Policy Adoption in International Organizations:  
The Case of the Social Protection Floor Initiative

by

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in

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Abstract

This dissertation project examines the Social Protection Floor Initiative (SPF-I), a global social policy initiative that brought together various international organizations which have traditionally had divergent social policy approaches. Since the launch of the SPF-I in 2009, most of the major international organizations in the development field became part of the Initiative and engaged in the Social Protection Floor (SPF) policy at varying levels. This project focuses on six international organizations, namely the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The overarching research question is, “what explains the extent of, and the variation in, the international organizations’ adoption of a given policy (in this case, the SPF)?” In order to explain the extent of policy adoption in international organizations, a policy adoption matrix has been developed. This matrix helps to identify each international organization as a policy leader, policy follower, or policy supporter based on the following parameters: the speed and the timing of policy adoption, the level of commitment, the breadth of organizational buy-in, and the scope of policy adoption. While the UNICEF, the UNDP, and the WHO are identified as policy leaders, the OECD is identified as a policy follower, and the World Bank and the IMF are identified as policy supporters.
Next, this study explains why these international organizations are policy leaders, followers, or supporters. The analysis of policy adoption in the six international organizations reveals that: (i) the presence of policy entrepreneurs within relevant networks and the policy’s good fit in the organizations’ outlook explain why the UNICEF, the UNDP, and the WHO are policy leaders, (ii) the role of member states and the policy’s poor fit in the organization’s outlook explain the OECD’s role as a policy follower, and (iii) the external pressures and the policy’s poor fit in the organizations’ outlook explain why the World Bank and the IMF are policy supporters. This analysis concludes with an analytical framework towards a theory of policy adoption in international organizations.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCD</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Directorate (OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCR</td>
<td>Development Co-operation Review (OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELSA</td>
<td>Directorate of Employment, Labour and Social Affairs (OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEG</td>
<td>Independent Evaluation Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFIs</td>
<td>International Financial Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISPA</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Social Protection Assessment Tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4H</td>
<td>Providing for Health (WHO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POVNET</td>
<td>Network on Poverty Reduction (OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRSPs</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>SPF</td>
<td>Social Protection Floor</td>
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<td>SPF-I</td>
<td>Social Protection Floor Initiative</td>
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<td>SPIAC-B</td>
<td>Social Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation Board</td>
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<td>SPL</td>
<td>Social Protection and Labour (World Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSN</td>
<td>Social Safety Nets (World Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCEB</td>
<td>United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN DESA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN DOCO</td>
<td>United Nations Development Operations Coordination Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDG</td>
<td>United Nations Development Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRISD</td>
<td>United Nations Research Institute for Social Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The notion that social policies go hand-in-hand with economic policies represents a significant shift in the field of development. Instead of ignoring the role of social policies in achieving development, international organizations now acknowledge the importance of addressing social and economic issues together in order to have a more nuanced, effective and successful approach to development in the global era. This new development framework has required international organizations that are socially-oriented or economically-oriented to work hand in hand together to achieve what have become a common set of development goals.

The literature on global social policy includes many examples of divergent social policy approaches among international organizations (see Deacon, 2007; Ervik, 2005; Kaasch, 2013; O’Brien, 2014; Orenstein, 2005; Orenstein & Deacon, 2014; Robertson, 2005). Consequently, there are cases of inter-agency cooperation failures, duplicated efforts, wasted resources, as well as long-lasting conceptual disagreements (see Brainard & LaFleur, 2008, p. 21; Collier, 2008, p. 101; Deacon, 2007). However, international organizations which have traditionally had divergent policy approaches to development issues are increasingly looking to find a common ground and language for productive inter-agency cooperation. Although their differences are still more emphasized than their similarities, and although global social policy initiatives that bring the major
development institutions together are still limited in number, policy coordination and collaboration is now the norm and continues to increase.

This dissertation project studies the Social Protection Floor Initiative (SPF-I), a global social policy initiative that brought together various international organizations which have traditionally had divergent social policy approaches. Since the launch of the SPF-I in 2009, most of the major international organizations in the development field became part of the Initiative and engaged in the Social Protection Floor (SPF) policy at varying levels.

Here, the focus is on six international organizations that vary significantly in terms of their adoption of the SPF: the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The overarching research question of this dissertation is, “what explains the extent of, and the variation in, the international organizations’ adoption of a given policy (in this case, the SPF)?”

1.1 Definition of Concepts

This dissertation project is at the intersection of policy adoption, international organizations, and global social policy. The concept of policy adoption is preferred over policy diffusion and policy transfer because the definitions of these latter concepts are
not applicable to this study of international organizations. In order to examine the extent to which the selected international organizations commit their resources for the development, promotion, and the implementation of the SPF policy, tangible efforts/outputs are investigated. Therefore, this study considers policy adoption to be an outcome, unlike the widely cited definitions of policy diffusion and policy transfer, which consider it to be a process. For instance, Dolowitz and Marsh define policy transfer as “the process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions, and ideas in another political system” (2000, p. 5). In a similar fashion, Simmon and Elkins “use the term diffusion to refer to all processes in which ‘prior adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the probability of adoption for remaining non-adopters’ (Strang 1991)” (2004, p. 172, emphasis added). Another widely cited definition by Braun and Giraldi notes that policy diffusion is “a process where choices are interdependent, that is, where the choice of a government influences the choices made by others and, conversely, the choice of a government is influenced by the choices made by others” (2006, p. 299, emphasis added). This focus on process rather than outcome makes the case for a new definition of policy adoption.

In this dissertation project, policy adoption is defined as “the extent to which an international organization commits its resources (be it staff, money, knowledge, and expertise among others) for the development, promotion, and the implementation of a
policy.”¹ In terms of international organizations, these refer to “formal intergovernmental bureaucracies ... with a legal standing, physical headquarters, executive head, staff, and substantive focus of operations” (Weiss & Wilkinson, 2013, p. 7). Global social policy is used to mean “social policy prescriptions for national social policy being articulated by global actors such as international organizations” (Deacon, 2007, p. 1).

The following subsection presents the gaps in the literature and explains how this dissertation project aims to address these. A discussion of the project’s outline and methodology also follows.

1.2 Gaps in the Literature

A review of the relevant literatures reveals three main gaps that this research project will address. First, to my knowledge, there is no study that breaks down the concept of policy adoption to capture the varying levels of adoption one sees in international organizations. Second, the existing theoretical and analytical frameworks are either too constraining or insufficient to explain this variation. Third, little is written on international organizations’ behaviour within the context of the SPF-I from a comparative perspective. The following sub-sections elaborate on each of these gaps in the literature.

¹ Chapter 3 will present a detailed explanation of policy adoption.
1.2.1 Conceptualizing Policy Adoption

There are a few studies that are important to note here as they aimed to develop a composite score or measure of policy adoption. Some scholars, such as Walker (1969), Gray (1973), and Savage (1978), attempt to develop an innovativeness measure, which considers the speed or timing of policy adoption as a key component. Walker proposes an “innovation score” to “represent the relative speed with which states adopt innovations” (1969, p. 882). He intends to answer the question of “Why do some states adopt innovations more rapidly than others?” by building on his preliminary measurement of innovation (Walker, 1969, p. 883). In another study, Gray (1973) searches for patterns involving the timing of adoption and the specific issue areas. She asks if “the states which are early to adopt one law also adopt other laws first as well?” (Gray, 1973, p. 1183). In an attempt to answer this question, she looks at whether “a composite innovation score” or “innovativeness” exists, and concludes that innovativeness does not seem to explain the timing of adoption in all selected policy areas. Savage (1978) also tries to develop a measure of policy innovativeness, where the speed of policy adoption is a key component.

While these studies examine and explain one specific aspect of policy adoption (i.e. the speed or the timing of policy adoption), they do not present a conceptualization that can be used to identify varying levels of policy adoption. This dissertation project intends to fill this gap in the literature and present a comprehensive breakdown of the
concept of policy adoption that can capture this variation. It sees the speed and the
timing of policy adoption as sub-components of an aggregate level of policy adoption.

1.2.2 Explaining Policy Adoption in International Organizations

In the diffusion literature, policy adoption is studied with reference to the diffusing
institutions/actors. Usually, there is a discussion about the relationship between two or
more units of analysis. While vertical diffusion indicates a hierarchical and asymmetric
relationship between two units of analysis, horizontal diffusion indicates diffusion
among similar units of analysis. Some scholars study horizontal diffusion across units,
such as cities (Crain, 1966), local governments (Wolman & Page, 2002), states (Berry &
Baybeck, 2005; Walker, 1969) and nations (Bennett, 1997; McAdam & Rucht, 1993).
Others study vertical diffusion from national to local (Allen, Pettus, & Haider-Markel,
2004), from state to federal (Mossberger, 1999), and from cities to states (Shipan &
Volden, 2006). Particularly pertaining to international organizations, vertical diffusion
between international organizations and member states has been studied in the
literature mostly as top-down diffusion (see Levi-Faur, 2005) or bottom-up diffusion (see
Sugiyama, 2011).

Here, two things are worth emphasizing. First, since diffusion studies are preoccupied by
the relationships between similar/dissimilar units of analysis, the explanations of policy
adoption in international organizations may be constrained by the adopter
organizations’ behaviour vis-à-vis the diffusing institution(s)/actor(s). Second, there is
not much said on horizontal diffusion across international organizations, as there is a
tendency to look at international organizations vis-à-vis states (as seen in Levi-Faur’s and Sugiyama’s work cited above). Since the SPF policy was initially developed by an international organization (namely the International Labour Organization, hereafter the ILO) and then disseminated to other international organizations, state-centered explanations would be too limiting for this study.

Furthermore, the causal mechanisms used to explain policy diffusion or policy transfer across units of analysis do not seem to be a good fit for a study of international organizations. This is mainly because scholars in the policy diffusion and policy transfer literature choose to rely on either structure-based or agency-based explanations. Marsh and Sharman (2009) note that while diffusion literature favours structure over agency as an explanatory variable, the transfer literature does the opposite and privileges agency over structure. International organizations may adopt policies (or, in other words, may choose to commit their available resources for the development, promotion, and the implementation of a policy) as a result of both structure-based factors (e.g. “exogenous and endogenous social, economic, technological, ideological and institutional structures” as noted by Evans and Davies, 1999, p.372) and agency-based factors (e.g. “elected officials, professionals, think tanks, pressure groups, academics, international organizations, and experts” as mentioned by Newmark, 2002, p. 163). However, existing models do not offer an operational analytical framework that reconciles structure-based and agency-based factors to explain policy adoption in international organizations. Previous attempts to do so are worth discussing here.
Evans and Davies (1999), Marsh and Sharman (2009), and Newmark (2002), argue that the relationship between structure and agency is dialectical as they try and reconcile these two approaches. More specifically, Evans and Davies (1999) develop a multi-level and multi-dimensional approach to policy transfer, which allows them to look at the international, transnational, interorganizational and domestic aspects of policy transfer. While acknowledging the risk of eclecticism, the authors defend their approach by arguing that their heuristic model has “additionality” as it introduces a new approach to policy transfer that has not been considered before (1999, p. 362). In practice, they bring together “international structure and agency and the epistemic community approach, domestic structure and agency, policy network analysis and formal policy transfer analysis” (p. 363).

Marsh and Sharman (2009) call the work of Evans and Davies “an honourable exception” to the approaches in the literature, which favour either structure or agency. They also note that Evans and Davies’s approach runs into the methodological problem of not identifying a way to study the interaction between structure and agency (2009, p. 275). Evans and Davies, therefore, do not provide an operational framework that can be employed in this study, despite their emphasis on the value of taking both structure-based and agency-based explanations into consideration.

In terms of explaining varying policy adoption levels, Newark’s study is very promising as it sees policy diffusion as a continuum, however the concepts as well as the variables employed in the study cannot be applied in a study of international organizations.
Newmark goes beyond the structure-agency divide in an effort to bring together the policy diffusion and policy transfer literatures under “a more unified theory for the spread of policy” (2002, p. 152). He recommends that policy transfer studies should not neglect the role of structural factors from which policies arise and that policy diffusion studies should not undermine the role of agency in spreading policy (p. 173). In an effort to reconcile these two factors, the author comes up with a continuum that aims to capture various degrees of policy diffusion (see Figure 1.1). The author argues that combining two theoretical approaches (i.e. policy diffusion and transfer) yields a stronger unified theory (p. 154).

Figure 1.1: Diffusion Continuum

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… Diffusion ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… Policy Convergence ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… Policy Transfer ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… Lesson Drawing ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

(Source: Newmark, 2002, p. 171)

According to this framework, “… diffusion … is the broadest term for describing the spread of policy. Policy transfer is more specific type of diffusion, while lesson drawing is a more specific kind of policy transfer” (Newmark, 2002, p. 173). This framework takes into consideration the organizational factors (operationalized as people or groups who interact with each other), geographic and regional factors, internal determinants (such as political, economic, and social characteristics) and policy content. Despite bringing together a coherent set of variables, this framework consists of variables that do not
apply to international organizations. For instance, “geographic and regional factors” and “internal determinants” cannot explain the spread of policy across international organizations in the way that they are operationalized. Furthermore, the concept of “policy convergence” can be problematic in a study of international organizations as not all international organizations will adopt or implement “identical rules and regulations” (see Drezner, 2001, p. 57). According to Drezner, “convergence” is a term used (by structure-based theories) to “imply that different ... policies are homogenized into one global policy” (p.57). This conceptualization neglects the varying forms and levels of policy adoption in international organizations, which is the main focus of this dissertation project.

In sum, the existing models do not allow for an analysis or explanation of the variation in the policy adoption levels of international organizations. An inductive study, therefore, would be an effective way of developing such a model. This dissertation attempts to do so.

1.2.3 The SPF and International Organizations from a Comparative Perspective

There is a growing literature on the SPF, especially since the launch of the SPF-I in 2009. An increasing number of studies are looking at the SPF policy, yet little consideration has been given to international organizations’ behavior and their involvement in the SPF-I, especially from a comparative perspective.
Bob Deacon is a leading contributor on the SPF policy and international organizations. In 2013, he published a book entitled *Global Social Policy in the Making – The Foundations of the Social Protection Floor*, which examines the emergence of the SPF policy.

While drawing significantly on Deacon’s work, this dissertation project differs in several aspects. First, it presents a systematic comparison of the international organizations’ behaviour in terms of their adoption of the SPF policy. Second, Deacon sees the efforts around “global social policy strategy” as a struggle (see Deacon, 2013a). This is very much in line with his use of the concept of “policy contestation among actors” in the field of global social policy (see Deacon, 2007). As Kaasch and Stubbs note, the “battle of ideas both ‘between’ and ‘within’ international and supranational organizations” has been a central topic of interest for Deacon (2014, p. 7). However, this dissertation project views the field of global social protection policy as a field of cooperation and coordination. Here, it is important to note that despite underlining that “there is a contestation of social policy ideas within and between international organizations,” Deacon also acknowledges that there is “a potentially new period (beginning in 2012) of *active cooperation*” (2014a, pp. 201-202). Third, from Deacon’s point of view, “what is happening is not so much a global process of diffusion of an agreed approach, but a global contestation about that approach within which individuals often make a difference” (Deacon, 2007, p. 175). His analysis emphasizes the role that individuals play in global social policy making. He encourages a close investigation of the role of policy entrepreneurs working in international organizations in order to have a full grasp of the
workings and the global social policy stances of international organizations (Deacon, 2014b). However, Chapter 5 and 6 will show that factors other than the presence of policy entrepreneurs may better explain the behaviour of international organizations in some cases. Finally, while Deacon’s work was written for “advocacy reasons” as “it advocates the case for the SPF” (2013a, p. 4), here, the SPF-I is the case study to examine and analyze the policy adoption behaviour of international organizations.

1.3 My Contribution

In light of the gaps identified in the literature, the main objectives are the following:

i) to break down policy adoption into its sub-components,

ii) to improve our understanding of policy adoption in international organizations,

iii) to map out the shared and varying characteristics of policy adoption of the six international organizations,

iv) to identify and explain the differences revealed in the analyses of the six international organizations, and

v) to establish an analytical framework towards a theory of policy adoption in international organizations.

1.4 Plan of the Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into eight chapters. Following the introduction, Chapter 2 provides a background on the SPF policy and the SPF-I. It also explains why the SPF-I was
selected as the case study for this dissertation project. Chapter 3 presents a policy adoption matrix that maps out the characteristics of policy adoption for the six selected international organizations. This matrix helps to identify each international organization as a policy leader, policy follower, or policy supporter\(^2\) based on the following parameters: the speed and the timing of policy adoption, the level of commitment, the breadth of organizational buy-in, and the scope of policy adoption. Chapter 4, 5, and 6 present analyses of policy leaders, policy followers, and policy supporters respectively. Based on the analyses of the six selected international organizations, Chapter 7 provides a series of explanations for the international organizations’ varying levels of policy adoption. This chapter also includes an analytical framework that shows how to explain policy adoption in international organizations in a systematic way. Chapter 8 concludes with a summary of the chapters as well as an assessment of the study.

1.5 Methodology

1.5.1 Data Collection

There are three types of data sources used in this study: academic publications, publications by the selected international organizations, and interviews with key informants. Data triangulation offers an opportunity “to test for ... consistency” (Patton, 2001, p. 248). It should be noted that “different kinds of data may yield somewhat different results ... [and] understanding inconsistencies in findings across different kinds of sources is important” (Patton, 2001, p. 248).

\(^2\) These categorizations will be explained later in Chapter 3.
of data can be illuminative” (p. 248). Therefore, the data collected through academic publications, international organizations’ websites, and interviews has been constantly compared and reassessed throughout the various stages of the writing process.

Academic publications used here come from a variety of disciplines, including international relations, public policy and administration, social work, development, international political economy, sociology, medicine, public finance, public health, income studies, law, economy and society. There are two journals that are worth emphasizing here due to their continuous engagement in the SPF-related topics. First, the Journal of Global Social Policy has long been presenting up-to-date developments regarding the SPF policy and the SPF-I in every volume. Second, the International Review of Social Security has published many articles that provide insightful perspectives on the topic.³

In terms of the international organizations’ websites and databases, the ILO has taken the lead in terms of providing the most recent developments, as it has been the home of the Initiative. Specifically, its Social Protection Department (formerly Social Security Department) assumed the main responsibility for the Initiative, though efforts were not limited to the Department itself. The ILO shares the SPF updates through its website, www.social-protection.org. It is important to note that during the initial stages of the

³ The Vice Chairperson of the International Review of Social Security Editorial Board, Wouter van Ginneken, is also an active and influential promoter of the SPF-I on the civil society side at the time of writing.
Initiative, there were multiple parallel online platforms about the SPF-I. The following platforms were set up to disseminate and create awareness on the SPF:

- The Global Extension of Social Security (GESS) website, which was later tied to the website noted above;
- www.socialprotectionfloor-gateway.org; and
- www.socialprotection.org, which was hosted by the UNDP.

Eventually, these duplicate efforts were minimized and the ILO’s website, www.social-protection.org, has been the key source of information on the SPF. It has gone through a significant transformation in 2015 and became a rich and elaborate source of the SPF knowledge.

Even if not specifically focused on the SPF, other international organizations’ social protection-related websites as well as their databases were also important sources in order to have a good grasp of their involvement in the SPF-I. These online sources were very useful for gathering reports, briefing notes, speeches, and notes on committee meetings, among other information, for analysis. After tracing the participants of each international organization in the key SPF meetings, the following departments/units have been noted due to their engagement with the SPF-I: the UNICEF’s Division of Policy and Strategy, the UNDP’s Bureau for Policy and Programme Support and Special Unit for South-South Cooperation, the WHO’s Health Financing Unit and Providing for Health (P4H) Social Health Protection Network, the OECD’s Development Centre, the World Bank’s Social Protection and Labour Global Practice, and the IMF’s Strategy, Policy and
Review Department and Research Department. The sources that were produced by these departments/units were followed closely.

In addition, interviews with key informants both at the ILO and the other selected international organizations (i.e. the UNICEF, the UNDP, the WHO, the OECD, the World Bank and the IMF) were crucial for (i) collecting firsthand data, (ii) filling in the missing data, (iii) eliminating surplus data, (iv) checking whether the preliminary analysis holds, (v) exploring any causally relevant variables that could otherwise been omitted, and (vi) discovering causal relationships pertinent to my research question (see Tansey, 2007).

In total, 26 semi-structured confidential interviews were conducted with policy experts from international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society and academia. These key informants not only shared their insights on the SPF policy process, but also provided further sources on the topic, as well as new contacts for interviews.

Each interviewee addressed questions about all of the six selected international organizations. In other words, instead of only focusing on the institutions that they were affiliated with, the interview participants provided information/their views/perspectives on the policy adoption in all six international organizations. Directing questions about all

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4 This project (#101829) was reviewed and approved by the Carleton University Research Ethics Board-A (CUREB-A) on September 24, 2014. Ethics clearance for the collection of data expires on December 30, 2016. This field study was made possible thanks to the Travel/Research Bursary provided by my Department, the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Affairs and the Dean of Public Affairs, as well as a Travel Support Grant provided by the Centre for European Studies.
six international organizations in every interview helped avoid a possible
methodological issue of relying on the self-description of international organizations.

The data collected during the interviews has been used throughout the dissertation, in
particular in Chapter 4, 5, and 6. The sections that draw on interview data make
reference to the “interview participants” rather than individual names and position
titles.\(^5\)

The interviews were semi-structured; hence the interview guide included a set of
questions to start with (see Appendix A). These questions were prepared based on the
preliminary analysis completed before the field research began. In the field, new
questions were added based on the points raised by the interview participants and the
interview guide was refined accordingly. Despite the fact that there was a set of
questions to guide the interviews, interviews started with open-ended questions to
allow participants to comment on the selected international organizations’ engagement
in the SPF policy without any analytical or conceptual restrictions. At that stage, the
interruptions by the researcher were kept minimal in order not to influence the
interview participants with any possibly biased concepts or questions. There was high
degree of flexibility in terms of discussing the questions as they come up naturally
during the interview. At the later stages of the interview, more structured questions

\(^5\) As a requirement of the Ethics Protocol, consent forms have been collected from all interview
participants. All participants have been assured that the interview data will be treated
anonymously.
were asked on topics that were not addressed by the interview participant earlier.\textsuperscript{6}

Thus, the interview guide aimed to find “a fine balance between rigidity and flexibility” in order to get the most benefit from the interviews (see Scheyvens & Storey, 2003, p. 32).

\subsection*{1.5.2 Methodological Tools}

This study employs content analysis, process tracing, and interviews. Content analysis of official publications has been instrumental in assessing the extent to which each international organization has adopted the SPF policy. Process tracing (supported by interviews) has been used to “identify single or different paths to an outcome, point out variables that were otherwise left out in the initial comparison of cases, check for spuriousness, and permit causal inference on the basis of a few cases” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 215). This methodological tool has helped to explain why the selected international organizations are policy leaders, followers, or supporters.

\subsection*{1.5.3 Case Selection}

The six international organizations selected for the analysis (namely, the UNICEF, the UNDP, the WHO, the OECD, the World Bank and the IMF) represent diverse cases. This

\textsuperscript{6}The preliminary analysis that was completed before the field research allowed speculation on where each international organization would be located on the policy adoption scale. Based on this analysis, the international organizations were categorized as one of the following: policy leader, policy follower, or policy supporter. During the interviews, however, the categories were referred to as “Category 1, 2, and 3” and the characteristics of each category were presented to the interview participants. They were then asked to place the six international organizations in one of the categories and to explain their reasoning.
case selection strategy aims for a selection of cases that represent “maximum variance along relevant dimensions” (Gerring, 2007, p. 97). There are cases that denote both extreme values (the UNICEF and the IMF) and the values in between (the remaining four international organizations). Also, representation for each interval categorization has been taken into consideration, following the “logic of typological theorizing” (see Gerring, 2007, p. 98). Accordingly, there are cases representing the three categories identified, namely policy leaders, followers, and supporters. Chapter 3 will present an elaborate discussion on the values that each international organization takes in the policy adoption scale as well as the categories to which they belong.
Chapter 2: Background on the Social Protection Floor Initiative

This chapter provides a background on the Social Protection Floor Initiative (SPF-I) and defines the concept of the social protection floor (SPF) to guide the discussions in the upcoming chapters. It also explains why the SPF-I was selected as the case study for this dissertation project.

2.1 Early Stages of the SPF Policy

The concept of the SPF is relatively new in the social policy field. Although the floor concept has entered the field of development recently, the idea and the principles behind it (such as universal coverage and the justification of the policy on the basis of human rights) (see Appendix B) have already existed and been promoted by some UN specialized agencies, such as the UNICEF, the UNDP, the ILO, the WHO, the United Nations Research Institute in Social Development (UNRISD), and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) (Ortiz, ed., 2007, p. 34).

The SPF concept reached its current form after more than a decade of discussions and exchanges between and among individuals and institutions. The earlier version of the concept included “social floor of global economy”, “global social floor” and “socio-economic floor” (see Deacon, 2013a; Somavia, 2000; van Ginneken, 2000). Van Ginneken states that “social floor of global economy” was used for the first time during the Social Summit of 1995 (2000, p. 8). The author advanced the concept of “global social floor” by elaborating on the steps towards achieving such a social floor (p.8). Later
in 2004, a report by the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization presented a relatively new version, i.e. “socio-economic floor” (ILO, 2004a; see also ILO & WHO, 2009a, p. 4). The current version of the concept, i.e. “social protection floor,” was officially introduced with the SPF-I in 2009.

2.2 The Launch of the SPF-I

In 2009, the SPF-I was launched as one of the nine Joint Crisis Initiatives of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (UNCEB) that were announced in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis. The Initiative has aimed to provide basic social rights and services for all on a universal basis. In addition to easing the severe social consequences of the 2008 financial crisis, the Initiative has also sought to enhance social and economic development beyond the crisis’ immediate timeframe. It has aimed to do so by promoting the concept of the SPF.

For each of the nine initiatives, one or more international organizations affiliated with the UN system took the lead (see Appendix C). The ILO and the WHO were the leading organizations for the SPF-I. The Initiative formally involved a large number of other institutional actors, including Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), IMF, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UN Regional Commissions, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), United Nations

7 The WHO’s role as the co-leader of the UNCEB Initiative is rather questionable later in the SPF process and it will be elaborated further in Chapter 4.

### 2.3 Defining “Social Protection Floor”

When the Initiative was launched in 2009, the report prepared by the co-leaders of the Initiative, the ILO and the WHO, noted that “no universally agreed definition [of the SPF] exists at this time” (ILO & WHO 2009a, p. 4). The concept was presented as a combination of the following two main elements:

- **Essential services**: geographical and financial access to essential services (such as water and sanitation, adequate nutrition, health and education).

- **Social Transfers**: a basic set of essential social transfers, in cash and in kind, paid to the poor and vulnerable to provide a minimum income security and access to essential health care. (p.4)

Later in 2011, the so-called *Bachelet Report* provided a full-fledged definition of the concept as “an integrated set of social policies designed to guarantee income security
and access to social services for all, paying particular attention to vulnerable groups, and protecting and empowering people across the life cycle” (ILO, 2011, p. 9).  

Using the SPF concept in the singular form led to concerns regarding the development and promotion of a “one size fits all” approach to social protection. To address these concerns, the SPF experts and policy makers decided to add “national” before the SPF concept as a way of acknowledging diverse social protection needs in different countries (see Deacon, 2013a). Since then, the SPF concept has been used to refer to “national social protection floors.” Accordingly, the ILO refined the definition as following:

National social protection floors should comprise at least the following four social security guarantees, as defined at the national level:

a) Access to essential health care, including maternity care;

b) Basic income security for children, providing access to nutrition, education, care and any other necessary goods and services;

c) Basic income security for persons in active age who are unable to earn sufficient income, in particular in cases of sickness, unemployment, maternity and disability; and

d) Basic income security for older persons. (ILO, 2012a, p. 5)

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8 A close reading of the SPF documents raised some questions about whether migrants are also taken into consideration in this policy idea. Although “providing basic social guarantees” to all is the key concern, whether the coverage will be based on residency or nationality or any other criteria has been debated in the SPF-related platforms and publications (Deacon, 2013a, pp. 90-91).
This most recent version of the concept was also featured in the ILO’s milestone 

All mentions of the SPF in the following chapters refer to this definition.

Deacon explains that as the concept evolved from its very early versions to the most recent version, it went through the following changes:

...the shift of the SPF from being a defined benefits package to a set of guarantees to be ensured by governments in ways they see fit, the shift from the SPF being a global social floor to being a set of national SPFs, and from it being a global social contract to something that would be essentially national responsibility. The question as to whether the SPF would be primarily about social transfers or also access to services is also addressed. (2013a, p. 37)

2.4 Staircase Approach

National SPFs constitute the foundation of the policy approach promoted through the SPF-I. Specifically, national SPFs are encouraged as a component of a two-dimensional strategy for the extension of social security: A horizontal dimension refers to establishing national SPFs, while a vertical dimension refers to building on the ground floor of social protection and progressively extending social security (ILO, 2012a, pp. 3-7) (see Figure 2.1).
2.5 SPF-I as the Case Study

As noted in Chapter 1, it has long been established in the global social policy literature that international organizations have their distinct perspectives (as well as their strong disagreements) about how development issues should be addressed. Therefore, grand promises made in the global platforms to address development issues do not always translate into coordinated actions among international organizations at the local, national, regional, or international levels. In the global social policy field, and in particular in the social protection sector, there is an increased effort between the socially-oriented and economically-oriented international organizations to collaborate in order to achieve a common set of development goals. The 2005 World Summit was a
turning point as the UN General Assembly invited the Secretary-General to investigate ways of strengthening the UN system-wide coherence, resulting in the “Delivering as One” approach at the country level with “one leader, one programme, one budget, and, where appropriate, one office” (UN website).⁹

When the UNCEB came up with the SPF-I as one of the Joint Crisis Initiatives, it emphasized the crucial role that the “Delivering as One” initiative can play with the “cooperation of the relevant Organizations under the umbrella of the UN coherence” (ILO & WHO, 2009, p. 12). In other words, the SPF-I came into being within this context of collaboration and cooperation. The SPF-I aimed to develop “coordinated efforts at the country, regional, and global levels.”¹⁰ A multi-layered approach proposed by the SPF-I involved coordination at three levels: at the country level by creating national SPF teams and integrating the SPF into United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs), United Nations Partnership Frameworks (UNPAFs), and One-UN Programs; at the regional level by creating a regional working group on social protection with the leadership of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Regional Chair; and at the global level through the UN post-2015 development agenda.

The SPF-I exemplified a unique case in several ways. For instance, one does not often encounter instances where the heads of the ILO and the IMF make a global call together

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⁹ For further details, see http://www.un.org/en/ga/deliveringasone/.
to address the social consequences of the economic downturn. It is not common for
the IMF to argue that it is possible to make room for expanding basic social security
programmes (towards the SPF) in a way that “does not present a threat to fiscal
sustainability” (Cunha, Pellerano, Mueller, Lledo, Xiao, & Gitton, 2013). Furthermore, it
is rare to see concepts mainly promoted by the ILO (such as the SPF) to show up in the
IMF country reports (see IMF, 2011a, 2011b, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e,
2014a, 2014b). Similarly, the heads of the ILO and the World Bank do not come together
often to establish “a joint mission and plan of action” by using the ILO concepts and
terminology, and announce that “it is time to join forces to make [universal social
protection] happen.” In this respect, the fact that a wide range of socially-oriented and
economically-oriented international organizations have collaborated around, and
endorsed, the SPF policy makes the SPF-I a unique case that is worth investigating in
depth.

The next chapter presents the conceptual framework that will be used to map out the
characteristics of policy adoption for the six selected international organizations.

11 Regarding the joint document prepared by the ILO and the IMF, see
http://www.osloconference2010.org/discussionpaper.pdf. See also
12 For the joint statement, see http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/who-we-are/ilo-director-
Chapter 3: Policy Adoption Matrix: Breaking Policy Adoption Down to Its Sub-Components

Chapter 1 defined policy adoption as “the extent to which an international organization commits its resources (be it staff, money, knowledge, and expertise among others) for the development, promotion and the implementation of a policy.” It also noted the lack of studies in the literature that sees policy adoption as an aggregated concept. In my attempt to understand varying policy adoption levels of different international organizations, I intend to break policy adoption down to its sub-components.

3.1 Policy Adoption Matrix

I propose to break down policy adoption into five sub-components: the speed and the timing of formal adoption, the level of commitment, the breadth of organizational buy-in, and the scope of adoption (see Figure 3.1).

The speed of formal adoption refers to the pace of policy adoption. While some institutions are quick to adopt the policy, others take longer. The speed of policy adoption (slow, medium or fast) is assessed based on two benchmark points: the point at which an international organization becomes aware of the policy, and the point at which it picks up the policy.13

13 Here, “picking up a policy” means the international organizations’ first formal engagement with the policy.
Figure 3.1: Policy Adoption Matrix

**The speed of policy adoption**
- Is the IO’s policy adoption **slow** or **fast**?
- When was the IO aware of the policy?
- When did the IO pick up the policy?
- Did the IO pick up the policy immediately after it became aware of the policy?

**The timing of policy adoption**
- Does the IO buy into the policy **early** or **late**?
- When was the formal launch of the policy initiative?
- When did the IO pick up the policy?
- Did the IO pick up the policy before or after the formal launch of the policy initiative?

**The level of commitment**
- Does the IO demonstrate **low** or **high** level of commitment?
- Did the IO attend key meetings regularly?
- Did the IO organize meetings?
- Did the IO publish on the topic?
- Did the IO create a working group or a committee?
- Did the IO invest in the initiative?

**The breadth of organizational buy-in**
- Is the organizational buy-in **limited** to a single department or **widespread** in the organization?
- Who/which departments represented the organization in key meetings?
- Which departments organized events on the topic?
- Which departments made references to the policy in its publications?

**The scope of policy adoption**
- Does the IO adopt the policy **selectively** or **comprehensively**?
- Did the IO use the policy concept?
- Did the IO just mention the concept or elaborate on it?
- Did the IO diverge from the original formulation of the concept?

**The aggregate level of policy adoption**
- Is the IO a **policy leader, policy follower** or **policy supporter**?
- Where is the IO located on the policy adoption scale?
The timing of policy adoption (early or late) is assessed on the basis of a reference point at which all international organizations have had the opportunity to adopt the policy. This reference point indicates the formal launch of the policy initiative. The international organizations that picked up the policy before this reference point will be identified as early adopters, while the international organizations that followed after will be identified as late adopters. Those, who picked up the policy at around the launch of the policy initiative, will be identified as moderate in terms of the timing of their policy adoption.

The level of commitment is assessed in a number of ways. Attending key meetings regularly, organizing meetings to disseminate the policy idea within and outside the organization, publishing on the topic, creating a working group or a committee to help advance the work on the policy, and investing in the initiative are indicators of the organizations’ level of commitment. International organizations will be categorized according to their low, medium, or high level of commitment.

The breadth of organizational buy-in relates to the question of whether the policy has been confined to a specific department or a unit within an institution or whether it has been circulated widely. The following questions are crucial to operationalize the level of organizational buy-in: Who/which departments represented the organization in key meetings? Which departments organized events on the topic and/or made references to the policy in its publications?
The scope of policy adoption refers to the extent to which an organization embraces the policy idea. This variable is operationalized by looking at whether the organization uses the policy concept as is or whether it diverges from the original formulation of the concept. Accordingly, international organizations will be identified as selective or comprehensive adopters.

Finally, the aggregate level of policy adoption aims to capture where in the policy adoption scale any given international organization is located (see Figure 3.2). International organizations that are fast, early, comprehensive adopters with high level of commitment and widespread organizational buy-in are close to one extreme of the policy adoption scale and can be identified as policy leaders. International organizations that are slow, late, selective adopters with low level of commitment and limited organizational buy-in are located in the other extreme of the spectrum and can be identified as policy supporters. International organizations that fall in between can be identified as policy followers.

**Figure 3.2: Policy Adoption Scale**
These categorizations are inspired by various scholarly studies. For instance, Crain uses the terms “opinion leaders” and “followers” (1966, pp. 471-472). Gray call states “leaders” or “laggards” while studying their innovativeness (1973, p. 1184) (she adds that there are also states that fall “in the middle range of innovativeness”, which is the third category of innovativeness in her analysis). While presenting institutional isomorphism, Drezner uses the concepts of “laggard states” and “global leaders” as following: “Laggard states emulate the practices of global leaders, causing a convergence of regulatory policies in the process” (2001, p. 61). In another study, Abbott and DeViney state “[p]erhaps individual characteristics determine where on the list of all adopters of particular programs particular countries tend to fall; some may be leaders, others followers” (1992, p. 248). Similarly, Walker refers to “pioneering states” and “laggard states” (1969, p. 895).

In light of the literature, the concepts of “policy leader,” “policy follower,” and “policy laggard” have been considered to refer to the three categories of international organizations. While the first two concepts fit well in this study, the concept of “policy laggard” has been replaced with “policy supporter” due to the following reasons. First, the concept of “policy laggard” implies time and being late. In this study, timing of policy adoption is only one of the five sub-components of policy adoption, therefore a concept that implies time cannot be used to refer to the aggregate level of policy adoption. Second, the concept of “policy laggard” has negative connotations when compared to “policy supporter.” All of the six selected international organizations engaged in the SPF
policy and adopted it at varying levels. Accordingly, the variation in policy adoption levels of international organizations is the dependent variable. In this respect, the “policy supporter” concept aims to capture a degree of variation in policy adoption, rather than the extreme opposite of the “policy leader” concept.

It is important to note that the “policy supporter” concept does not capture the content of the category perfectly, either. Section 3.3 and later Chapter 6 explain in detail that the international organizations that are identified as policy supporters are not always very supportive of the SPF policy. However, they play a supportive/complementary role in the SPF-I process. In sum, this study prefers the “policy supporter” concept to “policy laggard,” while acknowledging that neither is perfect in capturing the content of the category.

Regarding the policy adoption scale, for each international organization, I look at each variable and assign 1 for low, 2 for medium/moderate, and 3 for high.\textsuperscript{14} An international organization can score a maximum of 15 in the policy adoption scale (if it is identified as an early, fast and comprehensive adopter with a high level of commitment and widespread organizational buy-in). Conversely, the lowest possible score can be a 5 (when an international organization is a late, slow and selective adopter with a low level

\textsuperscript{14} The reason why I assign 1 (instead of 0) for low is that it can be misleading if an international organization scores low in all sub-components of the policy adoption matrix. A sub-total of 0 might be confusing and might raise questions about whether or not policy adoption occurred in a given international organization. It is important to remind that all six international organizations studied in this dissertation project adopted the SPF, though at varying levels.
of commitment and limited organizational buy-in). In the policy adoption scale, 10 is the median, which corresponds to the category of policy follower. International organizations, which score 9 or 11, also fall in this category.

The following section presents my data collection methods and then my analyses of the six international organizations under investigation based on the five parameters (as well as the aggregate level) introduced in the policy adoption matrix.

### 3.2 Data Collection Methods

In order to determine the speed of formal adoption, it was necessary to trace back the evolution of the concept of the SPF and identify when international organizations became aware of this policy. Academic sources, international organizations’ databases, and online searches were helpful to identify the publications and presentations in which the earlier versions of the SPF were mentioned before the formal launch of the Initiative. Once a reference point for policy awareness was identified, this was confirmed during the interviews with experts and key informants.

With regards to the timing of policy adoption, there was a need to identify a reference point, which indicates the formal launch of the initiative. *Global Financial and Economic Crisis – UN System Joint Crisis Initiatives* document presents the required details regarding the launch of the Initiative (see UNCEB, 2009).

In order to assess both the speed and the timing of policy adoption, it was also necessary to identify when each international organization picked up the policy.
International organizations can be considered as picking up the policy when they formally engage in the policy for the first time, which can be observed through their publications that make clear reference to the policy, and the events with a particular focus on the policy that they organize/attend, among others. In order to identify when each international organization first picked up the policy, a detailed database search was conducted in the six selected international organizations’ websites. Different variations of the term “social protection floor” were used as the search phase. The publications and events that were identified as an evidence of the first formal engagement with the policy were later confirmed during interviews.

Regarding the questions about the level of commitment, the documents collected from the Global Extension of Social Security (GESS) website and later from the social-protection.org website regarding the key SPF meetings (i.e. Show and Tell events, Inter-agency technical meetings, and Social Protection Inter-agency Cooperation Board meetings) helped answer some of these. More specifically, the meeting-related documents (including meeting reports, participants’ lists, meeting agendas and the participants’ presentations) provided data about whether the specific international organization under investigation attended the key SPF meetings. These documents were also very useful in the sense that representatives from each international organization usually made a presentation about the progress made within their institution regarding social protection. In addition, the international organizations’ own websites were very

15 Note that the data for Show and Tell 2007 and 2008 meetings are not available.
helpful to collect data with regards to whether they organize events and publish on the topic, create a working group, and/or invest in the Initiative.\footnote{16}

Pertaining to the breadth of organizational buy-in, data about who represented the institution in the key SPF meetings was useful. The names of representatives from each international organization, as well as their affiliated departments were obtained from the GESS and social-protection.org websites. In addition, in order to answer the questions about which departments organized events on the topic and made references to the policy, information/publications gathered from each international organization’s website were examined.

In order to determine the scope of policy adoption, the documents gathered from the above-mentioned websites constituted the starting point. Documents of any kind (publications, event announcements, speeches among many others) were used as an input for the content analysis to determine whether each international organization’s use of the concept is in line with the original formulation of the SPF.\footnote{17}

\footnote{16} Triangulation in data collection ensured that the analysis is not based on only international organizations’ publications or self-perceptions, which may be biased and incomplete.

\footnote{17} For the original (ILO’s) formulation of the SPF, see Chapter 2.
### 3.3 Policy Adoption Levels of the International Organizations

#### Table 3.1: Comparison of the Six Selected International Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Adoption</th>
<th>UNICEF</th>
<th>UNDP</th>
<th>WHO</th>
<th>OECD</th>
<th>WB</th>
<th>IMF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speed of policy adoption</td>
<td>Fast (3)</td>
<td>Fast (3)</td>
<td>Fast (3)</td>
<td>Moderate (2)</td>
<td>Slow (1)</td>
<td>Slow (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing of policy adoption</td>
<td>Early (3)</td>
<td>Early (3)</td>
<td>Early (3)</td>
<td>Moderate (2)</td>
<td>Late (1)</td>
<td>Late (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of commitment</td>
<td>High (3)</td>
<td>Moderate (2)</td>
<td>Moderate (2)</td>
<td>Moderate (2)</td>
<td>Moderate (2)</td>
<td>Low (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breadth of organizational buy-in</td>
<td>Widespread (3)</td>
<td>Widespread (3)</td>
<td>Moderate (2)</td>
<td>Moderate (2)</td>
<td>Limited (1)</td>
<td>Limited-Moderate (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope of policy adoption</td>
<td>Comprehensive (3)</td>
<td>Comprehensive (3)</td>
<td>Comprehensive (3)</td>
<td>Moderate (2)</td>
<td>Selective (1)</td>
<td>Selective (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate level of policy adoption</td>
<td>Policy leader (15)</td>
<td>Policy leader (14)</td>
<td>Policy leader (13)</td>
<td>Policy follower (10)</td>
<td>Policy supporter (6)</td>
<td>Policy supporter (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3.1 The speed of policy adoption

The differences among the six organizations are very significant in terms of their speed of formal adoption. The speed of policy adoption can be determined by looking at when policy awareness was created and when the policy was picked up by the organization.

In the case of the SPF-I, the international development actors (including the selected international organizations) were aware of the SPF policy before the launch of the Initiative that took place in April 2009 (see UNCEB, 2009). The earlier versions of the concept came up in Somavia’s and van Ginneken’s writings and presentations in 2000 (see Deacon, 2013a; Somavia, 2000; van Ginneken, 2000). Later in 2004, the report prepared by the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Development entitled A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All argued for a “socio-economic floor for global economy” (ILO, 2004a). Although the concept was not yet in its most recent version, it was used in a similar fashion with the SPF as it was built on the principles of universality and human rights. The Commission’s Report (ILO, 2004a) argued for “a minimum level of social protection” (p. xiii) “for all citizens” (p.66) provided on the basis of “human rights and human dignity” (p.5). Since the Commission was established by the ILO and had limited reach,\(^{18}\) the concept might not have come to the attention of all

selected international organizations yet. Therefore, it cannot be taken as a reference point in this analysis as a time when the selected international organizations in this study became aware of the policy.

The next effort to create awareness about the SPF was the Show and Tell meeting (at the same time the 1st Inter-Agency Information Exchange on Social Protection meeting) that took place in Geneva in February 2006. It is important to highlight that the concept of the SPF still did not exist in any of the presentations and documents although the core idea was there, i.e. “progressive universalism pursued through the global campaign” which aimed to expand the benefits coverage and the population coverage progressively over time (see ILO, 2006a). The figure presented in that meeting looked very much like Figure 2.1, which is the full two-stage version of the SPF concept, including both the horizontal and the vertical dimensions (ILO, 2006a). All of the six selected international organizations along with other key development partners participated in that Show and Tell meeting in 2006 and therefore became aware of the new policy idea following the meeting. Hence, February 2006 is taken as the reference point for the international organizations’ awareness.19

19 The fact that the concept of the SPF had not been mentioned at that point does not pose a problem in this analysis. As long as the policy idea that is being discussed is more or less the same with the SPF, it was considered sufficient. If the first mention of the SPF is taken as a reference point instead, then the contributions of other development actors in refining and developing the concept cannot be taken into consideration. The nuanced approach developed here allows for the international organizations’ involvement in the policy development process, part of which took place before the launch of the Initiative.
The next question is how fast each international organization picked up the new policy idea with regards to this reference point. A comprehensive search of evidence for the international organizations’ first formal engagement with the SPF policy and the SPF-I process revealed the following dates:

- UNDP: “Coalition for A Global Social Floor” in 2007
- WHO: “Coalition for A Global Social Floor” in 2007
- OECD: “Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Social Protection” in 2009
- World Bank: “Towards a Social Protection Strategy” in 2010
- IMF: “Discussion paper prepared for the Oslo Conference” in 2010

The founding document of the “Coalition for a Global Social Floor” (2007) indicates that the UN specialized agencies, including the WHO, the UNICEF, and the UNDP (along with some bilateral agencies and NGOs) were identified as the first points of contact for the promotion of the policy. With the Coalition, these three international organizations started to engage in the efforts to refine the policy idea and to promote it at the global fora as a key strategy in alleviating poverty and achieving development. Therefore, according to my definition, they have been fast adopters. The OECD followed the UN specialized agencies in terms of its speed of policy adoption. The Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) Network on Poverty Reduction (POVNET) published *Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Social Protection* with a few references to the SPF concept (see OECD, 2009a). The same year, a *Draft Summary Record of the POVNET Meeting*
briefly mentioned SPF with reference to its 2011-2012 Work Programme (see OECD, 2009b). Although the OECD did not pick up the policy immediately after the 2006 Show and Tell meeting, it did not take long to integrate the policy idea in its publications and discussions. Hence, it has a medium pace in its adoption of the policy. Different from the four international organizations discussed above, the World Bank and the IMF adopted the policy with a slow pace. The World Bank’s first formal engagement with the policy idea was through its publication entitled *Towards a Social Protection Strategy for the Poor and the Vulnerable* dated August 2010 (see WB, 2010).20 Finally, the IMF’s formal engagement with the SPF policy comes with the Oslo Conference background paper prepared in collaboration with the ILO in October 2010 (see ILO & IMF, 2010).

Therefore, the World Bank and the IMF were relatively slower in catching up with the UN specialized agencies and the OECD in terms of their first formal engagement with the SPF policy. As a result, they are identified as slow adopters.

### 3.3.2 The timing of policy adoption

In terms of the timing of policy adoption, whether the organization picked up the policy before or after the launch of the SPF-I determines whether it is an early or late adopter.

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20 Please note that this is a curated study on Cambodia by the World Bank and that it was prepared in collaboration with a range of other agencies. For further details, please see http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/08/15757508/towards-social-protection-strategy-poor-vulnerable
The UNICEF, the UNDP, and the WHO, were involved in the SPF process before the launch of the Initiative, and therefore can be identified as early adopters. With the “Coalition for a Global Social Floor” in 2007, these three international organizations engaged in the formulation of the policy and its dissemination before the formal launch of the Initiative in April 2009. When the SPF-I was launched, the UNICEF, the UNDP, and the WHO were already enrolled in the process as UN specialized agencies. The OECD’s first formal engagement with the SPF policy was soon after the launch of the Initiative.

As noted above, the SPF came up first in its publication entitled *Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Social Protection* in 2009 (see OECD, 2009a). Therefore, the OECD falls somewhere in between being an early and a late adopter. Finally, the World Bank and the IMF were the last to formally engage in the SPF policy. The World Bank’s *Towards a Social Protection Strategy* paper and the IMF’s *Oslo Conference Discussion Paper* came well after the launch of the Initiative (August 2010 and September 2010 consecutively). Hence, they can be categorized as late adopters.

### 3.3.3 The level of commitment

Levels of commitment vary significantly among the six international organizations. One way of assessing the level of commitment is observing the participation of the representatives from the selected international organizations in the key SPF meetings. Table 3.2 presents a list of key SPF meetings as well as the international organizations’ participation in each meeting. The UNICEF has attended all of the key SPF meetings. The UNDP, the WHO, and the OECD have also demonstrated high level of commitment in
terms of their participation in the key SPF meetings. The World Bank has followed the UN specialized agencies as it has missed a few meetings. Finally, the IMF participation has been relatively low.

Second way of assessing the level of commitment is examining whether the selected international organizations organized events on the SPF. In 2015, the heads of the ILO and the World Bank organized a meeting to issue a “Shared Mission for Universal Social Protection” and to launch a joint plan of action to achieve this mission (ILO & WB, 2015; see WB, 2015a). The World Bank’s contribution in terms of organizing events was not limited to this high level meeting on the SPF. It is also important to note that the World Bank has been co-chairing the Social Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation Board (SPIAC-B) meetings since 2012. With regards to the IMF, earlier in 2010, the Fund organized the Oslo Conference with the ILO, where the heads of these Organizations “agreed to explore the concept of a social protection floor” (IMF, 2010; see also ILO & IMF, 2010).

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22 Please note that the Oslo Conference was not a stand alone SPF event. However, the SPF was featured as one of the key topics in the meeting.
Table 3.2: Participation in the Key SPF Meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF THE MEETING23</th>
<th>SELECTED IOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Agency Technical Meeting, October 2009</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Agency Technical Meeting, November 2010</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Agency Technical Meeting, March 2011</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Agency Technical Meeting, January 2012</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show and Tell Meeting, February 2006</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show and Tell Meeting, June 2009</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show and Tell Meeting May 2010</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show and Tell Meeting May 2011</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection Inter-Agency Board (SPIAC-B) Meeting, July 2012</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection Inter-Agency Board (SPIAC-B) Meeting, October 2012</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection Inter-Agency Board (SPIAC-B) Meeting, February 2013</td>
<td>✓24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection Inter-Agency Board (SPIAC-B) Meeting, October 2013</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection Inter-Agency Board (SPIAC-B) Meeting, May 2014</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection Inter-Agency Board (SPIAC-B) Meeting, February 2015</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection Inter-Agency Board (SPIAC-B) Meeting, November 2015</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23 See footnote 15.
24 WHO was represented by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), which is its regional office.
Another way of assessing the level of commitment is looking at whether the selected international organizations published on the SPF. The WHO collaborated with the ILO for the publication of the two key SPF documents at the initial stages of the Initiative. These documents are called *A Joint Crisis Initiative of the UN Chief Executive Board for Co-ordination on the Social Protection Floor and Manual and Strategic Framework for Joint UN Country Operations* (ILO & WHO, 2009a, 2009b). The UNICEF made a notable contribution by developing (in collaboration with the ILO) the *Social Protection Floor Costing Tool* and publishing an *Explanatory Note* about it (ILO & UNICEF, 2011). In the case of the UNDP, its publication entitled *Successful Social Protection Floor Experiences: Sharing Innovative Experiences*, where 18 country cases were presented, is noteworthy (see ILO & UNDP, 2011). Furthermore, a letter co-signed by the UNDP Administrator Helen Clark and the ILO Director General Guy Ryder was sent out to Resident Coordinators and UN Country Teams to advance their work on the SPF (Clark & Ryder, 2014). In 2011, the OECD collaborated with the ILO for the G20 Labour and Employment Ministers meetings for a policy note. This document was entitled *Towards National Social Protection Floors* and it included sections, such as “Growing international support for the social protection floor approach” and “Recommendations of the Social Protection Floor Advisory Group to the G20” (ILO & OECD, 2011). Furthermore, the

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25 For further details, see http://www.socialprotectionfloor-gateway.org/24.htm
26 It is important to remind the dual role that Helen Clark has had at the time of signing this letter. She is the Administrator of the UNDP and the Chair of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) at the same time. She signed the letter as the UNDG Chair, yet her endorsement of the SPF-I as the UNDG Chair also brought heightened awareness and increased responsibility for the UNDP within the SPF-I framework.
OECD published *Global Social Protection Floor* and laid out its work programme around the SPF policy (see OECD, 2011a). With regards to the World Bank, the President of the Bank (together with the Director-General of the ILO) issued a statement called *Shared Mission for Universal Social Protection* and launched a joint plan of action to achieve this mission, where the SPF policy is a key feature (ILO & WB, 2015; see WB, 2015a). As for the IMF’s publications, a report entitled *Towards Effective and Fiscally Sustainable Social Protection Floors* was prepared in collaboration with the ILO (see ILO & IMF, 2012). This report explored and presented the feasibility of national social protection floors in three pilot countries, namely Mozambique, Viet Nam and El Salvador (ILO & IMF, 2012). The IMF also collaborated with the ILO for the preparation of a discussion paper for the Oslo Conference. Although the discussion paper is not exclusively about the SPF, it features the SPF policy as a key component.

Regarding the question of creating a working group or a committee, the following committees and working groups contributed to the promotion and the dissemination of the SPF: the UNICEF’s Social Protection Steering Committee and Task Force (see UNICEF, 2012), the OECD DAC’s Social Protection Task Team (see OECD, 2011a), and the IMF’s Working Group on Jobs and Inclusive Growth27 (see IMF, 2010).

Finally, with regards to the financial contribution made for the Initiative, since “A Global Fund for Social Protection Floors” is a work in progress, at the time of writing, financial

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27 Please note that this working group does not specifically focus on the SPF.
contributions of international organizations cannot be assessed as an indicator of their level of commitment for the Initiative.

In sum, the UNICEF demonstrates high level of commitment, the IMF demonstrates low level of commitment and the remaining four international organizations demonstrate medium level of commitment.

### 3.3.4 The breadth of organizational buy-in

In terms of the breadth of organizational buy-in, Table 3.3 presents the sections/units/divisions/departments represented in the key SPF meetings (which were listed in Table 3.2).

In the case of the UNICEF, more than one unit/section under the Division of Policy and Strategy represented the organization in the key SPF meetings, with a potential for the SPF policy to reach a wider segment of the Organization. Furthermore, the UNICEF’s Social Protection Steering Committee and Task Force (see UNICEF, 2012) demonstrated that the UNICEF made an effort to mainstream social protection in its policy advice and implementations. Extensive publications with references to the SPF at the national and regional level by various departments further validate its widespread organizational buy-in.

For the key SPF meetings, the UNDP sent representatives from its Bureau for Policy and Programme Support, from the United Nations Partnership on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNPRPD) Technical Secretariat and also sometimes from its regional offices.
Table 3.3 Participating Sections/Units/Divisions/Departments in Selected IOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the IO</th>
<th>Name of the Section/Unit/Division/Department</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNICEF</strong></td>
<td>Child Poverty and Social Protection Unit within Policy Analysis Section, Division of Policy and Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poverty Analysis and Social Protection within Social Inclusion, Policy and Budgeting Section, Division of Policy and Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDP</strong></td>
<td>Bureau for Policy and Programme Support (including the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth – IPC-IG, Poverty Group, and Development Planning and Inclusive Sustainable Growth team)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Nations Partnership on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNPRPD) Technical Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Bureaus (including Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WHO</strong></td>
<td>Department of Country Cooperation and United Nations Collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health Systems Governance and Financing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P4H Social Health Protection Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OECD</strong></td>
<td>Development Cooperation Directorate, Development Assistance Committee (DCD-DAC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Protection, Social Cohesion Unit, Development Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Policy Division, Directorate of Employment, Labour and Social Affairs (ELS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>World Bank</strong></td>
<td>Social Protection and Labour Sector, Human Development Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Protection and Labour Global Practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IMF</strong></td>
<td>Strategy, Policy and Review Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government Finance Division, Statistics Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Research Department</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The interview participants noted that the focal point for the SPF work within the UNDP was unclear for a short period of time and the UNPRPD’s representation in the SPIAC-B meeting was coincidental rather than on purpose at that time period. Despite temporary coordination problems, Helen Clark’s letter dated 24 March 2014, which was sent to Resident Coordinators and UN Country Teams, was a significant step to reach country offices and implied widespread organizational buy-in (see Clark & Ryder, 2014). This letter also helped the UNDP avoid any possible challenges that could have been associated with its decentralized organizational structure. Overall, the UNDP demonstrates widespread organizational buy-in, which is also evident in the UNDP publications at the global, regional, and national levels with clear references to the SPF.

The WHO was represented by various departments (such as the Department of Country Cooperation and United Nations Collaboration, Health Systems Governance and Financing, and P4H Social Protection Network) in the key SPF meetings. Despite the interest from various departments to the key SPF meetings, the concept of the SPF has not found its way extensively into the WHO’s publications or implementations. This demonstrates moderate level of organizational buy-in.

The OECD sends mixed signals in terms of its breadth of organizational buy in. The Development Cooperation Directorate’s DAC, the Directorate of Employment, Labour and Social Affairs (DELSA), as well as the Social Cohesion Unit in Development Centre represented the Organization in the key SPF meetings. This way, the SPF policy has reached very diverse forums within the OECD. For instance, DELSA provides a channel to
disseminate the SPF policy to the OECD member countries. DAC (and in particular, its
POVNET) provides an entry point for the SPF policy to the donor community, whose
main focus is alleviating poverty and achieving development (not in the OECD countries
but) in the developing world. Finally, Development Centre provides a forum for
representatives from both the developed and the developing world. Despite such
representation from the OECD in the key SPF related meetings, key informants pointed
out to the fact that the demise of the POVNET hindered the SPF work at the OECD
(particularly in DAC) and limited it mainly to the Development Centre at later stages. In
terms of the publications, the OECD has made clear references to the SPF policy, but not
extensively. As a result, the OECD demonstrates medium level of organizational buy-in.

At the World Bank, the SPF policy is very much confined to the Social Protection and
Labour Global Practice.\textsuperscript{28} This Global Practice is the focal point for the SPIAC-B meetings
and any SPF-related correspondence/work. The efforts made at the leaders’ level with
the Joint Mission Statement between the ILO and the World Bank did not seem to help
disseminate the policy outside the Social Protection and Labour Global Practice yet.
Furthermore, the number of the World Bank publications with clear references to the
SPF has been low. Therefore, the breadth of organizational buy-in remains limited in the
case of the World Bank.

\textsuperscript{28} As a result of the institutional restructuring at the World Bank, the Social Protection and
Labour sector of the Human Development Network was included in the Social Protection and
Labour Global Practice.
Similar to the World Bank, the leaders’ statement at the Oslo Conference did not help the SPF policy reach to the entire Operation’s Department at the IMF. A concrete evidence to support that claim is the IMF country reports. Only a few IMF country reports (focusing on Mozambique, Mauritania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Jamaica) make reference to the SPF (see IMF, 2011a, 2011b, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e, 2014a, 2014b). However, it should be noted that the IMF has made efforts to include other relevant departments when an opportunity arises, especially in the context of pilot studies. For instance, when the ILO and the IMF collaborated on a pilot project on Mozambique (regarding a national SPF), the IMF engaged its Fiscal Affairs Department (to assess how to create fiscal space) and also its Regional Departments. Yet, these instances were very limited in numbers. Furthermore, the Oslo Conference was organized by the Research Department and the Strategy, Policy and Review Department. In other words, it involved more than one department. However, in terms of the publications, the references to the SPF policy remained minimal. Therefore, the Fund’s organizational buy-in is identified as limited to medium.

3.3.5 The scope of policy adoption

Content analysis of all publications by the selected international organizations including the keyword “social protection floor” provides insights about the scope of policy adoption in each international organization. The survey of data reveals that international organizations differ according to whether they adopt the policy as is or whether they diverge significantly from the original formulation of the SPF by the ILO.
The UNICEF, the UNDP, and the WHO often follow the ILO’s conception of the SPF as it is in line with these international organizations’ social policy approach. Hence, these three international organizations can be classified as comprehensive adopters. More specifically, all the three international organizations support universal provision of social services and transfers on human-rights grounds. UNDG Chair Helen Clark’s words reiterate the UN’s position on universal provision of social policies:

> The UN sees social protection not only as a set of policies and instruments to protect people in situations of vulnerability, but also as empowering. Effective social protection goes wider than traditional concepts of social safety nets, the aim of which is usually only to protect households from falling below a critical threshold of well-being in times of shock. (Clark, 2012)

In contrast, the OECD is hesitant to opt for universalist approach, although it acknowledges the benefits of it. There are a couple of documents to better understand the OECD’s approach to social protection. The first document is a policy guidance document entitled *Social Protection, Poverty Reduction and Pro-Poor Growth* (OECD, 2009a). This document compares and contrasts the targeted and universal approaches to social protection and opts for “a comprehensive mix of instruments that appropriately addresses coverage and targeting” (pp. 28-30). Another document is called *Perspectives on Global Development 2012*. This report raises concerns about social protection systems that “leave a ‘missing middle’ in their coverage” and discusses innovative strategies in social insurance, one of which is *universal entitlement* (OECD,
Since the OECD does not single out universalism in its policy approach, it will be categorized neither as selective nor comprehensive adopter, but somewhere in between in terms of the scope of its policy adoption.

The World Bank and the IMF are selective in their policy adoption as they tailor the concept to fit it within their policy perspectives. Neither the World Bank nor the IMF embrace the ILO’s idea of a “floor” understood as universal coverage, and therefore they do not elaborate on the concept. As strong defenders of a targeted approach (as opposed to a universalist approach), their emphasis on “safety nets” and “conditional cash transfers” indicates a very selective adoption of the policy. In principle, their approach points to a non-universal or targeted coverage, of the poorest of the poor in the society. For instance, the World Bank’s State of Safety Nets 2015 Report is a clear indication of a continued preference of safety nets over the SPF (see WB, 2015b).

Furthermore, in the publication entitled Towards a Social Protection Strategy for the Poor and the Vulnerable, the World Bank presents SPF in a separate box, which looks more like an acknowledgement of the SPF policy rather than endorsement (WB, 2010).

The same document states that "[s]ocial protection, safety nets and the Social Protection Floor Initiative are concepts at the heart of this strategy" (WB, 2010, p. 24). Given that safety nets are targeted approaches and SPFs are universal approaches, it becomes contradictory to place these two concepts at the core of the World Bank’s social protection strategy.
3.3.6 The aggregate level of policy adoption

Finally, regarding the aggregate level, my analysis reveals that the UNICEF demonstrates the following characteristics: a fast, early and comprehensive policy adopter with high level of commitment and widespread organizational buy-in. The UNDP differs from the UNICEF slightly since it demonstrates moderate level of commitment, while all other components remain the same. The WHO can be identified as a fast, early and comprehensive policy adopter with moderate levels of commitment and organizational buy-in. The OECD scores moderate for every component of the policy adoption matrix. The World Bank can be identified as a slow, late, and selective adopter with moderate level of commitment and limited organizational buy-in. Finally, the IMF is very similar to the World Bank except that it demonstrates low level of commitment, while the other components remain the same.

When all five components of policy adoption are taken into consideration, according to my analysis, organizations range in terms of their scores in the adoption scale as the UNICEF gets 15, the UNDP gets 14, the WHO gets 13, the OECD gets 10, the World Bank gets 6 and the IMF get 5 in terms of their policy adoption scores (see Table 3.1). As far as the aggregate level is concerned, the UNICEF, the UNDP, and the WHO are closer to one extreme as policy leaders and the World Bank and the IMF are closer to the other extreme as policy supporters. The OECD falls in between as a policy follower.

The following chapters will explain what makes these international organizations policy leaders, followers and supporters.
Chapter 4:  Policy Leaders – The Cases of the WHO, the UNICEF, and the UNDP

4.1  Introduction

My analysis in the previous chapter revealed that the UNICEF demonstrates the following characteristics: a fast, early and comprehensive policy adopter with a high level of commitment and widespread organizational buy-in. The UNDP differs from the UNICEF slightly since it demonstrates a moderate level of commitment, while all other components are the same. The WHO is identified as a fast, early and comprehensive policy adopter with moderate levels of commitment and organizational buy in. Therefore, according to the policy adoption matrix presented in Chapter 3, all three international organizations fall in the category of “policy leaders.” This chapter tells the story of policy adoption in these international organizations and explains why they are policy leaders in the context of the SPF-I.

The following timelines aim to guide the discussions regarding policy adoption in the UNICEF, the UNDP, and the WHO.

Figure 4.1: SPF Timeline
Figure 4.2: ILO Timeline

- **Jun 2012**
  - ILO Recommendation No. 202
- **2013**
  - Social Security Department renamed
- **June 2015**
  - ILO Recommendation No. 204

Figure 4.3: WHO Timeline

- **2007**
  - Coalition for a Global Social Floor
- **Apr 2009**
  - WHO became the co-leader of the SPF-I
- **Aug 2010**
  - WHO formed the Advisory Group with the ILO

Figure 4.4: UNICEF Timeline

- **2007**
  - Coalition for a Global Social Floor
- **2009**
  - Isabel Ortiz joined the UNICEF
- **2012**
  - Isabel Ortiz left the UNICEF

Figure 4.5: UNDP Timeline

- **2007**
  - Coalition for a Global Social Floor
- **May 2014**
  - Letter by Helen Clark and Guy Ryder
4.2 Early Stages of the SPF Policy

As noted in Chapter 2, the origins of the SPF concept go back to the 1995 Social Summit. The earliest versions of the SPF concept appeared in Juan Somavia’s and Wouter van Ginneken’s writings in 2000 (see Somavia, 2000; van Ginneken, 2000). Since then, there have been a number of individuals, who played an important role in developing and disseminating this new global social policy idea. These influential individuals, or in Deacon’s words the “movers and shakers” of the SPF policy, are Juan Somavia (former ILO Director General), Michael Cichon (former Director of the Social Security Department29 at the ILO), Vinicius Pinheiro (former ILO Sherpa and the current head of the ILO New York), and Isabel Ortiz (formerly with the UN DESA and the UNICEF, the current Director of the Social Protection Department at the ILO) (Deacon, 2013a, pp. 151-152).

Most of these influential individuals have been affiliated with the ILO, making this international organization the hub of the policy idea, while Isabel Ortiz was with the UN DESA and then the UNICEF before transferring to the ILO as the Director of the Social Protection Department. Despite their affiliation and close ties with the ILO, the social policy idea that they had in mind was global in scope. Several interview participants noted that, in the early stages of the SPF policy, social protection, health, nutrition, 

29 The Social Security Department was later renamed as Social Protection Department (ILO website).
education, housing, water and sanitation among others were taken into consideration as potential components of this global social policy idea (see also ILO & WHO, 2009a).

After the early versions of the concept showed up in Somavia’s and van Ginneken’s writings as well as in the Report of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (see ILO, 2004a; Somavia, 2000; van Ginneken, 2000), the above-mentioned influential actors started reaching out to other actors to brainstorm about the name and the content of the policy.

The “Coalition for a Global Social Floor” was created in 2007 at a meeting gathered by Michael Cichon in Turin to discuss the SPF policy with other actors (Deacon, 2013a, p. 39). The founding document of the Coalition indicates that the UN specialized agencies, including the WHO, the UNICEF, and the UNDP (along with selected bilateral agencies, social partners and NGOs) were the first points of contact for the promotion of this policy idea (Coalition, 2007; see also Deacon, 2013a). These organizations were among the very first to engage in the SPF policy in its early stages.

These organizations shared a common understanding about human rights and universal coverage being the founding principles of a global social policy idea (see Ortiz, ed., 2007; UNDG, 2003). All of the three selected international organizations along with the ILO

30 The following members were proposed as core members of the Coalition: international organizations (namely UN DESA, UNDP Poverty Centre, ILO, UNICEF, UNFPA, and WHO), bilateral agencies (GTZ, DFID, and SIDA), social partners (namely ITUC and IOE), and NGOs (namely HELPAGE International, Save the Children, and International Council on Social Welfare) (Coalition, 2007, p. 3).
take the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as the basis for their social policy approaches. Accordingly, universal provision of social services is considered to be necessary from a human-rights point of view.

Deacon considers the Coalition as part of a series of UN efforts that eventually led to the launch of the SPF-I (2013a, pp. 104-105). The influential actors also decided to promote the policy idea through other platforms, including the Doha Financing for Development Conference (2008), the UN Commission for Social Development events (2008), and the UN General Assembly meetings (pp. 104-105). There was a general agreement among interview participants that the SPF policy became truly global with the SPF-I in April 2009.

4.3 Co-leaders of the Initiative and the SPF Policy

The ILO holding the rotating chair of the High Level Committee on Programs of the UNCEB created a fertile ground to include the SPF policy in the UN Joint Crisis Initiatives as a policy response to the global financial crisis (see Deacon, 2013b, p. 47). This is how the SPF policy moved from being an ILO policy to being a UN policy. The ILO has assumed a leadership role in the Initiative. As one of the interview participants pointed out, if there were a world governance structure, the ILO would have been the Ministry of Global Social Security. With the Declaration of Philadelphia, the ILO has been mandated to provide policy guidance on social security matters (ILO website) and
therefore it was a good fit to be the leader of the Initiative. However, it lacked expertise in the health field, therefore it reached out to the WHO.\textsuperscript{31} Several interviews underlined the ILO’s efforts and willingness to enrol the WHO in the SPF-I. Eventually, the ILO and the WHO became the responsible agencies to carry out the Initiative.

Immediately after the launch of the Initiative in 2009, the WHO and the ILO (in collaboration with the other cooperating agencies) combined their expertise to produce two key SPF documents entitled \textit{A Joint Crisis Initiative of the UN Chief Executives Board for Coordination on the Social Protection Floor} and \textit{Manual and Strategic Framework for Joint UN Country Operations} (see ILO & WHO, 2009a, 2009b). Along with the ILO, the WHO has been in the driver seat to set the guidelines for the SPF work in other organizations.

Furthermore, the ILO and the WHO formed the Advisory Group in August 2010 to bring global publicity to the SPF concept and mobilize support from other international actors (ILO, 2011). The Advisory Group consisted of Michelle Bachelet as the Chair (the President of Chile), Juan Somavia and Margaret Chan (heads of the ILO and the WHO consecutively), Vinicius Pinheiro (from the ILO) as the Executive Secretary, and the following Advisory Group members from academia, civil society and national governments: Aurelio Fernández López (EU Social Protection Committee), Ebrahim Patel

\textsuperscript{31} WHO’s main work areas are “health systems, promoting health through the life-course, noncommunicable diseases, communicable diseases, corporate services, preparedness, surveillance and response” (WHO website).
Yelda Gülderen

(South Africa), Eveline Herfkens (MDGs Campaign), Kemal Derviş (Brookings Institution), Margaret Wilson (University of Waikato), Martin Hirsch (former High Commissioner for Active Solidarity against Poverty), Sudha Pillai (India), and Zheng Silin (China).

The publication of the Bachelet Report by the Advisory Board was a landmark for the SPF-I. The members of the joint ILO-WHO Secretariat (namely Andrew Cassels, Assane Diop, David Evans, María Angélica Ducci, Michael Cichon, Peter Martens) helped produce this report (ILO, 2011, p. xvii). Furthermore, the International Labour Office, especially staff from its Social Security Department, provided extensive support. Altogether, these actors were influential in “enhance[ing] global advocacy and provid[ing] guidance on the conceptual and policy aspects of the social protection floor” (ILO, 2011, p. v).

4.3.1 The ILO

In the process leading up to the launch of the SPF-I as well as afterwards, the ILO has taken a few steps to make the organization an even better fit as the home of the SPF policy. The most significant step taken by the ILO in order to advance the SPF policy was the adoption of the Recommendation No. 202 Concerning National Floors of Social Protection (see ILO, 2012b). Annual International Labour Conferences, conventions, recommendations, and documents produced by the International Labour Office have been the key ways through which the ILO aims to shape employment and social welfare related reforms (Seekings, 2010). Several interview participants noted that the existing recommendations and conventions about social protection (for instance Convention No.
102) were out-dated and old-fashioned. Therefore, there was a need to develop new policy tools. According to the interview participants, although the initial idea was to adopt a (binding) convention around the SPF concept, the differences among constituents in terms of social protection perspectives and practices were not easily reconcilable. Therefore, the ILO settled on a recommendation, rather than a convention. In 2012, the International Labour Conference secured support from all of its constituents (unanimously) to adopt Recommendation No. 202, which Cichon considers “an important step ... to firmly establish social protection as part of national and global development strategies” (Cichon, 2013, p. 23).

With this Recommendation, the ILO not only developed a stand alone policy tool about the SPF policy (agreed to the tripartite constituents from member countries), but it also demonstrated an effort to extend social protection coverage beyond the formal sector (Cichon, 2013, p. 26-28). As an organization that has traditionally been concerned with labour and employment in the formal sector, the informal sector and unemployed had not been a main concern for the ILO. 32 This approach started changing in the second half of the 1990s (p. 26). In Recommendation No. 202, the ILO officially endorsed coverage for all and advised member states that they “should establish and maintain national social protection floors” through a horizontal extension of basic social security

32 This does not mean to say that the ILO has not addressed issues concerning informal economy before. For instance, the mention of the informal economy in the Conventions (No. 150 and 187) as well as in the Recommendations (No. 169, 189, 193, 195, 197, 198, and 200) prove that the ILO’s work aimed to address issues beyond the formal economy, even tough in a tangential way (see ILO, 1978, 1984, 1998, 2002, 2004b, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2010a).
guarantees (income and access to health) for all, along with a vertical dimension of extending coverage amongst vulnerable and excluded populations (ILO, 2012a, emphasis added) (see also Figure 2.1). Deacon and Stubbs see this as a change in the ILO’s dominant discourse from one that focuses on workers to one that considered residents (2013, p. 17).

Furthermore, the Social Security Department was renamed the Social Protection Department (ILO website). According to the ILO, social protection represents a broader concept when compared to social security as it includes both social (security) transfers and basic social services (see Appendix D). Since the ILO was putting forward a global social policy concept (where social transfers as well as social services were taken into consideration), social protection in the Department’s name indicated a broader mandate, according to the interview participants.

More recently, in 2015, when the ILO adopted Recommendation No. 204 Concerning the Transition from the Informal to the Formal Economy, it demonstrated further efforts to extend its scope and to resonate more with the Global South (see ILO, 2015). The fact that the ILO Conventions have mostly been concerned with worker-oriented systems of social insurance limited the ILO’s reach to the Global South where the informal sector plays a more prominent role in the labour market when compared to the Global North (Seekings, 2010, p. 147). In the context of the SPF-I, the ILO’s effort to reach both the developed and the developing world with Recommendation No. 204 made the ILO a
more suitable home for the SPF policy, which aims to guide national governments both in the Global South and the Global North in their social protection strategies.

The ILO has taken the above-mentioned steps to enhance its leadership position in the Initiative and mobilize its available sources to advance the SPF policy in the global agenda and to enrol as many actors as possible in the policy process.

4.3.2 The WHO

As these changes were taking place at the ILO, the WHO started sending mixed signals about its co-leadership position in the Initiative. The interview participants pointed out a couple of factors that were playing a role in the decline of the WHO’s level of commitment.

First, some interview participants argued that the WHO did not like the way the SPF policy was reformulated in the ILO’s Recommendation No. 202 in 2012, although the earlier (broader) versions of the SPF concept were appealing to the Organization. As noted in earlier sections, the SPF policy started with considerations of a range of social policy components, including health, nutrition, education, housing, water and sanitation (see ILO & WHO, 2009a). However, when the ILO was trying to institutionalize the SPF policy and get the support of the tripartite constituents, it could not introduce a recommendation that covers all social and economic rights, as it was far beyond the scope of the Organization. As a result, the ILO reduced the focus of the global social policy idea to a combination of basic income security and health (see ILO, 2012a,
Arguably, the price paid was that the boundaries of the concept narrowed down notably and that the policy idea became less attractive to the WHO.

Second, the interview participants suggested that the WHO was hit badly as a result of the financial crisis. A report prepared by the WHO Secretariat in 2012 presents that there was an 8.3% decline in the long-term staff and a 30.6% decline in the temporary staff between December 2010 and July 2012 (WHO, 2012, p. 2). Within the Organization, there were increasing concerns about the big deficit in the WHO’s budget (mostly triggered by the recent financial crisis), the staff reductions that came as a result of it (WHO, 2011, p. 3) as well as the Organization’s capacity to maintain its leadership in global health given the recent staff cuts (see WHO, 2013, p. 3).

Third, several interview participants underlined that the WHO has been busy with its own landmark P4H Initiative, which was launched during the G8 Summit in 2007 to promote universal health coverage (UHC) and social health protection (SHP) for all (see P4H website; WHO website).

The P4H Initiative and the SPF-I have many similarities and complement each other in several ways. First, both initiatives advocate for health coverage on a universal basis on human-rights grounds (see WHO, 2010a). Second, both international organizations have a multi-dimensional approach towards universal coverage (see Figure 2.1 and Figure 4.6). What the ILO calls the horizontal and vertical dimensions in Figure 2.1 corresponds to population coverage and service provision, respectively in Figure 4.6. Third, both organizations see social protection and health as part of an integrated approach rather
than two separate components (see Figure 4.7). While the SPF-I provides global advocacy for this integrated approach, P4H provides a policy framework to be applied at the country level (see ILO & WHO, 2009b, p. 13).

**Figure 4.6: Path Towards Universal Coverage**

(Source: WHO, 2010a, p. xv)
Figure 4.7: Providing for Health (P4H)

The WHO presentations made during the 2010 Show and Tell Meeting as well as the 2nd Inter Agency Technical Meeting on the CEB explicitly link the P4H strategy to the SPF-I (see WHO, 2010b, p. 3; WHO, 2010c, p. 9). The presentation made (by David Evans and Varatharajan Durairaj from the WHO) in the latter meeting has a slide with the title “The Path to Universal Coverage: SPF-I” where four ways of pursuing a path to universal coverage are explained:

1. Actively support countries who wish to develop and implement domestic health financing strategies, and consistent health plans, to move more quickly towards universal coverage.

2. Facilitate dialogue and understanding with ministries of finance and the
international financial institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and the regional development banks so that these plans can be developed and implemented.

3. Act as an information exchange, sharing experiences across countries of what has, and what has not worked in modifying financing systems for universal coverage.

4. Provide technical and policy support as requested and leverage support from others where necessary. (WHO, 2010c, p. 9)

The interview participants noted that, due to the similarities/parallels presented above, the two initiatives could have been combined and harmonized. The only thing that was missing was a political agreement between the ILO and the WHO. The WHO had no interest in harmonizing the two Initiatives. A few interview participants emphasized that while the ILO needed the WHO, the WHO did not need the ILO (or any other organization) to move its P4H Initiative forward. The P4H Initiative has been working very well with the support/resources secured from various international organizations. It arguably did not want to get involved heavily in the SPF-I in order to maintain the funds for its own project. The fact that about 80% of the WHO’s funding comes from voluntary contributions (WHO website) and that the Organization has been going through a budget deficit in the wake of the financial crisis support the claim that competition over financial resources played a role in the WHO’s declining level of enthusiasm about the SPF-I.
4.4 The UNICEF and the SPF Policy

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the UNICEF shares a similar approach to social policy with the ILO, the WHO, and the UNDP. This specialized UN agency “promotes the rights and wellbeing of every child” in its policy and programs (UNICEF website). It does so through several work streams, one of which is social protection. The UNICEF was therefore one of the first points of contact for what Deacon calls “movers and shakers” of the SPF policy. It was enrolled early in the policy-making process through the “Coalition for a Global Social Floor.”

The launch of the Initiative roughly corresponds to the time when Isabel Ortiz moved from the UN DESA to the UNICEF. She has been one of the influential individuals in relation to the SPF policy (see Deacon, 2013a). Several interview participants noted that her presence at the UNICEF played an important role in enrolling the UNICEF in the SPF-I. Her position at the UNICEF as the Associate Director of Policy and Strategy Branch coincides with the UNICEF’s most active involvement in the SPF-I until 2012. During this time period, the UNICEF produced several SPF-related documents/tools, including the Joint Statement on Child-Sensitive Social Protection, the Social Protection Strategic Framework as well as the Social Protection Floor Costing Tool.

The UNICEF has recognized the recent efforts to tackle global poverty through social protection and therefore created its own work stream of social protection. The Joint Statement on Child-Sensitive Social Protection, which was signed in August 2009, makes the case for its efforts in advancing social protection systems in collaboration with other
partners: “Social protection is increasingly viewed as a key investment in human capital and in breaking inter-generational poverty traps, results that are more likely when children’s interests are taken into consideration from the outset” (UNICEF, 2009, p. 1).

In its Social Protection Strategic Framework, the UNICEF reiterates its strong commitment to advancing social protection programs as well as its leadership in global efforts under the UN system. Its Social Protection Strategic Framework is directly tied to the SPF-I:

UNICEF has been working on social protection for many years as part of its global mandate to advocate for and expand children’s rights and opportunities. This work includes supporting governments in the development and strengthening of programmes and policies, advocating for child and gender-sensitive social protection, as well supporting the Social Protection Floor Initiative. (UNICEF website, emphasis added) (See also UNICEF, 2012, p. 32)

Furthermore, the Social Protection Floor Costing Tool is another indication of the clear connection between the SPF policy and the UNICEF’s mandate. The UNICEF developed this costing tool in collaboration with the ILO “to support governments as they consider different possibilities for implementing a Social Protection Floor” (ILO & UNICEF, 2011, p. 2). It helps governments calculate the costs of different social protection measures and assess the affordability of programs aiming to expand social protection coverage (UNICEF website).
4.5 The UNDP and the SPF Policy

Similar to the other UN agencies presented above, the UNDP was also one of the first points of contact for the influential actors, who have taken the lead to develop and disseminate the SPF policy. The UNDP was also part of the “Coalition for a Global Social Floor.” There was a general agreement among the interview participants that the broad mandate of the UNDP gave the Organization a lot of flexibility in terms of working on a wide range of projects and the SPF policy easily found its way in the Organization’s work program.

As the United Nations’ (UN) global development network operating in about 170 countries and territories, the UNDP “has a mandate of supporting countries in their development path, and to coordinate the UN system at the country level” since 1966 (UNDP website). The UNDP works in three main areas, which are (i) sustainable development, (ii) democratic governance and peacebuilding, and (iii) climate and disaster resilience (UNDP website). “Employment and social protection” has been one of the topics under its focus area of “inclusive development.”

The UNDP embraced social protection as a way of coping with poverty and achieving development goals when this policy landed on the global agenda in 2009. It took the initiative to administer the Social Protection Gateway website, which was one of the
three official sites for the SPF-I (later, the three websites were combined under social-protection.org).³³

Several interview participants noted the restructuring process that the UNDP went through in their discussions of the UNDP and the SPF policy. The UNDP Strategic Plan: 2014-2017 lists the challenges that the UNDP has been facing (such as gaps in skills, diminished speed of action, rising costs, and declining core funding) and proposes ways of improving institutional efficiency (UNDP, 2013, p. 8). One of the proposals has required shifting staff from the Headquarters to regional offices “to provide greater support to UN Country Offices” (UNDP, 2015). Furthermore, the Strategic Plan introduced structural changes, such as integrating policy and programme support within one bureau called “the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support” (UNDP, 2015), which does the SPF-related work. The interview participants pointed out that during this transition, there was a time when there was no focal point within the UNDP for the SPF-related correspondence with other organizations.

Despite the restructuring in the Organization, the UNDP maintained its involvement in the SPF-I, mainly through the efforts of the UNDP Administrator, Helen Clark (who had formerly served as the Minister of Health and a member of the Parliament from Labour Party in New Zealand). In her capacity as the Chair of the United Nations Development

³³ As noted in the introductory chapter, these three websites are: The Global Extension of Social Security (GESS) website, www.socialprotectionfloor-gateway.org and www.socialprotection.org hosted by the UNDP.
Group, Clark (together with the Director General of the ILO, Guy Ryder) reached out to UN Resident Coordinators in country offices with a letter to help coordinate their SPF activities (see Clark & Ryder, 2014).

Here, it is important to noted that the UNDP has a dual role (UNDP website): (i) it is a development actor that helps “achieve the eradication of poverty, and the reduction of inequalities and exclusion” and (ii) it is “the Resident Coordinator of development activities for the United Nations system as a whole” at the country level.

After the Initiative was launched as a One-UN Initiative by the UNCEB, the efforts of the UN specialized agencies were coordinated through the UNDG. The UNCEB brings together “29 Executive Heads of the United Nations and its Funds and Programmes, the Specialized Agencies, including the Bretton Woods Institutions (the World Bank and the IMF, and related Organizations – the WTO and the IAEA)” (UNCEB website). Its UNDG is responsible for coordinating the SPF-I. While the UNICEF, the UNDP, and the WHO are members of the UNDG, the other IOs that are studied in this dissertation project (i.e. the OECD, the World Bank and the IMF) are not. The World Bank only has observer status (UNCEB website). The OECD and the IMF does not have this status yet.

The letter sent by Clark and Ryder on 24 March 2014 was instrumental in synchronizing the activities of social protection experts in the member organizations at the country level (see Clark & Ryder, 2014). First, the letter referred to the ILO’s Recommendation No. 202 to legitimize work on the SPF. As noted earlier, the UN organizations favour human rights-based explanations as a justification for their actions (unlike the OECD, the
World Bank and the IMF). They also refer to international agreements and conventions to back up their policy actions. In this respect, Clark and Ryder’s letter explicitly referred to the recent ILO Recommendation as a common source of legitimacy for the UN organizations’ policy guidance and implementations. Second, the letter laid out clear steps for the Resident Coordinators and the UN Country Teams to follow in line with the main principles of the SPF policy. Third, it pointed out the key publications and toolkits on the SPF-I, which they could use as guides.

A year later, on 24 March 2015, a second (follow-up) letter sent by the Director of the United Nations Development Operations Coordination Office (UN DOCO) (which is the Secretariat of the UNDG) enhanced the UNDG Chair’s effort (Wignaraja, 2015). Director Kanni Wignaraja reiterated the message of Clark and Ryder’s letter and encouraged UN country teams “to build and strengthen One UN social protection floor teams, including UN representatives, relevant stakeholders and national partners” (Wignaraja, 2015). The letter also pointed to relevant policy tools and guidelines that would help Resident Coordinators coordinate those activities that help national governments extend their social protection systems.

4.6 Analysis

The stories of policy adoption at the WHO, the UNICEF, and the UNDP reveal that a couple of factors play a role in explaining why these three international organizations are policy leaders. First, there are a number of actors that stand out in all three stories, such as “movers and shakers of the SPF policy” (as Deacon calls them) (who are Juan
Somavia, Michael Cichon, Vinicius Pinheiro, and Isabel Ortiz), the Social Protection Advisory Group (convened by Juan Somavia and Margaret Chan and chaired by Michelle Bachelet) and the joint ILO-WHO Secretariat that worked closely with it, International Labour Office of the ILO (under the leadership of the Director General, Guy Ryder) and its Social Protection Department, UNDG Chair (Helen Clark) and the Director of the UN DOCO (Kanni Wignaraja) under the auspices of the UNDG.

In the literature, these actors are called policy entrepreneurs. They engage in entrepreneurial activities, such as idea generation activities (e.g. developing the SPF concept and discussing the content of the policy), problem framing activities (e.g. presenting the SPF policy as a way of tackling poverty and social injustice), dissemination activities (e.g. presenting the SPF policy in various platforms such as the Doha Financing for Development Conference, the UN Commission for Social Development events, the UN General Assembly meetings; preparing the Bachelet Report that brings large publicity to the SPF policy; sending out two letters from the UNDG Office to the UN Resident Coordinators), strategic activities (e.g. getting the SPF policy into the UN agenda by introducing it as one of the UNCEB Crisis Initiatives, and

34 In the literature, the influential actors are referred to in various ways, including policy entrepreneurs (Mintrom, 1997; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996; Roberts & King, 1991), bureaucracies (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004), international administrations (Nay, 2012), and transfer agents (Stone, 2004), among others. This chapter presents the influential actors as policy entrepreneurs. While there is a lack of consensus about the definition of policy entrepreneurs (Roberts & King, 1991, p. 151), in broad terms, policy entrepreneurs can be used to refer to “people who seek to promote policy innovations” (Mintrom & Vergari, 1998, p. 130). Nay reminds that policy entrepreneurs can be individuals or “organizational units (e.g., regulatory agencies international secretariats and think tanks)” (2012, p. 6).
introducing Recommendation No. 202), activities cultivating advocates (e.g. getting the support of the ILO tripartite constituents to adopt a Recommendation specifically focusing on the SPF), and collaborative activities with high-profile actors (e.g. Guy Ryder preparing a letter with UNDG Chair Helen Clark to be sent out to the UN Resident Coordinators, as well as creating the Advisory Group with prominent members of academia, NGOs, and national governments) (see Roberts & King, 1991, pp. 158-159).

A related factor that explains why the WHO, the UNICEF, and the UNDP are policy leaders is the participation of these policy entrepreneurs in policy networks35 of like-minded actors, in this case, the Coalition for a Global Social Floor and the UNDG. It is important to note that the other three international organizations, which are examined in this dissertation project, are not members of these policy networks.

Another factor that explains policy leadership of the three selected international organizations is the fit of the SPF policy within the outlook of these organizations. Here, the outlook of an organization refers to its work plans and programs in line with its mandate. Outlook is different from mandate in the sense that the mandate of an international organization is set in the constitution when the organization is formed. It

35 Here, policy networks are defined as “a group of actors who share an interest in some policy area and who are linked by their direct or indirect contacts with one another” (Mintrom & Vergari, 1998, p. 128). In the literature, these networks have many names, including transnational advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1999), epistemic communities (Haas, 1992), and global public policy networks (Reinicke, 1999-2000). “Notwithstanding these differences, a key feature of a network is a shared problem on which there is an exchange of information, debate, disagreement, persuasion and a search for solutions and appropriate policy responses” (Stone, 2004, p. 560).
does not change or evolve over time. However, an international organization’s work plans and programs evolve while still adhering to the organizational mandate identified in its constitution. While looking at the mandates of the organizations would not help explain why the selected international organizations adopt the SPF policy because they are too constraining, looking at the work plans and programs of the international organizations (prepared in line with their mandate) helps explain the adoption of the SPF policy in the UNICEF, the UNDP, and the WHO.\(^{36}\)

In the case of the WHO, the SPF policy is complementary with the P4H Initiative in many ways. In the cases of the UNICEF and the UNDP, both organizations have social protection programs, within which the SPF policy is an integrated element. Furthermore, all three organizations share a common understanding about the founding principles of the SPF policy, such as universalism and human rights grounds.

To sum up, policy entrepreneurs and their participation in policy networks of like-minded actors coupled with the policy’s fit in the organizations’ outlook explain the role of the UNICEF, the UNDP, and the WHO as policy leaders in the SPF-I. The stories of

\(^{36}\) Alternatively, the fit of the policy within the culture or the ideology of the organization could have been used here. Barnett and Finnemore define a bureaucracy’s culture as “the solutions that are produced by groups of people to meet specific problems, and then how these solutions become institutionalized as rituals, values, and ultimately as rules” (2004, p. 38). Furthermore, Finnemore uses “ideology” interchangeably with “shared cultural and normative understandings” (1996, p. 336). What is presented in this chapter is the fit of the policy within the work plans and programs of international organizations rather than within their ideology or culture, which would be difficult to operationalize in order to assess the behaviour of international organizations.
policy adoption at the WHO, the UNICEF, and the UNDP reveal that with the efforts of the above-mentioned policy entrepreneurs and through their interactions within policy networks, the UNCEF, the UNDP, and the WHO were the first ones to engage in the SPF policy. Their participation in like-minded actors’ networks also implied agreements on the main principles of the SPF policy, such as universal coverage and a human rights basis. Therefore, these three international organizations accepted the SPF policy without much modification in its meaning, which led to comprehensive adoption. The letters from the UNDG Chair and the Director of the UN DOCO invited these international organizations to stay committed to the policy and collaborate around it, which encouraged international organizations to further channel their available resources to advance and implement of the policy.
Chapter 5: Policy Followers – The Case of the OECD

5.1 Introduction

Chapter 3 demonstrated that the OECD scores medium/moderate for every component of the policy adoption matrix, i.e. the speed and the timing of policy adoption, the level of commitment, the breadth of organizational buy-in, and the scope of policy adoption. Therefore, it is categorized as a “policy follower.” Chapter 5 aims to tell the story of policy adoption at the OECD and explain why this Organization is a policy follower. The following timelines present the benchmark dates to guide the discussion on policy adoption at the OECD.

Figure 5.1: SPF Timeline

Figure 5.2: OECD Timeline
5.2 Early Stages of the SPF Policy

The OECD was not part of the Coalition for a Global Social Floor. Therefore, it was not among the international organizations, which helped develop and disseminate the SPF concept at the very early stages of the policy. The interview participants pointed to two related reasons why the OECD took some time to engage in the SPF policy.

First, the interview participants noted that the initial lack of interest at the OECD on the SPF policy was because the policy idea did not resonate with the member countries, most of which are highly developed countries with already established social protection systems. The SPF was considered to be a policy idea for the developing world rather than for the developed. For countries with advanced social protection systems, the idea of establishing a “floor” for the provision of social services and guarantees looked like a step back in achieving higher levels of development. Therefore, the OECD member states initially did not see any need for engaging in the SPF policy.

The interview participants noted another related reason why member states were reluctant to discuss the SPF policy at the early stages. They noted that the OECD’s work mainly focuses on the OECD countries, rather than the non-OECD countries in line with

37 Note that the OECD Development Centre is an exception to that. It is composed of both the OECD and non-OECD countries. Hence, the make-up of the Development Centre allows for the discussion of topics that interest both the developed and the developing countries. See http://www.oecd.org/dev/oecddevelopmentcentreservingdevelopmentanddevelopingcountries.htm.
the Organization’s mandate. The Convention on the OECD, dated December 14, 1960, states that

The aims of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development ...

shall be to promote policies designed:

(a) to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy;

(b) to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-member countries in the process of economic development; and

(c) to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance with international obligations.  

In addition, the work on the non-OECD countries has evolved around the topic of economic development, rather than social development in line with the Organization’s mandate. Hence, the SPF policy was not a natural fit in this organizational mandate.

It is important to note that despite the initial lack of interest on the SPF policy at the institutional level, some of the OECD members were strong supporters of the SPF policy

38 See http://www.oecd.org/general/conventionontheorganisationforeconomicco-operationanddevelopment.htm
since the very early stages of the SPF policy, as can be observed through their participation in the key SPF meetings by sending representatives from their bilateral agencies. More specifically, Finnish Aid, UK Department for International Development (DFID), and Germany’s government owned technical cooperation agency Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) were present in the 2006 Show and Tell Meeting organized in Geneva and made presentations about their social protection work (see GESS website).

5.3 The OECD and the SPF Policy

According to the interview participants, the interest from member countries was the driving force behind the enrolment of the OECD in the SPF-I. In this respect, it is important to understand the influence of member states in the workings of the OECD before delving into the Organization’s contribution to the SPF-I.

The OECD functions with committees (see Figure 5.3). Committees are composed of the representatives from the OECD’s 34 member countries. In the committee meetings, these representatives “request, review and contribute to work undertaken by the OECD

39 At the time of writing, the OECD is comprised of 34 member countries as a result of two enlargement processes. In addition to the most advanced economies of the world, some emerging economies such as Mexico, Chile and Turkey are also part of the OECD. Historically, it has always consulted both business groups and trade unions; therefore, worked in close proximity with the Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) and the Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) (Woodward, 2004, p. 119). Recently, in order to avoid becoming a marginal player in the development field, the OECD has been working to expand the civil society involvement as well as its membership (p. 119).
Secretariat” (OECD website). The member country representatives’ participation at the OECD is not limited to the committees. They are also the building blocks of the Council, which is the decision making body of the Organization (OECD website). While permanent representatives to the OECD carry out the regular work of the Council (i.e. “advance[ing] ideas and review[ing] progress in specific policy areas”), the priorities are set at the Ministerial meeting once a year (OECD website). The Secretariat follows the priorities and the strategic direction set by the Council and develops analysis and proposals to support the work on the specialized committees. Clearly, member states shape the workings of the Organization through the Council and the committees.

Figure 5.3: The OECD’s Organizational Structure

(Source: OECD website)

40 For further details, see http://www.oecd.org/about/whodoeswhat/
The interview participants highlighted that POVNET was one of the main channels of influence for member countries in terms of the OECD’s work on the SPF policy. POVNET was a network of experts from DAC member countries, who came together to provide policy guidance on pro-poor growth (OECD, 2007).

Under the auspices of DAC, a few countries, namely Finland, Germany, Sweden, and Britain, took the lead in POVNET in developing the OECD’s social protection work. European Commission was also an active supporter of the social protection work in POVNET. The following paragraphs explain these actors’ social protection activities in general and their SPF-related activities specifically through POVNET.

Social protection work of POVNET was developed in line with the DAC Guidelines: Poverty Reduction and was a continuum of the policy statement that DAC endorsed at its High Level Meeting on 27-28 May 2009 as well as the Policy Guidance Note that it developed for donors on social protection (see OECD, 2009a, p. 3). The policy statement does not only encourage “donors to provide adequate, long-term and predictable financial assistance to underpin developing countries’ efforts to build social protection systems and to make employment and decent work a key objective of development cooperation,” it also focuses attention on the “growing demand in developing countries for more public attention on social protection and employment” (p.3). The same policy statement indicates that “[s]ocial protection programmes can be affordable, including for the poorest countries, and represent good value for the money” (p. 11). In a similar vein, the Policy Guidance Note reiterates the affordability of social protection initiatives,
the important role that the donor community can play in supporting national social protection programs, and the benefits of such programs in (directly) reducing poverty (p. 17).

POVNET made its major contribution to the social protection field through its publication entitled Pro-Poor Growth – Social Protection in 2009. The POVNET Task Team on Social Protection, which was chaired by senior officials from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFAF), prepared this publication. This indicates the interest from Germany and Finland in advancing social protection work under the auspices of the OECD DAC. This POVNET publication includes papers on good practices written by experts from the UK’s DFID, Germany’s GTZ, as well as from Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) (OECD, 2008, p. 4; see also OECD, 2009a). In this publication, the concepts of “basic social security floor” and “a global social floor” found their way in various chapters.

In December 2009, the SPF concept was featured again in POVNET’s Draft Summary Record of the Meeting of the DAC Network on Poverty Reduction (POVNET) (see OECD, 2009b). Then, in October 2010, POVNET published its work agenda under three work streams, one of which was “Promoting a Global Social Protection Floor” (OECD, 2010). This work agenda tied its SPF work directly to Millennium Development Goal No. 1 (p. 2). More importantly, in March 2011, POVNET document entitled Global Social
Protection Floor was published with a clear roadmap for the Task Team on Social Protection to pursue in order to address social protection-related issues (OECD, 2011a).

The interview participants repeatedly pointed to the important contributions that DAC made through its POVNET and its above-mentioned publications. They also reminded that the interests and the financial contributions of member states were instrumental in maintaining this network. When the OECD Management made a decision to close down POVNET in 2011, member countries did not provide enough support for its continuity. The interview participants underlined the political changes in Britain, Germany and Sweden as one of the key reasons behind the declining interest on social protection issues. The interview participants noted that DAC’s contribution to the SPF policy significantly declined as a result of this development.

Having said that, DAC still maintained its interest in poverty reduction and social protection. For instance, in 2013, the annual Development Cooperation Directorate (DCD) publication entitled Development Co-operation Review (DCR) was dedicated to poverty reduction. Moreover, it has a stand-alone chapter on social protection. This chapter, authored by Michael Samson, makes the case for social protection in reducing poverty and achieving development. He concludes that “[s]ocial protection is not a discretionary option for governments, but rather an essential element of a policy framework to effectively tackle poverty and promote inclusive growth” (OECD, 2013, p. 78).
According to the interview participants, DAC’s main contribution to the SPF policy was mainly during the policy development stage at around and after the launch of the SPF-I in 2009. Member states were skeptical about the contributions that DAC members could make in the policy implementations stage that followed, as they did not want to make a financial contribution for a policy initiative whose financing is the national governments’ responsibility. Given that the OECD is not a financing institution, member states did not see a role for DAC members in terms of the financing of national SPF's.

The OECD’s involvement in the SPF-I was not limited to DAC and its POVNET. The OECD’s Development Centre is also worth investigating, as it is the focal point of contact for SPIAC-B meetings. The Development Centre is a forum of 51 countries both from the developed and the developing world to discuss innovative social and economic policy solutions (OECD website). The interview participants noted that the Development Centre is a unique part of the OECD as its Governing Board brings together 27 OECD and 24 non-OECD countries and allows for discussions that are of interest to both the developed and the developing countries. In other words, while DAC represents the donor community and allows for discussions from donors’ point of view, the Development Centre allows for discussions that are both from the donors’ and the recipients’ point of view.

The fact that the concept of the SPF found its way to the Development Centre’s 2015-2016 Programme of Work and Budget, which was approved by the Governing Board of the Development Centre, is worth noting here. The document makes reference to the
ILO Recommendation No. 202 and the post-2015 agenda while making the case for inclusive societies (OECD, 2014, p. 11). It is important to highlight that the paragraph, which mentions the ILO Recommendation on the SPF, endorses safety nets that are targeted approaches. This implies a selective use of the SPF policy in this case.

The Development Centre also started to manage the European Union (EU) Social Protection System Programme together with Government of Finland’s National Institute for Health and Welfare in September 2015. The Programme was initiated by the European Union and is co-financed by the OECD and the Government of Finland. The project website makes reference to the SPF.41 Government of Finland’s leadership as well as the broader support from European Union members is notable here.

Furthermore, the Development Centre’s most recent contribution to the SPF policy was through its work (with a number of other development partners) on Inter-Agency Social Protection Assessments (ISPA) tools, which aims “to support governments to improve the performance of social protection systems.”42

In addition to DAC and the Development Centre, the OECD’s DELSA has also been represented in SPIAC-B meetings. Two documents are worth emphasizing in relation to DELSA and the SPF: (i) a background paper for the Meeting of G20 Labour and Employment Ministers in 2011, and (ii) a policy note for the G20 Meeting of Labour and

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41 See http://www.oecd.org/dev/inclusivesocietiesanddevelopment/social-protection.htm
42 See http://www.oecd.org/dev/inclusivesocietiesanddevelopment/ispawebsitelaunch.htm and http://ispatools.org
Employment Ministers in 2012 (see ILO & OECD, 2011, 2012). The background paper entitled *Towards National Social Protection Floors* is entirely dedicated to the SPF concept and it stated that

The OECD Social Policy Ministers, together with their counterparts from Brazil, Indonesia, the Russian Federation and South Africa met in Paris on 2-3- May 2011, reaffirmed “their commitment to combating unemployment and poverty as well as providing adequate and financially sustainable social protection, including basic social protection floor in emerging and developing economies.” (ILO & OECD, 2011, p. 10)

The following year, in 2012, the ILO and the OECD argued (in the context of green growth) that “[i]n emerging and developing countries, a top priority is to introduce or strengthen social protection floors” (ILO & OECD, 2012, p. 11). In both cases, the committees working on labour, employment, and social policy were influential in raising awareness and mobilizing action around the SPF policy in member states.

5.4 Analysis

The story of policy adoption at the OECD reveals that the support from member states for the SPF policy despite the poor fit of the policy in the Organization’s outlook explains why the OECD is a policy follower in the context of the SPF-I.

Since the SPF policy did not initially resonate with the outlook of the Organization, the OECD was not part of the Coalition for Global Social Floor. Although some of its
members (i.e. Finland, Germany, and UK) demonstrated interest in, and support for, the SPF policy since the very early SPF meetings, this interest did not translate into organizational support immediately at the OECD. However, it did not take long for the OECD to catch up with the UN agencies in the policy development stage. In this respect, it demonstrated medium level of speed in terms of policy adoption. Also, its first formal engagement with the policy was neither early nor late.

The OECD made its first major contribution to the SPF-policy with its POVNET publication entitled *Pro-Poor Growth: Social Protection*, which made several references to the SPF concept. POVNET work around the SPF was supported and managed by member states. Member states were equally influential in the demise of POVNET later in 2011, this time, by not demonstrating sufficient interest in maintaining the Network partially because of the political changes in member countries and partially because of the reluctance to make a financial commitment in the policy implementation stage.

When the OECD DAC’s contribution to the SPF policy was in decline due to the demise of POVNET, there were contributions through its DELSA and Development Centre. Evidently, three separate departments/centres have done some SPF-related work, yet not consistently throughout the SPF process. This resulted in medium level of organizational buy-in and commitment in the SPF-I.

The occasional shift between the SPF concept and the safety nets concept indicated neither selective nor comprehensive buy-in of the SPF policy.
In sum, although the SPF policy did not fit well in the outlook of the OECD, the interest and support from member states on the SPF policy enrolled the Organization in the SPF-I. Member states influenced the Organization’s work on the SPF in different ways, such as by providing financial resources and experts to do the SPF-related work (as in the case of the DAC’s POVNET), by reaffirming their commitment to social protection at the Social Ministers’ level (through DELSA), and by financing and managing social protection programs (as in the case of the European Union Social Protection System Programme, co-managed by the Development Centre). While defining and shaping the Organization’s engagement with the SPF policy, member states also played a role in the diminishing organizational interest in the SPF policy by cutting/limiting the resources (be it money, staff or expertise) as can be observed through the demise of POVNET.

Here, it is important to remember that in Chapter 1, international organizations were defined as “formal bureaucracies.” In their study of international organizations, Barnett and Finnemore underline that “bureaucracies are, by definition, authorities” (2004, p.20). Furthermore, they argue that “four types of authority – rational-legal, delegated, moral, and expert – all contribute in different ways to making IOs authoritative and, by virtue of their authority, autonomous to at least some degree” (2004, p.25). The role of member states in shaping the adoption of the SPF policy should be assessed in this context. As Barnett and Finnemore note, “if the only type of authority IOs have is what states give them, then IOs can do what states tell them” (2004, p.22). Yet, here,
international organizations are considered somewhat autonomous actors, whose
decisions are influenced by their membership, among other factors.
Chapter 6: Policy Supporters – The Cases of the World Bank and the IMF

6.1 Introduction

Chapter 3 demonstrated that, in the case of the SPF-I, the World Bank can be identified as a slow, late, and selective adopter with moderate level of commitment and limited organizational buy-in. The IMF is very similar to the World Bank in terms of its policy adoption levels, except that it demonstrates low level of commitment. Given these characteristics, these two international organizations are categorized as “policy supporters.” This chapter tells the stories of policy adoption in these international organizations and explains why they are policy supporters in the context of the SPF-I.

The following timelines present the key moments in the SPF history as well as in the stories of policy adoption in the international financial institutions (IFIs).

Figure 6.1: SPF Timeline
6.2 Early Stages of the SPF Policy

As noted in Chapter 3, policy entrepreneurs started reaching out to like-minded actors to discuss the content of the SPF policy in the early stages of the policy’s development. While the UN agencies (along with a few bilateral agencies and NGOs) were the first points of contacts, the World Bank and the IMF were not part of the network early in the policy development process. This was mostly due to the differences in their social policy perspectives. Both the World Bank’s and the IMF’s social protection approaches were very distant to the founding principles of the SPF policy.
6.2.1 Diverse Social Policy Approaches

The SPF policy has evolved around a set of founding principles. The following key principles are worth elaborating on here as they provide insight into the very different social policy approaches between the UN agencies and the World Bank and the IMF: (i) universalism or universal coverage, (ii) the human rights-based justification for the policy, and finally (iii) affordability of the SPF regardless of a country’s development level or financial capacity (see ILO, 2012b for the complete list of the SPF principles).

The principle of universality is at the core of the SPF. The horizontal dimension of the policy idea, to provide basic social guarantees (access to essential health care and basic social security for all), aims to cover the entire population (see Figure 2.1). As noted in Chapter 4, the UN agencies agree on the principle of universal coverage. However, there are other international organizations, such as the World Bank and the IMF, which choose "targeting" over "universalism" in their social policy approaches (see Mkandawire, 2005, pp. 11-12). The World Bank defends targeted approaches because of the following reasons:

From an economic point of view, targeting allows policy makers to maximize coverage of the poor for a given budget. From a historical perspective, the poor are often excluded from public spending allocations, and focusing on poor can reduce this inequality in public spending. From a human capital point of view, the poor have significant human capital deficits. (Del Ninno & Mills, eds., 2015, pp. 9-10; see also Leite, 2014, pp. 1-2)
In a similar vein, the IMF favours targeted approaches, i.e. social safety net programs, and it pays special attention to these programs’ “cost-effectiveness and financial viability” (Gupta, Clements, McDonald, & Schiller, 1998; IMF, 2016a).

Targeting is criticized on several fronts for being ineffective in countries with large proportions of the population living in poverty, involving high administrative and transaction costs, being short-term, leading to under-coverage where a significant proportion of the poor is excluded, and being prone to underpayment and overpayment errors among others (Mkandawire, 2005; Ortiz, ed., 2007, pp. 33-34). While acknowledging the difficulties in the effectiveness and the implementation of targeting (see del Ninno & Mills, eds., 2015, pp. 11-12; Leite, 2014, pp. 3-4; van Domelen, 2007, pp. 7-10; Coady, Grosh, & Hoddinott, 2004, pp. 83-85), the World Bank and the IMF still defend targeting over universalism and offer ways of making them more effective by using a combination of multiple targeting methods and by creating a social registry for all potential program beneficiaries (Leite, 2014, pp. 3-4).

Second, the SPF is presented and defended on “human rights” grounds.43 Several UN agencies worked together to create the links between social protection and human rights, as can be observed through the web platform entitled Linking Social Protection and Human Rights (see socialprotection-humanrights.org website). While human rights-

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43 For an elaborate presentation of the human rights approach to social protection, see Sepulveda and Nyst (2012). The SPF-I makes references to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (which is binding in countries that ratified the treaty) (see ILO, 2012b).
based SPF discussions gained popularity in the UN platforms, it was not picked up by the IFIs. It has been a topic of convergence among international organizations (WB, 2012, p. 98). As was conveyed by key informants, the IFIs do not use the human rights–based explanations to justify their policy choices and actions to their constituents. Instead, they focus on macroeconomic arguments, e.g. explaining how good the given policy is for the overall economy. The logic behind this approach is that “macroeconomic stability is the cornerstone of any successful effort to increase ... economic growth” and “[e]conomic growth is the single most important factor influencing poverty” (Ames, Brown, Devarajan, & Izquierdo, 2001, pp. 4-5). Therefore, the IFIs consider a proposed social policy approach if it does not threaten macroeconomic stability. “Productive potential of social protection” (for instance, in terms of stimulating aggregate demand and acting as an economic stabilizer during downturns) is more appalling than the human rights-based explanations for the IFIs when they consider social protection measures (see Alderman & Yemtsov, 2012).

Third, there are disagreements between the UN agencies and the IFIs in terms of the affordability of the SPF policy. The Bachelet Report, one of the key SPF publications, argues (with reference to studies undertaken mainly by the ILO, UN DESA, UNICEF, and Help Age International) that national SPF s are affordable even in low-income countries (2011, pp. 42-47). For instance, it is estimated that providing a basic package of social protection (including old-age, disability pensions and family allowances) would cost between 2.2 per cent and 5.7 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in select low-
and low-middle income countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (ILO, 2008 study cited in *Bachelet Report*). Countries are expected to search for ways of creating/expand-
fiscal space for the provision of social services and guarantees in national budgets.
Depending on national capacities and circumstances, there are various ways of creating
this fiscal space for the SPF, such as “(i) re-allocating public expenditures; (ii) increasing
tax revenues, (iii) expanding social security coverage and contributory revenues; (iv)
lobbying for increased aid and transfers; (v) eliminating illicit financing flows; (vi) using
fiscal and foreign exchange reserves; (vii) borrowing or restructuring debt and; (viii)
adopting a more accommodating macroeconomic framework” (Ortiz, Cummins, &
Karunanethy, 2015, p. 56; see also Ortiz, Cummins, Capaldo, & Karunanethy, 2015). If
countries lack the resources to jump-start their SPF, they may seek guidance from the
international community, as noted in Article 12 of the ILO Recommendation No. 202:
“National social protection floors should be financed by national resources. Members
whose economic and fiscal capacities are insufficient to implement the guarantees may
seek international cooperation and support that complement their own efforts” (ILO,
2012b, p. 4).

Even in the presence of international financial support for the SPF, the ultimate
purpose of the policy is to establish SPF that are owned by countries and sustained
with national resources over long-term. While the socially oriented international
organizations are in favour of this approach, the economically oriented international
organizations are skeptical about it as they prefer short-term solutions to compensate
for the social and economic effects of shocks on the poor and the vulnerable in the society through safety net programs. They do not subscribe for long-term plans on affordability grounds. This is evident in the IMF’s policy approach when it advised countries to increase public social expenditure as a fiscal stimulus in 2008-9 in the wake of the financial crisis and then to contract public social expenditure for fiscal consolidation starting from early 2010 onwards (ILO, 2014, pp. 121-123; Ortiz, Cummins, & Karunanethy, 2015). Furthermore, a larger budget was allocated for social spending in 16 out of 19 IMF programs started in 2008-9 (IMF, 2009, p. 20). Later in 2010, the IMF underlined the need for “adequate social safety nets” as part of a fiscal adjustment strategy, which fit well in the IMF’s plan to exit from crisis intervention policies (IMF, 2010). Furthermore, it is evident in the World Bank’s “SMART” Social Protection and Labour (SPL) systems approach, where “A” stands for “affordable.” The World Bank argues that affordable SPL systems should be “cost-effective and fiscally sustainable” which can be achieved by targeting specific groups or interventions (WB, 2012, p. 19). In sum, while the UN agencies argue that national SPFs are affordable, the IFIs highlight financial capacity constraints in countries and opt for short-term social protection measures, i.e. social safety nets, on affordability grounds.

The above-mentioned differences in social protection approaches among the UN agencies and the IFIs were very apparent in the early SPF meetings as presented below. Some interview participants noted the tensions between the UN agencies and the IFIs in those meetings, where the UN agencies and the IFIs had very divergent perspectives on
the SPF policy.

6.2.2 Participation in the Early SPF Meetings

As noted earlier in Chapter 3, Show and Tell meetings, their successor SPIAC-B meetings, and Interagency Technical Meetings have been the key meetings that brought select international organizations, bilateral donors and NGOs together to discuss the SPF policy. Among these three sets of meetings, Show and Tell meetings took place the earliest, dating back to 2006. The Show and Tell Meetings provided the participants with a platform to present their social protection work. A number of interview participants noted these meetings reflected the name, i.e. show, tell, and then leave, without any of the participants demonstrating any particular effort to collaborate. Both the World Bank and the IMF were present at the ILO Headquarters in Geneva for the 2006 Show and Tell Meeting to share their social protection work with the rest of the participants.

Robert Holzmann, Director of the Social Protection Sector (Human Development Network), represented the World Bank at this meeting. He stated that “[t]he mission of the social protection sector is to assist Bank country clients to alleviate poverty and to promote equitable and sustainable growth” (WB, 2006, p. 3). Social protection measures were seen as tools for equitable and sustainable growth, rather than for the provision of human rights as was the perspective of the UN agencies.

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44 According to the interview participants, the nature of the meetings changed later in 2012, with SPIAC-B, as the “inter-agency cooperation” component in the name suggests.
In the same presentation, Holzmann noted that the “Social Risk Management (SRM)” concept is central to the social protection work at the Bank (p. 2). The SRM concept was introduced in the World Bank’s first Social Protection Strategy and it sees “social protection as a springboard as well as a safety net, for poor people” (WB, 2001, p. 9). Social protection instruments of the Bank “remained mainly reactive and palliative in nature” (p. 2) and the SRM framework seemed to reflect the same characteristics by seeing social protection as a temporary, short-term, and targeted policy instrument.

The IMF Representative, Peter Heller (Deputy Director of the Fiscal Affairs Department), noted the limited expertise of the Fund in the field of social protection (IMF, 2006a, p. 2). He presented the IMF’s activities on social protection under four sub-headings:

i. technical assistance (for instance, advice on pensions or advice on short-term expenditure rationalization and efficiency enhancement),

ii. policy development (for instance, policy work on pension reforms or on a fiscal framework for the MDGs),

iii. surveillance (of bilateral, regional and multilateral policies), and

iv. Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) (that looks at the distributional impact of various reform efforts, including energy pricing reform, tax reform and trade liberalization, and agricultural subsidies). (IMF, 2006a, 2006b)

Based on this presentation, the IMF’s social protection approach and work did not reflect any of the founding principles of the SPF policy. There was no mention of the provision of social services and transfers on a universal basis with an increased social
spending. Also, a human rights-based approach was not featured as a basis for the IMF’s social protection work.

The gaps between the social policy approaches of the UN agencies and the IFIs started to narrow down over time when the World Bank and the IMF started to reevaluate their approaches to social policy broadly and the SPF specifically. The following section presents the global developments that led to this change.

6.3 Changing Social Policy Approaches

6.3.1 The Broader Look

Developing countries who were in need of loans from the IFIs were required to follow structural adjustment programs, which were in line with the Washington Consensus principles\textsuperscript{45} and which promoted neoliberal policies and ideas. Neoliberal policies prescribed cuts in social expenditure, privatization, minimal or no state involvement in the provision of social services, and targeting, among others. In this policy framework, social policies had a "residual" or "secondary" role in achieving development and poverty reduction (Ortiz, ed., 2007; UNRISD, 2006). Contrary to the expectation of the

\textsuperscript{45} The term “Washington Consensus” was coined by John Williamson in a conference background paper in 1989 (see Williamson, 2004). The author identified 10 policies that “[he] thought more or less everyone in Washington would agree were needed more or less everywhere in Latin America” (2004, p. 1). The 10 reforms related to fiscal discipline, reordering public expenditure priorities, tax reform, liberalizing interest rates, a competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, liberalization of inward foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation, and property rights (pp. 3-4). Although he is the forefather of these reform ideas, he notes that the “Washington Consensus” was not meant to be “a text for all countries at all times” or “a comprehensive agenda for economic reform” (pp. 8-9).
IFIs, pursuing policies that prioritizes economic growth did not generate a trickle-down effect that benefited the poorest members of the societies. Instead, greater inequality within and across societies followed, and equitable development became a distant goal (Ortiz, ed., 2007).

As the global social crisis was unfolding, the IFIs have been criticized due to their economic growth-focused thinking. The IMF policy and programs have been highly criticized mainly due to the associated conditionalities. The Fund has been challenged for applying a standardized formula and neglecting the local causes of economic issues (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, p. 721). Critics argue that conditionality might induce governments to pursue less efficient methods of allocation of its resources simply to comply with loan conditionalities (Coate & Morris, 1996). Some even took a harsher perspective by saying that the World Bank and the IMF conditionalities hurt people (by redistributing income away from labour) (Vreeland, 2002).

The international community started to develop a response to this global social crisis. While there has not been an agreement among international organizations on what form a desirable national social policy should take, there has been a common understanding about the need to address the social deficits in societies and develop an approach to economic development that is socially aware.

The World Summit for Social Development of 1995 as well as its outcome document (namely the Copenhagen Declaration), the UN Conferences organized throughout 1990s on various social topics, the launch of the Human Development Reports in 1990 by the
UNDP, “Development with a Human Face” study as well as the “Adjustment with a Human Face” network by the UNICEF, and the project entitled “Social Policy in a Global Context” by the UNRISD all aimed to increase awareness on social issues in the development framework.\(^{46}\)

In the meantime, there were episodes of social movements (such as the Seattle Protests in 1999, Arab Spring in late 2010, and the Occupy Movement in 2011 and 2012) where people from all around the world expressed concerns regarding global inequality and the side effects of globalization, as noted by several interview participants.

Furthermore, the new millennium witnessed a global initiative that was one of a kind. The Millennium Summit in 2000 led to the Millennium Declaration, in which world leaders made a commitment to “make poverty history” by working collaboratively towards reaching the 8 MDGs.\(^{47}\) These social principles became a key reference point and guide for development actors in their efforts to reduce poverty and inequality and to achieve development. They have united a wide range of actors, around a common set of goals and created a common language for all development actors.

\(^{46}\) For the Report of the World Summit for Social Development, see UN 1995. For a comprehensive list of major UN conferences and summits, see http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/what-we-do/conferences.html. For the “Development with a Human Face” study, see Mehrotra and Jolly, eds., 1997. For the “Adjustment with a Human Face” network, see Ortiz and Daniels 2012. Also, further information on the “Social Policy in a Global Context” project can be found in UNRISD 2006.

\(^{47}\) The MDGs are (i) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, (ii) achieve universal primary education, (iii) promote gender equality and empower women, (iv) reduce child mortality, (v) improve maternal health, (vi) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, (vii) ensure environmental sustainability, and (viii) global partnership for development (www.un.org).
As a result of these developments at the global level, there has been a lot of rethinking and reevaluation within the World Bank and the IMF in terms of their approach to social policy since the 1990s. Eventually, the Bretton Woods institutions caught up with the social policy trends, though with a delay.\(^{48}\) Regarding the World Bank, Hall remarks that “[t]his delay should perhaps come as no surprise considering the institution’s traditional mainstream emphasis on infrastructural investment and macro-economic growth” (2007, p. 152). Molyneaux points out that this shift marks the Post-Washington consensus and some called this change "the end of neoliberalism", "neoliberalism with human face" or "reactive neoliberalism" (2008, pp. 780-781).

6.3.1.1 The World Bank

When the principles of the Washington Consensus were challenged in 1990s, the World Bank made some slight changes to its policy approach by hiring more people from disciplines other than economics (Weaver, 2007), developing a social policy program in 2005 and incorporating key social development principles into the preparation of projects (see WB, 2005), publishing a report presenting the lessons learned in the 1990s (Rodrik, 2006), and by changing its lending practices in a way that rationalist reasoning could not explain fully (Park, 2005, p. 121).\(^{49}\) The World Bank’s flagship publication,

\(^{48}\) Öniş and Şenses indicate their belief that “the process started in the World Bank at an earlier stage than in the IMF” (2005, p. 273).

\(^{49}\) Here, it is important to note that 1990s correspond to “rededication” to pro-welfare and anti-poverty measures in Bank policy (Kapur et al., 1997, cited in Hall, 2007, p. 155). The World Bank was involved in investments in education, health and other social policy areas in the 1960s and
World Development Report, also reflected this change as the 1990 report was entitled “Poverty” and the 2000 report was entitled “Attacking Poverty” (see WB, 1990, 2000).

Hall notes that the World Bank’s social policy work has evolved in three strands: social welfare (aligned with “Basic Human Needs approach”), social protection (“protection of vulnerable groups through safety nets and safeguards”) and social development (2007, pp. 152-153). The author also mentions that “[i]n the wake of structural adjustment and the move towards the construction of social safety nets targeted at the poorest groups, social policy in the Bank is increasingly seen as being synonymous with social protection” (2007, p. 153).

With regards to the World Bank’s social protection work, the following publications are worth noting as they justify and explain the Bank’s engagement with social protection work. The first Social Protection and Labour Strategy Report was published in 2001. It presents SPL strategies as policy tools to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth (WB, 2001). The second Social Protection and Labour Strategy Report followed in 2012 (see WB, 2012). It reiterates the main message of the first Report: with reference to a report 1970s in line with the human capital concept, until pro-welfare and anti-poverty measures fell in the agenda in 1980s (Hall, 2007).

50 The other strands of the World Bank’s social policy work kept going as well. For instance, social development agenda in the Bank was mapped out in 2005 with “Empowering People by Transforming Institutions: Social Development In World Bank Operations” and then revamped with “Mid-Cycle Implementation Progress Report” in 2011 (see WB, 2005, 2011; see also http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/socialdevelopment/overview#1)

prepared by the Growth Commission, the Bank notes that “a lesser known feature of SPL is that it provides a foundation for inclusive growth ...” (p. 2). The Bank makes the macroeconomic case for establishing well-functioning social protection programs. Its approach to social security is not necessarily a significant departure from the neoliberal orthodox thinking as it is a pragmatic move to tackle development issues through achieving “inclusive growth.” The same report “lays out ways to deepen World Bank involvement, capacity, knowledge, and impact in social protection and labor” (WB, 2012, p. xi). The third publication entitled the State of Social Safety Nets 2015 presents the social protection knowledge and expertise that the Bank collected over time and across countries (see WB, 2015b).

Although these developments hinted at a possible transformation in the World Bank’s development policy and thinking, as Rodrik notes, it would be naïve to expect the institution to change overnight and internalize all lessons learned in the 1990s (2006, p. 977). The evolution of the World Bank’s engagement in social protection also supports this claim. The assessment based on the consultations around the World Bank’s 2012-2022 Social Protection and Labour Strategy as well as the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG)’s Report on Social Safety Nets identifies the specific areas that need work in the

52 Please note that this document is reviewed and approved by the Executive Board. The Board approval indicates high-level involvement and interest on social protection and labour issues within the Bank.
World Bank’s future SPL work (WB, 2012, pp. 10-11; see also IEG, 2011). More specifically, the IEG Report advises the World Bank the following:

(i) to engage during stable times to help countries develop SSNs [social safety nets],
(ii) to continue emphasizing building SSN systems and institutional capacity,
(iii) to engage more strongly in LICs [low income countries],
(iv) to focus on results framework for Bank SSN support, and
(v) to ensure strong cross-network coordination on SSNs. (As cited in WB, 2012, p. 11)

Furthermore, the consultations ask for the World Bank’s involvement and support in the following aspects:

(i) generating and sharing evidence and knowledge on SPL,
(ii) building capacity,
(iii) financing SPL initiatives, both directly and by mobilizing others’ support,
(iv) supporting coordination across global partners, government agencies, and other actors, and
(v) listening and collaborating with others in setting and implementing the SPL agenda. (WB, 2012, p. 12)

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53 Consultation involved over 2000 people from governments, civil society organizations, academics, the private sector, and bilateral and multilateral development agencies (WB, 2012, p. 12).
In sum, in the changing development and social policy framework, the World Bank is moving towards assuming a larger role in the field of social protection. The social protection work in the Bank fits in the “inclusive growth” work stream and reflects a continuum of neoliberal principles in the Bank’s policy approach. As Mahon notes, “the WB’s social investment discourse holds to the original neoliberal thrust of the Washington Consensus, while conceding a role for the ‘right kind’ of social policy” (2010: 179), which is social safety nets.

6.3.1.2 The IMF

The criticisms against the IFIs resulted in changes in the IMF’s social policy approach, its programs geared towards low-income countries, as well as its conditionalities. The IMF published “Social Dimensions of the IMF’s Policy Dialogue” where the importance of social policies was acknowledged:

As economic and social developments are mutually reinforcing, these policies are essential for reducing poverty and engendering social integration in the medium term. At the same time, the IMF also recognizes the importance of sound social policies aimed directly at achieving social objectives. (1995, p. 8)

and the IMF introduced Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) approach in an effort to promote growth and reduce poverty based on the assessment of macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs (IMF, 2016b). Also the same year, Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) replaced the ESAF program (IMF, 2001). When compared to the ESAF, the PRGF-supported programs focused on less structural conditions and “more attention is being given to the social impact of major reforms under the program” (IMF, 2001). Furthermore, in early 2000s, the IMF introduced reforms to streamline conditionality, but the more significant changes to conditionality (including the efforts to make it “more flexible” for poor countries) arrived later, especially in 2008 and 2009 (Bird & Rowlands, 2010). In the meantime, the IMF’s concessional lending facilities have continued to evolve with the intent to address the changing needs of low-income countries and the PRGF was transformed into Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) in 2010 (IMF, 2016c). The lending facilities under the PRGT have had the intention to “increase the focus on poverty reduction compared to previous lending windows” and take into consideration “how loans will impact on poverty reduction and growth” (Bretton Woods Project, 2014).

Despite its recognition of the social dimensions of economic growth and development, the IMF’s policy advice has not diverted significantly from its key emphasis, which is that “[f]iscal policy is a key avenue for dealing with social aspects of adjustment.” (IMF, 1995, pp. 17-18). Only more recently, the work on “inclusive growth” started to challenge this key message. Research Department, whose main objective is to provide deep analysis
when needed or requested by other departments, started discussing topics, such as
inequality and employment, as part of its work on “inclusive growth.” For instance, in
their article entitled *Painful Medicine*, Ball et al. argue that fiscal consolidation is likely to
increase unemployment, especially in the long term (2011, p. 23). Also, another working
paper published in 2013 looks at the effects of fiscal consolidation on inequality, wage
income, and unemployment. The authors argue that “fiscal consolidation has typically
had significant distributional effects by raising inequality, decreasing wage income
shares and increasing long-term unemployment” (Ball, Furceri, Leigh, & Loungani, 2013).
Yet, it should be noted that in both cases, these staff papers represent the view of the
authors rather than reflecting the views of the IMF as an institution.

Furthermore, an IMF Staff Report prepared by the Fiscal Affairs Department is worth
mentioning here. The report, entitled *Fiscal Policy and Income Inequality*, ultimately
reached senior management within the institution. In February 2014, it was presented
to the Executive Board, although no decision was immediately taken (IMF 2014c).
However, it led to institutionalized debates on inequality as well as on tools to achieve
redistribution (including “well-targeted transfer programs” and “conditional transfer
programs,” among others) (see Francese, 2015). The Fiscal Department’s publication
entitled *Inequality and Fiscal Policy* argues that “[t]he appropriate design of fiscal
policies can mitigate income inequality, without hurting growth, or even while
increasing it” (Francese, 2015).
In sum, the “inclusive growth” work agenda has allowed for more discussions on and
engagement with social policy in the Fund. According to the interview participants, in its
current stage, these topics are far away from being discussed in the entire Operations
Departments, however there is some progress as seen in the example below (e.g.
Mozambique case study).

Regarding social protection, the IMF has endorsed “well-targeted social safety nets”
(1995, p. 10) and has underlined the limited nature of the IMF’s policy advice based on
“cost-effectiveness and financial viability” (p. 21). The focus on “cost effectiveness and
financial viability” of social safety net programs has continued up to today (IMF, 2016a).

As presented above, the World Bank and the IMF started to rethink their approaches to
social policy as a result of the global reactions to, and ideological turn away from, the
extremes of market neoliberalism. The 3F crises (i.e. financial, food, and fuel crisis)
intensified the external pressures on the IFIs even further. There have also been global
developments in the SPF front that called for the active engagement of the World Bank
and the IMF with the SPF policy. The following section presents these global
developments regarding the SPF policy, which were emphasized by the interview
participants.

54 The IMF focused attention on the need for collaboration with the World Bank in order to
strengthen social safety nets in IMF-supported programs (IMF, 1999, p. 3).
6.3.2 The SPF-Focused Look

The SPF policy reached global platforms through different channels. First, the UNCEB had a significant role in bringing the SPF to the attention of the global community with the SPF-I in 2009. As a response to the crisis, UNCEB launched nine joint crisis initiatives, one of which focused on social protection. Given the prominent role of the UNCEB in the global policy world, its SPF-I raised awareness on the role of social protection systems in tackling the severe social consequences of the global crisis. The UNCEB called all major development actors for collaboration and cooperation in the wake of the global crisis. Both the World Bank and the IMF were included among the list of collaborating agencies.

Second, the Report prepared by the Social Protection Floor Advisory Group, chaired by Michelle Bachelet, made the concept of the SPF “global.” While the UNCEB Initiative presented an operational concept in 2009, the Bachelet Report offered a fully-fledged global plan. The Report presented the Group’s recommendations on the design and implementation of the SPF (see ILO, 2011 or Bachelet Report). It emphasized “fair and inclusive globalization,” as the title of the Report suggests. Most importantly, it clarified the actors’ role, including that of the international organizations, in achieving this purpose. It has been clear that the ILO could not achieve this by itself (as a standard-

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55 Please note that the Chief Executives Board, within which the World Bank and the IMF participate, adopted the nine UNCEB crisis initiatives. See http://www.unsceb.org/content/joint-crisis-initiatives-jcis-un-system-wide-response.
setting institution) and it needed the support of the other UN specialized agencies as well as the IFIs, whose contribution would be invaluable at the operational level. The Report advised that “the social protection floor be fully integrated into the World Bank Social Protection Strategy 2012-2022” and that the “IMF-supported programmes take into account measures taken by the government to ring-fence and expand social protection systems drawing on the social protection floor approach” (ILO, 2011, p. 95).

Third, the G20 Summit in France created a momentum for the IFIs to have a more active role in the SPF-I. The French Presidency of the G20 had an impact on the promotion of the policy idea by endorsing it in the Final Communiqué (see G20, 2011). Furthermore, the G20 Development Working Group requested that SPIAC-B be formed with the co-leadership of the ILO and the World Bank (ILO website).

Fourth, the ILO Recommendation No. 202 adopted in 2012 created the legal basis for policy implementations at the country level. Despite the fact that the World Bank does not organize its work according to ILO Recommendations, it started mentioning how its social protection work aligns with Recommendation No. 202 (see WB, 2012).

Fifth, the Financing for Development Conference in July 2015 in Addis Ababa, and more specifically the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, called for international cooperation on a variety of issues including the SPF: “Countries adopted a new social compact in favour of the poor and vulnerable groups, through the provision of social protection systems
and measures for all, including social protection floors.” The Action Agenda noted the additional financing commitment from various stakeholders, including the World Bank and the IMF, to achieve the goals in the agenda.

Sixth, in September 2015, the SPF concept found its way into the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). As mentioned in earlier chapters, Target 1.3 (of Goal 1: No poverty) points out the international community’s commitment to “[i]mplement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable” (UN website, emphasis added). Furthermore, the importance of the social protection policies comes up in Target 5.4 (of Goal 5: Gender equality) and Target 10.4 (of Goal 10: Reduced inequalities) (UN website). The World Bank and the IMF, along with multilateral development banks, made a joint commitment to increase official development assistance to finance the SDGs (Development Committee, 2015).

The following section presents the story of policy adoption in the World Bank and the IMF mainly triggered by the global developments presented above.

6.4 The World Bank and the SPF Policy

The World Bank started to engage in the SPF-related work mainly on its own terms (unlike the UN agencies, which adopted the policy mostly as is). Specifically, although

there have occasionally been mentions of the SPF concept, the World Bank kept emphasizing the safety nets concept. Accordingly, while the universal provision of social transfers and services occasionally showed up in the World Bank publications, targeted approaches have been favoured in the Bank’s social protection discourse and practices. For instance, under Section 3, the *World Bank 2012-2022 Social Protection and Labour Strategy* states that “[t]he World Bank has been a strategic partner in the One-UN Social Protection Floor initiative” and “[t]he SPL strategy and engagement is consistent with these core principles of the SPF-I” (2012, p. 14).  

However, the remaining sections of the report repeatedly talk about safety nets and targeted approaches. The Report locates the SPF policy in a separate box and isolates it from the rest of the discussion as if there was a lack of reconciliation between these two policy approaches (see WB, 2012, p. 16). Furthermore, the recent publication entitled the *State of Social Safety Nets 2015* clearly states that “[e]mpirical evidence based on rigorous impact evaluations keeps growing and offering new insights on the transformational role of social safety nets” (WB, 2015b, p. 2).

Although it is not indicated in the *Social Protection and Labour Strategy 2012-2022*, several interview participants drew the links between the SPF policy and the World Bank’s SPL framework, which is based on three pillars, namely resilience, equity and opportunity (see WB, 2012). The interview participants noted that the resilience pillar

57 Please note that the ILO (among others) provided feedback on the World Bank’s *Social Protection and Labour Strategy 2012-2022* within the consultation framework (See WB, 2012).
corresponds to the vertical extension of social security (social insurance), while the
equity pillar corresponds to the horizontal coverage (social assistance) (see Figure 2.1).
The interview participants also reminded that the World Bank does not fully subscribe
to the SPF concept as the equity pillar considers (targeted) social safety nets as a social
assistance measure to protect people against poverty and destitution (see WB, 2012).

The change was not only at the rhetorical level as can be observed through the SPIAC-B,
which was formed upon the request of the G20 during the French Presidency (ILO, 2013)
and reports to the G20 Development Working Group. By forming the SPIAC-B and
collaborating through this coordination channel, the World Bank, the ILO and other
agencies started honoring the requests from the UNCEB, the Social Protection Advisory
Board, and the G20.

The interview participants noted that the World Bank had no intention to collaborate
around the SPF policy before the SPIAC-B meetings. The Bank attended Show and Tell
meetings to present its social protection work but did not make an effort for
collaboration. However, with SPIAC-B, the World Bank assumed important roles in the
process instead of being a passive participant in the SPF-I. Specifically, with the creation
of the SPIAC-B, Arup Banerji of the World Bank and Vinicius Pinheiro of the ILO New
York started co-leading the global social protection meetings.

58 The interview participants underlined that as an international organization with substantial
resources, the World Bank did not need to collaborate with other agencies to advance its social
protection work. However, this was not the case for other agencies, who wanted/needed the
World Bank to be on board so that they could advance their social protection programs.
The interview participants noted that the tensions between the ILO and the World Bank at the initial meetings were very noticeable and that there were concerns about the World Bank and its social protection approach dominating the meeting agenda. While, according to some interview participants, the SPIAC-B work has complemented the SPF-I work; for others, the occasional drift away from the SPF policy in SPIAC-B meetings has raised questions about the extent to which the World Bank aims to advance its own safety nets approach rather than the SPF policy.

The interview participants noted that, after a couple of meetings, the positions of the ILO and the World Bank slowly started to get closer and the tensions eased as the SPIAC-B participants moved away from policy development to policy implementation. Arguably, the policy development stage might have created a competition between the ILO-affiliated SPF concept and the World Bank-affiliated social safety nets concept. According to the interview participant, the implementation stage did not involve such ideological tensions, due to the general agreement on data and statistics-related aspects of social protection.

The World Bank’s engagement with the SPF policy was not limited to the above-mentioned instances. In June 30, 2015, the ILO and the World Bank issued a joint

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59 The interview participants also noted that the social protection discussions were not as tense as the pensions-related discussions between the World Bank and the ILO.
60 The interview participants also clarified that the discussions on data and statistics (e.g. the discussions about Assessment Based National Dialogue tools and ISPA tools) were not completely free of disagreements and tensions, but these disagreements were not impeding collaborative efforts substantially.
statement and initiated an action plan, within which the SPF was a central component.

In a Joint Statement, both international organizations acknowledge that “it is time for universal social protection” (ILO & WB, 2015, p. 1; see also WB, 2015a). This statement notes that universality is an important principle of development policy. In the development field, after the education and health sectors, the social protection sector now complies with this trend (ILO & WB, 2015, p.1). This joint statement is a radical change in the World Bank’s rhetoric.

Some interview participants pointed out the involvement of the senior management in this joint action plan and also speculated on any possible effect that Jim Kim’s health background might have had in this collaboration with the ILO. However, a closer look at the World Bank President’s twelve priorities reveals that his agenda does not include anything that relates to social protection and/or collaboration with the UN agencies, which could have been interpreted as a motivation behind the Bank’s collaboration with the ILO.61

According to the interview participants, while the dominant social policy approach/ideology has been maintained, the new tools, practices, and policies developed at the Bank are increasingly becoming in line with the SPF. There is a gradual and progressive realization of rights, and more specifically the right to basic social

protection within the framework of the SPF-I. Some interview participants noted that the Bank increasingly sees targeting as a starting point rather than the ultimate agenda.

6.5 The IMF and the SPF Policy

The IMF had very little to contribute to the policy formulation stage of the SPF-I. Also, since the SPF policy falls in the social domain, it did not initially resonate with its institutional mandate. However, the IMF became an indispensable actor during the implementation stage of the SPF-I. In concrete terms, the Fund has had an important role in assessing the affordability of the SPFs and identifying and creating fiscal space in countries for the implementation of the SPF policy. Despite the fact that the SPF policy is not a policy of interest for the IMF, the assessment of the fiscal space at national contexts for this policy’s implementation required the expertise of the IMF and called for its participation.

The IMF became the most active in the SPF-I in the aftermath of the global financial crisis around 2009 and 2010. The interview participants noted that when the former ILO Director General, Juan Somavia, reached out to the former IMF Managing Director, Dominique Strauss Kahn, it was a climate of uncertainty, high unemployment, and panic as a result of the financial crisis. Therefore, the IMF did not turn down the request for collaborative work with the ILO. This started a series of efforts, including a discussion document entitled The Challenges of Growth, Employment and Social Cohesion, the Oslo Conference that was co-hosted by the IMF and the ILO, a working group to work on the
topic, and pilot projects to assess the affordability of national SPF. The following paragraphs elaborate on each of these developments.

In 2010, the Research Department worked in collaboration with the Strategy, Policy and Review Department to publish a discussion paper entitled *The Challenges of Growth, Employment and Social Cohesion* and to organize the Joint ILO-IMF Conference (aka Oslo Conference) with the involvement of the senior management (ILO & IMF, 2010). The discussion paper is worth elaborating on in further detail. Although the cover page implies that the discussion paper was co-authored by the ILO and the IMF, the content section demonstrates that the document, in fact, combines two separate papers, one written by the ILO and another written by the IMF. This may be an indication of different and irreconcilable perspectives on social policy. Furthermore, the SPF concept only comes up in the overview section and the ILO section, but not in the IMF section.

With regards to the Oslo Conference, the interview participants noted that the conference became a political event with the participation of the President of Liberia, Prime Minister of Greece, Prime Minister of Spain as well as Ministers and representatives from select countries and individuals from academia and NGOs (see IMF, 2010). Also, the Prime Minister of Norway hosted the event. In this conference, the ILO and the IMF agreed to work on two areas, one of which is “to explore the concept of a social protection floor for living in poverty and in vulnerable situations,

62 For further details, see the press release at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10339.htm
within the context of a medium- to long-term framework of sustainable macroeconomic policies and strategies for development” (IMF, 2010; see also ILO & IMF, 2010).

The interview participants also added that the creation of the “Working Group on Jobs and Inclusive Growth” and the SPF pilot studies were direct consequences of the Oslo Conference. Although the working group did not have a specific SPF mandate, it has worked around the issues of jobs, inequality, and growth. Also, the ILO and the IMF collaborated on costing of SPFs in Mozambique, El Salvador, and Viet Nam (para. 4). The document entitled *Towards Effective and Fiscally Sustainable Social Protection Floors* included the pilot studies on these three countries and exclusively focused on the SPF and its affordability (see ILO & IMF 2012).

Within the SPF-I framework, the Strategy, Policy and Review Department has been the focal point of contact for the SPIAC-B meetings. Although this Department is the key to establishing the connections between the IMF and other SPF-related actors, other departments within the IMF have also been involved, depending on the topic.

In addition to the two departments mentioned above, the Fiscal Affairs Department also got involved in the SPF-I, as can be observed through the Mozambique case study that has been conducted in collaboration with the ILO and Oxford Policy Management (see Cunha et al., 2013). This case study was one of the IMF’s most important contributions

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63 For further details, see http://www.ilo.org/washington/areas/multilateral-initiatives/ilo-and-imf-collaboration/lang--en/index.htm
to the SPF-I. Mozambique was selected because it has been “one of the fastest growing economies in Africa in the last two decades. Nevertheless, the recent challenges to translate this positive economic trend into significant achievements in terms of poverty reduction have made clear the need for new policy approaches” (Cunha et al., 2013, p. iv). This study considered various cost simulations to expand the Mozambican social protection floor and concluded that “progressively building an SPF adopted to Mozambique’s needs does not present a threat to fiscal sustainability” (Cunha et al., 2013, p. 43). For this case study, the IMF (and particularly its Fiscal Affairs Department) provided extensive technical expertise and knowledge to assess the fiscal space available in Mozambique for the extension of social security systems (by looking at various policy alternatives). As noted earlier, the SPF policy mainly relies on national ownership and national resources; therefore it was crucial to identify how resources could be reorganized and tailored to implement the SPF policy in Mozambique. The Mozambique case study set the ground for further case studies in terms of the feasibility and the affordability of the national SPFs.

Another department that is worth mentioning is the Areas Department (more specifically, the African Department), which became relevant during the IMF’s assessment of the fiscal space in Mozambique. According to the interview participants, since the Area Departments have the resources to connect to the field more efficiently than the other departments, the involvement of the African Department was useful for the case study.
In sum, a closer examination of the IMF’s involvement in the SPF-I reveals that several Functional and Special Services Departments (i.e. Finance Department, Fiscal Affairs Department, Research Department, Statistics Department, and Strategy, Policy and Review Department) have done some SPF-related work at some point. Furthermore, Area Departments (for instance, the African Department in the case of Mozambique) have been involved when relevant. None of these departments have a specific social protection-related mandate, however they contributed to the SPF work when needed. Their work on the SPF has been tied to the “inclusive growth” framework that has been gaining momentum within the Fund. This way, unlike the World Bank, the SPF policy has travelled to several departments within the Organization despite the lack of broader institutional acceptance of the policy idea. 65

6.6 Analysis

This chapter demonstrates that the World Bank and the IMF are policy supporters as a result of the changes in the outlook of these organizations induced by global pressures. This chapter discusses two types of global pressures on the World Bank and the IMF. They are both external to these organizations. First type of global pressure is ideational, i.e. the reaction to the strictly growth-focused thinking and the recognition of

64 Please note that departments at the IMF are organized under Area Departments and Functional and Special Services Departments.
65 This led to comparisons between the IMF and the World Bank on the grounds that the IMF follows a more progressive policy approach towards the SPF.
“inclusivity” in development approaches as the norm. In the literature, ideational/normative factors inducing change come up in various studies, such as Beland 2009, Campbell 2004, and Finnemore and Sikkink 1998. The nature of change as a result of globalization pressures is identified as path-dependent, which happens through diffusion and translation (Campbell, 2004, p. 163): “[t]ranslation is a process in which new ideas that arrive from elsewhere through diffusion are combined with, rather than replace, already existing ... institutions.” The World Bank and the IMF’s work on “inclusive growth” demonstrate these characteristics as they integrate the new norm of “inclusivity” in their development approaches while not distancing themselves significantly from neoliberal principles.

The second type of global pressure that comes up in this chapter is more institutional in nature. Especially the SPF-related developments at the global level, which call for the World Bank and the IMF to actively engage in the SPF policy, fall in this category. More specifically, the UNCEB’s call in 2009 in the wake of financial crisis and the G20’s call in 2011 for collaborative SPF work are examples of such external institutional pressures.

External pressures led to engagement with the SPF policy at the senior management level. Dominique Strauss-Kahn from the IMF and Jim Yong Kim from the World Bank responded positively to the collaboration requests from the ILO. It should be noted that the leaders’ involvement in the SPF-related activities was more reactive (to global pressures) rather than being proactive (as a personal initiative or leadership decision to embrace and advance the SPF policy).
This chapter explains that during the early stages of the SPF policy, these two organizations were not part of the network of like-minded actors that were presented in Chapter 3, where the SPF policy was discussed and developed. The World Bank and the IMF did not demonstrate any interest in engaging in the SPF-work until high-level global forums invited them to collaboration. Even after the launch of the SPF-I, it still took these organizations a little while to respond to the global calls. Both organizations’ first engagement with the SPF policy came in 2010, not immediately after the launch of the SPF-I in 2009. This explains slow and late policy adoption at the World Bank and the IMF.

Since the early stages of the SPF policy, the gaps between the social policy approaches of the UN agencies and the IFIs were noticeable. This gap is reflected in the World Bank’s and the IMF’s presentations in the 2006 Show and Tell Meeting, where both organizations were very distant from the founding principles of the SPF policy. The emphasis on (targeted) social safety nets has continued even in the SPF-related events and publications. This explains selective buy in of the SPF policy in both organizations.

The Oslo Conference and the background paper prepared by the ILO and the IMF were critical points in terms of collaboration between two organizations around the SPF policy. The IMF’s contribution to the SPF policy was notable in pilot studies. With the directions coming from the senior management, a range of IMF departments got involved in these SPF-related activities, though for a very limited number of times. This explains limited to moderate organizational buy-in.
With regards to the World Bank’s engagement with the SPF policy, the Joint Action Plan, which was launched by the heads of the ILO and the World Bank, was a turning point. Despite the message disseminated by the senior management, the SPF policy has not travelled far within the World Bank (or outside of the Social Protection and Labour Global Practice). Therefore, when compared to the IMF, the World Bank demonstrated relatively more limited organizational buy-in of the SPF policy.

The World Bank’s co-leadership in the SPIAC-B was a critical milestone not only in terms of the relations with the ILO but also in terms of advancing the global social protection policy agenda. The World Bank’s efforts for co-leading and coordinating the global inter-agency work around social protection is very significant as it reflects the evolution in the organization’s outlook, where the World Bank sees a bigger role for itself in the field of social protection. While advancing the social protection agenda and action, it is questionable to what extent it advances the SPF policy, in particular. While acknowledging the benefits of the SPIAC-B platform in keeping social protection at the global agenda and in ensuring collaboration and coordination among key actors, many interview participants noted the limited mention of/reference to the SPF policy in these meetings. The World Bank’s chairmanship in SPIAC-B meetings is remarkable, however, the occasional drift away from the SPF policy weakens the ties with the SPF-I, while still advancing social protection work. This explains medium level of commitment.

The IMF’s level of involvement was even lower as the efforts were limited to a conference and a background paper (which did not specifically focus on the SPF), a
working group with a broad focus on “inclusive growth,” and a limited number of pilot studies to assess the affordability of the SPFs.
Chapter 7: Towards a Theory of Policy Adoption in International Organizations

The stories of policy adoption in six international organizations revealed the factors that explain the variation between policy adoption levels of policy leaders, policy followers, and policy supporters. However, the analysis did not end there. Chapter 4, 5, and 6 also revealed the factors explaining variation within these categories as well as within cases. In sum, three levels of analysis emerge here, which will be explained further in the following sub-sections.

7.1 Variation Between Categories

Figure 7.1 summarizes the factors that explain why the selected international organizations are policy leaders, followers, or supporters. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, policy entrepreneurs and their participation in policy networks of like-minded actors coupled with the policy’s fit in the outlook of the organization explain why the UN agencies are policy leaders. Chapter 5 presented that member countries define and navigate the OECD’s engagement with the SPF policy. Therefore, the interest/support of member states on the SPF policy despite the poor fit of the policy within the Organization’s outlook explain why the OECD is a policy follower. Chapter 6 showed that global pressures were the driving force behind the World Bank and the IMF’s role as a policy supporter. Similar to the OECD, the SPF policy does not fit well within the outlook
of these two organizations, but was articulated within the framework of inclusive
growth.

**Figure 7.1: Explaining policy leaders/followers/supporters**

In all cases, the extent to which the SPF policy fits within the outlook of the organization
was a determining factor for the Organization’s leader, follower, or supporter role in the
SPF-I. This is what distinguishes this study of international organizations from state-
centric diffusion studies. Furthermore, when international organizations are selected as
the unit of analysis, “(the fit of the policy within) the outlook of an organization” becomes very relevant as it establishes a broader framework through which policies are filtered. Such an explanatory variable would not be relevant to explain the behaviour of cities, states, or nations.

The remaining factors that explain the variation among policy adoption levels of international organizations can be categorized as either internal factors (i.e. policy entrepreneurs and their participation in policy networks) or external factors (i.e. member states and global pressures). In addition, the factors identified so far in the six selected international organizations are either bottom-up (i.e. policy entrepreneurs and their participation in policy networks, as well as member states), or top-down (i.e. global pressures). As noted in Chapter 1, such categorizations are commonly used in policy diffusion studies.

In the analysis of policy adoption in the UNICEF, the UNDP, the WHO, the OECD, the World Bank, and the IMF, three guiding questions seem to emerge. They are:

1. Does the policy fit well in the outlook of the organization?

2. Is policy adoption induced from within or outside the organization?

3. Is policy adoption a top-down or a bottom-up initiative?

The stories of policy adoption in the selected UN agencies revealed that these organizations are policy leaders as a result of bottom-up and internal factors as well as
the good fit of the SPF policy within their organizational outlook. The story of the OECD uncovered the role of bottom-up and external factors in inducing policy adoption in the Organization, despite the fact that the SPF policy was not a good fit in the outlook of the Organization. Finally, the stories of the World Bank and the IMF demonstrated that top-down and external factors played a role in the engagement of these two organizations’ with the SPF policy, despite the poor fit of the policy in their organizational outlook.

The analysis and the findings from Chapter 4, 5, and 6 lead to an analytical framework that captures the stories of all six international organizations (see Figure 7.2). This analytical framework allows us to look at policy adoption in international organizations in a systematic way.

This analytical framework draws on the three questions presented above and introduces eight possible outcomes, three of which were uncovered through the stories told in the previous chapters.

The following observations are worth noting in relation to the emerging analytical framework:

i. The analytical framework includes both structure-related (i.e. global pressures) and agency-related factors (i.e. policy entrepreneurs who participate in policy networks as well as member states/constituents). The analytical framework does not favour structure-based factors over agency-based factors or vice versa as they both appear as explanatory factors.
Figure 7.2: Analytical Framework

Does the policy fit well in the outlook of the organization?

YES >> Is policy adoption induced from within or outside the organization?

From within the organization >> Is policy adoption a top-down or a bottom-up initiative?

From outside the organization >> Is policy adoption a top-down or a bottom-up initiative?

NO >> Is policy adoption induced from within or outside the organization?

From within the organization >> Is policy adoption a top-down or a bottom-up initiative?

From outside the organization >> Is policy adoption a top-down or a bottom-up initiative?

Bottom-up   Top-down   Bottom-up   Top-down   Bottom-up   Top-down

POLICY LEADERS
Look at the role of policy entrepreneurs within relevant policy networks & the fit of the policy within the outlook of the organization
(e.g. the UN Agencies)

POLICY FOLLOWERS
Look at the role of the constituents or member states & the fit of the policy within the outlook of the organization
(e.g. the OECD)

POLICY SUPPORTERS
Look at the role of external pressures & the fit of the policy within the outlook of the organization
(e.g. the IFIs)
ii. In cases, where the SPF policy fits well within the organizational outlook, the engagement with the SPF policy was induced by internal factors, i.e. policy entrepreneurs within the organizations and their participation in relevant networks. On the contrary, in cases where the SPF policy fits poorly in the outlook of the organization, the SPF-related work in these organizations were induced from outside as a result of the requests from member countries (as in the case of the OECD) or global pressures (as in the case of the IFIs).

7.2 Variation Within Categories

The analysis does not end here. Chapter 4, 5, and 6 also reveal that the variation is not only between policy leader, follower and supporter categories, but also within them. As a reminder, all six selected organizations score differently in the policy adoption scale as presented in Chapter 4. Their scores are as following: the UNICEF (15), the UNDP (14), the WHO (13), the OECD (10), the World Bank (6) and the IMF (5).

The UNICEF, the UNDP, and the WHO all belong to the policy leader category. The presence of policy entrepreneurs in the relevant policy networks as well as the good fit of the SPF policy within these three organizations’ mandate explain why they are policy leaders, but do not explain why they move up and down in the policy adoption scale within the policy leader category. Chapter 4 reveals the factors that explain the variation within this category.
Since the ILO and the WHO are the co-leaders of the Initiative, one may expect that the WHO scores the highest in the policy adoption scale, which was presented in Chapter 3. However, the WHO is in third place after the UNICEF and the UNDP. According to the analysis, the change in the policy content (i.e. the concept of the SPF narrowed down with the ILO Recommendation No. 202), the institutional changes triggered by the recent financial crisis (i.e. big budget deficit and staff reductions that came with it), and also the competition among international organizations over financial resources and reputation (i.e. the WHO’s focus on its own well-functioning P4H Initiative and its reluctance to integrate it in the SPF-I despite the parallels and complementary features between the two Initiatives) explain why the WHO moved down in the policy adoption scale.

In addition, the case of the UNDP is worth elaborating further. One may expect to see the UNDP higher in the policy adoption scale because of its efforts in its capacity as a development agency and also as the coordinator of the UN offices at the country level. However, the UNDP comes after the UNICEF mainly because of the relatively lower level of commitment, which, very likely, was a result of the organizational restructuring it went through around 2013 and the temporary lack of focal point of contact for the SPF-work within the Organization during that time period.

Similar type of variation can be observed within the policy supporter category as well. While the World Bank scores 6, the IMF scores 5 in the policy adoption scale. Given that both Organizations are financial institutions, one may expect them to score the lowest
in terms of their adoption of a social policy idea that does not resonate directly with their work plans and programs. However, both Organizations made the SPF policy fit within their work on “inclusive growth.” This was a bigger stretch for the IMF than for the World Bank because the Bank has already had the Social Protection and Labour Global Practice through which the SPF work could be coordinated, but the Fund did not have such a unit/division or department mandated with social policy work. Accordingly, the IMF’s SPF-related work has been short-term, intermittent and narrow in scope, while the World Bank’s involvement has been more continuous and comprehensive, which allowed for a relatively higher level of commitment.

7.3 Variation Within Cases

Third level of analysis involves the variation within cases. This level of analysis is more tentative when compared to the analysis of variation between the policy leader, follower, and supporter categories. The analyses in Chapter 4, 5, and 6 reveal that in cases, where policy adoption is induced from bottom-up, the Organization’s engagement with the SPF-related work is more consistent throughout time. The UN agencies and the OECD exemplify this. However, when policy adoption is induced from top-down, there seems to be critical junctures, after which there is engagement with the SPF policy. The World Bank and the IMF exemplify this as their SPF-work comes after external pressures were exerted on them through various channels. The UNCEB Crisis Initiative and G20 meetings that call for their engagement with the SPF policy represent the critical junctures here.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

8.1 Summary of Chapters

This dissertation project is at the intersection of policy adoption, international organizations, and global social policy. It studied policy adoption in the six selected international organizations, namely the UNICEF, the UNDP, the WHO, the OECD, the World Bank, and the IMF. It has done so by examining their engagement with the SPF policy, within the context of the SPF-I. It aimed to answer the following questions: “what explains the extent of, and the variation in, the international organizations’ adoption of a given policy (in this case, the SPF)?”

Following the introduction, Chapter 2 provided a background on the SPF policy and the SPF-I, which is the case study under investigation. Chapter 3 followed with a detailed breakdown of the policy adoption concept and mapped out the characteristics of policy adoption in six the selected international organizations. The policy adoption matrix developed in this chapter helped categorize the selected international organizations as a policy leader, follower, or supporter.

My analysis in Chapter 3 revealed that the UNICEF demonstrates the following characteristics: a fast, early and comprehensive policy adopter with high level of commitment and widespread organizational buy-in. The UNDP differs from the UNICEF slightly since it demonstrates moderate level of commitment, while all other components remain the same. The WHO can be identified as a fast, early and
comprehensive policy adopter with moderate levels of commitment and organizational buy in. The OECD scores medium/moderate for every component of the policy adoption matrix. The World Bank can be identified as a slow, late, and selective adopter with moderate level of commitment and limited organizational buy-in. Finally, the IMF is very similar to the World Bank except that it demonstrates low level of commitment, while the other components remain the same.

Accordingly, international organizations ranged in terms of their scores in the adoption scale as the UNICEF gets 15, the UNDP gets 14, the WHO gets 13, the OECD gets 10, the World Bank gets 6 and the IMF gets 5 in terms of their policy adoption scores. These scores allowed me to identify the UNICEF, the UNDP, and the WHO as policy leaders; the OECD as a policy follower; and the World Bank and the IMF as policy supporters.

Chapter 4, 5, and 6 presented a detailed story of policy adoption in each international organization in order to identify the factors that explain what makes international organizations policy leaders, followers, or supporters. Chapter 4 examined policy leaders and revealed that the policy entrepreneurs and their participation within relevant networks as well as the good fit of the SPF policy within the outlook of these organizations explain the UN agencies’ policy leadership position. Chapter 5 focused on the OECD as a policy follower. It identified the role of member states and the poor fit of the SPF policy within the outlook of the organization as factors explaining the policy follower role of the OECD. Chapter 6 followed with an analysis of policy supporters. It
demonstrated that global pressures along with the poor fit of the SPF policy within the outlook of the organization explain why the IFIs fall in the policy supporter category.

Chapter 7 presented a synthesis of the analyses made in Chapter 4, 5, and 6. Drawing on the factors that emerged as explanatory factors for policy leader, follower, or supporter roles, Chapter 7 presented an analytical framework that captures all six stories of policy adoption in international organizations. In addition to explaining the variation between the three categories, it also elaborated on the variation within these categories as well as within cases.

8.2 Assessment of This Study

This dissertation has made the following contributions to the literature: (i) it broke down policy adoption to its sub-components and developed a policy adoption matrix, (ii) it improved our understanding of policy adoption in international organization by demonstrating that there are varying degrees of policy adoption, (iii) it mapped out the characteristics of policy adoption of the six international organizations and identified them as either policy leader, follower, or supporter, (iv) it explained what makes these six international organizations policy leaders, followers, or supporters, and (v) it established an analytical framework, which can be applied to other policy areas and international organizations.

The strengths and the limitations of the case study method are worth elaborating here as they apply to this study as well. In terms of the strengths, cases studies allow for (i)
“conceptual refinement with higher level of validity over a smaller number of cases,” (ii)
“identification of new variables and hypothesis,” (iii) detailed causal explanations, and
(iv) models that can assess complex interactions between explanatory variables (see
George and Bennett 2005: 19-22). In terms of the limitations, case study method may
carry the risks of (i) case selection bias, (ii) tentative conclusions, and (iii) lack of
representativeness (see George & Bennett, 2005, p. 22-34).

In an effort to avoid the case selection bias, the six international organizations were
selected according to diverse case selection method. This study does not claim to have
selected cases that are representative of all international organizations. However, it was
ensured that there are cases that represent each typological category (i.e. policy leader,
follower, and supporter) and that there are cases with both extreme values and median
values.

In order to make the findings less tentative and have a greater confidence on the
findings of this study, data triangulation has been used and the analyses have been
supported with rich evidence from various data sources. The data that has been
collected through various sources has been cross-checked and reassessed constantly
throughout the study. In addition, all interview participants answered questions about
all six international organizations, which helped avoid explanations based on self-
description of international organizations. While the explanations of the variation
between and within three typological categories have been cross-checked by using
multiple data sources throughout Chapter 4, 5, and 6, the explanations of the variation within cases are relatively more tentative.

In an effort to offer explanatory richness, the number of cases is kept manageable in this study. This study acknowledges that the trade-off of explanatory richness (that comes with studying a small number of cases) was parsimony. In other words, as the study moved towards uncovering various paths that explain the variation in policy adoption levels of international organizations based on thick descriptions of the six cases, the findings became less generalizable.

8.3 Future Research

This study creates a fertile ground for future research in several ways. First, this study attributes equal weights to each sub-component of the policy adoption matrix, which was presented in Chapter 3. However, it may be worthwhile to investigate whether there is variation in the weight of each component that makes up the aggregate level of policy adoption. This may bring fresh insights in to the discussions about policy adoption in international organizations. Second, the analytical framework that was developed in Chapter 7 can be applied to new policy areas to study policy adoption in international organizations. In the global social policy field, examples of global coordination and collaboration are limited in number; yet still exist (for instance, the WHO’s P4H Initiative may be an interesting case study to test this analytical framework). Third, the stories of policy adoption in the six selected international organizations help explain only three of
the eight possible outcomes in the analytical framework. The remaining outcomes are open for investigation in future research.
Appendices

Appendix A: Interview Guide

SET I

Could you please tell me about

(i) your branch and your work there,
(ii) your involvement in the SPF-I, and
(iii) your observations from the SPF-related meetings (such as Show and Tell Meetings and the SPIAC-B meetings) (if applicable)?

1. Why do you think that the ILO is the home of the SPF-I?

2. The WHO was a co-initiator of the policy? How has its role changed later in the process?

3. How has the concept of the SPF evolved over time?

4. When was the first time the SPF was discussed outside the ILO so that other international organizations became aware of it?

5. What are the key SPF meetings? Please name them.

➢ What were the tensions in these meetings? (i.e. tensions about the SPF concept itself, assessment tools, etc.)

6. (First, introduce the three categories) Which international organizations fall in the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> categories in the context of the SPF-I? Please explain why you have placed the international organizations in the three categories the way you did.
7. Which international organizations use the concept of the SPF in the original (ILO’s) formulation?

8. Do you agree that the focus of the international community is shifting from agenda setting to implementation?

   ➢ How do you think that this shift is going to affect the involvement of the international organizations in the SPF-I?

9. What are the prospects for the SPF policy and inter-agency cooperation in the post-MDG framework?
SET II

Could you please tell me about

(i) your branch and your work there,
(ii) your involvement in the SPF-I, and
(iii) your observations from the SPF-related meetings (such as Show and Tell Meetings and the SPIAC-B meetings) (if applicable)?

I. Identifying policy adoption levels:

1. The speed of policy adoption
   a) When was your organization aware of the SPF-I?
   b) When was the policy picked up by your organization?

2. The timing of policy adoption
   a) When was your organization’s first formal involvement in the SPF process?
   b) Did your organization pick up the SPF policy before or after the launch of the Initiative in 2009?

3. The level of commitment
   a) Did your organization attend the key SPF meetings?
   b) Did your organization attend the subsequent meetings regularly?
   c) Did your organization organize meetings on the SPF?
   d) Did your organization publish on the SPF?
   e) Did your organization create a working group or a committee for the SPF-work?
   f) Did your organization provide money for the Initiative?
4. The breadth of organizational buy-in

a) Which department(s) represented your organization in the SPF meetings?
b) Which department(s) organized events and/or published on the SPF?

5. The scope of policy adoption

a) Does your organization use the concept of the SPF as is, or does it diverge from the original (ILO’s) formulation of the SPF?
b) Which other concepts do you use to discuss social protection in your organization?

6. The aggregate level of policy adoption

Where does your organization fall in this categorization, and why? Where do other organizations fall, and why?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY 1</th>
<th>CATEGORY 2</th>
<th>CATEGORY 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slow adoption</td>
<td>Category 2 falls in between Category 1 &amp; 2</td>
<td>Fast adoption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late adoption</td>
<td></td>
<td>Early adoption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low level of commitment</td>
<td></td>
<td>High level of commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited organizational buy-in</td>
<td></td>
<td>Widespread organizational buy-in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective adoption</td>
<td></td>
<td>Comprehensive adoption</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. Explaining Policy Adoption

Please name factors influencing your organization’s involvement in the SPF-I.

(Participants can also identify degree variation)
## Appendix B: UN System Joint Crisis Initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Initiative</th>
<th>Lead Agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initiative 1: Additional Financing for the Most Vulnerable</td>
<td>UNDP, World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative 2: Food Security</td>
<td>FAO, IFAD, UN, WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative 3: Trade</td>
<td>UNCTAD, WTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative 4: A Green Economy Initiative</td>
<td>UNEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative 5: A Global Jobs Pact</td>
<td>ILO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative 6: A Social Protection Floor</td>
<td>ILO, WHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative 7: Humanitarian, Security and Social Stability</td>
<td>WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative 8: Technology and Innovation</td>
<td>ITU, UNIDO, WIPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative 9: Monitoring and Analysis</td>
<td>IMF, UN-DESA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: UNCEB, 2009)
Appendix C: Principles of the SPF Policy

1. universality of protection, based on social solidarity;

2. entitlement to benefits prescribed by national law;

3. adequacy and predictability of benefits;

4. non-discrimination, gender equality and responsiveness to special needs;

5. social inclusion, including of persons in the informal economy;

6. respect for the rights and dignity of people covered by the social security guarantees;

7. progressive realization, including by setting targets and time frames;

8. solidarity in financing while seeking to achieve an optimal balance between the responsibilities and interests among those who finance and benefit from social security schemes;

9. consideration of diversity of methods and approaches, including of financing mechanisms and delivery systems;

10. transparent, accountable and sound financial management and administration;

11. financial, fiscal and economic sustainability with due regard to social justice and equity;

12. coherence with social, economic and employment policies;

13. coherence across institutions responsible for delivery of social protection;

14. high-quality public services that enhance the delivery of social security systems;

15. efficiency and accessibility of complaint and appeal procedures;
16. regular monitoring of implementation, and periodic evaluation;

17. full respect for collective bargaining and freedom of association for all workers;

and

18. tripartite participation with representative organizations of employers and workers, as well as consultation with other relevant and representative organizations of persons concerned.

(Source: ILO, 2012b, pp. 2-3)
Appendix D: Definitions

Concepts of social security, social protection, social transfers, social assistance as well as social insurance have been commonly used, even more so with the increased emphasis on the importance of sound social policy along with economic policy in achieving development. Despite their widespread usage, there is no common understanding about their meaning. Even worse, the concepts have sometimes been used interchangeably, creating confusion in the academic and policy fields. Select definitions are presented below:

*Social security* … covers all measures providing benefits, whether in cash or in kind, to secure *protection*, inter alia from

a) lack of work related income (or insufficient income) caused by sickness, disability, maternity, employment, old age, or death of a family member;

b) lack of access or unaffordable access to health care;

c) insufficient family support, particularly for children and adult dependents;

d) general poverty and social exclusion...

*[Social protection]* is often interpreted as having a broader character than *social security*” … *Reference* is made to ‘social protection’ as having the following aspects: (1) as “protection” provided by social security in case of social risks and
needs; (2) in relation to the Social Protection Floor as envisaged by the family of UN agencies to include not only social (security) transfers, but also access to a range of basic social services.

All social security benefits comprise transfers, either in cash or in kind, i.e. they represent a transfer of income or services (most often health-care services)...

The recipients of such transfers may be in a position to receive them from a specific social security scheme because they have contributed to such a scheme (contributory scheme), or because they are residents (universal schemes for all residents), or they fulfil specific age criteria (categorical schemes), or they experience specific resource conditions (social assistance schemes) or because they fulfil several of these conditions at the same time. (ILO, 2010b, pp. 125-126)
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