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Full Name of Author — Nom complet de l'auteur

MAUREEN ANN MANCUSO

Date of Birth — Date de naissance

June 6, 1959

Country of Birth — Lieu de naissance

CANADA

Permanent Address — Résidence fixe

5421 ELM ST.
NIAGARA FALLS, ONTARIO
L2E 2V5

Title of Thesis — Titre de la thèse

"Attitudes of Canadian Legislators Toward Political
Corruption: An Empirical Analysis"

University — Université

CARLETON UNIVERSITY

Degree for which thesis was presented — Grade pour lequel cette thèse fut présentée

MASTER OF ARTS

Year this degree conferred — Année d'obtention de ce grade

1984

Name of Supervisor — Nom du directeur de thèse

ROBERT J. JACKSON

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ATTITUDES OF CANADIAN LEGISLATORS
TOWARD POLITICAL CORRUPTION:
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ©

by

Maureen Mancuso Hons.BA

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Department of Political Science

Carleton University

OTTAWA, Ontario

January 31, 1984

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ATTITUDES OF CANADIAN LEGISLATORS

TOWARD POLITICAL CORRUPTION:

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

submitted by Maureen Mancuso, Hons. B.A.
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts

Thesis Supervisor

Chairman, Department of Political Science

Carleton University

April 27, 1984

ABSTRACT

There has not been research conducted on the attitudes of Canadian legislators toward corrupt acts and the relationship of these attitudes to personal characteristics of the legislators. Intuitively, one would expect legislators to differ in their attitudes toward corruption, just as they vary in their attitudes toward other political phenomenon. In addition, these attitudes may display certain regularities in their relationship to individual and aggregate characteristics of legislators.

Are the motives of individual representatives which govern a decision to partake in corrupt activities, dependent on the background and values of each Member of Parliament? Or, are such motives more heavily influenced by the legislative environment within which the representative operates? Do legislative norms, procedures and conventions, homogenize members attitudes toward political corruption?

Based on a data base of self-administered questionnaires, completed by eighty-four Members of the 32nd Parliament, this thesis explores attitudes toward a number of potentially corrupt activities, in the hopes of discovering how much agreement or disagreement exists between MPs over what constitutes corruption. Several characteristics - party affiliation, regional location, and character of the constituency represented, and the number of years of legislative service - were all found to be significantly related to member's perception of what constitutes corruption and their tolerance or intolerance of such activity.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many people without whose help this thesis could not have been produced. Firstly, I must thank the eighty-four Members of Parliament who gave so generously of their time to participate in the survey. Without their cooperation this project would not have been possible and the response to my requests for help, indicate that MPs, while busy men and women, are willing to be a part of political research.

To Kimberly Flood and Catherine Thompson, my bilingual assistants who administered the francophone questionnaires with ease and grace, I say, "Merci Beaucoup". Susan Gervais from Carleton's french department, translated the questionnaire and the letters quickly and professionally. Debby Blais is responsible for the completion of the final manuscript.

The basis of this study was a survey conducted by John G. Peters and Susan Welch from the University of Nebraska. They gladly sent me not only a copy of their questionnaire, but as well, provided me with their codebook, data file, and letters of encouragement.

Bill Coleman, McMaster University, helped me with questions of survey design, interview techniques and methodology; while Chandra Hathiramani, provided invaluable assistance with all facets of SPSS programming. Not to be forgotten, N.H. Chi assisted with the random sample and was quite supportive of my endeavours. Peter Johansen, Carleton School of Journalism, provided excellent editorial comments, which certainly made revisions much easier.

To my friends, especially Joanne, I am grateful for their much needed encouragement, comments and comic relief. If not corrupt, they all certainly can be bought.

Special thanks goes to my supervisor Robert J. Jackson, whose help was not measured by the amount of time he spent with me, but by the quality of time we spent together. His structural suggestions, probing questions and stylistic comments were greatly appreciated.

Finally, for his constant support, enthusiastic encouragement, generous assistance and statistics tutorials, this thesis is dedicated to Michael M. Atkinson, who always told me one could not write about political corruption and suffer from biblical illusions. Michael, you were right, my illusions have all been shattered!

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INTRODUCTION

Political corruption in Canada has rarely been the subject of systematic research. The lack of scholarly consideration has left the investigation of corruption to journalists and others whose main interest lies in describing events in somewhat lurid detail. The validity of such accounts is always questionable. Reports of corrupt acts can often be distorted, and journalistic accounts rarely provide information on how extensive or widespread corrupt activities are. The existing literature on the topic is primarily of an American or comparative orientation, and various approaches to the study of political corruption can be discerned.

Works which adopt a descriptive approach have been very common. Authors have chronicled specific scandals which have plagued political systems,¹ and more general works have traced the history of corruption at different levels of government.² Much of the existing literature on corruption in Canada, has treated the subject in an historical fashion. Case studies of particular scandals and misdeeds dominate the research which has been done. While such accounts are useful in providing the details of a specific incident, they too are limited by the fact that authors have failed to make clear whether these are just isolated incidents of corruption, or whether they are indicative of a recurring, routine pattern of corrupt activity.

Several authors have become proponents of what has been termed the "modernization thesis" of corruption; notably Huntington(1958), Scott(1969) and Heidenheimer(1970).³ According to this thesis corruption usually reaches its climax during the tenuous, transitional phase of a country's modernization. Subsequently, its denouement follows, until in advanced democracies it becomes relatively rare.⁴ Such a pattern is not always applicable and a flaw in the thesis seems to be its inability to account for the widespread survival of corruption in advanced democracies.

Recent approaches to political corruption have been somewhat more theoretical. Susan Rose-Ackerman,⁵ applies economic theory assumptions to corruption. Elected representatives, voters and bureaucrats, are depicted as rational beings conducting a cost-benefit analysis of the potential for gain in acting corruptly. Lawrence Sherman(1978),⁶ adopts a sociological approach to help account for existing patterns of corruption within an American police department. From his viewpoint political corruption is intrinsic to the political system, rather than the result of the actions of an evil or corrupt individual. Thus, Sherman is not concerned with the actions of individual police officers, but with the corruption of entire police departments. In his writing, corruption seems to be a normal everyday occurrence.

Such a viewpoint is also advanced by Edward Banfield in his work, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. In this book, Banfield examines a phenomenon he terms "amoral familism", in the under-developed regions of Southern Italy. He suggests that amoral familism can be instrumental in the development of societal acceptance of political corruption. Amoral familism he defines as being a condition which exists when individuals maximize the short run advantage of the nuclear family, thereby assuring that all others act in the same manner.⁷ Such a sociological orientation, Banfield suggests is found where there exists an evident lack of public spiritedness.

Kenneth Gibbons in his attempt to link the study of corruption with the study of Canadian political culture, outlines a number of remaining approaches evident in the literature on political corruption. First, there is the regionalism orientation which is premised on the expectation that people from various regions or areas in a country will vary in their attitudes toward political corruption. Raymond Wolfinger, in outlining patterns of patronage in the United States, found such variation to exist.⁸ He discovered acceptance to be the norm in the East and the South, while the upper Midwest and Pacific coast regions were quite intolerant of such behaviour.

Gibbons himself suggests that similar regional variations in attitudes toward corruption exist in Canada. He advances that there

exists a political culture of corruption, based on regional variations in orientations which tolerate and even support the existence of corruption within the Canadian political system.⁹ It has often been assumed that political corruption in Canada has been more prevalent in the Atlantic provinces and Quebec.¹⁰ This seems to be credited to the longevity of corruption from one government to the next in Quebec, as exemplified by the practices of Duplessis; while the Maritimes have been portrayed as being continually plagued by patronage and the familiar activities of vote-buying and trading. While this regionalism approach is perhaps an interesting theory, seemingly based on traditional and historical interpretations, such a suggestion remains to be empirically tested.

The next approach is termed "psychological". As argued by Robert Lane, it seems common for many people to rationalize corruption. This he attributes to a pervasive, complex attitude of blamelessness. Such an attitude encourages the blame for corrupt activity to be shifted from the individual office holder to the political system itself. This was the general reaction discovered among a number of "average citizens in Eastport", interviewed by Lane for his book, Political Ideology.

According to Lane, most psychological predispositions have some basis in experience or perception.¹¹ In the case of the Eastport

respondents it was the prevalent belief that corruption was not a cause for concern. It was perceived as having no effect on the quality of government services, nor did it challenge the people's confidence in their elected representatives. Speaking of the people interviewed as a group, Lane stated:

"Their reaction is, generally speaking, a tolerant one, certainly not indignant, not moralistic, possibly insufficiently censorious. It is marked by the belief that the system encourages corruption, that somehow it is 'natural' to politics".¹²

Whether such a psychological disposition toward corruption exists in Canada has yet to be determined.

Lastly, is the developmental viewpoint which extends further the basic tenets of the psychological approach. James Scott has suggested that corruption can be treated in terms of the political system as a whole and that corruption is often consistent with the social patterns within that system.¹³ John Wilson, in his article which attempts to define Canadian political culture, relates the province's stage of development to the province's political culture. He classifies the provinces as Underdeveloped (NFLD., PEI, NB, NS), Transitional (Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, B.C.), or Developed (Alberta, Saskatchewan), and

then proceeds to argue that these stages of development cause variations in provincial political cultures. He suggests that these developmental and cultural differences then, can be related to a province's or region's perceptions of what constitutes corrupt behaviour.

This study will attempt to complement these dominant modes of analysis by providing instead a more systematic appraisal of political corruption. While this thesis adopts an empirically based, attitudinal approach to political corruption, it also indirectly tests for existing regional and cultural differences. As for psychological orientations, not enough data was collected to make any substantive conclusions as to whether Canadians blame the system or individual politicians for corrupt behaviour. The study was psychological only to the extent that elected representatives were asked questions which gauged their attitudes, perceptions and beliefs about corrupt activity.

The attitudes of Canadian legislators toward corrupt acts and the relationship of these attitudes to characteristics of the legislators themselves will be the focus of this thesis. Does there exist a standard of behaviour which aids MPs when faced with a decision to condemn or tolerate political malfeasance? Stated more generally, how much agreement or disagreement exists between MPs over what constitutes a corrupt act? This thesis will attempt to answer these questions by examining the responses of Canadian MPs to questions designed to elicit

their attitudes toward political corruption.

A number of scenarios form the core of the empirical research, which is largely a replication of a study conducted in 1978, by two political scientists at the University of Nebraska, John G. Peters and Susan Welch. The scenarios are all purely hypothetical and reflect an array of activities that some might deem corrupt, others not. Based on a dimensional schema developed by Peters and Welch, which allows the researcher to judge a priori, the venality of an act, each of the items was assigned a weighted corruption score. This score was determined by the decomposition of each of the items into what Peters and Welch call, "corruption dimensions". These dimensions include the number of individuals involved in the act, the role of the political official, the kind of reward involved and the degree to which the reward is dispersed. Each of the dimensions possesses sub-dimensions which help to determine the degree of corruptness embodied in each of the scenarios. Thus, an act which had more than one elected representative engaging in a corrupt activity, was deemed more corrupt, as was an act which involved a substantial reward, paid to the politician over a long period of time.

Premised on such a schema, can it be said that political corruption is multidimensional? If all corrupt acts cannot be categorized as the same in scope and nature, then perhaps such dimensions serve as

viable indicators of the degree of corruptness. Based on the degree of corruption detected, these items can be categorized into different "types" of corrupt activity. These types include bribery, misappropriation of funds, conflicts of interest and minor acts of influence peddling. Arnold Heidenheimer simplifies the notion of a typology further by colour coding acts of corruption as either black, grey, or white. At the polars of the spectrum fall those acts which both the political elite and the public would deem as corrupt, (black) or not corrupt (white), and in between fall those acts which one group might condemn and others condone (grey). What remains to be discerned is whether Canadian MPs distinguish among various types of corrupt activity. Which activities as described in the questionnaire scenarios, grouped together in the opinion of the representatives and which did not?

Subsequently, what factors influenced an MP's decision to render an act corrupt or not corrupt? What variables can be regarded as important in the shaping of representatives' attitudes toward political corruption. Previous American studies have shown personal socio-economic traits to be relevant as well as, political variables, such as party affiliation, prior political experience, number of years in the legislature, and ideology.¹⁴

This study will ascertain not only which factors shape Canadian

representatives' attitudes toward political corruption, but also will determine whether personal factors such as age, sex, education, religiosity, or, factors conducive to the legislative environment, are more strongly correlated with MPs' tolerant or intolerant attitudes.

Can it be said that there exists an elite culture of political corruption, tempered by parliamentary allegiances and legislative norms? Does an intralegislative socialization process nullify individual MPs' attitudes and opinions toward political corruption?

Finally, do the same factors influence the attitudes of Canadian legislators as do their American counterparts? Are Canadian and American representatives in agreement or disagreement, over what constitutes a corrupt act? If differences in opinion are uncovered, how might they be explained? It is plausible that the variance could be related to differences in systemic structures and norms. What political institutions exist in each of the countries, which facilitate, or inhibit, tolerance of corrupt activity?

In sum, this thesis will argue that: 1. Political corruption is multidimensional in nature. 2. That Canadian legislators differ in their attitudes toward political corruption. 3. These attitudes are shaped and influenced by a number of pre-parliamentary and parliamentary factors. 4. There exist some Canadian-American differences in attitudes toward

political corruption and in the factors which determine these attitudes. A brief chapter by chapter content summation will exemplify further these basic tenets.

Chapter One will cover the difficulties involved in defining the concept of political corruption. It will include a discussion of existing definitions and a categorization of them. As well, an examination will be made of the dimensions of corruption and various types of politically corrupt acts, classified in accordance with Heidenheimer's theoretical black, grey and white scale.

Chapters Two and Three will attempt to determine what constitutes corruption from an MP's point of view. An effort will be made to determine which of the corrupt acts are similar from the perspective of the MP. The acts will be theoretically categorized in accordance with the number of corruption dimensions evident in each and Heidenheimer's black, grey, white typology will be utilized to organize the dimensions. The focus of the chapter will be on determining whether Canadian MPs tolerate acts of corruption; do they condemn some acts more readily than others?

Chapter Three will explore why this might be case. What correlates can be considered relevant in shaping and determining the MP's attitudes toward corruption? Region has already been discussed, but it

will also be hypothesized that party affiliation, age, education, number of years in Parliament and the degree of urbaness/ruralness of the constituency represented, might prove to have significant bearing on whether the MP condones or condemns a particular act.

Finally, the last chapter will explore whether the same degree of tolerance exists for Canadian and American legislators. Do they tolerate the same types of corrupt acts? The uncovered differences can perhaps be related to systemic differences between existing institutional facilitators and inhibitors.

It is hoped that this thesis will serve to fill a lacuna in the existing literature on Canadian political corruption. In compliance with the suggestion of Kenneth Gibbons and Donald Rowat at the end of their book,¹⁵ an analytical approach to the study of Canadian political corruption has been adopted. In this instance, historical cases have been forgotten. The focus is not on illicit details, the misdeeds of a corrupt individual, or the causes and cures of corrupt behaviour, but rather on the attitudes of our elected representatives toward a complex phenomenon, political corruption.

NOTES

1. Works on Watergate are in abundance and in Canada, the best example of work on a specific scandal is Richard Gwyn's, The Shape of Scandal: A Study of a Government in Crisis. Toronto: Clarke and Irwin, 1965.
2. George Benson, Political Corruption in America (Lexington Mass: Lexington Books, 1978).
3. S. Huntington, "Modernization and Corruption", in Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis (New Jersey: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970).

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4. Anne Deysine, "Political Corruption: A Review of the Literature", European Journal of Political Research, 8(1980), p. 449.
5. Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Economics of Corruption: An Essay in Political Economy (New York: Academic press, 1978).
6. Lawrence Sherman, Scandal and Reform: Controlling Police Corruption (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
7. Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York: 1958), p. 83.
8. Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Why Political Machines Have Not Withered Away and Other Revisionist Thoughts", Journal of Politics, 34 (May, 1972).
9. Kenneth Gibbons, "The Political Culture of Corruption in Canada", in Kenneth Gibbons, Donald C. Rowat, eds., Political Corruption in Canada: Cases, Causes and Cures (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), p. 246.
10. IBID, p. 239.
11. Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology (New York, 1972), p. 327.
12. IBID, p. 335.
13. James C. Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political

Change", in A.J. Heidenheimer, ed., op.cit, p. 553.

14. John G. Peters and Susan Welch, "Attitudes of U.S. State Legislators Toward Political Corruption: Some Preliminary Findings", Legislative Studies Quarterly, II, 4, (Nov. 1977).
15. Kenneth Gibbons and Donald C. Rowat, Political Corruption in Canada: Cases, Causes and Cures (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976).

CHAPTER ONE: THE SEARCH FOR A DEFINITION AND A THEORY

The systematic study of corruption among elected representatives has been hampered by the lack of a clear understanding of what is meant when researchers refer to the concept of political corruption. If there exists no accepted standard for measuring the concept, it would be almost impossible to account for attitudinal and perceptual differences across individuals, provinces, regions or political parties. Excepting the term "power", in the whole vocabulary of politics it would be difficult to point out any single term that is more frequently employed and misused than the term corruption. It has been incorrectly assumed that political corruption needs no definition since it has a common usage which is acceptable to everyone.¹ Party propagandists, the press, journalists, and politicians themselves bandy the term about in a haphazard fashion. Ultimately, one word has not been satisfactory and thus a number of slang terms have evolved - "graft, boodle, rake-off, booty, loot, spoils, pots de vin" - the list seems endless.²

The task then of defining what it is that constitutes "corruption", is undeniably difficult, albeit necessary. An attempt to explain and define political corruption and its many sub-types is a first step towards deepening our understanding of the subject. Without a definition, too much is left unsaid. Parameters are not established and the range and scope of the discussion remains blurred, direction and focus indistinct. The absence of a widely accepted definition of political corruption has limited its study. Even in contemporary literature it is

evident that the study of corruption is hindered by the lack of a universal definition. This definitional multiplicity makes for confusion and lack of clarity. For example, what may be corrupt to one citizen, scholar or elected representative, is viewed as just politics to another, or indiscretion to a third.³

It is apparent that any attempt to analyze the concept of "corruption" must contend with the fact that in English and other languages, the word corruption has a history of different meanings.⁴ These meanings can be divided into a number of categories; social, moral, legal and political, each with its own explicit connotations. Also, the term corruption itself has been thought of in a metaphorical way. Even when it is distinctly qualified as political, social or moral corruption, the suggestion is still subtly conveyed of organic corruption and everything vile and repugnant to the physical senses which the latter implies.⁵

In the existing literature on political corruption various definitions have been advanced and explored. Each definition has unique features, but invariably in the array of definitions proffered, a defining characteristic can be distinguished. It is this characteristic which designates an act as corrupt, regardless of variations in political values, government systems and a country's culture and traditions. In all existing definitions of political corruption, the notion of the intentional misuse of political authority to achieve personal gain, monetary or otherwise, is central. Some politicians and theorists though, as we will see,

advance this precept more directly than others. They address political corruption specifically rather than dealing in sweeping generalization.

Other theorists tend to provide broad definitions, David Bayley being exemplary - "corruption while being tied particularly to the act of bribery is a general term covering the misuse of authority, as a result of considerations of a personal gain".⁶ For M. McMullan, a public official is corrupt if he accepts money or a moneys worth, for doing something that he is under duty to do, or exercises a legitimate discretion for improper reasons.⁷ While these definitions convey the sense of intentional misuse of authority or exchange for a personal gain, contemporary political scientists add the notion of the public interest.

Hence the defining characteristic is enlarged upon and advanced in a more direct and explicit manner. For example, Carl Friedrich suggests that a pattern of corruption can be said to exist whenever a power holder is by monetary or other rewards not legally provided for, induced to take actions, which favour whoever provides the rewards, thereby doing damage to the public and its interests.⁸ Freidrich's definition is buttressed by the claims of Rogow and Lasswell, who state that "a system of public or civic order exalts common interest over special interests and that violations of the common interest for special advantage are corrupt".⁹ These definitions unequivocally depict the citizens or the public as the offended party, the victims of the corrupt act. These definitions, while possessing the same strand of consistency as the former, develop it further by making the distinction between

public and private interests.

The above are only a sample of the existing definitions of political corruption. Generally, the definitions of corruption offered by political scientists can be classified in accordance with three criteria; definitions based on legality, definitions based on the public interest and definitions based on public opinion.¹⁰ A definition of political corruption based on legal criteria expounds the notion that a political action becomes corrupt when it offends some formal standard or rule of behaviour. These rules are normally established by a political system for its public officials to abide by and for the protection of its citizens. Until recent times, definitions of this kind were prevalent, but contemporary social scientists have grown skeptical as to whether legal definitions are sufficient to denote all that corruption implies.

Corruption can no longer be equated with illegal conduct. In fact, far more commonly, it involves extralegal or even technically legal activities.¹¹ As Brooks aptly stated: "all illegal acts are not necessarily corrupt".¹² By adopting this definitional approach those corrupt acts for which no legal provisions are made are excluded. Thus political scientists like Brooks, advance that legal definitions are not enough. "Definitions of corrupt practices...found in every highly developed legal code...are scarcely broad enough to cover the whole concept as seen from the viewpoint of political scientists or ethics".¹³ Legal sanctions are only applied to those more flagrant practices which past experience has shown to be so heinous that sentiment has crystallized into

statutory prohibitions.

Definitions of political corruption that are based on the idea of the public or common interest, provide a broader range of actions which might be investigated. But in itself, such a definition creates difficulty, as it becomes extremely treacherous to determine just what is in the public or common interest. More definitional problems merely arise and they in turn have to be reckoned with.

The third category of definitions of political corruption, is comprised of those which are based on public opinion. These definitions imply that a political act is corrupt when the weight of public opinion determines it is so!¹⁴ Yet, this determination by the public will almost inevitably clash at times with what political elites and public officials deem as being corrupt. A.J. Heidenheimer feels that behaviour should be judged to be corrupt, if both public officials and the public judge it corrupt and both wish it restricted.¹⁵ Congruence is the optimal situation, but in practice this is not a common occurrence, as people have different attitudes and perceptions about political corruption.

For the purposes of this paper, political corruption will be defined as the intentional misuse or neglect of a recognized public duty to the state, or the unwarranted exercise of power, with the motive of gaining some advantage which is more or less, directly personal.¹⁶ Corruption is acknowledged as being intentional in all systems and countries. The political duty is perceived, but it is ignored or mis-

performed.¹⁷

Despite this defining characteristic, each country and political system, has different interpretations of the terms "misuse" and "gain". This is most strikingly apparent in a comparison between countries in the western world and those countries in the developing world. "Misuse" in western countries is perceived of much differently than in the developing countries. For example, the man who in many non-Western countries is corrupt according to the previously specified definition is not condemned at all by his own society. In fact, the official may be conforming to a pattern of behaviour his peers, family and friends, strongly support and approve of.¹⁸ For example, in both Africa and India, the official who "misuses" his official position to obtain jobs for his unqualified relatives is not considered corrupt. In traditional terms, he is only doing what every loyal member of an extended family is expected to do. He would be criticized by his peers if he did not act in this manner. Likewise, in India, the giving of presents and gratuities (gains) to government officials is upheld as an expected courtesy and a respectable and civilized way of transacting business.¹⁹

This cultural, definitional variance can also be seen in the norms and values of the Filipino society. According to Robert J. Jackson, the primacy of traditional family values is combined with the Filipino moral imperative that one is required to return favours (utang na loob), which conflicts with universalistic norms. Such a conflict accounts for some of the problems in Filipino politics. Problems of graft and

corruption arise because of the two codes of behaviour. Local politics is ridden by vote-buying and selling, and national politicians and civil servants are often corrupt. Universalistic values and norms dictate that representatives act one way, but the need to help family and friends with favours is demanded by their particularistic values.²⁰

Yet, similar acts in either Canada or the United States, would be categorized as corrupt acts. In Canada for instance, although MPs are not prohibited from hiring family members as part of their staff, they must be qualified to perform the job employed for. If not, and discovered, the MP might find himself facing a charge of misappropriation of funds. As well, gifts and presents are not to be accepted by bureaucrats and politicians in return for services rendered. Codes of conduct and ethics have been issued in Canada to regulate and prevent such exchanges.

Ultimately then, controversy flourishes over which acts are to be deemed "corrupt", "not corrupt", or those merely considered to be unsavory. This will depend on the view of various publics including: politicians themselves, certain attentive publics (such as the news media) and finally, the public at large. Thus, corruption has a common meaning only in terms of its defining characteristic. Disputes over what constitutes "misuse", for example, will continue and remain the subject of much empirical research.

Thus, it appears that there are a variety of implications to be

considered when examining political definitions of corruption. The specified definitional criteria need not be used in isolation, as they do overlap. Elements of the public interest and the public opinion criteria are embedded in legal norms, which in turn sanction certain political behaviour as being corrupt.²¹ There exists a significant blurring of definitions and perhaps then, a true comprehensive view would include elements of all three types.

In an 1978 study, John G. Peters and Susan Welch implement such a theory. These two political scientists from the University of Nebraska suggested that research benefits could be increased by focusing on the development of a measure of political corruption that incorporated the legalistic, public interest and public opinion perspectives of that concept. The result was a dimensional approach to political corruption which decomposed potentially corrupt acts, according to the elements that appear to be involved with every political act or exchange.

According to Peters and Welch, every act of corruption can be decomposed into the "public official" involved, the "donor" of the payoff and/or the "recipient" of the favour, the actual "favour" provided by the public official and the "payoff" gained by the public official.²² Such a schema provides an explanation as to why elected representatives might perceive some acts as corrupt, and others, as not corrupt. As well, it provides a theoretical framework which allows the researcher to judge, a priori, the venality of certain corrupt acts.

Dimensions of Political Corruption

The above dimensions are characterized by a series of sub-dimensions which in combination cause acts to vary in the degree of their theoretical corruptness. These sub-dimensions include: the number of actors involved, the role of the political actor, the kind of reward, and the degree to which the reward is dispersed. The first sub-dimension, that of the number of actors involved in the corrupt act, is perceived to be indicative of the scope of the social involvement in corruption.²³ Some types of illicit activities like bribery or illegal campaign financing are very narrow in scope and normally only involve individuals or small groups. Conversely, other activities like pork-barrelling, are considered to be quite broad in scope since they involve a large number of individuals or groups throughout the country, province, or constituency. Thus, it is possible to suggest that an act which involved one individual or small group, would be judged more corrupt, than an act involving a large number of people.

The political actor is considered to be the individual who represents the public interest. In cases of corruption, the interaction is usually between a political agent and another person outside the realm of politics. These political actors include not only party politicians, but non-partisan figures like bureaucrats, or judges. Of importance here is the political nature of the public official's role. If the public official is in a judicial or other non-political post, certain acts are more likely to be seen as corrupt than if the public official holds a political post. In

each instance, the political actor can function as either the initiator or the target, in the enactment of a corrupt act. The political actor in the role of initiator intentionally sets out to commit a venal act. As the target, he or she, assumes a more docile role, influenced heavily by another actor, who may or may not be political. Seemingly then, an act would be judged more corrupt if the political official involved in the act, engaged in it in his public capacity. As well, if the official assumed the role of initiator, rather than target, he/she, would be seen as more corrupt.

An examination of the remaining sub-dimensions of political corruption would include consideration of the donor or recipient of the favour, the favour itself and finally, the payoff.²⁴ The most important fact to be established is whether the donor or the recipient of the political favour is a constituent or non-constituent. If the favour is granted to a constituent it is generally considered to be less corrupt than if the favour granted is to a non-constituent. Thus, the representative who performs corrupt acts under the guise of constituency service, is more likely to be excused, as constituency service, no matter how questionable, carries with it a certain degree of legitimacy.²⁵

Another characteristic to be considered is whether the donor of the payoff is more than one individual or company. Peters and Welch argue that the single donor will be perceived as making an act more corrupt, than if the donor is a large group of individuals or firms. This

might be the case, because voters tend to think that numbers give an action legitimacy, no matter how questionable it may in effect be. Perhaps the most flagrant violation the political actor can be involved in, is when he is both the initiator and the target. An example of this would be padding one's expense account or using public funds for personal travel.

The nature of the favour is worthy of some attention. If the favour is going to benefit only one individual or company, or if the favour is granted to a non-constituent, such acts would probably be considered more corrupt by the electorate. But if the granted favour was going to benefit the constituency and the public at large, the act would be regarded as being less corrupt.²⁶ Simply, the more who benefit from the favour the lower the degree of corruption attached.

The final component, the payoff to the political official, is perhaps the most important variable, especially in the eyes of the constituent. The most obvious fact to be considered is the size of the payoff. If the public official stands to gain substantially from the payoff the level of corruption rises, but if the gain is petty, the voting public is more apt to ignore it. Also, the degree of corruptness can vary according to the long or short term nature of the benefit to the public official.²⁷ The longer the benefit sustains itself, the more corrupt it is deemed. Finally, if the payoff is in the form of a campaign contribution, it is attributed a degree of legitimacy that is not rendered to other forms of material payoffs.

Table I summarizes the basic dimensions of a politically corrupt act and indicates the sub-dimensions in each which can vary according to perceived corruptness. Such an outline articulates a large number of testable hypotheses about the conditions under which an act can and will be viewed as corrupt. These hypotheses only deal with each sub-dimension singly and propositions dealing with more than one sub-dimension at a time have not been delineated. Clearly, an act possessing most or all of the characteristics on the left side would be considered more corrupt, than one having characteristics only from the right. Which components are most important in determining corruptness is a researchable question that remains untested. Peters and Welch' schema though offers a conceptual framework for analyzing and comparing potentially corrupt political acts. It facilitates the circumvention of the definitional problems surrounding the meaning of corruption.

Types of Corruption

Premised on this dimensional approach to political corruption, it can subsequently be advanced that there exist various types of corrupt acts, differing in the degree to which they are deemed corrupt by their respective publics. Generally, a distinction can be made between two broad categories. Firstly, there exist minor acts, or what is commonly called, petty corruption.²⁸ Such acts would be characterized by only a few of the previously outlined corrupt sub-dimensions. Petty corruption refers to the bending of official rules in favour of friends, as

TABLE I
CHARACTERISTICS OF TEN POTENTIALLY CORRUPT ACTS

ACT	PUBLIC OFFICIAL	DONOR	FAVOUR	PAYOFF
Driveaway	Political, Public Role*	Self	Private	Large* Specific* Short-Range* Non-Campaign*
Travel	Political, Public Role*	Self*	Private*	Large* Specific* Short-Range* Non-Campaign*
Roads	Political, Public Role*	Self*	Private*	Large* Specific* Short-Range* Non-Campaign*
Proposal	Political, Public Role*	Constit.* $\frac{1}{2}$ (not clear)	Private*	Large* Specific* Short-Range* Campaign
Judge	Non-Pol.* Public Role*	Self*	Private*	Large* General Long-Range Non-Campaign*
Leader	Political, Public Role*	Constit.* $\frac{1}{2}$ (not clear)	Private*	Large* Specific* Short-Range* Campaign
Defense	Political, Public Role*	Self*	Private*	Large* Specific* Long-Range Non-Campaign*

TABLE I (CONT'D)
CHARACTERISTICS OF TEN POTENTIALLY CORRUPT ACTS

<u>ACT</u>	<u>PUBLIC OFFICIAL</u>	<u>DONOR</u>	<u>FAVOUR</u>	<u>PAYOFF</u>
NEP	Political, Public Role*	Self*	Private*	Unspecified* Specific* Long-Range Non-Campaign*
Weapons	Political, Public Role*	Constit.	Constit.	Small General Long-Range Non-Campaign*
School	Political, Public Role*	Constit.* (not clear)	Non-Routine*	Small Non-Specific Long Range Non-Campaign*

* More corrupt

illustrated by the untruthful reporting of details, the ignoring of cut-off dates, the fixing of parking tickets and other seemingly minor violations. Routine or aggravated corruption, refers to the acceptance of gifts or money by the public officials or political parties, for merely performing their prescribed duties. Included in this category are those acts in which a politician in return for his intervention, receives a kickback or other benefit. For example, awarding a contract to the company which makes the largest campaign contribution, or an official who uses privileged information to secure personal profits, via government-sponsored projects.²⁹

By breaking these categories further into specific acts of corruption, these distinctions become somewhat more apparent. Bribery is an activity which is internationally recognized as being corrupt, and it is an activity that is usually codified in criminal law. The explanation may be that other individuals besides politicians and public officials, could possibly engage in acts of bribery.³⁰ Bribery has commonly been accepted as a synonym for corruption, but in reality it is only one specific element of it. It can be defined as an activity in which an official demands or receives payment from another party for rendering a public service which it is otherwise his duty to perform.³¹ Such activity requires great skill, especially if the bribe is to remain undetected. This is generally achieved through the development of an intimate relationship between the briber and the bribee.³²

But not all types of activity can be classified so readily as cor-

rupt. Political patronage while prevalent, is not universally perceived to be corrupt. This is perhaps true because this type of activity is generally difficult to detect and substantiate. Patronage is premised on the reciprocal relations between patrons and clients. The patron is the person who uses his influence to aid and protect some other person, the client, who in return, provides certain services to the patron.³³ This type of activity is generally conducted on an intimate basis, involving individuals, or small groups. For example, a political position might be awarded in return for a monetary or service favour, or a contract granted on the basis of partisan support rather than merit.

Finally, various conflicts of interest when allowed to persist unrestricted, are potential sources of corrupt activity. The role of the elected politician has gradually become more complex and thus political representatives may increasingly find themselves in situations for which no adequate rules or guidelines exist, to aid them in ensuring that their conduct respects their fiduciary duty.³⁴ When an individual assumes the responsibility of public office, he also assumes responsibility for his conduct, which he did not have as a private citizen. In most cases this means that legislators will be expected to place the public interest before their own private advantage. Therefore, a case of conflict of interest is deemed to have occurred when a representative's private interests are given precedence over the public interest.³⁵ Examples of such conflicts include the holding of incompatible offices, for instance, a Minister of Defense who is a stockholder in a company with which the Defense Department has a million dollar contract.

These conflict of interest cases are difficult to prove, as how does one determine what is in the public interest, or measure the extent to which the public interest is ignored or violated. Several systems of government, including the Canadian system, seek to regulate these conflicts by issuing codes of conduct which bear a stiff penalty if violated. Yet, it remains that many of these cases go undetected and, if restrictions are not more stringently applied, conflicts of interest remain as potentially corrupt acts.

From the brief examination of these existing types of political improprieties, it is apparent that each activity fits the prescribed definition of corruption. Yet, it can be advanced that each type of activity differs in the degree of corruptness attached to it, according to Peters and Welch's dimensional schema. This can be exemplified upon examining the ten scenarios which comprise the core of the empirical research on which this thesis is based.

The Research Instrument

The questionnaire which was used to compile the data for this study, was largely a replication of the study carried out in 1978, by John Peters and Susan Welch. Peters and Welch mailed questionnaires to 978 state senators the total of senators in twenty-four states.³⁶ Initially, they netted a response rate of 42%, and to bolster this, a shorter questionnaire was sent to a subsample of non-respondents, of

whom 21% returned a completed questionnaire. The American sample then was 442 with a response rate of 63%.

In the Canadian study a sample was drawn of 120 MPs and interviews were completed with 84 members. The sample was drawn randomly, although the Prime Minister, the leader of the Opposition, Mr. Broadbent, current cabinet ministers and House Leaders, were not included. This was done on the premise that the sample would be more homogeneous, comprised of only backbenchers, and that ministers with their demanding schedules might be more difficult to interview. Unlike the American study, personal interviews were conducted with the members over a four month period between March and June of 1983. The average interview lasted approximately forty minutes, with the shortest being fifteen minutes and the longest over two hours. The Canadian sample then was 120, with a 70% response rate.

The design of the survey remained largely the same, with a few changes being made to place the questions in a Canadian context. For the most part, the changes involved substituting Canadian officials and institutions for their American counterparts. For example, a member of Congress became a MP, a presidential candidate - a national party leader, and a state assembly member - a provincial cabinet minister. Three of the items though had to be substantially altered. These changes were largely due to the differences in the Canadian and American political systems and different legislative norms. Thus, seniority was not applicable in a Canadian context, nor was a legislator voting "the right way" or the depletion of the oil allowance. A

complete comparison of the questions and the changes can be found in the Appendix.

The core of the questionnaire was a series of items concerning ten actions by elected representatives that some might deem corrupt, others not. These items can be considered the dependent variables and are described on the following page.

1. A national party leader who promises an appointed political position in exchange for campaign contributions. (LEADER)*
2. A cabinet minister using his influence to obtain a weapons contract for a firm in his constituency. (WEAPONS)
3. An elected official using public funds for personal travel. (TRAVEL)
4. A Minister of Defense who owns \$50,000 in stock in a company with which the Defense Department has a million dollar contract. (DEFENSE)
5. An elected official using his influence to get a friend or relative admitted to law or medical school, or some other type of professional institute. (SCHOOL)
6. The driveway of the mayor's private home being paved by the city work crew. (DRIVEWAY)
7. A provincial cabinet minister while chairman of the public roads committee authorizing the purchase of land, he had recently acquired. (ROADS).
8. A judge hearing a case concerning a corporation in which he has \$50,000 worth of stock. (JUDGE)

9. A legislator accepting a large campaign contribution in return for supporting a legislative proposal. (PROPOSAL)
10. A MP who holds a large amount of stock in Gulf Canada (about \$50,000 worth) working to change the provisions of the National Energy Policy. (NEP)

These scenarios are examples of the type of corrupt activity described previously. First, there are two acts which can be considered acts of bribery, LEADER and PROPOSAL, each possessing $5\frac{1}{2}$ of Peters and Welch' corrupt dimensions. Second, DRIVEWAY and TRAVEL, are examples of misappropriations of funds by elected officials and each possess 7 corrupt dimensions. Third, JUDGE, DEFENSE, ROADS and NEP, all centre on a potential conflict of interest and the number of corrupt dimensions ranges from $5\frac{1}{2}$ to 7. Finally, SCHOOL, and WEAPONS, with $3\frac{1}{2}$ and 2 corrupt dimensions respectively, can, at the most, be considered minor acts of influence peddling, but are essentially constituency-service items. A more complete description of this weighting procedure is contained in the following chapter.

*These terms are used throughout the thesis to denote the essence of each dependent variable.

Arnold Heidenheimer's colour classification can be employed to organize the above types of corrupt acts. According to Heidenheimer, the corruptness of political acts is determined by the interaction between the judgement of the public and political elites or public officials.³⁷ Behaviour is thus judged particularly unsavory or corrupt, if both wish it restricted. These types of activities Heidenheimer classifies as black corruption. At the other end are those acts which the majority of both the elite and mass opinion probably would not vigorously want to punish. These tolerable acts are referred to as white corruption. Between these two extremes lie the forms of corrupt behaviour which are the most difficult to define and detect. Grey acts of corruption are those which either the public officials or the public want to see punished, while the other group does not.³⁸

It is possible to apply such a classification to the types of corrupt activity previously discussed. The acts of bribery and misappropriation of funds, can be considered black acts of corruption, bribery for the reasons mentioned earlier, and misappropriation of funds, because it is a flagrant violation of the public trust. In the empirical examples of TRAVEL and DRIVEWAY, the elected official misuses his position for personal gain; at the public's expense. Conflicts of interest, can be considered grey acts of corruption, not only because they are difficult to discover and substantiate, but as well, they are acts over which there would be the greatest divergence of opinion. Depending on the situation, the public might disagree with the elected officials over the

corruptness of a conflict. Elite opinion will be conditioned by the legislative environment and such opinion may well differ from the public. Constituency-service acts, or minor acts of influence peddling, can be considered white corruption, as they are acts which would seemingly be tolerated by both elected officials and the public.

Although behaviour fitting into any one of the categories could be considered corrupt by an individual who was particularly conscious of official norms, his interpretations would obviously be shared to a widely varying degree by his fellow citizens.³⁹ The problem of normative evaluation still remains. Empirically, such a classification can only be tested here at the elite level, as data has only been collected on the responses of elected officials to the various types of corrupt activity. In order to fully implement Heidenheimer's classification a random sample of the public would also have to score the questionnaire scenarios.*

*Data was collected on how the MPs felt members of the public would score the various acts. For a summary of these findings see Chapter Two, P. 55

Thus, according to Heidenheimer, perception is instrumental in the determination of the corruptness of a given political act. How do Canadian elected representatives perceive corruption? Is it thought to be a problem for the Canadian political system? What constitutes corruption in the opinion of Canadian legislators? The survey therefore, can be viewed as an instrument which gauges the member's perceptions of, and attitudes toward, political corruption.

Correlates of Corruption

Given these theoretical and dimensional differences, it remains to be discerned what correlates shape and determine MP's attitudes toward these different "types" of corrupt acts. For organizational purposes, such correlates can be classified according to two general models which researchers have employed to explain diversity in legislative behaviour.⁴⁰ The outside model of legislative behaviour is premised on the assumption that the factors which influence and mold the attitudes and behaviour of representatives before entry into the legislative arena have a continued impact on their behaviour following their election. This model has also been referred to as the pre-incumbency socialization process.⁴¹ Conversely, the inside model, or the post-incumbency socialization process, operates from the opposite premise: that factors such as legislative norms, conventions and partisan values and beliefs, have the greatest impact on behaviour.

The outside model then, relegates socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the individual legislators themselves, as being

prime determinants of MP's attitudes about political corruption. Can it be said that a group of individuals who possess mutual characteristics, such as educational achievement and occupational background,⁴² perceive political corruption in the same way? In a recent study, Kornberg and Mishler concluded that "no other set of variables predicted parliamentary participation as well".⁴³ Differences were found in levels of participation in parliamentary debates between members with a university education and those without, as well as between anglo-phone and franco-phone members. Other socio-economic traits that might be related to attitudes toward political corruption include age, sex, religious affiliation and religious attendance. While a study conducted in 1979⁴⁴ showed age to be a determinant of legislative behaviour, there have not been any studies undertaken (to the author's knowledge) which reveal sex, or religiosity, as determinants of legislative behaviour.

In addition to these socio-economic variables, demographic factors can be considered part of the outside model. One might expect that the nature of the constituency a member represents, to influence attitudes toward corruption. The research done by Peters and Welch, revealed that the level of affluence and urban-rural differences were important in shaping representatives attitudes about corruption. Seemingly, legislators from rural districts were found to be more tolerant of corrupt acts than their colleagues from urban areas.

As well, the geographic location of a member's constituency might have some bearing on their attitudes toward corruption. The notion of "regionalism" has been discussed in the literature on Canadian political corruption, as an approach to understanding attitudinal variations and tolerance levels of corrupt activity. If one accepts that Canada is marked by strong differences in "basic orientations to politics", is it reasonable to expect such orientations to extend to attitudes on corruption?⁴⁵

If the outside model is comprised of these socio-economic and demographic factors, the inside model focuses instead on factors which are conducive to the parliamentary environment. When an individual is elected to parliament, he is immediately introduced to its norms and standards of behaviour.⁴⁶ According to Kornberg and Mishler, among those norms cited by MPs in the 25th Parliament, were the endorsement of disciplined party divisions, efforts to minimize personal office conflict, to avoid conduct which reflects poorly on the House, and the establishment of expertise in some subject matter.⁴⁷ Informal, often unwritten rules and conventions of this type are an intricate part of the legislative system. Such norms and conventions establish a standard of behaviour from which members are expected to operate. Members who had been in the legislature for a greater period of time would undoubtedly be more familiar with these norms. What remains to be determined is whether these norms are influential in the shaping of MPs' attitudes toward political corruption? Is there an intralegislative socialization process at work which homogenizes members' attitudes and perceptions about corruption?

Ultimately then, when speaking about elected representatives and their attitudes toward political corruption, what remains to be discerned is whether the outside or the inside model, best accounts for existing attitudinal variance. Are MPs' attitudes toward political corruption influenced more heavily by extra-parliamentary factors, such as socio-economic and demographic characteristics, or by intra-parliamentary variables, such as institutionalized norms, party affiliation and years of parliamentary experience? The following empirical analysis will evaluate the effectiveness of these models as predictors of MPs' attitudes toward political corruption.

From the above discussion it is evident that the term "political corruption" is very complex. A multiplicity of definitions of corruption exist and even when qualified by the term "political", the range of definitions still remains unlimited. Why is it that a definition of political corruption is so important? What relevance do such definitions have for our elected representatives? Firstly, definitions have consequences. What MPs claim constitute corruption indicates what they would do if circumstances permitted. There is no code of conduct which states society's view of the right course of action in every situation, thus the representative must puzzle out for him/herself, the moral solution to each dilemma he/she faces.⁴⁸

What legislators believe is corrupt constitutes a part of their political theory. People will draw on this larger political theory to

provide the standards against which certain acts are measured. Corruption is presumably far more prevalent in an environment where political ideology does not shape policy goals and where commitment to public interest is weak.⁴⁹ Politicians may not be expected to be moral philosophers, but they ought to possess some measure of commitment to principled objectives.

Aside from these definitional implications, this chapter also suggested that political corruption is multidimensional. A corrupt act can be decomposed into a number of dimensions which permit the researcher to arbitrarily determine the degree of corruptness attributed to such activity. Premised on these dimensions, it was advanced that there thus exists different types of corrupt activities. Employing Arnold Heidenheimer's classification schema, these types were classified as acts of black, grey and white corruption.

The survey instrument was used to uncover elected representatives attitudes toward these "types" of corruption. The remaining chapters will discuss these attitudes and provide an explanation of not only attitudinal variance, but as well, produce a model which best explains the correlates which influence the shaping of MP's attitudes toward political corruption.

NOTES

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6. OP.CIT., p. 4.
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CHAPTER TWO: WHAT IS CORRUPTION? AN MP'S PERSPECTIVE

After having discussed the theoretical and conceptual approaches to political corruption in Chapter One, these approaches will now be systematically applied to the responses given by Canadian MPs to examples of corrupt activity. Operating on the assumption that political corruption is multidimensional, it can be suggested that the existence of certain dimensions, in a specific combination, determines the degree of corruptness of a given political act.

Which dimensions did MPs see as being influential in their decision to render an act corrupt, or not corrupt? More importantly, this chapter will attempt to delineate those acts which were seen as corrupt by the members, and those which were judged to be not corrupt. Which acts seemingly grouped together in the opinion of the elected officials, and why? What constitutes corruption in the minds of elected officials? Finally, is political corruption tolerated by Canadian Legislators?

The Theoretical Conceptualization

Adopting a dimensional approach to political corruption allows the researcher to determine a priori the venality of a political act. Following the schema employed by John G. Peters and Susan Welch, in their work on American legislator's attitudes toward political corruption, each of the ten acts contained in the survey outlined in the previous chapter (hereafter referred to as the dependent variables) can

be dissected into a number of dimensions and sub-dimensions.

As outlined in Chapter One, the dimensions of corruption include; the public official involved; the favour granted by the official; the payoff gained by the official; and the donor of the payoff, and/or recipient of the act. The sub-dimensions include such considerations as; whether the official engages in the act in his official capacity; the political nature of the public official's role; whether the donor or recipient is a constituent or non-constituent; and the nature of the favour, and of the payoff or reward given to the official. Thus, the sub-dimensions can be categorized into those which theoretically render the act more corrupt and those which diminish the degree of corrupt-ness. A complete description of all of the dimensions and sub-dimensions, and such a categorization, can be found in Table I on the following page.

TABLE I
COMPONENTS OF A POTENTIALLY CORRUPT ACT AND SOME SALIENT CHARACTERISTICS

<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>MORE CORRUPT</u>	<u>LESS CORRUPT</u>
Public Official - Type Of Position - Role when Act Performed	"Nonpolitical", i.e., the official is a judge Public Role, i.e., act is done as part of official's public duties	Political Private Role, i.e., act is performed by public official official acting as private citizen
Donor's Relation to Public Official	Nonconstituent pays official Public official pays self	Constituent pays official
Favor Rendered by Public Official - Type of Benefit - Type of Recipient - Nature of Act - Providing Favour	Private Nonconstituent Nonroutine, i.e., official departs from normal routine to provide favour	Public Constituent Routine, i.e., favour is performed as routine part of job
Payoff - Size - Time when Benefits Accrue to Donor - Substance - Relation to Campaign	Large Short-Range Benefit Specific Noncampaign	Small Long-Range Benefit General Campaign

Peters and Welch

Such a schema, therefore, provides a conceptual framework for analyzing and comparing potentially corrupt political acts. By counting the number of corrupt dimensions in a given act, one arrives at what can be called a corruption score. Utilizing the ten dependent variables then, this conceptualization enables one to predict for example, (see Table II) that DRIVEWAY, has more corrupt sub-dimensions than the other two examples cited. The public official involved - the mayor - is acting in his public role (more corrupt), the benefit is certainly for private gain (more corrupt), and the payoff, while not as substantial as it might be, is nevertheless, short range, specific and non-campaign related (all more corrupt). Following this pattern then, it can be said that LEADER is an act of a moderate degree of corruptness, and SCHOOL, an example of petty corruption.

This weighting procedure was applied to each of the ten dependent variables, enabling the acts to be ranked theoretically, from most corrupt, to least corrupt. The results of this weighting process can be found in Table III. (The asterisked items are those which are more corrupt and the corruption score is given at the bottom.) Subsequently, the acts were ranked as follows:

DRIVEWAY	7
ROADS	7
TRAVEL	7
JUDGE	6
DEFENSE	6

PROPOSAL	5½
LEADER	5½
NEP	5½
SCHOOL	3½
WEAPONS	2

TABLE II

ANALYSIS THREE POTENTIALLY CORRUPT ACTS

ELEMENTS	Corrupt Acts Marked*		
	DRIVEWAY	LEADER	SCHOOL
Public Official	Political Public Role*	Political Public Role*	Political Public Role*
Donor	Self*	Constituent	Unclear Probably Constituent**
Favour	Private*	Private* Constituent Routine Act	Unclear Probably Non-Routine*
Pay Off	Large* Specific* Short-Range* Non-Campaign*	Large* Specific* Short-Range* Campaign	Small* Non-specific Long-Range Non-Campaign*
Total Corrupt Dimensions	7	5	3 1/2

TABLE III
CHARACTERISTICS OF TEN POTENTIALLY CORRUPT ACTS

<u>ACT</u>	<u>PUBLIC OFFICIAL</u>	<u>DONOR</u>	<u>FAVOUR</u>	<u>PAYOFF</u>
Driveway	Political, Public Role*	Self	Private	Large* Specific* Short-Range* Non-Campaign*
Travel	Political, Public Role*	Self*	Private*	Large* Specific* Short-Range* Non-Campaign*
Roads	Political, Public Role*	Self*	Private*	Large* Specific* Short-Range* Non-Campaign*
Proposal	Political, Public Role*	Constit.* $\frac{1}{2}$ (not clear)	Private*	Large* Specific* Short-Range* Campaign
Judge	Non-Pol.* Public Role*	Self*	Private*	Large* General Long-Range
Leader	Political, Public Role*	Constit.* $\frac{1}{2}$ (not clear)	Private*	Large* Specific* Short-Range* Campaign
Defense	Political, Public Role*	Self*	Private*	Large* Specific* Long-Range Non-Campaign*

TABLE III (CONT'D)
CHARACTERISTICS OF TEN POTENTIALLY CORRUPT ACTS

<u>ACT</u>	<u>PUBLIC OFFICIAL</u>	<u>DONOR</u>	<u>FAVOUR</u>	<u>PAYOFF</u>
NEP	Political, Public Role*	Self*	Private*	Unspecified* Specific* Long-Range Non-Campaign*
Weapons	Political, Public Role*	Constit.	Constit.	Small General Long-Range Non-Campaign*
School	Political, Public Role*	Constit.* (not clear)	Non-Routine*	Small Non-Specific Long Range Non-Campaign*

* More corrupt

Thus, theoretically, on the basis of this dimensional approach, one would expect that TRAVEL would be perceived as more corrupt than JUDGE or DEFENSE, and that DEFENSE would be seen as more corrupt than PROPOSAL, LEADER, or NEP, and that SCHOOL and WEAPONS would be perceived of as the least corrupt of the ten. But is this rank ordering maintained upon examining empirically the responses of Canadian MP's? How different is their rank ordering from this dimensional one?

A Corruption Continuum

The ten dependent variables then were first ranked according to the proportion of MPs agreeing that an act was corrupt or not corrupt (Table IV). The first observation that can be deduced from Table IV, is that the acts considered corrupt by the most number of members, are those which have many starred components. It can also be suggested that any one attribute itself, does not determine the degree of corruptness, but this degree is determined only by a combination of attributes, thus supporting the premise that corruption is multidimensional.

Four acts were perceived as corrupt by over 90% of the sample: DRIVEWAY, ROADS, JUDGE and TRAVEL. This was perhaps the case because in all of them, the official involved was obviously in the position to personally ensure direct financial gain. In each instance the donor is the elected or appointed official, presumably acting out of their own self interest. While in JUDGE, it is difficult to ascertain the extent of the payoff, in the other three items, DRIVEWAY, TRAVEL,

and ROADS, the reward of payoff would seem to be almost immediate.

TABLE IV
PERCENT AGREEING ACT IS CORRUPT

	% OF RESPONDENTS VIEWING THIS ACT AS CORRUPT	% OF RESPONDENTS BELIEVING MOST ELECTED OFFICIALS CONDEMN THIS ACT	% OF RESPONDENTS BELIEVING MOST OF PUBLIC CONDEMN THIS ACT
DRIVEWAY	97.5	99.9	97.6
ROADS	97.5	99.1	96.1
JUDGE	93.8	95.0	92.4
TRAVEL	92.7	93.8	87.6
PROPOSAL	87.8	87.5	84.8
DEFENSE	84.3	89.1	87.7
LEADER	80.6	86.5	71.6
NEP	42.4	59.8	48.1
WEAPONS	42.4	53.7	41.3
SCHOOL	21.5	35.1	22.1

The JUDGE item was ranked ahead of TRAVEL, and was perceived to be corrupt to the degree it was, presumably because of the nature of the official's role. It could be advanced that perhaps any item which had a judge as the pivotal actor, might be perceived as being more corrupt, since there appears to exist a preconceived notion that judges are above corruption.¹

Traditionally, due to the autonomy accorded the judiciary from the political arena, judges have been viewed as being removed from the game of politics and thus, in a word, "clean".

At the other end of the continuum, just over 40% of the respondents found NEP and WEAPONS to be corrupt, and SCHOOL was considered corrupt by 21.5% of the sample, a substantial difference between the percentages for these items and those previously discussed. On the items WEAPONS and NEP, there was the least amount of consensus. There were almost as many respondents who viewed the acts as not corrupt, as there were those who said they were corrupt.

Both WEAPONS and SCHOOL were perhaps given a lower corruption score, because they cannot be considered corrupt if adhering to the definition of corruption provided in Chapter One. In each there is no reference made to a direct personal gain, financial or otherwise, for the elected official. This of course excludes the implicit gain of securing votes, thereby enhancing chances of re-election.

At the very most, WEAPONS and SCHOOL can be considered minor acts of influence peddling. The prevalent opinion among the MP's was that these two items were examples of activities that were considered part of their job. Essentially they are constituency-service tasks. WEAPONS was perhaps deemed corrupt by a higher percentage of respondents, because the wording of the question was such that the MP had to make a decision as to whether the minister was acting within, or outside, the realm of his responsibilities. The response the MP gave seemingly depended on the way in which he/she defined "influence". Thus, the members who scored the act as not corrupt believed that ministers are expected to use their influence to obtain contracts for firms in their constituency, as are all Members of Parliament. Every member wants to secure contracts in order to facilitate employment and revenue for their constituency, thereby increasing their own visibility and chances of re-election. In this instance, the minister was perceived to be acting within the bounds of his influence, presumably adhering to the entrenched tender system which governs the granting of government contracts.

But those respondents who viewed the act as corrupt seemingly must have felt that the question implied that the minister overstepped the boundaries of permissible influence. These respondents expressed the viewpoint that they would not look favourably on a cabinet minister choosing other than the lowest bidder for a contract. For this act to be scored as corrupt, the respondent must have felt that the minister did not consider all bids fairly, but because of his elevated position and

thus heightened influence, merely granted the contract to his own constituency.

SCHOOL was the item which was considered to be the least corrupt by the respondents. As deduced from comments on the questionnaires, the members generally thought that helping a friend, or relative, is a normal, expected practice. They were also told that a constituent could be making the request for help. The MPs said that they write countless letters to Deans and admissions officers at universities and law schools, providing references nearly always when asked. Many were of the opinion that such a letter could hurt more than help the requestors chances of admission. The respondents when scoring this question were informed that "influence" specifically meant a letter or a phone call. Some members had more difficulty with a phone call and expressed the viewpoint that the act had the potential of becoming more unsavory, if the official called the Dean of a law school and "leaned" on him, exerting undue pressure. This act then was considered by some members to be overstepping the normal scope of a legislator's activity, but by others as routinely trying to provide a constituent service.

NEP was also seen as being corrupt by less than half of the respondents. Unlike WEAPONS and SCHOOL, although not as explicitly stated as it might have been, the MP involved in the act stands to gain financially, presuming that he is working to change the provisions of the policy to his benefit. But seemingly, the majority of respondents

decided that this was perfectly within the realm of acceptable action, many members saying that it happens all the time. The respondents were really at a loss to explain how to stop or regulate such a practice.

Apparently, the respondents gave prime consideration to that dimension which concerns the nature of the public official's role. Had the official involved in the item been a cabinet minister, rather than a backbencher, the scoring on this act could very well have been different. As it was presented, it was felt that the ordinary MP just did not possess enough influence to single handedly change the provisions of the policy. Too, the size of the stock was considered to be relevant, as the respondents generally felt that \$50,000 in Gulf was not that substantial an amount. The MPs often cited interesting analogies when responding to this question. If the Members of Parliament, who also have oil holdings, were prevented from speaking out on policies which have to do with oil and energy, then the same provisions would have to apply to MPs with farms or ranches, and wheat board policies, or the Grow Rate; or Stanley Knowles would have to be forbidden from speaking on Pension Reform, since he himself draws a pension. In such a question it must be ascertained whether the conflict of interest is great enough to warrant attention. Members perceived such measures to be somewhat absurd, as they would prevent the experts in a field from speaking out on issues with which they were very familiar.

The remaining items PROPOSAL, DEFENSE and LEADER, were

seen as corrupt by 80-87% of the respondents, and comprise the middle of the corruption continuum. This was theoretically to be expected, since these items possess a moderate number of corruption dimensions. LEADER and PROPOSAL are somewhat different from the other items in that the payoff involved is a campaign contribution. While such a payoff is invariably more immediate, the donor is providing a campaign contribution, rather than funds for personal use. PROPOSAL and LEADER are thus quite similar, except that in one, the favour is a vote, and in the other an appointment. The former is seen as more corrupt, undoubtedly because the patronage system of appointment has an aura of legitimacy that the practice of supporting, or voting for a proposal for money, has not.

In DEFENSE, like JUDGE and NER, the public figure is in a position of performing a favour for which the payoff is an increase in the value of his/her own stock. Unlike DRIVEWAY, TRAVEL or ROADS, the legislator is not the sole donor and the payoff gained is less direct. A government contract, a favourable court ruling, or a change in the National Energy Policy, may or may not, increase the stock holder's dividends. PROPOSAL and LEADER, it was found, shared another commonality. The respondents generally expressed the viewpoint that these two acts would or could not, occur in Canada in the manner stated in the question.

Firstly, the MPs felt that PROPOSAL could not occur in Canada and in fact they suggested that it would be much more appropos in the

United States. The respondents generally felt that an individual MP's support for a legislative proposal would not be considered worth buying, by a lobbyist or pressure group. Secondly, any campaign contribution would go directly to the party rather than to the individual politician himself. LEADER too was regarded by some respondents as an unusual way of playing the political game, and while more opportunity perhaps exists for this type of activity to occur, the respondents generally felt that this was not the way a national party leader would grant patronage appointments. These types of appointments generally go to party faithfuls, who have supported the party, financially or otherwise, for a number of years. Members expressed that a leader who acted otherwise could only be considered politically naive. The MPs who then scored this item as corrupt, were reacting to the implicit suggestion in the item that the appointment could be purchased by a campaign contribution.

In these items then, it can be advanced that systemic features prevent or impede the act from occurring in the manner stated. In PROPOSAL, the convention of party discipline usually prevents a back-bencher from supporting a legislative proposal, other than one espoused by the party. And in LEADER, the accepted established route for the granting of patronage appointments would prevent a party leader from selling such offices to the highest bidder.

From the above discussion it is apparent that the conceptual dimensions are useful in accounting for different perceptions of the

corruptness of various acts. It can be advanced that the MPs gave prime concern to the sub-dimensions which centered on the nature of the favour and the donor, the role of the elected representative and in particular, to the size of the payoff. All these dimensions proved useful in analyzing the MPs' perceptions. The empirical rank ordering was found to be not much different from the conceptual one. The empirical continuum is matched by the conceptual one, with only minor exceptions. JUDGE, for the reasons noted, was scored ahead of TRAVEL which possesses more corruption dimensions; PROPOSAL was scored ahead of DEFENSE; and SCHOOL was seen as less corrupt than the lower weighted WEAPONS.

In sum then, the rank ordering of the ten dependent variables by the MPs shows at one end of the continuum a clustering of acts that involve a direct financial gain for the elected representative. At the other end of the continuum, are acts which involve no direct gain, financial or otherwise; and in between a set of acts in which the gain is not as blatant. What remains to be discerned is whether these clusters of acts are not only theoretically, but statistically significant.

The Findings

A correlation matrix was produced (Table V) to determine the strength of the relationship between the dependent variables. The matrix indicates which acts seemingly grouped together statistically and which did not. Upon examining the matrix, it becomes apparent that LEADER did not correlate significantly, with any of the other items. As

well, DRIVEWAY, ROADS, and PROPOSAL, did not correlate significantly with any of the items. This can perhaps be explained by recalling that LEADER and PROPOSAL were the items which were perceived by many of the respondents to be situations that could not happen in Canada, in the way stated in the question. The systemic convention of party discipline and the accepted practice of political patronage, prevented MPs from conceptualizing these particular situations.

ROADS, while not being perceived with the same amount of difficulty, was also somewhat problematic.

Members expressed that the situation could not occur exactly in the way stated in the question. The way that the committee system functions, it would take the consensus of the majority of the roads committee to approve the purchase of any piece of land; not just the authorization of the committee chairman. The chairman possesses no veto power and it would be difficult to imagine a purchase being made without the other members knowledge. Members rated the item as highly corrupt because it smacked of personal financial gain for the elected official.

Similarly, DRIVEWAY did not correlate strongly with any of the other items either. This item involved an official from the local level of government, and was as well, a blatant example of direct personal financial gain for the public official. Thus, it can be suggested that

these four items did not correlate with any of the other items, because the respondents had difficulty imagining them happening within the Canadian political system.

Those items which did correlate together strongly at the .05 level of significance, exemplify further, trends which were apparent with the simple rank ordering. Firstly, the items SCHOOL and WEAPONS correlated together, as did SCHOOL and NEP, which are the items which constitute the lower end of the corruption continuum. Secondly, the conflict of interest items of DEFENSE and JUDGE and DEFENSE and NEP also correlated together, which constitute the middle section of the continuum.

These correlation coefficients then, seemingly reveal which items are statistically related. In essence, they indicate which acts were evaluated similarly by the MPs. For example, if an MP found WEAPONS to be not corrupt, there was a good chance that he/she also found SCHOOL not corrupt.

A Typology

It can be advanced that the acts contained within the survey, can be distinguished from one another not only along dimensional lines, but as well, different types of corrupt activity can be delineated. As mentioned in Chapter One, Arnold Heidenheimer has developed a colour classification to denote these various types of corrupt activity. According to Heidenheimer, the corruptness of an

political acts is determined by the interaction between the judgement of a particular act by the public and by political elites, or public officials.

Subsequently then, behaviour is judged to be particularly unsavory or corrupt, if both public officials and the public judge it corrupt and both wish it restricted. Such behaviour Heidenheimer classifies as BLACK corruption. Conversely, there are those acts which are judged corrupt by both public officials and the public, but which neither feel are severe enough to warrant sanction. These acts Heidenheimer calls WHITE corruption. Between these two polar extremes, lie the forms of behaviour which are the most difficult to define and detect. GREY corruption refers to those acts which either the public officials, or the people, want to see punished, but the other group does not; one group is intensely concerned about the issue, and the other is unconcerned.

Heidenheimer's typology then, indicates the existence of a scale of corruption that can be used to classify political behaviour according to their degree of corruptness from "BLACK" to "GREY" to "WHITE". While such a typology does not account for those acts seen as corrupt by only one group, or explain why some groups see an act as corrupt, both other groups see it as less corrupt; it is useful in providing organizational focus to the discussion.

Applying this typology to the dependent variables, it can be advanced that WEAPONS and SCHOOL are acts of WHITE corruption.

They are constituency-service items and generally can be called "good-will gestures", carried out to increase a member's probability of re-election. They are tasks which are considered a part of an MP's job, and were ranked lowest on the corruption continuum, thus leading one to hypothesize that the members would not see such acts as worthy of sanction.

Next, there are the GREY corrupt acts, which encompass the conflict of interest situations; JUDGE, DEFENSE, NEP and ROADS. The first three items all involve a substantial amount of stock held by the public official in a situation in which he/she stands to personally profit. ROADS too involves a personal gain for the official but of a more direct nature. There are no stock holdings involved, just the monetary gain incurred from the sale of the official's land. While LEADER and PROPOSAL could as well be categorized as potential conflicts of interest, they differ from the above in that the gain to be secured by the official is not as direct, and is diminished somewhat by the fact that the gain is in the form of campaign contributions.

Finally, the remaining two items, DRIVEWAY and TRAVEL can be considered BLACK acts of corruption. Without a doubt members perceived these items as highly corrupt. In each, the elected official is gaining financially or materially at the public's expense. But unlike the previous conflict situations, the gain is not in the form of a campaign contribution, or an expected gain in the form of an increase in the value of their stock, but instead is a direct, personal benefit.

Premised on Heidenheimer's typology then, it is possible to create BLACK, GREY, WHITE variables. This would enable one to determine whether these types of corrupt acts are not only theoretically, but empirically independent, or different, from one another. These new variables were computed by adding together the corresponding items. Thus, the BLACK variable was created by adding together TRAVEL and DRIVEWAY, the WHITE variable comprised of WEAPONS and SCHOOL; and GREY, the sum of JUDGE, DEFENSE and NEP. For the reasons previously discussed, LEADER, ROADS and PROPOSAL were left out of the computation. Each of the included items makes a separate contribution toward the creation of their prospective new variable, each offering a slightly different perspective on the same issue. By computing these new variables, measurement capabilities are increased, as there now is more than a single item measuring the degree of BLACK, GREY or WHITE corruption.

In essence, what has been created is a cumulative scale, comprised of a combination of the dependent variables, which the respondents scored in terms of the degree of corruption. In a cumulative scale, items are related to one another in such a way that ideally an individual who scores one of the WHITE items as not corrupt, scores the other WHITE item in the same way. The frequencies provided in TABLE VI, show how the respondents scored similar types of corrupt acts. The left margin shows the corruption score which is the total of the scores assigned to each of the items which comprise the variable. For example,

if a respondent on the WHITE variable, scored WEAPONS a 6 and SCHOOL a 7, the corruption score would be 13. For the WHITE variable, 23.8% of the respondents scored both WEAPONS and SCHOOL as not corrupt, for a corruption score of 14. On GREY, the modal score was 9, with 17.9% of the respondents falling into this category; while 16.7% of the respondents saw each of the three conflict items as corrupt for a corruption score of 3. Finally, on the BLACK items, 54.3% of the respondents scored both TRAVEL and DRIVEWAY as corrupt, for a corruption score of 2.

TABLE VI
FREQUENCIES FOR WHITE, GREY, BLACK

WHITE				GREY				BLACK			
Code	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Frequency	Code	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Frequency	Code	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Frequency	Code	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Frequency
2	3	3.6	3	14	16.7	2	54	64.3			
3	3	3.6	4	7	8.3	3	9	10.7			
5	3	3.6	5	4	4.8	4	9	10.7			
6	3	3.6	6	10	11.9	5	3	3.6			
7	10	11.9	7	6	7.1	6	3	3.6			
8	10	11.9	8	9	10.7	7	2	2.4			
9	8	9.5	9	15	17.9	9	3	3.6			
10	9	10.7	10	3	3.6	10	1	1.2			
11	7	8.3	11	2	2.4						
12	1	1.2	12	3	3.6						
13	4	4.8	13	1	1.2						
14	20	23.8	14	1	1.2						
15	1	1.2	15	4	4.8						
16	2	2.4	16	2	2.4						
			17	1	1.2						
			18	1	1.2						
			20	1	1.2						

From these findings it can be said that the MPs were consistent in their scoring. Generally, if they found one of the BLACK items corrupt, they also saw the other as corrupt. The same held true for the WHITE items and to a somewhat lesser degree, the GREY items.

By producing a Pearson Correlation coefficient matrix, it can be determined whether these three types of corrupt acts are empirically independent from one another. Table VII contains the correlation coefficients which denote the strength of the relationship between the variables WHITE, GREY and BLACK. As evident from the Table, both BLACK and GREY are not related at the .05 level of significance, but seemingly it appears that WHITE is somewhat strongly related to both BLACK and GREY. Thus, it would seem that empirically these three types of corrupt acts cannot be said to be totally independent of one another. Interesting enough, it was the WHITE variable which was correlated with the other two. This can perhaps be explained in that the WHITE variables are those which possess the potential to turn into a GREY or a BLACK item. If the MP was to accept payment to secure a place in law school for a constituent or friend, the act would become BLACK; or if the minister in WEAPONS, automatically awarded the contract to the firm in his constituency without regard for the other tenders, a conflict of interest could be declared.

While this notion of the independence of types of corruption was not empirically validated in this instance, the theoretical differences

TABLE VII
CORRELATION MATRIX OF WHITE, GREY, BLACK

	GREY	BLACK
WHITE	.36	.30
GREY	-	.07

between the three types nevertheless remains quite important. These types are different from one another in terms of the reactions they receive from political elites, and presumably the public. Perhaps if data was available which measured the public's attitudes toward such acts, the independence of these acts could be fully measured in accordance with Heidenheimer's classification. Data was, however, collected on how MPs perceived the public would score the same acts of corruption. These results are presented in Table IV. As evidenced from the figures reported, the MPs did not perceive that the public would score the acts very differently from themselves. If a trend was to be discerned, seemingly the MPs felt that on a number of the items, the public would be more tolerant of the corrupt acts than themselves. This may be attributed to the public's ignorance of political propriety, and lack of information about legislative procedures, norms and conventions. The various types of corrupt acts differ as well, it will be remembered, along dimensional lines. The WHITE type of corrupt acts are those with few corrupt dimensions; GREY, those acts with a moderate number of corruption dimensions; and BLACK acts are those which have the greatest number of corruption dimensions. This argument will be augmented by the following chapter, in which it will be shown that the same independent variables do not collectively explain the new variables of WHITE, GREY and BLACK. For example, the correlates that explain BLACK are not the same correlates that explain WHITE.

Theoretically, these various types of corrupt acts cannot simply

be assimilated. As verified by the responses given by Canadian MPs, corrupt acts are perceived of in varying degrees. Only a fragment of the sample, 2 respondents, were willing to evaluate all the dependent variables as corrupt. The rest of the respondents answers illustrate that some acts are considered more corrupt than others.

The above discussion has indicated what types of acts are seemingly tolerated by Canadian elected officials and which are not. The MPs, it was found, were willing to tolerate WEAPONS, SCHOOL and the conflict of interest item, NEP. The rest of the items it can be advanced, would not be tolerated by a great number of representatives. Corruption from an MP's perspective, is constituted by a blatant, direct, personal gain for the elected official.

The dimensional approach to political corruption we have seen, allows gradients of corruptness of an act to be delineated. As well, such a schema aids in finding reasons why elected officials hold similar or divergent beliefs about a particular corrupt act. The researcher is provided with a method of measuring the responses of a group of individuals to several political acts that vary according to their theoretical corruptness.

From answers to such questions we can then determine what kinds of people, in this instance, what kinds of elected officials, condemn acts of marginal ethicality.² What kind of officials see almost

no activities as involving conflicts of interest, while others believe that even the mere hint or appearance of a conflict should be avoided. Having thus come to an understanding of the concept of political corruption and its definitional components, we now will focus our attention on an examination of those environmental and behavioural factors that might be advanced to explain the existence, perception and tolerance of political corruption.

NOTES

1. Richard Van Loon and Michael Whittington, The Canadian Political System (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1981), p. 177.
2. Peters and Welch, "Attitudes of US State Legislators Toward Political Corruption", p. 448.

CHAPTER THREE: WHO IS TOLERANT OF CORRUPTION?

A number of variables, it can be advanced, are relevant in shaping and determining MP's attitudes toward political corruption. These variables could conceivably be related to individual tolerance levels of marginally ethical acts. Authors who have written on the topic of political corruption and elected officials' attitudes toward it,¹ have broadly classified these factors into three groups: political, spatial or territorial, and socio-economic factors. In this study, political factors will include consideration of party affiliation, a self-perceived scale of the individual's degree of liberalism, and the number of years the member has been in the legislature. Spatial factors include the region or province the MP represents, and the degree of urban/ruralness of his/her constituency. Finally, covered under the socio-economic category will be such factors as sex, age, education, occupation, religious affiliation and religious attendance.

In order to organize systematically the discussion of the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variables, the colour classification schema of Arnold Heidenheimer (as outlined in Chapter Two) will be employed. Reiterating briefly, this schema facilitated the classification of the ten dependent variables into acts of WHITE, GREY, and BLACK corruption. These categories differed along dimensional, definitional and theoretical lines, and it was advanced that although not entirely statistically independent of one another, different variables, in combination, represented separate types of corrupt activity.

Premised on these theoretical differences, a set of new variables was created. A WHITE variable was created by adding together the dependent variables of SCHOOL and WEAPONS; a GREY variable the summation of DEFENSE, JUDGE and NEP; and a BLACK variable, comprised of TRAVEL and DRIVEWAY. Such a computation ultimately simplified the data analysis, as instead of ten dependent variables, there are now only three, thereby rendering the methodology more manageable.

In essence, what is being measured is the degree of tolerance or intolerance an MP has for the types of corruption outlined above - WHITE, GREY and BLACK - and the factors which determine and explain it. If a member scored an act as being corrupt (any score under 4 on the Likert scale utilized), it can be assumed that the corresponding tolerance level for such acts would be minimal, whereas, if an act was scored as being not corrupt (any score over 4), then the tolerance level of the respondent towards such acts would rise.

The dependent variables then, represent three distinct "types" of politically corrupt acts. The data analysis will subsequently reveal who is tolerant of corruption and perhaps reasons may then be offered to explain why, in light of the three classifications of independent variables.

Corruption: The Impact of Political Factors

The political environment would seemingly be of prime importance in the shaping of MP's attitudes toward corruption. Party affiliation might partially account for differences in tolerance levels towards politically corrupt acts. Whether a representative was a member of the government, the opposition, or a third party, might have some bearing on whether they would tolerate or condemn certain actions. It would seem plausible that members of the opposition or a third party might hold different perceptions of what constitutes a corrupt act, than a member of the government. Somewhat related to the variable of party affiliation, might be the variable measuring the individual MP's degree of liberalism, or general political ideology. Are members who describe themselves as very liberal, for example, less tolerant of corrupt acts, than a member who perceives him/herself as very conservative, or middle of the road?*

In addition, it would seem that members who have been in Parliament for a number of years would be more tolerant of corruption. This is perhaps the case because members become conditioned by their parliamentary environment. Allegiances are formed which become difficult to betray; collegiality remains an established norm, and one is better acquainted with the intricacies of the legislative process.

*It was thought that such a scale might be a problem for the NDP members interviewed. But all respondents were told that the intervals of the scale were small "I", small "c" and an "other" category was provided for those who could not place themselves comfortably within one of the categories.

These political variables then, contribute to the suggestion that there is a socialization process at work in the parliamentary arena,² premised on legislative norms, the conventions of party discipline and collegiality, and mutual codes of conduct and ethics. Can it be said that these internal norms of the legislative system tend to homogenize individual's attitudes toward political corruption? Is there an elite culture of political corruption which transcends regional, educational, religious and occupational differences?

Before this question can be satisfactorily answered, the data analysis employed must be discussed. We will proceed by looking at bivariate regressions, and move to specify a final multivariate model for both WHITE and GREY,* followed by a separate discussion of BLACK corruption.

The effect of political variables on acts of WHITE corruption will be discussed first. The component parts of the WHITE variable, the items dealing with a weapons contract and an elected official intervening to get a friend or relative admitted to a professional school or

*I am indebted to Professor Michael M. Atkinson, McMaster University for assistance with the specification of the final models. All models were specified using the multiple regression programme of SPSS, described in N. Nie et al, SPSS.

university, have been considered acts of WHITE corruption on the basis of the fact that they do not fit the prescribed definition of political corruption, on which this paper is premised. They are acts in which the elected official is not receiving a direct personal gain, and the only possible ensuing reward would be the garnering of future electoral support. According to Peters and Welch' dimensional approach, these items possess only a few of the corrupt dimensions outlined, notably that the official involved is acting in his public capacity.

Of the political variables which can be considered influential in the shaping of MP's attitudes toward WHITE corruption, party affiliation seems to be a prime determinant. Since one could not at the outset reasonably predict with any certainty, whether the Liberals, Tories or NDP, were more tolerant of acts of WHITE corruption, two-tailed tests were used.

The bivariate regression indicates that there are significant partisan differences in attitudes toward acts of WHITE corruption (see Table 1). The mean score of the parties on the WHITE variable was 9.67, with a standard deviation of 3.5. The Liberals scored above the mean at 10.5, and the Tories scored almost on the mean at 9.7, while the NDP, were significantly below the mean at 6.9. By just examining the mean scores, it can be seen that there is a significant difference in attitudes toward WHITE corruption between the Tories and the NDP and Liberals and the NDP. The difference between the Liberals and the Tories is only marginal and thus of little consequence.

It can be concluded then that the Liberals are the most tolerant of WHITE corruption, followed closely by the Conservatives, with the NDP, being dramatically less tolerant than either of the other parties. The t-statistics indicate (see Table 1) that the relationships are statistically significant, the differences in the scores being illustrative of the distance between the three parties on acts of WHITE corruption. What needs to be accounted for, is why there exists only a marginal difference between the Liberals and the Tories, and a great difference between the NDP and the two major parties. In addition, how does one account for the NDP members scoring the WHITE variable as corrupt, when the items that comprise the variable do not even adhere to the preferred definition of political corruption.

This seemingly lily-white or pristine pure attitude of the NDP might conceivably be traced to their historic roots and their origins as a movement and subsequent transition to party. According to Walter Young, one of the characteristics of a movement is the dogged determinism with which it clings to its ideals.³ A movement, Young defines as an organization of like-minded people, dedicated to a cause that is predicated on what are seen as high moral values.⁴

Stanley Knowles expressed in 1961 that there was still a need for a movement of the people and that the NDP was in fact a still larger movement, which the CCF and the Canadian Labour Congress had created.⁵ Acknowledging then, that the NDP evolved from the CCF, one

TABLE ONE

BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS
POLITICAL FACTORS

	WHITE		GREY	
	Simple Correlation	Bivariate Reg. Coefficient	Simple Correlation	Bivariate Reg. Coefficient
1. Party Aff. (Lib. vs Others)	.209	3.60**	-.143	1.28
2. Party Aff. (Tories vs Others)	.011	2.82*	.283	2.97*
3. Years in Parliament	.174	.134	.184	1.47

* < .05

** < .01

gains a better understanding of NDP ideology. The CCF was a movement of men and women motivated by Christian ideals, volunteering their services and determined upon the reformation of society to achieve the cooperative Commonwealth.⁶ Unlike the other existing parties in Canada, the CCF was caught in what Daniel Bell described as "a tension arising from the question 'are parties an attempt to realize ideals, or an endeavour to get advantages within the limits of ethics?'"⁷ The CCF response to this question was provided by Woodsworth in 1935 - "we are fighting for a principle and...we should fight for this principle even if we go down to defeat..."⁸

It is such an outlook which differentiates a movement from a party, and perhaps then accounts for differences between the NDP and the two traditional parties. The goals of a political party have long been recognized as the achievement and maintenance of political power.⁹ Sacrifice of principles has always been accepted by political parties in order that power should be secured or maintained. But for the movement, it is change and not necessarily power, that is sought, and thus, principle remains uncompromised.¹⁰ But how much of this protectionist sentiment toward principle, was preserved as the Canadian social-democratic movement was transformed into a social-democratic party, in the guise of the NDP?

The increasing attention that was paid to electoral activity and organization, and the reduced emphasis on education, marked the decline of the movement aspect of the CCF and the subsequent

predominance of the party aspect. This development reached its climax in the formation and marked political activity of the NDP. Doctrine and principle were not forgotten, but rather there occurred a shift in emphasis, from education to organization. The righteous, utopian and holier-than-thou attitude, which is in many respects the hallmark of a socialist movement, never completely disappeared.¹¹ The NDP in the transition from movement to party managed to remain loyal to their convictions and principles.

This then might explain why the NDP members scored the WHITE items as corrupt. Any item which even subtly suggested anything unsavory would probably be deemed corrupt by NDP members. To do otherwise, would be a violation of party ethics and convictions. A second argument will be presented which augments this ideological one.

Proximity to Power Argument

To explain the substantial differences in mean scores on the acts of WHITE corruption, between the Liberals and the NDP, and the Tories and the NDP, perhaps a proximity to power argument could be successfully employed. It can be advanced that the closer an elected official is to the apex of power, the more tolerant one might expect him/her to be of WHITE acts of corruption. This being the case, since in a position of power, for instance, a cabinet minister, an official would definitely have more opportunity to engage in acts of WHITE corruption. Thus, to a cabinet minister, or in this case, since the cabinet ministers were removed from the sample, members from the

government party who had the potential to rise in the ranks, or in the case of the opposition, shadow cabinet ministers, the item containing the weapons contract would appear to be an acceptable form of behaviour. The same would hold true for a letter of reference from an elected official. If the letter was to carry any influence at all, surely a letter from a cabinet minister, parliamentary secretary, or even a member of the government backbench, would be more influential than a letter from a member of the NDP backbench.

The findings on the WHITE acts of corruption seemingly support such an argument. The Liberal respondents, the officials closest to power, were the most tolerant of WHITE corruption. The Tories being the official opposition and former government, were also quite tolerant of the WHITE acts. Finally, the NDP members, being the farthest removed from the opportunity to wield power, were the least tolerant of WHITE acts of corruption. Denied the opportunity to engage in such activities as described in the WHITE items, it is understandable why the NDP would be less tolerant of these acts than MPs from the other two parties.

Seemingly, party affiliation was the only political factor which was found to be significantly related to the WHITE variable. The number of years the member had been in parliament and an individual's degree of liberalism, were seemingly indeterministic of member's attitudes toward WHITE corruption. The partisan differences that were uncovered were attributed in the case of the NDP, to differences in party principles and beliefs and the proximity of the individual MP to

the apex of power. We will now move to consider the relationship of political factors to the GREY variable, to see whether these initial findings are at all maintained.

The GREY variable was created by the summation of the items JUDGE, DEFENSE and NEP. These acts were grouped together because all can be considered conflicts of interest. In each the elected official stands to personally gain, due to privileged information or position. All involve a potential increase in the value of the official's stock. Such acts can be considered "GREY" since they are clearly not WHITE acts of corruption, nor are they quite as flagrant as the BLACK acts of corruption. The term "GREY" seems to emphasize this shaded area in between the two extremes. As well, along Peters and Welch' dimensional schema, these acts were attributed a moderate number of corrupt dimensions - more than the WHITE acts, but less than the BLACK ones. Undoubtedly, they were the ones the MPs had the most difficulty with, as they forced the official to draw a line between acceptable and unacceptable action.

The first political variable tested was party affiliation. The bivariate regression revealed again a significant partisan difference. The mean response on the GREY variable was 7.3. The Liberals and the NDP scored below the mean at 6.7 and 5.5 respectively, while the Tories scored not only above the mean, but also, well above both the Liberals and the NDP. Thus, on GREY, there exists a substantial difference of opinion between the Tories and the Liberals and the

Tories and the NDP, while the Liberals and the NDP seem to be more in agreement.

The Conservatives then, can be deemed the most tolerant of such facts and the Liberals and the NDP seemingly intolerant. Why this was the case is open to speculation. From discussions with the members, one would not have expected this outcome. Many of the Conservative MPs expressed the notion that existing conflict of interest guidelines were something that they felt very strongly about. The guidelines implemented by then Prime Minister Joe Clark, in 1979, and subsequently adopted by Trudeau in 1980, were regarded as being very stringent and rigid and a necessary safeguard to avoid violations of the public trust. Yet, the Conservatives scored above the mean on these conflict items.

Conflict of interest has rarely caused the loss of position for Canadian politicians. An examination of this peculiarity, resulted in an author's conclusion that "a little honest graft never hurt a politician at the polls".¹² In this study it was revealed that all of the conflict of interest cases examined resulted in the re-election of the offender or his party. This was true, even in the case of B.C. politician Robert Sommers, who was the first cabinet minister in commonwealth history to be jailed for corruption; yet his party managed to retain his vacated seat in the next election.¹³

This trend has seemingly persisted in current conflict of interest cases. Alistair Gillespie was cleared of allegations that he had breached

existing guidelines which regulate the post-employment activities of former ministers. More significantly, the "Coalgate Affair" as it now has been termed, caused great speculation as to whether Finance Minister Marc Lalonde, intervened in any way to approve the funding of Gillespie' coal conversion project, because he was a former cabinet colleague. Throughout the entire episode, opposition members called for the resignation of not only Lalonde, but of Deputy Prime Minister Alan McEachen, who it was claimed knew, or ought to have known that a former cabinet colleague broke conflict of interest guidelines by dealing with his former department, thereby implicating him as well in a conflict of interest.

It has been members of the Liberal party that have recently been involved in potential conflict of interest cases.¹⁴ Thus, one might expect that the Liberal members interviewed might have displayed a more tolerant attitude toward the GREY variable. Yet, it was the Conservatives who were seemingly the most tolerant. Why?

Whether such a finding could be related to differences in ideological principles, would be difficult to substantiate. Throughout the history of Canada it has been almost impossible to distinguish clearly between the policies of the Liberal and Conservative parties. This absence of difference in party policies does not imply that Canadian parties lack principles, but simply that the Conservatives and Liberals have fairly well agreed upon the fundamental principles they wanted established in Canada.¹⁵ If such ideological agreement exists, why then

was a difference perceived between the Liberals and Conservatives over conflicts of interest?

Perhaps such a difference is attributable not so much to philosophical tenets, as it is to tradition. The Conservatives have as part of their legacy a precedent of tolerance for conflicts of interest. This is well illustrated by Sir Allan MacNab's famous declaration in 1853 "Railways are my politics". The meaning is quite clear. MacNab's private interests were also his public ones and his home, Dundurn Castle, personified the profitability of such an attitude.¹⁶

With the passing of time, this type of candidness waned, but some politicians continued to be identified as representatives of special interests. For example, Sir Alexander Galt, a Father of Confederation, was viewed as a lobbyist for certain railway companies with which he was affiliated. Financier Rudolphe Forget, a Conservative MP after 1904, while concurrently president or director of twenty-nine companies, did not even consider disqualifying himself if one of his numerous ventures was affected by a proposal under debate.¹⁷ In fact, he believed his direct interest made him the most qualified to speak on certain issues.

Galt and Forget were undoubtedly connected with economic concerns highly dependent upon government regulation or support. Political participation garnered protection for these men and advantage in their private affairs. They saw no moral wrongdoing in their activ-

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ities;; rather they believed their action were natural and important, given Canada's critical need for development.¹⁸

Given the differences between modern notions of public and private interests, and those of a century ago, it would seem reasonable to expect that such behaviour by politicians would be severely criticised. While the Conservatives do not possess a monopoly on these conflict of interest skeletons, they remain a part of the Conservative party's past.

Tolerance for GREY acts of corruption might also be related to the traditional conservative principle of "laissez-faire". George Perlin in his study on the Tory leadership, examined the distribution of opinion on such a principle among delegates to the 1967 convention, the 1971 annual meeting and the 1976 convention. Over the three surveys, an increasingly larger number of delegates agreed with the statement that "government ought to interfere less with business".¹⁹ In addition, while it was not found to empirically related to the GREY variable, it is perhaps worth noting that the Conservative respondents constituted over half of the number of those members who said that they were currently holding another occupation beside MP. Of the twenty members who said they were holding another occupation, fourteen were Conservative members and the other six were Liberals. No members of the NDP party in the sample were presently holding another occupation.

The occupations of the Conservative members included lawyers,

farmers and a rancher, with the largest number of respondents indicating that their other occupation was business related. Conversely, with respect to the Liberal respondents, medical doctors and lawyers, numbered greater than did members with business interests. Naturally, one cannot make any substantive conclusions on the basis of these findings, although it is tempting to suggest that perhaps the higher tolerance level displayed by Conservative MPs, for the conflict of interest situations, might be related to such a finding.

Another unsubstantiated relationship was also discovered. Since party affiliation was statistically significant, it seemed plausible that perhaps the variable which depicted a member's ideological perspective would be significantly correlated. But this was not found to be the case, as the regression analysis failed to reveal a significant relationship, although an interesting trend was discerned. Noticeably, those members who described themselves as being "middle of the road", were the most tolerant of GREY acts. Why this was so can only be speculated upon. Acts of grey corruption comprised the middle of the corruption spectrum, and "middle of the road", constitutes the center of the ideological spectrum. It would seem then that perhaps those members who viewed themselves as between the two ideological extremes of liberalism and conservatism, were more tolerant of the corrupt acts which were between the extremes of WHITE and BLACK corruption.

In the case of GREY corruption, the political variable which

measured the number of years the member had been in parliament, proved to be statistically significant. It was predicted at the outset of this chapter that tolerance levels of corrupt acts might increase as a member spent more time in the parliamentary arena. The significance of this relationship is indicated by the t-statistic, which is greater than the critical value at the .05 level of significance for a one-tailed test. It is thus evident that members who have been in the legislature longer, scored the GREY acts less corrupt on the corruption scale. This could be the case since one becomes conditioned by the parliamentary environment. The longer one is a part of the legislative system, the better acquainted one becomes with the intricacies of operation, hence making it easier to circumvent rules, procedures and norms. Over time, members learn which actions are accepted or tolerated and which are not. MPs have not only personal standards of ethics to respect and operate from, but as well, there exist common legislative standards.

From the above bivariate regression analysis, it was learned that the political variable of party affiliation was statistically related to MP's attitudes toward both acts of WHITE and GREY corruption. Seemingly, Liberal MPs were found to be more tolerant of WHITE corruption than their colleagues from the other two parties. This was explained by the fact that it is the Liberals who are in power, and who thus have the greatest opportunity to engage in acts of WHITE corruption. The strong condemnation of the WHITE acts by the NDP was accounted for by their past; their origins as a movement.

The variable which measured political experience - the number of years in the legislature - on the other hand was found to only be a determinant of attitudes toward GREY corruption. The longer one is part of the legislative process, it seems, the easier it becomes to remain tolerant of conflict of interest situations. This could be accredited to the fact that unlike the WHITE acts of corruption, the GREY acts are governed by a set of written guidelines which dictate the behaviour expected of members with respect to conflicts of interest. Such guidelines would presumably be adhered to quite rigidly by a new member of the legislature, while more experienced members, conditioned by their political environment, would have the wherewithal to circumvent or bend existing guidelines. Loopholes would presumably be more apparent to a veteran legislator than a freshman.

Finally, the remaining political variable which measured the degree of liberalism of the elected official was found not to be significantly deterministic of politician's attitudes toward either WHITE or GREY corruption. Yet, indirectly, ideology was cited as a partial explanation of why NDP members were overly intolerant of acts of both WHITE and GREY corruption and why Conservative members were the most tolerant of conflict of interest situations. Thus, an elected official's political theory cannot be entirely ignored. Theoretical principles do shape and guide MP's actions in the ethical and moral issues they face daily. Now that we know which political variables are deterministic of MP's attitudes toward WHITE and GREY corruption, we will move to consider the next category of variables, to ascertain and

evaluate their impact and relevance in the shaping of attitudes toward acts of WHITE and GREY corruption.

Spatial Factors

With regards to the category of spatial or territorial variables, it can be argued that the constituency which the MP represents might also condition his or her tolerance of corruption. A member from a densely populated, primarily urban constituency, might be more tolerant of corrupt acts, than a member representing a sparsely populated, largely rural riding, because large urban areas have been affected by the phenomena of machine politics, successfully employed by a "boss", who has been able to secure the support of the people in his/her riding, regardless of the tactics utilized.²⁰ While such machines have been far more prevalent in the U.S., Canadian cities like Hamilton, have been exposed to machine politics. Thus, it would seem that characteristics of the constituency the member represents might be influential in shaping a member's attitudes toward political corruption.

The literature on political corruption also points to regional and cultural variables as sources of variation in attitudes toward corruption. It has long been thought that some provinces have been corruption prone and others reasonably free from the taint of corruption.²¹ Yet, it is unlikely that one province contains proportionally more venal individuals than another province.²² Rather, it has been asserted that not all regions of Canada are affected to the same degree by political corruption.²³ Thus, each region or province is bound to react and re-

spond to evidence of political corruption in a different manner. This conception is largely based on Raymond Wolfinger's thesis which asserts that regional variations in reactions to corrupt activities can be delineated. Wolfinger discusses the presence or absence of 'machine politics' in various regions in the United States, attributing the difference to "geographical variations in political style".²⁴ These differences in style, Wolfinger asserts, are actually variations in regional traditions.

Such regional variations, have also been discussed in Canadian literature. K.Z. Paltiel has argued that Canadian regional subcultures show a distinct variation in public awareness of party financing measures. This awareness he advances, increases as one moves from the eastern provinces to those in the west.²⁵ Also, responses to the 1968 national election survey conducted by John Meisel, display similar trends. The respondents were asked how many of those running the government were crooked. The Ottawa River became, in effect, the boundary line, as all provinces east of the river were more apt to say that "quite a few" were crooked, than was the case in the provinces west of it.²⁶

It has traditionally been assumed that corruption in Canada has been more prevalent in the Atlantic provinces and Quebec. This appears to be the case because of the longevity of corruption in Quebec and the tradition of corrupt election practices in the Maritimes.²⁷ Quebecers responded to evidence of widespread, pervasive corruption, by rejecting the alleged corrupters, replacing them with a Union

Nationale Government that was dedicated to the goal of housekeeping and implementing reform in administrative and election practices.²⁸ But ironically, they replaced one corrupt government with another, as Duplessis reverted to the practices of his predecessors, perhaps to a greater extent.

The Maritimes as previously mentioned have been portrayed as being continually plagued by patronage and the familiar activities of vote-buying and trading. While by no means "corruption-free", Ontario and the Western provinces have received less scholarly attention. But can it be said with any degree of certainty that Canadians in Ontario are less tolerant of corrupt acts than Canadians in the Maritimes? Or in this instance, are MPs from Ontario less tolerant of corrupt acts than their Atlantic counterparts?

According to the results of the bivariate regression, region was found to be a significant determinant of MP's attitudes toward WHITE corruption. Trends in initial analysis,²⁹ seemed to indicate that this independent variable could be collapsed into two categories, the West and the Rest, of the other regions in Canada. The west was noticeably different from the other regions in their attitudes toward WHITE corruption. Dummy variables were used to enable the inclusion of region into the regression equation.*

*For an explanation of Dummy Variable Regression see Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Applied Regression, Sage Publishers, 1982.

The results of the regression reveal a significant difference in tolerance levels of acts of WHITE corruption, between MPs from western Canada and MPs from ridings in other regions of the country, these being, Ontario, Quebec, and Atlantic Canada. The beta coefficients exemplify this difference, as it is evident that MPs from the rest of Canada scored above the mean ($Y=9.6$) on WHITE corruption ($B=10.6$), while western MPs scored below the mean ($B=8.2$). Thus, it can be said that western MPs are less tolerant of acts of WHITE corruption than members from elsewhere in Canada. A full report of the statistics can be found in Table II.

Accounting for this regional difference is purely speculative. As Gibbons has argued, it could perhaps be interpreted as 'an indication that there does indeed exist a regional culture of political corruption. This approach is premised on the concept of regionalism. Simeon and Elkins have written that "Canadian politics is regional politics: regionalism is one of the pre-eminent facts of Canadian life..."³⁰ They conclude that Canada is marked by differences in "basic orientations to politics",³¹ and Gibbons subsequently asks whether this regionalism can be expected to extend to attitudes toward political corruption.³²

This regional approach seems to pervade the Canadian literature on the topic of political corruption. It would appear that if there was a

TABLE TWO
BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS
SPATIAL FACTORS

	<u>WHITE</u>		<u>GREY</u>	
	<u>Simple</u> <u>Correlation</u>	<u>Bivariate</u> <u>Reg. Coefficient</u>	<u>Simple</u> <u>Correlation</u>	<u>Bivariate</u> <u>Reg. Coefficient</u>
1. Urban/ rural	-.289	-.343	-.094	-.114
2. Region	-.339	-2.37*	-.022	.151

* <.05

regional trend to be discerned, the literature would indicate that the Maritimes and Quebec have been plagued by corruption and an attitude of tolerance has been cultivated. Conversely, it would seem that the other provinces have remained relatively corruption-free.

The findings here seemingly support such a trend, but a less tolerant attitude was only found to exist among members from the West. Members from Ontario, for example, were grouped with the traditional tolerant cultures of Quebec and the Maritimes. An intolerant attitude by westerners toward corruption is not surprising given the success in Alberta of the CCF in 1944, a party campaigning partly on an anti-patronage platform.³³ But before agreeing that there does exist a regional culture of corruption, it must be shown that this regional trend is maintained with regards to GREY acts of corruption.

The expected finding that the more rural the constituency the member represents, the lower his or her level of tolerance toward corrupt acts, materialized as shown in Table II. The bivariate regression revealed that members from predominantly rural ridings were less tolerant of WHITE corruption than members from largely urban ridings. This difference in attitudes was somewhat expected. It has long been thought that there exists a difference in value orientations between "city" dwellers and "country" dwellers.³⁴ Traditionally, it has been the urban areas which have been subjected to long periods of urban machine politics. Such machines in Canadian cities like Hamilton, were at one time, able to successfully garner the support of a tolerant citizenry.

James Scott links the notion of machine politics to his broader approach to political corruption which he has termed "development".³⁵ Scott and others,³⁶ advance the idea that corruption can be related to the political setting, and distinct loyalty or deference patterns.³⁷ These patterns, he argues, are indicative of "phases of corruptive culture", of which he identified three: A) traditional patterns of deference to established authorities, where particularistic inducements are thought to be minor; B) weakened deference patterns with narrow parochial ties and competition among leaders where particularistic loyalties are of major importance. C) new loyalties which are horizontally based on class or occupational groupings, and where inducements are collective, consisting of policies, ideologies and legislation.³⁸ The level of corruption differs from one phase to the other, but corruption is thought to be the lowest in traditional cultures(A) and where loyalties are no longer ethnic, religious or geographical(C). It is phase B) which is considered the most conducive to corruption, and this conduciveness is increased by additional factors such as, the social disorganization that accompanies urbanization and economic change.³⁹

Perhaps it is due to these loyalty or deference patterns, that urban areas have been more hospitable to the existence of machine politics. John Wilson expands the developmental argument further and applies it in a Canadian context. Wilson focuses on the notion of varying degrees of political development from one province to another. Wilson's approach is more than just regionalism. He relates the provinces stage of development, which he classifies as either under-

developed, transitional or developed,* to the province's political culture. While traditionally it has been accepted that Canada possess two political cultures - English and French - Wilson hypothesizes that there exists a possibility that Canada contains more than two political cultures. Each province constitutes in effect, an independent political system and has on that account a political culture of its own. These developmental and cultural differences, he suggests, account for the presence of considerable disagreement over what constitutes legitimate and proper behaviour on the part of the government.⁴⁰

While both spatial variables were found to be significantly correlated to acts of WHITE corruption, attitudes toward conflicts of interest were influenced by only the nature of the constituency the member represents. Once again it was found that members representing rural riding were less tolerant of conflict of interest situations, than members serving urban constituencies. But MPs attitudes toward GREY corruption were seemingly unaffected by regional differences. This would seem to indicate that perhaps in the existing literature on political corruption, too much emphasis is placed on the relative importance of region, to the neglect of other factors, in determining the

*Underdeveloped - NFLD, PEI, NB, NS

Transitional - Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, B.C.

Developed - Alberta, Saskatchewan

attitudes of elected officials toward political corruption. This notion of over emphasis will be discussed further, once multivariate analysis has been conducted. What remains to be examined is the final category of variables, which are those describing the socio-economic traits of the individual politician.

Socio-Economic Factors

As mentioned previously, the remaining category of factors define personal socio-economic attributes of the legislator and a number of hypotheses can be made about them. The motives of individual officials which govern a decision to partake in corrupt activities, might be dependent on the background and values of each Member of Parliament. Female legislators, it has been shown in an American study,⁴¹ are less tolerant of corrupt acts than their male colleagues.* Somewhat related to the variable which measured the members years of parliamentary experience, is that of age. It can be predicted that older legislators, conditioned by time, experience and the parliamentary environment, might be expected to be more tolerant of corruption than younger members. As well, education might be a variable which would affect the member's attitudes toward corruption. Does one's tolerance level rise as

*The variable which denoted the respondents sex, was omitted from the analysis, as not enough women were included in the sample to make any substantive conclusions about the variable and its influence in the shaping of MP's attitudes toward political corruption.

TABLE THREE:
BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS
SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS

	Religious Attendance	Age	Education
WHITE	R -.10 B .259 (.784)	R -.016 B .024 (.119)	R .10 B .775 (.842)
GREY	R .009 B .024 (.069)	R .22 B .077 (1.79)	R .15 B -1.18 (1.31)

one's education level rises? Finally, does religious affiliation and religious attendance make a difference?

It was interesting to discover that seemingly none of the socio-economic variables make a difference, as exemplified by the statistics in Table III. Firstly, with respect to religion, since there exists no reason to suspect that a member of one religious denomination might be more or less tolerant than a member from another denomination, a more reasonable variable to consider was that of religious attendance. The respondents were asked to estimate how often they attended the services at their church or synagogue. Possible responses ranged from often, to at least once a week, to several times a year, to never. (The entire selection of responses can be found in the Appendix.) One might expect avid church goers to be less tolerant of corrupt acts than non church goers, but empirically this was not found to be the case. As the coefficients illustrate there does not exist a statistically significant relationship between religious attendance and WHITE or GREY corruption.

The age of the respondent, as well, proved to be indeterministic of attitudes toward political corruption. Although this variable was found to be close to the critical value, on the GREY variable, it was not significant enough to make any substantive conclusions.

In addition, the education level of the MP was found to be insignificantly related to acts of WHITE and GREY corruption. Members

with a university education were found to be somewhat more tolerant of acts of both WHITE and GREY corruption than members without a degree, but the t-statistic indicates that such a relationship is not empirically significant.

Another variable which was thought might be significantly related to the GREY variable was occupation. It was tested and recoded into several categories comprised of the following occupations - business related, government, farmers, lawyers, professionals and skilled labour - which were subsequently organized into a number of different combinations. No matter what combination was fit into the regression equation, the findings were not statistically significant.

It will be recalled that the existing literature on corruption does not cite occupation as a reliable predictor of attitudes toward corrupt activity. Occupation might have proven to be a viable correlate had the respondents been a sample of the population at large. As it was, with a pure sample of MPs, the occupations of the members tended to be homogenized. In essence, there just was not enough occupational variety. Within the political elite, as John Porter has described, certain occupational groups are somewhat overrepresented, especially lawyers.⁴² Thus, the calibre of occupation held, was definitely higher than would have been the case if individuals were polled randomly from the public and not just the elite.

Elected officials attitudes toward corruption are apparently not

influenced by socio-economic factors like religiosity, or educational levels, but are instead shaped by political and spatial variables. It can thus be suggested that there does exist a socialization process at work in the parliamentary environment which nullifies personal attitudes and opinions toward political corruption. It can, and subsequently will be argued, that an elite culture of political corruption exists which transcends religious, educational and occupational differences.

In summation, the bivariate regressions revealed that the political factors of party affiliation and political experience, and the spatial factors of region and the nature of the individual's constituency, were all significantly deterministic of MP's attitudes toward acts of WHITE and GREY corruption. Yet, all of these variables did not affect the attitudes of MPs toward GREY and WHITE corruption to the same degree. It would seem logical to surmise that if region affected attitudes toward WHITE corruption, the same would hold true for GREY corruption. But as mentioned at the outset of the chapter, there exist distinct "types" of corrupt activity, premised on different theoretical underpinnings. MP's attitudes toward these types are thus accounted for by different variables.

It would seem then, that attitudes toward acts of WHITE corruption are determined on the basis of partisan, regional and urban/rural differences, while attitudes toward acts of GREY corruption, are explained by partisan variations, discrepancies between the member's years of legislative service and the same urban/rural differences. The independence of these correlates is exemplified by a regression analysis

which incorporates all four of the statistically significant variables into an equation for each WHITE and GREY corruption.

An Expanded Model

The next step in the analysis was to create a model premised on the four statistically significant factors found within the three categories of independent variables. The socio-economic variables were excluded entirely as they were all statistically insignificant in the bivariate regressions. Both spatial variables were included and two of the political variables; party affiliation and years of parliamentary experience. The equation for this model can be expressed as follows:

$$Y = B_1(\text{PARTY AFFILIATION}) + B_2(\text{YRS IN PARL}) + B_3(\text{REGION}) + B_4(\text{URB/RURAL})$$

By testing this equation with both WHITE and GREY corruption the variables which were statistically related to each were identified. The statistics in Table IV, indicate which coefficients are empirically significant for each type of corrupt activity.

As evident from the statistics, the variable measuring the degree of urban/ruralness of the constituency represented seems to be the strongest coefficient in the WHITE model as well as, a significant variable in the GREY model. As for the other spatial variable of region, it was found to be significant only in the WHITE model. The political variable measuring parliamentary experience is the strongest coefficient in the GREY model but is apparently insignificant in the WHITE model. Finally, party affiliation in both models can be regarded as a viable variable.

TABLE FOUR
*REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR EXPANDED MODEL

	LIBERAL	CONSERVATIVE	REGION	URB/RUR.	PARL EXP	CONSTANT
WHITE	2.31 (1.43)	3.11 (2.09)*	-1.74 (-1.85)*	-.428 (-3.06)**	.087 (.944)	9.46 (5.38)
						$R^2 = .27$ $\bar{R}^2 = .20$
GREY	-.269 (-1.53)	2.60 (1.61)***	-.766 (-.745)	-.264 (1.74)***	.212 (2.11)*	6.60 (3.45)
						$R^2 = .19$ $\bar{R}^2 = .12$

t-statistics in parenthesis
 * < .05 two-tail test
 ** < .01 two-tail test
 *** < .05 one-tail test

The R^2 indicates the proportion of the variation in tolerance levels of MPs toward acts of political corruption explained by the model. Thus, it can be said that the WHITE model explains 27% of the variation attitudes, while the GREY model can only account for 19% of the variation. What remains to be done is to construct a final model for both WHITE and GREY corruption comprised of only those variables which were found to be significantly related to them in the previous expanded model. Once the insignificant correlates are removed, perhaps the model's explanatory power will be increased.

Political and Spatial Factors: A Multivariate Analysis

i) White Corruption

From the preceeding bivariate regression, it was learned that the independent variables of party affiliation (political) and the spatial variables of region and the degree of urbanness of the constituency the member serves, all were explanatory of tolerance or intolerance of WHITE acts of corruption. What remains to be discerned is to what degree?

The variables were entered into the equation using step wise multiple regression. Multiple regression was employed as it offers a fuller explanation of the dependent variable, as more than one independent variable can be incorporated into an equation. This is desirable, since few phenomena are products of a single cause. As well, the effect of a particular independent variable is made more certain, for the possibility of distorting influence from the other independent variables is

removed.*

Dummy variable regression was conducted for the final models. Thus, in this equation party affiliation was dichotomized into the three parties with the NDP being held constant,** and due to the findings of the bivariate regressions, the region variable was broken down into the West and the Rest.

A final model for white corruption was estimated as follows:

$$Y = 9.86 - 1.83(\text{REG.}) - 3.37(\text{URB/RURAL}) + 3.14(\text{TORIES}) + 2.28(\text{LIB})$$

(7.59) (-2.06)* (-2.86)** (2.72)** (1.79)

$$R^2 = .25 \quad R^{-2} = .21$$

Y = tolerance points

unstandardized beta coefficients

t-statistics in parenthesis

p<.05*, p<.01** (two-tailed tests)

*For an excellent discussion of Multiple Regression, see Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Applied Regression, Sage Publications, California, 1982.

**Dummy variable estimation requires that one category in the analysis be omitted. For the purposes of the final model the NDP were chosen as the constant because they were so noticeably different from the other two parties in their scoring of the dependent variables.

This model then serves to explain how much of the variation in tolerance levels of MPs toward WHITE corruption is accounted for by partisan, regional and urban/rural differences.

The statistics reveal that the urban/rural variable is the strongest in the equation. Thus, it can be said that the degree of urban/ruralness of the constituency the member represents is the most powerful determinant of attitudes toward WHITE corruption, with members from urban ridings being more tolerant than members from rural ridings. But the existing variation in tolerance levels cannot be totally explained by this one factor.

Party affiliation was the next most powerful determinant. The coefficients in the equation represent the distance between the NDP and each of the other two parties. In the bivariate analysis it will be remembered that both the Liberals and the Tories were significantly different from the NDP. But in the multiple analysis this difference is somewhat reduced. This is attributable to the presence of the other independent variables in the equation. When controlling for the variables of region and urban/rural, it is apparent that these two variables have a greater impact on the Liberal respondents than the Tories. This is perhaps due to the fact that there are more Liberals from rural ridings; and with regards to the West-East distinction; there are no Liberals in the West classification. Presently, there are no

sitting Liberal members west of Winnipeg,* and thus, the Liberals in the sample comprised the greatest percentage of the Rest classification. Therefore, the difference between the NDP and Liberals, notably was reduced considerably because of the presence of the other two variables, exemplified by the weakened beta coefficients.

Finally, for all the emphasis in the literature on regional variation in attitudes toward political corruption, region was found to be the weakest coefficient in the model. Seemingly, the nature of the constituency the member represents and his/her party affiliation are more viable predictors of member's attitudes toward acts of WHITE corruption, than the region they serve. While region provides a partial explanation of tolerance or intolerance levels, in this instance, it does not deserve the explanatory pre-eminence to which it is accustomed. The regional variation that was uncovered indicated a difference in tolerance levels between members from the west and those members from other regions of Canada. Apparently, it does not matter if a member comes from Ontario, Quebec or the Maritimes; all displayed similar tolerance levels toward acts of WHITE corruption.

*Lloyd Axworthy - member for Winnipeg-Fort Garry

The R^2 indicates the proportion of the variation in Y (tolerance for WHITE corruption) "explained" by all the independent variables. Thus, it can be said that this model's explanatory power is 25%. The degree of urban/ruralness of the member's constituency, party affiliation and region, combined, explain 25% of the existing variation in tolerance levels between MPs toward acts of WHITE corruption. It would seem that a Liberal MP from an urban riding in the West (a highly unlikely combination) would be the most tolerant of WHITE acts of corruption, while an NDP member from a rural riding, in either Ontario, Quebec or the Maritimes, would be the best candidate for an intolerant attitude.

Seemingly then, spatial factors account for the greatest proportion of the variation in tolerance levels toward acts of WHITE corruption. As we shall see, this is different from the correlates which explain the existing variation surrounding GREY corruption.

ii) GREY Corruption

Since party affiliation and the number of years in parliament were the two statistically significant independent variables identified in the bivariate regression, and the degree of urban/ruralness, significant in the expanded model, they were entered into the multiple regression equation to determine that proportion of the tolerance level for GREY corruption could be explained by them. Dummy variable regression was again employed and the NDP was once more the constant.

The final model then can be expressed as follows:

$$Y = 5.37 + 1.19(\text{PARL.EXP}) - .268(\text{URB/RURAL}) + 3.57(\text{TORIES}) + 1.14(\text{LIB})$$

(4.31) (2.21)* (-2.01)* (3.06)** (1.00)

$$R^2 = .21 \quad R^{-2} = .16$$

Y = tolerance points

unstandardized beta coefficients

t-statistics in parenthesis

p<.05*, p<.01** (two-tailed tests)

The statistics reveal that in the case of GREY corruption political factors are of greater importance in the shaping of MP's attitudes. As illustrated by the coefficients, the Tories are more tolerant of GREY corruption than either of the other two parties. This was partially accounted for on the basis of conservative ideology. Another significant variable was the one measuring the member's years of legislative experience. This factor was unrelated to the WHITE variable, but in the case of GREY, can be deemed a reliable predictor of MP's attitudes. Finally, as in the WHITE model, the degree of urban/ruralness of the members constituency, was found to be significantly determinant of attitudes toward acts of GREY corruption.

The R^2 indicates that our model explains 21% of the variation in the dependent variable GREY. This is a definite improvement over the expanded model, as the model's explanatory power was increased by 3%.

These final models portray two separate types of corrupt

activity; WHITE or constituency service tasks; and GREY or conflicts of interest. Each is modelled by a separate set of variables which buttress the existing theoretical differences between WHITE and GREY corruption. While party affiliation is a determinant of MP's attitudes toward WHITE and GREY corruption, it affects both differently. In the case of WHITE corruption, it was the Liberals who were found to be more tolerant, while Conservatives were found to be more tolerant of GREY corruption.

The spatial factors were found to be more deterministic of attitudes toward WHITE corruption, while political factors were strong determinants of attitudes toward GREY corruption. This is perhaps due to the fact that regional variations over GREY corruption, were obliterated by the existence of a written set of guidelines, established by the government to shape and determine member's attitudes and behaviour regarding conflicts of interest. Written, entrenched guidelines would impede the development of regional variations. Thus, it is appropos that political variables were found to be of greater influence in the shaping of attitudes toward conflicts of interest.

Regionalism is not therefore, as has been suggested by Gibbons, of primary importance in delineating attitudes toward corrupt activity. Seemingly, regional differences are not the first place one should look if interested in discovering patterns of attitudes that might be called a "culture of corruption", at least not at the elite level. What Gibbons fails to consider is the multidimensional nature of corruption and the

types of corrupt activities that can be delineated along these dimensional lines. There is a need for further examination of the importance of other factors beside region, if the gap in the current literature on Canadian political corruption is to be diminished.

The final models for WHITE and GREY corruption will be discussed further, once the attitudes of MPs toward acts of BLACK corruption are examined. The findings on BLACK corruption illustrate quite a different pattern than was found with the other two dependent variables, thus extending further the premise that political corruption must be considered in light of typological differences.

BLACK Corruption

The BLACK variable, it will be recalled, was constructed by adding together the variables TRAVEL and DRIVEWAY. Without a doubt, they were the most blatantly corrupt items in the questionnaire. They involved a direct personal gain to the public official at the taxpayer's expense. Intuitively, these acts could only seem rank and unsavory. The respondents certainly felt this way, as over 90% of those surveyed scored the BLACK items as very corrupt.

Since there was little variation in the scoring on this item, there was little chance that any of the independent variables would be strongly correlated. The amount of variance to be explained was so small, that to determine which independent variable or variables the variance was attributed to, was an impossibility. Nonetheless, a number

of bivariate regressions were run - party affiliation, region, urban/rural, years in parliament, age, occupation - were all tested, but none were found to be statistically significant. (The results of the regressions can be found in the Appendix.)

Thus, it can be concluded that tolerance or intolerance toward acts of BLACK corruption cannot be explained by any of the three types of factors: spatial, parliamentary or extraparliamentary. The scoring of these acts did not vary along partisan, regional or occupational lines, but instead the respondents were almost homogeneous in their attitudes toward BLACK corruption. Members of parliament - Liberals, Conservatives, NDP; veteran or newcomer; old, young; westerner, southerner; from a big city or a small town - overwhelmingly deemed these BLACK acts as corrupt.

As was advanced then in Chapter Two, although the three types of corrupt activity, WHITE, GREY and BLACK, are not statistically independent of one another, they are theoretically. Such a claim is buttressed by the fact that different correlates explain the existence of tolerance or intolerance for each type of activity. While party affiliation contributes somewhat to an explanation of both WHITE and GREY corruption, it does not affect the BLACK variable. Spatial variables seemingly account for a greater proportion of the variation in the WHITE variable, as both region and the degree of urban/ruralness were deemed significant. Finally, years in parliament provides a partial explanation of tolerant or intolerant attitudes toward GREY corruption,

but does not help to explain the same attitudes toward WHITE corruption.

What remains of prime interest is the fact that the extra-parliamentary variables were found to be indeterministic of the attitudes of MPs toward political corruption. It can thus be suggested that there does exist a socialization process at work in the parliamentary environment, which nullifies personal attitudes and opinions toward political corruption. It can be advanced that an elite culture of political corruption does exist, which transcend religious, educational and occupational differences.

An Elite Political Culture of Political Corruption

According to Robert Putnam, one can call the set of politically relevant beliefs, values and habits of the leaders of a political system, an elite political culture,⁴³ political elite being broadly defined as those in any society who rank toward the top of the dimensions of interest, involvement and influence in politics.⁴⁴ The beliefs, values and attitudes of this elite guide and shape a politician's response to his environment, and the issues he/she faces, in this instance, their attitudes toward political corruption.

Based on the findings in this study, it appears that a number of factors we believed were associated with attitudes toward corruption are in fact significantly related. Party affiliation, region, political experience, all seem to play some role in the shaping of general beliefs

about corrupt behaviour, and a subsequent tolerance or intolerance for political corruption.

Generally, the differences uncovered indicate that political and spatial variables are more important than individual, personal socio-economic traits. Being a member of either the government or official opposition, representing a constituency from the West, or a largely urban riding, and being a veteran member of parliament, are attributes associated with a higher degree of toleration for potentially corrupt acts. Personal and socio-economic characteristics were found to be indeterministic of the attitudes elected officials hold about political corruption. The personal variables, such as age or religious affiliation, did not correlate significantly with any of the socio-economic variables, like education or occupation. Rather it was the parliamentary variables of party affiliation and parliamentary experience, and the spatial variables of region and the degree of urban/ruralness of the constituency represented, which were influential in shaping MP's attitudes toward political corruption. Thus, it can be advanced that elected official's attitudes toward political corruption are tempered more by their parliamentary rather than personal environment.

Of all the variables employed in the data analysis, party affiliation proved to be the most durable, as it was significantly related to both WHITE and GREY. Robert Putnam asserts that elite beliefs are usually structured by partisan ideological commitments, often along the familiar Left-Right continuum. He goes on to suggest that a politicians

party affiliation is the best predictor of his position on a wide range of issues.⁴⁵ Allan Kornberg buttresses the claims of Putnam, "For a political elite, party affiliation constitutes a kind of conceptual net for capturing, organizing and evaluating incoming information which may be politically relevant".⁴⁶ It is not surprising then, that where politics are overtly ideological and political parties cohesive, party affiliation provides a remarkable index of an official's outlook.⁴⁹

In this study, clear partisan trends were uncovered. The Liberals were found to be the most tolerant of WHITE acts of corruption; the Tories, the most tolerant of GREY corruption and the NDP, intolerant of all types of corruption, including the WHITE items. Yet, members from all three parties overwhelmingly condemned the BLACK acts of corruption. Thus, while party affiliation remains a strong predictor of legislator's attitudes toward political corruption, it can be advanced that the existing variations cannot be explained by solely this only correlate.

Kenneth Gibbons has argued in an article entitled "The Political Culture of Corruption in Canada", that regional variations can be detected in Canadian attitudes toward political corruption.⁴⁸ It has been traditionally assumed and the existing literature on corruption exemplifies this, that corruption has been more acute and tolerated to a greater extent, in eastern Canada and Quebec. Such a belief seemingly rests on historic cases and the familiar stories of vote-buying or trading, for whisky or a job.⁴⁹ Yet, these beliefs have not been sub-

jected to empirical analysis. The empirical analysis employed here shows that while region was a significant correlate in the shaping of MP's attitudes toward WHITE corruption, it was the weakest of the coefficients in the final model. It was not even significantly related to the GREY variable, which is comprised of far more serious acts of corruption than the WHITE variable. Seemingly, the regional culture of corruption argument would have been enhanced considerably had the regional differences discovered over WHITE corruption been more significant and if this correlate had been at all explanatory of attitudes toward acts of GREY corruption.

The findings from this research then, do not support a regional political culture of corruption hypothesis. This is not to say that such regional variations do not exist in the mass political culture, but rather it seems at the elite level, there are other factors at work which transcend regional boundaries. It can be advanced, as do Peters and Welch, that there is perhaps a socialization process at work, which shapes and congeals perceptions of politically corrupt acts.⁵⁰ A code of political ethics is diffused within the elite by a process of socialization:

"These political actors constitute in effect a subculture with its own peculiar set of norms of behaviour, motives and approved standards. Processes of indoctrination internalize such norms among those who are born to or climb to positions of power and leadership. They serve as standards of action, which are reinforced by a social discipline among the political activists".⁵¹

The new legislator it would seem, would be affected to the greatest extent by such a process, as they attempted to adjust to the legislative environment, and to familiarize he/she with existing norms and conventions. These existing legislative norms have over time become institutionalized. Such informal standards of behaviour are crucial in determining what is appropriate conduct. These norms serve to outline expectations which members have regarding each other's behaviour.

Thus, because of these normative pressures, MPs are able to "police" one another. A member's status and reputation may be damaged if these legislative norms are violated. Yet, the effectiveness of these norms is perhaps challenged by the concept of collegiality. The House is seemingly enveloped in an aura of collegiality which causes members to hesitate to make accusations or take actions against fellow politicians. Thus, is the honour system which governs the Canadian House of Commons enough?

It must be acknowledged that the House of Commons is really two quite different institutions - one is a political arena where the government and the opposition clash over the great issues of the day. The other is as closed and discreet as the better sort of gentleman's club.⁵² In this second sort of House, members who may be the bitterest of rivals in the legislative arena, are frequently fast friends. It is an understood and respected norm that members do not challenge one another's personal conduct or integrity. Each is assumed to be an honourable member unless proven otherwise. An illustrative example is

provided by the Rivard Affair,⁵³ during which Tommy Douglas accused Prime Minister Pearson of deceiving parliament intentionally. The NDP leader made the most serious charge that one member could make against the other. Pearson countered that unless Douglas was willing to make a formal charge and to accept the responsibility for it, the accusation should be withdrawn. The responsibility referred to by Pearson implied that if Douglas made a formal charge and failed to substantiate it, he would be forced to resign from Parliament.⁵⁴ It is apparent then, that elected members of Parliament, not only have their own personal standards to respect, but in addition, must try to reconcile these standards with existing common legislative standards.

It can thus be asserted that internal norms of the legislative system tend to homogenize individuals and their attitudes about political acts. Such a socialization process then, would seem to invalidate or overshadow attitudes about political corruption, which the official might have acquired before entering the legislature, attitudes which were perhaps shaped by personal factors, such as religiosity or education.

Conclusion

Discovering that personal and socio-economic variables are not significantly related to toleration of political corruption, while parliamentary factors such as political experience or party affiliation are somewhat more viable, leads to the reiteration of a foregone conclusion; political elites display a substantial degree of homogeneity

and consensus about political goals, beliefs and attitudes.⁵⁵ Attitudes toward political corruption should prove to be no different.

Differences were found among Canadian elected officials in their tolerance levels of corrupt acts. Some of these differences are attributable to the parliamentary and spatial factors examined here. Since the extra-parliamentary variables had little effect on the MP's attitudes toward political corruption, it has been suggested that an intralegislative socialization process may be homogenizing the legislator's attitudes, creating an elite culture of political corruption.

NOTES

1. Most of the research on this topic has been conducted by American political scientists. John G. Peters and Susan Welch have done a number of empirical studies on attitudes of legislators toward political corruption. I am grateful to them for the use of their questionnaire design, codebook and data file. References to their work can be found cited below.
2. John G. Peters and Susan Welch, "Attitudes of US State Legislators Toward Political Corruption: Some Preliminary Findings", Legislative Studies Quarterly II, 4, (November, 1977), p. 450.
3. Walter Young, The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF, 1932-61 (University of Toronto Press, 1969), p. 4.
4. IBID, p. 6.
5. IBID, p. 10.
6. IBID, p. 28.
7. Daniel Bell, "Marxian Socialism in the United States", as cited by Walter Young, Anatomy of a Party, p. 59.
8. IBID, p. 59.
9. See Duverger and Michel's work on political parties.
10. Young, The Anatomy of a Party, p. 4.
11. IBID.
12. Peter Bruton, John Downing, Fraser Kelly, "A Little Honest Graft Never Hurt a Politician at the Polls", MacLeans, vol. 77 (Jan. 25, 1964), pp. 18-19, 31-32.
13. Kenneth Gibbons, "The Political Culture of Corruption in Canada", in Kenneth Gibbons and Donald Rowat, eds., Political Corruption in Canada: Cases, Causes and Cures (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), p. 245.
14. As well as the Gillespie Affair, the Mackessey incident concerned not only lobbying, but a conflict of interest.
15. John R. Williams, The Conservative Party in Canada, 1920-49 (Duke University Press, 1950), p. 218.
16. John English, The Decline of Politics: The Conservatives and the Party System, 1901-20 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p. 23.

17. IBID.
18. IBID, p. 24.
19. George Perlin, The Tory Syndrome: Leadership Politics in the Progressive Conservative Party (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1980), p. 184.
20. For a discussion of machine politics, see John Gardiner, "The Politics of Corruption in an American City", in Heidenheimer ed., Political Corruption (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 72.
21. Gibbons, "The Political Culture of Corruption", p. 239.
22. Peters and Welch, "Attitudes of US State Legislators", p. 450.
23. OP.CIT, p. 239.
24. Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Why Political Machines Have Not Withered Away and Other Revisionist Thoughts", Journal of Politics, vol. 34 (May, 1972), p. 397.
25. K.Z. Paltiel, "Canadian Attitudes on Election Expenses, 1965-66", Study 7, Report of the Committee on Election Expenses (Ottawa, 1966).
26. John Meisel, National Election Surveys, 1965 and 1968 as cited by Kenneth Gibbons in "The Political Culture of Corruption in Canada: A Study of Canadian Attitudes", Proposal for a Doctoral Discertation (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1977), p. 22.
27. Gibbons, "The Political Culture of Corruption", p. 239.
28. Herbert F. Quinn, The Union Nationale (Toronto: 1963), p. 71.
29. Such a trend was first discovered in a cross-tabulation between region and the WHITE variable.
30. Richard Simeon and David Elkins, "Regional Political Culture in Canada", Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 7, (Sept. 1974), p. 597.
31. IBID.
32. Gibbons, "The Political Culture of Corruption", p. 233.
33. J. Peterson, "Ethnic and Class Politics in Manitoba" in martin Robin ed., Canadian Provincial Politics (Scarborough, 1972), p. 74.

34. OP.CIT, p. 247.
35. IBID, p. 243.
36. Generally the difference in value orientation can be traced back to even children's classics like The Country and City Mouse or The Little House. On a more political note, George Perlin found differences in support for Tory Leadership between delegates from urban and rural areas.
37. James Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics and Political Change", in A.J. Heidenheimer, Political Corruption, pp. 549-63.
38. Others include, Samuel P. Huntington, "Modernization and Corruption", and J.S. Nye, "Corruption and Political Development", both of which are reprinted in the Heidenheimer reader.
39. Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics and Political Change", p. 551.
40. IBID, p. 554.
41. IBID.
42. John Wilson, "The Canadian Political Culture: Towards a Redefinition of the Nature of the Canadian Political System", Canadian Journal of Political Science VII, no. 3, (Sept., 1974), p. 445.
43. Peters and Welch, "Attitudes of US State Legislators", p. 456.
44. John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic (University of Toronto Press, 1973), p. 392.
45. Robert D. Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians (Yale University Press, 1973), p. 1.
46. IBID, p. 2.
47. Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 88.
48. Allen Kornberg, Canadian Legislative Behaviour (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), p. 137.
49. IBID.
50. Gibbons, "The Political Culture of Corruption", pp. 231-50.

51. P.E. Trudeau, "Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec", in Federalism and the French Canadians (Toronto, 1968), p. 108.
52. Peters and Welch, "Attitudes of US State Legislators", p. 459.
53. V.O. Key Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1961), p. 537.
54. "The Rooney Affair, Honour System Not Working", Globe and Mail, 30'77, p. 6.
55. For the best description of the Rivard Affair, see Richard Gwyn, The Shape of Scandal: A Study of a Government in Crisis (Toronto: Clarke and Irwin, 1965).
56. "Rooney Affair", p. 6.
57. Peters and Welch, "Attitudes of US State Legislators", p. 468.

CHAPTER FOUR: CANADIAN - AMERICAN DIFFERENCES

In the previous chapter it was shown that Canadian MPs differ in their attitudes toward politically corrupt acts, across partisan and spatial lines. Differences in tolerance levels for acts of WHITE and GREY corruption, were accounted for by an individual legislator's party affiliation, the length of time he/she had been in parliament, the region the official represents and the degree of urban/ruralness of the constituency he/she serves. These factors proved to obliterate the effect of extra-parliamentary factors - age, education, occupation, religious affiliation - in the shaping of MP's attitudes toward political corruption. This and the fact that there was near consensus in opinion on the BLACK acts of corruption, led to the assertion that there exists in Canada an elite culture of political corruption, which is tempered by the parliamentary environment and existing legislative norms.

What remains to be discussed is whether such an elite culture extends beyond not only regional, but national boundaries as well. Is the tolerance level of Canadian legislators toward politically corrupt acts the same as or different than legislators in the United States? Do they tolerate the same types of corrupt acts and do the same correlates help explain tolerant or intolerant attitudes? Uncovered differences can perhaps be attributed to not only perceptual variance, but to systemic differences as well. What institutional structures exist in each country which facilitate and conversely inhibit the occurrence of political corruption?

Answers to the above questions can perhaps be formulated upon comparing the results obtained in this study with the results of the American study. The American study conducted by John G. Peters and Susan Welch, of the University of Nebraska, as mentioned in Chapter One, provided the framework upon which the Canadian study was based. The questionnaires administered were similar, the core of each of the questionnaires being the ten scenarios which depict an elected official engaging in a potentially corrupt act. The scenarios were based on the same premise, with alterations being made to place the items in a Canadian context. (A complete comparison of the ten items can be found in Appendix Three.) The only other major difference was that the American study was a mail-based questionnaire, while the Canadian surveys were self-administered. Thus, the similarity of the questionnaires provides a sound foundation on which to base a series of comparisons.

Generally, it can be said that there exist only marginal differences in the rank-ordering of the ten dependent variables, by American and Canadian legislators (see Table I). Over 90% of the American respondents also deemed four items as being very corrupt. These items were DRIVEWAY, TRAVEL, LANDSALE and RIGHT WAY. The first three are the same as those found on the Canadian continuum, but RIGHT WAY was found to be more flagrantly corrupt than PROPOSAL, its Canadian counterpart. This was probably the case since voting the "right way" implies changing one's mind on an issue in return for

TABLE 1

DISTRIBUTION OF ATTITUDES OF STATE LEGISLATORS
ON CORRUPTION ITEMS
(In Percentages)

<u>CORRUPT ITEMS</u>	<u>RESPONDENT VIEWS AS CORRUPT</u>	<u>RESPONDENT BELIEVES MOST PUBLIC OFFICIALS WOULD CONDEMN THIS ACT</u>	<u>RESPONDENT BELIEVES MOST OF PUBLIC WOULD CONDEMN THIS ACT</u>
DRIVEWAY(7) ¹	95.9	92.2	97.5
TRAVEL(7)	95.2	80.4	96.5
LAND SALE(7)	95.1	92.1	97.5
RIGHT WAYS	91.9	82.2	94.3
JUDGE(6)	78.8	82.3	91.0
AMBASSADOR(5)	71.1	44.5	81.2
DEFENSE STOCK(5)	58.3	62.1	84.4
OIL(5)	54.9	55.1	81.2
WEAPONS CONTRACT(4)	31.6	20.9	34.4
LAW SCHOOL(3)	23.7	15.5	35.9

^a The figures in parentheses are the weights assigned to each act.

TABLE II
CANADIAN
PERCENT AGREEING ACT IS CORRUPT

	% OF RESPONDENTS VIEWING THIS ACT AS CORRUPT	% OF RESPONDENTS BELIEVING MOST ELECTED OFFICIALS CONDEMN THIS ACT	% OF RESPONDENTS BELIEVING MOST OF PUBLIC CONDEMN THIS ACT
DRIVEWAY	97.5	99.9	97.6
ROADS	97.5	99.1	96.1
JUDGE	93.8	95.0	92.4
TRAVEL	92.7	93.8	87.6
PROPOSAL	87.8	87.5	84.8
DEFENSE	84.3	89.1	87.7
LEADER	80.6	86.5	71.6
NEP	42.4	59.8	48.1
WEAPONS	42.4	53.7	41.3
SCHOOL	21.5	35.1	22.1

monetary compensation. In the Canadian legislative system, voting the "right way" is synonymous with voting the party way. Members of Parliament rarely possess the same degree of independence as congressmen in the conventional voting procedure. Money could not conceivably be offered to an MP in exchange for voting the right way. The cue giver for voting in parliament is the party whip and MPs, according to the convention of party discipline, are expected to adhere to established party position on issues and proposals. The only exception to this convention is the "free vote" which have been held very infrequently, the last one being in 1976, on capital punishment.

A comparison of the four acts which were scored corrupt by over 90% of both Canadian and American respondents reveals that Canadian legislators are somewhat less tolerant of the DRIVEWAY, ROADS (LAND SALE)* and JUDGE items, while the Americans were less tolerant of the TRAVEL and RIGHT WAY (PROPOSAL) items, the most substantial difference being that the Canadians scored JUDGE more corrupt than the Americans by over 15%. An examination of the remainder of the continuum shows that on the conflict of interest items of DEFENSE, LEADER (AMBASSADOR) and NEP (OIL), that the Canadians were found to be more substantially less tolerant of DEFENSE and LEADER, the difference on the DEFENSE item being 26%. Yet, on the OIL (NEP) scenario, the Americans were less tolerant than the Canadians by 12.5%. This could be due to the fact that the

*American counterpart in parenthesis.

American example is somewhat more explicit, as the respondents were told that the congressman was working to maintain the oil depletion allowance, while the Canadian respondents were told that the MP was working to change the provisions of the NEP. They were not told what "change" implied. Finally, the bottom of the corruption continuum was perceived in the same order by both groups of legislators. Canadians were found to be less tolerant (by 10.8%) of the WEAPONS item, while the Americans were less tolerant of the SCHOOL item, but only by 2.2%.

Thus, while it can be said that both American and Canadian legislators are seemingly intolerant of corrupt behaviour, it is apparent that Canadian MPs are somewhat less tolerant of the same corrupt acts than their American equivalents. This is especially true of the items which comprise the middle section of the corruption continuum. Unfortunately, since the Americans have not, in accordance with Heidenheimer's typology created a WHITE, GREY or BLACK variable, it is not possible to make conclusions about differences in attitudes toward various "types" of corrupt activity.

Comparisons can be made though between the types of correlates which shape and determine legislator's attitudes toward political corruption. Peters and Welch advance that such factors can be classified into three categories: the environment of the legislator, political and socio-economic characteristics of the legislator and the legislator's attitudes, including those about corruption in general. Included in the

environmental category is the region the legislator comes from. Peters and Welch seemingly lay their emphasis on the region's political culture. Persons, they argue, from "moralistic" political cultures might be less tolerant of corruption than those from individualistic or traditionalistic cultures.¹

Other environmental factors considered are the level of affluence of the district and urban/rural differences. Those factors defining personal attributes include consideration of whether the official is a long-time legislator or a newcomer, whether those previously holding public office are more tolerant than new office holders. And somewhat unconvincingly, Peters and Welch suggest that women may be less tolerant than men. While this may indeed be true, it is a sweeping generalization to attribute this to the fact that many women come to politics from a reformist tradition, as epitomized by the League of Women Voters. Finally, education was thought to be an important factor in the shaping of attitudes toward political corruption.

The last set of factors Peters and Welch suggest may be relevant are those attitudes the legislator may hold about corruption in general. Individual attitudes about the nature of corruption itself, they propose, would seem to be related to whether corruption is tolerated. If an individual sees corruption as a creation of the media, then it would seem reasonable to conclude that he/she is not likely to perceive as great many acts by his colleagues as corrupt. Or if the legislator felt corruption by businessmen and others was a greater concern, then they

would be disinclined to see a great variety of acts as corrupt.²

Peters and Welch chose ten independent variables to help measure the degree of tolerance or intolerance, American legislators have toward political corruption. A political environment variable was created which included an index of state affluence, a set of dummy variables indicating the region the respondent was from, and a measure of the urbanness of the legislators district, based on the size of the official's hometown. Individual political attributes utilized were whether the individual previously held political office and the number of years he/she had been in the legislature. Individual socio-economic traits were sex and years of education. The same ideological self-placement scale was also tested. The final two variables were included to provide an indication of the legislator's general beliefs about corruption. They were comprised of the scores legislators attached to the statements: 1. Much of the furor over corruption in the government is the result of a short-run phenomenon called the post-Watergate morality. 2. Political corruption is not a widespread problem.

Multiple classification analysis was employed with mean scores being calculated on the dependent variables for legislators fitting each category of the independent variables (see Table 3). The findings reveal a series of "moderately" significant relationships. Region was found to be somewhat related to the scale. The trend uncovered was that those legislators living in Western and New England States were more likely to be less tolerant of corruption than those legislators from Southern

TABLE III

PERCEIVED LEVEL OF CORRUPTION OF POLITICAL ACTS
BY CATEGORIES OF LEGISLATORS

Category of Legislators	Mean Perception of Corruption Score ^a	
	Unadjusted	Adjusted ^b
Region		
Upper East (n=36)	41.4	41.5
West Coast (n=20)	40.4	40.7
Industrial East (n=30)	39.5	37.7
Industrial Midwest (n=21)	38.8	38.4
Mountain (n=36)	38.7	39.4
Prairie (n=88)	38.4	38.4
South (n=42)	35.9	35.9
Border (n=37)	34.8	35.5
	Eta = .22	Beta = .21
Size of Hometown		
500,000 and over (n=20)	37.3	37.3
100,000 to 500,000 (n=62)	41.4	41.3
25,000 to 100,000 (n=119)	38.2	37.9
2,500 to 25,000 (n=95)	36.9	37.3
Less than 2,500 (n=14)	35.9	36.0
	Eta = .19	Beta = .18 ^c
Sex		
Male (n=298)	38.1	38.1
Female (n=13)	43.1	42.6
	Eta = .11	Beta = .07
Previous Political Office		
Yes (n=165)	37.2	37.0
No (n=145)	39.5	39.8
	Eta = .13	Beta = .13 ^d

TABLE III (CONT'D)
PERCEIVED LEVEL OF CORRUPTION OF POLITICAL ACTS
BY CATEGORIES OF LEGISLATORS

Category of Legislators	Mean Perception of Corruption Score ^a	
	Unadjusted	Adjusted ^b
Years of Legislative Service		
One (n=24)	41.6	41.0
More than one (n=286)	38.0	38.0
	Eta = .13	Beta = .09 ^b
Ideology		
Very Liberal (n=13)	39.0	37.6
Liberal (n=68)	41.2	40.4
Middle of the Road (n=102)	38.7	38.6
Conservative (n=112)	36.5	37.2
Very Conservative (n=15)	34.5	35.1
	Eta = .22	Beta = .16
General Beliefs about Corruption		
Furor About Corruption Due to Watergate		
Strongly Agree (n=26)	35.1	37.3
Agree (n=134)	37.4	37.9
Neutral (n=23)	37.8	37.9
Disagree (n=96)	39.9	39.1
Strongly Disagree (n=31)	40.0	38.5
	Eta = .17	Beta = .07
Corruption Not Widespread Problem		
Strongly Agree (n=114)	36.3	36.7
Agree (n=94)	39.0	38.9
Neutral (n=38)	38.9	38.2
Disagree (n=37)	38.8	38.2
Strongly Disagree (n=27)	42.2	42.1
	Eta = .20	Beta = .17 ^c
Multiple R = .438, .416 ^b		

TABLE III (CONT'D)

a	The perception scale used in this analysis is described on p. 452, above; a high score indicates that more acts are perceived as corrupt.
b	Controlling for each of the other variables. Because of the limitations of the SPSS MCA program that only allows five independent variables (those being presented by categories) and five additional control variables simultaneously, the calculations were done twice. Affluence and years of education were controlled in both cases; in one stance, sex, ideology, and years in the legislature served as additional controls for the remaining five ordinal variables; in the second instance, corruption not widespread, furor about corruption due to Watergate, and town size served as additional controls. Nineteen percent of the variance in the dependent variable was explained in the first equation, 17 percent in the second. The difference was due to the greater nonlinear variance explained when the attitudinal variables were used as independent variables.
c	Significant at .05.
d	Significant at .07.

and Border states, while legislators from midwestern, mountain and prairie states assume a middle position.³ The other environmental variables found to have some effect on the attitudes of legislators toward corruption was the size of his/her hometown. Legislators from small towns were seemingly more tolerant than those from large towns. Yet, such a statement cannot be made without qualification, as those legislators from the very largest cities were found to be as tolerant as those from cities of less than 25,000.⁴ While this variable was found to be related to the scale, it is curious that the variable measuring the urbanness of the legislator's district is seemingly indeterministic of his/her attitudes toward political corruption.

With regard to the individual's socio-economic characteristics, it was advanced that female legislators were found to be less tolerant of corrupt acts than their male counterparts.

The other variable chosen, education, was also discovered to be somewhat related to tolerance levels of political corruption. A higher level of education seemingly corresponded to a higher tolerance level of corrupt acts. The individual political attributes of prior political office and number of years in the legislature were found to be related to the scale. If a legislator had been in the Assembly for more than one year and had held a prior political office, they would be expected to be more tolerant of corruption than freshman members, or those with no prior political experience. Finally, with regards to individual attributes it was also discovered that in terms of ideological perspectives, those

legislators who described themselves as "liberal" were less tolerant than those who classified themselves as "conservative" or "middle of the road".

The general attitudinal variables showed that those who believed corruption was not a problem and a post-Watergate phenomenon, were more tolerant than the officials who said that corruption was a problem which could not merely be attributed to Watergate. Thus, the findings of the American study, seemingly indicate that region, sex, ideology and political experience, all play some role in the formation of general beliefs about corrupt behaviour and a resultant tolerance or intolerance for political corruption.

Unfortunately, the methodology employed by Peters and Welch does not reveal how much of the variance in the dependent variables can be explained by each of the independent variables. All the multiple classification analysis does is provide the mean scores for the legislators in each of the categories of the independent variables. In addition, the beta coefficients are not even that strong to make substantive conclusions about a number of the correlates. For example, how can it be said with any certainty that women are less tolerant than men, when the coefficient is not significant at either the .05 or .07 confidence interval (the levels of significance utilized). The authors themselves say that "some characteristics display modest relationships to the perceptual scale when controls are applied, but no variable bears a strong relationship".⁵ If this is the case, then how relevant are the

conclusions reported?

In addition, it seems that the variables chosen were done so to further the author's argument. No mention is made of how or why these variables were chosen. Did earlier analysis render them significant, or was the multiple classification analysis the only statistical method employed? What about other correlates like party affiliation, age, occupation - no mention is made of these? While the findings perhaps indicate which categories of legislators are tolerant or intolerant of corruption, no explanation is offered as to why. Why is it that legislators from the New England states were found to be more tolerant than members from southern states?

Finally, for all the previous emphasis by the authors in this study and other articles,⁶ on "types" and "dimensions" of corrupt acts, it is curious that the analysis is only done on corruption in general. The analysis does not reveal if legislators in the south perceived WEAPONS any differently than SCHOOL, or if freshman congressmen perceived JUDGE any differently than DEFENSE. The findings reported were too general, specifics were seemingly ignored.

These procedural criticisms aside, Peters and Welch advance that political variables are more important in the shaping of congressmen's attitudes toward political corruption, than individual socio-demographic variables. This was not different from what the Canadian study revealed. A socialization process, it was concluded, was at work in the

American Congress, which varied in effect by state or region, by sex and ideology, during the recruitment and the tenure of the legislator.⁷ Internal norms seemingly homogenized individuals in their attitudes about political acts. Such norms, although not the same everywhere, countered many of the prelegislative attitudes of the politicians.

While such an elite culture of corruption was also said to exist in Canada, different correlates explained the variance in the attitudes legislators held about corruption. Party affiliation, a prime determinant in the Canadian study, was seemingly not a factor with regards to American attitudes. Nor was the degree of urban/ruralness of the district represented, found to be significantly related to the dependent variable. Thus, the two strongest coefficients in the Canadian study were found to be unrelated in the case of American legislators. Yet, ideology was said to be determinant of American attitudes and in the Canadian instance, it was not found to be significantly correlated. The variables which were found to be mutually influential were region and political experience (or the number of years in the legislature).

Differences then, in American and Canadian elite cultures of political corruption, cannot be credited to only perceptual differences. Systemic differences as well, must be examined. If as Peters and Welch suggest, internal norms which condition legislator's attitudes differ from region to region, they most certainly would differ from country to country from a congressional system of government, to a parliamentary form of government. Perhaps such institutional differences contribute

toward an explanation of tolerant or intolerant attitudes about political corruption.

Political Facilitators and Institutional Causes

While corruption exists in the governments and publics of all countries, it has not prevailed to an equal degree at all times, or under the same conditions. It has responded to varying opportunities created by: the perversion of market mechanisms and consequently, the misuse of power, particular governmental institutions and pressures arising under the existing scheme of economic arrangements.⁸

Pressures toward political corruption are mediated by various political institutions that either amplify or diminish them.⁹ Thus, the extent of corruption depends largely on the nature of these institutions. As one journalist recently put it: "normal everyday greed aside, corruption is often a sign that something is amiss with our laws and institutions".¹⁰ Corruption, after all, can be viewed as an informal political system in its own right, hiding behind the facade of party declarations, legislation and policy proposals.¹¹ This makes corruption difficult to detect, as it is embedded within the system. In the political arena, there exist points of access and exclusion in the formal political apparatus which determine the degree to which corruption is able to flourish in any given system. Patterns of corruption then, can be related to the nature of the political system. It is thus at once the generator of corrupt activity, as well as the correctional agent striving to keep corrupt tendencies in check.

The crucial factors to be weighed in determining the plausible facilitating effects of political institutions, are the nature of political authority and the strength of these institutions and their value.¹² The more legitimacy a political system is granted, the greater the social pressures are against acts that would clearly violate the system's existing laws and norms. Thus, it can be advanced that corruption is facilitated in states which lack a substantial degree of legitimacy.

The new nation is able to acquire legitimacy gradually according to Max Weber, in four possible ways. Firstly, the system can be considered legitimate because it has existed for a long time. Thus, the system had become institutionalized and its mechanisms are regarded as being traditional. Another source of legitimacy finds its foundations in the law. If a nation is governed by a fully developed legal code, the masses undoubtedly perceive that what is legal, must be right. Next, legitimacy can thrive and sustain itself on an emotional basis. The emotional support of a system's electorate provides a symbolic commitment to its validity. The final mode of acquiring legitimacy is by providing constituents with a rational belief in its absolute order.¹³ If this belief is cultivated to a high degree, a strong commitment to the political order will result. With these social forms of legitimacy, the political system is enabled to engender new feelings of loyalty and to reinforce existing feelings.

The formal distribution of powers central to any federal govern-

ment, in itself can be viewed as a facilitator of political corruption. This can be considered the case as each branch of government has the ability and sometimes utilizes it to paralyze the other.¹⁴ When paralysis occurs, each branch is prevented from exercising its inherent modes of checks and balances. When deadlock is prevalent and stagnation ensues, political corruption presents itself as perhaps the only alternative. Corruption could provide the needed flexibility required to take action. Thus, many politicians may be forced to resort to corruption by the system itself, regardless of personal feelings.

Another factor which generally encourages the existence of political corruption is the whole question of so-called "market demands". Corruption might be expected to flourish most in a period when the political system for whatever reasons, is unable to cope with the scale or the nature of demands being made on it.¹⁵ Corruption in this regard suggests not only the failure of the political system to handle the demands being levied, but also indicates a kind of manipulative effort by an array of individuals and groups who attempt to abuse and mold the system to their own specifications and ultimate advantage.

Hence, in both Canada and the United States, interest and pressure groups can be considered potential, corruptible wielders of influence. In their attempts to bear upon the development of public policy, these groups seek access to the political decision makers, and are often able to exert a sizeable amount of pressure on these

politicians. These groups, in their attempts to gain access, might be more prone to resort to the use of inducements to gain the inside track. As well, the corrupt politician finds in these groups the opportunity to attain sizeable campaign donations and perhaps the acquisition of other benefits.

While a wide variety of groups may gain access to the political system through corrupt methods in both Canada and the United States, it is clearly the wealthy, established groups which possess the greatest capacity to bend government policy in their direction.¹⁶ These groups invariably have more resources to work with and are thus more likely to gain the ear of a corrupt politician. Exempting favours or motives of relatives or friendships, it is the wealthy groups which are involved in most of the larger deals and whose influence is likely to overshadow that of smaller groups.¹⁷ Yet, these groups really have no reason to resort to corruption to make their voice heard, as there exist numerous legitimate ways for a group to gain access to the system. If a group is able to take full advantage of such legitimate points of access, then the possibility of resorting to corrupt activities may decline.

In the United States, interest groups are considered to be a basic part of the democratic process, their activities even being protected by the First Amendment. These groups provide valuable and necessary functions including; serving as a channel of communication to inform both Congress and the public about problems and issues, forming opinion by stimulating public debate and providing representation for those

directly affected by government action.¹⁸ A larger part of American interest group activity involves the technique of lobbying. Direct lobbying includes such practices as wining and dining and political stock-brokering. To develop an amicable relationship, the lobbyist uses his expense account to make life easier for selected members of Congress.¹⁹ It is by these means that the elected representative leaves himself vulnerable to charges of corruption. Through such direct tactics and favours, the lobbyist tries to generate a feeling of personal obligation with the public official. But the official will adamantly try to maintain that the favours that were given and received were solely on the basis of friendship, with no strings attached. Yet the probability of the official neglecting his/her sense of responsibility to the public is strong. Each may come to feel that their first loyalties are to his/her private benefactors.²⁰

The greatest opportunity for interest groups to exert questionable tactics, arises in connection with political campaigns. Even more than free dinners, bottles of whiskey and tickets to Washington Redskins games, politicians like to have money for general expenses.²¹ It has been common for lobbyists to come to congressmen's offices to drop off what are called "campaign contributions", in an attempt to influence a member's decision on a policy matter that could affect their interests. To illustrate, in March of 1972, President Nixon met at the White House with more than a dozen dairy lobbyists. Two days later, a fifteen-day old decision was reversed and the President ordered an increase in the federal milk price supports. It was eventually revealed that following

this decision, the dairymen poured funds into Nixon's election campaign, totalling the sum of two million dollars.²² Although efforts have been made to regulate such activities (Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act), the resourceful lobbyist is still able to exert undue influence.

In the Canadian political system, interest groups too play a vital role. According to Gabriel Almond, interest groups; "articulate political demands in the society; seek support for these demands among other groups by advocacy and bargaining, and attempt to transform these demands into authoritative public policy by influencing the choice of political personnel and the various processes of public policymaking and enforcement".²³ Despite the intricacy of the governmental process, the vast majority of Canadian groups make their demands through legitimate channels and by legitimate means. But there nevertheless, are those groups that seek to influence policy formulation through corrupt means. But generally this is the case more so in the United States than in Canada, as verified by the greater prevalence of lobbyist activity.

This can be attributed to the parliamentary form of government in Canada, which concentrates power primarily in the cabinet and the bureaucracy. Thus, parliament and its members, unlike Congress and its members, is not the primary focal point of interest group activity. The fact that Canadian committees are of lesser importance and that an individual member is usually of minor importance, unless he holds special knowledge, or is in a tense minority government situation,²⁴ diminishes the need for the lobbyist to establish the amicable, intimate

rapport with members of Parliament. As one experienced Canadian lobbyist put it: "When I see Members of Parliament being lobbied, its a sure sign that the lobby lost its fight in the civil service and the cabinet."²⁵ It is the cabinet minister who possesses the political clout worth influencing, but cabinet has a collective policy role which may effectively counter pressure on individual ministers.²⁶

Unlike counterparts in the United States, the role of Canadian interest groups in the matter of party finance is not particularly significant. True, some groups and many corporations form the financial backbone of the major political parties. Yet they do not typically attempt to use donations to buy specific favours, especially with the publication of names of donors now being mandatory.²⁷ Too, since it will not be known until the end of the election which members will be accorded positions in the cabinet, interest groups do not spend much time and money seeking to influence regular MPs. Their strategy has generally been to refrain from lobbying until the cabinet portfolios have been announced.

In both systems, electoral abuse is probably the most visible form of political corruption. Because corrupt electoral activities can, by entrenched electoral laws occur only in isolated instances (in the American case, every two, four or six years, and in Canada, normally every four years, although five is the maximum term), they are more difficult to study.²⁸ Cases of electoral corruption have also been difficult to analyze because of the local nature of American politics

and the overlapping jurisdictions of elective and appointive offices.

While electoral corruption still exists today, it is not the electoral system itself that is corrupt, but rather other factors in the political system as a whole, which make corruption conducive to the entire electoral connection. Due to the high degree of competitiveness (illustrated by the vast sums of money spent on election campaigns), of a small number of candidates in any given constituency in America or Canada, the chances of corruption evolving are strong. In the United States this is perhaps of greater prevalence due to the nature of American parties, which can do little to check the spread of electoral abuse. Representatives are not as concerned with toeing the party line, as they are with getting re-elected, making party norms and values easier to ignore or violate. Ideologies play a rather minor role in electoral campaigns, exemplified by the candidates who preach about the need for "good" and "honest" government, while simultaneously fellow congressmen accept bribes or offer political rewards for favours rendered.

Electoral corruption occurs in a variety of instances. The representative in his efforts to secure a seat in the government will have to deal with the acquisition of votes. Some politicians do this quite effectively by legitimate means, while others turn to illegal methods to secure votes. "Payments" for votes have been disguised in an array of forms. Among the most common have been: free drinks, meals and entertainment, gift certificates, contributions to churches

and community groups, direct cash bribes, and finally, the traditional distribution of "headmoney" after the election by the winning candidate.²⁹ In the Atlantic provinces, the stories concerning vote-buying abound, the distribution of pantyhose and bottles of scotch being a long time source of amusement. Such methods of acquiring votes have been effectively consolidated by a few candidates into what have been identified as electoral machines, which have been quite predominant at times in the large American cities like Chicago.

But perhaps the greatest opportunity for acts of corruption to occur, arises during the rigours of the campaign itself, as candidates seek funds and applicable services to finance and staff a successful campaign. In Canada and the United States, both political parties and individual candidates spend phenomenal sums of money on campaign financing in their efforts to secure office. Before the implementation of restrictive electoral legislation, abuse of the electoral system was considered natural. Candidates regularly accepted campaign funds from individuals or groups in return for a staff position or a government contract, contingent of course on re-election. Such acts of patronage were previously difficult to detect and even harder to prove, especially when politicians were able to hide behind the facade of their representational duties. Whatever was gained corruptibly was considered to be a part of the representative's constituency service role.

Despite attempts to entrench electoral restrictions, corruption remains viable and elections are still tainted by corrupt actions, illegal

contribution, collusion, vote-buying and fraud. Loopholes exist in both the American and Canadian legislative systems which makes it possible for corruption to permeate the electoral restraints.

The prevalence of electoral abuse depends to a great extent on the nature of the elected officials themselves. The electoral system, indeed the entire political system, rests on the premise that the great majority of Senators and Representatives in Congress and Parliament, are just and honest people. But some of them let themselves be victimized by a system that puts almost irresistible pressures on men in high places, who will do almost anything they can get away with to stay where they are.³⁰ The costs of getting elected in the first-place, of maintaining a home in Washington or Ottawa, as well as local districts, of travelling constantly, of going back to the people regularly for votes of confidence in the form of re-election; all these factors exert heavy burdens on skilled and honest people who might crack under such pressures.

Elected representatives inevitably require a great deal of money to keep their campaign going. Headquarters have to be staffed, printing and postage allotted for and advertising done. The candidate is in effect trying to make his name a household word. But the startling inequality between these campaign costs and a representative's salary, especially at the lower levels of government, suggests some of the problems which confront candidates as they vie for office and continue to plague them after they have been elected. In this capacity, then, the

electoral process itself exerts grave pressures on the individual legislator. "Real as a man's virtues may be, in modern campaigns he also needs a large amount of money to convince the voters that he possesses these virtues".³¹ The wealthy candidate, then, is relieved of some of this burden, while the candidates of lesser means are forced to open themselves to the influence of contributors from various organizations and firms. This leaves the representative in a vulnerable position and possibly more liable to resort to corrupt measures to further or retain their political position.

The Canadian and American electorate, although they do not intentionally encourage corruption, do not seek to actively curb corrupt activities either. The average voter, whether American or Canadian, seems to be governed by the preconceived notion that corruption is a necessary evil, or that corruption must exist in order to get things done. Though he can view it from his own living room today, it has become increasingly common for citizens to shrug off evidence of bad government with such common excuses as "there just isn't anything I can do about it", or the more sophisticated answer of "corruption has always been with us and always will be".³² This lethargic or tolerant attitude of the mass public allows the corrupt official to continue to abuse the political system, often without repercussion.³³

Generally, when it comes to account for differences in the facilitating potential of institutional structures in Canada and the United States, it is broadly a question of a Parliamentary form of

government versus a Presidential system of government. In the United States, Watergate aptly demonstrated the danger of having an elected head of state as opposed to a constitutional monarchy.³⁴ There exists no higher authority in the United States to appeal to besides the President; thus once he is implicated in a scandal, correction must come from subordinate branches of government, the judiciary, or Senate and House Committees.

Unlike the tripartite structure of American government, the parliamentary system provides for the removal of an administration by resignation, or a defeat in the House of Commons. In the United States, voters have to wait until the four-year term expires before expelling a scandal-ridden regime, or else correct the system through the constitutional provision of impeachment, but this was recently proven to be a difficult alternative to invoke. It can be argued that corruption is more easily facilitated in the American system because of the lack of administrative responsibility. In a Parliamentary form of government, the executive branch is directly responsible for its actions to the legislature. For example, if President Nixon had been subjected to a daily question period during his administration, it is likely that Watergate might not have reached the traumatic stage it did.³⁵

As well, because the American political system involves many more campaigns for elected officials, including branches of the judiciary, the opportunities for corruption to occur are greater. With more campaigns to finance and a larger number of candidates vying for

a position, there are thus more politicians who could be considered potential corrupters and more people for them to corrupt.

The higher degree of tolerance for corrupt activity displayed by American representatives, may in effect be partially accounted for by these existing institutional facilitators. It seems that in the United States there exists greater opportunity to engage in corrupt acts; the congressional system of government being somewhat more vulnerable to the permeability of corruption. While simple greed motivates some grafters, others turn to corruption to gain power or prestige, or sometimes merely to advance the interest of their friends.³⁶ The motives of individual officials which govern a decision to partake in corrupt activities, were shown to be related to the institutional arrangements within which he/she operates. Institutional structures and the norms which support them, seemingly have an effect on whether corruption is tolerated or not. If institutional arrangements encourage the spread of corrupt activity, legislators might find it increasingly difficult to object to, or condemn such behaviour.

Political corruption, although facilitated by the type of government a country has, existing facilitators and attitudes of its elected representatives, is not permitted to fester rampantly or unrestricted throughout the political system. Each system does provide for inhibitors which strive to check the spread of corruption and seek to curb its effects. These inhibitors and their effectiveness will be the topic of the ensuing discussion.

Political Inhibitors and Institutional Cures

Each political system then, while institutionally vulnerable to corruption, has at the same time built in provisions for its defense. What is of utmost concern is whether these institutional inhibitors effectively check the spread of corruption in an attempt to establish a state of political equilibrium. In both Canada and the United States, although the opportunities and access points for corruption seem insurmountable, the systems do seek to regulate and control corrupt acts and to curb their pervasive effects. In addition, these inhibitors will invariably contribute to legislator's attitudes toward political corruption.

Bureaucracies in both systems are in a good position to regulate campaign conduct and the political activities of the representative. Bureaucrats are able to exert varying degrees of influence on the political actors. The bureaucracy being accorded a certain degree of autonomy is able to closely check the activities of the politician. This is not to say that the bureaucrat is non-corruptible, but that the bureaucracy attempts to stress to not only its employees, but to the politicians as well, the importance of integrity in office. Thus, some governments have their employees and politicians take an oath of secrecy, or an oath of office, as a symbolic commitment to the protection of the public trust. The bureaucrat, since he works with elected officials on a day to day basis, is afforded the opportunity to observe the activities of the representative regularly.

In the American as in the Canadian system, the bureaucracy has been reformed in an attempt to eradicate the so-called "spoils systems" which were prevalent in earlier times. Each polity, in its attempt to minimize acts of patronage, established a Public or Civil Service Commission. In the United States, with the Civil Service Reform Act of 1883, about 80% of all federal employees were to be chosen by competitive exams.³⁷ Yet, even with these restrictions, it was estimated that when Jimmy Carter took office in 1977, he made about 7,000 patronage appointments, including 2,200 described as key positions.³⁸ Likewise, the Canadian Civil Service Commission was created initially to take matters of promotion, recruitment and discipline, out of the hands of politicians.³⁹ Public Service appointments were no longer based on patronage, but rather on the merit of the job applicant as determined by written and oral competitions. The bureaucracy took steps to reform itself and subsequently inhibit the longevity of corrupt acts.

Generally, the American and Canadian bureaucracies are able to serve successfully as viable inhibitors because of their permanent character and their freedom from election day and the voters. Also, each is reasonably free from party control, as well as, control by either the legislative or executive branch of government. The bureaucracy's sheer size protects it from too close control.⁴⁰ But the bureaucracies provide the political systems with the required continuity and stability which can be considered vital combatants to systemic irregularities.

The bureaucracy, then, in Canada and the United States, functions as an inhibitor to the spread of corruption. It is an inside check which may have the opportunity to nip a corrupt act quickly before it begins to take root. The professional training and higher educational standards tend to produce bureaucrats who uphold professional codes of ethics and resist partisan political meddling,⁴¹ thereby providing the political system with an institutional policing force of sorts. In order for the inhibiting effect of the bureaucracy to be sustained, the autonomy of this institution must be preserved. Concurrently, the bureaucrats must be held accountable to their political superiors. Admittedly this is a difficult balance to achieve. While the bureaucrats are busy watching the politicians, who in turn is watching them?

Just as the formal constitutional distribution of power has facilitating potential, it can act as well in an inhibiting fashion. With political power being divided, a concentration of authority is prevented from forming. This dispersal of power allows that each branch of government cannot function effectively without the help of the other. Each serves as a check and balance on the other, in order to preserve the equilibrium of government. The inherent knowledge that the congressman or MP, is being watched by the executive and vice-versa, must deter a few potentially corrupt individuals, as exemplified by the FBI and Abseam.⁴²

Among the most obvious constraints a government can employ to halt or prevent corruption, are legal constraints. The laws of America and Canada naturally seek to inhibit corruption. Their existence tends to increase the possibility of discovery and thus the risks involved. With penal sanctions looming overhead, a possibly corrupt official will think twice before the act is committed. But in order for these constraints to function to their full potential, they must be strict enough to pose a real threat to the elected official. Fines and short prison terms are not powerful enough deterrents. The risk must be of greater value; if convicted the official must feel the effect of his/her crime so it will not be considered a second time.

Thus, in recent years, the American government, notably, has sought to enforce new legal measures, especially those pertaining to the regulation of elections. Disclosure laws, regarding not only political contributions, but revenue from all sources, have recently come into effect. The aim of these disclosure laws has been to make the requirements comprehensive enough to deter conflicts of interest and yet not so sweeping that it demands information whose chief value would be to nosy neighbours, creditors, and burglars.⁴³

Reform measures in the United States include: the restriction of amounts that can be spent on any given election; the amount donated by a contributor, the imposition of a bar on political contributions from potential government contractors and the reporting of campaign contributions and expenditures in party primaries and conventions.⁴⁴

These and other reforms were entrenched in the 1972 Federal Election Campaign Practices Act, but the Act largely pertained to Presidential elections, as Congress chose not to alter the basic system of private financing of House and Senate elections.⁴⁵ This was substantiated early in 1976, when the Supreme Court reviewed the Campaign Finance Act of 1974 and although the principle of public financing of presidential elections was upheld, the Court struck down spending limits for congressional candidates, where private contributions are used. The Court also ruled against spending limits on behalf of presidential contenders by individuals and groups, as well as, provisions which limited the personal contributions by candidates to their own campaigns.⁴⁶

Thus, the reluctance of Congress and the Supreme Court in enforcing and sustaining proposed reforms has weakened the ability of legal measures from functioning as substantial inhibitors. These reforms, especially those regarding full disclosure of a member's assets, or any gifts or rewards received, are considered a violation of not only what is considered personal, but also question the honour of each congressman. In accordance with these regulations, it appears that they might as well be accused of an impropriety. What must be acknowledged is that these requirements would serve to bring more into the open and aid in the prevention of corrupt acts. The number of candidates interested in running for office (thereby decreasing the incumbents chances), or that more accurate public accounting might scare away big contributors or alter the relationship between major interest groups and

members of Congress⁴⁷ are chances which have to be taken if effective reform is to be secured.

If public financing of all federal campaigns seems a somewhat utopian reform, there do exist more moderate means of reform which Congress might consider, including: the stricter enforcement of current laws on disclosure of contributors, the accounting of funds, and the use of electronic surveillance; the government could offer certain free services, television and radio, to all candidates; and to help attract small contributors, more publicity should be given to the Revenue Act of 1971, which allows up to \$100. in campaign contributions to be deducted from a joint tax return.⁴⁸ Only if the reforms are taken seriously will they effectively function as inhibitors to the spread of corruption.

To discuss fully Canadian reforms and electoral legislation, would constitute a paper in itself. Therefore, comments here must be restricted to an overview of federal legislation, tempered largely by generalizations. Until recently, laissez-faire was the pre-eminent characteristic of the Canadian approach to the problem of election expenses.⁴⁹ Previously, existing legislation was invariably weak, considering the narrowness of the reporting requirements which were limited to expenses alone. The far more important items of candidate and party income and of its disclosure in terms of amount and source, were virtually ignored.⁵⁰ But with the entrenchment of the Election Expenses Act 1973-74, reforms were made in this regard and campaign

financing became more rigid. Under the new Act, election expenses was defined to include amounts paid, liabilities incurred and the commercial value of goods and services donated or provided, other than volunteer labour.⁵¹

No longer were expenses the only items to be reported, but under the new Act, incoming revenues were to be accounted for as well. Within two months after an election, the agent for an elected candidate must now file with the returning officer a report containing detailed statements regarding not only all election expenses incurred, but also the amount of money and the commercial value of goods or services; for example, loan, advance or gift which exceeded \$100., are to be disclosed.⁵² With these new measures, the whole process of campaign contributions and financial reporting was brought out into the open.

In an attempt to reduce the costs of an election campaign, the federal, and some provincial governments, have attempted to impose overall limits on certain items of expenditure. This is especially true with regards to the media.⁵³ Under the federal legislation, each broadcaster is obliged to provide a total of 6½ hours of prime time for sale to the registered parties. This time is divided among the parties by the CRTC for their use only in the four-week period prior to the day before election day. The method of allocating the time is based approximately on the proportion of the vote received by the party in the previous general election. One-half of the cost of the time purchased by each of the registered parties is reimbursable from the

public treasury.⁵⁴

As well, in an effort to diversify the sources of campaign contributions, the federal and provincial governments now provide subsidies to serious candidates and parties, and tax incentives for the individual contributor.⁵⁵ But while tax incentives might encourage individuals and small businessmen to contribute, it has yet to be proven that the traditional parties possess the ability to organize mass fund-raising, thereby diminishing their dependence on big business and corporate sources.⁵⁶

The federal electoral legislation is buttressed by existing provincial legislation which varies in the degree of its restrictiveness. But neither the provinces or the federal government have sought to impose ceilings on central party or riding associations expenses beyond the campaign period. Thus, ongoing organizational and administrative costs are not controlled or regulated.⁵⁷ Too, the federal Act fails to place limitations on the amount and sources of party and candidate funding. Quebec is one province which prohibits the acceptance of donations from foreign based firms and individuals, and in recent years, has sought to enact reforms for partial funding of provincial parties between elections.⁵⁸

In analyzing American and Canadian electoral reforms and restrictive legislation, it seems that the United States is perhaps stricter towards the individual candidate, whereas in Canada, it is the

political party which bears the onus of reform. This is again reflective of the differing modes of government, as in the States, political parties are not as important in campaign financing⁵ as they are in Canada. The absence of a permanent specialized fund-raising structure (like the American Committee to Re-elect the President) often puts increased pressure on party leaders themselves who must bear the burden of finding ways of raising and distributing campaign funds.⁵⁹

But it must be stressed that in both systems, the reform of election finance and the introduction of new restrictive legislation will not cure all the ills of the respective political systems; political corruption will still continue to exist. Although such reforms may pave the way for desirable change, they will not bring it about themselves.⁶⁰ Despite this, these reform measures function as visible inhibitors to the spread of political corruption. The fact that they are recorded and protected under the legal system attests to their legitimacy and intensifies their role as inhibitor.

The courts in each system have played their part in upholding these legal constraints, illustrated by the numbers of convictions that have been made. In the United States, the court is aided by a Justice Department, which has actively sought to chronicle and inhibit the misdeeds of congressmen. But the role these judicial bodies can play is restricted by the fact that they really cannot exert any influence until cases of corruption are brought before them. The judges then, and only then, have the ability to inhibit political corruption via the sentence

passed. With each case the court tries, it inevitably sets precedents which are going to serve as a deterrent to the politician contemplating performing an illegal act.

The Americans have an institutional inhibitor which is latent in the Canadian political system. In essence, Congress with all its acknowledged imperfections, represents the best, and often the only means of discovering the truth about the decisions and actions of government officials.⁶¹ Specifically, it is the congressional committees which function as successful inhibitors to the spread of political corruption. The committees of Congress, have the power to subpoena and the right to require the submission of records and the testimony of high government officials and the ultimate authority to challenge the decisions of the executive branch.⁶² These committees are viable channels of surveillance and an excellent check, not only on their own members, but on the executive as well. Since their proceedings are largely conducted in the open, they can be said to be relatively free from corrupt influences. These committees, usually investigatory in nature, serve to further open the conduct of government to the public at large. They are granted a high level of prestige and their proceedings normally receive a great deal of attention from the press and the media.

But in order for this internal check to function effectively as an inhibitor, the committees must carry out their tasks to the utmost. For example, the investigative power during the Watergate scandal in both

the Senate and House, petered out before reaching its maximum capacity. While the Senate investigating committee, chaired by Sam Ervin, contributed to the increased public awareness of the scope of the systematic corruption and uncovered crucial facts such as the existence of presidential tapes which led to Nixon's resignation, the committee regrettably failed in meeting its obligation to make recommendations for new legislation and for not holding Nixon in contempt of Congress for withholding evidence.⁶³ The impetus is there for Congress to correct itself; it remains a matter of speculation whether such correctives would be initiated if the occasion arose again.

The Canadian committees just do not have the same authority as their American counterparts. The Canadian committees are restricted by the fact that they may only consider those topics which have been referred to them by the house, although they retain the right to "report from time to time".⁶⁴ The committees do possess the subpoena power but it must be specified in terms of reference, if the House wishes to confer it. It is a power which is very rarely used. However, committees can order witnesses to attend and order the production of documents, excluding the right to confiscate. The committees are not empowered to punish but only to make a report to the House.⁶⁵ In fact, investigatory committees in the Canadian system primarily deal with policy issues and rarely are they used to conduct an investigation into the behaviour of a member of Parliament or to look into allegations of corrupt activity. In the United States though, the committees have the expressed authority to obtain records from the President or members of his staff,

forcefully, if warranted. Committees then, while supplementary in the Canadian system, are perhaps a more effective check on corrupt activity in the American system of government. Canadian committees could serve to further open the conduct of government to the public at large. They are usually granted a high level of prestige and their proceedings normally receive a great deal of attention from the media. If their investigatory powers were increased and the scope of reference broadened, Canadian committees could perhaps increase their inhibiting potential.

Somewhat ironically, the system provides the elected Canadian and American official with alternatives to corrupt methods. It is these legal forms of patronage that make it difficult to identify a truly corrupt act. Legitimate means of influencing voters, corporations and interest groups are entrenched in the system and are recognized as being within the boundaries of law. These legitimate techniques include the use of legal patronage, pork-barrel legislation and private members bills.⁶⁷ With this room for manipulation, the representative may find it more to his advantage to be forcefully persuasive, utilize threat tactics or employ legitimate means of patronage (such as the granting of a staff position), before resorting to corrupt tactics. With these alternatives handy, political corruption is indeed stifled; to what degree has yet to be measured.

In addition to these internal institutional inhibitors, there exist external agents and forces which seek to minimize the prevalence and

corrosive effects of corruption. These include the use of paid informants and regulatory agencies such as Common Cause and the Better Government Association in the United States, and in Canada, the office of the Auditor General and the Provincial Ombudsmen. Such agencies actively participate as political "watchdogs" of the public trust. These agencies, to some extent, convince potential violators that they might be discovered and revealed. Quasi-judicial agencies, too, are able to yield a great deal of power; their names alone and their attachment to the judiciary, at times are a powerful enough deterrent.

These outside agencies are more numerous and more highly organized in the United States than in Canada, perhaps out of need. All of these agencies, because of the power allotted to them, seek to remain free from lobbyist and corporate pressure and operate in accordance with regulations imposed by Congress or Parliament. They generally content themselves with protecting the public from airplane accidents, dangerous drugs, misleading advertising and fraudulent stock,⁶⁸ all feasibly minor forms of corruption. Individuals, like consumer advocate Ralph Nader, are also capable of inhibiting potential corruptors. In Canada at the provincial level, the Ombudsman assumes this same type of role as sharpshooter, or governmental critic. The effectiveness of such agencies and individuals is largely attributable to the large amount of public response and media coverage they can generate, thereby averting intense attention to a subject or individual under their investigation.

The performance of the press as a scrutineer, is questionable at best. The press is renowned for printing only what they deem fit and that remains their prerogative, and even when they do print the details of possible scandalous acts, the public unfortunately only believes what it wants to believe. Yet, the press has potential as a useful surveillance weapon. The newspaper reaches a wide-reading public and reporters are able to uncover the traces of seemingly corrupt acts and consequently, are thus at times able to arouse public indignation and spark a revolt of sorts. This was exemplified by the Watergate crisis and the expert reporting and uncovering of events by reporters like Bernstein and Woodward.

The American press is in a sense more highly developed and more rigorous in their pursuit of the facts. If there are coverups in the Canadian government, the press cannot be expected to ferret them out. Based on the record of Canadian journalism, no Canadian newspaper could have touched the kind of reporting that led to the Washington Post's Pulitzer Prize. This is not to imply that scandals go undetected in Canada because of a weak press, but rather to assert that the poor coverage of corrupt acts distorts and detracts from the public's awareness of corruption. The press has the potential to serve as an effective inhibitor, but this potential needs only to be cultivated and utilized to its full capacity before the efforts of the press in a policing role can be fully appreciated.

"Measuring the extent of corruption in government today is like

taking account of an iceberg. • Every actual corruptionist, every pre-meditating thief who accepts pay offs or gives bribes or otherwise preys illegally on government is supported by a mass of persons who do not actively participate in wrong doing but who tolerate it one way or another⁶⁹, thus making them silent accomplices to the acts of intrigue. The public has the potential to inhibit the spread of corruption and if aroused, could prove to be a force the corrupt politician would have to reckon with. The only real cure for the decay of a political system is the active interest of its public. It remains vital for the people, the average citizen, to pay attention. If the citizenry remains lethargic or unconcerned, then all efforts at reform can essentially be deemed futile; a waste of time and money.

In both countries, public accountability and public responsiveness have not been fully developed, and hence, are not able to serve as fully operative inhibitors. Elected representatives are not even held in check by their quest for re-election as even instances where the official was convicted of corrupt activities, re-election was still prevalent. If the corrupt politician is not even going to be penalized by the source of his/her authority, all other inhibitors seem somewhat superfluous.

Conclusion

Despite the efforts of institutional inhibitors, political corruption is a phenomenon common to both the Canadian and American political systems. Differences in tolerance levels towards corrupt acts between Canadian and American legislators can be accredited to attitudinal and

CONCLUSIONS

This study has been concerned with Canadian legislators and their attitudes toward political corruption. We have been particularly interested in what the political elite believes constitutes a corrupt act; the factors which shape and determine MP's attitudes toward corruption; and the differences which exist between the attitudes of Canadian and American legislators. Any study about beliefs, must cope with the problematic link between attitudes expressed in an interview and actual behaviour.¹ When listening to legislators talk about political corruption, are we in fact watching them behave? How much congruency exists between their verbal behaviour in the interview situation and their verbal behaviour elsewhere?

There has not been evidence gathered to support the hypothesis that knowledge of an individual member's attitudes toward political corruption, permits one to predict the way he/she would act if circumstances permitted. But, it has been demonstrated that legislator's attitudes toward corruption, are a product not just of their personal opinions, but also of the objective situation in which they find themselves. As Fred Greenstein aptly stated: "Behaviour...is a function of both the environmental situations in which actors find themselves and the psychological predispositions they bring to these situations".²

Thus, it is understandable why variations in Canadian MP's attitudes toward politically corrupt acts, were attributed to partisan

accordance with established norms, precedents, rules and conventions. Because of such norms and conventions, legislators are able to determine what is appropriate or inappropriate behaviour. The Canadian conventions of party discipline and ministerial responsibility, the oral question period, the adversative role of the opposition and the norm of collegiality, all contribute to the explanation of why Canadian legislators were found to be less tolerant of corrupt acts than their American counterparts. Seemingly, the honour system is working, whether it is enough, is another question.

NOTES

1. Peters and Welch, "Attitudes of US State Legislators Toward Political Corruption", p. 450.
2. IBID, p. 451.
3. IBID, p. 456.
4. IBID.
5. IBID.
6. See Peters and Welch, references given above and below.
7. OP.CIT, p. 459.
8. Joseph Senturia, "Corruption", Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, p. 449.
9. James Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 16.
10. Barry Rundquest, Gerald Storm, John Peters, "Corrupt Politicians and Their Electoral Support: Some Experiment Observations", American Political Science Review, (1980), p. 698.
11. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, p. 16.
12. IBID.
13. IBID.
14. Peters and Welch, "Political Corruption in America", p. 954.
15. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, p. 26.
16. IBID.
17. IBID, p. 27.
18. David C. Saffell, The Politics of American National Government (Mass: Winthrop Publishers, 1978), p. 108.
19. IBID, p. 113.
20. IBID.
21. IBID.
22. IBID, p. 109.

23. Richard Van Loon and Michael Whittington, The Canadian Political System (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1981), p. 406.
24. Robert J. Jackson and Michael M. Atkinson, The Canadian Legislative System (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1980), p. 37.
25. OP.CIT, p. 418.
26. IBID.
27. IBID.
28. Arnold J. Heidenheimer, "The Analysis of Electoral and Legislative Corruption" in Heidenheimer, Political Corruption, p. 361.
29. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, p. 100.
30. Jack Anderson and Drew Pearson, The Case Against Congress (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), p. 426.
31. Paul H. Douglas, Ethics in Government (Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 71.
32. Clark Mollenhoff, Despoilers of Democracy (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1969), p. 379.
33. See Bruton and Scott, "A Little Honest Graft Never Hurt a Politician at the Polls", MacLeans, (Jan. 25, 1964).
34. Maurice Cutler, "Watergate: Could it Happen Here?", Business Quarterly, vol. 38, (Summer, 1973), p. 11.
35. IBID.
36. John A. Gardiner and David J. Olson, Theft of the City (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), p. 280.
37. Saffell, The Politics of American National Government, p. 308.
38. IBID.
39. Van Loon and Whittington, The Canadian Political System, p. 551.
40. OP.CIT, p. 325.
41. IBID, p. 331.

42. G. Walter, "King Con Artist Sets Up Abscam for the FBI and Snares Some Unsuspecting Politicians", People 14, 40 (January 5, 1981). "FBI Shake Down Hits Capitol Hill", Newsweek 95, 32 (February 11, 1989).
43. George Amick, The American Way of Graft New Jersey: Centre for Analysis of Public Issues Inc., 1976), p. 210.
44. Andersop and Pearson, The Case Against Congress, p. 488.
45. ✓ Saffell, The Politics of American National Government, p. 199.
46. IBID, p. 201.
47. IBID, p. 199.
48. IBID, p. 203.
49. Khayyam Z. Paltiel, "Improving Laws on Financing Elections", in Gibbons and Rowat, Political Corruption in Canada, p. 296.
50. IBID.
51. Election Expenses Act, 1973-74, Section 23.
52. IBID.
53. K.Z. Paltiel, "Canadian Election Expense Legislation: Recent Developments", in Hugh Thorburn ed., Party Politics in Canada (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1979), p. 100.
54. IBID, p. 103.
55. IBID, p. 100.
56. IBID, p. 104.
57. IBID.
58. IBID, p. 105.
59. Commission of Election Expenses, Studies in Canadian Party Finance, 1966, p. 7.
60. Paltiel, "Improving Laws on Financing Elections", p. 296.
61. Mollenhoff, Despoilers of Democracy, p. 9.
62. IBID, p. 10.

63. Larry Berg, Harlan Hahn, John Schmidhauser, Corruption in the American Political System (New Jersey: General Learning Press, 1976), p. 73.
64. Jackson and Atkinson, The Canadian Legislative System, p. 119.
65. As taken from personal correspondence with the author and Philip Laundry, Clerk-at-the-Table, April 2, 1982.
66. A recent exception is the Mackessey case.
67. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, p. 94.
68. Mollenhoff, Despoilers of Democracy, p. 161.
69. IBID, p. 376.

CONCLUSIONS

This study has been concerned with Canadian legislators and their attitudes toward political corruption. We have been particularly interested in what the political elite believes constitutes a corrupt act; the factors which shape and determine MP's attitudes toward corruption; and the differences which exist between the attitudes of Canadian and American legislators. Any study about beliefs, must cope with the problematic link between attitudes expressed in an interview and actual behaviour.¹ When listening to legislators talk about political corruption, are we in fact watching them behave? How much congruency exists between their verbal behaviour in the interview situation and their verbal behaviour elsewhere?

There has not been evidence gathered to support the hypothesis that knowledge of an individual member's attitudes toward political corruption, permits one to predict the way he/she would act if circumstances permitted. But, it has been demonstrated that legislator's attitudes toward corruption, are a product not just of their personal opinions, but also of the objective situation in which they find themselves. As Fred Greenstein aptly stated: "Behaviour...is a function of both the environmental situations in which actors find themselves and the psychological predispositions they bring to these situations".²

Thus, it is understandable why variations in Canadian MP's attitudes toward politically corrupt acts, were attributed to partisan

and spatial differences. Differences in tolerance levels for acts of WHITE and GREY corruption were accounted for by an individual legislator's party affiliation, length of time he/she had been in parliament, the region the legislator represents, and the degree of urban/ruralness of the constituency he/she serves. These factors proved to nullify the effects of personal factors - age, education, occupation, religious affiliation - in the shaping of MP's attitudes toward political corruption.

It was subsequently concluded that there exists an elite culture of political corruption, which transcends religious, educational and occupational differences. A socialization process it appears, is at work in the parliamentary environment, premised on legislative norms and conventions, and facilitated by the socializing experience afforded by caucus. Seemingly, such a process obliterates personal attitudes and opinions toward political corruption. It was not suggested that elite attitudes toward corruption differ dramatically from the attitudes of the Canadian public, as mass opinions and beliefs on the subject have yet to be gauged. Rather, it was advanced that the attitudes of Canadian MPs toward corruption, while different, are structured considerably by factors in the legislative environment, to which the public is not exposed.

In addition, since the scope of this paper was limited to "political" corruption, elected representative's attitudes toward corruption were rendered all the more important. It is elite orientations

toward political corruption which condition the nature and stability of patterns of governance.

In a desire to uncover uniformities in legislative behaviour, researchers adopting a comparative approach, must not blind themselves to the equal significance of national peculiarities. While this study outlined the similarities in the attitudes of Canadian and American legislators toward political corruption, stressing the pre-eminence of an intralegislative socialization process in each culture, differences were detected in the types of correlates which explained attitudinal variance. Party affiliation found to be a central factor in the Canadian study, was seemingly not a determinant of American attitudes. Nor was the degree of urban/ruralness of the district represented found to be significantly related to the dependent variables. Therefore, the two strongest Canadian coefficients were deemed void in the American study.

Conversely, ideology was found to be a strong correlate of American attitudes, yet in the Canadian sample it was not found to be statistically significant. The variables that were found to be mutually influential were region and the number of years in the legislature.

Numerous scholars have considered the social background characteristics of legislators and have concluded that such characteristics condition legislative behaviour. According to Robert Putnam, recently murmurs of discontent have been expressed over evidence that

many aspects of the belief systems of political leaders are virtually unrelated to their social origins.³ This study on political corruption adds to such an argument. Seemingly, if one wants to predict a politician's attitudes toward political corruption, his/her social background can be considered irrelevant. These factors do not have a continual impact on the development of such attitudes, and thus it was concluded that the inside model of legislative behaviour, best fits the models explaining legislator's attitudes toward political corruption. Blanket assumptions that social background characteristics are politically relevant, no longer are readily accepted.⁴

Any discussion of political corruption is, by nature, deeply grounded in the values and attitudes of our elected representatives. This study then, has sought to fill a void in the existing literature on Canadian political corruption, by examining the attitudes of MPs. Attitudes of elites have not previously been wholly ignored. Studies exist which contain investigations of the opinions of political leaders on current topics in foreign policy and domestic affairs.⁵ As well, there have been studies of the personalities and psychological motivations of political leaders.⁶ But studies which probe the beliefs, values and attitudes of legislators toward a subject like political corruption, number very few.

Further research remains to be conducted on both the cognitive and normative orientations of elected representatives toward political corruption. Only when a thorough understanding of such orientations has

been gained, will the historic case studies and numerous exposes, assume an increased degree of relevancy in the analytical study of political corruption.

NOTES

1. Robert D. Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians (Yale University Press, 1973), p. 25.
2. Fred Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1969), p. 7.
3. Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians, p. 238.
4. IBID.
5. See Allan Kornberg's, Canadian Legislative Behaviour cited elsewhere in the text.
6. Conrad Black, Duplessis (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977).

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

Initially it was perceived that the greatest obstacle in researching the topic of Canadian legislators attitudes toward political corruption would be acquiring access to the MPs themselves. It seems that MPs are perceived as being surrounded by an aura of inaccessibility. But this author was convinced that this was largely a preconceived notion that had remained untested for a number of years. Granted, Canadian MPs are extremely busy with constituency and committee work, but the enthusiasm and cooperation with which this survey was received has proven that our elected representatives will talk to researchers and consent to be a part of surveys and questionnaires.

Perhaps the large number of interviews was obtained because the subject matter intrigued many who were curious to know exactly what the survey was about. This air of curiosity was invariably enhanced by the parliamentary setting during which the MPs were approached. Following the Gillespie Affair and amidst the hearings of the Mackenzie Committee, the survey coincidentally proved to be very topical.

Initial contact with the MPs was made by mail with a letter of introduction, accompanied by another, explaining the project and asking for their assistance (attached). The letters were mailed out in five waves of twenty letters each. The first wave was mailed out March 23, 1983 and the last, May 16. Thus, the interviews were conducted over a four month period between March and June of 1983. The average inter-

view lasted approximately forty minutes, with the shortest being fifteen minutes and the longest over two hours. The questions were self-administered with the MPs using response cards with a seven-point Likert-type scale reproduced on it (see below).

In order to facilitate access to the francophone members, the letters and the questionnaire were professionally translated into french. In the letters, the members were told that the questions could be administered in either of the official languages. For the francophone interviews, the questions were administered by two bilingual assistants whose help and support was greatly appreciated. But in retrospect, this did not ensure access to the francophone members. Of all the members contacted, the francophones headed the list of refusals, proving to be the most difficult to pinpoint to an interview time.

As stated previously, a sample was drawn of 120 MPs and interviews were completed with eighty-four members. The sample yielded thirty-nine Liberals (46%), thirty-five Conservatives (42%), and ten NDP members (12%). Generally speaking, the respondents were members who were in their fourth year in Parliament. Seventy-nine males were interviewed and five females. The members ranged in age from 28-72, with the average age being forty-seven. The majority of the sample were university graduates, who had done some form of graduate work. The regional breakdown of the sample was as follows: 14 (16.7%) members were from British Columbia; 16 (19.1%) were from the West; 30 (35.7%) were Ontario MPs; 15 (17.9%) members from Quebec and 8

(9.6%) were members from the Atlantic provinces. As for refusals, interviews were declined by 22 Liberals, 8 Conservatives and 3 NDP members. Of the 22 Liberal refusals, 15 of them were francophone members.

The great majority of members were supportive, enthusiastic, attentive, kind and extremely helpful. Many offered valuable insight into the concept of corruption and enlivened the discussion with descriptive anecdotes, stories and past experiences. They listened to the interviewer's preface before beginning the questionnaires and responded with these comments in mind.

As one might expect, however, not all members were cooperative. A few were seemingly offended that political corruption was the focus of the research, suggesting that surely a more positive topic could be examined. The negative reception received was possibly due to the fact that some members misunderstood the intent of the study. The members who responded unfavourably to the survey seemed to forget that the examples cited were purely hypothetical and that it was not being asserted that the acts had occurred, or were occurring in Canada. A few members disliked the fact that the survey was premised on the assumption that corruption exists in Canada. But in order to conduct the survey; for the questions to have some degree of relevance, one must assume that corruption to some degree, exists in the Canadian political system. It would be naive to believe otherwise. Members also found it difficult to assign numerical values to the statements and

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situations they were asked about. For many, a corrupt act could not just be arbitrarily assigned a number and they thus prefaced their numerical responses with a qualifying remark.

Finally, perhaps the most common complaint with the questions was that not enough information was provided, and the circumstances surrounding the acts were in some instances unclear. This was done purposely, but was in no way meant to trick, or mislead the respondent. There was enough information provided to enable the MP to decide one way or another, if the act was corrupt or not corrupt, and to what degree. Especially since the study was an attitudinal one designed to garner instinctive reactions to the posed situations. Long, complicated scenarios would only have served to increase the chances of error. For all the questions only the most obvious clarifications were made. If the MP was unsure the neutral score of four was often employed. It was also made clear that if they felt it was impossible to make a decision on the basis of the information given, a refusal was acceptable. As indicated by the minimal number of missing cases for these variables, refusal was not a serious problem.

A number of questions were asked about each item, each with seven degrees of response. Firstly, the respondent was asked to decide whether the act was corrupt or not corrupt; then whether they thought most citizens would condemn the activity (responses ranged from probably to probably not). In addition, on a few of the items, the respondents were asked if they had positive proof that a member of

their own party, who they had previously supported, engaged in this act, would they continue to support them (responses ranged from definitely yes, to definitely not). Finally, they were asked if at all possible, whether they could estimate the occurrence of such an act in the past year in the House, if at all (responses ranged from never, once or twice, occasionally, to more than 20 times).

It would perhaps be useful to discuss the reservations and problems expressed about each of the ten dependent variables, providing when necessary the intended context of the item and the various interpretations MPs placed on the items. In the first item, LEADER, MPs wanted to know when the promise of appointment was made. If the appointment was promised after the contribution had been made, then it would appear to be politically acceptable; a simple act of patronage, intended to reward the party faithful. But if the appointment was promised "in exchange for" as the item is worded, this would seem to imply that the appointment would ensue if funds were contributed. Thus, the respondents correctly assumed that the question implied that perhaps the political position could be bought, even by an outsider of the party circle.

The next example, WEAPONS, was only thought to be problematic in that the term "influence", was not made clear. In essence though, this was the core of the question. The MP was forced to define in his/her own mind to what extent a cabinet minister can rightfully employ his/her influence and whether in this instance, the influence

expected to answer on the assumption that the paving had been done at the taxpayer's expense.*

On item seven, ROADS, really only one question arose, this being whether the government needed the land. In other words, was the land appropriated? The answer to this was no. The item was not intended to convey the impression that the government was in desperate need of the cabinet minister's land.

There were no questions on the next item, JUDGE. With the PROPOSAL item though, the members wanted to know whether the campaign contribution was given before or after the legislator supported the proposal. The members had to decide whether the question implied that the legislator changed his/her mind on a policy proposal, because of the campaign contribution. It was expressed that this did not happen too often in Canadian legislature, because of the convention of party discipline.

*It would have been interesting to ask the MPs if they would have responded differently, if the driveway had been paid for. Would money legitimize the act? Even if the mayor did pay for the driveway, the city work crew is not in the asphalt business. Who would have determined the cost - labour, equipment, supplies?

If it were a company like Bell Canada, then the minister's influence would be somewhat diminished, whereas if the company was quite small, \$50,000 worth of stock would enable the minister to exert a sizeable amount of influence and control.

The other variable which the members considered to be relevant, was whether the minister owned the stock before becoming a cabinet minister. There exists a strong current of opinion among respondents, that just because these people are politicians, they do not necessarily have to divest themselves of all their holdings. If forced to do so, these MPs felt that potential, worthy candidates would be discouraged from seeking public office.

Item five, SCHOOL, once again raised the question of influence. MPs wanted to know what kind of influence was being exerted. The only elaboration offered was that the MP in question, made it plain that it was a member of parliament making the recommendation. A number of members said that they possessed little influence, and that a letter from them would mean nothing. Many evidently explain to those individuals requesting a letter, that it could possibly work to their detriment.

DRIVEWAY, was the item on which there was the least problem with interpretation. The only question that did arise occasionally was whether they mayor paid for the paving of his driveway. Since it was not stated that remuneration had been made, the respondents were

2

expected to answer on the assumption that the paving had been done at the taxpayer's expense.*

On item seven, ROADS, really only one question arose, this being whether the government needed the land. In other words, was the land appropriated? The answer to this was no. The item was not intended to convey the impression that the government was in desperate need of the cabinet minister's land.

There were no questions on the next item, JUDGE. With the PROPOSAL item though, the members wanted to know whether the campaign contribution was given before or after the legislator supported the proposal. The members had to decide whether the question implied that the legislator changed his/her mind on a policy proposal, because of the campaign contribution. It was expressed that this did not happen too often in Canadian legislature, because of the convention of party discipline.

*It would have been interesting to ask the MPs if they would have responded differently, if the driveway had been paid for. Would money legitimize the act? Even if the mayor did pay for the driveway, the city work crew is not in the asphalt business. Who would have determined the cost - labour, equipment, supplies?

The final item, NEP, was the example which presented the MPs with the most difficulty. The observations made by MPs in responding to this question were as follows: first, the amount of stock - \$50,000 worth - was not that great in a company the size of Gulf Canada. Second, the ordinary backbencher's influence was once again not great enough to change a provision of any policy. And finally, this question raised the issue of whether an MP should be prevented from holding a stock portfolio all together.

From the above discussion, it is evident that the members took into consideration a number of the dimensions of corruption outlined in Chapter One, before responding to the questions. They wanted to have more information about the favour - its size, and the duration of its benefit; the donor - whether a cabinet minister or backbencher, member of the government or opposition; or whether a large or small company; and finally, the reward itself - whether it was being dispersed to the individual members specifically, or the political party in general.

The elaborations provided on the items were intended only to clarify the intent of the question, thereby helping to avoid egregious errors. The clarifications were consistent; everyone who asked was told the same story. Those who did not, it was assumed, understood the situation as depicted. While the questions are somewhat stark and unvarnished, the range of responses provided, 1-7, gave the respondent the opportunity to communicate the subtle differences he/she detected in the level of corruption embodied in each act.

Carleton University
Ottawa, Canada K1S 5B6

This letter is to introduce Maureen Mancuso, currently enrolled in the Masters programme at Carleton University. She is presently conducting important research on the political system.

Maureen is a responsible person who can be trusted to handle an interview and publication with discretion. I have complete confidence in her abilities.

The specific details of her project are explained further in the accompanying letter. Your assistance to her would be greatly appreciated.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'R. J. Jackson'.

Robert J. Jackson
Professor and Chairman

I am currently enrolled in the Master's program in Political Science at Carleton University. I am working under the supervision of Robert J. Jackson, and my thesis research is a comparative study of political morality in Canada and the United States.

I am interested in replicating a study that has been done in the United States, by two political scientists at the University of Nebraska. In this study, some two hundred congressmen were surveyed to obtain information about their attitudes toward political corruption.

I would like to gather similar data by administering the same questions to approximately one hundred Members of Parliament. Such a survey will provide me with the opportunity to compare the attitudes of American and Canadian elected officials toward political corruption.

You are one of the MPs whose assistance I am hoping to obtain. I can administer the questions in approximately twenty minutes, in either of the official languages and your anonymity is completely assured. You will be provided with a copy of the results, once the data has been analyzed.

I will be in contact with you within the next ten days, to arrange a suitable interview time. Your cooperation is greatly appreciated and I look forward to meeting you.

Sincerely Yours,

Maureen Mancuso

Présentement, je suis inscrite au programme de Maîtrise en Science politique à l'Université Carleton. Je travaille sous la direction de Robert J. Jackson, et les recherches pour ma thèse concernent une étude comparative de la moralité politique au Canada et aux Etats-Unis.

Je m'intéresse à reproduire une étude qui a été effectuée aux Etats-Unis par deux experts en science politique à l'Université de Nebraska. Dans cette étude, quelques deux cents Membres du Congrès ont participé à une enquête afin d'obtenir des renseignements sur leurs attitudes envers la corruption politique.

J'aimerais rassembler de pareilles données en posant les mêmes questions à une centaine de Députés. Cette enquête me fournira l'occasion de comparer les attitudes envers la corruption politique des officiels élus, américains et canadiens.

Vous êtes un des députés à qui je m'adresse. Je peux vous poser les questions dans une des langues officielles en vingt minutes, et votre anonymat est assuré. Je vous donnerai les résultats de l'enquête quand ils auront été analysés.

Je vous rejoindrai en-dedans de dix jours pour fixer une heure de rendez-vous qui vous convient. J'apprécie énormément votre collaboration et je m'attends à vous rencontrer bientôt.

Sincèrement vôtre,

Maureen Mancuso

APPENDIX II

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR CANADIAN MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

i) English

ii) French Translation

CORRUPTION QUESTIONNAIRE

I AM INTERESTED IN YOUR VIEWS ABOUT THE EXTENT OF DISHONESTY IN GOVERNMENT AND WHAT, IF ANYTHING, COULD AND CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT. PLEASE INDICATE YOUR AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS.

Strongly
Agree

Strongly
Disagree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

If you agree completely, you would pick position number 1. If you disagree completely, you would pick position number 7. Of course, you could also pick any of the numbered positions in between. Here is the first statement:

1. The distrust that some citizens have of government officials and activities, is largely due to a lack of understanding of what politics is all about.
2. Political corruption is not a widespread problem.
3. Dishonesty is more widespread in politics than in business.
4. Political corruption is more widespread at the federal than at the provincial level of government.
5. Political corruption is more widespread at the provincial than at the local level of government.
6. No matter what we do, we can never eliminate political corruption.
7. The corruption that exists in the political world, simply reflects the standard of the rest of society.
8. Much of the furor over corruption in the government is the result of a short run phenomena called the "post-Watergate morality".
9. The police should be freed from legislative and judicial restrictions placed upon their investigative and arrest procedures.
10. Parliament should vote a great deal more money to help police and other law enforcement agencies deal with crime.

Thank you. We will not need the card any more. I will now ask you some other kinds of questions.

Corrupt
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
 Not Corrupt

- Never _____ Occasionally _____
Once or Twice _____ More than 20 times _____

Corrupt	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Corrupt

- | Corrupt | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Not
Corrupt |
|---------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----------------|
|---------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----------------|

- a) b) c)**

13. A public official using public funds for personal travel.

Corrupt								Not Corrupt
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

a) b) c) d)

14. A Minister of Defense who owns \$50,000 in stock in a company with which the Defense Department has a million dollar contract.

Corrupt								Not Corrupt
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

a) b) c)

15. A public official using his influence to get a friend or relative admitted to law or medical school, or some other type of professional institute.

Corrupt								Not Corrupt
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

a) b) c) d)

16. The driveway of the mayor's private home being paved by the city work crew.

Corrupt								Not Corrupt
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

a) b)

17. A provincial cabinet minister while chairman of the public road committee authorizing the purchase of land he had recently acquired.

Corrupt								Not Corrupt
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

a) b) c) d)

18. A judge hearing a case concerning a corporation in which he has \$50,000 worth of stock.

Corrupt								Not Corrupt
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

a) b)

19. A legislator accepting a large campaign contribution in return for supporting a legislative proposal.

Corrupt

Not
Corrupt

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

a) b) c) d)

20. An MP holds a large amount of stock in Gulf Canada (about \$50,000 worth) working to change the provisions of the National Energy Policy.

Corrupt

Not
Corrupt

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

a) b)

NOW, JUST A FEW VERY GENERAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING
POLITICAL CORRUPTION:

21. Are there any changes in laws or regulations that you believe might reduce political corruption, such as personal income disclosure, or stronger campaign finance laws, etc.?

22. Do you feel there are any conditions or offices that are especially conducive to corruption, or especially not conducive to it?

23. In general, in political matters, how would you describe yourself?

1. Very liberal _____ 4. Somewhat conservative _____
2. Somewhat liberal _____ 5. Very conservative _____
3. Pretty much middle of the road _____ 6. Other _____

IN CONCLUSION, I WONDER WHETHER I MIGHT GO OVER A
LITTLE PERSONAL INFORMATION:

24. What is your party affiliation:

1. Conservative _____
2. Liberal _____
3. NDP _____

4. Other _____

25. What is the population size of your constituency:

26. In general, which description best fits your constituency:

1. Totally urban _____
2. Mostly urban _____
3. Totally suburban _____
4. Mostly suburban _____
5. Totally rural _____
6. Mostly rural _____
7. Mixed urban rural _____
8. Mixed suburban rural _____
9. Mixed urban suburban _____

27. What is the highest grade or year you completed in school?

(If respondent indicates that he/she attended University ask 27 a)).
(If respondent indicates that he/she attended a Post Secondary Institution other than University, ask 27 b)).

27a) Did you obtain a degree?

1. No 2. BA 3. B.SC. 4. B.COMM. 5. Other _____

27b) Where did you obtain your education beyond high school?

1. Technical School _____
2. Community College _____
3. Teacher's College _____
4. Other, Specify _____

28. What was your age on your last birthday? _____

29. Do you have another occupation besides MP? _____
If not, what was your previous occupation? _____

30. What is your religious denomination? _____

(If respondent has a denomination go to question 30 a)).

30a) About how often do you go the services at your church (synagogue)?

1. Often, at least once/week
2. Once or twice/month
3. Several times/year
4. About once/year
5. Never
6. Refused

31. How many terms in the legislature have you served, counting this

term?

Number of terms

31a) All together, how many year is that? _____ years

32. Approximately, how much time do you spend in your constituency?

33. How much of the monies allotted to you, would you estimate you spend on your constituency?

34. Have you ever served on a legislative or caucus committee, that has investigated allegations of political corruption?

35. Sex: Male _____ Female _____

36. Name: _____

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR OPINIONS AND ATTENTION.

IF YOU HAVE ANY OPINIONS ON POLITICAL CORRUPTION NOT COVERED IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE, PLEASE FEEL FREE TO COMMENT.

Questionnaire sur la corruption

Je m'intéresse à vos opinions sur l'importance de la malhonnêteté au gouvernement et ce qui pourrait être fait pour changer la situation. Veuillez indiquer si vous êtes d'accord ou non avec les affirmations suivantes.

accord								désaccord
complet	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	complet

Si vous êtes complètement d'accord, vous choisirez numéro 1.

Si vous êtes complètement en désaccord, vous choisirez numéro 7.

Bien sûr, vous pourriez aussi choisir une des positions numérotées entre ces deux. Voici la première affirmation:

1. La méfiance de certains citoyens des officiels et activités gouvernementales est généralement due à leur manque de connaissance de la politique.
2. La corruption politique n'est pas un problème très répandu.
3. La malhonnêteté est plus répandue dans la politique que dans l'industrie.
4. La corruption politique est plus répandue au niveau fédéral du gouvernement qu'au niveau provincial.
5. La corruption politique est plus répandue au niveau provincial du gouvernement qu'au niveau régional.
6. Quoiqu'on fasse, on ne pourra jamais éliminer la corruption politique.
7. La corruption qui existe dans le monde de la politique, ne fait que refléter la moralité du reste de la société.
8. La plupart du vacarme concernant la corruption politique est le résultat d'un phénomène appelé la 'moralité après Watergate'.
9. La police devrait être libérée de restrictions législatives et judiciaires qui sont imposées sur ses procédés d'investigation et d'arrestation.

10. Le Parlement devrait voter pour répartir plus de l'onds a'in d'aider la police et d'autres agences d'application de la loi à s'occuper du crime.

Merci. Nous n'aurons plus besoin de la carte. Maintenant, je vous poserai d'autres sortes de questions.

Récemment, le public a été informé des activités de quelques officiels publics que quelques-uns pourraient considérer comme corrompus, d'autres non. J'aimerais avoir votre avis au sujet de quelques-uns de ces actes.

Nous nous servirons maintenant de cette carte de réponses:

corrompu 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 pas corrompu

a) probablement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 probablement pas.

b) probablement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 probablement pas.

c) certainement oui 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 certainement non

d) A votre avis, quelle sera la fréquence de tels actes dans la Chambre.

Jamais De temps en temps
Une ou deux fois Plus de 20 fois

11. Le chef d'un parti national qui promet la nomination à un poste en échange de contributions à sa campagne électorale.

corrompu 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 pas corrompu

a) La plupart des citoyens condamnerait cette activité

b) La plupart des officiels publics condamnerait cette activité.

c) Si vous aviez des preuves concrètes qu'un membre de votre parti, que vous appuyiez avant, avait participé à cet acte, continueriez-vous à soutenir son élection.

12. Un ministre du Cabinet se servant de son pouvoir pour obtenir un contrat d'armes pour une compagnie dans sa circonscription.

corrompu 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 pas corrompu

a) b) c)

13. Un officier public se servant de fonds publics pour des voyages personnels.

corrompu 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 pas corrompu

a) b) c) d)

14. Un ministre de la Défense qui possède \$50,000 d'actions d'une compagnie, avec laquelle le Ministère de la Défense a un contrat d'un million de dollars.

corrompu 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 pas corrompu

a) b) c)

15. Un officier public se servant de son pouvoir pour faire accepter un ari ou un parent par une école de droit ou de médecine, ou une autre sorte d'institut professionnel.

corrompu 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 pas corrompu

a) b) c) d)

16. La cour de la résidence personnelle du maire est pavée par une équipe d'ouvriers de la ville.

corrompu 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 pas corrompu

a) b)

17. Un membre de l'Assemblée provinciale autorise l'achat d'un terrain qu'il avait récemment acquis, pendant qu'il était le Président d'un comité de chemins publics.

corrompu 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 pas corrompu

a) b) c) d)

18. Un juge qui entend une cause concernant une corporation de laquelle il possède \$50,000 d'actions.

corrompu 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 pas corrompu

a) b)

19. Un législateur qui accepte une grande contribution en échange de soutenir une proposition législative.

corrompu 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 pas corrompu

20. Un député qui possède un grand nombre d'actions de Gul^p (Canada) à peu près \$50,000) qui travaille à changer les provisions de la Politique nationale d'énergie.

corrompu 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 pas corrompu

a) b)

Maintenant, quelques questions généraux concernant la corruption politique:

21. Existence-ils des changements de lois ou de règlements qui puissent réduire la corruption politique, comme la divulgation de salaire ou des règlements plus stricts pour le financement des campagnes électorales, etc. ?

22. Crovez-vous que des conditions ou fonctions existent qui contribuent à la corruption, ou qui ne contribuent ~~surtout~~ pas à la corruption ?

23. Généralement, concernant la politique, comment vous décririez-vous ?

1. Très libéral _____	4. Un peu conservateur _____
2. Un peu libéral _____	5. Très conservateur _____
3. Plutôt modéré _____	6. Autre _____

Comme conclusion, j'aimerais pouvoir avoir quelques renseignements personnels:

24. A quel parti vous affilez-vous :

1. Conservateur _____
2. Libéral _____
3. PND _____
4. Autre _____

25. Quelle est la population de votre circonscription: _____

26. En général, laquelle des descriptions suivantes s'applique à votre circonscription:

1. Entièrement urbaine _____
2. Plutôt urbaine _____
3. Entièrement de banlieue _____
4. Plutôt de banlieue _____
5. Entièrement rurale _____
6. Plutôt rurale _____
7. Un mélange d'urbaine et de rurale _____
8. Un mélange de banlieue et de rurale _____
9. Un mélange d'urbaine et de banlieue _____

27. Jusqu'à quel niveau avez-vous fait vos études à l'école ? _____

(Si le répondant indique qu'il/elle a assisté à l'université, posez question 27a)

(Si le répondant indique qu'il/elle a assisté à une institution autre que l'université, posez la question 27b).

27a. Avez-vous reçu un diplôme ?

1. NON 2. B.A. 3. B.S.C. 4. B.COMM. 5. Autre

27b. Où avez-vous étudié après l'école secondaire ?

1. École technique _____
2. Collège _____
3. Collège des enseignants _____
4. Autre, spécifiez _____

28. Quel âge aviez-vous lors de votre dernier anniversaire ? _____

29. Avez-vous une autre profession à part de député ? _____

Si non, quelle était votre profession antérieure? _____

30. Quelle est votre dénomination religieuse ? _____

(Si le répondant répond à la question, posez 30a.)

30a. Combien de fois allez-vous à votre église (synagogue) ?

1. Souvent, au moins une fois par semaine

2. Une ou deux fois par mois

3. Plusieurs fois par année

4. A peu près une fois par année

5. Jamais

6. Réponse refusée

31. A combien de sessions de l'assemblée avez-vous participé, y incluse la présente ?

31a. Tout inclus, vous participez depuis combien d'années ? _____ ans

32. Approximativement, combien de temps passez-vous à votre circonscription ?

33. Combien, estimez-vous que vous dépensez au bénéfice de votre circonscription, de fonds qui vous sont attribués ? _____

34. Avez-vous jamais participé à un comité législatif ou électoral qui faisait une enquête des allégations de corruption politique ? _____

35. Sexe: Homme _____ Femme _____

36. Nom: _____

Je vous remercie de vos opinions et votre attention.

Si vous avez des opinions concernant la corruption politique auxquelles on n'a pas touché dans le questionnaire, veuillez bien en faire des commentaires.

APPENDIX III

Comparison of Canadian-American Dependent Variables

CANADIAN

1. A national party leader who promises an appointed political position in exchange for campaign contributions.
2. A cabinet minister using his influence to obtain a weapons contract for a firm in his constituency.
3. Public official using public funds for personal travel.
4. A Minister of Defense who owns \$50,000 in stock in a company with which the Defense Dept. has a million dollar contract.
5. A public official using his influence to get a friend or relative admitted to law or medical school, or some other professional institute.
6. The driveway of the mayor's private home being paved by the city work crew.
7. A provincial cabinet minister while chairman of the public roads committee authorizing the purchase of land he had recently acquired.
8. A judge hearing a case concerning a corporation in which he has \$50,000 worth of stock.

AMERICAN

1. A presidential candidate who promises an ambassadorship in exchange for campaign contributions.
2. A congressman using seniority to obtain a weapons contract for a firm in his district.
3. Public official using public funds for personal travel.
4. A Secretary of Defense who owns \$50,000 in stock in a company with which the Defense Dept. has a million dollar contract.
5. A public official using his influence to get a friend or relative admitted to law or school.
6. The driveway of the mayor's private home being paved by the city work crew.
7. A state assemblyman while chairman of the roads committee authorizing the purchase of land he had recently acquired.
8. A judge hearing a case concerning a corporation in which he has \$50,000 worth of stock.

9. A legislator accepting a large campaign contribution in return for supporting a legislative proposal.
9. A legislator accepting a large campaign contribution in return for voting the "right way" on a legislative bill.
10. An MP who holds a large amount of stock in Gulf Canada (about \$50,000 worth) working to change the provisions of the National Energy Policy.
10. A congressman who holds a large amount of stock in Standard Oil of New Jersey, (about \$50,000 worth) working to maintain the oil depletion allowance.

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