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INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL CHANGE
AND THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF THE
STATE APPARATUS: THE CASES OF
HONDURAS AND COSTA RICA

by

Andres Perez B.

A thesis submitted to
The Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

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Ottawa, Ontario

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INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF THE STATE APPARATUS:
THE CASE OF HONDURAS AND COSTA RICA"

submitted by

ANDRES PEREZ, Lic., M.A.

in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

.....
Chairman, Department of
Political Science

..... /V.S. Wilson
.....
Thesis Supervisor

..... J. Jacques
.....
External Examiner

Carleton University

October 10, 1986

Abstract

This thesis analyzes the historical development of the Public Administration discipline. It contends that the discipline has been limited by the ahistorical, reductionist and voluntarist nature of its explanations as well as by the parochialism and conservatism of its theoretical infrastructure. To overcome some of these limitations the author formulates an alternative model for the study of public administration. The rationale, nominal definitions and the mechanism of the model are based on an eclectic combination of Marxist and Weberian theories. In this model public administration is seen not as a self-sufficient, and static activity operating within a stable social formation but rather as a malleable and structurally determined mechanism for the institutionalization of political change.

The merits of the model are examined by applying it to the analysis of the historical development of the state apparatuses of Honduras and Costa Rica.

Finally, the thesis offers some suggestions for future research and explores the implications of the model for the study of public administration, the programs of international technical assistance in the field of public administration, and the functions of government.

TO THE MEMORY OF

MY FATHER IN LAW, JULIO C. PUHIERA, FOR WHOM HONESTY WAS
MORE IMPORTANT THAN SUCCESS.

MY BROTHER, ROBERTO PEREZ, FOR WHOM HIS IDEALS WERE MORE
IMPORTANT THAN HIS OWN LIFE.

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INTRODUCTION

After the military victory of the Sandinista revolutionary movement in Nicaragua in July of 1979, I was appointed Director of the Nicaraguan Institute of Public Administration. The mandate of the Institute included the organization of the development of the public sector, the training and education of public employees and the establishment of channels of communication between the state bureaucracy and the mass organizations. The task of the Institute was to build a state apparatus capable of promoting and institutionalizing the political, social and economic changes which the Sandinista revolutionary movement wanted to introduce into Nicaraguan society.

Never before had my frustration with the public administration discipline been so strong. My theoretical tools, as well as those of most of the experts in public administration who came to Nicaragua from many parts of the world, were inadequate to enable one to understand the relationship between public administration and political change.

At the end of 1981 I resigned from my position in the

Sandinista government. I then began to work with the Public Sector Management Program of the Central American Institute of Business Administration (INCAE), a regional graduate school of business administration that functions with the technical support of the Harvard Business School. For almost one year I worked as a researcher in the Project on Managing Decentralization, a multinational comparative study of the University of California at Berkeley with the collaboration of INCAE.

The Nicaraguan component of the project was designed to support the program of administrative decentralization that was part of the original program of the Revolutionary Government. Once again I had the opportunity to experience the political implications of administration and the administrative implications of politics. An example might suffice to illustrate this point. The process of administrative decentralization had two objectives. First, to improve the public sector's capacity to respond to increasing needs for government services after the revolution (decentralization as facilitator of efficiency). Second, to promote the process of democratization also associated with the original revolutionary program of government (decentralization as facilitator of popular participation). While the program of decentralization was officially being carried out by the Secretary of Municipal Affairs, the war against counterrevolutionary forces (now popularly known as "contras") had begun.

In these circumstances, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior began to promote a de facto process of centralization of the state authority as a security measure. While the process of decentralization promoted by the Secretary of Municipal Affairs was based on the formal program of government, the process of centralization carried out by the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior was based on military logic. In 1982, with the intensification of the war effort, not only the process of decentralization but also the Secretary of Municipal Affairs itself were officially abolished. To put it simply, the process of decentralization had political implications that were not compatible with the actual political conditions of the country.

These experiences clearly showed me how sharply the complexity of the practice of public administration contrasts with the prevailing superficiality of most theories of public administration and with the irrelevance of many of their conclusions. The fundamental questions concerning the analysis and understanding of social life and social phenomena which have permanently inspired the social sciences do not form part of the "issues" of the discipline. For this reason we are unable to answer questions concerning the socio-structural determinants of organizational design and administration, the relationship between the social distribution of power and the specific forms of organization.

4

and administration of the state apparatus, or the relation between ideology and public administrative theory and techniques. Similarly, the role of public administration systems in processes of institutionalization of political change and as mechanisms for the organization and control of social conflict remain enigmatic.

Nor has the discipline come to grips with the major theoreticians in the social sciences. For example, while the thought of Karl Marx has been largely ignored, Max Weber's has been used in a fragmented and superficial manner. Within the discipline of public administration, Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy is commonly taught in isolation from his theory of power and authority and his conception of historical change.³ Consequently, the crucial relationship between types of domination and administrative systems is lost and the characterization of his "ideal type" is adopted as a prescription.

Not only in academia, but also in the practice of international technical assistance, a reductionist and perfunctory interpretation of Weber's work has been adopted. William Siffin's analysis of the programs of international cooperation in public administration during the 1950s, still applies to those of today. In his analysis Siffin states that "the four elemental factors in Weber's model - specialization of function, hierarchical authority, operation on the basis of rules, and impersonality, or the

drawing of distinctions between roles and incumbents - were commonly seen as the pertinent features of the administrative agency or system".⁴ This view was not, according to Siffin,

mitigated by an awareness that Weber had actually presented three different ideal types of organization, and had distinguished them in terms of the type of authority that impelled the socio-political system within which each model "existed".⁵

Not only the original work of Marx and Weber but also the radical Marxian structuralist perspective and the Weberian approach to a radical organization theory have received marginal attention in the core theories and approaches that constitute the orthodoxy of the field of Public Administration.⁶

The shortcomings of the discipline become more visible when we review our current level of knowledge about the practice of public administration in developing countries. The lack of an historical perspective in the analysis of the maintenance, reproduction and transformation of public administration systems, the absence of any consistent consideration of the socio-structural determinants of the modes of organization and administration of the state apparatus, and the parochialism and conservatism that permeate the field are some of the reasons why our

understanding of public administration in third world countries is more descriptive than explanatory, often anecdotal, and frequently inconsequential. This thesis is a preliminary attempt to overcome some of these inadequacies. While my experience in Nicaragua was the primary motivation behind this attempt, the thesis itself was facilitated by a series of personal circumstances.

At the end of 1981-I moved to Canada where I began my Ph.D. work in Political Science. I was fascinated by the points of convergence of Marxist and Weberian theories regarding political change, institutionalization and political order. My academic work was greatly enriched by the opportunity I had to work as a Project Advisor to the regional research project "Science and Technology Policy in Central America" sponsored by the International Development Research Center (IDRC). This project attempted to facilitate the formulation of national technology policies in Central America. Involvement in this project further developed my interest in the relationship between public policies and politics. Moreover, it gave me the opportunity to travel to Central America and talk to a variety of social scientists, politicians and public administrators studying or experiencing the relationship between politics and administration. The project also allowed me to collect valuable information not only in Central America but also in Mexico and the United States.

This thesis is, then, the product of the author's historical circumstances. It is in this sense a confirmation that "thoughts are not suprahistoric; they are produced by the minds of men shaped in their motivation and urgencies by concrete circumstances which vary from period to period".⁷

Part one of this thesis analyzes the failure of public administration as a discipline to deal with political change. Chapter I reviews the historical development of the discipline. Chapter II consists of a characterization of the discipline.

Part two (Chapter ~~III~~) introduces an alternative model for the analysis of public administration phenomena based on Marxist and Weberian theories. This model is used in part three to analyze the historical development of the state apparatuses of Honduras and Costa Rica. Chapters IV and V contain the analysis of the Honduran and the Costa Rican case studies.

Finally, part four (Chapter VI) contains conclusions, explores some of the practical implications of the thesis, and offers possible directions for future research.

INTRODUCTION FOOTNOTES

- 1 See, Decree # 15, La Gaceta, Managua, Nicaragua, January 7, 1980.
- 2 See for example, Dwight Waldo, Ideas and Issues in Public Administration (New York: Mc Graw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1953) and Donald Rowat, Basic Issues of Public Administration (New York: The Mac Millan Company, 1961), p. 36.
- 3 The only textbook of Public Administration that the author of this thesis knows of, in which a balanced presentation of the Weberian and the Marxist views of the state is offered is, V. Seymour Wilson, Canadian Public Policy and Administration (Toronto: Mc Graw-Hill, 1981).
- 4 William J. Siffin, "Two Decades of Public Administration in Developing Countries", Public Administration Review, January/February, 1976, p.63.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 For a description and analysis of these approaches see, Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan, Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis (London: Heinemann, 1979), pp. 310-394.
- 7 Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, "The New Ignorance and the Future of Public Administration in Latin America", in Clarence E. Thurber and Lawrence S. Graham, eds., Development Administration in Latin America (Durham: Duke University Press, 1973), p.383.

PART ONE

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION'S FAILURE TO DEAL
WITH POLITICAL CHANGE: ROOTS OF THE
PROBLEM

CHAPTER I

THE DISCIPLINE'S HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT.

1.1 The Intellectual Background

Although the practice of public administration is as old as society, its systematic study as a separate discipline is relatively new. The practice of public administration has always been associated with the maintenance of social order as well as with the processes of institutionalization of political change.

The emergence of Public Administration as an independent discipline was intimately associated with the revitalization of functionalism in the West and with the emergence and consolidation of monopoly-capitalism in the United States during the last quarter of the 19th century. During the early and mid 1800's the study of society had concentrated on the search for macro socio-historical laws. For example, the work of intellectuals such as Condorcet, Hegel, Comte and Marx,

centered primarily upon historical first principles, upon the "cunning of history", upon the construction of audacious developmental theories, unilinear in form, based on single determining principles and more often than not predicting the imminent universality of democracy.¹

Within this evolutionary perspective, positivism and Marxism deserve special attention for the role they were to play in the emergence of functionalism and of monopoly-capitalism and consequently, in the emergence of the Public Administration discipline.

Positivism

Positivist ideas first appeared in France in the aftermath of the Revolution. They were originally developed by Saint-Simon and later organized by Comte as a grand theory during the Restoration.

Positivism was a response to the perceived need to reorganize French society after the Revolution. Comte, for example, perceived his task to be that of discovering the laws that govern social development in order to apply them "in connection with the real work of reorganization which is so imperiously required by the actual state of the body politic".²

Positivism attempted to construct a new set of

scientifically based social values and beliefs which would replace the religious and traditional general value system of society destroyed by the Revolution. Then, it was hoped, French society would be able to move toward the future in an organized and evolutionary manner.³

The fundamental characteristics of the positivist credo reflected the interest of the newly emerging middle class, threatened both by the possibility of the restoration of the power and privileges of the nobility and by the social demands of the impoverished masses. The motto "order and progress" captured the view of social change favoured by positivists. From a positivist viewpoint, society needed to move forward to the future in a non-revolutionary and orderly manner. For this purpose a new social consensus was urgently needed. As Percy Cohen has pointed out, "Comte argued that disorder in society was due to a lack of consensus on certain fundamental ideas and principles concerning the desired type of society and the proper means of administering it"⁴ Positivism offered to the disoriented society of its time the belief in science and knowledge as the fundamental components of a new religion of humanity. As Don Martindale explains:

In the religion of the new society Humanity becomes the object of worship. Humanity includes all dead, living, or future beings who have labored for the blessedness of man. A calendar was drawn up in which each day of each month was named after heroes who had furthered the

development of Humanity. The caste of priests in charge of education will not only have encyclopedic wisdom, but they will be poets and physicians as well. Every animal kind will be conceived as a human species whose growth was stunted. In the new religion, world space is the great medium and the earth the great fetish. The great medium, the great fetish, and the great being -space, the world, and mankind- are the positivist trinity. In the sociocracy no one will have rights, only duties. The ruling power in external affairs will reside with the captains of industry, but they will be so rich they will feel no greed. They will conduct industrial life in such a way as to make family life possible as the basis of blessedness. Men are in charge of rational life, and women are in charge of feeling. 5

The establishment of this new religion was expected to bring order and stability to society. Moreover, it would make possible a more equitable use and distribution of the benefits derived from the development of science and technology.

Marxism

As in Comte's positivism, Marxism assumes that change is an integral element of social reality. However, the theories differ in terms of the nature of social change. Positivism argues for the promotion of a progressive and non-violent form of social change. Marxism, on the contrary, argues for the existence and promotion of a revolutionary and dialectical process of social change. More importantly, while early Positivism provided "a conservative answer to socialism",⁶ Marxism explains the

inevitability of a classless society and the transitional nature of bourgeois domination.

Marx's environment was far from the perfectly organized and peaceful life envisaged by Comte and Saint-Simon. While science had proven successful in bringing about the understanding and the capacity to exploit the natural world, as exemplified in the work of Darwin and in the technological advances of the Industrial Revolution, it had proven unsuccessful in improving the quality of social life for the great majority. Exploitation of the workers became as visible as the smoke expelled by the factories in the industrial towns of Europe. The gap between the wealthy minority and the impoverished masses was rapidly increasing. The social science of Comte and Saint-Simon had failed in its practical consequences.

Moreover, the evolutionary movement promised by early positivism was being replaced by the most reactionary period in the history of Europe. With the establishment of the Quadruple Alliance of Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia after the defeat of Napoleon, aristocratic rule re-emerged in Europe and all notions of social change and progress were officially rejected.

Nevertheless, social discontent was very much alive and demands for change were expressed again and again. It is in these circumstances that Marx perceived the need for change

and analyzed the historical dynamic of social transformation and the role and nature of revolutionary movements in history. For him,

all previous historical movements were movements of minorities or in the interest of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority.

Consequently, Marxism offered a more extended version of future-oriented social change which would transcend the interests of the middle class as represented by the positivist's conception of historical development.

Functionalism

Functionalism - a body of theory that "examines social phenomena in terms of their consequences for the broader society"⁸ originated in Europe in the 19th century. It was fundamentally a university-based response to the growing influence and prestige of Marxism and to the perceived need for social order in France. These two concerns are clearly shown in the work of Emile Durkheim, the codifier of the functionalist approach.⁹

While Marxism is essentially a theory of social change, functionalism stresses the importance of social order and concentrates on the analysis of its dynamic. Its main aim is

to establish the conditions required for social order and social cohesion. In this sense, Functionalism finds its roots in Comte's positivism. However, there are important differences in the two approaches. As Alvin Gouldner points out,

While Comte had raised the motto of "Order and Progress", Durkheim, in contrast, felt constrained to place even less emphasis upon "progress" than had Comte; he came to invest his energies almost exclusively in the analysis of "order". In short, Durkheim began to truncate the future orientation of Comtianism in the course of his polemic against the conceived future projected by Marxism and socialism.¹⁰

It is important to remember that the France of Durkheim was different from the France of Comte. The positivist notion of "order and progress" emerged as a response to the need to move away from the aristocratic rule of pre-revolutionary France and minimize the possibility of its restoration, a need which no longer existed in Durkheim's time. For the functionalists, order --not progress-- constituted the central goal.

Functionalism comes to America

The functionalist concern for order and cohesion was shared by early American social thinkers. For Lester Ward, the leading figure of the emerging sociological tradition in the United States, the main problem of his time was "how to secure social stability".¹¹

Prior to the turn of the century, dramatic changes in the social political and economic structure of the United States were taking place. A massive flow of immigration into the country and strong internal migration resulted in unprecedented urban growth. Moreover, a vigorous process of industrialization was changing the face of the traditional agrarian communities. Isolated towns across the country "were swiftly bound into a cohesive whole by an all-enveloping web of communication and transportation lines".¹² Furthermore, Richard J. Stillman points out,

after more than a century of unique isolation, America was thrust into the troubled waters of imperialistic expansionism by the short, though hardly "splendid", Spanish-American War. Later, the full-scale national mobilization required by U.S. involvement in World War I was to sound the death knell for the tradition of local autonomy in America.¹³

Moreover, as a further result of the rapid process of industrialization, polarization between capital and organized labor had begun to undermine the foundation of "laissez-faire liberalism". As a result of this, alternative conceptions of society began to emerge. Liberal syndicalism - one of these alternative views - advocated the establishment of a new social order based on the idea of efficiency and the replacement of class conflict by class cooperation. As Appleman Williams states,

the idea that efficiency was crucially important to prosperity and the socially tolerable functioning of the system soon gained wide acceptance. Though some businessmen had stressed the axiom earlier, the general discussion was launched by engineering and scientific journals in the 1880's. Then it was adapted by Frederick W. Taylor to the needs of management. That in turn opened the way for a theory (and ideology) of rationalizing the political economy under the direction of the corporation that was evolved under the general leadership of Elton Mayo of the Harvard Business School. ¹⁴

Class cooperation was considered to be a prerequisite for the achievement of efficiency. Thus, liberal syndicalists did not conceive of capital and labor as being necessarily antagonistic. On the contrary, "the conflicts of interest between these groups, in their view, were quite reconcilable." ¹⁵

The idea of class cooperation was strongly promoted by a protestant group organized under the name of "Social Gospel". ¹⁶ This group perceived "the church and the state as prime means for ensuring industrial peace and proposed that an harmonious industrial system could only be achieved on the basis of class collaboration." ¹⁷

Some of the members of the Social Gospel movement later developed the conception of Christian Capitalism, which also promoted the idea of class collaboration. This concept was shared by such eminent people as Woodrow Wilson, Richard T. Ely, Edward A. Ross and Albion Small.

This particular social environment in the United States provided fertile ground for the emergence of functionalist thinking. The task for the social sciences was once again perceived by many scholars as one of social integration, and functionalism - a new form of positivism - pointed the way toward a more "constructive", practically oriented and instrumental social science. It was a time for constitutional engineering. Also, in view of the massive flow of immigration into the country, it was a time for the creation of a national spirit through vigorous socialization processes and citizen training programs. Finally, it was a time of growing administrative complexity in both the private and the public sectors in conjunction with the unprecedented development of science and technology.¹⁸ Answering these needs, functionalists advocated,

- 1) that all knowledge of matters of fact is based upon the "positive" data of experience, to which the enquirer must adhere strictly;
- 2) there is a purely formal realm concerned with the relations of ideas - that of pure logic and mathematics; and
- 3) all allegedly "transcendent knowledge" - of metaphysics, theology and uncritical speculation - that radically goes beyond any possible evidence must be eschewed.¹⁹

Functionalism was an instrumental science for the solution of the perceived social problems of the epoch. But more importantly, it was a science that accepted the existing order as given. Any critical view of the

foundations of the existing political and economic systems would be considered as speculative and beyond the realm of the "positive experience".

1.2 The Emergence of Public Administration.

Under the influence of the neo-positivist faith, the study of politics began to concentrate on the analysis of political data, mainly

formal institutional arrangements, prescribed in documents that are, in fact, mental constructs (and often bad hypotheses), but that can be treated as if they were raw data of political experience, for the political scientist does not invent them, but comes upon them, as he comes upon behavioral data of quite different sorts.²⁰

This concentration on the analysis of political "facts" constituted a double reaction: it was not only a movement against the highly theoretical tradition of "evolutionists" such as Condorcet, Hegel, Comte and especially Marx, but also an aggressive opposition to the more philosophically oriented study of politics. The latter, more venerable tradition involves the more subjective and less empirically oriented Platonic tradition where "values" and "facts" were considered to be integral parts not only of the reality to be studied but also of the method through which the

scientist approaches this reality. The reaction against the philosophical study of politics gave form to the persistent official separation between what was identified as "political science" - the systematic study of formal-legal arrangements- and "political philosophy" -the identification of the proper objectives of political life and the means to achieve them. ²¹

The newly developed formal-legal approach to the study of politics resembled, in many ways, the tradition of Machiavelli and Montesquieu which had been obscured by the eschatological nature of evolutionism during the 19th century. Again political scientists were concerned with government and constitutional engineering. According to Harry Eckstein, this approach involves two emphases:

One is on the study of public law: hence the term legal. The other involves the study of formal governmental organizations: hence formal. These emphases coalesce, of course, in the study of public laws that concern formal governmental organizations in the study of "constitutional" structure. This includes not just written constitutions but their equivalents: anything that explicitly prescribes rules for processes and organizations of authority. ²²

The formal legal approach gave birth to a "full awareness of administration as a process and problem, in general and in the abstract". ²³ Woodrow Wilson's "The Study of Public Administration" embodies this awareness as well as the emergence of public administration as a discipline

in contradistinction to political science.

Wilson's administrative thought, and more precisely his argument in favor of separating the study of politics from the study of administration, was a response to the need to transform the functioning of the state apparatus in view of the contemporary American process of dramatic social transformation. In his view, the prevailing conceptions of public administration were no longer appropriate for the new historical circumstances. Prior to Wilson, the practice of Public Administration was intellectually under the dominance of what Stillman calls "Romantic Jeffersonianism".²⁴ This is a model that includes the following characteristics:

1. Extensive popular participation, especially mass voluntaristic involvement in administration (as opposed to paid, full-time professionals);

2. Maximum decentralization in order to limit administration and bring it as close as possible under the scrutiny of The People;

3. Emphasis on simplicity and economy of administrative actions -simplicity so that administrative actions could be understood by the average citizen and economy in order to avoid the "sins" of extravagance and waste in government;

4. Stress placed upon strict legal limitations of administrative authority in order to prevent possible transgressions on individual liberties by autocratic magistrates;

5. Limits on the range of administrative activities, so that the role of the administrator constitutes a narrow functional specialist (rather than a broadly trained and broadly ranging professional);

- 6.- Issue orientation focused upon protection of individual rights, limitation of administrative actions, and promotion of participation in public affairs through popular

education. ²⁵

This model was appropriate for the relatively simple agrarian social structure of the United States in the early 19th century. Self-sufficient farming resulted in a low demand for public goods and services "with the possible exception of demands for the provision of adequate postal and transportation links to gain access to national and international markets". ²⁶ Even the existing government functions required relatively simple administrative operations which in turn facilitated the "Jeffersonian maxim of popular participation in government by means of patronage on the inside and legislative oversight from the outside". ²⁷

Wilson's response to the need for the transformation of the administrative system of the country was, according to Stillman, inspired by Hamilton's political thought and the model of public administration derived therefrom. This model comprises the following characteristics:

1. An enlarged, "conscious", active role for administration characterized by energy and leadership and tone;
2. Administration unified as a process, with responsibility for administrative actions undivided and preferably concentrated in one individual (as opposed to being divided among members of a board or committee);
3. Administrative power allocated commensurate with the responsibility for administrative functions;
4. Adequate duration in office to ensure administrative effectiveness and stability;
5. Preference decidedly favoring paid,

trained professionals (as opposed to part-time, unpaid volunteers) to staff administrative positions;

6. Special emphasis on the economic and institutional requisites of administration (i.e., fiscal and military matters) as the necessary lifeblood for maintaining energetic and effective government. 28

At this point it is possible to realize that Public Administration as a discipline was preoccupied not with the understanding of the universal phenomenon of public administration but rather with the particular problems and potentialities of the American public administration system. Consequently, the discipline grew up parochial as well as theoretically handicapped.

In addition, the discipline emerged with a very limited view of social change. The fundamental characteristics of the social, political and economic context of public administration were taken as given and the task of the discipline was conceived as one of simply supporting their evolution, reproduction and maintenance. This instrumental nature of the discipline was expressed by Wilson when he stated that "we shall deal with our economic system as it is and as it may be modified, not as it might be if we had a clear sheet of paper to write upon." 29 Wilson's unquestioning acceptance of the social context within which the practice of public administration takes place explains his views on constitutional reforms and public administration. According to him:

The weightier debates of constitutional principles are even yet by no means concluded; but they are no longer of more immediate practical moment than questions of administration. It is getting to be ³⁰ harder to run a constitution than to frame one...

Thus, from the beginning, public administration was not conceived to be a discipline capable of analyzing and understanding, from an administrative perspective, the fundamental issues of social life and social phenomenon. Public administrators were thought to be useful, as a positive force in shaping the instruments and mechanisms for the evolution, maintenance and reproduction of a given system of social relations. For this reason, Wilson believed that the role as well as the intellectual orientation of public administrators should be different from those of political scientists. The latter were expected to have the critical and the analytical capacity to deal with the fundamental issues concerning political life and political phenomena. On the other hand, public administrators were only expected to be efficient in carrying out political decisions. Wilson's concern for the production of efficient and non-critical administrators is clearly expressed when he points out that,

the time will soon come when no college of respectability can afford to do without a well filled chair of political science. But the education thus imparted will go but a certain

length. It will multiply the number of intelligent critics of government, but it will create no competent body of administrators.³¹

The attempt to establish an independent discipline of public administration that would serve to make the functioning of the public sector more rational and efficient was facilitated by the parallel development of the field of general administration. As Dwight Waldo points out:

Scientific management and public administration are related aspects of a common phenomenon: a general movement to extend the methods and the spirit of science to an ever-widening range of man's concerns. As public administration is based in political science, which has sought to place political relationships on an objective or scientific basis, so scientific management is but a highly conscious part of a general movement to place man's economic life, particularly production, upon a scientific basis.³²

The functionalist spirit, the concern for order and efficiency, the growing complexity of administrative systems, and the influence of the scientific management school took the newly developed discipline of Public Administration toward a concentration on the structural aspects of the state apparatus. This approach emphasized such concerns as organizational design, personnel administration and financial administration.³³ Meanwhile, the more politically oriented concerns of the mother discipline of political science began to be abandoned. According to Waldo, the assumptions upon which this disciplinary divorce

took place were the following:

That the proper ends of government are found in the ends of the people it serves; that the entire process of government can be divided into two phases, first to decide on policy and then to execute or carry out the policy; that the values and processes of democracy apply to the first of these phases and that it is here (in voting, legislating, etc.) that the congruence of the ends of government with the ends of the people is brought about; that the values and processes of democracy have no (or at least little) direct relevancy to the second phase, the execution of decisions, but rather are secured through the first phase. ³⁴

The analytical separation of politics and administration originally proposed by Wilson became a landmark of the field with Frank J. Goodnow's Politics and Administration, (1900) ³⁵ wherein he suggested that the function of politics "should be conceived of differently than administration, explaining that the former is the expression of the will of the State while the latter is the execution of that will." ³⁶

This amputation of politics from administration was reflected in the first textbooks of public administration: Leonard D. White's Introduction to the Study of Public Administration (1926) ³⁷ and W.F. Willoughby's Principles of Public Administration (1927). ³⁸ According to Wallace S. Sayre, these textbooks not only provided "the first effective teaching instruments for the new field of study; they also codified the premises, the concepts, and the data for the new

public administration".³⁹ Sayre's summary of this codification elucidates the nature of Public Administration during its early development:

1. The Politics-administration dichotomy was assumed both as a self-evident truth and as a desirable goal; administration was perceived as a self-contained world of its own, with its own separate values, rules and methods;
2. Organization theory was stated in "scientific management" terms; that is, it was seen largely as a problem in organization technology-the necessities of hierarchy, the uses of staff agencies, a limited span of control, subdivision of work by such "scientific" principles as purpose, process, place, or clientele;
3. The executive budget was emphasized as an instrument of rationality, of coordination, planning, and control;
4. Personnel management was stressed as an additional element of rationality (jobs were to be described "scientifically", employees were to be selected, paid, and advanced by "scientific" methods);
5. A "neutral" or "impartial" career service was required to insure competence, expertise, rationality;
6. A body of administrative law was needed to prescribe standards of due process in administrative conduct.⁴⁰

1.3 The Behavioral Approach.

The orthodox tradition of the public administration discipline began to suffer intensive critical analysis during the 1950s. In 1948, Waldo had concluded his classic work The Administrative State by forecasting the advent of a major revolution in the discipline of public administration that would defy the traditional understanding of public

administration phenomena. According to Waldo, this understanding

is by no means an unchallenged faith; but generally, it is still gospel in our schools, at least in undergraduate courses. Perhaps the tenets of orthodoxy still represent the "truth" for our time and our needs. Assuredly, their air of certainty and stability appeals to the emotions in these days of crisis and confusion. But the apparent likelihood of a disintegration of the old outlook and the synthesis of a new must be recognized. ⁴¹

The definitive challenge to the traditional public administration anticipated by Waldo emerged in the mid 1950s with the arrival of behaviourism. This intellectual movement first emerged in the 1920s until its influence evolved into the emergence of the so called "behavioral sciences" in the 1950s. Within the field of psychology J.B. Watson, one of the first major spokesman of this approach, argued that the easiest way to contrast the "old psychology" or introspective psychology and the new one was to say that,

all the schools of psychology except that of behaviourism claim that "consciousness" is the subject matter of psychology. Behaviourism on the contrary, holds that the subject matter of human psychology is the behavior or activities of the human being. ⁴²

In the field of political science we can trace the emergence of behaviourism and the decay of formal-legalism to the 1920s. According to Eckstein,

decay starts in early studies of political competition and political behavior, as structures of competition became more crystallized (and formalized), as the outcomes of competition became more consequential, and as the process of "civic incorporation" led to unexpected behavior by new citizens.⁴³

The emergence of political competition attracted the attention of political scientists. Scholars, such as Charles Merriam of the Chicago School, began to shift the emphasis of political studies from the traditional prescriptive assessment of formal political arrangements to what was considered to be an objective analysis and understanding of political behavior.⁴⁴ According to Stillman,

what emerged from the "revolt" at the Chicago School, beginning in the 1920s, was an impressive body of literature which endeavored to show the policy process "as it really was" - the product of a complex interplay of interest groups.⁴⁵

This pluralistic view of politics was based on the acceptance that "democracy is premised on diverse interests and the dispersion of power".⁴⁶ Interests are defined according to the preferences of organized groups acting within a particular cognitive system. However, the values inherent in the system are accepted at face value. For pluralists the historical origins of interest groups demands "are not problematic".⁴⁷ In summary, the behavioral approach

in the political science field,

1. rejects political institutions as the basic unit for research and identifies the behavior of individuals in political situations as the basic unit of analysis;

2. identifies the "social sciences" as "behavioral sciences", and emphasizes the unity of political science with the social sciences, so defined;

3. advocates the utilization and development of more precise techniques for observing, classifying, and measuring data and urges the use of statistical or quantitative formulations wherever possible; and

4. defines the construction of systematic empirical theory as the goal of political science. 48

The dissemination of the full impact of **behaviourism** to the discipline of public administration occurred somewhat later than was the case in the discipline of political science. Although the influence of behaviourism on the field of general administration first began to develop in the late 1920s with the Hawthorne studies of the General Electric Company, it is only by midcentury that a behavioral approach began to replace the formal structural one that had prevailed since the emergence of the discipline.

The effect of behaviourism on the study of public administration can be seen in both the development of a new understanding of the role of the state apparatus and its relationship with society and in the identification of a new focus of study for the discipline. In regard to the former, the state apparatus is analyzed from a classic democratic

pluralist perspective. According to this view,

1. administrative processes are pluralistic-i.e., they are rooted in representation of divergent, changing, factional interests in society, so that administrative goals can be neither static nor singular but rather are process oriented and representative of social diversity;
2. administrative processes are aimed principally at balancing interests through discussion, negotiations, and compromise in order to promote political consensus and social stability;⁴⁹

In regard to the change of the discipline's focus of study, H. A. Simon, the most influential proponent of the behavioral approach in the field of administration, argued that rather than concentrating on the analysis of administration as the art of "getting things done", the discipline should analyze, the processes of "decisions about doing", this is

how do organizations decide what is to be done? More particularly, how is the behavior of the operative employee influenced within and by the organization? The central word in the new vocabulary is "decision" or "choice" or "selection" (the words are used synonymously), and Simon is interested in whole series of decisions culminating in the decision of the operative employee to behave in a certain way.⁵⁰

In other words, the attention of the discipline should switch from the analysis of structures and legal administrative regulations to the analysis of administrative

behavior. More specifically, the emphasis of administrative studies should be "on the rational aspects of human behavior". 51

Rationality, in Simon's view, is defined in organizational terms. According to him, man is "intendedly rational" but his limited information and his limited rational capacity does not allow him to make correct organizational decisions. Thus, he has to base his decisions on the information provided to him by the organization.⁵² Moreover, he has to adapt his way of thinking to the organization's objectives. According to Simon the organizational environment provides "the initial stimulus to which humans respond in the somewhat mechanistic manner of 'administrative man' -defining the situation in 'limited ways', 'searching' and 'satisficing'".⁵³

As in the case of the "traditional" approach, behaviourism -as a theory- was limited by its ahistoricism. As a theory, it is not concerned with the understanding of the dynamic of organizational systems and administrative behavior over time, and with the identification of the factors that condition this process. In other words, the behavioral approach in public administration was exclusively concerned with the "synchrony" of organizations and administrative behavior rather than with their "diachrony". We will return to this theme in the following chapter.

Behaviourism, also suffers from reductionism. From the behavioralist perspective, the complex phenomena of human behavior are explained as if organizations are the only or most important determinant factors. As Simon himself recognizes,

taking the viewpoint of the social psychologist, we are interested in what influences impinge upon the individual human being from his environment and how he responds to these influences. ⁵⁴

However, Herbert Storing quite pointedly argues against Simon's understanding of human behavior. According to him, "an individual rationality is not necessarily dependent upon and confined by some non-rational commitment to or 'identification' with an organization". ⁵⁵ In other words, an individual can reason "beyond existing organizational boundaries". ⁵⁶

The most striking characteristic of behaviourism, however, is its parochialism and the conservatism of its theoretical infrastructure. Its main assumptions are based on the particular historical experience of organizational life in "market centered societies": societies in which the market functions as "the cardinal category for ordering personal and social affairs". ⁵⁷ As Ramos argues, the behavioral approach in organizational theory represents "an unprecedented effort to mold social order according to

economizing criteria". He elaborates:

The word [behavior] was never used in scholarly language before the fifteenth century. According to lexicographers, it began to gain linguistic currency around 1490 and denoted conformity to commands and manners dictated by external conveniences. Even today the word has not lost its original meaning. Behavior continues to be a category acknowledging conformity, a fact that is generally overlooked because conformity to socially given criteria of gregariousness has been transformed into the standards of human morality in general. Men and women no longer live in communities where a substantive common sense determines the course of their actions. They belong instead to societies in which they do little more than respond to organized inducements. The individual has become a behaving creature. 59

1.4 The Post-Behavioral Revolution

By the middle of the 1960s post-behaviourism began to emerge in revolt against what was considered to be irrelevant and conservative in the behavioral movement. The primary weaknesses of the behavioral movement according to their successors are summarized by David Easton:

- 1) Substance must precede technique...2)
- Behavioral science conceals an ideology of empirical conservatism...3) Behavioral research must lose touch with reality...4) Research about and constructive development of values are indistinguishable parts of the study of

politics...5) Members of a learned discipline bare the responsibilities of all intellectuals...to protect the humane values of civilization...6) To know is to bare the responsibility for acting, and to act is to engage in reshaping society...7) If the intellectual has the obligation to implement his knowledge those organizations composed of intellectuals-the professional associations-and the universities themselves, cannot stand apart from the struggles of the day. 60

The emerging interests of the post-behavioral movement and their emphasis on "relevance and action" were to be translated into a new approach to the study of public administration. In the field of Public Administration, the post-behavioral approach found expression in the New Public Administration movement which crystalized after the Minnowbrook Conference in September of 1960. The New Public Administration emphasized the need to promote social changes in favor of the underprivileged minorities. Moreover, the emerging movement viewed public administration as "the major vehicle for instituting the [necessary] changes more rapidly." 61

Post-behaviourism emerged in the United States in one of the most turbulent periods of its history. The Agenda for the Nation- a report elaborated by the Brookings Institute in 1969 - identified the situation in the United States as a paradoxical one:

on the one hand we are a nation which sees itself as wracked and divided over problems of

poverty, riots, race, slums, unemployment, and crime; on the other hand, we are a nation which is clearly enjoying high prosperity, rapid economic growth, and a steady diffusion of affluence at a rate almost unimaginable a decade ago. 62

A widening discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities, the effects of the Vietnam war, extraordinary growth in the youth population, misguided state policies, excessive state intervention, insufficient public spending - all these different arguments were used to explain what went wrong during the decade. Central to most of these explanations was the incapacity of the public administration system to adequately respond to the emerging social demands.⁶³ The New Public Administration movement attempted to find a solution to this problem by restoring the relationship between politics and administration. As Allen Schick points out, "it was in quest for a new political theory [that] the new public administration became a self-conscious enterprise in the late 1960's." ⁶⁴

This new political theory was conceived as an American solution for American problems. Richard S. Page, one of the initiators of the movement, clearly stated that "the challenge to public administration is to give new life to the values of liberalism and reason in the American tradition".⁶⁵ He then explained that,

students of public administration should,

therefore, articulate those ideological and philosophical strains that unite Americans, delineate clearly where and how our institutions fail to live up to the liberal tradition, and actively promote reform and reconstruction in the area of public administration.⁶⁶

One of the central concerns was the re-establishment of a balance between the value expectations and the value capabilities of the American society, a balance that was necessary to reduce the likelihood of social disorder. As Page indicated,

the ideological-philosophical setting of contemporary American public administration is a context of values and a related set of institutions and processes capable of accommodating great change, meeting new conditions, bending to different demands. But if the ideas and institutions of liberalism and representative government do not function fairly and honestly, then even those most ardently believing in liberal values will increasingly reject democratic processes. They will then resort to other ideologies and other political methods, including violence.⁶⁷

As a consequence of these new political concerns, the New Public Administration movement stressed the need to shift the emphasis of the public administration discipline, from the study of "processes" to the study of "impact". A concentration on how public policy is formulated was to give way to an emphasis on the content of policy and its impact on social reality. According to Robert T. Golembiewski, the policy orientation suited well the priorities of the New Public Administration movement.⁶⁸ The

new concerns of the "policy impact" orientation are summarized by Theodore J. Lowi in the following questions:

What is the policy as a policy, defined not as an isolated individual decision but as part of a "long line of intention" of government?

What is the policy as a law, that is to say, what is the specific type of coercion behind any policy?

What is the impact of the policy on the political system? For example: How will different kinds of policy and coercion affect the long-run capacity to govern? How do current policies affect the access of all public to the political system? How and to what degree do current policies and types of coercion provide defenses against bad policies? 69

As in the previous schools of thought in the Public Administration discipline, we find in the post-behavioral movement the absence of a sound theoretical approach to the study of public administration. The movement was basically romantic and its approach reductionist and voluntarist. The democratization of the state apparatus was proposed without any serious consideration of the structural factors that influence its organization and administration. There was a naive faith that "Ought", once known, could be translated into "Is". From its perspective, the transformation of the nature and practice of public administration was considered to be mainly a matter of human will. For example, the proper orientation of public policies was considered to be possible, simply by having policy makers that were sensitive about the most pressing needs of the country. This voluntaristic and reductionist view of public policy,

ignored the fact that international forces, as well as domestic political and economic forces, shape the modes of organization and administration of the state apparatus and limit the degree of freedom that policy makers and governments have in changing its nature, internal dynamic and orientation. Both in Parts Two and Three we will continuously emphasize this very important aspect of interaction between the environment and the state apparatus. Moreover, the New Public Administration movement was parochial, that is, no serious contribution was made to the understanding of public administration as a universal phenomenon. The movement was born and remained an American phenomenon concerned with American problems.

1.5 Comparative Administration

The official inauguration of the Comparative Administration sub-field of Public Administration was the Conference on Comparative Administration sponsored by the Public Administration Clearing House held at Princeton University in 1952.⁷⁰ Since that event, the academic production in Comparative Administration began to grow significantly, if not in quality and consistency, at least in quantity and diversity. The vast amount of literature generated within this sub-field of Public Administration has been classified by Ferrel Heady into four categories:

- 1) Modified traditional
- 2) General system model building
- 3) Middle-range theories, and
- 4) Development-oriented theories. ⁷¹

This classification, which is thematic rather than chronological, will be used to review the Comparative Administration literature. To facilitate our analysis, we will briefly review representative works of the previously mentioned categories.

Modified Traditional

According to Heady, the emergence of the modified traditional approach represented a shift from the study of "individual administrative systems to comparison among them". ⁷² A representative example of this tradition is Poul Meyer's Administrative Organization.

Meyer's main objective in this book is to work out a typology "of certain forms of organization which regardless of their concrete application, possess common characteristics making it possible to describe them in a conceptual way". ⁷³ Meyer argues that these forms of

organization, such as administrative tribunals, regulatory commissions and public corporations, occur in all countries. According to him, they

are not put into use everywhere, on the contrary, national administrative systems often differ considerably, but the basic types in use are everywhere the same, varying only in their mode of application and elaboration. Hence an analysis of administrative organization must necessarily be comparative.⁷⁴

Meyer's treatment of administrative phenomena is intentionally limited to the structural, as opposed to the functional, aspects of public administration. According to him, "the analysis of the decision making process, and in particular the process of motivation, together with the purpose of the activity tells the reader the functional story of public administration".⁷⁵ In his book, Meyer tells the "structural story".⁷⁶ Structures, in his view,

will denote the organization as it appears in a correctly designed organization chart indicating the organizational units and their interrelationship. The most important structural problem, then, is the distribution of administrative authority (i.e. the authority to make decisions) among the organizational units which make their contribution towards the carrying out of the public administration.⁷⁷

Meyer's treatment of public administration phenomena was limited by the typological orientation of his work. His book, although rich in description and information, does

little to facilitate the understanding of the historical dynamic of public administration systems and the factors that condition them. No systematic attempt is made to understand the historical reasons that explain the emergence and use of different types of organization, which exist in different countries at different times. Since his emphasis is on the construction of a typology rather than on the analysis of the dynamic of administrative reality, history is used in an anecdotal manner mainly to illustrate his classificatory scheme. ⁷⁸

Moreover, Meyer's analysis is reductionist. No consistent attempt is made to relate the practice of public administration to the social reality within which it operates. According to Meyer, his study is confined, "solely to those administrative facts which precede the decision and the social realities". ⁷⁹ Administrative phenomena he advises, should be treated "regardless of its social function". ⁸⁰ In consequence, his explanation of administrative phenomena is merely formal and legalistic. According to him,

it is most important to lay down that public administration in a democratic society is not itself the source of the competence on the strength of which administrative agencies interfere with the freedom and property of the citizens. Fundamentally, the administrative agencies are subject to the Rule of Law and here we are concerned with law in the formal sense of the word, i.e. statutes promulgated with the consent of the legislative assembly. All powers

of the administration are derived from statutes (or, in rare cases, from prerogatives), and on the other hand; the law binds the administration. 81

As a result of the ahistorical and reductionist nature of Meyer's approach, his explanation of administrative change is, furthermore, voluntaristic. Government actions are presented throughout his book as the central factor shaping and conditioning public administration systems. No attempt is made to analyze the structural limitations that governments face in the administration of the state apparatus.

Restricting his study to the analysis of Western administrative systems renders Meyer's work parochial. Finally, his views are conservative because his analysis is solely preoccupied with the role of public administration as a mechanism for the maintenance of social order.

General systems model building

The emphasis of this intellectual orientation is on the construction of general theoretical models for the comparative study of administration. The most representative example of this approach is the Theory of Prismatic Society developed by Fred W. Riggs. This theory synthesized what Riggs himself considered to be the prevailing trends in the field of Comparative Public

Administration during the 1960s when there was "increasing emphasis on empirical analysis; increasingly ecological approaches to the study of administrative behavior; and growing concern with theory as contrasted with case and country studies."⁸²

Certainly, Riggs' theoretical contribution to the field of comparative administration is an important one. As Warren F. Ilchman pointed out, scholars of public administration "must be grateful [to him]... for the restoration of public administration as a participating discipline in the continuous dialogue of the social sciences".⁸³ Indeed, the questions that he attempted to answer gave the discipline of public administration a rare opportunity to move into serious theoretical analysis. His concerns are reflected in his assessment of the comparative administration discipline. According to him,

we still lack a clear understanding of the forces which lead to administrative transformations, to changes from traditional, status-oriented bureaucracies to "modern", patterns of governmental organization in which the ideals of "efficiency" and "effectiveness" can become operating principles.

We lack, indeed, any consensus on what is characteristic of the administrative situation in transitional societies, on possible stages or sequences in the process of administrative transformation, on relationships between administrative change and corresponding processes of economic, political, social, and cultural development. There is even disagreement on the relation between administration and culture whether

administrative behavior is uniquely determined by particular cultures or corresponds to general levels of socio-political integration.⁸⁴

To achieve understanding of these issues, Riggs revived the notion of "ecology" originally developed by John Gaus in 1947:

What makes a study ecological, is the identification of sensitive variables in the environment -whether they form a part of the culture or not- and the demonstration of at least plausible patterns of correlation between these variables and the administrative items which are the focus of analysis.⁸⁵

In the application of his ecological approach, Riggs identifies three ideal types of society; the "fused" society in which all structures are highly diffuse; the "refracted society" in which structures are very specific; and finally, the "prismatic society" which is located between the "fused" and the "refracted". In Riggs words,

the prismatic model is intermediate between a "fused" model, useful in studying traditional or primitive societies, and the "refracted" type, useful for analysis of governments in advanced industrial Western societies.⁸⁶

The administrative model that Riggs associates to the prismatic society is the "sala model". The characteristics of this model are identified "by reviewing the primary features of the prismatic model, linking them to the logical behavior of the 'sala official', and relating them in each case to the criterion of administrative efficiency".⁸⁷ As a

result of this analysis, Riggs finds that "prismatic structures reinforce bureaucratic prodigality".⁸⁸ In other words,

the inefficiency of the sala is reinforced by the price indeterminacy of the bazaar-canteen, by pariah entrepreneurship and intrusive access to the elite, by the agglomeration of values, by strategic spending and strategic learning as instruments of elite recruitment, by poly-communalism and poly-normativism, by double-talk, blocked throughputs, bifocalism and equivocacy, by the dependency syndrome, interference complex, and the formalism effect.⁸⁹

• Riggs' analysis is not, however, deterministic. His ecological approach does not suggest that "environmental conditions shape administrative behavior to such an extent that no choice is possible.... Rather, ecological forces set boundaries; they give the ranges within which choice is possible." ⁹⁰

His view of ecological limitations and possibilities allows for a non-voluntaristic approach to the study of administrative change. Governments are not perceived as necessarily being the single most important factor in shaping the organization and administration of the state apparatus. For Riggs, "governmental setting is one of the fundamental determinants of administrative behavior",⁹¹ but he, nevertheless, recognizes the importance of economic and social factors "which also condition administration and indeed affect the political system as well". ⁹²

Despite the relevancy of the questions that Riggs attempted to answer and the importance of the issues he raised, his model suffers from major defects. Most significantly his work is ahistorical. The exclusion of historical factors in his analysis of administrative phenomena is acknowledged by Riggs himself when he points out that,

in my view, many, though not all, environmental factors -cultural, historical, geographical, and so on- are likely to be relatively insensitive to development and to the explanation of administrative behavior. However important it may be to learn about these environmental conditions if one wishes to work among and communicate with a particular people, it is not necessary to include them in ecological explanations of change or of politics or of administration. (emphasis added) ⁹³

Thus, Riggs' model concentrates on the analysis of the synchrony of public administration systems rather than on their dynamic. It analyzes "frozen" administrative sub-systems -the sala model for example- within "frozen" ecological systems -the prismatic model for example. No attention is paid to the analysis of social and administrative changes that occur in developing societies while they are in a prismatic state. Change is only conceived of in terms of a general historical process of social and administrative transformations that involves three consecutive stages: the fused society, the prismatic

society and the refracted society. The resemblance of this model with Rostow's unilinear and serialized view of historical dynamic is not accidental. Riggs argues that "whether or not Rostow's theory is empirically sound, it does give the economist a set of models which can direct his research to significant variables in economic development"⁹⁴ Then Riggs asks

can we discover or create any comparable tools to identify key variables in 'administrative development' to suggest at least for preliminary examination, what some crucial relationship among these variables might be? ⁹⁵

At the level of Riggs theoretical infrastructure we can also identify a parochial view of public administration. From Riggs' perspective, the world is analyzed according to its similarity to the Western and more particularly the American experience. Countries are more or less underdeveloped - fused, prismatic or refracted - according to their similarity to the societies of the West. Semi-differentiated societies are more advanced than undifferentiated societies and both are relatively underdeveloped in comparison to differentiated societies. Needless to say, the central characteristics of differentiated societies are those of the industrialized countries of the West. Moreover, Riggs' theory is conservative. His use of classic structural-functional analysis leads him to consider administrative systems as

mechanisms for the maintenance and reproduction of a given social ecology.

In conclusion, Riggs failed in his worthwhile attempt to move the comparative administration discipline to a more relevant position within the social sciences. Although his inquiries were sound, his method of approaching them was inappropriate. The criticism made by John Forward concerning the value of most theoretical ecological models of public administration is particularly applicable to Riggs' model. According to Forward, these models

are based solely upon intuitive and a priori assumptions concerning the relationship of bureaucracy to other societal systems. Consequently, although these models may make important contributions in terms of descriptive analysis and imaginative classificatory schema, their development towards explanatory theory is hampered by a serious lack of empirical background. ⁹⁶

Rather than the construction of general descriptive models, Forward argues that what is needed is "to give some consideration to the problem of finding types of analysis which are best suited to the task of developing an adequate empirical basis for ecological models given the limited quantity and quality of available data". ⁹⁷

Middle range theories

Middle range theories in comparative administration emerged as a reaction to the problem of excessive generalization presented by the general systems approach. According to Robert Presthus, following R.K. Merton, middle range theories "attempted to abstract from the whole social context some limited but, hopefully, meaningful segment for analysis".⁹⁸

According to Ferrel Heady, a major proponent of the use of middle range theories in the field of comparative administration, "a sweeping comparison across national boundaries requires some organizing concept to avoid burial under an avalanche of data about a multitude of diverse administrative systems".⁹⁹ Bureaucracy, according to him, provides such an organizing concept.

Focussing his attention on "middle" and "top" management, Heady presents the following questions as guidelines for comparative analysis:

1. What are the dominant internal operating characteristics of the bureaucracy reflecting its composition, hierarchical arrangements, patterns of specialization, and behavioral tendencies?;
2. To what extent is the bureaucracy multifunctional, participating in the making of major public policy decisions as well as in their execution?;
3. What are the principal means for exerting control over the bureaucracy from sources outside it, and how effective are those external

controls? 100

To answer these questions, Heady proposes an ecological approach in which "the environment of bureaucracy may be visualized as a series of concentric circles, with bureaucracy at the center".¹⁰¹ The largest circle represents the general social system; the next circle represents the economic system and finally, the smallest circle represents the political system.

Moreover, two types of classification are used by Heady to organize the vast number of cases to be studied: the first one is based on the traditional differentiation between "developed" and "developing" societies. According to Heady, "this is a classification based on the outer environmental circles, with consequences for the bureaucracy that may be considered secondary".¹⁰² The second set is based on political systems whose "differences are assumed to encompass environmental factors that have the most direct and consequential effects on bureaucracies."¹⁰³

Heady's proposed model suffers from the same problem as the system theories it criticizes: the theoretical generalizations derived from his model are too broad and superficial. Moreover, reality is used to illustrate theory, rather than to test it, and one wonders if his primary concern is to compare rather than to understand the true nature of the large number of administrative systems under

consideration. His attempt to generalize leads him sometimes to submit questionable historical data such as his statement that

potentially the most significant political fact of the twentieth century has been the closing out of the colonial era and the emergence, in most cases as newly independent states, of the nations of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.¹⁰⁴

The statement is incorrect in that the wave of independence in Latin America took place in the first part of the 19th century and not in the 20th century as stated by Heady. This type of mistake reflects a common tendency among comparative administration scholars to lump "developing countries" together, irrespective of the many highly significant differences that exist among them. To ignore the enormous differences between the colonial experience of Latin America and Africa is to renounce reality.

Again we find in the bureaucratic model the same ahistoricism, reductionism and voluntarism found in most public administration theories. Analysis of the dynamic of public administration systems and their structural determinants is sacrificed in favor of a descriptive and largely anecdotal review of different types of administrative systems. Heady recognizes that "the need for an awareness of historical antecedents is self-evident".¹⁰⁵

However, he renounces the attempt because "providing historical background adequate to understanding is a difficult task".¹⁰⁶ Moreover, according to him:

Sorting out and weighting the complex elements of any nation's administrative inheritance must be on a judgmental rather than a scientific basis. Such an effort is also handicapped by the relatively slight attention given to administrative history either by professional historians or ¹⁰⁷ by students of public administration.

Therefore, Heady decided to provide only "a brief, cursory, and highly selective treatment"¹⁰⁸ of the evolution of Western European countries. Not surprisingly, the developing world did not get even this minimum treatment.

As for voluntarism, Heady's model assumes that political factors "have the most direct and consequential effects on bureaucracies".¹⁰⁹ Social and economic differences are listed as among the less significant determinants.¹¹⁰ Since he assumes that social and economic factors are of secondary importance, his conclusions and explanations of administrative phenomena are voluntaristic. This is, public administration systems differ depending on the nature, political will and political orientation of governments and "caudillos".¹¹¹

Heady's refusal to confront the complexity of administrative phenomena resulted in the trivialization of

public administration as reflected, for example, in his analysis of the Guatemalan bureaucracy. In this analysis, Heady tried to answer his proposed questions by comparing the results of a study developed by Jerry L. Weaver in 1944 with data gathered in the mid 1960s.

Based on the two studies, he concluded that some of the most relevant features of the Guatemalan bureaucrats' behavior can be explained by the influence of General Jorge Ubico from 1930 to 1944, who insisted on "punctuality, Calvinist comportment, and absolute rectitude".¹¹² The explanation of the administrative behavior of the Guatemalan bureaucracy is then reduced to the identification of Ubico as its cause.

It is sad that a respected scholar such as Heady does not have a word to say about the extremely significant revolutionary change in Guatemala in 1944, the successful counterrevolution in 1954, and the attendant transformation in the modes of organization and administration of the Guatemalan state apparatus. Relevancy is sacrificed and triviality results from emphasizing comparison at the expense of a real understanding of the political, economic, and administrative historical development of the countries studied.

At the level of his theoretical infrastructure, Heady's theory is parochial. The unilinear and ethnocentric view of

social change implicit in the orthodox view of development, is accepted by him as appropriate. According to him, third world countries

can be called developing because of what they do have in common. All are caught up in the process of social change, not just the continuous change that any society undergoes, but change that is critical and disruptive. Put in terms of "models" of societies which have often in the past been used for purpose of analysis, they are moving from the traditional toward the modern type.¹¹³

Before completing our treatment of the bureaucratic approach, mention must be made of the literature that relates bureaucracy and political development. This body of literature analyzes the relationship between administrative change and the development of political systems in third world countries. The main objective of the proponents of the political development approach is to know more "about the various ways in which public bureaucracies can be more or less effective as instruments of change".¹¹⁴ Moreover, they are concerned about "how development might be pushed in the direction of freedom rather than tyranny".¹¹⁵

Two responses to this question are found in the literature. Some scholars and practitioners argue that "a phenomenon of the utmost significance in transitional societies is the lack of balance between political policy-making institutions and bureaucratic

policy-implementing structures".¹¹⁶ For these people, bureaucratic and political development should be¹¹⁷ balanced.

For others, balance between political and administrative development is not problematic. For them, the strengthening of administration must proceed irrespective of the rate of maturation of the political process.¹¹⁷

The literature dealing with the relationship between bureaucratic and political development is characterized by its ahistoricism, its voluntarism, the reductionist essence of its explanations, as well as by the parochialism and conservatism of its theoretical infrastructure.

No attempt is made within this literature to understand the historical factors - especially the economic and international ones - that condition the formation and change of both political and administrative systems. The ahistorical treatment of public administration systems leads to voluntarism, as it is assumed that political and administrative development can be engineered simply by strengthening political and administrative institutions, without paying equal attention to the transformations of the economic structure upon which the distribution of political power is based. In turn, it is also assumed that this engineering process can be the result of "external inducement" such as that provided by foreign technical

assistance.¹¹⁸ Thus, social change is analyzed as the outcome of the political will of enlightened elites combined with the technical, political, and administrative knowledge of international experts. According to Joseph La Palombara,

the elite of the developing newer states, might be persuaded to downgrade national plans for economic development and to make democracy a goal in itself, worth sacrificing speed in economic development in order to obtain.¹¹⁹

The parochialism of the approach is evident in the unilinear and unidimensional view of "political development" and "political modernization" shared by its proponents. For S. N. Eisenstadt, political modernization

can be equated with those types of political systems which developed in Western Europe from the seventeenth century and which spread to other parts of Europe, to the American continent, and, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to Asian and African countries.¹²⁰

Finally, from the perspective of this approach, political development is conservatively portrayed as "a continuous process of growth which is produced by forces within the system and which is absorbed by the system".¹²¹ According to Eisenstadt

the central problem of modernization in a modern political system is the ability to deal with such changing demands. They must be absorbed in

policy making while assuring continuity to the system. Sustained political growth thus becomes a central problem of political systems.¹²²

Thus, social order and system survival, rather than social change and system transformation, constituted the main concerns of the political and administrative development approach.

Development oriented theories

Social sciences are full of concepts that do not fulfill the requirements of appropriate "data containers" for the purpose of theory building. The concepts of modernization and development are good examples of this. Although the literature in these two fields is extensive, no agreement has been reached about the nature and dynamic of these processes. In one of the most recent reviews of the concept of development, George Ronald Hope states:

Despite the existence of a great body of literature on the concept of development there is still a great degree of ambiguity surrounding its meaning. Development has been defined in a

number of ways incorporating various elements of the social, political, cultural and economic system. As such, despite some consensus of what constitutes underdevelopment there is no real agreement on what is meant by development. 123

The lack of a solid foundation for the understanding of development as a form of social change has not prevented the construction of the nebulous concept of "development administration". The literature in this field is also mounting although our knowledge of the subject is still partial and contradictory.

The emergence of both "development" and "development administration" has to be understood in a historical perspective. New interpretations of the world emerge not primarily as the intellectual creation of innovative minds but as a reaction to social and political circumstances.

The aftermath of the Second World War left the third world caught between the hegemonic tendencies of the United States of America and the Soviet Union. In these circumstances, the notion and practice of development were introduced into the third world to ensure the evolution of these societies according to the political and economic convenience of the Western industrialized countries. 124

During the post-war years, development was basically conceived as a process of economic growth as measured by traditional economic indices such as GNP and income per

capita. While the goal of economic growth was generally achieved by many of the recipient countries, the benefits of this economic development were concentrated in the hands of the national elites. During the 1970s, the original conception of development was replaced by a new view in which "economic development should be regarded in terms of progress toward reducing the incidences of poverty, unemployment and income inequalities." 125

Within both the economic and the social field, there exists a large number of models and approaches. A review of this literature goes beyond the purpose of this chapter. The general essence of the development literature, however, has been properly summarized and critized by Ramos. According to him, this concept has traditionally implied that,

1. there is a normal, unilinear process of becoming, an only and best way to the future, that can be followed. If one observes prerequisites, deviance and breakdowns are avoidable;

2. in contemporary history we must distinguish between developed and developing societies. The former, as referent societies, show to the underdeveloped the image of their future.¹²⁶

With the belief that development and modernization could and should be promoted, it was also assumed that it could and should be "administered". At the same time it was assumed that traditional public administration systems were not capable of supporting processes of social and economic development. Eisenstadt, for example, argues that the

emergence and development of these systems "had been rooted in the need of the colonial powers for various resources and for the maintenance of law and order".¹²⁷ As a response to this perception, the concept of development administration was introduced and defined in the mid 1950s as "the administration of policies, programmes and projects to serve development purposes." ¹²⁸

With the identification of the need for development administration, large amounts of pro-development dollars began to reach the bank accounts of the Comparative Administration Group in the United States. The dollars came with a demand for less theoretical and more immediately applicable work. For example, The Ford Foundation grants "were not for comparative administration but for development administration, and the not unreasonable point of view was that some knowledge to guide the then substantial aid and technical-assistance efforts might be forthcoming." ¹²⁹

As with the rest of the comparative administration approach, the development administration literature reflects ahistoricism, voluntarism, reductionism, parochialism and conservatism. Development administration theories are ahistorical because they are not concerned with understanding the domestic and international structural factors that have shaped public administration systems in the third world throughout time. Administrative change is analyzed with a future oriented perspective, not with a

historical one.

Development administration theories are reductionist because social and administrative change are explained primarily as the result of political and technical intervention rather than as the outcome of multiple political, economic and international forces. As a consequence, development administration theories are also voluntaristic because administrative as well as social change are considered to be the product of human motivation, specifically the will of governments. For example, according to Hope

the role of the political leadership is indeed the most crucial factor to be ascertained in the process of national development and hence in the improvement in the administration of development....Lending support to administrative change and reform requires...commitment on the part of the political leadership. Commitment here involves an overriding desire to promote rationality, rise of productivity, social and economic equalisation and improvement of institutions and attitudes.¹³⁰

The assumption that human will is the determinant factor of administrative change is also expressed by Paul Meadows who argues that, "historically people's attitudes have altered long before their organizational or institutional environment has changed".¹³¹ No serious attempt is made by these authors to identify and understand the domestic and international structural limitations that

condition governments' capacity to shape public administration systems.

Finally, the theoretical infrastructure of development administration literature is parochial and conservative. It is parochial because its understanding of both social and administrative change is based on the historical experience of the West, and in particular, the United States. Development strategies essentially sought to recreate in the third world by means of plans and techniques the level and style of modernization which unfolded -unplanned- in the West. Development administration theories are conservative because they are designed to explain and support processes of developmental change which from the beginning were engineered to preclude the possibilities of revolutionary change in the third world. The promotion of gradual and homeostatic social change, as opposed to revolutionary social change, is then the practical and theoretical objective of the development administration approach. These views are supported by O. P. Dwivedi and J. Nef in their analysis of development administration theories:

Development Administration was supposed to be based on professionally-oriented, technically-competent, politically and ideologically-neutral bureaucratic machinery. It was to re-tool not only the foreign aid (both in the form of funds received and ideas suggested) but also to act as a main instrument for nation building by transforming the inputs received into developmental outputs. The most ostensible of these outputs was

modernization-induced and predictable social change following Western prescriptions. 132

1.6 Conclusions

The purpose of this chapter has been to display the theoretical weakness of the Public Administration discipline. According to our analysis, the discipline has been limited by the ahistorical, voluntaristic and reductionist nature of its explanations as well as the parochialism and conservatism of its theoretical infrastructure.

Any attempt to move the discipline toward a more theoretically and practically relevant position implies the need to overcome the previously mentioned limitations. This in turn requires a set of important changes in the way public administration is conceptualized and studied.

Of course, there is always the possibility of renouncing the attempt to develop theoretical capabilities within the field, limiting the discipline to its original intention: the production of apolitical public administrators with the technical capacity to implement political decisions. This is in a sense the essence of Waldo's proposal for a "professional" view of the

discipline.

However, the pressing need for developing countries to understand the nature of social change does not allow public administrators of these societies the luxury of the second alternative. Neither is this alternative valid for scholars of developed countries who have a genuine and serious interest in understanding the universal phenomena of public administration.

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CHAPTER II

A CHARACTERIZATION OF THE DISCIPLINE

The previous chapter which traced the evolutionary development of Public Administration as a discipline maintained that it is characterized by the ahistoric, reductionist and voluntarist nature of its explanations as well as by the parochialism and conservatism of its theoretical infrastructure. This chapter explores in greater detail the nature of these characteristics.

2.1 Ahistoricism

The discipline of Public Administration is ahistorical, in the sense that it is fundamentally concerned with the "synchrony" of the state apparatus rather than with its "diachrony". In other words, it is concerned with the "invariant structure and fixed modes of transformation" that characterize the state apparatus within a given temporal fraction of its history, rather than with the evolution of the modes of transformation of the state apparatus over time.

Ferdinand de Saussure's use of the concept of diachrony

and synchrony is of assistance in explaining ahistoricism.

- Using the graphic presented in Figure 1, he argues that diachrony refers to "the axis of simultaneities (AB), which stands for the relations of coexisting things and from which the intervention of time is excluded".² On the other hand synchrony, according to de Saussure, refers to "the axis of successions (CD), on which only one thing can be considered at a time but upon which are located all the things on the first axis together with their changes".³

Public Administration theories predominantly deal with the analysis of administrative systems abstracted from time -the axis of simultaneities- rather than with the history of those systems -the axis of successions. In other words, public administration analysis has traditionally been static. Within the field of economics, J. S. Mills described economic statics as the study of "the economical phenomena of society considered as existing simultaneously".⁴ Within the same field, J. A. Schumpeter describes static analysis as "a method of dealing with economic phenomena that tries to establish relations between elements of the economic system -prices and quantities of commodities- all of which have the same time subscript, that is to say, refer to the same point of time".⁵ Using these definitions, we could argue that public administration has traditionally studied the relations among elements of the administrative system and between the administrative system and its environment, abstracted from time. The problem with this approach is that

Figure 1: de Saussure's axes of Simultaneities and Successions.

Source: Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics* (New York: Mc Graw-Hill Book Company, 1959), p. 80.

it ignores the fact that public administration systems, as well as economic systems, are "the result of preceding configurations".⁶ As Oscar Oszlak points out, the formation of the state apparatus

describes a rather sinuous, erratic and contradictory pattern, in which remnants of various strategies and programs of political action can be observed. Efforts to materialize the projects, initiatives and priorities of the regimes that alternately control the state, give way to multiple organizational forms and varying functional arrangements within the state apparatus. To a large extent, these institutional outcomes depend on how the social conflicts, disputed in this power arena are settled.

As a consequence, it is not possible to understand the nature and functioning of public administration systems without understanding the historical factors that shape them throughout time. Moreover, it is not possible to adapt the nature and functioning of public administration systems to the objectives of governments without understanding that "to make a political project viable requires action upon, as well as through, a pre-existing bureaucratic structure."⁸

2.2 Reductionism

Reductionist forms of analysis attempt to explain "one kind of social phenomena as being determined completely by another kind of social phenomena".⁹ This overemphasis on one

causal factor leads to the exclusion of the multiple and variable structural factors that shape and condition the organization and functioning of the state apparatus.

While the development of partial theories -dealing with mono-causal relations between elements of reality in isolation from the whole of which these elements form a part- has been possible in the natural sciences, the analysis of mono-causal relations between parts of social reality in isolation from the whole has proven to be inadequate. The capacity of the natural sciences to develop partial theories has to do with the fact that the parts that integrate a physical entity have characteristics which are "independent of their presence in the whole".¹⁰ As Cohen states:

In the physical world there are entities which are composed of the relationship between parts; and it is often said that these entities are more than the mere sum of their parts. This means that the entities have properties which are not found in the parts taken separately, but which are found when the parts are related. But these parts do have characteristics which exist independently of the entities in which they participate.¹¹

In the social sciences however, there are enormous limitations to the development of specialized knowledge and of partial theories about social phenomena. As Cohen points out,

the most fundamental idea concerning the nature of social reality is that the properties of the elements of social phenomena obtain many of their characteristics from the larger phenomena of which they are a part, while the larger entities obtain their characteristics mostly from the relations between the parts of which they are composed. 12

Awareness of the holistic nature of the social world has produced important attempts toward integration within the social sciences. This is probably best reflected in the popularity of the formation of multidisciplinary academic programs as well as in the development of combined fields of studies such as Political Economy and Political Sociology. Nonetheless, the trend towards specialization still continues to be much stronger than the movement towards integration.

Probably no other discipline reflects more dramatically the problem of atomization and over-specialization than does Public Administration. Since its inception this discipline has analyzed public administration phenomena almost in isolation from the whole social reality within which the practice of Public Administration takes place. In 1887 Woodrow Wilson stated that

administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administration questions are not political questions.

As a result of the uncritical and superficial interpretation of this statement, comparative politics became a discipline in search of a subject matter while public administration developed as a subject matter in search of a theory. Political Science, furthermore, became a vague and erratic discipline with a chronic identity problem and scientific pretensions while the discipline of Public Administration has suffered from the over-specialized nature of its theoretical orientation and as a consequence, from the reductionist nature of its explanations.

2.3 Voluntarism

The reductionist nature of most public administration theories has resulted in a tendency for the discipline to offer voluntarist interpretations of public administration phenomena. In social sciences, voluntarism "denotes any theory that stresses the place of choice, decision, purpose, and norms in social action".¹⁴ In other words, voluntarist explanations tend to ignore the role that structural factors play in conditioning and limiting human beings' freedom of action.

Most public administration theories are voluntarist because they implicitly or explicitly deal with public administration systems as if they are the result of conscious design. The will of governments is considered to

be the single most important factor shaping the modes of transformation of the state apparatus. Consequently, public administration phenomena are explained "without a priori analysis of the social processes and structures in which organizations are thought to exist".¹⁵

2.4 Parochialism and Ideological Conservatism

Social theories and ideas are influenced by the historical circumstances within which they develop. It is not possible to fully understand the nature of theories and ideas concerning social phenomena without some knowledge of the temporal and spatial content that affect their emergence and development. Historicism, relativism and the sociology of knowledge have extensively dealt with this important issue.

Historicism basically argues that human thought and knowledge is determined by the particular socio-historical situation within which it emerges. From this perspective, it is wrong to assess the validity and consistency of past ideas without placing them in their historical context. Moreover, it is wrong to assume that ideas necessarily transcend the socio-historical milieu within which they emerge.

thought and knowledge by socio-historical circumstances. However, it concentrates more on the relative nature of values. From this perspective, ethical considerations in terms of what is right and what is wrong are determined by the particular socio-historical and cultural circumstances within which human actions take place.

Finally, the sociology of knowledge deals with the process of production and distribution of knowledge within society as conditioned by social circumstances. In other words, it is concerned with the social construction of knowledge which amounts to, "the social construction of reality".¹⁶

Historicism, relativism, and the sociology of knowledge share, as a fundamental assumption, the fact that man's consciousness is conditioned by his social and historical existence. This is not to say that ideas are totally subordinated to an outside reality or that subjective reality is totally determined by objective reality. There is a dialectical relation between ideas and realities in which ideas shape the same reality that stimulates them.

Thus, the history of the ideas of any discipline can only be understood by taking into consideration the socio-historical context within which they emerge and develop. Alvin Gouldner, in tracing the development of

"background and domain assumptions", behind every major sociological movement since Comte and Saint-Simon. According to Gouldner:

Deliberately formulated social theories, we might say with deliberate oversimplification, contain at least two distinguishable elements. One element is the explicitly formulated assumptions, which may be called "postulations". But they contain ... a second set of assumptions that are unpostulated and unlabeled, and these I will term "background assumptions". I call them background assumptions because, on the one hand, they provide the background out of which the postulations in part emerge and, on the other hand, not being expressly formulated, they remain in the background of the theorist's attention. 17

Background assumptions form a person's subjective view of reality. They are the product of the process of internalization of the society's objective reality as mediated by the process of socialization, which is nothing but society's attempt to establish "a high degree of symmetry between objective and subjective reality". 18

Background assumptions that apply only to members of a single domain are called by Gouldner, "domain assumptions". According to him, they might include "dispositions" to believe that men are rational or irrational; that society is precarious or fundamentally stable; that social problems will correct themselves without planned intervention; that human behavior is unpredictable; that man's true humanity

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A social scientist's set of domain assumptions constitute "the infrastructure of social theory".²⁰ For Gouldner:

This infrastructure is important not because it is the ultimate determinant of the character of social theory, but because it is part of the most immediate, local surround from which the theory-work eventuates in theory performances and theory products. Theory-work is surely linked to, even if not solely determined by, the character of the theorist doing it. This infrastructure can never really be left behind, even in the most isolated and lonely moments of theory work, when a man finally puts pen to paper in a room where there is no one but himself. The world is, of course, there in the room with him, in him; he has not escaped it. But it is not the world, not the society and the culture that is there with him, but his limited version and partial experience of it.²¹

The theoretical infrastructure of the Public Administration discipline has been almost exclusively determined by the historical political development of the United States. Thus, the fundamental assumptions of the discipline remain spatially and temporally trapped within the historical experience of that country. Not surprisingly its development has been almost solely influenced by American thinking about American problems.

The parochial perspective of the discipline accounts for its conservatism. Public Administration has never been seriously concerned with the understanding of social

transformation and its relation to the organization and administration of the state apparatus. On the contrary, it has been primarily concerned with order, 'social' integration and systems survival. Even when the concept of change was introduced into the analysis of public administration in developing countries, this was conceived to be evolutionary, homeostatic and intended to conform to the historical model of development followed by the Anglo-American societies.

Ahistoricism, reductionism, voluntarism, parochialism and conservatism have emerged as central characteristics of the study of Public Administration. In the following chapter an alternative model for the study of public administration will be developed. The formulation of this model is a preliminary attempt to overcome some of the shortcomings of the discipline.

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PART TWO

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE
INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF THE STATE APPARATUS: AN ALTERNATIVE
MODEL FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

CHAPTER III

THE MODEL: A CONVERGENCE OF MARX AND WEBER

3.1 Introduction.

In this chapter, an eclectic combination of the Marxist and Weberian traditions will be used to develop the rationale for the construction of an alternative model¹ for the study of public administration. From this rationale,² the nominal definitions³ and the mechanism⁴ of the model will be derived.

Eclecticism can be conceived as "the practice of selecting doctrines from different systems of thought without adopting the whole parent system for each doctrine."⁵ However, in the Social Sciences, so permeated by ideological overtones, eclecticism often has a negative connotation, synonymous with confusion and lack of theoretical clarity and definition. Behind these criticisms lies the predominance of ideology over science. The ideologically committed mind functions within a clearly organized theoretical framework that is used as a definitive interpretation of the world. Certainty is achieved by

reducing the world and its complexity to a subjectively acquired set of premises, concepts and methods. Eclecticism goes against absolute certainty, since it leaves the scientist always open for new ideas and new thoughts. The mind is not a closed fortress resisting doubt, but an open laboratory for testing and experimentation.

Interestingly, in the natural sciences, eclecticism is a common practice, the functioning and implication of which is described by Bertrand Russell in the following quotation:

The methods of increasing the degrees of truth in our beliefs are well-known; they consist in hearing all sides, trying to ascertain all the relevant facts, controlling our own bias by discussion with people who have the opposite bias, and cultivating a readiness to discard any hypothesis which has proved inadequate. These methods are practiced in science, and have built up the body of scientific knowledge. Every man of science whose outlook is truly scientific is ready to admit that what passes for scientific knowledge at the moment is sure to require correction with the progress of discovery; nevertheless, it is near enough to the truth to serve for most practical purposes, though not for all. In science, where alone something approximating to genuine knowledge is to be found, men's attitude is tentative and full of doubt.⁶

It is in line with the scientific tradition described by Russell that some of the theoretical arguments of the Marxist and the Weberian tradition will be used. It is a basic contention of this thesis that the ideas of Marx and Weber are partially complementary and partially

contradictory and that an eclectic use of the complementary elements provides a richer understanding of public administration phenomena than does the adoption of either to the total exclusion of the other.

3.2 The Rationale of the Model

Social Change, Institutionalization and Social Order.

The concepts of social order and social change are two analytical abstractions for the study and understanding of processes of socio-historical development. Social change and social order are intrinsic elements of the historical processes through which social structures are either modified into amended social structures or transformed into new ones. For while change is inevitable, order after change is indispensable. As Cohen points out:

That societies simultaneously possess these opposed characteristics may be perfectly obvious. Yet it does not appear to be obvious to those who constantly proclaim that it is in the nature of societies to be driven by conflicts of interest and principle and to be in a constant process of change, while overlooking the fact that it is equally in its nature to be orderly and persistent.

Unfortunately, too much effort within the social sciences has been devoted to the sterile question of whether change or order is the fundamental characteristic of society and social phenomena. A more meaningful issue is the study of change and order as interdependent elements of socio-historical processes. Order and change are not mutually exclusive; in fact, within human society they are mutually inclusive. Change cannot be perceived without preexisting order, and order is the inevitable outcome of the institutionalization of change.

The issue of institutionalization has been addressed from different social disciplines including sociology, anthropology, public administration and political science. In regard to social organizations, Samuel Huntington for example, defines institutionalization as the "process by which organizations acquire value and stability."⁸ For Philip Selznick, "to institutionalize is to infuse with value beyond the technical requirements of the tasks at hand."⁹ Larry B. Hill defines institutionalization as a "process that occurs over time in which the organization creates authority relationships vis-a-vis the environmental actors."¹⁰ A more comprehensive definition of the concept is the one provided by Talcott Parsons. For him, institutionalization is a process through which:

the value patterns of the common culture of a social system are integrated in the concrete.

action of its units in their interaction with each other through the definition of role expectations and the organization of motivation.¹¹

In this sense, institutions

define the broad rather than the detailed conditions of the balancing of performances and sanctions; they define the conditions of maintaining a stable state in terms of meeting the functional prerequisites of the system under more or less typical conditions. They set limits within which sanctions (economic and other ones) are permitted to operate. When these limits are exceeded, not only are advantages gained or lost, but rights and obligations are violated or infringed. Such violation activates not only rational measures to re-establish such rights and obligations, but also various non-rational psychological mechanisms of the sort involved in the genesis of deviant behaviour.¹²

In consequence, institutionalization refers to the ongoing phenomenon of creation of accepted social reality.¹³
This process implies:

1) The definition of the major ways of looking at the basic problems of human existence and of social and cultural order, of posing the major questions about them; ¹⁴

2) The provision of the possible and organizational answers to these problems which develop within a given society or civilization; and ¹⁵

3) The organization of various institutional and symbolic structures for the implementation of different types of solutions or answers to these problems. ¹⁶

For analytical purposes, the process of institutionalization of social change - or what is the same, the social construction of reality - can be divided into three phases.

The first phase can be identified as the stage of EXTERNALIZATION. This refers to the process of creation of social institutions by the members of a particular society. In this sense, "social order is a human product, or, more precisely, an ongoing human production." 17

The second phase is termed OBJECTIVATION. This refers to the process by which the social world that has been created by man acquires an independent character separated from his creator. In this situation, social reality is accepted as given and man loses awareness of his condition as creator. As Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann state, it is important to point out that

the relationship between man, the producer, and the social world, his product, is and remains a dialectical one. That is, man (not, of course, in isolation but in his collectivities) and his social world interact with each other. The product acts back upon the producer. Externalization and objectivation are moments in a continuing dialectical process. 18

Finally the third phase is INTERNALIZATION, or the process through which "the objectivated social world is retrograded into consciousness in the course of

socialization."¹⁹ It is through this process that man learns to accept the social world and its institutions as legitimate entities.

Political Change, Institutionalization and Political Order.

Like other types of social change, political change tends to become institutionalized. However, the process of institutionalization is guided -although not solely determined- by a preconceived notion of the ends sought and of the methods to be used for those purposes. In other words, the processes of externalization, objectivation and internalization are consciously promoted by the inducers of political change.

The element that distinguishes political change from other forms of social change is then the element of purposiveness. Political change is an intentional and preconceived process of social change; being politics, "the purposive organizational behavior the object of which is to formulate and to achieve social goals by means of consensus and coercion." ²⁰

In talking about the institutionalization of political change it is important -for analytical purposes- to distinguish between institutionalization as a process and

institutionalization as a state. As a process, the institutionalization of political change refers to an ongoing and preconceived process of creation of political reality. As a state, it refers to one particular socio-temporal fraction of the previously mentioned process. It is in this sense that we can compare different degrees of institutionalization of different political roles and institutions.

It is safe to say that the institutionalization of political change as a permanent state is the ultimate goal of any political actor attempting to introduce socio-structural changes and their maintenance through the use of authority rather than force alone. If political institutionalization as a state is a goal, political institutionalization as a process involves a purposive element, which can be identified as a government's political policy objectives.

By policy we mean "deliberate coercion -statements attempting to set forth the purpose, the means, the subjects and the objects of coercion."²¹ The process of policy formulation has both a technical and a political dimension, each of which presents a different type of rationality. These two different aspects are explained and exemplified by Bruce Doern, when he compares the view of the economist and that of the politician in the process of policy formulation:

when he comes to select ways of securing compliance for a policy, the economist tends to view these as tactics or as means to achieving the broader goal objectives, rather than the objective of compliance. This is where he tends to part company with the politician, because the politician knows that, in a very real sense, the selection of different approaches involves the securing of social compliance and involves it not only as a means, but also as an activity that is an end in itself. 22

In consequence, the rationality of the politician implies a concern for the institutionalization of the changes introduced through public policies. That is to say, the central political objective of public policy is the institutionalization of political change to the point where the predominant values being promoted "become explanations of a social situation (it does not matter whether the explanation is causal or mythical) and standards of appropriate action designed to produce some desired (envalued) resolution or management of the situation." 23

In summary, the element of purposiveness in the establishment of authority distinguishes political institutionalization from the more general phenomenon of social institutionalization. Political institutionalization refers to the purposive establishment of a specific pattern of relations of domination within a given social formation i.e. of politics, "as the organization of control of man over man." 24 Social institutionalization, mainly analyzed in anthropology and sociology, refers to the

institutionalization of roles or patterns of behaviour in a process that includes not only the political dimension but also unintentional by-products of human intervention:

Institutionalization of Political Change and the State Apparatus.

The notion of the state as an instrumental mechanism for the institutionalization of political change can be traced back to the original works of both Karl Marx and Max Weber. Each of these thinkers analyzed political change and political order as interdependent phenomena. However, while Marx emphasized the economic structure of society as the determinant factor of both political order and political change, Weber emphasized the relations of domination as the determinant of political stability and political transformation. Moreover, while Marx concentrated his work on the analysis of the dynamic of social and political change, Weber emphasized the element of social and political stability.

In his Critique of Political Economy, for example, Marx states that,

in the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are

indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society-the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or- what is but a legal expression for the same thing- with the property relations within which they had been at work before. From forms of development of the forces of production, these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation, the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. 25

Marxist historical materialism -the essence of which is expressed in this quotation- explains the persistence and transformation of political systems as interdependent faces of a predominantly economically determined process of historical development. According to Marx, social order entails social contradictions; social contradictions create the conditions for social change; finally, social change generates a new social order that contains new social contradiction and the cycle repeats again. This process, -in Marx's view- explains the emergence, existence and disappearance of the major forms of social order and their corresponding political expressions, i.e., primitive communism, slavery, feudalism and capitalism. Each of these

forms of social order has generated the conditions for its own disintegration as well as for the emergence of subsequent forms of order. Capitalism, the order that constituted Marx's focus of attention, is assumed to contain the elements of class conflict that will eventually transform it into a socialist order.

According to Marx, the polarization and intensification of the conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat - the two most important classes in capitalist societies - is the political expression of internal social contradictions taking place at the level of society's economic structure. For Marx, the resolution of this contradiction is the inevitable destruction of the bourgeoisie and the emergence of a classless society, the only form of social order with no internal contradictions.

It is important to point out that the concept of class in the Marxist tradition is based on the economic and legal relation of man to the social means of production. In other words, "property as a source of income is the basic objective criterion of class." 26

Weber, on the other hand, explains political order and political change as the result of the stability or instability of social relations of domination. According to him, it is possible to identify three types of relations of domination: legal, traditional and charismatic. These

relations may be based on:

a) Rational grounds -resting on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority);

b) Traditional grounds -resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them (traditional authority); or finally

c) Charismatic grounds -resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic authority).²⁷

The Weberian typology of domination is intimately associated with the process of emergence, disappearance and transformation of systems of domination throughout history. History is viewed by Weber as a process in which "the two basically antagonistic forces of charisma and tradition regularly merge with one another."²⁸ As Nicos P. Mouzelis explains:

In critical moments, when social institutions become too rigid and unfit to meet new difficult situations, the charisma, a disruptive force, upsets the established order and opens up new ways of life.²⁹

However, charismatic authority according to Weber, "can not remain stable but becomes either traditionalized or rationalized or a combination of both."³⁰ Order, in other

words, is the necessary outcome of change.

In analyzing history, Weber insisted "that conflict and the struggle for power are irradicable elements of the human condition."³¹ According to him, the actors of social conflict are not economic classes as defined by man's economic and legal relationship to the social means of production as Marx argued, but social classes as defined by man's access to the means of distribution. Classes, then, "appear to take shape by way of aggregation of groups that share a common set of life-chances and circumstances, as measured by the conventional indices of distribution."³² Life chances, in turn are defined by Weber as,

the kind of control or lack of it which the individual has over goods or services and existing possibilities of their exploitation for the attainment of receipts within a given economic order.³³

A common characteristic of both the Marxist and the Weberian approaches is their view of change emerging from an existing order and the tendency for change to be institutionalized. From both the Marxist and the Weberian perspective, the institutionalization of change is a process through which a new legitimized social order is created. Legitimation, as Berger and Luckman state,

"explains" the institutional order by ascribing

cognitive validity to its objectivated meanings. Legitimation justifies the institutional order by giving a normative dignity to its practical imperatives. ³⁴

Ideology is the concept used by Marx to refer to the social set of values and beliefs that justify institutional social arrangements. From his perspective, the concept has a negative connotation since it "encompasses all the mental misconceptions that constitute the failure of individuals to understand their alienated relationship to their surroundings and the significance of that relationship within the whole development of history." ³⁵ Ideology is, in other words, an impediment for the development of class consciousness.

In Weber's view, the existence of a set of social values and beliefs for the justification of the institutional order of society was simply an integral and necessary element of social reality. Since he accepted the inevitability of class relations, he perceived as natural the existence of relations of authority: of legitimized relations of power. As he points out, "without exception every sphere of social action is profoundly influenced by structures of dominancy." ³⁶ A relation of domination refers -in Weber's view- to a situation

in which the manifested will (command) of the ruler or rulers is meant to influence the conduct of one or more others (the ruled) and actually does influence it in such a way that their conduct to a socially relevant degree

occurs as if the ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of their conduct for its very own sake. 37

These beliefs about the legitimacy of power are important because they "determine the relative stability of systems of domination as well as portray the basic differences between such systems." 38

To sum up, Marx and Weber not only agree about the tendency for change to become institutionalized but they also argue that the legitimization of the institutional social structure -the essence of the institutionalization process- is a social device for the control of social conflict. Berger and Luckman synthesize this common position when they state that "to say that a segment of human activity has been institutionalized is already to say that this segment of human activity has been subsumed under social control." 39

Instrumentalization of the State Apparatus.

Marx and Weber also agree in their conception of the state apparatus as an instrumental mechanism for the institutionalization of political change or in other words, for the control of social conflict.

Within the Marxist tradition, it is possible to identify two different views of the state as an instrument for class domination. The first one, derives from the reading of the Communist Manifesto and the assertion that "the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie."⁴⁰ The second, is based on Marx's analysis of the Bonapartist state. As Frank Parkin has pointed out:

Marx portrayed the state under Louis Bonaparte as the saviour of the bourgeoisie, notwithstanding the fact that the coup d'etat stripped the bourgeoisie of parliamentary power and elevated Bonaparte to the standing of a personal dictator.⁴¹

The first interpretation -better known as the instrumentalist perspective- has given place to a view of the state as a simple instrument of the dominant class. As V. Seymour Wilson states: "This position, by making the state an instrument of the ruling class, allows no autonomy to state institutions. All state institutions are geared towards the fundamental needs of capitalist accumulation."⁴² From this perspective, "bureaucracy as a state structure is viewed simply as a pawn in the hands of the bourgeoisie."⁴³

The second interpretation, more commonly identified as the structuralist perspective, has made possible the development of a more sophisticated view of the state, one in which the state is viewed "neither as a specific

institution nor as an instrument, but as a relation -a materialized concentration of the class relations of a given society." ⁴⁴ As such, the state is a relatively autonomous entity with the capacity "to break free of its rôle as a mere executive committee and to win some measure of independence from the class whose destiny is so intimately bound up with its own." ⁴⁵

In Weber we find an even more explicit conception of the state as a mechanism for the control of social conflict. For him,

a compulsory political organization with continuous operations (politischer Anstaltsbetrieb) will be called a "state" insofar as it successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order. ⁴⁶

In other words, the state is conceived by Weber as a political organization capable of developing and maintaining a relation of domination vis-à-vis the members of a particular society, as well as capable of promoting and defending the legitimacy of the political order that it represents. According to Weber "the habit of obedience, which is essential to domination, ... cannot be maintained over time without a continually functioning administrative staff which enforces the order." ⁴⁷ Following this logic, Weber identified the particular administrative system corresponding to each of the charismatic, the traditional

and the legal forms of domination. Bureaucracy -the system of administration that he was mainly interested in- is defined as the "typical" administrative apparatus corresponding to the legal type of domination."⁴⁸

More recent contributions to our understanding of the state as an instrumental mechanism for the institutionalization of political change are those of Goran Therborn,⁴⁹ a neo-Marxist, and Oscar Oszlak,⁵⁰ a neo-Weberian.

Therborn and Oszlak each have attempted to show how the establishment and maintenance of different political systems -and consequently the achievement of specific types of political objectives- requires the identification, implementation and administration of specific modes of transformation of the state apparatus. Their contribution could serve to find a new understanding of the subject matter of the discipline of Public Administration, one in which the instrumentalization of the state apparatus becomes the focus of the discipline. Let us explain.

Following the tradition of Louis Althusser and Nicos Poulantzas, Therborn distinguishes between the concept of "state power" and "state apparatus". For him:

State power is a relation between social class forces expressed in the content of state policies. The class character of these policies may be seen in their direct effects upon the

forces and relations of production, upon the ideological superstructure and upon the state apparatus.⁵¹

State power, according to Therborn "is exercised through the state apparatus, or more precisely, through a system of state apparatuses."⁵² For him;

The separate existence of the state is part of a specific division of labour within society. Its internal organization thus reflects in a particular way the social division of labour and the prevailing social class relations, contributing to their reproduction in the ever-ongoing social process.⁵³

Thus for Therborn, "the very organizational form of the state manifests social class relations and contributes to their reproduction."⁵⁴ From here, Therborn attempts to identify the organizational and administrative characteristics that distinguish the modes of transformation of the state apparatus corresponding to the feudalist, the capitalist and the socialist systems.

Therborn's view of the state apparatus implies a recognition of the need to instrumentalize the state apparatus as a precondition for the institutionalization of political change. According to him,

the working class needs not only an economic programme of nationalizations and social services, but also a political programme of

changes in the organization of the state that will bring about a popular democracy.⁵⁵

Within the more specific context of Latin America, Oszlak has tried to establish the relationship between "styles of management" and the nature of political regimes. Styles of management are conceptualized "in terms of different structures of authority, means of control, patterns of functional organization, action orientations, and modes of resource appropriation and allocation."⁵⁶ According to him:

There is a causal relationship between political regimes and bureaucratic organization. That is, the various forms of bureaucratic interdependence (or intra-bureaucratic dynamics) are differentially affected by the nature of the political regime. The transformations underwent by the state apparatus as a new regime takes power, can thus be explained by the kind of interactions that occur once the incumbent power-holders try to make the state machinery compatible with their political designs.⁵⁷

The notion of the instrumentalization of the state apparatus, as a mechanism for the institutionalization of political change is made more explicit by Oszlak when he points out that

every new regime attempts at altering not only the power relationships in civil society according to its political conception and the need of strengthening its social bases of support, but also the power structure within the state apparatus itself.⁵⁸

In other words, the successful implementation of any political project requires the adaptation and administration of the modes of transformation of the state apparatus in accordance with the nature of the political changes sought. This adaptation and administration is what we have called instrumentalization of the state apparatus, and its analysis, understanding and mastering constitute the focus of study of the analytical framework for the study of Public Administration that is being introduced in this chapter.

Instrumentalization of the State Apparatus and the Totality of the Social Formation.

The notion of totality -as Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan point out- implies that "it is crucial to study total social formations as a means of understanding the elements of a social system." ⁵⁹ From this perspective, the analysis of the phenomenon of instrumentalization of the state apparatus requires one to consider it as one of several interrelated social structures that together comprise the totality of a given social formation.

Both Marx and Weber conceived of society as a mosaic of interdependent social relations or structures. From this

perspective, the analysis of any one of these structures would have to take into consideration its relations with the others.

At the more general level Marx distinguishes between the "economic structure of society" and the "superstructure". According to him, the economic structure, that includes the forces and the relations of production, determines "the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life." ⁶⁰

Marxist literature is plagued with mechanistic interpretations of the concept of determination as a simple, mono causal, unidirectional relationship between base and superstructure. These interpretations however, have been quickly losing appeal among contemporary Marxist scholars. For example, Althusser -the most important exponent of Marxist structuralism- defines the relations among structures within the totality of a social formation as "asymmetrical, contradictory and overdetermined." ⁶¹ That is,

the economic base "determines" ("in the last instance") which element is to be dominant in a social formation.... Hence it is a structure of dominance. But the dominant element is not fixed for all time, it varies according to the overdetermination of the contradictions and their uneven development.... In the social formation this overdetermination, is in the last instance, determined by the economy. ⁶²

Althusser's conception of the relations among structures within the totality of a social formation is a departure from mechanistic interpretations of the relationship between base and superstructure. Social structures according to Althusser,

possess a certain order, are organised into a certain hierarchy, according to the determination of the economy, which displaces the role of dominant instance onto a particular instance and allocates to the other instances their specific roles. However, they enjoy a certain autonomy, which is the very form that their existence as instances of the whole takes. ⁶³

The key element in Althusser's understanding of the relation among social structures is his interpretation of the Engelian concept of "determination in the last instance". According to Althusser, "the economy is determinant, but in the last instance...in the long run...the run of history." ⁶⁴ Moreover,

the economic dialectic is never active in the pure state; in the History, these instances, the superstructures, etc. are never seen to step respectfully aside when their work is done or, when the Time comes, as his pure phenomena, to scatter before His Majesty the Economy as he strides along the royal road of the Dialectic. From the first moment to the last, the lonely hour of the "last instance" never comes. ⁶⁵

Poulantzas has further elaborated the Althusserian conception of socio-structural relations, moving even

further from the mechanistic Marxist interpretation of the relation between base and superstructure. Especially important in understanding Poulantzas' theoretical position is his conception of the Marxist concept of "mode of production." According to him,

by mode of production we shall designate not what is generally marked out as the economic (i.e. relations of production in the strict sense), but a specific combination of various structures and practices which, in combination, appear as so many instances or levels, i.e. as so many regional structures of this mode. A mode of production, as Engels stated schematically, is composed of different levels or instances, the economic, political, ideological and theoretical: it is understood that this is merely a schematic picture and that a more exhaustive division can be drawn up. The type of unity which characterizes a mode of production is that of a complex whole dominated, in the last instance, by the economic. 66

With Poulantzas, the distinction between base and superstructure is blurred. This radical departure from one of the most sacred theoretical principles of Marxism has been noticed by Parkin who argues that within Poulantzas' conception of "mode of production",

everything reacts to and feeds back upon everything else, so bringing about the unification of those two domains once known as base and superstructure. In the process, Marxism's key explanatory concept turns into nothing more than a synonym for the social structure itself, occasionally masquerading as one of its principal parts. 67

The highly abstract language of Althusser and Poulantzas has been more clearly expressed by Erik Olin Wright who has attempted to clarify the Marxist interpretation of causal relations among structures within a given social formation. In doing this, Wright introduced the notion of "modes of determination", i.e. "a series of distinct relationships of determination among the structural categories of Marxist theory and between those categories and the appearances of empirical investigation." ⁶⁸

Wright organizes the different modes of determination he identifies into models of determination: "Schematic representations of the complex interconnections of the various modes of determination involved in a given structural process." ⁶⁹ According to Wright these models of determination "can be considered symbolic maps of what Althusserians have generally referred to as 'structured totalities'." ⁷⁰ The following is a summarized description of each one of the modes of determination identified by Wright. They help to explain the graphic representation of the "Combined Model of Determination of Economic Structure, State Structure, State Policies and Class Struggle", as presented by Wright in Figure 2.

1.- Structural Limitation: This constitutes a pattern of determination in which some social

Source: Erick Olin Wright, Class, Crisis and the State

(London: Lowe & Brydone Printers Ltd., 1978), p. 223.

structure establishes limits within which some other structure or process can vary, and establish probabilities for the specific structures or processes that are possible within those limits.⁷¹

2.- Selection: Selection constitutes those social mechanisms that concretely determine ranges of outcomes, or in the extreme case specific outcomes, within a structurally limited range of possibilities.⁷²

3. Reproduction/non reproduction: to say that one structure functions to reproduce another implies that the reproducing structure prevents the reproduced structure from changing in certain fundamental ways. Reproduction/non reproduction must therefore be understood as a variable relation of determination, not an absolute one.⁷³

4.-Limits of Functional Compatibility: This is the mode of determination which determines which forms of the state will be reproductive and which non-reproductive.⁷⁴

5.-Transformation: refers to a mode of determination by which class struggle (practices) directly affect the processes of structural limitation, selection and reproduction/non-reproduction.⁷⁵

6.-Mediation: It defines a mode of determination in which a given social process shapes the consequences of other social processes.⁷⁶

In order to understand the departure of contemporary Marxism from traditional mechanistic interpretations of structural causality Wright's use of the concept of "structural limitation" is crucial. For him, this form of determination "is especially important for understanding the sense in which economic structures 'ultimately' determine political and ideological structures."⁷⁷ As he points out,

Economic structures set limits on the possible forms of political and ideological structures, and make some of those possible forms more likely than others, but they do not rigidly determine in a mechanistic manner any given form of political and ideological relations. ⁷⁸

To sum up, the Marxist conception of economic determinism has evolved from a mechanistic interpretation of socio-structural relations to an interpretation of structural causation as a "probabilistic" relation of cause and effect. According to Wright, the economic structure does not determine the superstructure or the shape of the state and other social institutions. Indeed the economic structure only fixes limits to, and establish possibilities for, the form and organization of the superstructure. Thus, a socialist legal superstructure cannot develop within a capitalist economic system, and pluralism is more likely to develop within a society with an equalitarian distribution of wealth. Let us now turn to Weber.

An analysis of the Weberian conception of socio-structural causation necessarily starts with Weber's concept of "social action." From his perspective, "sociology, is a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of social action" and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and consequences.⁷⁹ Moreover, according to Weber,

We shall speak of "action" insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to his behavior- be it overt or covert, omission or acquiescence. Action is "social" insofar as its subjective meaning takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course.⁸⁰

Four main types of social actions are distinguished by Weber: a) Instrumentally rational, which according to him are "determined by expectations as to the behavior of objects in the environment and of other human beings; these expectations are used as 'conditions' or 'means' for the attainment of the actor's own rationally pursued and calculated ends";⁸¹ b) Value rational, which is "determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects of success";⁸² c) Affectual, which is "determined by the actor's specific affects and feeling states";⁸³ and d) Traditional, which is "determined by ingrained habituation." ⁸⁴

A set of relatively predictable and relatively homogeneous social actions carried out by a plurality of individuals is called by Weber a "social relationship." As Martindale points out with the introduction of the concept of "social relationship", Weber is able to "make the transition from his concept of social action to that of social structure."⁸⁵ According to Weber:

The term "social relationship" will be used to

denote the behavior of a plurality of actors insofar as, in its meaningful content, the action of each takes account of that of the others and is oriented in these terms. The social relationship thus consists entirely and exclusively in the existence of a probability that there will be a meaningful course of social action -irrespective, for the time being, of the basis of this probability.⁸⁶

In other words, the concept of social structure or social relation refers to identifiable patterns of behaviour or roles that develop as a result of recurrent and relatively predictable social interactions.

The relationship among roles and sets of roles within a given social formation has been more systematically and comprehensively studied by Talcott Parsons. His concept of "social system" refers precisely, to "the system of interrelated roles which are prescribed by shared norms and underpinned by fundamental values."⁸⁷ According to Parsons, some of these sets of roles "form constellations called institutions."⁸⁸

In the Weberian tradition there are no monocausal relationships among structures. For example, domination-according to Weber- does not "utilize in every case economic power for its foundation and maintenance."⁸⁹ However, "the structure of dominance is in many cases both a factor of great economic importance and, at least to some extent, a result of economic conditions."⁹⁰

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that Weber's rejection of any form of determinism means that he adopted a nihilist position toward history. Weber recognized the existence of socio-structural limitations and structural possibilities that may shape, facilitate or impede human action. In this sense, what is humanly possible is determined by the "relations of adequacy" among social structures. This concept refers to specific historical situations in which the relations among social structures (economic, political, etc.) allow or impede certain forms of social action. This aleatoric view of determinism is expressed by Weber in the following quotation:

As we have said, groups that are not somehow economically determined are extremely rare. However, the degree of this influence varies widely and, above all, the economic determination of social action is ambiguous -contrary to the assumption of so-called historical materialism. Phenomena that must be treated as constants in economic analysis are very often compatible with significant structural variations -from a sociological view point- among the groups that comprise them or coexist with them, including groups with primary and secondary economic interests. Even the assertion that social structures and the economy are "functionally" related is a biased view which cannot be justified as an historical generalization, if an unambiguous interdependence is assumed. For the forms of social action follow "laws of their own", as we shall see time and again, and even apart from this fact, they may in a given case always be co-determined by other than economic causes. However, at some point economic conditions tend to become causally important, and often decisive, for almost all social groups, at least those which have major cultural significance;

conversely the economy is usually also influenced by the autonomous structure of social action within which it exists. No significant generalization can be made as to when and how this will occur. However, we can generalize about the degree of elective affinity between concrete structures of social action and concrete forms of economic organization; that means, we can state in general terms whether they further or impede or exclude one another. We will have to deal frequently with such relations of adequacy. 91

It is important to point out that in this quotation, when Weber refers to historical materialism, he is thinking of the prevailing mechanistic Marxism of his time. Interestingly enough, Weber's conception of historical causation is not significantly different from the contemporary Marxist interpretation of the concept of "economic determinism". For example, to say that the forms of social action follow "laws of their own" is to say that social structures are "relatively autonomous"; to say that social action "may in a given case always be co-determined by other than economic causes" is consistent with Althusser's notion of "overdetermination" and determination "in the last instance". Finally Weber's notion of "elective affinity" i.e., the possibility for "the economic structure to "further, or impede or exclude" some forms of social organization is similar to the "neo-Marxist probabilistic conception of "structural limitation" as developed by Wright.

The evolution of Marxist thought that we reviewed

earlier, makes possible the reconciliation of the Marxist and the Weberian view of socio-structural causation since both use a model of determination that recognizes objective possibilities for human action. These possibilities are not strictly determined by one particular form of mono-causal relationships among social structures but rather by a variable form of multi-structural determination. Ramos' view of "historical possibilities" synthesizes the conciliated understanding of socio-structural causation reached by the Neo-Marxist and the Weberian schools of thought. The notion of historical possibilities, according to Ramos, entails "a conception of historical and social reality as a permanent result of a tension between objective possibilities and human choice."⁹² This conception,

does not entail an indeterministic approach. To save determinism - which is essential to social science - from any metaphysical connotation, it is necessary to understand that determinism and freedom are not antipodes. If one excludes from the deterministic approach any place for freedom or for the role of human choices or decisions, one no longer has determinism but fatalism. If one expels from the social process the objective determinants of it, one implies the meaninglessness of society as a whole, i.e. nihilism, and therefore, the impossibility of social science. Determinism is unthinkable without freedom and freedom is unthinkable without objective limitations, i.e. determinism. Determinism or freedom is a false dilemma. In the historical and social process there is always determinism and freedom.⁹³

3.3 Nominal Definitions

There is a dual relationship between the concept of institutionalization of political change and the state. That is, we can conceive of the state as both the outcome of the process of institutionalization of political change and as a mechanism for the institutionalization of political change. As Oscar Oszlak points out,

on the one hand, in an ideal-abstract sense the state is a social formation, a political medium through which a system of social domination is articulated. On the other, its concrete manifestation is an interdependent group of institutions that form the apparatus in which the power and resources of political domination are concentrated. 94

As an outcome, the crystallization of the state as a system of social relations is a concrete expression of the process of institutionalization of political change. In this sense, "the formation of the state is a gradual process of acquiring the attributes that imply the ability to articulate and reproduce certain patterns of social relations, this is, of the structure of roles, statuses and norms existing within a social formation." 95

As a process, the institutionalization of political change requires the use of the state apparatus as an implementing mechanism. The state apparatus is then, the organizational and administrative arrangement used to institutionalize government political policy objectives. It

is the operational mechanism through which governments attempt to change and/or reproduce the existing social relations of a particular society. Because of this, the instrumentalization of the state apparatus constitutes government's most important objective. In fact, it is possible to generalize and say that the instrumentalization of the state apparatus is the most important objective of any form of political conflict. Political conflict "within the regime" such as electoral competition, is concretely aimed at achieving control of the state apparatus. Political conflict "about the regime",⁹⁶ such as in the case of a revolution, is aimed at neutralizing the power of the existing state apparatus as a prerequisite for victory and to allow the organization of a revolutionary state apparatus.

By instrumentalization of the state apparatus, however, we do not simply refer to a government's capacity to give orders or the bureaucrats' disposition to obey them. Instrumentalization refers to a government's capacity to identify, implement and administer the mode of transformation of the state apparatus that can properly promote and/or sustain the process of institutionalization of the political system or project it seeks to introduce and/or maintain.

By mode of transformation of the state apparatus we refer to a) the organizational design of the state

apparatus, b) its social domain, c) its organizational character, and d) its management.

Subsequently, by organizational design, we refer to the "process of grouping activities, roles or positions in the organization to coordinate effectively the interdependence that exists." ⁹⁷ Thus, — the state apparatus is perceived as a macro-organization: an open macro system within which many subsystems — different institutions and organizations such as ministries, special commissions etc. — operate and interact.

It is important to point out that, in talking about the organizational design of the state apparatus, we are not referring only to the distribution and allocation of tasks among different organizations. As Jeffrey Pfeffer points out,

it is not only tasks that are allocated and distributed throughout organizations. Control over resources, legitimate authority, and control of decision making are also distributed. ⁹⁸

By social domain, we refer to a) the range of products and services offered by the state apparatus and b) the sectors of the population served. ⁹⁹ The identification of a social domain is, "in essence, a political problem" ¹⁰⁰. It requires finding and holding a position that responds to the variable balance of power of all the different social groups that present demands to the state.

By organizational character we refer to the epistemological dimension of organizations. Donald Schon refers to this dimension as the theory of a social system, this is, "the set of epistemological rules by which the internal and external reality is interpreted and practically treated."¹⁰¹ According to him,

when a person enters a social system, he encounters a body of theory which more or less explicitly sets out not only the 'way the world is' but 'who we are', 'what we are doing' and 'what we should be doing'.¹⁰²

The notion of organizational character was originally used by Gouldner. According to him, by organizational character we refer to the

embodiment of values in an organizational structure through the elaboration of commitments, ways of acting and responding that can be changed, if at all, only at the risk of severe internal crisis.¹⁰³

Finally, by management we refer to the "process of getting things done by people who operate in organized groups."¹⁰⁴ As Mouzelis points out, this process refers to "the basic activities or functions of the manager (planning, co-ordinating, controlling etc.) and the more detailed and specific techniques in which the management process is based (budgeting, financial control, stock control, etc.)"¹⁰⁵ While

the function of administration "is more concerned with valuing, that is, with ends ... the function of management is more preoccupied with rational (intentional and procedural) action, that is, with means."¹⁰⁶ Thus, administration is "the art of influencing men to accomplish organizational goals while management is the ancillary and subordinate science of specifying and implementing means to accomplish the same ends."¹⁰⁷

3.4 The Dynamic of the State Apparatus: The Mechanism of the Model

As a system, the state apparatus "transforms variable states into variable states in an invariant manner."¹⁰⁸ As Fernando Cortes, Adam Przeworski and John Sprague point out, systems

have a fixed structure and hence fixed functions. The inputs, the internal states, and the outputs vary over time, while the manner in which inputs are transformed into outputs remains invariant during the same period of time. The operation of systems is thus ahistorical: the transformation that a system applies to given inputs does not depend upon the moment of time at which these inputs occur. Only when the structure of a system becomes altered (i.e. either new operations are performed or the same operations become combined differently) does the manner of transformation become affected. At this moment a new system appears, and this system operates again in an invariant manner during some period of time.¹⁰⁹

The state apparatus adopts throughout time invariant manners of transformation; this is to say, invariant forms of processing the inputs and producing the outputs. This is what Przeworski calls "the synchrony", this is, "the invariant structure and fixed modes of transformation that characterize a given system."¹¹⁰

As a system, the state apparatus functions within a given social formation. For analytical purposes, this social formation can be perceived as being composed of several relatively autonomous structures, namely, the governmental structure, the political structure, the economic structure and the state apparatus itself. These structures are each affected by international forces.

The interplay of these structures and forces determines the inputs that "feed" the state apparatus as well as its mode of transformation and outputs. It also affects the dynamic of the state apparatus as a system. The concept of dynamic refers to the temporal variations of the inputs, the mode of transformation and the outputs of the state apparatus.¹¹¹ In other words, while the synchrony of the state apparatus is "ahistorical", the dynamic of the state apparatus reflects the functioning of the system throughout time as it is affected by the continuous and variable interplay of the structures and forces that interact within the totality of the social formation in which it operates. It is in this sense that Przeworski argues that,

synchronic laws assert the structure of systems and their characteristic modes of transformation. Dynamic laws describe the history of states and outputs of a system exposed to given inputs.¹¹²

7 In other words, dynamic laws deal with the development and transformation of different invariant modes of transformation of the state apparatus throughout time. Each one of these transformations corresponds to what Przeworski calls "diacronic change", which is the change of "structure and function" in a given system.¹¹³

It is possible now to conceive of a social formation as composed of different relatively autonomous social structures. For the purpose of this thesis four social structures will be identified and classified:

a) Public Administration Structure or State Apparatus: the set of roles, statuses and norms organized with the purpose of institutionalizing political change.

b) Economic Structure: the set of roles, statuses and norms organized around the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services within a socio-temporal context.

c) Political Structure: the set of roles, statuses and norms organized around the objective of influencing or

(

instrumentalizing the state apparatus.

d) Government: the set of roles, statuses and norms organized to legally hold the formal positions of control of the state apparatus.

e) International Structure: set of international political and economic roles, statuses and norms affecting the historical development of a national social formation.

(See Figure 3).

It is important to point out that the identification of the five previously mentioned structures does not imply that we are dismissing the importance of other existing structures such as the cultural and the religious. For analytical purposes, however, it is necessary to simplify the complexity of the world and of social phenomena. Rather than considering all the identifiable structures we have selected those which most directly affect the state apparatus. Thus, other structures such as the cultural and religious will not be ignored but rather will be considered through their manifestation in the political, economic and international spheres.

Each of these structures is simultaneously affected by all others. This multiple dependency means that no single structure, including government, can totally determine the modes of transformation of the state apparatus. These modes of transformation respond not only to the government's

Figure 3: Structural Relations.

political will but also to a) the balance of power among, and the different degrees of power of, all social and political groups competing for the control of the state apparatus; b) the economic structure, c) the influence of the international structure affecting the national social formation and d) the internal dynamic of the state apparatus itself.

In view of this structural interdependency, voluntarism -the understanding of public administration phenomena simply as the product of human will- and determinism -the understanding that public administration phenomena is shaped by structural forces beyond human motivation- are rejected in the alternative model proposed herein. Instead, a combined structural and actor-oriented approach will be used, which recognizes that a government's capacity to instrumentalize the state apparatus is limited by the determinant effect of the economic, the political, and the international structures as well as by the internal dynamic of the state apparatus itself.

3.5 Conclusions

The main propositions of this alternative approach to the study of public administration can now be summarized:

a) The establishment and transformation of the state as a system of social relations constitute the most concrete expression of the process of institutionalization of political change;

b) The institutionalization of political change, whose purpose is expressed in government's political policy objectives, is governments most important goal;

c) Government's attempts to institutionalize political change requires the instrumentalization of the state apparatus as the vehicle to induce and reproduce the effects of the political changes being introduced. The instrumentalization of the state apparatus implies the need to adjust or replace the modes of transformation of the state apparatus so that the process of implementation of public policy will not distort government's political policy objectives;

d) The study of public administration is placed within a socio-historical context. Thus, in order to understand the phenomenon of instrumentalization of the state apparatus it is necessary to first understand that the modes of transformation of the state apparatus are not entirely determined by government's will. In order to instrumentalize the state apparatus governments must overcome two obstacles: the relative autonomy of the state apparatus and the remnants of the modes of transformation

inherited from previous regimes. The relative autonomy of the state apparatus implies that its modes of transformation respond not only to government's political policy objectives, but to the influence of the political and the economic structures of the social formation within which the state apparatus operates, as well as to the influence of the international forces that affect this social formation. Furthermore, the modes of transformation of the state apparatus are, to a significant extent, historically determined. The weight of preceding administrative and organizational structures remains an important impediment to change.

e) The relation between social structures does not follow any rigid pattern of determination. In other words, the capacity of a government to instrumentalize the state apparatus is not rigidly predetermined by any one structural force but, rather, responds to the alternating dominance of various structural factors.

CHAPTER III FOOTNOTES

- 1 A model is defined as "a conceptualization of a group of phenomena, constructed by means of a rationale, where the ultimate purpose is to furnish the terms and relations, the propositions, of a formal system which, if validated, becomes theory". David Willer, Scientific Sociology (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.), 1967, p. 15. According to Willer, a model "contains a rationale and nominally defined concepts which are structured in the form of a mechanism". Ibid. p. 18.
- 2 The rationale "is an explanation of the nature of the included phenomena and leads to the nominal definitions of the concepts of the model". David Willer, op. cit., p. 17.
- 3 A nominal definition is "a stipulation to the effect that a specified expression, the definiendum, is to be synonymous with a certain other expression, the definiens, whose meaning is already determined." Carl G. Hempel, Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 2. The following is an example of a nominal definition: "Let the term 'antibiotic' be synonymous with (and thus short for) the expression 'bacteriostatic or bactericidal chemical agent produced by living organisms.'" Carl G. Hempel, op. cit., p. 3.
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- 30 Weber, op. cit. Vol. 1, p.246.
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- 84 Ibid.
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- 87 Percy S. Cohen, op. cit., p. 102.
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PART THREE

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE
APPARATUSES OF HONDURAS AND COSTA RICA

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The purpose of Part Three of this thesis is to test the merits of the alternative model for the study of public administration developed in Chapter III by applying it to the analysis of the development of the state apparatuses of Honduras and Costa Rica. It is important to keep in mind that a model is simply "a conceptualization of a group of phenomena, constructed by means of a rationale, where the ultimate purpose is to furnish the terms and relations, the propositions, of a formal system which if validated, becomes theory."¹ In this sense, a model cannot be proven valid or invalid but only useful or useless.²

The alternative model developed herein will be useful if it is able to "account for the numerous patterns that a researcher is likely to find in the real world"³. On the other hand, if the model is unable to encompass certain patterns of relations between domestic and international structural factors and between these and the modes of transformation of the state apparatus then "it must be modified in light of new information that cannot be processed in the original model".⁴

Testing the usefulness of a model in the historical analysis of comparable national case studies requires the researcher to have access to specialized descriptive and interpretative information produced by historians, economists, political scientists, sociologists and public administrators. As Theda Skocpol points out, comparative historical analysis only becomes possible

after a large primary literature has been built up by specialists. Only then can the comparativist hope to find at least some material relevant to each topic that must be investigated according to the dictates of the comparative, explanatory argument that he or she is attempting to develop.⁵

Moreover, the usefulness of a model can only be tested by applying it to significantly different case studies. Indeed, this is the only way to test its "combinational richness". At the same time, the development of a model follows a process of trial and error that should start by testing its usefulness on not too different historical realities. In this sense, Honduras and Costa Rica offer important advantages as case studies: a common geographical location, a common historical and cultural foundation and yet striking differences in their social, political, economic and administrative development. At the most visible level, the militarization of the Honduran political system sharply contrasts with the prevalence of liberal democratic

institutions and practices in Costa Rica. The reasons behind the different historical outcomes of the development of these two countries will be elucidated in the next two chapters. In examining the Honduran and the Costa Rican case studies, we will,

a) identify and analyze the most important political changes which have occurred in the history of those countries.

b) analyze government's attempts to instrumentalize the state apparatus.

c) analyze how the historical weight of the state apparatus and its relative autonomy facilitates or impedes government's attempt to instrumentalize it.

Honduras and Costa Rica: The Common Colonial Background.

Honduras and Costa Rica were two of the five provinces, as designated by the Spanish Crown, that composed the region that later came to be known as Central America. Spanish knowledge of Central America goes back to Columbus' fourth voyage in 1502. By the 1520's the conquistadores had become acquainted with the general outline of the area and had founded Guatemala city as the capital of the Capitanía.

General de Guatemala (now Central America).⁶ To institutionalize colonial rule, Spain created a colonial state apparatus whose organization is described by M. Hanson in the following quotation:

During the 300-year colonial period in Hispanic America, Spain created a formal pyramid of organizational control which, in hierarchical fashion, stretched from the crown to his subjects in the new world. At the top of the hierarchy in Spain were the King and his Council of the Indies. The hierarchical character of the ruling structure in the New World changed periodically over the long years of colonialism, but basically the descending order of governing levels after the King and his Council were: the vice royalty, headed by the Viceroy; the audiencia (regional government) headed by a governor, a Capitan General, or a president depending on the status of the Audiencia; the Province, headed by a governor; and finally, the Cabildo (municipal council) headed by a mayor.⁷

Independence came to Central America in 1821, as a result of a combination of international and domestic factors. In 1808, Napoleon had invaded Spain and had installed his brother Jose as the new head of the Spanish state. Jose remained in power until 1813. During the French occupation, the Spanish tried to obtain as much support as possible from the colonies. New ideas of freedom and liberty were diffused in America for the purpose of developing opposition against the French invaders. While Jose was never recognized as King of Spain in America, the conflict with France had the unintended effect of weakening Spain's control over the colonies and more specifically, Spain's

capacity to control internal political conflict in America.

In the American colonies, the most visible form of political conflict was that which emerged between Spanish and Criollos (Creoles). This conflict was the result of contradictions developed during the colonial period. According to Severo Martinez,

to extend and consolidate the colonial power, Spain had to stimulate and reward those who were willing to participate in the Conquista. This was basically done through concessions for the exploitation of land and Indians. This system represented a relatively inexpensive way to carry out the Conquista. However, it created fundamental contradictions between the colonizers and the Spanish crown and its representatives. Very soon, the presence of the Spanish crown in Central America was perceived by the colonizers as an obstacle in the exploitation of the New World.⁸

This racial dichotomy was translated into political polarization between Cacos or Liberals and Gazistas or Conservatives. The Liberals, largely creoles, were in favor of independence. They "rejected traditional Hispanic values and institutions, especially the Church, and espoused classical economic liberalism, opposing monopolies while encouraging private foreign trade, immigration and investment."⁹ The conservatives, on the other hand, were more concerned about the protection of the status quo. They emphasized "traditional Hispanic values and institutions, especially the Roman Catholic Church, and rewarded the loyal

indian and mestizo peasants with paternalism and respect for their communal lands." ¹⁰

Unlike other American colonies, such as Mexico, where armed struggle liquidated colonial rule, independence came to Central America by default. By 1821, the control of Spain over the day to day affairs of the Central American provinces was virtually dissipated. In consequence, the declaration of independence was but the formalization of an existing reality. As Edelberto Torres points out:

The absence of the masses in the struggle for independence, the stimulating examples received from the victories of other colonies such as the Mexican and the weakness of the Spanish state, explain the pacific transition from the Colony to the Republic. This special form of transition permitted the survival of the administrative and political structures of the colony after independence. ¹¹

After independence from Spain was achieved, the conservative sectors of Central America were in favor of the annexation of the region to the newly formed Mexican Empire as the best means of ensuring the preservation of the hierarchical social order inherited from colonialism. The liberals, on the other hand, favored the formation of an independent Central American Federation. The predominance of the conservative sectors after independence was demonstrated when, in 1821, they succeeded in annexing Central America to Mexico.

With the dissolution of the Mexican Empire in 1823, however, the question of the political organization of Central America re-emerged. The Liberals quickly moved to promote the idea of unification. After intensive and difficult negotiations, the Central American Federation was established in 1824. During the next two decades, conservative forces actively opposed the Federal liberal project. This common background of colonial administration and opposing conservative and liberal tendencies manifested themselves differently in the political and administrative development of Honduras and Costa Rica as the following case studies show.

MAP 1

Central America and the Caribbean, 1983.

MAP 2

The Central American Federation, 1823-38

INTRODUCTORY NOTE
FOOTNOTES

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- 3 A.S. Cohan, Theories of Revolution (London: Nelson, 1975), p.44.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 Theda Skocpol, State and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. XIV, XV.
- 6 Thomas L. Karnes, The Failure of Union (Tempe: Center for Latin American Studies, Arizona State University, 1976), p.4.
- 7 M. Hanson, "Organizational Bureaucracy in Latin America and the Legacy of Spanish Colonialism", Journal of Inter American Studies and World Affairs, XXI, 2 (1974), p.202.
- 8 Severo Martinez, La Patria del Criollo (San Jose: EDUCA, 1979), p.36.
- 9 Ralph L. Woodward, "The Rise and Decline of Liberalism in Central America: Historical Perspectives on the Contemporary Crisis", Latin American Studies Association Meetings, Mexico City, 1, Oct. 1983, p.3.
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MAP 3

CHAPTER IV

HONDURAS: THE POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SUBORDINATION

4.1 The Formative Period of the National State: 1821-1876

Economic, Political and International Factors Influencing the Modes of Transformation of the State Apparatus

Honduras inherited from the colonial period an impoverished and atomized economy, divided into many productive centers which were not integrated into anything that could be considered a national economic system. Mining and livestock, at that time the two most important national economic activities, were declining in economic importance.¹ Juan Arancibia corroborates this view of the post-independence Honduran economy when he states:

The economic situation of the newly independent Honduras is rather somber... The continuous decay of the mining activity has had serious consequences because it created some degree of internal articulation within the country and produced the means for international transactions. The economy is disarticulated. The existing economic centers tend to be

self-contained. The national market is weak and lacks the capacity to establish linkages with the International markets.²

The Central American federalist experiment was imposed upon this weak and disintegrated economy, exacerbating the old local contradictions between pro-free trade Liberals and anti-free trade Conservatives which had originated in the colonial period and had increased during the struggle for independence. In Honduras, the conflict between free trade Liberals and anti-free trade Conservatives was most clearly expressed in the rivalry between the Liberal city of Tegucigalpa and the Conservative city of Comayagua.³

Conflict during the federalist period was not only between Liberals and Conservatives within Honduras. In Guatemala, capital of the Federation, Honduran Liberal authorities clashed with federal Liberal authorities over the distribution of political and economic power between the national government and that of the Federation. The dissatisfaction of the provinces regarding this distribution is vividly illustrated in the following quotation taken from a document of 1823.

Now is the time ... for the monopolies to disappear; for centuries Guatemala has monopolized everything that attracts man. There [in Guatemala] is the university, the government, the superior tribunals, the mint, the army, the archdiocese, the high school, etc., all sustained by the taxes coming from the unfortunate provinces, always disregarded, and

always treated horribly.⁴

While the conflict between Honduran Liberals and Honduran Conservatives was mainly about trade, the conflict between the Honduran Liberals and the Liberal federal authorities was mainly about the appropriation and distribution of taxes between the national and federal governments. Tax revenues were simply not enough to maintain both a federal and a national bureaucratic structure. When this reality became evident, the national governments began to avoid contributing to the federal structure. According to Miles M. Wortman this attitude indicated "more their inability to finance both themselves and a national structure than a revolt against federation."⁵

The fiscal crisis of the emerging national states forced them to seek loans from foreign banks. However allocation of these loans between the national and federal governments emerged, predictably, as a new point of dispute. For example, when the governments of Costa Rica and Honduras acquired foreign loans independently from the federal government, the latter declared these transactions illegal. In defense of the Honduran government's action, Francisco Morazan, a Honduran and one of the most prominent Central American liberal leaders, declared that,

the State of Honduras is free, independent, and sovereign, the same as the other states of the

Federation. As a consequence, [it] can do whatever it wishes in this manner. To create taxes, administer them, borrow on them, distribute them, are inherent faculties of a free, independent and sovereign state. This [state] isn't a minor, not a pupil. It is sovereign, it is independent; and it does not have to ask permission from anybody to contract an obligation that obliges nobody except itself.⁶

The artificiality of imposing a federal political structure upon the disintegrated economies of the region was demonstrated by the reluctance of Honduran economic oligarchies to conduct their business through Guatemala. With the elimination of the colonial structures, Honduran miners refused to send their minerals to the mint that operated in Guatemala because they "found it easier to export their production directly to Belize".⁷ This incompatibility between the federalist political structure and the fragmented economic reality of decolonized Central America was a primary cause of Honduran secession from the Central American Federation in 1838.

After the separation of Honduras from the Central American Federation, the construction of a national system of political domination and of a national state apparatus was inhibited by the existence of strong oligarchies and caudillos that resisted national centralism and struggled to maintain local independence. A description of the power of the Zelaya family, one of the most notorious local oligarchies in Honduran history, provided by a visitor to Honduras in the middle of the 19th century, illustrates the

negative effects of caudillismo and localism on the construction of the Honduran political system:

The "national" officials in Tegucigalpa recognized the autonomy of the Zelayas. The family paid no taxes, nor were there national officials in the province. The only signs of the national government were titles. Jose Manuel Zelaya was the governor of Olancho, his brothers were alcalde primero, juez de primera instancia, and general of the army for the region. The area's residents respected the family: Francisco Zelaya was thought the best horseman in the province, no small compliment in a cattle country. Workers came to the Zelayas for loans and for advice. The Zelayas were, collectively, the caudillo of Olancho."⁸

In the absence of a national political system capable of regulating internal political conflict, "governments and self-styled politicians rose and fell in a confusing sequence of fraudulent elections, civil revolts, and international intervention."⁹ These national governments in Honduras lacked the legitimacy to countervail the pre-existing centrifugal forces. As James Morris states:

The transfer of power in Honduras more often than not was disorderly and violent, except in 1852 when Jose Trinidad Cabanas peacefully assumed the presidency. The first half century of independence was a period filled with turbulence, regional disunity, and the absence of national perceptions.¹⁰

During these years, the Honduran economy "languished in traditional cattle raising and subsistence agriculture

because no suitable major export materialized".¹¹ The absence of a predominant national economic activity prohibited the emergence of a predominant ruling elite that could put an end to regional rivalries as well as institutionalize a national system of political domination.

Some of the consequences of this situation are explained by Morris when he points out that, "an ephemeral nationalism and the lack of a strong and cohesive ruling class (oligarchy) left Honduras open to outside interference and exploitation by international intrigue and economic interests." ¹² Dana Munro corroborates this view when he explains that,

the central position of Honduras has forced her, whether she wished to or not, to take part in nearly every international conflict which has occurred in the Isthmus; and the continual intervention of her stronger neighbors in her internal affairs, combined with factional hatred and greed for the spoils of office on the part of her own citizens, have kept the Republic in a state of chronic disorder down to the present time.¹³

In fact, the period of domination by conservative oligarchies was to end in 1876 as a direct result of the intervention of newly formed liberal governments in El Salvador and Guatemala. The latter orchestrated the constitution of a liberal regime in Honduras that was to promote an important process of social changes known as the Liberal Reform.

It is important to note that political conflict during the formative period was largely intra-oligarchical. The masses, composed of Indians and Mestizos, did not have the power to compete for the instrumentalization of the incipient national state apparatus.

The Modes of Transformation of the State Apparatus

Introduction

The period under consideration reveals the alternating dominance of the national economic and political structures and international forces, in determining the capacity of successive Honduran governments to instrumentalize the state apparatus. The Liberal's attempt to institutionalize a Central American Federation was accompanied by significant efforts to create a federal state apparatus. However, the political and economic fragmentation of the region played a determinan~~t~~g role in shaping the political organization of the region and the modes of transformation of the national state apparatus. This resulted in the separation of Honduras from the Federation in October 1838 and the eventual dissolution of the federal government in 1839. The

conservative government that succeeded the liberal regime in 1838 changed the modes of transformation of the state apparatus in compliance with the economic and political realities of the country.

These structural realities changed in 1876 when the Guatemalan and El Salvadorean governments intervened in Honduras to introduce a liberal reform. This political change, which is analyzed later in this chapter, was accompanied by significant efforts to instrumentalize the Honduran state apparatus for the purpose of institutionalizing the liberal project.

The following is a characterization of the modes of transformation of the Honduran state apparatus during the period under study (1821-1876), as affected by the alternating dominance of the different structural factors acting within the Honduran social formation.

Organizational Design

From 1823 to the end of the federalist experiment in 1839, the organizational design of the Honduran state apparatus was mainly determined by the international forces acting in the region, namely the regional liberal elites that were attempting to institutionalize a Central American Federation. The changes introduced into the organizational

design of the state apparatus inherited from colonialism, were a response to the federalists' need to instrumentalize the state apparatus for their political purposes. In these circumstances, the balancing of national interests vis-à-vis federal interests became the guiding organizational principle of the Honduran state apparatus during the period of its membership in the Federation.

National interests were represented in the form of a national assembly, a national senate, a national judiciary and municipal governments. At the same time, regional integration was sought by establishing a hierarchical structure composed of three tiers: Federal authorities (located in Guatemala), provincial authorities and local authorities or municipalities. (See Chart 1)

However the federalist organizational design of the state apparatus, established by the Liberals in Honduras, did not adequately reflect the balance of power among the structural forces that were acting within the Central American region in general and within the Honduran state in particular. The Liberal political project could not overcome the centrifugal tendencies resulting from the lack of integration of the Central American political and economic structures.

The organizational design of the Honduran state apparatus that emerged in 1839 more accurately reflected the

CHART 1

Structure of the Federal
Government in Central America

Central Authorities	Président
	National Assembly
	Senate
	National Judiciary
State and Provincial Authorities	Governor
	Political Chief
Local Authorities	Legislative Assembly
	Legislative Council
	State Judiciary
	Civil Judges
	Municipality

Source: Miles L. Wortman, Government and Society in
Central America: 1680-1840 (New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 1982), p.239.

autonomy of the Honduran economic and political structures. This economic imperative was translated, in the constitution of 1838, into a declaration that the Honduran state "is a free and independent country with the right to establish its own legal framework".¹⁴ The constitution also established the organization of an independent Honduran state apparatus.

Social Domain

During its membership in the Federation, the social domain of the Honduran state apparatus was significantly influenced by the international forces represented by the Central American liberal elites and their project to institutionalize a Central American Federation even though it allegedly served the needs of both the Federation and the Honduran society. These two roles often contradicted one another due to the frequently mutually exclusive nature of federal and national interests.

With the separation of Honduras from the Federation, national interests prevailed over federal interests. However, the internal contradictions between Honduran Liberals and Honduran Conservatives were to survive and be expressed in the attempts of each group to orient the state apparatus to their own particular interests.

Generally speaking, the social domain of the

Conservative state that existed from 1838 to 1876 served primarily the interests of the traditional, agrarian oriented, national oligarchies. During this period, the functions of the state apparatus were reduced to a minimal role in view of the high degree of self sufficiency that these oligarchies enjoyed. These minimal functions included police, the penal system, customs, collection of some basic taxes, and diplomatic representations. Other social functions such as education were under the control of the church.¹⁵

Character of the State Apparatus

The character of the state apparatus during the federalist experiment as well as during the conservative rule was particularist. Government personnel felt primarily responsible to the particular social groups and caudillos that directly controlled the state apparatus as opposed to society. Furthermore, the state was not conceived of as being representative of the general interest of the Honduran society. On the contrary, its values were a direct expression of the groups that alternatively controlled it. As Fonk points out, during the period following independence "the privileged minority, which was the directing force behind the independence movement, was the sole group directly participating in the definition of public policy".¹⁶ Afterwards,

during the period of conservative rule from 1839 to 1876, the character of the embryonic Honduran state apparatus reflected the values of the particular groups which controlled it.

Management of the State Apparatus

The complexity of the Liberal attempt to establish a Central American Federation exceeded the rudimentary and inadequate managerial resources available in the region. Creating appropriate information systems that could allow the Federal government to govern was simply impossible. All the attempts coming from Guatemala to sustain the Federal structure were hampered by the fact that the existing managerial capacity in the countries had been limited and conditioned by the simple administrative tasks that their governments had performed during the colonial period. In the following quotation, Wortman illustrates this situation:

Early in its tenure the provisional government ordered a fiscal system organized "according to the enlightenment of the century and the progress of the science of economics". Records were missing and disorganized....By February 1824 the government conceded that it could not ... establish its fiscal base. 18

With the emergence of the conservative rule, after the termination of the federal experiment, the management of the

state again required little in terms of administrative and organizational techniques. The self-sufficient nature of the economic activity of the ruling landed oligarchy did not demand much from the state.

Conclusions

The period between 1821 and 1839 shows the attempt of the Central American liberal forces to instrumentalize the Honduran state apparatus to make it responsive to the needs of the emerging federal political and economic systems. However, all their attempts to permanently modify the organizational design, the character, the management and the social domain of the Honduran state apparatus failed because of the determinant effects of the fragmented political and economic structures of the region. This was more clearly reflected in the incapacity of the federal state apparatus to collect the necessary revenues for its maintenance and development.

After the failure of the federalist attempt, the modes of transformation of the state apparatus were modified to respond to the needs of the traditional agrarian oligarchies that were to control the state apparatus from 1839 to 1876.

4.2 The Liberal Reform: 1876-1949

Economic, Political and International Factors Influencing the Modes of Transformation of the State Apparatus

Unlike the experience of Guatemala, Costa Rica and El Salvador, the Liberal Reform that began in Honduras in 1876 with the government of Marco Aurelio Soto, was not the result of the transformation of the economic structure of the country. In the above mentioned countries, the emergence of coffee production as a predominant economic activity, made possible the formation of an economic liberal elite whose interests were in conflict with the traditional economic systems maintained by the conservative oligarchies. In Honduras, coffee production was unable to provide the power basis for the emergence of an indigenous and reform oriented economic elite. According to Mark Ruhl,

coffee failed to reorient Honduran agriculture for several reasons including the lack of a high proportion of the rich, volcanic soils conducive to coffee production and the preoccupation of Honduran governments both with intra-elite political conflicts and with encouraging silver and other ventures.¹⁹

More than anything else, the Honduran Liberal Reform was then the result of foreign intervention and

international circumstances similar in many ways to those that made possible the participation of Honduras in the Federal experiment after independence from Spain. The architect of the new intervention was Guatemalan President Justo Rufino Barrios, the leader of the Liberal movement in that country, who was actively promoting liberalism throughout Central America. To this effect, Barrios and Andres Valle, the liberal President of El Salvador, organized and financed an army that succeeded in putting Soto in power.

In the absence of a major export product, the liberal government attempted to create politically the necessary economic conditions for capitalist development in the country. To this effect, the Soto government introduced significant changes into the modes of transformation of the state apparatus as well as in the legal framework that sustained it. Above all, it attempted to consolidate the power of the central state apparatus to create the conditions of stability and national integration required for the capitalist development of the economy.

In other words, it was a case of political forces attempting to introduce economic transformations rather than economic transformations producing changes at the level of politics. The solution to the absence of a major export product such as coffee and of a national capitalist oriented elite was assumed to lie in the injection of foreign

investment into the country.

The government's desire to attract foreign capital as a mechanism for the development of a modern capitalist economy was clearly expressed by the liberal constitution of 1880 which stated that,

the state will provide everything that is needed for the welfare and progress of the country. It will promote the development of agriculture, industry and commerce. It will also promote immigration, the colonization of unoccupied land, the construction of roads and railroads and the creation of new industries and credit institutions. The state will also encourage the importation of foreign capital and the exploitation and canalization of lakes and rivers according to the laws that will be established for these purposes.²⁰

Moreover, the constitution stated that,

No foreigner will have more privileges than others. All of them have the same civil rights as those of a Honduran...Moreover, they can own any kind of property and use it according to the law.²¹

The Soto liberal government expected that foreign investment would promote the formation of an indigenous capitalist elite capable of leading the economic development of the country. However, rather than facilitating the formation of domestic economic elites, foreign capital quickly became the leading economic force in the country and

began to organize "the linkage between Honduras and the international markets."²² As Victor Meza points out,

the alliance between local oligarchies and the representatives of foreign capital was political rather than economic. In this alliance, the main function of the local elites was to create and maintain the political and institutional conditions required for the functioning of the foreign enterprises.²³

In other words, foreign capital actually operated as a substitution for, rather than a promoter of, the indigenous capitalist class that the Liberal Reform was attempting to create.²⁴ The liberal government unsuccessfully promoted the production of coffee to "transform this product into a link between the Honduran economy and the metropolitan markets of the world."²⁵ However, foreign capitalists never expressed interest in coffee. They concentrated first on the mining industry and when they finally moved to agriculture, it was to an unexpected product namely, Bananas.²⁶

The interrelation between foreign capital and national politics soon became evident. Arancibia's accounts of some of these relationships clearly illustrate the predominance of the political power of the foreign companies in a country with an extremely fragmented economic and political structure. According to him,

between 1882 and 1915 the government extended

276 concessions to British, North American and national companies. Marco Aurelio Soto (the president) and Enrique Gutierrez (a minister in the Soto government) were owners of the El Rosario mine. They were also minority partners with foreign investors in the organization of the Rosario Mining Company which soon became predominant in the Honduran mining industry. Abelardo Zelaya -another minister in the Soto government- and Luis Borgran, associated themselves with firms from New York and Chicago and organized several companies in the country. In all cases, the extent of the participation of Honduran capital was minor.²⁷

Similarly, the banana industry, which was originally in the hands of local producers, ended up being controlled by foreign companies. These local producers were quickly absorbed "by the enormous technical and financial capacities of the new companies and their chances of independent subsistence became tied to the destiny of the banana enclaves".²⁸ By 1910, North American companies exploited 80 percent of banana lands,²⁹ and, until the early 1930's, they "reigned supreme within the Honduran economy and, not surprisingly played a central role in the nation's political dynamics".³⁰ Table 1 shows the relative importance of banana exports from 1888 to 1937.

With the emergence of the "banana enclaves", foreign intervention was to come predominantly from the United States. As Posas explains, "the locus of political control was transferred externally to the imperialist banana capital (in the US) which unquestionably imposed, for at least the first half of this century, the rules of the political

TABLE 1

Honduras:

Relative Importance of Bananas Exports in the
Value of Total Exports 1887/1937

Years	% of Bananas Exports
1887/88	25.9
1888/89	23.8
1904/05	43.7
1913/14	50.0
1920/21	52.3
1928/29	84.9
1936/37	65.3

Source: Ministry of Commerce of Honduras (annual Publication) in Ciro F.S. Cardoso and Hector Pérez B., Centro America y la Economia Occidental (1520-1930) (San José: Editorial Universidad de Costa Rica, 1977), p. 290.

game." 31

In consequence, domestic political power became inevitably associated with the economic power of the foreign companies working in the mining industry and to an even greater extent those in banana production. In fact it is possible to argue that the whole power structure of the country and the possibilities for upward mobility within it, became solidly controlled by foreign firms. As Morris explains:

As the major economic resources of the nation came under foreign control and influence, Honduran political elites accommodated their interests to the needs of United Fruit, Standard Fruit, the Cuyamel Fruit Company, and other solidly entrenched foreign investors such as the New-York-Honduras Rosario Mining Company. For many professional and technical occupations, working for the companies directly or acting as consultants became important means of social mobility. 32

The political influence of the banana plantations was so strong and decisive during the period under study, that the only time in which parliament could impose conditions on United Fruit was by obtaining support of its rival company, Cuyamel. As Mario Posas explains:

The dispute between the Cuyamel Fruit Company and the United Fruit Company over the control of the U.S. banana market allowed a local political nuclei, supported by Cuyamel Fruit, to try to impose conditions of operation on United Fruit.

However, once the former company was absorbed by the latter during the 1929 economic crisis, local political groups had to retreat, and the way was paved for caudillo-like figures such as the dictator and leader of the conservative Partido Nacional, General Tiburcio Carías Andino (1933-1948), to maintain close ties to the United Fruit Company.³³

With the consolidation of the "enclaves" the mode of transformation of the state apparatus was inordinately determined by the needs of the major foreign companies in the country. In consequence, the degree of freedom of action of domestic groups to instrumentalize the state apparatus and to institutionalize a true national political and economic liberal reform, was severely hampered.

The consolidation of the "economic enclaves" also created the conditions for the emergence of new political actors, "a large and powerful mass of agricultural and industrial workers, who constitute an important sector of the labor movement in Honduras".³⁴ More specifically, their emergence can be attributed mainly to the expansion of the banana plantations and the consequent destruction of the peasant economy in the regions where the companies operated.

One of the characteristics of the modus operandi of the banana plantations was the rotation of cultivated land. When a company abandoned one area to start exploiting another, many peasants lost their jobs and were forced to illegally occupy the land now abandoned. Thus, a peasant subsistence

economy would emerge only to be again disrupted when the company decided to reclaim the land. This dynamic created the conditions for the emergence of a peasant movement that began to make demands on the state apparatus for the alleviation of their precarious existence.³⁵

Organized labor had its first appearance in 1916 in the Cuyamel plantations when the workers went on strike demanding better salaries and fairer prices at the company stores. This first strike was followed by others in the Vaccaro Brothers & Co. plantations in 1920; in "La Lima" plantations of the Cuyamel in March 1925; in the Standard Fruit Company plantations in 1930 as well as in The Tela Railroad Co., the Truxillo Railroad Co. and the Standard Fruit Company in 1932.³⁶

The attempted Liberal reform then, did not put an end to political instability in Honduras. On the contrary, to the traditional local rivalries and intra-elite struggles, it added two elements of conflict: the organized labor movement and the foreign companies.

Moreover, the consolidation of the enclaves within a formal liberal legal framework, developed into a visible contradiction between the national interests -as expressed in the objectives of the Liberal Reform-, and the economic needs of the foreign companies. The institutionalization of the Liberal Reform, required the conformation of a state

apparatus that would a) promote the emergence of an indigenous capitalist elite, b) produce and reproduce the necessary labor force for the capitalist development of the country, and c) organize and control the new forms of political conflict derived from the emergence of new political actors such as the labor movement. In turn, the achievement of these objectives required that the national state apparatus have a significant level of autonomy vis-a-vis the different political actors competing for its instrumentalization. However, the concentration of power by the foreign companies, and the absence of a strong domestic elite, resulted in the formation of a state apparatus that functioned primarily as an instrument of foreign capital.

The contradiction between the national needs and the needs of the foreign enterprises was resolved in favor of the latter with the emergence of General Tiburcio Carias Andino who proclaimed himself president on February 1, 1924 and dictatorially ruled the country until 1948. Through the use of force, Carias managed to put an end to civil war and to control the demands of organized labor. His emergence "represented the total elimination of the legal conditions to carry out union work and forced activists to do their political work clandestinely and under extremely difficult circumstances." 37

Carias' close relationship with the United Fruit Company - the most important banana producer at that time in

Honduras- represented his most important source of power. It should not, then, be surprising that the "Cariato" - the name given to Carias' ruling period- was characterized by its responsiveness to the needs of the banana companies. He created and consolidated a state apparatus that served primarily the needs of these companies and concomitantly those domestic economic groups that worked with them.

Nonetheless, the emergence of Carias played a positive role in regard to the elimination of local rivalries and consequently, the consolidation of the national state. The controversial role that Carias played in the history of Honduras is summarized by Richard Millet:

[Carias] provided the nation with a badly needed period of relative peace and order. The fiscal situation improved, steadily, the road network was expanded, the armed forces were modernized, and education improved slightly. At the same time, nascent democratic institutions withered, opposition and labor activities were suppressed, and national interests at times were sacrificed to benefit supporters and relatives of Carias or major foreign interests.³⁸

The Modes of Transformation of the State Apparatus

Introduction

The liberal government that emerged in 1876 attempted to instrumentalize the state apparatus to institutionalize in Honduras the social, political and economic transformations associated with the processes of liberal reforms that were taking place throughout Central America. At the economic level, these reforms basically aimed at the promotion of modern capitalism. At the political level, they were associated with the development of liberal democratic practices and institutions.

The absence of a national elite that could lead the economic development of the country and the emergence of the "economic enclaves", created the conditions for the subordination of the state to the interests of foreign capital. The determinant influence of the foreign companies became even more evident with the emergence of the dictatorial rule of Tiburcio Carías who transformed the weak and embryonic national state apparatus into a neo-colonial state apparatus that primarily served the needs of the foreign companies. The following is a characterization of the modes of transformation of the state apparatus during the period under study (1876-1933) as affected by the alternating dominance of the different structural factors acting within Honduras.

More than anything else, this period is characterized by the attempt -introduced by the Liberal Reform and consolidated by Carias- "to put an end to the political and economic fragmentation of the country by giving cohesion and strength to the national state apparatus." 39

The movement towards the centralization of the organizational design of the state apparatus was initiated by the Rosa government in 1876. First of all, the legal framework of the country was redesigned to give the state apparatus the capacity to regulate the national economic and political activity. As Molina points out, this was necessary because "most of the existing legislation was composed of old Spanish laws that were incompatible with the new liberal and republican system that the Reform attempted to promote".40

In consequence, the government enacted a Civil Code, a Penal Code, Customs Law, a Code of Procedures, a Code of Commerce, a Code of Mining and a Military Code, all of them based on a patchwork of South American and European legislation. Moreover, it secularized the properties of the church and of religious communities, cemeteries, the marriage institution and primary education.

Furthermore, the government created a truly national army giving the state the national monopoly of force. As Molina explains, the Rosa government,

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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
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proceeded to collect state weapons in the hands of particular individuals...moreover, the ministry of war proceeded to structure the national military organization of the state providing the army with modern equipment and uniforms.⁴²

While this process of centralization was taking place, municipal autonomy was theoretically maintained. In reality, however, "municipal governments have fallen under the control of the strongest government officials, and autonomy has been almost non-existent."⁴³

The process of centralization of the organizational design of the state apparatus initiated by the Liberal Reform of 1876 continued throughout the period under study. However the Liberal model of a national state apparatus, based on a combined development of legal authority and the monopolization of public force, suffered a setback with the emergence of the dictatorial regime of General Carias. The emergence of Carias represented the resolution of the contradiction that had developed between the liberal economic and political principles, as formally embodied in the legal framework of the country, and the operative needs of the foreign companies in the country.

General Carias' consolidation of a neo-colonial state apparatus subordinated to the foreign companies, synchronized the state apparatus with the actual balance of power of the structural forces operating within the Honduran

social formation. In this balance, the foreign companies played the pivotal role.

Moreover, political conflict came to be controlled essentially through the use of force. For this reason, Carias paid special attention to strengthening the military sector of the state apparatus. As Steve Lewotine explains:

An important element in Carias' repressive organization was the establishment of the Honduran air force. He created a new military school, rearmed the army, and developed a small air force. In order to maintain control, Carias created a network of local spies and instituted an internal passport system. His repressive policies were known popularly as "encierro, destierro y entierro": literally, "round'em up, throw'em out, and bury'em".⁴⁴

Moreover, the nominal degree of municipal autonomy that still existed was virtually abolished in an effort to consolidate the power of the central state apparatus. To this effect, Carias substituted nationally appointed municipal officers for local representatives. According to Martz's account, "these men were imposed on communities by federal rule regardless of the appointee's brilliance or sheer incompetence".⁴⁵

Social Domain

The Liberal Reform attempted to create a state

apparatus whose main objective would be the modernization and integration of the national economy along capitalist lines. More than anything else, the "promotor state" was conceived as an instrument for the formation of an indigenous capitalist elite.⁴⁶

However the contradiction between the intention to develop a domestic economic elite, and the government's decision to open the doors of the country to unlimited and virtually unregulated foreign investment, was reflected in the conformation of the social domain of the state apparatus during the period under study. During the last part of the 19th Century the state function had essentially been directed towards the promotion of the interests of national elites. However, the local landowners "had not yet broken with the precapitalist economy in which they operated, nor did they have sufficient capital to bring about the country's new economic venture towards 'progress' and 'civilization'."⁴⁷ In consequence, by the beginning of the 20th Century the interest of the foreign companies predominated over national interest and the state apparatus began to function mainly as a facilitator of their economic activities in the country.⁴⁸ This situation reached an unprecedented level with the emergence of Carias who "consolidated a neo-colonial state": a state whose main purpose was to serve the needs of the foreign companies operating in the country.⁴⁹

Character of the State Apparatus.

Despite the significant consolidation of the national state apparatus during the period under consideration, the emergence of national-social values as guidelines for the state's activities did not occur.

Caudillismo, political partisanship and subservience to foreign interests became normal aspects of the value framework within which the Honduran state apparatus functioned during this period. William Stokes' illustration of this situation is worth quoting at length.

There can be no doubt that the partisan selection of employees has contributed greatly to administrative inefficiency in Honduras. In some cases even the technicians in charge of vital public utilities have been replaced by political appointees. In 1894, for example, the great liberal reformer, Policarpo Bonilla, effected an almost 100 per cent turnover in personnel; and in 1903 President Manuel Bonilla followed the same policy. In 1911 President Bertrand eliminated all political opposition, filling the public service with adherents of his party. In 1919 President Francisco Borgan modified the policy of mass replacements by cutting across party lines and retaining competent, skilled personnel, but his successor, Rafael Lopez Gutierrez, reasserted the old tradition. Beginning with the administration of President Miguel Paz Baraona in 1925, however, the pace slowed considerably, and skilled employees in vital services are less frequently discharged for political reasons now.⁵⁰

The Carias government that emerged in 1933 reinforced

personalism and partisanship within the public sector. As John Martz points out,

His government, as do most under dictatorial control, reflected his will completely. Many close friends received influential, well-paying government jobs. Two of his sons became ranking diplomatic representatives of Honduras abroad....Carias wanted important positions filled with men who agreed with him. 51

The predominance of particularist values within the Honduran state apparatus and the absence of an administrative culture guided by national values, was a reflection of the political culture of the country, characterized by the absence of national perceptions.

Management of the State Apparatus

The Liberal Reform made an explicit attempt to modernize the management of the state apparatus. The modernization of the economic structure of the country necessarily required the introduction of modern techniques in the handling of the increasingly sophisticated work of the state apparatus. One of the most explicit references to this new attitude is expressed by Rosa himself when he referred to the period of Liberal rule:

In an era of freedom of thought, of industry and

of commerce it is necessary to govern with ideas and to administer with practical knowledge rather than with intrigues, caprices or passions. Government is a science and administration is a scientific experience. 52

Special efforts were given to the establishment of a more efficient system of state revenue collection not only through a fiscal legal reform but also through the introduction of modern management techniques. These efforts were important in view of the fact that, "there was no uniformity nor coordination among the different offices of the treasury and most of them operated with different accounting systems." 53

Also, new laws and decrees were enacted to regulate commerce, the production, and sale of alcohol, tobacco, gunpower as well as the exportation of timber. The enactment of these laws and regulations were accompanied by the introduction of the management techniques and procedures necessary for their administration. This task, according to an official document published in 1897, was a very difficult one:

The government cannot claim that the Public Treasury is completely organized nor that the revenues collected are sufficient to attend the numerous needs of the country....The organization of the financial operations of the country are in a state of transition. We have begun to eradicate the systems, habits and routines that produced the status quo. 54

One of the forms through which the government attempted to replace the "old habits, systems and routines" by more modern and rational ones was through the specialized training of the treasury office employees. For this purpose it created in February 1877, the School of Accounting of the Treasury.

Soto's attempt to modernize the management systems of the state apparatus continued during the two successive administrations of Luis Bogran (1833-1891) and Policarpo Bonilla (1894-1899) declining thereafter. Bogran initiated in 1888 the first administrative reform in the history of Honduran public administration. This reform "set up the rudiments of position classification and outlined the general behavior demanded of department heads and workers alike."⁵⁵ Bonilla created the Tribunal Superior de Cuentas and the Fiscalia General de Haciendas, which required the introduction of modern financial management techniques.⁵⁶

Despite all these efforts, the management of the state apparatus remained generally inefficient.—The political instability of the period played a major role in disrupting the normal operations of the state. As the American Arthur Young in 1921, then the most prominent expert in position classification in North America, indicated:

the lack of punctuality in the payments of the salaries of the state's employees is not only common during the revolutionary and the post revolutionary periods but also during ordinary

times. It is in other words, an endemic problem of the public administration (in Honduras.)⁵⁷

The emergence of Carias in 1933, put an end to political instability but did not promote the technical capacity of the state. The impact of the international crisis on the Honduran economy during the Carias government and his relatively simple administrative style based on discipline and centralism, did not favor the development of the managerial capacity of the state apparatus.

Conclusions

The analysis of the development of the state apparatus of Honduras during this period shows the overdeterminant role that international forces played in the conformation of its modes of transformation. Attempts to instrumentalize the state apparatus for the purpose of institutionalizing the Liberal Reform, after 1876, failed because of the absence of a national economic elite that could lead the economic and political modernization of the country. In the absence of domestic leadership, foreign companies determined the conformation of both the Honduran social formation and the Honduran state apparatus.

The most visible expression of the overdeterminant role that foreign companies played in the conformation of the

modes of transformation of the Honduran state apparatus during this period was the emergence and consolidation of the Carias regime. Carias transformed the state apparatus into a neo-colonial institution that primarily served the needs of foreign firms operating in the country.

The state apparatus continued operating as a neo-colonial institution until the balance of power of the structural factors acting within the Honduran society shifted so as to lessen the role of the foreign companies. This change is represented by the emergence of the government of Juan Manuel Galvez in 1949.

4.3 The Capitalist Organization of Society: 1949-1956

Economic, Political and International Factors Influencing the Modes of Transformation of the State Apparatus

The end of the Carias dictatorship and the emergence of the government of Juan Manuel Galvez represent the beginning of one of the most significant processes of social transformations in the history of Honduras. Galvez initiated, in 1949, an important process of political democratization as well as a dynamic process of economic modernization along capitalist lines. Moreover, the Galvez

government made important efforts to adapt the modes of transformation of the state apparatus to institutionalize its political project. These efforts were continued by the government of Lozano Diaz from 1954 to 1956.

The transition from dictatorial rule to a government that attempted to institutionalize a modern capitalist economy and a liberal democratic system can only be explained by looking at the country's international context and its effect on the Honduran society. Three elements have to be considered to understand the transformations of the Honduran social formation from 1949 to 1956.

First, the world economy was rearranged after World War II as a result of the military predominance of the United States and the dynamics of its expansive economy. In this situation, the most important Central American agricultural products began to be in demand in the United States markets. In consequence, the national economies of the region entered a process of rapid reactivation.

Second, security considerations emerged within the United States in reaction to the perceived "Soviet threat" and the possibility of communist expansionism in the continent. It is in this situation that several military agreements were established between the United States governments and the Latin American governments, such as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed

in 1947, which established that any aggression committed by a foreign power against an American state "will be considered as an aggression to all states of the continent".⁵⁸ Moreover, in 1951, the Treaty of Mutual Security was signed to regulate the United States program of military assistance to Latin America. In 1953 this program established that the Latin American armies would receive conventional weapons produced during the Second World War. Also, the United States government would intensify military technical assistance to increase the national armies' capacity to defend the national territories. In 1954, another treaty was signed. This was known as the Caracas Declaration which justified the participation of any government from the American continent in the overthrow of any government in the region that favored communist expansion.⁵⁹

Finally, the third factor to be considered was the active promotion of the economic development of the third world in general and of Latin America and Central America in particular by governments of the developed countries of the world and the emerging international development organizations. As John McCamant points out,

the end of World War II saw the organization of a group of world-wide international agencies with economic aims, which toward the end of the 1940's began providing assistance to Central America. The World Bank made its first loan to the area in 1949. WHO, UNESCO, and UNICEF began programs at about the same time. The technical assistance activities of the United Nations

family were enlarged through the financing provided by the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, which sent missions to Central America in 1950. 60

To sum up, the increased external demand for agricultural products, the United States government military concerns in regard to the possibility of Soviet expansionism in the continent, and the introduction of the idea and practice of development in Honduras, are some of the main elements responsible for the changes in the social, political and economic structure of the country during the period under study. These elements were also to have strong effects on the modes of transformation of the state apparatus during this era.

At the Central American level; another international factor was to influence the development of the Honduran state apparatus during this period. This factor was the emergence of a reformist regime in Guatemala from 1945 to 1954. The program of social reforms introduced in Guatemala by the Arbenz and the Arevalo governments were considered by the United States and neighbor countries to be a threat to the political stability of the area. In these circumstances, the Honduran military machinery developed, to a significant extent, in reaction to the "Guatemalan threat" as well as to the possible emergence of reformist movements within the country.

With favorable international circumstances, Honduras managed during this period to modernize its economic structure along capitalist lines, as well as to improve its economic performance. From 1945 to 1953, growth of external demand for Honduran products, allowed the country to increase its import capacity by 16 percent.⁶¹ This process of economic reactivation affected the relative economic importance of the banana industry. As Table 2 shows, it is in this period that its participation in the total value of exports started to decline. Concomitantly, cotton, coffee, bean and other products gained in relative importance.⁶²

The expansion of commercial agriculture not only widened the gap and accentuated the differences between the modern and the traditional agriculture sectors of the country, but also intensified the process of proletarianization of the labor force. These economic transformations promoted the consolidation of the organized labor and the formation of an urban middle class. The political and economic demands of these social elements, in turn, required the transformation of the relatively simple and authoritarian political regime organized by Carias. As Posas points out,

the political system inherited from the Carista dictatorship (1933-1948) was forced to loosen up as a result of the pressure from social classes (the urban petty bourgeoisie) and emerging social groups such as organized labor. The exclusive forms of political domination imposed

TABLE 2

Honduras:

Relative Importance of Bananas in the
Value of Total Exports 1947-1976

<u>Year</u>	<u>%</u>
1947	78.5
1948	74.3
1949	73.0
1950	73.9
1951	66.3
1952	64.7
1953	60.6
1954	51.6
1955	51.6
1956	58.3
1957	50.8
1958	53.9
1959	47.8
1960	52.8
1961	58.1
1962	50.2
1963	42.5
1964	35.4
1965	41.8
1966	48.8
1967	49.6
1968	42.6
1969	46.1
1970	44.0
1971	50.8
1972	44.4
1973	35.9
1974	27.0
1975	21.0
1976	27.2

Source: Frank Ellis, Las Transnacionales del Banano en Centroamerica (San José: EDUCA, 1983), p. 405.

by the "lords of the land" (traditional landowners who were slowly "junkerized" and the imperialist banana bourgeoisie) and the commercial bourgeoisie began to be questioned.⁶³

It is in these conditions that the civilian and modernizing government of Galvez emerged on the political scene in 1949. Galvez's economic policies encouraged further modernization of the agricultural sector of the country and the diversification of export agriculture. The Galvez government also took important steps to adapt the social and political structures of the country to the new economic reality of Honduras after the Second World War. As Millet points out,

a considerable degree of press freedom was restored, the Liberals and other groups were allowed to organize, and even some labor organization was permitted. Labor also benefited from legislation during this period. Congress passed, and the president signed, legislation establishing the eight-hour workday, paid holidays for workers, limited employer responsibility for work-related injuries, and regulations for the employment of women and children.⁶⁴

While new political actors and new social demands were arising within the Honduran political system, the army continued to be strengthened with the active help of the United States government. Moreover, the emergence of the reformist governments of Arevalo and Arbenz in Guatemala, made the United States government and the Honduran elites feel that the preservation of the existing political and

economic system could be only guaranteed with the development of a strong military capacity. ⁶⁵

In summary, increasing social demands were perceived by the army and the most conservative sectors of the country, as a threat to political stability. This perception is the major reason for the consolidation of the army and its emergence in 1956 as the restorer of order and as the main arbiter of the nation's politics.

The Modes of Transformation of the State Apparatus

Introduction

The period under consideration was characterized by governments' attempts to instrumentalize the state apparatus in order to modernize the national economy as well as the political structure of the country. The following is a characterization of the changes introduced by the governments of this period into the organizational design, the character, the social domain and the management system of the state apparatus. These efforts were conditioned and limited by the balance of power of the economic, political and international forces operating within the Honduran society. During this period, the determinant element was the international, particularly the United States concern

with hemispheric security. The most visible manifestation of the dominance of this element was the increasing modernization, professionalization and institutionalization of the national army.

By "modernization" we mean primarily, "the adoption of more sophisticated weaponry, tactics, and resources [by the army], largely through the importation of technologies and materials developed for military purposes elsewhere".⁶⁶

By "professionalization", we mean "the training of personnel for their respective roles in the military, either as officers or as recruits".⁶⁷

Finally, by "institutionalization", we mean "a process whereby [the army] assumes a life of [its] own, in the sense that [it] develops [its] own processes for renewal and regeneration which transcend specific military leaders".⁶⁸

The Organizational Design

The main characteristics of the organizational design of the state apparatus that emerged during the period under study are the expansion and diversification of its political and economic activities, as reflected in the creation of new state institutions, and the dramatic institutional strengthening of its military sector.

The dynamic process of institution building developed by the Galvez and the Lozano Diaz governments, was intended to facilitate the institutionalization of a process of political and economic modernization. For this purpose, the following institutions were created: the Central Bank, as the organization in charge of the monetary and financial control of the country; the Inter-American Technical Service for Agricultural Cooperation, to provide technical assistance in the agricultural sector; the National Development Bank, to promote the capitalist development of the agricultural sector by stimulating the production of cotton, cattle raising and coffee as well as the formation of agro-industrial enterprises. Other important new institutions created during this period were the Ministry of Agriculture (1952) transformed in 1954 into the Ministry of Natural Resources, and the National Economic Council (1955), the first coordinating and planning agency in the history of the country. In the social area, the government created the Inter-American Cooperative Service for Education, to promote rural and vocational education. Also, the Inter-American Cooperative Service for Public Health was organized to work in the fields of health engineering and preventive medicine.⁶⁹ It is important to point out, that the expansion of the state apparatus was associated with the increasing demand for state services generated by the economic development of the country. In turn this increasing demand, facilitated the development of the state apparatus' taxing capacity.

Finally, the increasing power of the military arm of the state apparatus was associated with the growing United States's security concerns after the end of the Second World War. Before the 1950s Honduras "did not have a well organized, professional military."⁷⁰ It is only during this decade that the Honduran army initiated its professionalization and modernization. Not only were schools created and scholarships given to army members to study abroad, but also modern military equipment was acquired.⁷¹ The growing institutionalization of the military was expressed in the enactment of the Organic Military Law in March of 1954, according to which, "the army [became] a national and permanent institution whose aim [was] to maintain the integrity and sovereignty of the national territory as well as to maintain peace and order in the country."⁷² In May of the same year, the United States and Honduras signed a military assistance agreement a result of which the first army batallion was created. The strong influence of the United States in the modernization, professionalization and institutionalization of the Honduran army can be seen in the fact that this batallion was under direct American control until August of 1956.⁷³

The Social Domain

During this period, the functions of the state

apparatus responded to two related needs: Firstly, the creation of conditions for the capitalist development of the country; and secondly, the organization and control of the new forms of political conflict generated by the emergence and activities of organized labor and the middle class.

In regard to the former, the government identified the stimulation of the capitalist sector of agriculture as "the main strategic activity for the development of the national economy. Managerial and economic resources were only available to this particular sector."⁷⁴ In regard to the latter, this period is characterized by a dynamic process of law creation generated in response to the demands of the working and middle classes. For example, the strike of 1954 was directly linked to the creation of new institutions and the enactment of new legislation. As Meza explains:

"In December of 1954, the government enacted the decree law # 8 which created the Ministry of Labor, Social Assistance and Middle Class. The purpose of this new institution was to "harmonize" the relations between workers and owners. In this sense, the creation of this ministry constituted a clear evidence of the importance attributed by the government to the workers movement."⁷⁵

Another consequence of the 1954 strike was the promulgation by the government of new labor legislation. This includes, the Carta Constitutiva de Garantias del Trabajo (February 1955), and the Ley de Mediacion,

Conciliacion Arbitraje (March 1955); Ley de Organizacion Sindicales (March 1955), and Ley de Contratacion Individual del Trabajo (April 1956). Before 1954, " there were different legal instruments dealing with labor problems. However, they did not constitute a coherent legal framework on the subject." 76

Character of the State Apparatus

The period under study is characterized by the government's attempt to introduce pro-développement and technocratic attitudes into the public sector. The introduction of these new values was necessary in order to institutionalize the changes associated with the modernization of the political and the economic structures of the country. As an example, the introduction of Planning in 1955 as a central state function, required that

administrators become goal conscious, i.e., that they become aware of the importance of the accomplishment of specific tasks. Acceptance of this frame of mind involves giving up some of the established attitudes and ways in which Central American bureaucracies, as those of the rest of the world, have always operated where public administration has been considered primarily as a place for employment rather than an institution for the accomplishment of tasks.⁷⁷

Furthermore, the introduction of pro-development and technocratic values required the elimination of the

particularist and political partisan values that had traditionally prevailed in the Honduran public sector. In other words, it required the development of national social values within Honduran public administration. This was a very difficult task in view of the political culture of the country. As Stokes observed in his analysis of the administrative culture of the Honduran public sector,

the slogan "to the victor belongs the spoils" means, in Honduras, that personal and partisan factors dominate all phases of administration at every level in government. The merit system is as foreign to the thinking of the typical Honduran politico as it was to the supporters of Jackson in the 1830's in the United States. In the Honduran spoils system, particularly in respect to the appointment of officers, a disproportionate emphasis is placed upon personal loyalty to the leader. Indeed, personalismo might well be defined as principle in the Honduran administrative process. The average man too frequently feels little or no responsibility for the efficient operation of government, a feeling which is in part a carry over of colonial tradition. 78

During this period, those institutions with a closer relationship to the international development agencies were the only ones that developed, at least partially, a pro-developmental ideology. A dual situation emerged in this period where progressive institutions such as the Central Bank and the Consejo Nacional de Economía co-existed with traditional state institutions that had had little or no contact with the international development institutions.

Management of the state apparatus

The period under study is characterized by a significant attempt to introduce modern legal and administrative techniques into the state apparatus. This attempt was associated with the diversification and expansion of the state's activities previously described in this chapter. New administrative and legal systems and procedures were required to facilitate the modernization of the national economy, the management of the growing financial capacity of the state, as well as the control of increasing levels of government expenditures.

The most significant effort to improve the managerial capacity of the state was the introduction of the function of planning in the early 1950's, with the active collaboration of the World Bank.⁷⁹ However, these efforts, as Gary Wynia points out, were not very successful:

While the public investment policies stimulated by the foreign missions met with small-scale, yet impressive success, their attempts to reshape Central America's policy making processes through the introduction of economic planning were dismal failures. In fact they were doomed from the beginning. The IBRD experts, although firm advocates of more rational policy-making, made only token attempts to create planning machinery. To be sure, Nicaragua in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and Honduras in 1955 dutifully created planning agencies as requested by the missions. But the planning agencies were staffed primarily with IBRD personnel who, when

they departed in the late 1950's; left nearly empty offices behind. 80

Conclusions

The development of the state apparatus during the period under consideration shows how its modes of transformations were shaped by the alternative effect of the domestic and international structural factors operating within the Honduran society. The vigorous process of economic modernization, promoted by the governments of this period, was accompanied by important changes in the organizational design, the social domain, the character, and the management of the state apparatus.

The modernization of the economic structure of the country promoted the emergence of new political actors such as the labor movement and a small middle class. These new actors voiced their demands to the state which was incapable of organizing and controlling the new forms of political conflict emerging in the country. As a result, the army, whose institutional, technical, and professional capacity had been strengthened by the United States program of military assistance, began to emerge as the arbiter of the nation's politics.

4.4 The Emergence of the Military: 1956-1980

Economic, Political and International Factors Influencing the Modes of Transformation of the State Apparatus

In 1956 the army overthrew the Lozano Díaz government that had ruled the country since 1954. The army argued that its only purpose in undertaking such action was to "re-establish constitutional order in the country."⁸¹ Moreover, the army promised that once this objective had been achieved they would "return the government to a civilian element."⁸²

The army re-established social order by limiting political freedom and complied with the declared intention to remain in power only the necessary time to achieve social order, and to organize national elections. However, before the elections took place in 1957, they reformed the national constitution, so as to allow the army to be transformed into a virtually autonomous political institution.

The self-appointed new political role adopted by the military was more clearly reflected in their public proclamation of September 1957, according to which the army would henceforth "irrevocably assume the historical and meritory role of permanent guardian of the (national) institutions."⁸³ Thereafter, it made full use of its legal

perogative, shaping and determining the course of political events in the country.

The emergence of the military as a legal political actor epitomizes the failure of the political system to institutionalize relations of legal authority vis-à-vis the different political actors as well as its incapacity to organize and control the new forms of political conflict generated by the economic development of the country. It also reflects the relative strength that the army had achieved vis-à-vis other political and economic actors in the country. During the period under study, the institutional power of the army significantly increased as a result of domestic and international circumstances.

The international context of Honduras during the period under study was mainly characterized by the vigorous continuation of the United States governments anticommunist policy in Central America. Financial assistance to promote the development of a capitalist economy, and military aid and assistance to the army to secure the stability of the country, had been the keystones of the United States relations with Honduras since the end of the Second World War. The success of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 and the victory of the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua in 1979, reinforced the United States anticommunist policies and their attitude towards the Central American region in general and towards Honduras in particular.

During the 1960s and the 1970s the Honduran army continued its process of professionalization, modernization and institutionalization. Not only did the size of the army grow substantially but also army positions were increasingly filled by academic graduates. Moreover, during these two decades, the organizational structure of the army experienced significant changes that increased its institutional capabilities. According to Steve Ropp, the most important ones were,

first of all, incorporation of the senior leadership of the national police into the armed forces ... second, increased organizational differentiation and complexity as the various service branches began to add general staffs and support units during the 1970s; and third, greater balance and standardization of the organizational structure across the various service branches as they developed general staffs and support units.⁸⁴

Given the strategic geographical location of Honduras, United States financial and technical assistance to the Honduran army further increased after the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua in July of 1979. With the success of the Nicaraguan Revolution, the importance of the Honduran army acquired a regional dimension. The new role of the Honduran army as a key international actor in the Central American crisis gave additional strength to its institutional capabilities vis-à-vis other institutions in the country, including other sectors of the state apparatus.

While United States' military assistance to Honduras was aimed at strengthening the role of the Honduran army as the guarantor of national and regional stability, United States' economic aid had as its central objective the institutionalization of a capitalist economic structure. Not only the process of military assistance but also the process of economic assistance to Central America in general and to Honduras in particular, acquired a special dynamic after 1959 as a result of the success of the Cuban Revolution, added to this was the threat perceived by the United States and the traditional ~~dominant~~ groups of the region, of similar political movements in the area. The most important expression of the new United States' concern was the formulation of the developmental program called "Alliance for Progress" in 1961.⁸⁵

For Central America in general and for Honduras in particular, the Alliance for Progress acquired special significance after the Meeting of Central American Presidents in March 1963 with the participation of President John F. Kennedy. At that meeting the particular characteristics of the Central American countries were analyzed vis a vis the potential impact of the Alliance for Progress. As a result of this analysis it was concluded that a proper use of this program and the institutionalization of the economic and social reforms in Central America called for an Alliance:

to expedite the establishment of a Customs Union; to perfect the Central American Common Market; to formulate and execute social economic national development plans and to coordinate them at the Central American level; to regionally program the different sectors of the economy; to establish a monetary union and a common fiscal, social and economic policy; within the program of economic integration; to jointly participate in programs tending to improve the prices of export basic grains; to complete as soon as possible the necessary reforms in the agrarian, fiscal, educational and social fields as well as in the field of public administration. 86

The enthusiasm that emerged as a result of the formulation of the Alliance for Progress Program waned after President Kennedy's death in 1963. However the program was going to have lasting effects in the social, political and economic configuration of Central America. The most important of these effects was the consolidation of the "Central American Common Market" (CACM). 87

Honduras was the country that benefitted the least from the creation of the Central American Common Market. At the time of the creation of the CACM, the country simply did not have the competitive capacity to participate in the commercial exchange promoted by this program. 88

In 1969, Honduras went to war against El Salvador. Although the public imagination attributed this war to a conflict that took place during a World Cup soccer match

between the representatives of Honduras and El Salvador, the armed conflict was really over the emigration of Salvadorean peasants to Honduras and over Honduras' disadvantageous economic position in regard to El Salvador within the framework of the Central American Common Market.⁸⁹ As a result of the armed conflict, Honduras withdrew from the Central American Common Market. Thereafter, "favorable ~~bilateral~~ trade arrangements between Honduras and the other former CACM partners were subsequently negotiated." 90

However, the level of industrialization achieved by the country as a result of its participation in the CACM, had important and lasting effects on the overall national economy. From 1950 to 1981 the participation of manufacturing activities in the Gross Domestic Product of the country went from 9.1 percent to 16.9 percent, while the proportion of agriculture activities went from 44.8 percent to 31.6 percent. (See Table 3)

Moreover, the process of industrialization promoted by the CACM had significant social effects, specially in regard to employment and population distribution in the country. In Central America in general and in Honduras in particular the process of industrialization was associated with a rapid process of urbanization. This process has been characterized by a) urban demographic growth higher than the rural one, b) by a migration flow from the rural to the urban areas that has increased the social pressures on the urban centers and

TABLE 3

Honduras:
Sectoral Shares of Gross Domestic Product, Selected Years
1950-81

	(in percentage)					
<u>Sector</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1981</u>
Primary Activities	44.8	32.8	36.8	34.5	29.6	31.6
Secondary Activities						
Manufacturing	9.1	15.3	13.6	14.0	16.6	16.9
Construction	5.4	4.5	4.0	5.0	5.2	4.6
Mining	2.3	1.9	2.1	2.2	3.9	1.8
Total Secondary Activities	16.8	21.7	19.7	21.2	25.7	23.3
Tertiary Activities						
Commerce and Finance	15.0	14.9	15.3	16.1	16.1	16.8
Transp. and Commun.	5.3	8.2	7.3	6.7	6.9	8.7
Housing	6.7	7.8	7.4	7.6	7.9	5.5
Public Admin.	4.1	4.7	3.8	3.6	3.8	3.7
Utilities	0.2	0.7	1.0	1.4	1.4	1.6
Other Services	6.2	9.4	8.9	8.7	8.5	8.8
Total Tertiary Activities	37.5	45.7	43.7	44.1	44.6	45.1

Sources: Based on information from James W. Wilkie and Stephen Haber, ed., Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 21, Los Angeles, 1981, 287, and Republica de Honduras, Depto. de Estudios Economicos, Banco Central de Honduras Informe 1981, in James Rudolph, ed. Honduras: A Country Study (Washington: The American University, 1983), p. 252.

c) by a gradual reduction of growth of the employed population in the rural sectors.⁹¹

During the 1950's and 60's the emerging industrial sector in Central America and the activities connected with it, were capable of absorbing the labor force moving from the agricultural sector. However, when the region faced declining rates of expansion during the 1970's, it was difficult for governments to maintain and increase the rate of growth of employment opportunities.⁹²

Social contradictions also emerged from the process of commercialization and diversification of agricultural production. This process, together with increasing population levels, increased social inequalities in the rural sector which in turn resulted in increasing social demands and frustrated expectations. In Honduras, as the production of cotton and beef became a lucrative business, the new elites that controlled these activities "began to expand their landholding by means of an enclosure movement that displaced thousands of peasants."⁹³ The consequences of this process are explained by Ruhl:

With export sales of both beef and cotton booming- combined earnings in 1967 were over 12 million dollars compared with 700 thousand dollars in 1945. -large landowners evicted tenants and squatters and absorbed thousands of hectares of national and ejidal land often by simply fencing them in with barbed wire. Peasants who could still find plots to rent

discovered that rents had risen dramatically due to the increasing value of agricultural land. Conflicts between peasants and large landowners became more frequent, and Honduran peasants began to organize to resist the enlargement of the latifundia.⁹⁴

Another important effect of the process of commercialization and diversification of agricultural production was the reinforcement of the gap between the production conditions of agricultural products for international consumption and those of agricultural products for internal consumption.

In Honduras, this gap was reflected in the different rates of growth achieved by these two sectors in terms of production, productivity and cultivated area. Tables 4 and 5 reflect the trend toward the polarization of the two sectors.

The widening gap between export products and products for internal consumption had important effects on the social conditions of the rural areas of the country, particularly as the production for world markets is generally associated with large size farms and the production for internal markets is associated with small productive units. Moreover, the distribution of income is clearly associated with the size of the productive unit as shown in Table 6.

It is important to mention that during this period,

TABLE 6

Honduras: Income Distribution in the
Agricultural Sector (1970)

<u>Size of Farm</u> <u>Manzanas*</u>			<u>Income per Capita</u> <u>Lempiras (Honduran currency)</u>
Landless			-
From	1 to	4	80.00
	5 to	9	224.00
	10 to	49	284.00
	50 to	499	820.00
	500 and more		21,640.00

Source: CONSUPLANE, Proyecto de Instrumentos y Mecanismos de
Politica Cientifica y Tecnologica para Centroamerica,
Tegucigalpa, Diciembre 1982.

* manzanas: 0.705 ha.

TABLE 5

Production for Internal Consumption:
Area Harvested, Production and Yield

	<u>1950-60</u>	<u>1960-70</u>	<u>1970-79</u>	<u>1950-79</u>
Corn				
Area Harvested	2.3	-1.9	1.4	0.5
Production	1.9	3.8	0.6	2.1
Yield	-0.4	5.9	-0.8	1.6
Rice				
Area Harvested	-1.0	-3.9	11.1	1.6
Production	-2.9	-2.5	10.5	1.2
Yield	-1.9	1.4	-0.6	-0.4
Beans				
Area Harvested	2.6	0.9	-2.1	0.5
Production	5.5	2.0	-1.0	2.3
Yield	2.9	1.0	1.1	1.7
Sorghum				
Area Harvested	1.6	0.8	0.4	-0.2
Production	0.2	2.0	0.5	0.9
Yield	1.8	1.2	0.2	1.0

Source: CONSUPLANE, Proyecto de Instrumentas y Mecanismos de Polictica Cientifica y Tecnologica para Centroamerica, Tugucigalpa, Diciembre 1982, p. 47.

TABLE 4

Export Products:
Area Harvested, Production and Yield

	<u>1950-60</u>	<u>1960-70</u>	<u>1970-79</u>	<u>1950-79</u>
Banana				
Area Harvested	1.7	0.7	-1.9	0.2
Production	-1.1	9.0	1.3	3.0
Yield	-2.7	8.3	3.2	2.8
Coffee				
Area Harvested	1.2	1.9	4.5	2.5
Production	4.9	4.7	8.8	6.0
Yield	3.7	2.7	4.1	3.5
Sugar Cane				
Area Harvested	-5.4	8.9	6.6	3.1
Production	-4.9	12.9	7.5	4.8
Yield	0.5	3.6	0.8	1.7
Cotton				
Area Harvested	8.8	3.9	12.9	8.3
Production	28.5	6.1	10.1	14.6
Yield	18.0	2.2	-2.4	5.9
Tobacco				
Area Harvested	-6.6	2.1	3.7	-0.5
Production	-3.7	4.4	7.2	2.4
Yield	3.1	2.2	3.4	2.9
Plantain				
Area Harvested		2.6	-1.7	0.6
Production		4.7	1.0	2.9
Yield		2.1	2.7	2.4

Source: CONSUPANE, Progeto de Instrumentos y Mecanismos de
Politica Cientifica y Tecnologica para Centroamerica,
Teguciagalpa, Diciembre 1982, p. 410.

banana production continued to lose importance in the total performance of the national economy. The favorable conditions of the post war international economy promoted "a process of gradual diversification of production and exports that was expressed in the increasing production of crops such as sugar, coffee, cotton as well as in forest exploitation and cattle raising."⁹⁵ The declining relative participation of banana production can be seen in Table 7 containing the composition of the total export value from 1955 to 1978.

In conclusion, the economic development of the country during this period had, as a consequence, the emergence of social contradictions. The process of commercialization and diversification of agriculture resulted in an increasing gap between larger farmers who could profit from the lucrative agro-exporting business and the small producers and peasants who could survive only as producers of staples for internal consumption and/or by selling their labor. At the same time, the process of industrialization had the effect of attracting strong migratory flows from the rural areas to the cities. The limited capacity of the emerging industrial sector to absorb the increasing urban labor force, resulted in high levels of unemployment, and in frustrated social expectations.

The failure of the economic development of the country to alleviate inequalities and to satisfy social demands put

TABLE 7
Honduras:

Composition of Total Value of Agricultural Export Products
(in percentage)

	<u>1955</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1978</u>
Bananas	61.0	61.0	55.5	65.0	46.8	33.7	35.7
Coffee	27.8	25.2	23.2	23.5	43.3	54.8	53.4
Cotton	0.3	1.4	6.4	1.0	3.5	2.4	4.0
Tobacco	0.9	1.0	1.5	2.1	4.2	3.2	2.3
Plantain	-	0.3	0.2	0.7	0.1	0.7	0.1
Beans	0.3	2.0	3.7	1.5	0.7	0.2	-
Corn	0.4	2.0	5.9	0.9	-	0.9	-
Rice	-	0.1	0.3	-	-	-	-
Cattle	3.3	5.1	2.5	0.5	0.2	-	-
Others	6.0	1.9	0.8	4.8	1.2	4.1	4.5
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: CONSUPLANE, Proyecto de Instrumentos y Mecanismos de Política Científica y Tecnológica para Centroamérica, Tegucigalpa, Diciembre 1982, p.462.

enormous pressure on the political system. The preservation of social order, became, then, the justification and the reason for, the consolidation of the military as the regulator of the political life of the country. An overview of the political development of the country after the military coup of 1956 will further support this argument.

The elections organized by the army in 1957 brought to power the reformist government of Dr. Villeda Morales who, enjoyed substantial support from organized labor movements as well as from the most progressive political groups in the country. The Villeda government pursued an anticommunist policy while trying to respond to the social demands presented by the labor movements, and the middle sectors of the Honduran society. It initiated the process of land reform, in response to the demands of the peasant movement, and increased governments social expenditures especially in the areas of health and education. Moreover, it enacted a first comprehensive Labor Law in response to the demands of the labor movement. 96

The process of social reforms introduced by the Villeda Morales' regime, and the increasing social demands were perceived as a threat by the most conservative elements of the Honduran society, organized in the Partido Nacional. The army, in alliance with these conservative elements, re-emerged on the national political scene, and on October 3, 1963 exercised its constitutional right to "defend the

national order" by deposing Villeda Morales. Once again, the communist threat was presented by Gral. Lopez Arellano -the leader of the coup d'etat- as the justification for the army's intervention. From 1963 to 1971, the army was to be in direct control of the state apparatus.

The military government utilized a combined strategy of direct coercion and negotiation as a way to control social unrest. According to Meza, the military repression "resembled the most difficult days of the Carias regime. Union leaders, students, and leftist intellectuals were sent to jail and later to exile. Others, less fortunate, were persecuted and assassinated within the national territory."⁹⁷

At the same time, the army instantly proclaimed its intention to guarantee the validity of the Labor Code and other labor laws as well as the program of land reform. Moreover, according to the military government, the state would also guarantee the existence of free democratic unions as "a natural dam against communism."⁹⁸ The combined strategy of negotiation and coercion utilized by the government did not succeed in neutralizing the labor movement. The two strikes of 1965 and of 1968 were expressions of strength by the labor organizations and resulted in direct confrontation between government and unions. This climate of confrontation temporarily disappeared in 1969 with the war between El Salvador and Honduras. The war generated a strong feeling of national

solidarity. The main leaders of the labor movement immediately gave their support to the military government and asked workers to do the same.⁹⁹ The country as a whole, was strongly behind the government. National solidarity however, quickly evaporated when the El Salvadoran army inflicted a humiliating defeat on the Honduran army. Moreover, the war revealed the technical incapacity of the Honduran army and the high level of corruption practiced by the top officials of this institution who, for many years, engaged in illegal profiteering in the purchase of weapons and military supplies.

After the war, the government came under the pressure of all social sectors of the country to organize elections by 1971. The business sector, middle class groups, as well as the labor movements, proposed that the elections should lead to the formation of a government of "national unity". On January of 1971, the two main national parties, the National and the Liberal, signed an agreement for the establishment of such a government.

From the time of its inception, the government of National Unity lacked a coherent plan of its own, which could answer the increasing demands expressed by the social forces of the country. As Salomon points out, the government of National Unity "was established on the basis of a simple distribution of public positions without consistent common objectives and strategies."¹⁰⁰ What was clear throughout the

life of the Government of National Unity, was the predominance of its conservative elements. This was reflected in the absence of a clearly defined land reform government policy. Consequently peasants began to illegally occupy land "as the only option left to them by the system."¹⁰¹ The coercive attitude adopted by the government as a response to social unrest did not stop the peasant movement. In these circumstances, the army decided to intervene and depose the Government of National Unity.

The re-emergence of the military initiated one of the most important periods of social and economic reforms in the history of the country. A central component of these reforms was the modernization of the state apparatus "to make it more efficient in the creation of conditions for investment." ¹⁰²

The leader of the coup was once more General Lopez Arellano who had organized the military coup of 1963. In his New Year's message, he proclaimed that,

the situation of poverty in which the masses live especially in the rural areas- demand immediate state action. In order to achieve democratic justice, the action of the state must reach the masses. In consequence, the military government has decided to adopt the program of land reform, as its fundamental task. ¹⁰³

In fact, the program of land reform was only one aspect

of a more comprehensive government strategy designed to "accelerate the degree of capitalist production in agriculture, to eliminate nonproductive latifundios, and to incorporate organized peasant groups into agricultural production under state control."¹⁰⁴ Nevertheless, the process of land reform constituted the most sensitive component of this strategy given its direct effect on the power structure of the country.

Government inefficiency and the strong resistance of big landlords to the program of land reform, were the two main factors responsible for the failure of this program. Table 8 shows government's performance in implementing this program of land reform.

By 1974, the military government was in a critical situation. It was not only under the pressure of the dominant national elites and the banana companies, especially the Standard Fruit Company, but it was also isolated from the masses whose demands had not been answered.¹⁰⁵ The culmination of this crisis took place in two stages. On March 15 1975, Lopez Arellano was removed from his position as Chief of the Armed Forces. With this the real basis of power of the reformist government disappeared. On the 15 of April, after the Wall Street Journal published evidence substantiating that illegal payments had been made by the multinational United Brands to Villeda Morales, in exchange for a tax reduction, the reformist government was replaced

TABLE 8

Honduras:

Agrarian Reform National Plan -

<u>Year</u>	<u>Estimated Distribution of land according to Plan</u>	<u>Actual Distribution of land*</u>
1975	150.000	116.804
1976	150.000	26.923
1977	125.000	15.985
1978	125.000	5.413
1979	5.000	6.355

Source: Victor Meza, Honduras: La Evolucion de la Crisis, op.cit., p. 19.

* hectareas

by the conservative military government of Colonel Juan Alberto Melgar Castro who assumed the position of Chief of State.

After promising elections in 1980, the new government initiated a repressive campaign against unions, opposition parties and other political organizations as well as against the progressive members of the army who had supported the deposed reformist government. Many of the reformist army officers were forced to occupy diplomatic positions abroad or were sent to continue military studies outside the country.¹⁰⁶ In 1978, after many scandals in which the army appeared to be involved in drug trafficking, the MelgarCastro government was replaced by an even more conservative military junta.

Finally, the promised elections took place in 1980. On April 20 of that year, a new National Assembly was elected where the Liberal Party occupied the majority of seats. The Assembly negotiated with the military the dates and conditions for presidential elections. The definitive date was set for November 29 of 1981, that is, 18 months after the formation of the National Assembly.

In October of 1981 the army negotiated with the presidential candidates of the two main parties further conditions for the election. The army wanted total guarantee that the new civilian government would not attempt to

conduct investigations concerning army involvement in cases of corruption. The condition was accepted and the elections took place on time. In 1982 a new civilian Liberal government took office. However, the emergence of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua in 1979, and the decision by the United States to use the Honduran territory as a military base against Nicaragua, gave the army additional strength vis-a-vis other national institutions.

In conclusion, the political development of Honduras during this period shows how the emergence of the army as the supreme arbiter of the nation's politics was the result of a) the incapacity of the economic structure of the country to fulfill social expectations; b) the absence of an institutionalized system of political domination capable of organizing and controlling political conflict, and c) the army's unparalleled institutional capacity to maintain social order. The effect of these circumstances was to be reflected in the conformation of the modes of transformation of the state apparatus during this period.

The Modes of Transformation of the State Apparatus

Introduction

The period from 1956 to 1980 was characterized by the continuation of the process of capitalist modernization of the national economy, the development of increasing social contradictions generated by this process, and the emergence and consolidation of the army as the supreme arbiter of the nation's politics.

Through this period, the army introduced important changes into the organizational design, the character, the social domain and the management system of the state apparatus, to adapt it for the purpose of institutionalizing the process of capitalist modernization of the national economy as well as for the organization and control of political conflict. The following is a characterization of these changes.

Organizational Design

The increasing importance of the military as a central factor for the maintenance of social order became clearly reflected in the organizational design of the state apparatus. After the coup organized by the army on October of 1956, the military developed into an autonomous power structure. The constitution of 1957 drafted by the military, officially recognized the army's new status. According to this constitution, the power to select the head of the armed forces was not in the hands of the executive

but left to the Supreme Council for National Defense which is a consulting body for military affairs integrated by the Chief of the Armed Forces, the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of State of the Armed Forces, the Chiefs of the Military Zones of the country, and the Commanders of the capital's military units.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, the constitution clearly established that the "presidents had to issue all orders through the chief of the armed forces, who in turn took an oath to defend the constitution and not to obey orders that violated either the spirit or the letter of that document."¹⁰⁸

The changes that the organizational design of the state apparatus experienced during the period under study and especially the emergence of the military as a parallel power structure to the civilian government structure can be seen in Charts 2 and 3.

In analyzing these charts it is interesting to notice that after the enactment of the 1956 constitution, the President was responsible for the appointment of the Secretary of State for national defense and public security. However, this minister possess only administrative responsibilities and "has no direct command over active military units."¹⁰⁹

CHART 2

Organization of the Armed Forces, 1975

Source Based on information from Leticia Salomon. *Militarismo y reformismo en Hon-*
duras, Tegucigalpa, 1982, 299

In Rudolph James, ed. Honduras: A Country Study (Washington:
 The American University, 1983), p. 213.

CHART 3

Organization of the Armed Forces, 1954

Source: Based on information from *Letra y Sable*, *Militarismo y reformismo en México*, *durán, Tequisquiapan, 1942*, 231. In Rudolph James, ed., *op.cit.*, p. 215.

After the emergence of the military in 1956, the social domain of the state apparatus was determined by the capitalist logic of supporting those activities and social sectors whose contributions to economic growth were more significant. In this sense, development policies mainly favored the production of old and new export products such as cotton, coffee, sugar cane, tobacco and beef as well as the promotion of agroindustries.¹¹⁰

The state promotion of capitalism did not mean that it did not intervene occasionally in direct support of the popular sectors of the country and even against the immediate interest of the capitalist groups. In fact, the Villeda Morales government (1957-1963) and the Oswaldo López Arellano government (1972-1979) were characterized by their reformist and populist attitude. It is important to point out however, that the inclusion of the interests of the popular sectors of society within the social domain of the state apparatus during these two governments, were always the result of the existence of significant levels of popular unrest and social demands. In other words, reformism was much more conditioned by the levels and forms of political conflict in the country, rather than by the attitudes and will of governments and rulers.

An important factor that explains the capacity that governments of this period had to include within the social

domain of the state apparatus the interest of the popular sectors of the Honduran society, was the relative autonomy of the army vis-a-vis the traditional dominant classes.¹¹¹

Character of the State Apparatus

During the period under study, some important changes in the character of the state apparatus began to emerge. However, important continuities can also be observed especially in regard to patronage, and political partisanship. In the early seventies, a comparative analysis of the Central American bureaucracies identified the Honduran public sector as "one of the most patronage-ridden systems."¹¹²

Corruption during the period remained high. The clearest example of the persistence of this practice was the case of the Lopez Arellano affair in which the military dictator "was implicated by the United States press in a million-dollar bribe paid by the multinational conglomerate United Brands."¹¹³ His participation in this deal cost him his position as Chief of the Armed forces and as President.

Despite these continuities, new emerging values seemed to have developed as a result of the appearance of new political actors, especially the labor movement and the urban middle class. According to Morris,

the new social forces that are beginning to act as political interest-groups, and also articulating demands through less formal channels - strikes, land invasions or occupation, mass rallies, and occasional violence - signify a new social-political consciousness that opens up the possibility of a "radical transformation of Honduran society". 114

Moreover, the emergence of the military as the most powerful political actor in the country gave the state apparatus an important degree of relative autonomy vis-à-vis any single political group. In consequence, the character of the state apparatus no longer reflected the values and interests of the traditional economic élites operating within the country.

Management of the State Apparatus

The period under consideration is characterized by an impressive attempt to improve the managerial capacity of the state apparatus. This attempt resulted from the need to rationalize the increasingly complex state operations which the promotion of capitalist development required.

The most significant managerial and technological innovations in the Honduran public sector, during the period under study, were associated with the continued efforts of the government to promote planning as a central state

function. These efforts involved the definition of clear distribution of functions among state institutions; the establishment of efficient systems of coordination; the design and implementation of expedient decision making processes; and, the implementation of evaluation systems as well as accurate information systems. It is important to remember that with the formulation and implementation of the Alliance for Progress program in 1961, United States economic aid was dependent on the formulation and implementation of national plans.¹¹⁵ The introduction of the new planning techniques, during the period under consideration, was then a direct result of international influences.

Efforts to introduce planning in the Honduran public sector, encountered the traditional managerial inefficiency that had plagued the national state apparatus throughout its history. As Wynia explained,

development policy execution is a very new activity in Honduras. Dominated by parochialism and the regional dispersion of political power, Hondurans have never demanded an active well-guided central administration. In fact, the Honduran art of presidential rule is still dominated by the disbursement of small favors rather than the delivery of large development projects.¹¹⁶

One of the largest development projects in the history of the country was the highway construction program included

in the Economic Plan 1965-1969. An analysis of the government agency in charge of this program, carried out by Wynia, pointed out that,

more than the other Central American countries, Honduras has been under intense foreign pressure to reshape its antiquated administrative structures. In the mid-1950's World Bank highway loans were made contingent on the implementation of reorganization schemes recommended by American consultants. The consultants reported in 1957 that the highway agency was primarily a one-man organization, that equipment was run down, and that too few skilled personnel were employed by the agency. With the aid of the consultants, the agency was reorganized, new statistics and personnel departments were created, and a new accounting and budget system was introduced.¹¹⁷

However, by the mid 1960, the Honduran highway agency "was plagued by more execution problems than any of the other Central American highway agencies."¹¹⁸ A reorganization proposal carried out by the Central American Institute of Public Administration and completed in 1968, "identified the familiar personnel and procedural problems as the most serious obstacles to program implementation."¹¹⁹

Later efforts to implement new economic plans encountered the same administrative and managerial difficulties. The reformist military government of Lopez Arellano (1972-1979), promised to introduce the necessary changes to overcome "the enormous deficiencies derived from the complexity and slowness of the existing administrative

procedures, the functional duplications and the lack of coordination among government agencies." ¹²⁰ However, the reforms introduced did not manage to solve the managerial problems of the Honduran state apparatus.

Conclusions

The consolidation of the military as the most important political actor of the country was reflected in the transformation of the state apparatus from 1956 to 1980. During this period a dual power structure was introduced into the organizational design of the state apparatus to accommodate the military's new political position. Moreover, the military introduced important changes into the social domain, character, and management of the state apparatus to modernize the national economy and to control political conflict.

4.5 Summary and Conclusions

Summary

The development of the state apparatus in Honduras reflects the variable effects of domestic and international

structural factors on its modes of transformation. Governments' capacity to instrumentalize it was always conditioned by the domestic political and economic structures as well as by the international forces affecting the country.

During the period from 1821 to 1839, the modes of transformation of the Honduran state apparatus were consciously designed to respond to the need to institutionalize the Central American Federation. The attempt to instrumentalize the state apparatus during this period failed primarily because economic fragmentation worked against all attempts towards regional or even national integration. The effect of the regional and the national economic structures was more determinant than the government's political will regarding the formation of both the Honduran social formation and the Honduran state apparatus. The overdetermination of the economic structure resulted in the failure of the integrationist liberal political project and the emergence of conservative groups that controlled the incipient national state apparatus from 1839 to 1876. During this period, the modes of transformation of the Honduran state apparatus were shaped according to the political and economic needs of the conservative oligarchies who controlled the national economy, resisted national centralism, and struggled to maintain local independence.

In 1876, international forces and more specifically, the intervention of the Guatemalan and the El Salvadorean governments in the affairs of Honduras, brought to power a liberal regime that attempted to modernize the political and the economic structure of the country along capitalist lines. The introduction and institutionalization of the liberal reform required the instrumentalization of the state apparatus by the new government. To this effect, the liberal government introduced important changes into the modes of transformation of the state apparatus as well as in the legal framework that sustained it. In order to create the social conditions required, the liberal government expanded the functions of the state apparatus, consolidated its national authority, centralized its organizational design, and introduced modern management techniques and systems.

In the absence of a true domestic economic elite that could lead the modernization of Honduran society, the liberal governments attempted to promote the development of the national economy by opening the doors of the country to foreign investment. However, rather than complementing domestic efforts and helping to develop a truly domestic economic elite, foreign capital quickly became the leading political and economic force of the country. The emergence of "economic enclaves" created the conditions for the subordination of the state apparatus to the interests of foreign capital.

The determinant influence of these international forces on the development of the Honduran social formation and its state apparatus became evident with the emergence of the dictatorial rule of Tiburcio Carias who transformed the weak and emerging national state machinery into a neo-colonial state apparatus which primarily served the needs of the foreign companies. In other words, with the emergence of Carias the modes of transformation of the state apparatus were adapted to the needs of foreign capital.

The Carias' government managed to instrumentalize the state apparatus until the balance of power of the domestic and international forces shaping its modes of transformation changed in 1949. In this year, the emergence of the government of Juan Manuel Galvez represented the beginning of one of the most important processes of social transformation in the history of Honduras. Galvez introduced an important process of political democratization as well as a dynamic process of capitalist economic modernization. Moreover, it made significant efforts to adapt the modes of transformation of the state apparatus so as to institutionalize its political and economic project. These efforts were continued by the government of Lozano Diaz from 1954 to 1956.

Galvez's capacity to instrumentalize the Honduran state apparatus was mainly conditioned by the effects that international forces had on the economic and political

development of the country in the early 1950's. . The increased external demand for agricultural products in the American market, the United States governments' fear of Soviet expansionism in the continent, and the introduction of the idea and practice of development in Honduras, are some of the most important elements responsible for the changes in the Honduran social formation and its state apparatus after the end of the Second World War.

The rapid Honduran post-war economic development took place without a corresponding modernization of its political structure. The traditionally weak state apparatus never developed the legal authority to regulate and organize the new forms of political conflict and the new political actors, such as unions and workers organizations, that emerged as a result of the economic development of the country.

As a result of the U.S. governments concern for hemispheric security, the military was able to institutionally develop and consolidate more quickly and effectively than any other national group. Consequently, the army showed greater capacity than any other political actor operating in Honduras at that time to control and instrumentalize the state apparatus. After 1956, it introduced important changes into the organizational design, the character, the social domain and the management system of the state apparatus to adapt it for the purpose of institutionalizing the process of modernization of the national economy and controlling political conflict. A dual

power structure was introduced into the organizational design of the state apparatus to accommodate the political functions of the military.

Conclusions

The historical development of the modes of transformation of the Honduran state apparatus reflects the overdeterminant role that international forces, especially the United States economic and political influences, have played in the conformation of the Honduran society.

The absence of a major export product that could provide cohesiveness to the political and economic structures of the country, and the predominant political role of foreign companies, prevented the conformation of a truly national political system. Real political parties never developed and "caudillismo" and governments subservience to international interests never disappeared.

With the United States concern for hemispheric security after the end of the Second World War and the consequent process of military and technical assistance to Honduras, the national armed forces developed more than any other national group in the country- the three features that according to Meisel characterize an elite: group consciousness, coherence, and conspiracy.¹²¹ These qualities

and appropriate international circumstances gave the military ample capacity to instrumentalize the state apparatus and control social conflict.

The historical weakness of the Honduran political system together with the overdevelopment of the Honduran armed forces contributed to the failure of political legitimacy and to the emergence of coercion as an effective means of controlling and organizing social conflict. Given the extreme dependency of the military on the United States technical and economic assistance and its resultant subservience to American interests in the region, the construction of a truly Honduran national state remains a remote goal.

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Republic of Costa Rica

CHAPTER V

COSTA RICA: THE POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

5.1 The Formative Period of the National State: 1821-1842

Economic, Political and International Factors Influencing the Modes of Transformation of the State Apparatus

Costa Rica, together with the rest of the Central American countries, achieved independence from Spain in 1821. From the beginning, Costa Rica enjoyed the benefits of political stability, a characteristic that even today differentiates it from the rest of Central America.

Three factors can be seen as facilitators of the sui-generis early political development of Costa Rica. These are:

- i) its geographical location;
- ii) its very small indigenous population; and
- iii) its lack of mineral resources.

Relative geographical isolation minimized colonial intervention before independence, and the effects of the post-colonial turmoil that characterized the rest of Central America. In consequence, Costa Rica had the opportunity to develop social, political and economic institutions, appropriated to its own needs rather than those of the colonial government or the post-independence federal government.¹

The significance of the geographical factor can be illustrated by the distance between Guatemala -the regional centre of the colonial power and later of the federal government- and Costa Rica. According to Thomas L. Karnes, Cartago, the most important Costa Rican city during the colonial and early post-colonial periods :

was about one thousand miles from Guatemala City. In the dry season, rapid messengers might complete the one way trip in a month and a half. For all but the most determined, travel simply ceased during the extended rainy season.²

Costa Rica's unique demographic makeup played at least as important a role as its geographical location. The absence of significant concentrations of Indian populations within the province inhibited the development of strong economic oligarchies.³ In the Central American experience the emergence of such oligarchies was always associated with the exploitation of cheap Indian labor. As Samuel Stone points out:

The absence of [a large concentration of Indians] in Costa Rica and [their] existence in the northern countries [of the region] have determined from the beginning, the development of different social structures in the north and the south. In Guatemala and the rest of the Central American countries -with the exception of Costa Rica- there emerged highly hierarchical feudal societies. On the other hand, the poverty of Costa Rica during the colony reduced the gap between social classes and produced a more equalitarian society.⁴

Another factor that significantly shaped the historical development of Costa Rica was the absence of opportunities for the profitable exploitation of minerals.⁵ As a Costa Rican sociologist points out:

Colonial wealth was unknown to us...We had no mines. The conquerors and their descendants had to struggle against nature in order to extract her fruits. The lack of mines determined that the seventeenth century would mark the Costa Rican people with the brand of poverty. The inhabitants had no desire to resign themselves to such a precarious destiny...But there was no remedy but to dedicate themselves to the cultivation of land.⁶

Despite the positive effects of these three factors on the long term historical development of Costa Rica, the formation of the national state was not without difficulties. In fact, the period under study was generally characterized by internal political conflict. Strong local interests struggled not only against the establishment of the Central American Federation, but also against the

development of a central national state apparatus.

Local identities within the country were stronger than a single national identity. Moreover, there was no national monopoly of force since every major region had its own local army. This political fragmentation was intimately related to the fragmentation of the economy of the country which was based on small and self-sufficient productive units that required little services from any central government. This, in turn, made it difficult for the state to expand its activities and functions and, consequently, to enhance its taxing capacity. In the absence of an interdependent national economic structure local interests prevailed as divisive forces against the formation of a strong national state apparatus.⁷

As a result, the years between 1821 and 1835 were characterized by conflict ~~amongst the~~ most important political and economic centers of the country, as represented by the cities of Heredia, Cartago, Alajuela and San Jose. Cartago and Heredia were "conservative outposts of Spanish imperial rule, fiercely loyal" to the crown".⁸ On the other hand, Alajuela and San Jose "were centers of defiance, their people attracted to the economic liberalism that eventually undermined Spanish rule in the early nineteenth century".⁹ Cartago and Heredia decisively opposed the emerging central structure of a national state apparatus whose geographical center was located in the city of San Jose. The power of the

incipient national state apparatus was based on the formation of an emerging national economic elite whose power, in turn, was based on the production of tobacco, sugar cane, and coffee.

Internal political conflict reached an unprecedented level when, in 1822 and 1823, the cities of Heredia and Cartago decided to join the newly formed Mexican Empire. San Jose and Alajuela, on the other hand, proposed "either union with the other Central American states or a separate existence for Costa Rica under a republican form of government."¹⁰ In December 1822, the pro-imperialist army was defeated by the republican forces. To prevent an invasion from Mexico, Costa Rica decided to unite with Colombia. The Mexican threat soon disappeared, however, with the overthrow and execution of the Mexican Emperor and the subsequent abolition of the short-lived Empire. These circumstances led to a battle in which San Jose won the capital from Cartago and in 1823 all parties agreed to co-operate with the Federation.¹¹

However, conflict amongst the cities did not stop here as the aristocratic sectors of Cartago continued to resent their loss of political power vis-à-vis the new economic elites of San Jose. In 1834, as a formula to achieve peace and national stability, it was decided that each one of the four important cities would take turns every four years being the capital of the country. The administrative chaos

that resulted from this decision almost paralyzed the functions of the national government.¹²

It was under these conditions that Braulio Carrillo was elected president in April of 1835. His strong personality and authoritarian style brought a much needed sense of order to the country. One of his first decisions was to make San Jose the permanent capital of the country. This decision was strongly opposed by the cities of Alajuela, Cartago and Heredia which organized themselves into a "liga", with a separate government and state apparatus. The rebel government and the constitutional national government went to war. Carrillo defeated the separatist army and "ruled Costa Rica firmly and arbitrarily, bringing order out of the chaos that had developed, and establishing a stable economy based on coffee production, but paying slight regard to the ideals of liberalism on which the Costa Rican state had been built."¹³ Moreover, in an effort to further consolidate the national state, Carrillo in 1838, declared full sovereignty for the country vis-à-vis the Central American Federation, although it declared itself a member of the Central American family. As Jones points out, even this connection "was a fiction brought to an end only on August 30, 1848, when Congress declared the nation sovereign and independent of any other state." ¹⁴

It is important to emphasize that the consolidation of the Costa Rican state can not be attributed exclusively to

the effects of Carrillo's strong personality. In many ways he merely expressed the aspirations, interests, and power of the emerging economic elite located in San Jose. Carrillo's success in the consolidation of Costa Rican society and the establishment of a national state apparatus was facilitated by the weakened position of the aristocratic and antirepublican sectors of the Costa Rican society, vis-à-vis the pro-republican emerging economic elite located in San Jose. The existence of this nationally predominant economic force was the prerequisite for national cohesiveness which Costa Rica had previously lacked.¹⁵

The Modes of Transformation of the State Apparatus

Introduction.

The period from 1821 to 1842 was characterized by the gradual consolidation of the Costa Rican national state. This process was reflected in the progressive crystalization of a national state apparatus. The following is a characterization of the modes of transformation of the Costa Rican state apparatus during this period as affected by the alternating dominance of the different structural factors acting within the Costa Rican society.

Organizational Design

From 1823 to 1838 Costa Rica was part of the Central American Federation. During this period, the Costa Rican state apparatus was part of a regional organizational structure composed of three levels: federal authorities (located in Guatemala), provincial authorities, and local authorities or municipalities.¹⁶ At the provincial level the organizational design of the state apparatus reflected the fragmented nature of the political and the economic structures of the country. At this level, the apparatus was divided into three powers: the executive, the legislative and the judicial. The executive was very much subordinated to the legislative arm, where the anti-federalist and anti-republican forces occupied the majority of seats. The legislature therefore became the focus of resistance to any fiscal or political government measure tending to increase the power of the central state.¹⁷ In addition to the powerful presence of localist forces in congress, the existence of strong municipal governments made the construction of a centralized national state apparatus difficult. After independence, municipal governments -especially those of the aristocratic cities of Cartago and Heredia- became the political refuge of the social forces opposed to the creation of a central national government.¹⁸ In spite of these centrifugal forces, the state was, nonetheless, able to progressively increase its strength and

authority thanks to the development of the coffee exporting industry.

In 1835 the assumption of power by Braulio Carrillo was rooted in the need for the emerging national elite, located in San Jose, to instrumentalize the state apparatus to allow for the institutionalization of ~~the~~ coffee economy.¹⁹ This conglomeration of a cohesive economic activity and oligarchy, with its demands for increased state services, was central to the process of consolidation of a national state apparatus.

Carrillo moved effectively to enhance the role of the central government. First he eliminated local armies and monopolized the use of the means of coercion. Second, the power of the municipal governments was severely limited subordinating them to the central state apparatus. Finally, the extractive capacity of the state was increased as a result of the dynamic development of the national economy. The development of the country's largely coffee based export economy led to an increase in demands for state services such as roads and agricultural incentives, which subsequently reinforced the state's taxing capacity. Moreover, Carrillo eliminated the competing extractive capacity of the church; obligatory contributions to the church, known as *diesmo* (tithing), were replaced by a direct property tax collected by the state.²⁰ Table 9 shows the significant increase in the state resources from 1833 to 1848.

TABLE 9

Export Value, Public Revenue and Public Revenue
per capita (1833-1848)*

<u>Year</u>	<u>Export Value</u>	<u>Public Revenue</u>	<u>Public Revenue per capita</u>
1833	\$ 184.824	\$ 50.484	\$ 0.69
1844	629.700	258.900	2.90
1848	618.750	340.099	3.60

Source: José L. Vega, La Formacion del Estado Nacional en
Costa Rica, op.cit. p. 99.

* American dollars

The predominance of one economic base and the intimately related dominance of a strong political force continued to be mutually reinforcing until Carrillo's dictatorial overreaching disturbed the balance causing the economic elite to reduce their support.

Social Domain

State policies during the period from independence in 1821 to the emergence of Carrillo in 1835 were incoherent and mainly reactive. The attention of the state apparatus was disputed by the Federal Government in Guatemala, the localist anti-federalist and anti-republican national forces, and the elites that favored the organization of a national and centralized state apparatus.

The Central American Federation was not a major disruptive force in the functioning of the national state, since for reasons that were explained before, Costa Rica remained relatively isolated from federalist intervention. The power of local economic and political forces, on the other hand, was central in shaping the functioning of the state apparatus. Vega illustrates the dominance of these local forces in conditioning the social domain of the state apparatus in the period from independence until the emergence of Carrillo:

In general, the fiscal and economic policies of the state between 1825 and 1835 were disparate, reactive and incoherent. They did not adhere to any overall plan formulated by the state nor to any particular set of interests. Decisions were made to respond to circumstances rather than to shape them. This was a pragmatic way of conciliating emerging political and economic interests still functioning with a local vision. These interests, were not yet articulated into a hegemonic national social class.²¹

The nature and orientation of state policies changed with the consolidation of the coffee elite and the emergence of the Carrillo government. The state apparatus built by Carrillo defined its policies according to the needs of the emerging social sector that controlled the coffee industry.²² It not only developed the physical infrastructure required for the development of a modern capitalist economy based on coffee production, but also formulated a legal framework that allowed the country's economy to interconnect with international markets.

Character of the State Apparatus

Until the emergence of the Carrillo government, the prevailing values of the Costa Rican public sector were diffused and particularistic: diffused because official roles and relationships were loosely defined and particularistic because government personnel felt primarily responsible to

the particular social groups and individuals that directly controlled the state apparatus. Government personnel was selected on the basis of who they were rather than on the basis of what they could do.²⁴ Consequently, the national government had been unable to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the national community so that the legality of a central state apparatus was questioned by local oligarchies. As a result, government officials lacked a clear sense of authority over the affairs of the nation. As Jose Luis Vega points out, during this period government executives "...[could] hardly justify their existence ...As members of a minor, diffused and unstable government, they ...[were] hardly accepted by local groups."²⁵

With the consolidation of an economic and political structure under Carrillo, the character of the state apparatus began to change. The demand for new services generated by the coffee economy legitimized the existence of a central government bureaucracy. Thus, the state capacity to develop this authority vis-à-vis the civil society was directly associated with the consolidation of the coffee elite that instrumentalized it. Not surprisingly, the values of the emergent coffee oligarchy came to be reflected in the functioning and orientation of the state apparatus. Moreover, these values were portrayed as representative of the general societal interest.²⁶

Management of the State Apparatus

The increasing complexity of the state operations during this period was clearly associated with the growing fiscal extractive capacity of the state and the increasing demands for state services generated by the coffee economy. Table 10 shows state revenues and expenditures from 1825 to 1832.

The first revenue institutions were created during the government of Mora Fernández; they included the National Treasury (1825), the Principal Customs Administration (1827), and the General Customs Office of San Jose (1831). In the same period, the government created the Accounts Tribunal (1825) which supervised the main accounts of the state at the request of the legislature.²⁷ The process of development of the managerial capacity of the state was consolidated during the Carrillo government, which carried out "the first comprehensive rationalization and systematization of the public sector."²⁸ The most significant expression of this process of administrative rationalization was the formulation and implementation of the General Regulations for the Public Treasury. These comprehensive and explicit regulations articulated the financial operations of the state and increased its managerial capacity. It also simplified the slow and complicated administrative procedures of the public sector, thereby facilitating the

TABLE 10

Costa Rica: Public Revenues and Public
Expenditures (1825-1832)
(pesos)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Public Revenues</u>	<u>Public Expenditures</u>
1825	16.354.6	29.045
1826	30.940.3	• 30.120
1827	- -	- -
1828	25.300	50.000
1829	- -	- -
1830	17.339.2	32.931.4
1831	- -	- -
1832	50.484	44.011.6

Source: Carmen L. Gomez, Los Gobiernos Constitucionales
de Don Juan Mora Fernandez (San José: Publicaciones
de la Universidad de Costa Rica, 1974) in Jose
L. Vega, La Formacion del Estado Nacional en Costa
Rica, op.cit., p. 55.

collection of revenues and the provision of public services.²⁹

Thus, the increasing development of the managerial capacity of the state apparatus was associated with the demands for state services generated by the coffee economy. Increased revenues -also associated with coffee production- required the formulation of new administrative and legal procedures, and the creation of specialized state institutions in charge of their implementation.

Conclusions

The analysis of the historical development of the Costa Rican state apparatus from 1821 to 1842 shows the effects that the different structural forces operating within the country had on the conformation of its modes of transformation. It is important to notice how domestic political and economic factors played a determinant role in the conformation of the national state and in the crystallization of the state apparatus. By 1842, the modes of transformation of the state apparatus reflected the predominant political position of a truly national economic elite that had been able to instrumentalize the state apparatus for the purpose of institutionalizing a coffee-export economy. The historical experience of other Central American countries was significantly different. In Honduras, as we have shown, the absence of a national

economic elite during its early historical development allowed international factors to determine the modes of transformation of the state apparatus.

5.2 Consolidation of a National Export Economy: 1843-1930

Economic, Political and International Factors Influencing the Modes of Transformation of the State Apparatus

The most important characteristic of the economic development of Costa Rica during the period under consideration was the consolidation of a dominant export sector. The production of coffee, and later bananas, and the existence of favorable international markets for these two products, were responsible for the internationalization of the Costa Rican economy. Before the development of coffee production Costa Rica had "only tenuous ties with the international economy".³⁰

Although Costa Rica had been exporting coffee to Chile since 1832, it was not until 1843 that the coffee industry began its consolidation as the most important economic activity of the country. Table 11 shows the development of coffee exports from 1832 to 1930.

TABLE 11

Costa Rica:
Coffee Exports, 1832-193
(in thousands of kilograms)

Year	Exports	Year	Exports	Year	Exports
1832	23	1874	10,780	1907	17,326
1833	45	1875	4,836	1908	8,978
1843	1,163	1876	11,176	1909	12,030
1844	2,300	1877	8,356	1910	14,397
1845	3,073	1878	11,487	1911	12,641
1846	3,821	1879	10,702	1912	12,238
1847	5,060	1880	7,934	1913	13,019
1848	6,900	1881	11,240	1914	17,717
1849	6,900	1882	7,408	1915	12,206
1850	6,440	1883	9,203	1916	16,844
1851	no data	1884	16,630	1917	12,267
1852	3,118	1885	9,150	1918	11,452
1853	3,680	1886	9,037	1919	13,963
1854	no data	1887	13,082	1920	13,998
1855	3,253	1888	10,318	1921	13,336
1856	3,818	1889	12,948	1922	18,617
1857	4,140	1890	15,395	1923	11,088
1858	2,776	1891	14,142	1924	18,211
1859	4,995	1892	10,798	1925	15,353
1860	4,138	1893	11,442	1926	18,249
1861	5,195	1894	10,777	1927	16,154
1862	4,964	1895	11,090	1928	18,842
1863	3,977	1896	11,716	1929	19,677
1864	5,179	1897	13,871	1930	25,337
1865	6,193	1898	19,486		
1866	8,344	1899	15,367		
1867	9,200	1900	16,101		
1868	9,384	1901	16,574		
1869	9,384	1902	13,749		
1870	11,558	1903	17,333		
1871	8,334	1904	12,578		
1872	11,592	1905	18,048		
1873	9,200	1906	13,774		

SOURCES: Dirección General de Estadística y Censos (1941: 14), Salas Marrero and Barahona Israel (1973: 533), Monge Alfaro (1966: 203), Vega Carballo (1972: 118).

In Mitchell A. Seligson, "Agrarian Policies in Dependent Societies: Costa Rica", Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 2, May 1977, p. 209.

By the late 1800s, Great Britain had become Costa Rica's most important international market for coffee. Moreover, British capital became a decisive factor in the development of Costa Rica's coffee production. As Walter La Faber explains:

Great Britain almost exclusively controlled the crop by financing the plantings and marketing the beans. The British also owned the nation's leading utility, and their most profitable investment in all Central America was a mortgage company created in 1911, to finance the expansion of Costa Rican coffee, sugar, cacao, and bananas.³¹

Despite the significant role played by British capital in the coffee business, Costa Rica managed to keep its coffee production under domestic control.³² In this way, "an indigenous coffee oligarchy was able to develop and control the country's economy, based on the profitable "golden bean".

The expansion of coffee production took place through three related processes: the utilization of uncultivated land, the dissolution of communal forms of property, and the commercial purchasing and selling of land.³³ The exploitation of uncultivated land was a process that began with independence. In 1821, the Town Council of San Jose passed a decree that provided free state land to any individual who agreed to plant coffee on it.³⁴ The expropriation of communal land played a relatively insignificant role in Costa Rica

given the paucity of Indian settlements in the country, although the enactment of several laws and decrees allowed the expropriation of "the land of the few indigenous communities in the Central Valley." ³⁵

The commercial selling of land was another way of facilitating the expansion of the coffee production. As a result, the process of proletarianization of peasant labour began to take place. Land prices increased significantly with the result that "there was a strong incentive for the poor peasant to sell his land to the expanding coffee plantations." ³⁶

The expansion of coffee production and the consequent emergence of a coffee oligarchy was, however, not without problems. One of the most important of these was the land tenure structure inherited from the colonial period, characterized by the predominance of the minifundio. The resulting scarcity of workers willing to sell their labor represented a major obstacle to largescale coffee production. As Jorge Rovira points out,

minifundistas preferred to work their own land and were opposed to selling and leaving land that provided their families' livelihood. The extraordinary diffusion of small properties for more than two centuries made it difficult and expensive to hire labour. ³⁷

This situation was responsible for the slow development

of capitalism in the country and forced the emerging coffee elite to find an indirect way of controlling the coffee industry. This control was given to them by the monopolization of the processing and commercialization of coffee. Carlos Araya corroborates this view when he explains that:

a hegemonic group of coffee growers, composed of descendants of the colonial elite as well as of European immigrants, began with the expansion of coffee production. This group did not dominate the coffee business through the control of land and labour but rather through the control of the processing and commercialization of the product, as well as through the regulation of credit available for coffee production.³⁸

Bananas constituted the other crop that linked Costa Rica to the international markets and which helped to shape the economic structure of the country during the period under study. With the increasing participation of American capital in the economy of the country during the 1900's, British dominance of the Costa Rican economy began to decline. Increasing American involvement was a corollary of the Monroe Doctrine and the direct result of the initiative of Minor Keith, an American businessman.

Badly in need of railroads to carry the coffee beans to the Atlantic ports, the government signed a contract with Keith who would finish the railroad that the state had failed to build. Keith, who completed the construction of

the railroad in 1890, "also laid the foundation for the banana industry by establishing plantations near the tracks." ³⁹ As Rinehart points out, "Keith's ventures added a new export crop to the economy and opened Costa Rica to foreign enterprises and investment." ⁴⁰

In exchange for additional track for the railroad and for funding the national external debt to the British, Keith obtained in 1884 "a ninety-nine year lease on the railroad, 800,000 acres of state land, and exemption from import duties on all construction materials." ⁴¹ By 1898 Keith's company, the "Tropical Trading and Transport Company", was one of the two most important banana suppliers to the United States market. The other, Andrew Preston's Boston Fruit Company, concentrated its production in the Caribbean, while Keith's company operated in Central America. ⁴² In 1899, the two companies merged to form the United Fruit Company (UFCO) which soon controlled an enormous expanse of land. The United Fruit Company's control of capital, technology and land was so great as to virtually subordinate all other independent producers. ⁴³

By 1907, the country supplied 20% of the bananas consumed in Europe and the United States, and by 1913 Costa Rica competed with Jamaica for the position of the world's major banana producer. ⁴⁴ In the same year, as LaFeber points out

Costa Rica exported slightly more products to the United States than to the United Kingdom (between them they took more than 90 percent of the total exports), but partly due to Keith's import exemption and control over customs, it imported five times more goods from the United States (about \$5 million worth) than from Great Britain. 45

After the crisis of the 1930's the banana industry entered a period of decline that was never reversed. According to Ellis, three of the factors which account for the decline are, a) the effects of the international crisis in the 30's, and the decision of the UFCO to reduce levels of banana production in order to stop prices from falling in the international market; and b) a series of plagues such as "sigatoka" and, above all, "el mal de Panama", that significantly affected the banana plantations; and c) the exhaustion of soil productivity. 46

It is interesting to note that in countries such as Honduras, the introduction of the banana industry created a virtual state within the state. In this country, the UFCO - a foreign company which came to the region to build railroads and to produce bananas - ended up financing coup d'états and revolutions.⁴⁷ However, this was not the case for Costa Rica, where the emergence of a national dominant class that controlled the coffee production made possible the development of a truly national system of political domination.

Besides their impact on the country's economy, the banana plantations were also to have a profound effect on the development of the rural labor force that included "not only private banana producers but also the specialized and non-specialized workers ... who sold their labor to the company."⁴⁸ The plantation workers were to initiate the labor movement in Costa Rica. As Mitchell A. Seligson points out:

In the early 1930's when Costa Rica was suffering under the dual pressure of the world depression and a ruinous disease in the banana plantations, the first massive strikes ever to hit the country broke out in the banana zones. Labor unions were given their real impetus from this strike and have gained in strength from the ones that have periodically followed it.⁴⁹

The development of a domestically-controlled export economy, and the consolidation of the coffee oligarchy was reflected in the increasing articulation of a system of political domination and of elite control of the state apparatus. This process, however, was not without its difficulties.

During this period, localism continued to act as an important countervailing force to the consolidation of a central national state. Some of the reasons for its survival are provided by Burt English when he points out that:

According to the Census of 1844, only 73,906 persons populated the area of the Meseta Central

(including Cartago), which was for all practical purposes the entire range of the national political system of the day. Because travel outside the Meseta was so difficult, the 5,193 inhabitants of Guanacaste and the 883 of Puntarenas each formed small, self contained, autonomous societies that were virtually out of the pale of national political influence.⁵⁰

Furthermore, the power vacuum created by Carrillo's retirement, resulted in a period of political instability and conflict. Carrillo had accumulated and centralized power to a degree that provoked the resentment of the dominant elites.⁵¹ After his departure, coffee exporters and merchant importers attempted to gain control of the state apparatus in pursuit of their particular interests.⁵² This is not to say that the state apparatus did not include within its social domain the interests of society as a whole. However, it did pay special attention to the promotion of the interests of the economic elites that alternatively controlled it.⁵³

The order and political stability established by Carrillo was therefore followed by a period of conflict and turmoil. Six constitutions were written between 1843 and 1871 in what has been described as a "constitutional seismic period."⁵⁴ As history later showed, this period of conflict and turmoil had a functional effect in that it helped to shape, consolidate, and unify a new national coffee elite that ruled the country and instrumentalized the state apparatus for the next century. As Rovira points out:

The period from 1843 to 1870 was characterized by the emergence of a dominant class composed of three interrelated factions: the agro-exporting faction formed by owners of large coffee farms, owners of coffee processing plants and coffee exporters; the mercantile-importing faction; and the banking faction. These three groups subsequently monopolized political power for almost a century. 55

The army played an important political role throughout this period, regularly intervening in the political affairs of the country in combination with the dominant economic elites. The development of the economic activities of the emerging coffee oligarchy required not only state administrative support but also "the control of the main centers of political and military decisions." 56

The military had gained significant strength as a result of its successful participation with other Central American troops in preventing an attempt in 1857 by United States mercenaries led by William Walker, to gain control of Nicaraguan territory. Because of the national prestige gained during the war, the army obtained an important degree of relative autonomy, and was able to freely intervene in the election and overthrow of presidents and governments.

Regular military interventions in the political affairs of the nation ended when Tomas Guardia came into power in a military coup in April 1870. His government promulgated the constitution of 1871 "which had the longest

life (seventy-five years, not counting one two-year interruption) of any such document on the isthmus."⁵⁷ According to the constitution, Guardia could not be reelected as president after 1876. However, "he remained as chief military commander, reassumed the presidency in 1877, and held power as he pleased until he died in 1882."⁵⁸

Guardia symbolized the end of instability and the recreation of national order. His emergence also represented the beginning of the institutionalization of the liberal state. Using the relative autonomy and power that had been gained by the army, Guardia got rid of the leaders of the most powerful social groups in the country and put an end to the direct use of the state apparatus as a private tool of the so called coffee barons.⁵⁹ In other words, Guardia was able to change the nature of the state apparatus from a tool in the hands of particular factions of the export oligarchies to a mechanism for the promotion of the capitalist economy as a whole.⁶⁰

The death of Guardia in 1882 did not stop either the development and consolidation of the liberal state apparatus, together with its increasing participation in the country's affairs, or the accentuation of its relative autonomy. Moreover, the legitimacy of the state came increasingly to be based on legal grounds rather than on the use of coercion.

It is important to point out that, during this period, Costa Rican participation in Central American affairs was largely nominal. With the exception of the country's involvement in the war against William Walker in the 1850's, Costa Rica remained aloof from isthmian affairs and pursued its own destiny.⁶¹ Its governments, "did not encourage efforts to restore the union, and resisted the attempts by strongmen Justo Rufino Barrios, in Guatemala (in the 1870's) and Jose Santos Zelaya in Nicaragua (at the turn of the century), to reunify the isthmus by force of arms."⁶²

The Modes of Transformation of the State Apparatus

Introduction

The most significant characteristic of the historical development of Costa Rica during the period under consideration was the consolidation of a coffee-export elite, and the institutionalization of a national export economy. These two processes were reflected in the conformation of the modes of transformation of the state apparatus.

Organizational Design

4

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIAL 1010a
(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)

Increasing diversification and growing relative autonomy were the most important characteristics of the organizational design of the state apparatus during the period under study. These trends reflected the consolidation of complex national political and economic structures. No longer was the state apparatus simply a reflection of the interests of particular groups. Gradually it became a relatively autonomous structure shaped by various, and sometimes contradictory, political and economic influences such as labor and capitalists demands.

The process of centralization of the state which was always resisted by the forces of localism, broke down after the political retirement of Carrillo, as different factions of the coffee elite competed for control over the state apparatus. As a result, the period from 1843 to 1870 was characterized by "the open and direct manipulation of the state apparatus by powerful economic groups."⁶³ It is important to emphasize that the nature of political conflict during this period was different from that which existed before the emergence of the Carrillo regime. Prior to Carrillo, political conflict was characterized by the aristocratic and anti-republican forces' attempt to prevent the conformation of a national central state apparatus. During the period under consideration, political conflict was characterized by the competition among elites to control an existing national state apparatus.

With the emergence of the Guardia regime in 1870, the state apparatus achieved a higher degree of independence vis-à-vis the ruling elites. Using the power of the military, Guardia neutralized the power of the elites and gave the state apparatus an important degree of relative autonomy.⁶⁴

At the same time, an increasing number of national functions began to be assumed by the state. In the middle of the century the public sector was composed of the Ministry of Treasury and the Ministry of the Interior. In the following decade the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was created, and by 1875 the number of ministries had increased to five. These were, Treasury and Commerce; War and Navy; Public Works; Foreign Affairs; and the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also responsible for public education, religious cults and welfare. The Ministry of the Interior was in control of the police, agriculture and industry, government printing services, national statistics, the registry of mortgages and the administration of mail and telegraph services.⁶⁵

The expansion of the state apparatus was associated with the development of the national economy. Earlier in the century, as explained by English,

the political and economic culture of the period emphasized individual responsibility, a laissez faire doctrine of state intervention, and an overall attitude of negative government. Desired or expected governmental actions were few in number- protection from foreign invasion, maintenance of order, and the provision of a few essential services, such as the construction of roads, bridges, and so forth.⁶⁶

This situation began to change with the development of an export economy and the subsequent growing need for government services. In turn, the expansion of government activities was made possible by the state's growing capacity to extract revenues from coffee exports and attract foreign capital. Table 12 shows the fiscal revenues collected by the state apparatus from 1850 to the end of the Guardia regime in 1882.

Social Domain

During this period, the role and the functions of the state apparatus increasingly concentrated on the promotion of the coffee economy. The analysis of the functions of the "liberal state apparatus" provided by Vega, clearly shows that the social domain of the state apparatus during this period, was determined by the interests of the dominant coffee oligarchy.

For analytical purposes Vega divides the functions of the liberal state into four categories: a) organizing

TABLE 12

Costa Rica: Public Revenues

(1850 - 1882)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Public Revenues</u> <u>(pesos)</u>
1850	229.406
1851	272.623
1852	485.957
1853	360.172
1854	490.097
1855	759.232
1856	655.028
1857	615.923
1858	-
1859	400.000
1860	600.000
1861	777.691
1862	735.982
1863	-
1864	-
1865	-
1866	1.095.465
1867	1.295.884
1868	1.000.567
1870	1.078.123
1871	1.663.774
1872	2.500.426
1873	2.812.584
1874	2.588.027
1875	2.396.156

Table 12 ...

<u>Year</u>	<u>Public Revenues</u> <u>(pesos)</u>
1876	2.379.432
1877	3.924.956
1878	2.803.851
1879	2.525.726
1880	3.164.051
1881	-
1882	1.550.020

Source: Soley Guell, Tomas, Historia Economica y Hacendaria en Costa Rica (San José: EDUCA, 1947); Gomez Carme, Los Gobiernos Constitucionales de Don Juan Mora Fernandez (San José: Publicaciones UCR, 1974) Revista del Congreso. Archivos Nacionales. in José L. Vega, La Formacion del Estado Nacional en Costa Rica. op.cit., pp. 271-272.

functions, b) protective functions, c) maintenance functions and d) promoting functions.

The organizing functions refer to the establishment of a legal framework that legitimized, rationalized and regulated the new capitalist social relations. This process "slowly began with the promulgation by Carrillo in 1841 of the General Code and continued with the enactment of the Code of Commerce in 1853, the Law of Mortgages of 1861, the Law of Creditors of 1865, and the Fiscal Code of 1885. It culminated with approval of the Civil Code of 1888."⁶⁷

The protective functions refer to the establishment of the rights of the private citizen vis-à-vis the power of the emerging state, i.e. "the legal protection of individual freedom, private property, formal equality, judicial and mercantile security, and the political participation of citizens in the conformation and orientation of the state through elections and other means."⁶⁸

Maintaining functions refer to the role of the state in the maintenance and reproduction of existing social relations. Specifically, the state "guaranteed free hiring and the continuation of the capital-labor relationship which gave disproportionate advantage to contractors."⁶⁹ This view is sustained by Roger Churnside who, in his analysis of the evolution of the labor force in Costa Rica, concluded that :

between the beginning of the XIXth Century and the beginning of the XXth Century, the administrative and political state apparatus was designed and managed to respond to the needs and preferences of the large producers and exporters of coffee...the norms enacted by the state to regulate the increasing relations between labor and capital, openly favor the latter...[as a result], workers absorbed most of the social risks generated by the expansion of these relations. 70

• Finally, promoting functions refer to the role of the state as the creator of "favorable conditions for the development of society in general and especially of the export-producer sectors of the country."⁷¹ During this period, the state paid special attention, to the expansion of the national communications network, the provision of basic services and the development of the urban areas of the country, especially San Jose, the capital of the country.

To sum up, the social domain of the state apparatus during this period was expanded to provide the necessary conditions for the development of the country along the lines of a political and an economic strategy designed and promoted by the national coffee elite. In this sense, the satisfaction of the needs of the elites constituted the main social function of the state.

Character of the State Apparatus

During this time, the value system of the state apparatus underwent significant changes. From 1843 until the emergence of Guardia in 1870, the prevailing values within the state apparatus continue to be largely particularistic. During this period, the state apparatus was controlled directly by the dominant factions of the coffee elite. Under these conditions, state officials were not accountable to society in general but rather to the elite that had given them responsibility for the conduct of state affairs. In consequence, the value system of the state apparatus reflected the values of the sections of the coffee elite that alternatively controlled it. This situation changed with the emergence of Guardia in 1870 when the particularistic values of the state apparatus began to be slowly replaced by national values.⁷² With Guardia, the state apparatus acquired an important degree of relative autonomy, which in turn explains the autonomy of the values of public bureaucrats vis-à-vis the values of particular sections of the ruling elite.

The process of replacement of particularistic values with national values, initiated during the Guardia regime, continued after his death. By the end of the 19th century the agro-exporting elite had lost direct control of the state apparatus and had been forced to delegate the administration of the state to a group of full time and specialized functionaries.⁷³ This process of specialization

and professionalization of the public service reinforced the development of national values within the public sector.

The functionaries of the state no longer perceived themselves as employees of particular elites but rather as "public employees". The replacement of particularistic values by national values within the state apparatus was part of a more general phenomenon of institutionalization of a social ideology. In this sense, the particular interests of the coffee elites began to be internalized and accepted as legitimate by all sectors of the Costa Rican society.⁷⁴

Management of the State Apparatus

The increasing functions of the state apparatus during this period and the corresponding complexity of its operations, necessarily required the introduction of modern legal, administrative and economic techniques into the government system. Among others, modern personnel administration techniques had to be adopted to organize the rapidly increasing number of public employees. Table 13 shows this growth from 1875 to 1930.

In the same way, the dynamic process of legislation and institution building that took place during this period, and that resulted in the creation of a liberal legal-economic framework designed to promote and reproduce the emerging social relations of production, implied the need to increase

TABLE 13

Costa Rica: Numbers of Employees for the
Public Sector (1875-1930)*

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Public Employees</u>
1875	1.683
1881	2.118
1882	2.310
1900	3.390
1916	4.441
1920	5.981
1930	7.173

Source: Jose L. Vega, La Formacion del Estado Nacional en Costa Rica, op.cit.,

* selected years

the states' capacity to organize the national economy. An example of this was the adoption of the Gold Standard by Costa Rica at the turn of the Century. Young, in his study of Central American Currency and Finance, points out that "the formulation and introduction of the gold standard is an accomplishment of which Costa Rica may well be proud"⁷⁵ Of all the Central American countries, Costa Rica was the first to adopt the gold standard and "to carry through to a successful conclusion a comprehensive monetary reform."⁷⁶

Conclusions

From 1843 to 1930, the economic structure of the country overdetermined the modes of transformation of the state apparatus and conditioned government's capacity to instrumentalize it. During this period, the Costa Rican state apparatus became a relatively autonomous structure rather than simply a tool in the hands of particular groups. This development was the result of the growing need for government services generated by the coffee economy. The expansion of government services made possible the state's growing capacity to extract revenues from coffee exports, and attract foreign capital. In turn, the growing financial capacity of the state resulted in its increasing relative autonomy vis-à-vis particular economic groups. With the institutionalization of the coffee export economy, the state apparatus became a promoter of the national economy as a

whole rather than the defender of the interests of particular groups. This was reflected in the changes introduced by the governments of this period into the organizational design, the social domain, the character and the management of the state apparatus.

5.3. Crisis, Revolution and the Institutionalization of the Second Republic: 1930-1980

Economic, Political and International Factors, Influencing the Modes of Transformation of the State Apparatus

The political stability achieved by Costa Rica since 1870 disappeared in the 1930's as the world economic crisis caused a serious decline in prices for coffee and bananas, the country's two main export products. As Rovira points out, this crisis:

uncovered the weak and dependent economic foundations upon which the development of the Costa Rican society had been based. Moreover, it made possible the emergence of numerous contradictions and was the beginning of a slow but irreversible deterioration of the system of social domination by the agro-exporting groups⁷⁷

The social consequences of the economic crisis quickly

emerged during the 1930's in the form of a succession of strikes by different social groups: "In 1933, the barreteros in Limon; the shoemakers in San Jose, Grecia and Limon; the bakers and printers in Cartago and a strike organized by the agricultural workers in Turrialba to demand better salaries."⁷⁸ Sectors of the educated urban middle class also expressed their dissatisfaction about "disparities in the distribution of wealth and their frustration at the country's backwardness, poor health facilities, housing, and inadequate transportation."⁷⁹ These sectors focused their discontent on "the concentration of political power in the hands of the liberal elite, that was dominated by land-owning families, and the bureaucratic functionaries who held office through ~~in~~ patronage."⁸⁰

With increased political activity generated by the hard economic conditions of this decade, new political organizations were created, among them the Communist Party and the student discussion clubs. As English explains "the newer groups had little impact on national politics until the 1940's, but their activities and ideas began to change the pattern of politics."⁸¹

The Communist Party, created by Manuel Mora and Jaime Cerdas, was particularly successful in capitalizing social unrest and the growing power of the labor movement. The Communists quickly gained influence among the workers of the banana plantations, and in 1934 organized the Huelga

Bananera, one of the biggest strikes in the history of the Costa Rican labor movement.

In the presidential elections of 1940, Rafael Calderon Guardia, leader of the National Republican Party was elected with the support of those who opposed and feared the growing influence of the Communist party. Calderon Guardia organized and led a reformist government that attempted to respond to increasing social demands within the framework of the existing political and economic system. Its reformist attitude, however, irritated the most reactionary sectors of the Costa Rican society, especially those in the coffee industry. In these circumstances, Calderon, with the support of the church and favored by the antifascist mood of the epoch, established an alliance with the Communist Party. As John P. Bell explains:

Coming as it did at a time when the Soviet Union fought as an ally of the Western democracies, the alliance was portrayed by its architects as consistent with the united war effort against Nazi Germany. International Communism in fact encouraged national Communist parties to collaborate with democratic governments during World War II. United States representatives in Costa Rica also seemed to look favorably on the alliance.⁸²

With the support of the Communist Party, Calderon promoted a relatively vigorous series of social reforms that included important concessions to the labor movement. One of the most important of these was the promulgation of The

Labor Code in 1943.

The process of reform initiated by Calderon was continued by Teodoro Picado, elected in 1944. By this time, however, the alliance with the communists began to break down, mainly as a result of deteriorating relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. As the foreign policy of the Soviet Union moved toward a state of mutual antagonism with the United States, Costa Rica tended to follow the United States lead.⁸³ In this situation, the most conservative elites, divided their support between Fernando Castro Cervantes, leader of the Democratic Party, and Otilio Ulate Blanco, leader of the National Union Party. Both of them opposed the reformist orientation of the government.

A third opposition movement, the Social Democratic Party, lead by Jose Figueres, Rodrigo Facio and Alberto Marten, was formed in 1945 with the integration of the Center for the Study of National Problems and Democratic Action. The Center was a political organization founded in 1940 by "young professionals, students and white collar workers".⁸⁴ According to Bell:

"the membership of the Center was almost exclusively middle and upper class. Its members were from the ranks of those highly favored few who reached the last years of secondary school and from the even more restricted groups who were able to pursue university studies.⁸⁵

Democratic Action, on the other hand, was a political party organized after the elections of 1944, and was composed of a group of young political activists.

The newly formed Social Democratic Party was aimed at the transformation of the political and economic structures of the country but within a liberal-democratic framework. As Rovira points out :

Although ...[the party] favoured measures introduced by Calderon Guardia, it firmly opposed any communist influence and criticized corruption in the government...the party was interested in promoting a new model of social and economic development for the country which was intimately linked to the interests of the small and medium urban bourgeoisie of Costa Rica.⁸⁶

The promotion of this new social and economic model implied:

1. The diversification of the productive base of the country to avoid dependency on coffee, and to allow new social groups to participate in the economic and political life of the nation;
2. The defence of small property; and
3. The conformation of the state apparatus as the "manager of the regime."⁸⁷

Before the elections of 1948, the opposition united behind Otilio Ulate against the official candidate Rafael

Angel Calderon Guardia. The country was in a state of turmoil. Reforms proposed by the government had disrupted the status quo. The country was ripe for a radical change.

When the opposition candidate won the 1948 election, the government refused to accept defeat and alleged irregularities and fraud by the opposition. Moreover, using its majority in congress, it invalidated the election results. In these circumstances, Figueres initiated a civil war that ended with the defeat of the government in April of 1948.

As well as being the leader of the Social Democratic Party, Figueres was one of the main organizers of an international revolutionary organization called "The Caribbean Legion" whose objective was to overthrow the dictatorial regimes of Central America and the Caribbean. Costa Rica was supposed to be only one in a series of democratic revolutions that was going to change the political configuration of the region. The revolutionary government of Arevalo in Guatemala actively supported the objectives of the Legion and played a significant role in facilitating the success of the Figueres' movement in Costa Rica.

The Nicaraguan government, also played an important role in the events of 1948. President Anastasio Somoza, although distrustful of the communist participation in the

Picado government in Costa Rica, had more reasons to oppose the Figueres movement. According to the Legion's agenda Nicaragua was to be liberated after Costa Rica. For this reason, Somoza was prepared to intervene militarily in Costa Rica to defend the Picado government. Picado realized that if a Nicaraguan invasion took place, the Arevalo government would also intervene and the future of the country would depend on the result of an armed confrontation between Arevalo and Somoza.⁸⁸ Picado, therefore, decided to capitulate and avoid a regional confrontation.

The United States government also contributed to shaping the result of the 1948 civil war. According to Miguel Acuña,

amid the Cold War, the existence of a regime, close to the Panama Canal, and infiltrated by communists was an obvious threat against North American interests. As a result, the U.S. government had withdrawn its support to Picado.⁸⁹

Once Figueres was firmly established in power relations between the United States and Costa Rica began to develop in a smooth and relatively friendly way. This occurred despite the frequent challenges by Figueres to the United States to "confront communism in the only effective way, by overcoming social injustice and promoting economic development."⁹⁰

After the victory of the revolutionary forces, Figueres

was less concerned with the need to recognize Ulate's electoral victory than with the institutionalization of his political project. However, the recognition of Ulate's victory had been one of his principle public and international justifications for his insurrection. As a consequence, in May of 1948, Figueres signed a pact with Ulate in which the need to recognize Ulate's legitimate victory and his desire to establish a new regime, were conciliated. By virtue of this pact, Figueres governed the country for eighteen months, as president of the Founding Junta of the Second Republic, after which Ulate became the president. This formula provided Figueres with the opportunity to introduce the changes needed to take control of the state apparatus and institutionalize his political project. Since this time, the political history of Costa Rica has been one of the consolidation of the middle class, and of the political displacement of the traditional coffee oligarchy.

After the period of government of the Founding Junta, Figueres continued to support the Ulate government. However, "the two stood at opposite ends of the spectrum of democratic groupings in Costa Rica and, predictably, relations between them cooled".⁹¹ It is important to remember that Figueres' group had attained power by virtue of its alliance with the oligarchy; an alliance made possible by the existence of a common political enemy, the Calderon government. With the elimination of this common denominator

a political struggle ensued between the reformed liberal conception of Figueres and his group, and the traditional liberal position of the oligarchy as represented by the Ulate's government. ⁹²

As a result of this conflict, Figueres organized the National Liberation Party and decided to run for the presidency in the election of 1953. Figueres' new party won the election, and since then, it has dominated the political life of the country. As Rovira explains:

the power structure was altered after the civil war of 1948. From that moment the middle bourgeoisie, in close alliance with the urban bourgeoisie, began to occupy a better position in the national power structure. The old fractions of the ruling class - composed of the agro-exporting elements of society that emerged in the XIXth century - were then forced to make political concessions to other social groups during the second half of the present century. ⁹³

These emerging groups later formed the industrial elite, politically represented by the National Liberation Party, which since that time has "determined the development of the Costa Rican state." ⁹⁴ When the National Liberation Party has not been in power, it has at least occupied a majority of seats in parliament. In reference to this situation, one of the leaders of the opposition and former president of the country pointed out that:

the so-called opposition never had an opportunity to initiate a political process of rectification and reorientation of the country towards other objectives and goals...given the control that [National Liberation] exerted over the Legislative Assembly and the autonomous institutions.⁹⁵

It is important at this point to characterize the nature of the Figueres movement and the significance of the revolution of 1948. First of all, Figueres's movement was not socialist. The working class followed the communist Popular Vanguard Party. Besides, according to the political thought of the party, "the idea of a political movement based on the radical theory of the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeois...[was]...totally alien to Costa Rican needs and possibilities." ⁹⁶

Neither was it an oligarchic movement, although it established an alliance with sections of the oligarchy to oppose Calderon Guardia and Picado, nor a populist movement, which formed the basis of the Calderon and Picado governments. The revolution of 1948 was organized by, and represented the interest of, the middle classes and petty bourgeoisie who perceived themselves to be in the middle of the closed system of the oligarchy and the growing power of the popular movement led by the communist Popular Vanguard Party.

To sum up, the economic crisis of the 1930's had revealed the incapacity of the agroexporting oligarchy to

help the country adapt to new conditions. Moreover, Calderon's government had shown itself incapable of introducing necessary social and economic reforms, while avoiding the growing influence of the communist movement. Figueres' movement wanted to prove that it was possible to introduce social and economic reforms without delivering the country over to communism. Their project was based on the notions of reformed capitalism as well as on a rejection of Marxism. Rodrigo Facio, the most important ideologist of the revolutionary movement, clearly expressed this position when he stated that the solution to the country's problems

was not to socialize the economy, but rather to stimulate its activities while maintaining the principle of private property and individual motivation...a free market economy was a condition sine qua non for the spiritual and political freedom of men. Not only the objectives, conditions, and orientation of Liberalism but also its modus operandis should be preserved.

However, Facio's liberalism and the liberalism that inspired the revolution of 1948 was not the classical liberalism that had been adopted and defended by the traditional oligarchies of the Central American independence. Rather, it was a reformed liberalism, one that in the Costa Rican context was basically anti-oligarchic. According to Daniel Oduber, another prominent figure in the National Liberation Party, the social democratic position of the party

is a healthy reaction against the cruel excesses of the so-called manchesterian liberalism practiced in the nineteenth century and brought...prosperity to a few nations and, at the same time, misery to workers. Those excesses also produced Marxism... our political opinion is that the modern State can liquidate the excesses mentioned and economically and socially emancipate the dispossessed masses without sacrificing the basic democratic liberties ultimately known as "Human Rights". That is to say that one can eliminate the inequalities and injustices that economic liberalism brought without foresaking the postulates of political liberalism. 98

The practice of this political philosophy was clearly expressed by Facio when he pointed out that "the objective of a domestic economic policy should be the growth and diversification of the national production to reduce our dependency on coffee and our dependency on the outside". 99

It is important to point out that favorable international circumstances helped the post-revolutionary government promote political development that was relatively free of foreign intervention. Out of fear of communist participation in the Calderon and Picado governments, the United States gave decisive support to the revolutionary government.

Later, the success of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 gave Costa Rica additional strength vis-a-vis its relations with the United States, especially in view of its consistent

anticommunist position. In many ways, "the Costa Rican model for economic and social reform within a democratic framework was presented as an alternative to the radical mode of the Cuban revolution." 100

Good relations between Costa Rica and the United States reached a peak during the 1960's with the emergence of President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Costa Rica was "the Central American country which had least need of the Alliance for Progress, but which ...[took] greatest advantage of the resources available within the Alliance".¹⁰¹ There is no doubt that this advantageous position was due not only to its internal political stability, but also to the fact that its image as an "alternative to communism" had enormous influence in the disposition of American officialdom to cooperate in the development of the country.

In 1979, with the emergence of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, the image of Costa Rica as the democratic alternative to socialism again acquired special significance. Once more it benefitted from the United States' need to keep Costa Rica's political and economic system viable and strong.

Introduction

The economic crisis of the 1930's had weakened the foundations of the traditional political and economic system maintained by the agro-exporting national oligarchies. As a result, a new strong socialist democratic political movement was able to capture state power in 1948. This new group intended to permanently transform the social structure of the country by institutionalizing a new political and economic system based on the diversification of the productive base of the country. The successful implementation of their project required the instrumentalization of the state apparatus.

The following is a characterization of the changes introduced by the governments of this period into the organizational design, the social domain, the character and the management of the state apparatus for the purpose of institutionalizing the "Second Republic". Governments' capacity to change the modes of transformation of the state apparatus, during the period under consideration, were always conditioned by the domestic and international forces operating within the Costa Rican society.

Organizational Design

The three most important changes introduced in the organizational design of the state apparatus during the period under consideration were a) the elimination of the army, b) the expansion of state activities, as reflected in the increasing number of institutions created after 1948; and, c) the decentralization of the central state apparatus, as reflected in the creation of "autonomous institutions". The process of decentralization began to be reversed in the 1970's due to the need to coordinate the increasingly complex functions of the state.

In an unprecedented move in Central American politics, Figueres abolished the army in 1948; moreover, in the constitution of 1949 the army as a permanent institution was proscribed, and only the existence of a police force for the preservation of public order was allowed. Different reasons may have influenced this decision. As Frederick Ehrenreich explains:

Figueres himself stated that the army was no longer needed and that it was abolished "in order to reaffirm the principle of civil government". On the one hand, Costa Rica's pre-civil war military had been notoriously ineffective; to perpetuate it would have been a waste of resources. On the other hand, a better trained and equipped professional force could have constituted a potential threat to the government as coups in 1948 against fledgling democracies in Venezuela, and Peru demonstrated. This was particularly true in Costa Rica because most of the leaders of the Army of National Liberation who would be expected to be prominent in a national army were political conservatives who had been more interested in fighting the

civil war to rid the country of communist influences than to support Figueres' brand of democratic socialism.102

The notion of an expanded and interventionist state as the active organizer of the new political and economic system was clearly expressed by the Centro even before the foundation of the Second Republic:

'tomorrow's society will have to be based...on increasing intervention by the state so as to guarantee the existence of the free citizen within a strong state....in other words, on a system that can effectively join the concepts of liberty and authority.103

The expansion and interventionism of the state apparatus was reflected in the rapid process of creation of new state institutions after 1948. By 1950, the public administration of the country was composed of 110 institutions. By 1980, the number of state organizations had increased to 216. Table 14 shows the institutional development of the public administration during this period, according to types of state organization.

The rapid growth of state institutions during this period, was accompanied by a similar growth in the number of public employees. From 1950 to 1980, the total number of public servants rose from 17,234 to 142,271, an increase of 825 % over 30 years. Table 15 shows the annual growth in the number of public employees.

TABLE 14

Costa Rica: Institutional Evolution of the
Public Sector (1950-1980)
(number of institutions)

Institutional Categories	1950	1962	1968	1980
Central Government	16	19	23	21
Local Governments	138	144	153	85
Public Enterprises	26	49	53	87
TOTAL	180	212	229	193

Source: De la O, J. Ma. El Crecimiento de la Administracion
Publica en el Desarrollo: El Caso de Costa Rica, Ph.D.
Thesis, Universidad Nacional, 1982, p. 179.

TABLE 15

Costa Rica: Economically Active Population (EAP),
Number of Public Employees (NPE), and
EAP/NPE Ratio (1950-1980)

<u>Year</u>	<u>EAP</u>	<u>NPE</u>	<u>EAP/NPE</u>
1950	275.8	17 234	6.2
1951	282.4	20 108	7.1
1952	290.2	20 955	7.2
1953	297.3	26 363	8.9
1954	306.0	28 023	9.2
1955	315.1	30 220	9.6
1956	326.6	31 032	9.5
1957	335.7	30 884	9.2
1958	347.6	30 588	8.8
1959	359.8	26 805	7.4
1960	371.7	27 533	7.9
1961	384.2	31 811	8.3
1962	396.1	32 902	8.3
1963	410.9	35 616	8.7
1964	419.8	38 301	9.1
1965	430.1	43 506	10.1
1966	446.7	42 310	9.5
1967	476.6	42 935	9.0
1968	499.4	42 669	8.5
1969	513.0	46 403	9.0
1970	528.0	54 208	10.3
1971	544.2	59 153	10.9
1972	560.1	64 673	11.5
1973	590.7	69 411	11.7
1974	603.1	80 391	13.3
1975	615.9	86 877	14.1
1976	631.0	104 011	16.5
1977	690.8	116 087	16.8
1978	729.2	130 169	17.8
1979	755.7	132 704	17.6
1980	770.3	142 271	18.5

Source: Julia Ma. de la O., op.cit. p. 228.

Another important indicator of the expansion of state bureaucracy after the 1948 revolution was the growth of state expenditures. Table 16 shows that the expenditures increased from 397.6 millions of Colones in 1950 to 5,308.8 millions of Colones in 1980, an increase of 70 percent.

The analysis of the historical development of Costa Rica has shown that the dramatic expansion of the state apparatus during this period arose in response to the political strategy formulated and implemented by the National Liberation Party according to which the state would function as the organizer of the new regime.

The growth of state institutions then, is a consequence of the National Liberation Party's efforts to adapt the modes of transformation of the Costa Rican state apparatus to its political project. The construction of a "strong state" was indispensable for the development of "a mixed economy; of private property with state regulation; and of private business and public institutions", as envisaged by Figueres.¹⁰⁴

One of the central elements in the strategy of National Liberation to institutionalize the new regime was to decentralize the state apparatus through the creation of "autonomous institutions" with an independent administration, and with ultimate authority vested in a

TABLE 16

Costa Rica: Public Expenditures (1950-1980)
(millions of Colones*)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Public Exp.</u>	<u>Rate of Growth</u>
1950	397.6	-
1951	348.2	-12.4
1952	437.3	25.6
1953	544.6	24.5
1954	570.3	4.7
1955	603.2	5.8
1956	652.5	9.2
1957	643.2	- 1.4
1958	889.2	38.2
1959	983.0	10.5
1960	949.6	- 3.4
1961	1 152.5	21.4
1962	1 168.0	1.3
1963	1 446.1	23.8
1964	1 417.8	- 2.0
1965	1 609.0	13.5
1966	1 704.7	5.9
1967	1 904.2	11.7
1968	1 989.3	4.5
1969	2 286.9	15.0
1970	1 809.9	-20.9
1971	2 240.0	23.8
1972	2 501.2	11.7
1973	2 812.3	12.4
1974	2 921.7	3.9
1975	3 171.6	8.6
1976	3 440.9	8.5
1977	3 933.5	14.3
1978	4 315.4	9.7
1979	4 884.1	13.2
1980	5 308.8	8.7

Source: Romero Carmen M., Estado y Políticas Sociales en Costa Rica, op.cit. p. 105.

* Costa Rica currency

Board of Directors. The executive power "could not impose its decisions upon these institutions nor could it ignore the decisions adopted by them."¹⁰⁵ The constitution of 1949 declared the following institutions to be "autonomous": banks and insurance companies; the national health system, railroads and trains and other state transport organizations; state energy organizations, the National Producers Council, the organizations in charge of regulating industries such as coffee and sugar cane; institutions in charge of housing construction; and others.¹⁰⁶

The creation of autonomous institutions in Costa Rica responded to both technical and political imperatives. According to Wilburg Jiménez, one of the objectives of the revolutionary government in promoting the proliferation of autonomous institutions was to reduce government corruption. According to the new government, the only state activities that had escaped corruption under the previous regime were those that enjoyed autonomy from the executive. In this sense, the creation of strong autonomous institutions was perceived as "a guarantee against the abuses of the central government."¹⁰⁷ Another reason for the creation of autonomous institutions was the need to increase government efficiency. Knowing the poor administrative capacity of the central state, the revolutionary government "preferred that some state activities were performed by autonomous institutions, so as to guarantee greater effectiveness, speed, and flexibility."¹⁰⁸ At the same time, the creation of autonomous

institutions responded to a general political strategy of creating a strong and expanded interventionist state, as well as to the specific political objective of breaking the control that the traditional agro-exporting sectors had over the executive power¹⁰⁹ and promoting the emergence of new social groups. 110

The process of decentralization was reversed during the 1970's with a series of legal measures which tended to give the executive more power to influence and coordinate the activities of the autonomous institutions. This change was due mainly to increasing state participation in production. The administrative complexity that derived from direct state participation in the process of capital formation and accumulation required a more effective coordination of the state apparatus. 111

Social Domain

One of the central concerns of the Liberation Movement after 1948, was the reorientation of the functions of the state apparatus so as to permit the development of new social groups and diminish the power of the coffee oligarchy. This reorientation was accomplished through increasing state intervention in the organization of the national economy which promoted the diversification of agricultural production and the process of

industrialization.

The single most important economic decision made by the first post-revolutionary government in the direction of state economic interventionism was the nationalization of the banking system. According to Figueres, the economic policy of the Founding Junta of the Second Republic, could not be properly implemented without "an effective control of credit policies...[because of this] the nationalization of the private banks [became] an imperative."¹¹² Moreover, Figueres believed that the nationalization of the banks would give capital "a fruitful orientation [and] put it to work for the advantage of the majority."¹¹³

With the state in control of the banking system and credit, the new government was able to introduce an important series of economic measures intended to achieve its social objectives. One example was the nationalization of the Institute for the Defense of Coffee, created in 1929 to protect the interest of the coffee growers during the period of the economic depression. After the nationalization, the Institute was transformed into the Coffee Office with a mandate to control the prices paid by the coffee processing plants to small producers. Another institution, the National Council of Production, was transformed into a semi-autonomous institution with the purpose of promoting production for internal consumption, and securing the supply of basic products at reasonable

prices. Finally, in 1949, the government created the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) which, according to Rovira, constituted the "angular stone of the emerging social groups".¹¹⁴ With the creation of the ICE, the government aimed at creating the basic conditions for the development of a capitalist process of industrialization.

During the 1950s governments concentrated on the promotion of export agriculture without abandoning the long term objectives of diversification and industrialization. The emphasis on the promotion of export agriculture was due mainly to high international prices for coffee and bananas after the end of the Second World War.¹¹⁵

During the 1960s the government shifted its economic emphasis to the industrial sector. Besides the government's own intention to promote the development of a national industrial sector, there were at least two other factors that promoted this shift. One was the decline in international coffee prices and the other, the organization of the Central American Common Market.¹¹⁶

During the 1970s the industrialization process suffered from the impact of increasing oil prices.¹¹⁷ With the weakening of the industrial sector, the state clearly emerged as the single most important economic actor of the country, making it propitious for the state to further extend its economic functions. Very soon, the state began participating directly

in production.

To sum up, in the period under consideration state interventionism was aimed at the diversification of the economy in order to: a) reduce the economy's dependency on coffee, b) reduce the political power of the coffee elite and c), allow the emergence of new political and economic groups. The result of these efforts can be seen in table 17 and chart 4.

Table 17 shows how the participation of traditional export products in the country's total exports decreased from 91.1 percent in the 1950s to 45.60 percent in the 1980s. At the same time, the participation of industrial exports increased from 3.7 percent to 34.7 percent.

The social effects of the economic diversification of the country can be seen in Chart 4, specially in the growth of the urban population and in the development of the urban middle class.

Character of the State Apparatus

The most important change in the character of the state apparatus during this period, was its increasing technocratization. Even before the military victory of 1948,

TABLE 17

Costa Rica: Relative Importance of Coffee and Bananas
in the Total Value of Exports (1950-1980)
(in percentage)

Categories	1950	1960	1970 ¹	1980
Participation of agriculture in the total value of exports	96.7	95.9	75.0	65.3
Participation of coffee and bananas in the total value of exports	91.1	75.4	60.6	45.6
Participation of industrial production in the total value of exports	3.7	4.1	25.0	34.7

Source: OFIPLAN, Compendio de Cifras Basicas, Comercio Exterior 1950-1970. For 1980 Direccion General de Estadisticas y Censos. in Salas, Walter et. al., El Sector Agropecuario Costarricense (San José: Universidad de Costa Rica, 1983) p. 72.

CHART 4

Selected Indicators of Structural Change in Costa Rica

Source: Rolando Franco and Arturo de Leon, "Estilos de Desarrollo, Papel del Estado y Estructura Social en Costa Rica". Pensamiento Ibero-Americano, Julio-Diciembre 1984, p. 89.

the ideologues of the National Liberation Party openly endorsed the perceived virtues of a technocratic state. The proposition of technocratism implied "an ideological utilization of the social prestige of science."¹¹⁸ As Carlos Molina points out, the promotion of technocratism:

presumes that the needs of society can be gradually and scientifically solved through technology. In this sense, governmental functions -as well as those of the private sector- should be the responsibility of specialists and technicians who are beyond and above ideologies and who act disinterestedly and according to their expertise.¹¹⁹

National Liberation believed that Costa Rica's problems, prior to the military victory of 1948, had their roots in the "general disorientation that the country suffered in regard to economic policy...and the lack of a scientific criteria in regard to the economy."¹²⁰ For Rodrigo Facio, the solution to the country's social problems, must be based on "the scientific intervention of the state".¹²¹ The implementation of this idea, according to Facio, implied that the state intervention:

would be carried out not directly by the ministries but by autonomous institutions with no political considerations; by technicians and specialists in the particular area who would work independently of politicians.¹²²

Facio's distrust of political intervention in technical

affairs was most clearly expressed in his reference to the formation and implementation of fiscal and monetary policy wherein he stated that "the government should not contract external loans without the previous authorization..of the National Bank of Costa Rica."¹²³ Furthermore he believed that the planning function too, should be de-politicized and conceived of "as an economic instrument usable under any political system."¹²⁴ Consequently, the creation of autonomous institutions after 1948 was guided by the perceived need by National Liberation to "technocratize the state apparatus". This technocratization was responsible, according to several authors, for the development of a "bureaucratic class" with a high degree of autonomy.

According to Ana Sojo, the direction of the state apparatus in Costa Rica -or at least a good portion of it- is under the control of a "state bourgeoisie" or "bureaucratic bourgeoisie". Furthermore, this fraction became a "class" during the 1970's when the state began to directly participate in the process of capital accumulation through the Costa Rican Development Corporation (CODESA).¹²⁵ A similar view is presented by Rodolfo Cerdas, who argues that the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" which emerged during this period, was closely associated with National Liberation and that -given the independence of their economic activities- often pursued interests that were in opposition to those of the private sector.¹²⁶ Furthermore, Jose Luis Vega argues that the country is facing an increasingly autonomous exercise of

state power by the top technocracy controlling the public sector. This technocracy, according to him, uses its position to increase its power, even if their actions go against the interests of other dominant classes.¹²⁷

Even those authors who disagree with the notion that the state technocracy constitutes an independent class or class fraction, recognize the significant power that it has in shaping the social and economic development of the country. Mylena Vega, for example, disagrees with the notion that the top state technocracy is an independent body. She argues that this technocracy "is composed of members of different fractions of the bourgeoisie".¹²⁸ However, she suggests that with an increasing expansion of the state functions in the process of capitalist accumulation this technocracy could be transformed into "an autonomous fraction."¹²⁹

It is important to emphasize that the technocratization of the state apparatus pursued political as well as technical objectives. The technocratization of the public sector was a vehicle through which non-oligarchical elements could gain access to important state positions because it implied the need to increase the educational opportunities for those who would become the experts and specialists that Façio envisaged. In turn, educational opportunities opened up possibilities for the middle class to enter the public sector.¹³⁰

Management of the State Apparatus

In the process of taking control of the state machinery, National Liberation introduced modern management techniques into the operations of the public sector. This was a logical corollary of the process of "technocratization" of the state described in the previous section. In this sense, the managerial innovations introduced into the Costa Rican state apparatus after 1948 should be understood as pursuing both political and technical objectives.

With regard to personnel administration the Constitution of 1949 established a civil service system wherein "employees of the central government...were to be selected on the basis of personal qualifications and competitive examinations and could not be dismissed because of political views or political-party affiliations."¹³¹ The civil service did not include employees of the autonomous institutions. However, these employees enjoy the same benefits as those formally functioning within it. Although some authors would argue that political and family links still play a major role in determining job possibilities in the public sector, most people would agree that the Costa Rican civil service is the most advanced in the Central America area and one of the most advanced in Latin America.¹³²

National Liberation was also concerned with the rationalization of state administrative procedures. In 1954, Costa Rica established an "Organization and Methods" office and since then "has been the leading country in Central America in O&M work."¹³³ Furthermore, new budgetary and financial procedures were introduced by National Liberation after 1948, as part of its efforts to organize the state apparatus according to its political objectives. The process of decentralization of the state apparatus through the creation of autonomous institutions was therefore accompanied by the establishment of decentralized financial and budgetary managerial systems. This move gave significant discretionary power to the autonomous institutions, and limited the power of the central government to control and supervise the financial operations of these institutions.

With the creation of the National Planning Office in 1963 the decentralized nature of the Costa Rican state apparatus came into conflict with the need to coordinate government functions. As Gary Wynia points out:

the national administrative structure enhance resistance by the ministries and the autonomous agencies to increased coordination of their public investments. Surprisingly, OFIPLAN does not have automatic access to agency information but must receive special authorization from each agency to review its investment plans. Agencies, fearing loss of autonomy, often ignored OFIPLAN

inquiries. 134

The process of centralization that took place during the 1970's was intended to solve problems inherent in coordinating the state's apparatus, especially in terms of the autonomous institutions. Through a series of legal reforms, the executive regained partial administrative and political control of the autonomous agencies.¹³⁵ This shift was motivated primarily by the increasingly complex functions of the state apparatus which, during the 1970's, began participating directly in production. However, as Jean R. Tartter points out:

the autonomous agencies continued to issue rules, adopt policies, and embark on new forms of activity without being obliged to secure executive and legislative sanction. New board members were appointed by the president, but once in office they were virtually immune from political control and exempt from arbitrary dismissal.¹³⁶

Conclusions.

The analysis of the development of the state apparatus of Costa Rica from 1948 to 1980 demonstrates that the successful institutionalization of a political project requires the instrumentalization of the state apparatus. Central to the political strategy of National Liberation for the institutionalization of the "Second Republic", was the

use of the state apparatus as "the organizer of the new regime". In consequence, the changes introduced by the governments of this period into the organizational design, the social domain, the character and the management of the state apparatus, were consciously designed to achieve the diversification of the national economy, the political displacement of the traditional coffee-export oligarchies and the development of new economic and political elites.

It is important to point out that the capacity which governments had, from 1948 to 1980, to instrumentalize the state apparatus, were conditioned by the domestic and international forces operating within the country. For example, out of fear of communist participation in the Calderon and Picado governments, the United States gave decisive support to the Figueres government. These favorable international circumstances helped the Revolutionary Junta in 1948 to promote social, political and economic development that was relatively free of foreign intervention.

5.4 Summary and Conclusions

Summary

The historical development of the Costa Rican state apparatus differs significantly from that of Honduras. While the evolution of the Honduran state apparatus resulted in a militarized and centralized administrative structure, the development of the Costa Rican state apparatus has resulted in the conformation of a decentralized administrative structure instrumentalized by a civilian political elite.

Like Honduras, Costa Rica participated from 1821 to 1839 in the liberal attempt to establish a Confederation of Central American republics. The effects that this attempt had on the conformation of the Costa Rican social formation and its state apparatus were not as significant as they were in the rest of the Central American provinces. The poverty of human and natural resources and resultant unattractiveness of Costa Rica for colonial exploitation, together with its geographical isolation, provided its early governments with the opportunity to pursue relatively independent political, administrative, and economic development. International forces, therefore, did not play the significant role that they did in the early development of Honduras.

All this is not to say that the early development of Costa Rica was without problems. From 1821 to 1839 the Costa Rican struggle to consolidate a national social structure and a national state apparatus was hindered by the

absence of an integrated economic structure and the resulting political fragmentation of the country. The consolidation of the Costa Rican social formation and its state apparatus only began to take place in 1835, with the development of a domestic economic elite whose power was based on the emerging coffee industry. The emergence of the dictatorial rule of Braulio Carrillo in 1835 reflected the rapid consolidation of this new elite.

Carrillo introduced new management techniques and values into the public sector; centralized and expanded the role of the administrative structure of the state apparatus; and developed its extractive capacity. Moreover, he reoriented public administration so as to promote the development of a coffee centered economy. All these changes in the modes of transformation of the state apparatus were rooted in the need for the emerging coffee elite to instrumentalize the incipient state apparatus so as to consolidate the coffee export economy.

Ironically, the growing accumulation of power by Carrillo soon became an impediment for the direct instrumentalization of the state apparatus by the coffee groups. As a consequence, they withdrew their support for Carrillo who consequently retired in 1842. After Carrillo's departure the control of the state apparatus was disputed by different fractions of the coffee elite, who attempted to instrumentalize the state apparatus according to their own

particular interests.

This period of conflict and turmoil came to an end with the military coup that brought Tomas Guardia to power. The military had gained power and prestige as a result of its successful participation in preventing an attempt by American forces to gain control over Nicaraguan territory in 1857. This gave the army a significant amount of autonomy vis-à-vis the dominant elite. This autonomy enabled Guardia to intervene in the political affairs of the country, to neutralize the leaders of the most powerful social groups and put an end to the direct use of the state apparatus as a private tool of the "coffee barons".

In fact, Guardia transformed the state apparatus from an instrument in the hands of particular factions of the coffee oligarchy into an instrument for the promotion of the capitalist, coffee-centered economy as a whole. This transformation was reflected in the significant changes Guardia introduced into the organizational design, character, social domain, and management of the state apparatus.

The orientation of the changes introduced by Guardia were to continue under subsequent governments until the 1930s. The political stability achieved by Guardia allowed the consolidation of the national coffee export economy as well as the consolidation of a national political elite.

Economic prosperity allowed the state apparatus to respond to social demands generated by the new political actors - unions, the middle class, peasants organizations- who had emerged as a result of the modernization of the national economy. In other words, the state apparatus was able to organize and control the new forms of political conflict generated by the economic development of the country.

Political stability and economic prosperity came to an end with the international economic crisis of the 1930s. The social contradictions which emerged during these years represented the beginning of the deterioration of the system of social domination by the agro-exporting elite. Workers, peasants, and middle class sectors openly expressed their disagreement with the social distribution of power and benefits in the country.

In these circumstances the Communist Party of Costa Rica was able to attract the support of large segments of the population. Reforms introduced by the government failed to satisfy the expectations of the disadvantaged sector of society while, on the other hand, they provoked the resentment of the most conservative sectors of Costa Rican society. Thus, the reforms polarized rather than alleviated political conflict. The government in these circumstances established an alliance with the Communist Party to promote social reforms.

A third political organization between the traditional oligarchies and the government and its communist allies also emerged. Social democratic in its orientation, this organization, composed of the Social Democratic Party and the Center for the Study of National Reality, proposed:

a) the diversification of the economic structure of the country to avoid dependency on coffee and to allow the emergence and participation of new political and economic groups.

b) the defense of private property especially small landholders and,

c) the conformation of the state apparatus as "the manager of the new regime".

Domestic popular dissatisfaction and favorable international circumstances, in particular the United States government fears of communist penetration in the Costa Rican government, made possible the overthrow of the Picado government in 1948 by the forces of Jose Figueres, the most important leader of Democratic Action.

The process of social, political and economic reforms introduced by the revolutionary government were to continue with no significant interruptions until the 1980's. The introduction of these changes and their institutionalization required not only the capture of state power but also the instrumentalization of the state apparatus to the political objectives of the revolution, especially the reorientation

of its social domain to promote the formation of non-oligarchical social groups. As a result, the organizational design of the state apparatus was decentralized not only to promote efficiency but also to reduce the power of the traditional agro-exporting elite that had traditionally controlled the executive power. Moreover, the role of the state was expanded to promote the development of new economic activities. Finally, the army was abolished to prevent the accumulation of power by the military at the expense of the executive, legislative or judicial sectors.

Not only the organizational design but also the character of the state apparatus was transformed. Successive reformist governments promoted the "technocratization" of the state apparatus: the promotion of technical rather than partisan political values within the public sector. The technocratization of the public sector sought not only technical efficiency but also to provide access for non-oligarchical social groups to government positions. The technocratization of the state apparatus required increased educational opportunities for non-traditional sectors of society, which in turn opened up possibilities for the middle class to enter the public sector. The promotion of technocratization and the expanded state role both required the introduction of modern managerial techniques and practices.

Conclusions

The historical development of the modes of transformation of the state apparatus of Costa Rica reflects the overdeterminant role that domestic forces had on the conformation of Costa Rican society.

The formation and consolidation of a national economic elite in the 19th century made possible the development of a truly national system of political domination. In consequence, international factors -such as the economic and political role of the banana plantations- never played the overdeterminant role that they did in Honduras.

Throughout the historical development of Costa Rica, political conflict was mostly provoked by indigenous causes and always resulted in domestic solutions which strengthened the political institutions of the country. This is certainly the case of the political transformation initiated with the establishment of the "Second Republic" in 1948. As a result of its historical dynamic, Costa Rica has been able to evolve into a truly national state. In turn, the Costa Rican state apparatus -as the concrete manifestation of the national system of domination- developed relations of authority vis-à-vis the political and economic actors of the country.

While in Honduras the formation of a national state remains an ostensible goal, in Costa Rica the construction of the state, both, as a national social formation, and as a national institutional apparatus, has been accomplished.

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PART FOUR

CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND DIRECTIONS
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

CHAPTER VI.

CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH.

6.1 Conclusions.

The model formulated in this thesis offers an abstract interpretation of the nature of public administration that can be used as an analytical tool to gather and organize information regarding the factors that condition the modes of transformation of the state apparatus and governments' capacity to instrumentalize it. As David Willer points out:

an attempt to make a model identical to phenomena is not merely epistemologically incorrect but would certainly in many cases frustrate the construction of successful models....In the physical sciences the most useful models often violate common sense in that they seem not to represent their phenomena as they "really are". But it is neither common sense nor convention which is the basis for judging a model, but its ability to represent the abstract features of the phenomena isomorphically while providing an adequate formal system for them.

The application of the alternative model for the study

of public administration developed in this thesis on the historical development of Honduras and Costa Rica has provided preliminary evidence in support of its rationale and mechanism. The following is an examination of each one of the propositions contained in the model in light of the historical analysis of the Honduran and the Costa Rican case studies.

a) The establishment and transformation of the state as a system of social relations constitute the most concrete expressions of the process of institutionalization of political change;

The institutionalization of political change -it has been argued before- is a process guided, although not solely determined, by a preconceived notion of the ends sought and of the methods to be used for those purposes. In other words, political institutionalization refers to the purposeful establishment of a specific pattern of relations of domination within a given social formation. However, the outcome of the process of institutionalization of political change does not simply reflect political will but also the effect of domestic and international structural factors in determining historical change.

The historical development of Honduras and Costa Rica shows how the establishment and transformation of the national state as a system of social relations reflect political attempts to create and re-create social reality as

conditioned by domestic and international structural factors. One of these attempts was the creation of the Central American Federation in 1823. The final outcome of this attempt, however, was not the institutionalization of a federal Central American state but the formation of five independent national states with the names of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. As previously explained, the Federation was dissolved in 1839 because efforts to unify the Central American provinces could not overcome the fragmented political and economic structure of the region.

After the dissolution of the Central American Federation, different political groups in Honduras and Costa Rica attempted to shape the existing social relations in the two countries according to preconceived political objectives. The most important attempts toward the creation and re-creation of the national states in Honduras and Costa Rica were:

In Honduras:

- The formation of the national state. (After 1838);
- The liberal reform. (After 1876);
- The capitalist organization of society. (After 1949);
- and,

• The militarization of the national political system.
(After 1956).

In Costa Rica:

The formation of the national state. (After 1839);

The consolidation of a national export economy. (After 1843); and

The institutionalization of the Second Republic (After 1948).

The outcome of each of these attempts, as reflected in the transformation of the existing social relations within each country, reflect different degrees of governmental capacity to institutionalize political change. Examples of success in the purposeful institutionalization of political changes are the consolidation of a national export economy in Costa Rica after 1843, the establishment of the Second Republic in this same country after 1948 and the militarization of the Honduran political system after 1956. Examples of failures in the institutionalization of attempted political changes are the project to establish a Central American Federation after 1821, and the Honduran Liberal Reform after 1876.

b) The institutionalization of political change, whose purpose is expressed in government's political policy objectives, is government's most important goal;

It has been argued that the institutionalization of

political change as a permanent state is the ultimate goal of any political actor attempting to introduce socio-structural changes and their maintenance through the use of authority rather than force alone. The political changes analyzed in the review of the historical development of Costa Rica and Honduras, attempted not only to transform the political, economic and social structures of the two countries according to preconceived technical objectives but also to recreate accepted social reality. While the technical goal of government policies in each of the periods under consideration was the transformation of objective reality, the political goal of those policies was the synchronized transformation of both objective and subjective reality. In other words, the political objective of government policies was to ensure that the changes introduced in the existing social relations were internalized and accepted as legitimate by the members of society.

c) Government's attempt to institutionalize political change requires the instrumentalization of the state apparatus as the vehicle to induce and reproduce the effects of the political changes being introduced. The instrumentalization of the state apparatus implies the need to adjust or replace the modes of transformation of the state apparatus so that the process of implementation of public policy will not distort government's political policy objectives.

The analyses of the historical development of Costa

Rica and Honduras showed that governments' efforts to change existing social relations in these two countries were invariably accompanied by significant attempts to adapt the organizational design, the social domain, the management and the character of the national state apparatuses to the nature of the political changes sought.

From 1821 to 1838 the modes of transformation of the Honduran state apparatus were designed to respond to the need to institutionalize the Central American Federation. From 1839 to 1876, the modes of transformation of the Honduran state apparatus were arranged according to the political and economic needs of the conservative oligarchies who controlled the national economy and resisted the formation of a strong national state apparatus. During this period, the functions of the state apparatus were reduced to a minimal role in view of the high degree of self-sufficiency that these oligarchies enjoyed.

After 1876, the institutionalization of the Liberal Reform required the instrumentalization of the state apparatus by the Liberal governments. To this effect, successive liberal governments expanded the functions of the state apparatus, consolidated its national authority, centralized its organizational design, and introduced modern management systems and techniques.

The process of capitalist modernization of the national

economy initiated by the government of Juan Manuel Galvez in 1949 was also characterized by significant attempts to adapt the modes of transformation of the state apparatus to government's objectives. From 1949 to 1956, the governments promoted a vigorous process of institution building that reflected the rapid expansion of the political and economic activities of the state. Moreover, the social domain of the state apparatus was modified to favor those activities that were crucial for the economic modernization of the country. In addition, the government promoted the development of technocratic values within the public sector as well as the adoption of modern managerial systems and techniques.

In 1956 the military emerged as the most influential political actor in the country. The military instrumentalized the state apparatus for the purpose of institutionalizing the process of modernization of the national economy and to control political conflict. The most important change introduced by the military into the modes of transformation of the state apparatus was the establishment of a dual power structure in its organizational design. With this change, the military developed into an autonomous power structure.

The case of Costa Rica also shows how governments' attempts to institutionalize political change required the instrumentalization of the state apparatus. The historical development of Costa Rica also confirms that the successful

implementation of a political project requires the adaptation of the modes of transformation of the state apparatus to the nature of the changes sought.

From 1821 to 1838 Costa Rica was part of the Central American Federation. During this period, the federal government in Guatemala and the provincial government in Costa Rica attempted to instrumentalize the state apparatus for the purpose of institutionalizing the Central American Federation. With the dissolution of the Federation, Costa Rican governments attempted to establish an independent national state. These efforts implied the creation and instrumentalization of a national state apparatus. The culmination of these attempts took place with the emergence of the Carrillo regime (1835-1842) which initiated the process of institutionalization of the Costa Rican state. This process required the creation and instrumentalization of a national state apparatus. For this purpose, Carrillo enhanced the role of the state and centralized the power of the state apparatus. He also changed the orientation of state policies according to the needs of the social groups that controlled the emerging coffee industry. Furthermore, with the Carrillo regime the values of the coffee elites began to permeate the character of the state apparatus. Finally, new managerial systems and techniques began to be adopted by the state apparatus to deal with the increasing complexity of government functions.

After 1843 a process of consolidation of a national export economy began to take place. The institutionalization of this process required the adaptation of the modes of transformation of the state apparatus to the needs of the new economy. Increasing diversification and growing relative autonomy were the most important characteristics of the organizational design of the state apparatus that emerged during this period. Also, the role and the functions of the state apparatus progressively concentrated on the promotion of the coffee sector, while the values of the coffee elites were even further reflected in the character of the state apparatus. Finally, the growing functions of the state apparatus and the increasing complexity of its operations facilitated the introduction of modern management systems and techniques into the public administration system.

The economic impact of the international world crisis of the 1930s shook the foundations of the coffee export economy and made possible the emergence of new political groups who competed for the control of the state apparatus. In 1948, a socialist democratically-oriented group achieved state power and attempted to permanently transform the social, political and economic structures of the country by diversifying the national economy and by promoting the emergence of non-traditional elites. This attempt was accompanied by the introduction of the following changes into the modes of transformation of the state apparatus: First, the organizational design of the state apparatus was

changed by a) the elimination of the army; b) the expansion of state activities; and c) the decentralization of the central state apparatus. Second, the government promoted the development of technocratic values within the public sector. Third, a process of adoption and adaptation of modern managerial techniques and systems took place to facilitate the increasingly complex government operations. Finally, the social domain of the state apparatus changed to promote the emergence of non-traditional political groups and elites.

d) The study of public administration is placed within a socio-historical context. Thus, in order to understand the phenomenon of instrumentalization of the state apparatus it is necessary to first understand that the modes of transformation of the state apparatus are not entirely determined by governments' will. In order to instrumentalize the state apparatus governments must overcome two obstacles: the relative autonomy of the state apparatus and the remnants of the modes of transformation inherited from previous regimes. The relative autonomy of the state apparatus implies that its modes of transformation respond not only to governments' political policy objectives, but to the influence of the political and the economic structures of the social formation within which the state apparatus operates, as well as to the influence of the international forces which affect this social formation. Furthermore, the modes of transformation of the state apparatus are, to a significant extent, historically determined. The weight of preceding administrative and organizational structures remain an important impediment to change.

It has been argued throughout the thesis that governments' capacity to instrumentalize the state apparatus

is conditioned by domestic and international forces. Consequently not only politics but also the instrumentalization of the state apparatus is the "art of the possible".

The successful instrumentalization of the state apparatus requires an understanding of the objective limitations and possibilities that governments face when attempting to introduce political and administrative change. Failing to recognize the influence that structural and historical forces have in the formation of the state apparatus and its modes of transformation might lead to the failure not only of a government's administrative project but also to the failure of its political project. The historical review of Honduras and Costa Rica offered ample support for these arguments.

The review of the historical analysis of the Honduran state apparatus showed how its modes of transformation reflected the variable effects of domestic and international structural factors. These factors also conditioned government's capacity to instrumentalize the state apparatus.

The failure to institutionalize the Central American Federation and a Federal state apparatus was due to the fragmentation of the political and the economic structure of the Central American region. These structural forces were

more significant than the liberal governments' political will regarding the development of both the Central American social formation and the federal state apparatus. The conservative governments that emerged in Honduras after this country separated from the Federation, changed the modes of transformation of the state apparatus according to the political and economic realities of the country.

The Liberal Reform of 1876 represented a significant attempt to consolidate integrated economic and political national structures. Governments' capacity to instrumentalize the state apparatus to institutionalize the Liberal Reform were largely conditioned by the economic and political structures of the country, as well as by the effect of international forces. The absence of a national economic elite and the government decision to open the doors to foreign investment to facilitate the economic modernization of the country, gave foreign capital the capacity to shape both the Honduran social formation and the Honduran state apparatus. This situation culminated with the emergence of the Carias government which adapted the modes of transformation of the state apparatus to the needs of foreign capital.

After the end of the Second World War, new international and domestic conditions allowed the governments of Juan Manuel Galvez and Lozano Dias the opportunity to promote a new attempt to modernize the

political and the economic structures of the country. However, their capacity to instrumentalize the state apparatus for the institutionalization of these reforms was severely limited by the international forces affecting the country. The United States' concern with hemispheric security resulted in the overdevelopment of the military sector of the Honduran state apparatus. The process of professionalization, modernization and institutionalization of the military supported by the United States paved the way for its emergence as a political actor in 1956.

From 1956 to 1980, the military successfully instrumentalized the state apparatus for the purpose of promoting the modernization of the economic structure of the country and for controlling social conflict. The continuation of the United States concern for hemispheric security, especially after the success of the Cuban and the Nicaraguan revolution, gave additional strength to the Honduran army. As a result, the military developed, more than any other group in the country, the capacity to instrumentalize and control the national state apparatus.

The case of Costa Rica also shows how international and domestic structural factors have conditioned the modes of transformation of the state apparatus and governments' capacity to instrumentalize it. After Costa Rica separated from the Federation, various governments struggled to institutionalize a national state and a national state.

apparatus. This process culminated with the emergence of the Carrillo regime which managed not only to neutralize the most important centrifugal forces working against the formation of a central government, but also to consolidate a central state apparatus. It is important to emphasize however, that Carrillo's capacity to instrumentalize the state apparatus was conditioned by favorable domestic circumstances. The development of the coffee industry had promoted the emergence of a truly national elite which began to control the political and the economic life of the country. The consolidation of a central state apparatus was a necessity for the institutionalization of the coffee economy. The historical experience of Honduras, as previously explained, was different. In Honduras the absence of a national economic elite during its early history allowed foreign capital to determine the modes of transformation of the state apparatus.

From 1843 to 1930, the development of the coffee export economy in Costa Rica continued to facilitate the consolidation of a truly national state apparatus whose modes of transformation responded to domestic rather than to international pressures. The international economic crisis of the 1930s weakened the coffee export economy and the state's capacity to respond to increasing social demands. At the same time, the United States government opposed the participation of the Communist Party in the Calderon and Picado governments. These conditions allowed a social

democratic group to capture state power, instrumentalize the state apparatus and institutionalize the Second Republic.

Later, the success of the Cuban and the Nicaraguan Revolutions gave the Costa Rican political system additional strength, especially in view of the need for the United States to portray the Costa Rican political system as an alternative to Communism in the region.

e) The relation between social structures does not follow any rigid pattern of determination. In other words, the capacity for a government to instrumentalize the state apparatus is not rigidly predetermined by any one structural force but, rather, responds to the alternating dominance of various structural factors.

The alternative model for the study of public administration developed in this thesis does not presuppose any form of determinism in socio-structural relations. Governments have the capacity to change the modes of transformation of the state apparatus within certain limits. The extent and the nature of these limits varies according to the variable effects of political, economic and international forces operating within a given social formation. While the case of Honduras shows that international forces have been the most influential factor determining governments' capacity to instrumentalize the state apparatus, the case of Costa Rica shows the determinant role that domestic forces have had in the

crystallization of the modes of transformation of its state apparatus.

Moreover, the historical evidence gathered in the two case studies goes against two common fallacies in the social sciences, namely, economic determinism and political voluntarism. While the economic structure of the two countries always imposed certain limits to governmental capacity to recreate social reality, these limits often allowed governments to choose among alternative political decisions. Furthermore, political decisions sometimes ended up changing the prevailing economic structure of these countries. An example of this is the transformation of the Costa Rican society after the revolution of 1948 where the political movement led by Figueres was able to institutionalize a reformist political project by carefully considering the limitations and possibilities that history offered them.

Even in those cases in which economic imperatives seem to have completely determined the course of events, it is possible to argue that what happened is not necessarily the only thing that could have happened. For example, the decision of the Soto government in Honduras in 1876 to open the doors of the country to foreign investment which resulted in the subordination of the country to foreign capital was not the only decision that this government could have made. To assume the economic predetermination of the

emergence and consolidation of foreign capital in Honduras is to suffer "the illusion of the accomplished fact". According to Weber, this illusion occurs when we contemplate "what has happened, and this appears to us as 'necessary', including the decision that was once actually made".²

As for political voluntarism, the two case studies clearly show that "to choose a possibility in a given situation is to choose under certain limits".³ From the federalist experiment to the militarization of the Honduran society and the consolidation of liberal democracy in Costa Rica, governments' freedom of action was conditioned by economic, political and international structural forces.

6.2 Implications

The lessons derived from the application of the model have important implications for: the teaching of public administration; the practice of public administration by governments; and, the programs of international technical assistance in the field of public administration to third world countries.

Implications for the Teaching of Public Administration

The understanding of the phenomenon of instrumentalization requires one to consider the state apparatus as one of several interconnected social structures which together constitute the totality of a social formation. At the theoretical level, this view is supported by both Marx and Weber, who each viewed society as a mosaic of interdependent social structures. From their perspective, the analysis of any one of these structures would have to take into consideration its relation with the other.

The discipline of Political Science has the potential to assist in the explanation of the functioning of the structural forces that condition both the modes of transformation of, and the capacity of governments to instrumentalize, the state apparatus. While the potential benefit that Political Science offers to Public Administration (and vice versa) is widely recognized, very little has been done to meaningfully integrate the two disciplines into the study of the political implications of administration and the administrative implication of politics. Lip service is paid by most universities to the formally accepted need for integration by offering Public Administration courses within Political Science departments and vice versa. In most cases, however, the only point of coincidence between the two disciplines is the common buildings where classes are held. The alternative model for the study of Public Administration formulated in this thesis

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offers an organizing scheme to integrate the two disciplines into the study of public administration phenomena.

Implications for the Function of Government

This thesis has shown that governments' attempts to institutionalize political change require the instrumentalization of the state apparatus as the vehicle to induce and reproduce the effects of the political changes being introduced. This thesis has also shown that the degree of freedom of action that governments have to instrumentalize the state apparatus is limited by structural factors. As the Costa Rican and Honduran experiences have demonstrated failure to recognize the structural limitations of any attempt to instrumentalize the state apparatus often result in failure to achieve the desired political goals. The instrumentalization of the state apparatus is the result of a dialectical relationship between human choices and objective possibilities. As Ramos points out,

how these two aspects are combined in the dynamics of events cannot be expressed in an univocal formula. Theoretically one is forced to assume that each situation has its own pattern of combination of those two aspects. Thus, to choose a possibility in a given situation is to choose under certain limits.⁴

In conclusion, an understanding of the possibilities

and limitations for the transformation of the state apparatus is crucial for evaluating both the policy objectives of a government and the probability of these objectives being institutionalized.

Implications for the Programs of International Technical Assistance in the Field of Public Administration

Most programs of technical assistance in the field of public administration suffer from their ahistorical, voluntarist, and reductionist interpretation of administrative phenomena in third world countries. In analysing the intellectual orientation of these programs in the 1950's, Siffin has explained how for example, the Weberian relationship between administration and domination was sacrificed to the simplistic adoption of his bureaucratic ideal type as a prescription. ⁵

The theoretical understanding upon which most programs of international technical assistance in the 1980s are based is not significantly different from that of the 1950s. For example, in the 1983 World Development Report,⁶ published by the World Bank, and in Investing in Development: Lessons of the World Bank Experience,⁷ public administration is still analysed in isolation from the political, economic and international forces that shape the modes of transformation of the state apparatus. Even in the 1980s, in the World

Bank's view, "development means growth, achieving this is essentially a technical matter - a matter of economic science - and management doctrine is to contribute as a handmaiden".⁸

Additionally, many of the programs of administrative decentralization carried out during the last decade by governments of third world countries, with the technical support of international development agencies and bilateral aid donors, also suffered from a narrow understanding of the way in which political, economic, and international factors condition governments' capacity to decentralize the state apparatus. In analyzing some of the reasons for the limited success of these programs, Diana Conyers suggests that:

it is necessary to recognize the complexity of the motives behind the decentralization programmes and, in particular, the fact that in many cases they are trying to achieve both 'centralization' and 'decentralization'. Added to this is the complexity of the reforms themselves, which generally involve a major restructuring of the whole political and administrative system - literally the decentralization of the national government.⁹

Conyers concludes her analysis by suggesting the "need for a more realistic view of both the potential and the limitations of decentralization."¹⁰

A new approach for the analysis of administrative phenomena is needed to guide the programs of international

technical assistance in the field of public administration. This thesis offers such a new approach, which suggests, a more realistic analysis of the possibilities and limitations for administrative reform in developing countries.

6.3 Directions for Future Research

The alternative model for the study of public administration developed in this thesis is only a preliminary attempt to overcome the demonstrated limitations of public administration and constitute only first step in the direction of theory building. The model itself should be further tested to more clearly establish its rigor, combinational richness and organizing power.¹¹ As Willer points out, "models are not constructed in a vacuum removed from reality but through consistent trial and error, reconceptualization, and retrieval in direct contact with the relevant data."¹² This could be achieved by the systematic application of the model to significant number of national studies.

Once a model has proven to be useful, the process of theory building is only half done. The next step is to derive from the model, a formal system of empirically testable hypotheses. This task "requires that relationships of the mechanism, either explicit or implicit, be stated as

terms connected by the rules of logic or mathematics."¹³ Examples of the type of terms and relations that a formal system based on the alternative model developed in this thesis are suggested in two given here:

In those Central American countries where domestic economic elites are weak, the modes of transformation of the state apparatus are mainly shaped in response to international forces.

In those Central American countries where domestic economic elites are strong, the modes of transformation of the state apparatus are mainly shaped in response to the needs of the national economy.

These hypotheses, if supported in the analysis of all Central American countries, could then be tested in other Latin American countries. A further step could be the testing of these hypotheses outside the Latin American region.

The process of theory building, then, involves arriving at generalizations "via abstractive inferences from observables"¹⁴, that is, by moving up in a ladder of theoretical abstraction. According to Giovanni Sartori, this ladder of abstraction can be conceptualized as follow:

1. Cross-comparisons
among heterogeneous
contexts (global theory).

2. Intra-area comparisons
among relatively homogeneous contexts (middle range theory)

3. Country by country
analysis (narrow-gauge
theory) 15

To sum up, the construction of theories of public administration capable of overcoming the traditional theoretical limitations of the field involves a long, difficult and painful process of intellectual inquiry. This thesis has attempted to provide an argument for the urgent need to move beyond ahistorical, reductionist, voluntarist, parochial and conservative explanations of public administration phenomena. To advance this purpose, the thesis has provided an alternative model for the study of public administration phenomena that can be used for the purpose of theory building. Models and methods, however, are only instruments of intellectual inquiry. More than anything else, theory building requires intellectual imagination. Because of this, models should not be

considered as prisons of the intellect but rather as instrumental devices to organize mental experience. As Whitehead points out:

Mental experience is the organ of novelty, the urge beyond. It seeks to vivify the massive physical fact, which is repetitive, with the novelties which beckon. Thus mental experience contains in itself a factor of anarchy. We can understand order, because in the recesses of our own experience there is a contrasting element which is anarchic.

But sheer anarchy means the nothingness of experience. We enjoy the contrast of our own variety in virtue of the order which removes the incompatibility of mere diversity. Thus mental experience must itself be canalized into order.¹⁶

CHAPTER VI FOOTNOTES

- 1 David Willer, Scientific Sociology (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 23.
- 2 Max Weber, The Methodology of Social Sciences (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 119, in Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, "Modernization: Towards a Possibility Model", Developing Nations: Quest for a Model, Beling and Totten eds. (New York: Van Nostrand Comp., 1970), p.29.
- 3 Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, Ibid., p., 26.
- 4 Ibid., pp. 25,26.
- 5 See, William Siffin, "Two Decades of Public Administration in Developing Countries", Public Administration Review, January/February 1976.
- 6 World Bank, World Development Report 1983, World Bank and Oxford University Press, New York.
- 7 Warren C. Baum and Stokes M. Tolbert, Investing in Development: Lessons of World Bank Experience (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 507-518.
- 8 David J. Murray, "The World Bank's Perspective on How to Improve Administration", Public Administration and Development, vol. 3, 1983, p.296.
- 9 Diana Conyers, "Decentralization: The Latest Fashion in Development Administration?", Public Administration and Development, vol. 3, 1983, pp.106-107.
- 10 Ibid., p.167.
- 11 See, Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control, New York, 1966, p. 17, quoted in A.S. Cohan, Theories of Revolution, (London: Nelson, 1975), p. 44.
- 12 David Willer, op. cit., p. 66
- 13 Ibid., p. 67.
- 14 Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics" in Roy Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, eds., Comparative Politics (Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1977), p. 35.
- 15 Ibid., p. 40.

- 16 Alfred North Whitehead, The Function of Reason (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p. 33.

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