Safety in Cameras? – An Exploratory Study of the Ottawa Public Surveillance (CCTV) Project

By

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Abstract

This thesis examines the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project announced in July 2019 as planned for the ByWard Market, but never implemented. The thesis relies on frame analysis of news articles and public documents, 11 open-focused interviews with people supporting or opposing the initiative, and social media data. The project was framed as a response to violent crime, but many Ottawa residents understood and promoted surveillance in the ByWard Market as a deterrent for the presence of marginalized people from the area more generally. Other nuances in public support for and opposition to CCTV are examined. My research unearthed that the Ottawa police quietly dropped the project, and, in an internal document, stated CCTV was not an evidence-based best practice, although the provincial government and other Ontario police forces continue to promote CCTV. Organized resistance in Ottawa likely played a role in stopping the project, and implications of this are discussed.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

This thesis explores the trajectory of the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project, which was proposed and announced in 2019, but never implemented. The project would have placed public CCTV surveillance cameras in the City of Ottawa’s busy ByWard Market area, a tourist centre and retail and entertainment hub of the city. The thesis traces the trajectory of the project and uses this case study to unpack the nuances underlying why and how individuals support or oppose the implementation of public open-street camera surveillance in an urban centre. Because Ottawa officials proposed a new public camera surveillance initiative, and then later, unlike in a number of other Canadian cities, discontinued the project, this location warrants analysis, to understand what may lead to rejection of such projects, which have been adopted in many other cities in this country and beyond. This research also seeks to understand the beliefs and attitudes of those who support and oppose public surveillance cameras more generally. I thus examine the politics behind implementing or opposing open-street CCTV, in the context of various media coverage, city policies, police response, provincial funding initiatives, and other factors. Using this exploratory case study, I hope to promote a more nuanced understanding of public perception of CCTV in Ottawa’s context, critiques regarding implementing open-street CCTV as a crime control and commercial revitalization tool, and reasons for and methods of resistance against public surveillance cameras.

ByWard Market

I will start with a description of the ByWard Market and then a brief recap of events. The ByWard Market is a popular area for locals and tourists alike; the pedestrian-friendly neighbourhood is filled with small businesses, restaurants, shopping, and
nightlife. The ByWard Market is one of the oldest markets in Canada, established in 1826 (ottawatourism.ca). Now, the ByWard Market is full of luxury condos, restaurants, bars, and clubs; however, there is another side of Market that is being pushed away from public view. The Byward Market is also frequented by many poor and often homeless people, who often are dealing with some combination of either mental health and/or substance issues. On the ByWard Market website, there is no mention of the social services offered, or the various shelters and food kitchens in the area. Covid-19, the toxic drug supply, and the housing crisis have had extremely damaging effects to the community. The pandemic contributed to making homelessness in the ByWard Market much more visible through many closures and service restrictions (Freiheit 2021).

In summer 2019, the shootings of 21-year-old Ryan Kabuya-Ntumba and 42-year-old Markland Campbell in the ByWard Market area received sensational media coverage and triggered discussions of increased gun violence in the area, concern about the effects on tourism and business, and the need for CCTV. These acts of violence were followed by Mayor Jim Watson publishing a memorandum on July 3rd 2019, requesting Ottawa’s City Manager – Steve Kanellakos – to initiate a feasibility study for a pilot project to install public CCTV systems in the ByWard Market, thus formally announcing consideration of what the Mayor would call the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project. In his memo, Mayor Watson wrote that the purpose of the CCTV project would be to:

contribute to the safe environment of the downtown areas; assist as one of the components of the downtown area’s revitalization efforts; and, improve the ability of the Ottawa Police Service and community to respond to crime and anti-social behaviour occurring in the downtown areas (Watson 2019, p. 1).

Once Mayor Watson’s memo was public, news media ran several stories and articles detailing the content of the memo, but no additional information was made
public. The news coverage of the proposed pilot project (excluding opinion pieces) nearly always began by discussing violent incidents in the Market before transitioning the discussion into how increasing CCTV coverage in the area would act as a deterrent to this violence.

On August 23\textsuperscript{rd} 2019, the province of Ontario announced $3 million investment to fund CCTV cameras for police in the city of Toronto (Ontario Newsroom, August 23\textsuperscript{rd} 2019). This investment more than doubled the amount of CCTV cameras in operated by the Toronto Police Service (TPS). According to Premier Doug Ford, “this investment will give the Toronto Police Service the tools they need to fight gun and gang violence in Toronto and put violent criminals behind bars - where they belong” (Ontario Newsroom, August 23\textsuperscript{rd} 2019). According to the news release announcing the funding, the cameras are “will act as both a deterrent to crime and aid law enforcement to ensure that dangerous criminals responsible for gun and gang violence are promptly brought to justice” (Ontario Newsroom, August 23\textsuperscript{rd} 2019).

A key moment in the story of the attempt to introduce CCTV in Ottawa was Anthony Di Monte’s (at the time the Manager of Emergency and Protective Services) memo, dated October 16\textsuperscript{th} 2019, to the mayor and city council. This key memo stated that the surveillance project falls under the purview of the Ottawa police and, similar to TPS, recommended that the OPS pursue provincial funding for implementing CCTV in the Market (Di Monte 2019).

\footnote{Some specifics of the Ottawa proposal were never made clear to the public, and it is unclear, among other things, whether the proposed Ottawa Public Surveillance Project would have been live monitored or might have involved Smart CCTV technology. Due to these uncertainties, interviewees (and likely other Ottawa residents) tended to make assumptions about how the surveillance system would operate without knowing the details.}
An anti-surveillance camera group, the Coalition Against More Surveillance (CAMS) Ottawa was formed soon in response the announcement of the surveillance project. It is a group of Ottawa residents, activists, and scholars resisting the camera initiative and drawing attention to the increasing use of surveillance in the Ottawa area more generally (cams-ottawa.ca 2021). Their goal was not only to fight the cameras, to draw attention to their concerns surrounding increasing surveillance in Ottawa, more specifically in historically over-policed neighborhoods including not only the ByWard Market, but also the neighbourhoods Overbrook, Jasmine Crescent, Caldwell Avenue, and Montreal Road; these areas are occupied by a large number of people of colour, First Nations, Inuit, and Métis peoples, and other marginalized groups (cams-ottawa.ca).

CAMS, along with the Criminalization and Punishment Education Project\(^2\) (CPEP), another local criminal justice activist group, organized a round table discussion on October 30\(^{th}\) 2019 to allow for public debate speak out on their counter-narrative concerning CCTV\(^3\). Public discussion surrounding the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project fell silent after the round table event, possibly because there were no further public announcements or moves to push ahead with the CCTV initiative. Close to three years later, it seems a decision was made to drop the initiative, although this was never publicly announced.

My research for this thesis has unearthed more details about what was going on behind the scenes. To give context, we must point out that prior to the announcement of the surveillance project, the Ottawa Police Service was developing their 2019-2020

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\(^2\) The objectives of CPEP are included in Appendix H.

\(^3\) More details on CAMS’s resistance are discussed in the resistance section of Chapter 5.
Strategic Plan (OPS 2019), which outlines the priorities for the service. In order to do this, the Ottawa Police Services Board conducted public consultation research to hear the concerns of residents.

On July 22, 2019, the Ottawa Police Service Board (OPSB) directed the Ottawa Police Service (OPS) to examine different ways to reduce gun violence in Ottawa by examining the use of guns, gun crimes, and best practices across Canada (OPS 2020a). As part of this process, several practices were examined by OPS as possible tools to reduce gun violence in Ottawa.

One of the major things unearthed in this study is the decision by OPS regarding implementing open-street CCTV. This decision was never made public to my knowledge, and all participants stated they were unaware the project was discontinued, nor are there any news media articles regarding the OPS decision. It is unclear at what point the service abandoned the surveillance project in their process of developing the 2019-2020 strategic plan. The plan to introduce surveillance was apparently just quietly dropped, at some time between July 22, 2019 (the date when OPSB directed OPS to investigate best

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4 The stated purpose of the research was to better understand residents’ “perception of safety, crime and disorder, trust, and the key priorities to address over the next few years. This information, along with other crime data and input, will be used to determine the strategic priorities, goals, and objectives” (OPSB 2018, p.3). A summary report titled 2018 Public Research issued on September 21, 2018, by the OPSB discussed several issues, primarily focused on drugs, gun violence, gangs, property crime, youth crime, speeding and driving offenses, and the lack of engagement with the root causes of crime (OPSB 2018). One community concern indicates, “Gun violence and drugs (using and selling). OPS can be more visible in neighbourhoods to deter crime. Surveillance cameras in strategic placement are recommended” (OPSB 2018, p.131). The research report does not indicate how many individuals advocate for implementing CCTV, nor does it mention the effect of in-use publicly run CCTV on crime.

5 These practices included the Community Safety and Wellbeing Plan (CSWB), Integrated Neighborhood Service Teams (INST), Neighborhood Resource Teams (NRT), and Neighborhood Engagement Safety Tables (NEST), and CCTV cameras (OPS 2020a). A summary and discussion of the Community Safety and Wellbeing Plan (CSWB), Integrated Neighborhood Service Teams (INST), Neighborhood Resource Teams (NRT), and Neighborhood Engagement Safety Tables (NEST), along with some OPS funding can be found in Appendix G.
practices for reducing guns and gangs) and April 27, 2020 (the date of report with OPS decision). Despite Mayor Watson advocating for CCTV to be used in Ottawa for crime control and for increasing public safety, the result of OPS’s examination of implementing CCTV is as follows:

There are a wide variety of publicly and privately owned CCTV cameras in the city. *While the OPS is not opposed to CCTV cameras, they have not been proven to be an evidence-based best-practice for crime prevention (especially prevention of violent crimes).* While they have some greater benefit for post-crime investigations, the OPS would rather invest financial resources for CCTV into CSWB, NRT, INST and/or NEST initiatives. (OPS 2020a p.8, emphasis added).

With this decision, the OPS apparently have abandoned and effectively discontinued the and Ottawa Public Surveillance (CCTV) Project. Important to note is that the City of Ottawa, the OPS and the Ottawa Police Services Board are semi-autonomous institutions that do not simply operate in unison.

In August 2020, the province of Ontario announced financial support for such projects through the CCTV Grant Program, which is part of Ontario’s Guns, Gangs, and Violence Reduction Strategy (GGVRS) and offers funding for a year to successful applicants that can be re-applied for the following year (Ministry of Solicitor General 2020). This provincial grant initiative, and its widespread use, seemed to demonstrate the general belief by Ontario provincial politicians, policymakers, and policing services that CCTV is an effective tool for policing. In fact, 27 grants have been received by Ontario police services, 18 in 2020-2021 and nine in 2021-2022 (Ministry of Solicitor General 2020).

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6 As mentioned previously, Anthony Di Monte’s (2019) memo to City Council and Mayor Watson includes that the surveillance project falls under the purview of OPS, which hands over the decision-making responsibility from the City to the service (Crawford 2019). Based on the information available, any conversations and/or decisions made regarding implementing CCTV that occurred behind closed doors between OPS and the City is unknown.

7 A summary and brief discussion of the Ontario CCTV Grant Program, along with all recipients, the amount of funding, and their project descriptions can be found in Appendix F.
2021; see Appendix F). The wide take-up across the province of these grants evidently demonstrates broad support for CCTV as an effective approach to crime. Indeed, the government of Ontario developed the CCTV Grant Program with the following stated objectives: to deter crime in the surveilled area(s), increase enforcement, increase perception of safety, and support municipal revitalization efforts (Ministry of Solicitor General 2021). These objectives were identical to the goals of the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project.

There is no information available on whether the OPS were initially supportive of implementing open-street camera surveillance. Including the language ‘evidence-based’ when referring to the efficacy or lack of same of CCTV implies that some form of research is influencing their decision. However, there are no references or research cited in their report. Based on the data that will be discussed throughout this thesis, it is arguable that this decision by OPS to quietly not proceed with the CCTV initiative is an attempt to increase trust in the police and bolster their public legitimacy when it is under challenge. As such, they may have been influenced considerably by negative public responses to the CCTV proposal. The lack of evidence that CCTV is an effective tool for violence prevention, along with the outcry of citizens who also cited research in their resistance, could have been a significant factor pushing the OPS not to proceed with the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project, despite the Mayor’s claims that it is effective⁸. The existence of the Ontario Solicitor General’s ministry’s CCTV grant program is also premised on this notion, as former Solicitor General Sylvia Jones stated:

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⁸ A chronology of the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project is included in Appendix D.
CCTV surveillance cameras are an essential tool in helping police detect, prevent and deter criminal activity and keep Ontarians safe. (news.ontario.ca, January 25 2022).

In short, the Solicitor General of Ontario states that CCTV is essential in crime prevention, yet the Ottawa Police Service state that based on evidence, they are not a best practice for crime prevention.

As I will go on to discuss, the Ottawa Police Service’s rejection of CCTV is consistent with sociologist Sean Hier’s (2010) analysis that Canada remains an outlier for the number of CCTV surveillance initiatives proposed but eventually rejected. Furthermore, it distances the OPS from panoptic ideology (Foucault 1979; 1991) by not assuming that CCTV cameras and signage will contribute to deterrence through internalizing the all-seeing nature of surveillance.

As the CSWB plan (discussed in Appendix G) is operational from 2021-2031 with no mention of implementing open-street CCTV, it appears that there are no current plans to implement streetscape monitoring. However, it is possible that, in the future, the City or OPS may apply for outside funding through the CCTV Grant program to fund a new open-street CCTV project. Certainly other cities in Canada and elsewhere are likely to consider similar public CCTV initiatives, hence the continued relevance of this thesis research.

One important question to consider in relation to the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project, is why it began when and where it did. What is it about the ByWard Market that was send to warrant increased surveillance, in comparison to other Ottawa neighborhoods? What changes have occurred in the community that were seen to warrant surveillance now, in comparison to years ago? The demand for increasing safety measures in the Market and improving conditions has been one of the top priorities of the
ByWard Market Business Improvement Association (BIA). Indeed, as I have discovered in my research, for local business owners and market residents, the point of the initiative was not to focusing on the effects of the high number of bars in the Market, perhaps Ottawa’s central tourist and entertainment area, and therefore high levels of drunkenness in the area. Instead, as I will discuss, the apparent goal of the proposed CCTV measure, at least in the view of business owners and residents of the area was on protecting businesses from “street people” and the homeless. This thesis explains this finding by adopting Smith’s (1996) concept of revanchism politics, wherein authorities seek to reclaim urban spaces for ‘respectable’ people through punitive and discriminatory treatment of homeless and marginalized community members. Viewed through this lens, CCTV in urban spaces is used to sanitize public space from undesirable consumers. This is therefore incongruent with the official claims by Mayor Watson regarding implementing CCTV aimed to deter guns and gang violence (Watson 2019), but is especially relevant when considering the objective of urban business revitalization. This element of Ottawa’s CCTV context is explored in depth in Chapter 4.

The project is situated within a Canadian city that has only once been discussed in surveillance studies, specifically in a chapter concerning the introduction of CCTV in taxis in Ottawa (Doyle & Walby 2012). My thesis does not include the widespread use of privately-run CCTV in the city, as the use of privately-run CCTV and CCTV on public transportation, including taxis, buses, and trains is outside the scope of this study. Other Canadian cities have been researched in surveillance studies, including (but not limited to) Windsor, London, Hamilton, and Toronto, ON (Lippert 2009), Brockville, ON
(Walby 2006), Vancouver, BC (Hier & Walby 2014), and Montreal, QC (Mishara, Bardon & Dupont 2016).

Research Questions

The primary goal of this study is to understand: why and how do individuals and/or organizations support or oppose the implementation of open-street CCTV? This is a necessary focus to understand why streetscape monitoring continues to proliferate across the globe, and how and why some locations can come to resist it. We can also ponder concerning how and why the project was discontinued, although as this decision was taken in secret and never announced, ultimately, we can only speculate.

To answer these questions, I conducted 10 semi-structured interviews with 11 participants (once I spoke with two interviewees at the same time). I reviewed hundreds of social media and news article comments, examined 14 news articles, reviewed established City of Ottawa policy and publicly available documents, and analyzed documents I requested and received from the Ottawa Police Service. I examined these various sources of data to formulate detailed themes regarding Ottawa’s experience of, and perception towards, open-street CCTV.

Plan of Study

This thesis includes six chapters. Chapter Two discusses significant previous literature, including theoretical approaches to surveillance, and research on the growth of CCTV, on CCTV surveillance as a deterrent, on CCTV and urban space, and on public attitudes, and resistance. Chapter Three details the methodology of this study.

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9 A full copy of the 2002 CCTV Policy can be found in Appendix A. Detailed description of the individual changes made to the policy will be included in Appendix B, and a full copy of the 2018 CCTV policy can be found in Appendix C.
Chapter Four and Five use frame analysis to consider the main frameworks of meaning supporting and opposing the CCTV plan.

Chapter Four explores the framework largely used by Ottawa’s news media to present the surveillance initiative to residents. As I will discuss, the framework of meaning in support of the cameras is built on law-and-order ideology, with a focus on increasing public safety and the deterrence capabilities of CCTV. The chapter goes on to discuss interviewees’ understandings of, and responses to open-street CCTV and the proposed project. This chapter includes discussion of interviewees’ perspectives on CCTV, include understandings of deterrence, what kinds of violence could be deterred, and of fairness and equitable treatment through CCTV. As I will discuss, some unexpected themes that emerged included an acceptance that crime might simply be displaced, and a focus on homeless people as a target of Ottawa’s CCTV project.

Chapter Five follows the same structure as Chapter Four, beginning with a presentation of the second framework used to present Ottawa’s surveillance project, one that is rooted in resistance and uses progressive criminal justice ideology. Included are interviewee’s perspectives on CCTV, deterrence, fairness and equitable treatment, and an unexpected theme of how far-right ideology also motivates opposition to CCTV, and resistance.

Chapter Six is the concluding chapter in this study, and includes a summary of major findings, limitations in this study, and avenues for future research.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

The main purposes of this study are to understand how and why the public and various actors such as politicians, police, the media, and activists support or resist CCTV surveillance in Ottawa, and to explore how and why an initiative to introduce CCTV cameras in the Byward Market was introduced and then eventually discontinued. This chapter features a literature review that includes work on theoretical approaches, literature that examines reasons for the growth of CCTV, that examines the effectiveness of CCTV as a possible deterrent of crime, that explores the relationship between CCTV and urban space, that provides insight on public attitudes towards surveillance, and looks at efforts of resistance.

Despite a sustained burst of Canadian literature investigating the rise in video surveillance in this country in the early 2000s (see Walby 2005a; Walby 2005b; Lippert 2009; Hier et al. 2007; Hier 2010), relatively few Canadian studies have more recently investigated the continued implementation of CCTV or the resistance that implementation has met. Meanwhile, research literature on surveillance more generally has continued to flourish, and the multifaceted nature of surveillance is explored in many recent studies of surveillance, which focus on topics such as the effects of surveillance, racialized surveillance, policing through surveillance, surveillance capitalism, and different forms of surveillance technologies (Sewell et al., 2016; Haggerty et al., 2014; Maynard 2017; Lupton & Michael 2017; Zuboff 2019; Weitzberg et al., 2021).

In this thesis, surveillance is defined as “any systematic focus on personal information in order to influence, manage, entitle, or control those whose information is collected” (Haggerty et al., 2014, p.6). I am particularly interested in open-street CCTV
surveillance, which Wilson (2005) defines as “visual surveillance systems, established in the main by local government authorities in cooperation with the police, to monitor public spaces such as malls and major thoroughfares” (p.43). Another name for open-street CCTV is streetscape monitoring, as used by Hier (2010). For Hier, public-area streetscapes encompass the entire area between buildings located on opposing sides of city streets. Elements of the streetscape include sidewalks, landscapes, utilities, roads, businesses, residential properties, rest areas, bus stops, vehicles, vendors, pedestrians, and cyclists (Hier 2010, p.2).

Open-street CCTV, open-street camera surveillance, streetscape monitoring, and streetscape camera surveillance are terms used interchangeably throughout this study.

Theoretical Approaches

I begin my review of the literature by looking at broad theoretical approaches. A notable difficulty for theorizing surveillance is defining the scope of the concept itself. Surveillance is a broad concept covering a vast array of technologies, practices, uses, and contexts. Therefore, it is difficult to make valid generalizing statements (Haggerty, Wilson & Smith 2011).

Surveillance has been an important component of policing since its inception, used, for example, in slave patrols and wanted posters (Maynard 2017); however, surveillance has taken on a more crucial role with the widespread development of technology. In particular, surveillance has become a more central component of crime control efforts, largely through the management and classification of individuals based on their ascribed levels of risk (Ericson & Haggerty 1997). From this perspective, surveillance can be conceptualized as a technology of governance, given its crucial role in social control and disciplinary power (Foucault 1979, 1991; Cohen 1985; Haggerty, Wilson & Smith 2011).
The surveillance literature tends to take a top-down approach to the deployment and practices of surveillance (Lyon 2006), with Foucault’s (1979) use of the Panopticon being one of the most famous ways to conceptualize surveillance and becoming synonymous with surveillance more generally.

**Foucault – Panopticism and Disciplinary Societies**

Foucault mobilizes Bentham’s notion of the Panopticon to conceptualize surveillance as a form of social control. The panopticon is an architectural design in which the illusion of constant surveillance is created for those potentially under surveillance. The prisoners in the Panopticon do not need to be constantly watched, rather, they need to believe they could be (Galič et al., 2017). During Bentham’s time, surveillance was limited by physical barriers. One of the crucial components of the Panopticon was “to create an extension of perception beyond visible locales and the reduction of temporal relations to spatial relations, thus enhancing the possibility of the disciplinary panoptic power” (Galič et al., 2017, p. 12; Božovič 2010). The inspector in the watchman’s tower possesses this extended power: they are perceived as invisible and omnipresent, a dramatic contrast to the transparent nature of the inmate-space of the prison Panopticon; this design is what allows for inmates to be seen, but without the ability to see who is watching (Hier 2010). It is the watchmen’s seemingly omnipresent nature that sustains the disciplinary effect of the Panopticon.

Within Foucault’s concept of Panopticism, a type of power is applied to people in “the form of continuous individual supervision, in the form of control, punishment, and compensation, and in the form of correction, that is, the modelling and transforming of
individual in terms of certain norms” (Foucault 2002, p.70) in which panoptic refers to “seeing everything, everyone, all the time” (Foucault 2006, p.52). Nevertheless, the key point was not the fact that the inmates of Panopticon would be watched all the time, but … that they would be aware that they might be being watched. The inspector saw an infraction. He did not punish immediately, but waited. He saw a second infraction. At some point thereafter, he would confront the perpetrator with his record book. ‘See here, your infractions, with the date and time. This is your punishment.’ Once a punishment had been administered, and the prisoners saw that, should they misbehave, punishment was certain, they would no longer misbehave. There would no longer be any need for them to be watched. They would be reformed. (Schofield 2009, p.92).

The continuous, all-seeing nature of surveillance is not what is desired in the panopticon. Rather, it is that the gaze would be internalized, and that “the purpose of such central inspection was to obviate the need for watching, punishment and the Panopticon itself” (Galič et al., 2017, p. 12).

The architectural design and the idea of omnipresent watching was projected onto other areas of societies to analyse modes of governance and power relations (Foucault 1979). When anybody can potentially be under surveillance, people can internalize this form of control and values, thus leading discipline to being a “type of power, a strategy, and a kind of technology” (Galič et al., 2017, p.16). Foucault named this type of society a disciplinary society, in which the West has developed technocratic forms of governing. The focus is not directed towards the goal of governing, rather it is the mode of governing; the mode of governance shifted from sovereign societies towards one of discipline. In a disciplinary society, power is exercised and hidden in processes of conformity within different areas of society; therefore, discipline is not exclusively enforced by the State, instead, it is spread across social institutions, it works through them (Galič et al., 2017). This disciplining process results in the process of normation,
meaning the creation of norms of behaviour (Foucault 1979). In this process, the norm is central, thus conforming to norms is both the standard and the ideal; those who are deemed abnormal are considered inferior in comparison to the norm(al) (Galič et al., 2017). This categorizing people into hierarchical status is linked to the individual body, whereby disciplining the individual will create docile bodies (Foucault 1991). In a disciplinary society, individuals are continually compared to the norm, and through different methods of bureaucracy, individual bodies are disciplined and transformed into docile people to be controlled and administered.

With CCTV, the watcher cannot be seen, and there is a constant, yet mediated, gaze that might see everything. In this context, panoptic ideology posits that with the surveilled gaze internalized due to the presence of cameras and signage, people will change their behaviour to adhere to the social norms, regardless of whether the cameras are even turned on. According to panoptic ideology, the cameras represent the potential for enforcement or disciplinary power, and as a rational being, people will be ‘reformed’ into law-abiding beings. Normation and internalizing ‘good behaviour’ are achieved through cameras, and people in public spaces can therefore be moulded into behaviour in accordance with the norm (Galič et al., 2017). Furthermore, the ability to store the footage for potential future use demonstrates the omnipresent capabilities of CCTV, removing it from the confines not only of space, but time. However, there are a number of empirical questions that surface related to whether CCTV surveillance actually has the Panoptical effects posited by Foucault, for example, what do those under surveillance know about how and when the cameras are monitored and responded to by authorities?
Are those monitored by the cameras going to make rational judgements about the situations they are in?

*Beyond the Panopticon*

Panopticism modelled on prisons and surveillance studies focusing on CCTV are somewhat different, given the enclosure and captivity of prisons versus the mobility and agency experienced in open streetscapes. CCTV’s “success” is partially connected to its ability to manipulate individuals’ understanding of crime, who commits it, and where it occurs (Coleman 2012). Therefore, despite its failures as a crime prevention tool, as will be discussed, Coleman (2012) argues its success as a tool of social control is evident in its ability to symbolically locate a criminal foe, allowing law-abiding citizens to cast a watchful and punitive gaze upon him/her/them.

Haggerty and Ericson (2000) were one of the first critics of the use of Foucault’s panopticon as a metaphor for contemporary surveillance. The rapid development of surveillance technologies, particularly computerized databases, is one of the reasons why the panoptic metaphor is no longer suited for contemporary surveillance (Haggerty & Ericson 2000). Thus, Haggerty and Ericson proposed the concept of the surveillant assemblage. The notion of surveillant assemblage was developed as contemporary surveillance is still “emergent, unstable and lacking discernible boundaries or accountable governmental departments, so that it cannot be criticized by focusing on single, confined bureaucracies or institutions” (Galič et al., 2017, p.21). According to Haggerty and Ericson (2000), post-panoptic surveillance: a) is primarily directed at

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10 This concept built upon Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of assemblage, which is defined as a collection of heterogenous objects whose unity stems solely from their ability to work together (Haggerty & Ericson 2000).
human data; b) is reliant upon machines to record and create observations; c) is driven by merging systems together, creating a convergence of formerly discrete systems, therefore drastically increasing surveillance capacity and capabilities; d) is growing exponentially and expanding its uses regarding control, security, entertainment, profit, and governance.

As technologies evolve, cameras are a key part of a broader surveillant assemblage (Haggerty & Ericson 2000).

As contemporary surveillance is predominantly directed at the human body to control access to information, places, and to monitor behaviour and consumption, the process transforms individuals from people into a series of flows that form data doubles (Haggerty & Ericson 2000, 611-612). According to Hier (2002), data doubles can be a “functional hybrid” (p.400), in which their purpose is to be useful to various institutions who deny or allow access to several domains including places, things, information and discriminate against certain people11. Data doubles are disassembled and scrutinized to develop administrative, social control, and economic strategies based on the assumption that with the amount of data created in daily in contemporary societies (e.g., using the internet, using credit cards, smartphones, being in public, shopping, taking a taxi, and so on) a “profit should be made” (Galič et al., 2017 p.22, brackets in original).

CCTV is an example of the assemblage nature of surveillance; it is often referred to as a single entity despite being comprised of several goals and agendas (Ericson & Haggerty 2006). Surveillance power is expanding, and with each new development, there is potential to multiply pre-existing surveillance capacity. This potential contributes to the

11 This concept is developed based on the capitalist idea of surplus, in this case, surplus information (Hier 2002).
globalized nature of surveillance in the form of “function creep” (Innes 2001; Ericson & Haggerty 2006, p.18), whereby technology designed for one purpose finds new applications not originally used. These new tools lead to new, unanticipated monitoring possibilities. The function creep capacity of surveillance technology can transform individual experiences of monitoring systems; when coupled with other, more subtle, modes of surveillance, the ubiquitous monitoring is capturing all facets of life. When conceptualized in this way, individuals are sacrificing privacy in nearly all aspects of their lives to an ever-growing set of surveillant assemblages. Western discourses on human rights, particularly privacy rights, emphasize resistance to the dominating risk of the globalization of surveillance (Murakami Wood 2013).

The process of social sorting (Lyon 2003) can be explored through labelling theory and Goffman’s (1963) work on stigma. Individuals can be stigmatized because they are perceived as morally deficient and embody characteristics deemed discrediting, therefore placing them into a category of others in a society of normals (Goffman 1963). Lyon’s (2003) concept of social sorting demonstrates how the categories and codes based on surveillance data have real consequences regarding social inclusion and exclusion. Social sorting is the result of surveillance systems which “obtain personal and group data in order to classify people and populations according to varying criteria, to determine who should be targeted for special treatment, suspicion, eligibility, inclusion, access, and so on” (p.20). Therefore, these systems create different categories of people; these categories are not neutral. They are based on societal stereotypes, further contributing to some groups' marginalization. How surveillance is distributed varies drastically according to one’s social grouping. This means that some individuals perceive
surveillance as invasive in nearly all aspects of everyday life, whereas others experience it as a tool of convenience (Haggerty, Wilson, & Smith 2011). From this perspective, surveillance does more than observe; “it *remakes* the body as a social actor, classifying some bodies as normative and legal, and some as illegal and out of bounds” (Nakaruma 2015 p.221, emphasis on original). In this regard, surveillance is used as a tool for societal differentiation, assisting with constructing or discovering differences among populations and then regulating those groups per their assigned status (Monahan 2010).

**Growth of CCTV**

Now I move on to discuss literature that is specifically about CCTV. Camera surveillance is evident across the globe (Piza et al., 2014), and with the advent of new technologies, at-home security cameras are also becoming increasingly popular (Selinger & Durant 2022). CCTV is now routinely constructed as a purported beacon of safety in particular locations throughout cities to promote consumer friendliness and public security (Walby 2005a).

Britain led the way in the introduction of the cameras, but a high prevalence of CCTV cameras is no longer limited to the UK as they have taken off in numerous other countries (Norris & McCahill 2006). The proliferation of camera surveillance is not limited to open-street CCTV or security cameras in private businesses; rather, CCTV can be found in universities, hospitals, private residences, apartment buildings, taxi cabs, even elementary schools (Walby 2005a; SCAN 2009; Smith 2012; Lyon 2012 Birnhack et al., 2018). This expansion of surveillance technology across the globe has been recognized as the “internationalization” of CCTV surveillance (Hier 2010). Despite the internationalization of CCTV technology, the differences in policies, legal restrictions,
and access to funding contributes to countries adopting emerging technologies at different rates.

One of the primary characteristics of some contemporary surveillance technology such as CCTV is its mass character (Kovanič 2020), which is evidenced by the continuously expanding and prolific presence of open-street camera surveillance systems across the globe. According to Norris & Armstrong (1997; 1999), mass surveillance is unlike targeted, personalized surveillance as it is often automated, involuntary, non-discriminatory, and routinized. CCTV camera surveillance falls into the category of mass surveillance as it targets all individuals who move within its range of coverage (Kovanič 2020); however, targeting all people within the gaze does not mean that individuals will be treated equally.12

Lyon (2003) argues that this rise of cameras has helped to transform western societies into surveillance societies, as visual surveillance technologies such as CCTV have important implications for social relations and modes of governance. With the growing use of new surveillance technologies, including facial recognition, tracking devices, CCTV, gunshot detection, computer vision technology, and interpersonal surveillance practices such as community watch, private security, and policing, Canadian cities are transforming into hypersurveilled spaces (Haggerty et al., 2014; Lyon 2018; Skogan 2019).13

12 Norris & Armstrong’s (1997; 1999) definition of mass surveillance does not consider that CCTV surveillance is not fully automated as it requires monitoring, and how discrimination can be built into the technology itself through biased algorithms (Crockford 2020; Buolamwini & Gebru 2018), or the choice of location, or how prejudice from CCTV operators, not criminal behaviour, can determine higher levels of surveillance (Smith 2002).

13 Rural communities can also have surveillance, but for the purpose of this study, the focus is on cities in particular as they have more substantial surveillance systems.
As the emerging technological developments for CCTV surveillance systems have been so drastic, La Vigne & Lowry (2011) argue that the term “closed-circuit television” may no longer accurately describe modern surveillance systems. This change is due to the “sophisticated infrastructure underlying the cameras and ability to stream video of footage to any device granted access to the computer network” (Thomas et al. 2021, p.3; La Vigne & Lowry 2011). One of these changes is the continuing development of automated facial recognition technology (AFRT) (Mann & Smith 2017). AFRT includes:

- the automated extraction, digitisation and comparison of the spatial and geometric distribution of facial features. Using an algorithm similar to the ones used in fingerprint recognition, AFRT compares an image of a face with one stored in a database. At the enrolment stage, a digital photograph of a subject's face is taken and a contour map of the position of facial features is converted into a digital template using an algorithm. AFRT systems digitise, store and compare facial templates that measure the relative position of facial features (Mann & Smith 2017, p.122).

AFRT involves creating an assemblage (Haggerty & Ericson 2000), and data doubles to enable social sorting, data storage, data sharing and integration (Mann & Smith 2017). While facial recognition technology is still being refined, using AFRT is becoming more common in law enforcement and can be integrated with CCTV (referred to as ‘Smart CCTV’) (Mann & Smith 2017)\(^\text{14}\).

Acceptance of the rapid expansion “in type and volume of information collected for security purposes” following the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Mann & Smith 2017, p.121) can influence research on surveillance technology, as some researchers may accept the

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\(^{14}\) Learned-Miller et al., (2020), argue that (in a US context) a new regulatory office must be created to manage to address the risks and benefits of facial recognition technologies.
premise that surveillance is necessary for security. For example, Kumar et al., (2018), state in the abstract of their study on identifying suspects with AFRT, “[n]owadays, finding and tracking a person in the world of technology is becoming a necessary task for various security purposes” (p.410, emphasis added). Stating that tracking is a necessary element for security reinforces the rhetoric of increased risk post 9/11. Furthermore, using AFRT encourages for passive surveillance systems, as stated by Kumar et al., (2018),

[t]here is no need of constant monitoring because once the query image is detected, the system can automatically send an alert message to the mobile whose number is stored (p.418).

If policing institutions across the globe are implementing AFRT to increase the efficacy of their CCTV systems, it begs the question as to whether their goal was ever crime prevention and if it is instead increased arrests and convictions. According to Learned-Miller et al., (2020, p.5), potential risks with implementing AFRT include:

1) Privacy (Risk) violation – identification information sold to data company, allowing tracking of individual. 2) Performance Assessment – partial occlusion causes overconfidence in result, inconsistent with original performance assessment. 3) Violation of Intended Use – resolution lower than allowed by software specification. Software fails to check for parameters of intended use. 4) Population Modeling – false positive match cause by overly homogenous training data.

These risks can impact the overall efficacy of any CCTV surveillance system wherein AFRT is implemented. These rapidly developing technologies will continue to present new challenges for legislation and regulation, adding further incentive for researchers to
continue exploring how surveillance such as CCTV is introduced and used in different contexts.\footnote{A discussion of international growth of CCTV – including Europe, Asia, Africa, the United States, and South America, can be found in Appendix E.}

\textit{Canadian Context}

Surveillance in Canada has been growing for years due to, or bound up with, a variety of factors such as the development of new technologies, an increasing focus on risk management, growing concerns about national security, public concerns about safety, crime, and policing, and the enactment of new laws relating to privacy, policing, the War on Terror, and so on (Haggerty et al., 2014). The first open-street CCTV program in Canada was established in Sherbrooke, QC, in 1991, but was later dismantled.\footnote{In 1999, a report was filed against the system by an investigator for the Commission d'Acces à l'Information (CAI), Quebec’s institution which regulates privacy issues, and found that surveillance system collected personal information (called nominative information in Quebec law), contrary to the province’s public sector privacy legislation (Walby 2006; Bennet & Bayley 2005; Stoddart 2002). This finding led the system to be dismantled (Walby 2006).} Other Canadian cities that implemented public CCTV following that decision were more closely modelled after successful initiatives in the UK (Walby 2005b), in an attempt to balance the right to privacy against other countervailing concerns (Walby 2005b). According to Lippert's (2009) study, the police, citizen, and business representatives promoting CCTV often cite a singular, highly publicized, violent crime or “trigger event” (Norris 2012) that indicates a need to prevent similar incidences.\footnote{For example, the shooting of 15-year-old Jane Creba in the Yonge Street shopping district in Toronto on Boxing Day in 2006 led to support for the implementation of CCTV in the area (Lippert 2009). The 2001 Downtown Camera Project promotion in London, Ontario, began after the murder of 20-year-old Michael Goldie-Ryder outside a downtown bar in 1999 (Hier et al., 2007). As the murder was sensationalized, it came to represent a broader problem of social disorder in the area, leading to the formation of the citizen organization Friends Against Senseless Endings (FASE). FASE was instrumental in gathering funds and community support to launch the surveillance program (Hier et al., 2007; Smith 2012).}
In 2006, fourteen Canadian cities already operated open-street CCTV, specifically “Sudbury, Hamilton, London, Windsor, Toronto, Peterborough, Thunder Bay, Sturgeon Falls and Thessalon Ontario (ON), Edmonton Alberta (AB), Antigonish Nova Scotia (NS), Kelowna British Columbia (BC), Montreal and Baie-Comeau Quebec (QC)” (Walby 2006, p.34), and another 19 cities were considering implementing a surveillance system (Walby 2006). By 2009, approximately 30 Canadian cities implemented CCTV (SCAN 2009). With the advent of Ontario’s CCTV Grant Program in 2020, 27 grants have been received by Ontario police services, notably increasing open-street CCTV in the province (Ministry of Solicitor General 2021). The overall level of CCTV surveillance in Canada is impossible to measure due to the prolific use of private surveillance systems, and in sites such as on public transportation, and with no database of in-use systems (Smith 2012). The lives of Canadians have become far more transparent in the digital age, leading to questions of how to balance privacy and security.

Although Canadian cities are clearly not impervious to the global growth of CCTV surveillance, Hier argues the Canadian context remains notable for the number of cities wherein open-street CCTV systems have been rejected (Hier 2010), raising questions about why this might be the case.

The following section will move into a discussion of the effectiveness of CCTV.

*CCTV as a Deterrent*

The widespread growth of CCTV and the fact that an ever-increasing number of public and private institutions and police services are using CCTV surveillance as a crime control tool has led to an intense debate in the academic literature on surveillance strategies and the effectiveness of CCTV as a deterrent (Caplan et al., 2011). Advocates
for CCTV claim that camera surveillance will deter criminal activity because potential perpetrators will believe that their behaviour is being monitored, which adheres to the notion of Panopticism as theorized by Bentham and Foucault. In this context, CCTV cameras represent the likelihood of punishment, which would be enough to deter criminal activity where they are present (Caplan et al., 2011; Akers & Sellers, 2009). This explanation for CCTV as a deterrent aligns with more traditional conceptions of crime and social control, where the aim is to increase the certainty of apprehending and convicting perpetrators and reducing fear of crime¹⁸ (Akers & Sellers 2009).

The rhetoric justifying the crime-fighting capabilities of CCTV is dependent on rational choice, situational crime prevention, and routine activities theory (Ratcliffe & Groff 2019; Clarke & Felson 1993; Cornish & Clarke 1986; Clarke 1997; Cohen & Felson 1979). Rational choice and situational crime prevention frameworks assume that prevention will occur when the potential offender, becoming aware of the surveillance camera and then deciding that the risk of identification outweighs the potential benefits of the offense, will be deterred from criminal acts (LaVigne et al., 2011; Piza et al., 2015; Ratcliffe & Groff 2019). From this perspective, camera surveillance is a component of a larger strategy of increasing the risks of committing crime and enhances or replaces the role of police or security in conducting official surveillance of the area (and the people within it) (Welsh & Farrington 2008; Ratcliffe & Groff 2019).

¹⁸ There are mixed results regarding the efficacy of CCTV concerning reducing fear of crime. Some research has showed over 70% of residents reporting a reduction in fear of crime after the installation of CCTV (Bennett & Gelsthorpe, 1996; Chatterton & Frenz 1994). Other studies confirm that while CCTV was not effective for crime prevention, it was effective at increasing perception of safety and reducing fear of crime (Bennett & Gelsthorne 1996; Sarno et al., 1999; Ditton 2000; Gill et al., 2007; Yavuz & Welch 2010; Reid & Anderson 2012). Nevertheless, despite these research results, other studies have indicated CCTV is not effective at reducing fear of crime or increasing feelings of safety (Honess & Charman 1992; Zurawski 2010).
Routine activities theory (RAT)\textsuperscript{19} relies on rational choice in the same way as situational crime prevention frameworks. From a RAT perspective, “CCTV can provide the necessary guardianship to prevent motivated offenders from taking advantage of criminal opportunities” (Thomas et al. 2021, p.2). With these considerations, CCTV’s potential crime prevention effects lie in the technology’s ability to disrupt and reduce situational cues necessary to commit illegal activities. These potential crime prevention effects are tied to what advocates say is the main benefit of CCTV technology in both private and public spaces – to prevent personal and property crimes (Welsh & Farrington 2009)\textsuperscript{20}.

Despite frequent advocacy that CCTV cameras create a deterrence effect, police services, municipalities, and private business owners must consider that research suggests the effects of CCTV on crime vary due to a wide range of contextual factors, including geographical setting, camera monitoring strategies, types of crime, who is doing the monitoring, use of other interventions, and even the country of origin (Piza et al., 2019; Thomas et al., 2021). On their own, surveillance cameras do nothing; cameras must be mounted and monitored in order to form a CCTV system (Norris 2012). However, if individuals do not acknowledge the camera, or if no one is monitoring the footage, then their “social and criminological impact is almost zero” (Norris 2012, p.24). Their impact is not zero as potential criminals may be unaware that no one is monitoring the footage, therefore, there may still be some deterrent impact. For CCTV to have a deterrent effect,

\textsuperscript{19} RAT emphasizes that crime occurs when there are three elements: a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian (Cohen & Felson 1979).

\textsuperscript{20} Although this discussion is adopting a rational choice, situational crime prevention and routine activities perspective, the proponents of CCTV may not be explicitly adopting these theories, nor have any clear understanding of the theory; rather, it is that politics of CCTV aligns with the key ideas of this perspective.
the individuals in camera range must assume their actions are being monitored and alter their behaviour because of the camera’s presence (Norris 2012). Furthermore, Lyon (2007) states that “the persons surveilled are not merely subject to surveillance but subjects of surveillance” (p.159), meaning that if people are aware they are being surveilled, they are no longer passive. Awareness of surveillance changes how an individual reacts; there can be new concerns, expectations, or fears (Foucault 1979; Kovanič 2020). Awareness of surveillance can determine whether criminal activity is deterred in the surveilled gaze.

The theory of deterrence assumes that those who commit a criminal offence are rational actors who have calculated the potential risk, cost, and benefits to their actions (Tomlinson 2016). However, many criminalized behaviours are not based on rational calculations, especially with the influence of drugs and/or alcohol, or any number of mental or cognitive illnesses or disorders. CCTV is not solely a technological system – “it is a socio-technical system” (Norris 2012, p.24). The system is based on the interaction between the technical system (including camera, operator, and algorithms) and those within the gaze, therefore, the mental state of those within the gaze impact the socio-technical interaction.

To understand how CCTV can be used as a crime control tool, it is essential to remember that each organizational system may be operating its CCTV systems differently. Some services have enough operators for monitoring the system on a 24-hour basis (active system), while other systems are left unmonitored until an incident occurs requiring the tapes to be reviewed (passive system) (Norris 2012).
Empirical research results regarding the effectiveness of open-street CCTV as a deterrent has shown mixed results\(^{21}\), with many of the frequently-cited studies now somewhat dated in 2022; some studies conclude that CCTV is effective for crime prevention (Short & Ditton 1995; Squires 1998; Gill & Spriggs 2005), while others argue that crime rates reduced more in control areas than in areas with installed CCTV (Farrington et al., 2002; Sarno 1995). Results are dependent in part upon installation area. CCTV in residential areas did not reduce crime but was more effective in parking lots at deterring auto theft (Welsh & Farrington 2002). In San Francisco, implementing CCTV resulted in no significant effect on violence, drug offenses, sex work, or vandalism (King, Mulligan & Raphael 2008). Gerrel’s (2016) study of the entertainment district in Malmö, Sweden found newly implemented CCTV did not result in reduced assaults. CCTV has also been documented to increase property crime reports (presumably resulting in reporting of some crimes that may not have been reported previously), and to increase police interventions post-installation, with no significant results concerning violent crime (Circo & McGarell 2021). However,

> disentangling the effect of CCTV cameras on crime alone is likely impossible given that improved lighting, deterrent signage, and proactive police response were employed simultaneously (Circo & McGarell 2021, p.146).

The combination of other crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) initiatives further confuses research results on the efficacy of CCTV. Ratcliffe & Groff published (2019) their longitudinal study (2003-2012) investigating the impact of open-

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\(^{21}\) At times, the criteria for efficacy vary from study to study. Rather than focusing on deterrence, some researchers focus on CCTV’s effect on clearance rates as a sign of efficacy (Jung & Wheeler 2021). As claims for CCTV’s effectiveness are sometimes based on CCTV’s evidentiary use in solving crimes – not its ability to deter these crimes – it is apparent that not all criminal behaviour is deterred in areas under the gaze, as the crimes continue to occur and be investigated and this consideration is recognized in academic literature.
street camera surveillance on violent street felonies (VSF) and found no substantial changes to VSF in the catchment area\textsuperscript{22}. Caplan et al. (2011) performed a quasi-experimental study investigating the effectiveness of CCTV as deterrence in Newark, NJ; their results indicate that the installation of CCTV in Newark, NJ had a city-wide deterrence effect on auto-thefts, further supported by Piza’s (2018) study in Newark, NJ. However, shootings and ‘theft from autos’ only experienced a deterrence effect in select neighbourhoods (Caplan et al., 2011)\textsuperscript{23}.

In Montreal, Stephane Leman-Langlois’s (2008) study revealed that rather than deterring drug offenses, the activity was simply moving to less heavily monitored areas. In Edmonton, CCTV cameras implemented to deter crime were removed after an internal investigation found “there was not sufficient evidence to conclude that there was any deterrent effect on crime or that they assisted in any investigations” (Smith 2012 p.130). Despite this decision, “public support for the project rose from 39 per cent to 61 per cent over the course of the project” (Smith 2012 p.130), demonstrating how, for some people, support for CCTV remains despite evidence of displacement effects.

In short, whether or not CCTV had a deterrent effect is highly debatable. In particular, due to little-to-no deterrence effects against violence, Mayor Watson’s rationale for implementing CCTV (i.e. deter violence in a select area) is generally not supported by scholarly research.

\textit{CCTV and Urban Space}

\textsuperscript{22} According to their results, camera intervention for VSF resulted in a non-significant result of p=0.028, indicating that implementing CCTV created no substantial changes to VSF in the catchment area (Ratcliffe & Groff 2019).

\textsuperscript{23} According to Caplan et al. (2011), part of this uncertainty about the impact of CCTV surveillance derives from difficulties in developing reliable research techniques that can effectively measure the impact of CCTV cameras as a means of crime control.
Some analysts argue that surveillance techniques such as CCTV in city centres and urban regeneration projects are actually designed to act as a cleansing mechanism to privilege select individuals, such as desired consumers, above others, while policing and/or removing less desirable populations (Patel 2012). Private businesses market distinctive city narratives and images and invest in CCTV to reconstruct desirable images, reinforcing and increasing consumer confidence (Walby 2005b; Coleman & Sim 2000). Key actors within these urban contexts in this country are Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) (also called Business Improvement Areas (BIAs)): defined as “organizations administered by a board that manages funds produced by a mandatory levy on all commercial property owners in a downtown or commercial retail strip” (Lippert 2012, 168; Hoyt 2003). According to the Government of Ontario’s BIA Handbook:

the general functions of a traditional BIA are to: oversee the improvement, beautification and maintenance of municipally-owned land, buildings and structures in the area beyond that provided at the expense of the municipality general [and] promote the area as a business or shopping area (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing 2010, p.3)

BIDs use a “clean and safe” rationale for security (Lippert 2012), which is essentially the “broken windows” theory of crime (Wilson & Kelling 1982). This security rationale is used by the ByWard Market BIA, which is explored in Chapter 4. With this perspective, being lenient towards lesser offences such as loitering, vandalism, and public intoxication suggests that the local authorities are not enforcing the norms, and with the appearance of relaxed norms enforcement, this motivates more serious crimes by decreasing the perceived likelihood of punishment (Wilson & Kelling 1982; Grainger 2021). This reasoning is used to crack down on minor signs and symptoms of disorder.
Having a consumption space that is safe and clean also ensures that consumers can pass through unscathed and without risk, and, perhaps as importantly, do not feel at risk (Lippert 2012). “Clean and safe” initiatives for Canadian BIDs include security cameras, ambassador programs, and clean teams. An important component to the effectiveness of CCTV is signage. BIDs can use CCTV along with urban revitalization to govern consumers and exclude unwanted people (Lippert 2012; Lippert 2009). CCTV signage is predominantly used to communicate to potential offenders the presence of watchfulness in an attempt to deter crime, but also allows the preferred consumers to experience increased *perception* of safety while moving through the space, which BIDs use to encourage increased consumption.

CCTV arrangements with BIDs can also be used to deter unwanted businesses (Lippert 2012). With the addition of cameras in a business neighbourhood, the rent increases; the desirable businesses can pay the increase, and the undesired businesses are forced to relocate elsewhere (Lippert 2012). This effect further deters unwanted patrons and potential panhandlers and increases the power of BID coordinators to ensure specific businesses and their respective clientele feel welcome in the space. Therefore, open-street CCTV is simultaneously a security and a capitalist tool; BIDs are an example of Foucault’s governance perspective (1979; 1991) in that BIDs are non-state authorities using their power to govern individuals in these spaces.

During first years of the 21st century, several studies in various countries (Coleman 2005; Doherty et al., 2008; MacLeod 2002; Raco 2003), focused on the “role

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24 Unwanted businesses could include smoke/vaping stores, cannabis dispensaries (since cannabis is legal in Canada), adult video stores, strip clubs or adult clubs, or any business that would attract loitering outside and rowdy consumers.
of surveillance in efforts to ‘cleanse’ urban public spaces of their homeless patrons, as authorities seek to redevelop inner-city areas as sites of consumption and leisure” (Clarke & Parsell 2019, p.1952). According to Speer (2019) and Grainger (2021), visible homelessness negatively impacts the reputation of cities, hinders economic development, and deters middle-class consumers. Here, politics of urban ‘revanchism’ come into play (Smith 1996), wherein authorities seek to reclaim inner-city spaces for ‘respectable’ people by using discriminatory and punitive treatment of homeless and other marginalized community members. Social and economic inequalities become further exacerbated as “the governance of homelessness comes to privilege the economic and aesthetic interests of the affluent over the wellbeing of the marginalized” (Clarke & Parsell 2019, p.1952; MacLeod 2002).

Exclusionary designs, also called hostile architecture or hostile design, create a restrictively built “environment that constrains the spaces that homeless individuals can occupy” (Grainger 2021, p.4; Savic & Savicic 2014). These designs are examples of punitive revanchism, wherein the goal is to push the homeless away from prime commercial spaces through building an environment that forces relocation into areas more secluded from consumer traffic (Chellew 2019; Grainger 2021). In the 1990s, street homelessness was in effect seen as a kind of ‘broken window’ (Wilson and Kelling 1992), representing the presence of more pervasive disorder and crime, and as a result, “the repression of homelessness became fundamental to urban growth strategies” (Grainger 2021, p.4).

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25 Exclusionary designs can include installing ledge spikes (Petty 2016), modifying public benches (Davis 1990), foliage (Rosenberger 2020), and mounting cameras on buildings (Coleman 2004) to prevent homeless people from sitting in areas of consumption or sleeping.
Proponents of urban revanchism argue that such laws restricting the behaviours of homeless people in public spaces are “‘quality of life’ laws [which] will encourage homeless people to move off the streets and into services, and thereby improving their quality of life” (Robinson 2019, p. 41). However, critics argue that these revanchist techniques target vulnerable populations and show little evidence of improving quality of life for homeless peoples (Robinson 2019). The literature on urban revanchism contributes to our understanding of the potential for surveillance to reproduce inequalities. However, most discussions in this literature are primarily dedicated to other punitive practices.26

Within their framework of critiquing corporate power, Coleman, Tombs and Whyte (2005) state that due to regeneration discourses and practice, the relatively powerless masses are exposed to the punitive gaze of surveillance that forms part of the entrepreneurial landscape of modern, neo-liberal societies. Regeneration discourses – defined as involving politicized local agents who “both encourage the development of capital and also help to police ‘public space’ in its interest” (Coleman, Tombs & Whyte 2005, p.2515) – stress the corporate and business interests in state-building, resulting in a carefully managed and hyper-surveilled public realm wherein the ‘corporatisation of crime control’ increasingly regulates and moves the ‘undesirable’ types from city centres (Coleman, Tombs & Whyte 2005; Waiton 2010). This perspective is especially relevant in the context of the ByWard Market, as this approach emphasizes that businesses have

26 This obscures the potential positive capacity of revanchist techniques, specifically surveillance, to assist the homeless as there is disproportionate attention given to the punitive elements of homeless governance (Clarke & Parsell 2019). For example, frontline workers supporting homeless people might potentially use CCTV to identify homeless encampments, locate missing clients, connect people to homeless services, and to protect the homeless from violence (Grainger 2021; Clarke & Parsell 2019; Löfstrand 2015; Huey 2010).
been able to increase attention and awareness of crimes against businesses. The Market is an intersection between the public and private sector wherein the businesses are advocating for open-street monitoring in order to protect consumption by desired patrons. Coleman, Tombs and Whyte (2005) argue that the:

convergence in the city of private-sector business and property interests with public-sector local authorities constitutes a localised neo-liberal statecraft’ where ‘space’ is left open, protected from the poor…. [This] is a form of governance of crime – but only certain crimes are governed, which intensifies the division between rich and poor within entrepreneurial cities (2005, p. 2525-2526).

It is worth noting that in this context, the authoritarian focus is not on the working class, but rather the homeless, beggars, and young people who hang out in city centres (Waiton 2010). As I will discuss, in the context of the ByWard Market, there are many local businesses owners who are openly advocating for the implementation of open-street CCTV as a crime control tool, on top of their use of private CCTV within their businesses. As there is such a concentration of visible homelessness and drug use in the ByWard Market, as I will discuss, those individuals are categorized as the “undesirable” types that businesses are targeting through open-street CCTV.

It has been widely shown that the homeless are a population that experience high rates of harassment and criminal victimization (Booth et al., 2002; Brunette & Drake 1998; Cohen et al., 1988; Garland et al., 2010; Ellsworth; 2019). Their level of vulnerability coupled with their inability to access various forms of security, results frequently in a “precarious existence” (Huey 2010, p.64). Therefore, some scholars state that the implementation of CCTV in public space and the surveillance of the homeless must be understood as “automatically and unquestionably repressive for the homeless population as a whole” due to the precarious nature of their existence (Huey 2010, p. 63).
This claim is evidenced by the following quote from a review of the surveillance measures implemented in several European cities:

the surveillance of public space – with electronic technology aiding and abetting border guards and security patrols – brings the ‘calibration and classification’ . . . long associated with homeless shelters and hostels to the street, squeezing the spaces in which the homeless can exercise their quotidian functions, denying them space where they have the freedom to ‘be’ (Doherty et al., 2008, p.308).27

Public Attitudes Towards CCTV

I next move to reviewing various research on public attitudes towards CCTV. Honess and Charman’s (1992) study in the UK reported that 89% of their respondents supported the installation of CCTV, whereas Bennet and Gelsthorpe’s (1996) UK study reported only 64% of their respondents supported CCTV. Spriggs et al., (2005), also a UK study, reported that 82% of their respondents reported being happy with implementing CCTV in a residential area, while only 4% reported being unhappy, with 14% being neither happy nor unhappy. Ditton’s (2000) UK study included an option of “don’t mind” for implementing CCTV, giving the respondents an opportunity to opt out of explicit support or opposition to CCTV and found that over one third of their respondents did mind if CCTV was implemented. Despite the varying results, they demonstrate that when CCTV technology was gaining popularity in the 1990s, the majority of the public was in support in the United Kingdom.

27 An alternative, less widely accepted position is that some argue that CCTV surveillance systems can be considered: “a) a measure of security for those living in the streets and in shelters, and; b) to the extent that security is conceived of as a social good, the receipt of which marks one as a citizen of the state, a means by which the homeless can be reconstituted as a something more than ‘lesser citizens’” (Huey 2010, p. 64). Huey’s (2010) analysis suggests that CCTV surveillance is not automatically experienced as a negative thing or a tool of marginalization. Experiences can range from questioning the usefulness of CCTV altogether, to some homeless men and women feeling safer in monitored spaces and actively seeking out these spaces (Huey 2010). Furthermore, Huey argues it is more often social service workers, not their clients, who agree that surveillance of public spaces is, de facto, “repressive for the homeless” (Huey 2010, p. 64).
In 2018, the LUSAX security team at Lund University in Sweden commissioned an opinion poll of the general public’s attitudes towards the use of CCTV in public spaces. Their results, and the responses of 1000 participants were nearly all favourable of CCTV, with some of the most significant results including: a) when asked “what do you think of surveillance cameras in public spaces?” 49% of responders stated they had “very positive” views; b) when asked if they believed more surveillance cameras were needed or if the current amount was sufficient, 72% of respondents stated there needed to be more; c) when asked if they agree with the following statement: “the mere PRESENCE of surveillance cameras deters a possible offender to commit crime,” 35% of respondents stated “fully agree” and 47% of respondents stated “partially agree” (Lahtinen 2018, p.1-2, emphasis in original). This type of broad support is not limited to one study. This trend is reflected in the (2016) study by Heumann et al., in the United States where there was almost universal acceptance of the reality that cameras surveying us when we are in public spaces is ubiquitous… Indeed, acceptance or at least resignation to the surveillance was so high and near unanimous that we think these data allow us to confidently reject (well beyond the usual exploratory qualification) the common view that the public is uneasy or even unsupportive of this kind of surveillance (p.49, brackets in original).

I now move on from discussing public opinion research to explore some of the dynamics of reactions among the surveilled public to CCTV. One argument made by proponents of camera surveillance is that CCTV does not infringe on someone’s anonymity or privacy as the observer in the control room can only see what is outwardly presented in a public domain (Von Silva-Tarouca Larsen 2011). This argument is premised on the idea that if you are in public space, there is no concept of privacy; while this may be how privacy is legally defined, individuals will define privacy in accordance with their norms. While many argue that open-street CCTV is solely “another set of
eyes,” the dynamics are far more complex than they seem. Von Silva-Tarouca Larsen (2011) argues that “… public CCTV surveillance replaces informal social rituals practised by civilians with formal supervision by officials who have access to the State’s monopoly over the legitimate use of force” (p.41). This consideration changes the relationship between the observer and the observed. When someone is subjected to CCTV surveillance, there is no face-to-face contact between the observer and the observed; physical barriers can be overcome with technological advancements, allowing the observer to zoom in on the footage, and the observed can be seen closer than with the naked eye.

Furthermore, the observer and the observed are not on equal footing. The observed is a civilian without status or power, whereas the observer represents the authorities through organized use of power. The observer’s access to the police connects to the state’s monopoly on the use of legitimate force, which can lead to negative consequences for the observed (Von Silva-Tarouca Larsen 2011).

Knowledge, experience, and awareness of surveillance are contributing factors in the dynamics of interacting with surveillance. While CCTV cameras represent the observing power of the state and prevent face-to-face interactions between the observer and observed, individuals still have power when interacting with surveillance through the subject’s surveillance capital (McCahill & Finn 2014). Surveillance capital refers to “how surveillance subjects utilize the everyday forms of tacit knowledge and cultural know-how that is acquired through first-hand experience of power relations to challenge the very same power relations” (McCahill & Finn 2014, p.4). This form of knowledge and experience allows individuals to oppose and resist surveillance.
Surveilled individuals are not only the objects of surveillance, but they are also “acting subjects” (Klauser & Albrechstlund 2014, p.284). As acting subjects, surveilled individuals can manage their self-image, interact with the surveillance device, and resist the surveillant gaze. In Lyon’s (2007) work *Surveillance Societies*, he identified three different reactions to surveillance – compliance, negotiation, and resistance.

The first two reactions are related. Compliance is primarily affected by the knowledge of surveillance; knowing how the data is gathered, where it is stored, and the watched subjects may support the use of the surveillance system if they deem it legitimate and necessary (Lyon 2007). Compliance may align with the normative narrative of CCTV, where if “you have nothing to hide, you should have nothing to fear.” Negotiation stems from questionable compliance, meaning concerns regarding a sense of space or control. These concerns can be due to where the surveillance or data gathering occurs or what type of data is collected. These concerns do not lead to dismissing the surveillance system as illegitimate, but rather a form of negotiation takes place (Lyon 2007). As resistance is such a crucial component of this study, it will be discussed in more depth in the next section.

**Resistance**

The concept of resistance has gained significant traction in modern social sciences (Lilja et al., 2017) as a tool to critically exploring politics of power. Resistance is not one specific set of actions or practices and can be performed for a multitude of reasons. Moreover, Žižek (2002) argues that the attitude in social sciences is one of resistance. He states,

The hegemonic attitude of academia is that of resistance – all the poetics of the dispersed marginal sexual, ethnic, lifestyle multitudes (the mentally ill, prisoners)
resisting the mysterious central (capitalized) Power. Everyone resists, from gays and lesbians to rightist survivalists – so why not make the logical conclusion that this discourse of resistance is the norm today and, as such, the main obstacle to the emergence of the discourse that would effectively question the dominant relations of Power? (p.66-67).

Whether Žižek’s claims ring true is dependent upon a variety of factors. In the context of surveillance studies, Lyon (2007) conceptualizes resistance as some sort of action performed by individuals to resist becoming a subject of surveillance. This can include individual actions to protect privacy or more organized and collective forms of resistance. Resistance is not always as structured as organizing a meeting with council members or writing critical articles: an action as simple as closing your curtains to prevent others from seeing into your private space is a form of surveillance resistance (Lyon 2007). This action prevents the unwanted gaze of others, in a space that has been deemed private, and covering the window is a practical technique to maintain that privacy. The level and nature of resisting surveillance varies by community; in some places, dozens of traffic cameras go up with no resistance, while others are rejected or removed (Gilliom 2019). Those who engage in opposition, “that is, the more public and organized efforts to block or modify a surveillance policy – or resistance – the often-hidden everyday struggles to thwart or evade an establish surveillance system – use widely divergent approaches” (Gilliom 2019, p. 113). Efforts such as litigation, protests, public awareness campaigns, and petitions have been used to oppose growing

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28 However, from my experiences as a student and researcher in Ottawa at the University of Ottawa and Carleton University, the critical gaze on the current Canadian criminal justice system, and therefore resistance of the current status quo, is a defining feature of my academic experience and stance as a researcher. This stance is not necessarily representative of criminology as a field, especially in the United States, but is a characterization of my experience in critical programs in Ottawa. This stance impacted other aspects of this study, as two participants are graduate students at these universities and instrumental resistors of the Ottawa Public Surveillance Program.
surveillance practices. Other, more individual resistance efforts include evading detection, masking prohibited actions, skirting the system, and breaking equipment (Gilliom 2019).

Adding to these analyses is Gary T. Marx’s (2003) identification of numerous general strategies in which surveillance is subverted or resisted, including: avoidance moves, piggybacking moves, switching moves, refusal moves, masking (identification) moves, blocking moves, distorting moves, breaking moves, cooperative moves, and counter-surveillance moves. Each represents a different form of resistance and non-compliance. These efforts are based on understanding the surveillance system and using that knowledge to defeat and deceive the system (Ericson & Haggerty 2006). The effects are usually local, immediate, and case-specific for evaluating the success of resistance measures.

According to Ericson and Haggerty (2006), the desire for resistance is usually not motivated by a need to eliminate or change the system; rather, it is to escape its grasp on an individual level. However, with more organized mass resistance to surveillance projects across the globe, the desire may no longer be simply personal evasion of surveillance; rather, the new goal is to dismantle and slowly change the ever-growing

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29 The term avoidance moves refers to changing the location or time of an activity to avoid surveillance. Piggybacking and switching moves involve masking oneself to surveillance or switching places with another individual. Refusal moves involve not participating in any surveillance systems that require consent. Both masking and blocking moves involve trying to prevent the surveillance system from obtaining any information. Distorting tactics attempt to manipulate the data gathered by a surveillance system. Breaking involves making the surveillance system inoperable. Cooperative moves involve working with sympathetic agents of the state within the surveillance system. Counter-surveillance involves using other forms of surveillance to disrupt the power dynamic between the observer and the observed (Marx 2003; p. 374-384).

30 This statement may be challenged in this project, possibly demonstrating how the surveillance systems, privacy, economics, and political action may have changed since 2006, and more organized and collective resistance to rejecting or eliminating CCTV may possibly be more common.
surveillance systems. Media coverage of resistance efforts is most often framed as a fight for the right to privacy (Gilliom 2019).

Despite many countries advocating for CCTV as a crime reduction method, many police services and citizen groups resist their local governments’ attempts at open-street surveillance. In Australia, many police officers themselves were hesitant when hearing about plans for open-street surveillance as a crime reduction technique, stating that these programs do not address the root causes of crime – for example, deficits in education, housing, lack of welfare support – and therefore seeing video surveillance as unhelpful and irrelevant (Sutton & Wilson 2004). Despite growth in CCTV in the 1990s, the expansion of it in Australia has been far slower than in the UK, potentially due to their “insurgent” approach to crime prevention (Sutton & Wilson 2004, 319). The “insurgent” philosophies “tend to see the causes of crimes as lying in economic and social inequality” (Sutton & Wilson 2004, 319). Skogan (1988) contrasts “insurgent” activists with what he terms “preservationists” (42-43). “Preservationists” include long-term residents, small businesses, homeowners, and others who have an interest in preserving the status quo and preventing disruption (Skogan 1988). This study has the potential to explore these concepts in a Canadian context.

Resistance in the Canadian Context

As mentioned previously, the Canadian context remains notable for the number of cities wherein open-street CCTV systems have been rejected (or dismantled), such as in Sherbrooke, QC (implemented then dismantled) (Walby 2006), Brockville and Peterborough, ON, (Hier et al., 2007; Hier 2010), Edmonton, AB (implemented then
dismantled)\textsuperscript{31}, Vancouver’s Downtown East Side, BC (Hier 2010; Smith 2012), and again in Vancouver, BC (Little 2022).

As Vancouver’s resistance is most recent, I will now briefly describe their rejection. In April of 2022, Vancouver’s city council once again rejected the use of CCTV as a crime control tool, preventing a CCTV proposal to be approved, effectively halting a new surveillance initiative before it could begin (Little 2022). Council members cited the ineffectiveness of CCTV with crime prevention, invasion of privacy, and how CCTV can criminalize marginalized members of their communities as reasons for their rejection (Little 2022).

The events of 9/11 have – and continue to – influence discussions and justifications for expanding camera surveillance systems across the country, however, efforts to develop monitoring programs have hitherto demonstrated that neither increasingly available monitoring technologies nor claims about the global terrorist threat guarantee the success of promotional efforts (Hier 2010, p.2).

This suggests that there are at least two possible explanations for the Canadian response to open-street camera use. First, based on Hier’s (2010) analysis, I argue that because it may be that Canada experienced less of an abrupt social change post 9/11 in comparison to the United States (e.g., national trauma, intense law-and-order propaganda promoted overnight, widespread fear, government and news-media framing the world as unsafe), meaning that Canadians are more likely to resist encroaching surveillance because they have not been as conditioned to believe that anywhere, and always, there is a potential threat or danger. It is important to keep in mind however that this argument is

\textsuperscript{31} CCTV was initially implemented and then rejected in 2012 due to limited deterrence effects, but as of 2020, Edmonton has 8 open-street CCTV cameras in use (Smith 2012; Snowdon 2020).
limited only to explain why Canada may be less supportive of CCTV than the United States, and also that many years have gone by since Hier wrote and 9/11 may be less salient now. Second, as Hier (2010) also suggests, the lack of commitment to long-term funding may be what has prevented Canadian cities from implementing streetscape monitoring. If this is so, then with the introduction of provincial funding programs, like the Ontario CCTV Grant Program, CCTV use in Canada may increase as more municipalities and policing services have access to funds.

Another possible contributing factor is that Canada is home to many internationally recognized surveillance scholars, all of whom have written critical articles regarding implementing open-street CCTV, with a key hub being Queen’s University’s Surveillance Studies Centre, arguably the most prominent centre of critical surveillance studies in the world. Having such a high density of critical surveillance scholars influencing academic discussion, newspaper reporting, and policy might influence the larger context of resistance in this country\(^\text{32}\). It is possible that the large concentration of critical surveillance scholars contributes to the higher levels of CCTV resistance in Canada.

The Canadian context includes “a mix of critical newspaper coverage, community activism, signal events, the absence of signal crimes, and resistance by civil libertarian and information and privacy commissioners” (Hier 2010, p.159). In terms of organized resistance, as this thesis will discuss, the Coalition Against More Surveillance (CAMS)

\(^\text{32}\) In particular, scholars such as David Lyon, David Murakami Wood, Sean Hier, Kevin Walby, Colin Bennett, Aaron Doyle, Randy Lippert, Kevin Haggerty, Valerie Steeves, Jeffrey Monaghan, and more, are all significant surveillance scholars who teach at Canadian universities and have published many articles and books regarding CCTV surveillance and various other facets of surveillance studies. These scholars are impacting the next generation of researchers, evident by my critical stance towards surveillance, as well as the other graduate students’ views as participants in this study.
was formed in Ottawa in 2019 to respond to the announcement of the CCTV project (cams-ottawa.ca). According to the CAMS website, their mission statement includes:

> through our public education and advocacy efforts, we will make municipal leaders aware of these concerns and encourage those with decision-making power to divest from this policing and surveillance strategy and instead invest in community programs, services, and support (cams-ottawa.ca).

CAMS’ messaging quoted above illustrates their efforts to encourage and facilitate other Ottawa residents in forming their own rights consciousness, and features a call-to-action to social institutions to re-evaluate their current involvement in the growing surveillance society. The collective actions performed by CAMS activists and other Ottawa residents to prevent the implementation of streetscape monitoring taken together are an example of a small-scale social movement motivated by progressive criminal justice ideology. Social movements are “organized challenges to authorities that use a broad range of tactics, both inside and outside of conventional politics, in an effort to promote social and political change” (Meyer 2003, p.30).

As with other social movements, the success of CAMS’ efforts are difficult to capture and cannot simply be reduced to whether they achieved a particular desired result (Amenta et al., 2010). One reason for this is that, often, even if a desired result is achieved, it is difficult to discern the extent to which the social movement was the cause of the desired result. It is often too easy to credit activists for social change, or alternatively, to dismiss their efforts; it is difficult to distinguish the effects of activism from social changes that would have happened anyway, and to determine how pivotal activism was in achieving it (Meyer 2003). Part of the difficulty is “because the forces that propel people to mobilize are often the same forces responsible for social change” (Meyer 2003, p. 31). Furthermore, authorities who are challenged by movements may not
admit that activism influenced their decisions. Nevertheless, social movements, often seem to play a significant role in convincing authorities to re-examine policies (Meyer 2003).

Opponents of the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project wrote critical editorial articles, organized a public discussion at City Hall, created a website, and used social media in an effort to prevent Ottawa from implementing open-street surveillance technology. Writing op-ed articles is a strategy to pique journalistic, political, and social interest in the activists’ concerns; by critiquing potential policies, these resistance articles promote alternative thinking (Meyer 2003). Furthermore, social mobilization may encourage some politicians to work with and support those constituents, as illustrated by the Capital Ward’s city councillor, Shawn Menard, who openly critiqued Ottawa’s CCTV plans and streetscape monitoring on social media and attended the City Hall roundtable discussion.

As this thesis will explore, CAMS organized together to educate the public on the potential risks of CCTV and held a round-table discussion at Ottawa’s City Hall with local city councillors, business owners, and scholars to voice their opposition to the implementation of CCTV in the ByWard Market (cams-ottawa.ca).

The following chapter is dedicated to the methodology of this study, methodological approach, data collection, sampling procedures, and analytical framework.
Chapter 3: Methodology

The focus of this research is to explore the various perceptions of, and the underlying reasoning behind, the attempt to implement open-street CCTV in Ottawa, and the reasoning behind opposition to it as well as methods of resistance performed by citizens. This chapter sets out the details of my methodological approach, data collection, sampling procedures, and analytical framework.

Given the extent of both citizen support and citizen resistance, the question of “how” is not the only factor to consider, and the underlying question of “why” must be answered. Therefore, one of the central research questions is: How and why did different people and organizations support and oppose the introduction of publicly run surveillance cameras in the ByWard Market? I will also attempt to understand: why was the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project discontinued? How does this fit with Hier’s (2010) analysis that Canadian jurisdictions may be more inclined to resist the introduction of public CCTV?

To answer these questions, I conducted 10 semi-structured interviews with 11 participants, and reviewed hundreds of social media and news article comments, 14 news articles directly concerned with the CCTV project, and many publicly available policy documents, and requested documents, in order to formulate detailed and overarching themes regarding Ottawa’s experience of, and perception towards, open-street CCTV.

Methodological Approach

The methodological approach for this project is a qualitative case study. I used Baxter and Jack’s (2008) discussion of case study methods, along with Yin’s (2003) foundational work in case study methodology, as a guide to uncover which type of case
study is best suited towards this project. A qualitative case study facilitates the exploration of a phenomenon; this method can explore a topic of interest using a variety of data sources, which ensures the issue is not explored through just one lens, allowing for several facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood (Baxter & Jack 2008). I accordingly structured my project as an exploratory case study investigating the process of attempting to introduce public CCTV surveillance in Ottawa’s urban core, as a particular case of the introduction of public CCTV more generally in urban spaces, in order to develop a more nuanced understanding of how camera surveillance is introduced and opposed in particular jurisdictions.

Yin (2003) outlines four points to consider when deciding to do a case study: 1) the focus of the study is answering “how” and “why” questions; 2) you cannot manipulate the behaviour of participants involved in the study; 3) you are trying to uncover context you believe is relevant to the phenomenon in question; 4) the boundaries between the phenomenon (what you are investigating) and other contextual conditions (other social problems/issues in the area) are unclear. Based on these four considerations, I knew that case study methodology was appropriate as my primary research question is focused on how and why individuals support or oppose the implementation of open-street CCTV in Ottawa. Furthermore, I did not introduce an independent variable to manipulate the answers of the participants (dependent variable). Rather, I am trying to understand their perspectives and lived experiences. Lastly, one of my goals is to understand personal experiences with CCTV,

33 In the context of this study, Yin’s (2003) fourth point means it is not clear how other contextual conditions in Ottawa, such as other social problems in the ByWard Market, impacts how/how/why individuals support/oppose CCTV.
particularly reasons for support and opposition. As CCTV can be implemented for a
variety of reasons and in different contexts, it is not clear how the local culture and other
recent events and social issues in Ottawa are impacting public perception and experience
of the proposed surveillance project. Therefore, an exploratory case study of the
surveillance project can provide insights into how the local context and other concerns in
the area may impact individual and collective support and/or opposition.

Word choice in research questions is a key consideration when developing a
qualitative research design; “how” questions lead to context-based understanding of the
data impossible to obtain with deductive style questions (Gaudet & Robert 2018). This
further supports why a context-independent method would be insufficient for this study
and why the context-dependent case study methodology is the appropriate choice.

Data Collection

Participant Sample

The target population of interviewees included various individuals in the
community engaged in some way with Ottawa’s Public Surveillance Project, including
activists, local business owners, and members of community associations in the target
area. Due to my interest in recruiting a diverse range of individuals from various social
backgrounds, recruitment for the study was initially purposive, and a list of individuals
ranging from city councillors, business owners, police, activists, policymakers, and
academic activists were pre-selected. Purposeful sampling is a technique that allows for
the selection of information-rich participants, allowing for the most effective use of
limited resources (Patton 2002; Palinkas et al., 2015). Using contact information obtained
through general searches or relevant websites (e.g. city official, CAMS, etc.) and
interpersonal contacts, potential interview subjects were contacted via email and asked to participate in the research.

Initially the sampling goal was to have approximately 15-20 participants. However, after numerous attempts to contact social actors relevant to the study, there was limited response. Indeed, after initial recruitment emails were sent to potential participants, there was nearly no response. This is perhaps not surprising as the individuals I was contacting have many other commitments. After several weeks passed with no response to the recruitment emails, I needed to change the recruiting approach.

With such limited response to the initial emails, I contacted the Lowertown Community Association (LCA) and asked if I could speak at one of their meetings with the hope that it would create interest in the study. This meeting included residents of the community and local business owners, several of whom expressed interest in participating in interviews. This recruitment method allowed me to explain the purpose of the study to residents who would have otherwise not been considered, allowing for residents of the community to share their voices. I also created a flyer for the LCA website which included details regarding the study and an open call for anybody who was interested in participating, with requirements indicating they needed to be residents of the community, comfortable using the internet, and at least 18 years of age.

The initial list of potential participants was formulated with the assistance of my supervisor, Dr. Aaron Doyle, as he had more connections to various actors than I had at that time. Once the participant sampling method evolved to include speaking with the LCA, all participants who contacted me to participate were included in the study.
A total of 10 interviews were completed, with 11 participants (one interview had two participants speaking as a pair). A total of four participants were from the pre-selected list of key actors in relation to public discussions of the project, with the other seven being recruited through the Lowertown Community Association; six of them were recruited through the LCA meeting, and one through this study’s flyer on the LCA website. The average length of interview was approximately 30 minutes, with the longest being 1 hour and 22 minutes for the two-participant interview. Each interview began by asking the participants to share a bit about themselves; this was done to establish some comfort and create an open line of communication. The demographics of interview participants are summarized in the following table: all names listed are pseudonyms and what is listed for racial and gender identity is based verbatim on participants’ responses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender Identity</th>
<th>Racial/Ethnic Identity</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maria</td>
<td>Late 20s</td>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>Iranian, Canadian</td>
<td>Graduate Student and Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olivia</td>
<td>Mid 30s</td>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>White Settler</td>
<td>Graduate Student and Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Man</td>
<td>Polish, White Settler</td>
<td>Retired Independent consultant (software, hardware, networking)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Man</td>
<td>Metis</td>
<td>Public Servant with Federal Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Age/Identity</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
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<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassandra</td>
<td>Early 50s</td>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>French Canadian</td>
<td>Public Servant with Federal Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter</td>
<td>Mid 30s</td>
<td>Cis Man</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Public Servant with Federal Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeff</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Man</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Criminal Defence Lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Man</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Founder of mutual aid organization, Researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>President of Hotel Association, Board Member on several local boards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elizabeth</td>
<td>“older”</td>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>French Canadian</td>
<td>Retired Urban Planner, Painter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alex</td>
<td>Late 60s</td>
<td>Man</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Retired Economist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Interviews*

Semi-structured interviews were conducted to gather relevant information from the responding participants. Semi-structured interviews are a qualitative data collection technique in which the researcher asks the participants a number of pre-determined, and open-ended questions (Given 2008). An interview guide was prepared in advance, listing several carefully worded questions to ensure that, as the researcher, I was prepared for participant discussion and could move questions around along with the flow of the participants’ answers. The interview guide was not a strict list of questions to be asked but instead served as a starting place for a conversation and a guideline of topics to be
covered; depending on participant answers, follow-up questions were asked, ensuring there were no fixed responses, and that the participant could elaborate on any of their responses. This structure allowed for probing and asking questions aside from those selected and allowed the interview subject to elaborate on topics relevant to their expertise. This interview style was selected because the primary research question is investigating how and why individuals oppose or support the implementation of CCTV, thus understanding the participants’ experiences and perspectives in some depth was essential to the “why” element of the study. Of the 11 participants, their responses to CCTV surveillance varied from supportive (4), to ambivalent (2), and opposed (5). Therefore, these interviews allowed me to probe in-depth responses from several people who held each position.

The interviews took place via Zoom due to COVID-19; the participants were in full control of the location they chose for the interview, and as the researcher I could see and hear them using the camera and microphones on their devices. In accordance with Carleton University’s Research and Ethics Board (REB), all participants agreeing to be interviewed signed an informed consent form. The form included the purpose of the study, that the interview would be audio and video recorded, that their participation was voluntary, and they could withdraw at any time during the study without penalty. They were informed that pseudonyms would be used to maintain anonymity. Audio recordings, notes, and files were not labelled in a way that could compromise confidentiality, and identifying information was not stored with the data.

News Articles
After the announcement of the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project, mass-circulation news media outlets were quick to produce articles regarding the details of the potential project. The surveillance project was primarily first presented to the public through news media, and discussed in op-ed articles (and in a few social media posts by the Mayor and others, as discussed below). These articles were included in data collection as the CCTV project was predominantly presented to the public through news media. The framing of these articles can influence how they are interpreted, and thus affect public interpretations of the CCTV project; therefore, a frame analysis of the news articles is essential to understand the presentation of the initiative. Details of the frames analysis methodology are included in the Data Analysis section below.

Through a Google search, 14 online news articles were collected for this study from various news websites including CTV Ottawa, CBC, Capital Current, The Ottawa Sun, The Ottawa Citizen, and Ottawa Business Journal, and Canadian Lawyer Magazine, through using the following search terms: “CCTV pilot project Ottawa,” “CCTV ByWard Market,” “Resistance and CCTV ByWard Market,” “Surveillance Ottawa,” “Ottawa Surveillance Camera Project,” “Ottawa CCTV Pilot Project ByWard Market” and “Ottawa Public Surveillance Project”. These articles were first gathered in Fall of 2021; however, it is unclear if this is an exhaustive sample of all news articles about the CCTV project as some of the articles are no longer visible when using the same search terms during April 2022.\(^34\)

\(^34\) In other words, articles apparently are sometimes taken down from news media sites, and it is not clear how many had been taken down already when I first gathered articles. At the time of writing, there were no other news articles that appeared in the Google search with the search terms listed above. Because, as I will discuss, the project was only in the works and under public discussion for a relatively short time, there were not that many media articles about it in general.
The online format of these articles also allowed for readers to post comments, which were also collected. The comments on the online articles were treated in the same way as social media comments, as these comment sections follow the four defining characteristics of social media, as defined by Murphy, Hill and Dean (2013), i.e. the commenting forum allows for a community of readers to discuss their opinions; it is user-generated content; it is open, two-way dialogue as other readers can add replies to other comments and make their own posts; and it features rapid distribution as the comments are immediately posted to the comment forum at the end of the article.

Social Media

Social media data provides another avenue for understanding public perception of CCTV. As I was only able to conduct a limited number of interviews, I decided to explore social media data as another avenue of data collection as the platforms promote opinion sharing and expressing feelings. The proliferation of new technologies, including social media platforms, is transforming the social landscape in which research on public attitudes about social issues operates (Murphy et al., 2014). For this study, I am using Murphy, Hill and Dean’s (2013) definition of social media: “social media is the collection of websites and web-based systems that allow for mass interaction, conversation, and sharing among members of a network” (p.3), and their four defining features outlined above (community, user-generated content, open, two-way dialogue, and rapid distribution). According to Murphy et al., (2014):

the ubiquity of social media and the opinions users express on social media provide researchers with new data collection tools and alternative sources of qualitative and quantitative information to augment or, in some cases, provide alternatives to more traditional data collection methods (p.789).
As there is a lack of reliable sampling frames for social media data (Murphy et al., 2014), non-probability samples can be used. Non-probability sampling is a technique in which the researcher uses their judgement to select a sample, meaning they meet a pre-established criterion (Given 2008). For the social media data, my pre-existing criteria included that all posts needed to be about the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project, and all comments needed to be in response to these posts. Social media posts by Mayor Jim Watson, Ottawa city councillor Shawn Menard, and anti-camera activist organization CAMS Ottawa were the posts that included the most comments, reposts, and responses which were used for this study. A common kind of post made by other citizens featured reposting a news article about the project and including their thoughts and feelings in the post. Any social media posts or comments on CCTV initiatives in other cities were not included in the data collection.

Social media data was collected using convenience sampling (Given 2008). In convenience sampling, participants (i.e., their social media post/comment) are selected because they are accessible (Given 2008). Gathering informed consent of all social media users for their comments in this study would be next to impossible. Therefore, I consulted the Internet Researchers Ethics Code to navigate the ethical questions around using social media posts without the users’ permission (AoIR 2019). In accordance with the AoIR strategies listed to mitigate risk and ensure anonymity of all commenters, no usernames or account profiles were retained or included in the study. Furthermore, any personally identifiable information was removed from any comments. All social media posts were publicly available, as well as the comments, and no private posts were used in this study. For news article comments, it is the policy of the news websites that the commenter must
sign-in to their account, which posts their comments with their names. It is unclear if users can make an account with a fake name or if the account requires an email and their full name to register. Therefore, for this study, no names were recorded or used for these comments. At the conclusion of this study, all data will be destroyed, and no comments will be retained.

Social media data was collected from several platforms, including Twitter, Reddit, and Facebook. The social media posts and comments were located by using several key search terms including “CCTV and Ottawa,” “Surveillance and Ottawa,” “Surveillance ByWard Market,” “CCTV ByWard Market,” “CCTV camera Ottawa,” “Cameras ByWard Market,” and “Ottawa Public Surveillance Project.”

Several hundred comments were gathered and reviewed. After the initial review process, a total of 26 pages of comments remained. I was searching for and removing all comments that did not reference the surveillance project, that were unclear, that do not include personal expression of support or opposition, or comments that include identifiable personal information. In order to narrow down the number of comments even further, a second round of coding was required. The comments were categorised into two primary groups: support or opposition. The comments were placed in the categories based on the content of the comment and whether the support or opposition

35 By including Ottawa or ByWard Market in the search terms, I tried to ensure the search results would only include posts, forums, or comments that were relevant to the location of the study. As for concerns of generalizability to the rest of the Ottawa population, the social media data was collected from various platforms to get different population characteristics, while acknowledging that the data could only provide a limited and partial view of what Ottawa’s public thinks and feels. Indeed, it is likely much of Ottawa’s population was unaware of the camera plan or had no strong feelings about it, and the social media data was capturing only those with strong views.

36 Comments that included identifiable information for the commenter were removed to protect the anonymity of commenters and to ensure that there is limited risk having information that could be traced back to the specific commenter. For example, a personal story of how they were arrested in the Market or the inclusion of someone’s name (not a city councillor, the mayor, or public figure) in their comment.
was explicitly stated or implied. After the second coding process, the comments were narrowed down to a total of 25 relevant Reddit forum posts/comments, 17 news article comments, 26 Twitter posts/replies/comments, and 44 Facebook posts/replies/comments. Due to the amount of similar comments/near identical statements, any duplicates were excluded, which accounted for at least half of the comments excluded.37

Documents

Reports and policies published by the City of Ottawa were used to understand politics behind implementing CCTV and to investigate the details of Ottawa’s CCTV policies38. The 2002 and 2018 City of Ottawa CCTV policies were located online through a Google search and were used to provide background information on the details of in-use public surveillance systems39. A memorandum by Mayor Watson (Watson 2019), which he posted on his Twitter page, was used to explore the reasoning behind, and purpose of, the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project. The memo was less than 2 pages and included brief bullet points on the three purposes of the CCTV project, which are

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37 A minor limitation is that it was impossible to confirm if the social media commenters live in Ottawa, or if they live elsewhere and commented on social media posts about the surveillance project. This was mitigated by specifically selecting social media posts about Ottawa’s initiative, to hopefully reduce the number of commenters from other locations. Any comment or post that was referencing other surveillance initiatives was not included in the sample. Nearly all Twitter comments came from the thread of comments attached to Mayor Jim Watson’s post about the surveillance project, or from the comment threads attached to local news outlets’ posts sharing their articles and Reddit posts and comments were on the City of Ottawa forum. The @CAMSOTTAWA Twitter page was also used for the live tweets of the roundtable meeting.

38 Further requests for municipal documents regarding the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project were made to the City of Ottawa via email; the City’s response indicated that it was an Ottawa Police Service project, and thus all requests must go through the OPS. However, when I contacted the OPS for further information on the details of the project, their response stated it was a municipal project and that requests must go through the City of Ottawa. My further emails sent to the City of Ottawa received no response. Therefore, limited official information was collected on the specifics of the proposed CCTV project. This is just one example of how accessing information regarding policing is inaccessible for the public, yet access to public data (e.g., social media data) is freely available to the City of Ottawa and the Ottawa Police Service.

39 A full copy of the 2002 CCTV Policy can be found in Appendix A. Detailed description of the individual changes made to the policy will be included in Appendix B, and a full copy of the 2018 CCTV policy can be found in Appendix C.
discussed in depth in following chapters. A memorandum by previous manager of Emergency and Protective Services, Anthony Di Monte (Di Monte 2019), which was posted on Shawn Menard’s (Capital Ward city councillor) Twitter page, was also used as data, as it details that the surveillance project falls under the purview of the Ottawa Police Service, and that the service should consider applying for political funding and do a privacy impact assessment.

An email request to the Ottawa Police Service did result in obtaining several documents relating to the service’s use of CCTV and a discussion of their 2020 budget allocations. The official OPS report (OPS 2020a), in response to enforcement efforts against guns and gangs, including the decision made by the service regarding implementing open-street CCTV, provided one of the major revelations of this study, as I will discuss.40

Several other publicly available OPS documents were relevant to this study, including their annual reports from 2015-2020 and their 2018 public research results (OPS 2018). These reports provided information on previous funding for OPS, as well as their knowledge of the communities’ needs. The published Ottawa Street Violence and Gang Strategy created by Crime Prevention Ottawa (CPO 2017a) was also used to understand the OPS’s structure and strategies. An email request for documents relating to the Ontario Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Grant Program was submitted to SafetyPlanning@Ontario.ca as outlined by the Ministry of Solicitor General and the

40 This information was accessed by contacting former Ottawa Police Service Board Chair, Diane Deans. I emailed Diane Deans to clarify some points concerning the 2019-2021 Strategic Plan, which included very little details on what the plan entailed, and the status of the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project. This email was forwarded to an Executive Director at OPSB, who provided a report by the OPS detailing the service’s decision about implementing CCTV. This information was never made public by the service.
CAMS website⁴¹. These documents allowed for exploring the Ontario government’s understanding and expectations of CCTV⁴².

Data Analysis

Frames Analysis

A frame analysis offers a critical tool to explore meaning-making amongst, for example, political elites (in this case, the Mayor and city councillors), news media, and the public (Allen 2017). Frame analysis was originally developed by Erving Goffman (1974) and is often used to analyze contested meaning-making in social or political controversies. A “frame is a socially shared organizing principle that works symbolically to shape democratic discourse and influence public opinion by creating and promoting particular vocabularies” (Reese qt in Allen 2017, p.584). Snow (2013) explains that frames perform focusing, articulating, and transformative functions. Frames can function similarly to a picture frame, focusing one’s attention to what is ‘in-frame’. They tie together various elements into a specific, cohesive set of meaning, and can reconstitute the way in which the object of attention is experienced and understood. Due to these functions, it is arguable that how we act towards various objects in our daily lives, at least partially depends on how they were framed (Snow 2013).

⁴¹ This request resulted in information concerning monetary distribution to Ontario police services for CCTV implementation as part of Ontario’s Guns and Gangs strategy. It provides information relating to the Ontario government’s perception of CCTV’s usefulness, and to political rhetoric behind CCTV’s effectiveness as a crime reduction technique.

⁴² A second email was sent to SafetyPlanning@Ontario.ca regarding the technological standard of the CCTV equipment required by the CCTV Grant Program, which detailed that it was the responsibility and discretion of the individual policing services to select their CCTV supplier and the standard of technology used. This information was used to provide further context as to the current attitudes towards CCTV in Ontario and to further highlight how the decision made by OPS is in contrast to current trends in the province.
The choices made in the presentation of the CCTV project by journalists, politicians, police, activists, and others are examples of attempts to frame an issue in particular ways to communicate desired messages effectively in the hope that this resonates with the existing cognitive schemas in the minds of Ottawa residents. The term “cognitive schemas” refers to the mental frameworks individuals use to help organize and interpret information. Information can be assimilated into pre-existing schemas, or accommodated, meaning a schema is altered, or a new one is created to interpret the information (Kibler 2011). Allen (2017) explored this element of framing and argues, “the frame is the socially shared organizing principle that informs how media coverage can fulfill the audience’s need to make sense of these news events in a way that aligns with their existing orientations” (p. 585). Frames can transform complex political and social issues into manageable bits of information that are easier to digest.

To conduct a frames analysis of the news media presentation of Ottawa’s Public Surveillance Project, I read, coded, re-read, and analyzed my sample of online news articles published on implementing CCTV in the ByWard Market. During the coding process, I focused on how the surveillance project was presented to the reader, specifically checking for discussions of crime prevention, use of CCTV in other locations, increasing safety, CCTV as a tool for revitalization, deterrence, surveillance technology and capacity, resisting surveillance, and privacy rights.

Frames analysis was also used to interpret Mayor Watson’s memo regarding the purpose of the project, as this memo was posted on his Twitter page where he first announced the project. The coding process was the same as for news articles, specifically looking for discussions of deterrence, crime prevention, urban revitalization, and safety.
The decision to conduct a frames analysis of this document was because this document was used as an opportunity to present the project to Ottawa residents and to the Mayor’s constituents, and one framework used by the media to present the project to the public, the framework explaining the reasons behind it, is based on the contents of the memo and interviews with Mayor Watson.

The media operates simultaneously as a filter and alert system, through which developments are canvassed to determine which information merits placement amongst the other news of the day (Comstock & Scharrer 2005). The very nature of picking and choosing which stories to share leads the stories to be chosen to be perceived as issues that matter and plays an active role in shaping public conversations regarding socio-political issues (Greenberg & Hier 2009; Dearing 1989). Framing in this way draws attention to certain aspects of the issue, while potentially omitting other aspects entirely.

This consideration is crucial when discussing the CCTV project because the public debate took on two different identifiable frameworks (outlined and discussed in depth in Chapters 4 and 5) resulting in Ottawa residents having to navigate contradicting statements, concerns, and active resistance to understand the project's actual goals and legitimate impacts if the project was put in motion.

In this study, important concepts and discussion relating to CCTV were pulled from pre-existing literature to begin the analysis; however, I allowed the opportunity for themes to form based on participant data, social media posts, and comments, news articles, op-ed articles, and public documents. As a step in my frames analysis, concept-driven coding was used to analyze the data with the concepts developed in the field and the established theoretical foundation. The concepts and themes the codes represent may
come from the interviews, previous literature, established theoretical foundations, and notes. A method of what Gibbs (2018) refers to as a priori coding was used to construct a collection of codes without first using them to code the data. This coding method is most useful for this study as there is already a significant amount of literature on surveillance topics; therefore, this study is not focused on developing new concepts, but rather is centred on applying these concepts to the Ottawa context and identifying how CCTV was framed, and themes relevant to Ottawa’s context. Despite a priori coding being used for this study, the possibility for new codes to emerge solely based on interviews or the policy framework were not discouraged or left unconsidered.

The first step of data analysis began with familiarizing myself with the data collected. As the primary researcher, I transcribed all interviews myself as quickly as possible after the interview was completed. This stage allowed me to identify themes within the data, reflect and make note on relevant discussion, and to ascribe meaning to developing concepts, and make connections to the framing of the CCTV project. Advanced planning of themes and concepts from the literature review was useful because as expected, discussion during the interviews focused on already developed concepts and patterns which are prominent in surveillance studies. Nevertheless, it was during the transcription stage that initial codes were noted, and these codes remained prominent during all data analysis throughout this study. News article comments and social media

With this technique, I was forced to member-check myself during the actual coding process to see if codes generated prior to the process needed to be amended and transformed to be useful with the collected data (Gibbs, 2018). Member-checking is when qualitative researchers “check on their own sense-making” (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012, p.100). These moments of member-checking ensure that the positionality of the researcher, the location of field research, and the socio-political influence of the researcher’s institution are not tampering the research process (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012).
data was analyzed alongside each other and used the same coding procedures were used as discussed above.

**Reflexivity**

In simple terms, in qualitative research, reflexivity is when “researchers turn a critical gaze towards themselves” (Finlay 2003, p.3). Understanding how my own experiences, my scholarly community, and the wider social milieu affects my interpretation of data is essential when conducting a qualitative case study. As all interviews were conducted via Zoom, there were no instances of “going into the field” to gather data; nevertheless, it is during these interactions that, as a researcher, I began to focus on several reflections: a) How is my positioning as a researcher (and my personal characteristics), and the online format of the interviews affecting the kind of information being accessed (or blocked)? b) What has the textual data told me? How is this influencing my assumptions of the project during interviews? c) What kind of revisions need to be made to the research design? d) How am I interpreting the individual perspectives? Am I inputting my beliefs in the interpretation? These questions forced me to slow down during data analysis, reflect on academic literature, and produce notes that include my observations and thoughts. These memos and small notes in margins allowed me to organize my thoughts and understandings in a separate place from the discussion, and to work with the discussion for what it is, instead of carelessly inserting my bias into the analysis.

The act of seeing, hearing, and feeling produces my understandings; practicing reflexivity involves self-consciously “testing” these emerging explanations and patterns, regardless if it appears clear or common-sense (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow 2011). My
schooling and previous research has primarily been critical of Canada’s criminal justice system and policing techniques; therefore, I must mitigate any potential biases that come from those experiences. As a white middle-class woman in her early 20s, I must also mitigate how my background may impact my interpretation of the data, therefore, to ensure I am maintaining critical detachment from my biases, I used member-checking (Schawrtz-Shea & Yanow 2011) during interviews to ensure that I was understanding what the participant had said and am reiterating it the way they intended. As there are a variety of perspectives on CCTV, it is improbable that all participants would agree that I “got-it-right” in the final report.

The following chapter is dedicated to public perception of CCTV, focusing on how individuals understand the capabilities of CCTV, deterrence, fairness and equitably treatment with CCTV, and several unexpected themes that became apparent during data collection. As I will discuss, one of the main unexpected findings was the links made by Ottawa residents between Ottawa’s homelessness crisis and increasing social controls through surveillance. Included is a frames analysis of Mayor Watson’s initial memo and the news-media presentation of the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project in order to contextualize public perception.
Chapter 4: Frame Analysis, Framework 1: Public Safety and Deterrence

As discussed CCTV surveillance technology continues to proliferate across the globe. Despite the rapid growth and distribution the technology, Ottawa has been one outlier in terms of resistance, and is therefore a fertile context to understand how and why people and organizations support or oppose the introduction of open-street CCTV. As the media presentation of the project aligned with two primary frames – one centered on increasing safety/security and the deterrence effects of CCTV and the other focused on resistance and privacy rights – my general hypothesis prior to completing interviews and gathering social media data was that the public perception would be divided between the two contrasting frames, so between support to implement open-street CCTV at least partially influenced by law-and-order ideology, and fundamental opposition to implementing this surveillance technology motivated by privacy concerns and more critical views of the current Canadian criminal justice system. Despite this hypothesis, there were a number of surprising nuances I found in my interviews, as I will discuss.

Unquestioningly declaring that one must reduce ‘perceived fear of crime’ ignores that people fear crime for a variety of reasons, some of which relate to real risk of victimization, and others which may have no connection to the real conditions of the areas in which they live, with age, for example, being one potential factor.\footnote{For example, Köber et al., (2020) found that younger people had similar fear of crime to older people in disadvantaged neighborhoods; however, older people were considerably more fearful in ‘better-off’ neighborhoods than younger people from the same community.} Fear of crime may possibly never be reduced, as it is due to a complex interplay of various experiences, social conditions and dimensions, emotions, and mental schemas. Since
combatting fear of crime is a frequently used argument for implementing open-street
CCTV, discussing fear of crime is important for this study. As discussed in chapter 2, a previous study reports that high levels of public acceptance of CCTV are explained partly because many people see omnipresent surveillance as already an established fact which they might as well accept (Heumann et al., 2016). Using the already prolific use of CCTV as a reason for accepting or supporting open-street surveillance was also a theme prevalent in all participant interviews and social media comments where they identified as supportive of CCTV. This perspective aligns with the narrative of why resist when surveillance already exists, which is challenged in this study. My research builds on Heumann et al’s (2016) study and other previous work by using open-focused interviews to explore the nuances of support and opposition. With the already prolific use of CCTV, it is important to understand why there is acceptance, why there is resistance, and what motivates these attitudes. This chapter explores why there was seemed to be fairly widespread acceptance among a portion of the public in Ottawa’s context, and what motivates this perspective.

Framework 1: Deter Violence and Increase Public Safety

The only publicly available information on the intentions and rationale for the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project is Mayor Watson’s July 3rd, 2019, memorandum wherein he announces the project and states its objectives, and news articles written in response to this announcement. My findings suggest that Ottawa residents needed to navigate a variety of contradicting statements and concerns to understand the project's goals and possible impacts. The CCTV project has primarily been presented to Ottawa residents by using language, rhetoric, and themes consistent with the memo from Mayor
Watson, framing the project as a needed tool to curb violent crime and increase safety. This framework was more actively used by local business owners, city councillors, the mayor, and politicians. The second framework, discussed in the following chapter, was shown in opinion pieces and some news articles demonstrating active resistance to the project, framing the project as, for example, a violation of privacy, a kind of technological encroachment, and a waste of funds. This framework was predominantly used by local activists and academics opposed to the project.

In his memo to City Manager Steve Kanellakos, Mayor Watson wrote that the purpose of the CCTV project would be to:

contribute to the safe environment of the downtown areas; assist as one of the components of the downtown area’s revitalization efforts; and, improve the ability of the Ottawa Police Service and community to respond to crime and anti-social behaviour occurring in the downtown areas (Watson 2019, p. 1).

Embedded in these objectives is the belief that CCTV has the capacity to deter unwanted behaviours, yet apparently not all behaviours would be stopped, if also the camera footage was also to be used for evidentiary purposes for crimes that would still be committed under the camera’s game. The news media immediately produced several online articles about the CCTV project, adopting Mayor Watson’s public safety and deterrence framing. Important to note is that Anthony Di Monte’s memo, which came later, in October 2019, was the first time it was announced to the public that the OPS would be in charge of the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project. In other words, it was not under their purview when Mayor Watson first announced the project in July 2019. Therefore, the OPS decision regarding the CCTV project occurred after the news media articles framed the project for Ottawa residents based on Watson’s memo.
As Mayor Watson’s framing of CCTV in his memo was drawn on for many pro-CCTV articles to frame their discussion, a more in-depth analysis of the memo is required. I will now analyze the key points in Watson’s memo.

*Safe Environment*

Embedded in the claim that CCTV will contribute to safety is an inference that CCTV is capable of preventing anti-social, violent, or criminal behaviour from taking place. This implies that CCTV would be capable of reducing violence and harm before an incident occurs. However, even if there is a reduction in anti-social behaviour in the catchment area immediately post-installation, the long-term efficiency of CCTV is limited (Welsh & Farrington 2002; Gill & Spriggs 2005; Klauser 2007). Klauser’s (2007) study of how street-prostitution responds to newly implemented CCTV in Switzerland discovered that:

> the mediated control of public space by CCTV fundamentally misses a ‘human element of proximity’, for building trust and for reminding people about them being assisted and taken into account in daily security operations. In this respect, CCTV fundamentally differs from mutual forms of social control that take place as a result of the concurrent face-to-face presence and surveillance of those occupying the same space at the same time. (p.345).

This disconnection leads the watched to presume there will be limited to no response to their actions, especially since the CCTV does not create any concrete prevention effects. Mayor Watson is using the panoptic ideology of deterrence by presuming that CCTV will contribute to normation through internalizing the all-seeing nature of surveillance (Galič et al., 2017; Foucault 1979, 1991). As previously discussed, the acceptance of panoptic ideology fails to acknowledge how deterrence is not feasible when anti-social, violent, or criminal behaviour is influenced by drugs and/or alcohol or
mental illness. If someone is under the influence of substances, it is highly unlikely that CCTV presence or signage would have a deterrent effect.

**Downtown Area Revitalization**

Mayor Watson’s use of “regeneration discourses” (Coleman, Tombs & White 2005), in other words saying the cameras would encourage the renewed development of the economic potential of the ByWard Market, contributes to an attempt to transform the Market into a hyper-surveilled space wherein increased regulation hopefully moves ‘undesirables’ from the city centre. In this context, the revitalization discourse associated with the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project emphasizes the interests of businesses by privileging select individuals, notably white, upper-middle class, consumers (Patel 2012), and shows a desire to sanitize the Market from the homeless, substance users, the mentally ill, beggars and inner-city youth (Coleman, Tombs & White 2005; Waiton 2010).

Public signage indicating the market is under CCTV surveillance would be used to communicate increased watchfulness, allowing preferred consumers to experience increased *perception* of safety while moving through the space, which the ByWard Market BIA can use to encourage increased consumption (Lippert 2012). Part of the

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45 As previously mentioned, the homelessness crisis in the ByWard Market was classified as a state of emergency (Willing 2020), with the local shelters struggling due to closures and restrictions (Freiheit 2021), including reduced number of beds available in shelters, leading to increased levels of visible homelessness in the area. As the homeless, substance users, and mentally ill are frequently stereotyped as dangerous (Booth et al., 2002; Brunette & Drake 1998; Cohen et al., 1988; Garland et al., 2010; Ellsworth; 2019), and 11/11 participants cited the visible homelessness and poverty as one reason why the City created the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project, it is apparent how the revitalization efforts have been internalized by audiences to mean sanitizing the ByWard Market from homelessness to encourage increased consumption from desired consumers. In this context, the revitalization efforts represent urban revanchist politics (Smith 1996), wherein authorities attempt to ‘reclaim’ inner-city spaces for ‘respectable’ peoples by using discriminatory/punitive treatment and exclusionary designs to move homelessness from prime to marginalized spaces (Grainger 2021).
City’s downtown revitalization efforts include street-closures to encourage pedestrian-friendly space and increasing bar and restaurant patio size in the streets of the ByWard Market, which are all efforts to increase consumption in the ByWard Market\textsuperscript{46}.

\textit{Improving OPS and Community Response to Crime}

The current operational structure of the Ottawa police (OPS) is largely reactive in nature. Mostly it is only once an incident has occurred, and therefore any harms have already occurred, will there be any intervention by the OPS. In other words, the focus is predominantly on enforcement rather than prevention. Mayor Watson states that implementing CCTV would assist in the OPS’s ability to respond to anti-social behaviour in the downtown areas (Watson 2019), yet the 2018 CCTV policy indicates that CCTV cameras in Ottawa at that time were not live monitored (see Appendix C)\textsuperscript{47}. We do not know whether the cameras in the proposed project would have been live-monitored. As the OPS and the City are separate institutions, I cannot be certain that the OPS would not develop their own CCTV policy to suit their operational goals, which might not have followed the City’s policy; however, if the City’s 2018 CCTV policy was followed, there would be no live monitoring. If the cameras did create a deterrence effect, then the cameras could potentially be effective for some crime prevention.

It is possible that Mayor Watson was not referencing improved response times regarding improving the abilities of OPS; instead, the improvement would be in the

\textsuperscript{46} As my analysis of my interviews suggests, this effort and its effects may be experienced as revitalization for some (especially business owners), but for residents, there are some undesired effects including increased public intoxication, drunken altercations, and a monoculture of alcohol-related businesses.

\textsuperscript{47} Included in this policy is the that the policy is to be reviewed at a minimum of every four years, meaning the policy could have been updated to support objectives of the surveillance project. It is unclear whether the current 2018 policy would have been used.
enforcement stage wherein OPS would be able to increase their enforcement capacity by utilizing the CCTV footage for evidentiary purposes. Enforcement aligns with typical views of criminality and those perceived as ‘criminals’ are viewed through levels of stigma and othering that promotes an enforcement approach rather than efforts to support them. With this consideration, the CCTV would also contribute to the safe environment of the Market through security theatre and by increasing perception of safety.

Nevertheless, it is unsurprising to have enforcement tools at the forefront of municipal and media discussion of crime and the criminal justice system due to the pervasive nature of law-and-order ideology (Doyle 2017).

Regarding the community’s response to anti-social behaviour, it is unclear as to what Mayor Watson is referring to. As CCTV footage is inaccessible to the public due to privacy legislation, community members cannot participate in the surveillance of other residents. However, including communities within his statement includes his constituents in the project, and with the pervasive nature of law-and-order ideology, insinuates that they are participating in keeping their streets safe from ‘criminals’, when in reality, violent incidents will be recorded, not stopped.

Embedded in the outlined purposes of the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project are tropes that are not evidenced-based, leading to my conclusion that Mayor Watson announced this project simply to appease fear of crime due to sensationalized acts of violence in the ByWard Market, and, in the absence of compelling evidence for the effectiveness of CCTV, following a similar trajectory to other surveillance initiatives.48

48 For example, the shooting of 15-year-old Jane Creba in the Yonge Street shopping district in Toronto on Boxing Day in 2006 led to support for the implementation of CCTV in the area (Lippert 2009). The 2001 Downtown Camera Project promotion in London, Ontario, began after the murder of 20-year-old Michael Goldie-Ryder outside a downtown bar in 1999 (Hier et al., 2007).
Media representations ranging from news stories to depictions of dystopian surveillance societies depicted in films (e.g. *Minority Report* and *Blade Runner*) to the voyeurism present in various reality and dramatic television programs (e.g., *COPS* and *Big Brother*) either problematize or legitimize the pervasive nature of social monitoring and information-gathering in everyday life (Greenberg & Hier 2009). Therefore, examining representations of surveillance in mass media can provide insights into the public’s attitudes towards surveillance and how media helps foster and constitute particular views. According to Greenberg and Hier’s (2009) comprehensive analysis of news media representation of CCTV in Canada, open-street CCTV surveillance of downtown areas was the most common type of CCTV surveillance portrayed in mass news coverage at that time, despite the variety of other locales in which camera surveillance occurs.

Elected officials, security and police personnel, privacy advocates, community groups, and activists engaging in the debate surrounding surveillance primarily use mass-circulation news media to influence policy and public agendas (Greenberg & Hier 2009). In Canada, ongoing discussions relating to surveillance and privacy issues occur in classrooms, on social media websites, in town and city halls, during election campaigns, in the courts, and in other forms of public discussion. The news media arguably “overshadows all others” (Gamson 2004, p.243), in the context of debates regarding social and political issues of public importance in which policy intervention is most likely required or desired (Greenberg & Hier 2009).

According to Greenberg and Hier (2009), proponents of CCTV have consistently used a set of arguments to promote various camera systems. One of the most common
arguments is security or community safety cameras are already present in private spaces including banks, shopping malls, universities, private business, and more, and they are considered normal, and harmless, therefore it is futile to oppose open-street CCTV (Greenberg & Hier 2009). Not only is opposition considered useless, but any form of opposition is portrayed as sympathizing with the “wrongdoers” that the cameras are supposedly there to address. A second, compounding argument, is the common \textit{if you have nothing to hide, there is nothing to fear} narrative (Greenberg & Hier 2009). This argument not only evokes a larger debate on personal privacy (or the lack thereof), but also “serves rhetorically to underscore the ubiquity claim: that since we acquiesce to increased surveillance in some areas, we should have nothing to fear about expanding this into others” (Greenberg & Hier 2009, p.470). These arguments will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.

After the announcement of the project on Mayor Watson’s Twitter page, several news outlets, including the Ottawa Citizen, CTV Ottawa, CBC, and The Sun have framed it as a public safety project necessary to ensure Ottawa residents are safe. The CCTV project for the ByWard Market has been presented to the public by its supporters as another tool in the Ottawa Police Service’s tool belt to prevent violent crime. Mayor Watson told CTV News, “They [CCTV] act as a deterrent. If someone knows they’re going to be on television, they may not be as brazen as they have been. And secondly, it does give police evidence: a second set of eyes in the neighbourhood” (Watson qt. CTV News, 2019).

The news coverage of the proposed pilot project (excluding opinion pieces) nearly always began by discussing violent incidents in the Market before transitioning the
discussion into how increasing CCTV coverage in the area would act as a deterrent to this violence. Since news media coverage focused their articles on the Mayor’s outlined objectives and used them as the talking points of their articles, readers who are unaware of research evidence on CCTV are not presented with the point that research suggests CCTV has a limited deterrence effect, if any at all (Smith 2012; Norris 2012; Ratcliffe & Groff 2019; Piza 2018; Circo & McGarell 2021).

This framework appeals to the law-and-order approach to criminal justice. Law and order ideology “shapes and is shaped by the views of particular members of the public, by the police institution, and by politicians who promote a ‘law and order’ approach to crime” (Doyle 2017, p.66). Media portrayals of the criminal justice system can interact with, help shape, reinforce, and evolve this system of meaning, and likewise are also shaped by it (Doyle 2017). In media coverage, explaining why crime occurs or discussing violence is not neutral. Frames are imposing certain logic on the audience and “foreclosing alternative perspectives in subtle and taken-for-granted ways” (Allen 2017, p. 585). However, this does not mean that the readers are passive, and that the media simply imposes views on the public; readers are active participants in how the information is interpreted. People participate in interpreting the information through their social schemas. Social schemas are cognitive structures through which individuals process, interpret, and organize information in the social world (Simons & Burt 2011). They are “abstract principles and dispositions that are tacitly relied on when perceiving situations and forming lines of action” (Simons & Burt 2011, p.555). It is the interaction between the frames and individual social schemas which shape the audience’s interpretations.
This approach to criminal justice positions societies as in a state of decline due to the continually growing threat of violent street crime by the lower-classes, requiring increasing punitive crime control measures; an *us vs them* mentality is used, positioning *them* (i.e., the lower classes) as the problem population and less worthy than *us* (Doyle 2017). With this mentality, the police become the thin blue line that separates *them* and *us*. Using frames positioned within law-and-order ideology fit traditional media templates due to their dramatic, emotive, simple, and violent characteristics, and their easily identifiable villains. As this ideology is so media-friendly and its ability to appeal with some audiences, this particular media framing can be a political tool (Doyle 2017). The political implications of this ideology go beyond the criminal justice system as it can potentially reproduce inequalities through linking socio-cultural issues such as poverty and unemployment with criminality (Doyle 2017). With this understanding of social schemas and the use of law-and-order ideology, it is apparent how certain frames can appeal to particular individuals as the frames align with their interpretation of the social world.

As most individuals have not directly and personally experienced negative effects of open-street camera surveillance, their mental schemas are less likely to interpret the downsides as legitimate concerns in comparison to the characteristics that appeal to their lived experience. While many individuals have not directly been the victims of street crime, they also may be influenced by routine encounters with homeless and street-involved people in the Market. The relative salience of these considerations is

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49 For example, focusing on violence that occurred in the ByWard Market despite police presence in the area feeds into the public’s fear of crime, reinforcing the narrative that CCTV is essential to increasing the safety of the ByWard Market.
demonstrated and reproduced when news media articles like those about the Ottawa CCTV project include privacy concerns lower down, after the discussion of violence, and present privacy concerns as a competing narrative rather than the central component of the issue. This framework pushes the public to perceive the violence in the ByWard Market as a critical issue to be dealt with, and indicates that privacy concerns are not as important, as demonstrated by the following quote by Mayor Watson: “That’s [privacy concerns] one of the reasons why I’m speaking to the chief later today. Are there things that we can do that are not going to get us in trouble legally, but also act as a deterrent for people to engage in this senseless gun violence?” (CTVNews 2019). Watson’s quote exemplifies how this framework presents privacy issues; rather than being a genuine concern to consider, the focus is to protect the project from privacy challenges and possible litigation.

Despite the reasons given by Mayor Watson for the surveillance initiative, my interviewees often perceived the cameras were a response to somewhat different problems, as I will discuss\(^50\).

I now move to a discussion of how and how much different audiences took up the official and news media frame concerning the project. The following discussions are based on the interview, social media, and news article data that is situated within law-

\(^50\) I asked all participants why they believed CCTV was considered for the ByWard Market, and there were a variety of responses, with some fitting with media frames and others not outside of the frames, demonstrating that media framing does not automatically shape how someone perceives an issue. Social issues including violent crime, gun violence, a lack of social service programs, the number of bars, loitering, and the number of homeless residents were all suggested by participants as reasoning for implementing open-street CCTV. All participants mentioned significant effects the COVID-19 pandemic had on the Market as especially relevant in worsening the social and economic issues in the area due to the lack of tourists, reduction of economic investment and consumption in the area, and the lack of services available to shelter residents. However, the CCTV pilot was announced prior to the onset of COVID-19, meaning the new conditions of the Market were not the motivators for implementing open-street CCTV.
and-order ideology and fits with general support for implementing open-street monitoring, specifically exploring nuances of what influences their perception of CCTV. The key points for those supporting CCTV include:

a) The ubiquitous use of CCTV is understood and experienced as evidence of its usefulness and success in its outlined objectives.

b) The presence of CCTV is considered a deterrent based on panoptic ideology.

c) Even if deterrence effects are limited and criminal incidents still occur, support for the technology remains and is based on the after-the-fact enforcement and investigatory potential of CCTV.

d) CCTV is perceived to be a neutral eye in the sky by supporters, but there is acknowledgement that it is only ‘needed’ in certain communities.

e) ByWard Market businesses support implementing open-street CCTV to encourage consumption and to deter ‘unwanted’ bodies from the area.

f) Despite the CCTV project being proposed by Mayor Watson in relation to guns and gang violence, the state of homelessness in the ByWard Market has created the conditions wherein stigmatizing labels of dangerous, dirty, and criminal have constructed the visibly homeless and substance users into folk devils, therefore justifying increased social controls. The role of class is evident in the responses of community members, as 11/11 participants I interviewed, whether or not they supported or opposed CCTV, included poverty and the homelessness crisis in the ByWard Market as one reason for why the City proposed implementing CCTV. In short, although nominally targeted as an effort to reduce violent crime, it was
understood by everyone interviewed as an effort to police poor and homeless people more generally.

Theme 1: Public Attitudes towards CCTV

Many members of the public base their knowledge of what CCTV is capable of through media representations on television (Spriggs et al., 2005). Some examples of these kinds of shows include See No Evil (reality TV), Caught on Camera (reality TV/documentary program), Person of Interest (fictional TV), and The Watchman (fictional TV movie). These reality and fictional representations of CCTV may influence the general public’s understanding of who can access this footage as there are rarely (if any) accurate representation of in-use CCTV systems in media. These fictional presentations of CCTV can influence the public’s understanding of CCTV’s capabilities.

More than 100 different (based on different usernames) social media users from Twitter, Facebook, and Reddit gave their thoughts on the potential efficacy of open-street CCTV in the ByWard Market, views which were consistent with Lyon’s (2007) identified reactions to surveillance – either compliance, negotiation, or resistance. Some users demonstrated compliance (Lyon 2007), meaning they openly accepted the initiative, and their views aligned with normative narratives of CCTV, including the nothing-to-hide argument. Others accepted implementing streetscape monitoring, but with some conditions, including increased social support, increased on-the-ground policing, and for some, increased penalties for anti-social behaviour. These users demonstrate Lyon’s (2007) notion to negotiation, meaning they adopted a form of qualified compliance, with expression of some concerns, but concerns that do not lead to dismissing the surveillance system altogether as illegitimate. As will be discussed in the following chapter, other
users demonstrated Lyon’s (2007) category of resistance and questioned the legitimacy of this initiative and of CCTV monitoring as a whole.

One misunderstanding evident in some of the comments and interviews was an assumption that the CCTV system would definitely be live monitored, and that police would be immediately dispatched for enforcement. Since the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project never reached the stage of implementation, it was never made public whether the CCTV system would actually be live monitored. However, the 2018 City of Ottawa CCTV Policy indicates that no publicly run camera-surveillance system in Ottawa used live monitoring (see appendix C). While it is not guaranteed that the OPS would be using the same viewing and storage procedures\(^{51}\) as indicated in the City’s policy, it is arguable that the same procedures would have been used. The extent of this misunderstanding and gaps in information became apparent in my interviews. Nearly all participants (10/11 participants – one was a stakeholder who worked with Mayor Watson on this initiative) did not know many specifics of the CCTV project, or any information on the procedures behind implementing CCTV, or who/or what organizing body would be acting as oversight to the cameras. This knowledge deficit concerning the specifics of the project was not something I anticipated in my findings.

The following social media comment demonstrates how for some, the new surveillance technology is perceived to encourage quick response times by police when responding to emergencies and apprehending potential criminals, based on the belief that the cameras are monitored live:

\(^{51}\) 30-day recording then footage is re-recorded unless there was a request made by authorized personnel due to an incident.
Jesus man, it’s better to stop a criminal who hasn't even left the scene then one who's had time to dump evidence, get sober and make a getaway plan. – Reddit user

This comment is not concerned with deterring the behaviour: rather, the support for CCTV stems from it being a better alternative than unruly criminals escaping the law due to the potential enforcement and evidentiary use of camera surveillance.

There are further public misunderstandings revealed by my data. The following comment by a member of the public on a news article shows another kind of misunderstanding:

As long I have free access to viewing through the camera lens, I have no problem with cameras being installed. In other words, I need to know exactly who, names and coordinates, is watching me through those cameras, and those people need to allow my access whenever I request it.

Letting members of the public view the footage would of course be highly unlikely. It would contradict the City’s 2018 CCTV Policy (Community and Protective Services Committee 2018) and Ontario’s Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (R.S.O. 1990, c.M.56).

Further misunderstandings were evident in how Ottawa residents thought public CCTV would be used. Having footage of clandestine affairs and drunken walks home from the bar were among some of the concerns raised as to what would happen with CCTV camera footage. The following news article comment, which is also expressing support for CCTV, demonstrates how a clandestine affair was acknowledged by Ottawa residents as a potential incident monitored through CCTV surveillance:

…unless you think that your visit to the market will involve a drug deal, assaulting someone, smashing someone's car window, or holding hands with your mistress when you told your spouse you were working late, it should not be a concern. – News article commenter
Residents do not seem clear that the footage would not be live monitored and that investigators would need to request the footage.

Robert used an appeal to past cases as reasoning for his support. When asked what steps he thought would be effective in getting others to support CCTV, he states,

Just evidence. There's, there's a long list of stories where CCTV has proved to be a positive contributor to solving either a crime or a situation. The evidence is in favour of this, and you rarely hear about a negative around it. I'm sure there are some, but I think it's probably pretty remote. – Robert, Resident, President of Hotel Association

As participants discussed their understanding of CCTV and whether they support or oppose its implementation, it became more apparent how law-and-order ideology is bound up individual perceptions of resistance and those who resist. The common perception that if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear is embedded within this ideology as the increasing implementation of surveillance technology is tied to the pervasive nature of Us vs Them (and the need to watch, observe, and control them), but also that the police are positioned as the thin blue line separating the two. According to one interviewee, when seemingly “non-criminal” people oppose CCTV, it must be due to misunderstanding the technology’s objectives or due to anti-government views. Robert explained his perspective – that if you are not doing anything wrong, then the CCTV is an asset:

You know, I think there was, there was a fair amount of pushback [against the CCTV pilot], but I believe it was for all the wrong reasons. I just think there's a lack of understanding of its purpose. There's a sense of Minority Report - the movie with Tom Cruise. It's designed to watch your every movement, and you know that's not the case. Have you ever gone to Rideau Centre? You're tagged. Nobody knows, nobody cares, nobody minds, unless you're trying to steal stuff, if you're trying to create a criminal activity, you're concerned, otherwise you're not.…. I think that those that are against it don't understand. It's there to provide factual data to help people do their job, police to do their job, and hotels to do their job, and businesses to do their jobs. If you're behaving, you got nothing to
worry about…. I think there are those that just hate government involvement in or more involvement in any part of our lives… they just don't trust government, but I don't think they understand the purpose of what's trying to be achieved here. – Robert, Resident, President of Hotel Association

Another nuance of Robert’s statement is the ‘nobody knows, nobody cares’ aspect of private surveillance in the Rideau Centre. If individuals are unaware of the omnipresent gaze monitoring their every move, how can we be sure they do not care, or that they consent to this personal data collection?

It is important to deconstruct the notion that if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear when discussing streetscape monitoring. This is the most common retort against those opposed to CCTV and privacy advocates (Solove 2011). Not only does this stance ignore the potential negative effects of open-street CCTV, such as contributing to a hyper-surveilled experience for minorities or stripping any semblance of privacy from the visibly homeless, but it also further reinforces the notion that ‘doing something wrong’ requires enforcement by the police. Although the nothing-to-hide argument can be perceived in its most extreme form, referring to all personal information, it is more common to encounter its less-extreme form, in which it refers only to the type of data likely to be collected by the government (Solove 2011), which Robert also acknowledges in his statement when assuming resistance is based on anti-government views. In this instance, it is unlikely that many people would see the footage, and therefore, it is arguable that the privacy interests are relatively minimal. Nevertheless:

when the nothing-to-hide argument is unpacked, and its underlying assumptions examined and challenged, we can see how it shifts the debate to its terms, then draws power from its unfair advantage. The nothing-to-hide argument speaks to some problems but not to others. It represents a singular and narrow way of conceiving of privacy, and it wins by excluding consideration of the other problems often raised with government security measures. When engaged directly, the nothing-to-hide argument can ensnare, for it forces the debate to
focus on its narrow understanding of privacy. But when confronted with the plurality of privacy problems implicated by government data collection and use beyond surveillance and disclosure, the nothing-to-hide argument, in the end, has nothing to say (Solove 2011, p.6-7).

Solove (2007) concludes that many people claim privacy harms exist only if “skeletons in the closet are revealed” (p.747). Embedded in this argument is the perception that any potential privacy infringements are not as significant as policing and protecting oneself from criminals, and that since private surveillance is everywhere, there is no reason to resist it in its public form. These sentiments were pervasive in comments that discussed their attitude towards CCTV, as evidenced by the following:

As long as you have nothing to hide you should have nothing to fear. Everyone has a cell phone on them with a camera anyways so it's not like we aren't in an age where it's easy to be recorded. Look at WordStar and YouTube. Or 99 Rideau. Even People of Walmart (all websites where users can upload video or photos). I don't see anything wrong with recording transgressions if people are dumb enough to have them in an open area. The public already does record on their own. At least this set up won't be for petty entertainment purposes. – Facebook user

What a load of crap. “Increase our funding because we’re at risk”. “We need more social programs.” How about this? Stop the criminal acts and stop being a burden on society. If you’re a law-abiding person you’ve got zero to worry about from cameras. Stop pointing the finger at everyone else and clean up your act. – News article comment

The market and downtown core is a magnet for crime and this [implementing CCTV] would definitely help. Those opposed must have something to hide. So what if you are caught on CCTV? If you are a law-abiding citizen then you have nothing to fear. – News article comment

If it deters crime, identifies perps, makes it safer for the residents and our tourists, then absolutely "yes". Don't talk about loss of freedom when that freedom is already lost to the hands of criminals taking over the Market. – Facebook user

Privacy? There is never any expectation of privacy in a public place. You are filmed at the bank and at the ATM. You are filmed when you fill up your gas tank. You are filmed when you buy lottery tickets at the convenience store. You are filmed when you buy groceries. You are filmed as you walk through your local shopping mall. Many of the stores and restaurants in the market area already
have surveillance cameras for their own protection but their coverage is limited and the quality tends to be poor. The only difference is that the police would have this tool on their own. And unless you think that your visit to the market will involve a drug deal, assaulting someone, smashing someone's car window or holding hands with your mistress when you told your spouse you were working late, it should not be a concern. – News article comment

I want the criminals to think twice and I want the police to have an easier time following the criminal from crime-scene to their hideout. I'm not committing a crime, why should I care? The police can watch me get drunk legally, then they can watch me get followed home by a criminal before I even realize it's happening. What's the downside? If you are so worried about being filmed while doing something maybe don't do it in public? Sometimes I feel like people aren't annoyed at the increased pervasion of the "police-state;" they are annoyed that it does its job. – Reddit user

These comments all demonstrate varying presentations and reasoning for the nothing-to-hide argument and showcase the embedded nature of law-and-order ideology when discussing the criminal justice system and safety. Moreover, the widespread nature of private surveillance is often used as reasoning for why there are no privacy concerns warranted for public surveillance.

This argument that “everyone is already tracking you” was common-place amongst social media comments and participant responses for those expressing support, ambivalence, and opposition. The reasoning might vary, for example, for those who expressed support, their reasoning included the prevalent nature of private surveillance, dataveillance, and public surveillance that already exists, therefore the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project was seen as harmless and even perceived as needed to stay current with other modern cities. However, for those who expressed opposition to the project, the prolific use of surveillance tools in modern societies was perceived as an encroachment on privacy and a demonstration that surveillance is embedded in the daily, even mundane, aspects of life.
Theme 2: Deterrence

All participants were aware of use of private-CCTV in businesses as a security tool. During interviews, 4/11 participants included observations like the following: “it is already used elsewhere so it works” and “people will change their behaviour when they see the camera” when discussing the deterrent capacity of surveillance, demonstrating how surveillance cameras are often “simply assumed to serve as deterrents” (Heumann et al., 2016, p.51). In this study, the most expressive acceptance and support for the deterrence capabilities of CCTV came from one participant who worked alongside the City in developing this proposal, as a representative of the hotels of the ByWard Market (a business support of CCTV). The themes evidenced in Greenberg and Hier’s (2009) study of the media representation of CCTV are apparent in the rhetoric behind deterrence capabilities with CCTV. The fact that participants were repeating media frames of CCTV is essential to note as 9/11 participants stated they heard about the surveillance project through social media or news media.

One frequently used argument evident in my data offered “proof” for the deterrence effect of open-street monitoring by citing the prolific use of CCTV, and its presence globally. In reality, as previously discussed, the deterrent effects of CCTV on crime are limited and variable and, when they possibly do occur, appear dependent on various contextual factors, including camera monitoring strategies, type of crime, use of other interventions, geographical setting, and country of origin (Piza et al., 2019; Thomas et al., 2021). Many commenters on the Ottawa plan focused on one particular city, London, England, when “proving” open-street CCTV’s ability to deter crime. The following comment is representative of several similar ones, and demonstrates how, for
the public, without access to the research data, the prolific use of CCTV is equated with it being successful at deterrence:

100% agree [with implementing open-street CCTV]; it’s made an incredible difference in places like London, England where crime is way down. Besides, if you’re not breaking the law why would you have a problem with it? – Facebook comment

Even experienced criminologists cannot be certain about the reasons for why crime rates go up or down, therefore it is improbable that community members might know what complex social relationships are impacting crime rates. In fact, crime rates have been generally in a pattern of sustained decline in Western democracies and globally (see for example – United Nations Information Centre 2019). Furthermore, public learning about crime often happens predominantly through news media, and as stated in the frames analysis, and thus is subject to media biases. Most importantly,

one cannot make any generalizations about the extent, nature and impact of CCTV surveillance from the mere existence of a system. CCTV systems are deployed for various purposes, have diverse levels of technological sophistication, operating procedures and staffing policies. Operation and impacts have to be understood as the outcome of the interplay between technological, organizational and cultural factors (Hempel & Töpfer 2004, p.1).

The existence of a CCTV system does not automatically imply success in its desired objectives; this reality contradicts the Facebook comment listed above, and other similar comments, as people will use the existence of CCTV as confirmation that it is a necessity.

Thus, when authority figures such as the Mayor, police services, city councillors, or politicians state that there is a causal relationship between implementing open-street surveillance and lower crime rates, this over-simplification and generalization can be
taken as fact. The following comment also uses London, England as their example.

However, it has a vastly different stance:

They [CCTV cameras] don't do anything with the criminals they catch. Look at London - they have CCTV cameras all over the place but knife and acid attacks are rampant. It's a cesspool. – Twitter post

Despite having polarized views towards the efficacy of camera surveillance and its deterrence effects, some individuals use the same surveillance concepts and ideas as reasoning for their support or opposition. What was not anticipated prior to beginning this study was terms such as “surveillance state”, “facial recognition”, and “police state” being used in comments expressing both support and opposition. It cannot be said with certainty exactly how these individuals understood these topics or how they interpret their meanings. For example, one Twitter user used the concept of police state to demonstrate their opposition:

Now we're talking about the beginnings of a police state where the gov knows everything you say, do, who you know, where you go, and what you do. NO THANK YOU!! It's coming fast enough on its own through social media. – Twitter user

This users’ opposition is focused on the ever-present nature of surveillance and ever-widening surveillance creep. The monitoring of all aspects of life is not experienced as increased safety. In contrast, one Facebook user uses the same term in a different way:

Ahhhh slowly but surely turning into a police state. Orwell is rolling in his grave yet again. Put the cameras and don’t tell. Because now that you did tell.... they will cover their faces or know where to avoid the cameras ugh so problem not solved! - Facebook user

This commenter uses the term police state and highlights an Orwellian perspective towards constant monitoring (Orwell 1949).

*Unexpected Theme: Acceptance of Displacement*
Surveillance cameras do not on their own do not create a 100% successful deterrence effect, rather, it is with the addition of enforcement through policing that CCTV likely has an effect. This understanding is evidenced by Robert’s discussion regarding deterrence and CCTV:

How it deters crime is not that you can predict or be able to, in real time, respond to images on a camera, that's not what it's designed to do. I've had many conversations with the Ottawa Police Services [about] if you're looking to solve crimes, having video footage often supports interviews with people and it just gives them another powerful tool to help to solve crime…. If it forces people to move to another precinct, it means it [CCTV] works. Now, is it the right solution for the other precinct? .... In one case you see a reduction in crime in the second case you see a movement of crime. Either way, it's improving crime for where the cameras are setup… the point is it deters crime in that area, so it works. – Robert, Resident, President of Hotel Association

While others believe CCTV is live-monitored, Robert states instead that CCTV is not designed to help real-time reaction; rather, his statement demonstrates what he sees as an inherent reactivity of CCTV and that, according to him, its usefulness does not stem from immediate deterrent effects. Instead, it serves as a tool during the enforcement and investigative process after-the-fact. As no one is actively watching the footage and there is no immediate enforcement response, Robert was describing what he understood to be a passive CCTV surveillance system (Caputo et al., 2014).

Interestingly, in addition, in Robert’s analysis of the situation, the potential displacement effects of CCTV are not perceived by him as harms or discrediting the benefits of CCTV, even though, if CCTV contributed to the displacement of anti-social and criminal behaviour into non-monitored areas, the behaviour was not actually deterred. The idea of displacement means that CCTV does not prevent an action from taking place, but instead, it is simply moved to a different location. This means results can be misleading unless statistics account for the fact that reduced crime in one location
results in an increase somewhere else (Piza, Caplan & Kennedy 2014). The following Reddit forum post is another example where a member of the public does not seem to care if crime is simply moved to a different location:

I've had cameras for 14 years and in that time I can personally vouch for their encouraging better behaviour within the scope of their coverage. Petty bullshit has been pretty well reduced to zero. They won't deter crimes of passion but may help move them elsewhere. – Reddit user

It was generally acknowledged by all interviewees that CCTV may move the behaviour; however, in discussions where interviewees have expressed their support for CCTV, or in pro-CCTV comments on news articles or social media comments, the potential harms of displacement were generally not explored. This is an example of a Not in My Backyard (NIMBY) attitude which is discussed in greater depth later in this chapter.

When considering the potential effects of CCTV, those who expressed support focused predominantly on how CCTV can aid police investigations. For example, when asked how they believed CCTV could be helpful, four participants focused on a common understanding of CCTV, that it will speed up police investigations, help find the perpetrator(s), and contribute to arrests with charges laid.

Another unexpected discovery during data collection is that there was a general acceptance amongst some Ottawa residents that CCTV is not a deterrent for violence, yet the same people argue that it still provides an increased sense of safety. The following Reddit comment exemplifies this stance:

The people arguing against this [CCTV project] are idiots. The market is completely fucked right now. It really isn’t a safe place. No cameras will not do much to deter these crimes because the people commuting them are generally fucking stupid but at least there will be some sense of safety. And for everyone who’s against being filmed in public, there’s already a camera on the outside of almost every business anyways. You’re still filmed everywhere you go it’s just
about time that the police don’t have to rely on private cameras to collect evidence or impact public safety. – Reddit user

This comment demonstrates several overarching themes in public discussion that have been found throughout this study. The combination of a fear of crime, a stigmatizing mental schema towards criminality and who is criminal, and a surface-level understanding of the complexities of private versus public surveillance feed into these attitudes toward Ottawa’s Public Surveillance Project.

As discussed previously, many supporters of CCTV use the widespread presence of privately-run monitoring systems to be further evidence to the efficacy of CCTV, and as a primary reason why resistance (or any opposition) is futile. In this argument, there is a disconnect between a lack of belief in a deterrence effect of CCTV and the idea that the public will still feel improved safety conditions which requires further attention. The author of this comment states that the anti-social behaviour will not be deterred, therefore, the on-the-grounds conditions of the ByWard Market will not change; yet, implementing CCTV will contribute to “some sense of safety.” This commenter’s acceptance that the negative conditions will not be changed conflicts with the claims that the ByWard Market is truly an unsafe and dangerous space.

Smith (2012) discovered that support for Edmonton’s CCTV project nearly doubled between pre and post installation, despite the decision to discontinue the project due to insufficient evidence of a significant deterrent effect. This discovery showcases even if CCTV is documented as ineffective for deterrence, public support for surveillance

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52 This means that the City of Edmonton implemented an open-street CCTV project, but then discontinued the project when post-installation follow-up was conducted to investigate the project’s impact on crime. After limited deterrence effects were noted, the project was discontinued, meaning that Ottawa is not the first Canadian city to discontinue a surveillance project due to insufficient evidence of deterrence effects.
can remain. In Heumann et al’s., (2016) study, when participants in the United States were asked if they would still support CCTV if there were no deterrence effects established, participants still endorsed the cameras and their purpose was re-framed from deterrence to aiding in the investigation. These considerations can be another nuance as to why displacement effects are accepted in Ottawa. If there is an assumption that CCTV can still serve a useful investigatory purpose aside from deterrence, then displacement may be accepted, demonstrating that those who advocate for CCTV adhere to a law-and-order stance and a pro-police bias.

Unexpected Theme: Deterrence of Police Violence

During my initial data analysis phase when investigating the overarching themes of the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project, I considered the question: “does CCTV deter violence?” However, when considering this question, I initially only thought of violence perpetrated by ordinary citizens. What I had not considered was the potential deterrence effects CCTV might have against police violence. Nevertheless, this commenter responded to one of the resistance-framed news articles with the following:

**Quote from article:** "All the evidence we have dug up from various jurisdictions indicate that there is no link between CCTV cameras and a reduction in violence," This is clearly not true...evidence in the courts and the media clearly show a reduction in police brutality and a reduction in police violating civil rights as more and more police get caught by cameras... On the other side of the coin, cameras also allow the honest cops to solve cases and keep their brothers in arms in check. – News article comment

This was an unexpected way for members of the public to think about the cameras. As an aside, it also raised interesting questions: would open-street monitoring lead to improved police behaviours and a reduction in systemic violence? Dr. Gregory Brown, a former Ottawa Police officer and Carleton University alumni and professor,
dedicated his doctoral dissertation to investigating the impacts of this new level of visibility on police behaviour. He argues that this “‘new visibility’ could function as a means of controlling illegitimate police violence (a form of deterrence) and for the shifting of power relations in our societies’ public-police relationship” (Brown 2013, p.80). His analysis notes that as a by-product of the technological development of smartphones, there has been an unprecedented level of civilian videorecording of police conduct, and citizen surveillance is a commonplace occurrence police officers in Canadian urban communities (Brown 2013). Furthermore,

officers today fully appreciate that they are visible at all times and potentially can be videorecorded at any time (overtly and/or surreptitiously), as they 265 police in urban environments. Today’s front-line police in Canadian cities operate (and understand that they operate) within a circumstance of universal surveillance (Brown 2013, p.264-265, brackets in original).

This awareness of the new levels of visibility has transformed the behaviours of police officers, with Brown’s (2013) results including:

Over half of the police officers that participated in this study’s survey admitted to having modified their use of force practices (either now using less force or using force less often, or both) because of the prevalence of citizen surveillance and the ability for the public to videorecord the activities of the police (p.267, brackets in original).

Brown’s (2019) results expand on his previous empirical study:

Not only are many (six in ten) of today’s front-line officers thinking about not doing something (that they otherwise normally would do), because they are concerned about video recording of their on-duty conduct, but the video recording potential accompanying ‘policing’s new 190 visibility’ also involves, for 57.3% of this study’s participants, actual behavioural modifications as an adaptation to today’s techno-social policing environment (p.189-190, emphasis and brackets on original).

Although the increased levels of visibility have marked a shift in police behaviour, clearly not all inappropriate, negative, and violent behaviour is deterred, as many
continuing examples suggest. For example, in April 2021, there was a viral video of two Ottawa police officers racially profiling a Black man and making racist remarks, all while being filmed on an at-home surveillance system (Williams 2021a). In this situation, being within a monitored gaze did not change the behaviour of these two officers. However, it is possible that the officers were unaware of the at-home security system, and therefore felt more comfortable engaging in behaviour that would have been deterred if they had been aware. Yet, since acts of violence perpetuated by police are still frequently captured on cellphones and uploaded to various social media platforms in Canada and elsewhere, this new level of visibility clearly does not change the behaviour of everyone.

Likewise, police behaviour may simply move outside of the surveilled gaze (be it through open-street CCTV or citizen surveillance). However, this does not qualify as successful deterrence, just displacement. The individual may make conscious changes to their behaviour in the surveilled zone to avoid consequences, and then engage in this same behaviour in perceived safe spaces. While Brown’s (2013, 2019) results are promising in suggesting that increased visibility of police conduct can reduce misconduct, of course we also need to address the cultural and structural issues within policing which reinforce these behaviours. Nor would open-street CCTV proactively address causes for street crime and violence. Brown’s (2019) results do demonstrate that due to increased visibility, a variety of police behaviour is deterred, including proactive engagement in the community.

**Theme 3: Fairness – Equitable Treatment Through CCTV**

There were a variety of responses in participant discussion concerning fair application of CCTV and whether the technology can treat individuals fairly, all
dependent on their varied understanding of CCTV’s capabilities and their mental schemas regarding criminality and police. While some members of the public focused on the investigative aspect of CCTV and the potential to have the CCTV footage used to clear one’s name or support other claims, others focused on the problems of over-policing minorities, racialized surveillance, and the barriers facing Ottawa’s mentally ill and homeless population. This discussion is dedicated to the former, with the latter covered with more depth in the following chapter on resisting the implementation of CCTV.

Peter’s stance towards CCTV was influenced by perceiving CCTV surveillance to be an investigative tool, and not part of a large socio-technical system of social control. Therefore, for him, the technology embodies the neutral observer, a watchful eye that captures the true story. Peter’s discussion exemplifies this perspective:

I mean it's indisputable and what you have on footage is, you know, real time footage, particularly if it's if the CCTV is everywhere. As in, there's no sort of interrupted coverage so you kind of see a suspect or an individual moving from sort of one frame to the next you can kind of see their movement and it's not necessarily just like a photo of them walking by, in a particular area, possibly minutes before an incident happened and then they're extrapolating if they have sort of live coverage of the area they can kind of see the whole incident take place and who was involved in who maybe ran away afterwards or who walked by.

In fact, now that I'm saying it… I think it's actually more fair because I think there are some people based on their background maybe accused of an incident, but… So if they happen to be the wrong place at the wrong time like literally seconds or a minute after an incident happens and let's say they have their own sort of criminal history, but are in this case innocent, I think it actually helps prove their innocence. – Peter, Resident, Public Servant

Peter highlights one of the biggest selling points for CCTV supporters: that the cameras would capture everything from the moment you enter their field of view. In this instance, that understanding is implicitly accepted and welcomed on the basis that it would also capture the movement of suspected criminals from the moment they enter the surveilled
area, thus, hopefully recording the criminal behaviour to be used for enforcement purposes. What is interesting is discrimination in policing is acknowledged; however, CCTV is still considered the fairest evidentiary tool.

Peter’s discussion of CCTV’s innate fairness as an evidentiary tool and the potential effects of ‘wrong place wrong time’ along with the discriminatory treatment that accompanies this position is echoed by Michael’s discussion of fairness and CCTV:

I think that [using CCTV] would be the only way to treat people fairly, right? because it'll be direct. It'll show exactly who, in that region, at least, who is doing what. Right? If there is a crime they'll be able to look at exactly who did it. So, if anything, wouldn't that be the most efficient way of telling exactly who did it? And as long as it's not like systemically placed in like certain regions like let's say if there's a certain neighborhood that's a certain ethnicity or something like that. They don't just put them there as long as they're distributed, you know, all along the city or whatever…. I don't see the point of having them out in like, you know, Kanata53 and in the suburbs right because those aren't really, I mean there are crimes that happened there but you have to put them where the majority of crime is happening. It's got to be, you know, we can't roll these programs out and then efficiency would be the key right like you want to put them where it's going to be useful. Like, you could put them in like a dog park if you wanted to, but I mean, what would be the point? – Michael, Resident, Public Servant

Michael’s discussion has several nuances that reflect broader themes regarding public perception of CCTV. At first, there is general acceptance and the belief that CCTV is innately fair as it solely records what is within its view, but there is the potential for discriminatory application depending on location. Therefore, there is the potential for unfair treatment, but that can be mitigated if a broad range of regions operated CCTV.

The comparison of implementing CCTV in the suburbs to having them in a dog park insinuates that the criminal activity within the suburbs is not something that is a threat to public safety, and therefore does not require this form of intervention, yet this

53 Kanata is a suburb in the West of Ottawa, comprised primarily of single-family homes, condos, luxury apartments, outlet malls, and businesses.
intervention is required in the downtown core. Both the ByWard Market and Kanata have many luxury condos, newly built apartments, and many options for consumption; one of the main differences between these communities is the large, unhoused population and visible substance use in the Market. Because of the difference in conditions, it is considered fair application of surveillance technology for those who live in the Market to experience daily monitoring, and residents of the suburbs to remain unwatched with no formal surveillance and limited police presence.

Michael discussed how minority communities should not be targeted based on their race or ethnicity, yet there was a missing discussion of class, and how minority communities are distributed geographically throughout Ottawa. Lowertown, Overbrook, and Vanier are neighboring communities to the ByWard Market and are home to several marginalized communities. These communities already experience a greater police presence, and now would be subjected to increased surveillance through the implementation of CCTV.

Both Peter’s and Michael’s discussions show good intention and an understanding of some of the potential discriminatory effects of surveillance.54

Not only are minority and marginalized communities more likely to experience over-policing (Sewell 2016; Maynard 2017), but they are also subjected to everyday forms of ‘citizen surveillance,’ (i.e. person-to-person gaze) in public spaces by the ‘normals’ (white, able-bodied) (Finn 2011; Patel 2012). Important to note is that these

54 While CCTV may be perceived as a neutral observer, the algorithms used to program facial recognition and the monitored gaze are discriminatory to people of colour and are far more likely to mis-identify BIPOC citizens (Crockford 2020; Buolamwini & Gebru 2018). However, in the context of Ottawa’s Public Surveillance Project, it is unclear whether these types of algorithms would have been used. Nevertheless, this consideration is relevant to overall discussions of fairness in surveillance technology, especially given the function creep often found with the technology (Koops 2021).
stares are beyond simple ‘hate stares,’ which are focused on telling those deemed ‘other’
that they do not belong (McVeigh 1998). They are motivated by “suspicion and fear, so
that [marginalized] bodies are labelled as deviant, and constructed as morally and legally
problematic, not only in their expected criminality… but also in terms of their citizenship
as a whole” (Patel 2012, p.220). Those who fit in the hegemonic conceptions of who
belongs in the downtown area would solely be subjected to increased surveillance
through the implementation of streetscape monitoring, while those additionally already
subjected to discriminatory citizen surveillance are experiencing increasingly surveilled
spaces in all aspects of their lives. Therefore, despite the apparent neutrality of an ‘eye in
the sky,’ implementing open-street CCTV further contributes to an already hyper-
surveilled existence for many residents of the ByWard Market.

Theme 4: Business Support of CCTV

Although we cannot know whether all long-term Market residents, businesses,
and homeowners support open-street monitoring, my interviews and news articles
suggested a significant number tend to support the cameras. For example, the Ottawa
Business Journal (OBJ) interviewed several business owners in the ByWard Market in
July 2019. Mandy Gosewich, the owner of STUNNING! Fashion Accessories and Then
Some, a boutique in the ByWard Market, said, “Just implement it now, plain and simple
as that… It doesn’t help the ByWard Market when there are shootings in the middle of
the night, what happens is, people who want to come down, they’re afraid. But they
shouldn’t be (Gosewich qtd. Sali 2019, n/a). In the same article, Pat Nicastro, the owner
of La Bottega Nicastro Grocery Store and Eatery, states, “I actually think it will deter
some of the people that we don’t really want down here. We love the idea, and we think it
could only help the area,” (Nicastro qtd. Sali 2019, n/a). At the same time, CBC interviewed several business owners in the ByWard Market, several of who also expressed their support for open-street CCTV. John Diener, the owner of Saslove’s Meat Market, told CBC, “I don't have any issues [with CCTV]. If someone wants to take my picture on the way home, I am happy to even wave at the camera” (Diener qtd. Fagan 2019, n/a).

Their statements focus on sensationalized acts of violence, desired consumers, and deterrence. These statements reflect broader trends when considering the relationship between CCTV and urban space (Lippert 2009; Lippert 2012). Specifically, the perception of increasing disorder and antisocial behaviour in the downtown area is linked to open-street CCTV being perceived as a social control tool which will re-formulate this space to increase consumption and deter unwanted people (the other/them) from the community.

Although there are acts of violence in the ByWard Market, there are far more people who enter and leave this space without incident; however, it is the infrequent sensationalized acts of violence which businesses will reference to evoke a sense of security risk and the need for increased security measures. These increased security measures are to deter ‘unwanted’ people from the area, which include people who do not fit the hegemonic ideals of who is accepted as a community member in Ottawa. The inclusion of consumer-related concerns distinguishes the interests of businesses in comparison to the interests of the City and OPS. The stance of business owners is in contrast to other deterrence discussions of CCTV wherein the focus is to deter unwanted behaviours, rather than unwanted peoples. Those who do not fit those ideals often include
people of colour, those who are homeless, individuals dealing with visible mental illness or substance use, and anyone labelled ‘criminal’.

Steve Monuk, the co-owner of York Real Estate Corporation, owns several buildings and operates eight bars in the ByWard Market, states, “Absolutely, anything to help [get] more eyes on the street will make people feel safer… I think if it was Big Brother with facial recognition, that's one thing. It's a fine line between privacy and safety, but people use OC Transpo every day and they have cameras, so what's the difference?” (Monuk qtd. Fagan 2019, n/a). Monuk is a co-chair of the ByWard Market Safety and Security Committee, vice-chair of the ByWard Market BIA, a board member of the Lowertown Community Association, and on the board of directors for Crime Prevention Ottawa (CPO 2019).

According to participant statements, the bar owners in the Market have a powerful lobby in the BIA which allows for their influence to run the BIA for the past several years. Due to this powerful influence, other residents perceive the BIA as giving the bar owners anything they want, according to my interview data. Therefore, due to Monuk’s status in the ByWard Market as a bar owner and the lobbying power of bars in the ByWard Market BIA, his voice (and beliefs) would hold more weight than the average citizen. His connections to the community associations and social-capital of owning several businesses in the area allows Monuk to represent the ideal stakeholder. His expressed support for open-street CCTV could have been seen as more influential to the City as his investment in the ByWard Market attracts consumers and tourists, increasing the consumption potential for the Market.
Open-street CCTV is simultaneously a security and capitalist tool in which the addition of security cameras in a business neighborhood can result in a rent increase (Lipper 2012). Desirable businesses are able to pay this increase, and the undesired businesses are forced to relocate elsewhere (Lippert 2012). As the ByWard Market is home to many of Ottawa’s social services and homeless shelters who may not be able to afford a rent increase, they could be forced to move to a new location. These prime real-estate locations could potentially be purchased to encourage more of the desired consumers of the ByWard Market, rather than the undesirables who invest less money into the area and who threaten the “clean and safe” rationale for the area.

Unexpected Theme: Homelessness and Not in My BackYard (NIMBY)

When I was formulating a list of potential themes to explore throughout data collection, I did not initially consider homelessness in the ByWard Market as a theme. As the interviews unfolded, it became apparent how the affordable housing crisis and the number of homeless people (specifically substance using or mentally ill) in the ByWard Market is arguably the largest issue affecting the area.

Questions asked during interviews included whether participants felt that CCTV would increase their feelings of safety in the ByWard Market, and if at the time of the interview, did they feel safe during the day and at night in the Market. Fear of crime was apparent with 6 of 11 participants, to varying degrees (starting with mild fear for themselves or others and ranging to substantial fear of victimization). Five of 11

55 Furthermore, this unexpected theme deserves analysis as the CCTV pilot was initially proposed in the summer of 2019, which is prior to the development of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020. COVID-19 had a dramatic effect on the ByWard Market and drastically influenced the level of visible homelessness in the area due to service restrictions and closures (Freiheit 2021). Therefore, the conditions of the neighborhood are drastically different than when the CCTV pilot was initially announced.
participants indicated very little to no fear of victimization, despite any experiences of victimization in the past. The level of perceived safety varies throughout the market depending on the street or intersection. Peter, a local resident of the market, states:

So I also recognize that I am, you know, a six foot 1, 200 pound white man. And so my experience is probably very different from a lot of other people, if not most people. I walk my dog in the day, I walk my dog at night and I never really feel unsafe. I've never felt unsafe in the two years [I lived here] and I'm generally walking from the east side of King Edward and what's called the wedge or Lower Town East, all the way up to Majors Hill Park. That's sort of like that my dog route so I got to go all the way up St Andrews into Majors Hill Park and then back down through the real market and then back to my house on the other side of King Edward.

I never ever go around Murray Street and King Edward (Avenue) basically right where the Good Shepherd (homeless shelter) is. But I do walk by the Salvation Army (homeless shelter) fairly regularly, and without any problem but I generally try to avoid that particular intersection where there's a lot of activity. I mean when you're driving down Murray Street to get on and King Edward because you don't really have any other option, you can see people using intravenous drugs or sort of violence there, fairly regularly just as you're waiting for the light to turn green and so I try to avoid that, when physically walking, basically all the time. – Peter, Resident

Peter is not the only participant to mention the intersection of Murray and King Edward. Louis explained in his interview that there is a wealth discrepancy in the ByWard Market region, with King Edward Avenue being the divide. On one side, there are property owners, and on the other, several homeless shelters and visible poverty. Michael, a former restaurant worker in the ByWard Market, now a public servant and resident of the area, states:

In the days the worst that will happen is you'll get yelled at. I’m like a fairly big guy so like they don't really usually… they might yell at me a little bit, and I'm just talking about whoever, could be drunk people or homeless people, or anybody that's looking for confrontation. But at night when I used to work in the restaurant industry you get out of there at four o'clock in the morning. I would avoid a lot of certain streets for sure… Murray and King Edward, that entire intersection you just avoid. I would take Clarence and cut across and it would force me to jaywalk because I didn't want to wait at that intersection and, you
know, I lived on Murray Street. But on the other side of King Edward, so I had to cross, but I wasn't going to go walk another 200 meters to get to the next light. It's full of gang activity. It's just not a pleasant alley. You get harassed when you're walking down, there’s drug dealers and all kinds of stuff, people screaming, garbage everywhere.

Even if nothing happens I just rather not... yeah just rather safe than sorry. And from what I've understood is: I have friends that live on the streets like on the other side and they just... well there's actually a neighbor that they've been there for 30 years and they've never used that street because they're like, “you know what, us too rather safe than sorry.” And you know, it's a couple they're in their 80s now and they just completely.... They just find it's like a no man's land or like a war zone so they just rather not go, which is unfortunate because they've been there for 30 years. They've never used that street. – Michael, Resident, Public Servant

Peter and Michael’s discussion demonstrates how residents negotiate their feelings of safety and their routines to ensure they do not have to pass through areas of the Market that they deem unsafe. In this context, the presence of visible homelessness and poverty symbolize a decreased safety in the area, worthy of avoidance. Although both responses acknowledge that their personal physical safety is not in danger, the perceived risk of harms impacts their use of public space. Not only does direct victimization through yelling and harassing affect perceptions of safety, but Michael’s consideration of other residents’ experiences also highlights how knowledge of other people’s fear of victimization or victimization experiences contribute to perceptions of safety. In this context, the visibly homeless and substance users represent potential victimization, and are perceived as folk devils\textsuperscript{56}.

Although the CCTV project was proposed in relation to guns and gang violence, I argue that the state of homelessness in the ByWard Market has created the conditions

\textsuperscript{56} Folk devils are deviant stereotypes identifying the enemy, the source of the threat, and the evil wrongdoers who are the source of the threat (Cohen 1972). The hierarchical and prejudiced labelling process creates master statuses for individuals based on misplaced sense of fear, which “in turn sanctions action that would otherwise be seen as victimising” (Patel 2012, p.218).
wherein stigmatizing labels of dangerous, dirty, and criminal have constructed the visibly homeless and substance users into folk devils, therefore justifying increased social controls. As previously mentioned, the role of class is evident to community members, as 11/11 participants included poverty and the homelessness crisis in the ByWard Market as one reason for why the City proposed implementing CCTV. Despite the lively nature of the ByWard Market neighborhood, there are continued reports of individuals who no longer feel safe in the area and recommend the area be avoided altogether, as one news article commenter states:

I used to enjoy the Byward Market, but now feel so "unsafe" that I do not take the family or visitors to the area. There are far too many bars, drunks, and drug addicts that have destroyed the original feeling of the market area. – News article commenter

As the previous comment demonstrates, in addition to concerns about the population of people that often are some combination of homeless, drug users, and those with mental health issues, there are also concerns with bar patrons and the various groups may blur in the public’s mind into a general tableau of disorder.

In 2018, a group of local businesses launched a “Save our Market” petition, which stated that “the shelters, in their current configuration, must be diagnosed for what they are – a cancer which is now terminal for those residents and businesses in their vicinity” (savethemarket.ca). The shelters targeted in the petition include the Shepherds of Good Hope, the Salvation Army Booth Centre, and the Ottawa Mission. Neighborhood organizations, business improvement districts, and homeowners’ associations lobby local governments in an effort to prevent stigmatized groups from ‘invading’ their community (Grainger 2021; Dear & Taylor 1982). In the Ottawa context, this is evident by the creation of this petition and business owners’ statements of support discussed in the
previous section. Although Mayor Watson never specifically addresses the number of homeless shelters in the area or visible homelessness to be part of the reasoning behind implementing open-street CCTV, Ottawa residents were quick to make the connection, as shown by the following comment in response to a Facebook post regarding the CCTV pilot:

Ottawa is no longer a safe city. Best to put cameras also near the injection and homeless shelters as well. – Facebook user

Comments such as this were also apparent during interviews, demonstrating the extensive stigma faced by those who are visibly homeless or substance users. Some Ottawa residents have embedded Othering and an *us vs them* mentality into the notion of safety in the Market. The way for some residents to feel safe is if all individuals whose primary identifiers are stigmatized, such as previous offender, homeless, or drug user, are monitored, and their movement and behaviour is systematically controlled. The demonization of substance users and those with mental illnesses in Ottawa is apparent in language used to describe the conditions, as seen in the following Facebook comment regarding the commenter’s support for the CCTV project:

Please please do [implement CCTV], I was there to shop today and came across at least 3 poor souls either high on something very scary or mentally ill. They approached quite a few tourists many with children and the look of terror in the children’s eyes was noticeably disturbing. -Facebook user

By using language such as “poor souls” and focusing on children (and the inherent innocence of childhood) and highlighting how simply seeing someone under the influence of substances or with mental illness induces terror, this comment further reproduces stigmatizing stereotypes. It draws upon notions of sanitizing public space, and how the substance using underclass is a terror-inducing (according to the comment)
deviant subculture, who are dangerous and even require punitive measures (Amster 2003; Krapf 2018). Similar to the one listed above, several other social media comments focused on using the open-street CCTV to monitor the behaviour of the homeless in the area, along with the need to implement public CCTV outside all social housing in Ottawa.

This initiative, at least for some residents, became an opportunity to sanitize public space, reinforce stigmatizing labels against the homeless, mentally ill, and substance users, through the guise of increasing the safety of those who adhere to the hegemonic social norms. This experience aligns with the business owners in the Market, who advocate for these effects, specifically the social sorting (Lyon 2003) capabilities of CCTV to deter unwanted bodies from the area. Louis, a resident of the ByWard Market and a founder of a mutual aid organization, takes a different stance and challenges this notion of community:

There's so much of us like the “our community,” and then, you know, “them” – but they're a part of our community too. It's not either/or, you know, they’re community members too. Just because they don't have, you know, half million-dollar piece of property doesn’t mean they’re less than [others], they're involved in our community… I’m tired of people being criminalized because they are poor. It’s stupid. – Louis, Resident, Founder of local Mutual Aid Organization

The wealth divide in this part of the city is apparent, with King Edward Avenue being the border. In the ByWard Market, there are luxury condos that are available for upwards of $3000 per month, yet there is also the largest unhoused population in all of Ottawa. Some participants suggested the Othering of some members of the Lowertown and ByWard Market communities stems from racial, economic, and social biases towards minority and low-income residents. Louis explains this trend:
There's also a big divide as community both in colour and in means, unfortunately, it's kind of right down King Edward, and at our community association meetings you have all the rich white homeowners and, you know, they're wondering why all the people that live in “the projects” on the other side of King Edward aren't attending the meetings, not realizing the barriers that are being putting up by the people attending those meetings, you know, they always cry about those people not being involved, but yet they offer absolutely nothing to get those people involved. It was the same for people from the shelter or people from St Andrews. It's a hard meeting to go to, even I'm having a hard enough time with it and I'm pretty, you know, stabilized and everything. So, you know, a single mother of 4 living in a city housing development, you know, across the way it's just… [hard for them] – Louis, Resident, founder of local Mutual Aid Organization.

Louis’s discussion of the social sorting that occurs in the ByWard Market demonstrates how the community is already divided through income disparities, and the categories of exclusion show that it is not enough to be a resident of the neighborhood to be considered a community member. The inaccessible nature of community association meetings may in turn shape what initiatives are recommended to the city, and due to the *us vs them* mentality, and acceptance of law-and-order ideology, the recommendations can unfairly target certain community members. Several members of the Lowertown Community Association (LCA) confirmed that one of the reasons they believe CCTV was considered for the area is the large, and visible unhoused population of the Market. The pervasiveness of the *us vs them* ideology goes beyond controlling behaviour. The goal seems to be to eradicate visible homelessness from view. Louis explains:

…I know they've [LCA] got like these, walkabouts that they do. It is basically to push people around the park. By the river there. We [members of the LCA] were actually asked to do that. Yeah, it's just they’re not even satisfied with people staying off of their properties and off the streets, they have to stay out of the parks now even though there’s actually no places for people to live. I don't know what they expect people to do. Like they just push them further and further away. Just because you buy a piece of property doesn't mean you buy the whole community. I find very offensive that some people feel that way. You know, someone sleeping in the park isn't there because they want to be there. For the most part they're there, [because] they have to be. And to criminalize them or over-surveil them
because of that… I just don't see how that's going to be helpful for anybody. – Louis, Resident, Founder of local Mutual Aid Organization

It is evident that despite Mayor Watson’s announcement that the CCTV pilot would be in response to the growing gang violence in Ottawa, residents, and respected stakeholders such as the LCA, are focused on another side of the issue. It is clear that the level of visible homelessness in the area is by far one of the largest concerns.

One LCA member hinted that the resistance to the CCTV cameras stemmed from the various homeless shelter employees not wanting the current situation of visible homelessness being documented on camera. Since no homeless shelter employee was interviewed for this study, this assumption cannot be proven nor dismissed, but it does demonstrate a general misunderstanding with the use of CCTV. Further details became clear when the topic was probed:

I think there's a lot of people that live on the street, and the people who take care of them don't want to know how many are going to their establishment. I think a camera will have control on this establishment and they didn't want nobody to have the control on this. They are paid by… well what they used to be paid by…. let's say they will have hundred thousand [dollars in funding] per person that goes there per year. So they would say we have 300 clients every year…. If the camera can prove… because if somebody contested saying “why did they get that money?” And then you could say, you say its 300, but from my record it’s not really 300 its 225 or whatever. So I think the pushback is for that, to control the… they don't want nobody to see what's going on in there and their surrounding [area]. Which actually they say they are not responsible outside their establishment. So we’re pushing to have CCTV because we said, “You told us that you're not responsible outside the establishment so let's put some CCTV to see exactly what's happening because you keep saying it's safe.”

That's my assumption that they didn’t want cameras, I don’t know that but if I were them, I wouldn't want any cameras because then it's right there to see these two people come there every week or every month when they've got their cheque or when they're coming to town and it's always the same person [disrupting the neighborhood/causing problems] so we want to press charges with the police. Without that [CCTV] they have no proof who was with them, wherever they are, where they're from. They've got no proof at all. – Cassandra, Resident, Public Servant
Cassandra’s analysis was based on the faulty assumptions that the CCTV footage would be available for viewing, and that the organizations in the area would have access to the footage, which was never proposed for this surveillance project. Another resident points out that despite the well-meaning appearance of the LCA, the true reason for their support of CCTV and increasing policing initiatives in the ByWard Market stem from an *us vs them* ideology. As he explains:

> If you were to come to the real [LCA] meeting as it was you would see that the people who attend those meetings are not a representative sample of the local community, not to mention the community at large. And they’re really good people, and they say that they do not have anything against homeless people being homeless as long as they are elsewhere. Right. As long as they are, you know… and they're careful about what they're saying because this is not very nice to say, “we want to get rid of homeless people from our area” so they say, “the concentration of the shelters in that area is much bigger than anywhere else in Ottawa and we need to do something about it.” – William, Resident, Retired Independent Consultant

This mentality that William references is what is known as *Not in My Backyard* (NIMBY) (homelesshub.ca). NIMBY describes the process wherein residents of a neighborhood “designate a new development (e.g., shelter, affordable housing, group home) or change in occupancy of an existing development as inappropriate or unwanted for their local area” (homelesshub.ca). NIMBY labels homeless individuals as a threat and uses this language to demand local governments to institute regulations for land usage so homeless services providers are barred from the community, and that governments institute limits on homeless assistance to discourage homeless individuals from migrating into the community (Grainger 2021; Law 2001). Local authorities respond to these NIMBY demands by concentrating social services in “high poverty minority neighborhoods” (Grainger 2021, p.4; Kaufman 2020; Reese et al., 2010).
With this discussion, to contextualize the significance of open-street CCTV, one must return to Mayor Watson’s initial objectives for the initiative, which includes urban revitalization (Watson 2019). What does urban revitalization mean in this context? To answer this question, one must first explore how visible homelessness thwarts revitalization efforts. Politics of urban ‘revanchism’ are used (Smith 1996), wherein authorities seek to reclaim inner-city spaces for ‘respectable’ people by using discriminatory and punitive treatment of homeless and other marginalized community members. Punitive revanchism embodies a NIMBY stance towards homeless governance. Revanchism and NIMBY both embody forms of criminalization and spatial exclusion of homeless peoples, in which revanchist politics attempt to ‘take back’ public spaces for consumption and white middle classes (Smith 1996; Clarke & Parsell 2020).

I argue that the sanitizing effect of exclusionary designs (including open-street CCTV) represents the urban revitalization objective, and the resulting increase in middle-class consumption, is one of the primary reasons why city stakeholders (including members of the LCA) support implementing streetscape monitoring in their community. The Save Our Market petition, coupled with several participants confirming the NIMBY stance of the LCA, demonstrates that to be considered a respected member of the Lowertown and ByWard Market community, it takes more than being a resident; one must be a property-owning resident who adheres to the hegemonic social norms of the neighborhood. This finding was also mentioned by Maria, a member of CAMS, who further explores this consideration:

I think that [the state-given legitimacy of the BIA and LCA] also speaks to how like the city mobilizes the language around community and consultations, when they really mean like property owners, people who are okay with certain developer interests, like, those are the people who get centered. When you hear
the discourse, a lot of the times when they're talking about community, and then they talk about the people who are a threat to the community, even though they're actually… they're also your neighbors, and they are othered in those discourses. It's like, “oh yeah like we have this park. Okay, but we got to get those people out of it.” But those people are seen as like outside of the community when they're having those discussions. – Maria, Graduate Student and Activist

William’s experiences with the LCA coupled with Maria’s consideration of mobilizing communities demonstrates how when stigmatizing labels against the homeless (ie., they are dangerous) are internalized, they are not perceived as members of the community. The inaccessibility of community association meetings for residents of the ByWard Market demonstrates how the voices of those who would be directly impacted by open-street CCTV, due to the nature of their public existence, were not considered.

Fear of crime plays a role in interpreting crime control and crime control represents “a major threat to difference and diversity in the city” (Fyfe 2004 p.42), contributing to polarized perception of what crime prevention strategies should be implemented. Left-leaning peoples perceive changes in policing and crime prevention such as CCTV surveillance as “tightening the ratchet of social control and as the forerunner of some new technologically sophisticated totalitarianism” (Young 1999, p.90), and “attempts to purify the public sphere of disorder and difference through the spatial exclusion of those social groups who are judged to be deviant, imperfect and marginal in public space” (Toon 2000, p.141). This perspective is reflected in this study, as evidenced by CAMS’ formation, and all 5/11 participants opposed to CCTV adopting a similar stance to Young’s (1999) and Toon’s (2000) analysis. In contrast, supporters of these crime control strategies believe they will create dramatic reductions in crime and reduce fear of crime. This reduction in fear means people will enjoy a renewed sense of freedom and safety (Fyfe 2004). This perspective was evident in Robert and Cassandra’s
interpretation of the CCTV project. These experiences and perception towards crime control contribute to a polarized perception of what strategies should be implemented, as will be evidenced with how contrasting William’s experience (discussed below) is to Robert’s perception of deterrence discussed previously.

This chapter focused on the public safety and deterrence framework used to present Ottawa’s CCTV project to the public, and several relevant themes. Overall, proponents of CCTV argue, based on panoptic ideology, that CCTV will create deterrence effects. Whether the deterrence effects are limited is almost irrelevant, as support remains anyway due to the enforcement and investigatory potential of CCTV. Business support for CCTV is largely based on improving perception of safety for desired consumers, and their sanitizing potential. There is a general understanding that there can be discriminatory applications of social controls. However, due to an us vs them mentality, the visibly homeless, substance users, or the mentally ill require increased surveillance to appease fear of crime for white, property-owning community members.

The following chapter focuses on the resistance framework, used by op-ed news articles to promote a counter-narrative of CCTV and used by activists and opponents of the cameras. The chapter will follow the same structure as this one, beginning with the frames analysis before moving into themes of public attitudes, deterrence, fairness and equitable treatment, unexpected themes, and resistance.
Chapter 5: Frame Analysis, Framework 2: Resistance to CCTV

As stated in the previous chapter, this study challenges the notion that opposition against camera surveillance is pointless due to their already omnipresent nature. Opposition to camera surveillance can result in change, as seen by Ottawa’s rejection of open-street CCTV just months before the Ontario government launched the CCTV Grant Program trying to promote the roll-out of public cameras across the province. Ottawa remains an outlier of resistance while other municipalities are implementing surveillance systems with objectives of deterrence, urban revitalization, and improving police response to crime (OPS 2020a; Ministry of Solicitor General 2020, 2021). This second framework used to present Ottawa’s surveillance project centered privacy rights, prevention, and resistance in their arguments to spread a counter-narrative concerning CCTV (Spratt 2019; Ifill & Kishet 2019; Spears 2019). With the already prolific use of CCTV, it is important to understand, in Ottawa’s context, why is there opposition, and what motivates this attitude? This question is what the following discussion attempts to answer.

Framework 2: Resistance of CCTV

Despite widespread popular acceptance of law-and-order ideology and the use of open-street CCTV, there are also opposing beliefs. The second framework used to present the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project can be interpreted as a collective action or resistance frame (Snow 2013). As a resistance-based frame, it focuses on action-oriented beliefs and means that help legitimize and inspire social movement campaigns and activities (Snow 2013). They differ from other frames in terms of their primary mobilization functions, including:
to mobilize or activate movement adherents, so that they move, metaphorically, from the balcony to the barricades (action mobilization); to convert bystanders into adherents, thus broadening the movement’s based (consensus mobilization); and to neutralize or demobilize adversaries (counter-mobilization) (Snow 2013 p.395, brackets in original).

In other words, disagreeing with implementing open-street surveillance does not automatically mean participating in collective action and adherents must be motivated to act on their beliefs.57

After Mayor Watson publicly announced his plans for the project, several opinion pieces were published attempting to discredit the project and demanding that the funds be used instead for much-needed social services (Spratt 2019; Ifill & Kishet 2019). These articles also focused on the ineffectiveness of CCTV for the outlined objectives, privacy concerns, and costs. This framing of CCTV was apparent in numerous social media comments (42 of the total relevant comments—total unknown due to duplicates removed during coding) and in interviews (5/11 participants). These op-ed articles frame this targeted, open-street CCTV surveillance as a violation of civil liberties, as harmful, and as eroding privacy rights (Spratt 2019; Ifill & Kishet 2019). As one article states,

[i]n the typical knee-jerk reaction of the law-and-order crowd, the proposed solution to reducing crime is not to invest in preventative measures, such as increased funding to social programs for those in vulnerable situations, but to introduce state surveillance as a way of making people feel safe… Monitoring and surveillance cause harm to human dignity by eroding privacy – our right to be free from undue state scrutiny, and an essential component of individual freedom… CCTV… will acutely infringe on the privacy of those who reside in or frequent public spaces, namely our neighbours who are homeless or under-housed (Ifill & Kishet 2019, n/a).

57 As will be discussed later in this chapter, some other opposition to camera surveillance in Ottawa took quite different form and was motivated instead by far-right and stigmatizing ideology.
Rather than highlighting individual violent events in the Market, these articles frame the issue instead around reducing social problems that lead individuals to criminal activity and the need for social reforms such as accessible housing, safe injection sites, and increasing employment opportunities are proposed rather than funding a reactive CCTV project.

The resistance-focused articles included discussion of how academic literature indicates there are limited deterrence effects with CCTV, except for circumstances such as auto theft in parking garages. One article states, “most importantly, an analysis this year that sums up decades of separate studies concludes there were no significant effects observed for preventing violent crime” (Spears 2019, n/a). Another article states that:

study after study has shown that the effectiveness of CCTV as a crime prevention tool is questionable. Why would a CCTV surveillance system in Ottawa will be any different? …. But if cameras don’t actually make our streets safer or solve cases maybe they will at least increase perception of safety. This was, after all, one of Watson’s explicit objectives …. and is the real goal of his proposal. Make the public feel like they are safer – even if they are not. At the end of the day the perception of safety may buy votes… The proponents of a CCTV system have done no work to make the case that the increased state surveillance is necessary or would be effective (Spratt 2019, n/a).

The focus on privacy concerns and insufficient evidence for deterrence of violence re-frames the CCTV project as another reactionary policing technique, continuing with the status quo and not contributing to social change. A frame is designed to focus attention, articulate, and elaborate on the elements within the frame (CCTV), and often transforms the meaning associated with the object of attention (Snow 2013). By focusing on resisting the implementation of the project, the frame transforms alternative narratives of deterrence and public safety to human dignity, privacy rights, and a need for social services, and uses CCTV as a symbol for technological encroachment on civil
liberties, state violence against already marginalized communities, and a representation of the status quo of Canada’s criminal justice system. This resistance framework aligns with progressive criminal justice ideology, and other existing social schemas of fear of technological encroachment, or Big Brother mentality.

The critical stance concerning the status quo is one of the core elements of progressive criminal justice ideology. At a fundamental level, this ideology entertain[s] the idea that the goal of our criminal justice system is not to eliminate crime or to achieve justice but to project to the American [and Canadian] public a credible image of the threat of crime as a threat from the poor. To accomplish this, the justice system must present us with a sizable population of poor criminals. To do that, it must fail in the struggle to eliminate the crimes that poor people commit or even to reduce their number dramatically. Crime may, of course, occasionally decline as it has recently— but largely because of factors other than criminal justice policies (Reiman & Leighton 2016 p.1, emphasis on original).

This ideology acknowledges that many people are ‘criminals’ for what they perceive as normal behaviours (drug use, prostitution, gambling, loitering), and the illegality of these behaviours contributes to an increase in ‘secondary crime’ (stealing to pay for drugs, sex worker needs a pimp for protection, etc.) and that the poor are more likely to burdened with harsher sanctions (Reiman & Leighton 2016). This ideology is rooted in an intersectional framework focused on anti-racism, anti-colonial, classism, sexism, and ableism. Alternative modes of criminal justice are emphasized instead of reactive policing and incarceration, including transformative and restorative practices, advocacy for increased funding for social services, harm reduction, and alternatives to reactive policing and incarceration are cornerstones of progressive criminal justice ideology.

The resistance framework challenges the us vs them mentality regarding Ottawa’s unhoused population, drug users, racial minorities, and those struggling with mental
illness. Allan Kagedan (2020) provides an excellent description of Othering in *The Politics of Othering in the United States and Canada*, by stating that “othering may be understood as the efforts of members of a politically dominant group to marginalize and subordinate a minority or a politically weaker group” (2). As the *us vs them* cognitive schema is prevalent in Canada, evidenced by systemic targeting and overrepresentation of racialized minorities (Maynard 2017), people with mental illness (Prins 2011), and the homeless (Novac 2007) in the criminal justice system. There is a portion of Ottawa residents who vehemently disagree with the resistance framework, as exemplified by this comment in response to Ifill & Kishet’s (2019) article: “‘CCTV WOULD HURT MINORITIES MOST.’ Give me a break. How dense can someone be to think this way? ‘Monitoring and surveillance cause harm to human dignity by eroding privacy.’ My human dignity is harmed more by thinking that someone not concerned with my safety or security even exists” (Ottawa Citizen 2019).

The influence that frames have on public perception is not lost on other social services in Ottawa. In 2022, Shepherds of Good Hope, a shelter in the ByWard Market, launched a Change The Frame initiative towards reframing homelessness (changetheframe.ca).

Important to note in this discussion are the different understandings of the idea of care in both frameworks, specifically how to care for people and who should be cared for. In the public safety and deterrence framing, the middle-class, white, property-owning community members are the focus of who to be cared for, and how is through increasing enforcement and monitoring of those deemed as an *other* or deviant. However, for the resistance framing, the focus of who should be cared for is centered on vulnerable groups
including substance users, homeless, and mentally ill, and the how is through increasing funding and capacity of social services in Ottawa.

Significant findings include:

a) The focus on progressive criminal justice ideology by the University of Ottawa and Carleton University does seem to impact public perception of criminal justice issues in the capital.

b) With the advent of surveillance technologies, a chilling effect is experienced wherein individuals feel they are constantly being monitored, in both private and public spaces, negatively impacting their lived experience and their behaviour.

c) Violence is often not deterred with the implementation of open-street camera surveillance and using rhetoric of violence prevention to implement social controls is experienced as security theatre.

d) Those opposed to open-street camera surveillance acknowledge that CCTV technology can unfairly impact some residents, but that the technology itself is neutral, and it is the human element (creating algorithms, implementing the technology) that can contribute to unfair treatment.

e) Resistance and opposition to the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project is not solely influenced by progressive criminal justice ideology. Far-right and law-and-order ideology also influence active resistance and opposition, with carding, violence, increased incarceration, and more harsh mandatory minimum sentences recommended instead of open-street CCTV by those espousing this approach.

f) The project is viewed in the following way by those who resist is: Rather than negatively impacting important stakeholders (Monuk and others alike) who are
heavily invested in the bar scene by enforcing new zoning restrictions, the City would rather invest in a band-aid solution such as streetscape monitoring to create an illusion of changed conditions and increased safety. The City of Ottawa used buzzwords of crime prevention, surveillance, and safety to gain public support and appease stakeholders prior to conducting thorough research on the impact and efficacy of open-street CCTV. Once more information was reviewed, the capabilities of CCTV did not align with the outlined objectives, and discussion amongst the City and city council ceased.

g) Due to decreased trust in police, investing in a reactive surveillance project in a more progressive community might further hamper community relations with the service. Therefore, it seems the OPS would rather invest in initiatives labelled ‘community policing’ to improve trust amongst the community and appease local (and vocal) activists.

h) The quick, organized resistance by CAMS activists contributed to immediate criticism of the project. This criticism, along with the lack of evidence that CCTV is effective for violence prevention, and the decreased trust in police, seemed to help result in the discontinuation of the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project.

Theme 1: Public Attitudes towards CCTV

Understandings of the capabilities of camera surveillance were influential in the opposition of the CCTV project. Knowing the capabilities of CCTV technology and the academic discussion allowed for a more informed stance when discussing the surveillance project. As one Reddit user said:
Too bad Watson is pushing CCTV in direct response to violent crimes in the Market, and not to property crime, vandalism, theft, etc. He wants increased surveillance in the Market and he's using false pretences to do it. – Reddit user

Having a baseline understanding of how CCTV has been used, its efficacy, and the ethical considerations involved allows people to understand another layer of the project’s narrative, which is using discussions of public safety and downtown revitalization as a way to reduce fear of crime.

Public attitudes towards CCTV also may depend in part on individual upbringings and experiences. For example, William, who grew up in Poland in the second half of the 20th century, has a different lived experience than someone who was born and raised in Canada:

I grew up in Poland, for many, many years in [a] very authoritarian state where the surveillance was the rule of the day except that it was not high tech because this was 40-50 years ago, and it was limited to more primitive tools. So, yes, my general attitude towards police state and surveillance and whatever is very negative. And as much as I appreciate technological possibilities which right now are available, I don't like them to be employed against anybody, especially against me in particular. – William, Resident, Retired Independent Consultant

Not only does constant monitoring impact individual perception of law enforcement and policing, but it also creates what William terms the “chilling effect”:

You know, we are 30 something years after 1984. But this is the world, Big Brother is watching you all the time. I can guess that because of my upbringing I’m more sensitive to that than some other people… One of the things that was very bad that I know from my youth, on the top of information being collected and potentially being misused, there is also the huge chilling effect. I know that when I was young, I wasn’t surveilled by the police, well I don’t know, but I can guess. There was definitely that feeling that whenever you pick up the phone receiver, there are more people than just you and the person on the other end. … You know you need to watch all the time what you are saying, to whom you are saying, what you are doing, this is what I’m calling the chilling effect. And this is not the pleasant… you know, quality of life. So, I know that I know that the people who believe in that “if you are not doing anything wrong, then you don't need to be afraid of anything” and I do not believe in that. This is not true. – William, Resident, Retired Independent Consultant
The *chilling effect*, in the context of Ottawa’s Public Surveillance Project, could be seen as constant awareness of one’s behaviour when within the gaze of the monitoring system, hyper-awareness of the behaviour of others, and potentially fearing or worrying about interactions with law enforcement. This feeling could predominantly affect the minority and marginalized communities of the ByWard Market, as they are already subject to increased scrutiny by law enforcement (Maynard 2017; Sewell 2016). The effect that over-policing has on these communities could make them more likely to have negative experiences with an open-street monitoring system, especially if these systems use facial recognition software, which as mentioned previously, has been proven to mis-identify BIPOC individuals (Garvie & Frankle 2016).

William included in his interview that he is a member of CPEP and Horizon Ottawa, two grassroots organizations focused on dismantling forms of oppression in Ottawa (horizonottawa.ca). Solidarity amongst community members, and challenging social structures that negatively impact marginalized communities, are some of the main focuses of a number of organizations in Ottawa, such as CAMS, CPEP, and Horizon. While none of the other participants in this study feared for *their own* safety due to the implementation of open-street monitoring, several voiced their concerns *for others* and the effect it can have on BIPOC residents, unstably housed or homeless residents, or substance users in the area, demonstrating their solidarity and commitment to the safety of other community members.
Key findings of a report, *Troubling Encounters: Ottawa Resident’s Experiences of Policing*, by criminologists David Moffette & Christine Bruckert (2022) include that only 21.4% of their respondents indicate they trust the police; participants reported racial profiling, racist, and Islamophobic comments from the OPS, and 49.2% of those who had encounters with the police reported a decreased sense of safety (Moffette & Bruckert 2022). These results are especially relevant due to the demographics of the Market, specifically as those in the Market who “were street-involved or drug using, reported rudeness, disrespect, verbal insults, racial slurs, hurtful comments, the reproduction of cultural stereotypes, and threats of detention/arrest from police” (Moffette & Bruckert 2022, p.4). With this context, it is apparent that what William describes as a chilling effect and apprehension concerning surveillance and policing seem to be experienced also by other Ottawa residents. For these residents, police are a threat, not a protector.

Attitudes towards CCTV also seem to be influenced by education. Maria and Olivia both discussed their background in critical criminology and the influence that their post-secondary education had on their feelings towards CCTV. Maria notes how having courses on critical surveillance studies during her undergraduate degree at the University of Ottawa is what influenced her decision to join CAMS and influenced her decision to pursue a master’s degree. Olivia’s post-secondary experience, along with years of frontline experience with criminalized peoples, also influenced her involvement in local activism specifically focused on stigma, criminalization, and advocacy, and encouraged her to pursue her doctoral degree. In the Ottawa context, both the University of Ottawa

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58 Their research was funded by the Insight Development Program of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.
and Carleton University operate their criminology and criminal justice programs from a critical stance, and the schools’ criminology and sociology departments employ a number of critical surveillance and criminal justice scholars and local activists.

Not only does the type of post-secondary education influence public attitudes towards CCTV, but there are also effects due to type of employment. Louis is the founder of a mutual aid organization focused on harm reduction and advocacy for drug users. He is in close contact with marginalized members of the community, who are experiencing first-hand the effects of homelessness, substance use, mental health struggles, and so on. This impacts how Louis perceives the ByWard Market community and CCTV. His perception seems tied to his role as an advocate for marginalized members of the community. When asked why he thought CCTV cameras were being considered for the area, he states,

Yeah, I think its ignorance, first and foremost, I'm going to be frank about it. A lot of people are of the mind of, “Oh, you know we don't mind those people we just don't want them in our freaking neighborhood….” there's so much of that. It's like “oh no well… you know we don't dislike these people of colour or indigenous people or homeless people…. You know we just want good things for them. We just want them to, you know, basically live 50 miles outside of our community and have to walk in town every day to get the kind of services [they need].” So, I think it's fear, ignorance. Yeah, some fear might be justified but from what I'm hearing, No, it's no different than any other neighborhood. – Louis, resident, founder of local mutual aid organization

Despite Mayor Watson never explicitly mentioning the levels of homelessness and substance use in the ByWard Market as a reason for implementing CCTV, local residents are making the connection, which may be due to residents internalizing an understanding of ‘sanitizing’ effect of CCTV (Patel 2012), as discussed in the previous chapter.

This attitude is apparent not only in front-line advocacy workers, but also those involved in the criminal justice system. Jeff, a criminal defence lawyer in Ottawa, also
had a critical stance towards CCTV. Having a background in law and being familiar with the criminal justice system influences how he sees the world. When asked if he thought CCTV cameras would be effective in the goals outlined for the surveillance project, he states,

Yeah, I don't think they would be for a number of reasons. I'm certainly not an expert in studying data or criminology, but from the studies that I've read both from outside the border and here in Canada, it seems that the benefits of the surveillance are overemphasized and overblown. You know, my view of the evidence is that although cameras might help deter some minor property offenses, and may, in some cases, lead to better documentation of crime, they really don't have much of an effect in terms of deterrence, and to the extent that they assist with the apprehension of offenders that's long after the damage is done and, you know, looking at the examples and given specific situations like murders or shootings, the offenders have been apprehended anyway so I don't think there's much of a benefit there. – Jeff, resident, criminal defence lawyer

Jeff’s stance is influenced not only by his lived experience of the criminal justice system and seeing how the process of arrest, prosecution, incarceration, and release cycle works in practice, but he also draws from some knowledge of academic literature (we clarified later in our interview that the ‘studies’ and ‘evidence’ he refers to are scholarly articles).

CCTV technology is expensive, requiring policing services across to apply for provincial funding, which has strict criteria for how it can be used. Despite the cost, some local residents continue to support implementing this technology as another tool for police. However, as Olivia states, when local activists advocate for social programs, they do not receive the same financial support.

I think what's laughable is how they're so expensive; the cameras are expensive, the systems to maintain them are expensive, paying people to survey and watch the footage is expensive. And it makes me laugh, in an angry way, because we get laughed at when we asked for money for very real things that would help prevent harm, but you know [Mayor] Jim Watson comes up with an idea to install security cameras and everyone's like “yeah let's spend money on those” and it’s just interesting the reaction you get when you want to spend more on policing and
surveillance versus when you want to spend money on actually you know, addressing harm or preventing harm. – Olivia, Graduate Student and Activist

The use of funds for another reactive policing initiative, when they could be spent on another initiatives, was mentioned amongst all participants who were critical of (5) and those ambivalent (2) towards the surveillance project.

Theme 2: Deterrence

Social media users scrutinized the City’s pre-established objectives, including the following comment regarding the deterrent effects of CCTV:

Research suggests not even the death penalty deters criminal behavior, so these cameras are pretty pointless. More should be done to address the actual cause of the crime, not put up all this extra stuff that violates the privacy of the average person. – Facebook user

This user draws upon other ‘research’ to support their position, a common choice made by participants and commenters adhering to the critical framing of the CCTV project. It unclear how much knowledge the commenter has of the research, where the research was gathered or what sources were used to influence these commenters’ perspectives. The frequent inclusion of the importance of ‘research’ in the resistance framework demonstrates a desire to ground their claims in evidence/academic legitimacy. Whereas in the public safety and security framing, there is often anecdotal evidence, mentioning of other cities with in-use systems, and how CCTV can deter crime (with no mentioning of any displacement effects).

Critical comments also addressed the ineffectiveness of CCTV against violence, and called attention to rhetoric used by Mayor Watson in regard to these objectives, as shown in the following two comments:

"More people getting caught" is not a deterrent. Violent crimes in the Market happen because people are angry/hateful/drunk. Anyone that kills somebody in
the Market isn't going to reflect on whether there's a CCTV camera present or on how many other people have been arrested due to being caught on CCTV before they pull a gun or knife out and go after someone. If Watson wants to push for CCTV, he'd likely get more support if he wasn't flat-out lying about how these systems prevent violent crime. – Reddit user

This will likely not help. Surveillance does not deter crime in a consistent way. There are many other approaches to reducing the violence in that area that do not require the constant expansion of surveillance in public places which increases the criminalization of the general population. This is security theatre. A non-solution. – Reddit user

Both comments establish CCTV as a non-solution for the established objectives. Worth noting how CCTV is understood to be ineffective specifically against violence, and the attention given to deconstructing the ‘appeal to fear’ often used by supporters of CCTV. These comments distinguish between legitimate use of CCTV and using camera surveillance as security theater.

By allocating funds towards implementing streetscape monitoring to “improve the ability of the Ottawa Police Service and community to respond to crime and anti-social behaviour occurring in the downtown areas” (Watson 2019, p. 1), this reinforces that those who commit street-level crime are dangerous, must be tracked down, and receive some sort of punishment. This messaging is not lost on those opposed to the project, as one Reddit user states,

CCTVs are useless at curbing violent crimes that are almost always committed by people reacting to a situation with anger and emotion… If you want to curb property crime in an area, CCTV is effective, but that's not what Watson & Co. are trying to do with this pilot project. If they want violent crime rates to fall in the Market, they need proactive measures. You can get as much video evidence of people shooting others as you want, but at the end of the day people are still getting shot. What's the priority here: arresting bad guys (I imagine it's the OPS' main aim, their clearance rate for crime across the City is less than 40%, which is fucking pathetic for a police force that gets above-inflation rate budget increases every year) or stopping these crimes from happening in the first place? – Reddit user
This comment acknowledges an important nuance when considering social control tools suggested by the state. Are the goals of these projects to improve the living conditions of residents in the area, or is it to improve crime clearance data? The dissatisfaction with OPS and their lack of preventative action was reflected by 7/11 participants during interviews as well as throughout social media comments.

When I asked participants if they believed implementing open-street CCTV would deter crime in the ByWard Market, there were several views, including: vehement disagreement, obvious support and acceptance, uncertainty, and ambivalence. When I asked William if he believed CCTV would have a deterrent effect in the ByWard Market, his remarks were as follows:

I vehemently disagree…. I absolutely do not believe in deterrence achieved by setting up those CCTV cameras. And by the way, if, if they really want to deter anything, then decoy cameras would be just as good as real cameras. – William, resident, retired independent consultant

William acknowledges an important nuance of the surveillance debate: if CCTV is supposed to have a deterrent effect, then solely seeing the signage or the cameras should be sufficient to create positive results of deterrence. When discussing deterrence effects with Alex, he also offers a critical perspective:

No [CCTV won’t address the concerns of the ByWard Market], I think that they’d get a lot more convictions probably. It might be a lot easier to convict criminals. But that wouldn't stop them from being criminals. So, they might be able to put more people in jail where they'd learn better techniques to evade crime: wear better face coverings, avoid places where the TVs are located. So, the crimes they would deter, I think would be displaced somewhere else. Or else the criminals will learn new techniques. The ones that they'd get [on CCTV] of course will be the ones that were crimes of passion without any thought. People drunk after bars closing start shooting each other up and they get caught on CCTV. It's easy to convict them and throw the key and throw them in jail.

But that's not the bulk of the crime. So, I think that it could be useful if all you want to do is put people in jail. But if you're going to actually prevent crime, I
don't think that it will make any difference to that. It could actually increase crime because you're getting more skillful criminals. You're teaching them how to be better criminals, it might actually increase the trend. Who knows, but the thing is, they're not looking at it that way. They're looking at convictions as the only measure of success and I think that's, that's not a measure of success that's a measure of failure. So, we're convicting more people but that means we're getting more crime not less. – Alex, resident, retired economist

Alex’s discussion focuses on a significant reason for resistance amongst those critical of the surveillance project: that implementing CCTV cameras will result in increasing incarceration. His discussion showcases that even members of the public who do not interact with the criminal justice system are aware of how policing heavily relies on convicting and incarcerating individuals to produce a reduction in crime. This way things operate is an understanding common to community members, with all participants discussing how the CCTV project could lead to increased convictions and incarceration, with those in support advocating for these changes, and those opposed highlighting the harms associated with increased enforcement.

*Theme 3: Fairness – Equitable Treatment Through CCTV*

When considering how marginalized communities are targeted through over-policing, adding CCTV in public spaces can contribute to a hyper-surveilled existence as not everyone has the often-taken-for-granted luxury of a home to escape monitored public and private spaces. This perspective is demonstrated by Jeff’s discussion of fairness and CCTV:

Yeah, I mean, the cameras are what they are their record that they record so superficial level it might seem sort of a neutral policy. But some people will inevitably be recorded, more than others, and some people will never be recorded in more personal circumstances. If you're living on the street and sleeping on the street and, you know, interacting with people in that way, going to the bathroom, you know, not in a private place. It’s obviously going to be more invasive, but it wouldn't be with respect to other individuals and so there's, you know, a problem
with who is captured and who is recorded just in that superficial level….

– Jeff, resident, criminal defence lawyer

The potential invasive effects of CCTV were rarely discussed amongst those in support of streetscape monitoring; however, the participants who were openly opposed to CCTV often referred to the invasive effects for homeless community. Jeff also mentions that, while CCTV cameras may capture middle aged men purchasing drugs or engaging with a sex worker, these situations are unlikely to result in consequences. However, when young Black men are captured on camera, their surveilled movements are more likely to result in consequences. He explains,

  taking the example of the young black men, where they go, who they talk to, who they're associating with, that's information that if it's in the hands of the police, it can be used to establish associations and connections. Who you hang out with and who you talk to, is one of the criteria used to determine gang membership for example. The extent that that term and has any value whatsoever, but it’s certainly something police and criminal justice system take into account and one of the criteria is “are you associating with other members?” And so, just having a 24/7 surveillance and presence, can I think result in some pretty inequitable situations in that regard. – Jeff, resident, criminal defence lawyer

What these statements focus on is the potential unequal experiences of open-street monitoring. Jeff’s acknowledgement of how CCTV can contribute to a hyper-surveilled life for homeless peoples and the potential negative effects against Ottawa’s BIPOC communities demonstrates one picture portraying how this technology would not impact people fairly. However, Alex’s discussion below suggests that the issue does not lie solely in the technology, it is the people behind the screens and software who require attention. When asked if he believed CCTV cameras would treat all individuals fairly, he states:

  Why shouldn’t they? I mean cameras are cameras, so they make you look bad. It can't be it’s fair or unfair there's just cameras. Fair and unfair are human concepts, cameras don't have humanity. The people who are looking at the camera, people
who are looking at the pictures are the ones who are treating people fairly or unfairly. If they tried to automate facial recognition software it’s the software that's being… software designers are designing in the biases, the software itself is just a just a machine. I don't blame the machines I just blame the people. – Alex, resident, retired economist

Alex thus offered a nuanced analysis of fairness in relation to CCTV technology.

Unexpected Theme: Stigma, Violence, and Far-Right Ideology

When beginning this study, one of my initial speculations was that those who are opposed to implementing CCTV would fall into certain categories: people aware of academic literature on the efficacy of CCTV; people who have privacy concerns; people who do not want to use tax dollars on CCTV; and/or people who fear the effects of surveillance creep. What unexpectedly became apparent during data analysis of social media and news article comments is that, rather than being motivated by progressive criminal justice ideology, some of the resistance to camera surveillance instead is linked to right-wing views, law-and-order ideology, and fears/concerns about stigma.

Far-right ideology is sometimes more obvious among those advocating citizen surveillance, suggesting that some people such as racialized groups are perceived as ‘out of place’ or different than the imagined ideal Canadian citizen and subject to increased scrutiny. Interpersonal acts such as continually asking “where are you really from?” fitting with a notion of hegemonic whiteness in Canada are examples of this kind of attitude to surveillance (Lyon 2018)\(^59\). Although previously far from immune to right-

\(^59\) This form of scrutiny may negatively impact personal identity or self-concept of marginalized peoples, who may internalize racist projections from the white hegemonic society (Sewell et al., 2016; Creese, 2019). The intent is to confirm their mental schema that Canadian equates to whiteness (nativism) and that their minority bodies do not belong (Creese, 2019). Nativism is attributed to belonging to one of Canada's “founding” races, either British or French, both of which are traditionally white and harbour Eurocentric normativity (Kagedan 2020). Even if minority families have been in Canada for generations, they are still regarded as others and non-belonging (Kagedan 2020).
wing populist ideologies, Canada has seen the increasing prevalence of right-wing ideologies appealing to nativism, Othering, and xenophobia (Budd 2021), as demonstrated, for example, in the recent convoy occupation of Ottawa.

Unexpectedly, I found that there were extreme perspectives on both ends of the political spectrum in relation to CCTV. There was open opposition to CCTV citing its ineffectiveness, with those opponents crying out instead for programs designed to provide assistance to street-involved and homeless peoples (e.g., Ottawa Inner City Health Programs), youth programs, ending poverty, increasing social housing, and more; however, there were also demands by others for actions such as carding, the death penalty, sometimes including public executions, “Three strikes you’re out” laws, more harsh mandatory minimum sentences, and other law and order measures. The following are several examples of such unexpected comments:

We'll NEVER agree to the solution to gun crimes=Installing invasive, privacy intrusive, cameras! We know of the corruption @ our borders=Bribes taken by guards, POLITICIANS, shipping & trucking companies in the pockets of the CARTELS=Rise in crimes by UNDOCUMENTED, ILLEGALS! NO! – Twitter user

Guns need to be mounted with the cameras for when the gang bangers are squabbling, the police might be able to get at least one of them. – Facebook user

Let the police do [their] jobs it’s called CARDING [instead of implementing CCTV]. Dumbass – Facebook user

'CCTV WOULD HURT MINORITIES MOST.' Give me a break. How dense can someone be to think this way? 'Monitoring and surveillance cause harm to human dignity by eroding privacy.' My human dignity is harmed more by thinking that someone not concerned with my safety or security even exists – Ottawa Citizen news article comment

With these comments it is apparent how stigma, racism, and violent responses are embedded in the mental schemas of some individuals and can influence both support and
opposition to camera surveillance. The authors have sorted anyone deemed ‘criminal’ into a category deemed worthy of increased policing, harsher punishments, and continuous surveillance; those perceived as criminal are therefore less deserving of fair treatment, require violence, and cannot be reasoned with. Often it is the same bodies that are categorized as outsiders: the BIPOC, Indigenous, Asian, homeless, substance using, poor, disabled, and mentally ill community members that are consistently marginalized and excluded from hegemonic white societies (Oni-Esoleh 2021). The lived experiences of minorities, specifically over-policing and hyper-surveillance are disregarded as legitimate issues facing these communities. Individuals who do not adhere to the social norm can be negatively labelled as the other and are targeted by other community members through citizen surveillance (Reeves 2019).

Whether and how much these mentalities influenced the initial proposal of the CCTV project is unknown; however, with the increase in right-wing extremism online during the COVID-19 pandemic in Canada (Thompson 2021), it is possible that these comments may increase in frequency with the 2022 municipal election in Ottawa, or with the proposal of future crime-control initiatives.

*Unexpected Theme: Dissatisfaction with Municipal Government*

During participant interviews, it was clear that some Ottawa residents are dissatisfied with the current municipal government. The ‘typical Ottawa response’ was characterised by interviewees as politicians using buzzwords and knee-jerk responses to appeal to their constituents, while ignoring the larger sociological issues at play. Olivia further explores this when saying:

*Yeah, I think that elected officials in Ottawa are very confident and cocky, in a way that they shouldn't be, given lack of experience with very real issues that*
people face day to day, especially in the downtown core. And Ottawa is… you know, it's funny because… and we're seeing it more and more now people talking about the impacts of amalgamation on Ottawa, so when you have like all the like suburban and rural councillors making decisions for people who live in the core, but then also the councillors in the core aren't always the best at kind of standing up for the issues here as well so you end up with a lot of very like reactive sensationalist like just status quo ideas like “oh someone got shot [we need] more surveillance cameras.” It’s so boring. It's boring, it's lazy. It's like typical, like it's a very like status quo solution…. But, I mean our politicians are… they're always playing a game too and trying to just like keep getting elected so they'll go roll back but only so far. I think it's just like constant in Ottawa you know we've seen that there's always more approval for more surveillance, and more policing than there is for, you know, prevention and things that will actually help....

And I think when elected officials in our city come up with solutions like this [CCTV project], it just shows their hand because it's telling us that they would rather watch people die, then stop them from dying. So, I'm not just talking about gun violence but I'm also talking about, you know, the overdoses, like the toxic drug supply in Ottawa, I'm talking about…. Yeah, the increase in homelessness and as we get closer to winter, once again we'll have these conversations about how many people are sleeping outside in the winter. And so, when they come to the table with surveillance, they're just telling us that they'd rather watch it happen, than stop it from happening and that’s just really depressing. – Olivia, Graduate Student and Activist

This unexpected finding was apparent regardless of if the individual was for or against CCTV, with only one participant (who worked with the City on the initiative) not critiquing any aspect of the municipal government. However, the dissatisfaction with those who supported the initiative stems from inaction on the City’s part to invest in more drastic measures to improve the conditions of the community (e.g., relocating shelters, having more on-the-grounds police in the area, transforming monoculture of bars in the area). The focus in Ottawa towards crime control efforts, including policing and surveillance, rather than prevention and mutual aid is one of the primary reasons for

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60 While general dissatisfaction with the municipal government was apparent in 10/11 participants, it is important to clarify that not all interviewees wanted the same action/measures to be implemented by the City. For example, some participants wanted to discontinue street closures in the ByWard Market, whereas others were focused on increasing policing in the area.
CAMS’s formation. For some, this dissatisfaction with Ottawa’s municipal governance and policy efforts was reinforced by a perceived lack of attention paid to the voices of residents in comparison to stakeholders. Some residents have indicated that the Lowertown Community Association and the ByWard Market Business Association are treated as consultative bodies by the city government. However, as Olivia states:

… [the LCA and BIA] are two bodies that are taken very seriously by the city, and they're taken as like consultative bodies so like, “oh well if the if the Community Association says it's good then it's good.” The Community Association is like five people! And like five rich, like retired public servants, retired cops themselves and like, you know… But I mean I just joined the one in my neighborhood and I'm a white woman, who rents, and like, I'm the diversity (laughing). Like it’s not good. But they do have a direct line to the councillors who shows up to every meeting, like they have a direct line to City Hall because they're seen as like the official voices. – Olivia, Graduate Student and Activist

Concerns regarding Ottawa’s city councillors and whether they care about their constituents’ issues or are concerned solely about re-election was apparent in 7/11 discussions with local residents. Louis, resident, and founder of a local mutual aid organization, stated:

Him [Mathieu Fleury] and I had butted heads on a few different issues, homelessness being the largest one. And, yeah, he is just basically trying to sway his voting populace you know and unfortunately it works in this ward. Unfortunately, too I believe we're the only riding in Canada that's been the same way every time federally, I believe we've been Liberals since like the 70s. So, like, people are very comfortable in their positions here, but they follow the constituents, and this is a real closed community it always has been. Historically, you know, denying places too many people of Asian descent, people of Irish descent, and of course people of colour and that. They try to push people out forever. – Louis, resident, founder of local Mutual Aid Organization.

Many residents of the ByWard Market and Lowertown Area express that they are fed up with waiting for real, long-term solutions to the harms facing their community, and when asked if they are satisfied with only implementing CCTV as a safety measure and not changing anything else, 11/11 participants state that they are dissatisfied. However, if this
was the only action taken by the municipal government to increase safety in their
neighborhood, then some would accept the implementation of open-street CCTV. For
example, when asking Elizabeth if she supported the initiative, she said:

I mean if that's all they going to do, then yeah. It's better to have [CCTV] then at
least if somebody kills someone, they can maybe have a photo… and it's easier to
find who is the culprit, but it's not a solution. The solution is really to deal with
the basic issues, this is like when you build a road, if you make it very wide, and
there's no restrictions, anybody even if you put a 20km/hr speed limit, people are
going to go faster. The only way to do it, to change it, bring… [using hands
symbolizing bringing barriers closer] you know if the drivers sense that there is
friction, they know they cannot go faster, and that's what you have to do, the same
thing. If you want people to feel comfortable in the space, you need to make to
design it that way. – Elizabeth, Resident, Retired Urban Planner

Her willingness to settle for open-street monitoring if no other action is proposed
or initiated was reflected amongst some other social media comments. Therefore,
resistance and fighting to push for desired initiatives was not always perceived as an
option for everyone.

Not only are local residents dissatisfied with the proposed CCTV project, other
initiatives in the ByWard Market are also seen by some residents to be harming the
community. The ByWard Market has undergone a transformation from one of the oldest
markets in Canada into an entertainment district. The number of venues selling alcohol
vastly outnumber the local shops and boutiques. Elizabeth, who is a member of the
Lowertown Community Association, states:

And so, in 2008, they were 17,000 licensed seats in a market, like it's a very small
area this is like four blocks. And now there are almost 30,000 licensed seats. So a
licensed seat is the capacity that someone has inside and outside. – Elizabeth,
Resident, Retired Urban Planner

During the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, with public health measures
preventing anyone from dining in restaurants, bars, or leaving the house for anything
other than essential services, the foot-traffic in the ByWard Market decreased tremendously. As local businesses in the area struggled to stay afloat, the City began street-closures on Clarence between Dalhousie and Parent to allow for outdoor patios to be outstretched into the streets. As discussed previously, the ByWard Market community is experiencing harm due to drugs and alcohol in the area, and street-closures for outdoor patios reinforces to the public that the Market is a space for consuming. While some residents believe the decreased crime rate in the area during that time was due to the pandemic, others believe it is due to the decreased access to alcohol in the community, and now that restrictions have lessened and people have returned to the neighborhood, the negative effects of the street-closures are experienced by residents. As Elizabeth said:

> During the pandemic, there was no crime. But then the mayor said ‘Oh, there was no crime because there was nobody’. But there was nobody because the bars and restaurants were closed… It's just too much of one thing, there's an overconcentration of… it's a monoculture of bars and restaurants and the city is basically subsidizing actually those bars and restaurants in the summertime, they allow them to use the public realm, which is the street, as well as the sidewalks, the public hideaway for free. It used to be that they have to pay. Now it's for free it's been for free for last two years and will be free again next year. And it's in, in the name of economic support, but they don't think about all the other retailers that don't sell alcohol, they don't think about the residents who are there we suffer from all these awful patios and the music and all of that, they don't, they don't think about that. – Elizabeth, Resident, Retired Urban Planner

With the street-closures, bars and restaurants are able to increase their capacity of consumers and sell more food and drinks, but it also creates an environment where large groups of people in a concentrated area can occupy the streets while intoxicated, increasing the potential for violence or anti-social behaviour. Elizabeth’s discussion
showcases how CCTV is perceived as a bandaid solution for the social problems of the
community for the benefit business owners.\textsuperscript{61}

Elizabeth’s analysis is that, rather than negatively impacting important
stakeholders who are heavily invested in the bar scene by enforcing new zoning
restrictions, the City would rather invest in a band-aid solution such as streetscape
monitoring to create an illusion of changed conditions and increased safety.

\textit{Theme 4: Resistance}

Olivia, 34, is one of the founding members of CAMS. When asked about how the
founding of CAMS, she states:

\begin{quote}
I was already kind of in conversation with people like other neighbours and other
activists around policing in Ottawa, and then this was announced and a few of us,
a really small group of us just kind of, you know, got together to start to push
back so that’s when you know kind of CAMS came to be and then… Yeah, we
started kind of putting a counter narrative out there around surveillance and
CCTV. – Olivia, Graduate Student and Activist
\end{quote}

Olivia clarifies that CAMS did not exist prior to the announcement of the CCTV project,
and that CAMS engaged in quick, organized, and targeted resistance by getting a counter-
narrative around CCTV into the media by doing several media interviews. Op-ed news
articles were written by CAMS activists to push a counter-narrative of the surveillance
project, focusing on how marginalized community members would be impacted, and how
funds can be re-allocated to harm reduction and prevention (Ifill & Kishet 2019). CAMS,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{61} A comparative risk assessment of alcohol, tobacco, cannabis, and other illicit drugs, using a margin of
exposure (MOE), which is “[the ratio of the no observed adverse effect level (NOAEL) of a substance to
the normal dose of exposure] was used to rank control measures for substance abuse and health risk
assessment” (Iranpour & Nakhaee 2019, p.131, brackets on original). This research exposed that alcohol is
the only substance, on a population scale, that is in the high-risk category (Iranpour & Nakhaee 2019;
Lachenmeier & Rehm 2015). However, those in the Market drinking alcohol at bars and clubs are not
perceived as the ‘dangerous’ community members. Rather, substance users are perceived as dirty and
dangerous, demonstrating that there is a ‘good’ substance used by paying consumers in bars, and ‘bad’
substances used on the streets. The dichotomy of good vs bad substance transfers to who is a good vs bad
consumer, impacting who supports CCTV and why.
\end{flushright}
along with CPEP, organized a round table discussion on October 30th, 2019, to speak out on their counter-narrative concerning CCTV. The meeting began with a short film illustrating the daily life of a woman under surveillance in a ‘smart city’, followed by a question-and-answer session with community members and local experts in criminology (Kurys 2019). Professor Justin Piché (co-founder of CPEP and a criminologist at the University of Ottawa) told CityNews the purpose of the meeting is to “have a discussion on the benefits and the consequences of expanding CCTV, and also discuss what alternatives could exist to improve our collective well-being and sense of safety in this city” (Piché qtd in Kurys 2019).

The @CAMSOTTAWA Twitter account posted live-tweets during the roundtable meeting, to further spread their counter-narrative of CCTV to the public. Those who attended who spoke against implementing open-street CCTV focused on several main issues, specifically: prevention, criminalization, data protection, lack of evidence regarding effectiveness, and the targeting of minorities and marginalized communities (@CAMSOTTAWA, October 30 2019). Important to note is that there was no participation of those who supported the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project on the panel, and thus no-one from the ByWard Market BIA, despite them being invited to participate; however, there were representatives of the BIA in the audience (@CAMSOTTWA, October 30 2019).62

The goal of CAMs was not only to fight the cameras. Their mission statement includes the goal of drawing attention to their concerns surrounding increasing

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62 It is unclear if an invitation to participate was posted online or in-person for residents to attend and participate, this could have influenced the attendance of supporters for the project.
surveillance in Ottawa more generally, and especially in historically over-policed neighborhoods including not only the ByWard Market, but also the neighbourhoods Overbrook, Jasmine Crescent, Caldwell Avenue, and Montreal Road; these areas are occupied by a large number of people of colour, First Nations, Inuit, and Métis peoples, and other marginalized groups (cams-ottawa.ca). In this context, CAMS was the group leading the opposition, representing the “insurgent activists” (Sutton & Wilson 2004; Skogan 1988) who advocate for increased social services and harm reduction strategies to address crime and perceive crime as a by-product of socio-economic inequality. The insurgent activists represent those adhering to progressive criminal justice ideology, with this stance evident in CAMS’ mission statement and amongst participant interviews with CAMS activists (2/11 participants) and other residents who were critical of the current criminal justice system (3/11 participants, not including the 2/11 CAMS activists). Their task included reframing the perspectives of what Skogan called “preservationists” (Skogan 1988), including long-term residents of the ByWard Market, small businesses, homeowners, and others who have an interest in preserving the status quo and preventing disruption. Five of the 11 participants adhere to a preservationist perspective, combining this with law-and-order ideology.63

After the roundtable event at City Hall in late 2019, public discussion surrounding the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project stopped in its entirety. Nevertheless, CAMS has remained active in civic affairs in Ottawa, advocating in relation to other social issues. Their website includes links to resistance movements, petitions, and a formal letter to the

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63 For 1 participant, it was unclear whether they adhere to insurgent or preservationist attitudes due to their ambivalence to the surveillance project.
Mayor Jim Watson regarding surveillance technology in Ottawa. According to both CAMS activists interviewed, if the surveillance project continued after the round-table, CAMS would have continued to resist and engage the public in resistance⁶⁴.

CAMS’ resistance efforts are focused on the potential harms that must be prevented due to the implementation of CCTV. As Maria, a local activist and member of CAMS, states,

> The best-case scenario, even if they did get a charge, they’re not dealing with the issue. They might send someone to jail. I’m like okay that’s not a win, that’s even more violence like you’re just moving violence around you’re not preventing it. And then, likely people come back to the community in a worse situation, and then the cycle just continues. So best case with these cameras is still a worst case in terms of public safety, and what the outcomes become. – Maria, Graduate Student and Activist

This coalition takes a transformative justice stance, rather than the current status quo law-and-order ideology which is pervasive in relation to Canada’s criminal justice system.

Not only are some residents of the ByWard Market aware of the larger social issues contributing to crime and anti-social behaviour in the area, but they are also calling out the lack of action taken by the City of Ottawa to improve these conditions. As one Reddit user states,

> I’m sorry, but this [CCTV Pilot] is just a simple solution that won’t solve the actual problem. I live in the market. I love the market. Cameras outside my house won’t fix any problems. I haven’t seen the city lift a finger to do anything in the last 5 years, and this is their big solution? On any given night you can find 4-6 bylaw officers ticketing cars on any given street and maybe 2 cops sitting in a car somewhere in the market. They refuse to deal with the social problems that cause the larger problems, and just shipping a bunch of shelters down the street to a mega shelter where there are no supports in place for the people that actually use the shelters is more than short sighted, and just shifting a problem rather than fixing it. You can’t treat people like cattle. How on earth is cameras on the corner of the street a solution?

⁶⁴ While the OPS may have decided to discontinue the surveillance project, this decision was not made public, and it was I who informed both Olivia and Maria during our interview that the project was not moving forward. All that CAMS knew was that there was no word about the CCTV project after the round-table meeting.
going to deter stabbings and shootings? This is just another passing of the puck to whoever comes next. – Reddit user

I now move on to discuss the effects of resistance to surveillance in this case. The data suggests that resistance is rooted in a desire to find non-reactive, transformative solutions to underlying social problems. With reports of decreasing trust in police in Ottawa (OPS 2020b; Moffette & Bruckert 2022), pursuing an initiative that quickly received very public resistance would not foster a positive relationship between the community and the service. Because the OPS decided to discontinue the surveillance project, that might conceivably have contributed to increasing trust between the service and the community as it appears that the service heard the concerns of the community, advocated based on evidence, and chose to invest in initiatives more likely to improve the community.

The OPS formally documented their discontinuation of pursuing open-street CCTV in April 2020 in a report submitted to OPSB (OPS 2020a), but never publicly announced this decision. Instead, the report said, the service would be focusing on their ‘community policing’ initiatives. It is impossible to discern with any certainty what actually lay behind the decision. Based on the data, it is arguable that this decision was at least in part an effort to avoid public criticisms and rebuild trust and relations with the community. The lack of evidence that CCTV is an effective tool for violence prevention, along with the outcry of citizens who also cited research in their resistance, op-ed articles criticizing use of CCTV, and the organization of a formal meeting to oppose the initiative all may well have contributed to the OPS discontinuing the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project, despite Mayor Watson’s claims that it would be effective. Despite the decision, OPS would go on shortly to further challenges for their legitimacy, especially in the
aftermath of the murder of George Floyd and subsequent calls to defund police, and with massive criticism of their handling of the convoy occupation of Ottawa in winter 2022.

When actors such as governments or businesses do what the social movement – in this context, the anti-surveillance and pro-prevention social movement – is asking them to do (i.e., discontinue the project), the actors in question often do not acknowledge the influence of the activists’ resistance. Therefore, it is impossible to state with 100% certainty that CAMS and their opposition to open-street CCTV in Ottawa is what influenced this project to be, at the time of writing, fully discontinued.

This chapter focused on the resistance-based framework used to present the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project to residents. This framework centres privacy rights, human dignity, the need for increased social services, and prevention to provide a counter-narrative of CCTV. Overall, in Ottawa’s context, opposition to camera surveillance is primarily motivated by progressive criminal justice ideology, with some outliers of resistance motivated by far-right, and law-and-order ideology. Those opposed to CCTV argue the cameras would be ineffective against Mayor Watson’s outlined objectives of deterring violence. They also express concern that the human element of camera surveillance (impact of operator bias, algorithms, choice of placement) requires further investigation to understand how this technology may unfairly impact some residents. The surveillance project is experienced by residents as a band-aid solution to create an illusion of increased safety, and as a tool to please important city stakeholders.

The quick, organized resistance by CAMS activists contributed to immediate criticism of the project. This criticism, along with the lack of evidence that CCTV is effective for violence prevention, and the decreased trust in police, likely helped in the discontinuation
of the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project in favour of other community policing practices.

The following, concluding chapter summarizes the significant results of this study and discusses limitations, and avenues for future research.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

Major findings

This study produced a number of findings. The following are the most significant results of this study:

1. The study unearthed that the Ottawa Police Service opted not to pursue implementing open-street CCTV in 2020 stating in an internal document that it was not an evidence-based best practice. This decision was never made public and activists opposing the CCTV initiative did not know about the decision by OPS until I told them. As there is decreasing trust in Ottawa police (Moffette & Bruckert 2022), and there was public citizen resistance to the surveillance project, it is arguable the OPS opted for investing instead in their community policing initiatives to improve community relations with the service. Implementing open-street CCTV was not included in Ottawa’s 2021-2031 Community Safety and Wellbeing Plan (while it was not included, it does not mean that the City cannot implement public camera surveillance before 2031).

2. Although the OPS formally documented their decision in April 2020, the Ontario government announced the CCTV Grant Program in August 2020, as part of their Guns and Gang Violence Reduction Strategy (GGVRS), providing funding up to $200,000 per successful policing service applicant to update or implement open-street camera surveillance. The objectives of the CCTV Grant Program are identical to Mayor Watson’s outlined objectives. The inconsistency of support between the provincial government, Ottawa’s municipal government, and the OPS demonstrates that governments and police services do not always have a united front regarding the effectiveness of CCTV as a crime fighting tool.
Therefore, it is important for researchers of surveillance and anti-CCTV advocates not to assume that governments and police are monolithically in favour of CCTV.

3. CCTV is linked to urban revitalisation and increased safety in the mental schemas of most residents – regardless of whether or not CCTV actually leads to those results. The gap between expectations and outcomes is at least partly explained by the fact that many individuals are unaware of how the CCTV system would function, assuming incorrectly that the system would be live-monitored, and help would be mobilized in real time when incidents occurred.

4. It was generally acknowledged by all interviewees that CCTV may move the behaviour; however, in discussions where interviewees have expressed their support for CCTV (4/11), or in pro-CCTV comments on news articles or social media comments, the potential harms of displacement were generally accepted or not explored. The acceptance of displacement in Ottawa is congruent with other Canadian cities (such as Edmonton, AB) wherein support for CCTV can grow despite evidence of limited-to-no deterrence effects.

5. Some Ottawa residents unexpectedly considered how implementing open-street CCTV would deter police violence. Although the increased levels of visibility have marked a shift in police behaviour (Brown 2013; 2019), not all inappropriate, negative, and violent behaviour is deterred. Since acts of violence perpetuated by police are still frequently captured on cellphones and uploaded to various social media platforms in Canada and elsewhere, this new level of visibility does not change the behaviour of everyone.
6. While the City focused solely on guns and gang violence and increasing public safety, residents perceived the high concentration of visible poverty, homelessness, and substance use in the downtown core to overshadow the City’s concerns. A number of residents and business owners supported CCTV as a way to manage the population of street-involved people in the Market, many of whom are homeless and dealing with mental health and/or substance use issues, and to sanitize public space. Not in My Backyard (NIMBY) rhetoric is apparent in the ByWard Market and Vanier regions, which contributed to both support and opposition to the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project (this study cannot speak to other Ottawa neighborhoods, but it is arguable that NIMBY rhetoric is pervasive across all communities in Ottawa).

7. Individuals support and oppose CCTV for a variety of complex, and inter-dependent reasons that go far beyond concerns for privacy, and my interviews have helped reveal some of the nuances and diversity in beliefs and attitudes towards CCTV among the Ottawa public. While CCTV is not the chosen method of crime prevention for some, they are desperate for any action, and therefore were in favour when the project was initially proposed. Many who were openly opposed to the surveillance project were unhappy with the Ottawa police, the efficacy of CCTV, the municipal government, and the criminal justice system as a whole, whereas those who openly supported the initiative discussed their fear of crime, how the introduction of open-street CCTV might increase consumption in the ByWard Market, and how camera surveillance could be used as a tool for deterrence and investigations.
8. There were varying reasons for resistance, including progressive criminal justice ideology, personal experiences, privacy concerns, and, unexpectedly, far-right and law-and-order ideologies. Some Ottawa residents openly rejected CCTV in favor of anyone deemed ‘criminal’ requiring increased policing, harsher punishment including mandatory minimum sentences and “Three Strikes you’re out” laws, carding, public executions, and other law and order measures. Whereas others mention they reject CCTV due to *chilling effect* of surveillance and how implementing these social controls contributes to an increasingly hyper-surveilled experience, impacting both their lived experience and their behaviours.

9. Interviews exposed that residents are experiencing general dissatisfaction with the municipal government and the current urban planning of the ByWard Market, but for different reasons. Some are unhappy with the proximity of several homeless shelters, safe injection sites, and food kitchens, whereas other residents are unhappy with the monoculture of bars and restaurants in the area. This dissatisfaction impacts the support and opposition of City proposals, including the CCTV project.

10. The resistance in Ottawa used a mix of critical newspaper coverage, community activism, and organized events to provide a counter-narrative of CCTV. Ottawa’s criminal justice activist community (in this instance CAMS, with help from CPEP and Horizon) have contributed to social change in the area. While it cannot be proven that the influence of quick resistance contributed to halting implementing open-street CCTV in the ByWard Market, CAMS and others were influential in gaining critical news media and social media attention on the project. Ties
between academia and activists may contribute to these organizations and thus influence the success of their social movement, as seen by the role of graduate students and professors in the formation of CAMS and the round-table meeting at City Hall.

Limitations

This study has some limitations that must be discussed. I was only able to interview a relatively small number of people, and many key actors did not agree to interviews, although this is common for a Master’s thesis.

If I had to do the study again, I would ask more questions probing the extent to which interviewees understood how CCTV works, and this is something future research could pursue. As it was, I did not fully capture what assumptions people were making about CCTV when they expressed their support or opposition. Therefore, it is possible that participants were in support or opposition for rightfully, or wrongfully believing that CCTV has specific capabilities. However, according to Spriggs et al.’s., (2005) analysis of public attitudes towards CCTV in the UK, “respondents support CCTV irrespective of what they believe it can do” (p.41), meaning that people support CCTV regardless of if they understand what the surveillance technology can do. This limitation can impact the support for 4/11 participants, the opposition for 5/11 participants, and ambivalence for 2/11 participants as it is possible they did not understand what CCTV can do when formulating their opinions.

Avenues for Future Research

The varying experiences of the same environmental conditions (e.g., the conditions of the ByWard Market) demonstrate how an individual’s mental schema,
education, and personal experiences do contribute to one’s attitude towards CCTV. Thus, when municipalities are considering a public CCTV monitoring system, I argue that a rigorous public consultation process is essential to ensure residents are aware of the proposal and are properly informed of its capabilities, in-turn allowing them to understand how it would impact their lives and they can make an informed decision of support or opposition. Further research is required to understand how a rigorous public consultation process impacts the public’s support and opposition to open-street CCTV.

If the current trends of prolific growth in camera surveillance remains, more research is required investigating the interplay between care and control when implementing open-street CCTV initiatives. How can already in-use surveillance systems care for and not criminalize the most marginalized members of their communities, or is the best approach simply to get rid of the cameras?

More research is required on how restructuring access to alcohol might impact violence in the ByWard Market. Before implementing any social control or crime control efforts, access to substances must be addressed to uncover whether a reduction in access contributes to a reduction of social disorder in the area. Lastly, more research is required to further explore Hier’s (2010) claim that Canada has a distinctive pattern of resistance to CCTV, and what the key factors promoting resistance are. While prominent surveillance theories (Foucault 1979, 1991; Galič et al., 2017; Haggerty & Ericson 2000) do not focus on resistance, Ottawa has shown that successful resistance of surveillance can occur, and therefore requires further research. The efforts of Ottawa’s community members demonstrate that Hier’s claims continue to reflect how some Canadian communities experience camera surveillance. What is different about Canada if
resistance is more common here? When and why are Canadians more likely to resist implementing open-street CCTV despite funding programs? Has the advent of the CCTV Grant Program dramatically impacted the level of CCTV in Ontario?

Conclusion

A mayoral candidate in the October 2022 municipal election, Mark Sutcliffe, told CTV Ottawa that he “would hire more police officers, open a new station in the ByWard Market and push to install CCTV cameras in an effort to deter crime” (CTV Ottawa 2022, Sep 1). These efforts are another example of the law-and-order ideology influencing proposals by the City of Ottawa and showcases that the ByWard Market is perceived to warrant increased policing. Based on Sutcliffe’s proposal, it is apparent that the OPS’s previous decision regarding CCTV is not known by the public and perhaps not by Sutcliffe himself. Sutcliffe “is also pledging to strike a task force within 30 days of taking office to seek recommendations on dealing with mental illness and substance abuse… [and would] tackle homelessness by mov[ing] away from emergency shelters in favour of supportive housing, and expand the city’s anti-racism strategy” (CTV Ottawa 2022, Sep 1). It is unknown how Sutcliffe will ‘tackle homelessness’ and substance abuse, and whether his shift towards supportive housing (potentially in other neighborhoods) is motivated by NIMBY ideology.

Despite the renewed discussion of CCTV in Ottawa, the Ottawa Public Surveillance Project marks a surveillance initiative in Canada that was proposed, then eventually rejected. Despite this rejection, the province of Ontario would soon introduce the CCTV Grant Program to assist police services across Ontario to implement or update their CCTV equipment. Will other cities and towns successfully resist implementation of
public CCTV cameras? Will Ottawa resist once again? How, when, and why this might occur raises important questions for future research.
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APPENDIX A

Report to/Rapport au :
Corporate Services and Economic Development Committee
Comité des services organisationnels et du développement économique

4 June 2002/ le 4 juin 2002

Submitted by/Soumis par : Kent Kirkpatrick, General Manager/Directeur général,
Corporate Services Department/Services généraux

Contact/Perso...
Closed Circuit Television ("CCTV") systems were budgeted for under the 2001-2003 Capital Program, Real Property Asset Management. The Corporate Services and Economic Development Committee, at meeting number 17, on Oct. 16, 2001, directed that a policy framework be developed to guide the installation and operations of such systems.

CCTV systems have been identified as an important component of the City of Ottawa security program. Such systems have been successfully implemented across the country by both public and private institutions in order to improve the security of facilities and to reduce security risks. These systems have proven themselves to be both cost-efficient and highly effective.

Corporate Security, in keeping with the directions of Council, has prepared the attached proposed policy and procedures, following extensive research and consultation. Corporate Security discovered that many Municipalities are currently grappling with the creation of such policy and procedures in order to comply with various protection of privacy legislation. This proposed policy constitutes the “best practices” identified through that research and consultation.

Because CCTV systems record individuals and their activities, it is imperative that their use be carefully controlled and guided. This Policy and these Procedures are intended to ensure CCTV systems, within City of Ottawa facilities, do not violate the relevant privacy legislation while balancing the need of the Corporation to provide a secure environment with the need for individuals to be free to conduct their business without excessive security surveillance.

DISCUSSION

CCTV surveillance cameras are an important enhancement of the existing security program. Such systems allow for the enhancement of security, both at large, heavily staffed facilities, and at remote/ non-staffed sites. CCTV systems are an effective deterrent to crime in a public location and of great assistance in identifying potential problems so that security can respond before an incident occurs. CCTV systems also provide valuable evidence, not only for the assessment of a situation at any given time, but also for prosecution and the review of existing security measures in the event of an incident.

One such enhancement is the ability to improve security without the posting of additional security personnel. CCTV systems make possible the provision of security surveillance at remote sites, where the posting of guard staff is not an economically feasible option. By improving the cost-effectiveness of the security program, CCTV systems allow the City of Ottawa increased flexibility in responding to security risks and issues.

The proposed policy includes guidelines to ensure that no CCTV camera views an area where an individual has a greater expectation of privacy. The proposed policy also ensures that, where CCTV systems are employed, the public is provided with adequate notice of
their presence. The monitoring of the video information will be conducted by well-trained and carefully selected operators. The policy also outlines that the video records will be used solely in the event of an incident occurring, which requires investigation, or where required by law.

The proposed CCTV program would utilize two types of storage devices:

1. **Digital Video Recorder**, in this type of system, the video images are transmitted to a hard drive unit, which stores the information digitally. In the event of an incident or suspicious activity, a record can be created by recording the information onto a disk or a CD-ROM. The information stored on the hard drive is looped and is automatically stored over at the end of each cycle.

2. **Time Lapse Video Cassette Recorder**: in this type of system, the video images are transmitted to a specialized Video Cassette Recorder that stores the images in time lapse on a videocassette. These tapes are used on a 31-day rotation with tapes only being removed from rotation in the event of an incident or suspicious activity. At the end of the cycle the tapes are recorded over.

With both systems information is only pulled out of storage upon the instructions of the Manager, Corporate Security, when required for a security investigation or where required by law. No information is stored or distributed for other purposes.

A CCTV program fulfills an important role in assisting Corporate Security to contribute to the Real Property Asset Management vision of excellence in managing the real property assets of the City of Ottawa, in keeping with owner investor focus on ensuring that the overall interests of the Corporation are protected.

**CONSULTATION**

The Corporate Security Division developed this policy and these procedures, in consultation with the Legal Services Department and the MFIPPA Core Office.

**FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS**

Funding in the amount of $150,000.00 was approved as part of the 2001-03 Capital Program, Real Property Asset Management, for the installation of security systems at City Hall. Additional CCTV projects for other facilities have been budgeted for under the 2002 Capital Projects budget. The improvements to the security program are likely to result in less loss/damage to Corporate assets, resulting in significant cost savings.

**ATTACHMENTS**
Annex A - Draft- Closed Circuit Television Policy and Procedures

DISPOSITION

Corporate Services Department - Corporate Security to implement this policy and these procedures upon approval.

- Legal Services to ensure that any revisions to MFIPPA affecting this policy are identified and addressed by Corporate Security.

- MFIPPA Core Office to review, determine, and respond to any access to records request made by an individual seeking access to a video record created by the CCTV system.

POLICY STATEMENT-RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVES

The City of Ottawa recognizes the need to strike a balance between the individual’s right to be free from invasion of privacy and the corporation’s need to ensure the safety and security of all city employees, clients, visitors, and property. Closed Circuit Television surveillance (hereafter referred to as “CCTV”) has been in use for many years by many institutions to serve as a deterrent and also to record significant events, breaches of By-laws, and criminal activity. Given the high costs and relative inefficiency of conventional means of surveillance, CCTV surveillance stands as the most effective means of ensuring the operations of the City of Ottawa are conducted in a safe and secure environment.

APPLICATION

This policy applies to all City of Ottawa elected officials, employees, contractors, and visitors, with regards to the facilities outlined in Appendix 3. This list of facilities will be updated from time to time and amended by the Manager, Corporate Security.

POLICY DESCRIPTION

This policy and these procedures are intended to act as guidelines for the use of CCTV surveillance in City of Ottawa facilities and events, in accordance with the dispositions and regulations set out in the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.M.56 (hereafter referred to as “MFIPPA”).

REFERENCES

Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act
Guidelines for Using Video Surveillance in Public Places Document from the Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario

Ontario Government’s Privacy Impact Assessment Tool

A Privacy Breach Has Occurred—What Happens Next? Document from the Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario

RESPONSIBILITIES

Manager, Corporate Security

- Authorize installation of security cameras, and surveillance practices.
- Delegate responsibility for the day-to-day operations to Administrator, Integrated Security Management System.
- Conduct periodic internal audits to ensure full compliance with City policy and MFIPPA.
- Assist and co-operate with the MFIPPA Core Office to process applications for access to information submitted by individuals under the provisions of MFIPPA.
- Determine the placement of each video camera, based upon documented, justifiable grounds for each.
- In conjunction with the MFIPPA Core Office, develop a training and awareness plan for employees with regards to their responsibilities under MFIPPA.
- Undertake yearly evaluations of the CCTV surveillance system to ensure it is still justified in accordance with the requirements of MFIPPA.
- Co-ordinate co-operation with law enforcement agencies for disclosure of information as authorized by MFIPPA.

Administrator, Integrated Security Management System

- Oversees day-to-day operations.
- Delegates authority to approved operators.
- Ensures daily compliance with policy guidelines.
- Ensures monitoring and recording devices are stored in a safe and secure location.
- In conjunction with the MFIPPA Core Office, provides training regarding compliance with MFIPPA and how to handle information inquiries.

Operators

- Monitor and record activity.
- Ensure equipment functioning properly.
- Ensure records not accessed by unauthorized persons.
- Direct all inquiries for information to the appropriate manager.
Use Of The CCTV System

Video Surveillance

The City of Ottawa uses both Digital Video Recorders (DVR) and time lapse Video Cassette Recorders (VCR) in facility CCTV systems. Where facilities are on a DVR system, the system is on a 30 day loop and a record is only created if an incident occurs which results in the CCTV Operator making a digital copy (recording the information onto a CD record). Where facilities use VCR systems, the tapes are rotated on a 31-day basis and a tape is only removed from the rotation to create a record only when an incident occurs.

Record

A record is defined for the purposes of this policy as a copy of the images captured by the CCTV system that has been saved for either review/investigation by Corporate Security, for law enforcement purposes, or where required by another legal authority.

Logbook

Each City of Ottawa facility having a CCTV surveillance recorder shall institute a logbook. The operators of the CCTV system shall document all information regarding the use, maintenance, and storage of records in the logbook. This logbook shall serve to demonstrate compliance with this policy and MFIPPA.

Location Of Reception Equipment

Camera positions will be determined on the basis of reasonable and justifiable grounds for the provision of safety and security. The position of all cameras shall be determined by the Manager, Corporate Security, or his delegated representative. No camera shall be placed so that it views into an area where individuals have a greater expectation of privacy, such as washrooms, change rooms, or private buildings. Only City of Ottawa facilities shall be subject to surveillance. Each proposed position shall be assessed in accordance with the Ontario Government’s Privacy Impact Assessment Tool with regards to the effects the system may have on personal privacy and means by which adverse effects can be mitigated.

Record Identification

All records shall be clearly identified as to the date and location of origin. In facilities with a DVR, the computer time and date stamp shall be understood to be this identification. In facilities with a VCR, the operator shall affix a label to each videotape identifying this information.

Personnel Authorized To Operate
Only persons designated by the Manager, Corporate Security, the Administrator, Integrated Security Management System, or their contracted delegates, shall be permitted to operate the CCTV system. In accordance with MFIPPA, these persons shall be informed of their obligations and responsibilities regarding the use and disclosure of information. Should such individuals breach these obligations they shall face disciplinary action, as determined appropriate by the Manager, Corporate Security, which may include termination of employment.

Employees of the City of Ottawa and all service providers who are authorized to have access to records created by through the CCTV surveillance system shall be required to sign a written agreement regarding their duties, obligations, and responsibilities under MFIPPA, which shall include an undertaking of confidentiality.

**Hours Of Operation**

Given the open and public nature of City of Ottawa facilities, and the need to provide for the safety and security of employees and clients who may be present at all hours of the day, the City of Ottawa CCTV systems may be in operation at any time.

**City of Ottawa Obligations With Regards To Records**

**Notice**

In accordance with MFIPPA, the City of Ottawa shall post bilingual signs at all entrances to areas under CCTV surveillance. These signs shall be as determined by the City Legal Department, and shall, at minimum, contain a warning that the area is under CCTV surveillance and the contact information for the office of the Manager, Corporate Security. (Please see Appendix 4 for an example of the notice)

In addition to the posted signs, a full bilingual notice of collection, as required by section 29 (2) of MFIPPA, shall be made available to the public at various public accessible locations throughout the City of Ottawa. (Please see Appendix 5 for an example of the full notice.)

**Access**

Access to the CCTV System and the records created by it shall be restricted to those employees or contractors whose duties require them to have such information. Individuals seeking to have access to records pertaining to themselves must submit an access request, following the procedures set out below.

**Use**
The City of Ottawa shall use the information recorded by the CCTV surveillance cameras solely for the purposes of safety and security of City staff, as well as that of users, and visitors of City facilities. This information shall not be used for any other purpose, except either with the prior consent of the individuals to whom the information relates to, or where required by law.

**Disclosure**

The information and records recorded shall not be disclosed to any individual or organization except as permitted through MFIPPA or required by other legislation.

**Retention, Security, and Disposal of Information**

The City of Ottawa shall not create records of the information collected except in circumstances where a record is created for an investigation pertaining to a safety or security issue. Records created shall not be retained for a period of less than one (1) year, as provided for under MFIPPA; except where differing retention periods are required by other legislation.

The City of Ottawa shall make all reasonable efforts to ensure the security of records while retained and to ensure their safe and secure disposal/erasure.

**Records Released for Evidentiary or Investigative Purposes**

Upon being notified by law enforcement authorities of a need to release a record for evidentiary or investigative purposes, the City of Ottawa shall store and retain the records according to standard procedures set out by said authority. The records will be released upon the completion of a storage device release form, which shall include the following information: the identity of the individual and agency taking the device/record, the legal authority for the collection, the date the device/record was disclosed, and provisions for the return of the record/device or its destruction. The completed storage device release forms will be stored in the records logbook. *(Please See Attached- Storage Device Release Form)*

**Control and Responsibility for Records**

It shall be understood that at all times the City of Ottawa retains control and responsibility for records, except when removed for a law enforcement investigation, or where required by law.

All service providers and contractors acknowledge that all records created or used while delivering a video surveillance program are under the control of the City of Ottawa and are subject to the provisions of MFIPPA.
Staff Response To Public Inquiries Regarding CCTV Records And Policy

In the event of a staff member receiving an inquiry regarding CCTV Policy or Procedure, the inquiry shall be directed to the office of the Manager, Corporate Security. All requests for access to CCTV records shall be made under MFIPPA and shall be directed to the MFIPPA Core Office. The MFIPPA Core Office, in co-operation with the Manager, Corporate Security, shall process MFIPPA requests, in accordance with the legislation.

Access Procedure

Individual Request:

Under the provisions of MFIPPA, a person requesting access to a record shall:

- make the request in writing and submit it to the City. The requests shall be in the format of a letter making reference to MFIPPA or by using the MFIPPA Access and Correction Form;
- provide sufficient detail to enable an experienced employee of the City of Ottawa, upon a reasonable effort, to identify the record; and
- at the time of making the request pay the prescribed fees, as provided for under MFIPPA.

(See attached “MFIPPA Access and Correction Form and Fee Schedule”)

Response:

In accordance with the procedures set out in MFIPPA, the City’s Head for the purposes of MFIPPA, the Director of Secretariat Services/City Clerk, shall process the request for information and respond to the requester as required pursuant to the legislation.

THE MFIPPA CORE OFFICE ADDRESS IS AS FOLLOWS: MFIPPA CORE OFFICE, 110 LAURIER AVE., WEST, OTTAWA, ON, K1P 1J1, OR VIA INTERNAL MAIL – 01-73

Unauthorized Disclosure:

If City of Ottawa Staff have knowledge of any unauthorized disclosure of a record, or any contravention of this policy:

- The staff member shall immediately inform the Manager, Corporate Security of the breach and the Manager, Corporate Security shall in turn inform the MFIPPA Core Office;
- The staff member shall work with the Manager, Corporate Security and the MFIPPA Core Office to take all reasonable actions to recover the record and limit the record’s exposure,
- The Manager, Corporate Security, in co-operation with the MFIPPA Core Office, shall make reasonable efforts to inform the individual(s) whose record(s) was/were disclosed as a result of the breach,
- In conjunction with the MFIPPA Core Office, the Manager, Corporate Security shall investigate the cause of the disclosure with the goal of eliminating potential future occurrences

Any unauthorized disclosure of information shall be dealt with most seriously by the City of Ottawa. It shall be understood that intentional wrongful disclosure, or disclosure caused by gross negligence, is cause for disciplinary action up to and including dismissal/termination of contract.
APPENDIX 1

CCTV Policy Draft-Storage Device Release Form

- Record of Disclosure to Law Enforcement Agency

(Please Print)

Name of Law Enforcement Officer: 

Badge Number: 

Agency: 

Description of Record Being Seized: 

Authority to Seize Record: 

When Record Seized: 

By signing below, the representative of the law enforcement agency certifies that the record(s) seized are required by the named law enforcement agency to aid in an investigation undertaken with a view to a law enforcement proceeding or from which a law enforcement proceeding is likely to result.
After Use Record Shall Be: *(check appropriate)*

- [ ] Destroyed: Returned:

CCTV Operator Releasing
Record: ________________________________________

(Print Name)

CCTV Operator
Signature: ________________________________________

- Seizing Officer’s Signature: ____________________________
APPENDIX 2

MUNICIPAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION & PROTECTION OF PRIVACY ACT (MFIPPA) ACCESS/CORRECTION FORM

Please note:

- An access/correction request for information will be processed in accordance with the time limits set out in the *Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* and its regulations. The time limit to respond to your inquiry will begin from the date the request and the $5.00 application fee are received.
- Photocopies of originals will be provided in responding to requests. On-site viewing of originals may be arranged if required.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART A: To be completed in full by the Requester</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 Access to General Records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 Access to Own Personal Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 Correction of Own Personal Information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Directed to:
- MFIPPA Core Office
- Corporate Services Department
- Secretariat Services Branch
- 110 Laurier Avenue West
- Ottawa, ON, K1P
- 1J1 Mail Code: 01-73

Details

- Last Name
- First Name
- Middle Name
- Address
- City or Town
- Province
- Postal Code
- Telephone Number
- Day □
- Evening □
- Telephone Number

Detailed description of requested records, personal information records or correction of personal information:
(If request is for correction of personal information, please indicate the desired correction and attach any supporting documentation)
Summary of Fees for Information Requests Under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act

Note:
If you are requesting information about yourself, your request is considered a “personal information request”. All other requests for information, whether about a person other than yourself, or about a government program or activity, are considered “general information requests”.

Fee Charges for Requests for General Information

Application Fee: $5.00 to be paid when you submit your request;
Search Time: $7.50 per ¼ hour required to search and retrieve records;
Record Preparation: $7.50 per ¼ hour required to prepare records for release;
Photocopying: $0.20 per page
Computer Programming: $15.00 per ¼ hour to develop program to retrieve information
Disks/CD: $10.00 for each
## Summary of Fees for Information Requests Under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act

### Fee Charges for Requests for Personal Information

- **Application Fee**: $5.00 to be paid when you submit your request;
- **Photocopying**: $0.20 per page
- **Computer Programming**: $15.00 per ¼ hour develop program to retrieve information
- **Disks/CD**: $10.00 for each

You will be given a fee estimate if anticipated fees are $25.00 or more. If the estimate of fees to be paid is $100.00 or more, you may be required to pay a 50% deposit. Please note that the fee charges are prescribed by section 45 of the *Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* and section 6 of the Regulations and Guidelines for Municipalities and Local Boards. All monies are payable by cash, money order or certified cheque only.

Please forward your request and the $5.00 application fee, directly to the MFIPPA Core Office, Corporate Services, Secretariat Services Branch, 110 Laurier Avenue West, Ottawa, ON K1P 1J1, Telephone: 580-2424, Ext. 21898.
## APPENDIX 3

### FACILITIES WITH CCTV CAMERAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hintonburg CC</td>
<td>1064 Wellington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dempsey CC</td>
<td>1895 Russell Rd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanata Leisure Centre</td>
<td>70 Aird Pl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlington CC</td>
<td>1520 Caldwell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potvin Arena</td>
<td>513 Sheffield Rd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britannia Filtration Plant</td>
<td>2731 Cassels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lemieux Island</td>
<td>1 River Rd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clyde Ave.</td>
<td>951 Clyde Ave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Hall</td>
<td>110 Laurier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPS East Division</td>
<td>10th Line Rd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter D. Clark</td>
<td>7 &amp; 9 Meridian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMS Stores</td>
<td>530 Tremblay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Constellation</td>
<td>2 Constellation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telesat Court</td>
<td>1595 Telesat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routhier CC</td>
<td>172 Guiges St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROPEC</td>
<td>800 Green Creek Dr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sawmill Creek CC</td>
<td>3380 D’Aoust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepean Sportsplex</td>
<td>1701 Woodroffe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucester Splash Pool</td>
<td>2040 Ogilvie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orleans Rec Centre</td>
<td>1490 Youville Dr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackburn Arena</td>
<td>200 Glen Park Rd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackburn CC</td>
<td>200 Glen Park Rd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>735 Industrial Ave</td>
<td>735 Industrial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champagne Bath</td>
<td>321 King Edward Ave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loretta Ave.</td>
<td>175 Loretta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denis Coolican Building</td>
<td>495 Richmond Rd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Shelter</td>
<td>2980 Carling Ave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Shelter</td>
<td>159 Forward Ave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manotick Depot</td>
<td>4244 Rideau Valley Dr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carp</td>
<td>Hwy. 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navan Memorial Arena</td>
<td>1295 Colonial Rd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maple Grove</td>
<td>1655 Maple Grove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swansea Garage</td>
<td>2799 Swansea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caldwell CC</td>
<td>1550 Caldwell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170 Castlefrank</td>
<td>170 Castlefrank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts Court</td>
<td>2 Daly Ave.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This list is subject to amendment, as required, by the Manager, Corporate Security.

## APPENDIX 4
SAMPLE OF WARNING SIGNS TO BE POSTED

24h

Information: 580-2580
APPENDIX B

9. UPDATES TO THE CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION (CCTV) POLICY

MODIFICATION DE LA POLITIQUE SUR LA TÉLÉVISION EN CIRCUIT FERMÉ (TVCF)

COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION

That Council approve the Closed Circuit Television Policy, as described in this report and set out in Document 1.

RECOMMANDATION DU COMITÉ

Que le Conseil approuve la Politique sur la télévision en circuit fermé décrite dans le présent rapport et jointe séparément (document 1).

DOCUMENTATION/DOCUMENTATION


2. Extract of draft Minutes, Community and Protective Services Committee, 17 May 2018.

   Extrait de l’ébauche du procès-verbal, Comité des services communautaires et de protection, le 17 mai 2018.

   Report to

   Rapport au:

   Community and Protective Services Committee Comité des services communautaires et de protection 17 May 2018 / 17 mai 2018

and Council
et au Conseil

23 May 2018 / 23 mai 2018

Submitted on May 10, 2018

Soumis le 10 mai 2018

Submitted by

Soumis par:

Pierre Poirier, Manager, Security and Emergency Management / Gestionnaire, Sécurité et Gestion des mesures d'urgence

Contact Person

Personne ressource:

Clayton Foster, Program Manager, Corporate Security / Gestionnaire de programme, Sécurité municipale

613-580-2424, ext./poste 24114, clayton.foster@ottawa.ca

Nicole Ward, Strategic Initiatives Project Officer, Business Support Services / Agent de projets, Initiatives stratégiques, Services de soutien aux activités 613-580-2424, ext./poste 12273, nicole.ward@ottawa.ca

Ward: CITY WIDE / À L'ÉCHELLE DE LA VILLE
File Number: ACS2018-EPS-GEN-0007

SUBJECT: Updates to the Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Policy
OBJET: Modification de la Politique sur la télévision en circuit fermé (TVCF)

REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

That the Community and Protective Services Committee recommend that Council approve the Closed Circuit Television Policy, as described in this report and set out in Document 1.

RECOMMANDATIONS DU RAPPORT
Que le Comité des services communautaires et de protection recommande au Conseil d’approuver la Politique sur la télévision en circuit fermé décrite dans le présent rapport et jointe séparément (document 1).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Council approved the original Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Policy in 2002. As such, the Updates to the Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Policy report will address specific issues, such as legislative changes, organizational changes, changes in technology, changes in business process and other administrative changes and clarifications.

The changes to the policy do not alter the intent of the policy and the majority are minor, administrative, and housekeeping in nature.

BACKGROUND

At its meeting of June 18, 2002 the former Corporate Services and Economic Development Committee approved the Proposed Closed Circuit Television Surveillance report (ACS2002-CRS-RPR-0051), which enacted the Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Surveillance policy. The CCTV policy aims to enhance security at City of Ottawa facilities while respecting privacy issues through compliance with the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (MFIPPA) and the Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) of Ontario’s Guidelines for the Use of Video Surveillance.

Since the enactment of the CCTV Policy in 2002, the policy has not been updated. Therefore, in 2015, the CCTV Policy was added to the Corporate Policy review work plan with the former Corporate Business Services. As a result, Corporate Security completed a best practice review and held stakeholder consultations with various administrators and end-users of CCTV Systems including the former Public Works, Transit Services, Community and Social Services and Parks, Recreation and Cultural Services departments prior to the 2016 re-alignment. In addition, Legal Services was consulted to ensure compliance with privacy legislation.

On 19 October 2016, Transit Commission approved the Surveillance System for Transit Network Access and Privacy Policy (ACS2016-TSD-OCT-0003). This policy has been expanded to encompass all CCTV cameras on Transit Services property and vehicles. Subsequently, in the review of this Corporate CCTV policy, staff reviewed the Surveillance System for Transit Network Access and Privacy Policy to ensure that where applicable, both policies aligned.

Furthermore, in 2018 staff worked closely with the Office of the City Clerk and Solicitor (Legal Services) in revising the CCTV Policy.
The revised CCTV Policy (attached as Document 1), provides the same safeguards as the original policy and further includes updates that reflect recent changes in legislation and guidelines, advances in technology, as well as changes to roles and responsibilities within the City’s organizational structure. The changes to the policy do not alter the intent of the policy and are minor, administrative, and housekeeping in nature.

DISCUSSION

The City of Ottawa is committed to balancing the safety and security benefits derived from the use of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) with an individual’s right to be free from invasion of privacy.

The City of Ottawa utilizes CCTV as one tool in its overall safety and security strategy. CCTV shall only be used where other measures designed to enhance security and safety are not feasible.

The CCTV policy is intended to govern the use of CCTV by the City of Ottawa in accordance with the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (MFIPPA) and the Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) of Ontario’s Guidelines for the Use of Video Surveillance. Specifically, the policy addresses requirements and responsibilities with respect to the installation of CCTV equipment and the collection, use, retention and disclosure of video-recorded personal information.

The CCTV Policy has been updated to reflect existing operations and align with current best practices, while capturing the feedback obtained through the stakeholder consultations.

Key Features of Policy Amendments

Staff worked with Legal Services to update the policy. Staff incorporated the policy into the new Corporate Administrative Policy Framework template, provided clarifications to language, and consolidated sections for simplicity. The changes to the policy do not alter the intent of the policy and are minor, administrative, and housekeeping in nature.

The key updates to the policy are summarized below (as compared to the original):

- Incorporated Transit Services, Surveillance System for Transit Network Access and Privacy Policy as it relates to Corporate CCTV policy, specifically by:
  - Incorporating a new heading “Viewing Live Video” which outlines restricted/authorized access to view live video from CCTV for operational purposes in the Security Operations Centre, the Emergency Operations Centre (when applicable), or by authorized staff at City facilities for security and safety purposes.
Incorporating a definition of “Special and Emergency Events” which describes both planned and unplanned events that occur within the City of Ottawa that have an impact on the City of Ottawa’s facilities.

• Incorporated a new section entitled “Purpose of Collection and Use of Information” to clarify the purpose of the CCTV system. While this was implied in the original policy, it was not explicitly stated.

• Incorporated the “Notice of Collection of Personal Information” into the body of the Policy. This was in the original policy as Appendix 5.

• Clarified the updated retention period and how a record is created.

• Incorporated a new section entitled “Disclosure of Images or Recordings” that restricts the internal sharing of video images and recordings to authorized City employees. Further, that such sharing shall only be with respect to the investigation of particular safety and security events. This is a long-standing operational requirement, and was addressed in the original policy, yet, it has been updated for clarity and ease of reference.

• Updated to reflect the 2009 transfer of responsibility for Corporate Security from Real Property Asset Branch to the Security and Emergency Management (SEM) branch of the Emergency and Protective Services department.

• Updated and clarified the roles and responsibilities of the Manager, SEM, the Program Manager, Corporate Security and Authorized Personnel.

• Updated the applicable legislative and administrative authorities.

• Incorporated a definition of a City of Ottawa facility, as this policy relates to City facilities only.

• Removed Appendix 2 Access/Correction Form and Appendix 3 Facilities with CCTV Cameras, as these are no longer accurate or valid.

Through stakeholder consultations, it was also noted that the CCTV policy does not apply to City of Ottawa traffic cameras that are operated by Traffic Services, or CCTV equipment located on Transit properties and vehicles that are operated by Transit Services, both within the Transportation Services department. Previously, Transit Services utilized the 2002 Closed Circuit Television Policy and their own Access and Privacy Policy Surveillance System for Transit Buses for all on-board video surveillance
systems that was approved by Transit Commission in 2014. The new Surveillance System for Transit Network Access and Privacy Policy has taken effect (ACS2016-TSD-OCT-0003), and Transit Services will no longer use this corporate policy. Previously, these exemptions were implied in the original policy but not stated; therefore, the policy was updated to explicitly state the exemptions.

Future Policy Review

The Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) policy is administrative and governed by the Corporate Administrative Policy Framework. As per the established framework, the authority for approval of any future updates to the CCTV Policy will reside with the General Manager, Emergency and Protective Services department and will be reviewed at a minimum of every four years.

RURAL IMPLICATIONS

There are no rural implications associated with this report.

CONSULTATION

There was no public consultation required, as the policy and report are administrative and/or housekeeping amendments.

The Office of the City Clerk and Solicitor (Legal Services); Recreation, Cultural and Facility Services; Public Works and Environmental Services, Community and Social Services, Transportation Services; and Emergency and Protective Services were consulted on the proposed revisions to the policy.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE(S) COMMENTS

There are no comments from any Advisory Committee associated with this report.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

There are no legal impediments associated with the recommendation of this report. The proposed CCTV policy meets the requirements of applicable Provincial legislation, and provides a comprehensive framework for both access to information and protection of privacy obligations relating to the operation of the CCTV system.

RISK MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS

The updated CCTV Policy is in accordance with the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (MFIPPA) and the Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) of Ontario’s Guidelines for the Use of Video Surveillance, as well as other applicable legislation.

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS
There are no financial implications associated with this report.

ACCESSIBILITY IMPACTS

There are no accessibility impacts associated with this report.

TERM OF COUNCIL PRIORITIES

This report supports the 2014-2018 Term of Council Priorities of Healthy and Caring Communities priority that provides "healthy, safe, secure, accessible and inclusive places and services", as well as the Governance, Planning and Decision-Making priority providing "measurable improvement in residents' level of trust in how the City is governed and managed".

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION

Document 1: Closed Circuit Television Policy (Held on file with the City Clerk)

DISPOSITION

Upon approval, the Closed Circuit Television Policy (attached as Document 1) will supersede the previous version of the Closed Circuit Television Policy.

APPENDIX 5

MFIPPA Collection Notice – Required under s. 29(2) of MFIPPA - to be placed in publicly available locations such as City’s external website, client service centers, information desks, reception desks, or other accessible locations in all City facilities which use CCTV

“The facilities listed below are being monitored by the City of Ottawa’s CCTV Security System, pursuant to s. 191 (6) of the Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.M.45, as amended, and s. 25(2)(h) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.O.1, as amended. Personal information collected through the CCTV Security System will be used to monitor activities in and around City of Ottawa facilities to ensure the safety and security of users of, and visitors to, these facilities. Questions concerning the CCTV Security System may be addressed to: the Manager, Corporate Security, [insert full telephone number], [insert full address]. Further information concerning the City of Ottawa’s CCTV Security System is available in the Closed Circuit Television Policy, Security Procedures, CCTV Use, dated ________, City of Ottawa Corporate Policy Manual.”
APPENDIX C

Document 1

Closed Circuit Television Policy

Policy Statement

The City of Ottawa is committed to balancing the safety and security benefits derived from the use of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) with an individual’s right to be free from invasion of privacy.

The City of Ottawa utilizes CCTV as one tool in its overall safety and security strategy. CCTV shall only be used where other measures designed to enhance security and safety are not feasible.

Purpose

This Policy is intended to govern the use of CCTV by the City of Ottawa in accordance with the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (MFIPPA) and the Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) of Ontario’s Guidelines for the Use of Video Surveillance. Specifically, this Policy addresses requirements and responsibilities with respect to the installation of CCTV equipment and the collection, use, retention and disclosure of video-recorded personal information.

Application

This Policy applies to all City Ottawa employees, contractors, and agents who procure, install, use and/or operate CCTV equipment at any property owned or operated by the City of Ottawa.

This Policy does not apply to City of Ottawa traffic cameras that are operated by Traffic Services, or CCTV equipment located on Transit properties and vehicles that are operated by Transit Services, both within the Transportation Services department.

Policy Requirements

Use of CCTV System

CCTV Equipment is any physical, mechanical, electronic, digital or wireless device or apparatus such as cameras, monitors and recording devices used to observe and/or record actions or events in a certain area.

The use and installation of any City of Ottawa CCTV system consists of the process described below.
Purposes of Collection and Use of Information

The City of Ottawa utilizes CCTV in its overall strategy for the safety and security of all City of Ottawa employees, clients, residents, visitors, and property. CCTV, when properly deployed, is effective in ensuring a safe and secure environment at City of Ottawa property.

Post-event, the City of Ottawa may use CCTV recordings to assist with the investigation and resolution of the full spectrum of facility related incidents, claims and complaints and to assist with responding to requests from law enforcement agencies that are for evidentiary or investigative purposes.

Design and Installation

The Program Manager, Corporate Security prior to the installation of any CCTV equipment, must approve a completed Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA). PIAs are required to identify and mitigate potential privacy risks. They include a determination of the camera’s field of view and confirm that security counter measures/tools other than the use of cameras have been considered and determined to be impractical.

Field of View

The field of view captured by cameras will be determined on the basis of reasonable and justifiable grounds for the provision of safety and security. CCTV equipment shall not be positioned in a manner that allows viewing into areas where individuals generally have a higher expectation of privacy, such as washrooms, change rooms and private buildings. Furthermore, video monitors shall not be located in an area that enables viewing by the general public.

Any alteration of a camera’s field of view must be approved by the Program Manager, Corporate Security.

Securing Video Recording Equipment

Video recording equipment shall be secured to prevent unauthorized access in accordance with the City of Ottawa Information Security Policy and the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario’s Guidelines for the Use of Video Surveillance.

Hours of Operation

CCTV may be in operation at any time. While CCTV cameras are continuously recording, they are only periodically monitored by Authorized Personnel.

Notice of Collection of Personal Information
Notification to the public of the use of CCTV shall be provided by ensuring:

1) Signs are posted at all entrances to areas under CCTV to provide the public with reasonable notice that CCTV is or may be in operation. Refer to Appendix A: Sample CCTV Sign.

2) The following written notice is posted on the City of Ottawa website. Notification – City of Ottawa CCTV

The use of a Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) system is undertaken in accordance with the City of Ottawa’s CCTV Policy. Personal information is collected for security purposes in and around facilities that are operated by the City of Ottawa to ensure the safety and security of users and visitors. CCTV cameras are continuously recording but only periodically monitored by Authorized Personnel.

Further information concerning the use of CCTV is available in the City of Ottawa Closed Circuit Television Policy and by contacting the Program Manager, Corporate Security at 613-580-2580, 110 Laurier Avenue West, Ottawa, ON K1P 1J1.

Retention and Disposal of CCTV Recordings and Records

CCTV Recordings

CCTV recordings shall be retained for up to 30 days from the date of collection. The recordings will automatically be overwritten (erased) after the 30-day period. The City of Ottawa shall not retain CCTV recordings beyond 30 days except in circumstances where the City has created a Record in accordance with this Policy, including in response to a request for disclosure or retention.

CCTV Records

Records from CCTV recordings shall only be created in respect to security and safety incidents, or in response to a request for preservation or disclosure. Records shall be retained in accordance with the retention period specified in the applicable schedule under the Records Retention and Disposition By-law. All Records shall be retained and disposed of in accordance with the Records Management Policy and Procedures.

Access to Equipment, Images or Recordings

Access to CCTV Equipment, images, and recordings shall be restricted to Authorized Personnel for purposes that are consistent with the purposes of collection and use only.

Control and Responsibility of Records
All City Ottawa employees, contractors, and agents acknowledge that all records created or used by the CCTV system are under the control of the City of Ottawa and are subject to the provisions of applicable legislation.

Viewing Live Video

Access to live video from CCTV cameras for operational purposes is restricted to Authorized Personnel at the Security Operations Centre (SOC) or at authorized city facilities.

The viewing of live video during Special and Emergency Events may also occur within a secure location, and may include authorized external stakeholders and City of Ottawa staff, as required.

Disclosure of Images or Recordings

The City of Ottawa shall not disclose CCTV images or recordings to any individual or organization except:

a) Internally within the City of Ottawa to authorized staff for purposes that are consistent with the purposes for collection and use of CCTV images or recordings such as in respect of security and safety incidents or in respect of facility related incidents, claims and complaints.

b) To a member of the public for access to records obtained through the use of CCTV upon receipt of a written request to the Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) Office. Individuals must complete the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (MFIPPA) - Access/Correction Form that is available at ottawa.ca.

c) To a law enforcement agency in Canada as requested for evidentiary or investigative purposes. The records may be released upon submission of a Disclosure of Personal Information to a Law Enforcement Officer form.

d) As otherwise permitted or required by the application of MFIPPA or other legislation.

Authorized Personnel shall document all instances where CCTV recordings are preserved as a Record in accordance with this policy, disclosed internally to authorized staff within the City of Ottawa, and/or disclosed externally. These entries shall detail the requesting staff name, other parties involved, date, time and activity that had occurred. This information shall remain in a secure location and shall be restricted to Authorized Personnel.

Unauthorized Access and/or Disclosure (Privacy Breach)
A City employee or contractor who becomes aware of any unauthorized access, disclosure, use, copying, modification or destruction of any record that contains personal information shall immediately notify the Program Manager, Corporate Security. The Program Manager, Corporate Security shall investigate any instances of unauthorized access or disclosure of personal information and mitigate the extent of the privacy breach with assistance from the City’s ATIP Office.

Responsibilities

Manager, Security and Emergency Management is responsible for:

Reviewing this Policy every three (3) years after it is approved in accordance with the City of Ottawa Corporate Administrative Policy Framework.

Program Manager, Corporate Security is responsible for:

The procurement, installation, use and/or operation of CCTV equipment at properties owned and operated by the City of Ottawa;

Developing specific procedures and practices for the administration of CCTV to ensure compliance with the requirements set out in this Policy;

Ensuring that the design and installation of all CCTV equipment meets the requirements set out in this Policy;

Ensuring that CCTV equipment is functioning properly at all times;

Ensuring that recorded CCTV footage is only accessed and used for its originally intended purpose;

Perform annual reviews of all CCTV systems to determine whether their installation and continued use is still justified in accordance with the requirements under FIPPA and MFIPPA;

Complying with a requirement disclose information pursuant to MFIPPA or other applicable legislation;

Investigating any instances of unauthorized access or disclosure of personal information and mitigating the extent of the privacy breach with assistance from the City’s ATIP Office;

Ensuring compliance with this Policy.

Authorized Personnel whose duties require them to operate CCTV equipment or access CCTV information and records are responsible for:
Ensuring that personal information is only accessed for the purposes set out in this Policy;

Ensuring that the appropriate documentation is completed any time CCTV information is accessed or disclosed;

Responding to law enforcement agency requests Ensuring compliance with this Policy.

Monitoring/Contraventions

This Policy shall be monitored by the Manager, Security and Emergency Management. The Manager, Security and Emergency Management shall investigate and address any possible or founded contraventions of this Policy and related legislation. Failure to comply with this Policy may result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment or contract.

References

Discipline Policy, City of Ottawa, July 27, 2001, as amended

Guidelines for Overt Video Surveillance in the Private Sector, Privacy Commissioner of Canada, March 2008

Information Security Policy, City of Ottawa, August 29, 2011, as amended

Records Management Policy, City of Ottawa, June 6, 2003, as amended

Records Management Procedures, City of Ottawa, June 6, 2003, as amended

Responsible Computing Policy, City of Ottawa, August 13, 2001, as amended

Legislative and Administrative Authorities

City of Ottawa Records Retention and Disposition By-law 2003-527, as amended

Guidelines for the Use of Video Surveillance, Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, October 2015, or as amended

Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.M.56

Definitions

Authorized Personnel: City of Ottawa employees, contractors and agents whose duties require them to operate CCTV equipment and/or access CCTV information and records.
CCTV: A Closed Circuit Television system in which video signals are transmitted from one or more cameras by a cable to restricted digital video recorders.

CCTV Equipment: Any physical, mechanical, electronic, digital or wireless device or apparatus such as cameras, monitors and recording devices used to observe and/or record actions or events in a certain area.

Design: To plan for the installation of CCTV equipment; includes equipment and camera location(s) and positioning.

Facility: Buildings that are leased or owned by the City of Ottawa out of which employees work.

Personal Information: Defined by Section 2(1) of MFIPPA as recorded information about an identifiable individual which includes, but is not limited to, information relating to an individual’s race, colour, national or ethnic origin, sex and age. If a video system displays these characteristics of an identifiable individual or the activities in which he or she is engaged, its contents will be considered “personal information” under MFIPPA.

Record: A record is created any time information collected through CCTV has been preserved electronically or otherwise. It includes CCTV recordings or images that have been saved to a computer, a computer disk (CD), a USB flash drive or any other device used to store or transfer information or images captured by CCTV equipment.

Special and Emergency Events: Both planned and unplanned events that occur within the City of Ottawa that have an impact on the City of Ottawa’s Facilities. Special events include such activities as Canada Day celebrations, sporting events, festivals. Emergency events include traffic disruptions, failure of infrastructure, unplanned construction, protests and emergency situations.

Keywords

ATIP
Access
Assessment
CCTV

Closed Circuit Television
Collection
Disclosure
MFIPPA
Information
Investigation
Personal Information
Privacy
Safety
Security

Enquiries

For more information on this Policy, contact:

Program Manager, Corporate Security
Tel: 613-580-2580

Appendices

1) Appendix 1: Sample CCTV Sign
2) Appendix 2: Disclosure of Personal Information to Law Enforcement Officer Form

Appendix 1: Sample CCTV Sign

Appendix 2: Disclosure of Personal Information to Law Enforcement Officer Form

Record of Disclosure to Law Enforcement Agency
Disclosure Information *(Print information)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Law Enforcement Officer</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Badge Number</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Record Being Seized</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Report #</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Record Sought</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By signing below, the representative of the law enforcement agency certifies that the record(s) sought are required by the named law enforcement agency to aid in an investigation undertaken with a view to a law enforcement proceeding or from which a law enforcement proceeding is likely to result.

**After Use Record Shall Be (Please check appropriate)**

- Destroyed: ☐
- Returned: ☐

Disclosure Record *(Printed name and signature)*

Date: ____________________________

Corporate Security Member
Printed Name:

Date: ____________________________

Law Enforcement Officer
Printed Name:
APPENDIX D

Chronology of CCTV Pilot Project

On July 3rd, 2019, Mayor Jim Watson asked Ottawa’s city manager to investigate the feasibility of the CCTV pilot project after several violent incidents occurred in the ByWard Market. On July 8th, 2019, City News interviewed Watson, discussing the purpose of the pilot project to deter violent crime (Vlasveld 2019). During this interview, Watson mentions that the city manager was asked to present a report to the city council on what the project would look like, where the funding would come from, and potential issues with privacy (Vlasveld 2019).

Over the summer, several news articles were published regarding the potential pilot project asking Ottawa residents whether they supported the implementation of open-street CCTV in the ByWard Market. This time was also when grassroots resistance began through publishing critical news articles and Twitter posts. Residents, activists, and scholars formed the Coalition Against More Surveillance (CAMS) to spread a message of grassroots resistance and advocacy for mutual aid initiatives (cams-ottawa.ca).

On October 16th, 2019, Anthony DiMonte, the Manager of Emergency and Protective Services for the City of Ottawa, sent a report to the city council regarding the pilot project. Within this report, the project's stated objectives would be to: “deter crime and anti-social behaviour; increase the perception of safety; and use camera images as evidence to identify suspects involved in criminal activities” (DiMonte 2019, 1). The report states that all objectives for the CCTV pilot project relate to criminal law enforcement. DiMonte indicates that per privacy considerations and the objectives as mentioned above, the pilot would be in the purview of the Ottawa Police Service; therefore, the OPS board
may consider a similar approach to Toronto and seek provincial funding to complete the mandatory Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) and for the pilot’s implementation (i.e. purchasing camera equipment, installation, signage). The PIA includes a review of privacy-related issues and a determination as to whether the proposed surveillance project is necessary under the circumstances. The City of Ottawa did not respond to any of my emails which inquired whether Ottawa’s surveillance project ever reached the stage of running a PIA.

This memo was posted onto Shawn Menard’s (Capital Ward City Councillor) Twitter page. If he had not posted this memo, it is possible the public would not have been informed that the surveillance project was now under the purview of the Ottawa Police Service.

On October 30th, 2019, a round-table meeting was held at Ottawa City Hall with city councillors, local scholars, local activists, the ByWard Market Business Improvement Association, and the Lowertown Community Association to have an open conversation on CCTV in Ottawa. During this meeting, local activists voiced their opinions that Ottawa should not implement this project, citing academic literature and concerns for the unhoused population in the ByWard Market.

After Fall 2019, the discussion of the CCTV Pilot Project halted in news media. However, in the April 2020, OPS released a report to OPSB regarding their response to proposed measures to curb gun violence in Ottawa, announcing their decision not to implement open-street CCTV as a crime-control tool (OPS 2020a). While OPS states they are not opposed to CCTV, the report states that “… they [CCTV cameras] have not been
proven to be an evidence-based best-practice for crime prevention (especially prevention of violent crimes)” (OPS 2020a, p.8).

In August 2020, the province of Ontario launched the CCTV Grant Program, where a total of $6 million in provincial funding will be used for policing services to implement or update their CCTV equipment, as part of the larger Guns and Gangs Strategy (news.ontario.com, August 10 2020). This announcement discussed how Ontario communities could use this funding to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic without fear of crime.

As of June 2022, there are no public CCTV cameras implemented in the ByWard Market.
APPENDIX E

This appendix is reserved for a discussion of the growth of CCTV in an international context.

Europe

The abduction of two-year-old Jamie Bulger in 1993 became sensationalized through massive publicity around the surveillance camera images of the crime (Norris 2012). Amid high levels of anxiety about rising crime, CCTV was presented as a magic solution (Norris 2012)\(^65\).

In the 1990s, Austria and Denmark had no open-street CCTV systems, and Norway only had one (consisting of 6 cameras), there were a minimum of 14 systems in Budapest and 15 in Germany; however, the UK had over 500 individual systems, meaning approximately 40,000 cameras monitoring public spaces (Norris 2012)\(^66\). By 2009, 21 mainland European countries had open-street CCTV systems as a crime prevention tool (Norris 2012). Although there is no official information on the number of camera systems in place, retailers indicate that in 2015, there was a 300% increase in the sale of public surveillance systems in Slovakia and the Czech Republic (Kovanić 2020).

Existing academic literature indicates that post-communist regions take a favourable view

\(^65\) The British government allocated close to £5 billion to support CCTV systems between 1992 and 2002 (Norris et al., 2004), and by 1995, CCTV accounted for 78 percent of the crime control budget (Williams and Johnstone 2000, 188-189). With the dramatic decrease in equipment price in the 1990s, the global CCTV market expanded swiftly, leading some countries to begin their first open-street CCTV program (Sutton & Wilson 2004).

\(^66\) The 7/7 bus and subway bombings in London, England, “further increased international interest in public-area CCTV surveillance, based on the indispensable role attributed to CCTV surveillance cameras in identifying the bombers” (Hier 2010, p.1).
towards surveillance technologies such as CCTV (Los 2002, 2010; Svenonius, Björklund & Waszkiewicz 2014).

In these contexts, the growth of CCTV in Europe ties back into sensationalized incidents reinforcing fear of crime (especially violence) and a turn towards risk management which has transformed crime-control techniques into an omnipresent watchful gaze. The relatively easy access to CCTV by private business owners, police services, and municipalities is one of the most transformative factors in increasing rates of CCTV.

**United States and South America**

In 1997, the first national survey for the use of CCTV was released in the USA; this survey found that only 13 police departments were using CCTV in public spaces; by 2001, the numbers rose to 25 (Nieto et al., 2002). Since the 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre, billions of government dollars have been used in the USA for domestic security projects, including the expansion of open-street CCTV (Norris 2012). In 2019, ShotSpotter Inc, the most well-known auto-steering (automatic point and zoom technology in direction of sound) camera systems, claimed they had active systems in 90 US cities (Skogan 2019).

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67 The widespread use of open-street CCTV and other surveillance technologies in the US is arguably due to after 9/11, the military propaganda fed to Americans encouraged fear of crime and fear of others, contributing to a widespread increase in surveillance initiatives across the country.

68 ShotSpotter systems are “couple fixed-base cameras with acoustic detectors capable of distinguishing between nearby gunshots and other routine city noises” (Skogan 2019, p.162). ShotSpotter promises to identify the locations of possible shootings more accurately than within citizens’ capabilities; however, previous research has shown mixed results (see Ratcliffe et al., 2018; Carr & Doleac 2016; Irvin-Erickson et al., 2017).
Ecuador is one of the first countries to purchase a country-wide digital surveillance system from Chinese Information Communication Technology (ICT) companies (Stryker 2021). Their system is built and operated by Huwaei and CEIEC, includes more than 4,000 cameras, 16 monitoring centres, thermal cameras, night vision drones, facial recognition, and artificial intelligence (Rollet 2018; Stryker 2021). In this context, open-street camera surveillance represents modernity and is an element of the overall surveillance assemblage (Haggerty & Ericson 2000).

Asia

The Gangnam district in Seoul, Korea, had a total of five CCTV cameras in 2002; by 2015, the entire country had a total of 141,687 CCTV cameras (Cho & Park 2017). In Seoul, the number had increased to 14,531 in 2012; by 2015, the number of cameras in Seoul soared to 27,694 (Cho & Park 2017).

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have all developed Safe City Projects in partnership with Chinese ICT companies, which use biometrics, facial recognition technology, and data management (Stryker 2021). Due to the data privacy legislation utilized by these Central Asian countries, alongside their histories of surveillance, demonstrates that the prolific use of camera surveillance is not motivated by sensationalized fear of crime. Instead, camera surveillance presents an opportunity for government relations to form, and for increased control subjected to citizens can be used to reinforce social order.

Africa
Very limited research has occurred on the proliferation of CCTV across the African continent. Whether this is due to limited research attention, or infrequent use of open-street surveillance is unknown.

The security industry in South Africa has grown tremendously since their first fully democratic election in 1994 (Minnaar 2010), prior to this election, security was managed through militarized policing. In the following years, rising levels of violent crime have emerged as a major challenge for South African state institutions and citizens. Due to the levels of violence, tough on crime initiatives has led to the exponential growth of security measures, including ‘security villages’ outfitted with CCTV (Minnaar 2010 p.211).
APPENDIX F

The CCTV Grant Program, which is part of Ontario’s Guns, Gangs, and Violence Reduction Strategy (GGVRS) offers funding for a year to successful applicants that can be re-applied for the following year (Ministry of Solicitor General 2020). Applicants are required to fund 50% of their project, and the ministry grant would be for the other half. The funding can reach a maximum of $200,000 (Ministry of Solicitor General 2020). A total of $6 million is allocated for this grant program over three fiscal years (2020-21 to 2022-23). This funding builds upon a recent investment of $75.1 million in 2021 to support gun and gang initiatives (Ontario Newsroom, November 16 2021). To date, approximately $187 million has been invested in Ontario to combat guns and gangs (Ontario Newsroom, January 25 2022). Municipal, First Nations, OPP contract and non-OPP contract policing services are eligible for this grant, and the funding is specifically allocated for CCTV cameras and their associated cost, including purchasing, installation, and software (Ministry of Solicitor General 2020).

Applicants must track and collect “the required provincially-identified outcomes” as well as have their own performance measures (Ministry of Solicitor General 2020, p.3). In addition to the provincially identified outcomes, applicants must also identify at least two local outcomes and their associated indicators. The accepted results by the province are in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Required Provincially Identified Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provincial Outcome</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease in Violent Crime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Decrease in Gun and Gang Activity | - Decrease in number of shootings in identified areas.  
|                                   | - Decrease in number of gang related activity in identified areas. |
| Increased use of CCTVs to address crime | - Number of cameras installed to date.  
|                                      | - Increase in number of potential suspects, victims or witnesses identified by CCTVs post-incident.  
|                                      | - Total number of downloads from designated cameras for investigative purpose.  
|                                      | - Increase in total number of charges laid for cases which there is CCTV video footage. |

(Ministry of Solicitor General 2020, p.4).

The CCTV Grant Program is specifically marketed towards deterring violent crime, yet CCTV is not effective in this area (Ratcliffe & Groff 2019). In the application guidelines and instructions, outcomes are defined as the “positive impacts or changes your activities are expected to make in your community” (Ministry of Solicitor General 2020, p.5). This language does not allow for the consideration that CCTV may contribute negative effects to communities. It is unclear if the grant program or if individual police services accounted for displacement for the first two outcomes when analysing crime statistics for their identified areas. The outcomes and indicators noted above are rooted in law-and-order ideology and operate within the reactive operational structure of modern policing.

The ‘increased use of CCTVs to address crime’ outcome demonstrates an important contradiction that raises questions regarding privacy. Using CCTV surveillance to gather personal information of victims and witnesses showcases that it is not solely those deemed ‘criminal’ that are subjected to this surveillance and non-consensual personal data collection. The indicators emphasize enforcement statistics, and say nothing
about the number of community members helped or the possibility that charges might be avoided due to informal resolution of issues while avoiding criminalizing people.

**CCTV Grant Recipients**

In 2020-2021, the Ontario CCTV Grant Initiative funded 18 CCTV surveillance initiatives for Ontario policing services, and in 2021-2022, the provincial funding was allocated for 9 CCTV surveillance initiatives for Ontario policing services.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police Service and Program Name</th>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Ministry Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Barrie Police Service:</strong></td>
<td>BPS will replace obsolete equipment and install additional CCTV surveillance cameras in areas of Barrie’s downtown core that have become a growing concern for gang-related activity, including human trafficking. The data collected using the CCTV technology will help BPS’ investigators determine where criminal activity is taking place, identify victims of human trafficking and rescue these individuals.</td>
<td>$170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brantford Police Service:</strong></td>
<td>Funding will be used to design and install a brand-new CCTV surveillance system in Brantford’s downtown and surrounding areas. With the new system, Brantford Police Service and their partners hope to deter crime and provide police with a tool to assist in identifying violent criminals.</td>
<td>$123,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chatham-Kent Police Service:</strong></td>
<td>The Chatham-Kent Police Service and municipal partners are joining forces to</td>
<td>$37,993.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Strategy/Program</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cobourg Police Service:</td>
<td>Next Generation Community Safety Strategy</td>
<td>The new CCTV system will provide an integrated and scalable solution to address Cobourg’s community safety needs. As part of their Next Generation Community Safety Strategy, the system will help deter violent crime, provide a reliable investigative tool to police and support effective prosecutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durham Regional Police Service:</td>
<td>Targeting Guns, Gangs and Violence Through CCTV Program</td>
<td>The grant will help DRPS fund a three-pronged CCTV initiative which aims to deter violence, help protect victims of gun and gang violence and improve overall community safety. Cameras will be strategically deployed based on current crime trends and identified hot spots of gang and gun violence. Durham’s improved CCTV system will allow the DRPS to gather video evidence that can be used to support both investigations and criminal prosecutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Sudbury Police Services Board:</td>
<td>Project Gateway</td>
<td>The Greater Sudbury Police Service will expand its CCTV surveillance system in areas where there has been an increasing number of gun and gang-related incidents associated with drug and alcohol abuse.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
human trafficking. The CCTV technology will also help with the seizure of illegal drugs, prohibited firearms and proceeds of crime. The evidence collected through Greater Sudbury’s CCTV surveillance system will assist other police services’ investigations due to the multi-jurisdictional nature of gang-related activities.

<p>| <strong>Hamilton Police Service:</strong> Mobile CCTV Equipment | Funding will be used to deploy additional mobile CCTV surveillance cameras in areas that have been identified as gang activity hot spots in Hamilton. The intelligence gained through the use of mobile CCTV surveillance system will be used to identify gang associates and provide intelligence on the criminal operations of street gangs, organized crime groups or any individual committing violent firearm offences. | $35,000 |
| <strong>Kawartha Lakes Police Service:</strong> City of Kawartha Lakes Police Service Partnership with Kawartha Lakes Haliburton Housing Corporation | Funding will support the purchase and installation of new CCTV cameras across Kawartha Lakes Haliburton Housing Corporation’s (KLHHC) properties in Lindsay that currently have no or very limited CCTV surveillance capacity. KLHHC-owned properties in Lindsay have experienced an increasing number of hostile unit takeovers, violent assaults and shooting incidents. This project will help detect, identify and apprehend violent offenders | $19,125 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Niagara Regional Police Services: CCTV Expansion</strong></td>
<td>The Niagara Regional Police Service will expand CCTV surveillance capacity across the region where there is growing criminal activity, such as St. Catharines’s downtown core and the touristic part of Niagara Falls, which have been identified as new hot spots for gang activity. Evidence collected through CCTV coverage will provide patrol officers and investigators with real-time visual evidence to help detect and identify gang members and support the prosecution process.</td>
<td>$90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OPP Headquarters – Huronia West Detachment: Town of Wasaga Beach New CCTV System for Town’s West End</strong></td>
<td>In partnership with the Town of Wasaga Beach, the Huronia West Detachment of the OPP’s Central Region will expand CCTV surveillance capacity to the town’s west end, which has been the scene of increasing gun and gang violence. The goal of the initiative is to prevent crime, identify offenders and hold them accountable by providing relevant video evidence to police investigators to support both the investigation and prosecution processes.</td>
<td>$22,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OPP Kenora: City of Kenora Camera Upgrade</strong></td>
<td>The project will support the expansion of Kenora’s CCTV surveillance system to areas of the city that are underserviced and have been reporting high-crime rates. Funding will also allow for</td>
<td>$50,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
an upgrade of storage and downloading technology. The expanded surveillance system will help police swiftly identify crime suspects, conduct missing and vulnerable persons investigations and present the best possible evidence in court prosecutions.

<p>| OPP Quinte West: Expansion of Quinte West CCTV Program | OPP Quinte West will use the funding to expand CCTV surveillance capacity in areas of Quinte West outside the downtown core and high-traffic areas that are not currently covered by cameras. The additional cameras will increase CCTV coverage and give local police the tools they need to detect and identify individuals involved in criminal activity as well as investigate and prosecute them. The project will also help deter violent criminals from entering densely-populated areas and increase community safety overall. | $200,000 |
| Peel Regional Police: Peel CCTV Guns, Gangs, and Violence Reduction Strategy | Funding will help expand CCTV surveillance capacity along Highways 410 and 403 to reach optimal coverage of both of these major transportation arteries. Incidents occurring on these two highways have been closely linked to gun and gang violence and organized crime activities, putting the safety of every day citizens at risk. Optimal surveillance of Highways 410 and 403 will help the police intervene in an expeditious manner and | $150,000 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sault Ste. Marie Police Service</strong>: Sault Ste. Police Services – Community Mobilization</td>
<td>To address this growing issue of gun, drug and human trafficking in Northern Ontario, Sault Ste. Marie Police Service will install a state-of-the-art Automated License Plate Recognition system at key points on the region’s highways that will allow for the monitoring of gang movements. The information gathered will provide the police with the knowledge of gang member activities in Sault Ste. Marie as well as their continued travel, both north and east, assisting other police agencies across the province.</td>
<td>$28,797.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>St. Thomas Police Service</strong>: Project CCTV St. Thomas: A Progressive CCTV Surveillance Initiative</td>
<td>Grant funding will help set up St. Thomas’s new CCTV surveillance system at several strategic locations in the downtown core. The new system will enhance already-existing investigation and intelligence gathering programs in the city as well as improve both community safety and the desirability of St. Thomas as a place for shopping, business and leisure.</td>
<td>$87,047.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thunder Bay Police Service</strong>: Eye on The Street</td>
<td>Grant funding will help upgrade and expand Thunder Bay’s existing CCTV system, to include the latest technology to meet the pressures of modern police operations. The project will increase surveillance capacity in top priority areas</td>
<td>$200,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
where drug trafficking has become a growing issue and enable officers to identify, prevent and respond to increased gun and gang-related criminal activity.

| Timmins Police Service: Operation “Oversight” | Operation “Oversight” seeks to expand Timmins’s currently-existing CCTV surveillance system to areas of the city that have presented persistent problems with drug trafficking, drug use, violent crime, and human trafficking. Cameras will be installed at strategic locations to capture video footage, identify criminals, and deter gun, gang, and violent activities in these areas. | $25,000 |
| Windsor Police Service: City of Windsor Traffic Camera Project | With the funding, Windsor Police Service will expand CCTV surveillance coverage in the City of Windsor’s downtown core by adding new modern digital cameras to the network and replacing older ones. Many of the new camera installations will provide multi-directional views at key intersections. This project will significantly increase the traffic camera coverage in the city and the quality of the captured video, as well as help deter gun and gang violence and support both the investigation and prosecution processes. | $142,650 |

<p>| Barrie Police Service: Project Lima | Barrie’s downtown core has faced an increase in criminality, including gun and gang-related violence in recent years. To address the | $200,000 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Durham Regional Police Service:</strong> Overt Community Camera Project</th>
<th>Overt public cameras are video cameras which are placed in a way that is noticeable to the public. They are becoming an increasingly critical surveillance tool to identify crime and gun and gang suspects. The DRPS is looking to create partnerships with its municipal community partners to support the placement of additional overt public cameras in public spaces.</th>
<th>$170,091.50</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gananoque Police Service:</strong> Project Gateway</td>
<td>Organized crime activity, human trafficking, escalating illegal drug use and trafficking are among the public safety issues that have been on the rise in Gananoque in recent years. The GPS will establish a CCTV presence across the city to gain intelligence on the movement of suspects in and out of town. By</td>
<td>$51,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Niagara Regional Police Service: Guns and Gang Violence Reduction Strategy</strong></td>
<td>acquiring CCTV equipment that will be strategically placed across town, GPS will be able to capture critical footage to play a crucial role in identifying suspects and detecting criminal activity.</td>
<td>$48,691.88</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nishnawbe Aski Police Service: Project Vision</strong></td>
<td>St. Catharines and Niagara Falls have become hot spots for criminal activity as a growing number of Greater Toronto Area (GTA) gangs engage in illicit activity in the Niagara Region. The expansion of CCTV capacity and coverage will help NRPS to identify these individuals, gather license plate numbers and bring them to justice.</td>
<td>$6047.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OPP Bracebridge Detachment Town of Gravenhurst: OPP CCTV Project 2021-2022</strong></td>
<td>This partnership between Gravenhurst and the Ontario Provincial Police Bracebridge Detachment will expand CCTV surveillance into Muskoka Road and Gull Lake Park where there are currently no cameras. This funding will support the purchase of approximately 60 outdoor bullet and eyeball cameras to help police detect and deter crime before it is committed and expedite investigations.</td>
<td>$50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OPP Fort Frances: Fort Frances Downtown Core Video Surveillance Upgrade</strong></td>
<td>Fort Frances’s existing video surveillance system is decentralized, obsolete and does not adequately address the city’s current community safety concerns of increased criminal activity. Drug-related occurrences have almost doubled from 2019 to 2020. In partnership with the</td>
<td>$170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Toronto Police Service:</strong> Increasing CCTV Capacity</td>
<td>municipality, the Fort Frances OPP detachment will replace the existing, standalone video surveillance cameras with a centralized system, expand video surveillance capacity throughout Fort Frances’s downtown core, and make surveillance files easily available and accessible to the OPP.</td>
<td>$200,000</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Windsor Police Service:</strong> City of Windsor Traffic Camera Project</td>
<td>The WPS began to modernize the Windsor traffic camera system in 2020. It replaced its camera management system and storage to provide a modern digital traffic camera network. Funding will be</td>
<td>$200,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
used to add 30 to 40 new digital cameras to the network in 2021 and replace 15 to 20 failing analog cameras with new digital cameras. CCTV technology will be crucial in combatting criminal activity and gun trafficking.

(Government of Ontario 2021; 2022).
APPENDIX G

The following is an overview of OPS’s funding and community policing initiatives to provide further context to the discussion of the service’s considerations for implementing open-street CCTV as a crime-control measure.

The 2015 annual report issued by OPS includes a discussion of funding partnerships and grants received by the service. This report states that OPS received $105,188 CAD from the Provincial Electronic Surveillance Equipment Program (PESEDP) (OPS 2015). In 2016, 2017, and 2018, the annual reports indicate that OPS received the same funding from PESEDP (OPS 2016; OPS 2017; OPS 2018). However, in each report, there was very limited discussion of what the funding should be used for, with only the following quote as an explanation (the same quote appeared in all reports) for the use of the funding; “PESEDP funds activities directed at organized and serious crime, and initiatives focused on proceeds of crime” (OPS 2015, p.53; OPS 2016, p.73; OPS 2017, p.51; OPS 2018, p. 59). In the 2020 annual report, the funding was lowered to $94,725 (with same explanation as quote above) (OPS 2020b). In general, what this funding is used for remains a mystery.

Several community policing practices aside from CCTV were examined by OPS as possible tools to reduce gun violence in Ottawa. These practices included the Community Safety and Wellbeing Plan (CSWB), Integrated Neighborhood Service Teams (INST), Neighborhood Resource Teams (NRT), and Neighborhood Engagement Safety Tables (NEST) (OPS 2020a).

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69 It is unclear if this funding was received in 2019 as the annual report for this calendar year is inaccessible on the OPS website, and when I sent emails asking for a PDF copy, there was no response.
Ottawa’s 2021-2031 Community Safety and Well-being Plan

This plan focuses on cross-sectoral approaches to community safety issues through a collaborative approach between the City, social services, police partners, and community agencies (OPS 2020a). It is designed to develop cooperative solutions to the challenges within Ottawa’s communities.

In March 2020, the city of Ottawa began community engagement efforts to better understand safety and well-being priorities of Ottawa residents to begin creating the CSWB plan (Community Safety and Well-Being Plan – News and Updates, 2022). The City began Phase 1 of community engagement between March 3rd and June 30th 2020, through online surveys, discussion forums, community toolkit submissions, emails, councillor meetings, and in-person and virtual consultations with Ottawa residents (Community and Protective Services Committee 2020). This engagement process spanned both the first wave of COVID-19, and the ascendancy of the Black Lives Matter and Defund the Police movements after the murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis police (Community and Protective Services Committee 2020). The City of Ottawa, along with the CSWB advisory committee, identified 20 topic areas to help direct the priority setting phase, with the potential topics being:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CSWB Topics for Consideration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and Skills Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Social/Positive Behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Environment and Neighborhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street Level Violence and Gang Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systems Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Community and Protective Services Committee 2020, p.68).

From their phase 1 and 2 of community engagement, six priority safety and well-being issues were presented, including: 1) discrimination, marginalization, and racism; 2) Financial security and poverty reduction; 3) Gender-based violence and violence against women; 4) Housing; 5) Mental well-being; 6) Integrated and simpler systems (Community and Protective Services Committee 2020). Worth noting is that street level violence and gang activity was not considered a priority issue by the respondents, ranking only 3.58% in engagement activities (Community and Protective Services Committee 2020). On October 27th, 2021, the City of Ottawa’s CSWB plan was officially approved by city council.

The CSWB plan report includes a list of all related initiatives, with none relating to implementing open-street CCTV; however, both INSTs and NRTs were listed as supporting initiatives (Emergency and Protective Services 2021). Further distance from camera surveillance is evident in the strategies to reduce gender-based violence and violence against women, which includes helping survivors, increasing awareness, education, and access to supports, and increasing capacity for community accountability.
measures (Emergency and Protective Services 2021). Regarding the issue of homelessness and housing, Council declared a Homelessness Emergency and Affordable Housing Crisis on January 29, 2020 and a 10 year Homelessness Plan was created. The CSWB plan works alongside the Homelessness Plan to address the current housing crisis in Ottawa.

*Integrated Neighborhood Service Teams*

These teams were first developed in the Fall of 2019. Their mandates were “to maximize the impact of community development efforts for neighbourhoods and individuals facing the most complex needs. INSTs are designed to identify and address service gaps, break down navigational barriers, and improve the coordination and delivery of City services and infrastructures” (OPS 2020a, p.5).

*Neighbourhood Engagement Safety Tables*

As of 2021, the OPS is developing a new service-delivery model to support the City of Ottawa’s CSWB and the OPS NRT program (OPS 2020a). NEST is developed based on research that promotes “hub” systems as a best practice for policing and communities to improve community safety, crime prevention, and well-being (OPS 2020a). The NEST strategy is designed to be embedded within the City’s CSWB plan to ensure understanding amongst the City’s agencies and the networks of community-based organizations. For OPS, the NESTs “would be implemented in each of our six NRT neighbourhoods to allow our [OPS’s] NRTs to work in a more coordinated and collaborative way with local community stakeholders to reassure, revitalize, and build resiliency at the individual/family, neighbourhood and community levels” (OPS 2020a, p. 7).
**Neighborhood Resource Teams**

NRTs were designed to increase the police presence in specifically assigned neighbourhoods, while also improving the ability for OPS to assess and address the communities’ concerns regarding social disorder and crime. NRTs were first launched in October 2019 in three prioritized areas: Vanier/Overbrook, Heron Gate/South End, and Carlington/Caldwell. In 2020, OPS doubled the number of NRTs to three additional neighbourhoods: ByWard Market/Lowertown (May 2020), Centretown (Fall 2020), and Bayshore (Fall 2020) (OPS 2020a). NRTs are exclusively for their assigned neighbourhoods for a minimum of two years to build rapport and strengthen relationships within the community. The officers assigned to these teams have undergone specialized training, including specific cultural training. NRTs work alongside community partners, leaders, and stakeholders – including “residents, not-for-profit organizations, business associations, and city staff – to enhance safety initiatives using an approach tailored to each community’s needs” (OPS 2020a, p.7). NRTs were also to include dedicated School Resource Officers (SROs), Community Police Officers (CPOs), and traffic officers. However, in June 2021, the Ottawa-Carleton District School Board (OCDSB) cut ties with the SRO program, issued an apology to any students that may have experienced harms due to the program, and issued a report directing the City of Ottawa to reallocate funds towards the creation of a mobile crisis team for youth, with no involvement from OPS (Williams 2021b). While NRTs are enforcing the law in their assigned community, their primary goals are centered on prevention and intervention (Carlington Community Association 2022).
APPENDIX H

Dr Justin Piché (University of Ottawa) and Dr Aaron Doyle (Carleton University) founded the Criminalization and Punishment Education Project (CPEP), which aims to:

A) Make visible the harms of criminalization and punishment as responses to social conflicts and harms by privileging and establishing a dialogue between persons affected by state repression and researchers. B) Pursue research that informs political and social action to resist the punitive status quo. C) Challenge inequality, privilege and dominant social structures (e.g. capitalism, colonialism, racism, patriarchy, heteronormativity and ableism) that have a particularly negative impact on marginalized persons and groups. D) Reject efforts to further expand and entrench state repression and promote policy alternatives that are appropriate, effective, just, humane, and non-violent to this end. E) Build capacity and solidarity amongst CPEP members and allies in a manner that values contributions, challenges difference, and offers mutual support (CPEP, n.d).

This organization embodies progressive criminal justice ideology, and five of 11 participants were either members (3) or supporters (2) of the organization. The goals established by CPEP are the objectives of progressive criminal justice ideology and align with the resistance framing techniques used by CAMS activists and others in critical op-ed news articles on Ottawa’s Public Surveillance Project.
APPENDIX I

Informed Consent Form

1. Name and Contact Information of Researchers:
   
   Primary Researcher: Diana Cave, Carleton University, Department of Sociology and Anthropology
   Tel.: 613-668-1814
   Email: dianacave@cmail.carleton.ca

   Supervisor: Dr. Aaron Doyle, Carleton University, Department of Sociology and Anthropology
   Tel.: 613-520-2600 x1914
   Email: aaron.doyle@carleton.ca

2. Project Title


4. Carleton University Project Clearance

   Clearance #: 116136 Date of Clearance: 30 Aug 2021

5. Invitation

   You are invited to take part in a research project on the proposed introduction of public CCTV surveillance cameras in the ByWard Market, because you may be aware of or have a position on this initiative or be affected by it. The information in this form is intended to help you understand what we are asking of you so that you can decide whether you agree to participate in this study. Your participation in this study is voluntary, and a decision not to participate will not be used against you in any way. As you read this form, and decide whether to participate, please ask all the questions you might have, take whatever time you need, and consult with others as you wish.

6. What is the purpose of the study?

   This study aims to understand the factors that have led to the proposed introduction of public CCTV cameras in the ByWard Market, why and how do some people and organizations support the cameras, and why and how do some people and organizations oppose the cameras.
7. **What will I be asked to do?**

If you agree to take part in the study, we will ask you to: complete a 45-60-minute individual virtual interview via Zoom that is audio and video recorded.

8. **Risks and Inconveniences**

Interviews may expose you to very small personal, professional and emotional risks. It is possible that if your views were inadvertently made public, they might cause controversy. No participants will be named in any outputs from the research and we will take a number of steps to keep the data confidential as discussed below.

9. **Possible Benefits**

You may not receive any direct benefit from your participation in this study. However, your participation may help improve understandings of public controversies around CCTV and advance debate towards resolution of these issues.

10. **No waiver of your rights**

By signing this form, you are not waiving any rights or releasing the researchers from any liability.

11. **Withdrawing from the study**

If you withdraw your consent during the study, all information collected from you before your withdrawal will still be used, unless you request that it be removed from the study data.

After the study, you may request that your data be removed from the study and deleted by notice given to the Principal Investigator (named above) within 4 weeks of the interview date.

12. **Confidentiality**

We will remove all identifying information from the study data as soon as possible, which will be after the interview is completed and a transcription has been made using the audio recording. You will be assigned a pseudonym so that your identity will not be directly associated with the data you have provided. All data, including coded information, will be kept in a password-protected file on a secure computer.

We will treat your personal information as confidential, although absolute privacy cannot be guaranteed. No information that discloses your identity will be released or published without your specific consent. Research records may be accessed by the Carleton University Research Ethics Board-A to ensure continuing ethics compliance.

13. **Data Retention**

After the interview has been transcribed, your Zoom interview recording will be deleted. After the study is completed, your de-identified data will be retained for future research
use; in other words, your interview responses will be retained, but your name will not be identified or linked to these responses.

14. **New information during the study**
In the event that any changes could affect your decision to continue participating in this study, you will be promptly informed.

15. **Ethics review**
This project was reviewed and cleared by the Carleton University Research Ethics Board A. If you have any ethical concerns with the study, please contact Carleton University Research Ethics Board by email at ethics@carleton.ca.

16. **Statement of consent – print and sign name**
I voluntarily agree to participate in this study. ___Yes ___No
I agree to be (audio/video recorded/photographed …) ___Yes ___No

________________________
Signature of participant Date

**Research team member who interacted with the participant**
I have explained the study to the participant and answered any and all of their questions. The participant appeared to understand and agree. I provided a copy of the consent form to the participant for their reference.

________________________  __  ______________________
Signature of researcher  Date
17. CERTIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS CLEARANCE

The following research has been granted clearance by the Carleton University Research Ethics Board-A (CUREB-A). CUREB-A is constituted and operates in compliance with the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (TCPS2).

Ethics Clearance ID: Project # 116136

18. Project Team Members: Diana Cave (Primary Investigator)

Dr. Aaron Doyle (Research Supervisor) Prof. Valerie Steeves (Committee Member)

Study Title: Safety in Cameras? – CCTV policy, rhetoric, and resistance in Ottawa

Funding Source: (If applicable):

Effective: August 30, 2021
Expires: August 31, 2022

19. This certification is subject to the following conditions:

1. Clearance is granted only for the research and purposes described in the application.
2. Any modification to the approved research must be submitted to CUREB-A via a Change to Protocol Form. All changes must be cleared prior to the continuance of the research.
3. An Annual Status Report for the renewal or closure of ethics clearance must be submitted and cleared by the renewal date listed above. Failure to submit the Annual Status Report will result in the closure of the file. If funding is associated, funds will be frozen.

4. During the course of the study, if you encounter an adverse event, material incidental finding, protocol deviation or other unanticipated problem, you must complete and submit a Report of Adverse Events and Unanticipated Problems Form.

5. It is the responsibility of the student to notify their supervisor of any adverse events, changes to their application, or requests to renew/close the protocol.

6. Failure to conduct the research in accordance with the principles of the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans 2nd edition and the Carleton University Policies and Procedures for the Ethical Conduct of Research may result in the suspension or termination of the research project.

IMPORTANT: Special requirements for COVID-19:

If this study involves in-person research interactions with human participants, whether on- or off-campus, the following rules apply:

1. Upon receiving clearance from CUREB, please seek the approval of the relevant Dean for your research. Provide a copy of your CUREB clearance to the Dean for their records. Please contact your Dean's Office for more information about obtaining their approval. See Principles and Procedures for On-campus Research at Carleton University and note that this document applies both to on- and off-campus research that involves human participants.

2. Provide a copy of the Dean's approval to the Office of Research Ethics prior to starting any in-person research activities.

3. If the Dean’s approval requires any significant change(s) to any element of the study, you must notify the Office of Research Ethics of such change(s).

Upon reasonable request, it is the policy of CUREB, for cleared protocols, to release the name of the PI, the title of the project, and the date of clearance and any renewal(s).

Please email the Research Compliance Coordinators at ethics@carleton.ca if you have any questions.

20. CLEARED BY:  
    2021  

Date: August 30, 2021
Bernadette Campbell, PhD, Chair, CUREB-A

Kathryn Dupré, PhD, Vice-Chair, CUREB-A
APPENDIX K

Sample interview questions:

Please tell me a little about yourself. (occupation, title if applicable, age, racial identity, gender identity, level of education)

Please tell me what you know about the plan to introduce public surveillance cameras also known as CCTV cameras into the Byward Market? How did you first hear about the plan? What do you know about where the plan is at right now?

Can you tell me what factors have led to the plan to introduce public surveillance cameras into the market?

Do you think the introduction of the cameras into the Market will be helpful? Why or why not?

What do you know about where else public surveillance cameras have been introduced? How successful have they been?

What (if any) are some potential problems you see with the introduction of the cameras into the Market?

Do you think the surveillance camera initiative will treat all people fairly? Why or why not?

What other solutions do you think there might be to the problems the cameras are intended to address?

If you support the cameras, have you taken any steps to support or promote the introduction of cameras? Why or why not? Please describe any steps you taken.

If you are against the cameras, have you taken any steps oppose the introduction of cameras? Why or why not? Please describe any steps you taken.

What do you feel are the most effective steps you have taken to support/oppose the cameras and why? What do you feel was less effective and why?

What opposition you have encountered to your position? Who have been the most effective opponents and why?

Do you feel like your efforts to support/oppose the cameras will be successful? Why or why not?