1

MICROD

National Library
of Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Canadian Theses Service

Service des thèses canadiennes

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4

NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.

**CANADIAN IMMIGRATION:
POLICY AND PERSPECTIVES**

by

TED MOROZ, B.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Political Science

**Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
December 12, 1988**

Permission has been granted to the National Library of Canada to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author (copyright owner) has reserved other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her written permission.

L'autorisation a été accordée à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de microfilmer cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

L'auteur (titulaire du droit d'auteur) se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation écrite.

ISBN 0-315-51138-9

The undersigned recommend to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
the acceptance of the thesis:
"CANADIAN IMMIGRATION: POLICY AND PERSPECTIVES"
submitted by Ted William Moroz, B.A.
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts

Professor N. Chi, Thesis Supervisor

Professor T. Rakowska-Harmstone
Chair, Department of Political Science

Carleton University

January 16, 1989

ABSTRACT

This thesis is concerned with immigrants in Canada and the policies that have been established in relation to this population. The basic contention of this composition is that annual immigration levels in Canada should be increased. From this starting point, two principal themes are developed. One theme incorporates several demographical and statistical surveys in the attempt to show why Canada should accept more immigrants. A second theme, employing statistical and descriptive accounts, reveals why Canada has not accepted more immigrants. Finally, this work would not have been complete without reviewing the special case of Québec. This province has obtained a special status in immigration vis-à-vis the other Canadian provinces.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have a good friend who argues that 80% of the work takes only 20% of the time while the final 20% of work takes 80% of the time. When one endeavours to complete that 20% of the work, he or she finds that the knowledge of many people is called upon. In the past eight months I have required the help of many such people. Information has been supplied through interviews, telephone calls, and even hallway conversations. To all of these people, I am most thankful.

There are several people who deserve very special thanks. Without their help, this task would have been impossible to complete. First, much gratitude is extended to my advisor, Dr. N.H. Chi, whose dedication to this thesis is most appreciated. I also thank Dr. Collin Farmer and Dr. Alain Gagnon for their most helpful suggestions. Much appreciation is bestowed to my comrades, Keith Heintzman and Christopher Adams, for their unrivaled empirical aid and proof-reading capabilities.

Upon completing 100% of the work, I realize who deserves most of my thanks and appreciation. I thank my parents, William and Claudette Moroz, whose love, encouragement, and belief in me, is immeasurable.

CONTENTS

<u>Title</u>	<u>Page</u>
List of Tables.....	i
List of Figures.....	ii
Introduction.....	iv
One - Immigration/Emigration Theories and Canadian Population Concerns.....	1
Two - The History of Canadian Immigration: Those Choosy Gate Keepers.....	32
Three - The Economic Impact of Canadian Immigrants.....	73
Four - Public Opinion.....	103
Five - The Integration of Immigrants: A Social-Psychological Survey.....	133
Six - Québec's "Not-So-Special" Immigration Status.....	158
Conclusion.....	182
Bibliography.....	187

List of Tables

<u>Table</u>	<u>Page</u>
1.0 Immigration and Natural Increase in Canada.....	9
1.1 Gross Reproduction Rates for Selected Years.....	14
2.0 Jewish Refugees Resettled - 1933-1939.....	61
3.0 Average 1980 Income per Person from Government Programs by Birth Place.....	98
4.0 Population Densities of Selected Countries.....	111
5.0 Percentages of Native-Born and Immigrants who Express Satisfaction with Life in Canada by Income Level.....	141

List of Figures

<u>Figure</u>	<u>Page</u>
1.0 Immigration to Canada by Calender Year.....	18
2.0 British vs. non-British Deportation.....	52
2.1 Ethnic Group Immigration to Canada.....	54
3.0 Percentage of Immigrants and non-Immigrants with University Degrees.....	88
3.1 Percentage of Immigrants with University Degrees by Year of Arrival.....	89
3.2 Percentage of Immigrants with University Degrees by Birth Place.....	91
3.3 Average Income of Immigrant and non-Immigrant Populations Over Age 17.....	93
3.4 Average 1980 Income of Immigrants Over Age 17 by Year of Arrival.....	94
3.5 Average 1980 Income of Immigrants Over Age 17 by Birth Place.....	95
3.6 Percentage of Immigrant (by Year of Arrival) and non-Immigrant Populations with 1980 Income of \$30,000 or more.....	97
3.7 Average Income from Savings and Investments for 1980 by Birth Place.....	100
3.8 Average 1980 Income from Savings and Investments for Immigrants by Year of Arrival.....	101
4.0 General Canadian Attitudes Towards Immigration.....	115
4.1 Percentage of Respondents who Agree/Disagree that Immigration is Bad for Canada by Age.....	116
4.2 Percentage of Respondents who Agree/Disagree that Immigration is Bad for Canada by Income.....	118
4.3 Percentage of Respondents who Agree/Disagree that Immigration is Bad for Canada by Education.....	120

4.4	Means of Acceptability and Discrimination Against Immigrants by Education.....	121
4.5	Public Opinion on Immigrant's Contribution to Canada by Education.....	123
4.6	Percentage of Respondents who Agree/Disagree that Immigration is Bad for Canada by Province of Birth.....	124
4.7	Mean Responses of Perceived Consequences of Immigration by Region of Birth.....	126
4.8	Percentage of Response to "Immigration is Bad for Canada" by Employment Status.....	128
4.9	Percentage of Response to "Immigration is Bad for Canada" by Degree of Political Interest.....	130
5.0	A Comparison of Immigrant Males and Canadian-born Males by "Language Spoken at Home".....	137
5.1	Dissatisfaction With Life in Canada by Birth Place.....	140
5.2	Percentage of Canadians who feel they are "Part of the Area" by Birth Place.....	147
5.3	Percentage of Respondents who Believe More Emphasis is Required on Most Policy Fields by Birth Place.....	155

INTRODUCTION

Why do people move from one country to another? What could possibly be so important that people would leave behind friends, family members, and maybe even jobs to move to a new country in which they may have to cope with a new language, culture, and customs, not to mention hostility? What does immigration do for a receiving country such as Canada in terms of population growth? Is it useful for Canada or only a necessary evil? These are a few questions which must be answered before one can systematically evaluate Canada's immigration policy in the past and present. Chapter one will address these concerns.

Unfortunately, Canada's immigration record has been clouded with injustice and discrimination. For example, on May 15, 1939, the St. Louis arrived at a Canadian harbour. The ship was filled with hundreds of Jewish refugees seeking asylum from German persecution. Having already been turned away at both Cuban and United States' borders, Canada seemed like a last resort before the long trip back to Europe. Citing high unemployment and the fact that "it was no time to act on humanitarian grounds," Prime Minister Mackenzie King also refused sanctuary to the Jewish

refugees.¹ Forced back to Europe, the passengers of the St. Louis eventually attained refuge in Britain, Belgium, and Holland. However, a refuge was not to be found.

Hitler soon overran Belgium and Holland, and most of the people from the St. Louis were caught and murdered in the gas chambers of Nazi concentration camps.

Chapter two will review Canadian immigration over the past few centuries in the attempt to determine who helped build this nation.

Canadians often accuse immigrants of "stealing" jobs. In a country which often experiences high unemployment rates, Canadians feel that new arrivals simply serve to aggravate such problems. Is it possible that immigrants actually displace native-born Canadians and create labour surpluses? Or, do immigrants create jobs as they become automatic consumers upon arrival? Chapter three will analyze the economic impact of immigrants in Canada in the hope of answering these questions.

Chapter four will reveal the attitudes of Canadians towards immigrants. Are Canadians humanitarian? Would Canadians sooner close the immigration gates to all applicants? Or more simply,

¹ Diane Swanson, "Voyage of the St. Louis," Canada and the World, 52:8 (April, 1987), p. 22. Also see: Irving Abella, None is too Many.

² Ibid.

are Canadians discriminatory, racist, and hopeful of "keeping Canada white?"

Canada is an interesting country in that it maintains a multicultural heritage within a bilingual framework. What does this mean for Canada's ethnic groups? Does this limit the degree to which immigrants will integrate into the Canadian society? Can Canada safely be divided into "we," those who were born here, and "they," those who came with different languages and customs? Or, have immigrants become well adjusted to life in Canada. These questions will be addressed in chapter five.

Finally, chapter six will deal with the special case of Québec. Throughout its past, Québec has expressed interest in maintaining its own immigration policy as a method for promoting the immigration of French-speaking persons to that province. This has resulted in several federal-Québec agreements which have recently been included in the Meech Lake Accord. The ramifications of this pact will be analyzed.

CHAPTER ONE - IMMIGRATION/EMIGRATION THEORIES
AND CANADIAN POPULATION CONCERNS

It is clear that much thought and preparation must be endured before deciding whether or not to leave one's homeland. In many cases a person leaves behind common customs, culture, and language in order to search for a better life. Even more difficult is the task of leaving friends and family to move to a country full of strangers. Yet each year hundreds of thousands of people from all over the world migrate to various countries. Why are so many people willing to experience such dramatic changes each year and move to a new country?

Immigration/Emigration Theories

Of all the significant factors which combine to convince a person to emigrate, economic consideration is usually a predominant concern.

The decision to emigrate may obviously result from a number of motives, which may differ in each individual case. But, generally speaking, among these motives an economic consideration, the desire to become better off, has been predominant.

In many other cases people must leave their countries because of religious, political, or other non-economic but adverse conditions of life. Thus, when a person is concerned with such adverse conditions, whether due to poverty or persecution, such

Julius Isaac, Economics of Migration, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1947, p. 23.

conditions act to "push" the person out of his or her country of residence.

The push factor is a necessary condition in an individual's decision to emigrate. There must be a reason for the person to choose to leave his or her homeland. Equally important is the country which the individual may choose to move to. The "pull" theory of migration assumes that certain favourable forces work within one country to attract people from other countries. Usually the availability of resources, technology, markets, and capital are considered an important pull factor which draws immigrants who desire to become economically better off.⁴

Often the conceptual distinction between the pull factor and the push factor is academically convenient. Yet it is difficult to determine which force drives the emigrant out of one country and into another. Obviously a refugee⁵ who fears for his or her life because of some sort of religious or political belief is "pushed" out of the country. In such a case, one may argue that the "push" theory of migration is certainly applicable. However, as Isaac points out, even though refugees are pushed out of their

⁴D.C. Corbett, "Immigration and Economic Development," Canadian Journal of Economics, 17 (August, 1951), p. 363.

⁵Canada has adopted the United Nations' definition of a refugee: someone who has left his or her country because of legitimate fears of persecution. Persecution must be for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or group membership. Furthermore, the refugee must be a person who cannot return home because of fear his or her life may be threatened.

country because of persecution, these people will often choose to migrate to a country in which they will have a chance to start a new life successfully.⁶ Thus while certain adverse conditions act to push a person out of one country, certain attractive features in another country may act to pull that same person in.

Furthermore, Taylor points out that it is often difficult to determine which factor, (that is, the "push" or the "pull") is the contributing determinant to immigration/emigration. The reason for this is that many factors may be regarded as both "push" and "pull" factors.⁷ For example, a lack of decent shelter and food supplies may push a person to emigrate. However, the prospect of decent shelter and food supplies elsewhere pulls that person to that country.

Despite such conceptual ambiguity, there seems to be a general agreement among immigration/emigration theorists that the pull factor is usually a stronger contributor to one's decision to migrate. For example, Corbett has discovered that business activity in the United States played a large pull role in attracting immigrants from Germany; yet, at the same time, poor harvest conditions in Germany did not act as a significant push

⁶ Julius Isaac, op. cit., p. 23.

⁷ R.C. Taylor, "Migration and Motivation: A study of determinants and types," in Migration, J.A. Jackson (ed.), London, Cambridge University Press, 1962, p. 99.

factor.⁸ He also points out that the pull factors brought into Canada a large influx of immigrants during the first decade of the twentieth century, without whom, the settlement of the prairie region and the development of the wheat staple industry would not have occurred.⁹ The superiority of the pull theory is also supported by Wainess who concludes:

The fact is that periods of net immigration have been periods during which the underlying factors affecting development and economic activity have been favourable and large numbers have not only been attracted to this country [Canada], but have found they could make a livelihood here.

On the other side of the coin, there are numerous obstacles to migration whether or not the push and pull factors are at work. The "counter-push" factor, for instance, may discourage the prospective immigrant from leaving home. Counter-push factors include leaving behind relatives and friends, and giving up the security of familiar environments (whether persecution exists or not). In other words, even though an individual is being "pushed," other forces act within the homeland to counter those push forces. Thus, in order for a person to make the final decision to emigrate, the push forces must always be stronger than the counter-push forces. Otherwise, the person will feel

⁸ D.C. Corbett, op. cit., p. 361.

⁹ Ibid., p. 364.

¹⁰ W.J. Wainess, "Post-War Immigration Policy," Canadian Banker, 51, (1944), p. 91.

that he or she cannot leave the homeland. This may be explained by the fact that if no pronounced advantage is apparent, the tendency is for the decision maker to take no action.

The "counter-pull" theory operates in the same manner. For example, the opportunity for economic enhancement in a certain country will pull immigrants to it. However, there are other forces in the same country which act to counter the pull force of economic opportunity. The immigrant may be required to learn a new language, adapt to new customs and cultures, cope with new economic and legal systems, and maybe even adapt to a new climate. These counter-pull forces may convince the prospective immigrant that a certain country may not be a desirable option, especially when there is the risk that the immigrant may become economically worse off. These are important considerations for any emigrant especially when savings are usually spent on resettlement. The final choice of where to emigrate is usually a country emitting stronger pull forces than counter-pull forces.

Often a compromise is made between these counter forces. The prospective immigrant will not necessarily choose a country which is most beneficial. Rather, to minimize the stress of counter-pull forces, an immigrant may choose to move to a country with a similar language, culture, or climate. Furthermore, relatives or friends who have already settled in another country

may influence the immigrant to move there. Such a compromise provides the immigrant with a sense of security and familiarity. Such "survival guidance" is of the utmost importance to any immigrant, especially during the initial period of settlement in a strange country.

In summation, one might think of emigration in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. First, the final push force is discovered once the emigrant has considered all known push forces in relation to all counter-push forces. The intensity of the final push is measured by subtracting the strength of the counter-push factor from the strength of the push factor. If the counter-push factor proves to be stronger than the push factor, the individual is not likely to leave his or her homeland. Similarly, the final pull factor is derived from considering all pull factors in relation to all counter-pull forces. If the counter-pull forces prove to be stronger than the pull forces, the emigrant will not choose that specific country. The emigrant will, on the other hand, choose to move to a country where the final pull factor is strongest.

There is also a Canadian theory of immigration. Introduced in 1939 by Professor W. Burton Hurd, the Displacement theory maintained that increased immigration to Canada simply led to

emigration by native-born Canadians."¹¹ This is similar to the Lower theory of immigration which maintains that "dear" Canadians are usually driven away by "cheap" immigrants. The Lower theory will be presented in chapter three. Hurd's theory has fallen under intense scrutiny and indeed seems quite questionable. The relatively frail foundation of Hurd's theory is based on two projections made by him in 1939. The first one predicted the population of Canada in the year 1971 by measuring immigration/emigration rates over a period of several years. The second projection also predicted the 1971 population using birth and death rates over the same time frame. Both projections predicted relatively similar population figures for the year 1971. Therefore, Hurd was convinced that immigration must displace native-born Canadians. Hurd further discovered that high immigration levels coincided with high emigration levels.

Despite Hurd's assertions, it is clear that nowhere in his theory has a causal relationship been established which would support the idea that immigration leads to emigration. As Timlin refutes:

The theory that immigration leads to emigration appears never to have been scientifically investigated. The relationship is just asserted.

No thorough-going examination of evidence appears

¹¹W. Burton Hurd, "Some implications of prospective population changes in Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 5, (November, 1939), p. 494.

to have been made. The post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy" seems to have been freely resorted to.

It is clear that Hurd's displacement theory may be safely set aside.

Immigration and Canadian Population Growth

While immigration to Canada seems not to have induced emigration, it is clear that Canada has relied on immigration to induce population growth. Of course natural increase has always been Canada's largest component of population growth. Nevertheless, immigration has made considerable contributions to Canadian population growth.

A detailed history of Canadian immigration will be reviewed in chapter two. However, the following provides some evidence as to the effects of immigration on population growth throughout Canadian history.

¹² This fallacy refers to the fact that a relationship has been established without thoroughly examining all variables which may affect the relationship. In other words, no control variables have been taken into consideration.

¹³ Mabel F. Timlin, Does Canada Need More People?, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1951, p. 79.

Table 1.0 - Immigration and Natural Increase in Canada

<u>Period</u>	<u>Gross Immigration</u> 000's	(a) <u>Net Immigration</u> 000's	(b) <u>Natural Increase</u> 000's	a/b <u>Approx. Ratio</u>
1861-71	187	-192	651	-30/100
1871-81	353	- 87	723	-12/100
1881-91	903	-206	714	-30/100
1891-1901	326	-180	718	-25/100
1901-11	1,759	716	1,120	64/100
1911-21	1,612	231	1,350	18/100
1921-31	1,203	229	1,360	17/100
1931-41	150	- 92	1,222	-8/100
1941-51	548	169	1,972	9/100
1951-61	1,543	1,081	3,148	34/100
1961-71	1,429	627	2,703	23/100
1971-81	1,447	573	1,942	30/100
1981-86	482	288	982	30/100

Sources: Canada: One Hundred 1867-1967, Canada Bureau of Statistics, 1967.

Canada Yearbook 1987, Statistics Canada, 1988.

Table 1.0 indicates that Canada actually experienced more emigration than immigration during the last forty years of the nineteenth century. It is clear that population growth relied on natural increase which remained quite consistent during this period.

The period 1901-1911 was the only period in Canadian history in which net immigration rose to more than 60% of the natural increase in population growth. The large influx of immigrants has already been explained by the opening of western Canada and the large number of people required to develop the wheat economy. Canada's indigenous population during that time would not have

been sufficient to facilitate such a huge development.

The decade 1911-1921 also experienced a positive net immigration. However, the influx was relatively low in contrast to the large natural increase which provided most population growth in that decade. The next decade, 1921-1931, revealed an almost identical record as that of the preceding period.

The 1930s revealed significant changes. While natural increase remained mostly stable, the depression years brought about a return to net emigration. Of course this may seem somewhat insignificant as gross immigration for the entire ten-year period was only 150,000 people. Furthermore, a net emigration of only 92,000 people suggests little movement with regard to immigration and emigration. It is obvious that the depression years can explain such reduced movement as little opportunity for economic enhancement was actually present anywhere.

The first half of the period 1941-1951 once again showed little movement in migration as the second world war limited international movement. Between 1941 and 1945 inclusive, immigration to Canada totalled 61,000 (1939 and 1940 were both years in which immigration was less than 20,000 per year).

¹⁴ Canada, Immigration Statistics 1986, Employment and Immigration, 1986, p. 1.

Timlin has shown that net immigration to Canada during this period totalled only 4,300 people.¹⁵ However, the post-war years brought about dramatic changes in population growth. Net immigration between 1946 and 1948 alone amounted to well over 100,000 people.¹⁶ Furthermore, net immigration soared to well over one million by 1961. War brides, Jewish survivors of Nazi persecution, anti-Communist Polish subjects, and Ukrainians accounted for the first major influx of immigrants during the first post-war years.¹⁷ By the mid 1950s the net immigration rate was further boosted by large numbers of immigrants from Hungary (fleeing revolution in their homeland) and Britons (escaping severe declines in economic opportunity).¹⁸ Whitaker adds that a "prosperous Canada, rich in natural resources and with a small population spread across one of the largest national land masses in the world," was under continuous pressure to open its gates to immigrants.¹⁹ Furthermore, it was remarked in 1957 that:

The increase in immigration since the war may be said to be in part, the result of a change in policy, but to a much larger extent, it is the result of returning prosperity and full

¹⁵ M.F. Timlin, op. cit., p. 126.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ J.L. Granatstein et. al., Twentieth Century Canada, Toronto, McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1986, p. 308.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Reg Whitaker, Double Standard: The Secret History of Canadian Immigration, Toronto, Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1987, p. 10.

employment.²⁰

These examples reveal that both push and pull forces were at work during this time of plentiful immigration.

While net immigration during this period was higher than it had been during the decade 1901-1911, its impact on population growth was certainly not as substantial as the net immigration of the earlier period. Almost 40% of the population growth from 1901 to 1911 could be attributed to net immigration. However, the 1941-1951 decade revealed a contribution, by net immigration, of only 8% to Canada's population growth. The 1951-1961 period experienced Canada's largest ever net immigration of almost 1.1 million people. However, in terms of population growth, this large influx of immigrants can be credited with creating only a quarter of Canada's population growth in that decade.

This rather small contribution to population growth by immigration may be explained by the explosive "baby boom" during the post-war era. The two decades between 1941 and 1961 showed a natural increase of well over five million people, most of which occurred after the second world war. The baby boom continued during the period 1961-1971 with more than 2.7 million newborns expanding population growth. It is interesting that while natural increase and gross immigration remained relatively high, net immigration declined rather sharply from the previous decade.

²⁰D.C. Corbett, Canada's Immigration Policy, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1957, p. 10.

The 1971-1981 period saw a decline in natural increase signifying the end of the baby boom. During this period net immigration suffered a further decline while gross immigration remained consistent with the preceding decade. This suggests a large proportion of emigration from Canada.

Finally, the five-year period between 1981 and 1986 reveals population figures which remain mostly constant with the prior decade. Should the period 1986-1991 resemble the 1981-1986 period, natural increase and net immigration for the entire ten-year period will remain similar to the 1971-1981 period. However, gross immigration has declined. Therefore, fewer people seem to be emigrating since net immigration remains consistent.

The significance of all these figures is that population growth has severely declined since the midpoint of the twentieth century. Unless population growth increases, the decline will prove to be detrimental to all Canadians. Current levels of natural increase and immigration should lead to a population decline early in the next century. As the population declines, the baby boomers get older, creating an aging Canadian population. Beginning early in the next century, the baby boomers will be approaching retirement age. What does this mean for Canada? An aging population with fewer young people will result in an increased demand for pensions, medical services, and

other related social services with fewer wage earners to pay for them. Obviously a population boost would provide Canada with more tax payers to facilitate the potential service demands.

From what or where will such a population boost evolve? Table 1.1 indicates Canada's Gross Reproduction Rate for selected years. The gross reproduction rate measures the number of daughters per mother of usual child-bearing age.

Table 1.1 - Gross Reproduction Rates for Selected Years

<u>Year</u>	<u>Gross Reproduction Rate</u>
1966	1.369
1971	1.060
1976	0.887
1981	0.829
1982	0.825
1983	0.816
1984	0.819
1985	0.811

Source: Canada Yearbook, 1988, Statistics Canada, 1988

Statistics Canada has discovered that a gross reproduction rate of 1.050 is required in order to attain an adequate population replacement level (taking into consideration potential deaths or emigration). It is evident that this level has declined constantly and has fallen well below the required replacement level. Furthermore, overall fertility rates have

also fallen well below required replacement levels.²¹

The decline in fertility rates, gross reproduction rates, and natural increase (as noted in Table 1.0) may be attributed to a variety of reasons including increased and more effective contraception, more working females, fewer marriages, people marrying at later ages and having fewer children, and higher divorce rates.²² A recent demographic report by the Department of Employment and Immigration has disclosed that marriage rates continue to decline. Only 6.6 marriages per one thousand people were evident in 1987. This crude marriage rate has been the lowest ever in Canadian history.²³ Furthermore, one may indicate optimism that a baby boom "echo" will occur in which the children of the baby boomers will provide a much needed population boost. However, another study conducted by David Foot for the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission, has determined that the baby boomers' children are not likely to increase population nor even replace themselves.²⁴

While some nations have adopted pro-natalist measures in

²¹Constantine Passaris, "Canada's Future People," Policy Options Politiques, 5:5 (June, 1987), p. 34.

²²Ibid.

²³Canada, Quarterly Demographic Statistics, Statistics Canada, May, 1988.

²⁴David K. Foot, Population Aging and Immigration Policy in Canada: Implications and Prescriptions, Canada Employment and Immigration Commission, 1986, p. 3.

order to halt population declines, Canada, apart from possibly Family Allowance services, has not initiated such action on a national basis. One such example is the Soviet attempt to increase the proportion of ethnic Russians inside the Soviet Union. Pro-natalist measures have been adopted in an attempt to compete with the high birthrate of Moslem Soviets.²⁵ One may argue that the province of Québec has adopted "quasi" pro-natalist measures. Since Québec has the lowest birthrate in the western world,²⁶ it has implemented a policy whereby Family Allowance payments increase as family size increases. So far, there have been no systematic studies which have measured the effectiveness of this program.

Despite this provincial initiative by Québec, Canada seems to have no national measures to stimulate population growth through natural increase. However, Canada could control population growth through manipulation of its immigration policy. After all, facilitating population growth is one of the main components of the Canadian Immigration Act "objectives." Section 3 (a) of the policy states;

It is hereby declared that Canadian immigration policy and the rules and regulations made under this Act shall be designed and administered in such a manner as to promote the domestic and

²⁵Victor Malarek, Haven's Gate, Toronto, MacMillan, 1987, p. 31.

²⁶Robert Mackenzie, "Québec French-Speaking Families Urged to Sponsor Big Foreign Influx," Toronto Star, 21 January 1988, Section A, p. 5.

international interests of Canada recognizing the need; a) to support the attainment of such demographic goals as may be established by the Government of Canada from time to time in respect of size, rate of growth, structure, and geographic distribution of the Canadian population;..

It has been estimated that 175,000 immigrants per year would be necessary to keep Canada's population from declining early in the next century.²⁸ Such an influx of immigrants would also facilitate a growth in the number of tax-payers which, in turn, would further supply the demand by retirees and senior citizens for social services early in the next century.

However, it is evident that in terms of population growth, the federal government has not fulfilled its objective as stated in Section 3 (a) of the policy. In fact, this objective seems to have been disregarded. Immigration levels have been in decline for several years and remain well below the level of 175,000 people per year. Figure 1.0 reveals the total immigration to Canada per selected year since 1867.

²⁸Canada, Immigration Act, 1976

²⁹Mary Anne Burke, "Immigration." Canadian Social Trends, (Autumn, 1986), p. 23.

Figure 1.0 - Immigration to Canada by Calendar Year (1867-1987)

Source: Canada, Immigration Statistics, Employment and Immigration.

Exit Demography, Enter Economy

In view of Figure 1.0, it is evident that demographic concerns have not been adhered to in the recent past. It has been noted that propitious factors in the Canadian economy have acted to pull immigrants to Canada at various times. However, it is also evident that the Canadian federal government pays close

attention to the business cycle in determining Canada's yearly immigration levels. Each year Parliament tables an estimate of the expected number of immigrants for the upcoming year (this estimate is not supposed to represent a quota or a ceiling). This estimate is derived from consultations between the Department of Employment and Immigration, other federal departments, the provinces, and academics. The problem is that "Canada's immigration policy has been in a reactive mode, responding to short-term manpower and economic considerations."²⁹

The hypothesis that economics is taken into consideration above all else (as opposed to other concerns such as population growth) in adopting yearly immigration levels seems to be supported historically. For example, it was noted in 1966 that the White Paper on Immigration presented by Jean Marchand, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, seemed to be altering Canada's immigration tradition from one of humanitarianism to one more concerned with the work force.³⁰ This accusation emerged from the fact that the White Paper called for strict standards of education and skills to be met by all immigrants. Furthermore, the White Paper encouraged the immigration of highly skilled persons on a regular basis.³¹

²⁹ Constantine Passaris, op. cit., p. 34.

³⁰ W.D. Jones, "The importance of immigration to Canadian business," Business Quarterly, 33 (September, 1968), p. 29.

³¹ Ibid.

This trend continued in 1975 with the emergence of a Green Paper which proved to be even more restrictive. The Green Paper urged that all immigrants acquire a solid job prospect before attempting to enter the country. The economic theory of Canadian immigration was further supported when the Paper suggested that immigration policy should operate "in close harmony with all the major areas of economic and social policy, and in particular with manpower policy."³² This seemed to suggest that the business community would have much say in Canada's administration of its immigration policy, especially since job prospects would be a determining factor.

In November, 1984, Employment and Immigration Minister Flora Macdonald admitted that immigration levels had severely declined because of high unemployment rates and an economic slump which had forced Canada into a period of recession.³³ There is no doubt that the recession of the early 1980s created a large decline in immigration levels. Because of high unemployment rates, many immigrants, between 1982 and 1986, were barred from entering Canada unless they had pre-arranged employment.

Finally, in order to understand that economic concern is of

³² W.H. Grafftey, "Quest for an immigration policy," Canadian Business, 48, (May, 1975), p. 60.

³³ Malarek, op. cit., p. 36.

utmost importance in determining immigration policy, one need not look further than the federal departments with which immigration has traditionally been linked. The Department of Trade and Commerce, the Department of Mines and Resources, the Department of Manpower and Immigration, and the Department of Employment and Immigration, to name a few, have each maintained the jurisdiction of immigration under their auspices at different times. "The establishment of the Department of Manpower and Immigration in 1966 confirmed the intended supportive role of immigration in the improvement of the quality of Canadian manpower."³⁴ Today's department, by virtue of its title of Employment and Immigration, seems to support the idea that immigration is most affected by economic concerns.

Canada's demographic concerns and its looming population crisis have been largely ignored in arriving at yearly immigration levels. In 1985, the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects (also known as the Macdonald Commission) reported some of the demographic concerns presented here. Low fertility rates and low levels of immigration would definitely result in a declining Canadian population. The result would be an aging population with fewer people to meet the costs of social services. The Commission maintained that long-term demographic concerns should be

³⁴ Leroy O. Stone and Claude Marceau. Canadian Population Trends and Public Policy Through the 1980s, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977, p. 58.

considered in arriving at immigration levels. However, the Commission also realized the importance of economic concerns and stated that long-term planning is difficult to incorporate in policy-making.³⁵ Finally, the Commission reported that a net immigration of 125,000 people per year will resolve any potential population crisis (allowing for a constant fertility rate of 1.7 children per mother). This prescription seems to be in accordance with the above projected gross immigration of 175,000 people per year since approximately 40,000 to 50,000 people emigrate from Canada each year.³⁶

Since the report of the Macdonald Commission in 1985, it is evident that the federal objective to maintain population growth may be undergoing a change for the better. In 1987, 146,000 immigrants were admitted to Canada. According to immigration officer Robert Greenslade, the reason for increased immigration is to align immigration policy with the federal objective of increasing immigration in a moderate and controlled manner.³⁷ Greenslade also related increased immigration to the objective of solving a potential decline in the population and the realization that immigrants are not "stealing" jobs from native-born Canadians. This economic aspect will be reviewed in chapter

³⁵Canada, Volume II, Royal Commission on Economic Union and Development Prospects, p. 664.

³⁶Canada, Canada Yearbook, 1988, Statistics Canada, 1988.

³⁷Telephone interview with Canadian Immigration Officer Robert Greenslade, July 7, 1988.

three. Greenslade did not credit the recently improved economic atmosphere in Canada with the responsibility of boosting immigration levels. If unemployment rates and inflation levels had been as high in 1987 as they were in the early 1980s, one wonders if immigration levels would have actually been increased last year. Judging by Canada's past record, it is doubtful that the government will stray far from economic concerns in arriving at yearly immigration levels.

Immigrating to Canada

While it has been noted above that the Canadian Immigration Act of 1976 (implemented in 1978) claims to attain several goals, it also ensures that prospective immigrants will not be discriminated against on grounds of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, or sex (Section 3f). Excluded from this list, however, is language which may completely halt the prospective immigrant. Knowledge of the English or French language is certainly an advantage to becoming an immigrant to Canada. The humanitarian objective of Canada's immigration policy is adhered to in Section 3g which advocates Canada's legal and traditional obligation to help the world's displaced and persecuted persons.

Section six of the Act sets forth three classes of people which may become eligible for admission to Canada as immigrants. An admissible immigrant can be a "Family class" member, a

"Convention refugee" (as defined on page 2), or an "Independent applicant." Section eight of the Act makes it quite clear that all applications for immigration must be made from outside Canada.

The Family Class

If the prospective immigrant applies to immigrate as a member of the family class, then the immigrant must be sponsored by a Canadian citizen or a Canadian permanent resident over the age of 18. Under this class the immigrant must be a close relative to the sponsor such as a spouse, an unmarried child under the age of 21, a parent or grandparent over the age of sixty,³⁸ an unmarried and orphaned brother, sister, nephew, niece, or grandchild under the age of eighteen. A fiancé may also be sponsored. Other persons eligible for sponsorship under this class are set out in Section four of the Immigration Regulations. Although there is no limit as to how many immigrants may be sponsored by one person, the sponsor is obligated to provide care, lodging, and maintenance for the applicant and accompanying dependents for a period of up to ten years.

Section three of the regulations indicates that it is this class of immigrants which is given first priority in the processing of claims. Indeed this appears to be the case as

³⁸ Canadian citizens may sponsor parents of any age.

family class members tend to marginally form the largest proportion of immigrants to Canada each year. In 1985, the percentage of family class members reached 46% of the total immigrants while in 1983 family class members accounted for 54% of total immigrants to Canada.³⁹ However, it should be pointed out that in 1987 the percentage of family class members declined to fewer than 35% of all immigrants. This class of immigrants was surpassed by the independent class (see page 26) which claimed almost half of the total immigrants in 1987.⁴⁰ It appears that the family class will be the second largest class of immigrants in 1988. According to the Annual Report to Parliament on Future Immigration Levels for 1987, it is expected that 50,000 immigrants will enter Canada through family sponsorship. However, it is also expected that between 51,000 and 58,000 will enter Canada as independent immigrants.⁴¹

The Convention Refugee Class

Second on the immigration priority list is the refugee class which has brought a considerably varied number of immigrants to Canada each year. For example, in 1972, refugees accounted for only 4% of the total number of immigrants landing in Canada that year. In 1980, refugees formed a total of 28% of all

³⁹ Canada, Immigration Statistics, 1985, Employment and Immigration, 1986.

⁴⁰ Greenslade Interview, op. cit.

⁴¹ Canada, Annual Report to Parliament on Future Immigration Levels, Employment and Immigration, 1987, p. 1.

immigrants.⁴² This proportion of refugees seems to be experiencing a decline since refugees accounted for 17% of total immigrant in 1984,⁴³ and only 13% in 1987.⁴⁴ While Canada has accepted the United Nations' definition of a refugee, the Act includes other persons who may be included within this class. A person may be considered a member of the "Designated class," a sub-class of the refugee class, if he or she is not considered a Convention refugee, but is displaced by an emergency situation. In such a case the applicant may be accepted by Canada on the same humanitarian grounds as those which are extended to Convention refugees.⁴⁵

The Independent Class

The last class of admissible immigrants is the independent class. Within this class are six sub-classes in which the independent immigrant may apply on his or her own initiative.

The Assisted Relative

The first sub-class is that of the assisted relative. The differences between the assisted relative sub-class and the family class are numerous. To begin, the assisted relative may

⁴²"Immigration: Closed Door/Closed Mind," Canada and the World, 52:4 (December, 1986), p. 14.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Greenslade Interview, op. cit.

⁴⁵Canada, Your Rights and Canada's Immigration Law, Employment and Immigration, 1986.

be an immediate relative regardless of age. An applicant under this class must be a person who was unable to qualify on his or her own right as a completely independent immigrant. The immigrant, in this case, is subject to a point system which awards points for certain qualities which will aid the immigrant in adapting to Canadian life (See Appendix A). The assisted relative must obtain at least 60 out of 100 maximum points. Ten points are awarded if a Canadian citizen or permanent resident are willing to assist the immigrant in settling in Canada.

The Entrepreneur

The second sub-class of independent immigrants is the entrepreneur. In order to immigrate as an entrepreneur an applicant must intend to establish a business in Canada which will employ one or more Canadian citizens or permanent residents. The entrepreneur must obtain only 25 out of 80 points.

The Investor

A third classification in the independent class is the investor sub-class. In order to qualify as an investor, the applicant must have a net worth of \$500,000 and must be willing to invest half in a Canadian venture. Like the entrepreneur, the investor need only obtain 25 points in the point system. In April, 1988, Employment and Immigration Minister Barbara McDougall announced an alteration to the investor sub-class. The investor may invest only \$150,000 if the investment takes place

in a province which received fewer than 3% of total Canadian immigrants the previous year. This change has been implemented as a method of reducing regional disparity.⁴⁶ The expected result is that more investors will migrate to provinces in which a reduced investment is required. Thus provinces such as Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island (each of which traditionally receive fewer than one percent of Canada's yearly immigrants), and Manitoba and Saskatchewan (fewer than 5%)⁴⁷ may benefit from the altered policy. The impact on the Canadian economy by the investor and entrepreneur sub-classes will be measured in chapter three.

The Self-Employed

In this category, which is fourth on the priority list, the applicant must intend to establish a business which will create employment for him or herself. If not, the applicant must be able to contribute to the cultural and artistic life of Canada. A self-employee must attain 50 points before being admitted to Canada.

⁴⁶Canada, For Release, Employment and Immigration, April 27, 1988.

⁴⁷Yearly immigration statistics published by the Department of Employment and Immigration reveal the province of intended destination of most immigrants. However, the Department's Annual Report gives final accounts of where Canada's immigrants actually moved.

The Retiree

A fifth division in the independent class is the retiree sub-class. The Regulations define a retiree as an applicant who is at least 55 years of age and has enough money for establishment and maintenance in Canada. The retiree must not intend to seek or accept employment once admitted to Canada. Retirees are not subject to the point system.

Other Independents

The last category is maintained for all other independent immigrants who wish to come to Canada. These people are last on the priority processing list as established in section three of the Regulations. These applicants must obtain at least 70 points.

The Inadmissible

While it has been discussed at length who may enter the country, Section 19 of the Act explains quite candidly those who are inadmissible. Any person who poses a threat to public health, safety, order, or national security will be prohibited from immigrating to Canada. In some cases a person with a health impairment may be admitted as long as he or she does not jeopardize public health, does not become a burden on health or social services, and is capable of self-support. Criminals (according to Canadian law) also constitute inadmissible persons unless a certain individual appears to have been rehabilitated.

Finally, applicants who do not achieve the required number of points according to their individual class will also be prohibited from entering Canada.

It is evident that this brief review of Canadian immigration policy does not comprise a detailed synopsis of the Act. However, it is clear from this review that the policy is mostly concerned with economics. Immigrant classes such as the investor and entrepreneurial divisions encourage the immigration of wealthy people who may enjoy relatively low point requirements. The point system itself is based on factors which take the country's employment situation into full consideration (see Appendix A). This simple fact may be a grave error on the part of the federal and provincial governments when one considers that little concern has been directed toward the looming population crisis. Should Canadian immigration policy not address this concern, economic recession seems a likely prospect for the future.

Appendix ASelection Criteria for Independent Applicants

<u>Criterion</u>	<u>Maximum Points</u>	<u>Explanation</u>
Education	12	One point for each completed year of primary & secondary school.
Specific Vocational Training	15	Points awarded according to levels of training (one point minimum required).
Experience	8	Points awarded according to levels of experience.
Occupational Demand	10	Points awarded according to Canadian labour supply.
Arranged Employment	10	10 points for solid job prospect.
Knowledge of English or French	15	Points awarded according to fluency in reading, writing, speaking, etc.
Age	10	10 points awarded if age 21-44 - 2 points deducted for each year above or below.
Personable Suitability	10	Based on officer's judgement of applicant.
Levels Control	10	Points awarded according to immigration pattern. If too many applicants, fewer points.
Total	100	
Bonus - Assisted Relative	10	Applicant must have agreement of assistance from Canadian citizen or permanent resident.

Sources: Immigration Act, 1976, Employment and Immigration, 1976
Your Rights and Canada's Immigration Law, Employment and Immigration, 1986.

CHAPTER TWO - THE HISTORY OF CANADIAN IMMIGRATION:
THOSE CHOOSY GATE KEEPERS

There is no exaggerating the conviction that Canada is a land of immigrants. Even its first inhabitants, the aboriginal people, were thought to have migrated from Asia across a land bridge over the Bering Sea.⁴⁸ While difficult to determine, it has been estimated that these first immigrants may have arrived as many as 30,000 years ago.⁴⁹

Apart from some landings at Newfoundland, Canada's first European immigrants came from France. When Jacques Cartier arrived in 1534, little effort was made to settle the new land. While some tentative settlements were established near the St. Croix River between New Brunswick and Maine, it was not until 1604 when Samuel de Champlain secured the first official French colony at Port Royal, Acadia that actual settlement got underway. Four years later Québec city was established by the French. However, little interest was extended toward establishing large settlements and towards exploiting the land. Early French colonization was simply established to develop the fish staple and later the fur trade and to secure the interests of

⁴⁸Mary Anne Burke, "Immigration," Canadian Social Trends, (Autumn, 1986), p. 23.

⁴⁹Frank H. Epp, Your Neighbor as Yourself: A Study on Responsibility in Immigration, Winnipeg, Christian Press, 1968, p. 87.

monopolistic trading companies.⁵⁰

The eighteenth century proved to be a time of significant change in Europe. This period of change also created confusion and frustration among many of its citizens. In France, the revolution had driven many to feel alienated by the quickly changing political events. In the United Kingdom the industrial revolution left many in awe of advancing technology. In both of these nations, revolution, whether industrial or political, created an air of uncertainty, frustration, and confusion. Revolution became a "push" force in driving people out of their respective homelands:

Under these confusing emotions and confusing circumstances, it is not surprising that the New World appealed to the unemployed and the discontented as a land of social, economic, and political opportunity, and that those able to do so, emigrated.

While revolution in Europe brought thousands of emigrants to both Canada and the United States, revolution in North America also had a marked impact on Canadian immigration. The defeat of the British, at the hands of the Americans, brought many British subjects to Canada after the American Revolution. By this time Acadia had already been ceded to the British (1713) and the British, under General Wolfe, had already defeated the French on

⁵⁰Canada, Canada Yearbook, 1948-49, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1950, p. 172.

⁵¹Norman Macdonald, Canada, 1763-1841: Immigration and Settlement, Toronto, Longmans, Green and Co., 1939, p. 2.

the Plains of Abraham in Quebec (1759). The fact that Canada had become a British colony made it quite simple for British subjects in the United States to migrate to Canada. During the 1780s these United Empire Loyalists, numbering some 50,000, migrated to and established several settlements in Canada.⁵² Most settled in Nova Scotia (22,000) and New Brunswick (14,000).⁵³

It is evident from this example that both push and pull forces were at work in bringing the United Empire Loyalists to Canada. On one hand the achievement of American independence in 1776 established a "push" force on those who did not want to remain in a non-British nation. On the other hand, Canada had been ensconced as a British colony. This proved to be a "pull" factor in drawing loyal British subjects away from the United States. One may question which force, the push or pull, proved the stronger. One might hypothesize that the pull force exerted more strength than the push force in moving the Loyalists northward. For example, of 500,000 Loyalists who refused to accept independence and embrace republicanism, approximately 100,000 fled the country or were forced out.⁵⁴ However, of the 100,000 Loyalists who fled to such places as Britain, the West Indies, and Florida, 50,000 came to Canada. Not only was Canada

⁵² Frank H. Epp, op. cit., p. 91.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Walter Stewart, True Blue: The Loyalist Legend, Don Mills, Collins, 1985, p. 3.

British, but, it was also closer to the United States (another factor further supporting the pull force) than the other countries. Overall, 20% of the Loyalists were "pushed" out by American independence. However, 50% of this group was "pulled" in by favourable Canadian factors such as British rule and geographic proximity. This seems to suggest that the pull force exerted more strength than the push force in leading to Canadian immigration of the Loyalists.

Of course, those fleeing revolution and change cannot be entirely credited with providing Canada's early immigrants. Several other factors played substantive roles in bringing immigrants to Canada. For example, in 1782, a famine in Scotland began to push out those most affected. By 1789 the Scottish famine was so intense that the Scottish government encouraged emigration as a means of alleviating the severe food shortages.⁵⁵ Of course many emigrants chose the established and populous United States as their new country. However, Macdonald has estimated that many came to Canada because of cheaper transportation fares⁵⁶.

While conditions in Ireland had not reached famine and starvation proportion, it soon became evident that potential danger was approaching. By the 1780s soil and land in Ireland

⁵⁵ Norman Macdonald, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

had practically been exhausted in order to provide food for a surplus of population. Irish landlords began to evict tenants in order to provide themselves with food.⁵⁷

As the 18th century drew to a close, the strength of European push forces such as famine and over-population, was matched by equally strong Canadian pull forces. The new pull force which would become a strong magnet in attracting immigrants to Canada was simply "word of mouth." Eventually, new settlers would send letters home to relatives informing them of success and achievement in the new land. Immigrants in Canada became responsible for charming and alluring more immigrants to the new world. This seemed to be especially true among the Scottish whose efforts at captivating new immigrants succeeded in the establishment of several villages in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island.⁵⁸

Equally important in terms of advertising the advantages to be found in moving to Canada was the work of the shipping companies. However, unlike the letters sent by relatives, shipping agents often proved to be deceitful in attempting to lure people into buying tickets to cross the Atlantic. Often shipping agents would speak of free land and comfort to discover

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 10.

in the new world. Never was there mention of the hardship and suffering experienced when breaking the land or enduring harsh Canadian winters. Nor did profit-seeking shipping companies speak of the over-crowding and disease found on most ships bound for the new world. In his detailed and dramatic recapitulation, Guillet discloses the pain and misfortune suffered by emigrants bound for Canada:

The overcrowding on emigrant vessels, together with defective diet and the lack of medical supervision, provided the best soil for the spread of contagious diseases among those whose power of resistance had been greatly lessened by poverty and destitution.

This situation did not improve for several years. In 1847, 15,000 of 90,000 emigrants died on vessels headed for Canada.⁶⁰ It is quite clear that the state was inactive in combatting the destitution encountered by emigrants. At first, Britain, for example, had never encouraged emigration and therefore, saw no point in legislative intervention. But, by the 1800s, it had begun the policy of advocating emigration as a method of ridding the country of "misery, unemployment, and pauperism."⁶¹ Furthermore, in 1815 the British government began to pay the cost of emigration to North America. However, this "assisted emigration" was done on a small scale and mostly implemented to

⁶⁰ Edwin C. Guillet, The Great Migration: the Atlantic Crossing by Sailing Ship since 1770, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1963, p. 89.

⁶¹ Frank H. Epp, op. cit., p. 27.

⁶¹ Ibid.

rid the country of its poor people, those deemed most unwanted, and also, its criminals.

To make matters worse, the United States soon tired of caring for the large numbers of diseased and poor persons landing at its borders. Thus, in the 1820s, the United States imposed restrictions against the masses of immigrants who were poor, helpless, or known criminals. A U.S. head tax policy soon resulted in increased immigration to Canada.⁶²

One of the most influential push forces to ever take effect in any country occurred in 1846. The Irish potatoe famine convinced thousands of its citizens to leave.

The feeling prevailed that Ireland was a doomed country, totally unable to bear the pressure put on her economy and that all should leave who could.

In 1846 alone, well over 50,000 emigrants came from Ireland. Irish migration to Canada continued to be high in the 1870s when the first Census of Canada revealed that the Irish were the second largest ethnic group in Canada, totalling more than 846,000 people. Only the French were larger with more than one million citizens.⁶⁴

⁶² Norman Macdonald, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

⁶³ Norman Macdonald, Canada: Immigration and Colonization, 1841-1903, Toronto, Macmillan of Canada, 1968, p. 58.

⁶⁴ Canada, Canada: One Hundred Years, 1867-1967, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1968.

Of course problems in migrating persisted as thousands fleeing poverty and famine died on the vessels headed for the land of opportunity. It was not until shortly after Confederation that action was taken to deal with the shipping companies who had for too long taken such advantage of prospective immigrants. The Canadian Immigration Act of 1869 imposed a head tax of \$1.50 on every immigrant; limited the number of passengers per ship; and required that all immigrants submit themselves to medical inspections.⁶⁵ Furthermore, a ship's captain might be expected to pay up to three hundred dollars for temporary care of immigrants who arrived in poor health.

By the 1880s Canada was beginning to prosper, especially on the prairies. The development of the wheat economy and the building of the trans continental railway system meant Canada would require more people to help build its future. And so the gates opened. With the initiation of the Canadian Pacific Railway in 1881 came thousands of Finnish and Italian workers who were the first immigrants to toil long hard days on railway construction projects for \$1.50 per day. However, it was not long before the labour supply ran short and more people were needed. This convinced the CPR to turn to an ample and willing supply of Chinese workers.

⁶⁵ Frank H. Epp, op. cit., p. 98.

The Chinese had been coming to Canada in small numbers since the late 1840s when the Gold Rush on the Fraser river had attracted thousands of immigrants from all over the world. With the desperate need for more workers, the CPR brought an increased number of about 17,000 Chinese workers to Canada during the 1880s.⁶⁶ The Chinese were easily pulled to Canada realizing the good life which could be attained by the benefits of one dollar per day. This "dollar-a-day" policy enraged the non-Chinese workers who made \$1.50. These labourers felt they were being undercut and would be replaced by the Chinese in the event of a labour surplus. Rather than attacking the CPR for its exploitation of the Chinese, these workers immediately blamed the Chinese workers. One British Columbia newspaper reported: "The Chinese ulcer is eating into the prosperity of the country and sooner or later must be cut out."⁶⁷ It was not long before physical attacks were directed towards Chinese settlements which were often burned and destroyed especially in Victoria. The Canadian federal government finally decided to act in a legislative manner when the Asiatic Exclusion League (which could have easily been called the Klu Klux Klan) was established and initiated several racial attacks in British Columbia.

⁶⁶Canada, Canada: One Hundred Years, 1867-1967, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1968, p. 84.

⁶⁷Derived from the British Colonist in 1878 and quoted in: Ted Ferguson, A White Man's Country. Toronto, Doubleday Canada Limited, 1975, p. 2.

Unfortunately, the government's actions paint a dark picture in Canada's history of immigration. The legislation which it adopted bowed to the dominant white, Anglo-Saxon community. Rather than dealing with the conflict that had been occurring at the time, the federal government began the process of legislative restricted immigration on a racial basis.

Restrictions on Chinese immigration began in 1885 when the federal government imposed a fifty-dollar head tax on each Chinese immigrant.⁶⁸ This policy failed in that it did not deter the rail companies from importing Chinese laborers. The rail companies simply paid the head taxes and later deducted the cost from wages paid to the Chinese workers. Parliament simply replied by increasing the head tax to \$100 in 1900 and to \$500 in 1903.⁶⁹ Chinese immigration was practically halted.

Not to be out-manoeuvred, employers seeking cheap labour turned to the Japanese and the East Indians who could easily replenish the labour supply cut short by the exclusion of the Chinese. However, as in the case of the Chinese, it was not long before these Asians were confronted with a similar public backlash. Eventually public opinion became so harsh that the federal government was forced to enter a "Gentlemen's Agreement"

⁶⁸ J.L. Granatstein, Irving M. Abella, David J. Bercuson, R. Craig Brown, and H. Blair Neatby, Twentieth Century Canada, 2nd edition, Toronto, McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1986, p. 247.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

with Japan to limit the number of Japanese immigrants to 400 each year.⁷⁰ With the commencement of a severe economic depression in 1907, the Asians were once again centred out as the brunt of the problem. Thus in 1910, several Orders in Council were invoked with the intention of halting Asian immigration all together.

One such Order required that any Asian landing in Canada as an immigrant must have \$200 on his or her own person.⁷¹ Another Order in Council invoked the policy that an immigrant must come to Canada by a direct route from his or her homeland. While the first order successfully halted many Asians who found themselves penniless, the second completely barred all subjects of India since there were no direct shipping routes between India and Canada. These early restrictions established a theme of racism in Canadian immigration policy which would remain in force for several years. As British Columbia Premier Richard McBride noted in 1914:

To admit Orientals in large numbers would mean in the end the extinction of the white people, and we always have in mind the necessity of keeping this a white man's country.

It is quite clear Asians were not the only victims of outright racism extended by Canadians and Canadian officials.

⁷⁰ Ted Ferguson, op. cit., p. 7.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid., p. 10.

Sessing reveals that an anti-black campaign was established in 1898 when W.D. Scott became the Superintendent of Immigration for the federal government. Scott often attempted to dissuade black immigration by incorrectly arguing that "blacks couldn't stand the cold."⁷³ There is obvious evidence that much of this racism originated in Canadian society. For example, a 1910 resolution, passed by the Edmonton Board of Trade expressed concern about black immigration. "It is hoped that the Dominion Government might devise some means of stopping this undesirable influx."⁷⁴ And so it did. Blacks were completely discouraged from entering Canada for reasons of economy, climate, and just about anything Canadian officials could think of.⁷⁵

The year 1896 saw the Liberal Party led by Sir Wilfrid Laurier rise to power in the Canadian national government. Laurier's appointment of Sir Clifford Sifton as Minister of the Interior quickly advanced the opening of the west. Sifton's goal was to enhance wheat production to an unlimited extent. Sifton's famous quotation, "Only Farmers Need Apply," was advertised throughout dozens of countries. Soon enough shipping companies were bringing immigrants from such countries as Britain, Holland, Scandinavia, Germany, Austria, Russia, Hungary, Finland,

⁷³ Trevor W. Sessing, "How they kept Canada almost lily white," Saturday Night, 85 (September, 1970), p. 31.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

Luxembourg, and Switzerland. To Sifton the ideal immigrant proved to be:

a stalwart peasant in a sheepskin coat,
born of the soil, whose forefathers have
been farmers for ten generations, with a
stout wife and a half-dozen children.

Most fitting to this description were the Ukrainians who in number, clearly exceeded all non-British European immigrants between 1896 and 1911. By 1911 there were approximately 75,000 Ukrainians in Canada, settled mostly between Winnipeg and Edmonton.⁷⁷ In 1901 only 5,000 Ukrainians could be found in Canada. The explanation for such a large influx of Ukrainians may be found by referring to the pull and push factors which were well in effect during this time in both Canada and the Ukraine. The pull factors are obvious. Canada was a land of opportunity providing immigrants with potential economic enhancement. Furthermore, many Ukrainians found themselves fitting the description of Sifton's idea of a perfect immigrant. On the other hand, push factors in the Ukraine also had an impact on Canadian immigration. Stricken with over-population, famine, economic instability, and political uncertainty, the Ukraine found many of its inhabitants wishing to emigrate.

It was not only Ukrainians who were subjected to the strong

⁷⁶ J. L. Granatstein, et. al., op. cit., p. 242.

⁷⁷ Canada, Canada: One Hundred Years, 1867-1967, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1968, p. 86.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

pull forces which Canada began to emit at the turn of the century. Immigrants from all over the world were responding to Canada's pull factors. For example, practically all land in the United States had been settled by this time. This made the vast Canadian prairies more appealing to those who wished to pursue a farming livelihood. The lifting world depression in 1900 also meant new markets and higher prices for Canadian goods, especially wheat. Despite such attractive features, no pull factor could match the appeal of homesteads. Clearly Sifton's wish to develop the west was easily achieved when he invoked the policy of granting 160 acres of land to settlers who promised to contribute to the establishment of the west.⁷⁹ This condition meant that settlers were required to grow wheat on the land.

Between 1896 and 1911, almost two million immigrants entered Canada in response to Sifton's call to open the west. However, not all would become farmers. Many immigrants became wage laborers by building railroads, constructing roads, cutting timber, and mining coal. It was at this time that the economy and immigration slowly became labour intensive and increasingly linked to industry. While Canada was officially seeking "stalwart peasants" to develop the wheat industry, thousands of these immigrants soon became part-time and full-time industrial workers.

⁷⁹ J.L. Granatstein, et. al., op. cit., p. 242.

The explanation for this dichotomy lies in the ability of industrialists and farmers to link their economic interests in demanding an "open door" immigration policy. Before 1914 the Dominion's immigration policy emphasized the recruitment of "stalwart peasants" from Europe who could both push back the frontier and provide the labour needed on a casual or seasonal basis in the country.

In order to keep labour costs low and to keep the Canadian trade union movement at bay, the business community in Canada became a strong voice in favour of an open-door policy. Industry pushed for the admittance of anyone, especially those who were unskilled, healthy, and preferably illiterate.⁸¹ These people were the most difficult to organize and the least difficult to exploit. Many came with the hope of returning to their homeland with wealth and the ability to improve their life styles. However, most found that wages were so low that they could ill afford comfortable lifestyles even in Canada. Returns to homelands were soon forgotten.⁸²

By 1903, the administration of Canadian immigration policy seemed to be mostly in the hands of Canadian industry. So influential were the capitalists that a Canadian Labour Bureau was established in London to oversee the actions of the

⁸⁰ Donald Avery, Dangerous Foreigners: European Immigrant Workers and Labour Radicalism in Canada, 1896-1932, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1979, p. 9.

⁸¹ J.L. Granatstein et. al., *op. cit.* p. 244.

⁸² Ibid., p. 245.

immigration offices. While Sifton may have been responsible for filling the west with mostly agriculturalists, there is no doubt that the Canadian Labour Bureau soon began to alter immigration to a function of capitalism.

Between 1896 and 1914, Canadian Immigration policy served, above all else, the dictates of the capitalist labour market. Under the banner of economic growth thousands of immigrant workers were encouraged to enter the country to meet the labour needs of commercial agriculture, railroad construction, lumbering, mining, and other labour-intensive industries.

Despite the advancement of Canadian industry and the growth of wealth which had occurred during the first few years of the twentieth century, the years 1907 to 1913 proved to be a downturn in the Canadian economy. Voices were soon raised against the thousands of immigrants coming to Canada. According to Canadians, new immigrants were undercutting the established labour force. Little criticism was directed toward the large companies which were responsible for exploiting immigrant workers by paying them low wages and forcing them to work long hours. A surprising fact is that during the first decade of the twentieth century, real wages seldom changed.⁸⁴ This suggests that the sudden influx of immigrants during this period had little to do with the sudden decline in the economy. In fact, the pre-World War I recession might be explained by the state of the European

⁸⁴ Donald Avery, op. cit., p. 37.

⁸⁵ J.L. Granatstein, et. al., op. cit., p. 251.

economy. Relying on foreign capital for continued prosperity, Canada found its economic well running dry with economic recession running rampant throughout Europe.⁸⁵

Besides the concern over the supposed negative impact immigrants were exerting on the Canadian economy, other concerns were also being raised. Many saw the influx of immigrants from so many different countries as jeopardizing the Canadian identity, or more specifically, the British identity that Canada had assumed. Most Anglo-Saxons opposed the immigrants who were emerging from Central, Southern, and Eastern Europe. Most of these immigrants could not speak English, had little knowledge of Canadian laws and institutions, knew only primitive modes of agriculture and machine handling, and exhibited different cultural traits and religions.⁸⁶ The fact that Canadian immigrants were coming in masses left little opportunity for assimilation. For Canadians, immigration had become a "problem."

English and Russians, French and Germans, Austrians and Italians, Japanese and Hindus - a mixed multitude, they are being dumped into Canada by a kind of endless chain. They sort themselves out after a fashion, and each seeks to find a corner somewhere. But how shall we weld this heterogeneous mass into one people? That is our problem.

⁸⁵ Donald Avery, op. cit., p. 65.

⁸⁶ Norman Macdonald, Canada: Immigration and Colonization, 1841-1903, op. cit., p. 268.

⁸⁷ James S. Woodsworth, Strangers Within Our Gates, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1909, p. 167.

The call for assimilation by English-speaking Canadians was loud and clear. Immigrants, at least those who were non-British, were asked to renounce their pasts, forget their languages, cultures, customs, and "behave like little Englishmen."⁸⁸ Of course this was not about to occur when so many ethnic groups could find solace in the fact that Canada contained large populations of several nationalities.

It was not long before parts of urban centres became "Little Italies," China Towns," and other ethnic villages which would become commonly known as urban ghettos. The explanation for small urban ghettos characterized by poverty lies in the fact that most immigrants were severely exploited by profit-seeking capitalists. Few could afford to leave the confines of cheap housing. Perhaps even more important as a factor contributing to the continued existence of urban ghettos was the fact that for many immigrants these villages were a reminder of home. The establishment of various churches and associations certainly eased the culture shock of moving to a new country. Urban ghettos were unwelcome sights for Anglo-Saxons. The residents of these villages were accused of breeding filth, disease, crime, violence, inebriety, and of posing a general threat to Canadian society.⁸⁹

⁸⁸J.L. Granatstein, et. al. op. cit. p. 259.

⁸⁹J.L. Granatstein, et. al., op. cit., p. 252.

Nevertheless, urban ghettos survived and so did the exploitation of immigrant workers. Eventually inhuman work conditions and poor wages convinced many immigrant workers that some sort of defense must be taken against the exploitative capitalists. According to Avery, resistance to exploitation among immigrants ranged from uprisings to support for industrial unions and socialist organizations.⁹⁰ For many immigrants this was certainly not a new concept. Finns, Ukrainians, Russians, and those of the Jewish culture, to name a few, had been accustomed to struggles in their respective homelands against state, landlord, and even church.⁹¹

There seems to be no evidence that union militancy among European immigrants was more forceful than the resistance formed by British and Canadian-born laborers. Nevertheless, such actions undertaken by non-English-speaking immigrants seemed only to reinforce xenophobic tendencies among Anglo-Saxon Canadians. Non-English-speaking immigrants were seen as disrespectful and the cause of many strikes and riots. While public opinion continued to be against non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants, government officials were also spewing with rage over the large influx of such immigrants. So severe were some concerns that the Federal Member of Parliament, E.N. Lewis introduced a private members'

⁹⁰ Donald Avery, op. cit., p. 11.

⁹¹ J.L. Granatstein, et. al., op. cit., p. 252.

bill on February 7, 1910, which would have prohibited all persons south of 44 degrees latitude and east of 20 degrees longitude, and all natives of Turkey, from entering Canada as immigrants.⁹² While the bill was never passed, Lewis' explanation for its necessity stemmed from the fact that in order to keep Canada free, independent, and happy, it would be necessary to keep out the serious menaces who emerged from outside this prescribed zone.⁹³

Rather than adopting Lewis' prescriptions for limiting immigration, a more subtle feature was invoked and placed in the Canadian Immigration Act of 1910. The new policy contained a clause "which aimed at the deportation of anarchists and those who advocated the employment of force or violence against constituted law and authority."⁹⁴ While there seems little doubt among historians that the deportation clause was aimed at non-British immigrant laborers, its impact seemed questionable. Massive strikes among such workers broke out throughout 1912 and 1913.⁹⁵

⁹²Canada, Debates, House of Commons, February 7, 1910, p. 3134.

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Canada, Canada Yearbook, 1910. Census and Statistics Office, 1911, p. xvii.

⁹⁵J.L. Granatstein et. al., op. cit., p. 255.

Figure 2.0 - British v. non-British Deportation.

Source: Canada, Canada Yearbook, 1915, Census and Statistics Office, 1915.

Nevertheless, there seems to be some indication that the deportation clause may have worked as expected. Figure 2.0 describes the percentages of deportations per year among British and non-British immigrants. From 1908 to 1910 inclusive (the three years prior to implementation of the deportation clause), British deportees were clearly the majority of all persons deported. However, with the commencement of new deportation

regulations in 1910 there was a rapid reduction in the number of deported British subjects. Just three years later, non-British deportees clearly outnumbered those of British descent. Of course, it is difficult to assume a strong correlation between the deportation clause and the decrease in British immigrant deportations which followed thereafter. Other variables may have imposed an impact on the relationship. For example, in 1908, British immigrants constituted close to 50% of all immigrants to Canada. However, in 1913, British immigration totalled only 37%⁷⁶. This dramatic decrease in British immigration may have also had an effect in reducing deportation among British immigrants.

The Act of 1910 also defined, for the first time, a general class of those to be excluded. This class included immigrants;

deemed undesirable because of climatic, social educational, labour, or other conditions or requirements of Canada as deemed undesirable because of their customs, habits, modes of life, and methods of holding property,⁷⁷ and their probable inability to become assimilated.

It has been noted above that the customs, habits, and property-holding methods of most non-British immigrants were frowned upon by Anglo-Saxon Canadians. Quite clearly this clause would stand as a preventative measure against admitting too many undesirable

⁷⁶ Canada, Canada Yearbook, 1914, Census and Statistics Office, 1915.

⁷⁷ Frank H. Epp., op. cit., p. 98.

immigrants. However, its effects on inhibiting certain ethnic groups from immigrating seems somewhat questionable. Figure 2.1 reveals different ethnic group immigration to Canada for five years before the exclusionary clause and for five years after.

Figure 2.1 - Ethnic Group Immigration to Canada.

Source: Canada, Canada Yearbook, 1915, Census and Statistics Office, 1915.

Until 1910, it seems clear that British immigration to Canada was on a dramatic downfall. However, in 1911, just after

the implementation of the exclusion clause, British immigration once again experienced a sudden increase. On the other hand, immigrants from the United States had reached 50% of total Canadian immigrants by the year 1910. However, by 1911, this group formed only 39% of total Canadian immigrants. Unlike the sporadic changes in British and American immigration totals, Asian and non-British European immigration remained mostly stable before and after 1910. Since it was these very immigrants who were likely to be labelled as undesirable, it seems that the exclusion clause of the 1910 Act had little effect in limiting "undesirables."

The commencement of World War I in August, 1914, greatly reduced the number of immigrants permitted into Canada. So reduced was immigration that during the war years only about 200,000 immigrants came to Canada. These proved to be mostly American citizens who came to fill substantial labour shortages. The implementation of the War Measures Act of 1914 partly explains the labour shortage during the war. Because of the war, more than 500,000 immigrants in Canada were considered "enemy aliens." Of this large group, more than 8,500 were sent to internment camps.⁹³ The need for more workers would soon "water down" this policy. While industries hustled to supply ammunition to the war effort, harvesters and food manufacturers attempted to feed the army. So great were labour shortages that by 1916 many

⁹³ Donald Avery, op. cit., p. 66.

"enemy aliens" were turned loose in order to supply the work force. Thousands from the United States poured into Canada seeking jobs and partly ameliorated the labour shortage. By 1917, Canada still needed an additional 100,000 workers. Most "enemy aliens" were released except those considered most dangerous.⁹⁹

While the war ended, violence in Canada did not. Over 100,000 immigrants came to Canada in 1919 with the hope of beginning new lives. However, the growth of the labour movement only made the immigrant seem more unpopular as 1919 proved to be a year of countless strikes and riots including the Winnipeg General Strike.

The key role played by immigrant workers in these strikes, as well as their prominence in the newly created One Big Union, convinced most government officials and businessmen that something had to be done. Many aliens were deported; police agents were instructed to infiltrate radical organizations; companies began firing their foreign workers; mobs of returning veterans attacked immigrants with impunity; and a royal commission was established to investigate the state of industrial relations in the country and particularly the role played by non-Anglo-Saxon workers.¹⁰⁰

During the Winnipeg General Strike of May and June 1919, Prime Minister Borden sent Robert Gideon, Minister of Labour, and Arthur Meighen, a cabinet minister from Manitoba, to investigate

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 69.

¹⁰⁰ J.L. Granatstein et. al., *op. cit.*, p. 258.

the violent strike actions. They concluded that the strike was actually perpetuated by immigrants and that the strike leaders should be deported.¹⁰¹ Thus on June 6, 1919, Immigration Minister, James Calder, proposed an amendment to the Immigration Act which permitted deportation without trial. According to Henry Borden, this amendment endured three readings, went through the committee stage and was passed within twenty minutes.¹⁰² Of course Robert Borden's government was most embarrassed when they soon discovered that the Winnipeg strike leaders were predominantly Anglo-Saxon.¹⁰³

While most immigrant workers were regarded as "bolshevist" and "revolutionary," Canada's so-called immigration "problem" was experiencing another change. In 1919, Canada needed more people. In attempting to formulate a new Immigration Act, James Calder announced the need for a greater population to alleviate the huge national debt which had accrued during the war.¹⁰⁴ It was Calder's belief that more people would reduce the burden on taxpayers in attempting to offset the national debt. Calder also expressed concern over the underutilized railroads and the very

¹⁰¹ John English, Borden: His Life and World, Toronto, McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1977, p. 181.

¹⁰² Henry Borden, Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs, New York, Macmillan Company, 1938, p. 978.

¹⁰³ John English, op. cit., p. 181.

¹⁰⁴ Canada, Debates, House of Commons, April 29, 1919, p. 1867.

small domestic market available to producers and manufacturers. More people would translate into more customers for the railroads and other businesses.¹⁰⁵

While Canada needed more people, it was certainly not Calder's intention to fling open the gates to any prospective emigrants. According to Calder, Canada had already been "too gracious" in allowing immigrants from all over the world, especially those who would not assimilate. The "problem" then was not one of quantity, but, one of quality. Calder was convinced that immigrants should only be those who were willing to renounce their culture and language and assimilate into the Anglo-Saxon Canadian society. Even better immigrants would be those who were already Anglo-Saxon.

As xenophobic views became pronounced, so did the call for reduced immigration. For example, Professor A.R.M. Lower was convinced that immigration, between 1919 and 1930, had become "socially injurious." Lower attempted to demonstrate that "cheap" men were driving out "dear" men.¹⁰⁶ Resembling Hurd's displacement theory, Lower's theory maintained that immigrants simply drove out native-born Canadians.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Arthur R.M. Lower, Colony to Nation: A History of Canada, Toronto, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1946, p. 470.

Immigration was proving as injurious for the quality of the population as it was for the quantity...The man who will work for a lower wage will always drive out the man who has become accustomed to the higher...The men who demand least from life will drive out the men who demand more. From 1921 to 1931 the increase of Canadian-born professionals in the United States and of European-born peasants in Canada indicated how inexorably this [theory] of immigration was working.

It seems unlikely that Lower's theory of immigration holds true. It seems more likely that Lower has disregarded the push and pull laws which usually determine whether or not a person will migrate. It is important to remember that during the first part of the century, Canada was mostly an agrarian society. The fact that this was appealing to many of the world's emigrants should have had no bearing on Canadian professionals' decisions to leave the country. It has been suggested that one's decision to emigrate is usually predominated by economic concern. Thus professionals in Canada were pulled into the United States because of the economic opportunities offered there. Canadian professionals were not driven away by "cheap" immigrants.

Advocates of reduced immigration included labour groups, which were certain they were being undercut by immigrant workers; French-speaking Canadians, who opposed immigration because most immigrants were assimilated into Anglo society and because French-speaking immigrants were discouraged from entering Canada;

Ibid.

Protestant churches, which believed too many of the incoming immigrants were Roman Catholic; and many English-speaking Canadians who expressed concern that most immigrants were totally unassimilable.¹⁰⁸

Despite the numbers opposed to immigration, the transportation companies seemed to hold the upper hand. New immigrants continued to enter Canada by the thousands. However, by 1925, most fertile land in the west had been settled. Many new arrivals found themselves without jobs. Many were also penniless. Some voices were raised against the shipping companies and the Canadian government for advertising the success to be found in Canada. Many accused the shipping companies of simply shipping emigrants as if they were cattle and dumping them wherever possible.¹⁰⁹ In Saskatchewan, the Klu Klux Klan began to grow with the intention of scaring off the prospective immigrant.¹¹⁰

It was not until 1929 and the commencement of the Great Depression that Canada cut off the flow of immigration. Between 1930 and 1939, only 140,000 immigrants came to Canada. One Order in Council, established early in the 1930s, proposed that only those with enough capital to establish and maintain themselves

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ H. Feilman, The Globe, Thursday, May 22, 1924, p. 4.

¹¹⁰ J.L. Granatstein et. al., op. cit., p. 259.

would be admitted. However, by 1931, immigration was refused to all except British and American agriculturalists.¹¹¹

This period also represented Canada's darkest performance in the realm of immigration. While the depression gave the federal government a chance to reduce immigration, it also afforded them a chance to solidify a racist immigration policy. This is evident in reviewing the plight of Jewish refugees. During the 1930s approximately 800,000 Jews sought sanctuary from German persecution. Following is a table of countries who accepted Jewish refugees during this era.

Table 2.0 - Jewish Refugees Resettled - 1933-1933

<u>Country</u>	<u>Number of Refugees accepted</u>
United States	140,000
Palestine	100,000
Britain	85,000
Argentina	22,000
Colombia	20,000
Mexico	20,000
Brazil	20,000
China	15,000
Canada	4,000

Source: Irving Abella and Harold Troper, "The line must be drawn somewhere; Canada and Jewish Refugees, 1933-1939" Twentieth Century Canada: A Reader, J.L. Granatstein, et. al. (eds) (see bibliography).

Part of the reason for Canada's dismal record of accepting Jewish refugees centres around F.C. Blair who served in the

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 261.

Immigration Department for 41 years beginning in 1903. Blair became Assistant Deputy Minister of the Department in 1924 and Director of Immigration in 1936. His influence seems to have had a great impact on the incredibly small number of Jewish immigrants who were admitted into Canada.

Pressure on the part of the Jewish people to get into Canada has never been greater than it is now and I am glad to be able to add, after 35 years of experience here, that it was never so well controlled.

In one memo Blair boasted his ability to avoid the responsibility of accepting Jewish refugee children. After successfully halting 9,000 Jewish children from entering Canada, Blair complained that accepting the children would have meant that Canada "would have had nothing but Jewish children here."¹¹¹ Eventually Blair suggested that all governments take a stand against admitting refugees without capital or recognized citizenship. Obviously this was a further ploy to halt Jewish refugees. It was common knowledge that Jewish people in Austria and Germany were stripped of all citizenship and all assets.¹¹²

Clearly Canada was able to use the depression as an excuse

¹¹¹ Irving Abella and Harold Troper, "The line must be drawn somewhere: Canada and Jewish refugees, 1933-39," Twentieth Century Canada: A Reader, J.L. Granatstein, Irving M. Abella, David J. Bercuson, R. Craig Brown, H. Blair Neatby, (editors), Toronto, McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1986, p. 260.

¹¹² David Thomas, "How we kept out the black and the yellow," Saturday Night, 87, (September, 1970), p. 12.

¹¹³ Abella and Troper, op. cit., p. 268.

to thwart potential immigrants, especially those who were thought to be undesirable.

...in a democratic country such as ours, racial and linguistic composition is of paramount importance, therefore, new Canadians should be of a readily assimilable type. Because the French do not take to emigration, preferable settlers are those who speak English.

Subsequently, Canada's immigration policy became ordered racially. On top of the priority list were the British and the Americans who were considered most assimilable. Second were the Dutch and the Scandinavians who supposedly were already acquainted with English or, at least, were quick learners. Southern and Eastern Europeans, considered less assimilable, were third on the immigration priority list. Finally Orientals were held to be least assimilable and least desirable.¹¹⁶

It would not be until after World War II that Canada's gates would creak open once again. However, Canada's immigration policy would still remain conditional as Mackenzie King revealed in a famous 1947 statement.

There will, I am sure, be general agreement with the view that the people of Canada do not wish, as a result of immigration, to make a fundamental alteration in the character of our population.

While King realized the need for more immigrants, he was also

¹¹⁶ Canada, Canada Yearbook, 1930, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1930, p. 165.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Canada, Debates, House of Commons, Thursday, May 1, 1947, p. 2646.

prepared to ensure that these people came from predominantly white, English-speaking nations. Thus restrictions were lifted on all British subjects and American citizens.¹¹⁸ However, it is evident that such groups did not compose as large a group of immigrants as would have been expected.

Between 1945 and 1961, British and American immigrants constituted only 30% of the total immigrants to Canada. Refugees, including anti-Nazis and anti-Communists formed over 22% of Canada's immigrants.¹¹⁹ This reveals that a huge proportion of Canada's 1.7 million immigrants during this period were pushed out of their respective homelands for political reasons. A survey conducted by Richmond clearly supports this position. Between 1945 and 1961, 23.2% of Canada's immigrants came because of political reasons.¹²⁰ All other immigrants seemed to have been pulled to Canada. Those who viewed Canada as a haven for economic opportunity constituted over 50% of total immigrants. Most other immigrants came to Canada for personal reasons such as family reunification.¹²¹

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 2645.

¹¹⁹ Abella and Troper, op. cit.

¹²⁰ Anthony H. Richmond, Post-War Immigrants in Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1967, p. 32

¹²¹ Ibid.

Several changes were implemented during this time such as the 1950 creation of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. According to Hawkins, moving Immigration from the Department of Mines and Resources to Citizenship and Immigration would separate human and natural resources. Under the Department of Mines and Resources, immigration had become somewhat unorganized.¹³

In 1952 a new Immigration Act was implemented which proposed to redefine several procedures. However, consistent with prior Acts, the 1952 regulations remained affected by racial discrimination. Any immigrant could be refused admission on the basis of nationality, citizenship, ethnic group association, class, or geographic origin. These are only a few of the restrictions which were listed in the Act. A racial priority list was maintained with British and American immigrants remaining most preferable. However, French immigrants from France, St. Pierre, and the Miquelon islands were added to the list.¹⁴ The reason for this addition stemmed from public pressure originating mostly in Quebec. Most immigrants were integrated into the English-speaking society. More French immigrants would help preserve the French language and culture in

¹³ Freda Hawkins, Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern, Montreal, McGill-Queen's Press, 1972, p. 95.

¹⁴ Canada, Canadian Immigration: An outline of developments in the post-war period, reference paper #1, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, November, 1957, p. 7

Canada.

Included in the post-war changes was the repeal of the 1923 Chinese Immigration Act which had prohibited all Chinese immigrants (except merchants) from entering Canada. However, this change had little impact in terms of Chinese immigration. The 1950 Canada Yearbook boasted its incessant policy of controlling Chinese immigration by admitting only wives and minor children of Chinese Canadians.¹²⁴ Finally, immigrants from India, Pakistan, and Ceylon were limited to 300, 100, and 50 persons respectively per year.

The post-war period was mostly one of prosperity in Canada as jobs seemed to be relatively abundant. Thus, there seemed to be no economic explanation to reduce immigration. However, as usual, there came a renewed call from Canadian society for assimilation, especially since so many immigrants were emerging from non-Anglophone origins.¹²⁵ This time the call for assimilation would be opposed by the emergence of a new concept-integration. The definition of assimilation assumes that people and groups acquire memories, sentiments, attitudes, and

¹²⁴ Canada, Canada Yearbook, 1950, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1950.

¹²⁵ Yearly immigration statistics reveal that British and American dominance of total Canadian immigrants per year have consistently declined since the post-war period. Since the 1970s Asian immigration has grown to a point where it now constitutes a majority.

experiences of other groups and peoples whereby an interpenetration of groups takes place.¹²⁶ In terms of Canadian immigration, assimilation has required that immigrants acquire the sentiments and attitudes of English-speaking Canadians and, on a secondary basis, of French-speaking Canadians. Little interpenetration has taken place. Rather, immigrants have usually been expected to abandon all previously acquired culture and language.

In 1955, some literature could be found criticizing the concept of Canadian assimilation. It was Woodside who argued for the practise of integration. While immigrants usually learn to speak English or French, the evasion of their respective common customs and cultures could not possibly contribute to Canadian life.¹²⁷ Woodside's intention was to see that a new Canadian culture commence to which all immigrants contributed, regardless of background. Although, Woodside never referred to the concept of "multiculturalism," it is interesting to note that this was his exact prescription as early as 1955. Of course it was not until 1971 when Trudeau announced a new program of multiculturalism designed; to assist cultural groups to retain and foster their identity; to assist cultural groups to overcome barriers and become full participants in Canadian society; to

¹²⁶Anthony H. Richmond, op. cit., p. 27.

¹²⁷C.W. Woodside, "Problem in integration: the new Canadians," Saturday Night, 70, (January 8, 1955), p.6-7.

promote creative exchanges and interactions among all cultural groups; and, to assist all immigrants in the attainment of at least one official language.¹²⁸

The years 1956 and 1957 represent two years in Canadian history in which push forces in other countries were responsible for sending a huge number of emigrants to Canada. While the Hungarian revolution brought nearly 40,000 immigrants to Canada, the Suez crisis convinced over 100,000 Britons to move to Canada.

The Hungarian crisis of November, 1956, which by the end of December 1958 brought 37,556 immigrants to Canada, awoke the nobler instincts of the Liberal government...Shortly after the Hungarian Revolution, the Suez crisis erupted, and in the wake of the Hungarians came 108,989 British immigrants, in a mood to migrate after this sad demonstration of ineptness by the Eden government.¹²⁹

From Hungary came many immigrants fleeing the Communist takeover. British emigrants were also leaving for political reasons. However, British emigrants were not persecuted as were many of the Hungarians. British immigrants to Canada during this period were mostly disillusioned with their own government.

Under Diefenbaker, immigration would experience an abrupt turn. Citing high unemployment, Diefenbaker's Conservative government quickly reduced immigration levels until they fell to

¹²⁸ Canada, Race Relations and the Law: Report of a Symposium held in Vancouver, British Columbia, April 22-24, 1982, Minister of State for Multiculturalism, p. 1.

¹²⁹ Freda Hawkins, op. cit., p. 111.

fewer than 72,000 in 1961 and fewer than 75,000 in 1962. Despite the decrease, many refer to 1962 as a watershed in terms of immigration. The reason lies in Citizenship and Immigration Minister Ellen Fairclough's Immigration Act of 1962 which wiped away a great deal of the discrimination which had accompanied immigration law for so long.¹³⁰ Fairclough claimed to initiate new emphasis on skills, training, and education. However, while this may be the case, one need not look further than the immigration regulations of 1962 to discover that all residents of Africa, except Egypt, and all residents of Asia were still discriminated against.¹³¹

It is evident that the emphasis on skills, training, and education, initiated by Fairclough, opened the door for what would become an official alignment between economics and immigration. In 1965, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration was dissolved and the administration of immigration was handed over to a new department, Manpower and Immigration. It is apparent that immigration was to be linked with the needs of the labour force. Indeed shortly after the creation of the new department, its minister, Jean Marchand, stated in a white paper on immigration that Canadian economic efficiency relied on a close relationship between manpower and immigration policies.

¹³⁰ G.A. Rawlyck, "Canada's immigration policy, 1945-1962," Dalhousie Review, 42, (Autumn, 1962), p. 294.

¹³¹ Freda Hawkins, op. cit., p. 126.

This national effort to improve the employability and the productivity of the work force should not be offset by immigration policy, as it would be if a large proportion of immigrants were unskilled.¹¹²

The Green Paper on immigration in 1974 sought to confirm Marchand's sentiments and further solidified the relationship between economics and immigration policy.

...immigration is intimately linked to economic realities. Immigration policy must be shaped by the same general aims as national economic policy, of which, from the manpower viewpoint, it is a constituent element.

During the mid-seventies, Canada's immigration levels began to steadily increase. In 1974 alone, Canada received well over 218,000 immigrants. The reason for this large influx did not rely on pull forces acting in Canada which usually had a strong impact. Rather, the explanation for the influx seems to be found in the counter-pull forces which were in force in several other countries during the same time. For example, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Britain, and Australia, each receive numerous applications from prospective immigrants each year. These four nations usually "pull" immigrants because each

¹¹² Canada, White Paper on Immigration, Jean Marchand, Department of Manpower and Immigration, October, 1966, p.9.

¹¹³ Canada, Green Paper #1: Immigration Policy Perspectives, Department of Manpower and Immigration, December, 1974, p. 19.

country, like Canada, seems to emit an atmosphere of economic opportunity. However, by 1974, each of these nations introduced counter-pull forces to limit the flow of immigrants into their countries. Australia and Britain were both tightening immigration laws because of rising unemployment and general economic strain. West Germany was refusing more immigrants because of economic and social strain. Even its policy of admitting "guest workers" was altered, forcing many to look elsewhere for economic opportunity. Finally, the United States had already implemented a policy of restricting immigrants to 280,000 per year with no more than 20,000 immigrants emerging from one specific country.¹³² All of these counter-pull forces resulted in increased immigration to Canada.

There is a clear indication of the relationship between economics and immigration in the 1980s. Canada introduced counter-pull forces of its own by limiting immigration only to those with certain job prospects. In 1985, Canada's total immigration fell to fewer than 35,000 people. Skyrocketing unemployment and severe economic recession has been the cause. It was not until 1987 when the federal government realized the nation's need for more people and that it once again opened the gates.

¹³² W.H. Grafftey, "Quest for an immigration policy," Canadian Business, 48, (May, 1975), p. 9-10.

It is quite clear that Canadian Immigration policy has moved in several directions throughout its evolution. For most of its existence, it has remained discriminatory with regard to many races and ethnic groups. For the student of Canadian politics this may seem surprising, especially when one considers that this country, from its beginnings, was built by immigrants, albeit two very large groups, the French and the English. While discriminatory regulations seem to have been removed, Canadian immigration policy, in the last few decades, has taken on a new light. Rather than being solely concerned with exclusion and discrimination, the policy has become administered in a manner mostly concerned with economics. Nevertheless, one must remember that the policy and its administration will always be affected by what happens elsewhere in the world. The laws of push and pull forces have always determined who and how many will come to Canada. It is these ever changing forces which make Canada's immigration policy difficult to administer. Finally, it is necessary to remember the potential population and economic crises which loom over the country. Canada must make optimum use of immigration policies, especially now, when its administration may be crucial to continued prosperity.

CHAPTER THREE - THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CANADIAN IMMIGRANTS

In attempting to discover the economic impact exerted by immigrants, one must realize that there are two opposing schools of thought which must be dealt with. One assumption is that in times of economic difficulties an open-door immigration policy would simply boost the unemployment rate. This "classical" point of view maintains that economic troubles are only aggravated by allowing too many immigrants to enter the country. Furthermore, in times of prosperity when the unemployment rate is relatively low, the arrival of immigrants would create unemployment so that economic prosperity would be turned into economic despair.

On the contrary, the Keynesian point of view assumes that immigrants do not aggravate unemployment, but actually create jobs. Once an immigrant arrives he or she becomes an immediate consumer. The more spending an immigrant does, the more the economy is primed with the introduction of new jobs. Thus a large influx of immigrants would push the economy through a down cycle. The advocate of this view point would maintain that Canada should always maintain an open-door policy of immigration in order to enlarge the Canadian domestic market. A large domestic market would replace Canada's export market which has become difficult to maintain because of the world wide growth of protective measures.

The Classical Theory

Probably the most significant factor which has contributed to decreased immigration levels in the past has been the existence of unemployment. Canadians and Canadian officials constantly refer to the problem of unemployment as a motive for maintaining or even reducing yearly immigration levels. This excuse has already been cited in chapter one as a major factor contributing to the refusal to allow Jewish refugees to establish asylum in Canada before and during the Second World War.

In 1959 a national report by Peter C. Newman revealed that Canadians, "some in their official positions, many more unofficially have been raising the cry that immigrants are snatching jobs away from native-born Canadians..."¹³⁵ This classical rage could be heard in queues as people, lined up at the Unemployment Insurance Commission, were bent on "doing something about the damn immigrants."¹³⁶ Indeed this accusation that immigrants are "job snatchers" has had academic support for most of the twentieth century. In his "Case Against Immigration," Lower was convinced that immigrants simply assumed jobs which could have otherwise been obtained by native-born Canadians.

¹³⁵ Peter C. Newman, "Are New Canadians Hurting Canada?" Maclean's, (July, 1959), p. 19.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

The man with the higher standard of living cannot compete with the man with the lower. In this sense, virtually all immigrants are "cheap" men, for on arriving in this country they are not in a position to bargain for the sale of their labour. They must get a livelihood on what terms they can.

Woodsworth expressed many of the same ideas, especially when he concluded that immigrants entered only to subsequently "crowd out" native-born workers.¹²⁶

This theory that immigration only succeeds in increasing unemployment rates has also been advocated by various groups. Organized labour, for one, has, in the past, held the classical view that increased immigration should never take place in times of economic downturn.

We are in agreement with the general economic immigration policy that the flow of immigrants should be regulated by the country's absorptive capacity. We agree further that to bring in immigrants during a period of high unemployment is to do an injustice both to the immigrants and to the Canadian citizens who are looking for and unable to find work.

This negative attitude among academics and public opinion leaders

¹²⁶ Arthur R.M. Lower, "The Case Against Immigration," History and Myth: Arthur Lower and the Making of Canadian Nationalism, Welf H. Heick (editor), Vancouver, University of British Columbia, 1975, p. 261. First published in Queen's Quarterly, (Summer, 1930), pp. 557-74.

¹²⁷ James S. Woodsworth, Strangers Within Our Gates or: The Coming Canadians, with an introduction by Marilyn Barber, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1972, p. 184. First Published in 1909.

¹²⁸ D. Orlikow, "Labour and Immigration," Canadian Labour, 9, (February, 1964), p. 17.

has affected public attitudes towards immigrants. For example, in 1974, a national poll found that approximately half of all Canadians believed immigrants were either a burden on the economy or contributed very little to it.¹⁴⁰ In 1985, Canadians were asked if the country's immigration levels should increase, decrease, or remain the same. Fifty-two percent of the respondents felt that immigration levels should be reduced (as opposed to 14% who favoured an increase and 38% who maintained that the policy should remain the same).¹⁴¹ Of the 42% who opted for reduced levels, 72% of this group cited high unemployment as grounds for their decision. It has been found that high unemployment levels in Canada usually lead to reduced immigration levels one or two years after the year of high unemployment.¹⁴²

The evolution of the classical theory has undergone an expansion to include other motives for barring immigrants from Canadian soil. While "unemployment" remains the most important justification, other factors have been introduced and relied on to reinforce the case against immigration. For example, immigrants are often accused of "loafing around on our generous

¹⁴⁰ Nancy Tienhaara, Canadian Views on Immigration and Population, Canada, Manpower and Immigration, 1974.

¹⁴¹ Joe O'Donnell, "Canadians Have Racist Views of New Immigrants," Toronto Star, November 29, 1985, p. A1.

¹⁴² Karin Walker, Immigration Policy in Canada: Public Opinion Versus Facts (A Study of the Relationship Between Unemployment Rates and Immigration Levels). B.A. Thesis, Carleton University, June 1988.

welfare benefits."¹⁴³ Of course such a statement directly contradicts the earlier argument that immigrants are "job snatchers." Either immigrants succeed in displacing native-born workers in the job market, or fail to do so and find themselves on welfare. However, one should not accuse them of both.

Overall, the classical theory proceeds on two contrasting lines of attack. On the one hand, it maintains that immigrants "steal" jobs and boost unemployment under the assumption that immigrants are competitive, well-trained, and capable of assuming jobs in the Canadian labour market. On the other hand, immigrants are seen as tax burdens on native-born Canadians under the assumption that immigrants are lazy, poorly trained and unable to compete in the Canadian labour force. Nevertheless, these opposing arguments lead to the same policy conclusion: Canada should close its doors to immigrants. Unfortunately, there is no evidence in support of restrictions on immigration on either ground.

The Keynesian Theory

While it is common for Canadians to accuse immigrants of "stealing" jobs, the Keynesian theory of immigration refutes this argument by showing that immigrants do not steal jobs, but create them. Increased population leads to a growth of consumers which,

¹⁴³ "Immigration: Closed Door Closed Mind," Canada and the World, 52:8, (April, 1987), p. 13.

in turn, leads to more demands for food, shelter, clothing, and other goods and services. Increased demand then translates into increased job availability.

People create markets and markets create jobs. Expanding markets means more efficient production of goods and services which leads to higher standards of living.

The basic assumption of the Keynesian school of thought is that the Canadian economy is still open for expansion because of the availability of natural resources, and that the marginal cost of production has reached the optimal level. As a result, the high cost of production and inefficient use of the productive forces prevent Canadian goods from successfully competing in the world market. With a larger indigenous market through immigration, increased product demand would lead to lower production costs as economies of scale and general efficiency are achieved. The result - fewer lay-offs and increased employment leading to increased competitiveness in the world market. Therefore, the Keynesian theorist would promote increased immigration levels in order to accommodate the enhancement of the Canadian economy.

Throwing Out The Classical Theory

In 1959, Citizenship and Immigration Minister, Ellen Fairclough, was convinced that immigrants actually facilitated

¹⁻⁻"Immigration: Closed Door/Closed Mind," op. cit., p. 14.

the initiation of a substantial number of jobs rather than creating a labour surplus. This was mostly because of the fact that immigrants became automatic consumers once they were established in Canada.¹⁴⁵ A 1974 study conducted by Louis Parai found that immigrants actually contribute to economic growth through demands for shelter, food, equipment, and other consumer needs.¹⁴⁶ This study has received further support from another investigation prepared in 1987. DeVoretz and Akbari concluded that "there is no strong evidence favouring the hypothesis of displacement of native-born workers by immigrants in Canada."¹⁴⁷ Finally a report to the Immigration Department in Québec revealed that for every ten jobs attained by immigrants in the province of Québec, five new jobs were created.¹⁴⁸

To counter the ethnocentric view of immigrants as "social parasites," DeVoretz and Akbari confirm that immigrants are not a burden on the economy. This study which measured immigrant income performance, tax contributions, and transfer payments, found that "immigrant families in general make a large net

¹⁴⁵ Peter C. Newman, op. cit., p. 19.

¹⁴⁶ Louis Parai, Economic Impact of Immigration, Ottawa, Department of Manpower and Immigration, 1974.

¹⁴⁷ Don DeVoretz and Syed Ather Akbari, The Substitutability of Immigrants in Production, Canada, Employment and Immigration, 1987, p. 10.

¹⁴⁸ Mario Polèse and Agnès Le Minh, L'impact à court terme de l'immigration internationale sur la production et l'emploi au Québec, 1968-1975, Ministère de l'immigration, 1978.

contribution to the Canadian treasury."¹⁴⁹ While unattached immigrants facilitated a net drain on the economy, the drain was so insignificant that overall immigrant contributions to the Canadian economy totalled \$2.1 billion in 1981 alone.¹⁵⁰ The Polese-Le Minh study revealed similar results. This report found that immigrants do cost the Québec treasury more in social services during their first three years in Canada. However, once immigrants had been in Québec for ten years they actually cost the government less in social services than did native-born Québécois.¹⁵¹

How Immigrants Affect the Canadian Economy: A Macro Analysis

In the attempt to understand the economic impact of immigration several macroeconomic models have been developed. Models such as RDX2, CANDIDE, and TRACE¹⁵² have each revealed that increased immigration levels subsequently lead to increased unemployment rates. The models arrive at conclusions derived from equations which measure estimated consumption expenditures, residential expenditures, government expenditures, and the gross national expenditure. However, each model relies on too many

¹⁴⁹ Don DeVoretz and Syed Ather Akbari, Canadian Immigrant Income Performance, Tax Contributions, and Transfer Payments, Canada, Employment and Immigration, 1987, p. 3.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁵¹ Mario Polese and Agnes Le Minh, op. cit.

¹⁵² Gordon W. Davies, "Macroeconomic Effects of Immigration: Evidence from CANDIDE, TRACE, and PIGOT," Canadian Public Policy, 3, (Summer, 1977).

assumptions. For example, do immigrants require more or less government support? In the Canadian case, it has been shown by the Polese-Le Minh study that this changes over time. The macroeconomic models simply maintain this variable as constant. The models also assume that consumption patterns between immigrant and indigenous populations are similar. However, these patterns may also differ, especially when one considers that immigrants are generally better educated and more highly paid than native-born Canadians (these factors will be revealed below in a micro analysis). Finally the models do not take into consideration wealth brought into Canada by the immigrant. It seems safe to conclude that these models may not be providing reliable projections based on immigration to Canada.

What must be realized now is the possible impacts which may be exerted by immigrants on the Canadian economy. In its Eighth Annual Review, the Economic Council of Canada provided four scenarios of the potential impact of immigration.¹⁵³ One possibility is that the immigrant enters the country to fill a job vacancy which cannot be filled by a native-born. In this case the number of unemployed remains the same but the unemployment rate decreases. A second potential impact is that the immigrant displaces the present native-born worker, thus boosting the unemployment rate and the number of unemployed

¹⁵³ Noah M. Meltz, "Does Immigration Aggravate Unemployment," The Canadian Banker and ICB Review, 82:5, (September-October, 1975), p. 9.

persons. Third, there is the possibility that the immigrant will enter and become unemployed. Once again the result is increased unemployment in terms of both the population and the rate. Finally, there is a fourth possibility in which a "vacuum effect" takes place. The immigrant enters the country, fills a job vacancy or invests in some venture and new jobs are created for other Canadians. Both the number of unemployed and the unemployment rate decreases as the immigrant becomes an automatic consumer and invests in the Canadian economy. It is this fourth scenario, the "vacuum effect," which is most applicable to understanding the economic impact of immigrants on the Canadian economy.

This "vacuum effect" or Keynesian approach to studying Canadian immigration may be traced to the first decade of the twentieth century. The economic impact of immigration during the wheat boom was enormous. For example, the huge influx of immigrants was largely responsible for increasing Canada's exports from \$177 million to \$274 million.¹⁵² Total wheat cultivation grew from four million acres to eleven million, driving wheat exports from \$6 million to \$45 million. The gross value of manufactured goods rose from \$481 million to \$1,125 million. There seems little doubt that immigrant demand provided a strong stimulus for the production of manufactured goods.

¹⁵²References to dollar amounts in this chapter are not constant dollars.

Total investment in manufacturing rose from \$446 million to \$1,247 million and the number of labourers in this field grew by 70%. Corbett has concluded that immigration during this period was mostly responsible for economic expansion.¹⁵⁵ This example seems to highly support the "vacuum effect."

Rather than pursuing a Keynesian approach to immigration, one of the most consistent aspects of Canadian immigration policy in the past has been the regulation of immigrant flows according to "absorptive capacity." Marr and Percy define this concept as the ability of the labour market to increase the employment of immigrants without "crowding out" domestic labour.¹⁵⁶ However, the study of "absorptive capacity" seems to ignore the "vacuum effect" in determining overall immigrant impact. For example, Jones has revealed that between 1950 and 1965 a total of 26,128 immigrants started their own businesses and invested over \$325 million. These businesses were responsible for employing 80,000 persons.¹⁵⁷ One can easily recognize the enormous amount of other jobs simply created from the consumer demands of these 80,000 people. Furthermore, it is evident that immigrants

¹⁵⁵ D.C. Corbett, "Immigration and Economic Development," Canadian Journal of Economics, 17, (August, 1951), pp. 364-367.

¹⁵⁶ W.L. Marr and M.B. Percy, "Immigration Policy and Canadian Economic Growth," Domestic Policies in the International Economic Environment, John Walley (editor), Volume 12: Background study, Canada, Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, 1985, p. 84.

¹⁵⁷ W.D. Jones, "The Importance of Immigration to Canadian Business," Business Quarterly, 33 (Spring, 1968), p. 28.

generate more employment than they actually assume. Waines has shown that while 16% of the Canadian population is foreign-born, 20% of Canada's self-employed persons are actually immigrants.¹⁵⁸

A brief review of Canada's investor and entrepreneurial immigrants also reveals the huge positive impact on the economy by new arrivals. In 1978 the federal government devised the entrepreneurial classification with the hope of attracting business immigrants to Canada. A prospective immigrant may be permitted into Canada if he or she obtains twenty-five points in the selection criteria process and is able to invest enough capital to establish a business which creates at least one job. In 1985 this program attracted 2,136 immigrants with total net assets of \$1.2 billion. The result of this entrepreneurial immigration program created over 9,000 jobs for Canadians in that year alone.¹⁵⁹ The Ontario Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Technology further reported that between March of 1985 and March of 1986, 230 new entrepreneurs had invested \$82.8 million in Ontario.¹⁶⁰ This average investment of \$360,000 per entrepreneur was responsible for creating 3,396 jobs.

The recent creation of the investor classification has also

¹⁵⁸ Morton Weinfeld, "More Immigrants Please," Policy Options Politiques, 8:8, (October, 1987), p. 27.

¹⁵⁹ Barry Critchley, "Immigrant Investors," Financial Post, November 17, 1986, Section A, p. 1.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

2

had a significant impact on the Canadian economy. In this case a potential immigrant must attain twenty-five points, maintain a total worth of \$500,000, and be willing to invest at least half of it into a Canadian business for a minimum period of three years. In 1985 this policy attracted 67 immigrants who invested \$20 million in the Canadian economy. In 1986, more than one hundred immigrants were attracted by this program and invested a total of \$69 million. Finally, more than 120 entrepreneurs entered Canada in 1987, investing more than \$150 million into the Canadian economy.¹⁶¹ There seems little doubt in these cases that immigrants have primed the economy, generated employment, and proven the existence of the "vacuum effect" in Canada.

The largest groups of immigrants applying under these programs are citizens of Hong Kong. Critchley has estimated that approximately 40% of Canada's investor immigrants come from that colony.¹⁶² Approximately 10,000 residents of Hong Kong applied to immigrate to Canada in 1986 alone. Many of its residents are emigrating because of potential wealth problems. Hong Kong, a British colony since 1842, will be ceded to China in 1997. Many citizens fear that the Communist government will expropriate accumulated capital from Hong Kong residents. Thus many residents are emigrating and taking their capital with them.

¹⁶¹ Hilary de Boerr, "Mideast Entrepreneurs Bring Ideas to Canada," Financial Post, October 26, 1987, Section D, p. 14.

¹⁶² Barry Critchley, op. cit.

When they do immigrate to Canada, they bring a tremendous amount of money with them. Much of that money is invested in small- and medium-sized businesses, where it creates jobs for Canadians.

Despite the relative success of the entrepreneur and investor programs, some concern is rising over the provincial destination of most immigrants in these classes. Approximately 40% of these immigrants head for Ontario.¹⁶⁴ It has been noted above that immigrants make up approximately 20% of all self-employed persons in Canada even though only 16% of Canada's inhabitants are immigrants. This has led to the conclusion that immigrants are more likely than native-born Canadians to start businesses. Thus, regional disparity may partially be explained by the fact that most provinces receive very few immigrants, especially in the investor-entrepreneur classes. Professor Roy George, dean of Management Studies at Dalhousie University has addressed this concern. George has defined Nova Scotia's poor economic development as a specific function of the fact that Nova Scotia does not receive its fair share of immigrants.¹⁶⁵

With the hope of ameliorating this problem, Employment and Immigration Minister Barbara McDougall, announced an alteration

¹⁶⁴ "Immigration: Closed Door/Closed Mind," op. cit., p. 14.

¹⁶⁵ Barry Critchley, op. cit.

¹⁶⁶ David Hatter, Mathew Hoggman, and Philip Mathias, "Immigrant Dilemma: Asset or Liability," Financial Post, July 20, 1987, Section A, p. 1.

to the investor clause of the Immigration Act. Rather than investing \$250,000, an investment of \$150,000 may be made by the immigrant if the investment takes place in a province which received fewer than 3% of Canada's total immigrants in the previous year. It is hoped that a reduced investment plan will pull immigrants to provinces which traditionally receive few immigrants. This amendment was introduced in April of 1988. Thus it is too early to measure its overall impact.

The State of the Immigrant in Canada: a Micro Analysis

The following data is based on information derived from a national survey conducted by social scientists from Carleton University and York University. More than 3,000 people were asked various questions in this 1981 Quality of Life investigation. In some cases the Quality of Life results have been compared to 1981 Census of Canada statistics in order to give the reader a concise comprehension of immigrant status vis-à-vis that of the non-immigrant.

Education

Evidence from both the Quality of Life data set and the 1981 Census of Canada reveal several differences in the education levels of immigrants and non-immigrants.

Immigrants tend to be more highly educated than native born

Canadians (see Figure 3.0). This is certainly the case for immigrants arriving after 1952 (see Figure 3.1). Immigrants arriving between 1972 and 1981 were the highest educated group as more than 22% had attained a university degree. In general 15% of all immigrants attain university degrees as compared to 12% of all non-immigrants. Immigrants who arrived before 1942 maintained the fewest number of degrees per capita.

Figure 3.0 - Percentage of Immigrants and Non-immigrants with University Degrees.

Source: Quality of Life Survey, 1981

Figure 3.1 - Percentage of Immigrants with University Degrees by Year of Arrival.

Source: Quality of Life Survey, 1981

The explanation for this lies in the fact that Canadian immigration policy since the 1960s has continually grown to be a function of economic policy. The increased stress on education and occupational skills has made immigration to Canada much more difficult. Therefore, immigrants who are admitted to Canada usually have higher levels of education and/or are geared for the

Canadian labour market.¹⁵⁶

The Quality of Life survey reveals that other education levels between immigrants and non-immigrants are almost equal. Approximately 25% of both groups have some college, university, or technical training. Forty-two percent of both groups maintain less than a high school education. The only other difference between the groups is in high school completion rates. Approximately 20% of non-immigrants and 17% of all immigrants have finished high school.

The Census of Canada results indicate similar statistics as those exhibited in the Quality of Life survey. However, in terms of university degrees, the Census divulges that 10.8% of all immigrants maintain university degrees as opposed to 8% of non-immigrants. It is also shown in the Census that a greater proportion of immigrants (27.5%) have less than a grade nine education. According to Statistics Canada, the majority of immigrants with less than a grade nine education arrived before 1961 when there was less emphasis on education and training.¹⁶⁷

¹⁵⁶ There is a significant correlation between the immigrant's year of arrival and the level of education attained by him or her. A Pearsons Correlation of .2828 reveals that since 1903, yearly immigrant arrivals maintain slightly higher education levels than their predecessors.

¹⁶⁷ Canada, Canada's Immigrants, Statistics Canada, 1984. (Study of immigrants in Canada - statistics derived from Census of Canada, 1981).

Figure 3.2 reveals that African and Asian immigrants tend to maintain the highest levels of education on a per capita basis.

Figure 3.2 - Percentage of Respondents with University Degrees by Birth Place

Source: Quality of Life Survey, 1981

Thirty-two percent of African immigrants and 25% of immigrants of Asian descent held university degrees in the 1981 survey. Immigrants from such areas as Mexico, Central America, South America, etc., (listed as "Other") also maintained significantly

high proportions of university degrees (17.4%). European immigrants held about the same per capita total of degrees as non-immigrants. Both of these groups maintained a proportion of 12% with degrees ranging from a Bachelors to a Professional degree.

Income - Employment Income

The Census of Canada for 1981 indicated that, on average, immigrants earned higher incomes than native-born Canadians in 1980. The average income for the immigrant population over the age of 15 years was \$14,100 while that of the non-immigrant population was \$12,800. The Quality of Life Survey, on the other hand, yielded somewhat different results. The average income for native-born respondents over the age of 17 was \$11,764. This proved to be slightly higher than the average income of immigrant respondents who attained a 1980 average of \$11,676 (see Figure 3.3).

It seems that the immigrant average income for 1980 is somewhat spurious. All immigrants arriving after 1941 attained average incomes which were higher than non-immigrant income earners.¹⁵⁸ It seems that immigrant retirees may have exerted a substantial impact on the overall average of immigrant incomes.

¹⁵⁸ In fact, there is a significant relation between the immigrant's year of arrival and his or her 1980 income earnings. A Pearson's Correlation of $R = .3275$ suggested that the later the year of arrival, the more the immigrant tended to earn in 1980.

As figure 3.4 suggests, immigrants arriving before 1942 attained an average income of only \$4,016 per person. All other immigrants were above the non-immigrant average with 1952-1961 arrivals earning the highest per capita income of \$13,714.

Figure 3.3 - Average Income of Immigrant and Non-immigrant Populations Over Age 17.

Source: Quality of Life Survey, 1981

Figure 3.4 - Average 1980 Income of Immigrants over Age 17 by Year of Arrival

Source: Quality of Life Survey, 1981.

Overall, African and Asian immigrants were the highest income earners per capita in 1980 (see Figure 3.5). While African immigrants earned an average of close to \$13,000, Asian immigrants collected just over an average of \$12,000 each. These incomes may possibly be explained by the fact that African and Asian immigrants tend to have higher education levels than other groups. The only group to earn an average income lower than

native-born Canadians was that of the American immigrants whose per capita income was less than \$10,000. This may be because of the fact that American immigrants rely more on income from savings and investments. This will be demonstrated in the section on savings and investment incomes below.

Figure 3.5 - Average 1980 Income of Respondents Over Age 17 by Birth Place.

Source: Quality of Life Survey, 1981

The hypothesis that African and Asian immigrants attain higher incomes because they also happen to attain higher educational backgrounds gains little support from the survey. Let us assume that income levels depend on a person's education. Given this hypothesis, we would expect that people with higher educations will receive higher incomes and vice-versa.¹⁶⁹

Therefore, based on a person's education level and/or total number of years of schooling, one may be able to predict that person's income level. Let us refer to the predicted income based on education as "x." Actual income will be called "y." If the residual or the difference between x and y is positive, then, based on education, the income earner has not earned what he or she is worth. If the residual is negative, then the person earns more than what his or her education warrants.

This type of analysis reveals that all people in Canada earn less than per capita education levels warrant. This is especially true for Asian immigrants. This might be an indication that visible minorities are still discriminated against despite the fact that they tend to earn most.

The Quality of Life survey also revealed that a slightly higher proportion of immigrants than non-immigrants attained incomes of \$30,000 or more in 1980 (see figure 3.6). This was

¹⁶⁹ Regression analysis reveals that this relationship is evident. The relationship is significant with a Multiple R of 0.15424.

especially true for immigrants who came to Canada during the 1950s. Almost 11% of this group accumulated average incomes of \$30,000 or more in 1980.

Figure 3.6 - Percentage of Immigrant (by Year of Arrival) and Non-immigrant Populations with 1980 Income of \$30,000 or more.

Source: Quality of Life Survey, 1981

However, immigrants who arrived during the 1960s and 1970s did not have as many \$30,000 income earners as their predecessors. While 10% of the arrivals of the 1960s attained 1980 incomes of \$30,000 or more, arrivals during the 1970s had an

even lower proportion of such. Among these immigrants, only 7.2% attained incomes of \$30,000 or more. Overall, 8.4% of the immigrant population attained employment incomes of \$30,000 or more. This was slightly higher than the non-immigrant population of which 7.2% attained 1980 incomes of \$30,000 or higher.

Other Income - Government Programs

In terms of government support it is evident that immigrants acquired more funds on average than did native-born Canadians in 1980. However, this difference was very little. While non-immigrants collected an average of \$1,720 per person from government programs in 1980, immigrants attained an average of \$1,820 per person. However, in terms of region of birth, non-immigrants were the third highest recipients of income from government programs. African and Asian immigrants, the highest average employment income earners, received the least amount of income from government programs.

Table 3.0 - Average 1980 Income per Person from Government Programs by Birth Place

<u>Region</u>	<u>Average Income per Person</u>
Canada	\$1,720
U.S.A.	1,960
Europe	1,920
Africa	1,080
Asia	940

Source: Quality of Life Survey, 1981

The data set also reveals that those immigrants arriving after 1952 received less from government support programs than non-immigrants in 1980. Arrivals before 1952 received an average of more than \$2,000 per person from government programs. This is due to the fact that many immigrants have worked in Canada for several years and have become eligible for Canadian pension benefits and other social services. On the other hand, immigrants arriving after 1952 received less from government programs than native-born Canadians. An average income of \$1,490 per person was accumulated in 1980 by immigrants who had arrived in Canada between 1952 and 1971. This amount was even lower for immigrants who arrived during the 1970s. These arrivals earned an average of \$1,100 per capita from government programs.

Savings and Investments

Overall, there was only a slight difference in savings and investment earnings between immigrant and non-immigrant populations. Immigrants tended to earn more than non-immigrants from such sources. On average non-immigrants accumulated \$1,800 per person while immigrants collected approximately \$2,100 per capita. However, once this is broken down into various groups the range of earnings becomes more distinct. American immigrants proved to earn most from savings and investments with an average income of \$3,620 per person in 1980 (see Figure 3.7). African immigrants, on the other hand, accumulated an average of only \$1,160 per person.

Figure 3.7 - Average Income from Savings and Investments for 1980 by Region of Birth

Source: Quality of Life Survey, 1981

When one analyzes immigrant earnings from savings and investments in 1980 according to year of arrival, more differences are apparent (see Figure 3.8). Quite clearly, those who arrived before 1942 were the highest income earners from such sources. This average income of \$5,100 decreased progressively

with later arrivals. Immigrants who arrived during the 1970s earned an average of approximately \$1,000 each from savings and investments. This is explained by the fact that immigrants usually spend most of their savings upon arrival in Canada and have little left over to invest. One must also realize that the entrepreneur division of the immigration act had just been introduced at that time and its effects had not yet been felt.

Figure 3.8 - Average 1980 Income from Savings and Investments for Immigrants by Period of Arrival.

Source: Quality of Life Survey, 1981

Conclusion

In general, the immigrant population in Canada tends to be better educated and more highly paid than native-born Canadians. These factors also seem to pose a positive impact on the Canadian economy. Rather than the classical theory, the Keynesian school of understanding the immigrant impact on the economy seems more applicable. In other words, immigrants are not a burden on the economy nor are they "job-stealers." They actually prime the economy by acting as automatic consumers and creating jobs for other Canadians. Some may argue that immigrants' higher standard of living on a per capita basis is due to a Canadian immigration policy which stresses economic concern, occupational issues, and educational qualities. While this should not be ignored, one must also consider the factors of ambition and initiative on the part of the Canadian immigrant and his or her desire to adapt to Canadian life. The overall result proves fortunate to all Canadians as the impact of immigration continues to boost the economy rather than hinder it.

CHAPTER FOUR - PUBLIC OPINION

Canadians of European descent are on their way out as a majority group...Who wants to wake up and find out that they are in a mini-version of Calcutta or Peking?

Are Canadians against immigration? Of course one cannot read the above statement and conclude that one person speaks for most Canadians. However, it should be shamefully pointed out that this xenophobic statement drew a standing ovation from 350 members of the Immigration Association of Canada in Vancouver on June 2, 1988. Still, this does not give the student an empirical privilege to assume that most Canadians are opposed to immigration. On the other hand, there have been several incidents which indicate that native-born Canadians are not receptive to new arrivals.

With increasing volume, voters are telling Ottawa to close the country's borders and they are backing up their opposition with arguments ranging from the unemployment rate to unabashed racism and xenophobia.

Public opinion in Canada subscribes to a long history of

¹⁷⁰ Speech given by Doug Collins in Vancouver, June 1, 1988- Reported in - Kevin Griffin, "Jeered Speaker Cites Racism," Vancouver Sun, 2 June 1988, Section B, p. 8.

¹⁷¹ Susan Delacourt, "Phone-ing, Dolls Bristle With Anti Immigration Feelings," Globe & Mail, 6 March 1987, Section A, p.1.

LEAF 103 OMITTED IN PAGE NUMBERING

opposition towards immigration. Most Canadians tend to cite the unemployment rate as a good motive for inhibiting immigrants. Others desire little immigration by maintaining that the Canadian population is "just right." More blatant in opinion are those who support limited immigration as a method of protecting the so-called social fabric or the Canadian identity. These people simply want to "keep Canada white." This aspect of Canadian society has not gone unnoticed by Canadian academics and officials. Wienfield in Rose reported in 1987 that:

Already some government officials are voicing concerns about a possible racial backlash if dramatically higher numbers of non-white immigrants are allowed into the country.

The purpose of this chapter will be to reveal Canadian public opinion on immigration since the second World War. While Canada, the state, professes to maintain a "humanitarian" policy on immigration (by giving family class and refugee class immigrants first priority), Canada, the people, does not convey a similar outlook on the issue. It will be shown that Canadian public opinion towards immigrants and immigration has been mostly harsh. Only recently have these harsh feelings somewhat receded. The following study of various groups will determine who, in Canada, bears most opposition towards immigration and Canada's immigrant population.

¹² Michael Rose, "Facing a Future with Fewer People," Maclean's, 100:34, (August, 1987), p. 17.

A History of Public Opinion

During the second World War Canadians were asked if the nation should open its doors after the war to allow immigrants from all over the world to establish new lives here. Most Canadians were apprehensive. In January, 1943, only 14% of the respondents were willing to agree to an open-door policy while 21% wanted to maintain a closed-door policy. Another 59% advocated the need for "selected immigration."¹⁷³

Several polls were conducted during and after the second World War which dealt specifically with Japanese citizens and Japanese-Canadians living in Canada. Most Canadians revealed hostile feelings towards the Japanese, both during and after the war. However, such hostility seemed not to be directed towards Japanese persons who had become Canadian citizens. In December, 1943, 54% of all respondents believed that Japanese citizens in Canada should be sent back to Japan after the war. Only 39% were willing to allow the Japanese to remain in Canada. However, 59% of the respondents in a 1944 poll were willing to allow Japanese-Canadians to remain in Canada.¹⁷⁴ Only 33% of the respondents in this poll advocated the deportation of Japanese-Canadians

¹⁷³ Canadian Institute of Public Opinion Poll (January 27, 1943), derived from, Nancy Tienhaara, Canadian Views on Immigration and Population, Ottawa, Department of Manpower and Immigration, 1974.

¹⁷⁴ Canadian Institute of Public Opinion Poll (December 22, 1943).

after the war.¹⁷⁵ However, the same survey found that a large majority (80%) of the respondents were willing to deport non-Canadian Japanese persons after the war.

It is evident that the role of the state at that time may have reflected public opinion.

Probably no people in Canada suffered more because of the war than those of Japanese origin. When Japan entered the war, they were uprooted from the west coast and placed in relocation centres. At the war's end about 4,000 were forced to leave the country under a government "repatriation" scheme. More than half of these were Canadian born and two-thirds were Canadian citizens.

There is no doubt that an injustice was done to Japanese-Canadians and other Japanese persons living in Canada during and after the period of the second World War. Some suggest that this was a reflection of racist behaviour on the part of Canadians and Canadian officials. However, it is difficult to determine the extent to which Canadians were actually emitting racist opinions. It is doubtful that 80% of all Canadians were anti-Japanese from a racial perspective. Rather, it is possible that Canadian public policy was under pressure from the United States which had undertaken similar measures against the Japanese. It might also be possible that a portion of Canadians, who were anti-Japanese, was actually instilled with a genuine fear of the Japanese as a

¹⁷⁵ Canadian Institute of Public Opinion Poll (February 16, 1944).

¹⁷⁶ Report, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Volume Four, October 13, 1969, p. 30.

result of the war. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that such a fear could hardly justify the expropriation of land belonging to Japanese-Canadians and the deportation of more than 2,600 Japanese-Canadians after the war was over.

There are several other indications from that time which point to the Canadian desire for a selective immigration policy. Of course, this would support the hypothesis that many Canadians were actually racist and not really against immigration because of the ramifications of the war. A 1946 poll revealed that Canadians were actually quite "choosy" in terms of who should be granted permission into the country. At least one quarter of the respondents were determined to refuse admission to Chinese and Italian immigrants. One third of the population was in favour of disallowing Blacks, Germans, and Soviets. More than half of all Canadians wanted nothing to do with immigrants of Jewish or Japanese descent.¹⁷⁷ The fact that Canadians were more receptive to German and Italian immigrants than to Japanese immigrants may be an indication of racist feelings among native-born Canadians towards the Japanese. One might carry this hypothesis another step by claiming that Canada's policy towards the Japanese was actually racist because the same deportation provisions were not implemented against German- or Italian-Canadians. However, these Canadians were registered with and watched by the R.C.M.P.

¹⁷⁷ Canadian Institute of Public Opinion Poll (October 30, 1946).

It has been mentioned before that the 1950s would once again stand as a period when the country's doors would open to thousands of immigrants. By the end of the decade most Canadians were infuriated by the sudden influx. In July, 1959, almost 64% of all Canadians reported that the country "did not need immigrants." Only 29% saw any need for immigrants.¹⁷⁸ When asked in 1960 if Canada should increase the number of immigrants permitted into the country, 67% of the respondents were absolutely opposed to such a policy. Only 26% of the respondents favoured such a policy.¹⁷⁹

One public opinion survey, conducted in 1961, addressed the selective nature of Canadian public opinion. The poll asked whether or not restrictions should continue on the admission of non-whites into Canada. A majority (53.1%) of the respondents clearly favoured continued restrictions as opposed to only 35% who favoured fewer restrictions on such admission.¹⁸⁰ However, a 1963 survey revealed that most Canadians (91.1%) would not move from their residence if non-whites were to assume residence in the same neighborhood. However, the same study revealed that

¹⁷⁸ Canadian Institute of Public Opinion Poll #276, (July, 1959).

¹⁷⁹ Canadian Institute of Public Opinion Poll (October 8, 1960).

¹⁸⁰ Canadian Institute of Public Opinion Poll #287, Part 1, (March 1961).

12% of the respondents would relocate if large numbers of non-white immigrants established residence in the same district as the respondent.¹⁸¹ Another 25% reported that they would consider relocation.

Public opinion remained mostly consistent during the 1970s. In 1971, 66% of the Canadian population would have halted immigration altogether¹⁸² while 57% would have done the same in 1973.¹⁸³ The public's stand on refugee policy during the 1970s also appeared more "exclusionary" than "humanitarian." In 1979, Canadians were asked whether the admission of 5,000 refugees from Indo-China (more commonly known as the "boat people") was too high or too low. Fifty-two percent of the respondents felt that the total was too high. Only 7% considered the amount too low.¹⁸⁴

This aggregate opinion on refugees seems to have remained. In 1986, a Gallup poll of Canadians' opinions of refugees revealed even less humanitarian characteristics. According to 72% of the respondents, Canada was doing more than its fair share of

¹⁸¹ Canadian Institute of Public Opinion Poll

¹⁸² Canadian Institute of Public Opinion Poll #346, (March, 1971).

¹⁸³ Canadian Institute of Public Opinion Poll # 357 (January, 1973).

¹⁸⁴ Elizabeth Hann Hastings and Philip K. Hastings, Survey Research Consultants International. Westport Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1980.

resettling international refugees. Only 9% thought that Canada was not doing enough while the remaining 19% felt Canada's contribution was "about right."¹⁸⁴

Why Canadians don't want Immigrants

In most cases, Canadians tend to cite high unemployment as a motive for reducing or maintaining immigration levels. For example, it has been noted in another chapter that 72% of respondents who favoured reduced immigration levels did so because of high unemployment in Canada. Immigrants, according to these Canadians, would only aggravate the problem. This myth, as maintained in chapter three, is clearly without support.

In many other examples, Canadians have expressed concern over the country's population. People tend to fear that the country will one day become congested or over-polluted if the country adheres to an open-door policy.

Do we want more congestion on our highways?
Do we want our cities to become copies of
Chicago or Los Angeles? Do we want our
beaches to become Canadian Coney Islands
where so many people congregate?

It is obvious that such concern is a display of absolute frivolity. The only potential threat is a shortage of people.

¹⁸⁴ Canadian Gallup Poll, September 29, 1986 - published in most newspapers.

¹⁸⁵ W.B. Harvey, "Let's Halt All Immigration at Once," Saturday Night, 75 (December 10, 1960), p. 76.

Canada is a country which can ill worry about congestion. Assuming a ten percent habitable land mass (a conservative assumption at that), it is revealed that Canada has one of the lowest population densities in the world.¹⁸⁷ Table 4.0 suggests that Canadians have no justification in arguing that a potential congestion problem exists. In contrast to many nations which maintain three-digit population densities per square kilometre, the Canadian figure is only nine.

Despite such a low Canadian population density, Canadians usually maintain that the population is "about right." In November, 1973, 59% of the respondents in one survey were happy

Table 4.0 - Population Densities of Selected Countries

<u>Country</u>	<u>Total Persons/square km</u>
Canada*	9
U.S.A.**	30
France	100
Denmark	119
Italy	188
United Kingdom	231
Federal Republic of Germany	247
Japan	318
Netherlands	422

* Assuming 10% habitable land mass

** Excluding Alaska

Source: Weinfield (see bibliography)

with the current population. Only 30% indicated that a larger

Morton Weinfield. "Hate Immigrants Please," Policy Options Politiques, 8:8 (October, 1987), pp. 24-26.

Canadian population was necessary.¹⁸⁸ However, it is evident that Canadian public opinion on the population may be changing. In June, 1988, a public opinion poll found that 58% of Canadians felt that the population was too low. This time only 32% of the respondents felt that the population was "just right."¹⁸⁹ Qu'ebec respondents were most adamant on increasing the population of the country as 66% of that province's residents suggested the population was too low. The explanation for the Québec concern with population lies in the fact that Canada's potential population decline is already being experienced there, not to mention its desire to protect its culture (these factors will be reviewed in chapter six).

While Canadian opinion on the population seems to be altering, it is difficult to determine where immigration fits in this sudden change. One survey, conducted in 1987, indicated that 53% of Canadians felt that the country was doing more than its fair share of accepting immigrants.¹⁹⁰ However, another poll, conducted in 1988, revealed that 48% of Canadian society was prepared to accept an increase in immigration levels as opposed to 47% who were against the idea.¹⁹¹ It seems that the

¹⁸⁸ Canadian Institute of Public Opinion Poll # 362 (November, 1973).

¹⁸⁹ "More Canadians Needed, Poll Says," Vancouver Sun 4 June 1988, p. 1.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

Canadian population may be moving from one that is mostly against immigration to one that is at least evenly divided on the issue. It seems that most Canadians are still in favour of white Anglo-Saxon immigrants only.

Besides those who cite high unemployment and the concern that the population is "just right," as methods for reducing immigration levels, are those who are concerned with the destruction of the Canadian identity. In 1985, the Department of Employment and Immigration commissioned Peter Riegenstrieff to determine public reaction to a proposed increase in immigration levels. The report concluded that the most common fear among Canadians was the demise of the Canadian culture.¹⁹² The 1981 Quality of Life Survey supports this finding. Canadians definitely tend to perceive immigrants as threats to the nebulous social fabric of the country. When asked if "immigrants should try harder to be like other Canadians," a majority (67.1%) agree while only 19.8% disagreed. In other words, a majority of Canadians tend to view the need for assimilation as an important factor contributing to the admission of immigrants. In conclusion the arguments against immigration are summarized by Tienhaara.

¹⁹² Joe O'Donnell, "Canadian Have Racist View of New Immigrants, Poll Finds," Toronto Star, 29 November, 1985, Section A, p. 1.

On the whole, it seems likely that Canadians are negative to immigrants insofar as immigrants are perceived as posing some sort of threat, which may be economic, social, cultural, or political, etc.

Variance in Canadian Attitudes Towards Immigrants

There is much evidence to indicate that Canadians are clearly divided on the question of immigration. While some characteristics tend to influence a person to hold favourable feelings towards immigrants, other characteristics operate in an opposite manner. The purpose here is to define the variables which influence one's attitude towards immigrants. A scale,¹⁹⁴ derived from the 1981 Quality of Life data set, measuring positive and negative opinions on immigrants has been correlated with several variables in order to measure divisions in Canadian public opinion on immigration.

¹⁹³ Nancy Tienhaara, op. cit., p. 3.

¹⁹⁴ A reliability scale was built on the foundation of four variables; "Immigrants should try harder to be like other Canadians;" "Immigrants' hard work has helped Canada;" "Immigrants are not prepared to work as hard as other Canadians;" and, "Immigrants bring discrimination on themselves." Respondents were required to state the degree to which they disagreed or agreed with such statements. Positive and negative scores were computed in the creation of a reliability scale which has been stated as; "Immigration is bad for Canada." An alpha reliability coefficient of 0.5580 indicates that it is possible to measure Canadian attitudes on the basis of positive or negative feelings held by respondents. The new scale ranges from four (strongly agree immigration is bad) to twenty (strongly disagree that immigration is bad for Canada).

Figure 4.0 - General Canadian Attitudes Towards Immigration -
(the response to "Immigration is bad for Canada")

Source: 1981 Quality of Life Survey

On the whole, as indicated by Figure 4.0, the modal attitude reveals that Canadians generally disagree with the statement that "immigration is bad for Canada." Overall, 45.9% disagree with the statement as opposed to 32.3% who agree that immigration is bad. Twenty-two percent of the respondents held equal numbers of positive and negative feelings. These respondents were classified as neutral. These results seem to indicate that Canadians, as a majority, are not in favour of immigration. However, there are fewer Canadians against immigration than there

are those who favour immigration.

Figure 4.1 - Percentage of Respondents who Agree/Disagree that Immigration is Bad for Canada by Respondent's Age

Source: 1981 Quality of Life Survey

Most age groups, as Figure 4.1 reveals, tend to maintain sub-groups with respondents who are more favourable towards immigration. The only exception is the "Over 59" class in which the largest sub-group contains respondents who are against

immigration.¹⁹⁵

Over time, this hypothesis that increased age leads to decreased favourability towards immigrants seems to remain inconsistent. For example in 1959, respondents over age 50 were more inclined to favour immigration than respondents under age 30. While 38.3% of respondents over age 50 favoured immigration, only 17.7% of respondents under age 30 maintained similar feelings.¹⁹⁶ On the other hand, a 1971 poll found that respondent's over age 50 were least receptive to the thought that Canada needed immigrants.¹⁹⁷ This same conclusion has been reached by Jones and Lambert in their study, "Attitudes Towards Immigrants in a Canadian Community."¹⁹⁸ Overall, it is difficult to conclude that age has any influence on one's attitude towards immigrants and immigration.

In all income groups, there was the tendency for respondents to extend more favourability than indifference

¹⁹⁵ The hypothesis that increased age (actual age and not age groups) leads to less favourability towards immigrants is only weakly supported by a Pearson's correlation. A significant correlation of ($R=-0.1408$) suggests that as age increases, the respondent is only slightly more likely to agree that immigration is bad for Canada.

¹⁹⁶ Canadian Institute of Public Opinion Poll # 276, 1959.

¹⁹⁷ Canadian Institute of Public Opinion Poll # 346, 1971.

¹⁹⁸ Frank E. Jones and Wallace E. Lambert, "Attitudes Towards Immigrants in a Canadian Community," Public Opinion Quarterly, 23, (1959), p. 542.

towards immigrants (see figure 4.2). However, as the respondents' income levels increased, there was the tendency for such people to maintain feelings more in favour of immigrants.¹⁹⁹

Figure 4.2 - Percentage of Respondents who Agree/Disagree that Immigration is Bad for Canada by Respondent's Income

Source: 1981 Quality of Life Survey

¹⁹⁹ A significant correlation ($P=0.005$) exists. However, the relationship is extremely weak ($r=0.0511$). The correlation suggests that as respondents' incomes increase, so will their favourability towards immigration.

Tienhaara has found that low income groups will extend more negative opinions towards immigrants because it is these groups which are most vulnerable to unemployment.²⁰⁰ A 1959 study by Jones and Lambert further develops this theory. It was their hypothesis that "immigrants tend to enter a social system at its lower-class levels and are therefore a greater competitive threat to native members of such classes."²⁰¹ While there is certainly no evidence to suggest that this is the case, the myth of immigrants as "job-snatchers" still exists. Therefore, it is obvious that persons with low incomes would be apprehensive to the idea of an open-door immigration policy.

Quite clearly a strong relationship exists between the respondent's attained level of education and his or her attitude towards immigration.²⁰² Unfortunately, the Quality of Life data set does not provide variables which permit the analyst to determine explanations for different attitudes on immigration among respondents with different education levels. One might speculate that those with higher educations are also those with higher incomes and vice-versa. Therefore, respondents with lower

²⁰⁰ Nancy Tienhaara, op. cit., p. 31.

²⁰¹ Frank Jones and Wallace Lambert, op. cit., p. 542.

²⁰² The relationship is supported by a significant ($P=0.000$) Pearson's correlation ($r=0.3473$). Of all data analysis this relationship remains strongest. As the respondents's education level increases, so does his or her favourability towards immigrants.

educational levels (who may receive lower incomes and increased susceptibility to unemployment) may once again feel "threatened" by the immigrant population. In this case, the so-called "threatened" group would fear the potential scenario of increased competition with immigrants.

Figure 4.3 - Percentage of Respondents who Agree/Disagree that Immigration is Bad by Respondent's Education

Source: 1981 Quality of Life Survey

Figure 4.4 - Means of Acceptability of and Discrimination Against Immigrants by Respondent's Education.

Source: John W. Berry et. al. Multiculturalism and Ethnic Attitudes in Canada (see bibliography)

Figure 4.4 provides clues to understanding respondents' views. In all education categories, respondents have indicated that they are likely to accept immigrants. However, other responses (not included here) have been analyzed in order to arrive at conclusions as to whether or not respondents with different educational levels would discriminate against immigrants of certain types. The analysis concluded that as

education levels decreased, respondents were most likely to desire the rejection of non-whites as immigrants and immigrants from communist countries. On the other hand, as education levels increased, respondents were more inclined to accept all immigrants. Thus, in figure 4.4, it seems likely that the claim by all respondents to generally accept all immigrants may be inaccurate.

A 1973 Gallup Poll bears upon the relationship between education and public opinion on immigrants. Figure 4.5 indicates public opinion among Canadians on the contribution of immigrants to Canada.

While the Gallup poll did not divide respondents into many different education levels, it is still evident that those with higher education levels are most willing to agree that immigrants make great contributions to Canada. Sixty-eight percent of the respondents with a university education felt that immigrants were good contributors. On the other hand, respondents with lower educational attainments were reluctant to reveal praise for Canada's immigrant population. Overall, the relationship between education and public opinion about immigrants provides the reader with the strongest coefficients.

Figure 4.5 - Public Opinion on Immigrant's Contribution to Canada by Respondent's Education

Source: Nancy Tienhaara, Canadian Views on Immigration and Population (see bibliography)

Province of Birth

Provincial public opinion on immigration is revealed in figure 4.6.

Figure 4.6 - Percentage of Respondents who Agree/Disagree that Immigration is Bad for Canada by Respondent's Province of Birth

Source: 1981 Quality of Life Survey

Figure 4.6 suggests that there is little variation in public opinion on immigration across provincial lines. The only significant difference can be found in the aggregate opinion of residents from the province of Québec. Almost half of Québecers agree that immigration is bad for Canada. The explanation for such disfavour among Québec residents is discussed in detail in chapter six. However, it should be briefly noted that Québecers

have tended to view immigration as detrimental because of the tendency for immigrants to become integrated into the English-speaking community. Thus, the potential problem for residents of Québec is that the employment of the French language will become jeopardized (see chapter six).

The fact that Québecers tend to maintain the harshest feelings towards immigrants seems to gather support from the findings of Berry et. al. Their study divided respondents into five geographic regions. The results are presented in figure 4.7 (responses based on Likert scale from rank one, immigration is bad, to rank seven, immigration is good).

Figure 4.7 reveals that Québecers are only slightly more likely to disagree that immigration is good for Canada. However, the difference in opinion is relatively limited. Overall, Québecers are most likely to view immigration as a method for increasing unemployment. However, respondents in Québec who are concerned with unemployment do not differ greatly from respondents in other regions such as the Atlantic provinces and the Prairies whom are also concerned with unemployment.

Figure 4.7 - MEAN Responses of Perceived Consequences of Immigration by Region of Birth

Source: John W. Berry et. al. Multiculturalism and Ethnic Attitudes in Canada (see bibliography)

Employment Status

Throughout this chapter, it has been noted that one of the most common motives for keeping out immigrants is the fear of increased unemployment levels. In one national survey, 53.7% of the respondents stated that immigration led to increased

unemployment. Only 32% disagreed with such an idea.²⁰³ Canadians do not often perceive immigrants as enhancements to the Canadian economy. Thus it would seem natural that native-born Canadians who are unemployed or who have been unemployed would be less receptive to immigrants than those who have not experienced unemployment. Figure 4.8 attempts to measure differences in opinion towards immigrants between respondents who were unemployed for part or all of 1979/80, and those who were not.

It is surprising that there is practically no difference in opinion between those who have been unemployed and those who have not.²⁰⁴ Unfortunately, the Quality of Life questionnaire is not sensitive enough to determine why no relationship exists between these two variables. One might speculate that the fear of unemployment is felt by all whether one is unemployed or not. One can only conclude that the variable of employment status has no bearing on one's opinion of immigration.

²⁰³ John W. Berry, Rudolf Kalin, and Donald M. Taylor, Multiculturalism and Ethnic Attitudes in Canada, Ottawa, Minister of State for Multiculturalism, (October, 1976), p. 71.

²⁰⁴ The relationship is insignificant ($P=0.3495$). A Pearson's Correlation of ($R=0.00925$) further reveals that no linear relationship is apparent.

Figure 4.8 - Percentage of Response to "Immigration is Bad for Canada" by Employment Status

Source: 1981 Quality of Life Survey

Interest in Politics

Respondents to the Quality of Life survey were queried on their general interest in politics. The scale of potential responses was ranked from "1" (very interested) to "4" (not interested). Figure 4.9 reveals a significant difference in attitudes on immigration among those who were interested in politics (ranks 1 and 2) and those who expressed no interest in

politics (ranks 3 and 4).

It is interesting to note that those who express interest in politics are more likely to disagree with the statement that immigration is bad for Canada.¹⁰⁵ However, the relationship is not as strong as the relationship between education and opinion on immigration. On one hand, this may seem logical. Those with higher educations tend to express more interest in politics.²⁰⁵ Thus it would follow that those who express higher degrees of political interest are also those who agree that immigration is good for Canada. There is support for this case. When the relationship between political interest and opinion on immigration is broken down by the respondent's education (i.e. education becomes control variable), it is found that political interest has little effect on one's opinion (insignificant correlation).

On the other side of the coin, immigration is, in one sense, a political phenomenon. Those who express interest in politics

²⁰⁵ A significant Pearson's Correlation of ($R = -.1824$) suggests a weak relationship exists between degrees of political interest and opinion on immigration. As the respondent's degree of political interest increases, he or she will likely become more favourable towards immigrants.

Mishler has shown that those with higher educations are more likely to participate in the political process. As a person's educational attainments increase, so does his or her likelihood to vote, campaign, contact M.P.'s, etc. See William Mishler, "Political Participation and Democracy," Canadian Politics in the 1980's Michael S. Whittington and Glen Williams (editors), Toronto: Methuen, 1981.

may be more sensitive to the issue of immigration. Such people are likely to have a better understanding of immigration and may realize that immigration is actually good for Canada. However, this hypothesis fails to gain support from the analysis. Political interest tends to be a greater reflection of educational attainment which, in turn, indirectly affects opinion on immigration.

Figure 4.9 - Percentage Response to "Immigration is Bad for Canada" by Degree of Political Interest

Source: 1981 Quality of Life Survey

Conclusion

It is surprising that a country which claims to maintain such a humanitarian tradition in the area of immigration, contains a citizenry who's views have been less likely to support such a tradition. Since the second World War, Canadians have attempted to shut out new arrivals by arguing that unemployment is too high, or that the population is "just right." Supporting these groups of anti-immigration advocates are those whom are simply racist.

An analysis of Canadian public opinion on immigration reveals marked differences among certain groups and individuals. The most significant relationship is indicated in education and opinion. Those with higher educations are most likely to agree that immigration is good for Canada and vice-versa. Similar correlations are derived from an analysis of income status and political interest. Province of birth has, in the past, had an effect on one's opinion. However, this seems to be no longer the case.

It has been forty years since the United Nations announced its Declaration of Human Rights which Canada has accepted. The growth of human rights advocacy groups has been experienced by many countries including Canada. Despite these attempts to appeal to humanitarianism, Canadian public opinion has not been kind to immigrants. Until recently, Canadians have held views

which shunned immigration altogether. However, in 1988, Canadians revealed a slightly larger percentage of respondents willing to increase immigration than decrease it. One is led to wonder whether this recent alteration in opinion is a reflection of increased knowledge about the advantages of immigration or simply a softening of heart.

CHAPTER FIVE - THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS:
A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL SURVEY

On the question of integration, it is difficult not to succumb to the "we-they" syndrome. "They," are the immigrants who come to Canada each year with different languages, habits, religions, beliefs and even clothes. "We," are the people who were born in this country, who speak English or French or both, who watch hockey games on Saturday nights, and who occasionally giggle at the immigrants with funny clothes. "We" tend to wonder why "they" wear those ridiculous turbans, speak foreign languages, and eat strange foods. When do "they" become "us?"

Perhaps, it is necessary to return to a hypothesis which was stated in chapter one. It was noted that Canada's first inhabitants, the aboriginal people, were probably immigrants themselves. They were thought to have crossed a large land bridge over the Bering Straits thousands of years ago. Eventually more "theys" started to find their way to our great shores. The French, the British, the Irish, the Scottish, the German, the Ukrainian, the Icelandic, the Chinese, the Indian, the American, the Italian, each with their own customs, began to build a nation. Every year "they" and other "theys" from all over the world came to form a country. Soon "we," basically a large English- and French-speaking citizenry, were born. However, that is not to say that "we" were not Japanese or that "we" were not Polish. After all, "we" descended from "them."

Therefore, not only do "they" become "us," but it is also, "they" who have contributed to our multicultural society. This process is called integration.

The purpose of this chapter is to measure the concept of immigrant integration from a social-psychological perspective.²⁰ It may be argued that there are several aspects of such integration. From a behavioural perspective, integration refers to the immigrant adoption of national sports, modes of dress, arts, and even religion. Behavioural integration in Canada has not taken place to the extent of assimilation. In other words, immigrants are free to practice their own religion and simply enjoy their cultural backgrounds. The lack of behavioural integration in Canada has permitted its multicultural heritage to prosper. The measurement of this lowest level of integration is unnecessary. The behavioural integration of Canada's immigrants, or lack thereof, need not be questioned. On the other hand, two other levels of integration have taken place to large extent. It will be shown that integration, based on the perspective of identity, has occurred to its full potential. An analysis of such variables as language and sense of belonging reveal that Canada's immigrants are well integrated. Finally, the highest level of integration will be referred to as attitudinal integration. This includes the adaptation of immigrants to the

²⁰ The results in this chapter are derived from analysis of the Quality of Life Survey, 1981.

social and political beliefs of the dominant society. Once again, it will be shown that immigrants are well integrated in this specific stream of integration.

Identity and Integration

One of the most common measurements of integration is identity. If the immigrant has learned to speak one or more of the languages of the host country and/or he or she feels a sense of satisfaction with and belonging to the country, then the process of integration is well under way.

Language

Upon arrival in Canada, most immigrants are unfamiliar with either of Canada's two official languages. Well over 50% of Canada's immigrants claimed no knowledge of French or English as a first language. On the other hand, approximately 95% of the persons born in Canada are taught English or French as a first language. An exploration of language-use by Canada's immigrants may indicate a certain degree of integration into Canadian society.

For example, one way to show that integration takes place is to compare "language first understood" with "language usually spoken at home." One would expect that the integration process would facilitate shifts in the responses of the immigrant population. If the immigrants respond that "language usually

spoken at home" has changed from a language other than English or French to one of the two official languages, then the integration process is in effect. This seems to be the case. In response to "language usually spoken at home," over 62% of Canada's immigrants indicated that they spoke one of the two official languages. Clearly this suggests a presence of integration as more immigrants learn to speak English or French and use those languages at home. It is interesting to note that immigrant males tend to adopt both of Canada's official languages. Figure 5.0 reveals that an equal proportion of immigrant and native-born males are actually bilingual.

With respect to language, it is clear that immigrant women are just as integrated into Canadian society as immigrant men. While 62.2% of immigrant males have acquired knowledge of at least one of the two official languages to the degree of speaking those languages at home, 62.5% of immigrant females have done the same. However, immigrant females are less inclined to speak both English and French at home. Only 1.0% of immigrant women are bilingual at home in contrast to 4.5% of women born in Canada.

When controlling the relationship between language and immigration by the variable, "year of arrival," a more significant relationship emerges. It is obvious that the longer the immigrant has been in Canada the greater likelihood he or she has adopted employment of either English or French at

home.²⁰⁸

Figure 5.0 - A Comparison of Immigrant Males and Canadian-Born Males by "Language Spoken at Home"

Source: 1981 Quality of Life Survey.

This is especially true for immigrant males. Eighty-eight

²⁰⁸ It is quite clear that a significant relationship exists, especially for immigrant men. An ETA of 0.29173 with language as the dependent variable and a significant Pearson's correlation of $R=0.26151$ suggests that the longer the immigrant male maintains residence in Canada, the more apt he is to learn and to speak, at home, one of the two official languages. This generalization cannot be extended to immigrant females. While 86.7% of females who arrived before 1945 had adopted English or French as a main language, those arriving between 1945 and 1981 were apt to speak English or French on an equal basis.

percent of the immigrants who arrived before 1945 have adopted English, French, or both, as official languages. Almost 60% of those who arrived during the post-war period up to and including 1960 have done the same. Immigrants who have arrived since 1960 are less likely to have adopted one of the official languages as a main language.

Overall, the study of language reveals that immigrants have adapted to Canadian society quite well. While a majority of immigrants were unable at one time to speak either English or French, the majority of immigrants in Canada have now adopted those languages as their main languages spoken at home. Immigrant males have proven well their integration at the language level by becoming as proportionately bilingual as males born in Canada.

Satisfaction with Life in Canada

Another way to measure the integration of immigrants in Canada is to determine whether or not they are satisfied with life here. It might be expected that those who express general feelings of satisfaction would be better prepared and able to adapt to Canadian society. Of course, one cannot assume that dissatisfaction with life in Canada is an absolute indication of non-integration. After all, there are many people who express dissatisfaction with life in Canada and were actually born here. Thus, it is necessary to study the relative satisfaction with life in Canada of immigrants in relation to that of native born

Canadians.²⁰⁹

When asked during the Quality of Life survey about satisfaction with life in Canada, immigrants proved to be more satisfied with life here than native-born Canadians. Fewer than five percent of the immigrant population expressed feelings of dissatisfaction. On the other hand, almost 10% of native-born Canadians indicated that they were dissatisfied with life in Canada. Figure 5.1 reveals which ethnic groups tend to be most dissatisfied life in Canada.

Next to native-born Canadians, in terms of dissatisfaction, are immigrants who were born in the United States. However, this group's level of dissatisfaction differs little from those who emigrated from western Europe and Asia. African immigrants proved to be most satisfied with life in Canada.

In chapter three, it was mentioned that African immigrants, on a per capita basis, were Canada's most highly educated persons and also the highest income earners. One wonders whether or not these factors influence such high degrees of satisfaction. When controlling the relationship between satisfaction with life and ethnic group for income level, it is found that immigrants are

²⁰⁹ This analysis of satisfaction with life in Canada has been prepared by studying such variables as: general satisfaction with life in Canada; and satisfaction with job (and derivatives of such).

Figure 5.1 - Dissatisfaction with Life in Canada by Birth Place

Source: Quality of Life Survey, 1981.

consistently satisfied with life in Canada across income levels. On the other hand, native-born Canadians are likely to be slightly more satisfied with life in Canada if they have higher incomes.²⁴ Table 5.0 compares levels of satisfaction between

²⁴ A significant Pearson's correlation of 0.03692 indicates that this relationship is statistically supported for native-born Canadians. On the contrary, the relationship is insignificant

immigrant and non-immigrant Canadians across various income levels.

It might be expected that immigrants who have been in Canada for a longer period of time would be more satisfied than recent arrivals with life here. In such a situation, it could be hypothesized that the immigrant who has been in Canada the longest would be more integrated. This hypothesis is not supported. Among immigrant males, 87.8% of those who arrived

Table 5.0 - Percentages of Native-Born and Immigrants who Express Satisfaction with Life in Canada by Income Level

Percentage of Respondents expressing satisfaction -----		
<u>Income</u>	<u>Native-born Canadians</u>	<u>Immigrant Canadians</u>
Below \$10,000	73.7%	81.3%
\$10,000-20,000	79.1	82.3
\$20,000-30,000	84.8	91.3
Over \$30,000	85.1	85.4

Source: Quality of Life Survey, 1981.

before 1945 expressed feelings of general satisfaction. On the other hand, 86.2% of immigrant males arriving during the 1970s also expressed general satisfaction with life in Canada.²¹¹ The same conclusions are arrived at when studying immigrant females.

and non-linear for immigrant Canadians suggesting that income has nothing to do with immigrant satisfaction with life in Canada.

²¹¹ The relationship is insignificant and non-linear. The same situation for immigrant females.

General satisfaction with life in Canada exists for all periods of arrivals. Overall, time of arrival has little effect on immigrant integration.

Another measure of satisfaction of life in Canada is the analysis of job satisfaction. The person most satisfied with his or her job may be able to avoid daily frustrations and become generally satisfied with life in Canada. That person then has time to adapt to other aspects of Canadian life and becomes well integrated. In Canada, immigrants are less likely than native-born Canadians to be satisfied with their jobs. However, the gap between the two groups is not a large one. While 82% of non-immigrant Canadians claim to be satisfied with their jobs, only three-quarters of the immigrant population has similar feelings. The reason for the existence of less satisfaction among immigrants may lie in the fact that most immigrants are left with little opportunity to shop around for employment. Since the 1960s, the immigrant was required to attain solid job prospects before entering the country. Many of these immigrants may have assumed jobs which other Canadians simply did not desire. In other cases, the job description may not have portrayed tasks adequately. This misleads the immigrant who later becomes frustrated and dissatisfied with his or her job. Furthermore, there is the persistent existence of discrimination against immigrants because of racial, cultural, or language differences. Richmond has demonstrated that such discrimination has allowed

immigrants to experience downward mobility upon arrival in Canada.²¹² All of these factors create a sense of dissatisfaction with employment.

On the job, it is evident that immigrants portray a "don't-rock-the-boat" image. Immigrants are less likely than native-born Canadians to engage in disagreements with advisors. Twelve percent of non-immigrant workers claimed to have had disagreements with bosses or supervisors. On the other hand, only 9.2% of immigrant workers had engaged in any type of conflict with supervisors. However, it is evident that immigrants were just as likely as non-immigrants to engage in conflict with co-workers. Overall 75% of all immigrants generally have no disagreements with anyone on the job while one-third of all non-immigrants are likely to engage in some sort of conflict.

The difference between immigrants and non-immigrants on the job, as noted above, is relatively small. This would probably suggest that the process of integration operates well. However, when controlling job satisfaction and job conflict for respondent's sex, differences become much more visible. Immigrant females are the least likely persons in Canada to be satisfied with their jobs. Fewer than 74% of the members of this

²¹² Anthony H. Richmond, Aspects of the Absorption and Adaptation of Immigrants, Manpower and Immigration, 1974, p. 22.

class were likely to maintain some degree of job satisfaction. On the other hand, fewer than 10% of immigrant males and females were dissatisfied with their jobs. Immigrant males resembled non-immigrants in terms of job satisfaction as only 11% expressed job dissatisfaction.

It is clear that native-born males are the most contentious of all workers. Approximately 15% of this group was likely to have had disagreements with bosses or supervisors. Thirty-five percent of this group was also likely to have had disagreements with supervisors, co-workers, or both. On the other hand, it seems that immigrant males were least likely to cross the paths of supervisors or bosses. Only 8% of this group was likely to maintain some sort of indifference towards supervisors. Immigrant females (approximately 11%) follow non-immigrant males as the second most likely group to engage in conflict with supervisors. It is this group which proves more contentious than both immigrant males and non-immigrant females.

The gap between immigrant males and females in job satisfaction and indifference towards supervisors may exist as a direct result of Canadian immigration policy. Since the official linking of economics and immigration in the 1960s the prospective immigrant has found it increasingly difficult to enter the country without a solid job prospect (or even job offer). During this period, immigrants have generally assumed jobs which non-

immigrants have either not been qualified for or have not wanted. The accepted emigrant, with family in tow, migrates to Canada to assume the new job. In most cases, this person will be satisfied and generally contented. According to the Quality of Life data set, this person has consistently been the male. On the other hand, the spouses of immigrant males are forced to search for employment after arriving in Canada. This task may prove frustrating as the spouse is confronted with possible language barriers and racism that was not confronted her male spouse who attained employment before entering the country. Finally, she is forced to accept a position which may generate disillusionment and indifference towards her supervisors.

Overall, it is evident that immigrants may not be as satisfied with employment as the non-immigrant population. However, this difference is not sizeable. When controlling for sex, the analyst finds that it is mostly immigrant women who are most dissatisfied with employment. On the other hand, one finds that immigrants are generally more satisfied with life in Canada than native-born Canadians. One can safely conclude that in terms of satisfaction with life here, immigrants have become well integrated.

A Sense of Belonging

A last measure of integration in terms of identification is to determine whether or not immigrants feel a "sense of

belonging" in the area around them. One might expect that people who feel accepted by the community will easily become integrated into that society. A federal survey, conducted in 1974, found that immigrants considered themselves to be well accepted by the community after they had been in Canada for three years. Forty-three percent felt they were "very well accepted," while another 49% felt they were "generally accepted." Only seven percent thought they were "treated with indifference" while 1% felt they were "not accepted at all."²¹³ These results seem to indicate strong community integration among immigrants.

The Quality of Life data set indicates that a sense of belonging may not be as strong among immigrants as suggested by the 1974 federal survey. When asked whether or not they considered themselves "a part of the area," only 67% of Canada's immigrants responded in agreement. However, this does not mean that the immigrant population is socially isolated from Canadian society. This arises from the fact that only 72% of the people born in Canada considered themselves part of a particular area.

²¹³ Canada, Three Years in Canada: First Report of the Longitudinal Survey on the Economic and Social Adaptation of Immigrants, Manpower and Immigration, 1974 p. 88.

Figure 5.2 - Percentage of Canadians who Feel They are Part of The Area by Birth Place

Source: Quality of Life Survey, 1981.

Figure 5.2 indicates that there is little difference among Canadians and their relative feelings of acceptance by the community. American immigrants are actually more likely than native-born Canadians to feel like they are part of their Canadian area. Other ethnic groups are only slightly less likely to feel accepted by the area in which they live. It was found in 1974 that immigrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan (75%) and from

India (70%) were the most likely of all immigrants to feel at home in Canada.¹⁴

This section has attempted to measure integration in terms of identification. It has been revealed that immigrants have adapted to Canada in terms of language, satisfaction with life in Canada, and feelings of community acceptance. In each situation the differences between immigrants and non-immigrants have been minimal. These conclusions support the hypothesis that integration at the level of identification has been complete.

Attitudinal Integration

In order to determine the possible existence of the highest level of integration, one would attempt to discover whether or not immigrants have adopted the attitudes and social values of the dominant society. This level of integration will be analyzed from a political perspective and will be divided into sub-levels. The first sub-level will compare the political interest and participation rates of immigrants and non-immigrants. The second sub-level will compare political efficacy and "satisfaction with government" between the two groups. The analyses of these two sub-levels will determine whether or not political isolation is apparent in either group. If such isolation is apparent then one might not expect integration in terms of political or social attitudes. The issues addressed by the dominant society of the

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 109.

non-immigrants) may have no effect on the immigrant population. Thus, a dichotomy in terms of political and social interaction may be proposed. However, if it is found that immigrants and non-immigrants maintain equal levels of political participation and efficacy then a measure of social attitudes may find integration or agreement in terms of social and political values. Thus, the first two sub-levels become necessary prerequisites for the measure of the third sub-level, political and social value integration.

Interest and Participation

With regard to political interest, it is quite obvious that no difference exists between immigrants and non-immigrants. Exactly 59% of both groups indicated some sort of interest in politics. Immigrants were actually slightly more prone than non-immigrants to be "very interested" in politics. As was the case for satisfaction with life in Canada, having been in Canada for a longer time had little effect on the immigrant's interest in politics.¹⁶ Immigrant males who arrived before 1945 were actually less likely to express interest in politics than those who arrived between 1961 and 1970. Immigrant females, on the other hand, proved most interested if they had arrived before 1945. However, this relationship proved non-linear over time.

¹⁶ Significant Pearson's correlations for both men (0.1515) and for women (0.14128) reveal that time in Canada has very little effect on the immigrant's interest in politics.

There is little difference between immigrants and non-immigrants in the process of political participation. At the lowest level, voting, it seems that immigrants are just as apt to vote as non-immigrants. In the 1984 federal election approximately 84% of the non-immigrant population claimed that they had voted. More than 87% of Canada's immigrants also responded that they had voted.²¹⁶

As the participation process becomes more in depth, immigrants are only slightly less likely to take part. The difference between groups is usually so limited that empirically established relationships are impossible to discover. For example, immigrants are less likely than native-born Canadians to take an active part in community problems. While 74% of the immigrant population "never" got involved, neither did 67% of the non-immigrant population. However, approximately the same proportion of immigrants and non-immigrants had been actively involved in community problems at least six times. Much the same may be concluded for other types of participation such as volunteer work or campaigning. In most cases, a slightly smaller proportion of immigrants is willing to take part in the overall process. However, in each case, both immigrants and non-immigrants are apt to equally participate as the political activity becomes more involved. For example, fewer immigrants

²¹⁶ 1984 Federal Election Data Results.

will perform volunteer work. However, just as many immigrants as native-born Canadians will perform volunteer work a number of times (say, six or more times).

Political Efficacy and Satisfaction with Government

Another useful measure of attitudinal integration is political efficacy. Political efficacy will be defined here as the degree to which one believes that he or she is capable of influencing government or the political process. As was the case with political participation, it is apparent that immigrants and non-immigrants reveal similar degrees of political efficacy.²¹⁷ Non-immigrant Canadians were likely to have the highest degrees of political efficacy. Approximately 5.7% of native-born Canadians revealed high degrees of political efficacy. This group was closely followed by Asian (4.5%) and East European (3.5%) immigrants in terms of expressing high degrees of political efficacy. However, the mode of political efficacy for all ethnic groups was moderately low.

Overall, there is no consistency in relating ethnic groups and political efficacy. There is no relationship at any level of

²¹⁷ A reliability scale was built on the basis of four variables in which respondents were required to state some degree of agreement or disagreement. The variables consisted of: "Parliament soon loses touch with people;" "Government does not care about people;" "Politics and Government are complicated;" and, "People have no say about what government." The scale achieved a reliability of alpha 0.7090, thus it is a reliable measure of political efficacy.

efficacy. With regard to "no efficacy," non-immigrants were apt to have one of the highest proportions of respondents in this group. African immigrants, on the other hand, were least likely to maintain "no efficacy." There seems to be no significant changes between ethnic groups when controlling for respondent's sex. Overall, 96% of immigrant females expressed little or no political efficacy while 93% of native-born females showed the same. The difference between immigrant males and non-immigrant males was also minute. Practically the same proportion of males from each group held little or no signs of political efficacy.²¹⁰ It is evident from this analysis that attitudinal integration in terms of political efficacy seems to have taken place. Political isolation in terms of political participation and political efficacy is a non-existent concept and cannot be associated with any given ethnic group in Canada.

It is evident that immigrants are just as satisfied as non-immigrants with Canada's system of governments. For example, when required to state one's degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with local government, approximately 55% of both groups responded with general satisfaction. The statistics remain much the same for satisfaction with provincial government. In this case, immigrants (55%) proved to be slightly more satisfied than non-immigrants (52.3%). With respect to

²¹⁰ Immigrant males maintained little or no political efficacy 94.6% of the time. Non-immigrant males were in the same category 92% of the time.

satisfaction with federal government, immigrants were much more satisfied with federal government performance. Only 34.8% of native-born Canadians were satisfied with the federal government. However, 42.3% of the immigrant population also felt satisfied. The explanation for this may be easily obtained. Immigration is first and foremost a federal jurisdiction. Therefore, Canada's immigrants would have once been required to deal directly with representatives of the federal government. The fact that these people actually qualified for immigration status may have enhanced their own feelings of satisfaction with the federal government at least to the point of being more satisfied than would be the case for native-born Canadians.

Political and Social Values

It has been shown, in the study of the last two sub-levels of attitudinal integration, that little difference exists between immigrants and non-immigrants. Canada's immigrant population has become well integrated in terms of political interest, participation, efficacy, and satisfaction with government. A measure of political and social values among immigrants vis-à-vis the non-immigrant population will be used to test attitudinal integration at its highest level. If a similarity exists between the groups at this level, it will be concluded that immigrant integration from a social-psychological view point is complete. Immigrant and non-immigrant attitudes will be measured by analyzing responses to various questions on policy emphasis and

minority rights.

Emphasis on Policy

In order to measure this first aspect of attitudinal integration, a scale was created which attempted to determine which groups felt more emphasis was needed on the country's most pressing issues. Included in this measure are such items as health, unemployment, welfare, crime prevention, environment protection, and education.¹³ In most cases, respondents were content to leave policies as they were. Figure 5.3 reveals the average percentage of respondents per country of birth who believed more emphasis was needed on these issues.

African and Asian immigrants are much more likely to believe that more emphasis should be given to most social issues. On the other hand, citizens of Canada who were born in Canada, the United States, Western and Eastern Europe were satisfied with the current emphasis on policy and responded that policy emphasis should remain unaltered. The explanation for this slight dichotomy between African-Asian immigrants and other ethnic groups may be found by referring to the political systems from which Canada's immigrants emerge. For example, people from Canada, the United States, and Western Europe, are familiar with and accept the free enterprise system in which government

¹³ The scale underwent a highest possible reliability alpha of 0.4124.

Figure 5.3 - Percentage of Respondents who Believe More Emphasis is Required on Most Policy Fields by Birth Place

Source: Quality of Life Survey, 1981.

intervention is usually limited. Such persons would probably desire limited emphasis on social policy. Eastern European immigrants, on the other hand, are mostly from communist-controlled nations. These people usually escape the reign of communism because they desire to dwell in a free enterprise

system. The desire to dwell in free enterprise system may convince these people that less government intervention is good. African and Asian immigrants usually emerge from underdeveloped, third world, and non-free enterprise systems. The appeal of social policies in the area of health, unemployment, and welfare, for example, may create a feeling of desire among these groups for increased emphasis on those issues.

Minority Rights

On the question of minority rights, it was once again established that African and Asian immigrants felt strongly in favour of protecting them. Well over 90% of both groups thought that such rights should be protected.²²⁰ However, it is clear that all ethnic groups stand strongly in favour of such protection. Over 80% of the members of each ethnic group expressed interest in protecting the rights of minorities. Since immigrants from Africa and Asia are usually visible minorities, it might be expected that these people would express more intense interest in protecting the rights of minorities. Overall, it seems that integration on the part of all ethnic groups has taken place despite the more intense views of African and Asian immigrants.

²²⁰ A reliability scale was created with following variables: "Should there be legislation to protect: the disabled; women; homosexuals; minorities; and children." A reliability coefficient of alpha = 0.7068 suggests that this a reliable measure of minority rights.

Conclusion

It can be seen from this analysis that immigrants in Canada are well integrated from a social-psychological viewpoint. It has been argued that behavioural integration which includes such dynamics as mode of dress, preference of art, and choice of religion has not taken place in Canada to any great extent. The lack of this low level of integration is the root of Canada's multicultural heritage and should be left unquestioned. On the other hand, measurement of higher levels of integration reveal that Canada's immigrants have become well adapted to Canadian society. Canada's immigrants have adopted at least one of Canada's official languages, are satisfied with life here, and feel a sense of belonging. This identity factor of integration seems to have occurred for all immigrants. At the highest level of integration, it is evident that immigrants have adopted attitudes which resemble those of the dominant society. Political interest, participation, efficacy, satisfaction with government, and attitudes on social issues seem to proportionately equal across ethnic groups. Very few differences are apparent which leads the analyst to conclude that immigrants have largely adopted the attitudes of the dominant society. Thus one may conclude that from a social-psychological perspective, Canada's immigrants are well integrated.

CHAPTER SIX - QUEBEC'S "NOT-SO-SPECIAL" IMMIGRATION STATUS

The whole interior of the British Dominion, must ere long be filled with an English population, every year rapidly increasing its numerical superiority over the French... The French Canadians are and ever must be isolated in the midst of an Anglo-Saxon world.

Lord Durham

Since 1759 when General James Wolfe and the British defeated Marquis de Montcalm and the French at the Plains of Abraham, the very existence of the French language in Canada has been threatened. There seems little doubt that Durham's words spoke for the entire British population living in Canada. The French language was to be erased from Canadian lands. This was certainly the case in 1838 when British politician John George Lampton was sent to Canada to preside over the formation of Upper and Lower Canada. It was Lampton's assignment to persuade "the union of Ontario and Québec in order to drown the French in an English legislature with English laws and the English language."²²¹ However, this did not occur.

²²¹ C.P. Lucas, Lord Durham's Report on the Affairs of British North America, vol.II: Text of the Report, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1912, pp. 290-291.

²²² Kenneth McRoberts, "English Canada and the Québec Nation," Canadian Forum, (February, 1980), p. 129.

The British North America Act gave back to Québécois their own political unit, their own "state," and made it possible for them to share in a "bigger state" with the other society and the other political units.

While French language laws and rights have continually been enacted in Québec and other parts of the nation in order to preserve the existence of the French culture, another problem has arisen - population. It is becoming quite clear that all the language rights and laws in the world will not save the French language if fewer people are born into the French-speaking community. While 88% of the Québec population is French-speaking, this majority figure may decline unless Québec can do something to prevent its potential population decrease. The main factor contributing to the decline of the French-speaking population is the current growth rate. Thirty years ago Québec mothers were having an average of just over four children each. However, this rate has undergone a severe decline since then and now ranks lowest in the western world. Today, Québec mothers are giving birth to an average of just over one child each.²²⁴ While a birth rate of 2.1 would maintain Québec at its current population, net positive emigration is further contributing to

²²³ Jean-Luc Pepin and John P. Robarts, The Task Force on Canadian Unity: A Time to Speak - The Views of the Public, Canada, Task Force on Canadian Unity, 1979, p. 137.

²²⁴ Robert Mackenzie, "Québec French-Speaking Families Urged to Sponsor Big Foreign Influx," Toronto Star, 21 January 1988, Section A, p. 5.

the population decline. If current fertility rates and net migration rates persist, a serious decline in the population of Québec is imminent.

In order to help replace its population, Québec has long relied on immigration to stimulate growth. At the same time the province has attempted to protect the existence of the French language by either attracting immigrants from French-speaking nations or by "francisizing" immigrants who emerge from non-French-speaking nations. Such actions have been facilitated by special arrangements agreed upon by various Québec and federal immigration departments. A constant and gradual decentralization of immigration jurisdiction has been passed from the federal government to Québec. This shift has allowed Québec to attain special status in the field of immigration.

Many of the Québec-federal agreements and the Québec special status in immigration have been included in the 1987 Constitutional Amendment. However, it is apparent that all that meets the eye may not be true. In fact, it is evident that the special status of Québec immigration may be jeopardized as a result of the pending implementation of the 1987 Constitutional Amendment (more commonly known as the Meech Lake Accord).

The purpose of this chapter is to present to the reader a clear understanding of the Québec immigration situation which

certainly warrants special attention. Unlike other provinces, Québec has not relied on immigration to simply stimulate population growth or to convey humanitarianism. Rather, Québec has attempted to manipulate its immigration policy so that it might aid in the protection of the French language. This long process has led to the constitutional entrenchment of Québec's special status in immigration which must be analyzed. Finally, it will be shown that the provisions of Meech Lake may suddenly nullify this status. Unless altered, the Constitutional Amendment of 1987²²⁶ may spell certain difficulties in Québec's protection of the French language through its management of immigration policy.

Despite its great need for immigrants, Québec has expressed concern over the qualities of its new arrivals. It is not that Québec citizens fear immigrants, it is simply that they fear the loss of the French language. It was estimated in 1987 that 92% of all immigrants heading to Québec settled in Montreal. Of that 92%, approximately two-thirds were usually integrated into anglophone communities.²²⁶ Statistics such as these clearly indicate why concern has risen over the survival of the French language in Québec.

²²⁶At the current time, the Meech Lake Accord is yet to be passed. It is expected that this will become a major issue after the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement has been dealt with by Parliament.

²²⁷Canadian Press, "Immigrants Create Ghetto of Dirt," Calgary Herald, 6 September 1987, Section C, p. 4.

Jacques Godbout has shown that Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States are four of the largest recipients of immigrants per year. These four countries also happen to contain predominantly English-speaking communities.

Il n'est pas indifférent que quatre de ces pays soient majoritairement de langue anglaise. Mais dans l'un des quatre, le Québec, une nation minoritaire, cherche courageusement, à faire son nid en français.

Taking into consideration the protective nature of Quebec residents with respect to the French language, it is no wonder that the province would express concern over its immigrant population and would also want specific jurisdictional power in that area.

A History of Québec Immigration.

Before Confederation it was the norm for each province to maintain individual policies on immigration and to hold such offices in various parts of the world. Thus it seemed only natural that the 1867 British North America Act deemed immigration as a shared jurisdiction between the provinces and the federal government with the latter assuming paramount responsibility. Section 95 of the Act states:

In each Province, the Legislature may take Laws in relation to Agriculture in the Province, and to Immigration in the Province; and it is hereby declared that the Parliament of Canada may from

"Jacques Godbout, "Les aspects provinciaux de l'immigration," L'Actualité, 12:5, (Mai, 1987), p. 14.

Time to Time make Laws in relation to Agriculture in all or any of the Provinces, and to Immigration into all or any of the Provinces; and any Law the Legislature of a Province relative to Agriculture or to Immigration shall have effect in and for the Province as long as and as far only as it is not repugnant to any Act of the Parliament of Canada.

It was not long after Confederation when a Canadian immigration office was established in London, England by the federal government. At the same time, independent provincial immigration offices were closed down throughout Europe. However, each province was permitted to maintain sub-agents in the London immigration office. It was no simple coincidence that the Canadian immigration office was located in London. This indicated that pre-Confederation anti-French sentiment still existed and that the immigration of French-speaking persons to Canada would be limited. This fact prompted René Lévesque to comment more than one hundred years later: "The federal government has maintained a very active network of immigration offices in England, Scotland, and Ireland, while there has never been one in France."²⁰ However, in 1892 Qu'ebec established an agent-general in charge of immigration in Paris. This attempt to encourage French-speaking emigrants to come to Canada was quickly "watered down" by the federal government. With the creation of the Department of Trade and Commerce, the agent-general in Paris was also appointed as the Canadian "commissaire general" to the

R ene Levesque, My Quebec, Toronto, Methuen, 1979.

federal government. These new duties soon took on more importance and effort than immigration, thus leaving the agent-general little time for promoting emigration to Canada among the French citizenry.²²⁹

Until 1960, very little occurred in terms of Quebec immigration policy. From 1897 to 1936 the Liberal party held office in Québec under premiers Gouin and Taschereau. The Conscription Crisis, World War I, the Great Depression, and the pursuit of American investment left little time during this period to attend to the task of immigration policy. With the rise to power of Maurice Duplessis and the Union Nationale, came even less attention to immigration.

Vineberg argues that Duplessis' ignorance of immigration promotion and services was a result of his xenophobic behavior.²³⁰ Little support for this theory is apparent. The fact that Duplessis paid little attention to immigration was not because he was xenophobic. Rather, it can be found that Duplessis actually paid little attention to all of his jurisdictions and services.²³¹ Partly because of his

²²⁹ R.A. Vineberg, "Federal-Provincial Relations in Canadian Immigration," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 30:2, (Summer, 1987), p. 303.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Rand Dyck, Provincial Politics in Canada, Scarborough, Prentice-Hall, p. 188-189.

conservative nature, believing in a minimal role for the state, and partly because of his antagonism towards the federal government, Duplessis was content to leave such important jurisdictions as immigration, education, health, and welfare in the hands of the Roman Catholic Church. While Duplessis was always a main antagonist to federal power, he was never willing to implement provincial powers he claimed in the process.

The 1960s, Jean Lesage, and "la révolution tranquille," brought about major changes in terms of Québec immigration.

The government of Jean Lesage realized that skilled immigrants could contribute to the development of the provincial economy and that it might be easier to integrate non-North American migrants into the francophone majority.²³²

It was not long before Lesage established a Québec immigration service within the department of cultural affairs. It is interesting to note that Lesage chose to integrate immigration with culture. As noted earlier, the jurisdiction of immigration in Canada has traditionally been linked with some aspect of the economy, such as Mines and Resources, and Employment and Immigration. The fact that Lesage chose to link immigration with cultural affairs proved that his interest in immigration would include protecting the French language. It was his wish that this new jurisdiction would better facilitate the "francisization" of new Canadians. In keeping with its revolutionary tactics, it was not long before Québec established

²³²Vineberg, op. cit., p. 307.

immigration offices in Paris, Beirut, Rome, and, Athens. There seems little doubt that Lesage and his government single-handedly contributed most to establishing provincial jurisdiction in terms of immigration.

On May 18, 1971, Québec and the federal government signed the first federal-provincial immigration agreement in the modern era. The agreement, signed by federal Manpower and Immigration minister Otto Lang and Québec Immigration minister François Cloutier, promised an increased francophone content in immigration. While this agreement did not reveal an outright devolution of power from the federal government to the Québec provincial government, it certainly did provide for increased input by the Québec government. Besides an increase in francophone content, the Lang-Cloutier pact would allow Québec to encourage French-speaking applicants to settle in Québec. Furthermore, Québec immigration officials would be on hand in federal international immigration offices to provide details on working and living conditions in the province of Québec.

It was noted at the time that "Québec needs this special recognition if French is to maintain its status as the province's official language."²³ However, it is quite clear that the Lang-Cloutier agreement would allow Québec to exercise much more

²³"Québec Gets Say in Immigration." Montreal Star, 18 May 1971, p. 3.

than simply an advisory or informational role at the international level. The fact that Québec had actually begun to establish offices in such areas as Paris and Rome facilitated the growth of an immigration service with substantial expertise.

This cadre of professionals felt themselves to be capable of far more than an informational role, and it was also the desire of the Québec Immigration Service to play a role in immigration to Québec. Through a series of negotiations with the federal government, Québec was able to obtain progressively, real authority in immigrant selection.²³⁴

Enter 1975 and the Québec desire to renegotiate the Lang-Cloutier agreement. This time a new agreement would be necessary because of the "need to maintain a bilingual balance in Canada's immigrant population."²³⁵ Thus another agreement was signed in October, 1975 by Robert Andras, minister of Manpower and Immigration, and Québec minister of Immigration, Jean Bienvenue. While Québec did not receive ultimate authority in immigration, once again its role therein was increased. The Andras-Bienvenue agreement ensured that all immigrants headed to Québec would be interviewed by a Québec immigration officer beforehand. Furthermore, a Québec immigration officer would also have significant input into the final decision on immigrant applicants to Québec. Of course federal immigration officers would still maintain the final decision-making authority. Finally the

Vineberg, op. cit., p. 313.

"Québec Immigrant Role Hiked," Montreal Star, 18 October 1975, p. 5.

agreement facilitated the establishment of a federal-provincial committee to provide on-going informational exchange and consultation on immigrant applicants. All of this was done in the hope that Québec would attract more immigrants who might be more suitable for "francisization" and for introduction into the French-speaking community.²³⁶ By this time Québec had also established two additional immigrant service offices in Haiti and London.

In 1976, the election of the separatist Parti Québécois found the province determined to gain as much autonomy as possible. In the area of immigration Premier René Lévesque claimed; "there is no self-respecting society that knows its interests and has self-identity that allows its immigration to be in the hands of others."²³⁷ What had been a gradual transfer of jurisdiction from the federal government to the province of Québec would suddenly become a more significant leap in terms of decentralized immigration power. It is clear that Québec was in search of increased jurisdiction in this field and this is exactly what the province was granted.

It is evident that a clear devolution of power occurred with the 1978 agreement signed by Bud Cullen, federal minister of

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Irvin Block, "Canada-Québec Immigration Pact Displays Flexibility," Montreal Star, 1 February 1979, Section A, p. 1.

Employment and Immigration, and Jacques Couture, Québec minister of Immigration. It practically nullified the paramount authority of the federal government in immigration policy as set out in Section 95 of the BNA Act. Article II A (1) (a) of the Cullen-Couture agreement provides that the selection of independent immigrants will be based on a joint and equal basis, according to separate sets of criteria for Canada and for Québec. Furthermore, Article III A (2) (b) maintains that an immigrant destined for Québec must first acquire prior agreement from a Québec immigration officer. In other words, both governments, by virtue of the agreement, were granted a veto in all immigration applications.

Furthermore, the Cullen-Couture agreement also established the initiation of a separate selection criteria program for immigrants applying to live in Québec. As noted in chapter one, the selection criteria or point system contains features which may allow the applicant to gain admittance status based on his or her education, profession, vocational training, language skills, etc. The Québec 100 point system reveals the attempt by the province to appeal to and to encourage French-speaking migrants to settle in Québec. For example, applicants may receive up to 15 points for being able to speak French. However, only two points are awarded to the applicant if he or she can speak English, but not French. Five points may be awarded to an applicant if he or she has a relative living in Québec in the

same area the applicant wishes to settle (two points if the relative wishes to settle elsewhere in Québec). The applicant's spouse may also help the applicant if the spouse can speak French or is in pursuit of a job for which there is demand.¹⁸ Finally, it is also apparent that Québec was concerned with its population growth in arriving at its point system. Points are awarded for families who have children under twelve.¹⁹ Of course, should an applicant be refused admission by Québec, there is still the chance that the applicant may receive admission status to the other provinces.

Many considered that the agreement finally granted Québec the chance to achieve a veritable policy on immigration, one which would take account of its economic, demographic, social, and cultural needs. However, there were those who saw the agreement as simply a concession to a separatist government and one which was totally unconstitutional.

It must be considered illegitimate and unconstitutional; in effect, it is subversive of the rights of parliament and the will of the people. It is unconstitutional because it gravely affects the nature of citizenship in this country. What constitutes citizenship, who is eligible for citizenship, and what are the rights and duties of citizenship are elements which are fundamental to the constitution of any self-governing country - whether that constitution is written, partly written, or

¹⁸ Canada, An Overview of the Constitutional Agreement, 1987, p. 102.

¹⁹ Ibid.

wholly written."²⁰⁰

Whether the constitution is written or unwritten is hardly important here. The fact is that there was no reason for Québec not to have more say in immigration in order to protect the French language. Furthermore, the Cullen-Couture agreement was well within the bounds of the BNA Act. Section 95 simply states that the provinces may enact laws concerning immigration as long as and as far only as they are not repugnant to any federal law in the area. Quite clearly the Cullen-Couture agreement did not repudiate any federal legislation. Furthermore, while selection was to be made on a joint and equal basis, one might argue that federal superiority in this issue was still maintained. This is due to the fact that even after joint and equal selection had been performed, "the final decision to issue a visa to all classes of immigrants is taken by the federal government following statutory procedures such as medical examinations and background checks."²⁰¹

In terms of citizenship, Harney has argued:

Residents of Canada were, and were to be, either British subjects, allies of the Queen (aboriginal peoples) or aliens. If we were to be citizens at all (an idea not totally familiar to British tradition), we were to be so as members of the British Empire.

²⁰⁰ John Harney, "Special Status in Immigration," Canadian Forum, 18:681, (May, 1978), p. 4.

²⁰¹ Vineberg, op. cit., p. 11

²⁰² Harney, op. cit.

One is compelled to wonder where French-speaking Canadians and practically all Québécois fit into such a scenario. Are they supposed to become British subjects? Comments such as these have created an air of apprehension among French-speaking Canadians who fear for the loss of their language. This agreement had virtually nothing to do with the granting of Canadian citizenship. This function is carried out by the federal government as always and was certainly not jeopardized just because Québec wanted to protect its employment of the French language.

An interesting note on the Cullen-Couture agreement is that it did provide for a compromise between centralized federalism and outright Québec sovereignty. Overall, the deal sparked the initiation of two schools of thought. One school believed that the Cullen-Couture agreement was simply a federal concession to a demanding separatist government. The other school saw the agreement as one reached within the spirit of cooperative federalism. When one considers that a gradual transfer of immigration power had been occurring since the early 1960s, it is difficult to conclude that the agreement was simply a concession to Québec. In this light, one might see the concession as simply a continuation of a long process. However, it is also difficult to determine whether or not the "joint and equal" clause in the agreement would have come about without the strong demands of the Parti Québécois government. This dilemma cannot be answered

here.

Québec Immigration Status and the Meech Lake Accord

Whether or not the Cullen-Couture agreement was reached in a spirit of cooperative federalism is no longer the issue. The agreement has been included in the Meech Lake Accord. Upon first viewing, the Constitutional Amendment of 1987 seems to maintain Québec's special status in immigration arrived at through years of negotiations in the Lang-Cloutier, Andras-Bienvenue, and Cullen-Couture agreements.

Québec's primary concern is to have an immigration policy which offsets its rapidly declining birth rate, fosters the preservation of a strong French-speaking community in the province and guarantees that Québec will be able to retain its relative demographic strength within Canada.

However, this special status was massively reduced when it was concluded that several clauses could not be included in the accord. It was first proposed that an agreement between the federal government and the Québec provincial government would:

guarantee that Québec will receive a number of immigrants, including refugees, within the annual total established by the federal government for all of Canada proportionate to its share of the population of Québec with a right to exceed that figure by five percent for demographic reasons.

¹¹ Canada, Release: Constitutional Accord Makes for a Stronger Canada, Ottawa, August 4, 1987, p. 14.

¹² Ibid., p. 97.

It was decided that it would be unconstitutional to guarantee Québec anything. For example, would such a guarantee mean that a certain number of immigrants would be forced to settle in Québec if the province could not attract its annual quota? If Québec decided that it wished to exceed its quota by five percent, would other provinces be forced to accept fewer immigrants? Or, would the federal government, under such circumstances, increase its annual immigration ceiling? Such potential controversy has been avoided and will not appear in the final Constitution Amendment of 1987. Rather, it has been established that:

Nothing will force immigrants to chose Québec as their destination; it will be up to Québec to attract them...The agreement with Québec will... let the province assume responsibility for services to immigrants that would otherwise be provided by the federal government, so the province can assist the integration of new immigrants into Québec's distinct society.

Revoking the Special Status

In all likelihood, the Amendment will provide backward steps in terms of Québec's special status which has been acquired in immigration. Allowing the province to assume responsibility for services otherwise provided by the federal government was an agreement reached long before the Cullen-Couture agreement was even initiated. In fact, such arrangements had already been

¹⁴⁵ Canada, Strengthening the Canadian Federation: The Constitution Amendment, 1987, p. 36.

forged in the Lang-Cloutier and Andras-Bienvenue agreements. Nothing "special" seems to have been facilitated by the arrival of the Meech Lake Accord.

Furthermore, the following clause has been added to Section 95 of the Constitution.

95 A. The Government of Canada shall, at the request of the government of any province, negotiate with the government of that province for the purpose of concluding an agreement, relating to immigration or the temporary admission of aliens into that province that is appropriate to the needs and circumstances of that province.

Suddenly the distinct society in Québec is not so distinct. Not only has Québec not been granted the guarantee it needed in order to better protect the employment of the French language, its distinct immigration status has also been nullified. Every province may now attain the same status. Thus, every province, with the opportunity to enter an immigration agreement with the federal government, will stand on equal footing vis-à-vis the federal government and vis-à-vis each other. Therefore, by recognizing Québec as a distinct society, the federal government has recognized every province as a distinct society (at least in terms of immigration policy) by simple virtue of Section 95 A of the Accord.

The Other Provinces

As Slater and Molnar have rightly noted, even though Québec's distinct status was recognized at Meech Lake, it seems

as though that status was "watered down" to please the other nine provinces. One report maintained, "it's like Papa Brian bought a new birthday suit for one child, and then nine others to keep the remaining siblings happy."²⁴⁶ It is quite clear that in the realm of immigration policy, other provinces will soon attempt to model their new "birthday suits."

In January, 1988, Alberta minister of Career Development and Employment, Rick Orman (also responsible for immigration), announced that his department would strive for the same immigration powers maintained by Québec. Orman announced that the province would also create an immigration services advisory committee to seek out an agreement with the federal government as expressed in Section 95 A of the Constitutional Amendment, 1987. This committee will also be responsible for gauging public opinion, evaluating emigration/immigration programs, and expressing provincial concern in overall policy. Upon first viewing, it seems that such action would hardly affect the policies adopted by Québec. However, Alberta has also expressed interest in coordinating immigration levels with the economy, "lowering them when unemployment is high and raising them when the economy grows rapidly."²⁴⁷ Furthermore, Orman is clearly interested in limiting the number of refugees admitted into the

²⁴⁶ Jeremy Slater and Monique Molnar, "The Murky Waters of Meech Lake," Canadian Dimension 21:1 (September, 1987), p. 23.

²⁴⁷ George Koch, "Orman's Piece of the Action," Alberta Report, 15:4, (January 11, 1988), p. 10.

province.

Alberta, now ranked fourth in population, was exceeded only by Ontario in overall refugee settlement last year. He [Orman] has told Ottawa that Alberta, with 9% of the country's population, is willing to accept 10% of the refugees entering Canada next year [1989].

While not all arguments have been exhausted, it has been noted with emphasis that immigration does not perpetuate unemployment problems. Rather, it has been pointed out that increased immigration would probably limit the occurrence of downturns in the economy. Despite Orman's misconception, his initiative reveals another problem which may arise as a result of Meech Lake. Should every province enter an agreement with the federal government in the attempt to control and even reduce the net flow of migration into any given province, the whole purpose of the Accord on immigration will be undermined. Distinct status and special arrangements will disappear as provinces will be compelled to accept a certain number of immigrants each year.

In such a case, Québec's attempt to protect the usage of French in Québec may also be undermined. For example, should all provinces enter agreements with the federal government and attempt to control the flow of immigrants (as Alberta intends to do), all provinces will be expected to accept a given number of

Ibid., p. 11.

immigrants each year. Québec, therefore, might be required to accept immigrants who may not fit into the French-speaking community (because if they did, Québec would have probably accepted them in the first place). Overall, it seems that the Meech Lake Accord may have profound consequences in terms of Canadian immigration policy. Ironically enough, an accord which has finally recognized the distinct features of the Quebec society may have actually removed the special status the province has enjoyed in the realm of immigration. Thus, the complete grounds for Québec-federal agreements on immigration - that is, to ensure francophone content in immigration and to protect the French language in Québec, may actually have been nullified by the Constitution Amendment, 1987.

Testing Québec's Special Status: A Case Study

There is one minor clause in the Meech Lake Accord which seeks to preserve Québec's special status in immigration.

Procedures for selecting immigrants to Québec will remain largely the same as they have been since 1978, except that Québec will get an expanded role in the selection of immigrants from within Canada.

This is an interesting point which deserves further investigation. A fair number of prospective immigrants who apply for admission from within Canada prove to be refugees. This is usually the case when refugees land at Canadian harbours or on Canadian airstrips and subsequently claim refugee status.

¹²³ Strengthening the Canadian Federation, op. cit., p. 6.

Despite Québec's so-called special status in selecting immigrants, it is clear that this status comes under certain scrutiny. An interesting case study which exemplifies this is the 1988 plight of Turkish refugees from Québec.

In the Autumn of 1986, an illegitimate refugee transfer attempt, organized by Turkish travel agents resulted in the landing of 2,000 Turks in Canada. These people were convinced by profit-seeking, unscrupulous travel agents that they would find a better life in Canada with homes and jobs for all. They were not told, however, that they would not qualify as genuine refugees as determined by the Canadian Immigration Act. Nevertheless, the Turks spent their last pennies and headed off to Canada in search of the good life.

Upon arriving, Canadian reception was not so hospitable. There was definite concern that the Turks would be a burden on public services and that they were simply jumping the bureaucratic immigration queues. The Turks joined a total of close to 50,000 people who have claimed refugee status in Canada. In an attempt to deal with public backlash and the fact that these Turks were not "real" refugees, Employment and Immigration minister, Benôit Bouchard began the long process of issuing deportation orders. In 1988, forty such orders were extended to Turks living in Montreal. Did the province of Québec, by virtue of the Cullen-Couture agreement have any special say in this

matter?

Québec, unlike any other province, has an agreement with the federal government which allows the province to issue certificates essentially allowing individuals to become landed immigrants.

After a plea from Québec Immigration minister Louise Robic to delay the deportations, Bouchard complied in order to give Québec time to decide whether or not it would accept the Turks. This compliance seemed to indicate that Québec's special status in immigration policy was well intact. However, Robic soon refused admission to the Turks. It was not the Constitution Amendment which interfered with Québec's immigration status, but the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 15 (1) of the Charter indicates that "every individual is equal before and under the law..." The Supreme Court of Canada has already deemed that as long as a person is on Canadian territory then that individual is entitled to the right specified in Section 15 (1). Since Robic refused to admit the Turks, it is difficult to determine whether or not the Charter would have been implemented by 25,000 other refugees, awaiting notice of status in Québec, on the grounds of discrimination. While the Charter and the Constitutional Amendment of 1987 are yet to clash in the field of immigration, it is likely that the Québec's special status will be questioned in the process.

²⁵⁰ Joan Bryden, "Turks Win Deportation Retreive," Ottawa Citizen, 23 March 1988, Section A, p. 1.

Conclusion

Québec immigration policy has come a long way since the early days of Jean Lesage's government. In feverish attempts to protect the existence of the French-speaking community in Québec, several initiatives were taken on by the Lesage government to ensure a francophone content in immigration. Since then three separate agreements between the federal government and Québec have revealed a gradual shifting of immigration jurisdiction from the federal government to the Québec provincial government. The Lang-Cloutier agreement opened the door for Québec input into the settlement of immigrants in Québec. The transfer of power reached a peak in 1978 with the Cullen-Couture agreement which provided that immigration to Québec would occur on a "joint and equal basis" between the federal and Québec governments. However, Québec's special status in immigration is now questioned. The fact that every province may now achieve the same special status as Québec in the realm of immigration means that the "distinct society" of Québec may be jeopardized. Quite clearly, the Meech Lake Accord, should it be passed, may put Québec's protective nature over its culture in check!

CONCLUSION

Each year, many individuals and families decide to move to another country. The reasons are usually economic. The desire to improve one's financial capabilities will usually rule over all other factors in making such a decision. As pointed out in chapter one, this is also the case for persons who are forced out of their homeland. Eventhough the persecuted person must leave, he or she will attempt to move to a country where economic opportunity is most apparent. The emigrant decides he or she will leave familiar surroundings to move to a location where the possibility of new languages, culture, and customs exist. Other people simply leave because they feel persecuted in their homeland for religious, political, or other beliefs.

Many of these people would like to make Canada their new home. There is little doubt that Canada is a country in need of immigrants. While many countries of the world are experiencing over-population, Canada will soon be struck by another type of population crisis - population shortage. As the baby boomers move towards retirement age, birthrates in Canada continue to decline. The result will be an age gap between the elder and the younger shortly in the next century. As the elder begin to demand increased health care and other social services, a lack of young labourers will create huge problems for Canada's welfare

state as we know it now. This population crisis would certainly lead to economic doom for Canada. A yearly gross immigration of approximately 175,000 people would allow Canada to avoid that problem. However, this has not been adhered to by the federal government.

Throughout Canada's history, many immigrants have arrived from all over the world. In most cases, immigrants have come in response to the economic opportunities available here. For example, the opening of the West and the development of the wheat industry brought thousands of immigrants to Canada. In other cases, immigrants have arrived because of dangerous situations in their homelands, such as the Irish Potatoe Famine which brought so many of that country's citizens to Canada.

Unfortunately, not all of Canada's immigrants have been welcomed with open arms. Canada's immigration policy was for decades clouded by its restrictive, discriminatory, and outright racism. Only recently has compensation been granted to some of the immigrants who have been served in the past with gross injustice. In August, 1988, the Canadian federal government finally acknowledged the undutiful performance of Canada's treatment towards its Japanese-Canadian citizens during the second World War. On the heels of American government action, the federal government has decided to compensate the Japanese for past injustice. As chapter two professes, there are a great deal

of other Canadian immigrants who have been blatantly mistreated. It is not surprising that Canada's Chinese and Ukrainian ethnic groups are now demanding compensation for the injustices done to them at the turn of the century.

Canada's need for immigrants can do no economic harm. Chapter three has revealed that the overall impact of immigrants in Canada is certainly positive. New arrivals do not "snatch" jobs from other Canadians, nor are they social parasites. Upon arriving in Canada, the immigrant becomes an automatic consumer, which eventually creates jobs for all Canadians. Many of Canada's immigrants are responsible for creating thousands of jobs each year through investments. Immigrant programs such as the entrepreneurial and investor class systems often bring hundreds of thousands of dollars to Canada each year. Latest statistics reveal that immigrants from Hong Kong invested \$776 million in Canada in 1987.²⁵¹

Despite the need for immigrants and the fact that they are economically feasible to this country, Canadians have long been willing to close the immigration doors. Many Canadians cite unemployment as a good reason for limiting or halting immigration. Others maintain that the population is "just right." Still others desire to slam the gates because they are

²⁵¹ Alison Pipa, "Hong Kong Market Gets Second Look," Globe and Mail, 21 November 1988, Section C, p. 3.

xenophobic. However, it seems that Canadians may be altering their opinions. Recent polls reveal that Canadians may be expressing increased acceptance of immigrants. This is likely due to the fact that more and more Canadians are becoming aware of the potential population crisis.

Chapter five has revealed that immigrants are quite well integrated. From a behavioural perspective, Canada's multicultural heritage encourages the practise of previously acquired cultures. Therefore, we would expect immigrants to join their own ethnic associations, practise their own religions, and enjoy their own cultural activities. However, this does not mean that immigrants are different from other Canadians. If one takes into consideration other measures of integration, it is found that immigrants have learned to speak English or French, are satisfied with life in Canada, maintain a strong sense of belonging here, and have acquired many of the social and political attitudes of the dominant society. The "we-they" syndrome is completely fallacious.

Finally, Québec's special immigration status has been reviewed. This status has been important to the existence of the French-Canadian culture in Québec and has been included in the Meech Lake Accord. This will undoubtedly create problems for Québec in the near future if the Accord is approved. The fact that all provinces will be guaranteed the same provisions as

Québec in terms of immigration policy, may jeopardize the existence of any special status.

Immigration is an issue which affects all Canadians. For too long new arrivals were mistreated and abused by Canadians and Canadian officials. It has become a difficult jurisdiction to preside over. There now exists a relationship between economics and immigration which has been exaggerated. This relationship may lead to a decline in the Canadian population shortly in the next century. It is hoped that the federal government will discover an immigration policy which is suitable to all!

REFERENCESBooks

- Avery, Donald, Dangerous Foreigners: European Immigrant Workers and Labour Radicalism in Canada, 1896-1932, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979).
- Berry, John W., Kalin, Rudolf, and Taylor, Donald M., Multiculturalism and Ethnic Attitudes in Canada, Minister of State for Multiculturalism, 1976.
- Borden, Henry, Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1938).
- Corbett, D.C. Canada's Immigration Policy, (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1957).
- Dyck, Rand, Provincial Politics in Canada, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1987).
- English, John, Borden: His Life and World, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1977).
- Epp, Frank E., Your Neighbor as Yourself: A Study on Responsibility in Immigration, (Winnipeg: Christian Press, 1968).
- Ferguson, Ted, A White Man's Country, (Toronto: Doubleday Canada Limited, 1975).
- Granatstein, J.L., Abella, Irving M., Bercuson, David J., Brown, R. Craig, and Neatby, H. Blair, Twentieth Century Canada, 2nd. edition, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1986).
- Guillet, Edwin C., The Great Migration: The Atlantic Crossing By Sailing Ship Since 1770, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963).
- Hastings, Elizabeth Hann, and Hastings, Philip K., Survey Research Consultants International, (Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1980).
- Hawkins, Freda, Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972).
- Isaac, Julius, Economics of Migration, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1947).

- Isaac, Julius, Economics of Migration, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1947).
- Lévesque, René, My Québec, (Toronto: Methuen, 1979).
- Lower, Arthur R.M., Colony to Nation: A History of Canada, (Toronto: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1946).
- Lucas, C.P., Lord Durham's Report on the Affairs of British North America, vol.II: Text of the Report, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912).
- Macdonald, Norman, Canada, 1763-1841: Immigration and Settlement, (Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1939).
- _____, Canada: Immigration and Colonization, 1841-1903, (Toronto: MacMillan, 1968).
- Malarek, Victor, Haven's Gate, (Toronto: MacMillan, 1987).
- Parai, Louis, Economic Impact of Immigration, Department of Manpower and Immigration, 1974.
- Richmond, Anthony H., Aspects of the Absorption and Adaptation of Immigrants, (Department of Manpower and Immigration, 1974).
- Richmond, Anthony H., Post-War Immigrants in Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967).
- Stewart, Walter, True Blue: The Loyalist Legend, (Don Mills: Collins, 1985).
- Stone, Leroy O., and Marceau, Claude, Canadian Population Trends and Public Policy Through the 1980s, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977).
- Tienhaara, Nancy, Canadian Views on Immigration and Population, Department of Manpower and Immigration, 1974.
- Timlin, Mabel F., Does Canada Need More People? (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1951).
- Whitaker, Reg, Double Standard: The Secret History of Canadian Immigration, (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1987).
- Woodsworth, James S., Strangers Within Our Gates, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1909).

Journals & Articles

- Abella, Irving and Troper, Harold, "The Line Must be Drawn Somewhere: Canada and the Jewish Refugees, 1933-39," Twentieth Century Canada: A Reader, J.L. Granatstein et al., (eds.), (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1986).
- Burke, Mary Anne, "Immigration," Canadian Social Trends, (Autumn, 1986), pp. 23-27.
- Corbett, D.C., "Immigration and Economic Development," Canadian Journal of Economics, 17 (August, 1951), pp. 360-68.
- Davies, Gordon W., "Macroeconomic Effects of Immigration: Evidence from CANDIDE, TRACE, and RDX2," Canadian Public Policy, 3, (Summer, 1977), pp. 299-306.
- Godbout, Jacques, "Les Québécois et l'immigration," L'Actualité, 12:5, (Mai, 1987).
- Grafftey, W.H., "Quest for an Immigration Policy," Canadian Business, 48, (May, 1975), pp. 60, 62.
- Harney, John, "Special Status in Immigration," Canadian Forum, 58, (May, 1978), pp. 4.
- Harvey, W.B., "Let's Halt All Immigration At Once," Saturday Night, 75, (December 10, 1960), p. 76.
- Hurd, W. Burton, "Some Implications of Prospective Population Changes in Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 5, (November, 1939), pp. 492-503.
- "Immigration: Closed Door/Closed Mind," Canada and the World, 52:4, (December, 1986), p. 14.
- Jones, Frank E., and Lambert, Wallace E., "Attitudes Towards Immigrants in a Canadian Community," Public Opinion Quarterly, 23, (1959), pp. 537-546.
- Jones, W.D., "The Importance of Immigration to Canadian Business," Business Quarterly, 33, (September, 1968), pp. 26-31.
- Koch, George, "Orman's Piece of the Action," Alberta Report, 15:4, (January 11, 1988).

- Lower, Arthur R.M., "The Case Against Immigration," History and Myth: Arthur Lower and the Making of Canadian Nationalism, W.H. Heick (ed.), (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1975).
- McRoberts, Kenneth, "English Canada and the Québec Nation," Canadian Forum, 59, (February, 1980), pp. 11-14.
- Meltz, Noah M., "Does Immigration Aggravate Unemployment?" The Canadian Banker and ICB Review, 82:5, (September-October, 1975), pp. 8-11.
- Newman, Peter C., "Are New Canadians Hurting Canada?" Maclean's, 72, (July, 1959), pp. 18-19, 55-57.
- Orlikow, D., "Labour and Immigration," Canadian Labour, 9, (February, 1964), pp. 17-18.
- Passaris, Constantine, "Canada's Future People," Policy Options Politiques, 5:5, (June, 1987), pp. 34-35.
- Rawlyck, G.A., "Canada's Immigration Policy, 1945-1962," Dalhousie Review, 42, (Autumn, 1962), pp. 287-300.
- Rose, Michael, "Facing a Future with Fewer People," Maclean's, 100:34, (August, 1987), pp. 16-17.
- Sessing, Trevor W., "How They Kept Canada Almost Lily White," Saturday Night, 85 (September, 1970), pp. 30-32.
- Slater, Jeremy and Molnar, Monique, "The Murky Waters of Meech Lake," Canadian Dimension, 21:5, (September, 1987), pp. 33-35.
- Swanson, Diane, "Voyage of the St. Louis," Canada and the World, 52:8 (April, 1987), p. 22.
- Taylor, R.C., "Migration and Motivation: A Study of Determinants and Types," Migration, J.A. Jackson (ed.), (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969).
- Thomas, David, "How We Kept Out the Black and the Yellow," Saturday Night, 87, (September, 1970), pp. 12-15.
- Vineberg, R.A., "Federal-Provincial Relations in Canadian Immigration," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 30:2, (Summer, 1987), pp. 299-317.

Waines, W.J., "Post-War Immigration Policy," Canadian Banker, 51, (1944), pp. 87-98.

Weinfield, Morton, "More Immigrants Please," Policy Options Politiques, 8:8, (October, 1987), pp. 24-28.

Woodside, C.W., "Problem in Integration: The New Canadians," Saturday Night, 70, (January 8, 1955), pp. 6-7.

Newspaper Articles

Block, Irwin, "Canada-Québec Immigration Pact Displays Flexibility," Montreal Star, 1 February 1978, Section A, p. 7.

Bryden, Joan, "Turks Win Deportation Retrieve," Ottawa Citizen, 23 March 1988, Section A, p. 1.

Canadian Press, "Immigrants Create Ghetto of Dirt," Calgary Herald, 6 September 1987, Section C., p. 4.

Critchley, Barry, "Immigrant Investors," Financial Post, 17 November 1986, Section A., p. 1.

Delacourt, Susan, "Phone-Ins, Polls Bristle With Anti-Immigrant Feelings," Globe & Mail, 6 March 1987, Section A, p.1.

de Boerr, Hilary, "Mideast Entrepreneurs Bring Ideas to Canada," Financial Post, 26 October 1987, Section D, p. 14.

Feilman, H., Editorial in The Globe, 22 May 1924, p. 4.

Griffin, Kevin, "Jeered Speaker Cites Racism," Vancouver Sun, 2 June 1988, Section B, p. 8.

Hatter, David, Horsman, Matthew, and Mathias, Philip, "Immigrant Dilemma: Asset or Liability?" Financial Post, 20 July 1987, Section A, p. 1.

Mackenzie, Robert, "Québec French-Speaking Families Urged to Sponsor Big Foreign Influx," Toronto Star, 21 January 1988, Section A., p. 5.

"More Canadians Needed, Poll Says," Vancouver Sun, 4 June 1988, p. 1.

O'Donnell, Joe, "Canadians Have Racist Views of New Immigrants," Toronto Star, 29 November 1985, Section A, p. 1.

Pipa, Alison, "Hong Kong Market Gets Second Look," Globe & Mail, 21 November 1988, Section C, p. 3.

"Québec Gets Say in Immigration," Montreal Star, 18 May 1971, p. 3.

"Québec Immigrant Role Hiked," Montreal Star, 18 October 1975, p. 5.

Government Documents

Canada, Annual Report to Parliament on Future Immigration Levels, Department of Employment and Immigration, 1987.

_____, An Overview of the Constitutional Agreement, 1987, 1987.

_____, Canada's Immigrants, Statistics Canada, 1984.

_____, Canada: One Hundred 1867-1967, Canada Bureau of Statistics, 1968.

_____, Canada Yearbook, 1910, Census and Statistics Office, 1911.

_____, Canada Yearbook, 1914, Census and Statistics Office, 1915.

_____, Canada Yearbook, 1915, Census and Statistics Office, 1916.

_____, Canada Yearbook, 1930, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1931.

_____, Canada Yearbook, 1948-49, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1950.

_____, Canada Yearbook, 1950, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1951.

_____, Canada Yearbook, 1988, Statistics Canada, 1988.

_____, Canadian Immigration: An Outline of Developments in the Post-War Period, reference paper #1, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, November, 1957.

- _____, Debates, House of Commons, 7 February 1910, p. 3134.
- _____, Debates, House of Commons, 29 April 1919, p. 1867.
- _____, Debates, House of Commons, 1 May 1947, p. 2646.
- _____, For Release, Department of Employment and Immigration, April, 27, 1988.
- _____, Green Paper #1: Immigration Policy Perspectives, Department of Manpower and Immigration, December, 1974.
- _____, Immigration Statistics, 1985, Department of Employment and Immigration, 1986.
- _____, Quarterly Demographic Statistics, Statistics Canada, May, 1988.
- _____, Race Relations and the Law: Report of a Symposium held in Vancouver, British Columbia, April 22-24, 1982, Minister of State for Multiculturalism.
- _____, Release: Constitutional Accord Makes for a Stronger Canada, 4 August 1987.
- _____, Report, Voloume IV, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 23 October 1969.
- _____, Strengthening the Canadian Federation: The Constitution Amendment, 1987.
- _____, Three Years In Canada: First Report of the Longitudinal Survey on the Economic and Social Adaptation of Immigrants, (Department of Manpower and Immigration, 1974).
- _____, Volume II, Royal Commission on Economic Union and Development Prospects, 1969.
- _____, White Paper on Immigration, Jean Marchand, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, October, 1966.
- _____, Your Rights and Canada's Immigration Law, Department of Employment and Immigration, 1986.
- DeVoretz, Don, and Akbari, Syed Ather, Canadian Immigrant Income Performance, Tax Contributions, and Transfer Payments, Department of Employment and Immigration, 1987.

- DeVoretz, Don, and Akbari, Syed Ather, The Substitutability of Immigrants in Production, Department of Employment and Immigration, 1987.
- Foot, David K., Population Aging and Immigration Policy in Canada: Implications and Prescriptions, Employment and Immigration Commission of Canada, 1986.
- Marr, W.L., and Percy, M.B., "Immigration Policy and Canadian Economic Growth," Domestic Policies in the International Economic Environment, John Walley, (ed.), Volume 12: Background Study, Canada, Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, 1985.
- Pepin, Jean-Luc, and Robarts, John P., The Task Force on Canadian Unity: A Time to Speak - The Views of the Public, Task Force on Canadian Unity, 1979.
- Polese, Mario and Le Minh, Agnes, L'impact a courte terme de l'immigration internationale sur la production et l'emploi au Quebec, 1968-1975, Ministere de l'immigration, 1978.

Statistics

- Federal Election Survey, Data Set, Carleton University, Computing Services, 1984.
- Quality of Life Survey, Data Set, Carleton University, Computing services, 1981.

END

1|7·0|2·90

FIN