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

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DAN McARTHUR's CONCEPT OF OBJECTIVITY AND HIS STRUGGLE TO DEFEND THE INTEGRITY OF THE CBC NEWS SERVICE, 1940-1945

by

Robert J.F. Albota, B.A.

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Department of History
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
August 15, 1988

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ISBN 0-315-46263-9

The undersigned recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research acceptance of the thesis

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submitted by Robert J.F. Albota

in partial fulfilment of the requirements for

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines Dan McArthur's concept of journalistic objectivity and his struggle to defend the integrity of the CBC News Service during the Second World War. As Chief News Editor, McArthur played a key role in organizing the News Service on January 1, 1941, and in implementing its news policy. The close collaboration between the CBC and the federal government during the war years led some people to assume that the News Service would be used to rally support for Canada's war effort. While accepting the necessity of wartime censorship, McArthur insisted that only he and his senior editors should determine the content of the newscasts. From 1941 to 1943, McArthur's position was accepted by the CBC's senior management. But by 1944 he was forced to resist the interference of Augustin Frigon, the CBC's new General Manager, and of some government officials. McArthur's narrowly defined concept of journalistic objectivity was an important weapon used to establish the CBC News Service on an independent footing during the war years. However, his concept had less desirable ramifications which impeded the News Service's development as a major player in the Canadian news system.

The Evolution of a Concept...

"The policy which guides the operations of the CBC National News Service is based on the primary conception that this service is in the nature of a public trust; to present all the significant news of the day's happenings in Canada and abroad factually, without bias or distortion, without tendentious comment, and in a clear and unambiguous style."

-- Dan C. McArthur
Chief News Editor
"The National News Bulletin,"
1940-53

". . . our job in a free society is to inform, to enlighten, to enrich, and to enlarge public understanding of uncomfortable problems, sometimes providing facts that painfully or fatally wound a theory. That puts heavy responsibility on our journalistic shoulders to try to be fair, accurate, honest, balanced, and thorough, in short, to be socially responsible. We are, after all, agents for the public and our credibility is the heart and soul of our business in providing 'history on the run.'"

-- Knowlton Nash,
Principal News Anchor
CBC TV's "The National,"
1978-88

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT i

PREFACE ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii

INTRODUCTION 1

Endnotes 9

I THE "CANADIAN PRESS NEWS": THE EVOLUTION OF RADIO NEWS BROADCASTING ON THE CRBC AND THE CBC, 1932-1939 10

The Origins of Radio News on the CRBC 12

(a) News Theft and Property Rights 15
(b) Commercial Sponsorship of News 24

CBC's Dissatisfaction with CP Bulletins 34

Profile of Dan McArthur 45

Endnotes 52

II ORGANIZATION OF THE CBC NEWS SERVICE, 1939-1940 59

CBC and the Outbreak of World War II 60

CP's Lobbying Campaign 73

The Board of Governors Committee on News 81

Endnotes 97

III THE ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS OF DAN McARTHUR's CONCEPT OF OBJECTIVITY 102

Journalistic Objectivity: The Origins of the Concept 104

The Rise of Interpretive Reporting 112

McArthur's Concept of Objectivity 116

Implementation and Consequences of McArthur's News Policy 122

(a) Use of Wire Service Dispatches 122
(b) Authoritative Newscasts 123
(c) Content of the "National News Bulletin" 125
(d) Balanced Political News Coverage 129
(e) Treatment of War News 137

"CBC News Round-Up" 146

Endnotes 151

IV McARTHUR's STRUGGLE TO DEFEND THE INTEGRITY OF THE CBC NEWS SERVICE, 1940-1945 160

CBC News Service and the Federal Government 162

(a) Role of the News Editors 163
(b) Direct Contacts with Government Departments 165
(c) The War Effort and Wartime Censorship 167

CBC News Service and the General Managers 172

The Outcome of McArthur's Struggle 193

Endnotes 200

BIBLIOGRAPHY 207

A NOTE ON SOURCES 219

PREFACE

Dan McArthur, who has been called "the founding father of the CBC News Service,"(1) is not a well-known figure in the annals of Canadian journalism. As Chief News Editor of the News Service from 1940 to 1953, McArthur organized the team of writers and editors who took over the preparation of radio news bulletins from The Canadian Press. Although McArthur was inducted into the Toronto Press Club's "News Hall of Fame" in 1975, his pivotal role in establishing the CBC News Service merits greater recognition from historians and students of the mass media.(2) Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to fill a sizeable gap in the literature on Canada's media history. It traces the development of radio news on the CRBC in 1932-1933 (the CBC's predecessor); examines the reasons that contributed to the organization of the CBC News Service in 1940-41; analyzes the CBC's journalistic policy during the war years; and describes McArthur's role in establishing and defending the integrity of the News Service.

---

1 Charles Lynch, <u>You Can't Print That!</u> (Toronto: 1983), p. 220

2 "Dan McArthur Named to News Hall of Fame." <u>Closed Circuit</u>, April 15, 1975, p. 1.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The research for this thesis began in 1985-1986 when Dr. Ross A. Eaman, Associate Professor of Journalism in Carleton University's School of Journalism, hired me (along with Bruce Wise) to research the history of the CBC News Service. In August of 1987, Professor Eaman gave me the opportunity to extend my research and write an M.A. thesis on this topic. As my principal thesis supervisor, he took an active interest in this project, made many suggestions which eased the task, and helped me to shape the overall direction of the thesis. His contribution of ideas, encouragement, criticism and editorial guidance made this academic project an enriching and rewarding experience for me. I would also like to thank him for the funding that I received from The CBC History Project under the Institute of Canadian Studies at Carleton University.

Professor H. Blair Neatby, my thesis supervisor in the Department of History at Carleton University, read drafts of my chapters and provided incisive comments and criticisms. I appreciated his guidance, encouragement and patience. I would also like to thank Professor Emeritus D. M. L. Farr, former Supervisor of Graduate Students, D. A. Muise, and other members of Carleton's Department of History for their support since 1985. I was honoured to have Wilfred H. Kesterton, Professor Emeritus of Journalism, on my thesis examination board, and I thank him for his suggestions.

The staff at the circulation desk of the National Archives of Canada and the National Library of Canada was always helpful, and the archivists of the Government Archives Division helped me sort through mounds of archival material. Rosemary Bergeron, of the Moving Image and Sound Archives Division, obtained recordings for me from the CBC sound archives collection.

During the ten months I spent researching and writing the thesis, my friends were a constant source of moral support and encouragement. I would especially like to acknowledge my fellow students and researchers at the National Archives and National Library, particularly L. Allison Webb, Roger Malenfant, Linda Goldthorp, Paul Marsden, Beth Brooks, Michael J. Way, Alan Brass, Linda Lord, and Dr. Thomas H. Mitchell. They made all the difference and were always pleasant company. Special thanks go to Alex I. Inglis, who, back in 1980, inspired and encouraged me to do graduate studies in Canadian history.

Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my parents and to my sister, Suzanne, whose encouragement, financial assistance, frequent home-cooked meals, proofreading, etc., kept me 'on course' during the past ten months.

Robert Albota
Ottawa, Ontario
August 30, 1988

INTRODUCTION

When the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation inaugurated its own national News Service on January 1, 1941, some federal government officials assumed that it would become yet another vehicle for the dissemination of government-authorized information and announcements. In fact, during its formative years, a small number of government officials and Members of Parliament did interfere with the CBC's news broadcasts.(1) As Daniel C. McArthur, the CBC News Service's first Chief Editor, later acknowledged:

> . . . many people were skeptical about [its] impartiality. In some quarters it was taken for granted that the CBC bulletins would present only the "official" viewpoint -- [and] would be, in other words, the mouthpiece and apologist of the party in power.(2)

In retrospect, it was easy for these officials to have made such an assumption. Throughout the Second World War, a close relationship existed between the CBC and the federal government, which considered the national radio network to be a principal means of public communication and an instrument for rallying support for Canada's war effort and helping Britain and her allies achieve victory. The government's attitude was reflected in a statement made in 1943 by the Minister of National War Services, Major-General Léo R. LaFlèche, who supervised the activities of the CBC from 1942 to 1945:

In military terms, radio is a war machine, a war weapon. With it one plays upon the minds and hearts of men. It can be used to strengthen the moral fibre of a people at war or it can be used to demoralize those far behind the fighting front. In a war where everything we have is at stake, as at the present moment -- everything from property to liberty and life -- at such a time it is to be remembered that the radio is essential in total warfare. (3)

By the time the CBC Board of Governors approved the decision to set up a News Service in the fall of 1940, the Corporation's programming division was already playing an active role in the dissemination of information about Canada's wartime policies and objectives through programs such as "Carry on Canada!", "Arsenal of Democracy," "Canada at War," and "Over the Top." Many talks, features, music and drama shows were either sponsored by the federal government or prepared with the active collaboration of federal government departments that were concerned with the prosecution of the war. According to the CBC's Annual Report for 1939-40:

. . . in time of peace, national radio has played an increasingly important role in welding together the diverse elements of our population; in wartime it serves also to interpret policy, by bringing the country's leaders in constant contact with listeners, and to sustain morale by means of programs that adequately interpret the will of the whole Canadian people to prosecute the war to a victorious conclusion by every means in their power. (4)

Thus when one considers the extent of the CBC's collaboration with the government during the war years, it is understandable why Ministers, such as General LaFlèche, or government spokesmen believed that the News Service should be called upon occasionally to receive instructions or suggestions about the content of newscasts. (5)

Among the personnel of the CBC News Service, however, there was a very different perception of the role that it was expected to play. McArthur, who organized the CBC News Service, accepted the notion that official wartime censorship was necessary to maintain military secrecy, national security, and public safety. However, he argued that the News Service should not make concessions to government departments or have special censorships, which did not apply to press and private radio newscasts, placed upon the CBC's bulletins.(6)

McArthur insisted that the news editors needed to perform their duties with complete "integrity." In other words, they had the right to exercise their editorial judgement independent of managerial or political interference. Without editorial freedom, he believed, the News Service would lack credibility:

> It is realized . . . that if any channels were opened whereby pressure could be put on editors to include or exclude certain news, modify it in any way, or give it special emphasis, the integrity of the service would be lost, and might never be regained. (7)

As a means of establishing the integrity of the newscasts, McArthur insisted that their content should be determined only by the news editors in accordance with policy directives established by the Chief News Editor. McArthur told them not to accept instructions or "suggestions" from government officials who wanted the editors to suppress a certain news item or give it special emphasis in the news bulletins. Established news practices and policies, however, could be set aside in "circumstances of exceptional urgency." (8)

Although the CBC News Service functioned with considerable autonomy within the Corporation's program division, it was never

"independent" of management or protected from criticism of its performance. The Chief News Editor was responsible to the CBC's General Supervisor of Programs, Ernie Bushnell, who in turn reported to the General Manager. The degree to which the CBC's management was prepared to support McArthur's position was the most critical factor determining whether the News Service would be able to maintain its journalistic integrity or become subordinate to the government's exigencies. More precisely, the maintenance of the integrity of the newscasts depended upon McArthur's ability to persuade senior management that no one outside the News Service should interfere with the selection of news items and preparation of the news bulletins.

Thus, the maintenance of the News Service's integrity hinged on McArthur's ability to stave off challenges both from inside and outside the CBC. By writing numerous memoranda to CBC management and staff, issuing policy statements, and carefully defining the extent of the News Service's cooperation with government departments, McArthur was reasonably successful in avoiding controversy during the first three years of the News Service's existence. From 1940 to 1943, the CBC's first General Manager, Gladstone Murray, and his successor, James S. Thomson, respected the integrity of the News Service. McArthur had persuaded them that the CBC News Service was not a conduit for "official" government news but could, however, assist the CBC in publicizing and promoting Canada's war effort. In so doing, the bulletins summarized statements by government officials and carried factual reports about wartime policies and activities

across the country, if and when these were newsworthy. The newscasts also provided a dependable and uniform service of accurate, authoritative and significant news about Canadian and international affairs.

Murray accepted McArthur's view that the integrity of the News Service had to be safeguarded from interference by either the CBC's management or the government. A staunch advocate of the CBC's war effort policies, Murray considered wartime radio to be "an instrument of communication, entertainment, education and enlightenment."(9) He believed that the open dissemination of news and information was an important responsibility of radio in a democratic society because it served as a counterbalance to the propaganda and restricted flow of news in the totalitarian states against which Canada was at war. A uniform, accurate and sober presentation of up-to-date news would help to create a well-informed citizenry, and daily broadcasts of "national" and "regional" bulletins would maintain national unity.

However, when Augustin Frigon took over as Acting General Manager in November of 1943, he adopted a far different attitude regarding the role of the News Service within the CBC. As William H. Metcalfe, senior editor of the CBC's Winnipeg newsroom, stated: "Frigon made it apparent early in his tenure, as general-manager, that he seemed to have a respect for Liberal party authority that overrode any respect he might have had for the integrity of the news."(10) In Frigon's mind, the preservation of the editorial freedom of the News Service was secondary to meeting the demands of General LaFleche or of other federal government officials. This position was clearly

unacceptable to McArthur.(11) Frigon was eager to please the government by bringing the News Service more into line with the CBC's overall objective of publicizing and promoting Canada's war effort. "Frigon's attitude," McArthur later said, "was simply to bow to [the] authority" of General LaFlèche. (12) On different occasions in 1944, Frigon instructed the news editors to modify or suppress certain 'sensitive' news items which he believed would be detrimental to national unity and the war effort. McArthur voiced strong opposition to "censorship" or "special treatment" of news on the CBC which did not apply equally to other media, such as newspapers, wire services or newscasts on private radio stations.

McArthur's concept of journalistic objectivity was used as a weapon to defend the integrity of the News Service during its the formative years. McArthur and his team of editors understood the term objectivity to mean the clear-cut separation of editorial comment from straight, factual reporting. For them, objectivity entailed a responsibility to ensure that news bulletins contained a balanced presentation of opposing points of view from recognized authorities or sources.

> CBC senior editors have been chosen for their objective sense of news values, based on [their] experience with the daily press or the larger news-gathering agencies. They have been impressed with the importance of handling news that has political or controversial implications, without bias or false emphasis, and to give equal treatment to the opposing points of view. They have been told to present the war news factually and objectively, neither overemphasizing successes nor minimizing reverses. (13)

Domestic political controversies were to be treated with impartiality and reported without interpretive or editorial

comment. The CBC's news editors and writers were forbidden from adding colour to a news story or to make known their personal opinions. Only news that was "authoritative" and "factual" could go on the air. Objectivity also meant that the newscasts were devoid of interpretation and analysis and of so-called "tendentious" or "speculative" news comment. The editors avoided broadcasting stories based on rumours, containing false emphasis, or considered to be "sensational" or "scandalous" in character.

Since the CBC News Service was "in the nature of a public trust," McArthur maintained that its integrity and objectivity were essential because Canadian radio listeners relied on the CBC to provide them with authentic, authoritative, accurate, and unbiased newscasts. According to a CBC policy statement:

> It has been the definite objective of the CBC News Service to win the confidence of Canadian listeners on a basis of merit -- both for the accuracy and dependability of the news content, and for the presentation of the bulletins in a style that is simple, conversational and direct. (14)

It was assumed that these same listeners would draw their own conclusions about the nature of the facts presented to them and would turn to newspapers for in-depth analysis and interpretation of domestic and international news.

In retrospect, the CBC News Service, during its formative years, interpreted objectivity in a narrow and somewhat restrictive fashion. Certainly, McArthur's concept of objectivity suffered from certain fundamental limitations and contradictions. These are apparent when one examines McArthur's memoranda and directives with regard to the handling of political and war news. Instead of gathering its own news, the CBC News

Service subscribed to two independent and reputable news agencies: The Canadian Press and British United Press. By relying on their purely factual and non-interpretative dispatches, McArthur could claim that the CBC's newscasts (which were rewritten into radio style by its own news editors) were "objective." Unlike newspapers, which published editorials and interpretive news articles, the CBC News Service tried to adhere to a completely neutral and unbiased editorial policy. But merely reporting 'just the facts' did not enable the CBC News Service to eliminate the biases and distortions inherent in the news-selection processes of CP and BUP. By relying on the wire services, the CBC did not have to assign its own correspondents to report federal and provincial politics until the postwar years.

McArthur's concept of objectivity helped to establish the News Service on an independent footing during the war years. But the News Service's reliance on wire service dispatches, its concern with trying to appear unbiased and impartial, and its adherence to McArthur's rather orthodox news values imposed certain constraints that impeded the development of the CBC News Service as an active, news-gathering component of Canada's news system.

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1
William H. Metcalfe *The View from Thirty* (Winnipeg: 1986), p. 93

2
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CHAPTER I

THE EVOLUTION OF THE "CANADIAN PRESS NEWS" BROADCASTS ON THE CRBC AND THE CBC, 1932-1939

When the CBC began its operations on November 2, 1936, its senior managers might conceivably have decided that news broadcasting should be an essential component of its daily programming schedule. They might even have taken the view that the CBC could become a major player in the overall Canadian news system by preparing and disseminating its own newscasts. After all, in 1932, Prime Minister R. B. Bennett had envisaged that a publicly owned Canadian broadcasting system would be "a great agency for the communication of matters of national concern and for the diffusion of national thought and ideals."(1) However, the notion that news broadcasting should be an essential component of the CBC's daily programming schedule gained impetus only in the late 1930s. Why was this the case?

In Britain, for example, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) broadcast its first evening news bulletin on January 3, 1927. Five news agencies and press associations agreed to supply the BBC with news dispatches if it aired its newscast after the evening papers were on the newsstands. Two editors hired by the BBC checked over the content of the news bulletins written by the news

agencies. In February of 1930, the BBC organized a small news department that consisted of two editors and two sub editors. Between 1927 and 1939, the BBC's news department expanded into an important domestic and overseas news service. The accuracy and calm delivery of the BBC news "established its reputation as the most honest purveyor of news in the world." As Asa Briggs noted, listeners would say: "if it came through the BBC, it is so."(2)

In the United States, the two major radio networks, the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) and the National Broadcasting Company (NBC), had their own news departments in place by the mid-1930s. In the early 1930s, the Associated Press (AP) refused to sell its news dispatches to radio stations, thus forcing the two networks to hire professional journalists, who prepared newscasts based on stories obtained by telegraph or telephone.(3) This practice precipitated a bitter rivalry between press and radio, which had repercussions in Canada.

Despite these precedents in Britain and the United States, the CBC did not make a major commitment to news broadcasting until it formed its own national News Service on January 1, 1941. Prior to that date, the CBC (and its predecessor, the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission) had been content to broadcast short, daily news summaries written and edited by The Canadian Press (CP), a cooperative news agency. These summaries were offered free of charge to the CRBC and the CBC as a "public service." Although these bulletins were read by a CBC announcer, the decisions about their content, length and frequency were determined solely by CP. Why did the CBC lag behind the BBC and

the American networks in setting up its own news department? In what sense did the wire services shape the development of radio news in Canada? What factors finally persuaded the CBC's management to make a bigger commitment to radio news broadcasting?

The answers to these questions are more complex than one might imagine. The CBC delayed the development of its own news department because of obvious factors such as high start-up costs, limitations of personnel, and the availability of the CP's wire service, which had prepared bulletins for the CBC since July of 1933. But when one examines the matter more closely, there are two other substantial reasons that appear to have had a greater influence. First, it was in the interest of the Canadian Press to restrict the development of radio news in order to safeguard its position as Canada's main disseminator of news. Second, by using CP bulletins, the CBC could offer Canadians a daily national news broadcast without having to take responsibility for their content. By claiming that these newscasts were entirely prepared by CP, an independent news agency, the CBC could easily deflect criticism that the bulletins heard on the publicly owned network contained 'official' government-authorized news.

The Origins of Radio News on the CRBC

During the late 1920s and early 1930s, radio was primarily an entertainment medium. It was not used as a news medium, although it did broadcast special events such as hockey games, church services, formal public events and political speeches.

Private radio stations that had news broadcasts limited them to short summaries of news published in the morning or evening newspapers. While it was not a 'news' broadcast in the conventional sense, the first great national event to be covered live on radio was Canada's Diamond Jubilee on July 1, 1927. Through radio receivers and public address systems, Canadians across the Dominion heard the dignitaries' speeches on a radio link-up of privately owned and CNR stations. This 'network' was accomplished with the help of Canadian National Railways and the Canadian Pacific Railway. This radio linkup was a dramatic Canadian initiative that received world-wide attention.(4)

The publicly owned CRBC was established in 1932, as an instrument to foster and sustain "national consciousness" and strengthen national unity by linking the country's different regions.(5) In the early 1930s, over one-half of Canada's population lived outside urban centres; those living in isolated, rural and coastal communities and in small towns and villages did not have regular access to a daily newspaper. Newspapers -- and the news agencies supplying them -- dominated the news business and considered radio as a medium primarily for entertainment. Radio's entry into the news business was viewed with hostility and contempt by many newspapers. For example, J. H. Woods, Editor and Managing Director of the Calgary Herald, railed against the "unsatisfactory and even dangerous character" of "amateur" radio news broadcasts. "Newspaper men spend years in learning how to handle news with moderation, and with accuracy. It is not a job that can be trusted to anyone who speaks into a microphone," he complained.(6)

On July 17, 1933, Canadians turned their radio dial to the CRBC network to hear the inaugural broadcast of "The Canadian Press News." This twice-daily, five-minute bulletin was prepared by CP for the benefit of "a large portion of the people of Canada in rural districts, more particularly in remote areas, [who] did not receive daily news service of any kind." People in urban areas who were interested in the news were expected to continue reading newspapers. In 1933, radio was still in its infancy. The significance of this new technology's ability to transmit news and information instantly to most homes in the country appears to have been missed by the CRBC:

> This [news bulletin] service was intended for the hundreds of thousands of people who do not receive the daily or weekly newspapers for several days or weeks after they are published and, obviously, is not of prime importance to those in urban centres, who receive the newspapers within several minutes after the time of publication.(7)

Nevertheless, CRBC listeners across Canada heard news broadcasts written and edited from a "national point of view" in an era when many newspapers were preoccupied with covering local and regional news stories.(8) During the early 1930s, neither broadcasting officials nor the public fully appreciated radio's vast potential as a means of gathering and disseminating news. But its impact would eventually make itself felt. During the last half of the 1930s, radio news became recognized and accepted as a significant new form of journalism.

One of the major reasons for CP's entry into the radio news field stemmed from its concern about what it called the "theft" of its news by private radio stations. The interplay between The Canadian Press and CRBC/CBC over the question of 'news piracy'

and commercial sponsorship of radio newscasts largely influenced and shaped the development of Canada's national radio news service.

(a) News Theft and Property Rights

The Canadian Press argued that its member newspapers held exclusive property rights over the dissemination and publication of news.(9) The news agency alleged that several private radio stations were "pirating" CP news by taking it right out of newspapers, rewriting the copy, and then broadcasting the stories on commercially sponsored radio news programs. These reports were not attributed to CP, which had spent thousands of dollars collecting and distributing news to its member newspapers. CP received no remuneration from radio stations (and whose news was not for sale to radio in any event). Thus, it launched a formal complaint to the CRBC about radio stations that made profits at CP's expense.

The decision to inaugurate a national news bulletin on CRBC appeared to have been the result of a quid pro quo agreement reached between CP and CRBC. The Canadian Press claimed that the news it gathered and distributed to its member newspapers was property of the agency and of its member newspapers. Although CP refused to sell its news to private radio stations, it offered to supply the text for radio bulletins free of charge to the CRBC network. In return CRBC made a commitment to end this "news piracy," which was widely practised by private radio stations at the time. (The CRBC, which was reorganized as the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation on November 2, 1936, licensed and

regulated both public and private broadcasting stations in Canada.)

The effort by The Canadian Press to stop the 'piracy' of its news by two radio stations in Quebec unleashed a series of events that culminated in Canada's first national radio news bulletin. Although the news agency did not object to the existence of "news on the air," CP's General Manager, J. F. B. Livesay, believed it should only be done by member newspapers that owned radio stations. "At the present time," Livesay complained, "any commercial radio station in Canada can steal our news once it is [at newsstands] on the street and broadcast it at will." (10) Livesay urged Hector Charlesworth, appointed Chairman of the CRBC in October of 1932, to put a stop to the theft of its news by private stations. In a letter to CP members on November 21, 1932, Livesay wrote:

> Numerous complaints have been received from members about commercial broadcasting stations in which our members have no interest [that are] scalping Canadian Press news or the news of member newspapers and putting it on the air. The President [of CP] suggested the writer have a talk with Hector Charlesworth, Chairman of the Radio Commission, in Ottawa, and as a result Mr. Charlesworth says he has the authority and will be glad to stop this practice provided he has a specific complaint.(11)

Instead of attempting litigation in Canadian court, CP lobbied the CRBC Chairman, Hector Charlesworth. Prior to his appointment, Charlesworth had been the well-respected editor of Saturday Night. Since this publication depended on advertising revenue, he probably sympathized with the concerns of newspaper publishers who feared a loss of advertising revenue to radio stations. A frequent exchange of correspondence between Livesay and Charlesworth followed.

Livesay wanted Charlesworth to use the CRBC's regulatory powers to order privately owned Canadian radio stations not to carry news broadcasts based on CP dispatches or member newspapers. Livesay envisioned that CP and CRBC could reach an agreement similar to that existing in Britain, where Reuters and Press Association news agencies agreed to supply news to the BBC with their full news service. The BBC's editors then selected the items to be broadcast for the first evening bulletin at 6 p.m., after the newspapers had hit the newsstands. "The general idea is not [for the BBC] to compete with the newspapers, particularly in the evening field where the broadcasting of routine news, such as sport and [financial] markets, does not take place until the evening papers are out." (12)

On December 10, 1932, Livesay told Charlesworth that he believed CP had clear case for establishing that it had a property right in news. Taking a case to the Privy Council would be "well worthwhile if we had no other recourse, but in view of your assurance [that] you have the authority and the intent to deal with these news pirates there seems no immediate reason why we should press into litigation." Charlesworth agreed to use the CRBC's regulatory powers to stop the practice of news theft. "I expect to go very fully into the question of protecting news within a few weeks' time," Charlesworth wrote on January 9, 1933.(13) The members of CP were "delighted and grateful to hear you are dealing with this matter," Livesay told Charlesworth.(14)

In Canada, there was no existing law establishing a property right in news, although decisions favourable to the press agencies had been reached in other parts of the British Empire such as in

Hong Kong, Ceylon, South Africa, New Zealand, and Australia. At that time, CP considered copyright law in the United Kingdom and the Canadian Copyright Act of 1921 to be ineffective in establishing a case for property right in news.(15) The Canadian Press had expressed its concern about radio stations pirating their news dispatches as early as April 27, 1925, when its Board of Directors passed a resolution to form a special committee that would "prepare the ground" towards establishing by legislative means the CP's property rights in news. In pressing its case, CP wanted the Canadian government to pass legislation similar to an Australian law recognizing that newspapers and news agencies had a property right in news. (16) Article 74, clause (b) of the Statutory Rules (1924, no. 101), incorporated with Australia's Wireless Telegraphy Act, stated that as a condition of the granting of any Broadcasting Licence, the licensee (radio station) shall not "send out news or information of any kind published in any newspaper or obtained, collected, collated, or co-ordinated by any newspaper, or association of newspapers or any news agency or service" except with the prior consent of and payment made to the newspapers and news agencies. (17)

As an interim measure, pending the passage of Canadian legislation, Livesay urged the CRBC to embody in its licenses to radio stations a regulation similar to that in the Australian licenses that would prevent radio stations from stealing news.

> The creation of the Commission, due in large part to newspaper support, was welcomed very generally as designed to put an end to the abuses that have arisen in Canada through uncontrolled commercial radio broadcasting. Among these abuses surely the most flagrant is this theft of news, and therefore would it not seem natural for us to expect

your Commission would apply itself to its effective correction? (18)

CP's position was supported by the Canadian Daily Newspapers Association, which was also opposed to "uncontrolled radio-broadcasting of news that has been stolen from the papers and the news services." It hoped that "this abuse will be met through regulations promulgated by the Commission," adding that "the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission has power to straighten this matter out by regulations and I believe every [newspaper] publisher is looking earnestly to see that justice is done us in this matter."(19)

The Canadian Press provided CRBC with the "specific complaint" Charlesworth requested. On December 20, 1932, Livesay accused Montreal radio station CKAC, owned by La Presse, of compiling news from CP and the early edition of the next day's Montreal Gazette (which was on the streets by 10:30 p.m.) for its 11 p.m. news broadcast, "The Roxy Reporter." (This program was sponsored by L. O. Grothé Ltd., manufacturer of Roxy Cigarettes.) Charlesworth telephoned "The Roxy Reporter's" news announcer, Corey Thomson, an employee of Ronalds Advertising Agency, Ltd. to convey the CRBC's disapproval about the use of CP's news dispatches without its permission. Charlesworth informed Livesay on January 3, 1933, that he "immediately took up" the matter with Thomson and had "received information that an endeavour would be made to remove the cause of complaint." (20) On January 20, 1933, Charlesworth wrote to Thomson to tell him of a similar complaint made against "The Roxy Reporter" by the Associated Press (21) and again urged him to "amend" his course. (22)

According to Thomson, the program's audience was mainly composed of "shut-ins, inmates of hospitals, people living in the wilds and in rural communities not served by the press."(23) Thomson assured Livesay that the "The Roxy Reporter" would not lead to a decline in newspaper readership: "We have always felt that it would stimulate rather than lessen the sales of newspapers." Nevertheless, Thomson relented and told Livesay on January 30 that the character of "The Roxy Reporter" had been changed and that it was being put out in the form of "very short and incisive highlights of the general news of the day, so as to rather whet the appetite of listeners to buy the morning paper."(24) However, the theft of CP news, whatever the length of the 'highlights' in the program, was unacceptable to Livesay. On February 1, 1933, Livesay replied "It is interesting to note of course that you are restricting these news broadcasts, but does it not occur to you that even at that instead of stealing a neighbor's sheep you are merely stealing the wool off its back?" (25

There was also a complaint made about radio station CHRC in Quebec City, which compiled news from Le Soleil, L'Evenement and other daily newspapers for its news program the "Gazette Verdonet," sponsored by D. Verdon, Ltd.(26) CHRC's lawyer refuted CP's claim that news was the exclusive property of CP and its member newspapers and argued that any news published in a daily newspaper became public property at the moment of publication. In his view, radio stations were entitled to broadcast any news on the air.(27)

On January 3, 1933, Charlesworth advised Livesay that "it will be necessary to send a deputation before our Commission

sometime within the next few weeks, when we can thresh the whole matter [news theft] out." (28) The next day, Livesay replied "we regard this matter of news broadcasting as being so important [that] we shall have no difficulty in getting together a representative deputation to wait upon your Commission within the next few weeks. . . "(29) Charlesworth subsequently told Livesay that "I am hoping sometime in the not distant future to have the whole question of news broadcasts reformed." (30)

The deputation before the CRBC Commissioners took place at the Chateau Laurier, in Ottawa, on February 21, 1933. The group included Livesay; CP's President, M. E. Nichols; its Honorary President, E. Norman Smith of the Ottawa Journal; 27 newspaper publishers (five of whom were Senators); and two representatives of the Canadian Daily Newspapers Association.(31) Both CP and CDNA asked the CRBC to "regulate the issue of new licenses to Canadian commercial broadcasting stations similar in effect to the regulation of such licenses in Australia." (32) According to Livesay's account of this meeting, Charlesworth was "anxious to establish, particularly for the outlying settlements, daily broadcasts of news, and he hoped this could be worked out in co-operation with The Canadian Press."(33) Charlesworth invited CP to submit a draft proposal for furnishing the CRBC with news bulletins. As a result of this deputation, CP offered to supply daily newscasts to the Radio Commission. On April 15, 1933, order-in-council 535 was tabled in the House of Commons, establishing the General Rules and Regulations for the CRBC. Part V, Section 2, no. 101 of the Rules and Regulations, dealing

with news broadcasts, provided the legal framework for a memorandum of agreement signed between CP and CRBC on May 25, 1933. (34)

A news bulletin prepared by CP would be "sponsored by the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission with proper credit to The Canadian Press, and shall not be used as part of any sponsored advertising programme."(35) The Board of Directors of CP decided to forego any compensation from the CRBC for its newcasts. According to Livesay, "we [CP] decided we would take no payment from the Commission because in the public interest we are as anxious as is the Commission itself to co-operate in the supply of reliable news broadcasts for the people of Canada."(36) Instead of accepting a fee for its news service, CP's Board of Directors agreed to supply news to the CRBC for the token sum of $1.00 per year. By not accepting a fee from the Commission for news, CP believed that the "position of the Association would be much stronger."(37) On June 5, 1933, Charlesworth announced "we [CRBC] hope to have news broadcasts in every section of Canada under our own sponsorship." Radio stations were warned that they would have to cease broadcasting news if they persisted in "pirating" news from CP and its members.(38) The CRBC-CP pact was lauded by the Ottawa <u>Journal</u>:

> . . . the collection of news isn't a matter left to chance. The Canadian Press maintains staff men and correspondents throughout the country and the world at points where news may be expected to arise, and the cost is very heavy. It was unthinkable that the product of this enterprise should be at the mercy of any person with a pair of scissors and a microphone.(39)

CRBC sent notices to all radio stations in Canada that the broadcasting of news obtained from CP would only be permitted on the national "Canadian Press News" bulletin heard on CRBC-owned and affiliated private stations.

> Canadian radio broadcasting stations shall not transmit any news or information of any kind published in any newspaper or obtained, collected, collated or coordinated by any newspaper or association of newspapers or any news agency or service. . . (40)

According to Livesay, this clause was the "measure of protection" the newspapers needed in return for providing the CRBC with a free service of news. (41) However, there was one loophole in the Rules and Regulations that gave private radio stations the permission to broadcast news from non-CP sources. According to Part V, Section 2, paragraph 101 (b), Canadian radio broadcasting stations could broadcast "local news under arrangements to be made by each station individually with its local newspaper or newspapers, or such news as it may collect through its own employees or through such collection agency or agencies as may be employed by the said station." (42) Allowing Canadian private radio stations to purchase and broadcast news compiled from American news sources had not been envisaged when the CRBC's Rules and Regulations were laid down. This clause enabled private Canadian stations to contract news from "collection agencies" such as British United Press and the U.S.-based Transradio, which soon began supplying private stations with (non-CP) newscasts for commercial sponsorship.

(b) Commercial Sponsorship of News

The Canadian Press, and its member newspapers, were apprehensive about the growing popularity of radio newscasts. Too many Canadians were turning their radio dials to listen to newscasts on U.S. stations. With the advent of radio news, CP and its member newspapers feared that these commercially sponsored newscasts would siphon away advertising revenue. Furthermore, they feared that newspaper circulation would decrease if Canadians preferred listening to radio newscasts instead of reading newspapers.

During the early 1930s, the dominance of the news business by newspapers and press agencies was challenged by the more than 80 private radio stations in Canada. These stations not only threatened to diminish newspaper circulation but competed for advertising dollars by broadcasting sponsored news programs. Advertisers realized that radio news broadcasts could command a large audience, and radio station owners looked for commercial sponsors for their news programs. Commercial announcements appearing immediately before, after or during a news broadcast, when listener attention was high, could be very lucrative to radio stations. Sponsored newscasts were allowed on private stations, but not at the same time as the broadcast of the CP News bulletin. Private stations not affiliated to the network were free to broadcast sponsored bulletins, but had to obtain permission from CRBC.(43)

Although newspapers wanted to control the proliferation of news on the air, several dailies, such as the Toronto _Daily Star_,

the Vancouver Province and Montreal's La Presse, operated their own radio stations. These newspaper-owned stations used radio as a means of selling newspapers.(44) It was assumed that radio listeners, who would hear highlights of the news, would be enticed into buying a newspaper to get the complete story. Some stations, such as CFRB, a private station in Toronto, would broadcast news directly from the editorial rooms of the Toronto Globe.(45) Over 30 newspapers endorsed the Canadian Radio League's (1931) concept of a publicly owned system of radio paid for by license fees and considered advertising on radio "a menace to the newspaper and a burden to the public."(46) The conflicting interests between newspapers that owned radio stations and those that did not had the potential of creating a rift among CP's membership. Therefore, CP had to find a solution that was satisfactory to both sides.

The controversy over the sponsorship of radio news broadcasting is best understood in the context of the similar situation in the United States, where a bitter rivalry existed between newspapers and radio stations. The controversy south of the border had repercussions on the development of radio news in Canada, because the Associated Press (AP) news agency furnished U.S. and international news to The Canadian Press. CP believed that the sale of its news to commercial corporations would "violate the principle and spirit" of the news organization and would "impair public confidence in its news reports." (47) Furthermore, CP's lobby against the commercial sponsorship of radio news, and its campaign was to an extent, influenced by the actions of AP.

As the popularity of news on U.S. radio stations increased, American newspaper publishers also began to fear that readership of newspapers would decline. The resulting press vs. radio "war" was a struggle not only between newspapers and radio, but between newspapers that owned radio stations (115 American newspapers owned stations in 1935) and newspapers that did not (about 1,850). Newspaper publishers in the latter group generally believed that any attempt to accommodate radio in the news business was an encroachment on their domain.(48)

In the early days of radio, the major U.S. news agencies such as International News Service and Associated Press refused to sell their news to American radio stations. Abe Schecter, a newswriter working for NBC wrote:

> The press associations would not sell to us, and we were not allowed to lift anything out of the newspapers. In fact, the press associations and leading newspapers were making a practice of keeping a stenographic record of our news broadcasts; in some cases they even recorded our newscasts on discs so they could check back and see whether we had swiped anything. (49)

Newspaper publishers feared that radio's competition with newspapers for advertising would cause their publications to lose millions of dollars in revenue. One news magazine stated that "Ever since radio has come of age, news broadcasting ... has been a chronic source of irritation. Publishers as a class feel they have a proprietary interest in news [and] a sanctified responsibility to see that it is presented to the public without bias or commercialization." (50) News agencies complained that private radio stations were "pirating" news dispatches by taking them from newspapers and rewriting them for commercially

sponsored news broadcasts. At first, reporters in the CBS and NBC news departments gathered news by telephone and telegraph. For their international coverage, radio newswriters rewrote stories already published in British and foreign newspapers. "These facilities duplicated the press associations to a degree unsuspected by radio listeners; [they] were set up, of course, to answer any accusation that the radio was pilfering [news of the press associations]."(51)

On March 1, 1934, NBC and CBS, which together owned 28 radio stations, "capitulated" to the demands of newspapers and agreed to the formation of a Press-Radio Bureau. This organization served as a compromise between radio and the press on the problem of who had the right to furnish American radio listeners with news. (52) Each day, the Press-Radio Bureau prepared two five-minute, unsponsored news bulletins culled from AP, United Press (UP was run by the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain) and International News Service dispatches. (INS was owned by the Hearst chain). A year later, the agreement collapsed.

The Press-Radio Bureau was doomed to fail. One hundred and fifty affiliated stations and 450 private radio stations in the United States, which were not bound to the provisions of the agreement, continued their lucrative practice of broadcasting commercially sponsored news programs to satisfy the public's increasing appetite for radio news. (53) Meanwhile, AP adamantly refused to commercialize its news, stating that public confidence in the integrity of AP news would not be compromised by intermingling advertisers' "propaganda" with news. (54)

On March 21, 1934, Transradio Press was organized to provide daily worldwide radio news service by teletype and short wave to over 200 radio stations in the U.S. and Canada. Livesay said CP believed Transradio's service was unsuitable because this news service "interpreted" the news in such a way as to adhere with supposed preconceived pro-American and anti-British biases. (55) As a result of Transradio's entry into the news business, UP and INS, which had previously serviced only newspapers, began supplying North American radio customers and their sponsors with news broadcasts in May of 1935. (56)

By 1940, Transradio Press was accused by both the U.S. and Canadian governments of having ties with a so-called "pro-Nazi" Trans-Ocean news service. The unproven allegations eventually drove Transradio out of business. In the wake of Transradio's demise, the United Press (and its Canadian subsidiary, British United Press) moved in quickly to grab the business of its former rival. Faced with the prospect of a serious rift between member newpapers that owned radio stations and those that did not, AP finally reversed its anti-sponsorship policy and began selling news to U.S. radio stations in 1940. The Canadian Press, AP's ally, had little choice but to follow suit the following year.

One major distinguishing factor between U.S. and Canadian news programs was that American broadcasts were often sensationalized to attract a large audience and to increase commercial sponsorship. As one magazine put it, "America's market-keen radio men found news was the most effective seller of

their advertising -- and scrambled for news that could be sponsored."(57) Walter Winchell became known nation-wide for his sensational and gossipy news broadcasts. NBC's Lowell Thomas, one of the premier news commentators of his time, added drama, interpretation and background to his newscasts. American commentators "made an effort to develop frivolous types of news designed to give the radio audience a momentary vacation from the grimmer side of life." (58) News commentators, such as Winchell, Thomas, and H. V. Kaltenborn were popular with Canadian as well as American radio audiences since the broadcasts could be picked up on radio receivers on both sides of the border. By the late 1930s many Canadian private radio stations that subscribed to British United Press and Transradio Press, which sold news to radio stations, broadcast sponsored newscasts.

From 1933 to 1940, the unsponsored "Canadian Press News" was the only news bulletin heard from coast to coast on CRBC/CBC-owned and affiliated stations. The CRBC expected that the "Canadian Press News" bulletins on radio would not only encourage Canadian audiences to listen to national newscasts but also dispel the notion that the publicly owned network was propagating "official" government news. Although CP newscasts were brief, they were widely listened to by Canadians. CP prepared the copy at offices of the Toronto Mail and Empire. Then it delivered the script by messenger to the CRBC's Toronto studio, where the bulletin was read by CBC announcers. Charles Jennings, who announced the national news beginning in 1935, became a familiar voice in many Canadian households. In a letter to R. P. Landry, a CRBC official, Livesay stated "I believe these [CP News] two

broadcasts are the best thing going on the air in a news way on this continent. I find intelligent people who have been in listening agree. They give in simple form a very good summary of all the outstanding news of the day."(59) However, one columnist was under the impression that the CP bulletins on the CRBC was "official" government information:

> . . . the alleged Canadian news broadcasts are about the worst feature of the twenty-four [sic] hours on the air. There appears to be a law against any news that hasn't been printed in the newspaper at least eight hours before it makes its radio debut. For anyone who lives within five hours of a daily paper the news broadcasts have the aroma of an ancient fromage. We speak, of course, of the official [CRBC] news broadcast, not those circulated by newspapers with their own [radio] outlets over private wire time. (60)

The newspapers' fear that radio news broadcasts would cause a decline in newspaper circulation and advertising revenue was apparently unfounded. The 6:30 p.m. CP news bulletin was merely a short summary of news that had already appeared in that day's evening newspapers. In reference to the Nova Scotia provincial election of August 22, 1933, CP informed its members that the radio news report of the election results was intended "to whet the public appetite rather than satiate it. The broadcast should give a good general idea of the election but the listener would have to fill in the story from the published print."(61) The 10:30 p.m. newscast contained more up-to-date news items. In October of 1934, CRBC and CP agreed to consolidate the two five-minute bulletins at 6:30 and 10:30 p.m. into one 10-minute bulletin (of about 1,200 words) at 10:45 p.m. (eastern time). The Dominion election of 1935 was the first federal election campaign to receive special treatment on

CP's radio news bulletins. Between 6 p.m. and 1:30 a.m., CP broadcast news flashes every 15 minutes.

News stories, however, were not necessarily confined to the CP bulletins. One event covered by the CRBC became legendary in the annals of Canadian news broadcasting. J. Frank Willis, the CRBC's regional representative in Halifax, made about 90 "live" reports from the site of a mine cave-in at Moose River, Nova Scotia, where three men (one of whom died) were trapped underground in an abandoned gold mine from April 12 to 22, 1936. The Moose River mine 'disaster' dominated newspaper headlines in North America for several days.(62) Willis' dramatic account of the rescue of the miners was the first major Canadian radio news event to capture the attention of North America's news media. He became a radio celebrity virtually overnight.(63)

CP emphasized that its ten-minute, late-evening national bulletin was backed by CP's reputation for "reliability and accuracy" and was "an accurate survey and review of the news of the day." However, William B. Preston, CP's President, told a House of Commons committee that "if the Canadian Press is to provide an alternative to the incessant radio news that is coming from across the border, it is necessary for the Canadian Press to be on the air, instead of once a day, at least three or four times a day." (64)

The Canadian Press offered to prepare bulletins for CRBC free of charge. The "tremendous increase" in newscasts from the United States had made it necessary and in the "national interest" to supply Canadian news that was "safeguarded with the British viewpoint."(65) Moreover, the sensationalism and

showmanship of American radio broadcasts were attracting Canadian listeners, and CP believed that these daily radio newscasts emanating from the United States would eventually harm the circulation of its member newspapers. Preston claimed that the proliferation of news on the air from non-Canadian sources was so distressing that CP was prepared to offer the CRBC an expanded service:

> News has become an outstanding feature in all radio programs. An increasing number of Canadian commercial stations pick off the air at nominal cost short-wave news broadcasts originating in the United States. These lack British character and in some cases are quite irresponsible, misleading and inaccurate." (66)

Most of the news from "foreign" (U.S.) sources "infiltrating across the border" was "quite unreliable . . . and a great deal of it filled with propaganda." Without naming Transradio specifically, CP believed it was "in the national interest" that news on the air should be "thoroughly Canadian and British in character" and an "effective substitute for foreign services." Livesay said of CP's competitor: "Lacking all sense of newspaper responsibility and quite naturally biased by its own nationalistic point of view, Transradio has become a very real peril." (67)

> The Canadian Press feels that in offering to supply this news, it is offering a commodity of very great value. We do so because we believe it is in the national interest that the news in this country be safeguarded and kept under Canadian sponsorship. The Canadian Press feels that news on the air should be just as accurate, just as reliable, just as impartial, and just as free from propaganda as the news that the Canadian Press is supplying by land [to its member newspapers]. (68)

In 1936, CBC-owned radio stations broadcast programs only during the evening. The Canadian Press claimed that its newscast

was unable to "meet foreign competition" during daytime. Until such time as the CBC network was able to begin daytime broadcasting, CP made a service of CP bulletins available during daytime with the CBC's private-station affiliates, which did broadcast during the day. On June 26, 1936, for a nominal fee ($10/week), CP began supplying the stations with three daily news bulletins (8 a.m., 12:30 p.m. and 5 p.m. EST) for transmission to private radio stations over tape tickers provided by Canadian National Telegraphs and Canadian Pacific Communications. This service was discontinued when the CBC's five-high-powered transmitters began transmitting a daytime broadcasting service across Canada in 1939.(69)

By the late 1930s, many Canadian private radio stations affiliated to CBC broadcast news on a sustaining basis (the unsponsored CP bulletins in addition to commercially sponsored newscasts based on news obtained from British United Press or Transradio Press. Although CBC depended on commercial sponsorship of entertainment programs for a large part of its revenue as well as on license fees paid by the public, the network, in accordance with its agreement with CP, refused to accept sponsors for "The Canadian Press News." On the other hand, private stations relied on revenue-generating commercial sponsorship for most of its programs, including its non-CP newscasts. Livesay was adamantly opposed to any sponsorship of CP's newscasts, which, he believed, had absolute integrity because they were beholden to no advertisers:

The Canadian Press has nothing to do with advertising. Canadian Press is trying to do an honest and workmanlike job for the Canadian people. It abhors propaganda, the capitalistic control of news and government subsidies. It will never sell its news to advertisers on air and, for it would then have to think in terms of advertising, not news. (70)

Meanwhile, the CBC supplemented its bulletins with coverage of special events. With the help of a mobile broadcasting unit, CBC announcer John Kannawin scooped all the other media on January 27, 1938, with his on-the-scene report of the collapse of the Falls View Bridge at Niagara Falls, Ontario. Kannawin's account was on the air only seven minutes after the bridge collapsed.(71) In May of 1939, a mobile CBC broadcasting unit provided extensive coverage of the Royal Tour across Canada of King George VI and Queen Elizabeth. (72)

CBC's Dissatisfaction with CP Bulletins

By the late 1930s, the CBC's senior management was becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the quality of CP's bulletins and with the extent of the Canadian Press agency's domination of news broadcasting over Canada's national broadcasting service. The CBC began to consider that the corporation should have greater control over the style, content, format and frequency of the news bulletins presented on CBC. The CBC began rethinking its relationship with CP as early as December 23, 1937, when Livesay wrote to CBC's General Manager Gladstone Murray suggesting that CP would consider asking him for payment for the bulletins it supplied to the corporation. Many CP members opposed CP's decision to supply CBC with a free news service and were "very apprehensive" about rumours that the CBC was "putting on an

intensive campaign for advertising" in order to offset a deficit. Livesay said the CBC should try to cooperate more with CP and "if necessary to go out of its way to meet our reasonable wishes" and said the "weight of obligation is from CBC to CP . . ." Livesay argued that CP had refused to accept payment for its news bulletin service to "maintain a free hand" in its decision-making over the content of the bulletins. Livesay did, however, express satisfaction that the CBC was "very good in checking radio stations that have stolen our news or that of our members." (73)

Livesay disapproved of Transradio, which catered to radio stations sponsoring its newscasts. "In my opinion news should not be sold as a commodity on the air, because there is not the responsibility, the tradition, that governs the daily newspaper." The Canadian Press was convinced that "Transradio is a bad news service for the Canadian public" because "it was loaded up with American news, including much crime, and there [is?] practically not a word of Canadian or British news." Transradio, he said, was the "best seller of advertising on the air." (74)

Livesay's comments annoyed Ernie Bushnell, the CBC's General Supervisor of Programming. In a letter to Murray on December 30, 1937, Bushnell was critical of CP's newscasts: "The news is not suitably written for radio. It is practically all straight copy [ripped off the news wire]." Furthermore, CP's radio news items were "often badly selected." Bushnell told Murray that "about the only time I can share Mr. Livesay's opinions is in the value of well written, well presented news" as a broadcast feature. "If The Canadian Press wants to be paid for the service it is giving us, then I think we should look around

and obtain the best value we can for our money."(75)

> The Canadian Press suggest more friendly cooperation. The best form of cooperation would be for the CP to allow one of our men to go to their office and in collaboration with their news editors, to write a radio version of the news. The CP people know the news and how to set it up for newspaper purposes. They do not know how to write material for oral delivery; they do not know how to build a radio newscast giving it a shape just as a musical, or a dramatic production, has a shape. There are many facts and items which the eye can take in but the ear will miss . . . Facts should be simply stated and figures eliminated as far as possible.(76)

The Canadian Press, Bushnell argued, was "fighting" Transradio's service because its rival could broadcast reports about major news stories to its subscribers as the story was breaking.

> CP is apparently not willing either to give or to sell its news to radio stations until it has first been printed. I am definitely of the opinion that this is the wrong attitude. If something of importance comes along why not let it be broadcast[?] As soon as people hear it they start talking and then go and buy a newspaper to read the full report, thereby increasing rather than decreasing the circulation of the local papers. (77)

Bushnell was the only senior CBC manager who, as early as 1937, advocated that the CBC take over the job of writing the news bulletins.(78) The CBC, he wrote, needed "an entirely new deal" with The Canadian Press.

> Mr. Livesay must somehow be convinced that what we have been getting from them is not good enough -- stale news, poorly written and oft times poorly chosen. I quite appreciate that it would be a serious matter for the CBC to become embroiled in a controversy with Canadian newspapers at the present time. I think we must look ahead and begin paving the way for a new setup insofar as news broadcasting is concerned.(79)

In the same letter, Bushnell suggested that CBC could consider subscribing to Reuters news service, which could be supplemented by Canadian news "gathered from all parts of Canada by our own reporters." A full-time news editor in Ottawa, reporters in

every provincial capital, paid on a salaried basis, in addition to free-lance correspondents, would form the nucleus of a costly yet satisfactory news service. He suggested that, in the meantime, every effort be made to convince CP that its bulletins "should be prepared by a broadcaster and not a newspaper man."(80)

On March 6, 1938, W. J. O'Reilly and Terrence O'Dell, two CBC announcers who regularly read the CP news bulletins on the air, submitted a plan to Bushnell proposing "a solution for the present unsatisfactory condition with regard to the quality and completeness of news broadcasts on the CBC network."(81) O'Reilly and O'Dell recommended that the CBC build a news service of its own that would be "outstanding for editorial value and authenticity of material." If the corporation took over the job of selecting news and writing newscasts from CP, the CBC would have "a more complete and more interesting daily news" service. A national broadcasting service required up-to-the-minute news on its bulletins -- and not "news that has [already] been published in every evening paper in the country." The existing CP service was serving only the "limited portion of our audience which resides in areas not serviced by the daily papers."

> Such news is definitely lacking in interest, chiefly because it is stale, and therefore not news but history, and also because [it] is written by newspaper men, not men who are thoroughly acquainted with radio and its needs. That is, it is written so as to appear well in print, but with no thought as to how it will sound when spoken. (82)

Relying on CP to provide the bulletins created unreasonable delays in getting important news stories on the radio they wrote. Furthermore, CBC did not have any say over the content of

the bulletins being broadcast over its own network. "What this network needs is a news service which imposes no restrictions as to times of broadcast and which does not compell [sic] us to abide by its selction [sic] and writing of the news." The CP radio style was "frequently awkward and lacking in euphony" which radio listeners found difficult to understand. O'Reilly and O'Dell considered it "absurd" that the CBC broadcast only one "national" bulletin every day. They also suggested that the CBC diversify its sources of information, and recommended that the CBC subscribe to the services of British United Press in addition to Canadian Press. "It would be necessary to use Canadian Press, largely to maintain their goodwill and not to incur their opposition which might be very detrimental at the outset."

> . . . a News department could be created that would supply the CBC audience with news -- news written for radio by radio men who have carefully studied the requirements of this network and who have the instinct for showmanship and administrative ability to edit and manage such an enterprise.(83)

Although Bushnell was sympathetic to their proposal to set up a news department, was not optimistic about the prospect of the CBC setting up its own News Service. Two months after O'Reilly and O'Dell submitted their memorandum, Bushnell acknowledged that a "good many" people had reviewed their proposal and considered it an "excellent report" worthy of discussion with CP. But he did not hold out much hope that the CBC would be in a position to implement their suggestions:

> I am sure you appreciate that the question of Canadian Press news is a particularly difficult one to handle. We do not pay for this [CP] service and until we do I am afraid that we cannot dictate to Canadian Press as to the type of news we want and the style in which it should be written. (84)

Management's rationale for shelving the proposal was simple: even if the CBC did create its own News Service, it would likely obtain the straight news dispatches from CP anyway. The CBC was receiving an adequate news bulletin service from CP without cost to the corporation (except for "out of pocket expenses") and a move to have the CBC wrest control of news broadcasting from The Canadian Press might create ill will with the news agency and arouse suspicion from the press as to the CBC's motives. Setting up a News Service would be costly. As CBC Chairman Leonard Brockington told a House of Commons commitee on March 9, 1938: "The gathering of our own news would be very expensive and one which we cannot engage in at the present time."(85) The CBC was already spending a considerable amount of money on opening new CBC stations and installing high-powered transmitters to assure CBC coverage nationwide. Nevertheless, the O'Reilly and O'Dell memorandum provided impetus to the debate within CBC management circles that the CBC should take over the responsibility for preparing newscasts. Although their proposal was shelved by management, it constituted a blueprint for the CBC News Service that would be created three years later.

Ironically, six months later, Bushnell was himself strongly advocating that the CBC should create such a service. He thought the CBC needed more than one national news broadcast each day. "It is probable that in order to do so, the source of our news supply will have to be enlarged . . . [and] I see no reason why we should not."(86) The CBC had the right to do this under the provisions of the _Canadian Broadcasting Act, 1936._

. . . it may be a difficult task to persuade Canadian Press to provide us with more news and to permit our own people to prepare it in a manner suitable for broadcasting. It may be that we will have to pay for such a service. If so by all means let us do it even if this means temporarily limiting the development of other forms of broadcasting. To me, the proper presentation of news, both in the quantity and quality of it, is by far the most important function of a nationally operated broadcasting system such as ours.(87)

Bushnell concluded by urging that "a definite plan of action be discussed and preparatory steps" taken to strengthen what he considered one of the "weakest links" in the CBC's structure.

> I realize only too well that this may precipitate trouble between the CBC and the Press but I am absolutely convinced that the time has come for us to give those who pay a [radio] license [fee] more than we have been giving them in the past. I see no quicker or better way of doing so than by rejuvenating our news broadcasts irrespective of whose corns we may tread on in doing so. (88)

By 1938, the CBC's General Manager suggested that the CP needed to improve its newscasts. Murray had suggested to Livesay that a "radio man" employed by the CBC needed to go over the CP copy to tailor the bulletins for broadcasting. However, CP did not approve of the idea. Livesay said that "So long as The Canadian Press is delivering its news free to CBC, it must control through its own staff the character of these bulletins. If CBC desires to prepare them and put them out, the first step will be for it to make an acceptable offer [of remuneration] for our complete news service."(89)

Murray wrote to Livesay on September 7, 1938, stating that the CBC did not challenge CP's right to determine the "form and wording" of the bulletin since CP provided its news free of charge. However, Murray suggested that CP read aloud its bulletins to make them more suitable for broadcasting. Murray accepted CP's "complete authority over the selection of news and

its preparation," but he could not "subscribe to the doctrine that we [CBC] have nothing to say about its radio presentation." He added: "The acceptance of a free service of news has been of great assistance to the CBC, but I cannot look upon this arrangement as permanently healthy."(90)

In November of 1938, upon returning from a fact-finding trip to Europe, Bushnell appeared convinced that in order to improve the news bulletins, the CBC would have to organize its own news department. While in Britain, Bushnell had been "greatly impressed" by "the handling of the [BBC] news, which I think is well done."(91)

> The BBC is laughed at by some for its lack of imagination and the stodginess or its programmes but not once did I hear the smallest word of criticism for its news broadcasting except for the lack of it during daytime hours and occasionally on the lugubrious voice of the announcer. The fact is that the BBC has become an institution of national importance and justifies the existence of the BBC if for no other reason. (92)

The CBC, Bushnell stated, would benefit if it adopted the best aspects of the radio systems in Britain and Europe as well as those of the United States, without "slavishly imitating" either of them. After seeing the operations of European radio stations, the extent of CP's control over the newscasts of the CBC had clearly disturbed him.

> In none of the countries which I visited has the Press or the daily newspapers control of the broadcasting of news as is the case in Canada. Such a situation exists partially in Great Britain where the BBC, through an agreement made many years ago, does not broadcast news before 6.00 p.m. In the totalitarian states the broadcasting of news and propaganda is of course controlled by the Government, but in the democracies, Great Britain, Belgium, France and Switzerland, this [news] is perhaps the most important function of the state-controlled broadcasting systems. (93)

Bushnell noted that even Belgium's state radio service had its own editorial staff that compiled the information supplied by Reuters and Havas news agencies. In addition, it had a full-time staff of six professional journalists assigned to bureaux in Belgium's principal cities. News was broadcast five times a day in 15-minute newscasts in French and in Flemish.

Bushnell also noted the novel techniques used by the BBC in presenting the news. In London, the BBC had "equal rights" with newspapers. Any text of an announcement made by the Prime Minister or his Cabinet Ministers was issued simultaneously to both the press and the BBC. The CBC had not adopted such a practice, since government news on the CP bulletin had been issued to CP. "This, I think, is important and is an arrangement which should be striven for in Canada," he stated. Bushnell was particularly interested in the BBC's insertion of pre-recorded statements made by statesmen and other public figures in its news bulletin. Bushnell, who had been in London at the time of the Munich crisis in September 1938, noted that Britain's Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, had been met at the airfield by newspaper reporters and by "a BBC man with a microphone and recording equipment" the morning Chamberlain flew to Munich for his historic meeting with German Chancellor Adolf Hitler. That evening, the BBC inserted part of Chamberlain's statement in its evening newscast.(94)

> Probably that same statement had been carried in millions of copies of newspapers during the day, but I believe that it had a much greater effect given to the people by the voice, or a reproduction of the voice, of the man who made it. That is a concession that I feel the CBC must obtain without delay from Canadian Press. In order to do this we may have to lengthen the period of the news broadcast. We may also

> have to establish in Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver a small news staff of former journalists -- men qualified to judge proper news values. We will undoubtedly have to have more and better equipment and additional mobile pickup facilities. Nevertheless, I strongly recommend that steps be taken at once to see that this is done. (95)

Although some consideration had been given to setting up a news department within the CBC, management instead decided to expand the existing Canadian Press service. Setting up a news department was a worthy goal, but the proposal did not have a high priority. Instead, management would try to obtain CP's cooperation to improve the existing CP service.

On May 2, 1939, as the international situation was becoming increasingly precarious, CP and CBC concluded an agreement to supply an expanded service of newscasts. The number of CP news bulletins was increased. A daytime service consisting of three 15-minute regional summaries for each of the CBC's five main program-production centres (Toronto, Montreal, Halifax, Winnipeg, Vancouver) were broadcast at breakfast, lunch and dinner time, and a "national" news summary was broadcast from Toronto at 11:00 p.m. EST. (96) CP made a commitment to provide "an objective and non-partisan service of Canadian, British and world news" in return for a commitment by the CBC to prohibit the broadcast of "any commercially sponsored news over its own stations." CP agreed to "place its entire news service at the disposal of the Corporation" and to supply bulletins, supplemented by local, regional, and national bulletins, news flashes, as requested by the CBC. The CBC could determine the timing, number, form and length of the bulletins, and insert actuality broadcasts and recordings. The CBC could stylize the

news fro radio, but it could not make any change in the CP copy that would "affect its meaning or integrity."(97) Although CP would continue to provide news to CBC "free of charge," the corporation agreed to pay $20,000 a year to cover the "out-of-pocket" expenses incurred by CP (teletype machine hookups, etc.). The agreement came into effect on July 3, 1939.

On March 30, 1939, Livesay told a House of Commons committee that CP had been furnishing a free service of news to the CBC, despite complaints from some of its member newspapers. "Some of our members in rather hard times, with loss of revenue, and so on, are rather annoyed that we should be giving away their news [to the CBC] for nothing." Livesay reiterated that CP supplied news to the CBC free of charge from "a sense of national duty" because CP believed that the "news on the air shall be Canadian and not foreign."(98) However, CP's interest was primarily motivated by a desire to curb the number of sponsored newscasts. As war loomed in Europe, the news agency intensified its lobbying campaign to eliminate the sponsorship of radio news.

Although the agreement of May 1939 had called for more direct CBC input in the production of its newscasts, dissatisfaction with the quality of CP's newscasts prompted CBC personnel to seriously consider setting up an alternative service. In October of 1939, Daniel Carman McArthur, the CBC's Ontario Representative for Press and Information, was appointed as part-time supervisor of news broadcasts. He urged the CBC to take a more direct role in the production of the CP newscasts.

Profile of Dan McArthur

Born in Brooklyn, N.Y., on August 12, 1897, "Dan' McArthur was the son of Peter McArthur, a columnist with the Toronto Globe and editor of Truth, a literary magazine published in New York. (His godfather was Canadian poet Bliss Carman).(99) After spending his childhood in England, Dan McArthur's and his family settled on a farm in Appin, Ontario (Middlesex County) in 1910. McArthur attended high school in Glencoe, Ontario and spent one year drawing, cartooning and painting with the New York Art Students' League. During the "Great War," McArthur served overseas with the 55th Battery of the Canadian Field Artillery from 1916 to 1919. He was discharged with the rank of Sargeant. In 1921, he graduate with a Bachelor of Science in Agriculture from the Ontario Agricultural College in Guelph.

McArthur's experience in journalism was not particularly distinguished or extensive. He was assistant agricultural editor for the Toronto Globe from 1922 to 1923; general news, farm and markets reporter for the Farmer's Sun from 1923 to 1925; and part-time farm and general news reporter for the The Globe from 1926 to 1927. After leaving the newspaper business, McArthur had various jobs in writing, publicity and public relations. From 1925 to 1928, he became publicity director for Toronto's Royal Winter Fair, publicist for the Council of Canadian Meat Packers, and wrote advertising copy for five chicken hatcheries in Ontario. From 1928 to 1931, McArthur managed the Canadian office of the Chilean Nitrate Bureau (which sold fertilizer) and directed that company's press relations, publicity and

advertising. He lost his job when the office closed due to the economic collapse of the Great Depression. In 1932, he held a variety of publicity, advertising and free-lance writing jobs. He worked briefly for the Ontario Fruit Growers' Association in 1933.(100)

At the same time, McArthur also had a short-lived career with the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission (His salary: $20 a week). In 1933, he worked with Robinson F. MacLean, then a reporter with the Toronto Telegram, and co-wrote "The Canadian Bugle," a satirical radio program consisting of "snappy items" from the newspapers, adapted to verse and set to piano and accordion music.(101) The radio commissioners were "scandalized" by an offbeat story about the bathing problems of the residents of Ste. Genevieve, Quebec that the two writers transformed into a raffish poem. After only three episodes, the CRBC pulled the program off the air and fired McArthur and MacLean for "vulgarity."(102)

Following this debacle, McArthur worked for the Maclean Publishing Company Ltd., where he was put in charge of the direct mail division of the circulation department. From 1934 to 1939, he wrote letters, circulars, advertisements and promotional material for Maclean's, Chatelaine, Mayfair, and Canadian Homes and Gardens magazines. He was also in charge of the Fidelity Circulation Company, a general magazine agency operated by Maclean's.

On June 19, 1939, McArthur joined the CBC as its Press and Information Representative for the Ontario region. He would later reminisce about his early days with CBC:

> When I came to the CBC in 1939, it was a happy release . . . I had spent a long dismal time doing work in which I had no interest, kissing the asses of people for whom I had neither liking nor respect. . . . For the first time since I had made my own living, I felt that it was not at the expense of my integrity as a human being. There was an atmosphere of aliveness and enthusiasm, of human understanding and companionship, of satisfaction in doing one's job, that was new in my experience. It made me slap-happy and I still look back on those months with the CBC in 1939 as something never to be forgotten.(103)

His previous professional experience in publicity and public relations had required him to subordinate his own personal integrity and to be deferential toward the businessmen for whom he worked, and who he characterized as "a bunch of stupid bastards."

In addition to his duties as a Press and Information Officer, McArthur was asked to supervise the "Canadian Press News" broadcasts on October 1, 1939. (Prior to that date, the bulletins had been supervised by D'Arcy Marsh, who left the CBC to enlist in the armed forces.) (104) McArthur checked the style of the bulletins and maintained a day-to-day liaison with the radio news writers at CP's Toronto office and with CP's General Superintendent, Gillis Purcell. Over the next few months, McArthur spent more and more of his time supervising the bulletins and less on his publicity work.

On September 25, 1939, McArthur indicated in a memorandum that "as things stand at present, the choice of news items, the order in which they are presented in the newscasts, and their preparation is entirely discretionary with the Canadian Press, and not with us. We function merely in a consultative role, offering suggestions on stylizing for radio."(105) CBC liaison personnel working at the CP newsroom frequently made suggestions

to the CP's copywriters about ways to improve the radio style of the newscasts. However, CP's radio newswriters had an "understandably negative reaction to having anyone make suggestions over their shoulders while they are busy writing," he wrote, adding "suggestions under such circumstances are not well received." Although McArthur believed that CP's bulletins were "for the most part quite acceptable" he suggested that the CBC consider two alternative proposals:

> . . . one is that we should do all of our own newscast writing, using the CP simply as a source; the other, that we should have a stylizer continuously on the job at the CP head office, watching each piece of CP copy as it is written by their copy writers. Either of these plans would demand the full-time services of one or more persons. The second plan, that of having someone watching each piece of CP copy as it . . . is being written, would, I think, work out most inharmoniously as far as our relations with CP are concerned. If any change is made, the plan of doing the writing job ourselves appears to me to be the only sound one. (106)

After spending one month analyzing the writing style and quality of CP's newscasts, W. H. Brodie, the CBC's Supervisor of Broadcast Language, came to the same conclusion. It was Brodie's "firm conviction that one of two things must be done; either the CP must supply better writers, or we must write the copy ourselves. [To] attempt to educate present copy-writers up to the standard that we want is a waste of time."(107)

On September 26, 1939, Bushnell stated that CBC's dissatisfaction with the "news situation" in Canada was due to three reasons: "withholding" news from being broadcast on radio bulletins until it had appeared in the newspapers; unreliability of sources and accuracy of news broadcasts

on private stations; and proliferation of sponsored newscasts on private stations and CBC affiliates.

Bushnell admitted that, in some cases, "I have had the feeling they [CP] have delayed news reaching us but I cannot convince myself that this was done wilfully." Such delays, combined with CP's lack of interest in covering news of local interest in its regional bulletins, led Bushnell to conclude that he could not see "how any conclusion can possibly be drawn but that the Canadian Press service [to CBC] will never be completely satisfactory."(108)

In a memo to Murray, Bushnell said the CBC could no longer accept CP's "dictum" that its bulletins could not be changed without the approval of its senior executives. The agency held the view that "they [CP] are completely responsible for the content of each and every bulletin, and that we have nothing much to say about it other than to instruct their writers how to put words together so that they will sound well on the air."

> There is a principle involved in all this. While my fears may be more imaginary than real, I have definitely gathered the impression that Canadian Press is fully determined to control news broadcasting in Canada. If we do not hold out for our rights, we shall become completely subservient to their selfish interests and once having gotten us under their thumb, they will be in a position to dictate to us what news is or is not to be broadcast.(109)

On November 16, 1939, Bushnell reported that CP had improved its bulletins because of suggestions made by McArthur and Brodie as well as CP's "spirit of willingness to cooperate." However, Bushnell's "greatest complaint" was that each news broadcast started with the phrase "This is the Canadian Press News." He took a "strong objection to [CP] using our

facilities to advertise their news service in such a direct manner," although he did not mind if CP used the phrase "For further details read your local newspaper" at the conclusion of the bulletin.(110) According to Bushnell, the only possible way to resolve the conflict was for the CBC to lessen its dependency on CP by setting up its own news service.

Clearly, the CBC's dissatisfaction with CP's news bulletins and its concern over CP's domination of news broadcasting in Canada was increasing. It was also assumed that a news department similar to the one established in the BBC and in the U.S. networks would eventually have been organized. The agreement reached in May of 1939, which had called for an expanded CP service and better CBC-CP cooperation, was a "stop-gap" measure that postponed the decision to set up a CBC News Service until a more opportune time.

The outbreak of war in September of 1939 created a new and more difficult problem for the CBC. The federal government used radio as a means of communicating directly with the public. But news broadcasting posed certain problems for Canada's fledgling radio network. As a publicly-owned corporation, a news department set up by the CBC might have been viewed with some suspicion as a medium that would broadcast news that served the government's interest. Although CP had provided an adequate service of radio news bulletins, the CBC's management concluded that, during wartime, the CBC needed to obtain more control over news broadcasting on its national network. The outbreak of the war gave CBC's management an opportunity to justify the additional funds needed to organize a national news service. It

became imperative that important decisions regarding the selection, writing and broadcasting of news be made by the publicly owned network, and not by a private business, the Canadian Press. The CP newscasts had a high degree of public credibility. By pledging to continue CP's tradition of objective news reporting, the CBC could set up its own News Service without creating the impression that it was a medium for 'official' government news.

ENDNOTES -- CHAPTER I

1
Frank W. Peers, The Politics of Canadian Broadcasting, 1920-51 (Toronto, 1968), p. 101.
2
The Newspaper Proprietors' Association, the Newspaper Society, Reuters Ltd., the Press Association, the Exchange Telegraph Company, and the Central News agreed to supply the BBC with news. In 1930 two editors and two sub editors produced the first 6:00 p.m. news bulletin written and edited in a BBC newsroom. News was collected as it came off the tape machines in the newsroom and subsequently written up as news "items" for broadcasting. [source: Asa Briggs The Golden Age of Wireless, vol. II of "The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom," (London: 1965) pp. 153-55.]
3
A. A. Schecter, I Live on Air, (New York, 1940), p. 1
4
National Archives of Canada, Beyond the Printed Word (Ottawa, 1988), p. vii.
5
Peers op. cit., p. 101
6
J. H. Woods to Hector Charlesworth, March 16, 1933. [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, file: 11-17-3 (1)
7
CRBC, Interim Report, 1933, p. 8
8
Peers, op. cit, p. 156
9
By 1938, 83 of Canada's 97 daily newspapers were CP members. "CP: Its History" in Carman Cumming et. al. Canadian News Service, vol. 6, of the Research Publications of the Royal Commission on Newspapers (Ottawa, 1981).
10
J. F. B. Livesay to H. E. Turner, November 8, 1932 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, file: 11-17-3 (1)]
11
J. F. B. Livesay to CP Members, November 21, 1932 (circular no. 14) [NAC RG 41, vol. 172, 11-17-3 (1)]
12
J. F. B. Livesay to H. Charlesworth, October 24, 1932 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, 11-17-3 (1)]
13
H. Charlesworth to E. G. Smith, January 9, 1933 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, file: 11-17-3 (1)]
14
J. F. B. Livesay to H. Charlesworth, December 10, 1932 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, 11-17-3 (1)]
15
In the United States, a court of appeals prohibited radio stations from broadcasting Associated Press dispatches in December of 1935, overturning a lower court ruling in December of

1934. The appeals court sided with the Associated Press because it had an obligation to protect the news gathering and disseminating agencies "against the impairment of their efficiency by the inevitable reduction of their business income" due to increased commercial sponsorship of radio newscasts. In the landmark case International News Service vs. Associated Press, a U.S. court in 1918 ruled that news was protected as a "quasi property" against unfair competition.

With regard to newspaper copyright, the Canadian Copyright Act of 1921 (which came into force in 1924) has adhered to Article 9, revised schedule, of the second Berne Convention (Paris, 1896). W. H. Kesterton has explained that "news as such is not copyrightable, but that the form of the news report and the language with which that news [story] is clothed do enjoy copyright." Except for a series of articles, other newspapers may freely reproduce news that has been published in other newspapers unless such a borrowing has been expressly forbidden. [Sources: "News Piracy Ban," Business Week, December 21, 1935, p. 10; and Wilfred H. Kesterton, "Newspaper Copyright" in The Law and the Press in Canada (Toronto, 1976), pp. 128-132.]

16
J. F. B. Livesay to H. Charlesworth, February 6, 1933. [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, file: 11-17-3 (1).

17
The Canadian Press "Report of the Special Committee on Property Right in News," Meeting of the Board of Directors, Montreal, Que., November 23, 1925. [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, file: 11-17-3 (1).]

18
J. Livesay to H. Charlesworth, December 30, 1932 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, file: 11-17-3 (1); and CP memorandum, "News on the Air," November 4, 1935, NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: "CRBC and CBC news development.]

19
Arthur Partridge (CDNA) to H. Charlesworth, January 3, 1933. [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, file: 11-17-3 (1)]

20
H. Charlesworth to J. F. B. Livesay, January 3, 1933 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, file: 11-17-3 (1)]

21
Jackson S. Elliott (AP) to J. F. B. Livesay, January 9, 1933 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, file: 11-17-3 (1)]

22
H. Charlesworth to J. F. B. Livesay, January 20, 1933 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, file: 11-17-3 (1)]

23
C. Thomson to H. Charlesworth, January 18, 1933 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, file: 11-17-3 (1)]

24
C. Thomson to J. Livesay, January 30, 1933 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, 11-17-3 (1)]

25
J. F. B. Livesay to C. Thomson, February 1, 1933 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, 11-17-3 (1)]

26
E. Castonguay to J. F. B. Livesay, November 26, 1932 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, file: 11-17-3 (1)]
27
Lucien Moraud to Thomas Maher (CRBC), December 5, 1932 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, file: 11-17-3 (1)]
28
H. Charlesworth to J. F. B. Livesay, January 3, 1933 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, file: 11-17-3 (1)]
29
J. F. B. Livesay to H. Charlesworth, January 4, 1933 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, file: 11-17-3 (1)]
30
H. Charlesworth to J. F. B. Livesay, February 3, 1933 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, file: 11-17-3 (1)]
31
J. F. B. Livesay to Charlesworth, February 16, 1933 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, file: 11-17-3 (1)]
32
"Deputation before the CRBC at 2:30 p.m., February 21, 1933 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, file: 11-17-3 (1)]
33
J. F. B. Livesay, "News on the Air," (1) November 4, 1935. Memorandum from CP General Manager to CP members. [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: CRBC-CBC News Development, 1933-40.]
34
E. W. Jackson to Station Managers, "Broadcast News Bulletin Service," September 2, 1933 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, file: 11-17-3 (2)]. See also "CRBC Rules and Regulations," PC 535, April 15, 1933. Part V, Section 2, no. 101 on News Broadcasts, Roger Bird (ed.) Documents of Canadian Broadcasting (Ottawa: 1988), p. 132.
35
"A Memorandum for an Agreement between the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission and the Canadian Press," May 25, 1933 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, file: 11-17-3 (1)]
36
J. F. B. Livesay, cited in "News Over the Radio," (editorial) Ottawa Journal, July 3, 1933.
37
"Minutes of Meeeting of sub-Committee of the [CP] Board of Directors re: proposed Agreement with the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission, held at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of Tuesday, June 6, 1933." [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, file: 11-17-3 (1)]
38
Hector Charlesworth to J. M. Williams [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, June 5, 1933, file: 11-17-3 (1)]
39
"News Over the Radio," Ottawa Journal, July 3, 1933.
40
E. W. Jackson, September 2, 1933. See also Bird, op. cit., p. 132.
41
J. F. B. Livesay, "News on the Air," (1) November 4, 1935.

42
J. F. B. Livesay "News on the Air," (2) April 7, 1936; see also Bird _op. cit._, p. 132
43
E. W. Jackson (CRBC manager of station relations) to Charles Shearer (CRCT) Toronto, July 7, 1933 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, 11-17-3 (1)]
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45
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"News on the Air," November 4, 1935
48
"News on the Air," _Business Week_, March 24, 1934, pp. 11-12.
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Schecter _op. cit._, p.1
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"News on the Air," _Business Week_, March 24, 1934, pp. 11- 12
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"Press-Radio Squall," _Business Week_, January 7, 1939, p. 24
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"News War in the Air," _Business Week_, May 25, 1935, p. 20-21.
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R. W. Lipsett, "National Affairs," _Saturday Night_, vol. 49, no. 1 (November 11, 1933), p. 4.
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Ibid.
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71
Beyond the Printed Word, p. 16

72 The mobile unit used for the 1939 Royal Tour broadcasts gave CBC an opportunity to try out the equipment and gain expertise that would be used by the CBC's overseas unit covering Canada's fighting forces in Europe from 1943 to 1945. [source: Beyond the Printed Word (Ottawa, 1988), p. vii.]
73
J. F. B. Livesay to G. Murray, December 23, 1937 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 173, 11-17-3.]
74
Ibid.
75
E. Bushnell to G. Murray, "Canadian Press News Bulletins," December 30, 1937 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 173, file 11-17-3 (8)]
76
Ibid.
77
Ibid.
78
On December 12, 1936, the head of the CBC's Public Relations Division, E. C. Buchanan, expressed dissatisfaction with CBC's "position of obligation" to CP. Referring to the handling of

news about the abdication of King Edward VIII, he stated in a memo to Murray that he "had to approach The Canadian Press with almost excessive delicacy and to some extent from a personal angle in suggesting our special requirements when the story first broke." He said any suggestion that the CBC desired to control the content of bulletins "would have been resented and might have shut off the source of supply." Buchanan then added:

> "While The Canadian Press ordinarily handles the news, including bulletins for broadcasting, with care and good judgment, we should ourselves be able to be in a position to determine the manner in which the news should be broadcast. It has seemed to me that the conveying of information and intelligence to the public must increasingly become a function of the national broadcasting system and that as soon as circumstances permit provision should be made for a more satisfactory discharge of this function."

McArthur later wrote that this memo was the first specific proposal on record stating that the CBC should establish its own News Service. [source: E. C. Buchanan to G. Murray, December 12, 1936; NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2; file: CRBC and CBC News Development, 1933-1940;" and McArthur manuscript.]

79
E. L. Bushnell to G. Murray, December 30, 1937.

80
<u>Ibid.</u>

81
W. J. O'Reilly and T. O'Dell to E. Bushnell, March 6, 1938 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, file: 11-17-2]

82
<u>Ibid.</u>

83
<u>Ibid.</u>

84
E. Bushnell to W. J. O'Reilly and T. O'Dell, May 20, 1938 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 172, file: 11-17-2]

85
House of Commons, Standing Committee on Radio Broadcasting, March 9, 1938, <u>Minutes of Evidence and Proceedings</u>, pp. 10-11.

86
E. Bushnell memorandum (circa November 1938) [NAC, MG 30 E250, vol. 14, file "CBC - News and Programme Orientation, memoranda, 1938"

87
<u>Ibid.</u>

88
<u>Ibid.</u>

89
<u>Ibid.</u>

90
"News on the Air: Memorandum by CP's General Manager (no. 4), October 1938 [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, CRBC-CBC News Development"]

91
CBC memo, "Bushnell Appointed Director of North American Corporation of BBC Service, 1940-41," [NAC, MG 30 E250, vol. 14]

92 Bushnell memorandum [NAC, MG 30 E250, vol. 14, file "CBC -- News and Programme Orientation -- memoranda, 1938"]

93 *Ibid.*

94 *Ibid.*

95 *Ibid.*

96 CBC *Annual Report*, 1939-40, p. 13

97 "Memorandum of Proposed Agreement between the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the Canadian Press for a Comprehensive News Service," May 2, 1939 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 899, PG-10-1 (1)]

98 House of Commons, Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting, March 30, 1939, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, p. 289

99 "Daniel C. McArthur: Journalist Founded CBC News Service," (obituary) *The Globe and Mail*, March 20, 1967.

100 Allan Sangster, "Dan McArthur -- from Limericks to CBC News Editorship," *Saturday Night*, October 12, 1946, pp. 26-27.

101 Gerard McNeil (CP) "Battled 13 years for Integrity of CBC News -- Dan McArthur in Profile," The Ottawa *Journal*, May 14, 1966; this story also appeared as "This McArthur Was a General Too: He Fought for CBC News, and Is Now Writing Its History," Montreal *Gazette*, May 23, 1966, p. 14.

102 *Ibid.*

103 D.C. McArthur, memorandum to CBC, "Up Shit Creek With a P & A Paddle," July 21, 1947 [NAC, MG 30 D 67, vol. 4]

104 G. Murray to John A. McNeil, September 13, 1939 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 171, file 11-17-7-(2)]

105 D. C. McArthur to Bushnell, "Canadian Press," September 25, 1939 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 899, file 10-1 (1)]

106 *Ibid.*

107 W. H. Brodie to D. C. McArthur, October 28, 1939 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 899, file: PG-10-1 (1)]

108 E. L. Bushnell to Murray, September 26, 1939 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 899, file: 10-1 (1)]

109 E. L. Bushnell, "General Observations on the News Situation" September 26, 1939 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 171, file: 11-17-7 (2)]

110 E. L. Bushnell to D. Manson, "Canadian Press News," November 16, 1939 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 899, file: PG-10-1 (1)]

CHAPTER II

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CBC NEWS SERVICE, 1939-1940

The dramatic events during the late summer of 1939 accelerated the process culminating in the organization of the CBC News Service. As the threat of war in Europe loomed in 1938 and 1939, anxious listeners turned to their radios to catch the latest news reports. The "Canadian Press News" broadcasts captured large radio audiences, and private radio stations featured many news programs and commentaries in addition to the Canadian Press (CP) bulletins. In the summer of 1940, many Canadians feared that an invasion of Great Britain was imminent. Acting in the national interest, the CBC's Board of Governors decided that the CBC should have the facilities at its disposal to get the latest news on the air quickly. But why did it require the stimulus of the Second World War for the CBC to reconsider its own role in the news field? It appears that the escalation of the war was not the only factor.

First, the Canadian Press intensified its concerted lobbying campaign to pressure both CBC and the government into putting an end to the more blatant forms of commercial sponsorship of newscasts on private radio stations. In wartime, the Canadian Press and its member newspapers feared that lucrative sponsored (non-CP) newscasts on private Canadian and American radio

stations would attract large audiences and greater commercial sponsorship. The combined effect would siphon off precious advertising revenue from the newspapers.

Second, at a time of great national urgency, the federal government and the CBC Board of Governors acted in concert to approve the creation of a national radio news service, which would prepare authoritative, accurate, and 'objective' newscasts. It was hoped that the calmer presentation of information on the CBC newscasts would dissuade Canadians from listening to the more popular and sometimes sensational newscasts on major American networks and private stations in Canada.

Third, some newspaper editorialists played up the fears in policymakers' minds that sensationalism on some radio newscasts -- if left unchecked -- could spark mass hysteria, which would be detrimental to morale, public order, and the nation's war effort.

CBC and the Outbreak of World War II

Radio news came of age during the Czechoslovakian crisis that culminated in the 'peace' agreement signed at Munich in September of 1938. Daily news reports about the Sudeten-German Question were transmitted by short wave to North America by the major networks, NBC, CBS and Mutual Broadcasting System (many of which were rebroadcast on CBC).(1) One newsman wrote: "Never before had the radio audience done such wholesale listening to a news story. Never before had a story so gripped the listening public. More radio sets were sold during those three weeks than had been sold previously in any similar period." (2) During those "strained days" from September 7 to 30, 1938, Gladstone

Murray, the CBC's General Manager, said the CBC presented 83 special broadcasts on the crisis. Among these broadcasts were CP news 'flashes,' evening bulletins, and commentaries from journalists reporting for the CBC and from correspondents working for the BBC, NBC, CBS, AP and other organizations. "Events moved with such speed and the background changed so constantly that great efforts had to be made to bring to Canadian listeners reports from experienced newspaper observers, both British and American," Murray said.(3)

The Second World War was the first major international conflict in which radio played a major part. In the summer of 1939, as tension in Europe increased over the Polish Question, the CBC devoted more programming time to news and began preparing for the eventuality of war. On August 25, 1939, two days after the signing of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact, the national English-language network extended its operating hours from 7:00 a.m. to midnight as the news bulletins focussed on the grave European situation.

Ernie Bushnell, General Supervisor of Programs, "took immediate charge of programme arrangements." News bulletins dealing with the "kaleidoscopic trend of events" were inserted in CBC programs as soon as they were received from CP, and regular transmission of the BBC news was arranged. From August 24 to August 31, 1939, the CBC broadcast 82 news "flashes," 42 news bulletins, 32 news commentaries, and 9 talks on the crisis, totalling 21:08 hours of coverage.(4)

On August 28, 1939, Gladstone Murray, praised the Canadian

Press "for the remarkably efficient way in which your people have been cooperating with us during the emergency." Murray said the events of the previous day had provided "an excellent opportunity of assessing the value of the [CP] service":

> For the whole morning, we carried only your bulletins. Your news was right up-to-the-minute, and it seemed to me it was drafted in just the right way. Rumours were discounted and there was a wholesome restraint -- a striking contrast to the frantic outpourings elsewhere. (5)

Replying to Murray the next day, John A. McNeil, CP's General Manager, wrote that "The Canadian Press is succeeding in large measure in achieving its purpose of supplying the Canadian radio public with its sane, accurate, impartial and balanced presentation of news." (6) In another letter on September 2, 1939, McNeil, referring to a telephone conversation he had with Murray earlier that day, thanked the General Manager for assuring him that

> the Canadian Press will be protected to the full in any action taken regarding exclusion from the air of unreliable foreign or semi-foreign news reports. I am confident that you will use your power and your influence in insuring that Canadian Press news will be given the widest possible dissemination to the exclusion of any services which might be considered unfavorable to the national interests of Canada under war conditions. (7)

On August 28, 1939, as war in Europe appeared imminent, Murray sent a memorandum to C. D. Howe, Minister of Transport, outlining three issues on news broadcasting in wartime.

In the event of war, Murray recommended that censorship should be imposed immediately "at the source of news as it comes into the country." The General Manager was concerned that if the government's censorship "machinery" were not in place during the initial stages of the war, the onus would then be placed on the

CBC to take "special [censorship] measures." Because of the nature of radio, Murray urged Howe to recommend that the government set up "its censorship machinery for the press so that, from the commencement of hostilities, the same machinery will be able to deal with news material intended for broadcast." Without adequate preparations, the network would "run the risk of some untoward announcement over the air creating a dangerous situation which the same announcement would not [create] in cold print." (8) A committee responsible for the censorship of both press and radio news would make it possible to apply censorship regulations uniformly and to avoid unnecessary duplication of functions. However, Murray warned that censorship of radio news should only be implemented if the press were also "wholly censored."

> No special steps could be taken by the CBC without public knowledge and criticism. The cry might be raised that the government was throttling freedom of expression over the air. This might raise profound misgivings throughout the country and militate against national unity. Critics of the CBC would say that their predictions about radio dictatorship had been well founded. (9)

The second part of Murray's memo dealt with news agencies. Although newspapers were getting their information from "reputable" agencies, the same could not be said of the services (other than CP) that supplied news to radio stations. He singled out Transradio Press Service as the "most likely to put out exaggerated, unfounded and inflammatory material." If the CBC prohibited the 22 private Canadian radio stations subscribing to Transradio from using that service, the stations, sponsors and Transradio would attack the CBC and accuse of CBC of "victimization." This would result in a "disturbing effect on

public opinion." Murray added "If the responsibility for the action rested on the Corporation, it would impair public confidence in the impartiality and tolerance of the corporation." (10)

Restricting Transradio's press service could only be done under the "direction" of the Minister of Transport. If action against Transradio were taken, the CBC could offer Canadian Press service directly to the stations that had subscribed to Transradio's service. "Even on this basis," Murray wrote, "the stations concerned would probably elect to carry BUP, unless it were made mandatory to carry the Canadian Press Service."

Murray had faith in CP's commitment to objective and non-inflammatory journalism. Although Murray's memorandum did not mention the option of organizing a CBC News Service, his criticism of Transradio news made it clear that he favoured placing restrictions on the type and content of news broadcast over the CBC and its affiliated stations in the event of war. Murray's attitude is evident in his suggestion that the CBC was considering "mandatory" use of CP newscasts for private stations. However, Murray did not want the CBC to be accused of restricting the free flow of news. He hoped to deflect criticism by simply requesting private stations to carry CP's news bulletins (instead of commercially sponsored newscasts) without having to ask the CBC Board of Governors to issue a formal directive.

A third problem outlined in the memorandum concerned the deletion of American news bulletins. This could inadvertently be broadcast on "exchange" programs with the U.S. networks. It

was "undesirable and impossible" to take American entertainment programs off the CBC's program schedule since they were well liked by Canadian radio listeners. However, the CBC

> should not leave itself altogether unprotected against. . . an American news bulletin carrying unfounded tidings of reverses or the destruction of cities which would create panic in Canada, especially if no particulars of the event were carried from Canadian sources. (11)

Murray believed that allowing the broadcasting of U.S. news "flashes" which interrupted American entertainment programs would create difficulties for the CBC, strengthen pressure for rigid and complete radio censorship, and impair relations between Canada and the United States. Conversely, Murray said that if the CBC deleted American news broadcasts, it would "create suspicion on the part of Canadian listeners" and would "increase the tendency of Canadian listeners to tune [in to] American stations." This factor, he said, "places a natural barrier on the extent of radio censorship." (12) He indicated that the CBC would make special arrangements to delete all news flashes on American programs. Replying to Murray the next day, Howe agreed that the censorship of radio news broadcasts could "best be handled by the same authority that may be set up for handling the daily press" and said he would bring the matter of press censorship before cabinet. In the meantime, he urged Murray to encourage "your staff continue to do everything possible to prevent the broadcasting of inaccurate news." (13)

Although Canadians still relied on newspapers for in-depth coverage, radio coverage of the war had two major advantages over its competitor -- brevity and immediacy. Despite printing "extra" editions, newspapers simply could not match the speed

with which radio could put news on the air. On the morning of September 1, 1939, many CBC listeners who were glued to their radio sets probably heard a version of this newsflash:

> LONDON, Sept. 1 -- (C.P.) -- A Reuter's despatch from Paris today said:
>
> The following is given with all reserve: According to unconfirmed reports received here, the Germans have begun an offensive with extreme violence on the whole Polish front. (14)

The CBC broadcast 20 news "flashes" on that fateful day. On September 1, 1939, the CBC English-language network carried news bulletins every half-hour (11 in all, totalling 3 hours and 10 minutes) devoted to Germany's invasion of Poland.

From September 2 to 6, 1939, CBC broadcast bulletins every hour. At 6:15 a.m. on September 3, 1939, it broadcast the BBC's announcement of Great Britain's declaration of war on Germany. "A comprehensive up-to-the-minute news service was provided by the Canadian Press and flashes and bulletins were broadcast through the day to keep Canadian public constantly aware of the events that were transpiring in Great Britain and elsewhere in Europe."(15) The CBC carried 14 news bulletins and special broadcasts and 17 news flashes as well as a statement from British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. An address by King George VI to the Empire was aired in the afternoon followed by statements from the Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada; Norman Rogers, the Minister of Labour; C. G. Power, the Minister of Pensions and National Health; and Ernest Lapointe, Minister of Justice.(16) The War Measures Act was invoked. Canada was unofficially at war; but the federal

government would wait until September 10, 1939, for Parliament to formally approve Canadian participation.

The war news interrupted the CBC's entire national program schedule. Since the CBC did not want to inadvertently broadcast the news flashes from U.S. networks that interrupted American entertainment programs carried over the CBC network, a "special line" was arranged between New York and Toronto to bring in exchange programs from the U.S. in which news flashes were not inserted. (This line was discontinued on September 8, when normal program arrangements resumed, and the early evening bulletin was dropped.) Program service was made available to several private stations, not ordinarily connected with the network, so that listeners in all parts of the country would be assured of receiving adequate daily and nightly coverage of the Canadian Press news bulletins. Gillis Purcell, CP's General Superintendent, reported that "The tendency of the sudden 'flash' to alarm listeners was realized, and the number of news 'flashes' was reduced."(17) With the gradual reestablishment of normal programme operations, the use of 'flashes' and special bulletins was curtailed, and news bulletins at predetermined times were scheduled.(18) News programming returned to normal on September 25.

When the resolution declaring war on Germany was approved by the House of Commons on Sunday, September 10, 1939, a special one-minute CP bulletin reporting the official proclamation of a state of war existing between Canada and Germany was broadcast on CBC at 1:32 p.m. EST. The Defence of Canada Regulations (which

contained sections on press and radio censorship) and the Censorship Regulations were immediately promulgated. Surprisingly, there were fewer bulletins and no news flashes that Sunday, compared with the surge of news reports that followed the invasion of Poland and the declaration of war by Britain and France. (CP prepared five English-language bulletins for the national network totalling 36 minutes). Since Britain had declared war, Canada's participation had been a foregone conclusion. The CBC's desire to avoid the kind of criticism that had been directed against its frequent news bulletins surrounding the war's outbreak, probably accounted for the absence of news flashes on the day Canada formally entered the war.

Newspapers were quick to condemn radio -- particularly private Canadian stations and U.S. stations -- for broadcasting news commentaries and analyses that bordered on "hysteria." The Globe and Mail and Ottawa Journal counselled its readers to rely on authoritative reports published in newspapers rather than on radio bulletins. One editorial on August 30, 1939, accused radio commentators of aggravating the "war of nerves" by bombarding listeners with harmful commentary. "The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation has wisely discontinued a broadcast by one "commentator", whose background as an official of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation. . . in Ontario [Graham Spry] scarcely qualified him as a desirable person to tell the people of Canada the significance of developments in Europe."(19) Another stated: "Radios are not being tuned in to stations broadcasting comment on the war crisis. . . because of the nervous strain produced by commentators who dramatize and exaggerate in a manner that is

good neither for private nor public morale."(20) The Ottawa Journal objected to the CBC's habit of breaking into programs to read bulletins, especially with items of "minor importance."

> The broadcasting of straightforward news at set times, such as is done by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation on authoritative reports by the Canadian Press, is a commendable public service. . . . If this crisis ends in war it seems to us the manner and matter of CBC news needs to be considered very carefully. Straight news is fine, at regular intervals, but the comment on it can do much harm.(21)

The Globe and Mail suggested that Canadian listeners should avoid tuning in to U.S. stations and asked Canadian radio stations not to broadcast commentaries from mainly U.S. sources, which spread rumours and "highly coloured bulletins." The newspaper argued that "The radio, of course, is useful. But the amount of guesswork which has gone out in recent days from commentators and others has been more confusing than convincing, and this is liable to be the danger right there." The editorial added:

> In the days preceding and since the declaration of war the radio department of this newspaper has been inundated with calls concerning the authenticity of reports, the confusion of conjecture and rumour sent over the airwaves as news. It is no exaggeration to say that many persons have been reduced to a state of radio jitters. (22)

To reduce the "mass of misinformation," the Globe and Mail editorial stated that "radio's first duty is to be sure of the reliability of its sources of information." News broadcasts such as those on the CBC came under less criticism because of its "regular news broadcasts, sponsored by the newspapers and accredited press agencies." (23)

The outbreak of war made CBC officials question the existing agreement with CP. Although CP provided a "fine service" to

newspapers, it was not well suited for radio because CP's copy writers lacked experience in the broadcasting field. Bob Bowman, a CBC Special Events producer, told Bushnell:

> From now until the end of the war, the broadcasting of news will be our most important programme and possibly the most important function. This being the case, I think the CBC should assume full control of the preparation of news to be broadcast on the CBC network. . . . I know you have been hopeful, for sometime, that we might be able to have a news office of our own in which we could prepare, for broadcasting, the news which would be supplied to us by the Canadian Press. The present situation may be a good lever to assist us in making this necessary change. (24)

Referring to the number of sensational news broadcasts on private stations, Bushnell wrote on September 26, 1939, that the CBC would be apparently obliged to either discipline broadcasting stations or find some means of controlling news broadcasts [while] . . the newspapers [are] allowed to continue misleading the public day in and day out by printing false news. . ."

> it is a fact that the news they [private stations] have given has been so alarming, so unreliable, that the public or the government has taken a serious view of the situation. I fully realize that even one minor indiscretion might do considerable damage to our cause or to the morale of listeners in a reasonably large area. (25)

On April 9, 1940, the "phoney war" in Europe came to an abrupt end as Denmark and Norway were overrun by the Nazi <u>Blitzkrieg</u>. This attack was followed, on May 10, by the invasion of Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg. On June 10, Italy declared war on Britain and France. The French government capitulated on June 22, and the British Expeditionary Force was evacuated from Dunkirk. With the United States remaining neutral, Britain and her Empire stood "alone" against Nazi aggression. The <u>Luftwaffe's</u> bombers would soon be raining death and destruction

on British cities during "the Battle of Britain." The escalation of the conflict and public demand for authoritative news at more frequent intervals prompted the CBC, from May 10 to 12 to broadcast hourly bulletins. Newspaper editorials again began to condemn news broadcasts. One somewhat exaggerated view argued that radio listeners, transfixed by a spate of war news bulletins, would be so overcome with anxiety and tension that they would not be able to carry out their daily tasks. The Ottawa Journal criticized the CBC for having broadcast 12 newscasts on one day, which it said, was as ludicrous as publishing a dozen 'extra' editions.

> Many people have told us of the evil effects on their families of the present deluge of radio news. Sensitive persons, who will listen if the news is there [on the radio], develop a state of dread and become almost or quite hysterical. And even the calmest person, subjected to this bombardment a dozen times in his or her waking hours, finds it a nerve-wracking experience. (26)

The Journal believed the commercially sponsored newscasts of the private stations were the most alarming. The newspaper called upon the CBC to use its regulatory authority to "limit the number of war news bulletins" across Canada. "The public interest seems to demand that this situation be taken in hand sharply and without delay." (27)

Public alarm in Canada was building as an invasion of Britain by Germany appeared imminent. Murray stated that "the broadcast of news has become of even greater importance on account of the war and is now one of the major activities requiring constant and centralized supervision."(28) An up-to-the-minute news service had to be provided in a calm and factual

manner, so as not to unduly alarm the population. McArthur indicated in a memorandum that "Last September [1940] when an invasion of England appeared imminent, a plan was prepared covering news broadcasts, which was approved by the General Manager."(29) News about Britain was bound to generate a great deal of public attention, especially with those many Canadians who had an affinity with "the Old Country." If the CBC did not improve its news broadcasting service, Canadians listeners could turn to the more sensational American radio broadcasts.

The escalation of hostilities was the catalyst that prompted the CBC to reconsider its role in news broadcasting. As a result, it organized an "emergency service" of news that would be "supplied by our own news bureau and not by Canadian Press." CBC officials believed that a News Service operated by the CBC would ensure the preparation of accurate and authoritative news reports. A team of full-time editors could edit and write the news bulletins and get them on the air soon after the news had been ripped off the news "wire." Rene Morin, Chairman of the Board of Governors, later confirmed that one of the reasons behind the creation of the News Service was CBC's desire "to give the news on the radio more swiftly than it had been done before and also to have more news available for radio broadcasting."

> I should not like to say anything against the Canadian Press, but it was normal that in getting the news they took the time to edit it and they sent it to the newspapers who were members of their association. . . ahead of the time at which they sent it to us. . . so that the press had the news ahead of us, and was in a position to print it before we could give it on the radio.(30)

Although the escalation of the war was the ostensible reason for organizing the CBC News Service, increased activity on the

war front coincided with a vigorous lobbying campaign mounted by the Canadian Press. The agency attempted to persuade the CBC to ban sponsorship of news on private radio stations in Canada.

<u>CP's Lobbying Campaign</u>

The News Service resulted from a compromise agreement made between CP and CBC. The CBC made a commitment to prohibit commercial sponsorship of news broadcasts on private stations radio stations for the duration of the war. In return, CP agreed to supply the newly organized CBC News Service with its wire service. The unsponsored CBC news bulletins were offered at no cost (as a public service) to all private stations. CP believed that "if the profit factor were eliminated and all news placed on an equal basis," more private stations would carry the CP bulletins.(31)

Pressure from the Canadian Daily Newspapers Association and CP over the question of news sponsorship steadily mounted. On July 5-6, 1939, CP's Radio Committee passed a resolution stating that the news bulletins supplied by CP "should be broadcast by all stations on the CBC network and that the CBC should make every effort to have these bulletins used by all other stations." In response to CP's resolution on July 6, 1939. Leonard Brockington, Chairman of the CBC's Board of Governors, agreed that the CBC newscasts would be "extended towards having all affiliated stations use the CP bulletins." CP made a representation to the Board of Governors on July 6, 1939.

On October 24, 1939, CP's Board of Directors passed a resolution that news on the air should be confined to the CP news

bulletins for the duration of the war. Brockington believed that an expanded CP service available to all radio stations would eventually drive all of its competitors out of business. Although Brockington objected to the sponsorship of news and wanted it stopped, he thought it unwise to prohibit private stations from sponsoring non-CP newscasts.(32)

When Howe learned that CP's membership was not unanimously opposed to sponsored news on the radio, he suggested the CP Radio Committee "ascertain the consensus of the membership."(33) On May 21, 1940, CP's President and two Vice-Presidents presented Howe with an eleven-point petition signed by 74 of CP's 89 newspapers. In addition, it claimed that "in the national interest, in view of the existence of a state of war and the necessity of censorship of all news, consideration should be given by the Government to the general character of all news broadcasts and the sources from which they emanate."(34) The petition claimed that "improper" news had been released on the "sponsorable" radio services. CP charged that some of these sponsorable services included not only news, but "interpretation or comment upon the news content" which infringed upon the "prohibition of sponsored opinion on the air" put into effect by the CBC when war broke out. CP argued that its news bulletins were "purely factual" and "prepared from its basic news services, of which the British content has been passed by both the British and Canadian censors, and which in its entirety has been edited by a staff of Canadians in close co-operation with the Canadian censorship."(35)

The Canadian Press maintained that sponsored news on the air was "undesirable" and may be "colored by the interests and prejudices of its sponsors." It would be in the public interest to eliminate sponsored news "in view of the availability of the CP service to all broadcasting stations." Furthermore, CP claimed it was not trying to set up a "monopoly" of news on the air because "private stations would still have the right to broadcast news [from other sources] providing it is not commercially sponsored."

In its representation to Howe, CP stated that it did "not request that any other news service be banned from the air -- it feels that if sponsorship is banned the undesirable element in news on the air will soon vanish." CP considered it "disconcerting" to report that it had not received the "fullest cooperation of the CBC in making our radio news bulletins available to every station desiring them, regardless of duplication of coverage." The refusal of some private stations to carry CP bulletins left the way open to "inferior" news services. (36)

In a telegram to the Chairman of CP's Board of Directors, W. Rupert Davies, on May 24, 1940, Howe replied that there was "a predominant feeling in Cabinet favorable to prohibition of news sponsorship." However, Howe also indicated there was a strong demand that the matter be placed before the CBC Board of Governors prior to making a final decision. Fearing a delay in making a final decision, Davies telephoned Howe to press the government for a resolution of this matter. Howe told Davies that the CBC Board of Governors would be convened at once to

reach a decision on the matter.(37) According to CP's General Manager, J. A. McNeil, the special CP news bulletins broadcast on CBC since September 1939 had been "acclaimed in all quarters as an invaluable national service." In a statement released on May 25, 1940, McNeil stated:

> War news on the air and its accurate, level-headed presentation in CP bulletins has won for us a listening audience that is a testimony to the responsibility we insist must be the basis of all CP news -- whether on the air or in the newspapers. Unquestionably, the war has made news the most popular of radio programs. It is unfortunate that with this increase goes a complementary increase in potential profit for sponsored news. Accordingly, advertising programs of news sponsored by the butcher, the baker and the candlestick maker are on the increase. (38)

On June 1, 1940, a 30-member CP delegation met the CBC Board of Governors (including General Manager Gladstone Murray and Assistant General Manager Augustin Frigon), and made a forceful representation reiterating its opposition to sponsored newscasts. CP's President, M. E. Nichols, claimed the news agency was not trying to create a monopoly on news dissemination. However, he stated that CP wanted the CBC to stop "undesirable" sponsorship of news.

> Objection to sponsorship was based on the belief that sponsored news was subject to improper influence, was sensationalized and was broadcast at greater length and frequency than if the profit motive were absent. Redundancy of newscasts, often exaggerated and inaccurate, was not conducive to public morale in wartime.(39)

The publisher of the Calgary <u>Herald</u> and CP director, O.L. Spencer, said the radio station owned by his newspaper carried only the unsponsored CP newscasts. His station never permitted commercial sponsorship of news on the air because that this "lent itself to abuses often without realization by the station.

management." Spencer said an essential difference between radio and a newspaper was that "radio was primarily an amusement enterprise and its personnel were trained in showmanship, leading them to emphasize the theatrical aspects of the news."(40)

The CBC Board of Governors agreed to consider adopting "certain new restrictions on news broadcasts in Canada as a wartime protection," but deferred making any decision until a special meeting of the Board was convened. Following the meeting on June 1, 1940, Rene Morin, who replaced Brockington as Chairman, announced that the CBC Board of Governors "as a precautionary measure on account of the war," passed an order effective July 1, 1940, "rescinding all existing permissions authorizing news broadcasts over broadcasting stations in Canada." New applications would have to be filed for such permissions and would be considered on their merits. This order did not affect CP's news broadcasts or local news arranged by individual stations. The Board also issued a regulation prohibiting the insertion of advertising content in the body of any news broadcast. (41)

The Board of Governors cancelled the permits allowing BUP and TransRadio to sell their news services to Canadian private radio stations. In 1940, a committee of the U.S. House of Representatives accused Transradio of having links with the Trans-Ocean news agency, which allegedly obtained some of its news dispatches from Berlin and teletyped them with a "London" dateline. Howe informed the House of Commons that the Canadian government was also concerned about TransRadio's news sources.

One week after the June 1st Board of Governors' meeting with CP, the Ottawa Journal ran yet another editorial expressing its opposition to radio news:

> After watching the experiences of the last few months, the Journal has come to the conclusion that the CBC Governors should reduce and set a limit on the number of news broadcasts permitted in the course of a day. The constant emission of war news over the radio with the common habit of leaving the receiving instrument turned on all day in the homes, is nerve wracking, and when the war bulletins are prepared and announced by expert publicity mongers, we believe they are a menace to public health. (42)

The editorial argued that it would be "easier and safer" for the CBC Governors to ban all news broadcasts except those supplied to the CBC by CP and end the sponsorship of news on private stations. "The sale of news for advertising purposes -- with the opportunity the advertiser may have of controlling the character of that news -- has seemed to many thoughful people a very dangerous thing, particularly in wartime." The editorial claimed that newspapers, at the cost of thousands of dollars annually, had done their "public duty" by placing a complete news service at the "disposal of the Canadian people through the radio" without charging the CBC.

> Like most things people get for nothing, the gift does not seem to have been appreciated by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Governors. The Canadian Press may yet seriously consider whether that generous policy should be continued, or whether it should retain for its newspapers the services originally collected only for them.(43)

The clear implication of this editorial was that CP might conceivably revoke its agreement to supply news to CBC if the Board of Governors did not take action against radio news sponsors. Although the editorial did not represent CP's official position, the news agency could have used this threat as a last

resort if it did not obtain a redress of its grievances. Such a scenario must have been disturbing to the CBC's Board of Governors. Although CP had not actually threatened to revoke its 1939 agreement to provide news bulletins for free to the CBC, CP knew that it had the network over a barrel, and a response to CP's grievance was considered necessary. The CBC Governors wanted to assure the public that an adequate news service would continue to be provided on national radio. Thus, the escalation of the war, combined with CP's lobbying, prompted the CBC to seriously consider organizing its own news department.

News sponsorship soon became a public issue. The Minister of Transport, C. D. Howe, told the House of Commons on June 6, 1940, that "there has been some trouble over news being put out in an unduly alarming form and many complaints have been received from radio listeners in this connection."(44) Three weeks later, Howe announced that the CBC Board of Governors was formulating a general policy on news, and he expected that "sponsored news on the air will be a thing of the past." Howe asked Walter S. Thompson, Publicity Director for Canadian National Railways, who had served as first Director of Censorship for Canada between September 1939 and April 1940, to give him recommendations for a "more satisfactory" policy on sponsored newscasts. Howe added:

> Whether in the meantime the present news services will be allowed to function I am not sure. I rather think they will. . . . It would perhaps be a mistake. . . to make any radical change in the existing situation. But I think I can say that within the next month there will be a new policy for news on the air, which I shall announce as soon as I can and which I think will be recognized by all as an improvement on the present situation."(45)

In a telling comment revealing Howe's belief that the CBC might set up a government-run news service, the Minister stated that he would make the announcement in the House of Commons. But, he said, "I may be scooped by my news service."(46)

Thompson wrote to Howe on July 1, 1940, expressing his reservations. "I do not recommend that the [Canadian] Broadcasting Corporation be required to be responsible for the preparation of a news service."(47) Thompson said he envisaged a type of radio news bureau, outside the CBC, staffed by experienced newspapermen such as was done with the defunct Press-Radio Bureau in the United States during the mid-1930s. However, Thompson modified his opinion after being informed that the Board of Governors wanted the CBC, and not an independent body, to take responsibility for national news broadcasting. He advised Howe that despite the added expenditure, it was "part of the war time duty of [the CBC], as a public service, to provide all Canadian listeners, wherever they may be situated and to whatever stations they may be listening, with a complete and free news service."(48) Thompson emphasized:

> The war, its necessities and its responsibilities has obviously changed the conditions that underlie the broadcasting of news. The needs of the hour and the natural demands of listeners, especially in places where there is no ready access to daily newspapers, have increased the need of regular and complete news services by radio. The war itself and the nature of the news to which it gives rise, make it imperative that news shall be present[ed] fully, fairly, and calmly. Above all, it is important that the source of the news be free from suspicion of anti-Canadian or anti-British bias.(49)

Thompson stated that the CBC should edit, and present a "composite news service" based on the dispatches of the three

major news agencies operating in Canada. In addition, he emphasized that no other news service, with the exception of local news broadcasts, should be allowed on any Canadian radio station during the war. Thompson's recommendations were passed on to the CBC Board of Governors for consideration. The Board's decision was in line with Thompson's major recommendations.

Thompson cited four arguments to support a ban on commercial sponsorship of news on all Canadian radio stations during wartime: (a) commercially sponsored news was "apt to demand more or less sensational treatment, whereas the objective treatment of news is more than ever necessary in these days of public anxiety"; (b) commercial announcers, whose voices would be heard at the beginning of a news bulletin, did not possess the proper training for "the straightforward, lucid and accurate presentation of current events"; (c) war and its related tragedies were "cheapened" when their "recital [was made a] vehicle for the sale of products"; (d) the "events affecting the destiny of Canada and the personal lives of its people should be placed before our nation in the calmest and most dignified manner possible, and from the broadest national viewpoint."(50) Thompson's memorandum was persuasive. Howe and the Board members were now convinced that the creation of a national radio news department would be an important public service.(51)

The Board of Governors Committee on News

The CBC Board of Governors set up a Special Committee on News, which met on July 17-18, 1940 and on September 30, 1940. This subcommittee was appointed to study and draw up a plan under

which the CBC would "prepare and edit a unified national broadcast news service."(52) The Committee consisted of Chairman Rene Morin, Vice-Chairman N.L. Nathanson, and Board member J.W. Godfrey. The meetings were attended by General Manager, Gladstone Murray, Assistant General Manager, Augustin Frigon, and the Chief Executive Assistant, Donald Manson.

On July 17, Frigon's report to the subcommittee stated that in "the interests of the Canadian public," the CBC had decided to assume the responsibility for and the "exclusive right" over broadcasts of news bulletins of "regional, national, international and to some extent local interest." This service would be made available to all broadcasting stations in Canada. Furthermore, the CBC would not allow sponsored news bulletins on any station in Canada but "spot announcements" on private stations would be permitted before and after news bulletins. The restriction on sponsored bulletins would ensure that newscasts would be "as veracious, attractive and effective as possible, and free of the more or less sensational stylizing which is characteristic of news broadcasts done with an exaggerated desire for showmanship often typical of commercial efforts." To achieve this, "it is essential that the news bulletins. . . be entirely prepared and put on the air by a staff responsible to CBC authorities." (53)

Frigon's report stated that the news agencies, CP, BUP and possibly TransRadio Press Service, would supply to the CBC "the best regional, national, international and local news service" they could offer. Newsrooms would be set up in the main production centers in Toronto, Montreal, and in the regional

centers in Halifax, Winnipeg and Vancouver. In addition to recognized news agencies, the CBC news service would also rely on hand-outs from government departments. Frigon favoured the concept of a news service serving as a vehicle for government wartime information.

> To complement these sources of information, the CBC must secure from the Government of Canada the privilege of receiving all news releases issued by the federal authorities as soon as they are made available to the Press, and also establish that the CBC be considered as a semi-official medium to reach the public. Similar contacts should be arranged with all provincial governments. (54)

Since much of the regular programming on the CBC network was devoted to promoting Canada's war effort, Frigon did not consider it unreasonable to suggest that the CBC News Service should serve a similar purpose. However, the Frigon proposal, if it had been implemented, would have clearly violated the CP doctrine of an impartial and objective news service. Frigon recommended that all "official sources of information," such as the federal and provincial governments, would be contacted regularly to obtain the "best possible news connections" for the CBC News. There is no evidence in the papers as to whether Frigon's proposal elicited much discussion among the CBC Board of Governors. The idea of a "semi-official" news service was rejected, perhaps as a result of opposition by Murray, who, being former journalist, understood the tradition and function of a free press in a democratic society. It is also probable that both CP and BUP, which prided themselves on their commitment to integrity, would have refused to supply their news to the CBC if the national news bulletin were intended as an organ for "semi-official" information.

Frigon stated that it was neither "desirable" nor "feasible" for the CBC to attempt full coverage of local news, and that this would be better left to private stations. "We would have to establish, by regulation, that no private station may broadcast news prepared by themselves except strictly local news meant for local people." "It is evident that if commentators were allowed, many newspaper-owned stations would have announcers giving their interpretation of the news, amounting to a news bulletin." He proposed that the CBC should "retain the services of a first-class Chief editor" who would organize "editing offices" in the CBC's five major production centres. Frigon did not specify whether the Chief Editor would have to accept government control of the news beyond normal censorship requirements.

The increased public demand for news about the war meant that the CBC could no longer afford to treat newscasts as a "routine service" and secondary function of its programming division. On May 20, 1940, McArthur argued that the CP news broadcasts required supervision on a full-time basis:

> . . . continuous thought must be given to improving the service, to incorporating new ideas, to checking and comparing with competitive services -- in brief, to keeping our CBC news service alive, creative, not only meeting the needs of the moment but always planning for the future.(55)

He cited a recommendation from the CBC's government liaison officer, Peter Aylen, who recommended that a position of news editor be created because "the problems of news broadcasting are so complex, that it would require a very able man to control the News Bureau in Toronto and supervise news in the regions."

McArthur outlined his experience and qualifications in the area of writing, publicity and promotions, although he acknowledged his limited experience as a journalist. "I have never been a straight news man, or worked on a news desk, even when I was with a daily newspaper. Naturally I know something of news handling, and have a general news background, but it is not a specialized one," he wrote.(56)

McArthur was appointed full-time supervisor of news bulletins on May 23, 1940. He kept Bushnell, Murray and Frigon informed about CBC's relations with CP during the events leading up to the creation of the CBC News Service. McArthur's sound judgment and editorial abilities (despite his limited experience as a professional journalist) had evidently impressed Murray. In September of 1940, the General Manager asked him to organize the News Service. In a memorandum to the CBC Board of Governors, Murray wrote: "Mr. McArthur has a thorough knowledge of our business and is alive both to the needs and the possibilities of a good national news service." (57) Murray gave McArthur credit for having "done something to improve [the CP news bulletins] within the very small margin of latitude which we exercise under the existing arrangement [with Canadian Press]." (58)

The Board's proposal to end commercial sponsorship of news broadcasts met with stiff opposition from some business groups. Organizations were invited to make representations before the CBC Board's Committee on News. W. J. Harper, of the CBC's Western Regional Advisory Council, sent a brief to Murray on July 10, 1940, stating that rural people in Alberta would object to the cancellation of the 'Texaco' newscast sponsored by

the MacColl-Frontenac Oil company. "This newscast has become an institution in this province, particularly amongst the farmers, whom it was designed primarily to serve." Heard during the farmers' lunch hour, the "Texaco" newscast was "complete and authentic in its world news coverage" and also because it carried "items of local interest, which a CBC national newscast obviously cannot do." He believed a serious disservice would be done to Alberta farmers if the Texaco newscast were cancelled.

> ...the best way to keep Canadians from listening to this undesirable propaganda [from U.S. and foreign stations] is to give them a better news service from our Canadian stations. If the CBC intends to do this, well and good, but I do not believe that it is wise to forbid this eminently satisfactory newscast, unless it is adequately replaced.(59)

The Radio Committee of the Association of Canadian Advertisers (ACA) believed that the regulation that "discriminated against the free competition of the various media for a share of our advertising dollars is not fundamentally in the best interest of our country." It accused CP of acting from "purely selfish" motives and claimed the proposed CBC News Service would "eliminate competing news services and give the Canadian Press a monopoly." In its brief, ACA argued that there was no evidence to prove that commercial sponsorship was harmful to Canada's war effort, and argued that commercial sponsorship of news increased the commercial activity of the sponsors. This would result in "increased commerce within the country" and higher profits. The taxes derived from these profits would "materially assist our government in financing Canada's war effort." If the government banned commercial sponsorship on radio, ACA claimed, "the same argument under war conditions would

reporting of domestic and international news. While offering its elite, well-to-do readership "All the news that's fit to print," this newspaper relegated editorial comment and opinion to a separate editorial page.(6)

In Canada, partisan journalism had also been common among newspapers until the late nineteenth century. Gradually party-dominated dailies, such as the Toronto Empire and Montreal's La Minerve, were replaced by newspapers whose editors encouraged the removal of most of the blatant bias from the news reports in their newspapers.(7) Sir John Stephen Willison is credited with having been the leader in a movement to establish a style of journalism that led to the removal of most of the "partisan bias and venomous scurrility" from the newspapers in Canada.(8) As editor of the Liberal-oriented Toronto Globe from 1890 to 1902, he allowed Conservatives to express their opinions in his newspaper.

With the advent of high-speed presses and improved literacy rates within the general population, newspapers in North American cities became increasingly reliant on advertising revenue for their expansion. As the economic strength of newspapers grew during the early part of the twentieth century, they eventually broke free from political-party sponsorship. Publishers were unwilling to risk alienating commercial sponsors who held political viewpoints contrary to the expressed editorial positions of the newspaper. By not offending the political sensitivities of their readers, newspapers hoped to obtain a larger share of the market and increase their circulation.(9) As M. E. Nichols stated: "Economic forces . . . promoted the

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

hold good for Canadian newspapers," which derived much of its revenue from advertising. "If sponsorship of their news by the advertisers was banned, the dissemination of news through this medium would be seriously harmed. The absurdity of such suggestion as to newspapers is apparent."(60)

The Canadian Association of Broadcasters (CAB) argued against the imposition of "discriminatory legislation" or regulation on any medium of news dissemination or advertising. The CBC's no-sponsorship policy would be "harmful to business," said its President, Glen Bannerman, who represented some 80 private radio stations and, that a multiplicity of news services, and not just the CBC, should be permitted to broadcast "up to date news at frequent intervals" to Canadians. The CAB had earlier claimed that no "important" private station in Canada used the CP bulletin because it did not meet "public demand for up to the minute news over the air" and contained "only such news as the CP cares to give out for broadcasting." (61)

The Western Association of Broadcasters (WAB) (radio station owners in Canada allied to the CAB) scoffed at the charges that private broadcasters allowed advertisers to interfere with the content of the newscasts. While admitting that sponsorship of newscasts was lucrative to private broadcasters because the news was heard at times when many people were tuned in, the CAB denied that advertisers tried to manipulate the news. The advertiser "buys only the right to give his message to the audience that tunes in to get the latest news. He does not buy the right to colour or interfere with the news in any way." In fact, the CAB

explained that the contracts drawn up between private stations and BUP and TransRadio, which sold news for radio stations, stipulated that "news dispatches shall not be subject to change in substance or to any alteration of phraseology which would have the effect of distorting the intended meaning or significance of the dispatch." (62) According to the CAB, some stations did not allow news announcers to promote products, but used a different announcer in order to avoid any suggestion that advertisers could interfere with the content of the newscasts.

Private radio stations in Canada had "proved worthy of their responsibilities" since the outbreak of war. Canadian radio news should be made "so up to date and interesting that listeners [would] not likely go to foreign or enemy stations for their news." The association accused CP of trying to monopolize radio news in Canada.

> ...the democratic principle of a free press and free speech should be maintained and that the present progress and probable future development of radio entitles this modern medium to as much consideration as any older medium; furthermore, that the dissemination of news should never be completely controlled by any one agency or group, whether public or private. This is the keystone of the very democracy for which Canada is now at war. (63)

Bannerman warned that the removal of sponsorship and the setting up of a CBC News Service would "inevitably lead to a monopoly of radio news, either under the control of the Canadian Press, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, or the Government of Canada." Private radio broadcasting stations, which were in the majority in Canada, did not receive license fees and depended on commercial sponsorship to survive. With the money radio stations earned from commercial sponsorship of newscasts,

Bannerman said private stations could afford to pay for the news it obtained from BUP and Transradio Press.

> It can readily be seen that the banning of commercial sponsorship of the dissemination of news over private stations, apart from its effect on the commercial business of Canada, will place the private stations in the position of being unable to purchase news services. Consequently, unless the Canadian Press, the CBC or the government are prepared to pay the private stations for the time involved and supply the news free, such stations cannot provide a news service to their audiences. If the Canadian Press or other organizations are prepared to meet this condition, we then get a monopoly of the news. (64)

Bannerman's argument that private radio stations would be unable to afford news broadcasts did not convince the Board. These stations earned considerable revenue from commercial announcements interspersed throughout their daily programming schedule. However, the Board made a concession and allowed private stations to insert a brief statement of institutional sponsorship at the beginning and the end of the non-CP newscasts. No statement of sponsorship was permitted on the national or regional CBC News broadcasts carried by CBC and its affiliated private stations.

The subcommittee of the CBC Board of Governors issued a directive on July 17, 1940, stating the "all news broadcasts in Canada shall be on a sustaining (non-commercial) basis." The CBC recommended the setting up of a "national unified broadcast news service for its own stations and affiliated privately owned stations carrying this news service exclusively." Affiliated stations (basic outlets) essential to "maximum national coverage" would be required to take the CBC service on an "exclusive basis." Independent stations would be allowed to make their own news arrangements on a strictly unsponsored basis. However, the

hours and times of the private stations' newscasts would be "so controlled as to give adequate protection to the national news service."(65) The CBC ruled that a private station had to wait at least 30 minutes before a CBC bulletin or after its completion before it could broadcast a non-CP newscast.

Opposition to CBC's proposal to remove sponsored newscasts came not only from business interests. In an article in Saturday Night Steven Cartwright lashed out at the proposal to create a national news service. He accused the CBC of collaborating with CP to achieve "dominance" of radio news: "The CBC has apparently accepted the principle of a radio news monopoly and is only opposing the Canadian Press demands on the score that it wants to operate the monopoly itself." In presenting this scenario, he charged that a ban on sponsored news would lead to the elimination of Transradio Press from Canada and force a retrenchment of BUP's activities. Moreover, it would strengthen CP as the "guardian of the collective interests of the Canadian newspapers."

If private radio stations were ordered by CBC to stop the sponsorship of newscasts, he argued, BUP and Transradio would suffer considerable revenue losses because radio stations would be unable to afford to buy news. Instead, private stations would have to take the unsponsored CP bulletins offered to them for free by the CBC. CP would thus be "relieved of threats to its monopolistic position and would be left in a situation in which it was the main source of news for all major Canadian newspapers and the only source of news for Canadian radio stations."

Cartwright maintained that there had been no groundswell of public dissatisfaction expressed against sponsored newscasts in Canada. In fact, many of these programs were quite popular with the average listener. "Some people may dislike hearing about a breakfast food at the same time that the fall of Paris is announced," he wrote, "but many sponsors have cut down to a bare minimum the time devoted to their wares." Listeners should have the choice of listening to either sponsored or unsponsored newscasts from diverse news sources, he concluded. "By all means, let us have a new and great national news radio serviceb, but not one that has to be rammed down the throats of all Canadian radio stations radio listeners." (66)

Nevertheless, the CBC was persuaded that the sponsorship of radio news in wartime created an unsatisfactory situation, which was fraught with the potential for all sorts of abuses. "The whole business of news sponsorship as conducted up to date has given rise to justifiable concern in responsible quarters," Murray wrote. He later stated that CP's demand to have "prohibitory legislation enacted through the CBC was discussed "very carefully" and after "frequent consultation" with Howe and the Board of Governors, the CBC "came to the conclusion that prohibitory legislation at this juncture was "unwise." (67)

As a compromise, CP agreed to supply the CBC with wire service dispatches at no cost to the corporation (except for $20,000 expenses annually for teletype machines, transmission costs, etc.) CBC could draw on any other wire service and make no payment for news or allow any sponsorship for news programs on its stations. CBC then laid down regulation "drastically

restricting the nature of sponsorship off news on privately owned stations." Thus, CBC could offer for the first time to all its affiliated and private stations, a "comprehensive news service."

The Board of Directors of the Canadian Press, which met on September 9-10, 1940, gave only lukewarm endorsement of CBC's proposal set up its own News Service:

> The Canadian Press notes the desire of the CBC to establish its own national newscasts, but submits that it has furnished, and will continue to furnish, a completely adequate seven-day news service, rendering it unnecessary for the CBC to pay any over-riding or service fee to obtain what, at best, whould be merely a partial duplication of this seven-day service.(68)

CP recognized that the formula suggested by the CBC, allowing a simple statement of sponsorship before and after the newscast, was "an advance in the right direction" but was "far from being the prohibition asked for by the Canadian Press." CP's directors expressed regret that the CBC had not accepted CP's "urgent recommendation" that "all commercially sponsored radio newscasts be prohibited" in the public interest."(69)

The creation of the CBC News Service was formally approved by the full Board of Governors on November 26, 1940, and the Minister accepted the recommendation. Referring to the recommendation of the CBC Board's subcommittee, Howe wrote: "It would seem to me that the way is being opened to set up a CBC news service, and I trust that you will do all you can toward that end."(70) Howe was kept informed about developments by Murray and considered the Board of Governors' decision to be "reasonably satisfactory." Howe stated that he was "inclined to agree with the position of the Canadian Press that there should

be no possibility of sponsoring [the] news." He was satisfied with the Board's decision but questioned "whether the change [in the CBC's relationship with CP] is sufficiently drastic to warrant all the publicity it has received."(71) Murray told the Acting Minister of Munitions and Supply, H. H. L. MacDonald, if the [CP-CBC] arrangement were withdrawn

> we might be thrown back into the previous morass in which commercial sponsorship was much less controlled than it should be. One consequence of a reversion such as this would be an early revival of the Canadian Press agitation for complete elimination of sponsorship. . . . I think sponsorship under the restrictions now contemplated will either die a natural death or lose its objectionable features.(72)

Howe touched on an important point. Although the newscasts would be produced under the CBC's auspices and control, there would be little change in the style and format of the newscasts; they would still be based, in large part, on CP wire copy (with additional BUP copy to allow for some diversity). Although CBC developed a better announcing style for the newscasts, the content of the newscasts continued to be imbued with CP's rigid factualism and neutrality.

On January 1, 1941, the unsponsored "national broadcast news service" was inaugurated on CBC and supplied free of charge to its affiliated network stations and to all "privately owned stations designated by the CBC as essential to maximum national coverage." The Board of Governors amended Broadcasting Regulation no. 14, which authorized all radio stations in Canada to transmit only (a) news or information released regularly from the various bureaux of the Canadian Press and British United Press; (b) local news made under arrangements between a private

station and its local newspaper; (c) news from sources other than (a) and (b) if the "express permission in writing" from the General Manager of CBC was obtained in advance.(73) These regulations on news broadcasting remained in effect for the duration of the war. The Board of Governors left the organization of the News Service in McArthur's hands.

The last broadcast of "The Canadian Press News" which had been "a part of the daily life of Canadians" since 1933, was heard on the CBC on December 31, 1940.(74) Although CP no longer the exclusive supplier of news to the CBC, its campaign to curtail the commercial sponsorship of news for the duration of the war was largely successful.

BUP entered reluctantly into the arrangement, knowing that it would lose money because of the restrictions on commercial sponsorship. The arrangement worked out between CP and BUP was, according to Murray, "highly desirable, not only from the angle of broadcasting but also from that of public policy, not the least consideration being that it is easily defensible in Parliament."(75) Murray said BUP participation "suits our [CBC] purpose not only because of the wider range of news but also because it meets the criticism that has been made frequently on the floor of the House of Commons that we are conspiring with the Canadian Press to create a news monopoly in Canada," Murray wrote.

Private broadcasters denied the spurious claims and exaggerations that demonstrated the dangers of combining news with advertising. They also claimed that advertisers did not distort the news. Nevertheless, private broadcasters obtained a minor

concession: a "simple statement of sponsorship." This concession was not enough to save Transradio, which had been steadily losing clients since the accusations about alleged Nazi links were made against the agency. The controversy eventually contributed to Transradio's demise, thereby opening up the market to British United Press.

In 1941, in order to compete with BUP, CP abandoned its long held policy, and began selling its news to private radio stations through a subsidiary company, Press News Limited.(76) Although the organization of the CBC News Service did worry some newspaper publishers, who were ever mindful of radio's encroachments in the news business, newspaper readership remained high. Moreover, advertising revenue for newspapers continued to be plentiful during the war. Canadians listened to radio news for the latest developments and continued buying newspapers for in-depth news coverage.

Until 1943, the news agencies (CP and BUP), as a public service, supplied news to the CBC News Service free of charge. The independent sources of news supplying the CBC gave the News Service legitimacy and dispelled the notion that the CBC News Service was a vehicle for the dissemination of official government information.

The wartime situation made the CBC's Board of Governors decide uniform, and factual news broadcasts be provided to all CBC-owned and private stations in order to ensure national coverage. By setting up its own uniform and dependable national News Service tailored to each of Canada's five regions, the CBC

hoped to attract a large Canadian audience and thereby deter of them from tuning into non-CP newscasts on other stations.

The CBC's concern about the "dangers" of sponsored newscasts in wartime seemed to be justifiable. Radio in wartime was a relatively new phenomenon. Given the criticism that had been voiced about the proliferation of news flashes and bulletins at the war's outbreak, the CBC's Governors thought it was prudent to curb the sponsorship of news. The CBC concluded that news without advertising would be more authoritative and credible in the eyes of the public. With public anxiety about the war increasing to a fever pitch, combined with the immediacy of the new technology, the broadcasting of the latest news during the war along with commercial "plugs" for cigarettes, soap or other consumer products was considered inappropriate. The war, therefore, provided the Board of Governors with the pretext it needed to step in and regulate the broadcasting of commercial advertising during newscasts, and, at the same time, create a new player in the Canadian news system.

ENDNOTES -- CHAPTER II

1
William L. Schirer, "Berlin Speaking," <u>The Atlantic Monthly</u>, September 1940, pp. 308-317
2
Schecter, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 205
3
Murray, <u>1939 Proceedings</u>, p. 168, March 17, 1939
4
In addition to the Canadian Press bulletins broadcast on CBC, exchange broadcasts from National Broadcasting Company (NBC), the Mutual Broadcasting System (MBS) and British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) supplemented CP's coverage. According to a CBC report, during the period from August 24 to August 31, 1939, there were 81 news flashes (48 CBC, 27 NBC, 2 MBS, 4 CBS) totalling 1:41 hours); 43 News bulletins, totalling 7 hours 23 minutes of coverage. (CBC 29, NBC, 6, BBC 8); 32 News Commentaries (CBC 8, NBC 13 , MBS 6, BBC 5) totalling 8 hours and 7 minutes; 9 "outstanding" talks (CBC 3, NBC 5, BBC 1) totalling 4 hours and 37 minutes). (The CBC began rebroadcasting BBC News bulletins before the war's outbreak; they became a regular feature of CBC beginning on September 1, 1939.) [Source: "Special Broadcasts Covering Events Leading Up to the War," memorandum by H.N. Stovin, October 13, 1939. [NAC, RG 41, vol. 436, file 27-7 (pt.1)]
5
G. Murray to J.A. McNeil, August 28, 1939 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 899, file PG 10-1 (1)]
6
McNeil to Murray, August 29, 1939 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 899, file PG-10-1 (1)]
7
McNeil to Murray, September 2, 1939 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 899, file PG-10-1 (1)]
8
"News Broadcasts in Event of War," Murray to Howe, August 28, 1939 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 621, file: "13th meeting of Board of Governors, Ottawa, January 22, 1940"]
9
<u>Ibid.</u>
10
<u>Ibid.</u>
11
<u>Ibid.</u>
12
<u>Ibid.</u>
13
C.D. Howe to G. Murray, "News Broadcasts in Event of War," August 29, 1939 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 435, file 27-4-1.]
14
The Ottawa Morning <u>Journal</u>, "Five Polish Cities Bombed by Nazis, Warsaw Reports," First "Extra" edition, September 1, 1939, p. 1

15 "War Broadcasts -- September 1939," memorandum, October 12, 1939 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 436, file 27-7 (pt. 1)]

16 Ibid.

17 "News on the Air": Memorandum by [CP's] Superintendent (no. 5) October 23, 1939 [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2]

18 On September 6, the CBC established a regular schedule of six daily news bulletins broadcast at: 8.00-8:15 a.m.; 10:15-10:20; 12.30 -12.45 p.m.; 2:30-2:35 p.m.; 5.45 to 6.15 p.m. (BBC news); 6.45-7.00 p.m.; and 11.00-11.15 p.m. On August 27, bulletins were 10 to 15 minutes long. By September 10, they had been reduced to 5 minutes, and on September 17, they were 2 to 5 minutes long. [source: "War Broadcasts -- September 1939"]

19 "False News on the Air" Globe and Mail, August 30, 1939, p. 6

20 "The air is filled with lies," Globe and Mail, September 1, 1939, p.6.

21 "It isn't the news -- it's the commentator!" Ottawa Journal, August 30, 1939, p. 6

22 "Make Radio Credit its News," The Globe and Mail, September 9, 1939, p.6

23 Ibid.

24 R.T. Bowman to Bushnell, September 4, 1939, [NAC, RG 41, vol. 171]

25 E. Bushnell, "General Observations on News Situation," September 26, 1939.

26 "Too Much Radio News Becomes a Nuisance," Ottawa Journal (editorial), June 25, 1940, p. 6

27 Ibid.

28 "Supervision of News," G. Murray to CBC heads of divisions, May 23, 1940 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 171, 11-17-7 (2).

29 D.C. McArthur to CBC Senior Editors, December 26, 1940 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 171, file 11-17(1)]

30 Rene Morin, House of Commons, Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, May 19, 1942, p. 59

31 "News on the Air," October 23, 1939

32 Ibid.

33
The Canadian Press, "News on the Air," Memorandum by [CP's] General Manager (no. 6), June 1940 [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: CBC-CRBC News Development]

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Ibid.

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Ibid.

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Ibid.

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Ibid.

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Ibid.

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Ibid.

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Ibid.

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"War News on the Air," Ottawa Journal, June 7, 1940, p.6

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Ibid.

44
C.D. Howe, House of Commons Debates, June 6, 1940, p. 557

45
C.D. Howe, House of Commons Debates, June 28, 1940, p. 1225

46
"New Policy on Radio News Being Evolved," Ottawa Journal, June 29, 1940, p.2

47
Thompson to Howe, July 1, 1940, [NAC, RG 41, vol. 622, "Board of Governors, Special Committee on News, Meeting Held in Ottawa, July 17 & 18,1940"]

48
Thompson to Howe, July 12, 1940, [NAC, RG 41, vol. 622, "Board of Governors, Special Committee on News, Meeting Held in Ottawa, July 17 & 18, 1940"]

49
Ibid.

50
Ibid.

51
D.C. McArthur "Here is the CBC News" (unpublished manuscript, circa 1966-67), p. 21 [NAC, RG 41, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: the CBC News Service -- the formative years."]

52
A. Frigon, "Notes and Recommendations on the Establishment of a CBC News Bulletin Service Across Canada," July 17, 1940. Brief submitted to the Special Committee of the Board of Governors on News, July 17-18, 1940. [NAC, RG 41, vol. 622]

53
Ibid.

54 Ibid.
55
D. C. McArthur to E. Bushnell "News Supervision," May 20, 1940 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 171, file 11-17-7 (2)]
56
Ibid.
57
Gladstone Murray "Memorandum to Board of Governors' Special Committee on News. Re: Chief Editor position," September 28, 1940 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 622].
58
Ibid. Note: The Board of Governors considered 13 candidates to fill the job of Chief Editor of the newly created News Service, but none of the people named on the list was selected:

W.L. MacTavish, Editor, Vancouver Province,
Bruce Hutchison, Special correspondent, Winnipeg Free Press
David Rogers, Managing Editor, Regina Leader-Post
George Ferguson, Editor, Winnipeg Free Press
Charles Bruce, New York representative, the Canadian Press
David[son] Dunton, Editor, Montreal Standard
Tom Wheeler, Editor, Toronto Star Weekly
R.A. Farquharson, Ottawa Correspondent, Toronto Globe and Mail
Wilfrid Eggleston, Chief Press Censor, Ottawa
G. H. Lash, Director of Public Information
Walter Herbert, Secretary, National Liberal Foundation
Paul Heading, Southam Press Ltd.

MacTavish was considered "one of the best editors in Canada." Murray wrote in the memorandum. "In the beginning it was "considered desirable by the Minister [C.D. Howe] to sound out" MacTavish, but "no commitment was or could be made in the absence of a decision by the Board." Although negotiations were said to be under way with Southam publishers, MacTavish indicated that he would accept the job if he were paid $15,000 a year. This salary greatly exceeded what the CBC was prepared to pay. (D.C. McArthur's salary at the time was $3,790 per annum.) Hutchison was ruled out because his "tempermental [sic] qualities [were] more reminiscent of operatic stars or distinguished conductors, than editors." It was assumed that Eggleston, who was "highly regarded and well liked in the journalistic profession," would not accept the position because he was serving as Chief Canadian (English) Press Censor, a position he held from April 1940 to February 1944. A. Davidson Dunton, considered a "newcomer to the Canadian Journalistic world," was passed over because he was "not yet established" in the profession. [Source: "National Broadcast News Service -- Selection of Staff (English-speaking)" [NAC, RG 41, vol. 622].
59
W. J. Harper to Murray, July 10, 1940, Special Committee on News, CBC Board of Governors, July 17-18, 1940
60
"A memorandum from the Association of Canadian Advertisers on the Subject of Commercial Sponsorship of Radio Newscasts." Board of Governors, Special Committee on News, July 17-18, 1940, NAC,

RG 41, vol. 622]
61
Harry Sedgwick, "Brief Presented by the Canadian Association of Broadcasters on the Broadcasting of Commercially Sponsored News by Private Radio Stations," November 16, 1939, p. 2. [NAC, RG 41, vol. 621, file: "10th Meeting of CBC Board of Governors, March 20, 1939 (sic)"]. The CAB's (as well as the Western Association of Broadcasters') position on the news situation is discussed in T. J. Allard _Straight Up: Private Broadcasting in Canada: 1918-1958_ (Ottawa, 1979), pp. 153-164.
62
Ibid., p. 4

63 Western Association of Broadcasters, "A Statement Concerning the Fundamental Principles of News Broadcasting in Canada", submitted to Special Committee on News, CBC Board of Governors, July 17-18, 1940 [NAC, RG 41, Vol. 622]
64
Glen Bannerman, "Radio News Monoply," _Saturday Night_, August 24, 1940.
65
"Special Committee on News," July 17, 1940
66
Steven Cartwright, "The Plan for a Radio News Monopoly Ought to Fail," _Saturday Night_, July 27, 1940, p. 2.
67
G. Murray to Hon. H. H. L. MacDonald, December 26, 1940 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 899, file: PG 10-1 (1)]
68
"Minutes of a Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Canadian Press, held in Ottawa, on September 9th and 10th, 1940," [NAC, RG 41, vol. 899, PG-10-1 (1)]
69
Ibid.
70
C. D. Howe to G. Murray, September 16, 1940 [NAC, RG 41, Vol. 899, file: PG 10-1 (1).]
71
"The News Situation," C. D. Howe to G. Murray, September 5, 1940 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 899, file: PG 10-1 (1)]
72
G. Murray to H. H. L. MacDonald, December 26, 1940
73
"16 Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, held in Ottawa, November 26th & 27th, 1940" [NAC, RG 41, vol. 622]
74
"CBC to Have Own Newscasts," Ottawa _Journal_, January 1, 1941, p. 6
75
G. Murray to H. H. L. MacDonald, December 26, 1940
76
Stephen Ford, "PN" (Press News) _Canadian Business_, vol. 15, no. 4 (April 1942), pp. 50-52

CHAPTER III

THE ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS OF DAN McARTHUR's CONCEPT OF OBJECTIVITY

Since its inception, the CBC News Service has declared that objectivity is a cornerstone of its journalistic policy. The News Service consciously adopted what it considered to be the "objective" news practices and broadcasting techniques of recognized and authoritative news organizations in Canada, Britain and the United States. As Chief Editor of the News Service from 1940 to 1953, Dan McArthur was especially committed to the idea that the CBC's newscasts should be written and edited by experienced journalists who possessed an "objective sense of news values."(1) But how did McArthur define objectivity and put this concept into practice? What impact did his journalistic policy have on the development of CBC News Service over the long term?

McArthur defined objectivity in terms of accuracy, rigid factualism and the exclusion of editorial comment and analysis. According to a general policy statement issued by McArthur to his senior news editors in 1941, the mandate of the News Service was to "present all the significant news of the day's happenings in Canada and abroad factually, without bias or distortion, without tendentious comment, and in a clear and unambiguous style." (2)

Furthermore, McArthur wanted to ensure that political and controversial items on the National News Bulletin, which was based on wire service dispatches furnished by Canadian Press and British United Press, would be handled fairly by giving "equal treatment to the opposing points of view." (3) For McArthur, the concept of objectivity meant complete neutrality and absolute impartiality with regard to the reporting of domestic political news and controversial issues. McArthur believed that

> To hold views on political matters is not only the privilege, but the duty of every citizen of a democratic state, where the party system is an accepted vehicle for the expression of public choice. It is taken for granted, however, that no member of CBC News Service staff will permit his personal views, whatever they may be, to exert the slightest influence on the manner in which he may handle political copy for CBC news bulletins. (4)

As a corollary to this, McArthur adamantly opposed the reporting of sensational, scandalous, or speculative news stories on the CBC's newscasts, even if these appeared in newspapers.

There was nothing unusual about McArthur's understanding of the meaning and implications of the concept of objectivity. Such journalistic standards had been adopted by many leading news organizations in North America during the 1920s and 1930s, including the Canadian Press. But around the time the CBC News Service was created, many newspapers, wire services and private radio stations were beginning to adhere to a broader, more encompassing definition of "objective" news reporting. In retrospect, the constraints arising from McArthur's acceptance of a rather narrow concept of objectivity, combined with his orthodox and conservative news values, impeded the News Service's development as CBC's news-gathering arm for several years.

Journalistic Objectivity: The Origins of the Concept

The extent to which a journalist should be able to insert his or her own opinions, judgements or values in a news story has been an ongoing debate in journalism for over a century. Until the 1880s, most North American newspapers were highly partisan organs sponsored by political parties. They made little (if any) distinction between political comment and "news" coverage. News was interpreted to suit the opinion or political affiliation of the editor or publisher.(5) Not until the end of the nineteenth century did the news reporting as we now know it begin to emerge.

The Associated Press (AP), a news cooperative formed in New York in 1848, has often been credited with "inventing" the orthodox concept of objectivity in order to help sell its telegraphed news "wire" service to client newspapers with diverse political affiliations. Its succinct dispatches were purely factual and free of editorial comment. The adoption of a factual style of reporting by AP, Reuters, United Press, and International Press Service had more to do with business considerations than with any ideological commitment to improve journalistic standards by eliminating biased reporting.

The transformation of newspapers from small-circulation, political-party organs to mass-circulation, popular dailies. contributed to the spread of the doctrine of journalistic objectivity in North America by making a clear distinction between factual news and editorial comment. This period also saw the rise of newspapers of record like The New York _Times_, which was well respected for its accurate, authoritative, and objective

reporting of domestic and international news. While offering its elite, well-to-do readership "All the news that's fit to print," this newspaper relegated editorial comment and opinion to a separate editorial page.(6)

In Canada, partisan journalism had also been common among newspapers until the late nineteenth century. Gradually party-dominated dailies, such as the Toronto Empire and Montreal's La Minerve, were replaced by newspapers whose editors encouraged the removal of most of the blatant bias from the news reports in their newspapers.(7) Sir John Stephen Willison is credited with having been the leader in a movement to establish a style of journalism that led to the removal of most of the "partisan bias and venomous scurrility" from the newspapers in Canada.(8) As editor of the Liberal-oriented Toronto Globe from 1890 to 1902, he allowed Conservatives to express their opinions in his newspaper.

With the advent of high-speed presses and improved literacy rates within the general population, newspapers in North American cities became increasingly reliant on advertising revenue for their expansion. As the economic strength of newspapers grew during the early part of the twentieth century, they eventually broke free from political-party sponsorship. Publishers were unwilling to risk alienating commercial sponsors who held political viewpoints contrary to the expressed editorial positions of the newspaper. By not offending the political sensitivities of their readers, newspapers hoped to obtain a larger share of the market and increase their circulation.(9) As M. E. Nichols stated: "Economic forces . . . promoted the

tendency of newspapers to clear their news columns of party bias and to moderate their editorial thunder."(10) The actual news content of the newspaper was no longer written to suit the interests of a particular political party. Although Canadian newspapers still adopted editorial positions, these were expressed on a separate editorial page.

There were, however, other reasons underlying the emergence of objectivity in journalism in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. The concept of objectivity was not a journalistic invention, but was adopted in part from the social and natural sciences, where an objective enquiry was understood to be one in which researchers followed rigidly prescribed scientific methods of investigation, observation and measurement. Journalists were probably also influenced by the attempts of historians to make their discipline more scientific. Leopold von Ranke, a German historian, established a method of scholarly investigation based on the accumulation and substantiation of facts. As the founder of "scientific history," he developed a methodology of critical analysis of documentary evidence and introduced objective, dispassionate and impersonal techniques of historical analysis.(11)

In experiments undertaken in the natural and social sciences, the results obtained by one scientist could, in principle, be duplicated by another researcher, provided that each one follows the same precise and exacting methods of investigation. Journalistic enquiries could not, of course, hope to achieve the same rigid standards of empirical and scientific research as in the social and natural sciences. Deadline

pressures associated with news reporting combined with the journalist's lack of specialized academic training relative to other professions prevented the attainment of such standards. (Although journalism schools existed at the University of Missouri (1908), Columbia University (1912) and Carleton College (1945), reporters at the time tended to learn their craft on the job). But journalists could try to emulate some of these standards by eliminating or at least reducing the overt expression of personal opinion and values as well as the influence of bias, prejudice, ideology and partisan affiliation; they could at least try to adopt a detached, impartial and neutral stance. In so doing, journalists could easily come to think of themselves as being "objective" in the narrow sense of eliminating subjectivity and rejecting ideology from a news report. Thus, the emergence of the scientific method of analysis, combined with the gradual removal of partisan bias in news reporting and the promotion of an ideal of objectivity by the wire services, had a profound influence on the way journalism was practised in North America.

There is, however, a third possible explanation for the adoption of objective reporting methods in journalism. Michael Schudson has argued that journalistic objectivity did not become standard practice in American newspapers until after the First World War. Schudson believes that prewar journalists were "naive empiricists" who had a "simple faith in facts." He claims they accepted statements at face value and made little effort to substantiate the facts they were reporting.(12) It was during

this period, at the turn of the century, that sensational or "yellow" journalism was in its heyday. Many mass-circulation dailies were more interested in telling a good story than in providing their readers with an accurate account of the facts.

After the First World War, Schudson claims that journalists began practising their craft with an increasing amount of cynicism and scepticism. Many journalists were horrified by the wholesale slaughter of trench warfare and concluded that their governments had misled them in order to spread falsehoods and propaganda.(13) Consequently, journalists wanted to have hard facts and began to adopt more objective standards of reporting.

Objectivity, in the narrow sense, was generally understood to mean the reporting of facts that could be verified for accuracy, and statements and opinions that were attributable to a news source. A journalist was expected to leave his personal values out of the story, and his fact-gathering methods were not to be tainted or distorted by his conscious biases, prejudices, and moral and religious beliefs. William Rusher suggested that there was a "general obeisance to the ideal of objectivity, as well as a widespread belief that every important factual assertion ought to be "sourced" -- i.e., either documented or attributed to a named individual."(14)

During the interwar period, journalists from reputable and respected wire services and many mass-circulaton dailies adopted standards of objectivity. The main reasons for the appeal of this concept lay in its simplicity and in its ability to show that the reporting of news was no longer beholden to partisan interests. By adopting a purely factual approach, journalists

insisted that their personal feelings or opinions did not influence the way in which they reported a news story. The interpretation of facts was kept to a minimum. For a news report to be considered balanced, fair and impartial, journalists had to give all sides of a controversy an equal opportunity to state an opinion.

The establishment of codes of conduct, guidelines and procedures to govern reporting added greater legitimacy to the journalism profession. Since newspapers no longer depended on political party support for their economic survival, editors could point to their adherence to objective reporting methods in order to dismiss complaints that political reports were unfair and that journalists were motivated by personal biases. Objective reporting also protected the public. As Herbert Gans noted, journalists have a "professional obligation to protect audiences, who cannot gather their own news, from being misled by people who, having 'axes to grind,' would withhold information contrary to their values." (15)

One of the constraints associated with this somewhat narrow concept of objectivity was that it limited a journalist's ability to substantiate the accuracy of conflicting "truth-claims" and evaluate the credibility of his news sources.(16) A journalist could unknowingly or inadvertently report erroneous facts and derogatory statements in the mistaken belief that the information he received from his news sources was the 'truth.' The role of the journalist was to report the facts as they were told to him and to supply enough information to the reader, who would

then draw his own conclusions about where the truth lay. (17)

Secondly, a reporter was expected to provide a "balanced" report by presenting each side of an argument or controversy to his newspaper's readers. Balance was achieved by simply providing to the person against whom an accusation had been levelled with the opportunity of making a denial, rebuttal, or a counter-accusation. But this method of presenting a claim and counter-claim -- quoting a source without evaluating whether or not the statements made were true -- was an insufficient means of ensuring objective and accurate reporting.(18) Furthermore, the narrow concept of objectivity made it difficult for a journalist to evaluate and interpret the facts without appearing biased.

Thirdly, objective reporting meant that a journalist had to be personally detached and emotionally distant from the subject of his enquiry in order to maintain a semblance of professionalism. But often, detachment resulted in flat and dull copy.(19) By the late 1930s and 1940s, the notion that a "newspaperman should work with his heart as well as his mind" gained greater acceptance.(20) Gradually, journalists began to agree with the notion that the admission of bias, personal values, beliefs and emotions in a news story was not incompatible with honest, thorough, competent and balanced reporting. In 1946, Herbert Matthews argued that a journalist could still provide an objective, factual account provided that his biases were made clear to the reader:

> . . . the chronicler, being human, must have his feelings and opinions; in condemning bias one rejects the only factors [in journalism] which really matter -- honesty, understanding and thoroughness. A reader has a right to ask

> for all the facts; he has no right to ask that a journalist or historian agree with him. (21)

In Canada, The Canadian Press helped promote the doctrine of straight, factual objective reporting. Since 1917, CP had been supplying unbiased and impartial news dispatches to its member newspapers throughout Canada, most of which endorsed either Liberal or Conservative party policies in their editorials. As Carlton McNaught stated in 1940:

> The reporter from an orthodox wire service [such as CP] turns out copy from round the world that aims to be, first of all, factual and objective. His personality may show in turn of phrase and crispness of style, but the copy must be "straight down the line," acceptable as a factual report in any or all of 100 newspapers. (22)

According to CP's General Manager, J. F. B. Livesay, news that was free of editorial comment was "factual" and "objective." Livesay boasted that CP's dispatches presented "home news free from political party prejudice" and that its editors extirpated "any appearance of nationalistic flavour" from foreign news. (23) Speaking before a House of Commons committee in 1936, Livesay claimed:

> The [CP] news service is objective and not interpretative. We serve all the newspapers of Canada and therefore we have to be strictly non-partisan, unbiased, and sometimes even a little dull. . . . [W]e do not put colour or partisanship into the news reports. (24)

Although CP claimed it was objective, there was a certain degree of subjectivity inherent in its own news-gathering. As W. H. Kesterton stated: "The very process of selecting what is to be reported and what omitted imparts its own bias and distortion."(25) Livesay said that the editors at CP's New York bureau rewrote the U.S. and international news dispatches that it received from AP and, in turn, cabled them to CP's main Toronto

newsroom. Although AP was well respected for fair and objective news reporting, Livesay claimed it often conveyed an American point of view and "was not devoted to the British side of the case." To obtain news from the British Empire, CP subscribed to Reuters and Press Association, based in London, and to the Paris-based Havas news agency for news from Europe. Although CP claimed that its dispatches, like those of the Associated Press, were neutral and objective, Livesay admitted that CP's editors, whenever possible, tried to insert a Canadian "slant" or "angle" in international news:

> The AP will not deliberately put any partisan slant on the news. But after all we are all human. As a Canadian, I look at news from a Canadian angle As an American, the AP reporter, whether he is in China or whether he is in Rome, looks at it from the American angle. We do our best to take that out of it before it reaches here [CP's Toronto newsroom]; and I think, on the whole, we succeed. (26)

While straight, factual wire service news copy suited the needs of a diverse number of newspapers with different editorial positions, editors realized that their adherence to a narrow concept limited the ability of journalists to write a complete and accurate account of the truth.

The Rise of Interpretive Reporting

By the late 1930s, newspapers began spearheading the drive to adopt a somewhat broader concept of objectivity based on the interpretation (or explanation) of news. Aware that the world's complex social, economic, military, and diplomatic problems required more than factual reporting, journalists felt compelled to explain the background of major issues and news events like the Great Depression, the economic recovery, and the outbreak of

the Second World War. Therefore, explaining to readers "how" and "why" an event happened became as important as telling newspaper readers "who did what." (27) As Mitchell Charnley stated, "news that was only objective was not good enough." (28) Journalists concluded that their adherence to orthodox news values and their reliance on a narrow definition of "objectivity" had imposed too many limitations and constraints on their profession. Arthur Hays Sulzberger, publisher of the New York Times, concluded that "the time had come when . . . interpretation had to go hand in hand with the statement of the fact itself, when the meaning of things had to be made clear if they were indeed to have meaning."(29)

As a result, a somewhat broader concept of objectivity began to supplant the more narrow definition of this term. Its proponents recognized that the complete removal of subjectivity or bias was unattainable.(30) Their responsibility as journalists was not only to report the news in a straight, factual manner, but to explain it as well. Edwin Emery concluded:

> Old-style objectivity, which consisted in sticking to a factual account of what had been said or done, was challenged by a new concept of objectivity which was based upon the belief that the reader needed to have a given event placed in its proper context if truth really was to be served. (31)

Interpretive reporting, as this somewhat broader concept of objectivity became known, entailed the use of analytical comment, background information, interpretation, and prognostication. It placed the onus on journalists to dig for facts that had been overlooked or had not been stated by their sources. Journalists believed interpretive reporting helped the

public better understand what was going on.

Newspaper editors made a clear-cut distinction between straight, factual news stories (such as "front-page" news) and interpretive articles that contained an analysis of news and opinions. This broader definition of objectivity began to emerge in the editorial pages of major newspapers, in syndicated columns of opinion, in bylined articles of news analysis, in "background" information stories, and in interpretive paragraphs inserted in news stories. Interpretive articles were identified as such to alert the reader of possible editorial bias. (32)

American newspapers, news magazines, and radio commentators paved the way for the spread of interpretive reporting practices in Canada. By the late 1930s, Canadian newspaper reporters also accepted the notion that fair and balanced news coverage could be achieved within the framework of a broader concept of objectivity. As Carlton McNaught stated in 1940: "The separation of news from editorial comment is as complete in Canada as anywhere. . . . [and] a kind of personal comment brings many bylined news stories closer to the world of [opinion] columns than that of the reporter." (33) Although journalists continued to maintain that they strived to be objective by reining in personal biases and prejudices, they also accepted the notion that subjectivity could never be completely eliminated from a news story. They attempted to report the news accurately and tried to present a balanced point of view.

While newspapers and magazines separated editorial commentary from their news pages, radio listeners could not

easily make this distinction with news broadcasts. By 1939-40, the CBC "Talks" department presented special programs featuring scholars and journalists who provided background commentary on events in the news. Since participants in these round table discussions and commentaries were not CBC personnel, the opinions expressed could not be construed as representing the corporation's policy. One weekly program, "The World Today," offered "authoritative, interesting and up-to-the-minute news and views on the international situation." It featured a six-member panel of Canadian commentators including Edgar McInnis, a professor of history at the University of Toronto, and Grattan O'Leary, an editorial writer with the Ottawa Journal. (34) Other discussion programs were "This Canada," hosted by Arthur Phelps, and "Sinews of War," presented by R.A. McEachern. American journalist Raymond Gram Swing analyzed news from an American perspective in "The United States Today" (an exchange program obtained from the Mutual Broadcasting System), and British journalist Richard S. Lambert analyzed news from Britain in "Old Country Mail." The CBC also broadcast fortnightly "Topical Commentaries," a "Mid-Week Commentary," and "European Commentary," an exchange program produced by the BBC. (35)

The rise of interpretive reporting in North America during the late 1930s and 1940s was only an interim stage in the evolution of the concept of journalistic objectivity. It was not until the postwar period that print (and eventually broadcast) journalists took a further step toward the development of an even broader concept. During the mid-1950s, widespread dissatisfaction with the way in which the press had failed to

investigate the "witch-hunting" tactics of U. S. Senator Joseph McCarthy resulted in the rise of the modern definition of objectivity. American journalists began to consider themselves as being objective if they undertook a process of journalistic enquiry that led to the discovery of truth. The broad definition of objectivity was predicated on the belief that a reporter, as an impartial and disinterested observer, would take on an assignment and follow it through to wherever it might lead, regardless of the outcome. Although straight, factual reporting continued, journalist could state their assumptions, opinions and biases provided the news report accurately depicted the event. Furthermore, an 'objective' journalist in the modern sense would strive to attain a standard of reporting that was both fair and balanced. In other words, he was expected to report opinions that did not necessarily conform to his own views. In a similar vein, Herbert Gans concluded that modern journalists "do not choose the news on the basis of whom it will help or hurt; and when they cannot ignore implications [of the news story], they try to be fair." (36)

McArthur's Concept of Objectivity

When the News Service was formed, the CBC made a "very clear-cut distinction between the objective presentation of factual news and its interpretation."(37) McArthur did not believe that the National News Bulletin should adopt interpretive reporting techniques. None of McArthur's news staff, at the time, participated in any of the CBC's panel discussions or interpretive talks and commentaries. Thus, by sticking to a

completely factual and non-interpretive news presentation, the News Service lagged behind other major North American news organizations.

When Murray announced the inauguration of the CBC News Service on January 1, 1941, the newscasts maintained "the same characteristics of dependability, impartiality and objective treatment that have characterised the Canadian Press service."(38) The narrow concept of journalistic objectivity espoused by the Canadian Press greatly influenced the development of the CBC's own concept of objectivity. According to Gladstone Murray, CP's newscasts, which had avoided sensationalism, tendentious comments, and unobjective treatment, were "presented in a better way" because they emphasized "news value" rather than entertainment.(39) (The following subjective criteria have been used by journalists to determine a story's news value: timeliness, proximity, prominence, consequence, and human interest.) (40)

The News Service adhered to factual news presentation because some listeners might assume that opinions or interpretations expressed in the newscasts would represent the official policy of the CBC or, by extension, that of the federal government. This concern was expressed by H. R. Armstrong, the _Toronto Star_'s correspondent in the Parliamentary Press Gallery in Ottawa. Referring to a private Toronto radio station owned by the _Star_, Armstrong told the Minister of National War Services that his station's newscasts assisted in the dissemination of news on Canada's war effort. "In this regard we are in a

position to add interprative [sic] and explanatory comment which the CBC, being publicly owned, cannot do. We believe this to be an important national service." (41) The CBC's status as a Crown Corporation and the assumption in some circles that its News Service served as a mouthpiece of the federal government during Wartime presented real problems for the fledgling News Service. Only factual news bulletins could dispell suspicions that the CBC News Service was a vehicle of government wartime information.

The important distinction between McArthur's narrow concept of objectivity and the somewhat broader approach being developed by other news organizations was the degree to which the background and significance of news events could be interpreted and explained without compromising a news editor's "objective sense of news values." The News Service defined objectivity as follows:

> The editorial policy of the CBC news is to present the news objectively and factually, avoiding sensationalism on the one hand and dullness on the other. In reporting political news or other news which may have a controversial aspect, absolute impartiality is observed. So far as possible, equal space and prominence are given to statements by either side in a controversy which has news value. (42)

In McArthur's view, the CBC's news editors were considered objective if they selected and reported news "without bias or false emphasis" and gave "equal treatment to opposing points of view" in political or controversial stories. (43) They were required to present news in an "even-handed" manner and without regard to their personal inclinations and predilections. (44) The news bulletins had to be factual and could not include editorial commentary, which could spark criticism or challenges to the integrity of the News Service. With this concern in mind,

McArthur wrote:

> It would, for instance, be most injudicious and at the same time harmful to the reputation of our service for impartiality, if an editor gave utterance to definitely partisan views in public. People overhearing would find it difficult to believe that the CBC News Service handled political news with any degree of impartiality. (45)

But, as McArthur soon discovered, even adherence to a narrow view of objectivity did not prevent the CBC's critics from accusing the News Service of biased reporting. Why did McArthur opt for the narrow form of objectivity instead of the somewhat broader concept, which permitted interpretive reporting?

McArthur believed that the CBC had a public obligation to provide radio listeners with honest, factual and authoritative news and information about the war effort and domestic and international affairs.(46) The News Service stated that the policy guiding its operations was "based on the primary conception that this service is in the nature of a public trust."(47) Since Canada's national radio service was an important vehicle for the dissemination of information to the public, especially in wartime, the CBC believed it had a responsibility to maintain the trust of its listeners by providing honest, accurate, unbiased and balanced news coverage. "We are," McArthur wrote, "without question, the most important medium of news dissemination in the Dominion [of Canada], with an audience that includes the great majority of Canadian homes."(48) In a democratic society, the free dissemination of news (provided that it did not contravene censorship regulations) served as a counterbalance to the propaganda and falsehoods broadcast by the Axis countries against which Canada was at war. As Gladstone

Murray stated:

> The public today is hungry for news as it never was before. . . . And the public is entitled to hear the news reported as completely and as soon as is consistent with security. The people want to feel that the news which comes to them is authentic and unbiased; if they had reason to believe that the dissemination of news was in the hands of any particular government or government department, as it is in Germany, if they thought that news was being edited, distorted or coloured to meet the views of any particular advertiser, they would lose faith in the news and would entertain rumours, with the disadvantages that flow therefrom. (49)

In order to perform its duty as a "public trust," the CBC News Service had to obtain and maintain its credibility with Canadian radio listeners. As an "instrument of public information," the CBC was an important medium for "providing information and stimulating the public mind" about Canada's war effort.(50) People did not listen to the CBC's newscasts for propagandistic exhortations but for accurate, factual news and information about the war. As McArthur stated in a memo: "One important justification for the CBC News Service is the responsibility for keeping Canadians well-informed on all developments in their own country, including all parts of the Dominion."(51) If the public were to conclude that CBC news reports lacked credibility, they might conceivably have turned to newspapers or American newscasts to obtain accurate news and information about the war. McArthur was determined that the CBC News Service would not present false or misleading information, unfounded rumours, idle speculation, or partisan editorialization in the guise of news. To accomplish this, a policy of objective reporting was needed to ensure the credibility of the newscasts and demonstrate that they were not a vehicle for government-

controlled wartime propaganda.

Moreover, to establish the credibility of the News Service, McArthur believed that its integrity also had to be maintained and defended at all times. In other words, the News Service would be better able to carry out its important task if the news editors exercised free and independent editorial judgement. Furthermore, the credibility of the newscasts would be enhanced if the public were made aware that the government did not control the news disseminated on the CBC. The way to preserve the integrity of the newscasts was by adhering to a clearly defined standard of journalistic objectivity. In a memorandum to senior editors, McArthur wrote:

> . . . the approach to handling news [should] be entirely objective and personal bias [should] not be permitted to intrude. The fact that the CBC News Service has been protected from political interference by the Management, and the fact that we have gradually developed a reputation with the public for non-partisan handling of the news, implies a corresponding sense of responsibility on the part of the members of our staff. (52)

McArthur directed the senior news editors never to deviate from the facts in an original wire service dispatch. He discouraged any temptation to interpret the significance of the facts, especially with regard to war news, because "so much depends on the basis of interpretation, which might reflect a very strong personal bias." The dissemination of only accurate and factual news was necessary, McArthur wrote, because "any approach except purely factual reporting might lead to dangerous distortion and false emphasis which might have serious consequences." (53)

Implementation and Consequences of McArthur's News Policy

McArthur instructed the news editors to select and appraise the news strictly on the basis of its objective news value. By dealing only with facts, bias in the news copy would, in theory, be removed before the story went on the air. But how did McArthur put his concept of objectivity into practice? And what were the constraints placed upon the News Service as a result of his concept of objectivity?

(a) Use of Wire Service Dispatches

The establishment of the CBC News Service in 1940 was accomplished, in part, because the corporation finally recognized the important role played by news broadcasts. McArthur hired experienced print journalists to serve as senior news editors, but the News Service was not established to do its own domestic news reporting. (54) Wire service dispatches were transmitted by teletype to the CBC's national newsroom in Toronto and to its four regional newsrooms. The senior editors selected the main news items from among the tens of thousands of words that came over teletype printers every day, summarized the main points, and wrote the regional and national bulletins (up to 2,300 words) in a popular radio style.

Because of wartime budget constraints and the lack of available personnel, the CBC News Service relied on the wire services for domestic and international news. As a result, the CBC's newscasts were imbued with the straight, factual values adhered to by CP and BUP. Both these wire services filtered out most of the obvious bias and editorialization before the

dispatches were passed on to their subscribers. Their neutrality was, of course, ideally suited to the CBC's requirement for objective and impartial reporting. In deciding which stories were newsworthy and worth covering, CP and BUP relied on their own biases and selective judgement when writing news dispatches.

Using the wire services enabled the CBC to obtain news from across Canada, but the amount of Canadian news was limited especially in wartime. Furthermore, CP and BUP obtained foreign news services such as AP and Reuters. But by depending on the wire services, the CBC delayed the long-term development of the News Service as a full-fledged news-gathering operation in its own right. While the correspondents with CBC Overseas Unit began sending actuality reports from Europe, CBC correspondents did not cover news events in Canada for the national and regional news bulletins. This anomalous situation would only be rectified after the Second World War.

(b) Authoritative Newscasts

McArthur's concept of objectivity led naturally to an emphasis on the style of newscasts as on their substance. By downplaying the personality of the news announcer and eliminating "showmanship," McArthur hoped the CBC's newscasts would develop an authoritative style similar to that of the BBC. The presentation of radio news as a form of entertainment was an anathema to McArthur, who scorned the American radio networks for playing up the personality of their news commentators to attract commercial sponsors and large audiences. News selected and written for the newscasts should be governed by their instrinsic

news value, not by their entertainment value.

> When the war news is exceptionally good . . . it should suffice to present the facts to the listener and let them speak for themselves. Let the listener do the gloating, rather than the announcer. If someone like Mr. [Winston] Churchill, or a general in the field, expresses his satisfaction, quote him. Apart from that, deal with facts.(55)

The BBC, on which the CBC partially modelled its own newscasts, was respected around the world for presenting accurate information in an authoritative manner. In occupied Europe, the BBC was the only source of accurate news and information. McArthur believed that the crisp, clear English voice of the BBC news announcer enhanced the authenticity of the news report but believed the BBC newscasts were "dry, factual and rather deadpan":

> The BBC, which has built an international reputation for the accuracy and soundness of its news, has always stuck to the calmly factual approach; people do not listen to it for entertainment, or for emotional excitement: they listen to it for information. (56)

McArthur wanted the CBC to avoid the complete impersonality of the BBC's style of news announcing and the more personal and often sensational news-reporting style of the two major U.S. radio networks. The deadpan delivery of BBC newscasts, McArthur believed, appealed to a "very limited number of people" in Canada. Nevertheless, McArthur admitted that Canadian listeners preferred the American style of news broadcast, which was "much more sensational and 'histrionic' than our own." The CBC's newscasts would try to be conversational without being too emotional. "A good news announcer should sound interested in what he is saying, using about as much voice inflection as an intelligent, educated person would in carrying on a conversation." He believed that a calm, matter-of-fact, and

reassuring news-announcing style would enhance the CBC News Service's reputation for accuracy and objectivity. (57)

McArthur instructed the CBC's editors to "avoid anything in the nature of the exciting or the emotional" which could trigger an unwelcome reaction on the part of listeners. In urging the editors to pay attention to "appropriateness" in the phrasing and content of bulletins, McArthur wrote that "we should never allow ourselves to handle news in an off-hand or casual manner that may jar the sensibilities of the public."(58) It is probable that an authoritative announcing style was, in part, motivated by McArthur's desire to avoid the excitement and near-hysteria of news flashes following the outbreak of the war in September 1939 and its escalation in 1940.

(c) Content of "The National News Bulletin"

By providing "a summary of the day's news," the News Service complemented -- but did not compete with -- other established news organizations.(59) The News Service did not intend that its radio bulletins would supplant newspapers as the major source of news for Canadians. Although the members of the news staff were all seasoned journalists, they did little or no news reporting for the CBC. In his view, radio newscasts summarized wire service dispatches and gave the highlights of events. Newspapers, on the other hand, had the ability to cover news in greater depth and offered readers background and interpretation.

During the war, the late evening National News Bulletin carried a greater proportion of war-related news because it had "first claim on public interest." (60) The regional newscasts,

broadcast earlier in the day, had more regional and Canadian news. "The National News Summary [sic] covers the war news of the day and other international news fairly completely, although an effort should be made to give major Canadian news as full coverage as possible in this bulletin too."(61) It was assumed that radio listeners would get full news coverage from the newspapers, particular regional and local news.

Unlike the wire services and the large-circulation daily newspapers, the CBC News Service did not compete with other news organizations: In the news business, getting a 'scoop' meant beating the competition by being first with a hot news story. Since the CBC received news dispatches from the wire services, it could not, of course, do this. As Knowlton Nash later wrote: "If the Canadian Press didn't carry it [news story], we [CBC] didn't report it. We lost a lot of scoops that way."(62) The major advantages of the CBC's newscasts were their brevity, immediacy, and access to a national audience. Radio's advantage over the newspapers placed the onus on the News Service to be careful about the content of the news it broadcast over the radio. In some instances, the CBC did get a fast-breaking story on the air before it was published in newspapers. On December 7, 1941, the CBC broadcast the first news "flash" of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour at 3:27 p.m., only minutes after receiving the first wire service dispatches based on information from official White House sources. Thirteen special news bulletins were broadcast that day.(63)

Closely linked to McArthur's desire for authoritativeness,

was his concern about whether the content of the news stories was suitable for a radio audience. McArthur directed his editors not to broadcast rumours, speculation and tendentious comments. (64) Stories of questionable news value were not aired, and news had to have attribution or confirmation from authoritative, official sources. Stories that might have had real news interest in newspapers were not broadcast on CBC News because they were unsuitable for a family listening audience. McArthur directed the News Service's editors to avoid sensational or scandalous news, such as stories about crime, divorce, suicide, physical handicaps and deformities, lotteries and gambling because these stories could "go into the home and may be heard at unsuitable times." "Flash" news stories about accidents, fires and natural disasters were reported only if the story came from dependable sources. (65)

McArthur understood the necessity of "using the greatest discretion and good judgement" in handling news items that might exacerbate tensions or offend some segments of the population. While McArthur did not suggest that the CBC should suppress items of "real news interest," he cautioned the staff to use discretion in reporting stories that contributed to "internal discord" and "incipient antagonisms" because they could have had a detrimental effect on Canadian people's morale and resolve.

> Our news service, like the CBC as a whole, has an important function in wartime as in peace, to help Canadians achieve mutual tolerance and understanding in the interest of national unity. English speaking vs. French speaking, Gentile vs. Jew, native born vs. foreign born, labourer vs. employer, East vs. West, all these and other potential antagonisms can, if permitted to develop in Canada, impair our war effort and even threaten our future as a nation. It is most important that our presentation of news should not

give cause in any possible way, for criticism on the score of having encouraged such antagonisms. (66)

McArthur's policy of rigid factualism made the CBC News Service overly cautious about broadcasting unconfirmed reports, rumours or speculative political stories. In one memo, McArthur stated: "The fact that many [news] papers keep correspondents in the Federal and Provincial capitals to dig out speculative and quasi-factual stories of this sort in no way affects our own policy."(67) McArthur reminded his staff to

> Keep in mind always that our bulletins are factual, and that we should not carry speculative material, that belongs properly to commentaries or to the newspapers. . . . Our responsibility is to give Canadian listeners a complete service of factual news. If some critical statement, or even a bit of straight speculation, comes from a responsible person or organization whose name is definitely given as the source, the statement is news in a factual sense. It is when such statements come to us without any name and verifiable source that, in my opinion, they have no place in our bulletins. (68)

According to CBC news policy, "rumours should have some reasonable basis of authenticity" and be attributed to a "definitely named source."(69) For example, on May 10, 1942, the CBC's editors decided not to broadcast a news report (based on a BUP dispatch) which stated that a "highly placed government spokesman" had refused to confirm or deny a rumour that Arthur Cardin, the Minister of Transport, had resigned from the cabinet of Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King because he disagreed with the Liberal government's policy on conscription. The story was aired on private radio newscasts, but the CBC did not broadcast the story until Cardin's resignation had been officially announced on May 11. Speaking to a House of Commons committee, Gladstone Murray said he did not want the News Service to "take

chances" with speculative news items:

> I would not criticize the privately owned station for putting that [Cardin story] out, but I would certainly criticize any of my own staff for publishing that in a CBC bulletin in that form. Mind you, it turned out to be quite true and it is a tribute to the enterprise of the BUP. But it is a question of whether we should deal in speculation, not subject to confirmation at the time. (70)

This incident reveals how the CBC's concern for factual coverage caused it to pass up a legitimate news story.

(d) Balanced Political News Coverage

In McArthur's view, domestic political news had to be treated with "absolute impartiality," and the way to achieve this was through a balanced expression of viewpoints. According to McArthur, the News Service saw its role as being simply "the medium or instrument for bringing a balanced presentation of opinion to the public without the obligation of sponsoring any opinions itself."(71) Much of the Canadian news on the national and regional bulletins dealt with Canada's war effort and federal and provincial politics. (Local news was still the exclusive domain of the newspapers). As a "non-partisan news service," the CBC bulletins allowed only "responsible sources," such as Cabinet members, party leaders, and opposition critics to have "reasonable space" for announcing or criticizing government policies and other issues. McArthur instructed the news editors to give all sides "absolutely even-handed" treatment and equal emphasis.(72) The onus was put on the news editors to present the news 'solely on the basis of its news value, and without regard to the interests of any political party, including the party in power." (73) The same policy applied during election

campaigns. Referring to the upcoming B.C. provincial election on October 21, 1941, McArthur stressed that election news should be "presented factually, and without bias, giving all sides even-handed treatment." He added:

> I do not think that we should carry resumes of campaign speeches to any great length in the news; simply picking out the salient points of attack or defence, made by the more prominent speakers of each side [is satisfactory]. Of course, if someone of less prominence should make a particularly important charge, it should not be ignored in the news.(74)

But covering political controversies by simply reporting statements and counter-statements without interpreting the facts and analyzing the different positions resulted in sketchy and superficial radio reports. The CBC's national affairs coverage consisted mainly of brief summaries of the most newsworthy political debates in House of Commons and provincial legislatures that were reported by CP and BUP.

Another limitation of McArthur's policy was his assumption that the News Service was objective if it simply distanced itself from the political scene. The CBC News Service did not open a newsroom in Ottawa to gather news from Parliamentary Press Gallery, nor did it assign correspondents to cover provincial politics. McArthur considered it "desirable" to rely on CP's Ottawa bureau for news about federal politics. "This obviates any possible criticism that the CBC News Service is an official Government mouthpiece and that CBC bulletins are weighted with official releases," he wrote. (75) It is likely that News Service would have been vulnerable to accusations of biased and partisan reporting in favour of the government if it had set up a

newsroom in Ottawa to gather news. This might conceivably have increased the possibility of greater political interference with newscasts. Moreover, the News Service might have been perceived by the public as an agency that disseminated government-authorized news similar to the Bureau of Public Information (renamed the Wartime Information Board.)

Political reporting by the wire services could never be thorough because they could not file reports on all the day's Parliamentary proceedings. Subsequently, CP's editors in the Parliamentary Press Gallery decided which stories to send over the news wire and which ones to drop. The CBC did not have any say over which debates were covered by the wire service dispatches; it could only take responsibility for the news items that its editors selected for broadcast. The CBC's news editors did not supplement political coverage with their own interviews or fact gathering, and made little or no effort to substantiate government statements and verify allegations by the opposition.

McArthur used the idea of balance as a shield to protect the News Service from such criticism. Despite McArthur's assurances that the News Service dealt with stories impartially, some Members of Parliament alleged that the CBC's newscasts were biased and partisan. McArthur instructed news editors to avoid using direct quotations when reporting partisan political attacks by an opposition member on the government, and vice-versa. "If the statement [attacking a politician] is a strong one and fairly long, the effect of the direct quote is like using scare headlines in a [news] paper." In reporting such statements, McArthur preferred using indirect quotations. This allowed the

announcer to report information without giving it special emphasis. (For example, an attack on the government should be presented as "Major [W. D.] Herridge, in a statement issued today, said that Prime Minister King was timorous, incompetent and unfit for leadership, etc.") (76)

While admitting that the news bulletins had a "fairly heavy preponderance of government news," McArthur said the number of times federal party spokesmen were mentioned closely approximated the relative strength of the four parties represented in the House of Commons (Liberal, Conservative, C.C.F. and Social Credit in descending order). This was "defensible on the grounds of public interest":

> No matter what party may be in power, statements by ministers and responsible heads of government departments will always have news value, apart from political considerations. However, opposition critics do take the stand that any news which presents the government in a favourable light is not without political significance; for that reason, and because it is sound democratic practice, we have tried at all times to give space in our bulletins to all important opposition criticism, as well as news of opposition party activities and policies. (77)

McArthur told his editors to select and summarize political news carefully, because the meaning of certain statements and speeches could be criticized by politicians who were alert for an opportunity to accuse the News Service of bias. "In simplifying [campaign] speeches for our news items," McArthur wrote, "be particularly careful that the condensation is absolutely in line with the original intent and meaning, so that we will not lay ourselves open to any charges of distortion or misrepresentation." (78) Political speeches and debates were reduced to only a few hundred words by the wire services. Those

dispatches that were selected for the newscasts were, in turn, summarized by a CBC news editor who stated the main points of a controversy in a few sentences. This news-selection process was the News Service's most vulnerable point. Since thousands of words were written about political debates in Parliament and the legislatures every day, the CBC news editors could only be expected to choose a few highlights of a given day's proceedings. One commentator observed that the very fact of deciding whether or not to broadcast a story belied the CBC's impartiality:

> Aside from the fact that no record, except a stenographic record, can be completely impartial, the CBC news service in its political reporting works under limitations which will always leave it open to the suspicion of favoritism. At present it can be greatly improved, but it can never be impartial. (79)

McArthur was particularly concerned about how the news editors handled domestic political news. When a newscast reported an attack on the government by an opposition party spokesman, "equal prominence" had to be given to the government's reply even if the rebuttal came several days later.

> As a non-partisan medium for the dissemination of news, the CBC News Service should give reasonable space in its bulletins to criticism, when it comes from reputable and newsworthy sources. . . . It should also be kept in mind, that an attack, by its very nature, is usually more sensational, from a news standpoint, than a reply; for that reason the presentation of such attacks should be kept properly in balance and not given prominence and emphasis greater than would be accorded to a reply. (80)

But this policy was cumbersome in practice. Since the news editors might not be able to report all sides of an argument on the same day, public interest in a controversy could have waned.

> The lapse of a few days between the attack and the reply, pressure of other news, or another editor handling the trick [news story] might cause an omission that would have

> unfortunate repercussions. We must make a special point of guarding against any presentation that might be one-sided, and when an item of this type is carried and the reply is not available for the same bulletin, possibly other members of staff should be informed and advised to be on the lookout [for the rebuttal]. (81)

Despite McArthur's efforts to ensure balanced news coverage, some politicians had misconceptions about the role of the News Service. Members of Parliament from all four federal parties represented in the House of Commons at one time or another complained that the News Service's treatment of political debates was biased in favour of or against either the government or the opposition parties. For example, M. J. Coldwell, leader of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, accused the CBC News Service of ignoring statements made by C.C.F. members: "I am determined that the kind of political discrimination practiced deliberately, I believe, in programmes and news-casts over the National Broadcasting System [CBC], must be discontinued. . . ." (82) Refuting Coldwell's allegation, Augustin Frigon, the CBC's Acting General Manager, insisted that the news bulletins could not possibly cover everything said in Parliament on a given day. "Even if the whole bulletin were devoted to Parliamentary proceedings, it would still be necessary to be highly selective, choosing from representative spokesmen for different parties, and trying, without bias, to give a fair and well-balanced report."(83)

Ironically, at about the same time, a Liberal Member of Parliament, Walter Tucker, complained that the "CBC has been giving its news broadcasts a strong C.C.F. slant." "When the Canadian Press news was used by the CBC there were no complaints. Perhaps that was because the Canadian Press always had been

schooled for impartiality in the news," he said. (84) E. G. Hansell, a Social Credit M.P., alleged that someone within the Corporation was manipulating the news to favour the C.C.F. party.

> The CBC cannot dangle the name of Coldwell in front of the people [radio listeners] of this country almost every day without it having some effect on the people. I believe in some way or another that . . . the hidden hand is there trying to build up this [C.C.F.] party. (85)

McArthur deflected such criticism by stating repeatedly that the News Service was unbiased, impartial, and received all its news (including government announcements) directly from CP and BUP. He also emphasized that neither he nor his news editors had any political party affiliation. On May 24, 1944, McArthur delivered a statement before the House of Commons Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting denying that the News Service was biased against any party:

> It is possible that some of our editors may be sympathetic to the C.C.F., the Social Credit, the Progressive-Conservative or the Liberal Parties. I have never heard of any of our staff express partisan political opinions, and I frankly do not know what their personal views may be. Such views, if they hold them, are a right that they share in common with other Canadians. My concern as chief editor, is to see that personal predilection is not a factor in the way political news is handled in our bulletins. (86)

Criticism levelled against the News Service seemed, at times, "to have been coloured by the political views of the critic," McArthur retorted. "And since few persons are free from some sort of political orientation, even the most unbiased presentation of political news is likely to prove unsatisfactory, at one time or another, to a certain proportion of listeners."(87) To support his statement, McArthur quoted the findings of a survey commissioned by the CBC. It reported that 98% of 5,540 respondents believed that the different political

parties were treated in a fair and equal manner in the National News Bulletin, while only 17% believed the political news was biased (25% had no opinion).(88) In McArthur's view, the News Service could not be slanted for or against any one political party if they all accused the News Service of biased reporting.

Although some Liberal members criticized the News Service for mentioning political attacks on the government in the newscasts, McArthur justified this by saying that political give and take was inherent in Canada's democratic system. He believed that CBC editors would be placed "in an impossible situation" if they did not mention political attacks on the government in the bulletins. This would be tantamount to exercising "a most undesirable type of political censorship over the news, presumably in the interests of the party in power in federal and provincial government." (89)

McArthur believed that CBC's newscasts were objective because the News Service included spokespersons from each major political parties in the bulletins. Indeed, the News Service's credibility was enhanced because McArthur did not allow the government to have any special privileged access to the newscasts. McArthur defined objectivity, in part, as a commitment to balanced reporting, but that alone was insufficient for determining whether a news story was objective. As he later admitted, it was "not possible to achieve an exact balance of political news in any single bulletin." (90) McArthur tried to overcome some of the constraints on parliamentary news reporting by assigning an editor, in the central newsroom in Toronto, to

write the political copy for the National News Bulletin on a full-time basis. But as long as the CBC relied on wire service reports for its political news, the bulletins would continue to reflect the news values and biases of CP and BUP.

Under McArthur's helmsmanship, the News Service did not consider that its role as a news organization was to prove or disprove the facts reported in the bulletins let alone interpret them. If one accepts the premise that objectivity can be broadly defined as the pursuit of truth whatever the outcome of the story, then it seems the CBC's newscasts, by today's standards, were not 'objective.'

(e) Treatment of War News

As a vehicle of public communication, the CBC News Service's most important function during its first year of operation was to broadcast news about the Second World War:

> Like all other media of news dissemination in Canada, the CBC National News Service is expected, insofar as it can within the special limits of its function, to aid in furthering the country's war effort, by carrying news of all important war activities, local and national. (91)

During the war, the News Service, like the rest of the CBC's wartime programming, assisted Canada's war effort by providing factual information about Canada's fighting forces overseas and the war-related activities on the home front. The bulletins included stories about appeals and campaigns for recruitment, war savings, rationing, salvage and any other developments in connection with wartime activities. Special statements or announcements that were "not strictly news in character" received "desired prominence" by being inserted immediately

before or after the news bulletins. (92) McArthur told the news editors "we should look upon our work and our personal responsibility toward our work, in the same way as those who -- at a personal risk which we are not sharing -- are in the armed services." (93)

As Britain and her Empire stood alone against Nazi Germany in early 1941, the "responsibility in reporting the war," McArthur later wrote, "was heightened by the fact that in 1941 we were not winning it. . . . It was a time for calm and unadorned reporting."(94) But in what sense did McArthur attempt to ensure that the news reports on the CBC National News Bulletins would remain 'objective' during the war years?

McArthur told the CBC's editors to "present the war news factually and objectively, neither overemphasizing successes nor minimizing reverses."(95) But his narrow definition of "objectivity," in theory, meant that the news editors should not report the news according to subjective criteria. Despite the established policy, a close examination of McArthur's guidelines and directives reveals that there was a fundamental contradiction in his definition of 'objectivity.' It appears that the selection of news stories about the war and the manner in which they were reported was more or less determined by McArthur's biases and prejudices rather than by truly "objective" criteria. The wartime bulletins may have been factual and honest, but they certainly were not objective. Like most Canadians, the news editors wanted Canada and her Allies to win the war. These sentiments were reflected in the way they prepared the newscasts. For example, on June 6, 1944, the "National News Bulletin"

presented the latest news on "D-Day" in a decidedly non-objective fashion. Although announcer Earl Cameron read the report in a calm and sober manner, the editor who wrote the bulletin could hardly contain his glee:

> The dagger pointed at the heart of Berlin has been driven into the side of Nazi Europe. Here are the latest reports of the progress of the Allied invasion forces. The communication issued tonight by Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary force . . . says that shortly before midnight last night, Allied night bombers opened the assault. They attacked in very great strength and the attacks continued until dawn. Between half past six and half past seven this morning, British time, two naval task forces launched their assault at enemy beaches. . . . (96)

Canadians had to accept that Britain and her allies would, from time to time, suffer reversals on the battlefield. Therefore, no attempt was made to conceal bad news from Canadians. "The news of enemy successes should be presented factually and without verbal embellishment," McArthur said. (97) One guideline read:

> When the [war] news is particularly grave, care should be taken to handle it in a way that will not unnecessarily alarm or depress listeners. Editors should keep in mind that during wartime a state of nervous or emotional tension exists that must always be taken into account. Grave or disturbing news must sometimes be used as a lead item because of its importance. If more cheerful or encouraging war news is available, use it in the next item. (98)

The News Service believed that British and Allied reversals on the battlefront should not be downplayed or sugarcoated. War news that was "unfavourable" to the British cause would be presented "as factually as possible, without including too much extenuating comment" even if this came from official or authoritative sources. Attempts to intrepret the significance of these reversals could be detrimental to morale. As McArthur

noted, "The use of such extenuating comment, instead of being reassuring, may have the opposite effect."(99) He did, however, tell the news editors that there was "no reason why unpleasant news should be made still more unpalatable to Canadian listeners." He urged the editors to avoid inserting colourful, descriptive phrases in the bulletins like "the formidable strength of German armoured divisions" and "the shattering impact of the German drive."(100) Furthermore, McArthur believed that "every bulletin should present a balanced picture of the war: not one overburdened with doubtful reports of British reverses."(101)

> It has been a matter of established policy in the CBC News Service . . . to handle the war news without giving the listener a feeling of unwarranted optimism. On the other hand, news of reverses has been presented without extenuating comment. Such news is not overemphasized; if we did so, our service would immediately be criticized as defeatist. (102)

McArthur wanted to keep the CBC News reports about the war on a "fairly even factual basis, free from either excessive optimism or overemphasis of bad news."(103) He instructed the editors, to try, whenever possible, to "counter-balance" news of Allied reversals with "authoritative stories of our own successes." When the war news was good, the editors could strike a more positive note in the newscast. "I do not see why ... there should not be a slight note of elation in an announcer's voice when he is reporting good news, which God knows has been scarce enough."(104) However, the news editors were not to glorify minor Allied victories. Referring to the British drive against the Germans and Italians in North Africa, McArthur wrote:

> It is much better to err on the side of understatement until

there is a clear-cut decision. During the victorious British advances in Libia [sic] and Ethiopia, there has been justification for some loosening of this rule; our bulletins have reflected the general satisfaction and jubilation at the good news. (105)

McArthur was also concerned that war news should be announced in a tasteful and appropriate manner. Because fast-breaking events in war news could cause alarm and anxiety to the families of Canadian military personnel overseas, McArthur believed that war news should be treated with caution and reserve. The reporting of casualty figures, names of Canadians fighting men killed overseas, and reports of fatalities related to air training accidents (e.g., involving pilots enrolled in the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan) were not broadcast, even if they had been reported in the newspapers. Radio was not to be used as a "medium for carrying casualty lists." "This is the sort of thing that in my opinion it is best to handle in print, rather than over the air; it is not the sort of thing that people like to hear discussed as part of a broadcast."(106) CBC Chairman Rene Morin elaborated:

> There are occasions . . . which require [the] most cautious treatment in order to make sure that the public is kept informed, and at the same time is not subjected to needless panic or alarm. Radio, its must be remembered, is an intimate medium, whose message penetrates to the fireside, and whose audience comprises the whole family. Good taste is therefore imperative; and reasonable reserve must be used in handling of some news, particularly those items which sound different on the air from the appearance to the eye in cold print. (107)

McArthur advised his editors to take great care in broadcasting speculative news stories, even if the source of the story was an authoritative public figure, because such items could be disconcerting to listeners. In one instance, an elderly woman in

Vancouver apparently became hysterical and died shortly after hearing a CBC newscast in which Ontario Premier Mitchell Hepburn was quoted as having said "Canadians may become slaves of the Axis."(108) The news item, which the News Service reported without indicating whether it had any credence, read:

> "Don't," Premier Hepburn cautioned, "say it can't happen here." The Ontario Premier says he believes it possible that Japan will invade Canada within the next three months. As a result of their successes since the start of the war, one million land-hungry Japanese may seek to establish themselves in Canada so as to block the United States from retaliation on Japan. . . . No country, Mr. Hepburn added, ever faced war as totally unprepared as Canada. (109)

McArthur said that overblown rhetoric, such as this, was "the sort of thing that unhappily is likely to take place during times like these." (110)

McArthur did not want to shelter radio listeners from the reality of war, but descriptive and graphic terms that conveyed the brutality and horror of warfare were considered unsuitable to listeners who had family members and friends overseas. Reports of atrocities perpetrated by the enemy on civilians or prisoners of war could only be reported if these came from official sources. "These [atrocity] stories are disturbing enough in print, but the effect is much harsher when they are heard for the first time, on the air."(111) McArthur objected to the use of words and phrases that conveyed a feeling of "stark brutality and inhumanity." One newscast reported that German parachutists had been "butchered" by partisans, and another stated that Maori troops from New Zealand troops had "slit" the enemy's throats. Graphic depictions such as these should be left out of the newscasts, McArthur wrote. (112)

> It is not suggested that any attempt should be made to prettify the unpretty business of war in our bulletins; in fact, it is probably desirable that civilian listeners should understand what this war means and exactly what we are facing. At the same time, considering that our bulletins do go into homes where people have not yet become entirely hardened -- including children who hear the bulletins -- some discretion might be used in the choice of phrases.(113)

There were also subtle differences in the way news copy was worded. For example, "claimed" or "admitted" was to be used when referring to German or Italian reports, but "announced" was used when referring to official British communiques.(114) The collaborationist government at Vichy led by Marshal Philippe Petain was not to be referred to as the 'government of France.'

If the CBC's newscasts had been as "objective" as McArthur claimed they were, equal weight should have been given to both the official Allied version and the Axis viewpoint. However, if the CBC had tried to balance its war coverage with a Nazi point of view, there would surely have been a fierce public outcry. McArthur instructed his editors to be particularly careful about using direct quotations in the newscasts, especially with regard to enemy propaganda and statements by Nazi leaders such as Adolf Hitler or Joseph Goebbels. Although their comments may have news value, McArthur believed that the use of direct quotations was tantamount to doing the "enemy's propaganda job":

> Hitler might make a statement about the Roosevelt-Churchill [lend-lease] agreement, in the course of which he might say "The London and Washington Governments are the tools of international finance and Jews, etc., etc." If the statement is in direct quotes, and fairly long, and the announcer goes to town with it, the effect is most unfortunate from the listening standpoint. It would be better to say "Hitler, in a bitter attack on the Roosevelt-Churchill agreement, accused both London and Washington Governments of being tools of international finance and the Jews, etc."(115)

When German propaganda was reported, the CBC qualified these announcements with rebuttals from "authoritative" British sources. For confirmation of news items, the CBC News Service relied on the BBC Overseas Service. McArthur said the Nazi reports contained "fantastic claims" which were unreliable and often false. "News" emanating from "enemy" sources was to be viewed with scepticism.

> It must be kept in mind at all times that every story released from enemy sources is done so for a purpose. Their news is completely controlled by their propaganda machine, and even when it contains some truth, must be regarded with scepticism, since they do not even release true stories, except for a specific reason. . . . We must be continually vigilant not to do the enemy's job for him in the war of nerves which has been carefully planned and skilfully developed by Axis news propagandists. (116)

McArthur said is was "preferable not to use unsupported enemy claims unless there is a British announcement, which, of course, should be given prominence."(117) Sometimes the CBC broadcast items gathered from its "Listening Post" monitoring service, but enemy claims (i.e., from Radio Berlin) were also treated with a great degree of scepticism. For example, the CBC's "Listening Post" service, which monitored short-wave broadcasts from the BBC and the Axis countries, picked up an unconfirmed Nazi radio report which claimed that Canadian prisoners of war, captured by the Germans at Dieppe, France on August 19, 1942, were in shackles when they were marched through the town. Although this story had not been picked up by the wire services, the CBC's news editors decided not broadcast the report in its newscast because they feared a negative impact on morale, which was already at a low ebb due to the failure of the Dieppe raid. Sallie Solomon, who monitored foreign broadcasts for the CBC, later wrote: "The

scoop went down the drain, but the public was spared a thunderbolt."(118)

McArthur's concept of objectivity was instrumental in preventing the colouring and distortion of war news on the CBC. The professional journalists who left newspaper jobs to join the CBC News Service wanted to ensure that their credibility and personal integrity would not be compromised. In other words, they did not want to work for a 'government news service that disseminated news that the government wanted Canadians to hear. Objectivity was, therefore, the foundation upon which the pillar of integrity rested A tenet of journalism used as a weapon of democracy, the concept of objectivity prevented the CBC's newscasts from becoming the propaganda vehicle of a Corporation that was committed to rallying support for Canada s war effort.

Furthermore, Canadians who listened to the CBC expected that the information they heard on the newscasts was honest, accurate and credible. Canadians, who might conceivably have questioned the veracity and accuracy of CBC programs which exhorted them to carry on with the war effort could appreciate factual and accurate nature of the CBC newscasts. Although objective reporting of war news was an ideal which CBC news editors strived to achieve, it was difficult for them to completely eliminate subjective values from the way in which they selected and reported news in the bulletins. But even if the war news on the bulletins was not truly 'objective,' the newscasts did not knowingly spread falsehoods or distort reality.

"CBC News Round-Up"

In September of 1942, the CBC Talks Department launched a weekly feature program "Canadian Round-Up" that offered "interesting local events of interest to the whole Dominion." According to Neil Morrison, the CBC's Supervisor of Talks, the purpose of this program was to "supply a picture of war activities in different parts of Canada," and to give a "sense of unity between all parts of Canada." The program consisted mainly of reports from correspondents in Canada's different regions.(119) Charles Jennings, a CBC announcer, expressed some reservations about involving the News Service staff in reporting news because that "might impair the integrity of the CBC news service in the eyes of the public by using its staff for this purpose." However, McArthur approved of the idea. Since members of the News Service staff were keen to do feature reporting, he was eager to cooperate in the making of this program because having regional news editors contribute stories would be a "good forum for the National News Service." Writers with the CBC News Service (such as Peter Stursberg) occasionally contributed feature reports to "Canadian Round-Up."

The success of this program prompted the CBC news editors to pass a resolution at their annual conference in late 1942 favouring the expansion of news features. On June 26, 1943, an important change in the CBC's news policy was made when management gave the News Service the go-ahead to produce an interpretive news program in cooperation with CBC Talks called

"CBC News Round-Up. However, this joint effort was rather cumbersome. On September 1, the CBC's General Supervisor of Programmes, Ernie Bushnell decided that "news commentaries which deal directly with day to day news developments . . . will be the responsibility of the CBC News Service instead of the Talks Department."(120) James S. Thomson, Murray's successor as General Manager, explained the change in the CBC's news policy:

> The public want not only news, but they are eager to have some kind of interpretation provided for the changing scene that confronts us in a time of war. News pours from all quarters and is difficult for people to see anything like the entire picture of the events through which we pass. . . [News Commentators] have made a fine contribution to a public understanding of the great issues involved in the war struggle.(121)

By separating its national "news" broadcasts into two programs -- one factual, the other interpretive -- the CBC News Service was able to respond to public demand for interpretive news without compromising its stated principles of factual and objective news bulletins. McArthur discussed the new policy:

> The general purpose of the CBC News Round-Up will be to provide authoritative background material to important news developments, material that is interpretive rather than spot news based on authoritative comments from persons in a position to offer such comment themselves or through interviews and investigations by CBC News Representatives or special commentators. (122)

"CBC News Round-Up" was a 15-minute interpretive news program broadcast five days a week, immediately following the late-evening "National News Bulletin." Its inaugural broadcast on August 17, 1943, coincided with the conference of Allied leaders held in Quebec City. The format usually consisted of an introduction by a CBC announcer, followed by three 4 1/2 minute interpretive talks or actuality reports. The opening talk was

usually by journalists Wilson Woodside or Elmore Philpott, who reviewed the day's war news. It was followed by the dramatic reports from CBC correspondents with the CBC's mobile Overseas Unit (such as Matthew Halton, Marcel Ouimet, and Peter Stursberg) broadcasting from the scene of one of the battlefronts of Europe. (Canadian combat troops took part in the invasion of Sicily on July 10, 1943).(123) 'News Round-Up' was the forum for most of the dramatic reports of Canadians in action from 1943 to 1945. The third item was an "item of Canadian interest from some part of Canada," another voice report from a reporter with the Overseas Unit, or another commentary by a Canadian journalist, such as Blair Fraser, or American speaker on some aspect of the war. Occasionally, the CBC broadcast additional 'News Round-Up' programs in order to "keep Canadians progressively informed."(124) McArthur explained "News Round-Up"'s interpretive format:

> Almost all news developments today are capable of interpretation and comment from a political angle -- political . . . in the sense of a particular viewpoint -- right or left, clerical or anti-clerical, imperialist or anti-imperialist, etc. [but] . . . any strong personal bias [or] slant should be avoided. In a news commentary for a news program, as much objectivity as is compatible with honest and effective discussion must be maintained. If there are two possible interpretations, these should be indicated. (125)

On March 16, 1944, McArthur and members of a subcommittee the CBC formulated a policy on news commentaries. They decide to adopt two basic approaches -- a "short interpretive commentary" and an "opinion commentary." The former was presented by an individual commentator, who tried to bring into "sharper focus" the news developments of the day and to give the listener

"factual background information." However, the commentator had to avoid "any strong personal bias or expression."(126). The latter consisted of a balanced panel of speakers who could interpret the news from frank, personal viewpoints. While the second type allowed more personal freedom of expression than the former, both commentaries were intended to give listeners enough background information to help them form their own opinions. McArthur believed the main responsibility of this program was not advocacy, but the "careful study of each day's news." McArthur advised the senior editors that it was part of their responsibility to secure "competent and dependable commentators." CBC News Round-Up was a precursor of the type of programs that would eventually be produced by the CBC's News and Public Affairs division. McArthur envisioned that it would include eye-witness accounts of important national and international events such as state visits; coverage of events, such as federal political party conventions and meetings of national organizations (e.g., the Trades and Labour Congress); and specialized commentaries, secured by members of the news staff, for "matters of national interest as a new federal budget, the announcements of important social or reconstruction plans or legislation, etc." (127) McArthur kept 'commentaries' separate from 'news' programs. "It is not desired to hamper the opinions of commentators, but it is felt that they should be presented in balanced panels for the discussion of current affairs rather than have one commentator heard repeatedly in association with news programmes."(128)

"News Round-Up" was discontinued on July 13, 1945, two months after the end of the war in Europe, but revived on October 22, 1945, with a new format focussing on Canadian political and domestic news and peacetime issues. Thus, by providing both interpretive and factual news programs, the CBC News Service took its first steps toward the formulation of a broader concept of journalistic objectivity.

ENDNOTES -- CHAPTER III

1
CBC News Service, "Statement of General Policy," August 9, 1941 [NAC, MG 30 E 333 (hereafter referred to as A.E. Powley papers), vol. 2, file: CBC National News -- general policy statements].

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"Statement of General Policy," August 9, 1941, op. cit.

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Paul Rutherford, A Victorian Authority: The Daily Press in Late Nineteenth-Century Canada (Toronto: 1982), pp. 225-226

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Schudson op. cit., pp. 3-11; and Chapter 4: "Objectivity Becomes Ideology: Journalism after World War I." pp. 121-159.

13
For example, in 1914, newspapers published reports of atrocities and barbarism that had allegedly been perpetrated against men, women and children by the "Huns" (German invaders) in neutral Belgium. The governments in the belligerent countries fabricated such accounts in order to rally public support against the enemy. Such sensational accounts of barbarism were accepted as fact by journalists and widely reported in British, French, and North American newspapers. Source: Phillip Knightley The First Casualty (New York: 1975), p. 83-84

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Herbert Matthews The Education of a Correspondent (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946) cited in Knightley, op. cit., p. 195.
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Carlton McNaught Canada Gets the News (Toronto: 1940), pp. 410-11.
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House of Commons, Standing Committee on Canadian Radio Commission, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, May 8, 1936, p. 429
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Ibid.
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Kesterton, op. cit., p. 129
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House of Commons, Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (April 7, 1938), p. 173
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Edwin Emery The Press and America: an Interpretative History of the Mass Media, 3 rd edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1972), p. 562
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Charnley op. cit., p. 349
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J. Edward Gerald "Freedom's New Community," cited in Charles S. Steinberg (ed.) Mass Media and Communication (New York, 1972), p. 628
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Kesterton op. cit., p. 129-130
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Emery, op. cit., p. 562
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Kesterton, op. cit., p. 130
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McNaught, op. cit., pp. 410-11

34 The four other panelists were Professor Herbert L. Stewart, Professor of Philosophy, Dalhousie University; B.K. Sandwell, Editor of Saturday Night; R.O. MacFarlane, Professor of History, University of Manitoba; and Frederick H. Soward, Professor of History, University of British Columbia.

35 "Background to the News: The CBC Presents a Series of International Commentaries and Reviews of the News" (circa 1939); and "Memorandum on CBC News Policy," January 8, 1940. [NAC, RG 41, vol. 435, file 27-4-2]; CBC Annual Report, 1939-40, pp. 13-14

36 H. Gans op. cit., p. 183

37 Gladstone Murray, House of Commons, Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (May 28, 1942), p. 178

38 "About the CBC Overseas News and Plays: Broadcast 7:45 -8:00 p.m. January 1, 1941, by Mr. Gladstone Murray, General Manager of the CBC." [NAC, MG 30 E333, vol. 2, file: policy statements, 1941-52]

39 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Radio Broadcasting, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (April 7, 1938), p. 173

40 Curtis D. MacDougall Interpretative Reporting, revised edition (New York: 1948), p. 86

41 H. R. Armstrong to J. T. Thorson, November 27, 1941 [NAC, RG 44, box 6, acc. 85-86/537]

42 CBC Annual Report, 1940-41, p.16.

43 D. C. McArthur, "Statement of General Policy," August 9, 1941

44 D. C. McArthur to Senior Editors, September 21, 1943 [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: CBC News - political news directives]

45 D. C. McArthur to Senior Editors, September 29, 1943 [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: political news directives]

46 House of Commons, Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (June 11, 1943), p. 29]

47 CBC "Statement of General News Policy," August 9, 1941

48 D. C. McArthur to senior editors "War-time Responsibility" October 27, 1941 [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: CBC News, Policy -- Wartime Directives]

49 House of Commons, Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, (May 28, 1942), p. 175

50 J. S. Thomson, 1943 Proceedings, June 11, 1943, p. 27

51 D. C. McArthur, "News Presentation," April 21, 1944, "Here is the CBC News" (hereafter referred to as McArthur manuscript) [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: "CBC News Service: The Formative Years."] p. 87

52 D. C. McArthur to Senior Editors, September 29, 1943 [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: political news directives]

53 D. C. McArthur, memorandum to General Manager, "Listening Post," October 23, 1942, RG 41, vol. 908, file: 10-30 (pt. 1)

54 On January 1, 1941, the five senior news editors working under McArthur's direction were: A.E. Powley, in the central newsroom in Toronto; Marcel Ouimet in Montreal; Ian Sclanders, Halifax; William H. Metcalfe, Winnipeg; and James N. Crandall, Vancouver. Sclanders soon resigned and was replaced by V. F. Segee in March of 1941. Powley later directed the operations of the CBC Overseas Unit. William Hogg became Senior Editor in Toronto and succeeded McArthur as Chief News Editor in 1953.

55 D. C. McArthur "Leave Out the Gloat," memorandum to Senior Editors, November 6, 1942 [NAC MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: CBC News Policy -- Wartime Directives]

56 D. C. McArthur "News -- Entertainment or Information?" Radio (CBC publication) February 1945, p. 11

57 D. C. McArthur to J. N. Crandall, February 20, 1942 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 175, file: 11-17-6-5]

58 D. C. McArthur, "Sense of Appropriateness" April 20, 1943, [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: News Policy -- Wartime Directives]

59 D. C. McArthur, "Statement on CBC News Service," May 24, 1944 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 900, file: PG 10-1 (2).]

60 D. C. McArthur, "News Presentation," April 21, 1944, McArthur manuscript, p. 87

61 McArthur believed that the "National News Bulletin" should "attempt to give listeners in every part of Canada some idea of what was going on in the rest of the Dominion." By offering listeners a "general exchange of news between the different provinces," listeners in British Columbia would be able to hear news from Atlantic Canada and vice versa. Thus, by providing a "National" news bulletin, the CBC assumed a special role in "counterbalancing sectional and parochial presentation of news in local newspapers." Although war news tended to predominate most of the international news content, McArthur envisioned that the CBC's newscasts should, in the postwar years, try to reflect the reality of Canadian life. One of the ways this would be achieved was by expanding the CBC's news-gathering capabilities by assigning correspondents in major Canadian cities and important foreign capitals. After the war, he suggested that the CBC's

bulletins should provide a balance of 'hard' news on politics and public affairs, as well as human interest and feature stories:

> **Canadian news dealing with news enterprises and projects, with important provincial personalities in industry, agriculture, education and religion, as well as in politics, and occasional items that have a distinctly Canadian human interest angle -- the opening of the maple syrup season in Quebec or the salmon run on the Pacific Coast are instances -- should all be acceptable.**

Sources: McArthur manuscript, p. 85; D. C. McArthur to A. E. Powley, March 4, 1943; D. C. McArthur to A. E. Powley, March 9, 1943; D. C. McArthur, "Brighter News Bulletins," September 29, 1943; [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: CBC News Policy (B)]; and McArthur interview, 1963.

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Knowlton Nash, History on the Run (Toronto, 1985), p. 8

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CBC Annual Report, 1941-42.

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"News Policy-- speculative items," 22 July 1941, [NAC MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: CBC News Policy; Political News Directives, 1941-48]

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CBC News Bureau [sic] "Guide for News Editors" (circa 1941) [NAC, RG 41, vol. 171, file 11-17-1; also published in 1942 Proceedings (May 14, 1942), p. 43]

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D. C. McArthur to Senior News Editors, "Handling News that Might Cause Internal Friction," May 6, 1941 [NAC, MG 30 E 333, file: "CBC News Policy -- McArthur memos, bulletins, Government news, content and quality, 1941-51"]

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McArthur manuscript, p. 69

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D. C. McArthur, "Political News" January 22, 1942, [NAC, MG 30 E 333, file: CBC News Policy, Political News Directives, 1941-48]

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"Guide for News Editors." 1941

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House of Commons, Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (June 26, 1942), pp. 723-724

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D. C. McArthur to E. Bushnell, "Ottawa Commentaries," January 8, 1944 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 176, file: 11-17-7 (5)]

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"Statement on CBC News Service," (to CBC Board of Governors) February 16, 1944

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Ibid.

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D.C. McArthur to J.N. Crandall, September 30, 1941, [NAC, RG 41, vol. 175, file: 11-17-6-5]

75 D.C. McArthur, CBC National News Service: Statement of General Policy, August 9, 1941, [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file E].

76 D.C. McArthur to W. H. Metcalfe, August 16, 1941 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 175, file 11-17-6-6]

77 D. C. McArthur "Statement on CBC News Service" [NAC, RG 41, vol. 900, file: PG 10-1 (2)] Published in House of Commons, Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (May 24, 1944), pp. 389-395.

78 D. C. McArthur to J. N. Crandall, September 30, 1941 [RG 41, vol. 175, file: 11-17-6-5.]

79 D. P. O'Hearn "CBC News Can be Good But Never Impartial," Saturday Night, March 4, 1944, p. 8

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81 D. C. McArthur "Political News" memorandum to news editors, February 22, 1941 [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: CBC News Policy]

82 M. J. Coldwell to CBC Board of Governors, February 12, 1944 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 904, file: 10-6 (pt. 2)]

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D. C. McArthur to Senior Editors, "War News," June 6, 1941 {NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2 file: CBC News Policy: Wartime Directives]

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127 D. C. McArthur "Job memo -- CBC News Round-Up," September 2, 1943.

128 D. C. McArthur to Senior Editors, "News Commentaries," June 28, 1945 [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: News Round-Up and commentaries.].

Note: Roger Bird's edited series of Documents of Canadian Broadcasting (Ottawa: 1988) contains excerpts from a report on CBC/Radio-Canada prepared by the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission in 1977 and from the CBC's 1982 guidebook on Journalistic Policy. These documents reflect the modern view of objectivity as practised by the CBC News and Current Affairs division. In particular, readers should refer to "The Question of Objectivity" on pp. 586-87 and "Journalistic Policy," pp. 588-93.

CHAPTER IV

McARTHUR's STRUGGLE TO DEFEND THE INTEGRITY OF THE CBC NEWS SERVICE, 1940-1945

"Whatever integrity the CBC news ever enjoyed, then and now, Dan McArthur should receive the credit for it."(1)

William H. Metcalfe
Senior Editor, Winnipeg newsroom
CBC News Service, 1941-1947

From its inception, the CBC News Service had to dispell the misconception in some circles that it was a "mouthpiece" of government and an "apologist of the party in power."(2) "From the outset," McArthur wrote, "there had been a few people in the CBC, as well as in some government departments, who thought that the News Service should be closely linked with government information services."(3) A more extreme view was that held by the Victoria Daily Colonist, which feared that the CBC News Service was being created to disseminate government propaganda in the guise of news:

> Beginning next year [1941], the C.B.C. is to prepare its own news reports. Since it is a political organization the assumption is that these will be designed to interpret the news as it strikes the imagination of those who are the servants of the Government in power. In other words, the news will be made an agency of governmental propaganda. That is far from being a desirable matter, but, as the C.B.C. views its mission as a State-owned institution, it is only to be expected.(4)

When McArthur organized the News Service in the winter of 1940-41, his most immediate concern was safeguarding the integrity of its newscasts. He believed that the News Service, like its newspaper and wire service counterparts, had a social responsibility to present to the public "all the significant news of the day's happenings" without hindrance from either the federal government or CBC's senior management.(5) To ensure the credibility and integrity of the newscasts, McArthur provided the news editors with clearly defined policy directives on news selection and presentation. During the war, however, he had to remain vigilant to prevent the CBC's management or the government from interfering with the content of the newscasts. McArthur's basic concern was expressed succinctly in a policy statement dated August 9, 1941:

> It is realized too that if any channels were opened whereby pressure could be put on editors to include or exclude certain news, modify it in any way, or give it special emphasis, the integrity of the service would be lost, and might never be regained. (6)

McArthur's battle to protect the integrity of the News Service took place on two battlefronts: He had to ensure that his editors adhered to a carefully defined working relationship with the federal government. And he had to persuade CBC management of the News Service's need for editorial freedom. But what specific steps did he take to ensure that the integrity of the News Service would be respected by both CBC management and the federal government? And what were the conditions that made the application of this principle particularly difficult during wartime?

CBC News Service and the Federal Government

The working relationship between the CBC News Service and the federal government can be examined in terms of three elements: (a) the way in which news editors were used as "front-line" bulwarks of integrity; (b) the ground rules that were established to govern the CBC's contacts with government departments; and (c) the use of news bulletins as an integral part of the CBC's war effort.

When the war broke out in September of 1939, radio broadcasting was declared an "essential war service." On June 11, 1941, the responsibility for the CBC's broadcasting policy was shifted from C. D. Howe to J. T. Thorson, the Minister of National War Services. In 1942, Major-General Leo R. LaFleche assumed responsibility for the portfolio. During the war, much of the CBC's talks, features, drama, music and entertainment programming centred around a wartime theme. The CBC's wartime programming policy, as outlined by Gladstone Murray in 1942, was geared to:

(a) overcoming enemy propaganda by telling the truth;

(b) entertaining the troops and workers on the home front;

(c) maintaining an effective link between troops and their families at home;

(d) safeguarding and stimulating civilian morale;

(e) explaining and promoting the numerous war tasks involving the need for national and individual sacrifice. (7)

Many of these programs were produced with the cooperation of federal government departments. (8) In 1943, the CBC became the coordinating body for government information on radio.

(a) Role of the News Editors

For the CBC newscasts to have credibility with the public, McArthur believed that it was "essential that the integrity of the News Service as an unbiased medium of news dissemination should be protected and kept in mind at all times."(9) More precisely, the news editors had to have editorial freedom, which was defined as "independence of news judgement in handling stories, free from any special considerations of Government policy, party political or other considerations apart from standards of general news interest."(10) For example, the news editor, was the "only person fully qualified to see the whole objective news picture of the moment in its proper perspective."(11) News stories were appraised and presented solely on the basis of their "objective news value."(12) The space an editor devoted in a bulletin to a particular news item depended on other considerations, such as the amount and importance of other news events happening on a given day.(13)

McArthur had to have ultimate responsibility for the overall news policy. He did not edit the news bulletins himself but prepared policy directives, helped develop a distinctive news announcing style, encouraged the senior editors to exercise sound editorial judgement, and verified that the newscasts were presented according to established policy. According to McArthur, the decision as to whether or not to include information obtained from official statements and announcements in the newscasts had to rest solely with the editors on duty, who would assess the news interest of any particular press release or

statement. Although news editors had "full editorial authority for the selection and presentation of the news items that make up the bulletins"(14), they could still be criticized by management for the way in which they implemented news policy. But they were supposed to be "free from interference or pressure in exercising their news judgement."(15)

McArthur believed that the integrity of the News Service had to be established and made absolutely clear from the start, and he instructed his news editors to take a firm stand against any direct attempt by a government official to order or 'suggest' that the News Service to carry official announcements. These, he said, had to be first issued to the wire services (except in extraordinary circumstances when this procedure would be bypassed in the interest of national security or public safety. He also instructed the news editors not to delete information from a newscast unless the request originated from an official wartime censorship directive. The editors did not censor news themselves, but they had to ensure that newscasts did not contravene the restrictions specified in _Defence of Canada Regulations_ and other official directives. As McArthur explained to the General Manager in 1943:

> If we undertake to modify the news for CBC bulletins alone, and people then discover that more specific information -- even though it may be of a disturbing nature -- is being given in other news bulletins, and in the newspapers, we will be open to the old criticism that "the CBC censors the news." Listeners will feel that they do not get a full or true story from our bulletins. (16)

What he did not yet realize was that he and his editors could not prevent the General Manager or his assistant from issuing a directive to include or suppress a news story.

(b) Direct Contact with Government Departments

As final preparations were being made to inaugurate the News Service, Peter Aylen, the CBC's Programme Liaison Officer with government departments, insisted that the CBC News Service should develop close links with government information departments. Aylen disagreed with one policy statement outlined in the "Guide for News Editors" prepared by McArthur and the five senior news editors. The Guide stipulated that only the wire services could furnish news to the CBC. Aylen urged that the Guide be withdrawn from circulation. On December 13, 1940, he told George Taggart, Assistant General Supervisor of Programming, that complete reliance on the wire services "is not correct and would for instance bar us from receiving direct Government announcements. This is a vital aspect of the Service and any revision is obviously of extreme importance."(17)

Reacting to Aylen's suggestion on behalf of McArthur, who was busy inspecting the newsrooms in western Canada, A. E. Powley, the newly appointed senior editor in the CBC's central newsroom in Toronto, urged Taggart to oppose any attempt by the government to use the News Service as a medium for official news. The use of wire services, Powley wrote, was a "vitally important safeguard to the integrity of the news service." The News Service should rely exclusively on Canadian Press and British United Press for its news, and not use handouts from government information officers. Otherwise, "we shall be left somewhat at the mercy of all sorts of people and departments who want to use us for their own purposes."(18) Moreover, whether or not a

reporter should use an official statement, Powley, a veteran newspaperman with the Toronto <u>Mail and Empire</u> and Toronto <u>Telegram</u>, said that official statements and press releases should be appraised according to their news value.

> There are enough people already who persist in objecting to any measure of government control over radio. And I have been surprised to discover a belief among newspaper men that the CBC news bureau has been created as a sort of government voice -- this belief being coupled with the fear that the next step will be the suspension of all independent news broadcasting and the daily issuance of government-controlled bulletins.(19)

Powley urged Taggart to "play up the fact" that the News Service obtained its news from recognized wire services because Canadians would be on the alert for any sign that the CBC News Service was a "medium of expression" for government departments.

> The public may not have any definitely formulated views on the freedom of the press and radio, and the integrity of the news, but it knows the word 'propaganda.' . . . The public should know "beyond question that the [news] service was a real news service and nothing else. I cannot state too strongly my feeling that it would be fatal to let our service become in any way a vehicle for conveying official opinion instead of news. And that is what it could become if it were laid open to suggestions from Directors of Public Information and other publicity men. (20)

Taggart discussed the points raised in Powley's memorandum with Murray's executive assistant, Donald Manson. The "Guide for News Editors" was not withdrawn, and there was no further discussion of the matter. (21)

On December 28, 1940, McArthur and Aylen met with G. H. Lash, Director of the Bureau of Public Information, and several Press Liaison Officers from various government departments. The meeting was set up at McArthur's request to discuss how the CBC News Service would cooperate with government departments in bringing "essential information to the attention of the public." (22)

The Bureau of Public Information was apparently dissatisfied with the inadequate amount of official news carried by news-gathering agencies such as the Canadian Press and hoped that the CBC News Service would fill the gap. According to McArthur, Lash was "somewhat disturbed" to learn that the CBC News Service did not intend to have a special representative in Ottawa to "maintain continuous contact with the war service departments." But McArthur insisted that the CBC News Service would not be a medium for official government statements and press releases. He explained that the CBC's credibility would be harmed "if the public felt that CBC News bulletins were in the nature of an official mouthpiece, and were too heavily loaded with news of that type no matter how important such news might be." But, in a memo to Murray, McArthur stated: "At no time during the meeting was there any implication that the CBC News Service would be expected to accept releases from the Department [sic] of Public Information or the war service departments as 'MUSTS' for news bulletins." (23)

(c) The War Effort and Wartime Censorship

McArthur argued that the News Service "did not lack a sense of its responsibility in furthering the country's war effort and in co-operating with war service departments."(24) But he did not want the CBC News Service to be considered as an organ of official government information to the same extent as in wartime Britain, where the Ministry of Information could determine the content of the BBC news.(25) The BBC's wartime newscasts were entirely "official" and "all of it has to be

passed by Government departments," McArthur claimed. "That is a handicap that does not apply to us, and I hope that it never will."(26) McArthur believed that citizens in a democracy had a right to know the salient facts necessary to form valid opinions and make intelligent decisions.

Finally McArthur did not dispute the necessity of abiding by The Defence of Canada Regulations in the interest of protecting national security. In wartime, news reports broadcast on the radio might be heard by the enemy ships or submarines lurking off the coast. The Regulations prohibited the mass media from disclosing information "useful to the enemy," publishing or broadcasting material that would cause disaffection or be prejudicial to national security, and hampering the war effort or efficient prosecution of the war. The reporting of news was subject to the regulations of a Censorship Coordination committee, which gave guidelines for press and radio. Censors advised editors not to report news about secret weapons, military manoeuvres, troopship and convoy sailings and weather forecasts because they might face prosecution for contravening The Defence of Canada Regulations. (27)

But the CBC's editors would not suppress or censor the news themselves or modify it to make it more palatable to its listeners. News originating from CP and BUP had already been cleared by the official press censor when it reached the CBC newsroom. When censorship was warranted, McArthur argued that it should be applied by way of official directives to all news media

(newspapers, wire services, and radio stations in Canada, both privately and publicly owned), not simply to the CBC. If "responsible members of government" (the Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers or important party spokesmen) believed that a certain news story should be withheld or handled in a particular manner, "this should not, it is felt, be put into effect as a direct suggestion to CBC news editors."(28) In addition, he believed that a general censorship policy should be concluded by representatives of the Air Force, Army and Navy Press Relations Departments, in consultation with CP and BUP.

McArthur did not oppose all contacts between government departments and news editors. He agreed that war service departments could provide the news editors with "important background material and fuller information that might be helpful in re-writing special releases from these departments for radio."(29) This information could then be used by the CBC Talks and Special Events departments, which might want to schedule interpretive talks, invite a government official to make a statement on the air, or prepare actuality reports. But McArthur had to make it clear that only the news editor determined whether this information was used in the bulletin. He was also prepared to have announcements about campaigns, drives, emergency measures placed before and after newscasts.

Moreover, members of the news staff, did attend special background briefings, conferences, demonstrations and inspections, arranged by various war service departments. Although the news editors did not prepare special reports based on these briefings, these contacts helped them gain a better

understanding of the government's policies.(30) From the outset, McArthur resisted attempts by government officials to use the CBC News Service as a vehicle of official government information. If the News Service did not defend its integrity, government departments might conceivably have pressured the news editors to include or exclude certain news items, modify an item or give it special emphasis. McArthur believed that allowing government officials to have say in determining CBC's news policy would set a dangerous precedent. McArthur made an exception for announcements or statements of "exceptional national importance and urgency in connection with the prosecution of the war, or the national security, from a person of unquestioned authority." These could be given directly to the news editor on duty for inclusion in the newscast, without having first been routed through the wire services. (31)

The initial challenges to the integrity of the CBC News Service were mostly in the form of interference by government officials or MP's, who did not quite understand the role of the CBC News Service. They contacted the newsroom directly and asked the editor on duty to cover a story or drop a particular news item from the bulletin. McArthur resented this at first.

> [B]ecause of the peculiar nature of news, and because Ministers and their Secretaries may be in the habit of dealing directly with the editors of papers, they are likely to cause serious embarrassement and misunderstanding by action of this sort, unless it is done with a clear understanding of our news policy. (32)

McArthur had been "more or less prepared" for attempts by government officials to interfere with the newscasts. The General Manager of the Canadian Press, Gillis Purcell, warned him

about the many statements and suggestions that were sent to CP.(33) In the case of the CBC, these officials were to be politely told the CBC News Service did not take instructions from government officials. They were then told to send their press releases or statements to the wire services. If CP or BUP decided the story was newsworthy, it would be put on the news wire. (34)

McArthur claimed that the Toronto newsroom began receiving telephone calls or teletyped messages and "suggestions from Ottawa" recommending that certain news items be included in the "National News Bulletin." In one such incident, on August 7, 1941, the newsrooms in Toronto and Montreal received a 'suggestion' for a news item from Aylen in Ottawa which read:

> In conversation with the Prime Minister's Office today, they mentioned this was [Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie] King's 22nd anniversary as leader of the Liberal Party. This as they pointed out constitutes a record as he is the only national leader in office to have had such a position for such a long time.(35)

The Prime Minister's Office did not insist that King's anniversary had to be mentioned in the bulletin, but Aylen stated that the information was at the News Service's "disposal." This 'suggestion' prompted McArthur to issue a "Statement of General News Policy" for the benefit of the Minister of National War Services, J. T. Thorson, and other members of the Cabinet. In a letter to Murray on August 12th, McArthur complained that some of these suggestions would have been considered newsworthy if they had been routed through usual channels (i.e., the Ottawa bureau of The Canadian Press.) However, many others were not "definitely not news in the accepted sense" and were not used in

the body of the newscasts,(36) but were included as 'announcements' before or after the bulletins. (37)

A year or so later, McArthur altered this policy and allowed representatives from government departments to telephone the central newsroom at a time when such calls could be handled by an editor on duty. Such calls were permitted "with the proviso that the use of the information was at the CBC editor's discretion."(38) In these instances, however, the information also had to be given to the wire services at the same time. If the information did not have news value, it was either dropped or put on the air as an announcement either before or after the news bulletin. McArthur reported on September 2, 1942, that an official from the Department of External Affairs telephoned the central newsroom with an 'important' news announcement. When informed about the CBC's policy by a news editor, the official replied "Never mind your policy, just take this and shut up."(39)

CBC News Service and the General Managers

McArthur's strategy for maintaining the integrity of the News Service depended largely on his ability to persuade the CBC's senior management that the content of the newscasts should be free from managerial and government control. From 1941 to 1943, the General Managers of the CBC, Gladstone Murray and his successor, James S. Thomson, accepted McArthur's view that management should not be directly involved in determining the content of news bulletins. As McArthur affirmed in a memorandum to Bushnell on May 4, 1944:

> If [CBC's] senior executives, by virtue of their position in the Corporation, felt free to call the news editors and make suggestions that certain items should not be carried [on newscasts], or should be given some special emphasis, for reasons that were personal or political in nature, then the whole integrity of the news service would immediately be lost, and our editors would feel that our policy directives were no more than window dressing. (40)

McArthur accepted that the News Service was responsible to the senior management for the way in which it carried out its tasks. It was the CBC's role to ensure that the editorial freedom of the News Service was not abused; the management expected the news editors to use "sound judgement" and have a "proper sense of [their] responsibility" to the public. But, if a news editor was incompetent or made repeated errors in judgement, he would be reprimanded or fired by the Chief News Editor, with or without the consent of management.(41) The Chief News Editor was himself accountable to the CBC's General Supervisor of Programmes, Ernie Bushnell, who, in turn, reported to the General Manager. McArthur accepted that complaints could be levelled at the News Service from senior management. McArthur accepted -- and never challenged -- the right of senior management to make criticisms and suggestions, and to advise the Chief news editor about general policy direction. (42)

As a former journalist and public relations director for the BBC, Murray sympathized with McArthur's view and agreed that the integrity of the newscasts must protected.(43) In a statement broadcast on January 1, 1941, Murray assured listeners that the CBC's news bulletins would be prepared from the same wire service news dispatches that were "laid down in the newsrooms of the local daily papers," and would be edited and rewritten for radio

by "a staff of experienced newsmen." The judgement of the CBC's news editors in each newsroom would not be "hampered by red tape and unnecessary restrictions." (44)

In a memorandum to Murray, McArthur complained about attempts by some federal government officials to interfere with the CBC News. Any concessions made to government officials who tried to 'manage' the news would "open the gates" to political interference and other forms of influence, he warned.(45) In an interview in April of 1963, McArthur recalled that he had told Murray: ". . . if he himself or people [in Ottawa] acting in his name could tell us what we should run in the news, or what we should not run, or how we should handle [a news story], then he [Murray] would have to accept public responsibility as the *de facto* head of the CBC News, and I would simply be an assistant to him." In reply, Murray told McArthur "you must have been in quite a disturbed state to have felt it necessary to write this letter." He assured the Chief News Editor of his support by stating that "the integrity of the CBC news is a panoply of protection to me as General Manager." Thus, Murray gave "the full protection of his office to preserving that integrity from any pressures, internal or from outside the CBC." McArthur said Murray "built me up [in the minds of CBC and government officials] as a somewhat disagreeable character who would react unpleasantly if the news were fingered in any way."(46)

Murray's successor, James S. Thomson, who held the post of General Manager for only one year, maintained the relative autonomy of the News Service vis-a-vis the office of the General Manager. Thomson told the House of Commons Special Committee on

Radio Broadcasting: "I have very great confidence in the news staff of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. We have a senior news editor [McArthur] who impresses me continuously with his sense of very great responsibility."(47) Both Murray and Thomson accepted the fact that the CBC should have no special censorships on its newscasts. But there was one statement in the CBC's news policy that could have been interpreted by senior management as justification for interfering in the editorial practices of the News Service. "News that Management might consider to be of such paramount importance in connection with the war effort, that it should take precedence and be considered a "must," for reasons known to the Management but perhaps not to the editor on duty.(48) However, neither Murray nor Thomson gave the News Service any instructions of this kind.(49)

McArthur was less successful at convincing Augustin Frigon, who became Acting General Manager on November 2, 1943, that the integrity of the newscasts was of paramount importance.(50) After Thomson returned to academic life, a tense relationship developed between McArthur and Frigon, who expected the News Service to publicize official statements or omit certain information from its news broadcasts at the request of the General Manager or the government. Frigon made few attempts to consult with McArthur with regard to these deviations of the news policy. Moreover, Frigon seemed to believe that some limits needed to be imposed on the 'independence' and editorial freedom of the CBC News Service.

Dr. Frigon, an electrical engineer, had been a director of the Ecole polytechnique de Montreal, Director-General of technical education for Quebec's provincial government. Furthermore, he had been a member of the Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting, chaired by Sir John Aird, whose landmark report in 1929 recommended a public broadcasting system for Canada. Unlike Murray, who had been a professional journalist earlier in his career, Frigon did not seem to understand why McArthur and the news editors attached so much importance to the preservation of the News Service's integrity.

In Frigon's mind, it was not an unreasonable request if he or a Cabinet Minister would call upon the News Service, from time to time, to handle a story in a certain fashion. Frigon believed that the government had the right to ask the CBC to hold back news and information if it was in the public interest.(51) Moreover, he did not want CBC news to report stories that would undermine national unity, embarrass the government, detract from the war effort, or tarnish the corporation's image in the eyes of politicians or the public. He also believed that there was sufficient justification in wartime for the CBC News Service to modify or distort a news item even if it had been passed official wartime censorship. He was even prepared to suppress a story on the CBC newscasts to abide by the wishes of a minister or government official, regardless of whether the story appeared in the newspapers or on private radio newscasts. Frigon seemed to have been more interested in winning approval from his superiors by complying to requests by the government to tamper with the newscasts than to defend the integrity of the CBC News Service.

Some of Frigon's instructions were apparently made on behalf of the Minister of National War Services, General LaFleche, who believed the CBC News Service, like the rest of the corporation, should serve the government's interests. McArthur said he received instructions from LaFleche's secretary who started the practice of telephoning the Toronto newsroom with the Minister's instructions for the news editors. According to McArthur, LaFleche's secretary "held an exaggerated view of his master s powers," and was reported to have boasted in Ottawa that he was "running the CBC News."(52) His requests were usually ignored by the news editors. In an interview in 1963, McArthur recalled that there had been several attempts at interference from outside the News Service during the "unhappy period" when LaFleche was Minister of National War Services. Although there was never any direct confrontation with the Minister over news policy, there was "a good deal of indirect pressuring." "He [the minister], I think, felt that his position as Minister of National War Services gave him the right to expect certain things in the news." McArthur said the newsrooms also received 'suggestions' from the Minister's public relations officers who wanted "advance treatment" for certain stories. "We would get [suggestions for] stories of no great news value -- things like Red Cross packages to Britain, which usually included a small plug, [or] a commercial [message] written for the Minister by his PR man. We always deleted these. It didn't make for an entirely happy relationship."(53)

In February of 1944, LaFleche asked Frigon to send him

copies of all CP and BUP dispatches as well as the scripts of the national bulletins, presumably in an effort to monitor what the News Service was saying about the government's policies. (54) McArthur and his staff considered this request to be unreasonable and viewed it as an attempt by the Minister to meddle in the internal affairs of the News Service. The Minister's request was taken up by the Board of Governors, whose Chairman, Rene Morin, told LaFleche that it was "beyond the capacity of our present staff" to supply the Minister with wire service dispatches and copies of the newscasts. The Board also asked the Minister to direct his inquiries about news broadcasts to the senior management of the Corporation instead of to the news editors. It advised the Minister to respect the autonomy of the News Service. Otherwise, "the public might get the impression that the CBC is run as a Department of the Government which, as you know, would be in contradiction with the policies expounded and practised by the Prime Minister, by your predecessors and by yourself, and with our conception of the character of the institution."(55)

The first major clash between McArthur and Frigon occurred in February of 1944. It was prompted by a story on the "National News Bulletin" that reported the return to Canada of General Andrew McNaughton, who was replaced as commander of the Canadian Army overseas in December of 1943. McNaughton had opposed the splitting up of the First Canadian Army; consequently, he fell out of favour with the Minister of Defence, J. L. Ralston and senior British military officials. On February 3, 1944, the evening "National News Bulletin" carried this story, based on a wire service dispatch:

> Canada's number one soldier -- Liutenant-general [sic] A. G. L. MacNaughton [sic] -- arrived back in this country today, and unintentionally set in motion another flood of rumours and questions as to the reasons behind his retirement.(56)

The news report reminded listeners that the General's poor health had been the official reason given for his "retirement" in late December of 1943. It went on to say that a Canadian government spokesman had earlier denied rumours that "any other factors had entered into the army shake-up" and emphasized that it was illness and "not any other reason which had brought about the general's retirement." The newscast continued:

> So, when General MacNaughton [sic] arrived in Quebec today, reporters expected to meet a sick man. Instead, they were surprised to find the general as robust as ever. He said: "I am feeling absolutely fit -- there is nothing wrong with me."

The bulletin reported that the General had had a "pleasant voyage" overseas and was planning to take a holiday for a few days at the Seignory Club in Quebec. McNaughton then added: "we shall see what comes after that." The report then mentioned that reporters had asked McNaughton if the official reason given for his 'retirement' was true:

> General MacNaughton [sic] at first declined to answer the question. He drew his greatcoat back with his thumbs, and teetered on his heels -- a familiar gesture of his. The[n] he said flatly: "There is nothing wrong with me. I have no idea what reasons for my resignation were given here. It is up to those who made the statements regarding my health to explain them."

The newscast also reported that McNaughton subsequently issued a written statement which he hoped would clear up some of the "misunderstanding" surrounding his retirement. In this statement, McNaughton admitted to having had a "severe attack of influenza" and "low-blood pressure" while he was in England.

However, he again told reporters that he was "just as fit as ever, and that there was nothing organically wrong with him."(57)

The next day, Frigon fired off a terse memorandum to Bushnell. "We had last night another example of 'yellow' newspaper work in our 10:00 o'clock bulletin," Frigon wrote. While he understood that this story about McNaughton's health was indeed newsworthy, Frigon objected to the manner in which the story had been reported by the CBC News Service. "There was no reason whatever to go into the matter with so much detail," he said, adding that the item had been presented "with all the colouring of a feature." "That is certainly not the kind of service the CBC should give." In a thinly veiled criticism of McArthur and his senior editors, Frigon concluded:

> Some people in our News Department fail completely to understand the purpose and the importance of our news broadcasts. Will you please make plain to all concerned that we are not looking for "circulation", but that we are interested only in bringing facts or statements to the listening public without the glamour and emphasis which one often notices in daily newspapers. (58)

There was, in fact, nothing sensational about the way the CBC had presented the McNaughton story; it had been widely reported by newspapers and other media. But McNaughton's comments were controversial and had embarrassed the government. Frigon believed the News Service should not have drawn attention to the apparent contradiction between the government's version of McNaughton's 'retirement' and the General's subsequent denial that ill-health had been the major reason for giving up his command. Bushnell passed on the memorandum to McArthur.

Frigon's comments angered McArthur, and he strongly objected to the General Manager's labelling of the McNaughton report as "yellow newspaper work." "This is a very strong condemnation, and if it is deserved by the persons to whom it is directed, they should not continue to hold their present positions in the News Service." The story's "news interest" was "indisputable," McArthur argued, denying that the CBC treated it in a sensational manner. "It is difficult to accept the criticism offered with regard to this particular item of news; all the facts are relevant to the story, with the possible exception of the bit about General MacNaughton [sic] striking a characteristic attitude," he retorted. He argued that the onus was on the government to make the "necessary explanations" about the apparent contradiction in the reasons behind McNaughton's decision to leave his command. McArthur alleged that management's criticism of the News Service was "almost without exception," in connection with "items that might be distasteful to the Government." While admitting that the story was "written in a more easy and conversational style that an official type of report," McArthur wrote:

> It has been my understanding, and I was encouraged by the Management in the past, to accept this as basic news policy, that we should present the news as it comes to us, without modification in the interests of any party, including the party in power. Controversial and political news should be handled with balance and reasonable restraint, and with few exceptions I think this has been done.(59)

McArthur claimed that implicit in Frigon's memo was a "disturbing lack of confidence on the part of the Management in the present direction of the News Service." He demanded to know what Frigon meant by "yellow newspaper work" and how the news

bulletins could be made more "colourful and realistic." If such clarification were not forthcoming, "I feel that I should offer you my resignation, and the News placed under direction in which the Management has confidence."(60) Since he was responsible for the operation of the News Service, McArthur believed Frigon's criticism applied to the Chief News Editor as well as the editor who handled the bulletin, whom he described as "one of the most experienced and able members of the News staff."

> If this criticism is fully justified, I and the editor responsible for the bulletin should be relieved of our responsibilities. If not, then the expressions chosen [by Frigon] -- "yellow newspaper work" and "failed completely," are unfortunate and deeply humiliating to those to whom they are applied. Our editors carry a heavy responsibility. In spite of occasional errors in judgement, they are in my opinion carrying out this responsibility consciencíously and capably. (61)

Frigon instructed Bushnell to "make sure that Mr. McArthur is available in Ottawa" to explain the News Service's news policy at a meeting of the CBC Board of Governors on February 20-21, 1944.(62)

In his statement to the Board, McArthur reiterated that "CBC editors exercise no political censorship over the news." Although remarks in the newscasts made by "responsible" political leaders, party spokesmen, and public figures might conceivably be "offensive" to some listeners, it was not the duty of CBC editors "to pass judgment on such statements, or modify their meaning in any way." Without specifically mentioning the McNaughton incident, McArthur cited the final report of House of Commons Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting that had recommended in 1943 that the News Service devise a more popular format for the

newscasts. The committee's final report stated: "While anything of a scandalous or sensational nature should be avoided in news broadcasting, we do believe that news broadcasts and commentaries could be more colourful and realistic."(63) Taken too literally, McArthur said, this statement

> . . . might lead some enthusiastic editors to develop a style where colour and sensationalism were achieved at the expense of factual accuracy and good taste. It has been the CBC policy to strive for a conversational style, not too personal or sensational in treatment, but somewhat more lively and descriptive than the style followed, for example, by the BBC in news broadcasting. (64)

The Board of Governors expressed satisfaction in the manner in which the news bulletins were presented, but it intimated that more care needed to be taken to avoid "colourful" and "dramatic" news presentation. It also passed a resolution commending the staff of the CBC News Service for the "excellent work they have done." (65)

During the summer and fall of 1944, there were additional challenges to the integrity of the News Service. On August 18, 1944, Frigon's Chief Executive Assistant, Donald Manson, acting on instructions from Frigon ordered the News Service to omit any mention of a planned demonstration in Montreal. Several thousand supporters were intent on welcoming Camillien Houde, the former mayor of Montreal, who had been released from internment. (66) Acting on the instructions from General LaFleche, Board Chairman Howard B. Chase issued a "policy directive" forbidding the CBC's news editors from making "any mention" of the huge reception that greeted Houde's arrival at the train station.(67) Only a "bare statement" that Houde had been released from internment and had returned to Montreal was to be stated in the bulletin. The CBC

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

newscasts could not report that thousands of cheering Montreal citizens turned out to greet him, despite the fact that these facts had appeared in newspapers and on private radio newscasts. As McArthur noted: "The demonstration had been announced in advance. It was a very big news story, which received full coverage in the newspapers."(68) Frigon feared that this story might foment sectionalism and the antipathy of anglophones toward Quebec. The distortion of this story on the CBC's newscasts was in direct violation of the principles on which the News Service was founded. As McArthur later wrote: "The basic principle of honest news reporting which had guided the News Service from its inception had been swept aside by an authoritarian management at the behest, or perhaps merely at the suggestion of the government."(69) The News Service was prohibited from making anything more than a simple mention of Houde's return to Montreal. McArthur later wrote: "It was obvious that Management had given a commitment to the Government, over the heads of the News Service, to suppress the story of the demonstration. Such a commitment given, no argument against it could prevail."(70) McArthur felt that if such a concern was warranted, it should be applied by a general directive by wartime censor to all mass media. He also feared that a potentially dangerous precedent was being established that would bode ill for the future integrity of the CBC news. In the memo to Bushnell, McArthur stated it was ludicrous that "essential part of the story was withheld from CBC listeners" although the wire services, newspapers and private radio newscasts reported the story in full. In a democracy,

McArthur argued, the public is entitled to hear all the essential facts if the revelation of the news story did not threaten public safety. "If the Government, or Minister of the Crown, can request and apply special censorship to CBC News that they are unwilling to apply to all news media, then the CBC News becomes a Government news agency, and must operate on that assumption." (71)

> To report such news in a factual way, without emphasis or comment, does not imply any sympathy with Houde or his supporters, or any desire to embarrass the Government. To carry such a report is simply an acceptance of the fact that the public in other parts of Canada has a right to know that such a situation exists in Montreal. (72)

On August 21, 1944, the Acting Senior Editor in the Montreal newsroom, Jean St.- Georges, resigned in protest over the suppression of the Houde story. St.-Georges stated in his letter of resignation:

> I went down personally to the [train] station to witness the arrival of the former mayor; I saw the crowds; I listened to [Houde's] speech; I drove up to his house; I saw other crowds, and I listened to another speech. . . . I was, and am still, convinced that the story we were asked to broadcast did not reflect the true picture of the situation . . . . (73)

Still reeling from the Houde affair, McArthur was forced to resist yet another challenge to the integrity of the newscasts. On August 21, 1944, inmates rioted at Stoney Mountain penitentiary in Manitoba. Inmate disturbances created a particularly difficult situation for prison authorities. During the war, there was of a shortage of prison guards (many of whom had left their employment to enlist for military service) who could deal effectively with prison uprisings. Prisoners did not have personal radios but presumably were allowed to listen to the CBC newscasts on the prison's public address system.

The federal Minister of Justice, Louis St. Laurent, asked the CBC not to broadcast news of the Stoney Mountain disturbance or of any future prison uprising. In a letter to Frigon on August 22, St. Laurent wrote "it would be appreciated if the Editor of the CBC News could see fit to eliminate, in the news, broadcasts with reference to these minor disturbances." (74) He indicated that information about these disturbances was often obtained by local newspapers, which, in turn, passed it on to CP. However, St. Laurent said that these news reports were "not always accurate" and "sometimes exaggerated." The problem, according to the Minister, was compounded by the fact that these inaccurate dispatches were reported on the CBC's newscasts. There was justification for such a request:

> The news from the CBC is broadcast in each penitentiary, but the daily newspapers are not available to the convicts, and when news of some disturbance in one penitentiary is broadcast it has a tendency to unsettle convicts in the other penitentiaries and, possibly, convey to them a desire to duplicate or better the trouble in the particular penitentiary referred to in the broadcast. (75)

Frigon complied with the request, stating the reasons advanced by the Minister for eliminating such news were "well taken." He said he was "very pleased to offer the cooperation of the CBC in a matter of such significance."(76) Without consulting McArthur, the General Manager instructed the CBC's news editors to "omit from the CBC news service" any mention of penitentiary disturbances on the grounds that prisoners could hear the newscasts and be incited to riot elsewhere. He rationalized that "the reason given is, I believe, a very good one and in a sense carries quite a compliment to our news service," and ordered Bushnell to "issue necessary instructions in order that such news

are not hereafter included in our news service." He added:

> Should anyone criticize the CBC for this decision on the ground that we are withholding facts from the public, the proper answer would be that we have a very good reason to adopt this policy and that at any rate the facts are well known to the public who has all other stations and newspapers as a source of information. (77)

McArthur agreed to comply with Frigon's request on this particular occasion, but he did not want the suppression of the Stoney Mountain incident to serve as a precedent for all stories dealing with penitentiary unrest. If the CBC ceased to report minor disturbances in prison, then the Justice department might conceivably, at some future date, request that news about prison reform measures also be withheld. "I can think of a wide variety of news stories that have general interest but which might have an unsettling effect on prisoners," he wrote. It was up to the Department of Justice -- not the CBC -- to make arrangements for providing news to prisoners. "It is unreasonable to suggest that news meant for the people of Canada should be styled and cut to make it fit for the ears of prisoners. (78)

Frigon's interference had exasperated McArthur. "It may be that I get steamed up too easily; but my experience with WEGM [Murray] at the start [in 1941] indicated that the time to ask for a show-down on policy matters is the first time that things go off the beam."(79) McArthur admitted to being "uncompromising" and "supersensitive" about deviations when it came to policy matters. He demanded a "watertight policy directive" from the Board of Governors that would reaffirm the integrity of the newscasts. The "whole matter must be placed on a sound and unequivocal basis" at the Board's next meeting. McArthur

previously been made public.) Speaking in the House of Commons during a debate on penitentiary reform, St. Laurent said:

> The broadcasting corporation was reluctant to eliminate reports of these incidents in such institutions, and I confess that I was reluctant to have to insist that it be done, but the alternative would have been for us to eliminate radios from the penitentiaries. That kind of news created unrest with which we were not prepared to cope.(98)

St. Laurent's revelation sparked a furor as newspaper editorial writers railed against the Minister's interference in the News Service and staunchly defended the CBC's right to freely disseminate the news. The Globe and Mail was particularly outraged over St. Laurent's interference in news broadcasting:

> The unrest in prisons in Canada was not created by radio broadcasts, nor will it be greatly reduced by deletion of references to it in radio news reports. The effect of this Government pressure on the CBC, in order to protect the Government, is to deprive that part of the public which pays a license fee to support the CBC of its rightful privilege of complete news. (99)

Davidson Dunton, who became the first full-time Chairman of the CBC Board of Governors in November of 1945, made sure that future CBC newscasts would be protected from any attempts at government or managerial interference in the content of the news broadcasts. Dunton supported McArthur's view that the integrity of the newscasts must be preserved.(100) As the former editor-in-chief of the Montreal Standard prior to his appointment as director of the Wartime Information Board, Dunton was sympathetic to McArthur's position. He asked the Board of Governors to review Frigon's decision to censor news about prison disturbances at its meeting on November 29, 1945. As a result, the Board rescinded Frigon's directive of August 28, 1944. The circumstances that led to this decision had arisen out of wartime

> I know, and you know, that the Doctor [Frigon] has for some reason resented what he considers the "independence" of the news. I am also convinced that at heart he does not accept the democratic approach to the news --- that the public is always entitled to the full facts of any important news story, barring wartime censorship. Unless we can maintain this basic policy unimpaired, I don't care to continue the news responsibility. (83)

McArthur threatened to make an issue by "placing all the facts before the public." More precisely, he contemplated leaking the story of Frigon's interference in the newscasts to Members of Parliament such as Paul Martin, John Diefenbaker and M. J. Coldwell, and to journalists such as Blair Fraser of Maclean's magazine:

> I'm completely serious about feeling that our news policy must, if necessary, be made a public issue, because it is the public that has the real stake in our news. . . . Blackmail maybe -- but good! It would be far better, of course, to clean it up without any external fuss, and that is what I hope you can arrange. You [Bushnell] have been a bulwark of support and protection for our news policy in the past; our news staff appreciates this. . . . (84)

He held back on this threat when Bushnell assured him the matter would be taken up at the next meeting of the CBC Board of Governors. But until that meeting took place, there were other attempts at interference which compounded McArthur's frustration. On October 26, Frigon instructed the Senior Editor in the central newsroom in Toronto to include a report of a statement by General LaFleche in that day's newscast. Frigon recommended that "at least the last part [of the statement] should be used in our news bulletins." Once again, McArthur said this order violated the News Service's policy of appraising and presenting the news according to its objective news value.(85) On November 14, a publicity agent working for the Liberal party telephoned a CBC

news editor in the Montreal newsroom requesting that the News Service send a staff member to cover a speech by General LaFleche, who would be making an "important statement" in that city. The news editor on duty had to tell the publicity agent that the News Service did not accept statements directly from government officials. (86)

On November 28, 1944, Major-General George R. Pearkes, commander of Canada's home-defence Army on the Pacific coast, requested that all CBC news stories pertaining to disturbances in camps should be verified by Pacific Army Command before broadcast. A brigade of the home-defence troops (or "Zombies" as they were known) stationed at Terrace, British Columbia, had taken up arms, tried to take over a troop train, and declared they were "on strike." This was the consequence of the government's decision, on November 23rd, to send 16,000 men conscripted under the National Resources Mobilization Act overseas for military service. The CBC's Vancouver newsroom was asked by General Pearkes not to report any future incidents of this kind. Pacific Army Command said CP/BUP reports were "grossly exaggerated and, in some cases, . . . inaccurate."

McArthur once again argued that the CBC should not be subject to military censorship that did not apply to other mass media. He travelled to Ottawa on November 30th to discuss the matter with Frigon and Howard B. Chase, the new Chairman of the CBC's Board of Governors. Frigon believed that news of anti-conscription disturbances was not conducive to the maintenance of national unity and contributed to the "unrest prevailing in the Dominion." Chase suggested that the CBC "should set an example

by publicly announcing that it would in future carry no news at all in CBC bulletins of anti-conscription demonstrations."(87) McArthur rejected this idea, and recommended that "no attempt should be made to exclude any developments of general interest from CBC bulletins." But he agreed that all stories dealing with military and civil disturbances arising from the conscription issue would be confined to "bare factual statements" without any "descriptive detail and 'color'." This compromise was accepted.

On November 30, 1944, Frigon issued a policy directive to all CBC newsrooms stating that "in the interest of the country as a whole, news of demonstrations by the public or the Armed Forces relating to conscription and the sending of troops overseas, should be confined to basic facts without any elaboration or details."(88)

McArthur complied with Frigon's directive because the public was in an "excited state of mind." Descriptive details, he believed, sounded "more alarming and sensational" on radio than in print.(89) However, he stressed that this should not be accepted as a precedent for stories dealing with similar disturbances. McArthur was in a difficult position. On one hand, McArthur advised his editors to avoid phrasing news stories in such a way that inflamed "racial and sectional antagonisms":

> Every CBC news editor should be aware of the very heavy responsibility which devolves on our service at this time when political and racial feelings have been roused to a point where they offer a threat to national unity and the prosecution of the war. We face a situation where listeners' nerves are on edge and prejudices are easily aroused. Heard on the air, an incident of very minor interest may serve to stir up feelings entirely out of proportion to its real importance.(90)

On the other hand, McArthur was concerned that management might use this incident as a precedent to ask CBC editors to omit any news story that "placed Quebec in an unfavourable light" (a majority of Quebecers had voted against conscription in a plebiscite on this issue in 1942). (91) If the CBC had decided to set an example by not carrying certain news on its bulletins, the public would have turned to newspapers and private radio stations because the newscasts would have been perceived as government-censored news.(92)

Shortly after meeting McArthur on November 30, Frigon discussed the matter with Wilfrid Eggleston, the Director of Censorship. Eggleston supported McArthur's position and argued that it would be "injudicious and likely to develop criticism, if CBC imposed such a special censorship on news."(93) Eggleston was agreed that such censorship should only be carried out through "official censorship machinery" and applied uniformly to all the mass media across Canada.(94)

When he travelled to Ottawa to meet Frigon, McArthur was prepared to submit his letter of resignation. But when Eggleston persuaded Frigon that a special censorship on the CBC was unwise, McArthur decided to stay on as Chief News Editor. Eggleston issued a general censorship directive on November 29, on anti-conscription demonstrations which applied to all mass media. As McArthur later wrote: "There was no recourse, save [for] a mass resignation of senior news staff, which would hardly have been in the public interest."(95)

Despite Eggleston's directive, Frigon violated the agreement he had made with McArthur. On December 8th, Colonel Rene Landry,

the CBC's Director of Personnel and chief radio censor, telephoned the Toronto and Montreal newsrooms. He informed news editors of Frigon's request that the CBC bulletins not carry any stories about any future movement of troops or disturbances in NRMA camps, even if the news had been cleared by official censors. According to McArthur's account, one of the editors on duty asked if Frigon's request was to be taken as "an order." Landry replied that it was. The next day, McArthur told Bushnell that this latest interference by Frigon in the affairs of the News Service had an unfortunate and detrimental effect on the morale of the newsroom staff. CBC senior editors had joined the CBC News Service in the belief that it was not to be a 'Government news service.' They would not continue their responsibilities unless the Board of Governors secured a clear reaffirmation of their News Service's integrity. (96)

The Outcome of McArthur's Struggle

Instead of resigning, McArthur again demanded that the Board of Governors take up the issue. He wanted the Board to resolve this fundamental question: "Should CBC news be subjected to special censorships at the request of Ministers or Departments of Government, when such restrictions do not apply to the press and to private radio stations?" At a conference of Senior Editors in Montreal held from January 10 to 12, 1945, the News Service staff passed a motion that reaffirmed the integrity of the CBC News. They approved a resolution drawn up by McArthur and the senior editors was subsequently approved at a meeting of the Board of Governors on January 28, 1945. The

resolution stated that the News Service and General Manager had agreed that "all the integral facts of significant stories should be given, in their proper perspective. The integral facts of a story may be defined as those facts necessary to give the listener a true picture without distortion either through exaggeration or by suppression." Significantly, the resolution stated that regardless of how a story was handled by the wire services, newspapers or private radio stations, the CBC's news editors would consider the news for the bulletins "entirely on the basis of its real news value and presented in a soberly factual way, having special regard to the impact of adjectives and descriptive phrases on the listener."(97) In other words, objectivity was used as a weapon to protect the News Service from future encroachments by the General Manager in its internal affairs. Frigon later told McArthur he supported the resolution.

The Stoney Mountain controversy came back to haunt the government in November of 1945. McArthur claimed that he had ignored Frigon's directive of August 28, 1944, which had instructed the News Service to delete items about any future "minor prison disturbances" from the CBC's newscasts. Nevertheless, no other prison incident had occurred to precipitate a showdown with Frigon. Ironically, the Minister of Justice sparked a renewal of the controversy. On November 16, 1945, St. Laurent revealed that, during the previous previous year, he had the "distateful" task of asking the CBC to "refrain from including in its broadcasts" news about penitentiary disturbances. (Frigon's directive on prison riots had not

previously been made public.) Speaking in the House of Commons during a debate on penitentiary reform, St. Laurent said:

> The broadcasting corporation was reluctant to eliminate reports of these incidents in such institutions, and I confess that I was reluctant to have to insist that it be done, but the alternative would have been for us to eliminate radios from the penitentiaries. That kind of news created unrest with which we were not prepared to cope.(98)

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conditions, when shortages in the number of prison guards would have posed some difficulties for prison authorities. This restriction was no longer necessary because wartime labour shortages were not as critical since the war ended in August of 1945. In a letter to St. Laurent on December 1, 1945, Dunton wrote:

> It was felt by the Board that in peacetime there could not be justification for restrictions that would prevent certain legitimate news items reaching the CBC listening public across Canada, even though in this case it might be desirable that prisoners in penitentiaries not get news of minor disturbances in other institutions. It was further felt that such restrictions on legitimate news would weaken the faith of the public in the impartiality and integrity of CBC news bulletins in general. (101)

Dunton issued a statement to the press on December 7, 1945 reaffirming the integrity of the CBC news. Newspaper editorials praised Dunton's stand. The Ottawa Journal stated: ". . . The CBC can't be half bond, and half free. If its [Board of] Governors be without the right to run it independently, with the public good its only aim, than [we might] as well turn it [CBC] over to the Government as an instrument for ministerial propaganda."(102) An editorial in the Globe and Mail concluded that the "CBC's reassertion of its responsibility for maintaining the freedom of communication is carried well beyond the prison incident." It went on to praise Dunton for making the integrity of the CBC News Service its "guiding principle" and for "having set the Government at rights on this fundamental purpose." The editorial concluded:

> It is indeed encouraging to learn that Chairman Dunton had stood by the principle of journalistic freedom, to which he is trained, in defiance of Mr. St. Laurent's insistence. . . The statement which Mr. Dunton released in this connection, is, in its way, a declaration of independence.(103)

In retrospect, the degree of political interference in the newscasts in 1944 was small compared with the overall CBC - government collaboration during the war years. Frigon, LaFleche, and St. Laurent and others considered the News Service to be an integral part of an important national radio system, and so felt justified in imposing their views over the heads of McArthur and his staff. From 1939 to 1945, Canada was on a total war footing. In their view, the CBC, which communicated the government's aims directly to its citizens, had to set aside some of the policies that governed it in peacetime. As an important component of Canada's national broadcasting system, the CBC News Service, from time to time, had to compromise its editorial freedom in the interest of national unity, public order and safety. Although McArthur did not dispute the need for wartime censorship to maintain national security and public safety, he opposed the suppression or distortion of news for political reasons.

The four main controversies in 1944 that prompted McArthur to mount his defensive campaign -- the return of McNaughton and Houde, the uprising at Stoney Mountain, and the revolt of the 'Zombies' -- dealt with one central question: Should the CBC News Service censor or give "special" treatment to a news item or event, even if newspapers and private radio newscasts could report the same story without restrictions? These controversies were the exception rather than the rule. There was no concerted or systematic attempt by either the CBC's General Manager or the Minister of National War Services to rein in and control the News Service. Despite McArthur's claims, the News

Service never became a "Government news service" or a "semi-official" news service of the type envisioned by Frigon in the summer of 1940.

McArthur waged an important and ultimately successful struggle to defend the basic principle underlying the CBC News Service: that its editors should exercise editorial freedom subject only to those wartime restrictions that applied to all mass media. He was an impassioned advocate of the basic principles underlying 'the freedom of the press' in a democratic society. In his view, this 'freedom' also applied to Canada's national radio news service:

> . . . our primary responsibility [is] to give the listener the news <u>without special censorships or concessions.</u> . . . If a news service that is presumably operated in the public interest with public funds -- and which can influence listeners in every part of Canada -- can be modified by governmental, political or any other special considerations. The dangers are obvious and need no elaboration. (104)

By steadfastly defending the integrity of the CBC News Service, McArthur enabled it to operate with considerable autonomy within the CBC during the war years. By vigorously resisting political and managerial interference, he no doubt prevented even further challenges to the News Service's editorial freedom.

In the postwar years, there were several well-publicized controversies involving government interference in the CBC's Talks and Public Affairs programming.(105) But with a few minor exceptions, there was no recurrence of the type of controversy that had rocked the News Service in 1944.

After the war, the news editors were no longer prevented from disseminating legitimate news stories, and the News Service went on to become a bona fide news-gathering organization. (106) McArthur had won a hard-fought struggle to maintain the editorial freedom of the News Service during wartime. However, to preserve that integrity, he and his news editors would have to remain eternally vigilant in peacetime as well.

ENDNOTES -- CHAPTER IV

1
William H. Metcalfe The View From Thirty: A Veteran Newsman Files His Last Dispatch (Winnipeg, 1986), p. 96. See Metcalfe's account of McArthur's struggle with Frigon on pages 93-102.

2
D.C. McArthur, "Statement on CBC News Service, with special reference to presentation of political views." February 16, 1944. [NAC, RG 41, vol. 626, file: 34]

3
D.C. McArthur, "Here is the CBC News," unpublished manuscript, unrevised version, circa 1966-67. Hereafter referred to as "McArthur manuscript.") [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: "CBC News Service -- the formative years."] (hereafter referred to as "McArthur manuscript." (Page numbers have been indicated by me.)

4
"News Broadcasts," Victoria Daily Colonist, December 12, 1940, p. 4

5
"CBC National News Service, Statement of General Policy," August 9, 1941. [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: CBC National News -- general policy statements]. This statement was later entrenched in the CBC's Internal Rules and Regulations.

6
"Statement of General Policy," August 9, 1941

7 Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting, 1942 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, pp. 172-173.

8
The government departments which collaborated with the CBC in producing wartime programming were: the Bureau of Public Information (later the Wartime Information Board); the Wartime Prices and Trade Board (for programs dealing with price controls); the National War Finance Committee ("Victory Loan" and "War Savings Certificate" campaigns); the Department of National War Services (salvage and national service); the Department of Labour (unemployment insurance, Selective Service, labour relations); the Department of Munitions and Supply ("Voice of Victory" campaign, defence production); the Department of National Defence (Army, Navy, Air Force recruitment); Department of Agriculture (food production and rationing); Department of Pensions and National Health (civilian protection, national health, nutrition). [source: House of Commons, Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting, Final Report, 1942, p. 1092.]

9
D.C. McArthur to G. Murray, "Report of meeting with Director of Public Information and Press Liaison Officers of War Service Departments in Ottawa December 28th [1940]," December 30, 1940 [NAC, RG 41, file 11-17-7 (2). This memorandum also in RG 41, vol. 900, file: PG 10-1 (2)]

10
D.C. McArthur to Ernie Bushnell, September 24, 1944 [NAC, MG 30 E 250, vol. 2, file: CBC correspondence, 1944]

11
"Statement of General Policy," August 9, 1941.

12
Ibid.

13
D.C. McArthur to Peter Aylen, January 4, 1941 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 900, PG-10-1 (pt. 2), file: 1941-1956]

14
Statement of General Policy, Aug. 9, 1941 *op. cit.*

15
"News" Memorandum from D.C. McArthur to E.L. Bushnell, circa December 4, 1944 [NAC, MG 30 E 250, vol. 2, file: "CBC correspondence, 1944"]

16
D.C. McArthur to J.S. Thomson, "Losses in Air Raids," March 25, 1943 [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: wartime directives]

17
McArthur manuscript, p. 99

18
Powley to George Taggart, December 16, 1940 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 171, file : 11-17-7 (2)]

19
Ibid.

20
Ibid.

21
McArthur manuscript, p. 100

22
D.C. McArthur to G. Murray, December 30, 1940.

23
Ibid.

24
Ibid.

25
Ibid.

26
D. McArthur to J. N. Crandall, February 20, 1942 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 175, file: 11-17-6-5]

27
See Wilfred H. Kesterton "Censorship in Wartime," in *A History of Journalism in Canada* (Toronto: 1967) pp. 245-249; Wilfrid Eggleston, *While I Still Remember*, (Toronto: 1968), pp. 252-270.

28
"Statement of General Policy," August 9, 1941

29
D. C. McArthur to Murray, December 30, 1940

30
D. C. McArthur to E. Bushnell, May 4, 1944

31
"Statement of General Policy," August 9, 1941

32
D. C. McArthur to G. Murray, re:"Statement of General Policy," August 12, 1941 [RG 41, vol. 904, file: PG-10-6, pt. 1]

33 CBC Radio Program Archives. Oral History Interview of D.C. "Dan" McArthur by Peter Stursberg, April 18, 1963 (59:40 minutes). [National Archives of Canada, Moving Image and Sound Archives division, acc. no. 1986-0103] (hereafter referred to as "McArthur interview, 1963.")

34 McArthur manuscript, p. 45.

35 P. Aylen to A. Powley and M. Ouimet, August 7, 1941, [NAC, RG 41, PG-10 pt (1), vol. 904]

36 D. C. McArthur to G. Murray "Statement of News Policy," August 12, 1941 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 904, PG 10-6 (1)]

37 Ibid.

38 McArthur manuscript, p. 101

39 McArthur manuscript, p. 104

40 "News Policy," memorandum from D.C. McArthur to E. Bushnell, May 4, 1944 [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: CBC National News, general, 1941-52]

41 Ibid.

42 D. C. McArthur to E. Bushnell, "News Policy," May 4, 1944 [NAC, MG 30 E 250, vol. 2]

43 After the First World War, Murray was a reporter for Lord Beaverbrook's London Daily Express. He subsequently became Publicity Director for the League of Nations Union and joined the British Broadcasting Company in 1923, where he took charge of its Information, Political and Public Relations Branches. He founded the BBC's three weekly publications (including The Listener) and handled media relations for the BBC. [Source: R.S. Lambert "What About the C.B.C.? Men, Programmes, Policy and Problems of Canada's National Radio," in Food For Thought no. 2 (February 1940), p. 14.]

44 G. Murray "CBC National News Service. Broadcast by the General Manager of the CBC on New Year's Day" (January 1, 1941). [NAC, RG 41, vol. 171, file: 11-17-1].

45 McArthur manuscript, p. 61

46 McArthur interview, 1963

47 House of Commons, Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, July 1, 1943, p. 111.

48 "Statement of General Policy," August 9, 1941

49 D.C. McArthur to E. Bushnell, "News Policy," May 4, 1944, [NAC, MG 30 E 250, vol. 2]

50
Dr. Frigon became Acting General Manager on November 2, 1943, following the resignation of James S. Thomson, who returned to the University of Saskatchewan, where he had served as President. Frigon served in this capacity until August 27, 1944, when his appointment as General Manager was confirmed. He held this position from August 28, 1944 until September 27, 1951. He died in 1952.
51
Frank Peers referred to Frigon as "an able administrator and devoted public servant." He was a "man of broad knowledge and integrity, but was, at times, rather too deferential to constituted authority. [source: The Politics of Canadian Broadcasting, (Toronto, 1968), p. 438-439.]
52
McArthur manuscript, p. 103
53
McArthur interview, 1963.
54
General L. R. LaFleche to Augustin Frigon, February 18, 1944, NAC, RG 41, vol. 626, file 34]
55
Rene Morin to L. R. LaFleche, February 22, 1944 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 626, file: 34]
56
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57
Ibid.
58
A. Frigon to E. Bushnell, "CBC News Broadcasts," February 4, 1944 [NAC, MG 30 E 250, vol. 2, file: McNaughton retirement.]
59
McArthur to Bushnell, February 7, 1944.
60
D.C. McArthur to E. Bushnell, "CBC News," February 7, 1944, [NAC, MG 30 E 250, vol. 2, file: McNaughton retirement.]
61
Ibid.
62
A. Frigon to E. Bushnell, "News Bulletin - February 3rd, 1944", February 8, 1944, [NAC, MG 30 E 250, vol. 2, file: McNaughton retirement]
63
House of Commons, Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Second and Final Report (July 21, 1943), p. 259.
64
D.C. McArthur, "Statement on CBC News Service, with special references to the presentation of political news," February 16, 1944. Presented at meeting of CBC Board of Governors, February 20-21, 1944. [NAC, RG 41, vol. 626, file: 34];

65 **Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Governors [NAC, RG 41, vol. 616, February 21, 1944, p. 568 (microfilm reel T-3040)]; D.C. McArthur to News Editors, "Commendation from Board of Governors," March 4, 1944 [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2].**

66

Stripped of his title as mayor on August 5, 1940, Houde was arrested by the RCMP under the provision of the War Measures Act for having advocated defiance of registration for military service.

67

"News," McArthur to Bushnell, December 9, 1944. [MG 30, E 250, vol. 2, file: CBC correspondence, 1944]

68

McArthur manuscript, p. 111

69

McArthur manuscript, p. 115

70

McArthur manuscript, p. 111.

71

D.C. McArthur to E. Bushnell, "confidential" memorandum, August 21, 1944 [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2]

72

Ibid.

73

J. St-Georges to D.C. McArthur, "The Houde Case," August 21, 1944 [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2]

74

Louis St. Laurent to A. Frigon, August 22, 1944 [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: "political confrontations, CBC news."]

75

Ibid.

76

A. Frigon to Louis St. Laurent, August 26, 1944 [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: political confrontations]

77

A. Frigon to E. Bushnell, "CBC Newscasts -- Penitentiaries," August 28, 1944. [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: political confrontations.]

78

D.C. McArthur to E.L. Bushnell, "confidential" memo, August 22, 1944 [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: political confrontations]

79

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80

Ibid.

81

D. C. McArthur to E. Bushnell, September 24, 1944.

82

Ibid.

83

Ibid.

84

Ibid.

85 "News," D. C. McArthur to E. Bushnell, December 9, 1944 [NAC MG 30 E 250, vol. 2, file: CBC correspondence, 1944]

86 McArthur manuscript.

87 D. C. McArthur to E. Bushnell, December 9, 1944

88 A. Frigon to D.C. McArthur, untitled memorandum, November 30, 1944 [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2, file: Political Confrontations]

89 D. C. McArthur to E. Bushnell, "News Developments During November [1944]," December 6, 1944 [NAC, RG 41, vol. 171, file: 11-17 (pt. 3)

90 D. C. McArthur to Senior Editors, "News of Domestic Disturbances," November 30, 1944. [NAC, MG 30 E 333, vol. 2]

91 D. C. McArthur to E. Bushnell, December 9, 1944

92 McArthur interview, 1963.

93 McArthur to Bushnell, December 9, 1944

94 _Ibid._

95 McArthur manuscript

96 _Ibid._

97 "Handling of CBC News," Statement no. 3, January 28, 1945. [NAC, RG 41, vol. 629, file: "40th meeting of the Board of Governors, Ottawa, January 27-29, 1945.]

98 House of Commons _Debates_, November 16, 1945, pp. 2194-95

99 "Government Commands, CBC Obeys" (editorial) _The Globe and Mail_, November 21, 1945, p. 6.

100 Dunton later wrote: "I had a great respect for Dan [McArthur] and for the integrity of the CBC news." [Davidson Dunton to W. H. Metcalfe, February 27, 1984. Copy of letter obtained by Ross Eaman.

101 A. Davidson Dunton to Hon. Louis St. Laurent, December 1, 1945 [NAC, MG 30, E 333, vol. 2, file: political confrontations].

102 "Declaration of Independence," (editorial) The Ottawa _Journal_, December 12, 1945, p. 8.

103 "Independence Declared" (editorial) _The Globe and Mail_, December 11, 1945, p. 6

104 D. C. McArthur to E. Bushnell, "Further Notes on News Policy," September 24, 1944. [NAC, MG 30 E 250, vol. 2, file: CBC correspondence, 1944. (emphasis his).

105 The most controversial examples of government interference in Talks and Public Affairs (later renamed News and Current Affairs) were: the cancellation of "Preview Commentary" in 1959 and "This Hour Has Seven Days" in 1966; the CRTC's investigation into alleged Quebec separatists among journalists in CBC/Radio-Canada in 1977 (at the request of the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau); and the debate over the Progressive-Conservative government's interference in the awarding of a licence for the proposed "All News Channel" in 1987-88.
106

By the late 1940s, the CBC established its own foreign news bureaux in London, Paris, Washington and at the United Nations. A new CBC newsroom was established in St. John's when Newfoundland joined Confederation in 1949. Under the direction of senior news editor Norman DePoe, "CBC News Roundup" continued to provide listeners with a more in-depth treatment of Canadian affairs. In 1951, the CBC sent over correspondents Bill Herbert and Rene Levesque to report on Canada's soldiers fighting in Korea.

At his own request, McArthur stepped down as Chief News Editor in February of 1953. He was succeeded by William Hogg, who piloted the CBC's expansion into television and local news. McArthur moved to Ottawa, where he served as Executive Assistant to the new General Manager, J. Alphonse Ouimet. In August of 1954 McArthur was appointed Director of Special Program Projects in the CBC's National Program Office, a post which he held until his retirement in 1962. In 1966, McArthur was commissioned by the Corporation to write a history of the CBC News Service. But he never completed the project. He died on March 17, 1967.

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"CBC News Roundup Canada's First Program of This Kind," CBC Program Schedule, August 29, 1943, p. 1.

"CBC Covers the Home News Front," CBC Program Schedule, July 25, 1943, p. 4.

"CBC Overseas Unit: It Brings the Sound of Battle Directly into Your Living Room," CBC Program Schedule, December 24, 1944, p. 4.

Radio-Canada. "La radio des annees de guerre" (transcript of radio documentary) Si la radio m'etait contee Cahier no. 3 [broadcast on April 24, 1980]. Montreal: Service des Transcriptions et Derives de la Radio. Radio Canada, Document d'Archives.

F. CBC Radio Archives -- Recordings

CBC Radio Program Archives, Oral History Interview of D. C. "Dan" McArthur by Peter Stursberg, April 18, 1963 (59:40 min.). National Archives of Canada, Moving Image and Sound Archives Division, acc. no. 1986 - 0103.

D-Day broadcast of "The National News Bulletin" read by Earl Cameron, June 6, 1944. National Archives of Canada, Moving Image and Sound Archives Division (T 1982-0043/278)

A NOTE ON SOURCES

Secondary Sources on the CBC

The "definitive" works on public broadcasting in Canada are Frank Peers, The Politics of Broadcasting (Toronto: 1969) and E.A Weir The Struggle for National Broadcasting in Canada (Toronto: 1965). The two authors review the debate surrounding the beginning of public broadcasting in Canada and the création of the CBC. Peers' book, in particular, contains a good deal of memoranda and official documents relating to the administrative and political aspects of radio broadcasting. Chapter 13, entitled "The CBC as a Wartime Arm of Government" (pp. 323-345), is particularly useful in describing the context within which the CBC News Service emerged. Weir's account makes only a brief mention of the CBC's wartime role (see "CBC and World War II," pp. 269-271). Ernest Dick's Guide to CBC Sources at the Public Archives, published by the Public Archives of Canada (Ottawa: 1987) is a helpful reference source for researchers.

With the exception of sketchy and somewhat breezy chapters in popular histories [see "Radio's Silver Age, 1936-1949" in Sandy Stewart's From Coast to Coast (Toronto: 1985); and "Radió at War, 1940-45" in Warner Troyer's The Sound and the Fury: An Anecdotal History of Canadian Broadcasting (Rexdale, 1980), there is, as yet, no definitive account of the important role played by the CBC in the area of wartime programming during the Second World War, let alone a history of the News Service. Carlton McNaught's Canada Gets the News (Toronto: 1940) has a chapter on "News on the Air," which traces the beginning of radio news broadcasting in Canada from 1933 to 1940 (pp. 247-257).

The Library of the Moving Image and Sound Archives Division of the National Archives Library has the issues of CBC Times, Radio, CBC Radio Guide. The CBC's annual reports, available at the National Library, are also useful for general information on CBC programming from 1933 to 1953. In addition, a bound volume containing the Annual Reports of the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission from 1933 to 1936 and the CBC Annual Reports from 1936-1949 is available at the Library of Parliament. See Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), Annual Report: 1933 to 1948/49 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1933 to 1949. [Canada, Library of Parliament, Ottawa, acc. no. HE 8699 C22 A1, 1933-1949].

The booklets CBC News and CBC War Effort are available in CBC Communications collection, Carleton University, School of Journalism (Resource Centre). The complete set of booklets in the "Five Years of Achievement Series, 1936-1941" can also be found in the Bushnell Papers. The Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence and Final Reports of the various House of Commons Committees on Radio Broadcasting of 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1942, 1943, 1944, and 1946 are at the Library of Parliament and National Library of Canada in Ottawa. The Minutes contain useful transcripts of statements and briefs on CBC programming policy.

"Here is the CBC News : The McArthur Manuscript

In March of 1966, the CBC commissioned D. C. McArthur to write the story of the organization of the CBC News Service. The manuscript, entitled "Here is the CBC News," was written shortly before his death in March of 1967. McArthur provided a brief overview of news broadcasting from the early days of radio in Canada until Dunton's reaffirmation of the integrity of CBC news in December 1945. McArthur's manuscript is basically a personal recollection that includes documentation from CBC archival records (but no references or footnotes). Most of this manuscript, especially the section on "news policy," is a compilation McArthur's wartime memoranda, which have been reproduced in chronological order and quoted in their entirety There was no attempt at synthesis and analysis, nor is there a discussion of McArthur's concept of 'objectivity.'

In the endnotes, I have referred to the unrevised version of the manuscript in the A. E. Powley papers (MG 30 E333, volume 2, file: "The CBC News Service: The Formative Years.") The page numbers referred to in this 148-page manuscript have been indicated by me since this manuscript does not have consecutive pagination. Researchers are advised to refer to the original memoranda in the CBC records and in volume 2 of the A. E. Powley papers, which contains most of the memoranda used by McArthur for the manuscript (they were handed over to Powley shortly before McArthur's death).

I have have not relied extensively on the manuscript as a primary source. The manuscript does contain a good account of McArthur's struggle to defend the News Service's integrity, and it is useful for corroborating certain facts. It also contains memoranda that are missing from the CBC papers. The final, unpublished version of the manuscript, which was revised by A.E. Powley in 1976, can be found in the CBC papers at National Archives of Canada, Government Archives Division. [RG 41, vol. 436, file 27-5-1 (1)]. With the exception of a few added sentences and words, the 1976 version does not differ markedly from McArthur's original draft.

<u>CBC Papers</u> Government Archives Division, National Archives of Canada [RG 41]

Although there is a dearth of secondary source material about the CBC News Service, a rich amount of primary material exists in the Government Archives Division at the National Archives of Canada. The files that were most useful for this thesis are listed on the following pages.

volume	file no.	Programming -- News Broadcasts
171	11-17 (1 - 6)	News broadcasts -- general, 1940-78
	11-17-1 (1-2)	Development of National News, 1933-41
172	11-17-1-1 (1)	Development -- Halifax newsroom, 1940-55
	11-17-1-2 (1)	Development -- Montreal newsroom, 1940-52
	11-17-1-3 (1)	Development -- Toronto newsroom, 1940-58
	11-17-1-4 (1)	Development -- Winnipeg newsroom, 1940-57
	11-17-1-5 (1)	Development -- Vancouver newsroom, 1940-58
	11-17-2 (1)	Proposed CBC News Service, 1938-40
	11-17-3 (1 to 4)	The Canadian Press -- general, 1932-34
173	11-17-3-3 (5 - 9)	The Canadian Press -- general, 1934-72
	11-17-3-4 (1)	Relations with CP -- 1940-64
	11-17-4 (1)	National News Service -- general, 1941-43
174	11-17-4 (2)	National News Service, general, 1943-75
	11-17-4-1 (1)	National News Service, stylizing, 1940-6
	11-17-4-2 (1)	National News Service, features, 1941-62
	11-17-4-6 (1)	National News Service, relations with BUP, 1940-63

175	11-17-5 (1)	**Foreign News Service, TransRadio Press, 1937-40**
	11-17-5-1 (1-2)	Foreign News Service, BUP, 1933-46
	11-17-5-2 (1)	Foreign News Service, United Press, 1937-40
	11-17-6 (1)	Sponsored news broadcasts, general, 1937-41
	11-17-6-1 (1)	News censorship, general, 1939-63
	11-17-6-2 (1)	Censorship, American news broadcasts, 1941-42
	11-17-6-3 (1)	Prairie provinces -- regional news, general, 1941-44
	11-17-6-4 (1)	B.C. regional news, general, 1940-64
	11-17-6-5 (1)	B.C. regional news, policy & procedures, 1940-44
	11-17-6-6 (1)	Western provinces, policy & procedures, 1940 - 53
176	11-17-6-7 (1)	Ontario regional news, policy & procedures, 1941-44
	11-17-6-8 (1)	Quebec regional news, policy & procedures, 1940-43
	11-17-6-9 (1)	Maritimes regional news, policy & procedures, 1940-44
	11-17-7 (1)	CBC News Roundup, general, 1942

CBC Wartime Broadcasting

431	27-1 (1- 4)	Wartime Broadcasting - general, 1940-71
	27-1 (5-6)	Wartime Broadcasting - general 1940-71
433	27-2 (1)	Special Wartime Activities, 1937-66
435	27-4-2 (1)	Wartime Activities, censorship, 1939-55
	27-4-4 (1-2)	Wartime Activities --

		Interdepartmental War Publicity Committee, 1941-44
436	27-5-1 (1)	**"Here is the CBC News," final draft of McArthur manuscript (revised by A.E. Powley in 1976)**
	27-7 (1)	War diaries, 1941-44

Board of Governors - Working Papers

621	"13th meeting of Board of Governors, Ottawa, January 22, 1940."
622	"Board of Governors, Special Committee on News, Meeting held in Ottawa, July 17-18, 1940."
	"16th meeting of the Board of Governors, Ottawa, November 26-27, 1940."

Programming -- News Programs

899	PG-10-1 (1)	general correspondence, 1938-40
900	PG-10-1 (2)	general correspondence, 1941-56
901	PG-10-4-2 (1)	CBC National News, 1938-47
904	PG-10-6 (1)	CBC National News Service, bulletins, 1933-41
	PG-10-6 (2)	bulletins, 1941-43
	PG-10-6 (3)	bulletins, 1943-44
905	PG-10-6 (4)	bulletins, 1944-45
	PG-10-6 (5)	bulletins, 1945-47
	PG-10-6 (6)	bulletins, 1948-50
	PG-10-7 (7)	bulletins, 1951-53
	PG-10-9 (1)	BBC news, 1938-42
	PG-10-9 (2)	BBC news, 1942-46
906	PG-10-10 (1)	Press News Ltd., general correspondence, 1941-71
908	PG-10-32 (1)	TransRadio news, 1938-40
	PG-10-32 (2)	TransRadio news, 1940-43

A. E. Powley Papers (MG 30 E 333)

Volume 2, contains memoranda and documents used by McArthur for his unpublished history of the CBC News Service in 1966-67. Many memos in this volume are not in the CBC papers.

-- "The CBC News Service: the Formative Years" (original, unrevised drafts of D.C. McArthur's manuscript, 1966-67).

-- CRBC-CBC News Development, 1933-40 (includes Canadian Press News development)

-- Board of Governors, correspondence, memoranda and notes regarding the establishment of CBC National News coverage, 1940

-- Organization of CBC News Coverage, 1940-41

-- Political Confrontations -- CBC News, 1942-45

-- CBC News Policy (file A), Basic Policy, 1940-52

-- CBC News Policy (file B), McArthur memos, bulletins, government news, content and quality, 1941-51

-- CBC News Policy (file C), Wartime and Post-war directives, 1941-46

-- CBC News Policy (file D), Editors conferences and special reports, 1940-50.

-- CBC News Policy, (file E), Political News Directives, 1941-48

-- Style and Annnouncing, CBC News, 1938-50

-- News Round-Up, commentaries, CBC News, 1941-50

-- CBC News Staff salaries, working conditions, and responsibilities, 1941-50

-- French News, development of Montreal newsroom, 1933-43

-- San Francisco Conference, CBC News, 1945

-- Canadian Daily Newspaper Association Brief to House of Commons Committee on Radio Broadcasting, 1947

-- Newfoundland [bureau], news, CBC News, 1949

-- Korean war, 1950-52

-- Central registry of news file list used by D. C. McArthur in writing history of CBC News

-- Reference material and photographs 1941-61

-- Agency contracts with CBC News, 1940-50

-- Operations and Procedures, CBC News, 1940-50

-- CBC News, Directives and Style Guide, June 1956

Other Papers -- National Archives of Canada

Ernie Bushnell papers (MG 30 E 250, volume 2) contains memoranda from McArthur and Bushnell dealing with the controversy surrounding challenges to the integrity of the CBC News in 1944 (i.e., McNaughton retirement, Stoney Mountain incident, conscription crisis of 1944). Volume 14 contains memoranda on news broadcasting written by Bushnell in November 1938.

E. Austin Weir papers (MG 30 D 67, volume 4) contains a small file of correspondence with D.C. McArthur. It also contains a copy of his legendary memorandum: "Up Shit Creek with a P & A Paddle," written in 1947.

Peter Stursberg papers (MG 31 D 78) contain some of Stursberg's memorabilia (newspaper clippings and correspondence about his activities with CBC Overseas Unit.

W.G. Gladstone Murray papers do not contain any information on the CBC News Service.

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