Self-Monitors' Coping Strategies in Response to an Identity Threat:

Self-Presentation versus Self-Protection

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Abstract

The self-monitoring personality distinguishes between those who are concerned with presenting a positive self-image (high self-monitors) and those who respond according to their own attitudes and beliefs (low self-monitors). The present study examined differences in the responses of high ($n = 66$) and low ($n = 62$) self-monitors when faced with threatened group identity. In an experimental paradigm, participants were exposed to an external identity threat (their group was positively vs. negatively construed) followed by an internal identity threat (the presence or absence of a dissenting ingroup member), and their collective esteem and self-stereotyping were assessed. A series of MANOVAs indicated that when their group identity was threatened by an external source, low self-monitors perceived more threat in comparison to high self-monitors, but neither demonstrated a loss of collective esteem. However, when the source of threat arose from within the group, low self-monitors expressed lower levels of collective esteem and were more likely to derogate the dissenting ingroup member, whereas high self-monitors were more likely to enhance their own self-depictions. Findings from the present study support the notion that low self-monitors respond in a self-protective manner, whereas high self-monitors use strategies to present a positive self-image.

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Self-Monitors' Coping Strategies in Response to an Identity Threat:

Self-Presentation versus Self-Protection

The well-being of members of stigmatized or devalued social groups may be challenged by various sources. A great deal of research has focused on threats that arise due to the prejudices and discriminatory actions that are expressed by sources external to the group. However, groups can also experience threats that may challenge their sense of group identity and well-being from other members within the group itself. For example, members may experience a sense of threat when the actions of others indicate lack of loyalty or a source of shame (Branscombe, Wann, Noel & Coleman, 1993; Matheson, Cole, & Majka, 2003). These different sources of threat may affect the ways in which group members apprise and cope with a challenge to their identity. Moreover, it seems likely that individual differences among group members exist in terms of the impacts of these threats on their well-being, as well as in their own goals and motivations in responding to such threats. In the present thesis, it was argued that the personality dimension of self-monitoring may play a moderating role in group members' responses to various group-based threats.

Typically, belonging to a socially devalued group is likely to bring about a response from members as they strive to achieve positive self-regard. According to the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1978, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), individuals recognize and identify themselves as members of social groups, and are motivated to derive a positive and distinct identity in relation to their group membership. In order to do so, members of devalued groups may take actions that range from denying the self-applicability of the identity (thereby enhancing personal esteem), or by adopting

cognitive or behavioural strategies to change the status of the group as a whole (Abrams & Hogg, 1988). Group members' choice of action is likely to depend on perceived characteristics of the group's situation, and in particular, whether or not they perceive the group's status as legitimate and stable, and group boundaries as permeable (Ellemers, Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 1993).

However, responses (and indeed, even perceptions of the group's status) may also vary as a function of individual differences, including, for example, group identification (Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998), personal self-esteem (Aberson, Healy & Romero, 2000), and even personality characteristics, such as self-consciousness (Major, Cozzarelli, Testa, & McFarlin, 1988), and self-monitoring styles (Matheson, 2002). While research in the area of intergroup relations has not focused a great deal on the personality characteristics that may affect members' responses to their group status, there is no reason to believe that personality plays any less of a role in this context than in other situations in which individuals' behaviours vary.

One personality characteristic that may be important in affecting responses to a collective identity may be self-monitoring (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000; Snyder, 1974). Self-monitoring combines notions of attentiveness to one's self-concept with an awareness of situational and social factors that may impinge on the self-concept. Without question, people differ considerably in the ways in which they monitor the world around them, and adjust the behaviour they display in various social settings and relationships. For some, it is quite important to be the type of person called for by a given situation. These individuals are considerably more sensitive to situational cues about appropriateness. By contrast, other individuals are much less responsive to situational

cues concerning behavioural appropriateness. Rather, they guide their behaviour on the basis of their own inner sources and personal dispositions. These individual differences are what constitute the high versus low self-monitoring personalities, respectively (Snyder, Gangestad & Simpson, 1983).

When a group's status is viewed positively, and therefore, consistency exists between the self and social cues, the effects of self-monitoring may be irrelevant. However, in such instances where the social group is one that is devalued, this personality characteristic may be important to how group members respond to such a challenge. Because of the differential attention paid to internal versus external cues in low versus high self-monitors, the moderating effect of self-monitoring on group members' responses to a threat to the collective identity may predictably differ. It was therefore the goal of this thesis to explore more fully the implications of self-monitoring personality types in relation to how group members appraise and cope with a group-based threat.

The Self-Monitoring Personality

The personality dimension of self-monitoring has received substantial attention in the last few decades. Self-monitoring refers to a 'variation in the extent to which individuals strategically cultivate public appearances' (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000). The notion of multiple selves seems quite relevant when considering the self-monitoring personality type. More specifically, there may be striking differences between the public appearances and private realities of the self (Snyder, 1980). The strategies and techniques that people use to control the impressions that they convey to others, namely their public appearances, are often referred to as "impression management" techniques.

Some people have the ability to carefully monitor their own performances and to skillfully adjust them when signals from others tell them that they are not having a desired effect. To do so, these *high self-monitoring* individuals seek out information about appropriate patterns of self-presentation (Snyder, 1980) to ensure that they project desired public appearances. In effect, high self-monitors seem to be externally focused, demonstrating high attentiveness to cues that facilitate their ability to maximize a desired self-image within a given situation.

In contrast, *low self-monitors* are considerably more inner-focused, such that their responses reflect their personal attitudes, principals and beliefs, rather than impression management concerns. It is quite possible that these individuals lack either the ability or the motivation to regulate their expressive self-presentations. Instead, their behaviours reflect their own enduring and momentary inner states (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). The behaviour of low self-monitors appears to represent an attempt to convey that they present no false images, that "what you see is what you get". Thus, their motivations may be less related to wanting to convey a positive self-image, and more a function of projecting what they believe to be consistent with their self-concept. Thus, while the high self-monitoring individual seems to be asking the strategic question, "what does the situation want me to be, and how can I be that person? The strategic question for the low self-monitor might be "who am I, and how can I be me in this situation" (Graziano & Bryant, 1998).

Situational responsiveness: What cues they attend to and when. Given the nature of the self-monitoring personality types, it may be that those individuals who engage in high self-monitoring are more sensitive to shifts in cues that convey what constitutes

situationally appropriate performances. As a result, the behaviour of high self-monitors should show greater variation in how they present themselves across situations, in comparison to low self-monitors. However, it is important to consider the potential motives of the high self-monitor, which might, in fact, be highly consistent. For example, Snyder (1980) found that high self-monitoring individuals conformed to the group when it was the most appropriate behaviour, but did not conform when they knew that the norms of a larger audience would deem the behaviour inappropriate. Thus, variations in self-presentation are not designed to simply achieve approval from those in the immediate context. Rather, the behaviour of the high self-monitor appears to involve strategically cultivating an image that maximizes self-gain at the broadest possible level. Low self-monitors, on the other hand, were not sensitive in differentiating the expectations of various audiences, but may instead responded in the same manner across situations, presumably conveying their true core selves.

A focus on the cross-situational motives of high self-monitors may be particularly important in a group-based context. Specifically, Snyder and Cantor (1980) noted that while low self-monitoring individuals were more knowledgeable about their characteristic selves in particular trait domains, high self-monitoring individuals were more skilled at constructing informative images of individuals who were prototypic examples of a variety of trait domains. Specifically, these individuals demonstrated richer, more vivid descriptions of the types of people who best fit particular trait dimensions, in comparison to low self-monitors. These prototype images may prove useful in their efforts to tailor their self-presentations to maximize their status within a group. Indeed, group members who are viewed as similar to the prototype traits and

norms fostered by a given group are more positively evaluated by other group members than those who are dissimilar to the prototype (Hogg & Hains, 1996, 1998). In contrast, dissimilarity from the group prototype may result in being rejected by other group members (Branscombe et al., 1993; Hogg & Hardie, 1991; Hogg, Hardie, & Reynolds, 1995; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988; Matheson et al., 2003). Thus, familiarity and conformity to group-based norms can serve a strategic function that is consistent with the motives of the high self-monitor, in that it may render them valued within the group. Though the underlying motives may differ, to the extent that group membership shapes the individual's identity, low self-monitors may appear similar to the high self-monitor in the group context, particularly if the group is one that they strongly identify with. Differentiation between high and low self-monitors in this context might only become evident when the identity of the group is threatened.

While low self-monitors are typically viewed as driven by internal cues, under some circumstances they are responsive to social cues, depending on its implications for their self-concept. Although high self-monitors have been found to be more responsive to information that was complementary to the self, low self-monitors were more sensitive to information that was potentially self-threatening (Krosnick & Sedikides, 1990). In this study, participants were given consensus information that was either flattering or threatening to their self-image and were asked to predict their own behaviour in experimental situations. High self-monitors were found to be more influenced by consensus information that was perceived to help them construct a positive self-image than were low self-monitors. Low self-monitors, on the other hand, were more sensitive

to consensus information when the information was threatening to their self-image. Thus, it was suggested that the low self-monitor may be more motivated by self-protective needs than self-presentation.

As noted earlier, the self-presentational motives of the high self-monitor may be tied to personal gain, but such gains may not always be sought through means that appear to be individualistic. In line with this, it has been argued that even the nature of friendship may be considerably different for high versus low self-monitors (Snyder et al., 1983). High self-monitors seem to choose friends based on particular skills, expertise, or specializations in various activity domains. In contrast, low self-monitors prefer to be friends with those people who share similar personalities, likes and dislikes. These low self-monitoring individuals presumably enjoy the company of those who allow them to be themselves and display their own attitudes, traits and dispositions. Thus, it was argued that the friendships of high self-monitors are relatively activity-based, and the friendships of low self-monitors are more affect-based (Snyder et al., 1983). This raises the possibility that high self-monitors may be more instrumental in their interpersonal relations, evaluating others in terms of their potential utility to provide alternative perspectives, abilities, and skills. This, combined with their differential motives with respect to self-presentation and protection, may have implications for how they regard other members of their group, particularly when they encounter a challenge or threat to the group and are seeking an appropriate response.

The Intergroup Context: Responding to an Identity Threat

As noted earlier, awareness of the personal relevance of membership in a devalued social group is often not a positive experience, and can have negative

implications for the individual (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Nonetheless, individual differences among group members are evident in terms of their perceptual and behavioural responses to their identity (Crosby, 1982; Dion & Earn, 1975; Foster & Matheson, 1998; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002; Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam, & Lalonde, 1990; Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990). When a group's identity is threatened, in an attempt to re-establish their identity as positive, group members' may respond by dissociating themselves from the group and denying any personal relevance (Major & Schmader, 1998). In doing so, they set themselves apart from fellow ingroup members and avoid being categorized according to their group membership. This response facilitates ingroup comparisons that may be more likely to result in a positive outcome for the self relative to other group members. While this maintains a positive personal identity, it does not facilitate a positive image of the ingroup as a whole (Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998). Another strategy that is commonly implemented by disadvantaged group members is the use of 'social creativity', or selective self-stereotyping. This tactic involves highlighting ingroup superiority on attributes that positively represent the group, and downplaying the importance of characteristics on which the outgroup excels (Hunter, Platow, Bell, & Kypri, 1997). This strategy allows members to view their group as distinctly positive, hence, increasing collective esteem (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990).

One variable that seems to influence responses to belonging to a devalued group is the degree of identification with the ingroup (Brown, 2000; Major, Quinton & McCoy, 2002; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002). Highly identified group members tend to employ group-level strategies (e.g., try to change the status of the group as a whole) when faced with a threat to their group identity, whereas those who have low levels of identification

with the group tend to employ individualistic strategies (e.g., by disengaging from the group, attempting individual social mobility). Low identifiers may be relatively opportunistic, in that they might temporarily align themselves with the group when it serves their personal interests, but distance themselves when it serves their individual purposes (Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998). Such individualistic strategies may facilitate the ability to maintain a positive personal identity and protect one's self-esteem. By perceiving themselves as independent and possessing valuable personal qualities, rather than as prototypical members of a disadvantaged social group, a positive personal image can be conveyed. Conversely, those who have high levels of identification with the group are unlikely to dissociate themselves from the rest of the group when a group-based threat is experienced. These individuals prefer to collectively pursue social change, rather than individual mobility (Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998).

The black sheep effect. While a considerable amount of research on threats to a group identity focus on external threats, such as discrimination, outgroup biases, group derogation, and so on, groups might also be threatened by internal intragroup dynamics. Not only do groups attempt to maintain a positive social identity, but they also strive to appear distinctly different from the outgroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As a result, pressures to conform to a common group norm or prototype surface. Indeed, when group members are not similar to the prototype, they are often rejected, presumably because they threaten the group's distinctiveness (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2001). This phenomenon is known as the "black sheep effect". According to Marques et al. (1988) the black sheep effect involves the joint occurrence of ingroup bias toward those who fit the group prototype and ingroup derogation of members who do not. In several studies

conducted by Marques and Yzerbyt (1988) it was demonstrated that ingroup members were judged more extremely than similar outgroup members who did not fit the ingroup norm. Presumably, downgrading the negative ingroup member (the black sheep) may be a way of protecting the legitimacy of the group as a whole. As such, the black sheep is no longer perceived to be a genuine ingroup member, and hence, the image of the rest of the group can remain relatively in tact (Coull, Yzerbyt, Castano, Paladino, & Leemans, 2001).

As previously mentioned, the level of identification with the group influences the need to achieve positive group distinctiveness (Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998). Similarly, according to Branscombe et al. (1993) the degree of identification with the ingroup determines whether the black sheep effect is observed. These authors demonstrated that only high identifiers showed ingroup extremity, and this response was greater when the group itself was threatened. In other words, among those who value their group membership, a disloyal ingroup member represents a threat to their identity and must be rejected to protect the value of that social identity (Branscombe et al., 1993; Matheson et al., 2003).

The Present Study

As noted earlier, within the intergroup context, the self-monitoring personality type may prove to be particularly interesting. Due to the differential attention paid to external versus internal cues in high versus low self-monitors, systematic differences may surface in how these individuals respond to a threat to their collective identity. More specifically, one might expect that low self-monitors would be unresponsive to social cues, maintaining their collective esteem even under threat. In contrast, high self-monitors

may be more sensitive to situational factors that provide them with information about their relative status, and hence, may be more likely to adopt strategies that maximize their ability to present a positive self-image. Indeed, as noted earlier, high self-monitors seek to project images that bring about positive social outcomes. In a group-based context wherein the group is positively regarded, they might respond in a self-serving fashion by attempting to enhance their personal image by describing themselves in terms of the prototypical group characteristics, thereby gaining approval from other members of the group. Low self-monitors may appear quite similar in this context, as the groups they belong to, likely are a reflection of characteristics that they themselves have.

However, what happens when this group is threatened? In this instance, to the extent that the high self-monitor is self-serving, and the ingroup is no longer serving their best interests, they might be expected to respond in a manner similar to that noted by low identifiers, that is, by disengaging from the group in order to enhance their personal image, possibly at the expense of other group members. In addition, because high self-monitors are concerned about self-relevant positive outcomes, they may be most responsive to a threat that comes from outside the group.

On the other hand, low self-monitors may respond in a more self-protective manner. Because group membership constitutes a dimension of their own identity, instead of disengaging from the group, low self-monitors may derive their self-worth by fortifying perceptions that their group is, in fact, positively distinct, albeit perhaps on different characteristics than are being threatened. Thus, while high self-monitors may be motivated to present a positive personal image, low self-monitors may be motivated to protect the group image when it is threatened. Moreover, because the group comprises an

intrinsic component of low self-monitors' identity, they were expected to be more responsive to a threat that undermines their understanding of that identity. Such confusion is particularly likely to occur when an ingroup member challenges the groups' distinctive meaning by conveying an image that is contrary to the rest of the group (Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Henson, 2000; Hogg, 1996).

The goal of this study was to examine the differences between high and low self-monitors in terms of how they respond when faced with a threatened group identity. It should be noted that although self-monitoring has been conceptualized as a dichotomy in the present study, this has been an issue of some debate. More specifically, some discussion has been raised in the self-monitoring literature about whether scores reflect a continuum, such that the higher the score, the greater the propensity toward high self-monitoring behaviour, or whether they reflect a typology, such that individuals above or below the cutoff score are simply high or low self-monitors, respectively (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). For the purpose of this study, Snyder and Gangestad's (1986) typological model of self-monitoring was followed conceptually and operationally. Only those individuals who were at least 3 points away from the cutoff were included to maximize the likelihood that we were comparing the "truly high" and "truly low" self-monitors' responses to a threatened group identity.

In this study, a group identity that was common to both high and low self-monitors was made salient and challenged externally and internally. The group identity was one that was typically negatively stereotyped, but nonetheless chosen by participants, namely their post-secondary institutional affiliation with Carleton University. This particular institution traditionally was accessible to members of the working community

who were seeking opportunities to upgrade qualifications, as well as to underachieving students who were often given a chance despite previous poor academic performance (hence, the label "last chance U"). This history often made the institution the target of negative stereotypes.

In the experimental context, this identity was made salient to participants. The identity was then described in the context of a videotaped interview with a researcher from a competing institution who conveyed a set of findings that either construed the meaning of being at Carleton University positively (providing external affirmation of the identity), or negatively (thereby creating an external threat to the identity). A task that then allowed for the creation of an internal group threat was then created. In this instance, participants role-played jury members deliberating on a trial, and their ability to derive a fair consensual decision was allegedly being assessed. An internal group threat was created, by having a confederate who represented an ingroup member, who either conformed to the position of the group (no internal threat), or dissented with the opinions of the other group members (internal threat). The effects of these threats on the collective esteem of high and low self-monitors was assessed, along with their self-stereotyping perceptions of themselves as individuals, their jury group, and the confederate.

It was hypothesized that

- 1) there would be an interaction between self-monitoring style and whether an identity threat from an external source was present on collective esteem. When threatened by an external source, high self-monitors would be more threatened, and hence would express lower levels of collective esteem (disengagement) than when the identity was not threatened. In contrast, low self-monitors may be more

likely to attempt to protect the groups' image by viewing it as more positive in the face of threat, and hence would express higher levels of collective esteem.

- 2) Self-monitoring would interact with an internal identity threat to affect collective esteem and self-stereotyping. Low self-monitors were expected to experience this as more threatening than high self-monitors, and hence, it would represent a greater challenge to their collective esteem than that of high self-monitors. To protect the group's identity, it was expected that low self-monitors would rate the dissenter more negatively than would high self-monitors. Under these conditions, high self-monitors, would maintain esteem not so much by denigrating the deviate group member as by expressing more polarized positive self-ratings.

Method

Participants

Participants ($N = 128$) were recruited from Introductory Psychology at Carleton University to take part in a study on personality and jury deliberations (see Appendix A for telephone contact). They were contacted if they completed a pre-measure of the 18-item version of the self-monitoring inventory (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) during a mass-testing session (see Appendix A for phone recruitment). To maximize identification with the group as well as the expression of individual differences, only those who were at least 3 points above (high self-monitors, $n = 66$) or below (low self-monitors, $n = 62$) the self-monitoring cutoff score of 9 (scores could range from 0 to 18) participated. Due to the persistent difficulty of recruiting low self-monitoring males, this criterion was adjusted to include those who obtained a score of seven ($n = 2$). Participants were run in small group

sessions (35 sessions with 2-5 people, plus the confederate) that included both men ($n = 61$) and women ($n = 67$) (M age = 19.8, $SD = 3.1$).

Procedure

Each group of participants was randomly assigned to an experimental condition in a 2 (presence or absence of an external threat to the group identity) $\times$ 2 (presence or absence of internal threat to the group identity) design, while maintaining roughly equal numbers of women and men in each condition. Upon arrival, participants were told that the study concerned people's abilities in jury deliberations. This cover story was used in order to provide a compelling and realistic context in which participants were able to demonstrate differences in their reactions. Participants were told that in the last few years, there had been an interest in whether students from different universities had the fundamental skills needed to perform basic citizenship functions, such as jury decision-making. As a result, we were assessing the skills of students in this context. Following a brief description of the tasks involved in the study, participants completed the informed consent (see Appendix B).

Participants' identity as a 'Carleton University student' was then threatened or affirmed from an external source. We used this identity as the basis for the identity threat because we have conducted a substantial number of projects in which we have found this manipulation to be effective. Participants were exposed to a videotaped interview lasting approximately 5 minutes in which a researcher either negatively (threat) or positively (affirmation) depicted how Carleton students were viewed by others (see Appendix C for script). More specifically, in the *threat condition*, students were told that because average admission grades were low, many students were unable to complete their degrees

because they were “less competent, smart, and less hardworking than students who were able to go to other universities.” Also, good students would get scholarships to go elsewhere, while many students at Carleton University worked part-time to afford their education, meaning “that many Carleton students have higher priorities than their studies, and so they are perceived as not very serious... [and] lacking in intellectual collegiality, challenge and stimulation”. Finally, they were told that due to limited resources, “Carleton students are perceived to be ill-prepared... [and] unfamiliar with cutting edge technologies and techniques. As a result, Carleton students are viewed as needing more on the job training, and to be lacking in innovative ideas and skills”.

The *affirmation condition* described the same dimensions, but participants were given a positive interpretation. In particular, although they are again told that a student’s grades might not be as high at admission, “Carleton University gives a student the opportunity to do well at university to acquire a degree”. As a result, “Carleton students are viewed as resilient, committed, and hard-working, because they have to do well to prove themselves”. With regard to funding and part-time work, the affirmation condition emphasized “a flexible scheduling system that allows many students to attend... This in itself contributes to the diversity of students and therefore ideas and experiences students get at Carleton. It also means that Carleton students have to be extremely committed and serious about their studies”. Finally, the limited resources were also spun to students’ advantage, in that “students are trained to be resourceful... [and] well-prepared to work with the constrained resources of many small organizations and institutions”. After this, participants completed a short questionnaire assessing their appraisal and reactions to the interview, and their identity as Carleton University students.

Participants were told that because of the results of this interview, we decided to do a study to look at various skills of Carleton University students, and in particular, the decision-making and coordination skills that are needed in situations, such as jury decision-making. Participants were therefore asked to watch a 25-minute video of the highlights of a simulated murder trial (see Appendix D for trial transcript). Following the video, participants were asked to deliberate to make a decision about the guilt or innocence of the defendant (see Appendix E). This group interaction was meant to create the basis for experience with ingroup dissension (internal identity threat). While the video was strongly oriented to the majority of viewers agreeing that the defendant should be found not guilty, an ingroup confederate (see Appendix F for script) either insisted that he should be found guilty (dissension), or concurred that the defendant was not guilty (consensus). It should be noted that based on a pilot study, the majority of participants believed that the defendant should be found not guilty, agreeing that the videotaped trial was biased, in that all the evidence was circumstantial and reasonable doubt concerning the defendant's guilt was strongly evident. It was therefore, relatively easy to set up the confederate's position in advance. Following the jury deliberations, a final questionnaire assessed participants' personal opinions, perceptions of themselves and the other group members (including the confederate), and they again completed a measure of collective esteem.

Finally, participants were debriefed (see Appendix G). This involved describing the goals of the study, as well as providing them with an explicit positive reconstrual of Carleton students, along with a description of Carleton's strong points based on a MacLean's survey that we have used in past research to overcome any remaining

negative perceptions (see Appendix H). We then asked them to provide a brief write-up describing the positive benefits to being a student from Carleton (see Appendix I). They were then given a second informed consent to complete (based on their knowledge of the true purpose of the study) (see Appendix J) and their experimental credits, a list of contact names (see Appendix K), and a brief article describing the self-monitoring personality type (Snyder, 1980).

Measures

All measures used in this study can be found in Appendix L

Self-monitoring (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). In order to measure self-monitoring, an 18-item version of the scale was used. Participants were presented with a number of different situations and asked to consider whether or not each statement was true or false when applied to the self. This 18-item scale was found to have an acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach's α) of .87. The cutoff for low vs. high self-monitors is a summed score of 9 (Snyder, 1974).

Manipulation checks. To ensure that the manipulations of the affirming versus threatening identity construal were regarded as equally credible, participants rated along 7-point bipolar scales (from 1 to 7), a series of characteristics concerning their beliefs about the "research conducted on Carleton University students". These characteristics included scientific/unscientific, ethical/unethical, truthful/deceptive, accurate/inaccurate, and believable/unbelievable.

Participants also rated their perceptions of the identity construal according to five statements, using rating scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). Average responses were taken for two items assessing perceived threat, including "How pervasive

do you think negative beliefs about Carleton University students are?" and "How difficult do you think it will be to get a job given the research on Carleton University students?" ($r = .33$). In addition, perceived control was assessed using two items, namely "How confident are you that you'll actually overcome any concerns and negative perceptions?" and "How much control do you think you have to overcome any negative views of Carleton University students?" ($r = .37$). Finally, perceived importance was assessed using one item, "How important is it to you to get a job?" Perceptions of threat and control were negatively correlated with each other ($r = -.29, p < .01$). However, appraisal of importance was not significantly correlated with the other two appraisals ($r_s = -.05$, and $.05$, respectively).

To examine whether the manipulation of unanimity versus dissension affected confidence in the personal opinions of the participants, three statements were assessed using rating scales that ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (definitely). These statements included "To what extent do you personally believe that the defendant was guilty?" "How convinced are you that your own opinion is correct?" and "How confident are you that the jury returned the correct verdict?"

Collective esteem. Luhtanen and Crocker's (1992) 21-item measure of collective self-esteem was modified to refer to students' university affiliation, and included an additional dimension that assessed perceived self-typicality. Response ratings ranged from -3 (strongly disagree) to 3 (strongly agree), such that higher scores reflected more positive collective self-esteem. The questionnaire consisted of 5 subscales measuring private collective esteem (e.g., "I feel good about the university that I belong to"), public collective esteem (e.g., "Carleton students are considered good by others"), membership

collective esteem (e.g., I am a worthy Carleton University student”), centrality (e.g., “Being a Carleton University student is an important reflection of who I am”), and an additional dimension we created and labelled ‘typicality’ (e.g., “I am similar to other students from Carleton”). Collective esteem was measured following the external identity threat, and again following the group discussion in which the internal threat to the group identity was conveyed. In both instances, these subscales yielded acceptable alpha coefficients (see Table1).

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics (Mean (*SD*)) and Internal (Cronbach’s α s) Reliabilities for the Collective Esteem Subscales Both Following the External Identity Threat (Time 1), and Following the Internal Identity Threat (Time 2).

Subscale	Time 1			Time 2		
	<i>M (SD)</i>	α	<i>n of items</i>	<i>M (SD)</i>	α	<i>n of items</i>
Private	1.98 (0.96)	.81	4	1.92 (0.99)	.82	4
Public	0.50 (1.17)	.82	4	0.59 (1.09)	.75	4
Membership	1.97 (0.79)	.64	4	2.02 (0.75)	.68	4
Centrality	-0.30 (1.41)	.78	4	-0.22 (1.36)	.74	4
Typicality	0.99 (1.24)	.87	5	1.22 (1.17)	.91	5

Self-stereotyping. Using a 20-item scale, participants indicated the extent to which they themselves had each attribute (e.g., intelligent, likeable). They were required to place an X in the space corresponding to the number that best represented them. This scale ranged from 0 (not at all descriptive) to 100 (extremely descriptive). Self- ratings

were subjected to a principal components analysis with a varimax rotation. Based on a scree plot, four factors emerged, explaining 60.7% of the total variance. Factor scores were created by unit weighting and averaging items with loadings greater than .45; where an item loaded on more than one component, it was assigned to the factor that was most conceptually relevant. The first factor comprised of 6 traits reflecting perceptions of sociability (including fun to be with, adaptable, easy-going, likable, social, and interesting to talk to). The second factor comprised of 4 traits reflecting perceptions of competence (competence, resourceful, innovative, and skilled). The third factor comprised of 5 traits reflecting motivated (hard working, serious, driven to get things done, committed to work, and responsible). Finally, the fourth factor composed of five traits, all of which were negative characteristics reflecting laziness (lazy, not interested in learning, closed-minded, ill-prepared to work and unmotivated). As seen in Table 2, these subscale scores demonstrated adequate internal reliabilities.

Stereotypes of jury group members. Using the same 20-item scale as above, participants rated each member of their group, including the confederate. Each group member was identified with a letter (placed on the table in front of each of them), and the participant used this letter to locate each group member on the 0-100 rating scale. Responses were averaged across the ratings for the group members (excluding ratings of the confederate) on each item, and then scored in terms of the same four factors used to assess self-ratings to provide average ratings for the group. Scores on these four factors were also computed for perceptions of the confederate. Once again, as seen in Table 2, these subscale scores demonstrated adequate internal reliabilities.

Table 2

Descriptive Statistics (Mean (*SD*)) and Internal (Cronbach's α) Reliabilities for the Stereotyping Subscales for the Jury Group as a Whole and for the Confederate.

Subscale	<i>M (SD)</i>	α	<i>n</i> of items
Self- Stereotyping			
Competence	74.35 (10.60)	.79	4
Sociability	76.55 (11.16)	.85	6
Motivated	74.25 (11.83)	.81	5
Lazy	29.13 (16.49)	.73	5
Group- Stereotyping			
Competence	64.83 (13.09)	.87	4
Sociability	63.48 (13.24)	.91	6
Motivated	66.31 (12.20)	.86	5
Lazy	33.01 (15.29)	.76	5
Confederate- Stereotyping			
Competence	66.25 (16.30)	.84	4
Sociability	62.56 (19.50)	.90	6
Motivated	70.27 (14.01)	.70	5
Lazy	31.02 (17.65)	.71	5

Results

To assess the effects of an identity threat on group members' perceptions of the threat, esteem, and self-stereotyping, and whether these effects were moderated by self-

monitoring type, multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) were conducted. When the multivariate effect was significant, univariate results were examined, and where appropriate, follow-up analyses pursued. For multiple comparisons, familywise error was maintained at $p < .05$ using Bonferroni-corrections. Repeated measures (target of stereotype ratings) that violated the assumption of sphericity were evaluated using the Huynh-Feldt correction of criterion degrees of freedom. Measures that were taken following the group interaction (e.g., following the internal threat to the group) no longer met the assumption of independence of responses. Analyses were initially conducted with the group (experimental session) as the nesting variable (with external and internal threat conditions nested within experimental session). In those instances where it was found to be not significant, variance due to the experimental session was pooled with the total error term (Keppel, 1991). All remaining analyses involving measures taken after the group interaction were conducted assuming a nested design.

In order to evaluate whether any sex differences were evident in the dependent variables used in this study, independent sample t-tests were conducted. No significant sex differences were found, with the exception of self-ratings on both competence, $t(125) = 1.94, p < .05$ and motivation, $t(125) = -2.215, p < .05$. Consistent with past stereotype research, male participants tended to rate themselves higher on competence ($M = 76.23, SD = 10.80$) than did female participants ($M = 72.61, SD = 10.19$), whereas female participants ($M = 76.45, SD = 10.69$) rated themselves as more motivated than did male participants ($M = 71.87, SD = 12.62$). Given that gender was balanced across experimental conditions, it was not controlled for in subsequent analyses.

Manipulation Checks

To ensure that the external identity threat were viewed as credible in both the affirmation and threat conditions, a MANOVA comparing the two groups was conducted on the five manipulation check items. Comparisons between the affirmation and threat conditions revealed significant differences, Pillais = .321; $F(5,121) = 11.45$, $p < .001$ (see Table 3). Specifically, when the identity was negatively construed, it was perceived as less credible in all instances. It may be that participants' evaluations of the credibility of the construals were biased by their motivation to preserve a positive identity.

Table 3

Descriptive Statistics (Mean (*SD*)) on Manipulation Checks.

Manipulation	External identity construal		<i>F</i>
	Affirmation	Threat	
Unscientific	3.93 (1.36)	4.64 (1.48)	7.66*
Unethical	2.28 (1.02)	3.88 (1.41)	53.04**
Deceptive	2.87 (1.24)	4.11 (1.62)	23.04**
Inaccurate	2.97 (1.26)	4.02 (1.46)	18.52**
Unbelievable	2.75 (1.36)	3.70 (1.48)	13.91**

* $p < .01$; ** $p < .001$

Appraisals of an external identity threat. To investigate the differential perceptions of the identity construal of high versus low self-monitors, a 2 (external construal of the group: affirmation vs. threat) $\times$ 2 (self-monitoring type: high vs. low) MANOVA was

conducted on perceived threat, control and importance of the identity. Neither the main effect for identity construal (Pillais = .056; $F(3, 122) = 2.42, p = .07$) or self-monitoring (Pillais = .039; $F(3, 122) = 1.64, ns$) was significant. However, the 2-way interaction of construal by self-monitoring type was significant (Pillais = .069; $F(3, 122) = 3.01, p < .05$).

The simple effects of construal on the perceptions of each low and high self-monitors were examined. The external identity threat significantly affected the perceptions of low self-monitors (Pillais = .197; $F(3, 58) = 4.74, p < .01$), but not high self-monitors (Pillais = .041; $F < 1$). As seen in Table 4, univariate analyses revealed that when faced with an external identity threat, low self-monitors were significantly more likely to appraise the situation as threatening, $F(1, 124) = 4.36, p < .05$. They did not differentially evaluate the controllability, or the importance of the identity. Thus, it appears that low self-monitors were more sensitive to threat cues, suggesting that there might be some motivational bias in how participants perceived the external identity threat.

Self-confidence following an internal identity threat. It was expected that an internal identity threat would result to feelings of uncertainty, in regard to both personal opinions, and concerning the group's decision. A 2 (external construal of the group: affirmed vs. threatened) $\times$ 2 (internal identity threat: unanimity vs. dissension) $\times$ 2 (self-monitoring type: high vs. low) MANOVA was conducted on the three questions assessing participants' views of the defendant's guilt (personal opinions). For these measures, experimental session was a significant nesting variable, and so was removed from the error variance. The main effect of the internal identity threat was significant (Pillais =

.362; $F(3, 87) = 16.46, p < .001$). Univariate effects indicated that when dissension from an ingroup member was present, ratings of 'guilty' were higher ($M = 2.84, SD = 1.66$) than when unanimity occurred ($M = 2.25, SD = 1.32$), $F(1, 89) = 6.54, p < .01$, keeping in mind that the dominant response of the group was one of 'not guilty'. Also, when dissension was present their confidence in their own opinion tended to be lower ($M = 5.62, SD = 1.20$) than when the group was unanimous ($M = 5.98, SD = 1.18$), $F(1, 89) = 2.99, p = .087$. Finally, confidence in the groups' decision regarding the verdict was lower under conditions of dissension ($M = 4.02, SD = 1.70$) than unanimity ($M = 5.91, SD = 1.29$), $F(1, 89) = 44.67, p < .001$. Taken together, these data suggest that the presence of dissension from an ingroup member evoked uncertainty in the participants' own position. Given that there were no further significant effects, this uncertainty was not qualified by the presence of an external threat or self-monitoring style.

Collective Esteem Following an External Identity Threat

In order to assess the effects of an external identity threat on the collective self-esteem of high versus low self-monitors, a 2 (external construal of the group) $\times$ 2 (self-monitoring type) MANOVA was conducted on private, public, membership, centrality and typicality subscales. Although self-monitoring was not significantly related to self-esteem levels following the identity threat (Pillais = .029; $F < 1$), there was a marginal effect of the identity construal (Pillais = .076; $F(5, 120) = 1.97, p = .09$). Specifically, univariate effects suggested that when the identity was affirmed ($M = 2.16, SD = 0.66$), participants reported higher membership esteem than when the identity was threatened ($M = 1.79, SD = 0.86$), $F(1, 124) = 7.56, p < .05$. The effect of external threat was not moderated by self-monitoring type (Pillais = .030; $F < 1$).

Table 4

Descriptive Statistics (Mean (*SD*)) on Stressor Appraisals for High vs. Low Self-Monitors.

	External identity construal				
	Affirmation	<i>n</i>	Threat	<i>n</i>	<i>F</i>
Low Self-Monitors		30		32	
Threat	3.38 (0.69)		3.92 (1.15)		4.36*
Control	4.62 (1.10)		5.16 (0.94)		3.53
Importance	6.63 (0.49)		6.31 (1.38)		1.42
High Self-Monitors		31		35	
Threat	3.37 (1.05)		3.34 (1.08)		0.01
Control	5.39 (0.99)		5.14 (1.40)		0.77
Importance	6.77 (0.43)		6.37 (1.42)		2.37

* $p < .05$ *Collective Esteem and an Internal Identity Threat*

The collective self-esteem of high versus low self-monitors was further examined following an internal identity threat using a 2 (internal identity threat) $\times$ 2 (self-monitoring type) MANOVA. Neither the main effect for self-monitoring type (Pillais = .035; $F < 1$) or internal threat (Pillais = .042; $F(5, 116) = 1.01$, *ns*) was significant. However, as predicted, the 2-way interaction between self-monitoring type and internal threat was significant (Pillais = .134; $F(5, 116) = 3.58$, $p < .01$).

Simple effects analyses of the effects of the internal threat on collective self-esteem for each of high and low self-monitors were conducted. As expected, the presence or absence of an internal threat affected the collective esteem of low self-

monitors (Pillais = .243; $F(5, 55) = 3.54, p < .01$), but not that of high self-monitors (Pillais = .112; $F(5, 57) = 1.44, ns$). As seen in Table 5, univariate analyses revealed that when there was dissension in the ingroup, low self-monitors demonstrated lower levels of public collective self-esteem, and typicality, than when there was unanimity, although private collective self-esteem, membership collective self-esteem, and centrality were unaffected, $F_s < 1$.

Self-stereotyping

Ratings of competence. The differential ratings of competence were assessed using, a 2 (external construal of the group) $\times$ 2 (internal identity threat) $\times$ 2 (self-monitoring type) $\times$ 3 (target rating: self, dissenter, average of remaining group members: within subjects) mixed model ANOVA with external and internal identity threat nested within experimental session. The main effect of target, $F(2, 176) = 27.68, p < .001, \eta^2 = .239$ was significant. However, this effect was qualified by a significant 2-way interaction between target and internal identity threat, $F(2, 176) = 3.82, p < .05, \eta^2 = .042$, which was further qualified by a significant 3-way interaction between target, self-monitoring type and internal identity threat, $F(2, 176) = 4.07, p < .05, \eta^2 = .044$.

The simple interactions of ratings of competence for each of the target members, when an internal identity threat was present or not, were assessed for each of high and low self-monitors (see Figure 1). These analyses indicated a simple main effect of target for both low, $F(2, 176) = 8.10, p < .01, \eta^2 = .250$, and high self-monitors, $F(2, 176) = 22.88, p < .001, \eta^2 = .392$. However, ratings of competence varied under conditions of dissent for low self-monitors, $F(2, 176) = 9.81, p < .01$, but not for high self-monitors ($F < 1$). Multiple comparisons for high self-monitors revealed that ratings of competence for

the self ($M = 74.35$, $SD = 10.65$) were significantly higher than those given to both the confederate ($M = 66.25$, $SD = 16.31$) and the other group members ($M = 64.83$, $SD = 13.09$) ($p < .001$). However, no difference was found between ratings of the other group members and the confederate.

For low self-monitors, not surprisingly, ratings of competence for the self and the other group members did not vary as a function of an internal identity threat; however, ratings of the confederate did, $F(1, 176) = 37.14$, $p < .001$. More specifically, as seen in Figure 1 (bottom), the confederate who dissented was rated as least competent by low self-monitors.

Ratings of sociability. A mixed measures ANOVA (with external and internal threat nested within experimental session) indicated that the main effects of target, $F(2, 176) = 50.71$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .366$, and the presence or absence of an internal identity threat, $F(1, 88) = 11.70$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .117$, significantly affected ratings of sociability. However, these effects were qualified by significant 2-way interactions between target and internal identity threat, $F(2, 176) = 9.09$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .094$, and between target and self-monitoring type, $F(2, 176) = 4.97$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .053$.

The simple effects of internal threat on ratings of sociability for each of the target members indicated that ratings of sociability for the self and the other group members did not vary as a function of internal threat, however, ratings of sociability for the confederate did, $F(1, 176) = 43.28$, $p < .001$. As seen in Figure 2, ratings for the confederate were considerably lower under conditions of dissension.

Simple effects analyses of high and low self-monitors' ratings of sociability for each of the target members showed that, as seen in Figure 3, low self-monitors rated the

self lower than did high self-monitors $F(1,176) = 6.64, p < .017$. No differences were found between high and low self-monitors on ratings of the group or the confederate.

Table 5

Descriptive Statistics (Mean (*SD*)) on Collective Self-Esteem for High vs. Low Self-Monitors.

	Internal identity construal		
	Ingroup unanimous	Ingroup dissension	<i>F</i>
Low Self-Monitors			
Private	2.02 (0.87)	1.88 (1.05)	0.303
Public	0.93 (0.82)	0.12 (1.11)	8.94**
Membership	1.99 (0.83)	1.94 (0.91)	0.068
Centrality	-0.23 (1.26)	-0.53 (1.53)	0.74
Typicality	1.61 (0.10)	0.89 (1.06)	6.40*
High Self-Monitors			
Private	1.86 (1.03)	1.91 (1.04)	0.04
Public	0.63 (1.22)	0.68 (1.05)	0.04
Membership	2.02 (0.63)	2.13 (0.63)	0.37
Centrality	-0.19 (1.34)	0.07 (1.31)	0.56
Typicality	0.79 (1.39)	1.58 (0.99)	7.77**

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Figure 1. Mean ratings ($\pm SE$) of the perceived competence of target members under conditions of unanimity and dissension as a function of self-monitoring type.

Figure 2. Mean ratings ($\pm SE$) of perceived sociability of target members under conditions of unanimity and dissension.

Figure 3. Mean ratings ($\pm SE$) of perceived sociability of target members as a function of self-monitoring type.

Ratings of laziness. Once again, the main effects of target, $F(2, 236) = 4.88, p < .01, \eta^2 = .040$, and the presence or absence of an internal identity threat, $F(1, 118) = 7.25, p < .01, \eta^2 = .058$ were significant, and these effects were qualified by significant 2-way interactions between target and internal identity threat, $F(2, 236) = 10.12, p < .001, \eta^2 = .079$, and between target and self-monitoring type, $F(2, 236) = 4.21, p < .05, \eta^2 = .034$.

The simple effects of the internal threat on ratings of laziness revealed that ratings of laziness varied as a function of internal threat for both the confederate, $F(1, 236) = 51.59, p < .001$ and the other group members, $F(1, 236) = 9.81, p < .017$. As seen in Figure 4, when dissension from an ingroup member was present, ratings of laziness for

the dissenter and the group were much higher than when the group was unanimous.

Under these conditions, the confederate was rated the least negatively (i.e. Least lazy).

Despite the significant interaction, simple effects analyses of high and low self-monitors' ratings of laziness for each of the target members were not found vary significantly as a function of self-monitoring type (see Figure 5). However, it appears that the main effect for target, whereby the self was perceived as least lazy, may hold only for high self-monitors.

Ratings of motivation. Finally, only the main effects of target, $F(2, 236) = 20.52$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .148$, and self-monitoring type, $F(1, 118) = 4.56$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .037$ were significant in their effects on ratings of motivation. Multiple comparisons indicated that ratings of motivation for the self ($M = 74.28$, $SD = 11.88$) were significantly higher than those given to the other group members ($M = 66.41$, $SD = 12.20$) and the confederate ($M = 70.34$, $SD = 14.01$) ($p < .001$), the latter of whom was also perceived as more motivated than the remaining group members ($p < .001$). In addition, low self-monitors rated themselves as more motivated ($M = 72.23$, $SD = 9.85$) than did high self-monitors ($M = 68.46$, $SD = 9.85$).

Figure 4. Mean ratings ($\pm SE$) of perceived laziness of target members under conditions of unanimity and dissension.

Figure 5. Mean ratings ($\pm SE$) of perceived laziness of target members as a function of self-monitoring type.

Discussion

Belonging to a social group that is devalued is often not a positive experience, and can have negative implications for the individual. Nonetheless, individual differences among group members are evident in terms of their perceptual and behavioural responses to an identity threat (Crosby, 1982; Dion & Earn, 1975; Foster & Matheson, 1998; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002; Taylor et al., 1990; Wright et al., 1990). While research in the area of intergroup relations has not focused a great deal on the personality characteristics that may affect members' responses to their group status, it was argued in the present thesis that personality, and in particular self-monitoring styles, may play an important role in moderating responses to group identity threats. Thus, the primary goal

of the present study was to examine the differences between high and low self-monitors in terms of how they responded when faced with various forms of a group-based threat.

Responses to an External Identity Threat

The findings of the present study suggest that self-monitoring personality moderated responses to an external identity threat. Although it had been anticipated that high self-monitors would be most reactive to an external threat because of their concern regarding self-relevant positive outcomes, contrary to this expectation, it was the low self-monitors who appraised the negative identity construal as most threatening.

Although not expected, in fact, this is consistent with Krosnick and Sedikides' (1990) finding that low self-monitors were more sensitive to cues that threatened their identity.

However, on the whole, high and low self-monitors had very similar reactions to the external identity threat, in that their collective esteem, for the most part, remained intact following the threat manipulation, perhaps because these participants viewed the negative construal to be less credible than did those who received the positive construal. It is possible that diminishing the legitimacy or credibility of the threatening construal was a coping strategy that aided in protecting collective esteem. Past research has shown that individuals who belong to stigmatized groups do not necessarily report low self-esteem (Crocker & Major, 1989) because they find alternative strategies for disengaging from the source of the threat. In particular, group members may attempt to disengage from negative feedback about their identity by suggesting that it was not based on a valid or accurate assessment (Major, Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe & Crocker, 1998). In the present study, participants might have perceived the negative construal as undeserving, and obtained through unfair or inappropriate research procedures. If so, they would not

likely incorporate the negative construal into their own evaluations of the groups' self-worth, thereby maintaining collective esteem (Major & Schmader, 1998). However, it might also be contended that the measures used in the present study were more prone to reporting biases to preserve a positive identity, and hence, were less sensitive to the effects of the identity threat. In line with this, a similar pattern of findings was found by Matheson and Cole (2004) who used the same manipulation of identity threat, wherein there were no direct effects of the manipulation on appraisals of threat, control or collective esteem. However, the identity threat did affect affective and physiological reactions, in that exposure to the negative identity construal resulted in higher levels of anger and elevated salivary cortisol. Thus, perhaps affect-based measures would have proven to be more sensitive to the external identity threat manipulation.

However, it is also possible that the findings were attenuated by methodological artefacts. One of these artefacts may be the nature of the identity threat, namely students' post-secondary affiliation, which also meant that the study included a restricted population (e.g., university students). Reactions to a devalued group identity very likely differ depending on age, history of experiences with such threats, or even depending on characteristics of the group itself (e.g., controllability, visibility, extent of integration with outgroups). It might be that other social groups, particularly those who are devalued on a chronic and persistent basis, would show more profound differences in responding to a threatened group identity. Thus, it might prove worthwhile to examine other groups that vary in their characteristics.

Another methodological artefact that may have affected the reactions to the manipulation was the use of a simulated experimental context. It is possible that group

members react very differently in other contexts in which the implications of the threat have very real and tangible consequences. Although attempts were made to maximize the relevance of the threat used in the present study to students' lives, given that these cues were presented within an experimental context, participants may not have viewed them as particularly real or serious (which they, in fact, indicated in terms of the perceived credibility of the negative construal). Again, under such conditions, it is not clear if the same responses would have been evident in a real world setting.

Reactions to an Internal Identity Threat

It was expected that the presence of dissension from an ingroup member would challenge the group's distinctiveness, and hence their confidence in the identity and norms of the group (Brewer & Brown, 1998). Consistent with this, when there was ingroup dissension, participants in the present study reported lowered confidence in both their own and the group's position. Thus, the internal threat manipulation appeared to decrease certainty of participants' own beliefs and attitudes, as well as their perceptions of the legitimacy of the group's position.

Under conditions of such an internal identity threat, it was anticipated that low self-monitors would experience this as a challenge to their identity, and hence demonstrate reduced esteem and a tendency to derogate the source of the threat, that is the dissenting group member (Abrams et al., 2000; Hogg, 1996). Indeed, as expected, when there was an internal threat, low self-monitors reported lower levels of public collective self-esteem, suggesting that a lack of consensus in the group was perceived by low self-monitors as undermining the group's value to outsiders (e.g., demonstrating poor citizenship skills, as reflected in their inability to come to a unanimous jury decision). In

addition, low self-monitors reported lower levels of self-typicality, indicating that they themselves felt that they had less in common with other members of their group when the group lacked consensus. The inability to reach a common position may have diminished the salience of a distinctive group prototype, and hence more difficult for group members to identify a normative or typical position within the group. Thus, the differences in low self-monitors' responses when the group was unanimous or not were not surprising. However, collective esteem was maintained on the other dimensions, namely, private esteem, being a valuable member of the group, and the importance or centrality of the identity. It would seem that rather than undermining the implications of the identity for low self-monitors personal sense of self and relation to the group, the internal threat had a greater impact on how they thought the group would be evaluated.

As a strategy for protecting the group's identity, and in particular its implications for the self, it was expected that low self-monitors would be most likely to derogate the dissenter who was the source of the internal identity threat. Indeed, the present study demonstrated that low self-monitors were more likely to denigrate the deviate member of the group on all dimensions (competence, sociability, and laziness), with the exception of motivation. Perhaps, ingroup extremity was not apparent on this latter dimension because the confederate who was acting as the dissenter was actively involved in the group discussion and trained to follow a specific script, and therefore probably conveyed a fair degree of motivation relative to the other group members.

The low self-monitors' response to the dissenter was consistent with the black sheep effect (Marques et al., 1988), in that, low self-monitors may have been attempting

to protect their group's identity by isolating or marginalizing group members that might undermine the group's positive distinctiveness.

Unlike low self-monitors who we argued would be more likely to be threatened by a challenge to their identity, particularly when the source of the threat was internal to the group, it was expected that high self-monitors would be unaffected by the internal threat in terms of undermining their collective self-esteem. This pattern was anticipated given that high self-monitoring individuals were expected to be motivated by individualistic strategies, and to be more concerned with improving their own status (Danheiser & Graziano, 1982). As a result, if anything, dissension within the group would provide a basis for making social comparisons with other ingroup members that would result in a more positive self-construal. Indeed, high self-monitors did not report lower collective esteem. Moreover, high self-monitors demonstrated more polarized positive self-ratings in terms of both competence and sociability, irrespective of whether or not the confederate dissented. These findings are in accordance with research documenting high self-monitors' motivation to maximize their own outcomes by engaging in behaviours that are strategic to receiving positive outcomes within any particular social interaction (Danheiser & Graziano, 1982). It is likely that high self-monitors sought mechanisms to maximize their self-presentation in relation to the group, as opposed to immersing themselves in a group identity that did not serve their best interests. Indeed, by evaluating themselves as highly valued on dimensions perceived to be important (e.g., competence, sociability), high self-monitors were able to maximize their status within the group.

As mentioned earlier, when the group encounters a threat, an important variable that influences members' responses to the threat is the degree of identification with the ingroup (Brown, 2000; Major et al., 2002; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002). It was anticipated that high self-monitors would respond like low identifiers and low self-monitors would respond like high identifiers. Interestingly enough, prior to the internal identity threat, no differences were evident in the extent to which high and low self-monitor's identified with their group. Nonetheless, as expected, in comparison to high self-monitors, the internal threat was more likely to challenge the esteem of low self-monitors and to increase their tendency to black sheep the dissenter. These are the behaviours that are typically seen among high identifiers (Branscombe et al., 1993). It might be suggested that the degree of identification with the group was not what influenced their responses; rather it is possible that group membership and experience with an identity threat had different impacts on these individuals due to the meaning of this group identity to their self-concepts. Thus, it might be worthwhile to investigate individual differences in the implications associated with group membership at a more qualitative, as opposed to simply quantitative level.

It is notable that, in the present study, the internal identity threat proved to be more effective in altering individuals' reactions than the external identity threat. It might be that individuals have better strategies for minimizing the effects of external threats, as belonging to a devalued group may require such responses on a day-to-day basis in order to maintain well-being (Crocker & Major, 1989). However, it is also possible that the relative effectiveness of these threats reflected differences in the manipulations themselves. For example, the internal identity threat was emanated from someone who

was actually present and in contact with participants, whereas the external threat was in the form of a videotaped presentation. Speculatively, direct contact with the source of threat may have been deemed less avoidable, thereby heightening the attention paid by participants. This confound might also be true, however, outside the laboratory. External threats are often ambiguous in terms of the source (e.g., the media, 'someone' from higher up, institutional biases). It has been argued that such ambiguity of the source of threat is a factor that motivates individuals to deny that they have been personally discriminated against, as their ability to confront the perpetrator is not perceived to be within their control (Major et al., 2002). However, another experimental confound that may have enhanced the effectiveness of the internal identity threat was the order of presentation. For logistic reasons, the presentation of the two manipulations lacked counterbalancing. It may have been useful to vary these sources of threat, in order to examine the effects of being exposed to one source of threat before the other (e.g., the internal threat prior to the external threat). Speculatively, if the order of threats were counterbalanced and the internal identity threat was presented first, it is possible that the low self-monitors' would have reacted more strongly towards the external threat. In effect, if the positive distinctiveness of the group was challenged initially, low self-monitors would have been more sensitive to the effects of the external identity threat and showed lower levels of collective esteem

Conclusions

Theories of intergroup relations were intended to shed light on how individuals respond as a result of their shared status within a group (Ellemers, 1993). While group-based identification is clearly integral to responses to prejudice and discrimination, the

need to consider key individual differences to explain the variability in group members' responses is becoming increasingly evident (Major et al., 2002; Matheson & Cole, 2003; Miller & Kaiser, 2001). The results of this study provide some support for the importance of considering individual differences, and in particular, self-monitoring in responses to a devalued group identity. The personality dimension of self-monitoring was of particular interest due to the inherent variations in sensitivity to internal and external cues, and how these sensitivities might be predictive of differential responses in the group context. High and low self-monitors appear to respond according to different motives, and the meaning they ascribe to the intergroup context. Indeed, low self-monitors seemed to have internalized their group membership, and thus were more sensitive to perceiving a group threat and more motivated to adopt strategies to protect the group's image when it was threatened. Conversely, high self-monitors seemed to have responded in a more individualistic manner, and adopted mechanisms that were more likely to promote a positive personal, rather than group image. The results of this investigation emphasize the importance of considering the differential motives associated with the self-monitoring personality and how these motives influence how group members' respond when they encounter a threatened group identity.

Footnote

¹Perceptions of the three confederates were not significantly different from one another, Pillais = .131, $F(8,236) = 1.77$, $p = .084$. The three confederates were equally represented in each of the internal threat conditions, $\chi^2(df=2; N = 125) = .661$, *ns*.

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Appendix A: Telephone Contact

Hi, my name is _____. I am with a team of researchers at Carleton University. We are conducting a study looking at how different characteristics of university students are associated with basic citizenship skills, such as serving as juror. We will be asking you to watch a video of a simulated murder trial, and then to deliberate as a jury to come to a verdict. We will also ask you to complete some short questionnaires concerning yourself and your perceptions of the trial and other jurors.

We are only calling people who took part in mass-testing last fall. We had included relevant measures at that time that you completed. We will be telling you about that measure and what it meant for this study. The study may take up to 2 hours. You will be given experimental 2 credits for your participation

Are you interested?

If yes, make appointment.

If no, thanks and good-bye.

Appendix B: Statement of Informed Consent

The purpose of an informed consent is to ensure that you understand the purpose of the study and the nature of your involvement. The informed consent has to provide sufficient information such that you have the opportunity to determine whether you wish to participate in the study.

Research Title: Skills in Jury Deliberations

Research Personnel: The following people are involved in this research project and may be contacted at any time:

Kelly Carroll (Student Investigator, 788-2600, X2683)

Chris Motz (Student Investigator, 788-2600, X2683)

Connie Pora (Researcher, 788-2600, X2683)

Charlene Dodd (Researcher, 788-2600, X2683)

Dr. K. Matheson (Faculty Investigator and Chair of Dept. of Psychology, 788-2648)

If you have any ethical concerns about how this study please contact Dr. M. Gick (Chair of the Carleton University Research Ethics Committee for Psychological Research, 520-2600, ext. 2664).

Purpose and Task Requirements: The purpose of this study is to examine how students respond in the context of jury deliberations. You will be asked to listen to an interview with a researcher and to answer some questions about yourself and how you feel about being a student. As stress can affect performance, we will also be asking you to provide 5 saliva samples from which we can extract stress hormones. Finally, we'll be asking you to watch a video clip of highlights of the simulated trial of a man accused of second degree murder, and to deliberate as a jury about the guilt or innocence of the defendant. You will be asked some questions about yourself, including what you think of the case, your jury group, and your performance. This study should take about 2 hours. You will be given 2 experimental credits for your participation.

Potential Risk/Discomfort: There are no physical or psychological risks in this study. However, some of the information discussed is sensitive and personal and may perhaps cause some discomfort.

Anonymity/Confidentiality: The data collected in this study are kept anonymous and confidential. The consent forms are kept separate from your responses.

Right to Withdraw: Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. At any point during the study you have the right to not answer any questions or to withdraw with no penalty whatsoever.

I have read the above description of the study concerning jury decision-making. The data in the study will be used in research publications or for teaching purposes. My signature indicates that I agree to participate in the study, and this in no way constitutes a waiver of my rights.

Full Name (please print):

Participant Signature:

Date:

Researcher Signature:

Date:

Appendix C: Transcripts of Interview with Dr. Jones

Threat Condition

In terms of the university survey that you conducted with workplace employees, what did you find their general impression of Carleton University students to be?

Carleton University has been dubbed 'last chance U'. Based on its history of admissions, it is viewed as the university people go to when they can't get in anywhere else. For this reason, average admission grades for incoming students are low in comparison to other universities. And many students who begin their degree at Carleton never finish. Thus, Carleton students are viewed as less competent, smart, and less hard working than students who were able to go to other universities.

What did you find contributed to that impression of Carleton University students?

This is reinforced by the less than ideal funding Carleton has to put towards scholarships and student awards. Because of this students who are really good are likely to get more competitive offers from other institutions and so they do go elsewhere. Students who do choose to go to Carleton often end up doing their degree part-time so that they can afford their education. This means that many Carleton students have higher priorities than their studies, and so they are perceived as not very serious about learning and their educational opportunities. The student environment at Carleton is perceived to be as lacking in intellectual collegiality, challenge and stimulation.

What about resources that Carleton puts toward students and student resources, what influence does that have on their impression of Carleton students?

Carleton's lack of funding also affects learning resources such as library acquisitions and computer labs. And if the learning resources are viewed as substandard, then Carleton students are perceived to be ill-prepared because they are using outdated resources. To make matters worse, to maximize the number of students that can be dealt with a small number of faculty, Carleton's first and second year classes are mostly very large. Student's may never see a tenured faculty member until their third year. So, they may get jobs in organizations, but Carleton students are expected to be unfamiliar with cutting edge technologies and techniques. As a result, Carleton students are viewed as needing more on the job training, and to be lacking in innovative ideas and skills.

Affirmation Condition

In terms of the university survey that you conducted with workplace employees, what did you find their general impression of Carleton University students to be?

Carleton University has a historical underlying philosophy of giving people one last chance to get a university education. So even if a student's grades aren't as high at admission that they'd have to be at other universities, Carleton gives a student the opportunity to do well at university to acquire a degree. Clearly if they don't do well, they are not permitted to continue. Thus Carleton students are viewed as resilient, committed, and hard-working, because they have to do well to prove themselves – it is their last chance.

What did you find contributed to that impression of Carleton University students?

It also reflects Carleton's image as being 'down to earth' as opposed to elitist or snobbish. Students aren't selected because their family has a lot of money that might eventually be endowed to Carleton from the rich alumni – it is open to everyone, irrespective of social class. This means it isn't as rich as other universities, and so may not have as much scholarship money. As a result, Carleton has had to be innovative in how it provides resources to students. While it provides as many student awards as possible, it also has a flexible scheduling system that allows many students to attend on a part-time basis so that they can afford their education. This in itself contributes to the diversity of students and therefore ideas and experiences students get at Carleton. It also means that Carleton students have to be extremely committed and serious about their studies, because they are clearly working at fitting them in with many other demands in their lives.

What about resources that Carleton puts toward students and student resources, what influence does that have on their impression of Carleton students?

Carleton's lack of funding also affects learning resources such as library acquisitions and computer labs. Students are trained to be resourceful, and to not rely on one library on campus, but to learn to use the many library systems Carleton has agreements with, such as the University of Ottawa, the medical research archives, and so on. This resourcefulness and independence is further encouraged in students' early years because they are often in large classes, in order to allow departments to focus on a larger number of more specialized senior level classes. Because of this Carleton students are perceived to be really well-prepared to work with the constrained resources of many small organizations and institutions. And by the time they graduate, it is clear that they will have a well-balanced, focused education in their areas of specialization.

Appendix D: Trial Transcript

Judge

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, in the trial you will hear today the Crown has charged Mr. John Russell with the second-degree murder of Mr. Irving Harris. During the trial you will see presentations of the case by both the Prosecution and the Defense.

Members of the jury, in our legal system a defendant is presumed to be innocent until a jury of his peers hears all of the relevant evidence, deliberates on this evidence and then finds him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it is very important that you keep an open mind throughout the whole trial and do not make a decision in this case prematurely. You will have ample time to carefully weigh the evidence and deliberate to a verdict after all of the evidence has been presented. It is important that you do not prematurely reach a verdict before this time.

Ladies and gentlemen of the Jury, murder is defined in the Canadian Criminal code as one type of Culpable Homicide. A person commits homicide when, directly or indirectly, by any means, he causes the death of a human being. Not all homicide is culpable. A person commits culpable homicide when he causes the death of a human being by means of an unlawful act. Culpable homicide is murder where the person who causes the death of a human being (1) means to cause his death, or (2) means to cause him bodily harm that he knows is likely to cause his death.

Members of the Jury, let me caution you once again that the defendant is presumed innocent of the charges against him, and that you are to listen to all of the evidence with an open mind. The prosecuting attorney will now present their opening statement.

Opening Statement by the Attorney for the Prosecution

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, this case is really very simple. The Crown will prove beyond a reasonable doubt that on July 9th of last year Mr. John Russell, the defendant in this case, murdered Mr. Irving Harris. Now Irving Harris was not an exemplary citizen. He was a loan shark, and he had a criminal record. Nevertheless, he did not deserve to die, and Mr. Russell had no right to kill him.

Ladies and gentlemen, the record will show that Mr. Russell was in debt and was unable to borrow any more money from the bank in order to pay off his debts. He was desperate, and about to lose the business he had worked for years to build. Because the banks would not loan money to Mr. Russell he borrowed it from Mr. Harris, a loan shark. In order to get the loan he agreed to pay Mr. Harris a very large rate of interest. Mr. Russell used the \$25,000 dollars he borrowed from Mr. Harris to pay off his creditors and keep his business. However, the business did not do as well as expected and Mr. Russell was unable to pay back all of the original loan or the extra \$10,000 dollars in interest that

had accumulated. Mr. Harris insisted that Mr. Russell sign over his business in order to make good his debt. When Mr. Russell refused to do this, Mr. Harris threatened to have Mr. Russell beaten up. Mr. Russell was desperate. However, instead of going to the police, he took matters into his own hands and, on July 9th he murdered Mr. Harris in cold blood. Unfortunately for Mr. Russell, a witness was at the scene of the crime. The witness saw a profile that fit the description of Mr. Russell. The witness saw the whole murder from beginning to end. After the murder the police searched Mr. Harris' office and found a list of people who owed him money. Mr. Russell's name was on that list. The police went to Mr. Russell's business and asked him about his whereabouts on the day of the murder. Mr. Russell was unable to provide a convincing alibi and insisted lamely that he had been at home alone in bed the morning that Mr. Harris was murdered.

Ladies and gentlemen, the bullet that killed Mr. Harris was a 38-caliber slug fired at close range from a revolver. Mr. Russell owns a 38-caliber revolver, which the police confiscated as evidence when they questioned him on July 11th of last year. I would like to submit as evidence the report made by the Forensic Laboratory of the Ottawa Police Department.

(HANDS THE REPORT TO THE JUDGE)

The report states that Mr. Russell's gun had been fired sometime within a week of the lab's examination. Thus it is possible that Mr. Russell's gun was the weapon that killed Mr. Harris. In addition, Mr. Russell matches the description of the man who murdered Mr. Harris. Ladies and gentlemen, this is an open and shut case. Mr. Russell had the opportunity to murder Mr. Harris, the means to murder Mr. Harris, and the motive to murder Mr. Harris.

Members of the Jury, there is no reasonable doubt in this case. Mr. Russell murdered Mr. Harris in front of a witness. Nothing could be clearer. Therefore I ask that you find Mr. Russell guilty of Murder in the second degree. Thank you for your attention.

Opening Statement by the Attorney for the Defense

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, as you have been told by the judge, in our system of justice a defendant does not have to prove that he is innocent. Instead, the defendant is presumed to be innocent until it is proved by the Crown, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is guilty. Ladies and gentlemen, the Crown will be unable to prove that Mr. John Russell murdered Mr. Irving Harris. It will be unable to do this for a very simple reason. Mr. Russell is not guilty. Mr. Russell is not a criminal. Before the death of Mr. Harris he had never been arrested or been in any trouble with the police. Instead, he was a respected businessman, well liked in the community.

Now, as the Crown has stated, Mr. Harris was a crook. He was a loan shark who took the hard earned money of desperate people, and when these people couldn't pay him back in time he had them beaten and took all that they had. My client, Mr. Russell fully

admits that he borrowed money from Mr. Harris and that Mr. Harris threatened to have him beaten and threatened to take over his business when he had trouble repaying the loan. In this respect, however, my client is no different from a great many other people. When the police found Mr. Harris' record book it contained the names of more than 60 people who owed him money, and many of these people owed him more money than Mr. Russell. Any one of the very many people who owed money to Mr. Harris and who were threatened by him had as much of a motive to kill him as did my client. When the police questioned Mr. Russell he readily admitted that he owned a gun. Mr. Russell has a permit for this gun. He was given this permit for protection because he often keeps large sums of money on his business premises. Ladies and gentlemen, there is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Russell's gun was the weapon that killed Mr. Harris. The report from the Forensic Laboratory indicated that it was impossible to determine if the bullet fragments were fired from the gun belonging to Mr. Russell. The report states that the bullet could have come from any other 38 calibre revolver. In addition, the report cautions that 38 calibre revolvers are, in fact, the most common type of gun owned in the Ottawa area.

I would like to submit as evidence the log book from the R.A. Centre Shooting Range which indicates that on July 6th of last year Mr. Russell was at the shooting range.

(HANDS LOG BOOK TO JUDGE)

Being a registered gun owner, Mr. Russell engages in regular practice at the shooting range. This evidence would explain why Mr. Russell's gun had been fired within a week of the examination of the gun by the Police Lab. The report states that on the basis of the forensic evidence, Mr. Russell's 38 calibre revolver is no more likely to be the gun that killed Mr. Harris than any other 38 calibre revolver that had been fired within a week of the crime.

Ladies and gentlemen, if you carefully planned a murder would you use a gun that you had registered with the police? And then, after the killing would you simply put the gun back in your drawer and then hand it over to the police as soon as they asked for it? No, of course not. An innocent person behaves this way. A guilty person does not. Suppose you went to the trouble to carefully plan a murder. Would you be so stupid as to forget to give yourself an alibi? Of course not. When the police questioned Mr. Russell about his whereabouts at the time of the crime he said that he had slept in that morning because he had a headache and had been up late the night before.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Crown's depiction of Mr. Russell's actions makes no sense at all. Mr. Russell cooperated with the police from the beginning of the investigation. He handed over his gun immediately, he didn't lie about having a gun, and he made no attempt to concoct an alibi. These are not the actions of a guilty man.

The Crown has a witness who saw a man resembling Mr. Russell kill Mr. Harris. In this case, the witness did not see the face of the murderer. The witness claims to have seen someone resembling Mr. Russell, come up behind Mr. Harris and shoot him. That the witness saw someone shoot Mr. Harris is not in question. What is in question is who the witness saw.

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, what we have here is a case of an overzealous police officer putting together circumstantial evidence in an attempt to implicate my client. It is important that you, the jury do not compound that error by finding an innocent man guilty of murder on the basis of what a frightened witness claimed to see while witnessing a killing.

Members of the jury, John Russell is a good man. He is not a murderer, for this reason I ask you to find him not guilty of the murder of Irving Harris.

PROSECUTION WITNESSES

Detective Timothy O'Malley Direct Examination (By the Prosecution)

P. Detective O'Malley will you please state your name, occupation and relation to this case.

W. I'm Detective Timothy O'Malley of the Ottawa City police force. I was assigned to investigate the murder of Irving Harris.

P. And did you arrest the defendant in this case, John Russell for that murder?

W. Yes

P. Detective, please tell the court the circumstances that led you to arrest Mr. Russell.

W. Mr. Harris was a known loan shark and so, naturally, we began our investigation by finding out who owed him money. At his home I found a diary that contained the names and phone numbers of people who owed him money, how much they owed, and the amount of interest he charged on their loan.

P. What did you do after you found the diary?

W. We began to question the people who were named were in the diary. There were 63 names in the diary, and we interviewed each of those people. One of them was John Russell. My partner and I went to Mr. Russell's place of business and questioned him about Mr. Harris. Mr. Russell admitted knowing Mr. Harris, and also admitted that he owned a gun. When I asked him to show it to me I noted that it was a 38 calibre, the same calibre gun used to kill Mr. Harris.

P. Detective O'Malley, did Mr. Russell admit to knowing Mr. Harris?

W. Mr. Russell admitted that he knew Harris and that he owed Harris money, but he denied killing him.

P. Did you arrest Mr. Russell at that time?

W. Yes, Mr. Russell matched the description of the murderer given by the witness. This, and the other evidence lead us to believe that Mr. Russell was the murderer. We took him into custody at that time.

P. What about the other people whose names were in Mr. Harris' diary? Were they also suspects?

W. As I said we interviewed everyone in the diary. We also ran a check to find out if any of them owned handguns. Mr. Russell was the only one who owned a 38-caliber revolver.

P. You've mentioned the witness, did you interview the witness?

W. Yes, my partner and I interviewed the witness who had originally phoned in the report of the crime.

P. Please tell the Court what your interview revealed.

W. The witness reported that the perpetrator was a Caucasian male with a medium build who wore a baseball cap. The witness reported that the perpetrator left his car and approached the victim from behind and then, when close to the victim drew a gun and shot the victim in the back of the head. The witness also reported that the perpetrator got back into his car and drove away. The witness described the killer's car as being light in colour.

P. Detective, when you and your partner questioned Mr. Russell did you ask him to show you his car?

W. Yes, we wanted to see if it was a light colour.

P. And what colour was the car?

W. It was light grey.

P. Did you also ask Mr. Russell if he owned a baseball cap?

W. Yes, he said that he owned a blue baseball cap and showed it to us.

P. Thank you detective. No further questions.

Cross-examination (By the Defense)

D. Detective O'Malley, how long have you been on the Ottawa police force?

W. 8 years.

D. Eight years. By this time you must know the crime scene in this city pretty well.

W. Yes, that's true.

D. Tell me detective, were you surprised to learn that Irving Harris had been murdered?

W. No. A lot of people didn't like Harris. It was no surprise that someone finally killed him.

D. Why was Harris so unpopular?

W. He was a loan shark. He'd loan desperate people money at outrageous rates of interest. If they couldn't pay it back he would threaten to hurt them. He bled people dry so, naturally, he was not well liked.

D. Had Mr. Harris ever been arrested?

W. Numerous times. He'd been arrested for assault, fraud, and extortion. He had an extensive criminal history.

D. Now, the diary you found in Mr. Harris' home contained the names of people from whom he was extorting money is that right?

W. That is correct.

D. And you testified that there were 63 names, is that right?

W. Yes.

D. Sixty-three names, that's a lot of enemies. Now did you recognize the names of any of the people in Mr. Harris' diary?

W. Yes. Some were people who themselves had criminal histories.

D. Did any of the people named in Mr. Harris' book have records of committing violent crimes?

W. Yes.

D. Had any of those people ever used a gun to commit a crime?

W. Yes. Often times loan sharks loan money to other criminals, and that was the case with Mr. Harris.

D. Tell me detective, have you ever known of a criminal who used a gun that was not registered to him to commit a crime?

W. Yes.

D. In your experience, do professional killers use guns registered in their own name to commit murders?

W. No. They usually use unregistered guns, stolen guns or guns with the serial numbers removed.

D. If a professional criminal killed someone with an unregistered or stolen gun would you expect him to tell you he owned such a gun when you asked him?

W. No.

D. Had any of the criminals in Mr. Harris' diary ever used a gun that was not registered to them in the commission of a crime?

W. Yes.

D. But you didn't arrest all of those people did you?

W. Forty-one of the people in the Harris diary had prior criminal records, and 15 of those had prior records for violent crimes. We questioned those 41 people extensively, particularly the 15 with violent records. We had no evidence that any of those people owned a handgun, and all of them had better alibis for the time of the murder than did Mr. Russell.

D. Detective, when you questioned Mr. Russell did you ask him if he owned a gun?

W. Yes.

D. What did he answer?

W. He said yes, and told us where he kept it.

D. Was he evasive in any way, did he try at first to deny that he owned the gun?

W. No.

D. He didn't try to say that he had lost the gun or that he didn't know where it was, or that it had been stolen, did he?

W. No.

D. You said that Mr. Russell matched the description of the murderer given by the witness is that right?

W. Yes. The witness saw a Caucasian male with a medium build wearing a baseball cap.

D. But did the witness see the murderer's face?

W. No.

D. Of those 63 people named in the diary, how many could be described as Caucasian males with medium builds?

W. I would say almost two thirds.

D. Did you ask any of them if they owned a baseball cap?

W. No.

D. How many of those 63 people owned light-coloured cars?

W. Twelve of them had registered at least one light-coloured car.

D. Thank you detective. No further questions your Honour.

DEFENSE WITNESSES

Expert Witness: Dr. Samantha Lawson Direct examination (By the Defense)

D. Dr. Lawson, please tell the Court your name Occupation and relationship to this case.

W. My Name is Dr. Samantha Lawson. I am a forensic psychologist and Professor of Psychology at the University of British Columbia. Most of my research has focused on the factors that influence Human memory, and the errors of memory. I have published over 50 research articles in professional psychological journals on topics relating to human memory and eyewitness testimony.

D. Doctor, is it true that when a person witnesses a crime, all of the details of the crime are stored in their mind even if they can't remember the details right away, and if they remember details or faces later that these memories are always accurate?

W. No, a person who has witnessed a crime has not necessarily stored all of the details in his or her mind. Many people believe falsely that human memory works something like a video tape recorder. They falsely believe that everything that is remembered is remembered accurately and that everything they remember happening must have actually happened. Actually, human memory is nothing like a videotape recorder. People frequently make mistakes about what they remember because memory is very heavily influenced by peoples' beliefs and expectations about what they think should have

happened or must have happened. Without even realizing that they are doing it people often fill in the gaps in their memories with false memories.

D. Why wouldn't an eyewitness pay attention to a criminal's face?

W. In a frightening situation like a crime witnesses tend to focus attention on those things that are most important to them at the time. Usually that is the criminal's weapon rather than his face. Many eyewitnesses to crimes testify that they can't remember anything about a criminal's face, because they spent all of their time focused on his gun. This phenomenon occurs so frequently that it even has a name. Psychologists call it "weapon focus" and several experiments have shown that a person holding a threatening object is significantly less likely to be accurately recognized than a person without a weapon because witnesses tend to focus on the weapon rather than on the face of the person holding it.

D. Suppose the witness was hiding and wasn't seen by the criminal, and the witness watched the criminal shoot and kill someone else. Under those circumstances would the witness be likely to attend to the criminal's face?

W. No, probably not. The witnesses' first concern in such circumstances would probably be to remain in hiding and not be seen. Even if they had a clear view of the shooting, they would probably focus more attention on the gun, the shooting incident itself, and the victim than on the criminal. Also, when people are frightened they tend to focus their attention on only a narrow range of events. The events that would be most likely to draw a witness' attention during a shooting would not be the criminal's face, but the gun pointing and firing at the victim. After the shooting the witness would be more likely to focus on the victim than on the shooter.

D. Doctor, can the likelihood of a witness misidentifying someone be influenced by events that happen after the witness has seen the crime?

W. Yes. The term "post-event information" refers to information that a witness gets after they have witnessed the crime. Post-event information can strongly influence what a witness recalls and who a witness identifies. When the post-event information is misleading it can lead witnesses to create false memories and to identify the wrong person.

D. Thank you Doctor. No further questions.

Cross-examination (By the Prosecution)

P. Doctor, you said that the likelihood of a witness making a correct identification depends on the circumstances right?

W. Yes. Some circumstances are more conducive to a correct identification than others.

P. For instance, witnesses are more likely to be correct if they see a crime take place in daylight than at night, right?

W. Yes, other things being equal, they are more likely to be accurate in daylight than at night.

P. Have you ever heard of a witness who kept their head and tried to notice the distinctive features of a criminal in order to later be able to identify them?

W. Well, most witnesses don't do that, but occasionally one remains cool and behaves like that.

P. No further questions your Honour.

CLOSING STATEMENTS

Defense

Members of the Jury, at the beginning of this trial the Prosecution told you that it would prove beyond a reasonable doubt that John Russell shot and killed Irving Harris. The Prosecution has now presented its case, and I think that it is clear to everyone that the Prosecution case fails to prove that John Russell is guilty. The Prosecution's case falls to pieces for lack of convincing evidence. Let us take each piece of Prosecution evidence one at a time. Mr. Russell borrowed money from a loan shark named Irving Harris, and therefore, Mr. Russell's name was found in Harris' diary by the police. However, 63 other names were also found in Harris' diary and every one of those 63 people had at least as strong a motive as my client for wishing Mr. Harris dead. Moreover, some of these people were criminals who had previously committed violent crimes. The Prosecution has argued that none of these people owned a 38-caliber handgun. But the detective who arrested Mr. Russell stated under oath that some of these people were professional criminals who had used unregistered or stolen guns for their previous crimes and then lied about this to the police. The fact that such people do not own a registered weapon obviously does not prevent them from murdering someone with an unregistered weapon.

In short, the fact that Mr. Russell knew Mr. Harris, owed him money and disliked him proves absolutely nothing. Mr. Harris was killed with a 38-caliber revolver, the most common type of gun in Ottawa. Mr. Russell owns a 38-caliber revolver. If the Prosecution could prove that it was Mr. Russell's gun that shot Mr. Harris then they might have a case. But, of course, the Prosecution can prove nothing of the kind. The ballistic evidence is so scanty that it is impossible to match the bullet fragments from Harris' body with any gun. Certainly they could not be matched to Mr. Russell's gun.

Members of the Jury, if you planned to murder someone and knew that you might become a suspect, would you use your own licensed handgun and then turn it over to the police when they asked you if you owned a gun? Is this the behaviour of a guilty man? Of course it isn't. A guilty man would have used an unregistered gun, or would have

thrown his registered gun away after the crime and reported it stolen. He certainly would not hand it over to the police. Mr. Russell's gun had been fired at some time in the week before the gun was examined by the Forensic Lab. Does this prove that Mr. Russell fired his gun at Harris? Of course not. In fact, we know that a few days before the murder Mr. Russell had fired his gun at a shooting range. The Police Lab report states that a 38 caliber revolver is the most common gun in the Ottawa area. Thus contending that Mr. Russell's possession of such a gun constitutes evidence that he murdered Harris is clearly absurd.

Members of the Jury, the case for the Prosecution revolves around the testimony of a witness who did not actually see the murderer's face. In addition, as you have learned from Dr. Lawson, eyewitness testimony is often unreliable. Even if we could be sure beyond a reasonable doubt that the witness was correct in his identification, we have no way of knowing exactly who the witness saw murder Mr. Harris.

In this case the witness claims to have seen a Caucasian male with a medium build and a baseball cap drive away in a light coloured car. However, light coloured cars and baseball caps are common in our society. Detective O'Malley testified that at least two thirds of the 63 names in Mr. Harris' diary were of Caucasian males with medium builds. All of this evidence is circumstantial, and none of it is enough to implicate my client.

In summary, ladies and gentlemen, the Prosecution has been unable to make a convincing case. They have provided no evidence whatsoever to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that John Russell murdered Irving Harris. Members of the jury, Mr. Russell is not a killer. Before this unfortunate incident he had never been in trouble with the police. When the police interviewed him he did not act like a killer. He was not evasive; instead he cooperated fully with the police. Mr. Russell did not kill Irving Harris. For that reason I ask that you find him not guilty of Murder. Thank you for your attention.

Prosecution

Members of the Jury, this is not a difficult case. John Russell shot and killed Irving Harris. Mr. Russell had the motive to kill Mr. Harris. Mr. Russell owed Mr. Harris large sums of money and Harris had threatened to hurt Russell or to take away his business. Mr. Russell had little time left, he was frightened that he would be badly hurt and that he would lose his business. Mr. Russell not only had the motive to kill Harris he also had the means. He knew where Harris worked, he knew where he parked his car, and he knew when there were likely to be few witnesses around to see the crime. Mr. Russell is also unable to account for his whereabouts at the time of the crime. Instead, he expects us to believe the flimsiest of alibis. He was home alone asleep, where no one could see him or corroborate his story. Moreover, Mr. Russell also had a gun. But not just any gun, Mr. Russell had the same type of gun used in the murder. Mr. Russell had a 38-caliber revolver and he used it to shoot Harris who was killed with a 38-caliber revolver. Now the Defense can try to dodge and weave and do its best to pretend that this is a coincidence. However, the truth is that Harris was killed with a 38 revolver, that

Russell had a motive to kill Harris, had in his possession a 38-caliber revolver, and also had no alibi for the time that Harris was killed. Ladies and gentlemen, it does not take many coincidences of this kind to make it crystal clear that these are not coincidences at all.

Members of the Jury, you have heard Dr. Lawson testify about the supposed unreliability of eyewitness testimony. However, someone actually saw the whole crime in broad daylight from beginning to end. You have all been frightened at one time or another, did it make you blind? Of course not. The witness saw several important details of the murder and these details have lead to the arrest of Mr. Russell. Mr. Russell is a Caucasian male with a medium build. Is it just a coincidence that he owns a baseball cap and a light coloured car? I think not.

In summary, ladies and gentlemen...this is not a difficult case. The evidence is overwhelming. It indicates beyond a reasonable doubt that John Russell murdered Irving Harris. For this reason I ask that you find John Russell guilty of murder. Thank you for your patience and your attention.

Judge's Charge

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you have heard the evidence in this case and you must now follow the law as I will present it to you and deliberate to a unanimous verdict. Mr. John Russell has been charged with the murder in the second degree of Mr. Irving Harris. In order to commit second-degree murder a person must cause the death of a human being and mean to cause his death, or mean to cause him bodily harm that he knows is likely to cause his death. Section 235 of the Canadian Criminal Code holds that anyone who commits second degree murder is guilty of an indictable offence and shall be sentenced to prison for life.

Ladies and gentlemen, in your deliberations it is important that you review very carefully all of the evidence that has been presented. If, after careful deliberation you conclude that the evidence presented before you clearly proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Russell murdered Mr. Harris, then you should follow the law as I have described it to you and find Mr. Russell guilty of second-degree murder. On the other hand, if after careful deliberation, you believe that the evidence does not clearly indicate that Mr. Russell murdered Mr. Harris, then you should find him not guilty of the charge against him.

Members of the jury you may now retire and begin your deliberations.

Appendix E: Jury Deliberation Sheets

Charge: Second degree murder of Mr. Irving Harris

Plea: Not guilty

Charge to jury:

To find Mr. Russell guilty as charged;

OR

To find Mr. Russell not guilty of Culpable Homicide.

The Canadian Criminal code as one type of Culpable Homicide. A person commits homicide when, directly or indirectly, by any means, he causes the death of a human being. Not all homicide is culpable. A person commits culpable homicide when he causes the death of a human being by means of an unlawful act. Culpable homicide is murder where the person who causes the death of a human being (1) means to cause his death, or (2) means to cause him bodily harm that he knows is likely to cause his death.

Jury Deliberation Task Sheet

Group Code: _____

*As jury members you need to decide on a **unanimous** verdict regarding the charge against Mr. John Russell of the second degree murder of Mr. Irving Harris.*

We, the jury, find the defendant

Guilty / Not Guilty (please circle one)

The factors that led to our decision are as follows:

Appendix F: Confederate Scripts

Presence of dissension from an ingroup member

I think that both sides presented their case well and had a lot of really good points. Both sides were able to present us with a lot of convincing evidence in their favor.

After weighing all the evidence, I agree with the prosecution. I think that the defendant should be found *guilty*.

There is just too much evidence that points to Mr. Russell. The prosecution showed that he had a motive, he owned the same type of gun that killed the victim, and he had no alibi.

Just because Mr. Russell didn't have a criminal record doesn't mean that he didn't murder Mr. Harris. In my opinion, this just explains why he didn't have a good plan...he was desperate. I have no doubt that Mr. Russell murdered Mr. Harris. I think he should be found *guilty*.

Absence of dissension from an ingroup member (unanimity)

I think that both sides presented their case well and had a lot of really good points. Both sides were able to present us with a lot of convincing evidence in their favor.

After weighing all the evidence, I agree with the defense. I think that the defendant should be found *not guilty*.

Mr. Russell wasn't the only person to have a motive to murder Mr. Harris. He had a lot of enemies who could have done it. Also, the prosecution couldn't prove that it was the gun that shot and killed Mr. Harris.

Mr. Russell didn't even have a criminal record before this. Some of the other people on the list, however, did have criminal records for committing violent crimes. I have reasonable doubt that Mr. Russell murdered Mr. Harris; therefore I think the defendant should be found *not guilty*.

Appendix G: Statement of Debriefing

There is more to this study than I have told you about so far. But before I tell you exactly what it is, I would like to explain why it is necessary in some kinds of psychological studies not to tell people all about the purpose of the study at the very beginning. In some kinds of studies, if we tell people what the purpose of the experiment is and what we predict about how they will react under particular conditions, then they might deliberately do whatever it is they think that we want them to do, just to help us out and give us the results that they think we want. If that happened, their reactions would not be a good indication of how they might react in a situation in everyday life, where they didn't think they were being studied or that a psychologist was predicting that they would react in a certain way. What would be influencing them is what they thought the purpose of our study was rather than the specific conditions that we are trying to investigate. It is also possible that the opposite might occur and that people might think that if we predicted that they would do a certain thing; they might deliberately not do that to show us that we can't figure them out. That would also make the results invalid, because again what people would be responding to is what they thought we were looking for rather than responding naturally as they would in everyday situations.

Now I would like to explain exactly what we are trying to get at in this study, and why we couldn't tell you everything from the beginning.

These days, people from groups that experience a lot of negative social prejudice and discrimination are finding ways to not only feel good about belonging to the group, but the group members also work together to provide social support, and take collective action. In this study, we were trying to look at the effects of belonging to a group that is viewed negatively. Therefore, most students in this study were given a very negative description of what it means to be at Carleton. For the purposes of comparison, others were given a very positive description. We used a cover story in order to manipulate how you felt about being a Carleton student. Dr. Jones is a fictitious researcher and the interview with Dr. Jones that you heard was also fictitious. We created two versions of the interview with Dr. Jones in order to provide students with either a very positive or negative view of Carleton students.

For those getting negative depiction: Just so you can see how we did this - these are the kinds of things that were said in the positive interview - read from manipulation.

Awareness of the personal relevance of membership in a group that society views or treats negatively is often not a positive experience, and can have severely negative implications for the individual. Not surprisingly however, members of the same group may respond differently, maybe because of differences in their personalities. We are particularly interested in the personality dimensions called self-monitoring. This measure was completed by you in mass-testing. People are either high or low self-monitors. High self-monitors tend to be more sensitive to environmental cues regarding what is appropriate behaviour, whereas low self-monitors tend to act on the basis of their own personal beliefs and values. We will give you a description of this personality dimension to take away with you.

Finally, we were interested on how members of a group, especially one that has been challenged (in this case told that their group is negative) responds to disagreements among other members of the group. This is why we had the jury simulation. We were not interested in the verdicts per se, but rather how members of the group felt if someone disagreed with what seemed like an obvious verdict, namely not guilty. In fact, there is a phenomenon called the 'black sheep effect', where group members are more likely to dislike a person from their own group who disagrees in comparison to someone who is not a member of the group. To test this, we planted a person in each group who was in cahoots with the experimenter, and it was this person's role to either agree with the rest of you or to disagree.

→ Introduce confederate.

We wanted to see how you reacted, depending on what she did. Please be assured that we were aware that you had to come to a verdict consensus, and so may have had to give in to our confederate even if you didn't agree with her. This is a common reaction to come to a resolution, and says nothing about your own decision-making abilities.

I would like to emphasize that this study was not a test of your ability or your character. There were no correct responses. People's natural responses are what we are looking for. We will be combining the data, such that all persons will remain anonymous. In order for us to draw any conclusions, we will have to combine the data that we got from you together with data from other people so that we will have enough data to draw conclusions about the average person's reactions. What this means is that it is going to be necessary for us to ask you not to say anything about the study to anyone else. If you talked to someone else about the study and told them all the things I just told you and then they were in the study, that would be just the same as if I told them at the beginning all about the whole purpose of the study; their reactions wouldn't be natural, and their results couldn't be used and combined with the data from you and other people. If that happened, the whole study would really be wasted; the data we got from you and other people would be useless because we wouldn't be sure whose data was valid and whose wasn't.

If anybody asks you about the study, just tell them it was a study on students' reactions in a jury simulation. You're not lying, as this really is the context in which we are looking at these ideas. You don't need to make it a mystery, just something you've been asked not to talk about any more in case they bias their own reactions. If they want to know more, they can sign up for it.

Do you have any questions? Comments? Suggestions?

Appendix H: Carleton University Fact Sheet

As a student of Carleton University you are a member of a scholarly community committed to academic excellence. Indeed, the 1990s, according to the Handbook for New Students, represents a time of restoration. Committed to the intellectual and social development of students, the president of Carleton, Dr. R. Van Loon began a process of renewal and restructuring of the academic program in 1996, with the aim of not only improving the quality of the program, but ensuring a good match to student and societal demands.

As noted in the Handbook for New Students, Carleton boasts outstanding scholars and scholarship. Indeed, this is backed up by the Maclean's survey (1998), in which Carleton was ranked third over nine other universities in terms of the amount of prestigious medical/science grants awarded to faculty members. Carleton also achieved this ranking (tied with Simon Fraser University) in terms of the number of students to win national awards. Clearly, Carleton does not attract the academic 'under-achievers' for which it was once reputed. In fact, for the first time in Carleton's history, the average first-year high school entrance grade was more than 80 percent. This calculation was based on all incoming high school students' marks in the fall of 2000 (Enrolment Management).

Rated number one in terms of attracting out-of-province first year students speaks to Carleton's burgeoning reputation, and ability to meet a diversity of interests. The number of alumni who make contributions to a university may also be considered to reflect the strength of a university's reputation. Past student's who contribute to their alma-mater do so as a reflection of their devotion to the institution that contributed to who they presently are. And in fact, Carleton ranked second amongst 12 other universities in this domain.

Finally, as McLean's points out, "the financial resources at a university's disposal determines its ability to provide students with many valuable opportunities". Within this realm, Carleton is clearly devoted to its students. Testimonial to Carleton's commitment to both the intellectual and social development of its students is exemplified by its rating in terms of the percentage of total operating expenditures devoted to two realms which are inextricably linked to academic excellence, a) scholarship and bursaries, and b) student services. Carleton earned a ranking of 4th and 3rd out of 12 in these categories, respectively.

In a new study published in October, 2000 by Montreal-based Observatoire des sciences et des technologies (OST), which ranked 27 universities across Canada according to research output in the natural, engineering and biomedical sciences, Carleton was ranked first in Canada in international research collaboration and third in terms of the quality of its scientific research output.

In sum, Carleton University has evolved into an institution that ranks among the best comprehensive universities on a number of measures which speak to a university's scholarly reputation and commitment to an academic environment.

Appendix I: Positive Task

Please take a moment to think about the most positive experiences you have had as a student at Carleton University. Select one of the experiences that you think was the most positive. We would like you to take a few minutes to write about this experience and why you chose it.

Appendix J: Statement of Informed Consent to Use Data

The purpose of an informed consent is to ensure that you now understand the true purpose of the study and that you agree to allow your data to be used for research and teaching purposes. Because you were only told of the procedures and not the purpose of this study at the outset, we are now asking for your consent to allow your data to be used for research and teaching purposes.

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to assess students' reactions to a negative challenge to their identity. This research is also attempting to look at how high and low self-monitors cope with negative threats to their identity, and how this is altered when they are exposed to conflict from someone with the same or a different group from themselves.

Anonymity/Confidentiality: The data collected in this study are kept anonymous and confidential. The consent forms are kept separate from your responses.

Right to withdraw data: You have the right to indicate that you do not wish your data to be used in this study. If you indicate this is your choice, then all measures you have provided will be destroyed.

Signatures: I have read the above description of the study concerning self-monitoring types and their reactions to a threat to their identity. The data in the study will be used in research publications or for teaching purposes. My signature indicates that I agree to allow the data I have provided to be used for these purposes.

Full Name (Print): _____

Participant Signature: _____

Date: _____

Researcher Signature: _____

Date: _____

Appendix K: Contact Information

In the event that you have any questions about this study, or anything you wish to discuss further, here are a list of people you can contact.

Kelly Carroll (Student Investigator, 520-2600, X2683)

Chris Motz (Student Investigator, 520-2600, X2683)

Connie Pora (Researcher, 520-2600, X2683)

Charlene Dodd (Researcher, 520-2600, X2683)

Dr. K. Matheson (Faculty Investigator and Chair of Dept. of Psychology, 520-2648)

If you have any ethical concerns about how this study please contact Dr. M. Gick (Chair of the Carleton University Research Ethics Committee for Psychological Research, 520-2600, ext. 2664).

Appendix L: Questionnaires

Self-monitoring Inventory (for pre-selection)

Name: _____

Phone Number: _____

Student Number: _____

e-mail: _____

Sex: Male / Female

The following statements concern your personal reactions to a number of different situations. No two statements are exactly alike, so consider each statement carefully before answering. If a statement is TRUE or MOSTLY TRUE as applied to you, mark T in the space to the left of the statement. If a statement is FALSE or NOT USUALLY TRUE as applied to you, mark F in the space to the left of the statement.

- _____ 1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.
- _____ 2. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like.
- _____ 3. I can only argue for ideas that I already believe.
- _____ 4. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information.
- _____ 5. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others.
- _____ 6. I would probably make a good actor.
- _____ 7. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention.
- _____ 8. In different situations and with different people, I often act like a very different person.
- _____ 9. I am not particularly good at making other people like me.
- _____ 10. I'm not always the person I appear to be.
- _____ 11. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone else or win their favour.
- _____ 12. I have considered being an entertainer.
- _____ 13. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.
- _____ 14. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.
- _____ 15. At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going.
- _____ 16. I feel a bit awkward in company and do not show up quite so well as I should.
- _____ 17. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end).
- _____ 18. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.

Manipulation Check and Appraisal Measures

To what extent do you believe that Dr. Jones' research is:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Unscientific						Scientific

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Unethical						Ethical

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Truthful						Deceptive

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Accurate						Inaccurate

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Believable						Unbelievable

1. How difficult do you think it will be to get a job given the research on Carleton students?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all						Extremely

2. How important is it to you do get a job?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all						Extremely

3. How much control do you think you have to overcome any negative view of Carleton students?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all						Extremely

4. How confident are you that you'll actually overcome any concerns and negative perceptions?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all						Extremely

5. How pervasive do you think negative beliefs about Carleton students are?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hardly anyone believes this						They're held by almost everyone

Personal Opinions

The scale below assesses your private and personal beliefs about Mr. Russell's actions. We are asking you for your *personal opinion* concerning whether his guilt, as opposed to the decision that reached by your jury group.

To what extent do you personally believe that Mr. Russell was guilty?

Not at all Guilty	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Definitely Guilty
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How convinced are you that your own opinion is correct?

Not at all Convinced	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Totally Convinced
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How confident are you that the jury returned the correct verdict regarding Mr. Russell?

Not at all certain	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Definitely the right decision
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Collective Esteem Measure

We would like you to describe how you feel about your identity as a Carleton student, and respond to the following statements on the basis of how you feel about this group and your membership in it at this moment. There are no right or wrong answers to any of these statements; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions. Please read each statement carefully, and respond by using the following scale:

-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3
<i>strongly disagree</i>						<i>strongly agree</i>
_____						1. I am a worthy Carleton University student.
_____						2. Carleton students are considered good by others.
_____						3. I am a typical Carleton student.
_____						4. I feel I don't have much to offer to Carleton University.
_____						5. I am a cooperative Carleton University student.
_____						6. Most people consider a Carleton University education, on average, to be more ineffective than from other Canadian universities.
_____						7. My attending Carleton University has very little to do with how I feel about myself.
_____						8. I feel I'm a useless Carleton University student.
_____						9. I am similar to other students from Carleton.
_____						10. I'm glad to be a student at Carleton University.
_____						11. Others respect Carleton University students.
_____						12. I am a good example of a student from Carleton.
_____						13. I regret that I study at Carleton University.
_____						14. Being a Carleton University student is an important reflection of who I am.
_____						15. I feel that being a student at Carleton University is not worthwhile.
_____						16. I feel good about the university that I belong to.
_____						17. In general, being a Carleton University student is an important part of my self-image.
_____						18. Others think Carleton University students are unworthy.
_____						19. I like to think of myself as a typical student at Carleton.
_____						20. Being a Carleton University student is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am.
_____						21. I have a lot in common with other students at Carleton.

Stereotypes of jury group members (including the confederate)

We would now like you to describe each of the members of your jury group, using the rating scales on the following page. Describe one member at a time. As you can see on the table, each jury member is represented by a letter to identify them. For the first group member, whose letter is A, go down the list of dimensions, and provide the rating that best describes this person. Work through all of the ratings for one juror at a time. When you've finished rating the first juror, go on to rate the second one; when you've finished all of the ratings for the second, go on to the third. Place in the space that you think best describes the extent to which each juror displayed each trait, the letter of that juror.

Just skip the letter that applies to yourself - you will describe yourself on the following page.

Please respond using the traits below:

Lazy:

Hard-working:

Fun to be with:

Adaptable:

Serious:

Easy-going:

Driven to get things done:

Not interested
in learning:

Closed-minded:

Competent:

Likable:

Resourceful:

Committed
to work:

Ill-prepared
to work:

Responsible:

Unmotivated:

Social:

Innovative:

Interesting to
talk to:

Skilled:

Self-Stereotyping

Using the characteristics below, please indicate the extent to which you **YOURSELF** have each attribute. Place an X in the space corresponding to the number that best represents you

Lazy:

Hard-working:

Fun to be with:

Adaptable:

Serious:

Easy-going

Driven to get things done:

Not interested in learning:

Closed-minded:

Competent:
Not at all Extremely

Likable:
Not at all Extremely

Resourceful:
Not at all Extremely

Committed
to work:
Not at all Extremely

Ill-prepared
to work:
Not at all Extremely

Responsible:
Not at all Extremely

Unmotivated:
Not at all Extremely

Social:
Not at all Extremely

Innovative:
Not at all Extremely

Interesting to
talk to:
Not at all Extremely

Skilled:
Not at all Extremely