restrictions in place for over a decade. Yet, women had very little say on the content of that Constitution. Conservative forces wielded significant influence over the drafting of the Constitution. Whilst they accepted women's political equality, they maintained Conservative gender beliefs and favoured the continuation of many aspects of the Francoist gender order (especially with regards to the family and reproduction). Women activists had to rely on the Parties of the Left to support their positions. Yet, formal Socialist and Communist party positions on women did not translate into real commitment to women's issues. They were willing to back down on their positions to meet political ends. In this case, the goal of legalizing abortion was sacrificed for the sake of political expediency and a 'consensus'.⁴⁹⁴ Women were not a priority.

The women's movement, excluded from the political process, could only critique the Constitution after it had been drafted. Once elites, however, had agreed upon a final draft, there was no opportunity for women to achieve changes. Public debate over the Constitution was limited prior to the Constitutional referendum, and no means existed for obtaining further amendments to the draft being presented. Thus, the women's movement

⁴⁹³ Long after democratization was complete, abortion remained illegal. Socialist support for abortion rights faded onto the party's backburner even after it had won a majority government. After the women movement's lengthy struggle, in 1996 it was finally legalized, but still under narrow conditions,

could only call for its entire acceptance or rejection in the forthcoming Constitutional referendum. Inevitably, the Constitution heightened existing tensions within the women's movement. Party feminists, for the most part, viewed the Constitution as progressive, especially compared to its Western European counterparts, and endorsed it prior to the referendum.⁴⁹⁵ Radical feminists, on the other hand, did not see the Constitution as progressive enough. They considered the contents of the Constitution to be insufficient to bring about substantive equality for women.⁴⁹⁶ Activists opposed to double militancy questioned the entrenchment of the political parties as the primary vehicles for political participation. Lastly, critics of the Constitution were concerned over the lack of guarantees for reproductive rights, including abortion.⁴⁹⁷ These feminists called for a rejection of the Constitution, which led to a vilification of these groups in the mainstream media and political realm. They were equated with the extremist Basque nationalists, who had also denounced the Constitution. The Constitution was widely approved in the referendum, marking the end of the transition. This approval highlighted the ideological distance between "feminists" and Spanish women.⁴⁹⁸ Radical demands were discredited, pushing some women towards party activism, but many others away from politics entirely.

Final Comparisons

The Spanish and the Portuguese transition processes demonstrate how contrasting modes of transition offer women's movements different political opportunities and

⁴⁹⁴ The secrecy of the Constitution-drafting process facilitated their change in position. Only after the process was complete, did the nature of proceedings come to light.

⁴⁹⁵ Folguera, "El Feminismo en España Hoy," 122.

⁴⁹⁶ Threlfall, "Gendering the transition to democracy" 36.

⁴⁹⁷ Concerns shown by critics of the Constitution were later shown to be justified, as in the case of abortion rights.

discourses for collective action. In Portugal, the Revolution and the rise of Popular Power created a window of opportunity for the women's movement. By breaking with the past authoritarian regime, the Revolution allowed for more radical demands and discourses. Women played key roles in the grassroots mobilization that emerged. However, the Counterrevolution and the decline of Popular Power soon closed the window of opportunity. The weak women's movement had been unable to mobilize extensive popular support or to play a leading role in the transition during this brief opening. Once the Revolution failed, and the People retreated home, the women's movement faced a weak, unstable political opportunity structure, with fewer opportunities. Nonetheless, the new democratic regime restructured the dominant gender regime, and the Constitution offered women formal political and economic equality. Unfortunately, the rights guaranteed by the Constitution were not implemented.

The Spanish transition through negotiation did not present women with a similar window of opportunity. Access to the transition negotiations was restricted to political elites, and women could only rely on indirect influence through political parties. Elites attempted to contain popular mobilization, and emphasized the need for moderation. In this context, many feminist demands were marginalized and women faced obstacles mobilizing popular support. The comparative strength of the Spanish women's movement, however, did allow party feminists to achieve some gains through political parties. The new Constitution, although narrower in scope than the Portuguese Constitution, established a public gender regime, in which women were granted formal political and economic equality. Yet, it too lacked the mechanisms to create substantive

⁴⁹⁸ Radical feminists failed to condemn an attempted coup in 1981, further marginalizing the movement. Astelarra, "The Transition to Democracy in Spain," 62.

equality. Moreover, the Constitution promoted a less participatory democracy, channeling activism through political parties. By contrast, the Catalan and Basque women's movements found opportunities to pursue their goals and to create more women-friendly gender regimes through their regional nationalist movements and through regional national parties. Regional nationalism offered women the possibility of a more egalitarian, participatory democracy.

The nature of the transition and the women's movements mutually impacted one another. In Spain and Portugal the repercussions of transition events shaped the consolidation phase and the functioning of democratic politics. Many of the women's issues that went unresolved over the course of the transition remained unresolved under the democratic political opportunity structures, as activists continued to encounter many of the obstacles they faced during the transition. The transition also impacted the development of the women's movements in Spain and Portugal. In both countries, the movements saw a decline in popular participation as the consolidation phase of democratization set in. The Spanish movement was still stronger than the Portuguese movement, but both were comparatively weak next to other Western European movements. Neither movement took a defining role in their respective political transitions. Their restricted place with the transitional processes exposed the barriers faced by both movements and indicated the difficulties they would face in the democratic state. The ideological tensions that arose during the transition period also revealed the internal weaknesses of the women's movements. Consequently, the relationship between the transition process and the women's movements in Spain and Portugal provides an important referent for understanding the post-transition women's movements and their

relationship to the democratic POS. As these cases show, the mode of transition and the discourse of democratization matter in the overall development and role of women's movements in democratic transitions. Yet, the character of the movements themselves and their capacity to respond to changing political circumstances are also key factors in determining women's ability to gender the transition.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Spain and Portugal experienced the longest-running Fascist regimes in Europe. While other Western European nations were liberated at the end of the Second World War, Portugal and Spain lingered under Fascist rule. Franco and Salazar stunted economic growth and imposed strict, highly conservative social orders on their countries. Unable to stem social and economic transformations, these regimes slowly began to collapse. By the mid-1970s, their breakdowns were complete and both Spain and Portugal had begun their transition to democracy. Despite the similarities of Fascist rule, they present two distinct paths to democratization: transition by transaction and transition by revolution. Their divergent paths to democracy translated into distinct experiences for the Spanish and Portuguese women's movements. The two transition modes presented women with contrasting political opportunity structures, actors and discourses, which then shaped their development and their relationship to the broader political context. The contrasting transition modes thus led Spanish and Portuguese women to adopt different strategies and forms of activism in their attempts to 'gender' the transitions.

These transitions, however, did not occur in political vacuums. The previous experiences of authoritarianism and authoritarian collapse affected the nature and course of the transition processes, including the mobilization of women's movements. In turn, the Spanish and Portuguese transitions shaped the consolidation of democracy, and continue to influence democratic politics today. Moreover, the women's movements have been shaped by their relationship to the transition processes, as well as by the long-term effects of these transitions on democratic politics and their new gender regimes. In this concluding chapter, I overview the previous chapters and draw some final

comparisons between the Spanish and Portuguese cases. I also address some broad implications of the transitions to democracy on the consolidation of democracy and their subsequent impact on the Spanish and Portuguese women's movements. Lastly, I assess how the Spanish and Portuguese transitions fit within the existing the existing feminist literature on democratization.

Women's Movements under Iberian Fascism

At the turn of 20th century, Spain and Portugal were predominantly Catholic, agrarian societies, with low levels of development and modernization. Despite the weakness of civil society overall, early women's movements were growing. Women activists and political leaders framed transformations to the existing gender order as elements of modernization. In Spain especially, women achieved new democratic rights under the Second Republic, and in Catalonia the Generalitat granted women social rights and greater gender equity. When the Fascist regimes came to power, they successfully squelched these early manifestations of the women's movement. Unlike other Fascist regimes, neither Franco nor Salazar relied on Fascist movements or populist support to reinforce their hold on power. Both distrusted the masses, and attempted to demobilize their populations through ideological rhetoric and through repression.

In Portugal, years of economic and political instability allowed Salazar to manoeuvre himself into power with little opposition. Widespread passive support for his dictatorship, and the general weakness of civil society, prevented the successful mobilization of an opposition movement. The existing women's movement was also too weak to mount an opposition to Salazar's regimes and policies. Through the police and paramilitary forces, Salazar suppressed any dissent to his rule. Once Salazar had

successfully positioned himself into power, his regime successfully suppressed the Portuguese people by keeping the majority in a state of illiterate, agrarian poverty. This imposed hardship catered to the economic elites and impeded the development of a civil opposition, thereby reinforcing Salazar's grip on power. Salazar also relied on the Catholic Church and his strict ideology of National Catholicism to demobilize the masses. The gender order underpinning National Catholicism upheld traditional gender roles. Entrenched in the Civil Code, the gender regime glorified women's maternal roles, and simultaneously rendered them inferior, placing them under male control. Feminism, like democracy and secularism, presented a threat to the hierarchical order of society and to the moral fibre of the family and the nation. By promoting the ideology of National Catholicism and physically relegating women to the domestic sphere, Salazar suppressed the development of the women's movement. Furthermore, any woman who challenged the regime or the dominant gender order, relinquished her moral superiority and thus became the target of state repression.

Prior to Franco, women's movements in Spain were comparatively stronger than their Portuguese counterparts. Higher levels of industrialization and literacy both facilitated the mobilization of women. Advances made under the 2nd Republic further promoted women's activism. These changes constituted a part of the ruling government's modernizing project. For the forces of the Right, they represented the forces of Anti-Spain, threatening the Spanish nation. United under Franco, the Right attempted to seize power, instigating the Civil War. The war actually prompted women's mobilization, as the war effort created new venues and opportunities for women's activism. Yet, once the Nationalist forces defeated the Republican front, Franco moved to consolidate power and

to eradicate the threat of anti-Spain. Reprisals against Republican supporters, including public executions, forced the opposition underground. The experiences of the war and the Post-war repression discouraged public dissent. Like Salazar, Franco distrusted popular activism, and sought to impose a state of general passivity. Similarly, Franco used coercive measures and the ideology of National Catholicism to contain the masses and control civil society. Post-war fatigue, and the economic devastation wrought by the three years of fighting, further discouraged any mass mobilization. Women returned home, and Franco's gender regime kept them there. Franco's fascist discourse presented feminism and women's equality as a threat to the moral fibre of the family and the Spanish nation.

Accordingly, under Fascist rule, Iberian women's movements faced a closed opportunity structure. Access to the state was restricted to a political elite, and they lacked allies among elite power-holders to promote their goals. Outside of formal state structures, women also lacked important resources, spaces and mobilizing structures necessary to mobilize. The Fascist gender ideology further limited the collective action frames available to women that did mobilize. Women could not draw on their maternal roles to make claims. Once women stepped into the public sphere, they relinquished their moral advantage. By taking a public stance, women would be challenging their private, proper place in society, and by extension, the gendered, ideological foundations of the regime. Apolitical activism also undermined the generalized apathy Franco and Salazar imposed on society. Accordingly, neither regime dismissed women's 'apolitical' activism, nor were they averse to targeting women who challenged gender boundaries. As

a result of this political context, women's movements did not survive the decades of authoritarian rule.

Women's Movements During the Breakdown of Authoritarianism

By the 1960s and 1970s, the social and economic stasis imposed by Franco and Salazar, was no longer feasible. Development could not be curtailed indefinitely. Macro-structural changes began to undermine the existing political opportunity structures in Spain and Portugal. As tensions arose among ruling elites over the future of the regime, and as opposition movements began to reorganize, both regimes began to breakdown. Unable to contain Western influences, the regimes also saw the demise of their ideological strongholds on society. The instability of the existing opportunity structures, the rise of the opposition movements and the broader socio-economic transformations characterizing this stage created new spaces for women's activism. The collapse of authoritarianism thus allowed for the resurgence of women's movements in Spain and Portugal. Nevertheless, over the course of the breakdown, women in Spain faced a political context that facilitated women's organizing to a greater extent than in Portugal.

In Spain, ruling elites divided over the pace and extent of Spain's economic development. Pro-modernizers eventually won out, opening up the Spanish markets and setting Spain on the course of rapid development. Pro-modernizers also sought closer ties to Western Europe, creating new elite conflicts over the liberalization of the state. Elites fluctuated between loosening state controls, and cracking down on civil society. Internal divisions, as well as the rise of the opposition forces, destabilized the fascist political opportunity structure and opened the way for democratization. The victory of pro-modernizing elites and their policies of socio-economic development facilitated the rise

of the women's movement by instigating a round of restructuring from a private gender regime to a more public regime.⁴⁹⁹ The market economy demanded greater levels of women's employment, and technocratic elites facilitated this process by loosening legislation curtailing women's public activities. Women were no longer relegated to the home; instead they began participating in the formal labour force and attending university. The workplace and university campuses offered women valuable mobilizing structures. These structures, along with the periods of liberalization, facilitated the rise of the broad opposition forces, in which women increasingly participated. Participation in other opposition movements led women to self-organize around gender issues not addressed by the male-dominated opposition. Furthermore, the ideology of True Catholic womanhood lost its relevance, opening the discursive space available to women. The women's movements in the Basque Country and Catalonia, in particular, found key allies in their regional nationalist movements. Moreover, women played central roles in the nationalist movements. During the breakdown of authoritarianism, the women's movements in Spain had clearly begun to organize.

By contrast, women in Portugal saw fewer spaces open up during the breakdown phase of democratization. Although internal divisions over modernization did exist, Salazar and Caetano hesitated to implement socio-economic development. Lower levels of development resulted in fewer mobilizing structures available to women in the form of the workplace and the universities. The Portuguese opposition was generally less developed than in Spain. As such, the women's movement lacked the same launching pad for women's organizing. Moreover, the Colonial Wars posed new obstacles for women's

⁴⁹⁹ Walby, "From gendered welfare state to gender regimes: National differences, convergence or restructuring?"

activism. The wars curtailed investment in socio-economic development. Additionally, as thousands of young men were drafted (or fled the draft) increasing numbers of women were left with the double burden of work and family. Given that Portugal continued to be a predominantly agrarian society, many women were left isolated on rural farms and villages. In a hyper-masculinized society, consumed by war, there was little ideological space available to the demands of the women's movement. Although women lacked the same political opportunities to mobilize as their Spanish counterparts, a women's movement did emerge. Nevertheless, it played a limited role in the overall breakdown.

Women's Movements during the Democratic Transition

The Spanish and the Portuguese transition processes exemplify two contrasting transition models. The Portuguese Revolution razed the existing political opportunity structures, and resulted in a new, fluid and unstable political environment. The Portuguese transition also opened up political discourse to new and radical positions. In this climate, a window of opportunity opened up for women's activism. The Revolution opened up new political spaces and offered the possibility of an entirely new form of politics based in Popular Power. Yet, women also faced gendered obstacles. In the early phases of the Revolution, male political actors, especially the Movement of the Armed Forces, largely dismissed the women's movement. The women's movement was also too weak to successfully stake a place in the early transition process. The women's movement was unable to channel widespread popular support, or to unite localized women's groups under the movement wing. Instead, women's activism centred on meeting women's immediate needs, and did not connect demands for housing, sanitation and childcare to women's overall position in society. Just as the movement began to

organize itself and to adapt to the changing socio-political circumstances, Popular Power waned and political parties began to dominate the political process. A Counterrevolution challenged the Left's political control, and its ambitions for the creation of a socialist state. Forces on both sides moved towards extremes.⁵⁰⁰ The result of the upheaval was an incomplete Revolution, and the patching together of unstable new democratic regime. In this context, women's issues were not prioritized, and women were excluded from the Constitution-drafting process. Having lost the opportunity to achieve their goals, and to dislodge the existing gender order, the women's movement saw the establishment of a democratic regime that did not sufficiently address many of its demands. The new Constitution and Civil Code granted women formal equality but did not address women's lack of substantive equality. Furthermore, as a last minute compromise, the Constitution lacked the support and political will necessary for to be implemented.

By contrast, the Spanish women's movements experienced a highly structured, negotiated transition. Elites sought to contain any revolutionary tendencies by tightly controlling the democratization process. Leaders emphasized the importance of moderation and consensus to prevent another authoritarian backlash and possible civil war. Under these conditions, the transition did not give way to a similar window of opportunity for the Spanish women's movement. The transitional political opportunity structure remained closed, with few channels of access available to the women's movement. Transition leaders attempted to curtail popular activism, and to retain elite control over the terms of the transition. Despite the importance of opposition movements in keeping democratization on track, they did not set the terms of democratization.

⁵⁰⁰ Kenneth Maxwell, "The Emergence of Portuguese Democracy" in *From Dictatorship to Democracy* Ed. John Herz (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1982) 243.

Instead, many Opposition leaders and parties opted to work within the transition framework set by ruling elites, accepting calls for moderation. The elitist nature of the transition allowed political parties to control the transition, and to narrowly define the role of civil society in the political sphere. In this context, the central women's movement was restricted to indirect influence on the transition negotiations. Double militancy feminists, in particular, pursued their goals through political parties. Parties such as PSOE and PCE incorporated many of women's demands into their agendas, but set these issues aside in favour of other priorities. The discourse of consensus further hindered attempts to push women's issues, viewed as contentious by Right. The Basque and Catalan women's movements, however, were closely tied to their nationalist movements. Nationalism continued to provide the movements with key allies and channels for women's activism. Although women in Spain faced fewer opportunities, the Spanish movements were comparatively much better organized than the Portuguese movement. Consequently they were able to garner wider support and to raise more awareness of women's issues. Women were excluded from the Constitution drafting-process. Nonetheless, the Constitution established a new public gender regime, in line with those of Western European countries. The Constitution thus established women's political and economic formal equality, but narrowly defined citizenship rights. Moreover, contentious women's issues went unresolved.

Implications of the Transition Phase

Once Spain and Portugal ratified their democratic constitutions, their democratic transitions gave way to consolidation. At this stage of democratization, the formal rules of the democratic game are set. Formal democratic structures and processes are

established; thus, the democratic political opportunity structure gains a degree of permanence. Along with formal institutions, the discursive and normative features of democracy become entrenched. During the consolidation phase, democracy becomes politics as usual, and opportunities available to women's movements during the transition contract.⁵⁰¹ Instead, women's movements must learn the rules of the democratic game, and how to manoeuvre within the new socio-political terrain.⁵⁰² Women must devise new strategies and positions so as to access and to impact the new democratic structures. In turn, democratic consolidation and the nature of the democratic game shape women's activism.⁵⁰³ The dynamics of consolidation, however, are conditioned by the transition phase. Therefore, insofar as transition processes inform the consolidation of democracy, they also influence the democratic terrain in which women's movements manoeuvre. I identify how Spain and Portugal's modes of transition shaped their POS's and the functioning of their democratic politics. Moreover, I assess how the transition phases had a lasting impact on women's movements in both countries. The short-term opportunities of the Portuguese transition gave way to long-term obstacles for the Portuguese women's movement, whereas the Spanish movement encountered a friendlier POS during the consolidation of democracy.

In Portugal, the consolidation phase of democratization demonstrated the failure of the Revolution of the Carnations. During the transition phase, both the Left and Right lacked the support of the majority of the population necessary to impose their vision of democracy. Rather than moderating their demands, however, groups on either side of the

⁵⁰¹ Friedman, *Unfinished Transitions* 114.

⁵⁰² Molyneux, *Women's Movements in International Perspective* 193; Craske and Molyneux, "The Local, the Regional and the Global: Transforming the Politics of Rights" 7.

spectrum moved towards more extreme positions. The Constitution that was adopted attempted to appease forces on the Left and the Right, especially the revolutionary leaders of the MFA. The new Constitution established a social democracy in Portugal, yet weakened the state's capacity to implement this democracy. A semi-presidential system was established which divided power between the President, the Council of the Revolution and National Assembly.⁵⁰⁴ The Council and the President were intended to act as safeguards of the Revolution, and they possessed veto power over Parliamentary legislation. As such, the division of powers within the Constitution paved the way for democratic deadlock. The Revolution and Counterrevolution had deeply divided the Portuguese populace, and the result was a series of minority governments.⁵⁰⁵ The extremism of the Revolutionary period also manifested itself during the consolidation phase; policymaking was obstructed since parties remained unwilling to cooperate.⁵⁰⁶ State apparatus were paralysed. Consequently, the social democracy guaranteed by the Constitution existed only paper. Politicians lacked the political will and the capacity to implement a socialist state. Instead, they focused on reviving Portugal's economy, increasingly turning towards the free Market.⁵⁰⁷ Once the ban on Constitutional revisions expired, Constitutional amendments also became frequent. The socialist dimension of the

⁵⁰³ Georgina Waylen, "Gender and Democratic Politics: A Comparative Analysis of Consolidation in Argentina and Chile," *Journal of Latin American Studies* (32) 765.

⁵⁰⁴ The Constitution guaranteed a minimal five-year term for the Council of the Revolution, and the appointment of a military president, by prohibiting Constitutional revisions during the first five years of the new democracy.

⁵⁰⁵ The first majority government came a decade after democratization, in 1987, under Cavaco Silva and the centre-right PSD.

⁵⁰⁶ The Socialist and Communist party, in particular, were unwilling to cooperate. Maxwell, "The Emergence of Portuguese Democracy" 243.

⁵⁰⁷ Boaventura calls this process the construction of a parallel state, "a constitutional state busily constructing a modern democratic capitalist society under a constitution that pointed toward a classless socialist society." Boaventura de Sousa Santos. "State and Society in Portugal," in *After the Revolution: twenty years of Portuguese literature, 1974-1994*. Eds. Helena Kaufman and Anna Klobucka (Lewisburg PA: Bucknell University Press, 1997) 46.

Constitution was steadily removed, and social rights eroded. The far-reaching Constitution became a hollow document, rather than a source of revolutionary change.

In this unstable political context, few opportunities were available to the women's movement. The women's movement had to adapt to institutionalized politics, and learn the rules of the democratic game. However, institutions in Portugal were incapacitated and democracy scarcely functioned. Weak state structures meant that women could not rely on institutional allies to pursue their goals. Effective political channels were virtually nonexistent across state structures, such that achieving substantive changes through state policies was near impossible. Nor were these male-dominated structures very gender friendly. Additionally, due to the weakness of the economy, the demands of the women's movement remained marginal. Furthermore, given the slow rejection of the Revolution, the women's movement could not rely on claims based in the revolutionary discourse to achieve change. The rhetoric of social democracy, and the entrenchment of social rights, did not lead to the implementation of a welfare state that guaranteed those rights.⁵⁰⁸

The new Constitution afforded women equality in the new social democracy. As feminist scholars have noted, changes to the Constitution or legal code are insufficient to result in the practical implementation of those changes. Having been given rights from above, women did not have to struggle for legal recognition. Without this previous struggle, the women's movement lacked a wide support-base, and mobilizing women remained a difficult task.⁵⁰⁹ After formal equality was granted, many women did not see the need to organize further around gender issues. Moreover, "formal equality ha[d] the effect of demobilizing women because it designate[d] no institution to which demands

⁵⁰⁸ Santos, "State and Society in Portugal"; Ferreira "Engendering Portugal: Social Change, State Politics, and Women's Social Mobilization".

could be addressed.”⁵¹⁰ Also, the Revolution had raised popular expectations of democracy, which were defeated by the Counter-Revolution. Once disenchantment with the failed Revolution set in, collective action frames that drew on socialism and Popular Power lost their resonance and mobilizing potential in society at large. In the post-revolutionary phase, women retreated to the home. Subsequently, grassroots activism also declined during the consolidation of democracy. In the new democratic context, the Portuguese women’s movement faced fewer structural and discursive opportunities. Democratic consolidation resulted in new obstacles for the Portuguese women’s movement; consolidation, however, opened new opportunities for Spanish women’s activism.

Whereas Portuguese democratic politics faced over a decade of uncertainty, the Spanish consolidation period was markedly stable. Elite pacts, including the Constitutional drafting process enabled party leaders to craft stronger institutions. The moderate discourse of democracy appeased Francoist supporters, and led both the Left and the Right-wing parties to move their platforms towards the centre. During the transition, the Socialist Party successfully positioned itself as a centrist, pragmatic party. The consolidation phase was subsequently marked by the rise of the Socialist Party. The PSOE served as a valuable ally for the Spanish women’s movement.⁵¹¹ The elitist, highly centralized nature of the transition process required the women’s movements to adapt to institutionalized politics. The Constitution drafting process, in particular, obliged women to devise new strategies, leading double-militancy activists to turn to party politics.

⁵⁰⁹ Ferreira, “Women in Portugal – Situations and Paradoxes.”

⁵¹⁰ Ferreira, “Engendering Portugal” 180.

⁵¹¹ By contrast, the Portuguese Socialist Party could neither form a majority government nor achieve its agenda; consequently it was an ineffective ally in the promotion of women’s rights.

Although women's issues were not a priority in the party, the PSOE and its leader Felipe Gonzalez were friendlier to the women's demands. As a result of inroads made by party feminists, the first Socialist majority government established the *Instituto de la Mujer* (the Women's Institute) to promote the status of women. Both the PSOE and the *Instituto* presented women with key points of access to the POS.

The Constitutional drafting process further paved the way for the decentralization of the Spanish State, and more diffuse political opportunity structures. The Statute of the Autonomies allowed regional governments to obtain greater autonomy. The regional governments in Catalonia and the Basque country offered the Catalan and Basque women's movements important spaces for women's political activism. Regional parties constituted potential allies to the regional women's movements, and regional nationalism offered them key discursive opportunities. Moreover, decentralization of the state and the establishment of regional governments, offered women's groups across Spain new points of access to the state.

Despite the opportunities created during the consolidation phase, activists encountered many of the same obstacles they faced during the transition. Firstly, the discourse of moderation remained dominant. Radical, divisive positions were politically and socially marginalized, including feminism. The negative connotations of feminism limited the collective action frames available to women's groups, and hampered attempts to mobilize support. The discourse of moderation de-legitimized radical demands, and many women's issues that were not addressed by transition leaders remained unresolved under the democratic government. Meanwhile, as feminist critics of the Constitution

originally warned, Constitutional reforms have not taken place.⁵¹² Political elites have hesitated to engage in a Constitutional debate, and to raise divisive conflicts. Consequently, a narrow, liberal democratic model of citizenship remains in place. Moreover, like Portugal, the equal rights granted by the Constitution did not translate to the practical implementation of gender equality.

The elite-driven, negotiated Spanish transition helped prepare women activists for the return to conventional politics. The Spanish transition to democracy, however, discouraged widespread popular mobilization. During the consolidation of democracy, the continued emphasis on party politics and institutional channels of activism entrenched a passive model of citizenship and hindered the development of civil society.⁵¹³ *Desencanto*, disillusionment, with democracy slowly set in, as the masses remained disconnected from democratic politics.⁵¹⁴ Politics as usual discouraged collective action; activists found it difficult to sustain or mobilize new support. Rather, a sharp decline in women's activism took place, as women returned home. Having been unable to establish a wide base of support during the transition period, the women's movement remained small.⁵¹⁵ Although stronger than the Portuguese women's movement, the Spanish women's movement was comparatively weaker than Western European movements.

Spain and Portugal's paths to democracy shaped the consolidation and the functioning of democratic politics. By extension, transition events also influenced the development of the Spanish and Portuguese women's movements. In Portugal, the

⁵¹² Gonzalez, *El feminismo en España*, Hoy, 13.

⁵¹³ Again, these experiences did not apply to Catalonia and the Basque Country, as leaders promoted active citizenship.

⁵¹⁴ Raymond Carr, "Introduction. The Spanish Transition to Democracy," in *Spain in the 1980s*. Eds. Robert P. Clark and Michael Haltzel (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing, 1987) 6.

⁵¹⁵ Duran and Gallego, "The women's movement in Spain," 205.

instability of the new democratic regime and the overall weakness of state institutions resulted in a political environment that offered the women's movement few opportunities to push its agenda through institutional mechanisms. Women's issues were generally disregarded as parties attempted to resolve more pressing matters. In Spain, women's movements' experiences during the transition had provided an important source of learning. Women had already made strategic choices about institutional politics, and double militancy feminists had achieved inroads within the political parties. Greater opportunities within Spain's new political opportunity structure encouraged continued focus on institutional politics. Nevertheless, women's movements in both Spain and Portugal faced organizational challenges that derived from the transition period. Neither movement took a defining role in their respective political transitions. Their restricted place within the transitional POS exposed gender barriers that they would continue to face under the democratic structures. Furthermore, low levels of mobilization during the transition could not be overcome by the women's movements during the consolidation phase. Consequently, the relationship between women's movements and the transition process provides an important referent for understanding the development of the post-transitional movements, and their relationship to the democratic political opportunity structures.

Theorizing the Spanish and Portuguese Women's Movements

Feminist literature on women and democracy provided me with valuable conceptual tools with which to theorize the relationship between the Spanish and Portuguese women's movements and democratization. Feminist scholars have identified central themes and issues faced by women's movements in various contexts. Yet,

feminist literature has also highlighted the diversity of women's experiences and the importance of context. Isolated by years of Fascism, semi-peripheral Spain and Portugal were caught between Western Europe and the developing world. Existing scholarship on democratization, whether examining Latin America, Eastern Europe or Post-Colonial states, has not fully addressed Spanish and Portuguese women's transitional experiences. My comparison of the Spanish and Portuguese women's movements addresses this gap, locating their experiences within a broader feminist framework.

My examination of democratization in Spain and Portugal uncovers the distinct features of Iberian women's experiences. I have shown the lasting, demobilizing effects of Iberian fascism on both the Spanish and Portuguese women's movements. Fascism both suppressed the early women's movements, it also limited women's role in the pro-democratic Opposition. I have also demonstrated the importance of the mode of transition on women's organizing. For Portuguese women, the transition by Revolution created a window of opportunity for women's activism. This opportunity was not available to Spanish women who experienced a transition by transaction. However, the *ruptura-pactada* led the women's movement to adapt to institutionalized politics early on, and prepared them for democratic politics. The Spanish case demonstrates how the experiences of mainstream women's movements are not the same as those of minority nationalist women's movements. Moreover, the experiences of the Basque and Catalan women's movements illustrate how minority nationalisms can provide important structural and discursive opportunities to movements.

The transitions to democracy in Spain and Portugal affirm the insufficiency of political democratization. Despite offering women new rights, neither transition

sufficiently transformed the gender regime to offer women first class citizenship. Gender relations have yet to be democratized. The women's movements in Spain and Portugal continue the struggle to create women-friendlier democracies.

Glossary of Foreign Names and Abbreviations

CCF: Comissão para a Condição Feminina (Commission for the Status of Women)

CDS: Centro Democrático Social (Democratic Social Centre Party)

COPCON: Comando Operacional do Continente (Continental Operations Command)

GNR: Guarda Nacional Republicana (Republican National Guard)

LAMAR: Antiauthoritarian Struggle of Antipatriarchal and Revolutionary Women

MDM: Movimento Democrático de Mujeres (Democratic Women's Movement)

MDM: Movimento Democrático de Mulheres (Democratic Women's Movement)

MUD: Movimento Unido Democrático (United Democratic Movement)

MFA: Movimento das Forças Armadas (Movement of the Armed Forces)

MLM: Movimento de Libertação das Mulheres (Women's Liberation Movement)

PCE: Partido Comunista de España (Spanish Communist Party)

PCP: Partido Comunista Português (Portuguese Communist Party)

PIDE: Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (International and State Defense Police)

PPD: Partido Popular Democrático (People's Democratic Party)

PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party)

SF: Sección Feminina (Women's Section of the Falange)

UCD: Unión de Centro Democrático (Democratic Center Union)

Bibliography

- Ackelsberg, Martha A. *Free Women of Spain. Anarchism and the Struggle for the Emancipation of Women*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991.
- Aguilar, Paloma and Humlebaek, Carsten. "Collective Memory and National Identity in the Spanish Democracy: The Legacies of Francoism and the Civil War." *History & Memory* 14(1-2) (2002): 121-164.
- Alexander, Gerard. *The Sources of Democratic Consolidation*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.
- Alexander, Gerard. "Women and Men at the Ballot Box: Voting in Spain's Two Democracies," in *Constructing Spanish Womanhood: Female Identity in Modern Spain*. Eds. Victoria Lorée Enders and Pamela Beth Radcliff. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999.
- Al-Ali, Nadjé S. "Gender and Civil Society in the Middle East." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 5(2) (2003): 216-232.
- Alvarez, Sonia. "Advocating Feminism: The Latin American Feminist NGO 'Boom'." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 1(2) (September 1999): 181-209.
- Alvarez, Sonia. "Contradictions of a "Women's Space" in a Male Dominant State: The Political Role of the Commissions on the Status of Women in Postauthoritarian Brazil" in *Women, International Development, and Politics: The Bureaucratic Mire*. Ed. Kathleen Staudt. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990.
- Alvarez, Sonia. *Engendering Democracy in Brazil: Women's Movements in Transition Politics*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.
- Annot, Madeleine et al. "Changing Femininity, Changing Concepts of Citizenship in Public and Private Spheres." *European Journal of Women's Studies* 7 (2000): 149-168.
- Astelarra, Judith. "The Transition to Democracy in Spain," in *Women and Counter-Power*. Ed. Yolande Cohen. Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1989.
- Astelarra, Judith. "Women, Political Culture, and Empowerment in Spain," in *Women Transforming Politics: Worldwide Strategies for Empowerment*. Ed. Jill M. Bystydzienski. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.
- Astelarra, Judith. "Spanish Feminism: Historical Perspectives." *Canadian Woman Studies* 6(1) (1985): 72.
- Astrain, Luiz Núñez. *The Basques: their struggle for independence*. Wales: Welsh Academic Press, 1997.

Baker, Gideon. *Civil Society and Democratic Theory: Alternative Voices*. London: Routledge, 2002.

Banaszak. Lee Ann and Plutzer, Eric. "The Social Bases of Feminism in the European Community." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 57(1) (Spring 1993): 29-53.

Barbosa, Madelena. "Women in Portugal." *Women's Studies International Quarterly* 4(4) (1981): 477-480.

Bayes, Jane H., Hawkesworth, Mary E. and Kelly, Rita Mae. "Gender, Globalization and Gender Regimes," in *Gender Globalization and Democratization*. Eds. Rita Mae Kelly, Jane H. Bayes and Mary Hawkesworth. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001.

Beckwith, Karen. "Beyond Compare? Women's movements in Comparative Perspective." *European Journal of Political Research* 37 (2000): 431-468.

Bell, David, S., Ed. *Democratic Politics in Spain: Spanish Politics after Franco*. London: Frances Pinter, 1983.

Belo, Maria. "A Hero of Portuguese Women," in *Femmes et contre - pouvoirs (Women and counter-power)* Ed. Yolande Cohen. Montréal: Black Rose Books, 1989.

Benford, Robert D. and Snow, David A. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment." *American Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 611-639.

Bermeo, Nancy and Nord, Philip, Eds. *Civil Society Before Democracy: Lessons from 19th Century Europe*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000.

Bermeo, Nancy. "Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict During Democratic Transitions," in *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 29, No. 3, Transitions to Democracy: A Special Issue in Memory of Dankwart A. Rustow (Apr., 1997).

Berntzen, Einar. "Democratic Socialism in Spain, Portugal and Greece," in *Social Democracy in Transition: Northern, Southern and Eastern Europe*. Eds. Lauri Karvonen, Lauri and Jan Sundberg. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1991.

Bruneau, Thomas C. and Macleod, Alex. *Politics in Contemporary Portugal*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986.

Brush, Lisa D. *Gender and Governance*. Lanham: Altamira Press, 2003.

Buechler, Steven M. *Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Cabral, Manuel Villaverde. "O 25 de Abril em Retrospectiva," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Portuguese Edition, April 2004.

Canadell, Rosa M. and Uggén, John F. "Chilean Women's Organizations: Their Potential for Change." *Latin American Perspectives* 20(4) (Autumn 1993): 43-60.

Carbayo-Abengozar, Mercedes. "Shaping Women: National Identity Through the Use of Language in Franco's Spain." *Nations and Nationalism* 7(1) (2001): 75-92.

Carey, John M. "Institutional Design and Party Systems," in *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies Themes and Perspectives*. Eds. Larry Diamond et al. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1997.

Carr, Raymond. "Introduction. The Spanish Transition to Democracy," in *Spain in the 1980s*. Eds. Robert P. Clark and Michael Haltzel. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing, 1987.

Carr, Raymond and Aizpurua, Juan Pablo Fusi. *Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy*. London: George Allan & Unwin, 1979.

Catt, Helena. *Democracy in Practice*. London: Routledge, 1999.

Cesarini, Paola and Hite, Katherine. "Introducing the Concept of Authoritarian Legacies" in *Authoritarian Legacies and Democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe*. Eds. Katherine Hite and Paola Cesarini. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004.

Chappell, Louise A. *Gendering Government: Feminist Engagement with the State in Australia and Canada*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002.

Chappell, Louise. "Interacting with the State." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 2 (2) (2000): 248.

Chinchilla, Norma Stoltz. "Marxism, Feminism, and The Struggle for Democracy in Latin America." *Gender and Society* 5(3) (Sept. 1991): 291-310.

Chowdhury, Najima and Nelson, Barbara J. "Redefining Politics: Patterns of Women's Political Engagement from a Global Perspective," in *Women and Politics Worldwide*. Eds. Barbara J. Nelson and Najma Chowdhury. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.

Coelho, Encarnação and Cabral, Marília Vilaverde. "Trabalho da Mulher, Condições de Vida, Condições de Trabalho e Desigualdade de Tratamento," in *3º Congresso da Oposição Democrática, Aveiro, 4 a 8 de abril 1973*. Lisboa: Seara Nova, 1973.

Cohen, Annie. "Un Mois Au Portugal." *Les Temps Modernes* (Oct. 1974): 133-139.

Collier, Ruth Berins and Mahoney, James. "Adding Collective Actors to Collective Outcomes: Labor and Recent Democratizations in South America and Southern Europe," in *Transitions to Democracy*. Ed. Lisa Anderson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.

Collier, Ruth Berins. *Paths Toward Democracy: the Working Class in Western Europe and South America*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Connell, R.W. "The State, Gender and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal," in *Power/Gender: Social Relations in Theory and Practice*. Eds. H. Lorraine Radtke and Henderikus J. Stam. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1994.

Correia, Ramiro, Soldado, Pedro and Marujo, João. *MFA Dinamização Cultural Accção Cívica*. Amadora: Ulmeiro, 1976.

Costain, Anne N. "Representing Women: The Transition from Social Movement to Interest Group." *The Western Political Quarterly* 34(1) (Mar 1981): 100-113.

Cova, Anne and Pinto, António Costa. "O Salazarismo e as Mulheres." *Pénélope* 17 (1997): 71-94.

Coverdale, John F. *The Political Transformation of Spain after Franco*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979.

Craske, Nikki. "Remasculinisation and the Neoliberal State in Latin America," *Gender, Politics and the State*. London: Routledge, 1998.

Craske, Nikki and Molyneux, Maxine, Eds. *Gender and the Politics of Rights and Democracy in Latin America*. New York: Palgrave, 2002.

Craske, Nikki and Molyneux, Maxine. "The Local, the Regional and the Global: Transforming the Politics of Rights," in *Gender and the Politics of Rights and Democracy in Latin America*. Eds. Nikki Craske and Maxine Molyneux. New York: Palgrave, 2002.

Crespo, Pilar Folguera. "El Franquismo. El Retorno a la Esfera Privada (1939-1975)" in *Historia de las mujeres en España*. Eds. E. Garrido et al. Madrid: Sintesis, 1997.

Crespo, Pilar Folguera. "El Siglo XX," in *Las Mujeres de Madrid Como Agentes de Cambio Social*. Ed. Margarita Ortega López. Madrid: Instituto Universitario de Estudios de la Mujer, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 1995.

Crossley, Nick. *Making Sense of Social Movements*. Buckingham: Open University Press, 2002.

Dandavati, Annie G. *The Women's Movement and the Transition to Democracy in Chile*. New York: Piet Lang, 1996.

D'Arthuys, Bearice. *As Mulheres e o 25 de Abril*. Porto: Afrontamento, 1976.

Dahl, Robert. *After the Revolution: Authority in a Good Society*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.

de Figueiredo, Antonio. *Portugal: Fifty Years of Dictatorship*. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1975.

de Lucena. Manuel. "The Evolution of Portuguese Corporatism under Salazar and Caetano," in *Contemporary Portugal: The Revolution and Its Antecedents*. Eds. Lawrence C. Graham and Harry M. Makler. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979.

de Sousa, Maria Manuel Stocker and Dominguez, Maria Cristina Perez. *Women in Portugal Supplement No. 11 to Women of Europe*. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 1982.

Del Valle, Teresa. "Basque Ethnic Identity at a Time of Rapid Change," in *Iberian Identity: Essays on the Nature of Identity in Portugal and Spain*. Eds. Richard Herr & John H. R. Polt. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1987.

Delphy, Christine. "The European Union and the Feminist Challenge," in *Sexual Politics and the European Union: The New Feminist Challenge*. Ed. R. Amy Elman. Providence RI: Berghahn Books, 1996.

Diamandouros, P. Nikiforos, and Gunther, Richard, Eds. *Parties, Politics, and Democracy in the New Southern Europe*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2001.

Diamantino P. Machado. *The Structure of Portuguese Society*. New York: Praeger, 1991.

Diamond, Larry et al, Eds. *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies Themes and Perspectives*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1997.

Dobrowolsky, Alexandra. "Women, Constitutionalism and Contestation: Some Tentative Conclusions" in *Women Making Constitutions* Ed. Alexandra Dobrowolsky. New York. N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

Downs, Charles. *Revolution at the Grassroots: Community Organizations in the Portuguese Revolution*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989.

Duerst-Lahti, Georgia. "The Government's Role in Building the Women's Movement." *Political Science Quarterly*, 104(2) (Summer 1989): 249-268.

Dulphy, Anne and Leonard, Yves, Eds. *De la dictature à la démocratie: Voies Ibériques*. Bruxelles: P.I.E- Peter Lang, 2003.

Duran M.A & Gallego M.T. "The Women's Movement in Spain and the New Spanish Democracy" in *The New Women's Movement*, Ed. Drude Dahlerup. London: Sage Modern Publications, 1986.

Echeverría, Begoña. "Privileging Masculinity in the Social Construction of Basque Identity." *Nations and Nationalism* 7(3) (2001): 339-363.

Einhorn, Barbara and Sever, Charlotte. "Gender and Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 5(2) (July 2003): 163-190.

Einwohner, Rachel L., Hollander, Jocelyn A., and Olson, Toska. "Engendering Social Movements: Cultural Images and Movement Dynamics." *Gender and Society* 14(5) (October 2000): 679-699.

Elliott, Carolyn M. Ed. *Civil Society and Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Ellwood, Sheelagh M. *Spanish Fascism in the Franco Era*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987.

Encarnación, Omar G. *The Myth of Civil Society: Social Capital and Democratic Consolidation in Spain and Brazil*. New York: Palgrave, 2003.

Enders, Victoria Lorée and Radcliff, Pamela Beth. "General Introduction: Contesting Identities/ Contesting Categories," in *Constructing Spanish Womanhood: Female Identity in Modern Spain*. Eds. Victoria Lorée Enders & Pamela Beth Radcliff. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999.

Enloe, Cynthia. *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives*. Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 2000.

Ergas, Yasmine. "1968-1979. Feminism and the Italian Party System: Women's Politics in a Decade of Turmoil." *Comparative Politics* 14(3) (April 1982): 253-279.

Eschle, Catherine. "Engendering Global Democracy." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 4(3) (December 2002): 315-341.

Esteves, João. "A Liga Republicana das Mulheres Portuguesas. Uma organização política e feminista". CIDM: Lisboa, 1991. <<http://clio.revues.org/document248.html>>

Ethier, Diane, Ed. *Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia*. London: Macmillan Press, 1990.

Ethier, Diane. "Processes of Transition and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical Indicators," in *Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia*. London: Macmillan Press, 1990.

Feijoo, Maria del Carmen. "Democratic Participation and Women in Argentina" in *Women and Democracy*. Eds. Jane S. Jaquette and Sharon L. Wolchik. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.

Ferree, Myra Marx and Merrill, David A. "Hot Movements, Cold Cognition: Thinking About Social Movements in Gendered Frames." *Contemporary Sociology* 29(3) (May 2000): 454-462.

Ferreira, Ana Paula. "Home Bound: The Construct of Femininity in the Estado Novo." *Portuguese Studies* 12 (1996): 133-144.

Ferreira, Ana Paula. "Para Uma História-Mulher: Ora-Esguarde, de Olga Gonçalves." *Luso-Brazilian Review* 26(2) (1989): 11-23.

Ferreira, Hugo Gil and Marshall, Michael W. *Portugal's Revolution: Ten Years On*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Ferreira, Virginia. "Engendering Portugal: Social Change, State Politics and Women's Mobilization," in *Modern Portugal*. Ed. A. Costa Pinto. Palo Alto: Sposs, 1998.

Ferreira, Virginia. "Women in Portugal – Situation and Paradoxes" *Babel*. <<http://www.lxxl.pt/babel/biblioteca/women.html>>

Fields, Rona M. *The Portuguese Revolution and the Armed Forces Movement*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976.

Folguera, Pilar, Ed. *El Feminismo En España: Dos Siglos de Historia*. Madrid: Editorial Pablo Iglesias, 1988.

Foweraker, Joseph M. "The Role of Labor Organizations in the Transition to Democracy in Spain," in *Spain in the 1980s*. Eds. Robert P. Clark and Michael Haltzel. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing, 1987.

Franceschet, Susan. "Explaining Social Movement Outcomes, Collective Action Frames and Strategic Choices in First- and Second-Wave Feminism in Chile." *Comparative Political Studies* 37(5) (June 2004): 499-530.

Franceschet, Susan. "Gender and Citizenship: Democratization and Women's Politics in Chile." PhD Dissertation. Carleton University, 2001.

Franceschet, Susan. "State Feminism and Women's Movements: The Impact of Chile's Servicio Nacional de la Mujer on Women's Activism." *Latin American Research Review* 38(1) (February 2003): 9-40.

Franceschet, Susan. "Women in Politics in Post-Transitional Democracies: The Chilean Case." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 3(2) (August 2001): 207-236.

Friedman, Elisabeth J. "Gendering the Agenda: The Impact of the Transnational Women's Right Movement at the UN Conferences of the 1990s." *Women's Studies International Forum* 26 (2003): 313-331.

Friedman Elisabeth J. "Paradoxes of Gendered Political Opportunity in the Venezuelan Transition to Democracy." *Latin American Research Review* 33(3) (1998): 87-135.

Friedman, Elisabeth J. *Unfinished Transitions*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000.

Gallagher, Tom. "Democracy in Portugal Since the 1974 Revolution," in *Conflict and Change in Portugal, 1974-1984*. Eds. Eduardo Ferreira and Walter C. Opello Jr. Lisboa: Teorema, 1985.

Gallagher, Tom. "From Hegemony to Opposition" in *In Search of Modern Portugal : The Revolution & Its Consequences*. Eds. Lawrence S. Graham and Douglas L. Wheeler. Madison, WI.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983.

Gallagher, Tom. "The Portuguese Socialist Party: The Pitfalls of Being First," in *Southern European Socialism*. Eds Tom Gallagher and Allan Williams. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989.

Ganson, Joshua. "Messages of Exclusion: Gender, Movements and Symbolic Boundaries." *Gender And Society* 11(2) (April 1997): 178-199.

Garretón, Manuel António. *Incomplete Democracy: Political Democratization in Chile and Latin America*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.

Gibson, Ian. *Fire in the Blood: The New Spain*. London: Faber and Faber, 1992.

Gill, Graeme. *The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society, and the Transition Process*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000.

Gillespie, Richard. "Spanish Socialism in the 1980s" in *Southern European Socialism: Parties Elections, and the Challenge of Government*. Eds. A.M. Williams and Tom Gallagher. Bristol: University of Bristol, 1989.

Giugni, Marco G. "Structure and Culture in Social Movement Theory." *Sociological Forum* 13 (1998): 365-375.

Gonzalez, Anabel, Ed. *El feminismo en España hoy: bibliografía completa y documentos*. Bilbao: Zero, 1979.

Guibernau, Montserrat. "Catalan Nationalism and the democratisation process in Spain," in *Ethnicity and Democratization in the New Europe*. Ed. Karl Cordell. London; Routledge, 1999.

Guibernau, Montserrat. "Images of Catalonia." *Nations and Nationalism* 3(1) (1997): 89-111.

Gunther, Richard P., Diamandouros, Nikiforos and Puhle, Hans-Jurgen. "Introduction," in *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995.

Graham, Lawrence S., and Makler, Harry M., Eds. *Contemporary Portugal*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979.

Grugel, Jean. *Democratization: A Critical Introduction*. New York: Palgrave, 2002.

Grugel, Jean and Rees, Tim. *Franco's Spain*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.

Gunther, Richard, Diamandouros, Nikiforos P., and Puhle, Hans-Jurgen, Eds. *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1995.

Gunther, Richard, Montero, José Ramon, Botella, Joan, Eds. *Democracy in Modern Spain*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.

Gunther, Richard, Ed. *Politics, Society, and Democracy: The Case of Spain*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.

Hamilton, Carrie. "Changing Subjects: Gendered Identities in ETA and radical Basque Nationalism," in *Contemporary Spanish Cultural Studies*. Eds. Barry Jordan and Rikki Morgan-Tamosunas. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Hammond, John L. *Building Popular Power: Workers' and Neighborhood Movements in the Portuguese Revolution*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988.

Hanagan, Michael and Tilly Charles, Eds. *Extending Citizenship, Reconfiguring States*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999.

Hawkesworth, Mary E. "Democratization: Reflections on Gendered Dislocations in the Public Sphere" in *Gender, Globalization and Democratization*. Eds. Rita Mae Kelly, Jane

H. Bayes, Mary E. Hawkesworth and Brigitte Young. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001.

Kriesi, Hanspeter. "Political Context and Opportunity" in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*. Eds. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. Malden, MA : Blackwell Pub., 2004.

Herr, Richard, Ed. *The New Portugal: Democracy and Europe*. Berkeley: International and Area Studies, University of California at Berkeley, 1992.

Heywood, Paul, Ed. *Politics and Policy in Democratic Spain: No Longer Different?* London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999.

Hipsher, Patricia L. "Democratization and the Decline of Urban Social Movements in Chile and Spain." *Comparative Politics* 28(3) (April 1996): 273-297.

Hirst, Paul and Khilnani, Sunil. *Reinventing Democracy*. Cambridge, MA.: Blackwell Publishers, 1996.

Hopkin, Jonathan. "From Consensus to Competition: The changing nature of democracy in the Spanish transition," in *The Politics of Contemporary Spain*. Ed. Sebastian Balfour. London: Routledge, 2005.

Howell, Jude and Mulligan, Diane. "Editorial." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 5(2) (July 2003): 157-161.

Htun, Mala. *Sex and the State, Abortion, Divorce and the Family under Latin American Dictatorships and Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Huber, Evelyne, Rueschemeyer, Dietrich and Stephens, John D. "The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory, and Social Dimensions." *Comparative Politics* 29(3) (April 1997).

Huiskamp, Gerard. "Identity Politics and Democratic Transitions in Latin America: (Re)organizing Women's Strategic Interests through Community Activism." *Theory And Society* 29 (2000): 385-424.

Humm, Maggie. "Feminisms and Women's Movements in the 1990s," in *Feminisms and Women's Movements in Contemporary Europe*. Eds. Ann Bull, Hanna Diamond and Rosalind Marsh. London: MacMillan Press, 2000.

Imig, Doug, and Tarrow, Sidney Eds. *Contentious Europeans, Protest and Politics in an Emerging Polity*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001.

Irving, Cynthia. *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.

Jenson, Jane and Valiente, Celia. "Comparing Two Movements for Gender Parity: France and Spain," in *Women's movements facing the reconfigured state*. Ed. Lee Ann Banaszak, et al. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Jaquette, Jane S. and Wolchik, Sharon L., Eds. *Women and Democracy: Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1998.

Jaquette, Jane S., Ed. *The Women's Movement in Latin America*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.

Jaquette, Jane S. "Feminism and the Challenges of the 'Post-Cold War' World." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 5(3) (November 2003): 331-354.

Jaquette, Jane S. "Women and Democracy: Regional Differences and Contrasting Views." *Journal of Democracy* 12(3) (July 2001): 111-125.

Joachim, Jutta. "Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs, and Women's Rights." *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (2003): 247-274.

Jones, Anny Brooksbank. *Women in Contemporary Spain*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997.

Jones, Anny Brooksbank. "Work, Women and the Family: A Critical Perspective" in *Spanish Cultural Studies: An Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Jones, Margaret E. "Vindicación Feminista and the Feminist Community in Post-Franco Spain," in *Recovering Spain's Feminist Tradition*. Ed. Lisa Vollendorf. New York: The Modern Language Association of America, 2001.

Jorge, Celia González and Barbado, Amparo Almarcha. "Equal Treatment of Women," in *Spain & EC Membership Evaluated*. Ed. Amparo Almarcha Barbado. London: Pinter Publishers, 1993.

Kaplan Gisela. *Contemporary Western European Feminism*. New York: New York University Press, 1992.

Kaplan, Temma. *Taking Back the Streets: Women, Youth and Direct Democracy*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.

Karl, Terry Lynn. "Dilemma of Democratization." *Comparative Politics* 23(1) (1990): 7-18.

Kaufman, Helena, and Klobucka, Anna, Eds. *After the Revolution: Twenty Years of Portuguese Literature*. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1997.

Kitschelt, Herbert. "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science* 16 (1986): 57-85.

Kohler, Beate. *Political Forces in Spain, Greece and Portugal*. London: Butterworth Scientific, 1982.

Koopmans, Ruud. "Protest in Time and Space," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*. Eds. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004.

Kurth, James and Petras, James, Eds. *Mediterranean Paradoxes: The Politics and Social Structure of Southern Europe*. Providence: Berg, 1993.

Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996.

Linz, Juan, Stepan, Alfred and Gunther, Richard. "Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, with Reflections on Latin America and Eastern Europe" in *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*. Eds. Richard Gunther, Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jürgen Puhle. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995.

Lomax, Bill. "Ideology and Illusion in the Portuguese Revolution: The Role of the Left" in *In Search of Modern Portugal: The Revolution & Its Consequences* Eds. Lawrence S. Graham and Douglas L. Wheeler. Madison, WI.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983.

Macaulay, Fiona. "Taking the Law into their Own Hands: Women, Legal Reform and Legal Literacy in Brazil," in *Gender and the Politics of Rights and Democracy in Latin America*. Eds. Nikki Craske and Maxine Molyneux. New York: Palgrave, 2002.

Machado, Diamantino P. *The Structure of Portuguese Society: The Failure of Fascism*. New York: Praeger, 1991.

Magone, José M. *Contemporary Spanish Politics*. London: Routledge, 2004.

Magone, José M. *European Portugal*. Houndmills: MacMillan Press, 1997.

Mailer, Phil. *Portugal: The Impossible Revolution*. London: Solidarity, 1977.

Malefakis, Edward. "Spain and Its Francoist Heritage," in *From dictatorship to democracy: coping with the legacies of authoritarianism and totalitarianism*. Ed. John H. Herz. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood. 1982.

Malefakis, Edward. "The Political and Socioeconomic Contours of Southern European History," in *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*. Eds Gunther et al. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995.

Mansbridge, Jane. "Anti-statism and Difference Feminism in International Social Movements." *Journal of Democracy* 12(3) (July 2001).

Manuel, Paul Christopher. *Uncertain Outcome: The Politics of the Portuguese Transition to Democracy*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995.

Margolis, Diane Rothbard. "Women's Movements around the World: Cross-Cultural Comparisons." *Gender and Society* 7(3) (September 1993): 379-399.

Markoff, John. *Waves of Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 1996.

Marshall, Barbara L. *Configuring Gender: Explorations in Theory and Politics*. Orchard Park, NY: Broadview Press, 2000.

Martínez, Gregorio Peces-Barba. "The Constitutional Consensus and the Basque Challenge," in *Consensus Politics in Spain: Insider Perspectives*. Ed Monica Threlfall. Bristol: Intellect Books, 2000.

Martínez-Hernández, Eva and Elizondo, Arantxa. "Women in Politics: Are They Really Concerned About Equality? An Essay on The Basque Political System." *European Journal of Women's Studies* 4 (1997): 451-472.

Martínez-Herrera, Enric. "From Nation-Building to Building Identification With Political Communities: Consequence of Political Decentralisation in Spain, the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, 1978-2000." *European Journal of Political Research* 41 (2002): 421-453.

Maxwell, Kenneth. "The Emergence of Portuguese Democracy" in *From Dictatorship to Democracy*. Ed. John Herz. Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1982.

Maxwell, Kenneth, Ed. *Portugal in the 1980s Dilemmas of Democratic Consolidation*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1986.

Maxwell, Kenneth. *The Making of Portuguese Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Maxwell, Kenneth and Spiegel, Steven. *The New Spain: From Isolation to Influence*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Book, 1994.

Mazur, Amy. *Theorizing Feminist Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

McAdam, Doug. "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems and Future Direction," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings*. Eds. Doug McAdam et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

McAdam, Doug, McCarthy John D. and Zald, Mayer N Eds. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

McCarthy, John D. "The Globalization of Social Movement Theory," in *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997.

McCarthy, John D. and Zald, Mayer N, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory." *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (1977): 1212-1241.

McCarthy, John D. "Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting, Adapting and Inventing," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings*. Eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

McDonough, Peter et al. *The Cultural Dynamics of Democratization in Spain*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.

McDonough, Peter. "Identities, Ideologies, and Interests: Democratization and the Culture of Mass Politics in Spain and Eastern Europe," *Journal of Politics* 57(3) (August 1995): 649-675.

McRoberts, Kenneth. *Catalonia. Nation-Building Without A State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Mendez, Gallego Maria Teresa, "Women's Political Engagement in Spain," in *Women and Politics Worldwide*. Eds. Barbara J. Nelson and Najma Chowdhury. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994

Meyer, David S. and Staggenborg, Suzanne. "Movements, Countermovements and the Structure of Political Opportunity." *American Journal of Sociology*, 101 (6) (May 1996): 1628-1660.

Molyneux, Maxine. "Analysing Women's Movements." *Development and Change* 29(2) (1998): 219-245.

Molyneux, Maxine. *Women's movements in international perspective: Latin America and beyond*. New York: Palgrave, 2001.

Montecinos, Veronica. "Feminists and Technocrats in the Democratization of Latin America: A Prolegomenon." *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 15(1) (September 2001): 175-199.

Montero, Rosa. "The Silent Revolution: The Social and Cultural Advances of Women in Democratic Spain," in *Spanish Cultural Studies: An Introduction*. Eds. Helen Graham and Jo Labanyi. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Morcillo, Aurora G. *True Catholic Womanhood: Gender Ideology in Franco's Spain*. DeKalb IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2000.

Morlino, Leonardo. *Democracy Between Consolidation and Crisis: Parties Groups and Citizens in Southern Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Moxon-Browne, Edward. *Political Change in Spain*. London: Routledge, 1989.

Munck, Gerardo L. and Leff, Carol Skalnik. "Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective," in *Transitions to Democracy*. Ed. Lisa Anderson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.

Nash, Mary. *Defying Male Civilization: Women in The Spanish Civil War*. Denver, CO: Arden Press, 1995.

Nash, Mary. "Political Culture, Catalan Nationalism, and the Women's Movement in Early Twentieth-Century Spain." *Women's Studies International Forum* 19 (1-2) (1990): 45-54.

Nash, Mary. "Un/Contested Identities: Motherhood, Sex Reform and the Modernization of Gender Identity in Early Twentieth-Century Spain," in *Constructing Spanish Womanhood: Female Identity in Modern Spain*. Eds. Victoria Lorée Enders & Pamela Beth Radcliff. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999.

Nataf, Daniel. *Democratization and Social Settlements: The Politics of Change in Contemporary Portugal*. New York: State University of New York Press, 1995.

Noonan, Rita K. "Women against the State: Political Opportunities and Collective Action Frames in Chile's Transition to Democracy." *Sociological Forum* 10(1) (March 1995): 81-111.

Nunes, João Arriscado and Serra, Nuno. "'Decent Housing for the People,' Urban Movements and Emancipation in Portugal." *South European Society* 9(2) (2004): 51.

O'Donnell, Guillermo, and Schmitter, Philippe C, Eds. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986.

O'Donnell, Guillermo, Schmitter, Philippe C. and Whitehead, Laurence. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Offen, Karen. *European Feminisms, 1700-1950: A Political History*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.

Okeke-Ihejirika, Philomina E. and Franceshet, Susan. "Democratization and State Feminism: Gender Politics in Africa And Latin America." *Development and Change* 33(3) (2002): 4439-462.

Opello, Walter C. Jr. "Portugal's Parliament: An Organizational Analysis of Legislative Performance." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 11(3) (August 1986): 291-319.

Opello, Walter C. Jr. *Portugal's Political Development: A Comparative Approach*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985.

Ottolenghi, Claudia. *Women in Spain Supplement No.8 to Women of Europe*. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 1981.

Oxhorn, Philip D. *Organizing Civil Society: The Popular Sectors and the Struggle for Democracy in Chile*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995.

Payne, Stanley G. *Fascism in Spain 1923-1977*. Madison WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999.

Payne, Stanley. "The Role of the Armed Forces in the Spanish Transition to Democracy" in *Spain in the 1980s: the democratic transition and a new international role*. Eds. Robert P. Clark, Michael H. Haltzel. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Pub. Co., 1987.

Pérez-Díaz, Victor M. *The Return of Civil Society: The Emergence of Democratic Spain*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.

Phillips, Anne. *Engendering Democracy*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991.

Pimentel, Irene. "Cem Anos de Vida das Mulheres em Portugal." *História* 34 (2001): 12-34.

Pimlott, Ben and Seaton, Jean. "Political Power and the Portuguese Media" in *In search of Modern Portugal: The Revolution and its consequences*. Eds. Lawrence Graham and Douglas Wheeler. Madison WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983.

Pintassilgo, Maria de Lurdes. "Portugal: Daring to be Different," in *A Rising Public Voice: Women in Politics Worldwide*. Ed. A. Brill. New York: The Feminist Press, 1995.

- Political Constitution of the Portuguese Republic*. Lisbon: S.N.I., 1957.
- Porch, Douglas. *The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution*. London: Croom Held, 1977.
- Poulantzas, Nicos. *The Crisis of the Dictatorships: Portugal, Greece, Spain*. London: NLB, 1976.
- Preston, Paul. *The Triumph of Democracy*. New York: Methuen, 1986.
- Pridham, Geoffrey and Lewis, Paul G. Eds. *Stabilising Fragile Democracies*. London: Routledge, 1996.
- Pridham, Geoffrey. *The Dynamics Of Democratization: A Comparative Approach*. London: Continuum, 2000.
- Pridham, Geoffrey, "Southern European democracies on the road to consolidation: a comparative assessment of the role of political parties," in *Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe*. London: Routledge, 1990.
- Przeworski, Adam. "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
- Puig, Emili Ferrando. *La Dona a Badalona Cent Anys de Protagonisme Invisible (1897-1997)*. Barcelona: Editorial Mediterrania, 2000.
- Raby, D.L. *Fascism and Resistance in Portugal*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988.
- Radcliff, Pamela. "Citizens and Housewives: The Problem of Female Citizenship in Spain's Transition to Democracy." *Journal of Social History* 36(1) (2002): 77-100.
- Radcliff, Pamela Beth. "Imagining Female Citizenship in the 'New Spain': Gendering the Democratic Transition, 1975-1978." *Gender & History* 13(3) (November 2001): 498-523.
- Radcliffe, Sarah and Westwood, Sallie, Eds. *'Viva' Women and Popular Protest in Latin America*. London: Routledge, 1993.
- Randall, Vicky and Waylen, Georgina Eds. *Gender, Politics and the State*. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Rague-Arias, Maria-José. "Spain: Feminism in Our Time." *Women's Studies International Quarterly* 4(4) (1981): 471-476.
- Razavi, Shahra. "Women in Contemporary Democratization." *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 15(1) (September 2001): 201-224.

Richards, Michael. "From War Culture to Civil Society." *History and Memory* 14(1-2) (Fall 2002): 93-120.

Richmond, Kathleen. *Women and Spanish Fascism*. London: Routledge, 2003.

Rios Tobar, Marcela. "Chilean Feminism(s) in the 1990s: Paradoxes of an Unfinished Transition." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 5(2) (July 2003): 256-280.

Robinson, Richard A.H. "National Political Change in Portugal, 1976-1999," in *Contemporary Portugal: Dimensions of Economic and Political Change*. Ed. Stephen Syrett. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002.

Rodriguez, Lilia. "Barrio Women: Between the Urban and Feminist Movement," *Latin American Perspectives* 21(3) (Summer 1994): 32-48.

Rubio-Marin, Ruth. "Women and the Cost of the Transition to Democratic Constitutionalism in Spain." *International Sociology* 18(1) (2003): 239-257.

Sadlier, Darlene J. *The Question of How: Women Writers and New Portuguese Literature*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1989.

Safa, Helen Icken. "Women's Social Movements in Latin America." *Gender and Society* 4(3) (September 1990): 354-369.

Santos, Boaventura de Sousa. "State and Society in Portugal" in *After the Revolution: twenty years of Portuguese literature, 1974-1994*. Eds. Helena Kaufman and Anna Klobucka. Lewisburg PA: Bucknell University Press, 1997.

Schmitter, Philippe C. "Civil Society East and West," in *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies Themes and Perspectives*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1997.

Schmitter Philippe C. "The regime d'Exception that became the rule" in *Contemporary Portugal*. Eds. Lawrence S. Graham and Harry M. Makler. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979.

Seidman, Gay W. "Gendered Citizenship: South Africa's Democratic Transition and the Construction of a Gendered State." *Gender and Society* 13(3) (June 1999): 287-307.

Share, Donald. *Dilemmas of Social Democracy: The Spanish Socialist Workers Party in the 1980s*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1989.

Smith, Jackie, Pagnucco, Ron, and Chatfield, Charles Eds. *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997.

Suarez Lafuente, Maria S. "Women's Associations and Education in Spain," in *Thinking Differently: A Reader in European Women's Studies*. London: Zed Books, 2002.

Sundman, Kerstin. *Between the Home and the Institutions: The Feminist Movement in Madrid, Spain*. Goteborg, Sweden: ACTA Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1999.

Tarrow, Sidney. "National Politics and Collective Action; Recent Theory and Research in Western Europe and the United States." *Annual Review of Sociology* 14 (1988): 421-440.

Tarrow, Sidney. "States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Tavares, Manuela. *Movimentos de Mulheres em Portugal: nas Décadas de 70 e 80*. Lisboa: Livros Horizonte, 2000.

Tavares, Manuela. "Romper o Cerco: O 25 de Abril e os Movimentos de Mulheres," *História* (1999).

Taylor, Lucy. "Client-ship and Citizensip in Latin America." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 23(2) (2004): 213-227.

Threlfall, Monica. "Feminist Politics and Social Change in Spain," in *Mapping the Women's Movement: Feminist Politics and Social Transformation in the North*. Ed. Monica Threlfall. Verso: London, 1996.

Threlfall, Monica. "Gendering the Transition to Democracy," in *Gendering Spanish Democracy*. Eds. Monica Threlfall, Christine Cousins and Celia Valiente New York: Routledge, 2005.

Threlfall, Monica. "State Feminism or Party Feminism? Feminist Politics and the Spanish Institute of Women." *European Journal of Women's Studies* 5 (1998): 69-93.

Threlfall, Monica. "The Women's Movement in Spain." *New Left Review* 151 (May/June 1985): 44-73.

Tobio, Constanza. "Working and Mothering: Women's Strategies in Spain." *European Societies* 3(3) (2001): 339-371.

Tura, Jordi Solé. "The Spanish Transition to Democracy" *Spain in the 1980s*. Eds. Robert P. Clark and Michael Haltzel. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing, 1987.

Valenzuela, Maria Elena. "Women and the Democratization Process in Chile," in *Women and democracy: Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe*. Eds. Jane S. Jaquette and Sharon L. Wolchik. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.

Valiente Celia. "A Closed Subsystem and Distant Feminist Demands Block Women-Friendly Outcomes in Spain," in *State feminism, women's movements, and job training: making democracies work in the global economy*. Ed. Amy G. Mazur: New York: Routledge, 2001.

Valiente, Celia. "An Overview of the State of Research on Women and Politics in Spain." *European Journal of Political Research* 33 (1998): 459-474.

Valiente, Celia. "Implementing Women's Rights in Spain," *Globalization, Gender and Religion: The Politics of Women's Rights in Catholic and Muslim Contexts*. Ed. Jane H. Bayes and Nayereh Tohidi. New York: Palgrave, 2001.

Valiente, Celia. "Pushing for Equality Reforms: The European Union and Gender Discourse in Post-Authoritarian Spain" in *Gendering Europeanisation*. Ed. Ulrike Liebert. Brussels: P.I.E-Peter Lang, 2003.

Valiente, Celia. "State Feminism and Gender Equality Policies: The Case of Spain (1983-95)", in Frances Gardiner, Ed. *Sex Equality Policy in Western Europe*. London and New York: Routledge, 1997.

Valiente, Celia. "The Feminist Movement and the Reconfigured State in Spain (1970s-2000)" in *Women's movements facing the reconfigured state*. Ed. Lee Ann Banaszak, et al. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Valiente: Celia. "The Power of Persuasion: The Institute de la Mujer in Spain," in *Comparative State Feminism*. Eds. Amy Mazur & Dorothy McBride Stetson. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995.

Vickers, Jill. "Notes toward a Political Theory of Sex and Power," in *Power/Gender: Social Relations in Theory and Practice*. Eds. H. Lorraine Radtke and Henderikus J. Stam. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1994.

Walby, Sylvia. "From gendered welfare state to gender regimes: National differences, convergence or re-structuring?" (2001): 1-47.
<www.sociology.su.se/cgs/Walbypaper.doc>.

Walby, Sylvia. *Gender Transformations*. London: Routledge, 1997.

Walby, Syvia. "Gender, Globalisation, and Democracy." *Gender and Development* 8(1) (March 2000): 20-28.

Walby, Sylvia. "Gender, Nations and States in a Global Era." *Nations and Nationalism* 6(4) (2000): 523-540.

Walby, Sylvia. "The European Union and Gender Equality: Emergent Varieties of Gender Regime." *Social Politics* 11(1) (Spring 2004): 4-29.

Warnenska, Monica. "Hard Struggle for the Future." *Women of the World* 3 (1975): 30-33.

Waylen, Georgina. "Gender and Democratic Politics: A Comparative Analysis of Consolidation in Argentina and Chile." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 32 (2000): 765-793.

Waylen, Georgina. "Gender, feminism and the state," in *Gender, Politics and the State*. London: Routledge, 1998.

Waylen, Georgina. "Women and Democratization: Conceptualizing Gender Relations in Transition Politics." *World Politics* 46(3) (April 1994): 327-354.

Walzer, Michael. "The Idea of Civil Society," in *Civil Society and Democracy*. Ed. Carolyn M. Elliott. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Weldon, S. Laurel. "Beyond Bodies: Institutional Sources of Representation for Women in Democratic Policymaking." *Journal of Politics* 64(4) (November 2002): 1153-1174.

"We Protect Our Red Carnation." *Women of the World* 2 (1978): 52-53.

Wheeler, Douglas. "The Military and the Portuguese Dictatorship, 1926-1974: "The Honor of the Army," in *Contemporary Portugal*. Eds. Lawrence S. Graham and Harry M. Makler. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979.

Wiarda, Howard J. *The Transition to Democracy in Spain and Portugal*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute For Public Policy Research, 1989.

Wieringa, Saskia, Ed. *Subversive Women: Historical Experiences of Gender and Resistance*. New Delhi: Kali for Women, 1995.

Zald, Mayer N. "Culture, ideology and strategic framing," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.