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**GERMAN SECURITY AND ALLIANCE INTEGRATION:
PEACE AND STABILITY IN EUROPE**

by

Michael Juricic, B.A. (Hons.)

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

**Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
September 22, 1992**

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ABSTRACT

This essay examines why there has been no major inter-state war in Europe since 1945. Traditional political science research attributes this "long peace" to postwar bipolarity, the existence of nuclear weapons, and the changing social evaluation of war. However, theoretical analyses and empirical evidence demonstrate that these three interpretations are flawed, principally because the definitions of key terms like "stability" and "security" are formulated incorrectly. Research on Germany's military role in Europe offers a more precise methodological framework. The effects of German foreign policy within Europe are only stable when security for Germany and security from Germany can be realized simultaneously. The 19th-century German Confederation was able to successfully balance these competing interests; the NATO alliance has been instrumental in the 20th century. The defining variable in both cases is security integration, illustrating that NATO can and should continue to contribute to the maintenance of peace in Europe.

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INTRODUCTION

One major theme of German foreign policy research after 1945 has been the compatibility of Germany's central geographic location in Europe with continental European security. Germany has always had access to valuable mineral resources; the country has been able to tap into its large population base and recruit skilled individuals into industry, high technology, and scientific research, and the political mechanisms necessary for the large-scale organization of the citizenry have never been absent. These factors have meant that as a nation-state, Germany has continually been able to address matters of foreign policy with high efficiency, considerable preparation, and a large degree of flexibility.

A common concern of foreign policy is the securing of a country's territory and the defence of its national interests. In the case of Germany, however, the resources available to leading decision makers have always given these statesmen more than simply the option of safeguarding the status quo. When the circumstances were optimal, politicians could choose to use the country's military forces, expand the limits of the country's political borders, and aggrandize power. As a consequence, Germany has posed since at least 1871 a potential threat not only to its immediate neighbours, but also to Europe as a whole. Even if this threat has not always been real, it has been the perception of possible danger which has counted, because in international politics, nation-states often respond to *perceived* threats by joining alliances and increasing their readiness for war.¹

Therefore, in the process of carrying out their country's foreign policy, German statesmen have normally elicited one unintended response: neighbouring states have sought to guarantee their own security as a precaution against possible

¹See, on this point, the seminal analysis by Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

German manipulation and attack. Germany has customarily viewed these moves with concern, and the country has sought to protect itself on both its eastern and western borders, fearing above all a two-pronged attack on its territory. This represents the famous *cauchemar des coalitions* which so preoccupied the thoughts and strategic plans of Otto von Bismarck. From this point of view then, European politics is partially a product of maintaining security from Germany and security for Germany at the same time. If this balancing act cannot be successfully managed, the danger arises that the intensity and frequency of war in Europe will increase, and instability will become widespread.

A second major theme of German foreign policy research after 1945 has been the search for possible solutions to this security dilemma. One suggestion which is commonly put forward is the integration of Germany's military potential within the general framework of Western Europe and under the specific control of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Atlantic Alliance, it is reasoned, is much more than simply a security institution which can protect member states from common external threats. It also serves to manage the foreign policies of sixteen different countries, influence their room for manoeuvrability, and provide consensual decision-making processes for matters of transatlantic concern. In other words, NATO guarantees North American and West European security from threats stemming outside of the alliance's geographic boundaries, while at the same time providing security for member countries from historical animosities, imbalances in economic potential, and the realities of power politics within the international system of states. NATO would then seem to represent the ideal

framework for maintaining Germany's security while protecting other countries from Germany, and for sustaining peaceful inter-state relations in Europe.²

Therefore, German foreign policy research is largely concerned with stability in Europe and with ways of avoiding war on the continent. This closely parallels the framework of analysis of a field of international relations theory which seeks to explain why Europe has been a geopolitical area free of major inter-state war for a significant period of time. Indeed, the length of this time period has been so significant that it has represented a "long peace".³ However, research on the long peace has ignored many theoretical propositions and a considerable amount of empirical evidence from the literature of German foreign policy, even though the potential for a stimulating exchange of ideas exists. At the same time, academic studies on German foreign policy, especially after 1945, have tended to avoid direct discussions of the *causes* of peace in Europe after the end of the Second World War. For example, the division of Germany within a bipolar Europe has been well researched, but always within the context of Cold War historiography, and never as part of an investigation into the reasons why major war has not been fought in Europe since 1945.⁴ The interaction of ideas between research on the long peace and research on German foreign policy can be greatly increased, and this should be

²This is the argument, for example, of Timothy P. Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1981).

³This term was first coined by John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," *International Security*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 99-142.

⁴See, on this point, the study of the process by which both Germany and Europe as a whole were divided during and after World War II, in Wilfried Loth, *Die Teilung der Welt: 1941-1955* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1989). See also Wilfried Loth, *Ost-West-Konflikt und deutsche Frage* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1989); and Pierre Hassner, "German and European Reunification: Two Problems or One?" *Survey*, No. 61 (October 1966), pp. 14-37.

encouraged in order to question whether current approaches to the study of European security need to be re-evaluated and re-assessed.

The purpose of this study is to synthesize research on postwar German foreign policy with research on the long peace stemming from conventional political science. The principal question which this study addresses is: "Why has there been no major inter-state war in Europe since 1945?" Since different research fields offer different answers to this question, the assumption is that *there are no uni-causal explanations for the long peace*. Instead, a multiplicity of reasons is more likely, and interpretations which foreclose all options but one should be avoided for their analytical narrow-mindedness and inaccurate reading of historical and empirical evidence. The purpose is not to argue that current research on the long peace is fundamentally flawed or incorrect, but that it is inconsistent and sometimes contradictory, and that new ideas are needed in order to sharpen the terms of reference and enhance the ability of political science to explain the dynamics of security in Europe.

The hypothesis of this paper is that as German foreign policy is integrated within a framework that provides for Germany's security while prohibiting the country's aggrandizement of power, the level of stability within Europe will increase. Therefore, for analytical reasons, it is first necessary to accurately define the term "stability", since the adjustment of one single variable can potentially undermine the entire argument and radically alter the focus of discussion. This study will then seek out empirical referents from the 19th and 20th centuries in order to evaluate whether the present period of peace in Europe is unique, or whether historical precedents exist in European politics. Finally, the validity of the research hypothesis will be tested, and if it sustains critical examination, the necessary structure for organizing peaceful inter-state relations in Europe will become apparent.

CHAPTER ONE

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND RESEARCH ON THE LONG PEACE

Since 1945, Europe has been a geopolitical area free of major inter-state war. This fact has attracted the attention of both historians and political scientists, and in 1986, John Lewis Gaddis wrote an article which sought to explain why the "great powers" of Europe, in addition to the United States and the Soviet Union, never let their political disputes escalate into a large military confrontation and initiate a Third World War.¹ In his study, Gaddis explained that inter-state relations in Europe after 1945 have been very stable, and this stability has been so comprehensive and durable that one can speak of a "long peace". Other social scientists have developed and expanded upon the ideas of Gaddis, so that there now exists a body of literature which looks exclusively at why there has been no major inter-state war in Europe since the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945.²

Long peace research argues that stability within Europe after 1945 has been a consequence of three factors: bipolarity, the existence of nuclear weapons, and the changing social evaluation of war. This area of research is strongly influenced and stamped by the Realist and Neo-Liberal Institutional schools of international relations theory, and it is highly dependent on the consistency and logic of its theories in order to prove, or at least demonstrate convincingly, that specific

¹John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," *International Security*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 99-142.

²The body of literature investigating the causes of the long peace will be referred to as "long peace research" in order to differentiate it from other areas of academic study which deal with alliance politics, economic integration, and the causes of war. These other areas all offer interpretations about peace and stability in Europe, but they do so in contexts quite separate from the frame of reference of John Lewis Gaddis, and they never specifically use the term "long peace".

hypotheses are valid. Empirical evidence is usually given, but it is always scarce in relation to the volume of pure theory which one is required to absorb. This is not viewed as a drawback or deficiency, precisely because the theories used in long peace research are considered to be logical and rational, and therefore appealing.

The purpose of this chapter is to develop one side of the argument; that is, that postwar stability within Europe has been a consequence of bipolarity, the existence of nuclear weapons, and the changing social evaluation of war. The object is to illustrate what the principle explanations are within long peace research for the absence of major inter-state war in Europe, what theoretical generalizations are made, what empirical evidence is given, and what the relevance is for social science and for the concrete policies of governments and security organizations. The purpose is also to illustrate that the way in which the term "stability" is defined can be fundamentally important for the analytical framework of long peace research. An imprecise definition can allow conclusions to be made which are either counter-intuitive or historically inaccurate, but are still compatible with the terms of reference that are given. Specific examples of how different definitions of stability can lead to totally competing interpretations of European security will be presented later in this chapter.

Long peace research will then be tested for its consistency and explanatory power, assessing whether this body of literature rejects the assumption that a *multiplicity of reasons* has been responsible for the absence of major war in Europe. This chapter will also assess whether established arguments about European security must be totally rethought, or whether analytical propositions should simply be better conceptualized and integrated with empirical evidence from other areas of research. Finally, the utility of using *either* a unit-level *or* a systems-level analysis for studying European security will be evaluated, questioning whether a synthesis of the

two levels could be more productive for explaining inter-state relations in Europe after 1945.

I. Bipolarity and Stability

Within the entire literature of political science, only Kenneth Waltz examines the *theoretical* reasons why bipolarity should contribute to international systemic stability.³ One is immediately confronted with an analytical problem, however, especially in relation to long peace research. Waltz concentrates his study on *world* stability, although the emphasis of the long peace is clearly on Europe after 1945. This need not necessarily pose a dilemma if one accepts the argument that international stability between 1945 and 1989 was simply an outward representation of superpower duopoly within Europe, but this would require a leap of faith not at all consistent with the framework of social science, let alone political science. Equating global stability with European stability is essentially a matter of how one defines and utilizes the terms which one employs. But if an argument is dependent upon how an individual researcher shapes a definition, then the standardization of academic reference points becomes very problematic. The significance of this for long peace research will be clarified later on.

Kenneth Waltz measures "stability" according to the peacefulness of adjustment within the international system and the durability of the system itself.⁴ By definition, then, an international system is stable if changes in the relative power of nation-states can be accomplished peacefully, or at least with the lowest level of violence possible, and if these changes do not limit the length of time during which

³Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus*, Vol. 93, No. 3 (Summer 1964), pp. 881-909.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 881.

the system can function successfully. Violence is therefore a key element, and Waltz offers four factors to illustrate why a bipolar world will reduce international violence. First, "with only two world powers there are no peripheries."⁵ This means that all political and military events occurring even in far away continents and completely remote areas of the globe are of interest to the two superpowers dominant in Waltz' model, namely the United States and the Soviet Union. But not only are the two superpowers interested in all aspects of world politics, they are actively involved in them as well, creating a two-power competition in which one side's loss is necessarily and inevitably the other side's gain. In short, bipolarity not only leads to, but is equivalent with, a zero-sum condition of international politics.

However, this condition does not encourage the spread of violence, because wherever hostility has the chance of breaking out, counterpressure not only can, but will be applied to contain it. This is possible because each superpower in a bipolar world has both the resources and the motivation to stem the upward spiral of violence so that the country's relative power is not jeopardized. There are no realms open to aggrandizement. Indeed, as Richard Rosecrance clearly points out, "[t]he very existence of serial confrontation renders the balance more stable."⁶

The second factor illustrating why a bipolar world will reduce international violence is that the *intensity* of the competition between blocs increases, not just the level of competition itself. According to Waltz, increased intensity is defined as "a reluctance to accept small territorial losses...."⁷ Whereas before the Second World War the remilitarization of the Rhineland did not immediately lead to global violence, the loss of the Rhineland after 1945 to a hostile bloc would be anything

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 882.

⁶Richard N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1966), p. 314.

⁷Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," p. 883.

other than irrelevant. Under bipolarity, all losses and gains are calculated in terms of the international balance, and a stable equilibrium is maintained precisely because the two opposing blocs are willing to assert their interests in even minor cases and prevent large aggregations of power before they occur.⁸

The third distinguishing factor is "the nearly constant presence of pressure and the recurrence of crises."⁹ The problem with this factor is that it seems counterintuitive that crises could ever lead to a reduction in violence, and consequently to an increase in systemic stability. But this is exactly what Waltz is asserting. The argument is that if crises do not occur, it is proof that one bloc is neglecting its own interests and failing to assist in the regulation of the international system. Crises arise when one bloc is determined to increase its relative power, and this intention is held in check by the actions of the other side.¹⁰ Maintenance of the balance therefore requires low level posturing, rather than a build-up of pressure which can only be relieved by a large war at some point in future. The axiom is that a large crisis in the near future is much better than a small war in the long term, but only when there are two major protagonists and there is certainty of who will oppose whom. For crises also occur in a multipolar world, but "the dangers are diffused, responsibilities unclear, and definition of vital interests easily obscured."¹¹ John Mearsheimer sums up this point with the observation that the prospects for deterring violence are consequently greater within a bipolar system, since miscalculations of relative power and of the determination of one's opponents are fewer and less likely than under conditions of multipolarity.¹²

⁸Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future," p. 314.

⁹Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," p. 883.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 884.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 884.

¹²John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), p. 14.

The fourth and final factor is that the preponderant power of the United States and the Soviet Union under a bipolar structure meant that minor changes in power or prestige were not of decisive significance.¹³ Change could be accommodated because both countries were so strong. Naturally, this factor is the one that is most dependent on historical observation and interpretation, and it is not strictly bound by the rigours of theoretical logic and consistency. For example, the international system after 1945 is generally referred to as being bipolar,¹⁴ but the Soviet Union immediately after World War II was certainly not in possession of preponderant power, especially in relation to the United States. Therefore, this fourth factor is the most tentative in terms of theory and general explanatory power, although its relevance should not be dismissed off-hand.

Within Kenneth Waltz' frame of reference, the relationship between bipolarity and international stability is one based essentially on anxiety and concern. Only the Soviet Union and the United States had the ability, in concrete terms, to inflict irreparable damage on the other without any third-party assistance, and since each side was aware of this, considerations that the existing arsenals could actually be used were always in the forefront of policy deliberations. Counter to normal expectations, however, this existential superpower *Angst* limited bilateral tension and actually reduced the danger of major inter-state war, as long as one accepts Waltz' rationale:

Intensity and breadth of competition and recurrence of crises limn a picture of constant conflict verging on violence. At the same time, the relative simplicity of relations within a bipolar world, the great

¹³Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future," p. 315. See also Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," pp. 886-887.

¹⁴See, for example, A.W. DePorte, *Europe Between the Superpowers* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

pressures that are generated, and the constant possibility of catastrophe produce a conservatism on the part of the two greatest powers. The Soviet Union and the United States may feel more comfortable dealing *à deux* than in contemplating a future world in which they vie for existence and possible advantage with other superpowers.¹⁵

In the final analysis, this rationale derives its logic *only* within the boundaries of the terms of reference, especially where stability is defined as the peacefulness of adjustment within the international system and the durability of the system itself. It is because of this definition, and the possible avenues for analytic investigation which are *unique* to the definition, that allow Waltz to conclude that a bipolar political structure must be responsible for a framework of world politics that limits inter-state violence and encourages competition. As a consequence, competition is considered to be healthy, and a country's clarity of focus contributes to the maintenance of peace precisely because indecision undermines the ability to protect assets situated overseas. It is exactly in this context that Waltz uses the term "bipolarity", describing a bipolar world as one in which each dominant nation-state or bloc "has global interests which it can care for unaided, though help may often be desirable."¹⁶ To attribute more to Waltz' use of the word "bipolarity" is to misinterpret his understanding and perception of postwar politics. Not surprisingly, however, there is a high degree of deliberate alignment between Waltz' definitions of stability and bipolarity, and this congruence of cause and effect through the manipulation of the terms of reference is dubious at best. For example, if stability were measured against variables other than adjustability and durability, then it might be possible to draw entirely different conclusions. The importance of definitions for long peace theory will become even more evident later on.

¹⁵Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," pp. 903-904.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 888.

Structural Elements of Bipolar Stability

In order to demonstrate that the bipolar structure of the international system can directly contribute to stability, it is necessary but insufficient to rely on the logic and consistency of theoretical insights. One must also show in concrete terms how peace after 1945 was bolstered by structural elements within bipolarity which were *not* present within previous multipolar configurations. Using a methodology which integrates political science and historical analysis, four structural elements of stability unique to bipolarity become evident. First, as the postwar bipolar era came to a close at the end of the 1980s, dominant military power, and hence the capacity to influence and shape world events, was really only possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union, the same two countries which entered the new bipolar structure in 1945 as superpowers.¹⁷ Naturally, the military dimension is not the only measurement of power, and is often equalled or even surpassed by economic competitiveness, but the Gulf War of 1991 is a very good example of how the economic strength of Japan and Germany was ineffectual in forming and leading a coalition to expel the Iraqi military from Kuwait. That distinction went exclusively to the United States.

Second, "[t]he post-1945 bipolar structure was a simple one that did not require sophisticated leadership to maintain it."¹⁸ Only one opposing bloc faced the United States, and the interests of the Soviet Union could only be directly affected by inroads made by the Americans. This bloc confrontation over a period of forty-five years allowed each side to carefully study the other, read its military and scholarly literature, and observe troop movements and official viewpoints regarding offence and defence in war. Therefore, one superpower was less likely to

¹⁷Gaddis, "The Long Peace," p. 108.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 108.

misconstrue the tactical and strategic interests of the other, or to poorly approximate the strength, resolve, or capability of the opponent.¹⁹ This relative clarity induced a sense of caution and restraint, and it lowered "the risk of wars arising from misunderstanding or optimistic miscalculation."²⁰

Third, alliances within the framework of a bipolar structure were much more stable than they had been in the 19th century, primarily because the simplicity of relations in a bipolar world and the strong pressures that were generated made the United States and the Soviet Union "conservative", and allowed the establishment and maintenance of agreed spheres of influence.²¹ A mutually acceptable order is most easily created and sustained in an unchanging world, and the bipolar world of 1945-1989 changed very little.²² Furthermore, as long as only one superpower bloc was the only major source of insecurity for the opposing bloc, neither superpower encountered any fundamental difficulties in maintaining its formal alliances, since defection from the ranks of one's allies was simply not a valid option of policy.²³ For example, although France withdrew from the integrated military command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it never fully pulled out of NATO and is in the 1990s even considering a limited reconciliation with NATO over security matters.

Finally, defections from both the American and Soviet spheres of influence, but not from their formal alliances, were tolerated "without the major disruptions that might have attended such changes in a more delicately balanced multipolar

¹⁹Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," pp. 26-27.

²⁰Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990-1991), p. 35.

²¹See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1979), p. 174.

²²Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," p. 35.

²³This is the main argument of Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 461-495.

system."²⁴ Examples from the American side were China, Cuba, and Vietnam; from the Soviet side were Yugoslavia, Egypt, and China. Remarkably, China was able to defect from the spheres of influence of *both* superpowers without causing much more trouble than internal domestic quarreling between rival political factions; international stability was not affected. This was in stark contrast to the gunboat diplomacy of the late 19th century concerning control over sparsely populated regions of desert in North Africa. Bipolarity encouraged alliance solidarity, although it also permitted a certain fluidity between spheres of influence that tolerated reversals in alignment without the concomitant increase in instability common under multipolarity.²⁵

Both theory and historical observation lend strong support to the argument that bipolarity can directly contribute to stability, be it only within Europe or diffused throughout the international system of nation-states. There have existed elements of stability found only within bipolarity and foreign to the historical example of multipolarity, as illustrated by the multipolar politics of the late 19th century and from 1919 to 1939. It has been argued that the bipolar framework of international relations after 1945 was never consciously crafted by any one state or group of states; the framework simply emerged as a by-product of hardening East-West relations after the demise of Nazi Germany.²⁶ However, since bipolarity was based upon realities of power, and since the division of Europe and hence the entire

²⁴Gaddis, "The Long Peace," p. 110.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 110.

²⁶DePorte, *Europe Between the Superpowers*, p. ix. See also the seminal analysis by Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik: Deutschland im Widerstreit der außenpolitischen Konzeptionen in den Jahren der Besatzungsherrschaft 1945-1949* (Berlin: Neuwied, 1966).

world was structurally tenable, the new system served the cause of order and supported decades of stability thereafter.²⁷

Recently, there has been an attempt to go beyond theory and historical observation, using "hard core" empirical evidence and a mathematical model, in demonstrating the stability of a bipolar world. Alvin Saperstein has presented a nonlinear mathematical model of international competition with the intention of proving that as the complexity of a system increases, stability decreases.²⁸ As a consequence, a tripolar world must be inherently less stable than a bipolar world.

Saperstein's model, and all of its conclusions, is based on the premise that stability can be identified when small perturbations from within or without a system produce small system changes.²⁹ In straightforward terms, Saperstein means that when moderate causes produce moderate effects, a system can be defined as being stable. Already, Saperstein's model is suspect, since he himself admits that results may differ from model to model "[g]iven the differing concepts of stability...."³⁰ This is the same weakness as in Kenneth Waltz' theoretical approach, where conclusions fit in comfortably with expectations since definitions are conveniently crafted to suit specific purposes.

Essentially, Saperstein's model relates uncertainty and a lack of clarity, order, and predictability in the international system to the onset of war, and hence to instability. The assumption is that chaos implies uncertainty, and uncertainty varies directly with systemic complexity, or in other words, with the number of major poles within a system. As a result, it is not particularly difficult to design a model which

²⁷See, on this point, Wilfried Loth, *Die Teilung der Welt 1941-1955* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1989).

²⁸Alvin M. Saperstein, "The 'Long Peace' -- Result of a Bipolar Competitive World?" *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (March 1991), pp. 68-79.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 73.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 78.

compares the number of possible points of contact with the number of participating actors. Not surprisingly, the model shows evidence by which Saperstein can conclude that

... the tripolar system is less stable than the bipolar system. A weak tripolar system ... is only slightly less stable than its corresponding bipolar one, but as soon as the third party becomes a significant factor in the system, overall system stability drops precipitously.³¹

The first problem with the model is, as already explained, the convenient way in which "stability" is defined. The second problem is that the international system of states is not comparable to a game of billiards, where action and reaction can be predicted and controlled. Increasing the number of billiard balls increases the number of possible interactions, but as historical experience has demonstrated, the insertion and deletion of China from the international scene and between superpower spheres of interest did not affect the level of systemic chaos and instability. Thirdly, and most importantly, stability in international relations is only partly a function of structure, or the framework inside of which nation-states interact. Stability also depends upon the conscious behaviour of countries within the international system.³² Within a bipolar world, stability may still not be possible if one of the two dominant powers exercises a strong willingness to risk war and engage in military brinkmanship. Correspondingly, a system more complex than a bipolar one need not elevate the chances of instability if the leadership displays the conservative prudence of a statesman like Bismarck. As a result, Saperstein's model has little explanatory power, and represents merely a first tentative step towards

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 77.

³²Gaddis, "The Long Peace," p. 120.

gathering empirical evidence in order to decisively illustrate the validity of his assumptions.

These three criticisms of Saperstein's model, however, are helpful in demonstrating that a *multiplicity of reasons* is probably responsible for the long postwar peace. Military power and its distribution among states are certainly factors which condition the likelihood and intensity of conflict, but the structure of the international system is inadequate in and of itself in accounting for an absence of major inter-state war after 1945. Instead, the optimal methodology is to integrate Realist and Neo-liberal Institutional assumptions about international politics and focus the terms of reference for studying the long peace. One consequent avenue of research is that of the effect of nuclear weapons on postwar inter-state relations, since the atomic arsenal highlights both how the relative gains of war and peace can be perceived -- and hence what the role of decision makers is -- as well as the significance of power and competition for military arms under conditions of anarchy.³³ Opinions about the effects of nuclear weapons reveal a great deal about the theoretical assumptions which underlie them, and discourse on the stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons on the postwar international system can encourage the synthesis of ideas necessary for the strengthening of political science.

³³Anarchy is defined as a condition of international relations where no central agency is available to enforce promises or to provide protection. See Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 485-507.

II. Nuclear Weapons and Stability

From the mid-1960s to the present day, most leading Western decision makers have assigned little utility to nuclear weapons beyond that of deterring a potential opponent from using its nuclear arsenal first. The rationale has been that since nuclear weapons are indiscriminate and almost unimaginably destructive, the *political* effects of these weapons are of significance, not their role in military doctrine. This way of thinking became widely accepted in part because of the influence of Robert McNamara, the American Secretary of Defence under President John F. Kennedy and President Lyndon B. Johnson. In contributing to the general debate on the role of nuclear weapons, McNamara asserted that deterrence is most robust when both one's allies and one's opponents perceive the costs and risks of proceeding to war as being too great, a state of affairs brought into being with the simple existence of nuclear weapons. A condition of stalemate arises when two opponents have atomic arsenals, because a mutually assured destruction (MAD) capability induces careful planning, introspection, and caution, and a desire not to initiate a military showdown. Since decision makers and the countries they represent are less compelled to commit aggression to further the interests of state, the intensity and frequency of conflict can be dramatically reduced with nuclear weapons, lending at least theoretical support to the argument that the nuclear revolution is responsible -- at least partially -- for the long postwar peace.

The political influences of large nuclear stockpiles on international politics and on the long postwar peace are threefold. Firstly, nuclear weapons are extremely destructive, no nuclear power or allied state would be spared devastation in even a small nuclear exchange, and the devastation would almost certainly occur rapidly,

within the space of days or perhaps hours.³⁴ These considerations illustrate that no country or bloc of countries can expect to profit from nuclear war. This is totally different from the case of conventional war, where cost-benefit analyses can be rationally undertaken, since expected levels of damage are measurable according to conventional indicators like industrial capacity and the productivity of the labour force. After several nuclear explosions, on the other hand, there would be no discernible labour force left to measure. If that thought is kept in mind, the concessions needed to avoid conflict in the first place are much easier to make, and as a consequence, the escalation and brinkmanship of earlier eras become antiquated, replaced by cautious diplomacy and careful political manoeuvring. John Lewis Gaddis summarizes this stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons on the postwar international system with the observation that these weapons

... have had a sobering effect upon a whole range of statesmen of varying degrees of responsibility and capability. They have forced national leaders, every day, to confront the reality of what war is really like, indeed to confront the prospect of their own mortality, and that, for those who seek ways to avoid war, is no bad thing.³⁵

The second influence of nuclear weapons is that they affect the degree of equality within the international system.³⁶ One obvious lesson of the 1991 Gulf War was that the Iraqi military was really no match against the American forces which spearheaded the Allied coalition. Conventional military inequality is easily discernible, a product of troop levels, the quantity and quality of armaments, training, professionalism, and other indicators. But the blanket devastating force of

³⁴Robert Jervis, "The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment," *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 1988), p. 83.

³⁵Gaddis, "The Long Peace," p. 123.

³⁶Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," p. 20.

even a handful of nuclear weapons possessed by a small country can create a mutually assured destruction capability, allowing an effective level of deterrence against even a superpower. A rough example was the French-Soviet nuclear relationship, where the French political and military establishment argued that France's ability to destroy only the city of Moscow could deter Soviet aggression, even if all of France were vapourized by Soviet missiles. This situation of closer equality induces caution and deliberation, both of which have a positive effect on bolstering stability.³⁷

The third and final influence of nuclear weapons is that they allow countries to calculate and measure the distribution of power within the international system.³⁸ Unlike with conventional forces, precise knowledge of an opponent's nuclear arsenal is not particularly important, provided that the opponent has an assured destruction capability. Above this level, increments in power are of little strategic importance.³⁹ Thus, a state's relative power and capability can be closely approximated, allowing a certain level of clarity conducive to the maintenance of effective deterrence. Specific intentions can still be miscalculated, but not factors which could decisively influence the outcome of a war and alter the products of one's cost-benefit analyses. Clarity enhances the strength of deterrence, which in turn is important for the preservation of peace and stable relations between states.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 20.

³⁸See, on this point, Michael M. May, George F. Bing, and John D. Steinbruner, "Strategic Arsenals after START: The Implications of Deep Cuts," *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer 1988), pp. 90-133.

³⁹Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," p. 20.

Nuclear Weapons and the Long Peace: The Empirical Record

The primary difficulty in empirically demonstrating a correlation between nuclear weapons -- especially their deterrent value -- and the long peace is that it is troublesome to prove the cause of an event which never occurred. Obviously, a nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union never took place; to indicate exactly why nuclear war was avoided is a delicate task, requiring analysis of a crisis like the Cuban Missile Crisis which could have escalated to war but never did. Even in this case, however, results are tentative at best, since it is not clear whether a specific event in time can be used to generalize about forty-five years of history. Moreover, the exact lessons to be learnt from the Cuban Missile Crisis are still under discussion as new transcripts and archival material from the 1960s become available.

John Mearsheimer attempts the next best course of action, highlighting the mutual caution which decision makers have exercised in the presence of nuclear weapons during the postwar era.⁴⁰ Mearsheimer asserts that there simply is no evidence indicating that a leader has ever behaved as if nuclear war could be a valid policy option in order to further the interests of state, and during the many crises after World War II, from Berlin to Baghdad, nuclear weapons have never been brandished like the sword of Manuel Noriega at a political rally. On the contrary, the statesmen of the "great powers" have been exceedingly cautious after 1945 in risking war with one another in situations and under circumstances which would sooner or later have escalated to conflict in almost any other historical era.⁴¹ To quote Carl Kaysen:

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁴¹Gaddis, "The Long Peace," p. 121.

Another way to make clear that the nuclear-missile revolution in military technology has had a profound effect is to imagine, *per impossibile*, that the revolution had taken place in the world of the eighteenth century. Even the most calculating of absolute monarchs, completely focussed on their dynastic interests, and totally unconcerned with the welfare of their powerless peasant populations, would nevertheless have had to take a different view of war than they had previously held. The prospect that they themselves, their families, their capitals, and their hunting lodges as well as their palaces would all vaporize in the thermonuclear fire would certainly change their assessment of the relative virtues of war and peace.⁴²

Therefore, John Mearsheimer concludes that "[t]his cautious conduct has lowered the risk of war."⁴³ Nuclear weapons, from this point of view, have directly contributed to the long postwar peace.

⁴²Carl Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete? A Review Essay," *International Security*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 61-62.

⁴³Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," p. 28.

Table 1.A**Crises in Soviet-American Relations since 1945**

Crisis	Year(s)	Peaceful Outcome or War?
Iran	1946	Peaceful Outcome
Greece	1947	Peaceful Outcome
Berlin I	1948	Peaceful Outcome
Czechoslovakia	1948	Peaceful Outcome
Korea	1950	Peaceful Outcome
East Berlin Riots	1953	Peaceful Outcome
Hungarian Revolution	1956	Peaceful Outcome
Berlin II	1958-1959	Peaceful Outcome
U-2 Incident	1960	Peaceful Outcome
Berlin III	1961	Peaceful Outcome
Cuban Missile Crisis	1962	Peaceful Outcome
Czechoslovakian Invasion	1968	Peaceful Outcome
Yom Kippur War	1973	Peaceful Outcome
Afghanistan	1979	Peaceful Outcome
Poland	1981	Peaceful Outcome
Korean Airliner Incident	1983	Peaceful Outcome

Source: Adapted from John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," *International Security*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986), p. 121.

There are two main drawbacks in associating the existence of nuclear weapons with the long peace, however. First, common to the argument is the definition of "stability" simply as "the absence of wars and major crises."⁴⁴ This is curiously a definition which passes very conveniently into the framework of a nuclear weapons-long peace correlation. If, on the other hand, stability is defined as Alvin Saperstein uses the term, where "moderate causes produce moderate effects", then it immediately complicates the theoretical analysis. Nuclear weapons are heralded for their *revolutionary* destructive capability, and for the unprecedented caution which is necessitated thereby. The effect has been, as John Mearsheimer and John Lewis Gaddis argue, a uniquely peaceful era in great power relations. Accordingly, the postwar period would have to be labelled *unstable* if one accepts Saperstein's terms of reference. The now familiar dilemma of "defining by convenience" has serious implications for political science theory and for the study of the long peace.

The second main drawback is the ambiguity of the historical record. For example, political scientists would be studying the postwar era in a completely different light if the Cuban Missile Crisis had ended in war. This could have happened either by design or by accident and miscalculation. If war had been the final step in the ladder, then bipolarity would now be scoffed at for being prone to conflict, and nuclear weapons would be branded as being unnecessarily destabilizing, since they radically reduce reaction times and encourage a "use them or lose them" mentality. Moreover, the fact that the Cuban Missile Crisis was actually resolved peacefully does not empirically prove that the existence of nuclear weapons was the root cause. The backroom diplomacy of individual statesmen and their willingness to compromise may be just as plausible a reason.⁴⁵ In short, the

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁴⁵See, on this point, James G. Blight, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and David A. Welch, "The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Fall 1987),

historical record is ambiguous, and asserting that nuclear weapons *alone* are responsible for the long peace is nothing less than analytical negligence. On the other hand, it demonstrates that a *multiplicity of reasons* is probably responsible, and that further research in other areas is necessary, if not imperative.

III. The Social Evaluation of War and Stability

The third general argument within the literature of political science which attempts to account for the long postwar peace is that since the early 19th century, a gradual but fundamental social re-evaluation of the utility of war has been taking place. The long peace is simply "the culminating result of a historic process in which the institution of war has gradually been rejected because of its perceived repulsiveness and futility."⁴⁶ This argument normally takes two forms, which are usually classified as "the obsolescence of war" and "peace-loving democracies". These two classifications are normally treated as separate phenomena worthy of independent analysis, but this is arguably a case where synthesis is necessary, because socio-cultural change since the industrial revolution is really the common denominator under discussion.

The "obsolescence of war" theory primarily looks at the intensity and frequency of war within the entire international system, not just within Europe, so it is immediately problematic for studying postwar *European* security. This is similar to the problem of Kenneth Waltz' analysis of bipolar international stability. But if the

pp. 170-188. For a more detailed discussion, see also James G. Blight and David A. Welch, *On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York, N.Y.: Hill and Wang, 1989).

⁴⁶John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), p. 264.

applicability of general results for specific scenarios is kept in mind, then the validity of certain theoretical and empirical findings can be measured. Primarily, the "obsolescence of war" theory argues that major inter-state war among developed, modernized countries now seems so unlikely that it may well be appropriate to consider it obsolescent. Especially before World War I, war was generally considered to be beneficial, progressive, and a logical option of policy. By 1918, the conviction became widespread that war in the developed world was too costly and counterproductive, since the costs of fighting far outweighed any expected benefits. World War II simply served to repeat and reinforce this lesson. John Mueller argues that "... since preparations for major war are [now] essentially irrelevant, they are profoundly foolish."⁴⁷ In short, war as a form of activity in the developed world "... may be following once-fashionable dueling into obsolescence: the perceived wisdom, value, and efficacy of war may have moved gradually toward terminal disrepute."⁴⁸

Major war has not only been discredited as an option of policy. There has also been a shift in values. Prosperity and economic growth have become the overriding goals of modern states, and even minor, inexpensive war has been viewed after 1945 as being counterproductive to the achievement of these goals. When such facts are fully evident, peace is likely to be firm.⁴⁹ Yet war has not only been rejected because of its current ineffectiveness and undesirability -- in short, because it is a bad idea -- but because there has been a transformation in mental habits through socio-cultural evolution. War is no longer even a coherent possibility, remaining subconscious all of the time and being blocked out by mental habits accustomed

⁴⁷John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 1988), p. 79.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p. 78.

⁴⁹Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday*, p. 240.

only to peace.⁵⁰ Peace, in other words, has proved to be addictive and habit forming.⁵¹ This argumentation is strangely reminiscent of the principles of Newspeak in George Orwell's book, *1984*. Newspeak was the official language of Oceania, and its purpose was to make modes of thought impossible which were not appropriate for the worldview of English Socialism. The creators of Newspeak cut the number of words in existence so that it would become literally impossible to commit heresy, simply because the necessary menu of words for expressing heresy had been purged from reality. There would be no "thoughtcrime", no truth, only orthodoxy. Granted, John Mueller's theory is not nearly as radical, but his belief in a uniformity of opinion regarding peace and war is excessive.

Essentially, the postwar world contains redundant sources of stability, so that even in the absence of nuclear weapons, war would still have lost its appeal. For the past forty-five years, in other words, there has existed a condition of "general stability", where the major countries have preferred the maintenance of the status quo even when confronted with the alternative of fighting a war and winning it at very low cost.⁵² Therefore, modernized countries have been "deterred" from aggression by the blessings and comforts of peace, and only secondarily by nuclear weapons. General stability is identifiable in Canada-United States relations, where the Americans have been persistently unwilling to attack Canada for over 150 years.⁵³ It is also identifiable by the fact that democracies do not go to war against one another.

The "peace-loving democracies" theory ultimately stems from the observation that the social evaluation of war during the past two centuries has changed, and this

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. 240.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 240.

⁵²*Ibid.*, p. 249.

⁵³*Ibid.*, p. 248.

has been the product of two factors.⁵⁴ First, the tax-payers and enfranchised voters in a democracy have a relatively greater say in the decision-making process than citizens under an authoritarian régime. Since it is exactly these people who pay the price when war breaks out, it is in their interest to pressure their elected representatives to exercise discretion in foreign diplomacy and practice peaceful inter-state relations. This is feasible in a democracy precisely because democratic leaders are accountable to their publics. For example, leaders of the two German states before 1989-1990 were all elected, even Walter Ulbricht and Erich Honecker. But only leaders in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) were accountable to their electorate. As a consequence, East German participation in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia was condoned and even justified, whereas a West German incursion into France in reaction to Charles de Gaulle's rebuff of NATO's military integration would never have been tolerated, and hence could never have occurred.

Second, democratic principles and values are generally respected by the citizens of liberal democracies, who uniformly believe that liberal democracy is the ideal way for a state to be governed.⁵⁵ Moreover, individuals in other countries which espouse the virtues of "liberal democracy" are considered to be entitled to the same treatment and respect. Legitimacy is a very important commodity, and democracies take care to stock it more than authoritarian régimes do. As a result, if a foreign government is "legitimate", then a democratic state is reluctant to attack it by force, since this would violate the very principles and values which it holds so

⁵⁴This theory has been recently articulated by Michael W. Doyle in three articles: "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs [Part 1]," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (June 1983), pp. 205-235; "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs [Part 2]," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (October 1983), pp. 323-353; and "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169.

⁵⁵See, on this point, Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, No. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3-18.

high. "Thus an inhibition on war," John Mearsheimer writes, "is introduced when two democracies face each other that is missing in other international relationships."⁵⁶

The argument that in the past two centuries there has been a positive correlation between representative government and peace -- at least vis-à-vis other countries with similar beliefs -- because mental patterns of evaluation have been transformed, is supported by an interesting field of research called "civilizationalism". This research field posits that political and historical events are accompanied simultaneously by changes in outlook, and changes in outlook are accompanied simultaneously by events. Similarly, "stability of outlook and political structure seem to accompany one another."⁵⁷ If this is accurate, it means that the long peace exists because the majority of civilization is currently in a normal phase of development, or as John Mueller would call it, a phase of "general stability". Peace is perceived and evaluated as being normal because "many of the leaders who come to power and the citizens who dominate our business and communities are at an age at which they no longer have strong memories of the Depression and World War II."⁵⁸ Consequently, it may be that nuclear weapons have not been used *because of* the present peace, where such arsenals have no utility in a period in which rational limited objectives are sought. "The Pax Atomica may be a consequence, not a cause."⁵⁹

This field of research is still relatively young, but it does lend support to the view that general stability and a lack of desire to change the status quo by force, strengthened by socio-cultural changes, are responsible for the long peace. At the

⁵⁶Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," p. 49.

⁵⁷Matthew Melko, "Long-term Factors Underlying Peace in Contemporary Western Civilization," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (February 1992), p. 106.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, p. 112.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, p. 107.

same time, it directly challenges the theoretical assumptions behind nuclear stability, and indicates that not all of the arguments in support of bipolarity, nuclear weapons, and the social evaluation of war can peacefully coexist. The time is ripe to assault head on the conventional wisdom of long peace research.

IV. Concluding Observations

In its attempt to account for the long postwar peace in Europe and to describe the fundamentals of European security, long peace research has shown that three factors -- bipolarity, the existence of nuclear weapons, and the changing social evaluation of war -- are responsible for the peaceful management of inter-state relations. These factors are both systemic and behavioural, and they can be demonstrated with theoretical and empirical frames of reference. Indeed, long peace research appears comprehensive, well researched, and well suited to the policy needs of decision makers in the 1990s.

But it has already been demonstrated that long peace research is suspect. Primarily, definitions upon which all assumptions rest are carefully chosen for the sake of convenience and for their ease of manipulation. Completely different conclusions can be derived simply by replacing one key word with another, even though the internal logic can remain untouched. Secondly, all evidence points to the fact that a *multiplicity of reasons* is responsible for the long peace. Bipolarity, for example, cannot stand on its own. It is an attractive explanation, but only describes part of the picture. Finally, and most significantly, certain arguments and propositions within long peace research actually tend to cancel each other out. One factor cannot be proven unless another is disproven and discredited, either in whole or in part. Specific examples of this incompatibility will be given in chapter two. The

implications for political science are serious, since its descriptive and prescriptive abilities are immediately put into question, and the astonishment with which political science observed the political events of 1989-1990 -- and with only shallow explanations -- could become commonplace. Indeed, by critically evaluating the state of long peace research, it may in fact be difficult *not* to come to the conclusion that many assumptions of international relations theory are bankrupt, and that new ideas and approaches are vitally necessary. This will be the topic of debate in the next chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

THE LONG PEACE, OR: THE BANKRUPTCY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

Within the general field of political science, and specifically within international relations, conventional research indicates that stability within Europe after 1945 has been a consequence of three factors: bipolarity, the existence of nuclear weapons, and the changing social evaluation of war. These three factors all associate stability with security, where interaction between nation-states is stable only if it is secure at the same time, and only if the general "rules of the game" are never breached. Furthermore, theoretical approaches to European stability all accept that the general rules of inter-state behaviour, especially in Europe, have not been violated for a significant period of time; so significant, in fact, that a "long peace" has existed in Europe since 1945.

The three main theoretical approaches of long peace research are all well defined and coherent, and their use of historical examples and of a limited amount of direct empirical evidence can convince the student of international relations that the general insights are correct. If this is true, as long peace research would argue, then one need not look for other explanations in order to improve the existing models. The purpose of this chapter is to argue against this assumption. Specifically, the purpose is to highlight how arguments about bipolarity, the existence of nuclear weapons, and the changing social evaluation of war not only contradict each other, but are internally flawed upon close, critical analysis. The purpose is not to argue that the available models should be thrown into the theoretical wastebin, but that the monopoly they hold within the field of study is disadvantageous and impedes clarity of thought. Theoretical and empirical weaknesses must be pointed out, but they must also be used as "roadmaps" in order to indicate what future research must

take into consideration, and how specific terms and words should be defined. In short, the point is not to disprove that a multiplicity of reasons is responsible for the long peace, but to inquire whether new ideas and approaches are necessary for realigning the terms of reference of international relations theory.

I. Bipolarity and Stability: A Critique

The theoretical approach of Kenneth Waltz which argues that there is a positive correlation between bipolarity and international stability after 1945 offers four reasons why a bipolar world will reduce international violence. First, there are no peripheries in such a world, so competition is widespread. Second, the intensity of this competition is high. Third, pressure is always in evidence, and small-scale crises are relatively frequent. Finally, minor shifts in the balance of power are not decisively significant, since the two major countries under bipolarity hold predominant power. However, simply by analyzing the internal logic of Waltz' approach, three arguments arise which can directly contradict the conclusions which are reached, and undermine the explanatory power of the theory.

First, bipolarity makes conflict intractable, because it does not reduce the motivations behind state aggression. Since competition within a bipolar world is zero-sum, any improvement in the position of one political bloc must come at the opponent's expense. Therefore, "... each action by one will be viewed as a strategic gambit by the other",¹ and even examples of extending humanitarian aid outside of one's own sphere of influence, as West Germany's *Ostpolitik* was designed in part to do, have been interpreted as suspect. And as the early phase of Ronald Reagan's

¹Richard N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1966), p. 315.

foreign policy demonstrated, antagonism intentionally generated by one side will be reciprocated by the other, increasing the general level of discordance in the international system. Systemic structure is a significant determinant of state behaviour, and the intractability of conflict between states under bipolarity is counterproductive to the enhancement of security, especially within Europe.

Second, two different definitions of "bipolarity" are generally referred to. For Kenneth Waltz, bipolarity refers to an international system in which each bloc "has global interests which it can care for unaided, though help may often be desirable."² One fundamental global interest is to guard one's relative power, and since competition is zero-sum, increments in an opponent's relative power represent an immediate, concrete loss for one's own position and status. Therefore, all change under this definition of bipolarity is of vital significance. For John Lewis Gaddis, on the other hand, a bipolar structure allows substantial territorial and political changes to take place between spheres of influence without "major disruptions" in systemic stability.³ Gaddis illustrates that the United States both "gained" and "lost" China, but the balance of power was not critically destabilized. But if Gaddis' definition is correct, it means that international competition is *not* zero-sum, for China represented neither a simultaneous gain nor a simultaneous loss for the United States. However, if major fluctuations in power do not threaten system-wide stability, then the bipolar structure is no longer even "bipolar". As Richard Rosecrance explains, "[a]ll changes are either vital in that they directly affect the bipolar balance, or they are not vital in that they fail to do so."⁴

²Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus*, Vol. 93, No. 3 (Summer 1964), p. 888.

³John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," *International Security*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986), p. 110.

⁴Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future," p. 316.

The third and final problem of Waltz' approach is that "... the prescription 'peace by crisis' is a dubious palliative. It seems equivalent to saying that the world's most peaceful place is on the brink of war."⁵ The Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, has been very instructive in teaching how individual decision makers are important for crisis management, and how crises can act as significant mechanisms for spurring on the arms control process. But this of course would be totally false if a single American naval commander had acted impetuously during the blockade of Cuba and had provoked war. Moreover, if the regular occurrence of small crises supports uniform, tentative stability, known as "détente" in common parlance, then the problem of defining "bipolarity" surfaces once again. Détente allows the political and military interests of two blocs to be promoted simultaneously, as during the process of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), but zero-sum bipolarity only allows one bloc's advantage at the other's expense. But if John Lewis Gaddis' definition of bipolarity is then accepted, the result is that there *are* peripheries in the world, like China, where significant changes in the distribution of power are not immediately met by countervailing pressures.⁶

The approach of Kenneth Waltz and other Realist scholars is plagued, therefore, by a weakly defined substructure upon which the framework of theory depends. Systemic change under détente can be peacefully accommodated, but disequilibrium is sanctioned, and the international structure is no longer strictly bipolar. On the other hand, the rapid exertion of counterpressure common under taut bipolarity rules out accommodation between opposing blocs, and is very likely to heighten tension and the readiness for war.⁷ Waltz' approach to bipolar stability is incompatible with the methodology of Gaddis, and the arguments of one

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 316.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 317.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 317.

undermine the theoretical conclusions of the other. This incompatibility is insufficient to prove that a strictly bipolar world is unstable, but it is certainly enough to undermine research on bipolarity as an exclusive approach to the study of European security. And this only serves to weaken the basis of long peace research as a whole.

Multipolarity and Stability

One of the strengths attributed to the bipolar model is the claim that it has an exclusive ability in accounting for international, or at least European, stability. The common hypothesis is that as the international system moves away from multipolarity toward bipolarity, the frequency and intensity of war will diminish. It is possible, however, to formulate exactly the opposite hypothesis and give convincing theoretical and empirical evidence to prove one's case. The proposition would then be that there is a positive correlation between international peace and *multipolarity*. This would obviously serve to further question the logic and consistency of Kenneth Waltz' model.

The best theoretical study of multipolar stability is that of Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer.⁸ In their study, Deutsch and Singer equate multipolarity with *international* stability, and they define "stability" as "... the probability that the system retains all of its essential characteristics; that no single nation becomes dominant; that most of its members continue to survive; and that large-scale war does not occur."⁹ This definition varies from those of Kenneth Waltz and Alvin

⁸Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," *World Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (April 1964), pp. 390-406.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 390.

Saperstein, and it comes as no surprise that the insights given by Deutsch and Singer pass comfortably into the terminological framework of their essay.

Three basic reasons are given to show why a correlation exists between multipolarity and international stability. First, multipolarity affords a greater number of interaction opportunities. This means that one country will have associations and loyalties with many other countries, and these ties will reduce the chance of a mutually reinforcing antagonism between two nation-states.¹⁰ The rationale is that interdependency between countries lessens the dangers of zero-sum politics where actions by one require an immediate offsetting response by the other. Interdependency over a period of time allows countries to become familiar with one another, and this promotes stability and diminishes the tendency for states to pursue a conflict up to and beyond the commencement of military hostilities.¹¹

In addition, multipolarity acts as a form of "flexible response". Since there are a wide variety of states with which to conduct business and establish ties, threats need not always be balanced by a military response. Instead, a threat can be offset simply by forging an alliance with a third party; this illustrates solidarity and commitment, and it can persuade an aggressor that the costs of war will outweigh the benefits.¹² Therefore, a large number of independent states is conducive to peace and stability, as long as the Deutsch-Singer definition of stability is used, and it allows the conclusion to be drawn that "... one of the greatest threats to the stability of any impersonal social system is the *shortage* of alternative partners."¹³

¹⁰Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future," p. 317.

¹¹Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990-1991), pp. 37-38.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹³Deutsch and Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," p. 394. Emphasis added.

The second reason why multipolarity is conducive to international stability is that it diminishes the attention that one country can pay to other states. This is beneficial to stability because foreign policy behaviour which tends toward armed conflict requires a certain minimum percentage of a country's external attention to be allocated to another state. But if this percentage is only rarely reached because a country must widen its scope of vision to take in many states simultaneously, then this is likely to have a stabilizing effect on the international system.¹⁴ For example, one reason why Germany never went to war in the 1950s with Vietnam, while France did, was that Germany's *critical attention ratio*¹⁵ was too low. Thus, as soon as more than three major countries exist in the international system, the average amount of attention that can be devoted to any one conflict drops sharply.¹⁶ Multipolarity contributes to international stability.

The third and final reason why a multipolar system is conducive to international stability is that it has a dampening effect upon arms races. In the mobile, fluid world of multipolarity, a moderate decline in the relative power of a state need not be significant, since the balancing of an opponent's power can be accomplished through alliances and coalitions. Provided only that a state realigns its interests in a timely fashion, it can as a middle power guarantee the integrity of its borders just as well as it did with great power status. Therefore, Deutsch and Singer conclude that "[a]rms increases by a rival power, which in a bipolar world might pose a fatal threat, might call in a multipolar world for little more than a quick adjustment of alliances."¹⁷ Multipolarity limits the competition for arms and promotes peace and stability.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 400.

¹⁵This term was coined by Deutsch and Singer, p. 399.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 399.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 403.

Bipolarity and Multipolarity: Lessons for Future Research

Arguments for both bipolarity and multipolarity are equally attractive and persuasive, and the logic of their construction is, at first glance, consistent and convincing. But theoretical insights into bipolarity suffer from stark inner contradictions, and these are only intensified by arguments in favour of multipolarity. The main problem with the current state of political science research is that the empirical tools necessary for measuring theoretical propositions are not refined enough, and this drastically limits the descriptive and prescriptive abilities of the academic field.¹⁸

Moreover, structural factors by themselves do not cause or explain war and peace in international relations. Structure is necessary but insufficient in accounting for international stability. As Stanley Hoffmann argues, "... *any* structure [in anarchy] can lead either to peace or to war; it depends on the domestic characteristics of the main actors, on their preferences and goals, as well as on the relations and links among them."¹⁹ Therefore, one lesson for future political science research is that in accounting for peace and stability in Europe, the polarity of the system is a misleading indicator, and analysis must go beyond conventionally accepted patterns of methodology. For example, the peaceful era of European inter-state relations between 1815 and 1854 was *multipolar*, not bipolar; the structural Realism of John Mearsheimer cannot account for this. The second lesson is that "stability" must be defined very carefully, since one single variable can affect the entire framework of analysis. A clearer definition of stability will be outlined later on.

¹⁸See, on this point, the conclusions of Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," p. 40.

¹⁹Stanley Hoffmann, in correspondence with John Mearsheimer, in "Back to the Future, Part II: International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Fall 1990), p. 192.

The two lessons for future political science research can be phrased as follows:

Lesson One: "Systemic polarity alone cannot account for peace and stability in Europe. Factors common to both bipolarity and multipolarity must be sought out and analyzed."

Lesson Two: "Defining the term 'stability' is vital for long peace research, and is vital for the analysis of peace in *any* historical era."

II. Nuclear Weapons and Stability: A Critique

The destructive power of nuclear weapons, their ability to equalize large discrepancies in state power, and the unambiguous calculation of the distribution of power which their stockpiling allows, are three arguments within long peace research that demonstrate how nuclear weapons have directly contributed to the long postwar peace. At the same time, it is this same body of research which argues most strongly *against* the contention that nuclear weapons alone can explain the stability -- or instability -- of international systems. Kenneth Waltz advances the argument that nuclear capabilities merely reinforce a condition that would exist in their absence. That is, even if nuclear technology had never been developed by scientists, both the United States and the Soviet Union after 1945 had the ability to develop conventional weapons of extreme destructive power, and they would have both lost heavily if they had engaged in major conventional war.²⁰

John Mueller agrees with Kenneth Waltz that war after 1945 has been prevented not so much by the deterrence value of nuclear weapons as by "... the generally-accepted belief that conflict can easily escalate to a level, nuclear or not,

²⁰Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," pp. 885-886.

that the essentially satisfied major powers would find intolerably costly."²¹ Nuclear weapons have been very important in influencing military targeting and the allocation of defence resources, they have been at the core of strategic thinking ever since the early postwar period, and they have shaped political discourse for decades. But it cannot be empirically demonstrated that nuclear weapons either crucially define a fundamental stability or threaten to overturn it.²²

First, the United States and the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1989 were essentially content with the status quo, since they emerged from World War II in comfortable positions of predominance over their respective spheres of influence. Beginning with Iran and Greece in 1946 and 1947, there were a steady series of crises and tests of strength between the superpowers, but a major war was never fought. Instead, methods like economic pressure, coerced autarky, backroom diplomacy, and guerrilla warfare by proxy were applied. This uniform contentment with the postwar status quo, or "general stability" as John Mueller terms it, is therefore a very significant element of post-1945 international relations, and it illustrates one important factor which any definition of stability must take into account. Stability cannot simply be equated with security or with an effective balance of power. It also requires an acceptance of the inviolability of the political boundaries between major countries, an acceptance that the general domestic political structure of these countries is not coerced on the population but is acclaimed as being "just", and an acceptance that other forms of "systemic fairness", like international recognition of legitimate governments, are uniformly disseminated.

²¹John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 1988), p. 59.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 55.

Lesson Three: "Any definition of 'stability' must account, in part, for the level of legitimacy which the major nation-states give to the existing political and military framework of international relations."

Second, it is difficult to demonstrate that the fear of nuclear war helped contain the Soviet Union from expanding by force into Western Europe or into other geopolitical areas. One of the West's presuppositions about Soviet foreign policy was that it was inherently expansionistic and aggressive, and it was necessary to deter the USSR from overrunning the industrial heartlands of West Germany, Holland, France, and Great Britain. Basic to all assumptions was the Soviet "threat", which provided the basis for most strategic theorizing. The opponent was considered not to be conditioned by the structure of international politics or by any domestic political forces, but was instead an abstract "strategic man" who thought, as did Henry Kissinger and Thomas Schelling, in game-theoretical terms. From a very early stage, then, American strategists got entangled with the theory of action and reaction in the nuclear realm and vis-à-vis the Soviets, rather than with the objective of avoiding and preventing world war. This hard-core frame of mind which was oriented more against the Soviets than in favour of stability is what Michael McGwire calls "deterrence dogma", and it is this body of attitudes and ideas which has characterized the postwar nuclear relationship, *not* the mutual desire to abstain from major inter-state war.²³

Deterrence dogma has had three major features which have increased the likelihood of war. First, its abstract style of reasoning has favoured models like the "prisoners' dilemma", while studies of the political psychology of both opponents and allies have been neglected. Thus, rational behaviour has been defined only in pure

²³See the seminal article by Michael McGwire, "Deterrence: The Problem -- Not the Solution," *International Affairs* (London), Vol. 62, No. 1 (Winter 1985-1986), pp. 55-70.

theoretical, and often unrealistic, terms. Second, the absence of serious Sovietologists from the theoretical debate has undermined overall deterrence, since theories of escalation control and a credible force posture depended on assumptions of how the Soviets would react under specific circumstances. Finally, the tone of deterrence dogma has always been punitive, stressing both the capability and the will to inflict "unacceptable damage" on one's opponent. Deterrence has been a policy of action, and one important prerequisite for making such a policy credible was that "... the electorate should continue to believe in a high level of Soviet threat."²⁴

The overall effect of deterrence dogma on American foreign policy has been to narrow the policy's focus and to limit unnecessarily the range of its policy options. This increased the danger of war because conflict was made intractable due to the adversarial nature of the Soviet-American relationship. In addition, the steady increase in the size of the Americans' nuclear arsenal, the objective of which was to deter hypothetical Soviet undertakings, made war more likely through accident, miscalculation, reduced reaction time, and increased suspicion of even benign initiatives beyond the Iron Curtain. "Worst-case scenarios masquerading as analyses of Soviet intentions reinforce[d] the tendencies to conflict in the relationship and stifle[d] the cooperative ones, *increasing the likelihood of war.*"²⁵

The attempt of the United States and its allies to find a military solution, through nuclear weapons and their attributed deterrence value, to the central problem of postwar East-West relations has only served to worsen the situation. Nuclear weapons do not contribute to peace, they jeopardize it, and the conventional wisdom of political science research which attributes the proliferation of nuclear weapons to international stability is simply false in its theoretical and

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 57.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 70. Emphasis added.

empirical analysis of the subject. The absence of major inter-state war after 1945 has been caused by factors which have had little to do with considerations of pure military logic and strategic calculation. Instead, as Michael McGwire concludes, the insurance of peace is primarily a political task, and it is in the realm of politics that answers are to be found.²⁶

III. The Social Evaluation of War and Stability: A Critique

Within the field of long peace research, evidence indicates that changing socio-cultural evaluations of war have been steadily lowering the value at which inter-state conflict is held by decision makers and by a country's general population. Sobered by the suffering endured in past wars, the lessons of previous conflicts have been learned, so that war is currently not a valid option of foreign policy. In a sense, war has become "obsolete". In addition, war has decreased in frequency, especially in Europe, because most European states have accepted democracy as the governmental model of choice, and liberal democracies simply do not fight against each other. However, four factors question the validity of this proposition.

First, relatively few democracies have actually existed since 1800, so the actual opportunity for one democracy to engage in battle against another has not arisen very often. Second, other explanations can be given as to why democracies never fought during the few periods in time when they could have fought. For example, British-American relations in the early part of the 19th century were not free of conflict; the War of 1812 is perhaps the most convincing piece of empirical evidence. However, the relations of these two countries from 1914 to the present have been exceptionally harmonious. But this harmony can be interpreted as a

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 70.

balancing, in sequence, of the Imperial German, the Nazi, and the Soviet threats, in traditional balance-of-threat fashion.²⁷ The "peace-loving democracy" theory need never come under consideration in order to explain British-American military cooperation after 1914. The difficulty is in finding satisfactory empirical evidence to account for the change in tone in British-American relations between the 19th and 20th centuries.²⁸

The third factor is that several democracies have come close to fighting one another, which suggests that "... the absence of war may be due simply to chance."²⁹ For example, the Rhineland was a relatively serious source of dispute between Weimar Germany and France in the 1920s, and if Germany had been militarily stronger and more forceful in defending its interests, war could have been the result.³⁰ Admittedly, this third factor is a weak point, because as Bruce Russett argues, the fact that war between democracies *threatened* to break out on a number of occasions is exactly the point; under such dire circumstances, "... democracies, whatever their conflicts of interest, have *held back* from full-scale wars with each other."³¹ Therefore, the absence of war may indeed be due to effective crisis management and powerful forces of restraint within democracies. The current state of empirical analysis is poor, so conclusions are still primarily ambiguous.

²⁷On the "balance of threat" and its significance for theory and practical policy, see Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

²⁸On this British-American rapprochement, see Stephen R. Rock, *Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989).

²⁹John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), p. 51.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 51.

³¹Bruce M. Russett, in correspondence with John Mearsheimer, in "Back to the Future, Part III: Realism and the Realities of European Security," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990-1991), p. 217. Emphasis added.

The fourth and final factor is that some political scientists and historians would classify Wilhelmine Germany as a democracy, or at least a quasi-democracy if the political rhetoric of the time and the republican laws enacted are taken today at face value.³² If this classification is accurate, then the two antagonistic sides in World War I were primarily made up of democratic states. In opposition to this argument, Bruce Russett replies:

It may not be as absolute as a law of physics that democracies will not war against each other, but a few quasi-exceptions (and there are one or two more plausible than Wilhelmine Germany as a quasi-democracy) do not undermine the generalization or the theoretical argument. Furthermore, since World War II the evidence seems to hold up, even when controlling for possible confounding variables: e.g., that rich states, or economically growing states, or allies, or physically distant states rarely fight each other.³³

The evidence for and against the argument that the changing social evaluation of war is responsible for the long peace is, at best, ambiguous. More problematic, however, is the correlation between democracy and postwar *European* peace. Clearly, the Soviet Union and its allied countries were never democracies, and it is questionable whether the "peaceful revolutions" of late 1989 did anything to substantially and concretely further the interests of democracy as it is generally defined in Western Europe and North America. Between 1945 and 1989, the two halves of Europe never went to war with one another, even though dangerous crises occurred, like Berlin in 1948. One cannot use the "peace-loving democracies" theory to explain this abstinence from war, since the Eastern European régimes ranged from authoritarianism to totalitarianism; these régimes were never democratic.

³²Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," p. 51.

³³Bruce M. Russett, "Back to the Future, Part III," p. 217.

Furthermore, one cannot use the "obsolescence of war" theory, since the Soviet Union invaded both Hungary and Czechoslovakia with impunity and with disregard for human life. Instead, the deterrence value of nuclear weapons seems much more appropriate as an explanation, but if this can be empirically verified, it would totally dismiss the relevance of the social evaluation of war theory for analyses of *European* security. The next difficulty, in turn, is that superpower deterrence as a concept is riddled with theoretical dead-ends and with assumptions about inter-state relations which pale in the light of historical evidence. The once-clear logic of conventional long peace theory has consequently spiralled down into the mud of inconsistency, confusion, and contradiction.

In short, long peace research, particularly as it pertains to postwar Europe, is in a state of crisis for three reasons: the field of study contradicts itself, it lacks convincing empirical evidence, and it relies excessively on the bankrupt theories of international relations.

IV. Prerequisites for Future Research

In order to avoid the pitfalls and contradictions which characterize current approaches to postwar European peace and security, future political science research must first extrapolate exactly which errors should not be repeated. This is the best building block upon which improvements can be made, and the three lessons of this chapter provide useful guidelines. To repeat, the three lessons are:

Lesson One: "Systemic polarity alone cannot account for peace and stability in Europe. Factors common to both bipolarity and multipolarity must be sought out and analyzed."

Lesson Two: "Defining the term 'stability' is vital for long peace research, and is vital for the analysis of peace in *any* historical era."

Lesson Three: "Any definition of 'stability' must account, in part, for the level of legitimacy which the major nation-states give to the existing political and military framework of international relations."

Therefore, one prerequisite for any thorough and accurate analysis of European security is that it be shaped and influenced by a use of the term "stability" in which the balancing of threat and "systemic legitimacy" are defining variables. Surprisingly, more than twenty years ago, Henry Kissinger based a study of Otto von Bismarck and the establishment of the first unified German state on just such a definition of stability, deducing intuitively that the longevity of any political structure is *not* simply a calculation of military strength or military equilibrium. Consequently, Kissinger's interpretation of stability will be used in the remainder of this study, and his interpretation should also be integrated into the entire body of research on European security, not because the definition is convenient, malleable, and easily open to manipulation, but because logic and empirical observation lead *by necessity* to such a framework of reference. Henry Kissinger defines stability and explains its implications as follows:

The stability of any international system depends on at least two factors: the degree to which its components feel secure and the extent to which they agree on the "justice" or "fairness" of existing arrangements. Security presupposes a balance of power that makes it difficult for any state or group of states to impose its will on the remainder. Too great a disproportion of strength undermines self-restraint in the powerful and induces irresponsibility in the weak. Considerations of power are not enough, however, since they turn every disagreement into a test of strength. Equilibrium is needed for stability;

moral consensus is essential for spontaneity. In the absence of agreement as to what constitutes a "just" or "reasonable" claim, no basis for negotiation exists. Emphasis will be on the subversion of loyalties rather than on the settlement of disputes. Peaceful change is possible only if the members of the international order value it beyond any dispute that may arise.³⁴

Stability, therefore, is not simply a factor of security and the structure of international politics. This accounts, in part, for the ambiguous evidence which bipolar and multipolar power systems give to the study of international relations. Bipolarity can be stable, but the opposite is just as true, as relations between ancient Greece and Sparta illustrate; although structure influences the interaction between nation-states, it is also the way in which structure is perceived and evaluated by these countries which determines systemic longevity and the frequency and intensity of major conflict. As a consequence, using Henry Kissinger's definition, one can argue that the European political system between 1945 and 1989 was *unstable*, since the Federal Republic of Germany never considered the forced separation from its eastern political half as being final, and since the "buffer states" of Eastern Europe were only coerced into the Soviet sphere of influence, failing to opt out in 1953, 1956, and 1968, but eventually with success in 1989-1990. Stability in the postwar period of 1945 to 1989 may simply have been transitory, patched into place by armed forces and rough military equilibrium, and lacking not only a solid and acceptable basis, but also real durability, exemplified by the rapid disintegration of the status quo in the eleven months between November 1989 and October 1990. If stable inter-state relations in Europe were only illusory and in expectation of some more legitimately established order, then the implications for international relations

³⁴Henry A. Kissinger, "The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck," *Daedalus*, Vol. 97, No. 3 (Summer 1968), pp. 899-900.

research are considerable. These implications will be discussed in the following chapters.

This inquiry into European stability and security leads to the second prerequisite for any thorough and accurate analysis of European security. That is, nation-state interaction itself should be studied, as well as internal domestic forces, not simply the relation of various countries to system structure. As explained in the introduction to this study, research on Germany, the changes in its foreign policy, and its ties to other countries can provide new, valuable, and useful approaches to long peace research. Moreover, this is a logical area in which to begin, since the terms of reference of German foreign policy and long peace research are similar, and many of the same questions are posed. If clarity can be brought into the study of European stability and security, while avoiding common points of contradiction, confusion, and inconsistency, then analyses which encourage this academic precision should have precedence in future research.

These two prerequisites for future research, as well as their implications, illustrate that an analysis of the factors common to both bipolarity and multipolarity, such as the interaction of nation-states in Europe and their perception of the legitimacy of the existing order, is a logical base upon which to begin. Since traditional long peace research has concentrated primarily on 20th-century bipolarity, new emphasis should be placed on the multipolar structure of 19th-century European politics in order to find commonalities and differences, and in order to assess the relevance of previous eras of peace and stability for the present period of transition away from superpower bipolarity. And this examination of Europe's political system in the preceding century, its ability to regulate peaceful and stable conduct between states, and the general political and military role of Germany, will be the topic of debate in the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

NINETEENTH-CENTURY EUROPEAN STABILITY AND THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION

As a general statement, most political scientists and historians would agree that the 19th century was more peaceful than the 18th. And if the term "stability" is used to define a situation in which major inter-state war is either absent or very infrequent, then the assertion could also be made that from 1815 until the beginning of the Crimean War in 1853, Europe was more stable than during any equivalent period in the entire 18th century. This observation need not only be of interest to diplomatic history and to the study of Europe's political and military development. In addition, it can and should be of direct concern to international relations and long peace research, for two reasons in particular.

First, the year 1815 marked the beginning of a system within Europe that was able to inhibit conflict and promote both a new era in consensus building and accommodation, as well as general stability, where threats were balanced and legitimacy was accrued to the status quo. This pattern of political conduct differed sharply from 18th-century norms, and the parallels to inter-state relations before and after 1945, with their implications for peace in Europe, represent an almost unique opportunity for comparing evidence and synthesizing different avenues of analysis. Second, 19th-century stability was achieved under a structure of European *multipolarity*, a fact that conflicts sharply with the hypotheses of Kenneth Waltz. If systemic polarity alone is unable to account for peace and stability in Europe, then new approaches which offer fresh interpretations should be welcomed, especially if insights into the long postwar peace can be made clearer and more precise.

Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to pose the question, "What factor or set of factors accounted for the absence of major inter-state war in Europe between

1815 and 1853?" The intention is not to analyze systemic features and characteristics while excluding evidence at the unit level, such as the tactful diplomacy of statesmen. Nor is the intention to deny the relevance of the prevailing system structure of that period in time as it constrained or permitted various courses of action. Instead, the purpose is to integrate the lessons for future research from chapter two, and inquire into the role of nation-state interaction for continent-wide stability. That is, does the presence or absence of certain countries, like Germany, and the manner in which they are permitted to form alliances and coalitions of common interest, affect the manageability of peaceful relations between states in Europe? And finally, even if research into German history and foreign policy had been previously neglected by earlier work on stability in Europe, would the answers to the questions posed in this chapter necessitate a reappraisal of conventional analytical approaches in order to include a new emphasis on Germany?

I. European Politics in the Nineteenth Century

Beginning in 1815 and continuing until at least 1890 or 1900, no single European country consciously attempted to achieve dominant power and a position of preeminence on the continent of Europe.¹ Although internal forces within Germany and Italy strove to gain unquestioned domestic power in order to unify competing factions and fashion a new state in the way they chose, "... no one state ever tried for, much less achieved, such mastery in Europe as a whole, and it is questionable whether any coalition did."² Paul Schroeder argues that the reason was

¹This is the argument of Paul W. Schroeder, "The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure," *World Politics*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (October 1986), p. 9.

²*Ibid.*, p. 9.

not that the Napoleonic Wars had illustrated the futility of large-scale conflict, nor that changing socio-political norms had made 19th-century statesmen wiser and more restrained, but that the *structure* of 19th-century European politics inhibited attempts to gain hegemony in Europe.³

Three new elements of 19th-century European politics characterized this structure and served to distinguish it from the political norms of the 18th century. First, both the treaty system of 1815 and the European Concert helped to guarantee the existence, security, status, and vital interests of all the major European countries and centres of power.⁴ Specifically, the Congress of Vienna set itself the task of creating a balanced and ordered system that would serve peace inside of specific European countries and inside of Europe as a whole. The former was accomplished by working to suppress the forces of liberal, democratic, and national movements, the latter by a network of treaty guarantees which affirmed the political boundaries of Europe in a manner mutually acceptable to all the important powers, *including* France.⁵ France was not heavily punished with forced territorial losses, and this fact helped to ensure that France approved of the status quo as being legitimate, an important aspect of general "stability" as the term was defined at the conclusion of chapter two.

A new system of diplomacy by conference and some general principles of a European Concert strengthened the network of treaty guarantees by protecting and safeguarding the rights, equal status, and existence of the great powers. In return for this benevolence, the great powers were obliged to desist from interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries, and generally pursue restraint and legality in

³*Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁴Helmut Handzik, "Der 'Deutsche Bund': Ein Modell für die Regelung der innerdeutschen Beziehungen?" *Europa-Archiv*, Vol. 23, No. 21 (1968), p. 795.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 795.

their international actions, such as upholding inter-state treaties and supporting the decisions and actions of the European Concert.⁶ In contrast, the 18th-century norm, shared by great and small powers alike, was that a country's security corresponded directly to the status that it held, and status could be strengthened not only by augmenting the size of one's borders through war, but also by deliberately attempting to dismember the territory of other countries, eliminating them as threats by jeopardizing their very existence. This was a "constitutive and necessary" feature of 18th-century politics, not an accidental by-product of the system.⁷

The second new element of 19th-century European politics was that it was "... essentially separated from colonial, maritime, and commercial competition between European powers in the non-European world."⁸ Before 1815, conflict between Britain and France over maritime and colonial issues had international consequences, such as preparing the basis and structure upon which Britain established and later consolidated its territorial rule in India. Two other consequences of major importance were the drawing in of the United States into the Napoleonic Wars, and the liberation of Latin America by revolutionary means. As peace in Europe was then pursued, various continental powers tried to pressure Britain to concede aspects of its colonial holdings in return for France's pledge to accept an ending of hostilities and a return to relatively workable inter-state relations. Britain refused this, not allowing principles of maritime law to be discussed at the peace table, rejecting any third-party mediation of its war with the United States, and forcing Europe in the process to acknowledge Britain's naval and colonial supremacy. However, this served to fundamentally sever most concrete

⁶Schroeder, "The 19th-Century International System," pp. 12-13.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 13.

connections between European and overseas wars and politics, and represented a major shift in how politics in Europe was thereafter conducted.

For example, after the Congress of Vienna, commercial and colonial rivalries between Britain and the Netherlands, and their disputes in the Far East, never impeded their ability to cooperate in Europe. Similarly, in the period after 1815, the established cycle of Anglo-Russian rivalry and accommodation went into protracted recess. Neither country was overtly or surreptitiously allied for or against the other, despite the efforts of domestic forces in Russia like Tsar Nicholas I and his political confidants to forge a new rapprochement with England. Indeed, "[i]n the typical post-Vienna manner, each power saw the other as a potential rival to be managed by ostensible friendship."⁹ The first real change in this relationship only came in 1853 with the outbreak of the Crimean War, overturning an unprecedented forty years of peace.

Arguably, this shielding of European politics from conflicts outside of the continent was important to general stability, and this contributed to peaceful interstate relations and an absence of major war. More unclear, however, is whether one can attribute this stability simply to Britain's unchallenged superiority overseas, or whether the successfully functioning 19th-century system owed its viability in part to the *manner* in which Britain ran its empire. More precisely, the maritime and colonial supremacy of Britain was made much more tolerable, and even advantageous, to the principal European powers than was the case in the 18th century. Britain gradually transformed its empire from the framework of mercantilism to that of free trade, holding colonies with which all countries could carry out business on a competitive basis. In addition, British naval vessels routed pirates from the waters of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, and guarded sea lanes

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 15.

for all forms of traffic, actions which benefitted both coastal and land-locked European countries.¹⁰ Finally, the 19th-century imperial expansion and consolidation of France and Holland was not seriously infringed and obstructed by Britain during most of the 1800s, even as Britain itself expanded the limits of its own empire. Simply by interacting with other countries in the new manner in which it did, and the constraints this imposed on possible policy options outside of Europe, Britain contributed to a functional balance of power and to a widespread belief that the status quo at that time was legitimately arranged. In short, cohesive *stability* was achieved in part by a new approach to interaction between states that was absent during the preceding one hundred years of European history.

The third and final element of 19th-century European politics was that a broad network of intermediary bodies was established by the Congress of Vienna and was specifically designed to inhibit great power conflict and promote flexible interaction across the continent. These intermediary units were not always full-fledged states, as for example the German Confederation (*Deutscher Bund*), but they all shared the common characteristics of being smaller in size while at the same time geographically in the position to form buffers between and spheres of influence for the great powers. This did not mean, however, that the smaller powers of Europe were the continental objects of exchange, conquest, and influence as they had been in the 18th century. Instead, they contributed directly to the independence of all countries, including themselves, by separating the great powers from one another and complicating their plans to wage war; simultaneously, the great powers were given a set of inter-state linkages and problems which they had to manage jointly, and solve on the basis of compromise and conciliation.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 16.

More specifically, the intermediary bodies of Europe, like Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, and the smaller states of the German Confederation, all occupied strategic areas, especially after 1815, and this geographic centrality could either separate two powerful countries, like France and Prussia, and keep them from interacting, or link them together and facilitate contact. Naturally, sometimes both possibilities could occur at the same time, either focussing bilateral competition or diffusing it. Even a less critically located intermediary power like Sweden could occasionally become strategically important, as for example during the Crimean War.¹¹

However, not only their geographical and strategic functions allowed intermediary powers to shape European politics and limit its possibilities. These powers also had a "distraction effect", making it necessary for larger states to pay attention to them during crises and worry about what they would do.¹² This made both the intentions and capabilities of potential opponents unclear, but contrary to the theoretical assumptions of political science scholars who advocate bipolarity because it enhances clarity and thus political restraint, the historical record after 1815 illustrates that an inability to predict the reactions and moves of other states actually strengthened deterrence, since countries were dissuaded from engaging in conflict when they could not reasonably expect to control the patterns of alliance and plans for military reinforcement prior to battle.¹³ For example, the uncertainty of how the Italian and smaller German states would react after 1815 distracted and deterred Austria and France from direct conflict.

¹¹Paul W. Schroeder, "The Lost Intermediaries: The Impact of 1870 on the European System," *The International History Review*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (February 1984), p. 4.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹³*Ibid.*, pp 4-5.

But the most important functions and roles of the intermediary powers in Europe after 1815 were those which resulted naturally, mostly unwilling, from their existence.¹⁴ The real significance of countries like Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands was not the conscious policies and actions that they pursued, but simply the cumulative effect of their presence. To illustrate, one analogy could be the ozone layer, which constitutes only a small portion of the entire atmosphere; but if this protective layer is removed or even damaged, the consequences are enough to destabilize the ecosystem of the entire Earth. It is the simple presence of ozone which is important, and in its absence, major adjustments must be made in order to compensate and re-establish an equilibrium. Similarly, the presence of intermediary powers after 1815 accrued a certain equilibrium to European politics, rendering it more flexible and allowing the continental powers to interact and function without recourse to low-level conflict or major war. This was achieved by *multiplying* the number of points of contact between the great powers, not by reducing them.

Contrary to bipolar stability theory and in affirmation of the assumptions of Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, interaction between European countries after 1815 tended toward peaceful cooperation only at times when the great powers had *numerous* opportunities and options for carrying out specific policies of state. This was particularly evident when intermediary countries were in a position to interact with, and partly through, their larger neighbours by distracting them from attempts to achieve hegemony and by convincing them to pursue political, rather than military, courses of action.¹⁵ For example, the relationship between Austria and Prussia in the three generations preceding the Congress of Vienna was

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁵See, on this point, Wolf D. Gruner, "Der Deutsche Bund und die europäische Friedensordnung," in Helmut Rumppler, ed., *Deutscher Bund und deutsche Frage 1815-1866* (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1990), pp. 243-244.

characterized by enmity, rivalry verging on haphazard brinkmanship, and an overt competition for political influence and military primacy. After 1815, however, this conflictual bilateral interaction was replaced by the cooperative management of the independence and territorial integrity of the German Confederation.¹⁶

In addition, the geographic location of the South German states, especially Württemberg, was manipulated by Russia as one link in its chain of buffers against inter-state conflict and revolution.¹⁷ The Russian rationale was that the best method of guaranteeing its own security was by hindering the creation of any power vacuums in Central Europe, by encouraging regional alliances between Europe's intermediary powers, and by promoting the idea that all European countries be entitled to equal status and representation. The British rejected these initiatives as being too vague and impractical, but that did not dissuade the Russian policy makers against the utility of intermediary powers.¹⁸ The mere existence of independent German states was even useful to Italy in its desire to achieve international recognition after 1860, since a precedent for and functional example of independence was already in existence in Central Europe.¹⁹

In a concrete manner, therefore, the intermediary powers of Europe and especially the smaller states of the German Confederation were able to promote non-conflictual relations between different countries simply by the fact that they were in existence and were strategically located. Specifically, the historical record indicates that peace was furthered and a general régime of systemic *stability* was supported in three ways:

¹⁶Schroeder, "The Lost Intermediaries," p. 9.

¹⁷Wolf D. Gruner, "Europa, Deutschland und die internationale Ordnung im 19. Jahrhundert," *Politik und Kultur*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1984), p. 29.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

¹⁹Schroeder, "The Lost Intermediaries," p. 10.

1. The German Confederation obliged foreign policy cooperation between two rivals.
2. The German Confederation was manipulated as a buffer against instable geopolitical regions and forces.
3. The German Confederation was a model for successful integration and defence.

Naturally, a close examination of European diplomatic history could also illustrate many additional examples of how intermediary bodies actively or unintentionally promoted peace after 1815. Such an analysis would also show that these same intermediary states served at times to focus rivalry and focus overt conflict; they did not simply encourage restraint, flexibility, and peace in international relations. Instead, intermediary states were mechanisms for augmenting the likelihood that inter-state relations could be conducted without recourse to war. To attribute more to such countries would be to misunderstand their role in European politics. In short, "... where intermediate states exist, great-power rivalry stands a good chance of being limited to competition for primacy. Where they do not, great power rivalry tends powerfully towards struggle for mastery."²⁰

A clear understanding of the role of 19th-century intermediary states is significant for international relations theory and for long peace research because it introduces an idea which is independent of the constraints of bipolar and multipolar stability arguments. Intermediary states are functionally important because of their geographical location, because they serve to intensify indecision and uncertainty among decision makers and distract their attention from preparations for war, and because of the manner in which their very presence impacts international politics and limits its possibilities. These factors can exist under the structure of both bipolarity and multipolarity -- indeed, under *any* degree of polarity -- and they

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 6.

therefore meet the first criterion for research on European security discussed in chapter two.

The second reason why studies on 19th-century intermediary states are significant for current research endeavours is that the political structure of Europe from 1815 until at least 1853 enjoyed widespread legitimacy and acceptance by the major, intermediary, and even small countries of the time.²¹ Since it was demonstrated that the German Confederation played a pivotal role in maintaining this legitimacy and supporting general stability in turn, a *prima facie* case exists that certain aspects of Germany's relationship to the European system of states can influence the intensity and frequency of inter-state war on the continent. This serves to illustrate that long peace research and research on German foreign policy naturally coincide and intersect, and that a synthesis of ideas is necessary for a more comprehensive understanding of peace and stability in Europe. This also illustrates that a close analysis of the German Confederation is required so that political science can articulate precisely how a manageable security régime in the 19th century was achieved, and use this understanding for academic analysis and policy making in the 1990s and beyond.

II. The Contribution of the German Confederation to European Peace and Stability

The German Confederation (*Deutscher Bund*) was formed on 8 June 1815 out of thirty-seven monarchies and four city-states. The political boundaries encompassed approximately thirty million citizens, 9.5 million of whom were from Austria, and 7.9 million from Prussia. Therefore, since about 58% of the population

²¹Wolf D. Gruner, *Die deutsche Frage: Ein Problem der europäischen Geschichte seit 1800* (Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1985), pp. 52-66.

lived in Austria and Prussia, the effective fulfillment of the Confederation's many administrative responsibilities -- indeed, the very "survival" of the Confederation -- depended on the cooperation of two influential members of the European system of states.²² But despite large differences in the size of their population, territory, and economic and military potential, the forty-one members of the Confederation enjoyed a large measure of domestic political manoeuvrability without suffering any loss of solidarity in the realm of foreign policy. And it was this interaction of domestic and foreign policy which provided the necessary "glue" for holding the political structure together: there was a common desire among all member states to protect the governing style at that time and its accompanying social order from threats both within and outside of the Confederation. As Helmut Handzik argues, the maintenance of *security* was the most important common concern: security from military threats stemming from German and non-German states, and security from threats to "subvert" the stability of the status quo by nationalistic or liberal forces.²³

Concerted efforts at cooperation were also facilitated by the fact that the German Confederation was really a cross between a federal state and a confederation.²⁴ This "structure of compromise" was no accident; the creation of the German Confederation was the result of a deliberate effort by the statesmen of the day, all of whom had just experienced the consequences of Napoleon's bid for hegemony, to re-establish a workable European balance of power.²⁵ The belief was that a centrally organized German nation-state, and therefore a powerful locus of attraction in Central Europe, could never be reconciled with a stable and balanced régime of peace. From this point of view, a centralized German any represented the

²²Handzik, "Der 'Deutsche Bund'," p. 795.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 795.

²⁴The German translations for these two terms are, respectively, *Bundesstaat* and *Staatenbund*.

²⁵Gruner, *Die deutsche Frage*, p. 59.

antithesis of a durable structure of peace. Germany's strategic geographic location dictated that the country would be caught in the maelstrom of any major conflict and could aggrandize its power by either balancing with a hegemonic contender or bandwagoning against it with other smaller states.²⁶ In turn, Germany could itself develop hegemonic desires and destabilize the European political system as a consequence.²⁷ Thus, simply by using common sense and studying any map of Europe, Germany's neighbours reasoned that the structure of Germany's political constitution must be anything other than centralized. The direct result of this rationale was the German Confederation.

The architects of the Confederation gave the new structure three tasks to fulfill. First, the Confederation was to be the official "national bond" for all of the states and smaller principalities which emerged from the old Holy Roman Empire.²⁸ It was to guarantee external security against all attacks for the intermediate and small German states, as well as peacefully mediate and settle all internal disagreements between any of the forty-one members. If war was ever waged against an external country, no separate peace treaty or cease-fire could be legally negotiated by a constituent state of the Confederation. Furthermore, all forms of alliances and strictly political arrangements which could jeopardize the security of either the entire Confederation or one single member country were prohibited.²⁹

²⁶On the meaning and significance of the terms "balancing" and "bandwagoning" for international relations theory, see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 126, 163-168.

²⁷For an account of 19th-century perceptions of how a centralized Germany, owing to its location and resources, would not long resist the temptation to strive for European hegemony, see Robert Spencer, "Thoughts on the German Confederation 1815-1866," *The Canadian Historical Association: Report* (1962), p. 80.

²⁸Wolf D. Gruner, "Der Deutsche Bund -- Modell für eine Zwischenlösung?" *Politik und Kultur*, Vol. 9, No. 5 (1982), p. 30.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 30.

The second task was that the Confederation was intended to give Central Europe a certain modicum of political, territorial, and social order. Indeed, the German states were supposed to become the "cornerstone" not only of an enduring framework of peace within Europe, but also within the Eurocentric international system.³⁰ The constitutive element was, as explained before, the grouping together of a wide range of German states under a confederal structure. This structure was supposed to strengthen Central Europe to such a degree that it could successfully block any military attacks from the West by France or from the East by Russia. Simultaneously, the organizational capacity and resources of the Confederation were not to become so great that it could pose a military security risk to the rest of Europe.³¹ The trick was to find this "critical magnitude" for ensuring the security of Germany while protecting Europe's security *from* Germany.³²

The fundamentally intrinsic nature of this balancing act to German and European security, and accordingly to peace on the European continent, cannot be emphasized enough. It represents an immutable element of German-European security relations which changes in systemic polarity and advances in nuclear technology have done nothing to alter. For example, Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, the third Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), often alluded in his speeches to the necessity for maintaining a "critical magnitude" for Germany after

³⁰Gruner, "Europa, Deutschland und die internationale Ordnung," p. 32.

³¹Willy Real, "Die Ereignisse von 1866/67 im Lichte unserer Zeit," *Historisches Jahrbuch*, Vol. 95 (1975), p. 362.

³²The phrase, "security for Germany and security from Germany", and all points of significance which are attached to it, represent the core of one principal area of research within the study of German foreign and security policy. Two good examples within this large body of literature are Henry A. Kissinger, "The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck," *Daedalus*, Vol. 97, No. 3 (Summer 1968), pp. 888-924, especially at p. 900; and Egon Bahr, *Sicherheit für und vor Deutschland: Vom Wandel durch Annäherung zur Europäischen Sicherheitsgemeinschaft* (Munich and Vienna: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1991).

1945 in order to deter the Soviet Union while not alerting France to the defence of its eastern border at the same time. Indeed, the argument that the stability and peacefulness of Europe is connected in part to the maintenance of security for Germany and from Germany can be valuable to long peace research. Since Germany's geographical location remains constant, and its resource potential and industrial capability are still as imposing as they were in the last century, the centrality of Germany on the European political and military map remains unaffected by changes in systemic polarity. This meets the first criterion for research on European security discussed in chapter two, and it highlights that research on German security, history, and foreign policy can be central in illustrating that there are no uni-causal explanations for the absence of major inter-state war in Europe -- in any age. A multiplicity of reasons must be sought out, and analyses which concentrate on one factor at the expense of all others impede clarity of thought for discussions of European security.

The third and final task of the German Confederation was an active role in the securing of peace in Europe. Principally, the Confederation had what Wolf Gruner terms a "hinging function".³³ That is, it was able to hinge and contain France from re-exploring any ideas that a new bid for hegemony could be feasible and militarily expedient. This forced compliance with the norms of inter-state conduct helped to reintegrate France into the international system of states and permitted France to maintain its great power status. At the same time, the Confederation hinged geostrategically isolated countries like the Netherlands and Denmark in a loose way to the general structure of defence in Central Europe.³⁴ In these two respects, the Confederation became a principal contributing factor to a successfully functioning European security régime. This was possible in part because the German states

³³Gruner, "Europa, Deutschland und die internationale Ordnung," p. 33.

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 33.

played neither a passive role in European politics nor made a bid for a position of hegemony. Within the context of the political situation at that period in time, the German Confederation never reached a "critical magnitude".³⁵

The German Confederation also actively secured peace in Europe by making the problem of Austro-Prussian rivalry manageable. Within the Confederation, the interests of Austria ran very much in congruence with those of the smaller German states. They both desired to maintain the status quo by preventing any attempts by Prussia to strive for hegemonic status, but they wanted to achieve this goal without open conflict. The solution was that all decisive action, except in the case where overwhelming foreign danger was imminent, was delayed and bogged down in the diplomatic mechanisms and procedures of the Confederation's administrative assembly in Frankfurt-am-Main.³⁶ Matters requiring immediate expedition could be put on hold, exposed to the light of sober examination, and eventually forgotten if necessary. In this way, Prussian policy did not become the dominant policy of the Confederation, and the smaller German states never lost their independence either to Prussian coercion or to a restoration of the Holy Roman Empire under Habsburg leadership.³⁷ Instead of having to submit to some form of policy unity, the German states enjoyed considerable manoeuvrability; the only prerequisite was that agreed upon policies of state in the realm of foreign relations were to be uniformly applicable within the political boundaries of the Confederation. Thus, in the words of Prince Clemens Metternich, the Confederation afforded the German states "Einigkeit ohne Einheit", or policy concordance without political unity.³⁸

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 33.

³⁶Kissinger, "The White Revolutionary," p. 901.

³⁷Schroeder, "The 19th-Century International System," p. 20.

³⁸For a detailed analysis of Metternich's thoughts on German history and foreign policy, especially within the context of European security, see Roy A.

This formula was in the interests of European peace and stability because it served to settle old rivalries and territorial disputes between various smaller German states, between those who had profited from Napoleonic rule and those who had suffered under it, and between Catholics and Protestants.³⁹ This accrued a certain legitimacy to the existing status quo and helped to support *general stability* in European inter-state relations. From a theoretical point of view, the Confederation's success was attributable in part to its role as an intermediary body in Central Europe. It both linked and separated all the parts of Germany, preserving their individual independence while enabling them to coexist in close geographic proximity with each other. It prevented outside European intervention in the domestic affairs of most German states, while linking these same states with trade opportunities, industrial technology, and a régime of durable peace and stability in Europe. But in concrete terms, the Confederation was never reduced to a zone of neutrality in Central Europe under the influence of France or Russia. Neither was it a buffer zone which inactively insulated the major European powers from one another. Instead, for almost all of the first half of the 19th century, the German Confederation acted as a central pillar in Europe's system of security, and as a stabilizing mechanism in both European and international politics.⁴⁰

Paul Schroeder makes an interesting case that the presence of the German Confederation in Central Europe not only contributed to a forty-year period of peace; its *disappearance* after 1866 also corresponded to a major alteration in the conduct of European politics which tended ultimately towards war.⁴¹ With the establishment in 1870-1871 of the new German Empire, formerly independent states

Austensen, "Einheit oder Einigkeit? Another Look at Metternich's View of the German Dilemma," *German Studies Review*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1983), pp. 41-57.

³⁹Schroeder, "The 19th-Century International System," p. 20.

⁴⁰Gruner, *Die deutsche Frage*, p. 74.

⁴¹Schroeder, "The Lost Intermediaries," pp. 1-27.

in South Germany, especially Bavaria and Württemberg, ceased to maintain their independence. This removed inhibiting and modifying factors in the relations between Germany and its immediate neighbours, and this consequently narrowed available choices and possibilities and promoted problems that in time proved unmanageable. Schroeder asserts that three such problems emerged quickly after the disappearance of the German Confederation and are clearly linked to its dissolution in 1866:

1. Austria-Hungary became increasingly dependent upon Germany to support its great-power status. This almost inevitably entangled Germany in Austria's internal disputes and external rivalries.
2. An enduring antagonism arose between France and Germany.
3. Friendship between Prussia and Russia degenerated into rivalry and hostility between Germany and Russia.⁴²

Schroeder is not arguing that this increase in conflictual inter-state relations within Europe was directly caused by the end of South German independence. Instead, the peaceful manageability of these relations became much more problematic once the inhibiting and distracting effects of an intermediary body like the German Confederation were negated. This reaffirms the observation made earlier in this chapter that intermediary states were only mechanisms for augmenting the likelihood that inter-state relations could be conducted without recourse to war. They dampened areas of contention by increasing the number of points of contact that countries shared with their neighbours and allies, and by heightening indecision in circumstances where a clear understanding of an opponent's motives could facilitate moves towards war. In short, the very presence of the German

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 10.

Confederation was important to Europe's security, and its absence was just as significant.

First, with the demise of Bavaria and Württemberg, Austria lost considerable influence in South Germany and, correspondingly, in Central Europe. This undermined Austria's traditional balance of interests between Europe and the Near East, and essentially destroyed the country's *raison d'être* as a great power. Relations with the new German Empire were necessarily based on inequality in favour of Germany, since Austria had just suffered a considerable decrement in power. Austria's one option was to accept dependence upon Germany in the hope of manipulating alliance ties, drawing from Germany's strength, and challenging the only rival Austria could still compete with: Russia. This trilateral zone of intrigue and status grabbing ultimately proved to be unstable, and general stability within Europe was not maintained, since the prevailing status quo was not in the interests of Austria. "In this instance, an apparently determinist formula is not too strong: no independent South Germany, no really independent Austria-Hungary."⁴³

Second, the South German states as geographic, political, and military intermediary bodies had made Franco-Prussian rivalry potentially manageable, even while they were the focus of that rivalry. But once Baden and Württemberg were incorporated into the German Empire, France had few choices, if any. The new concentration of German power which unification produced, as well as French territorial losses in the process of Bismarck's state-building, sparked anticipation within France and a desire to re-establish equilibrium in every respect possible. But while France sought to recover lost ground, Germany simply widened the gap in its industrial, demographic, and military superiority over France. Thus, no Franco-

⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 12.

German partnership was possible except for limited, temporary purposes, and this protracted antagonism essentially continued until 1945.

Finally, the incorporation of the South German states into the German Empire in 1870 freed Prussia and its decision makers from many of the burdens and commitments involved in membership in the German Confederation. At the same time, however, Russia was still tied down by Austrian and British rivalry in the Near East and by British rivalry elsewhere. This almost immediately opened up time and resources for Germany which could not be compensated for in Russia; as a consequence, Germany was afforded the opportunity to manipulate and obstruct Russian foreign policy, restrict the flexibility of this policy, undermine Russian prestige, and even threaten Russian security.⁴⁴ Naturally, this intensified Russian fears and jealousy, just as German unification did in France, and it undermined for at least one generation most possibilities for Germany to establish stable, non-conflictual inter-state relations with Russia. Ironically, Bismarck had ruined his own best device for achieving a friendly rapport with Russia by annexing the South German states. Thus, in the long run, European politics in the 19th century was only durable, stable, and peaceful when the intermediary continental powers were permitted to inhibit aggression, shape inter-state relations, and influence the foreign policy options of Europe's major countries.

III. Concluding Observations

The multipolar structure of 19th-century European politics was conducive to peace and stability for at least forty years. This should prove puzzling to conventional political science research which attempts to explain the 20th-century

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 15.

"long peace" using arguments from bipolar stability theory, but exactly the opposite is true. Earlier eras of durable systemic peace within Europe do not raise *any* questions for current research endeavours. History has either been forgotten or deliberately ignored. Unfortunately, the implications for standard long peace theories are not optimistic, because empirical evidence from the 19th century demonstrates that stable inter-state relations are not unique to a bipolar political structure, or to a political framework stamped by the ominous presence of nuclear weapons, or to circumstances where the social evaluation of the utility of war has fundamentally changed. Instead, new analytic approaches are necessary to sharpen the terms of reference and realign political science theory with the historical examples that are available.

One new approach is to synthesize the observations and conclusions of studies on German history, foreign policy, and security with hypotheses from political science theory. This is valuable because an analysis of the German Confederation, combined with theoretical insights into the functions of intermediary states, reveals that one principal mechanism for augmenting the likelihood that inter-state relations can be peacefully conducted is the traditional *corps intermédiaire*. Such a political body is functionally important because of its central geographic location, its ability to distract decision makers from preparing for war, and the manner in which its very presence can influence and constrain the foreign policy of a major country.

Research into the German Confederation also illustrates that Germany in particular was central to the forty-year period of systemic peace in 19th-century Europe. Germany was neither too weak to successfully resist attacks from both East and West nor so powerful and centralized that it became an offensive threat. Instead, Germany's political and military potential was **integrated** within the framework of the German Confederation, a structure which was designed to serve continent-wide interests. In a sense, German politics was **Europeanized** and raised

above the one-sided, single-purpose influences of nation and state. This served the furtherance of peace well, and rationalized a manner in which both German and European security concerns could be harmonized.

The purpose of the next chapter is to inquire whether the integration and Europeanization of German politics represents the *only* rational manner for reconciling competing security concerns, especially in the 20th century. Germany's central geographic location has remained constant, so the country's central importance to European peace and stability should logically also be independent of the constraints of polarity and technological change. The next chapter will test this assumption and articulate whether analyses of German security in the 20th century can improve conventional approaches to long peace research and supplement the reasons traditionally given for explaining the absence of major inter-state war in Europe.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ATTEMPT TO SQUARE THE CIRCLE: RECONCILING GERMAN SECURITY WITH EUROPEAN STABILITY

The study of European security represents an area of research disciplined neither by a cohesive analytical framework nor by a straightforward interpretation of historical evidence. The principal reasons for this lax methodology are twofold. First, traditional security studies have been infiltrated by theoretical propositions about inter-state relations stemming from the general literature of international politics, which draws in turn from economics, sociology, and psychology. Common to all these propositions is the assumption that theory in and of itself is important, and that as long as a particular theory is elegant, well-structured, and appeals to intuitive logic, it need not be evaluated empirically. Theory can stand on its own. One concrete result of this assumption is that several scholars now argue that the post-1945 bipolar structure of European politics was *uniquely* stable, primarily because theory illustrates that bipolarity by nature is equivalent to political and military stability -- at least within a certain frame of reference. Therefore, as European politics in the 1990s moves away from bipolarity to some as yet undefined configuration, inter-state conduct should tend towards instability, and the intensity and frequency of major war should increase. This contradicts, of course, the historical example of European politics between 1815 and 1853, where *multipolarity* was conducive to peace and stability; thus, the argument that European relations after World War II owe their unprecedented tranquility to bipolarity simply represents a major area of analytical weakness.

The second reason for the lax methodology of European security studies is that there exist very few constants in European politics, making it difficult to establish cause and effect, and hence a consistent line of argumentation. For example, the

structure of European politics is very fluid, having changed from highly variegated multipolarity, to the relatively predictable multipolarity of the 19th century, to bipolarity after World War II, and finally to some pattern after 1990 which still eludes strict definition.¹ Moreover, technology is constantly developing and improving, and sometimes revolutionary advances are made, as with nuclear weapons, which can immediately antiquate previous thoughts concerning the utility of war and the costs and benefits of maintaining a particular status quo. But whether this fundamentally alters the basic approaches to inter-state behaviour is open to debate: John Mueller, for instance, contends that nuclear weapons are "essentially irrelevant" and do not represent an extraordinary factor in international relations after 1945.²

The influence and effect of geography *does* remain constant, however. Granted, political boundaries change and countries are sometimes created and later dismembered, like Yugoslavia. But the physical presence and location of a nationality or ethnic group, and its concomitant industrial impact and general effect on its immediate neighbours, can remain uniform from one century to another. In the case of Europe, this is particularly relevant for the German nation, because although the Germans have been organized and governed under various political structures, their strategic geographic location has remained constant. This centrality of position, the resource potential which accrues from it, and the opportunities to aggrandize power which rational political planning allows, has been recognized by

¹For competing interpretations of exactly how to define the structure of international and European politics after 1990, see Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 1 (1991), pp. 23-33; and Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will it Resemble the Past?" *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Winter 1991-1992), pp. 39-73.

²John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 1988), pp. 55-79.

European statesmen since at least the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. But the first concrete attempt to deliberately manage a structure under which German and European interests could be rationalized was the German Confederation, established in 1815 and formally discontinued in 1866.

The German Confederation represented the first successful model for reconciling the security concerns of both Germany and the entire continent of Europe. This was achieved by integrating Germany's political and military potential so that the German people could defend their borders from attack while at the same time lacking sufficient strength to pose an offensive danger to the rest of Europe. In addition, German politics was Europeanized and forced to debate matters of European concern, rather than being allowed to concentrate on purely national, self-centred interests. Arguably, one result of this integration and continentalization was forty years of peace and stable inter-state relations in 19th-century Europe.

The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate and assess the relationship between German security and European peace and stability. Primarily, by synthesizing earlier evidence about the centrality of research on German history and foreign policy to the study of the long peace, a methodological framework will be established that draws upon the prerequisites for European security established in chapter two. Within this context, the following question will be posed: "Is there a correlation between European stability and the manner in which German security policy and foreign relations are allowed to impact European politics and limit its possibilities?" That is, does the central geographical location of Germany affect the intensity and frequency of major war in Europe, or are the conscious policies of Germany's statesmen and the political manoeuvrability that they are afforded more central to the question? And finally, are integration and Europeanization the only functional ways of reconciling competing security concerns in the 20th century as they were in the preceding one hundred years, or can academic literature

concentrating on German foreign policy offer other insights into how "general stability" can be maintained?

I. Germany Between East and West

The deliberate foreign policy decisions of a nation-state always have the potential to either strengthen or undermine the military security of adjacent countries. There are many intervening factors which help to determine the exact political consequences which a particular policy can have, but the geographic location of a country arguably ranks as one especially important variable. Geographic centrality, for example, was one key to the significant role which intermediary countries played in 19th-century Europe as they interacted with the great powers, either separating the great powers physically and retarding their ability to conduct matters of state, or linking them together and facilitating contact. Since the German Confederation encompassed both Austria and Prussia, and since it lay between the borders of France and Russia, it fulfilled the prerequisite of geographic centrality; therefore, the Confederation was directly in the position to impact European politics, regardless of any conscious techniques of decision making practiced by the statesmen of the time. When the German Empire was established in 1870-1871, Germany inherited both the assets and liabilities of being located in Central Europe, and the simple geopolitics of Germany's situation dictated that one primary concern of the new nation-state would be the viability of its borders. In the words of Walter Hahn, "... the Germans are captives of history and geography. Situated in the vulnerable trough of Europe, they have always grappled with the question of how to cope with insecurity: whether to turn to the East, to the West or

go it alone, whether to achieve security through passive accommodation or assertive power."³

Geography, however, is not a factor which operates independently of all others. The way in which a country's geographic position and corresponding resource potential are manipulated by statesmen is also very important in determining the relative tendency of a country's foreign policy to pursue peace or wage war. In the particular case of the German nation-state, three main traditions for conducting foreign relations in Europe have existed since 1871. The first, or "classical", tradition of German foreign policy has been characterized principally by Otto von Bismarck and Gustav Stresemann. Common to both of their approaches was the conviction that Germany represented a "bridge" in Central Europe that could connect various geographic regions to one another; simultaneously, however, Germany remained independent from these regions in a political-economic context, in a military context, and, to a limited degree, in a cultural context.⁴ Therefore, Germany almost had the *duty* to avoid strategic choices between East and West in Europe. The second tradition of German foreign policy has been a relationship of close cooperation between Germany and Russia, and later with the Soviet Union. Germany allied itself with Eastern Europe against the interests of the West, although many points of contact between Germany and its eastern neighbours remained contentious and divisive. The two cases which best exemplify this "Eastern option" are the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo and the socialist solidarity of East German-

³Walter F. Hahn, *Between Westpolitik and Ostpolitik: Changing West German Security Views*, The Foreign Policy Papers, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 3.

⁴Waldemar Besson, "The Conflict of Traditions: The Historical Basis of West German Foreign Policy," in Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan (eds.), *Britain and West Germany: Changing Societies and the Future of Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 62.

Soviet relations between 1949 and 1989-1990. The third and final tradition of German foreign policy has been that of Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Adenauer totally renounced the "classic" foreign policy orientation of the country and instead unequivocally anchored the Western part of Germany not only in Western Europe but also in the sphere of influence of the United States. At the same time, a constitutional democracy was established, and Germany was changed from a unitary state to a federal republic.

The effects of these three traditions on European security have all been different, and an examination of the interaction between German foreign policy and peace and stability in Europe demands close attention. Indeed, the manner in which Germany is allowed to impact European politics can have a direct effect on the frequency of war in Europe, just as it did during the existence of the German Confederation. This is of direct relevance to long peace research because it offers to synthesize historical empirical analysis with theoretical assumptions about inter-state relations, and to assert a measure of methodological precision to the study of European security. This is also of relevance to the concrete policies of decision makers in the 1990s, because conclusions about how to best reconcile German and European security interests can provide useful guidelines at a period in time when established approaches to world politics are being overtaken by the course of events.

Germany as a Bridge between East and West

The German state which was finally consolidated and established in 1871 was modelled on strong, unitary, centralized lines. The state was founded without the inclusion of the German-speaking areas of Austria-Hungary, but it still represented a very considerable political, industrial, and military force within Europe. This was

the case to such a degree that as soon as the German Empire was created, inter-state relations within Europe became strained.⁵ France, already weakened by war and territorial losses to Prussia in the 1860s, viewed the new strength of Germany with anxiety, and the freedom of political manoeuvre gained by the dissolution of the German Confederation allowed Prussia to spearhead its relations with Russia in an increasingly concentrated manner. As explained in chapter three, Russia could not reciprocate these moves and forfeited the relatively equal status that it had previously enjoyed with its German neighbour.

As a direct consequence, Bismarck pursued a skilful policy of "balancing and equalizing" the initiatives of the other countries of Europe.⁶ Specifically, "... Bismarck's celebrated foreign policy consisted of a complex set of agreements meant to keep all the other powers perpetually off balance."⁷ Bismarck prudently influenced, managed, and manipulated the interests of the competing power poles in Europe to Germany's advantage, principally by abstaining from all *entangling* alliances with both Western and Eastern Europe.⁸ For example, Bismarck maintained formal military ties with Russia, but he did not commit Germany to the support of Russian foreign policy at all levels. Rather, German-Russian solidarity was designed principally to secure Germany's eastern borders in the event of any future German conflict with France.⁹

After 1871, Bismarck pursued a consistent policy of acceptance of the territorial status quo, and he adamantly objected to provoking other countries in

⁵Harald von Riekhoff, "Westdeutschlands Ostpolitik im Vergleich mit historischen Modellen," *Schweizer Monatshefte*, Vol. 53, No. 8 (1973-1974), p. 559.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 559.

⁷David Calleo, *The German Problem Reconsidered: Germany and the World Order, 1870 to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 10.

⁸Walter F. Hahn, "NATO and Germany," *Global Affairs*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 4-5.

⁹von Riekhoff, "Westdeutschlands Ostpolitik," p. 559.

colonial and naval affairs. In a sense, Bismarck established a rule of conduct within German foreign policy which argued that truly effective, productive, and useful external relations were only acceptable when they did not provoke discordance within Europe, yet at the same time could safeguard the valid security concerns of Germany.¹⁰ The logical pursuance of such a policy could even help to create a durable régime of general stability in which potential military threats were successfully balanced and legitimacy was accorded to the existing status quo by all major countries. This durability was not secured by Bismarck, however, since none of his successors had the requisite skill to maintain what he had accomplished, and since the South German states of Bavaria and Württemberg had lost their independence in 1871, abruptly ending their capacity to peacefully manage interstate relations in Central Europe. In short, the Bismarckian tradition had no sustainability and proved incapable of inhibiting war in Europe in the long term.

Gustav Stresemann, like Bismarck before him, also took Germany's position within Europe as the starting point for his thinking on foreign policy, and his approach adhered to the "classical" tradition of considering the German nation as a Central European nation between East and West. The reason Stresemann's perceptions about European politics ultimately differed from those of Bismarck was because of the different political environment in which Stresemann was obliged to conduct matters of state.¹¹ The Germany of the early 1920s, officially called the Weimar Republic, had been demilitarized in the Rhineland and was generally weak in comparison both to its power potential before 1914 and to its large neighbour to the West: France. As a result, Stresemann was forced to depend far more on economic and cultural resources than on military strength to achieve the goals of

¹⁰Besson, "The Conflict of Traditions," pp. 64-65.

¹¹von Riekhoff, "Westdeutschlands Ostpolitik," p. 560.

foreign policy.¹² Secondly, the domestic political situation within Russia at that time, where the Bolshevik Party was in the process of consolidating and expanding its relatively tentative grip on power after victory in the Civil War, prevented any comprehensive cooperation with Moscow. Thus, the feasible options which were open to Bismarck, and the room for manoeuvrability which this permitted, were simply not available to Stresemann, and the conduct of German policy between 1923 and 1926 derived its logic from these constraints.

Principally, Stresemann wished to restore the power of the German nation-state and re-obtain "great power" status, while at the same time excluding all active policies of territorial expansion. Stresemann strove to maintain symmetrical relations with both East and West and manipulate Germany's standing in one part of Europe in order to win policy concessions from the other. In concrete terms, he desired a satisfactory solution to the question of war reparations, as well as a timely withdrawal of all occupying forces from the Rhineland. This required the agreement of the two major West European powers, Britain and France, so Stresemann pursued a policy of rapprochement and general cooperation with the West in order to gain their trust and long-term assistance.¹³ But in order to increase his leverage in the West, Stresemann maintained contact with Russia through the 1926 Treaty of Berlin, using the same rationale as Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger did when they played their "China card" against their competitor, the Soviet Union.

The foreign policy of Gustav Stresemann was oriented more towards Western Europe than towards the continent's eastern half, especially in comparison to Bismarck's policies, but Stresemann never opted exclusively in favour of the West. Instead, he pursued a variation of Bismarck's Central European approach, and this met with only limited success. Thus, the balancing of Germany's security interests

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 560.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 560.

between East and West -- or a "seesaw policy" as it is now termed -- has proven to be too dependent upon the imagination and creativity of individual statesmen, and too prone to the political constraints and antagonistic influences of the day.¹⁴ This manner of conducting foreign policy has been continually subject to political events and forces beyond its control, and its effects have consequently been entirely different than those of the German Confederation, a *corps intermédiaire* which could actively impact European politics, influence inter-state relations, and promote a general régime of peace. Therefore, the option of using Germany as a bridge between East and West is *not* conducive to durable stability within Europe, and this option cannot reconcile competing security concerns. Guidelines for the improvement of long peace research must be found elsewhere.

Germany Committed to the East

One very good historical example of Germany's commitment to and cooperation with Eastern Europe is the foreign policy of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) between 1949 and 1989-1990. The GDR was an active member of the Warsaw Pact, had foreign policy interests very similar to those of the Soviet Union, and organized its domestic social structure on principles closely mimicking the Soviet model. But despite this tight community of interests, there was no equality in the East German-Soviet relationship. For the USSR, the maintenance of socialism in the GDR represented only one small component of Soviet foreign policy, whereas for the GDR, the Soviet style of conducting matters of state, in addition to the furtherance of purely Soviet concerns, dominated the thinking of

¹⁴The German translation of "seesaw policy" is *Schaukelpolitik*.

Walter Ulbricht and Erich Honecker.¹⁵ Moreover, the GDR owed its very existence and diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union and its East European allies; this contributed to East Germany's dependence on the USSR and assisted the furtherance of socialist, rather than liberal and free market principles.¹⁶ As a consequence, a dichotomy arose within the GDR. On the one hand, the ruling élite favoured the existing status quo and worked to maintain a bipolarized Europe that could preserve East German sovereignty and independence. On the other hand, the majority of East German citizens were dissatisfied with the status quo, considering it illegitimate and unfair; this accounts in part for the extremely rapid disintegration of the GDR as soon as a real opportunity arose to opt in favour of the West in 1989-1990. Therefore, the model of unequal partnership with the East proved incapable of maintaining general stability within Europe, since the status quo did not enjoy widespread legitimacy.

The second historical example of Germany's strong ties to the East was the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo. Under this agreement the Weimar Republic and Soviet Russia committed themselves to mutual support in order to overcome their international political isolation and balance the interests of Britain and France, the two major countries of Europe which had emerged victoriously from World War I. The intent was to eventually revise the Treaty of Versailles and re-align the post-1918 European political order more in favour of Germany and the USSR.¹⁷ A second less obvious goal was that both the Germans and the Soviets desired to block the other from gaining any unilateral advantages in the West; Rapallo, in other words, acted as a door through which influence could be exercised over the foreign

¹⁵See, for example, Eric G. Frey, *Division and Détente: The Germanies and their Alliances* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987).

¹⁶von Riekhoff, "Westdeutschlands Ostpolitik," p. 558.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 559.

policy of an *apparent* ally. This was possible because the German-Soviet partnership of the early 1920s was relatively equal in terms of power politics; at the same time, however, the domestic social frameworks within both countries were highly antagonistic, hindering any form of long-term cooperation. Therefore, since this tradition of German foreign policy worked against the status quo and attempted to aggrandize Germany's power at the expense of Europe, it failed to reconcile the competing security interests of Germany and its neighbours. Durable peace in Europe and general continental stability have not been compatible with Germany's exclusive ties to the East, and this model is subsequently incapable of providing any guidelines for improving the current state of long peace research.

Germany Committed to the West

The unequivocal and conclusive commitment of Germany to Western Europe is characteristic only of the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), a state formed in 1949 from the occupation zones of the United States, Great Britain, and France which stemmed from World War II. This tradition of foreign policy was established by Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the FRG. By opting without reservation for the West, Adenauer was demonstrating that a complete break with past traditions was necessary *and* unavoidable; the "classical" tradition of playing East off against West had to be discredited, as did any one-sided affiliation with Russia and, later, the Soviet Union. The reasons why such a rationale was inescapable are twofold.

First, Adenauer reasoned that one basic prerequisite which had to be met before the FRG could even be established was a firm, decisive commitment to the West. In 1945, Germany was occupied by the victors of World War II, and it was in

no position to make demands about its future domestic social structure or about its alliance ties. The three Western sectors of Germany were simply amalgamated into the West European/American sphere of influence, and Adenauer was obliged to accept this fact. However, the political forces at work in 1949 had much more intrinsic interests than simply the consolidation of their territorial hold over West Germany. More fundamentally, the United States, Britain, and France recognized that they had to anchor and bind the future FRG into their framework of security in order to control the country's foreign policy.¹⁸ This control was deemed necessary because any other option would create the opportunity for Germany to use its central geographic location, resource potential, and demographic strength to reassert its power in Europe, just as Germany had always done before. Europe required *security from Germany* to maintain a durable régime of peace and continent-wide stability.¹⁹ And this, ironically, confirmed the rationale of the architects of the German Confederation who deliberately set out to insulate Europe from the most detrimental effects of German power, influence, and organizational capability.

The second reason why Adenauer's rationale was inescapable is that West Germany immediately after 1945 considered its security to be concretely threatened by the presence of the USSR and by the external policies which the Soviet Union pursued. For example, the USSR was conscious of the fact that maintaining a strong military presence in Europe could be very influential in sustaining not only its great power status but also its grip on Eastern Europe. This explained in part Moscow's early confrontational approach to inter-state relations when it sealed off Berlin.

¹⁸See, on this point, the seminal analysis of Hans-Peter Schwarz, "Die Politik der Westbindung oder die Staatsraison der Bundesrepublik," *Zeitschrift für Politik*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1975), p. 315.

¹⁹Christopher Layne, "Toward German Reunification?" *Journal of Contemporary Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Fall 1984), pp. 21-22.

provoking the allied airlift, and when it directly helped socialist political parties to cement their hold on power in the eastern sector of Germany, in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and other countries. Adenauer's interpretation of these Soviet manoeuvres was that West Germany must *volumarily* choose some form of integration in the West. In concrete terms, this meant developing and strengthening a multitude of political, economic, ideological, and military ties between the FRG and the West; these included, among others, the European Community, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the West European Union (WEU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In addition, the firm institutionalization of Western-style democracy was reasoned by Adenauer to be concomitant with security, since accountability in politics would help make the federal system legitimate and also influence other people, especially the citizens of the GDR, that the Federal Republic was desirable as a political and social model and should be supported as a potential ally, not as a potent threat.²⁰ In short, Adenauer wanted *security for Germany* after the Second World War, and a policy of integration into the Western network of military ties, economic interdependence, and ideological fraternity appeared to be the best option to pursue.

Therefore, Adenauer's tradition of Western integration directly contributed to the maintenance of *security for Germany* and *security from Germany*, much as the German Confederation had done in the 19th century. But the Confederation also did more than simply manage the power potential of the German states so that they could protect the integrity of their borders while being unable at the same time to launch military attacks against other countries. The Confederation was thus instrumental in lending legitimacy to the status quo, since the major powers of

²⁰Schwarz, "Die Politik der Westbindung," p. 320.

Europe were given the opportunity to interact without suffering territorial losses or substantial decrements in power.

Upon initial reflection, Adenauer's integration of the FRG into the West made no such comparable contribution to general systemic stability, because Western integration precluded for forty years any chance of reunifying the nation-state, making the status quo merely transitory until some definitive decision about the division of Germany had been made. Indeed, Western integration may have been realized at the expense of reunification.²¹ The re-establishment of a unified German state on 3 October 1990 may have been possible only because German politics was *Europeanized* within the European Community, reconciling the security interests of Germany and Europe by denationalizing the foreign policy of the FRG. And this, in turn, may have been one contributing factor to the absence of major inter-state war in Europe since 1945. The literature of postwar German foreign policy offers several different interpretations and explanations about the links between Western integration, reunification, and European stability, and this body of research can provide useful guidelines for sharpening the focus of analysis of studies on the long peace. This chapter will now examine what academics have considered to be possible solutions for reconciling competing security concerns, and whether their assumptions have been proven or disproven by the events of 1989-1990.

²¹By far the best "revisionist" analysis of Konrad Adenauer's foreign policy, contending that Western integration has meant the antithesis of German reunification, is the book edited by Josef Foscith and entitled, *Adenauer und die Deutsche Frage* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990).

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II. German Reunification and European Security: Analytical Assumptions vs. The Political Events of 1990

Henry Kissinger

The contributions of Henry Kissinger to the academic debate on German reunification and the ties of Germany to European security have been very influential -- within the context of both political science research and practical policy. Essentially, Kissinger believed two things about the division of Germany and the country's prospects for reunification. First, the division of the German nation-state was a condition of European politics that was likely to continue for a very substantial period of time, and certainly beyond the actual reunification date of 3 October 1990.²² Moreover, reunification would not result from any one particular policy of Western Europe or the United States, but from an extended historical process that would either cause Soviet power to collapse or "... make the East German régime less important for a more national Russia."²³ Second, while progress toward German unity presupposed a change in East-West relations, this change had to be sought within a continental European framework; thus, it was paramount that the United States do nothing to undermine moves towards European unity within the framework of the European Community or towards greater friendship between France and Germany.²⁴

²²Helgine Ritter, "Adenauer und Kissinger: Ein Vergleich ihrer Pläne zur Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands," *Deutschland Archiv*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (March 1977), p. 266.

²³Henry A. Kissinger, "For a New Atlantic Alliance," *The Reporter*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (14 July 1966), pp. 26-27. A revised version of this article was translated into German by Helga Haftendorn and reprinted as "Die deutsche Frage als Problem der europäischen und der internationalen Sicherheit," *Europa-Archiv*, Vol. 21, No. 23 (1966), pp. 831-838.

²⁴Kissinger, "For a New Atlantic Alliance," p. 27.

However, the European framework which Kissinger envisaged was not intended to be a political force that could conceivably play the United States off against the Soviet Union, or shift alliances in favour of the USSR when transatlantic cooperation proved too costly. Instead, a reunified Germany within a "greater Europe" would have to be oriented unequivocally to the Western world. Germany would have to support liberal democracy, pursue free market economics, and pledge its policy concordance with the United States in major areas like human rights, arms control, and the role of military force in post-1945 Europe. In this sense, Kissinger has been a supporter of Adenauer's tradition of German foreign policy, even though Kissinger devoted a considerable amount of time to the study of the life and influence of Otto von Bismarck.²⁵ Thus, in the opinion of Henry Kissinger, a stable framework in which German security can be reconciled with European security is only possible when Germany is allowed to mobilize its resources and draw from its manpower reserves so that it can adequately defend its borders. Simultaneously, a powerful and centralized Germany must not be in the position to pose an offensive threat to its neighbours. General stability within Europe and a durable period of peace can be achieved only when these two conditions are met, and the Europeanization of German politics within a Western ideological framework is the most effective policy to pursue:

The ideal situation would be a Germany strong enough to defend itself but not strong enough to attack, united so that its frustrations do not erupt into conflict and its divisions do not encourage the rivalry of its neighbours, but not so centralized that its discipline and capacity for rapid action evoke countermeasures in self-defence. Such a Germany

²⁵See, for example, Henry A. Kissinger, "The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck," *Daedalus*, Vol. 97, No. 3 (Summer 1968), pp. 888-924.

has existed only at rare periods. To help establish it must be a major task of Western policy.²⁶

The major shortcoming of Henry Kissinger's analysis is, of course, that the reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990 did *not* take place under the auspices of European unification. Europe is not a unified state -- not even Western Europe -- but the two halves of a divided Germany were still permitted to come together, and the frequency of major inter-state war in Europe has not dramatically increased.²⁷ Therefore, one particularly timely question for political science is, "Why was German reunification possible under conditions other than European unity, and why did this not jeopardize the durability of the long peace?" This question will be pursued later in this study.

Martin Sæter

Martin Sæter, in contrast to Henry Kissinger, argues that general stability within Europe is not a product of the formula, "security for Germany and security from Germany", but rather a consequence of superpower duopoly in Europe after 1945. "This relatively long period of stability has, of course, not been in the first place due to the Europeans themselves, but to the two super powers, the USA and

²⁶Henry A. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy* (New York, N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1960), p. 129.

²⁷The war in Yugoslavia does *not* undermine the argument. It is a *civil* war, and even if conflict between ethnic groups spills over into Albania, Bulgaria, or Greece, a Serbian-Albanian military confrontation would still not constitute war between two major European countries.

USSR, who have dominated the scene completely."²⁸ Since the Second World War, the stability of Europe has been based on superpower hegemony, which has manifested itself in one principal way: alliance integration. The incorporation of the FRG into NATO, a defensive military alliance with an integrated command structure, secured West Germany's contribution to Western defence and allowed the United States to control -- or at least heavily influence -- the external policies of the Federal Republic. And within the framework of this integration, the FRG won back the freedom of action and military security that it had lost in 1945, also achieving a considerable improvement in the status that it held within the international community.²⁹

However, alliance integration solidified the bipolar division of Europe and the division of Germany into two antagonistic spheres of influence.³⁰ The Warsaw Pact was responsible for East Germany's security, as was NATO for the security of the FRG, but these two alliances, as an unavoidable by-product of their competition, foreclosed any hope of German reunification. Thus, Sæter reasoned that German disengagement from both alliance blocs was the only possible way of achieving reunification. Committed neither to the East nor to the West, the two German states could seek political, military, and economic rapprochement with one another, and eventually agree to an acceptable formula by which to achieve reunification. This formula, however, would necessarily preclude the GDR from joining *any* West European defence organization, since the aggrandizement of West European status

²⁸Martin Sæter, "Germany and a New Europe," in Jerzy Sawicki (ed.), *Blocs, The German Problem, and the Future of Europe* (Vienna: International Institute for Peace, 1968), p. 111.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 114.

³⁰This closely parallels the argumentation of A.W. DePorte in his book, *Europe Between the Superpowers* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

and power would prove totally unacceptable to the Soviet Union.³¹ Yet the incorporation of the GDR into the framework of NATO is exactly what has happened. How could Sæter so fundamentally misread the path which German reunification eventually took? Moreover, why did Sæter stress the importance of alliance integration for European stability but disregard it as a possible avenue through which a unified German state could be achieved and be acceptable to the rest of Europe? These are two more questions which will be pursued later in this study.

Pierre Hassner

The final major academic approach to the relationship between German reunification and European security has been that of Pierre Hassner. Hassner argues, like Sæter, that superpower hegemony in Europe after 1945 has directly contributed to peace in Europe. Where his line of reasoning differs is in his perception of the role of alliances. According to Hassner, alliances serve two functions. First, they are instruments of control, mutual influence, and restraint between the most powerful allied state and those countries associated with it. Second, alliances can serve to illustrate to one's enemy that control and restraint can be *mutually* advantageous, muting the effects of zero-sum politics.³² For example, during the past two centuries, one primary threat arising from Germany has been its ability to organize its population, tap into its resource base, and use this power to threaten both Western and Eastern Europe. If this power could be controlled by an

³¹Sæter, "Germany and a New Europe," p. 125.

³²Pierre Hassner, "Change and Security in Europe -- Part II: In Search of a System," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 49 (July 1968), p. 21.

alliance in the western half of the continent, this could also serve the interests of its eastern counterpart, because it would nullify Germany's ability to strike eastwards if it ever desired to do so.

Therefore, a multilateral framework or collective arrangement committing stronger states to the protection and *restraint* of smaller ones must be an essential part of any functional European security system.³³ This argument allowed Hassner to assert that a more cooperative and indirect form of bipolarity, in combination with growing Europeanization, was the best formula for achieving German reunification while maintaining stable inter-state relations within Europe. That is, Hassner did not opt in favour of dissolving NATO and the Warsaw Pact at the same time, nor did he support the merits and likelihood of pan-European unity. Instead, he pursued the argument that if *either* NATO *or* the Warsaw Pact were disbanded, the security of all countries in Europe would be maintained through a régime of continental solidarity and by the increasing realization that one's own security depended on the sovereignty and military cohesiveness of allies and opponents alike.

This all relates back to the role of alliance integration in postwar Europe. If NATO was instrumental not only in defending Western Europe against Soviet initiatives but also in ensuring the security of the USSR from French nuclear weapons or from hardline conservative policies within Britain and Germany, then NATO's continued existence could prove valuable to both East and West, regardless of the adversarial nature of postwar bipolarity. Thus, Hassner argued that one possible way to reunite Germany was by integrating its eastern and western halves completely into NATO.³⁴ And almost prophetically, he also stated that "... while a reunified Germany would be free to join NATO, no troops of the alliance should be

³³*Ibid.*, p. 21.

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 15.

stationed in East Germany, and that for a transitional period Soviet troops could be maintained there after the political transformation."³⁵ Therefore, since Pierre Hassner's analytical framework has corresponded almost exactly to the way in which European security was configured in 1990, his conclusions deserve very close examination.

Principally, Hassner concluded that the Europeanization of German politics as an independent course of action was untenable; it had to be accompanied by the **security integration** of Germany. And the key to any workable system of European security was not the ironing out of differences between nation-states in a non-conflictual manner. Rather, it was the prevention of the emergence of Germany as a threat to the common peace and stability of the continent. This could be best achieved by NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Thus, if the real function of these two alliances was not deterrence and defence but inter-allied control and the containment of Germany, it would be prudent if this became the official basis of their existence. This would give security alliances a clear rationale and purpose, and directly contribute to durable and peaceful inter-state relations in Europe. Therefore, the implications of security integration for long peace research and for the concrete policies of decision makers in the 1990s will be the topic of discussion in the next chapter.

III. Concluding Observations

The maintenance of general stability within Europe is a product, in part, of the manner in which German security policy and foreign relations are allowed to impact European politics and limit its possibilities. General European stability is

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 15.

incompatible with a German policy of playing East off against West, since the success of such a policy is too dependent upon the skilful diplomacy and timely judgment of leading statesmen and upon the manoeuvrability which they are afforded by the structure of international politics. Stability is also incompatible with German ties to the East at the expense of the West. The dependence of Germany upon Western Europe for economic viability, military support, and political capital is simply too great, and Germany's exclusive association with the East can never be durable and profitable. The reconciling of German security with European stability only seems possible within the framework of Germany's unequivocal integration in the West.

After 1949, however, Western integration appeared to be achieved at the expense of Germany's unity. The country was divided, and as long as the status quo remained unchanged, it lacked legitimacy, since it consolidated a state of affairs which deprived the German people of true statehood within one indivisible nation. Thus, postwar European politics was never "stable" if one accepts the definition of stability established in chapter two. But as Germany's reunification within the exclusive framework of NATO has demonstrated, Konrad Adenauer's policy of Western integration was ultimately successful in achieving a unified German state. Reunification was accomplished *because of* Western integration, not in spite of it.

At the same time, reunification has not increased the likelihood that major inter-state war in Europe could become more frequent, because the security integration afforded by the NATO alliance has been in the interests of the United States, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the now defunct Soviet Union. NATO's integrative mechanisms have provided security for Germany and security from Germany, and this has legitimated the post-1990 status quo and has made relations between Europe's major countries truly "stable". Therefore, the concept of security integration demands close attention, and analysis into the functions and

roles of military alliances should be synthesized into long peace research so that precise conclusions about peace in Europe can be drawn. This will be the topic of debate in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE

SECURITY INTEGRATION AND THE LONG POSTWAR PEACE

Between 1945 and 1990, the structure of European politics was bipolar. Separated into an eastern and a western sphere of influence, Europe was subject to the general political, military, and economic policies of the world's two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. At the same time, the division of the continent was extended to include the division of Germany into two entirely different nation-states. Although this process of partition was never totally deliberate, but more a by-product of increasingly antagonistic East-West relations, the two superpowers did consciously institutionalize their presence in Europe after 1945 and thereby gave structural tenability to the postwar order.¹ European politics was functional because the United States and the Soviet Union were able to balance threats, guarantee the integrity of political borders between nations, and most importantly, prevent any re-emergence of a security danger arising from Germany. From this point of view, then, stability in Europe was maintained and supported in part by the *division* of Germany.

This interpretation of postwar European politics fails to meet, however, the two prerequisites for "stability" that were established in chapter two. That is, stability is not simply a function of a balancing of threats; it is also a function of the level of legitimacy which any particular status quo enjoys. If it is in the interests of a country to work against the political status quo rather than in favour of it, functional inter-state relations will be jeopardized. Therefore, within this frame of reference, one could argue that the structure of European politics between 1945 and 1990 was *not* stable, because the "buffer states" of Eastern Europe were only coerced into the

¹One of the best examples of this line of reasoning is A.W. DePorte, *Europe Between the Superpowers* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

Soviet sphere of influence, and the German people were deprived until 1990 of true statehood within one indivisible nation. Stability in the postwar period of 1945 to 1989 may simply have been transitory, patched into place by armed forces and rough military equilibrium, and lacking real durability in expectation of some more legitimately established order.² Therefore, it may be more accurate to argue that, until 1990, postwar European politics was *predictable*, not stable. For example, one could surmise in 1975 that the Soviet Union would continue to exist for a considerable period of time, but this did not mean that internal sources of contradiction would not eventually tear the country apart.

The way in which one defines the term "stability" is, consequently, of central importance to long peace research, and this fact cannot be emphasized enough. The importance of accurately defining stability is also significant for the study of postwar German foreign policy, because it offers insights into the relationship between German security and peace in Europe. Specifically, the reconciling of German security with European stability is only possible within the framework of Germany's unequivocal integration in the West. At the same time, this has not precluded the reunification of Germany, because the integration in 1990 of both halves of the country into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was in the interests of the United States, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the now defunct Soviet Union. Thus, the obvious question is: "Why has this been the case? Why has Germany's security integration in NATO been so widely and positively received?" Second, German reunification to date has not increased the likelihood that major inter-state war in Europe could become more frequent. Have NATO's integrative functions been partially responsible for the maintenance of peace, and how can these functions be described so that general analytical conclusions can be drawn

²See, on this point, Harald von Riekhoff, "The Changing Function of NATO," *International Journal*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Spring 1966), p. 160.

about the role of military alliances? And finally, can security integration be added to the list of factors commonly put forward to account for the long postwar peace, affirming the argument that a multiplicity of reasons is responsible for the absence of major inter-state war in Europe after 1945?

I. The Significance of Alliance Politics

The term "alliance" is normally regarded within the literature of international relations as one of the discipline's central concepts. Cycles of war and peace are attributed to the dissolution and formation of alliances, and most studies of alliances base their observations on the *a priori* assumption that states ally with each other in order to achieve common goals, the most basic of which is to provide security against common external threats. Despite the sophistication and originality of most studies, however, very few writers seek out empirical referents upon which to establish their assumptions. Fewer still actually define words like "stability" and "security", systemic features which alliances are supposed to promote; for most writers, it is enough to illustrate that stability is a good thing in order to justify the formation of alliances.

The frequently inaccurate generalizations which are made about alliances stem from the almost blind acceptance that alliances are simply instruments of power politics and are "... a necessary function of the balance of power operating within a multiple-state system."³ If additional purposes and uses of alliances are cited, they are almost always interpreted as being ancillary to those of capability aggregation, collective defence, security, and power diplomacy. Indeed, intra-alliance politics are shown to be the result of these main purposes and are explained

³Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1960), p. 181.

as the by-product of the alliance's strategy and tactics for dealing with external threats. If one accepts this logic, then only two kinds of alliances are possible: defensive and offensive. A defensive alliance functions on the basis of a common interest between contracting states that threats from countries or groups of countries outside the alliance must be deterred or defended against when deterrence fails. An offensive alliance attempts to use force in changing the international status quo, territorially or otherwise, in order to gain the widest possible range of assets for its members.⁴

The problem with this logic is that it is not possible, either theoretically or empirically, to draw a precise dividing line between benefits which are accrued at the expense of enemy states and those which are gained at the expense of one's own allies. For example, two allied countries may wish to punish a third state on religious or ideological grounds; but if ally A is more dependent *economically* on the third state than is ally B, then intra-alliance disputes become likely at the point when the costs of alliance membership are no longer equal. At some point in time, then, one ally could find it necessary to restrain the foreign policy and limit the political options of another allied nation in order to successfully meet a common outside threat. To extend this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion, then, it follows that alliances also function as tools of internal management and control, and that in most scenarios, intra-alliance politics are more significant than the actual reaction to common external threats.

Robert Osgood, for example, argues that "[a]lliances, although ostensibly or actually directed against an external threat, may additionally *or even primarily* be intended to restrain a member, limit its options, support its government against an

⁴Robert E. Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 18.

internal threat, or control its foreign policy in some fashion."⁵ That is, although the *casus foederis* article of an alliance treaty may bind two or more sovereign states for reasons of security, the interaction of domestic politics with economic and monetary forces and with varying threat perceptions will have synergistic effects. These will serve to limit an ally's freedom of action within the alliance and provide its partner with access to, and influence upon, its government. That is what Osgood means by the term "entangling alliance".⁶ Allies are entangled and are dependent, to greater or lesser degrees, on each other for both military support and political solidarity, neither of which can be separated into distinct functions. For example, the military posture of allied countries affects the nature and scope of desirable political accommodation, and the agreement upon a political accommodation logically presupposes an appraisal of the alliance's military-strategic implications.

If an alliance is to achieve military security or to support diplomacy, it must promote policies which strengthen the cohesion and solidarity of allied states -- this is essentially a political task. Solidarity is difficult to quantify and qualify empirically, but it logically should be measured not only by the degree of military integration within an alliance, but also by the level of political cooperation between countries; the two factors are interdependent. The dual task of any alliance's military strategy is, therefore, to promote a coordinated, well-prepared military posture supporting the security of allied members against external threats *and* to obtain the necessary measure of political-diplomatic cooperation which is essential for this purpose.⁷ But in a multilateral alliance which demands extensive commitments and contributions, this is bound to be a delicate and complex task, since the requirements of political

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 18. Emphasis added.

⁶See, for example, Robert E. Osgood, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962).

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 18.

cooperation do not automatically, indeed rarely, coincide with the requirements of security. Therefore, all viable alliances must permit or coercively extract political concessions in order to remain cohesive. Yet they must do so without undermining or jeopardizing the common security.

As a consequence, one of the principal functions of an alliance is as an instrument of management and control. Paul Schroeder illustrates the significance of this managerial function by summarizing the various conclusions about alliances in three main points:

1. All alliances in some measure function as pacts of restraint (*pacta de contrahendo*), restraining or controlling the actions of the partners in the alliance themselves. Frequently the desire to exercise such control over an ally's policy is the main reason that one power, or both, enter into the alliance. In every case, the way in which the alliance functions as a *pactum de contrahendo* has an important effect upon the success and durability of the alliance, and on its impact upon the general system.
2. Although alliances are commonly used to try to isolate and intimidate an opponent, alliances are frequently also employed in order to group and conciliate an opponent, in the interest of managing the system and avoiding overt conflict.
3. The perception of a threat from another power might lead a state to try either to form an alliance *against* that power, in order to meet the threat by capability-aggregation, or to ally *with* that power, in order to manage the threat through a *pactum de contrahendo*.⁸

⁸Paul W. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Klaus Knorr (ed.), *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Lawrence, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 1976), pp. 230-231.

The third point is recognizable as the balancing-bandwagoning metaphor in international relations theory, but Schroeder demonstrates that by checking opponents, controlling allies, diffusing the ambitions of belligerent states, and restraining conflicts within the system of states, the two primary motives for alignment can also function as very effective keepers of the peace in world politics.

Table 5.A
The Major European Alliances, 1815-1945

Alliance Name	Date Established	1. Primary Alliance Purpose 2. Secondary Alliance Purpose
Quadruple Alliance (Austria, Britain, Prussia, Russia)	November 1815	1.A. Mutual security against a revival of French aggression and imperialism 1.B. To manage the international system and solve new problems as they arose
Holy Alliance (Austria, Prussia, Russia)	September 1815	1. European concert and mutual restraint between alliance signatories 2. Security against external threats
German Confederation (Austria, Prussia, other German states)	1815	1.A. Mutual security for Germany against France 1.B. A pact of mutual restraint for controlling the German problem from within
Convention for Greek Independence (Britain, Russia, France)	July 1827	1. Purposes of management, <i>not</i> power
Russo-Turkish Alliance	July 1833	1. A pact of management and control
Münchengrätz Agreement (Russia, Austria, Prussia)	September 1833	1. Metternich's desire to control Russia through a <i>pactum de contrahendo</i>
Quadruple Alliance (Britain, France, Spain, Portugal)	1834	1. A pact for restraint and management in Western Europe, especially in the Iberian Peninsula
Triple Alliance (Austria, Britain, Russia)	July 1840	1. To militarily protect Turkey from Egypt 2. To bring France back into the Concert of Europe and force it to conform

Alliance Name	Date Established	1. Primary Alliance Purpose 2. Secondary Alliance Purpose
Italian Treaties (Austria, Italy)	1849-1850	1.A. Gave central Italy security against invasion and externally supported revolt 1.B. Allowed Austria to control the foreign policies of Tuscany, Modena, and Parma
Anglo-French Alliance	April 1854	1. To restrain France and manage the crisis in the Crimea
Austro-Prussian Alliance	April 1854	1. To gain military support for Austria against Russia 2. To gain Prussia's acceptance of Austrian leadership both in Germany and in European affairs
Anglo-French- Austrian Alliance	December 1854	1. Management and control i. British control over France ii. France wanted to exploit Austro-Russian hostility iii. Austrian control over the effects of the Crimean War
British-French- Sardinian Alliance	January 1855	1. Anglo-French rivalry for control and influence in Sardinia 2. Sardinia sought to gain Western support for its ambitions in Italy
Turkish Defence Alliance (Britain, France, Austria)	April 1856	1. An instrument of mutual security against Russia in protection of Turkey 2. Austria to gain general British and French support in Central Europe
Anglo-French Partnership over Italy	mid-1859	1. To control France and thus prevent Napoleon from making territorial gains or acquiring a dominant influence in Italy
Prussian-Austrian Alliance	1863	1. To ruin Austria's reputation with Britain and other Western powers

Alliance Name	Date Established	1. Primary Alliance Purpose 2. Secondary Alliance Purpose
Prussian-Italian Alliance	April 1866	1. A purely offensive alliance only (A notable exception to the rule)
Dual Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary)	1879	1. Capability aggregation for security 2. To manage Austria's foreign policy, internal policy, and constitution 3. German control over Russian policy
Franco-Russian Alliance	1891	1. Intended <i>only</i> for mutual security
Anglo-Japanese Alliance	1902	1. Capability aggregation 2. British desire to make Japan constrain Russia, and to restrain Japanese commercial and naval competition in East Asia
Entente Cordiale (Britain, France)	1904	1. To protect Britain's world position by supplanting overseas rivalries with cooperation and partnership, and to prevent Franco-German friendship
Balkan League (Russia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece)	1912	1. An offensive alliance for conquest of Turkish territory and for security from Austrian intervention 2. To manage Balkan affairs to Russia's own advantage
Anglo-French Alliance	1935	1. To manage and co-opt Germany through peaceful diplomacy and appeasement 2. Security and capability aggregation against Germany after March 1939
Axis Alliance (Japan, Germany, Italy)	September 1940	1. Capability aggregation and military gain

Alliance Name	Date Established	1. Primary Alliance Purpose 2. Secondary Alliance Purpose
Grand Alliance (Britain, US, USSR)	1941-1942	1. Power and military victory 2. Britain to manage its great power interests through Anglo- American partnership 3. USSR to gain Western economic aid

Source: Paul W. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Klaus Knorr (ed.), *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Lawrence, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 1976), pp. 227-262.

In his book, *The Origins of Alliances*, Stephen Walt offers the valid critique that studies of alliances rarely offer systematic tests of general hypotheses.⁹ Interesting propositions are often put forward, but reliable and convincing historical evidence which supports these propositions is usually absent. Paul Schroeder, on the other hand, backs up his three principal arguments with an impressive survey of the major European alliances from 1815 to 1945, illustrating empirically that the main function of most alliances is as an instrument of inter-allied diplomacy and control. Alliances which operate effectively are those which explicitly coordinate alliance politics and simultaneously prepare to challenge any external threats.

Jane Sharp implicitly agrees that alliances are instruments both for sharing resources and confronting an external threat, and for managing and restraining the foreign and domestic policies of an allied state. But she does not agree that any

⁹Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 7.

meaningful coordination between political costs and security benefits is possible.¹⁰ Instead, the costs of dependence and of reduced freedom of action will always outweigh the benefits of shared resources and increased protection, and these costs increase instability and increase the likelihood of conflict. In short, interdependence -- better described as asymmetrical dependence -- within an alliance is a bad thing.¹¹ By definition, "entanglements" are counter-productive.

The essence of this "security dilemma" is that each state within an alliance "... oscillates between the fear of abandonment by its partners in a crisis -- the cost of dependence -- and the fear of being entrapped or dragged into a conflict not of its own choosing -- the cost of reduced freedom of action."¹² For the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the alliance most relevant to this study, the security dilemma is a constant source of anxiety and potential discord, if one accepts Sharp's argument. Because of the power asymmetries within NATO and because of the geographical isolation of the United States, America's degree of direct dependence is minimal. To the extent that European members of the alliance, for reasons of deterrence, feel dependent on American nuclear weapons, over which they have little or no control, they are more vulnerable to fears both of entrapment and of abandonment than the United States.

¹⁰See, for example, Jane M.O. Sharp, "Arms Control and Alliance Commitments," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 100, No. 4 (Winter 1985-1986), pp. 649-667.

¹¹Jane M.O. Sharp, "After Reykjavik: Arms Control and the Allies," *International Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Spring 1987), p. 241.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 241. The terms "abandonment" and "entrapment" were first coined by Michael Mandelbaum in his book, *The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 151-154.

Figure 5.A

The Abandonment-Entrapment Cycle

Source: Jane M.O. Sharp, "After Reykjavik: Arms Control and the Allies," *International Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Spring 1987), p. 242.

Jane Sharp argues that before 1990, when the United States responded to European fears of abandonment by explicitly recognizing its role in alliance security or by stationing extra weaponry in the European theatre, the Soviet Union would react adversely, East-West relations would worsen, and the Europeans' fear of entrapment in a superpower conflict would become more acute. On the other hand, when the United States responded to fears of entrapment by consciously attempting to improve bilateral superpower relations and to hammer out arms control agreements with the USSR, the European allies who were most dependent considered that their security guarantees were being undermined.¹³ In practice, however, balancing between abandonment and entrapment fears has always been more a trade-off than a dilemma. The problem has been to optimize between the two, not to totally counterbalance one option at the expense of the other.¹⁴ This cycle of abandonment and entrapment is simply useful as an analytical model, not as an exact representation of how alliances work under all circumstances.¹⁵

In the final analysis, then, Jane Sharp considers the restraining and controlling functions of alliances to be counterproductive, and asserts that NATO's security dilemma was a principal factor in hindering the establishment of normal security relations in Europe before 1990.¹⁶ Essentially, the argument is that although NATO, despite its many shortcomings, had been able to keep the peace in Western

¹³Sharp, "After Reykjavik," p. 242.

¹⁴Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (1991), p. 113.

¹⁵To date, one of the best empirical analyses of this model, although ironically the terms "abandonment" and "entrapment" are never used, has been by Leroy Miller, "Die deutsche Doppelabhängigkeit," *Beiträge zur Konfliktforschung*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1987), pp. 23-50.

¹⁶Sharp, "After Reykjavik," p. 241.

Europe along side its eastern counterpart, "NATO serve[d] as much to perpetuate as to alleviate the Soviet threat",¹⁷ making East-West adversarial relations intractable.

Two counterarguments have been posited which support the contending thesis that alliance structures and alliance politics are directly responsible for predictable and generally healthy East-West relations in the period after World War II. First, writing in 1984, Glenn Snyder argued that the United States could not credibly threaten to defect from the NATO alliance and abandon its European allies. The United States was solidly committed by its own interests to defend its allies within NATO; therefore, its de-alignment would have been irrational. Furthermore, as long as the bipolar structure of European politics remained intact, American realignment with the Soviet Union was logically impossible, "... simply because there [was] no other state powerful enough to provide a motive."¹⁸ As a result, the "abandonment-entrapment" cycle was untenable in bipolar Europe, since abandonment was simply not an option. Thus, the NATO allies were free to disagree, to disassociate themselves from unpopular American policies, and to even attempt to restrain the United States, without concern that an ally could defect in consequence. The NATO alliance promoted common military security and simultaneously allowed for the management of member states' foreign policies precisely because "... rigidity of alignment in bipolarity promotes flexibility of strategy."¹⁹ Snyder concludes:

The superpowers and their allies may disagree about policy toward the adversary, and, as in NATO at present, they may even pursue contradictory policies. But they need have little fear that their own association is thereby endangered. Indeed, it is largely because the

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 241.

¹⁸Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 461-495.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 494.

alliance itself is fundamentally stable that such policy divergences may develop and persist. The alliance is stable because it is essentially a product of the structure of the system and of the common security interests generated thereby. So long as that structure and those interests persist, the allies are free to disagree.²⁰

In short, at times when defection is not an option, entangling alliances are a good thing, inhibiting outward manifestations of nationalism and reconciling historical antagonisms and previously intractable geopolitical tensions. It is exactly this consideration which most mainstream observers of German politics use as their starting point in analyzing the relationship between German security and European stability.

The second counterargument which posits that entangling alliances are inherently *productive* instruments has been put forward by Robert Osgood, whose fundamental point is that, similar to arms control, there is more to European security than simply the military aspect. Political considerations are equally important, if not more so. Militarily, the NATO states always lacked the power to support many of their vital interests independently of the alliance. Politically, they were unable to promote their interests by leaving the alliance or by realigning with another. The commitments and contributions exacted by NATO further constricted their room for independent political manoeuvre. Therefore, the allies pursued their policy goals, in large measure, by seeking the terms of cooperation which would enhance their influence and promote a favourable structuring of interests *within the alliance*.

At the same time, to further compensate for their loss of political independence, the allies tried to retain control over foreign relations more directly by asserting their voice in the determination of joint allied policies concerning

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 485.

relations with the Soviet bloc. To the extent the allies surrendered independent control of their military capacity to support the security of the entire alliance, they had to seek control over foreign policy by political consultation, accommodation, and agreement with their West European neighbours *instead of by unilateral means*. The more "entangled" and militarily interdependent the allies became, the more compelling their need for political cooperation grew and the more they asserted their political voices. Thus, "NATO [became] a kind of military-political framework within which its members ... pursued a variety of interests transcending military security, and NATO's military strategy [became] an inseparable part of this framework."²¹

This overlapping of political and military interests, whereby military security can be augmented through political integration and cooperation, is a second fundamental premise upon which most mainstream analyses of German foreign policy are based. Indeed, NATO has been so successful in "absorbing" the traditional problem of German power and influence in central Europe that Americans and West Europeans often take the Atlantic Alliance's managerial role for granted.²² NATO has been able to prevent any re-emergence of historical animosities within Europe precisely because it functions both as an instrument of control and inter-allied diplomacy, *and* as a deterrent to the Soviet "threat", at least while it still existed. Since the need to counter a menacing Soviet challenge captured the imaginations of America's foreign policy and defence establishments, the success of embedding German politics within the architecture of NATO has gone largely unnoticed. It is exactly for this reason that much of the literature on Germany's political and military role in Europe makes use of history to contrast German

²¹Osgood, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance*, p. 23.

²²See, on this point, Pierre Hassner, "Change and Security in Europe -- Part II: In Search of a System," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 49 (July 1968), p. 21.

foreign policy before and after 1945, and to highlight the efficacy of NATO's restraining and controlling functions.

II. NATO's Security Integration and the Long Postwar Peace

In concrete terms, the security integration afforded by the NATO alliance has contributed to general stability in post-1945 European politics by helping to create a "security community". This concept was first defined by Karl Deutsch, who explained that such a community was identifiable as "... a group of nations having become sufficiently integrated by formal and informal practices and institutions to allow the expectation of peaceful change for a long period."²³ By definition, then, a security community actively and overtly works to secure peace within a geopolitical area for a considerable length of time. It is not bound by the constraints of systemic polarity, since integration can be furthered and sustained from one framework of polarity to another; the endurance of NATO into the 1990s is one good example of this. In addition, this affirms the first lesson for research on European security established in chapter two.

Writing in 1966, Harald von Riekhoff argued that as NATO worked in its initial stages to confront the perceived political and military threat stemming from the Soviet Union, the regular diplomatic contacts which NATO allies had with one another increased to such a degree of frequency and cooperation that the alliance began to function on its own momentum and accommodate any changes in the status quo along peaceful lines.²⁴ In an informal way, then, NATO served as a framework in which allied states with different and sometimes competing points of

²³Quoted in von Riekhoff, "The Changing Function of NATO," p. 161.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 161.

view could assemble and work out problems in a non-conflictual manner, even as the primary area of concern was the external threat posed by the Warsaw Pact. However, owing to the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus, it could not be theoretically argued or empirically proven that the NATO of the 1960s constituted a true security community as Karl Deutsch had defined the term.

But since the 1960s, two aspects of alliance integration within NATO have been considerably developed and refined, supporting processes of consensus building which, although in strict theoretical terms may not be representative of a security community, have worked in a real way to maintain manageable inter-state relations in Western Europe. First, NATO has constructed many channels through which common military planning can be pursued and political information, analysis, and consultation can be continuously exchanged.²⁵ For example, NATO allows high-level deliberation between its sixteen member states on matters ranging from military doctrine, to events like the disintegration of the USSR which threaten the stability of the status quo, and to the future tasks which the alliance should carry out in a changing world.

Representative of this information exchange and consensus formation was the process of German reunification in 1990, and specifically the four "two-plus-four" talks which debated the external aspects of German unity, including the security of all countries bordering on Germany. One major function of these talks, which were partially but certainly not exclusively conducted under NATO auspices, was to ensure that discussions concerning German and European security be carried out *with* the active participation of the two German states, rather than by excluding them.²⁶ Among other topics was the sovereignty of a reunified German nation-state

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 167.

²⁶Wilhelm Bruns, "Die Regelung der äußeren Aspekte der deutschen Einigung," *Deutschland Archiv*, Vol. 23, No. 11 (November 1990), pp. 1726-1732.

and its freedom to choose its alliance membership, and great pains were taken to avoid the irony of re-establishing full German independence using discriminative, paternalistic methods.

Harald von Riekhoff argues that the importance of these consensus-building mechanisms should not be underestimated. Even with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of NATO's traditional *raison d'être* of defending Western Europe from the eastern half of the continent, NATO need not be disbanded as a consequence.²⁷ Transnational political and military contacts between the countries of Western Europe and North America will continue to exist, and the sheer volume of this interaction will necessitate that an organization be present that can facilitate exchanges of information and diplomatic consultation. Ironically, such an organization would probably mirror the present framework of NATO. Thus, just as Pierre Hassner has suggested, NATO's role in integration could become the official basis of its existence, replacing the alliance's external defensive functions with a more workable role as an apparatus for discussing and implementing foreign policy.²⁸ Harald von Riekhoff concludes:

It would therefore seem preferable to maintain the organization sufficiently flexible in order to facilitate an eventual shift of emphasis within the NATO edifice from its present military pre-occupations to political adjustment functions, than to follow the counsel of abolitionists, only to discover the immediate need for a laborious restoration of something very similar.²⁹

²⁷von Riekhoff, "The Changing Function of NATO," p. 167.

²⁸Pierre Hassner, "The Implications of Change in Eastern Europe for the Atlantic Alliance," *Orbis*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring 1969), pp. 237-255.

²⁹von Riekhoff, "The Changing Function of NATO," p. 167.

The second aspect of alliance integration within NATO has been the consolidation of previously autonomous national defence policies into one single framework of defence under NATO guidelines. For example, before the Second World War, Britain's national security was ultimately dependent upon the efficiency of its air force, its navy, its ground soldiers, and its intelligence-gathering and intelligence-processing networks. The same was true of France, Germany, the Soviet Union, and the other major powers of Europe. However, with the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and especially the rearmament of Germany within NATO's framework six years later, there was no longer a necessity for the West European allies to make autonomous choices in defence-related areas. Instead, the integrated military command structure of NATO could be tapped by national governments in order to gain access to information vital to the making of prudent decisions.

However, it has sometimes been difficult to differentiate between the contributions to a common defence provided by NATO and contributions extended unilaterally by the United States. Josef Joffe argues, for example, that only the permanent intrusion of the United States into continental European affairs was able to change the terms of state interaction in such a way that the West Europeans no longer had to worry about relative gains in an anarchic international system. "By promising to protect Western Europe against others and against itself, the United States swept aside the rules of the self-help game that had governed and regularly brought grief to Europe in centuries past."³⁰ In a sense, American initiatives within the framework of NATO served to both pacify and protect Western Europe, forging an increasing similarity of behaviour and complementarity of interests which made

³⁰Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," *Foreign Policy*, No. 54 (Spring 1984), p. 72.

the use of force within these boundaries almost inconceivable.³¹ Thus, in the course of protecting NATO's territory against all threats -- both real and perceived -- from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the United States also protected Western Europe from itself. Security guarantees provided by the Americans have become very closely associated with those of the Atlantic Alliance, but the effect has been uniform: an integrated system of military cooperation that, in broad definitional terms, not only resembles but has actually become a security community. To quote Josef Joffe:

And by paving the way from international anarchy to security community the United States not only defused ancient rivalries but also built the indispensable foundation for future cooperation.³²

This American paternalism, however, has *not* jeopardized the legitimacy of the NATO alliance, nor has it elicited German objections within policy-making circles to the suggestion that NATO's main future role be the integration -- indeed, the **containment** -- of the German nation-state. Some of the best empirical pieces of evidence in support of this argument have been statements and articles in recent years by leading members of the governing Christian Democratic - Christian Social - Free Democratic coalition in the Federal Republic of Germany.³³ For example, Horst Teltschik, a very close advisor of Chancellor Helmut Kohl on foreign policy, and his personal friend as well, argues in explicit terms that because of Germany's location in the middle of Europe, "... the question of to whom Germany belongs and

³¹For this argument, and for a detailed examination of the "pacifier-protector" analogy, see Uwe Nerlich, "Western Europe's Relations with the United States," *Daedalus*, Vol. 108, No. 1 (Winter 1979), pp. 87-111.

³²Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," p. 69.

³³The German abbreviations for these political parties are, respectively, CDU, CSU, and FDP.

where the Germans belong has explosive potential at both the European and the global level."³⁴ The basis of peacefully resolving this question is through Germany's *integration* in NATO. Teltschik writes that the postwar military strength and political weight of the FRG and the Bundeswehr have been acceptable to the West European allies only because of the security integration afforded by the political and military structures of NATO.³⁵ This integration guarantees security for Germany and security from Germany, and this is the basis of allied trust in the benevolence of German foreign policy. "Whoever questions or seeks to reverse this integration will destroy this trust, create insecurity and distrust, and harm German interests."³⁶

Furthermore, the containment of Germany within NATO actually *widens* the country's room for manoeuvrability. Since the FRG is firmly anchored in the West, it cannot successfully pursue the classical Bismarckian tradition of playing East off against West. Therefore, the FRG has been permitted in the past to pursue a policy of *Ostpolitik* with the German Democratic Republic, and the country's reputation as a reliable and predictable partner has assisted it in eliciting cooperation and rapprochement with its other Eastern European neighbours.³⁷ Contrary to expectations, then, the proposal for shifting the emphasis of the NATO alliance solely to one of security integration and inter-allied control need not be met with the disagreement of the alliance's member countries, including Germany. NATO can directly support a legitimate status quo, and the coordination which its structure reinforces can work to balance any latent threats stemming from the disintegration

³⁴Horst Teltschik, "The Role of Germany Within NATO and Europe," in Gale A. Mattox and John H. Vaughan, Jr. (eds.), *Germany Through American Eyes: Foreign Policy and Domestic Issues* (Boulder, San Francisco, & London: Westview Press, 1989), p. 158.

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 162.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 162.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 163.

of the Soviet Union. In short, NATO's security integration contributes to the maintenance of general stability, and security integration deserves to be considered as one of a multiplicity of reasons in accounting after 1945 for the absence of major inter-state war in Europe.

III. Concluding Observations

The NATO alliance functions as an instrument for managing the foreign policies of its member states, and it also provides security against common external threats. These two functions are well-suited to the demands of German and European security, and the effectiveness of the alliance as a stabilizing mechanism has been recognized by the United States, Western and Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union. Indeed, German reunification within the framework of NATO affirms the two original, central assumptions of Konrad Adenauer's foreign policy: reunification could be achieved only within the framework of Western integration, and the question of reunification would be settled on terms favourable to the West.

The integrative structures of NATO remain the most effective way of reconciling German security with European stability. Any fundamental change in NATO contains the danger of reopening the issue of how to provide security for Germany and security from Germany, and maintain a framework of general stability within Europe. There persists a solid West European consensus that an alliance with the United States is indispensable in making Germany's contribution to European security politically acceptable both to the Germans and to Germany's allies. The strength of this consensus has enabled the allies to overcome numerous crises in Atlantic relations. And the peaceful cooperation which the constraints of NATO

membership have imposed on Western Europe may be the strongest argument why NATO *can* and *should* continue to exist well into the next century.

CONCLUSION

Conventional long peace research argues that the absence of major inter-state war in Europe after 1945 is a consequence of three factors: bipolarity, the existence of nuclear weapons, and the changing social evaluation of war. Common to all three factors is a definition of "stability" which manipulates the terms of reference so that propositions follow logically from conclusions, instead of the reverse methodology. Naturally, this does not adhere to the normal way in which social science is conducted, and the findings of long peace research are immediately open to question.

Furthermore, in order to prove that the bipolar structure of European politics has been directly responsible for peace in Europe, it is necessary to refute the argument that nuclear weapons have provoked an unprecedented level of caution and circumspection among statesmen, diplomats, and the military forces which serve them. It is also necessary to disprove that war has become virtually obsolete, or that war between liberal democratic states is extremely infrequent. That is, no one particular factor has caused the long peace, and analyses which argue that peace in Europe has been uni-causal are flawed and lack clear focus. Instead, a multiplicity of reasons has contributed to the successful functioning of peaceful inter-state relations in Europe.

One way of sharpening the focus of analysis is by redefining "stability" so that it corresponds to the realities of interaction between states, and not simply to intuitive logic and theoretical reasoning. Accordingly, one prerequisite for any thorough and accurate analysis of European security is that it be shaped and influenced by a use of the term "stability" in which the balancing of threat and the level of legitimacy afforded to a particular status quo are defining variables. Stability is not simply a factor of security and the structure of international politics, and this accounts in part

for the ambiguous evidence of conventional long peace research. In addition to systemic structure, nation-state interaction itself should be studied, and particularly the manner in which certain countries are permitted to form alliances and coalitions of common interest, impact political processes, and affect the manageability of relations between states.

The study of nation-state interaction provides useful empirical evidence for explaining why the bipolar structure of postwar Europe has not been *uniquely* stable. Peace and stability within Europe was also maintained in the 19th century under a structure of multipolarity. This was achieved in part by a group of intermediary states which could influence European politics simply by their presence, shaping the foreign policies of major countries and distracting leading decision makers from undertaking preparations for war. These intermediary states were normally located in central geographic areas, and this centrality allowed these states to either separate two powerful countries and keep them from interacting, or link them together and facilitate contact on the basis of compromise and conciliation.

The structure of the German Confederation was particularly central to this forty-year period of systemic peace in 19th-century Europe. Germany was neither too weak to successfully resist attacks from both East and West, nor so powerful and centralized that it became an offensive threat. Instead, Germany's political and military potential was integrated within the framework of the German Confederation, and this integration served continent-wide interests. German politics was also Europeanized and raised above the partisan and sometimes nationalistic interests of state. This integration and Europeanization served the furtherance of peace well, and rationalized a manner in which both German and European security concerns could be harmonized.

In the 20th century as well, the maintenance of general stability within Europe has been a product, in part, of the manner in which German security policy and

foreign relations have been allowed to impact European politics and limit its possibilities. Essentially, the reconciling of German security with European stability has only been feasible within the framework of Germany's unequivocal security integration in the West. At the same time, this has provided a structure in which the reunification of Germany could be realized *without* making major inter-state war in Europe more likely. The reason is that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has successfully accommodated security for Germany and security from Germany. And this affirms the hypothesis of this study that as German foreign policy is integrated within a framework that provides for Germany's security while prohibiting the country's aggrandizement of power, the level of stability within Europe will increase. This is one reason why "stability" must be defined so carefully, because changing one single variable can upset the entire analytical argument.

NATO represents an organizational framework which can successfully balance competing security concerns, and it remains the most effective way of reconciling German security with European stability. As long as NATO remains intact and its political and managerial functions are stressed, rather than its pure military role in trans-Atlantic relations, European politics after 1990 need not become prone to war. Instead, the security integration afforded by the NATO alliance should be recognized as one of a multiplicity of reasons responsible for the long postwar peace.

The study of German foreign policy is of central importance to research on international politics, and the theoretical and empirical conclusions from these two areas of analysis should be synthesized in order to enrich and improve the current ways of thinking about European security. This study has been such an attempt at synthesis, and its methodology will hopefully be implemented in future research endeavours within the field of political science. Fresh approaches are vital for keeping security studies relevant and interesting, and new interpretations are

continually necessary in order to match political theory with the reality of concrete political events. It remains to be seen whether this paper has been up to the challenge.

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