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ETHNICITY, COMMUNITY, AND THE STATE:
THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES, PRACTICES AND STRATEGIES OF
THE MONTREAL JEWISH COMMUNITY'S DAY SCHOOL SYSTEM AND ITS
RELATIONS WITH THE QUEBEC STATE.

by

MICHAEL ROSENBERG

A Thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
September, 1995

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THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES, PRACTICES AND STRATEGIES
OF THE MONTREAL JEWISH COMMUNITY'S DAY SCHOOL SYSTEM AND
ITS RELATIONS WITH THE QUEBEC STATE.

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in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

This thesis examines the interorganizational relations between the state and ethnic communities in Canadian society. It is based on research on the nature of and evolution of the relations between the Quebec state and the Montreal Jewish community's private day school system.

Following a critical review of structural theories of ethnicity, a model of ethnic community organization and action is developed which combines Barth's (1969b) and Breton's (1964; 1979b) structural analyses of ethnic organization with Giddens' (1984) structuration theory and Bourdieu's (1990) discussion of the role of strategies in social practices.

Organizationally, the state is treated as embedded in a set of dialectical social relations with civil society whereby politics and parapolitics pervade social life. As such, the contemporary state is fragmented and structurally, interpretively, and configurationally ambiguous.

The implications of the state's fragmentation and structural ambiguity are examined within Quebec's public education system. That system is itself structurally ambiguous and as the state has incorporated more and more of the education system within its administrative space, it has also incorporated political and parapolitical disputes among

conflicting interest groups.

Montreal's Jewish day school system emerged out of dynamic processes within the Jewish community and because Jews were unable to obtain equal rights within the public school system prior to 1968. Since 1968, active state intervention in the area of education has required the Jewish community to centralize and bureaucratize its own day school system. The result has been that the Jewish community, too, has evolved a structurally ambiguous education system which has incorporated the conflicts of interest among competing community groups. Today, the circumstances within which Jewish schools must operate have led to a systemic crisis aggravated by the structural ambiguity of the education system.

The research concludes that Quebec state policy on education has provided the Jewish community with a set of constraints and a set of opportunities which have combined to give a shape to the Jewish day school system. State policy, in turn, has altered in response to the changes and transformations within the Jewish and other ethnic communities. In this respect, the interorganizational relations between the state and an ethnic community are shown to be dialectical relations.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: EDUCATION, ETHNICITY, AND THE STATE

Understanding the relationship between ethnic communities and the state is one of the fundamental issues in the sociology of ethnicity and ethnic groups in Canada (Breton, 1984). Yet there have been remarkably few studies which examine this relationship. Research on the state tends to focus on class or political distinctions, rarely taking into account other social distinctions such as those of gender, race, age or ethnicity (Stasiulis, 1988). At the same time, research on ethnic groups typically limits the relevance of the state to issues such as federal or provincial policies on multiculturalism (Anderson and Frideres, 1981), immigration policies (Hawkins, 1988), or efforts to combat racism (Kallen, 1994). With the exception of Breton's (1984; 1986; 1989) and Stasiulis' (1980; 1990) work, however, there has been little theoretical consideration of what the impact of such policies tells us about the nature of the relationship between ethnic communities and the Canadian state.

This lack of theoretical and research interest on the relations between the state and ethnic communities is as pronounced in Quebec as in the rest of Canada. Recent

studies of major ethnocultural minorities in Quebec - the Armenians (Chichekian, 1989), Chinese (Helly, 1987), Greeks (Ioannou, 1983), Jews (Langlais and Rome, 1986), and Italians (Painchaud and Poulin, 1988) - pay little or no attention to state-group relations. Yet, since the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, the provincial state has served as the primary motor of social change in Quebec and the state's legislative and regulatory impact has come to be felt throughout all sectors of Quebec society. In particular, the impact of the state on education has had a profound effect on Quebec's ethnocultural minorities. The extraordinarily vehement emotional and political response of Quebec's ethnic and linguistic groups to government legislation on education, and the government's own shifting response to ethnic unrest (such as the changes found in Bills 63, 22, and 101¹), suggest that here lies an area of research which will tell us much about the dynamics of the

¹Within less than a ten year period, these pieces of legislation dramatically altered the right of parents to choose the language of education in Quebec. Bill 63, passed in 1969, granted to parents the right to choose the language of education of their child. Bill 22, passed just a few years later in 1974, asserted that French was the language of education and that only anglophones had a right to an English language education. Children whose parents had not been educated in English were to be tested to see if they qualified as being sufficiently anglophone. Bill 101, passed in 1976, essentially limited the right to an English education only to those having had at least one parent educated in English in Quebec.

state's relations with ethnic groups.

It may be that the lack of interest in the relations between the state and the ethnic community stems from the prevalent tendency among Canadian sociologists to view the ethnic community as primarily composed of "parallel" organizations which serve as an ethnic alternative to the public institutions of the state and of civil society. In that respect, a private Jewish school simply "parallels" a public school; it provides a Jewish education to those who prefer it.

This is not the point of view taken in this thesis. The ethnic community and its organizations do not simply mirror those of the state and civil society. The formation of an ethnic community and the establishment of ethnic organizations are not simply a matter of preference, they imply a set of relations between the ethnic community members and the broader society, in particular the state. In their interactions with the state, ethnic community members are simultaneously faced with a set of opportunities and a set of constraints. How community members take advantage of these opportunities and how they come to terms with these constraints gives a shape to the community and its organizations.

In turn, as ethnic community members respond to the

state by coming to terms with this combination of opportunities and constraints, they develop strategies and initiate processes which the state did not anticipate and to which it must respond. In this way both the state and the ethnic community serve to act upon and modify the other. It is, then, the major premise of this thesis that there is a dialectical relationship between the state and the ethnic community in which the actions and reactions of each modifies the other.

This thesis will address this premise by examining the impact of the Quebec state's education policies on the private day school systems operating within the Montreal Jewish community. More specifically, it will examine the organizational structures, practices and strategies which have evolved within the Jewish community as the community relates changing state policies on education to its own perceived interests and parapolitical concerns.

The Research Problem

The education system was chosen because education provides a crucial point of contact between civil society and the state, particularly in the case of relations between an ethnic community and the state. Since education, in its most general sense, is the means whereby we

reproduce the social order, both ethnic collectivities and the state have much to gain – and much to lose – depending upon their degree of control over the education process. The problem is that neither ethnic collectivities nor the state have common goals or interests with regards to education. Typically the state favours a centralized, universal system of education oriented to state policy, easily monitored and easily controlled. In contrast, ethnic communities – especially immigrant communities – see education as a means of ensuring their members equal access to jobs and other opportunities in the broader society. At the same time, the members of ethnic groups may also desire the education system to reflect as well their values and to pass on their traditions. For this reason, schools and schooling play a particularly important role in what Clifford Geertz (1973: 274) refers to as ethnic “parapolitics.” In this context, such parapolitics consists of the practices, strategies, and institutional activities whereby groups seek to gain or retain control over educational institutions, curricula and discourse.

In Quebec, the parapolitics of education have been particularly contentious because the education sector has played a central political and symbolic role in the process of modernization (Guindon, 1983). Throughout this process,

maintains the largest network of private, ethnic day schools in Montreal. These schools have been attended by significant numbers of Jewish children since the 1970s (Kage, 1975). At present there are over 20 such schools, which differ from each other in terms of language, religious orientation, ideology, and clientele. These differences have perpetuated the administrative independence of the schools while government subsidies have allowed for a high degree of financial autonomy.

However, the Jewish community, too, has begun to centralize control over its independent community day schools, largely as a response to government and ministerial dictates and actions. The high priority placed by the state on education has upped the stakes in dealings with the government and has led to a recognition that the independent schools need to speak with a single, clear voice in representations to the government and the Ministry of Education. This has led the Jewish community to establish the Association of Jewish Day Schools to mediate on behalf of the schools in dealings with the government, and the Jewish Education Council to coordinate and oversee the actions of the independent day schools. Both of these agencies were set up by Allied Jewish Community Services (renamed Federation CJA in 1993), the 'umbrella' social service federation and chief fundraising agency in the

the state has viewed education as the primary instrument for the transformation of Quebec society and to this purpose has profoundly altered the structure and workings of Quebec's education system. Beginning with "la grande charte de l'éducation" (Audet, 1971b) in 1961 up to Bill 107 (passed in 1988 to reorganize public schools along linguistic rather than religious lines), the state has passed legislation, set policies, and enacted regulations which have had a direct impact on the form, content, and organization of public and private education in Quebec. At the same time, the Ministry of Education has broadened the scope of its authority and the degree of its control over education. The resulting changes in the education system have reflected and even anticipated the shifting course of state linguistic, cultural, and economic policies. For this reason, the impact of state policy has often had its first and most dramatic effects vis-a-vis ethnocultural minorities in the education sector.

While all of Quebec's ethnic communities are affected by state policy on education, the case of the Montreal Jewish community has been somewhat unique. In education, as in many other areas of community life, Montreal's Jews have supported a high level of institutional completeness and organizational autonomy. The Jewish community currently

Montreal Jewish community. This centralization of representation and of decision-making has been designed to improve the ability of the community to deal directly and effectively with the Ministry of Education and to ensure that its views are known to the government.

As this thesis will show, however, the centralization of control over the independent day schools by both the Ministry of Education and the Jewish community has also led to a loss of autonomy on the part of the schools, growing financial dependence upon Allied Jewish Community Services, and a loss of 'grass-roots' support on the part of parents. The loss of autonomy by the schools is felt most keenly in three areas: the restrictions concerning 'eligible' students introduced by Bill 101 and its successors; the high degree of control exercised by the Ministry of Education, especially in terms of curriculum content and hours of instruction in English and French; and restrictions on hiring, firing, and the working conditions of teachers resulting from both government legislation and union contracts. Dependence upon Allied Jewish Community Services to supplement declining government subsidies to the Jewish schools has proven to be a major financial burden to the Jewish community, leading the federation to seek ways to "rationalize" the Jewish school system through

closings, mergers and other moves which directly threaten the independence of the schools' boards (Kantrowitz, 1977; Weinfeld, 1984; Jewish Education Council, 1987). The loss of support by parents has been a consequence of increasing costs which have made public schools seem more attractive to some and elite private schools less prohibitive to others; a decline in Jewish 'content' in many schools resulting from ministerial control over the curriculum; and an inability on the part of the schools - squeezed by financial, union and ministerial constraints - to provide individualized education to students or to be fully responsive to parents' wishes (Zelkowitz, 1989).

The overall result has been what can aptly be described as a "systemic crisis" in Jewish education (Weinfeld, 1985). Parents have come to feel that they are getting less from the Jewish schools both in Jewish content and in the quality of education while they are paying more. The recent closing of two schools brought about by the financial crunch and increased competition among schools means that many parents feel they no longer have the freedom to choose the kind of Jewish education they prefer for their children. Above all, parents are concerned that they personally have little influence on the decisions the schools make about curriculum, teachers, or students

(Zelkowitz, 1989). Parents have begun to pull their children out of the Jewish schools and more schools are in danger of having to close.

Ironically, there are signs that a new "social contract" may be emerging in Quebec in the relations between the state and the ethnic groups as the effective integration of immigrants and other ethnic group members into Quebec society becomes a higher priority (Rosenberg and Jedwab, 1992). Much of the hopes for the preservation and expansion of the use of French in Quebec despite low birthrates has been focused on integrating new immigrants into the French milieu and educating their children in the French language. However, this focus on immigration has raised many problems of integration. Recognizing that current methods of integration, especially the use of special "welcoming" schools for immigrant children, are not working well, the government is looking to the ethnic communities to ease and facilitate the integration of immigrants (Québec, Ministère des Communautés culturelles et de l'Immigration, 1990). There are some indications that the provincial government will be handing over more resources and controls to the ethnic communities to allow them to undertake the task of integration. Whether and how such an arrangement would work must wait, of course, for

Quebec to decide its future within Canada and for a new definition to be given to the Quebec state.

As the example of Jewish education shows, the relationship between state policies and community control has been fairly complex and continues to evolve. Jewish schools have both benefited and lost in important ways from the expansion of state control over education. The real issue, however, is not the costs and benefits to the Jewish community of state control over education but the patterns of social relations which have developed both within the community and between the community and the state.

Outline of the Thesis

This thesis begins by examining theoretical accounts of both ethnicity and of the state in an attempt to generate a model of the relations between the two.

Chapter Two examines the structural theories of Fredrik Barth and Raymond Breton in order to generate an account of the ethnic community as a corporate group. Both federal and Quebec provincial policy treats ethnic groups in Canada as corporate groups, that is, as organized, civil communities with identifiable core institutions (Breton, 1978b). The special constitutional and legislative rights assigned to the two charter groups and to the Native

peoples, of course, makes their corporate status in Canada particularly evident. State policy treats ethnic groups in general as corporate groups, however, and Chapter Two seeks to account both for the historical development of this status and to consider its theoretical implications for understanding ethnicity in Canada.

Chapter Three undertakes another, related task, which is to provide some elements of a sociological theory of ethnic community organization and action. A dialectical model of relations between an ethnic community and the state implies the capacity of an ethnic group to mobilize and organize its members to act in terms of their interests. Making use of Anthony Giddens' (1984) theory of structuration and Pierre Bourdieu's (1990) concept of strategies, Chapter Three attempts to generate a model of ethnic community action and organizational style.

Chapter Four then considers the role of the state itself and the relations between the state and civil society. Three issues are examined. The first of these issues is to examine how and where the state fits into the rest of society, i.e., to identify the boundaries between the state and civil society. The second issue is to examine the nature and patterns of state action. Who makes decisions? How are they carried out, and by whom? The third

issue is to provide a preliminary account of how the configuration of the state and the actions it undertakes give a shape to the organization of an ethnic community and the actions it undertakes. Using Skocpol's (1985) "configurational" approach, the contemporary state is shown to be both fragmented (Held, 1989) and structurally ambiguous. This approach, it is argued, allows us to treat the state and the ethnic community as "interorganizational phenomena" (Breton, 1989).

The thesis then turns to the issue of education with an examination, first -- in Chapters Five and Six -- of the evolution of state policies with regard to education in Quebec in general, and then -- in Chapters Seven and Eight -- of the evolution of the private Jewish day schools in the context both of Jewish community concerns and of state policies.

Chapter Five, examines the evolution of Quebec's education system in the period before 1960 when Quebec's provincial government had neither a Ministry of Education nor a consistent set of policies related to education. During this period, the state was largely inactive in the areas of education, health and welfare, and left control of education in the hands of local school boards and the Catholic Church.

A second period, discussed in Chapter Six, begins with

Quebec's Quiet Revolution and the emergence of an activist state. Active intervention by the state in the education sector led first to a massive reform of both the public and private education systems designed to modernize and democratize education, and then to a policy of the centralization and bureaucratization of the education sector. The legislation and regulations adopted by successive provincial governments during this period have reflected the commitment of the state to the use of the education system in the transformation of Quebec society.

Chapter Seven examines the evolution of the Jewish education system up to 1960. This chapter makes two crucial points. The first is that the Jewish day school system did not emerge as a result of community preference - many in the community opposed such a system - but because Jewish schoolchildren could not be easily fit into a public school system which only acknowledged the rights of Catholics and Protestants to an education. Second, the chapter also uncovers a history of repeated state intervention in disputes over the educational rights, status, and arrangements of the Jewish community. This intervention contradicts the traditional image of the provincial government before 1960 as passive and uninvolved in educational matters.

Chapter Eight identifies the set of organizational structures, practices and strategies which have evolved within the Jewish school system over the past twenty-five years in response to the evolution of the Quebec state's educational policies. Again, two crucial points are made. One is that both the opportunities and the constraints generated by state policy have led the Jewish community to centralize and bureaucratize its education system in a manner equivalent to the state itself. The second is that, again as in the case of the state, the resulting organization of the community's education system is characterized by structural ambiguity. Paradoxically, while the bureaucratization and centralization of the education system have given the Jewish community more contact with and influence upon the Ministry of Education, they have also weakened the Jewish education system in fundamental ways.

One of the unintended consequences both of state policy and of changes in Quebec society has been the emergence of a systemic crisis in the Jewish community's education system, beginning in the late 1980s and continuing today. Chapter Nine will identify the sources of this crisis and examine how the structural ambiguity characterizing key educational agencies prevents the

community from resolving the crisis. The result is that today the Jewish community is again looking to state action to solve some of its fundamental problems.

The concluding chapter attempts to tie together the various issues which have been discussed in the thesis. The chapter summarizes how the dialectical relations between the state and the Jewish community have had consequences for both and how state policy is changing as it takes into account the realities of ethnic organization and group relations in contemporary Quebec society. The conclusion also returns to the theoretical issues raised in Chapters Two, Three, and Four and considers the theoretical implications of the data for a dialectical model of ethnic group organization and action.

Methodology

In recommending a method to be used for the analysis of the interactions between state and society, Evans, Rueschmeyer, and Skocpol (1985b: 353) argue for "finely-tuned analyses [to] probe actual state organizations in relation to one another, in relation to past policy initiatives, and in relation to the domestic and transnational contexts of state activity." These analyses should be (Evans, Rueschmeyer, and Skocpol, 1985b: 355),

"dialectical analyses that allow for non-zero-sum processes and complex interactions between state and society."

Given the research interest of this thesis, the focus is on Montreal's Jewish educational organizations rather than on state organizations or the transnational contexts of state activity. Nevertheless, the goal is still to articulate a dialectical analysis that allows for "non-zero-sum processes and complex interactions between state and society." Such analysis would then allow for theoretical generalizations concerning the nature of the relations between the state and ethnic communities in Canada.

Much of the data which must be utilized in such an analysis are historical data which illustrates the interplay between state and society over time. Yet if the data are historical, the analysis is not. Given our assumption that the relations between the state and the ethnic community be approached as "interorganizational phenomena" (Breton, 1989), our analysis focuses on organizations and agencies within the Jewish community rather than individual interactions or strictly "structural" phenomena such as class relations. Use is made of the theories of Giddens and Bourdieu in order to generate a conceptual model of the ethnic community, and of

Skocpol and Held in order to generate a conceptual model of the state, precisely because each attempts to overcome the duality of social structure and individual action.

In addition, each of these authors acknowledges the central role of unanticipated consequences in social change. The theoretical model developed in Chapter Four argues that the dialectical relations between state and society do not reflect some thought out plan, set of societal needs, or the inexorable working out of some inherent structural principles. Instead, ambiguity in state structures and policies generates structures of opportunity and structures of constraint (Breton, 1985: 45) for ethnic community organizations. The strategies and practices whereby these organizations attempt to take advantage of these opportunities or to evade or adapt to these constraints in turn act back upon the state which modifies its own structures and policies as a result.

The historical data are analysed, then, in line with this dynamic, dialectical model of the Quebec state's relations with the Jewish community's day school system, with particular attention paid to the unintended consequences for both the state and the community of the policy and actions of the other.

i. Data Collection

As for the data themselves, the primary difficulty in conducting this research was in uncovering information on the Jewish education system, its constituent organizations, and its dealings with the government. Unfortunately, little previous research has been done. Research reports exist, as do some scholarly studies, but the only sociological analysis of the relations between the Jewish schools and the provincial government is Kantrowitz's (1977) report on the implications of government funding policy for the Jewish schools. While a very valuable source of information, this was a research report prepared for the Jewish community which dealt with a very specific set of issues relevant at a specific point in time. Moreover while there is a great deal of material available in the form of documents and archival material, it is difficult to access, because it has never been collected or catalogued in any systematic way.

Given the lack of previous research and of secondary analyses, three distinct methods were used to gather data for this thesis. One was participant observation, the second consisted of a set of unstructured interviews conducted with members of the Jewish community, and the third was the analysis of existing documents and archival

material.

Participant observation was an especially rich source of data. It was my good fortune to be elected to the Board of Directors of United Talmud Torahs shortly after I began to do the research for this thesis. I then became a board representative on the Elementary Education Committee of United Talmud Torahs, serving for a time as the chairperson of the committee. During my time on the board, the United Talmud Torahs system was undergoing significant change and was in a state of crisis, both financially and in terms of its relations to the rest of the Jewish community. This provided me with a first-hand experience of many of the events described in this thesis as well as first-hand access to the strategies, practices, and ideologies characteristic of parents, teachers, administrators, and the other board members. Indeed, as chairperson of the Elementary Education Committee, I was also in contact with my counterparts in several other Jewish schools, as well as with some of the staff of the Jewish Education Council. My position on the board of United Talmud Torahs thus also gave me access to others concerned with Jewish education in other school systems.

That I was elected to the board of United Talmud Torahs was a consequence of earlier involvement in a number of other Jewish organizations, especially the Jewish Public

Library. I served as a member of the Board of Directors of the Jewish Public Library for fifteen years, during which time I assumed the Chair of several committees, served as an Officer, and was elected several times as Vice-President. During my time on the board of the Jewish Public Library, several individuals active on Jewish school boards or working as school administrators served with me on the board and conversations among the Officers often included informal discussions on issues and concerns related to the Jewish education system.

For several years I also served as one of the Jewish Public Library's representatives to the Board of Trustees of Allied Jewish Community Services, which familiarized me with many community issues and provided a first-hand look at the decision-making processes characteristic of Allied Jewish Community Services and its related agencies.

I also spent several years as a member of the editorial board of Viewpoints, a Jewish community magazine dealing with issues of concern to the community, including education.

In addition to my own participation in Jewish organizations, I had numerous ties of friendship and acquaintance with many individuals active in a number of Jewish organizations at a variety of levels. Many of these

acquaintances knew of my research interests and kept me informed of issues or events relevant to this research. I had, then, many informal conversations with others regarding the issues discussed in this thesis, and was able to approach such individuals for specific information when needed.

In addition to participant observation, fifteen unstructured interviews were conducted with individuals active in Jewish organizations: the educational director of United Talmud Torahs; current and former staff of the Jewish Education Council, the Association of Jewish Day Schools, Allied Jewish Community Services, and Canadian Jewish Congress; as well as a number of community leaders in the area of Jewish education and community-government relations. Interviewees were chosen because they held senior positions in organizations discussed in this thesis or because they had been identified by others as particularly knowledgeable about some aspect of the Jewish education system.

These interviews were used to identify (1) problems and conflicts within the Jewish education system, (2) the Jewish community's educational goals and priorities; (3) the community's perception of state education policy; and (4) the practices and strategies developed community

organizations to relate community goals and priorities to perceived state policies.

These interviews were a crucial source of data because they allowed for follow up on information obtained through participant observation. In addition, conducting a formal interview encouraged the interviewees to reflect on issues and try to get their point of view across in a more systematic way than is typical of casual conversations. All the interviews were taped and the interviewees agreed to have their comments used in this thesis. Some of the most important comments were made spontaneously once the tape recorder was turned off, however, when the interviewees could be sure that they would not be identified as the source of the information.

The third source of data was archival research and the analysis of documents. As noted earlier, little previous research has been done on the specific issues which are addressed in this thesis, i.e., the organizational structures, practices and strategies which have evolved within the Jewish community as it adapts to, attempts to alter, or tries to evade state policy on education. While studies of the Jewish day school system and of various facets of the Jewish community's relations with the provincial government have been done (see Rome, Nefsky and

Obermeir, [1981] for an annotated bibliography), they tend to be historical studies which provide little sociological analysis and no information on the contemporary dynamics of community-state relations. Nevertheless, what studies do exist provided much useful information on the history and evolution of the Jewish community's day school system. Primary source material dealing with the relevant issues were obtained in the form of organizational bulletins, newsletters, annual reports, and other reports and studies, minutes of committee meetings and other organizational and archival material. Such material from a number of Jewish organizations were examined, in particular, material from Allied Jewish Community Services, the Jewish Education Council, the Association of Jewish Day Schools and United Talmud Torahs.

Another important source of archival material, documents, and community briefs submitted to the government is Canadian Jewish Congress, which has also produced a number of publications and historical studies under the direction of David Rome and the National Archives of Canadian Jewish Congress.

Particularly important to this thesis was the material obtained concerning United Talmud Torahs. For a variety of reasons, United Talmud Torahs, the largest of the day

school systems, has been at the center of the current school crisis. It has had to close two of its schools in the past few years, was placed for a time under a form of trusteeship by Allied Jewish Community Services, which set up a Joint Management Committee to manage United Talmud Torahs, as well as a Strategic Planning Committee for United Talmud Torahs under the auspices of the Association of Jewish Day Schools and the Jewish Education Council. The minutes of the Board of Directors of United Talmud Torahs were examined, as well as the correspondence between United Talmud Torahs and Allied Jewish Community Services, the Association of Jewish Day Schools, the Joint Management Committee, and the Strategic Planning Committee. The minutes of the United Talmud Torahs Education Committee, which monitors the schools' curricula and considers the impact of the Ministry of Education's policies on the curriculum, were also examined.

Still another major source of information relevant to the thesis was found in government documents and other materials such as: Bills 63, 22, 101, and 107; and various reports, studies, and policy statements on education or on government policy in general. These documents provided information on the evolution of state policy on education in Quebec and the interrelationship between schools and the

state in Quebec.

Finally, additional information was obtained from newspapers, especially The Canadian Jewish News and The Montreal Gazette.

ii. Triangulation

The use of multiple methods, or "triangulation," is recommended by Denzin (1970: 26) because, "no single method will ever permit an investigator to develop causal propositions free of rival interpretations." Triangulation is particularly important in research such as this because so much of the data collected consist of opinions, reminiscences, ideologies, reports intended for specific clients, statements intended for public consumption, position papers setting the stage for negotiations - in other words, discourse. Such discourse on the state and on the Jewish education system is a crucial component in their relations, but it is essential to have multiple sources of information in order to relate discourse to actual events and the practices and strategies acted on by community members and agencies.

In addition, because so much of the data is reminiscence, different sources often disagree on such matters of fact as when a particular day school system began to operate. Only the careful examination of documents

combined with interviews and conversations with knowledgeable informants allowed such details to be verified. For example, the documents related to one Jewish school indicated two different dates, separated by several years, for the opening of its day school division. Examination of these documents showed that the earlier date indicated when a day-time kindergarten class was initiated, while the later date was for a grade one class. Since kindergarten was not considered a part of the official elementary school program at that time, the later date was the correct one for the inauguration of the day school division. The school itself, however, consistently used the earlier date in its public documents to emphasize that it was one of the oldest Jewish day schools in Montreal.

Given the vast amount of material available if one digs deeply enough, it is surprising that so little use has been made of it by social scientists. Indeed, the history of Montreal's Jewish community remains largely unknown to the majority of its members because so little has been published on that history. It is hoped that this situation will be rectified in the future.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORIES OF ETHNICITY AND OF THE ETHNIC COMMUNITY

This chapter will examine some theories of ethnicity and of the ethnic community which can help us to understand how and why ethnic groups in Canada have tended to establish communities whose collective organization and structure takes a 'corporate' form. It will be argued here that the corporate character of ethnicity in Canada is largely a consequence of two factors: the special role ethnicity has played in Canadian society and the policies of the state, such as official bilingualism and multiculturalism, which promote and sustain ethnic group identity and corporate structure.

By a corporate form, I refer to the establishment of an organized, civil (Alexander, 1980) community with identifiable core institutions, such as synagogues, mosques, or other ethnic churches; schools; recreational clubs; or political lobby groups. Within these institutions ethnic identity takes on special significance and, in general, such institutions are directed towards collective, ethnic interests. In this sense, even the family can serve as a core institution in an ethnic community, as can festivals or the ethnic media. In a more general sense,

Breton (1978b: 62) states that "corporateness pertains to the capacity of a collectivity to maintain its social and institutional boundaries, and to define the rules and conditions of membership."

The corporate character of ethnicity in Canada is particularly apparent when we look at the two charter groups, the British and the French, which have given themselves special rights and privileges, such as special constitutional rights in the areas of language and education. Since 1960, francophone Quebecois have gone further, defining the public institutions of Quebec as their institutions and using both legislation and public opinion to define the provincial state as the protector and guarantor of francophone society and culture. In such cases, where nationalist movements ensure that state agencies come to be identified with a particular ethnic group, the ethnic community attains what Breton (1978b: 62) calls dominant corporateness, "a characteristic that tends to prevent the partialization of the ethnicity of the group."

Canada's Native peoples, too, have a special status in the constitution, and maintain geographically bounded, corporate communities on the reserves. Until recently, however, Native groups were under the paternalistic control

of state agencies, isolated from the rest of Canadian society, and unable to make crucial decisions for themselves (Frideres, 1988; Valentine and Taylor, 1980). To some degree this has now changed and Native groups have been able to take more control of their own communities and institutions. Again, as with the Quebecois, the corporate status of Canada's Native groups is not diminishing but increasing, as Natives have demanded, and to some extent obtained, self-government and recognition of aboriginal rights (Hawkes, 1992; Wotherspoon and Satzewich, 1993).

Finally, the corporate character of Canadian ethnicity is visible as well among many other ethnic groups. These groups, however, differ in the degree to which their community takes such a form. Some groups, such as the Italians, have a less developed network of community-wide institutions, while others, such as the Mennonites and Doukhobors, have highly developed and well bounded community structures. Despite these differences, it has been argued that, in general, many of Canada's ethnic groups have been evolving more elaborate and more centralized community institutions as a consequence of federal and provincial multicultural policies (Stasiulis, 1980; Li, 1988). Again, we see the corporate character of ethnic groups being enhanced.

Perhaps because of the 'dominant corporateness' they have attained, many Quebecois seem to define their society as one composed of corporate ethnic groups rather than, say, socioeconomic classes or traditional political interest groups. Thus, some Quebecois debate the role of ethnic minorities in the upcoming sovereignty referendum, but not the role of the working class; they argue about whether Quebec's language policy violates "human rights," but not whether the Parti Quebecois government is a "liberal" or "conservative" government. In any case, both federal and provincial multicultural policy recognizes ethnic communities as corporate groups.

It is the corporate form taken by ethnic groups in Canada which this chapter seeks to address. As such it asks the following questions: What is meant by ethnicity and what role does ethnicity play in Canadian society? What is an ethnic community and under what circumstances do people get together to form such a community? Why have such communities in Canada tended to take a corporate form?

The Concept Of Ethnicity

In its broadest sense, the sociological concept of ethnicity refers to sets of social relationships - particularly class, status, or power relationships - which

people define as based on inherited biological differences. As Max Weber (1978b) described it, ethnicity refers to the sets of social and cultural distinctions – such as religious, linguistic or national distinctions – whereby groups differentiate themselves from one another on the basis of presumed biological ties. Members of such groups, suggested Weber, have a sense of themselves as a common “people” separate from and distinct from others. On this basis they may insist upon practicing endogamy and upon closing or restricting membership in the group.

This biologically legitimated claim to form a “people” is crucial. While sociologists and anthropologists often consider cultural distinctions to be as intimately tied into ethnicity as is biology, cultural distinctiveness is not enough to characterize an ethnic group; if it were then ‘intellectuals,’ for example, would (as Greeley [1975] in fact suggests) constitute an ethnic group. Nor are politico-legal entitlements which are often tied into ethnicity sufficient; if they were then slaves in ancient Rome, for example, would have formed an ethnic group. This is not to say that neither intellectuals nor slaves have ever come to form an ethnic group; but only after redefining common biological origin as the basis of their solidarity (Turner, 1974; Weber, 1978b). This last point

illustrates another crucial sociological feature of ethnicity emphasized by Max Weber: common biological origin need not be real, as long as it is believed to be real (Smith, 1988).

An ethnic community can be conceived as a set of social relationships organized around a constellation of group interests, given form by a particular organizational style, and constituted out of a particular set of institutional and individual practices. It is not inevitable, however, that some group of people will form such a community. A key issue in understanding ethnicity, then, is in understanding how and why group boundaries are formed and "a public life beyond the private lives of ...individuals, families, and small groups" (Breton, 1991: 1) is constituted. Put differently, the question is how and why ethnic identity is created and transformed into collective structures and practices.

Barth's Theory of Ethnic Social Organization

Perhaps the most influential approach to understanding ethnic community formation today is that of Fredrick Barth (1969b). Barth begins from the simple and obvious – but often overlooked – point that the existence of an ethnic group implies as well the existence of group differences. An ethnic community cannot be examined in isolation because

ethnic groups are always organized around patterns of interaction. As Barth (1969b: 13-14) puts it, "to the extent that actors use ethnic identities to categorize themselves and others for purposes of interaction, they form ethnic groups in [an] organizational sense." Ethnic groups are thus seen to be "forms of social organization" (Barth, 1969b: 13) and the issue of how and why ethnic groups are formed becomes an issue of how and why group "boundaries" are created and maintained; how groups take on a corporate form in the sense of the term used above.

By an ethnic group boundary, Barth (1969b: 16) refers to a "structuring of interaction" in three senses. First, it "entails criteria for determining membership and ways of signalling membership and exclusion" (Barth, 1969b: 15). This does not refer to steadfast "rules" for identifying who is or is not a member of the group but the "continual expression and validation" (Barth, 1969b: 15) of membership through strategies of interaction.

Second, patterns of interaction are different when dealing with fellow group members than when dealing with non-members. Membership "implies a sharing of criteria for evaluation and judgement ... [and] the assumption that the two are fundamentally 'playing the same game'." In contrast, identifying others as non-members, "implies a

recognition of limitations on shared understandings, differences in criteria for judgement of value and performance, and a restriction of interaction to sectors of assumed common understanding and mutual interest" (Barth, 1969b: 15).

Finally, "stable inter-ethnic relations presuppose ...a set of prescriptions governing situations of contact ...allowing for articulation in some domains of activity, and a set of proscriptions ...preventing inter-ethnic interaction in other sectors" (Barth, 1969b: 16).

Barth's approach does not presuppose any consistent set of functions to ethnic interaction, nor does he identify a restricted set of types of ethnic communities. Instead, his approach allows for both structural and interactional variation based on such factors as ecological and demographic context as well as cultural "value standards" (Barth, 1969b: 17).

There are many merits to Barth's approach, but two stand out in terms of the goals of this chapter. Barth's analysis of ethnic groups stresses social organization and directs our attention to understanding how and why different ethnic groups evolve different forms of social organization. Second, Barth sees ethnic groups as formed and persisting through structured patterns of interaction

which constitute ethnic group boundaries. If we wish to understand ethnic community action, then, we should examine how forms of social organization generate and perpetuate patterns of interaction both within the group and in dealings with others.

What remains underdeveloped in Barth's analysis, however, is precisely the issue which has most intrigued Canadian sociologists: the link between ethnicity and inequality. Barth does consider this issue, but tends to see ethnicity and stratification as following out what he describes as two different "logics." The "logic" of ethnicity is ascriptive, whereas the "logic" of stratification assumes "performance" (Barth, 1969b: 28):

a basic premise of ethnic group organization is that every A can act roles, 1, 2 and 3. If actors agree on this, the premise is self-fulfilling, unless acting in these roles requires assets that are distributed in a discrepant pattern. If these assets are obtained or lost in ways independent of being an A, and sought and avoided without reference to one's identity as an A, the premise will be falsified: some A's become unable to act in the expected roles. Most systems of stratification are maintained by the solution that in such cases, the person is no longer an A.

This argument does not account for the interrelationship between ethnicity and inequality found in

a society such as Canada. Indeed, it seems to go against Barth's own admonition that ethnic group interactions reflect the existence of structural differences. Barth seems to mean only cultural differences in interaction which perpetuate group boundaries. Economic or political differences seem to fall into the category of 'performative' sectors of inter-ethnic interaction.

In the case of Canada, however, and perhaps in most cases, relations among ethnic groups occur within a context of inequality; it is this context which gives ethnic group relations their significance. British and French, Charter groups and immigrants, Native peoples and whites, European ethnics and visible minorities; these differences form the context within which we understand ethnic group relations and much of their significance to group members.

Take, for example, Barth's point regarding the strategies whereby group membership is continually expressed and validated in interaction. The use of one's language is an important way of sharing with others the validation of one's own group membership. But not everyone is free to speak their own language in every context. Roseborough and Breton (1968: 622-624) remarked that "it is well known that in Canada the English and the French are more likely to speak to each other in English when they

have contact with each other." This use of the English language both implies and sustains the domination of the English charter group. In Barth's (1969a) own book, a chapter by Eidheim (1969) gives the same sort of example when he notes that Lapps will always defer to the presence of Finns by speaking Finnish rather than Lapp. Indeed, the symbolic markers of Lapp identity in the context of Finnish domination have become forms of stigma. The logic of ethnicity and the logic of stratification need not be mutually exclusive.

John Porter On The Vertical Mosaic

The connection between ethnicity and inequality in Canada had its classic formulation in the work of John Porter. Porter's (1965) depiction of Canadian society as a "vertical mosaic" stimulated research into the link between ethnicity and inequality. Porter argued that to a large extent an individual's ethnicity defined their 'place' within Canada's stratification system. As a result there was little social mobility among immigrants or their children and most individuals in Canada tended to retain their ethnic entrance status, that is, their status upon first arriving in Canada. Porter's data showed that the British- and French-origin groups dominated Canadian

society economically, politically, and in terms of status. Other groups fell into place in what was, in effect, a stratification system divided along ethnic lines.

Porter's work was not a theory of ethnicity, but it illustrated the ambiguous role ethnicity has historically played in Canadian society. On the one hand ethnic groups were encouraged to retain their distinctive identity and culture; on the other hand they found that doing so locked them into accepting limited economic opportunities, retaining their entrance status, and having little more than token participation in political life.

To Porter, ethnic stratification posed a threat to the survival of Canadian society, particularly in the relations between the British and the French. In Quebec, ethnic stratification meant francophone workers supervised by anglophone management, a pattern unacceptable to more and more educated francophones seeking to take their 'rightful' place in the stratification system. Unless room was made for francophones within the ranks of management, Porter (1975) foresaw increasing dissatisfaction, support for nationalism, and pressures to separate Quebec from Canada.

Porter believed that promoting bilingualism could serve as a possible solution to the tensions between English and French because bilingualism would make being 'anglophone' or 'francophone' in large measure irrelevant.

In general, Porter's preference was to eliminate distinctions of all kinds among Canadians. For this reason he disapproved of the federal government's policy of multiculturalism, although he acknowledged reasons for support of multiculturalism among minority ethnic groups (Porter, 1975: 295):

Ethnic stratification has been a feature of both the United States and Canada. Consequently there has been a shift to achieving equality through a system of organized minorities demanding rights and making claims qua minorities. ...It is ...understandable that ...minorities have had to organize to obtain some measure of distributive justice when deprivation remains concentrated within particular groups.

Nevertheless, Porter considered multiculturalism to be "regressive" because it increased rather than decreased distinctions among Canadians. Porter believed this would perpetuate the ethnic stratification system, diminish the likelihood of widespread bilingualism, and "runs the risk of believed-in biological differences becoming the basis of invidious judgments about groups of people" (Porter, 1975: 288). While acknowledging that the alternative is assimilation or anglo-conformity, Porter (1975: 294) argued that at least anglo-conformity is conformity "to the values of societies leading in the modernization process." In any

case, having an effective legislative and regulative system based on individual rights would eliminate ethnic stratification without running the risks which he believed accompany the acceptance and legitimation of group rights and distinctions.

Porter saw multiculturalism in Canada as equivalent to the 'revival' of ethnicity occurring in the United States as well as in many other parts of the world. To Porter, this revival of ethnicity was tied to the decline of broad support for liberal values and its emphasis on the rights of the individual. Thus, Porter was biased against the preservation of ethnic diversity and despite his deep insight into Canadian society he did not try to fully identify the structural roots of diversity within Canadian society.

Does Porter's thesis of the vertical mosaic still reflect the reality of inequality in Canada? This is a hotly debated question (Darroch, 1979; Lautard and Guppy, 1990; Isajiw, Sev'er, and Driedger, 1993). What is beyond debate, however, is that, whatever else they may be, ethnic communities are always elements in some system of stratification. These communities are embedded in a social context in which significant social forces such as class relations or political interests cut across the

commonalties (Rex, 1986). In a society such as Canada, an ethnic community is usually a 'partial' community, one whose members also have diverse interests, participate in other, often competing institutions, and take on multiple and distinct identities (Breton, 1978). Most people's participation in their ethnic community is a sometime participation, just as the salience of their ethnic identity ebbs and flows with the circumstances in which they find themselves. These circumstances are often situations of group conflict because ethnic communities are among the more important means by which group conflict is expressed; they provide the resources used to compete for political, economic, and cultural advantages.

Raymond Breton On Ethnic Community Structure

Like Porter, Raymond Breton, too, has been concerned with the issue of inequality. Unlike Porter, however, Breton's work has been focused primarily upon ethnic groups and he has engaged in empirical research on forms and aspects of ethnicity in Canada while at the same time contributing to the development of a theoretical understanding of ethnicity in Canadian society. Combining his interest in inequality with Barth's emphasis upon the organizational characteristics of ethnic groups, Breton's

work, has tended to focus on the impact of structural differences among ethnic groups upon political inequality and the competition for control of state institutions (Breton, 1978a, 1978b; 1983, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991). In this respect, Breton emphasizes the corporate form taken by ethnic communities in Canada and focuses on the consequences of structural variation in corporate form for intergroup relations.

Barth's discussion implied that the organizational form taken by ethnic groups is primarily an outcome of the pattern of interaction among these groups. To a significant extent, this may be the case, but groups which interact may each already have very different and distinct organizational forms. Indeed, to some extent the patterns of interaction will themselves reflect structural differences among ethnic groups, differences which may precede the interaction, as in the case of a colonial power with superior military technology imposing a pattern of relations upon an indigenous people (Lieberson, 1985).

Barth's approach, then, raises a host of issues relevant to understanding the structural bases and structural forms of ethnic communities. It is to these kinds of issues that Raymond Breton has devoted much of his research. Breton has broadened and deepened Barth's

approach by looking at ethnic communities as complex networks of intergroup relations which can take different forms and variations. As Breton (1978a: 148) puts it:

An important reason for paying attention to variations in types of ethnic communities and to the resulting variations in intergroup relations is that these variations have consequences for two related classes of phenomena: the production and distribution of societal values, both material and symbolic, and the degree and character of societal integration. In other words, variations in types of intergroup relationships have relevance for the degree and patterns of inequality among communities as well as for the extent and mode of incorporation of the communities (or community) in the society and its institutions.

In his article on institutional completeness, Breton (1964) looked to the relationship between the structural features of ethnic communities and the integration of immigrants into Canadian society. In this article Breton suggested that the high level of institutional development within ethnic communities helped explain the lack of integration among ethnic groups in Canada. In effect, the level of community organization within a particular ethnic community provides an index through which to gauge the level of group identity. Institutional completeness is a measure of the degree to which a community offers a range of services to its members. Full institutional completeness

implies that "members would never have to make use of native institutions for the satisfaction of any of their needs" (Breton, 1964: 194). By focusing on the level and type of social organization found among ethnic groups, Breton initiated an examination of ethnic groups in Canada as organized communities. The broad acceptance of his concept of institutional completeness by Canadian social scientists indicates that this notion of Breton's provided an important conceptual tool for those who wish to examine the corporate character of ethnicity in Canada (Herberg, 1989).

In his later work Breton has broadened and deepened this initial interest in institutional completeness. Rather than retain his original measure of institutional completeness, Breton has examined the structural variations "in types of ethnic communities and ...the resulting variations in intergroup relations." Similarly, his original interest in integration has been replaced by a multidimensional approach to "the extent and mode of incorporation" of ethnic communities" (Breton, 1978a: 148).

For example, Breton (1978b) differentiates ethnic segmentation from ethnic heterogeneity. "Societies are segmented," Breton (1978b: 57) states, "insofar as they exhibit, to a greater or lesser degree, 1) an enclosure of

social networks along ethnic lines; and 2) [quoting van den Berghe, 1969: 67] 'a social structure compartmentalized into analogous, parallel, non-complementary but distinguishable sets of institutions.'" In contrast, heterogeneity refers to ethnic differentiation which (Breton, 1978b: 58) "tends to occur within the social and institutional systems common to the society." Traditional heterogeneity was based on involuntary and holistic patterns of social affiliations. Modern patterns of social affiliations (Breton, 1978b: 59), "follow a pattern of intersecting circles, with the individual at the point of intersection."

There are also ethnically homogenous societies (Breton, 1978b: 60), "in which virtually everyone shares the sense of a common origin, the sense of belonging to the same 'people.' In such a society ethnicity takes the form of nationalism." Breton (1978b: 60) differentiates territorial nationalism from ethnic nationalism, but argues that in a homogenous society the two are fused, making ethnic identity "total," "in the sense that it is supported by all the cultural and organizational components of a society."

In a heterogeneous society (Breton, 1978b: 60) "ethnicity tends to become fragmented or partialized rather

than being total." This is possible because, "roles are performed in separate organizational contexts" (Breton, 1978b: 61). Because of the partial nature of ethnicity in modern societies, the possibility of "de-ethnicization" exists. The (Breton, 1978b: 62) "cultural, social, and institutional elements of ethnicity (may) become dissociated from each other ... and some of the elements (may) lose their importance and even disappear." The ability of a dominant group to take control of the state as a corporate ethnic group "tends to prevent the partialization of (their) ethnicity" (Breton, 1978b: 62).

Finally, "under conditions of segmentation, ethnicity is more likely to be consistently either an asset or a liability; in situations of heterogeneity, it will vary much more with the position one occupies in the social structure, with the role relationship involved, with the organizational context, and so on" (Breton, 1978b: 64).

This is only a small portion of Breton's analysis of ethnic groups as structural phenomena with particular corporate forms tied into distinctive patterns of intergroup relations. The relevant point here is that the broad range of structural possibilities as well as the variations in who is interacting and why makes ethnicity into a polymorphous phenomenon which can take on an

extraordinary variety of forms and serve as the basis for a wide variety of social relationships.

The Concept of Emergent Ethnicity

By treating ethnic groups as forms of social organization which emerge out of the interactions among groups, Barth de-emphasized the "cultural stuff" out of which ethnicity is usually supposed to be constructed. While sociologists often take ethnicity to be primarily about shared cultural traits and valued traditions, the boundaries which differentiate an ethnic group and those which define culturally distinct groups rarely overlap. Take Jews as an example. Jews are defined and treated as an ethnic group in Canada. Yet within Canada's Jewish community we find many distinct and sharply differentiated cultural groups. There are francophone Sephardic Jews, often from Morocco, who share many cultural traits with Arabs rather than with other Jews. There are ultra-orthodox Hasidim who continue to speak Yiddish as a first language and live a lifestyle largely derived from eighteenth century Eastern Europe. There are Israelis whose culture centers about the use of Hebrew and contemporary, secular Israeli culture, with little connection to the local, organized Jewish community. There are Russian immigrants

whose cultural ties to other Jews have been cut off in most areas other than religion. There are the anglophone, middle class Jews whose lives are largely secular but who have a high rate of participation in Jewish organizations and strong sense of identity as Jews. There are those who joined the Jewish community through marriage and/or conversion and who come from a wide variety of cultural backgrounds. There are as well significant differences within the Jewish community based on social class, level of education, occupation, even neighbourhood. Culturally, the Jewish community is a hodgepodge of different languages, beliefs, traditions, and lifestyles.

Whatever Jews are, then, they are not a culturally homogenous or culturally distinct group. Jews may be an extreme case, but perhaps not. Significant cultural differences will be found within many other 'ethnic' groups in Canada, such as the Chinese (Wickberg, 1982), Italians (Boissevain, 1970), and Blacks (Williams, 1989).

Recognizing that ethnic groups are in large measure a product of the circumstances and the contexts within which they exist – the notion of "emergent ethnicity" (Yancey, Ericksen and Juliani, 1979) – leads us to recognize that neither their cultural nor structural characteristics are either essential or innate. Rather, we come to examine how ethnic institutions, interests, and even identities

develop, are maintained, and undergo transformations. Moreover, because ethnicity is a relational concept, it is always the product of social relationships among groups (Barth, 1969b), reflecting the patterns of intergroup relations characteristic of the particular groups involved. Ethnicity is less about internal cultural traits than it is about patterns of intergroup relations which generate group differences.

A related issue is that an 'innate' cultural approach to ethnicity typically inhibits a recognition of the processual character of ethnicity. Ethnic identity, for example, may emerge in the course of an individual's lifetime when he or she leaves their country of origin to live elsewhere. Also ignored is an examination of how ethnic groups, in interaction with their social environment, undergo change. The Jewish community of Montreal differs from the Jewish communities of Toronto or New York (Elazar, 1989; Elazar and Waller, 1990). Since the Jews who built all three communities during the period of mass migration came from the same regions of Europe at about the same time, it is relevant to ask how and why these structural differences evolved.

The Role Of The State

If ethnic communities are a product of the circumstances and the contexts within which they exist, then the role of the state in the formation of ethnic communities becomes a significant issue. Indeed, sociologists have begun to look at the role of the state in defining and promoting ethnic distinctions. This approach is becoming particularly popular in Canada because the Canadian state has always played a central role in the economic and social development of the country (Panitch, 1977). In addition, state policies such as official bilingualism and multiculturalism have not only promoted ethnic distinctions but defined these distinctions. The federal government's policy has been to treat ethnic groups as primarily cultural groups rather than as religious, national, political, or economic groups. This has caused many groups to redefine themselves and has allowed the state to control ethnic group activities and to determine ethnic group leaders by how and to whom it disburses grants (Stasiulis, 1980). Li (1988: 132) suggests that this policy allows for "managing race and ethnic relations within a state apparatus ... through fiscal control of ethnic associations whereby the nature, duration, and amount of grants that ethnic associations receive fall in line with

the officially defined priorities of multicultural programs."

Versions of this approach have been used by Wotherspoon and Satzewich (1993) to understand the relations between Native groups and the state; by Rosenberg and Jedwab (1992) to identify organizational differences among major ethnic groups in Montreal; and by Breton (1984, 1989) to examine the impact of state policy on ethnic identity and concerted group action.

Since the role of the state is the topic of later chapters, further consideration of this particular approach will be put aside until then.

The Formation Of Ethnic Communities In Quebec

While both Porter and Breton have discussed the factors which have made ethnicity salient in Canada since the 1960s, many of the structural factors promoting the corporate character of ethnicity in Canada date back much farther, especially in Quebec. Like, Porter, Guindon (1967), too, has argued that the cleavage between the British and the French has had a profound structural impact on the development, nature, and context of intergroup relations. Because the cleavage between British and French has historically run deepest in Quebec, it is in Quebec

that the institutional and organizational development of ethnic communities has been the greatest. Following the British Conquest, a pattern of ethnic and religious institutional self-segregation developed between the British and French communities whereby two parallel societies were created (Guindon, 1967). These two societies were not totally isolated from each other. They did interact in the areas of politics and work, although this interaction was asymmetrical, with the British clearly the dominant group. Nevertheless, until the 1970s they maintained a rigorous separation in terms of language, education, religion, residence, and marriage. If the notion of "two solitudes" ignores the important realities of class, status, and political divisions within each of the charter groups, it still reflects a sense in which each of Quebec's majority groups took on a corporate form and lived in a world of their own.

There is also a sense in which the other minority ethnic groups lived in solitudes of their own. Certainly, this was true for the Native peoples, not only in Quebec but across Canada. Their isolation on the reserves kept them outside the economic and political mainstream of Canadian society. Each of the other major ethnic groups imitated the larger pattern of institutional self-

segregation they found in Quebec to a greater or lesser degree. For most of Quebec's history, the cultural and physical separation of British and French created a climate for the newly arriving immigrant groups in which sharp and distinctive differences among groups were fostered and preserved. Neither of the two charter groups went out of their way to incorporate the new arrivals. These, left to their own devices, imitated the pattern of cultural diversity, preservation, and isolation which they found. While most immigrants chose to learn English and to involve themselves in Quebec politics along the lines of the British-French cleavage already established, they had to develop their own institutions and find their own solutions to the problems of integration into Canadian and Quebec society.

This means that the development of distinct, institutionally complete communities was not merely imitation. In large part the immigrants really had no choice. British Canadians, as Porter (1965: 73) noted, saw ethnic segregation as serving to enhance their status as a charter group and their right to control Canada's and Quebec's political, economic, and cultural life. Prior to the 1960s, immigrant ethnic groups were accepted as long as they respected this right and allied themselves with the

British against the French politically. Even then, there were many periods when immigration was closed to those groups, such as Orientals, Blacks or South Asians, that many members of the Canadian public considered unacceptable (Knowles, 1992).

Among the French, too, opposition to immigration was widespread before the 1960s. Many of the French viewed non-francophone immigrants with hostility and sought to close themselves and their institutions off from these "outsiders." To them, the arrival of immigrant ethnics, most of whom would learn English and ally themselves politically with the British, posed a threat to the political position of the French in Canada and Quebec. This, in turn, it was feared, would lead to the erosion of French rights and the destruction of the French culture (Linteau, Durocher and Robert, 1983). Both the British and the French, then, aided the development not of two but of many solitudes.

It was the relations between the British and French groups that set the context for the first significant wave of Jewish immigration to Montreal in the period between 1880 and 1914. Newly arriving Jews found a society already divided up into distinct, separate, and institutionally complete British and French communities. Because they could fit into neither, Jews responded by forming their own

relatively institutionally complete community.

This is in accord with Barth's view of ethnic social organization as the outcome of the interactions and relations among social groups. Note a number of things, however. First, and most obvious, Jews were unable to establish as complete a set of institutions as had the British and the French because they had neither the resources, the numbers, nor the constitutional rights needed to do so. The relations between groups are rarely symmetrical, and this lack of symmetry has an effect on the form a community takes. Put simply, less powerful groups will have to accommodate more to the demands of the more powerful.

Second, Italians arriving at about the same time as the Jews did not form the same kind of community. Italian immigrants found themselves in somewhat the same situation as Jews, but because they were Catholics they had more entry into existing institutions, such as the schools. Another major difference is that Jews tended to come to Canada as family groups with the intention of making a permanent home for themselves in the new country. This meant that Jews required a broader range of services than did Italians, most of whom were unmarried men who intended to return in time to Italy. They were, as Ramirez and Del

Balso (1980) put it, sojourners. Different organizational forms, then, reflect not only the patterns of interaction but also who the social characteristics of those who are interacting as well as why they interact.

Third, institutional self-segregation as the context for ethnic group relations no longer applies today. The Quebec state now promotes universalistic institutions and universalistic policies designed to integrate new immigrants and the various ethnic minorities into a Quebec society with a common language and a common culture. Yet at the same time the provincial state promotes a Quebecois nationalism which treats the goals and aspirations of the French as the foundation of Quebec society. The result is that the state continues to treat minority groups as corporate groups which have their own distinctive 'place' in Quebec society. Having defined rights and entitlements on a collective basis, the provincial state sees Quebec society as composed of a set of such collectivities.

Moreover, an ethnic community may evolve within a specific context of intergroup relations, but once evolved, its organizational form itself becomes part of the context of intergroup relations. Ethnic institutions are neither ephemeral nor are they necessarily very adaptable.

That many ethnic communities in Quebec have a

corporate form does not mean that ethnic communities have been hermetically sealed off from the rest of society. Quebec's ethnic communities are partial communities in the sense that they are themselves embedded within larger socio-political communities. Moreover, the existence of ethnic differences and of ethnic communities does not imply that other differences within a society are nonexistent or less relevant. Ethnicity can also serve to reinforce other sets of distinctions, such as class distinctions. Ethnicity, then, can be examined on its own as a specific set of cultural traits and/or institutions; it can be identified as a pattern of status distinctions and status relationships among groups; or it can be seen as interconnected with other sorts of distinctions, especially class distinctions.

Ethnicity as a Polymorphous Phenomenon

As noted earlier, an ethnic community can take on an extraordinary variety of forms and serve as the basis for a wide variety of social relationships. It is this very polymorphous character of ethnicity which makes it so difficult to identify the essential structural and interactional processes underlying ethnic group formation — what are called the “lines” or “axes” of ethnic group

affiliation and differentiation. Put simply, the question is how and why some people come to affiliate with others as members of a particular ethnic community, and on what bases do they differentiate themselves from non-members. Breton (1978a: 148) recognizes that this issue is crucial and that, "it is ...difficult to understand the processes of intergroup relations unless the analysis takes account of the ways in which ethnic communities are structurally differentiated from one another." Unfortunately, as he also notes (Breton, 1978b: 62), "much of our thinking about inter-ethnic relationships assumes the existence of ethnic groups. That is to say, the very phenomenon that is problematic is frequently taken as a given." The underlying assumption continues to be that ethnic groups exist because they are culturally, linguistically, or religiously distinct groups.

Barth made a major contribution to the understanding of ethnicity when he asserted that ethnicity is first and foremost about differences; about how people differentiate themselves from others. Porter and Breton, in turn, have shown us that ethnicity is also about inequality, because people do not emphasize differences unless these make a difference – in power, in status, or in the distribution of material resources. Despite the claims to common biological

origin, sociologists consider the study of ethnicity to be the study of socially engendered social differentiation. Because it is social in origin, ethnicity in this sense is a polymorphous phenomenon which can take on an extraordinary variety of forms and serve as the basis for a wide variety of social relationships.

In the case of Canada, and particularly Quebec, it was the unequal pattern of relations between the British and the French which served as the context within which other ethnic groups had to adapt and establish their own communities. Partly out of imitation, partly out of necessity, some groups, such as the Jews, established institutionally complete communities which took a corporate form. This corporate character to ethnicity is now acknowledged and even enhanced through federal and provincial multicultural policies.

Yet while they assert a link between ethnicity and inequality, neither Porter nor Breton provided a theoretical scheme to allow us to understand the nature of that link. Because he sought to eliminate differences among Canadians, Porter ignored the structural sources of ethnic diversity in Canada, believing such diversity could be overcome by appropriate policies. While Breton's work is directed towards understanding the structural sources and

consequences of diversity, he has not sought to locate his analyses within any overarching theoretical edifice. Perhaps because the ethnic community is so polymorphous in form and multidimensional in organization, Breton prefers to organize his analyses of the ethnic community around specific aspects of community structure or of types of action.

What is now needed is an approach which retains Barth's and Breton's organizational approach to ethnicity but is able to place this within a broader theoretical context within which economic, political and status distinctions either crosscut or reinforce ethnic group differences. This issue will be taken up in the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ETHNIC COMMUNITY: STRATEGIES, PRACTICES, AND ORGANIZATIONAL STYLE

The existing literature on ethnicity discussed in the last chapter raises many important issues and provides many useful insights. Nevertheless, the study of ethnicity remains, to a large extent, outside the mainstream of contemporary sociological theory and research. Almost all researchers on ethnicity acknowledge that the ethnic community should be located within the larger context of social differentiation, including class and political differentiation, but doing so remains problematic. If we are to understand the relations between ethnic communities and the state, which is the goal of this dissertation, we need a model of ethnic community organization and of ethnic community action.

The first section of this chapter is directed towards examining the link between ethnicity and other forms of social differentiation in greater detail. Our starting point is the assertion that the existence of an ethnic community always implies a set of social relationships whereby symbolic, political, and economic differences among individuals and groups come to be the focus around which

identities and actions are structured. Rephrased in the terminology of Anthony Giddens (1986), we ask the following question: how is the structuration of an ethnic community implicated in the structuration of economic and political groups?

This question will be addressed by looking to the work of two sociologists, Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu. While neither deals explicitly with ethnicity, each has generated a theoretical model that seeks to account for the existence of economic, political and status groups. Each seeks as well to overcome the dualism of "structure" versus "action" prevalent in sociological work, an important issue in contemporary sociology.

"Action" is the focus of the second part of this chapter. Relations between an ethnic community and the state imply the capacity of an ethnic group to mobilize and organize its members to act in terms of their specifically "ethnic" interests. What is needed is a systematic analysis of ethnic community action that can address a broad range of issues. For example, what is ethnic community action as distinct from those actions undertaken by people who happen to be members of an ethnic community? Should we consider the voting preferences of the members of an ethnic community to be community action? Can such voting

preferences be ethnic community action under some circumstances but not under others? Is voting for a Jewish candidate in a largely Jewish riding ethnic community action? What if all the candidates are Jewish? What if one candidate runs on a platform of altering state subsidies to private Jewish schools? Clearly, we need to specify what is meant by ethnic community action if we are to address these issues. The work of Raymond Breton will be central to dealing with these issues.

Finally, reference to ethnic community action implies a corporate character to ethnicity; which raises yet another issue to be addressed in this chapter, that of organizational style, since the context within which an ethnic community responds to state action or initiates actions of its own is related to the organizational style of the community. The term organizational style refers to the typical structures, practices, and strategies used by ethnic community members as they organize to act on their interests (Rosenberg and Jedwab, 1992). Such an organizational style reflects the interests, internal resources, demographic profile, culture, and traditions of the group itself. That is why one community, such as the Italian community, differs from another, such as the Jewish community. But organizational style is also a consequence

of the social, economic and political context, especially the pattern of intergroup relations, within which an ethnic group finds itself as its members build their community. It is for this reason that the Jewish community of Montreal, for example, differs significantly from that found in Winnipeg, in Toronto, or in New York (Elazar, 1989; Elazar and Waller, 1990).

A key component in the model of organizational style I will be formulating here is the analytical distinction between structures and practices on the one hand and that between structures and strategies on the other. As used here, the term strategy does not have the sense specified by game theory but rather that suggested by Bourdieu (1990) to refer to objectively oriented lines of action inherent in the social context within which choices are being made. Agency, as Giddens (1984) has noted, always implies choice; a recognition that people "could have acted otherwise." Choices, however, are constrained by factors both external and internal to the group. Internally, for example, they imply a particular structure to the community, a set of ties among people, and a commitment to a set of practices. Nevertheless, the notion of strategy implies that agency cannot be reduced either to structural constraints nor to the habituated practices of everyday life. The distinction

between "strategy" and "practice" as perspectives on action emphasizes that an ethnic organizational style evolves in a social context within which certain kinds of social relationships evolve, relationships which are often assymterical and which constrain or require the particular kinds of choices which can be made.

Giddens' Theory of Structuration

The work of Anthony Giddens (1989) is explicitly directed towards the generation of sensitizing concepts which can be applied to an examination of organizational form, of corporate action, and of other features of institutional analysis. In particular, Giddens' concept of structuration is designed to examine the emergent processes of group formation, including ethnic group formation.

Giddens (1984: 17) uses the term structuration - in contrast to the more static term structure - to refer to the active processes whereby "structural properties" emerge out of patterns of social relations and are then reproduced through "social practices." Giddens hopes thereby to take advantage of the analytical power of structural concepts without losing sight of the role of human agency in the process of creating structures.

In the following discussion I will consider Giddens'

approach in some detail and suggest ways in which it can make a contribution to an understanding of both ethnic organizational style and ethnic community action. At the same time, however, I will argue that despite his reservations, Giddens' theory of structuration would profit from incorporating an analysis of agency as strategic action such as that developed by Bourdieu.

i. Structural Properties

Structural properties are (Giddens, 1984: 377) "structural features of social systems, especially institutionalized features, stretching across time and space." Since to Giddens structures themselves are "rules" and "resources," we can say that structural properties are those rules and resources which individuals can call upon in discourse as being independent of their own volition. In other words, an immigration official can make reference to immigration 'policy' to explain his or her actions in any particular case. This policy is explained and understood as a property of the immigration 'department,' rather than as a consequence of the personal biases or desires of the official. This is so even if the immigration official has had to 'interpret' the policy in order to determine how it applies in any particular case.

Structural properties can also be analysed at a

"higher" level of abstraction in terms of "structural principles." These, Giddens (1984: 17) says, are "the most deeply embedded structural properties implicated in the reproduction of societal totalities." Such structural principles are the most "comprehensive level of institutional analysis" and can be understood as "principles of organization" (Giddens, 1984: 185). For example, in tribal societies, "the dominant structural principle operates along an axis relating tradition and kinship" whereas in modern capitalism "the distinctive structural principle ...is to be found in the ...interconnecting of state and economic institutions" (Giddens, 1984: 182-83).

At a "lower" level of abstraction are structural "sets" which are (Giddens, 1981: 55) "'clusterings' of transformation/ mediation relations" which "convert" rules and relationships to link "otherwise incommensurable phenomena." Giddens' example is private property, and its role in linking together the cycle of capital. This generates the following structural set (Giddens, 1984: 186):

private property:money:capital:labour contract:profit

For example, the transformation of private property from ownership of land into money was a key step in the emergence of capitalism, as was the transformation of money into capital. These structural relations not only characterized a historical process of transformation, but are reproduced in the structural principles of capitalism.

ii. Social Practices

As for social practices, of these Giddens (1976:104) says:

...social practices may be studied, first from the point of view of their constitution as a series of acts, "brought off" by actors; second, as constituting forms of interaction, involving the communication of meaning; and third, as constituting structures which pertain to 'collectivities' or 'social communities'.

While social practices reproduce structural properties, the notion of "practices" emphasizes that (1) individuals must often decide for themselves how to accomplish the appropriate acts in the setting in which they find themselves; and (2) will have their own reasons for doing so. Again, to return to the example of the immigration official, such an official may find that in any ambiguous situation, the safest decision to make is one

which seems to conform most closely to official policy as he or she defines it, especially if taking such a course of action is most likely to lead to promotion, or at least, keeping the official out of trouble.

Without necessarily accepting all of Giddens' theoretical assumptions, the notion of structuration is helpful in examining the formation of an ethnic community. It allows us to ask such questions as: What are the structural properties or principles we see as characteristic of the ethnic community? What patterns of social relations (or structural sets) give the community its distinctive shape? What are the social practices whereby the community is reproduced? For example, rather than seeing institutional completeness as determining the relations among immigrants and between the immigrants and the host society, the imagery of structuration leads us to ask how and why different communities exhibit different degrees and forms of institutional and organizational completeness (Rosenberg and Jedwab, 1992). It should also be kept in mind that neither structural properties nor social practices are static; they alter as the circumstances within which group members find themselves alter. The Francophones of Quebec may have been more or less institutionally complete in 1964; today, as the

Quebecois, they are more or less a nation. Structuration, in other words, is an ongoing process.

iii. The Overlap of Ethnicity, Class, and Politics

The notion of structuration is particularly helpful because it can be applied not only to ethnic group formation, but to the intersection of ethnic groups with classes and political interest groups as well. Assuming that ethnicity is intimately tied into inequality, what is the nature of that tie? Some American sociologists have suggested that ethnic differences are in effect a "cover-up" for class inequalities (Patterson, 1977; Steinberg, 1981); others that ethnicity is essentially a form of political identity or at the very least a legitimation for claiming political entitlements (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975; Horowitz, 1977). Neither of these alternatives seem to fit the case of Canada. We cannot reduce the aspirations of the Quebecois to nothing more than class conflict any more than we could define the Doukhobours as essentially a political interest group. What is needed is some theoretical model which ties class, ethnicity and political interests together within a common framework yet which allows us to identify the significance of each - separately - for Canadian society.

Giddens (1981: 112) provides one suggestive link between ethnicity and class when he argues that:

While it may be agreed ...that the bases of the formation of classes and status groups ...are different, nonetheless the tendency to class structuration may receive a considerable impetus where class coincides with the criteria of status group membership — in other words, where structuration deriving from economic organization 'overlaps' with, or ... is 'superimposed' upon, that deriving from categorizations based upon ethnic or cultural differences.

If we assume that the structuration of class, status, and political interest groups reflects the social context within which the 'lines' or 'axes' of group affiliation and group differentiation are formed, then we can identify (1) the bases along which these lines of affiliation and differentiation are formed as well as (2) which of these lines of affiliation and differentiation is likely to be seen as primary.

Combining Raymond Breton's (1984) discussion of "symbolic resources" with Giddens' (1984) concept of "authoritative resources," and Bryan Turner's (1988) discussion of "politico-legal entitlements," Canada's stratification system can then be visualized as the unequal distribution of material, authoritative, and symbolic

resources (Tepperman and Rosenberg, 1991). The unequal distribution of material resources reflects an economic system within which different groups – social classes – are differentially rewarded. The unequal distribution of authoritative resources reflects a system of domination in which power, authority, and politico-legal entitlements are differentially distributed among interest groups. Finally, the unequal distribution of symbolic resources reflects a status system in which ethnocultural groups are differentially ranked in terms of honour, prestige, and even identity.

The patterns of social relations which result from the unequal distribution of these resources constitutes the lines of affiliation and differentiation along which groups are formed. Which of these lines of affiliation and differentiation will be seen as primary will be a consequence of the "localised factors which condition or shape (group) formation" (Giddens, 1981: 107). This means that the 'overlap' referred to by Giddens above may differ from one society to another. I am not arguing here that one set of social relations is primary – for example that class, or status, or political interest is primary – rather, I am asking what determines the public face of group affiliation and differentiation when forms of

structuration overlap.

In discussing class, for example, Clement (1988: 22) has noted that:

class relations are everywhere, but they never exist in "pure" form; that is, they always combine with other social relations (except at the very highest level of abstraction. These other social relations include gender, ethnicity, age and region. ...While class "conditions" non-class cleavages ...it is also conditioned by them. ...these factors are relational and interactive, not determined but dialectical.

A comparison of Britain, the United States and Canada helps to identify some of the "localised factors" which Giddens argues condition or shape group formation in each country. In the case of Britain, where class has a much more legitimate and accepted role in social differentiation than is true for either Canada or the United States, it is largely class which gives shape to the structuration of inequality. Political and ethnic differences are then explained and experienced in class terms. The United States presents a very different picture of how ethnicity works in conjunction with class and politics. In the United States, where economic achievement is popularly seen as a consequence of individual rather than group circumstances and where the ethnic is still considered to be on the road

to becoming an 'American,' it is political interest groups which are seen as the legitimate and acceptable public face in the overlap with class and ethnicity. Historically, the Irish, Italians, and Jewish immigrants to the United States found political structures into which they could easily fit and a party, the Democratic party, which welcomed their participation. Politics became, in the United States, a career for individuals and a means of opportunity for groups, as well as the point of conflict, contact, and compromise among those groups. Consequently, political activity evolved into a relatively autonomous institutional sector which reflects - without being subservient to - ethnic interest groups (Glazer, 1983).

This overlap between ethnicity and politics constituted a system whereby politico-legal entitlements were distributed among European ethnic groups and from which Blacks were largely excluded until they began to demand access in the 1960s. It makes little sense, then, to argue that the 'revival' of ethnicity in the United States was an imitation of Black success in attaining political support for equal opportunity programs. Instead, it could be argued that what has changed is not the overall pattern of ethnic participation in political life but the number of groups which participate and the grounds on which such participation is justified and seen as legitimate.

In the case of Canada, I would suggest, it is ethnic status which has been seen as primary. Indeed, Porter's description of the vertical mosaic can be reinterpreted as suggesting that in Canada both class structuration and the formation of political interest groups have tended to overlap with the criteria of ethnic group membership, especially charter group membership. The origin of Canada in the union of two distinctive ethnolinguistic groups has meant that many Canadians have typically come to see the ethnic community as the legitimate agent to act on behalf of their economic and political as well as their ethnic or cultural interests.

Applying Structuration Theory

Although Giddens' approach provides many valuable insights for thinking about ethnicity and the formation of ethnic communities, there are also a number of problems with his approach. One is that Giddens is engaged in generating what used to be called a 'general' theory. As a consequence his concepts tend to be devoid of empirical content. "Institutions," for example, are (Giddens, 1984: 17) "those practices which have the greatest time-space extension." This definition is so general it can be applied to any institution, but tells us little about any specific

(Giddens, 1989: 298):

As an operational principal of research ...we should place the emphasis squarely upon the constitution and reconstitution of social practices. Investigating 'structure' in the structurationist sense is more than simply looking for patterns in how the behaviour of some individuals connects with that of others. It means delving into the subtle interplay between the intractability of social institutions and the options they offer for agents who have knowledge, but bounded discursive awareness, of how those institutions work.

The concept of institutional completeness, then, would serve to sensitize us to the practices which tie individuals into an ethnic community by participation in or use of ethnic institutions. Rather than a 'measure' of ethnic affiliation, institutional completeness can be seen as what I shall call a 'complex' of social practices organized in terms of collective interests. Such a 'complex' of social practices is equivalent, when looking at social practices, to a 'structural set' when looking at structural properties. It is difficult to make sense of social practices as constituting social structure unless we identify ways in which social practices themselves reinforce one another or are directed towards some common set of outcomes. This is what I mean by a 'complex' of social practices.

institutions; especially when it refers to such vague notions as the "greatest" time-space extension. Even Giddens' examples are general. He uses 'language' as an example of structure, when language too – as opposed to an instance of conversation using a particular language, is a general concept devoid of content.

Structuration, then, suggests certain links between structural properties and social practices, but these require filling in. For example, would institutional completeness – a widely recognized characteristic of ethnic communities – be considered a structural 'property' of an ethnic community within Giddens' model? No, because institutional completeness is a variable. It cannot also serve as a structural property. How then should we conceive of institutional completeness in terms of Giddens' model of structuration?

i. Sensitizing Devices

Giddens might well say such a question makes no sense because it implies a mechanical application of structuration theory to empirical phenomena. Giddens (1989: 297) suggests instead that "the notions of structuration theory be used as sensitizing devices in the pursuit of ...research inquiry." In practical terms, this means that

ii. Assigning Social Practices to Structural Properties

This leads us to a second problem with Giddens' approach, which is determining what structural properties any particular social practice serves to reproduce. How do we know, for example, that some instance of behaviour serves to reproduce structural properties A and B but not C or D?

Giddens argues that it is not necessary for the social actor to know. In Giddens' model social practices are characterized neither by intention nor motivation, since action can have unintended or unmotivated consequences, but by (Giddens, 1984: 3) "the reflexive ...knowledgeability of human agents." Which does not mean that actors cannot be motivated or intend to bring about certain results, only that it is not necessary that they should be.

Reflexivity is taken to be the 'monitoring' of our own actions, but it is hard to understand how we can monitor our actions unless we have some set of 'goals,' 'reasons,' 'motives,' or the like in terms of which to evaluate our actions and modify them. Otherwise we assume that 'monitoring' is the disinterested process of noting certain actions, or that 'goals,' 'reasons,' or 'motives' are imposed from the outside. This latter does seem to be what Giddens (1984: 2) is saying when he argues that:

Human social activities ...are recursive. That is to say, they are not brought into being by social actors but continually recreated by them via the means whereby they express themselves as actors. In and through these activities agents reproduce the conditions that make activities possible.

Giddens uses language as an example. We did not create the English language, merely use it, but (Giddens, 1984: 8) "one of the regular consequences of my speaking or writing English in a correct way is to contribute to the reproduction of the English language as a whole." Giddens may be right, but is this what is sociologically significant about speaking or writing in any language? We do monitor our speech, but only because we are speaking to others. What we monitor is related to the context within which we speak, what we are trying to say, and why we are saying it. So, for example, a teacher monitors his or her speech in an attempt to make what is being said intelligible to students, while a con artist monitors what he or she is saying in an attempt to make it believable. In both cases the monitoring involves not only what is being said but also, as Mead (1934) pointed out, how others respond. The conversation between a husband and wife may not involve intentions in this sense, but even so each is

trying to say something. In this case they are neither producing meaningless sounds (although sometimes each may be misunderstood or mispronounce a word); nor are they simply reproducing institutional practices (although their conversation may also reproduce the patterns of male domination in their society).

Even if Giddens is right and we need assume neither intentions nor motives on the part of social actors, how do we as social scientists know to connect social practices with structural properties in our explanations of empirical phenomena? This is an important issue, for unless we can determine how to assign social practices to structural properties, Giddens' model, for all its theoretical elegance, cannot be applied in any rigorous way to explain social phenomena.

One possibility is that we could ask people, and, being reflexive, they should be able to tell us. Yet, since Giddens asserts that much of what people do is neither intended nor motivated, even if agents are knowledgeable in terms of what Giddens calls "practical consciousness," they may be unable to account for their actions at the discursive level.

iii. Agency, Practice, and Strategy

This leads us to yet another problem in Giddens' approach, which is the determined nature of agency implicit in his approach. Like the early work of Talcott Parsons (1968), Giddens stresses the importance of paying attention to agency but has great difficulty in providing examples of agency as independent of structural properties. Yet if human agency is reduced to nothing more than reproducing structural properties, such a role does not merit the emphasis Giddens insists should be placed upon it. After all, Giddens' notion of practical consciousness implies that agents are often not aware of the implications of their actions.

As a result, Giddens' notion of agency is underdeveloped. Particularly significant in this respect is his consideration of strategic conduct. Giddens (1979: 80) suggests that social practices can be understood as "actors' mobilization of discursive and practical consciousness in social encounters," which he calls strategic conduct to differentiate it from institutional analysis. Giddens refers to Goffman's work as an example of strategic analysis. But, while he acknowledges the usefulness of such an approach, Giddens argues that it fails to develop an account of institutions. Instead, "institutions appear as unexplained parameters within which

actors organize their practical activities" (Giddens, 1979: 81).

Thus Giddens' approach is incomplete. While he provides us with some important tools with which to understand the overlap in the structuration of ethnicity, class and politics, he does not take his analysis far enough to allow us to uncover how individuals come to generate ethnic communities in the first place.

Bourdieu On Strategies

Whereas Giddens emphasizes the differences between strategic and institutional analyses, Pierre Bourdieu (1990) treats strategies as intrinsic to the reproduction of social properties and seeks to identify how institutional social practices, such as marriage practices, can themselves take the form of strategies. In doing so, Bourdieu presents a more autonomous role to agency than does Giddens. While Bourdieu seeks to identify the "objectively oriented lines of action which agents continually construct in and through practice" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 129), his approach suggests that objectivity does not imply inevitability.

For example, in studying the frequency of marriage between parallel cousins among the Kabyle in Algeria, where

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such marriage was supposedly the norm, Bourdieu (1990: 15) found that many marriages could not be clearly and simply classified as marriage between parallel cousins since "the proportions that emerged were quite meaningless because they depended on the extent of the social unit in relation to which the calculation was made." What Bourdieu (1990: 15-16) then realized was that not only was this ambiguous classification of marriages true for a researcher trying to understand Kabyle society but that it was part of how the Kabyle made decisions about whom to marry:

each form of marriage is not a simple variant ...but a dimension of a strategy which takes on its meaning within the space of possible strategies. Since this strategy is the product, not of obedience to a norm explicitly posited and obeyed or of regulation exerted by an unconscious 'model', it became clear that it cannot be explained without taking into account not only the purely genealogical relationship between the spouses (which can itself undergo strategic manipulation) but a whole range of information about families united by the marriage, such as their relative positions within their groups, the history of their past exchanges and the balance-sheet of these transaction at the moment in question, about spouses (age, previous marriages, physical appearance, etc.), the history of the negotiation and the associated exchanges which led up to the union, etc.

Agency, then, implies strategy. As in Goffman's (1961)

strategic analysis of poker, rules exist, and, we could say, are reproduced by playing the game. Yet we cannot understand the course of a particular game only by knowing the rules. Looking instead at the types of players who could be playing the game in any particular situation, we can look at their skill, their style, or their strategies as features of how a particular game can progress – how the rules can be used or manipulated. There is no rule against having your eyes light up when you are dealt a winning hand, but controlling communication is as critical a skill in winning as is knowing and following the rules. Goffman's work often presents an extensive catalogue of such situational possibilities, the types of people who could be playing, for example, and the implications of their different styles of play.

Strategies, however, do not imply freedom. To Bourdieu, strategies form a system. In the case of poker, for example, strategies are limited by and to the possibilities inherent in the game itself. In that sense strategies are, as Bourdieu said, objectively oriented lines of action.

Still, it would be inappropriate to view all action as strategic. Depending upon one's particular research interests, it might be appropriate to view some action as

patterned, while at other times that action may be viewed as strategic. For example, the programme of religious services followed by Jews in synagogue on a Saturday morning is, by and large, patterned (although services will differ from synagogue to synagogue based on many factors, such as the orientation of the congregation or the preferences of the Rabbi). But once set, a programme of services tends to be followed from week to week, differing only on the basis of religious requirements such as a special service for a particular holy day. If we were to interview each participant we might find that each has his or her own reasons for attending services, but to the degree that services are already patterned, we need not always take these reasons into account. Whether we do or do not depends upon our particular research interest in the synagogue.

On the other hand, some aspects of morning services, such as the sermon delivered by the Rabbi, might better be viewed as strategic. Since a sermon always reflects a set of choices, it makes sense to try to understand the reasons underlying the particular choice of topic made by the Rabbi. As in Bourdieu's account, these reasons will reflect the full set of social relations relevant to the Rabbi's choice.

In line with this distinction, the term social practices will be used to refer to regularized or routine patterns of action which serve to reproduce a way of life. In contrast, the term strategies will be used as lines of action directed towards some end. The advantage of this distinction is that it allows us to differentiate distinct forms of action rather than merely different forms of consciousness 'implicated' in action.

One final example may make clear this distinction between strategies and practices. The use of language, suggests Giddens, is a social practice which serves to reproduce the English language as a set of structural properties. But a poet, an author, or a playwright might well use language 'incorrectly' in order to get across some particular meaning or desired effect. In this case, the use of language is better viewed as strategic. In no sense, however, is the examination of social practices or of structural properties more 'institutional' than is the analysis of strategies. Strategies, too, only make sense - can only have the effect they are intended to have - because of the recurrent practices of social life and the structural properties they reproduce.

Collective Interests

The term strategy also directs us to an awareness of

the interests in terms of which choices are made. The concept of interests has played a central role in the work of many sociologists, from Marx and Weber to Habermas (1971), yet it, too, is underdeveloped in Giddens' theory of structuration (see, for example, Giddens, 1979: 188-190).

Nevertheless, Giddens does make some important points concerning interests. One is that we can refer to the interests of actors or groups even if those actors or groups are unaware of these interests. This means that we can refer to "objective" interests, which are those interests actors have "by virtue of their membership of particular groups, communities, classes. etc." (Giddens, 1979: 189). Moreover, in line with the notion of strategies outlined above, Giddens (1979: 189) views interests as implying "potential courses of action, in contingent social and material circumstances." Put together, these allow Giddens to give this example of collective interests (Giddens, 1979: 189): "A person shares certain interests in common with others ...for example, by virtue of being a member of the working class; there are conflicts of interest between capitalists and workers which are integral to capitalist production."

i. Interests, Experience, and Determinism

Before Giddens, Max Weber also argued that social action often leads to unanticipated or unintended consequences. Yet these unanticipated consequences will come to constitute new forms of social organization and generate new forms of social action to the degree that they fit in with the "interest situation" (Weber, 1958b: 281) of specific social groups. Since social organization serves to pattern social action, interests are also relevant in understanding social practices. Interests serve as a general framework in terms of which we act and in terms of which we can understand others as well as monitor ourselves. In a Weberian framework, then, both strategies and social practices are tied together by interests.

Social practices directed toward the same set of interests can be referred to, as I do above, as a 'complex' of social practices whose reproduction generates identifiable structural properties. So, for example, in Weber's (1958a) analysis of the Protestant ethic the complex of social practices and strategies of the Calvinists (inner-worldly asceticism) directed towards a search for "signs of grace" ("ideal" interests) unintentionally generated a capitalist economic ethic which was reproduced and amplified by the perpetuation of these

very social practices.

This is not to say that interests determine social practices or strategies. Interests, as Max Weber argued, can be both "ideal" and "material." In Weber's account, the connection between "ideas" such as the Calvinist belief in predestination and the social practices and strategies which led to the development of capitalism was tied into both ideal and material interests, as well as the ability and determination of the Calvinists to act on their interests.

Applying this to the formation of ethnic communities we can say that ethnic communities are reproduced to the degree that individuals find ethnic differences relevant to their own practical interests and thereby share a collective interest with others in the community's perpetuation. Ethnic differences are tied into collective interests. Put in a less simplistic way: in the overlap among forms of ethnic, class and political structuration in Canada, ethnicity has come to serve as a focus around which communities are mobilized and maintained. Rather than viewing them as mere expressions of cultural distinctions, ethnic communities can be seen as among the more important means used by Canadians to compete for political, economic, and cultural advantages.

ii. Collective Interests As Practical Interests

The issue of collective interests raises problems of its own. If collective interests are not some form of collective consciousness but the bases upon which individuals make decisions as or for a group, then collective interests are themselves founded upon practical interests.

Take, for example, the case of newly arrived immigrants. Immigrants come to a nation as a result of their own concerns. They may be escaping from oppressive economic or political conditions; they may be searching for new opportunities or even new adventures; they may be joining relatives or friends; in any case, they come with the expectation of improving their lives and because the nation they are entering seems a promising place to do so. Upon the arrival the new immigrant faces a whole set of new practical problems - finding work, a home, learning a new language. He or she also faces a situation in which all previous common-sense assumptions about life, about the new country, above all about themselves, are suddenly problematic and questionable. Whatever the reason the receiving society may have in admitting the immigrant is unlikely to be relevant to the immigrant himself or herself. What is relevant are the problems they face and

the solutions they seek, i.e., the practical interests in terms of which their everyday activities are organized.

The use of the term practical interests does not imply that the analysis of ethnicity should proceed by focusing on the "individual." Nor does it imply that collective phenomena are the outcome of individual personality, psychology, or motivations. Rather, it is the shared circumstances faced by groupings of individuals which create sets of collective interests out of practical interests. The key, then, lies in understanding these shared circumstances, not only the individuals involved.

How do practical interests become collective interests? Breton (1990: 196) suggests that collective interests are composed of "aspirations, problems, and opportunities." When individuals find themselves in situations where they share such aspirations, problems, or opportunities, and where these are "sufficiently frequent, ...have symbolic value for the group, or ...[where] the situation of individuals depends to a significant extent on their group membership," they then become collective interests, "collective goods (or bads)" which serve to form the bases of group solidarity and group action (Breton, 1990: 196).

It is not necessarily the case that collective

interests will always be recognized as group aspirations, problems, or opportunities. Ethnic community institutions also provide services to individual members, and even to individuals who may not be a member of the group at all. Indeed, community organizations – such as the Jewish Public Library or the Young Men's and Young Women's Hebrew Association – may pride themselves on being able to serve non-Jews. At other times, individuals turn to community institutions for help in dealing with individual problems, and it is sometimes in the interest of the institution to do so. Put differently, people will get together with others to protect their individual interests if they believe, rightly or wrongly, that the group is a better vehicle for doing so than is their own individual efforts.

Since ethnic communities are resources with which community members compete for advantages, material or authoritative resources, and politico-legal entitlements, this puts the issue of collective interests at the very center of the analysis of ethnic group formation and action.

Ethnic Community Action

Ethnic community action has not been studied much by sociologists, perhaps because they fail to see that ethnic action is of more than parochial interest. Nevertheless,

individual studies of ethnic groups have uncovered significant features or forms of ethnic community action. Examples would be the role of proselytization in maintaining religious identity and commitment among Hassidic Jews (Shaffir, 1974), the organization of Italian parents seeking to preserve English language education for immigrants in Quebec (Taddeo and Taras, 1987), and the actions taken by Native groups to obtain aboriginal rights (Fleras and Elliott, 1992b). Most of these accounts, however, tend to be either episodic or limited to a particular ethnic group. The most systematic consideration to date of the issues surrounding ethnic community action can be found in Breton (1977; 1978a).

i. Breton On Corporate Action

Looking at ethnic corporate action, Breton identifies four factors to be included in an analysis of corporate action. These are (1977: 3):

...The social organization of the ethnic collectivity; in particular, the composition, structure and ideology of its leadership, its social networks and system of communication, and its interorganizational form.

...various "background conditions", such as historical, demographic and ecological ones as well as the level of potential resources available to the collectivity and the degree of societal support and opposition.

...the social definition of the problems or issues requiring attention, the mobilization of resources (including participation), the collection of the necessary information, the building of a consensus, and the coordination of activities.

...mobilization ...[as] the result of ...socio-psychological ...conditions and processes at the level of the individual member of the collectivity.

Moreover, Breton (1983; 1990) locates ethnic community action within a broader set of related corporate and individual actions which are responses to aspirations, problems, and opportunities: the use of organizational resources, the activation of social networks, and individuals taking action on their own. Of these, only the use of organizational resources is seen as ethnic corporate action, and then only when the organization involved is an ethnic organization. Taking one's problems with discrimination to a provincial human rights agency, for example, would not be an example of ethnic community action.

Yet, as Breton (1991: 1) has also noted, the ethnic community is a multidimensional phenomenon. Ethnic phenomena do not take only an organizational or corporate form, although without such a form intra-ethnic relations are unlikely to persist. The social networks which are activated may be ethnic networks, even within a non-ethnic

milieu, just as the individuals with whom one groups together in a spontaneous demonstration of protest or support may be fellow ethnics. Moreover, many organizations, such as ethnic day schools, would not persist were it not for the collective impact of numerous individual decisions being taken. If we assume that ethnic community actions are directed outwards, towards the broader society, then only organizational activities are regularly and routinely visible. Yet I would suggest that much of what constitutes ethnic community action is also directed inwards, towards other members of the ethnic collectivity. It is this very domain of action which makes an ethnic "polity" possible and which Breton himself has examined so thoroughly in The Governance of Ethnic Communities (1991).

This issue is particularly important because it helps us to understand important aspects of the organizational dynamics which underlie ethnic community formation, persistence, and change. In his research on Toronto ethnic groups, Breton (1983; 1990) found that most respondents preferred to deal with problems such as discrimination or changes in immigration laws either on their own or by turning to public organizations. For no group were ethnic organizations the favoured mechanism for dealing with

problems; not even for Jews, although Jews were more likely than others to say that they would turn to ethnic organizations. Yet if ethnic groups are themselves composed of diverse sub-groups having different sets of goals and interests, then conflict within the ethnic community may be as important to many people as problems in dealing with outsiders. Conflict and competition for control over ethnic institutions may then have their own domains of significance.

Indeed, as the discussion of the Jewish community in Chapter Eight will show, conflict among diverse groups within the community has been as significant a factor in understanding the evolution and organizational dynamics of the Jewish community as the pressures and interventions from outside the community. Thus, a Jewish worker may look to the provincial human rights agency to solve problems at work, but would not turn to the Montreal Island School Council to try to change the content of the Hebrew curriculum at the Jewish school attended by his or her child. Other times, the two factors may work together. Precisely because the consequences of group decisions and actions vis-a-vis the broader society can often be so fateful, groups are deeply committed to attaining control over, or at least input into, communal decision-making.

ii. Political, Economic And Symbolic Action

Applying Breton's model of concerted group action takes us much of the way towards further development of a systematic model of ethnic community action, but before I try to build on his model I would like to first locate ethnic community action in the context of Giddens' structuration theory as developed and modified above.

By ethnic community action I refer to strategies and practices which are directed to ethnic group interests. Such action is salient to ethnic group members to the degree to which the lines of affiliation and differentiation along which ethnic groups are formed overlap with or reinforce class, status, or political interests and structuration. The form taken by much of this overlap seems to have undergone change in Canada since Porter's description of Canada as a vertical mosaic. In large measure, the cultural division of labour has diminished since the early 1960s (Darroch, 1979), although it remains relevant for newly immigrant groups (Boyd, 1992; De Silva, 1992), within particular ethnic sub-economies (Thompson, 1989), and for Native groups (Agocs and Boyd, 1993).

Yet, if the economic significance of ethnicity might be diminishing in Canada, its political significance has

been increasing. Until the 1960s, the political significance of ethnicity was largely restricted to conflict and competition between the two charter groups (Breton, 1988). Ethnic minority participation in politics was limited (and almost non-existent for native groups). Other than voting, few members of minority ethnic groups sought political office beyond the local level (Stasiulis and Abu-Laban, 1991).

This political inactivity on the part of ethnic minorities began to change in the aftermath of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. It has been argued that the adoption of an official bilingualism policy divided rather than united Canadians (Guindon, 1983). Certainly recent history has shown that this policy failed to meet the aspirations of most francophone Quebecers while also creating tensions and animosities among many anglophone Canadians. These tensions and animosities led, in turn, to the formulation of the federal government's multiculturalism policy. Because official bilingualism had generated "identification and status concerns" among non-charter groups, the official policy of multiculturalism was devised to defuse "status anxieties" and "cultural tensions" among ethnic groups (Breton, 1984: 134 - 136).

Canadians, however, tend to be ambivalent about the

whole idea of multiculturalism and state policies seem to have aggravated the ethnic tensions they were designed to ease. In addition, the state has unintentionally made political issues more salient to ethnic communities and of greater immediate consequence. As a result ethnic communities have become more involved in politics and have to some degree taken on the character of political interest groups typical of American ethnics. The most dramatic example is the case of the Native peoples, who have organized to become a highly visible and more effective political force in Canada, but several other ethnic communities have been successful in establishing umbrella and lobbying organizations to represent them to the state.

Yet if the economic significance of ethnicity has been declining, economic issues remained tied to ethnicity in a variety of ways. The overlap between ethnicity and class is likely to be greatest for recent immigrants, particularly members of visible minorities. These so-called "new immigrants" are less integrated into Canada's economic system than are the members of other ethnic groups: they are more likely to earn less money and to work longer hours, to be subjected to prejudice or discrimination, and to suffer from having to accept jobs lower in status than their education, qualifications and experience would merit (Boyd, 1992; De Silva, 1992).

Economic action remains relevant as well within the ethnic sub-economy. Weinfeld (1983: 8) has defined the ethnic sub-economy as "a network of economic relationships which may link employees, employers, consumers, buyers, and sellers, of a specific ethnic group." Using what he calls a "conservative" estimate, Weinfeld (1983: 19) suggests that "between one-quarter and one-third of the respondents [in a 1978 survey of 657 Jewish household heads in Montreal] were almost exclusively economically active within the Jewish sub-economy." While Weinfeld did not investigate the scope and variety of economic actions within the sub-economy, he suggests that relevant issues would be (1983: 20): "ethnic consumption patterns, participation in housing markets, links between manufacturing, wholesaling and retailing operations, membership in professional associations, the giving and receiving of credit, the use of information networks, and the occupational and sectorial profile of participants in the sub-economy." In addition, Weinfeld (1983: 21) notes the existence of a "public sector" within the sub-economy which "is sustained through patterns of philanthropic contributions or fees for services used to support welfare institutions, churches, and other cultural, social, or political institutions." In this respect, economic actions such as fund-raising and budget

allocations are the economic backbone upon which the institutional structure of an ethnic community is based

As for the symbolic interests manifested in ethnic community action, the argument of Gans (1979) and Parsons (1975) is that symbolic interests have no behavioural consequences, that symbolic ethnicity is ethnicity which has no impact upon an individual's life. This, however, fails to take into account that many of the actions undertaken by ethnic communities constitute symbolic action, such as, for example, a Yom Hashoah commemoration in the Jewish community. Yom Hashoah is both a remembrance of those who perished in the Holocaust and a promise to take action in the future to ensure that such a catastrophe will never again be allowed to happen. Yom Hashoah, in other words, is symbolic action which carries with it the potential for political mobilization and political action. Think, too, of the election night celebration after the victory of the Parti Quebecois in 1976. As the celebration that night both showed and proclaimed, the election of the Parti Quebecois was not merely a political event like any other, but a momentous symbolic event which, supporters claimed, showed the "maturity" of the Quebecois as a nation.

Indeed, many forms of symbolic action center upon

issues related to matters of status and the differentiation of identity. Ethnic groups, for example, have their own notions of what Hirsch (1988) has called "cultural literacy," which consists of knowing at least some of the ethnic language, traditions, customs, and expectations. Using the language, participating in festivals, attending concerts, buying a newspaper from the homeland, writing to relatives, visiting the homeland, eating ethnic foods; all of these are instances of symbolic action. Such action can also be concerted group action, as in the organization and operation of the St. Patrick's Day Parade by the United Irish Benevolent Society or the March to Jerusalem by Federation CJA in Montreal. Of course, in Montreal all such organized activities also have to observe the linguistic and other symbolic niceties of contemporary Quebec, such as the use of French signs and the invitation of francophone celebrities, as well as the avoidance of actions or displays which the linguistic majority might find offensive. That paying attention to these niceties is so obvious in Montreal does not mean that such strategic decisions need not be made elsewhere — they probably do — only that in Quebec nationalist sentiment has made these issues more overt and less tacit. In Quebec today cultural issues almost always imply an element of politics just as

politics almost always implies an element of cultural concerns.

A Systematic Model of Ethnic Community Action

There is little question then, that ethnic group structuration overlaps with that of both class and political groupings, and that symbolic, political and economic interests are all relevant to ethnic community action. It would be useful, however, to examine ethnic community action itself in a somewhat more systematic way.

Ethnic community action can take two forms. One form is institutional: the organization of social practices and strategies directed towards aspirations, problems, and opportunities acknowledged as relevant to the ethnic group or to some significant segment of that group. Institutional action itself can be further sub-divided into the establishment of formal organizations designed to achieve particular goals, or the establishment of social networks which work within and through other, already existing institutions.

A second form of ethnic community action can be designated as 'collective' rather than institutional. Attending (as opposed to organizing) a concert to aid people in the ethnic homeland would be an example of such

action. Collective action, too, can be sub-divided into group actions based on the shared experience of aspirations, problems, or opportunities; or they can be individual, as when an individual turns to the collectivity for support or when the group sees such support for an individual as being in its interests.

A study of these forms and sub-types, along with one other crucial feature of ethnic community action discussed earlier, indicates that action can be analysed either as social practices, that is, as regularized or routine patterns of action which serve to reproduce social properties, or as strategies, which are objective lines of action directed towards some end (see Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1

Ethnic Community Action

Take, for example, the complex of strategies and practices involved in the preparation for a Bar Mitzvah, a religious ceremony undertaken by Jewish males at the age of thirteen to symbolize their readiness to assume adult religious obligations. The Bar Mitzvah ceremony itself is a set of institutionalized, symbolic practices usually performed in a synagogue, which include a reading from the Torah. These practices are no more than the core around which a host of other actions are organized, however. A Bar Mitzvah as a religious ceremony is usually accompanied by a party (sometimes more than one), which can become very elaborate and very expensive. Parents have to decide what sort of party to have and how much to spend. Whether the party should be in the synagogue, at home, or at a restaurant. Whether it should follow immediately after the religious ceremony, later in the evening or the next day. Who should take the photographs and who should do the catering. Who should be invited, who would be offended to be excluded and who would be relieved. They have to ensure that their son learns the Hebrew necessary for the ceremony, and decide how much of the Torah their son should read. These and many other decisions are strategic forms of action which take on their meaning and are only possible within the context of the Bar Mitzvah as a set of social practices.

It might be objected that the example of parents choosing what sort of party to give their son does not constitute an instance of ethnic community action. I would suggest that it does in the following respects: (1) While this is individual action, it is collective in the same sense that paying taxes or voting in an election are collective. Individuals placed in the same set of circumstances organize their actions around the same set of interests. In the case of the Bar Mitzvah, these are ethnic, symbolic, or religious circumstances. (2) Individuals obtain information and make decisions on such matters as which caterer to use or where to hold the party through participation in and use of social networks. Indeed, many businesses and individuals within the Jewish sub-economy are engaged primarily in providing services for Bar Mitzvahs, weddings, and other religious or ethnic events. (3) However elaborate the final result, individuals define the whole complex of events as a part of the Bar Mitzvah, whose religious and symbolic significance is seen to subsume all of the decisions and events.

Other sets of distinctions could be introduced into the present general scheme, such as whether community actions are internal to the community or are directed outside the community towards external issues or goals.

Political action, for example, may be internal in the form of competition for control over specific ethnic institutions, or its may be external, as in the lobbying efforts of an ethnic organization in dealing with the government.

None of these distinctions should be considered hard and fast, of course. The distinction between strategies and practices will often depend upon one's point of view. For parents, the planning of a Bar Mitzvah for their son is episodic and strategic, while for those providing services such as caterers, photographers, synagogue directors, or Hebrew teachers participation in the planning and preparation of a Bar Mitzvah revolves around a set of recurrent practices. Thus parents will have to make a decision about what food to serve, but they will do so from the menu provided by the caterer, which is limited to those foods the caterer is willing to prepare for such an event.

Similarly, the distinction between competitive and concerted group actions should reflect the possibility that some concerted actions may have competitive implications. The sponsoring of immigrant labourers may be concerted group action in some respects, as is the sponsoring of relatives seeking to immigrate to Canada. It may also be competitive economic action as in Toronto's Chinatown

(Thompson, 1989) where it serves to perpetuate cheap labour, class differences both within the community and vis a vis the broader society, and the competitive advantage of Chinese manufacturers. The sponsoring of relatives can also become competitive when, as among the Portuguese of the Southern Okanagan valley, almost all new arrivals end up working in the same economic sector as their sponsors (Munzer, 1981).

Everyday Social Practices as Community Action

The absence of community organizations does not imply the absence of community. Italians may not provide extensive examples of organizational forms of community action, but they do illustrate the dynamics of how ordinary individuals evolve strategies for dealing with those circumstances which face them as new immigrants in a foreign land. For Italians the term arrangiarsi, used by Perin and Sturino (1989) as the title of their book on Italian immigrants, provides an example of the practical interests and the set of strategies used by the immigrants as they integrate into Canadian society. Perin and Sturino (1989: 11) translate arrangiarsi as "'making do' or 'getting by'." As they explain it (Perin and Sturino, 1989: 11):

The term implies not the passivity inherent in the image of the immigrant as outcast, but inventiveness, quick-wittedness, forethought; in other words, activity. ...For example ...the Italian immigrant had to insert himself into the world of French-English conflict. Given a context he could not change, the immigrant over time adapted himself to the dynamics of the situation and has learned arrangiarsi in a peculiarly Quebec way.

Such adaptation allows immigrants to integrate into the new society without losing sight of their own practical interests.

Arrangiarsi as a strategy of dealing with the problems and opportunities facing a new immigrant stands in sharp contrast to the approach taken by members of the Jewish community, who have tended to establish formal organizations to deal with problems seen as needing a collective approach. Yet, it can be argued that arrangiarsi and the development of strategies oriented to practical interests are ethnic phenomena in the same way that the creation of formal ethnic organizations are. The difference is that they are largely informal and, to the observer outside the community, largely invisible. What we see is not that one group, the Jews, formed an organized community while another group, the Italians, did not, but that both

groups form communities which differ in organizational style.

The Role of the Ethnic Community

Because of Canada's unique development as a union of two distinct "founding nations," ethnicity in Canada is neither a matter of subjective individual preference nor of membership in an objective "involuntary" collectivity (Isajiw, 1975). Instead ethnicity here often takes the form of an organized, civil community: a set of persons who share common or overlapping interests, institutions, and identities. This is not to argue that ethnic sentiments are irrelevant but that these sentiments either in the form of interests or of identities must be channelled into some form of concerted group activity - usually through ethnic organizations - for them to have a visible impact on the lives of Canadians. The ties among people are not merely feelings, they are social relationships; it is this which makes them sociologically relevant. Similarly, while the notion of an ethnic group as an objective demographic category makes collecting census information easier and allows for determinate implementation of government policies ("where numbers warrant"), this notion has little real significance in Canadian society unless it refers to some "agency," some community organized to act on its own

behalf.

Rather than viewing the individual as standing between the ethnic community and the host society, an alternative view would be to visualize the ethnic community as coming between the individual and the broader society. Seen in this way, ethnic communities may take on various forms implying different relationships to the host society. They may (1) serve as mechanisms to integrate group members into the host society; they may (2) mediate between group members and the host society; or they may (3) serve to isolate group members from contact with the broader society.

i. Integration

Communities which integrate group members into the broader society will have both a low level of solidarity and a low level of associational or concerted group action. They will be largely symbolic both in structure and action (Gans, 1979). Only when crises affect the group's perceived interests does concerted group action come into play. An example of such an ethnic community would be the Italians. Descriptions of the Italian community (Harney, 1978; Boissevain, 1970; Ramirez and Del Balso, 1980) emphasize that Italians show little sign of specifically ethnic

solidarity. Italians are more likely to identify with their family, their kin group, or, at most, with other people coming from the same region of Italy.

Breton's (1990; Breton, Isajiw, Kalbach and Reitz, 1990b) study of ethnic groups in Toronto shows that only 21 percent of Italian respondents had ever been a member of an ethnic organization, compared to 63 percent of Jews and 51 percent of Ukrainians. Similarly, only 28 percent of Italians claim to know "personally" the leaders of their ethnic community, compared to 48 percent of Jews and 37 percent of Ukrainians. Significantly, 77 percent of Italians were found to agree with the statement that "immigrants and members of minority groups should try to blend into Canadian society and not form ethnic communities." Only 42 percent of Jews and 57 percent of Ukrainians agreed (Breton, 1990).

As for ethnic identity, the data presented by Isajiw (1990) suggests that Italian identity becomes less salient by the third generation. Among first generation immigrants, Italians scored 6.4 on Isajiw's ethnic identity index, higher than the score of 6.1 for Ukrainians and 5.8 for Jews. But by the third generation, the score for Italians drops to 4.5, as does that of Ukrainians; while the score for Jews is 5.9, actually higher than that for first

generation immigrants.

Understandably, given their lack of common ethnic as opposed to regional identity and the lack of frequent interaction with others outside their immediate circle, the Italians are also typified by little interest in associational development. But the St. Leonard school crisis of 1968 in Montreal (discussed in Chapter Six) showed that the community is capable of concerted group action if its members feel that their interests are threatened.

ii. Mediation

Communities which mediate between group members and the broader society have a high level of associational development, with a network of organizations and associations acting as "mediating structures" (Berger and Neuhaus, 1977). A good example of such a community would be the Jewish community.

As noted above, the Toronto Jewish community has not followed the pattern of decreasing salience of ethnic identity by the third generation. Data for Montreal, while collected under different circumstances and analyzed differently, also suggest that the Montreal Jewish community continues to find Jewish identity to be highly

salient. For example, 66 percent of Montreal Jews are members of a synagogue, temple or congregation, compared to 56 percent in Toronto¹. There is a high level of participation in Jewish organizations, with 45 percent of Montreal Jews currently belonging to a Jewish organization, compared to 40 percent in Toronto. Montreal Jews are also more likely to live near other Jews, to have primarily Jewish friends, and to feel "close" to other Jews, than do Jews elsewhere in Canada (CRB Foundation, 1991).

As we shall see, Montreal's Jews tend to feel that their interests are best served by specialists: acting in support of these interests is left to Jewish associations with their "lay" volunteers and specialized professionals.

iii. Segregation

Communities which isolate or segregate group members from the broader society are 'communal' in Max Weber's (1978b) sense. A good example of this type of community would be that of the Hutterites or the ultra-orthodox Jewish Hasidim (Shaffir, 1974). Indeed, such groups often seem to be ethno-religious groups.

There may well be a combination of these

¹All figures on the Montreal Jewish community and in comparison with Toronto in this section are from Allied Jewish Community Services (1991).

organizational forms, either provided to differential segments of the group's membership or provided to all members by differential segments of the community. None of these distinctions imply either a greater or lesser degree of either institutional completeness or community solidarity. Nevertheless, community solidarity and institutional completeness are often linked.

Organizational Style.

The term 'organizational style' refers to the typical structures, practices, and strategies used by ethnic community members as they organize to act on their interests (Rosenberg and Jedwab, 1992). While the phrase organizational style may sound like a contradiction in terms, the use of the term 'style' is intended to reflect the equality of strategy with structure in understanding ethnic community organization. Clearly, the corporate form a group takes reflects the relationship with the broader society the group promotes: integration, mediation, or segregation.

An examination of organizational style helps us to uncover the various forms of institutional completeness which are to be found in different ethnic communities. The Jewish, Italian, and Greek communities in Montreal, for example, have each developed a very different

infrastructure with a different focus, different sources of intra-group attachment (points of affiliation), and different points of integration into the broader society. Thus, while all three communities may have a relatively high level of institutional completeness, there the similarity ends and each of the three communities developed in different ways for different reasons (Rosenberg and Jedwab, 1992).

This can be seen in a brief comparison of the Jewish and Greek communities. In both communities, ethnic organizations tend to mediate between group members and the broader society. Yet while they have shared some common problems, the Jewish and Greek communities have evolved in different ways.

In terms of organizational style, the Jewish community evolved an extensive network of formal organizations because clerical control over public institutions in Quebec in the period before the Quiet Revolution meant that Jews could not easily or comfortably fit into these institutions. The contemporary tendency within the Jewish community remains that of searching for institutional solutions to collective problems. This tendency is reinforced by the large network of already existing organizations often dating back to the early years of the

century. In turn, this has allowed the Jewish community to quickly set up the sort of bureaucratic and centralized agencies needed to deal effectively with the provincial government since the mid 1970s.

As for the Greek community, much of the immigration occurred just before and during the Quiet Revolution. The community was therefore able to take advantage of new state policies and funding to maximize the scope of its organizations while minimizing the need to draw upon the community's own funds. Government policies and regulations which other groups, such as the Jews, have interpreted as government takeover of their institutions, have been seen by the Greeks as an opportunity to expand the range of services provided to the members of their group. In terms of organizational style, the Greek community has been willing to see state institutions as their partners in the provision of services to community members.

As we can see, while both the Jewish and Greek communities look to their ethnic institutions to mediate between their communities and the state, they have evolved a significantly different organizational style. Compared either to the Italian community, whose emphasis is on integration, or the Hutterite community, whose emphasis is on segregation, however, the Jewish and Greek communities

show many similarities. Integration, mediation, and segregation do not determine the organizational style of a community, then, but when different groups face similar kinds of problems in trying to achieve similar goals, they may evolve similar sets of strategies and practices.

Since the development and transformations of an ethnic community's organizational style often involves a pattern of relations with the state, we now turn in the next chapter to an examination of the state and its relations with ethnic communities.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE EVOLUTION OF ETHNIC COMMUNITY
ORGANIZATION

Fredrik Barth (1969b) suggested that the social organization of ethnic groups is a product of the pattern of interactions and inter-relations among them. Yet interactions among ethnic groups do not occur in a socio-political or economic vacuum. They evolve within a particular political, economic, and social context. Nor are ethnic group relations limited to interactions with other ethnic groups; such interactions are themselves part of a complex set of overlapping group relations, including class and gender relations (Stasiulis, 1990). The preliminary examination of ethnic community action and organizational style presented in the previous chapter suggested that relations with the state can also play a crucial role in generating the organizational structures, practices, and strategies characteristic of ethnic groups (see also Brass, 1985a; Breton, 1984, 1986, 1989; Rosenberg and Jedwab, 1992).

The social organization of an ethnic group is likely to be affected by its relations with the state because the legislative and regulative actions of the state often

constitute the context for ethnic group organization, mobilization, and action. In the case of Canada, federal and provincial policies and initiatives, such as immigration and refugee admission policies, employment equity programs, and human rights agencies have had a significant impact on who comes to Canada, their circumstances upon arrival, and many other facets of their lives.

Breton (1984) has suggested that the Canadian state also manages intergroup relations among various ethnic groups. At one time, the state supported and maintained the political, economic, and cultural domination of the two charter groups (Porter, 1965). To some extent this is still true today, most notably in the role played by the Quebec government in promoting and protecting the linguistic, educational, and economic rights and privileges of the province's francophone majority. With the implementation of multicultural policies during the 1970s, there also began what Breton (1984) has called a redistribution of "symbolic resources" among Canada's ethnic groups. Whether federal or provincial, such policies have had a significant impact upon how ethnic communities have organized and changed.

This chapter will look at the state and its relations with ethnic groups in order to gain a more complete

understanding of how ethnicity is organized in Canadian society. The goal is to examine how state actions and state policies affect the ethnic community, its leadership, and its constituent organizations; as well as how state actions and state policies reflect the influence of the ethnic community, its leadership and its constituent organizations. A preliminary, yet crucial, question must first be addressed at length, however: How are we to conceive of state organization and state action?

The State

Reference to the state brings into play two distinct, yet interrelated, analytical notions: that of the state as a set of institutions, agencies, and agents; and that of the state as a set of social relationships.

Institutionally, a modern state such as Canada is (Stasiulis 1988: 228) "a complex of interacting institutions which includes the government, public service, military and police, judiciary, subcentral government and various national, provincial and local assemblies." Together, these "interacting institutions" consist of institutional agents and agencies that successfully claim to coordinate, regulate and legitimate the diverse components which constitute a particular territorial

'nation.'

Held (1989) presents a similar view of the state, though in his case the emphasis is upon the lack of consistent interests, goals or actions among state agents. The state is a "cluster of agencies, departments, tiers and levels, each with their own rules and resources and often with varying purposes and objectives" (Held, 1989:2). As such, the state is not some unified whole with a consistent structure and integrated policy but a fragmented set of discrete agencies and agents which act in different ways, at different times, and for different reasons. This "fragmentation" of the state, Held also suggests, reflects the fragmentation of modern society, a point to be taken up later in this chapter.

Fragmented or not, the institutions and agencies which make up the state are organized around the structural principle of the 'legitimate' exercise of power and authority by state agents. State institutions are produced and reproduced through power relations. This means that the form of the state itself, its organizational "configuration" (Skocpol, 1985), the boundaries between the state and civil society, its mode of action, and its various relationships with segments of civil society, are all based on and reproduced through particular patterns of

power relations. Various sorts of power relations have been identified by social scientists as characteristic of the state: political relations, as in state relations with citizens (Held, 1989); bureaucratic relations, as in the regulations and procedures put into place and followed by state officials (Weber, 1978a, Skocpol, 1985); the control and use of "legitimate" violence (Weber, 1978a; Giddens, 1987); parapolitical relations, as in the competition among interest groups for control over the means of access to and influence upon state officials (Geertz, 1973); and control over those means of information which allows the state to monitor its citizens (Giddens, 1987).

Organized as they are around differentials in power, relations between an ethnic community and the state are not symmetrical (Breton and Stasiulis, 1980). It is the actions and interests of the state that usually set the agenda for relations with ethnic groups. But this does not mean that the relations between an ethnic community and the state must always take the form of either resistance or subservience. Rather, such relations are characterized by what Giddens (1984) has called the "dialectic of control." "All forms of dependence," Giddens (1984: 14) contends, "offer some resources whereby those who are subordinate can influence the activities of their superiors." In a nation

such as Canada, the dialectic of control allows for, and in fact encourages, ethnic groups to organize and mobilize collective action on their behalf. Precisely because state policies are so consequential, Canada's ethnic groups work to influence the formulation of those policies. The result, as Breton (1989: 40) has suggested, is that "State institutions and ethnic communities are in a situation of interdependence ... and multicultural policies, including those pertaining to institutional mechanisms, should be analyzed as interorganizational phenomena." The dialectic of control is part of a broader set of dialectical relations whereby both the state and an ethnic community respond to and affect one another, in a "two way process of power and influence" (Breton, 1989: 40).

Conceiving the State

If the study of ethnicity is marginal to much contemporary sociological work, the same cannot be said of interest in the state. The study of the state has been at the very core of mainstream sociological work from the time of Max Weber (1978a) until today. Yet as Held (1989: 11) has noted, "the nature of the state is hard to grasp." There remain a significant number of theoretical difficulties in conceiving the state which lead to

extensive debate and disagreement among social scientists. This section will address three specific issues essential to an understanding of the state and its relations with ethnic groups.

The first of these issues is to examine how and where the state fits into the rest of society, i.e., the problem of the boundaries between the state and civil society. Is the state an identifiable 'entity' discrete from and different from civil society as has been assumed by liberal political philosophy since Hobbes? Or is the state, as Held (1989) has argued, itself embedded in society?

A second issue has to do with the nature and patterns of state action. Who makes decisions? How are they carried out, and by whom? The issue of state action is usually formulated as the issue of state "autonomy," although as Skocpol (1985) has shown, understanding state action also raises important questions concerning what she calls state "capacity."

The third issue is to provide an account of how "the structures and activities of states ...influence the formation of groups and the political capacities, ideas, and demands of various sectors of society" (Skocpol, 1985: 21). Generating such a "configurational" account of state-society relations has been a goal of contemporary analysts of the state such as Cairns (1988), Evans, Rueschmeyer, and

Skocpol (1985b), Held (1989), Simeon and Robinson (1990), and Skocpol (1985).

i. The Boundaries of the State

How do we differentiate the state from the rest of society? There is little question that a modern state pervades and intervenes in the rest of society. There are few aspects of life in Canadian society which are not regulated, monitored or controlled by one or another level of the state (Panitch, 1977). How then do we differentiate between the state and the other sectors of society under its control or influence?

A course followed by a number of recent theorists is to drop the distinction between state and civil society and to treat the state instead as an intrinsic part of society (Frankel, 1983; Giddens, 1987; Held, 1989). The state, as Held (1989: 2) puts it, is "embedded in particular socio-economic systems" and it cannot be treated as distinct from those systems. This means that the state is not only a set of institutions or agencies but embodies a set of relationships with the other sectors of society. The education system, for example, is both a part of the state and a part of the local community, and one cannot understand education in Quebec, for example, without

examining the overlapping sets of institutions and relationships which make up the educational sector.

Held provides what Skocpol (1985) calls a dialectical, configurational approach to the state. As Held (1989: 1) puts it, "the state is enmeshed in the political structures of 'society' - of groups, classes and institutions (formal and informal) - and the ...latter in turn are shaped by the state." Held (1989: 1) goes farther and suggests that the boundary between state and society is no more than a conceptual boundary whereby "for analytical purposes ... [we] single out aspects ...for detailed consideration."

Still, even if the boundary between the state and society is a conceptual one, state institutions can be differentiated from other institutions. State institutions may influence and be influenced by an ethnic community, but such institutions are not a part of the community, nor is the community itself as an ethnic community a part of the state structure. The relations between the two - at least in Canada - do not usually take this form.¹

That there are different modes of power relations

¹Native demands for self-government and entrenched aboriginal rights, of course, would change this for native communities, which would become a distinct level of the state. Also, the Quebec state publicly and officially identifies itself with the aspirations and goals of the francophone majority. Nevertheless, the Quebec state is not equivalent to the francophone community.

means that state institutions and state agents differ in how, where, and when they interact with or control other segments of society. In addition, Giddens' notion of the duality of power mentioned earlier ties the exercise of state power irremediably into sets of relations with civil society. In a modern nation-state, Giddens (1987: 201) suggests:

the mobilization of social activities via the expansion of [administrative resources] necessarily increases the reciprocal relations between those who govern and those who are governed. The more reciprocity is involved, the greater the possibilities the dialectic of control offers subordinate groups to influence the rulers.

When we look at the place of state institutions within civil society, we see that not all state institutions are equally and identically embedded within civil society. Some state institutions are clearly core institutions central to the decision-making or administrative apparatus of the state, such as Parliament or the Treasury Board. Such institutions are usually considered and treated as distinct and separate from civil society. When people refer to the state, they usually mean such a set of core institutions which regulate, coordinate and order the rest of society. But in addition to these core institutions there are other

sorts of institutions through which the state penetrates civil society. There are institutions which are directly controlled by the state, such as crown corporations; and there are those where control is shared with other segments of society, such as educational institutions. We can therefore distinguish among at least three types of state institutions: core state institutions, state controlled institutions, and what can be called interactive state institutions.

Civil society, too, can penetrate the state, as in Habermas' (1991) notion of the "public sphere." As discussed by Habermas, the public sphere is both a process and an ideology. As process it is the open and free debate and discussion among citizens on matters of collective interest. As ideology it is the identification of a "public" having rights, interests, and an institutional "space" separate from that of either the state or of private life. Habermas equates this ideology of the "public" with that of the 18th century bourgeoisie who assumed that public opinion emerged through free, informed, and rational discourse.

Civil society penetrates the state as well in more organized ways, as when interest groups engage in political and parapolitical action, lobbying, and public relations.

Geertz (1973: 316) describes parapolitics as those political processes which unfold outside of the formal political procedures and channels of the state. Parapolitical relations, then, are most likely to be significant outside of the core state institutions, particularly in interactive state institutions, such as educational institutions.

To summarize, the state and civil society necessarily interpenetrate and we cannot fully understand either without taking into account the other. Yet if the state per se is not distinct from society, not all state institutions, agencies or agents are implicated in society in the same manner. In particular, it is important to remember that relations between core state institutions and the rest of society are not symmetrical; such institutions are organized around, and claim to have a legitimate monopoly upon, power relations. Core state institutions claim to regulate and coordinate other social institutions and public social relations among individuals and groups. Such claims, as sociologists from Weber to Giddens have argued, are presented as law and backed up by force. In this sense state institutions do differ from other social institutions and it continues to make sense to refer to the state and to state relations with the rest of society.

ii The State as an Agent

If it makes sense to refer to the state as a complex of institutions, it also makes sense to refer to state actions and to examine the origin, nature, and consequences of such actions. Since the 1970s, the issue of state action has largely been raised in the context of ongoing discussions and debates on the nature of state autonomy. Those who argue in favour of such autonomy maintain that, "states ...are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups" (Skocpol, 1985: 9), but that state agents act on their own (which is sometimes held to mean everyone's) interests.

Skocpol (1985) has developed a model of the state which complements the concept of state autonomy with that of a state's capacity to act. The form and degree of autonomy, for example, may be related to (Skocpol, 1985: 9), "the extranational orientation of states, the challenges they may face in maintaining domestic order, and the organizational resources that collectivities of state officials may be able to draw upon and deploy." Central to Skocpol's position is her claim that civil service administrators are often in a better position to set policy than are politicians or interest groups and that these policies reflect the concerns of such administrators with

"the perceived failings of previous policy" and "the government bureaucracy's own conception of what it has been doing" (Skocpol, 1985: 11-12, quoting Heclo).

That it is usually state officials who routinely initiate and formulate policy does not mean that these policies will be carried out successfully or that they will have the intended results. According to Skocpol, this means that state autonomy is connected to, but should not be confused with, state capacity. For this reason, Evans, Rueschmeyer, and Skocpol (1985b: 353) argue in favour of "finely-tuned analyses [to] probe actual state organizations in relation to one another, in relation to past policy initiatives, and in relation to the domestic and transnational contexts of state activity." These analyses should be (Evans, Rueschmeyer, and Skocpol, 1985b: 355), "dialectical analyses that allow for non-zero-sum processes and complex interactions between state and society."

While Skocpol's approach to the state claims to correct some deficiencies in the work of both neo-Marxists and neo-Weberians, it also loses the systematic character of their analyses of the state. Skocpol's "finely-tuned" approach is rich in data and emphasizes historical variations by focusing upon changing economic and political

circumstances and processes. However, such an approach tends to generate ad hoc explanations of state actions and of state relations with civil society tied to particular empirical events.

The problem, however, may reside in the notion of state agency itself. By focusing only on what may be termed concrete social practices, Skocpol's approach loses sight of the structural relations these concrete social practices reproduce (Held, 1989: 70). It is this which neo-Marxists seek to retain in examining how the state reproduces class relations, and which Giddens (1987) seeks to retain when he examines how states reproduce power relations. The concepts of autonomy and capacity do not explain state action, they merely describe some of the circumstances which make possible particular actions initiated by particular sets of actors.

The approach taken here, as noted earlier, is that state relations are power relations. Even class and gender relations are transformed into political relations vis a vis the state. This is also true for ethnic group relations with the state. Still, other than the special case of the Native peoples, ethnic groups have no formal part in the structure of the state. In that respect, ethnic groups, like classes, exert much of their influence outside the

formal structures and political processes of the state. Unlike classes, however, ethnic groups in Canada are acknowledged and treated by the state as collective, corporate groups. Indeed, the two charter groups, along with the Native peoples, have specific rights set out and protected by the constitution. For the most part, though, ethnic groups have legislative and regulative entitlements rather than constitutional rights. So, for example, most ethnic groups in Quebec have no collective educational rights entrenched in the constitution, but they are allowed to establish and operate their own private schools and some receive provincial government subsidies to support those schools.

Some state relations with ethnic groups incorporate formal political processes. More usually, however, they take the form of informal, parapolitical relations primarily organized around specific state policies, legislation, and regulations concerned with ethnic group rights and entitlements. The impact of these relations are thus primarily organizational and, as Breton (1989: 40) noted, such relations can best be understood as "interorganizational phenomena" rather than as the initiatives of specific state agents. It is these interorganizational relations which give rise to and are reproduced through concrete social practices and

strategies, rather than the other way around. Any analysis of state agency or of the actions of specific state agents (or of ethnic community action for that matter) needs to be put in the context of these broader organizational relations. We need, then, an organizational approach to state relations in order to identify how, when, and why ethnic groups deal with the state.

iii. The Organizational Configuration of the State

Skocpol's (1985) seminal essay on "bringing the state back in" attempts to formulate such an organizational approach. Skocpol suggests that the state be treated as an "organizational configuration" which gives a shape to the kinds of actions which are undertaken and the ongoing pattern of relationships between the state and society. In this perspective, Skocpol says, (1985: 21):

states matter ... because their organizational configurations, along with their overall patterns of activity, affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group formation and collective political actions (but not others), and make possible the raising of certain political issues (but not others).

This allows a reconception of state activity in terms of the, "sites of more or less independent and effective

official actions [as] a key aspect of organizational configurations and overall patterns of activity" (Skocpol, 1985: 21). Rather than attending to the individual autonomy or capacity of agents, "the investigator looks macroscopically at the ways in which the structures and activities of states unintentionally influence the formation of groups and the political capacities, ideas, and demands of various sectors of society."

Such an approach is particularly suited to the case of Canada because Canadian society and the Canadian state have evolved together since 1867 in a way which is not true for societies where state structures preceded modernization or where state structures were imposed by colonial powers. This has allowed the state to penetrate Canadian society more than has been the case in many other nations. In the United States, for example, a legacy of the revolutionary war was to encourage the formulation of constitutional limitations on the powers of the state. Similarly, 18th and 19th century European liberals sought to differentiate the state from society. In contrast, Canada did not really constitute a state until well after Confederation, only slowly evolving the full apparatus of a modern state. This means that Canadians' understanding of the state and their political control upon it, too, has evolved and modified

over time. In this respect, most Canadians have not seen the state as inherently oppressive, and have been willing to go along with the expansion of state power both at the federal and provincial levels. The range of powers currently exercised by the Quebec government, for example, goes far beyond anything specified in the BNA act (Bell, 1987).

Using a configurational approach, Skocpol (1985: 22) makes the point that political and constitutional concepts - or the political culture - articulate the lines along which political interests and political cleavages form and are transformed into political actions. Politics, then, is not simply competition among interest groups since interest groups are themselves the product of political structures. As such (Skocpol, 1985: 23, quoting Suzanne Berger), "students of Western European countries find that 'the timing and characteristics of state intervention' affect 'not only organizational tactics and strategies,' but 'the content and definition of interest itself,' with the result that each European nation, according to the historical sequence and forms of the state's social and economic interventions, has a distinctive configuration of interests active in politics."

As presented by Skocpol, a configurational approach

can be used either to argue for the primacy of a consensual political culture or to identify the axes along which interest groups are differentiated. In discussing Canada's constitution, for example, Cairns (1988: 12) presents a consensual view of Canada's political culture:

A functioning constitution for an historic people such as Canadians is more than an instrumental arrangement of the machinery of government. It is also a set of internalized rules and norms that structures the behaviour of citizens and office holders. It embodies conceptions of community that help mould citizen identities, and it makes a potent contribution to the symbolic order from which Canadians seek recognition and affirmation of their various identities and values.

Cairns goes so far as to suggest that Canada's constitutional and political arrangements have a significant impact upon the identity and sense of self of individuals. An obvious example would be the identification with the Quebec state on the part of many Quebecois. Whether this is as true for an Italian-Canadian businessman or a new immigrant from Hong Kong as it is for a Quebecois politician, is, however, doubtful.

Simeon and Robinson take a different view of the social impact of state structures and constitutional arrangements. Their work, for example, considers the impact

the division of the Canadian state into a central and several provincial governments has in promoting differences among Canadians (Simeon and Robinson, 1990: 11):

The enduring impact of the federal structure of the Canadian state has been to make it easier to organize and mobilize collectivities that are territorially concentrated than those which are not. This is one of several reasons why ethnic and other differences that are regionally based have been more dominant in Canada than have class differences.

Simeon and Robinson (1990: 16) assert that a configurational approach by itself is inadequate because such an approach cannot explain change: "Changes are not the result of the internal logic of institutions; rather they derive from the interaction of the institutions and the underlying society." Even if one shifts the level of analysis from the institutional to that of the political culture in general, then one must still be attentive to the "dialectical relationship between culture and institutions" (Simeon and Robinson, 1990: 16).

The Dialectic of State and Society

Skocpol, too, argues in favour of a dialectical view of the relationship between state and society. Yet her discussion of this relationship emphasizes the role of the

state and provides something of a state-centered model of political and parapolitical processes. For example, Skocpol (1985: 24) suggests that, "state structures, established interest groups, and oppositional groups all mirror one another's form of organization and scopes of purpose." This suggests that it is the state's structures which are shaping the form taken by interest and oppositional groups and that the organizational forms and political practices of civil society are treated as subordinate to state structures.

A state-centered model of social relations has its limitations. For example, as Simeon and Robinson have noted, it fails to adequately account for social or political change. Oppositional and other interest groups may usually "play the game" by the state's rules, but there may be times when such groups must purposely reject existing political arrangements if they are to accomplish their goals. Take feminism as an example. A state-centered approach does not allow us to understand how feminist concerns arose as political issues, much less how such concerns came to be acted upon, or how feminist groups were able to transform the existing political culture. Feminists are an important contemporary example of a group seeking to achieve their goals by explicitly rejecting the prevailing

political culture, a process which cannot be accounted for solely by making use of a state-centered, configurational approach.

The problem goes beyond issues of political and social change, however. State structures and oppositional groups cannot simply "mirror" one another because state relations are power relations. The state, as Brass (1985: 26) noted, "is itself both a resource and a distributor of resources." As such, the state is as much a "differentiating force" as it is a source of political "norms" and social cohesion (Brass, 1985; Held, 1989).

In what sense, then, can we assert that state relations with civil society are dialectical? The key may reside in a crucial characteristic which Held (1989: 47) ascribes to the modern state: that "social struggle is 'inscribed' into the organization, administration and policies of the state." State structures not only give a shape to the organization of civil society, they are the product of such organization. As an example, Held (1989: 48) argues that British parliamentary forms "themselves are the outcome of conflicts over the old powers of the monarchy, landed nobility and bourgeoisie." It is because social struggle is "inscribed" in state structures that state practices reproduce the structural relations of a

society. The state, says Held (1989: 1), "is enmeshed in the political structures of 'society' - of groups, classes and institutions (formal and informal) - and the ...latter in turn are shaped by the state."

This has a number of consequences, two of which are important for our purposes, that the state is "fragmented," and that it is "ambiguous." Both of these characteristics, Held seems to suggest, reproduce what he considers a fundamental feature of the relations between state and society.

i. The Fragmentation of the State

The contemporary state, Held asserts, is fragmented because society itself is fragmented. A modern society is one in which different groups divide along multiple axes of diverse interests and distinctive identities. Race, class, gender, occupation, language, and religion are some of the differences among groups which can become relevant in differentiating among them. The fragmentation of the state, then, reflects the nature of modern society with its multiplex and overlapping groups, interests and identities. It is also compatible with the bureaucratic forms taken by a modern state, in which distinct state agencies with specific areas of jurisdiction operate with a high division

of administrative labour.

This experience of the state as fragmented reflects a particularly significant feature of the state in Canada. Canada's federal system of one central and several provincial governments which divide constitutional powers has promoted regional and cultural disunity (Bell and Tepperman, 1979) along with divided loyalties among many Canadians. Cairns (1988) argues that this fragmentation has lead to the creation of multiple political and bureaucratic elites which compete for resources and influence and which help to drive the expansion of the state. In addition to the active role taken by these elites, Cairns (1988: 150) also suggests that it "is impossible to think clearly about Canadian federalism without devoting extensive attention to the one million Canadians parcelled out in eleven jurisdictions and committed by loyalty, the terms of their employment, and self-interest to the particular governments they serve." Not only is the state fragmented along social axes, then, but also by interests specific to government jurisdictions and the conflicts among their elites.

If the state is fragmented, then it may be that state actions reflect no consistent policy and embody no cohesive sets of interests. It may be that most state actions are the outcome of procedures already in place, bureaucratic

convenience, internal power struggles, and contradictory external pressures from conflicting groups. This is not to deny that state policies and actions have very significant effects, but to reject a functionalist notion of the state as acting on either consciously acknowledged or immanently unfolding needs. One can then examine state action without making any assumptions about either social cohesion or state cohesion.

The state, then, is neither a monolithic oppressor, nor is it simply there for the taking by competing ethnic or interest groups. The agents and agencies of the state have interests of their own, but they are not always clear or may disagree on what those interests are; may not always be in a position to carry out their desires; may have alternative loyalties and alternative social ties which are separate from their identity as representatives of the state. Even when acting in their own interests, it must often make sense for them to try to anticipate and modify the possible reactions on the part of influential members or groups in civil society.

How can the state continue to operate if it fails either to generate or carry out clear-cut goals? It may be that the state operates very well this way, allowing for and giving play to the conflicting demands placed upon it

by a fragmented society and reproduced through structurally ambiguous institutions.

ii. The Ambiguity of the State

The fragmentation of the state which has both social struggle and the symbols of identity inscribed within it promotes what Held (1989) calls the "ambiguity" of the state. The state may reproduce social relations, but, says Held (1989: 76), "the multiplicity of economic and electoral constraints on state action and regime survival ...means that the state is not an unambiguous agent of capitalist reproduction." Nor of other sorts of relations, such as political, ethnic or gender relations.

Building on Held's comments, we can see in the ambiguity of state reproduction a more general case of ambiguity in state structures. The state is ambiguous in a number of ways: in that multiple and conflicting meanings are inscribed within the state; in the absence of clear cut structural principles around which social practices are organized; and in the need for state agents to work up strategies and practices on the bases of their interpretations of their interests and those of their constituencies. These three forms of ambiguity - which will be called configurational, structural, and interpretive

ambiguity respectively - are central to the symbolic, organizational, and strategic relations between state and society.²

Configurational ambiguity is built into state structures in a democratic society in terms of the competing meanings assigned to the state. The state governs, yet at the same time it 'represents' the will and aspirations of its citizens. State agents claim to be attuned to the varied and conflicting demands made upon the state by different segments of the public, yet these agents also claim to initiate, coordinate, monitor, and modify their actions in line with consistent and carefully considered state policies and goals.

One example of configurational ambiguity in this sense is the Canadian constitution. A constitution is not only a piece of legislation like any other but is a central, symbolic instrument of government. In this respect, Canada's constitution is clearly an ambiguous instrument, one which has different meanings to different Canadians. The meaning of the constitution and its symbolic connotations are not the same to a Native activist as they are to a Quebecois separatist; they are not the same to an Alberta business executive as they are to an anglophone

²These three types of ambiguity are ideal types differentiated for analytical purposes. The ambiguity of modern state structures is an amalgam of all three.

Montrealer. It is these multiple meanings which have helped make the attempt to reform the constitution in recent years so difficult. Different Canadians have different expectations of the constitution and a different image of the kind of country and political system they want.

Structural ambiguity, in contrast, is an organizational feature of the state and of its relations with civil society. Given the fragmentation of civil society and of the state as well as the multiplex and conflicting group interests which are simultaneously at work, many state institutions come to be characterized by the lack of clear and distinct structural relations or social practices among state institutions and state agents. In effect, the institutions come to lack clear and distinct boundaries to differentiate them from other state or public institutions.

An example would be the local community health centre, the Centre Local de Services Communautaire (CLSC), established within Quebec's health sector. The CLSC overlaps with other institutions designed to provide outpatient health services, such as hospital emergency rooms, social service agencies, or private clinics operated by physicians. Whatever the intentions when it was established, the actions of competing interest groups has

had the effect of adding the CLSC into the mix of available health care options rather than serving as a distinct and identifiable component within a clearly differentiated health care system (White, 1988).

The CLSC is an example of an interactive state institution, but structural ambiguity can also be found within core state institutions. Indeed, the constitution, for example, serves not only as a symbolic instrument, it also reproduces the structural ambiguity of the Canadian state. Conflicting interests are inscribed in the constitution, as in the provisions which protect the religious educational rights of Catholics and Protestants in Quebec. These provisions produced a structurally ambiguous educational system, to be discussed in Chapter Five, in which the distinctions between religious and public schools, as well as between private and public schools, were blurred. Moreover, by its ambiguous division of powers between the federal and provincial governments, the constitution also perpetuates and legitimates political divisions and fosters the fragmentation both of the state and of civil society.

Being both configurationally and structurally ambiguous, the constitution is also interpretatively ambiguous. It requires ongoing interpretation over what can

or cannot be done, and has often led to attempts to implement contradictory policies. Cairns (1988) argues, however, that the constitution works quite well this way. As Cairns (1988: 38) puts it, "The search for the contemporary meaning of the constitution does not consist in minute examination of what was said or intended or achieved a century ago." Instead, "the constitution is constantly interpreted and modified by the men who work it" (Cairns, 1988: 39).

This is true not only for the constitution but for the state as a whole. Since social structure is produced and reproduced through social practices and strategies, state agents do not merely follow rules or procedures, they are continuously "working at" (Glaser and Strauss, 1965) the bases of social structure, appraising and evaluating how procedures, rules and regulations should be followed, modified, or ignored, both in terms of their own interests and those of the constituencies with which they must deal. State institutions may thus also be interpretatively ambiguous in the sense that the social practices out of which they are constituted are neither directed towards nor reflect the interests of any one paramount group. This has institutional consequences in that the goals towards which state institutions and agents may be directed are either

contradictory or shifting, altering as do relations with an institution's different constituencies.

The notion of structural ambiguity is not the same as that of structural contradictions, which as Giddens (1984) notes, implies perverse effects. Taking the CLSC as an example, the issue is not that the CLSC has had perverse effects which undercut the intentions of its planners, but that it has failed to evolve the distinctive role with Quebec's health care system which was initially envisioned for it. Too many individuals and groups had a vested interest in preserving the existing structures and procedures. Ambiguity need not be the outcome of unintended, perverse effects, but may be desired and promoted by some of the parties involved in decision-making or in responding to the decisions made by others.

The fragmentation of the state and the structural ambiguity of its institutions are fundamental to the dialectical relations between state and society. These relations reflects neither some thought out 'plan,' set of societal needs, nor the inexorable working out of some inherent structural principles. The 'logic' of political and parapolitical practice so to speak, does not follow either course. Rather, ambiguity in state structures opens up spaces, which we can view as both structures of

opportunity and structures of constraint (Breton, 1978a: 148). How ethnic groups work to 'fill-in' these spaces is the issue to which we now turn.

Ethnicity and the State

In line with the approach articulated above of a fragmented, structurally ambiguous state, understanding ethnic group relations with the state requires an approach that not only pays attention to what states provide but to what they lack; not only to the presence of state institutions and policies but to their absence; not only to how the political culture incorporates social groups but also to how they are excluded.

One concept which helps to get across this sense of the state as a particular combination of both presence and absence is that of the state as an "administrative space"; a term borrowed from Giddens (1981). To the degree that the state governs, it intervenes — explicitly and purposefully — in the lives of its citizens and the groups, organizations, and communities they form. Where it intervenes and where it is absent, what it sees as being the business of the state, and what it sees as none of its business, constitutes the state as an administrative space.

The term administrative space as used here is not on y

the extension of an administrative apparatus over some territory but also over social space. Its topography is formed not only of geographic features but also out of the symbolic, strategic and organizational practices of the state and its agents. It is the state as an administrative space which gives a shape to ethnic groups symbolically (in terms of how ethnic identities come to be understood and used by individuals), strategically (in terms of ethnic group action, especially political and parapolitical action) and organizationally (in terms of the community's organizational style).³

Differentiating among symbolic, strategic, and organizational relations allows us to identify different sorts of relations between the state and civil society, rather than treat as equivalent such disparate matters as the role of the constitution in the political culture, the emergence of bureaucratic linkages between state agencies and ethnic organizations, and the conditions which foster concerted political actions among ethnic community members. While each case may indeed involve relations between the state and civil society, understanding the symbolic role of the state is not equivalent to examining the organizational

³Again, these three types of relations between state and society - symbolic, organizational, and strategic - are ideal types. Each is implicated, to a greater or lesser extent, in all relations between segments of the state and segments of civil society.

links between state agents and lobby groups. As we consider the symbolic, strategic, and organizational relations between the state and ethnic communities, it is important to differentiate each of these sorts of relations as well as to identify the political, economic, and cultural contexts within which these relations evolve.

Ethnic groups can also be differentiated by their degree of formal integration or participation in, or recognition by, state structures. As a consequence of federal and provincial multicultural policies, Canada's ethnic groups in general are acknowledged by government to be distinct communities, albeit in the very specific sense of cultural communities. To the degree that they are so acknowledged, ethnic interests will be "vested" in state institutions (Breton, 1989). By vested interests, Breton (1989: 36) refers to the "routine consideration" of ethnic interests by state agents, whether through formal or informal contacts and mechanisms. Not all ethnic communities, however, are in a position to ensure that their interests are taken into consideration, nor do all necessarily seek to attain such consideration. As Breton (1989: 48) puts it:

...the interests that are likely to become vested in societal institutions are those that are related to

sets of opportunities or threats and that come from communities able to mobilize the resources available and convert them into influence on the relevant centers of decision making.

In addition to these sorts of ongoing interorganizational relations which can evolve with ethnic communities, the state may also formally acknowledge for some groups a set of specific, special, and limited rights and privileges, as is the case of the constitutional and other rights assigned to Canada's Native peoples. An ethnic group may also succeed in "appropriating" the state apparatus (Breton, 1986), as in the case of the Quebec state which has explicitly and legislatively defined itself as a collective instrument of the francophone Quebecois.

Given the complex relations and interrelations between ethnic groups and the state, the following discussion will merely highlight those issues relevant to the political and parapolitical context of symbolic, strategic, and organizational relations. Other important issues, such as the economic context of state relations with ethnic groups, are therefore outside the scope of the present discussion.⁴

⁴Stasiulis (1980) provides a political economy of state relations with ethnic groups which discusses some of these other issues, such as the impact of both the state and economic forces on the residential patterns of an ethnic group.

The State and Ethnic Identity

The issue of the symbolic links between the ethnic community and the state, especially the role of the state in the formation and distribution of symbolic resources, has been addressed by two social scientists, Brass (1985) and Breton (1984).

Brass (1985: 29) presents a systematic model of the role of the state in inter-ethnic relations which treats the state as a differentiating force, "a prize and resource over which groups engage in a continuing struggle." It is this competition for control over administrative, material and symbolic resources which Brass sees as the key to understanding ethnic identity formation. As he puts it (Brass, 1985: 30):

When elites in conflict lack the bureaucratic apparatus or the instruments of violence to compete effectively, they will use symbolic resources in the struggle. When elites in conflict come from different cultural, linguistic, or religious groups, the symbolic resources used will emphasize those differences.

Brass suggests that ethnic identity becomes relevant when and if ethnic symbols can be used by the members of an elite to gain competitive advantage. He develops a model of how the state is used by contending elites depending upon

the types of elites in contention. For example, are they religious, aristocratic or commercial elites; are they composed largely of locals or of alien conquerors? In the case of the state too, Brass identifies a number of options. The state may remain neutral in the conflicts among ethnic groups, it may actively support one particular ethnic group and its elite, or it may seek to assimilate ethnic groups and reduce conflict.

In the case of "mid-20th century Quebec," for example, Brass (1985: 39) identifies three competing elites: a "local religious elite," a "local secular elite," and an "external ethnic elite." As for the state, Brass asserts that the state, depending upon the historical period, tended either to be neutral or to support one side. Unfortunately, Brass does not discuss this case, so it is difficult to know what he means by an "external" ethnic elite. Does this refer to the anglophone elite within Quebec, to Canadians outside Quebec, or to the foreign owners of Quebec corporations? Moreover, to which state does Brass assign the role of being neutral or of supporting one side, the Quebec state or the Canadian?

Brass' approach is a society-centered one in Skocpol's terminology, one which subordinates consideration of either the state or ethnic groups to the analysis of elites and

the competition among them. This is an important topic, but it certainly does not exhaust the relevance of the state for understanding ethnic group formation.

Nevertheless Brass' work makes two important points. Like Barth (1969), Brass pays attention to the context of inter-ethnic relations in ethnic identity formation. Just as we should not ignore the role of the state in the evolution of an ethnic community, so too we should not lose sight of the role played by relations with other ethnic groups or the ways in which the two sets of relations may commingle. Also, Brass points out the special role played by elites in formulating and mobilizing ethnic community organization and action. The 'ethnic community' as perceived and dealt with by state agents may often consist of such elites and the organizations they control.

Breton's approach to the role of the state is more comprehensive, although he does not try to generate the sort of systematic model of state relations with ethnic groups which Brass attempts. Instead, Breton examines the interorganizational relations between the state and ethnic groups both from the point of view of state actions and intentions as the distributor of symbolic resources (Breton, 1984; 1986) and from the point of view of the ethnic group and its capacity to respond to (Breton, 1991)

or appropriate (Breton, 1989) state policy.

In his discussions of the role of the state, Breton (1984) argues that the state plays a crucial role in the production of what he calls the "cultural-symbolic capital of a society," through the "allocation ...of social status or recognition among various segments of the society," and in maintaining the integrity, and managing the display, of the symbolic system.

The ability of the state to manage the symbolic system, however, is limited by such factors as the capacity of the state or the development of unintended and sometimes contradictory consequences. It is also affected by the state's ongoing pattern of relations with particular ethnic groups, which may cooperate with the state in its attempt to manage the symbolic system, may resist state initiatives, or may simply remain indifferent. Since different ethnic groups are likely to respond to the state in different ways, the state may be faced with all three possibilities.

Not all segments of society are equally implicated in political structures, share equally in the political culture, or have equal access to state agents. Not all Canadians, for example, look to the constitution or to state structures for "recognition and affirmation of their

various identities and values" (Cairns, 1988: 12). Others may look, but not find what they seek. Breton has noted that some groups may find themselves alienated from existing institutions. "Individuals expect to recognize themselves in public institutions," Breton (1986: 31) says, "otherwise [they] feel that they are strangers in society, that the society is not their society." In such circumstances, individuals may organize either to transform the existing institutions, as feminists have, or reject these institutions entirely and seek new political structures, as in the case of Quebecois separatists. This, in turn, may lead authorities to intervene. State officials may then generate strategies to alter the political culture to make it more inclusive or to alter those circumstances of particular groups which have led to alienation (Breton, 1986: 32).

If individuals are to feel that state structures and institutions are "theirs" the state will incorporate as many of the various symbols, strategies and practices as possible which will allow citizens to identify with the state. This means that not only "struggle" is "inscribed" in the state. So too are the symbols of identity. Moreover, not all politics consists of conflict and not all parapolitics centers on resistance or struggle.

Negotiation, accommodation, cooptation – the varieties of politics and parapolitics are many. Each of these forms of power relations and conflict resolution can be “inscribed” in state institutions.

Pluralism, or at least the ideals of pluralism, can also be inscribed in state institutions, as is the case with Canada's federal multicultural policy. This policy, however, was developed in the larger context of social changes and political policies which have made it both ambiguous and contradictory (Rosenberg, 1995; Stasiulis, 1980). Breton (1984: 134) suggests that this larger context has been the attempt by the federal government at the “reconstruction of the symbolic system and ... the redistribution of social status among linguistic and ethnocultural groups in Canadian society.” Since the establishment of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1963, this has largely consisted of an attempt to promote a feeling among francophone Canadians that Canada and its state institutions are “theirs.” The identification of Canada as officially bilingual, the high status and power given to elected Quebec politicians in the federal government, and the attempts to ‘renew’ federalism – largely in response to Quebec's demands – have all been part of this process.

Because group status is relative, Breton argues that these attempts to enhance francophone identification with Canada generated "identification and status concerns" among some of the non-charter ethnic groups. Some members of these groups came to feel that they were being treated as second-class citizens, less "Canadian" than British or French Canadians. The official policy of multiculturalism was in part devised to defuse "status anxieties" and "cultural tensions" among these ethnic groups (Breton, 1984: 134 - 136), to suggest that they are also valued members of Canadian society, and that Canada's institutions are "theirs" as well.

At the provincial level, the Quebec government, too, has been engaged in an effort to effect its own "reconstruction" of the symbolic system and "redistribution" of social status among the province's linguistic and ethnocultural groups. Indeed the impact of the provincial government's legislative and regulative actions since Bill 101 have been far more pervasive and far more fateful for many of its citizens than the more limited multicultural and bilingual programs of the federal government. What is particularly clear in the case of Quebec, however, is that this process has been intimately tied into a redistribution not only of symbolic resources but of political power as well.

Ethnicity, Politics and Parapolitics

Since the formulation of the federal government's official multicultural policy, ethnic diversity has been portrayed by the state as a 'contribution' to Canadian society and cultural pluralism has been portrayed as inherently positive. Cultural pluralism and ethnic diversity are said to promote tolerance, to enrich our lives, to strengthen Canada's economic links with the rest of the world, and are promoted as morally good in themselves (cf. Fleras and Elliott, 1992a).

Multicultural policy as formulated by the federal government implies, however, that ethnic groups are primarily cultural groups and that only cultural issues are relevant to ethnic community action. Yet despite the attempt by the state to define ethnic groups as primarily cultural groups, the political character of ethnic group organization cannot be overlooked. Indeed, government policy has actually and unintentionally promoted the political organization of ethnic groups and the politicization of their organizations. Stasiulis (1980) uses federal funding as an example of how federal policy intervenes in ethnic organization. Federal funds tend to be disbursed to "umbrella" organizations rather than to individuals or to more specialized institutions. An

umbrella organization is an organization whose membership is composed of other organizations. Such an umbrella organization may provide services for its member organizations, such as fund-raising, it may coordinate inter-organizational activities, or it may serve as the representative of its member organizations in dealings with the government. Examples of umbrella organizations are the National Congress of Italian Canadians, the Canadian Jewish Congress, and the National Association of Canadians of Origin in India.

Because of the relationship which these umbrella organizations evolve with government agencies, they come to serve as points of contact between the ethnic community and the government. Receiving funds legitimates such organizations as the representatives of the ethnic community both in the eyes of the community and of the government. Prominent individuals from these organizations will be invited to join consultative committees or commissions, to participate in workshops, and to help legitimate government policy. Such members may also come to lobby on behalf of their group's interests, and, to the degree that they are seen as 'official' representatives of their communities, their views may come to have an impact on government policy. In addition, ethnic representatives

may be invited to join political parties and to seek elected office, thereby further strengthening the formal and informal ties between the ethnic group and the government. In a way, such members and the organizations they control come to form an organizational elite within the community.

Just as government policy creates winners, it also creates losers. Those organizations which fail to gain state funding lose their status and influence within the community. When their views differ from that of the organizational elite they may be derided as unrepresentative of the community and they may find themselves cut out of key decision making processes within the community. Other organizations, unable or unwilling to adjust to new state demands, may lose their autonomy. In the case of Montreal's Jewish day schools, for example, the administrations of individual Jewish schools have found it convenient to turn over dealing with the provincial government to the Association of Jewish Day Schools, an umbrella organization which negotiates on behalf of the Jewish schools and maintains ongoing relations with the Ministry of Education.

To summarize, what all this means is that federal multicultural policy has a number of 'payoffs' for ethnic

group members and organizations. One is financial, access to and the use of federal funds. A second is the increased influence and authority within the ethnic community of those who receive and disburse these funds. Yet another is the influence exercised by these group members and organizations upon the state itself.

Given these payoffs, ethnic groups have a vested interest in maintaining, and if possible, appropriating, government multicultural policy. Indeed, Breton (1978a:155) suggests that the dynamics of ethnic group relations with the state inevitably generate political or parapolitical conflict since the state "is a critical instrument for institutional building, either in economic, educational, or cultural spheres." Inevitably, then, "an ethnic community with an institutional system will attempt to appropriate itself the state apparatus" and "as a result, the structure of the state apparatus tends to be a regular object of conflict between organized ethnic communities" (Breton, 1978a:155).

There has therefore been a slow but steady reorganization of some ethnic organizations from being cultural or social welfare organizations to being the representatives of political interest groups. This may lead to conflict, but it can also produce cooperative

strategies. Different groups sharing common political goals may work together to achieve those goals. In Quebec, where the political agenda of state cultural and immigration policy is the most blatant, key umbrella organizations of the Italian, Jewish, and Greek communities have worked together in recent years on political issues. They have prepared joint submissions and briefs, formed joint committees, and organized common community political events. These groups believe that their unified action has given them more influence with the government than any one of them could have had on their own, even had they separately supported the same policies. Whether or not unity provides greater strength, it clearly identifies the joint structures as political structures. Politicians recognize the political strength of ethnic organizations and they try to curry favour with these organizations which they hope will be translated into votes at election time.

If the state is not distinct from society, but embedded in a set of dialectical social relations, this means, in turn, that politics pervades social life. Politics is not exclusive to the state but is a set of practical activities whereby people and groups struggle for control over social relations - be they organizational or personal social relations - and resources. This broadened sense of politics is parapolitics in Geertz's (1973) term,

and is here taken to refer to the capacity of social agents, agencies and institutions outside the formal agencies of the state to control the actions and discourse of others (Giddens, 1984; Held, 1989).

As we shall now see in the next few chapters, the parapolitical context of education in Quebec has often been decisive in determining provincial government policy. This was true when the Catholic Church exerted its influence over the state to ensure that the education system reflected traditional goals and values, and it remains true today when the provincial government has come to identify the nationalist and cultural goals of the francophone Quebecois as the goals of the state. Political and parapolitical issues have provided the context within which the dialectical relations between the Quebec state and minority ethnic communities have evolved.

CHAPTER FIVE

SCHOOL AND THE STATE IN QUEBEC BEFORE THE QUIET REVOLUTION

As the set of practical activities whereby individuals and groups struggle for control over social relations and resources, both politics and parapolitics have been central to the evolution of the education system in Quebec. We can identify numerous groups engaged in such parapolitics: politicians, ministry bureaucrats, school boards, school administrators, teachers, students, parents, professors of education, journalists, taxpayers, ethnic and linguistic groups, and 'concerned citizens.' The conflicts and compromises among these groups have been inscribed into the constitution of Quebec's education system.

These conflicts and compromises had two consequences which were decisive for the evolution of the Jewish day school system in Montreal before 1960. One was the development of a confessionally organized public school system divided into Protestant and Catholic sectors. Because of the confessional character of public schools in Quebec, Jewish students could not easily be fit into the existing public school system while Jewish parents felt that they were being treated as second-class citizens within the public schools. It is this which made a private

Jewish day school system seem an attractive alternative to many Jewish parents.

The second was that Quebec's education system in general came to be characterized by structural ambiguity, the absence of clear cut structural principles differentiating one institutional sector from another. This structural ambiguity served to legitimate the creation of a private Jewish system (both to Jews and to the broader community) and also meant that Jewish schools eventually came to be seen as equivalent to public schools. One result was that when the state finally began to involve itself actively in the administration of education in Quebec, the Jewish schools were treated as a quasi-public school system by the state.

This chapter will examine the development both of the confessional control of public education in Quebec and of the structural ambiguity of the school system¹ up to 1960. Because state intervention fundamentally altered the character of education in Quebec after 1960, that period

¹ The focus of the discussions in this thesis will be on the elementary level of schooling, since that is the level at which students are most likely to be attending a Jewish community day school. Jewish high schools are attended at a much lower rate. As for colleges and universities, which have played a very important role in Quebec's educational development, these are not relevant for understanding most of the structural and ideological issues involved in the Jewish education system.

will be covered in the next chapter.

Structural Ambiguity

In its 1963 Report, the Parent Commission studying Quebec's education system characterized that system as "ambiguous" (Québec, Commission of Inquiry on Education in the Province of Quebec, 1963). This structural ambiguity has had a long history in Quebec, reflecting the legacy of past divisions in Quebec society, as well as recent attempts to restructure the system to meet current goals. The result is an education system split into different sectors and divided between Catholic and Protestant schools, English and French language schools, and elite private, public, and ethnic "community" schools. This structural ambiguity has not diminished as a consequence of centralization by the Ministry of Education. Indeed, as the next chapter will show, the attempt to centralize Ministerial control over Quebec's schools while maintaining their distinctive character has contributed to retaining and even compounding that structural ambiguity.

Referring to the structure of Quebec's education system as 'ambiguous' means more than that it is complex and fragmented. At the heart of the ambiguity built into Quebec's educational system is the absence of a common,

universal, and secular public school system such as that typically found elsewhere in North America². Instead we find not one but two, dual, parallel educational sectors. The first duality is the division of public schools into confessionally organized, Catholic and Protestant public schools; the second the dual system of public and private schools. The structural ambiguity resides in the fact that none of these disparate educational sectors have clear and distinct boundaries.

Despite the important role confessionality has played in Quebec's educational history, it was only in Montreal that the dual confessional structure developed to its full potential, and then largely after 1875. The constitutional definition of public schooling in Montreal as confessional schooling, however, meant that for a long time only Catholics and Protestants had the constitutional right to attend public schools; others could attend only as a privilege granted by the school commission at its discretion. The result was that there was no universal public school system in Montreal which was open and accessible to all during much of the time of heavy Jewish

²Multiple public schools organized on a confessional or linguistic basis can be found elsewhere, as in Newfoundland or the multiple school boards of the Ottawa region. The existence of multiple school boards does not necessarily imply structural ambiguity, however.

immigration to Montreal. Prior to 1971, non-Catholics were not admitted to Catholic schools, and while non-Protestants could attend Protestant schools, non-Protestants could not serve on school boards and had no say in how the schools were administered until 1968. This, as we shall see in Chapter Seven, had much to do with the emergence of an extensive Jewish day school system. Although recent reforms of the education system have sought to alter or eliminate confessionality as the line along which public school commissions are divided, these reforms have only been partially successful (Milner, 1986), and the issue of who is or is not entitled to attend any particular school still continues to be a significant issue for the Jewish community.

In the past, this dual, confessional split also often implied a linguistic split, with most Catholic schools operating in French and most Protestant schools in English. The overlap between confessionality and language was never perfect, however, and today the Montreal Catholic Schools Commission continues to operate English language schools while the Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal has significantly increased the proportion of French language schools and French immersion schools it operates.

Further adding to the structural ambiguity of the

education system is the second duality, the division of the education system into a public and a private sector. For most of Quebec's history, especially within the French sector, private schools were not merely an alternative to the public schools but also served as a sort of de-facto public school system because of the failure of the state to provide public high schools. In most of the French sector before 1960 it was only the private schools which led to a higher education and to a university degree; the public schools, as René Levesque (Levesque and Chaiton, 1977: 180) noted, usually "led nowhere."

How are we to account for the prevalence of these and other forms of structural ambiguity in Quebec's education system? The structural complexity and ambiguity of Quebec's education system is itself a consequence of the shifting cultural, economic, and sociopolitical goals assigned to education in the course of Quebec's evolution. The issue of structure, then, gives rise to an examination of the evolution of policies and programs directed towards education both by the state and by various significant interest groups. Constitutionally and in practical terms it is the policies of the provincial government which currently structures the education system. Historically, however, the state had little if any control over the education system prior to 1960. Since 1960 the situation

has been radically altered with the state exerting a high level of control over both the public and the private education systems. Still, state policy and action does not emerge in a vacuum. In the rest of this chapter we will examine how changes in the state's pattern of control over education in Quebec has reflected the political, ideological, and structural changes which have transformed Quebec society. As we shall see, this examination of Quebec's education system reveals a complex web of structural ambiguities, divergent goals and conflicting group interests which mirrors that of the society as a whole.

The Evolution of Quebec's Education System

Historically, Quebec's education system has undergone several dramatic changes which have fundamentally altered both the pattern of the state's relation to and its control over the province's various public and private education systems. A crucial issue, then, is to document the evolving interplay between the structural, ideological and parapolitical components of Quebec's education system.

i. 1801-1875: Conflict, Tradition, and Change

Because of the dramatic changes which have so

fundamentally transformed Quebec society since 1960, it is common to view 'traditional' Quebec before the Quiet Revolution as having been a cohesive society, one which was largely rural, somewhat backward socially and economically, and dominated by the Catholic Church. Henchey (1972: 95), for example, characterizes the francophone Quebecer prior to 1960 as having been "defined by his attachment to tradition, his allegiance to the Church, his elitist view of society, his distrust of change and his detachment from the economic life of the continent."

Like all stereotypes, this image of a passive, defensive, conservative and quiescent francophone Quebec society is an exaggeration and distortion of historical reality. At every stage of its history from the time of New France until today Quebec society has been made up of diverse groups having distinctive and often contradictory interests and ideologies (Dumont and Rocher, 1964; Monière, 1981). In addition to the obvious divisions of language and religion which separated the British and the French - and which separated both Charter groups from Quebec's other minority ethnic groups - francophone Quebec society itself has always been divided by such factors as class, status, residence and political philosophy.

The image of a cohesive and passive society certainly

does not reflect the long history of turmoil and conflict over education in Quebec. From the late 18th century on education has been a contentious political issue in Quebec³ with basic disagreements among major social groups over what sort of education system Quebec should have, who should control it, and who should pay for it. As such, education was an issue which not only divided the British and French, but which also aroused controversy and animosity within the French community.

Much of the debate during the period before 1841 concerned the attempt to establish universal public schools (Audet, 1971a). At first the conflict over education was between the British and the French communities, as was the case with the attempt to establish the so-called "Royal Schools" under the control of Anglo-Protestant authorities in 1801. Many French Canadians saw these schools as instruments designed to ensure their assimilation into Anglo-Protestant institutions, which may well have been the case (Carter, 1957: 9; Monière, 1981: 92). Consequently, few Catholic parishes set up Royal schools, although a significant number were set up in Protestant communities. Indeed, Catholic opposition to the Royal schools was so

³ Throughout this thesis, reference is made to "Quebec" as a social entity rather than the historically specific political units such as "Lower Canada" and "Canada East."

great that "Bishop Lartigue recommended to his priests that all means be taken, including the denial of sacraments, in order to prevent Catholic parents from sending their children to Royal schools" (Magnuson, 1980: 20).

After the failure of the Royal Schools the debate on education underwent a fundamental shift. It was the new francophone membership of Quebec's legislature that was most concerned to establish a state run system of "common" public schools. In this case, the resulting conflict and debate was not over language or religion but over the relative roles of church and state.

In remarking on the conflict that often arises in Quebec over education, Carter (1957: 5) has noted that "three main agencies have claimed a share in education: the parent, the state, and the church." The matter is not as simple as this, however. Neither "church" nor "state" should be understood here to be clear-cut entities. Prior to 1841 the state was divided into several distinct components: an elected legislative assembly dominated by francophone representatives; an appointed legislative council; an executive council headed by a powerful Governor; and the British Colonial Office in London (Finlay, 1990). The resulting state apparatus was united neither in structure, in composition, nor in interests,

and, as Lower (1977: 218) put it, "the system of government ...could not have been more skilfully contrived to promote friction if such had been its design." Even after Confederation, the persistence of an upper chamber in Quebec and the split in powers between the federal and provincial governments perpetuated conflict and prevented the emergence of a effective state.

The term "church," too, would perhaps better be replaced by "churches." While there is a tendency to equate the "church" with the Catholic Church, the Anglican Church, too, took a vocal and strong role in defining and controlling education, as did a number of other Protestant denominations. It is true, however, that as had been the case of the Royal schools, it was the Catholic Church which took the lead in the struggle with the state to define and control education in Quebec.

To this list of interested parties within the French community should also be added rural and urban property owners, upon whom much of the burden of paying the costs of education was placed, and the professional middle class of lawyers, doctors, and notaries, who constituted francophone Quebec's political elite (Linteau, Durocher and Robert, 1983: 228). It was this latter group which was the key player in the disputes with the Catholic Church over

education. Each of these groups had a different vision of Quebec society and each assigned a different role both to the state and to education.

Opposition by the Catholic Church to what it defined as state "interference" in education was based on the clerical conception of the state as subordinate to the authority of the Church, authority being "hierarchical, from the top down, not egalitarian or democratic" (Cook, 1986: 62). The determination of the Church to prevent the state from taking control of education was reinforced by a profound suspicion and distrust of state institutions and the politicians who oversaw them. Representative democracy, many clergy believed, led to secularism and atheism. Moreover politicians - whom clerics believed could easily be corrupted or swayed by special interest groups - could not be trusted to have the interests of either the people or the church at heart.

Finally, the Catholic Church already had in place and under the control of various religious orders a network of private schools, some dating back to the time of New France. A new, comprehensive, common school system which would wrest control of education away from the Church or which would compete with the religious orders was unacceptable to the clergy.

In contrast to the conservatism of the clerics,

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PM-1 3½"x4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT

PRECISIONSM RESOLUTION TARGETS

Quebec's francophone political elite, composed largely of members of the "liberal professions," were committed to the ideologies of "liberalism" and "nationalism" (Ouellet, 1980: 218). As described by Ouellet (1980) this "liberalism" took the form of political activism combined with a strong commitment to the parliamentary institutions of British government, which were seen as the best means to protect and extend the interests of ordinary francophones against British merchant and French seigneurial elites. Many of these politicians sought the separation of church and state, seeing a state unfettered by either religious or commercial interventions as the best means available for maintaining collective rights. Their nationalism, in contrast, was "defensive" (Bonenfant and Falardeau, 1969; Ouellet, 1980), primarily directed towards preserving the traditions and institutions of Quebec's French society. Eventually these two ideologies proved to be contradictory, since, as Monière (1981: 91) notes their nationalism "proceeded from the basic tenet that a nation must be self-governing."

Quebec's political elite saw education as an essential part of nation-building. This fit in with their own experiences. It was education which was the foundation of the liberal professions and gave to these professionals

their privileged status in Quebec society. In addition to nation-building, the existence of a secular, state run education system was also consistent with the liberal view of the state as the protector and guarantor of collective rights as opposed to the special interests of the Anglo-Canadians (assimilation of the French) and the Catholic Church (religious education).

The problem facing Quebec's legislators in the first half of the 19th century was to find a way to accommodate the desires of all of these disparate interest groups and of a population which was largely indifferent to education. Several attempts, the first in 1824 and then again in 1829, proved that despite their control of state institutions, the political elite did not have the power to establish an education system on their own terms.

These attempts failed because the legislators proved unable to establish a broad consensus within the francophone community over educational structures and goals. The ability of the Catholic Church in particular to hinder state action emerged out of a combination of factors: the political influence of the Church, the alliances the Church was able to forge with anglophone and francophone elites, and the inherent weakness of the state.

The result was the gradual evolution of a highly

decentralized school system composed of a diverse set of institutions. As the Parent Report (Quebec, Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education in the Province of Quebec, 1963: 7) put it:

[In] 1837 ... there were schools of the Royal institution, fabrique schools, trustee schools, schools dependent on private generosity and schools of religious orders. Some among them were public in nature, others private; some under church direction, others administered by laymen.

By the 1840s it was apparent that a fresh start had to be made to establish an effective and wide-spread system of public education acceptable to all the major interest groups in Quebec. This was accomplished with a series of legislative measures in the 1840s, commencing with the "Act of Union" of 1840, which established local elected school commissions operating "common schools," funded largely by local property taxes. This act put into place a community-based structure to run the schools, with a "common school fund" established by the legislature with which to pay half the costs of establishing and operating the schools.

Although the stated intent of the act was to establish a system of "common schools" in Quebec, these schools soon became confessional schools in practice and eventually in

law. The 1841 act sought to placate clerical concerns, including Protestant concerns, by providing the right for minority groups of Catholics or Protestants in a school district to dissent and establish their own "dissentient" schools with their own trustees. Further changes in 1846 established confessional schools in Montreal and Quebec City with separate Catholic and Protestant commissioners and boards of examiners. Another change with profound consequences for the dissemination of clerical control over "common" schools was a provision which granted clerics the right to teach without certification. Once religious criteria were established for differentiating some of the schools as confessional, however, all of the schools became confessional by default. This process was furthered by the control exercised over the schools at the local level by the Catholic and Protestant clergy. As the Parent Report (Quebec, Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education in the Province of Quebec, 1963: 13) described this process:

The aspirations of both groups worked together to intensify the confessional aspects of the system and to resist every effort by the State to assume effective control over education. Indeed the dissatisfaction and fears of the Protestants were in large measure responsible for the insertion in the British North America Act of provisions intended to protect the established rights of religious minorities.

These provisions, found in Section 93 of the BNA Act of 1867, gave to the provincial legislatures exclusive authority over education while at the same time prohibiting any new legislation revoking or altering those laws concerning denominational schools already in force at the time of union (Henchey and Burgess, 1987: 259).

Although a provincial Ministry of Public Instruction was established in 1867, the constitutional provisions preventing the provincial government from altering the laws governing education are a clear sign of the political weakness of the state in the area of education. This weakness of the state is further evident in its failure both to finance and to regulate the schools. Inadequate state funding of education remained endemic right up until the 1950s, with the state's subsidies for education making up 10 percent of the public school budget as late as 1875 and reaching only 30 percent by 1960 (Quebec, Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education in the Province of Quebec, 1963: 11).

The local community, too, was often unable and sometimes unwilling to finance education at a sufficient level. Indeed, the decision to grant local school commissions the right to tax the populace led to widespread disorder (Quebec, Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education

in the Province of Quebec, 1963: 11):

Unaccustomed to paying school taxes, a portion of the populations set up resistance to the law of 1846, burned some schools and closed others. This episode was known as the "guerre des eteignoirs" ...and both the civil and religious authorities had to devote several years to restoring order in some of the country areas.

As was the case with public education, the state, too, had little control over private education. Prior to 1968 the Education Act provided that anyone could obtain a permit to operate a private school upon filing with the Superintendent of Education. This lack of control was particularly significant because almost all institutions of higher learning - including the classical colleges - were private institutions.

In contrast to the weak and ineffective control exercised by the state, the Catholic Church took a very aggressive and prominent role in education in Quebec prior to 1960. The Church had a number of reasons for doing so. There is no question that the Catholic Church had a legitimate and sincere concern with providing education to the public and ensuring a quality Catholic education. Given the inadequate degree of financing both at the state and local level, only the Catholic church had sufficient

influence and resources at the local level to operate, maintain and staff schools in many of the French communities. In effect, the Catholic Church stepped into the vacuum created by the inadequate commitment of the state to education. The church devoted a great deal of its resources to private educational institutions and largely staffed and ran the Catholic public schools. At the same time there is also no question that the church worked to prevent state intervention in education because of the fear that such intervention would eventually lead to state control and to secularization, and to a weakening of the church's influence.

As for the French Canadian community's endemic distrust of the state's motives, this was often justified when put into context. Until 1867 the state was, after all, a British institution, even if representative government meant that locally, the state was to some extent controlled by the French Canadian majority. Despite their sometimes genial relations, French Canadians had little illusion that their interests and those of the British government or of Anglo-Canadians had much in common, a view reinforced by the Durham Report and the Act of Union of 1840. Many suspected that the attempts to establish a public school system in 1801 and in 1841 were intended to assimilate the French community.

Several factors, then, vitiated attempts to establish universal public schools in Quebec: the financial and political weakness of the state, the strength of clerical influence, especially in the local community, and the general mistrust by the French Canadian majority of the motives behind such efforts.

ii. 1875-18^o Decentralization and Autonomy

By 1875 Quebec's education system had taken on most of the structural features which were to characterize it for the next eighty-five years (Audet, 1971b: 167), in particular its two predominant characteristics: decentralization and autonomy. The education system in Quebec between 1875 and 1960 was decentralized in structure, divided into separate French Catholic and English Protestant sectors, each of which was further divided into public and private sectors. Each of these sectors was able to operate largely independent of state control and in virtual isolation from one another, coordinated neither by the state nor by the structures put into place to oversee them.

This does not mean that conflict and disagreement over Quebec's educational structures and policies had come to an end. Indeed, the period between 1875 and 1960 were years of

major debates and significant changes in Quebec's education system, beginning with the abolition of the Ministry of Public Instruction. Linteau, Durocher and Robert (1983) identify three issues which generated extensive conflict over education within Quebec society between 1875 and 1960: the demand for compulsory education; the establishment of a ministry of education, and the problem of Jewish education. Leaving aside the issue of Jewish education for a later chapter, we will focus here on the other two issues identified by Linteau, Durocher and Robert.

1875 was a crucial year in the evolution of Quebec's education system. In that year, Conservative Premier de Boucherville, arguing that "a politician generally had neither the time nor the competence to take charge of education" (Linteau, Durocher and Robert, 1983:207; Audet, 1971b: 117), eliminated Quebec's Ministry of Public Instruction. Control over school commissions devolved onto the Catholic and Protestant Committees of the Council of Public Instruction. One third of the Council was composed of the province's Catholic Bishops, one third of Catholic laymen and one third of Protestants. Overall administration of the school system was put under the authority of an appointed Superintendent of Public Instruction who served as Chairman of the Council. The two Committees "considered

themselves wholly independent of the Council in matters under their jurisdiction and made decisions as bodies of final resort" (Quebec, Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education in the Province of Quebec, 1963: 16). Neither the state nor the Council interfered in the work of the two Committees. By 1875, then, the dual structure of Quebec's public education system was set firmly in place and became largely autonomous of state interference. For the most part, this structure remained unchanged until 1964. Indeed, so independent did the two Committees become, that no joint meeting was held between 1908 and 1960. The failure of the state to retain control over education in Quebec was a sign of the continuing weakness of the state, both politically and financially.

Politically, the provincial government found itself facing a coalition of Catholic clergy and the Protestant minority, both of whom desired, for different reasons, to retain separate, denominational schools.

The Catholic Church gained political influence in Quebec after Confederation for both structural and ideological reasons. Linteau, Durocher and Robert (1983: 198-201) provide a detailed discussion of the structural factors involved in the growing political influence of the Catholic Church. One particularly interesting point they

make is that Confederation placed under provincial jurisdiction precisely those matters which were of most interest to the church, such as education and public health. As provincial matters, "the church had to deal only with an assembly elected by a population that was more than eighty-five per cent Catholic" (Linteau, Durocher and Robert, 1983: 198). Since the church was already active in educational and charitable work, its influence and prestige with the public in these matters was considerable, and politicians in many constituencies had to take the views of the church into account. Combined with the decline of anti-clericalism among politicians following the 1837-38 rebellion, the position of the church in Quebec society, and in particular in regards to education, was significantly enhanced.

Ideological factors played as important a role as structural factors, however, and the church took an active role in promoting its own political interests. Ideologically, this was an era of increasing ultramontane influence among the Catholic clergy. The Catholic Church condemned both liberalism and socialism in 1864 and saw education as a major battleground upon which to combat what it considered the inevitable secularism of state control (Magnuson, 1980). Clerics became actively involved in

politics, leading to the "the annulment by the courts in 1876 of election results in two constituencies on the grounds of undue influence exercised by curés during the campaign" (Linteau, Durocher and Robert, 1983: 200). Despite this setback, interference by the clergy during elections remained commonplace.

In addition, Quebec politicians during this era were largely conservative in attitudes and ideology. Like other middle class French Canadians, most politicians were educated in Catholic colleges and were taught that the survival of French culture and institutions required a vigorous and strong Church. Even the Liberal politician Honoré Mercier, who sought educational reform when he was a member of the opposition, was forced to drop his plans when he became premier in order to retain the support of conservative legislators.

The negative attitudes held by clerics towards politicians persisted well into the twentieth century. Writing in the 1950s, Canon G. Emmett Carter (1957: 20) presented what appears to be an almost demonological view of political "interference" in education:

Quebec has witnessed ...many attempts at political control of education. Nor is it safe to say that this is a battle that can ever be won decisively. Like the struggle for virtue itself, it must go on until death,

and each succeeding generation must expect to witness its own group of political exploiters who will always see in the rich fields of education a produce that would grind well in their particular mills of avarice or power-seeking.

Despite the ideological opposition of the church to the state, an alliance of sorts emerged between politicians and clerics whereby the state left many areas of public life under church control. In any case, many conservative politicians, such as de Boucherville, agreed with the church that the state should play a lesser role in education and charitable works. The consequence of this alliance was that (Magnuson, 1980: 40):

Increasingly, the lines between church and state were blurred, if not indistinguishable. Clerics were to be seen everywhere in society and at public functions were accorded status. Courts of law as well as other public offices and buildings displayed religious symbols belying the fact that Quebec had no official state religion.

Anglophone Protestants, too, opposed state control over education, although for very different reasons. As a numerical minority, anglophones feared losing their rights in a provincial state controlled politically by an overwhelming francophone Catholic majority. An autonomous

denominational system guaranteed continuing anglophone control over their own school system. This system was denominational in name only. Since Protestant schools had to accommodate children from many different Protestant sects, they were, in fact if not in name, interdenominational. Protestant education, Magnuson (1980: 51) claims, "was committed more to teaching the moral as opposed to the doctrinal tenets of Christianity."

Anglophone support for a separate school system was strengthened by the arrangements put into place in 1869 to fund public education. Property owners were divided into two 'panels,' one Catholic and one Protestant according to each property owner's denomination, and payed school taxes to the appropriate panel. Incorporated companies and any property owners who declared themselves neither Catholic nor Protestant paid taxes to a 'neutral' panel whose revenues were distributed proportionately among Catholic and Protestant school commissions. The panel system therefore ensured that the school taxes of Protestants would only be directed to Protestant schools. Moreover, while Protestants were a minority, their proportion of taxable property was significantly greater than their numbers, meaning that Protestant schools received a disproportionate amount of the total monies collected for

school taxes. This was an important advantage for the Protestant schools, one which would be lost should a more universal or more centralized scheme of school funding be initiated. State intervention, then, might very well herald a significant loss of revenues for the Protestant schools.

Still another factor in anglophone opposition to state control of education was the desire on the part of anglophone elites to have the provincial government invest its resources in building the infrastructure needed for business and commerce. Given the very limited resources available to the provincial government, anglophone elites were concerned to ensure that the needs of business came before the provision of educational or social services. These, it was felt, should be left to philanthropic and charitable agencies, an arrangement which strengthened the influence and status of businessmen in the anglophone community much as it did the status of the Catholic Church in the French community (Linteau, Durocher and Robert, 1983: 270).

The financial weakness of the government further eroded the state's interest in controlling education. The Quebec government was extremely limited in means whereby to collect revenues during this period. Premier de Boucherville's decision to dismantle the Ministry of Public Instruction was made during a time of severe economic

depression which drastically reduced the fiscal resources of the provincial government, and the economic climate did not improve substantially before the turn of the century. The government's own priority over the next few years was on raising funds for the building of railroad track, leaving little money available for education.

Provincial expenditure on education increased throughout this period, but the state's contribution to educational costs dropped from 16.3 percent in 1867-68 to 13.4 percent in 1876-77, then down to 11.2 percent in 1887-88 (Jedwab, 1992: 210). The extent of this decline in support becomes clear when Quebec is compared with Ontario. While Quebec contributed \$256,000 to education in 1867-68, Ontario's provincial government contributed \$275,000, only slightly more. By 1896, however, Quebec was contributing \$392,760 while Ontario's contribution had increased to \$702,000 (Jedwab, 1992: 210).

One factor responsible for the higher level of expenditure on education in Ontario was compulsory education to age twelve, which Ontario initiated in 1871. Compulsory education meant that more students were attending school, and they were attending for a longer period of time. In contrast, children in Quebec typically left school at an early age. 208,030 pupils were registered

in public schools in Quebec in 1867, of which about 86 percent, or over 173,000, were in elementary schools (Magnuson, 1980: 39). The situation did not improve with time. In 1910, 350,094 pupils were registered in Catholic public schools, with 40 percent registered in year one, 24 percent in year two, and only 59,493 or 18 percent registered in a grade higher than grade three (Audet, 1971a: 280). Actual attendance figures are unavailable; because there was no compulsory schooling in Quebec, many of the students who were registered did not actually attend classes on a regular basis.

It was the widespread agreement in Quebec society concerning the preservation of the existing denominational education system which led Monière (1981: 176) to describe the church as exercising "a hegemony in politics and ideology." So widespread was acceptance of the clerical views on education that the Quebec delegates to the 1891 meeting of the Trade and Labour Congress of Canada, a group calling for such radical reforms in that era as the nine hour work day and the nationalization of transportation, gas and electricity, voted against a resolution calling for compulsory education (Monière, 1981: 161).

iii. 1897-1960: The Beginnings of State Intervention

Yet despite the supposed "hegemony" of the Catholic Church, there were significant social groups calling for real reforms in education, including the Ligue de L'Enseignement. The first serious attempt at shifting control over education from the church to the state was made by Liberal Premier Marchand in 1897. Marchand succeeded in passing through the Assembly a bill to establish a Department of Public Instruction, in part by clearing the proposal with the papal authorities in Rome. In presenting the bill to the Assembly, Joseph-Éme Robidoux, the Provincial Secretary noted that, "It is the government's duty to create the future of a nation, ...If the government is responsible for the end, it must have the means" (cited in Linteau, Durocher and Robert, 1983: 462). That this bill passed despite strong opposition from Quebec's Catholic Bishops is an indication that the politicians in the assembly had an independent stance on education and were willing to challenge the Catholic Church on this issue. The bill, however, was defeated in the largely Conservative upper chamber, and the government then backed down, making no attempt to override the upper chamber's vote.

It is difficult to determine which event was more

significant, that the assembly attempted to transfer control over education to the state or that the attempt failed. In any case, the result was that Quebec did not establish a ministry of education until the 1960s and was the last province to institute compulsory education, in 1943.

Just as had been the case in the process which eventually led to the establishment of public schools, the issue of compulsory education pitted different segments of Quebec society against one another. As before, the issue was only resolved when significant groups formed an alliance to support reform.

Fundamental changes occurred in Quebec society after 1900, especially industrialization and urbanization. Manufacturing grew at a dramatic pace after 1900; by 1929 the gross value of manufacturing production had increased from \$154 million to \$1.1 billion (Linteau, Durocher and Robert, 1983: 324) and reached \$2.8 billion by 1943 (Linteau, Durocher, Robert and Ricard, 1991: 9). During the same period the percentage of the population living in urban areas went from 36 percent in 1901 to 60 percent in 1931, a massive movement away from rural communities (Linteau, Durocher and Robert, 1983: 356).

The movement to the cities weakened the influence of

the Catholic Church. Because of the intimate historical and organizational ties between the parish structure and the local community, the church had been strongest in rural areas. At the same time, the educational needs of an industrial, urban working class were of a different order of magnitude than those of rural farmers. Committed to retaining clerical control over all educational and social services for Catholics in the cities, as well as controlling many other institutions and agencies within the francophone community, the costs to the church of providing services increased dramatically with urbanization.

The depression of the 1930s then came to severely weaken the financial base of the church, allowing and even requiring greater levels of state intervention. Unemployment insurance, worker's compensation and other forms of social assistance were initiated by the federal and provincial governments. In these circumstances it was obvious to many Quebecers that only state agencies, not church-supported charities, were able to provide the level of assistance needed. The provincial government even had to come to the assistance of parish organizations and religious communities which found themselves in financial trouble (Linteau, Durocher, Robert and Ricard, 1991: 61).

All of this raised the status and increased the power

of the state while putting into question the social policy and fiscal capacity of the church. Ideological splits within the church also began to develop as some clerics supported adaptation to the new needs of an industrialized society. Papal authority itself, for example, backed compulsory education, which the Pope instituted in Vatican City in 1931 (Linteau, Durocher, Robert and Ricard, 1991: 66). Many clerics continued to oppose compulsory education, but a determined provincial government, backed by significant elements in Quebec society, was finally able to challenge successfully the divided and weakened church.

The anglophone corporate elite and francophone middle classes were the most important of these elements. Opposition among businessmen and the middle classes to compulsory education largely disappeared as industrialization progressed and the need for an educated labour force became apparent. Quebec's francophone liberal professionals in particular, who had formed a conservative and anti-statist element of the population heretofore, now "wanted the state to move in and save them from ruin and proletarianization" (Monière, 1981: 209).

Another factor was the growth of government itself during the 1930s and 40s which gave rise to a "new middle class" (Guindon, 1968) of government employees committed to the expansion of state services and control. Professionally

and personally committed to state institutions, this new middle class was not only a new segment of Quebec society, they had a new view of the state and of state action; in effect a new world view. Not only did they expect the state to coordinate and control all significant segments of Quebec society, they expected this to be done through rationalized bureaucratic agencies run by trained professionals. For this reason, the new middle class began to look beyond the immediate issue of state control to question both the structures appropriate to educating Quebecers and the quality of education they would receive. To the professionals and technocrats now emerging as a coherent group the existing system of classical education was an inadequate form of preparation and training for the needs of a modern society.

This new set of attitudes and new expectations directed at the education system gradually grew more widespread in Quebec society during the 1950s. It was not only the middle class which looked to education as a means of improving the quality of life. Monière (1981: 233) argues that the working class, now more highly skilled and better paid, developed an "awareness of lagging status and hopes for upward mobility." The economic prosperity of the 1950s raised everyone's expectations about their standard

of living, while the "baby boom" made the issue of raising children and ensuring a decent and secure future for them more immediate. The working class too, then, looked to education to better the lives of their children. The result was not only a significant increase in the demand for education, but a demand as well for a change in the quality of education being provided.

At the same time that Quebecers were beginning to place greater importance on education, the recognition that Quebec's education system was in a sorry state finally began to be widespread. Quebecers had often been told by their politicians that Quebec's education system was the best in the world. By the 1950s Quebecers began to realize that this was far from the truth. The combination of compulsory education and the baby boom dramatically increased the numbers of students and demanded a complete overhaul of the education system's physical plant. School attendance rose from about 729,000 students in 1945 to 1.3 million in 1959, while the total cost of public education rose from \$69 million in 1951 to \$213 million in 1959 (Linteau, Durocher, Robert and Ricard, 1991: 244). Quebec's school commissions, however, were still based on a parish model. This meant that there were far too many school commissions, about 1500, many of which simply did not have

a sufficient tax base to keep up with the new quantitative and qualitative demands being made. In 1951, 70 percent of the schools in Quebec were still one room schoolhouses, and "60 per cent had no electricity and 40 per cent had no running water or indoor toilets" (Linteau, Durocher, Robert and Ricard, 1991: 244). Neither these schools nor the education system as a whole seemed to be meeting the needs and desires of a new generation of Quebecers.

While many complaints about Quebec's education system were voiced throughout the 1950s, an alliance of conservative politicians, led by the premier, Maurice Duplessis, together with the Catholic clergy, and the traditional, rurally-based middle class was able to retain political control in Quebec and to continue to insist that Quebec had the "best" educational system in the world.

This conservative political alliance gradually began to break up in the late 1950s as new groups in Quebec society were beginning to coalesce and form a new political force. A key factor in the dissolution of the conservative alliance was the precipitous decline in influence, status, and political power of the Catholic Church. Guindon (1983) has argued that this decline began with the introduction of compulsory education in 1943, which initiated a dramatic expansion of the education sector and required an enormous

investment in facilities, material and teachers. Guindon argues that it was the church itself which finally recognized that only the state could fund and coordinate the expansion put into place by compulsory education. Once having cooperated in handing control over education to the state, the decline of the church was sure and rapid. Once the state rather than the church was the purveyor of jobs and services in the education sector, as well as other crucial sectors of Quebec society, the influence of the church collapsed, seemingly overnight.

In any case, it is quite likely that the strong political influence of the Catholic Church before 1960 had more to do with its ability to align itself with powerful groups in Quebec society than with any ideological closure or hegemony. Essentially, the Catholic Church constituted the public face of conservative elements in Quebec society. Some of these conservative elements may have been acting on the basis of quite a different set of interests than those expressed by the church, but preferred to have the church act as the spokesman and official representative of conservative ideology.

One indication that this may well have been the case is the increasingly peripheral role played by the Catholic church during the tenure of Premier Duplessis. Duplessis'

administration began to involve itself much more directly in subsidizing education and health care, for example, than had previous governments. Whereas the Catholic Church may have only been a partner in a conservative alliance, it had at least been an equal partner. Under Duplessis the church had become a tool used to promote and maintain those policies which Duplessis found to be in his interest. Despite the public avowals of devotion to the church, Duplessis attitude in private was less devout. "The Bishops," Duplessis is reported to have said, "eat out of my hand," and "There is no great difficulty in governing Quebec. All one must do is keep the Jesuits and Dominicans fighting" (McRoberts, 1988: 106).

During this period Catholic clerics themselves saw that the church's policies were being subordinated to Duplessis' political goals and interests. The church began to realize that its alliance with Duplessis and Quebec's conservative forces were placing it at a disadvantage and were moreover threatening the entire institutional edifice established with so much difficulty in Quebec society. This was particularly true in the area of education where the policy of the government was highly inconsistent. Duplessis' government established apprenticeship schools, trade schools and technical institutes, under the

supervision of a Department of Youth and Social Welfare. The University of Sherbrooke was established, as were a school of veterinary medicine and a forestry school, and grants for all levels of education were increased.

Yet at the same time political corruption was damaging Quebec's public education system by tying government educational grants to political patronage, as Magnuson (1980: 105-106) describes:

A favourite tactic of the Duplessis government was to warn school districts that unless they voted Union Nationale their grant was in danger of being reduced or cut off altogether. As if to dramatize the government's largess, it was common practice that when a school district received a government grant a cheque for the amount was personally delivered by a Union Nationale politician.

The whole process of receiving government grants was so unpredictable and unreliable that it became an obstacle to the development of the education system and a threat to the financial stability of many school districts. In addition, school commissions were expected to use the money to give contracts to and buy supplies from Union Nationale contributors.

There began to develop a widespread consensus that the time had come for some fundamental changes, not only in education, but in Quebec society as a whole.

Given the intensity of the debates over education in Quebec society, the educational problems of the small Jewish community of Montreal were not a major concern of most Quebecers. Why then do Linteau, Durocher and Robert (1983) identify the problem of Jewish education as a major issue in the debates over education after 1875? This will be discussed in detail in Chapter Seven, but a few preliminary points will be presented here. Quebec's education system emerged as an accommodation among Quebecers divided along cultural, political, and ideological grounds. The arrival of Jews and other religious minorities raised questions about and posed potential threats to this accommodation. Would Protestants and Catholics continue to control their schools if Jews and other religious minorities began to attend these schools in significant numbers? What rights did Jews and other minorities have in a school system in which only Catholic and Protestant students and parents had their rights constitutionally guaranteed? What rights should they have? Would the extension of rights to Jews and other minorities diminish the rights and special status of the charter groups? While Jews may have been few in number, their arrival raised major questions about, and created a major challenge to, the education system in Quebec.

Quebec's Public Education System to 1960.

As we have seen, changes in state policy and in its pattern of relations with significant elements in Quebec society had a significant impact upon the evolution of Quebec's public education system. The period, lasting from 1801 to 1875, was one of conflict among Quebec's major interest groups - and in particular between Church and state - over fundamental education policy and structures. During this period, the state attempted but failed to establish a universal system of public education accessible to all. Instead, a series of half-measures and compromises gave rise to an education system split into separate public and private sectors and further divided along linguistic and religious lines.

A second period, from 1875 to 1896, has been described as "the triumph of clericalism" (Magnuson, 1980). During most of this period the Quebec state had neither a Ministry of Education nor a consistent set of policies related to education, with the result that educational institutions were largely autonomous and state control over education was severely limited. Instead, control over education was left in the hands of local school boards and of the Catholic Church which controlled the Council of Public Instruction, as well as its own network of private schools.

While the state continued to make regular attempts to exert control over education, the fiscal, political, and structural weakness of the state prevented the provincial government from effectively challenging clerical control.

After 1897 the state slowly began to gain control over the education system. By the 1950s that control had been significantly extended (especially at the level of technical and higher education) but a lack of consensus among the different segments of Quebec society meant that the public education system remained divided and largely autonomous. The state was hampered as well by the provisions of the BNA Act which prevented any thoroughgoing reform of the education system.

If education was to be reformed, what was needed was a new consensus in Quebec society. It was that consensus which emerged with the new state-centered nationalism of the Quiet Revolution. As we shall now see in the next chapter, the result was a massive and profound reform of Quebec's education system.

CHAPTER SIX

THE QUIET REVOLUTION AND THE EDUCATION SYSTEM IN QUEBEC

The previous chapter discussed the evolution of Quebec's public education system up to 1960, documenting the emergence of a dual confessional system characterized by structural ambiguity. As we shall see in Chapter Seven, this was the context within which the Jewish day school system first emerged.

But that context changed dramatically with the Quiet Revolution of the early 1960s. The Quiet Revolution transformed the Quebec state through a broad set of structural changes which altered the state's administrative space. The state began, for example, an aggressive series of interventions in many sectors of society, particularly the area of education, and including the private community education system of the Jewish community. Just as important as these structural changes, however, were a set of ideological changes which re-"configured" the state, altering the meaning of the state and its relationship to the rest of society.

Did these changes alter the fundamental character of education in Quebec? In many ways they did, but they did not affect the split of the education system into two

sectors, one Catholic and the other Protestant. Indeed, it can be argued that the reforms increased rather than decreased the divisions within the public education system by making language a further complicating feature of educational structures in Quebec. Nor did these reforms eliminate the structural ambiguity characterizing the education system. Again, it can be argued that the reforms enhanced rather than diminished this ambiguity.

The Quiet Revolution: Reform and Centralization

A new political alliance which came into power after 1960 was composed of groups with vested interests in a strong and financially viable Quebec state (A. Breton, 1964; Guindon, 1967, 1968; Renaud, 1984). Foremost among these emergent groups was the "new middle class," whose ties to the state were direct and intimate; newly emerging francophone business elites whose interests were tied to state expansion; and parapublic employees, in particular teachers and health care workers, whose jobs were a product of the dramatic increase in the scope and size of the parapublic sector initiated by the government and whose salaries were paid from the provincial treasury. Linteau, Durocher, Robert and Ricard (1991: 408) also mention "intellectuals" such as social scientists, teachers and

journalists with strong personal and ideological commitments to the state, and "career trade union officials, many of them university-educated, and includ[ing] few genuine workers" (Linteau, Durocher, Robert and Ricard (1991: 408).

It also included a new generation of politicians, some motivated by the desire for social reforms, others inspired by a new nationalism. Quebec in the 1950s had been a breeding ground for a new generation of political activists personally committed to overcoming the Duplessis era's legacy of political corruption and state inaction. This new generation of politicians was impatient to begin the process they referred to as "rattrapage," the accelerated modernization and democratization of Quebec society, and they began to make significant legislative initiatives almost immediately upon coming into office.

As noted earlier, the Liberal government elected in 1960 began to initiate changes of two types. One type was structural change, such as the establishment of a Ministry of Education, the Office de la Langue Francaise, and the implementation of the Quebec Pension Plan. The impact of these structural reforms was enormous, not only in expanding the role of the state but also in expanding the size of its bureaucratic apparatus. Between 1960 to 1971

the number of people employed in Quebec's public and parapublic sectors increased from 36,000 to 350,000; which meant that government employees increased from 2 percent to 15 percent of the total labour force (Renaud, 1984: 151).

The second type of change was ideological, expressing a new conception of the state and of its goals. The state now came to be seen as the leading actor in the process of transforming Quebec into a new, modern, self-assured, and democratic society capable of controlling its own destiny. This meant altering the role of the state within Quebec, and altering as well relations between Quebec and the federal government. These two types of reform are related, since structural changes almost always reflect group interests and ideological convictions, but it is convenient to treat the two separately, at least initially, for purposes of analysis.

Reform of the education system was considered by almost all segments of Quebec society to be a central part of the process of social transformation and empowerment initiated by the Quiet Revolution. Education was expected to be one of the most powerful tools available to the state with which to remake Quebec society. As a result, reforms of the education system were also of two types, structural and ideological.

When it came to structural changes, the new government moved quickly, enacting a whole series of legislative reforms in 1961 collectively referred to as "la grande charte de l'éducation" (Audet, 1971b). Altogether, a dozen pieces of legislation were passed, the two most significant of which were the shift of responsibility for public education to the Minister of Youth and the establishment of a Royal Commission of Inquiry on education, the Parent Commission. The first move allowed for regulative and structural reforms to proceed immediately, even in the absence of a ministry of education. The second piece of legislation initiated a profound and comprehensive review of Quebec's education system and led to the recommendation of a sweeping series of reforms.

In addition to legislative changes, a broad series of regulatory and pedagogical reforms were initiated. These were primarily designed to rationalize and modernize the education system. As an example, regional corporations were set up to operate and administer regional secondary schools, eliminating many of the local school commissions, which were often too small or too poor to operate secondary schools on their own. As the 1960-1964 Report of the Ministry of Youth expressed the new view of educational organization (quoted in Audet, 1971b: 404), "Il lui fallait

avoir, en éducation, le même souci d'efficacité et de prévision que celui dont fait preuve le monde des affaires et utiliser le mieux possible des ressources disponible."

The most significant change of all was the establishment of the Ministry of Education in 1964. The first volume of the Parent Report recommended the establishment of such a ministry, arguing that given the fragmented and disorganized state of Quebec's education system "only a strong and forthright authority can put the house in order" (Québec, Commission of Inquiry on Education in the Province of Quebec, 1963: 82). This was only an organizational issue, however, it was also an ideological one. The Parent Commission saw the extension of state control over educational institutions as the extension of democracy, an integral component of the ideology of the Quiet Revolution. "In a democratic society," the Report asserted, "the government represents all those interested in education: families, religious groups, educational institutions, professional associations" (Québec, Commission of Inquiry on Education in the Province of Quebec, 1963: 80).

Education, the Parent Commission argued, must be accessible to all, must be humanistic, and must be oriented towards the needs of the child. This was a tall order, but

the Parent Report is imbued with a sense of optimism that anything is possible if careful research is done, rational plans are prepared, and appropriate structures are put into place. State action, it seemed, could accomplish anything.

What the Commissioners did not seem to realize was that the humanistic and democratic education system they were trying to implement was incompatible with the centralized and bureaucratic structures they were recommending. For example, the report recommended the establishment of the Superior Council of Education as an advisory body to the MEQ to ensure that the Ministry did not arrogate to itself all decision-making powers vis-a-vis education in Quebec, but remained responsive to the views of a wide spectrum of concerned groups. This attempt to modify or limit the powers of the MEQ proved unsuccessful, however. The MEQ began to treat the advice of the Council as pro forma and tended to act very much as it pleased (Gallagher, 1972). The result was that educational policy, planning, administration, and funding soon became highly centralized and highly bureaucratized.

Within a short time local school commissions found their traditional autonomy eroded and the MEQ was able to impose its own policies, priorities and decisions in a variety of ways. The MEQ was able to control "local educational priorities through budgetary norms" and

"inadmissible expenses" (Gallagher, 1972: 160). Another form of centralization evolved as the MEQ came to enact collective agreements with teachers and other workers in the education sector. Such agreements standardized working conditions, pay scales, hiring practices and other matters previously under the control of the school commissions. As their authority and autonomy eroded, individual school commissions soon became "local or administrative units of the [MEQ] with almost no powers of any significance" (Gallagher, 1972: 162).

Critics of the MEQ began to charge that the Ministry's zeal for rational planning failed to take into account the needs, abilities or concerns of teachers, students or the local community. For example, regional secondary schools became large impersonal centers to which thousands of students are bused. Such a school, one former member of the Parent Commission complained, became a "usine de cours [course factory], that is, a well-scheduled organization of lectures and movement with little or no consideration for human aspirations" (Sister Ghislaine Roquet, quoted in Buteau, 1972: 197).

After the MEQ consolidated its control over the public sector, it turned its attention to the private sector. The Parent Commission had argued that private schools should

come under the authority of the Ministry: "Private institutions will continue to exist but their relations with the State, like those of the public bodies, must be channeled through a single authority, the Ministry of Education" (Québec, Commission of Inquiry on Education in the Province of Quebec, 1963: 89). This was seen as a particularly serious issue because of the high proportion of students attending private schools and the high status and autonomy such schools had in Quebec.

The first step was the establishment of a network of public colleges (CEGEPs) in 1967 which initiated a new era of accessible and inexpensive institutions of higher education. The creation of the CEGEP redefined the role of the private classical colleges, transforming most of them into CEGEPs incorporating trade, technical and other existing institutions (Magnuson, 1980). This dramatic change served to subordinate the private colleges, which had played so important a role in Quebec's educational history, to the new public educational structure.

MEQ control over the private education sector was further extended and centralized by the passage of the Private Education Act in 1968 which gave the MEQ substantial powers with regard to private schools. Private schools would now have to be certified by the Ministry and

were now expected to meet the same pedagogical and regulatory standards as public schools. The legislation also regularized and standardized public funding for private schools. Schools which were now 'Declared in the Public Interest' by the MEQ would be given 80 per cent of the previous year's per pupil grant to public schools, while other private schools, those 'Recognized for the Purpose of Grants,' were entitled to receive 60 per cent of the public school award. The extension of state funding to private schools, of course, soon led as well to the extension of state control over private schools. Indeed, one could argue that the state soon exerted even more control over the private sector than over the public, since the public sector schools have certain constitutional as well as acquired rights with which the state has been unable to tamper but which do not exist for the private schools.

The Linguistic Turn

The Quebec society which emerged from the Quiet Revolution in 1968 was substantially different from the traditional society which had preceded it. Quebec's key institutions - in particular the Catholic church and the state - had been radically transformed in a remarkably

short period of time. The rapid secularization of Quebec society had diminished the role and authority of the Catholic church while the newly activist state was expanding its influence into almost every sector of Quebec society. During this period, much of Quebec's francophone population had come to equate the promotion of their collective identity with the empowerment of the state. The Quebecois, as they now began to call themselves, felt that in the state and its agencies they at last had the collective tools with which to build their future society. But what type of society would it be? How would it fit into Canada's political and economic structure? Was a fully developed Quebec society even possible within the confines of the Canadian federation? These questions raised new debates and generated new disagreements within the Quebecois community about the nature of Quebec society and its future within Canada, making the issues of nationalism and language come to take on a new and urgent priority. The result was a breakdown of the ideological and political alliances which initiated the reforms of the early 1960s along with the rise of various competing forms of state-centered nationalism (Moniere, 1981).

The issue of language played a significant role in these debates for a number of reasons. As Marcel Fournier

(1990: 44) has noted, the "representation of identity does not rest only on inherent characteristics, but is also ...a function of the balance of power within which the group or collectivity exists, which determines the ease with which it may transform these traits into a collective identity." In this respect, the French language has always been a key part of the francophone community's collective sense of self; the symbolic marker which identifies them as a distinct and coherent collectivity, differentiating them from most other Canadians and indeed from the rest of North America. The preservation of the French language despite two hundred years of British domination was a major accomplishment of francophone Quebecers, a shared source of pride in the past and a collective point of concern for the future. Magnuson (1980), has argued that, with the modernization of Quebec, the French language came to take on an even more important symbolic role as the significance of other traditional elements of Francophone identity, such as religion and lifestyle were reduced. One point on which almost all francophone Quebecers agreed, then, was that the new Quebec society being built should be a French society. The issue of language and nationalism were thus intertwined whatever the form of nationalism being formulated.

Another factor which made the role of language a

contentious issue in Quebec society at this time were demographic changes affecting the francophone population. The high birth rates which had characterized the francophone community for two hundred years went into a steep decline and the Quebecois ceased to reproduce themselves. This demographic decline caused widespread public concern because it seemed to pose a threat to the continued survival of Quebec as a French society; a serious issue to a people which had fought so hard for two hundred years to assure the survival of their language and institutions. Given that the Quebecois now felt that they had the tools with which to take complete control of their society, this perceived demographic threat to the very survival of their society provoked a powerful emotional reaction.

Reinforcing the proportionate decline of the francophone Quebecois population was the linguistic choice made by immigrants, most of whom chose English as their language of work and education. Immigrants seemed to see Canada as an English country and to believe that job opportunities and higher status were more accessible to English-speakers as opposed to French-speakers. Yet if it was to survive as a French society, many nationalists believed, Quebec would have to expand the use of French by immigrants. In this respect, the preference of most

immigrants for English seemed to nationalist Quebecois to be a rejection of their vision of Quebec as a French society and, given the significant number of immigrants coming to Quebec at that time, posed a further threat to the possibility of establishing such a society.

Guindon (1978: 216) suggests yet another factor to account for some of the significance now being attached to the French language, the interests of the new middle class:

At first, in the early sixties, the public and parapublic sector was able to absorb all of (the new middle class), since this was the period of extensive institution building ...Language became a political issue when the cadres of public institutional development were to a large extent filled.

Under these new circumstances, the "francization" of other institutional sectors became a prerequisite to any further personal or collective opportunities for the middle class.

The new nationalism and new debates in Quebec society inevitably had their impact upon the education system. Throughout this period, from 1968 to 1982, language became the political and parapolitical issue around which educational debate centered and group conflicts were focused.

The year 1968 marked the end of major structural reforms to Quebec's education system, with the final changes largely directed, as we have already seen, at the private education sector. It is not that no more could be done in the public sector; indeed, the final volumes of the Parent Report released in 1966 recommended yet another series of sweeping changes, most notably the establishment of common, non-confessional public schools. Several attempts were made over the next few years to implement further reforms to Quebec's educational system, especially on the island of Montreal (Québec, Ministère de L'Éducation, 1982), but interest in the education sector was shifting from structural issues to nationalist ones, with the role of language taking center stage.

The demographic decline of the francophone population meant that the dramatic growth of the student population in the school system occurring in the 1950s and early 60s had ended, and that schools - and teachers - now faced the prospect of declining enrolments. Whatever the long term threat to Quebec's cultural survival, this also posed a more immediate threat of job losses to Quebec's teachers and to other workers in the education sector. Not surprisingly, many francophone teachers became among the most ardent of the linguistic nationalists.

The linguistic choice being made by new immigrants to Quebec was also having a significant impact upon the school system. During the 1950s the majority of immigrants chose English as the language of education for their children. There were a number of reasons for this choice. One was the willingness of the anglophone Protestant system to accept non-Protestant immigrant students, such as Jews and Greeks. In contrast, the Catholic system at the time would only accept Catholic students, such as Poles and Italians. Moreover, even within the Catholic system there was a marked preference for anglophone schools among immigrants, in part because the anglophone sector had established a network of high schools with a clear path to university. The francophone sector remained poorly organized with no clear path leading to acceptance at a university. Another factor was the perception on the part of immigrants that the use of the English language afforded more opportunities and a higher status than did the use of French.

This "anglicization" of immigrants, which had, in the past, been seen as "normal" (Linteau, 1989: 191), was redefined as an alarming trend by nationalists in the 1960s. What was now different was the scope of the new immigration, the impact it was likely to have upon a declining francophone population, and the symbolic

significance the preference for English had in the new Quebec.

Particularly significant in this respect was the linguistic choice being made by Italian immigrants, the largest immigrant group arriving in the 1950s and 60s. The previous wave of Italian immigrants - those who had come before the Second World War - had tended to integrate into the francophone milieu. As Catholics, Italians had been able to enter the Catholic school system with all their rights intact and had even been able to arrange to have the Italian language taught in a number of Catholic schools in addition to French and English. In addition, Italians had tended to settle in largely francophone sections of Montreal, shared roughly the same socio-economic status as their francophone neighbours and intermarriage between Italians and French Quebecers had been relatively common (Linteau, 1989). Religion, residence and intermarriage, then, had all contributed to integrating the Italians into the francophone milieu.

The 60,000 Italian immigrants coming to Quebec after the Second World War, however, often made a very different linguistic choice, tending to send their children to the English language sector of the Catholic school commissions. The residential concentration of the Italians in

francophone districts provided them with Anglo-Catholic or "bilingual" schools that were relatively monoethnic. Some schools had as high as 90 percent of their student population of Italian descent. Altogether 75 percent of Italian schoolchildren were attending English Catholic schools as opposed to French schools (Linteau, 1989).

Linteau (1989) has suggested that this latter choice by Italian parents was particularly troubling and galling to Quebecois nationalists. Ironically, what made the linguistic choice of Italian parents so blatant was that most Italians were living in predominantly francophone neighbourhoods but their children were attending different schools from their francophone neighbours. This generated and exacerbated linguistic tensions between the two groups. As Italians continued to come to Montreal in large numbers they also posed a threat to francophone control over the local school commissions, particularly in St. Leonard, an area of heavy Italian residential concentration (Taddeo and Taras, 1987). In addition, the growth of Anglo-Catholic schools and the decline of Franco-Catholic schools in Italian districts was disturbing to francophone teachers, school officials and others fearing a threat to their jobs.

Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that conflict should erupt between the Italian and French

communities in the City of Saint Leonard over the language of education for immigrant schoolchildren. Nor, given the activist role of the state in Quebec society, is it surprising that this conflict led to a series of state interventions.

i. The St. Leonard School Conflict

The Jerome Le Royer School Commission, the Catholic school commission in St. Leonard, opened its first bilingual schools in 1962 to meet the demand for English-language instruction by Italian and other Catholic immigrant parents. Although these schools were considered to be providing a bilingual education, most of the curriculum was offered in English. Given the evolving nationalist climate in Quebec, however, opposition to these bilingual schools was soon organized and the decision was made by the commission in 1967 to shift to French as the primary language of instruction in all its schools with English taught only as a second language.

This decision to francisize the bilingual schools was fiercely opposed by the leadership of the Italian community, which organized the Saint Leonard English Catholic Association of Parents to oppose it. Francophone nationalists, too, organized to achieve their goals,

forming the Mouvement pour l'integration Scolaire (MIS). Given the numerical majority of the francophone population, the MIS won a majority of seats on the school commission in the 1968 commission election and reaffirmed a policy of French as the exclusive language of instruction in the commission's schools. This dispute became a highly emotional one, with public meetings mobilizing angry Italian parents and a demonstration led by MIS supporters in 1969 turning into a minor riot. Many Italian parents refused to go along with the commission's action, some switching their children to English Protestant schools while the English Catholic Association of Parents organized private English classes in October of 1968 (Taddeo and Taras, 1987: 93).

This dispute soon had serious ramifications well beyond the border of St. Leonard. Widespread debate on the school issue increased public awareness of the role of language in Quebec society and hardened the views of both those who opposed and those who supported the right of parents to choose the language of instruction for their children. Clearly, the issue seemed too important to be left up to individual school commissions to decide or to allow for further battles to break out on the streets. Intervention by the provincial government seemed necessary to decide whether parents should have the right to choose

the language of instruction, and if so, whether all parents, including immigrants, were to have this right.

The first of these interventions, Bill 63, passed by the National Assembly in 1969, was an attempt by the provincial government, then headed by the Union Nationale, to establish an official language policy. Bill 63 gave parents the right to educate their children in the language of their choice, a legislative decision which, far from settling the matter, provoked a storm of protest in the francophone community. At the same time, the government set up the Gendron Commission to study the whole issue of language in detail, a sign that the government, too, had evolved no consistent policy on language and sought to tap public opinion.

Public opinion, however, seemed solidly against Bill 63, especially as reflected in the francophone media. The defeat of the Union Nationale government in the provincial election of 1970 meant that a new policy on the language of education would soon be in force. Although the new Liberal government did not act quickly, it took into account the remarkable strength shown by the newly formed Parti Quebecois which obtained 24 percent of the popular vote in the 1970 provincial election, and the recommendation by the Gendron Commission in 1972 that French be made the

exclusive official language of Quebec.

ii. Bill 22

The new linguistic policy, promulgated in Bill 22 (Quebec, National Assembly, 1974: 1) stated that the French language "is a national heritage which the body politic is in duty bound to preserve, and it is incumbent upon the government ...to employ every means in its power to ensure the preeminence of that language and to promote its vigour and quality." Despite this straightforward language, however, Bill 22 failed to establish a clear policy on the language of education. Instead, Bill 22 required that children seeking entry into an English school be tested on their proficiency in the English language prior to being allowed into such a school.

This policy, one which may have been intended as a compromise among divergent groups, ended up being extremely unpopular with most segments of Quebec society. The requirement that their pre-school children be tested lead many immigrant families to obtain English instruction for their pre-school children in order that they qualify for entry into English language schools. This posed a financial and emotional drain for many families not yet firmly established in their new country of residence and generated

massive resentment on the part of ethnocultural minority groups. Many members of these groups withdrew their support from the Liberal party in the provincial election of 1976.

As for francophone nationalists, they too were dissatisfied with Bill 22, which still left immigrants with a means of access to English language instruction. In any case, nationalists argued, how could one apply rigorous standards of "proficiency" in English to pre-school children? Such a policy would inevitably lead to simplistic tests which would make a mockery of the nationalists' desire to limit access to English education. The Liberal Party, the party which had initiated the Quiet Revolution, now seemed to many Quebecers to have lost all sense of direction and sense of purpose.

iii. Bill 101

The election of a Parti Quebecois government in the 1976 election put into power a party committed to building Quebec as a French society. Bill 101, passed by the National Assembly in 1977, presented a more emphatic vision of Quebec as a francophone society and the role of the government in promoting the language. The French language, the Bill asserts (Quebec, National Assembly, 1977: 8), is "the distinctive language of a people that is in the

majority French-speaking [and] is the the instrument by which that people has articulated its identity." As a consequence, "the Assemblée Nationale du Québec ...is resolved ...to make of French the language of Government and the Law, as well as the normal and everyday language of work, instruction, communication, commerce and business."

Bill 101 replaced the tests specified by Bill 22 with a clear-cut definition of who is or is not eligible to attend English schools in Quebec. New immigrants were no longer to be allowed to send their children to English schools. Only those children with at least one parent who had attended English schools in Quebec or who had an older sibling in such a school would receive a certificate of eligibility for English language instruction. All others would have to attend French schools.

The educational provisions of Bill 101 were not only intended to limit and control access to English language instruction, they were also seen as "destined to accelerate the integration of English-speaking institutions into the life and work of French-speaking Quebec society" (Quebec, Ministère de L'Éducation, 1982: 11) - a much more far-reaching objective. The assumption underlying Bill 101 and much of the educational policy over the next few years was that language and culture are equivalent; by learning

French one was learning as well the culture of the Quebecois and being integrated into Quebec society.

This is an equation not made by anglophone Quebecers who, like other anglophone North Americans, do not assume that all anglophones are one people with a common culture. Speaking English has not been a source of solidarity among blacks and whites in the United States, for example, nor among Jews, Italians, and Protestants in Quebec. To francophone Quebecois, however, who for most of their history have been a relatively homogenous cultural group, the equation between language and culture seemed obvious. It is this which has made many Quebecois see the teaching of English to francophone students to pose a cultural threat to such students unless they are old enough and mature enough to be firmly embedded in their own culture. English is therefore not taught to francophone students until after grade three, while anglophone students are required to learn French, even in anglophone schools, from kindergarten on. Similarly, by requiring even anglophone school boards to function in French, these public institutions were believed to be set on a course towards integration into the francophone community (Quebec, Ministère de L'Éducation, 1982: 11).

Bill 101 proved to be only the first of a series of

measures initiated by the Parti Quebecois government. In 1977 the MEQ changed its funding criterion for private schools to one based on the hours and quality of French instruction, a change which, as we shall see in the next chapter, had serious repercussions for the Jewish education system. Still more changes were proposed by the MEQ in its policy statement entitled The Schools of Québec (Québec, Ministère de L'Éducation, 1979), particularly with regard to curriculum and pedagogical issues. The most comprehensive series of changes, however, were proposed in the MEQ's White Paper entitled The Quebec School: A Responsible Force in the Community (Québec, Ministère de L'Éducation, 1982).

There were constitutional limits, however, to how much the education system could be changed. A clear example came in 1982 when the new constitutional agreement modified Quebec's language law. Bill 101 had limited English language instruction, by and large, to those having had a parent educated in English in Quebec. The new constitutional agreement granted the children of all anglophone Canadians residing in Quebec, whether educated in Quebec or not, the right to an English language education.

Re-evaluation and Response

The 1980s proved to be a period during which few substantive changes were made to the education system in Quebec. Instead, this was a period of fine-tuning as the state's educational policies created new and unexpected problems both in the schools and in the relations among different groups in Quebec society. Throughout this period ministerial regulations, interpretations, negotiations and court challenges served to define and limit both the state's legislative powers and the accommodations required on the part of the various public and private interest groups.

The re-election of the Liberal Party to power in 1985 signalled a re-evaluation of Quebec's continuing development and an end to the dramatic pace of change initiated by the Quiet Revolution. Nevertheless, while it moved cautiously in other areas of jurisdiction, the new Liberal administration did not give up on the issue of structural reforms to the education system. This was because the structural ambiguity and complexity characterizing Quebec's education system was preventing an administrative and cost effective "rationalization" of the education system. The existence of separate confessional and linguistic sectors, especially in the area of Montreal, multiplied the number of schools at a time when enrolments

were dropping and generated disagreements among interest groups seeking to control the schools and the school commissions. Indeed, the unexpected effect of government legislation restricting enrolment in English schools was the emergence of a new, Protestant, francophone school sector, which, together with French-immersion schools designed for anglophone students, further fragmented the school system and further increased the duplication of services. Regardless of whether one was motivated by nationalist ideology or bureaucratic expediency, it was becoming clear to many Quebecers that the constitutional guarantees placed in the BNA Act in the 1860s to preserve separate Protestant and Catholic schools had become an obstacle to reforms of the education system designed to meet the needs of contemporary Quebec society.

Bill 107, passed by the National Assembly in December 1988, proved to be yet another attempt at initiating structural reforms. Bill 107 sought to replace the system of dual denominational public school boards with linguistic boards. This change, the MEQ asserted, "brings the legislative and administrative framework of the public elementary and secondary school system into line with the public consensus" (Québec, Ministère de L'Éducation, 1989: 1). Given the failure of previous attempts however, the

decision was made not to implement this change until its "legal validity has been confirmed by the courts" (Québec, Ministère de L'Éducation, 1989: 1).

Bill 107 was quite modest in its aims and carefully designed to avoid the constitutional pitfalls which had killed previous legislation. The key to the legislation was a literal compliance with constitutional provisions. Those confessional and "dissentient" boards in existence in 1867 would continue to exist - in addition to linguistic boards - as constitutionally guaranteed. The MEQ reserved for itself, however, the power to redistribute educational facilities and resources from these confessional boards to the new linguistic boards. The new linguistic boards would then be created out of facilities taken from the existing confessional boards rather being built from scratch. In addition, only Catholics and Protestants who so desired would have the right to attend confessional schools, as guaranteed in the constitution. All others would attend schools run by linguistic boards. Confessional schools would continue to exist, but would become only a small part of the education system.

Opposition to Bill 107, initially strong among anglophone groups and Catholics, began to diminish during the late 1980s. Anglophone opposition had centered on the

perception of Protestant school boards as the most important protectors of English language rights, in part because the only anglophone institutions with a constitutional guarantee in Quebec are the Protestant schools. The Protestant school boards, however, had been consistently moving more and more to French language instruction as the effects of Bill 101 caused the anglophone student population to shrink. The Task Force on English Education (1992: 2) reported that English enrolment had dropped by 48 percent between 1976 and 1986, and the total English enrolment, which had been at 250,000 in 1972, was down 56 percent to 108,000 by 1990. In contrast to the 1960s, when Protestant schools were almost exclusively English schools, only 61 percent of students attending schools belonging to the Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal in 1991 were attending English schools (Task Force on English Education, 1992: Table 20).

In addition, as the anglophone leadership realized, constitutional guarantees are confessional, not linguistic. The constitution guarantees Protestant denominational schools, not English language schools. This means that, realistically, the continuing existence of anglophone schools is a function of state policy, not constitutional guarantees. The question then is how best to ensure that

such policy perpetuates English language instruction. The constitutional rights accorded the Protestant school boards had succeeded in preserving these boards for the moment, but given the drastic declines in enrolment their long term future as anglophone institutions was in doubt. Especially since more and more students attending Protestant schools were attending French schools and conflicts were emerging between French and English groups within the Protestant system over the distribution of resources and facilities.

The issue of preserving English language instruction could now be separated from the issue of preserving the Protestant system. To some anglophones, state guarantees of anglophone rights now seemed preferable to constitutional guarantees of Protestant rights. Moreover, having two separate anglophone schools in a community, one Protestant and the other Catholic, often meant that neither was viable, with the result that neighbourhood schools were being closed and students bused to schools in other areas. Combining anglophone Protestant and Catholic students in one board would make English language schools more viable in more areas. Finally, the composition of the anglophone community itself was changing, with more and more of those identifying themselves as "anglophone" - such as many Jews - neither British nor Protestant in origin and with no

particular commitment to Protestant institutions. Anglophone resistance to linguistic boards, then, began to diminish, as was made evident when the report of the Task Force on English Education (1992: 8) came out in favour of linguistic boards.

As for the Catholic sector, here the situation was more complex. Numerous interest groups were active in the Catholic educational sector in the 1980s, contesting elections to school boards and acting as pressure groups. Henry Milner (1986: 45) argues that the end of the large scale reform efforts of the 1960s meant that, "grand reform schemes gave way to conflicts over specific schools and the election campaigns of the commissioners who administered them." These conflicts arose because of the structural ambiguity inherent in having a Catholic school system serving as the public school system for the vast majority of Quebec's students.

Given the rapid secularization of Quebec society so noticeable in the 1960s, it might be supposed that the Catholic public school system, too, would be secularized, and to some extent this was the case, most dramatically in the virtual disappearance of clergy from the teaching profession. Certainly at the college and university level, clerical control over educational institutions evaporated.

But at the public school level Catholic interest groups fought a relatively successful campaign to retain control over the Catholic school commissions, with the support of provincial government policy and legislation. This has perpetuated what Milner (1986) calls "traditionalist" Catholic control over the schools at the very time that the school's clientele has been undergoing a dramatic change.

This change is in large measure a consequence of Bill 101 and its redirection of Quebec's immigrants schoolchildren into the francophone Catholic sector. Many of these children are neither francophone nor Catholic. Groups such as Russian Jews, Moslems, and Hindus are attending supposedly public schools which assert a particular confessional status. This issue was addressed by the White Paper on education (Quebec, Ministère de l'Éducation, 1982: 24) which noted that:

In the French-Catholic school ...[students] can be excused from religious instruction but this places them outside the mainstream and they are then excluded from participating fully in the orientation of the school and its educational projects. ...To request exemption can be an alienating and negative step especially when we know that all the parents do not have easy access to information ...Can schools be public, democratic and welcoming when practices deemed discriminatory by the Commission des droits et libertés de la personne are institutionalized within them?

The White Paper (Quebec, Ministère de L'Éducation, 1982: 24) put the matter quite bluntly: "We can hardly force immigrants into French schools if by doing so we relegate them to the status of second-class citizens."

This is not only a problem facing immigrants, however. Another change affecting the nature of the student body is the growing number of anglophones sending their children to francophone schools. These parents are not being forced to send their children to French schools, they do so voluntarily, yet some also find themselves culturally and ideologically uncomfortable with the religious content of the school programs. Wanting a high quality French language education for their children, they find their children are getting a religious education as well.

Finally, many francophone Québécois, too, have sought a public school system which would be secular. A survey conducted by the CECM in 1982 found that only 28 percent of 5000 parents responding to the survey preferred a confessional school, while 55 percent preferred a "pluralist" school (Milner, 1986: 59). Structurally, then, the new kinds of students in Quebec's public schools have difficulty fitting into the existing school structures, yet the provincial government continues to be either unwilling

or unable to change those structures.

The New Social Contract

Quebec society continues to evolve and change. To those living through it, the ongoing ebb and flow of events makes it difficult to identify precisely what is changing, how or why. Confident analysis can only come from hindsight. Nevertheless we can identify a number of recent trends in Quebec society which are having a significant impact both upon the education system and on the relations between the state and Quebec's ethnocultural minorities.

One trend is the increasing attention being focused on ethnic groups and in particular on ethnic conflicts in Quebec. In general, there has been a noticeable shift in the social location of ethnic minorities in Quebec, a shift which has become particularly evident since the Oka crisis of 1990. Concerned as they were with their own collective development, Quebec's francophone majority paid little attention to the needs or aspirations of the ethnic minorities. Insofar as minorities posed a "problem" in Quebec, the problem was largely seen as a linguistic one: the need to integrate the minorities into Quebec's linguistic majority.

This has fundamentally changed as many Quebecois have now come to see ethnic minorities as posing a problem.

Integration, once assumed to be simply a matter of learning French, is now recognized to be a much more complicated and much more consequential issue. Immigrants do not merely integrate, they may also subtly change the society into which they are integrating. Also, as the natives at Oka made clear, minority groups have agendas of their own. One result has been a new interest among francophone social scientists in discovering what the members of ethnic communities think and how they experience life in Quebec (Labelle, Beaudet, Levy and Tardif, 1993; Langlais, Laplante and Levy, 1990; Saganash, 1993; are examples). Quebec is now being described as a "pluralist" society facing a new set of challenges (Groupe de Recherche Ethnicité et Société, 1992).

Several of those challenges pertain to education. Given the diversity of students attending school in Quebec by 1990, it is not surprising that conflicts should arise within the schools. Some of these conflicts are predictable and by no mean limited to Quebec, such as inter-ethnic animosities and hostilities. Students finding themselves in a new country, learning a new language and new customs quite naturally gravitate to others of their own background with whom they feel more comfortable. The resulting ethnic stratification and fragmentation within the schools provide

a climate within which ethnic antagonisms can develop.

More significant, however, was the development of ethnic antagonism towards the students on the part of teachers, administrators, and school board officials. A short-lived but instructive debate arose in 1990 over whether non-francophone students should be allowed to speak to one another in their native tongues anywhere within the schools, such as corridors during recess, or on school grounds. After a proposal was presented to the CECM commissioners that only French be permitted, widespread opposition to what was seen as a coercive approach was voiced. Opponents included the Commission des droits de la personne du Quebec (Quebec, Commission des droits de la personne, 1990) which criticized the CECM's proposal to discipline students found to be talking to one another in a language other than French.

This debate reflects the frustration of school personnel who had discovered that the learning of French was, by itself, not having the effect upon students which had been expected. As noted earlier, state cultural policy as formulated in Bill 101 and A Cultural Development Policy For Quebec (Québec, Le Ministre d'État au Développement culturel, 1978) assumed that teaching the French language would suffice to integrate newcomers into Quebec culture.

This was proving not to be the case, however. As Rocher (1992: 444) notes:

Mais que les immigrants soient concentrés presque exclusivement dans la région montréalaise pose de difficiles problèmes à la francisation dans les écoles primaires et secondaires: beaucoup de ces écoles comptent une proportion élevée d'élèves allophones, à telle enseigne qu'il arrive maintenant que les Québécois de "vielle souche" soient minoritaires dans certaines d'entre elles. Il est certain que la francisation des allophones se produit, mais il n'est pas aussi certain qu'ils assimilent la culture québécoise francophone et qu'ils s'intègrent à la communauté francophone du Québec.

Frustrated teachers and principles, looking for some explanation for the failure of newcomers to integrate, focused again on language: immigrant students fail to integrate into Quebec society because they continue to speak to one another in Chinese or in Tagalog or in Hindi. Prevent them from doing so and this last barrier to becoming a Quebecois will be overcome.

The problem with this assumption is the equation of learning a language with cultural integration. It ignores the circumstances within which the immigrants find themselves: their attachments to their relatives and friends both in Quebec and "back home"; their own

motivations, desires and the goals to which they are directed; the traditions and values they bring with them and to which they may remain attached; their perception of Quebec society and of their place within it; and the treatment accorded to them by the francophone majority, whether, as individuals, in the school and in the other activities of everyday life, or, as a group, by the media. Immigrants do not come to a country in order to meet the objectives of some government agency; they come to meet their needs and to improve their lives. By 1990, it was clear that government policy on education would require an overhaul if it was to achieve its stated aims. Integration could not be a one way process.

One response has been negative: a desire to minimize or eliminate the "problem" of minorities. The film "Disparaitre" reflected this negative view of immigrants and the possible threat they pose to the preservation of Quebecois culture. Calls by francophone social scientists to reduce the number of immigrants is another example.

More positively, many Quebecois are now asking themselves how to open up Quebec society in such a way as to take advantage of what immigrants and minority groups have to offer (Langlais, Laplante and Levy, 1990). This too would appear to be the government's own approach as expressed in Vision, a recent policy statement on

immigration and integration (Québec, Ministère des Communautés culturelles et de l'Immigration, 1990). This policy statement calls for the state to enter into a partnership with the various ethnic communities in establishing ethnic institutions to ensure that the integration of new immigrants is both effective and directed to the francophone milieu. The policy statement on immigration and integration refers to this new partnership as a "social contract" between the state and the ethnic communities.

In terms of education, this makes the ethnic private schools primary vehicles for the integration of new immigrants, a change of focus which may reflect the failure of the public schools to work as expected. Nevertheless, there are contradictory forces within the MEQ pushing in a very different direction. In a report made public in 1993, the Commission Consultative de l'Enseignement Privé suggested that the provincial government should stop funding ethnic private schools. Ethnic schools, the report said, "risk favoring a form of ghettoization which can delay the integration of some communities into the common social fabric" (quoted in The Gazette, April 22, 1993: A1). This view is consistent with warnings that immigration threatens Montreal's "French face" and calls that

immigration be substantially reduced or halted (see Paillé, 1990; Piché, 1991; Jedwab, 1992).

Private Schools and Structural Ambiguity

State subsidies have lowered the cost of tuition in private schools, making these schools more affordable and more attractive to parents. Many private schools, including most ethnic community day schools, are certified by the Ministry of Education as being in the "public interest" and receive substantial subsidies from the ministry. Such subsidies usually run at between 60 percent to 80 percent of the equivalent funds allocated on a per pupil basis to the various public school commissions. Subsidies may be allocated at an even higher level under certain circumstances¹. Les Écoles Elementaire Socrates, for example, are run by Montreal's Greek community but have been "associated" with the Montreal Catholic School Commission since 1978. They currently receive a subsidy equal to 100 percent of the rate allocated per pupil to the MCSC's schools. Partly as a consequence of relatively low tuition costs, partly as a consequence of the high status and important role private schools have historically had in

¹Subsidies to private schools do not, however, cover administrative or maintenance costs, nor the costs of materials, such as Hebrew or Greek text books, not included in the regime pedagogique.

Quebec, even today 8.6 percent of Quebec students attend private schools, a figure close to double the Canadian average of 4.7 percent (Easton, 1988).

With both public and private schools funded by the state and with both sets of schools required to meet the same ministerial standards and abide by ministerial regulations, the distinction between public and private schools is blurred to say the least. In this respect, structural ambiguity has been reinforced by the high level of funding granted to many private schools by the Ministry of Education.

The systematic reform of the province's education system during the 1960s led to the centralization of that system under state supervision. But this does not mean that the state simply took control of the education system, for as the state incorporated the educational sector within its administrative space, it also incorporated the conflicting interests of groups competing for control over education. Education in Quebec had always been a political issue, but now conflict over such matters as the language of education, the cultural integration of immigrants, the role of parents in the school's administration, or the working conditions of teachers also became bureaucratic and administrative issues for the state. As state control

increased, interest groups began to seek greater influence on state educational policy to ensure that their views and goals were represented in state structures and practices. In Held's terminology, conflict over educational issues became inscribed within the state's institutions and policies. In this respect, the dialectic of state relations with civil society transformed the state even as the state tried to transform civil society.

The result is an education system characterized by structural ambiguity which has not been resolved by the reforms initiated by the Quiet Revolution. If anything, structural complexity and ambiguity would appear to have been reinforced by government policies and ministerial regulations which continue to try to accommodate divergent interest groups rather than effect a total overhaul of the education system. In any case, any comprehensive restructuring of the education system seems destined to perpetuate the structural ambiguity of Quebec's education system because of the constitutional impediments put into place by article 93 of the BNA Act.

How has the structural ambiguity of Quebec's education system affected Montreal's Jewish day schools? What impact have successive government policies had on the Jewish system? How has the system accommodated itself to

increasing ministerial centralization and control? It is to these issues that we now turn in examining the evolution of Montreal's Jewish day school system. As we shall see in the next chapters the answer to these questions are complex. Montreal's Jewish day schools neither evolved in isolation from the structural and ideological changes affecting the broader society, nor are they a simple reflection of these changes. While the Jewish school system reproduces some of the characteristics of the broader system, it reflects as well a creative and distinctive adaptation to the needs of the Jewish community and to the constraints of life in Quebec. This has much to tell us about how ethnicity is manifest in Quebec society.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE EVOLUTION OF THE JEWISH DAY SCHOOL SYSTEM IN MONTREAL: CONTINUITY, CONFLICT, AND CHANGE

Having examined the development of the public school system in Quebec, we will now look at the evolution of the private day school system within the Montreal Jewish community. As noted earlier, Montreal's Jewish day school system is unique in North America. Elsewhere, the majority of Jewish schoolchildren attend public schools, receiving their Jewish education in the form of supplementary schooling (Genuth, Dellapergola and Dubb, 1985). Only a small proportion attend full-time day schools in lieu of secular public schools. In Montreal, however, it is community day schools rather than public schools which are the norm, with over 50 percent of Montreal's Jewish schoolchildren attending Jewish day schools, compared to 33 percent in Toronto and an average of 11 percent in all of North America (Joint Education Campaign, 1990). In addition, day schools in most other cities tend to be operated by and to cater to religiously Orthodox groups. In New York, for example, 91 percent of pupils attending Jewish day schools in 1982-83 attended Orthodox schools (Genuth, Dellapergola and Dubb, 1985: 68). In contrast,

only about 22 percent of pupils in Montreal were attending Orthodox schools in 1984-85 (Weinfeld, 1985: 27), despite the fact that Montreal has a higher proportion of Jews who consider themselves to be Orthodox than does New York (Allied Jewish Community Services, 1991: 22). Rather than having a primarily Orthodox system, the Montreal community has evolved an extensive network of over twenty Jewish day schools with a wide variety of ideologies and orientations ranging from the ultra-Orthodox to schools which are largely secular in orientation.

Indeed, the diversity of Montreal's Jewish day school system is another of its unique characteristics. The schools differ in form and degree of religiosity, languages of instruction, ideology, and goals. As a consequence, they differ as well in constituency.

How and why did the Jewish community in Montreal develop such a distinctive day school system? The answer is that Montreal's Jewish day school system evolved and continues to evolve as a consequence of diverse factors which have come into play at different times and in different ways. The initiatives which led members of the Jewish community to establish private day schools were internal to the community, reflecting the ideological commitments, religious preferences and class distinctions

existing within the community. The forces which sustained these schools, however, and allowed them to flourish were primarily tied into the ongoing pattern of relations between the Jewish community and the dominant British and French communities, along with the actions and interventions of the state.

Montreal's Jewish day school system developed within the context established by Quebec's public and private education system. As such, the evolution of the Jewish system has been tied into the evolution of the Quebec system as a whole. This is true in an administrative sense in that Quebec's educational bureaucracy has authority over the Jewish system. It is also true in a much more profound structural sense for the dialectical relationship between the state and civil society can be seen in the reproduction of structural properties and social practices within the Jewish community. The ambiguity of state educational structures identified in Chapters Five and Six opens up spaces, which we can view as either structures of opportunity or structures of constraint, which have both allowed for and further encouraged ambiguity in Jewish community educational structures.

While technically private schools, the Jewish day schools claim to be "community" schools; a claim

legitimated by the state through substantial government grants and by ministerial definition and treatment. In addition, the failure of the MEQ to set up a single, integrated educational structure, or at least one which is religiously neutral, has both legitimated the existence of alternative religious or ethnic community structures and made them possible. In this way, the Jewish education system has reproduced the structural ambiguity of the broader education system as a consequence of divergent group interests and of conflicting goals.

These three factors – internal community developments, external relations with other ethnic groups, and the role of the state – will be examined in this chapter as we describe the evolution of the day school system. While it is usually assumed that active state intervention in the area of education only began after 1960, the history and evolution of Montreal's Jewish education system reflects the direct and indirect effects of regular intervention by the state in the educational affairs of the Jewish community and its relations with the Protestant and Catholic majorities. This is a complex scenario and untangling the different factors affecting Jewish education over time requires the same sort of chronological approach used earlier in examining education in Quebec in general.

As we did in that chapter when looking at the public school system, we will identify distinct periods characterized by evolving state policy on education as well as by different and distinct patterns of relations between the Jewish community's schools and the state¹. This chapter will examine the evolution of Jewish education until 1960, the next chapter will deal with the period following the Quiet Revolution.

The Beginnings of Jewish Education: 1760-1870

Organized Jewish education in Montreal began in 1847 when the newly arrived Reverend Abraham de Sola established a Hebrew supplementary school program at the Spanish and Portuguese synagogue (Shearith Israel congregation). Indeed, prior to the 1840s education in general was difficult to obtain in Quebec. Many Montreal Jews sent their children to be educated in the United States, Europe, or to other parts of Canada. Wealthy Jews who could afford it did not hesitate to take advantage of what they considered the best education available for their children. As Paris (1980: 28) notes, many Montreal Jews "educated

¹This chapter only examines the role of the Quebec state, which has jurisdiction in the area of education. The role of the federal government will not be considered here, although its policies and actions, as in the case of immigration policy, has had major impact upon the Jewish community.

their children in the best schools, and if the best schools were Catholic schools, well, they compensated with a rigorous Hebrew-school education after hours."

Stuart Rosenberg (1970) has described the period up to the 1880s as an era of Anglo-conformity in which Montreal's Jewish population tended to identify with the British community and sought to integrate with that community economically and socially if not in terms of religious practice. For the most part they themselves came either from Britain or the American cities to the south, and by their language, lifestyle, and choice of residence, they clearly indicated their identification with the British.

Given the Anglo-conformity prevalent at the time, the British-educated de Sola seems to have raised the status of Judaism as a religion both within the Jewish community and in the Montreal generally. De Sola became a professor of Hebrew and Oriental languages at McGill University in 1853, which further raised the stature of his synagogue school, and he began his own Jewish day school in 1854 (King, 1987). With de Sola on its faculty, McGill became the university of choice for Montreal's Jewish students. De Sola's own son later attended Montreal High School before moving on to university, a sign of a shift to local rather than American or foreign education even among Montreal's

Jewish elite.

By the 1870s, Montreal's general education system was undergoing significant change. As noted in Chapter Five, control over most schools was becoming concentrated in the hands of the Catholic Church which was transforming the ostensibly common schools into confessional schools. At the same time, there was the gradual emergence of a network of Protestant public schools, as a complement to private Protestant schools. This was also the period in which the problem of the 'place' of Jews in Quebec's public education system was beginning to emerge.

Legislation in 1870 officially integrated Jews into the existing system of funding for public education, giving them the choice of paying school taxes to either the Catholic or Protestant 'panel' (i.e., list of taxpayers). This also gave parents the choice of sending their children to schools operated by either the Catholic or Protestant commissions (Brown, 1986; Sack, 1965). It might seem that this would serve to integrate Jews into the emerging publicly-funded school systems, but it had the opposite effect. In this era of increasing confessional and clerical control over schools and school commissions, Jews were finding themselves relegated to being second-class citizens in the school system. They had no rights within the

confessionally organized school commissions, such as the right to serve on a commission's board of trustees. For the next hundred years, Jews suffered from what Louis Rosenberg (1993: 263) described as "taxation without representation, since [Quebecers] who are neither Roman Catholics nor Protestant Christians are compelled to pay taxes for the support of Catholic or Protestant schools but have not in return the legal right to have their children educated in these schools, nor the right to hold office as members of school boards or members of the school staff."

This, then, was not an era of increasing integration by Jews into Quebec's public school system, but of recurring conflict with public school authorities and increasing disenchantment. It was also an era of repeated interventions by the state which tried several times to legislate an arrangement among the parties involved in order to fit Jewish students into the confessional school systems.

Although a relationship was established in 1870 with the Protestant Board and Jews elected to pay their taxes to the Protestant panel, that relationship was frequently strained and soon seemed to satisfy neither Jewish parents nor the Protestant board. A clear sign of disenchantment was the decision of the Spanish and Portuguese congregation in 1874 to re-establish a private Jewish day school which

would provide both religious and secular studies. Initially it was proposed that this school be a community-wide school operated jointly with the German-Polish (Shaar Hashomayim) congregation², but a dispute arose over whether the Sephardic or Ashkenazic form of prayer would be taught. The result was that each congregation decided to act independently. Neither congregation had the means to support a day school of its own, much less accept the many new immigrant children who would soon be arriving. Each school soon encountered financial difficulties, with consequences which will be discussed below.

Community Crises and Conflicts: 1875 - 1960

The real history of Montreal's Jewish community (as opposed to the history of individual Jews) begins with the arrival of significant numbers of East European Jews in the 1880s. These new arrivals came with a sense of ethnic identity and ideological commitment which became the building blocks of the new community. At the same time, the need to deal with the influx of new immigrants and the problems their arrival brought forced the already

²These two were the oldest and most prestigious congregations in Montreal. The Spanish and Portuguese congregation followed the Sephardic religious ritual while Shaar Hashomayim followed the Ashkenazic ritual.

established Jews to develop a new, collective response and level of organization.

The period between 1880 and 1930 were formative years for the Montreal Jewish community. It was during this period that the community came to evolve its distinctive organizational style. This evolution was not without conflict, for there were many different ideas current of what a community should be and what it meant to live a "Jewish" life in North America. The arrival of so many new people from different regions of Europe with different goals, traditions, and beliefs generated conflict within the Jewish community, both among the new immigrants and between the immigrants as a whole and the already established Jewish community.

Prior to the 1880s, the Jewish residents of Montreal were characterized by a high level of individual commitment. There was little sense of communal Jewish identity, of collective organizational life, or of mutual responsibility. While Jewish organizations were established, such as the Young Men's Hebrew Benevolent Society in 1867 and the Anglo-Jewish Association in 1881, Tulchinsky (1992: 57) suggests that these organizations tended to be "paternalistic and philanthropic... [and] were part of a quest for respectability - acceptance, even - in

the best circles."

Such an individualistic and paternalistic approach to Jewish life inevitably came into conflict with the collective needs generated by the high level of immigration which began in the 1880s. It also came into conflict with the corporate perception of Quebec society on the part of both the British and French communities, who tended to see Canada as a union of two distinct and different cultures or "races." Individual Jews had been able to be accepted and integrated into Montreal's British community. But would Jews as a group be accepted into the self-segregated institutions, such as the separate Protestant and Catholic schools, which were more and more coming to characterize life in Montreal? Would the Yiddish-speaking Eastern European Orthodox Jew working as a presser in a garment factory receive the same sort of welcome in Montreal society as had the sophisticated and learned, British-educated Abraham de Sola forty years earlier? Quebec society was changing and a new sort of Jewish community was emerging. Not all elements within the Jewish community were willing to change, however, and conflicts soon arose. Characteristically, conflict first appeared as a dispute over education, and not surprisingly, this conflict soon spread to engage the British and French communities as

well.

That Montreal's Jewish parents put a special emphasis on the education of their children is characteristic of the new immigrants. In this respect Montreal was no different from New York or Toronto. Education played a particularly significant role for Jewish immigrants to North America. Quite apart from the traditional importance it had been assigned in Jewish culture, education was seen as the path to economic opportunity and to full participation in the new society. Whatever the hardships or deprivations parents had to endure in the new land was tolerable so long as they believed that life for their children would be better, and they looked to the education system as the means of assuring that it would be better. It is not surprising then, that so much emphasis has been placed on education by Montreal's Jews or that they have put so much time and energy into fostering their children's education.

What is significant about Montreal's ideologically diverse day school system is not the establishment of such schools but their survival and the central role they came to occupy in Montreal's Jewish school system. Most Jewish immigrants to North America during the years of mass migration saw the public school as the road to social and economic integration. The public school was considered the great equalizer, which, taking students from many different

cultures and backgrounds, transformed them all into fellow citizens and gave everyone the same opportunities for advancement (Goren, 1970).

The problem in Montreal was that there were no public schools in the commonly accepted sense found in most major cities in North America; only publicly funded confessional schools. If many of Montreal's Jews chose a different path for educating their children than that followed by most other Jews in North America, the difference is partly a consequence of the kind of society in which they came to live and the kind of public education system it had.

It was the absence of a real public school system which fueled the establishment in 1874 of the two Jewish day schools mentioned earlier. These schools, however, soon ran into financial difficulties. The solution followed by each congregation to their financial problems was characteristic of the deep splits within the Jewish community, and contributed to further aggravating those splits. The Shaar Hashomayim congregation sought an arrangement with the Protestant School Board in which the Protestant Board would operate their school as a regular school and would offer a special class of Jewish instruction every day taught by a rabbi (Rome, 1991a: 46). Eventually the Shaar Hashomayim school disappeared and its

students were merged into the regular Protestant schools.

Initially the school operated by the Spanish and Portuguese congregation also agreed to an accommodation with the Protestant board, very much along the same lines. The congregation insisted, however, that Rabbi Meldola de Sola (son of Abraham de Sola) be hired as the Hebrew teacher, at a salary which the Protestant board considered exorbitant. By 1884, the Protestant board decided not to continue paying de Sola, offering instead to pay a substantially reduced salary for Hebrew instruction. This angered the members of the congregation who chose another alternative, coming to terms instead with the Catholic school commission. Members of the congregation would now elect to have their taxes paid to the Catholic panel, in exchange for which the Catholic school commission would return 80 percent of the money to the congregation to pay the expenses of its school and to offer secular studies.

i. The Hebrew Free School Controversy

The decision by the Spanish and Portuguese congregation to make a separate deal with the Catholic school commission was a sign of a serious rift between this congregation and the emerging mainstream of Jewish Montreal³. Most of Montreal's few, elite, wealthy Jews

were members of this congregation and they had made a deal which not only kept their children separate from those of the newly arriving immigrants but actually threatened the relationship the Jewish community had developed with the Protestant school board. This at the very time when immigration was increasing and more and more Jewish students were attending Protestant schools. The indifference of the elite to the plight of the new immigrants produced conflicts within the community and with the Protestant board which were aggravated as large numbers of immigrants continued to arrive.

By withholding their taxes from the Protestant panel, the elite members of the Spanish and Portuguese congregation ensured that the Protestant Board would have to educate most of the Jewish children in Montreal while receiving only a minor share of the tax revenues. This the Protestant board was willing to do at first, but the continuing arrival of immigrant children made this task more and more expensive and led to mounting criticism within the Protestant community of the wisdom of educating any Jewish students.

The situation became even more complex in 1890 when the Baron de Hirsch Institute established the Hebrew Free

³The following discussion is largely based on the accounts found in Rome (1991a) and Tulchinsky (1992).

School. Many immigrant children did not know enough English or lacked other skills necessary to enter the Protestant schools at the appropriate grade for their age. The Free School was established by the Baron de Hirsch Institute to provide immigrant children with whatever schooling they needed in order to move on to the Protestant system. The Institute, originally founded in 1867 as the Young Men's Hebrew Benevolent Society, had evolved into an organization whose membership represented a new type of leadership, one which had a collective and communal sense of responsibility. Supported by donations from the Baron and Baroness de Hirsch, European philanthropists, along with other foreign charitable agencies, the Institute provided a wide range of services to new immigrants and took an active leadership role in the evolving community.

All of this activity, however, took a great deal of money. The Institute considered it essential, for example, that its school be free of any tuition fees in order to be accessible to all the immigrant children, many of whose families were desperately poor. This meant the Institute was unable to maintain all of its services through its own fundraising, even with the sums donated by the Baron de Hirsch and other philanthropic agencies. The Institute approached the Protestant school board to ask for a subsidy

for the school, on the reasonable grounds that most of these children would otherwise be attending Protestant schools and be a financial and pedagogical burden to the board. The Protestant Board agreed, but was reluctant to provide more than a token amount as long as the bulk of Jewish school taxes continued to be paid to the Catholic panel.

The Institute also approached the Spanish and Portuguese congregation, asking that some of the money being returned by the Catholic school commission to the congregational school be made available to the Hebrew Free School. Although several officers of the Institute were prominent members of the congregation and several officers of the congregation strongly supported the plea for a subsidy, elite members of the congregation refused. Rome (1991a: 59) notes that at that time "wealthy businessmen considered school taxes practically their own private property, a proper subject for negotiation with the authorities as to the disposition at their option." Perhaps, but it was also only the anomaly (or, as Brown [1986: 239] puts it, ambiguity) of Jewish taxpayers in a system which presupposed everyone to be either Protestant or Catholic which made the actions of the Jewish elite possible in the first place.

The result of the refusal was an unequal distribution of school taxes when it came to the education of Jewish children in 1891. Twenty-three thousand dollars out of the \$2800 total paid by all Jews in school taxes in 1891 was paid out by members of the Spanish and Portuguese congregation to the Catholic commission, of which the congregation received \$1840 back from the commission.

Several prominent members of the Spanish and Portuguese congregation resigned in protest, but the elite members continued to insist that the tax money was theirs to give and that they would give it in whatever manner they pleased. As one prominent member put it (Rome, 1991a: 66 [the member is not identified]) "[The Baron de Hirsch Institute's] demand ...amounts to about communism. Our congregation supply 90 percent of the taxes and yet they claim an equal distribution."

This conflict between what was a small circle of elite businessmen and professionals and almost the whole of the Jewish community was made possible because Jews did not easily fit into the existing constitutional and legislative provisions which assumed Québec society to be neatly divided between Protestants and Catholics. Consequently, this issue had implications which went beyond the boundaries of the Jewish community, involving as it did

both the Protestant and Catholic school commissions. The English and French press recognized the inequities in money available for the education of Jewish children which arose from the peculiar situation of the Jews in Quebec society and called for a change in the distribution of school taxes. They also criticized the Catholic school commission for being a party to what was blatantly an unfair agreement.

Despite nearly unanimous condemnation, the elite members of the Spanish and Portuguese congregation remained adamant until 1894. In the end, it was state intervention which finally led to a resolution. The Baron de Hirsch Institute requested that the provincial government intervene with legislation to ensure that the Spanish and Portuguese congregation's tax payers not take advantage of an unforeseen loophole to retain control over money intended, as all school tax money was intended, to pay for public, not private, schooling. They requested that money from school taxes paid by Jews be made available to school boards on a per capita basis. The matter was considered important enough to be investigated by the Premier and members of the cabinet, who stopped short of legislation, preferring to put pressure on the Spanish and Portuguese congregation to come to terms with the Baron de Hirsch

Institute.

Why did the government fail to take legislative action? To do so would have been to acknowledge a special status for Jews in Quebec's education system which posed a potential threat to the compact between Protestants and Catholics entrenched in the educational provisions of the BNA Act. So, too, would the disbursement of school tax revenues on a per capita basis rather than according to confessionality. Nevertheless, despite the reluctance to legislate on matters related to education characteristic of the Quebec state at the time, it was pressure from the state which resolved this internal dispute among members of the Jewish community.

As a result of government pressure and extensive public criticism, the Spanish and Portuguese congregation and the Catholic school commission agreed in 1893 to provide \$800 to the Hebrew Free School. Despite this compromise, the Catholic school commission found the continuing public criticism embarrassing and troublesome. In 1894, the Catholic commission asked that a joint committee of Catholics and Protestants be set up to administer the revenues from the school taxes paid by Jewish property owners. This proposal was rejected by the provincial government and the Catholic commission put an

end to the dispute by unilaterally ending its agreement with the Spanish and Portuguese congregation.

By the end of 1894, then, Jewish school taxes were once again being paid to the Protestant panel and the Spanish and Portuguese congregation closed their school. The Protestant board then agreed to pay the Spanish and Portuguese congregation's Rabbi a salary to teach Hebrew to Jewish students in a Protestant school as well as to subsidize the Hebrew Free School. The immediate problems were solved, but "resentment," notes Rome (1991a: 75), "was widespread" particularly among the other congregations at the generous arrangement made between the Protestant Board and the Spanish and Portuguese congregation.

The controversy over the Hebrew Free School makes evident several important features of the newly developing Jewish community. For one thing, it identifies for us three distinct segments within the Jewish community who were in conflict over the kind of community that was emerging. One group was the established elite of wealthy businessmen and professionals who retained a paternalistic attitude towards their "co-religionists" but were more concerned with their status and role within the British community than with the needs of the immigrant Jews. This elite looked to the Spanish and Portuguese congregation as the central institution in the Jewish community. A second group

consisted of a new Jewish middle class which was taking an active role in building the community by establishing community-wide structures, providing centralized services for the immigrants, and engaging in extensive fundraising. The central community organization for many in this group was the Baron de Hirsch Institute. The third group consisted of the Eastern European immigrants themselves. Divided among themselves, often poor and at a disadvantage in the new land, they were willing to accept assistance from the established community, but were already forming their own congregations, associations, and clubs and looking forward to taking their own, independent place in Canadian society.

Each of these groups tried to give a shape to the community that was emerging. While there was no clear winner in this contest, the Hebrew Free School episode indicates that the Baron de Hirsch Institute and its supporters were coming to be seen as the official representatives of the community (Tulchinsky, 1992). In this respect, Montreal evolved in a very different way from what was happening in American cities at the same time. In New York, for example, the mass of immigrants, with their multitude of religious, regional, and political associations, prevented any centralization of community

services or organizations (Goren, 1970). Whereas the corporate character of ethnicity in Canada is constitutionally entrenched, requiring a "Jewish" response to issues such as education, one of the most important characteristic of Jewish community life in the United States is that participation is voluntary. Those Jews who decided to leave Europe for America knew almost nothing about the country to which they were going, other than that it was a country of "freedom" (Howe, 1976). As Elazar (1976: 8) explains, "Any organized interconnections within the maze of institutions and organizations of American Jewry have had to be created in the face of many obstacles, including the lack of any inherent legitimacy attaching to any coordinating institutions."

Canadian Jewry has been, as Tulchinsky (1992) has noted, far more centralized. In Montreal, the Baron de Hirsch Institute played a major role in that centralization because its access to foreign sources of funding and to government grants made it the only Jewish organization in Montreal able to generate the substantial funds needed to provide services to the immigrants.

In contrast to the individualistic, paternalistic, and philanthropic approach of the elite, the leadership of the Baron de Hirsch Institute promoted a collective,

Protestant schools or subsidies for Jewish schools.

Jews were still not able to teach in Protestant schools, however, and Jewish parents were still not entitled to serve as commissioners on the Protestant board. Thus the legislation did little more than restore a status quo which neither the Protestant nor the Jewish community had found acceptable. Not surprisingly, disagreement soon broke out, with each side now convinced the other was acting in bad faith.

By 1906 the Jewish community was petitioning the Quebec legislature to allow Jews to serve as Protestant commissioners. It is not necessary to detail every dispute, however, to make the point that Jews remained dissatisfied because the place of Jews in Quebec's public school system remained undefined. In fact it could not be defined because of the constitutional limitations on and structural ambiguity of Quebec's education system. Education was intimately linked to the fundamental linguistic, cultural, and religious divisions in Quebec society and Jews were unable to alter these fundamental divisions and the educational structures to which they had given rise. The legislation of 1903, then, solved nothing because it contained no real solution to the structural problems caused by the presence of Jews in a system designed to

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organizational approach to dealing with communal problems. In contrast to the particularistic provision of assistance only to fellow members characteristic of the regional, religious or political associations of the Eastern European immigrants, the Baron de Hirsch Institute promoted a centralized, community-wide set of agencies controlled by the community's "leadership" and staffed by "professionals." The emphasis upon an organizational response to collective problems, the centralization of community services and of fundraising, and the "professional" character of Jewish community workers remain key features of the contemporary community's organizational style.

This does not mean that the other segments gave up trying to fashion the community in their own image. Clarence de Sola, a leader of the Spanish and Portuguese congregation during the Hebrew Free School conflict and member of Montreal's Jewish elite, later became the national head of the Federation of Canadian Zionist Societies, which he ran in a manner Tulchinsky (1992: 201) describes as "self-righteous, pompous, [and] dictatorial." For a long time the Federation served as the national spokesman for Canada's Jews.

As for the immigrants, they continued to form a vast

array of organizations and associations, such as the landsmanshaften (regional associations), the Workman's Circle, and the Jewish Public Library. Unlike the agencies established by the Baron de Hirsch Institute and the later Federation of Jewish Philanthropies, however, these began as essentially niche organizations of interest only to specific segments of the Jewish community. As time passed, some disappeared while others evolved into broadly based community organizations serving a wide constituency.

ii. The Protestant School Board Versus the Jews

The conflict over the Hebrew Free School made it clear that the elite no longer represented the Jewish community to the rest of Quebec society. It did not put an end either to conflicts within the Jewish community or to conflicts between the community and other segments of Quebec society. Indeed, if the dispute over the distribution of school taxes made evident some of the problems resulting from the absence of a common, secular public school system, the next major dispute, between the Jewish community and the Protestant board itself, questioned whether Jews had any rights whatsoever in Quebec society to educate their children in publicly funded schools.

The Protestant board's satisfaction at reclaiming the

Jewish community's school taxes evaporated in the face of the rising numbers of Jewish children attending the schools. The 269 Jewish students of 1890 had increased to 749 by 1899 and went up to 2144 by 1903, rising from 4.5 percent of all the students in Protestant schools to 23.1 percent (L. Rosenberg, 1969: 10). Given that the increase came primarily from immigration, the rising number of Jewish students was not matched by a proportionate increase in the amount of money contributed by the Jewish community to the Protestant panel. Nor was the rate of increase to appreciably slow. By 1906 Jews made up 30 percent of all students attending Protestant schools and by 1912 they made up 40 percent, reaching a peak in 1916 when they made up 44.4 percent (L. Rosenberg, 1969: 10). Thereafter, the proportion of Jews in the Protestant system began to decline, but not the absolute numbers, which continued to climb steadily until the 1930s.

The presence of so many Jewish students presented more than a financial burden on the Protestant board. It called into question the image of Quebec as a society composed of only two groups entitled to constitutional and legislative protection. Somehow, Jews would have to be accommodated in a system into which had not been designed with them in mind and into which they could not easily be fit.

Many Protestants were concerned that large numbers of Jewish students posed a threat to the continuing Protestant character of the board's schools. While most Protestants were willing to admit Jewish students into their schools, they saw the preservation of the schools as Protestant schools to be central to the preservation of their rights as a minority in Quebec. Thus they were willing to grant Jewish children some rights and privileges, such as dispensation from religious instruction and absence on Jewish holidays, but not if these were seen to threaten the Christian character of the schools or the status of Protestant parents. Yet with Jewish children constituting a majority of the students in some of the schools, in what way could these schools be understood to be Protestant schools providing a Christian education?

Some members of the Protestant community were disturbed that Jews were disenfranchised in the existing system and felt that Jews might be better off in a school system of their own under their own jurisdiction. Others feared that Jewish parents would demand a say in the education their children were receiving and might succeed in taking control of the board's administration away from the Protestant community. Moreover, some members of the Protestant community saw the Protestant system as theirs and the cost of educating Jewish students was seen by them

as a personal and unwarranted financial burden. (Rome, 1975; Tulchinsky, 1992).

Indeed, while Jewish parents were now paying their school taxes to the Protestant system, Jewish students were not taken into account when funds from the neutral panel (into which corporations paid) were divided between the Protestant and Catholic schools. Again, Jewish students in a publicly funded Protestant system constituted an anomaly which had financial implications. While most members of the Protestant board had no wish to discontinue the education of Jewish children, they wanted to make it clear that those children whose parents paid no school taxes had no right to an education; they were guests of the Protestant system and as such not entitled to any privileges, including prizes, awards or scholarships.

Over a thirty year period the Protestant board tried to steer a middle course between those who wished to expel the Jewish students from the schools and those who wished to grant them full and equal rights in the Protestant system. In addition, the Protestant board had its own agenda, one in which its relations with the government and with the Catholic community took precedence over any specific concerns related to the Jewish community. The result was an inconsistent policy in which the Protestant

board alternated between restricting Jewish rights in the schools and publicly defending those rights.

The restrictions began in 1902 when the Protestant board refused to award a scholarship won by a Jewish student whose parents were not property owners and thus paid no school taxes⁴. This issue was taken to court in 1903, at which time it was ruled that Jewish students had no legal rights in Quebec's public school system and thus were subject to whatever conditions the Protestant board chose to apply. Having made their point, the Protestant board was now willing to grant limited rights if Jewish children would be counted in the distribution of funds from the neutral panel. Again, the state was asked by both parties to intervene by passing legislation to formalize the agreement. An act was therefore passed by the Quebec legislature in 1903 which provided that Jews be treated as Protestants within the school system: Jewish students would be entitled to attend Protestant schools, Jewish parents would pay their school taxes to the Protestant panel, and Jews would "be subjected to the same regulations and shall enjoy the same rights and privileges as the [Protestants]" (quoted in L. Rosenberg, 1993: 267). In return, Jews agreed to give up all requests for Hebrew courses in the

⁴The following discussion is largely based on the accounts found in Rome (1975) and Tulchinsky (1992).

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Jews were still not able to teach in Protestant schools, however, and Jewish parents were still not entitled to serve as commissioners on the Protestant board. Thus the legislation did little more than restore a status quo which neither the Protestant nor the Jewish community had found acceptable. Not surprisingly, disagreement soon broke out, with each side now convinced the other was acting in bad faith.

By 1906 the Jewish community was petitioning the Quebec legislature to allow Jews to serve as Protestant commissioners. It is not necessary to detail every dispute, however, to make the point that Jews remained dissatisfied because the place of Jews in Quebec's public school system remained undefined. In fact it could not be defined because of the constitutional limitations on and structural ambiguity of Quebec's education system. Education was intimately linked to the fundamental linguistic, cultural, and religious divisions in Quebec society and Jews were unable to alter these fundamental divisions and the educational structures to which they had given rise. The legislation of 1903, then, solved nothing because it contained no real solution to the structural problems caused by the presence of Jews in a system designed to

accommodate only Protestants and Catholics.

Structural ambiguity is a consequence of conflicting group interests being inscribed in one set of institutions. Montreal's Protestant school system after the legislation of 1903 serves as an excellent example. Jews were now legally regarded as Protestants and given the legal right to attend "Christian" schools, in some of which Jewish students constituted up to 90 percent of the students. Jewish students were accepted into and graduated from Protestant teacher training schools which granted them a teaching certificate, and were then refused a teaching position in a Protestant school, even one with a large majority of Jewish students, because they would threaten the "Christian" character of the school. Jewish parents were required to pay school taxes to support the Protestant system but given no voice in how the system was run.

It is not surprising that many Jews found this situation humiliating. Protestants, for their part, found the demand by Jews for changes to be threatening, not necessarily because they came from Jews but because of their implications for the whole school system. As the Presbytery of Montreal wrote (quoted in Rome, 1975: 24), "[to] appoint to the Protestant School Board of Montreal anyone who is not a Protestant is an invasion of the rights

guaranteed by the British North America Act to both Roman Catholics and Protestants of Quebec to control their own schools." Both Catholics and Protestants strongly opposed such a move. One contemporary politician, (Nichol, quoted in Rome, 1975: 22), expressed the concerns of Protestants and Catholics explicitly in the legislature when he stated:

If the Jews could sit on the Protestant Board, then they could also sit on the Catholic School Board. And if Jews on the Catholic School Board, why not Protestants on the Catholic Board also?

As time passed and the relative position of Jews in Quebec society changed, various accommodations were worked out between the Jewish community and the Protestant board. Jewish teachers, for example, began to be hired, though only in small numbers, in 1913. Jewish contributions to the school tax rose rapidly, from \$4500 in 1903 to \$450,000 in 1923, with hundreds of thousands more coming on a per capita basis from the Neutral panel (Rome, 1975: 9). Nevertheless, the Protestant board continued to insist that it was not receiving sufficient income from the Jews to cover the expense of their education and felt insulted that notwithstanding the board's "generosity," Jews continued to call for representation in administering the system (Rome,

1975).

To Jews, the issue of representation on the school commission was neither a symbolic issue, nor one of honour or status. It involved an attempt by the Jewish community to ensure that its interests were protected and that the "privileges" so often pointed to by the Protestant board would not be unilaterally revoked (L.Rosenberg, 1993). That this concern was legitimate became clear when the Protestant board initiated a policy of segregating Jewish students in separate schools. As in the rest of North America, most Montreal Jews wanted their children to be educated equally with and together with all other students, and in the same schools. Segregation was opposed because it singled out Jews as a different class of students. Such a situation, it was feared, could easily lead to a subordinate status for Jewish students, to antisemitism, or to other abuses (L.Rosenberg, 1993).

The Protestant board nevertheless saw segregation as a solution to two problems, ensuring that Jewish teachers were not providing religious instruction (or even example) to Protestant students, and preventing the disruption of their education caused by large numbers of Jewish students being absent during the Jewish holidays. Many Jews, in contrast, felt that if they were to be segregated in Protestant schools, then, they might as well have separate

Jewish schools (Rome, 1975).

Given the context of Quebec's education system, the Protestant board had legitimate grievances. Given the context of Jewish life in North America, Montreal's Jews, too, had legitimate grievances. Under these circumstances and the mutual tensions and misunderstandings to which they gave rise, the initiatives each side took to alleviate what they saw as problems lead the other side to complain. The result was to maintain a status quo neither side desired out of an inability to alter the relations between the two groups.

It was the Protestant board that finally took the initiative to fundamentally alter that relationship in 1921 when it asked the legislature to revoke the Act of 1903 in order to initiate a new agreement with the Jewish community. What seemed to trigger this attempt was an increasing number of new immigrants, such as Greeks, who also failed to fit into a school system divided between Protestants and Catholics (Rome, 1975: 46). Such groups, not covered in the 1903 legislation, had no rights in Quebec's public schools, but were asking for rights similar to those legislated for the Jews. The Protestant board saw the arrival of these immigrants as creating a new set of difficulties and a new set of expenses. Given the problems

the board believed it was already having with the Jewish community, and the new problems which might arise with other groups, the Protestant board decided that the agreement of 1903 should be revoked.

The goal of the Protestant board was not to exclude Jews from their schools, although some in the Protestant community supported this step. Rather, it was to regain "control" over the system: to set conditions for Jewish students, such as segregated schools, as it saw fit; to put an end to Jewish demands for representation on the commission; and to renegotiate the financial arrangements under which Jews or other non-Protestant and non-Catholic children were educated (Rome, 1975).

The Protestant board may have been surprised, then, when significant support within the Jewish community emerged in favour of a separate Jewish school commission. Since 1903 the Protestant board had consistently been dealing with a group of community representatives, a set of "notables" as Rome (1975) refers to them, including Jewish members of the Quebec Legislature and Montreal's City Council, along with the leadership of the Baron de Hirsch Institute. In 1922, in response to the Protestant board's new plans, several of these notables formed what they called the Jewish Educational Committee to negotiate with

both the Protestant board and the provincial government. The members of this Committee strongly opposed a separate Jewish school commission and theirs was the policy with which the Protestant board was familiar.

By the 1920s, however, new groups were coming to the fore within the Jewish community, particularly immigrant groups and organizations which had been active in establishing the Canadian Jewish Congress in 1919. Many of these groups had come to favour separate Jewish schools under a Jewish school commission, seeing it as the only possible way to attain educational equality. Establishing their own so-called "separatist" committee, they argued that the Jewish Educational Committee had no mandate to represent them and that the Committee's goal of returning to the status quo with the Protestant board was unacceptable (Rome, 1975: 70).

A split was therefore emerging in the Jewish community, along with a new struggle for control, between the so-called "uptowners" such as the establishment members of the Jewish Educational Committee and the immigrant "downtowners" who formed the separatist committee. Both the Educational Committee and the separatist committee made representations to the Premier and the Cabinet, and the Liberal Premier at the time, Taschereau, seemed

particularly open to the separatist views (Rome, 1975).

The Protestant board was determined to renegotiate its deal with the Jews, and it had enough political support in the provincial legislature to have a bill passed in 1922 which gave the legislature the right to repeal the Act of 1903 if no new agreement could be reached by 1924. In the intensive negotiations which followed it became clear that the provincial government, the Protestant board, the Catholic Bishops, and the Jewish community all had different goals. Moreover, just as Jews were split on the issues, so too were Protestants, and Catholics.

The split in the Protestant community centered on the members of the Protestant Committee of the Council of Public Instruction, most of whom opposed the stand taken by Montreal's Protestant board. From its broader perspective, the Protestant Committee saw the incorporation of immigrants into the Protestant schools as important to the survival of the Protestant board. The Protestant Committee therefore did not support the requests of the Protestant board and the provincial cabinet set up a commission composed of Catholics, Protestants and Jews to study the matter and suggest a solution. When the members of the commission failed to find any common ground, the issue was sent by the government to the courts for a decision on the

constitutionality of the 1903 Act.

In 1927 the Supreme Court ruled, and in 1930 the Privy Council agreed, that the Act of 1903 was unconstitutional and that Jews did not have any rights within the Protestant system other than the right to be educated in Protestant schools in Montreal. The Supreme Court also ruled, however, that the Provincial government was constitutionally entitled to establish a Jewish school commission to provide schooling to Jewish children in Montreal (L. Rosenberg, 1993: 269). Since the Liberal government of Premier Taschereau was seeking to extend its authority in the area of education, the cabinet announced in 1930 that it would legislate the creation of a Jewish school commission for Montreal. Once again, we see that the Quebec state, often assumed to have been passive during that era, was actively engaged in an attempt to intervene in the area of education.

Initially uninvolved in the debate, the Catholic Bishops saw government intervention as a threat to confessional public schools and declared their opposition to the proposed legislation. The Bishops recognized that the creation of a Jewish school commission generated potential problems within Quebec's education system. If Jews had their own school commission, would it be under the

authority of the Council of Public Instruction? If yes, then Jews were once again disenfranchised because the Protestant and Catholic committees of the Council would have authority over the Jewish school commission. Jews would then demand representation on the Council, perhaps in the form of a Jewish Committee equivalent to the Protestant and Catholic Committees. This however, would be totally unacceptable to both Protestants and Catholics since it would give Jews on the Council some degree of authority, however limited, over individual Protestant and Catholic school commissions.

Yet if Jews were not under the authority of the Council, then they would be under the direct authority of the provincial Cabinet or its representative, which would mean that the provincial government would appoint a de facto Minister of Education to deal with the Jews. Should other groups, such as the Greek Orthodox, receive similar commissions of their own, this de facto Ministry would expand and pose a potential threat to the autonomy of the Council. This was strongly opposed by the Catholic Bishops, who rejected even a hint of state control over education. They also feared another possibility, that Greeks and other non-Protestant, non-Catholics would be included with the Jews in what would eventually become a neutral, non-denominational school commission. In either case, the

Bishops distrusted the motives of Taschereau and the Liberal government in supporting a separate school commission for the Jews (Linteau, Durocher and Robert, 1983).

Yet Catholics, too, were divided, with Henri Bourassa, for example, speaking out in strong support of a separate Jewish school commission. Bourassa insisted that French Canadians could not claim the right to a French, Catholic education elsewhere in Canada if Jews were denied the equivalent right in Quebec.

Nevertheless, most of the significant groups in Quebec society disapproved of the legislation. Despite the opposition, Premier Taschereau continued to favour a separate Jewish panel and school commission, arguing that unless Jews could find a place in Quebec's existing education system, a neutral system would one day become necessary (Rome, 1975: 84). The Bishops were not convinced and opposition to the government's plan continued to grow.

The legislation which was finally passed in 1930 was a compromise. The act of 1903 was cancelled to please the Protestants, and a separate Jewish school commission (to be appointed by the government) was established to please the Jewish separatists, but the commission was given the right to negotiate a new deal with the Protestants to please the

Jewish establishment. Jews were not to serve on the Protestant board, Protestant Committee, or the Council of Public Instruction, measures designed to please both the Protestants and Catholics.

Having allowed the Jewish community its own school commission, the provincial government then put pressure on the Jewish community to come to terms with the Protestant board, a goal still cherished by the Jewish establishment, and a new agreement was arranged in 1930. While the Protestant board agreed to prohibit segregation, the new agreement was not substantially different from that worked out in 1903 except that it now explicitly prevented Jews from insisting on equal rights with Protestants on the board, a clear defeat for the Jewish community. Otherwise, it was a return to the status quo.

Why did the Jewish community decide to back a new agreement with the Protestant board rather than establish their own schools? Rome (1975) suggests that it was a consequence of disorganization on the part of the "downtown" immigrants, a distrust of the commission's membership on the part of those Jewish groups already establishing private Jewish day schools, and the economic disorientation caused by the depression.

Another problem may have been more significant,

however: the extraordinary diversity of the Jewish community which made agreement on such matters as curriculum impossible. How could Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Jews; Zionists and socialists; Hebraists, Yiddishists, and Anglophiles all agree on a common set of schools? Montreal's Jews already had developed a private Jewish education system by 1930, one which worked well only because no attempt had been made to unite the disparate elements which composed it (Rome, 1991a; 1992). The battles had already been fought within the Jewish community in the 1920s, and the combatants had learned to leave one another alone. A Jewish school commission sounded fine in theory, but in practice it would have have lead to endless conflict and further divided a community which was looking for ways to unite in the face of severe economic hardship and growing antisemitism.

In any case, the window of opportunity available to the Jewish community to establish its own public schools proved very short. As soon as agreement had been reached with the Protestant board, the government passed new legislation in 1931 putting the agreement into effect for fifteen years and revoking the Jewish community's right to establish its own public schools. Clearly, the government felt the need to repeal the legislation of 1930 in the face

of widespread opposition, especially among Catholics. The views of the Jewish community were ignored by the legislators, and, as a protest, the entire Jewish School Commission resigned, with the result that the legislatively imposed agreement between the Jewish community and the Protestant board remained in effect well past the fifteen year limit (Rome, 1975).

As noted earlier, education in Quebec was intimately linked to the fundamental linguistic, cultural, and religious divisions in Quebec society. Despite thirty years of effort, Jews were powerless to alter these fundamental divisions and find a distinctive place within the education system. To all intents and purposes, Jews remained second class citizens within Quebec's schools until the 1960s. Even with the support of the Premier, the Cabinet, and notable Quebecers such as Henri Bourassa, the Jewish community was unable to obtain equal rights in Quebec's educational system.

iii. The Growth of a Jewish School System

The failure of the Quebec state to ensure educational equality for Jews did not create Montreal's private Jewish day school system. Such schools emerged in Toronto, Winnipeg, and other cities as well. But the actions of the

Protestant board and of the Quebec state led many of Montreal's Jews to see community schools as the only alternative to educating their children in the Protestant system. As a consequence, the 1920s and 30s were an era during which the development of educational institutions became a priority for many segments of the community. The rich and varied educational system which evolved soon became an integral part of Montreal's Jewish community.

Education was only one of the areas in which the marginal status of the Jews in Quebec society led to a creative community life. Intellectually and experientially, the Eastern European immigrant Jews who flocked to Montreal between 1900 and 1924 lived in a world far removed from their British and French "hosts." If Quebec society was not particularly welcoming to the new immigrants, then it is also true to say that in many ways the immigrants ignored the host society around them, inattentive to those issues which had no meaning within their own worldview and uninterested in many of the disputes and passions which divided the British and French communities. In that sense, the Jewish community was "inward looking" as August (1975) puts it. This phrase probably gives the wrong impression, however. The Jewish immigrants did not simply ignore the sociopolitical and economic environment around them; their

political, and especially their union activism, makes evident their activist orientation to their new home. But their interpretations and understandings of the world around them was coloured by their beliefs, commitments, and experiences.

The Eastern European immigrants were also very different from the "uptown" Jewish establishment which sought to integrate (and some even to assimilate) as much as possible within the British community. Many of the "downtown" immigrants were ideologically committed to social or religious movements. In this respect, the immigrants did not really come to Canada as economic migrants looking for work. After hundreds of years of living on the margins of Eastern European society, Jews had expected the slow and partial modernization which was finally beginning in Eastern Europe to improve their lot. The fierce political repression which began in the 1880s made many of them realize that despite this modernization, there was still had no place for them in the mainstream of Eastern European society. They turned their backs on the traditions and institutions within which they had been brought up in order to live as free and equal citizens in a new society (Belkin, 1966; Howe, 1976; Kage, 1962).

The Eastern European immigrants, then, were familiar

with being second-class citizens (or worse), and many of them were unwilling to accept such a status in their new home. If Jews were "inward looking," they were also determined to take their place in Canadian society. More than that, their political and union activism indicates their refusal to simply accept this society as it was. They were determined to make this new society a better place in which to live, one where all people could be equals and they could still be Jews (Tulchinsky, 1992).

This, as noted earlier, is why they put such a focus upon education and why they insisted that their children supplement their secular education with Jewish learning. Jews insisted upon supplementary schools not because they were contemptuous of the public schools or found them lacking. Indeed, throughout North America they were fervent supporters of the public schools. But to Jews who saw themselves as taking an equal place in a new and better world, a public school education was not enough. They wished to go farther and provide their children with a religious or ideological environment which would build character and teach values. A public school education was seen as crucial to having a decent life as a full and equal member of civil society, but a Jewish education was seen as crucial to being a decent person, one who retains values and traditions going back thousands of years. The two were

not seen as incompatible; it was precisely the attraction of "America" that they believed that here in North America the two could be integrated (Goren, 1970).

By the 1920s, a variety of educational institutions and agents were available within the Jewish community directed to the differing ideological, religious, and financial commitments and capacities of the parents. The first of these was the United Talmud Torahs system which began in 1896 as a single school with twenty students. A "talmud torah" in Eastern Europe was a charity school operated by the community to provide a minimal Jewish education to the children of the poor. In Montreal it was a free school designed to provide supplementary Orthodox religious education to Jewish students attending Protestant schools. By 1926 the United Talmud Torahs (UTT) system had eight branches and 1300 students (Candib, 1986). In 1935, UTT opened a day school, and had expanded its day school system to include a full high school program by 1957. UTT became the "mainstream" Orthodox system in Montreal: regular day schools teaching both religious and secular studies, supported by tuition fees paid by parents rather than charitable contributions or community support (although both remained a source of funding).

In contrast to the traditional religious orientation

of UTT, a Jewish secular school system emerged in 1913, the National Radical school. This school was founded by a coalition of socialist, Yiddishist, and labour Zionist groups committed to providing Jewish students with a "civilizational" approach to Judaism rather than a religious approach (August, 1975, Tulchinsky, 1992). This uneasy coalition fell apart quite quickly, however, ostensibly over the language of instruction. One faction wanted the school to emphasize Hebrew instruction while another sought to emphasize Yiddish. The Hebrew faction, more Zionist than socialist, broke away to establish the Jewish People's School in 1915. The differences were more profound than language, however. The Hebraists sought a stronger Zionist component in education, and also a more traditional approach to religion. The Yiddishist faction, which renamed their school the Jewish Peretz School, sought a more literary and "progressive" approach which de-emphasized religion and emphasized issues of social justice rather than Zionism (August, 1975). Both schools operated as supplementary schools, but became day schools in the 1930s.

Another impetus to establishing day schools came with the arrival of large numbers of Hassidic Jews following the Second World War. To the Hassidim, a secular education such

as that offered by the Protestant schools was unacceptable, but so too was the level of Orthodoxy characteristic of United Talmud Torah. For example, they preferred to have male and female students educated separately in different schools. Several ultra-Orthodox schools were established to cater to the needs of the Hassidim.

By the late 1950s, United Talmud Torahs, the Jewish People's School and the Jewish Peretz School operated the mainstream Jewish day schools in Montreal. New schools continued to open to meet the demands of an increasingly diverse community, but, with the exception of the ultra-Orthodox schools, most of the schools were actually becoming more and more similar as the ideological or religious ardour of their leadership faded.

Jewish Education in Quebec: A Preliminary View

A number of important points have emerged in this discussion concerning the role of the state in the evolution of the Jewish community's day school system. Contrary to the view of the Quebec state as passive prior to the Quiet Revolution, we have seen that the state intervened repeatedly in the disputes which arose over the place of Jews in Quebec's education system. Such active intervention was required because Protestants, Catholics,

and Jews were characterized by such divergences of interest, both in their dealings with one another and internally as well, that agreement even on basic and fundamental issues of civil rights could not be resolved. The state had no choice but to intervene on several occasions. Such intervention, however, did little more than reproduce the status quo.

The state itself, however, did not act an impartial referee. State agents had interests of their own, such as broadening state control over education, which they tried to advance through legislation and regulations concerning Jewish education. The state was not passive; it tried to act several times to alter the circumstances within which Jews were educated. Yet despite these attempts those circumstances did not alter appreciably from 1903 until the 1960s. The state failed to alter Quebec's fundamental educational institutions because the basic divisions of Quebec society were inscribed within the state itself. Indeed, as we have seen in Chapter Six, even the attempts by the state to take firm control over Quebec's educational system in the 1960s and 70s ultimately served merely to reproduce the structural ambiguity of that system.

None of this is to suggest that Jews could simply fit into other existing educational systems in North America

with no difficulty whatsoever, whether it be in Toronto, Winnipeg or New York. In every case, accommodations had to be made both on the part of the existing educational system dealing with new kinds of students and on the part of immigrants dealing with new and unfamiliar institutions. The additional complexity in Quebec arose out of the control already exercised over distinct segments of the educational system by two competing ethnic and religious groups which were determined to retain their control over that system. The result was a constitutionally entrenched set of publicly funded confessional schools and the absence of a true public school system.

In that respect, the growth of the Jewish day school system in Montreal sprung from a different set of factors than those found in Toronto, Winnipeg or New York. From one point of view it might be supposed that the extensive day school system established by Montreal's Jewish community constituted a "parallel" educational system. Had the Jewish community been able to form its own school commission and operate its own publicly funded schools then that would indeed have been the case. Instead, we have seen in this brief survey that rather than establishing a parallel system, Jews were trying to find some distinctive place within a set of ambiguous educational structures into which

they could not easily fit. Most Jews preferred to attend Protestant schools, despite their lack of representation on the board, because the Protestant schools were the closest thing to a public school which Montreal had to offer. Most lived with the problems which resulted, concerned more with getting an education for their children rather than the niceties of equal status and formal rights. For those parents who found the Protestant schools unacceptable, Jewish schools provided a viable alternative. Typically, during the 1950s and 60s, that meant that about 25 percent of Jewish children were attending Jewish day schools while 75 percent were attending Protestant schools (Kage, 1975).

When change finally came to Quebec's education system, beginning in the 1960s, Montreal's Jewish education system too began to change. The declining significance of confessionality in Quebec's schools did not lead to the decline of the Jewish school system, however. Quite the contrary, the actions of the state had the effect of increasing enrolment in Jewish schools. Indeed, the period which began with the Quiet Revolution showed a much higher level of state intervention and outright control, but also shows even more clearly how such intervention and control not only provide constraints, but opportunities as well.

CHAPTER EIGHT

STATE INTERVENTION AND THE JEWISH DAY SCHOOLS:

CENTRALIZATION AND BUREAUCRATIZATION

As seen in Chapter Six, the Quebec state began a systematic reform of the province's education system during the 1960s which led to the centralization of that system under state supervision. In doing so the state incorporated within its administrative space the conflicting interests of groups competing for control over education. While at the same time increasing rather than resolving the structural ambiguity which characterized Quebec's education system.

One of the groups affected by, and seeking to affect, state action on education was the Jewish community, and it is the dialectic between state action and community response in the area of education which will be examined in this chapter and the next. The focus will be on understanding the symbolic, political, and economic strategies and practices evolved by the Jewish community to deal with the opportunities and constraints generated by state action. A key argument is that in the course of their dealings with the state, the community's educational structures came to take on some of the characteristics of

the state itself. In particular, the community's school system became more centralized, more bureaucratic, and, as we shall see in the next chapter, evolved its own set of structural ambiguities. As in the previous chapter, a chronological approach will be used in presenting this argument because the nature and implications of state actions and intervention changed over time as both the state and the Jewish community continued to change.

The 1950s and 60s: Fragmentation and Change

The 'Quiet Revolution' of the 1960s had a direct impact on the Jewish community and its schools, although it took some time before community members began to understand how Quebec society was changing and could take these changes into account. The Jewish community itself was undergoing significant changes and it was with these internal changes and the issues they generated that the community as a corporate group was primarily concerned.

i. Change Within the Jewish Community

These internal changes were a consequence of the renewed immigration to Canada which began after the Second World War, the decline of traditional ideological and social distinctions as new divisions arose to fragment the

community, and the changing social location of the Jewish community within Quebec society.

The renewed immigration which followed the Second World War was particularly important because it altered the make-up of the Jewish community, fragmenting what had become a rather "homogenous" community (Burnet and Palmer, 1988). Many of the immigrants were from Europe, survivors of the Holocaust, who arrived in Canada with a very different view both of Judaism and of the world than that held by pre-war immigrants. Given the relatively small size of the Jewish community in Montreal before the war (approximately 64,000 in 1941 [Elazar and Waller, 1990: 74]) and the relatively large number of immigrants who arrived after the war (numbering about 28,000 between 1946 and 1951 [Szacka, 1984: 109]), the impact of the survivors upon the established community was quite significant.

Within the established Jewish community, Montreal's evolution was in some ways typical of other communities in North America where internal distinctions were decreasing. The immigrants who had arrived between 1880 and 1930 brought with them a set of competing ideological, cultural, and religious commitments which, together with the class distinctions between "uptowners" and "downtowners," had significantly divided the Jewish community. By the 1950s,

however, these differences were rapidly diminishing in importance. The distinctions among Yiddishists, socialists, zionists of various types, and the orthodox were largely irrelevant to a community which primarily spoke English, had become largely middle class and secular, and equated zionism with sending money to the State of Israel (Kallen, 1977; Weinfeld and Eaton, 1979).

In contrast to the members of the established community, many of the post-war European immigrants were Yiddish-speakers committed to preserving the Jewish culture which had been destroyed in Eastern Europe. They arrived with an activist orientation towards community participation and readily organized with others to accomplish their goals. Like the immigrants of the early 1900s, they tended to reject the authority of recognized community leaders and looked to each other for communal support and cooperation. They also rejuvenated Montreal's mainstream Jewish day schools and ensured that these schools continued to be seen as relevant to a significant number of community members. Still, despite their commitment to preserving Jewish culture, they were eager to make a new life for themselves in Canada and were willing to adapt to the economic, political, and social institutions of Canadian society.

Another group of European immigrants consisted of ultra-Orthodox Hassidim who sought to re-establish their traditional, religiously centered life-style in their new home. Segregationists both from the broader society and from the rest of the Jewish community, the ultra-Orthodox established their own institutions, including schools, and sought their own solutions to the problems and circumstances facing them.

A third category of immigrant beginning to arrive in the late 1950s also had a profound effect on the makeup of the Jewish community. These were the francophone Sephardic Jews, mostly from North Africa, who found Montreal a congenial home because they could continue to live and work in the French language (Lasry, 1983). The Sephardic immigrants soon found that they, too, faced their own problems requiring unique solutions and institutions of their own. Education, for example, proved to be a problem. Many of the Sephardim wanted to educate their children in French, but found that French-language public schools were Catholic schools which would not accept their children. Protestant schools, which would accept their children, were anglophone schools unwilling to accommodate requests for French-language instruction. As for Jewish schools, these, like most other Jewish institutions of the time, operated

either in English or in Yiddish. Many of the Sephardim too, like the Hassidim, decided to set up their own schools.

The result of this influx of new immigrants was a fragmentation of the Montreal Jewish community along linguistic, cultural, and religious lines. In the area of education, it meant that new schools were being established to meet the needs of an increasingly diverse clientele. Indeed, new organizations of all types were being created and the Montreal community was able to renew the organizational dynamism which was largely disappearing elsewhere in North America.

In part that dynamism was also a consequence of the social location of the Jewish community in Quebec society. In the United States, as Jewish communities became more middle class, their members began to move into the mainstream of American society. In Montreal the established Jewish community also became more middle class, but its "place" within Quebec society remained marginal, for the Jewish community became a solitude as complete and thoroughgoing as those inhabited by the British and the French.

One indication of the marginal status of Jews in Quebec society is the central role played by the ethnic sub-economy in community life (Weinfeld, 1983b). Some Jews became middle class professionals, but they worked as

doctors, lawyers or accountants for other Jews. Some became managers, but typically it was in firms owned by Jews. Research by Weinfeld (1983b: 19) in 1978 found that "between one-quarter and one-third of the respondents were almost exclusively economically active within the Jewish sub-economy" of Montreal. Many more were significantly tied into that sub-economy without being exclusively tied to it. In addition, Weinfeld notes that his figures underestimate the level of participation somewhat because he excludes the Jewish "public" sector.

That Jewish "public" sector, with its plethora of community organizations, emerged as an important source of jobs for Jewish professionals and support staff during the 1950s and 60s. Many of those who initially founded and staffed community organizations had been unpaid volunteers, while those who were paid were often hired on the basis either of ideological commitment or readiness to accept a low salary rather than training or credentials. When social workers began to achieve important positions in influential Jewish organizations during the 1950s and 60s, they led the way to the professionalization of the staff in these organizations. This raised the salary and status of community work and made careers in the Jewish "civil service" more attractive (Elazar and Waller, 1990). It also

altered the organizational style of the Jewish community, with consequences which will be discussed below.

As for the Jewish working class which continued to exist in such industries as garment manufacturing, here too Jewish workers tended to work for Jewish owners. Even many of the union locals in the garment industry tended to be organized along ethnic lines, with Jewish pressers in the manufacturing of men's clothing, for example, organized in a different union local from Italian pressers. The increasing nationalism of the francophone union leadership also inhibited union solidarity and further ethnicized relations among workers.

Another indicator of the marginal status of Jews in Quebec society was their relatively low level of political participation and activism prior to the 1980s. Compared to Jews in the United States, Montreal's Jewish community was remarkably apolitical. In the United States, politics was a career for individuals and a means of opportunity for groups, as well as the point of conflict, contact, and compromise among those groups. (Glazer and Moynihan, 1970; 1975). In contrast Quebec's ethnic groups, including the Jews, accepted the political domination of the charter groups and "tend(ed) to preserve their entrance status rather than seek to trade it in for something higher"

(Horowitz, 1974: 7).

Insofar as Jews did participate in party politics in Quebec, they typically did so through an elected "ambassador" (Newman, 1978: 272), from a predominantly Jewish riding who was seen to represent the community's "official" interests in Quebec City. Otherwise, representation to the government worked through regular official channels, with the submission of briefs and participation in public hearings. The Quiet Revolution did little to change this indifference to provincial politics because the goals and aspirations of the francophone new middle class which came to dominate state policy and action were not the goals and aspirations of most Jews. Nevertheless, Jewish political influence was increasing in the 1960s as the community became more unified in political orientation and community organizations such as Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC) became more effective at lobbying with politicians and civil servants.

Because of their marginal status in Quebec society, members of the Jewish community tended to be removed from the major currents of change in Quebec. Whereas most Jews seem to have approved of the Quiet Revolution and to have voted for the Liberal party in the 1960s and 70s, they were more concerned with the changes occurring within their own

community and with issues relevant to their concerns in North America and in Israel. As the community became more middle class, its members may have become more comfortable with their lives in Quebec, but they were no more integrated into the mainstream of Quebec society.

Yet another important change in the Jewish community was the emergence of new elites which reflected the fragmentation of the community. The aloof and indifferent attitude of the wealthy which was evident during the Hebrew Free School crisis (Chapter Seven) was replaced by a new ethos of community participation and strong commitment to specific community organizations among a new wealthy elite headed by the Bronfman family (Newman, 1978; Waller, 1974). Part of this commitment was financial, such as the contribution of significant funds to the community's annual fund-raising campaign; part was ideological, a conception of Jewish community service and of support for community causes and for Israel. Waller (1974) suggests that this commercial elite, which he calls "the establishment," has had a significant impact upon the goals and policies followed by the community.

Others disagree. In an interview, Manny Batshaw, a former executive director of Allied Jewish Community Services (now renamed Federation CJA), suggested that a

second elite has more of a say in the operations of the community. This elite consists of upper middle class professionals such as lawyers, notaries, accountants, and physicians who make up the bulk of the positions on the boards of directors of major Jewish organizations, especially AJCS and its constituent agencies, and who see themselves and are seen by others as the community's leaders. It is this professional elite, Batshaw argued, which has come to make the important decisions within the Jewish community and it is their aspirations which dominate community policies. Members of the establishment may intervene when their direct interests are effected, but that is rather rare. Also, members of the establishment have a more global view of the Jewish community, being more concerned with issues affecting Israel, for example, than with local community needs. In contrast, the professional elite tend to concern themselves more with local issues and needs.

Yet another elite can be identified, one consisting of individuals with a strong commitment to and influence within a particular organization or segment of the community. The members of this "activist" elite need not be wealthy or high in status; often, they are retired persons or others with the time to devote to organizational

activity. Many are immigrants, especially Holocaust survivors or Sephardim, who work to maintain particular cultural organizations or maintain services they see as important. Nevertheless, despite their lower social status and more narrow set of concerns, their participation ensures that Jewish organizations remain relevant to major segments of the community and that grass-roots goals filter up to the higher status elites.

Finally, we can identify still one more elite, that composed of Jewish communal workers, the career community "civil servants." Because of their claims to expertise, their high visibility in the community and the media, and their stable careers within organizations whose volunteer leadership comes and goes, the communal workers have been able to attain a high degree of control over decision-making in many Jewish organizations. Even where they are unable to influence policy directly, they have influence through their control over day to day operations.

What is crucial is that different elites do exist and the community is not characterized by unanimity either of opinion or of influence. In the area of education, for example, each of these elites — the establishment, the professionals, the activists and the communal workers — have had a different set of attitudes and promoted different policies. As the education system began to

change, these differences led to disagreements and conflicts.

ii. Educational Change in the Jewish Community

Despite the arrival of many Jewish immigrants after the Second World War, new problems began to plague Jewish education during the early 1960s. One was the growing perception of the mainstream schools as irrelevant because they remained intent on perpetuating a vision of education and of Jewish life which was out of touch with the evolving Jewish community. This was particularly dramatic in the case of Yiddish education. As noted earlier, the retention of the Yiddish language and culture had become largely irrelevant to the majority of Jews. Had there not been a flood of new immigrants in the 1950s, the Yiddish language would have all but disappeared. As it was, by 1971, the Jewish Peretz School, the mainstream Yiddish school, was forced to merge with the Jewish People's School in order to survive.

Traditional religious beliefs and practices were also becoming less relevant to many people. While religious orthodoxy was renewed by a large number of Hassidic immigrants to Montreal after the Second World War, the Hassidim did not find the mainstream United Talmud Torahs

(UTT) system acceptable, and they preferred to establish their own schools. At the same time, the increasingly secular Jewish population was also rejecting the orthodoxy of UTT, in this case as being too orthodox.

Mainstream schools continued to attract the children of new immigrants, but the relative absence of Canadian-born students tended to lower the status and threaten the financial viability of the schools. There were complaints too about the quality of Jewish schools at the time, complaints summarized in a report prepared by a number of American experts on Jewish education commissioned by Canadian Jewish Congress and Allied Jewish Community Services (Joint Committee on Jewish Education, 1972). The report noted that teachers failed to make Jewish education relevant to the experiences, interests and needs of the students and that teachers were authoritarian and rigid in their approach, poorly motivated and poorly paid.

Overall enrolment in the Jewish schools remained stable (Kage, 1975), because new day schools were opening which could attract a new clientele, but by the early 1960s there were growing signs of dissatisfaction with the mainstream Jewish school system (Joint Committee on Jewish Education, 1972). One important consequence of the ideological convergence among mainstream schools was that

these schools were becoming competitors for the same students, competition that became more intense as new schools drew off some of the declining pool of students whose parents desired them to have a Jewish education. This was one of the factors making cooperation and joint action among the schools difficult to achieve at a time when it was becoming more important.

During the 1950s and 60s, the majority of Jewish children continued to attend Protestant schools. The Protestant system was itself undergoing change at this time. The Christian character its board had been so concerned to maintain in the 1920s had largely dissipated by the 1960s. This made Protestant schools more acceptable to Jewish parents, as did the increasing segregation of Jewish students in Protestant schools. Despite its agreement with the community, the Protestant board continued to segregate Jewish students. This tendency was reinforced by the movement of the Jewish population west which increased their residential segregation in districts such as Cote St Luc. Ironically, this was one of the features which now made the board's schools more acceptable to Jewish parents¹. By the early 1960s new problems and

¹Officially, the board still maintained that it did not segregate, but many who went through the Protestant system, as I did, was aware of blatant examples of segregation. For example, between 1963 and

concerns were emerging among these parents, such as a fear of intermarriage, the desire to have their children make friends with other Jews, and a concern that their children retain a Jewish identity. The segregation of Jewish students in Protestant schools was now seen by many as an attractive feature of those schools.

The issue of "taxation without representation" was still a contentious one for Jews, however (Kage, 1975). Indeed, as a result of the increasingly affluent status of Jewish community members, the funding relationship between the community and the Protestant school board was reversed. By the mid-1950s, Jews argued that they were paying a larger proportion of the total school tax to the Protestant panel in Montreal than the percentage of Jewish students within the Protestant schools. A brief presented to the Superior Council of Education in 1967 claimed that (Committee for Tax Supported Jewish Schools, 1968: 6), "Since 1943 the Protestant Board has reaped a profit of \$25 million from Jewish taxpayers ... [and in] the 1964 fiscal year, revenue from Jewish taxpayers exceeded the cost of

1967 I attended Montreal West High School, which had very few Jewish students (2.3 percent according to L. Rosenberg [1969: 48]) in preference to another school, Wagar High School in Cote St. Luc, not much farther away, which L. Rosenberg (1969: 48) reports was 94 percent Jewish. It was suggested to me several times by the school's principal that I would be much happier at Wagar High School.

educating Jewish children by about 3 million dollars." This made the lack of rights with respect to education even more of an irritant than it had been in the past.

New attempts were initiated in the 1960s to have the provincial government set up a separate Jewish school commission to benefit from the tax money paid by Jews, many of whom now felt that they were disadvantaged by paying school taxes to the Protestant panel. This was particularly true of those who sent their children to private schools. These parents felt that they were being doubly taxed, once in paying taxes to the public school commission and once again in paying tuition fees to a private school. Also, private schools were ineligible for the grants being provided by the provincial government to public school commissions, so once again Jews were paying taxes, this time to the provincial government, without being entitled to all of the benefits. A Jewish school commission, some felt, would solve these problems and put Jewish schools on an equal financial footing with Protestant and Catholic schools (Committee for Tax Supported Jewish schools, 1968; Yetnicoff, 1963). This proposal seems to have become the official position of Canadian Jewish Congress in 1967, although supporters of separate schools complained that this policy was not being promoted vigorously (Committee

for Tax Supported Jewish schools, 1968).

This lack of vigour reflected strong differences of opinion within the community over the importance of Jewish education. In particular, members of the establishment and professional elites argued that maintaining a Jewish day school system was wasteful of community resources and unnecessary to preserving Jewish identity. They looked with even less favour upon the idea of a separate school commission. The promotion of such a policy by Canadian Jewish Congress then, was lukewarm at best. Dissatisfaction was widespread, but there was little consensus in the community about what the problems really were and what to do about them.

iii. The Educational Reforms of the 1960s

The educational reforms of the 1960s fundamentally altered the position of the Jewish day schools within the Quebec education system. This change began in a small way in 1961 when the provincial government undertook to promote secondary education in Quebec. Funds were made available to private high schools, and among the recipients of these funds were Jewish schools. This was the first contemporary instance of direct government funding of education within the Jewish sector and it set an important precedent for the community.

It was the establishment of a Ministry of Education (MEQ) in 1964 which really changed the relationships existing among the Jewish community, the state, and the public school sector. Previously, the state only intervened in Jewish education when called upon to do so because of crisis or conflict. The creation of the MEQ meant that the Jewish community could deal directly with the government in its efforts to achieve goals such as state funding for the Jewish day schools and the equal rights for parents and students within the public schools. These were the two crucial educational issues facing the community at the time.

In terms of funding, community representatives argued that, on the basis of religious equality, Jewish schools should receive subsidies similar to those received by Catholic and Protestant schools for that portion of the curriculum which consisted of secular studies. Because Catholic or Protestant religious instruction was still a part of the public school curriculum, the Jewish community asserted that Jewish day schools were not really private schools but community schools equivalent to public schools in structure, curriculum and in having a distinctive religious orientation. So long as Jewish schools were excluded from the funding available to Catholic and

Protestant schools, Jews were being treated as second-class citizens (Yetnikoff, 1963).

The problem was presenting the government with a united and effective front. The Jewish community remained divided between those who opposed an extensive Jewish day school system and those who supported such a system; between those who sought to maintain the status quo and those who sought to establish a separate Jewish school commission; and between those who wished to maintain the autonomy of the Jewish schools and those who preferred to unite the schools under the supervision of a community-wide agency. Many influential community leaders saw the preservation of a Jewish school system as a withdrawal from the broader Canadian community, a form of self-imposed segregation which harmed rather than helped the community. Others saw Jewish education as essential to the preservation of the Jewish people, their religion and their culture. The internal disagreements on these issue, which were rarely visible to non-Jews, meant that CJC was unable to effectively promote the creation of a separate public school system, and these disagreements not only persisted but intensified into the early 1970s².

²Much of the information concerning educational issues in the 1960s and 70s was obtained through interviews conducted with knowledgeable informants. Additional information was obtained from documents in the

The various Jewish day schools themselves remained autonomous and fragmented, divided up into independent corporations operating as their administrators and boards of directors saw fit. This autonomy and fragmentation prevented the schools from developing any coordinated policies or concerted actions. Although the boards of directors recognized that action was needed to solve the problems facing the schools, they viewed each other as competitors and were more concerned with retaining their autonomy and providing their traditional form of education than with addressing these problems.

As for relations with the Protestant board, these began to change in the 1960s. Increasing government intervention in the area of education meant that the Protestant boards were no longer able to operate their schools as they saw fit, and they needed political allies to ensure that government policy reflected their interests. The Jewish community was one such potential ally. Also, declining student enrolments made the issue of retaining Jewish students in the Protestant system more urgent, especially with the possibility of government funding of Jewish schools making such schools more attractive. It was therefore in the interests of the Protestant board to

Canadian Jewish Congress National Archives and the archives of the Jewish Public Library of Montreal.

accommodate Jewish demands for representation. In 1965, negotiations between the Jewish community and the Protestant board resulted in the decision to appoint five Jews to serve on the Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal (PSBGM). After allowing no Jews to serve for so many years, the position of the Protestant board shifted to one of maintaining a quota of Jews on the board. This decision meant, however, that Jews were still being treated by the PSBGM as a distinctive corporate group, not as citizens having equal rights. The establishment of a quota, Kage (1975: 99) argued, was a step forward, "but tolerance, even if well-meaning and genuine, does not represent equality."

In 1971, legislation was passed explicitly prohibiting the exclusion of Jews from voting or serving as school commissioners, although the legislation excluded the Protestant boards of Montreal, Outremont and Verdun (Kage, 1975: 100), the largest parts of the PSBGM. When a Jew was appointed to the PSBGM in 1972 as a school commissioner by the board of Westmount, she became the sixth Jew on the PSBGM commission, requiring one of the appointed Jewish commissioners to resign to keep the number at five (Elazar and Waller, 1990: 88).

While Jews had finally received the right to sit on a

school commission, the creation of a Jewish quota on the PSBGM failed to satisfy many members of the community who continued to press for representation on the school commission based on equal rights rather than on a quota (Kage, 1975). This right was eventually obtained when the provincial reform of education on the island of Montreal established elected rather than appointed boards.

Growth and Expansion: 1968 - 1977

If the educational legislation of 1961 constituted "la grande charte de l'éducation" (Audet, 1971: 401) for the public sector, the Private Education Act of 1968 fulfilled the same role for the private sector, including the Jewish day school system. The Act acceded to many of the policies promoted by the Jewish community while giving the Ministry of Education new powers with regard to private schools. Qualified private schools would now be entitled to receive subsidies from the ministry. Schools which were "Declared in the Public Interest" (DIP) would be given 80 percent of the previous year's grant to public schools, while those private schools "Recognized for the Purpose of Grants" (RFS) were entitled to receive 60 percent of the public school award.

In the long run, the 1968 act gave rise to a

substantial growth in the population of the Jewish day schools, changed their relationship with the provincial government, and permitted institutional development of the education sector within the community. The impact of the provincial legislation upon the Jewish schools was delayed, however, because a new arrangement had been worked out between the community and the Protestant school board of Montreal.

In 1967, the Association of Jewish Day Schools (AJDS, then under the supervision of Canadian Jewish Congress) worked out an arrangement to whereby Jewish schools would be granted "associate" status with the Protestant board. This would entitle the schools to a subsidy from the Protestant board in exchange for standardizing secular studies within Jewish schools with the Protestant curriculum. This move significantly improved the financial position of the Jewish schools, although it did not solve all the problems, as the merger between the Jewish Peretz School and the Jewish People's School in 1971 made evident.

In 1973, associate status with the Protestant schools was revoked by ministerial decision. In the future, Jewish schools could apply to the Ministry of Education (MEQ) for grants under the Private Education Act if they met the criteria for operating in the public interest. As

understood by the MEQ, however, the public interest was "defined in terms of the extent of instruction in French" (Elazar and Waller, 1990: 126). Anglophone Jewish schools, following the Protestant school curriculum, had been providing 5 hours of French language instruction per week, a figure unacceptable to the MEQ. Negotiations between the MEQ and AJDS led to an agreement that Jewish schools would provide 8 hours of French language instruction per week in addition to 7 hours of English and 15 hours of Hebrew language instruction, in exchange for declaring Jewish schools to be in the "public interest" and the receipt of subsidies equalling 80 percent of the public school grant (Elazar and Waller, 1990: 126).

Considering that the regular public school week consists of 25 hours of instruction, the new agreement called for a longer school day and a week equaling 30 hours. This raised the cost of a Jewish education because the government's grant was 80 percent of the cost of the 25 hours of education equivalent to that offered by the public schools. The extra 5 hours of instruction were not supported by any government funds. Assuming that all hours of instruction cost the same, this would mean that a government grant at 80 percent worked out to 67 percent of the actual total hourly cost. Moreover, all other costs,

such as Hebrew books or the cost of maintaining, heating or expanding the physical plant, had to be paid for entirely by tuition fees, donations, or whatever other sources of income were available to the schools.

The subsidies regularized the funding of Jewish schools and allowed for their expansion. But they also subjected the Jewish schools to the demands of the MEQ. Thus the MEQ set criteria for the funding of private schools, such as increased hours of French language instruction, which were not required of public schools. These demands altered as new governments were elected and new policies implemented. As a result, Jewish schools lost control of much of their curriculum, which continues to be changed at the discretion of the Ministry.

The Changing Structure of Jewish Education

The problems which were to come from MEQ control were not foreseen when Jewish schools began to receive grants, first from the Protestant board and then from the ministry itself. New schools began to open to take advantage of the new fiscal arrangements. One was Ecole Maimonides, which opened in 1969 and began to attract the children of francophone Sephardim. Others, such as Solomon Schechter Academy which opened in 1969 and Akiva School which opened in 1968, were formed to meet the needs of middle class

parents seeking a Jewish education for their children more attuned to 'modern' religiosity or educational standards. The increasing diversity of the schools and their fragmented clientele made coordinating their activities or developing a common educational strategy extremely difficult.

Nor were the individual schools in a position to deal effectively with the government. Having long operated autonomously without funds from either the province or the community, most school administrators and board members had not developed the experience or the tools with which to deal with MEQ officials and bureaucrats. The Association of Jewish Day Schools was created to deal with these issues, but was hampered by the lack of agreement on goals or tactics among the schools.

Eventually, this led to intervention. The new monies being provided by the provincial government to Jewish schools made this sector more important to the community and led to increasing scrutiny from Allied Jewish Community Services (AJCS), the major fundraising and disbursing agency in the Jewish community. To the leadership and communal workers at AJCS, the anarchy of the education system called for rationalization and centralization (AJCS policy statement quoted in Joint Committee on Jewish

Education, 1972: 177):

Education, by its very nature, is very complex and has to serve a widely dispersed and diverse community. It therefore needs to be highly organized if it is to be qualitatively effective ...Jewish education needs to be planned and organized on a community-wide basis

Reflecting a similar perspective, the report recommended the creation of a central agency to oversee Jewish education in Montreal. Such an agency would be fiscally accountable to the community; establish educational standards; assist the schools in curriculum development; achieve a "working unity" among the schools on pedagogical matters; and generally promote Jewish education within the community.

The report chastised the leadership of the Montreal Jewish community for the failure to support the education system either materially or morally, arguing that providing a Jewish education had to become a priority for the community if it was to survive and its members retain their identity. Jewish education should not only be upgraded, but made available to a much broader segment of the community. Despite the new subsidies being provided by the Protestant board and promised by the MEQ, this would entail a substantial financial outlay by the community itself, in

particular AJCS, the main fund-raising and coordinating agency in the community.

This required a shift of supervision over education from the loose coordination provided by Canadian Jewish Congress to the centralization of services and funding by AJCS. This move was bitterly opposed by many segments of the community. School administrators and board members distrusted AJCS and feared a loss of autonomy. Groups active and influential within CJC argued that as a "democratic" organization, CJC was more responsive to the education system than was AJCS which they considered a self-appointed board representing the interests of the commercial and professional elites. As for the establishment, they too opposed a move they saw as creating an unnecessary financial drain on the community. Few members of the establishment or their children had attended Jewish schools. One respondent reported that during the negotiations over providing education one very wealthy and influential member of the establishment had said, "I didn't have any Jewish education and my children aren't getting any Jewish education. Am I a bad Jew?"³

Despite the disagreement, it was clear that government funding was predicated on the community's claim that its

³Interview data.

schools were really community schools rather than elite private schools. Now the community would have to live up to this claim by making the schools accessible to all regardless of the ability to pay. This meant that despite government grants - or, ironically, because of government grants - the community would have to subsidize the education of children whose parents could not afford to pay school fees. While opposition to Jewish education persisted in some segments of the community, government grants made the question of whether the community would consider Jewish education to be a priority moot. "Every Jewish child," AJCS finally proclaimed, "is entitled to a Jewish education" (Jewish Education Council of Montreal, 1987). Subsidies from AJCS, then, were added to the pool of money made available to the schools.

The money would not simply be handed over to the schools to do with as they saw fit, however. The Jewish Education Council (JEC) was created in 1975 as the Jewish education system's "central community agency for coordinating and planning" (Jewish Education Council of Montreal, 1987). Like many Jewish organizations created by fiat to deal with a wide variety of issues, the JEC was given an ambiguous structure, partly an umbrella organization providing services to the schools, partly an

independent organization acting on a mandate of its own, and partly a watchdog for AJCS given the task of overseeing the actions of the schools.

1977-1983: The New Crises of Jewish Education

Despite the problems facing the Jewish schools summarized in the 1972 report, Jewish day school enrolment was already beginning to expand by 1970 and continued to expand throughout the decade. While the total number of Jewish children of school age declined 26 percent from 1971 to 1981, the number of students in Jewish day schools increased from 4,680 in 1971 to 6617 in 1984 (Weinfeld, 1985: 22). The proportion of students attending an elementary Jewish day school increased from 26 percent in 1971 to 57 percent in 1981 (Weinfeld, 1985: 22). These two trends continued from 1970 to the 1984, a declining population of Jewish students who were attending Jewish schools in growing proportions.

This increased attendance reflected several factors. The new grants and subsidies made available to the Jewish schools raised the quality of education and of the other services being offered. The arrangement made with the Protestant board, and then with the MEQ, meant that Jewish schools now offered the same curriculum and were obliged to

meet the same standards as the public schools. Because they were private schools, however, parents felt that they could have a greater say in how their children were being educated than was the case in public schools. Also, Protestant schools were changing their character as overall enrolment in Protestant schools declined and the number of schools decreased. Rather than neighborhood schools reflecting the demographic characteristics of the local area, public schools now had students bused in from other neighborhoods. Many parents became concerned that their children were no longer being exposed to a primarily Jewish environment.

i. Bill 101 and the Redefinition of Education in Quebec

The election of a Parti Quebecois (PQ) government in 1976 came as a shock to most Jewish Quebecers. As noted earlier, most Jews were removed from the main currents of social, economic, and political change in Quebec society, and did not realize the degree to which nationalist aspirations had become a part of that society.

In some ways, however, the community's education system was prepared for the alterations in its relations with the state brought about by the election of the PQ. This realization that Quebec was changing had come earlier in the case of education than in other sectors of the

Jewish community because the degree and extent of state intervention in the area of education was so dramatic and so consequential after 1960. The high level of state intervention had already promoted the centralization of the education system and both the Association of Jewish Day Schools and the Jewish Education Council were established and in place by 1975.

The election of the PQ, then, accelerated changes already underway in the Jewish education system while creating both new constraints and new opportunities for the schools. The PQ government had a different conception than its predecessors of the role of the state and its relations with civil society. The state now sought to "normalize" Quebec society, i.e., to establish those relations which nationalists assumed would be "normal" were Quebec a sovereign, francophone state directed to protecting and promoting the will of its majority. This required the expansion of the administrative space of the state to encompass a much wider variety of social, cultural, and economic relations than had ever been the case before, either in Quebec or elsewhere in Canada. It also allowed for and legitimated a much greater degree of state intervention than had been the case before.

Inevitably, such a conception of the role of the state

would create problems for the Jewish community. But the election of the PQ meant that the Jewish community no longer had an elected "ambassador" within the governing party in Quebec City to look after its interests. How would the community make known its views to the new government? How would it have an impact on policies or legislation? Who would negotiate with the government on matters of concern to the community? Who would intervene should conflict arise?

The Jewish community's leadership quickly realized that action needed to be taken. First of all, the community could no longer afford to be ignorant of the currents of change in Quebec society or of the implications political policies could have on the community. As a result, Canadian Jewish Congress and Allied Jewish Community Services jointly established the Jewish Community Research Institute (JCRI) in September 1977 to identify political issues of concern the community, to consider all the implications of these issues, and to make recommendations concerning the appropriate course of action or the community to take.

In addition, the community also hired a so-called "man in Quebec," as a representative of the JCRI to the provincial government. His job was to learn how the government was thinking and what they were planning, in

order that the community be prepared for possible legislative and regulatory changes. He was also to establish informal ties with key decision-makers in the government so that the Jewish community would have a chance to make its views known.

Eventually, the JCRI was dissolved as its specific functions became unnecessary. The Quebec Region of Canadian Jewish Congress took on the task of maintaining "official" liaison with government officials and representing the community to the government, while Allied Jewish Community Services and its agencies maintain ongoing formal and informal contacts with specific ministries and bureaucrats. In the early period after the election of the PQ, however, the JCRI played a crucial role, especially with regards to Bill 101 and the negotiations with the PQ over the funding of Jewish schools.

The first action of the PQ government which affected the Jewish community was the passage of Bill 101, which prescribed French as the language of education in Quebec. An English education was therefore largely restricted to those who had a parent or sibling educated at an English school in Quebec, or whose older sibling had been so educated.

Bill 101 had a profound and divisive effect upon

Jewish education. The community might assert that every Jewish child was entitled to a Jewish education, but the state defined the education being provided by most Jewish schools as an English education, and considered the children of immigrants to be inadmissible to such schools. Attendance would no longer depend upon the criteria set by the community but upon the government's decision on the eligibility of the child and its definition of the language of the school. Moreover, none of this was a straightforward matter. It was not always clear just who was eligible for English instruction, nor on what constituted an English school. Since the language of the school was not defined solely by the number of hours of English or French language instruction but also by the language of administration, a French immersion school operated by an anglophone school board might still be an anglophone school, closed to ineligible students. But what was a Jewish school which taught more hours of French than of English, and more hours of Hebrew than of both? How would Jewish schools fit into a system which was no longer defined (except formally) as composed of confessional schools but was now considered to be composed of either English or French schools? Once again, as had been the case in the 1920s, the answer was that they did not quite fit.

This created problems for the Jewish schools, problems for the government, and promoted a new set of relations between both.

ii. The Funding Crisis of 1977

At the same time that the community was grappling with the problems created by Bill 101, another set of difficulties emerged in relations with the MEQ. In March 1977 the MEQ changed the criteria under which private schools could receive grants, explicitly tying these grants to the process of francization. Only a francophone school would be eligible to receive funding at 80 percent. Such a school would have to offer 17 1/2 hours of French instruction per week in grades 1 - 3 and 21 2/3 hours in grades 4 - 6. Only three Jewish schools qualified, the two Sephardic schools, école Maimonides and école Sepharade, and grades 1 - 3 in Hebrew Foundation School. None of the other Jewish schools offered enough French language instruction even to be eligible under the new guidelines to receive 60 percent funding. Such status now required a school to provide 14 1/6 hours of French instruction per week in grades 1 - 3 and 18 1/3 hours in grades 4 - 6 (Kantrowitz, 1977: 14). This would effectively cut off all grants from the MEQ to almost all of the Jewish schools,

grants which in 1977 amounted to about \$6,000,000. The loss of these grants would mean either a dramatic increase in the tuition fees charged to parents, or a decision by the community as a whole to make up the shortfall, or some combination of the two. In either case it would put an end to the policy of providing an affordable Jewish education to everyone who wished it. It would also almost certainly mean the closing of some of the schools.

Nevertheless, there were some in the community who supported such a move. They believed that by refusing to accept government grants, Jewish schools would no longer be under the control of the MEQ and would no longer be bound by the restrictions on English education specified by Bill 101. Others noted that government legislation on this point was ambiguous and that the Jewish community would be running a serious risk of losing its schools. Even if that were not to happen, a public rejection by the Jewish community of the nationalist project implemented by Bill 101 and supported by the majority of Quebecers would potentially harm both the community and threaten the position of Jews in Quebec society⁴.

⁴In an interview conducted in 1977 with a senior Jewish community "civil servant" this was presented as a major concern of the "establishment." It should be remembered that the members of the PQ government were unknown to the Jewish community and that some community members feared punitive or restrictive legislation should the PQ not get its way. Businessmen also feared that offending public

The existing legislation and regulations and their possible interpretations were examined by the JCRI, and a number of options were considered, including the refusal to accept any grants from the MEQ. The JCRI's report on education (Kantrowitz, 1977) stressed that regardless of whether or not Jewish schools accepted government funds, the permit to operate a private school was granted or revoked at the discretion of the Minister of Education. The failure to comply with the MEQ's criteria as to curriculum, the language of instruction, or compliance with Bill 101, posed the threat of having the Minister revoke the offending schools' permits. Unilateral action by the community was therefore inadvisable.

Negotiation seemed the only viable option, and AJDS argued that Jewish schools must have a significant Judaic content or they lose all reason to exist. Eventually negotiations produced a compromise which would allow Jewish schools to receive funding if they provided 14 hours of French language instruction per week. But on other significant issues the Jewish schools lost: they would not, with the exception of the francophone schools, be allowed to admit students ineligible for English education (of which there were about 140 in 1977 [Kantrowitz, 1977: 37]), opinion might mean the loss of francophone customers.

and the level of funding available to the majority of Jewish schools would be reduced to 60 percent.

iii. New Strategies

This agreement marked a turning point in the relations between the Jewish community and the state. The era of negotiation through elected "ambassadors" was over. What was evolving instead were a broad set of bureaucratic and informal linkages between Jewish "civil servants" (particularly in the agencies associated with Allied Jewish Community Services) and their state counterparts, as well as between Jewish community spokesmen (particularly at Canadian Jewish Congress) and their political counterparts. Despite the fears of nationalism on the part of the Jewish community, the MEQ showed a much greater flexibility in negotiations than most members of the Jewish community would have expected from the PQ government. This also turned out to be true when other matters affecting the community were negotiated with the government. Politically, most community members continued to oppose the nationalist goals of the PQ, but the ongoing relationships which evolved in the course of day to day relations between community agencies and the state were organized around specific bureaucratic, practical, and even personal issues,

not political ones. This remained true after the return to power of the Liberals in 1985 and the re-election of the PQ in 1994.

Community organizations, too, could no longer afford to be out of touch with the currents of thought and planning for change within the provincial government. These bureaucratic linkages became a part of a new strategic approach within the Jewish community designed to adapt quickly to shifting government policies; which sought ways to maintain the individual autonomy and goals of community organizations such as schools despite new constraints; and which could identify and take advantage of new opportunities provided by state legislation and ministerial regulations. Such an approach required more coordination within the community and further promoted the centralization of "community planning" and the role of umbrella organizations such as the Association of Jewish Day Schools and the Jewish Education Council.

The individual school systems were dissatisfied with the compromise reached with the MEQ, however, and attempts were made by school administrators to take advantage of the ambiguities in the provincial legislation and MEQ regulations. In an important move, United Talmud Torahs, which already operated several different branches, opened a

new branch in 1979, the Section Française, as a separate unit with its own francophone administration under the supervision of a unified board of directors. This new branch was accepted by the MEQ as a francophone school to which students ineligible for an English education could be admitted. The Section Française soon became the Jewish school of choice for many non-francophone Jewish immigrants, such as Russians or Israelis, as well as for some francophone Sephardim living in the area. It solved many of the problems created for the community by Bill 101, but did so by adapting to rather than resisting the new "reality" proclaimed by Bill 101.

That the MEQ accepted the Section Française as a francophone school also shows a desire on its part to interpret the language legislation loosely so long as the major goal of francization was being accomplished. By establishing a francophone branch, United Talmud Torahs was not only contributing to the francization of the immigrants but to that of community organizations as well. The community, aware that much was at stake in terms of government funding of Jewish education⁵, was also

⁵It should be noted that in addition to the direct funding of Jewish schools by the provincial government, both the federal and provincial governments accepted a significant proportion of the tuition fees paid by parents as charitable contributions eligible for tax deductions. This indirect funding of Jewish education was especially vulnerable because it depended upon the good will of the government

displaying a spirit of cooperation rather than conflict. The MEQ, for its part, may also have sought to avoid any direct confrontation with the Jewish schools which might cast the nationalist project of the PQ government in the role of restricting minority rights.

Just as the state made new demands upon the Jewish schools, it also often provided the means whereby to satisfy these demands. For example, the increase to 14 hours of French instruction posed problems for anglophone Jewish schools which had neither the experience nor the skills to develop francophone materials for teachers or students. The strategy which evolved was to treat the demands of the government as opportunities. The Jewish Education Council, for example, applied to l'Office de la Langue Francaise for grants to subsidize the costs of curriculum development and the production of materials in French. These grants reduced the costs to the schools of shifting from a primarily English to a primarily French program. Again, we see the Jewish education system taking advantage of opportunities provided by the government and its agencies.

and its removal could well have had catastrophic consequences on enrollment in the schools.

1984 -1994: Competition, Crises, and Decline

The centralization of Jewish education in Montreal did not put an end to conflict within the education system, nor did the emergence of bureaucratic linkages with the government officials eliminate problems in dealing with the state. Government cutbacks in the funding of Jewish schools; a decline in student enrolment reflecting demographic changes and the impact of Bill 101; and renewed competition from the public sector all combined to create new problems for the Jewish education system after 1984. Many of these problems were tied into finances, since the cost of providing an education was going up significantly while revenues from the government were decreasing and enrolment was declining (Weinfeld, 1985).

An indication that the Jewish school system was facing new problems was the lockout of teachers in 1984 following the breakdown of negotiations between the schools and the teachers' union. This was a dramatic change from the often willing exploitation of ideologically committed teachers which characterized the Jewish system just a few years earlier. The amalgamation of the Jewish Teachers Seminary with McGill University raised the status of the teachers and their expectations. Together with the many non-Jews hired to teach subjects required by the MEQ, most Jewish

teachers expected parity in salary and job security with teachers in the public sector for what was the same, and in some ways more difficult, work. The lockout harmed the credibility of the school administrations with the Jewish public and angered parents who did not expect labour problems disrupting classes in a private school (Weinfeld, 1985). The schools came to terms with the teachers, but similar labour problems arose again in 1987 when the contract between the schools and the teachers had to be renewed.

For the most part, the teachers achieved their goal of parity with the public sector, but unlike the public sector, Jewish schools were not fully funded by the state. The effect of these disputes and negotiations, then, was to raise the cost of education for parents, while leaving a legacy of resentment and distrust among teachers.

Increasing tuition fees decreased the number of students in the schools because fewer parents could afford to pay those fees⁶. AJCS began to increase subsidies to the schools on an annual basis in 1986 to fund scholarships for low-income parents, but these subsidies did not cover all of the demand for reduced fees. The increasing number

⁶I was informed in 1989 at a United Talmud Torahs Board meeting that government subsidies covered about 40 percent of the real cost of operating the schools.

of single-parent families and increasing poverty meant that the demand for subsidies outstripped the capacity of the community to provide money without taking funds away from other high priority concerns such as services for the elderly. This Allied Jewish Community Services was unwilling to do. Instead, fees were raised even more for those parents paying full tuition to subsidize those who could not. This further rise in tuition fees, in turn, meant that still more could not afford to pay, a vicious circle which has steadily eroded enrolment in Jewish schools.

Enrolment also declined for demographic reasons. Montreal's Jewish population began to shrink as immigration decreased and birth rates fell in the 1960s. The election of the PQ in 1976 had also led to the emigration of a significant number of Jews from Montreal, especially those in their twenties and thirties, precisely those who had or would soon have young children in schools. Altogether, the Jewish population of Montreal declined by about 10,000 between 1971 and 1981 (Elazar and Waller, 1990). This decline began to make itself felt in the schools by the mid 1980s.

Another major problem for the Jewish schools which developed in the late 1980s was more vigorous competition

from the Protestant board. Protestant schools, too, were dealing with declining enrolments and the PSBGM could no longer depend upon its traditional clientele. Immigrant children were now required to attend francophone, usually Catholic, schools, while some anglophone parents believed that if Quebec was becoming a francophone society, then their children would be better off being educated in a French school (Milner, 1986). The PSBGM thus began to compete for students with private schools by reorganizing a number of public schools to operate as if they were private schools; with restricted admission based on entrance exams or other requirements, uniforms, strict discipline, and a higher standard of education. This has proven attractive to parents who feel they can get the advantages of a private school for their children without paying any fees. In particular, the PSBGM went into direct competition with Jewish schools by offering a Jewish "program" for a small fee in so-called "alternative" schools operating in or near areas of Jewish residence. While such a program is not equivalent to a Jewish education, it provides what many parents consider adequate Jewish content while also providing what some feel is even more important, a Jewish environment (Zelkowitz, 1989).

The PSBGM's strategy has drawn off a significant

number of students from Jewish schools, leading to the closing of the United Talmud Torahs school in Cote St. Luc, one of two school closings in the United Talmud Torahs system which occurred in 1990. These closings will be discussed in detail in the next chapter because the circumstances which gave rise to them illustrate the degree of conflict and the nature of the disputes which still persist within the Jewish education system despite the centralization promoted by Allied Jewish Community Services.

Declining enrolment and increasing costs have prevented some Jewish schools from being able to improve their buildings, buy new equipment such as computers, or otherwise upgrade their facilities. More and more, parents have had to pay special "assessments" or "voluntarily" contribute to special funds to meet the needs of the schools. These extra costs over and above tuition fees have become a financial burden which further compounds the problem of declining enrolment. An attempt by Allied Jewish Community Services to raise funds through a special community-wide capital funds campaign in 1990 was a failure. A Jewish education for every child may be promoted as a community priority, but the "establishment" as well as many other community members clearly do not agree, and they

expect parents who wish a Jewish education for their children to pay for that education.

As this chapter has shown, the combination of internal Jewish community conflicts and dynamics with the opportunities and constraints created by state action and policies served to transform and expand the Jewish day schools. These schools underwent a period of significant growth in the 1970s as a result of state funding and new community priorities. This period of growth was followed, however, by a significant decline as the long term effects of state policies, demographic decline, and increased competition among schools have decreased the number of students enrolled in Jewish schools.

Indeed, in some ways, it would not be an exaggeration to describe Montreal's Jewish education system today being as in a state of crisis, one which presents at least the possibility that several Jewish schools will close unless the system as a whole is radically transformed. In the meantime, the state continues to intervene both directly and indirectly in Jewish education. It continues to set the parameters within which the Jewish system must operate and formulates the regulations with which the schools must comply. Allied Jewish Community Services (renamed Federation CJA) also intervenes indirectly on an ongoing basis through the Association of Jewish Day Schools and the

Jewish Education Council, and more directly on occasion as when a two year period of trusteeship was imposed upon the administration of United Talmud Torahs. Parents, teachers, unions, religious authorities and many other interest groups have their own designs for or demands upon the Jewish schools. Given this complex mix of forces imposing upon the schools, it is not surprising that the Jewish education system continues to reproduce the structural ambiguity which characterizes that of Quebec's education system in general. It is to this issue we now turn.

CHAPTER NINE
THE SYSTEMIC CRISIS OF JEWISH EDUCATION
AND THE REPRODUCTION OF STRUCTURAL AMBIGUITY

Montreal's Jewish education system is caught in a bind of incompatible goals and conflicting conceptions of its role. The increasing bureaucratization and centralization of education described in Chapter Eight have not solved these problems, nor are they likely to do so in the future, because those organizations which are competing for control over the Jewish education system have incorporated, rather than eliminated, these incompatibilities and conflicts. The result has been structural ambiguity within the Jewish community's education system which parallels that found within Quebec's education system as a whole.

This chapter will identify some incompatibilities and conflicts which have come to characterize the contemporary Jewish education system in Montreal and which have led to what has been called by Weinfeld (1985) a "systemic crisis." In doing so this chapter will examine the processes whereby structural ambiguity is produced and reproduced within the Jewish education system; ambiguity which prevents the structures put in place by community members from dealing effectively with the crisis.

Conflict and the Reproduction of Structural Ambiguity

Elazar (1976) has argued that any major Jewish community can be viewed as a polity. This does not mean that an ethnic community is equivalent to a state, but that it can take on some of the characteristics of a state to the extent that identifiable political and parapolitical elites exist which make consequential decisions on behalf of community members (Breton, 1990) or which compete to make such decisions. This, as we saw in the previous chapter, is the case in the Montreal Jewish community. Indeed, in Quebec the political character of ethnic groups is further enhanced in several ways. One is that state policy recognizes ethnic groups as corporate groups with distinct and identifiable 'representative' and 'administrative' structures. Also, given the high degree to which the Quebec state penetrates civil society, many ethnic organizations have come to adopt procedures and practices which ensure that state agents can deal comfortably and effectively with community representatives. In this respect, a community organization may take on the form and begin to act as if it were a part of the network of what were earlier called "interactive" state institutions.

One example to be discussed in this chapter, the

Association of Jewish Day Schools, acts – and is treated by the state – as if it were the Jewish community's school board without having either the representative form or the mandate to do so from its autonomous member schools. In this respect, state policy and procedures may encourage a community organization to "parallel" interactive state institutions.

If ethnic groups have some of the characteristics of a polity, then it also makes sense to see ethnic organizations as like the state in having their own administrative space. Yet the notion of an ethnic group as a polity runs into one major difficulty, which is the lack of representative relations between community agencies and community members. Indeed, in the case of Jewish communities it can further be argued that there are no structural principles around which representative communal administrative structures can form. A Jewish community, for example, has no 'church' which can serve as an authoritative resource within a community and become the nucleus around which other organizations form, as is the case with Montreal's Greek community (Gavaki, 1977). While centralization and bureaucratization can occur under specific circumstances and affect particular sectors of the community, Jewish communities have been described by Lipset

(1969: 23) as characterized by "competitive pluralism ... (within) associational life." What Lipset means is that decentralization and competition rather than centralization and coordination seem to be the norm within most Jewish communities, and may reflect fundamental features of Jewish life in North America. Elazar (1976: 8), too, agrees that there is a, "lack of any inherent legitimacy attaching to any coordinating institutions." Jews may feel a sense of attachment to their identity, history, and traditions, but few - other than the ultra-Orthodox - accept the authority of any body to define for them what it means to be a Jew or to live a Jewish life in North America.

It is the resulting tension between solidarity and freedom, and between continuity and 'modernity' which are the structural principles upon which Jewish communities are organized. As a consequence, not only is there conflict among organizations competing to 'coordinate,' 'regulate,' 'rationalize,' or 'streamline' community affairs, the very attempt to transform communal relations into administrative space generates conflict between the 'voluntary' character of group membership and the 'representative' claims of leaders. Bureaucratization and centralization thus generate tension in themselves.

Canada's Jewish communities are more centralized than

the American ones (Tulchinsky, 1992), but such centralization is an organizational phenomenon which has not prevented extensive competition and conflict among individuals, groups, and organizations within the communities (Elazar and Waller, 1990). This makes understanding the unique characteristics of Montreal's Jewish community all the more significant. In Montreal, too, there is tension within the community between those forces and contingencies which promote and produce centralization and those which serve to preserve and reproduce organizational and individual autonomy. By promoting bureaucratization and centralization, the state promotes this tension to a greater extent than that found elsewhere, particularly in the education sector. Allied Jewish Community Services¹, the Jewish Education Council (JEC), and the Association of Jewish Day Schools (AJDS) have centralized and bureaucratized many elements of the community's education system and established structures which "parallel" those found in the public sector. Yet this has proceeded despite the opposition of significant groups within the community, including not only many of those who work in the schools, but also some of the elite. In this

¹Allied Jewish Community Services (AJCS) changed its name in 1993 to Federation CJA. In order to avoid confusion, the term "federation" will usually be used in subsequent discussions whether referring to AJCS before 1993 or Federation CJA after that date.

respect, conflict and other forms of communal relations have come to be inscribed within the very organization of Jewish education in Montreal. Moreover, the absence of consensus as to the role and boundaries of the organizations competing to control the community's education system has promoted structural, configurational, and interpretive ambiguity.

Individual school administrations, Federation CJA, the JEC, and AJDS – to name only the major players – all have overlapping jurisdictions within the education system, leading both to conflict over the control of education and over administrative space. To the degree that this evolved and continues to evolve in interactions with the state, community relations have come to reproduce the tendencies found in the Quebec state itself.

Overlapping Jurisdictions and Divergent Views of Jewish Education

Before examining the conflicts and interactions which reproduce structural ambiguity, this section will describe the major organizations within Montreal's Jewish education system and how the leadership of these organizations view their own role and place in the education system vis a vis one other.

i. The Association of Jewish Day Schools²

A convenient starting point is the Association of Jewish Day Schools (AJDS), which has come to take on the function, but not the form or representative structure, of a school commission. In the interview the Executive Director of AJDS emphasized two points: that AJDS operates as a "quasi" school board in terms of its relationship with the government, and that much of that relationship is informal and personal.

In one sense, AJDS is an umbrella organization which provides services to the day schools and acts on their behalf in dealings with the government. While the various schools remain autonomous in terms of their own curriculum and fundraising, AJDS deals on their behalf with the provincial government concerning government grants, as well as attempting to coordinate the wide variety of educational services required by the various schools. It centralizes purchasing, for example, and also centralizes such services as site licensing of computer software. AJDS also sees its role as one of providing common services to the schools in terms of professional development, organizing curricular

²Interviews were conducted in December 1991 with the Executive Director of the Association of Jewish Day Schools, the Executive Director of the Jewish Education Council, and the Educational Director of United Talmud Torahs.

and developmental workshops, and seeking ways to integrate the schools' curriculum with the MEQ's régime pédagogique. Some of these programs are done in collaboration with the Jewish Education Council, but the Executive Director of AJDS asserted that the Jewish Education Council deals primarily with the Judaic content of courses whereas AJDS deals primarily with secular matters.

While the Executive Director identified a number of important activities, he asserted that the most important of all was that he could pick up a telephone and deal directly with senior ministry officials when problems came up affecting Jewish schools. The ongoing formal contacts made such occasional informal relations possible and indeed desirable to both parties. In this way problems could be solved before they became serious or led to a public crisis.

Yet while AJDS deals with the government on behalf of the schools, it does not see itself as merely the representative of the individual schools to the government. Rather, AJDS sees itself as the coordinating body of the Jewish day schools, acting in the interests of the community's educational system as a whole. AJDS, the Executive Director explained, is a "quasi" school board. Since the major activities of AJDS involve dealing with the

MEQ, it is the MEQ and its policies which are the point of reference in terms of which the Executive Director of AJDS perceives his role.

This may not be how the individual schools see their relation to AJDS but the implication of the Executive Director's comments was that this is how the government - and AJDS - see these relations. This also makes administrative and bureaucratic sense from the government's point of view because it allows the government to deal with the Jewish schools in a manner equivalent to its dealings with public school commissions. The same procedures and policies can then be applied. MEQ officials also know whom to contact should problems arise and to whom to listen when the community reacts to announced policies.

Indeed, so entrenched is AJDS as the Jewish community's "school board" that copies of all correspondence from the MEQ to individual schools are automatically sent to AJDS (Figure 9.1). Also, AJDS representatives participate on the standing committees of the MEQ's Education Committee and the Executive Director of AJDS sits on the Superior Council of Education. In this respect, the organizational style of AJDS is similar to that of a public school commission, a similarity enhanced during the term of one recent Executive Director of AJDS

who had formerly been the Director General of the Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal.

Figure 9.1

AJDS's Perception of the Educational System.

Particularly emphasized during the interview were the very extensive personal relations which have been developed with ministry officials. The Executive Director noted that he was able to write to the Minister directly requesting funding for special projects. He had recently written a letter for example, in which he requested a \$20,000 grant for a project. This grant had been awarded on the basis of the letter. The Executive Director and the Minister would meet for lunch and they had ongoing personal relationships. Similarly the Executive Director asserted that he knew everyone in the various departments of the MEQ relevant to

Jewish education quite well and called many of them by their first names.

In addition to these informal relationships, formal relationships were also well established. Formal grant applications were processed and a \$50,000 grant was received in 1991 for an anti-drug program in the Jewish schools. The Executive Director emphasized that such awards further indicated the acceptance on the part of the provincial government and the ministry of the AJDS as a "quasi" school board.

In conceiving of itself as a "quasi" school board, however, AJDS has gone far beyond its original mandate and contributes to the structural ambiguity of the Jewish education system. The interview with the Executive Director also made it clear that he saw the role of the Jewish Education Council and that of AJDS as clearly differentiated, with the Jewish Education Council seen as dealing with Judaic issues while AJDS is more concerned with the secular curriculum. As we shall see, this was not how the Executive Director of the Jewish Education Council saw the relations between the two organizations.

ii. The Jewish Education Council

The Executive Director of the Jewish Education Council

(JEC) provided a very different perception of the Jewish education system and of the respective roles of the JEC and Association of Jewish Day Schools than that presented by the Executive Director of AJDS. The JEC sees Federation CJA, not the MEQ, as the point of reference for the education system.

Figure 9.2

JEC's Perception of the Educational System

The JEC is a department of Federation CJA, and, like other components of the federation, tends to equate the federation and its policies with the "community" as a whole (Elazar and Waller, 1990). The JEC defines itself as the

"central community agency for coordinating and planning" (Jewish Education Council, 1987: 25) in the area of Jewish education (see Figure 9.2). As a consequence, the JEC covers a broad range of activities of many different kinds with the result that many of its activities have come to overlap with those of other organizations, such as AJDS. "Where there is overlap," the Executive Director of the JEC explained, "there's less of a chance that something goes through the cracks." The Educational Resource Centre, for example, is operated by the Department of Educational Services of the JEC, and combines a library with the provision of other instructional, audio-visual and technical services directed primarily at individual teachers. While the Educational Resource Centre's library has a different mandate, it still overlaps with the much larger Jewish Public Library which is housed on a different floor in the same building. Another example is the JEC's Department of Living Judaism which overlaps in some respects with the activities undertaken by the synagogues, and in other respects with the activities organized by the Canadian Zionist Federation.

Inevitably questions arise as to which organization undertakes which task and who has authority over whom. Indeed, the Jewish Education Council is a particularly ambiguous organization within the education system,

especially in its relationships with the Association of Jewish Day Schools, with Federation CJA, and with the individual schools. For example, when the JEC was first formed it had a department dealing with day school issues. After a time it was decided that AJDS could serve as the JEC's advisory body on matters related to day schools. In that respect, AJDS is now considered to function somewhat as a department of the JEC; a very different perception from the view of AJDS as a "quasi" school board held by its Executive Director. While only AJDS deals directly with the provincial government, the Executive Director of the JEC asserted that AJDS must go through the JEC in dealing with Federation CJA on all matters, such as deciding on the funding formula for granting tuition supplements to the day schools.

The relationship between the Association of Jewish Day Schools and the Jewish Education Council is thus a particularly complex one. For example, whereas the Executive Director of AJDS considered curriculum development to be divided between AJDS and the JEC with AJDS handling the secular curriculum and the JEC the Judaic curriculum; the JEC considers all issues related to the implementation and development of the curriculum, whether Jewish or secular, to be its concern. The focus of the JEC

on the Judaic curriculum represents its attempt to fill a significant gap by providing a common Hebrew "language arts" program to all the Jewish schools. This does not mean, however, that the secular curriculum is not within its sphere of interest. The JEC will not, however, negotiate with the government to modify the régime pédagogique; that is considered the task of AJDS.

At the time of the interview, in December 1991, a new constitution had been framed for the JEC, in large part, its Executive Director asserted, because AJDS had "too much influence upon JEC." AJDS, the Executive Director explained, represents the point of view of the day schools, but the JEC has to be concerned with all forms of Jewish education, including supplementary education, adult education, and summer camps. AJDS, however, appointed nine members of the twenty-seven member Board of Directors of the JEC, and as a consequence, the Executive Director claimed, "they were dominant and somehow our hands were tied."

In the new constitution the board was enlarged from twenty-seven to thirty-six members with reduced representation from AJDS. This, the Executive Director asserted, would give the board greater "flexibility," yet it was not spelled out in the course of the interview what

that meant in practical terms. Who needed this greater flexibility and in order to do what? Clearly the "domination" of the board by AJDS did not prevent the constitutional change from being implemented, which strongly suggests that it is not necessarily the board which really makes the crucial decisions.

Indeed, the Jewish Education Council has a constitution and a Board of Directors, but it was not incorporated as a separate organization or agency. It was formed in 1975 as a division or "committee" of the federation. The JEC, its Executive Director explained, considers itself to be "the educational arm of [the federation] entrusted with the full gamut and the full spectrum of educational needs." Yet questions arise, particularly among the schools themselves, whether the JEC is a partner in the tasks of Jewish education, whether it is the community "authority" in the area of education, or whether it is an agent of the federation handling whatever tasks and responsibilities may be assigned.

Similar ambiguities can be found in the JEC's relations with the individual schools. The JEC's departments and the services they provide to the schools foster an image within the community of the JEC as an umbrella organization serving the education system and the

individual schools. But that is not how the JEC defines itself. While the JEC does provide services to the schools, it sees itself as engaged in planning and setting policy for the school system as a whole.

In this respect, the JEC sees its relationship to the schools as one in which the JEC has the responsibility to the community as a whole "to provide leadership ...and ...ensuring that community dollars go as far as possible" (Jewish Education Council, 1987: 25). Such a centralized planning, allocation, and leadership role, however, is incompatible with the autonomy prized by the schools. Thus, "JEC respects the principle of school autonomy. So long as schools place no burden on the general community, they have the right to continue independently" (Jewish Education Council, 1987: 26). Clearly, if in the opinion of the JEC they do pose such a burden, then independent action on the part of the schools and autonomous administration is unacceptable.

Indeed, as we shall soon see, the JEC and the federation did not hesitate to place the administration of one school system under a form of trusteeship when it was seen as acting irresponsibly and placing a financial burden upon the community.

iii. The Jewish School Administration

Schools are on the front line of the education process. As such, school administrators and management must deal with an extraordinary number of day to day issues, from ensuring an adequate supply of chalk, to dealing with teacher grievances, and evaluating the merits of the latest pedagogical fad. This is even more the case in a private community school in which senior administrators and management are not removed from the schools either geographically or by layers of bureaucracy. Administrative offices and meeting rooms are in the schools, and the meetings of the Board of Directors of United Talmud Torahs, for example, were routinely held in the cafeteria of one of the high schools during the time I was a member of the board.

In addition, parents in a private school play a much more active role within the school; since they pay fees some treat the school in many respects as their property. They feel free to enter the office of the principal at any time to chat or complain, to speak to teachers after class without appointments, and to complain directly to members of the Board of Directors or to senior administrators of the school when they are dissatisfied.

In these circumstances the preoccupation of school

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administrators is with the day to day operation of the school. The MEQ, in contrast, is perceived by school administrators as a distant and relatively unknown body, which imposes burdens, red tape, and incompatible and inconsistent demands. In the interview, the Educational Director of United Talmud Torahs (UTT) stressed that contacts with the MEQ were minimal and highly bureaucratic; primarily the filling out of forms and the preparation of reports. Should any problem or circumstance arise requiring additional contact with the MEQ, the matter would be handed over to be dealt with by the Association of Jewish Day Schools. UTT had been visited by the Minister of Education just a short time before the interview, but such a visit was essentially a public relations exercise organized by AJDS and neither reflected nor produced personal contacts between ministry officials and the UTT administration. In contrast to the first name basis of relations between the Director of AJDS and MEQ officials, the Educational Director of UTT could not remember the name during the interview of the one ministry official who regularly dealt with UTT on routine matters.

Indeed, school administrators seek to minimize their contacts with the MEQ, preferring to leave such contacts to AJDS. Doing so does not imply that they see themselves as

subordinate to AJDS, only that they see AJDS as providing them with an important service. School administrators take their individual school or educational organization as the point of reference from which to interpret the place of the various components of the education system. They see their schools as autonomous and independent organizations which are affected by, but not subordinate to, either the MEQ or Federation CJA (Figure 9.3).

Figure 9.3
UTT School Administrator's Perception of Educational Structure

An individual school turns to AJDS when it needs to deal with the MEQ and to the JEC when it needs to deal with Federation CJA. Nevertheless, while school administrators do not acknowledge it, such a surrender of jurisdiction is a surrender as well of autonomy, of administrative space, and of participation in decision-making which has

significant impact upon the schools.

iv. Conflicts of Interest

The Association of Jewish Day Schools, for example, and the schools do not always have the same interests. AJDS does not question the Quebec state's nationalist project; its goal is to cooperate with the MEQ and retain the good will of Ministry officials. While it seeks to minimize the negative impact of some MEQ policies on the schools, it also seeks to develop strategies whereby the schools can accommodate the MEQ with minimal disruptions. AJDS accepts the MEQ as providing the framework within which Jewish education in Montreal must operate.

This is understandable. As a small minority group in Quebec receiving significant special privileges for its schools, including direct grants and tax deductions to parents for school fees, the Jewish school system is dependent upon the good will of the MEQ and of the provincial government in general. In addition, AJDS has special privileges of its own, such as a seat on the Superior Council of Education and special treatment from the MEQ as a "quasi" school board. Retaining the good will of the government is as much a priority for AJDS as retaining the good will of parents is a priority for the

individual schools.

In contrast, MEQ policies are seen by the schools as constraints rather than opportunities. One example would be the constraints built into the school week by requirements concerning the language of instruction. Requiring 14 hours of French instruction produces a 35 hour school week including 9 hours of English instruction and 12 hours of Hebrew instruction. In 1988, the St. Laurent campus Home and School Association brought a proposal to the Elementary Education Committee of United Talmud Torahs that there be an increase in the number of hours of English instruction to 10 or 11 hours, with a corresponding decrease in the hours of Hebrew instruction. The parents were particularly concerned that, despite the long school week, there was less time being spent on the teaching of mathematics and of the sciences than in non-Jewish anglophone private schools. It was explained by the chairperson of the committee, however, that the agreement with the MEQ in 1977 to allow Jewish schools to offer 14 hour of French instruction rather than 18 hours was based on the community's claim that 12 hours of Hebrew instruction was the minimum number of hours needed to teach the language and prayers effectively. Any time now taken away from Hebrew instruction, the chairperson explained, would have to be

replaced with French instruction; no increase whatsoever could be made to the number of hours of English instruction. Neither the parents nor the schools have any flexibility in this matter.

As for Federation CJA, again there is little direct contact on the part of the schools, which deal instead through the Jewish Education Council, and, again, there is often a conflict of interest between the JEC and the schools. In their dealings with the federation, the schools, as Weinfeld (1985: 31) pointed out, tend to treat the education system as a "zero sum game, with a loser for every winner." Each school, for example, tries to maximize its portion of the funds provided for tuition assistance or to obtain funds for capital requests. It is in the interest of Federation CJA, however, to minimize the amount of money spent on Jewish education, especially when ambivalence persists within some segments of the Jewish community whether community funds should support an education system which serves only a portion of the community, and when free education is available within the public schools.

While the Jewish Education Council asserts the importance of Jewish education, it identifies itself as the "educational arm" of Federation CJA, rather than as the representative of the schools to the federation. As such,

it seeks to centralize and coordinate school operations and does not favour retaining a system of autonomous schools which may reflect a narrow set of interests, duplicate services, and cost the community money.

The differences in definition and conception of task and authority among the Association of Jewish Day Schools, the Jewish Education Council, and the individual school administrations have led to conflicts, and in some ways, to an adversarial relationship among them. Whereas the JEC asserts its right to control and coordinate Jewish education, AJDS acts as the education system's "quasi" school board, and the individual schools insist upon their autonomy and their right to make decisions for themselves. These views of how the education system does and should operate are incompatible. To the degree that they persist they prevent coordinated action within the education system and promote conflict. This confusion of task and authority is a prime example of structural ambiguity.

The Systemic Crisis in Jewish Education in Montreal

The Jewish day school system, then, is enmeshed in a complex network of multiplex relationships not only with the state and with the public schools system, but also with other segments of the Jewish community. That these

relationships are in a constant state of change promotes a strategic approach on the part of the school administrations: responding to new legislation and regulations from the state; to competitive moves on the part of public and other private schools; to evolving priorities within the Jewish community; and to changing demands on the part of parents, teachers, and other segments of the educational sector. Change, then, is nothing new and the Jewish education system has had to completely redefine itself several times, as in the shift to day schools in the 1930s and 40s, the adoption of the MEQ's régime pédagogique for secular studies in the late 1960s, and the francization of the curriculum in the late 1970s.

Such a redefinition seems to be happening now as well. Beginning in the mid-1980s, relationships with the state, with the public schools, with the rest of the community — and even among the schools themselves — evolved in ways which may threaten the very survival of much of the system as it now exists. Such a situation, as Weinfeld (1985) noted in anticipation, is a "systemic crisis." That is, there is little question that some form of Jewish education will survive in Montreal, especially ultra-Orthodox day schools, but the system as a whole may undergo significant change and may lose some or all of what has been its

"mainstream" education sector.

A crucial factor in the contemporary changes affecting the Jewish education system is declining enrolments within the mainstream schools. As shown in Table 9.1, enrolment in mainstream anglophone Jewish schools in 1984 consisted of 4403 students, which had declined to 4006 by 1988 and was projected to further decline to 3560 by 1993; a decrease of 19 percent.

Table 9.1.

Enrolment and Projected Enrolment in Jewish Schools by Educational Sector, Montreal, 1984, 1988 and 1993.

Year	Sector					
	Anglophone		Francophone		Ultra-Orthodox	
	No.	%increase/ decrease	No.	%increase/ decrease	No.	%increase/ decrease
1984	4403		1123		1114	
1988	4006	- 9%	1192	+ 6%	1429	+ 28%
1993(proj.)	3560	- 19%	1284	+ 14%	2021	+ 81%

(source: Strategic Management Study, AJCS, 1989)³

³Note that the table indicates the projected figures for 1993 upon which planning in 1989 was based. The actual figures for 1993 are not presented because they are not relevant to the situation unfolding in 1989-90, and because the criteria used in 1989 were no longer consistent with the make-up of the schools by 1993. United Talmud Torahs, for example, had evolved two separate francophone divisions within its anglophone school system; a complication not reflected in the 1989 calculations.

In contrast, enrolment in francophone Jewish schools was rising, from 1123 in 1984 to 1192 in 1988, and projected to be 1284 in 1993 for an increase of 14 percent. The largest increase of all was in the ultra-Orthodox schools, which had 1114 students in 1984, had increased to 1429 in 1988, and was expected to be 2021 in 1993; an increase of 81 percent (AJCS, 1989). Overall growth in attendance was expected to climb from 6640 in 1988 to 6865 in 1993, but as we see, hidden in this increase are significant reductions among the mainstream anglophone Jewish schools.

The decline in the anglophone schools is itself a consequence of declining birth rates, restricted access to English language education, and increased competition from public schools. Francophone schools, too, are affected by low birth rates, but Quebec's language legislation has ensured that new immigrants are enrolled in francophone schools and excluded from anglophone schools. As for the dramatic increase expected within the ultra-Orthodox schools, this is a consequence of high birth rates among the Orthodox and the lack of competition from public schools, which are unlikely to attract students from the ultra-Orthodox community.

At the same time that enrolment began to decline in

the mid-80s, however, problems were emerging with the facilities used by the schools. Government funding did not include subventions for capital expenditures and the expansion of the schools in the early 1980s meant that facilities were being stretched and proving inadequate. By 1988, most schools needed to enlarge or renovate their premises. Some, such as Hebrew Academy and the Cote St. Luc branch of United Talmud Torahs rented buildings from the Protestant board (the PSBGM), which wanted those buildings back. They would therefore require new premises, preferably owned rather than leased. By 1988 the total anticipated budget for the renovation, enlargement or construction of Jewish school facilities was \$38 million, and Federation CJA, as the main fundraising and dispensing agency within the community, was being asked for a total of over \$21 million in capital requests by the school administrations.

This was a massive amount of money, especially in light of declining enrolments within some sectors of the education system. The federation was unsure whether such an expenditure was really necessary given enrolment declines, or whether alternative approaches could be developed to deal with capital needs. They also wanted to know if there were likely to be further declines or if there was a way to make a Jewish education more attractive to parents and stem

the decline in enrolment.

Two studies were commissioned by the federation and the JEC. The first was a "strategic management study"⁴ to evaluate the "governance, mission, program, enrolment and facilities" of the schools along with the "competitive, social, political, and technological forces" in the "external environment" (Universalialia Report, 1989: ii). The second study was a "needs assessment" of the Jewish schools which surveyed parents to ascertain why some chose a Jewish education and why some parents then decided to remove their children from Jewish schools (Zelkowitz, 1989). Together, these studies were intended to allow the federation to develop strategies for planning and prioritizing within the Jewish school system and for dealing with the "threats, challenges and opportunities that are a part of their dynamic environment" (Universalialia Report, 1989: 3). They would also allow the JEC and AJDS to direct the Jewish schools to provide an education in line with what parents wanted.

The Universalialia Report (1989: 107) emphasized that the goals of the Jewish education system should be to "focus on competition and improvements that will have schools outside the Jewish network of schools as its targets," reduce the

⁴Allied Jewish Community Services, 1989; hereafter referred to as the Universalialia Report.

capital costs to the community and provide the community with "resources that could be redeployed in future for other priorities if necessary." The report (1989: 59) noted that there were 8595 "pupil places" in the existing facilities of the Jewish education system and an enrolment of 6627, a surplus of 1968 places at a time when many schools were complaining they lacked space. Rather than simply spend money to create still more pupil spaces, the report recommended that resources and facilities be shared among schools, creating, in effect, new community schools. For example, the report proposed the sharing of facilities by Hebrew Academy, United Talmud Torahs, and école Maimonides in a single large elementary school for the community of Cote St. Luc with a projected enrolment of 758 students in 1993. Such a shared facility would have a significantly lower cost than building three separate schools, and while each unit would use a different portion of the building, they would share a common gym, schoolyard, cafeteria, and maintenance staff.

This proposal purposely ignored the different languages, religious orientations, and perceived mission of these schools, along with the preferences of the schools' administrators, teachers or parents. Not surprisingly, the report was greeted with resentment by much of the

leadership of the schools. School administrators and board members felt that they were in the best position to know their own needs and that the outside consultants were insensitive to the schools' goals and missions. The schools' leadership also resented the assumption that presumed "community" needs and the federation's priorities should have precedence over the preferences of school administrators or parents.

There was particular animosity towards the proposal to share facilities. School administrators feared that this would constitute a de-facto merger of the schools and would mean not only the loss of autonomy, but an end to each of the schools as an independent corporation. A large community school would inevitably have to come under the control of the community itself, i.e., the federation, as disputes among its constituents would need to be resolved.

No mechanism existed within the community, however, to effect such a solution. Federation CJA has neither the authority nor the capacity to impose a merger on existing independent corporations. While the federation seeks to act on a model of 'rational planning' and community prioritizing, it is itself subject to diverse influences from various interest groups in the community which limit its ability to act. The federation's organizational style

is an uneasy amalgam of professional planning and lay decision making. Also, as a fundraising agency, the federation cannot afford to generate strong opposition among significant segments of the community, such as the parents and supporters of three Jewish schools. It was one thing to recommend a merger, quite another thing to try and effect it.

Indeed, merging schools or sharing facilities had been recommended before, in the 1972 consultants' report and in Weinfeld's 1985 report. But neither then nor in 1989 did the federation, the JEC, or AJDS have the authority to impose such a solution, or the influence to convince the individual schools to surrender their autonomy and put aside their self-interest. Moreover, given the adversarial relationship between the school administration and the federation, some school administrators believed the federation was acting in its own interest, not that of either the community or the schools. The federation had a long history of neglecting Jewish education and of considering it a low community priority. Despite its new public commitment to education, school administrators believed the federation was more concerned with saving money than with ensuring that every Jewish child receive a Jewish education. They also suspected that the federation sought to take control of Jewish education away from the

schools and centralize such control in its own hands.

United Talmud Torahs (UTT) publicly questioned the mandate of the federation both to engage in this sort of research and to intervene in the area of education (Minutes, UTT Board of Directors meeting, March 30, 1989). Such a question was relevant given the lack of a formal organizational role for the federation within the education system. The Officers of UTT⁵ also complained that the Universalia Report failed to reflect UTT's criticisms of earlier drafts and that "our successes were treated as abnormalities" (Minutes, Board of Directors meeting, March 30, 1989).

There was a lack of consensus, however, even among the United Talmud Torahs board members as to its mission. Some board members described UTT as the "public" school of the Jewish community because it offered the broadest range of education to the widest variety of students. It was UTT which had established the Section Française at the urging of the federation, at a significant financial loss since

⁵Negative comments about both reports were voiced by the Officers of UTT at Board of Directors meetings and other public occasions. Because of the crisis facing UTT at the time (1988-1990 [to be discussed below]), however, a portion of each board meeting was held in camera and many comments about the reports and about the federation were not recorded in the minutes, which stand as incomplete records of the board meetings.

many of the immigrant families which made use of the school could not pay the full tuition fees. As such, many felt that UTT could not be judged by the same standards as other schools and was more deserving of community consideration and support. Others rejected the notion of UTT as a community school, seeing it instead as an elite trilingual Orthodox school which was not necessarily suitable for all students. From their point of view, the goal of UTT was not to enroll as many students as possible, but to provide an education in keeping with its mission and its perception of Jewish education.

These differences showed up when serious consideration was given by the Officers at UTT board meetings in 1988 to refusing federation subsidies for tuition and enrolling only the children of "full payers." This would have transformed UTT into an elite school, possibly with only one campus at the elementary school level, but it was argued that it would also free UTT from acquiescing to the federation's demands and plans. There was little support for such a move among the board members, however, and it was not followed up.

The United Talmud Torahs Crisis⁶

The strong negative reaction on the part of the United Talmud Torahs board to the Universalia Report was itself part of the larger systemic crisis, which at the time seemed to threaten the very survival of the UTT system. In 1988 and 1989, the federation, JEC and AJDS were all involved in trying to solve the specific problems affecting UTT, but the conflicts which resulted from the incompatible goals of the organizations involved prevented finding an amicable solution. By 1990, two of the four elementary school branches of UTT had closed.

The immediate cause of the crisis was a dramatic Jewish population decline affecting the Chomedey branch along with the demand by the PSBGM that the Cote St. Luc branch move out of the building it rented from the PSBGM. It is worth examining the situation facing UTT during this time period in some detail, because as the largest day school system, serving students spread over a larger area than any other, UTT was more susceptible to changing circumstances and to the emerging systemic crisis of Jewish education.

In 1988 there were 1253 students in 4 UTT elementary

⁶The following section is based on formal and informal interviews, memos, minutes of meetings, newsletters, information I obtained while on the Board of Directors of UTT and other organizations, and informal conversations with active community members and leaders.

schools and 3 high schools. By 1990 the number of students had decreased to 1143 and two of the elementary schools had been closed; UTT was over two million dollars in debt on land it had bought but on which it could not build; and its administration had been put under a form of trusteeship by the federation.

The problems which beset UTT tell us much about about the dynamics of interaction both within the Jewish community and between the Jewish community and the institutions of the broader society. Some of those problems, as noted earlier, were demographic. Jews were moving out of the Montreal suburb of Chomedey (part of the city of Laval, see the map in Figure 9.4) and the Chomedey branch was no longer viable without extensive community subventions, which were not forthcoming

In general, it was considered necessary to have 25 students per class to make an elementary school financially viable, which meant a minimum total of 175 students in the classes from Kindergarten to grade six. In 1986 there had been 192 students in the Chomedey school. Two years later, in 1988, there were 129 (Universal Report: 118). An attempt was made in 1989 to save the school by transforming it into a second Section Française, but few parents registered their children and the branch had to be closed.

Figure 9.4.
Jewish Residential Areas in the Montreal Region.

While Jews were not leaving Cote St. Luc in similar numbers, declining birth rates were decreasing the pool of students available to be shared among the mainstream Jewish

schools and the public schools. The Cote St. Luc branch of UTT had 249 students in 1986, but had decreased to 183 students by 1988 (Universalia Report: 121). This number of students was still viable, but the decline itself was a matter of concern, especially because it was less a consequence of decreasing population than the uncertain future status of the school.

The Cote St. Luc branch of UTT was located in a building which had previously housed a Protestant school and still belonged to the PSBGM. The growth in the number of students attending Jewish schools and the consolidation of Protestant schools had made this school surplus. But in 1987 the PSBGM initiated a new policy to compete directly with the Jewish schools by establishing "alternative" schools with "high" academic standards (usually providing some version of French immersion), and some optional Jewish content. The PSBGM decided to reclaim the school leased to UTT as the site for its alternative school. This move, however, put into question the survival of UTT's Cote St. Luc branch and led parents to register their children in other schools, as shown by the figures for registration in Kindergarten, which declined from 33 in 1987 to 23 in 1988 (Universalia Report: 121).

UTT turned to the federation for help in convincing

the PSBGM to delay its repossession of the building until a new facility could be built, and to finance that new construction. In neither case did UTT receive what its leadership considered a satisfying response. Attempts were made to come to an accommodation with the PSBGM, which suggested sharing the facility with the alternative school, but UTT refused, arguing that its mission was to provide students with a "total Jewish experience wherein tradition is implemented throughout the school day in all its activities" (letter from the President of UTT to the Director General of the PSBGM, November 24, 1987). Despite the suggestion to share facilities, the Officers of UTT's Board of Directors described the PSBGM's posture towards UTT as "hostile in both attitude and intention" (Minutes, UTT Emergency Board Meeting, November 23, 1987). United Talmud Torahs and the alternative school, after all, would be competitors, and UTT did not trust the PSBGM to be acting in good faith. This meant that UTT would need a new location, and given the lack of existing facilities, would need to build a new school.

The plan was not only to build a new elementary school, however, but to relocate the Snowden campus of the high school to the new building as well. The facilities in Snowden were old and cramped and were believed to lower

both the status of the school and its enrolment. Most of the students attending the high school lived in or near Cote St. Luc and it made sense to the administration of UTT to move the high school once construction was being contemplated in any case. Also, the Section Française in Snowdon had a waiting list of potential students because it lacked sufficient room for all applicants. It would be able to move into the old high school facilities and expand in size.

The construction project planned for Cote St. Luc, then, was a sizable one. But very little land was available on which to build a school, and none of the available land was zoned for a school. This meant that not only would land have to be found and bought, but it would have to be rezoned by the Cote St. Luc municipal council. The mayor and council of Cote St. Luc, however, turned out to be opposed to building another school in Cote St. Luc. Residents did not like to live near a school; they feared noise, unruly behaviour, traffic problems, and a decline in the value of their homes. The suggestion was made by the council that UTT instead build a school in a new development being planned for the extreme western end of Cote St. Luc. This proposal was rejected by the UTT administration because it would have put the school far away from the majority of its existing student base, and

because the new residential project was still in the planning stages and might not get approved for years to come (as has indeed proven to be the case). Waiting indefinitely to build a new school was equivalent to indefinitely closing the existing branch.

Again, UTT turned to the federation for help in dealing with the mayor and municipal council of Cote St. Luc and, again, the federation seemed unwilling to put pressure on the city administration to change its policy. This might not have been a problem, because Cote St. Luc has an overwhelmingly Jewish majority population and an active public campaign of support for UTT by the federation would probably have been very effective in influencing the municipal administration.

Why was there no active support by the federation? Cote St. Luc had four other elementary Jewish schools: Jewish People's and Peretz School, Hebrew Academy, école Maimonides, and Solomon Schechter Academy. Hebrew Academy and école Maimonides also needed new premises, while Jewish People's and Peretz School and Solomon Schechter Academy were also facing a future of declining enrolments and increased competition with each other and with the new PSBGM alternative schools. While it was understandable that UTT would not want to lose its largest branch in the area

of heaviest Jewish residential concentration in the Montreal area, from a broader, "community" point of view, one school less in Cote St. Luc would make the other Jewish schools more viable.

Also, Hebrew Academy and école Maimonides had several advantages in their competition with UTT for community preference. Hebrew Academy's enrolment was growing, it had been able to raise substantial funds towards the construction of a new building, and it offered a form of strictly traditional Orthodox education which was not available at another school. As such, Hebrew Academy was not threatened by the PSBGM's alternative school, whereas UTT was threatened and was already in decline. École Maimonides, too, as a francophone school with mostly Sephardic students, was not affected by the alternative school.

Moreover, even if it should close its Cote St. Luc campus, UTT would still have a campus in the Snowdon district, not very far from Cote St. Luc, and accessible in era of car pools. Immigrant parents living in Cote St. Luc were already making use of the Section Française campus in Snowdon. Those committed to a UTT education for their children, then, had an option. The UTT system as a whole would not be closed if the Cote St. Luc school was closed.

Finally, UTT's plan to build a combined elementary and high school facility was considered too grandiose by the federation when an existing high school facility was still in operation. Rather than spend community dollars to build a new high school, it would be much less expensive to renovate the existing high school. UTT's leadership, however, insisted that this could not be done; that architects had examined the existing structure and found that only limited renovations could be made. This claim, which was not backed up by any strong evidence, cost UTT credibility with the federation, which was unsympathetic to UTT's plans.

This lack of sympathy also reflected complaints the federation had about the schools in general and UTT in particular. Since the schools were not agencies of the federation (despite receiving subsidies) and raised their own money, the federation did not trust the schools to be providing accurate accounts. The federation also did not trust the ability of the schools to determine reliably who really needed assistance with tuition. It was widely believed even among UTT's board members that many parents lied about their income in order to obtain tuition reductions and that the school administration was not vigilant in verifying parents' claims⁷. It was also

rumored that the schools, including UTT, had large sums of money hidden away and were much less needy and deserving of community support than they appeared to be⁸.

Such rumors, allegations, and mutual suspicions fostered a climate in which the federation and UTT did not act as allies facing a common problem but as competing organizations which viewed each other with irritation and distrust. Indeed, in the events which unfolded during 1989 and 1990, the mutual distrust sometimes turned into outright hostility.

Just as serious as the demographic problems, then, were the political, economic and social problems concerning the dynamics of relations and decision making within the Jewish community. The crisis promoted an adversarial relationship between UTT and the PSBGM, Federation CJA, the municipal council of Cote St. Luc, and the other Jewish schools. As their support within the Jewish community turned out to be minimal and the number of options available to them decreased, the Officers of UTT began to feel beleaguered and some spoke openly of a conspiracy to

⁷This point was a frequent topic of informal conversation among UTT board members during my tenure on the board.

⁸Again, this was a common theme of informal conversation among community members which I often heard during my time on the board of the Jewish Public Library and as a "trustee" of Allied Jewish Community Services.

ensure that UTT lost its Cote St. Luc branch. It was in this context that UTT's Officers questioned the mandate and motives of the Universalia Report and had to apologize when one UTT representative publicly called the mayor of Cote St. Luc a liar. The ongoing sequence of events, however, continued to generate hostility and conflict.

In 1989, the UTT officers found a plot of land in Cote St. Luc which in many ways seemed perfect. It was in a central location only a few blocks away from the existing location and across the street from the Cote St. Luc branch of the Young Men's and Young Women's Hebrew Association, another important Jewish community organization. In addition, much of the area was undeveloped and there were few local residents to complain about noise or traffic. In many ways it seemed an ideal location, and despite federation disapproval, the UTT administration paid a deposit of \$250,000 for the land. In asking the board for approval, the UTT Officers argued that by acting they would force both the federation and the Cote St. Luc council to approve the deal. That was not the case and the council of Cote St. Luc refused to rezone the land while the federation refused to get involved, arguing that UTT had acted without proper authority.

Unknown to most members on the board of UTT, which had

approved the Officers' action, the issue of rezoning this land was complicated by a deal being arranged by the federation for Hebrew Academy. The Cote St. Luc branch of the Young Men's and Young Women's Hebrew Association (YM-YWHA), located across the street from the land sought by UTT, was in financial difficulty. The YM-YWHA is an agency of Federation CJA and the federation wished to close the branch. Hebrew Academy was willing to take the building and convert it into a school. This would save the community a significant amount of money, both in terms of closing the YM-YWHA branch, and in the cost of constructing a new school building. Having two schools across the street from each other, however, would certainly have created traffic and other problems for the city, which refused to rezone the UTT property. As a result, UTT was forced to forfeit its deposit.

In line with the recommendations of the Universalia Report, the suggestion was made by the federation to UTT to share a new building with école Maimonides. No serious consideration was given by the UTT board to this suggestion, which was considered unacceptable. In addition to its general opposition to sharing facilities, board members were concerned that prejudice against the Sephardim would lead Ashkenazic parents to withdraw their children

from the school. Inevitably, it was felt, enrolment would drop and the school would close. Also, the proposed UTT branch would only be an elementary school, and the board of UTT remained committed to having its high school move to Cote St. Luc.

Instead, another plot of land was found which, again, was not zoned for a school, and once again the Officers of UTT decided that forcing the issue would produce positive results. They therefore went ahead and purchased the land for \$2 million. This action was approved by the Board of Directors after being assured by the Officers that (1) the purchase of the land would force the federation to build the school to protect the investment; (2) action had to be taken immediately because there was another buyer interested in the land; and (3) should anything go wrong, private arrangements had been made with the existing owner to ensure that the deal would be cancelled at no cost to UTT.

All of these assurances turned out to be false. The federation still refused to endorse the project, while the Cote St. Luc administration would not relent and once again refused to zone for a new school. The previous owner of the land refused to cancel the deal, and there was no other buyer for the land, which UTT tried and failed to sell. The

beginning of the recession and the political fallout of the failure of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown constitutional accords made it almost impossible to sell a large plot of land in Cote St. Luc, and it was clear in retrospect that UTT had paid far too much for the land.

At this point the federation, shocked at the "unauthorized" expenditure of \$2,250,000 by a school administration they saw as out of control, threatened to close UTT down unless its Officers resigned and surrendered control to a "management committee" composed of representatives from AJDS and the JEC. In addition, a number of experienced people active on the boards of other Jewish schools and trusted by the federation to act in the "community's" interests were added to UTT's Board of Directors. In effect, UTT had been placed under trusteeship by the federation, acting through the JEC and AJDS.

The era of school autonomy seemed over and the new regime at UTT now looked to the federation to solve its major problems. These problems were considerable: UTT was still without a location for its Cote St. Luc school, it still needed to do something about the inadequate high school facilities in Snowdon, and it was now well over two million dollars in debt. The management committee, in accordance with federation policy, decided to let the

matter of a new building in Cote St. Luc drop, and simply close the branch, a move which was welcomed by the other Jewish schools in Cote St. Luc.

The end of the attempt to build in Cote St. Luc meant that new plans had to be made concerning the Snowdon campus. An architect was hired and it was discovered that the Snowdon facility could be renovated after all. Moreover, sufficient land was available adjoining the existing building to erect a substantial extension. Given the need to pay off its massive debt, however, UTT was in no position to raise the money required for renovation and expansion. Now that the federation was in charge, though, this was defined as a "community" problem and an attempt was made to develop a community solution.

Since many other schools were in need of capital funds for the expansion, renovation or replacement of facilities, the federation decided upon a capital funds campaign to raise 22 million dollars. This was later reduced to \$10 million, then \$6 million, and then finally to a \$2 million campaign for only three schools. The decreasing scope of the campaign reflected the refusal of the "establishment" to donate money when its members had neither particular interest in Jewish education nor any control over the expenditures. In the end, even the 2 million dollar campaign failed because the mass exodus of Russian Jews to

Israel became a major fundraising priority for the community, one more central to the concerns of the establishment than the needs of local educational organizations.

The failure of the federation to provide the funds for renovation and building meant that UTT would have to raise most of the money itself. Ironically, after having taken over the management of UTT, the failure of the federation's capital funds campaign constituted a significant loss of "face" and lowered its status with the schools. It illustrates once again the fundamental tension between the federation's claim to coordinate community action and its financial dependence upon the elites. The federation's planners could set policy, but could not impose that policy upon a community whose membership is voluntary. The result was that the federation backed away from promoting "community" control over the schools and UTT's board was soon again running its own affairs.

A strategic approach was adopted by UTT and a plan was put into place to dramatically alter its schools. If the PSBGM and other Jewish schools could compete directly with UTT, then UTT would compete directly with them. The solution worked out was to move in two different directions. One was to increase the French component within

the elementary schools. In addition to the Section Francaise at the Snowdon campus, a new French program was initiated at the St. Laurent campus. This program allowed UTT to compete more directly with the Sephardic schools and also to provide a French immersion alternative for anglophone parents who wished their children to be fluent in French. This also had the advantage of allowing for a higher level of funding from the provincial government.

The second strategy involved the St. Laurent campus of Herzeliyah high school, which had lost a significant number of students. These losses were due in part to a rigid approach on the part of the school's previous administration which had insisted that the core curriculum of the high school be the acquisition of traditional Hebrew religious teachings and a thorough knowledge of prayer. Many parents, however, preferred less emphasis upon Hebrew and prayer once a boy had undergone his Bar Mitzvah and a girl her Bat Mitzvah. It was therefore decided to establish a "Judaica" stream in the high school which would have less emphasis on Hebrew instruction and prayer and would allow children who had not attended a Jewish day school to enter the high school. This approach soon proved successful in attracting new students and regaining students who had previously left UTT.

The lowered aspirations of UTT since 1991 and the end of its conflict with the other key members of the Jewish education system have not ended the crisis facing Jewish education in Montreal. The UTT crisis was only the most visible instance of a much broader systemic crisis. The failure of the federation's fundraising campaign was a clear indication of a lack of commitment among many members of the community to the Jewish day schools. The continuing political instability in Quebec makes Jewish schools vulnerable because they are so dependent upon government money and good will. At any time, government austerity measures could lead to the elimination of subsidies to private schools, and there is substantial sympathy within Quebec society in any case to the idea of ending such funding.

It was because of this vulnerability that negotiations were begun to achieve associate status with the Montreal Catholic School Commission (MCSC). Such status would mean that funds would come through the MCSC, not directly from the MEQ. In that way, funding could survive changes in MEQ policy. An agreement was worked out between the Jewish schools and the MCSC, but was cancelled by the newly elected PQ government in 1994, and the problems facing the Jewish school system persist.

Systemic Crisis and Structural Principles

The systemic crisis which currently affects the Montreal Jewish community's day school system is partly a consequence of specific social, political and economic circumstances and of specific state policies and community priorities. But it reflects as well fundamental structural principles around which North American Jewish communities are organized. It has been noted many times that Montreal's day school system is unique in North America, and that very fact should give us pause. With the exception of the ultra-Orthodox, North American Jews seem to prefer that their children attend public or non-Jewish private schools. It may be that a broadly based, secular Jewish education system is unlikely to develop within other Jewish communities because it is not compatible with the structural principles or with the social practices typical of North American Jews. If so, then as the special circumstances which gave rise to it change, the Jewish education system in Montreal may well be changing to become more like that found elsewhere, with Orthodox Jewish children attending Jewish schools while most other Jewish children attend secular public schools and small numbers attend elite private schools.

Two of those structural principles noted earlier are

the fundamental tensions between solidarity and freedom and between continuity and modernity among North American Jews. Jewish communities are divided along many lines, but in general Jews seem committed both to group solidarity and to individual freedom, both to retaining their distinctive identity and to harnessing the transformative powers inherent in modernity. Yet in many ways these are incompatible goals (Sklare, 1971) and the tensions between them are produced and reproduced in the organized community. Certainly these fundamental tensions are reproduced in the organizational style and practices of each of the three organizations we have examined in this chapter. As a result, each is characterized not only by a high degree of structural ambiguity, but also by incompatible goals which have led to structural contradictions. This is a complex topic and only a brief summary will be presented here.

The Association of Jewish Day Schools is not a school board, it is an umbrella organization; one whose organizational strategies includes an odd mixture of bureaucratic procedures and personal influence. Such a mix may be appropriate for dealing with the state and with state agents, but it is inappropriate for dealing with other community agencies. In a sense, AJDS tries to serve

several masters - the MEQ, the schools, and the Jewish Education Council - each of which has different interests. The resulting structural contradiction is manifest in the transformation of AJDS from being the schools' representative to the MEQ to being, in some ways, the MEQ's representative to the schools. It might be that such a transformation was inevitable, given the asymmetrical relations between the state and an ethnic community agency. Nevertheless, AJDS does not have the tools to deal effectively with the systemic crisis, having to accept the ultimate authority of the state in matters of education. Thus, AJDS was unable to prevent the PQ government from cancelling the arrangements which would have given Jewish schools associate status with the Montreal Catholic School Commission.

As for the Jewish Education Council, like the federation in general, the JEC tries to reconcile the "rational planning" model of community work which evolved under the influence of social workers and other professional staff with the realities of the community's dependence upon fundraising to sustain its activities. There is thus a fundamental contradiction between the attempt to plan "rationally" and the tacit recognition that the influence a community member has is related to the size of his or her contribution. The federation's moral

authority in the community is undercut by the widespread recognition that it is elite preferences, not community needs, which have the greater weight in decision making. This was shown by the repeated downscaling and ultimate failure of the fundraising campaign for the schools. In the absence of any moral or other authority over the education sector on its part, schools look to the federation to provide money, not leadership; to distribute resources, not set policy. However much the JEC sees itself as the "coordinating" body in Jewish education, it is perceived by the school administrations as the educational department of the federation and as such as a tool of the elite.

Finally, the mainstream schools have incompatible goals of their own. They try to provide a quality secular and Jewish education while at the same time being ideologically committed to providing a Jewish education to every Jewish child. Such a commitment cannot succeed, if only because not all children are capable of handling instruction in three languages. More fundamentally, however, there is a contradiction between the educational goals of the schools and the realities they face in dealing with parents and students. Because parents pay for this education many feel they have the right to chastise teachers or administrators in the school hallways yet

complain that teachers are unable to discipline the children. Students, for their part, are often bored and see a Jewish education as having little relevance to their lives, especially when religion plays almost no role in their homes (Weinfeld, 1985). There is thus a built-in tension between school and parents and between school and students. This tension promotes a sense of vulnerability on the part of teachers and school administrators who strive to retain the good opinion of both parents and students under difficult circumstances. It is not surprising, then, that some school administrators see their relations, not only with other schools but even with the parents, as a zero sum game.

Significantly, each of the three organizations we have examined has sought to solve the systemic crisis in very different ways. The Association of Jewish Day Schools has sought to alter the status of the Jewish education system vis a vis the MEQ and the public school system by association with the Montreal Catholic School Commission. Federation CJA and the Jewish Education Council have sought to alter the organization of Jewish education in Montreal through the centralization of decision making. The schools have sought to gain competitive advantages vis a vis one another and the public schools. This lack of unanimity in approach, however, serves to perpetuate the problems.

CHAPTER TEN

CONCLUSIONS: THE DIALECTIC OF STATE AND COMMUNITY

This dissertation has addressed what seems to be a simple issue: the role played by the Quebec state in the development of the Jewish community as a corporate group. An examination of the role of the state in the evolution of the Jewish community's day school system has shown, however, that these relations are quite complex. Presence and absence, opportunities and constraints; politics and parapolitics; action and reaction; what Giddens called the "dialectic of control" between the state and the Jewish community presented in the previous chapters has taken many forms and moved through a variety of contexts. Quebec state policy on education provided the Jewish community with a set of constraints but also with a set of opportunities. How the community dealt with those constraints and how it took advantage of those opportunities gave a shape to the Jewish day school system. In that sense the impact of state policy can be clearly recognized within that system. Nevertheless, the school system and state policies evolved together, reflecting the social, economic and political context within which each evolved, as well as the mutual, if unequal, influence of state and community upon one

another.

Yet the image persists among Canadian social scientists of the ethnic community as composed of organizations which 'parallel' those of the host society and of the state. This image assumes a host society which provides a broad range of services which are easily and readily accessible to everyone. It also assumes an ethnic community which has a narrow set of rather specialized functions centered around the integration of the immigrant into a new society.

But neither the state nor civil society in general can meet the diverse and often very specific needs of many Canadians. This is not only true for needs based on ethnic, cultural, or linguistic differences, but also in terms of gender, class, occupation, age, or many other forms of social differentiation. A closer look has shown us that supposed parallel community organizations often meet very specific needs which would otherwise not be met or that they provide very specific services no one else is likely to provide.

In addition, some of the best organized ethnic communities, such as the Jewish community, are not composed largely of immigrants but of people born and raised in Canada who in most respects are well integrated into

Canadian society. Despite this, the majority of Jews seem committed to retaining their ethnic and religious identity and to maintaining (at considerable cost) a host of ethnic organizations providing a broad range of services.

Indeed, ethnic groups are encouraged to do so by the state. In the case of Quebec, for example, the state looks to the ethnic community and its organizations to promote state policy. In the Canadian - and particularly Quebec - context, in which ethnic groups are assumed to be corporate groups, participation in an ethnic community is not always a means of remaining excluded from the broader society but often a means of participation in that society. The ethnic community is considered a legitimate form of organization through which to assert collective goals. It thus constitutes a resource upon which individuals can draw in their dealings with government or in their economic, political, or status competitions with one another.

Since Canadians do differ in so many ways from one another and have so many diverse interests, the state, too, is not a cohesive whole but is itself fragmented. This does not mean that the state cannot formulate consistent policies nor that it is unable to carry out such policies. Rather, the fragmentation of the state implies a set of multiplex relations which link the state to civil society.

A modern state pervades the life of individuals in multiple ways while individuals, for their part, can interact with the state in a wide variety of ways and in a wide variety of contexts: as citizens and taxpayers; as members of ethnic or occupational or other interest groups; as recipients of unemployment insurance or welfare; as parents concerned about their children's education; and so on. These multiplex relations interconnect and interlink in complex ways, so that a Quebecois nationalist, it would seem, can support both sovereignty for Quebec and retaining a Canadian passport and Canadian currency.

That the state is fragmented means that multiple interests are inscribed within the state, and consequently that the state and its institutions are configurationally, interpretively, and structurally ambiguous. Ironically, this ambiguity means that more, rather than fewer, people can find their interests reflected within the state's administrative space. The ambiguity of the state allows a diverse population divided along many lines to nevertheless "recognize themselves in public institutions" (Breton, 1986: 31).

Relations between an ethnic community and the state, then, are not as simple as the notion of 'parallel' organizations seems to imply. This was shown in our

examination of the role of the state in the evolution and contemporary organization of the Jewish community's day school system. In particular, the systemic crisis currently affecting the Jewish education system in Montreal is a consequence both of state policy and of the structural ambiguities which characterize key organizations within the Jewish community. It is this interplay of state structure and action with community structure and action which has been examined in this work. As we have seen, however, the relations between the state and the ethnic community are not symmetrical, it is state policy which sets the context within which the systemic crisis has evolved, and it is the influence of the state on the organizational style of the Jewish community which has partly contributed to the inability of Jewish organizations to resolve the crisis.

The State and the Systemic Crisis of Jewish Education

It was state funding which allowed for the rapid expansion of the Jewish day school system, tying that funding, however, to acceptance of the Ministry's control and of the state's linguistic policies. While state funding created new opportunities for the schools, expansion also created a host of new problems and altered the relationship of the day schools with the other major organizations of

the Jewish community. While it was state funding which made the community's goal of providing "a Jewish education for every Jewish child" a possibility, only substantial additional funds from the community could have made it a reality. Like the state, however, Federation CJA is unwilling to provide funds to the schools without also having a significant say in how those funds are spent. In effect, the centralization of the provincial education system is matched by a parallel, though less complete, centralization of the Jewish education system through the federation, the Jewish Education Council and the Association of Jewish Day Schools. Just as the expansion of the state's administrative space within the education sector has incorporated, rather than eliminated, conflicts over education, so too has the expansion of Federation CJA's administrative space. And just as the interplay of competing interests within the state's administrative space has promoted structural ambiguity, the same processes have been at work within the Jewish community.

More directly, it has been cutbacks in state funding to Jewish schools which have contributed to many of the current systemic problems in the day school system. Moreover, state policy on the language of education and the resulting decline in anglophone enrolment has also led the

Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal to compete with the Jewish schools for students; competition which has also contributed directly to the systemic crisis. Given the linguistic, religious, and pedagogical divisions among the schools, this crisis has had a differential impact upon the various schools and has promoted attempts such as United Talmud Torah's to develop an individual solution to the problems rather than to join with other schools to find a collective solution. The result is that the Jewish day schools continue to compete while the incompatible goals and conflicting conceptions of community agencies which seek to control them prevent coordination.

It is, then, in the interactions and interrelations between the state and the Jewish community - and in the structures of opportunity or constraint these produce - that the Jewish education system has evolved to its present form. Because these interactions and interrelations reflect the broader changes occurring in Quebec society, the Jewish education system is itself in a constant state of change. Since both the state and the community respond as well to the practices, expectations, and demands of each other, the relations between them are dialectical relations.

A Model of Ethnic Community Organization

Before turning to some specific conclusions which can

be drawn about the dialectical relations between the Quebec state and the Montreal Jewish community, some conclusions will first be drawn about the dynamics of ethnic group organization and action. Returning to the earlier questions raised in Chapter Three: how do we fill in the concepts of structural properties and social practices with regard to an ethnic community in general and the Montreal Jewish community in particular?

Since ethnicity is always a relational concept, the structural properties of Canadian ethnic community organization are those properties which emerge out of practices and strategies directed to establishing and maintaining group boundaries and group differences. As for the social practices and strategies themselves, these constitute patterns of intergroup and intragroup relations which are organized around sets of collective interests.

To use Giddens' terminology, the dominant "structural principle" implicated in the formation of ethnic communities is the differentiation of groups within a society on the basis of cultural distinctions. In the case of Canada, language, for example, is seen by most Canadians to be particularly important as one axis along which groups are differentiated (as, indeed, is the Canadian state itself). Cultural distinctions, then, constitute an

acceptable "public face" for social and political differentiation in Canadian society.

i. The Duality of Ethnic Group Boundaries

Ethnic group interests, however, are not only directed outward, towards interaction with others, but inwards as well. Segments of an ethnic community may compete for control over ethnic institutions or even to serve as the "official" spokespersons in dealings with outsiders. Group boundaries, then, may also serve to contain internal cleavages in some way and to some degree, although internal disagreement and conflict can never be eliminated. Nevertheless, ethnic group boundaries serve both to differentiate oneself from others and to affiliate oneself with one's own.

This means that ethnic communities are characterized by a 'duality' of boundaries. As Royce (1982) puts it, there is an "inner" boundary and an "outer" boundary. The inner boundary is organized around patterns of intragroup relations while the outer boundary is organized around patterns of intergroup relations. In turn, this means that ethnic community action can move in two directions; outwardly, towards other groups or the institutions of the host society, or inwardly, toward segments or institutions

within the community itself.

ii. The Permeability of Ethnic Group Boundaries

Boundaries, however should not be seen as impermeable. Some ethnic groups, such as Hutterites, do form geographically bounded communities, but all ethnic group boundaries are first and foremost symbolic constructs which are therefore 'permeable.'

Ethnic group boundaries are permeable in two senses. Individuals can move into and out of the ethnic group, through 'passing' or intermarriage, for example. More significantly, perhaps, ethnic boundaries are also permeable in the sense that they are incomplete. Ethnic communities are not 'wholes' and cannot be treated as a totality. Not only are there conflicts within an ethnic community, such communities are composed of diverse institutions, networks, sub-groups, and segments such as residential, occupational, and class segments. When examining the impact upon a community of state policy, for example, it makes little sense to refer to the community as a whole since not all segments are affected or affected in the same way. Instead we can identify particular sites where "practices, policies and actors" (Hindess, 1986: 120) intersect. In that respect, to speak of the ethnic

"community" is to use a shorthand term to identify the sites relevant to our particular research questions.

We can identify a variety of sites within a community depending upon the set of research questions we ask. There exist sites where ethnic group participation is less relevant than other forms of participation or where ethnic interests or identity must compete with other interests or identities. Work, for example, is one site for many people where ethnic identity is often less relevant than or must compete with organizational, class, gender, status, or other identities. Education is often another such site. A setting or site where the outer boundary of group interests, identity or institutions meet or compete with those of the broader society, can be called a point of integration. Such sites can be organizational, as in the case of work or education; they may be strategic, as when ethnic interests intersect with political interests; or they may be symbolic, as when cultural capital or professional credentials penetrate ethnic group boundaries to form the bases of status distinctions (Bourdieu, 1984; Hall, 1992). In all these cases, points of integration penetrate the ethnic group's outer boundary.

The organizational style of an ethnic group may permeate outwards as well. Jewish workers, for example,

were in the forefront of organizing labour unions in the manufacturing sector at the turn of the century (Levin, 1977), a reflection of the Jewish community's activist organizational style.

Inner boundaries, too, have their sites. These are sites where ethnic identity takes on special significance. Synagogues, mosques, and 'national' churches are examples of such sites, as are festivals or the ethnic media. A setting or site where the inner boundary of the group seems to 'congeal' or 'thicken' around common interests, identity or institutions will be called a point of affiliation. Such sites, too, can be organizational, as in an ethnic community school; strategic, as in a political or parapolitical lobby group directed towards specific interests; or symbolic, as in the pride expressed by Italian Canadians some years back when Italy won the World Cup in soccer.

Ethnic affiliation poses something of a 'problem' in a society such as Canada because an ethnic community is a partial community, one whose members also have diverse interests, participate in other, often competing institutions, and take on multiple and distinct identities (Breton, 1978). Most people's participation in their ethnic community is a sometime participation, and the salience of

their ethnic identity ebbs and flows with the circumstances in which they find themselves. These circumstances are often situations of group conflict because ethnic communities are among the more important means by which group conflict is expressed; they provide the resources used to compete for political, economic, and cultural advantages.

The problem of affiliation has also been referred to as the problem of ethnic solidarity. Olzak (1983: 356-357) summarizes the issues raised concerning ethnic solidarity:

Ethnic solidarity is defined as the conscious identification with a given ethnic population and includes the maintenance of strong ethnic interaction networks and institutions that socialize new members and reinforce social ties ...Measures of ethnic solidarity include marital endogamy rates ...participation in and density of network interaction in ethnic organizations and association ...and the retention of various cultural practices that differ from that of the host society...

Ethnic solidarity is community solidarity because these measures only make sense in the context of some community, such as the Montreal Jewish community, rather than in the context of an ethnic group per se, such as Jews in Canada. Jews in Montreal are likely to have "strong ethnic interaction networks" in some meaningful sense among

themselves; whereas most Montreal Jews are unlikely to have such networks in any ongoing way with Jews in Vancouver.

In any particular ethnic community, then, we can identify the points of integration which link members to the broader society and the points of affiliation which tie members to one another. This pattern of integration and affiliation is not random, however, but a consequence both of factors internal to the community and its pattern of interactions with others.

iii. The Institutional Content

As to the 'content' of the ethnic group, i.e., what is 'enclosed' by the double boundary, cultural components are, of course, very important, especially in terms of sustaining ethnic identity. But patterns of intergroup and intragroup relations also imply an organizational context – an organizational style – and sets of institutionalized practices. The pattern of social institutions, practices and strategies which emerge from the combination of intergroup and intragroup relations constitutes the organizational style of the community.

When a community has few points of integration with the broader society, such as the Hutterite community, the result is a high level of community institutional

completeness. When a community has many points of affiliation among its members, or a special significance to these points, the result is a high level of community solidarity¹. Institutional completeness, then, in itself, need not imply a high level of community solidarity, although chances are that those internal and external factors which promote institutional completeness will also promote solidarity.

Modifying Giddens' model of the relations between structure and practice, we can diagram the following transformative relations in Figure 10.1, both as a structural set and as a corresponding complex of social practices and strategies.

In this model, the patterns of relations with others, both within and without an ethnic group, generate inner and outer group boundaries which give an ethnic community its systemic form. These boundaries imply particular points of integration, where the 'host' society penetrates the ethnic group, and points of affiliation, where ethnicity takes on special importance.

¹An example of the special significance of a point of affiliation is the important role played by religion among groups such as the Hutterites or the Hassidim.

Figure 10.1

A Dialectical Model of Ethnic Group Organization

Points of integration are organized, in part, around the presence or absence of institutions or services provided by the host society – especially the presence or absence of the state's administrative space. The absence of a non-denominational public school system in Montreal, for example, led the Jewish community to fill the gap by establishing Jewish day schools. In contrast, interventions by the state in the workings of the Jewish schools – the penetration of the ethnic community by the state – called forth community agencies to centralize and bureaucratize the Jewish schools.

This combination of presence and absence forms the context within which individuals find themselves faced with both shared opportunities and shared constraints; opportunities and constraints which give rise to collective interests. Individuals who share such interests get together with others to establish and participate in community organizations and networks. One result is institutional completeness, especially when, as was true of Quebec before the 1960s, the host society provides few services to community members. Institutional completeness, then, does not reflect the desire to establish parallel structures but rather attempts made to fill in the gaps, especially where the state is absent, or to take advantage of the opportunities the state provides.

Institutional completeness can, however, take different forms, such as formal community agencies or informal networks of personal relations. These different forms of institutional completeness imply different patterns of participation in ethnic institutions and lead members to evolve a particular organizational style which, at the same time, generates a pattern of collective solidarity (i.e., degree of and type of identification with the group).

Identification with the group has implications of its

own. As Barth (1969: 17) points out, "ethnic identity implies a series of constraints on the kinds of roles an individual is allowed to play and the partners he may choose for different kinds of transactions." A Jewish Member of Parliament, for example, is expected not to take an oath on a New Testament. Such an MP may be also expected to 'represent' the interests of the Jewish community in parliament, or, at the very least not to go counter to those interests, especially if the MP was elected in a largely Jewish riding.

Just as structural sets are organized around 'complexes' of social practices, social practices are themselves organized around sets of interests. In the case of ethnicity, these practices constitute patterns of intergroup and intragroup relations. Furthermore, such practices often take the form of strategies whereby community members produce and reproduce social relations and thus take into account the variations in the institutional completeness, organizational style, and collective solidarity characteristic of the community.

Diagrams, of course, always present a much neater picture of social reality than we find in our research. Canadian society promotes ethnic affiliation and identity, yet at the same time it also promotes open access to the

broader society and participation in a wide variety of institutional contexts. This generates a fundamental tension between ethnic group membership and feeling oneself to be a part of Canadian society. This fundamental tension is itself one of the structural principles of ethnicity in Canada; it helps to define what we take to be "ethnic." Thus while ethnic differentiation in general is considered legitimate in Canadian society, not all such differentiation is considered legitimate. For example, differentiating oneself from others in order to exclude persons or groups considered inferior would not be acceptable to most Canadians.

Nor is ethnic differentiation seen as equally legitimate in all contexts. While many Quebecois, for example, are ambivalent about state funding of ethnic community day schools, it is hard to imagine any public support for the state funding an ethnic university. It would also not be considered acceptable today for unions to explicitly organize locals along ethnic lines, as was once common in Quebec. Ethnicity, then, has its place in Canadian society, but ethnic differences are expected to be subordinate to what unites Canadians as citizens. This tension enters into the constitution of ethnic communities as corporate groups in Canada.

This tension poses special problems for Canadian Jews because Canada is a society into which Jews can also fit as individuals without any corporate status. For all practical purposes, being Jewish today is irrelevant to being admitted to a public school or a hospital, to buying a house in a particular neighborhood or to getting a job with a particular company. In this sense, the collective 'problem' faced by Jews in Canadian society today is not the one of integration but of "continuity" (Torczyner and Brotman, 1994). Jewish parents of the 1920s worried about how to integrate their children into Canadian society. It was this which motivated the demand for equal rights in the Montreal public school system, and even the creation of Jewish day schools. Today, when integration poses little real problem for most Jews, the problem has become one of retaining Jewish identity and preserving group membership. It is this which motivates many of today's parents to send their children to a Jewish school.

The Dialectic of State and Community

The dialectical relations between the state and the Jewish community have had consequences for both. As time has passed, the community's educational structures have come to take on some of the characteristics of the state

itself as a consequence of their dealings with the state. In particular, the Jewish community's school system has become more centralized, more bureaucratic, and has evolved its own structural ambiguities. In this strictly structural sense, the Jewish community's school system can be said to have become a 'parallel' education system, but ironically this is more a consequence of state action than any desire on the part of Jewish community members to evolve such a system. Indeed, this evolution has gone counter to the desire of the individual school administrators who have sought to retain both their autonomy and their accustomed practices. It has also gone counter to the fundamental structural principles around which North American Jewish communities have been organized. There has been, then, conflict and competition within the Jewish community while it has participated in the broader conflicts and competitions affecting Quebec's education system - and Quebec society - as a whole.

The state, too, has changed, both in its mode of dealing with the Jewish community and in its goals towards that community. As we have seen, the structural complexity and ambiguity of Quebec's education system is a consequence of the shifting cultural, economic, and sociopolitical goals assigned to education in the course of Quebec's

evolution. Given the importance assigned to it in the modernization of Quebec, education assumed a central symbolic role in Quebec society. Quebecers soon came to expect a great deal from their education system: they expect education to solve the problems of drug use, racism, sexism and pollution; to promote the French language, safe sex practices, and industrial and scientific development; to train young people to be independent, competent, and responsible citizens. Members of Quebec's ethnocultural minorities expect even more; they expect the schools to provide the skills, credentials and cultural capital to allow their children to obtain good jobs, a decent income, and a secure and recognized place in Quebec society.

Because education means so much to so many people, it is as much a source of conflict in Quebec society as it is a source of unity. Moreover, as the role of the state in education has increased, so too has the parapolitical significance of education.

Since the 1960s, state policy towards the Jewish community has been a subset of its general educational policy of building Quebec as a modern, democratic, francophone society. In this respect, state agents have often been unaware of, and sometimes simply indifferent to, the goals and aspirations of minority groups such as the

Jews, especially when state contact with the Jewish community tended to proceed through a sort of unofficial "ambassador," usually an elected Jewish member of the National Assembly, such as Victor Goldbloom or Herbert Marx.

As the Jewish community altered its educational structures and practices in response to state requirements, its mode of interacting with the state began to alter, away from occasional contacts via ambassadors or notables to regular, ongoing relations among state and community agents and bureaucrats. Moreover, the centralization and bureaucratization of the Jewish community's educational apparatus meant that state agents came to better 'understand' the needs and desires of the Jewish community as these were reformulated in terms understandable to state bureaucrats. Also, as the oldest and most extensively organized of the major minority ethnic groups, the Jewish community came to be seen by state agents and by other communities as a model of how ethnic relations with the state should be handled. State policy with other ethnic groups was to some extent directed to replicating the 'success' of that model. The Chinese community is a case in point, with Chinese Family Services, for example, looking to Allied Jewish Community Services for advice and assistance when setting up their operations.

Again, this dialectic does not assume any symmetry of relations between the ethnic community and the state. Whether we look at structure or at action – the political or parapolitical context within which participants in formal organizations make decisions and act – then the state's policies pervade and largely determine the structures, plans, and actions of the ethnic community.

The New Social Contract

The lack of symmetry between the state and the Jewish community is compounded by the social location of the Jewish community within Quebec society. Montreal's Jews are few in number (101,210 in 1991) and have little impact upon the life of most Quebecois, certainly outside of Montreal. Few Quebecois know much about the Jewish community or consider Jewish issues to be important issues for Quebec as a whole. In this respect, Jews must adapt themselves to the issues and concerns of interest to the majority group and it is the state which sets the agenda for its relations with the Jewish community.

That agenda, however, is currently in a state of disarray because the present Parti Quebecois government is preoccupied with issues of sovereignty and with the forthcoming referendum. Nevertheless, there are some

indications that the Parti Quebecois government intends to maintain some of the policies of the previous Liberal government, including what was being called a "new social contract" between the state and the ethnic communities.

In a policy document released in 1990 (Québec, Ministère des Communautés culturelles et de l'Immigration, 1990) the Ministry of Cultural Communities called for the state to enter into a partnership with the various ethnic communities in establishing ethnic institutions to ensure that the integration of new immigrants is both effective and directed to the francophone milieu. The policy document on immigration and integration refers to this new partnership as the social contract between the state and the ethnic communities.

Two points are particularly noteworthy about this new social contract. First, as the state conceives it, the social contract implies mutual responsibilities and obligations on the part of both the ethnocultural communities and the host society. The state, then, acknowledges a responsibility towards the immigrants and minority group members, an attitude which can be found in various forms as early as the White Paper on education. Second, this policy statement conceives of immigrants as members of ethnic communities rather than as individuals

arriving in a new country. Rather than seeing the ethnic community as an obstacle to integration in Quebec, the state now recognizes that participation in and a commitment to a corporate community is itself a form of integration.

As articulated in the policy statement, ethnic community institutions are expected to help community members to socialize to and adapt to Quebec society. In return, the government will provide increased financial support for ethnic organizations, appoint community members to decision-making and advisory bodies, increase their representation in the public sector, and promote "the initiatives of organizations of the cultural communities to develop their partnership with public and parapublic institutions" (Québec, Ministère des Communautés culturelles et de l'Immigration, 1990: 74). In this way, the ethnic community becomes a mediating agency which takes on the task of integration in exchange for obtaining state resources and being granted input on state policy.

What are the relations with the state implied in this new social contract? How does an ethnic community attain input on state policy? In practice, no community acts as a collective entity. Instead, it is key decision-makers and community leaders who take on the role of dealing with the state. The social contract, then, has come to center around

a set of bureaucratic linkages with the state. The real partners in the new social contract are state agents and their bureaucratic counterparts in the ethnocultural community. In effect, the actions of the state over the past twenty years have created an extensive bureaucracy within the older, established communities; particularly the Jewish, Greek, and Italian. These bureaucratic linkages are extremely important, for they indicate a new style of negotiation and arbitration with the Quebec government. The benefit of the social contract for the ethnic community is that - regardless of their numerical proportion in the Quebec population or their degree of political participation within the party in power - they have access to appropriate government officials and can ensure that their point of view is, at the very least, taken into account. The benefit to the government is that ethnic groups can be accommodated into state policy via their own leadership without recourse to restrictive legislation or disruptions to the "social peace."

It is very questionable, however, whether the Quebec state could or would be willing to extend this social contract to the entire plurality of new ethnic groups currently entering Quebec. Certainly not on the same terms as have been accorded the Italian, Jewish and Greek

communities, which have in some ways achieved a special kind of 'charter' status of their own in Quebec, as the place reserved for a Jewish representative on the Superior Council of Education suggests. Nevertheless, the possibility exists for communities which have reached a significant level of institutional development to assume more responsibility for the reception of immigrants. A recent example is the important role taken by Montreal's Chinese community in providing assistance to immigrants from Hong Kong. It may be that in time the Chinese community, too, will come to have a special status in Quebec society.

Additionally, Native groups have become much more active politically and they too, can be seen to be evolving a kind of charter status. In the case of Natives, however, their 'place' in Quebec is much more problematic, since Natives have their own social and economic agenda and are asserting an identity and a set of political rights of their own which are not directed to the problem of 'integration' into Quebec society.

It is unlikely, then, that the Jewish community will continue to serve as the model of state relations with an ethnic community, because it is unlikely that any one model can serve to cover the diverse relations evolving between

the Quebec state and its ethnocultural minorities. Indeed, there is some concern that as Quebec's ethnocultural minorities become more diverse, they are becoming more marginalized and remain removed from the mainstream of Quebec society (Shiose and Fontaine, 1995). In that respect, it is the state itself - its institutions and agents and the services it provides - that becomes in large part the "host" society. The fundamental presumption remains, however that ethnic groups are corporate groups, and relations between the state and minorities are organized around this presumption. Whatever other changes emerge in Quebec society over the next few years, that fundamental presumption is unlikely to change.

Suggestions for Further Research

The issues raised in this thesis suggest several areas for further research. Broadly, these fall into three categories: research on the dynamics of Jewish education outside of Montreal; research related to understanding why different ethnic groups evolve varying organizational styles and how these generate different patterns of relations with the state; and research on how different states, or sectors of the state, differ in their relations with ethnic groups.

Two factors were identified as crucial elements in the emergence of an extensive Jewish day school system in Montreal. One was the inability of Montreal's Jewish population to fit within a public school system originally designed to accommodate only Protestants and Catholics. This lack of fit led many Jews to give up on the public system and establish their own private schools. The second was the expansion of state control over private education in 1968 which both provided direct funding to the schools and standardized curriculum, facilities and labor relations between private and public schools in Quebec. This ensured that Jewish schools could provide an education equal in quality and content to that of the public schools, while also providing Jewish content and a Jewish environment for a relatively low cost.

Yet Jewish day schools emerged elsewhere in Canada, such as in Winnipeg, and are currently growing in popularity and enrolment in Toronto. What other factors - either endemic to the community or characteristic of its interactions with other groups and with the host society - can promote the emergence of such schools? Toronto is particularly interesting in this respect, because, as in Montreal, Jewish schools are providing a broad range of educational alternatives to parents rather than simply an Orthodox education. With Montreal's system shrinking and

with Orthodox schools the rule almost everywhere else, the growth of Toronto's Jewish education system provides an opportunity to examine an alternative set of organizational and interactional dynamics underlying the growth of a community school system.

Chapter Three noted that while Montreal's Jewish community organizations provide a wide range of diverse services, many serve to mediate between the community's members and the broader society. In the case of education the Association of Jewish Day Schools and the Jewish Education Council serve as examples. Certainly, in their dealings with the state, Jewish organizations such as Canadian Jewish Congress, Federation CJA, the Communaute Sepharade du Quebec, or B'nai Brith, claim to 'represent' community members and their interests; a role acknowledged by the state.

Within other communities, however, the emphasis may be upon either integrating the member into the host society or on segregating the individual from that society. What are the relations with the state implied in the cases of these two alternatives? This is a very important area of research for understanding relations between the state and ethnic communities.

There are many other issues which require research.

What of different ethnic communities which differ in organizational resources, capacity, or style? How do differences in the ability of a community to organize, to present a common front, or to deal with state bureaucrats in their own terms alter the patterns of relations with the state? What of differences among states or sectors with a state? How do relations between Montreal's Jewish community and the federal state differ from those with Quebec? How do relations between Winnipeg's Jewish community and the Manitoba government differ from those we found for Montreal's Jewish community and its relations with Quebec? What of the new immigrant groups, what pattern of relations are evolving between such groups and the state?

Clearly, much work remains to be done on the issue of the relations between the state and ethnic communities. Given the central role ethnic groups have played in Canadian society, such work is an important area of sociological interest in and knowledge about Canadian society.

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