1

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIAL 1010a
(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)

**National Library
of Canada**

**Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada**

Canadian Theses Service

Service des thèses canadiennes

**Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4**

NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.

MODERNITY IN DECLINE:
POLITICS AND THE MODERN NOVEL

by

NEVIO CRISTANTE, B.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Political Science

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

November 20, 1989

copyright
1989, Nevio Cristante

**National Library
of Canada**

**Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada**

Canadian Theses Service Service des thèses canadiennes

**Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4**

The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence irrévocable et non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de sa thèse de quelque manière et sous quelque forme que ce soit pour mettre des exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

ISBN 0-315-58986-8

**The undersigned recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
and Research acceptance of the thesis**

**"MODERNITY IN DECLINE:
POLITICS AND THE MODERN NOVEL"**

**submitted by Nevio Cristante, B.A.
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts**

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Tom Sarty", is written over a horizontal line.

Thesis Supervisor

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. Smith", is written over a horizontal line.

Chair, Department of Political Science

Carleton University

ABSTRACT:

The generation of this text spawns from a few premises: firstly, that we are living through a political crisis inclusive of all global concerns; secondly, that this condition finds its best expression in Nietzsche's understanding of nihilism. Symptoms of political nihilism announce themselves everywhere: they are most evident in the on-going difficulties for intelligent communication amongst one another. There appears to be no moral accord on anything: a need for a thousand judgments with no judges nor those who wish to be judged. This text is not meant as a programme to overcome political nihilism. It merely makes suggestions. It suggests a path for a possible re-vitalization of political discourse within the discourses generated by the contemporary novel. This is all one can really expect in an age of nihilism. But with this attitude I seem in good company.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

May my acknowledgement be in the dedication of this thesis to my teachers, family and friends, for they form a large part of the heart and soul that went into the work. Names are unnecessary. I believe the more deserving of these people are obvious; they know who they are and do not need to be mentioned here. It is my sincere wish that this paper is a testament to their unwavering support. For this, I am grateful.

Table of Contents

	Page
Abstract.....	ii
Acknowledgements.....	iii
Table of Contents.....	iv
INTRODUCTION.....	1
PART I A GENEALOGY OF MODERNITY	
CHAPTER 1 THE MEANING OF MODERNITY	
I. (i) The Modern Attitude.....	18
(ii) The Irony of Modern "Subjectivity".....	24
(iii) Democratic Humanism and the Death of God.....	30
(iv) Technology and Modern Philosophy: Reverberations for "World Order".....	37
CHAPTER 2 THE END OF PHILOSOPHY	
I. (i) Technological Deception in Present Day "Science".....	43
(ii) Modern Metaphysics and Present Day "Science": A Problem of "Knowing".....	48
(iii) Nietzsche and Metaphysics.....	56
CHAPTER 3 "MODERNITY" AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE WORLD	
I. (i) World Alienation and Worldless Instability.....	62
(ii) Our Historical Legacy.....	68
(iii) From <u>Cosmos</u> to Historical "World".....	72
(iv) "Old Worlds"-"New Worlds".....	78
PART II THE POST-HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE AND THE "NEW" NOVEL	
CHAPTER 4 THE MEANING OF THE POST-HISTORICAL	
II. (i) Nietzsche's Confrontation with Hegel: Radicalizing the Modern Apocalyptic Vision.....	82
(ii) The Unsaid Side of Hegel and the Implosion of the Modern Project:(Into the Abyss).....	89
(iii) Hegelian Discourse & Worldless Infinity.....	93
(iv) Nietzsche and Nihilism: The Task of Thinking at the End of History.....	96

CHAPTER 5 THE "NEW" "MODERNITY" AND THE POST-HISTORICAL NOVEL

II. (i)	The Historical Epic Novel and the Rise of the Social.....	107
(ii)	The End of History and the Life of the "New" Novel.....	116
(iii)	The Post-Historical Legacy of Cervantes.....	118
(iv)	Dostoevsky and the Life of the "New Novel"	123
(v)	Characteristics of the "New" Novel.....	126

CHAPTER 6 DOSTOEVSKY'S POETICS: A PEDAGOGY FOR A TECHNOLOGICAL AGE

II. (i)	Polyphony and Dialogicality.....	141
(ii)	The "New" View of the Inner Man.....	150
(iii)	"Carnivalization" In Dostoevsky's Poetics.....	155
(iv)	The Politics of Dostoevsky's Poetics.....	160

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY LITERARY THOUGHT: IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION.....	163
--	-----

BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	181
-------------------	-----

This Word (logos) is everlasting, but men are unable to comprehend it before they have heard it or even after they have heard it for the first time.

Although everything happens in accordance with this Word, they behave like inexperienced men whenever they make trial of words and deeds such as I declare as I analyze each thing according to its nature and show what it is. But other men have no idea what they are doing when awake, just as they forget what they do when they are asleep.

Heraclitus, Fragment 1

INTRODUCTION

This text takes on a huge problem seemingly inherent in our discourses on how to live in a technologically-transformed world. This is a political problem of first order. The capabilities of technology bring us untold conveniences but also plague us with moral and ethical questions whose answers to which there seems no accord. The problem isn't that the question of how to live is not answered; the problem is that there are too many immoderate and imprudent answers. This thesis suggests a way to re-vitalize a responsible political discourse for a technological age through the teachings found within the modern novel. Let us see if this is not a more healthy and prudent manner to deal with our technological world.

To begin we must first illustrate the interrelationship between the dominant visions of life which come to us by way of language and the subsequent pragmatic representations of these visions in day-to-day associations. Specifically, we will be dealing with certain unprecedented characteristics of "modernity" and the influence they have on the dominant orientation of an age. Therefore, we will reveal aspects of contemporary existence that are just beginning to become "known". We will come to know what it really means to be "modern," and, ultimately, to consider, perhaps, an age beyond "modernity" (our present)

the signs of which are barely beginning to be distinguished from the "modern" age. We will consider the nature of our present day that is so "modern" that the very distinction of "modernity" itself becomes suspect. As Hannah Arendt relates in her book, The Human Condition, ours is yet an "unknown age".¹

The attempt at knowing our present is indispensable to illuminating the differentiations and continuities our technological age bears towards past ages. It is fitting that our point of orientation is the interrelation of linguistic creations with day-to-day human associations, for if there is one continuity that has extended throughout the time of man it is such an interrelationship.

Indeed, language and politics are what allow mankind its distinction from the plants, animals and gods. The way we use speech and language makes us distinctly human. The literary is a kind of speech transposed onto a visible medium. Being a medium of human communication, a consideration of the literary is crucial for describing human associations and organizations, in other words, for politics.² Of course, this interrelationship has taken different forms and orientations, as political associations and organizations have, but the simple truth of its extended influence is taken for granted.

¹ Arendt Hannah, "Prologue" to The Human Condition, p.6

² In The Politics, Aristotle tells us that, "man is by nature a political animal." By claiming man as a political animal, illustrates politics as what distinguishing man as man. Politics, the "master of the arts" from which all other arts derive their meaning, involves the communication and recognition of meaningful speeches and actions. Animals communicate, but they do not communicate politically, that is, they communicate for the sake of mere preservation. They do not make speeches that recognize great and noble acts nor upon the necessities for the "good life", which is the goal of the polis.

It is the master of the arts, for all other arts are subordinate to it. Art, for Aristotle, means the bringing of something into existence. This activity requires speech(lexis) and action(praxis); it requires words and deeds. It is the master of arts since it is a self-sufficient activity for happiness. The end of politics is in its own activity. The recognition acquired through great words and deeds determines the self-sufficient nature of political man as he engages in the highest end of human activity. Politics involves the consideration of the best way to live, the best manner to form human associations and organizations, to allow for this highest of all activities--the recognition of the greatness and eventual immortality of the political man of excellence.

Although this thesis will focus on the decline of "modernity," it is necessary to consider how the "modern" age is said to be both distinct and continuous with ages of the past, and perhaps how it provides us with a possible glimpse of the future. This requires a scope of great breadth extending from the Homeric experience through to Classical Antiquity, Christendom, "modernity" and, perhaps, a "beyond."

In dealing with "modernity" we must consider the literary art form which is said to be characteristically "modern:" the novel. The novel can only be distinguished in terms of other literary forms and artistic orientations. It is said that novels are more compatible with "modern" experience. But what was said previously about the nature of modernity is true of the novel: there are aspects of the twentieth-century novel which contravenes the notion that novels are particular to a distinct time period. Suffice it to say that a consideration of the way the novel uses language, the way it communicates, has a bearing on the perception of our day-to-day relations.

In being true to "modernity" we also must consider another distinctly "modern" attribute which informs us of our world: scientific method. It appears that scientific method is at the heart of the dominant vision of "modern" society. It is the animating force of "modern" "political" activity. It has won an independence over philosophy and onto-theological thought. Yet the scientific method informs through an approach which appears antithetical to the pedagogy of the novel. How they oppose remains to be seen.

Methodological disciplines use language in a discernibly different manner from the novel, an art form which arose out of the same experiences as modern science but which relates to those experiences differently. The language of mathematical methodology certainly does not contain everyday speeches amongst men on matters concerning the "good

life". We will come to see why such speeches have been replaced by the recourse to factual knowledge as the way to establish "truth". By way of comparison, we may learn more about the distinctive characteristics of both "ways of relating" to experience, for the ways of relating to experience can be determined by the way we use our language and, in the case of mathematics, our language symbols.

To "know" about modernity is to elucidate how moderns come to "know". We "moderns" come to "know" in a way significantly different from the way the ancients did. The question of knowing is all-encompassing. The epistemology of an era can only be understood in its relation to an orientation of the human in his living world. Philosophically speaking, epistemology and philosophical anthropology should be considered as indispensable to one another in coming to understand the characteristics of any age. As man's orientation to his world has changed, so, too, has the manner by which things are to be "known."

The orientation of the human in his living world is reflected in language, for language responds to certain principles of knowledge that illuminate a world of beings and things. Hence, language responds to certain principles of knowledge which are related to specific visions and beliefs which form man's orientation to his world. These principles of knowledge are form-giving: they create a "world" for the human that he can believe and live in. Therefore, a profound change in the way man orients himself to his living experiences is reflected in an equally tumultuous change in the form-giving principle of language, in the way we communicate with each other. Accordingly, this re-orientation to the world of beings and things would mean an equally revolutionary shift in the way things are to be known, and the way that they can be talked about.

There are a set of interrelations of which we can speak when we inquire into Western thought as representing a certain orientation of man in his living world. Western thought is synonymous with a philosophico-historical vision,³ and this in essence is what constitutes the Western "world". Throughout Western history, there has been a gradual cultivation of the possibilities and limitations of this vision whose process of differentiations and continuities has unleashed the exigencies of "modern" experience. Thus, the Western world is a product of a philosophico-historical orientation.

The language of Western thought is then conditioned by such an orientation, by such a vision. It is the pragmatic representations of such visions which determine our political associations. Hence, there is an interrelationship between how man sees himself in the world, and how he can respond to it in his effort to "know" it, which is similar to his living in the world. How man decides to live in his world is how he decides to formulate his political associations. To live in the world is to "know" the world in a discernible manner. To "know" the world is to learn how to live in the world.

In The Theory of the Novel, Georg Lukacs grappled with the relationship between artistic form and life itself, for he foresaw this as crucial to his account of the novel. Indeed, as Laurent Stern relates in a commentary on Lukacs: "Forms of literature are forms of life, and the central concern of every literary form is an answer to the question how to live?"⁴

³ To describe Western thought with the word vision is significant when one considers that the privileging of sight over hearing is characteristic of the Western tradition as it is commonly "known". Here, the written word takes precedence over the spoken word: the tradition of textuality takes precedence over the oral tradition. The dialogues of Plato occur right on this rift. Plato reveals Socrates' trepidation of the written word, and although Plato wrote, he handed his written words over to his characters.

⁴ Stern Laurent, "Lukacs At 103", The Partisan Review, 2, Spring 1988.

It will be argued that the great novels of our era are ultimately political. Indispensable to politics is the way man relates to his fellow man in the terms available to him determined by his particular experiences. It is under these considerations where artistic creations have served politics to some degree or another. For the artist both represents and creates our surroundings and circumstances: in effect, both delineating and determining our experiences; the artist creates a knowable world that can be believed in. Thus, it has been that literary traditions have served in both ordering day-to-day associations and providing a pedagogical basis for understanding further experiences. In understanding our experiences we can better determine how to arrange ourselves or, how we are best to live--the most fundamental political question. As such, it should be clear that politics and the products of human imagination relate to one another out of necessity. The form of art, of which the literary is a part, reflect these profound changes in the forms of life and suggests ways of coming to apprehend these changes, to make them understandable. In this sense, politics is inseparable from art, for these changes are reflected in the visions of our great artists.

By merit of such changes in the forms of life coupled with the changes in artistic form, we may show the interrelationship of artistic visions and our day-to-day associations, for the accepted view of life and essence that are reflected in artistic forms, are indispensable to a consideration of political legitimacy and authority. This is precisely the relationship of art and politics. The particular characteristics of the form-giving principles of a specific time period's art works illustrate the context of experiences of that time period. Thus, the art form ultimately teaches about the particular human associations and organizations of the day.

Every art work is a product of a specific time period, insofar as it both reflects the particular context by which experiences are understood, and it anticipates, through imagination, other experiences. Hence, these products of human imagination are determined by a particular context and, especially works of true genius, set standards for understanding new experiences to determine new contexts. Every different time period has, as its context, distinctive manifestations of order and disorder from which human associations relate. Different time periods constitute a different arrangement of the boundaries of order and disorder based on specific relations which determines human associations, which determines how we live and relate to one another. Every specific time period adopts certain principles, assumptions and standards. These relate directly to our political associations. It is from the accepted human associations and organizations, from the adopted assumptions and principles that touch upon the very deepest concerns of life and essence, that political legitimacy, authority and judgement are possible.

Yet so-called political intellectuals of the present day are quick to dispel the literary as having any bearing on modern politics. It would appear that this is unprecedented. It is evidence of the particular quality of "modern" "politics." The study of politics is now relegated to the discipline of "science", which, in modern times, means only scientific method.⁵ As it is, the methodological approach to political phenomena sees no need for literature, being under the assumption, these methodologists, that they have claim to "facts" in formulating a discernable "reality", while literature is the mere "fictional" activity of

⁵ Nietzsche Friedrich, Aph.466, The Will to Power, p.261: "It is not the victory of science that distinguishes our nineteenth century, but the victory of scientific method over science."

imaginative fantasy. Suffice it to say that the novel engenders a way of relating to events that is significantly different from scientific method.

A fundamental belief of scientific method is in the presence of a "true reality" to which the human intellect is privy. "Reality" can be determined through "objective" observation. It appears to be motivated by a profound theoretical need not to be deceived. We must know the "facts" and do away with deceptive beliefs. It is informed by an impulse to know the "things-in-themselves" and eradicate deceiving "subjectivity". There is a need to discover the world-in-itself. This presupposes the possibility that the "subject" may arrive at "absolute knowledge" of the "object": this presupposes that history is a movement towards a single, totalizing discourse. These presuppositions are so strongly believed in that it is not even considered a belief. The progress of history will bring "certainty", and man can then grasp the exterior world by bringing it under the assumed certainty of his "inner world."

In brief, this is the manner by which the modern comes to "know" of the "world". Such a way of knowing is inextricably linked to the way moderns live in the world. The "world" is something that should be measured. "Truths" are determined through mathematical, methodological procedures and instruments which measure. The "world" is to be controlled by human hands, it can be built by human design and, at last, the modern believes he can be at home in the world, a world of his own making.

This formulation of life is the dominant relation of power which still determines to a large extent our human associations and organizations. Hence, it represents the dominant field of assumptions that we base our "political" activity upon. Yet, the formulation of the novel is ostensibly different than scientific method to such an extent that a specific comparison would be fruitless. Scientific method uses more instruments and numbers than

words. Obviously, the discourse of scientific method and the imaginative discourse of the novel are committed to the experiences of "reality" in very different ways.

The novel, as the literary art form par excellence of the present day, uses language in such a way that engenders an imaginative participation in experience. Contained within the great novel, implicitly or explicitly, is an account on its own way of "knowing" and living with the world. Its discourse speaks to imaginative participation as always being the determining factor for any way of knowing. Scientific methodological discourse does not even come close to giving an account of its epistemological principles nor its ontology. The "ontology" of the novel is entirely distinct. The fundamental relationship to the principles of "Being" itself are radicalized with the great novel. Even the novels' "ontology" is subject to radical change. "Ontology" is given a new meaning, a new possibility. The view of "knowing" in the present day novel is radically opposed to the absolute disposition that scientific method assumes. It is radicalized to such an extent that the very principles of "knowing" are called into question. This new way of considering man's ability to know is not even approached by scientific method, yet it is enough to completely undermine its epistemological principles.

The pedagogy of the novel in the present day suggests a tumultuous new orientation of man in his relationship to his experiences that is no less profound than the shift in perspective which occurred in the transition from a cosmological to an historical consciousness. The spark of such an event occurred with the decline of Athenian civilization during the lifetimes of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. In a very crucial respect, our age can be viewed as a recurrence of that pivotal period in the history of the human

race, for it appears that our present Western world is experiencing a somewhat similar decline.

In many ways the novel is opposite in its approach to experience. For the novel, there is only an "apparent reality", a possible "reality". The novel presents itself as the essential discourse of the times, and is obviously opposed to the principles, assumptions and standards of methodological discourse.

We have mentioned the essential relation of art and politics. This would seem to common opinion both unbelievable and perhaps contradictory since it is modern science that admittedly animates our so-called "political activity". If modern science has a degree of political legitimacy and authority at present how can it be said that something that opposes it is essential for the recognition of political authority and legitimacy? The only viable answer is to suggest that modern "politics" in some sense is not political.⁶ What is called politics today is ideological discourse, which is supported by and owes its existence to, the dominance of technology and the victory of scientific method over philosophy. What is called politics is an activity which seeks to intervene upon human and non-human nature and mould it to a social world-order that is compatible with technology. What is at present beyond the incorporation of a technological world-order is simply viewed as chaotic matter(standing reserve) that is left to be shaped and formed. This is possible only under an age of democratized "politics" where the manipulation of the masses and the world of things becomes possible. One realizes that such "political" activity is far less rich than pre-

⁶ Hannah Arendt, in her consideration of the nature of modernity within The Human Condition, distinguishes modern modes of organization with what she calls "the rise of the social". It is her contention that the rise of the social, of a socialized form of government, abolishes the necessary dividing line between public and private, between noble and base, that would allow for a healthy political condition. Further explanation will be reserved for Chapter 5.

modern cosmological thought, wherefrom came the inception of politics. The world is being closed down upon. The universal modifications are effected by the created wills of societies conditioned by a plethora of historical forces. Here there is no possibility for an account of what is done outside of the eschatological proximity that has been affected with respect to the modern project of creating a universalized, technological state. Ambiguous things are responded to only by the further manipulation of conscious will to align better to a technologically rationalized world-order. Hence, the very commitment that scientific method has eliminated the possibility for an account of its way of "knowing". Perhaps this is why the novel is recognized as the most important literary form that can teach about the essence of technology: the most important literary form for the task of thinking through our technological milieu. The novel can expose the short-sightedness of modern scientific consciousness.

The theoretical characteristics of the novel--the manner to which experience is related to reality--reflect a disposition of self and world, an orientation to beings and things, which questions the assumptions of scientific method, and reflects precisely what has been lost as well as what has been gained.

The novel explores the possibilities of experience. Ultimately, the novel suggests manners by which one may live with these experiences. The novel esoteric teaching illustrates that the human mind is only privy to the possibilities of experience. The time for realizing this way of "knowing," of living, is ripe at present. What this suggests is a new way of "knowing" and living differentiated from the dominant "modern" attitude towards the world. For this reason as well, the novel is political; it deals with the relationship which we are to

have with our surroundings, and it tackles the age old political question of how we are best to live.

Modern scientific activity assumes a self-evident answer to this all-important political question. But in recent times scientists are beginning to question this assumption themselves. It is an assumption that the novel has always questioned from the outset. Evidently, scientific reductionism, and the tunneling specialization of knowledge, have furthered the chasm between self and world. To project the essence of life into the future deepens the chasm between everyday life and essence, because it becomes more apparent that future ideals cannot be reached.

We forever lose the totality which we seek to gain. Everything does not occur within the conceptual totality which we postulate. There is always more discovered outside of it. The self loses the ability to inform itself of the world except for showing how the self is lost. The novel has always been self-conscious of this. It has always been aware of the need of replacing that totality (which does not capture all of reality) yet does so in full recognition that its replacement can never achieve the desired totality. That is why the novel explores the possibilities of experience and not reality, for that "reality" is far too grandiose to be accessible to the human mind. The novel, because it presents possible experiences, guides us towards knowledge, while scientific method, because it desires to encapsulate reality, coerces.

Clearly, such an attempt to explain experience absolutely, is displayed as being impossible. And this is evident if you consider the rapidity with which theoretical accounts of the nature of the universe are being created; thus, with the rapidity which such totalizing propositions are continually changing.

Newtonian physics was taken, both theoretically and practically, to be universal, essential and eternal. Although Newtonian physics is still used in the practical world at present, it is theoretically defunct. Along came Einstein with his theory of relativity; and, recently, quantum mechanics as the best theory of the movements of the universe. But to admit that quantum mechanics is the best theory is to say that Newton was wrong. All theories of the past taken to be absolute and eternal must be thrown aside, are negated. This is why the typically "modern" attitude has a repugnance for the past tradition. The past world's knowledge is negated, for future perfectibility is believed to be at hand. This attitude is due to the belief in progress.

The positivistic sciences are motivated by the same end as the novel. Yet positivistic sciences have not made themselves aware that reality will always be outside of their methodological conceptualizations. In this sense, the novel goes beyond positivism in showing a proper relationship to experiences. Therefore, the pedagogy of the novel is more viable in informing us of our political situation for it is self-aware of the fundamental shift in epistemological orientation that the experiences of our age demand.

No man, it has turned out, can live among "causes" or give a full account in normal human language of a Being whose truth can be scientifically demonstrated in the laboratory and tested practically in the real world through technology.⁷

Both the methodological approach and the novelistic one are similar in that they involve a technological employment, yet the novel is one which knows its limitations, and, therefore, its possibilities. As such, it communicates experience with more historical and

⁷ Arendt Hannah, "Introduction" to The Life of the Mind, p.11.

psychological richness engendered by the thinking activity. This is the essential difference between the rhetoric of the novel and the rhetoric of methodological analysis, from which all other differences stem. This realization is truly new world knowledge.

Yet it has not hindered the animating kernel of modern political activity to assume that with increased accumulation of data, increased dissemination of information and further spread of technology, one can bring the world to a state of equilibrium: one can bring the world to a constant state where suffering, disease, a violent and untimely death, civil strife and hunger will be a thing of the past. Such an outlook will be revealed as a harmful illusion perpetuating the modern crisis.

In our consideration of the present day novel, we will come to terms with the works of Fedor Dostoevsky. The characteristic form-giving principle of the novel took a fundamental turn within his works. His works are representative of a fundamental re-structuring of the novel art form to such an extent that Lukacs declared, "Dostoevsky did not write novels",⁸ and the great Russian literary critic, Mikhail Bakhtin, claimed Dostoevsky, "as one of the greatest innovators in the realm of artistic form",⁹ yet never admitting that Dostoevsky was not a novelist.

From this otherwise contradicting argument we may adduce that Dostoevsky's works are pivotal in terms of principles of novelistic characteristics. With Dostoevsky, the traditional novel has been clearly exposed and radicalized. The traditional novel's concealments were brought to light and a breakthrough was made. A truly new creative orientation was opened by this great Russian writer. The traditional way of looking at the

⁸ Lukacs Georg, "Tolstoy and the Social Forms of Life" in, The Theory of the Novel, p.152.

⁹ Bakhtin Mikhail, "From the Author" in, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, p.3.

novel ended with him and a new way of looking upon the "tradition" began. If this is so, we may extrapolate this claim onto the nature of modern life: that the traditional orientation of "modernity" is subject to a radical re-orientation, for present day experiences make traditionally modern beliefs no longer believable. As such, there are aspects of "modernity" that are only beginning to be "known".

The revolutionary and explosive change in artistic form suggests a similar change in our concept of life and its relationship to essential being. This change can be encountered within the poetics of Dostoevsky's writings: within the way he uses language. As we will see, the new relationship to essential being which he illustrates is compatible with twentieth-century experiences. In this case, Dostoevsky truly "belongs to the new world", he belongs to a world that is beyond the "modern". Or better, he belongs to a more modern world - the present day. It will be shown just how Dostoevsky's poetics are compatible with present day literary thought. But first, we must attempt to understand modernity and the novel before we can come to terms with a kind of "end to modernity" and an "end to the novel".

In speaking of some of the distinguishing principles of Western thought, we have set upon ourselves the means by which we come to understand our present. The interrelationship of the literary and day to day associations reveal the way to come to "know" the world, which means, the way to live in the "world". Our task demands that we expose certain tendencies of the modern age. It behooves us to expose how novelistic literature can teach us of the apparent short-sightedness of the modern vision and the ensuing political crisis that it has brought about. The premise of this work issues from a

recognition that we are living through a crisis of nihilism and thus, like no other time, the question of how best to live becomes the most important.

The first part of this paper is entitled, A Genealogy of Modernity. Genealogy is a tracing of descent. This strange use of genealogy is attributable to Nietzsche whose Genealogy of Morals precisely examines the origins of modern morality as perspective views, views that emerge that are taken as "fact". This view upon factitiousness involves a forgetting that these facts are only perspective views. Of course, we will also play on the double-entendre of the meaning of "descent": we will be tracing the pedigree of modernity, tracking its descent, its "origins", and also tracing its "descent", meaning decline. We will also examine the mechanisms by which these views in question conceal their perspectival nature.

The second part of this paper is entitled, The Post-Historical Experience and the New Novel. We will deal with the assertion by various thinkers that we are living at "the end of history." In order to speak of the aesthetic significance of the new novel at the end of history, we are forced to reveal the meaning of post-historical existence, for the forms of the literary in the present day demand a challenge to traditional historical notions of what it means to "know" of a "world", which, in turn, means a challenge to the way we are to live with our experiences.

And, therefore, to business...

PART I. A GENEALOGY
OF MODERNITY

"Let me tell you novice, that absurdities are only too necessary on earth. The world is founded on absurdities and perhaps without them nothing would come to pass in it. We know a thing or two!

Ivan speaks with his brother, Alyosha
The Brothers Karamazov

"You speak of the tyrant as parricide and a harsh nurse of old age," I said, "and, it seems, this would at last be self-admitted tyranny and, as the saying goes, the people in fleeing the smoke of enslavement to free men would have fallen into the fire of being under the mastery of slaves; in the place of that great and unseasonable freedom they have put on the dress of the harshest and bitterest enslavement to slaves."

"That's exactly what happens," he said.

Socrates speaking with Adeimantus
Republic Book VIII

CHAPTER ONE

I. THE MEANING OF "MODERNITY"

(i) The "Modern" Attitude

"Modernity" is characterized by the victory of democratic humanism, and of a particular brand of "science" that is closely allied with technology.¹ These exist on account of each other. There are many factors which have contributed to this process and to the victory of

¹ Modern forms of human association are clearly democratic. Democracy, as a modern form of social arrangement, should be as readily recognizable as technology is characteristically "modern." This being so since they seem to depend mutually on each other. The rumblings of democracy, the challenge to the hierarchically-structured Med'eval society under the political authority of the Church, began in the 17th Century and has grown in intensity up to the present day where no trace of aristocratic, or hierarchical order of rank is tolerated. The scale to which democracy pervades our world is more grandiose than any other time in the history of the human race. Universal democracy is thus necessarily to be considered as another symptom of political nihilism, or at least, that during nihilistic periods, it is merely the best of the worst form of government. The task of recovering a truly healthy political posture out of this social arrangement is the foremost burden of our present day.

these forces. There are, also, many consequences. To be a "modern" is truly a unique and enthralling fate.

To be "modern" means to have a recognizably "modern" orientation to the world of beings and things. In his essay "What is Post-Modernity?"² Cooper tells us that "the crucial difference between modern and pre-modern political regimes is the attitude taken towards nature, that is, the cosmos, the divine, the gods, religion, God, and so on."³ The modern attitude affects the elimination of these transcendental elements which guided the relationship of the human with his world, in favour of the newly-won power and autonomy of the individual subject: the human. The world was to be known in a different manner hence, lived in differently.

The "modern" activity was made possible precisely through the "newly" envisioned role of the subject with respect to the world. The human was no longer just to "be" in the world, but was to mould the world to the design of his "will". This "new" orientation demanded a resoluteness of the individual for the mastery of his "will". This mastery, then, is necessary to better perpetrate the creation of the world to the design of that "will". The "modern" believed with certainty that he can make and change the world to his own design. Necessarily, this "new" belief demanded an overthrowing of the organizing foundations of pre-modern regimes: the human "subject" was to become the foundation for a new world made by his own hands and not by God, or nature, or religion, or anything divine, which was the case in the past.

² Neither myself, nor, I suspect, Barry Cooper himself, wish to encourage this fashionable term, "post-modernity" without a degree of irony. More will be said on this throughout the text.

³ Cooper Barry, "What is Post-Modernity?" in Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, (Fall/1985), p.25.

The "modern" attitude thrives on revolutionary principles with respect to past states of being. Life in the past is viewed as not worth living. "Modernity" is ostensibly secular. The sacred and the sacramental have been obliterated willfully. In recognizing this as primordial to modernity, we can speak of the modern age as distinct.

The word "modern" is said to come to us from the Latin modo, which loosely means, "just now". The meaning of the term has since been embellished to incorporate the ideas of "way" or "fashion", and , inevitably, to what is considered new and vital. Although the concept has been embellished over the past 450 years, the attitude--apparent at the inception of the term--has retained consistency, for "just now" assumes an air of vitality, of importance, of which previous times fell short. The attitude that what is "just now" is the most vital, the most truthful, the most important, remains dominant in the present day attitude. Life in the past was not worth living.

The assumed desires of past centuries become possible "just now." The past becomes a backwards realm of antiquated notions having little significance outside of mere nostalgia. Or, the past becomes a grab bag of "facts" which are to be used as causal building blocks for the perceived future.

And the future-orientation of the present day vision is also characteristically "modern". The "modern" becomes more informed of the world through what can be accomplished in the future. By the awakening power in the ability to make his future the "modern" believes with increasing certainty that the end of all striving, that is assumed man has had throughout human history, can be achieved "just now". The end of the historical dialectic is imminent, for the "modern" mentality informs itself under the pretext that history progresses to ever-better states of being. And this view of life is veritably new, because previous human associations

would learn of their experiences through the Great literary traditions of their past. In the process of relating current events to the stories of the past, the truths of the past would reveal themselves. Therefore, truths of their present were discovered, not by making, as are "modern" truths, but by revealing; or, in the ancient case, by reason.

Whether it was the ancient Greeks who informed themselves of their world by the mythical stories of the great poets, or the Romans who took their orientation to the world by pagan stories handed down by the Etruscans and by the Greeks; or even, to some extent, the Jews and the Christians who, in their time, would consult the Bible--all sought to come to terms with their experiences through looking at their past. Such a relationship to the past and to literary tradition, from which all other human associations stemmed, is diametrically opposed to the "modern" outlook. But just because the modern believes he supercedes the ancient, does not suggest that the past has no bearing on "modernity." Quite the contrary. The "modern" is conditioned by the past as much as he is by his strident adulation of the future. The vehement fervour in which modernity denies its dependence on the past suspiciously adumbrates the frailty of the "modern" belief in progress. The "modern" attitude is offensively defensive, and thus, appears to mask an underlying insecurity. Such a system of attitudes and beliefs is but another example of the unprecedented nature of certain aspects of modern life.

Hence, with such an unprecedented shift in perspective of the relation to the world, and to everyday experiences, it should not be surprising that the modern age is a particularly unsettling, explosive and chaotic. An age, which in some respects, is so new that its understanding is difficult: an age of upheaval whose grasp is elusive. We are living through a transitional period.

No one at the time seemed more aware of the upheavals of the then awakening "modern world" than the fathers of modern science. We learn of the wrath that Galileo experienced at the hands of the, then, all-powerful Roman Catholic Church, who felt their authority being severely challenged by his discoveries.⁴ The insistence of "absolute novelty" made by the heralds of what has come to be known as the modern age, that they have seen things never before seen, thought things never thought before, and could do things never done before, filled men's minds and hearts with optimism, hope and omniscient pride. This attitude has continued up until the present day. If you ask anyone on the street you will find that the belief in technology and the global democratization that goes alongside it, is undeniable. It is generally believed that all sufferings and hardships will be eradicated by the spreading of technology and democratic social arrangements throughout the entire globe making for a higher state of political and social equilibrium: a "better" world. The modern believes that he has "more" than any other people in the history of the human race, and that the future will certainly bring "betterment". In everyday speech one does not have to go far to here this language. It is the language of an historical dialectic consciousness exalting modern science and technology as mechanisms of "progress" toward an evermore "better" world. The fathers of "modernity" believed with rigid certainty that they were expanding man's knowledge as they directed their activity towards "discovering" all of the world's secrets. For the first time it was believed that

⁴ The authority of the Church was challenged by Galileo's discovery that the earth spins, for the church felt that it could only maintain authority in a static world and an earth-centered universe. Copernicus' theory opposed diametrically the relationship of earth and universe: the earth was considered no longer the centre of the universe, but a mere speck of dust in a vast expanse of infinite space. And we learn of how Descartes believed with certainty that the workings of the world could be accounted for totally by the workings of the human mind. He believed this with such conviction that he admitted that if Galileo's ideas, which he took as truth, were wrong, then his entire philosophy would be jeopardized. The vision of a static heliocentric world under the authority of God was de-stabilized by these discoveries. Ironically, the world of God was de-stabilized in order for it to be re-stabilized through human construct.

the human mind had the ability to encapsulate the workings of the universe. The world became an object for technical and mathematical investigation. Knowledge of the world was relegated to the internal realm of consciousness. It was viewed as an object to be measured through the application of abstract mathematical and methodological models created by the human subject.

The imminence of a complete and absolute apprehension of the world became apparent. This filled men's hearts and minds with enthusiasm and optimism, for the world became an object to be brought under human control. When the world becomes imminentized in an absolute and total account within the mind of the Subject, it becomes more than just an object of investigation, but a Substance to be molded. Hence, came the belief that the newly discovered power and autonomy of the individual subject's "will" could now make the world to the design of that "will".

It is through these "new" epistemological presuppositions that Hobbes claimed political philosophy to be "no older than my own book, De Cive."⁵ And Descartes was convinced that he had written the "only successful philosophy". Philosophy, with him, became the hand-maiden of a "New Science", modern science. Of course, such a new perspective on the world and human relations in it, were lauded with the exaltation due to being on the threshold of a cataclysmic era, a great age of truth and wisdom. But there are aspects of our present that make such a claim less believable.

⁵ Hobbes, English Works, (1639, I, ix).

(ii) The Irony of Modern "Subjectivity"

The "modern" conceives the "subject" in an entirely different manner than did the ancient. The "modern" conception of the "subject" is crucial to "modern" metaphysics as being distinct from ancient metaphysics. Hence, it is pivotal in considering the amalgamation of philosophy and scientific method, for this marks a transformation into a new way of conceiving man in his living world. As such, it is crucial to the plausibility of the "modern" beliefs and attitudes.

Scientific method and its incorporation into philosophy marks the beginning of the "modern" age.⁶ "Modern metaphysics," Heidegger tells us, involves, "the emphatic positing of the 'subject'".⁷ Therefore, "modern" "subjectivity" and "modern" "metaphysics" are inextricably related.

The dominance of the "subject" in guiding "modern" humanity and its understanding of the world can be found within the curious and famous dictum of Descartes: "I think, therefore, I am." The fascination with the "I," the "subject," distinguishes "modern" philosophy. Man comes to claim the role of the only proper "subject" for knowing and being. Every being, in so far as he is a being, is a "subject." The world of things become subordinate to the dominant human subject. In ancient times, the world of things was also a consideration in the establishment of knowledge. But in "modern" times this reliance is dismissed vociferously.⁸

⁶ The "beginning" of the "modern" age has been a point of contention with scholars for a considerable period. The incorporation of modern science into philosophy as a starting point--an origin--is not meant to be determinative for, as we shall clearly see later, aspects of contemporary thought deny the absolute determinacy of any "origin" for any "periodization."

⁷ Heidegger Martin, "The Dominance of the Subject in the Modern Age" in, Nietzsche Vol.I: The Will to Power as Art, p.97.

⁸ For Aristotle, who gives a description of the ancient Greek way of knowing under the chaotic and indeterminate conditions of his time, tells us that the knowledge of an object involved the discerning of its nature (physis). Knowing the nature (physis) was to understand the object as in the dynamic process of its growth: its

The "modern" is distinct from the ancient conception of man in emphasis placed on securing in himself, the "subject", the "ground for "truth"":

Man's claim to the ground of truth found and secured by man himself arises from that "liberation" in which he disengages himself from the constraints of biblical Christian revealed truth and Church doctrine.⁹

In the "modern" conception of the human, man is viewed as being autonomous and self-determining by liberating himself from all necessities outside himself. This new "liberation", then, allows for man himself, through his will, to posit what he himself wishes to be necessary and binding for him. It is a revolt against what was necessary and binding for man in previous times which came from outside the self: which came from God. Therefore, the determinants for the "modern" man were transformed from an external positing to an internal, self-willed determination.

The emphasis of the "subject" for "modern" metaphysics exists on account of the discovery of the faculty of the "will"--something the ancient did not conceive. Although this transformation of the determination of man goes counter to Biblical tradition, the notion of the

movement from potentiality to actuality, or in other words, how the object comes to be what it is and not otherwise. Aristotle admitted that convention (nomos), or man-made intervention, could effect and disrupt the natural growth of an object, be it a being or a thing, thus interfering with an adequate "knowledge" of it. Therefore, for Aristotle, knowing involved the methodological study of the natural teleology of an object. For Aristotle, the polis (city as a political unit) was natural. Modern epistemology is based on historical (conventional) principles which are fervently pitted against a perceived inert and chaotic natural world that must, at any cost, be manipulated under man-made (conventional) principles in a conventionally constructed social structure in order for it to be of any value. Clearly, aspects of ancient and modern epistemology are in direct opposition to one another.

For Aristotle, knowing a thing involved an understanding of the four causes of what makes a thing what it is and not otherwise: the material, formal, efficient and final cause. The modern appears to have a narrowed reliance on the third, the efficient cause, as being sufficient for the necessary "knowledge" of an object, be it a being or a thing.

⁹ Heidegger Martin, "The Dominance of the Subject in the Modern Age" in, Nietzsche Vol.I: The Will to Power As Art, p.98.

"will," crucial to this new determination, was inherited through Christian teaching. The "modern" conception of freedom would not be possible without the invention of the "will". The "will" appears as a "discovery" only because of the psychological need to view it as a "discovery" for the "modern" belief to be believed in.¹⁰

With this "liberation", man believes he can have mastery over his own determination, over his own essence, and this is what animates history for the "modern". "Modern" man sees himself as free to control his own future, to bring about the essence of life that He chooses through His "will". Man, not God, can now shape history.¹¹

The new "liberation", then, exists precisely as something against which it may be distinguished in the first place. In other words, the distinction of the new "liberation" is possible only as a negation of the old manner of "liberation" from which the new "liberation" has its roots. The eventual outcome of this process could only be nihilistic:

"Liberation from the revealed certitude of the salvation of individual immortal souls is in itself liberation to a certitude in which man can by himself be sure of his own definition and task"¹²

¹⁰ The appearance of the will in the teachings of St. Paul illustrates a transformation of the experience of freedom from an external experience as the ancients knew it involving contest, to a supposedly more peaceful internalization of this experience in the concept of the "free will." The turning inward to the quietude of thought and "consciousness" where the mind's activity could come under self-inspection and where some degree of certainty was attained by the simple fact that one could be aware that he was thinking, was an appealing notion to the later Christians. But Paul's experience of the will was not so "liberating." As Hannah Arendt analyses, the experience was one of "impotence:" "for to will is with me; but how to perform that which is good I find not." (St. Paul, Letter to the Romans:7:18)

¹¹ The manifestation of this attitude toward self-determination achieved its first spark with the rebellion initiated by Martin Luther who, with his 95 Theses which he nailed onto a door of a Church in Germany, demanded that there be no intermediary between man and God. God was still the law, but the interpretation of the Bible became a possibility for the masses. With this event, we see the beginnings of a democratic thrust.

¹² Heidegger Martin, "The Dominance of the Subject in the Modern Age" in, Nietzsche Vol.I: The Will to Power as Art, p.97.

As Heidegger is quick to point out, this new "liberation" is "above all a new determination of the essence of freedom."¹³ History becomes driven by the desire to "realize" this essence of "freedom." In other words, History is viewed as the force which will carry mankind to a state where man can completely and certainly determine himself, and at this point he will be "free." When "freedom," as such, is realized under these conditions the end of the historical process will be reached.

Historical consciousness is the guiding element of the Western world, and its influence extends from the Old Testament. Historical consciousness is synonymous with Biblical teaching:

and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth.¹⁴

This goes to prove that "modernity", although a rebellion against God's teachings and church doctrine, is still influenced by biblical teaching:

The securing of the supreme and absolute self-development of all capacities of mankind for absolute dominion over the entire earth is the secret goad that prods modern man again and again to new resurgences, a goad that forces him into commitments that secure for him the surety of his actions and the certainty of his aims.¹⁵

¹³ Heidegger Martin, "The Dominance of the Subject in the Modern Age" in, Nietzsche Vol.I: The Will to Power As Art, p.97.

¹⁴ Genesis:1:28.

¹⁵ Heidegger, Martin., "The Dominance of the Subject in the Modern Age" in, Nietzsche Vol.I: The Will to Power As Art, p.99.

In acknowledging the continuity of "modernity" with past influences, the very distinction of "modernity" is subverted to some degree.

The misplaced praise and exaltation of modern life above all else is filled with ironic and unrealistic fantasy, which, appears to be responded to by the modern in his more fervent assertion that modern "truths" are clear-cut, "realistic", "practical" and without any distorting "subjectivity". "Modernity" begins to display its underlying absurdity. Its belief in "absolute novelty" seems absurd for it seems to conceal "modernity's" dependence on the past, a past which is attempted to be superseded. An historically-determinist world-view, the "modern" "worldview" is motivated by a negation of the past and present.

In a curious way "modernity" can be viewed as a "resurgence" of the Tower of Babel, or a self-making of a "land of milk and honey". As Heidegger points out, these recurrences take various "guises and disguises." The modern necessity for self-determination, for dominion and power, is expressed through: Enlightenment Rationality, the power of human reason; through positivism, the "factual" arrangement of enlightenment rationality; or through historical action governed by an ideal, the "victory of the proletariat."¹⁶ The "secularization" of modern times, which smells of victory for modern consciousness, does not exist, ironically enough, outside of strong, sacred influences. "Modern" thought is historically-determinist. As such, it has its roots in the Great book of the Western world, the Bible. Being historically-determinist "modern" thought is also determined by metaphysics. We will let Heidegger explain:

The new world of the modern age has its own
historical ground in the place where every

¹⁶ Heidegger Martin, "The Dominance of the Modern Subject in the Modern Age" in, Nietzsche Vol.I: The Will to Power As Art, p.99.

history seeks its essential ground, namely in metaphysics.¹⁷

History itself becomes metaphysical, it takes over the ground of the supersensuous, which was once the place of God, replacing Him by something man-made(conventional) not something divine, or made by Nature. The metaphysical grounding of traditional "modernity" is found in the philosophy of Descartes. Heidegger tells us, "It was his task to ground the metaphysical ground of man's liberation in the new freedom of self-assured self-legislation."¹⁸ But what if this self-assuredness is revealed to be a chimera? How can such a belief be labelled anything other than absurd in the present age?

If we agree with Heidegger, and indeed we should, that Hegel's metaphysics is a fulfillment or a completion, of Descartes' "metaphysics of subjectivity", then the historical determinations that propelled "modern" activity have been realized in the current state of universal, democratic "politics" and the dominance of technology which Hegel exposed. It is under these conditions that "modern" man believed he could completely and certainly determine himself. When this state had been reached, "modern" metaphysics, which means "modern" philosophy, had to end: it was completed. It is from this standpoint of completion that allows us to look back and reveal the self-certainty of the "subject" as a chimera. Again, "modernity", at least in one respect, is at an end.

Our present age is living through the completion of the essential aspects of what it means to be "modern". More than this, as we will see, our present age is living through the end of the element that has guided the Western world: a philosophico-historical orientation. As such,

¹⁷ Heidegger Martin, "The Dominance of the Modern Subject in the Modern Age" in, Nietzsche Vol.I: The Will to Power As Art, p.100.

¹⁸ Ibid., p.100.

As such, our present age is living through the end of the "West". It is only at the end of the "west" that one sees a necessity in reviewing the "beginning" of the "West".

Ironically, the dominance of the "subject" that distinguishes "modernity," has its roots in Judaeo-Christian individualism, something to which "modernity" seems vociferously opposed as it is, in some sense, to "subjectivity" itself. We will presently see how the completion of "metaphysics" of the dominant "subject" effects the present day. The absurdity exposed in the dominance of the subject in the "modern" age has direct implications for modern "knowing". The "modern" is the loudest to disclaim "subjectivity" for the acquisition of knowledge, yet "modernity" is doubly subjective: subjective because its knowledge is dependent on a vision of the world to be from the subject's imagination; and subjective because it is an orientation which emphasizes the "subject" as the ground for knowledge.

(iii) Democratic Humanism and the Death of God

The victory of scientific method could not be possible without the universalization of democratic politics. The dominance of "modern science" exists on account of the nature of scientific procedure for establishing "truths" or "facts" which is dependent on democratic social arrangements. The omniscient pride in the newly-won autonomy of the "subject" in "modernity" comes from the possibility that everyone, in reproducing certain scientific procedures, can be a harbinger of "truth", or "factual" knowledge, and actualize the desire to make a more ordered world. No longer is this activity reserved for a few contemplative men who spent years of their lives in preparation, in study and prayer for their God who was the truth. The harbinger of effectual truth could not be found in biblical teaching and ancient philosophy, therefore was sought in the laboratory, where everyone could reproduce procedures

to "prove", democratically, the "truth" simply by demonstrating that everyone in following those procedures would arrive at the same result. And this result would be valid if it carries further the "modern" project generated by the "modern" vision.

Scientific "truths" and "facts" are dependent on the "modern" vision: they are arrived at democratically. They exist on account of one another. Scientific truths can only have validity under the pretext that we advance in accumulating knowledge to ever higher states of being. The dependence of these "truths" and "facts" upon particular social conditions for their establishment, is enough to remove the plausibility in their assumed transcendental characteristics. They do not extend over space and time but are limited to spatial arrangements and a particular time. When "modern" social arrangements become suspect these established "truths" and "facts" become vacuous. The victory of "modern science," which is the victory of scientific method over science, is only possible and hence has dependence upon the existence of the "modern" form of "humanism" and the ubiquity of democratic social arrangements. "Modern science" was not possible for the ancients, since, at that time, democracy was considered politically irresponsible, and they had no notion of history as progress. Hence, it was not possible because it was not desired by the ancients.

The "politics" of democratic humanism has assumed many guises and disguises throughout the modern age. Humanism. Heidegger tells us, should be understood, "as a concern that man become free for his humanity and find his worth within it."¹⁹ Thus, the concern for this humanism is clearly supported by the "modern" desideratum of self-determination and self-

¹⁹ Heidegger Martin, "Letter on Humanism", from Basic Writings, p.201.

legislation.²⁰ As with other elements of "modernity" who stake their very essence on challenging biblical Christian teaching, humanism has its very roots in that teaching. Marxist humanism involves the redemption and salvation of the slave laborer. In this sense, Marx could be considered--most likely to his disgust--a "good old Jew".²¹ On the other hand, the dominant humanism of the present day is determined through a "modern" metaphysical interpretation of man's relation to the world of beings and things. History is to be shaped by and for the human alone. This humanism can be understood as constituting a negation of the power and authority of pre-modern humanism which was ordained by God.

Plato's doctrine of the metaxa indicates the particular brand of humanism as conceived during his own period. Man's position in the cosmos was in-between the animals below and the gods above. This determination was carried through the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Although, this tradition's literature is characterized by much more frequent and vociferous rebellion against the one God, and with a no less vengeful attitude towards the animal world and the world of things. With "modern" metaphysics, this orientation to the world is further transformed. The emphatic positing of the unified human "subject", characteristic of the modern age, effectively abolishes the neat hierarchy of animals, man and God, and places the

²⁰ This also finds expression in the dominance of the language of "human rights". Modernity may very well be characterized by its universal concern for human rights, the belief that humans can declare to one another that they actually all have "rights" to the things of this world. This of course, is part and parcel of universal democracy. The language of "rights" is fine if it is a protective mechanism against tyrannous regimes, but often the universal coddling of the language of "rights" has gotten to absurd extremes. For that matter, as Aristotle said, "how can you say all and mine at the same time?". For more insight into the language of "rights", see, Ellis, Faron., A Genealogy of Rights: The Politics of Social Technology, M.A. Thesis, Carleton University, 1989.

²¹ The religious influence in Marx's thought has always impressed me as blatantly obvious and ironic. That he did not even realize this himself evidenced by his resentful proclamation, "religion is the opiate of the masses", shows his failure to think through the meaning of his own thought. Such shallowness in thought, may keep the masses happy--it may even be called an opiate itself--but it is inadequate as a discourse for understanding post-historical existence. Marx did not understand Hegel; therefore he could not, "stand him on his head". This is but another example of Marx's misapprehension of his own thought. Besides if one overturns a syllogistic text what does one get?

"human" above all. "Humanism" now means that the human subject is what determines his own essence, that it is not to be determined by anything else.²²

This view is essential for the belief that man can design a stable world order through his "will". But if in our democratic age, anyone has the power to define what is "human", if "political" power is given to the many and if all opinions are to be taken equally, then how can a definition be established for any identity and any subject that we can speak constructively upon? Is this not chaotic? In so far as "modern" metaphysical "humanism", which animates our "political" activity, actually de-stabilizes the concept "human", so, too, the activity of creating a stable-world order democratically, ironically, is actually de-stabilizing the world.

Democracy, be it the liberal or communist variety, is based upon principles which are mutually lacking in common sense. The principles of universal and absolute freedom and equality which, however different the tactics between communists and liberals are, both are sought after as ultimate "political" goals by both ideologies. Yet freedom expounds individuality and plurality and equality speaks of unity. In a democracy you may be said to be "free" only if your individual desires coincide with the desires of the majority.²³ Democracy appears to be, as it did to Aristotle and Plato, the best of the worst forms of association for nihilistic periods.

²² This desperate recourse, that we must determine our own determinants, this "liberation" at any cost--as if it has anything to do with freedom--makes possible the killing of human fetuses simultaneous with the stringent protection of, not only the killing of good-looking animals, but even the cutting down of trees. Nowhere in this assumed "stable world order" is there moral accord on anything. Modern "liberation", which really is the worst type of slavery, is another example of how the desperation engendered by the underlying homelessness of modern life makes modern man believe in certain concepts which are filled with unconscionable fantasy.

²³ This can be seen in the recent controversy over smoking. Smokers have now lost their freedom, because smoking in many "public" places is not tolerated. All kinds of statistics are now being used to aggrandize the dangers of smoking supporting the majority's view that it should be eliminated from society.

The victory of democratic humanism is won through the "death of God"²⁴. The newly-born power and "authority" of the human "subject" which characterizes "modernity" replaces the old subject of power and authority which is God himself. The actualization of this victory, if we may place words in Hegel's mouth, came about with the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars that followed. It was with this event that Hegel foresaw the culmination of "modern" history, the culmination, in principle, of the modern project initiated by the philosophical, scientific-methodological discourse of Descartes where the conditions were set for the free, complete and certain self-assured, self-legislation.

At the time of the French Revolution, it was believed that the world was being transformed. In principle, the complete re-shaping of the world for the self-determination of the "human" was set in place: the social-world order compatible with this end of the absolute self-determination of man above all else, was set in place. All "political" activity since has involved the introduction of "liberte, egalite et fraternite" found in both late liberal and Marxist ideologies throughout the globe. With these events the goal that motivated "modern" history was reached: "modern" history was completed. This is why Hegel could state that history ended in 1806. The importance of the great insight of Alexandre Kojève into present day politics has come to fruition:

No, Hegel was not wrong; he truly gave the date of the end of history in 1806. Afterwards, what has happened? Nothing at all, just the align-ment of provinces. The Chinese Revolution is only the introduction of the Code Napoleon into

²⁴ Of course, this phrase is usually attributed to Nietzsche; but it was mentioned first by Hegel, who announced the end of history. (See, Arendt Hannah, "Introduction" to, The Life of the Mind, p.10, where she cites Hegel declaration that, "the sentiment underlying religion in the modern age [is] the sentiment: God is dead." from, "Glauben Und Wissen" (1802), Werke, Frankfurt, 1970, vol.2, p.432.) The relationship of Nietzsche's thought with Hegel's, which consequently deals with the end of history and the death of God, is explained in Chapter 4.

China.²⁵

Kojeve argued that the entirety of the modern present could be comprehended through Hegel's description, in the Phenomenology, of the master-slave dialectic.²⁶ The "modern" movement of history was one in which each man sought to be recognized by all other men. All masters are to recognize slaves and vice versa. The satisfaction of this desire, Hegel argued correctly, is within the configuration of a universal and homogeneous State. Liberte, egalite and fraternite truly involves the recognition of each by all: it truly recognizes universal democratization. Each man is to be recognized by all other men who are his equals, and this man is "free" in this sense because of the great common brotherhood that equality affords him. Cooper explains Kojeve's importance for this insight into present day politics:

Kojève has provided a glimpse of what post-historical politics are like. In principle, the universal and homogeneous State provided for the first time the conditions necessary and sufficient for the mutual recognition of each by all.²⁷

The French Revolution and the battle cry of the Napoleonic wars actualized and accomplished the "modern" project. The overturning of the French aristocracy by the peasants, in principle, set the conditions necessary for the recognition of each by all.

The actualization of the "modern" project speaks directly to "modern" metaphysics. "Modern" metaphysics, as we have seen, involves the victory of the human subject over and

²⁵ Kojeve Alexandre, taken from, Cooper Barry, "Hegelian Imperialism" in, Sojourns in the New World, p.27. For a familiarization of Kojeve's crucial interpretation of Hegel's philosophy, see, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel.

²⁶ In this subsection, our concern is on the end of history, the victory of democratic humanism and the inextricable link with the "death of God". The intricacies of the master-slave dialectic will, too, be reserved for Chapter 4.

²⁷ Cooper Barry, "What is Post-Modernity?" in, Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, p.23.

above God as to the determining of the essence of man. This victory finds its completion within the effort for the actualization of the universal and homogeneous State which guarantees that each subject could have equal autonomy in determining his essence, his "rights". In principle, the universal and homogeneous state, which Hegel exposed in his Philosophy of Right, was set in place by the French Revolution and the following Napoleonic wars. The victory of the "modern" regime, the "modern" project's fruition, comes about through a complete overthrowing of the pre-modern basis for justice and authority. The victory of "modernity" can only occur alongside the "death of God". Unknowingly, as we moderns praise the liberalization of the present day, we praise the "murder" of God and the end of any orderly and stable basis for justice and authority.

It takes a madman to tell the people in the marketplace who take indignant pride in their atheism, that, "God is dead", and, "We have killed him -- you and I"²⁸ He must be mad for believing the mob will understand him. When and if they do, perhaps they will realize that he is not "mad" after all. If they do, they will see that we "belong to a higher history than all history hitherto." Also, they will see our technological age differently than what the dominant vision dictates. They will see the absurdity of "modernity." The revolutionary and tumultuous nature that characterizes "modernity" is so, to such an extent, that modernity appears to have undermined itself. Yet modernity's own undermining may simply be the revealing of another aspect of "modernity" itself.

²⁸ Nietzsche Friedrich, Aph.125, The Gay Science.

(iv) Technology and "Modern" Philosophy: Reverberations for "World Order"

The dominance of technology can only exist under a certain set of conditions: the death of God, the universal and homogeneous State, the victory of democracy, the end of history and of philosophy. Being that "modern" history finds its ultimate expression in the master-slave dialectic, the observation of an ancient thinker, namely, Aristotle, gains tremendous import:"

like the statues made by Daedalus or the tripods of Hephaestus, of which the poet says that 'self-mo'ed they enter the assembly of the gods'--shuttles in a loom could fly to and fro and a plectrum play a lyre all self-moved, then master-craftsmen would have no need of servants nor masters of slaves.²⁹

The automatus nature of technology dismisses the neat hierarchy between the illustrious and the vulgar. But also the neat hierarchy that allows us to be distinguished from the plants and the animals and the gods. The price of technology's dominance is a removal of the human element from our lives, for technology is more than just machines, it has come to dominate all aspects of life. This is what George Grant--the only recognized thinker that our technologically-advanced country has produced--meant when he stated: "In each lived moment of waking and sleeping, we are technological civilization."³⁰

When Aristotle correctly deduced that in a technological age there would be no need for masters or for slaves, he wished to suggest that the stability of the Athenian cosmos would be undermined. This was most likely a torturing insight that came to Aristotle precisely

²⁹ Aristotle, The Politics, I,iv,1253b23.

³⁰ Grant George, "Thinking About Technology" in, Technology and Justice, p.11.

because he lived during the twilight of the golden age of Athens with the loss of the Peloponnessian war and the victory of the rigid Spartan democratic rule that followed.

Technology, by its very nature, dissolves the orientation to a world of beings and things that produced it. "Modern" thought dies with its own victory in technological domination. Technology undermines the traditional conception of "modernity". That these traditional conceptions of "modernity" have not died in common opinion of the present should not surprise us. Barry Cooper explains that technology is deceptive:

technology can conceal its own meaning. Like glasses at the end of one's nose, it mediates the shape of the world. Specifically, it reveals only man and nature, and what encompasses both, namely, technology, is not revealed. Indeed, technology prevents its own disclosure.³¹

By way of support, the above quote may be seen as a re-iteration of one by Heidegger, the greatest thinker on the essence of technology:

the essence of man is framed, claimed and challenged by a power which manifests itself in the essence of technology, a power which man himself does not control. To help with this realization is all we can expect from thought. Philosophy is at an end.³²

The movement towards our present technological age had as its motivation the desire for man to make and control a stable world order. Yet he has handed himself over to a non-human entity that claims him, possesses him and surpasses him and makes him a puppet to its undirected forces:

³¹ Cooper Barry, "Nihilism and Technology" in, The Rhetoric of Nihilism, p.166.

³² Heidegger Martin, "Only a God Can Save Us: Der Spiegel Interview with Martin Heidegger" in, Philosophy Today, 20:4, (1976), p.278.

The actualization of potentiality undirected by anything other than the will, which is itself undirected, is the most prominent feature of technology.³³

Instead of creating a stable world, the world is dissolved--a "world" being the living relationship with beings and things that are durable, that can be understood and known, that are not continuously fleeting:

One of the unsettling consequences is that technology does nothing. To be more precise, it dissolves the world while understanding this dissolution of the world as its transformation. Sometimes this is called progress.³⁴

The world dissolves into the boundless potentiality where everything is permitted. An apocalyptic, stable world-view is dissolved into a worldless infinity which feeds on continual instability, metamorphosis and change, where nothing can be grasped and held.

Contemporary man is framed by his own temporality as he is by nothingness. A flash in an infinite universe, he is time. There is no resurrection, no immortality, no beyond, no eternal element left that affects his activity. This temporality is responded to by an incessant desire to experience heaven on earth. He desires to play with other beings and things like a god, and wants to satisfy all desires as they immediately present themselves like an animal. Death is an absolute end; it is no longer a step to a new life. So the modern becomes motivated by convenience and expediency to make his life as secure, and as "happy" as possible:--"we're here for a good time, not a long time". Security has come to be equated with happiness and freedom. These are the characteristics which describe what Nietzsche called, "the Last Man".

³³ Cooper Barry, "Nihilism and Technology", in The Rhetoric of Nihilism, p.167.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 166.

The last man's "humanness" is only a disguise. The modern perception that the present is an age of truth and wisdom is merely another disguise.

The philosophico-historical vision cannot be believed in anymore. If the remnants of that vision in common opinion of the present day only spells itself out into the characteristics of the last man, what is left? What remains for us by which we can understand again, know again, attain the fullness of life again? These questions require much thought and effort. Possibilities can only come about by a profound understanding of the death of God, the end of philosophy, of history and of "modernity."

It is only beginning to be seen that the absolute, certain disposition that characterizes the "modern" is no longer tenable. On the contrary, what is revealed by the unleashing of the "modern" activity, is knowledge of experience that can never be absolute and certain. Ironically, the "modern" project of a stable world order has ended in the inverse of itself. It has "ended" in a chaotic nihilism.

But this nihilism appears to be a part of "modernity" itself. Ironically, to believe that we have arrived at an age "outside" of "modernity" is a continuation of the "modern" attitude that we may supercede previous ages and know them better than they knew themselves. Hence, the "post-modern" position does not make sense. As Stanley Rosen relates "there is no valid distinction between the modern and post-modern."³⁵ The "post-modern" position seems to fall back upon elements of an historically-determinist view point which has been clearly exposed as part of the negating and undesirable components of the "modern" vision. It is a return to the conventional rigid "periodizations" that condition a negating historicist viewpoint. "Post-

³⁵ Rosen Stanley, "Post-Modernism and the End of Philosophy" in, Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory. Vol.IX, No.3 (Fall/automne) 1985,p.91.

modernity" construed as a liberation from "modernity" and therefore, nihilism, is utter nonsense. This is merely a delusory position of a truly un-self-conscious nihilist. It is for this reason that in some respects the "post-modern" position is a degenerate form of "modernity."

The "post-modern" position cannot therefore, and does not to my knowledge, recognize nor affirm the continual recurrence of differentiated versions of the same underlying chaos of all that is. For the "post-modern" then, to claim affinity with Nietzsche is clearly erroneous and fraudulent, for there is an implicit misunderstanding of his doctrine of eternal return; and it is precisely from the standpoint of eternal recurrence that Nietzsche claims to leave "modernity" behind him.³⁶ For Nietzsche, this "leaving behind" does not mean a rejection of "modernity," but keeps it as something forever present. Therefore, for Nietzsche, "going beyond" modernity is really a "rising above" it in such a way as to not admit of a rejection of modernity.

In tracing the path of "modernity", we have seen how the dominant vision that informed the "modern" age and became the building blocks for the "modern" world was made possible. We see now how "modern" beliefs conceal their dependence upon ancient greatness, from which the "modern" believes he has superseded. But there are also experiences which call to question the very basis of the "modern" project, that call into question the very periodization of "modernity", such that "modernity" displays many instances of being an impoverished form of life in comparison to the "ancient." One aspect of "modernity" appears to have come to an end. But this admission does not suggest that we are outside of "modernity," this recognition is a revealing of the previously unsaid side of "modernity."

³⁶ See, "Preface" to The Will to Power, Aph.4, p.3.

The "meaning" of "modernity" then, speaks of how one perspective of "modernity" is rendered meaningless due to the "unsaid" perspective of "modernity" which speaks of a superabundance of "meanings" and perspectives whereby "modernity" itself becomes a caricature. Any definitive claim to "modernity" becomes a ludicrous exaggeration. There is either this view or one where "modernity" appears ever-present and recurrent. It is more appropriately viewed as fluid, where one may speak of numerous "modern" periods and numerous others which will recur, or which have already recurred.

How can Mexico play, so at ease, with these
 symbols of randomness and fright? Innocent
 as a child, perhaps unaware-perhaps-that in
 his play he wrecks the elegant rooms of
 history, threatens the idea of cause and
 effect itself. What if Mexico's whole
 generation have turned out like this? Will
 Postwar be nothing but "events", newly
 created one moment to the next? No links?
 Is it the end of history?

Gravity's Rainbow, Thomas Pynchon

Clever beyond all dreams
 the inventive craft that he has
 which may drive one time or another to well or ill.
 When he honors the laws of the land and the god's
 sworn right high indeed is his city; but stateless the man
 who dares to dwell with dishonor. Not by my fire,
 never to share my thoughts, who does these things.
 Chorus in Antigone, Sophocles circa 427 B.C.

CHAPTER TWO

I. THE "END" OF PHILOSOPHY

In the previous chapter we spoke of how technology impedes its own disclosure. Consequently, the limited instrumental view of technology still seems to persist. The nature of technology conceals this instrumental view as a negating, disenchanting and sterile perspective. Presently, we will see how maintaining such a view upon technology by methodologists lead to further absurdities.

(i) Technological Deception In Present Day "Science"

As common opinion will attest, "philosophy" or "metaphysics" are two terms and two fields of inquiry that have fallen into disrepute. The dominant epistemological perspective issues from the technical rationalizations of scientific methods of research. It is assumed that this orientation to the world is more "realistic" and "practical", believing that it is entirely

distinct from the disreputable fields of inquiry such as "philosophy" or "metaphysics". But modern science is more dependent on philosophy and metaphysics than common opinion realizes. The interrelations of "philosophy", "metaphysics" and "scientific method" are far more complex than what common opinion allows us to see. This opinion must be dispelled for any worthwhile discussion on our present day political and social condition.

Heidegger's cryptic statement, that, "Philosophy is at an end" is an interpretation of what Hegel understood his philosophy to be: "To help bring philosophy..to the form...where it can lay aside the name of love of knowledge and be actual knowledge."¹ Such a wholesale change in the form of philosophy is really a death of philosophy, at least to the way that it was conceived traditionally. What does it mean that our "knowledge" has become "actual", that "philosophy" is no longer to be seen as the love of knowledge but the acquisition of it?

Hegel himself reveals that when philosophy achieves this form where it can lay aside its name of the love of knowledge and become actual knowledge, it is changed to an unrecognizable degree. "Philosophy," he said, "does not deal with a determination that is non-essential." He further elaborates, "the abstract or unreal is not its element and content, but the real, what is self-establishing, has life within itself, existence in its very notion"² "Philosophy" becomes actualization, a technological accomplishment. "Modern" philosophy is eclipsed into the truths established in a technological manner. It is the deceptive element of technology that would still call this activity philosophy, for it truly is transformed to an unrecognizable

¹ Hegel G.W.F., "Preface" to The Phenomenology of Mind.p.70.

² Ibid., p. 105.

degree. "Modern" philosophy sought to transform the world, but it has dissolved the world and dissolved itself into technology.

"Philosophy", and what later came to be understood as "metaphysics", have contained the essential discourses for Western thought which have guided all other disciplines and fields of inquiry since the Socratic age. If the face of these two fields of inquiry have changed to such a degree, what is to be the essential discourse for our age? What is there left to guide our "knowledge" of things and beings? If "philosophy" and "metaphysics" have to change their face, what are the exigencies of the "new" philosophy, the "new" metaphysics?

It is safe to say that 'modern' science cannot answer these questions. To attempt to answer questions one must first ask them. The misplaced praise for the disrepute of philosophy and metaphysics exists precisely because of the short-sightedness within the dominant scientific rationalizations of man and his world upon common opinion. 'Modern' science does not bring itself to any of the essential questions that persist at the end of philosophy. As such, it should be discredited as a means for dealing with the problems that arise out of the farrago of day to day associations and relations. The modern scientific approach never considers the epistemological origins of its own rationalizations. The very characteristics of its approach hinders its self-knowledge. Modern science misapprehends its own essence, for it is inseparable from an instrumental view of technology which does not disclose its essence.

Activity generated by the short-sighted, instrumental view of technology rips away at Being in the obsessive desire to "know" and subsequently control nature. Such a view adopts the simplest mechanical, black and white propositions to satisfy this obsession. It shallowly assumes a certainty over Being, for it is demanded for the modern "truths" to be believed in.

Yet, Being, Heidegger argues, is always "hidden"; it can never be closed down upon or measured. It never discloses itself and can never be seized by knowledge.

The dominance of the sciences both physical and social, are attempting a holistic knowledge of things, taking over philosophy's own task, yet do so entirely inadequately. The short-sightedness of modern scientific perception does not consider the ontologic basis of its own assumptions. This is done so by simply denying that they have any ontologic meaning.

Scientific knowledge is an "actual" knowledge. The "truths" of science are equated with efficiency. They are effectual "truths". Science interprets itself technologically, that is, instrumentally. Judgement upon its own truths is accomplished through the narrow-minded recourse to its own instruments' methods and procedures. The "value" of methodological "theories" are measured cybernetically: that is, they are only considered within the cybernetic functioning of the method itself. If a "theory" is effective for the active organization and management of societal arrangements, then it has "value". This is how "truths" or "facts" are established. The only things to be "known" is what is made to effect a systematized, democratic world order--that which further sustains the power of modern science. "Truths" and "facts" are both evaluated and made through the same entity: technology. Yet the ontology of technology, the basis for judgment of technological valuations and established "truths", are not given consideration. Technology evaluates and makes its own "truths", but there is no reflection involved as to the political responsibility of these valuations. Technology does not disclose this, if you will. The worth of scientific knowledge is measured by its effective use within the actualization of the making and shaping of societal humanity into an order which precipitates the further dominance of modern science. Technology is not neutral; it continually seeks to over-power, to dominate.

The scientific activity does not include thought proper. It exists because it has use for the convenience and expediency of bringing about a projected vision, a social order to the world, that is directly descendant from the history of Western thought. The deceptiveness of technology deceives the "modern" by not disclosing such a world order as a phantasm, and, in essence, politically irresponsible.

Heidegger insists that the scientific attitude is not viable as to the demands of the new task of thinking, for it has not thought through the end of philosophy: it has not considered the basis of its own establishment and independence. It is only now beginning to realize that it stands on "feet of clay".

"The end of philosophy", Heidegger tells us, "is the place in which the whole of philosophy's history is gathered in its most extreme possibility." But, as he further suggests, the end of philosophy does not necessarily entail a "cessation of its way of thinking." This extreme possibility that occurs at the end of philosophy is the establishment of the "independence of science.":

Philosophy turns into the empirical sciences of man, of all of what can become for man the experiential object of his technology, the technology by which he establishes himself in the world by working on it in the manifold modes of making and shaping...the end of philosophy proves to be the triumph of the manipulable arrangement of a scientific-technological world view and a social order proper to this world view.³

As modern science has become dominant, it has separated itself from philosophy, yet has its roots in philosophical thinking:

³ Heidegger Martin, "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking", from Basic Writings, pp.376 and 377.

They can deny their origin from philosophy,
but never dispense with it. For in the
scientific attitude of the sciences, the
document of their birth from philosophy
still speaks.⁴

The self-deceit of modern science is due to the ignorance of its own essence. This allows the "modern" to believe in what now appear as absurd things.

In the present day, at the time when philosophy as a way of thinking has reached its completion, modern science, based on historicist principles that the objectivity of objects can be rationally accounted for, appears to hold sway. Hence, the dominant way of thinking for human subjects as they relate to a world of objects at the end of philosophy--at the most extreme possibility of Western thought--is fraught with delusion.

(ii) "Modern Metaphysics" and the Present Day "Science":
A Problem of "Knowing"

It is Heidegger who indirectly demonstrates "metaphysics" as a type of thinking which has entered its final stage. Metaphysical thinking assumes that the human mind can represent what is, or in Heidegger's words, "the Being of beings", as a whole: that is to say, that there is a principle or "ground" for objects such that they can be "known, handled and worked upon." Metaphysics involves ontological discourse, that is, discourse concerning "what is Being?" This epistemology is characteristic of Western thought in general which attempts to comprehend the essence of reality through a belief that Being is to be found in a transcendent realm extracted over and above the everyday world of appearances. Hence, this view is an extension of the philosophico-historical vision which has separated the essence of beings and

⁴ Heidegger Martin, "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking", from Basic Writings, pp. 376 and 372.

things from everyday experiences. From the metaphysical approach to the world developed the other-worldly thinking of the religious ages which has been replaced by the worldless mentality of the modern age. Metaphysics, if taken as the separation of everyday life from the essence of life, is stronger and more dominant than ever in modern day science.

Modern metaphysics finds expression in the use of mathematical models or other various experimental methods of research. This activity entails extracting from the everyday world of appearances a representational construct. This representational construct, be it a mathematical model, experimental method or statistical procedure, transcends the obscurity and flux of the everyday by placing its observations within rational and controlled procedures that are assumed to endure over time and space: time and space as determinable, static, external constructs, ie; transcendental themselves. What is transcendent is that which extends over all time and all space, or that which has absolute epistemological characteristics. Therefore, the results obtained by placing observations within these rational procedures are assumed to form a part of absolute knowledge themselves. These expressions form a replacement of that same other-worldly thinking that dominated the Christian era, of which modernity has its apparent roots.⁵ Yet if

⁵ The positivist orientation is one which assumes that truths are only arrived at through "sensuous" observation. Thus, positivists believe they are outside of the theoretical necessities of a metaphysical world view which finds its "truths" in the supersensuous realm. The positivists believe that in abolishing this realm as a consideration in acquiring knowledge, they overturn, and go "beyond" metaphysics. This is delusory on two counts:(1) Metaphysics encompasses more than the mere bifurcation of the world into the "sensuous" and "supersensuous" realm. Metaphysics involves a desire for a "being other". Therefore, the replacement of the theological, supersensuous world as the repository for absolute and eternal truth by the perceived anthropological possibility for absolute truth in the sensuous world, is a continuation of metaphysical thinking;(2) the sensuous world only makes sense in terms of the supersensuous. One can only exist on account of the other. We owe this profound philosophical insight(which is really the identity of identity and difference taken to extreme) to Nietzsche, who, in his, "History of an Error" section of The Twilight of the Idols, declared:

We have abolished the real world: what world is left? the apparent world perhaps?...But no!
with the real world we have abolished the
apparent world!

philosophy and metaphysics are in disrepute and no longer are acceptable as an epistemological perspective, and, as a result, the other-worldly thinking of traditional metaphysics is no longer viable, what does this mean to what we can "know" at all? What does this mean for 'scientific' ways of knowing, scientific ways of living?

Within the discipline of "metaphysics" is the dominant orientation to the self and world, and life itself which animates our political and social activities in general: modern scientific consciousness. Modern scientific consciousness is saturated with metaphysical pronouncements of man in the world. It more than any other field of inquiry represents the dominant source for "knowing" of the world. The world can be measured through experimental procedure. These measurements, being that they are established by experiment, are considered "objective", for they are without the distorting influence of subjectivity. Yet it is precisely the newly-won power and authority of the subject that distinguishes and animates 'modernity'. Again, this is absurd.

Precisely these principles and assumptions make up what has come to be known as "metaphysics". This assumes that there are propositional truths about the world as object which can be given. More importantly, when given, they can be acted upon. In general, this describes the essence of modern activity, which can be characterized through the amalgamation of philosophy with scientific method.

Modern "philosophy" or "metaphysics" is inseparable from modern scientific method. It becomes obvious that the reverence once reserved for philosophy and religious beliefs in ancient times was manipulatively carried over to inculcate a reverence for modern science. It was in Descartes philosophy, as Hannah Arendt tells us, that, "philosophy became the hand-

maiden of modern science."⁶ But the tenets of modern philosophy, the philosophy of Descartes and other moderns, in many respects, is antithetical to ancient political philosophy and ancient science. That is to say, it is antithetical to political philosophy at the time of its inception, at the time which is considered to be the "origin" of the West. This is a reflection of the typical 'modern' attitude to challenge or delete all previous ways of knowing.

Present day positivism in political science is a twentieth-century extension of modern "philosophy" and modern "metaphysics". The insurrection of mathematics and mechanical models was proclaimed by Descartes, where he believed, "a fundamental accord existed between the laws of nature and the laws of mathematics".⁷ This could only be possible through the complimentary believe that the subject could come to know the workings of nature through the interior workings of the mind: mathematics being, according to Arendt, "the non empirical science par excellence, wherein the mind appears to play with itself".⁸

This approach is accompanied by the conviction that the movements and characteristics of nature can be measured absolutely and controlled. Nature can be controlled by bringing it under the logical procedures of the mind's workings. This is a crucial conviction for the possibility of the appearance of technology. This is a crucial conviction of the modern, for it carries with it the conviction that what is known can be made. Technology, that which, in a word, most adequately determines contemporary times, brings together the two Greek words for "making" and "knowing". The co-penetration of making and knowing is unprecedented.

⁶ Arendt Hannah, "Introduction" to, The Life of the Mind, p.11.

⁷ Ibid., p.7.

⁸ Ibid., p.7.

It is this activity which precipitates the positivist position. "Facts" are made when results are obtained from placing observations within democratically-agreed upon methodological procedures. At the same time, positivism maintains a distinction between "facts" and "values", the "real" and "abstract", or the "objective" and "subjective". But it becomes obvious that if knowable "facts" are made through a method or experimental procedure, a "non-empirical" method, than it is clearly based on a deceiving "subjectivity" in the most derogatory sense of the word. The distinction between "facts" and "values", the "real" and "abstract", or the "objective" and "subjective", is a metaphysical distinction: it is grounded in a metaphysical orientation of the self and world. In essence, it assumes that Being can be "grasped, held and worked upon." Insofar as these methodologists declare philosophy and metaphysics as abstract and disreputable, let us declare modern scientific method abstract and disreputable. In being so, it is indicative of the misapprehension of the nature of twentieth century political events, because its observations are based on an orientation to the world which certain everyday occurrences have rendered inadmissible, untenable and absurd. Or worse; they bestow no life, for they are dead concepts.

As we have seen, modern scientific method is saturated in "metaphysical" pronouncements of man in the world, yet it is present day methodologists and positivist who claim to be "objective" who are the first to declare the inappropriateness of "philosophy" or "metaphysics". Clearly, the short-sightedness of this approach to experience is exposed, for without knowing it these modern scientists throw themselves into disrepute by their own hands. It is a great calamity, as Nietzsche noted in that most famous and infamous aphorism, "The madman", that the short-sightedness of modern man does not know its own essence. In Hegelian terms, modern scientific consciousness is not yet self-conscious: it has not yet reached the level of

comprehension that would allow itself to be known, "in-and-for-itself". In other words, it is not aware that the essence of its nature is, "the sentiment underlying religion in the modern age, the sentiment: God is dead."⁹

It is Nietzsche in that same aforementioned aphorism who adds to this statement: "God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him."¹⁰ The worst irony, for Nietzsche, is that the modern does not know that this is the essence of his faith: "This deed is still more distant from them than the most distant stars-- and yet they have done it themselves."¹¹

Being that the authority of God that once ordered the universe came to an end, it was necessarily accompanied by the termination of other authorial entities: the end of philosophy, the end of metaphysics and the end of history. These modern deaths are part and parcel of the cataclysmic processes unleashed in the last two centuries. These cataclysms have created a crisis for the modern vision, for certain events bring the modern vision or model into question. The awareness of a disproportion between the modern apocalyptic vision and its achievement is becoming increasingly evident through the social and political conditions of the present day. The propensity for 'modernity' to overthrow the existent and the past, has thus overthrown itself.

The positivist and neo-positivist orientation--a factual extension of Enlightenment rationality--is rendered absurd. It is the positivist and neo-positivist orientation which is the loudest to proclaim the worthlessness of metaphysics while its method of inquiry is entirely based on metaphysical, ergo, philosophical assumptions: assumptions which are, admittedly, dead.

⁹ See Arendt Hannah, "Introduction" to, The Life of the Mind, p.9.

¹⁰ Nietzsche Friedrich, Aph. 125, The Gay Science.

¹¹ Ibid., aph.125

It is evident from our observations that the disrepute that metaphysics and philosophy have fallen into are symptoms of a crises in political authority, and is, therefore not entirely praiseworthy as generally assumed. The dominant orientation of the age, although having a certain repugnance for tradition, maintains mental perspectives stemming directly from the tradition of modern metaphysics and philosophy. A political crisis arises for our dominant political discourses are saturated with principles from these traditions which are dead, whose tenants are no longer compatible with what everyday experiences teach us. Modern ideologies are discourses of technological rationalizations of being. This is readily seen in their constant use of statistics to justify themselves.¹² Modern ideologies and technology exist on account of each other. As such, their ontologic meaning is never a consideration in their own valuations. Modern ideologies are symptoms of the deceptive nature of an instrumental view of technology, and contribute to the political crisis.

These insights to this point only have brought us to further persistent questions. If the dominant attitude of the present day is not adequate in knowing what it really means to live in a technological age, then what attitude towards beings and objects of knowledge should we have? Is there another possibility for thinking that does not dissolve into the instrumental epistemological attitude of technologized sciences? Is there a possibility for thought within the

¹² Statistics, as a chief tool of behavioral sciences, could not be possible without the modern premise that men can be made to behave and not act, that they are to have only a "normalized" pattern of behaviour. Statistical determinism could not be possible without the desire for human beings to be coerced by society into behaving uniformly. That is why statistics works! Economics can only become scientific when it is believed men follow unanimously accepted patterns of behaviour. The desire to acquire this scientific information is activated by the universal democratization process. If ambiguous "facts" or beings exist, one must change the conditions to alleviate this problematic. The political manifestation, in the crudest form, would be the holocaust and the Stalinist and Cambodian purges. In that part of the world that is referred to as "liberal democracies", the methods are less crude, but the orienting principle is the same!

"place" at the end of philosophy and metaphysics that is beyond the epistemological attitude of the sciences, and what is it?

With Hegel's self-appointed task to lay aside the love of knowledge for actual knowledge, we have suggested here the decisive import of the nature of the way of thinking of the present day as it relates to "metaphysics". More importantly, in our case, modern "metaphysics". This includes the consideration of a completely different epistemological perspective that has been known hitherto: one in which the very "objectivity" of objects, the basic principles of scientific method are called into question. It becomes quite ironic that some of the basic principle of scientific method which allows for "truths" and "facts" to be established, is a continuation, an extension, of traditional "metaphysical" principles--principles which scientists and positivists are the first to dismiss. It becomes obvious that, as a way of thinking in an age where philosophy and metaphysics are no longer viable fields of inquiry, scientific method has its shortcomings. We should not propose to do away with modern science; but we should be aware and beware of the manipulation of the world into what is believed to be a stable and integrated, systemic whole. We must find then a way of thinking which takes into account the implications of the end of philosophy and metaphysics so that certain characteristics of our present day can be more fully apprehended.

Heidegger insists that,"the fundamental traits of the present age have scarcely been thought through." To eliminate the deception of technology we must engage in an activity which the essence of technology impedes--we must think and reflect. Heidegger stated that all we can expect of thought is to bring about the realization that we are, "in each lived moment, technological civilization"(Grant), that it "frames" us "claims" us and is beyond our control.

It is also obvious that the type of thought necessary is not modern "philosophy" or "metaphysics".

(iv) Nietzsche and Metaphysics

Heidegger claims Nietzsche to be a metaphysical thinker since, in his own words, "Nietzsche's thinking proceeds within the vast orbit of the ancient guiding question of philosophy, 'What is being?'"¹³ This statement taken on its own is both admissible and misleading. Nietzsche's thought does proceed within some aspects of ancient philosophy, but he engages in "guiding questions" which are not altogether a part of the history of philosophy, at least not since Plato. Nietzsche's metaphysics are different than metaphysics hitherto.

At the time when Heidegger wrote his 1,000 page commentary on Nietzsche's thought, Nietzsche was not considered a rigorous thinker. Suffice it to say that Heidegger clearly shows Nietzsche to be a thinker who does not engage in traditional metaphysics or philosophy: that his thought is a challenge and reversal of traditional metaphysical principles. Hence, Nietzsche's thought issues explicitly from the confrontation of traditional philosophical or metaphysical thinking and its place in a technological world.

If Nietzsche is a metaphysical thinker his thought cannot be associated with traditional metaphysics: traditional metaphysics being "modern" philosophy. Heidegger admits this himself, in particular, when he illustrates that Nietzsche does not only ask "What is a being?" but, "what is 'being' itself?": what would make us ask this question? Heidegger admits that this questioning goes "beyond" "modern" ontology but somehow maintains that Nietzsche is not outside metaphysical thinking. There are aspects of Nietzsche's thought that would balk at the

¹³ Heidegger Martin, "Nietzsche as Metaphysical Thinker", Nietzsche Vol.I: The Will to Power as Art, Chapter 1,p.4.

necessity for going "beyond" metaphysics, for going beyond speaks to a perspective of unilinearity, which is, for Nietzsche, a harmful perspective to have upon the nature of things. It is a continuation of the type of thinking of which we are trying to rid ourselves. Heidegger is well aware of this.

Nietzsche's metaphysics rises above previous metaphysical thinking.¹⁴ Nietzsche is not a metaphysical-ontological thinker.

Nietzsche's philosophy, the source of his thought that is determinative for the thinker known as Nietzsche, is found in the "doctrines" of eternal recurrence, will to power and the revaluation of all values.¹⁵ These fundamental formulations comprise Nietzsche's own metaphysics; yet, as Heidegger tells us,

Nietzsche, with his doctrine of the eternal return thinks nothing else than the thought that pervades the whole of Western philosophy, a thought that remains [or remained] concealed but is its genuine driving force.¹⁶

¹⁴ Suffice it to say that I would like to consider Heidegger's thought as entirely within the thought of Nietzsche. Heidegger admits only to thinking through the end of metaphysics and never suggests that he is "beyond" it. He was too great a thinker not to see the necessity for going "beyond" as a continuation of modern degeneration. Stanley Rosen argues in his essay, "Remarks on Nietzsche's 'Platonism'", that "neither Nietzsche nor Plato is a Platonist.", suggesting that Nietzsche and Plato's texts are "neither metaphysical nor ontological, but rhetorical or poetic". Rosen perceives this as an attack on Heidegger's supposed crude identity of metaphysics with Platonism and Nietzsche as a Platonist. This may be partially correct. A question remains to be answered: can one say that to be poetic or rhetorical is to be entirely non-metaphysical or non-ontological?

¹⁵ See, Heidegger Martin, "Plans and Preliminary Drafts" in, Nietzsche Vol.I: The Will to Power As Art, Chapter 3,p.17.

¹⁶ Ibid.,p.19

Hence, the end of philosophy and necessarily of "metaphysics" which translates into the nihilism of the independence of scientific method and short-sighted "empirical" ¹⁷ knowledge, is a product of Western thought, inherent within it throughout its course in history. Out of necessity the path of the traditional way of thinking Being has brought about its own end, and we are left with the task of preparing ourselves for a new beginning. We are left with a new metaphysical task which is no inconsiderable one.

In Book Three of The Will To Power, entitled, "Principles of A New Evaluation", Nietzsche reiterates a statement that he made in his "Preface" to The Birth of Tragedy From The Spirit Of Music: "art as the real task of life, art as life's metaphysical activity."¹⁸ Nietzsche is proclaiming that art, and the essence of the truly creative spirit, is the most potent stimulant to life, and is the path to revitalizing the negating components of traditional metaphysical thinking which no longer bestows any life: where everywhere that there are remnants of this thinking are symptoms of a declining vitality.

Art is decisive for the new grounding principle, of the new valuation. This implies that man's essence is creation. Man has always created himself and a "world" which he is to "know" and live in. Heidegger is correct in saying that to understand Nietzsche's thought, to understand his brand of metaphysics of art and not "truth", is to understand the formulations of will to power, eternal recurrence and the revaluation of all values. These formulations rise

¹⁷ The root of the word empirical is said to have referred in ancient times to a sect of disreputable physicians--quacks with a knack-- who were reputed so because of their narrow-minded recourse to merely sensuous observations through experimental procedures. The word later "developed" to mean knowledge acquired through trial and error, and later still to knowledge acquired through experiment. Clearly, the link to experience and not "abstract" theory that has become the claim of modern empiricism is actually a fraud. Modern "empiricism" seeks to coerce experience to obtain results, perpetuating a narrow and impoverished view of experience. See Q.E.D.

¹⁸ Nietzsche Friedrich, The Will to Power, Aph.853,p.453

above the negating components of Western thought. Art, for Nietzsche, is primordial to knowledge or to "truth":

For a philosopher to say, 'the good and the beautiful are one,' is infamy; if he goes on to add, 'also the true,' one should thrash him. Truth is ugly. We possess art lest we perish of the truth.¹⁹

"Knowledge" or "truth" is not something to be discovered through procedures and methods, for these things are created through the imaginative artistic act, and always have been. The dominance of the "will to truth" is a symptom of decline.

Nietzsche describes art as affirming the perspective view of the world thus rendering itself from absolutist and the uni-linearity of the philosophico-historical vision. All of our conceptualizations are a part of our imaginative processes. What becomes measure is that these artistic creations do not detract from the vitality of life but enhance it: "Art is an enhancement of the feeling of life, a stimulant to it"²⁰

Art, for Nietzsche, is similar to Aristotle's view: it is a bringing forth of something into the world. The "world", for Nietzsche is as a, "work of art that gives birth to itself". The "world" continuously renews itself in the great work of art. The "world" is never stable, nor is its stability desired for the great artist. A crisis exists when a work of art--our technological world--exists without an artist, without an artists' consciousness. In other words, without a discernable authority that recognizes the essence of the work of art.

These statements on art have direct influence upon our political concerns, which are concerns about the communicability of meaningful and significant experiences:

¹⁹ Nietzsche Friedrich, The Will to Power, Aph.822,p.435.

²⁰ Ibid., Aph.802,p.422

The aesthetic state possesses a superabundance of means of communication, together with an extreme receptivity for stimuli and signs. It constitutes the high point of communication and transmission between living creatures--it is the source of language...Every enhancement of life enhances man's power of communication, as well as his power of understanding.²¹

For Nietzsche, art is the most immediate configuration of the unity of the "doctrines" of will to power, eternal recurrence and the revaluation of all values.²² And this is a crucial insight for our endeavour for in coming to understand Nietzsche's metaphysical task, in coming to think Nietzsche's most determinative thought, his "most difficult thought", we will coincide with the task of thinking necessary at the end of philosophy which Heidegger illustrates for us so decisively through Nietzsche.

To this point in our endeavour, we remain in persistent questions about the task of thinking through our technology, a task which impels a way of "knowing" "above" traditional approaches that can bring us to more realistic terms about our technological world. We are brought to consider Nietzsche's metaphysics in terms of artistic creation as primordial to absolute knowledge and "truth" which perpetuate a short-sighted, instrumental view of technology. Nietzsche comes to think technology, not through philosophic principles *per se*, but through technology's activity on the world and its effects on those philosophic principles, those philosophic ways of knowing.

The first step requires thinking by way of reflection of "what we are up to", what we are doing by living in a technological age. By questioning our activity, we may attempt to

²¹ Nietzsche Friedrich, The Will to Power, Aph.809, pp.427-428.

²² see Heidegger Martin, Nietzsche Vol.I: The Will to Power as Art, p.33.

understand something of what still seems to be an "unknown age".

"What we are up to" is precisely the approach taken within Hannah Arendt's wondrous and disturbing work, The Human Condition. She begins by identifying a curious attitude which animates present day activity: the "pressing desire to escape the world". With such a prominent attitude, it becomes obvious that with maintaining technological rationalizations of the world, we forever lose the world.

"Alas," said the mouse, " the whole world is growing smaller everyday. At the beginning it was so big that I was afraid, I kept running and running, and I was glad when at last I saw walls far away to the right and left, but these walls have narrowed so quickly that I am in the last chamber already, and there in the corner stands the trap that I must run into." "You only need to change your direction," said the cat, and ate it up.

Franz Kafka, "A Little Fable"

The darkness of the world
never reaches to the light of Being
Heidegger

CHAPTER 3

I. "MODERNITY" AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE WORLD

(i) World Alienation and Worldless Instability

As Hannah Arendt describes the reaction, in 1957, to the first man-made satellite that circled the earth for some weeks, it becomes clear that the "modern" mentality is "worldless". The immediate reaction to this event was to consider it "a first step towards escape from man's imprisonment on earth."¹ And as she points out, this sentiment is echoed by an epitaph for one of the Soviet Unions' great scientists: "Man will not remain bound to the earth forever." ² That once upon a time this earth was regarded as our home, and living within it a free gift that was given all the splendour and exaltation fitting to this life, reveals this sentiment of escape, more graphically than any other way, the distinction of our present age with the ancient age. This sentiment appears as utter abandonment of faith in the earthly life for some "better" life. Although the founders of the "modern" age wished to expand the world,

¹ Arendt Hannah, "Prologue" to The Human Condition, p.1.

² Ibid., p.1

some mechanism within the "modern" schema betrays itself by a shameful, world-weary resentment.

Clearly, the aspirations and desires that animated the beginnings of the "modern" age have accelerated into the present day. In many respects, the present state of things illustrate a perversion of the original pre-modern aspirations from which the "modern" activity received its first spark. Dreams and aspirations that were once the property of the imagination are overturned, the "modern" project was begun, to make dreams a reality. But this "reality" exists only as a betrayal of the original dream. It indicates that something underlying that dream, hidden for a time, has now reared its ugly head. Contained within the "modern" dream are the seeds for its own destruction.

Hannah Arendt illustrates the irony within "modernity" in her great work, The Human Condition:

The increase in power of man over the things of the world springs from the distance man puts between himself and the world, that is, from world alienation.³

The attempt for "modern" man to mould the world to his own design is indispensable, so it seems, to distancing himself from the world, from immediate earthly surroundings. Hence, "modern" man further alienates himself from "mundane" associations which condition his experiences.⁴ The "modern" activity, where philosophy becomes a hand-maiden to methodological disciplines, involves a flight from the day to day experiences in order to be

³ Arendt Hannah, "The Vita Activa and the Modern Age" in, The Human Condition, p.252n.

⁴ The impoverishment of the modern experience with earthly life can be seen through the etymology of the word mundane. Mundane used to mean "worldly" in such a way as to speak of personal adornment and magnificence through an exalting experience. Presently it is used when speaking of the boring and frivolous routine of everyday life.

outside of them. Here one can coerce experience for the sake of convenience and expediency fueled through the abstract preachings of ideal societies. This can only be possible under the assumption that the world is an object to be measured by the constructs of the human mind. The possibility for convenience and expediency to become acceptable is due precisely to this distancing from the world:

It is the nature of the human surveying capacity that it can function only if man disentangles himself from all involvement in and concern with the close at hand and withdraws himself to a distance from everything near him.⁵

For Arendt, world alienation as a determining characteristic of the "modern" age, is part of a process begun by: the discovery of America and the opening of the Earth to exploration, the Reformation, and the development of a new science which considers the nature of the earth through an Archimedean perspective.⁶ But the concerted effort in coming to grips with the horizons of the world was to reduce the world. The effort in looking upon the world from a universal, Archimedean perspective involved a flight from the world of everyday life into the murky world of consciousness, muddled by mathematical and methodological abstraction. The price of an apocalyptic objectification of the world has meant a further dislodging of the self from that world. Life and essence became further separated through the methodological approach to objectivity. The "modern" activity, it is clear, is dominated still by a scientific consciousness that seeks to escape this world. Hence, scientific activity is in this respect profoundly more metaphysical than ancient metaphysics.

⁵ Arendt Hannah, "The Vita Activa and the Modern Age" in, The Human Condition, p.251.

⁶ *Ibid.*, see p.248.

The "modern" political project, which relies on scientific method for its accomplishment, is antithetical to the political order and aspirations of the past. The desire for stability and order is given away for change and innovation.⁷ Therefore, there is a constant re-shaping of the boundaries of order and disorder. "Modern" activity feeds off of its own process of continual change:

Under modern conditions, not destruction but conservation spells ruin because the very durability of conserved objects is the greatest impediment to the turnover process, whose constant gain in speed is the only constancy left wherever it has taken hold.⁸

The process increases with speed as more and more human production becomes obsolete under shorter periods of time. The stability of the world is undermined as an object's consumption is becoming more closely followed by its production. Hence, there are no longer any durable objects. Present day experience is one in which the world of objects is continually fleeting.

Arendt concludes that, "world alienation and not self alienation has been the hallmark of the modern age."⁹ With the loss in the belief in a transcendent realm as having any bearing on day to day activities, one would think that man would fall back entirely on worldly things. But, as evidenced, man continually alienates himself from the world. Arendt further concludes

⁷ The Greeks recognized the enormous destructive potential in unrestrained technology which would further chaos--which would bring about innovations. Therefore, this was undesirable, for it would cause the dissolution of the spatially-oriented polis. To allow technique to dominate the external world and the interactions within it would strip away the possibility for the political. It would reduce the life of contemplation, therefore, the possibility to engage in meaningful actions and speeches. It would reduce the possibility to engage in lexis and praxis (which has minimal similarity to Marx's conception of "praxis") to one of sheer manipulation and power of machines. In turn, this would necessarily mean the exaltation of the lower, mechanical activities above those of higher rank. Such circumstances the ancients were aware of as posing a threat to the greatness of Greek civilization.

⁸ Arendt Hannah, "The Vita Activa and the Modern Age" in, The Human Condition, p.253.

⁹ Ibid., p.254.

that, "modern men were not thrown back upon this world but upon themselves."¹⁰ Furthermore, that all experiences were relegated to consciousness, the dialogue that man has with himself. Hence, the world's care loses importance to the "constant worry and care about the self."

The elimination of cares and worries, other than maintaining the mere exigencies of life's necessities, becomes the dominant, singular goal of the modern age. It is a goal to which the majority of the people has been forced to comply. The mere preservation of life is a goal sought to be maintained by the process of labour, "the only activity left to us."¹¹

This dominant goal is directly related to the accelerated expropriation and accumulation of wealth which also distinguishes the modern age. What ensued is a transformation of wealth into capital through labour.¹² From this activity the capitalist economy arose which was followed by the glorification of labour which maintained it. The glorification of labour as a distinctly modern occurrence, represents an inversion in hierarchy from the age of ancient Greece, for Aristotle described labour as an activity that is sub-human. For him, labour was the lowest activity that man could perform, and was anything but something to be glorified. Working and living within the labour process, that which was considered the lowest of activities, is the only activity left to us.

With the intensification of the process of labour, human activity is relegated to the cybernetized cycles of the life process where worldly objects, food, clothing and money is

¹⁰ Arendt Hanah, "The Vita Activa and the Modern Age" in, The Human Condition, p.254.

¹¹ Ibid., see "Prologue", p.5.

¹² This recognition is precisely what Marxists find so hard to swallow, for it associates the glorification of labour as inextricably linked to capitalism. This is unfortunate, because the common response of Marxists and those on the "left" is to find convenient and expedient ways to dismiss this work with predictable religious conviction while it otherwise could teach them about our present day predicament.

produced in order to be consumed. All class distinction, all distinction in human activity is subsumed under this unprecedented process for the accumulation of wealth such that the goal of the modern age can be delivered to one and all. The glorification of labour and the abolition of all other distinction of class and human activity, stems from the desire for liberty, equality and fraternity for all. The leveling process of modern times can be attributed to the growing power in revolutionary movements, proponents of an apocalyptic and democratic mass mentality, a mass faith.

Such a process is dependent upon a constant turnover of worldly objects such that they are consumed almost as quickly as they are produced: the objects of production become immediately consumed as efficiently as possible, thus maintaining the stability of the process. But, as Arendt teaches,

the stability of the process can continue only provided that no worldly durability and stability is permitted to interfere, only as long as all worldly things, all end products of the production process, are fed back into it at an ever-increasing speed. In other words, the process of wealth accumulation, as we know it, stimulated by the life process and in turn stimulating life, is possible only if the world and the very worldliness of man are sacrificed.¹³

The ideological mass movements characteristic of "modern" mass politics are propelled by a "worldless mentality". They spring out of the dreams of the "modern" age where the worldlessness of reducing the earth into a size where it can be seen and grasped conceptually, is intensified and becomes, an actuality in the "modern" "world". The "modern" "world" comes about by the "modern" project of manipulating both human and non-human nature to fit the

¹³ Arendt Hannah, "The Vita Activa and the Modern Age" in, The Human Condition, p.258.

design of the general and dominant will. It is precisely this design of human will which is worldless. The modern "world" is worldless. The attempt to achieve a world made to the design of the human collective will, ends in the inverse of itself: the loss of the world.

Hegel maintained that the absolute objectification of the world meant that one could finally be at home in the world. But many have argued that the inverse is true. The "modern" has lost the world. Twentieth-century man is more homeless than Socrates was in Athens. The "modern" has built and continues to build a fictitious world at the expense of the world given to us.

And this is ironic because it seems the impetus to objectify the world - which inevitably brings about a homelessness --is an attempt to find a home of our own design. Perhaps this signifies that there was something wrong with this attempt from the beginning. It follows that the attempt to make a world through the mastery of our will stems from an unhappy consciousness: a consciousness that does not accept the past from which the present is a perceived result. The movement through Western history is a progressive movement in the increasing loss of the world. This loss is responded to by the attempt to encircle the world and bring it under human control, and lately, to give up on this world altogether.

(ii) Our Historical Legacy

The Stoic through to the Christian experiences and the formulations thereof, reflect an increasing loss of certainty in the external world. The need for internal certainty is

accompanied by mistrust and doubt in the external world and the earthly life.¹⁴

It is now becoming apparent that the intense faith and optimism in the human ability to objectify the world--in the effort to control it and reform it to the design of the human will--involves a doubtful betrayal of the world we are presented with. The denial of the present world in the intense desire to manipulate it for ultimate justification of a future world stems from a repudiation of the this-worldly, and amounts to a continuation of the attack on past worlds. The "modern" continually constructs future worlds at the expense of the dignity of the present and past worlds. The "modern", then, increasingly loses the world of his own being by continually divorcing essence away from life of present-everyday experiences into some future. Information of the world comes from the coercive making of new knowledge, of reality, such that it may be manipulated to form a future ideal world. When the future world holds no apparent hope for "betterment", despair and nausea is generated. One becomes historically sick. Most "moderns," because they do not wish to suffer these experiences will continue to believe that the world will get better. Yet we moderns have no agreed upon standard upon which to measure the better or the worse.

The ancient, by contrast, saw no need to change the world to his own design. He resisted innovation. His life was viewed as in touch with the cosmological ordering of Nature (physis). A desire to control Nature is something entirely foreign to the ancient Greek. Events were perceived, not as coming to be and passing away forever, but as recurrent. Events were related

¹⁴ Hegel explains in the "Preface" to the *Phenomenology*: "the truth is only realized in the form of System, that substance is essentially subject, is expressed in the idea which represents Absolute as Spirit" (p.85) Hegel means to say that an absolute account of all substance comes from the internalized relation of substance to the subject. The experiences of the external world are responded to by an inward encircling or comprehension within the subject. Heidegger calls this penchant "absolute subjectivity", and here we expose the root of the modern fascination with the all-powerful subject in acquiring knowledge initiated in Descartes' discourse.

to the mythical stories which ordered and educated the cosmos. They were given relative significance to the great stories. This made experience syncretic. Experiences were not perceived as, "here one minute, gone the next." The ancient Greek experience, then, was one of more certainty, immediacy and durability with respect to the external world. The ancient Greek was at home in his "world".

Homeric verse, for example, would sing the praises about the complete and existent totality of life. There was nothing that needed to be surmounted, nothing to be apprehended or grasped: the experience of life was "all-embracing". There was no perceived lack within the life experience. Life was harmonious. Language was used in such a way as to express the existent wholeness of life. Lukacs explains that the Homeric world was not bifurcated:

"Already in Homer's time, the transcendent was inextricably interwoven with earthly existence, and Homer is inimitable precisely because, in him, this becoming-immanent was so completely successful"¹⁵

The Pre-Socratic Greek civilization did not think historically. The ancient Greek language has no word for history. There was to be nothing in the future that was significantly different than any of the events that had already occurred. Occurrences were given relative significance to the great myths. The recognition of greatness, perfection and immortality for the ancient Greek was a possibility in the earthly life. These elements were not relegated entirely to God or a fictitious world created beyond the present world. This is why the ancient Greek saw no need to change the world. The gods were perceived as actively participating with the mortals within the cosmos. There was no significant degree of rebellion with the gods as there was

¹⁵ Lukacs Georg, "The Problems of a Philosophy of the History of Forms" in, The Theory of the Novel, p.42.

in the Judaeo-Christian relation to their God. Experience was not perceived as a lack that had to be fulfilled by a future Covenant with God.

With the dawn of historical consciousness, the world becomes imperfect. Experience is perceived as suffering: a suffering that is not perceived as necessary but one that comes from a perceived lack. This historical legacy which influences the present age extends from the Old Testament. Here we are told the story of a group of slaves in Egypt who are to be led away to a promised land in some distant future where their suffering will finally be redeemed, and they will finally be saved from their toil. The story of the old Jews is a story of years and years of disappointment and frustration. Their sufferings continued, and they could not seem to find any significant degree of their expectations fulfilled in the external world presented before them. The loss of the external world was conditioned by expectations of the Judaeo-Christian eschatology. This led, inevitably, to a certain fictitious world to be created--a world beyond this world--which became the repository of greatness, perfection and immortality. For the ancient Greek, these were possibilities in the earthly life; but this possibility could not be considered for the Judaeo-Christian. As Hannah Arendt tells us, "Lying behind the many new [Christian] beliefs is clearly the common experience of a declining, perhaps a dying world."¹⁶ Hence, the Judaeo-Christian attitude is resentful by wishing to re send the experiences of the past and present through a concerted effort to find justification in some future world.

The dawn of historical consciousness occurred alongside the first appearance of apocalyptic literature, that is, at the dawn of Biblical times. Historical consciousness perceives

¹⁶ Arendt Hannah, The Life of the Mind Vol.II,p.66.

experience as suffering. This continual suffering is appeased by a future Covenant with God. Hence, the Judaeo-Christian eschatology is conditioned by a future fulfillment. Therewith, the passage of time is given a uni-linear direction. Experiences are perceived as directed towards some future end. Time moves; it goes somewhere. The future will bring with it events that are absolutely different from the present and the past. The sufferings of the present are appeased by the belief in future redemption. The flux and change of everyday life is appeased by the dream of a fictitious world promised by God: a world beyond the present world which becomes the repository for greatness, perfection and immortality--elements which are perceived as impossible in the present world. But, clearly, these new worlds were created only at the expense of the dignity of the existent world.

(iii) From Cosmos To Historical "World"

The transition of cosmological consciousness to historical consciousness is crucial to our discourse on the literary and politics. For within this transition is a simultaneous transition in the form-giving principles of the written word, which means, a fundamental transition in the way the world is to be known, talked about and lived in. An examination of the transition from a mythological "cosmos" to a philosophical-historical "world" is required.

Lukacs himself, in speaking of forms of literature as they relate to forms of life, begins with a description of the Homeric experience, and the transition to political philosophy and historical existence. He considers the Homeric world an "integrated civilization" which, therefore, knew no philosophy, for the Homeric hero was completely at home in the world, while philosophy, borrowing Novalis' dictum, "is really homesickness, it is the urge to be at

home everywhere."¹⁷ Philosophy emerged from a loss in the wholeness of life in the pre-philosophic, pre-historic, Homeric "cosmos":

philosophy, as a form of life or as that which determines the form and supplies the content of literary creation, is always a symptom of the rift between 'inside' and 'outside', a sign of the essential difference between self and world, the incongruence of soul and deed.¹⁸

Therefore, the emergence of philosophy and history is evidence of a fundamental change in the form of life, in the way in which life is perceived. This change in the way life is perceived, necessarily suggests a change in the form and content of literary creations. As well, a change in the way the world is to be known.

The emergence of philosophy and history as determinants of political associations and organization has had a profound influence on the Western world. Lukacs is correct in telling us that a philosophico-historical orientation assumes a "worldview" where self and world, life and essence, inside and outside, are divorced from one another. Effectively, life became divorced from essence. Self was divorced from the world. This was responded to and evidenced by, a new artistic vision. The new creative desire was no longer to teach and enhance life through great stories, but to attempt to apprehend the world.

The Homeric hero knew of no such "worldview". There were no oppositions that were insurmountable. There was no opposition between self and world for there was no difference between self and world. The human was inextricably tied to the cyclic rhythms of Nature. It is only when these two entities are conceived as different, as divorced from one another, that

¹⁷ Novalis, taken from, Lukacs Georg, "Integrated Civilizations" in, The Theory of the Novel, p.29.

¹⁸ Lukacs Georg, "Integrated Civilizations" in, The Theory of the Novel, p.29.

their very identities become possible. One cannot speak of the identities "self" and "world" unless there is a perceived difference between self and world. The philosophico-historical form-giving principle involved the reconciliation of this division. Life was divorced from essence: experience involved a lack of essence so language became oriented to what should be in order to acquire that lost essence.

The artistic orientation of the Pre-Socratics was not concerned with what should be, but with what was and how it could be enhanced. Only under an philosophico-historical pretext does the question of what should be become necessary. In other words, how or when does life become essence, becomes the new orienting determinant with the rise of the philosophico-historical world, which means, the rise of the "West". In the Socratic era a futurist orientation is hinted at but only with a notion of history as progress would the question of "when" be necessary.

Such a question is interchangeable with the question how is mankind best to live, or what is the good life, the most fundamental political question. From an artistic standpoint, the question becomes "how can the self be reconciled with the world?". While they are differently worded questions they are closely related.

This line of questioning arose together with the inception of the idea that the human could have agency in coming to grips with the world: a world that was somehow newly envisioned as being outside of himself. The possibility for an identity of self as we know it came about at a time of chaos. The evidence of this new vision can be found in the words of Socrates concomitantly with the new vision of the soul in opposition to the body.

It is in the Phaedo, where the discussion of the relation of body to soul and to the world takes place. The dialogue turns to inquiries upon the immortality of the soul and into views

about the future life. Socrates suggests a new idea that only the soul is immortal, because only the soul can perceive the eternal attributes of truth, goodness, beauty, etc. The body is considered temporal and has no bearing on the possibility of immortality. The possibility for immortality is disassociated from earthly life and, suddenly, becomes possible only within the new belief in life after death.¹⁹ The determinants for meaningful speeches and actions changed their face. The orderliness of the cosmos was disrupted.

The term "self" refers to a notion of personal identity or a distinct soul. Such an identity has many related offshoots. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul, begun by Socrates and appropriated by Christianity, could have only come about with the recognition of human mortality. There will be no return, no recurrence. Experience is no longer tied to the eternal rhythms of Nature(physis). This rhythm is disrupted. The human has agency in controlling Nature(physis) by convention(nomos). Physis is disassociated from Nomos. The eternal element of the cycle of nature is replaced by the soul as being the repository for the possibility of immortality. But the soul, as a new repository for immortality, involves the extrication of essence away from experiential existence. Life becomes divorced from essence to some degree. Although the soul, for Socrates, is not removed from the body or everyday life entirely, the aim of human orientation takes a futurist direction. Life's essence is to be found in the future: in the possibility of life after death. The original spark for the Western world's way of knowing and living was conditioned by this experience of homelessness.

¹⁹ For Socrates, death is, "the release of the soul from the body" (Phaedo, 64c); and that the "philosopher frees his soul from association with the body" (Ibid., 64e). Therefore, for Socrates, philosophy is clearly "the practice of death." The essence of the soul becomes homeless in the earthly life with the inception of Western philosophy. For the first time, the soul's home is sought in life after death.

The futurist outlook that comes about from a perceived separation of "self" from "world", or life from essence, is what the historical worldview thrives on; and, indeed, has been magnified into universal proportions. The opposition of soul and body introduced by Socrates becomes the separation of soul from body through the historical orientation of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. The "how" changes to "when is life to become essence" in the increasing historical determinism of modern times. With the increasing pathos of distance between the body(the worldly) and soul(the other-worldly) it would appear that a more desperate means to apprehend the world, to eradicate this separation, of self from world, life from essence, took hold. It is desperate because, as we will see, man has forced himself into believing such increasingly outlandish things the further he becomes alienated from the world. We will come to see how the notion that history progresses to ever better states of being is a fraudulent vision, motivated by what people want to believe. As is the case in such situations, what people want to believe has little to do with what is.

So desperate are "moderns" in solving the problematic of Western homelessness through an obsession not to be deceived by the world, that modern "scientists" appear to "clutch at the straws" of ridiculous abstractions. Abstraction is important, but only if it speaks of possible experiences, a possible "reality." We have seen how the "modern" vision dominating our present and animating scientific method is unrealistic.

Only with a notion of history as progress does the question of "when" emerge. The modern assumes he has the "know how", it is only a matter of "when". With the belief in "know how" and the concern for "when", politics moves from a spatial orientation in the times of classical antiquity, to an intensely time-oriented preoccupation in the present day. These changes can

be understood in the comparison of the changing relationships between such identities as "essence" and "life", and "self" and "world".

Our Judaeo-Christian heritage has entrenched in our consciousness a level of denial of the present world for an ultimate justification in the future. And this appears to be the very premise upon which historical consciousness arose. Meaning and justification was not recognized by external manifestation but rather, it became an internal experience. The certainty in the internal world appears indispensable to an utter mistrust and doubt in the existent, external world. The internalization of the external world is a product of historical consciousness influenced by Judaeo-Christian sensibilities. Aspects of "modernity" are clearly not outside of these influences however much pride is taken to the contrary. Manifestations of these attitudes remain with us at present. This way of thinking has not ceased. As such, it can be said that there are influences and elements of "modernity" that extend to periods long before the "modern" age. It becomes apparent that we may characterize "modernity" as a loss of faith in the world, the non-acceptance of our earthly surroundings given to us. Since the dawn of history, the experience of this loss has increased with intensity by the continual creation of fictitious worlds at the expense of the dignity of this world.

There have been benefits accrued from technology, but also there are certain events, linked directly with these very processes, which display undercurrents of worldly denial and doubt in the face of much apparent faith and optimism. The "new world" reveals itself with irony and ambiguity. These undercurrents of the modern activity are the rumblings of a new, unknown age which, for Arendt, began with the atomic explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This cataclysmic event is evidence of an "end to modernity" an end to the modern "world". Just now are these undercurrents of the "absolute novelty" of modern activity and the modern

"world", being understood. Hence, what is required is a new way of speaking and relating to experience, since such an event should teach us that certain assumptions, standards and principles that we based our political legitimacy, authority and judgement upon can no longer be believable. It is precisely the assumptions that the novel has questioned for a significantly long period of time suggesting that the pedagogy of the great novels may be ripe for the present day.

(iv) Old Worlds-New Worlds

This "new world" is truly full of ambiguity and paradox. It could not have been achieved without the breakup and denial of old worlds. Each "old world" considered itself new, that is true, but what seems to distinguish our "New World" is a certain universal and apocalyptic conviction: our New World is the last New World. We have seen with what obsession the ancient world had to be denied by the fathers of the modern age, and with what vitality and industriousness the modern project was begun: "The mastery of the world is at hand. Finally, the world can be made perfect."

But to say this is to say that the present world is imperfect. This is precisely why the apocalyptic character of the "New World" engenders a "mass forgetfulness"--imperfect things are of no interest. Modern consciousness--especially the North American - has a repugnance for tradition. The necessary outlook is forward to the future perfectability of the planet: "And the planet will be made perfect by our hands, not God's." This inspires a religious reverence in the modern mind and heart: a religious reverence for technology which has the power, so it seems, to bring about the modern project, to end suffering altogether, to bring on an age where pain, disease, violent and untimely death, civil strife and hunger will be a thing of the past.

But it is a religious reverence that has inverted the traditional religious sentiment: "Man is as God once was, if not better", so the modern consciousness preaches. What is even more striking, is that, often, the modern mind is not aware that this is the essence of its faith. To revere the modern faith is to 'catechize' God as a sinner, an evil-doer, as someone limited by His faults: "The world He created is flawed: the old world is flawed, let us focus on the new." The gains of the new world have brought with them the loss of God, and therefore, a de-sacramental view of the world.²⁰

The old tradition is a necessary constituent of the "New World." We can speak of the "New World" as having a place in the old world insofar as it is both an extension and a restructuring of the rubble of the broken worlds of the past. The "New World" then, (and this extends to any temporal "periodization") can be accounted for in the simultaneous fluidity of old and new. The "New World" can be accounted for, both in terms of the past and the influences therein upon it, and in terms that it is radically new: that the "New World" is ultimately different from the new worlds of the past.

All of the old world must be broken down and restructured to form the New World. This also reveals that the dawn of Western history contained the seed of nihilism. When this is first recognized, it engenders an experience of homelessness, because, what man had exalted throughout history--what made man at home in the world--has become devalued.

Nietzsche diagnoses this as fundamental to the emergence of nihilism at the end of Western history being an influence--on the underside--throughout that history. Heidegger explains:

²⁰ The modern tries to perfect creation to avenge God for his perceived imperfect nature. We recognize ourselves in relation to both the perfect creator (God) and ourselves as an imperfect creation. Out of our imperfection (incompleteness) the we moderns vex and torture Nature (creation) to maintain our worth as a species. We moderns do it in time, that is, in history. This is akin to the murder of God.

nihilism is that historical process
whereby the dominance of the "transcendent"
becomes null and void, so that all being
itself loses its worth and meaning.
Nihilism is the history of being itself,
through which the death of God comes
slowly but inexorably to light.²¹

As Nietzsche announced the new age is not an age of wisdom, as Hegel claimed, but is an age of nihilism, and that Western history is a history of ressentiment. Nihilism is the reality of the present. The seed of nihilism appears to have been influenced by the first sparks of the philosophico-historical world vision, the "Western" world's vision, which, by separating self from world, and therefore, life from essence, began a history of continual and increasingly exaggerated resentment of the conditions of the world presented before man. This attitude of resentment has accelerated with the increased historical determinism of the present age. It is something that Nietzsche believed we must be "cured" of, that we must rise above. But the question remains, how do we do this?

²¹ Heidegger Martin, "The Five Major Rubrics of Nietzsche's Thought" in, Nietzsche Vol.IV: Nihilism.p.4.

PART II. THE POST-HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE
AND THE "NEW" NOVEL

They were offered the choice between becoming kings or couriers of kings. The way children would, they all wanted to be couriers. Therefore there are only couriers who hurry about the world, shouting to each other-since there are no kings-messages that have become meaningless. They would like to put an end to this miserable life of theirs but they dare not because of their oaths of service.

Franz Kafka, "Couriers"

CHAPTER 4

II. THE MEANING OF THE POST-HISTORICAL

In arriving at a meaning of the post-historical, let us consider the confrontation of Hegel's thought with Nietzsche's. We have already spoken of how the task Hegel had set before him, to make philosophy acquire wisdom and not merely love it, is decisive for what has come to be known as the end of philosophy and metaphysics. And Nietzsche, out of necessity, has gathered the possibilities of Western thought, has, as Heidegger tells us, "completed metaphysics", and it will be argued prepares us for the task of thinking that is to come "beyond" the end of philosophy. Nietzsche revitalizes philosophy and metaphysics under new auspices. Such auspices can only be understood from an apprehension of the meaning of the post-historical.

(i) Nietzsche's Confrontation with Hegel: Radicalizing The Modern Apocalyptic Vision

Does Nietzsche go 'beyond' Hegel? It would seem that this question is of great concern to the thinkers of the present day. It has consistently been maintained that all discourse since Hegel has been a furthering, or a response to, the discourse he initiated. It is also our concern, being that we may find in the matter of thinking that goes 'beyond' traditional metaphysics the path to understanding the present.

An in-depth look at such a question merits our concern, for the task at hand is to understand our world in which we live through our thoughts, our words, and the way in which we come to know our experiences. This task is the task of living itself. It is a political task, for it deals directly with our day-to-day associations with other beings and things. As Hannah Arendt correctly tells us, "plurality is specifically the condition--not only the conditio sine qua non, but the conditio per quam--of political life".¹ We are political beings because in order to live well we require associations with other beings and things. Therefore, we must recognize plurality as a basic constituent of a responsible political life.

Clearly, given such a task, there cannot be a one-word answer to this question. It is difficult to determine what form this answer may take. As well, the question itself must be more carefully examined. The subtle nuances of the use of 'beyond', as such, require explanation and amplification: to what extent does going 'beyond' constitute something new, something over and above, disengaged from the previous, as say Nietzsche's historicism as over and above Hegel's? Or, does 'beyond' not necessarily imply a complete overstepping but rather, an extension: or, as follows, that Nietzsche's thought may go beyond, but does not overstep Hegel's? Also, consider the possibility that the desire to go beyond the "modern" age may be a continuation of "modernity." And, finally, but most importantly, what bearing do these questions have on how we are to live in our scientific-technological world? In answering such questions we can better understand what it means to live in our "New World": we can better understand its "newness".

¹ Arendt Hannah, "Prologue" in, The Human Condition, p.7.

The "modern" vision that is inextricably linked to the dominance of a scientific-technological world-view and the social order proper to that world-view, is a result of certain distinctive features of Western thought which a study of Hegel and Nietzsche would reveal. The problems associated with the tenability of this modern vision can be found within the comparative discourses, and therefore within the continuities and discontinuities of historical perspectives, between these two great thinkers, Hegel and Nietzsche.

The modern apocalyptic vision is a result of Western eschatological and apocalyptic imperatives. It is framed within an apocalyptic view of the world and history which speaks of our Biblical heritage. It also speaks of our historical orientation to the world and life within it. The modern vision is framed by this apocalyptic and eschatological imperative which finds its formulation in metaphysical pronouncements. Hence, the interest in overcoming traditional metaphysics, traditional valuations of the world, becomes significant because the metaphysical grounding formulated out of the "modern" vision does not accommodate the entirely the true nature of technology. Therefore, the relationship of Hegel and Nietzsche to this metaphysical framework is of paramount importance to understanding our technological age, our "New World". If we follow this line of questioning, we will see another appearance of our "New World" different from what technological rationalizations tell us.

It appears evident in Foucault's article, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", that he wishes to demonstrate Nietzsche's "effective history" as going "beyond" the "suprahistorical" perspective of Hegel's, since, as Foucault tells us, it is outside the traditional necessity for "apocalyptic objectivity."² Therein, identified with Hegel's perspective, is the specifically Western

² This term "suprahistorical" may be somewhat confusing. I believe Foucault is emphasizing here a certain absolute, historical determinism that is usually associated with Hegel's historicism. He identifies it with the "emergence of metaphysics" because, like metaphysical thought, this historicism places History itself over and above everyday occurrences in order to give to those occurrences an order and meaning. The genealogical

imperative. Foucault is suggesting that with "effective history", which is beyond the need for apocalyptic objectivity, one can go beyond and step out of this destructive orientation. How a genealogical imperative is outside of a suprahistorical perspective in its use of history becomes significant insofar as we accept the identity of a suprahistorical perspective with the "emergence of metaphysics", as Foucault does. For this would constitute Nietzsche's historicism as one which oversteps Hegel and modern metaphysics. Whether or not this is true remains to be seen.

On the other hand, we may consider the Derrida-Bataille argument in, "From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelian Without Reserve".³ Here, Derrida, through Bataille's argument, contends that Nietzsche, although he may criticize Hegel, does not "undo" his discourse, but--and rather paradoxically--Nietzsche further extends Hegel's discourse. Derrida-Bataille argue that a "certain laughter" is the only experience which makes "Hegelian discourse dislocate itself". Yet, appealing to a "certain laughter" betrays their own complicity with Nietzsche, whom Bataille criticizes as knowing of Hegel, "only the usual vulgarization."⁴

For Nietzsche to confront Hegel requires that he first engage in Hegel's thought, and that he take him seriously. Within this confrontation is a recognition of Hegel. But Derrida, who admittedly calls himself "a Hegelian without reserve", agrees with Bataille in claiming that

perspective removes necessity and the absolutist characteristics from this historicism. With a genealogical orientation, there are no elements set over and above the everyday by which meaning may be derived. Meaning is derived from a different approach. How much different remains to be seen. See, Foucault, Michel., "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", in his Language, Counter-Memory, Practice.

³ Derrida Jacques, "From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelian Without Reserve" in, Writing and Difference, p.254.

⁴ Ibid., p.255.

Nietzsche only knew the usual vulgarization of Hegel. This misreading of Nietzsche by an avowed Nietzschean thinker is suspicious.

For Bataille and Derrida to claim such is to say that Nietzsche did not have a sufficient understanding of Hegel and they do. In no way does Nietzsche's re-telling of the master-slave dialectic constitute a vulgarization. Clearly, The Genealogy of Morals is the same story told in different terms. Nietzsche reveals what was concealed by an account conditioned by an apocalyptic imperative.

To identify Hegel within such a perspective indicates an adequate understanding of Hegel's breadth and depth. Nietzsche does not necessarily disagree with Hegel's description of the movement of Western history, but he removes necessity from it; he writes from a perspective which is beyond the necessity for apocalyptic objectivity, which, for Nietzsche, means beyond a slavish perspective. Hence, he displays history, not as absolute and deterministic, but as perspective. This is precisely how Nietzsche radicalizes Hegel's historicism.

To remove determinism from the process of history is to remove progress in history. It is to say that it may have happened that way, but it did not have to happen that way. It just happened accidentally: it could have happened a multitude of different ways. To say this, in one sense, is to go beyond the metaphysical and apocalyptic imperative. But, certainly, to admit this in no way is to admit that we can undo history. It is erroneous to suggest that Nietzsche undid Hegel. In truth, he probably would not wish to do so because of the importance of the master-slave dialectic which Hegel elucidates for us so decisively. The attempt to "undo" Hegel would be resentful, and could be attributed least of all to the intent of Nietzsche.

Hegel's system or Science becomes an adequate description of totality, but only within an apocalyptic framework. This becomes possible to the human mind because of the perceived apocalyptic immanence of universalizing the end (telos) of the historical movement, that the world can be made absolute and coherent sense of within the human mind. Hence, it is believed best to develop the world, to make everyone experience that the end of the historical dialectic is at hand, the mastery of the world is possible through a resoluteness to self-mastery.

What greater force can achieve this ultimate goal of Western historical development than technology? Indeed, is this not why technology is given such a religious reverence in our present day world? Yet, if we look closely for a moment, we see that our technological activity constantly escapes our conceptual grasp: it constantly escapes our scientific rationalizations of the "real". This can be seen in the apparent inability to come to terms with ethical decisions, such as surrounding abortion and euthanasia, which are set off by technological capabilities. Such problems are only responded to by further technological activity, and often the problems are compounded.⁵ It becomes clear that an apocalyptic vision may not be an adequate description of the "real", and that it misapprehends the events of the "modern" world. The reverence for technology comes precisely from this absolute, apocalyptic vision which sees technology bringing about a ever-more stable "world". The notion of stability itself comes from this apocalyptic vision. It is clear that this vision is victim to the deceptive nature of technology. In clarifying this further, we will elaborate on the root of the

⁵ The ironies of our technological dependence is illustrated in this subtle but curious story about the Long Pole Pine, indigenous to the Province of Alberta. Apparently, the Long Pole Pine can only regenerate itself under the intense heat of a forest fire. It needs this intense heat for its cones to open and for its seeds to disseminate. Forest fire technology has kept forest fires to a minimum in the province. As a result, the Long Pole Pine has declined sharply in number. Presently, there are Forest Fire Prevention technologists lighting forest fires in Alberta to raise the population of the Long Pole Pine.

crisis in modern politics, as such, achieve a clearer understanding of what it really means to be "modern".

To my knowledge, the crisis of modern politics is most clearly stated as such:

..it is the disproportion between the vision or model and the experienced reality of everyday life...either the vision of modernity cannot be achieved or the present achievement brings to light aspects of modernity that were previously unnoticed or obscured.⁶

Being that we find in Hegel the highest expression of Western consciousness represented through an imperative for apocalyptic objectivity, and acknowledging that the concepts, which are Hegelian concepts, with which we attempt to understand and live in the world cannot catch up to everyday experiences, would suggest that Hegel failed. And Bataille, although admitting that "the dialectic of the master and slave['s] lucidity is blinding",⁷ ends up erupting into laughter after a full consideration of Hegel's discourse.

What is laughable is that Hegel concludes in giving absolute meaning to something which does not make sense. The master, in putting at stake his very life for recognition and prestige, thereby representing the movement and meaning of history, only can achieve this recognition through the servile consciousness of the slave. In effect, the master is enslaved to the slave's recognition for the possibility of his own mastery. Therefore, his prestige is not desirable, since, in his bid for independent self-consciousness--for self-determination and self-legislation--he does not detach himself from the slave consciousness:

The independence of Self-consciousness becomes laughable at the moment when it liberates itself

⁶ Cooper Barry, "Introduction" to, The End Of History: An essay in modern Hegelianism, p.13.

⁷ See Derrida's, Writing and Difference, p.255, from Bataille's L'experience interieure.

by enslaving itself, when it starts to work,
that is, when it enters into dialectics.⁸

Therefore, Bataille dislocates Hegel's logic at its starting point, and, since Hegelian discourse is circular, this dislocation extends to its end.

But it is only a failure in one sense, because the more true nature of "modernity" may be within Hegelian discourse itself. It was just not enunciated by Hegel. Bataille called it Hegel's "blind spot". It appears that Hegel retained a slavish perspective upon the final culmination of history which blinded him from all implications of his own formulation. The imperative for apocalyptic objectivity blinds him because it is a submissive disposition. Derrida explains:

"What is laughable is the submission to the self-evidence of meaning, to the force of this imperative: that there must be meaning, that nothing be definitively lost in death, or further, that death should receive the signification of "absolute negativity", that a work must always be possible which, because it defers enjoyment, confers meaning, seriousness, and truth upon the putting at stake."⁹

But, as Bataille shows us, this imperative for meaning, which the West has exalted, confers meaninglessness. Although, we would not have discovered this if Hegel did not complete the process for us. We must come, then, to understand Hegel before we can reveal the unsaid side of Hegel. It becomes important to understand the Hegelian dialectic in terms of Negativity and Death, to understand the death of the West. In such terms, we see other laughable instances.

(ii) The Unsaid Side of Hegel and The Implosion of The Modern Project

⁸ Derrida Jacques, "From Restricted to General Economy. A Hegelian Without Reserve" in, Writing and Difference, p.256.

⁹ Ibid., p. 256-7.

2 of/de 2

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIAL 1010a
(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)

It is Kojève that tells us that, "human history is the history of desired desires."¹⁰ For it is when man desires another man's desire--in effect, recognition--which constitutes the beginning of history. The beginning of history is the beginning of the self-creation of man: in Heidegger's terms, the self-determination of man. The struggle for recognition between men is a "fight to the death." To speak of this is necessarily to speak of the "origin" of Self-consciousness [the capital letters are Kojève's] which is directly related to a mortal battle. Self-consciousness, in its pure form, is the end(telos) of the dialectic. As man creates himself through the struggle for recognition, he negates the given-Being of the Natural world. Negativity is the ontological basis for the dialectic, because it represents man's movement to pure self-consciousness which necessarily requires negating those elements which determine man's existence outside of himself. It is a movement to determine man's Being "in-and-for-itself". The self-creation of Man is through historical becoming which involves creating a Historical world at the expense of the Natural world.¹¹ It involves a mortal battle with the Natural world. The process of history is a progressive self-creation of Man through the ever-increasing possibility for absolute freedom. This modern freedom is attained when Man removes himself from all determinations outside of himself, from all external determinants.

Furthermore, in his essay, "The Idea of Death in the Philosophy of Hegel", Kojève identifies death as having tremendous significance and import for Hegel's "philosophy". The idea of death anthropologizes Hegel's "philosophy". Philosophy is completed by the Word of Man,

¹⁰ Kojève Alexandre, "In Place of an Introduction" in, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p.6.

¹¹ Here again, is further evidence of the bifurcated vision typical of a philosophico-historical orientation. For the aggrandizement of "modern" man and "modern" beliefs he must extricate himself from the Natural world and create what has come to be seen as a fictitious world of his own that he nonetheless perceives as "real" or "better."

which means the recognition that slave comprises the essence of "modern" man. It is this that distinguishes Hegel from previous philosophers. In Hegel's rendering, the essence of man is conditioned by a fear of death and the uncertainty of life. The idea of death anthropologizes Hegel's philosophy because it is through the foreknowledge of death that distinguishes Man as Man. One can only assume to give a complete and certain account only in posterity.

If the essence of Man is won with the death of Man, then the self-creation of Man occurs at death. It is a rendering of an account that can never be given, for one remains an enigma until one dies. But is this not laughable? This paradox is precisely why one can say that "modernity" has undermined itself. Kojève tells us:

"..the totality of the Real implies human reality, which exists only as a creative movement. Perfect and definitive adequation of Being(=Substance) and Discourse(=Subject) cannot therefore be effected until the end of times, when the creative movement of Man will be completed.¹²

The desire for Man to objectify himself absolutely as Man can only come about at the "end of times", or, in other words, when Man is over. The imperative to complete man's striving for preservation, sovereignty and domination ends in the inverse of itself: the destruction of the totality that was achieved. The Western project is both culminated and imploded within Hegel's discourse. It seems this is a necessary condition of its completion. Bataille represents this paradox in these words:

The privileged manifestation of Negativity is death, but death, in truth, reveals nothing. In principle, death reveals to Man his natural, animal being, but the revelation never takes place. For man finally to be revealed to himself

¹² Kojève Alexandre, "The Idea Of Death in the Philosophy of Hegel" in, Interpretation, Winter, 1973, p.116.

he would have to die, but he would have to do so while living... But this is a comedy!"¹³

If the totality of the real is a creative movement, a constant movement, how can one arrive at a completion? To claim to absolutize, finalize and complete this movement is, indeed, a fine show of wizardry. In the end, all which made man distinct, i.e.; the creation of the Historical world opposed to the determinations imposed on Man by the Natural world, are eclipsed into one another. Man is returned to his natural, animal being in the concerted effort to create himself outside of his naturalness and animality. All Bataille can do is laugh.

This paradox is manifest if one considers some peculiarities of the present day. Although there is a perceived notion that the perfectibility of the world is immanent, it also appears that we are returning to a primitive commonality which Plato seriously joked about in Book V of the Republic. Although it appears that initiatives informed by the modern vision has brought about the conveniences of peace, security and a commodious living, it also appears that we are still warring against one another, only that it is increasingly competitive and technologically advanced.¹⁴

Clearly, to arrive at a conclusion such as Hegel did, that this New World is the Age of Wisdom, is a failure. Nietzsche calls this Wisdom nihilism. Hegel fails not because what he said cannot be considered "true" --truth and falsehood becoming almost a matter of indifference at present--Hegel fails because he brings himself to the abyss and turns away. But this does not keep Hegel's discourse from being the highest expression of conventional

¹³ Derrida Jacques, "From Restricted to General Economy" in Writing and Difference, p.257.

¹⁴ No one doubts, as Nietzsche even admitted, that "ours is the most compassionate age". Yet, paradoxically, it is the age of more mass murders per capita than ever before, an age where the entire world went to war twice as never before--a democratic age which nonetheless has experienced the most brutal and despotic tyranny, and has suffered most from man's inhumanity to man than ever before in the history of the human race.

wisdom, as that which expresses most profoundly the characteristics of our current political activity.

Truly, what must go beyond Hegel is different than any philosophy or thought previous, but there remains a task that requires much effort. There remains much more to be enunciated. To reveal Hegel's "blind spot" is to embark upon a task which considers an anti-apocalyptic perspective as a stronger disposition for the present age and one which coincides with the task of thought at the end of philosophy.

But, it must be remembered, that this enunciation is a furthering of what can already be found in Hegel. As Bataille claims of Hegel: "He did not know to what extent he was correct."¹⁵ Though we acknowledge that Hegel has left us with laughable paradoxes, his argument is still convincing. His failure is minimized if the Phenomenology is read as a great, serio-comic parody of the history of the West. Hegel turns away because at the end of history, with the completion of his writings, all is finished: philosophy, modernity and history are over. It requires a discourse which takes these laughable paradoxes seriously. This is our task, we epigones. What is required is a discourse which does not shy away from the abyss.

(iii) Hegelian Discourse and Worldless Infinity

We can find the abysmal within the corpus of Hegel's dialectic if we agree with Gadamer that, "motion is the dialectic of all that is."¹⁶ and that we remove ourselves from the eschatological, apocalyptic imperative for the moment. Here, motion and Being come together. The worlds of Being and Becoming are "inverted" and eclipse into each other. Gadamer tells

¹⁵ See Derrida Jacques, "From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelian Without Reserve" in, Writing and Difference, p.254.

¹⁶ Gadamer Hans-Georg, Hegel's Dialectic, p.27.

us that to understand the "inverted world" we must see that, "what is real [is] where everything is continually disappearing. The real world exists precisely as change, constant change."¹⁷ Does this not identify the real with a notion of infinity? Gadamer further adds:

That means that there is life in it which manifests itself in infinite change, in the continuing differentiation of itself from itself.¹⁸

This speaks of the "underside" to modernity, the side that the essence of our present age conceals from itself. The 'real' world is rendered perspectively necessarily concealing its own essence, for no one can give an uniform account of that which manifests itself in infinite change. Clearly, the idea of the world progressing to a higher state of equilibrium within a universal and homogeneous finality is rendered, not only impossible, but absurd. The historical perspective that we progress towards a "better" world, a world more full of meaning is seen as meaningless. This meaninglessness is a preliminary stage of nihilism, for we realize that "progress" may come to mean more excessive forms of tyranny and totalitarianism. Global "freedom" presents simultaneously the possibility for global tyranny, for universal totalitarianism.

The "real" is in infinite motion and metamorphosis. Any goals or projects based on an apocalyptic view can now be rendered as harmful idealisms, for they do not take into account the truer nature of the "real", they are not aware of the underside to the technological age, thus, they perpetuate the inability to come to terms with the extent of our scientific-technological age. In perpetuating this orientation we forego the world of beings and things.

¹⁷ Gadamer Hans-Georg, Hegel's Dialectic, p.27.

¹⁸ Ibid., p.53.

For Nietzsche, retaining the idea that humanity is at its height at the end of history, is a harmful sham. Yet this idea is not discouraged from our educational process, even through to the twentieth-century:

there has been no dangerous change or turn in the German education of this century which has not become more dangerous through the enormous influence, continuing to the present moment, of this philosophy, the Hegelian.¹⁹

Part of this danger, Nietzsche admits, comes from what Hegel did not say--what he wished to blind himself from:

He should have said that all things after him are properly judged to be only a musical coda of the world historical rondo; more properly yet, to be redundant. He did not say that.²⁰

This is a clear indication that there is an underside to Hegel which inverts and implodes the motivating imperative that sought to give humanity its justification and sovereignty. Nietzsche reveals the unsaid side of Hegel. Nietzsche is emphatic where Hegel is passive. And this comes about because Nietzsche rises above the imperative for apocalyptic objectivity: a slavish imperative.

Indeed, for the "modern" to think that he is at the height of his development or evolution, and for him to think the "New World" represents greatness in its consummation of the historical process, is fraudulent. The full extent of Hegel's discourse reveals the devaluation of the Western project in the very effort to give it a culminating, finalizing valuation. The Age

¹⁹ Nietzsche Friedrich, "On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life", Preuss Ed., p.47.

²⁰ Ibid., p.47.

of Wisdom only turns out to be the victory of slavish consciousness, the victory of the "last man" and an age of nihilism.

(iv) Nietzsche and Nihilism:

The Task of Thinking at The End of History

We have tread a path of thought that has revealed an underside to Hegel's philosophy, an underside to the discourse at the height of metaphysics which reveals the opposite of its original intention. For Nietzsche, the events of Hegel's time unleashed out of necessity the age of nihilism:

Nietzsche uses nihilism as the name for the historical movement that he was the first to recognize and that already governed the previous century while defining the century to come, the movement whose essential interpretation he concentrates in the terse sentence: 'God is dead.' That is to say, the 'Christian God' has lost His power over beings and over the determination of man. "Christian God" also stands for the "transcendent" in general in its various meanings--for "ideals" and "norms", "principles" and "rules", "ends" and "values," which are set "above" the being, in order to give being as a whole a purpose, an order, and --as it is succinctly expressed--"meaning."²¹

With Nietzsche we have a new view of the present scientific-technologized world. The "new World's" very emergence and possibility is indispensable to the appearance of nihilism. What gave the world meaning has been stripped away. The "New World" is formulated at the expense of old worlds. All is broken down to be manipulated by the will to mastery. All of the ideals and norms, principles and rules, ends and values once held as above man, ever-enduring and transcendent over time and space, become stuff to be continually molded by

²¹ Heidegger Martin, Nietzsche, Vol.IV:Nihilism,p.4.

technological means in the desire to formulate a global social order compatible to our delusory technologized rationalizations of Being. Technology disguises its nihilistic components. The illuminations of our technologized world carries with them the darkness of nihilism.

Nietzsche diagnoses the root of nihilism with the imperative for control and domination of the world. The root of nihilism stems from a resentment of the world presented before man. This has made man mendacious to the most base level. Man has become mendacious in his incessant creation of fictitious worlds beyond this one to appease the perceived evils within it. The effort to do so has robbed man of the very instinctual strength that would assure a participation in the fullness of Being.

the overwhelming experience derived from the history of nihilism is that all valuations remain without force if the corresponding basic attitude of valuing and the corresponding manner of thinking do not accompany them.²²

Hence, the attitude and manner of thinking become primary in overcoming nihilism. Nietzsche's thought tempts the reader through an exchange with the text, to perform bold deeds, to "quicken activity". His writings seek not to render the "truth", nor are they constructed to appeal to a will to truth, but to power. "Truth" is demonstrated not to be an ontologically possibility. As Stanley Rosen relates, "Nietzsche's rhetoric of nihilism can be understood...as the consequence of a conscious rejection of the very possibility of ontology."²³ Hence, a countermovement to nihilism is effected by discourse that rise above the necessity for a determinative ontology, rises above the necessity for "truth."

As Heidegger reminds us, corruption, physiological degeneration and such are not causes of

²² Heidegger Martin, Nietzsche Vol.IV:Nihilism,p.27.

²³ Rosen Stanley, "Remarks on Nietzsche's "Platonism"",in Nietzsche and the Rhetoric of Nihilism,p.146.

nihilism but effects. Therefore, an attempt at overcoming nihilism by the mere extirpation of those conditions only masks the cause delaying the overcoming of nihilism. Nihilism must be overcome by a profound insight into nihilism, an experience of it, which is to say, an involvement in the guiding questions and the movement of thought in Western history. Significant post-historical discourse must be necessarily nihilistic, but also much more than this. The requirements for what may be considered a viable discourse at the end of history are sensitive and complex.

The general character of the countermovement to nihilism is within nihilism. Because nihilism is the final outcome of Western history's valuations, this countermovement is not outside of history entirely; i.e., it does not negate what occurred in the past, because the past is newly perceived as recurrent:

No historical movement can leap outside of history and start from scratch. It becomes all the more historical, that is to say, it grounds history all the more originally, as it overcomes radically what has gone on before by creating a new order in that realm where we have our roots.²⁴

As such, Nietzsche's countermovement to nihilism radically changes Hegel's historicism by creating a "new order"; yet this is done by an even more radical historicism. Therefore, Nietzsche new "way of thinking", which emerges out of necessity, radically overturns and reverses the previous thinking in the effort to overcome that way of thinking. The new way of thinking rises above the old but does not negate it.

²⁴ Heidegger Martin, "Nihilism as History" in, Nietzsche Vol.IV: Nihilism, p.57.

It is an historicism, but one which is not absolutely deterministic; hence, for Nietzsche, it is not enslaving but creatively liberating. Also, it is done so from those very roots without negating the past or present, but accepting all as necessary, accepting all that is with an affirmative disposition.

The valuations of our technological age are imposed through a basic attitude and manner of thinking that does not correspond to the essence of technology. Technology, as a dominant force in the universal and homogeneous state, could not have occurred without the recognition that all standards, rules, principles, ends and ideals become stuff to be molded by the human "will." The "will" itself has become a cardboard concept that exists on account of the prevailing spirit of democratic progress. Nihilism means, "the uppermost values devalue themselves" in the very process of assigning to them a final and culminating valuation. Nietzsche, the thinker, did not devalue them, they are the necessary outcome of Western history's valuations, of its method and manner of thinking, of its way of viewing life. Therefore, if values of any strength and worth are to be imposed, they would correspond to an attitude and manner of thinking that, firstly, understands the experience of nihilism and, secondly, understands the necessities for a countermovement to nihilism. That is to say, that the demands of the essential writings and creative works of our time would be the ones which do not ascribe to a will to truth by means of methodological modes of inquiry or the "essayistic approach" of commentary. The essential writings of our time would show an implicit awareness of the end of history, of nihilism, as a creative standpoint; one which, through an exchange with words and stories, tempts the reader to perform bold deeds, to be virile and mature, to make his own valuations and goals in full knowledge that they are based in otherwise dubious origins. They should acknowledge that their merit is entirely within their

own creative power. And the greater the strength of conviction within, the greater the power of the author, and the greater the binding effect it will have. Therefore, the merit of any art work is to the degree that it overpowers itself, that it continually accrues power. Hence it recognizes the new character of being at the end of philosophy, at the end of metaphysics, as Nietzsche's metaphysics of the will to power.

The merit by which to judge a thinker's worth is the strength he has in affirming the present age of nihilism as necessary. The new standard for judgement is not "truth". For Nietzsche, truth is only "relative error". The new image of being over man must tread paths and break trails in the knowledge that they do not have the truth: the new thinkers must attempt and tempt. This becomes the new measure: "How much truth can a spirit bear, how much truth can a spirit dare? that became for me the real measure of value".²⁵ This is the new attitude and way of thinking, of a new inquiry that grows out of the countermovement to nihilism. The "will to truth" is a burden that we must rise above. The way to growth, health and revitalization is through suffering this burden.

This is how Nietzsche understood his task:

Philosophy, as I have understood and lived it,
is a voluntary living in ice and high mountains.
The ice is near, the solitude terrible - but
how peacefully things lie in the light! how
freely one breathes! how much one feels beneath
one!... I made out of my will to health, to life,
my philosophy.²⁶

Nietzsche wishes to place the negating components of previous philosophy "beneath" him. But this is done through a renewed and revitalized philosophical posture: one which affirms life

²⁵ Nietzsche Friedrich, "Foreword" to, Ecce Homo, p.34.

²⁶ Nietzsche Friedrich, Ecce Homo, pp.34 and 40.

rather than negates it. The "newness" involved in overcoming an apocalyptic historicism can only have origins in traditional thinking.

As Gadamer tells us, "we must stay with history, but in a special way." Or, as Nietzsche teaches, "the unhistorical and the historical are equally necessary for health."²⁷ Thus, it is a manner in living and thinking which does not place itself completely "beyond" or "outside" of what occurred previously. One may go "beyond" without being against what occurred in the past tradition.

To posit values is to give life value, which is to live the power of life. For Nietzsche, life is the will to power: the will to power is the will of life. It is the new ground for valuation which fundamentally denies the ground of the "subject" as with traditional metaphysics. Therefore, the constitutive principle of traditional metaphysics and its extensions into positivist and neo-positivist thought, as well as, the instrumentalist view of technology, are depicted as symptoms of the disintegration and the denial of the real essence of life. They are a continuation of the negating components of Western thought, evidence if you will that the essence of that thought is nihilism.

The Will to Power is "the basic character of all being." Life is not measured by a principle above life; but life, the principle of Being, is measured by the way we live life. Life evaluates itself through Being, that is, through appearances, actions and even deception: it cannot be evaluated or measured through instruments, but is measure itself. The world cannot be measured or accounted for ontologically. This view exalts creativity above scientific rationalizations of a determinable measure to life and Being. The measure itself is always a

²⁷ Nietzsche Friedrich, "On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life", Preuss Ed.p.10.

creative activity: it ,too, is art. This view exalts the importance of rhetoric above ontology.

Traditionally the will was viewed as a faculty of the soul, a soul that was unified and identical to itself. This alone allows for the will to be determined as an integral part of the psyche(soul). This view of the will as an intrinsic faculty of the soul which is identical to the "subject," also allows for the belief in the human "subject" as causal agent perpetrating various effects actualizing an inner vision. These elements of the unified subject are assumed to be under the complete control of the subject. Hence, the "modern" "subject" believes he can actualize his vision through what he perceives as certain self-legislation. The belief in the "subject" having agency to change the world is made possible by the assumption of a first cause.²⁸ With this assumption the "subject" believes he determines his own "will", that it does not determine him.

For Nietzsche, this "will" does not exist. It is a quite arbitrary fiction filled with a false sense of intentionality and intelligibility. It is believed in by weaker natures to appease the accidental appearance of the subject on this earth, and the continual flux of everyday experiences which deny any finalizability in conceptualization therefore, any direct control by the human subject. The will to power cannot be elucidated by appealing to particular characteristics of being, for it denies the possibility to conceive of a unified monologic "subject" identical to a unified monologic "will." The essence of will to power denies the origin of this "will" in the "ego", denying that there are willed acts attributable to a distinct

²⁸ The theological influence of Western thought gave metaphysics this imperative of a first cause (*causa sui*) and causality. With the immediate certainty of the "I" or the "ego" as subject that has agency over the world, the object, the One, God, or the Good and so forth, became ultimately approachable through this perspective upon experience. It is this orientation which formulated the apocalyptic pronouncements of 'modern' metaphysics. With these theological influences and through the transition from a cosmological orientation to an increasingly historically-determinist one, the manifestation of the first cause involved a re-directing of spirit towards an ever-enduring, fictitious global state or world. The projected 'modern' world was to achieve the perfectibility of the *causa sui*, the first cause of all substance.

unified "subject." There is no causal origin. Being, insofar as it is will to power, cannot be grasped through an assumption of causation as scientific method clearly does.

For Nietzsche, what it is to "will" involves "submission": willing as submission to the multiplicity and indeterminacy that characterizes our being. Willing is to submit to becoming what one truly is, to be resolute in this command which impels us visualized in a tension between dissolution and rebuilding: a tension perpetrated by a lack of discernable authority. And it is a command that does not originate from ourselves but is conditioned by a multiplicity of factors which are not quantifiable:

Willing seems to me to be above all something complicated, something that is a unit only as a word...in all willing there is first a plurality of sensations.. which begin their actions by force of habit. Willing is above all..an affect specifically the affect of a command... A man who wills commands something within himself that renders obedience, or that he believes renders obedience.²⁹

It is a willing to openness, not to a closed "something" to fixate the will upon. Will and power are essential to one another. They are all-pervasive and indeterminate. It involves the submission and admission that we are conditioned by forces beyond our control, which cannot be determined in any absolute or transcendent manner. And these forces too, are will to power. For Nietzsche, all that is is will to power.

"Truth" is conventionally dependent upon the value we have in life. If "truth" loses its power, it is because life has lost its value. For Nietzsche, truth does not necessarily denote

²⁹ Nietzsche Friedrich, "On the Prejudices of Philosophers" in, Beyond Good and Evil, Aph.19, pp.25-6.

the antithesis of error, but in the most fundamental cases, only the position of various errors in relation to one another. What is in truth, is necessitated to error. The worst kind of lying is self-deception: "Because you lie concerning what is, the thirst for what should come to be does not grow in you". What should come to be is already within what is. If you negate what is, you cannot anticipate or determine the future: you cannot find happiness in an overweening power of life to anticipate the future. There is much in Nietzsche's thought that is ostensibly practical and tangible, going to the very core of our everyday growth. We are conditioned by eternally recurrent influences and it would be a detriment to conceive of such things as "progress." All that is now is a re-configuration of all that will ever be, a re-configuration ordering the same underlying chaos. The demand of Nietzsche's "willing" is to submit to this eternal resoluteness.

The true "newness" of "modernity" can be considered as the possibility for a renewed, recurrent configuration of the past. Instead of an historical determinism, there is an element of eternal indeterminacy: a renewal and regeneration, however different, of past forms upon present day experience.

So what does it mean to be post-historical beings, to live through the end of history? The answer seems to come by way of an overcoming, a "going beyond", more precisely, a "rising above". But what is the nature of this "rising above", this overcoming? It appears the path first points to revealing the underside to "modernity." We are to be aware and beware of Hegelian discourse or any other absolutist, historically-deterministic visions within discourse. We are to think and reflect upon the essence of technology as revealing the underside to "modernity," where technology, in essence, undermines the very process that brought it to fruition.

The end of history exposes the underside to "modernity", exposes the instability, flux and infinite nature of all beings and things. It exposes the necessarily erroneous endeavour of arriving at an absolute, finalized discourse on "Being" which, it turns out, can never be finalized. It exposes that any identity cannot be known in any absolute sense. There is no longer any certainty. However, there is a certain kind of "uncertainty", of continual flux and activity with the recognition that the essence of technology is always in process.

To be post-historical is to experience the universal and increasingly homogeneous State as nihilistic. That with this singular goal for all of humanity, we lose sense of beings and things, and the best we can do is to come to think through the nihilistic consequences of Western thought. The meaning of the post-historical displays the meaninglessness of historical determinism.

And what does this mean for a viable form of discourse, what does it mean for a viable political edification? It must be a discourse which accepts Hegelian discourse and parodies it at the same time (just in case Hegel didn't intend it as such). It is to display an historicism that is not absolute and deterministic, but perspectival. It should call us to think and reflect on Hegelian discourse to prepare ourselves to "rise above" it, to not revert to any further visionary, fictitious worlds, for this would constitute only a continuation of the negating components of Western thought: negating because they were born out of resentment inherent in slavish consciousness. "Rising above" in this case is to affirm these negating components in placing them beneath us.

In Cooper's questioning of "post-modernity" is an appeal to Nietzsche's thought to find its "meaning": "if post-modernity is to mean anything, it is the practice of curing ourselves

when we no longer have souls to be saved."³⁰ We must cure ourselves when the way to freedom, salvation, has been eliminated from our possibilities. If there is a discourse to convey this "meaning":

it would amount to an ironic discourse,
a practice that undermined itself even
when it was being spoken, that would require
at the same time both careful attention,
and thus the greatest suspicion, as well as
utter trust, a surrender to the charmed flow
of words, and an unwilling willingness to
believe.³¹

It will be argued that the nature of discourse within the corpus of Nietzsche's writings and the observations of great novelists such as Dostoevsky are the most viable for the curative revitalization of the present day experiences of nihilism. Their writings suggest a way of thinking that rises above the metaphysical constructs of scientific method, for they are explicitly self-conscious of the end of philosophy and metaphysics and are in accord with the necessities of post-historical discourse which we have uncovered. Hence, these writings are viable precisely because they challenge most profoundly and comprehensively the tenets of traditional metaphysical and philosophical thinking and point the way for a new thinking at the end of philosophy, at the end of history without rejecting the past as typically "modern" thinking does.

³⁰ Cooper Barry, "What is Post-Modernity?" in Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, p.27.

³¹ Ibid., p.26.

You can find in a text whatever you bring, if you will
stand between it and the mirror of your imagination. You
may not see your ears, but they will be there.

Mark Twain, "A Fable"

Who can better hope bequeath?

Death.

What are the means to make me free?

Inconstancy.

And wherein lies the cure for sadness?

Madness.

If that be so, it's merely silly

To seek my passion's cure,

For there's no remedy that's sure

But death and change and folly.

"Song of a Shepherd"

in Don Quixote

CHAPTER 5

II. THE "NEW" MODERNITY AND THE POST-HISTORICAL NOVEL

Hannah Arendt identifies the rise of the social with the appearance of the "modern" novel.¹

If we are to find in the post-historical novel the necessary characteristics for a curative overcoming of the negating components of Western thought, it behooves us to examine the implications of the rise of the social and its relationship to the novel.

(i) The Historical Epic Novel and The Rise of the Social

The appearance of the genre of literary activity known as the "novel", and modern scientific perception came into being with apparent simultaneity. As we have seen, the dominance of "modern science" is dependent upon a particular configuration of social forms of associations,

¹ See, "The Public and the Private Realm" in, The Human Condition, p.39.

namely, democratic ones. Most importantly, for Arendt, the rise of the social has immediate political consequences:

the emergence of society...has not only blurred the old borderline between private and political, it has also changed almost beyond recognition the meaning of the two terms and their significance for the life of the individual and the citizen.²

The severing of the division between the private and the public domain is the result of mass socialization movements. Arendt tells us that democratic societies, "demand that its members act as though they were members of one enormous family which has only one opinion and one interest." This "one opinion and interest" is wrapped around the singular goal of modern activity which seems to be the mere maintenance of life's necessities. This is even called, sometimes, "freedom". The emergence of society--the social--which occurred at the dawn of the "modern" age, introduced the eventual elimination of class distinctions, subsuming every activity under one singular, societal goal, namely, that of "making a living". "Modern" society seeks hegemony. Maintaining the mere necessities of life was regarded by the ancients as a private non-political activity at the lowest stratum of human endeavour. But at present, this activity has grown to dominate our "public" life. Therefore, the public and private truly have lost their significance and meaning. Presently there is very little of our private lives that escape public scrutiny. Modern mass movements promote the further severing of the public and private domains in the march towards "freedom". This "freedom" is arrived at when everyone is guaranteed to have the basic necessities of life taken care of. The labour of

² Arendt Hannah, "The Public and the Private Realm" in, The Human Condition, p.33.

³ Ibid., p. 39.

maintaining the securing of individual basic needs, in ancient times, was a considered a lowly activity, an activity which was the responsibility of the slave. Nevertheless, the radical equalization movements forces the activation of these desires upon all individuals in society. Accordingly, the recognition of all by all can be made possible.

But, as with many aspects of our technological age, the benefits accrued from the "oneness" of mankind within a universal democratization process can also provide the means for a universal despotism:

Large numbers of people, crowded together,
develop an almost irresistible inclination
toward despotism, be this the despotism of a
person or of majority rule..⁴

The rule of bureaucracy, which Arendt calls a "no-man rule", can turn out to be, "its cruellest and most tyrannical versions."⁵ This extends to our educational process, for, as Arendt correctly observes, ""behavioral sciences" aim to reduce man as a whole, in all his activities, to the level of a conditioned and behaving animal."⁶ Our psychology departments test chemical levels in rats to determine mental behaviour in human beings. (And, in the darkest times of this century, like-minded experimenters didn't use rats!)

We ourselves are subject to bureaucratic scrutiny in order for society to run more efficiently to allow the possibility that basic necessities can be guaranteed for every individual. Those individuals who don't comply to these goals are inefficient. Society runs more efficiently the

⁴ Arendt Hannah, "The Public and the Private Realm" in, The Human Condition, p.43.

⁵ Ibid., p.40.

⁶ Ibid., p.45.

more the subjects are "normalized" in their behaviour. Efficiency involves rooting out deviations from the norm. Such activity is motivated by an idealized vision of social order:

society expects from each of its members a certain kind of behaviour, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to "normalize" its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement.⁷

Therefore, the rise of the social, it may be said, denies the participation in the truly political life: it denies the plurality of the human condition. It may also be said that the universal democratic, socialization process is politically irresponsible, for it involves extraction from the real human condition of plurality--as if it could actually be done--under the idealistic preachings for a singular massification, a herding of a multiplicity of diverse individual souls into a singularly-directed conglomeration.

At the heart of the on-going tensions within contemporary society is the incompatibility of absolute freedom and absolute equality, two principal democratic notions. Human distinction is removed in the movement for equality. Equality and freedom can only be correlated insofar as they promote the qualities of "the herd." "Modern" freedom is nothing more than a concept related to a process of normalization. "Modern" "freedom" is slavish. The typical "modern" conception of life is ultimately impossible. The victory of democracy, then, is but another symptom of nihilism.

The victory of universal democratization exists as a "communistic fiction", where we are truly ruled by an "invisible hand"--nobody! These are aspects of universal democratization that "moderns" wish to blind themselves from. We wish to blind ourselves from seeing that

⁷ Arendt Hannah, "The Public and the Private Realm" in, The Human Condition, p.40.

what often is a sub-human realm of slavery, is called freedom. Mass socialization involves a detachment from concrete experience in the effort to coerce a stable world order which actually has the potential to further chaos.

In his study of the novel, Lukacs speaks of the epic novelistic intention and its relationship to social forms:

The artist's epic intention, his desire to arrive at a world beyond the problematic, aimed only at an immanently utopian ideal of social forms and structures; therefore it does not transcend these structures.⁸

The traditional or historical novel, of which Arendt was speaking, allows itself to be pre-determined by the expectations and demands of modern society. It is a response to the desires of the people to arrive beyond the problematics inherent within a democratically-transformed world. The masses expect to hear or see a well-constructed novel that responds to the way they choose to perceive life--stripped of all contradictory elements and ambiguities: they choose to perceive life as well-constructed and orderly, assuming that the evils of society can be changed and controlled. Most people in society seek answers and results which require little effort to obtain. The traditional narrative plot corresponds to the dominant way in which the society is accustomed to perceiving life. In this manner, the epic, historical novel is truly a social art form. It is aimed at a utopian ideal of a social, stable world order. But this is only one type of novel. Novels of this type do not transcend the conformity of societal forms; their life is short and particular to the existent, popular beliefs of their time.

⁸ Lukacs Georg, "Tolstoy and the attempts to go beyond the social forms of life" in, The Theory of the Novel, p.144.

It is the nature of the epic historical novel to negate previous novels, radically and sharply, for it is conditioned historically, meaning that its life depends on continual negation or, in other words, progress. This process becomes necessary when the form-giving principle of language is dominated by an philosophico-historical world vision. The historical novels' renewal, then, if perceived within this orientation of man in his living world, will always be in the form of a negation. If the contemporary novel is still viewed under these auspices it will certainly appear as a dying genre. Perhaps this is the reason for so much "literature" on the death of the novel. But, as will be made abundantly clear, the "new" novel at the end of history which does not consider the philosophico-historical orientation of man in his world, is in a constant and affirmative process of renewal.

It is with the penchant for continual negation, for "liberation" from the previous, that scientific method and the historical novel stand on common ground. Their livelihood is dependent upon advancement, upon making a step forward from the past whether it be in methodological procedure or more readily responding to the newest of societal demands, the latest configuration of societal morals. The past is devalued or negated for the attainment of a perceived better future. For modern science, this means a future more dominated by scientific rationalizations of the world of things. The difference between the novel and scientific method, to speak in very general terms, is that the novel has made a breakthrough of sorts where it has come to reflect on its own principles, and therefore on the implausibility of the "modern" historical vision. It is apparent that scientific method has not made this breakthrough.

The rise of the epic historical novel accompanied to a certain extent the rise of the social. Yet, some elements of truly great novels during the "modern" period are anti-social, for they

challenge the tenets of modern "politics" which has come to embrace the socialization process. Their legacy remains alive up until the present. These are writers of great breadth and depth of vision transcending their respective times and continuing to influence strongly contemporary artists: Chaucer, Shakespeare, Boccaccio, Rabelais and of course Cervantes just to name a few. They still have influence because they rose above their limited social viewpoint of their day. Hence, I will argue, they were more politically responsive.

The view of politics in the novel as a "violent intrusion" by some literary critics comes from a misapprehension of the political. The novel that challenges modern "politics" is very political, for it challenges the authority and outlook of socially-oriented forms of government. The expounding of radical equality and "radical" freedom, for instance, found in contemporary ideological rhetoric, does not allow men or women a public space where constructive action or speech can be recognized. Radical equality denies the recognition of plurality as central to the human condition and politics. When all opinions are equal, no opinion has validity over any other. Nothing can be established except through the coercive and expedient practice of majority rule. No one can be free. The possibility for freedom is undermined by the espousing of radical equality. The truly inspired political writer must go "underground".

Lukacs recognizes some political intent within the emergence of the epic historical novel, but it appears minimal. The novel of "romantic disillusionment" found the writings of Rousseau as its greatest influence. But Rousseau's "rebellion of the heart" was an attempt to overcome the problematic of an oppressive society through a denial of the existent world. This romantic "rebellion" was a reaction to the levelling of the human spirit with the emergence of democratic, communistic principles. Part of the rebellion was due to the corrupt power of society over its subjects where the rule of common opinion arrived at by a mob majority,

enforced by sheer number alone, abolished any recognition of distinction in political insight, of courage and strength in political judgment. Rousseau's politics were anti-progressivist and anti-Enlightenment precisely at the time when the opposite sentiments dominated the society. But Rousseau's eventual response to this condition is somewhat a failure. To become a "solitary walker" is not exactly a politically responsible posture, and his prescriptions seemed to further the negating components of the modern project.

Lukacs goes on to identify Tolstoy as the last epic novelist to attempt to go beyond the conformism of social forms. But it was only an attempt:

In Tolstoy, intimations of a breakthrough into a new epoch are visible; but they remain polemical, nostalgic and abstract.⁹

Lukacs places himself among many others when he admits that this breakthrough occurred in the works of Dostoevsky. Lukacs' poignant words I shall reproduce in full here:

It is in the words of Dostoevsky that this new world, remote from any struggle against what actually exists, is drawn for the first time simply as a seen reality. That is why he, and the form he created, lie outside the scope of this book. Dostoevsky did not write novels, and the creative vision revealed in works has nothing to do, either as affirmation or as rejection, with European nineteenth-century Romanticism or with any, likewise Romantic, reactions against it. He belongs to the new world. Only formal analysis of his works can show whether he is already the Homer or the Dante of that world or whether he merely supplies the songs which, together with songs of other forerunners, later artists will one day weave into a greater unity: whether he is merely a beginning or already a

⁹ Lukacs Georg, "Tolstoy and the Social Forms of Life" in, The Theory of the Novel, p.152.

completion.¹⁰

Dostoevsky's works are politically responsible, for they do not represent a world denying posture. Therefore, they represent a new orientation that breaks free from the social formalism that conditioned the historical novel. His creations rise above the necessity for negation by having a world-affirming posture. Dostoevsky illustrate a possibility for re-politicizing an otherwise non-political form of association without rejecting or attempting to "liberate" himself from the existing societal arrangements. His novels seem to move to the music of a serio-comical dance, a cathartic revelry.

Such writings truly still exist in a "private" world. Although most people know the name Dostoevsky, they do not know his thought. His name is used by socialites who wish to display their high-browed acculturation, or by journalists who effectively castrate Dostoevsky by speaking of his "contradictions in character" saying nothing about his creations. Such philistinism is barely worth mentioning. As Mark Twain once said: "Classic literature is what everyone wants to have read, but no one wants to read."¹¹

Dostoevsky's artistic direction discredits any conforming formalization. It would seem that there are aspects of Lukacs' thought that blind him from seeing the essence of Dostoevsky's brand of the novel. Exposing this shortcoming will be reserved for later in the work. Through this analysis we will also come to see why Lukacs does not comprehend how Dostoevsky can be both a beginning and a completion.

¹⁰ Lukacs Georg, "Tolstoy and the Social Forms of Life" in, The Theory of the Novel, pp.152-153.

¹¹ The danger of literary ignorance is evident when a novelist is subsumed into the social milieu, in effect, made impotent. His work and thought are further used to rigidize mass society. Mark Twain is a profound critic of many aspects of American and modern society influencing many twentieth-century American novelists. Yet this has not hindered him from becoming a national icon.

(ii) The End Of History and The Life of the New Novel

It is Dostoevsky who is the first "novelist" to write from the standpoint of the end of history. Dostoevsky's writings do not base themselves on historical horizons to reveal possibilities. Such horizons are dispensed with. His works are derailed from history and from popular societal demands. Since Dostoevsky, no longer was the novel written to correspond to the desires of "modern" society. His works often satirizes "modern" desires. There is no intent to conform to moral beliefs. "Modern" morals and values are shown to be vacuous. "Modern" morals, values and expectations are not to be the arbiter of the worth of his creations.

The orientation for aesthetic judgment is transformed from the reader or listener to the creative artist. Dostoevsky's artistic vision not only revolutionized novelistic form but also certain aesthetic principles themselves. The creative artist became the standard of judgement for art, not the receiver. With this re-orientation the art form of the post-historical novel is brought into affinity with our technological age whose determinants for judgment are cybernetic, meaning they are made internally and arbitrarily. Thus, Dostoevsky was the first to depreciate some aspects of the "traditional" novel in a sustained and comprehensive manner out of necessity in order to be in affinity with the contemporary situation. In this manner it may be said that the novel after Dostoevsky is truly "new."

Dostoevsky does away with the "modern" search for the reconciliation of world and soul. His creative energy is an unabashed display of power, a declaration of war which both attacks and affirms. Here there is no counsel. It is unabashedly technological in that it presents itself as an arbitrary statement of power as the determining factor of its merit. World and soul are not considered, for from the standpoint of the technological world such identities become

meaningless. All that is left is the arbitrary manipulation of the "will" which is really unwilled. Dostoevsky revels in it. His texts are attempts at being juridical as were Homer's, but juridical by way of providing an infinite source for discourses, interpretations and a plurality of influences. This is done to accord to actual experiences in a cosmopolitan world conditioned by a plethora of perspectives and "worldviews." His texts are ultimately empirical in this sense. Experience is all that there is; there is no recourse to a bifurcated "real" world.

The "world" displays itself as boundless power or bounded by nothingness. The bifurcated "real" world is dissolved. His works display themselves in affirmation of boundless potentiality in creative power that a technological age unleashes. His works do not attempt to ground themselves ontologically. They ostensibly revel in the power of rhetoric.

Dostoevsky's approach comes from a recognition that the "stable" world order which generates modern activity is a fiction (in the most derogatory sense of the word). The "modern" "world" is abolished. He does not respond to the aesthetic orientation of "modern" societal formalism; he reveals this as an empty possibility: a vision without a real affirming and creative power. One which bestows no life. "Modern" society under traditionally "modern" notions has no affirming and life inspiring power, for it is politically irresponsible.

The novel that is alive explores the lost legacy of the political world. Hence, the novel that lives is one which, in some respects, runs counter to mass socialization. In another respect, it affirms this process although through an entirely different attitude than the typically "modern". The novel is motivated by the desire for distinction, excellence, and virtue over against the levelling of the human spirit attributable to democratic socialization. Yet it does not take a resentful posture to social conditioning manifest in the desire to transcend the age. That would only amount to a continuation of the negating aspects of Western thought. It

transforms and re-vitalizes experiences from within the social conditions at present, hence it does not respond to the negating elements of "modernity." Such a position is admittedly ironic, and, out of necessity, so, too, is novelistic discourse. To repeat: there is no attempt in the vital post-historical text to ground itself ontologically rather there is an affirming revelry in the power of rhetoric.

(iii) The Post-Historical Legacy of Cervantes

Don Quixote, reputed to be the first novel, displays aspects of anticipating post-historical thought. The dehumanization in technological discourse based on the negating components of Western thought, had already been anticipated by Cervantes 400 years ago. As all truly great novels, its influence speaks to the present day. It is still alive.

Don Quixote is an ambiguous hero. He is filled with the honour and valour of the golden age of chivalry but can only find misadventures in the "modern" world which no longer recognizes such virtues. Don Quixote's desire to be a knight errant is so overwhelming that he distorts the reality of his obvious misadventures by making them appear as personal triumphs. Undaunted is he in his quest to go out into the world, to do justice, to help the fallen and punish the wicked. He pushes onwards even though he has been through a series of catastrophe's which can only be described as pathetically humorous. He can find no one who is interested in his gallant promises, and is considered certainly to be mad.

At the outset, the novel Don Quixote appears to be simply a parody on the romances of chivalry. Yet life cannot be characterized so simply. Don Quixote's character is not without ambiguity. He looked to the past greatness of the stories of the knights to understand and act in the present. Clearly, at first, such an undertaking is presented as pure folly, for he continually engages in misadventure and displays that his view of the world is fraught with

illusions of grandeur. His deeds are so far from his intentions that one can only laugh at him pitifully. His perspective on the world is presented as narrow and restricting.

However, as his misadventures continue, the reader becomes more informed of this dubious hero of the novel. Don Quixote grows in his own self-awareness. He begins to realize his estrangement in the world. But this does not inhibit his gallant ways. He shows courage: he displays at times great intelligence and erudition, and his judgement appears more and more sound. The mood of the novel, changes from a laughable parody of the past chivalrous age, to a mood which relates of a loss of this past. Don Quixote is not pitiful any longer; he becomes "The Knight of the Sad Countenance." Don Quixote appears less and less restricted by his own self than he is by the world. It is the world that makes Don Quixote's vision appear narrow. The self realizes that it can be lost in the world.

Cervantes truly reveals "modernity" as the battle of facing a dissolving world without God.¹²

Even though it is reputed to be the first novel born in the same era as the fathers of modern science, all theorists on the novel hold Cervantes' Don Quixote with the utmost respect bordering on reverence. (It is a sentiment shared equally by Dostoevsky):

In the whole world there is no deeper, no mightier literary work. This is, so far, the last and greatest expression of human thought; this is the bitterest irony which man was capable of conceiving.¹³

This truly great novel interpreted the historical condition with such profundity and richness that its lessons still speak to the present day:

The first great novel of world literature stands at the beginning of the time when

¹² See Lukacs, Georg, "Abstract Idealism" in, The Theory of the Novel, p.103.

¹³ Dostoevsky Fedor, Diary of A Writer, Vol.I, p.260.

the Christian God began to forsake the world; when man became lonely and could find meaning and substance only in his own soul. whose home was nowhere...¹⁴

Cervantes' genius was to such extent that he anticipates post-historical, Hegelian discourse. The novel is written by an apparent nameless interpreter of a history of Don Quixote, written by a Moorish historian, Cide Hamete Benegeli. In the second part of the novel, the characters, including Don Quixote himself, are aware that a first part of a history has been written, and is, in fact, well-known. The characters enter into dialogues discussing the general benefits and dangers of giving historical accounts through stories of their own adventures. There are stories within stories, and some include actual historically-recorded events within them. This account on storytelling forms part of the historical account of the nameless interpreter. Cervantes figuratively removes himself from the account by using a nameless interpreter and by having him give an account upon the nature of historical accounts. This has the effect of revealing history as perspectival. Furthermore, Cervantes has the interpreter speaking within the novel of the actual activities of Cervantes himself. Suffice it to say that the novel is multi-levelled and multi-voiced thus challenging the certainty of the dominant subject that scientific perception slavishly adopted. The greatness of the novel is in its admitted "wisdom of uncertainty", which was shared by none other than Socrates himself:

Don Quixote is the first great battle of interiority against the prosaic vulgarity of outward life, and the only battle in which interiority succeeded, not only to emerge unblemished from the fray, but even to transmit some of the radiance of

¹⁴ Lukacs Georg, "Abstract Idealism" in, *Theory of the Novel*, p.103. The "God-foresakenness" of the world is crucial for Lukacs' understanding of the conditioning of the novel: "The novel is the epic of a world that has been abandoned by God." (p.88) The question of God was later forgotten and novels became more concerned with "abstract idealism" and "social forms".

its triumphant, though admittedly self-ironising, poetry to its victorious opponent.¹⁵

The victory of interiority in *Don Quixote* and Cervantes himself is the recognition of a "self-ironising" discourse. The dying novel responds to social conformism, the living novel is ironically asocial, it battles the conformism of modern "politics", hence it is political.

Milan Kundera, in his The Art of the Novel, shares the same reverence and recognition of this monumental work when he argues that Cervantes as well as Descartes was a founding father of the modern era. Kundera's otherwise praiseworthy book is coloured by a brooding, negative tone. This is unfortunate. His negatively fatalist attitude too easily envisions the death of the novel as in unison with the end of the modern era:

At the time it became utterly clear that
the novel was mortal; as mortal as the
West of the Modern Era.¹⁶

Some novels may be mortal--in some instances it would be fortunate if they were--but all novels do not have to be. The truly great and alive novel is in affinity with the underside to modernity. *Don Quixote*, anticipates the underside to modernity; hence, it is not or never was in complete affinity with the modern era, for it is now evident that the modern era has undermined itself. The "end" to "modernity" has proven Cervantes as correct in his assessment of things. Therefore the "end of modernity" does not necessarily mean the end of the novel or even a "depreciated leg. of Cervantes" as Kundera would have it; quite the contrary, it elevates his discourse of the "unsaid" side of "modernity" as being more vital.

Cervantes' novel can be more than just "an investigation of forgotten Being", it is a

¹⁵ Lukacs Georg, "Abstract Idealism" in, Theory of the Novel, p.104.

¹⁶ Kundera Milan, "The Depreciated Legacy of Cervantes" in, The Art of the Novel, p.13.

creative positing of Being. There is no need to see the present day novel as a depreciation of the legacy of Cervantes, but rather a renewed regeneration of it. There is a depreciation of the traditional historical epic novel, but this is co-joined with an affirmative appreciation of the "new" novel.

The novel comes alive when it affirms the end of history, the end of the "modern" era, as setting the conditions for a truly affirmative creative posture. Part of the cure of removing our "historical baggage" is to see the depreciation of tradition as necessary: to see the self-parodic and self-ironic discourse of a novel like Don Quixote as necessary. Hence, we will be taking an affirmative stance that comes out of the very conditions that the novel opposes itself against. Yet in such a way that this opposition is neither a rejection nor an attempt to escape. The "new" novel works simultaneously with and against the persistent human condition. It does not seek to go beyond the social conditions of the present, but renews these conditions under new considerations giving them life promoting powers. The "live" novel seeks to rise above the emergence of the social, to rise above contemporary political nihilism, but does so within the very context of the conditions of mass socialization, which means within the very conditions of nihilism.

Some novels do die; some are better off dead. If novels die it is because they maintain historically-absolutist perspectives. The "socialist realism" "novels" commissioned by a totalitarian regime are hopefully dying, if not already dead. But the death of a novel can be just as much the doing of the reader-interpreter as it is the writer. Novels can come alive by the way we read them. Even historical epic novels can come alive if we read them genealogically, which means, if we read them as perspectival. In one sense, Kundera misunderstands the nature of the "new" novel. It would seem that his misapprehension comes

from a short-sightedness with respect to the aesthetic significance of Dostoevsky's art form. As we shall see further, there are aspects of Dostoevsky's artistic "revolution" which renews and re-vitalizes Cervantes' great work.

(iv) Dostoevsky and The Life of the "New" Novel

Mikhail Bakhtin, the great Russian scholar, claimed that the truly live novel seemed to begin with Dostoevsky: "He created a fundamentally new novelistic genre."¹⁷ He argues that Dostoevsky brings elements of the novel into full bloom. There are intimations of the more mature "novelization" in the historical novels but they were thwarted by the dominant societal demands. The historical epic novel, which Lukacs gave an account of, is of little interest to Bakhtin.¹⁸ True novels for Bakhtin transcend the demands of social conformism in their depiction of possible experiences. But this seems strange because it would appear to glaringly contradict our previous admission that the novel emerged simultaneously with the socialization process which characterizes the "modern" era. Let us see, then, how Bakhtin could dismiss the historical epic novel as insignificant; indeed, he would not even consider it a mature novel. As we do, we will resolve the quandary of why, who Bakhtin called, "the greatest innovator in novelistic form", Lukacs declares, "did not write novels."

¹⁷ Bakhtin Mikhail, "Dostoevsky's Polyphonic Novel" in, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, p.7.

¹⁸ After a consideration of Bakhtin, not only Lukacs, but Kundera becomes questionable. Kundera is confusing. In The Art of the Novel, he speaks of the worth of polyphony in the novel as breaking the uni-linearity of the historically-determinist plane; that polyphony involves the simultaneous presentation of divergent "lines" of various temporal co-ordinates which run in and out of each other without merging, that do not resolve themselves in consonance. In the first essay, "The Depreciated Legacy of Cervantes", he speaks of the dying novel as, "one which falls away from the novel's history." But what does the truly great novel's worth have to do with establishing a "history"? Is this not a re-instatement of the uni-linearity for determining the novel's worth, or determining its "depreciation"? Bakhtin, for example, would never be interested in a "history of the novel". For Bakhtin, the novel is linearly ahistorical. The novel that lives, is in touch with the perspective which sees events as occurring in renewed and regenerated cycles. The truly great novel speaks to a sphere which sees "history" as cyclically and eternally conditioned. To speak of a "history" of the novel in apparent uni-linear terms is to misrepresent the more appropriate and worthy novelistic features. The life of the novel seems dependent on the perspective of the reader.

For Bakhtin, the novel came into full view in our time. He echoes the praise of Dostoevsky for Cervantes' Don Quixote as an example of a truly great novel. The nature of the novel is best explained by its openendedness and continual state of process, of flux. The novel is, "the most fluid of all genres."¹⁹ And its characteristics, "determine the direction of its peculiar capacity for change and of its influence and effect on the rest of literature."²⁰

The novel cannot be identified within the groundwork of an historical perspective; the novel has now emerged again to the forefront of literary activity. Thus, a "theory" of the novel is not possible, for the novel cannot be captured within a conceptualizing discourse. A theory can no longer be apotheosized into a concept or doctrine in the typically bifurcated manner. Hence, the identity of the novel as a distinctly "modern" art form is suspect, as, indeed, is any distinct "periodization." Bakhtin argues that there were other periods where literature became "novelized". We may extrapolate and say there were then other nihilistic periods, other periods that in some ways resemble the "modern." One can only think of the novel, not as a distinct genre, but as an entity that is recurrent. It is erroneous to conceive the novel in unison with the "modern" era. The contemporary novel experiments with possibilities that typical "modernity" did not consider.

This insight is attributable to writers like Dostoevsky. Dostoevsky's art form, in particular, revolutionizes genre theory and, thus, literary theory: the novel after Dostoevsky, in particular, is removed from its historical fetters. Dostoevsky, then, is truly the first great post-historical novelist. This is precisely why Lukacs did not know how to deal with Dostoevsky: it is why, as far as his "theory" of the novel is concerned, he did not consider Dostoevsky a novelist.

¹⁹ Bakhtin Mikhail, "The Epic and the Novel" in, The Dialogic Imagination, p.11.

²⁰ Ibid., p.11.

Dostoevsky's art form reveals the novel as removed from external historical boundaries; it is removed from any viable external determinants that would allow one to concoct the novel as a distinct, historically-conditioned genre. A "theory" of the novel is no longer possible. If the novel of Hegelianism as a genre is seen rendered through the historical determinants, as Lukacs sees it, then Dostoevsky cannot be regarded as a novelist. Yet Lukacs' observation is not without importance, for it indicates how Dostoevsky, in particular, is pivotal in revolutionizing and renewing the novel's form.

The form which he initiated and introduced into the novel revolutionizes the principles of genre characteristics where novels can now be seen as not distinct to "modern" experience but actually are conditioned by ancient influences. The fluidity of infinitely recurrent influences denies the particular identity of "modernity" as distinct to a specific time-space configuration. The novel, then, places itself within the context of openness to infinity: it is no longer a closed world that would allow an historically apocalyptic perspective to be possible. The novel, then, points towards a new perspective on life and knowledge "beyond" traditional notions, that is, "above" the common and dominant orientation of the age. The novel is characteristically eternally re-thinking and re-evaluating, not only experiences, but itself as well.

Bakhtin's account of the novel fully regards Dostoevsky as a novelist as Dostoevsky himself apparently did. Through a profound understanding of Dostoevsky's art, Bakhtin has apparently arrived at a description of the novel that is the most comprehensive and inspiring. And it is also the "newest:" it is newest, ironically, by demonstrating it as a renewed, regenerated and somewhat recurrent version of the old. It is also extreme in so far as the traditional categories of viewing the novel are virtually exploded. Hence, it is in greater affinity itself with the nature of contemporary experiences where traditional approaches to

viewing our experiences, traditional epistemological approaches, are no longer tenable within the explosive nature of the technological milieu. In this sense, the "new" novel is technological through and through, for its characteristics coincide with the unmediated essence of a technological age and technological discourse.

(v) Characteristics of the "New" Novel

The novel is new because it corresponds to a "new" view of experience and a "new" way of living at the end of history. In Bakhtin's collection of four essays which is entitled, The Dialogic Imagination, the characteristics of this "newness" are outlined with profound originality, clarity and in an extravagantly provocative manner. Within these essays Bakhtin demonstrates an uncanny understanding of contemporaneity and its affinity with the nature of the "new" novel. The scope of his insight displays a breadth and depth that revolutionizes much of popular literary theory leaving most critics lagging behind. Some of these insights will be spoken of alongside the insights established through the study of Hegel's and Nietzsche's discourses. Hence, we will focus on aspects of the "new" novel that are "above" the historically-determinist, typically "modern" "worldview."

Bakhtin explains the relationship between twentieth-century experience and the characteristics of the new novel:

The novel is the only developing genre and therefore it reflects more deeply, more essentially, more sensitively and rapidly, reality itself in the process of its unfolding. Only that which is itself developing can comprehend development as process. The novel has become the leading hero in the drama of literary development in our time precisely because it best of all reflects the tendencies of a new world still in the making; it is, after all, the only genre born of this new world and in

total affinity with it. In the process of becoming the dominant genre, the novel sparks the renovation of all other genres, it infects them with its spirit of process and inconclusiveness...²¹

Here we have identified for us the novel governed by the "spirit of process and inconclusiveness" which "best of all reflects the tendencies of a new world still in the making."²² Since it is in affinity with the "new" world, this "new" world is properly characterized as openended, as process and by the apparent possibility to renew older forms of discourse, infecting them with the same "spirit of process and inconclusiveness." These characteristics speak to a notion of infinity:

The present, in all its openendedness, taken as a starting point and centre for artistic and ideological orientation, is an enormous revolution in the creative consciousness of man.²³

It is through the recognition of openendedness and infinity that a "new" creative well-spring takes shape.

The novel is an amalgam of reborn and dying genres. Novels provide evidence of the simultaneous recreation and destruction of old genres in the constant process of their own renewal. The novel, as such, has no canonical genre characteristics. They cannot be "rigidized" into a doctrine or theory for it is characteristically in continual flux itself:

It is the only genre that was born and nourished in a new era of world history and therefore is deeply akin to that era, whereas the other major genres entered that

²¹ Bakhtin Mikhail, "The Epic and the Novel" in, The Dialogic Imagination, p.7.

²² Ibid., p.7.

²³ Ibid., p. 38.

era as already fixed forms, as an inheritance, and only now are they adapting themselves--some better, some worse--to the new conditions of their existence.²⁴

The characteristics of the new novel which criticize and parody old genres has profound implications on space-time configurations. With no "absolute past", the new novel can renew and regenerate the past through the present by infusing the present with past possibilities and vice versa. The "epic distance" with the past is destroyed. Epic wholeness is disintegrated. Hence, this rises above the typically, "modern" attitude towards the past. The once perceived worthlessness of the past is ironically infused with new life. But the worth of the past has always been a matter of evaluation. The novel represents this process that animated Western thought, and this insight could only have dawned on the horizon of novelistic consciousness when "modern" history had ended, when it was revealed that history was mere perspective.

Bakhtin refers to space-time relationships as "chronotopes". The "chronotope", "provides the ground essentially for the showing forth, the representability of events." The fluidity of infinitely recurrent influences in the post-historical "chronotope" denies the particular identity of "modernity" as distinct to a specific time-space configuration. Apparently, it may be said that there were other "modern" periods in some ways similar to ours. The past, present and future is made to appear as fluid. The nature of the new novel suggests the cyclic recurrence of events. The post-historical ground for "showing forth" the representability of events is conditioned by infinitely recurrent principles.

The eternal conditioning of the novelistic chronotope affects the relation of the world of the novel and actual existence. Poetic techniques in the "new" novel infuse this relationship

²⁴ Bakhtin Mikhail, "The Epic and the Novel", in The Dialogic Imagination, p.38.

with inconclusiveness and infinitude. Hence, the form of the "new" novel can provide the content for an understanding of the present:

poetic images conceived as an image of temporal art represent spatially perceptible phenomena in their movement and development. Such are the specific novel-epic chronotopes that serve for the assimilation of actual temporal reality, that permit the essential aspects of this reality to be reflected and incorporated into the artistic space of the novel.²⁵

Although "real" existence and the represented world of the novel never fuse, they are shown to be indissolubly tied up with one another and in continual interaction. This interaction is dialogic and extra-referential:

we may call this world the world that creates the text, for all its aspects--the reality reflected in the text, the authors creating the text, the performers of the text and finally the listeners or readers who recreate and in doing so renew the text--participate equally in the creation of the represented world of the text. Out of the actual chronotopes of our world (which serve as the source of representation) emerge the reflected and created chronotopes of the world represented in the text.²⁶

Differences in interpretations hinge on variant "chronotopes", which means variant spatial-temporal configurations, and the "authors creating the text," the "performers of the text" and the "listeners and readers" each have divergent and fluid "chronotopes" themselves. History, then, as a spatial-temporal configuration, is apprehended as arbitrary and fluid. Hence, within Dostoevsky's poetics, and the works of other great twentieth-century artists such as Joyce,

²⁵ Bakhtin Mikhail, "Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel" in, The Dialogic Imagination, p.252.

²⁶ Ibid., p.253.

Kafka, Faulkner Bulgakov and Woolf, historical distance with the past--the absolute chronotope of the past, if you will--collapses. The distant past is made immediate: the past is no longer an absolute past. The immediacy of the distant past becomes a constituent of their creative design. Their novels are responses to the possibility of an infinity of recurrent influences, the fluidity of space-time "chronotopes."

The "ahistoricity", or fluid "history" of the post-historical "chronotope" encourages, not memory, not nostalgia, but a "counter-memory"--an imaginative re-writing of the past, not to arrive at the "truth", but to revitalize the present, hence revitalizing the past as well. To repeat the past through memory is not a possibility; what becomes possible is to use the past, to renew it and regenerate it under the new auspices of the present. The past, present and future become fluid. At the end of history, the idea of an absolute "history" becomes vacuous. The nature of the "new" novel suggests the cyclic recurrence of events as a more revitalizing perspective upon experiences.

The merit to any discourse becomes the strength, power and health that an affirmative rather than a negative perspective can deliver. Here, the novel, since it is in such a close affinity with the present, is an ultimately affirmative discourse. In stemming from a fuller apprehension of everyday events, the novel raises the present to a new and heroic sphere.

Accordingly, the characteristics of the new novel speak to a new view of experience which is removed from the apocalyptic and historically-determinist view that characterized "modernity." The "new" novel, then, rises above the negating components of the "modern." Presently, we shall go in depth into the nature of the "new" novel and show its appropriateness for a proper post-historical discourse, its appropriateness for our technological age.

(iv) The "New" Novel and The "New" World

the novel should become for the contemporary world what the epic was for the ancient world (an idea that Blackenburg expressed very precisely, and that was later repeated by Hegel)²⁷

The post-historical novel's characteristics of continual process and inconclusiveness serve to envelop more comprehensively as a form of discourse the tendencies of the contemporary world.

By opposing itself to the epic, the novel is only partially critical. It is affirmative and life bestowing, for it elevates the significance of, not only itself, but resuscitates the epic from its burial in the "absolute past". The novels' confrontation with the epic is a recognition of the epic.

Bakhtin identifies three characteristics of what may be described as the post-historical novel. These characteristics distinguish the novel from the other literary genres: (I) Its stylistic three-dimensionality, which is linked with multi-linguaged consciousness realized in the novel; (II) the radical change it effects in the temporal coordinates of the literary image; (III) the new zone it opens for structuring literary images namely, the zone of maximal contact with the present in all of its openendedness. ²⁸

The new novels' "peculiarity" results from, "the active polyglossia of the new world, the new culture and its new creative consciousness.. the new creative consciousness lives in an active polyglot world."²⁹ Bakhtin is speaking of an aspect of the universal democratization

²⁷ Bakhtin Mikhail, "Epic and Novel" in, The Dialogic Imagination, p.10.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 11.

²⁹ Bakhtin Mikhail, "From the Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse" in, The Dialogic Imagination, p.61.

process of our time which makes it possible, with increasing speed, for people from all corners of the globe, with divergent languages, cultures and beliefs, to be together in the same space. The increasing homogeneity of the world brings together a polyglot of influences. Under these experiences language began to have a different feel, and "completely new relationships are established between language and its object"³⁰ Such an admission has enormous consequences for the modern vision that is closed and apocalyptic in nature.

The polyglossia of the "new world" is a result of the universalizing tendencies of modern "politics" of which Hegel spoke. The mixing and meshing of all distinctions into a homogeneity is attempted through existent political movements towards global unification. Yet experiences have taught that the opposite may be true. The desire for homogeneity for the formulation of a more stable global societal arrangement, has unleashed a polyglossia of cultures, beliefs, thoughts, and ideologies. The attempt at stability through the homogenizing socialization has unleashed the contrary: a heterogeneous, polyglot condition.

Under these new and unprecedented conditions, language is used in a different way. The polyglossia of theories and beliefs forces one to look differently upon his own. Language renews itself in transfiguring itself. This is a result of concrete occurrences, namely, the inevitable democratization of the entire planet. Language transfigures itself, takes on a "new feel", because there is no longer any external determinant to dictate which, culture, thought, belief or ideology should dominate. The novel affirms the inevitability of this dominant political event, which is anticipated within Hegelian discourse, but it does not affirm it as a higher state of equilibrium, rather, it affirms the inevitability of absolute democratization as

³⁰ Bakhtin Mikhail, "Epic and Novel" in, The Dialogic Imagination, p.12.

an event which may be described as chaotic. The novel laughs at this reality. The attempt of modernity to form a stable world through universal hegemony has unleashed the utter "polyglossia" and "heteroglossia" of the present day, where the only unity in action and speech comes from tyrannous socialization processes. The new novel, then, establishes as part of its teaching, the exposure of the narrow-minded and politically irresponsible orientation that dominates our so-called "political" activity. The novel challenges the modern attitude by removing itself from an historically-deterministic and progressivist world-view.

The novel is beyond the necessities of a historico-philosophical world view which would like to see the world progressing to an end. The attempt to eradicate the problematic associated with the bifurcation of life and essence is an historically conditioned response. The new novel has no such approach. This is why the new novel is compatible with post-historical times, and becomes dominant at the end of history.

The novel uses language in such a way as to treat the past, to treat history, as fluid. In this manner, truly, the temporal coordinates of the literary image is radicalized:

The present is something transitory, it is flow, it is in eternal continuation without beginning or end; it is denied on authentic conclusiveness and consequently lacks an essence as well.³¹

A new attitude of language is unleashed: a new form-giving principle has emerged. The characteristic of the post-historical literary present a new view of experience removed from the historically-determinist view. The eternal flux of the present engenders the new attitude of language toward its object of representation, because language, by its nature, fixates, yet the

³¹ Bakhtin Mikhail, "Epic and Novel" in, *The Dialogic Imagination*, p.20.

present--its object--is continuous flow. Language amalgamates word concepts towards creating a fixed idea, a static objectification. But since the "new" attitude includes an awareness that the object of language can never be finalized, produces the response of laughter upon itself and all other genres of the literary. This is why the new novel is both critical and self-critical:

the novel emerges consciously and unambiguously
as a genre that is both critical and self-
critical, one fated to revise the fundamental
concepts of literariness and poeticalness
dominant at the time.³²

These characteristics find expression through certain poetic techniques. In Joyce's Ulysses there are a group of unnamed narrators who are entirely non-descript, in Dostoevsky, many times the nameless narrators constantly depict characters erroneously--they refuse to behave in accordance with their narrator's definitions; and the narrator often complains about his lack of writing ability. In Cervantes' Don Quixote, in Dostoevsky's works and even in Plato's, the author figuratively removes himself from his words. These techniques have the effect of dispelling the world of experience as being closed down upon by a monological, finalized discourse. They are somewhat self-critical in this sense. Experience suggests an openness, where a final word can never be given. The dominant in literary works is removed from the authorial position to one in which the characters themselves are presented in such a way as to display an autonomy of their own. The author presents his reluctance to assume a dominant authorial position that would permit an absolute and conclusive account of experience.

³² Bakhtin Mikhail, "Epic and Novel" in, The Dialogic Imagination, p.10.

Such an attitude is not at all negative, but affirmative; it involves "laughing at reality"-- a reality that can never be completely given by the word. But this is not a diminishing of literary activity; quite the contrary, the word takes on new artistic possibilities.

Bakhtin calls this "new" attitude "serio-comical", which, as it turns out, is really not new at all. Bakhtin explains:

here flourish parody and travesty of all high genres and of all lofty models embodied in national myth. The "absolute past" of gods, demigods and heroes is here, in parodies and even more in travesties, "contemporized": it is brought low, represented on a plane equal with contemporary life, in an everyday environment, in the low language of contemporaneity.³³

This ambivalent and paradoxical attitude, which presents the simultaneity of the "cheerful and the annihilating", is how language in the novel has taken its shape. It is an defiant attitude, one of laughing at reality. The haughtiness of the past beliefs are brought to the low language of the everyday environment, down to a profane, democratic world. The haughtiness of truth-centred discourses, of modern science and philosophy, are democratized. They are given their own medicine, so to speak:

The novel took shape when the world and man were assuming a degree of comic familiarity, when the object of artistic representation was being degraded to the level of contemporary reality that was inconclusive and fluid.³⁴

³³ Bakhtin Mikhail, "Epic and Novel" in, The Dialogic Imagination, p.21.

³⁴ Ibid., p.39.

Laughing at this reality indicates an affirmative stance upon the indeterminacy of the world. It is affirmative because this "reality" is taken as necessary to the eternal movements of the past, the fluidity of the past that recurs in the present.

The situation is responded to comically, yet it is not difficult to see that all humour has a serious intent. The opposite side of this new literary attitude invites one to take this laughter seriously. Bakhtin comments:

Laughter demolishes fear and piety before an object, before a world, making it an object of familiar contact and thus clearing the ground for an absolutely free investigation of it. Laughter is a vital factor for realistic [and perhaps it may be said, "objective"] creativity.³⁵

The laughter that exudes from the familiarization with the world comes from the recognition that we have been all-too-long deceived. Laughter in this case is a purifying, cathartic response to historically-conditioned errors.

The recognition of the end of history transforms the absolute nature of the time-space coordinates by which mankind once oriented itself to "reality". The novel is indestructible precisely because of its temporal elusiveness. Time and space no longer have absolute and transcendental determinations. The necessity for space-time for man to orient himself to his environment does not necessarily admit that these entities have absolute or transcendental characteristics. Time-space coordinates in the new novel are presented as fluid.

Hence, the novel maintains its vitality precisely in its inexpressibility to absolutist and transcendental necessities. It cannot be given a final word within traditional commentary or

³⁵ Bakhtin Mikhail, "Epic and Novel" in, *The Dialogic Imagination*, p.23.

criticism. It is removed from its historical fetters and refuses, by its very nature, to be a mechanical instrument to support the dominant societal desires of convenience, expediency and the utility of scientific epistemological approaches, which are motivated by absolutist perspectives. The novel, the true novel which still has life, points the way to wholly new epistemological principles.

Bakhtin insists that this "new" attitude of the word in respect to the "world" revolutionizes the epistemological principles of not only art but science as well: it revolutionizes the very principles of "knowing":

laughter delivers the object into the fearless hands of investigative experiment --both scientific and artistic-- and into the hands of free experimental fantasy...familiarization of the world through laughter and popular speech is an extremely important and indispensable step in making free, scientifically knowable and artistically realistic creativity in European civilization.³⁶

Bakhtin suggests that both artistic and scientific ways of "knowing" are freed from their absolute, historically-determinist fetters when they adopt this new epistemological perspective. The tendencies of contemporaneity call for a "new" epistemological perspective, a new way of "knowing. "Facts" or "reality" can no longer be "known" in any absolute sense. They will always escape our conceptual grasp. Yet this notion is affirmed with laughter, albeit of a serious intent. This laughter is liberating and radically revolutionizes the democratic notion of "freedom" based on historicist principles. The new approach does not seek to capture "reality"

³⁶ Bakhtin Mikhail, "Epic and Novel" in, The Dialogic Imagination, p.23.

but to affirm it, to strengthen it through creative endeavours that reveal the possibilities of experience.

Such images and thoughts cannot be represented in modern scientific discourse. For science to be "freed" it must come to adopt the new time-space configuration that is in affinity with post-historical existence. The "world" or "reality" is not privy to a finalized, absolute and monologic discourse, as methodological principles assume:

mathematical concepts: we make use of them for measuring spatial and temporal phenomena but they themselves have no intrinsic spatial and temporal determinations; they are the object of abstract cognition. They are an abstract and conceptual figuration indispensable for the formalization and strict scientific study of many concrete phenomena. But meanings exist not only as abstract cognition, they exist in artistic thought as well. These artistic meanings are likewise not subject to spatial and temporal [absolute] determinations. We somehow manage however to endow all phenomena with meaning, that is, we incorporate them not only into the sphere of spatial and temporal existence but also into a semantic sphere. This process of assigning meaning also involves assigning of value.³⁷

These words harken us back to Nietzsche's words, that our words and signs need not be absolute to give meaning, that meaning can be given beyond the modern historical imperatives for absolute certainty: "we have to believe in time, space, and motion, without feeling compelled to grant them absolute reality."³⁸ This incorporation of meaning has nothing to do with the imperative for absolute truth, for, "belief, however necessary it may be for the

³⁷ Bakhtin Mikhail, "Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel" in, The Dialogic Imagination, p.257.

³⁸ Nietzsche Friedrich, The Will to Power, p.269.

preservation of the species, has nothing to do with truth."³⁹ The new way of "knowing" involves belief and not truth; and it also involves the assigning of meaning and value under otherwise nihilistic precepts that nothing can be "known" absolutely: it assigns meaning and value to a world which has lost its way.

The assigning of value within this incorporation of meaning above the meaningless imperatives of modern thought, is really a revaluation, for it implies that what once had meaning--the imperative for truths to be absolute, stable and certain--has been devalued. With this insight we find out, "what value these "values" really had."⁴⁰ Therefore, the revaluation of values--of incorporating both science and art within the same semantic sphere--assigns meaning to both.

Infusing our experiences with meaning requires, continually, a further sign, a further word. Within this insight, artistic creation is brought to a more primordial contact to reality than modern science. Even the novels invented reality is as possible as any established reality. In his Diary, Dostoevsky writes:

"Reality should be represented as it is,"
they say, whereas there is no such reality,
never has been because, to man, the substance
of things is inaccessible, while he apper-
ceives nature as it reflects itself in his
idea after having passed through his senses.
This is why one should give more leeway to
the idea without fearing the ideal.. the
artist should trust his idea (the ideal).
The ideal, indeed, is also a reality as
legitimate as current reality.⁴¹

³⁹ Nietzsche Friedrich, The Will to Power, p.269.

⁴⁰ Ibid.,p.4.

⁴¹ Dostoevsky Fedor, "Apropos of the Exhibition" in Diary of a Writer Vol.I,p.83.

Simply because something has not occurred does not mean it cannot be "real", all occurrences often take on a fantastic character for they are subject to abstract cognition. So long as it is a possible reality artistic creation is in tune with "reality". True artistic creation affirms the imaginative positing of "reality". The discourse that is left to us is one which recognizes our speech as abstraction: we can abstract about our abstractions. Thus our experiences are revitalized, strengthened, charged with value and meaning. The post-historical novel points the way for the overcoming of nihilism.

By way of summary: the novel, as an entity, is mistakenly spoken of, if conceptualized within the perspective of historical progress. Aspects of the novel do not move in this way: the novel incorporates characteristics and other fixed genres within it through a recurrence and renewal, through the simultaneity of the old and the new. The past is not viewed as absolute, but as recurring in the present, as it will in the future. The novels' intrinsic characteristics point toward a perspective above that of history as progress, that is, above modern historicism, without denying the past. Indeed, it renews the past by making it come alive again. The novel, then, implicitly recognizes the necessity for eternal recurrence as a more compatible perspective upon the nature of everyday occurrences in the present day, that is, upon the nature of a technological era amongst a nihilistic human condition.

Iphigenie, Iphigenie, are we not united in body,
mind and spirit? Is not thy destiny my pre-
ordained fate, do we not vibrate together to the
winds of love and hatred like an Aeolian harp
throbbing to the fingers of the storm?

Ah! Iphigenie, Iphigenie, fear not the god's, for
the gods are in us: we are the gods we dread and
out of this self-dread comes madness! This tragic
discord; it is ourselves divided against ourselves.
Do not pray to the gods, do not pray:

Save Me

And save your image in my soul!

Do not pray to the gods, for the gods are in us;
the mirror reflects their image; we are the gods
and all the strength of heaven! Pray rather to
yourself, grasp the earth like Antaeus, and be
strong with the might of the almighty earth. We
are the guardians of our own destiny; I am your
fate and you are mine.

Nietzsche

CHAPTER 6

II. DOSTOEVSKY'S POETICS: A PEDAGOGY FOR A TECHNOLOGICAL AGE

(i) Polyphony and Dialogicality

In Bakhtin's analysis of Dostoevsky's poetics, he cites Dostoevsky's uniqueness as the inventor of the "polyphonic novel".¹ Through this provisional coinage, Bakhtin wishes to show Dostoevsky as demonstrating a new orientation, a new type of thinking of experiences. His assertion that Dostoevsky created "a new artistic model of the world" suggests precisely the shift in perspective and thought concomitant with the post-historical experience, the unfolding

¹ Polyphony is a musical metaphor used to describe fundamental features of Dostoevsky's form. It refers to the musical structure of the simultaneous playing of independent melodies against each other. They are arranged contrapuntally, and are never ended by a final, resolving cadence. Simultaneity is important, for it speaks of the disruption of the uni-linearity of time-space configurations (chronotopes) of the historically-deterministic world view. That it is a musical metaphor is also significant, for it speaks of the extra-referential nature of the post-historical novel which demands exchanges and pedagogic possibilities of other forms of art.

of the technological age. For to say that the "world" is created artistically admits of the autocratic formulations which are created internally by society, and are no longer viewed to be the property of external determinants such as God, or progress in history.

The fundamental feature of Dostoevsky's structuring of language is its open-endedness and unfinalizability. These features are fundamental to the polyphonic novel. Dostoevsky constructs a polyphonic world destroying the uni-linear framework of the historically-conditioned, traditional European "novel." With him the form-giving principle, which was subject to an philosophico-historical dialectic, is overturned. The writer in history needs to transcend the empirical, the life of the everyday, to represent essence or a transcendent reality. This is the intention of not only the historical novel, but scientific methodological discourse as well. Such an approach involves an alienation from earthly existence. Because scientific method assumes itself privy to a "reality", this alienation is made concrete in the construction of the "modern" "world" over against the world given to us. Dostoevsky's artistic vision dispels the presuppositions of "modernity." They are rendered meaningless. The meaning of "modernity" has become meaningless. "Modernity" has come to mean something other.

The poetics of the polyphonic novel became ripe in the creative activity of Dostoevsky which rises above the negating and alienating orientation of traditional thought. According to Bakhtin, the chief characteristic of Dostoevsky's novels is the simultaneous presentation of a polyphony of voices:

A plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices is in fact the chief characteristic of Dostoevsky's novels. What unfolds in his works is not a multitude of characters and fates in a

rights and each with its own world, combine but are not merged in the unity of the event.²

The fundamental technique of Dostoevsky's characterization is the juxtaposition of various personalities in dialogues amongst each other and themselves in such a way that his works consist primarily of a series of interacting consciousnesses. These consciousnesses engage in unresolved dialogues. Each voice is played against other voices with equal validity. The interacting voices are focused within a short time span, usually a situation of great crisis. One voice does not dominate the other. To have one character dominate the discourse is not a part of Dostoevsky's artistic design. The characters are continually learning from each other in constant exchanges, entangling themselves in contradictory stances that are not resolved, that are not closed down upon by the author. Not only the characters are invited to learn through the dialogic interaction, but the reader, as well, is implicated into the exchange amongst a polyphony of other voices.

The pedagogy of such a poetic technique demands the recognition that the validity of any "word" upon the experiences of life can only occur alongside another "word". The way to establish meaning is through dialogue: the interaction of a plurality of consciousness is displayed as necessary for the recognition of an event--for the assigning of meaning and value to an event. The critical events of life can only have meaning through an interaction, a "co-existing" a shared experience, or being with another.

It is not a part of Dostoevsky's intent to completely and absolutely give a character's identity by the traditional functions of character and plot development:

² Bakhtin Mikhail, "Dostoevsky's Polyphonic Novel" in, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, p.6

consciousness of a character is given as someone else's consciousness, another consciousness, yet at the same time, it is not turned into an object, is not closed, does not become a simple object of the author's consciousness. In this sense the image of a character in Dostoevsky is not the usual objectified image of a hero in the traditional novel"³

Therefore, the characters and events in the stories are not written to reveal the author's ideological position. Such a position is only possible alongside the philosophical positions of a multitude of characters and presupposed readers and listeners. The author's is not the dominant consciousness. Dostoevsky's artistic intent is not to present his ideological position; it would be entirely unacceptable to his particular artistic design. Common misapprehensions of Dostoevsky's works occur, Bakhtin tells us, because, "his work does not fit any of the preconceived frameworks or historico-literary schemes that we usually apply to various species of the European novel."⁴

To repeat: characters are not presented as objects, as static and fixed by the author's word. There are no finalized images to which Dostoevsky's artistic design responds. The traditional authorial links of author as "subject" and character as "object" are not given consideration:

Dostoevsky's major heroes are, by the very nature of his creative design, not only objects of authorial discourse but also subjects of their own directly signifying discourse.⁵

³ Bakhtin Mikhail, "Dostoevsky's Polyphonic Novel" in, The Dialogic Imagination, p.7

⁴ Ibid., p.7

⁵ Ibid., p.8.

The characters achieve an independence toward their own characterization: characterizations are not monologically imposed by a dominant authorial consciousness, but grow in an inconclusive process as a character actually experiences the dialogues with himself and other characters. Raskolnikov characterizes himself in his dialogues with Razumikhin, with Sonja, and they with him. The characters need the voice of others, need external influences, in this sense, to hear their own voice. A character learns of himself in interaction with other voices. Dostoevsky's pedagogy is dialogical through and through.

There is an interrupted process of multiple exchanges on many levels of interaction. Bakhtin correctly emphasizes that, "the general characteristic of these interactions is that they are dialogical (in the broadest sense of the word)"⁶ Dialogic exchanges occur amongst: the characters in the novel, amongst the reader or listener and the characters, amongst the reader and the poetics of the author, amongst the author and other authors, amongst characters in one story with the characters of another, amongst artists from other artistic forms (especially music). All such exchanges are continuous and necessarily inconclusive.

If viewed traditionally, if viewed from the historically-conditioned necessity of responding to established novelistic formalization, Dostoevsky's works may seem to be chaotic, disparate and lacking wholeness. But it is Dostoevsky's task to destroy the established forms. The "world" is not to be represented by a monologic, authorial and dominant position, but is to invite exchange for an interaction between a plurality of divergent positions. As Bakhtin relates, some critics fail to see, "the fundamental plurality of unmerged consciousnesses which is part and parcel of the artist's design."⁷ The approach to living and learning is to be both

⁶ Bakhtin Mikhail, "Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel" in, The Dialogic Imagination, p.252.

⁷ Bakhtin Mikhail, "Dostoevsky's Polyphonic Novel" in, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, p.11.

internally and externally dialogic. Dostoevsky wishes to present this inconclusive, unfinalizable dialogicality as a whole view of experience.

And, in accordance with the immense complexities and ambiguities of the age, such a view is meant to be "objective" in a broader sense of the word. Dostoevsky's pedagogy is not narrow-mindedly pedantic. It issues from the desire to expose and affirm the great diversity and complexity of human life, and seeks to disavow the reduction of the multi-coloured, multi-voiced and eternally contradictory elements of life by methodological black and white propositions, not in a desire "truer"--truth and falsity being a matter of indifference--but because to disavow them because they de-vitalize life. The de-vitalizing power of "modern" perspectives on the world may be said to be dangerous. Dostoevsky's artistic merit issues from the strength of his realistic and affirmative position in respect to his interpretation of experience. Hence, he strengthens and re-vitalizes experiences through his powerful creativity.

Dostoevsky is too much a latecomer in history to see in scientific method and "modern" "philosophical" systems anything aside from a pathological, narrow-minded stupidity, a symptom of degeneration that actually sets itself to acting on the belief that the immensity and diversity of the world can be made absolute and coherent sense of within the minuscule confines of the human mind. Dostoevsky's intent is not to give a coherent, absolute account of the "world." There is no intent in his works to resolve problematics through a logically, complete, systematic monologue. Any truths worthy of their name, are human truths, that is, dialogically revealed "truths." Absolute truths are impersonal abstractions, and are not worthy of assigning value or meaning to beings and things.

Dostoevsky's view of the human condition and experience is profoundly pluralistic. Therefore, his works speak to a new humanism that responds to the plurality of our social

condition over the one-sided orientation of "modern" "humanism". His form and content is "dialogic through and through". The dialogues are openended: they are polyphonic thus they are not resolved into a fixed certainty or resolution. It is a "humanism" that does not allow the human "subject" as the dominant harbinger of absolute certainty:

Dialogic relationships exist among all elements of his novelistic structure; that is, they are juxtaposed contrapuntally. And this is so because dialogic relationships are a much broader phenomenon than mere rejoinders in a dialogue, laid out compositionally in the text; they are an almost universal phenomenon, permeating all human speech and all relationships and manifestations of human life--in general, everything that has meaning and significance.⁴

These dialogic relationships are complex and profound. The teachings of these dialogues are meant to extend to many aspects of human life, especially political life, meaning simply, the way we relate to other people, the way we associate ourselves in accommodating human desires. Part of the pedagogy of these dialogues suggest an exchange beyond the confines of the book. Dostoevsky's novels and truly great novels since, demand an extra-referentiality.

Dostoevsky's extraordinary power in creative ability comes from the depth to which he displays the intersecting consciousness each in tune with one another to a point where, they lose their identity and practically coincide. In the major dialogues an eternal and infinite bond between the contradictory elements of each characters' soul is displayed with poetic brilliance and breathtaking urgency.

⁴ Bakhtin Mikhail, "Dostoevsky's Polyphonic Novel" in, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, p.40.

The best example, which merits reproduction here, is Alyosha's questioning of his brother Ivan Karamazov as to the responsibility for their father's murder. Alyosha, the religious novice speaking to his atheist brother, actually peers into Ivan's soul farther than Ivan has peered himself. It is a dialogue that in some respects appears comical but after the ensuing events that fall upon Ivan, it takes on a poignant appearance. Alyosha tries desperately to change Ivan's fate, for he foresees Ivan's eventual breakdown:

'I only know one thing,' Alyosha said, still almost in a whisper. 'It was not you who killed father.'

"Not you"? What do you mean by "not you"? Ivan was dumbfounded.

'It was not you who killed father,' Alyosha repeated firmly. 'Not you!'

They didn't speak for half a minute....

'You've said it many times to yourself, when you've been alone these two dreadful months,' Alyosha went on, quietly and distinctly as before. But he was saying this, as it were, automatically, not of his own free will, as though in obedience to some irresistible command. 'You have accused yourself and have confessed to yourself that you and no one else is the murderer. But you did not do it. You are mistaken. You are not the murderer. Do you hear? It is not you! God has sent me to tell you this.'

Most of Dostoevsky's decisive dialogues occur in infinity, those fateful times where two destinies meet for the last time under ultimate moments of crisis: Shatov argues with Stavrogin over which "god-bearing" people is "given the keys of life and the new word". Stavrogin, the resentful nihilist, does not accept Shatov's assertion, that it is to be found in the Russian people:

'I ask to be treated with respect - I demand it!' shouted Shatov. 'Not respect for my personality - to hell with it! - but for something else, just for this once, just for a few words. We are two human beings and we've met in infinity - for the last time in the world. Drop your tone and speak like a human being! Speak for once in your life with a human voice.'¹⁰

⁹ The Brothers Karamazov, Penguin Ed., p.706

¹⁰ The Devils, or, The Possessed, Penguin Ed., p.252.

The Possessed, or The Devils, is the most evidently serio-comical of Dostoevsky's novels as it portrays the ironic and ambiguous nature of "politically" active people--revolutionaries--during a time of crisis who constantly contradict themselves.¹¹ Once again, though, this laughter has serious intent. The characters are portrayed by their internally-contradictory ideological stances which only reveal the undirected nature of their activity: they reveal a political crisis. The "world" is beyond their control.

Aspects of Dostoevsky's character depictions call for a recognition that man is not self-determined. The affirmation that someone's consciousness becomes exposed through someone else's consciousness and the degree to which consciousnesses coincide with each other's internal dialogue, is an affirmation of the disintegrated "subject" as the basis for the content of Dostoevsky's characterization. The "subject" is depicted as never identical to himself. The "subject" can only "know" himself through interactions with other "subjects", which, also are not identical to themselves. The characters "self-characterization" appears a product of unquantifiable, unidentifiable sources: Raskolnikov's incessant visions of murdering the old miserly woman appear to make the event inevitable, as something beyond his control; Alyosha, who was motivated by an irresistible and irrepressible drive to remind his brother that he shouldn't blame himself for his father's murder, are evidence of eternal unidentifiable forces which determine the "subject". The "subject" cannot determine himself; there is no "free will". The manner to which a truly objective identity is possible is through dialogic interaction with other subjects, who have no static, absolutely definable "ego" themselves, who appear

¹¹ The comical irony in the above citation is that Shatov is shouting at Stavrogin to drop his tone and speak like a man.

also to be determined by unidentified forces.

Dostoevsky portrays characters through idea-forces, thoughts and word-forces that run their course through various voices, none of which are identical to themselves or other voices:

Everywhere there is an intersection, consonance or interruption of rejoinders in the open dialogue by rejoinders in the heroes' dialogue. Everywhere a specific sum total of ideas, thoughts, and words is passed through several unmerged voices, sounding differently in each. The object of authorial aspirations is certainly not this sum total of ideas in itself as something neutral and identical with itself. No, the object is precisely the passing of a theme through many and various voices, its rigorous and, so to speak, irrevocable multi-voicedness and vari-voicedness. The very distribution of voices is what matters to Dostoevsky.¹²

Dostoevsky, through his creative design, displays a new orientation of the "subject" with regard to experiences with other beings and things. With Dostoevsky we have a new view of the inner life of man.

(iii) The New View of the Inner Man

In one of his letters, Dostoevsky defined his task:

With utter realism to find the man in man.
...They call me a psychologist; this is not true. I am merely a realist, that is, I portray the depths of the human soul.¹³

The well-spring of Dostoevsky's creative vision and energy comes from the depths of the human soul, which reveal the disintegration of the "self." We shall see this with particular

¹² Bakhtin Mikhail, "Discourse in Dostoevsky" in, Problem's of Dostoevsky's Poetics, p.265. Underlined words denote Bakhtin's italics.

¹³ taken from, Biography, Letters and Notes from F.M. Dostoevsky's Notebooks (St. Petersburg, 1883), p.371.

reference to the portrayal of the "soul" of the "Underground Man."

Underlying the words of this "fictitious" character is a study of the circumstances under which the "Underground Man" becomes a possibility. As Dostoevsky remarks in his introductory note, "people like the author of these notes [the underground man] may, and indeed must, exist in our society."¹⁴

The underground man introduces himself in his "Notes" as spiteful, as contrary to society. His words are entirely unexpected. The text is full of interruptions, interjections, half-finished questions, tempts and taunts of not only himself but the reader as well:

Doesn't it seem to you as if I were trying to justify myself, to ask for your forgiveness? I,m sure you must think that...Well believe me, I don't care if you think so.¹⁵

Here, in these "notes" it is explicit: the reader is taunted into engaging with the text. The "underground man" is a tease. He lures the reader into identifying him, but he makes it impossible. He is purposely self-contradictory, mixing self-reproach with megalomania, at once demanding seriousness, then only to laugh at himself and at the reader. He defies categorization, he leaves himself open to interpretation--he demands interpretation--but he makes into an inconclusive process. He lies and admits it. The reader, from then on, is never certain of any "truth" about him.

These poetic techniques push the possibilities for interpretation beyond the traditional impulse, to close down on an identity, to determine something absolute about this character, to finalize a position on him, to arrive at a "truth" about him. All of these aspects of

¹⁴ "Notes from Underground", Signet Ed.,p.90.

¹⁵ Ibid.,p.92

character and poetics are related through the actual occurrences of this "fictional" man, this possible "voice" of our era. His experiences determine his thought, as much as thought determines him. Thoughts themselves envelope his character; he is determined by unidentifiable idea-forces that uncontrollably pass through his voice. And this is not done for the convenience that this "spiteful" man enjoy in denying responsibility. "Responsibility" itself is pushed to a new dimension; it is forced to consider something beyond traditional categorization. The morals of responsibility do not apply. What becomes responsible is to see this character as necessary, that this character, "must exist in our society". There is a new necessity exposed with this type of characterization. There is no moralizing here. No "should be". This "man of heightened consciousness" appears destined to be this way. The "underground man", the man of "heightened consciousness", portrays himself as being beyond good and evil. He is conditioned by fate: his destiny is nihilism. This is what he is faced with.

The poetics of these "notes" display the underground man with indeterminacy in controlling himself and his life. Ideas are portrayed as running through him issuing forth in profusion and confusion to the point of excess. They are, sometimes, disjointed and incoherent. The underground man is constantly anticipating other voices, constantly answering what he perceives are the reader's questions. His speech is full of interruptions and turns:

Do you think I'm trying to make you laugh?
Then you've got me wrong again. I'm not at
all the cheerful fellow you think I am.¹⁶

And,

Speaking of the will, I'm damned if I---"
'Ha-ha-ha! Strictly speaking there is no such
thing as the will!' you may interrupt me,

¹⁶ "Notes from Underground", Signet Ed.p.92.

guffawing. 'Today, modern science has
 already succeeded in dissecting a man
 sufficiently enough to be able to tell that
 what we know as desire and free will are
 nothing but---'
 Hold on, Hold on a moment! I was coming to
 that myself...'¹⁷

Such anticipation and apprehension of the author towards the reader necessarily implicates the reader as an influence on the text. This poetic technique ultimately teaches something "new" about the reading and writing activity. The poetics of these writings necessarily demand a on-going dialogue between writer and reader. The reader is forced to relate to the text in a completely different manner that was hitherto, demanded. This "way of relating" to the text is literary, for it speaks of an active participation with the words with the idea-forces of the writer to constitute a proper reading, as such. It demands that the reader respond to text through an interpretation of another's voice. This is the purpose of the creative act: to demonstrate the necessity of a dialogic exchange between reader and writer to ensure the continuous interpretive activity, to show that there is continual questioning and restructuring that the creative act inspires. The reader becomes inspired to re-write the text, so to speak, to come to see the plurality of voices inside the text that bounce off each other and off of his own voices, and the necessity for such exchanges for learning. It is only under such auspices that one can learn and attempt to understand the "new" era, for it is through the experiences of the "new" world that these types of exchanges are demanded.

We see here, with particular reference to "Notes from Underground," that we are considering an artistic vision that defies aspects of the interpretive activity which traditional

¹⁷ "Notes from Underground", Signet Ed., p.110.

schools of thought, the "modern" approach of the "subject" to the world, took for granted. We are introduced to a form of interpretation and pedagogy that is wholly different from traditional principles.

Principles of "modern" "subjectivism" are motivated by the belief that the "subject" can arrive at a complete, coherent and definitive discourse upon aspects of the world. With adopting mathematical methods, the discourse of the nature of things included more signs than words. The reader was envisioned as a somewhat passive, "outside" observer who could objectify the text and determine it definitively, making the texts' teachings canonical. But clearly, Dostoevsky's poetics disavow this doctrinal reliance on the text or any absolute belief on any semantic representation for that matter. Clearly, we have here a disavowal of the dominance of the "subject:" we have a disavowal of "modern" "subjectivism."

This disavowal also is a part of the content of "Notes from Underground". We will let the "underground man" speak about the dangers of "modern" "subjectivism" and its adoption of principles of mathematical, methodological rationalizations of man:

You say, moreover, that science itself will teach man(although I say it's a luxury) that he has neither will nor whim--never had, as a matter of fact--that he is something like a piano stop; that, on the other hand, there are natural laws in the universe, and whatever happens outside his will, as it were, by itself, in accordance with the laws of nature. Therefore, all there is left to do is to discover these laws and man will be no longer responsible for his acts. Life will be made easy for him then. All human acts will be listed in something like logarithm tables, say up to the number 108,000, and transferred to a timetable. Or, better still, catalogues will appear, designed to help us in the way our dictionaries and ency-

clopedias do.[self-help books] They will carry detailed calculations and exact forecasts of everything to come, so that no adventure and no action will remain possible in this world."¹⁸

The form and content of "Notes from Underground" severs "modern" "subjectivism" from its god-like dominance. Within these notes is an appeal for a reconsideration of what it truly means to be human. This "new" humanism appears to be a renewed, re-configuration of ancient humanism. The "world" is not to be "known" or grasped. As Hannah Arendt pleads, "we are of the world, not in the world": we are both subjects and objects simultaneously. We can never be the measure of things, for we are measure. No longer is man to consider himself the centre of Being; he is rather depicted in the great novels of our time as a disunited, dispersed element of becoming. A "new" posture towards Being is unleashed. It sees no need to dominate Being in order to find value in life, but to actualize this "Being", to let life evaluate through ourselves and our interactions with other beings and things. The measure of life comes from the way we live life. This new posture affirms artistic creation, not only the narrow "modern" view of art, but art as a "bringing forth" into the world, harkening a plea made by Aristotle: "Live life as if it were a work of art."

(iii) "Carnivalization" In Dostoevsky's Poetics

We have seen how pronouncedly different Dostoevsky's novel is from the traditional novel. The aspects to which we will focus here--in no way exhaustive--is on Bakhtin's assertion that Dostoevsky's brand of novel is a reborn and renewed version of the ancient genres of "Socratic dialogue and Menippean satire":

This entire tradition, beginning with

¹⁸ "Notes from Underground", Signet Ed.,p.109.

Socratic dialogue and the menippeia, was reborn and renewed in Dostoevsky in the uniquely original and innovative form of the polyphonic novel.¹⁹

The influence of ancient genres upon Dostoevsky's works is significant for our endeavour, for it evidences the possibilities of the past to be reborn--somewhat paradoxically--in post-historical literary. Such an incorporation of the ancient upon the present demonstrates Dostoevsky's creative activity to be freed from the fetters of absolute historicism.

Bakhtin identifies the genres of the Socratic dialogue and menippean satire with "carnivalistic folklore": that these genres are saturated with, "a carnival sense of the world."²⁰ The carnival sense of the world has three characteristics that are readily seen as integral to Dostoevsky's poetics. They are: that "the living present" is the starting point for, "understanding, evaluating and sharpening reality: they operate on the present plane, "in a zone of maximal contact with living contemporaries;(2)they consciously rely on experience and free invention: that they are freed from epic distance, from the "absolute past";(3) there is a deliberate, multi-styled and heterovocal nature of all these genres.²¹

Of course, it would be entirely inconsistent to draw an absolute identity of Dostoevsky's novelistic techniques with those of Socratic dialogue or, with what followed from them. Menippean satire. There are many differences in orientation of Socratic dialogue and the type we find in Dostoevsky's work. Certainly, Menippean satire, originating from the third century B.C., would not be identical to Dostoevsky's satire. That is not really our point of concern.

¹⁹ Bakhtin Mikhail, "Characteristics of Genre" in, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, p.178.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 107.

²¹ Ibid., p. 107.

What concerns us in this comparison, besides the characteristics of these genres, is the specific conditions that gave rise to these somewhat diverse yet similar literary forms. In other words, we will ask the question, what conditions pertain for the sense of the world to be "carnavalized" in the literary forms during the days of Socrates as are repeated in the present day? Why is there an artistic necessity for our present age to be "novelized" again?

We may find the answer in a further elucidation of the general characteristic of the "carnival sense of the world." Bakhtin tells us, "the carnival sense of the world possesses a mighty life-creating and transforming power, an indestructible vitality".²² Carnival time is the "non-time" experienced in-between the decrowning of one king and the crowning of the next. Hence, it is an ambivalent and dubious situation that is ironically affirmed in ritualistic acts. The "non-time" speaks to the ahistoricity of Dostoevsky's creative design. As Bakhtin relates, Dostoevsky's series of dialogic exchanges occur in a "mystery space-time." Bakhtin explains the primary carnivalistic ritual as, "the mock crowning and subsequent decrowning of the carnival king."²³ The saturnalia, festival-like ritual is chaotically vibrant, and carries with it the need for a catharsis of sorts. Bakhtin adds that, "all is ambivalent and acquires a veneer of joyful relativity."²⁴ The mock crowning already has the immediate recognition of an imminent and subsequent decrowning: it is exalting and demeaning at the same time. It is coincident with a state of ambiguity and paradox; and it displays the affirmative recognition of the cycle of living and dying authorities, living and dying faiths. Bakhtin explains:

Under this ritual act of decrowning a king lies
the very core of the carnival sense of the world--

²² Bakhtin Mikhail, "Characteristics of Genre" in, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, p.107.

²³ Ibid., p.124

²⁴ Ibid., p.124

the pathos of shifts and changes, of death and renewal.²⁵

Both Socratic dialogue and Menippean satire ambivalently criticize established socio-political orders, and simultaneously, attempts to renew that order by looking and acting upon them under renewed considerations. Satire is inherently critical, therefore, serious, yet affirms the "joyful relativity" of the "non-time" through laughter: it affirms the nihilistic experience of the lack of authority and direction in the non-time by laughing and celebrating. The saturnalia-like carnival is a cathartic activity to purify the vestiges of the old authority and prepare for the new.

The content of some of Plato's dialogues questioned the authority of the gods and the poets in a poetic fashion; and Menippean satire--which is a literary genre attributable to Menippus of Gadara, a Cynic who settled in Thebes in the 3rd century B.C.--satirized all formal schools of philosophy and mocked "serious" forms of literature, yet was simultaneously, philosophically and artistically inventive. Elements of the genre characteristics of archaic literature are re-incarnated in the novels of Dostoevsky. Whether they were deliberate or not has no bearing on our assertion. What does is that there were elements that existed during the emergence of Socratic dialogues and Menippean satire that recur in the great philosophical artists of the present day.

We have learned that the creative impetus characterizing Dostoevsky's works is motivated by the desire to re-vitalize the otherwise declining social conditions at present. His novels thoroughly transform all previous literary formulations, ambivalently criticizing old forms yet simultaneously renewing them as well. His starting point for evaluation and understanding

²⁵ Bakhtin Mikhail, "Characteristics of Genre" in, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, p.124.

was certainly the present, and it generated and/or reflected a "new" relationship to "reality". And we have spoken of the multi-levelled and heterogeneous nature of Dostoevsky's dialogues that permeate his novels from top to bottom. Dostoevsky, in both content and form, criticizes all previous philosophic systems but does so with profound philosophical insight. And we have spoken of how Dostoevsky is the first novelist to reveal, through form, the tendencies of an age without any determinative authority, which has plunged man into a spiritual and political crisis.

It becomes significant that one of the greatest post-historical artists achieves an affinity with artists from an age that was not dominated by an absolute historically- determinist view: the Socratic age. The ancient Greeks had no word for history, therefore, no concept of history. History had a beginning, therefore, it must, too, have an end. Although there are elements in Socrates' discourse which point to a futurist orientation compatible with an historical view of the world, it was not developed and certainly not deterministic. The overriding feature on the similarity between philosophical artists from the declining Athenian civilization and those from the declining Western civilization, is an element of ahistoricity in their vision. This gives the insights of the philosophers and artists of the Socratic age a new life, a new possibility. Plato's dialogues was a response to certain conditions of his time.

Plato sought to re-introduce dialogue between men of noble mind about the concerns brought on by the fall of Athens to Sparta in the Peloponnesian War and the rigid democratic rule that followed. He chose the dialogue precisely because the ensuing democratic conditions plunged Athens into a spiritual and political crisis where people could not speak to each other meaningfully anymore. To a people who were masters of speech this would have had profound effects. In the confusion and commotion of a polyglossia of influences that Athens

was newly experiencing, meaningful speeches had to be written. Meaningful speeches were now reserved only for the "underground" artist, no longer for the political statesman. Yet these artists appear to simultaneously warn of the delusory nature of the written word. Through the characteristics of their respective artistic forms, they demand an extra-referential exchange through actual speech and dialogue of the type of discussion lacking in their respective times. Encompassed within is a recognition of plurality, a recognition of the necessity for decision and judgments to be made orally, in dialogue, amongst recognized men of noble stature. Encompassed within, is a demand for basic human trust as essential to any meaningful discourse, and this amounts to a re-instatement of a new faith in the external world presented to men, a world who the "modern", so resentfully, sought to dispose of.

Also, the parallel is clear, for we are living through a "non-time" without an discernable authority, mock-crownings notwithstanding.

(iv) The Politics of Dostoevsky's Poetics

Dostoevsky's poetics teach. Poetics are the particular characteristics of form. They speak of the affectivity of the way language is used for the reader-writer relationship. Hence, they speak of a relationship of the reader-writer upon experience. The form of Dostoevsky's writings suggest a particular artistic vision from which is promulgated a particular pedagogy: a pedagogy which teaches us to learn in a new manner. Hence, the extent of Dostoevsky's influence is considerable and profound. This great Russian writer radicalizes the "modern" vision calling for a radical restructuring of the view of human experience and existence.

Within this new artistic vision is a new political vision which is made explicit in Dostoevsky's works. The new vision is explicitly political, because Dostoevsky's creations consider the interactions of consciousnesses against a backdrop of experiences which are

particular, not only to his time, but remain important in our new age at present. It is a new political necessity to recognize these experiences, for they influence greatly the plausibility of traditionally "modern" beliefs from which, it appears, perpetuate the crisis of "modern" "politics."

Dostoevsky announces our particular epoch with a depth and breadth which since has not been equalled by any philosophical novelist. The conflict of divergent social, political, historical and ideological voices running through all stages of Dostoevsky's experiences and creative activity, organize both the form and content of his works.

In his, Diary of a Writer, Dostoevsky displays his profound and insightful awareness of the political and social conditions that were a part of his everyday.²⁶ He wrote about the things in which he moved, in which he was a part. His Diary, is a unique literary production "having no counterpart in world literature". He touches upon the pressing everyday concerns of the Russian nation. He speaks directly to the encroachment of liberal theories and their effect upon Russian society and the Russian soul. His pronouncements on his literary activity were in no way meant to be a detachment from his overt political concerns. Indeed, his Diary, is partly an attempt precisely at this: to dispel the conventional notions of the worth or

²⁶ It was with utter awe that I read these words in the "Translators Introduction" to the Penguin edition of The Devils. "Dostoevsky's spite and hatred not only of his opponents, but also of all imaginary 'enemies' of Russia, was perhaps entirely in harmony with his religious obsessions. In The Devils he was not able to overcome them, and this is a serious blot on the novel...It would be absurd to take Dostoevsky's political views seriously..."(p.xvii) Perhaps this can be an example of the degree to which Dostoevsky is misunderstood by otherwise noteworthy academic minds. These literary critics and translators obviously are politically naive, for there is nothing naive about Dostoevsky's political views which he outlines explicitly in his, Diary. Many of his predictions have come to fruition. Dostoevsky dismissed any belief in liberal or Marxist(Western) forms of government, and was entirely aware of the encroaching bureaucracy overpowering the aristocracy and the Russian Orthodox Church. He declared that for Russians to maintain their soul, and if there were to be a universal state--which he correctly envisioned as inevitable--that was truly humane, it could be so through the strength of Russian orthodoxy. But there was no obsession. Like Don Quixote, even though it was a doubtful possibility of which Dostoevsky was aware, it was still a belief he chose to live by. And, as he challenged his skeptics, he'd ask, "what is yours?" He was correct, there are no true Russians anymore. They have been overtaken by Western thinking, Western forms of organization. The results have been deadly.

worthlessness of the literary as a viable means for understanding political and social conditions. Dostoevsky's intent is to reveal the necessity for such conditions to appear in literature, especially for a nation whose literature is so much a part of its culture.

Clearly, elements of Dostoevsky's poetics reveal a comprehensive understanding of contemporary political nihilism. Dostoevsky's recognition of pluralism within his presentation of polyphonous dialogues, along with his "carnivalization" of experience through engaging us in the dance of the "mystery space-time" of the present, are his attempts to re-vitalize a politically responsible form of discourse during our era of technological nihilism. And it is presented in such a way as to neither reject nor suggest a determinative answer to nihilism, but rather an affirmation of the world-forming possibilities our age presents us with.

A connection arises, here, between the type of novel which Dostoevsky initiated and a notion of technology as play, which is world-forming, contrasted to the connection between scientific method and technology which dissolves the world. The power of the novel affirms our contemporary experiences by bearing meaning and value upon them through our day-to-day human interactions. "Modern science" dissolves the world, denying the plurality of our interactions by foregoing the everyday for the "universal", a "universal" which is impossible to attain. On closer reflection, the contemporary novel would seem nothing less than essential for life in a technological age, and literature the only available means for constructive political discourse.

Political Considerations of Contemporary Literary Thought:
In Lieu of a "Conclusion"

It would appear that a clearer understanding of "modernity," of what it means to live in the twentieth-century, suggests a reversal of the common social and political orientation which is currently being perpetrated under the desire for a universal and homogeneous state. A clearer understanding of "modernity" can obviously be acquired through an acquaintance with ancient thought, who, as we have seen, greatly influences contemporary writers. And it may also be better understood through a familiarization with the works of great novelists and other artists who, in whatever medium of art, teach us aesthetically about the essence of our times, for in our day aesthetics have become primordial to knowledge, and more politically responsible. This is a necessity because there are obvious shortcomings within the dominant orientation of the age which are ultimately harmful and injurious.

These shortcomings in the "modern" vision can be evidenced experientially. The incompatibilities of freedom and radical equality, words which have blind religious reverence attached to them, are becoming more and more evident. The notion of progress, which still animates scientific consciousness, was dispelled in any thoughtful account after the first World War--the war to end all wars. But war has not ended; there was a second Great War, and a third would be infinitely greater.

The "modern" is ambiguously both the most compassionate and most brutal of men throughout the history of the human race. There are elements of traditional thought which cannot come to terms let alone affirm such ambiguities and paradoxes in experienced reality except to resort to a coercion of one's vision, in order that these ambiguities be erased. It is not difficult to see that this attitude is the impetus of contemporary educational procedures of

research. It is precisely this manner of educating, that is injurious, for it really is a continuation of the cowardice of an enervated idealism that is untruthful in the face of "reality." Hence, we require, I will argue, a more aesthetic orientation to the uncertainty, ambiguity and paradox that apparently condition our age, for to do otherwise, to attempt to coerce experience through scientific method, is to continue that activity which has contributed most to our devitalized times, and would impede an understanding of the exigencies of living in a technological age.

Central to our concerns in this case, is the general conditions of everyday life, and how the most seemingly personal experiences have their "origin" in unquantifiable, undemonstrable conditions. Historically determinist causal relations are now viewed as vacuous. The trail of historical progress is no longer determinate. History itself is revealed as an arbitrary and fluid imposition which has no "reality", but which, nonetheless, is needed. Nietzsche explains his personal relationship with "modern" historicism that all men and women of heightened consciousness must face in order to rise above it:

and what I had to say against 'historical sickness' I said as one who had slowly and toilsomely learned to recover from it and in no way was prepared to give up 'history' thereafter because he had once suffered it.¹

History can no longer be looked upon in the same manner. Hence, the belief that there is a privileged "subject" that may come to definitive terms about an "object" is dispensed with. It is no longer tenable. The very distinction of "inside" and "outside" become blurred. The two-leveled bifurcations representative of an historical context are rendered asunder. The

¹ Nietzsche Friedrich., Human, All-Too-Human, p.209.

"interior" of an individual, be it a character in a novel or the subject of a methodological discourse, is a mere surface covering of a plethora of unconscious, unquantifiable drives and forces, many of them "exterior" to the individual or "subject." Therefore, the pedagogy of present day literary thought denies the traditional approaches to both the writing and reading activity.

Writing from such a standpoint encourages an unabashed vitality and fertility which defies a stultifying systematization and categorization that is given through a unified, monological discourse. A traditional approach determined by an historically determinist view would allow the reader to place himself 'outside' the text whereby he can univocally determine things definitively 'inside' it. This traditional approach is contiguous with the necessity to close down on the world, to apprehend the world, which derived its inspiration from the fall of the cosmological order and the adoption of the philosophico-historical world view. But we who are living through the end of this world view can see the disenchantment that underlies it.

Post-historical art that is worthy of merit, recognizes a necessity for re-enchanting and revitalizing our experiences through creative means, renewing the possibility for enhancing life. Hence, in a limited respect, post-historical literature is a renewed re-configuration of the pre-philosophic artistic orientation. These are elements involved in recovering from absolute historicism without suggesting a "giving up" on "history."

It is the style, form and poetics of the writing that may teach us about the context of our experiences and, therefore, ultimately about the essence of our human associations, for the revolution of post-historical consciousness affects a re-orientation of not only aesthetics but aesthetic significance as well. The profundity of this re-configuration can hardly be exaggerated. It commands a radical restructuring and reformulating of the activity of

interpretation and pedagogy than what is commonly accepted, for the traditional relations of reader-writer-text is altered considerably under these new considerations. It also commands a radical restructuring of epistemological principles.

The tenets of present day literary thought deny the traditional way of relating subject and object: the possibility for language to reveal "reality" is denied. This illustrates a new form-giving principle, a new form of life of which scientific method has not made itself aware entirely. Thus, it has not made itself aware that scientific discourse maintains strains of traditional thought that appear no longer to be tenable. It was Nietzsche who gave us this treatment of the nature of literature:

..the great paradox of literature, the
intransitory amid the changing, the food
that always remains esteemed, like salt,
and never loses its savour, as even that
does.²

The element of permanence in literature, its dynamics, is not in its ability to bring us closer to reality, to objectify and measure the world, or even to fulfill our will to truth; but it is permanent by its very paradoxical relation between the intransitory nature of the written word or symbol in the midst of an ever changing context, the continual flux of everyday experience. What makes language and literature alive is its resistance to traditional necessities of formalization, objectification and finalization.

Post-historical understanding has achieved a dialectical clarity that implodes the very possibility of an historically dialectic, unified and finalized discourse. There is no longer any privileged observer, no historically determinate "subject" that may quantify, or objectify the

² Nietzsche Friedrich., Mixed Opinions and Maxims, p.168.

object of his discourse. The essence of post-historical existence, if closely thought about, shows that the "modern" system of rules, principles and assumptions are no longer seen as static, eternal, or divinely ordained. The traditional two-worldly bifurcation is no longer considered as a form giving principle. Thus, a language that displays itself as perpetually active, which demands continual re-interpretation and re-integration, that is necessarily open and incomplete, defying a single, unified and finalized valuation or objectification of itself, not only characterizes the movement of thought itself or the continual metamorphosis of the principles, rules and assumptions by which we come to designate things, but it also stands as analogous to what is. It reflects the inconclusiveness and indeterminacy of everyday life in a world that is without a stable authority. Hence, it is again distinguished from the traditional form of language, which, when subject to the historical form-giving principle where life is divorced from essence, relates what should be.

The form-giving principle is transformed. Existence is perceived is entirely unprecedented. Methodology by adopting principles and assumptions that are no longer believable, by formulating itself within an historical absolutist vision, necessarily falls short in comprehension of the tendencies of the present day. Here we have revealed an underside to "modern" consciousness, an underside that is hidden by the essence of the "modern" vision. I believe it erroneous to label it "post-modern". Perhaps, it is erroneous to call it even "more" modern, for there are traditional impulses which we still need; albeit, they are to be looked upon in an entirely different way.³

³ Throughout this work, I have purposely refrained from using this fashionable term. I believe its use is fraudulent. To claim our age as "post-modern" suggests a distinct "periodization" "after" or "beyond" "modernity". The essence of "post-historical" experience denies any such identity that can be spoken of meaningfully. The use of the word "post" suggests an historical continuum, which the essence of contemporaneity denies. "Post-historical" is more appropriate, I believe, since it signifies precisely the end of an historical orientation to such an extent that "modernity" takes on a new face: "modernity" is eclipsed into a recognition that it is not a distinct period.

What is veritably "new" about present day literary thought is that every word can never expresses a determinate, identical meaning let alone a calculable object: the subject of language expression and the object spoken about are only relatively determinate. Hence, Nietzsche teaches that language is doubly metaphorical: the 'subject' and 'object' can only be identified relatively, in other words, by metaphor:

One designates only the relations of things to man, and to express them, one calls on the boldest metaphors. A nerve stimulus, first transposed into an image - first metaphor. The image, in turn, imitated by a sound - second metaphor.⁴

When metaphor achieves a primacy in the relation between language which designates things as existent, what were formerly considered existent are only relative determinations of things for the possibility of knowing itself. Knowledge, as Heidegger relates in his commentary on Nietzsche, is the "schematizing of chaos for practical need." It is an impulse which we need to live by, but the traditional concept of truth becomes an impossibility. Knowledge is necessitated to error for the schematizing process is continual. There is no definitive and

There cannot be, therefore, a "post-modernity". To say that we are in an era beyond the "modern" speaks of a rejection or "liberation" from "modernity" which we have identified as typically "modern" position. Elements of the pedestrian adoption of the "post-modernist" fervour places more firmly entrenches such a position within "modernity" rather than without. Recurrence becomes the more viable orientation with which we are to have with our experiences. Recurrence robs any periodization of its distinction. Our age is characterized by nihilism, where any "essence" can never be distinctly defined.

(There is a progressivist attitude in "post-modern" artists of the present day--particularly those who use this term fashionably without any idea of its meaning. It is a resentful attitude, for "post-modernists" take indignant pride in not being proud of art, in not being proud of language. The deconstructive tendencies of contemporaneity are taken as determinate. Therefore, their work is viewed as a kind of "anti-art". Language and artistic form in general, become only "methods of random signification". This is not a creative standpoint. Just because the word is fragile does not mean that it is not valuable, quite the contrary. Even though every creation necessarily involves destruction, I fear that many of our contemporary "artists" destroy more than they create. They wish continually to devalue everything, acknowledging no ...g. That this "deconstructiveness" is taking hold, not only in literature departments, but also social science departments, is a point of grave concern for the future of a healthy and responsible educational system for our children.)

⁴ Nietzsche Friedrich., "On Truth and Falsity in an Extra-Moral Sense".p.178.

determinate knowledge. What is to be known is continually changing. What is to be 'known' is continually made. The bringing together making and knowing, in ancient Greek, techne and logos respectively, is the constitutive principle of technology. Hence, in discussing the implications of his teachings of the "Will to Power as Knowledge", his description of life itself upon the nature of language, Nietzsche illustrates how these new principles of language is analogous to the nature of technology.

Here the effect of the forms and content of language becomes analogous to the everyday flux of our very lives, and becomes inextricably linked to day to day experiences. What makes our experiences unprecedented and truly "modern" is the dominance of technology in every aspect of our day to day lives. Therefore, this new restructuring of language and things which influences new principles of creative activity within literature, are not to be looked upon disparagingly, but rather to be affirmed by a powerfully creative spirit. This for Nietzsche is the new standard to judge the viability in determining things: it is the new standard by which authority can be based. Hence, the great artist becomes viable for the recognition of authority, especially in a technological age. The nature of technology itself appears to be much more than a traditional perspective upon it would allow. Here we can see that the philosophy of Nietzsche prepares us for the task of thinking for a technological age.

As well, because it eventually affects our day to day lives, this new relation of language and things does not at all make creation a whimsical enterprise. Creation, which, as Nietzsche relates, necessarily involves destruction, is a politically responsible activity, for the element of authority is a determining principle.

Yet many are quick to place Nietzsche completely beyond any trace of traditional thought. This is not accurate, for traditional necessities still determine us if only in "a special way."

Nietzsche in no way dispels traditional thought or metaphysics completely in light of our political responsibilities. Traditional "onto-theological thought" may still display possibilities but only in a special way:

As such, we have outgrown Christianity and are averse to it - precisely because we have grown out of it, because our ancestors were Christians who in their Christianity were uncompromisingly upright: for their faith they willingly sacrificed possessions and position, blood and fatherland. We - do the same. For what? For our unbelief? For every kind of unbelief? No, you know better than that, friends! The hidden Yes in you is stronger than all Nos and Maybes that afflict you and your age like a disease; and when you have to embark on the sea, you emigrants, you, too, are compelled to this by - a faith! ⁵

This new faith, then, is not directed towards a final, closing apocalyptic valorization of experience, but rather one which faces the open sea of infinity: an infinite plurality of interpretations and valorizations. This occurs when God Himself, the last stable authority, is not recognized publicly any longer.

If the creative activity becomes whimsical, or if no consideration is given to the possibilities, albeit in a new way, towards traditional onto-theological thought, then what is at stake is political responsibility and authority in general, and conventionality, which would allow for a decent way for human beings to relate to one another, in particular. In other words, what is at stake is that our artists and intellectuals may destroy more than they create. For there are many artists and intellectuals who fashion themselves "deconstructionists", especially those who "ape" the French, who indeed treat artistic creations as whimsical and

⁵ Nietzsche Friedrich, The Gay Science, Aph.377

trivial, and give a resentful stand-offish attitude towards tradition, while at the same time claiming an affinity with Nietzsche. At best, it would only be a partial affinity. Most of them came out of the Marxist school and his resentful influence is clear. Adopting Nietzsche under these terms is clearly a perversion, for they fall back into the reactive nihilism which Nietzsche has nothing but contempt for.

A more proper pedagogical stance for the technological age would challenge traditional "ontological" principles and, to some extent, its own. This we can say the new novel does without exception, simply by the way language is used. Literature can be best described as a way of relating to a text, wherein it is more important to view, not only what language is talking about, but the way it is talked about. Therefore, form is equally as important to content, and this is why the merit of language is no longer on how closely it represents reality, but how language talks about itself. This is what is meant by present day literature as a kind of self-referential language, and, also, an extra-referential language. Contemporary literary revels in rhetorical possibilities, revels in its rising above strictly ontological form.

Under these influences plurality is restored. This plurality re-establishes a faith in the external world where one voice can only be heard in contrast to the external influences of other voices. The re-recognition of plurality under polyglot conditions destroys the monologic plane of an instrumental discourse, restoring a healthy political stance. It also destroys the reliance on a single unified subject as the harbinger of "truth", and shatters the rigidity of self-certainty. The modern 'last man' who is deceptively self-certain and self-satisfied is contrasted so strongly in Dostoevsky's characterizations. His characters tangle with forces of which they cannot know the outcome. This view of experiences is opposite to the 'last man's'. Dostoevsky's "world" exhibits aspects of which one can never be certain. Dostoevsky teaches

that only by realizing a struggle on this ground can man truly achieve greatness again, and possibly love the world again, something which the dominant world view will not allow. Only on this ground can man restore the higher activities of humanity. Through this ground only human beings treat each other "humanely" again. Dostoevsky attempts to insurrect a new humanism which is politically responsible.

Within these auspices is the recognition of meaning and the re-assigning of value for a nihilistic age. In effect, the way the great post-historical novel uses language presents a possibility for enriching the politically impoverished modern age. In this manner, the great work of art accrues power; it continually over powers itself through this extra-referentiality and necessary inconclusiveness.

"Post-modern" "anti-art" carries with it an attitude of disparagement: it bestows no life-giving power. There are some art works which are not extra-referential, hence the possibility for political responsibility is bypassed. The truly great work of art for the present day does not rely upon nor take advantage of the lack of external determinations upon form which would allow the creative activity to become whimsical. Here the recognition of extra-referentiality is pivotal as a dividing line between the politically responsible art and other "art" works of the present day which, because there is no respect for form--which pride themselves in "formlessness"--do not achieve a politically responsible posture.⁶

Why is it necessary for literature to be defined in the manner in which we have spoken? Because definitions under such auspices, are only arbitrary and transitory. Literature itself

⁶ What I have in mind here, for example, is Andy Warhol's arrangement of Brillo Pad boxes which can be found in contemporary art museums, and even, I might dare add, a section in *Ulysses* where Joyce does not use any punctuation marks. These seem only to amount to nihilistic commentary, therefore, are only important as symptoms of nihilism.

cannot be defined in any traditionally objective manner. What makes a text literature is the way it is read and the way it is written. Reading a text as literature necessarily implicates the reader actively, figuratively speaking, within the text. Interpretation acts as the readers re-writing of the text. The new novel engages a dialogue with its readers, tempting them to come to their own terms with the discourse and points of view within the book. So, if we are to define literature or a novel, and seeing the task which is set before us it is rather indispensable that we do, it must be so by the way the reader reads the text. (Hegel's "failure", for instance, depends on whether the Phenomenology is read as a serious philosophical treatise or a parodic epic comedy) Obviously, aside from entertainment books, novels generate, by their form and content, the kind of relationship of reader to text that can be considered 'literature'.

Literature, then, is a way of relating to writing which involves utterances by the reader upon his readings on the state of human associations, meanings, standards, judgments, assumptions, and, in the present day, is indispensable to utterances upon itself. Literature has become self-referential and extra-referential because there are no external standards, limits, assumptions that are binding upon form and content. These standards are now internalized within the text itself. Hence, present day literature, to define itself, involves an entirely new way of looking upon itself objectively. A new objectivity exposes itself which is unleashed from the historical form giving principles that bound it in one sense, because there can no longer be any objects such as the "world" that language can designate through anything but a metaphorically reciprocal relation.

What is at stake is not the objects, characters, or the totality of reality that language attempts to capture, but how it talks about these entities. This may be said to be a new

objectivity. When there are no externally determining standards that are believable, unmoved or stable, it is impossible to identify definitively any object by any subject. There is no longer any identity that has a unified, permanent and eternally distinguishing feature. Identities, and their constituted differences, are in continual flux. This requires an extra-referential exchange with other artists for any value to be established. Hence, the traditional manner of approaching the novel, which could find itself within historical boundaries, is no longer possible. The modern historical project, which foresees a continual progress to a state of global equilibrium, is no longer tenable. For the essence of modernity involves a continual metamorphosis, a reshaping of the boundaries of order and disorder that determine a world of beings and things. The novel displays this notion. And, in this sense, the novel has a possibility for "re-politicizing" our technological age.

Therefore, if political activity is to coincide with a more proper description of the context of our present day experience, a consideration of the works of this great thinker, Nietzsche, and this great artist, Dostoevsky, becomes a necessity.

II

The confrontation with Nietzsche has not yet begun, nor have the prerequisites for it been established. For a long time Nietzsche has been either celebrated and imitated or reviled and exploited. Nietzsche's thought and speech are still too contemporary for us. He and we have not yet been sufficiently separated in history; we lack the distance necessary for a sound appreciation of the thinker's strength.⁷

⁷ Heidegger Martin, Nietzsche, Vol. I The Will to Power As Art, p.4.

The same could be said about Dostoevsky. Did not the great German "poet-philosopher" find in the great Russian "literary artist" an all-too-long sought after kinship, which men of great stature not often find during their lifetime? "The instinct of kinship", Nietzsche wrote a friend after reading Notes from Underground, "spoke up immediately; my joy was extraordinary..."⁸ The kinship between a poet-philosopher and a literary artist is more significant than the mere curiosity evolving out of everyday human relationships. For one, these men were extraordinary. This can be said without a doubt. Secondly, time and time again, in alternate disciplines of philosophy and literature, both thinkers are regarded with the utmost of reverence. Their thought is both recognized as representative of our contemporary political and social condition, and as anticipating events beyond the present day. Any student of modern political philosophy should read Dostoevsky, and no modern literature student can deny the influence of Nietzsche on the greatest literary artists of the twentieth-century. It is apparent that the confrontation with the genius of Dostoevsky's and Nietzsche's vision has just begun. We are only beginning to acquire a sound appreciation of these thinkers. Hence, the time is ripe for an expose of the influence of these writers, these philosophical artists, upon the present day human condition.

With the collapse of philosophy into the literary arts, comes the possibility for the recognition of another philosophical artist: Plato. Plato also had a close kinship to the literary artists of his day--Aristophanes in particular, who, in a tribute to him, Plato called, "the eternal poet". Yet it is precisely these philosophical artists which are not considered practical to present day "politics". Is this not a further example of the rock-bottom stupidity of the

⁸ See "Letter to Overbeck" in, Walter Kaufmann, The Portable Nietzsche, p.424.

"modern" orientation?

It would appear that the triumph of rhetoric and poetry coincides with the dominance of technological nihilism. This does not suggest that "novelized" literature, philosophical art or poetry, is a "liberation" from nihilism; this would only amount to securing it firmly within a reactive form of nihilism. It would seem erroneous to suggest that rhetoric is void of any ontological characteristics, therefore, of any metaphysical, philosophical or scientific necessities. To be more accurate, contemporary rhetoric handles these entities in a "special way", at once with both suspicion and trust. Neither metaphysics nor ontology can be escaped through a rhetorical use of language, for language by its very nature fixates, therefore to some degree, closes down on "Being." Rhetoric affirms, not a victory over metaphysics or ontology, rather the paradoxical tension between the closing down on "Being" inherent in any form of discourse, alongside a recognition that "Being" cannot be closed down upon. "Knowing" becomes a "schematizing of chaos". Art involves the creation of order amidst this chaos for the purpose of leading a life, of having a world to live in, realizing full well that there is no absolute determinative or essential ontologic grounding for this order, this "schema." Furthermore, doing this is dangerous. Rhetorical teaching is characteristically unresolved, inconclusive and continual.

In this regard philosophy, metaphysics, ontology or history need not end absolutely. The "end" of philosophy may only be a transformation. Philosophy becomes more closely related to poetry and rhetoric than to ontology and metaphysics. Perhaps we are revealing what was concealed by a philosophy dominated by ontology and metaphysics. With this view we can understand the affinity amongst Nietzsche's and Dostoevsky's rhetoric with the rhetoric of Plato, and, perhaps, Aristophanes. Under such considerations the teachings of these ancient

writers become renewed and recurrent, for did not Plato and Aristophanes and other great poets write during a nihilistic period after the fall of the Athenian civilization? The presentation of philosophy through art does not privilege closure - does not privilege ontological metaphysics. The "end" of philosophy may release the possibilities for a metaphysics of art that, rather than discloses "Being", actually hides it. With this orientation, the philosophical artist may revitalize discourse.

I have attempted to illustrate, through an analysis of the features of the post-historical novelist, a precipitating of a form of literary activity that is an important and decisive form of political expression. The post-historical novel in particular, has characteristics within its discourse which has the possibility at least for being the more responsible political discourse. Such can be said because philosophy (science) has seen its culmination justified by ideology, yet technology and the instrumental discourse that it applies itself to both, are deceptive. They hinder an understanding of the nature of our social condition. This is evident by the blind assumptions that: (1) we are, as human beings, at the height of our development, and that with increased technological 'progress' will get 'better'; (2) that human and non-human 'nature' can be controlled; (3) that we can arrive at absolute and determinative 'facts' through efficient methodological procedures; (4) that, because scientific method dominates and controls 'reality', it contains the 'truth'; (5) that all other ways of 'knowing' are 'useless', and therefore, 'inadequate'.

A genealogy of 'modernity' has exposed these assumptions as deceptive fallacies. The characteristics of the 'new' novel, initiated in the form of Dostoevsky's poetics, and I might add Nietzsche's as well, reveal an underside to 'modernity'--reveal modernity in decline. Such an orientation is in direct opposition to scientific method. The pedagogy of the novel is above

the pedantics of scientific method, which means, it is above the negating perspective of the Western world, for these great artists are explicitly aware that 'modernity' is in decline, and that 'modern' scientific and philosophic principles, although used at present, hold no water. The 'new' novels' characteristic openendedness to infinity captures best the essence of our technological age which was exposed by Nietzsche's revealing of the underside of Hegelian discourse. The poetics of the 'new' novel suggest a perspective that clashes with commonly held opinion; it clashes with an historically-determinist world view and the orientations to the world of beings and things that are a part of that view.

The 'new' novel presents itself as perspectival. Therefore, it is necessarily self-ironising, self-parodic, for it cannot appeal to any absolute epistemological principles as modern science does. It shows that such principles are not possible with any type of discourse. Hence, the use of language in relation to reality is profoundly radicalized. Under the new auspices of this radicalization, language achieves a doubly-metaphorical relation to reality where artistic discourse becomes the most viable, adequate and responsible manner by which to educate. The poetics of the novel also, demand an exchange not only internally, but also externally with other readers and writers and other artists as well.

The present day has been inscribed with a new meaning. This is evidence of a transformation, a transfiguration of the world of cataclysmic proportion, no less dramatic, than the fall of the ancient Greek cosmos with the decline of Athens into a democratic free-for-all. Here began the amalgamation of philosophy and politics and formed the inspiration for the foundations of the Western world and the philosophico-historical world view. Now, we are at the impoverished end of that world view. No longer is our discourse to be directed by

the conviction that we must change the world at any cost.⁹ Discourse is to affirm the active participation and acceptance of all that is here and now, in full affirmation that all that is now, is all that will ever be and all that has ever been. Only in accepting the "world" would there be a participation in the eternal. The new novel affirms eternal recurrence as the highest expression of what is. This "novelty" has a tinge of irony to it as Foucault tells us, "The novelty lies no longer in what is said, but in its reappearance."¹⁰

This admission would pave the way for a restoration of discourse back to its loftiest dignity, and to a greater respectability and responsibility. As Umberto Eco comments in his "Introduction" to his novel, The Name of the Rose, "the man of letters can happily write out of pure love of writing." By no means is this meant to be educationally irresponsible; quite the contrary, for it is the commitment of our modern education to inform, I will argue, rather than educate.

With a new pedagogical transformation, one can revive the strength and vitality that were known to the past great ages, whose pedagogy precisely sought to educate character: the character that would endow men and women with mastery over themselves in order to acquire sound judgment in matters arising out of day to day associations. As Lukacs tells us the novel is conditioned by a "virile maturity". Therefore, it is an education that is more politically responsible. With it we may restore again the higher activities of humanity. And it is the type of pedagogy that is a recurrence, however slight, of the great thinkers of another democratic age: Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in 5th Century B.C. Athens. At the end of history, the

⁹ This insight is enough to spell the end of the rhetoric of ideologies--both communist and liberal democratic ones-- for in this essential sense, they are similar, if not indeed identical.

¹⁰ Foucault Michel, "The Discourse on Language", "Appendix" to The Archaeology of Knowledge, p.221.

possibilities within such great minds before history come alive again.¹¹

For that matter, was not the activity of "modern" "science" initiated by our ancient ancestors? Did not Democritus discover (or invent) the atom? Did not Archimedes with his desire to apprehend the world by extricating himself from it and looking down upon it anticipate modern scientific method? Is not the 'success' in modern 'science' in its belief that it realized the deeds and desires that the ancients could not realize? The difference in the realization of desires and in the desires themselves for the ancients resides in that the conditions, the permutations and combinations of possibilities and limitations, were not ripe for a technological age. With such an admission, we must realize that in the ancient world there were possibilities that in the present day are impossible. We do not have 'more' than any other time period. Our tremendous gains bring with them tremendous losses. If the nihilism of the present day is a result of the resentment of the world presented before us would it not be wise to love the world, as it is, without the mediating belief and intense desire to change the world? Would such a life not be futile? There can be no progress. We are left to accept that the world cannot be known, cannot be grasped, cannot be controlled. We are left to love these questions themselves, and, one day, some of us may inadvertantly stumble upon an answer.

¹¹ The extra-referential affinity of contemporary literary creations with aspects of musical form becomes very important. The ancient Greeks--the most political of all peoples--emphasized the indispensability of mousike for a sound political edification. Plato in Book II of the Republic and Aristotle in Book VIII of The Politics maintained this emphasis, for they held mousike (which entails more than the modern conception of music) as crucial to the education of character and virtue to balance the education of intellect and information. It is a sentiment shared by Nietzsche who claimed, on numerous occasions, that music was more in touch with the substratum of sensations and feelings representing a more immediate affinity with the world of beings and things. Contemporary literary creations attempt to be musical in order to capture this immediacy, and it places their pedagogy in close affinity to the ancient. The contemporary affinity of the literary with music is doubly important when you consider that our educational priorities privilege intellect and information over character and virtue.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Arendt Hannah, The Human Condition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 1958.
- _____, The Life of the Mind: Vol. I: Thinking, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York & London, 1978.
- _____, The Life of the Mind: Vol. II: Willing, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York & London, 1978.
- Aristotle, On Man in the Universe: Metaphysics. Parts of Animals Ethics. Politics. Poetics. Louise Ropes Loomis ed., Walter J. Black Publishers, New York, 1943.
- Bakhtin Mikhail, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics: Theory and History of Literature. Volume 8, Caryl Emerson ed., and trans., University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1984.
- _____, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M.M. Bakhtin, Micheal Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson and Micheal Holquist trans., University of Texas Press, Austin, 1981.
- Boyers Robert, Atrocity and Amnesia: The Political Novel Since 1945, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1985.
- Cooper Barry, "Nihilism and Technology" in, Nietzsche and the Rhetoric of Nihilism: Essays on Interpretation. Language and Politics, Tom Darby, Bela Egyed, Ben Jones, eds., Carleton University Press, Ottawa, Canada, 1989.
- _____, The End of History: An essay in modern Hegelianism, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1985.
- _____, "What is Post-Modernity?" in, Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, Vol. IX, No. 3 (Fall/automne) 1985.
- Cervantes, Don Quixote, J.M. Cohen trans., Great Britain, 1982.
- Darby Tom, ed., Sojourns in the New World: Reflections on Technology, Carleton University Press, Ottawa, Canada, 1986.
- Derrida Jacques, "From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelian Without Reserve" in his, Writing and Difference, University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 1978.
- Dostoevsky Fedor, Crime and Punishment, Jesse Coulson trans., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981.

- _____, Diary of A Writer: Vol.I, Octagon Books, New York, 1949.
- _____, Diary of A Writer: Vol.II, Octagon Books, New York, 1949.
- _____, "Notes from Underground" in, Signet Classics, Dostoevsky, "Notes from Underground", "White Nights", "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man", and selections from, "The House of the Dead.", McAndrew Publishers, New York, 1961.
- _____, The Brothers Karamazov, David Magarshack trans., Penguin Books Great Britain, 1958.
- _____, The Devils, David Magarshack trans., Penguin Books, Great Britain, 1971.
- Eagleton Terry, Literary Theory: An Introduction, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1983.
- Eco Umberto, The Name of the Rose, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, San Diego, 1983.
- Foucault Michel, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" in, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, Donald F. Bouchard, ed., Cornell University Press, Ithaca & New York, 1977.
- _____, "The Discourse on Language" "Appendix" to, The Archaeology of Knowledge, R.D. Lange ed., A. M. Sheridan trans., Great Britain, Tavistock Publishers, 1985.
- Gadamer Hans-Georg, Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutic Studies, P. Christopher Smith trans., Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 1976.
- Grant George, Technology and Justice, Anansi, Toronto, 1986.
- Hegel G.W.F., The Phenomenology of Mind, J.B. Baillie ed., Harper & Row, New York, 1967.
- Heidegger Martin, "Letter on Humanism" in, Basic Writings, David Farrell Krell ed., Harper & Row, 1977.
- _____, Nietzsche: Vol.I: The Will to Power As Art, David Farrell Krell trans., Harper & Row, San Francisco, 1982.
- _____, Nietzsche: Vol.IV: Nihilism, David Farrell Krell trans., Harper & Row, San Francisco, 1982.
- _____, "Only a God Can Save Us" Der Spiegel Interview with Martin Heidegger, published in, Philosophy Today, 20:4, 1976.

- _____, "The End of Philosophy And The Task of Thinking" in, Basic Writings, David Farrell Krell ed.,
- Holy Bible, King James Version, Collins' Clear Type Press, Great Britain.
- Kaufmann Walter, ed., The Portable Nietzsche, Viking Press, New York, 1954.
- Kojeve Alexandre, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, assembled by Raymond Queneau, Allan Bloom ed., James H. Nichols, Jr. trans., Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1969.
- _____, "The Idea of Death in the Philosophy of Hegel" in, Interpretation, Winter, 1973.
- Kundera Milam, The Art of the Novel, Linda Asher trans., Harper & Row, Grove Press, New York, 1988.
- Lukacs Georg, The Historical Novel, Penguin Books, New York, 1962.
- _____, The Theory of the Novel: An historico-philosophical essay on the forms of great literature, Anna Bostock trans., Merlin Press, London, 1978.
- Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, Walter Kaufmann trans., vintage Books, Random House, New York, 1966.
- _____, Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is, R.J. Hollingdale trans., Penguin Books, Great Britain, 1979.
- _____, Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, R.J. Hollingdale trans., Introduced by Erich Heller, Cambridge University Press, Great Britain, 1986.
- _____, "On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life", Peter Preuss trans., Hackett Publishing co., Indianapolis & Cambridge, 1980.
- _____, The Gay Science, Walter Kaufmann trans., Vintage Books, New York, 1974.
- _____, The Will to Power, Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale trans., Vintage Books, Random House, New York, 1967.
- Plato, Republic, Allan Bloom trans., Basic Books, New York & London, 1968.
- Rosen Stanley, Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1969.

_____. "Post-modernism and the End of Philosophy", Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, Vol.IX, No.3, (Fall/automne) 1985.

Stern Laurent, "Lukacs at 103", The Partisan Review, 2, Spring, 1988.

END

18/02-91

FIN