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DESTINIES WITH GREATNESS OR DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR?

Causes and Consequences of Prime Ministerial Interventions in Response to International Crises

by

DAVID J. MEREN, B.A. (Hons.)

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of:

Master of Arts

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of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Martin Rudner', written over a horizontal line.

Professor Martin Rudner, Director
The Norman Paterson School
of International Affairs

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Harald von Riekhoff', written over a horizontal line.

Professor Harald von Riekhoff, Supervisor

Abstract

This thesis examines Canadian foreign policy decision-making during crisis situations. It compares the interventions of three prime ministers in response to a crisis: (1) the Trudeau Peace Initiative, 1983-1984; (2) the Persian Gulf Crisis, 1990-1991; and, (3) the humanitarian intervention in Zaire, 1996.

Analysis of the cases suggests the necessity of broadening the concept of "crisis" from the objectivist, neo-realist paradigm. Such an approach holds inadequate explanatory power with regard to the liberal internationalist tradition in Canadian foreign policy. Moreover, any explanation of prime ministerial interventions in response to crises must incorporate a discussion of domestic political considerations, pressure from external sources, and subjective factors such as the perceptions and values of senior decision-makers.

While prime ministerial interventions may be laudable and even possess certain advantages, they also promote deficiencies in the decision-making and policy-operationalizing processes. These can result in a foreign policy output that undermines the objective that originally motivated the intervention.

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List of Acronyms

ADFL	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire
CHOGM	Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DEAIT	Department of External Affairs and International Trade
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DND	Department of National Defence
FAZ	Forces Armées de Zaire (Zairian Armed Forces)
INF	Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks
MNF	Multinational Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
PCO	Privy Council Office
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
SCFAIT	House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade
UDU	Ultimate Decision Unit
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNSSOD	United Nations Special Session on Disarmament
ZIT	Zaire Interdepartmental Task Force

Chapter 1 - Introduction

1.1 INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the foreign policy decision-making process in Canada, specifically, the manner in which decision-making occurs in foreign policy crisis situations. On at least three separate occasions within the past two decades, a Canadian prime minister has intervened personally and forcefully in the foreign policy decision-making process. These interventions have occurred for the purpose of initiating foreign policy actions in response to what each prime minister perceived to be an international crisis that threatened the interests of the Canadian state and the interests of his respective ministry.

While such prime ministerial interventions may be commendable and possess certain advantages, such as a capability for a rapid response, the potential negative impact of such interventions raises several serious questions about the foreign policy decision-making process in Canada. These questions are particularly relevant to the appropriateness of responses to foreign policy crises:

- What are the factors connected to foreign policy crises that motivate a prime ministerial intervention in the foreign policy decision-making process?
- What is the relationship between these motivational factors?
- What are the implications of such interventions for the decision-making and policy-operationalizing processes?

- What are the consequences for the appropriateness and effectiveness of the resulting foreign policy output?

In seeking the answers to these questions, this thesis advances three broad arguments. First, the neo-realist theoretical approach that has been predominant in the existing crisis literature is inadequate to the task of understanding Canadian responses to international crises. Specifically, this American-centric approach fails to provide a comprehensive explanation of Canadian prime ministerial actions, and fails to account for a country like Canada, which in the post-World War II era, has sought to identify its "national interest" with the maintenance of a stable, multilateral, liberal internationalist world order.

Second, the thesis argues the necessity of taking into account factors beyond the neo-realist, Cold War-inspired definitions of "crisis" and "national interest," with their heavy emphasis on the international level-of-analysis. Rather, factors at the state, group and individual levels-of-analysis also need to be examined. Domestic political conditions, political culture, foreign policy traditions, and the personal values and perceptions of senior decision makers must be incorporated into any explanation of prime ministerial interventions in response to foreign policy crisis situations.

Third, and most significantly, the thesis argues that there is a causal relationship between the centralization of decision-making structures and processes that occurs in crisis situations, and the subsequent quality of decision-making and resulting policy output. The tendency for authority to contract in crisis situations, coupled with the dynamics of crises, increases the potential occurrence of certain bureaucratic and

psychological deficiencies, thereby undermining the quality of decision-making and the resulting policy output.

1.2 HYPOTHESES

These arguments will be advanced through the testing of the following two general hypotheses and the accompanying auxiliary hypotheses:

HYPOTHESIS 1: A number of independent variables: (1) personal motivations; (2) domestic political concerns; and, (3) pressure to act from sources outside the prime minister's normal circle of advisors; combine with a trigger event that arises from an international crisis. These variables interact to produce the perception of a foreign policy crisis, creating a virtually irresistible pressure on the prime minister to intervene personally and forcefully in the decision-making process.

Auxiliary 1(a) - Personal Motivation: If the prime minister's leadership style or beliefs cause a personal interest to be taken in the international crisis, this interest can interact with the other independent variables and a trigger event, compelling the prime minister to intervene personally and forcefully in the foreign policy decision-making process. This has a distortive effect of personalizing the decision-making and policy-operationalizing processes, and ultimately the foreign policy output.

Auxiliary 1(b) - Political Motivation: If the prime minister is aware of pressures arising from prior political decisions or domestic political issues, such domestic political considerations, although not necessarily related to the crisis directly, can interact with the other independent variables and the trigger event to encourage a prime ministerial intervention. This politicizes the decision-making and policy-operationalizing processes, causing the resulting foreign policy output to be a function of domestic political considerations.

Auxiliary 1(c) - External Motivation: If the prime minister comes under pressure to act from a source(s) outside his normal circle of advisors, particularly after the trigger event, such external pressure can interact with the other independent variables and the trigger event to encourage the prime minister to intervene. This has the effect of the prime ministerial intervention occurring for reasons beyond the Canadian interest, and may result in a policy output that is not reflective of, or is even contrary to, Canadian objectives and capabilities.

Auxiliary 1(d) - Trigger Event: These independent variables interact, and are reinforced by a key event related to the international crisis. This triggering event will result in a combining of the independent variables, creating an almost irresistible pressure on the prime minister to intervene.

HYPOTHESIS 2: The high centralization of the foreign policy power in the Canadian constitutional-institutional context, while facilitating such prime ministerial interventions,

combines with the dynamics of crisis situations to lead to a bypassing of parliamentary, bureaucratic and even ministerial opposition, and the use of *ad hoc* decision-making structures and processes. This increases the probability of deficiencies in the decision-making and policy-operationalizing processes. This increases the risk of a poorly planned and executed foreign policy output that can have negative consequences for Canada's international reputation, the outcome of the crisis, and even the lives of Canadians.

1.3 METHODOLOGY

These hypotheses will be tested using a controlled comparison research strategy. The thesis employs a "disciplined-configurative analytical approach,"¹ which will facilitate the inductive development of a model of Canadian prime ministerial interventions in response to foreign policy crises. The model will incorporate the variables discussed in the hypotheses following their discussion in the description, comparison and analysis of three case studies.

As Eckstein has argued, case studies are valuable at all stages of the theory-building process, but are most valuable at that stage of theory-building where the least value has generally been attached to them: the stage at which candidate theories are tested.² The controlled comparative method involves "testing hypothesized empirical relationships among variables on the basis of the same logic that guides the statistical

¹ Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy*, edited by Paul Gordon Lauren (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 48-51. Also, see Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in *Handbook of Political Science, Volume VII: Strategies of Inquiry*, edited by Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Don Mills: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1975) pp. 99-100.

² Eckstein, p. 80.

method, but in which the cases are selected in such a way so as to maximize the variance of the independent variables and to minimize the dependence of the control variables."³

Vertzberger employs the case study approach in his work on the impact of risk on decisions relating to foreign military interventions. He bases his combination of deductive-theoretical and comparative-historical approaches on three premises:

*(1) To be useful and generalizeable, the analysis has to take place in a real-life context.*⁴

In this thesis, the analysis is rooted in a context of prime ministerial interventions in response to foreign policy crises. This involves the development and application of two interdependent theoretical frameworks. The first serves to explain the motivational forces causing the initial prime ministerial intervention. The second explains the effect that such an intervention has on the decision-making and policy-operationalizing processes.

(2) To provide a comprehensive explanation of multiple causal influences ... the theoretical approach needs to be multivariate and interdisciplinary.

This study involves multiple levels-of-analysis. It comprises the individual level (prime minister's belief system, personality attributes), social level (group dynamics,

³ Arend Lijphart, "The Comparative-Case Strategy in Comparative Research," in *Comparative Political Studies*, v. 8(2), July 1975, p. 164.

⁴ Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, *Risk-Taking and Decisionmaking: Foreign Military Intervention Decisions* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 8.

organizational structure and processes), political level (domestic political considerations, external pressures from governmental and non-governmental sources), cultural level (Canadian cultural-societal attributes and norms, foreign policy tradition), state level (Canadian constitutional-institutional foreign policy context), and the international level (impact of the crisis on the international system).

- (3) *Since explanations that motivate prime ministerial interventions and their subsequent impact on decision-making processes are subject to "equivifinality" (similar choices can result from different causal paths), a credible theoretical analysis should map the spectrum of alternative patterns, rather than presenting unrealistically parsimonious explanatory models.*

This introductory chapter is followed by a deductive-theoretical analysis of crises and decision-making. Chapter 2 presents a review of the theoretical literature on crises. This will include a discussion of the various means of conceptualizing "crisis," and the applicability of the concept to the Canadian context. Special attention will be paid to Canada's foreign policy tradition, political culture, and constitutional-institutional context in order to demonstrate that the dominant neo-realist approach fails to provide a comprehensive explanation of Canadian responses to various crises.

This literature review will be followed in Chapter 3 by a discussion of the various bureaucratic and psychological theories of decision-making, focussing on the impact of crisis on, and consequences of, centralized decision-making structures and processes in crisis situations. American-centric scholarship and a neo-realist bias have dominated the

development of such theories. The application of such theories to the Canadian context will yield insights and conclusions that are more directly relevant to Canada's foreign policy experience.

The second portion of the thesis presents the structured comparison of three case studies, as a means of testing the deductive-theoretical analysis undertaken in the previous chapters, and to facilitate the inductive development of a theoretical model of prime ministerial interventions in crisis situations. Chapter 4 provides the reader with a historical overview of each case. The reader is also directed to the *Appendices* for detailed chronologies. The comparison and evaluation of the three cases in Chapter 5 will entail the discussion and analysis of the following variables referred to in the hypotheses, specifically:

1. The ***independent variables*** are those factors that motivate the prime minister to intervene personally and directly in the foreign policy decision-making process.

These independent variables may be characterized as follows:

- i. ***Personal Motivation*** - This involves the personal beliefs and values of the prime minister relevant to the crisis at hand, including the individual's leadership style and any personal stake the individual may have in the issue.
- ii. ***Political Motivation*** - This pertains to the impact of any prior political decisions that may be related, directly or indirectly, to the foreign policy crisis. Additionally, the prime minister may be affected by considerations of any domestic political benefits arising from the course of action taken. Such

motivations arise from the role (and awareness of that role) occupied by the prime minister as the head of government.

- iii. ***External Motivation*** - Pressure to act from a source outside the prime minister's usual circle of advisors, either governmental or non-governmental. Although more prevalent subsequent to the trigger event, this motivation may also be present preceding the immediate crisis.

These independent variables interact with, and are reinforced by a ***Trigger Event***, a key event that prompts the prime minister to perceive the existence of a foreign policy crisis. Once set in motion, the independent variables have a mutually reinforcing effect, the result of which is the creation of an almost irresistible pressure on the prime minister to intervene.

- 2. Once the independent variables interact to produce the prime ministerial intervention, the prime minister's personal and direct involvement in the foreign policy decision-making process acts as a mediating variable. Combining with the dynamics of crisis decision-making, the intervention gives rise to and interacts with a number of other mediating variables, such as:

- i. ***Bureaucratic/Ministerial Opposition Bypassed*** - The prime minister's intervention, combined with the dynamics of a crisis, results in the bypassing of the concerns of the ministers responsible and their respective departments.
- ii. ***Ad Hoc Decision-Making Structures and Processes*** - The prime ministerial intervention, combined with the dynamics of crisis, leads to a contraction of

decision-making structures and processes, involving the employment of *ad hoc* measures.

- iii. ***Parliament Bypassed*** - The centralization of the decision-making authority reinforces the constitutional-institutional marginalization of the Canadian legislative branch as a consultative mechanism in the foreign policy process.

The cumulative impact of these mediating variables is the increased probability of the occurrence of a number of deficiencies within the decision-making and policy-operationalization processes, including: (1) information failures; (2) groupthink; (3) newgroup syndrome; (4) leader dominance; and, (5) political manipulation.

- 3. The ***dependent variable***, or policy output, is thus the product of decision-making and policy-operationalizing processes that have been affected by the various mediating variables. Each case witnessed a foreign policy response that was inappropriate to Canada's capabilities, and had an outcome that failed to achieve the expressed goals that initially motivated the prime minister to intervene.

This "controlled-comparison strategy" will yield observations and conclusions about the nature of decision-making and policy-operationalizing processes in foreign policy crises from a Canadian perspective. It will also facilitate the inductive development of a theoretical model of prime ministerial interventions in crisis situations. The model and the attending conclusions will be presented in Chapter 6. The result will

be a refinement and expansion of the existing literature on crisis decision-making in Canada.

1.4 CASE STUDY SELECTION

Lijphart argues that while the comparative method does require a careful selection of cases that fit the research problem, employing such an approach minimizes the problems of data reliability and validity. When analyzing a smaller number of cases, it is possible to be more thorough and more attentive to details that are likely to be overlooked in statistical analyses, while also decreasing dependence on data that may not be possible to evaluate properly. Moreover, one can ensure that concepts are not stretched, that the data is as reliable as possible, and that the cases are really independent.⁵

There are, however, challenges posed by this methodological approach, the most significant being the "many variables, small n " problem (where n represents the number of historical cases). Lijphart argues that there are two main responses to this challenge. The first is to maximize the number of cases - statistically manipulating the data in order to test the hypotheses, while control is exercised by means of partial correlation. The second approach, which Lijphart favours (as it involves a truly "comparative" methodology), is to select a smaller number of comparable cases for analysis and achieve a large measure of control by virtue of their comparability.⁶

⁵ Lijphart, pp. 167-171.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

Another methodological challenge stems from the traditional divide between the disciplines of political science and history. As George outlines, political scientists employing historical case studies of a phenomenon typically convert a historical explanation into an analytical one, couched in theoretically useful variables. Historians object that this causes the loss of some of the unique characteristics of the case. Political scientists have responded, however, that the essential issue is whether the loss of information and contraction of the exploration jeopardizes the validity of what George terms the "generic knowledge" generated, and its practical utility for diagnosing and dealing with new instances of the phenomenon.⁷

It is with these arguments in mind that the following cases were selected for study: (1) the Trudeau Peace Initiative, 1983-84; (2) the actions of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney during the Persian Gulf Crisis, 1990-91; and, (3) the attempted Zaire Rescue Mission initiated by Jean Chrétien in 1996.

Superficial examination of the case studies selected might lead to the suggestion that the cases share little in common that would make them useful tools to develop a theoretical model. Indeed, the shooting down of a Korean airliner, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and media images of starving, panicked refugees in central Africa appear highly dissimilar. When viewed through the prism of Canadian foreign policy, however, these events begin to reveal striking similarities. Each event propelled a Canadian prime minister onto the international stage, and into the decision-making process, personally undertaking foreign policy responses that were extraordinary and that had significant implications for Canada. These responses and the manner in which they were arrived at

⁷ Alexander L. George, "Knowledge for Statecraft: The Challenge for Political Science and History," in *International Security*, v. 22(1), summer 1997, pp. 47-48.

will reveal the extreme centralization of the foreign policy decision-making process in Canada, particularly in crisis situations, and the risks that accompany such a concentration of authority.

The neo-realist approach suggests that regardless of any similarities, the cases remain largely unimportant, given that Canada's geopolitical position in the international system means that its national interests, or "the high-priority goals of the decision-making unit," are generally immune from external threats.⁸ This criticism may be addressed, however, by approaching the debate over the applicability of the crisis decision-making literature from a theoretical perspective other than neo-realism, while simultaneously paying greater attention to the various sub-systemic levels-of-analysis. This involves recognition of the Canadian constitutional-institutional context and historical trends within the Canadian political culture and foreign policy tradition. Although this issue will be explored more fully in Chapters 2 and 3, some clarification is required at this point for methodological purposes.

An examination of the liberal internationalist tradition in Canadian foreign policy reveals that there exists in Canada's political culture and its foreign policy establishment a tendency to identify the "national interest" with international order and the maintenance of effective multilateral organizations to ensure stability.⁹ This tendency, combined with

⁸ Charles F. Hermann, "The Concept of Crisis," in *Classic Readings of International Relations*, edited by Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein and Jay M. Shafritz (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1994), p. 292. Also, see P. Stuart Robinson, *The Politics of International Crisis Escalation: Decision-Making Under Pressure* (New York, NY: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996), p. 16.

⁹ For example, see Tom Keating, "The Future of Canadian Multilateralism," in *Canada Among Nations, 1994*, edited by Maureen Appel Mollot and Maxwell Cameron (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1995), pp. 58-59. Also, see Costas Melakopides, *Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1995* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998) pp. 3-6; and James Patrick Sewell, "A World Without Canada: Would Today's United Nations be the Same?" in *Making a Difference? Canada's*

the constitutional-institutional predominance of the executive in the foreign policy process, suggests the relevance of the case studies selected.

For example, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau's 1983-1984 Peace Initiative may be interpreted as his response to the deterioration in superpower relations in the early 1980s, which reached its nadir in September 1983 with the shooting down of a Korean airliner over the Soviet Union. Trudeau was concerned that the international order was threatened by the heated rhetoric that followed the incident. Specifically, he believed that such rhetoric threatened disarmament talks and increased the likelihood of a nuclear exchange between the two superpowers.

In August 1990, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was the first test of the post-Cold War world order and the ability of the United Nations and other multilateral organizations to respond effectively to aggression. Aside from an interest in safeguarding a major source of the industrialized world's oil supply, Prime Minister Mulroney's commitment of Canada to participate in the American-led coalition was meant to gain leverage for Canada, in order to encourage the United States to conduct its operations under United Nations authority. This was seen as a necessity to the greater objective of strengthening the multilateral organization as an effective institution in the post-Cold War era.

Finally, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien's attempt to organize a Canadian-led rescue mission to Zaire in late 1996 may be viewed as another example of Canada's identification of its national interest with the ability of the United Nations, and the international community in general, to respond effectively to international crises. This is

particularly relevant given that the failures of United Nations missions in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda in the early 1990s had undermined the institution's reputation and credibility in dealing with crises in the post-Cold War era.

Examination of the cases reveals a number of similarities that will assist in the development and application of a model for prime ministerial interventions in response to crisis situations. All have at their empirical core the intervention of a prime minister in the foreign policy process that had a significant impact on the subsequent decision-making and policy-operationalizing processes. Each prime ministerial intervention resulted from the interaction of the independent variables discussed above, and led to the emergence of similar deficiencies that affected the foreign policy output.

The case studies also differ in a number of key respects. For example, each case involves a different prime minister, and the cases are cross-partisan in nature.¹⁰ Each case occurred in significantly different international contexts.¹¹ Linked to the different international context is the scope of the crisis that occurred, and the actors that were involved.¹² Finally, each prime ministerial intervention led to a different style of response.¹³ These differences will permit any conclusions yielded from the analysis to be generalizeable and applicable to other prime ministerial interventions.

¹⁰ For example, Trudeau (Liberal); Mulroney (Progressive Conservative); Chrétien (Liberal).

¹¹ For example, Peace Initiative (1983-84) - Cold War; Persian Gulf Crisis (1990-91) - immediate post-Cold War; Zaire Rescue Mission (1996) - latter post-Cold War.

¹² For example, Peace Initiative - superpower; Persian Gulf Crisis - major power/regional; Zaire Rescue Mission - regional/humanitarian.

¹³ For example, Trudeau - high-level political diplomacy; Mulroney - participation in a multilateral coalition; Chrétien - organization/leadership of a multilateral coalition.

Chapter 2 - Crises (and Canada)

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter has two objectives. The first is to arrive at a working definition of "crisis." What is a crisis? Does our understanding of crises vary based on the level-of-analysis employed? Does the conceptualization differ based on the actor(s) involved? Does the traditional neo-realist approach provide a comprehensive explanation? What is the importance of perception in understanding crises? Is an objectivist definition adequate, or are crises an inherently subjective phenomena?

Answering these questions is a prerequisite to the realization of the chapter's second aim - to establish the relevance of the crisis literature to the Canadian foreign policy context. What is the relevance of this discussion and the crisis decision-making literature to a relatively minor power such as Canada? Is Canada ever confronted with crises? If so, how do they manifest themselves? Are there attributes of the Canadian state that make portions of the crisis literature particularly relevant?

These questions will be answered through a review of the theoretical literature on crises, and the application of the conclusions to the Canadian context. Special attention will be paid to the Canadian foreign policy tradition since 1945, as well as the "constitutional-institutional"¹ context of the Canadian foreign policy power. In so doing, the chapter will set the parameters for a discussion of decision-making in crisis situations, with a particular focus on the Canadian context.

¹ This term will be used throughout the thesis; it signifies the constitutional basis of the Canadian foreign policy power, and its relationship to the institutional environment within which this power is exercised.

2.2 CRISIS: TOWARDS A WORKING DEFINITION

There is no consensus in the international relations literature on the definition of "crisis."² The term has virtually become a cliché, used to describe all types of disruption and disorder on the international stage.³ 'Crisis' has been applied to a range of natural and technological disasters, civil disturbances, terrorist actions, acute international conflicts, and the spectre of global nuclear conflict.⁴ It has been so "diffused, refracted and extended" that the concept of "crisis" has become obscured.⁵

At the outset of any theoretical discussion of "crisis," one is confronted with a level-of-analysis problem.⁶ A survey of the major theoretical works reveals that the use of different levels-of-analysis results in varying conceptualizations. Moreover, there has

² The exploration of the concept of "crisis" and the development of a definition could easily constitute a major piece of research in itself. The aim here is not to resolve the theoretical debate. Indeed, it is arguable that the debate is irresolvable. Rather, the goal is to discuss the pertinent literature with a view to revealing the analytical strengths and weaknesses of a number of theoretical perspectives, and to arrive at a working definition that will serve as the basis for further discussion.

³ Michael Brecher, *Crises in World Politics: Theory and Reality* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1993), p. 3.

⁴ Uriel Rosenthal, Paul 't Hart and Alexander Konzmin, "The Bureau-Politics of Crisis Management," in *Public Administration*, v. 69, summer 1991, p. 212. Also, see Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-Making and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 6; and, Charles F. Hermann, "The Concept of Crisis," in *Classic Readings of International Relations*, edited by Phil Williams *et al.*, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1994), pp. 291-292.

⁵ Charles A. McClelland, "The Anticipation of International Crises: Prospects for Theory and Research," in *International Studies Quarterly*, v. 21(1), March 1977, p. 24.

⁶ For a general discussion of this dilemma in the study of international relations, see Jack S. Levy, "Contending Theories of International Conflict: A Levels-of-Analysis Approach," in *Managing Global Chaos*, edited by Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996). Also, see J. David Singer, "The Levels-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," in *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*, edited by G. John Ikenberry (Princeton, NJ: Harper-Collins Publishers, 1989).

been a tendency to argue for the use of a specific level-of-analysis, while incorporating variables into the discussion that would be more appropriate at other levels.

Theoretical approaches to conceptualizing "crisis" employing the international level-of-analysis may be divided into two broad categories. The first describes 'crisis' in terms of process, as a "critical turning point in the international system," accompanied by an abnormal period of intense conflictual interaction.⁷ This process-oriented approach has been criticized as possessing several analytical disadvantages, including that the logic for designating the beginning and end of a crisis is undeveloped. Further, by focussing exclusively on the processes within the international system, this conceptualization often fails to make the linkage between the international system and its component parts (*i.e.*, states). Such an approach also has limited proactive analytical utility, given that it posits a definition that remains unrecognizable until after the fact.⁸

The second category at the international level-of-analysis has been called the "structure-interaction" approach. It posits "crisis" as a situation characterized by basic changes in the interaction between the component parts of an international system that affect the system's structural integrity. It focuses on the characteristics exhibited in a specific situation, or the traits exhibited by a decision-making unit in such a scenario. In making a linkage between the structure and process of the international system, the process-related approach's lack of proactive analytical utility is corrected by specifying essential conditions and potential effects of crisis situations. A weakness of this

⁷ Hermann, pp. 289-292. Snyder and Diesing define crisis as "a sequence of interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states ... short of actual war." Snyder and Diesing, p. 6.

⁸ Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *Crisis, Conflict and Instability* (Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1989), p. 18.

theoretical approach, however, is that while it attempts to analyze crises at the international level, it employs variables more relevant to sub-systemic levels.⁹

Perhaps the most well known definition belonging to the structure-interaction school is that proposed by Hermann, who described "crisis" as "a series of situational characteristics hypothesized to produce certain effects on foreign policy decision-making." These characteristics are: (1) the high-priority goals of the decision-making unit are threatened; (2) the amount of time available for a response is limited, and; (3) members of the decision-making unit are surprised when the threat appears. Hermann argues that although useful in an international level-of-analysis approach, his definition is especially valuable "when studying internal processes by which policies are formed."¹⁰ This demonstrates the tendency of the structure-interaction approach to lead to an overlapping of levels-of-analysis.

Since Hermann first presented his definition, the distinguishing characteristics he proposed have undergone a substantial amount of debate and revision. Snyder and Diesing criticize Hermann's characteristics for obscuring the "state-to-state interaction" aspect of crises, which they regard as fundamental to understanding crises as international political phenomena.¹¹

One of the most ambitious attempts to unite the differing theoretical approaches and resolve the levels-of-analysis dilemma sought to distinguish between what are termed "international crises" and "foreign policy crises." "International crises" occur at the

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19

¹⁰ Hermann, pp. 292-293.

¹¹ Snyder and Diesing, pp. 6-9.

systemic level, and are distinguishable as situational changes characterized by: (1) a distortion in the type and increase in intensity of disruptive interactions between two or more adversaries, with an accompanying probability of military hostilities,¹² which (2) challenges the structure of the existing international system, or dominant or regional sub-systems.¹³

A "foreign policy crisis" occurs at the state level-of-analysis. Brecher and James describe it as a situation with three "individually necessary and collectively sufficient conditions, which arise from a change in a state's external or internal environment." All three conditions build on Hermann's original definition of crisis, and involve perceptions held by the highest-level decision-maker(s): (1) the perception of a threat to one or more basic values of the decision-making unit; (2) a simultaneous or subsequent expectation of a higher probability of involvement in military hostilities, and; (3) an awareness of a finite time for response to the threat to the basic values.¹⁴

In this conceptualization, great emphasis is placed on the linkage between the "international crisis," and the "foreign policy crisis." Each international crisis begins with a foreign policy crisis for one or more states. While the former draws attention to the international level-of-analysis, such phenomena arise from and are accompanied by a behavioural change originating with the latter at the state level.¹⁵

¹² Brecher, p. 3. The following examples of distortions and/or disruptive interactions are presented: a threatening statement; political act; economic act; non-violent military act; indirect violent act; direct military attack; internal challenge to a regime; or a technological/geo-political change that weakens the capacity of states to protect their vital interests, including independence.

¹³ Michael Brecher and Patrick James, "Patterns of Crisis Management," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, v. 32(3), September 1988, p. 430.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 429.

¹⁵ Brecher, p. 4.

In addition to linking the international and state levels-of-analysis, Brecher has departed from Hermann in five essential areas regarding the characteristics of a foreign policy crisis.¹⁶ Firstly, surprise as a defining characteristic is omitted due to the lack of empirical proof of its presence in crises. Hermann himself deleted surprise from his definition after failing to establish the characteristic as generating a measurable result.¹⁷

Secondly, Brecher replaces the characteristic of "short time" with the more subjective "awareness of finite time for response." While some crises may last weeks, others may last many months, a year, or beyond. What is stressed is that there exists a heightened awareness of a pressing need for a decision-maker to take action, to prevent the situation from degenerating.¹⁸

Thirdly, the change or "trigger" that induces the foreign policy crisis may originate in the state's external and/or internal environment. This catalyst involves an escalation of the level of perceived threat, time pressure, and likelihood of war.¹⁹

This is related to the replacement of a threat to the decision-making unit's "high-priority goals" with Brecher's "basic values," the fourth analytical difference.²⁰ The shift away from "goals" to "values" has been echoed by Rosenthal *et al*, who argued that a

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 17. Brecher describes his differences with Hermann's classic definition in five ways: (1) omission of "surprise" as a defining condition; (2) replacement of 'short time' with 'finite time' for response; (3) the change which triggers a crisis may originate in the state's external and/or internal environment of the crisis actor; (4) the use of "basic values" rather than "high-priority goals" as the object of the perceived threat; and, (5) the addition of "perceived heightened probability of involvement" in military hostilities.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 18. See also Snyder and Diesing, p. 6. They argue that while the presence of a sense of urgency is important, an objectively short period of time is not an essential distinguishing characteristic of crises.

¹⁹ Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *A Study of Crisis* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997), p. 8.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

crisis arises from a "threat to fundamental values and norms," and a threat to basic social, institutional and organizational interests and structures.²¹

"Basic values" are described as consisting of those core values that are near constant and few in number (*e.g.*, state survival and avoidance of damage through war). Differing regimes and decision-making groups, in addition to the attentive and mass publics of the state, will share such core values. Basic values, however, also include context-specific "high-priority values," which will vary based on the ideological and/or material interests as defined by decision-makers. A foreign policy crisis is therefore said to exist when a threat is perceived to either core or high-priority values, or a combination thereof, although the former alone, or a combination of the two, will evoke the perception of a greater threat than the latter by itself.²²

Finally, Brecher argues for the addition of a "perceived heightened probability of involvement" in military activity as a characteristic of crisis.²³ This somewhat echoes Snyder and Diesing, who describe crises as involving the "perception of a dangerously high probability of war by the governments involved. Just how high ... is impossible to specify ... it must at least be high enough to evoke feelings of fear and tension to an uncomfortable degree."²⁴ There must be a perception of conflict, since no crisis can exist without the element of risk.²⁵

²¹ Rosenthal *et al.*, p. 212.

²² Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997), pp. 33-34.

²³ Brecher, p. 6.

²⁴ Snyder and Diesing, p. 7.

²⁵ Robert B. McCalla, *Uncertain Perceptions: United States Cold War Crisis Decision-Making* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1992), p. 10.

Brecher does not argue, however, that for a crisis to exist the perception of a war erupting must be high. Rather, the perceived probability of involvement in military activities should be qualitatively higher than normal. It is the increase in the perceived probability, not the specific level of probability itself, which triggers the crisis. In this sense, Brecher's primary concern is with the perception of likely involvement in any military hostilities, or a worsening of hostilities in progress, not just with war involvement. In Brecher's estimation, crises may therefore exist not only prior to war, but also during war.²⁶ This is where he departs from a number of theorists.²⁷

Brecher's work demonstrates the necessity to understand the manifestations of crises at the varying levels-of-analysis and their interconnectedness. This, accompanied by a refining of the characteristics of crises, leads to the development of a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon.

Brecher's definition has been challenged, however, particularly over his description of the characteristics of foreign policy crises. Robinson defines crisis as "a sharply increased likelihood of war perceived by one or more parties to a dispute where one or more of these states perceive a surprising threat to important national interests and an unusually short time response."²⁸

²⁶ Brecher, p.19.

²⁷ For example, according to Snyder and Diesing: "Lying as they do at the nexus between peace and war, crises reveal most clearly and intensely the distinguishing characteristic of international politics and the logical point for theorizing about it: the pervasive expectation of potential war ... It is useful to conceive of crisis as an intermediate zone between peace and war." Snyder and Diesing, pp. 3, 10. Also, see Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); and, P. Stuart Robinson, *The Politics of International Crisis Escalation: Decision-Making Under Pressure* (New York, NY: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996) p. 14.

²⁸ Robinson, p. 16.

Robinson challenges Brecher over not retaining surprise as a characteristic of crises. He suggests that for the conditions of a perceived threat and time restrictions to exist for at least one of the actors, it is almost certain to involve the condition of surprise. Further, the retention of surprise as a variable is argued to assist the analyst in grasping the unusual nature of the situation. It helps explain other characteristics such as a short time response and the increased likelihood of war.²⁹

Further, despite a primary concern with the sub-systemic levels-of-analysis, Robinson uses what appears to be a more realist-oriented approach in his discussion of the political dimension of a crisis, spurning Brecher's concept of "basic values," and favouring the traditional notion of "national interest" as the threatened object. He argues that the term "basic" does not address the issue of whose concerns are at stake. Robinson suggests that a focus on "national interest," as it relates to the motivation of the decision-maker, draws attention to an important and dynamic dimension of crisis - that as the corporeal manifestation of the state, the decision-maker must define the situation in terms of the "national interest," or what appears as the common perception of the "national interest." It is the potential risk to the decision-maker, as the representative of the state, of a threat to the "national interest," that engenders a response and influences subsequent action.³⁰

Robinson also complains that "value" suggests an enduring good, something more substantial and timeless than simply context-dependent preferences. This focus is said to

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19, 37. Robinson argues that "decision-makers are neither isolated utility-maximizing individuals, nor merely bureaucrats caught in the complex web of state machinery. They are the agents of the state. As such they are conscious of a common political culture and attendant set of values, conscious of their role and responsibility, publicly monitored, to pursue the public interest. Their political benefit, even survival depends to a great extent on this."

be misleading, in that it suggests a leader's criteria of action is more constant than is the case. The strength of the concept of "national interest" is that it explains how relatively general and constant values apply to particular and variable circumstances.³¹

Robinson appears to have missed Brecher's point in this instance. Although his point is well taken - that the use of "national interest" will reveal the interplay between constant values and the peculiarities of a given context - Brecher has made the same argument in his work. His distinguishing between "core values" and the "context specific high-priority values" of the decision-making unit accomplishes this important task.

Robinson reserves his greatest criticism for Brecher's subjective "awareness of finite time for response," arguing that decision-makers never feel they have an infinite amount of time to make a decision. The use of the objective "short time" speaks to the quality of the decision-maker's experience, and so holds greater analytical promise. Limited time may be discerned through evidence of increased information-searching, the holding over of other business, the bypassing of usual decision-making channels, and the creation of *ad hoc* groups.³² This is perhaps Robinson's strongest argument against Brecher's foreign policy crisis characteristics. It might therefore be more appropriate to suggest that while a crisis can be said to exist for a longer period of time, "finite time response," either as an objective or subjective phenomenon, is concerned chiefly with the decision-making aspects of a crisis.

It should be pointed out that Robinson's concern here is not related to Brecher's approach to the levels-of-analysis dilemma. Although he does argue that the predilection

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19

³² *Ibid.*

of the literature to rely on abstract levels-of-analysis obscures the political dimension of crisis, his disagreement is primarily with the defining characteristics of "crisis."³³ Underpinning such arguments, however, is the greater issue of what constitutes a "crisis." The case has been made that the rise of multilateral institutions, transnationalism, and increased interdependence, means that the conceptualization of "crisis" has to evolve beyond the narrow neo-realist approach of the past. When discussing the characteristics of crisis, the new understanding may include military concerns, but should also account for other considerations and situations.³⁴

Brecher implies this argument in his critical observation that the vast majority of crisis literature has tended to focus on crises and conflict among the great powers. He argues that lesser political events and actors destabilize parts of the system, often with spillover effects that affect great power relations, and ultimately the stability of the international system as a whole. Non-great powers are affected by, and can affect, international crises. The traditional neo-realist approach, however, has resulted in a paucity of study of crises, both peaceful and violent, among middle and small powers.³⁵

McClelland presents three conceptual models for the future of "crisis." The first is a *transnational* model, in which the occurrence of crisis is based on transnational factors. In this model, crises lose most of their traditional political colouration. Their

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 30. Robinson does criticize Brecher and James, however, for continuing this tendency: "[Their study] encompassing ... unit and systemic levels-of-analysis ... remains no more than a collection of categories unbesmirched by the refinement or semantic order to be expected of genuine theory. There is no attempt, either, to take account of the influence of domestic economics, society and politics."

³⁴ McClelland, pp. 19, 25.

³⁵ Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997), p. 745.

political dimension consists mainly of the process of enlisting cooperative efforts from governments or post-national entities such as the United Nations.³⁶

The second conceptualization is termed the traditional *political-realist* model. This argues that the state will continue to be the predominant actor in the international system. Challenges within the international system, combined with the growth of interdependence and mutual vulnerability in the world will generate demands for solutions from states.³⁷

The third conceptual model, and that favoured by McClelland, is the *eclectic model*, which combines elements of the two other models. Given the transitional nature of the international system, McClelland argues that some crises and their responses will arise from transnationalist impulses, while others will arise from more traditional realist-based motivations.³⁸

Robinson warns against a broadening of the concept of "crisis." He argues that the response of states to a military threat (or one with military implications) is so distinctive (as is the kind of behaviour it engenders), that it is at best counter-productive, and at worse nonsensical, to lump it with other phenomena that may be similar on an abstract level.³⁹

This debate, however, with its continued focus on the international level-of-analysis, may be subsumed into a broader argument - the objective versus subjective

³⁶ McClelland, p. 28.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Robinson, p. 15.

nature of crisis.⁴⁰ An objective approach, focussing on quantifiable and measurable physical phenomena, may be argued to be more closely associated with the traditional neo-realist conceptualization of crisis, with its emphasis on the international and state levels-of-analysis. Conversely, the subjective approach argues implicitly for greater attention to the individual level-of-analysis. This allows greater flexibility in conceptualizing "crisis" and its attributes, and facilitates a greater understanding about the effect of crises on decision-making.

Haas argues that the theoretical literature regarding crises is beset by weaknesses arising from the lack of consensus over the appropriate philosophical and epistemological approaches, in addition to the level-of-analysis problem.⁴¹ Haas outlines the gulf between the materialist (objective) and idealist (subjective) approaches that exists in the metaphysical conceptualizations of crises. The former holds that crises may be understood as measurable, quantifiable, physical phenomena, whereas the latter suggests crises exist solely in the human mind. Haas also discusses the dualist metaphysical approach, which holds that since neither mental nor physical phenomena can be reduced to each other, both possess equal validity. It is therefore essential to examine both the materialist and idealist elements of crises, and understand their interaction and respective consequences. Haas concludes with the recommendation that crises should be considered phenomena with both physical and mental attributes.⁴²

⁴⁰ This argument echoes the arguments of Mor: "The primary factor that has impeded the development of such a [general] theory [of crisis] is the deep gulf that separates the two dominant approaches to crisis research - psychological and the rational-choice model." Ben D. Mor, *Decision and Interaction in Crisis: A Model of International Crisis Behaviour* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publications, 1993), pp. 1-2.

⁴¹ Michael Haas, "Research on International Crisis: Obsolescence of an Approach?" *International Interactions*, v. 13(1), 1986, pp. 26-28.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 24-26, 53-54.

Although there is widespread disagreement over what exactly constitutes a crisis, and what its defining characteristics may be, much of the recent work appears to suggest that the role of perception, the subjective aspect, is essential. For a crisis to exist, it must first be perceived. The way in which decision-makers view events and change their minds has an important impact on the origin, duration and termination of a crisis.⁴³

Holsti was among the first to undertake a detailed study of the perceptions of decision-makers in his study of the relationship between crises, stress and decision-making. He concluded that the threat to important values, time constraints (real and perceived), and the unexpected nature of the event(s) causes decision-makers and decision-making units to experience increased stress levels that impact on behaviour.⁴⁴ Kupperman *et al.* use psychological relativism to distinguish crises "from routine situations by [the existence of] a sense of urgency and concerns that problems will become worse in the absence of action." McClelland goes so far as to argue that "crisis" as a concept has become so confused that threat recognition and response to threat now make better objects for theory development than the notion of "crisis" itself. This is consistent with his call for a broader definition of "crisis," in that it facilitates explanations of how the new definitions of crisis relate to the development and conduct of foreign policy.⁴⁵

⁴³ McCalla, pp. 1, 10.

⁴⁴ Ole R. Holsti, *Crisis, Escalation, War* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972), pp. 9-13. Holsti used the events leading up to the outbreak of World War I and the Cuban Missile Crisis as case studies to determine the characteristics of crisis, their impact on the stress levels of decision-makers and decision-making units, and the cumulative impact on crisis decision-making.

⁴⁵ McClelland, pp. 24-25.

While Hermann's definition may have been discussed and undergone extensive modifications since its presentation, it implicitly focussed attention on activities and behaviour within the decision-making unit itself, and stressed the relativistic nature of crises. For decision-makers to consider themselves to be in a crisis situation, they must first *perceive* the existence of the distinguishing characteristics.⁴⁶

Snyder and Diesing build on this approach and referred to individual perceptions in crises.⁴⁷ Their emphasis on the "sequence of [state-to-state] interaction," however, retains the analytical focus on the state and international levels, neglecting the importance of the information that their theoretical approach suggests may to be gained by paying greater attention to the individual level.⁴⁸

Brecher also stresses the importance of perceptions in his discussion of finite time response, wherein the element that is essential is that decision-makers feel there is pressure to do something about a given situation. It is the *perception* of finite time that adds to the sense of crisis. Brecher also stresses the role of perception in his distinction between international and foreign policy crises. In a foreign policy crisis, the description of the threat present at the state level is reflective of the subjective perception of decision-makers.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Hermann, pp. 292-293.

⁴⁷ Snyder and Diesing, pp. 7-8. The core of their definition is stated as "the *perception* of a dangerously high probability of war by governments involved" [emphasis added]. Further, they argue that "to a considerable extent, it is this element of uncertainty [arising from a lack of control over events and a lack of information about the other side's values and intentions] that lends an event its 'crisis atmosphere.'"

⁴⁸ Thomas C. Wiegale, Gordon Hilton, Kent Layne Oots, and Susan V. Kisel, *Leaders Under Stress: A Psychophysiological Analysis of International Crises* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985), p. 4.

⁴⁹ Brecher, pp. 3, 18.

Given these examples and his admonition to link the various levels-of-analysis, it is ironic that Brecher does not place greater emphasis on the individual level. While itemizing the relativistic characteristics of the foreign policy crisis for the decision-making unit, he neglects to take the next logical step and suggest the need to focus on the perceptions and motivations of those members of the decision-making unit.

This is a point not missed by Robinson, who focuses on how individual leaders deal with decision-making in crisis situations. He lists the most distinguishing features of a crisis as being its abnormality or extraordinariness, its threatening quality, and the sense that something highly valued, or at least well-established, is endangered. Although taking a narrower view than will be employed in this thesis, Robinson concludes that "crisis" is a subject-dependent concept since its status depends on a decision-maker's perspective. Any substantive consideration of crises requires examination of the matter at stake, in whose estimation, and the context in which it exists.⁵⁰

Wiegele *et al.* echoed this sentiment in their early study of crisis and the effect of stress at the individual level-of-analysis. They argue that in focussing on the individual level, greater insight is gained into the reality of crisis decision-making.⁵¹

The following conclusions may be drawn from this overview of the theoretical literature on crises. These will serve as the basis for subsequent discussion. Firstly, crises are complex phenomena that evade a simple, objective definition. Attempts at description and definition will be influenced heavily by the level-of-analysis employed. To gain a comprehensive understanding of crises, therefore, it is important to understand

⁵⁰ Robinson, pp. 13-15. Robinson is "concerned solely with security crises, where security is to be understood in its narrow sense of protection from external military violence, or protection of other national interests through at least potentially violent means, on a national scale."

that they exist as multilevel phenomena, and possess both objective and subjective attributes. Arising from this conclusion is the corollary that the analyst must pay greater attention to the role of the subjective factor of perception, and its interplay with the characteristics of crises at all three levels. Since this thesis examines crisis decision-making, it is appropriate to use a theoretical approach that allows for greater emphasis on the sub-systemic levels-of-analysis.⁵²

At the international level, crises are manifested as a distortion in the type and scope of intensity of disruptive interactions between two or more actors, with an accompanying probability of military hostilities, that challenges the structure of the existing international order's global, dominant or regional systems. At the state level, crises manifest themselves as a perception of a threat to one or more basic values of a state. This results in a simultaneous or subsequent expectation of a higher probability of involvement (directly or indirectly) in military activity, and an awareness of a finite time for decision-making in response to the threat to the value(s) in question.⁵³ Finally, at the individual level-of-analysis, crises are a result of the perception of decision-makers, particularly senior political leaders, who in their roles as the representatives of their states, bear personal responsibility for the response to the situation. It is their perception and interpretation of facts that facilitates the existence of a crisis at the other two levels-of-analysis.

⁵¹ Wiegele *et al.*, p. 4.

⁵³ Brecher and James, pp. 429-30.

The value in this expanded conceptualization of crisis - paying greater attention to multiple levels-of-analysis, and the role of perception - will become apparent when these conclusions are applied to the Canadian experience.

2.3 CRISES (AND CANADA)

Is Canada ever confronted with an international crisis? The answer to this question could be "rarely," by arguing that Canada's geopolitical position and the fact that it is not a great power means that its national interests are largely immune from serious international threat. This observation is predicated, however, on a narrow, neo-realist conceptualization of crisis.⁵⁴ It may be countered by approaching the debate over the applicability of the crisis decision-making literature from a perspective other than neo-realism, while paying greater attention to historical trends within Canada's political culture, the constitutional-institutional context, and the role of perception in crises.

For example, when viewed through a liberal internationalist prism, Canadian foreign policy may be interpreted as having linked the "national interest" to the maintenance of international order and stability, and the enhancement of multilateral organizations designed to achieve such conditions.⁵⁵ The major goal of Canadian foreign policy since 1945 has been to satisfy Canada's interests in pursuit of broader global

⁵⁴ Such a narrow approach suggests that with the exceptions of World War I, World War II and perhaps French President Charles de Gaulle's infamous 'Vive le Quebec libre' speech, Canada is largely immune to crises.

⁵⁵ Tom Keating, "The Future of Canadian Multilateralism", in *Canada Among Nations, 1994*, edited by Maureen Appell Mollot and Maxwell Cameron (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1995), pp. 56-59.

interests.⁵⁶ Eayrs argues that Canada was "born allied," and came of age internationally at the same time as the establishment of the United Nations, thus "incorporating an identity of purpose between itself and the United Nations into ... its foreign policy."⁵⁷

Melakopides has described post-1945 Canadian foreign policy as consistently pursuing a course of "pragmatic idealism." The idealist component consists of a set of interests conditioned by human values, which reflect the principles, interests, and values of the country's mainstream political culture.⁵⁸ The pragmatic component is argued to have shaped the pursuit of these values and led to their harmonization with Canada's specific national interests. Canadian liberal internationalism is thus "far more flexible than realism, while being far more realistic than utopianism."⁵⁹

Given Canada's position vis-à-vis the United States and the United Kingdom, multilateralism has been an effective way to promote Canada's freedom and independence. Canada's international distinction, prestige and influence have been derived from its pursuit of a liberal internationalist agenda.⁶⁰ Although this suggests that the motivation may have been less moral than practical in its origins, the net result is the same - Canada's national interest has become linked to the global interest.⁶¹ Such a

⁵⁶ Costas Melakopides, *Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1995* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998), p. 2.

⁵⁷ Quoted in James Patrick Sewell, "A World Without Canada: Would Today's United Nations be the Same?", in *Making a Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order*, edited by John English and Norman Hillmer (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1992), p. 195.

⁵⁸ Melakopides, pp. 3-4, 17. These are listed as being "the primacy of justice, satisfaction of global and human needs, existence of extra-boundary duties, respect for universal human rights, and the importance of moderation, communication, generosity and cooperation in international affairs."

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁶¹ Andrew Cohen, "Canada in the World: The Return of the National Interest," *Behind the Headlines*, v. 52(4), summer 1995, edited by Gayle Fraser (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1995) p. 1.

linkage leads to the perception of international crises, particularly those that test the resolve and stability of the international order and its multilateral institutions, as being threats to Canada's national interest, even though Canada may not necessarily be directly involved.⁶²

The Canadian liberal internationalist approach in the post-Cold War order continues to seek to employ and strengthen multilateral associations to secure its overriding foreign policy objectives. Although the longstanding concern of a nuclear exchange between the superpowers has dissipated, a senior Canadian official has noted that "the end of the Cold War ... has opened up more instability and more challenges to security and more dangers of armed conflict in the world."⁶³

In spite of its heavy pragmatic emphasis on the economic aspects of Canada's foreign policy, the government's response to the report of the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee on Canadian Foreign Policy strongly echoes these sentiments. The response has been criticized for having diluted, and even denied the liberal internationalist

⁶² This view is readily apparent in the *1994 Defence White Paper*: "Canada's commitment to remain an active participant in multilateral efforts to promote collective security is a reflection of our values and interests: (1) Canadians believe that the rule of law must govern relations between states; (2) Canadians have deemed their own security indivisible from that of their allies; (3) Canadians have a strong sense of responsibility to alleviate suffering and respond where their efforts can make a difference.

These are the abiding foundations of Canada's commitment to collective security. They have proven their worth in the past ... Canadians are internationalist and not isolationist by nature ... Multilateral security cooperation is not merely a Canadian tradition; it is the expression of Canadian values in the international sphere. We care about the course of events abroad, and we are willing to work with other countries to improve the lot of all manner of peoples ... Canada's experience has also underscored the need to develop and maintain effective multilateral institutions that can address security and stability - and that can respond effectively to aggression should other measures fail ... [M]ore than ever, multilateralism needs and deserves our support - not only in terms of our words and ideas, but also in terms of tangible Canadian contributions to international security and well-being." Canada, Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1994), pp. 12, 27-29.

⁶³ Andrew F. Cooper, "Stretching the Boundaries of Security", in *Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Publishers, 1997), pp. 112-114.

principles that have driven Canada's foreign policy since World War II.⁶⁴ Notwithstanding this criticism, *Canada in the World* may also be construed as the latest evolution of the liberal internationalist tradition in Canadian foreign policy. For example, the document described Canadian security interests as including non-traditional, transnational threats such as terrorism, international crime, smuggling, drugs, pollution, disease, overpopulation, and refugee flows.⁶⁵ In a document heavily influenced by economic considerations and preoccupied with the impact of the fiscal reality of the early 1990s on Canada's foreign policy capabilities, "it is striking that the government should claim that the concerns of Canadians about security issues are broader than self-interest."⁶⁶

Similarly, the Canadian foreign policy review's references to "human security," - the argument that global security is at risk until the security of the person is guaranteed,⁶⁷ - may be interpreted as another manifestation of what has consistently been the primary goal of the Canadian state in the post-1945 era. Specifically, the maintenance of a peaceful, stable international order in which "rules matter more than the arbitrary use of power, where weaker states have the ability to form coalitions that can influence both agendas and outcomes, and where decisions are made on the basis of expertise and bargaining instead of brute force."⁶⁸

⁶⁴ Cohen, p. 3.

⁶⁵ Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs, *Canada in the World: Government Statement* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1995), pp. 1-9.

⁶⁶ Cohen, p. 10.

⁶⁷ Canada, Report of the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, *Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priority for the Future* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1994), pp. 11-13.

⁶⁸ Keating, p. 75. Also, David B. DeWitt and David Leyton-Brown, "Canada's International Security Policy," in *Canada's International Security Policy*, edited by David B. DeWitt and Donald Leyton-Brown

Such passages serve as a reflection of Canada's mainstream political culture, and may represent an acknowledgement on the part of the government that Canadians still have a strong sense of what should be their foreign policy. *Canada in the World* was written to signal not the abandonment of this tradition, but its adaptation to the fiscal realities of the early 1990s. The government appears to have understood that "Canada has too much history to wash its hands of the world."⁶⁹

Beyond neglecting the liberal internationalist tendencies in Canadian political culture, the traditional neo-realist approach to crises, focussing as it does on the systemic level and relying on the rational-actor model of state behaviour, ignores the vagaries of the Canadian constitutional-institutional context.

Writing about the formulation of Canadian foreign policy in the 1920s and 1930s, the historian C.P. Stacey claimed it was determined largely by the personal temperament and wishes of the prime minister.⁷⁰ In many respects, this assertion holds true in the contemporary period. This, despite the massive expansion of Canada's decision-making apparatus and the various attempts at rationalizing the foreign policy bureaucracy that have occurred during the twentieth century.

(Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1995), p. 4. DeWitt and Leyton-Brown quote a senior Canadian official as describing Canada's post-Cold War security policy as being threefold: "*First, it is the encouragement of a stable, prosperous world community.* [emphasis added] Second, it is the pursuit of national security interests defined as the protection and enhancement of Canadian sovereignty in an increasingly interdependent world. Third, security policy is concerned with the protection and enhancement of Canada's international economic competitiveness."

⁶⁹ Cohen, pp. 14-15. Cohen predicted in 1995 that the neo-realist, less "boy-scoutish" orientation of the Canadian 'national interest' contained in *Canada in the World* would meet a similar fate as what befell 1970's *Foreign Policy for Canadians*. Cohen stated "[t]he internationalist impulse in Canada should never be understated, much as this government may undermine it. It endures despite the odds ... Let us remember: as rational and skeptical as Pierre Trudeau was, he left office almost as Pearsonian as Pearson himself, with his government committed foursquare to those [liberal internationalist] values he had once scorned." Recent trends in the direction of Canadian foreign policy, particularly since the appointment of Lloyd Axworthy to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, would seem to validate Cohen's prediction.

Such an argument may be understood when one examines the constitutional-institutional framework of foreign policy decision-making that Canada inherited from the United Kingdom. The formal authority to formulate Canada's foreign policy is vested in the Crown, in keeping with the principle of state sovereignty established by the *Peace of Westphalia* (1648). In practice, of course, this authority is exercised by the executive-in-council, or cabinet. In the context of Canada's Westminster-based parliamentary system, which fuses the executive and legislative branches of government together, this constitutional-institutional framework has facilitated the preeminence of the prime minister in the foreign policy process.⁷¹ This preeminence arises from the several roles conferred on the prime minister through partisan or conventional authority.⁷²

This is not to suggest that the prime minister has a completely free hand in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. To conduct a foreign policy at all, the prime minister and government require the confidence of a majority in the House of Commons. As long as majority support is ensured, however, the executive possesses the far-reaching prerogative to conduct Canadian foreign policy as it deems fit.⁷³

As Nossal has written, any study of Canadian foreign policy must focus on "the central core of cabinet ministers most heavily involved in foreign policy decision-making. Depending on the issue, that circle may include the ministers of National

⁷⁰ Quoted in Kim Richard Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1997), pp. 179-180.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 175-176.

⁷² Colin A. Campbell, "Political Leadership in Canada: Pierre Elliott Trudeau and the Ottawa Model," in *Presidents and Prime Ministers* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980), p. 61.

⁷³ Nossal, pp. 269-270.

Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Trade, and Finance. Given the constitutional-institutional framework in Canada, however, when it comes to important issues [*i.e.*, issues to which the prime minister or his advisors attach particular interest], the prime minister will likely be at the centre."⁷⁴

The result is that, far more so than in the United States, Canada's constitutional-institutional framework centralizes the foreign policy authority in the executive branch, facilitating a dominance, when the prime minister is so inclined, of the foreign policy decision-making process.⁷⁵ This dynamic is particularly apparent in situations such as crises, which by their nature, are of particular interest to the prime minister. Recalling the importance of the perception and the relativistic nature of foreign policy crises, a threat to basic values exists when the decision-making unit perceives it to exist. In other words, if the prime minister perceives there to be a crisis, then a *de facto* crisis exists.

Recalling the working definition of crisis arrived at previously, we may therefore conclude that the crisis decision-making literature is relevant to the Canadian experience. At the international level, a distortion or disruption within the structure and processes of the international system, accompanied by an increased probability of military activities, whether or not Canada is directly involved, has the potential to be interpreted as signaling the existence of an international crisis from a Canadian perspective.

This interpretation leads to the state level-of-analysis, in keeping with the argument that international crises and foreign policy crises may occur concurrently. At the state level, there exists a tendency in Canadian political culture and its foreign policy establishment to identify the "Canadian interest" with the maintenance of a stable, liberal,

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

multilateralist international order. A threat to this order and/or the context-specific goals of the decision-making unit results in the perception of a threat to the basic values of the Canadian state. This combines the expectation of a higher probability of involvement in military hostilities (either directly through efforts to maintain the international order, or indirectly as a consequence of the breakdown in the international order). It also is impacted by an awareness of a finite time for a response. This results in a perception by senior decision-makers that Canada is experiencing a foreign policy crisis.

Finally, this draws attention to the individual level, since an international and/or foreign policy crisis for Canada manifests itself in the perception of the decision-makers, particularly the senior political leaders, who, in their roles as the representatives of the state, bear the responsibility for any response to the situation. The constitutional-institutional predominance of the executive in the foreign policy process, specifically the prime minister, dictates that the prime minister's perceptions and interpretations of the situational context have a potentially large bearing on the existence of crisis, and any subsequent response. These conclusions will become even more apparent when examining examples of Canadian responses to crisis situations.

⁷⁵ Campbell, p. 61.

Chapter 3 - Crises and Decision-Making

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Having established the parameters of crises, and demonstrated the relevance of the scholarly literature to Canada, this chapter examines decision-making in crisis situations. As was suggested in Chapter 2, a comprehensive study of crisis entails examination of the phenomenon at multiple levels-of-analysis, while taking into account the importance of subjective attributes. To do otherwise, while perhaps facilitating the development of a parsimonious theoretical model, is to risk the possibility of neglecting an important reality - that it is people, not nation-states, who make foreign policy.¹

This chapter examines the centralization of decision-making structures and processes that occurs in crisis situations. As a part of this discussion, attention is paid to the motivational factors prompting prime ministerial responses to foreign policy crises. The chapter also explores the impact that such centralization of authority has on the quality of decision-making and the resulting policy output.

What is it about a crisis that causes authority to contract within the executive branch and results in centralized decision-making structures and processes? What is the relationship, if any, between the process and structure of decision-making, the quality of decision-making, and the resulting policy output? What are the ramifications of the

¹ Charles A. Powell, James W. Dyson, and Helen E. Purkitt, "Opening the 'Black Box': Cognitive Processing and Optimal Choice in Foreign Policy Decision-Making," in *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, edited by Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr. and James N. Rosenau (London: Harper-Collins Academic, 1987), p. 205.

centralization of decision-making and authority? What is the relevance of this discussion to Canada?

Exploration of these questions leads to the conclusion that the tendency for authority to contract in crises, coupled with the dynamics of high-pressure situations, increases the probability of certain deficiencies arising in the decision-making and policy-operationalizing processes, undermining the quality of the processes and the subsequent policy output.

Such conclusions are particularly relevant to the Canadian context. Chapter 2 argued that Canada possesses a constitutional-institutional framework that is predisposed to concentrating foreign policy power in the executive branch, facilitating prime ministerial dominance of the decision-making process, especially in foreign policy crises. Canada may thus be particularly susceptible to certain decision-making deficiencies.

3.2 CRISIS: IMMEDIATE IMPACT ON DECISION-MAKING

As Haas has suggested, any research undertaken on crisis decision-making is based on a presumption that it differs fundamentally from non-crisis decision-making.²

Howlett and Ramesh argue, however, that a theoretical model of any type of decision-making should identify: the actors involved in the policy process and the

² Michael Haas, "Research on International Crisis: Obsolescence of an Approach?" *International Interactions*, v. 13(1), 1986, p. 24.

interests they pursue; the institutional context; the set of ideas and beliefs surrounding a policy problem; and the impact of various contingencies and past experiences.³

In the late 1960s and 1970s, sparked in part by the Cuban Missile Crisis, much attention began to be given to the manner in which governments arrive at and implement policy decisions, particularly during crisis situations. The work of Allison was of great significance, in that he presented alternatives to the rational-actor model traditionally used in foreign policy analysis. Allison's bureaucratic-politics and organizational-process models challenged the view of government as a self-contained unit in pursuit of "the national interest."⁴

Rather, bureaucratic conflict and organizational context were presented as obstacles to effective decision-making. Decisions were argued to emerge not as the expression of a readily apparent "national interest" from a uniform bureaucratic apparatus, but as the result of bargaining between the components of the government, each with its own specific agenda, concerns and perception of what constituted "the national interest."⁵

Canada's legislative branch may not enjoy the same control over foreign policy as its American counterpart, but the Canadian policy process is not immune to such conflict and competition at both the bureaucratic and ministerial levels. The cabinet-based system

³ Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh, *Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems* (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 13.

⁴ Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," in *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*, edited by G. John Ikenberry (New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 1989), pp. 332-378. Also, see Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," in *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*, edited by G. John Ikenberry (New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 1989), pp. 378-418.

⁵ Allison and Halperin, pp. 378-418.

of government does not eliminate bureaucratic and ministerial fragmentation, but changes its manifestation and shields it from public view. The presence of strong central agencies mandated to coordinate and arbitrate bureaucratic interests, combined with the growing tendency in the Canadian system to assign the formulation of policy to standing and *ad hoc* interdepartmental committees facilitates the interaction that is the basis of the bureaucratic-politics model.⁶

Although Allison's models have been recognized as a significant contribution to the foreign policy analysis literature, they have also been criticized for "de-emphasizing the underlying hierarchy of power ... ignoring the possibility that the agenda and the arena of bureaucratic conflict are determined by the distribution of authority."⁷ Krasner challenged Allison's bureaucratic-politics model, arguing that it threatened to obscure the power of the executive branch, absolve senior officials of responsibility for their actions, and offered leaders a convenient excuse for failures.⁸

Krasner suggested that while bureaucratic interests may sometimes be decisive in the formulation of foreign policy, this happens when the executive fails to assert sufficient control over decision-making. The executive is able to counter bureaucratic constraints through its ability to shape the structure and process of the decision-making environment. This includes the choice of advisors, the regulation of the access of

⁶ Kim Richard Nossal, "Allison through the (Ottawa) Looking Glass: Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy in a Parliamentary System," *Canadian Public Administration*, v. 22, 1979, p. 617.

⁷ P. Stuart Robinson, *The Politics of International Crisis Escalation: Decision-Making Under Pressure* (New York, NY: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996), p. 11.

⁸ Stephen D. Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)," in *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*, edited by G. John Ikenberry (New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 1989), p. 420.

advisors and bureaucrats, and the influencing of bureaucratic interests.⁹ Krasner's critique of the bureaucratic-politics model appears to support the contraction of authority in crisis situations, implying that to ensure effective policy responses, the executive branch should retain and exercise a strict, central control over decision-making.

Krasner's proposal for centralized executive control over bureaucratic competition is realized in the Canadian political system. The priority of the Canadian executive branch has been to avoid bureaucratic and ministerial fragmentation, and achieving coordination between the various bureaucratic departments. The executive branch has sought to achieve this goal through the use of strong central agencies, such as the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the Privy Council Office (PCO), which are mandated to coordinate policy and act as arbiters in interdepartmental disputes.¹⁰ In the past thirty years, these agencies have come to enjoy an increasingly large measure of influence in the policy-making process. This concentration of political authority in the executive allows it to impose constraints on legitimate bureaucratic conflict, while exercising preponderant control over the structure, process, and outcomes of decision-making.¹¹

General agreement appears to exist in the scholarly literature that an immediate consequence of the eruption of a crisis situation is in fact a contracting of authority and a

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 425-426.

¹⁰ Kim Richard Nossal, "Bureaucratic Politics and the Westminster Model," in *International Conflict and Conflict Management*, edited by Robert O. Matthews, Janice Gross Stein and Arthur G. Rubinoff, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1989), pp. 122-123.

¹¹ Harald von Riekhoff, "The Structure of Foreign Policy Decision-Making and Management" in *Canada Among Nations, 1986*, edited by Brian W. Tomlin and Maureen Appel Mollot (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1987), pp. 14-20. This was also the assertion of former Canadian Prime Minister Joe Clark, who maintained that the cabinet committee system became captive of the PMO and PCO, thus reducing ministerial [decision-making] autonomy. Joe Clark, Speech, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, March 18, 1998, question posed by the author.

centralizing of the decision-making structure and process in the executive branch.¹² This reduces the number of individuals and groups involved in decision-making.¹³ This arises from the dynamics (both international and domestic) of crises, which serve to enhance the political executive's authority and its definition of the national interest.¹⁴ "In crises, responsibility for action moves upward precisely because important values are threatened, standard operating procedures are inadequate, and necessary decisions exceed the authority and competence of junior, often less experienced officials."¹⁵

Supporters of the centralizing of authority that occurs in crisis situations argue that it is desirable, given the necessity of secrecy, prompt action, and the minimizing of bureaucratic conflict, and ascribe such capabilities exclusively to the executive.¹⁶ This argument is predicated on an expectation that the decision-making unit "operates with an understanding of the necessity of considering a range of options, for making reality-based

¹² This is the contention of several pieces of the crisis-decision-making literature. For examples, see: Louis Fisher, "Congressional Checks on Military Initiatives," *Political Science Quarterly*, v. 109(5), 1994-5, pp. 742-743; Alexander L. George, *Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), p. 88; Patrick Haney, "Structure and Process in the Analysis of Foreign Policy," in *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation*, edited by Laura Neack, Jeane A.K. Hey, and Patrick J. Haney, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995), p. 104; Fen Osler Hampson, "The Divided Decision Maker: American Domestic Politics and the Cuban Crises," *International Security*, v. 9(3), winter 1984, pp. 131-132; Ole R. Holsti, *Crisis, Escalation, War* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972), p. 20; P. Stuart Robinson, *The Politics of International Crisis Escalation* (New York, NY: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996), p. 12; Carolyn Smart and Ilan Vertinsky, "Designs for Crisis Decision Units," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, v. 22, December 1977, p. 643; and Paul 't Hart and Thomas Preston, "Towards a Political Psychology of Bureaucratic Politics: Explorations on the Role of Political Leaders and Intergroup Dynamics in Bureaucratic Conflict Resolution," paper presented at International Studies Association Meeting, Toronto, Ontario, March 18-22, 1997, p. 4

¹³ Smart and Vertinsky, p. 643.

¹⁴ Robinson, p. 12.

¹⁵ Hampson, p. 131.

¹⁶ Fisher, p. 742.

appraisals of potential policies, and for avoiding hazards of conformity pressures that lead to the stifling of critical viewpoints."¹⁷

This argument has been reflected in subsequent works that assert that crisis situations enhance the executive authority while mitigating the impact of bureaucratic politics.¹⁸ Jensen suggests that the characteristics and demands of international crises lead to the executive's employing of decision-making structures and processes that result in decisions that are "less likely to be watered down through bureaucratic compromise."¹⁹ Arising from a desire not to leave important decision-making vulnerable to bureaucratic conflict, decision-makers bypass normal bureaucratic channels, employ *ad hoc* structures and processes, and tend to exercise unusual levels of direct control over the decision-making process.²⁰

A desire to mute the impact of bureaucratic conflict is only one factor, however, in the explanation of the contraction of decision-making authority. For example, the first generation of crisis decision-making literature neglected the impact of political and domestic considerations when explaining the contraction of authority.²¹ When discussed at all, the conventional wisdom posited that the contraction of authority would reduce the impact of domestic political pressures on decision-makers during a crisis.²² The

¹⁷ George, p. 88.

¹⁸ Robinson, p. 12.

¹⁹ Lloyd Jensen, *Explaining Foreign Policy* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Ltd., 1982), p. 151.

²⁰ Robinson, p. 12.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 28.

²² Hampson, pp. 131-132. In a discussion of the impact of domestic political considerations on crisis decision-making, Hampson outlines the conventional view of crisis: "domestic political pressures on the decision-making process is attenuated because the contraction of authority in the executive branch limits

outbreak of crises was thought to lead to the abandoning of the pursuit of parochial interests as a means to generating unanimity and facilitating a coordinated institutional response. Such a view, however, was grounded in a rational, unitary understanding of the state.²³

Hampson has argued that domestic political pressures are in reality an important factor in crisis decision-making, and help explain the initial contraction of authority. When leaders perceive a crisis to be a threat to their political survival, they respond in a manner that they believe best safeguards their political career. This preoccupation with domestic political concerns contributes to the centralizing of decision-making, as leaders tend to rely on their closest advisors for support and advice in such situations.²⁴

Robinson has reiterated this argument in his depiction of senior decision-makers as "agents of the state." As such, they are conscious of their role and responsibility, publicly monitored, to pursue the public interest, and are cognizant that their political benefit and survival depends on their success in this pursuit.²⁵

The predominance of neo-realist discourse has also obscured the role played by an individual's perceptions, beliefs and personality in the centralizing of the structures, process and authority of decision-making. Such materialist approaches to foreign policy

the number of individuals and groups who are involved in the decision-making process ... [d]uring crises, initially at least, there is ... likely to be a reduction in the salience of domestic politics, in part because of the desirability of maintaining secrecy."

²³ Uriel Rosenthal, Paul 't Hart and Alexander Konzmin, "The Bureau-Politics of Crisis Management," *Public Administration*, v. 69, summer 1991, p. 212.

²⁴ Hampson, pp. 143-144, 163-164. Hampson argues that the traditional literature fails to take into account that decision-makers and decision-making units face multiple risks from both the domestic and international fronts in crisis situations. He argues that the political executive's first priority is its continued political health: "rare is the President who is prepared to sacrifice his own political interests for the sake of some broader national purpose, particularly when the two cannot be reconciled."

²⁵ Robinson, pp. 37, 62.

behaviour are potentially misleading, in that they tend to treat governmental action as a non-cognitive political phenomenon, given that political institutions stand between individual cognition and foreign policy outputs. This has led to a tendency to describe foreign policy behaviour, even in crises, as being "the product of a set of binary choices over an array of non-competing sources of action implemented by a collection of loosely coupled governmental sub-units." The rational-actor model employed in neo-realism depersonalizes crisis decision-making, not accounting for variables such as personal characteristics.²⁶ Instead, it posits an apolitical 'statesman' who chooses the most appropriate foreign policy option. Presuming such behaviour to be coherent and planned is problematic at best.²⁷

Vertzberger states that a decision-maker's definition of a situation is vital, given that it affects foreign policy choices and the structure of the decision-making unit and its procedures. He depicts foreign policy as not only a process of strategic interaction, but as one of symbolic interaction in the sense that "human beings interpret or 'define' each other's actions instead of merely reacting to each other's actions. Any 'response' is not made directly to specific actions, but to the meaning that ... [is] attach[ed] to the actions."²⁸

²⁶ Brian Ripley, "Cognition, Culture and Bureaucratic Politics," in *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation*, edited by Laura Neack *et al.*, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995), pp. 87, 89; Rosati, p. 50.

²⁷ Paul A. Anderson, "What Do Decision-makers Do When They Make a Foreign Policy Decision? The Implications for the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy," in *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, edited by Charles F. Hermann *et al.*, (London: Harper-Collins Academic, 1987), pp. 288, 307.

²⁸ Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, *The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decision-Making* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 7-8. Vertzberger argues that a decision-maker will go through five basic cognitive steps when confronted with a new international situation that requires a policy response: (1) initial amplification of relevant beliefs; (2) search for historical antecedents explaining the events; (3) search for consequences of likely future

Holsti suggests that the cognitive processes of key foreign policy decision-makers are particularly relevant in a number of situations. He emphasizes contexts requiring innovative decision-making; cases where decisions are made under highly complex, stressful, ambiguous or unanticipated circumstances; and in scenarios in which individuals at the top of an organizational hierarchy make the decisions.²⁹ Holsti contends that decision-making under circumstances of crisis-induced stress differs from non-crisis decision-making situations in a number of respects. Crisis situations create high amounts of stress for the individuals and organizations involved. For example, the onset of crisis-related stress leads to increased perceptions of time constraints, which affects decision-making in a number of ways, including increased cognitive rigidity, short-term thinking, and a failure to identify various policy alternatives.³⁰

The cumulative result of such stress-related behaviour is that high-quality decision-making is undermined. Broad consultations may be rendered impossible, given that there is a tendency to consult others to a lesser extent, or to rely more upon those who support the prevailing wisdom, as time pressures, real or perceived increase.³¹

behaviour of actors involved; (4) search for policy alternatives; and, (5) policy choice. Also, see Jerel A. Rosati, "A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy," in *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation*, edited by Laura Neack *et al.*, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995), p. 56.

²⁹ Powell *et al.*, p. 207.

³⁰ Holsti, pp. 11, 141, 167. Holsti uses as his case studies the July Crisis, 1914, which preceded the outbreak of World War I, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. With regard to the former, he contends that time pressure increased during the most intense stages of the crisis. The decision-makers of 1914 *perceived* that time was of the essence, and it shaped their subsequent behaviour. It is worth pointing out, however, that with regard to this case study, Holsti acknowledges that not all of the decisions of July, 1914 can be attributed to human failing under intense pressure. Objective factors such as the rigidity of military mobilization plans also played a substantial role.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

Such arguments suggest the value of a subjective approach to crisis decision-making. The socio-cognitive approach recognizes that the core of any decision-making and information processing operation is the human being, whose personality structure, attributes and style can have a decisive, and sometimes dominant effect on the manner and outcome of information processing.³² The decision-making approach to explaining foreign policy behaviour posits that international affairs cannot be explained without reference to the beliefs, values and personalities of decision-makers.³³ This approach is particularly relevant to the Canadian experience, given the preeminence of the prime minister, and the constitutional-institutional context of foreign policy decision-making.

An individual's prior beliefs and expectations play an integral role in structuring perceptions through all stages of foreign policy decision-making, from problem definition to understanding, analysis, evaluation and response. Interrelated aspects of cognition such as prior beliefs act as relatively stable filters throughout the decision-making process. It should be stressed, however, that cognitive processes are only one set of variables among many that influence the outcome.³⁴ For most analysts, the purely "subjective" elements of discourse analyses have been tempered by recognition of the need to incorporate institutional elements into the analysis. This acknowledges the fact that public policy theory must take into account the complex interplay of both ideas and material conditions in the decision-making process.³⁵

³² Vertzberger, pp. 7-8.

³³ Zeev Maoz, *National Choices and International Processes* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 50.

³⁴ Powell *et al.*, p. 206.

³⁵ Howlett and Ramesh, pp. 109-111.

This approach is part of an enduring debate over the relationship between the impact of domestic and international characteristics on foreign policy decision-making, versus the impact of psychological characteristics and idiosyncrasies. Walker has proposed to resolve the debate through the use of role and exchange theory, arguing that the origins of foreign policy decisions may be found in the interaction the shared core beliefs of a country's authoritative decision-makers and the situation that they perceive as problematic. Using such an approach addresses both the objective and subjective nature of crisis situations.³⁶

For a variety of reasons then, existing at the individual, domestic and international levels, crises provide the justification for a centralization of authority to ensure that the governmental response will be both efficient and effective. Is this a wise course of action? Such situations can lead to an uncritical support for excessive concentration of power.³⁷ An examination of the linkages between centralized decision-making structures and processes, followed by an overview of the potential consequences of such centralization reveals this to be the case. The centralization of decision-making authority, structures and processes, combined with the characteristics of crises, are conditions that increase the risk of a number of deficiencies that can undermine the decision-making and policy-operationalizing processes.

³⁶ Stephen G. Walker, "Role Theory and the Origins of Foreign Policy," in *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, edited by Charles F. Hermann *et al.*, (London: Harper-Collins Academic, 1987) pp. 269-270. Walker cites role theory as providing insights into the role and idiosyncratic dispositions of the decision-maker(s), while exchange theory specifies the primacy of domestic and international sources of foreign policy under different conditions.

³⁷ Rosenthal *et al.*, p. 212.

3.3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STRUCTURE, PROCESS AND OUTPUT OF CRISIS DECISION-MAKING

As Holsti has observed, "policy-making in crisis situations is not simply a process of selecting from a neatly delineated set of alternatives; rather, it is usually concerned with seeking out and perhaps even creating options, under levels of intense pressure."³⁸ Putting in place the structures and processes to cope with crises is thus a significant organizational goal for any foreign policy establishment.³⁹

Structure may be defined as the organizational configuration in which foreign policy decision-making takes place. This may involve a broad set of formal institutions and their organization, or much smaller, perhaps less formal decision-making groups, and how they are configured in a crisis. This reflects Ikenberry's description of structures as "both the organizational characteristics of groups and the rules and norms that guide the relationship between actors." It draws attention to both the formal and informal structures used in decision-making.⁴⁰ *Process* may be defined as the "steps taken or tasks performed by a group that lead to a decision or policy choice being made, such as the conceptualizing of goals and objectives, the searching for information, and the development of contingency plans."⁴¹

³⁸ Holsti, p. 143.

³⁹ Rosenthal *et al.*, p. 211.

⁴⁰ Patrick J. Haney, *Organizing for Foreign Policy Crises: Presidents, Advisors and the Management of Decision-Making* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997), p. 16.

⁴¹ Haney (1995), pp. 101, 106.

The argument that policy-making structures need to be part of the focus of foreign policy can be found in the early literature on foreign policy decision-making. Writing in the early 1960s, Robinson and Snyder posited that three major clusters of factors helped explain decisional outcomes: (1) the occasion for decision; (2) the individual(s) involved; and, (3) the organizational context within which individuals operate.⁴² Similarly, Snyder *et al.*, argued that "to ignore this [structural] context omits a range of factors which significantly influence the behaviour of decision-makers, including ... how choices are made ... [and] the conditions under which choices are made."⁴³

In general, however, the first generation of crisis decision-making literature failed to yield "any additional insights that cannot be extrapolated from well-written history," treating the structure and process of decision-making as two distinct, unrelated concepts.⁴⁴ Canadian foreign policy literature has also exhibited an unwillingness to make the linkage between the structure, process and outcome of decision-making.⁴⁵

Increasing attention is now being given to the relative merits of different organizational configurations, however, and their impact on the quality of decision-making and the policy outputs.⁴⁶ Anderson argues that there is growing evidence that different foreign policy decision-making processes produce different results, and that an

⁴² Haney (1997), p. 8.

⁴³ Haney (1995), p. 101.

⁴⁴ Phillip Zelikow, "Foreign Policy Engineering: From Theory to Practice and Back Again," in *International Security*, v. 18(4), spring 1994, pp. 154-155.

⁴⁵ Nossal (1979), p. 617.

⁴⁶ Haney (1995), p. 100. Also, see: Paul 't Hart, Eric K. Stern and Bengt Sundelius, "Foreign Policy-Making at the Top: Political Group Dynamics," in *Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making*, edited by Paul 't Hart, Eric K. Stern and Bengt Sundelius, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997), p. 6; Ripley, pp. 86-87.

improved understanding of the various processes can make a difference to the development of large-scale theories of foreign policy behaviour.⁴⁷

Howlett and Ramesh describe the neo-institutionalist approach to public policy as acknowledging the crucial role of institutions in political life. Its focus of analysis is related to the 'transactions' between individuals within the confines of institutions. As such, institutions do not necessarily cause action, but rather affect them by shaping the interpretation of problems and by constraining the range of solutions and the means by which they may be implemented. The approach also encourages attention be paid to relevant international and domestic factors, without presuming that any one set of factors is more important, leaving that to be revealed through empirical research.⁴⁸

Preston and 't Hart have echoed that while not determining the behaviour of decision-makers directly, decision-making structures do provide certain incentives and rules for the decision-making process.⁴⁹ Similarly, Maoz has drawn attention to the role played by institutions, rules, agendas, and individual preferences in the foreign policy decision-making process, and how leaders may manipulate these components of structure and process to produce their desired policy.⁵⁰

Smart and Vertinsky argue that high quality decision-making is a function of three factors: (1) the quality of information inputs into the decision-making process; (2) the ability to formulate objectives and evaluate various policy choices, and; (3) the cognitive

⁴⁷ Anderson, pp. 285-286.

⁴⁸ Howlett and Ramesh, pp. 26-27.

⁴⁹ 't Hart and Preston, p. 13.

⁵⁰ Zeev Maoz, "Framing the National Interest: Manipulation of Foreign Policy Decisions in Group Settings," in *World Politics*, v. 43, October 1990, pp. 77-110.

abilities of the decision group. High-quality crisis decision-making requires adequate information about intentions, motives, and developments and the effective processing and use of that information. It also requires inputs from a wide range of individuals reflecting a variety of experiences and expertise, in order to combat the narrowing of cognitive processes that occurs in crisis situations.⁵¹ It follows that the structure, internal processes and management of decision-making have a major impact on the quality of information processing, and consequently, the quality of decision-making.

Smart and Vertinsky's arguments stem directly from the elements of crises, and the understanding that individuals and decision-making groups perform less effectively under protracted periods of intense stress. For example, one of the characteristics of crises is an increase in communication flows, which combine with time pressures to add to stress levels. Since it is difficult to examine evidence effectively from more than one or two perspectives, it is precisely in such situations that penetrating questions and the critical examination of various alternatives are most needed.⁵² The structure and process of decision-making must therefore facilitate such conditions.

Stern and Sundelius echo this conclusion, suggesting that ideal decision-making involves "balanced critical deliberations," wherein moderate levels of conflict and conformity have a positive effect on decision-making. Decision-makers must achieve in their deliberations a balance between extreme levels of conflict and conformity. It has been suggested that balanced critical deliberations tend to be associated with more open,

⁵¹ Smart and Vertinsky, pp. 640-651.

⁵² Holsti, pp. 199-217.

democratic and facilitative leadership styles.⁵³ This runs counter to the tendency of decision-making authority, structures and processes to contract in crises.

Similarly, Herek, Janis and Huth argue it is important to recognize that the discrediting of the rational-actor model should not negate the possibility that the most effective crisis decision-making involves a careful search for relevant information, a critical appraisal of viable alternatives, careful contingency planning, and the exercise of caution. Citing an empirical study they conducted of American responses to international crises, Herek *et al.* argued that a causal relationship exists between decision-making processes and outcomes. They proposed the use of a "vigilant problem-solving" approach to crisis decision-making. This involves the judicious search for and analysis of relevant information, which will reduce the risk of miscalculation, thereby increasing the probability of desired outcomes. This echoes Smart and Vertinsky's assertion that it is not the collection of information that is the major challenge in crisis decision-making, but the effective processing and use of the relevant information.⁵⁴

Welch has criticized these findings as being of limited utility, arguing that the process of one side's decision-making never absolutely determines the outcome of crises. He suggests that more emphasis should be given to external variables and random chance, suggesting that such factors can make vigilant problem-solving not only impossible, but undesirable: "without doubt, crisis management requires a sense of strategy and instrumental rationality; but equally, if not more so, it may require an

⁵³ Eric K. Stern, Bengt Sundelius, "Understanding Small Group Decisions in Foreign Policy: Process Diagnosis and Research Procedures," in *Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making*, edited by Paul 't Hart *et al.*, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 131-133.

⁵⁴ Gregory Herek, Irving L. Janis and Paul Huth, "Decision-Making During International Crises: Is Quality of Process Related to Outcome?" in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, v. 31(2), June 1987, pp. 204, 216-218.

awareness of fallibility, an ability to handle the unexpected." Welch argues there are limits to the extent to which decision-makers can and should attempt to anticipate the consequences of their actions. Further, it is unavoidable, particularly during crisis situations, that important information will be lost in the shuffle.⁵⁵

Herek *et al.* counter that their study does take into account the roles of external variables and random chance in crisis situations. Although the ideal in crisis decision-making may be impossible to attain, this does not detract from the argument that the failure to use a vigilant problem-solving approach increases the probability that decision-makers will miss important warning signs, facts and contingencies. This consequently increases the likelihood that the decision arrived at will result in avoidable losses and the failure to achieve the original objectives of the decision-making unit.⁵⁶ Moreover, while conceding Welch's point on the problematic nature of crisis decision-making, it could be argued that his call for an "awareness of fallibility and an ability to handle the unexpected" would be better realized in the crisis decision-making environment depicted by Herek *et al.*

Hermann, Hermann and Hagan have suggested a way of classifying decision units to enhance the understanding of governmental foreign policy behaviour. Their approach recognizes that numerous domestic and international factors influence such behaviour, and that these are filtered through a political apparatus that identifies, decides and implements foreign policy. Within this apparatus exists a set of authorities with the

⁵⁵ David A. Welch, "Crisis Decision-Making Reconsidered," in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, v. 33(3), September 1989, pp. 439-440, 442-443.

⁵⁶ Gregory M. Herek, Irving L. Janis and Paul Huth, "Quality of U.S. Decision-Making During the Cuban Missile Crisis: Major Errors in Welch's Reassessment," in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, v. 33(3), September 1989, pp. 447-448, 456-457.

ability to commit the necessary resources and, with respect to a particular problem, enjoys the authority to make decisions that are not easily superseded. This "ultimate decision unit" (UDU), may be a single individual or entity, or multiple separate bodies. While a government's definition of internal and external pressures may predispose it to act in a particular manner, the precise structure and dynamics of the UDU shape the decision-making process and resulting foreign policy output. Hermann *et al.* argue for the necessity of employing a contingency approach to decision-making to indicate under what conditions the UDU will follow one process and in what situations alternative processes will operate. They posit that the UDU composition varies, based on the issue and its importance.⁵⁷

For example, a predominant leader is the UDU when that leader has the power to make the choice for the government. After the leader's preferences are known, those with differing points of view stop public expressions out of respect for the leader's authority or out of fear of reprisal.⁵⁸ This seems particularly relevant to a discussion of the Canadian policy-making environment during crisis situations.

To gain an understanding of the foreign policy output generated by this UDU, it is critical to examine the personal characteristics of the predominant leader. These shape initial inclinations and determine whether and how the leader will respond to advice, react to information, and assess the political risks associated with particular actions. Of particular importance is the predominant leader's orientation to foreign affairs, including

⁵⁷ Margaret G. Hermann, Charles F. Hermann and Joe D. Hagan, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy Behaviour," in *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, edited by Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley and James N. Rosenau (London: Harper-Collins Academic, 1987), p. 309.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 311.

beliefs about the manner in which governments should act in the foreign policy arena, and the political style used to respond to foreign policy problems. Hermann *et al.* argue that the "sensitive" predominant leader will welcome information from the political environment, using it to shape the selected foreign policy output.⁵⁹

Some scholars have argued that while organizational structures, routines and bureaucracies might ordinarily have significance, the centralization of authority and "*ad hocery*" that occurs in crisis situations increases the salience of personality and the psychological profiles of individuals to the point that the relevance of internal and external factors, including decision-making structures and processes, is diminished.⁶⁰ If we accept the argument that crisis decision-making involves a small elite and is driven largely by individual perceptions, it could be posited that structures do cease to be important to policy-making in such situations.⁶¹

Haney suggests that this argument misses the point. He urges that greater attention should be paid to the relationship between the structure, process and outcomes of decision-making: "If crises heighten the importance of small *ad hoc* groups of decision-makers as evidence overwhelmingly suggests that they do, then ... management and structures are ... a vital component of decision-making during crises."⁶² He recommends an institutional perspective, given that it stresses that "individuals, when

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 311-313, 328. Also, see: Walker, pp. 270-271. In his discussion of role theory, Walker cites Holsti's description of national role conception as including: "the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems." This description appears particularly relevant to Hermann *et al.*'s discussion of the predominant leader UDU, as it emphasizes the decision-maker's perception of the "national role."

⁶⁰ Haney (1995), p. 104. For example, see Rosati, p. 68.

⁶¹ Haney (1997), p. 9.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 10; Haney (1995), p. 104.

making a decision, act not just as individuals, but also within an organizational environment."⁶³ As Hill has observed, "[At the] highest level of responsibility, foreign policy-making is made up of a set of moving relationships, played out within the limits laid down by institutions, precedents, personalities, and the structure of the issue of the moment."⁶⁴

It follows therefore, that decision-making structures and processes need to be sufficiently open and diverse in outlook to encourage a thorough, open examination of the available information and the various alternatives. This reduces the likelihood of poor quality decision-making. As has been suggested, however, there is a tendency for the exact opposite to occur in crisis situations. This is particularly problematic for Canada; although differing significantly from the American system that serves as the contextual basis of the literature, analysis of the Canadian constitutional-institutional context reveals that even prior to crisis situations, there is a predisposition towards centralization of the foreign policy decision-making authority in the executive branch of government. Given this reality, it is important to undertake a more thorough investigation of the potential impact that centralized authority, structures and processes can have on crisis decision-making and its policy outputs.

⁶³ Haney (1997), pp. 10, 15-16.

⁶⁴ 't Hart *et al.*, p. 26.

3.4 CONSEQUENCES OF CENTRALIZED DECISION-MAKING

The study of small group decision-making is most pertinent in situations that involve a single, small group at the apex of the policy-making process. This has been demonstrated as being the case in crisis situations. As such, the group's dynamics are as close as they can be to the dependent variable, or the policy output.⁶⁵ The group acts as the forum where decisions are made in a collegial setting, and/or as a crucial advisory body to the political executive making individual decisions. Opening up the 'black box' of group decision-making thus is a pressing task for the study of crises.⁶⁶

One of the rationales behind centralized decision-making is that smaller groups have simpler structures, and therefore require less time and effort for the coordinating of participants' actions. In theory, this allows for greater focus on the task at hand. Decision-making in a small, centralized group can also ensure that there is a greater consistency and sharing of values among group members, which can facilitate a more efficient pursuit and promotion of those values. Related to this advantage is that it may be easier for members of such a group to change their minds and to persuade others during the decision-making process.⁶⁷

Hermann *et al.* describe small groups as being the UDU when all of the individuals necessary for allocation decisions participate, and the group makes decisions through an interactive process among its members. They qualify their argument, however, by stating that not all group members need to concur on every decision.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9

⁶⁶ Stern and Sundelius, p. 123.

Moreover, the group does not need to be legally established as an authoritative agent. Rather, it only requires a *de facto* ability to commit or withhold resources without another unit engaging in the reversal of its direction at will.⁶⁸ This has been noted as often being the case in crisis situations.

Similarly, 't Hart *et al.* have attempted to contextualize groups as a means of revealing insights into their operations. They argue that it is essential to recognize that what transpires in small groups is not simply a reflection of the larger organizational, political and even international system structure of which they are a part. Rather, small decision-making groups are the setting for complex and unpredictable social-psychological dynamics. Variables such as the decision-making group's structure, processes and relationship to the executive authority have a wide-ranging impact on the group's operations and its subsequent outputs.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ George, pp. 85-86.

⁶⁸ Hermann *et al.*, pp. 315.

⁶⁹ 't Hart *et al.*, pp. 5, 14-24. It is beyond the scope of this work to undertake a detailed discussion of 't Hart *et al.*'s work on the various incarnations of "group" decision-making. Rather, for the purposes of the research undertaken, a summary of their typology will suffice to demonstrate that the "group" phenomenon, which has been demonstrated as accompanying crisis situations, can take on a variety of manifestations (even simultaneously), with accompanying implications for the structure and process of the decision-making:

1. **"Group as thinktank"** - This metaphor focuses on the dynamics of group information processing. For example, the manner in which the group arrives at a common representation of events; the extent to which during deliberations group members come to share information; the process by which groups make inferences from the information available and develop a composite picture of its implications for past, present and future policies.
2. **"Group as command centre"** - Collective decision-making at the pinnacle of government. It refers to the idea of a cabinet or high council of government as the centre of attempts to control societal images of, and responses to, major foreign events such as crises.

A key issue raised by this metaphor is leadership and power. A distinction needs to be made between the power of the group and the power over the group. The former refers to the degree to which the group is able to effectively coordinate and control foreign policy actions undertaken on its behalf. The latter is concerned with the question of [executive] control over group decisions. Simply put, who is in command of the group?

Small, centralized groups do not necessarily lead to high quality deliberations and outputs. Decision-making in such an environment may lead to the consideration of fewer policy alternatives. The involvement of a small number of individuals, tending to be from the highest levels of the organization, often results in a tightly knit, homogeneous group led by a strong leader, insulated from the rest of the organization by a sense of shared responsibility, trust and mutual support.⁷⁰

Highly centralized policy-making systems can easily overburden top decision-makers, contributing to stress levels that can impact negatively on decision-making.⁷¹ The executive's attempts to secure its political future and mute the impact of bureaucratic politics in crisis situations has the potential to give rise to a number of deficiencies detrimental to effective crisis decision-making.⁷² Examples of such deficiencies include:

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3. **"Group as sanctuary"** - Deliberations are close-knit and informal, with a good deal of *ad hoc* measures. In such circumstances, it is more likely that relatively small circles of the political executive's closest advisers or key colleagues will assume the sanctuary role.
 4. **"Group as arena"** - The group also serves as the site of bureaucratic politics, a stage for the enactment of conflict and negotiations between various institutional stakeholders.
 5. **"Group as sorter"** - Small groups may sort out priorities and tasks. Alternatively, the group may be on the receiving end, charged with handling a particular matter. In this scenario, crucial parameters come into play, such as the nature of the group's purpose(s), participation, and procedures. These will determine how the issue will become defined, and what strategies will be employed to respond to the issue.
 6. **"Group as ideologue"** - The "team-like" nature of the group is stressed, wherein unity and a common front is equated with strength and resolve. This approach may be used to restrain bureaucratic squabbling, but can be used by leaders and decision-makers to squash legitimate dissent.
 7. **"Group as smokescreen"** - This stresses the cleavage between formal and informal decision-making processes. The highest level discussions may not be seen. For example, the submitting of informal task force recommendations to cabinet for rubber-stamp approval.

⁷⁰ Smart and Vertinsky, p. 645.

⁷¹ Alexander L. George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," in *American Political Science Review*, v. 66, 1972, p. 755.

⁷² 't Hart and Preston, pp. 3-4, 22.

(1) information failures; (2) 'groupthink'; (3) 'newgroup' syndrome; (4) leader dominance; and, (5) political manipulation.

(1) Information Failures

By virtue of the nature of crisis decision-making, information failures are difficult to detect. When a failure does not produce poor outcomes because of the intervention of other variables, significant failures may go unnoticed by scholars.⁷³ Notwithstanding this investigative challenge, it may be argued that at a minimum, high-quality decision-making requires adequate information. Crises give rise to sharply increased individual and bureaucratic activity, resulting in increased communication volumes. Although the volume of information may increase, it is likely to be uneven. For example, there may be considerable disruption of communication at the crisis source. This increase in the volume of information, coupled with the erratic nature of the communication that does take place, can lead to greater stress levels.⁷⁴

More important than raw information then, is a valid process and structure to give the information meaning and relevance - "rarely do the facts 'speak for themselves.'"⁷⁵ It is critical during crisis situations that a steady flow of relevant and timely advice be provided, and that decision-makers remain open and receptive to new information.

⁷³ Vertzberger, p. 8.

⁷⁴ Holsti, p. 19.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 104-105; 206. Also, Smart and Vertinsky, p. 640; Stan A. Taylor and Theodore J. Ralston, "The Role of Intelligence in Crisis Management," in *Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management*, edited by Alexander L. George (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), p. 398.

Centralized decision-making units tend to rely on their own intelligence sources, and are often dominated by the agency or department in which they are located.⁷⁶ Given that crisis situations are marked by increased internal information flows, the centralization of the structure and process of decision-making can lead to constraints on the effective use of that information, a phenomenon known as "information overload."⁷⁷ Members of the decision-making unit are also more likely to lose contact with information sources at lower levels. Moreover, attempts to provide the "relevant" information can lead to a minimizing or neglect of critical uncertainties in reports to the decision-making group.⁷⁸

Information failures also arise from the combining of the contraction of authority with the executive's tendency to employ *ad hoc* task forces. Decision-makers may seek to bypass both the effects of information overload and the distortion of content through the use of improvised *ad hoc* means of communication that operate according to separate rules, procedures, and information sources. This can result in duplications of effort, contributing to delays in decision-making, and preventing full, objective consideration of information.⁷⁹ It may also lead to "pathologies of secrecy," wherein the principle of

⁷⁶ Taylor and Ralston, p. 402.

⁷⁷ Smart and Vertinsky, pp. 643-644. Also, see Karl W. Deutsch, "Crisis Decision-making: The Information Approach," in *Managing International Crises*, edited by Daniel Frei, (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982), pp. 18-24. Deutsch argues that a foreign policy establishment will respond to information overload through one of five measures: (1) delay; (2) omission of relevant information; (3) increased error frequency; (4) categorization of information to ensure conformity with established procedures; and, (5) assignment of priorities. He argues that the larger and more pressing the problem of a political system, and the smaller its capacity for information search and processing, the greater the likelihood of its crisis policy output being inferior.

⁷⁸ George (1980), p. 86.

⁷⁹ Taylor and Ralston, p. 402. Also, see Holsti, p. 21.

secrecy is observed so strictly that it leads to the further isolation of the decision-making group, resulting in a lack of exposure to expert advice, and the increased risk of the appearance of other deficiencies.⁸⁰

(2) Groupthink

"Groupthink," as developed by Janis, is perhaps the most significant theory explaining the problems associated with crisis decision-making in small groups.⁸¹ Groupthink focuses on the role that high stress levels can play in the emergence of concurrence-seeking and a reinforced cohesion that is detrimental to the procedural "quality" of the decision-making process.⁸²

The phenomenon consists of the "deterioration of mental efficiency, reality in testing, and moral judgement that results from in-group pressure. The striving for unanimity overrides any motivations to realistically appraise alternative courses of action."⁸³ Associated with this phenomenon is a tendency to develop stereotyped images, dehumanize out-groups, develop polarized collective judgements, and shift towards either extreme in possible actions. Group cohesiveness, something that may accompany the contraction of authority in the executive branch, is emphasized as a major antecedent

⁸⁰ 't Hart and Preston, p. 18.

⁸¹ Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), pp. 174-175. Janis describes groupthink as involving the following characteristics in small group deliberations: (1) the illusion of invulnerability leading to excessive optimism and risk-taking; (2) a belief in the inherent morality of the group; (3) collective efforts to rationalize/discount contradictory information; (4) stereotyped views of the enemy; (5) the self-censorship of diverging views; (6) the shared illusion of unanimity concerning judgements; (7) direct pressure on dissenting group members; and, (8) and the emergence of self-appointed "mindguards" who push the group towards consensus.

⁸² Stern and Sundelius, p. 126.

⁸³ Janis, p. 9.

condition, given that greater amiability can lead to less opportunity for independent, critical thinking. The greater a decision-making group's cohesiveness, the more power it has to bring about conformity to its norms and to gain acceptance of its goals.⁸⁴

Despite the similarity in effect, it is important to distinguish groupthink from "conformity pressures," which occur when group members suspend their critical judgment and even sensory evidence to avoid deviating from a (real or perceived) established or emergent group norm.⁸⁵ In this phenomenon, the movement towards a majority position occurs simply by virtue of the group's interaction, independently of any external pressure.⁸⁶

Groupthink occurs under conditions of high stress from external threats, and where there exists low hopes of finding a better solution than the one favoured by the leader. It is the presence of high stress levels that produces the heightened need for affiliation with other members of the group; this contributes to the reinforcing of group cohesion. As such, the phenomenon involves a "mutual effort among members of a cohesive group to maintain self-esteem, especially when they share responsibility for

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-9, 245.

⁸⁵ Stern and Sundelius, p. 126. Also, see Vertzberger, pp. 236-237. Vertzberger distinguishes between four types of conformity: (1) *instrumental conformity* involves members conforming to be rewarded or avoid punishment for deviating from the group norm; (2) *identification conformity* occurs when members accept an individual's (usually the leader) arguments, arising from the need to identify themselves with that individual; (3) *internalization conformity* arises from a belief that group harmony and support for the majority view outranks confrontation or dissent; (4) *integrative conformity* involves a combination of two or more of the above concepts.

⁸⁶ Glen Whyte, "Groupthink Reconsidered," in *Academy of Management Review*, v. 14(1) 1989, p. 44. Whyte uses the term "uniformity pressure," arguing that it is most prevalent under conditions of uncertainty about the appropriate response, and the perceived need to maintain a good relationship with other group members.

making vital decisions that pose a threat of social and self-disapproval."⁸⁷ Janis posits that this occurs when a decision-making group becomes insulated and isolated; when there is a lack of impartial leadership; and when there is an absence of group norms regarding the procedures for the decision-making tasks. Each of these conditions encourage groupthink because each increases chances that before a full survey of alternatives is complete, group members will develop the impression that there is an emerging course of action.⁸⁸

It could be argued that these conditions accompany the centralizing of decision-making authority that occurs in crisis situations. As the structure and authority of decision-making contracts, the amount of stress on decision-makers increases correspondingly, since each member feels greater responsibility for potential failure.⁸⁹ Any advantages that may be gained by having decisions made by a centralized group are therefore lost due to the dynamics of the group and resulting artificial cohesion. While groupthink may not guarantee a policy failure, the defects associated with it increase the probability.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Alexander George, "From Groupthink to Contextual Analysis of Policy-making Groups," in *Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making*, edited by Paul 't Hart *et al.*, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 37-39.

⁸⁸ Janis, pp. 176-177, 248.

⁸⁹ Smart and Vertinsky, p. 643.

⁹⁰ Janis, pp. 10, 51. Janis lists seven defects in decision-making associated with groupthink: (1) group discussions are limited to an incomplete survey of few alternatives; (2) there is a failure to conduct a survey of the policy goals to be achieved and the values implicated by those aims; (3) the group fails to reexamine the chosen course of action for possible problems; (4) the group fails to reexamine courses of action initially rejected; (5) little effort is made to obtain information from outside experts; (6) the group exhibits selective bias in its reaction to information, favouring that which appears to reinforce the group consensus, rejecting that which contradicts it; and (7) the group engages in little debate over the problems of implementing the decision, or the development of contingency plans.

To avoid the perils of groupthink, Janis recommends that leaders conduct policy deliberations in an impartial way, so as to set the norm for open discussion of a wide range of alternatives.⁹¹ This has been echoed by Holsti, who suggests that decision-making groups should be sufficiently large and diverse in outlook to ensure that the available information is subjected to vigorous probing from multiple perspectives, not merely from the view of the conventional prevailing wisdom.⁹²

Ongoing debate has resulted in a number of revisions to Janis' original theory. For example, there have been efforts to distinguish between the types of false cohesion, including "internalizing" - involving the adoption of consensus view(s) without reservation; "compliance" - self-censorship of views deviating from the consensus; and, "anticipatory compliance" - the tendency of those lower in the organizational hierarchy to take positions which conform to the real or perceived predisposition of their superiors.⁹³

George has observed that Janis' list of 'defects' could arise from a variety of causes unrelated to groupthink. Further, he has iterated a number of methodological and theoretical weaknesses with the theory, including the possibility that Janis imposed it on his case studies, given that aspects of their historical accuracy have been subsequently questioned. He speculates it may be necessary to rely upon a more specified contextual analysis of each case. It may be more realistic to treat groupthink as a contingent

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 243, 250-254.

⁹² Holsti, p. 207.

⁹³ Stern and Sundelius, pp. 126-127. Also, see Vertzberger, pp. 230-231, 236-237. Vertzberger describes internalization as arising from an individual's lack of confidence in coping and interpreting ambiguous information. He argues that the larger the majority within the group that supports a particular interpretation, or the more powerful the group members supporting it, the stronger the inclination towards internalization. The various manifestations of conformity discussed in fn. 85 are also applicable here, with the proviso that they occur in situations marked by high stress levels.

phenomenon, rather than as a general property of foreign policy decision-making in small, high-level groups.⁹⁴ Groupthink is therefore neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the occurrence of policy fiascos. Rather, it is a phenomenon conducive to errors in decision-making, and such errors increase the likelihood of an unwelcome outcome. When political executives depend upon one particular group, or set of groups as the primary source of information and analysis, there is greater potential for a flawed group decision to place the policy process as a whole in jeopardy.⁹⁵

(3) Newgroup Syndrome

Having discussed the perils of conformity pressures and groupthink, there is reason to believe that the potential for such decision-making deficiencies are particularly strong in newly formed small groups. New groups are common in crisis situations, given the political executive's tendency to employ *ad hoc* decision-making groups, involving members that may have little experience working together.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ George (1997), pp. 48-49. This would include recognizing that: (1) executive decision-making most often deals with difficult compromises between policy quality, the requirement of support by others, and the need for a timely response. Academic specialists can easily fall into the error of thinking about high-quality policy decisions in too narrow a framework; (2) a thorough canvassing of problems, information, options does not necessarily result in a sound decision; (3) sound decisions by the executive do not always require vigilance or consensus within the group; (4) executives do not always "consult" advisors in order to receive information and advice. Often they may do so for very different reasons, such as: (a) satisfaction of cognitive needs; (b) emotional support; (c) gaining understanding and support; (d) co-ordination and dissemination of information; and, (e) political legitimacy.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 40-45, 48. Also, see 't Hart *et al.*, p. 11. To avoid such problems, George proposes a multiple advocacy approach to foreign policy decision-making. He argues that that such an approach facilitates the centralized decision-making that occurs in crisis situations, while avoiding the perils of potential decision-making deficiencies such as groupthink. See George, 1972, pp. 751-785.

⁹⁶ Eric K. Stern, "Probing the Plausibility of Newgroup Syndrome: Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs," in *Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making*, edited by Paul 't Hart *et al.*, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997) pp. 154-156.

The "shadow of the future" - the awareness among members of having to work with the group for an extended time period - tends to increase initial conformity incentives. "Newgroup syndrome" as such, is a variation of groupthink, in that it produces a false cohesion, based on insecurities of the situation and the motivation to maintain membership and maximize group acceptance.⁹⁷

Unlike groupthink, however, newgroup syndrome also appears within groups that are only moderately cohesive. The syndrome can be exacerbated by the defensive mentality associated with a decision-making environment marked by personal, factional, or bureaucratic-political conflict. The vacuum created by the lack of common group sub-culture and well-developed procedural norms results in uncertainty, giving the advantage to more assertive group members or leaders wishing to set the initial procedural rules. New groups are thus particularly ripe for leader dominance and political manipulation - deficiencies that will be discussed below. The key factor is whether leaders intervene to set the norms and procedural rules that suspend extragroup considerations, to encourage a range of critical and broad discussions.⁹⁸

Newgroup theories allow that where a clear set of group-specific norms have not evolved, members can bring a wealth of experience from prior group interaction. This is particularly the case in government settings. The result, however, is that early interaction is affected by the prior experience that is brought to the discussions by members.⁹⁹

It should be noted that not all scholars are critical of new groups. Weick and Roberts have extolled the virtues of newly formed groups in terms of their capacity for

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 164, 166.

⁹⁸ Stern and Sundelius, p.127. Also, see Stern, pp. 163, 166.

alert and heedful thinking, arguing that institutionalization tends to decrease vigilance. Crisis decision-making groups can be highly vigilant despite low levels of bonding and prior interaction. Such arguments are not strong enough, however, to warrant a dismissal of the phenomenon.¹⁰⁰

(4) Leader Dominance

Any discussion of small group decision-making requires an examination of the role of leaders, specifically the political executive, in the deliberations. While theories such as groupthink may explain the internal dynamics of small group decision-making, they often neglect the fundamental institutional role of the political leader.¹⁰¹ Such individuals play a major role in shaping the structural and procedural context of crisis decision-making, and therefore influence the quality of decision-making and its results.¹⁰² This is particularly relevant to the Canadian case, given the demonstrated predominance of the executive branch in foreign policy.

Preston has argued that the "leader-group nexus" consists of the impact of the leader's personality and style upon the characteristics of advisory groups at both the structural and process level. Focussing on the impact of the American president, Preston posits that presidential influence takes place within a broad arena of interactions between the leader, advisory group, and involves both the policy and problem contexts of the surrounding decision-making environment. Leadership styles often set the "rules of the

⁹⁹ Stern, p. 162.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p 167.

¹⁰¹ Robinson, p. 28.

¹⁰² George (1980), p. 100.

game" regarding leader-advisor interactions, their characteristics, and the role advisers will be allowed to perform within the decision-making process.¹⁰³

Through their behaviour and the role they occupy, leaders can deprive themselves of genuine alternatives and high-quality decision-making.¹⁰⁴ Leaders vary in their need for control over decision-making. This need for control affects the degree to which decision-making structures and processes are centralized.¹⁰⁵ Following the crisis-induced contracting of authority, the way in which the executive consults and interacts with the group becomes a critical factor in determining the quality of decision-making and is a key component in the development of a group consensus.¹⁰⁶

The nature of crisis, the centralizing of authority and accompanying executive dominance means that leaders are less likely to act as neutral directors of policy, and are more likely to be obstacles to open, thorough debate. This is particularly the case among leaders who exhibit a high need for control but are insensitive to the context of decision-making. Such individuals are more likely to centralize the structure and process of decision-making within their inner circles, thereby preventing input and a thorough policy debate. The result is that these inner circle advisory groups become susceptible to many of the deficiencies discussed above.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ Thomas Preston, "Following the Leader: The Impact of U.S. Presidential Style Upon Advisory Group Dynamics, Structure and Decision," in *Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making*, edited by Paul 't Hart *et al.*, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997) pp. 192-193, 197.

¹⁰⁴ George (1972), p. 785.

¹⁰⁵ 't Hart and Preston, pp. 13-14.

¹⁰⁶ George (1980), pp. 88, 97-98.

¹⁰⁷ 't Hart and Preston, p. 22.

The corollary to this dynamic is that an overly assertive leader may promote a feeling among the decision-making group that all value questions are the leader's prerogative. This also hampers proper debate and an evaluation of policy alternatives. The development of this feeling among group members may lead to not only diffusion, but also a displacement of responsibility onto the leader, through which group members abdicate any personal responsibility for the decision-making.¹⁰⁸

This contention is reflected in the research conducted by Preston, who examined the potential effects that the characteristics of individual leaders may have upon the structure and interactional dynamics of their advisory groups, and their subsequent policy outputs. He focussed upon five specific dimensions of leadership style, including: (1) authority-structure orientation; (2) information-management orientation; (3) information-processing orientation; (4) interpersonal orientation; and (5) conflictual orientation.¹⁰⁹ They concluded that the authority-structure and information-management orientations of

¹⁰⁸ George (1980), p. 101.

¹⁰⁹ Preston, pp. 198-201. These may be summarized as follows:

- 1) ***Authority-structure orientation*** - the degree of control over policy process preferred by the leader;
- 2) ***Information-management orientation***- the structural roles preferred by the leader. Does the leader prefer to be at the centre of information flows, or at the apex of a hierarchy? When participating in the group's deliberations, does the leader adopt a formal or collegial style?
- 3) ***Information-processing orientation*** - this involves a leader's need for cognition, and preferences regarding the amount and type of information required for decision-making tasks. This comprises the leader's openness to differing points of view, including the relative emphasis and value placed on a broad information search.
- 4) ***Interpersonal orientation*** - this pertains to the leader's emphasis of preferences regarding social interactions between themselves, the group, and individual advisors. This involves a leader's need for affiliation and the relative emphasis they place upon advisor, group or constituent needs as opposed to task accomplishment considerations.
- 5) ***Conflictual orientation*** - this refers to a leader's tolerance or acceptance of political conflict within advisory groups.

leaders impact most directly upon the "foundational level," or the structure and organization of groups; whereas the information-processing, interpersonal and conflictual orientations more directly affect the "interactional aspect," or the processes employed by the decision-making group.¹¹⁰

(5) Political Manipulation

Many of these ideas are echoed in the literature regarding political manipulation in foreign policy decision-making. This phenomenon refers to the implementation of a hidden agenda through the deliberate manipulation of the process or information that is available to the group. This involves the conscious manipulation of the structure, procedural aspects of decision-making, as well as the interpersonal relations in the group. The result is that those involved in small group decision-making are often manipulated into choices that they would not have made otherwise.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹ Paul D. Hoyt and Jean A. Garrison, "Political Manipulation within the Small Group: Foreign Policy Advisors in the Carter Administration," in *Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making*, edited by Paul 't Hart *et al.*, pp. 252-266. The authors grouped the various types of manipulative strategies into the three following general categories:

- 1) **Structural manipulation** - Described as effort by an actor(s) to alter the physical composition of a group to over-represent favoured positions, at the expense of contrary positions. While perhaps not directly impacting policy output, it does affect the policy debate leading to the output. Examples of such manipulation may include exclusionary or inclusionary tactics.
- 2) **Procedural manipulation** - A deliberate manipulation of the process or substantive information base for those people involved, to suit one's purposes while confounding others. This may include agenda-setting, defining the choice rule or defining the sequence by which issues are introduced into the group to direct the deliberations towards one's objective. This may involve framing the issue, the way in which information is presented to the group, and the relative emphasis given to them.
- 3) **Interpersonal manipulation** - This is a process characterized by attempts to shape the formal/informal relationships between members of the group. Such tactics may include pressure through the use of threats/deceit/leaks. It may also comprise bringing in outside expertise or engaging in coalition building to present "social proof" - arguments in support of one's position - as a means to redressing a power imbalance in the decision-making group.

The hierarchical nature of policy-making groups permits the process to be manipulated by the principal decision-maker (*i.e.*, political executive). Further, the more pronounced the hierarchy of the decision-making group, the more easily political manipulation is achieved. It is also facilitated by asymmetrical information distribution within the group. Decision-makers who can determine the decision-making procedures are in a position to affect the policy output without directly inducing preference changes among group members. Manipulation may manifest itself in what might otherwise appear as a close-knit atmosphere or as a "managed" forum of conflictual behaviour.¹¹²

While arguing that Maoz approaches political manipulation too narrowly, and that the phenomenon takes place in multiple ways at different phases of the decision-making process, Hoyt and Garrison suggest that a focus on political manipulation highlights certain aspects of the decision-making process that are too often downplayed and ignored. Specifically, that decision-making is an inherently political process, often characterized by competition among participants, as well as the central role played by leaders and their advisors.¹¹³

Given the high levels of stress, confusion, the "rally round the flag effect" and centralization of authority that usually accompany crises, it would appear that the executive is in an optimal position to establish the procedural and structural conditions that permit political manipulation. Maoz argues that political manipulation may lead to

¹¹² Maoz (1990a), pp. 77-94. Maoz suggests that four sets of conditions facilitate the manipulation of foreign policy decision-making in small group settings: (1) *procedural* - the formal rules that establish the decision-making context. This category is particularly relevant to decision-making in crisis situations; (2) *situational* - those associated with the characteristics of crises; (3) *informational* - possession of information and/or expertise not shared by all members of the decision-making group; and, (4) *structural* - the formal and informal hierarchy of the group.

¹¹³ Hoyt and Garrison, p. 249.

either high-quality or defective decision-making. The preceding discussion regarding the requirements for high-quality crisis decision-making, however, suggests that the phenomenon can have particularly negative ramifications.¹¹⁴

3.5 CONCLUSION

In crisis situations there is a tendency on the part of the political executive to centralize the structure, process and authority of decision-making. This action is prompted by several factors. The first, and perhaps the most significant contributing factor, is the nature of crises themselves. The high stress accompanying crises causes the political executive to bypass normal bureaucratic processes, fearing that a failure to do so will result in an undesired outcome of the crisis. Beyond these factors, however, the political executive may be moved to act for reasons that include domestic political pressures, and the personal leadership styles and beliefs of the national leader. These may be related directly or indirectly to the issue at stake.

There is a connection, however, between the structure and process of decision-making, the quality of deliberations, and the resulting policy outputs. Until recently, the crisis decision-making literature has generally failed to give this subject the attention it deserves. Nevertheless, studies such as that one conducted by Herek *et al.* demonstrate that a linkage does exist. The political executive's attempts to ensure centralized control over the decision-making process can encourage the development of decision-making

¹¹⁴ Maoz (1990a), p. 77.

deficiencies, such as information failures, groupthink, newgroup syndrome, leader dominance, and political manipulation. Each of these malfunctions, alone or in combination, serve to undermine the quality of the decision-making unit's deliberations and the resulting policy outputs.

This is particularly problematic for countries such as Canada. The Canadian foreign policy decision-making process differs from the American, in that its constitutional-institutional framework is predisposed towards executive predominance, particularly that of the prime minister. Canada and its institutionalized centralization of the foreign policy decision-making authority may therefore be particularly vulnerable to the decision-making deficiencies discussed above. This proposition will be explored in the subsequent chapters through the application of these conclusions to historical case studies.

Chapter 4 - Case Historical Overview

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The following chapter presents an overview of the historical cases selected for examination. The reader is also directed to the *Appendices* for a detailed chronology of each case study. Specifically, this chapter surveys Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's Peace Initiative, 1983-1984; Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's handling of the Persian Gulf Crisis, 1990-1991; and the attempt by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien in late 1996 to launch a multinational rescue mission in response to the humanitarian crisis in eastern Zaire. This overview will facilitate the structured-focused comparison in Chapter 5 of Canadian prime ministers intervening in the foreign policy decision-making and policy-operationalizing processes in response to international crisis situations.

4.2 CASE STUDIES

4.2.1 Trudeau Peace Initiative, 1983-1984

The Trudeau Peace Initiative was Prime Minister Trudeau's personal response to increasingly hostile superpower relations, which reached their nadir following the shooting down of Korean Airlines Flight 007 (KAL 007) when it strayed into Soviet air space on 1 September, 1983, resulting in the death of 269 people. The tragedy caused international tensions, already heightened by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the

American military expansion of the early 1980s, to grow to levels higher than any period since the Cuban Missile Crisis.¹

In the wake of the incident, the rhetoric from both sides increased to extreme levels.² This did not bode well for the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) talks scheduled to begin in Geneva on 15 September, 1983. Several American legislators went so far as to call for the breaking off of the talks.³ This was to be the last round of talks prior to NATO's scheduled deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, as a means to countering the Soviet INF in Eastern Europe. Failure of the talks

¹ J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 364. As an example of the international climate, Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Tikhonov stated during the summer of 1983 that Moscow would boost its arsenal in response to NATO's deployment of American Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, stating that "the military balance will be restored as a result, but at a higher level, which will be dangerous for peace." Reuters, "Soviet's Promise to Match Missiles Repeated to Kohl," *The Globe and Mail*, 5 July, 1983, p. 1.

² The initial American response came from Secretary of State George Schultz, who stated that: "The US reacts with revulsion to the attack. We can see no excuse whatsoever for this appalling attack." John King, "U.S. to Study Sanctions over Jet," *The Globe and Mail*, 2 September, 1983, p.1.

American President Ronald Reagan accused the Soviets of lying, and questioned the value of a continuing dialogue: "What can we think of a regime that so broadly trumpets its vision of peace and global disarmament and yet so callously and quickly commits a terrorist act...What can be said about Soviet credibility when they so flagrantly lie about such a heinous attack?" American Press, "Soviets Liars, Terrorists, U.S. President Charges," *The Globe and Mail*, 3 September, 1983, p. 1. Also, a senior White House aide was quoted as saying that: "[I]t is further evidence that the President was right when he said the Soviet Union is a country that is essentially evil." William R. Doerner and Ed Magnuson, "Atrocity in the Skies," *Time*, 12 September, 1983, p. 9.

Caspar Weinberger, American Secretary of Defense, echoed such sentiments, arguing that Moscow's destruction of KAL 007 increased awareness of the "the total barbarity of the Soviet leadership and their total willingness to ignore the norms of human behaviour." Reuters, "More Aware of Soviet Barbarity: Weinberger," *The Globe and Mail*, 26 September, 1983, p. A13.

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher compared the shooting down of KAL 007 to the Berlin blockade, 1948, Soviet actions against the uprisings in East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, stating: "[these] are all manifestations of the same thing, a totally oppressive regime which lives by oppression ... and wishes to extend its oppression." Jeffrey Simpson, "Interview with Margaret Thatcher," *The Globe and Mail*, 24 September, 1983, p. 17.

For their part, the Soviets were less than forthcoming with a response, suggesting that the jetliner had been on a spy mission, and accused the Americans of using the accident to score cheap political points. Doerner and Magnuson, p. 9.

³ King, p. 1.

meant another escalation of the nuclear arms race.⁴ Reagan's arms proposals were subsequently rejected by the Soviets, who argued that they were "aimed at the unilateral disarmament of the Soviet Union."⁵

Determined to "inject a jolt of political energy" to "reverse the dangerously downward trendline in East-West relations," Trudeau undertook a highly personal diplomatic mission in late 1983 and early 1984.⁶ The initiative was described as a "dramatic first in the annals of Canadian diplomacy." Canada's Prime Minister was to break with the country's multilateral and bilateral foreign policy traditions, acting unilaterally and personally to save the world from the spectre of nuclear annihilation.⁷

Although Trudeau foreshadowed his initiative in remarks to the House of Commons and during British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's visit to Canada in late September 1983,⁸ the initiative began officially on 27 October, 1983 with a speech at the

⁴ John Gellner, "Talking Time is Running Out for the Nuclear Missile Impasse," *The Globe and Mail*, 15 September, 1983. p. 7.

⁵ Reuters, "Soviets Scorn Reagan Plan to Curb Arms," *The Globe and Mail*, 28 September, 1983, p. 1.

⁶ Pierre Elliott Trudeau, "Reflections on Peace and Security," Speech made at the University of Guelph, 27 October, 1983, Guelph, Ontario, in *Lifting the Shadow of War*, edited by David C. Crenna and Pierre Elliott Trudeau (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1987), p. 72.

⁷ Lawrence Martin, "PM's Shuttle Plan is a Dramatic First," in *The Globe and Mail*, 22 October, 1983, p. 11.

⁸ Trudeau concluded a toast to Thatcher by stating: "The experts do not have the responsibility for the fate of the earth. Political leaders, however, do ... There is no issue more important than the control, the limiting and the reduction of armaments. There is no higher priority for leaders than to work towards those goals." Pierre Elliott Trudeau, "Transcript of a Toast by Prime Minister Trudeau to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at a dinner in her Honour at Toronto, Ontario, 26 September, 1983," in *Lifting the Shadow of War*, edited by David C. Crenna and Pierre Elliott Trudeau (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1987), p. 65.

See also Trudeau's remarks welcoming Thatcher to address a joint session of the Canadian parliament: "Forty-two years ago, her famous predecessor, Sir Winston Churchill, spoke in this House words that inspired Canada and the free world in wartime. Today ... the real challenge is to inspire the world to peace ... Madame Prime Minister, at the Williamsburg Summit, you and I declared, together with our colleagues ... 'We undertake to devote all our political resources to reducing the threat of war' ... The threat of a nuclear holocaust which hovers over the entire world has taken increasingly frightening forms.

University of Guelph, in which Trudeau listed his initiative's objectives.⁹ Two days after this speech, Trudeau flew to New York for a private meeting with members of the Harvard University Nuclear Study Group. The views of this group had been reflected in the remarks Trudeau had made in launching his mission.¹⁰

Trudeau next met with a number of Western European leaders, as a means to building a consensus that he could then present to the two superpowers.¹¹ This tour was followed by a speech on 13 November to the Quebec-wing of the federal Liberal Party in Montreal in which he reported on his progress and outlined the five proposals that were serving as the basis of his initiative.¹²

The Prime Minister then departed for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in New Delhi at which he promoted his agenda and hoped to enlist

Our nations are therefore demanding that we, their governments and leaders, honour our commitment to the cause of peace. As far as I am concerned, no personal enterprise and no priority other than the pursuit of peace is important enough to take up all my time and energy. Today, more than ever before in the history of mankind, the survival of our species depends on the courage and wisdom of nations and their leaders." Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 26 September, 1983, (Ottawa: Hansard, 1983), p. 27475.

⁹ The speech, delivered at a conference on peace and security at the University of Guelph, while not listing specific policy actions, set the tone for the initiative. Trudeau stated: "Over the years, other leaders and I have made several proposals in that direction [arms control] ... I intend to speak further, in other speeches, in the weeks ahead, about these issues of confidence, stability, arms control, and political will ... My consultations with other leaders have already commenced ... I plan to bring them in person my own recommendations for a strategy of political confidence-building ... It is my personal purpose to live up to the undertaking, made by leaders at the Williamsburg Summit last May, 'to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war.'" Crenna and Trudeau, p. 72.

¹⁰ Roger Smith, "PM Joins New York Thinktank for Talks," in *The Globe and Mail*, 29 October, 1983. p. 1.

¹¹ Granatstein and Bothwell, p. 369; Jeffrey Simpson, "Trudeau Likens Mission to Papal Peace Efforts," in *The Globe and Mail*, 11 November, 1983, p. 1. Trudeau met with heads of government and state in France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and with Pope John Paul II.

¹² The proposals may be summarized as follows: (1) a conference of the five nuclear powers; (2) enhancement of the powers in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); (3) transformation of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) conference into a foreign minister's conference; (4) acceleration of the pace of the Medium-range Ballistic Missile Force Reduction (MBFR) talks; and (5) a ban on the use of high altitude anti-satellite weapons. Pierre Elliot Trudeau, "Address by Pierre Elliot Trudeau to the Liberal Party of Canada (Quebec)," in Montreal, Quebec, 13 November, 1983,"

the support of Third World leaders. En route, Trudeau stopped in Tokyo for meetings with the Japanese Prime Minister. While in Japan, Trudeau also met with Georgii Arbatov of the Moscow Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada, although in what capacity Arbatov was meeting with the Prime Minister remained unclear.¹³ The initiative received some support at the subsequent CHOGM, reflected in the issuance of the *Goa Declaration*, which urged the Soviets and Americans to "work for the resumption of a genuine political dialogue ... leading in a relaxation of tensions ... the central issue in securing wider progress on disarmament is the stopping of the nuclear arms race."¹⁴

During his trip to Asia, Trudeau's initiative gained credibility and momentum when Chinese communist leader Deng Xiao Ping and Premier Zhao Ziyang invited him to Beijing. Following these discussions, Trudeau returned to New Delhi to brief Indian Prime Minister Indira Ghandi, prior to returning to Canada.¹⁵

in *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, (Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council of the United States, 1984) pp. 303-305.

¹³ John Gray, "PM Undaunted by Faint Support for Peace Plan," in *The Globe and Mail*, 22 November, 1983, p. 1

¹⁴ *The Goa Declaration*, named after the resort in India where a portion of the CHOGM took place, stated that the Commonwealth leaders "are alarmed by increasing disregard for the moral and legal principles which should govern the conduct of states, by the degree to which the ethic of peaceful settlement of disputes is being eroded, and by the readiness of nations to resort to the illegal use of force." The statement noted that if some of the world's resources could be diverted from the arms race to Third World, "the needs of the developing countries, which are in the forefront of our concern, could be significantly met." Commonwealth Secretariat, Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, 1983, "The Goa Declaration on International Security," in *The Commonwealth at the Summit: Communiqués of CHOGM, 1944-1986* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987), p. 245-246.

Trudeau also used this visit to meet with the leaders of the military regime in Bangladesh, and with President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. John Gray, "'Positive' Hearing for Trudeau Plan in Dhaka Talks," *The Globe and Mail*, 21 November, 1983, p.1.

¹⁵ Richard Gwyn and Sandra Gwyn, "The Politics of Peace," in *Saturday Night*, May 1984, pp. 19-20.

Shortly thereafter, on 15 December, Trudeau met for talks with American President Ronald Reagan in Washington, where the Prime Minister fell short of receiving an endorsement for his initiative from the President.¹⁶ Resuming his initiative in mid-January, 1984, Trudeau met with United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, and the leaders of Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and Romania.¹⁷ Trudeau also attended a conference on 28 January, in Davos, Switzerland, where he sat on a panel on international security, during the course of which he questioned the credibility and correctness of NATO's nuclear deterrence strategy.¹⁸

Upon his return from this round of meetings, Trudeau formally concluded the initiative, reporting on his accomplishments in a speech to the House of Commons on 9 February.¹⁹ Trudeau had planned on meeting with Soviet leader Yuri Andropov during his initiative, but Andropov's poor health throughout the period prevented this meeting from occurring. Less than a week after the official end of the initiative, however, while

¹⁶ In a brief press opportunity following an Oval Office meeting of Trudeau and MacEachen with Reagan, Vice-President George Bush, Schultz and Weinberger, the President stated: "We fully share the concerns for peace which the Prime Minister has expressed. We appreciate his strong statements supporting the joint efforts of the Western allies to negotiate meaningful arms reductions and to promote dialogue with other nations. And I thank you, Mr. Prime Minister, for coming here sharing your ideas with us. And we wish you Godspeed in your efforts to build a durable peace." Trudeau interpreted these remarks in what may be characterized as an overly optimistic light, stating "... [A]s you have just heard, the President supported what is being known as my peace initiative." United States, National Archives and Records Administration, "Remarks of the President and Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau of Canada Following their Meeting," *Administration of Ronald Reagan* (1983), 15 December, 1983, pp. 1705-1706.

¹⁷ Granatstein and Bothwell, pp. 372-373.

¹⁸ Charlotte Montgomery, "PM's Doubts May Hurt Peace Plan," *The Globe and Mail*, 30 January, 1984, p. 1

¹⁹ Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 9 February, 1984 (Ottawa: Hansard, 1984) pp. 1211-1214, 1216. In addition to presenting a ten-item list of "principles of a common bond between East and West," Trudeau concluded his initiative declaring: "It is leaders who must direct. It is leaders who must assert their will for peace ... I decided to use Canada's influence to call international attention to the danger, to try to inject high-level political energy into East-West relations, to turn the trend line of crisis ... Let it be said of Canada and Canadians that we saw the crisis; that we did act; that we took risks; that we were loyal to our friends and open with our adversaries; that we lived up to our ideals; and that we have done what we could to lift the shadow of war."

in the Soviet Union to attend Andropov's funeral, Trudeau had the opportunity to meet briefly for discussions with Constantin Chernenko, the new Soviet leader.²⁰

4.2.2 *The Persian Gulf Crisis, 1990-1991*

On 1-2 August, 1990, the armed forces of Iraq invaded and rapidly conquered Kuwait. This action aroused the concerns of the international community, particularly in the industrialized North, which viewed Iraqi actions as a clear threat to their economic and security interests. The invasion was perceived to endanger the balance of power in the Gulf and throughout the Middle East, threatened the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and placed in jeopardy a major source of the industrialized world's oil supply.²¹

In an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council on 2 August, the invasion was condemned and Iraq was directed to undertake an immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwaiti territory.²² The Security Council subsequently passed a number of resolutions that authorized *inter alia* the imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions and the establishment of a blockade to enforce such measures.²³

²⁰ Granatstein and Bothwell, p. 369.

²¹ Martin Rudner, "Canada, the Gulf Crisis and Collective Security," in *Canada among Nations, 1990-1991: After the Cold War*, edited by Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992), pp. 244-247. Also, see the Department of National Defence Directorate of History's account in Jean Morin and Richard H. Gimblett, *Operation Friction: The Canadian Forces in the Persian Gulf* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997).

²² United Nations Security Council, S/RES/660 (1990) (New York: August 2, 1990).

²³ United Nations Security Council, S/RES/661 (1990) (New York: August 6, 1990). This resolution provided for the imposition of economic sanctions. United Nations Security Council, S/RES/665 (1990) (New York: August 25, 1990). This authorized the international community's establishment of a naval embargo and the use of limited force to enforce the economic sanctions provided for in *Resolution 661 (1990)*.

The Canadian reaction to the invasion of early August was initially cautious. Canada has few historic, cultural or social ties with the Persian Gulf.²⁴ There was little Canadian economic investment in the region, and Canada was not dependent on the region as a source for oil or commercial markets.²⁵ Nevertheless, the first major crisis of the post-Cold War era occurred at a time when Canada occupied one of the ten non-permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council.²⁶ Prime Minister Mulroney and Yves Fortier, Canada's ambassador to the United Nations, saw the crisis as an opportunity to strengthen the international organization.²⁷ Throughout the crisis, the Canadian government was actively engaged, both bilaterally and multilaterally, in shaping the international community's response through the United Nations and its participation in the multinational coalition arrayed against Iraq.²⁸ The initial condemnation of Iraqi actions and the imposition of limited unilateral sanctions was thus succeeded quickly by

²⁴ Miller, p. 73. The Department of External Affairs announced the following measures: (1) an embargo on imports of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil; (2) placement of Iraq on the Area Control List under the *Export and Import Permits Act*; (3) suspension of the *Canada-Iraq Agreement on Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation* and cancellation of most-favoured-nation status; (4) suspension of all trade and business promotion activity by the federal government on behalf of Canadian exports to Iraq; (4) ceasing of the Export Development Corporation's provision of financial coverage for new business activities of Canadian companies in Iraq and Kuwait; and (6) suspension of the *Memorandum-of-Understanding on Academic, Cultural and Sports Relations* between Iraq and Canada. The government also subsequently announced the *de facto* freezing of Iraqi and Kuwaiti government assets in Canada.

²⁵ Rudner, p. 268.

²⁶ Editorial, "The World Must Act to Contain Saddam Hussein," *The Globe and Mail*. 3 August, 1990, p. A12. This editorial perhaps best summed up the international community's dilemma: "The UN will have to back up its tough talk with effective action. The first major crisis since the end of the Cold War will test the world's ability to act together ... What is the common strategy to serve the common interest in stopping Saddam Hussein?"

²⁷ Morin and Gimblett, p. 17.

²⁸ Rudner, pp. 268-271.

comprehensive multilateral sanctions, following the Security Council's passage of *Resolution 661 (1990)*.²⁹

Von Riekhoff has noted that Canada had three broad objectives during the Gulf Crisis: (1) to strengthen the international order based on a system of collective security as represented by the United Nations; (2) to integrate American operations under the authority of the United Nations; and, (3) to secure the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait by measures other than war.³⁰ Following telephone conversations with American President George Bush on 3-4 August, Mulroney flew to the American capital for a dinner and discussions at the White House. The Prime Minister emerged from ninety minutes of talks to suggest that "the establishment of a military blockade might help make international sanctions stick."³¹ During the discussions, Mulroney privately pledged Canadian participation in the armed coalition in the Gulf at the White House dinner.³²

These remarks were followed on 10 August by Mulroney's announcement of the deployment of three warships to assist in the enforcement of economic sanctions against Iraq. In the span of little more than a week, Canada had committed itself to a military coalition. This deployment occurred independently of any NATO or United Nations actions, but did follow actions taken by the United States, United Kingdom, France, West

²⁹ Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993), p. 121.

³⁰ Harald Von Riekhoff, "Canada and Collective Security" in *Canada's International Security Policy*, edited by David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, Canada, Inc., 1995), p. 243.

³¹ Colin McKenzie, "Bush Sows Diplomatic Channels," *The Globe and Mail*, August 7, 1990, p. A11.

³² Miller, p. 74

Germany, Australia and Belgium. This was only the second time since 1946 that Canada was involved in military action that operated outside of the aegis of the United Nations.³³

The Canadian ships departed Halifax on 24 August, and four days later, Mulroney flew to Kennebunkport, Maine, for further discussions with Bush. Two weeks later, Mulroney announced the deployment of an air component to the Gulf, with the deployment of eighteen CF-18 fighter jets to Qatar, assigned to provide air cover to the Canadian ships enforcing the international sanctions. This number was augmented by six in the days immediately preceding the international attack against Iraq. In October, the government also sent a field hospital and a team of 250 command, communications and security specialists.³⁴

On 29 November, the Security Council passed *Resolution 678 (1990)*, authorizing the American-led international coalition to use "all force necessary" to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait if Iraq failed to comply with the directive to withdraw by the deadline set for 15 January, 1991.³⁵ On 12 November, Mulroney had refused to rule out sending Canadian ground forces to assist if requested by the United Nations.³⁶

As the crisis quickly approached war, Mulroney sent Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark to the United Nations with a letter addressed to the Secretary-

³³ Ross Howard, "Ottawa Orders Three Ships to the Gulf" *The Globe and Mail*, August 11, 1990, p. A1. Announcing the deployment, Mulroney said "Iraq has flagrantly violated international law and offended against the most basic human values everywhere ... [Canada] must do everything it can [to restore Iraqi respect for international law] ... [Canada's expertise and reputation is based on peacekeeping, but that] does not remove from us the responsibility to respond to attacks and threats on friends and allies of Canada."

³⁴ John Kirton, "Liberating Kuwait: Canada and the Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991," in *Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases*, edited by Don Munton and John Kirton (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, Canada, 1992), p. 382.

³⁵ United Nations Security Council, S/RES/678 (1990) (New York: November 29, 1990).

³⁶ Canadian Press, "PM Won't Rule out Troop Move," *The Globe and Mail*, 13 November, 1990, p. A1.

General Xavier Perez de Cuellar, in which he outlined Canada's ideas for achieving a peaceful resolution of the crisis.³⁷ Such efforts notwithstanding, the subsequent failure of the Iraqis to withdraw from Kuwait resulted in the outbreak of the Gulf War on 16 January. At an emergency meeting of the war committee of cabinet, the Canadian Forces personnel deployed in the theatre of operations were authorized to adopt an offensive role in the conflict.³⁸

4.2.3 Zaire Rescue Mission, 1996

The Zaire Rescue Mission has been depicted as Prime Minister Jean Chrétien's personal response to the humanitarian emergency that had arisen in the Rwanda-Zaire border region in late 1996.³⁹

Throughout the 1990s, tensions in Zaire had steadily increased for a variety of reasons. Economic collapse, the fitful "democratization" process launched by President Mobutu Sese-seko, the outstanding issue of the political-citizenship status of the Zaire's indigenous Tutsi population, the refugee crisis in eastern Zaire caused by the arrival of hundreds of thousands of mainly Rwandan Hutu refugees following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and the Hutu militias that were operating out of the refugee camps, all acted as

³⁷ Hugh Winsor, "Clark Carries Note from PM to UN," *The Globe and Mail*, 10 January, 1990, p. A13. The article carried highlights of a CBC report that the proposal consisted of the following: (1) recognition of Iraq's desire for better access to the Persian Gulf; (2) settlement of these claims through an international arbitration process; (3) guarantee of Iraq's pre-invasion borders, to be monitored by a largely Arab peacekeeping force; (4) an offer of Canadian assistance in implementing any peace arrangements; and, (4) some form of movement towards a Middle East Peace Conference.

³⁸ Hugh Winsor and Ross Howard, "Cabinet Authorizes Offensive Role in Gulf," *The Globe and Mail*, 17 January, 1991, p. A1-2.

³⁹ Francine Pelletier, Documentary, *The Fifth Estate*, CBC-TV, November 18, 1997.

destabilizing influences in the region.⁴⁰ By late 1996, Zaire existed as little more than a phantom state.⁴¹

Matters were aggravated further by hostilities that erupted in early 1996. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) had hired soldiers of the Forces Armées de Zaire (FAZ) to guard the refugee camps with the aim of loosening the control the Hutu militias enjoyed over the general refugee population. The FAZ soldiers were bribed, however, by members of *Interahamwe*⁴² and ex-soldiers of the Forces Armées Rwandaises, the groups chiefly responsible for the Rwandan genocide. FAZ personnel subsequently combined with these Hutu militias to initiate a war in 1996 against local Tutsi civilians, particularly the Banyamoulenge⁴³ of the Masisi region of eastern Zaire.⁴⁴

These actions prompted the Banyamoulenge to enter into a military alliance with other forces and Tutsi "volunteers" from Rwanda's armed forces to establish the Tutsi-dominated Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL), under the leadership of Laurent Kabila.⁴⁵ By late 1996, fighting between the ADFL and FAZ and the Hutu militias had resulted in the ADFL controlling much of eastern Zaire.

⁴⁰ Amnesty International, Press Release, "Lawlessness and Insecurity in North and South-Kivu," at <http://www96.reliefweb.int/emergenc/greatlak/source/amnesty/analysis/011196a.html> (November 1, 1996).

⁴¹ Herbert Weiss, "Zaire: Collapsed Society, Surviving State, Future Policy," in *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, edited by I. William Zartman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp. 157-159.

⁴² *Interahamwe* is an extremist Hutu militia. Its Kinyarwanda name may be translated as "those who attack together."

⁴³ Banyamoulenge is term used to refer to the Tutsi population indigenous to northeastern Zaire.

⁴⁴ Howard Adelman, "Responding to State Failure," Unpublished Conference Paper, 14 November, 1996, pp. 21-22.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

Zaire and much of the Great Lakes region of Central Africa thus was confronted with a five-way mutually reinforcing conflict, involving: (1) an ethnic war between Masisi's Banyamoulenge civilian population and the coalition of FAZ and the Hutu militias; (2) Zaïrian Tutsis (and the ADFL) versus Mobutu 's regime in Kinshasa; (3) interstate conflict between Zaire and Rwanda caused and exacerbated by the refugee population and the other related conflicts; (4) control of the refugee population by Hutu extremist militias; and, (5) the United Nations and various Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) struggling to perform their humanitarian tasks, but hampered by the ADFL, FAZ and Hutu militias.⁴⁶

The result of this complex, multi-faceted conflict was a humanitarian crisis of catastrophic proportions. As the ADFL came to control one refugee camp after another, fleeing refugees swelled the population of the Mugunga refugee camp to 500,000 while another huge population went into hiding in the harsh interior west of the camps.⁴⁷ By the beginning of November, the fighting had intensified to the point that the United Nations and the NGO community felt compelled to evacuate their personnel from Eastern Zaire.⁴⁸ With the population, local and refugee, cut off from humanitarian assistance, it was reported that one million lives were at risk.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁴⁸ Inter-Press Service (Africa) – Third World Network, Press Release, "Conflict Watch, Zaire: The Players," at <http://www.ips.org/Africa/CW2nf.htm> (September 20, 1997). On 24 October, the ADFL seized Uvira, its first major town. This was followed with the seizure of Bukavu, South Kivu province's capital, on 30 October. On 1 November, the crisis reached a critical stage with the fall of Goma to the ADFL, a town on the Rwandan-Zaire border. This development prompted United Nations agencies and the NGO community to pull out of Eastern Zaire to ensure the safety of their personnel.

⁴⁹ Paul Knox, "Tutsi Offensive Imperils Hutus," *The Globe and Mail*, November 1, 1996, p. A1.

Representatives of the African states met in Nairobi, Kenya on 5 November to discuss the emergency. The meeting resulted in an affirmation of Zaire's borders and sovereignty, and a call for the international community: (1) to establish a neutral force to oversee a ceasefire; (2) to provide humanitarian corridors to facilitate the movement of refugees and (3) to facilitate the delivery of aid to the population.⁵⁰ In Canada, Chrétien watched the events unfold, increasingly "frustrated by the lack of commitment from the international community" in responding to the emerging humanitarian crisis.⁵¹

Amid news that a French proposal to launch a multinational rescue force had failed at the Security Council,⁵² and following conversations with his nephew,⁵³ wife, and James Bartleman, his senior foreign policy adviser, about the situation, Chrétien responded with an unusual example of personal diplomacy, calling world leaders in an attempt to forge a "coalition of the willing." Chrétien spent the weekend of 8-10 November building high-level support for a multinational intervention force that would bring aid to the masses of refugees in central Africa.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Adelman, p. 24.

⁵¹ Jim Brown, "Chrétien takes Political Chance on Aid Mission," in *The Halifax Daily News*, 15 November, 1996, p. 10.

⁵² John Hay, Thesis, *Conditions of Influence: An Exploration Study of the Canadian Government's Effect on United States Policy in the Case of Intervention in Eastern Zaire* (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1998) pp. 43-44. These efforts had resulted in the Security Council's passage of *Resolution 1078 (1996)*. This resolution has been characterized as a failure by the Council to act. It did, however, invite the willing to mount an operation, subject to Council approval.

⁵³ Chrétien's nephew, Raymond Chrétien, was Canada's ambassador to the United States, and in late October had been nominated by his uncle to the position of Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General on the humanitarian emergency in the Great Lakes region. From 1978-1981, Raymond Chrétien had served as Canada's ambassador to Zaire, with joint accreditation for Rwanda, Burundi and Congo.

⁵⁴ Hay, p. 1; Terrance Wills, "PM Keeps One Eye on Quebec when Developing Peace Plan," *The Montreal Gazette*, 18 November, 1996, p. A9. Among those Chrétien called were President Nelson Mandela of South Africa, British Prime Minister John Major, French President Jacques Chirac, Kenyan President Daniel Arap-moi, the prime ministers of Belgium, Japan, Italy, and the Presidents of Senegal, Brazil and Argentina to make the case for an international intervention "to prevent another Rwanda."

Chrétien was determined "to have a good head of steam" before approaching American President Bill Clinton for support. American reluctance was believed to arise from its lack of vital strategic interests, the complexity of the conflict, the considerable risk compared to the little advantages to be gained, the ambiguous nature of the mission, and the legacy of the American-backed United Nations operations in Somalia.⁵⁵ Chrétien approached United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali with his proposal for action after conversations with the leaders of eighteen countries. On 12 November, Chrétien announced Canada's willingness to lead the rescue mission.⁵⁶

That same day, a high-level Canadian delegation flew to Washington to brief senior American officials.⁵⁷ On 13 November, following a conversation with Chrétien, Clinton announced tentative American agreement to participate in the mission in a support and logistical capacity.⁵⁸ The American pledge of support was followed two

⁵⁵ Paul Knox, "Previous Debacles, Lack of Economic or Security Interests Slow Response to Crisis," *The Globe and Mail*, 6 November, 1996, p. A14.

⁵⁶ Wills, p. A9. In a news conference, Chrétien stated: "[w]e have all seen the disturbing images from Eastern Zaire in recent days: innocent men, women and children dying; human beings going without food and water for days and days. None of us can be indifferent to that suffering, none of us can be blind to the consequences."

⁵⁷ Jeff Sallot and Paul Knox, "Canada Pushes for U.S. Support," *The Globe and Mail*, 13 November, 1996, p. A12; Hay, p. 47. The delegation was led by Gordon Smith, deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, and included James Bartleman, secretary to the cabinet for foreign affairs and Chrétien's senior foreign policy advisor, Louise Fréchette, deputy minister of foreign affairs, Vice-Admiral Larry Murray, the acting Chief-of-Defence-Staff, and Lieutenant-General Maurice Baril. The meeting was attended by American National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, and representatives of the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Lake led "several painful hours of grilling of the Canadians about the plan," making two facts clear. First, he was unconvinced that Canada was ready and competent to take command of an intervention in Zaire. Second, American officials in general, but he specifically, placed the highest importance on securing answers to the outstanding questions regarding the mission, particularly those about its objectives and parameters.

⁵⁸ United States, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, *Press Briefing*, (Washington, D.C.: November 13, 1996). President Clinton's press secretary stated that "the President had decided that United States is willing in principle to participate in a limited fashion in this humanitarian mission, as long as certain conditions are stipulated to." These conditions may be summarized as the following: (1) increased information about the situation on the ground, including permission to operate from the affected states; (2)

days later by the Security Council granting Canada authority under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to lead a multinational intervention force (MNF).⁵⁹ It was the first time Canada had ever led a force with a Chapter VII mandate.

Almost immediately, however, the refugee population that the mission was designed to assist began streaming across the border back into Rwanda and westward into Zaire.⁶⁰ Media reports indicated that the ADFL had launched a series of attacks on the remaining refugee camps, which caused the Hutu militias to flee and thus permitted the previously intimidated refugee population to leave the camps and return to the Zaire-Rwanda border.⁶¹ Speaking in the House of Commons, however, the Prime Minister credited the initiative with causing this "massive, peaceful refugee movement."⁶² Within a matter of days, the entire rescue mission was thrown into doubt. On 19 November, the United States withdrew the ground force portion of its commitment to the MNF. Both

clear definition of the mission's objectives and parameters; (3) robust rules-of-engagement under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter; (4) that the cost of the mission is borne by the participating states; (5) a limited duration for the mission, about four months; (6) limitation of American involvement to airport security near Goma and logistical support; and, (7) American forces remain at all times under American command while serving under the operational control of a commanding officer.

⁵⁹ United Nations, Security Council, S/RES/1080 (1996) (New York, NY: November 15, 1996). The resolution provided for the following under Chapter VII of the United Nations' charter: "the establishment for humanitarian purposes of a temporary multinational force to facilitate the immediate return of humanitarian organizations and the effective delivery by civilian relief organizations of humanitarian aid to alleviate the immediate suffering of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in eastern Zaire, and to facilitate the voluntary, orderly repatriation of refugees by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as well as the voluntary return of displaced persons, and invites other interested States to offer to participate in these efforts ... by using all necessary means." The operation was set to terminate on 31 March, 1997, unless "the Council, on the basis of a report of the Secretary-General, determines that the objectives of the operation have been fulfilled earlier."

⁶⁰ David Pugliese, "UN Mission Not Needed, Africans Say: First Wave of Canadians Leave, but Full Deployment Delayed," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 17 November, 1996, p. A1.

⁶¹ Anne McIlroy, "Refugees Stream Back to Rwanda," *The Globe and Mail*, 16 November, 1996, p. A1.

⁶² In his speech, Chrétien stated: "the situation on the ground has improved dramatically ... This change is due in large part to the resolve shown by the international community under the leadership of Canada ... There was a job to be done and we were ready to do it." Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 18 November, 1996 (Ottawa: Hansard, 1996), pp. 6380-6381.

Rwandan and ADFL officials made it clear that the international force was no longer welcome. At a meeting in Stuttgart, Germany on 22 November, amid confused reports of continued fighting, the whereabouts of refugee flows, and the number of people at risk, the ground force component of the mission was abandoned, and alternatives such as airdrops of food and humanitarian assistance were discussed.⁶³

On 28 November, Canada announced it had achieved a consensus among its coalition partners to set up the MNF's operational headquarters in Entebbe, Uganda, and to begin aid airdrops if it was decided that the situation warranted such action. By 13 December, however, the mission was effectively terminated, following a report by Canadian Lieutenant-General Maurice Baril (the commander of the multinational force) to the United Nations' Secretary-General, in which he stated that the force had fulfilled its mandate under *Resolution 1080 (1996)* to the best of its ability. The initiative was subsequently credited with resolving the humanitarian crisis, with the Prime Minister stating that "the multinational force has served as a catalyst which helped break the impasse which kept hundreds of thousands of refugees in camps for over two years."⁶⁴ The mission came to a formal conclusion on 31 December, 1996. Even after the fact, however, except for mass graves later discovered and grim accounts from survivors, the exact number and the fate of those Rwandans left in Zaire remains largely unknown.⁶⁵

⁶³ Pelletier, 18 November, 1997; Hay, pp. 60-61. The Stuttgart negotiations remain in the memories of Canadian officials and NGOs as a crucial turning point in the crisis. They were described as being "difficult, acrimonious and ultimately disappointing, rooted mostly in disputes over numbers, intentions and the whereabouts of the refugees still in Zaire."

⁶⁴ Canada, Prime Minister's Office, Press Release, "International Steering Group Agrees that Zaire Force No Longer Needed," (Ottawa: December 13, 1996).

⁶⁵ Hay, p. 4.

Chapter 5 - Case Study Comparison

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The following chapter undertakes a detailed examination of the three selected historical examples of Canadian prime ministers intervening in the foreign policy process in response to a crisis. This structured-focused comparison will enhance the understanding and evaluation of the motivations of the prime ministers, their subsequent actions, and the impact of their respective interventions on the decision-making and policy-operationalizing processes and the resulting foreign policy output.

In spite of the different contexts, the discussion reveals a number of striking similarities. Analysis of the manner in which the decision-making and policy-operationalizing processes occurred in the three case studies indicates the centrality of the prime minister, a number of common motivational factors contributing to the prime ministers' interventions, and a similar set of consequences arising from each leader's actions. Such similarities will serve as the basis for the presentation of a theoretical model in Chapter 6 that may be tested against other cases.

5.2 CRISIS: MOTIVATIONS TO INTERVENE

5.2.1 Personal Motivations

Each prime minister had a set of personal motivations that contributed to their level of concern and that were a factor in their subsequent actions. This is perhaps most apparent in Trudeau's interest in nuclear disarmament. Trudeau's concern can be traced to 1962-63 and his vociferous opposition to the Pearson government's decision to allow the stationing of nuclear weapons in Canada.¹ Throughout his time in power, Trudeau had exhibited interest in the issue of disarmament. In speeches made in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the House of Commons, at the University of Notre Dame, and at the First and Second United Nations Special Sessions on Disarmament (UNSSOD I and II), Trudeau expressed growing concern about East-West relations, and promoted a policy of "nuclear suffocation."² One participant traces Trudeau's motivation to launch his initiative to a 1981 meeting he witnessed between the Prime Minister and American President Ronald Reagan. During their discussions, Trudeau argued strongly for superpower communication, and urged Reagan to maintain a dialogue with his Soviet counterpart. The President, however, smiled and remained non-committal.³

¹ Michael Pearson, Gregor MacKinnon and Christopher Sapardanis, "The World is Entitled to ask Questions," *International Journal*, v. XLI, no. 1, winter 1985-86, p. 140.

² Pierre Trudeau, "Speech by Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, to the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament," in *Lifting the Shadow of War*, edited by David Crenna and Pierre Elliott Trudeau (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1987), p. 31. Trudeau's "suffocation policy" was predicated on the belief that the best means of altering the dynamic of the arms race was to control the nuclear arms that fuelled that race. This policy consisted of proposals such as a comprehensive test ban treaty; an agreement to stop flight testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles; prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and an agreement to limit and then progressively reduce military spending on nuclear weapons systems. Elements of this policy would be present in Trudeau's subsequent initiative.

³ Confidential Interview.

Trudeau lobbied successfully for the inclusion of a pledge “to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war” in the final communiqué issued at the 1983 G7 summit in Williamsburg, Virginia.⁴ Even before the KAL 007 incident, Trudeau had been convening meetings of officials and friends to discuss easing Cold War tensions.⁵

Trudeau may also have felt some guilt over the decision to permit the testing of American cruise missiles over Canadian territory, and been aware of the effect the decision had on his reputation as a peace advocate.⁶ Trudeau has stated his peace initiative had its origins in this decision [to allow cruise missile tests]: “I felt I had a right to ask them [senior officials in the Department of External Affairs], some hard questions. The hard questions [were], in part, the birth of my initiative.”⁷ Having witnessed Trudeau's work on the subsequent preparations for the peace initiative, one senior PCO official proffered that Trudeau was “preparing his legacy for history.”⁸ Clearly, the “peace initiative could come as a surprise only to those who had not carefully followed the Prime Minister's concerns and preoccupations.”⁹

⁴ Harald von Riekhoff and John Sigler, “The Trudeau Peace Initiative: The Politics of Reversing the Arms Race,” *Canada Among Nations, 1984: A Time of Transition*, edited by Brian W. Tomlin and Maureen Appel Molot (Toronto: James Lorimer and Co., 1985), pp. 53-55. They argue that in his speeches, Trudeau had distinguished between active participation in arms control, and active encouragement and facilitation of such a process, the latter described by Trudeau as being both an appropriate and legitimate role for Canada, and one reflected in his subsequent efforts. See also Pearson *et al.*, p. 140.

⁵ J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 365.

⁶ Christina McCall and Stephen Clarkson, *Trudeau and Our Times, Volume II: The Heroic Delusion* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, Inc., 1994), p. 355.

⁷ Richard Gwyn and Sandra Gwyn, “The Politics of Peace,” *Saturday Night*, May 1984, p. 22.

⁸ J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 368; Pearson *et al.*, p. 141.

⁹ von Riekhoff and Sigler, p. 54.

With regard to Mulroney's personal motivations, there existed strong ties between himself and American President George Bush. Some have speculated that Mulroney was easily influenced by this friendship, which led him to make foreign policy decisions prior to consulting his cabinet.¹⁰ One senior official has characterized Mulroney's actions during the crisis as being a response to "what George needed."¹¹

Cooper, Higgott and Nossal argue, however, that it is important not to assume a direct causal relationship between this personal relationship and the prime ministerial intervention. They suggest the Canadian decision to participate in the anti-Iraq coalition was a foregone conclusion given the gravity of the international crisis. The strength of the Mulroney-Bush friendship only determined *when* the Canadian commitment of participation in the American-led multinational coalition would be made, not *whether* the commitment would be made.¹² While this is important to acknowledge, the point does not negate the argument that this personal motivation combined with other factors and contributed to the pressure on Mulroney to intervene. Assuming Cooper *et al.*'s assertion is correct, the Prime Minister's action still resulted in what may be considered a premature foreign policy decision regarding, at a minimum, the tactical nature of the commitment.

¹⁰ Ronnie Miller, *Following the Americans to the Persian Gulf: Canada, Australia and the Development of the New World Order* (Toronto: Associated University Press, 1994), p. 78. Also, see Charlotte Gray, "War Games," in *Saturday Night*, March 1991, p. 13. Gray quoted former Canadian ambassador to the United Nations, Stephen Lewis, as observing that "[t]o an extraordinary degree, Canadian foreign policy is driven by the Prime Minister's friendships."

¹¹ Confidential Interview.

¹² Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993), p. 138.

Chrétien also had personal motivations that contributed to his actions. The Prime Minister was deeply disturbed by media reports about the crisis.¹³ These reports included news that France's proposal for an intervention force had foundered in the Security Council, due to a lack of support among African countries and the United States. The Security Council had decided only to report back on the situation in twelve days.¹⁴ Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy recalls that Chrétien "basically said he had been watching the tragedy unfold ... he had talked to some of the other world leaders and they didn't know what to do either, and as a result, somebody had to grab a hold of it."¹⁵

Moreover, after being approached by United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in late October, Chrétien had nominated his nephew Raymond Chrétien, Canada's ambassador to the United States, to be the Secretary-General's special envoy to the humanitarian crisis in the Great Lakes region. The two men have a close relationship, described more in terms of brothers than that of uncle and nephew.¹⁶

Throughout the crisis, Ambassador Chrétien was in close communication with the Prime Minister and Gordon Smith, the deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, not to recommend Canadian leadership of a multinational force (MNF), but rather to stress the urgency of international action. Talking with his nephew about the seriousness of the

¹³ Confidential Interviews. Jeff Sallot, "Refugee Images Haunted Chrétien," *The Globe and Mail*, November 14, 1996, p. A1.

¹⁴ Terrence McKenna, Documentary, *The National Magazine*, CBC-TV, 18 November, 1996.

¹⁵ Pelletier, November 18, 1997.

¹⁶ John Hay, Thesis, *Conditions of Influence: An Exploration Study of the Canadian Government's Effect on United States Policy in the Case of Intervention in Eastern Zaire* (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1998), pp. 41-43.

situation, the Prime Minister's fears were heightened.¹⁷ The two men spoke at least twice on 8-9 November as Chrétien was making his decision on the initiative.¹⁸

More than one official who was involved in the mission cited the importance of the "family stake" in motivating the Prime Minister. One went so far as to question whether the mission would have been launched without this factor.¹⁹ "Any explanation of the Prime Minister's otherwise uncharacteristic boldness in asserting Canadian leadership in the Zaire crisis must acknowledge the effect of the energetic and self-confident Raymond on his proud and admiring uncle - who was anyway moved by the television images of suffering from the Zaire-Rwanda border country."²⁰

5.2.2 Political Motivations

In two of the selected case studies, the government had pursued policies that had drawn criticism from their traditional constituencies within a year of a federal election. The third case, the decision that sent Canadian forces to the Persian Gulf, while not occurring within a year of a federal election, occurred during Canada's infamous "summer of discontent," when the government possessed an approval rating below twenty percent.²¹

¹⁷ David Pugliese, "African Mission: How PM's Plan Slipped Away," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 23 November, 1996, p. A1.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

¹⁹ Confidential Interviews.

²⁰ Hay, pp. 42-43.

²¹ Gray, p. 11.

In Trudeau's case, the government's decision to permit cruise missile testing in Canadian territory was criticized as being inconsistent with "nuclear suffocation," and became the focus of protest of the Canadian peace movement.²² Tom Axworthy, Trudeau's principal secretary warned him that "our people" were being alienated by the policy. Trudeau and his advisors recognized that he had to take some remedying action, and were aware that a peace initiative had the potential to reverse the Liberal government's political fortunes.²³ While there is no evidence suggesting that the peace initiative was merely a cynical ploy, it must be recognized that the Prime Minister's actions had domestic political implications. In pursuing his initiative, Trudeau was on the right side of an issue that polls indicated was among Canadians' major concerns.²⁴ Indeed, there was initial reluctance about launching the initiative, based on concern that the public would in fact interpret it as a cynical political manoeuvre.²⁵

²² Confidential Interview. One official stated that the government, particularly Trudeau, had been made "constantly uncomfortable" as a result of the decision to allow the testing of the cruise missile. Anti-testing sentiment among the electorate had to be responded to, and in any event, Trudeau had never been comfortable with NATO and the approach it was taking in East-West relations. Also, see "Officials Urge Early Decision on Cruise Tests," *The Globe and Mail*, 12 July, 1983, p. 10. Also, see "Eight Big Peace Rallies Protest Cruise," *The Globe and Mail*, 25 July, 1983, p. 1.

²³ Gwyn and Gwyn, pp. 22-23.

²⁴ James Rusk, "Peace and Politics: PM Could Be Playing Only Card Left," *The Globe and Mail*, 11 November, 1983, p. 1.

²⁵ Gwyn and Gwyn, pp. 22-23. Tom Axworthy (Trudeau's principal secretary) and Liberal strategist Senator Keith Davey initially opposed the idea of Trudeau's peace initiative on political grounds. Trudeau himself also expressed concern that any action would be interpreted as a pre-election gambit. Despite such reservations, however, the Prime Minister argued that the gravity of the issue outweighed any domestic political concerns. Also, see "In Andropov Scenario, PM Would Stay," *The Globe and Mail*, 16 July, 1983, p. 11. Interestingly, in the summer preceding the peace initiative, senior Liberal sources responding to questions about a forthcoming federal election referred to "The Andropov Scenario." It posited that in the event that the nuclear arms negotiations stalled, Trudeau, who had been invited to Moscow to meet Andropov, would be called on to play the role of mediator between the superpowers. Trudeau would then go to the electorate on a tide of publicity praising him as the "man of peace" following the achievement of renewed negotiations and an arms control agreement.

During the Gulf Crisis, the preceding failure of the Meech Lake Accord, the stand-off with aboriginals at Oka and Khanawake, and the government's dismal approval rating did little to encourage the government to recall parliament for an emergency debate. This contributed to the response to the crisis being determined unilaterally by the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). Domestic political considerations may also have led Mulroney to intervene in the hopes of boosting his government's popularity.²⁶ One senior official stated subsequently that "Ottawa's handling of Oka and the Gulf Crisis [were] the only government actions that were popular in the polls during 1990."²⁷

Examining political motivations from an international perspective, Canada was a non-permanent member of the Security Council at the time of the Iraqi invasion. This placed pressure on the Mulroney government to take some action as a means of upholding the international order and institutions such as the United Nations.²⁸ Closely linked to this rationale was ensuring that Canada retained a voice in the post-Cold War world order.²⁹ Canada also had indirect geo-strategic concerns as a major industrialized trading nation in seeing that the global economy was not disrupted by the apparent threat to the global oil supply.³⁰

²⁶ John Kirton, "Liberating Kuwait: Canada and the Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991," in *Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases*, edited by Don Munton and John Kirton (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, Canada, 1992), p. 385.

²⁷ Gray, p. 11.

²⁸ von Riekhoff, p. 242. Also, see Ross Howard, "Ottawa Orders Three Ships to Gulf," *The Globe and Mail*, 11 August, 1990, p. A1. When announcing the deployment of the Canadian task force, Mulroney prefaced his remarks by stating that: "Iraq has flagrantly violated international law and offended against the most basic human values everywhere ... [Canada] must do everything it can [to restore Iraqi respect for international law]."

²⁹ Miller, p. 74.

With regard to the humanitarian crisis in Zaire, upon taking office, Chrétien had inherited Canada's involvement in the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR I). The mission, led by Canadian Major-General Roméo Dallaire, failed amid the 1994 Rwandan genocide. An assessment of the genocide held the West partly culpable due to its hesitant, vacillating response. This report reached "the highest levels" of the Canadian government when it was released in March 1996. Chrétien and Lloyd Axworthy were perceived by officials to believe deeply that the international community had an obligation to ensure that the mistakes made in Rwanda were not repeated. Chrétien thus saw the rescue mission as preventing a recurrence of recent history.³¹

There is also speculation about other political motivations contributing to Chrétien's intervention, including that he was prompted to act in response to criticism that foreign policy under his administration had become too commercially driven, having abandoned Canada's traditional international idealism.³² The fact that Axworthy had recently received accolades for his work regarding the International Campaign to Ban Landmines may have contributed to this motivation.³³ Such suggestions are not outlandish, given that press officials portrayed Chrétien as an "international knight in

³⁰ Martin Rudner, "Canada, the Gulf Crisis and Collective Security," in *Canada Among Nations, 1990-1991: After the Cold War*, edited by Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992), p. 269.

³¹ Hay, p. 38.

³² Giles Gherson, "Chrétien's African Gambit makes Political Sense," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 17 November, 1996, p. A10.

³³ Rosemary Spears, "Why Jean Chrétien will go to Zaire: Votes, rebuilding army morale and human suffering are all factors," *The Montreal Gazette*, 15 November, 1996, p. B3.

shining armour," and the mission initially earned the Prime Minister applause both domestically and internationally.³⁴

The impact that a rescue mission to a francophone country could have on Chrétien's personal popularity in Quebec also played a role.³⁵ Chrétien was particularly sensitive to the close association that many francophone Quebecers had with Rwanda and Zaire through longstanding missionary and educational ties.³⁶

A senior advisor to the Foreign Affairs minister has rejected any suggestions that Chrétien's motives were anything but altruistic.³⁷ While this may be true, a review of the theoretical literature suggests that domestic political considerations do increase in salience during crises, and it is reasonable to expect that the domestic political scene contributed to the motivations underpinning the prime ministerial intervention. The observation of one senior official - that Chrétien *was* aware of domestic political issues but that they were secondary to the Prime Minister's personal motivations and his belief that Canada was in a position to make a difference - perhaps comes closest to resolving this debate.³⁸

³⁴ Jeff Sallot, "Canada Offers to Lead Aid Force," *The Globe and Mail*, 12 November, 1996, p. A1; Editorial, "Containing the Crisis in Central Africa," *The Globe and Mail*, 13 November, 1996, p. A14.

³⁵ Confidential interview. Terrence Wills, "PM keeps an eye on Quebec when Developing Zaire Plan" *The Montreal Gazette*, 18 November, 1996, p. A9.

³⁶ John J. Kirton, "Foreign Policy Under the Liberals: Prime Ministerial Leadership in the Chrétien Government's Foreign Policy-making," in *Canada Among Nations, 1997: Asia-Pacific Face-Off*, edited by Fen Osler Hampson, Maureen Appel Molot, Martin Rudner (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1997) pp. 43-44.

³⁷ Michael Pearson, former advisor to the Hon. Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lecture, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, 1 December, 1997.

5.2.3 External Motivations

All three prime ministers faced external motivations to act, specifically, pressure arising from outside their close circle of advisors, or even from a non-Canadian source. This pressure may precede the trigger event, but its effect is heightened dramatically following the trigger event's occurrence.

For example, in the summer of 1983, Trudeau met with prominent Australian anti-nuclear activist Dr. Helen Caldicott, who urged him to use his position to improve East-West relations.³⁹ The Prime Minister had received similar messages in discussions with Robert McNamara, former American Secretary of Defence, and others, who urged him to act on disarmament while he still held power.⁴⁰ In the immediate aftermath of KAL 007, Trudeau was approached separately by Ivan Head, his former foreign policy advisor, who urged him to undertake a secret one-man peace mission to Moscow and Washington to facilitate a superpower dialogue.⁴¹ Although Trudeau was initially wary, Head challenged Trudeau to act in a memorandum:

³⁸ Confidential Interviews. Another participant, although not suggesting that political motivations are paramount, stressed the need to understand that the prime minister, by virtue of his nature, is a political animal, so that "everything is political."

³⁹ Canadian Press, "Reagan 'Clinically Paranoid': Anti-War MD," *The Globe and Mail*, 19 September, 1983, p. 8. Caldicott stated that the Canadian government had a major role to play in easing tensions between the superpowers and should perform this role, adding that she had had "good, respectful arguments" with Trudeau over the decision to permit cruise missile testing, and that Trudeau needed to "be pushed harder by the people to function to represent your interests." Also, see Gwyn and Gwyn, p. 23. Caldicott claims she told Trudeau at a private luncheon that "he was the one person in the world who could bring East and West together."

⁴⁰ Confidential Interview. McNamara apparently also reinforced Trudeau's beliefs that the Soviet actions had been unintentional. Also see, von Riekhoff and Sigler, p. 52. Two of these individuals were Brigadier-General Maurice Archdeacon (retired), who approached Trudeau with the idea of a personal peace mission. Another was actress Margot Kidder, to whom Trudeau had been linked romantically, who urged him to take action on the nuclear issue. Gwyn and Gwyn, p. 73.

⁴¹ McCall and Clarkson, p. 364.

Canada is a respected member of the international community, has an enviable policy record, is regarded as being deeply affected by arms build-ups because of its geographic location, and has proved again and again its effectiveness as an actor. We have an obligation to contribute to the impasse. *Your reputation and your seniority combine to place an inescapable burden on you.*⁴² [emphasis added]

von Riekhoff and Sigler have suggested that Trudeau was more deeply affected, and more persuaded to act by such personal contacts, than from any bureaucratic or cabinet efforts.⁴³

In the case of the Gulf Crisis, the external motivation is linked closely with the personal motivation, given that it stemmed from the American president. What differentiates this motivational factor from Mulroney's personal motivation, however, is that whereas the former is concerned with the presidency as a political institution and the representative of American governmental influence, the latter focuses attention on Mulroney's relationship with Bush as an individual.

In this sense, the Canadian actions during the Gulf Crisis were encouraged by pressure from the United States, not the United Nations. This pressure began to build with Mulroney's telephone conversation with Bush on 4 August in which they "reviewed efforts to bring international collective pressure on Iraq to end its occupation from

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 366. Also, see Ivan Head and Pierre Elliott Trudeau, *The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada's Foreign Policy, 1968-1984* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1995), p. 301.

⁴³ von Riekhoff and Sigler, p. 52.

Kuwait,"⁴⁴ and culminated in Bush's formal invitation to Mulroney at the White House dinner to join the American-led coalition.⁴⁵

With regard to the Zaire rescue mission, the external motivation arose out of a series of conversations between Canadian and American officials. As the Security Council debated *Resolution 1078 (1996)*, Gordon Smith, deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, was contacted by Peter Tarnoff, American undersecretary of state for political affairs. Smith was informed that the suggestion of a Canadian-led MNF had been raised at a State Department meeting.⁴⁶ This was relayed immediately to the Prime Minister, who was described as having "jumped" at the idea.⁴⁷

The fact these events transpired does not detract from the Zaire rescue mission as a case of a prime ministerial intervention. They do not discount the suggestion that Chrétien had been deeply affected by news coverage and reports from his nephew. Indeed, the Prime Minister's immediate agreement indicates that the American proposal occurred at a moment when his concern had reached a level that caused him to seize the opportunity.

⁴⁴ Cooper *et al.*, pp. 122, 129.

⁴⁵ Jean Morin and Richard H. Gimblett, *Operation Friction: The Canadian Forces in the Persian Gulf* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997), p. 18.

⁴⁶ Hay, p. 44. The first of these conversations had occurred between James Bartleman, Chrétien's PCO foreign policy advisor, and Anthony Lake, Clinton's National Security Advisor. Lake informed Bartleman that the only country that Clinton administration "might conceivably" allow to command its troops would be Canada. This was apparently the first mention by anyone in authority of a Canadian leadership of the MNF.

5.2.4 Trigger Events

Although the factors described above interacted and reinforced one another, each case also involved a trigger event in which immediate events on the international stage converged with the various motivations to lead each prime minister to perceive the existence of a foreign policy crisis that required their intervention. For Trudeau, the trigger event was the shooting down of KAL 007. Having attended a conference of nuclear experts in Sicily earlier that summer, Trudeau had been "deeply impressed with the evidence ... that civilization could not survive a nuclear war."⁴⁸ Trudeau was increasingly concerned about the potential for a relatively minor international incident to lead to a global war, as had occurred prior to World War I.⁴⁹

This growing concern was crystallized by the KAL 007 incident and the ensuing bellicose rhetoric from the superpowers.⁵⁰ Although the government's official response was to strongly condemn the attack, Trudeau's personal response was muted.⁵¹ Trudeau

⁴⁷ Confidential Interview. Also, see Francine Pelletier, *The Fifth Estate*, CBC-TV, 18 November, 1997.

⁴⁸ von Riekhoff and Sigler, p. 55.

⁴⁹ Head and Trudeau, p. 299.

⁵⁰ Granatstein and Bothwell, p. 365. Also, see Crenna and Trudeau, p. 63. Trudeau used the language of crisis in his depiction of this incident and the general state of superpower relations in his subsequent speech at the University of Guelph: "There is today an ominous rhythm of crisis. Not just an arms crisis. It is a crisis of confidence in ourselves, a crisis of faith in others. How can we change that ominous rhythm? That is the question which brings me here tonight ... [Washington and Moscow] both seem to lack at the present time ... a political vision of the world wherein their nations can live in peace."

⁵¹ Granatstein and Bothwell, p. 364. Also, see American Press *et al.*, "Soviets Liars, Terrorists, U.S. President Charges," *The Globe and Mail*, 3 September, 1983, p. 1. Gerard Pelletier, Canada's ambassador to the United Nations, condemned the attack as "nothing short of murder." Secretary of State for External Affairs, Allan MacEachen condemned the incident as "an irresponsible act that violates all the norms of international behaviour ... nothing would justify the shooting of the plane and the killing of its passengers." In contrast, Trudeau stated that "until we know what final explanation they give and we've made a judgement on the explanation, it's premature to say what we're going to do about it." Trudeau's more moderate stand was echoed by his External Relations Minister, Jean-Luc Pepin, who was described as "going out of the way" to emphasize that the incident could have been an accident. James Rusk, "Avoid 'big conflict' over fatal incident, Pepin urges after meeting Soviet envoy," *The Globe and Mail*, 2 September, 1983.

refused to condemn the Soviets' actions, calling the shoot-down an "accident", stating that "[we must make] some effort to re-establish communications with the Soviets ... we must find some way to stop shouting at each other when the world is teetering on the brink of disaster."⁵²

Trudeau based these remarks on his assessments of intelligence from the American National Security Agency he obtained via the Canadian Security Establishment. The intelligence convinced him that the Reagan administration knew that the Soviets' actions had been an accident, but was using the incident as an excuse for rhetoric: "The Americans knew that it was an accident and the Soviets knew that the plane was not sent by the Americans. The two superpowers were talking past each other."⁵³

With regard to the Gulf Crisis, it would be wrong to discount the triggering effect that the Iraqi invasion had in and of itself on Mulroney's intervention. Kirton suggests the Canadian military response was prompted by six factors, all directly related to Iraq's actions, namely: (1) the unprovoked aggression; (2) the apparent brutality of the occupation; (3) the holding of Canadian nationals as "human shields"; (4) the Saudi request for American assistance; (5) the imposition of sanctions; and (6) Iraq's order for Canada and other states to close their embassies in Kuwait City.⁵⁴

The ultimate trigger event that would directly propel Mulroney into action, however, occurred at the 6 August dinner at the White House. Over the course of the

⁵² Crenna and Trudeau, p. 63.

⁵³ Granatstein and Bothwell, p. 364.

⁵⁴ Kirton (1992), p. 385.

evening, Mulroney and Bush discussed the deployment of American forces and it is speculated that it was at this meeting that Bush requested the Canadian military commitment to join the American-led coalition to enforce the United Nations.⁵⁵

For Chrétien, the trigger event that motivated his intervention appears to have been the telephone call from Tarnoff that raised the idea of a Canadian-led intervention force. This occurred amid a series of news reports that depicted masses of refugees in Zaire, with claims that one million people were at risk due to a lack of access to food and humanitarian aid.⁵⁶ One official has characterized Chrétien's reaction to this telephone call as having been a "visceral response."⁵⁷

5.3 PRIME MINISTERIAL INTERVENTIONS

In each case then, there is a combination of motivations -- personal, political and external -- that interact and reinforce one another.⁵⁸ A trigger event arising from an

⁵⁵ Cooper *et al.*, p. 128.

⁵⁶ For example, see Paul Knox, "Tutsi Offensive Imperils Hutus," *The Globe and Mail*, 1 November, 1996, p. A1. Relief workers were quoted as fearing a catastrophe on the scale of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Also, see Anne McIlroy, "Relief Workers Forced to Leave," *The Globe and Mail*, 4 November, 1996, p. A1; Paul Knox, "Relief Workers Study Lesson in Politics," *The Globe and Mail*, 6 November, 1996, p. A1. The aid workers reported that the African crisis was the largest and most complex humanitarian emergency they had ever seen. Some believed that only a multinational force could be effective in restraining the paramilitary guerrillas, as a means to delivering aid to the refugees. Beyond the immediate refugee crisis, however, there were fears that all of central Africa could be pulled into the conflict. Howard French, "Fear of Continental Crisis Rising," *The Globe and Mail*, 4 November, 1996, p. A10.

⁵⁷ Confidential Interview.

⁵⁸ It could be argued that a ranking of the relative influence of the various motivational factors would strengthen the analysis. Aside from the obvious methodological difficulties posed by ranking subjective phenomena, it is beyond the scope of this work to undertake such a ranking, given that the sampling of cases examined is too small to provide any reliable results. The application of the model to a larger sample of cases would assist in overcoming this difficulty.

international crisis leads the prime minister to perceive the existence of a foreign policy crisis, accompanied by a feeling of the necessity for a response. The result is a prime ministerial intervention in the decision-making policy process to respond to the crisis and its attending motivational pressures.

In the case of the Peace Initiative, Trudeau held a private meeting on 15 September with Head and Robert Fowler, his PCO foreign policy aide. Although Trudeau remained uncommitted to the peace mission at this meeting, by 21 September, he had summoned Allan MacEachen, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Minister of Defence Jean-Jacques Blais, and their top officials to declare he was launching such a mission.⁵⁹ Instructing them to assemble a task force, Trudeau imposed a ten-day deadline for the formulation of proposals.⁶⁰

With regard to the Gulf Crisis, in addition to publicly announcing Canadian support for a military blockade to enforce the economic sanctions against Iraq,⁶¹ Mulroney privately pledged Canadian participation in the armed coalition in the Gulf at the White House dinner.⁶² Although the official history of the Department National Defence (DND) suggests the Prime Minister made only a tentative commitment, it was nevertheless Mulroney who began implementing his commitment immediately upon his return to Ottawa.⁶³

⁵⁹ Granatstein and Bothwell, pp. 360, 454. Those present at the meeting were Trudeau, MacEachen, Blais, Tom Axworthy (PMO), Fowler (PCO), Gordon Osbaldeston, Secretary to the Cabinet, Marcel Massé, de Montigny Marchand, Louis Delvoie and Gary Smith (all of DEAIT).

⁶⁰ von Riekhoff and Sigler, p. 56.

⁶¹ Gray, p. 10.

⁶² Hugh Winsor, "Three Ships Sailing Eastward With Little Sense of Direction," *The Globe and Mail*, 24 August, 1990, p. A1; Miller, p. 74; Cooper *et al.*, p. 128.

With regard to the Zaire Rescue Mission, Chrétien made the key decision to launch the mission following discussions he had with a small number of people.⁶⁴ It was only following conversations with various world leaders that Chrétien contacted his cabinet ministers, informing them of his intentions and recalling them to Ottawa for a meeting on 10 November, along with other senior officials.⁶⁵ Officials involved in the events have remarked that they found Chrétien's intervention striking, given his record for cautious incrementalism in foreign policy. This increased the sense of urgency surrounding the mission.⁶⁶

Decision-making authority contracted within the executive branch in each of the cases studied. Each prime minister surrounded himself with his closest advisors, bypassing established decision-making processes to direct a specific course of action. Although the Canadian political system allows prime ministers to act quickly and decisively, the review of the theoretical literature suggests that such actions are not without consequence for the quality of decision-making and policy outputs. In each case, the prime ministerial intervention engendered (and was reinforced by) resistance

⁶³ Morin and Gimblett, p. 18; Kim Richard Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1997), p. 231.

⁶⁴ These individuals apparently were Raymond Chrétien, Chrétien's wife Aline, who was also disturbed by the news reports from Central Africa; and James Bartleman, who confirmed Chrétien's belief that Canada could lead the mission successfully, and Gordon Smith, who approached Chrétien with the American proposal.

⁶⁵ Confidential Interviews. Tim Harper, "How the PM Stirred State Heads," *The Toronto Star*, 15 November, 1996, p. A24; Hay, p. 45. Present at the meeting were Lloyd Axworthy, Smith, Deputy Defence Minister Louise Fréchette, Huguette Labelle, President of CIDA, and Vice-Admiral Larry Murray, the acting Chief-of-Defence-Staff. Minister of Defence Doug Young did not attend as he was in his constituency, but was present the next day. One participant said the action, although surprising, was understandable given that Chrétien perceives himself as Canada's *de facto* Foreign Affairs minister.

⁶⁶ Confidential Interviews. Hay, p. 122.

from senior officials, led to *ad hoc* decision-making structures and processes, and reinforced parliament's marginalization in the foreign policy process.

5.4 CONSEQUENCES OF PRIME MINISTERIAL INTERVENTIONS

5.4.1 Ministerial-Bureaucratic Opposition Bypassed

In the case of the Peace Initiative, no consultations with the ministers or senior officials present from DEAIT and DND had occurred prior to the meeting at which Trudeau announced his intentions. There was little official enthusiasm for the idea among those present, including MacEachen and other senior officials, who saw the initiative as quixotic at best, and as embarrassingly naïve at worst. Further, the role that external contacts had played in the initiative's formation was a source of tension between Trudeau and senior officials that impacted negatively on the mission's development.⁶⁷ The Prime Minister "couldn't be stopped ... despite the best efforts of External Affairs and others. [He] was going to do what he believed in."⁶⁸ Trudeau has been described as having "quashed" the reservations held by senior bureaucrats.⁶⁹

This bureaucratic opposition was reflected in the efforts of senior departmental officials to keep a relatively safe distance when establishing the task force. Those

⁶⁷ von Riekhoff and Sigler, pp. 52, 56; James Rusk, "More Active Role in Global Affairs Urged for Canada," *The Globe and Mail*, 22 August, 1983, p. 8. Interestingly, one week prior to the shooting down of KAL 007, MacEachen had described Canada's role in East-West relations as being an "interpreter." He suggested "an offer from Canada to mediate negotiations would likely be rejected, but that it didn't preclude efforts by Canada to try to interpret the situations and efforts of one country to the other." MacEachen proceeded to caution that this itself was a limited role and that Canadians shouldn't overestimate the abilities of the Canadian government to act. Such statements indicate that MacEachen was likely to be sceptical of Trudeau's initiative.

⁶⁸ Granatstein and Bothwell, p. 366.

⁶⁹ Crenna and Trudeau, p. 63.

charged with developing the initiative were drawn from the younger, middle ranks of DEAIT and DND.⁷⁰ It has been argued that this was less a symptom of bureaucratic malevolence than it was an acknowledgement of the difficulty in getting senior bureaucrats to focus on one issue, in addition to their lack of familiarity with arms control issues.⁷¹ Nonetheless, further exploration of the evidence suggests that this opposition was both a consequence of the prime ministerial intervention, and a factor reinforcing the contraction of decision-making authority, structures and processes.

With regard the Gulf Crisis, Cooper *et al.* claim that there was general agreement with Mulroney's action, particularly with regard to a limited naval deployment.⁷² Closer examination, however, reveals ministerial and bureaucratic opposition, including a split in the cabinet, arising from the prime ministerial intervention.⁷³ Mulroney's pledge of Canadian participation in the military coalition was made unilaterally, without consulting his Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, who was in his constituency, nor his Minister of Defence, William McKnight, who was abroad.⁷⁴ Cabinet was neither consulted nor convened until after this commitment had been made.⁷⁵ Moreover, Mulroney's close working relationship with Bush meant a minimizing of involvement of those cabinet ministers whose departments were most affected by the crisis.⁷⁶

⁷⁰ McCall and Clarkson, p. 365.

⁷¹ von Riekhoff and Sigler, p. 57.

⁷² Cooper *et al.*, p. 128.

⁷³ Gray, p. 13.

⁷⁴ Miller, p. 74; Cooper *et al.*, p. 128.

⁷⁵ Morin and Gimblett, p. 160.

⁷⁶ Cooper *et al.*, p. 128.

Mulroney's intervention contradicted DEAIT's initial reaction of "heroic caution."⁷⁷ Clark reflected his department's cautious, if rhetorically strong response. On 3 August, following a forceful condemnation of Iraqi actions, he replied to a question about possible Canadian military action by stating: "No. Certainly not by Canada." This was contradicted completely by the Prime Minister, however, following his Washington visit.⁷⁸ Mulroney suggested that the issue of Canadian military involvement would be decided at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels.⁷⁹

This contradiction reveals a difference of opinion between Mulroney and Clark. Throughout the crisis, the Secretary of State for External Affairs was doveish, opposing the dispatch of CF-18s and any ground forces to the Gulf, preferring a "wait and see" approach to sanctions.⁸⁰ In a speech in late October, Clark stated: "[w]e should not rule out the possibility that young Canadians will not return to this country for celebration, but will stay there for burial." This quote has been subsequently interpreted as an expression of his skepticism about the government's policy.⁸¹

Moreover, it became apparent that an unofficial division of labour existed between the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Whereas Mulroney took the lead in announcing and commenting upon Canada's overall policy in the crisis, Clark and DEAIT handled consular matters, specifically, the fate of the

⁷⁷ Gray, p. 10.

⁷⁸ von Riekhoff, p. 242.

⁷⁹ Kirton (1992), p. 384.

⁸⁰ Miller, p. 79.

⁸¹ Cooper *et al.*, p. 142.

Canadian nationals detained in Iraq, and the status of the Canadian embassy in Kuwait City. Although Clark was sent to Brussels for formal discussions with European leaders and the meeting of NATO foreign ministers, the visit was symbolic due to Mulroney's prior actions.⁸² As one writer indicated: "Clark and senior officials were front men; Mulroney may often have been in the background, but this was "his show [and the PMO's] from the start."⁸³

From a bureaucratic perspective, DND was preoccupied with the events at Oka and Khanawake, given that the deployment of Canadian Armed Forces personnel in the area of the domestic unrest occurred simultaneously with the eruption of the Gulf Crisis.⁸⁴ There were also serious concerns within the military about Canada's capacity to contribute. Mulroney responded to such concerns, stating: "... we're not bereft of equipment. We're capable of participating - as we do with peacekeeping forces - in other initiatives that may or may not be taken by allied governments."⁸⁵

The Zaire Rescue Mission also involved a bypassing of resistance from senior officials. The Prime Minister did not ask for any advice at the 10 November meeting where he announced his intentions to the assembled ministers and officials. There was no canvassing the advantages and disadvantages of leadership, or the costs of action or inaction. "He had made up his mind when he walked in...There was no holding him

⁸² Miller, p. 111. Ross Howard, "Liberals Want Warships Held Back," *The Globe and Mail*, 24 August, 1990, p. A1. This apparent division of labour was not lost on the opposition parties. Liberal House Leader Jean-Robert Gauthier suggested that the Minister of External Affairs had been "prematurely retired," or silenced by Prime Minister Mulroney.

⁸³ Kirton (1992), p. 385.

⁸⁴ Morin and Gimblett, p. 18.

⁸⁵ Kirton (1992), p. 384.

back." Chrétien imposed his decision on his ministers. "He didn't know and didn't want to know the details ... It was a top-down decision, and we were told to do it, to find a way to make it happen."⁸⁶

Senior DND officials were resistant and pushed against the decision. One senior official confessed surprise, along with others, and to being "uncomfortably comfortable" with the Prime Minister's decision.⁸⁷ Questions about the safety of Canadian troops and the ability of the Canadian Armed Forces to lead the international effort were discussed at length, with particular emphasis on American concerns regarding "command and control" arrangements.⁸⁸ DND was keenly aware of its lack of reliable intelligence, airlift and other capabilities, and the fact it had few soldiers to spare. In October, Chrétien had forced the resignation of General Jean Boyle as Chief-of-Defence-Staff. The department was under stress, heavily deployed in Bosnia and Haiti and under pressure at the Somalia inquiry. Fréchette and Murray are said to have left the meeting shaking their heads and wearing expressions that were read as terror.⁸⁹

Similarly, some senior officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAIT)* were uncertain about the wisdom of the mission.⁹⁰ DFAIT officials argued that if Ottawa

⁸⁶ Hay, pp. 45, 122

⁸⁷ Pearson, Lecture, 1 December, 1997; Confidential Interviews. One participant expressed the opinion that Chrétien "was absolutely snowed" by DND: "I don't think that either he or Bartleman ever really grasped that what we [Canada] were offering was insufficient." Another individual claimed that Young was particularly opposed to the mission, to the extent that DND officials were torn between fulfilling their duty to follow direction from the Prime Minister, and serving their Minister.

⁸⁸ Confidential Interviews; Harper, p. A24.

⁸⁹ Hay, pp. 45-46, 121. According to Hay, James Judd, chair of the interdepartmental task force responsible for the mission, used two arguments to address DND's resistance, both of which reflected bureaucratic-political dimensions of the crisis: (1) the Prime Minister has proceeded too far to give up without significant political damage; and (2) success will help win back DND's reputation and morale that was lost due to the Somalia affair.

were to facilitate establishment of a humanitarian corridor for the return of refugees to Rwanda, it would have to make sure that that country would receive them. Many feared it was beyond Canadian capabilities to assume the task of pressuring Rwanda to do so and to create the harmonious conditions necessary to assure the safety of the repatriated refugees.⁹¹ Although Axworthy was eager to act, and while deputy ministers were subsequently involved, one official has admitted the bureaucracy would not have recommended such a course of action had Chrétien not shown such a deep interest.⁹²

5.4.2 *Ad Hoc* Decision-Making Structures and Processes

As discussed in the theoretical literature review, there is a tendency in crises for the executive branch to employ *ad hoc* decision-making structures and processes. This is done to counter the potential problems of bureaucratic politics and to ensure the implementation of the desired crisis response.

Examination of the case studies reveals this holds true in the Canadian context. For example, the Trudeau peace initiative was developed in a top-down approach by an *ad hoc* task force. Throughout the course of their work, the task force “ruptured all protocols of departmental reporting authority.”⁹³ Both Trudeau and Fowler were insistent that ideas from the Task Force be presented to them in raw form, preoccupied that

*The Department of External Affairs and International Trade had been renamed upon the coming to power of the Chrétien government.

⁹⁰ Confidential Interview. Also, Pearson, 1997.

⁹¹ Kirton (1997), p. 42.

⁹² Hay, p. 45; Ian C. Ferguson, Political Advisor to the Commander of the Multinational Force for Eastern Zaire, 1996, Lecture, “The Zaire Mission: A Challenge for Canadian Foreign Policy,” Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, 25 November, 1997.

⁹³ Gwyn and Gwyn, p. 24.

bureaucratic resistance could undermine the initiative. The Task Force enjoyed unparalleled access to the PMO, and Trudeau himself devoted an hour a day - a major commitment - to the initiative.⁹⁴ This decision-making structure and process arose from Trudeau's disdain and mistrust of the bureaucracy, which was reinforced by the initial reception that his initiative had received.⁹⁵

During the Gulf Crisis, it has been noted above that it was Mulroney who initiated the implementation of the bureaucratic aspects of his commitment, immediately upon his return to Ottawa.⁹⁶ From the beginning, the PMO took the primary decision-making role in the formulation of the Canadian response, while DEAIT and DND were marginalized. One observer went so far as to report that the Mulroney government's handling of the crisis was being directed by a tightly controlled axis between the PMO, DND and DEAIT. Virtually all of the work was being performed "in secret by a few powerful officials, with little involvement of the public or cabinet."⁹⁷

Throughout the Zaire Rescue Mission, normal decision-making and communication channels were also bypassed. This was done to facilitate negotiations with the coalition partners, and to overcome any bureaucratic-political frictions to ensure the mission's implementation. The Prime Minister's extraordinary decision to assert

⁹⁴ Granatstein and Bothwell, pp. 360, 366. At the 21 September meeting, a steering committee of nine officials had been established and charged with forming the task force that was responsible for formulating the initiative. Fowler (Trudeau's PCO adviser on foreign and defence policy) was insistent that the bureaucracy not take over, fearing that any significant bureaucratic opposition would result in a scuttling of the mission.

⁹⁵ Beth A. Fischer, "The Trudeau Peace Initiative and the End of the Cold War: Catalyst or Coincidence?" *International Journal*, v. XLIX, no. 3, pp. 616-617. Also, see von Riekhoff and Sigler, p. 56; Granatstein and Bothwell, p. 366.

⁹⁶ Nossal, p. 231.

⁹⁷ Winsor, 24 August, 1990.

Canadian leadership of the MNF triggered intense activity and confusion in the bureaucracy. While DFAIT, DND and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) had undertaken preliminary planning for a modest Canadian participation in a hypothetical international intervention, the Great Lakes region was little understood, save for a few specialists in African affairs and aid, peacekeeping and security policy.⁹⁸ Gordon Smith recalls that he "effectively stopped being deputy minister and had to take the senior echelons of DFAIT out of their regular activities" in order to facilitate the department's contribution to the organization of the MNF.⁹⁹

The first organizational response was the creation in DFAIT of an *ad hoc* task force, under the joint leadership of two assistant deputy ministers and reporting to the deputy minister. This assembled all of DFAIT's scarce expertise on central African and military operations in the same enterprise, partnering desk officers in regional and functional areas with the most senior levels of the organization.¹⁰⁰

The second organizational response was the PCO's formation of the Zaire Interdepartmental Task Force (ZIT). This consisted of eight officials from DFAIT, DND, CIDA, and the PCO. Originally conceived of as simply a coordinating body without operational roles in diplomacy or the field, ZIT ended up becoming the media relations

⁹⁸ Hay, pp. 35, 118; Confidential Interview. This point was dramatically underscored by one participant, who claims some aspects of the rescue mission were being worked out literally "on the back of an envelope" on the flight that carried the Canadian delegation to Washington for its 12 November meeting at the White House.

⁹⁹ Interview with Gordon Smith, former deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, Ottawa, Ontario, 24 March, 1999. Smith suggested that the Prime Minister was never fully aware of the level of bureaucratic activity that had been engendered by his decision to organize the MNF.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

and operational hub of the mission. This task force also partnered junior officials with those at the highest bureaucratic levels.¹⁰¹

In the estimation of those involved in the task force, ZIT successfully contributed to interdepartmental coordination in Ottawa and helped maximize scarce organizational resources. They claim it minimized bureaucratic conflict while not eliminating it completely.¹⁰² James Judd, ZIT's chair, appears to have been crucial in resolving interdepartmental strife. Judd brought a reputation for frankness and a readiness to confront senior officials. He briefed the ministers involved for almost daily conference calls with the Prime Minister, who was abroad during this stage of the crisis.¹⁰³

The relations between the PMO and DND during this period further suggest that this was a PMO-directed foreign policy action. Chrétien demonstrated a proclivity to bypass normal bureaucratic procedures and contact the mission commander in the field directly. Although such actions were eventually accommodated, it took time for DND to adjust.¹⁰⁴ Further, on 13 November, National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) issued a directive ordering silence, indicating that the PMO would co-ordinate the release of all information about the mission. When commanders of the Disaster Assistance Response

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 119; Ferguson, Lecture, 25 November, 1997.

¹⁰² Hay, p. 122; Kirton (1997), p. 44.

¹⁰³ Hay, pp. 119-120. Confidential Interviews. One witness stated that ZIT was granted decision-making authority in a "remarkable way" arising from the conflict between Young and Aworthy. The result was that *de facto* decision-making authority devolved onto the Task Force. Another said that Judd was able to be such an effective leader of the Task Force because of awareness of his privileged access to Chrétien.

¹⁰⁴ Keith Coulter, Speech to the Civil-Military Relations Conference of the Security Defence Forum, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, 20 February, 1998. Also, Confidential Interview. Chrétien apparently was constantly asking about how many Canadian Forces personnel were in the field, failing to appreciate that it was the type of personnel, not the numbers that mattered.

Team (DART) fielded media questions, senior military officials were summoned and chastised by the PMO for “upstaging the Prime Minister’s initiative.”¹⁰⁵

5.4.3 Parliament Bypassed

The prime ministerial interventions also reinforced the constitutional-institutional marginalization of parliament in the foreign policy process. In the case of the Peace Initiative, Trudeau only reported to the House at the very end of his mission. This action brought criticism from Mulroney, then leader of the opposition, who argued that Trudeau’s actions would have carried greater credibility if they had received the unanimous sanction of the House of Commons.¹⁰⁶

During the Gulf Crisis, while it is true that parliament debated the issue of Canada's involvement four times, parliamentary participation consistently occurred after key decisions had already been taken.¹⁰⁷ As mentioned, the House of Commons was not recalled for a variety of domestic political reasons pertaining to Canada's infamous "summer of discontent" (see page 105). In fact, Canadian ships were delayed in port at Sicily for two days so that they would not enter the zone of operations too soon, thus

¹⁰⁵ David Pugliese, "African Mission: How PM's Plan Slipped Away," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 23 November, 1996, p. A1.

¹⁰⁶ Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 9 February, 1984 (Ottawa: Hansard, 1984), p. 1216. Mulroney said: "until now ... Parliament has had to glean its information from a political platform in Montreal where the PM elaborated on some proposals, and from the reception halls of Eastern Europe, where some blanks were filled in. We regret this disregard for Parliament ... The missing dimension ... has been a formal endorsement of his proposals ... by all Members of this House of Commons, who deserve to be consulted on a regular and ongoing basis about such matters."

¹⁰⁷ Nossal, p. 276.

avoiding the early recall of parliament required by the *National Defence Act*, for a debate on the Order-in-Council that had dispatched them.¹⁰⁸

Opposition parties were only given a briefing on the crisis and the Canadian response in late August, after Canada had already committed to participate in the military coalition.¹⁰⁹ A further example of this marginalization was the fact that opposition leaders did not receive any briefing on Canadian participation in the pending Gulf War until 10 January, 1991.¹¹⁰ The result was that by the time parliament finally conducted a full-scale debate on the issue of Canadian involvement in the conflict, the House of Commons had become polarized along partisan lines.¹¹¹

On 11 January, 1991, four days before the deadline for the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait expired, parliament was recalled for debate over Canadian participation in possible hostilities.¹¹² Canada was the last member of the multinational coalition to have its legislative body authorize its executive's operational action, and it did so only five days *after* the start of a conflict that had been foreseen fifty days earlier with the passing

¹⁰⁸ Miller, p. 125; There was and continues to be a significant confusion surrounding this point. See Canada, Library of Parliament, *International Conflicts: Parliament, The National Defence Act, and the Decision to Participate - Background Paper BP-303E*, (Ottawa: Library of Parliament Research Branch, 1992). Under Section 32 of the *National Defence Act*, the government is obliged to issue a proclamation for the meeting of parliament within ten days of the placement of Canadian personnel on "active service." Beyond this obligation, however, there is no provision in the legislation for either parliamentary debate or approval of the government's actions. Further, there is no provision as to the timing of placing service personnel on "active service." By precedent, however, some form of parliamentary debate does take place on either the government's decision to deploy, and, as was the case in the Gulf Crisis, the decision to commit the deployed service personnel to offensive duties.

¹⁰⁹ Kirton (1992), p. 387; Howard, 24 August, 1990. The opposition criticized the government's despatch of the ships as being premature and dangerous, and urged the recall of parliament given that the decision had been "poorly explained, hasty and jeopardized the safety of Canadians."

¹¹⁰ Susan Delacourt, "Chrétien, NDP Boss to receive briefings," *The Globe and Mail*, January 10, 1991, p. A10.

¹¹¹ Rudner, p. 272.

of *Resolution 678 (1990)*.¹¹³ Bernard Wood, director of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security chastised parliament: "I would have to fault the government for not doing more to clarify the choices and provide the opportunity for debate; and fault the opposition for focussing on the peripheral questions and ... trivializing issues of war, peace and security."¹¹⁴

With regard to the Zaire Rescue mission, the impotence of the legislative branch in the foreign policy process was evident throughout the crisis. Although the mission was debated in the House on 18 November, the debate took place well after the key decisions had been made, and as events on the ground rendered the exercise virtually meaningless.¹¹⁵ Further, no emergency meetings of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade Committee (SCFAIT) were held to receive parliamentary input about the mission. In an appearance before SCFAIT, Axworthy and Don Boudria, Minister of International Co-operation, referred only once to the Zaire mission, and then only in connection with the costs of peacekeeping operations in Haiti, the subject of the meeting.¹¹⁶

In Chrétien's defence, he did approach Reform Party Leader Preston Manning on 11 November regarding his intentions, and offered to recall parliament from a one-week recess. Manning declined the offer on the condition that the debate would be held on 18

¹¹² Kirton (1992), p. 390.

¹¹³ Morin and Gimblett, p. 160.

¹¹⁴ Gray, p. 9.

¹¹⁵ Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, November 18, 1996, (Ottawa: Hansard, 1996), pp. 6380-6381.

¹¹⁶ Canada, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Evidence – 19 November, 1996* (Ottawa: Hansard, 1996).

November.¹¹⁷ This suggests that the contraction of decision-making authority in crisis situations is accepted to the point that even senior parliamentary leaders are prepared to forget their primary legislative duty to hold the executive accountable. It was only after it became apparent that the mission was foundering that the opposition began to raise questions about Canada's capacity to undertake the mission. Manning stated that: "once again, Canada has rushed into a peacekeeping mission without thinking and is now paying the price." He also questioned how Canada expected to be effective given its continuing commitments in Bosnia and Haiti. For his part, Progressive Conservative leader Jean Charest said that while he supported the decision to help refugees, "[it] is now obvious that this mission lacks proper preparation and risks ending in confusion."¹¹⁸

5.5 INCREASED POTENTIAL FOR DECISION-MAKING DEFICIENCIES

Examination of the cumulative impact of these mediating variables, and their interrelationship, reveals that they combined with the dynamics of crisis to increase the potential for the appearance of deficiencies in the decision-making and policy-operationalizing processes. This ultimately resulted in an undermining of the policy output that prompted the prime ministerial intervention.

In the Trudeau Peace Initiative, the time constraints imposed on the task force meant that the initiative did not suffer from an excess of planning. One official

¹¹⁷ Harper, 15 November, 1996.

complained: "[why] must the Prime Minister wait fifteen years and then choose his last year in office to come up with a global peace plan which must be ready in ten days?"¹¹⁹ Another official stated he could not comment on the eve of the initiative's launch because "the mission [was] so ill-defined."¹²⁰

The task force operated as a small, close-knit team. Non-hierarchical composition and homogeneity of beliefs allowed the group to function effectively and consensually in the high-pressure atmosphere.¹²¹ While this may have been the case, the time constraints involved, the *ad hoc* nature of the task force, and the direct involvement of the prime minister left the decision-making process vulnerable to a number of deficiencies, particularly groupthink, newgroup syndrome, leader dominance, and political manipulation.¹²²

On 7 October, Trudeau presided over a meeting to finalize the main points of his mission with senior officials and a number of ambassadors that had been recalled to

¹¹⁸ Hugh Winsor, "Ottawa Now Focusing on Aid," *The Globe and Mail*, 21 November, 1996, p. A15; Paul Knox, Graham Fraser, Anne McIlroy, Jeff Sallot, Hugh Winsor, "Commitment Fades for Aid Mission," *The Globe and Mail*, 20 November, 1996, p. A12.

¹¹⁹ von Riekhoff and Sigler, p. 56.

¹²⁰ James Rusk, "PM to Outline Plan to Curb World Tension," *The Globe and Mail*, 27 October, 1983, p. 9.

¹²¹ von Riekhoff and Sigler, pp. 56-57. Also, see Gwyn and Gwyn, p. 245. They list the task force as being composed of the following individuals: Louis Delvoie, head of DEAIT's security and arms control unit; Gary Smith, head of the disarmament unit; Peter Hancock, chief of the eastern European Division; James Mitchell and James Harlick from policy analysis; General Maurice Archdeacon (ret.) from the PCO; from National Defence, Arthur Mathewson, chief of policy planning, Captain John Toogood, a DND specialist in arms control; and, Ken Calder, DND's director of strategic analysis.

¹²² Gwyn and Gwyn, pp. 24-25. An example of this vulnerability is contained in the account of when one task force member got up from the table late one evening and shouted at another, "You know what you are? You're the enemy of ideas!" Another example is that one senior official, whose position was very much relevant to the course of the initiative, can not recall having been consulted at all during this crucial planning stage. Confidential Interview.

Canada to advise on the initiative.¹²³ Prior to his appearance, comments on the initiative were largely critical. The atmosphere shifted diametrically when Trudeau entered the room, took control of the meeting, and endorsed all but one of the task force's proposals.¹²⁴ Trudeau is said to have been clearly in control of the meeting and the final decisions. He liked what the task force had presented, and the manner in which the proposals had been developed.¹²⁵ These accounts support the claim that groupthink, leader dominance and political manipulation were present in the decision-making and policy-operationalizing processes, particularly in their final, and perhaps most crucial stages.

During the Gulf Crisis, the overwhelming decision-making deficiencies appear to have been leader dominance and political manipulation, arising from Mulroney's unilateral commitment to Bush of Canadian military participation. The Prime Minister's intervention set the stage for all of the subsequent Canadian responses to the crisis, and this commitment was made in the absence of Clark and McKnight. Further, the subsequent division of labour between the PMO and DFAIT suggests that decision-making making structures and processes were manipulated to ensure the predominance of executive authority in the realization of the Prime Minister's commitment.

¹²³ Head and Trudeau, p. 304; Clarkson and McCall, p. 365. These proposals were presented in the speech in Montreal on 13 November, 1983. Those present at the meeting included Trudeau, James "Si" Taylor, Ambassador to NATO; Geoffrey Pearson, Ambassador to the Soviet Union; Allan Gotlieb, Ambassador to the United States; Michel Dupuy, Ambassador to France; Gerard Pelletier, Canada's Permanent Representative at the United Nations; Louis Delvoie, chair of the task force; and senior officials from the PCO, DEAIT, and DND.

¹²⁴ Clarkson and McCall, p. 367; von Riekhoff and Sigler, p. 58.

¹²⁵ Granatstein and Bothwell, p. 367.

The presence of decision-making deficiencies arising from the centralizing of decision-making authority, structures and processes was also seen during the Zaire Rescue Mission. The initial decision to act was taken by Chrétien after consulting with a small number of people. This suggests the presence of leader dominance and groupthink at the outset of the decision-making process.¹²⁶

Further, any doubts were not able to coalesce into a concerted opposition. This was due partially to the time constraints involved, but also, as more than one official has remarked, Chrétien's interest in seeing the mission succeed. This caused bureaucrats to put aside any doubts and proceed with planning the mission.¹²⁷ This confirms the presence of groupthink and leader dominance in the policy operationalizing process, which precluded a more realistic, objective appraisal of the situation. A similar dynamic occurred in the cabinet's discussions. It was only when Chrétien left the room for a moment that previously silent cabinet ministers began to voice their concerns.¹²⁸

Another deficiency that was prevalent in the Zaire case was information failures. It has been described as:

impossible to overstate the extent of confusion, ignorance, misunderstanding and cross-purposes that went into decisions and judgements in the case of intervention in Eastern Zaire. Without a single exception, diplomats, military officers, international civil servants, NGO field workers, and journalists all speak of a muddle and missed signals on the ground and in the diplomacy.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ Confidential Interview. One participant also confirmed the presence of leader dominance in the closing stages of the mission. Despite being skeptical of aid air-drops, ZIT acted to operationalize the action due to the Prime Minister's insistence.

¹²⁷ Confidential Interviews; Hay, p. 122; Ferguson, Lecture, 25 November, 1997.

¹²⁸ Coulter, Speech, 20 February, 1998.

¹²⁹ Hay, p. 108.

Perhaps the most dramatic example of this is the claim of a senior aide to the Minister of Foreign Affairs who stated that DFAIT officials only received word about the intended rescue mission when "bureaucrats from other countries [contacted us] telling us our PM had just called!"¹³⁰ Another example was Chrétien's 12 November announcement of the MNF, in which he invoked Canada's "moral authority" to lead the mission. This offended some American officials, and did not ease the Canadian delegation's task in the difficult negotiations with the Americans that were occurring at the time.¹³¹

Information on the situation in eastern Zaire was poor and often contradictory. Due its lack of an external intelligence gathering apparatus, Canada was forced to rely on its coalition partners and the NGOs. It quickly became apparent that intelligence was being used as a political tool to influence the course of the mission, and that parochial interests were leading to the skewing of the intelligence provided, both by Canada's coalition partners, and the NGO community.¹³² Officials were confronted with the task of trying to determine the massive logistics requirements for a mission that remained ill-defined and uncertain, aggravated by a keen awareness of a lack of reliable information

¹³⁰ Pearson, Lecture, 1 December, 1997; Confidential Interview. Another example of this occurred regarding communications with the South African government. Although Mandela had promised Chrétien a contribution of personnel to the MNF, when senior South African officials were contacted, they professed an apparent lack of knowledge regarding Mandela's commitment. Such incidents were symptomatic of the information failures and technical challenges that occurred.

¹³¹ Hay, p. 49.

¹³² James Appathurai and Ralph Lysyshyn, "Lessons Learned from the Zaire Mission," *Canadian Foreign Policy*, v. 5(2), winter 1998, p. 96. Also, Confidential Interviews. One senior official maintains he was constantly worried that the intelligence from coalition participants was being supplied in a selective manner. Interestingly, another senior official, while conceding that the reliability of the intelligence being received was a concern, argues that such concerns were not borne out by events, and that a *post facto* comparison of the intelligence supplied revealed this to be the case. Notwithstanding this apparent

and serious time constraints. These are conditions that have been noted as conducive to the emergence of information failures and groupthink.¹³³

Adelman has countered that despite Canadian frustrations, a significant amount of reliable information was in fact available. What was lacking, however, was a detailed analysis of the key policy options and their empirical and normative implications. This resulted in information failures, and the rhetorical rationale for the initiative, if not the objectives themselves, shifting from one position to another.¹³⁴ This argument appears borne out in a post-mortem conducted of the mission, which suggests that decision-making was marred by the inadequate provision for recording decisions and distributing results to those who needed to know.¹³⁵

While Axworthy's sentiments were therefore understandable when he stated that "now is not the time to stop and reflect" regarding how best to proceed with the mission, such reflection (and the means to reflect) was essential to have ensured a more effective, efficient response.¹³⁶ The failure to do so resulted in an undermining of the objectives that motivated the Prime Minister's original intervention.

contradiction in accounts, Canada's lack of its own external intelligence-gathering apparatus at a minimum placed additional stress on decision-makers.

¹³³ Confidential Interview. Similarly, ZIT's deliberations were not characterized by long drawn-out debates over details. When representatives of the Chief-of-Defence-Staff expressed some concerns, they were "dealt with."

¹³⁴ Howard Adelman, "Responding to State Failure," Unpublished Conference Paper, 14 November, 1996, p. 26.

¹³⁵ Kirton (1997), p. 44.

¹³⁶ Knox *et al.*, 20 November, 1996.

5.6 POLICY OUTPUT

Examination of the policy outputs in each case reveals that their aims were undermined. This was the result of their being the products of deficient decision-making and policy-operationalizing processes attributable to the prime ministerial intervention.

At one point during his initiative, Trudeau stated: "One man representing one country cannot promise a miracle, let alone deliver one. I have absolutely no illusions about the complexity of the issues in play."¹³⁷ Despite his candour, Trudeau has been criticized as having been ill-prepared and naïve in his understanding of the dynamics of the arms control issue, and for overestimating his peace initiative's ability to alter the condition of superpower relations.¹³⁸

The Peace Initiative was seen as abandoning of Canada's functionalist heritage in arms control, particularly its rational-technical contribution to security problem solving between East and West. It was criticized for being a deviation from Canada's multilateral, "quiet diplomacy" tradition, which worked out of the glare of the public spotlight.¹³⁹ The initiative's unilateral nature also saw a lack of prior consultation with NATO allies, with the exception of a letter to the leaders the day before the initiative's launch. Such unilateralism, followed out of Trudeau's perceived urgency and the wish to not see the initiative undermined by the United States or United Kingdom governments,

¹³⁷ Pierre Elliott Trudeau, "Address by Pierre Elliott Trudeau to the Liberal Party of Canada, Montreal, Quebec, November 13, 1983," in *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, 1984, p. 303.

¹³⁸ Granatstein and Bothwell, pp. 375-376

¹³⁹ Pearson *et al.*, pp. 130-132.

resulted in restrained support at best. Trudeau may have received polite handshakes and platitudes, but little more from the leaders with whom he met.¹⁴⁰

This highly public unilateralism antagonized the Reagan administration, arguably Trudeau's primary target in his initiative. Former American Secretary of State Dean Rusk argued that "the Prime Minister should state his disagreements on multilateral issues to the President privately. Do it in public and the president is only going to get his back up."¹⁴¹ Trudeau's public expressions of doubt about NATO's nuclear strategy that he made at Davos could only enrage the United States and the other NATO allies, thus further undermining his objective of lowering the rhetoric as a prelude to more constructive superpower relations.¹⁴²

Some have argued a systematic lack of adequate preparation on the ground for the initiative contributed to its lack of sustainable success. In fairness, however, to expect such a level of preparation may have been unrealistic given the domestic political pressures in Western Europe, specifically West Germany and Italy, surrounding the deployment of the new missiles, and the time constraints involved.¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ von Riekhoff and Sigler, p. 62; Pearson *et al.*, pp. 151-152. Also, Confidential Interview. One official claims this approach to the NATO allies was symptomatic of the antipathy that Trudeau and NATO Secretary-General Joseph Luns had for one another, and echoes the assertion that the unilateralism was followed out of fear of a negative reaction. The official went on to state that the allies' reaction was predictable: "we were breaking a fundamental rule of alliances [in acting unilaterally]. There was a sense, even among those who liked Trudeau, that the Prime Minister was acting quixotically. While they may have admired his actions, they didn't take him seriously."

¹⁴¹ Martin, 22 October, 1983.

¹⁴² Charlotte Montgomery, "PM's Doubts May Hurt Peace Plan," *The Globe and Mail*, 30 January, 1984, p. 1; Fischer, pp. 629-630; Martin, p. 11. Also, Confidential Interview. This point was underscored by the remarks of one official involved in the initiative: "If you're going to make something like that [a dramatic shift in NATO policy] work, you have to persuade your allies, not confront them...you need to persuade the United States, United Kingdom and France...it serves no purpose to persuade the Danes!"

¹⁴³ Pearson *et al.*, p. 152.

But the haste with which the mission was formulated meant the loss of an opportunity to strengthen the initiative and its credibility by having it co-sponsored by other world leaders.¹⁴⁴ Trudeau also failed to gain strong support from the Movement of Non-Aligned Nations because the initiative failed to offer a concrete linkage between disarmament and development. A senior aide admitted: "That one got away from us ... we couldn't get our act together in time."¹⁴⁵

Another challenge to the initiative arose from Canada and Trudeau's standing on the international stage. The Trudeau initiative distinguished itself in its attempt "to aim for the highest possible influence, in the full knowledge that the outcome would, by necessity, fall short of the broad aims of the peace initiative."¹⁴⁶ Just what the prime minister of a country with little military or economic clout could do to reduce superpower tension remained unknown. Admittedly, Trudeau was NATO's longest-serving leader, perhaps giving him a greater amount of influence than a typical Canadian prime minister, but this clout could not overcome the reality that Canada did not have the international standing and power to undertake such an ambitious diplomatic effort.¹⁴⁷ Trudeau may have been personally respected, but he had no special expertise in mediation, no broad experience in the area of arms control, and thus lacked credibility.¹⁴⁸ This was summed up by a Canadian official stationed in Washington: "He's dying on the vine with it here

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

¹⁴⁵ Gwyn and Gwyn, p. 25.

¹⁴⁶ von Riekhoff and Sigler, p. 66.

¹⁴⁷ Granatstein and Bothwell, p. 368.

¹⁴⁸ Pearson *et al.*, p. 151.

... we're [Canada] not a player, he's not a player. And the only concern is that he may be muddying the waters."¹⁴⁹

In fairness, Trudeau did not envisage himself as an arms control expert, and certainly not as an active mediator. Pearson *et al.* have suggested that his central objective was to create a "climate of confidence," not an arms control agreement, nor even renewed negotiations. They proceed to argue any assessment of the initiative must take this broad objective as its starting point.¹⁵⁰

The first aim of the initiative was to gain a credible foot in the door of the Kremlin and the White House. Once inside, Trudeau would have the opportunity to encourage better communications. The second aim was to directly encourage and facilitate superpower communication and recognition of their common interests.¹⁵¹ As has been noted, however, the unilateralism with which Trudeau pursued these objectives actually undermined them.

These objectives were also weakened by the very nature of the proposals that comprised the initiative, particularly the suggestion of a conference involving the five nuclear powers. At first trumpeted as the key aspect of the initiative, Trudeau and his officials were soon playing down the conference's importance, due to the poor reception it received. It appealed to the fears rather than the security of smaller nuclear powers like the United Kingdom, France and China, poisoning their reaction to the other proposals and robbing the initiative of its momentum. During his visit to Washington, Trudeau

¹⁴⁹ John Gray, "Peace Tour: Trudeau Praised at Home, but Limping on the Road," *The Globe and Mail*, 17 December, 1983, p. 1.

¹⁵⁰ Pearson *et al.*, pp. 142-143.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

admitted he did not ask Reagan about the conference for fear of hearing a negative response. For his part, Reagan refused to answer about attending such an event. Similarly, the administration was hostile to Trudeau's proposal of a ban on the use of high altitude anti-satellite weapons. *The Globe & Mail* observed that "by stressing the Big 5 conference and de-emphasizing others (including not defining them adequately), Trudeau sabotaged his own initiative."¹⁵²

This becomes even more apparent upon closer examination of the American response. The American invasion of Grenada immediately after the initiative's launch sent a clear signal as to the Reagan administration's attitude. Trudeau was neither consulted nor contacted in advance by the American administration. If actions were not loud enough, the American Embassy in Ottawa released a tersely worded statement that cautioned Trudeau against interfering in superpower relations lest the unity of the Western alliance be called into question.¹⁵³ Laurence Eagleberger, under-secretary of state for political affairs, removed any remaining doubts about American attitudes when he referred to the Prime Minister as "an erratic leftist high on pot."¹⁵⁴

Notwithstanding such comments, Trudeau claimed success citing a modification in superpower rhetoric.¹⁵⁵ While the initiative's proposals did meet some mixed success,

¹⁵² Gray, December 17, 1983; Editorial, *The Globe and Mail*, February 9, 1984, p. 6.

¹⁵³ Thomas Walkom, "Grenada Invasion Deals Severe Blow to Trudeau Plan," *The Globe and Mail*, 29 October, 1983, pp. 1-2; Fischer, p. 626.

¹⁵⁴ McCall and Clarkson, p. 381.

¹⁵⁵ Pierre Elliott Trudeau, *Memoirs* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Publishers, Inc., 1993) pp. 335-336. Also, see Fischer, p. 615; Pearson *et al.*, pp. 148-151; von Riekhoff and Sigler, p. 66.

even the successes cannot be attributed to the initiative alone.¹⁵⁶ Fischer suggests that the Peace Initiative merely coincided with changes in Washington's Soviet policy that had been determined prior to the initiative.¹⁵⁷

Fischer argues that, ironically, Trudeau's initiative actually threatened this American policy shift. The unilateral initiative threatened to undermine Soviet perceptions of the subsequent policy change, making it appear like lip service to an ally at best, or as a compelled action resulting from international pressure at worst. Accordingly, it is not surprising that Trudeau received such a chilly reception; this might have been foreseen with better communication. Like the other weaknesses of the initiative, however, this was prevented by the nature of the decision-making structures and processes. The initiative, as such, was "less a failure of Canada and its global influence, but a failure of leadership and strategy," arising from a deficient decision-making process.¹⁵⁸

With regard to the Persian Gulf Crisis, the Prime Minister intervened to commit Canada prematurely to the American-led coalition. The Mulroney government's actions were described as the "product of an attempt to balance a profusion of sometimes

¹⁵⁶ Pearson *et al.*, p. 147. These were the political re-energizing of Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks and the attendance of the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe by NATO foreign ministers. These were the results of Franco-German pressure on the United States.

¹⁵⁷ Fischer, pp. 615-625. According to Fischer, as early as mid-November 1983, the White House had planned a major change in its Soviet policy. Reagan's shift in rhetoric began only hours after meeting with Trudeau, and was followed by a January 1984 speech that was much more conciliatory in tone. The President spoke of the common interests of the superpowers, and did not refer to the Kremlin in derogatory terms. He said that the United States sought the goal of "a better working relationship, one marked by greater co-operation and understanding." This decoupled the issue of the Soviets' international behaviour from a superpower dialogue and arms control. Instead, Reagan advocated the urgency of high-level talks and emphasized the need for arms reductions. This shift culminated in the November 1985 Geneva summit between Reagan and new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. The fact these developments echoed Trudeau's initiative has been cited as proof of the mission's success.

¹⁵⁸ Fischer, p. 630.

conflicting goals ... a saw-off between wanting to be part of the action with allies and wanting to sustain a role as a peacemaker."¹⁵⁹ His unilateral commitment to participate in the multinational coalition occurred four days prior to a meeting of NATO foreign ministers, the date by which it was understood Canada that had to make a decision on the nature of its response.¹⁶⁰

While it is possible, perhaps probable, that the same decision may have been reached, these four days could have been used for consultations with the cabinet, the bureaucracy, and parliament to arrive at a better informed decision, and perhaps even a modification in the tactical nature of the Canadian response. The Prime Minister's actions sacrificed valuable time for reflection and contemplation.

From a military perspective, Mulroney's action resulted in the dispatch of three warships, ranging in age from eighteen to thirty-one years old to the Gulf. The ships departed from Canada without a clear mission and the nature of their role was not decided upon until they reached the theatre of operations, a fact that makes it problematic indeed to determine the appropriateness of their initial dispatch.¹⁶¹

While HMCS *Terra Nova*, the oldest ship in the Canadian fleet, had been modernized in 1984, it required a substantial refitting, as did HMCS *Athabaskan*, which was overdue for a complete modernization. Moreover, the two ships were designed primarily for anti-submarine warfare, a superfluous advantage at best given that Iraq

¹⁵⁹ Winsor, 24 August, 1990.

¹⁶⁰ Cooper *et al.*, p. 138.

¹⁶¹ Gray, pp. 10-11.

possessed no submarines.¹⁶² The third ship in the task force, HMCS *Protecteur*, a supply ship, conducted patrols in the Gulf, a task for which it was neither designed nor suited. It was readily apparent that the purpose of the task force was more symbolic than strategic, a point driven home when it was suggested that the task force would need to stay out of the range of Iraqi missiles because it lacked the ability to counter the missiles at a sufficiently safe range.¹⁶³

The Canadian Armed Forces, particularly the task force deployed, were clearly not prepared for such a mission. Even with their refits, the ships' defensive systems were highly antiquated, and their air-warning systems were inoperable for a significant portion of the time. Matters were so difficult that the Canadian Armed Forces had to requisition an anti-aircraft gun from a museum to attach to one of the ships. Canada's was the least well-equipped of all of the navies in the Gulf.¹⁶⁴

From a diplomatic perspective, Mulroney's concern was with pushing the United Nations to catch up with military developments. This was done to strengthen the institution and its collective security role in the post-Cold War order. Ironically, however, the Prime Minister's pledge to Bush and the subsequent dispatch of three Canadian warships were made outside of the United Nations system, and prior to the organization's approval of the use of minimal force to enforce the sanctions.¹⁶⁵ The

¹⁶² Howard, 11 August, 1990.

¹⁶³ Miller, p. 124; Howard, 11 August, 1990, p. A1; Deborah James, "Enthusiasm High on Board Ships Bound for Gulf," *The Globe and Mail*, 18 August, 1990, p. A3; Kevin Cox, "Canadian Ships Ready for Gulf, Navy Says," *The Globe and Mail*, 23 August, 1990, p. A12.

¹⁶⁴ Miller, pp. 123-124.

¹⁶⁵ Tom Keating, "The Future of Canadian Multilateralism," *Canada Among Nations, 1994*, edited by Maureen Appell Molot and Maxwell Cameron, (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1995), p. 229.

government was also criticized for committing the ships and the squadron of CF-18s without seeking a United Nations command,¹⁶⁶ and for insisting that the United Nations had sanctioned the use of military force to expel the Iraqis from Kuwait, notwithstanding the passage of *Resolution 678 (1990)*.¹⁶⁷

The rationale behind such actions was to sustain any Canadian leverage that could be used to integrate American actions into the United Nations framework. Mulroney's premature commitment of Canadian support of the American military response, however, only served to erode any minimal leverage that Canada possessed to restrain American belligerency and achieve a diplomatic resolution to the crisis. Arguably, such actions undermined the Canadian government's overarching diplomatic goal of strengthening the United Nations and tying the United States to its system of collective security.

Once *Resolution 678 (1990)* was passed, (with Canadian co-sponsorship), American decisions drove the final stages of the crisis and its conflict.¹⁶⁸ The American military response to the crisis, unlike its diplomatic response, was thus largely independent of the United Nations.¹⁶⁹ It is possible that without the prime ministerial intervention and the resulting loss of four days of deliberations, such developments could have been foreseen. Similarly, the contradiction between the two aims of strengthening

¹⁶⁶ Miller, p. 128. This was a non-starter, however, given that the Bush administration and the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had made it quite clear that they could not tolerate a United Nations command of the military coalition.

¹⁶⁷ Rudner, p. 269.

¹⁶⁸ Cooper *et al.*, p. 132.

¹⁶⁹ Keating (1995), p. 228.

the United Nations system of collective security and encouraging American use of the institution to legitimize its actions might also have been anticipated.¹⁷⁰

The reality was that Mulroney's actions resulted in Canada becoming bound tightly to American preferences and decisions, and being drawn into an active, offensive position after having joined what had initially been a defensive coalition. Cooper *et al.* posit that the failure to commit Canadian ground forces indicates that the government was not as comfortable with the course of events as it had initially been in August. However, the diplomatic and political consequences involved dictated that Canada was in no position to alter its policy.¹⁷¹

Kirton has countered that the cause of Canada's response to the Gulf Crisis does not lie primarily in Washington, but in the pursuit of Canadian interests. He suggests Canadian advice was weighed and considered before, rather than after decisions were made. As evidence of this independence, he cites Canada's resistance to American requests for ground forces.¹⁷² The revelation that DND began developing contingency plans to deploy a mechanized brigade group after a meeting between Clark and American Secretary of State James Baker III, however, suggests that this resistance was not as strong as Kirton suggests.¹⁷³

¹⁷⁰ Harald von Riekhoff, "Canada and Collective Security," in *Canada's International Security Policy*, edited by David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, Canada, 1995) p. 243.

¹⁷¹ Cooper *et al.*, pp. 132, 140.

¹⁷² Kirton (1992), p. 383.

¹⁷³ David Roberts, "Canada Has Secret Plan to Send Troops," *The Globe and Mail*, 12 January, 1991, p. A1; Canadian Press, "PM Won't Rule out Troop Move," *The Globe and Mail*, 13 November, 1990, p. 1. Apparently, the plans to send Canadian ground forces, notwithstanding the lack of desert equipment or training, were drafted following the 13 November meeting between Clark and Baker in Bermuda. It is interesting that one day prior to this meeting, Mulroney refused to rule out any Canadian ground force contribution.

From a broader diplomatic perspective, Canada's behaviour suggested a significant extension of the geo-strategic parameters of its foreign policy, which had ramifications for its future involvement in the regional politics of the Middle East and in efforts to establish a more stable security framework in the area.¹⁷⁴ Mulroney's premature commitment had the potential of undermining Canada's established international reputation as a peacekeeper, and its future ability to participate in peacekeeping and post-conflict reconciliation efforts.¹⁷⁵

The Zaire rescue mission has also endured a great deal of criticism. A senior official claims the mission was an example of the impact that poor decision-making structures and processes can have, stating that "we didn't make an effort to build a consensus ... we were naïve about it. If we had done our homework better ... [the deliberations] would have resulted in either no action or a different action."¹⁷⁶ These sentiments were echoed by veteran peacekeeper Colonel Jim Allen, who claimed the mission was conceived of by the Prime Minister and ordered into the field without proper research.¹⁷⁷

In fairness, an evaluation of the initiative found that the forward momentum to implement the mission was most effectively sustained when Chrétien was personally involved. The initial success of launching the initiative was made possible by his personal intervention. It was only when the management dropped to the level of ministers and

¹⁷⁴ Rudner, p. 241.

¹⁷⁵ Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1993), p. 231.

¹⁷⁶ Pearson, Lecture, 1 December, 1997.

¹⁷⁷ Juliet O'Neil, "Fizzled Mission to Zaire cost Taxpayers \$14.5 million," *The Ottawa Citizen*. January 18, 1997, p. A1.

senior officials that difficulties arose.¹⁷⁸ The Prime Minister's personal role and relationship with other leaders, particularly Clinton, was emphasized by almost all participants, with one describing it as "a dominating factor" in the case.¹⁷⁹

The very qualities that made Canada well-suited to lead the formation of the MNF, however, also served to undermine its efforts. Canada had few levers, save for moral suasion, to influence and to direct the MNF in ways its larger partners did not want to go, nor could it effectively influence the parties on the ground. Its lack of a sizeable military contribution, and any strong geo-political and economic interests in the area, also left Canada and the rescue mission susceptible to the influence of stronger nations and their parochial interests.¹⁸⁰ Canada was quickly caught in a position where it was being pressured from its European partners, particularly France, to at least initiate airdrops, while being confronted with growing resistance from the Americans and British. Moreover, Canadian diplomatic missions abroad were urging the government not to end the MNF prematurely for fear of damaging the country's international reputation.¹⁸¹

By taking on a leadership role without contributing combat troops, Canada was also dependent on other nations to conduct any significant operations. For example, the mission's success rested almost entirely on Washington's provision of logistical

¹⁷⁸ Appathurai and Lysyshyn, p. 98.

¹⁷⁹ Confidential Interview; Hay, p. 122.

¹⁸⁰ Appathurai and Lysyshyn, pp. 94-96; Paul Koring, "U.S. Planes Key for Canadians to Get to Zaire," *The Globe and Mail*, 14 November 1996, p. A1.

¹⁸¹ Hay, pp. 62, 68. Also, Confidential Interviews. One official suggested the chief challenge of the rescue mission was the political aspects of coordinating the coalition. The mission was characterized by the official as being a "useful education, a real 'eye-opener'" regarding the political implications and challenges of leading a MNF.

support.¹⁸² This placed Canada in a vulnerable political and military position. For example, Smith claims the Americans asked Canada to "cool our heels," stating "the need for the force [was] gone ... so don't try to keep inventing a rationale. We weren't convinced ... that there wasn't still an important role for a MNF."¹⁸³ As in the Gulf case, attempting to enmesh the Americans in the constraints of the United Nations norms and procedures invited the danger of the decisions becoming driven by American objectives and energies.¹⁸⁴

Canada was also poorly positioned diplomatically in the region. Although its lack of diplomatic presence was mitigated by the mission of Raymond Chrétien, a former ambassador in the region, the closest full Canadian missions were in Kenya and Tanzania. The result was an inability to anticipate and respond effectively to events on the ground. For example, although initially signalling their willingness to accept a "neutral intervention force," the Rwandan government reversed their position ten days later. This resulted in the *de facto* detention of the Canadian advance party of the MNF upon its arrival in Kigali. The party was only released following an intervention by Ambassador Chrétien, and even then, the party was ordered to leave its weapons on the plane on which they had arrived. Baril subsequently tried to get permission to set up his headquarters in Kigali, but was ultimately forced to set up in Entebbe, Uganda,

¹⁸² Confidential Interview; Also, see Koring, 14 November, 1996; Hay, p. 59. When officials briefed parliamentarians on 18 November, the planned Canadian contribution amounted to 1500-1600 personnel, including a headquarters unit, signals regiment, three C-130 Hercules transport planes for in-theatre transport, a logistics unit, and an intelligence unit - an admittedly humble contribution for a country leading the MNF. An official involved in the mission claims that had the MNF actually progressed for any length of time, Canada would have quickly found itself in a position of having to contribute combat forces - both for the sake of appearance, and for the very real necessity of possessing leverage in negotiations with the coalition partners.

¹⁸³ Pelletier, Documentary, 18 November, 1997.

¹⁸⁴ Hay, p. 90.

approximately 550 kilometres north-east of the refugees that the MNF was mandated to assist.¹⁸⁵

The mission's degeneration was perhaps best exemplified in remarks made by Canada's Minister of Defence. Young contradicted himself, stating "We are prepared to confront anybody that would restrict the distribution of humanitarian aid," going on to say "... [I] make this clear, this is not an invasion force. We are not going anywhere where we are not wanted."¹⁸⁶

This quote also reflects what became a major problem for the initiative - Canada and the other coalition partners coalesced around "humanitarianism" without agreeing on the difficult political decisions required for a well-defined and coherent policy for the use of the military in support of the humanitarian goals. Indeed, there seems to have been a tremendous amount of naïvete on the part of the Canadian government regarding the political implications of the rescue mission, and that this humanitarian emergency was the product of an ongoing, complex political conflict.¹⁸⁷

The fact was that every use of the MNF had political implications. It was these implications, combined with the interests of the parties on the ground and the coalition partners that made it exceedingly difficult for a relatively minor power such as Canada to manage the coalition effectively. The force's very existence had a political impact,

¹⁸⁵ Knox *et al.*, 20 November, 1996; Jeff Sallot, "Baril Sets Up Base in Uganda," *The Globe and Mail*, 21 November, 1996, p. A15; Hugh Winsor, "Mission to Africa Hung Up On Confusion Over Need," *The Globe and Mail*, 23 November, 1996, p. A20.

¹⁸⁶ Paul Knox, Hugh Winsor, "Confusion Settles Over Aid Mission," *The Globe and Mail*, 19 November, 1996, p. A1.

¹⁸⁷ Appathurai and Lysyshyn, pp. 94-96.

emboldening the ADFL to attack the Hutu militias in the refugee camps.¹⁸⁸ While no one could have anticipated the massive and unexpected exodus of refugees, it appears that the prime ministerial intervention resulted in decision-making structures and processes that prevented recognition of the various political interests at play and the non-humanitarian impacts of the MNF.¹⁸⁹

Such developments also underscore the overwhelming importance of access to intelligence and an effective framework for the processing of the intelligence. Proper intelligence and analysis would likely have helped prevent information failures, more clearly revealing the political dimension of the conflict, and providing balance to the predominant perception of the crisis as solely or even principally a humanitarian emergency. Canada simply did not have the proper access to intelligence it needed to facilitate high quality decision-making and operate the rescue mission effectively.

Robin Walsh of *Oxfam Canada* said that at the very least, the mission helped focus attention on a troubled part of the world, probably increased financial support for refugees and demonstrated "Canada can be a serious player."¹⁹⁰ While Walsh's first two assertions might be correct, the fact that the mission ended before it got off the ground suggests the policy output was not fully thought out, and was undermined by the

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 3; Anne McIlroy, "Refugees Stream Back to Rwanda," *The Globe and Mail*, 16 November, 1991, p. A1; Hay, p. 66.

¹⁸⁹ Confidential Interview. One official, although making it clear that the Zaire rescue mission differed substantially from the Cuban Missile Crisis, cited the literature pertaining to that crisis in emphasizing the role that stress, fatigue and incomplete information has on undermining effective crisis decision-making. Although the official would not blame the Prime Minister for the deficiencies in the decision-making and policy-operationalizing processes regarding the rescue mission, the reality can not be avoided that it was the Prime Minister's personal intervention, combined with the dynamics of crisis situations, that facilitated the appearance of such deficiencies.

¹⁹⁰ O'Neil, 18 January, 1997.

decision-making structures and processes that accompanied the prime ministerial intervention.

Chapter 6 - Conclusions

6.1 PRESENTATION OF THEORETICAL MODEL

This thesis began with a discussion of crises, their operation at multiple levels-of-analysis, and the objective and subjective attributes of crisis decision-making. The conclusions yielded from this review were then applied to cases of Canadian prime ministerial interventions in response to foreign policy crises. Having completed the comparative analysis of the cases, a theoretical model can now be constructed that incorporates the points that have been discussed. The model (**Figure 1**) may be divided roughly into three sections: (1) *Motivational Factors*; (2) *Consequences of Intervention*; and (3) *Policy Output*.

1. Motivational Factors

This section consists of the independent variables, those factors that assist in explaining what motivates the prime minister to intervene in the foreign policy decision-making process. These are:

- i. ***Personal Motivation*** - This comprises the prime minister's personal beliefs and values that are relevant to the crisis at hand.
- ii. ***Political Motivation*** - This pertains to any prior political actions that impact, directly or indirectly, on the crisis. Additionally, the prime minister will be affected by considerations of any domestic political consequences arising from a

Figure 1

particular course of action. Such motivations arise from the role (and awareness of that role) occupied by the prime minister as the head of government.

- iii. ***External Motivation*** - The prime minister is pressured to act from a source, either governmental or non-governmental, outside of the normal circle of advisors. Although more prevalent subsequent to the trigger event, this motivation can also exist prior to its occurrence.

These motivational factors interact with, and are reinforced by a ***Trigger Event***, a key event related to an international crisis. Once set in motion, the motivational factors have a mutually-reinforcing effect, the result of which is a perception being held by the prime minister that a foreign policy crisis exists, attended by a virtually irresistible pressure to respond with a ***Prime Ministerial Intervention***.

2. Consequences of Intervention

Once this intervention occurs, the prime minister's direct and personal involvement in the foreign policy decision-making process acts as a mediating variable. In combination with the dynamics of crisis decision-making, the intervention gives rise to and interacts with other mediating variables, such as:

- i. ***Ministerial/Bureaucratic Opposition Bypassed*** - The prime minister's intervention, combined with the dynamics of crisis leads to the bypassing of the concerns of the ministers responsible, and/or their respective bureaucratic departments. It should be noted that any policy initiative -- prime minister-

initiated or not -- is going to engender a measure of ministerial and/or bureaucratic opposition. What is essential to note here, however, is that the forcefulness of the prime minister's intervention results in the bypassing of such opposition.

- ii. ***Ad Hoc Decision-Making Structures and Procedures*** - *Ad hoc* decision-making structures and processes are employed to counter the potential problems of bureaucratic politics and to ensure the implementation of the prime minister's desired crisis response.
- iii. ***Parliament Bypassed*** - The centralization of the decision-making authority reinforces the constitutional-institutional marginalization of the Canadian legislative branch as a consultative mechanism in the foreign policy process.

The cumulative impact of these mediating variables is an increased probability of the occurrence of deficiencies within the decision-making and policy-operationalization processes, specifically: (1) information failures; (2) groupthink; (3) newgroup syndrome; (4) leader dominance; and (5) political manipulation.

3. *Policy Output*

The resulting ***Policy Output*** is thus a product of decision-making and policy-operationalization processes that have been impacted by various deficiencies. This increases the probability that the policy output will be an ineffective and inappropriate response to the crisis.

6.2 CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has demonstrated that crises are complex phenomena that evade a simple, objective definition. To gain a comprehensive understanding of crises, it is important to acknowledge their operation at multiple levels-of-analysis. Arising from this is an argument for the necessity of examining the subjective attributes of crises, particularly the role played by individual perceptions.

The recognition of the subjective nature of crises also leads to the conclusion that the neo-realist theoretical discourse that has tended to dominate the crisis decision-making literature lacks adequate explanatory power. With its emphasis on the international level-of-analysis and its preoccupation with great power relations, neo-realist discourse neglects variables at the sub-systemic level that are crucial to understanding crises, and has resulted in a lack of scholarly attention being given to crisis behaviour among middle and lesser powers.

This is evident when the case of Canada is examined. The liberal internationalist tradition in Canadian foreign policy suggests that distortions or disruptions within the structure and processes of the international system, whether or not they directly affect Canada, have the potential to be interpreted as an international crisis from a Canadian perspective.

Moreover, this thesis has demonstrated that there is a constitutional and institutional predisposition in Canada towards centralizing the foreign policy power in the executive branch. This centralization of power facilitates the predominance of the prime minister in the foreign policy decision-making process, particularly in situations

considered by the political executive to be of vital interest to the government and the country. Such executive predominance can manifest itself in the form of interventions into the foreign policy decision-making process to respond to what the prime minister perceives as a foreign policy crisis. This dictates that the prime minister's perceptions and interpretations of a given situation have a potentially significant bearing on the existence of a foreign policy crisis, and any subsequent policy response.

Such centralization of power may be advantageous in that it permits quick, decisive responses to foreign policy crises. Certainly, it can be argued that in at least two of the three case studies -- the Trudeau Peace Initiative and the Zaire Rescue Mission -- no action would have been taken at all without a prime ministerial intervention. In the third case, the Gulf Crisis, given the nature of the crisis, it is likely that Mulroney's intervention helped determine the tactical implications of the response to the crisis, rather than the actual response itself. The political executive's direct involvement in the foreign policy process also prevents a bureaucratic-dominated foreign policy, something that Krasner warned against. Such a distribution of power, however, does have serious consequences on the decision-making and policy-operationalizing processes, particularly when considered in conjunction with the dynamics of crisis situations.

These conclusions have been corroborated by the analysis of the cases of Canadian prime ministerial interventions. Each prime minister's perception of the existence of a foreign policy crisis led to a further contraction of power, manifested as a direct, personal intervention into the decision-making process.

The contraction of decision-making structures, processes and authority in the political executive that occurs in crisis situations is prompted by several factors. The

first, and perhaps the most significant contributing factor, is the nature of crises themselves. The high stress accompanying crises causes the political executive to bypass normal bureaucratic processes, fearing that a failure to do so will result in an undesired outcome.

Analysis of the three cases reveals that prime ministerial interventions are also motivated by a variety of factors, including the leadership style, beliefs and values of the national leader, domestic political considerations, and pressure from a source(s) outside of the prime minister's normal circle of advisors. These factors interact and reinforce one another, heightening the prime minister's sense of anxiety. When combined with a key event related to an international crisis, the level of pressure that results prompts the prime ministerial intervention into the foreign policy decision-making process.

There is a connection, however, between the structure and process of decision-making, the quality of deliberations, and the resulting policy output. Each case witnessed a prime minister arriving at a decision to intervene based on the advice of a very small number of close advisors. The impact of this intervention simply could not be anticipated with any substantial level of certainty by the Canadian governmental apparatus.

Arising from each prime ministerial intervention was the bypassing of ministerial and bureaucratic concerns. Each intervention and its attending policy encountered resistance at senior ministerial and bureaucratic levels, but this resistance was bypassed by virtue of each prime minister's dominance. All three cases also witnessed the employment of *ad hoc* procedures and measures that undermined the role of the bureaucracy, and ruptured conventional bureaucratic procedures and policies. Such actions arose from the prime minister's desire to counter the potential problems of

bureaucratic politics and to ensure the implementation of their desired policy response. Finally, each intervention reinforced the constitutional-institutional marginalization of the Canadian parliament in the foreign policy process. The foreign policy response in each case was undertaken with minimal parliamentary input.

The cumulative impact of these consequences of the prime ministerial intervention was the increased potential for deficiencies in the decision-making and policy-operationalizing processes. These in turn produced foreign policy outputs that were ineffective, inappropriate and in certain respects, actually undermined the achievement of the aims that originally compelled each prime minister to act.

These conclusions raise serious questions about the foreign policy process in Canada, and its capacity to respond effectively to crisis situations. Is it wise for the executive branch, particularly the prime minister, to enjoy such a monopoly on the authority to conduct foreign policy? Is there perhaps a role for parliament beyond its legitimating function in such circumstances?

Parliamentarians need to be cognizant of the role they can play in ensuring government accountability, and using the tools at their disposal to raise questions about the conduct of Canadian foreign policy. For parliament to forsake this role in crisis situations out of deference to the government is simply to embrace its own marginalization, and thus deny one more alternative perspective in the foreign policy process.

At a minimum, senior leaders, both bureaucratic and political, need to remain aware of the potential consequences that prime ministerial interventions can have on the decision-making and policy-operationalizing processes. Failure to do so increases the

risk of decision-making deficiencies that can result in policy responses that are unrealistic given this country's capabilities, and that pose risks to the outcome of the crisis, Canada's international reputation, and even the lives of Canadians.

Clearly, these are issues that need to be addressed if Canadians are to have a foreign policy that responds more effectively and appropriately to developments on the international stage. A failure to do so increases the risk of future instances where Canadians will be called to upon meet a destiny with greatness, only to realize too late that their leaders, although perhaps well-intentioned, have in fact been suffering from delusions of grandeur.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A - Chronology of Trudeau Peace Initiative, 1983-1984

May 26, 1978 Trudeau's speech to UNSSOD I in which he proposes "nuclear suffocation policy."

May, 1982 Speech by Trudeau at the University of Notre Dame, in which he challenges Americans to help ease East-West tensions.

June, 1982 Attending UNSSOD II, Trudeau expresses hope for the success of INF talks to obviate need for any new deployment in western Europe and the development of the Strategic Defence Initiative, or "Star Wars."

April 28, 1983 Attending a Canadian Embassy dinner in Washington with actress Margot Kidder, Trudeau is encouraged by her to meet with her acquaintance, Dr. Helen Caldicott, a prominent anti-nuclear activist.

May, 1983 Trudeau attends G7 economic summit at Williamsburg, Virginia. Communiqué issued in which the leaders commit themselves to reducing East-West tensions.

July 8, 1983 Trudeau has lunch with Dr. Helen Caldicott, Margot Kidder, Thomas Axworthy and Robert Fowler. Caldicott argues Trudeau "[is] the one person in the world who could bring East and West together."

July 15, 1983 Canadian cabinet approves testing of cruise missiles over Canadian territory. Sparks huge protests from Canadian peace movement.

September 1, 1983 KAL 007 shot down by a Soviet jet.

September 2, 1983 Trudeau cuts short official visit to Greece to return to Ottawa to deal with the crisis.

September 6, 1983 Ivan Head, Trudeau's former foreign policy advisor, sends Trudeau a memorandum challenging him to act.

September 15, 1983 Ivan Head, Robert Fowler, Trudeau meet for discussions about a possible peace mission. Trudeau expresses concerns, but is receptive. Retired General Maurice Archdeacon prepared a similar proposal and approached Trudeau. Beginning of the last round of INF talks prior to deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe by NATO.

September 21, 1983 Trudeau meets with senior ministers and bureaucrats to declare his intention to launch a peace initiative. A steering committee is established and delegates authority to an *ad hoc* task force to develop the initiative.

September 21-28, 1983 Task force holds marathon sessions, presents six proposals to Steering Committee and Trudeau.

September 26, 1983 At a state dinner for visiting British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Trudeau foreshadows his initiative in a toast. Thatcher had addressed Parliament earlier in the day.

October 2, 1983 Task Force finalizes its proposals.

October 7, 1983 Prime Minister meets with senior ministers, bureaucrats, ambassadors at Meech Lake to finalize the initiative. Comments are generally negative until Trudeau appears, and endorses the task force's report.

Week of October 22, 1983 Trudeau meets with Robert McNamara, former American Secretary of Defence, and American General Bernard Rogers, top NATO Commander in Europe. An important element in Trudeau's recent interest was an article that McNamara had written in *Foreign Affairs*, in which he urged NATO to renounce first use tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, in favour of built up conventional forces.

October 27, 1983 Trudeau launches his initiative at the University of Guelph, having informed NATO allies the day before.

October 28, 1983 American invasion of Grenada. Americans warn Trudeau not to threaten the common front of the NATO alliance.

October 29, 1983 New York - Trudeau meets with members of the Harvard University Nuclear Study Group.

November 8, 1983 Paris - Trudeau launches a tour of western European capitals, meeting President Francois Mitterand.

November 9, 1983 The Hague - Trudeau meets with Queen Beatrix, Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers. Brussels - Trudeau meets with Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens and Foreign Minister Leo Tindemann.

November 10, 1983 Rome/The Vatican - Trudeau meets Pope John Paul II, Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi and Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti. Bonn - Trudeau meets with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

November 11, 1983 London - Trudeau meets with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

November 13, 1983 Trudeau returns to Canada, addresses Liberal convention in Montreal, during which he reports on his tour of Western Europe and outlines the main points of the initiative.

November 19, 1983 Tokyo - Trudeau meets with Georgi Arbatov, director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies in Moscow, following a request from Arbatov. Meets with Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone.

November 23, 1983 Trudeau attends CHOGM in New Delhi. Meets with Lt.-Gen. Hussein Ershad, head of the military regime in Bangladesh, and President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia.

November 27, 1983 CHOGM issues *Goa Declaration on Peace and Security*, which broadly reflects Trudeau's message, but contains no specific reference to Trudeau's proposals.

November 28-29, 1983 Beijing - Trudeau meets with Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang and Communist Party Leader Deng Xiao Ping.

December 5, 1983 Trudeau returns to Ottawa after returning to New Delhi to brief Ghandi on the talks in Beijing.

December 8, 1983 NATO council of ministers announces NATO members will send their foreign ministers to the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

December 15, 1983 Washington - Trudeau meets with American President Ronald Reagan. Reagan is non-committal.

January 15, 1984 Trudeau credits his initiative for a speech by Reagan in which he moderates his anti-Soviet rhetoric.

January 22, 1984 Thatcher praises Reagan's speech as a "very important change in East-West relations."

January 28, 1984 Davos - Trudeau questions willingness of United States, NATO to defend Western Europe, employ a first-strike nuclear response.

February 9, 1984 Trudeau reports to the House of Commons, formally ending his initiative.

February 14, 1984 Following the death of Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, Trudeau has the opportunity to meet the new leader, Constantin Chernenko, in Moscow.

APPENDIX B - Chronology of the Gulf Crisis, 1990-91

June 23, 1990 Meech Lake Accord fails. Government approval rating at historic lows.

July, 1990 Confrontation with Mohawks in Oka, Quebec begins.

August 2, 1990 Iraq invades Kuwait, saying it was responding to an invitation from a revolutionary government. The United Nations condemns the attack. About 400 Canadian nationals are trapped.

August 3, 1990 American officials call for wide-ranging sanctions against Iraq. Ambassador to the United Nations, Yves Fortier, calls Mulroney to discuss Canadian position on *Resolution 660 (1990)*. Agree that the lack of an American response offers the opportunity to strengthen the United Nations. DEAIT freezes Kuwaiti assets and announces support for any economic sanctions, demands release of Canadians.

August 4, 1990 Canada announces it will join the economic embargo of Iraq against Kuwait. Phone conversations between Mulroney and President George Bush "to review efforts to bring collective international pressure on Iraq." Clark states military action not contemplated. Canadian Armed Forces personnel deployed at Oka, Quebec.

August 5, 1990 Canada imposes limited sanctions on Iraq.

August 6, 1990 United States and Britain announce major troop deployments to the Persian Gulf. *Resolution 661 (1990)* imposes sanctions and an international embargo. Canada co-sponsors the resolution in the Security Council. Mulroney meets with Bush at the White House. Mulroney makes private commitment to join the military coalition.

August 7, 1990 Canada announces trade embargo on all trade, financial transactions with Iraq.

August 8, 1990 Clark dismisses the idea of Canadian military involvement, suggesting Canada's contribution should be diplomatic. Clark states preference for a "wait and see" approach to economic sanctions.

August 9, 1990 Cabinet formally briefed on Canadian military response.

August 10, 1990 Mulroney announces Canada will send the destroyers HMCS *Terra Nova* and *Athabaskan* and the supply ship HMCS *Protecteur* to the Persian Gulf. Brussels - Clark attends meeting in Brussels of NATO foreign ministers.

August 12, 1990 Bush announces blockade of Iraqi ports.

August 17, 1990 Mulroney refuses to rule out larger Canadian force.

August 20, 1990 Clark advises Canadian nationals in Kuwait to ignore Iraqi order to congregate.

August 21, 1990 Iraq begins detention of Western nationals.

August 23, 1990 Refit of ships and tests of new systems completed, navy declares readiness. Mulroney states it unlikely that diplomatic efforts will succeed in resolving the crisis.

August 24, 1990 Ships depart for the Gulf without mandate, ordered to arrive as quickly as possible.

August 27, 1990 Mulroney meets with Bush at Kennebunkport, Maine.

September 13, 1990 Clark states Canada "actively" considering a request from the United States for more military assistance.

September 14, 1990 Mulroney orders squadron of CF-18s to the Gulf to provide air cover for ships.

September 24, 1990 Parliament returns from summer recess, debates Order-in-Council motion putting three ships and CF-18s on active service.

October 17-18, 1990 House of Commons debates Gulf Crisis.

October 26, 1990 Clark tells House of Commons that Canada is willing to act without United Nations approval.

November 8, 1990 Bush doubles the size of the American troop commitment, saying the new forces are needed for "an offensive option." Dynamics of the coalition have moved from defensive to offensive.

November 10-11, 1990 Mulroney-Bush telephone conversation. Mulroney denies Bush requested troops.

November 12, 1990 Mulroney indicates willingness to deploy ground forces if requested.

November 13, 1990 Clark and Baker meet in Bermuda. Clark denies Baker requested troops.

November 28, 1990 House of Commons debates resolution regarding whether Canada favours United Nations authorization of the use of offensive force against Iraq and, if so, how soon.

November 29, 1990 Resolution 678 (1990) authorizes use of force if Iraq is not out of Kuwait by 15 January, 1991. House of Commons supports resolution on division 111-82.

December 6, 1990 Release of all foreign hostages by the Iraqis.

January 7, 1991 Government announces it will supply gas masks to Canadians in Gulf.

January 8, 1991 Mulroney states Canada ready to consider offensive role.

January 9, 1991 Negotiations between Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz fail. Clark delivers note from Prime Minister to United Nations Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, outlining ideas for peace.

January 10, 1991 New crew posted to HMCS *Protecteur*. War cabinet decides to reconvene Parliament for emergency debate. Chrétien and McLaughlin receive first briefings of Canada's involvement in the pending conflict.

January 11, 1991 Six more CF-18s ordered to the Persian Gulf.

January 12, 1991 DND official leaks news of contingency plan to send mechanized brigade to the Persian Gulf. The official states the plans were drawn up after the Baker-Clark Bermuda meeting of November 13, 1990.

January 14, 1991 Mulroney endorses use of force to implement resolution, Baker in Ottawa for briefings.

January 15, 1991 Emergency parliamentary debate begins on resolution: "that this House reaffirms its support of the UN in ending the aggression by Iraq against Kuwait."

January 16, 1991 Gulf War commences. Cabinet authorizes offensive role for Canadian forces in Gulf, announces plans to send field hospital.

January 22, 1991 House of Commons endorses government resolution that was tabled on January 15, 1991. Last legislative body of any coalition country to do so.

APPENDIX C - Chronology of Zaire Rescue Mission, 1996

April-June 1994 Rwandan Genocide. Following the Tutsi reaction, Hutu refugees flee to eastern Zaire, including those responsible for the genocide. Large refugee camps established, and become destabilizing influence in Eastern Zaire.

Early 1996 Zairian Tutsis begin armed resistance against the Zairian armed forces, Hutu militias and the regime of President Mobutu Sese-Seko.

October, 1996 Americans attempt to build regional support for an American-backed, African-manned rapid reaction force

October 7, 1996 Deputy Governor of South Kivu province tells Banyamoulenge to leave Zaire within a week or "be hunted down as rebels." This sparks widespread conflict.

October 24, 1996 ADFL seizes their first major town, Uvira.

October 30, 1996 ADFL seize Bukavu, capital of South Kivu. Prime Minister Chrétien nominates his nephew, Raymond Chrétien, Canada's ambassador to the United States, to be the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Envoy.

November 1, 1996 ADFL with assistance of Rwandan armed forces capture Goma, Zaire, which lies between the majority of the refugee population and the Zaire-Rwanda border.

November 2, 1996 Aid agencies/United Nations pull out of Eastern Zaire. Reports of one million lives at risk in eastern Zaire.

November 4, 1996 UNHCR appeals for international action to create protected humanitarian corridors in eastern Zaire to coax Rwandan refugees home.

November 5, 1996 ADFL appeals to international community for assistance to aid the refugees who have fled into the hills around Goma. Meeting of African states in Nairobi, Kenya, results in call for establishment of a neutral multinational military force to establish "humanitarian corridors" to facilitate aid delivery to refugees.

November 6, 1996 Ambassador Chrétien begins tour of Great Lakes Region. Laurent Kabila, leader of the ADFL states he opposes any intervention force that includes European or American troops.

November 7, 1996 French propose an international rescue mission to Zaire, but are supported only by Spain.

November 8, 1996 *Resolution 1078 (1990)* is passed, a compromise resolution that only invites interested member states to form a multinational rescue mission that would require subsequent Security Council approval. Peter Tarnoff, American undersecretary of state for political affairs, approaches Gordon Smith, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, with suggestion of Canada leading a multinational force (MNF). Smith reports suggestion to Chrétien, who "jumps" at the idea.

November 9, 1996 Chrétien calls world leaders to promote establishment of an MNF under Canadian leadership.

November 10, 1996 Prime Minister meets senior ministers and bureaucrats and declares his intention to have Canada lead the MNF.

November 11, 1996 Chrétien approaches Manning at Remembrance Day ceremonies. The Prime Minister offers to recall the House of Commons. Manning declines but requests a debate once House returns from recess on November 18.

November 12, 1996 Senior level delegation goes to Washington to negotiate the MNF with senior American officials. Chrétien announces Canada's intended leadership of the MNF.

November 13, 1996 Chrétien calls Clinton, who gives the MNF conditional American support.

November 14, 1996 American National Security Advisor Anthony Lake meets with Canadian delegation in New York. Canada presents plan for the multinational force to the Security Council. Reports of ADFL bombardment of Mugunga refugee camp with rockets, mortars, heavy artillery.

November 15, 1996 *Resolution 1080 (1990)* approved, giving Canada leadership of the MNF under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Limited mandate in that it excludes the disarming of the Hutu militias operating among the refugees. Media reports of refugees streaming back across the border to Rwanda, following ADFL attack on Sake, west of Mugunga refugee camp, which forced Hutu militias to flee westward into Zaire. 700,000 thought to be moving into Rwanda. Axworthy credits the rescue mission as already paying dividends. Rwandan ambassador to the United Nations says proposed force 'no longer relevant.'

November 17, 1996 American Defence Secretary William Perry suggests mission will be scaled back. Canadian officials say no plans to scale back multinational force. Lt.-Gen. Maurice Baril leaves for Kigali to make a new assessment and to negotiate terms of deployment with the Rwandans. Rwandan President claims the international force is no longer needed, nor is it welcome. Rwandan officials for most of the day detain the Canadian advance party, until Raymond Chrétien intervenes. The compromise is that Canadian soldiers are allowed into Rwanda, but their weapons have to remain on the plane.

November 18, 1996 Debate in the Canadian House of Commons. Chrétien claims the mission is still needed, while the Minister of Defence suggests the plan may be completely reoriented if the refugee flow continues. Americans withdraw their tentative support, saying they will wait until after the meeting of the MNF participants in Stuttgart to confirm the nature of their commitment. Lake and other senior American officials travel to Ottawa, to argue that the mission should be refocused on Rwanda, not Zaire.

November 19, 1996 Baril arrives in central Africa. Americans withdraw their support for the mission. Offers only logistical support. Rwandan Vice-President reiterates Rwandan opposition to the multinational force. Canadian opposition parties begin to raise doubts.

November 20, 1996 Baril sets up operation headquarters in Entebbe, Uganda, after failing to gain permission from Kigali, 550 km from refugees. Confused reports claim 100,000-300,000 refugees moving from Bukavu to Goma

November 21, 1996 UNHCR/NGOs agree that there are 600,000-800,000 still at risk, confirmed by satellite imagery and other sources. Media reports of intense fighting between ADFL and Hutu militias, such as *Interahamwe*.

November 22-25, 1996 Stuttgart - meeting of MNF participants. Acrimonious discussions result in abandonment of ground mission. Other alternatives are discussed, such as airdrops of aid. ADFL warns that the MNF is not welcome.

November 25, 1996 Axworthy, Young begin another round of consultations regarding the potential for aid drops, amid further reports of massacres in Eastern Zaire. Young contradicts Axworthy in terms of the necessity of American involvement.

November 27, 1996 Idea of aid drop receives tentative American support. NGO community agrees generally, but warns the plan will be inefficient at best. Rwandans condemn the new plan as unnecessary.

November 28, 1996 Axworthy announces contact group consensus on setting up an operational headquarters at Entebbe, Uganda. Continuing confusion over location and number of refugees at risk.

November 29, 1996 Formal approval given by coalition for scaled-down multinational force, with actions dependent upon subsequent recommendations of Baril. Axworthy responds to opposition criticism in the House of Commons.

December 2, 1996 Boutros-Ghali claims refugees remain in danger. UN states a military force still necessary in Eastern Zaire. Lisbon - At OSCE meeting, Prime Minister Chrétien proposes a middle-power led rapid reaction force that could respond to such crises in the future, to avoid any *ad hocery* in future crisis situations.

December 5, 1996 Doug Young states there is no longer any need for military involvement.

December 7, 1996 Baril returns to Eastern Zaire to investigate the condition of 165,000 refugees, particularly 150,000 that are believed to be 65 km west of Goma, as a means of determining the necessity of any aid drops. Baril argues it is premature to rule out any course of action at this point

December 13, 1996 Baril reports the MNF's mandate has been fulfilled to the best of its ability. Mission set to end officially on December 31, 1996.

December 21, 1996 Canadian force disbanded.

December 31, 1996 Canadian troops return home. Mission is officially concluded.

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Those interviewed for this thesis included individuals who remain in the public service, and others who wished to retain their anonymity. To ensure their cooperation and candour, the interviews were conducted on a non-attributive basis, unless permission was expressly given to cite the remarks. Obviously, this presents a methodological challenge, and leaves the thesis open to a charge of biased presentation of research. In an effort to respond to such a potential challenge, the information gained from such interviews has been used largely only in conjunction with secondary source material, and in cases where the information provides a particularly useful insight into the circumstances.

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