9310

NATIONAL LIBRARY
OTTAWA

BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE
OTTAWA

NAME OF AUTHOR.....Vernon J. Kronenberg
TITLE OF THESIS....."All Together Now--Canadian Defence
.....Organization, 1964-1969"
.....
UNIVERSITY.....Carleton University
DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED.....M.A.
YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED.....1971

Permission is hereby granted to THE NATIONAL LIBRARY
OF CANADA to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies
of the film.

The author reserves other publication rights, and
neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be
printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's
written permission.

(Signed).....

PERMANENT ADDRESS:

.....1 STONE PLACE
.....GARRAN ACT 2625
.....AUSTRALIA

DATED.....19

NL-91 (10-68)

ALL TOGETHER NOW

Canadian Defence Organization

1964 - 1971

by

VERNON J. KRONENBERG

A thesis submitted to Carleton University in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Public
Administration.

School of Public Administration
Carleton University
Ottawa, Canada
July, 1971

© Vernon J. Kronenberg 1971

The undersigned recommend to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies acceptance of the thesis

"All Together Now--Canadian Defence Organization,
1964-1969"

submitted by Vernon J. Kronenberg
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Arts in Public Administration.

.....
Thesis Supervisor

.....
Director, School of Public
Administration

Carleton University

Date: August 24, 1971

SYNOPSIS

Details of major changes in Canadian defence organization between 1964 and 1971 are traced in the context of integration of the Headquarters in 1964, unification of the armed forces in 1966-68, and developments since that time. Primary attention is given to the organizational changes during this period and the reasons for them. Changes over this period are analyzed mainly in terms of their implications for classical organization theory, following the framework used by Ries (see bibliography). Concludes with an evaluation of integration and unification both to the Canadian situation and to other countries.

PREFACE

The origins of this thesis may, in some way, explain its contents. I was fortunate to be selected as an Australian Commonwealth Public Service Board Postgraduate Scholar in 1970. I had applied for a scholarship to come to Canada in order that I might make a close study of the defence integration and unification process. My aim in doing this was to acquaint myself, as a public servant then working in the Australian Department of the Army, with a subject that would, in my opinion, shortly impinge on the Australian defence scene.

Concurrent with my studies, in fact, there was in progress an Army Review Committee - the Hassett Committee - which was investigating and recommending on a form of organization suitable to a modern Australian army. In many quarters the Hassett Committee was interpreted as preparing the Army for a closer association with the other defence elements of the country. As well there had been created in 1969, in the Department of Defence, a special studies group whose task it was to investigate and work on a closer association of supporting services in the interests of rationalization and economy.

My immediate aim was to study at first hand the process by which what could possibly happen in Australia had been accomplished in another Commonwealth, federal country with a similarly sized defence force, and, at least during this period, much the same type of defence role. In particular, I was interested in the organizational aspects of unification, and this is the substantial element of the thesis.

That I was able to accomplish this work is due to the assistance of a large number of people in several countries. My first thanks

must go to my department and particularly my Permanent Head, Mr. B. White, who vigorously supported my original application. The Public Service Board Postgraduate Scholarships Scheme is a generous one, and I am grateful to have been one of its recipients. Part of the research for the thesis was carried out in Washington, D.C., at the Library of Congress, the State Department and the Canadian Embassy, and I was ably assisted there. In Canada the Department of National Defence, and in particular the Secretary, Mr. J.R. Chisholm, gave me every assistance, some of it above and beyond the call of duty, for which my grateful thanks. I was able to discuss earlier drafts of this work with a number of National Defence staff members, past and present, and their interpretations of fact and opinion were most useful.

The two main readers and supervisors of my thesis were Dr. J.C. Arnell of the Department of National Defence and Professor Harold Von Reikhoff of the School of International Affairs. To them is owed a debt of thanks for pointing out obscurities which required clarification, and for pointing out errors of fact. Professor G. Bruce Doern of the School of Public Administration also read an earlier draft of part of the manuscript. The errors of fact and opinion that remain, of course, are mine.

Carleton University
Ottawa, 1971

V.J.K.

CONTENTS

Synopsis	i
Preface	ii
Introduction	vi

PART 1 - BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 1 - PRELUDE TO THE WHITE PAPER

Introduction	2
Earlier Attempts at Integration	6
The Need for Economies	17
Conclusion	22

CHAPTER 2 - THE 1964 WHITE PAPER

Introduction	24
Political Considerations	26
Chosen Roles	27
Organizational Decisions	29
Discussion	34

PART II - ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

CHAPTER 3 - THE EVOLUTION OF THE HEADQUARTERS

Introduction	42
The Integration Debate	43
The Vice Chief of Defence Staff Branch	67
The Controller-General Branch	83
The Deputy Minister Branch	89
Civil-Military Relations in the Headquarters	95
Conclusions	103

CHAPTER 4 - THE FORMATION OF THE COMMANDS AND THE
ISSUES OF UNIFICATION

Introduction	107
The Formation of the Commands	108
The Issues of Unification	121
Conclusion	134

CHAPTER 5 - DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1967

Introduction	136
Political Changes	137
Field Force Changes	139
Changes at CFHQ	148
Discussion	155

PART III - EVALUATION

CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSIONS

Introduction	161
Organization Theories	162
The Uniqueness of Canadian Defence Forces Unification	168
The Lessons of Canadian Defence Unification	178

APPENDIX 1 - LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	196
------------------------------------	-----

APPENDIX 2 - PERSONS INTERVIEWED IN CONNECTION WITH THESIS RESEARCH	197
--	-----

APPENDIX 3 - CFHQ ORGANIZATION MID 1971	198
---	-----

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE	199
BIBLIOGRAPHY	201

INTRODUCTION

The original aim of this thesis was to present an account of how a specific event - the integration and unification of Canada's Defence Forces - reflected on the status of organizational theory. It was hoped to synthesise the dual effects of events on theory, and theory on events. However a number of factors altered the original conception of this aim.

Foremost among these was the growing realization as research progressed, that the major events of the period had not been adequately described. Previous writers on the subject had either described the whole process in detail that was too broad to enable much application of theory, except in a very preliminary way; or had concentrated on one specific part of the story without placing the whole series of events in a perspective which permitted the application of theory to a number of incidents. It became clear that for this work to have any lasting value a clear account of the history of this period was required.

As much of this history is not written down, but remains in the minds of participants of that period, it was important that this be done first. In my interviews with participants it became clear that very few of them had more than a narrow awareness of what had gone on in areas of the department outside their immediate focus. Indeed the turbulence of those times, both in terms of movements of personnel and the ebb and flow of discussions and decisions would have made it very hard for anybody but an almost full-time student to marshal the facts and place them on record. To this must be added the observation that many of the judgments made by individuals appear to be based largely on a combination of hindsight and predilection. There is a danger in

reviewing the events of a period that material subsequent to these events will be used to explain them. This has been scrupulously avoided, and the narrative is taken in the order presented by the documents.

The Canadian defence organization is so large and many-faceted that any study of this length can only be a partial one. Particular attention has been paid to the facts of organizational development of its more important branches. As well some comments have been made about the concepts of organization involved. For fuller, and indeed better treatments of this latter aspect the reader is referred to the books by John Ries and Paul Hammond,¹ who have used the same framework to analyse the development of the US defence organization. The analysis attempted here is explicitly based on the concepts explored by these writers, particularly in their treatment of what Reis has called "the folklore of unification".

Previous writings on Canadian defence organization have described this only up to 1968 - the moment of unification. Considerable development has taken place since, both in developing a more balanced approach to the 'functional' concept of organization and in devising an organization that is better suited to the Canadian environment and newly emerging roles for its armed forces. Chapter 5 therefore attempts to describe these trends, which are still emerging, but which are particularly interesting from an organizational viewpoint.

An attempt to sum up the utility and the appropriateness of integration and unification is made in Chapter 6, which concludes this work. Although the views expressed there more or less state the

1. Ries, The Management of Defence, Hammond, Organizing for Defence.

common currency of feeling among interested observers, they are based to a greater extent on first hand information than were previous opinions on the subject. An attempt is also made to place the Canadian experience in a wider context, and to review its application to other countries.

PART I

BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 1 - PRELUDE TO THE WHITE PAPER

Introduction

The integration and eventual unification¹ of the Canadian armed forces has its origins in at least four prior internal circumstances and it is the aim of this chapter to describe and illustrate them, so that they may be examined as a background against which the events of 1964-1968 can be seen in clearer perspective. The first and most important of these, as the immediate precursor of the events of 1964-67, was undoubtedly the desire to seek greater economies in the armed forces, both in itself and as a reaction to some previous events which had cast the administration of the armed forces and military foreign policy in an unfavourable light domestically, if not internationally.

Nor must it be forgotten that the dynamism and undoubted personal ambition of a new Minister - Mr. Paul Hellyer - determined both to impose his will on a very large and complex department and to use it as a stepping-stone to higher offices, was another very important factor in the train of events that led to unification.

Most of those writers who have explored this subject have been content to find in these two factors sufficient causes for subsequent events. In fact there are two earlier parts of the story that

1. It is important to bear in mind that these terms are not interchangeable, and for this reason they are often misused. Unification means the merging of the armed forces and their supporting structures into a single organization with a unitary hierarchy. Integration is something which stops short of total unification. At the very least it means devising structures that enhance co-ordination between the three armed forces, the Department of National Defence and the Defence Research Board. At the other extreme it may mean unification of elements of the armed forces, usually the supporting services and the planning staff.

complete the history of the subject, and these may serve to explain some of the attitudes of the dramatis personae in the events of 1966-67, thus forming a significant background against which the success of the eventual unification may be measured as an accomplished fact. The first of these is the earlier history of integration and unification efforts which eventually foundered for a number of different reasons, and the second is the attempts at integration before 1963 which, in the event, turned out to be successful.

This chapter will briefly outline these factors, dealing first with the earlier attempts at integration and unification. For ease of narration, it is convenient to link the successful and unsuccessful attempts together in one temporally coherent strand to illustrate the interplay of forces and circumstances that eventually determined which efforts were to succeed and which were to fail. Before doing this, however, a few words on the organization of the armed forces.

For the purpose of this thesis, the organization of the Canadian armed forces can be viewed as a broad aggregate of three parts as illustrated in Diagram 1.

The Field Forces comprise the fighting arms of the armed forces - army, air force and navy - together with their immediate supporting services, mainly training and logistic components. The Headquarters comprises the policy-making and senior directing staffs that together control the total armed forces. As well there are substantial numbers of persons engaged in supporting both the field forces and the headquarters with indirect rather than immediately direct services. Included in this group are functions such as medicine, chaplaincy, major printing works, non-field communications, stores services, dockyards and service depots, provost and security services, firefighting, libraries and suchlike.

All of these can, of course, be unitary as they are now, or replicated into a number of separate units: with a more or less complete set of each for each Service. Very often the supporting services do not clearly exist as distinct entities but are merged into and functionally controlled directly by the Headquarters and the Field Forces. Nevertheless these supporting services can be regarded - at least in theory - as a distinct group. It is usually elements of the supporting services group - as will be shown - that are the first subject of integration exercises; and very often success or failure in this relatively unimportant area determines whether integration will be pursued elsewhere. The corollary to this 'proving ground' theory is that the kind of opposition arguments raised against efforts at integration in the supporting services are then transferred and used again in other contexts against other efforts at integration and unification.

Any slight familiarity with the difference in primary role of the field forces, the headquarters and the supporting service elements will indicate the shallowness of this approach. Arguments for and against integration or unification of one of these elements often have little relevance to arguments for doing the same in the others, except very marginally. This of course works both ways, and it was a significant criticism of the Hellyer unification that a totalist attitude was adopted without sufficient consideration being given to the special needs of each of these elements. Be that as it may, earlier attempts at integration of the supporting service elements were often opposed on grounds that were really more appropriate to opposing a major unification effort. Each minor skirmish was in some quarters viewed as the major battle which, if lost, would catastrophically collapse the rest of the structure.

It is important to take note of this because it illustrates one problem that often arises in attempting to change organizations and that is the question of setting limits on change; of going so far and no further, and of being able to persuade people that one has a limited aim which, if met, will not result in any more changes. Perhaps it was the failure to state clearly such limited aims which led to violent, extreme and in some cases successful opposition to the earlier attempts. Possibly the aims were never sufficiently clear to enable them to be stated in a language intelligible within a large and disparate organization such as the Canadian armed forces. The documents of the earlier period - both the files and the military journals - do not indicate the same awareness of this communication problem that was evinced in the Hellyer period.

Earlier Attempts at Integration

Probably the earliest attempts at integrating the armed forces commenced in 1922 when the government gave notice that

"With the object of promoting economy and increasing efficiency, a Bill will be submitted ... providing for a Department of Defence in which the various branches of the defence forces of Canada will be co-ordinated under one ministerial head"¹

and in 1923 this was accomplished. During the same period a limited integration of the military headquarters was attempted: that it failed dismally showed

"that without the willing co-operation of the officers affected by these reforms, and in the absence of ruthless political determination to see that they are put into effect, it would be better not to have introduced them in the first place."²

By the late 1930's sufficient courage was found to attempt further experiments. In 1939 a Chiefs of Staff Committee was formed replacing the Joint Staff Committee which had not included the head of the Air Force. It was not till February 1951 that a Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee was appointed,³ and that appointment persisted until it was replaced by the Chief of the Defence Staff in 1964.

The first attempt at unification of the armed forces into a single service was in 1939 when a bill to give effect to this was

-
1. Governor-General's Speech, HC, Session 1922 Vol 1, p. 7
 2. Eayres, "Canada Pioneers the Single Service," p. 151. The whole story is entertainingly told there.
 3. Before that the Chief of the General Staff had functioned as the de facto head of the Committee. Foulkes Evidence, SC 22 Oct 1963, p. 523.

drafted. However, parliament never saw the bill as the government of the day decided, just ahead of the outbreak of hostilities, that a time of war was no time to attempt to change the organizational structure of the armed forces.¹

In fact what happened was that the intervention of the Second World War and the consequent dramatic increase in work and responsibility forced a temporary breakup of the unitary Minister for National Defence into three parts. Junior Ministers of National Defence for Air and for Naval Services were created, leaving the Minister for National Defence with the overall direction of military policy as well as responsibility for the Army. At the end of the war political control reverted to a single Minister of National Defence, who was given an Associate Minister of National Defence to help with the work.

In 1946 another attempt to unify the armed forces "by banging heads together" was again commenced.² As the story goes, the Minister of the day - Mr. Brooke Claxton - undertook this task on the understanding that he would shortly thereafter be transferred to another Cabinet post, and thus better insulated from the consequences. When he was advised that he would have to stay on at National Defence, he quickly put a stop to the unification process as such.

Despite this apparent setback at the organizational level, the need to explore all possible measures of manpower economy was noted. It was suggested that, in an effort to release additional personnel for

1. Ottawa Citizen, 15 Dec 1966.

2. Ottawa Journal, 10 Nov 1966. Foulkes Evidence, SC, 22 Oct 1963, p. 508

employment in combat units, an extension of measures for joint operations and administration should be attempted. This was assented to by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which agreed that at the appropriate time a high-level joint committee, reporting to the Chiefs of Staff would investigate and report on those functions of the three Services which could be combined to provide more efficient and economical operation and administration. This decision produced an Interservice Combined Functions Committee, and was subsequently endorsed by the Minister in January 1947.

As soon as the Minister's thinking was intimated to other persons in the Department the attempts at procrastination commenced. The reasons for postponing consideration of this were varied, and well illustrated the difficulties encountered in subsequent exercises. They included the following:

- a. "The present incomplete state of Canadian-United States planning". This referred to a post-war attempt at co-ordinating Canadian and US security plans and command structures. As this was to be a continuing process, acceptance of this reason would have put off the evil day indefinitely.
- b. From various quarters the 'tail wagging dog' argument was advanced. It was said that a serious loss in efficiency would result from integrating supporting services under one or other of the Armed Forces as the other Service Commanders would not have full control of the supporting services, as previously. This in itself would be a bad thing, under the accepted 'command and control' concept which was a significant element of military thinking.

- c. Considerable efforts were made to differentiate the functions of what might at first glance appear to be common services. Among the 'specialties' that quickly emerged were aviation medicine, shipboard cooking, RCAF photography as well as a host of differing conditions of service that would apparently make commonality of supporting services either unfeasible or would require such extensive review as to cast doubts on the value of amalgamation on cost/benefit grounds.
- d. " Many sectors of common services, if amalgamated, would not produce any significant staff savings. As this was the main reason for undertaking such amalgamations, it was hardly worthwhile.

As well as the above conceptual difficulties, the practical experience of concrete attempts to impose integration was a significant factor, and is best exemplified by the integration of the Medical Services. Dental Services had, up to 1947, been integrated, with the dental elements of all three Services operating as a service provided by the Army. In 1947 the internal organization was altered and the three dental companies were reorganized on a regional instead of a Service basis. In May 1947, the proposals for bringing together the three medical services, which had been recommended by the Ministers of National Revenue, Veterans Affairs and Defence was approved by Cabinet. The implementation of this directive was to take another eleven years, all of them spent in considerable acrimony. A number of formal reports

recommending against amalgamation were prepared, together with accompanying minority reports recommending for amalgamation. In the final analysis the Armed Forces Medical Service was integrated in 1951 and consolidated in 1959, but this was achieved on the basis of considerable dispute, and by the courage of a minority.¹

The need for some integration was realized, but the process of achieving it was slow, and in some cases painful. Between 1947 and 1951 very minor organizational changes were made towards integration. These included

- the appointment of a single minister as previously described;
- the creation of the Defence Research Board out of Service laboratories as a permanent part of the Department;
- the reopening of RMC and Royal Roads as tri-service colleges;
- the integration of dental, medical, chaplain and legal services;
- the handing over of certain rather minor clerical functions to one Service, and the elimination of duplicative branches in the other services.²

1. Foulkes Evidence, SC 22 Oct 1963, p. 502. It should be noted however that the Canadian effort at integrating medical services succeeded while in the UK - where the matter was being looked at concurrently by the Nathan Committee - it failed to gain acceptance.

2. DND: "Major Events 1947-1950"; DND "Canadian Armed Forces, March 1970".

The major issue during this period continued to be whether a supreme commander of all three forces should be created or not. From 1946 right up to 1950 a succession of papers, usually entitled Central Organization for Defence, made their way from the Planning Staffs to the Chiefs of Staff and thence to the Minister, in which the pros and cons were debated.¹ The argument was usually presented in three sections, a historical section, a comparative section, and a 'principles of military organization' section. The absence of a unified military command in the history of the UK and the US, together with the failure of the German OKW were covered in some detail.² Then the rejection by the UK and the US in the immediate postwar period to unify their military command would be noted. Finally the view that a supreme command in peacetime is not necessary would be supported on a number of principles. This last view is worthy of closer examination.

The argument divided into three major parts; political, military and organizational. The political argument was that the ultimate decisions would rest with the Prime Minister or Cabinet, who would in any event take counsel from a number of departments such as foreign affairs, war production etc. Provided the final decision-making body was unified it did not matter much that the channels which fed up preliminary recommendations were more or less numerous. In any case,

1. A similar debate was being carried on in many other countries, including Australia, New Zealand, the US and Britain. The doctrinal history is well covered in the volumes of Brassey's Annual.

2. In his Central Organization For Defence Michael Howard is scathing on the persistent misinterpretation of the failings of the OKW - a misinterpretation which, as here, is often very convenient.

to unify the military channel would be a marginal effort as the other channels would persist. The favourite quotation of this viewpoint was Hankey's rather ambiguous statement that "In the grand strategy of the war the views of the Service Chiefs (or Supreme Commander) must usually prevail but even here the last word must rest with the statesmen, who are responsible for policy and for distributing the resources of the country in the manner best calculated to win the war."¹

The military and organizational elements of this view flow naturally from the political one. That a supreme commander is necessary for the co-ordination of the Services in an operational wartime theatre was accepted. It was even noted that such a peacetime appointment would facilitate the changes dictated by technically revolutionary weapons, would provide professional co-ordination of the three Services as a single instrument, would save time in arriving at decisions and may eliminate faulty compromises arrived at by Chiefs of Staff purely to attain agreement. On the other hand the appointment of a supreme commander in peacetime, when every Service is likely to be most jealous of its prerogatives would place him in a difficult, even invidious, situation. In any case, in order to carry out their responsibilities, the Chiefs of Staff must have under their direct control the machinery of their Service. And it is an accepted principle of military organization that if a Chief of Staff is to be given a responsibility involving his Service, his must be the sole control over that Service.

1. M.P.A. Hankey, Government Control In War, Cambridge, C.U.P., 1945, p. 12. A similar viewpoint was expressed by Lt. General Simonds in his Evidence, SC 17 Oct 1963, p. 466.

The broad conclusions of the Chiefs of Staff were that a substantial organizational improvement had been achieved by adopting a single Minister of Defence arrangement, but that to integrate any further was not necessary.¹ When one recalls that during this period the US and UK had not established a unitary minister system, had rejected a Supreme Commander concept, and that a very bitter unification debate was going on in the US. the decisions reached in Canada appear sound, liberal and appropriate to this situation.² The 1951 appointment of the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee was made at a time when two factors had altered the original postwar conception of a small peacetime force. The formation of NATO in 1949 in which Canada was a significant partner, and the troubles in Korea reversed the decline of the armed forces so that in less than twelve months their numbers increased by 75%.³ It was not till 1964/66 that the argument about a chief of the defence forces would be resumed, with much the same points being raised. Although the immediate factors that led to the appointment of the CCOSC are not available one can conjecture that the situation had changed sufficiently to justify the appointment without violating the logic of the original arguments against such a move. The NATO and Korean situations would shortly lead to the formation of operational theatres, and thus require a supreme commander.

1. Foulkes Evidence, SC 22 Oct 1963, pp 523-524.

2. For two detailed, if rather bloodless accounts of US defence integration see the Report to The President and The Secretary of Defence on the Department of Defence, Ch 1, and "Unification Observed: The American Experience" by COL R.D. Heintz Jr in Brassey's Annual 1965. A very lucid account of UK developments is given in Howard's Central Organization For Defence.

3. 31 July 1950 - 46,886: 31 August 1951 - 82,139. DND "Major Events 1947-1951".

If one attempts to compare the relative failure of these postwar attempts at integration with the success of the 1964-67 venture, three important differences are immediately evident.

The early attempts were an effort to integrate from the bottom upward. The top structure, and in particular the organization of the Headquarters staff, received, with the exception of the question of the CCOSC, almost no attention at all. By the same token it can be argued that the commitment of the Service Chiefs and the Deputy Minister was thereby lessened, to the extent that the attempts at integration did not really appear to impinge on their domains directly.¹ By comparison the 1964 integration was achieved by beginning with the top of the structure and working down. Once the top was integrated, the momentum of commitment could not so easily be halted.

The absence of a firm plan was also greatly in evidence in the earlier attempt, as compared with the amount of detailed planning that was undertaken during the Hellyer integration. The marginal and piecemeal approach to integration in 1946-51 together with the strong emotions aroused by integration (these were probably self-reinforcing elements) made the chances of any major successful integration very small. One can go further and say that, to the extent that there was a plan in the earlier period it was ill-founded. The postwar attempts can be characterized by their haphazard nature, by an attempt to see what could be integrated, to weigh the arguments pro and con, and to reach a judgement without any firm prior commitment. In the later period the question of whether to integrate or not was no longer an issue: the question was simply how best to carry out something that had already been predetermined.

1. The powers of the Deputy Minister at that time were considerably less than what they were intended to become in 1964. See Armstrong Evidence SC 3 June 1964, and Glasco Report, Vol 4, pp 74-79.

The third factor has already been noted in the Introduction to this Chapter - ministerial drive. From all accounts Mr. Claxton had his fingers burned in the earlier attempt: Mr. Hellyer was more successful; although it must also be noted that he had more reasons for national support, as will be explained in the subsequent section. But his personal dynamism was an important - and probably the prevailing - factor. Unification was very much his own brainchild,¹ and his intervention on a number of occasions to continue to push the process forward and to restart the occasionally stalled engine of the military decision-makers in this regard was a critical factor.²

Although due weight and credit is owing to Mr. Hellyer, it should be noted that the necessity for close ministerial interest was due not only because of the need for this in some absolute sense, but also because of the extremely primitive nature of central planning and direction of defence in Canada. If one compares the defence organization

-
1. Subsequent probing by the SC failed to reveal anybody else in DND who would accept the slightest responsibility for the original decision.
 2. For an interesting, if partial account of the origins of some of Mr. Hellyer's views see "The Man Behind Canada's Bold Look At Tomorrow"; Armed Forces Management, June 1964, pp 45-48. Some of Mr. Hellyer's subsequent opponents, many of them from within the Department, later viewed Hellyer's drive to unification as being of purely political origin. On the contrary, the subject had been in his mind for some time, and as early as 1959 he made the following statement to the Commons "(We) support the orderly and continual integration of those services which can be integrated in order to improve the efficiency of the armed forces and to save the taxpayers' money" - HC 25 Feb 1959, p. 1377. This point is stressed because another recent study by Byers comes to the opposite viewpoint; in this writer's opinion, incorrectly.

of other developed English-speaking countries in the early 1960's, Canada stands out as being the least centrally directed. The US, England, Australia and New Zealand had, as well as their Armed Forces, substantial staffs working independently of the Services and exerting strong pressures on the thinking of the Minister. Canada had virtually no Defence Department apart from the input of the Services. The CCOSC had neither a significant staff nor any significant power,¹ the Deputy Minister's powers were limited in practice if not in principle,² the Defence Council was concerned with administration rather than with policy advising,³ and the number of senior civilians concerned with broad defence policy matters independently of the Services was inconsequential.⁴ Canadian defence policy-making apart from the input of the Services has always been, and continues to be, minimal, apart from the occasional incursions of the Minister of National Defence and his Cabinet colleagues, and some members of the Defence Committee.⁵ For this reason the degree of ministerial interest, and continual pressure on the integration process is probably critical to a greater degree in Canada than in the other countries which have been mentioned.

1. Glassco Report Vol 4, p. 70

2. ibid pp. 74-77

3. Armstrong Evidence, SC 3 June 1964, p. 122.

4. Glassco Commission, Vol 4, pp 78-79.

5. One likely reason for this is that, under the role Canada has adopted for its armed forces since World War II, much of the planning for defence which goes on in NATO, NORAD and the PJBD is adopted as the basis for Canadian planning.

Between 1951 and the early 1960's the pace of organizational progress slowed, though it never stopped entirely. In 1963 the Glassco Report and the Special Committee on Defence again brought the subject to the fore. Although the Glassco Report devoted a section to a brief analysis of "Tri-Service Integration" and described four alternative forms which this could take, it was careful not to make any recommendations except those incidental to other sections of its report on the Department. It did however note that "regardless of whether or not a case can be made for unification, there are strong reasons for seeking a greater integration of those functions common to the three Services."¹

The Special Committee on Defence heard evidence on this subject from a number of senior officers, serving and retired, on the subject of unification. Generally speaking these officers were favourable to the idea, though with reservations both as to the form it should take and the speed with which it should be achieved.² In his last day of evidence to the 1963 Committee, Mr. Hellyer also indicated his interest in the idea and said that possible areas of integration would be considered in the forthcoming White Paper.³

The Need for Economies

The need for economies in defence, both administrative and financial, was closely interwoven with the political events of the

1. Vol. 4, pp 69-72.

2. These included Lt.Gen. Simonds, former CGS, 17 Oct 1963: Gen. Foulkes, former CCOSC, 22 Oct 1963: Mr. Gellner DFC, writer on military affairs, 24 Oct 1963: Lt.Gen. Walsh, CGS 29 Oct 1963: Air Marshal Dunlap, CAS, 31 Oct 1963.

3. SC 5 Nov 1963, p. 667.

previous decade. The major elements of the political story have been told elsewhere in detail,¹ and need be only summarized. Between the end of the Korean War and the accession to power of the Diefenbaker government very little occurred in the way of defence matters. Between 1957 and 1963 three major issues emerged: costs of equipment, the basic working relations of Canadian-US defence agreements particularly in relation to continental defence, and the question of Canada's role as, if not a nuclear power, a US-equipped nuclear force. For the first time in many years defence policy became a significant election issue; in fact one of the reasons which overturned the Conservative government.

One of the first tasks of the Liberal Government in 1963 was to "tidy up the past",² and to redefine Canada's role in the world. In fulfillment of an election promise a parliamentary Special Committee on Defence, empowered to look into policy questions as well as administration,³ was set up, and work began on redefining Canadian defence policy: something that had not been done since 1959,⁴ an urgently needed expression in view of the number of outstanding decisions that needed to be taken.

Another event that impinged on the considerations of the Department was the Glassco Commission which, although it did not report formally for three years after its inception,⁵ had been actively carrying out its inquiries and making its views well known to the senior

-
1. Especially by McLin in his book, and in sketchier form by Lyon (1963) and Holmes (1970).
 2. Armed Forces Management, June 1964, p. 47
 3. Hodgetts "Grasping the Nettle: Parliament's Special Committee On Defence" gives the political background to this step.
 4. The date of the previous White Paper "Defence 1959", Hon G.R. Pearkes, V.C.
 5. (Canada) Royal Commission on Government Organization, Vol 4, pp 55-92.

echelons of the Department. Thus some of the findings of the Glassco Commission could to a large extent be anticipated by the Department which, by taking prior action, would emerge in a better light.¹ In fact this is what happened with regard to the Commission's recommendations concerning manpower policies and practices. One of the factors that made integration difficult to achieve was the different conditions of service under which each of the Armed Forces operated. This was in large measure due to the rapid increase of the armed forces in the early 1950's during which time each service had adopted slightly different measures, some of a temporary nature, to cope with that expansion. In the absence of adequate co-ordination it was also noted that some methods of operation in each service were basically different. It was in order to reduce these differences to a workable minimum, as well as to take account of what was expected to be a severe criticism by the Glassco Commission that a Minister's Manpower Study Group was created in 1961.²

The Group was formed for the purpose of reviewing the organization and employment of manpower in the administrative and support services within the Department, excluding the Defence Research Board. In particular the group was to attempt to plan the minimum composition of the Headquarters concomitant with acceptable levels of performance of tasks. The Group was chaired by the Associate Minister.

1. Interviews

2. H of C Debates, 14 Sep 1961, pp 8369-8370.

By early 1962 the Group had prepared preliminary reports and indicated some areas of possible duplication of functions. Consequently a second round of investigations began, the aim of which was to increase efficiency through integration, amalgamation, or single service management, to minimize duplication, and to get the best use out of manpower resources. During April and May 1962 reports on these investigations were again considered by the group as well as by the COSC and other relevant committees.

However the detailed planning of several of the studies was overtaken by subsequent events; the change in government, the publication of the Glassco Report, the setting up by the government of an Inter-Agency Committee on Personnel Statistics to study manpower in the public service, including the armed services; and, one must presume that a halt was called to any further reorganization measures pending the outcome of the review that was being undertaken. Nevertheless the work of the Minister's Manpower Study Group was important because of its temporal proximity to subsequent events - it started people thinking hard about how duplication could be eliminated - and because of the significance of its findings. Time and again it was reported to the Group that the only way to economize on a function was to amalgamate it completely. This however was out of the question for most staff and support functions. The other alternative - integration - was so marginally cost-saving in terms of manpower as not to make integration on any large scale really worthwhile. Though no direct evidence is available on the point, one can fairly conjecture on the effect the findings of the group would have on an incoming minister determined to economize somewhere.

On the equipment side the problem of economies was twofold. A series of program delays, stretch-outs and blunders of which the Arrow, Bobcat and Bomarc were only the highlights had, since 1958, produced a continuing debate, the substance of which was Canada's continued ability to develop, or even afford to buy sophisticated military equipment.¹ This facet of the problem was more than occasionally exacerbated by inter-Service rivalries which revealed significant disagreement between the Services as to their role, and particularly whether the Air Force and Navy were adequately committed and equipped for a major transport role.²

The other side of the coin was the absolute cost of defence hardware as a percentage of the overall defence budget. Over the years the percentage of the defence budget devoted to capital procurement had decreased, and was rapidly approaching the point where, given a constant defence budget, equipping the armed forces with adequately modern hardware was becoming increasingly difficult. The amount of money spent on equipment had declined from 42.9% of the military budget in 1954 to 13.3% in 1963. If the forecast trends were correct, by 1965-66 the amount would be, to all intents and purposes, zero.³ In particular the re-equipping of the Brigade Group stationed overseas would very shortly need to be undertaken. As the equipment of the Canadian armed forces determined their role, and vice versa, this was very much a policy matter, and one which would shortly have to be undertaken.

1. McLin, Chs 4-6.

2. SC 16 July 1963, p. 183. Third Report of the SC 17/18 Dec 1963, p. 798.

3. Armed Forces Management, June 1964, p. 53, quoting Mr. Bill Lee, Hellyer's Executive Assistant.

Conclusion

As is evident from the brief summary of early attempts at integration, this is a thread, albeit a rather thin and broken one, that has run continuously through the thinking of the defence policy makers in Canada. From the end of the Second World War to the early 1950's the process of organizational development within the Department of National Defence has virtually been continuous. Despite the fact that Canada tended to look very much to Britain and the US for inspiration on defence matters, in the early postwar period it displayed considerable originality in devising some structures that in many respects were ahead of those being developed in the aforementioned countries.

By the early 1950's, however, despite Canada's participation in NATO and the Korean War, the pace of organizational development was considerably slowed. Despite the armed services being under unified political control, there was little actual co-ordination of tasks and policies. Additionally, there was a notable lack of growth at the top of the Department of National Defence. The Deputy Minister's involvement with policy was marginal, the Defence Council's role was largely irrelevant to either policy or planning and, if one compares the other English-speaking developed countries, there did not arise a defence department that was separate from, yet intimately linked to the Services, and whose main concern was policy and planning. Stated in organizational terms the gap between the Minister and the three Chiefs of Staff was left unfilled in Canada, whereas in other countries in the same situation there arose very significant organizations that intervened between the political head and the Service Chiefs.

Problems of developing and acquiring military hardware as well as the relatively rising costs of this development and acquisition added to the problems of the Department of National Defence during the period 1957-63. By the time of the Liberal accession to power in 1963 this latter element was coming to a head as major re-equipment, already delayed to take account of rapid technological advancement, was simultaneously becoming both immediately necessary and apparently too costly.

Mr. Hellyer's comments, both to the Commons and to the Special Committee on Defence during 1963 indicated that he saw a relationship between the economics, the policy and the organization of defence; that these all required redefinition, and that this would be done in the White Paper on Defence.¹ This was presented to the Commons on 26 March, 1964.

1. HC, 5 Dec 1963, pp 5454-5455.

CHAPTER 2 - THE 1964 WHITE PAPER

Introduction

Set out in the 1964 White Paper on Defence was the basic philosophy and rationale for the forthcoming unification of the armed forces.¹ Its value lies in its closely reasoned and logically argued consideration of alternatives in arriving at the announced policy for the development of the armed forces. The White Paper was described by its authors as "a charter, a guide, not a detailed and final blueprint" and was designed to be primarily a statement of philosophy from which action would subsequently flow.²

In view of subsequent events the authorship of the White Paper is of some import. Although it bears the names of Hellyer and Cardin - the Minister and Associate Minister - it is known that the first draft of the paper was written by Hellyer in December 1963.³ Described by one writer as "a concise plan with all its parts neatly tied together in a fashion any bright young staff officer would be proud of",⁴ it is for this reason, and because of its "consistent and literate" style seen by an expert on these matters as having all the marks of being written by a single hand and, because of this, as being "most unusual for a Government statement".⁵

-
1. A point that seems to have escaped at least one serious writer on the topic, who saw only the international aspects of the government's policy: L. Beaton - "The Canadian White Paper on Defence".
 2. White Paper, p. 30.
 3. Armed Forces Management, June 1964, p. 60
 4. *ibid.*
 5. Beaton "The Canadian White Paper on Defence", p. 364. He was wrong on this count too. Although earlier drafts were by Hellyer, considerable redrafting and additions of material was undertaken at the headquarters. Foremost among the contributions was that of the late Dr. R.J. Sutherland, from the Defence Research Board, who is credited with a considerable impact on Hellyer's thinking - interviews.

The organization and the future structure of the defence forces are seen in the White Paper as basically being derived from three sources: the political considerations affecting future policy for defence, the chosen roles of the armed forces in carrying out Canada's stated policy, and the best organizational pattern for the armed forces both as a derivation of this conscious choice and as a result of technological and organizational requirements. In fact the latter two aspects of government policy were seen as being closely related. That is to say the envisaged future roles of the armed forces would very much determine their organizational structure, and in turn the capacity and shape of the armed forces would necessarily limit the roles which Canada could play in a defence capacity.

As the White Paper itself notes,¹ this marks a significant step forward in strategic thinking. In the past the structure of a country's overall armed forces had tended to be taken as a constant factor in political considerations: the White Paper proposed that in future the armed forces should be more closely tailored to their chosen role. This is not to say that countries have not on occasion taken such a step; but when they have it has been marginal to the overall structure of their armed forces and has not altered their basic composition.²

It follows, if one accepts the logic of the White Paper, that the details of what Canada has done is of relevance only to countries with very similar defence requirements. It makes no sense to treat the

1. p. 17

2. Examples of this are the formation of the Royal Marines, the US Marines and the attempt to create a Pentropic Division in Australia.

Canadian unification as a model on which other countries, without any consideration as to other factors, should organize their defence forces. Therefore to state that the Canadian model is not applicable to the UK, or not relevant to the needs of the US, is but a truism: it is certainly no criticism of the model, as some writers seem to suggest.¹

Political Considerations

The whole tenor of the White Paper's view of the future international situation is founded on two premises. The first is that Canada is guarded from external threat by the US:

"It is, for the foreseeable future, impossible to conceive of any significant external threat to Canada which is not also a threat to North America as a whole. It is equally inconceivable that, in resisting clear and unequivocal aggression against Canadian territory, Canada could not rely on the active support of the United States."²

The second premise was in part based on the first. Granted that Canada was as safe from external military threat as the US is - for that is what the first premise implies - the choice as to Canada's role in world military affairs is primarily a diplomatic one. Within this diplomatic range of options Canada chose to participate solely in collective security and peacekeeping missions: that is, to eschew any military actions outside its borders independent of its participation in collective

-
1. See for example C. Mayhew MP, Britain's Role Tomorrow, Ch 13; and Michael Howard Central Organization For Defence. Sherman in his paper "A Single Service For Canada?" acknowledges this point to the extent that he opines "The Canadian experiment with a single service seems likely to remain an idiosyncrasy", p. 14. This point is discussed in considerably more detail in Chapter 6.
 2. p. 13.

security measures; and preferably to participate in collective security measures in such a way as "will permit the disposition of the majority of our forces in Canada where they will be available for deployment in a variety of peacekeeping activities"¹ (my emphasis).

Canada, in other words, saw itself fulfilling the role of a middle power in the sense that on the world's stage it would always militarily participate with other countries rather than independently.² Collective participation was seen in the White Paper as enabling some considerable degree of specialization of Canada's military functions so that its main strategic role would be one of being able to provide extremely mobile forces for peacekeeping, a gradually declining air defence capability and an "adequate anti-submarine warfare capability".³

Chosen Roles

Within the parameters of diplomatic options on the one hand and budgetary and material resources on the other, the defence roles that Canada was prepared to assume in 1964 were as follows.

NATO Europe - One Brigade Group, stationed in Germany.

- One Air Division consisting of six strike squadrons in Germany and two reconnaissance squadrons stationed in France.

1. p. 12

2. "The Role Of Middle Powers In A Changing World" - address by Mitchell Sharp. The White Paper itself uses the term: "A middle power such as Canada must be particularly careful to ration its commitments", p. 12.

3. pp 14-16.

NATO Maritime - An anti-submarine warfare capability both on the Atlantic and the Pacific.

NATO Reserves - Two brigades stationed in Canada and "intended primarily for deployment to the European theatre in the event of hostilities"¹ but also available for United Nations peacekeeping operations.

- One air mobile battalion to be made available to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe as part of his mobile force.

North American Air Defence - Five squadrons of aircraft and cruise missiles, of which three squadrons of CF101's would be operated "during the life of the aircraft". The two Bomarc squadrons would be continued "as long as they form an integral and essential part of the NORAD system".²

- The continued operation of radar and surveillance systems of the Canadian part of NORAD. It was hoped that this would be a diminishing task.

1. White Paper, p. 21

2. ibid p. 23.

UN Requirements - Canadian air, land and sea forces would be trained and equipped "to satisfy almost any conceivable requirement for UN or other operations".¹

Domestic Requirements - emphasis would be placed on greatly increased mobility in the Canadian force structure, and in particular air transport capability was to be significantly augmented.

- Armed forces reserves to be re-organized following a review carried out by a Ministerial Commission. The aim of the review was to recommend changes in policy and organization which would permit the reserves to carry out their roles, particularly those set out in the Emergency Defence Plan "more efficiently and realistically".²

Organization Decisions

The organizational reforms introduced in the White Paper stemmed basically from two issues already noted. The need for economics so as to enable greater procurement of military hardware within a restricted budget has already been noted in Chapter 1. It can best be summarized by the following table.

1. White Paper p. 24

2. ibid p. 25.

TABLE 1

Department of National Defence Expenditures by Major Category¹

(\$000)

YEAR	PERSONNEL	OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE	EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT	CONSTRUCTION	OTHER	TOTAL EXPENDITURE
1955-56	464,491	524,818	568,907	135,814	56,868	1750,898
1956-57	500,261	563,097	458,637	140,430	144,509	1806,934
1957-58	544,835	603,099	412,354	91,907	43,678	1695,873
1958-59	554,268	591,265	425,923	75,772	14,602	1661,830
1959-60	545,311	586,764	292,481	87,830	17,410	1529,796
1960-61	565,779	577,502	285,032	78,811	14,199	1521,323
1961-62	619,964	596,170	320,836	84,763	11,096	1632,829
1962-63	631,235	605,134	258,415	78,239	15,675	1588,698
1963-64 (est)	664,720	726,493	296,451	49,434	21,127	1758,315
1964-65 (est)	640,853	622,125	248,906	24,620	20,583	1557,087

1. Derived from Armed Forces Management, June 1964, p. 46.

Integration was seen as bringing about a "substantial reduction of manpower strengths in headquarters, training and related establishments, along with other operating and maintenance costs."¹ The need was seen "to make possible a more equitable distribution of the defence dollar between equipment and housekeeping costs", and it was hoped that sufficient savings would be generated by integration "to permit 25 percent of the defence budget to be devoted to capital equipment".² The aim was to divert \$100 million annually from overhead costs to military equipment over a ten year period, generating \$1 billion for military equipment and ending the situation whereby Canada would "soon have the best housed, best dressed, best fed, most poorly equipped troops in the world".³

The second reason for the organizational changes proposed was a dissatisfaction with the effects of the defence organization as it existed. This too has been mentioned in Chapter 1, and the importance of the Glassco Commission Report to this aspect has been noted. The White Paper made three specific criticisms of the current organization, and based them all on the Glassco Commission findings.⁴

The first criticism questioned the relevance of the traditional pattern of organization into three Services, and in particular whether such a pattern was relevant to the modern combined operations concept. The White Paper stated that "the services have found a growing area of overlap in the tasks with which they are charged." The second criticism

1. White Paper, p. 19

2. *ibid.* Privately, Hellyer is reported as having thought that 'real' unification could save 40-50 percent: Armed Forces Management, June 1964, p. 54.

3. HC 1964, p. 3067.

4. White Paper, pp 17-19.

was that because of the rapid development of defence technology there was a growing range of defence activities common to each of the services which "further diminished any value or significance of the individual services as independent entities". To continue with this mode of organization would deny certain economies of scale that were becoming increasingly attractive. It also exacerbated "the chronic scarcity of many of the skills involved" which would continue to exist because of "rigidities in the defence establishment" that militated against the easy transfer of scarce employment categories as between the services. These two points appear to refer mainly to the organization of the Services themselves.

The third criticism dealt with the problem of high-level co-ordination, particularly at the headquarters. Although there was unity of political direction, the position of the CCOSC was not strong enough; and the system of leaving control of the Services with their Service Chiefs, each of whom had a virtual power of veto in the Chiefs of Staff Committee and rights of direct access to the Minister, denied him adequate effectiveness. The weakness of the Committee basis of direction was that it led to procrastination, to an unwillingness to make hard decisions and to top-heaviness of the senior deliberating bodies as evidenced by the more than 200 tri-service committees that flourished in the bureaucratic undergrowth of the department. Noting that "the absence of a single commanding voice may spell the difference between success or failure in any matter of joint concern to the three Services", the Glassco Commission had suggested that "effective consolidation cannot be based on joint control by the three Services with the object of

preserving the traditional responsibility of the three Chiefs of Staff for the control and administration of all the Armed Forces";¹ and recommended transfer of executive control over common requirements to a greatly strengthened CCOSC.

Noting these criticisms and bearing in mind that in making its decisions the government saw "(T)he fundamental considerations" as being "... operational control and effectiveness, the streamlining of procedures and, in particular, the decision making process, and the reduction of overhead", the White Paper rejected the Glassco Commission recommendations for strengthening the CCOSC, as not going far enough:

"... this solution does not adequately resolve the basic issues. If a single command structure is not established, co-ordination by the committee system will remain with all of its inevitable delays and frustrations.

... there is only one adequate solution. It is the integration of the Armed Forces of Canada under a single chief of defence staff. This will be the first step toward a single unified defence force for Canada."²

In deciding to follow this course of action the White Paper noted that two objections might be raised against it.³ The first is that integration might weaken morale or esprit de corps. This was dismissed on the grounds that the "worthwhile traditions" on which esprit de corps was based would not be eliminated, and that furthermore morale should remain high or even improve as a direct result of the improved effectiveness of the integrated service. The possibility that competition between the Services might be diminished was similarly rejected:

1. Quoted in White Paper, p. 18

2. White Paper, pp 18-19

3. ibid p. 19.

"The sailors will press for more ships, the soldiers for more tanks and the airmen for more planes. This is as natural as breathing. Competition will not be lost but it will be contained at the Service level."¹

The White Paper concluded its section on the future organization of the armed forces by disclaiming any preconceptions that it would prescribe the details of the new organization in advance. This was to be left to the Defence Staffs to be worked out in practice. The only predetermined guidelines laid down were that the organization should include "a strong staff group which is essentially civilian in character" under the strengthened powers of the Deputy Minister, and that procedures for improved defence programming should be introduced to enable resources to be allocated most effectively.²

Discussion.

The White Paper dealt with the government's intentions on integration in a very general manner: the only specific statements of intent were that a single Chief of the Defence Staff and a single Defence Staff would be created.³ Subsequent chapters will examine the actual details of what was achieved in the decisions and steps leading up to complete integration. But it is useful here to consider the White Paper's declarations of intent according to its own standards, and according to the evidence available at the time.

1. White Paper, p. 19

2. *ibid* p. 20

3. p. 19. I was subsequently told that this was because the CCOSC and the Chiefs adamantly refused to permit in the White Paper the inclusion of some pages which described the government's intentions more clearly. A number of meetings failed to budge the opponents and, at least on this occasion, Hellyer gave in to them.

The two strongest overt influences on the thinking of the White Paper are the Glassco Report - which is quoted extensively - and the drastic economic situation of the armed forces. To deal with the latter problem first, it must be noted that this is very much a negative reason for proceeding with unification: Canada must integrate to avoid a situation where increasing overheads erode the hardware acquisition needs. The logic of this type of argument does not lead one to the conclusion that integration per se is a desirable course of events: rather it would appear to suggest that, if anything, integration is the lesser of two evils.

It has already been noted in Chapter 1 that the Glassco Commission did not make a firm recommendation either for integration or the form it should take. It merely canvassed possibilities in the light of its strictures concerning the need to strengthen the positions of the CCOSC and that of the Deputy Minister. Again it is a significant intellectual jump to conclude from the recommendations of the Glassco Commission that their implementation required unification of the Services. That this is so can be seen from considering some intermediate alternative steps that would also meet the Glassco Commission recommendations. As the focus of this work is organizational, only organizational solutions will be proposed.

The first possibility is to seek organizational economies by a much closer integration of duplicative supporting services common to two or more of the Services. Greater development of the major-user-responsibility doctrine suggests that in any total organization with fragmented parts, the major user of a service should assume the responsibility for providing and administering that service or commodity for the

lesser users. To give concrete examples in a military context, the doctrine suggests that aircraft maintenance for the three Services should be undertaken exclusively by the air force, that the provision of stores and ammunition should be an army responsibility, along with communications, land-based construction etc. The effect of the adoption of this doctrine is to reduce duplicative overheads at the supporting service level.¹ This was tried in the joint commands such as MARLANT and MARPAC, but not found to be successful.²

At the policy formation level an alternative to unification is to do away with the tri-service committee concept and to replace it with a joint staff method of operation under a greatly strengthened and much more powerful central decision-making body. This was the course adopted by the UK in its 1963 White Paper which argued that "(P)olicy and management cannot ... be isolated from each other"³ and by a series of steps taken in subsequent years moved towards a central Defence Staff organized on a secondary functional basis as distinct from Canada's eventual primary functional organization.⁴ There are a number of institutional steps which can be taken to secure greater loyalty to the centre by those drawn from the Services and thus tip the scale away from what at first would appear to be almost uneasy balance. Centralization

-
1. For actual examples see Brassey's Annual, 1964, pp 3-4; and "Does Britain Need And Can We Afford Three Air Forces?", Brassey's Annual, 1966. That this doctrine is not a dogma was noted in the 1965 UK White Paper, "Nor is centralized control of particular functions, with removal of direct management responsibility from at least two of the three Services ... always the most efficient and economical arrangement. Each case must be carefully examined on merit". p. 43.
 2. Interviews
 3. Central Organization For Defence, para 13.
 4. J.L. Moulton "British Defence Policy 1967" in Brassey's Annual 1967.

of budgetary allocative decision-making is perhaps a most obvious requirement. But the human element must not be overlooked, and it is notable that both the British and American centralization were accompanied by decisions to transfer the loyalties of the senior Service officers away from their present Service and to vest them in an organization where promotion is based on the ability to see beyond immediate (and hence limited) interests.¹

These intermediary steps were taken both by the US and by the UK in the face of similar needs for stringent economies - in the UK one might add, even more stringent than in Canada - and for greater civilian direction of policy making. Canada in effect went beyond this limited solution, and sought maximum economies by pushing these two trends to their logical conclusions. Whether this extra step was in fact expected to generate further economies over a more limited attempt at integration is not discussed in the White Paper; nor is it clear on an a priori examination. One is forced to the conclusion that the decision for unification was based on something more than the material evidence available at the time.

A third course available to countries with defence budget constraints is to re-examine defence commitments with a view to reducing these. This is best exemplified in recent times by Britain's "East of Suez" policy, which was a direct response to its continued inability to accept the rate at which such a policy would increase costs. In terms of

1. Huntington The Soldier and The State pp 394-397. Service in a Joint Staff capacity is a pre-requisite for promotion to the very senior ranks in the US. In the UK the ranks of Major-General and above have been placed in a common promotion roll which will be controlled by a Defence Secretary - "Central Organization For Defence" Cmd 2097.

Canada's defence role this would have involved reconsideration of whether to remain militarily active in NATO and possibly whether to continue to participate in UN peacekeeping operations - in which she has played a very notable role.

The question of Canada's continued military participation in NATO had been re-examined as recently as May 1963 when Canada hosted the annual spring ministerial meeting of the NATO council.¹ At that meeting Canada affirmed its continued participation and in fact resolved to do away with any lingering doubts as to its commitments.² On the question of UN peacekeeping operations there was little evidence to suggest that significant amounts of money would be saved if Canada did not engage in this kind of work in the future.³ In fact if one examines the White Paper closely and particularly the section entitled "Considerations Affecting Future Policy", very much the opposite kind of argument is advanced: that by eschewing any independent role Canada is not merely politically committed but technically 'locked into' collective security and peacekeeping operations. So this was not an alternative which Canada could realistically contemplate when seeking economies.

It appears then, if one analyses the evidence on the basis both of theory and of the practices of other countries, that the decision to go ahead with unification was not based purely on the logic of the situation. An Ottawa journalist later reported that the idea was largely a preconception of Mr. Hellyer's.⁴ The situation was not as simple as that.⁵

1. For details see Canadian Annual Review for 1963, pp 319-322.

2. *ibid* p. 321

3. Gellner "Background to Canadian Unification" in Brassey's Annual, 1967, p. 105.

4. Charles Lynch in the Ottawa Citizen, 8 Dec 1966.

5. The following account is based on interviews with a number of the participants of that period.

Like most expressions of government policy, the White Paper was a compromise between divergent points of view, particularly in those parts where future intentions were stated. From all accounts, these were the most watered down parts of the White Paper, and particularly so in regard to the government's intention to reorganize the armed forces.¹

Much of the specifics of what Hellyer intended were not inserted in the White Paper, although as early as January, 1964, Hellyer had outlined his plans to a meeting of the Service and civilian chiefs.² In part this was because a white paper is not always the appropriate vehicle for such levels of detail, and partly it was because some of those who participated in the drafting of the White Paper were adamantly against even the little that was said about integration and unification in that document. As to Mr. Hellyer's preconceptions, they were not only based on his earlier experience with the Department, first as Parliamentary Secretary and then briefly as Associate Minister, but also arose out of his experiences as Minister within the first two months of taking over the Department.

Although in the White Paper economics seems to be a major factor, it was primarily the command and control of the Services that was Hellyer's paramount concern. The Services were neither responding

-
1. It hardly needs spelling out but, in view of some criticisms of Hellyer, the points should be made (a) that Mr. Pearson himself was a unificationist, and (b) that throughout the period the cabinet was solidly behind the Hellyer reforms. Interviews.
 2. At least one diary entry by a person who was then an impartial observer confirms this. Later, some unification opponents told the SC that the organization plans were "sprung on them" with little or no notice. If this was so, the fault was not Hellyer's.

adequately to the Minister's directions, nor were they cooperating sufficiently between themselves. It was in order to remedy this situation - which some recent experiences had demonstrated to be almost intolerable - that Hellyer took the drastic steps he did. Whatever advice he got, there appears to have been a genuine feeling in his own mind, not always shared by others, that the "Hellyer solution" to the problem was the correct one. To this two minor factors may be added, which may explain some later events. The first was a growing awareness of the uniqueness of the Canadian venture, together with a feeling that other countries would shortly follow along the same road. The second, related to this, was the political realization that the successful management of such a large undertaking could not but enhance the political career of its architect.¹ How this would work out in practice remained to be seen.

1. It will be recalled that on Pearson's retirement in 1967 Hellyer was a candidate for the Prime Ministership, and came third in the ballot. Newman, Ch. 30.

PART II

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

CHAPTER 3 - THE EVOLUTION OF THE HEADQUARTERS

Introduction

The first two chapters dealt with the background of developments which occurred in 1964-1969. Chapter 1 dealt with the organizational background, and Chapter 2 dealt with the strategic and policy background. In the following three Chapters the details of Canadian defence organizational development will be examined. This chapter - a rather long one - will trace the evolution of the Headquarters 1964-1967. The following Chapter will do the same for the Commands. Chapter 5 will deal with events which occurred after unification of the Services in 1967.

Since 1st August, 1964, when the Headquarters was integrated it has been in almost constant reorganization. In part this is because, in the absence of a firm original plan, the new organization could only be devised by a series of corrective measures in an attitudinal and organizational framework which seems to correspond very closely to Lindblom's portrayal of disjointed incrementalism.¹ Much of this incremental approach stemmed from what might be described as organizational necessity. But an equal part seems to have stemmed from the forces of personality which operated in two ways: as the direct personal influence of the actors involved, and also as the influence of the actors assuming Service roles. The interaction of these three

1. C. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through".

factors is very hard to disentangle in all instances, and there are cases where opinions differ as to which was the predominant influence in a particular historic situation. In tracing this organizational development then, one tends to agree with Michael Howard's observation that:

"Organizations do not consist of tidy lines on charts but of men working together; and in the long run it is the personalities, skills and capacity for co-operation of the people concerned that will produce efficient administration; not intellectually satisfying models which look good on paper."¹

The detailed narrative of all the steps in the development of the Headquarters is interesting, but not particularly useful for drawing any significant organizational conclusions. This chapter will therefore briefly outline the issues involved in the debates over the organization of the integrated Headquarters, and then focus on the three areas which raise the most interesting theoretical points: the organizational ascendancy of the Vice Chief of Defence and his staff, that of the Comptroller-General's Branch, and the Deputy Minister's organization and civil-military working relations in the Headquarters during this period.²

The Integration Debate

The White Paper tabled on 26th March, 1964 did not receive much parliamentary comment as it was swiftly overtaken by subsequent events.³ On 10th April Hellyer informed the Commons that a bill "designed to implement the policy set out in the White Paper, namely

-
1. Central Organization For Defence, p. 48.
 2. The two major Branches excluded, Chief of Personnel and Chief of Logistics and Engineering are more interesting from a personnel management and technical viewpoint than organizationally.
 3. It did receive extremely favourable comment from the press.

to replace the present Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Chiefs of the individual staffs by a chief of defence staff" would be shortly introduced.¹ This Bill - known as C90 - was introduced on 13th April, passed on 7th July 1964, and came into effect on 1st August of that year. By that time the implications of the government's intentions had been exhaustively debated in the Commons and equally exhaustively examined by the Defence Committee. Before describing the organizational changes that were brought about it is useful to highlight some aspects of the debate which throw light on the general reasons for the particular headquarters organization that was chosen.

The 1964 debates on Bill C90 were the first of two major debates by parliament on the organizational policy of the Department. The second series of debates commenced early in December, 1966, and dealt mainly with the unification of the forces. Apart from these the only other occasions for parliamentary comment were the continuing sittings of the Committee on National Defence (see bibliographical note at the end of the thesis) and the annual appropriation debates. As is traditional with the latter, they tend to be rather diffuse in content, enable members to air their pet grievances and often veer from the main course of the subject under examination. For this reason the two large-scale debates of 1964 and 1966/67 deserve close attention. The first debate will be examined in this chapter and the second one in the chapter following.

1. p. 1999.

Opening the debate Mr. Hellyer indicated that the purpose of Bill C90 was to replace the individual Service Chiefs with one Chief of the Defence Staff, to permit the reorganization of the armed forces on a functional basis.

"This will not only simplify procedures and permit the development of a more efficient fighting force, but it will also greatly facilitate the implementation of a long range, co-ordinated defence policy as set out in the White Paper. In the absence of a unified defence staff the implementation of such a policy would be extremely difficult, and, in my opinion, virtually impossible."¹

Mr. Hellyer went on to outline why this was so. Three options had been considered: the status quo, the substantive recommendations of the Glassco Report, and the solution now proposed.

The status quo was unsatisfactory because direct access to the Minister was too broad. The three Service Chiefs, the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Research Board had rights of direct access, and because "the minister is inadequately staffed to co-ordinate at his level and in his office the information coming from these several sources" the system became "virtually unmanageable, and the minister is unable to exercise his constitutional authority adequately."²

The Glassco Commission had suggested that the CCOSC have transferred to his direct control a number of support functions. This would, in effect, make him into a chief administrator for some military aspects of the Department and thus accomplish a measure of integration,

1. HC, 1964, p. 3085.

2. HC, 1964, p. 3086.

as well as strengthening the position of the Chairman vis-a-vis the Service Chiefs. This solution, which is in line with procedures in several other countries, was also rejected because it was not seen as resulting in any real reductions of manpower. On the contrary, it seemed that "it would probably result in a continuation and perhaps even an amplification of the committee system ... with all its inevitable delays and frustrations."¹ The other difficulty with this proposal was that, if implemented, it placed the Chairman in a situation of potential instability. If he was given power to impose his decisions in these areas upon the Services, the real power of the Service Chiefs would be substantially diminished. If on the other hand he was not given the power to impose decisions in these areas and the acceptance of his proposals depended on persuasion and the accommodation of views, then nothing positive would have been gained from the alteration in the Chairman's status.

The third alternative, which was the one finally adopted, was the integration of the armed forces into a single unit, under the control of a sole Chief of Defence Staff. "This was decided on because it was considered to be the only solution likely to achieve these two important objectives (a) a more streamlined and effective system, and (b) reduced manpower due to reduction in duplications and increased efficiency in headquarters, command, training, logistics and support organizations."²

1. HC, 1964, p. 3066

2. HC, 1964, p. 3066.

Such a reorganization of the defence staff would also strengthen the position of the Deputy Minister and his civilian staff, who would in future only have to deal with one military organization rather than three as hitherto. As well, because it was recognized that "it is essential that there be a strong civil staff ... outside the military chain of command ... capable of reviewing and advising on defence estimates and programs" some improvements to the organization of the Deputy Minister's staff was contemplated to enable a program review system to be established.¹ Also the largely defunct Defence Council would be resurrected under the chairmanship of the Minister, and it was intended that the Defence Council should become the "departmental policy board".² Nonetheless the Minister had "clearly in mind the need at the same time for exercising care that the civil staffs do not assume functions which are necessary to the military staffs in order that they can efficiently control their military forces and carry out their military responsibilities."³

At the same time Mr. Hellyer moved that the Special Committee on National Defence be reconstituted, and advised the Commons that the proposed amendments to the National Defence Act would be referred to it for consideration and advice.⁴ Finally Mr. Hellyer noted that:

"The proposals put forward in the bill have been the subject of general discussions for many years and have been supported by many of the greatest military leaders of our generation. ... We have often pioneered

1. HC, p. 3068.

2. *ibid* p. 3069. Hellyer subsequently revealed that in the twenty-nine months prior to July 1964 the Defence Council had met only four times - HC 7 Dec 1966. One of these meetings was entirely devoted to the question of how the troops should slope arms with the new rifle - Interviews.

3. *ibid* p. 306S.

4. *ibid* p. 3064-5.

with new ideas in war and peace, and having proved their effectiveness set a pattern for future development. In the integration of our armed forces once again we are giving leadership in a very important area. As Canadians we have an inescapable responsibility to proceed with the plan and demonstrate its effectiveness."¹ (my emphasis)

The ensuing debate was conducted almost exclusively by members of the Defence Committee, past and future, and as most of the points raised were covered in detail at the subsequent Committee hearings they can usefully be left for later examination. The main opposition to the government's proposal was that its plans were not apparently conceived in adequate detail, and that the Commons were not really sure what the government's ultimate intentions were. Another point raised by the Opposition and repeated by a number of participants was "Where is the minister getting his advice? From whom is he getting it?"² There was also expressed the feeling that Hellyer was somewhat rushing things, that "the hasty boy who now holds that office" has a policy of "rush, rush, rush, with no plans and no answers for the questions that will develop in such an undertaking".³ The changes envisaged by the government were seen as largely organizational, and especially designed to save manpower costs and the overhead associated with these costs. There were, at this stage, little or no political imputations to the matter.

The scene of debate then shifted to the Committee on Defence which, in seven days of long sittings, heard evidence from a number of witnesses. First up was Hellyer who expanded on his remarks to the

1. HC, 1964, p. 3069.

2. ibid p. 3177

3. ibid p. 3177-3178

Commons and gave a number of useful brief histories of various organizations.¹ He then produced a Chart (Chart 4 - opposite) outlining a proposed unified headquarters for the armed forces which was thought "will work satisfactorily. ... However, if in the future it should be thought that it does not ... we would be prepared to take another look at it."² Hellyer also announced that the unified rank structure adopted would be that of the army, following "The propensity ... to use the United States army ranks."³

-
1. Of particular interest is that of the Defence Council. SC 19 May 1964, pp 17-20
 2. SC 19 May 1964, p. 26
 3. *ibid.*

CHART 1 - ORGANISATION OF CANADIAN ARMY HEADQUARTERS PRIOR
TO INTEGRATION

Source: Hellyer Evidence to S.C. May 1961.

CHART 2 - ORGANISATION OF ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS
PRIOR TO INTEGRATION

Source: Hellyer Evidence to S.C. May 1964

CHART 3 - ORGANISATION OF ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY HEADQUARTERS

PRIOR TO INTEGRATION

Source: Hellyer Evidence to S.C. May 1964

CHART 4 - ORGANISATION PROPOSED FOR INTEGRATED HEADQUARTERS

Source: Hellyer Evidence to S.C. May 1964

In the questioning that followed, a number of other points were brought out. The first two of these emerged from the following verbatim excerpt:¹

Mr. LAMBERT: My concern is the basic criteria which have motivated the minister to come to this decision in respect of unification of command. It would appear from your remarks that it concerned savings of money; in other words that the minister was looking forward to obtaining money out of the defence budget, which seems to be pretty well fixed by circumstances, for other purposes than, shall we say, housekeeping, and in order to get this extra money he had to go after personnel. In my opinion, this has been the basic criteria. I am interested in the balance of military efficiency.

Mr. HELLYER: In my statement I mentioned there were two criteria; the first and most important is a streamlined effective force capable of co-ordinated action, the single plan, and the second is the maximum elimination of duplication, with consequent savings.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, those are a fine lot of words but what I am concerned about are the basic criteria. Is it for the improvement of military efficiency of the forces, starting with this command structure, or is it a question of savings of dollars which is the prime consideration?

Mr. HELLYER: It is both, Mr. Lambert, and you cannot separate them because, first of all, the organization is important from the standpoint of response, readiness and co-ordination. But, in addition to that, the availability of modern weapons and equipment is important in order to have a highly flexible and ready force. These things are complementary and it is impossible to consider them in complete isolation because, in fact, they are related. It is for both reasons we have made the proposals that are now before you.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, I want to make it quite clear that I agree with the idea of unification of command. I have my own reasons for it but I wanted to know your reasons because you are the one who is putting the changes into effect. I want to get to the crux of this whole matter. I want to know your ultimate plans and upon what advice you have acted in this connection.

1. ibid pp 30-31

Mr. HELLYER: I think the motivation is simply this, to get the maximum amount of effective forces in the highest state of readiness for the least amount of money.

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes; I have heard that from four or five different ministers and I think that is a general hope of all ministers of defence, together with other ministers. But, where does the advice come from in this regard. Were you under advice in this regard?

Mr. HELLYER: The advice comes from many sources, as you know. The ministers obtain their advice from many persons. I have mentioned a number of the committees, both ad hoc and otherwise, which advise the minister. These are sources of advice.

Mr. LAMBERT: Was the plan which has now been disclosed to this committee primarily the result of the studies of the minister which he spoke about at the last hearings?

Mr. HELLYER: The report primarily is based on the experience of ministers in the administration of the armed forces of Canada.

Mr. LAMBERT: That is your own experience?

Mr. HELLYER: Not at all; our experience plus the advice and the reports of the studies all combined. There is one concept.

Mr. LAMBERT: Perhaps the minister will be a little more open. I am not trying to beat you. I want your view. What was the source of the planning for this reorganization? I know you had your committee; you had your own idea. Presumably advice was sought from the chiefs of the various services; but where else?

Mr. HELLYER: Like yourself, Mr. Lambert, I do a considerable amount of reading, as does the associate minister, and we get ideas and advice from many sources. I do not think we should waste too much time finding out what each individual thinks. Under our system, the ministers of government are responsible for the decisions made in the proposals put forward to parliament. Regardless of where the advice comes from, how slanted or how put together, the ministers have the responsibility and it is on that basis we are prepared to discuss the proposal put before you.

Mr. LAMBERT: The minister is asking the committee to examine what would be a fundamental reorganization of the forces. He is asking us and parliament to approve of it on his word and on the word of the government. Is that the sole yardstick we are to use? I am attempting to find out what have been the yardsticks to evaluate this plan.

As will be seen, Hellyer was to display a similar reticence about his sources more than once. He went on to announce the formation of a planning group to work out the details of the reorganization of the headquarters, which he hoped would be completed within a year of the proclamation of the Act.¹ It was also confirmed that the proposed reorganization of the headquarters was the first of three steps, to be followed by the reorganization of the field command organization and the "unification of all three services into a single defence force."²

On the official side the Minister was followed by the Associate Minister and the Deputy Minister who spoke respectively on the special arrangements that would be made for staff retired prematurely and on the organization of the Deputy Minister's Branch (see Chart 5 opposite) which, while it would not change substantially in organization, would be considerably strengthened as a result of the changes contemplated in the military branches, and would adopt a major role in a revamped defence programming system. The Deputy Minister was closely questioned as to the involvement, if any, of the civilian staffs with policy matters and whether this function would be strengthened as a result of the reorganization. Pressed on this matter, he responded, "Of course, the deputy minister has never been entirely remote from policy influence. I do not think there is a change here."³ The overall effect of the reorganization of the military

1. SC 2 June 1964 pp 73-74

2. ibid pp 79-80

3. Armstrong Evidence SC 3 June 1964 p. 122.

CHART 5 - ORGANISATION OF THE DEPUTY MINISTER'S BRANCH

staffs on the Deputy Minister's Branch was that the civilian branch would more closely parallel the organization of the military, and that by this means it would become more effective. The difficulty for the Deputy Minister was in attempting to explain how, although his responsibilities remained unchanged, his role was somehow altered.

Two of the three unofficial witnesses before the Committee took a much less sanguine view of the role of the departmental civilians (the third was not questioned and offered no evidence on this). As with every matter on which they gave evidence they all differed very strongly, thoroughly confused the Committee and could not but have left it with the view that in such matters it was each man to his own opinion.¹ But despite this they raised a number of interesting points, although they did not resolve them.

Brigadier Malone's main concern was that the supplanting of the three Service Chiefs with a commander-in-chief or supremo principle, which was inherent in the new proposals, would produce disastrous results both politically and administratively. Eloquently arguing from history, he showed that the very evil that Canada was contemplating took years to weed out of the British army, and that in fact the great Cardwell reforms of the 1860's, and the Esher/Haldane reforms subsequently did away with, and had to get rid of the single Commander principle and instead adopt the military board concept that had succeeded so well over in the Admiralty. As to the political dangers involved, it seemed to him that "If we do in fact establish a chief of

1. In fairness it must be pointed out that the collective expertise and persuasiveness of these witnesses was not significant. Maj. Gen. Macklin had strong iconoclastic views on everything; Air Vice Marshal Curtis was negativistic and pleased neither the government nor the opposition; and Brig. Malone, who gave the most sensible evidence had been propagandizing his major point for some considerable time. This did not make his viewpoint wrong, but he was placed in the position of 'crying wolf'.

staff with all the powers of a commander-in-chief, and the chief adviser to the minister, in my opinion this chief must either dominate his minister, destroy him or, in time, be destroyed himself by the minister. While the minister does represent the power of the parliament it is difficult for him to ever reject the advice of a single professional adviser."¹

On the practical side Brigadier Malone went on to illustrate his thinking by proposing an organization as shown opposite at Chart 6. He pressed very strongly for an organization that would be headed by a supreme council, in part so as to produce "a really strong element of civilian leadership ... under the present system it has not been uncommon for the services to be working for months on new weapons, research and so forth, and committing large sums of money ... without a proper understanding by the civilians until it is too late."² The other reason why Malone favoured a conciliar approach to military organization was that it would make co-ordination of the armed forces both easier, and place the responsibility for such co-ordination where it belonged - right at the top - rather than further down in the organization. The last reason in favour of the conciliar approach was that it would provide greater continuity than under a single chief, whose tenure does not normally exceed five years.

Unfortunately, Brigadier Malone's recommendations went unheeded, and were in fact specifically rejected, item by item, by Hellyer before the Committee.³ All of Hellyer's responses were slightly

1. SC 4 June 1964 p. 135

2. SC 4 June 1964, p. 145

3. SC 9 June 1964, pp 186-211

R. S. MALONE

Source: Malone Evidence to S.C. June 1964

evasive in that they did not go to the nub of the kind of approach that Malone was expounding. Many of the points raised by Malone in fact became serious problems, and his organization chart was in many ways prophetically accurate in respect of the later development of the headquarters.

Air Vice Marshal Curtis' evidence before the Committee was largely negativistic and is not important in this context. General Macklin's evidence attempted to set the cat among the pigeons from the point of strategic policy.¹ Very briefly, Macklin's attitude was not against integration - in fact he implied indirectly that he was in favour of it - but that the roles of the Navy and the Air Force were uncoordinated, both between themselves and particularly with respect to the Army which could expect neither the provision of mobility nor close tactical support from the other Services. Macklin saw the Air Force in particular as a great drain of money, little of which had been wisely expended: and the Navy as some sort of irrelevancy, very much set in its ways and doggedly committed to the anti-submarine role. Macklin stressed the weakness of the current roles of the Services, that in these roles they were inadequately integrated and pressed for a revaluation of the tasks of the Services so that in their roles they should be capable of greater co-ordination.

On 9th June, 1964 the Defence Committee reported Bill C90 back to the Commons without amendment, where the debate mainly went over the ground that had been covered previously both there and in the Defence Committee. The bill passed the third reading on 7th July and came into effect on 1st August, 1964. On the whole the govern-

1. SC 9 June 1964, p. 186-211

ment's proposals appeared to have the blessings of all the parties (that of the NDP and the two Social Credit parties was affirmed during the debates).

Even before Bill C90 was presented to the Commons the changes had been set in motion at the Headquarters. On 2nd April, 1964 a letter signed by Hellyer and Associate Minister Cardin addressed to all servicemen and departmental employees, and giving in broad detail the effect the proposed changes would have on them was widely circulated. In that letter the decision to unify the forces was clearly stated.

A few days earlier, at a meeting between the Minister, the Deputy Minister, the Chairman DRB, the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Service Chiefs it was decided that a main planning group, steered by the COSC, would be formed and required to make recommendations on a proposed outline organization for the new headquarters. This was to be done within two weeks. In conjunction with this group there were to be two other planning groups: one under guidance of the Chairman, Defence Research Board to recommend the organization of research and development in the headquarters; and another steered by the Deputy Minister to recommend on his organization. The overall target date for settling the organization of the Headquarters was put at 1st July, 1964. It was out of these meetings that the first headquarters organization was devised.¹

The first Chief of the Defence Staff had been designated by Hellyer at the time the White Paper was tabled. On 12th June, 1964 the

1. Interviews

other Branch Heads' names were announced - Vice Chief, Assistant Chief and the Chiefs of Personnel, Logistics and Engineering, Operational Readiness, and the Comptroller-General. With the deadline for the new-look Headquarters less than two months away, there was a hasty setting up of planning staffs by the Chiefs-designate to work out not only organization but also procedures and doctrine appropriate to an integrated military headquarters. At the same time it was necessary to ensure continuity of the old business, and to ensure that in the process of changeover none of this was overlooked and allowed to lapse by default. This was a particularly busy time in the headquarters of the services, which found themselves running two parallel services: the old tri-Service headquarters planning for relinquishment of command and the new integrated headquarters planning for takeover, which was to be accomplished with a 30 per cent reduction of staff.¹

To all the participants a redefinition of functions was seen as necessary. Taking the broadest view, the organization of the Headquarters unfolded in three stages. The first of these was the definition of the role of the VCDS. Then came a similar exercise in respect of the CG. Together these established a viable working relationship within the headquarters in respect of all Branches. A third stage,

1. The origins of this figure of 30% are themselves both interesting and indicative of the level at which planning was carried out. Thirty percent was very much a "magic figure": the estimate placed by Hellyer upon the possible reductions of manpower which would follow unification. It also roughly approximated the manpower reductions required to generate the 25% of the budget devoted to equipment procurement. It also appeared in a different form when the size of the new Headquarters was being considered. Hellyer issued a ukase that the new NDHQ and CFHQ should be as large as could be accommodated within the Cartier Square buildings - and the reduction involved in this came to ... 30%.

commenced in 1967 and still continuing, is the search for a more appropriate organization, based to a greater extent on modern management philosophy rather than the enforced accommodation of the membership of a three-way merger. As this last stage is still underway it is not possible to fully evaluate it, although some attempt is made in Chapter 5.

The organization chart presented by Hellyer to the Standing Committee was the first public unveiling of the CFHQ new-look organization. This was the outcome of various compromises reached between the main and subsidiary Planning Groups. An earlier recommendation had proposed a much simpler form of organization, diagrammed below.¹

CHART 7 - REJECTED CFHQ ORGANIZATION

1. The following account is based on interviews.

The above functional organization, as well as having the advantages of utmost simplicity was designed to operate as follows. Under the Chief of Defence Staff there would be three branches. Operations would be headed by the Vice-Chief, and there would also be Chiefs of Logistics and Personnel. The Deputy Minister's branch would be strengthened by the disappearance of the military Controllers' Branches, and he would assume responsibility for defence programmes, and for financial management. A small secretariat, without "line" functions, would "staff" intelligence, co-ordinate strategic planning, and act as a co-ordinating secretariat and staff for the CDS. In every way this form of organization would represent a 'classical' form as regards civil-military relations: dominated by the political appointees, with financial and programming functions headed by civilians, and with military functional responsibilities clearly assigned.

This organization proposal did not survive for long, and was augmented by having the Vice-Chief as a kind of deputy to the CDS, a Chief of Operations added, and the Controller Branch functions retained by the military rather than largely being handed over to the Deputy Minister. Although the reasons for this, by their very nature, were never recorded on paper, they are nevertheless clear. The reduction of numbers of senior generals which would result from adopting the 'classical' organization was too much to bear in one fell swoop. More had to be fitted in, and the organization was thus varied to accept the increase in numbers.¹

1. The "magic formula" at the time of integration was 3:2:2: three Army, two Navy and two Air Force. $3/2/2 = 7$ = the number of chiefs which appears in Hellyer's plan, and distributed according to the above formula. This was, of course, not only a formula for assigning places to the Services, but also one for assigning power. While this was rational as a power-allocation formula, it was irrational organizationally.

The injection of these extra two chiefs had three effects which will be traced in the rest of this chapter. The relationship of the VCDS, ACDS and CG was made much more complicated and subject to friction: flowing from this the clear allocation of functions between functional chiefs was blurred and this led to numerous demarcation disputes; and finally the overall effect of retaining the CG branch undermined the powers of the Deputy Minister implicit in the earlier diagram and, secondarily, had the effect of subverting the careers of civilians within the Department.

The Vice-Chief of Defence Staff Branch

It will be recalled that the original plan for the Headquarters, did not contain a VCDS Branch. Rather, as indicated at Chart 8, below, the Vice-Chief and Chief of Defence Staff were boxed

CHART 8 - OUTLINE ORGANIZATION CFHQ, AUGUST 1964¹

together at the top of the Headquarters organization. Operational matters were to be handled by a Chief of Operational Readiness. A major component

-
1. On a point of detail the ACDS in fact worked very closely with and, in effect reported directly to the CDS, notwithstanding the formal lines of control. The reason for this was that Bean ACDS, and Miller CDS, both RCAF officers "understood each other" while Walsh, the VCDS, was Army. This is a typical example of the way personalities and service loyalties pervaded and in many cases set aside the logic of formal organization. Interviews.

of the 'general staff' work was to be handled by the Assistant Chief of Defence Staff acting as a 'staff' rather than 'line' manager, and responsible to the VCDS. The terms of reference for the VCDS indicated that he was to act for the CDS in his absence, and that he was to "co-ordinate the Defence Staff as a whole".

Three factors militated against the stability of this arrangement. The small staff allotted to the VCDS - he originally had little more than a personal staff - gave him little scope for working up staff papers of his own. (He could always commission them from one of the Branches, but they would then reflect a Branch viewpoint rather than what he wanted to say). The second factor was the increasing likelihood that he might - surrounded by the Defence Secretariat and the ACDS staff, co-ordinating bodies in their own right - be virtually unemployed in his secondary duty of overall co-ordination. What was not co-ordinated by the two above staffs was worked out either between Branch Heads and the CDS himself or, where necessary, at Defence Council level, where the VCDS tended, because of the absence of primary functions, to be very much of a fifth wheel.

The third destabilizing factor was the most crucial. The traditional authority of Vice Chiefs has derived from their being the functional controllers of the military operations branch of their Service. The creation of a Chief of Operational Readiness, which in effect took over the Service operations branches, and the cutting of the direct line of responsibility and control between that branch and the VCDS relegated him to a position where his authority was not based on functional control, and hence declined visibly. The solution to this problem lay in rearrangement of functions, and the means to achieve this lay in the inconsistencies which abounded between ACDS, COPR and, to a lesser extent in the CG Branches.

The inception of the formation of COPR Branch unveiled a latent conflict of theory. There were two simultaneous requirements: to organize the Branch according to general function (Force Development, Force Requirements and Operations) at the same time as retaining expertise for 'elemental' function (Land, Sea, Air) at a sufficiently high level. The discussions which commenced in May of 1964 thus revolved mainly around choosing between one of the following alternatives.

CHART 9 - ALTERNATIVE OPERATIONS BRANCH ORGANIZATIONS

Involved in this choice were a number of major issues. The first was the choice of primacies: whether the concept of operations (development, requirements, operations) was superior to the concept of elements. Acceptance of the former implied two assumptions, neither of which were too clear at the time. Foremost among these was the assumption that henceforth military operations would require combined elements. Secondly came the assumption that, given organization A, the elements would not be disregarded to the extent that untenable assumptions would be made about their innate capabilities. The solution to this issue lay in distributing the top jobs - at Director level - equally between land, sea and air; which in itself was dangerous as it would perpetuate old ties. The second major issue was present in the minds of all, but would have to await future developments. This was the relationship of the Headquarters operations organization vis-a-vis the future force configurations. At this early stage the future Command organization was not defined, but there was an obvious requirement for the headquarters organization to reflect - and hence be adequately responsive to - the structure of the Commands. At this point in time one could no more than take a stab in the dark; although 'functional' rather than 'elemental' would seem the better bet.

The third factor to be taken into account were the political realities of the time. Hellyer was obviously intent on integration, as were the senior officers involved. Implicit in the organization of the Operations Branch was the danger that the Services would try to get back in by a back door. To put it bluntly, it would not look good if too much emphasis were given to elemental thinking. Functionalism was the preferred dogma.

All these matters were explicitly recognized by participants in the discussion. What may not have been as clearly recognized was that the choice, once made, would not in any way 'solve' the issues. They are of their very nature insoluble as they represent the essential tensions involved in choices of patterns of military organizations. It is important to make this point because later events might seem to cast aspersions on particular individuals or Services. That this is not intended should be self-evident: however it is equally true that there were occasions when personality clashes were disguised as honest elemental representations. The judgement as between these two has been partially covered elsewhere and thus need not be gone into deeply here.¹ What is more difficult to disentangle - and more important to clarify - is the distinction between speaking up for a Service and speaking up for an element. That these are not co-terminous is readily appreciated, yet the connection is so close, and the ties of loyalty between Service and element are so unyielding that it has in practice been very difficult for proponents of the latter viewpoint to refute the charge that they are speaking for the former. It is at this level of discussion that stereotyped attitudes emerge, and because of the emergence of stereotyped responses that many discussions degenerated into personality clashes.

1. Byers' "Reorganization of the Canadian Armed Forces: Parliamentary, Military and Interest Group Perceptions" in particular attempts to disentangle the issues involved in what came to be known as "the revolt of the admirals".

Another issue that needs to be pointed out here concerns the terminology employed to identify alternative courses of action. The term "functional" was very often used to denote non-geographical, non-elemental or non-Service modes of organization. However the adoption of this vocabulary led some persons to hold that elemental, geographic or Service organizations were "non-functional" as distinct from organization by task, which was "functional". The difficulties caused by this military foray into semantics were to lead to considerable confusion as the word "function" became more and more narrowly defined, overlooking the wider and equally legitimate usage which would encompass both geographical and elemental connotations.

On 1st August, 1964 the Chief of Operational Readiness Branch became effective. Its organization is at Chart 10. By the end of the year the organization was seen as being in some respects unsatisfactory, and planning was begun for reorganization. What had happened to cause this dissatisfaction may be described by the analogy of selective filtration.¹ The organization adopted was of the Chart 9A variety. Each of the Director-General appointments came from a particular Service or element. Below each Director-General were the elemental groupings. What was happening was that a process of selective reinforcement was taking place. If, for example the Director-General of Force Development was from the air element it so transpired that his force development programmes had an added emphasis on air matters, and that sea and land force development matters were rather muted. The same was occurring elsewhere in the structure. The consequence was a twofold

1. The following account is based on interviews with several officers.

imbalance. Requirements and Operations plans were not balanced with respect to elements (Force Development was slightly less important in this context) and at the same time the elemental representations were not coming through clearly, but were emerging in the guise of the function which had a corresponding Director-General.

It is easier to describe the effect than to ascribe causes, and it is not necessary to go into these in detail. But what was clear was that in many ways the worst of all possible worlds was reflected if not in the organization of the Operational Readiness Branch, then in its members. In particular the levels at which disagreements were being resolved were inappropriate as regards both tasks and elemental representation. The Chief was not getting the integrated viewpoint that he had been seeking.

Paradoxically, the solution seemed to lie in giving primary recognition to the elements, and in grouping the tasks of force development and requirements underneath them. In this way the elemental biases, where they existed, would be out in the open, and not disguised or filtered through task functions. At a special COPR Branch conference the original organization was described as being a council of perfection, one which would be possible to adopt only after the training of staff officers has been reoriented to make full integration possible. Whether this comment was entirely fair is a matter on which very few are equipped to pass judgement: whether it was realistic should be evident by the end of this work.

On 12th April, 1965 the new COPR Branch organization, at Chart 11, came into effect. The volte-face was complete, and the first lesson in the organizational realities of defence integration was available for others to see, to reflect on, and to draw their own conclusions.

Apart from its own domestic affairs, there were other forces at work which were to draw the VCDS closer to this area. They can be grouped into the two major areas of demarcation disputes with other CFHQ organizations, and forces of circumstance and personality. In practice it proved undesirable to separate the planning function from the operations function: thus there was a good case for the ACDS and COPR Branches to be drawn closer together. By the same token COPR required considerable input from the CG Branch as regards establishments and the CLE Branch; both of these inputs being required for the Force Development function. These are only the outstanding examples: there was a whole range of matters over which considerable coordination was required, and the fact of the matter was that, despite having the VCDS as a free-floating coordinator, this task was not being done adequately.

Many of these difficulties represented no more than the growing pains of a new organization, staffed by persons who were not accustomed to dealing with each other, and, in these early days, had to operate a system that was untested. New areas of power, both personal and deriving from their respective offices, were there to be captured, and many of the Chiefs and their subordinates were not averse to devoting almost as much time to this latter task as to their primary function.

Although this element of human nature could not be eliminated, it could be made more manageable, and this is why the VCDS Branch was established in late 1965. Coincident with, and probably facilitating the changeover was a wholesale turnover of senior officers, depicted in Table 1 opposite. Bean, formerly ACDS was sent to Europe; Allard the COpR was sent to form Mobile Command and Sharp to Training Command; Moncel stepped up to become the new 'functional' VCDS, and the way was cleared for a considerable input of newcomers who, it was hoped, would more easily accommodate to, and abide by the evolving rules of the integrated Headquarters.

This was the first of four discrete major staff changes in the Headquarters. The second was coincident with, and largely derived from the unification debate of 1966/67 (described in the following chapter). The third changeover commenced in January, 1969, with the changeover of three out of the five Chiefs and continued with the replacement of many of their deputies during late 1969 and mid 1970. Coincident with this change was the development of new organizational concepts, which are described in Chapter 5. The beginning of the fourth stage, in July 1971 is the replacement of several of the deputies, and this stage will come to an end in 1972 with the retirement of the present CDS. It is notable, but not surprising that the occasions on which major changes both in organization and concepts have occurred, should coincide with wholesale personnel changes.

Returning to the VCDS Branch, it became effective in October 1965, and took over the functions of the ACDS and COpR Branches. Its

TABLE 1 - SENIOR MILITARY POSTINGS AT DND HEADQUARTERS, 1964 - 1971

POSITION	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
CDS	MILLER			ALLARD			SHARP	
VCS	WALSH	MONCEL		SHARP		REYNOLDS	DARE	
SCOPS	ALLARD	WELLAND		BALL	WILSON-SMITH	DARE	STOVEL	
DCS		CHARLES			WILSON-SMITH	TEDLIE	CHARLES	
DCRS		ANDERSON		DARE				
DCPMS	BEAN	BALL		MURDOCH	TIMBRELL		BALL	
CG	MONCEL	FLEURY		HENNESSY		POLLARD		
DCG	DILLON			AUSTIN		ROTHSCHILD	CHARLES	SPENCER
DCMEA	SHARP	AUSTIN		ELCOCK (DGOM)				
CTS	ANNIS			LILLEY			WALDOCK	
DCLOS	WHITING	BURCHELL		ARMOUR				
DC Emy		LILLEY		WALDOCK			PADDON	
CD	DYER			REYNOLDS		HENNESSY	DEXTRAZE	DEXTRAZE
DCD	MARTIN			MACDONALD		STOVEL	DEXTRAZE	LAUSMAN
	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971

Source: Compiled from DND Official Biographies and newspaper reports.

main sections were as follows.

CHART 11 - EARLY VCDS ORGANIZATION

By early 1966 the establishment of the Branch had been filled out to almost 800, with the following organization.

CHART 12 - VCDS BRANCH, APRIL 1966

One important difference between this VCDS organization and the previous COpR organization is that, although the elemental component of operations remained as before, the planning and reserves and survival

organizations were more or less integrated, and thus the VCDS Branch was nicely balanced as to environment and to function. Even with this organization, however, there remained some problems.

The basic problem, common to all operations branches in military organizations - and the above is by no means an untypical example - is how to meld intelligence, plans and operations in a dynamically changing situation. This is basically a problem of management and one best resolved by intimate cooperation of those participating in the operations process. It is particularly necessary for the long-range planning function that it neither become out of touch because of remoteness from the other operations sections, nor, under pressures of events be reduced to insignificance because of other greater priorities. In the above organization the planning function, in an effort to meet these requirements, was buttressed by the creation of separate Programs and Operational Research divisions.

Desirable as this is, it brought with it problems of span of control by the VCDS. With eight separate divisions reporting to him, he was kept extremely busy. To function adequately as an effective Branch Head would have been hard enough: to carry out this duty as well as being the alter ego of the CDS proved well-nigh impossible. All these matters were discussed in 1966 and 1967, during which period minor organizational changes were attempted. The solution, as many saw it, was to reallocate duties so as to spread the VCDS load between his organization and an "office of the CDS". The programming function, which is really an aspect of all the Headquarters Branches, and the Reserves and Survival organization, which in any case reported directly to the CDS were prime candidates for inclusion in such a CDS office. The other desideratum

which would come of this would be that the VCDS would relinquish his direct Branch Head responsibilities and once again be able to resume coordination as a full time role.

CHART 13 - SUGGESTED REFORM OF THE VCDS BRANCH

The interesting thing about such a proposal is that, organizationally it represented a return to the COpR Branch concept, which only a couple of years previously had been considered deficient! But the difference between this and the COpR organization of 1964 was that in the first place the cast of participants had changed, and secondly that the programming function (and some suggested that a large component of the planning function, at least long-term planning) would come under

the top management, thus adequately serving the whole department.¹ Perhaps because of its similarity to what had been tried before and found wanting, such a proposal was not adopted, and instead the VCDS functions were, effective April 1968, reorganized as follows.

CHART 14 - VCDS ORGANIZATION - APRIL 1968

1. Such a proposal was also in line with organizational developments in the US, "New Army Top Management Level Seeks to Tap Information Flow" Armed Forces Management, May 1967. Although the CDS and VCDS were aware of this, it is not possible to ascertain the influence it had on them.

If anything, such an organization was even more complex than the one it was replacing. As well, some of its divisions, particularly the Force Development and the Operations and Reserves organizations, were themselves large, unwieldy, and did not appear adequately integrated within themselves. On the whole, the organization did nothing to relieve the VCDS of his burdensome Branch Head responsibilities. The resolution of this problem would have to await further developments.

The Controller-General Organization

The CG organization is very much an Americanism that has recently been adopted by Canada. Prior to the formation of CG Branches by the Services, the accounting and establishments function was handled within the operations branches of the Services, usually in directorates of accounting and staff duties organizations. In 1955 the RCAF formed a CG Branch; the Navy followed suit in 1962, and the Army in 1966.

Within each Service the CG Branch had the relatively modest aim of correlating manpower to finance, and providing information to the financial side of the Deputy Minister's organization. With integration, the Working Group on a Controller Organization by mid 1964 had identified a number of other functions that would probably have to be handled by a CG Branch. These mainly dealt with the wider issues of management which were entailed in the effort to integrate the Services. For example, standard terminology would have to be developed; anomalies which, over the years, had differentiated the Services would have to be resolved; the need for emphasis on management improvement which had been recommended by the Glassco Commission would have to be supervised and

coordinated. Above all, the determination of objectives in terms of the reductions of personnel, which was a primary aim of the integration effort would have to be closely supervised so as to achieve both efficiency and equity.¹

At the same time the Working Group identified areas of overlap of function between the envisaged CG organization and other Branches. With CG in charge of establishments there was a need to establish close coordination with the personnel branch that would be created. With the CG in charge of current financial management a similarly good working relationship with those in charge of the programming function would have to be established. This in fact would be a three-way relationship, involving also the DM organization, which had the ultimate responsibility for the financial management of the department. The Working Group also noted that at that point in time no attempt had yet been made to assign overall responsibility for what can be called the management audit or management services function.

With these things in mind, the early CG organization was devised. The one that was settled on in August 1964, at the inauguration of the integrated Headquarters was as follows.

CHART 15 - CG ORGANIZATION, AUGUST 1964

1. This was the point in time at which rumours of impending drastic cuts, ranging from 20% to 50%, were circulating, and there was a pressing need both to allay fears, and to determine an adequate programme of reduction.

A month later, in an effort to economize on staff (and thus probably also set an example to others) the organization under the DCG was consolidated under a DG Budget. But this proved too much of a compression, and in November, 1964, the budget and accounting services divisions were recreated. The pay and finance systems and procedures of the three Services had prior to integration all been different, and considerable readjustment was necessary. At the same time it was necessary to keep in line with the DM's organization, and other audit, Treasury and financial organizations which had dealings with the CG Branch.

By the end of 1966 changes in other parts of DND impinged on the CG organization sufficiently for a fresh look to be given to it. The formation of the functional Commands in July, 1965 entailed a complete revision of the field force establishment, both in the light of the reorganization itself and to achieve the personnel reductions that had been made mandatory.¹ Even if only cursory control of this was maintained at the Headquarters (one aim of the functional Commands was to enhance the responsibility of the Commander in such matters) a very large workforce would be required. Although the Commanders were, organizationally and in theory responsible directly to the CDS, in practice extensive consultations with (and appeals to) the VCDS and the CG in respect of Command organization were required.

1. And in fact had been written, at Hellyer's direction, into the terms of reference of the Commanders - interviews.

The same thing was true with regard to the programming function, which was also shared between the VCDS (after the elimination of ACDS Branch in 1965) and the CG. The VCDS was in charge of programme planning and analysis, with the CG in charge of programme management. This distinction was not always easy to maintain, particularly in a situation as dynamic as was the case during 1965/66. There was always at the back of the minds of the CG Directors and above the realization that the CG should not attempt to preempt the primary functional responsibilities of the VCDS and CP. The solution to this difficulty lay in a considerable expansion and generalization of the CG concept.

From being a service agency, providing financial services, accounting and pay services (pay policy was the responsibility of CP), the CG Branch was coming to view itself as the means by which the CDS could assure himself that the responsibilities and resources vested in him were being optionally managed. This thought was given tangible expression in the next major organization of the CG Branch. The

CHART 16 - CG ORGANIZATION, MARCH 1967

financial side of management was again compressed (and less than a year later expanded again to its former organization). The previous Management

Engineering Services division (which in September, 1964 had become the Management Engineering and Automation division) was largely handed over to the Establishments side of the Branch.¹ Thus organization, manpower and management engineering were closely related; making it both a more powerful representative of the CG organization, and making it a more formidable force and voice in the Headquarters.

This heavy emphasis on management rather than control, and the efforts to develop sound doctrines of organization, finance and such like, is almost entirely an RCAF contribution. It was the RCAF who first copied the USAF and developed both a CG organization and the management doctrine that went with it. The bulk of generalist management thinking, and almost the entire component of people trained in management came from the RCAF, with the Navy a considerable way behind, and the Army hardly on the scene at all. This has been reflected in the composition of staff at Director level and above in the CG Branch. Despite the various reorganizations, the number of staff at this level remained constant at 15 between 1965 and 1967.² As Table 2 indicates, the air element representation has been out of all proportion to its overall representation in the armed forces, and the land element representation has been consistently poor. Despite this (or maybe because of it), the first CG to be selected from the air environment was not appointed till 1969.

-
1. The remainder of this function, Management Information, was split off to form the core of DND's new computer management organization.
 2. The period during which this observation was made.

TABLE 2 - COMPOSITION OF CG BRANCH DIRECTORS AND ABOVE, 1964-1967

Element Of Origin	Aug '64	May '65	Jun '65	Jun '66	Jun '67	Forces at June, 1965
Air	5	7	7	6	7	47,108
Land	3	2	5	4	2	45,826
Sea	2	6	3	5	6	19,450

Source: Official Organization Charts on File

The growth and development of this management philosophy, as it was developing during this period had two major implications. It raised the question of the degree to which the Deputy Minister's Branch - representing civilian control - should be responsible for such 'economy and efficiency' functions. This is examined in the concluding sections of this chapter. As well was raised the question of the status of the CG Branch vis-a-vis the other military branches, in respect of whose primary functions the CG organization could easily appear to become excessively obtrusive. This aspect of later developments is examined in Chapter 5.

The Deputy Minister's Branch

The effect of the changeover to an integrated headquarters on the Deputy Minister's organization and on civil-military relations can be summed up as plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. The reasons for this go back to the early post-war history of the Department.¹

It will be recalled that Chapter 1 described the immediate post-war rundown of the Department which resulted in a return to the earlier single-minister system that had been in effect up to 1939 (an associate minister was retained but he was not organizationally important). Under the Minister and Deputy Minister the Services, now that the war was won, were left pretty much to their own devices as there was no provision for formal co-ordination at the Service Chiefs level. The defence budget dwindled till by the end of 1949 it was approximately \$400 million.

The outbreak of hostilities in Korea changed this situation. Almost overnight the budget was increased to \$1 billion, and the Services were given the task of managing a vast expansion in a very short time. Even despite the pressure of hostilities some reservations were expressed in government circles, and particularly by the Treasury Board about the ability of the Department to cope with the added burdens not merely of management, but especially of financial controls. Although Mr. Claxton's attempts to integrate the Services had failed

1. The following account is mainly based on interviews.

in 1946, he resolved to integrate the civilian elements of the Department under the Deputy Minister. He accordingly commissioned a report on the organization of the Deputy Minister's Branch.¹

This report came to grips with all the outstanding problems. It noted that the task of amalgamation and unification would involve the reconciliation of different methods and personalities which were not necessarily complementary, consistent or even compatible. It recognized the tendency on the part of the Services to on the one hand regard the Deputy Minister's Branch in a period of peacetime retrenchment, reduced budgets and restricted activity as an obstructive rather than an expediting agency, and on the other hand (or maybe because of this) for the Service Chiefs to tend to encroach on the functional responsibilities of the DM.

To solve these problems the Report recommended three things: that the DM Branch have its functional organization clarified (it was already more or less functionally organized); that this be done by a strengthening of its top-level organization (the theory of counter-vailing power was clearly expressed); and finally that adequate personnel of the right calibre be sought to staff the senior positions and to assure the Service Chiefs that their business would be dealt with sympathetically. Adopting the organizational recommendations of the Report, by November, 1951 the DM's Branch was structured as indicated in Chart 17.

1. The Report was written by Mr. Martin M. Mendels, a World War II Army Brigadier, later Secretary of the World Bank.

CHART 17 - ORGANIZATION OF DM BRANCH NOVEMBER 1951¹

1. From original organization chart on file.

The significance of this organization for our purposes was that it was a completely function-oriented rather than Service-oriented structure. In their major dealing with the DM's organization the Services would pass through the ADM Finance or ADM Requirements organizations, the staffs of which had been considerably strengthened both by additions and by reclassification. A solution to gaining the confidence of the Services was sought in appointing Service officers to many of the top jobs.¹

With minor changes this organization persisted up to the time of integration. When the CFHQ organization was being devised the Chairman COSC, Air Chief Marshal Miller, proposed that the Service CG Branches not persist in the new organization, but that the bulk of their financial duties be transferred to an expanded DM's organization. For a number of reasons this proposal was not implemented. The reasons for this appear to have been threefold.

The incorporation of a vast army of bookkeepers, paying officers and accounts managers - the inevitable accompaniment of what is the government's largest single spending unit - would have markedly changed the character of what was a very small organization,² arranged as a horizontal filter rather than as a vertical branch organization.

-
1. This statement is technically correct. Many negotiations were begun while the officers were serving, and there were cases where officers were loaned to the DM staff for shorter or longer periods, ultimately retiring or resigning from their Service and coming over to the civil service. The ADM (Requirements) position became, almost by right, the position to which the Army's Chief Engineer was transferred on his retirement from the Service.
 2. Leaving aside clerical organizations such as libraries, typing pools and registries, staff under the DM's control numbered less than 200 over the whole period from 1952 to the present.

There is some evidence to suggest that the utility of this type of organization was questioned. Whether it would in fact be any more efficient, on a priori grounds may have been discussed, but could only be tested by implementing such an organization.

Another, and possibly more binding consideration was a quasi-political one. Military financial management does not run in a straight line from the Cabinet and Minister of National Defence to the Department but also involves the Treasury Board, which exercises a measure of program and establishment control. It is possible that a conversion of the financial management function totally to a civilian organization might have been adequate grounds for weakening the control link between the Treasury Board and DND. The effect of this would be to convert some disputes over financial matters from one involving a very powerful and prestigious outside department, to a purely internal matter. The apparent strengthening of the DM organization thus might paradoxically have the effect of weakening civilian control on financial programming.¹

A third and even more cogent reason for the DM's Branch not proceeding to expand its functions was a politico-legislative one. In Canadian law the DM is not merely the permanent civil head of the Department (as in countries with a purely 'British' form of government) but is also, as his name implies, the deputy to the Minister, and has much the same powers administratively as has a departmental minister. Thus the DM's power does not derive from his being a functional chief - in the

1. In countries with a 'Treasury Defence Division' this is a classic tension.

way we saw this was absolutely vital to the VCDS - but from the fact that after the Minister he takes at least equal precedence with the CDS in terms of formal influence, if not greater precedence.

In the words of the National Defence Act the CDS is charged with the control and administration of the Canadian Forces, under the direction of the Minister. The present DM, with a wealth of DND experience behind him¹ has taken the view that for the CDS to exercise this function properly he must have control of the Armed Forces both operationally and administratively. Hence another reason for the persistence of the CG Branch. In any event, the DM feels that, although the operation of his Branch may be improved, this can be undertaken within the present arrangements, and without any further accretion of functional elements.²

Thus, the DM's organization has remained largely as it had been since 1951. When the integration of Service Headquarters resulted in a functional organization, the DM organization had been functionally organized for over a decade. Hence there appeared little need for reorganization on the civil side. Rather, it was a matter of the military

1. Mr. E.B. Armstrong, Deputy Minister, DND 1960 - 71, Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance) 1951 - 1960. Treasury Board 1938 - 1951.

2. Interviews. For non-Canadian readers, the powers of a deputy minister are derived from the Interpretation Act which gives him all the statutory powers of a Minister of the Crown, except authority to make regulations. The Deputy Minister also has specific responsibilities under the Financial Administration Act. Not all Deputy Ministers have applied their powers equally; nor have these powers been equally recognized by different Chiefs - or even Ministers for that matter. Interviews.

organization reflecting the functional concepts that were expressed in the DM organization. After 1966 there were a number of developments which would reopen the question of the DM Branch vis-a-vis the CG organization, and they will be dealt with in Chapter 5. There are, however, a number of implications in the story to date for civil-military-relations generally, and the discussion of these will conclude this chapter.

Civil-Military Relations in the Headquarters

It seems that at the time of revising the concept of the headquarters there was no apparent thought given to revising the concept of the role of the civilians in the organization except indirectly, inasmuch as the unification might appear to strengthen the civilian headquarters component by making 'the odds against them more even'.¹ Of course, the opposite possibility was equally true - that the new organization would enable the military to present more of a united front than hitherto. But the essential point was that the role of civilians qua civilians in a military organization was not considered, or if it was, the distinction made in some other countries between civilian control and political control was not made as clear in Canada.² In part this was a contribution of the Canadian military practice, partly a failure of the civilians to exert sufficient influence (there is little to suggest they had much at all), and perhaps it was in part due to the exigencies of the changeover that this aspect was not considered. Each of these possibilities will be considered after the traditional role of civilians in the Canadian military organization is described.

1. This was the contention of Mr. Hellyer, SC Evidence 3 June 1964

2. One possible reason for this is that the role of the DM, described previously, does not itself make this distinction clear as in countries where the system of permanent heads is followed. In this, as in so many things, Canada is more closely coming to resemble the United States.

This can best be done by comparing the Canadian organization with that in Britain where the tradition of having civilian Branch and Command Secretaries in the military branches has been established.¹ There the Branch and Command Secretaries are senior civilians (usually second in rank only to the branch head or commander) located in the branches and commands, among whose duties is to act as advisor on behalf of the permanent head. Organizationally the secretaries, while nominally under the command of their military masters, have the right of direct and independent access to the permanent head. Practically, their job is to be the eyes and ears of the permanent head in the command or branch. Assisting the secretaries is a civilian staff who undertake all financial management and operations in the organization and they are thus in a position to advise their secretary of the overall operations of the military. The Command Secretary's Branch is thus an organization that as well as its functional duty of financial management acts as an overall auditor of the policy of the military. By virtue of their role in finance management such an organization is well integrated into the various military branches and commands. It should also be pointed out that such an extensive civilian organization, starting with clerks and ledger-keepers, rising to the various command and branch secretaries and thence on to the senior headquarters civilian organization and finishing with the permanent head provides a reasonable career structure for civilians in the department, promoting both a necessary element of continuity and a desirable expertise and

1. The following description is based on the Australian Army organization, which is derived from that of the UK.

familiarity with the ways and needs of the military on the part of civilians. Much the same organization is found on the supply side, with civilians similarly integrated into this function.

The Canadian organization of civilian staffs is somewhat different. The senior civilians in the department - the assistant deputy ministers - are superimposed on the military organization as senior policy makers rather than as branch heads in their own right. This is because to a far greater extent than in Britain or Australia the military undertake the financial and establishments functions that are normally relegated to civilians. The career structure for civilians in the Canadian armed forces provides for a large number of minor functionaries, a few senior officers, and not enough in between these two structures to provide for an adequate career stream. This leads to a situation where the senior civilians come to the department from outside the military organization, and hence are less experienced in military ways. The lower graded civilians have no adequate career in the department and the more able or ambitious among them move to other departments. This has two main effects. A valuable element of continuity is thereby lost, as the military occupants of positions tend to stay in one posting for about three years or less. The other effect is that the military have a smaller cadre of civilians familiar with their ways and their needs who can represent their requests to other government departments and organizations, and thus act as mutually acceptable go-betweens in the overall administrative process. Inevitably this must lower the efficiency of the administrative process.

This is not to say that there is lacking in Canada civilian political control of the armed forces. The military are fully responsive to and act responsibly towards the civilian government, as personified by the Minister of National Defence. But whether this control is adequately efficient is another matter. Nor is it suggested that civilians should have greater power within the department: rather there should be more of them at key points so that by their broad training in the public service they can more adequately provide assistance to the military, who are not specifically trained in intra-governmental relations and attuned by experience to the finer nuances of politics. Indeed it is in this area that the greatest dangers lie in the continuing use of military rather than civilian assistance.

The reasons why this trend has persisted and continued into the post-integration phase of the department's development are several and interrelated. It is traditionally normal for the civilian permanent head of a military department to be placed in a generally awkward situation whereby he can offer counsel to the military chief, but cannot impose his views on him against his will. This requires a rare combination of tact and ability on the part of the senior civilian. It also requires that the minister have faith in him, and be prepared to be influenced by him upon sufficient demonstration of good cause. It also serves the cause of the civilians if they have a direct part to play in the administration of the department. Unfortunately it appears that Canada has both forgone the advantages of the British military organization without gaining the advantages of the American military organization which has influenced her thinking. On the one hand there is no civilian organization which pervades the military

department, and on the other hand Canada does not have an overriding Department of Defence which is largely civilian and utterly dominates the three services. Despite the wide-ranging terms of reference of the Deputy Minister,¹ he is not adequately staffed and has insufficient 'branch head' responsibilities to exert direct pressure on the military.

The other arena for expression of advice to the military - the Defence Council - was in the few years prior to integration a nonentity, meeting infrequently and then only to deal with trivialities.² Brigadier Malone's representations to give the revamped Defence Council more teeth was rejected by Hellyer in favour of making the Chief of the Defence Staff supreme. The overall effect of these pressures in the past had been eloquently put by Morison, speaking in the context of the US:

"Other Secretaries, in earlier times, had found it sensible to rise, benign and inactive, above similar situations. Drawn from civil life in answer more often to the pressing exigencies of politics than of national defence, returning shortly to civil life as ignorant of the particular rituals of military society as any tourist can be of tribal customs, the average Secretary has tended to disengage himself - or to be disengaged - from the administration of which he is the directing agency."³

There is another aspect to this whole question of "civilianization" which is strangely absent from the Canadian scene. It is an accepted fact that, *ceteris paribus*, a civilian is substantially cheaper

-
1. Hellyer Evidence SC 28 May 1964, p. 38 and Armstrong Evidence SC 3 June 1964, pp 113-118.
 2. Maj Gen Macklin was scathing both on the extent of civilian assistance and on the performance of the various councils and committees. Evidence SC 9 June 1964, pp 191-193, 200.
 3. Morison p. 125. Macklin in his Evidence - SC 9 June 1964 p. 193 - alleged that in the past there had been political patronage at work on the civilian side of the Department. This being so might be another reason why an increase in civilian participation was not well regarded.

to employ in an administrative/clerical task than his military counterpart. He provides greater continuity and expertise in clerical skills than a soldier, and hence the overhead costs associated with retraining and on-the-job training are reduced to a minimum. Unlike his counterpart, who spends about a third of his service life in training, field exercises etc., the civilian is at the desk or available for clerical/administrative duties for a greater part of the year. In terms of direct costs the military man is more expensive to employ as, apart from direct salary and allowances in the way of salary, the government is also responsible for his uniforms and kit, housing, provisioning and medical and dental care. The government's responsibilities towards civilian employees go only as far as salary. When one considers that this doctrine arose in countries such as Britain and Australia which have significant conscript armed forces, in a country such as Canada which employs only volunteer forces and thus has to pay closer to market rates, the cost differential must be even correspondingly greater in favour of civilians as against military in clerical/administrative employment.¹

In fact the problem of the civilians in the Department is worse than it appears on the surface due to three internal factors, which are self-reinforcing and act as a vicious circle. The bad staffing structure available to civilians has already been mentioned. Even within this structure a large number of positions at all levels are filled by ex-servicemen who, on retirement or resignation from the service, take up civilian positions with almost no break in service.

1. The fact that CFHQ was regarded for planning purposes as a Divisional HQ until 1967-68 may have militated against a more extensive use of civilians.

This serves to make a bad civilian establishment even less attractive to civilians both in and outside the department. The third factor that results from this had a dual effect: in considering candidates for promotion within the departments to civilian positions, because so many of the positions are occupied by ex-military persons the civilians do not appear to be attractive candidates, and there is therefore a reinforcement of the tendency not merely to appoint ex-military members to civilian positions but then to keep promoting them. This denies the training and experience essential to civilian staff and, over time, makes them progressively less well considered by the military.

These actions of the Department - interrupting the career structure of civilians by inserting ex-military members, and the poor establishment structure - do not go unheeded by the rest of the public service which generally has a poor opinion of the Department, particularly as a place in which to work,¹ and the travails within the Department have been rendered even more difficult by the apparent unwillingness of public servants to consider lateral transfers or simple promotions (that is without jumping several grades) to the Department.²

The continuation of these attitudes after 1964 would appear to derive from three main sources: lack of ministerial interest in the problem, the force of personalities and the failure of the Glassco Committee to adequately understand the problem. The portfolio of National Defence is a comparatively junior one, with the consequence

1. Interviews. I was told that it was common practice to offer Assistant Deputy Minister positions to senior service officers, and only then, if no suitable ones were available, to fill it with a civilian. The number of ex-military ADM's would seem to bear this out.

2. Interviews.

that the Department's successive ministers are themselves relatively untrained both in governmental administration and bureaucratic dealing. For this reason it is likely that they undervalue, or are even ignorant of the value, to be had out of a well trained civilian staff in assisting them.¹ There was also the direct impact of personalities at work, and particularly the forces at the top of the structure. Between 1955 and 1960 the Deputy Minister was the former Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Miller, who went on in 1960 to become Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee and in 1964 became Chief of the Defence Staff. As the obviously dominant figure of the Department during this period Miller did little to foster the greater use of civilians.² Nor was this overall lack of civilian expertise picked up by the Glassco Commission. They saw civilian control in terms of political controls, and applied 'businessmen's standards' to the exercise of this control; missing both the subtleties of civil-military administrative relationships and the need to develop appropriate civilian career structures.

Thus what has been described as a "great problem of military administration - the successful accommodation of the civil and military influences within the structure"³ has not really begun to be solved in the Headquarters. From the organizational viewpoint this has meant that the development of the headquarters organization since 1964 has been a military one, with little injection of civilian thought or deed. It is striking to find, at a time when economies were so significant, so little application of the economic doctrine of "civilianization" to a situation where its utility would be not only economic but far more transcendental.

1. The most recent major example of this is that the 1971 White Paper on Defence was "staffed" by an outsider, specifically imported to the Department for the task.

2. Interviews. The evidence is basically circumstantial.

3. Morison, p. 403. An excellent view of this problem is given in Chs 26 and 27 of Morison.

Conclusions

The outstanding feature of the development of the Headquarters since 1964 has been its constant evolution. The structure has not remained immutable, and this in large part has been due to the willingness of the Defence Staff to tinker with the overall structure of the Department. If anything, the changes have come too fast and there has been more than a shade of pious belief that some of the major problems of the defence forces may be disposed of by reorganization of the structure than by the reconciliation of its elements.

In his analysis of American strategic policy Huntington suggests that the rapid rotation of officers, by preventing

"any single individual from becoming identified with a particular office or organizational unit and from building up continuing sources of support for that office or unit ... strengthens civilian control and stimulates identification with the service as a whole. As a corollary, it also reduces the effectiveness of the officer in any single job. Rotation conflicts with innovation. When not only the commander but all senior personnel change every few years, no one individual has the incentive or time to make major changes. Routine or formalized procedures are employed because they can be known by all and because they minimize the disruptive impact of continuously changing personnel."¹

If, as a generalization this holds true, then Canada has been a notable exception to the rule as regards most of the points made above. The organization of the Headquarters from 1964 to the present has been in a constant state of flux, all of it generated by the military themselves. At the same time the pace of innovation has been rapid, and again mainly generated by the military. What is the reason for this departure from Huntington's view?

1. The Common Defence, p. 311.

The answer seems to lie in the aphorism "circumstances alter cases". The need for change was so overwhelming that the usual military patterns of stability-seeking behaviour were just not appropriate. In particular, the experience of trying to accommodate three Services with widely different philosophies of management and methods of operation into a military framework was one which forced the Chiefs to seek out innovative patterns of organization. It is interesting to note that two different parts of the same organization behaved quite differently over this period.

The Commands, which were created in 1965, bedded down very rapidly and, despite some major changes in their functions after 1966 (which are described in Chapter 5) maintained very stable organizations throughout the period. By contrast the CFHQ element of the Canadian Forces has had constant organizational upheavals, despite almost equally high rates of posting turbulence in both parts. So excessive rotations cannot alone account for this difference. What in fact happened at CFHQ was that although the organizational changes were brought about by the military, the basis for the changes was civil. The performance targets and timetables imposed by the Minister were not being achieved. This caused the rotation of the hierarchy, and the incoming personnel, in an effort to adopt, sought organizational change as a means of solving their problems.

So the reason for the difference between the situation that Huntington is describing and the Canadian situation appears to be that Huntington analyzes the military incentives for change in the absence of civilian direction. Where this latter element is present it invalidates the former conclusion.

As to the major difficulties of the headquarters during this period, these have been mainly difficulties of management, and only secondarily difficulties of operational control. This was reflected in the discussion of the evolution of the Comptroller-General's Branch and also in the branch of the Vice-Chief. Many of the management difficulties were inherent in attempting to integrate the three Services into a common pattern of procedure and language, and it is apparent that, for many of these matters, a greater settling-in period is going to be required than was originally envisaged by Hellyer.

The technical/logistics and personnel functions are those which appear to have bedded down the best organizationally, if organizational quietude is any guide. That these areas are largely technically determined and hence more susceptible to the logic of their situation should not detract from the excellent programs of integration that were worked out and are still being implemented.

Much of the upheaval in the Vice Chief's Branch has also been due to the continuing management dialogue that is proceeding. On the operational side, what seemed to be a bad start organizationally has now been amended to a more usual type of organization. The biggest problem in the traditional organizations of the Vice-Chief or Chief of Operations - whatever the appellation - has always been co-ordination. This was recognized in the general debate, but has not apparently yet been adequately resolved. In the Canadian context an added burden of tri-element co-ordination has rendered any solution more difficult to find. On the operational side it is only fair to point out that the new organization has not yet been adequately tested even in a situation of limited, let alone total, war, and thus had its effectiveness proved.

Less transient are the problems of civilians in the Department. They have suffered a very long period of what appears to be not merely neglect but incomprehension of the role that civilians can play in facilitating the Department's business. Nothing has been said so far about Departmental civilians participating in - and hence in a way legitimizing to others - the military consideration of national strategic policy. To what extent this function goes on within the Department is hard to ascertain. The arena for such discussions in Canada seems not to be so much between departments and the executive as in the reconstituted Standing Committee on National Defence and External Affairs, which has recently been providing excellently informative Proceedings, and casting its net very widely to obtain useful witnesses. In itself this has pointed up some of the deficiencies of the National Defence organization from the broad policy discursive aspect.¹

One final point should be made clear in the light of the controversy that surrounded unification in 1966 and 1967. The integration of the headquarters and the actual form that this took was widely and enthusiastically supported by serving officers; and continues to be extremely well regarded. The organization of the headquarters is almost a classic of organizational economy and would probably not be bettered in this respect by other countries.

1. The more recent creation of a small Defence Secretariat in Prime Minister Trudeau's Privy Council Office may also provide a partial focus for this activity.

CHAPTER 4 - THE FORMATION OF THE COMMANDS AND THE ISSUES OF UNIFICATION

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to describe two events which, while apparently separate, have an important link. Although unification did not come till February 1968 the early stages of the formation of the Commands, the period between 1965 and the end of 1966 was in many ways a rehearsal of the postures and the attitudes that would later be adopted. The success or failure of unification would be seen in the field forces more than at CFHQ.

Very few of the participants had any doubts that a measure of integration would - and should be made to - succeed. There were many precedents which, when taken together with the enthusiasm of many senior officers well justified this attitude. But for those who had their doubts about unification the formation of the new Commands would give them the opportunity to express, or even to demonstrate their reservations.

A third point, clearly foreseen by all, was that the formation of integrated commands would reopen the issue of inter-Service competition. Even though the White Paper and subsequent detailed planning had settled the force configuration many matters were left unresolved, the resolution of which would greatly affect the careers of officers, and not merely as individuals but as representatives of their Services. Even to the foresighted and to those who accepted the concept of unification (these categories are not inclusive) this was probably the outstanding issue. Because planning and implementation of these changes were so close in time little in the way of prior information was available - to anybody, including the Minister who was forced to change his mind on a number of occasions.

The Formation of the Commands

Even before planning the new-look Commands began, it was generally agreed that major reforms were required in the field force organization. In the climate of seeking manpower economies the organization of three separate types of command structures under three separate Services was seen as entailing duplication on the one hand, and under-exploitation of available resources on the other. There was considerable scope for reducing responsibility for some support services such as training and logistics which could be consolidated into functional commands of their own, and thus transfer responsibility for such support from each of the Services to an integrated Headquarters and Command structure.

In July 1964 the Minister approved in principle, and as a basis for planning, an overall strategic concept for the Canadian Field Forces. This confirmed the Force structure that was described in the White Paper previously (see Chapter 2), and paved the way for detailed planning of the commands. The following month senior Headquarters directors were requested by the Controller-General to consider alternatives, having particular regard to the command and control aspects. In their considerations the Directors were requested to consider both an area organization approach and a functional organization approach. They were therefore asked to identify organizational variants, together with the pros and cons of each. Some combination of the two approaches might provide the best answer but this would have to emerge from their appreciation and recommendations. One overriding principle stated was that CFHQ was intended to be a policy rather than an operating headquarters.

The response to this direction was considerable, both in output and in diversity of view, particularly as between the Army and Air Force. In general the Army proposals tended to seek a middle ground between geographical and primary task functions, recognizing that neither a purely functional nor a purely regional organization can satisfy all the factors affecting the choice of a Canadian Defence Force Command structure. On balance, however, it was thought that the functional organization went further to meeting the basic requirements than did the geographical one: the modifications to a functional organization to give it a regional representation aspect need not necessarily be so extensive as to degrade its capability. Such thinking produced a suggested organization such as that depicted below.

CHART 1 - FUNCTIONAL/GEOGRAPHICAL COMMAND STRUCTURES

The prevailing attitude of the Air Force, on the other hand was quite different from that expressed in Army circles. They tended to reject the concept of a regional organization which would vest in an individual commander all the forces in a given geographical area of

Canada, regardless of function or Service of origin. This was because it cut across the basic requirement of maximum flexibility and maximum economy. The Air Force considered that the basis of any new concept of organization of the Commands must be entirely functional in character. Apart from what it saw as the basic good sense of this view it was considered to be indeed almost a matter of direction, having regard to the organization of CFHQ and the future basis of force structure development.

Another factor that influenced the RCAF view of preferred Command structure was the conviction that Canadian forces assigned abroad would invariably come under allied control (ie non-Canadian); and that for this reason there appeared to be little or no requirement to establish a separate Command HQ organization in Canada for these forces. Therefore a task force organizational concept was proposed. This would result in the following organization.

CHART 2 - FUNCTIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE (AIR FORCE VIEW)

A third reason for the Air Force emphasis on task functionalism derived from their history. From the end of World War II to 1952-53 the Air Force had been organized regionally into three Commands known as 1,

2 and 3. Whatever their experience of this system was, they had little desire to return to it, and pressed very strongly for task emphasis to be embodied in the Command structure rather than regional emphasis, or even a combination of both of these.¹

At this point in time the Navy was very much the silent Service: a maritime command with or without other Service elements would obviously persist, and there was little that they could usefully add to the chorus of debate at CFHQ. The major issue for the Navy was whether the East and West coast naval establishments would be formed as separate commands or as one command with a major subsidiary. A minor issue was the future role of the Air Force in assisting the Navy in its anti-submarine warfare role. But these were not matters of principle: merely aspects of organization to be clarified at the appropriate time.²

It is clear that there was a major divergence of views, which seemed to coincide with Service lines, about the field force structure. As a general point, the notion of task and the notion of region were seen as being opposed: the former was 'functional', the latter was not, and in fact was represented as a degradation of the 'functional approach'. Much of this can be accounted for by the different role of the Army and Air Force.

The Army was engaged, to a far greater extent than might have been recognized in the other Services, in tasks that essentially reflected regional responsibilities. The six major Army commands, dispersed across the country, effectively 'masked' the realization of this by the

1. Interviews

2. Interviews.

other Services. Most aid to the civilpowers consists of providing troops for a variety of purposes, providing construction engineering troops and materiel, and representational functions. It had become accepted practice for the Army to be the major (indeed almost the sole) provider of such services to the community. The Air Force and Navy, because of this knew very little about such matters, and tended to downgrade their importance.

Another distinction between the Services that had considerable impact at the regional level was the difference in the number of reserves (militia) attached to each Service, the way they were trained, and the role envisaged for them in case of war. As these matters will be covered in greater detail in the next chapter, it suffices for our purposes here to point out that the role of managing the reserves was also one which differentiated the Services.

For both these reasons it was only natural that differences of views should be strong. Considerable attempts were made to integrate these viewpoints at the highest levels prior to a proposal going to the Minister. During December, 1964 the CDS considered three alternative organizations.¹

The first was the purely functional organization: five Commands - Mobile, Home Defence, Maritime, Personnel and Training, and Technical Services. The major advantages of this organization were that it produced clear cut areas of responsibility, gave ample scope for delegation of authority, and was economical. Its major disadvantage - recognized at the time - was that it did not cater to a number of national regional responsibilities to the degree that it should.

1. The following account is based on interviews.

The solution to this latter problem lay in the opposite approach, organization on a regional basis. Canada was to be divided into five regions, with regional commanders responsible for all defence-of-Canada tasks. It was noted that this was the "administration-oriented rather than mission oriented approach". Its two main disadvantages lay in that such an organization required a very complex command and control system, and that it was difficult to give any one commander full responsibility for a function or to hold him singularly accountable for his mission.

A compromise proposal was one which incorporated both regional and functional elements so that, as well as Commands, the country would be divided into seven regions which would cater to the requirements of aid to the civil powers, provincial representation and reserve activities. A variation of this approach, generally agreed upon, and presented to the Minister late in December 1964, is depicted below.

CHART 3 - COMMAND/ORGANIZATION PROPOSED TO MINISTER DECEMBER 1964

At a Defence Council Meeting in January, 1965, the Minister made a counterproposal which, while not firm, indicated the directions in which further consideration and studies should be made.

CHART 4 - MINISTER'S COMMAND PROPOSAL - JANUARY 1965

The major distinctions between these two organizations are of considerable interest.¹ In time of peace and given the ministerial, and hence parliamentary control of all defence matters, Canadian forces stationed overseas would be directly responsive to the Headquarters and not to a subsidiary commander. Hence the two force components in Europe were moved up to report directly to CFHQ. By a similar process of reasoning all aspects of personnel management would remain at the headquarters. Materiel Command should be an entity controlled from and preferably with its headquarters at CFHQ.²

-
1. Mr. Hellyer made his points very fully and clearly at a Defence Council meeting.
 2. Mr. Hellyer preferred Materiel to Logistics or Supply Command.

The Defence University concept was postponed pending a trial run for the new concept embodied in Training Command and until an appropriate division of responsibilities as between CFHQ and Training Command could be settled in practice. The concept of a Home Defence Command running parallel with Mobile Command was dropped in favour of a single, integrated Mobile Command.¹ The issue of regional versus task emphasis as formed by the Air Force was resolved by assigning task priorities to the Commands, and by deciding to co-ordinate and control the Reserves at CFHQ.

Thus in one fell swoop a number of issues were simultaneously settled by the Minister - at least for a while - and work began on re-casting the Command structure in line with the Minister's directions. By the end of March, 1965 the special study groups formed to examine each of the elements of the Minister's plan had reported, and final decisions were issued separately during April and May that year. The outcome of these decisions was as follows:

Maritime Command - although the question of the relationship between the East and West coast elements was not settled, this should be studied in detail after the Command was set up with its Headquarters in Halifax.

Air Transport Command - was basically the same as the Air Force Command of that name, and was to continue.

-
1. Of a number of very good reasons for this the two outstanding ones were that it would generally have blurred the lines of command and control to have two such organizations, and in particular it was decided to concentrate the Army formations under a single commander both for strategic and for economic reasons.

Air Defence Command - was again a previous Air Force Command, and its continuation was approved. However as it was closely integrated into the NORAD organization the feasibility of relocating the Command HQ with the Northern NORAD Region HQ was to be examined (a move both strategically logical, and likely to generate economics).

1 Air Division and 4 CIBG - were to continue to report directly to CFHQ.

Mobile Command - comprising three brigades in Canada and the tactical Air Forces was agreed.

Materiel Command - was agreed initially. A number of outstanding issues remained to be resolved.

Training Command - was agreed in concept and would be set up.

Early in July 1965 the Commanders designate were appointed and authorized to start planning for establishing the new Commands. At the same time a Central Integration Planning Group (CIPG) was formed to staff the organizational model of the Headquarters and the new Commands: that is to ensure that both CFHQ and the Commands devised structures appropriate to all facets of the new organization.¹

The formation of the Commands in July, 1965, merely marked the beginning of a long campaign whereby the Commanders, in consultation

1. Although the new look CFHQ was created in August, 1964, it was still very much of an empty shell. The idea was that the Command and HQ structures would fill out in harmony to each other.

with the Branch Chiefs and CDS, organized the very complex details of the changeovers from Service Commands (of which there were eleven) to the six functional commands. As with the organization of the Headquarters two aspects of reorganization had to be dealt with simultaneously. On the one hand existing bases and commands marked for extinction had to be closed down and their functions handed over in an orderly manner. On the other hand there was the task of integrating the new Commands by ingesting all sorts of newcomers, not merely at the physical but also at the conceptual level.

Air Transport and Maritime Commands were virtually continuations of the previous Service Commands except that the Pacific maritime base came under the direction of the Commander at Halifax, N.S.¹ Some greater degree of integration of the naval and air elements of MARCOM was also undertaken during this period.

The organization and primary tasks of Air Defence Command go back to the formation in 1957 of an integrated North American Air Defence Command, including both Canadian and U.S. elements.² By 1958 the SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment) reporting, detection and communications complex was operational. In 1963 the hardened SAGE complex at North Bay, Ontario became operational and the Northern NORAD region established its headquarters there under joint US-Canadian command. It was decided, in 1965, to move the headquarters of AIRDEFCOM from St. Hubert, Quebec to North Bay, and to "two-hat" the Commander. Thus some

1. In June, 1966, all Commanders presented what were virtually progress reports to the SC. The following account is mainly taken from that source.

2. Huntington The Common Defence pp 326-341.

economics of co-location have been realized, but no very great economics were possible organizationally. This is because the NORAD organization of which Canada is a part is largely manned by technicians, whereas AIRDEFCOM's other role is to provide aircrew, planes and maintenance facilities to intercept manned bombers. These two rather distinct, although very closely related, roles continue.¹

Mobile Command, under the energetic direction of the former COpR, Allard, was to be Canada's largest Command, comprising the bulk of the operational land forces, together with an operational air element. The main new task for MOBCOM was to design the operational plans for an augmented, single, fighting force; to plan for combat support operations, and to work out details of integrating into the new supply system being devised at CFHQ.²

Even though it was physically taking over the physical plant and resources of what was previously Air Training Command, the new Training Command was one of the novel concepts that arose out of the organizational decisions made at DND Headquarters early in 1965. The major task of TRAINCOM was to develop and implement training courses for these trades and skills that were common to all elements. This involved considerable research, discussion and negotiation with CFHQ and other commands. The senior staff at TRAINCOM became pioneers in, and avid users of the new planning techniques exemplified by PERT and critical path analysis, not only to plan training programs but also to manage the numerous establishments spread over Canada.³

1. S.C. Evidence 28 June, 1966, pp 269-292.

2. S.C. Evidence 21 June, 1966, pp 161-172.

3. S.C. Evidence 17 June, 1966, pp 239-256.

Materiel Command was the other major expression of the concept of integration. Formed with its Headquarters in close proximity to CFHQ, and very much under the direction of the Chief of Logistics and Engineering, the task of Materiel Command was literally immense. As well as providing the necessary supply and maintenance services to the other Commands when and where they need such services, MATCOM was charged with the development of a single, integrated logistics system. As each of the Services, in the past, had operated under vastly different systems, different both in the nature and control of inventory and supply systems, the task of MATCOM was to completely revise and update the supply system of the Canadian Armed Forces. Extensive use would be made of computers, and of operational research techniques. Also evident was the need for existing supply staff from the three Services to learn a common supply language and, equally important, to discard their old ways of doing things.¹

Some analysts of this phase have compared the new Command organization with the old, and devised a score which purports to show that the Army "lost out" while the Navy fared no better or worse than before, and the Air Force won hands down as a result of this reorganization. The basis for this is hard to justify on grounds other than changes in the rank structure of the Services. A more reasonable conclusion is that the Navy and Air Force, being already functionally organized, did not much alter their command structure. The Army command structure was in many ways improved from a command and control point of view by the centralization of all units under a single commander. If anything, such a change could work towards enhancing the prestige of

1. S.C. Evidence 9 June, 1966, pp 161-172.

Mobile Command as the area from which the exciting tasks spelled out in the White Paper would be coming. From this point of view nobody lost out in the reorganization.

In all these developments the Controller-General's Branch played a major - indeed a vital - role. It will be recalled from the previous Chapter that at this time there was no VCDS Branch as such, but that the functions of planning, programming and operations management were divided. The important task of organizational midwifery was to a great extent undertaken in the CG Branch. To this end a publication entitled "Canadian Forces Command Structure: Organization Concept" was prepared. This basic document was, in the years to come, to go through a number of revisions as details and structures changed,¹ but the concepts remained basically unchanged. As they express the principles of organization and operation of the Commands and CFHQ, they form an apt conclusion to this section.

- "a. The organization must effectively and efficiently achieve the objectives of Canadian defence policy.
- b. Authority and responsibility for operating management will be delegated to the field commands.
- c. The formal organization should clearly indicate the specific function of each element, the relative authority and responsibility, and the relationship of individual elements to one another and to the organization as a whole.
- d. To the maximum extent possible the organization should be simple in design and consistent in pattern. It should also be sufficiently stable to cater to the current needs of the forces but flexible enough to accommodate changes necessitated by a dynamic international situation, technological advancements, or improvements in management concepts and techniques.

-
- 1. 1st Edition June 1965
 - Revised November 1965
 - 2nd Edition May 1966
 - Revised June 1966
 - 3rd Edition September, 1967.

- e. Unity of command must be preserved.
- f. The span of control should not exceed that which can be effectively coordinated and directed.
- g. Clear channels of communication must be provided in the formal organization to facilitate the rapid and effective flow of information.
- h. Related operating functions should be grouped and assigned to a single segment of the organization.
- j. The organization must provide responsible commanders at all levels with an effective control system and streamlined procedures for decision-making.
- k. The system should require a minimum of overhead but should provide suitable management incentive and career opportunities.
- l. The transition to the new organization should cause a minimum¹ of disruption to the operational forces."

The Issues of Unification

The broad timetable of the government at this stage was that the integration of what were formerly Service tasks should be completed by the new commands by 1967, when the final step, the abolition of the Services and the creation of a unified armed service would be taken. This target was reached, but only after a very bitter campaign had been launched against it, which itself provoked a lengthy debate in the Commons, and a long and detailed examination of the whole issue in the Committee on National Defence.

1. Canadian Forces Command Structure: Organization Concept, June 1965. Quotation by permission of DND.

First of all, considering the amount of discussion and acrimony this subject can raise, it is important to define unification as it was intended for Canada. It will be recalled that the earlier Bill C90 that integrated the Services eliminated the Chiefs of Staff of the Services and the Chairman, COSC. In the place of these four positions was created a single Chief of the Defence Staff. The rapid development of the CFHQ resulted in a number of functional Chiefs being created under the CDS. In effect this left the Services without a head, and in fact the Service Headquarters organizations waned as the new-look CFHQ organization grew. Much the same process then occurred, with functional Commands being established in 1965 and gradually taking over functions and physical resources, including personnel, of the Service Commands. All of this - which was described as integration - occurred without any unification legislation having to be passed in the Commons.

The purpose of the unification legislation which was passed in 1967 was two-fold. All it did in effect was to establish a uniform personnel list, by placing all members of the forces in the new Canadian Forces organization, and abolishing the three previous Services which, by this stage had more of a conceptual than an actual existence. The second purpose of the unification legislation was to give de jure recognition to a de facto situation which, organizationally, was already in being.¹

1. It has been suggested by some observers of the Canadian defence scene that the 1967 unification was in the nature of an afterthought. This view has it that Hellyer, having got rid of the Service Chiefs and established a single chain of command expected the Services to 'fall into line'. Disappointed by progress to 1966 he then sought unification legislation to establish the commonality of personnel functions which he was seeking. Research and interviews with the immediate participants of the events of 1966-67 disproves this view on two counts. The first is the intention expressed in the White Paper and in the Minister's letter of 2nd April 1965 to unify the Services. The second is the denial of the above analysis by those without any axe to grind one way or the other.

Opposition to this final step was expressed by numerous persons, within and outside the Service, during 1966 and 1967. They fell into two camps: outright opposition to unification, and those who wished to see unification delayed for a number of years, while the new organization bedded down. It is probably more correct to count these latter persons not as oppositionists but as something less than clear opponents. However, as their views clashed with that of Mr. Hellyer and the departmental spokesman, their evidence had the effect of bolstering the case of the oppositionists. The evidence and the views of both these groups of persons is of particular interest as a critique of developments to date, and an analysis of this forms the rest of this Chapter.

Those who opposed the unification of the forces did so for one main reason: to protect the existence of the Army, Air Force and Navy.¹ Their argument had two main branches. On the one hand some argued from a tactical/strategic viewpoint; and on the other the argument was based on traditionalism.

The tactical/strategic argument had various components. The first of these was that the Services had distinct and separate primary roles - maritime anti-submarine warfare, air defence against manned bombers, the provision of troops for NATO and UN tasks - and that nothing would be gained from merging the Services. On the contrary, to do so would degrade their capability because these tasks were performed in different ways, best understood in each Service. To unify these would merely create an inefficient Tower of Babel at the Headquarters, and greatly weaken the Commands.

1. Of course, some who did so were also seeking to protect their own careers, but this was taken for granted by both sides to the discussion.

There are good grounds for this 'separate and distinct' viewpoint. In particular the operational role of each Service does differ greatly in its basics. A navy is organized so that a large body of men, under very senior command take to the sea for extended periods of time. Capacity and operational importance grow with age to a greater degree in the navy than in the other Services. All fighting decisions are made by the person in charge of the vessel, not by other members of the crew.

By contrast, the air force system is different in almost every respect. An air operation seldom lasts more than a few hours - the distance it takes to fly to the target and return. Fighting decisions are made by junior officers, very often independently - the target of opportunity concept. Only up to the middle range of rank structure is the direct control of air fighting found. In fact one can say that, comparing ranks in the air force and the navy, a naval officer only assumes direct control of a battle at a rank at which an air officer is largely desk bound, with his fighting days behind him as regards direct participation.

As regards direct participation in battles the army is different from both the navy and the air force in that all ranks participate to a greater degree, and with almost as much discretion as in the air force battle concept. But an even greater difference between the army and the other Services is that to a much greater extent an army field officer has to be a manager - of supplies, logistic forces, over prisoners of war and foreign territory. The scale of a land battle generally far exceeds, in numbers directly involved, that of air or naval encounters.

It is these tactical facts - according to this viewpoint - that form the basis for the differences that are found between the Services. The environment is different, this causes differences both in technique and tactics, because of which training and organization are different. To disregard these 'facts' is to take a grave risk with the efficiency of Canada's armed forces. The argument was clear, not too hard to understand, and almost irresistably attractive to presently serving and ex-members of the forces who 'knew' that the Services were innately different. It was also slightly beside the point, although the senior departmental management was at fault in not making this irrelevancy clear at the outset.

The aim of unification was not to do away with these facts of operational organization, but to organize the forces so that they could come under unitary control. In particular, on the planning side, a means was sought to do away with the older concept of a distinctive Service role, and rather to review the trade-off between means and ends so as to provide a sounder basis for decision making.¹ It was for this reason that the Services had to go; to destroy the fortresses of unique Service roles, but not those roles themselves. Hence arose all the uninformed talk of doing away with regiments and squadrons and destroying the very fibre of the fighting components of the Services. To a large extent this was nonsense, but the point is that this was not made clear at the time.

1. Canada was keenly interested in Macnamara's new-look management at the Pentagon, and Alain Enthoven visited DND to explain some of its details.

Only in part was this the fault of Hellyer and his immediate supporters, who were not always very clear on the details of organization. But to a greater extent this was because, of those officers who should have been doing the detailed staff work on such matters in order to come up with answers to such fundamental questions, many were themselves opposed to unification and were either actively or passively undermining the planning process, mainly by delay.¹ At this stage the effect of delay was to raise fears, to start rumours and to lower the morale of the junior officers and other ranks who had no authoritative source of information.

The traditionalists were, in one of their arguments very close to the strategic/tactical viewpoint. Their complaint was that unification, by doing away with the Services as entities would complicate allied participation in a number of ways. There was no guarantee that the occupant of a particular position in the integrated Headquarters would have any detailed familiarity with a particular Service function. Yet, by virtue of his position he would be logical choice to attend international conferences on military affairs, at which agreements and undertakings - very often of a considerably technical nature - would be made. Even the counter argument: that this indicated the need for good staff work in the Headquarters which would have to be forthcoming if unification was to succeed, did not satisfy them. The point that was being made was that the members of such conferences all had a common Service background. The Canadian hybrid who would turn up at one of these would not only be out of his depth, but would be treated as an outsider.

1. Interviews. Some more specific details are given later in this Chapter.

This was one of those prima facie arguments to which the only adequate reply at the time could be, let us wait and see what actually happens. This was, after all, merely a point of detail which, while important, was not an overwhelming one.¹ But this argument - that Canada would lose face with its allies - was strongly harped upon as the reason for retaining the Services.

There were also personal rather than organizational reasons for the traditionalists to oppose the extinction of the Services. Leading this vanguard was the Navy. Its senior spokesmen pointed out that international naval association was an established fact, and loudly bemoaned the loss of their identity and uniforms which, so it was said, would make them a laughing stock and virtual pariahs in naval circles. Great naval traditions were to be lost if the Royal Canadian Navy were to disappear. In this particular case certain facts came to light which indicated that this was only the viewpoint of a very small minority of serving naval personnel.²

Most senior naval officers had served with the Royal Navy in World War II, been trained with it, and were strongly tied to the RN by uniform, military decorations and fond memories of fighting days when brotherhood was strong and the British connection was even stronger.³ Hence this component was violently opposed to anything which would sever these connections. Among the younger officers and in the other ranks

-
1. Many positions would continue to be 'starred' for particular types of background, which were noted by those in charge of establishment control.
 2. The following account is based on interviews.
 3. Of the three Services the RCN was the most British oriented, not merely by custom, but also in makeup. See HC 17 October 1966, p. 8715 ff, 18 October 1966, p. 8779, 8786 ff.

the attitude was diametrically opposite. The problem of the Canadian sailor was that, on leave in another country he would "invariably be taken for a limey" and, to defend his identity would often have to resort to his fists. The view of the average Canadian sailor was that the new uniform was excellent, and uniform issues to the Navy were quickly snapped up, much to the chagrin of those who had opposed such a move.¹

A much larger issue was at stake than was appreciated by the Navy. Many of Canada's peace-keeping operations placed its armed forces in former British colonies, and this formerly close association was an occasional embarrassment. One of the reasons why Mr. Pearson was a supporter of unification was probably because it represented an

"... attempt to dissociate modern Canada from the policies, and even the symbols, of imperialism. The Prime Minister is said to have been shocked when he discovered that a Canadian peace-keeping unit, operating under the United Nations, was not welcome in the Sinai peninsula - Gaza Strip area after the Suez crisis of 1956 because its uniforms, customs and designations too closely resembled those of the British."²

For this much more important reason, the complaints of the Navy and other pressure group organizations, some such as the Tri Services Identity Organization (TRIO) set up especially to oppose unification,³

1. This is another instance of the general problem of representativeness, which has been examined considerable practical and theoretical detail by Harry H. Eckstein. See in particular his "The Politics of the British Medical Association" Pol. Q Vol. XXVI No. 4, Oct - Dec 1955, 345-359.
2. New York Times 20th February, 1967. Canada is one of the few countries which, at one stage took seriously the task of training its forces for peacekeeping. Tackaberry "Organizing and Training Peace-Keeping Forces: the Canadian View".
3. SC Evidence 10th February 1967 and 13th February, 1967. Four organizations, with very much of an interlocking directorship gave evidence. These organizations, like the Navy, also had their problems with representativeness - a point which was not overlooked by the SC. Hilborn Evidence 10 February 1967, p. 750.

were not likely to be well received in the highest quarters which viewed the reorganization of the forces as

"a scrapping of the past, complicated by the attempt of a former British Dominion, bilingual in language and divided in loyalties, to become a unified nation. The division in Canada between an old and dwindling but vocal group that still sees the British crown as the symbol of its fealty; the French-Canadians, with their divided loyalties and their tendency towards separatism, and the believers in the "Maple Leaf Forever" is reflected in the Canadian armed services."¹

The insularity of the naval viewpoint was not matched by the other Services to anything like the same degree. The Air Force was primarily associated with the USAF, but also had links with the US Army Air Defence Command. In any case the USAF used army ranks and wore a lot of khaki, so the transition was, if anything, beneficial. There was considerable Army opposition to the loss of distinctive uniforms, historical regiments and suchlike. But when it became clear that no such changes were in fact contemplated, peace was gradually restored and attention turned to other matters.²

The three main arguments of those who flatly opposed unification were only very marginally considered to be of significance by the senior departmental management. For one thing it was too easy to ascribe much of this opposition to the personalities involved, or to a combination of personality and Service interest. More serious, and more to the point

1. New York Times 20th February 1967. This analysis is by Hanson Baldwin.

2. One indicator of the difference between the Army and the Navy is that the crack regiment of the Army is the Van Doos - a corruption of Vignt Deuxieme - with long and worthy French-Canadian associations.

was the argument of those who, while declaring themselves not opposed to unification, wanted to delay the target date.

The first thing to note about proponents of this view was that, without exception, they were the senior officers, many of them with 'staff' rather than 'line' backgrounds, with the experience of integrating the headquarters.¹ To Moncel, when he was VCDS

"... it was abundantly clear to me that we were going to force (sic) ahead with this process of unification which, to me, appeared to be moving on an uncharted course at a very, very high speed towards a very, very dim destination, and I did not think that I could produce the staff work necessary at that speed to keep the thing on the rails."²

Lt-General Fleury, giving evidence to the Defence Committee two days afterwards pointed out that when he was still CG in June 1966 he had told them

"... it would take in the order of three to five years to shake down Materiel Command into an integrated posture. ... If anything, that is conservative.

I am also on record as saying a year ago this month that at that point in time the comptroller general had not less than two years' hard work before him just to deal with the backlog of problems which then existed as a result of integration....

... anything less than three years (from now) would in my view be indecent haste, and it may take 10 years or 15 or 20 years..."³

-
1. Moncel, Fleury and Miller were the ones who appeared before the SC in this role, but there were also many others.
 2. SC Evidence 20 February, 1967, p. 1304.
 3. SC Evidence, 22 February, 1967, p. 1511.

Air Chief Marshal Miller, former DM, CAS and CDS opined that the Department should

"... get the integration process further along the road before we rock the boat."¹

Even General Foulkes, doyen of the integration school, and one of the most impressive and clear-sighted military leaders that Canada has had expressed his doubts to the Committee on the timing of unification, by which he meant not so much the absolute need for delay as the absence of a firm plan and - its concomitant - the morale and communications problems this was causing:

"I was told that there was no blueprint, there was no phased plan, and that the details would be hammered out as they arose. It appeared to me that with such a complex problem, affecting the future of a lot of Canadians, more suitable implements would have been a sharp pencil and a big, big, big eraser. Mistakes made with a hammer are quite permanent, and they can sometimes, be quite painful."²

In summary the, those who sought delay did so on the two grounds that it was necessary to pause and assimilate the major changes of the first three years, and that in any case organizational change should await the production of a firm and agreed plan, the details of which, being known to everybody, would allay their unconfirmed fears.

Although the push forward to unification had been settled by the government on February, 1967 when the Second Reading on Bill C243 was passed on division, discussion on this topic had been going on for

-
1. SC Evidence, 20 March, 1967, p. 2297. Miller's evidence, which puts the Department in a rather bad light, occasionally conflicts with evidence of the same events given by others.
 2. SC Evidence, 16th February, 1967, p. 1216. After his retirement Gen. Foulkes, until his death, occupied the Chair of Strategic Studies at Carleton. He was closely involved in many of the previous integration attempts and, in 1961 prepared a detailed unification plan in a paper which was never made public. SC Evidence pp 1215-1216. In his latter capacity he may well have been one of the influences behind the Hellyer scheme - Interviews. The Foulkes papers are now in private hands, and I was not able to definitely establish this point.

eight months, and was to continue for at least a month afterwards. The beginning of this stage can be dated quite firmly as coinciding with the date on which the 'retirements' of the CDS, VCDS, CP and CG - all on the same day - were announced.¹ Very shortly thereafter the news of Admiral Landymore's dismissal - the beginnings of a long cause célèbre, and one that epitomized much of the worst aspects of the debate on both sides - made headlines across the country.² At the time Parliament was in recess, and it was not till the 6th September that it resumed. Immediately the demand was made for the Defence Committee to be reconvened so that the allegations of Landymore and Brock could be probed. Over the next two days the Government temporized, by which time Parliament recessed again till October 5th.³

For the first few days after resumption nothing happened. The storm burst on October 12th, when the first of a number of privilege motions was raised,⁴ and almost every sitting thereafter raised some aspect of defence organization. The Interim Supply Bill, on which debate began on 31st October was taken up almost entirely with the unification issue and continued through to 15th November. On 4th November Bill C243 had its first reading, but even this, with the promise of a full-scale debate not far away, could not stem the flow of criticism.

1. Ottawa Citizen 15 July 1966.

2. Ottawa Journal 19 July 1966, and most other newspapers 19-26 July.

3. HC 1966/67 pp 8058 ff, 8125-8126 and 8132 ff.

4. HC 1966/67 pp 8553-8558. This was the motion that accused the government of tampering with Landymore's Evidence to the SC on 23 June 1966. This was not resolved till 28 February 1967 when Hellyer and Landymore finally settled the matter before the SC.

One reason for this criticism was that, having given the unification bill first reading, the government refused to let it be referred to the Defence Committee until it had passed the second reading stage. This was rightly deplored by the Opposition, who saw in such a move an attempt to neutralize the Committee. The real reason of course was that, although the Committee was relatively tame, or had been so in the past, there was a large number of opponents to unification, and they would undoubtedly make themselves heard. Hellyer was forced to argue that the bill could still be negatived at the Third Reading, and on this shaky constitutional point the matter proceeded as planned by the government. It was thus not until the 7th December, when Hellyer gave his long Second Reading speech¹ - almost five months after public debate had begun - that any definite information on the government's intention was available.

It is unlikely that Hellyer had a detailed plan much before this. It must be remembered that only a few months earlier all five of the CFHQ Chiefs, as well as both Maritime Commanders had resigned, retired or been fired.² In the absence of any firm plan the government's role during most of the latter half of 1966 consisted merely of denying the more untenable assumptions of its critics, yet not coming up with any definite blueprint. In this it made a rod for its own back by confirming the worst fears of its critics - that although it may have known where it was going, it was not quite sure how it was to get there.

-
1. Reprinted in booklet form, and with pictures and charts and tables, it is 47 pages long.
 2. The fifth was Air Marshal Annis, CTS, who retired at the compulsory retiring age.

Conclusion

The link between the formation of the Commands and the issues of unification was that they were both undertakings to which Hellyer committed himself without a clear plan. On the whole the Command formation effort was successful. This was largely because the only major change was to amalgamate the Army regional Commands into one large Mobile Command, with tactical air support elements. The other changes were, to a large degree, paper exercises which, while they would accomplish integration would need a considerable time to become fully efficient.¹ This part of the operation flowed relatively smoothly.

Not so smooth was the passage of the unification bill. There the absence of a plan was seized on by the opponents of, and those who sought to delay, unification. The timetable for this was extremely tight and, what is more important, was much more compressed than was apparently accepted by many in the Headquarters.² Many who could not cope with the direction or the pace of change left the armed forces. A new generation of general officers, much younger and more deeply committed to unification than were those who left, took over the reins of the Department. Unification - the creation of a single defence force - had been rammed through the Services and the Commands. How it would develop, with this apparently unfavourable beginning, and the impact it would have on the organization of the Canadian Forces was, at that stage, hard to predict.

-
1. Landymore (15/16 February, 1967), Annis (21 February, 1967) and Fleury (22/23 February), gave specific incidents and criticisms when they appeared before the SC, and none of it was strongly rebutted.
 2. One of the main reasons for this only became clear later. A shrewd guess was made that Pearson would retire late in 1967 or in 1968. Hellyer wanted to conclude his mission at DND and move on to a portfolio which would give him a broader electorate so as to place him in a more favourable political position for the leadership contest. Late in 1967 he in fact moved on to become Minister of Transport - Interviews.

The moral of this story would appear to be that organizational changes, however great and far-reaching can more easily be brought about than changes which affect people's identity and self-concept. However this cannot be pushed too far. In retrospect much of what happened seems to have been inevitable. It is not easy to ask men to preside over the dissolution of a Service with which most have been associated for over thirty years. It has even been suggested that, notwithstanding the managerial benefits to be gained by retaining the Service Chiefs for a longer period, that is during the integration phase, Hellyer was morally bound not to place them in a situation as described above.

Above all, the greatest problem of this time - and this has been agreed by everybody - was communication. The main reason for poor communications appears to have been that, because everybody was simultaneously involved in numerous changes (it was only at this stage that the lower establishment of the Headquarters and some Commands was being filled), because everybody was very busy, there appeared to be no one person or group of persons who, in full command of the situation, could speak authoritatively for the forces and get their attention. For a short while the hierarchy was broken down, and that is why communications went awry.

"We trained very hard ... but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams, we would be reorganized.

I was to learn late in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralization."¹

On many files of those days is the above quotation found. The battle of unification had been a long one, and produced many casualties. By April, 1967, it was over. It was time to take stock, and to return from the consideration of personal issues to the problems of organization.

1. Petronius Arbiter, 210 BC

CHAPTER 5 - DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1967

Introduction

On 1st February, 1968, the unification of the Canadian Forces officially came into effect. This is the point at which other accounts of the Canadian Forces organization cease.¹ Since that time, however, there have been a number of significant changes and, although they have occurred too recently for any final evaluation to be made of them - many are in an incomplete stage now - some description of the trend of events is useful in rounding off this examination.

Before 1968 the trend of unification, as far as the field organization was concerned, was to concentrate very heavily on functionalism as the single target for achievement. Events after 1968; both the experience that was being gained within the Department, and the external political changes that were shortly to be announced, combined to alter this as the sole organizational aim. Within CFHQ a different story was being played out. A third round of organizational change, coinciding with the wholesale change of senior personnel in early 1969, has operated so as to alter radically the earlier doctrines that were developed in the Headquarters.

The overall effect of these recent developments seems to have restored a middle ground of organizational thinking that had been notably absent during the 1964-1967 period, and the aim of this chapter is to illustrate the highlights of these changes in policy.

1. Byers; Sherman; Armed Forces Management, June 1967.

Political Changes

The year 1967 marked, politically, the changing of the old guard. Diefenbaker, the Progressive Conservative leader and former Prime Minister 1957-1963 lost the leadership of the party and later that year, Lester Pearson, the Prime Minister and leader of the Liberal Party retired. The Canadian political stage was cleared for younger actors to take the major role. The leadership of the ruling party passed into the hands of a much younger man, Pierre Elliot Trudeau, who in many ways represented a much broader constituency. An independently wealthy French Canadian, his popularity throughout anglophone and francophone Canada was confirmed in the 1968 general elections, which returned the Liberals to power very comfortably.

Coincident with the changeover at the top was a change in the subject matter of the Canadian nationalism issue. During the Pearson regime the main effect of the debate was that the old ties with Britain were loosened even further. Canada sought a distinctive identity, epitomized by the new Canadian flag, which would enable the francophones, and particularly the Quebecers to integrate more readily into the political climate of Canada. In the late 60's the issue of Canadian identity revolved around relations with the United States. The unpopularity of the US conduct of the Vietnam war - in which Canada was not directly involved; the increasing flow of migration from the US to Canada of persons seeking to escape racial, urban and other tensions; the increasing possibility that Canada might become culturally engulfed by the US; and, above all, the effects of the flow of direct US investment which threatened the little Canadian ownership that was left in primary and

secondary industry, all provided a new dimension, and gave fresh impetus to the nationalism debate. The general feeling in Canada was that on both sides of the border there was too much of a "Neighbours Taken For Granted" attitude.¹

Most aspects of this debate became issues in the 1968 election campaign, during which Trudeau promised a foreign policy review. In April 1969 the first result of this review came to light as a new emphasis in Canadian foreign policy - sovereignty. Noting that one sixth of the national budget is spent on defence, Trudeau specifically tasked DND with the military and internal security component of this policy,² which was later expanded and explained more clearly in a foreign policy white paper.³

Within DND the effect of this foreign policy review was to confirm the trends that, as early as 1966 had been developing within the department. The announcement of the new military priorities provided the justification for giving formal expression to changes that had, in fact been worked out in detail by 1968, but had then to await the outcome of the foreign policy review.

-
1. L.M. Merchant, Neighbours Taken For Granted: Canada and the United States Praeger, 1966, coined the phrase that has become synonymous with this debate.
 2. External Affairs Vol XXVI No. 6, June 1969, pp 249-256. The Winter 1970/71 issue of the Canadian International Journal was devoted to Canadian foreign policy. The articles in that issue by Hyndman, Lyon, Cohen and Legault cover the main changes in foreign policy.
 3. Foreign Policy For Canadians.

Significant organizational changes were made to the field force organization. These in turn acted consequentially on some aspects of the CFHQ organization. But by far, most of the CFHQ changes were independent of the field force changes, despite their occurring over approximately the same period. As the changes in the field force organization have substantially been completed, these will be described first.

Field Force Changes

The major changes which have been made in the field force organization can largely be ascribed to two factors: the impact of regionalism, and what I would call the resurgence of environmental identity.

Very early in 1965, when the secondary aspects of the Headquarters organizations were being considered, with some account also being taken of the future command organization, it was decided that regional matters would be handled by the Headquarters. This was presumably because, intended to be "functional" in role, the Commands would not be tasked with regional responsibility. Thus when the new Commands were formed in late 1965 various regional Chiefs were appointed in the Headquarters, and they assumed command and control responsibility. In the VCDS Branch this led to the appointment of a Deputy Chief of Reserves who became the person in charge of the reserves and the survival and civil defence organizations that were under the control of DND. For these purposes Canada was divided into twelve military district, and a District Commander, usually at Colonel level was appointed to the district. A similar arrangement was made in respect of the Canadian Forces Communications System (CFCS) which in effect became a separate functional command directly responsible to the headquarters.

By late 1966 and during all of 1967 the DCRes organization was subject to careful scrutiny, most of it in the light of various difficulties that had arisen. The first difficulty arose from the assumption that the reserves were all similar, could be handled independently of their environmental origin, and could be organized and administered separately from the operational Commands.¹

In fact the three reserve organizations, the Air Auxiliaries, the Naval Reserves and the Militia had different roles at this period. The former were originally organized into eleven Squadrons under the control of AIRTRANSCOM. In 1962/63 they were reduced to five squadrons, with a strength of about 1000. Their main function was flying, both propellor and jet aircraft. Their task was twofold: to assist in air search and rescue operations (in which they often had a primary role), and to provide a limited communications transport facility. In both these roles the main area of operations tended to be Western Canada with its vast and open spaces, and settlements of comparative isolation.

The Naval Reserves numbered about 2900, and operated mainly in and around the shore bases of MARCOM. They were organized to perform two main tasks: to assist in a convoy and merchant shipping reporting system (a kind of coast-watching activity ideally suited for yachtsmen), and to provide a mixture of trades to bring ships and units up to the required strength of war establishments. The 27,000 strong Militia had been organized around the Army Commands, and had four tasks: to provide trained individuals for augmentation and reinforcement of the Regular Force; to provide trades-trained sub-units to support the field force; to

1. The following account is drawn from interviews.

provide trained personnel for augmentation of the civil defence emergency operations organization; and finally as an expansion base for times of national emergency.

Despite these important, basic differences in the tasks, organization and operation of the reserves, by the end of 1966 they were largely under the control of DCRes, operating through his twelve military districts.¹ Although the DCRes and the District HQ organizations had command and control over the reserves and survival organization, they did not have direct control over all the resources required under all conditions, such as equipment, transport and facilities for summer training, or for large-scale emergency operations. For these the proximate functional Commanders were made responsible, often with little notice and, more often than not in situations which degraded their capacity for their primary role. As well, this removal of the reserves from elemental to Headquarters control was considered likely, in the long run, to degrade the Reserves' capacity in terms of environmental training.²

A third factor which led to the eventual changes in this mode of organization was human nature. The changes which had occurred in Canada's military organization were difficult enough to understand within DND: outside it there was almost complete ignorance. When a local

-
1. This is definitely true of the Militia, who became dispossessed as a result of the consolidation of the 6 Army regional Commands into MOBCOM. Whether in fact it is true also of the Naval Reserves and the Air Auxiliaries is not clear. Many of these changes were really paper exercises, particularly where major physical resource changes were not made.
 2. This point is explained in greater detail in the following part of this section.

authority wanted military representation, or a band at a civic function; when it wanted assistance in fighting a forest fire or in some other calamity, it had been used for years to speaking with a General, or an Admiral or someone of this rank. DND may have decided to make a Colonel the person in charge of such tasks in future, but the civil authorities would persist in addressing their requests in the first instance to the nearest functional Commander. He would have to declaim responsibility and pass the matter on to the District Commander (often co-located in the same headquarters area). Where the District Commander did not have the delegation he would have to ask DCRes. DCRes would decide and assign the responsibility for a task to the District Commander, simultaneously tasking the functional Commander with the provision of resources outside the capacity of the District Commander.

By the end of 1968 most persons involved had come to accept that this was a terrible system - unwieldly, duplicative, confused and disliked. If it operated at all, it was as a result of personal negotiations, which is scarcely a commendation of the organizational concept involved. Outside the DCRes organization there was a whole plethora of CFHQ organizations, many of which were running into the same kind of difficulties.¹ It was informally calculated that a reorganization that would devolve these to the functional Commands would reduce the welter of Command/CFHQ/Regional messages by over 50%, reduce the lines of control to a more rationale one, and greatly reduce costs.

1. These were mainly controlled by the CTS.

It was the cost factor which gave the penultimate impetus to the major change from functional to functional/regional Commands. A series of imposed staff cutbacks could be achieved only by reducing the CFHQ operators of such regional organizations, and by merging the headquarters of the regional and functional organizations into one, which hopefully would lead to a second round of economies. The decision to do so was made in late 1968. The process was delayed because by then the foreign policy review was underway, and DND awaited the outcome of this to ensure that any changes it was contemplating would be in harmony with Canadian foreign policy generally.

The priorities that were announced on 3rd April, 1969 by the Prime Minister were as follows:

- "a. The surveillance of Canadian territory and coast lines i.e. the protection of Canadian sovereignty.
- b. The defence of North America in cooperation with United States forces.
- c. The fulfilment of such NATO commitments as may be agreed upon.
- d. The performance of such international peacekeeping roles as Canada may, from time to time, assume."

The sovereignty priority fitted in conveniently with the kind of thinking that had been going on within DND prior to this announcement, and in August 1969 the implementation of the new functional/regional organization for the Canadian Forces was commenced. By the end of February, 1970 the major changes had been made or announced.

1. Canadian Armed Forces, March 1970 mimeo, DND.

The first group of changes dealt with the organizational concept of the Canadian Forces. The forces were placed into five regions, which are indicated at Map 1. An integrated HQ within each region was to be formed from staff of the functional command, the CFHQ regional support units, and a portion of the regional reserves HQ. The commanders of the functional Commands would also henceforth become the regional commanders, that is, the senior military commander in the region.

On the reserves side, considerable economies would be effected by major consolidations and by force reductions.¹ The Naval Reserves were assigned to MARCOM with effect December, 1969; the Air Auxiliaries and a substantial component of the Militia were assigned to MOBCOM with effect from April 1970.²

Finally, a senior land environment position was authorized in each Command to provide commanders other than MOBCOM with appropriate expertise in Land Forces control with respect to provincial representation, aid of the civil power, assistance to civil authorities, and civil defence - survival operations.

Thus, finally, after five years' experience with 'functionalism', cognizance was taken both of Canada's regional needs, and of the elemental commanders' need to have under their control the conduct of all operations within their regions. As anticipated during the long formative period of

1. DND, Statement By the Hon Leo Cadieux, Minister of National Defence 19 Dec 1969 mimeo, Information Services, DND.

2. The bulk of the Militia's signal units were placed under the CFCS. Cadieux Statement.

MAP 1 - CANADIAN FORCES
REGIONAL ORGANIZATION, 1970

this evaluation, this had proved efficient, economical and a sound method of operating: readily understood by all the military, and one which passed its major test with flying colours.¹

.

Concurrent with this regional development, which had important organizational implications was another change in the field forces organization which illustrates a remnant issue of unification as well as organization. This was the rearrangement of functions between TRAINCOM on the one hand, and MOBCOM and MARCOM on the other. The history of this goes back to the early days of integration, and is worth recounting.

One of the ideas which was eventually not adopted when the functional commands were being designed in 1964/65 was that of an Education Command. This would coordinate, staff and plan an educational stream which commenced with recruit training, trades and operational training, and moved up through the RMC, the staff colleges and finally the NDC. For a number of reasons which were never made fully clear² this concept was not supported. Instead it was agreed that a TRAINCOM, supplanting the three separate Services, would take over recruit, individual operational, and trades training.

-
1. This was the 1970 Quebec crisis: by all accounts the MOBCOM troops performed very well in their role. A much smaller operation in mid-1971; relieving the guards at a Kingston penitentiary, was also well handled. Interviews with persons in and outside the CF.
 2. In this case a number of forces appeared to work together to kill this proposal. For one thing it was never concretely stated just how such an Education Command would hang together except by its common subject matter. For another, as this section makes clear, the Services were jealous of their own interests. As CFHQ wished to retain all elements of policy control within its ambit, this proved yet another good reason for not going ahead with the concept. It nevertheless seems to lie in the back of the minds of various people, and something may yet come of it.

To this end the previous Army Combat Arms Schools and the Navy Fleet Schools were transferred to TRAINCOM. Flying training to wing standard was also continued at TRAINCOM, which was previously the Air Training Command.

This arrangement did not prove satisfactory for a number of reasons. In the first place another aspect of human nature was at work.¹ There was a natural desire by the operational commanders to "put their own stamp of approval" on the man. This was nothing new - it had been going on even within the Services for years prior to integration. Particularly at the Other Rank level there was a tendency to decry the training done in other units, squadrons or ships; and this was largely a concomitant of high morale and esprit de corps. Invariably the Chief Petty Officer or the Regimental Sergeant Major would complain to the Captain or the Commander that "they just don't train chaps the way (or as well as) we do". This human foible, always present, was given even greater expression when the person trained came from a separate and distinct hybrid organization such as TRAINCOM.

Another, and quite different factor that compounded the difficulties of TRAINCOM in regard to individual operational training was the equipment factor. To train sailors ships were required: to train armoured and artillery soldiers tanks, anti-personnel carriers, and the whole repertoire of artillery was required. Between 1966 and 1970 TRAINCOM

1. Interviews. Persons who told me of this reason did not necessarily accept it as truth themselves, but it was an ever present factor at the senior NCO level in the land and sea elements. Because the air element operates differently, it never had this trouble - another demonstration of what appear to be major differences between the elements.

did not have such training aids readily available but had to negotiate for the loan of such equipment as and when it could be spared from MOBCOM and MARCOM units. The severe economies of this period - described in the following Chapter - did not make it possible for TRAINCOM to command sufficient resources to do its job adequately without the assistance of land and sea elements.¹

In such a situation a Service that wished to undermine the unification effort or the concept of a TRAINCOM distinct from and under separate management than the Services had the ready means whereby to do so, and not infrequently availed itself of such opportunity.² Of course, if proper equipment was not readily available, the men could not be adequately trained. Finally, in early 1970 this unequal struggle was lost, and the Minister announced the repatriation of the Fleet and Combat Arms Schools to their original owners.

Changes at CFHQ

The first two rounds of changes in the Headquarters organization are relatively easy to trace through time. The first round began in the weeks before the 1964 White Paper was published and finished on 1st August 1964 when a purely functional organization comprising seven powerful heads of branches was created. The defects of this first organization were twofold. First of all it was very much an accommodation of the personalities of the time. Its strength and at the same time its weakness was

1. No such problems existed with regard to air training to wing standard because trainer aircraft, as distinct from operational aircraft, were used. Besides, the concept of a separate TRAINCOM and existed in the RCAF since its inception.

2. Interviews.

that although it was very much an agreed distribution of power between individuals, it did not take account of the new roles that these individuals might assume under new conditions. The imbalance of power on the planning, programming and operations side was sufficient to provoke a rapid change in this area, which culminated in the second major organizational change.

The formation of the VCDS Branch in July - August, 1965 in turn had two organizational effects. First of all it reduced the Headquarters organization to four major military Branches, very much along traditional lines. The second effect was to make the VCDS not merely a deputy to the CDS, with the sole task of coordinating all the branches, but he now became a functional chief in his own right. This solution to a previous dilemma - how to exercise control and authority without having a functional power base - has since created a new problem. The problem now is how, as head of a very large and busy functional branch whose efficiency depends in large part on the output of the other branches, the VCDS can at the same time still carry out his coordinating function.

In the CG Branch, a slightly different aspect of this problem also arose, and it is useful to consider this as a prelude to the VCDS problem, and also as a commentary on it.

From its inception in 1964 until 1970 the CG Branch was one of the four functional branches of the Headquarters. As in all organizations there were some minor and not so minor functions where clear-cut lines of responsibility were not always easy to establish. A brief account was given of this in Chapter 3, and it was not a factor of which

CG's were themselves unaware. In 1967 two former CG's gave evidence on the matter. Moncel's view was

"... that I would disband the comptroller general's organization. This is a military anachronism. I would put a civilian in charge; in fact I would put the deputy minister in charge of this. As comptroller general you have all the controls of money and manpower that you possibly need. At the moment there is complete duplication between the deputy minister's office and the comptroller general's office. All the deputy minister's office did in my day, when I was Comptroller General, was to generate work for me. It was not productive. We maintained two sets of books and two sets of everything. We were administered out of our wits. You have an awful lot of soldiers, sailors and airmen - highly trained "chaps" - wasting their time on this business."¹

The other CG, Fleury, thought so too:

"I think that an outsider looking into the set-up, and examining it objectively, would be bound to say that there was a great deal of taking in each other's washing; that there was duplication; that there was checking and double-checking....

... I thought, at several times, that it might be possible to save a substantial number of people and a good deal of money, if many of the functions - not all - could be combined either under the Deputy Minister or under the Comptroller General..."²

Certainly to the extent that the CG Branch was operating as a functional branch it did tend to act as a contaminant in the management process, not only with the DM, but also with the CP and VCDS Branches. But, as the integrated CFHQ developed, the functional element of the CG's work was - at least within that Branch - increasingly regarded as a very secondary aspect of its overall task.

This transformation of the CG role has, to date, occurred in three stages, with one more stage clearly to come. From its inception in

1. Moncel Evidence, SC 20 February 1967, p. 1315.

2. Fleury Evidence, SC 22 February 1967, p. 1519.

1964, apart from its functional duties, the CG also assumed the role of mediator between competing interests. As most proposals involve, if not the increase of resource demand at least the redistribution of resources, and as the CG was largely the guardian of financial and manpower allocation, all important matters require CG concurrence and support. The CG is a very powerful - and largely misunderstood part of the management process of the Canadian Forces.¹

Between 1964 and 1967 the method of mediation that was attempted consisted of repeated attempts to resolve differences between competing Branches, viewpoints and Services. The process of adjustment seemed to occur largely within the limits of discussants. By the time unification had been effected the major tasks of reorganizing the Canadian Forces - forming and staffing the Commands and the CFHQ had been accomplished. During this period what appeared to be a newer generation was starting to take its place towards the top of the organization, both in the CG Branch and elsewhere.²

Within the CG Branch itself the task of mediation became even more important, but the method of approach changed. Whereas in the past differences were reconciled on a 'splitting the difference' basis, from

-
1. The following analysis is based largely on observing the handling of issues as revealed by the files of DND, and discussions with senior officers.
 2. Between 1 Jan 1965 and Oct 1966, 79 senior officers of the rank of Brigadier and equivalent up left the services, 38 by normal retirement, and 41 by voluntary or compulsory retirement. SC Evidence, 21 March 1967, pp 2527-8.

1968 onwards the main thrust of the CG Branch has been towards synthesising a new policy of management. This is a higher position than the one previously adopted, and perhaps is best exemplified by the following diagram.

DIAGRAM 1 - CG METHODS OF RESOLVING DIFFERENCES

Examples of what I have called the higher management approach were the impetus and fresh examination given to concepts such as Management By Objectives (sometimes called Management By Results), Financial Responsibility Accounting methods, greater consultation with, and input by, management consultants outside the public sector and various Treasury Board management experts.

The outward and visible manifestations of this development can be seen in the major public speeches and writings of the senior CFHQ officers over this period.¹ Of course this trend did not confine itself to the CG Branch, but was there given its strongest and clearest expression. Considerable thought was also given to the organizational implications of this personification of higher management in the Branch.

1. For Example, Lt Gen F.R. Sharp "Canadian Armed Forces Unification Some Lessons in Management" Mimeo, DND, June 1968. When Sharp wrote this article he was VCDS, but he had earlier spent some time as DGMEA in the CG Branch and there is a lot of CG Branch input in this talk. Lt Gen M.E. Pollard "An Address on Management in the Canadian Forces" to the Canadian Forces College 18 Mar 1971. Mimeo DND. An earlier version of this talk was given in 1970.

The difficulty and misunderstandings about the main task of the Branch was that "the CG was being regarded as merely another branch head, like CP or CTS".¹ Rather, the CG preferred to regard itself as a staff agency, not competing with the other Chiefs for the ear of the CDS, but reporting directly to him as an advisory agency. If this view were to prevail, it was appropriate that some of the functional aspect of CG Branch be taken over by others, leaving the CG with mainly an Inspector-General type of role or, as one of the discussants put it, a tsar of management.

Thus began a third round of drawing up by hypothetical organizations, negotiating with others for the handover of functions from CG, and the general "staffing" process that accompanies this. By the end of 1970 the decisions had been agreed, and were implemented early in 1971. One large functional component: data handling and data processing was embodied in a new branch, the Information Handling Agency, and the rest of the CG organization moved up on the organization chart of CFHQ to become an advisory agency to the CDS on financial and budgetary matters on the one hand, and organization, establishments and management.²

Many in the Department, both civil and military, felt that the former function could and should be largely handed over to the DM's organization where ultimate financial control rested. As explained in Chapter 3, this view is not shared by the present DM. As regards the organization and establishment function, it was suggested that this function properly lay with the VCDS Branch which, having the responsibility

1. Quoted in interviews.

2. For details of this new organization see Appendix 3, which presents the consolidated CFHQ organization as at mid 1971.

for planning, operations and force development, should include in this last function the organization and establishment component of force development. The argument used to justify this is exactly analogous to that used to retain financial administration under the CDS.

Putting aside for the moment the soundness or otherwise of the reasons why such rearrangements of the functional, as distinct from advisory, tasks of the CG Branch should be devolved, the impact of such devolution onto the VCDS Branch should be considered. From the original conception of the VCDS as a free floating coordinator, the VCDS has become probably the most deeply immersed and busy branch head at CFHQ.¹ His immediate span of control already exceeds that of the other Chiefs, and makes it hard for him to exercise the degree of coordination that is expected of the CDS's Chief of Staff. Whatever the theoretical desirability of placing the responsibility for a function with its operator, such an addition to the VCDS organization would require serious consideration to be given to the organization of that Branch.

Such a review, with very wide ramifications was ordered by the Minister early in June 1971. An outside Management Review Group has been commissioned to evaluate present relationships between the civil, military and research organizations within the department, and to make recommendations to ensure effective planning and control.² The scope of the review is very far-reaching and all aspects of the planning, control and resource management functions both at CFHQ and in the Commands will be scrutinized.

1. On this point there is widespread agreement, interviews.

2. DND Information Services, 3 June 1971. A partial analysis of the origins and implications of such a review is in the Ottawa Citizen 8 June 1971.

It is expected that one outcome of this review will be the resolution of the issues raised by the attempt of the CG to rid himself of these financial and establishment functions, and to pass them on to the DM and VCDS Branch respectively. So, for the moment, the third major reorganization of CFHQ remains incomplete, pending further investigation.¹

Discussion

As stated at the beginning of the chapter, some of these recent organizational developments have not yet been fully completed, and for this reason any attempt to evaluate them with precision is likely, at this stage, to be premature. Some of the comments made in this section will therefore be brief and impressionistic.

On the whole, this stage of organizational change in the field forces seems largely complete, although there are a number of consequential actions still to come. After more than five years of attempting to adhere to a narrow concept of functionalism, this has proved to be unwieldy and inefficient, and a more natural balance of centralization and decentralization as between CFHQ and the Commands has now been restored. Together with the handing back of some elements of training to MOBCOM and MARCOM a certain greater recognition of the different basic identities of the three environmental functions - the conduct of land operations, sea operations and air operations - has finally been achieved, and it is now possible to draw up a balance sheet indicating the strengths and remaining shortcomings of the current field forces organization.

1. The Group is expected to report its findings by mid 1972. Another impetus for reorganization, a defence white paper, is expected to be published in late 1971.

Before these recent changes it used to be said by those who were Service oriented that the Air Force had gained from integration, that the Navy had not really lost anything, and that the Army had been the major loser. In many ways this is true, although also irrelevant if one accepts that the aim of unification was to reorganize the armed forces as a whole to the benefit of Canada. There is, however, no doubt that this round of organizational change has greatly strengthened the MOBCOM function and, if anything, has strengthened the land force component even more than prior to 1964. Before that it was split six ways by geography: now it is concentrated into Canada's largest Command. Before 1964 tactical air support for land forces was a RCAF function: now the operational command of the tactical air squadrons is in the hands of Commander, MOBCOM. Now, with the handover of operational control of regional responsibilities MOBCOM has complete power over all aspects of the conduct of land operations. As this last function is expected to become of greater significance in Canada, the present organization is, in many ways, very much an ideal organization from the aspect of unity of command and command and control.

The MARCOM functions have not changed during the whole of this period. However, like MOBCOM, MARCOM now has command and control over the maritime air function. Neither has the AIRDEFCOM function changed during this period, but its colocation with the 22nd NORAD Region HQ has improved the pre-existing command and control function.¹ In every sense

1. Because it is largely not equipped for such a role, and because its primary operation is so unique, AIRDEFCOM is the only command not directly tasked with regional responsibilities. However it does carry out surveillance over northern Canada and the Arctic and is equipped to assist in the Air Traffic Control function of detection and rescue operations.

of the word, AIRTRANSCOM is now an operational command, with the growing emphasis on air-portability of the overseas components of MOBCOM, and with world-wide responsibility for the air transport of the Canadian Forces in their peacekeeping and allied support functions.

Thus the major fear expressed by those opposed to unification - that the Services would lose their identity - has not come about. On the contrary, the function of the Services - the conduct of specific environmental operations - has been not only more clearly identified but in fact strengthened by giving the commanders operational control of all functions identified in their primary task. This explains why, in the very brief time since the bitter unification controversy of 1966/67 this matter has become a completely dead issue. Unification is no longer an issue because it has not changed anything, apart from strengthening the identity of the Canadian Forces as a whole, which is in many ways desirable.¹

Of course, not all problems can be resolved in so brief a time frame. The outstanding issue still remains the appropriate balance of environmental expertise and environmental representation as between CFHQ and the field forces. In general CFHQ likes to have 'on tap' someone with reasonable up-to-date expertise who can staff matters having to do with environments, whether it be operational or other policy matters. Within CFHQ this issue revolves around the rank appropriate for such a function: should it be at the one-star or two-star function? Within the

1. Even the uniforms can now be adopted to indicate elemental identity by the addition of wings, badges and insignia, berets and service ribbons. This is a trend which has just recently begun, and can be expected to grow.

Commands there is the feeling that many more such matters could be handled within the Commands, or that alternatively there should be greater consultation with them: their point being that the Command staff constitute the primary source of environmental expertise, that in this modern age they are readily available for consultation, that the CFHQ 'experts' may be out of date and, above all that the Commands have now settled down to the point where they can provide good, honest advice.

Like several other matters, this one in no way constitutes a problem to which there is a 'right' solution. Rather, it is a continuous dialogue which occasionally becomes more urgent as certain experiences are shared, or as organizations change. At the moment the dialogue - in the full sense of the word - is amicable and points are logically put forward by both sides to the discussion. This also constitutes a marked improvement on the situation before 1968, and particularly before 1966 when the Commanders were virtually outside any official channel through which they could be consulted and make themselves heard.

Within CFHQ the organizational changes during this period, however major in scope, have remained largely insignificant in resolving the important issues. The most important of these, from both a practical and a theoretical point of view is the arrangement, proper precedence and appropriate level for the confluence of the planning, programming and operations function. Even if, in theory, this should all be done within the VCDS Branch, experience has demonstrated that the present organization is too unwieldy to justify the continued present relationship of these functions.

As the present Minister has recognized, this is not merely an aspect of the proper organization of a military branch, but is intimately bound up with the issues of civilian control and appropriate civil-military intradepartmental relationships. The resolution of this awaits the deliberations of the recently appointed Management Review Group, and it is largely on the findings of this Group that the future efficiency of CFHQ depends.

What is notable about the developments of this period, in summary, are three things: another swing of the pendulum of organization change from an extreme position to a more rational halfway one, that recognizes the appropriate importance of both 'functional' and regional requirements, a re-discovery of the importance of and necessity for environmental identity; and, finally, a more far-sighted delineation of the major problems of the current CFHQ organization, which will shortly be tackled by a strongly backed review team.

PART III

EVALUATION

CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

In the previous chapters the history of the unification of the Canadian armed forces has been recounted: the early attempts at co-ordination; the impact of the 1963 White Paper; the evolution of the Headquarters and Command organizations; the issues posed by unification; and the subsequent reversion to a less integrated organization than was originally envisaged have all been described.

Associated with these developments are various general points of interest, some of which derive from the particular Canadian environment in which this unification was carried out. But there are also points of theory which have a more general application to the question of military organization. Although these have all been touched on in the previous chapters it is useful to recapitulate them here, to expand on their more theoretical aspects, and to attempt to relate the one to the other more closely so as to fully appreciate both the achievements of the Canadian unification exercise and the problems that attended it.

The main points to be summarized are those that emerge from the study itself: the organization theories on which integration and unification were based and the applicability of the present Canadian Armed Forces organization to other countries. The chapter concludes with an attempt to evaluate the utility of the recent changes in defence organization to Canada's defence posture.¹

-
1. The substance of much of this chapter was discussed with Dr. Michael Sherman's Canadian Foreign Policy class at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, in February, 1971. I am grateful to members of the seminar group for their comments on, and additions to the Chapter.

Organization Theories

Military theories of organization are innately classical in approach.¹ The two main reasons for this are that first of all the classical approach retains considerable value in guiding the thinking of field officers. Concepts such as span of control, unity of command and the notion of functionalism as frameworks on which to base organizations are the very lifeblood of military organization theory. This is epitomized in one facet of organizational thinking that the military have distinctively made their own: the ideas expressed in 'command and control'.

Command and control are broadly the two alternatives of organization open to a field commander who has a number of units under his direction. When he has control of them, they are his responsibility, and his alone. The channel of authority is a single one. When he has command over them, they are, for operational purposes, his responsibility, but they are not under his full control. They may just be loaned to him, as were numerous allied units loaned to the supreme allied commanders during World War II. In this case the lines of authority vary, depending on which aspect of organization is being examined. Together with 'staff and line' formulations, these two sets of concepts, taken alone, are capable of explaining nearly all of a military organization. They provide the major lines of distinction along which authority is distributed.

A military organization has one main function - to fight, to wage wars and to win them. Until recently large military organizations

1. By classical is meant the theories of organization expounded by writers such as Fayol, Taylor, Gulick and Urwick.

did not persist in peacetime, but were mobilized when the need for them was pressing. However the changes in the technology of war have so shortened the time available for mobilization that the major countries (that is those equipped with, if not prepared to use, the modern arsenal of weapons) have largely discarded the idea that mobilization for many future types of conflict is possible. From this has arisen the modern doctrine of 'forces in being': that is, that a considerable part of a country's military resources must be kept in a state of total readiness for war.¹ The acceptance of this doctrine means that, to a far more significant degree than previously, the influence of martial thinking on a peacetime headquarters organization is overwhelmingly present.

In a single Service military headquarters the above aids to organizational problems may be sufficient to solve them. But in a multi-Service, government department headquarters these aids are not sufficient not only because they are inadequate, but also because, adequate or not, they do not address themselves to the variety of problems encountered in this different environment.² The effect of integration and unification in Canada has had the effect of compressing these different entities - a Service Headquarters, and a government department into the one framework.

The issues of organization in a government department are different from those in a Service Command. The latter is basically

-
1. As was explained to me during interviews "If the game only lasts for five minutes, we won't be playing in it; but if it lasts longer than that then we're going to have to play with what we've got now - there won't be time to build up anything".
 2. See for example H.A. Simon's "Administrative Behaviour" (New York, The Macmillan Co., 1951) and in particular his section on the proverbs of administration.

concerned with task specialization; the issues of power and influence distribution are present to a far lesser degree. The military organization is designed, in its ideal form, to be speedily responsive to some external authority and cues; and to respond in predetermined ways, according to plans that have been worked out beforehand and tested, as far as possible, by military exercises. These criteria of military efficiency - responsiveness, speed of action, and predictability - are sought after by devising strictly hierarchical organizations, with the 'line' people identified beforehand, with clear channels of communications and above all with predetermined forms of organization.

The structure of most government departments, and indeed many other organizations is devised for purposes which, though they may include some of the military organizational desiderata, also include other functions. In a modern bureaucracy perhaps the most important of these is the design of 'problem solving structures' which are built into the organization at various levels: structures which attempt to be responsive not in an automatic, predetermined fashion, but in an innovative, problem solving manner. As Lewin has shown these two different forms of organization function best under different manifestations of authority, the former being more coercive and the latter tending to be more democratic and participative in tone.¹ If one accepts such a structural - functional approach to a theory of organizations, the problems involved in reconciling a military headquarters with a government department head office, and the manner in which some organizational issues were expressed during this period can be more readily analyzed.

1. K. Lewin "Group Decision and Social Change" in Readings in Social Psychology, Eds. E.E. Maccoby, E.L. Hartley and T.M. Newcomb; New York, Holt, 1958.

In his study of the organization and control of the US Armed Services, John Ries devotes considerable space to an examination of the 'folklore of unification'.¹ In particular he examines the aims of the centralists, the unificationists to show how their proposed solutions to what is apparent inter-Service rivalry are bound to fail. This is because the envisaged solution:

"the folklore symbol of organizational efficiency and control ... the all-powerful executive who sits at the apex of a tightly organized, tightly run organizational pyramid - the man who makes all₂ decisions, the man who runs things from the top down."²

is based on a fallacy of power distribution. Power does not, and indeed cannot, in a large organization, flow only from the top down. The range of management responsibilities is so broad, the extent of knowledge is so specialized, the number of tasks to be overseen are so great that the higher up the ladder of authority one goes the less one is in full control of the situation.

"Judgements replace facts; the specific becomes abstract; the definite becomes vague just as the top executive has really minimal control over the discretion of his subordinates, he is also a victim of "uncertainty absorption". The individual who occupies the top position in a hierarchical structure is much more isolated, powerless and dependent than the advocates of the hierarchical model believe."³

Ries concludes his study of the reorganization of the US Armed Forces thus:

"Centralization means control. This slogan has been and continues to be the dogma of every defence reorganization proposal. It is so imbedded in the folklore of organization that nothing, not even the experience of the preceding fifteen years can shake the faith of those who believe in it."⁴

1. pp 3-59

2. Ries, p xv

3. Ries, p. 50

4. Ries, p. 194.

Much the same observation can be made about the history of Canadian defence organization between 1964 and 1967. Just as a solution was sought in the US by centralizing power in the hands of the Secretary for Defence, so Hellyer in 1964 sought to dominate the Services by placing them under what was imagined to be central control. On the military side a similar attitude prevailed during this period. For example, following the dissolution of the three Service Boards in 1964, efforts were made to resuscitate a Service Board comprising the Chiefs of the Branches or their representatives.¹ Although in fact both the CDS and the VCDS chaired what in effect were Service Boards, which met regularly and kept minutes, they were never given formal recognition.² After the Commands were formed the Commanders pressed for a council to be set up at which they could come together to discuss and plan matters of common interest. Such a formal arrangement was resisted in preference to an informal and ad hoc approach. It was not till the complaints of Admiral Landymore, that he had no direct access to the CDS to discuss command matters, were aired that an Armed Forces Council was formed.³ Every effort was made to pretend that the Services,

-
1. In fact a rump naval board continued to meet during the latter part of 1964, under the senior naval member present at CFHQ. This unauthorized committee, which was formed to influence personnel in the headquarters and to give consolidated expression to a 'naval viewpoint' was finally ordered to cease and desist - interviews.
 2. This may have been an action of prudence on the part of Service officers who probably guessed correctly that the Minister might not countenance any formal councils other than the Defence Council.
 3. Ottawa Citizen, 10 Aug 1966, reporting the first meeting of the Council. Its 14 members comprised the six Commanders, the six Headquarters Chiefs, the DM and the CDRB.

or their remnants did not exist; and it was only the experience of attempts to organize a responsive VCDS Branch, the similar experiences in Training Command and the problems of regional responsibilities that turned the tide back in partial recognition of the Services, or at least their elements of origin.

In this respect the most important dogma to be overcome was the nature of functionalism. This dogma derived from two main sources. Part of it was a natural desire to respect the wishes of the Services' political masters, and hence not to give the appearance of attempting to resurrect the Services in disguise. But an even larger part of the dogma arose in the 'collective unconscious' of each of the Services. Separated for so long from each other - so near in appearance yet so far in actuality - they had gone their separate ways. The ascendancy of Air Force thinking in the CG Branch, described in Chapter 3, together with Naval quiescence in the surety that, come what may, the Navy would have a role that would guarantee it independence of a sort, completely swamped the reasonable view of the Army that functionalism was multi-dimensional, and as a notion should be used in a variety of ways as appropriate.¹ The fact is that the semantic differences which over time had developed between the Services were so great that in many vital areas there was little congruence between what was being said by one Service representative, and the way it was being understood by another. Official recognition of this did not come till the new wave of management thinking in the CG Branch in 1968.

1. Commenting on this false dichotomy between functionalism and Service orientation, Howard makes the point "Each Service does fulfil a discrete function in a distinct environment" and goes on to suggest that, for this reason, these functions differ basically in their operational concept. P. 36.

Thus a combination of faulty organizational thinking, together with what was regarded as a limiting range of options pervaded the first years of the combined defence organization in Canada. Whether it was mere coincidence or not, the departure of Hellyer from the Defence portfolio in October, 1967, was concomitant with a partial resurgence of the Services in a number of indirect ways, described in the preceding chapter. Some evaluation of these events as a whole will be given, but before that it is useful to consider the utility of the Canadian experience to other countries.

The Uniqueness of Canadian Defence Forces Unification

At the time of the original decisions in 1963/64 and in subsequent evidence to the Commons, the Committee on Defence and other groups, much was made of the fact that Canada's venture into unification was the first such attempt in the world. For a while Mr. Hellyer appeared to view the unification exercise almost as part of a process of national catharsis. Coming almost immediately after the flag debate and the last stages of the Bomarc revelations the question of unification was talked about in some official quarters as though it was an exercise in national identity. This was the impression conveyed to Hanson Baldwin, who, in the New York Times, wrote that:

"Nearly all experts agree that the changes reflect Canada's continuing search for a national identity and her attempt to adjust old loyalties and traditions to a modern frame."¹

Here at last was something in which Canada was leading the world: in fact interest in the scheme was considerable and a number of leaders from other countries visited Ottawa to be briefed on the workings of unification.² Much of the publicity surrounding integration and

1. 20 Feb 1967

2. "At least nine Western nations have set up political - military study groups to observe the Canadian experiment" - Christian Science Monitor 15 Feb 1968.

unification - official publicity - implied that what Canada had done was to lead off in a series of actions that would shortly be followed by the rest of the world.¹ This was not borne out by subsequent events, was probably never so, and in any event went against the case on which unification had been justified in the 1964 White Paper - the need not merely for general but for drastic economies, and the almost unique national defence posture in which Canada found herself. To extrapolate from these restricted circumstances to those of other countries left a very large logical gap.

In fact it appears that such statements as were made along these lines originated more from the politicians than from the military, and were designed to gain political favour and acceptance of the scheme rather than to reflect military actualities, particularly as these applied in other countries. As was pointed out in Chapter 1, it is no valid criticism of the Canadian exercise to say that it may not be applicable to other countries. The reasons for this non-applicability are many and varied, and some of them may usefully be considered here. They can be divided into three broad groups - organizational, military/political and economic.

It has been suggested that the Canadian model is not relevant to nations with large armed forces as unification would be administratively impossible.² This raises the interesting question of what - if any - is the appropriate cut-off point: 200,000, half a million, a million? At

1. "... within 20 years every country in the Western World "and perhaps some behind the curtain" will have a single armed force replacing the traditional army, navy, air force concept" Windsor Star 16 Sep 1966, describing Mr. Hellyer's speech at Clinton.

2. As in Sherman's Adelphi Paper.

what point the diseconomies of scale begin to take effect is not clear; in fact this is likely to be very closely related to - and probably dependent upon - the role differentiation of the armed forces. The more varied the roles that they are called upon to play the less will the immediate benefits of unification be apparent and the more difficult will the process of unification be. This point will be dealt with in greater detail later.

One strongly held organizational attitude is that ultimate unification is largely irrelevant because the elements of combat - land, sea or air - are already predetermined and pose insuperable obstacles to any common military activity.¹ The military skills required to master the technology of combat in any one of these elements, be it flying an aircraft, commanding a vessel or directing a land battle with ground troops, are already so large as to require many years of training to master. Hence both enlisted men and officers cannot be thought of as completely interchangeable parts.

The obvious gaps in and weaknesses of this argument can be countered by a more sophisticated version of the above argument. This recognizes the greater interplay of the armed services in combined operations, the need for the senior military to be aware of the problems and capabilities of the different Services, and the growth of technological combat systems that appear to be eroding the elemental foundations of the three services. At the same time it is held that unification is not an optimal solution for a number of reasons. The solution to a proper

1. Without describing this as the official view, it was the major response given by those American officers who were willing to discuss unification.

grasp of combined operations lies not in unification but in strengthening the concept of a joint staff; derived from the Service experts, but owing some higher allegiance to a common cause. Although combat aids such as missiles, marines and naval aircraft obviously call into question the validity of distinguishing the traditional trio of services, technology has not yet reached the point where this has any major significance.¹ Failure to cope adequately with multi-Service situations requires strengthening of the top structure to make it administratively more powerful: not amalgamating the bottom of the structure; which, in effect, is to use the proverbial sledgehammer to crack the proverbial walnut.

This argument does have some point: in fact the weakest arguments in the Canadian scheme were those that attempted to justify the unification at the bottom parts of the services, and, for a number of reasons they encountered the greatest opposition. These will be dealt with in the subsequent section of this chapter.

On the military/political aspect there are a number of points that deserve recapitulation. Already referred to has been the point that the very restricted role envisaged for the Canadian armed forces in the 1964 White Paper - essentially, participation in combined operations alongside other countries - while at the same time justifying unification might, for this reason, sufficiently explain why such a move is not attractive to other countries who can foresee the continued need of the

1. On the contrary, it indicates that a Service may, with considerable efficiency, take on a task that is not entirely rooted in its original element. Such diversity of functions should provide a basis for greater understanding between the Services.

traditional services to carry out specific, single service roles for some time in the future.¹ This being so, such countries would wish to retain the identity of their services. Another, related reason why other countries have not followed the Canadian example is because many of them can envisage a situation where they may be militarily involved in a number of tasks simultaneously, both in different force configurations and in different parts of the world. The relatively small number of the present Canadian armed forces would appear to preclude her from having such a simultaneous variety of military roles on any significant scale, except in the last resort.

The foregoing is probably more applicable to the four major powers than, say, to the other Western European countries which also have a limited military role; at least since World War II, the formation of NATO and the current atmosphere of détente (this generalization would not include Portugal, which retains substantial colonial and hence military responsibilities). The reasons why they have not seen fit to follow the Canadian example must lie in other factors.

First among these must be included sheer inertia, combined with a general satisfaction with the current military organization. What Canada has done is so drastic that even if other countries contemplate some change they would wish to observe how the new Canadian organization settles down; and in particular how the organization operates during a serious military emergency. In terms of military achievement the Canadian

1. This argument also has its dialectic. One form of opposition to unification takes the view that because in any combined operation Canada would be a minor partner, it is foolish for her troops and support units to be different from those of other defence forces, particularly in terms of service organization and procedures which, since unification, have become bastardized. One officer went further and suggested that when war comes Canada would make a virtue of a necessity and fall back into the normal pattern. Interviews.

organization has not yet proved itself, and for this reason there is no good reason for other countries to follow an as yet untried and untested military organization, particularly where military capability is of greater national importance than it may appear to be in a Canada that is so solidly sheltered under the defence umbrella of the U.S.

Some of the military doctrine on which Canadian unification is based may not be acceptable to other countries. Foremost among these, of course, is the loss of identity of the traditional services, which can be either opposed, or dismissed as an exercise in futility that flies in the face of reality. The existence of a single Chief with few or no countervailing military voices may also be rejected both on military grounds (that this prematurely narrows the options at the highest levels of military advice to the government), or on political grounds (the 'man on horseback' fears that exist in many civil governments). The latter consideration is obviously of particular impact to the underdeveloped countries where civil-military tensions are of the greatest consequence, and it is for this reason unlikely that the Canadian model could serve in the Third World.¹ Its applicability is thus very restricted indeed.

It must also be remembered that the political influence of the military in other countries is often more significant than it was in Canada. Objections to such a scheme by the military themselves may fall on more receptive ears, or on a polity which has greater respect for military traditions, and hence greater willingness to perpetuate historical military organizations. It will be recalled that unification did not have an entirely easy passage in Canada, that many officers

1. For an up to date version of this problem see Perlmutter's "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army".

retired prematurely or were prematurely retired - some of them in protest - and that the determination of the minister to impose his will was a significant factor in the overall success of the scheme. These conditions might not hold, or not be tolerated, in other countries such as Britain or France.

To these organizational, military and political considerations must be added the economic reasons for other countries not following in the Canadian pattern. These properly will be dealt with in the following Section where the Canadian unification is evaluated in absolute rather than comparative terms. But it can be said here that the experience of the Canadian unification does not suggest that unification, as distinct from integration of supporting services, can be justified solely on economic grounds. This will be supported in detail subsequently.

To conclude this brief examination of Canadian military experience in the light of its applicability to other countries, it would appear, at this juncture, that the Canadian lead is, for a number of reasons, unlikely to be followed by others. To some extent this is implied in the defence reorganizations of other countries since 1963. Despite very major organizational changes in the British Ministry of Defence, unification has been rejected in favour of an approach that places the Services under the firmer dominance of a central organization that is dominated by civilians. Howard's conclusion, after studying the systems of both countries is that:

"The Canadian experience is held up with some reason, as an awful warning; but the traumatic experiences of the Canadian Armed Forces are (not) relevant to, or necessary for our own Services..."¹

1. P. 49. He does not make clear, in this writer's opinion, what the awful warning is, or ought to be.

Although Australia has issued no policy statements on defence organization, developments there indicate that, if anything, the British line will be followed.

Factors of scale would probably operate alone to prevent any attempts at Service unification in the U.S. But in fact a number of other trends work in harmony to make it inconceivable that the U.S. would ever contemplate such a move. The 'man on horseback' argument is one with which the Americans have a continuous and morbid association, perhaps recently exacerbated by the travails of their Armed Forces in overseas theatres.¹ The issues of unification have always been seen differently in the U.S. than they would be in Canada. There the extent of authority over the armed forces is not merely a matter for the President and his Executive, but also involves Congress to a degree that would never be countenanced in Canada. The Services have a powerful ally in the legislature, which has tended to the view that any closer control over the Services by the Executive would at the same time derogate the powers of the legislature. The extent of the distinction between the Canadian and the U.S. situation is perhaps best summarized by the following quotation from the late Congressman Vinson, speaking to an Army Organization Bill:

"Now I want to know how the Congress can carry out its Constitutional responsibility of providing and maintaining an Army if the only control that Congress has over what type of Army we have is that of the amount of money we give to support the Army? You want to fix it here by law (so that) Congress will only be in the picture so far

1. While visiting Washington, D.C., I was informed by one American scholar of military affairs that Cromwell was more closely studied in the U.S. than in his own country.

as appropriations are concerned and whenever possible leave absolutely ... the complete management, control, and regulation by departmental orders of the Army Establishment."¹

Except in very general and theoretical terms, the U.S. has never really accepted that the Services should be unified. Some integration of supporting services is countenanced, but this is as far as matters have been taken. The latest public report on military organization, the Blue Ribbon Defence Panel Report did recommend a closer degree of integration of the Navy, Army and Air Force by placing them under a Deputy Secretary of Defence for Management and Resources.² But even this mild recommendation, which would leave the Services intact was not unanimous, and two members of the panel submitted dissenting statements. Their reasons for this view are interesting. One dissenter expressed concern "at the proposed derogation of the three Military Departments" because "The legislative history of our National Security Act makes clear that Congress intended each of the Departments to be separately organized under its own Secretary ..." Furthermore:

"The Services are not alike. The retention by each of its separate character, customs and confidence is essential to the presentation of our national military power. The first requirement of our unified military establishment is the moral soundness of each of its integral parts."³

The second dissenting opinion was to the effect that management of defence was already overcentralized; what was needed was greater decentralization; and for this reason the recommendation was a step in the wrong direction.⁴ It is clear that unification, in the Canadian sense, is a long way off in the U.S.

-
1. Quoted in Hammond, p. 271. The value of the Hammond book is that it explores in detail the assumptions of power distribution in the American military establishment, and shows how inherently different they are from those in countries with a parliamentary democracy.
 2. Defence for Peace - pp 36-42.
 3. *ibid* pp 203-204
 4. *ibid* pp 207-209.

The one country which has specifically considered unification as a basis for Service organization, New Zealand, rejected the utility of this concept in quite definite terms in its latest White Paper:

"In considering general policy on the closer unification of the Services, we have considered the possibility of creating, as New Zealand's contribution to collective defence, a national force in which the efforts and resources of all three Services would be combined But examination has led the Government to conclude that such a combined force would not make sense in terms of our principal aim, to gain maximum effect from the level of contribution which New Zealand can make to collective defence."¹

The White Paper goes on to point out that taken together, the smallness of the New Zealand contribution to collective defence and the 'separateness' of the three Services of its principal allies do not justify such a radical move. Instead,

"The Government's general approach to greater integration of the Services is that the three Services should retain their separate identities, and that the opportunities for closer unification be in the supporting areas of supply, personnel administration etcetera, rather than in the operational activities of the Services."²

It therefore seems that unifications in other countries will not take place according to the sanguine expectations of the 1964-66 propagandists. In part this represents a conscious choice by some countries, explicitly made or otherwise; in part it is because the kinds of defence problems faced by other countries are of a nature that do not lend themselves to solutions à la canadienne. For this reason it is especially important to judge the Canadian unification on its own terms: what it has done for Canada.

1. Review of Defence Policy 1966, para 18.

2. *ibid* para 52.

The Lessons of Canadian Defence Organization

Evaluation of these changes in defence organization is best made by examining results against the originally stated intentions. The original aims were to improve the command and control organization under the Minister for National Defence, and at the same time to effect organizational economies such that a greater percentage of a fixed defence budget could be directed towards capital procurement. It is necessary to evaluate not only the results but the aims themselves.

The aim of unifying command and control of the Canadian Forces under a unitary CDS was the substance of the 1964 integration debate. In effect the opponents to the single CDS concept took the view that the Minister should take counsel from a number of military sources. It is not good enough for the CDS to present the Minister with cut and dried alternatives: information with much of the argumentative element extracted from it. On the contrary, the function of making choices is one that the Minister cannot and should not abdicate. In a sense the major function of the political head in a democracy is to make these very choices, and to bear the responsibility for them. Allied to this general view was the specific fear that the quality of elemental advice to the Minister would deteriorate if elemental representation was not adequately present - and it was felt that no one person could adequately represent the interests of the different elements.

All these points are valid. Furthermore the more vocal of the proponents of this view were arguing from their own experience, which would have tended to substantiate the fears they were expressing that, if

things were to go on as before, Canada would move from a defence organization that was excessively decentralized to one that was overcentralized. What they failed to take account of were three factors that, taken together, reinforced the tendency for fears that had been expressed not to eventuate.

The first of these was the personality of the Minister himself. Hellyer was very much of a no nonsense character, who liked to see decisions made speedily. The criticisms that were levelled at him were not that he was enthralled by the CDS or a coterie of his senior advisors, but that on the contrary he would reach down into the system and communicate directly with the officer most directly concerned with a particular subject. Of course, the relationship between the political and the military and bureaucratic heads of the Department is an unpredictable factor; and one that is subject to considerable variation, and there is no guarantee that their relationships will over time persist in the same form. But despite their innately different personal styles there is little evidence that the two Ministers who have succeeded Hellyer to date - Cadieux and Macdonald - have been 'captured' by the Department.

The second factor that was not taken into account by some who opposed integration was the possibility that the Defence Council might become a more significant body under the new arrangements. Quite a succession of witnesses to the Defence Committee gave evidence that in their day the Council had performed indifferently. In large part this was because the locus of powers lay with the Service Chiefs as individuals rather than as a group. This has now changed, and the regular meetings

of the Defence Council are the occasion and the locus for decision-making.¹

The third reason for the success of the new Headquarters organization might have been foreseen a priori, but was not referred to at all during any of the debates - external or internal to the Department - even by proponents of the new system. The creation of a functional headquarters organization made the new-style Chiefs interdependent to a degree that, like it or not, the Chief and the Vice-Chief of Defence Staff became the acknowledged powers and leaders of the Headquarters. Given the original aim to create a unitary chain of command, the integration of the Headquarters certainly established this. In fact, as was shown in Chapter 3, the difficulty in the early stages of establishing the VCDS Branch was to adequately adjust the level of elemental representation so that it would come through clearly.

It is very likely that these three phenomena reinforced each other. Having no independent power base of their own, the functional Chiefs became dependent upon the support of the CDS and VCDS in their work. The CDS and VCDS in turn found that the Minister, DM and CDRB were determined to make the Defence Council the forum at which final decisions were taken. So, in addition to the elimination of duplication by integrating the Services at CFIHQ, the actual form the new organization took enhanced unitary command and control.

The formation and subsequent development of the Commands revealed that there was still a power vacuum as regards elemental representation. In fact one could go so far as to state that the three

1. Exactly who makes the decisions at Defence Council meetings is another issue - Fleury Evidence SC 22/23 February, 1967.

operational commands - MOBCOM, MARCOM and AIRDEFCOM represent not merely environmental, but Service interests, in a sense replacing the Service Chiefs as the remnant focus of prior loyalties.¹ Some of the pros and cons of this have been examined in Chapter 4, when the issues of unification come to the fore. In fact if one examines the line up of witnesses and debates in the 1967 unification debates, the outright opponents to unification - which would eliminate the Services completely - tended to be operational and Command spokesmen. Those who sought merely to postpone unification - recognizing it as eventually appropriate or inevitable - were mostly Headquarters people.² Since 1967 there has been a significant amount of (in this writer's opinion, necessary) decentralization of influence to the operational commands, but overall command and control has remained unitary. One can only conclude that in this respect the original aim was accomplished very successfully.

The second aim of integration and unification, to secure the greatest economies possible, has not been successful within the original parameters established in 1963/64. It will be recalled that in the original stage of integration two determinants were set by the government: that the defence budget be stabilized at about \$1.5 billion in 1963 dollars, with a 2 percent inflation escalation permitted annually; and that the 'tangible' results of integration/unification should be such as

-
1. This is not meant in any pejorative sense. Rather the influence of the Services of other countries has tended to be greater at the Commands, so that in a sense, the Service view they represent is not their own but that of the US Air Force at AIRDEFCOM and the US and NATO navies at MARCOM.
 2. Even before integration and unification the real repository of Service lore, custom and tradition has been with the Commands and formations. This is probably a universal truism. Hence persons such as Brock and Landymore - heads of the Navy's operations base - tended to oppose unification ab initio. Staff officers such as Miller, Fleury and Foulkes found it easier to digest unification as a concept, although they did question certain details, particularly the timing.

to yield a 30 percent saving in staff, which, when put towards equipment procurement, would raise this component to 25 percent of the defence budget. For a while it seemed that these aims might be achieved, given considerable belt-tightening all around and a determined effort on the part of the survivors. But three factors subsequently emerged which made these aims both impossible to achieve, and made the success of the unification exercise in these terms impossible to measure in absolute terms.

The first of these, and one over which the Department had no control, was the upturn in the inflationary rate of the economy from 1966 onwards. The 2 percent built-in escalation factor turned out to be a rather sanguine estimate as the actual Canadian rate of inflation jumped to about 6 percent. Up to 1970 the government in its successive budgets made no provision to recognize this added cost factor - at least, not in money terms. The upshot of this was that by the end of the 1970 financial year the Department was, in constant dollar terms, operating on a budget that was not constant but had in fact declined by between 12 and 15 percent. If one examines Tables 1 and 2 the result of this can be seen to be reflected in the capital equipment figures as a percentage of the defence budget. At no stage have these approached the 25 percent target, and the inflation was in part to blame. Table 2 in particular indicates the inflationary influence on personnel costs during this period (operations and maintenance were constant during this period). Despite a decrease of manpower of over 50,000 or almost 30% between 1962/63 and 1970/71 fiscal years personnel costs have continued to rise, and there seems to be no stop to this trend.¹

1. The reason for the difference in Capital and Budgetary Expenditures between Table 1 and Table 2 is because the amounts in Table 1 show expenditure for defence services (i.e. CFHQ and all its offshoots), plus all other programs of DND as a whole (i.e. DRB, Mutual Aid programs etc.). Table 2 is only in respect of the defence services component.

TABLE 1

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE - MANPOWER AND EXPENDITURES

Financial Year	Manpower (As at 31 March of fiscal year)		Expenditures \$ millions	Non-Budgetary Expenditures	Capital Expenditures as a Percentage of Total Expenditures		Total
	Military	Civilians (incl. Casuals)					
1962-63	123,694	48,590	1,574.9	1.1	326.0	21.7	1,576.0
1963-64	120,781	47,690	1,683.5	.5	301.6	17.8	1,684.0
1964-65	114,164	44,562	1,535.6	7.4	269.6	17.5	1,543.0
1965-66	107,467	44,492	1,548.4	-	259.7	16.8	1,548.4
1966-67	105,584	43,187	1,610.4	-	261.6	15.9	1,640.4
1967-68	101,572	41,533	1,753.5	2.5	305.3	17.4	1,756.0
1968-69	98,340	39,725	1,760.8	25.5	289.2	16.2	1,786.3
1969-70	93,353	38,767	1,790.0	9.8	262.9	14.6	1,799.8

Figures provided by Department of National Defence

TABLE 2
DEFENCE SERVICES PROGRAMME - EXPENDITURE AND MANPOWER
SUMMARY 1962/63 - 1971/72

Source: 2012/2013, 2014/2015, 2015/2016, 2016/2017, 2017/2018, 2018/2019, 2019/2020, 2020/2021, 2021/2022, 2022/2023, 2023/2024, 2024/2025, 2025/2026, 2026/2027, 2027/2028, 2028/2029, 2029/2030, 2030/2031, 2031/2032, 2032/2033, 2033/2034, 2034/2035, 2035/2036, 2036/2037, 2037/2038, 2038/2039, 2039/2040, 2040/2041, 2041/2042, 2042/2043, 2043/2044, 2044/2045, 2045/2046, 2046/2047, 2047/2048, 2048/2049, 2049/2050, 2050/2051, 2051/2052, 2052/2053, 2053/2054, 2054/2055, 2055/2056, 2056/2057, 2057/2058, 2058/2059, 2059/2060, 2060/2061, 2061/2062, 2062/2063, 2063/2064, 2064/2065, 2065/2066, 2066/2067, 2067/2068, 2068/2069, 2069/2070, 2070/2071, 2071/2072, 2072/2073, 2073/2074, 2074/2075, 2075/2076, 2076/2077, 2077/2078, 2078/2079, 2079/2080, 2080/2081, 2081/2082, 2082/2083, 2083/2084, 2084/2085, 2085/2086, 2086/2087, 2087/2088, 2088/2089, 2089/2090, 2090/2091, 2091/2092, 2092/2093, 2093/2094, 2094/2095, 2095/2096, 2096/2097, 2097/2098, 2098/2099, 2099/2100, 2100/2101, 2101/2102, 2102/2103, 2103/2104, 2104/2105, 2105/2106, 2106/2107, 2107/2108, 2108/2109, 2109/2110, 2110/2111, 2111/2112, 2112/2113, 2113/2114, 2114/2115, 2115/2116, 2116/2117, 2117/2118, 2118/2119, 2119/2120, 2120/2121, 2121/2122, 2122/2123, 2123/2124, 2124/2125, 2125/2126, 2126/2127, 2127/2128, 2128/2129, 2129/2130, 2130/2131, 2131/2132, 2132/2133, 2133/2134, 2134/2135, 2135/2136, 2136/2137, 2137/2138, 2138/2139, 2139/2140, 2140/2141, 2141/2142, 2142/2143, 2143/2144, 2144/2145, 2145/2146, 2146/2147, 2147/2148, 2148/2149, 2149/2150, 2150/2151, 2151/2152, 2152/2153, 2153/2154, 2154/2155, 2155/2156, 2156/2157, 2157/2158, 2158/2159, 2159/2160, 2160/2161, 2161/2162, 2162/2163, 2163/2164, 2164/2165, 2165/2166, 2166/2167, 2167/2168, 2168/2169, 2169/2170, 2170/2171, 2171/2172, 2172/2173, 2173/2174, 2174/2175, 2175/2176, 2176/2177, 2177/2178, 2178/2179, 2179/2180, 2180/2181, 2181/2182, 2182/2183, 2183/2184, 2184/2185, 2185/2186, 2186/2187, 2187/2188, 2188/2189, 2189/2190, 2190/2191, 2191/2192, 2192/2193, 2193/2194, 2194/2195, 2195/2196, 2196/2197, 2197/2198, 2198/2199, 2199/2200, 2200/2201, 2201/2202, 2202/2203, 2203/2204, 2204/2205, 2205/2206, 2206/2207, 2207/2208, 2208/2209, 2209/2210, 2210/2211, 2211/2212, 2212/2213, 2213/2214, 2214/2215, 2215/2216, 2216/2217, 2217/2218, 2218/2219, 2219/2220, 2220/2221, 2221/2222, 2222/2223, 2223/2224, 2224/2225, 2225/2226, 2226/2227, 2227/2228, 2228/2229, 2229/2230, 2230/2231, 2231/2232, 2232/2233, 2233/2234, 2234/2235, 2235/2236, 2236/2237, 2237/2238, 2238/2239, 2239/2240, 2240/2241, 2241/2242, 2242/2243, 2243/2244, 2244/2245, 2245/2246, 2246/2247, 2247/2248, 2248/2249, 2249/2250, 2250/2251, 2251/2252, 2252/2253, 2253/2254, 2254/2255, 2255/2256, 2256/2257, 2257/2258, 2258/2259, 2259/2260, 2260/2261, 2261/2262, 2262/2263, 2263/2264, 2264/2265, 2265/2266, 2266/2267, 2267/2268, 2268/2269, 2269/2270, 2270/2271, 2271/2272, 2272/2273, 2273/2274, 2274/2275, 2275/2276, 2276/2277, 2277/2278, 2278/2279, 2279/2280, 2280/2281, 2281/2282, 2282/2283, 2283/2284, 2284/2285, 2285/2286, 2286/2287, 2287/2288, 2288/2289, 2289/2290, 2290/2291, 2291/2292, 2292/2293, 2293/2294, 2294/2295, 2295/2296, 2296/2297, 2297/2298, 2298/2299, 2299/2300, 2300/2301, 2301/2302, 2302/2303, 2303/2304, 2304/2305, 2305/2306, 2306/2307, 2307/2308, 2308/2309, 2309/2310, 2310/2311, 2311/2312, 2312/2313, 2313/2314, 2314/2315, 2315/2316, 2316/2317, 2317/2318, 2318/2319, 2319/2320, 2320/2321, 2321/2322, 2322/2323, 2323/2324, 2324/2325, 2325/2326, 2326/2327, 2327/2328, 2328/2329, 2329/2330, 2330/2331, 2331/2332, 2332/2333, 2333/2334, 2334/2335, 2335/2336, 2336/2337, 2337/2338, 2338/2339, 2339/2340, 2340/2341, 2341/2342, 2342/2343, 2343/2344, 2344/2345, 2345/2346, 2346/2347, 2347/2348, 2348/2349, 2349/2350, 2350/2351, 2351/2352, 2352/2353, 2353/2354, 2354/2355, 2355/2356, 2356/2357, 2357/2358, 2358/2359, 2359/2360, 2360/2361, 2361/2362, 2362/2363, 2363/2364, 2364/2365, 2365/2366, 2366/2367, 2367/2368, 2368/2369, 2369/2370, 2370/2371, 2371/2372, 2372/2373, 2373/2374, 2374/2375, 2375/2376, 2376/2377, 2377/2378, 2378/2379, 2379/2380, 2380/2381, 2381/2382, 2382/2383, 2383/2384, 2384/2385, 2385/2386, 2386/2387, 2387/2388, 2388/2389, 2389/2390, 2390/2391, 2391/2392, 2392/2393, 2393/2394, 2394/2395, 2395/2396, 2396/2397, 2397/2398, 2398/2399, 2399/2400, 2400/2401, 2401/2402, 2402/2403, 2403/2404, 2404/2405, 2405/2406, 2406/2407, 2407/2408, 2408/2409, 2409/2410, 2410/2411, 2411/2412, 2412/2413, 2413/2414, 2414/2415, 2415/2416, 2416/2417, 2417/2418, 2418/2419, 2419/2420, 2420/2421, 2421/2422, 2422/2423, 2423/2424, 2424/2425, 2425/2426, 2426/2427, 2427/2428, 2428/2429, 2429/2430, 2430/2431, 2431/2432, 2432/2433, 2433/2434, 2434/2435, 2435/2436, 2436/2437, 2437/2438, 2438/2439, 2439/2440, 2440/2441, 2441/2442, 2442/2443, 2443/2444, 2444/2445, 2445/2446, 2446/2447, 2447/2448, 2448/2449, 2449/2450, 2450/2451, 2451/2452, 2452/2453, 2453/2454, 2454/2455, 2455/2456, 2456/2457, 2457/2458, 2458/2459, 2459/2460, 2460/2461, 2461/2462, 2462/2463, 2463/2464, 2464/2465, 2465/2466, 2466/2467, 2467/2468, 2468/2469, 2469/2470, 2470/2471, 2471/2472, 2472/2473, 2473/2474, 2474/2475, 2475/2476, 2476/2477, 2477/2478, 2478/2479, 2479/2480, 2480/2481, 2481/2482, 2482/2483, 2483/2484, 2484/2485, 2485/2486, 2486/2487, 2487/2488, 2488/2489, 2489/2490, 2490/2491, 2491/2492, 2492/2493, 2493/2494, 2494/2495, 2495/2496, 2496/2497, 2497/2498, 2498/2499, 2499/2500, 2500/2501, 2501/2502, 2502/2503, 2503/2504, 2504/2505, 2505/2506, 2506/2507, 2507/2508, 2508/2509, 2509/2510, 2510/2511, 2511/2512, 2512/2513, 2513/2514, 2514/2515, 2515/2516, 2516/2517, 2517/2518, 2518/2519, 2519/2520, 2520/2521, 2521/2522, 2522/2523, 2523/2524, 2524/2525, 2525/2526, 2526/2527, 2527/2528, 2528/2529, 2529/2530, 2530/2531, 2531/2532, 2532/2533, 2533/2534, 2534/2535, 2535/2536, 2536/2537, 2537/2538, 2538/2539, 2539/2540, 2540/2541, 2541/2542, 2542/2543, 2543/2544, 2544/2545, 2545/2546, 2546/2547, 2547/2548, 2548/2549, 2549/2550, 2550/2551, 2551/2552, 2552/2553, 2553/2554, 2554/2555, 2555/2556, 2556/2557, 2557/2558, 2558/2559, 2559/2560, 2560/2561, 2561/2562, 2562/2563, 2563/2564, 2564/2565, 2565/2566, 2566/2567, 2567/2568, 2568/2569, 2569/2570, 2570/2571, 2571/2572, 2572/2573, 2573/2574, 2574/2575, 2575/2576, 2576/2577, 2577/2578, 2578/2579, 2579/2580, 2580/2581, 2581/2582, 2582/2583, 2583/2584, 2584/2585, 2585/2586, 2586/2587, 2587/2588, 2588/2589, 2589/2590, 2590/2591, 2591/2592, 2592/2593, 2593/2594, 2594/2595, 2595/2596, 2596/2597, 2597/2598, 2598/2599, 2599/2600, 2600/2601, 2601/2602, 2602/2603, 2603/2604, 2604/2605, 2605/2606, 2606/2607, 2607/2608, 2608/2609, 2609/2610, 2610/2611, 2611/2612, 2612/2613, 2613/2614, 2614/2615, 2615/2616, 2616/2617, 2617/2618, 2618/2619, 2619/2620, 2620/2621, 2621/2622, 2622/2623, 2623/2624, 2624/2625, 2625/2626, 2626/2627, 2627/2628, 2628/2629, 2629/2630, 2630/2631, 2631/2632, 2632/2633, 2633/2634, 2634/2635, 2635/2636, 2636/2637, 2637/2638, 2638/2639, 2639/2640, 2640/2641, 2641/2642, 2642/2643, 2643/2644, 2644/2645, 2645/2646, 2646/2647, 2647/2648, 2648/2649, 2649/2650, 2650/2651, 2651/2652, 2652/2653, 2653/2654, 2654/2655, 2655/2656, 2656/2657, 2657/2658, 2658/2659, 2659/2660, 2660/2661, 2661/2662, 2662/2663, 2663/2664, 2664/2665, 2665/2666, 2666/2667, 2667/2668, 2668/2669, 2669/2670, 2670/2671, 2671/2672, 2672/2673, 2673/2674, 2674/2675, 2675/2676, 2676/2677, 2677/2678, 2678/2679, 2679/2680, 2680/2681, 2681/2682, 2682/2683, 2683/2684, 2684/2685, 2685/2686, 2686/2687, 2687/2688, 2688/2689, 2689/2690, 2690/2691, 2691/2692, 2692/2693, 2693/2694, 2694/2695, 2695/2696, 2696/2697, 2697/2698, 2698/2699, 2699/2700, 2700/2701, 2701/2702, 2702/2703, 2703/2704, 2704/2705, 2705/2706, 2706/2707, 2707/2708, 2708/2709, 2709/2710, 2710/2711, 2711/2712, 2712/2713, 2713/2714, 2714/2715, 2715/2716, 2716/2717, 2717/2718, 2718/2719, 2719/2720, 2720/2721, 2721/2722, 2722/2723, 2723/2724, 2724/2725, 2725/2726, 2726/2727, 2727/2728, 2728/2729, 2729/2730, 2730/2731, 2731/2732, 2732/2733, 2733/2734, 2734/2735, 2735/2736, 2736/2737, 2737/2738, 2738/2739, 2739/2740, 2740/2741, 2741/2742, 2742/2743, 2743/2744, 2744/2745, 2745/2746, 2746/2747, 2747/2748, 2748/2749, 2749/2750, 2750/2751, 2751/2752, 2752/2753, 2753/2754, 2754/2755, 2755/2756, 2756/2757, 2757/2758, 2758/2759, 2759/2760, 2760/2761, 2761/2762, 2762/2763, 2763/2764, 2764/2765, 2765/2766, 2766/2767, 2767/2768, 2768/2769, 2769/2770, 2770/2771, 2771/2772, 2772/2773, 2773/2774, 2774/2775, 2775/2776, 2776/2777, 2777/2778, 2778/2779, 2779/2780, 2780/2781, 2781/2782, 2782/2783, 2783/2784, 2784/2785, 2785/2786, 2786/2787, 2787/2788, 2788/2789, 2789/2790, 2790/2791, 2791/2792, 2792/2793, 2793/2794, 2794/2795, 2795/2796, 2796/2797, 2797/2798, 2798/2799, 2799/2800, 2800/2801, 2801/2802, 2802/2803, 2803/2804, 2804/2805, 2805/2806, 2806/2807, 2807/2808, 2808/2809, 2809/2810, 2810/2811, 2811/2812, 2812/2813, 2813/2814, 2814/2815, 2815/2816, 2816/2817, 2817/2818, 2818/2819, 2819/2820, 2820/2821, 2821/2822, 2822/2823, 2823/2824, 2824/2825, 2825/2826, 2826/2827, 2827/2828, 2828/2829, 2829/2830, 2830/2831, 2831/2832, 2832/2833, 2833/2834, 2834/2835, 2835/2836, 2836/2837, 2837/2838, 2838/2839, 2839/2840, 2840/2841, 2841/2842, 2842/2843, 2843/2844, 2844/2845, 2845/2846, 2846/2847, 2847/2848, 2848/2849, 2849/2850, 2850/2851, 2851/2852, 2852/2853, 2853/2854, 2854/2855, 2855/2856, 2856/2857, 2857/2858, 2858/2859, 2859/2860, 2860/2861, 2861/2862, 2862/2863, 2863/2864, 2864/2865, 2865/2866, 2866/2867, 2867/2868, 2868/2869, 2869/2870, 2870/2871, 2871/2872, 2872/2873, 2873/2874, 2874/2875, 2875/2876, 2876/2877, 2877/2878, 2878/2879, 2879/2880, 2880/2881, 2881/2882, 2882/2883, 2883/2884, 2884/2885, 2885/2886, 2886/2887, 2887/2888, 2888/2889, 2889/2890, 2890/2891, 2891/2892, 2892/2893, 2893/2894, 2894/2895, 2895/2896, 2896/2897, 2897/2898, 2898/2899, 2899/2900, 2900/2901, 2901/2902, 2902/2903, 2903/2904, 2904/2905, 2905/2906, 2906/2907, 2907/2908, 2908/2909, 2909/2910, 2910/2911, 2911/2912, 2912/2913, 2913/2914, 2914/2915, 2915/2916, 2916/2917, 2917/2918, 2918/2919, 2919/2920, 2920/2921, 2921/2922, 2922/2923, 2923/2924, 2924/2925, 2925/2926, 2926/2927, 2927/2928, 2928/2929, 2929/2930, 2930/2931, 2931/2932, 2932/2933, 2933/2934, 2934/2935, 2935/2936, 2936/2937, 2937/2938, 2938/2939, 2939/2940, 2940/2941, 2941/2942, 2942/2943, 2943/2944, 2944/2945, 2945/2946, 2946/2947, 2947/2948, 2948/2949, 2949/2950, 2950/2951, 2951/2952, 2952/2953, 2953/2954, 2954/2955, 2955/2956, 2956/2957, 2957/2958, 2958/2959, 2959/2960, 2960/2961, 2961/2962, 2962/2963, 2963/2964, 2964/2965, 2965/2966, 2966/2967, 2967/2968, 2968/2969, 2969/2970, 2970/2971, 2971/2972, 2972/2973, 2973/2974, 2974/2975, 2975/2976, 2976/2977, 2977/2978, 2978/2979, 2979/2980, 2980/2981, 2981/2982, 2982/2983, 2983/2984, 2984/2985, 2985/2986, 2986/2987, 2987/2988, 2988/2989, 2989/2990, 2990/2991, 2991/2992, 2992/2993, 2993/2994, 2994/2995, 2995/2996, 2996/2997, 2997/2998, 2998/2999, 2999/3000, 3000/3001, 3001/3002, 3002/3003, 3003/3004, 3004/3005, 3005/3006, 3006/3007, 3007/3008, 3008/3009, 3009/3010, 3010/3011, 3011/3012, 3012/3013, 3013/3014, 3014/3015, 3015/3016, 3016/3017, 3017/3018, 3018/3019, 3019/3020, 3020/3021, 3021/3022, 3022/3023, 3023/3024, 3024/3025, 3025/3026, 3026/3027, 3027/3028, 3028/3029, 3029/3030, 3030/3031, 3031/3032, 3032/3033, 3033/3034, 3034/3035, 3035/3036, 3036/3037, 3037/3038, 3038

There was also another factor that, irrespective of the post-1965 inflation, prevented the 25 percent target figure from being achieved. This is the dramatically increasing cost of military equipment over this period. The cost of re-equipping the armed forces with modern weapons can be reckoned in hundreds of percent of the unit cost of the equipment they are replacing: the demands of modern warfare are such that a \$1 million fighter plane in the early 1960's now needs to be replaced by a plane costing \$10-12 million; warships have similarly jumped in price, as have all minor pieces of equipment. This phenomenon of cost escalation is not new to Canadians (their experience with the Avro Arrow in the 1950's is still well remembered) but the severity of the present trend has operated so as to confound the already difficult problem of equipment purchasing.¹

Of course, this problem is not unique to Canada. The increasing sophistication and cost of military equipment strains the resources of all but the two most powerful nations and will in future cast even more serious doubts on the ability of other nations to equip themselves militarily. In Canada, as elsewhere, the effect of this was to further depress, in absolute equipment terms, the capital equipment component of the defence budget, already depressed by unforeseen levels of inflation.²

Both these factors operated so as to cast serious doubt on the government's ability to maintain the defence forces at a constant budget. The solution to this problem, as adopted by the government, was to announce force reductions over and above those expected to accrue as a result of

1. Cadieux Evidence SC 3 March 1970, pp 16:26-16:27.

2. Much the same situation was occurring in the UK. See Howard's section on Procurement in his Central Organization For Defence.

the unification exercise. The reductions are noted at Table 1. One effect of these force reductions, coming as they did during the unification exercise, is to complicate the attribution of certain reductions as between the direct economies achieved by integration and compensatory economies achieved by the other means of force reduction. Nonetheless integration and the effects of unification did effect substantial savings in staff, which probably approximated Hellyer's target of 10,000. The integration of the Headquarters resulted in savings of 1,000; and considerable savings of overhead accrued as a result of reducing the commands from eleven to six, and the closing of many bases.¹ But no one suggests that it is other than fallacious to regard the Canadian armed forces at their present level of under 90,000 as merely a trimmer and tauter version of the 1963 forces when they stood at 124,000. The force configuration is different; the present tasks of the armed forces are different and, even allowing for the reduction of 10,000 since 1963 as not affecting the direct capacity of the forces - as being a direct by-product of integration - the other reduction of more than 20,000 represents in part the decreased capacity of the armed forces, in keeping with the strategic concepts expressed in the 1964 White Paper and subsequently.

For these reasons, because the Canadian Forces are different both quantitatively and qualitatively from what they were in 1963, it is not valid to read too much into comparisons between 1963 and 1971, and to

1. According to figures given by Sherman. In 1966 the Associate Minister, in answer to a question on savings in integration provided the following percentages saved in these functional groups: CFIHQ - 26%; Training - 13%; Recruiting - 33%; Information Services - 60%; Construction Engineering - 45%; Cataloguing Section, MATCOM - 26%; Liaison Staff, Washington - 34%; London - 44%. HC 19 October 1966, p. 8853.

attribute these solely to integration and unification.¹ Nonetheless, in spite of this caveat, some overall evaluation of integration and unification on an economic basis is possible, in general terms.

Organizationally, substantial economies were achieved: a greatly streamlined headquarters and the elimination of all the worst side effects of the tri-service committee system on the one hand, and the consolidation of functionally overlapping commands into fewer functionally distinct commands on the other. Both of these are major achievements, and were carried out during the integration phase of reorganization. The economies that arose out of the unification of the Services were much more minor, and are much harder to ascribe purely to this latter process.

In terms of capital equipment the same problem of disentangling savings made as a result of force rundowns from those brought about by integration exist. But in terms of equipment procurement, the five year \$1,500 M programme announced by Hellyer and Cadieux in 1964 was substantially completed on schedule.² In fact this part of the programme was completed using a budget percentage that never exceeded 18 percent, and over the period averaged 16.8 percent. This suggests that Hellyer's target of 25 percent was larger than was really necessary to acquire the equipment needed - even if one took into account a slightly larger force structure during this period.

In fact the figure of 25 percent was another of those magic figures which Hellyer plucked out of the air - much as he decided that

1. This is self-evident, and was strongly stressed by all in the Department whom I tried, in interviews, to draw out on the subject of comparisons - even on a *mutas mutandis* basis.

2. Appendix UU to Arnell Evidence SC 17 April 1968, pp 1218-1219.

integration would achieve 30 percent personnel savings at CFHQ.¹ There does not seem to have been any studies made which indicated the need for 30 percent of the budget to be spent on capital equipment. Indeed, it is likely that such a percentage could not have been sensibly spent, as all that the Canadian Forces programmed for, they got.

As with command and control, all the improvement that was achieved was an outcome of integration, rather than unification. The only real savings possible here are retraining costs as between Services, and the savings arising out of the establishment of a common personnel list - both of these very minor components. This strengthens the impression that unification was, first of all a technical requirement; a means to an end, from a command and control point of view and also economically, rather than an end in itself. It was, despite this, an end in one person's mind - the Minister's, even if in no one else's. He achieved this in a technical sense, but whether it exists in a more tangible form outside the Headquarters is debatable.

The Commands, despite the veneer of unification, see themselves as basically single-element entities. Of the two that were most 'unified' Materiel Command was always regarded as a transitional structure,² and Training Command, as was noted in the previous Chapter has reverted to being merely an Air Training Command, with some added trades training. Of the three operational Commands, Air Defence Command is very much a northern branch of the USAF Air Defence Command; Maritime Command, as regards its anti-submarine warfare role is very closely tied in to NATO on the Atlantic; and Mobile Command is likewise closely tied to NATO insofar as it has responsibility for providing troops for Europe. Even

1. Interviews

2. It has since reverted to the direct control of the CTS.

though on paper the Services do not exist, they tend to persist in the Commands and, more importantly, in the minds of the officers and men there.¹

It is not only because of involvement in allied operations that the original concept of unified forces has been diluted. As Chapter 5 attempted to demonstrate, the functional concept for the Canadian Forces could not, and should not have remained a pure one. The very concrete pressures that emerged in 1967 for some account to be taken of the regional needs of Canada and its population has forced a reversion to a structure that embraced the regional realities of the Canadian sub-continent. In a smaller, more compact area, a purely functional organization, even if thinly spread, might have been viable, but in the Canadian environment it was not. This trend has been endorsed by Macdonald - the present Minister - who envisages the Canadian forces devoting much more time and effort to community service in Canada as opposed to preparation for wars abroad.² What has emerged out of all this is a command structure that is, in its primary tasks, functionally oriented but has the capacity for, and is attuned to respond to "aid of the civil power" and "assistance to civil authorities" tasks in its designated geographical area. For a country such as Canada this type of organization is probably the best as, containing within it both elements, either can be given quick and special importance as required.

One of the most frequently repeated criticisms of the integration and unification process in Canada - in fact a criticism of Hellyer - is that on the one hand he proceeded to implement a major change

1. And even more so in the minds of their wives - interviews.

2. Ottawa Citizen 24 Feb 1971.

without any agreed plan, and also that the whole pace of the change was much too rapid. As regards the first part of this criticism the White Paper was explicit that no attempt would be made to theorize in advance about changes, the scope of which was so great and so significant. Rather, it would be "the responsibility of the Defence Staff to work out the problems ... in accordance with the chain of command."¹ The background to this bland theory was made more explicit three years later when Hellyer explained that "had he asked the Defence Staff for a proposed 'blueprint', unification would never have gotten off the ground.... we have started with the initial approval in principle of what we desired to do. We then formed the single integrated Defence Staff; followed by reorganization of the Command structure."² In other words the nature of the government's aims was such that planning and implementation had to be done concurrently.³

This may in part explain why in certain quarters there was the feeling that implementation was being hurried along too quickly. There were a number of reasons for this, both on the positive and negative aspects of the argument. There is no doubt that the changes in organization caused considerable administrative dislocations and degraded the efficiency of the forces.⁴ This had to be overcome as quickly as possible

1. P. 19

2. Armed Forces Management, June 1967, pp 38 and 40.

3. The lack of clear blueprint may also have been a result of Hellyer's realization of the enormous opposition this would encounter from the Services. But it also reflected his ad hoc, action-oriented way of responding to situations. Even if unification had not been an issue, Hellyer's relations with his military advisors would have been a poor one for other reasons; as he was not prepared to stick to the traditional chain of command. On this point see Fleury Evidence, SC 22/23 Feb 1967 pp 1491 ff.

4. The current quip of those times was "If the boss rings, for goodness sakes get his name and find out who he is" - from various forces newspapers 1964/1965.

and hence any prolongation of the changeover was undesirable. Related to this is the question, how long is enough for the changeover? In retrospect many of the difficulties which emerged were not conceptual - the plan itself was quite satisfactory - but resulted from the clash of personalities and from the differing Service doctrines. To reconcile the former, to wait as Moses did for the old generation to die out would have taken at least ten years.¹ To reconcile the latter was probably impossible: what was needed was to do away with the normal concept of a transitional stage and instead to do away with the old in one fell swoop and to start afresh with the new. To do otherwise was to run the risk of merely perpetuating old rivalries, of attenuating the changeover and thus to risk jeopardizing the whole venture on purely secondary and irrelevant grounds.

Indeed, quite the opposite can be argued in support of Hellyer's pace of change. It was obvious from the first that the change would not be easy, that difficulties would arise, and that temptations would occur to slow the process down. Thus it was doubly necessary to build up a certain momentum to prevent the machinery of change from being bogged down in the sticky patches of disagreement; to set firm deadlines which, if unrealistic from the viewpoint of settling all differences, was at least valuable in sharpening the perceptions of the participants to separate the important and the necessary problems from the trivial and secondary irritants of change.

1. "By a military generation, I mean the time span it would normally take an officer currently in the Staff College to progress to my job as Chief of the Defence Staff, say ten years" - Gen. Allard, Armed Forces Management, June 1967, p. 40.

In the light of these factors no real fault can be found either with the way the plan was administered or with the pace at which it was achieved.¹ If there is any specific criticism of the plan, it is with the concept itself and how it was developed. In large part this depends on whether one views the unification of the armed forces as basically a political decision or an administrative exercise.

There is considerable evidence, from different sources, for either viewpoint.² The determination of a Minister with the personal qualities of Hellyer was a force to be reckoned with, and this could not avoid giving a very strong impression of political impetus. On the other hand the early stages of integration were supported by all parties. The opposition, when it came, did not really deal with the fundamental principles of unification, but with matters such as the speed at which these changes were being carried out. The 'revolt of the admirals' in 1966-67 had the effect of personalizing many issues, and furthermore making it appear that the Services were more concerned with preserving their identity than with accepting the higher rationale of integration.

Public opinion on the matter, if one judges this according to the newspapers and periodicals of the period, tended to regard the whole matter with derision.³ This was partly a reaction to some of Hellyer's more heavy-handed moves, such as his labelling of Landymore's actions as

-
1. This may appear to be a bloody-minded judgement, when one considers the way in which the careers of many officers and men were blighted by the events of the period. But there is a point beyond which opposition to government views becomes obstruction. That some officers crossed that point, and had therefore to be removed in a number of ways does not alter the above judgement. Rather it strengthens the view of the need for a new generation to arise. Unfortunately there is little evidence for such a generation emerging. On the contrary they are carefully, if informally, being trained to make the same inter-Service distinctions as previously.
 2. Byers' unpublished study of the various interest group perceptions of the events of 1966-68 traces this in considerable detail.
 3. Certain events of this period were followed with considerable interest. The period 1966-1968 really deserves a full-length study. Anything short of this is mainly impressionistic.

disloyal - a term which he later had to retract. Certain newspapers were frankly partisan to the Services - the Halifax Chronicle and the Winnipeg Free Press for example - and to some extent Canadians could receive vastly different interpretations of the same events, depending on which publications they read. Partisanship, never far below the surface of parliamentary activities, welled up strongly in the Parliamentary Committee on Defence in its 1967 hearings although this too, in the end was inconsequential, and turned out to be little more than letting all parties to the issue have their say, and then going on as before.¹

In 1964, the Suttie Report had noted the dilemma of the peacetime Services: "It is inconsistent that a serviceman should be a hero in wartime and a curiosity in peacetime."² This view still held three years later.

The Service viewpoints had their major weakness in that they did not greatly command popular support. On the contrary, if one removes from the periodicals the extreme partisans of both sides - many of whom wrote under bylines - and retains merely journalistic and editorial writings, the overwhelming impression one has is that the Services were made a laughing stock, not from any deep insight or conviction, but because they did not carry the country, which preferred to support the Government. Nor was Hellyer's main aim - integration and unification - taken very seriously

1. After very lengthy hearings and sittings, which included the staged confrontation of Hellyer with his major Service opponents, Bill C243, which the Committee was examining, was referred back to the Commons without any comment or amendments of substance.

2. P. 18.

either. The periodicals tended to seek to amuse rather than to inform.¹ The unification effort was seen as an effort at bureaucratic reform rather than as a political issue. Defence was not a major issue - it was hardly an issue at all - in the 1968 elections.

In retrospect it appears that integration brought with it many benefits, both economic and organizational, and that unification, as defined in Chapter 4 was to a considerable degree little more than the legal formality of tidying up the loose ends, left over from the previous integration effort. But to accept this distinction on the basis of the official statements of the day is not enough. The stage that the Department of National Defence arrived at in late 1966: a single CDS in charge of a completely unified (in the structural sense) headquarters where the Services only existed in the dress and background of the people who staffed it; restructured functional Commands which completely replaced the previous Service Commands, if not in composition, then at least in their responsibility to a unified headquarters, was far more than what is normally understood by integration, as it was described in Chapter 1. The process of unification began on the day that integration began, by the abolition of the Service Chiefs. Without the Chiefs, the Services were in a limbo, and had no alternative but to respond to the directions of the CDS, whatever the legal position.

For this reason it is futile to regard the events of 1964-1968 as falling into stages, some of which are acceptable in some sense, and

1. The cartoonists had a field day both with the Services (characterizing admirals as going down with their desks) and with the new look of the Armed Forces (Hellyer as the spurred and kilted leader of Hellyer's Hybrids).

others which are not. The distinctive aspect of the Canadian Defence reorganization is that it did not evolve in stages, but emerged fully formed and developed within a year of its official conception. It is this which makes the Canadian effort unique: not that it was carried out at all, but the way in which so many stages in the organizational development were so compressed.

The restructured Canadian Forces have been operating under this new framework for over five years now. They have not yet been tested in battle, either as an entity, or in combination with an ally. At the time of writing it is unlikely that they will be so tested for a number of years. But more and more it appears that the aim of the Canadian Forces is not so much to make a contribution to external events, as to assist the government in the building up of the country from within. The unitary organization that has been devised is more appropriate for this task than was the former triad of Services, only one of which had major domestic responsibilities.

It seems that what Canada has done has been to give more positive meaning to the peacetime role of the Canadian Forces as a contributing factor in national development. Although this has not yet been given clear and unequivocal expression, it is expected that future developments will confirm this. It goes without saying that this is a role which the Armed Forces will, in time, be proud to adopt and place alongside their more traditional one.

APPENDIX 1

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACDS	- Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff
ADM	- Assistant Deputy Minister
AIRDEFCOM	- Air Defence Command
CAS	- Chief of the Air Staff
CCOSC	- Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee
CDS	- Chief of the Defence Staff
CFHQ	- Canadian Forces Headquarters - replaced NDHQ after 1967
CG	- Controller General
CGS	- Chief of the General Staff
CLE	- Chief of Logistics and Engineering; later CLED - Chief of Logistics, Engineering and Development
CoPR	- Chief of Operational Readiness
COS	- Chief of Staff
COSC	- Chiefs of Staff Committee
CP	- Chief of Personnel
CTS	- Chief of Technical Services
DCFD	- Deputy Chief Force Development
DCOpsR	- Deputy Chief Operations and Reserves
DCOS	- Deputy Chief of Staff
DCRes	- Deputy Chief Reserves
DGMEA	- Director-General Management, Engineering and Automation
DM	- Deputy Minister
DND	- Department of National Defence
IDP	- Integrated Defence Plan
MARCOM	- Maritime Command
MATCOM	- Materiel Command
MOBCOM	- Mobile Command
NDHQ	- National Defence Headquarters
NORAD	- North American Air Defence
OKW	- Ober Kommand der Wehrmacht
PJBD	- Permanent Joint Board on Defence - US/Canada
RCAF	- Royal Canadian Air Force
RCN	- Royal Canadian Navy
RMC	- Royal Military College
TRAINCOM	- Training Command
VCDS	- Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

APPENDIX 2

PERSONS INTERVIEWED IN CONNECTION WITH THESIS RESEARCH

Mr. R.M. ALDWINCKLE	- Director General Programs; Chief of Staff, Mobile Command (Retd)
Mr. E.B. ARMSTRONG	- Deputy Minister
Dr. J.C. ARNELL	- Assistant Deputy Minister Finance
COL R.R. BARBER	- Senior Staff Officer Plans AIRDEFCOM
COL R.B. BENNETT	- Director of Organization
B.GEN. L.A. BOURGEOIS	- Director Information Services
B.GEN. G.C. BROWN	- COS Ops MOBCOM
COL R.B. BUTTON	- Senior Staff Officer Organization and Management AIRDEFCOM
COL C.V. CARLSON	- DCOS Ops/Plans MOBCOM
Mr. J.R. CHISHOLM	- Departmental Secretary
Mr. E.L.K. COWAN	- Chief, Parliamentary Returns Section
COL E.B. CREEBER	- DCOS Logs MOBCOM
LT.GEN. M.R. DARE	- Vice Chief of Defence Staff
CMDRE ELCOCK	- Director General Organization and Manpower Management
LT.GEN. F.J. FLEURY	- Comptroller General (Retd)
Mr. A.C. GRANT	- Director of Financial Administration
Mr. P.T. HELLYER	- Minister for National Defence 1963 - 1967
B.GEN. J. JOHNSON	- Deputy Commander AIRDEFCOM
M.GEN. R.J. LANE	- Deputy Commander MOBCOM
Mr. W.M. LEE	- Executive Assistant to Mr. Hellyer, Minister for National Defence
CDR. W.H. NORTHEY	- Deputy Assistant for Personnel Research
COL J.L.A. ROUSSEL	- DCOS Coord MOBCOM
GEN. F.R. SHARP	- Chief of Defence Staff
PROF S.F. WISE	- Director of History
LT.COL. G.J. YANCHUS	- Acting Controller MOBCOM

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

In gauging this thesis, insofar as it purports to account for the circumstances of government actions over a number of years, it is important that sources used and unused be noted.

As well as the normal bibliographical items, the thesis is based largely on three official sources:

House of Commons Debates - referred to in the footnotes as H.C.

Special Committee on Defence - referred to in the footnotes as S.C. This Committee was created in 1963 and since then has changed its name on two occasions. In 1965 the Special Committee was given permanent status as the Standing Committee on National Defence; and in 1969 it was merged with its counterpart in External Affairs as the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

The Committee prints its Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence - over 5000 pages to date - and issues irregular reports.

Department of National Defence Files - I was given access to all the files dealing with integration and unification. Their security classification prevents me from describing them in more detail. I carefully read over 100 files dealing with events between 1946 and 1971. Most of the decisions on file were later announced through Hansard or to the Committee on National Defence; and I have not had to breach any confidences on this account. The files were

useful mainly in allowing me to observe the nature of the discussions that proceeded, and to illustrate some of the considerations that went to the final announced decisions. A considerable amount of my source material on the pros and cons of issues is based on my reading of the files.

It should also be noted that two sources of government information were not revealed to me. These are the Defence Council Minutes and Cabinet Submissions and Decisions; and I have not examined them as a series, although excerpts were occasionally found on the files I examined. In retrospect, and having regard to the dimensions of the subject, it is likely that the unavailability of these documents has not greatly hindered my appreciation of the factors that impinged on policy decisions. On the contrary, because I have not been made privy to the minds of the ultimate decision-makers (except with some of them at subsequent interviews) I have found it easier to speculate widely on the choices that were made and the alternatives that were rejected in the unification debates.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

1. BOOKS

Brassey's Annual: the Armed Forces Yearbook, 1962-1969
London, Praeger, 1962-1969

Canadian Annual Review, 1963-1968. Toronto, U. of T.
Press, 1964-1969

GOODSPEED, D.J. A History of the Defence Research Board of Canada
Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1958

HAMMOND, P.Y. Organizing for Defence. Princeton,
Princeton U.P., 1961

HOLMES, J.W. The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian
Diplomacy. Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1970

HOWARD, M. The Central Organization of Defence. London,
Royal United Services Institution, 1970

HUNTINGTON, S.P. The Soldier and the State
Cambridge, Harvard U.P., 1967

----- The Common Defence; Strategic Programs in National
Politics New York, Columbia U.P., 1961

LYON, P.V. The Policy Question. Toronto,
McClelland and Stewart, 1963

McLIN, J.B. Canada's Changing Defence Policy 1957 - 1963
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1967

MAYHEW, C. Britain's Role Tomorrow. London, Hutchinson, 1967

MORISON, E.E. Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and
Times of Henry L. Stimson, N.Y., Atheneum, 1964

MOULTON, J.L. Defence in a Changing World. London, Eyre and
Spottiswood, 1964

NEWMAN, P.C. The Distemper of Our Times. Canadian Politics in
Transition: 1963-1968. Toronto, McClelland and Stewart,
1968

RIES, J.C. The Management of Defence. Baltimore, Johns
Hopkins Press, 1964

SNYDER, W.P. The Politics of British Defence Policy 1945-1962
Columbus, Ohio State U.P., 1964

2. ARTICLES ETC.

Armed Forces Management June 1964, June 1965, June 1966,
June 1967

BEATON, L. "The Canadian White Paper on Defence". Inter-
national Jnl., Vol. XI, no. 3, Summer 1964, 364-370

BYERS, R.B. "Reorganization of the Canadian Armed Forces:
Parliamentary, Military and Interest Group Perceptions"
Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Carleton University, Ottawa,
1970

COHEN, M. "The Arctic and the National Interest". International
Jnl., Vol. XXVI, no. 1, Winter 1970, 51-81

COX, D. "Canadian Defence Policy: the Dilemmas of a Middle
Power" Behind the Headlines, Vol. XXVII, no. 5,
Nov 1968

DEAN, M. "Central Organization for Defence" R.U.S.I. Jnl.,
June 1969, 53-59

EAYRS, J. "Canada Pioneers the Single Service" The Round
Table, no. 234, Apr 1969, 149-159

----- "Future Roles for the Armed Forces of Canada"
Behind the Headlines, Vol. XXVIII, no. 1-2, Apr 1969

HEELIS, J.E. "Integration in Canada - What Lessons Has It For
Us" R.U.S.I. Jnl., Vol. CXII, no. 646, May 1967, 132-136

HODGETTS, J.E. "Grasping the Nettle: Parliament's Special
Committee on Defence" International Jnl., Vol. XIX, no. 2,
Spring 1964, 213-218

HYNDMAN, J.E. "National Interest and the New Look". International
Jnl., Vol. XXVI, no. 1, Winter 1970, 5-18

LEE, W.M. "Background to the White Paper on Defence" by Group-
Captain W.M. Lee, Special Assistant to the Minister of
National Defence. (n.d.) mimeographed (copy held at
Directorate of History, Department of National Defence)

LEGAULT, A. "La position stratégique du Canada et la décennie
1970". International Jnl., Vol. XXVI, no. 1, Winter 1970,
82-108

LINDBLOM, C.E. "The Science of Muddling Through". Pub. Admin. Rev.,
Vol. 19, No. 2, Spring 1959, 79-88

LYON, P.V. "The Trudeau Doctrine". International Jnl., Vol. XXVI,
no. 1, Winter 1970, 19-43

MUELLER, J.E. "Incentives for Restraint: Canada as a Non-Nuclear Power" Orbis, Vol 11, Fall 1967, 864-884

PERLMUTTER, A. "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army" Comparative Politics, April 1969, 382-404

RYAN, P.B. "Unification in Canada: the World Watches" U.S. Nav. Inst. Proc., Vol. 93, March 1967, 64-69

SHARP, M. "The Role of Middle Powers in a Changing World". An address given at Carleton University, Ottawa, 20 Feb 1969. Ottawa, Dept. of External Affairs, 1969. (Mimeographed)

SHERMAN, M.E. "A Single Service for Canada?" Adelphi Papers, No. 39, July 1967

TACKABERRY, R.B. "Organizing and Training Peacekeeping Forces: the Canadian View". International Jnl., Vol. XXII, No. 2, Spring 1967, 195-209

3. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Canada. Commission on the Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Militia) Report. Brigadier E.R. Suttie, Chairman. Ottawa, 1964. (Mimeographed)

Canada. Department of External Affairs. External Affairs, Vols. XX, XXI, 1968, 1969

Canada. Department of External Affairs. Foreign Policy for Canadians, Vol. 1 Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1970

Canada. Department of National Defence. Defence 1959, Hon. G.R. Pearkes, Minister. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1959

Canada. Department of National Defence. White Paper on Defence. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1964

Canada. Royal Commission on Government Organization. Report. V. 4. Mr. J. Grant Glassco, Chairman. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1963

Great Britain. Ministry of Defence. Central Organization for Defence. Cmd. 2097. London, H.M.S.O., 1963

New Zealand. Ministry of Defence. Review of Defence Policy 1966. Wellington, Government Printer, 1966

U.S. Defense Dept. Defense for Peace; Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, 1 July 1970. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1970.