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SOUTH AFRICA AND INDEPENDENT AFRICA:
CONTINUED CONFRONTATION OR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE?

A THESIS
SUBMITTED BY

CHARLES MUNHAMU BOTSIO UTETE

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

Abstract

Relations between the Republic of South Africa and the newly-independent African states constitute a significant aspect of international relations in contemporary Africa. This study analyzes these relations by focusing on the development of South Africa's extra-territorial policies.

South Africa's extra-territorial policies have been directed to the attainment of a number of political, economic, military-strategic, and diplomatic goals all of which seem fundamentally linked to the maintenance of white rule in that country. These goals have been pursued with determination since the launching of the so-called outward-looking policy in the mid-1960's. Successful implementation of this policy would facilitate the establishment of an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence in place of the hostility that characterizes South Africa's relations with the bulk of the African states today.

The outward-looking policy has thus far proved only partially successful. This is largely due to the fact that South Africa's domestic racial policies and the domestic colonial environment in which they are framed are bitterly opposed elsewhere in Africa.

However, given her considerable economic resources, South Africa is in the position of using economic and technical aid as instruments of diplomacy in Africa. Since most of the African states are in

desperate need of capital investment for economic development and of markets for their exports, South Africa offers opportunities that seem considerably attractive. A few African states have already availed themselves of these opportunities. We have also argued in this study that African regimes of a conservative political orientation such as that of Dr. Hastings Banda in Malawi, are likely to accomodate themselves with relatively little reservation to policies of cooperation with South Africa.

South Africa's quest for a normalization of relations with the new African states as a whole has however been hampered by political and ideological factors. Moreover, in light of her own domestic requirements and the immense economic and social problems of the African countries in general, South Africa's willingness and ability to expend resources in the service of her outward-looking policy seem limited. Then too, African states' fears of possible political "satellization" by South Africa should tend to limit the latter's ability to effect a diplomatic penetration of these states.

The new African states' hostility to South Africa thus seems likely to persist. It is interesting to note that even those states that have favourably responded to South Africa's diplomatic overtures have felt compelled to justify their policies in part by reference to their intention to engage South African authorities in "dialogue" directed to changing the political status quo in that country. It thus seems justifiable to assert that political confrontation in varying degrees of intensity will continue to characterize South Africa's relations with the bulk of the member states of the Organization of African Unity.

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

I

This study seeks to analyse the international relations between the Republic of South Africa and ^{several} newly-independent states of Africa. The focus is on the development, nature and significance of South African foreign policy as it relates to the rest of the African continent; the period of interest in this respect being the two decades from 1948 to 1968.

The question may be posed at the outset as to why it is felt that these relations are sufficiently important to deserve the present examination. After all, as might well be pointed out, the new states, on attaining their sovereign status, seem on the whole to devote their energies to the problem of creating viable policies and economies, and of establishing relatively peaceful and stable conditions in which basic and rapid societal transformations at many levels might take place.¹

¹The saliency of these issues is to some extent attested to by the great volume and variety of social science literature devoted to them. Some examples are: James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964); Aristide Zolberg, Creating Political Order: the Party State in West Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967); Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden, and Crawford Young, Issues of Political Development (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1967); Andrew M. Kamarck, The Economics of African Development (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967); P. C. Lloyd, Africa in Social Change (Baltimore: Penguin, 1967).

The issues referred to above are no doubt crucial enough to require major effort by the new states for their resolution as well as great perspicacity by scholars for their analysis and explication. Nonetheless, they do not constitute the sum total of the major concerns of the new states. The problem of the international relations of these states is obviously of great importance also. Thus, not surprisingly, African states have, on achieving their independence, sought to define their positions and policies relative to the rest of the world. In particular, they have sought to define their relations with their immediate and more distant neighbours on the African continent.²

A number of factors tend to make problems of international relations in the new Africa as crucial as those relating to "purely" domestic issues such as those referred to above. First, some African states have achieved independence only to find themselves beset by irredentist movements or have had to

²Some pioneering studies of international relations in the new Africa are: Vernon McKay, ed., African Diplomacy (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1966); Denis Austin and Hans N. Weiler, eds., Inter-State Relations in Africa (Freiburg, West Germany: Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institut, 1965); I. William Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966); Doudou Thiam, The Foreign Policy of African States (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1965).

contend with a neighbouring state over a disputed border.³ Second, foreign policy problems are of importance to the new states on ideological grounds. Most of these states have proclaimed their opposition to colonial and similar forms of rule. Yet the southern portion of the African continent - in particular the area covered by the Republic of South Africa, South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola - continues to be ruled by colonial and racially oligarchical regimes. In a real sense this phenomenon raises crucial foreign policy issues for African states, especially those close to the countries mentioned above. The question is whether, in the light of ideological differences the piquancy of which lies in the southern African denial of the political premises of African independence, "normal" relations can be established between the new African states and the southern African regimes, especially the Republic of South Africa, the principal state in the area. Third, foreign policy issues in the African context - as elsewhere - are important inasmuch as they have a bearing on domestic problems and the resolution

³In at least one case, that involving Morocco and Algeria, border disputes have led to actual warfare (1963). The question of border disputes should be kept in perspective. Border disputes have occurred in less than ten cases, a small number considering there are over 70 inter-state boundaries dividing African states. See Ravi L. Kapil, "On the Conflict Potential of Inherited Boundaries in Africa," World Politics, Vol. 18, No. 4 (July, 1966), pp. 657-671.

of these. It is obvious, for example, that if a government spends meagre resources bolstering its military capability against possible attack from its neighbours, it will to that extent deprive itself of the possibility of satisfying some of the economic needs and expectations of its population. Or again, a small state, faced with massive socioeconomic problems the solution of which appears to lie outside its capability, may find itself in a situation of dependence on some wealthier state such that politically its international behaviour has to reflect its economic dependence on the other state. In a sense, the Republic of South Africa, with its considerable resources and level of economic development, poses challenges for the rest of independent Africa that could, in theory at least, produce the dynamics of a situation of "enforced" cooperation between ideological incompatibles.

In addition to analysing specific African policies of the government of South Africa, the study seeks to delineate patterns of interaction between the Republic of South Africa and independent Africa at the economic and commercial levels.⁴

⁴Patterns of interaction are understood here to include both relations of cooperation and of conflict between states. Relations of conflict or cooperation can also be either partial or complete, i.e., they may be limited to one area of interaction (e.g., the economic), or extend to all possible areas of interaction (economic, political, diplomatic, etc.).

It is evident that economic and commercial relations between states do not in every case have to develop as adjuncts of specific foreign policies. They, however, tend to influence or otherwise react upon the foreign policies or the relations of the states concerned. Hence, this study is directed to analysing economic, commercial, and other "non-political" factors that, together with specific political policies and diplomatic dealings, constitute the complex corpus of relations between the Republic of South Africa and certain newly-independent African states.

Two points may be noted regarding the scope of the study. First, the period of interest for an exploration of South African policy toward Africa - 1948 to 1968 - covers virtually the entire period during which the government of South Africa has been under the administration of a single political party, the Nationalist Party, and it is also a period during which that party has developed its conception of South Africa's position and role in the world and especially in Africa. The twenty year period also covers the ten years during which the bulk of African countries have achieved independence (1957 - 1966), which situation has enabled them to formulate their own foreign policies. Second, in order to render the material manageable, the study concentrates on the responses to South

African initiatives of only a selected number of African states - particularly Zambia, Malawi and Botswana. Reference is also, however, made to such east African states as Tanzania and Kenya.⁵

There have been several studies in recent years devoted to analysing South Africa's problems, both domestic and international. With respect to the latter, hardly any of these works have directed their attention to the concerns of the present study, viz., an attempt at a systematic examination of South Africa's place, role, and performance as a power on the African continent. Studies of South Africa's international position have tended to treat this dimension as relatively peripheral and have in general concentrated on one general theme - the importance of which is not denied - i.e., the ideology of apartheid and its implications in international politics. Many of these studies also seek to delineate the policy problems posed for the international community by the

⁵Reference will also be made to relations between South Africa and its most immediate newly-independent neighbouring states, Lesotho and Swaziland. This, however, is not - for reasons explained below - the major frame of reference of the study. The study will also indicate the role of such international organizations as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) where appropriate.

The explanation for the above choice of countries is provided under Section VI of this chapter.

apartheid policy and often go on to indicate how countries with interests in South Africa might use their influence to help modify or reverse the domestic policies of the South African government.⁶ These concerns are no doubt of great importance but exclusive attention to them may tend to detract from or to obscure a relevant dimension in any consideration of South Africa's problems and prospects, viz., that country's position in a continent politically transformed by the decolonization processes of the last decade.

It also seems evident that if (as the studies referred to above imply) a solution to South Africa's political problems must to a lesser or greater degree depend on an input of international action, the role of the new African states in such a process has to be indicated and assessed. In any event, as will be shown subsequently, the African states have themselves taken the initiative in recent years in bringing the question of South Africa's racial policies before various international bodies. Consequently, the development of the

⁶See for example: Colin and Margaret Legum, South Africa: Crisis for the West (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964); William R. Frye, In Whitest Africa: The Dynamics of Apartheid (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1968); Denis Austin, Britain and South Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1966); William A. Hance, ed., South Africa and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); J. E. Spence, Republic Under Pressure: a Study of South African Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).

policies of these states toward South Africa may be presumed to be of more than peripheral interest in any assessment of the direction and momentum of international efforts to influence political changes in South Africa.⁷

This study seeks to explore a number of related questions regarding South Africa's relations with the new African states. The main question may be posed thus: In the light of sharp ideological differences and a recent history of relatively intense mutual hostility as between the Republic of South Africa and the newly-independent African states, what are the prospects for a normalization of relations? Are these relations to continue to be characterized by the political and diplomatic confrontation of the relatively recent past or does the situation indicate the possibility of some form of peaceful coexistence developing between South Africa and the new states? More generally, what kinds of international relations evolve when one relatively cohesive and economically advanced state (in this case the Republic of South Africa) finds itself the object of hostility on the part of numerous relatively less

⁷One student of South African foreign policy even argues that foreign powers, especially Western powers, are likely to give up any efforts to change the sociopolitical status quo in southern Africa (including South Africa) if the new African states do not present a united diplomatic front aimed at assisting processes of change in southern Africa. See, J. E. Spence, op. cit., pp. 79-80.

powerful "developing states" on the same continent? What are the determinants of national foreign policies of the new African states, seen from the perspective of their interactions with South Africa? Is an independent foreign policy possible for small, economically-underdeveloped states in a geopolitical environment such as that of southern and central Africa? To what extent are foreign and domestic policies separable or interlinked from the point of view of the conduct of relations between the Republic of South Africa and the new African states?

II

In a sense the above questions resolve themselves into the single question: To what extent are normal interstate relations feasible as between countries whose domestic political ideologies and internal policies diverge to the point of seeming fundamentally and irrevocably incompatible with each other? This problem has been posed rather starkly by South African scholar Cornelis de Kiewiet. He writes:

The South African view that they [the South African regime] can and will resolve the contradiction of their own independence and that of black Africa calls for examination. Nobody has seriously sat down to examine South Africa in the context of a very troubled Africa that may be sliding into inanition, or may be moving with despairing slowness to putting flesh on its barren independence.⁸

⁸Cornelis W. de Kiewiet, "The World and Pretoria," Africa Report (February, 1969), p. 52.

Several ~~propositions~~ are advanced hereunder which it is the object of the thesis to sustain.

First, it is argued that as Pan-African solidarity, of which the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is the principal expression, has declined, South Africa's position vis-a-vis the rest of Africa has improved.⁹ A noticeable move toward some kind of modus vivendi between South Africa and some members of the Pan-African world has not only developed but is likely to continue given the absence of powerful counteracting factors. In particular, such a trend is likely to manifest itself in a more pronounced form if the following conditions obtain:

- (a) Further decline of the OAU unaccompanied by alternative or compensating interstate structures especially in the east and central African region;
- (b) Failure on the part of South African (as well as other southern African) liberation movements to launch and sustain viable guerrilla uprisings in their respective countries.

It is observed that the above two conditions do, to some extent, characterize the present situation within the OAU

⁹One index of such improvement in South Africa's position has been her ability to establish normal diplomatic relations with the Republic of Malawi.

and the southern African liberation movements. In consequence, the trend toward peaceful coexistence between South Africa and other African states should, in the short term at least, manifest itself more extensively and overtly than hitherto.

Second, it will be argued that the establishment of diplomatic and other relations between South Africa and some Black African states has been achieved almost invariably on South Africa's terms. In particular, the normalization of relations has in such instances occurred in spite of:

- (a) The continuation within South Africa of the ideology and policies of apartheid, which most African leaders have condemned;¹⁰
- (b) South African support of the colonial regimes in Angola, Mozambique, and Southern Rhodesia which the bulk of African states and leaders oppose.

Since these two factors might be regarded as tending to limit the possibility of normal relations developing between

¹⁰The Malawian president himself, Dr. Hastings K. Banda, while on a 1960 speaking tour of the United States, made a point of attacking South Africa's domestic policies and the ideology on which they are based. He, for example, advised his hosts: "Do not back the wrong horse in Africa. Africa is on the move ...[When they attain political power Africans will remember] what you did to back South Africa with capital to keep Africans down." See Anti-Apartheid News (London), May, 1967, p. 3.

South Africa and the new African states, the establishment of relations which has nonetheless occurred is to a large extent to be explained in terms of factors internal to the new African states themselves. As will be shown subsequently, it is the contention here that South Africa's success in breaking out of the circle of her isolation vis-a-vis the new states represents in part the opportunistic exploitation of problems within and between African states themselves. It is further contended, however, that as long as conditions (a) and (b) above continue to hold - and there is little reason to assume they might not - the normalization of relations with the rest of Africa that South Africa seeks will remain at most partial and limited. In short, the peaceful coexistence that South Africa wishes to see develop between herself and the rest of Africa¹¹ is likely to meet partial success, rather than attaining the condition of full normalization of relations.

The success South Africa has achieved in winning new friends among the African states is attributable in part to

¹¹The quest for coexistence is evidenced, for example, by the wording of a motion introduced in the South African House of Assembly on January 31, 1967, by a government supporter, a certain Dr. P. S. van de Merwe. Merwe's motion, which was subsequently carried, read in part: "This House approves the policy pursued by the Government for friendly coexistence and fruitful cooperation with countries in Africa ..." Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 19 (January 20-March 10, 1967), col. 412.

her government's apparent willingness to expend considerable economic resources in cultivating these states. Eric Louw, foreign minister of South Africa from 1955 to 1964, argued in 1959 that South Africa's "superiority" in educational, scientific and industrial development assured her a leadership role in the future development of the African continent.¹² Dr. Hendrick Verwoerd, then prime minister of South Africa, expressed essentially the same view when he told parliament in January, 1959:

In our dealings with other countries of Africa, we are seeking friendship above all else. If we find that we cannot gain friendship in a certain way, let us say by establishing certain forms of diplomatic relations, but we can gain this friendship by assisting one another in the scientific, economic and other fields, we should obviously adopt the policy by which the main objective ... can be achieved.¹³

This means, one would assume, that the South African regime feels it should and can use its resources to achieve "friendly" relations with other countries in Africa. The supposition here seems to be that those African states that

¹²Eric H. Louw, "The Union [of South Africa] and the Emergent States of Africa," in South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA), eds., South Africa in the African Continent (Stellenbosch: SABRA, 1959), pp. 12-13.

¹³H. F. Verwoerd, Verwoerd Speaks, Speeches 1948-1966 (Johannesburg: APB Publishers, 1966), p. 247.

might ordinarily be disinclined to cultivate friendly relations with South Africa will alter their stance once South African economic aid is extended to them. This assumption seems to underlie many of South Africa's recent policy moves with respect to her neighbours.

South Africa's ability to deploy her admittedly considerable wealth in efforts to win friends in Africa is limited by several factors. First, she cannot obviously extend aid to all African countries in such quantities or in such a way that all these states would in time come to feel that their own welfare was dependent on good relations with South Africa. There is, after all, a limit to what even a rich country like South Africa can do to alleviate conditions of poverty in an immense continent the size of Africa with its 350 million people.¹⁴ Second, from a political point of view, it is not at all clear that the South African government would wish to help advance the economic development of the African states in any decisive fashion since to do so would be to assist these states to increase their chances of attaining economic viability

¹⁴Dr. Verwoerd himself declared in June 1966 that South Africa could only assist some of the African states; and in this connection he mentioned Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Zambia and Malawi. He went on to add that his government would not assist those who might have the tendency to keep "their hands spread out like beggars." See Cape Times (Cape Town), June 1, 1966.

and therewith a higher military potential or capability.¹⁵

Third, South Africa's ability to use her resources to win friendship with the African states should be examined in the light of two factors that are given extended treatment in the next section, namely: (a) the possibility of political satellization or political domination by South Africa of those states that accept her aid to any considerable extent. Fears of such satellization are likely to deter the bulk of the African states from friendly dealings with South Africa since the political costs of such dealings is likely to be regarded as too high;¹⁶

¹⁵Even from a purely economic point of view there is a further limitation. South Africa is, for example, unlikely to extend aid directed to promoting the industrialization of the African states as this would tend to limit market opportunities for South African secondary industry in these countries. The journal South Africa Today (Johannesburg), 1967, has for example observed:

South Africa has invested considerable capital in developing Swaziland's mineral resources, but it remains to be seen whether South African secondary industry would accept Swazi developments that would compete with home interests. (p. 115).

¹⁶In September 1969 the Zambian Foreign Ministry issued a statement on the question of economic collaboration with southern African colonial regimes. The statement declared in part that while such collaboration might ordinarily be encouraged, in the particular circumstances of southern Africa, "economic opportunities cannot be divorced from political realities." The Rhodesia Herald (Salisbury), September 25, 1969.

That some African leaders will accept the political costs referred to is admitted. To this extent South Africa has "exploitable" opportunities in Africa. The contention here, however, is that the probability of rejection of satellization, taken together with the ideological incompatibilities to be discussed below, constitute a stronger general tendency than its opposite.

(b) the incompatibility of South Africa's official internal ideological system with the values deeply held by many of the elites governing the new African states. Such incompatibility constitutes an important factor that helps explain South Africa's diplomatic and political isolation from the bulk of the newly-independent African states.

III

The possibility of South Africa's using her economic power to establish friendly relations with African states has already been tried and has resulted in that country being able, in part, to end her isolation from the rest of the African states. South Africa's developing relations with Malawi offer the most outstanding example of the process being referred to here.¹⁷ With the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Africa and Malawi, the question of peaceful coexistence between the former and some states of Black Africa is no longer a chimera but a political fact fraught with significant implications for the continental

¹⁷ On this see also Nathan Shamuyarira, "Dr. Banda's Lonely Road," The Institute of Race Relations Newsletter (London), October/November 1967, pp. 402-404; Andrew Ross, "White Africa's Black Ally," New Left Review (London), No. 45 (September/October 1967), especially p. 94; Henry Richardson, "Malawi: Between Black and White Africa," Africa Report, Vol. 15, No. 2 (February 1970), pp. 18-21; John G. Pike, Malawi: An Economic and Political History (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 162-172, at Nassim

diplomacy of the African states in particular and inter-African relations in general.¹⁸

Yet, in spite of these developments, this study argues that South Africa's relations with the other African states are unlikely in the long term to be characterized by any degree of mutual acceptance or coexistence extending much beyond the "friendship" South Africa has been able to gain thus far in Black Africa. Rather, in its thrust, the study asserts that these relations will in general continue to be - or increasingly become - characterized by mutual hostility or confrontation, although the probability seems high that such confrontation will not develop into armed conflict. Yet why should this be so particularly in the light of what has been said above with regard to the considerable resources at South Africa's command and the equally considerable desire on the part of the African states to tap as many sources of aid and trade as they can?

The answer to the above question may be provided by reference to a number of variables that seem germane to the conduct of interstate relations between developed and underdeveloped states, given that these relations are conducted in

¹⁸It may be noted here that in this chapter the study is concerned to introduce the main hypotheses and the propositions bearing on them. Further elaboration of these propositions and the empirical evidence underlying their formulation will be developed in succeeding chapters.

a political atmosphere in which ideological factors have relevance.¹⁹ Reference is here made to the following variables:

- (a) The linkage between domestic and foreign policies and especially the impact of ideology on interstate interactions;
- (b) The role and relevance of economic factors in international relations, and especially the role and impact of foreign aid as a tool of foreign policy;
- (c) The strain toward "assertive sovereignty" in the new states, and the dynamic interaction of this orientation with variables (a) and (b).

The selection of these variables may, at first sight, appear random. Indeed, as presented, they lack any evident logical linkage. However, with respect to the problem under review, such a link exists at least empirically, as is demonstrated below.

¹⁹It should be noted that the following formulations are developed basically within the structural and temporal confines of the problem or case to which this study addresses itself, viz., South Africa's relations with the new Africa. They, however, may have value as heuristic devices for analysis of interstate interactions in comparable contexts.

To postulate a link between a country's domestic ideology and policies and its general international posture is almost a truism. This link exists not only in the sense that political elites who shape a country's foreign policies seek by such policies to promote the interests of their country and citizenry as they define these interests, but also in the sense that the elites' perception of the international political environment is itself a derivative of the relevant national political culture.²⁰ That culture evidently "biases" or "colours" the way external reality is perceived, defined, categorized and understood or interpreted.²¹ In particular, and for purposes

²⁰Gabriel A. Almond, in his study: The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1950), p. 29, observes: "Attitudes and opinions toward foreign policy are not only to be understood as responses to objective problems and situations, but as conditioned by culturally imposed qualities of character. These largely unconscious patterns of reaction and behavior strongly influence the perception, selection, and evaluation of political reality ... At the elite level [these psycho-cultural factors] affect patterns of policy making."

²¹Ibid., especially pp. 30-68. Also, as an example of this, see the lucid and perceptive assessment of the American national style and political ideology and how they affect patterns of foreign policy making in that country, in Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), Part II.

of this study, it is assumed that the political ideology²², above all, constitutes a crucially relevant category in terms of its influence on the elites' perception of the external world and the objectives to be pursued within that world.

Needless to say, this statement is intended to hold for elites

²²Ideology is here understood to mean a set of ideas held by a sociopolitical group or individual members thereof, that systematically expresses the values (especially political values) that the group purports to live by or wishes to live by. Such a set of ideas may be directed to the preservation or "conservation" of the current state of affairs, or it may be directed to the modification or radical alteration, of the said state of affairs. The ideology may also, and often does, include some conception of man's past, estimates of "probable lines of future development" and a set of prescriptions relating to ways of hastening, retarding or modifying such future development. See Joseph G. LaPalombara, "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 60, No. 1, (March 1966), p. 7; Charles P. Schleicher, International Relations: Cooperation and Conflict (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1962), p. 74.

Note that, as defined, ideology is action-oriented or has "action consequences." In this respect we may agree with Franz Schurmann's refinement of the concept of ideology when he says it has both "pure" and "practical" aspects. In Schurmann's words: "Pure ideology is a set of ideas designed to give the individual a unified and conscious world view; practical ideology is a set of ideas designed to give the individual rational instruments for action." See Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1966), p. 22.

The term ideology as used here seems more explicit in connotation than the "psycho-cultural" or "national character" variables that Almond (The American People and Foreign Policy, Ch. III) attempts to work with. The concept of national character seems somewhat spongy and nebulous as even Almond himself admits (p. 29). Moreover, the concept cannot be applied to the new states where, in general, the "nation" as an integrated sociopolitical entity does not yet exist.

in both the initiating state and the target state.²³ The influence of the ideology of the initiating state on the target state may manifest itself in any one of three sets of consequences. The influence of the ideology may be:

- (i) integrative;
- (ii) isolative; or,
- (iii) "neutral."

An ideology that is "integrative" would - other things being equal - tend to induce favourable responses on the part of the target state to the moves of the state initiating given policies that affect the target state. That is, the probability seems high that target state B will respond sympathetically, or even favourably, to the policy initiatives of state A if B already "accepts" the set of values (or ideology) that inspires such policy initiatives, or in terms of which such initiatives are justified by A. Put differently, if the ideologies of two

²³The "initiating state" is the state that formulates or develops some policy or set of policies designed to affect some other state, or what is here referred to as the "target state." (It is conceded that in a highly inter-dependent world the policies of country X may affect country Y without X's having sought to promote such a state of affairs. This consideration is, however, peripheral to the present analysis which is concerned with country X's explicitly-formulated policies designed to affect the behaviour of Y in some way.)

or more states are congruent, the patterns of behaviour internationally of such states will tend to coincide.²⁴ Thus for example, the new states of Asia and Africa which came into existence after successful anti-colonial revolutions have as a whole shown themselves to be so committed to the values and goals of independence from colonial rule that they have come to form an identifiable, if informal, grouping that tends to take common stands on certain issues of international politics.²⁵ On issues relating to colonialism, for example, the international behaviour of such states tends to be synchronized due to the values that these states hold in common - commitment to nationalism and political self-determination

²⁴This is not to say such states will develop common policies on any given issue (though this possibility is not excluded). It should be evident that even where basic values and goals are shared, differences may appear regarding methods to be adopted for the pursuit of desired ends. Moreover, a state's foreign policy at any one time may be more or less significantly affected by such ^{as} the (constitutional) nature of the regime and the idiosyncratic factors of personality, i.e., personality of policy maker(s). For more detailed treatment of these and other variables that bear on foreign policy decision-making, see James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 31-43.

²⁵The reference here is to the so-called Afro-Asian group at the United Nations.

for peoples under colonial rule.²⁶

The ideology of a given state - state A in the example above - may tend to be viewed negatively by the state (B) that is the target of the policies of A. In this case the ideology upholds values that are regarded by the target state as violative of its own, possibly-deeply-held - values. In this case, A's system of values is isolative in terms of its overall impact on B. Although such states as A and B may develop relations with each other, e.g., commercial relations, such relations are likely to be conducted in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion or mistrust. An ideology such as, for example, "communism" is evidently isolative in its impact on those who uphold Western liberal-democratic values. Hence, the warnings that are sometimes uttered by some of the latter about: "the communist threat," the communist" conspiracy," or, simply, the danger of "totalitarianism."²⁷ These evaluations -

²⁶Indeed, Inis L. Claude, The Changing United Nations (New York: Random House, 1967), Ch. 3, argues that "the drive for decolonization or the anti-colonial movement" has - together with the Cold War and the development of thermonuclear weapons - exercised a powerful impact on international politics in the postwar period. Hence, Claude observes, an act apparently illegal in international law such as India's invasion of Goa in 1961, was upheld by the U.N., the bulk of whose members reject the ideology and practice of colonialism.

²⁷In their book, A Forward Strategy for America (New York: 1961), R. Strausz-Hupe, William R. Kintner, and Stefan T. Possony, argue that the real issue between East and West is "totalitarianism versus the open, liberal democratic society ..." (p. 8) They also assert the impossibility of coexistence between the two opposed systems (ibid., and passim).

whether soundly based or not - have importance and relevance to the conduct of interstate relations insofar as they indicate the relative lack of compatibility between the ideology of one state or society and another. This lack of compatibility tends to separate out, or to isolate, from each other the states concerned, whenever they are involved in any process of interaction. An isolative ideology in short tends to exercise a negative impact on all areas of interstate relations. As Rapoport has observed, with regard to East-West relations:

No explanation of the present East-West conflict can make sense without a heavy reliance on ideological issues and causes. If the conflict ~~was~~ entirely about strategic and political matters (Germany, Southeast Asia and so forth) it could, in principle, be settled on that level ...We must conclude that more covert or more 'irrational' factors are operating to inhibit the liquidation of the conflict ...These factors [are derived] from the ideological commitments of the opponents, that is, from ways of thinking rooted in different world views.²⁸

Finally, it is conceivable that the basic political values of two states seeking to establish relations with each other may, in spite of any incompatibilities, constitute no barrier to the said establishment of relations. In this case

²⁸Anatol Rapoport, "Perceiving the Cold War," in Roger Fisher, ed., International Conflict and Behavioral Science (New York: Basic Books, 1964), p. 14. (Emphasis in original.)

the ideologies of the two states become, as it were, more or less "neutral" from the point of view of the conduct of relations between the two states involved. In other words, each party to those relations, and in particular the target state, is persuaded that the ideology of the other party is more or less "external" to the conduct of their mutual relations. Whatever ideological incompatibilities exist in such a case are either sloughed off or minimized. The states concerned would in this case tend to place such a premium on the establishment of relations (considered mutually beneficial) that they would be prepared to institute, with respect to each other, a high degree of "ideological disarmament."²⁹

It is important to note that a situation of "ideological disarmament" is not likely in practice to remain frozen. Since "ideological disarmament" does not imply the liquidation of ideologies but merely the ~~diminution~~ of ideological conflict, a situation of "ideological disarmament" is likely, sooner or later, to evolve in the direction of one or the other of the two polar cases of ideological relationships - the "integrative," or the "isolative." Given the fact that two states are prepared to render their ideologies "neutral" in the interests of

²⁹The notion of "ideological disarmament" is borrowed from ibid., pp. 25-26.

developing relations that are mutually perceived as beneficial, we would anticipate that the further development of the two states' relations at the level of ideology will increasingly be toward the "integrative." In other words, the two states will tend to emphasize whatever ideological compatibilities can be found in their systems, or will tend to move toward some kind of "convergence" in outlook or policy, domestic or international.³⁰

In general, it can be expected that all states will seek to maximize the attractiveness of their particular political ideologies with respect to any potential or actual target states. They seek to make such ideologies "integrative"³¹ or, at the very least, "neutral." Hence, as will be shown in this study, the government of South Africa, finding its ideology of

³⁰For an interesting exploration of the theory of "convergence" of sociopolitical systems whose ideological underpinnings derive from different world views, see Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington, Political Power USA/USSR (New York: Viking Press, 1964).

³¹For example, in their relations with the developing countries in the early period of the Cold War, the major powers of both East and West were evidently at pains to render their ideologies "integrative" vis-a-vis the so-called uncommitted countries. In the words of Stanley Hoffmann, "The bipolar struggle (between East and West) is a contest for the minds of at least as much as a fight for men, markets, resources, or space." Hoffmann, The State of War: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 163-164.

apartheid and the policies flowing therefrom generally repugnant to the new African states, has sought to reassure the latter that that ideology is irrelevant to the establishment of normal and beneficial interstate relations.³² The South African government is in effect attempting to render the apartheid ideology non-isolative by assuring potential target states that the ideology is of purely domestic import and application and poses no threat to those outside. This study argues that this attempt to render apartheid neutral is unlikely to succeed; the ideology is likely to remain basically isolative in effect and thus render unlikely the possibility of peaceful coexistence as between South Africa and the bulk of the new African states.³³

³²Commenting on the visit to South Africa of a Malawian ministerial delegation (March 13, 1967), South African foreign minister Hilgard Muller observed that the visit was "of historic significance and [that it] should serve as an example to others that peaceful coexistence is possible in Southern Africa between nations whose internal policies may not necessarily be the same." Anti-Apartheid News (London), April 1967. (Emphasis added.)

³³Since South Africa has already established "friendly relations" with some of the African states, notably Malawi and the Malagasy Republic (strictly speaking one should not include here countries like Lesotho and Swaziland, the geographical situation of which makes their subordination to South Africa inevitable), it would be absurd to state that South Africa cannot develop such relations with any African country. The interesting point here is that in those cases where - for economic and other reasons - these relations develop, a process of "ideological disarmament" occurs. There may even be a development toward the "integrative" ideological situation, at least with regard to the foreign policy values of the elites involved. On this, see especially Chapter V below.

IV

In spite of its relevance to the problem of the development of interstate relations, ideology is of course far from being the only variable of importance in interstate interactions. That is, ideology cannot serve as a kind of overall monist explanatory variable for complex processes such as the development and conduct of interstate relations. In other words, the development of interstate relations can neither be predetermined nor foreclosed by ideological factors alone. In particular, an accounting of interaction processes must also take into consideration factors that relate to the purposes of human actors, or policy makers. The transition from a consideration of political cultural and ideological variables to variables relating to the purposes of human actors is justified methodologically by the assumption that policy makers are not merely passive agents whose course of action is predetermined by the given factors of culture (among others), but rather are purposive actors with more or less clearly defined strategies

for the pursuit and attainment of desired ends.³⁴

The next question to consider, with regard to the subject of this study, relates therefore to the strategies South Africa might use to achieve normal relations with the new African states, especially those states that might be opposed to such normalization of relations on the basis of the isolative ideology of apartheid. In more general terms, the question here relates to the strategies that are available - in theory - to a developed country that is desirous of establishing "friendly" relations with one or more underdeveloped countries,³⁵

³⁴For a brief but useful discussion of these issues, see Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXI, No. 4 (December 1967), pp. 971-982. It may be noted that the study is not here concerned to discuss the goals or specific objectives of a state's foreign policy. Objectives of particular policies can only be discovered or examined by reference to a concrete case - as is attempted later in this study. Nor can one proceed with the analysis on the basis of what is sometimes called the "national interest" of states. Ultimately, the so-called national interest is defined subjectively by policy makers in concrete situations. See also J. C. Plano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969), pp. 128-129.

³⁵The term underdevelopment is to be understood only in its economic sense. Underdeveloped countries are those countries with a relatively low per capita output. Additionally, underdeveloped countries are characterized by economies that are structurally-dependent on foreign (developed) economies, for example, in the sense that the underdeveloped economy has a high ratio of both exports and imports to national product, is dependent on foreign developed economies or countries for development capital as well as for the bulk of the manufactured goods usable by the population of the underdeveloped country. See Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Marzani and Munsell, 1960), pp. 134-136; Maurice Dobb, Economic Growth and Underdeveloped Countries (New York: International Publishers, 1963), pp. 1-11; Reginald Green and Ann Seidman, Unity or Poverty? The Economics of Pan-Africanism (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 92-95.

especially those countries that might initially be opposed to the establishment of such relations. In their attempts to establish interstate relations in situations of this kind, many developed countries have resorted to various strategies the major component of which seems to consist in the dispensing of military, economic and technical, or "foreign" aid.³⁶

Foreign aid as a process whereby resources are transferred from one country to another may create a favourable impression

³⁶It may be asked why foreign aid is here thought to be strategic a weapon in the hands of a developed state seeking to establish friendly relations with some target state or states in the underdeveloped or so-called developing world. After all, a militarily powerful state such as South Africa (powerful in relation to other African states) could, in theory at least, use its power to control patterns of behaviour in weaker states that conflict with its own interests. Apart from current international disapprobation of "gun-boat" diplomacy (the 1956 Franco-British Suez venture being one example of a case over which such disapprobation by the international community was generated), the answer to the above question lies in the fact that military power tends in general to accomplish only a negative effect, viz., to prevent undesired actions being initiated against the wielder of such power or to punish such actions if they take place. For example, deterrence strategy essentially seeks to prevent hostile behaviour by making it clear in advance that such behaviour would not benefit the perpetrator. (As will be shown, South Africa's military strategy vis-a-vis other African states derives in part from such deterrence premises.)

Military power thus deters and punishes. It does not of itself induce "friendship" or "good behaviour" on the part of the adversary or victim. (See E. James Lieberman, "Threat and Assurance in the Conduct of Conflict," in Roger Fisher, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-122). Foreign aid, on the other hand, may be said to be capable of inducing friendly behaviour in the target state since it answers to the perceived needs of the underdeveloped country itself.

in the elites of a target state to the extent that it alleviates temporary difficulties or helps in the solution of major long-term socioeconomic problems. It may even be said that such aid is politically successful to the extent that it helps the elites of the recipient state to maintain themselves in power, for in such a situation these elites would then be beholden to the donor government.³⁷

An important limitation of aid as a friendship-inducing device is that it implies a dependence relation. The term dependence as used here may be understood in two senses, economic and political. In economic terms a situation of dependence arises when a state or society draws the bulk of its capital and other imports from one source and when the bulk of its exports go to one destination.³⁸ This, however, is an extreme case. One can conceive of the situation depicted here developing gradually. Thus, dependence in this case may be regarded as a developing situation, a process. Politically, dependence or satellization is a situation akin to the relationship

³⁷The type of aid referred to here may, for example, assist the recipient government to maintain or build large military forces and other coercive instrumentalities used to hold down domestic revolts.

³⁸See also Bert F. Hoselitz, Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960), p. 93.

subsisting between an imperial power and its colony. In a satellized state or political system, members of the dominating state directly influence, or even participate in the making of, policy decisions of the former.³⁹ Put differently, this means that to the extent that a state is dependent on another economically, in the sense indicated, its political policies become subject to more or less direct influence by the dominant state.

To return to the question of South Africa's relations with the African states, the government of that country appears to proceed on the assumption that by extending economic aid to these states it can achieve their satellization. This position was stated, with little equivocation, by South African prime minister, John Vorster. Asked by a correspondent of a foreign news magazine how he viewed South Africa's relations with the rest of Africa, Mr. Vorster replied that he expected that these relations would be analogous to those that obtain as between the United States and many underdeveloped countries. He went on:

³⁹This refers to a situation similar to Rosenau's notion of a "penetrated political system," i.e., a system in which elites from another political system share in the allocation of values. See James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 65-71.

We wish to avoid the dangers of neo-colonialism in any pattern of assistance which may be agreed upon ... In many respects we have, with respect to much of Africa south of the Sahara, a responsibility which the United States has undertaken on a much larger scale with respect to the underdeveloped areas of the world as a whole. Although we do not publicise it, we are already doing quite a lot in this field.⁴⁰

The same sentiment was echoed even more forthrightly by Vorster's minister of police, S. L. Muller, when he declared:

South Africa has a calling not to remain small and narrow-minded but to become great and to make our influence felt in the world - in the first instance in Africa, to ensure our own safety and not for the sake of being walsy-palsy with non-whites.⁴¹

⁴⁰U.S. News and World Report, November 14, 1966. It is interesting in this regard to note that one student of post-war American foreign policy asserts unequivocally that the foreign aid aspect of that policy "has been mainly political, in that [the United States] has utilized economic power to control the foreign policies of other states in order to enhance its own security." See Charles P. Schleicher, International Relations: Cooperation and Conflict (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1962), p. 256. See also Joan M. Nelson, Aid, Influence and Foreign Policy (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1968), passim.

It may also be noted here that before South Africa had started using aid as an instrument of foreign policy, some of her leaders felt it necessary to warn the newly-emerging African states against uncritically accepting such aid. In 1959, for example, the then South African foreign minister, Mr. Eric Louw advised African leaders to be wary of offers of economic aid from abroad, for, as he observed, "if assistance is granted by a foreign government, a political quid pro quo will be demanded (or at least expected)." See Eric Louw, "The Union [of South Africa] and the Emergent States of Africa," in SABRA, eds., South Africa in the African Continent (Stellenbosch: SABRA, 1959), p. 12.

⁴¹Muhammad Speaks (Chicago), February 20, 1970. (Emphasis added.)

If, under the given conditions, satellization or imperial control over the international behaviour of target states is both the purpose and result of foreign aid policies directed principally to selected target states, two types of response are likely to be forthcoming from the target states themselves. The response may be in the form of acquiescence to satellization - in which case the government of the target state is likely to adjust at least certain portions of its behaviour and ideology toward a situation of compatibility with those of the initiating state. The other type of response on the part of target states may be in the form of resistance to satellization. It is contended here that in many underdeveloped countries such resistance is likely to be forthcoming especially due to ^{the} a third major variable listed above, viz., the strain toward "assertive sovereignty" in the new states.

The concept of assertive sovereignty as used here implies basically two things. First, it means that the newly-independent (or underdeveloped) state, as well as enjoying a formal juridical independence, seeks in a rather "conspicuous" even if mainly symbolic manner, to show itself free ~~f~~rom external control. The state in this situation strains ~~to~~ demonstrate openly that its claims to independent status must receive attention and recognition both domestically and

externally. But since the state in this situation, by definition lacks any significant units of power⁴² with which to back its claims to sovereignty internationally, it resorts to the manipulation of symbols, especially verbal symbols, to "assert" its sovereignty. This manipulation of verbal and other symbols has a significant impact on the development of relations between developed and underdeveloped states. Moreover, such impact may often be in the direction of antagonizing any existing relations between such states. Two hypothetical examples may be suggested to illustrate the phenomenon being referred to in this connection: The elites of developing country X may find themselves - whether due to strongly-held principles or for domestic political reasons - persistently attacking the policies of country Y, a major power. The latter may retaliate, say by limiting the amount of its trade with X or simply by threatening to take measures in future against any more "provocations" from X. In another example which is similar to the above, Y may threaten similar retaliation (as in the above case) if, for example, X persistently votes against Y at the United Nations or in some other international forum. The result of such patterns of action and response is to produce or exacerbate an atmosphere of hostility between X

⁴²For example, a highly developed economy, or military power, etc.

and Y. What is important in both of these cases is that a condition of hostility, the identification of which initially lies in X's resort to verbal and action symbols (the verbal denunciation or the vote at the U.N.), is progressively reinforced and exacerbated. In this case it is immaterial that X, a poor and weak country, is unable to take effective retaliatory action against Y; relations of hostility and conflict can be generated "without shots being fired" and once such a pattern of conflict is established it may persist for a long time since it tends to develop a dynamic of its own.⁴³

The second aspect of the strain toward assertive sovereignty manifests itself in the developing state's support - again often symbolic - of pro-independence movements or aspirations elsewhere. As recent repudiators of the doctrine of colonial legitimacy, many of the leaders of the new states tend to regard as natural allies those movements or forces engaged in ^{the} further repudiation of colonialism. More fundamentally, in repudiating colonialism everywhere, the new states tend to legitimize, on

⁴³Oran Young argues that in a crisis (and one can add to this the conflict situations being depicted here), positions of protagonists "become harder to relinquish as they become invested with emotional commitments and as they are subjected to greater publicity over time." The Politics of Force (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 263.

a wider international scale, their own recently-achieved sovereignty. That is, the more the principle of national independence is accepted and extended globally, the more legitimate and secure tends to become the status of those states whose claim to international recognition is recent and perhaps still tenuous. Consequently, although the new states may not be able decisively to influence the fate of pro-independence movements elsewhere, the very symbolic support they afford such movements places them in opposition to supporters of the (colonial) status quo.

In southern Africa, the new African states wish to see a change in the status quo. However, it is precisely this which brings them into conflict with the colonial and minority racial regimes in the area. These regimes, led by the Republic of South Africa, proclaim their desire for friendly relations with the new African states, but only on condition that the latter are prepared to respect the status quo in colonial southern Africa.⁴⁴ In this fundamental disagreement lies the conflict which is likely to characterize relations between

⁴⁴This is a constant theme of South African government pronouncements on the question of relations with the African states. Eric Louw, for example, declared in 1959 that relations with the African states had to be based on the recognition by these states that South Africa is a "permanently White African state." Louw in SABRA, op. cit., p. 21.

South Africa and her allies on the one hand and the bulk of the new African states on the other.

V

One may now summarize the formulations developed above. It has been postulated that in interactions between any two or more states, ideology may play a more or less important role in helping to determine the character of these interactions. If the ideologies of the interacting states are integrative, cooperation between or among such states is likely to be highly facilitated. In the case of isolative ideologies, the opposite development is likely; although an "intermediate" stage of interaction is possible in spite of ideological divergences. That is, cooperation between states is possible in face of ideological divergences if such states decide to treat their conflicting ideologies as "neutral" elements with respect to their mutual relations. In such situations "ideological disarmament" would have occurred. It has also been suggested, however, that ideological disarmament may itself be caused by processes whereby the conflicting ideologies are becoming more alike or more integrative.

In terms of economic relationships, it has been suggested that where one state depends on another to a disproportionate extent for inputs of aid, imports and export markets, a process

of political satellization is likely to ensue. As the process of economic dependence accelerates, satellization can conceivably reach a point when the dependent state loses any independent initiative in the formulation of its policies, particularly foreign policies. Attempts at satellization should, however, be seen from the point of view of factors that tend to counteract them. Apart from ideological considerations discussed above, it has been suggested that many of the elites in the new states tend to show acute sensitivity to developments that seem to them to derogate from their states' newly acquired sovereignty. There is here what has been referred to as a compulsive drive for "assertive sovereignty."

Applied to the case of South Africa's relations with the African states, the above propositions lead to the assertion that ideological factors are likely to pose a continuing difficulty to the South African government in its efforts to cultivate friendly relations with the new states to the north. It is noted that South Africa has recourse to its wealth which can be used to exert political leverage on the African states. While this device has already been used successfully in the case of South Africa's relations with Malagasy and Malawi, it is not likely to be efficacious so far as the bulk of the African states are concerned. This is so both because South

Africa does not have the resources to aid more than a few states and because, above all, South African interest in satellizing these states is unlikely to be accepted by their governments.

VI

It now remains to indicate the way the study is organized, the type of data employed and the methodological assumptions informing their selection for use in the analysis.

Chapter II briefly reviews South Africa's policies towards Africa prior to 1948. The aim in this chapter is to place in perspective "traditional" South African conceptions of the place and role of that country in Africa. It is noted that even as early as the 1920's and 1930's South African policy makers were already pursuing policies intended to establish for their country a dominant position as a regional power in southern Africa.⁴⁵

Chapter III deals with the early political and diplomatic interactions between South Africa and the new African states. It lays stress on: South Africa's policy towards these

⁴⁵In this study southern Africa includes, apart from South Africa itself and the former British High Commission Territories, South West Africa, Angola, Zambia, Southern Rhodesia, Malawi and Mozambique. See Appendix A for a map of the region.

states, under the regime of premier Verwoerd; the domestic political context of South African policies and actions; and the general attitudes and reactions of the African states to the system of apartheid in South Africa. The chapter explores the nature of the confrontation characterizing the said interactions and reveals the failure of South Africa to develop a viable African policy prior to the mid-1960's.

South Africa's partial success in ending her diplomatic isolation from the rest of the African states is the subject of Chapter IV. This success, achieved in terms of the South African government's new "outward-looking" policy, is analyzed both in terms of factors contributing to it and the objectives underlying the outward-looking policy. These objectives are mainly strategic, economic and political in character. It is asserted that their realization would contribute immensely to South African domination of the southern African subcontinent as a whole.

Chapter V deals with some African responses and reactions to the outward-looking policy. Particular attention is focused on the contrasting policies of Zambia, Malawi and Botswana with regard to relations with South Africa. The chapter analyzes the economic and ideological factors underlying these contrasting policies. It attempts to indicate the

implications for these countries of their positions on South Africa. For Malawi, satellization seems indicated as the probable consequence of her developing relations with South Africa; for Zambia, increasingly hostile pressure from the South African regime may be expected for the future in view of Zambian rejection of the outward-looking policy and that country's support of southern African liberation movements. Botswana is even more vulnerable than Zambia and her policy vis-a-vis South Africa has to reflect extreme caution.

Chapter VI analyzes the outward-looking policy from the point of view of its impact on South African domestic (i.e., "white") politics. The data used in this chapter - while admittedly inadequate - seem to point to the fact that there is a wide measure of support for, or at least acquiescence in - the government's policy on the part of white South Africans. It is also noted in this chapter that that policy is likely to be continued both because of the said support or acquiescence and because of the importance attached to the objectives of the outward-looking policy by the policy's leading exponent, namely, South African prime minister John Vorster himself.

Chapter VII concludes the study.

A Note on Scope and Methodology

As already indicated above, the study covers the period 1948-1968 in its exploration of the development of South Africa's policies toward Africa. Chapter II which deals with the pre-1948 period has, however, been included due mainly to the light it sheds on some persistent themes of South Africa's policies directed to the rest of Africa.

Insofar as the new African states' responses to South African policies are concerned, the focus is on the newly-independent states of southern Africa, particularly Malawi, Botswana and Zambia,⁴⁶ as well as such east African states as Tanzania. This choice is dictated both by considerations of the manageability of the material and by the fact that South African policy makers have themselves seemingly directed particular attention to winning the friendship of countries in southern Africa, and to some extent east Africa also. The choice of southern Africa as the priority area for the

⁴⁶While Lesotho and Swaziland are not entirely excluded, their policies vis-a-vis South Africa are not given the same attention as those of the other states of southern Africa. One reason for this is the one given under footnote 33 above. Then too, several studies have previously explored the situation of these territories adequately. See, for example, J. E. Spence, Lesotho: The Politics of Dependence (London: Oxford University Press, 1968); Jack Halpern, South Africa's Hostages (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965); Richard Stevens, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1967).

extension of the outward-looking policy is intended to subserve South Africa's vital interests in this region.

A few points may be noted with regard to methodology. First, this study explores interactive processes in which independent states are the major actors. The interactions to be described and analyzed are diplomatic, political, ideological, strategic and economic. The objective underlying such an exploration is to indicate the direction in which these interactions tend: whether they conduce to relations of conflict or cooperation, confrontation or peaceful co-existence, insofar as the states involved are concerned.

Second, a combination of approaches to the data is utilized. Thus, an historical approach is to some extent unavoidable since the study seeks in large part to outline the development (i.e., the unfolding over time) of a specific country's policies and relations with other countries. In addition, the study makes use of aggregate data such as statistics relating to trade, national budgets and especially national expenditures on such items as the military and related services. These and similar statistics often can yield significant information regarding policy makers' perception of the environment around them and their conception of

appropriate responses to problems occurring in that environment. As one student of international relations has noted:

By analyzing comparative data [such as] national defense expenditures, one might reveal important facts about relations between nations, and about the foreign policy process generally.⁴⁸

A considerable part of the study seeks to analyze the stated ideological preferences, observations on foreign policy and other relevant pronouncements, of governmental elites in the states involved. The assumption underlying this approach is that such material tends to indicate the framework in which policies are developed and helps to reveal the perceptions of the said elites with respect to the international situation confronting them at any given time. This approach may be justified from at least three standpoints.

First, in the new African states, foreign policy issues cannot be viewed from considerations of national power - usually conceived of in military terms - since such power is often lacking. This means that most African states are not in fact able to affect the international environment, or "the world around them," in any decisive fashion. Consequently,

⁴⁸ Gilbert R. Winham, "Quantitative Methods in Foreign Policy Analysis," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 2 (June 1969), p. 190.

ideology, or the manipulation of other verbal symbols, becomes their strongest forte. Moreover, since these states have a very short history of existence as states or national societies, what constitutes "national interests" are largely the goals and purposes declared to be such by the elites who govern these countries. The "images" of themselves that these states project to the outside world are largely a derivative or reflection of the political ideology and style of the governmental elites in these countries. As Mohan has observed:

The national interests of a new state at independence are neither given, nor yet fixed; they are waiting to be defined, indeed to be shaped by the country's leadership out of the admittedly slender resources and choices available to it.⁴⁹

Second, the problem of elite perceptions can also be linked to environmental factors which bear upon foreign policy formulation. For example, if one takes environment to mean, say, geography, it becomes a relevant question to inquire into the problem of what particular governmental leaders think or imagine or perceive their environment to be. Such perceptions, as indicated in policy pronouncements for example, can give

⁴⁹Jitendra Mohan, in a review of W. Scott Thompson's Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1966 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), in Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (April 1970), p. 157.

the analyst some idea of what the policy makers feel can be or ought to be achieved within the (perceived) parameters of their environment.⁵⁰ Third, reference to elite perceptions and ideologies alerts one to the question of "linkages" between foreign and domestic politics, for the values or goals governing elites seek to realize at the international level are often related to domestic political imperatives and situations.⁵¹

In general, therefore, the study utilizes a methodology combining historical analysis and interpretation, analysis of aggregate data and examination and interpretation of certain items of officially communicated or published data.

⁵⁰As Harold and Margaret Sprout have pointed out, analysis of foreign policy must not only take account of the purposes or goals pursued by policy makers, it should also assess the environmental data that are "deemed" relevant by the policy makers as they estimate their situation. See their "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics" in Harold Karan Jacobson and William Zimmerman, eds., The Shaping of Foreign Policy (New York: The Atherton Press, 1969), Ch. 2.

⁵¹For a fuller analysis of linkage phenomena consult James N. Rosenau, ed., Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems (New York: The Free Press, 1969), especially Chapters 1, 3 and 12.

CHAPTER II

THE COLONIAL ERA IN AFRICA: DREAMS OF EXPANSION

The building up of a strong white community to hold and develop the healthy highlands stretching from Rhodesia to Kenya would be a magnificent [undertaking].

Jan Christiaan Smuts in Africa and Some World Problems, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1930, p. 64.

I

Established in 1910 as a European-controlled state under the auspices of the British Empire, the Union of South Africa gained independence at a time when most of the African continent had entered upon a period of sustained European imperialist control following upon the so-called Scramble for Africa in the 1880's.¹ Thus, whilst the rest of the continent was to remain under effective European control, as colonies, for almost fifty years, its southernmost portion was emerging as a unified sovereign state in which political power was reserved exclusively in the hands of a small minority

¹ Among works dealing with the unification of South Africa the following seem particularly useful: Eric A. Walker, A History of South Africa (London: Longmans, Green and Co.: 2nd Edition, 1940); Leonard M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, 1902-1910 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1960); Nicholas Mansergh, South Africa, 1906-1961: The Price of Magnanimity (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1962).

of European settlers.²

This chapter seeks to examine the position of South Africa vis-a-vis colonial Africa during the first forty years of the Union's existence as an independent state. In other words, it is intended to indicate at some length South Africa's conception of its own position and role in Africa during this period. In thus exploring the origins, nature and significance of the Union's extra-territorial policies, the analysis aims at putting in historical perspective current South African attitudes and policies toward the rest of the continent.

The claim has been made that prior to 1948 South Africa did not have an independent foreign policy, and that, rather, most foreign policy decisions affecting that country were made in London.³ The validity of this assessment is very much in doubt, unless it is meant merely to refer to the fact that South Africa's involvement and interactions with the world in general

²The population of the Union in 1911 was constituted roughly as follows:

Africans	4,019,000
Europeans	1,276,000
Coloureds	428,000
Asians	150,000

See Walker, op. cit., p. 579.

³Edwin S. Munger, Notes on the Formation of South African Foreign Policy (Pasadena: The Castle Press, 1965), pp. 16 and 28.

were undertaken within the context of the British Empire (later Commonwealth) and that Britain itself, being the most important of South Africa's economic and commercial partners,⁴ was strategically placed to influence the main lines of South African foreign policy.⁵

⁴For a full exposition of the historic, economic and other ties between South Africa and Britain, see Denis Austin, Britain and South Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1966).

⁵An example of the role Britain played in influencing South African participation in international events of great consequence is provided by the two world wars. See, for example, W. K. Hancock, Smuts (2 Vols.); Vol. 1: The Sanguine Years, 1870-1919; Vol. 2: The Fields of Force, 1919-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962 and 1968).

It should be noted, however, that South African participation in both world wars was attended by serious splits in the ranks of the ruling Afrikaner element of the white population. The split was between the extreme nationalists such as General J. B. M. Hertzog, D. F. Malan, H. F. Verwoerd, and B. J. Vorster, who opposed collaboration with Britain in favour of war-time neutrality and the subsequent establishment of a South African republic, and those who, like Generals Louis Botha and J. C. Smuts, preferred to operate in the framework of the British Empire and Commonwealth both in peace time and during war. In both world wars the latter group was able to carry the day. See Hancock, Smuts: The Fields of Force, pp. 367-370; Brian Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 22-29, 79-104; Nicholas Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 168-169.

(All six men mentioned above have served as prime ministers of South Africa. Botha served as the Union's first prime minister, 1910-1919; Smuts succeeded Botha in 1919 and continued as prime minister up to 1924, returning to the office, 1939-1948. Hertzog, the founder of the (Afrikaner) Nationalist party, was prime minister, 1924-1939, and when his party resumed control of the government after the elections of 1948, Malan took over as prime minister until his death in 1954; Verwoerd held the post, 1958-1966, and Vorster, 1966 to the present.)

Although the British and Commonwealth connection was of importance in influencing the main lines of South African foreign policy especially in the pre-World War II period, it did not in every respect preclude the possibility of South Africa defining and developing interests and policies of her own. In particular, as a state on the African continent, South Africa could not but attempt to define her place, role and attitudes toward the rest of the continent, then almost entirely under one form or another of European overlordship, as has been indicated above.

There are a number of important features that distinguish or characterise South Africa's early policies toward the rest of the African continent. First, these policies were formulated in terms of a perspective which basically assumed the permanence, and indeed the continued desirability, of colonial rule over the continent. In terms of this perspective, any changes or modifications in the colonial situation, could only have merit if they were directed to the granting of increased political power to European settlers in the various European colonies on the continent. Second, as the wealthiest country in Africa and one with the largest settled European population that was already in complete control of its own political destiny, South Africa saw itself as the "natural" leader

of European settlers beyond South Africa's borders, and the country's African policies therefore took the Union's leadership role in Africa as axiomatic. Third, the area of interest of South Africa's policies in the first forty years of the Union's existence was, essentially, sub-Saharan Africa, especially the British colonies of southern, central and east Africa. These were the areas to which most of South Africa's policies were directed and in which South Africa saw herself as having the most direct interests which themselves will be referred to below. More generally, South Africa's foreign policies were significantly influenced and affected by domestic politics within the Union itself, in particular the relationship between the two dominant white communities of the Union, viz., the Afrikaners and the English-speaking white South Africans, as well as problems relating to the treatment of the African people of South Africa.

In short, official South African thinking on the rest of Africa during the early part of the period under review was characterized by the assumption that the colonial system would continue indefinitely. There was also the feeling that South Africa could play an important part in influencing and shaping developments in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly the region of southern, central and east Africa.

In general, it seems that in the period 1910 to the mid-1950's successive governments in South Africa sought to realize two main goals in Africa:

- (a) Incorporation, within the Union of South Africa, of adjacent colonial territories, especially the following: the British High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland, Southern Rhodesia, and South West Africa. A subordinate objective in this respect, and one which could precede the said incorporation or provide a functional alternative to it, was the promotion of larger, European settler-controlled entities (or federations) in the region extending from Southern Rhodesia to British East Africa. Such political formations were to be linked to each other economically, diplomatically, and militarily, under the general leadership of the Union of South Africa.
- (b) After World War II, more active support on the part of the Union, of the colonial system in Africa; this being a South African government response to the rapid growth of nationalism throughout much of colonial Africa.

The above two objectives of early South African policy are discussed in turn under Sections II and III below.

II

The Policy of Annexation

The vision of the southern tip of the African continent as a pivot for the establishment of a larger white-controlled political formation precedes the creation of the Union of South Africa. It may be traced to Cecil John Rhodes and his attempt, towards the end of the nineteenth century, to carve up a broad belt of British-controlled territory covering and extending beyond, the frontiers of present day South Africa.⁶ Rhodes' imperial designs failed. Indeed they culminated in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 which led to the formation of the Union of South Africa out of the two former Boer republics of the Orange Free State and the South African Republic and the British colonies of Natal and the Cape.

What is of interest here is that with the establishment of the Union, Rhodes' old dream of expansion from the south northwards was taken up by the leaders of the new state. The expansion was now, however, to be pursued in the name and in the interests of the newly unified state, rather than in the interests of an expanding British imperialism in the manner

⁶On Rhodes' dreams of an "imperial federation" in southern Africa, see, for example, Walker, op. cit., pp. 436-456.

of Rhodes. Self-consciously, South Africa was seeing itself as an emerging power on the African continent and as a state that had an important stake in the future of the continent. The nature and scope of that stake would be defined in part at least by the specific objectives that the Union's African policies were designed to accomplish. Examples of such policies are analysed below.

(1) The Attempt to Annex the High Commission Territories

The incorporation of the British High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Swaziland, and Bechuanaland into the Union was a goal on which the founders of the Union were in basic agreement.⁷ Successive South African governments and political leaders persistently sought to annex the three countries and the objective was only renounced formally in 1963.

⁷This is attested to by the inclusion in the South African constitution of a "schedule" laying out the method whereby the Territories would be annexed to the Union. See text of the South African constitution in H. R. Hahlo and Ellison Kahn, The Union of South Africa: The Development of its Laws and Constitution (London: Stevens, 1960).

Basically, annexation of the Territories was to be contingent on the affirmative votes of the two houses of the South African parliament and the subsequent concurrence of the British government. See also Leo Marquard, The Peoples and Policies of South Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 4th Ed., 1969), p. 249; Walker, op. cit., pp. 530, 533-534.

In 1935 General J. B. M. Hertzog, South Africa's third prime minister, raised the issue of the incorporation of the High Commission Territories with the British government. His representations were, however, frustrated by British parliamentary opposition to any scheme of annexation that did not take account of the feelings of the Africans in the Territories on the issue.⁸ These inhabitants of the Territories were in fact opposed to an incorporation which, in their view, would lead to their subjection to the South African pattern of race relations, including the expropriation of their land by a European minority which had already shown interest in promoting just such a goal.⁹ Indeed, as early as 1918, G. C. Oliver, an associate of General J. C. Smuts, had spoken most directly to the subject of incorporation when he declared:

Would it not be possible gradually and gently to include these regions [the High Commission Territories] in the Union and to make provisions for the different Native races in such portions

⁸Marquard, op. cit., p. 249; Walker, op. cit., pp. 645-648.

In spite of the African opposition to incorporation, Hertzog was able, the following year to advance an amount of £ 35,000 to the Territories to assist in soil conservation measures. He was still certain that annexation of the Territories was a matter of time since economic realities would in any case ultimately dictate this course. See ibid., pp. 648-649.

⁹Ibid., pp. 533-534.

of the former German territories as are not suitable for a white population.¹⁰

Ten years before this, Smuts himself had suggested that the proposed Union of South Africa should include all three of the High Commission Territories. He had urged the British government to

trust the [white] people of South Africa ...and commit the Government of the whole of British South Africa [including the High Commission Territories] unreservedly to their charge.¹¹

The annexation of the High Commission Territories was sought on various grounds. First and most obviously, the geographical position of the Territories - more particularly Basutoland and Swaziland, both of which lay ^{either} wholly or partly within South Africa's borders - was somewhat anomalous. Incorporation therefore seemed a reasonable proposition in light of

¹⁰Cited in Richard P. Stevens, "South Africa and Independent Black Africa," paper delivered at a conference at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, March 10, 1969, p. 4.

¹¹W. K. Hancock and J. van der Poel, eds., Selections From the Smuts Papers, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 440.

(Oliver and Smuts' basic argument in favour of incorporation of the High Commission Territories, namely the protection and strengthening of white political control of South Africa, was to be repeated in an official publication of the South African government some four decades later. See Union of South Africa, Fact Paper No. 13 (Pretoria: State Information Office, June 1956), especially pp. 5-10. This publication will hereafter be referred to only by title and date.

the consideration that South Africa's territorial integration would be incomplete if Basutoland, Swaziland and - with less force - Bechuanaland, were not placed under South African political jurisdiction.¹²

Economic factors also accounted for South African interest in the Territories. Much of South Africa's history had involved a struggle for land between the European colonizers and the African inhabitants. By the beginning of the 20th century, the latter had for the most part lost much of the land they had traditionally occupied and worked and it seems clear that sooner or later white South Africans would have taken a considerable portion of the land in the hands of the Africans in the High Commission Territories.¹³ Also on the economic plain, the Territories had become an important source of labour for South African mines and

¹²Ibid., p. 10. See also A. J. H. van der Walt, "Dr. Verwoerd's African Policy," Africa Institute Bulletin (Pretoria), November/December, 1966, p. 263.

¹³Walker, op. cit., pp. 533-534; Marquard, op. cit., p. 251.

industries,¹⁴ a factor which would strengthen the argument in favour of South African political control of the Territories.

A more important consideration underlying the South African policy of incorporation of the Territories relates to political and security factors. Politically, the continuation of British rule in the Territories was seen by South African leaders as something of an affront to the government of the Union, especially after that government was under the control of the (Afrikaner) Nationalist party, itself the political expression of the anti-British "Boer Republican tradition."¹⁵ It was of course evident that if the Territories

¹⁴For example, by the mid-1950's, 20 percent of South Africa's African labour force (or well over half a million workers) came from outside South Africa itself, mainly from the High Commission Territories as well as British-ruled Nyasaland and the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. See M. Horell, South Africa's Non-White Workers (Cape Town: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1956), p. 58. In 1958 alone some 214,623 African migrant workers entered the Union, mostly under various forms of short term contracts negotiated with neighbouring territories by the South African gold mining companies' Witwatersrand Native Labour Association. Of the above number of Africans entering the Union in 1958, 75,606, or about one-third of the total, came from the three High Commission Territories. See United Nations, Economic and Social Consequences of Racial Discriminatory Practices (E/CN.14/132/Rev. 1, May 1963), p. 53. Also relevant on this point is Republic of South Africa, Focus on South Africa (New York: Information Service of South Africa, n.d.), p. 44.

¹⁵Harold M. Glass, South African Policy Towards Basutoland (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, Paper No. 2, 1966), p. 21. See also J. E. Spence, Lesotho: The Politics of Dependence (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 24; and Marquard, op. cit., p. 251.

remained under British rule or guidance, South Africa would be less able to influence, let alone determine, the form and rate of their political development.

When, in the period after the Second World War, it appeared that Britain might progressively allow for a measure of self-government to develop in the Territories, South African political leaders became even more insistent in their call for the annexation of the Territories. Speaking in the South African House of Assembly on March 14, 1951, H. F. Verwoerd, then minister of Native Affairs, issued a call to the High Commission Territories to join South Africa. He cited benefits that the people of these Territories could expect to enjoy if they joined South Africa, including:

the advantages of the apartheid policy [which] will mean that the Protectorates will actually become self-governing territories and Native areas ...[The Territories should not aim at] an absurd, sudden and westernised development as in the case of the Gold Coast.¹⁶

¹⁶Cited in Glass, op. cit., pp. 25-26. Verwoerd was to repeat the same sentiment on at least one other occasion. Speaking as prime minister as well as leader of the ruling Nationalist party, he pointed out to his followers attending a conference of the Nationalist party in November, 1958: "Inclusion of the protectorates [in South Africa] is in the interest of the Bantu. But it is also in our interest ...because we shall be able to develop Bantu communities within our borders and on our borders which will not lead to enmity and clashes." H. F. Verwoerd, Verwoerd Speaks: Speeches, 1948-1966 (Johannesburg: A.P.B. Publishers, 1966), p. 197.

In this and similar statements, Verwoerd was concerned to contrast two types of self-government available to colonized Africans, as seen from the perspective of the South African government. One type of "self-government" was that which was achievable within the framework of apartheid, under the control and direction of the South African government. Such self-government was seen as superior to the second variety, viz., self-government of the "westernised" type such as that on which the Gold Coast (Ghana) was then embarked. In Verwoerd's view, Africans - at any rate those in the High Commission Territories - should prefer self-government under the apartheid system to "an absurd, sudden and westernised development as in the case of the Gold Coast."

Verwoerd was, however, not able to indicate specifically why or how the type of constitutional development then taking place on the Gold Coast had to be shunned. He seemed to take it merely as axiomatic that the apartheid system - the purported complete separation of "racial" groups in South Africa - should prove more attractive to the African inhabitants of the Territories. Verwoerd's argument, however, contained a number of contradictions which themselves reveal the basic weaknesses of the South African policy of incorporation of the High Commission Territories.

First, South African leaders such as Verwoerd, while often given to publicly proclaiming their good intentions with regard to the High Commission Territories, never seriously engaged the Africans of the Territories in any discussions pertaining to their future. Indeed, it has remained a basic problem of South African politics that the African in that country has never been taken into account except as the object of official policy.¹⁷ If the High Commission Territories were given a choice between incorporation in South Africa, but without the opportunity to negotiate the terms of entry, and a "Gold Coast" type^{of} self-government which held out the prospect of ultimate self-determination, it is hardly likely that they could choose the former. Moreover, in terms of his own argument cited above, Verwoerd, in denouncing any scheme for a "westernised ...development" in the Territories, seemed to reject "Western" forms of political development or Western-type institutions. Yet many South African political leaders including Verwoerd himself have never lost an opportunity of pointing out that they were the custodians of "Western

¹⁷ As far back as 1930 a South African leader, Dr. A. B. Xuma, had complained that Africans in his country suffered particularly from the fact that they were "excluded from the Councils of the State," i.e., excluded from the decision-making institutions and processes of their country. See A. B. Xuma, Bridging the Gap Between White and Black in South Africa (Lovedale, Cape: Lovedale Press, 1930), p. 2.

civilization" and Western values on the African continent.¹⁸ If then the High Commission Territories were to be developed on non-Western lines politically, the South African regime could not at the same time logically defend its domestic policies in the name of a Western civilization which it had in effect abjured.

Verwoerd's statement of the political options available to High Commission Africans essentially stemmed from a South African desire to provide some sort of attractive inducement to the Territories such that they might voluntarily opt for incorporation in South Africa in place of decolonization.¹⁹ The Territories

¹⁸See Verwoerd, op. cit., p. 338, Eric Louw, "The Relations Between the White and Bantu Peoples in the Union of South Africa," speech delivered to the U.N. General Assembly in 1959, reprinted as Fact Paper, No. 77 (October 1959).

¹⁹Prior to the late 1950's annexation of the Territories had been regarded by successive South African governments and official representatives or spokesmen as largely a procedural matter involving an agreement between the British and South African governments to carry out the provisions of the South African constitution relating to the incorporation of the Territories. Indeed a South African government commission, the so-called Tomlinson Commission, which investigated the practical problems relating to the implementation of the apartheid policy (1951-1954), based its calculations of the total land area available for African use in South Africa on an assumption that the Territories were destined to join the Union. See Union of South Africa, Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa (Pretoria: Government Printer, U.S. 61/1955). See also report of the debate in the South African parliament on the commission's findings and recommendations in Fact Paper, No. 11 (May 1956), especially the then Native Affairs minister Verwoerd's comments on the High Commission Territories on p. 12.

were, however, not persuaded of the value of these inducements and so continued to develop politically - though not economically - separately from South Africa. Nonetheless, the South African government continued for some time throughout much of the 1950's, to press for incorporation particularly as that government now feared that the Territories might be used as launching pads for armed attacks on South Africa by hostile forces, both internal and external.²⁰

But by the early 1960's, incorporation of the Territories appeared clearly doomed due to the combined opposition of the Africans and the British government.²¹ Consequently the South African government gradually changed tack and began to accept, if reluctantly, the possibility that the Territories would become autonomous states, separate politically from the Union itself.²² Indeed, early in 1959 Verwoerd was able to declare that the independence of the Territories was acceptable to the South African government since it accorded with

²⁰See especially Fact Paper, No. 13, June 1956, p. 5.

²¹Glass, op. cit., pp. 17-18; Spence, op. cit., pp. 26-28.

²²Glass, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

that government's own "Bantustan" policy,²³ providing for a form of "home rule" for Africans in designated areas of the Union itself. By 1966, the South African government's change of front on the High Commission Territories issue had gone so far that newly-appointed South African prime minister, John Vorster, could declare - though without much regard for historical accuracy:

It has never been our policy in South Africa to annex territories. Our policy in South Africa has been to acknowledge tribes in the places where they lived and we have protected them as far as their territories were concerned.²⁴

(2) Policy Towards Southern Rhodesia and Other Northern Territories

South Africa's pre-World War II policy of territorial expansion was by no means limited to the High Commission Territories. Annexation of the latter was merely part of a broader vision involving the establishment of a greater South Africa that would encompass, at a minimum, the colony of Southern Rhodesia. Smuts' determination to incorporate Southern Rhodesia is evident in the following excerpt from a

²³Verwoerd, Verwoerd Speaks, p. 246. See also RSA World (Pretoria), File 1, No. 2 (November 1964), p. 22.

²⁴Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, Vols. 17-18 (1966), col. 2653.

diary entry he made in April 1922:

I am going to try very hard [to incorporate Southern Rhodesia]. It would be a great thing to round off the South African state with borders far flung into the heart of the continent.²⁵

There was thus in the inter-war period, under Smuts' inspiration, a South African aspiration to the leadership of a sort of white-settler Pan-Africanism aiming at a union or alliance of settler-controlled states in southern, central and east Africa. The realization of this aspiration would depend on whether Smuts could persuade the majority of white South Africans to support his schemes. Equally important, Smuts had to win over the settlers in Southern Rhodesia if his expansionist schemes were to have any chance of success. As Professor Hancock, his biographer, has observed:

'Wider and still wider' was his [Smuts'] dream for South Africa; but if he failed in his Rhodesian attempt he would fail everywhere. On the other hand ...if he succeeded in bringing the Rhodesians in, he would hold the whiphand over the Portuguese in Mozambique; he would be in a position to establish South African control over the emergent copper industry in Northern Rhodesia, if not in Katanga; he would be able to build economic and political bridges between all the territories of white settlement as far north as Kenya.²⁶

²⁵Cited in Hancock, Smuts (Vol. 2), p. 152.

²⁶Ibid. See also Jan Christian Smuts, Africa and Some World Problems (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 64.

Southern Rhodesia therefore held the key. Whilst the incorporation of the largely African-inhabited High Commission Territories had been regarded by South African political leaders as a purely procedural matter,²⁷ the extension of the Union's power and influence into territories of significant European settlement called for different tactics. In effect, South Africa would have to negotiate with the relevant white settlers to obtain their consent to any scheme of incorporation. In this regard Southern Rhodesia held a strategic position relative to any northward expansion by the Union.

The opportunity to annex Southern Rhodesia seemed to present itself in the early 1920's, during Smuts' first term as Union prime minister. Rhodesian settlers were, at this time, scheduled to decide in a referendum whether they would join the Union or assume a larger measure of "internal self-government."²⁸ In 1921 Smuts met a Rhodesian settler

²⁷See Note 19 above.

²⁸The constitutional and political evolution of Southern Rhodesia, particularly with respect to the development of white settler politics, receives thorough and lucid treatment in Colin Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia (London: Oxford University Press, 1959). See also, Philip Mason, The Birth of a Dilemma (London: Oxford University Press, 1958); Richard Gray, The Two Nations: Aspects of the Development of Race Relations in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland (London: Oxford, 1960); Claire Palley, The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia, 1888-1965 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1966).

delegation to discuss terms under which the colony could join the Union.²⁹ The following year, during the referendum campaign, Smuts traveled to the colony with the intention of persuading the settlers to vote for union with South Africa.³⁰ As against the "parochialism" of local autonomy, Smuts urged the settlers to "take the broader point of view, the future of the [southern African] subcontinent."³¹ In the event, the settlers rejected Smuts' pleas ;³² yet South African interest in Southern Rhodesia and other northern territories was to survive the Rhodesian settlers' rejection of incorporation, as will be shown below.

Why, however, did South African leaders like Smuts regard Southern Rhodesia as of any special interest to themselves?

²⁹ Smuts offered the settlers a number of inducements including: 5 seats in the South African Senate, 17 seats in the House of Assembly; a cash payment to the colony amounting to £ 550,000 annually over ten years, to facilitate Rhodesia's economic development and offset that country's loss of customs revenue. Walker, op. cit., p. 591.

³⁰ Basil Williams, Botha, Smuts and South Africa (New York: Macmillan, 1948), pp. 129-130; Hancock, Smuts (Vol. 2), pp. 151-154.

³¹ Walker, op. cit., p. 592.

³² The referendum results were: 8,774 in favour of "self-government" and 5,989 in favour of union with South Africa. (The figures are taken from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 19 (1970), p. 278.)

It is possible that Smuts, as a representative of the pro-British Empire wing among Afrikaner politicians, saw the annexation of Southern Rhodesia as an act of (British) imperial consolidation.³³ It is possible that Smuts was persuaded of the soundness of an imperial policy aimed at consolidating or uniting British-ruled territories in Africa since this would presumably make for their political advance and economic viability as members of the Commonwealth.³⁴

Reference to the imperial factor seems, however, to fail to fully account for Smuts' policies and actions with regard to Rhodesia and other territories lying to the north of the Union. To assume that Smuts was making all his northern moves and initiatives merely in the interest of a more efficiently governed British Empire seems, on the face of it, simplistic. It is inconceivable that Smuts could have justified the not inconsiderable expense of incorporating Southern Rhodesia, already referred to above, by citing the need to rationalise

³³Williams, op. cit., pp. 191-192. Marquard, (op. cit., p. 146) points out that the Afrikaner nationalists were given to taunting Smuts as the "handyman of the British Empire." Indeed nationalist leader D. F. Malan declared flatly: "I do not consider him [Smuts] an Afrikaner." See Brian Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 86.

³⁴Smuts, in his Africa and Some World Problems, p. 64, implies strongly that this was primarily his objective. See also Williams, op. cit., pp. 191-192.

or to streamline the structure of Britain's African empire. After all, the same South Africa had sought the incorporation of the British High Commission Territories without reference to the factor of imperial consolidation. The fact that Britain herself continually rejected the incorporation of those Territories in South Africa in itself argues that that country was far from assuming that an independent South Africa could act as its agent to promote imperial territorial consolidation in Africa.

It seems clear that in seeking the annexation of Southern Rhodesia Smuts was pursuing essentially South African, rather than British imperial, goals. His call for imperial consolidation in southern Africa would be seen, from this perspective, to have been largely a tactical maneuver born of the desire to allay any suspicions the British settlers of Southern Rhodesia might have regarding joining the Union. Specifically, Smuts' policies seem to have been influenced by two considerations whose importance from the point of view of the Union's conception of its own position in Africa was to be given due recognition by his successors in the 1950's, viz., (i) South Africa's interest in consolidating and strengthening European political control in southern Africa - and perhaps also beyond that area - to the extent of foreclosing

any possibility of African-controlled governments emerging in the area; (ii) The extension of South African influence and power northwards to promote the country's economic, political, and security interests. These considerations constitute the second aspect of South Africa's policies towards Africa up to the 1950's, as already indicated at the beginning of this chapter. It is to the analysis of this aspect that the following discussion turns.

III

The Quest for European Hegemony in East and Central Africa

In Smuts' view, the position of the European settlers in east and central Africa was likely to be strengthened if a programme of mass immigration of Europeans in the area was vigorously undertaken by states such as Britain.³⁵ In particular, the white communities in Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and British-ruled East Africa had to be linked to the Union politically or in some other way, as a further guarantee of settler political hegemony over those territories. Smuts called for the creation of "a sort of African League of Nations ...for the British states."³⁶

³⁵Smuts, op. cit., pp. 64-68.

³⁶Ibid., p. 69.

It appears in all this Smuts was most concerned about the security and stability of European settler hegemony firstly in South Africa itself but also in the British colonies of east and central Africa. In his mind, white rule could be further safeguarded by the creation of larger political entities in east and central Africa, and these would then be tied to South Africa by various means, including the mechanism of annual conferences to formulate defense and other policies for the entire region. In addition to the annual conferences, Smuts suggested the setting up of a permanent secretariat to coordinate the policies and activities of the various governments involved in his "African League of Nations", in areas of common concern.³⁷

Smuts' vision of Africa's future was that of a continent in which Europeans would continue to exercise political power over the bulk of the African peoples indefinitely.³⁸ Within South Africa itself, for example, he had observed that most Europeans were united in rejecting any notion of granting political rights to black South Africans. Those who did not

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸J. C. Smuts, The Basis of Trusteeship in African Native Policy (Cape Town: South African Institute of Race Relations, New Africa Pamphlet No. 2, 1942), p. 17. See also Smuts, Africa and Some World Problems, Ch. III; and Stevens, op. cit., p. 7.

accept this fundamental fact of South African political life, Smuts noted, could be dismissed as "mad, quite mad."³⁹ In spite of his role in promoting international cooperation as well as a broader conception of human rights within the context of international organization,⁴⁰ Smuts could only see Africans in South Africa and elsewhere on the continent as wards of the Europeans. The latter were to act as trustees in a relationship in which the African was to remain a passive element except as a source of labour. European settler rule was seen by Smuts as a kind of religious duty, involving a sort of sacred "trust" which the settlers had to discharge vis-a-vis their African "wards." In Smuts' own words:

The fundamental aspect [in the concept and policy of trusteeship] is the responsibility which the trustee has towards his ward ...The whole idea of trusteeship is that there is a trust imposed on

³⁹Cited in W. E. B. DuBois, The World and Africa (New York: International Publishers, 1965 edition), pp. 43, 255. As far back as 1906, Smuts had declared: "I do not believe in politics for them [the Africans] ...So far as the Natives are concerned politics will only have an unsettling influence. I would therefore not give them the franchise." Cited in Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, p. 92.

⁴⁰Smuts' role is notable especially in the founding of the League of Nations and the United Nations. See, for example, Hancock, op. cit., passim; Williams, Botha, Smuts and South Africa, pp. 193-195; Inis Claude, Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization (New York: Random House, 3rd ed., 1964), pp. 37-39, 356.

the Europeans ...There is a trust on him, and there is a responsibility placed on him. There is a duty placed on him to look after the interests also of his ward ...There are helpless people on our doorstep and we are trustees for them. We have to look after them, and if we do not do so we are breaking our trust.⁴¹

If the paternalism of Smuts' trusteeship were applied in east and central Africa successfully, it is clear South Africa would gain in many ways in such an eventuality. The guarantee of European political hegemony north of the Limpopo that Smuts' policy aimed at would, if achieved, secure for South Africa a zone of friendly states on that country's northern borders. Such friendly states would be amenable to the extension of South African influence northwards, particularly given the fact that as the wealthiest country in sub-Saharan Africa and one with the largest settled immigrant European population, South Africa was bound to play the leading role in the proposed "African League of Nations" to which reference has already been made. More specifically, the said zone of friendly states

⁴¹Smuts, The Basis of Trusteeship in African Native Policy, pp. 11-12. Smuts did not explain who had "imposed" the trust of which he spoke; nor did he indicate when and how, or even whether, the period of trusteeship would terminate. On the basis of the general tenor of his views on the question of political rights for Africans, it is likely that Smuts saw trusteeship as destined to be a more or less permanent feature. See Mansergh, op. cit., pp. 92-93, for some suggestions on this point.

would provide for South Africa immense opportunities for economic expansion in the areas of investment, raw materials supply sources, and markets for South African products.⁴²

Referring to Smuts' interest in annexing Southern Rhodesia, Walker observes:

Smuts fought hard to win Rhodesia ...To him the Union was ...the most important power in Africa. Rhodesia was the railway bridge to the copper of the Katanga and to much else in the far north. Already [1921] a Union trade commission was on the point of starting for Kenya, and Nyasaland and Uganda were borrowing Union railway officials, thus giving a wider outlook to the railway policy of the Union.⁴³

As an expression of its commitment to the objective of white settler collaboration in east and centra Africa, the South African government, under the so-called "Fusion Ministry"

⁴²Considerations of this kind still influence South African policies towards Africa as of today, as will be argued subsequently in this study. From this perspective, the attribution to present South African prime minister, John Vorster, of bold new policy initiatives in the form of a so-called "outward looking policy", is an exaggeration that ignores a long-standing South African interest in participating fully in developments shaping Africa's future. True, the outward-looking policy is being applied to newly-independent African states and in this sense it is a new policy. But in terms of the objectives that that policy seeks to subserve, there is little departure from the foundations laid down by General Smuts.

⁴³Walker, A History of South Africa, p. 592. See also Hancock, Smuts (Vol. 2), p. 223.

(1933-1939),⁴⁴ sought to bolster and expand its links with the northern territories. In 1935, defense minister Oswald Pirow called for the formation of settler-controlled federations in east and central Africa, with the stipulation that these federations be "linked to the Union by a common Native policy [and] ...a common defense policy."⁴⁵ In the same year South Africa dispatched a planeload of teargas to Northern Rhodesia to assist the colonial authorities in that territory to suppress a strike by African mine workers on the Copperbelt.⁴⁶ In 1935 and 1936 various regional conferences on health, radio communications, transportation, posts and telegraphs, were sponsored by South Africa and held in Johannesburg, with colonial officials attending from Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Madagascar, as well as Belgian

⁴⁴The "Fusion Ministry" was a governmental coalition in which the leading participants were the South African party - later called the United party - under General Smuts, and the (General J. B. M) Hertzog wing of the (Afrikaner) Nationalist party. Hertzog served as prime minister with Smuts as his deputy. See Marquard, op. cit., pp. 145-158; Leonard M. Thompson, Politics in the Republic of South Africa (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), pp. 89-95.

⁴⁵Walker, op. cit., p. 669.

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 650-651.

and Portuguese African colonies.⁴⁷ As a follow-up to all these conferences, defense minister Pirow made a flying trip through most of the above-named territories in 1937, returning to the Union fully convinced of the great potential for the extension of South African influence in the area covered in his itinerary. As Walker puts it, Pirow was convinced that "all Africa up to the line of the Equator, excluding the French Equatorial Provinces [sic] but including Kenya and Uganda, was the concern of the Union"⁴⁸

In many crucial respects South Africa's pre-war northern policies were a failure. First, the attempt to annex Southern Rhodesia was no more successful than the other attempt to annex the High Commission Territories. Rhodesian settlers were unwilling to be linked politically to South Africa mainly due to their fear of domination by the anti-British Afrikaner nationalists whose notion of South African independence did

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 669. Interestingly, this roster of territories still constitutes a fundamental object (or targets) of South Africa's African policy. The same countries also regularly receive mention as potential members of the proposed southern African commonwealth whose fountainhead would be South Africa herself. See Fact Paper, No. 72, May 1959, entitled "The Union's Attitude to Africa." Also relevant to this point are: Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 22 (February 2-March 22, 1968), cols. 2693-2725; and RSA World (Pretoria), File 1, Nos. 2, 3, 7 and 8 (1964-1965).

⁴⁸Walker, op. cit., p. 669.

not brook the idea of the Union's membership of the British Empire and Commonwealth.⁴⁹ Additionally, Rhodesian settlers were apprehensive that union with South Africa might have undesirable economic consequences for themselves, including the possibility of Rhodesian African labour being lured away from the colony to South Africa where wages were relatively higher.⁵⁰

Rhodesian settler opposition to incorporation was, to some extent, paralleled by Afrikaner Nationalist opposition to the same scheme.⁵¹ Lacking Smuts' commitment to English-

⁴⁹Williams, op. cit., pp. 129-130. The Nationalist party was to achieve power in 1924 when it formed a coalition government with the anti-Smuts South African Labour party. In 1929 the Nationalists won their first outright electoral victory; in 1933 D. F. Malan and other Nationalist extremists rejected the Hertzog-Smuts "Fusion Ministry."

⁵⁰Walker, op. cit., p. 590. The general reluctance of Africans to work for the Rhodesian settlers posed a serious labour problem for the latter in the 1920's. This in part explains the early introduction in the colony of various measures designed to coerce Africans to work on settler farms and mines, e.g., a universal "hut tax," land seizures, and "pass" laws. See Colin Leys, op. cit., p. 10; Giovanni Arrighi, "The Political Economy of Rhodesia," in Irving L. Markovitz, ed., African Politics and Society (New York: The Free Press, 1970), pp. 397-398.

⁵¹The bulk of the Rhodesian settlers being of British origin (in 1922 the total settler population was 34,000), the Afrikaner Nationalists felt that the annexation of Southern Rhodesia would merely help to increase the number of white South Africans opposed to Nationalist political aspirations. See W. K. Hancock, Smuts: The Fields of Force (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 152-153. (The figure of 34,000 is taken from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 19, p. 278.)

Afrikaner rapprochement within the Union, as well as his wider perspective on South Africa's role in Africa, the Nationalists remained little impressed by the former's expansionist aspirations.⁵² This, however, should not be taken to imply that the Nationalists repudiated every aspect of Smuts' policy. As already indicated, they too favoured the annexation of the High Commission Territories; after 1948, they too were to define as the minimum goal of South Africa's African policy, the preservation of the colonial system, as is argued below.

The preservation of the colonial system that Malan's African policy aimed at was to be sought by South African participation in various multilateral organizations that the colonial powers had established to coordinate their activities in various spheres in post-war Africa. For example, South Africa was not only a full participant in the U.N. Economic

⁵² While Smuts and his followers in the South African Party (later the United Party) saw the foundations of a strong South Africa as lying in a unity forged between Afrikaners and English-speaking white South Africans, the Nationalists were interested only in the unity of the Afrikaner "nation." Consequently they saw the English more as rivals, if not enemies, than as potential political partners. For some suggestions on this point, see Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, pp. 18-19; Marquard, The Peoples and Policies of South Africa, Ch. 7; Stanley Trapido, "Political Institutions and Afrikaner Social Structures in the Republic of South Africa," in Markovitz, op. cit., pp. 368-392.

Commission for Africa (established April 29, 1958, at Addis Ababa), but was also a founder-member of the Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara (the CCTA) and its subsidiary institutions, viz., the Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa South of the Sahara and the Scientific Council of Africa.⁵³ The impact of these organization on African developments seems rather minimal. Nonetheless, South Africa saw her role in them as that of exercising leverage on the European powers to maintain the colonial system intact. In 1957 Foreign Minister Eric Louw still saw these organizations as serving the useful purpose of offering South Africa the opportunity to cooperate "with European states which have interests and responsibilities in Africa."⁵⁴ More significant was Malan's call, first made in 1948, for the establishment of an "African Charter" comprising the

⁵³The CCTA and its subsidiaries were formed in 1949. The membership of these organizations consisted of the colonial powers and South Africa itself. As the names suggest, the organizations - which have since been discontinued - were concerned with economic, technical and scientific problems affecting African territories south of the Sahara. Regarding South Africa's role in these bodies, see the brief references in Stevens, op. cit., pp. 10-11; RSA World, File 1, No. 2 (November 1964), p. 19.

⁵⁴Louw made the observation in a major foreign policy address before the graduating class at the University of Pretoria in early 1957. The speech, entitled "The Union's African Policy," is reprinted as Fact Paper No. 33 (Pretoria: State Information Office, 1957). The citation is from pp. 8-9.

colonial powers and South Africa, with the ostensible object of providing collective defense for the continent.⁵⁵ South Africa's interest in such a Charter lay in the fact that she did not wish to see developments occur to the north of the Union which could jeopardise white political control in that country. As Malan put it:

Whatever happens to Africa will necessarily affect us as well. If Africa should become the settling-place of the surplus population of Asia ...will that not affect us here in South Africa? If they [the European colonial powers] are going to militarise the Natives of Africa, does that not create for us here in South Africa a danger, a serious danger, and a threat? There is not the least doubt about that. We have an interest in Africa not being militarised.⁵⁶

Thus, from South Africa's point of view, the so-called African Charter was to serve as a sort of latter-day "Holy Alliance" dedicated to the preservation of the colonial status quo in Africa. Malan was confident that the colonial powers would be willing to cooperate with South Africa since the latter was valuable to them economically and as the guardian of

⁵⁵Foreign Policy of the Union of South Africa (Pretoria: State Information Office, n.d.), p. 14.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 14. (Malan was fearful that European colonial powers might include African troops in their NATO forces. To his mind such a move would be fraught with dangerous implications for the future of colonial and settler political hegemony in Africa.)

the Cape gateway to the Far East, a factor the strategic significance of which South Africa has never ceased to emphasize.⁵⁷

To bolster its position on the importance of maintaining colonialism in Africa the Malan government attempted to make use of the Cold War rivalries between East and West by taking a stance of firm support for the Western side. Malan, for example, drew a picture of an "expansive" communism which had already seized parts of Europe and Asia and was threatening other continents. Regretting that the charter of the NATO alliance precluded countries like the Union from joining that group, Malan declared nonetheless that the Union was unequivocally committed to the Western camp and would ally itself with the West in case of war between East and West.⁵⁸ Putting the same point over in the context of African political developments, a prominent government supporter, journalist W. van Heerden, observed a few years later: "We in South Africa more than any of the other influences or forces of the

⁵⁷Ibid., pp. 14-15. See, for a recent restatement of this position, South Africa in World Strategy (London: The Director of Information, South African Embassy, 1969), pp. 1-2, 18-21, et passim.

⁵⁸Foreign Policy of the Union of South Africa, pp. 10-13.

West, are fated to determine whether Africa will seek to join the West or the East."⁵⁹

It seems therefore clear that in calling for the establishment of the so-called African Charter, and in declaring South Africa's faithful support of the Western camp against alleged prospective communist encroachments into Africa, the Malan regime was seeking support in order to stem the tide of African nationalism from spreading across the continent and thus endangering white rule in Africa in general and in South Africa in particular.

IV

The preceding discussion illustrates the persistence and nature of South African interest in the African continent,

⁵⁹Fact Paper, No. 5 (February 1956), p. 12. The question to which van Heerden drew attention was of course rather unreal in the context of Africa of the mid-1950's. The bulk of the African territories were then colonies of European powers and therefore firmly in the Western camp. Van Heerden, it however appears, was also looking to the possibility of African nationalist movements successfully coming to power in territories to the north of the Union. He was after all speaking only a year before Ghana's attainment of independence. Hence his references to (*ibid.*) "Bantu nationalism" [sic] spreading over much of the continent. The point to note here is that van Heerden was distressed by this nationalist phenomenon and regretted the European failure to resist it more strongly for, as he put it, "the disappearance of white leadership would mean ...the return to barbarism" What was further to be regretted, he observed, was that African nationalism was not African at all, but merely a manipulation of the swelling populations of Asia searching for more land in Africa for future Asian settlement. *Ibid.*, especially pp. 8-11.

going back to the founding of the Union as an independent state. The discussion has sought to focus on the Union's perception of its position and role in an Africa largely under colonial rule.

As might be expected, South African leaders, during the period under review, formulated their African policies in terms calculated to win the best advantages ~~for~~ the Union within the African environment as given. Among objectives persistently pursued by South African leaders, from Smuts to Verwoerd, was the annexation of the British High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Swaziland, and Bechuanaland. The failure to annex these Territories, though constituting a notable defeat of a foreign policy quest to which successive South African prime ministers had devoted their energies, did not mean the end of South African interest in these Territories.⁶⁰

⁶⁰The Territories - all now politically independent - have become the testing ground of South Africa's emerging relations with the new African states, as will be indicated subsequently in this study. Sir De Villiers Graaff, Leader of the Opposition in the South African parliament showed an appreciation of this point when he observed: "Our relationship with these protectorates when they become independent may well set a pattern for our relationship with certain other emergent states of Africa." House of Assembly Debates, Vols. 17-18 (July 29-October 19, 1966), col. 2549.

For reasons already outlined, South African attempts to annex Southern Rhodesia were also unsuccessful. The only territorial gain that South Africa made during the period under review was the virtual acquisition of South West Africa in consequence of Germany's defeat in the First World War.⁶¹

Apart from desires of territorial acquisitions, the other aspect of South African policy towards Africa, and one which assumed some prominence after the Second World War, was the attempt to cope with a rapidly changing political climate both on the international scene and within Africa itself. Internationally, the East-West Cold War had by the mid-1950's become the dominant feature of international politics. Then too, anti-colonial nationalism had already registered great successes in Asia, leading to a South African fear, later to be realized, of a possible spill-over effect into the African continent. Within Africa itself, stirrings of African nationalist agitation were becoming insistent. The potential for rapid change and the consequent overturning of established patterns was therefore quite considerable. To minimize the

⁶¹For a useful discussion of the South West African problem, see John H. Wellington, South-West Africa and its Human Issues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967); Ronald Segal and Ruth First, eds., South West Africa: Travesty of Trust (London: Andre Deutsch, 1967).

impact on herself of developments deemed inimical South Africa took the initiative in proposing measures considered necessary to maintain a colonialism that was already on the defensive. By declaring their fidelity to the Western Alliance (NATO) even without invitation, and by calling for the establishment of mechanisms geared to a kind of collective defense of colonialism, South African leaders like Malan felt they could thereby assure the security of the white oligarchic rule in that country.

It may be asserted then that pre-1960 South African policy towards Africa exhibited a mixture of two modes of orientation and operation, viz., an activist-aggressive mode, and a reactive-defensive mode. The activist-aggressive mode may be defined as an attitudinal and operational stance based on the assumption that the given segment (or issue) of the international environment in which the actor or policy-maker is interested is susceptible to manipulation by him in desired ways. A reactive-defensive mode, on the other hand, assumes that the initiative, in the given segment (or issue) of international politics in which the policy-maker is interested, lies with other actors in the system, and that the policy-maker can affect the outcomes of relevant international interactions by

reacting to, or parrying, other relevant actors' initiatives.⁶²

In terms of pre-1960 South African policies towards Africa, the activist-aggressive mode may be said to have been in evidence when the Union made its various attempts to annex neighbouring territories, or when she sought to strengthen European settler rule in east and central Africa by calling for various forms of inter-territorial cooperation under the leadership of the Union itself. In the late 1940's and early 1950's, the reactive-defensive mode became more prominent as the Union sought to resist the impact of African nationalism and also sought to resist increasing international opposition to the Union's domestic policies.⁶³ The country's extra-territorial African policy increasingly resolved into one

⁶²These distinctions are introduced for analytical purposes primarily. In practice, there are, no doubt, cases in which it is difficult to isolate unprovoked initiative from calculated response. Arms races, for example, often involve complex "mixes" of initiative and response that it becomes difficult empirically to distinguish between an activist-aggressive mode and a reactive-defensive one.

⁶³The attacks on South Africa's racial policies in the United Nations, starting in 1946, ultimately led Smuts to denounce the U.N. General Assembly as a compound of "emotion, passion, and ignorance." See Stevens, op. cit., pp. 7-8. Malan, felt the U.N. was little more than a platform for Soviet and Indian propaganda much of which he felt was "unjustly" directed at South Africa. See Foreign Policy of the Union of South Africa, pp. 5, 10-11.

persistent, if vain, call for the freezing of established situations which themselves became even more valued in the light of a multiplicity of perceived dangers among which African nationalism figured prominently.

South Africa's policies of the status quo in Africa failed in their objective. After Ghana's attainment of independence in 1957, those policies increasingly became unrealistic and persistence in them merely contributed to the progressive isolation of the Union from the rest of the continent as political independence was conceded to more and more colonial territories. Why, however, did South Africa fail to respond realistically to the emerging political reality of Africa in the late 1950's? Why, after four decades of attempting to cope with African issues, was the Union so apparently unequipped to deal meaningfully with the Africa of the late 1950's?

Some answers to the above questions are provided by an examination of South Africa's domestic policies and the ideological framework in which these policies were developed, especially after the Afrikaner Nationalist electoral victory of 1948. The emergence of the policy of apartheid and its widespread implementation with respect to the Africans of South Africa in the 1950's, produced a pattern of events that was

directly in conflict with emerging political realities in the rest of the continent such that South African policy towards Africa became severely restricted in the range of its continental applicability and effectiveness at best, and futile at worst. A brief review of domestic political developments in the Union and of the impact of those developments on the rest of Africa in the late 1950's and early 1960's, may provide some explanation of South Africa's increasing diplomatic and political isolation during that period. Of interest too are the ways the new African states reacted to the situation in South Africa and how those reactions have affected the pattern of relations between these states and South Africa. It is to these questions that the next chapter turns.

CHAPTER III

CONFRONTATION AND ISOLATION

In isolation in the sphere of our colour policy lies our strength! If we were to agree to the demands of other nations because in that sphere we were afraid of the word isolation, then we would go under.

H. F. Verwoerd in House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 3 (1962), col. 3453.

I

It has been noted in the preceding chapter that the attitudes and policies towards Africa pursued by South Africa in the first forty years of its existence as an independent state became increasingly irrelevant to the political realities of Africa in the 1950's. In particular those attitudes and policies failed to reflect any understanding of the significance of African nationalism, a phenomenon the relatively favourable prospects of which were evidenced by the growth of self-government institutions in West Africa, especially in the then British colony of the Gold Coast. The Gold Coast was in fact to become a sort of test case of South African attitudes towards African states on the threshold of independence. As already noted the South African attitude initially was to oppose any granting of independence to African

territories.¹ The failure to appreciate the probable trajectory of African nationalism merely led to the pursuit of a pro-status quo policy the unreality of which might have been appreciated sooner.²

By the mid-1950's it increasingly became evident that the Union was heading for a sort of diplomatic cul-de-sac at the level of African policy. This chapter addresses itself to questions relating to the nature and consequences of the interactions that characterized relations between the Union and the new African states in the late 1950's and early 1960's. An attempt is made to delineate emerging patterns of South

¹For additional evidence on this point, see Nicholas Mansergh, Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 1287-1288; Ali Mazrui, The Anglo-African Commonwealth: Political Friction and Cultural Fusion (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1967), pp. 31-33. Mazrui cites evidence to the effect that at one point South African prime minister D. F. Malan threatened to terminate his country's membership of the Commonwealth if the Gold Coast (Ghana) were admitted to that body. Ibid., pp. 32-33.

²The failure to fully understand developments in Africa is perhaps accounted for by, inter alia, the Union's paucity of diplomatic representation in colonial Africa. Representatives of the country - themselves mainly trade commissioners - could only be found in Angola, the (Belgian) Congo, Egypt, Kenya, and Southern Rhodesia as of 1959. There was, significantly, no representation at all in West Africa. See Union of South Africa, Fact Paper No. 72 (Pretoria: State Information Office, May 1959), p. 132. (This publication will henceforth be referred to as Fact Paper... together with the serial number and publication date and page reference.)

African policy.

Relations between South Africa and the new states, especially as they developed initially in the decade from 1955 to about 1964, may be said to have assumed a pattern of confrontation which ultimately led to South Africa's isolation relative to the new African states.

It may be asserted that the factor underlying the emergence of relations of confrontation between South Africa and the new African states was the nature of South Africa's political system and the official ideology on which that system was based. The South African government's apartheid ideology and policies formulated to implement it, proved^s fundamentally at variance with general African developments and expectations as to lead to South Africa's isolation from the rest of decolonized and decolonizing Africa. Since, however, South African leaders gradually became interested in developing relations with the new states, the thrust of their post-1955 policies was in the direction of rendering the apartheid ideology "neutral"³ to the development of relations between their country and the new African states. They recognized

³The term "neutral" as used in this context is defined in Chapter I above as are also the terms "isolative" and "integrative."

the incompatibility of their politico-ideological system with the political values and expectations of the African states, but pursued policies that assumed that domestic political values and practices could be kept from interfering with the conduct of interstate relations.

During the period under review South Africa's African policy remained essentially declaratory, inflexible, and defensive. The policy was declaratory in the sense that evaluations of developments in Africa and perceived interests therein, were articulated, although this was done in a context that militated against any realization of those interests. The policy was also inflexible in that it was premised on the unalterability of the official ideology of apartheid, the isolative nature of which has been alluded to above. The policy pursued during this period was also defensive in the sense that, finding itself the object of increasing hostility and political attack by the African states, the South African government resolutely and consistently denied the legitimacy of external criticism and proceeded to implement policies which had in the first place inspired such criticism.

The ensuing discussion of South African policy towards Africa up to 1964 is structured as follows: Section II elaborates on the above-indicated characteristic features

of South African policy during the period under examination; sections III, IV, and V deal with the nature of the South African regime, laying stress on the implications of the apartheid system on the development of relations between South Africa and new Africa; Section VI attempts a critical evaluation of the political confrontation between South Africa and the African states.

II

What was the nature and direction of South Africa's African policy during the period under review? As already asserted above that policy was in character declaratory, inflexible, and defensive. Using these characterizations as guideposts of analysis, this section aims at elucidating the nature and objectives of the said policy.

In its declaratory form South African policy was given to stressing certain themes of a general character relating to goals that the government of that country evidently regarded as fundamental in terms of its interests in a rapidly changing continent. These themes included the following:

- (a) That the Union's major preoccupation at the level of African policy was the realization of a state

- of friendly coexistence with the new states;
- (b) That any friendly relations with these states should be based on a clear distinction between "domestic" and foreign" policies and the consequent acceptance of the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of each other by the states concerned;
 - (c) That South Africa was particularly qualified to assume the leadership and guidance of African states in spheres of national policy and activity considered crucial in post-independence Africa - economic, scientific and technical development;
 - (d) That South Africa could act as a "bridge" between Africa and the West so as to prevent any non-Western - especially communist - forces and influences from establishing a foothold in the continent.

The stress placed on these themes may be illustrated by citations from statements of official South African spokesmen regarding the form relations between their country and the African states should take.

Speaking in 1957, and evidently anticipating the emergence into independence of many African territories, prime minister J. G. Strydom declared, relative to the theme of friendship:

One after the other independent non-white states are coming into being in Africa ...We acknowledge those states as part of Africa; we must not regard them as enemies, but together with us they should realise that there is room in Africa for non-white states, and room also for white states.⁴

Two years later foreign minister Eric Louw re-emphasized the same theme of South Africa's desire for friendly relations with the African states, adding also that his country was ready to cooperate with those states in spheres of activity he did not, however, define. He pointed out:

The Union of South Africa is an African state, as are the emergent states in the north. Let those states recognize that fact, and in so doing accept South Africa's offer of friendship and cooperation in regard to matters of common concern ...One can only hope that the time will come when the independent and emergent states of Africa will realise that it is in their interests to cooperate with the Union of South Africa in defense of our common heritage - Africa.⁵

Finding the African states unresponsive to his country's protestations of friendly attitudes towards them, Louw, on another occasion, sought to warn those states that good relations could only be founded on a recognition of South

⁴Fact Paper No. 33, April 1957, p. 9.

⁵Cited in Colin de B. Webb, "The Foreign Policy of the Union of South Africa," in J. E. Black and K. W. Thompson, eds., Foreign Policies in a World of Change (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 441. See also Fact Paper No. 70, April, 1959, pp. 7-8, wherein Louw repeats the same sentiments.

Africa's status as a "white" state and one which could serve as Africa's link with the West. As he put it:

If the African states to the north are willing to accept South Africa as a fellow African state and as a permanently white state and if ... they are willing to accept our cooperation in matters of common concern, then the Union can serve as a link between the Black states of Africa and the West ...⁶

The view that South Africa was destined to play a special role as the link between Africa and the West especially in the context of the East-West cold war, was formulated as follows by then prime minister Hendrik Verwoerd in 1960:

⁶Eric H. Louw, "The Union and the Emergent States of Africa", in SABRA, eds., South Africa in the African Continent (Stellenbosch: SABRA, 1959), p. 21.

The revealing booklet in which Louw's statement occurs is a compilation of papers delivered at a 1959 symposium on South Africa's relations with the new African states. The symposium was sponsored by the pro-government South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA). The SABRA itself had its origins in Afrikaner dissatisfaction with the more liberally-oriented South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR). In 1935 a number of Afrikaner intellectuals broke away from the SAIRR to found their own Bureau of Racial Studies whose search for solutions to South Africa's racial problems led to the coining and formulation of the "apartheid" concept. This Bureau was itself superseded by the SABRA in 1948.

On both SABRA and the SAIRR, see Gwendolen M. Carter, The Politics of Inequality: South Africa Since 1948 (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1958), pp. 266-272, 336-337; Leonard M. Thompson, Politics in the Republic of South Africa (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), pp. 138-139, 158-161; Leo Marquard, The Peoples and Policies of South Africa, 4th Ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 168-169, 185-186.

We see ourselves as a part of the Western world, a true white state in Africa ...We look upon ourselves as indispensable to the white world. If there is to be a division in the future, how can South Africa best play its part? It should both cooperate with the White nations of the world and, at the same time, make friends with black states of Africa in such a way that they will provide strength to the arm of those who fight for the civilization in which we believe. We are the link. We are white but we are in Africa ...That lays upon us a special duty and we realise that.⁷

These and similar policy declarations by South African leaders indicate not so much the content and direction of South Africa's African policy as they reveal a discernible groping for a viable policy. The pronouncements show themselves as having in the main been made in a politico-diplomatic vacuum. They show South Africa as a country which, lacking any significant political contacts with the emerging African

⁷H. F. Verwoerd, Verwoerd Speaks, Speeches 1958-1966 (Johannesburg: APB Publishers, 1966), p. 338.

(Verwoerd was speaking in parliament on the occasion of the visit to South Africa of the then British prime minister Harold Macmillan. Appearing before the South African parliament, Macmillan made his famous statement about a "wind of change" or nationalist political awakening, blowing through Africa. As is evident in the quotation, Verwoerd felt that this "wind" was inadmissible in South Africa - "a true white state.")

states,⁸ was unsure what role it could realistically play - if ~~any~~ - in an Africa undergoing rapid political transformations. It is scarcely credible, for example, that a more realistically formulated African policy could have entertained the idea that South Africa was destined to become the link or bridge⁹ between the African states and the Western powers. It is not clear why the African states should require an intermediary to facilitate their relations with Western states. Nor is it clear why the Western powers should wish to have South Africa intercede with the African states on their behalf. In any event, a South Africa which was already itself considerably unacquainted with major African political developments

⁸The only independent African state with which South Africa maintained diplomatic relations at this time was Egypt. Egypt however withdrew its diplomatic mission to Pretoria in 1961 in line with the general Pan-African boycott of South Africa. See John Sutherland, "South Africa and the Changing African Continent," in South African Institute of Race Relations, eds., Looking Outwards: Three South African Viewpoints (Johannesburg: SAIRR, 1961), p. 10. It may be noted however that foreign minister Eric Louw was to express puzzlement at the Egyptian decision. He even intimated that the Egyptians made their decision capriciously. The decision was, in his view, made "without any reason whatsoever." See House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 3 (1962), col. 4169.

⁹For more official references to the idea of South Africa as such a bridge, see Fact Paper No. 5, February 1956, p. 12; ibid., No. 33 (April 1957), p. 9. The present foreign minister, Dr. Hilgard Muller, pointed out once again in 1965: "We [in South Africa] are eminently suited to serve as a bridge between Africa and the West, between the non-whites in Africa and the whites in the West." House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 13 (1965), cols. 456-457.

would hardly be likely to serve fruitfully as any kind of link between the new Africa and the Western powers. What is even more notable in the "bridge" concept is its failure to take account of the many links - economic, commercial and diplomatic - existing between African states and the Western powers, especially the former colonial powers.¹⁰

¹⁰On the extent and significance of these links, see, for example, Lucy Mair, The New Africa (London: C. A. Watts and Co., 1967), especially pp. 133-142. Mair notes that due to historical, linguistic, economic and cultural factors, many African states have maintained close links with their former colonizers. She notes, for example, that in 1964 there were, in former British East Africa, some 7,500 technical and administrative personnel of British origin working in various capacities within the governments of that area; that as of 1966 the bulk of former French colonies in West and Equatorial Africa maintained military agreements with France including the stationing of French troops in territories such as Chad, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Gabon; that most of these same territories belonged to the European Economic Community; that virtually all the new African states trade with, and belong to the same monetary zones as, the European powers that once governed them. Ibid.

See also I. M. D. Little, Aid to Africa (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1964), pp. 5-7, 47-52; Albert Tevoedjre, Pan-Africanism in Action: An Account of the U.A.M. (Cambridge: Harvard University, Center for International Studies, Occasional Papers No. 11, May 1965), pp. 3-5, et passim; Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism (London: Nelson, 1965), passim; Royal Institute of International Affairs, The African Economy: Developments Since 1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 11-18, et passim.

For the most succinctly critical analysis of economic ties and relations between the African states and their former colonial overlords, see Reginald H. Green and Ann Seidman, Unity or Poverty? The Economics of Pan-Africanism (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1968), especially Part II.

If the idea of South Africa constituting herself as a bridge between the West and Africa was unrealistic, yet that country was not thereby denied a role to play in terms of a more realistic African policy. In fact the hope began to be entertained by the government of the Union that the refusal by the African states to establish normal relations with it might yet be overridden by South Africa's judicious use of economic and technical aid to win friends in Africa.¹¹ The assumption was that if African states indeed accepted South African aid, they could not subsequently maintain a posture of hostility towards their benefactor.

Any policy aimed at winning friends through the use of economic aid was, however, likely itself to be attended by a number of difficulties. First, there was some question as to the amount and variety of aid South Africa could give

¹¹In 1959 Verwoerd told parliament: "In our dealings with other countries of Africa, we are seeking friendship above all else. If we find we cannot gain this friendship in a certain way, let us say by establishing certain forms of diplomatic relations, but that we can gain this friendship by assisting one another in the scientific, economic and other fields, we should obviously adopt this policy by which the main objective ...can be achieved." Verwoerd Speaks, p. 247. See also a statement to the same effect by Eric Louw in Fact Paper No. 33, April 1957, pp. 8-9.

to African countries.¹² Then too since the African states had themselves shunned making requests for such aid it was unlikely that they would accept it when it was now being publicly advertized for offer as part of a frankly political ploy to win their "friendship."¹³

¹²In 1966 foreign minister Hilgard Muller observed that South Africa's readiness to give aid to African states was attested to by a recent gift of foodstuffs for famine relief in Lesotho as well as by the supply of medications to treat animal diseases in Botswana and Swaziland. House of Assembly Debates, Vols. 17 and 18 (1966), cols. 2799-2800. While such assistance was no doubt of importance in the instances in which it was given, the point here is that this aid was of a mainly emergency character and was not directed to the promotion of schemes of economic development in the territories concerned. Such aid was hardly likely to impress states that were seeking to promote development in ways which might not even be favourable to future prospects for South African exports to these countries.

Later, however, the South African government gave evidence of a readiness to attempt more ambitious aid schemes. The first experiment to this effect was launched in Malawi. A more detailed discussion of the Malawi case occurs in the next two chapters.

¹³A Guinean diplomat reacted to South Africa's offers of aid to African states this way: "There could be no greater insult than [for South Africa] to invite African states to participate in the ferocious exploitation of their brothers who are groaning under the system of exploitation of apartheid in South Africa." H. E. M. Achkar Marof, Racism in South Africa: A Call for International Action (New York: American Committee on Africa, 1965), p. 10.

It may be noted, however, that by the early 1960's some South African politicians themselves had become less sanguine about the feasibility of a South African aid programme and especially about its political efficacy in winning friends for the country. Thus, for example, Eric Louw complained that although the Union had at various times offered some assistance to such African states as Uganda, Tanganyika, the Sudan, the Congo (Leopoldville),

(Continued)

South African policy makers do not also seem seriously to have addressed themselves to the question as to what precisely was to be the nature of the "friendly" relations they constantly proclaimed as their goal vis-a-vis the African states. Would South Africa, for example, accept to exchange diplomatic representation with any of the African states, a development that would constitute an important index of the feasibility of "friendly relations?" In fact, up to 1967 South Africa remained adamant in opposing diplomatic exchanges with the African states.¹⁴

¹³(Cont'd.) the Ivory Coast, Mali and Madagascar none of the affected countries had even seen fit to express gratitude to South Africa for its generosity. (It appears that the aid offered was mainly in the form of various vaccines for the treatment or prevention of animal diseases.) See House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 7 (1963), cols. 7308-7309.

Louw was silent on how the assistance to the above seven African countries had been solicited. He even beclouded the whole issue further by pointing out that one of the seven, namely Tanganyika, had subsequently firmly rejected an offer of South African technical assistance for geological surveys. Ibid., col. 7309.

¹⁴The problem in this regard was that concerning whether African diplomats assigned to South Africa could be accepted and treated on the same basis as representatives of other countries maintaining diplomatic relations with South Africa. Any failure to accord such African diplomats the same status and treatment as those from other countries - i.e., as a consequence of the apartheid laws - could hardly be expected to be acceptable to the African states. But even if African representatives were to be granted the same legal-diplomatic status as any others the South African government at this time seems to have been apprehensive about the social problems likely to arise were African representatives to be admitted into a society based on strict racial segregation. See Eric H. Louw, "The Union and the Emergent States of Africa," in SABRA, eds., South Africa in the African Continent (Stellenbosch: SABRA, 1959), p. 20.

As an alternative to normal diplomatic exchanges with the African states, South Africa during this period suggested a combination of techniques to maintain contact with the African states. These included the dispatching of South African scientific and other experts to African countries for temporary tours of duty on specific assignments,¹⁵ and the conduct of diplomacy by telephone or by periodic exchanges of visits by officials of the interested parties.¹⁶

To some extent, the question of South Africa establishing diplomatic relations with the African states was a somewhat academic question, at any rate as of the late 1950's. No African state then seemed keen to establish those relations. However, early in 1964, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, then prime minister of self-governing Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), declared during a press conference that, given South African concurrence,

¹⁵Ibid., p. 21. Prime minister Verwoerd thought African embassies in South Africa would be dangerous since they might be used to subvert the South African government. See House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 3 (1962), col. 3759.

¹⁶See Hilgard Muller's observations in this regard in ibid., Vol. 19 (1967), cols. 439-440. Earlier Muller had observed that foreign representation was such an expensive undertaking that he thought African states would therefore not have to insist on sending diplomats to South Africa. See ibid., Vols. 17 and 18 (1966), col. 2807.

he would send to that country "a Black Zambian" ambassador after his country became independent later the same year.¹⁷ South Africa's reaction to the Zambian initiative was swift and firmly negative. Eric Louw discounted the Kaunda proposal by merely noting that he (Louw) had tried several times to cultivate friendly relations with African states and in every case his efforts had been rewarded with snubs and insults.¹⁸

South African press comment on Kaunda's proposal was broadly divided along linguistic lines: Afrikaans newspapers broadly echoed the government's rejection of the proposal, while the English language press generally took the line that South Africa should seize the opportunity for a diplomatic

¹⁷News report in the Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), January 16, 1964. Kaunda added the proviso that the said Black Zambian ambassador - who was to be accompanied by a staff of 30 to 40 other Zambians - would have to be treated like any other diplomatic personnel in South Africa. Ibid.

¹⁸Die Burger, January 17, 1964. (Die Burger is a leading pro-government newspaper published in Afrikaans in Cape Town. Both this and all subsequent references to material from the Afrikaans press are based on English translations of such material available in various digests of that press. The digests used in this study are available in the African studies centre libraries of Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, and Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts. The latter has holdings of South African English language newspapers as also does the New York Public Library.)

entry into the Pan-African world that Kaunda's proposal seemed to offer.¹⁹

The rejection of Kaunda's initiative was consistent with South Africa's attitude towards an earlier and similarly potentially friendly gesture from the leader of another African state. In 1962 Nigerian prime minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa had suggested that he would be interested in visiting South Africa if an official invitation were extended. This announcement became the subject of debate in South African parliament²⁰ during which both Louw and Verwoerd ruled out the

¹⁹The following may be taken as illustrative. Die Vaderland (Johannesburg), January 20, 1964, asserted that Kaunda's proposal was sheer "propaganda" especially since it was made during a press conference. The paper commented further: "The way in which the [South African] English press immediately exploited [the issue] raises hardly any impression other than that it was plain propaganda language."

The Star (Johannesburg), January 15, 1964, while accepting Kaunda's initiative, raised some questions regarding the new Zambia's diplomatic outlook and strategy in the context of southern African geopolitics and Pan-African pressures. The paper observed that Kaunda was evidently interested in establishing relations based on peaceful coexistence with South Africa but wondered how he would reconcile this with Zambia's participation in an OAU which had at its founding established an African Liberation Committee which already gave aid to movements seeking to overthrow the South African government. The Star speculated, however, that economic considerations might have weighed more heavily with Kaunda than any desire to aid liberation movements from South Africa. (These issues are discussed more fully in the next two chapters.)

²⁰House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 3 (1962), cols. 3699ff.

possibility of official visits to South Africa by African leaders all of whom were declared to be uniformly hostile to that country.²¹

It seems evident that South African policy towards the new African states prior to the mid-1960's was characterized by a great deal of equivocation. As already suggested, the policy tended to consist of broad declarations of intent which themselves either betrayed ignorance of political conditions in Africa or were unlikely to be implemented if only because of the inflexibility of South Africa's own domestic political system. Declarations were made, for example, to the effect that South Africa could offer significant amounts of aid to African states or could act as a bridge between those states and Western powers. But there was little evidence of any appreciation of what such broad policy goals might entail in terms of detailed policy and at the level of actual implementation. Yet when African leaders such as Kaunda in 1964 and Balewa in 1962 suggested courses of action which appeared to fall in line with South Africa's intentions as reflected in the said declarations, South African policy makers found some excuse for failing to respond favourably to the African initiatives.

²¹Ibid., cols. 3758-3759, 4152-4169.

South Africa's proclaimed goal of establishing friendly relations with new African states was, to a large extent, frustrated by the inflexibility of its own ideology of apartheid and the policies that flowed from it. Even some supporters of the ruling Nationalist party were themselves clearly aware of this, although they were unable to provide alternative solutions. Thus, a prominent member of SABRA observed in 1959 that South Africa had been unable to exercise any influence on Africa's political evolution, adding:

Of the leadership of which we have dreamed for many a decade, little has thus far materialized, and the same can be said of Mr. Eric Louw's great vision of the Union's becoming the link between the Black peoples of Africa and the Western World.²²

However, since the South African government has consistently insisted that fundamentally apartheid is not aimed at the denial of political and other rights to black South Africans but rather is intended to enlarge those

²²W. van Heerden, "Africa and South African Politics," in SABRA, eds., South Africa in the African Continent (Stellenbosch: SABRA, 1959), p. 134.

rights,²³ a brief analysis and interpretation of the policy is attempted below. This attempt explores at some length aspects of the apartheid ideology from the point of view of its impact and significance for South Africa's interactions with the African states. It does not, however, seek to provide an historical and legal interpretation of the theory and practice of apartheid. It is the general political aspects of apartheid to which attention is paid.²⁴

²³The present prime minister of South Africa, J. B. Vorster, has put this claim across as follows:

My political philosophy is this: If the Black man should come to me today and say, "I want political rights," then I should say to him: "You can have political rights, but you can only get them in your own territory and over your own people, as is fitting, but over my people and in my territory I am not prepared to share them with you."

House of Assembly Debates, Vols. 17 and 18 (1966), col. 2653. See also Republic of South Africa, Progress through Separate Development: South Africa in Peaceful Transition (New York: Information Service of South Africa, 1968), Chapters I, IV et passim.

²⁴For extended analyses of apartheid, see for example, N. J. Rhodie and H. J. Venter, Apartheid: A Sociohistorical Exposition of the Origin and Development of the Apartheid Idea (Cape Town: HAUM, 1959); Gwendolen M. Carter, The Politics of Inequality: South Africa since 1948 (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1958); William R. Frye, In Whitest Africa: The Dynamics of Apartheid (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1968); Brian Bunting, op. cit.; Gwendolen M. Carter, Thomas Karis and Newell M. Stultz, South Africa's Transkei: The Politics of Domestic Colonialism (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

III

The apartheid ideology is concerned most fundamentally with the question regarding how the European minority in South Africa is to maintain its long-established political domination over the bulk of the population which is African.²⁵ Apartheid has, since 1948 when the Afrikaner Nationalist party came to power, been directed to the formulation of legal and constitutional devices whereby white political domination over the African population might be maintained indefinitely while yet being rationalized as equivalent to the political status enjoyed by Africans in the newly independent states themselves.²⁶

(1969)

²⁵The South African population is currently^A officially estimated as follows:

Africans ("Bantu" in official terminology)	12,750,000
Europeans or Whites	3,563,000
Coloureds	1,859,000
Asians	561,000

TOTAL..... 18,733,000

The following discussion analyzes the apartheid system mainly as it affects the African majority in the population. They are the major target of official policy. Source of above data: Republic of South Africa, Progress Through Separate Development, p. 4.

²⁶See references in Footnote 23 above.

Nationalist party leaders have sometimes, however, stated the goals of the apartheid policy without subtlety or equivocation. Verwoerd, for example, had this to say in 1963:

Reduced to its simplest form the problem is nothing else than this: We want to keep South Africa White ... "Keeping it White" can only mean one thing, namely White domination not "leadership," not "guidance," but "control," "supremacy." If we are agreed that it is the desire of the [white] people that the White-man should ... protect himself by retaining White

(Continued)

Fundamentally apartheid is an aspect of domestic colonialism which itself defines the character of the South African political system as it relates to the African population of that country.²⁷ In the classic historic case, colonialism was founded upon the basis of the conquest of a

²⁶(Cont'd.)

domination ...we say that it can be achieved by separate development [apartheid].

Cited in a U.N. report on "Apartheid in South Africa," reprinted in UNESCO Courier (Paris), April 1963, p. 21. On yet another occasion Verwoerd noted that South Africa could only develop politically in two directions: either into a racially integrated society with full political rights for Africans which would mean African political domination, or in the direction of apartheid in terms of which Africans were given their own areas apart from those of the whites but with the proviso that the whites exercised ultimate control in both sets of areas. See H. F. Verwoerd, Verwoerd Speaks, Speeches 1958-1966 (Johannesburg: APB Publishers, 1966), p. 194.

²⁷This term has also been used by Carter and others to refer to the subordinate character of the Transkeian political system. The Transkei, lying to the east of Cape province, has been selected by the South African government as the pioneer area for the application of the so-called policy of separate development or apartheid. See Gwendolen M. Carter, Thomas Karis and N. M. Stultz, South Africa's Transkei: The Politics of Domestic Colonialism, op. cit.

As used here, however, the term domestic colonialism refers to the South African political system as a whole, but from the perspective of its operation and impact on the African population which in this instance is regarded as the subject or colonized group. In this sense, the usage here is broader than that in the above work by Carter and others.

particular territory by a foreign power.²⁸ In consequence of such conquest an alien regime was imposed on the conquered peoples. Politically, power in a colonial situation lies in the hands of the colonizers; they control the administrative apparatus of the colony, they control the instruments of coercion - the police, military and similar forces. Socially and economically those members of the colonizing group that happen to reside in the colony are granted privileges that are not open, at least not in the same measure, to the colonized: better social, educational, cultural opportunities and amenities, and ready availability of economic opportunities and a higher reward for the exploitation of these.

Classic colonial society is stratified, as are all societies. The distinctively salient dimension of the colonial stratification system is the position of the individual relative to the colonial system as a whole in the given colony: that is, one either belongs to the colonizing group, in which case the privileges mentioned above become more or less automatically

²⁸The ensuing depiction of classic colonial society is in no sense a description of an actual colonial regime. It merely aims at presenting a rough composite picture of the colonial situation, abstracting what seem to be the salient features of that situation. The result is a kind of ideal type which in its essentials seems to correspond to the socio-political patterns characteristic of present South African society.

available to oneself, or one belongs to the colonized group whose sociopolitical status is in every respect subordinate. Such division of the society into two broad categories of colonizer and colonized would be greatly facilitated operationally by racial factors if, as is often the case, the colonizing group belongs to a different "race" from that of the colonized. In this situation, racism becomes a functional category from the point of view of ordering colonial relationships and from the point of view of apportioning the material and social "goods" available in the colony. Since racial characteristics are ordinarily incapable of being transcended, the promotion of racism, to the extent that it is successfully enforced, conduces to the equilibrium of colonial society and to its relative structural immutability.

If the above characterization provides some picture of classic colonialism, it also accords with the main features of domestic colonialism. The difference between the two primarily lies in the fact that in domestic colonialism, the colonizing group is itself in its entirety present in the conquered territory. Hence, both geographically and sociologically, the "colony" and the "mother country" are juxtaposed. They constitute a single system in which social interaction

between colonizer and colonized is constant and direct.²⁹

In consequence, the distinctions between colonizer and colonized found in classic colonial situations tend to be accentuated not only because the numerically superior colonized threaten the position of the colonizing group but also because members of the latter feel that they have no acceptable alternative to their privileged position. That is, they have "no other home."³⁰

From the perspective briefly elaborated above, the South African political system typifies the basic realities of a domestic colonial situation. In it the European minority - the colonizing group - is in effective control of all the levers of the society - political, administrative (including control of the instruments of coercion), and economic. The system is polarized basically around a European/African, colonizer/colonized, dimension which is officially assumed

²⁹See also H. J. Simons, "Inside South West Africa: Techniques of Domination," in Ronald Segal and Ruth First, eds., South West Africa: Travesty of Trust (London: Andre Deutsch, 1967), especially pp. 103-117; H. J. and R. E. Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950 (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969), Ch. 26.

³⁰This theme is highlighted by a Southern Rhodesian settler in a book with this title. See Richard Haw, No Other Home (Bulawayo: Stuart Manning, 1961).

to be, and forcibly held as, immutable.³¹

IV

The introduction of the apartheid ideology into the South African political system has been designed to provide a solution which apparently eliminates the domestic colonial system and apparently substitutes for it a process akin to de-colonization by dispersion. In effect, the aim of apartheid is to maintain the essentials of domestic colonialism by making them under a new guise which purports to give the colonized full political rights, but in their own specially-partitioned areas. Some references to official and semi-official thinking on these aspects may be in order here.

In an attempt to provide a moral and political rationale for apartheid, SABRA published a closely-argued statement

³¹This characterization is to some extent simplified. South African society reflects a multiplicity of sociological, ethnic and other divisions both within the ruling white group and the subject population. For an appreciation of some of these divisions, see for example, Leonard Thompson, op. cit., pp. 98-103 et passim; H. J. and R. E. Simons, op. cit.; Stanley Trapido, "Political Institutions and Afrikaner Social Structures in the Republic of South Africa," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 57, No. 1 (March 1963), pp. 75-87; Kenneth Carstens, "Power in South Africa," in Gary Gappert, ed., South African Dilemmas: The Dynamics of a Static State (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University, 1965), pp. 12-42; David Welsh, "Urbanization and the Solidarity of Afrikaner Nationalism," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (July 1969), pp. 265-275; Leo Kuper, "The Political Situation of Non-Whites in South Africa," William Hance, ed., Southern Africa and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 85-104; Pierre L. Van den Berghe, South Africa: A Study in Conflict (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1965).

in 1952.³² The statement assumed that there were only two possible ways in which South Africa's political problems might be resolved, viz., integration - including greater African urbanization - which would result in political power gravitating to the numerically superior African population; or territorial and racial separation which also implied that each racial group was to be in control of its own destiny in a designated area.³³ The former was rejected since it implied that the whites would have to accept being absorbed by the "social, political, cultural, and biological society of the larger group."³⁴ This was an unrealistic expectation since "the European community will never permit the Native population to deprive the Europeans of their right of political self-determination."³⁵

³²SABRA, Integration or Separate Development? (Stellenbosch: SABRA, 1952).

³³Ibid., pp. 4-10.

³⁴Ibid., p. 4.

³⁵Ibid., p. 11 (Emphasis in original.) A government commission report on the feasibility of the apartheid policy also declared to the same effect as follows: "There are not the slightest grounds for believing that the European population, either now or in the near future would be willing to sacrifice its character as a national entity as a European racial group." See Union of South Africa, Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa (Pretoria: Government Printer, U.G. 61/1955), p. 103. This report is hereafter referred to in the name of the commission's chairman as the Tomlinson Commission Report.

Only apartheid could accommodate the interests of all since it provided for both territorial separation and political autonomy.³⁶ Apartheid thus seeks to justify the absence of political rights for Africans in the so-called white areas by claiming that Africans can satisfy their political aspirations in the areas reserved to them and in which they are destined to exercise rights of self-government.³⁷

The apartheid scheme has, however, raised a number of difficulties which seem to indicate its impracticability and to expose its essence as a propaganda ploy to mask the realities of domestic colonialism. Two aspects may be referred to to indicate the problems involved. First, the area assigned for African occupation is hardly likely ever to be adequate for the total African population since it constitutes not more than 13 percent of the land area of South Africa. The economically undeveloped African reserves which it is intended to consolidate into so-called Bantu homelands or Bantustans, are already incapable of maintaining a population of four million Africans at more than a subsistence standard of

³⁶SABRA, Integration or Separate Development? pp. 11-17.

³⁷For a statement by Vorster on these aspects see House of Assembly Debates, Vols. 17 and 18 (1966), cols. 2653-2674.

living. In consequence, the drift from the rural into the urban areas on the part of the African population continues, in spite of official attempts to reverse the trend. The following table on the growth of the African urban population in selected cities illustrates the situation.

Table 1
Statistics of African Urbanization in Selected
South African Cities

<u>City</u>	<u>Total African Population</u> <u>(in thousands; as of 1965)</u>	<u>Percentage Increase</u> <u>on 1955 Population</u>
Johannesburg	517.7	26 1/2
Durban	197.0	27
Cape Town	53.2	48
Pretoria	254.0	165
Port Elizabeth	121.3	27 1/2
Bloemfontein	67.0	---

Source: South Africa Today (Johannesburg), 1967, p. 197, based on the official South African Municipal Yearbook for 1965/1966.

On the average, some half a million Africans leave the rural

areas annually to seek jobs in the urban areas.³⁸ This is because there are few opportunities for earning a living in these rural areas. Moreover, there is not likely to be any appreciable increase in employment unless it is agreed to

³⁸UNESCO Courier (Paris), April 1963, p. 22. One tactic designed to retain Africans in the rural areas is the concept of "border industries," i.e. the siting of factories near the borders between the African reserves and the so-called white areas such that African workers do not have to leave their "homelands" to find work. In fact, however, very few such factories have been built: only R300 million had been invested in the border industries by 1966 and the number of Africans employed in them was no more than 41,000, a figure that represents only 8% of the estimated number of Africans entering the urban areas yearly. These data are based on a study by the Trade Union Council of South Africa as reported in the Cape Times (Cape Town), June 2, 1966. For comparable data see Frye, In Whitest Africa, p. 34.

It may also be noted here that the border industries concept is built around the notion that "Bantu homelands" will serve as labour pools for white industries rather than becoming viable economic units, even did the potential for this exist. For had it been the intention to turn the Bantustans into viable economic entities, any investment of resources for this purpose would have had to take place inside rather than near the borders of the "homelands."

The foreign policy implications of the border industries concept are rather interesting in at least one instance. Bunting (op. cit., p. 437) quotes two Lesotho cabinet ministers as expressing very great interest in the border industries scheme in relation to their country. The siting of factories near Lesotho's border with South Africa would, in the view of one of the ministers, prevent family ties in Lesotho being broken "through workers having to travel hundreds of miles to seek jobs." Ibid. Lesotho thus sees itself as a sort of Bantustan.

partition the country on a basis that reflects population distribution as well as providing for the equitable distribution of resources of the country. The Africans have also after all contributed heavily to the development of South Africa in general and to the growth of its industries and towns in particular. Yet these industries and all large urban areas have, under the Bantustan scheme, been declared "white." This means that all Africans in the urban areas referred to, have, by administrative fiat and in spite of their being South African citizens, been declared foreigners with no political rights in those areas.³⁹

The general drift of Africans to the urban areas is a direct challenge to the assumptions of the apartheid scheme. If Africans are allowed to live and work in the so-called white areas, any political rights they may theoretically enjoy in the "homelands" are essentially meaningless since those homelands would not have any say in the way the urbanized

³⁹African workers in the "white" urban areas, Verwoerd pointed out in 1956, "will be like the Italians who go to France to take up employment there. They remain Italians and they remain anchored in their homeland; that is where they seek their rights; they do not expect and ask for rights in the other place." Fact Paper No. 11, May, 1956, p. 14.

Africans lived. As the SABRA itself observed in 1952: "There is no logic whatsoever in the argument which makes use of the existence of Native areas to deny political rights to Bantu in the European areas, if the Europeans permit the majority of the Bantu to obtain permanent domicile in the 'European' areas."⁴⁰

The second problem of importance with regard to the apartheid scheme as a whole relates to the political status allowable to the Bantustans. From the point of view of this study, this is a question of some considerable interest. If, as the South African government claims, the apartheid system provides a pattern of decolonization,⁴¹ the degree of political autonomy allowed to the Bantustans would indicate the extent of "independence" that the South African government believes Africans can and should enjoy. The inference may then be made that those African states that, by circumstance or preference, are dependent on South Africa economically and otherwise - as would the "Bantu homelands" - will likely be regarded by the

⁴⁰SABRA, op. cit., p. 17. See also Tomlinson Commission Report, p. 211, wherein essentially the same point is made.

⁴¹That government has asserted: "It was...left to the white nation of South Africa, after its own emancipation from Imperialism, to provide the opportunity, to set the pace and to devise a pattern of emancipation for the non-white population." Republic of South Africa, Progress Through Separate Development (New York: Information Service of South Africa, 1968), p. 23 et passim.

South African government as more or less equivalent in status to the said "homelands." Assuming the Bantustans do not attain an appreciable degree of political independence - as is argued below - the African states referred to are likely themselves to become political "satellites" of South Africa, beholden to her power and policy.⁴²

So far as the future political status of the Bantustans is concerned, there does not appear to be any plan or programme of constitutional advance which would include complete independence for these territories. Indeed, the late Dr. Verwoerd himself pointed out that the future status of the Bantustans could only be "determined by those who will be governing the country, according to the circumstances prevailing at that time."⁴³ This hesitation could only have its origin in doubts about either the practicability or desirability of independent Bantustans existing within the present borders of South Africa. It is more likely that the latter aspect, viz., doubts about the desirability of any advance to independence by the Bantustans, is the factor Verwoerd had uppermost in his mind when he made the statement

⁴²This argument is fully developed in Chapter V below.

⁴³Fact Paper No. 11, May, 1956, p. 14.

above.⁴⁴ In any event, the constitutional and political status of the Transkei, the prototype Bantustan, shows that the degree of self-government allowed to these territories will be extremely circumscribed. Few powers of government - and these being mainly of a "local" nature - have been assigned to the Transkei administration; the acts of the Transkei "parliament" are subject to veto by the South African government; the administrative apparatus of the territory is in every significant respect in the hands of white personnel assigned to the territory by the Pretoria authorities; and within the said "parliament": the unelected chiefs, who are themselves paid employees of the government in Pretoria, constitute a majority.⁴⁵ It is in the light of such factors that a Zimbabwean nationalist leader has asserted:

⁴⁴Cf. Verwoerd's declaration on the aims of apartheid in footnote 26 above.

⁴⁵For more detailed treatment of these and related aspects of the Transkei's political and constitutional status, see Carter, Karis and Stultz, South Africa's Transkei, especially Sections III, IV, and pp. 175-184; Frye, In Whitest Africa: The Dynamics of Apartheid, pp. 33-38 et passim; Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, pp. 476-507; Republic of South Africa, Progress Through Separate Development (New York: Information Service of South Africa, 1968), especially Chapters IV and V.

The creation of Bantustans with a bogus self-government was...intended to placate critical world opinion. The African nationalists have rejected Bantustans on the grounds that they are counterfeits of freedom and independence.⁴⁶

The foregoing discussion seems to indicate that the apartheid system is unlikely to develop to the point where the Bantustans can become viable economic entities. Nor is there any indication that the system can develop to the point where the Bantustans become independent states. As was asserted at the outset of this discussion, the system seems essentially to have been devised in order to perpetuate extant domestic colonial relationships in South Africa by providing a gloss of de-colonization. It is, as already indicated, an attempt at a sort of de-colonization by dispersion, i.e., by the creation of territorial entities into which the African population would be 'dispersed' to the point where the colonizing whites would now have a "mother-country" of their own, separate from the Bantustans, which however, would remain colonial territories in spite of the claims of "separate" development. The judgment of the Johannesburg Rand Daily Mail on these

⁴⁶Ndabaningi Sithole, African Nationalism (London: Oxford University Press, revd. ed., 1968), p. 127. For a critical assessment of the Bantustan system by a black South African nationalist, see Govan Mbeki, South Africa: The Peasants' Revolt (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964).

aspects of apartheid seems, for all its apparent harshness, essentially sound. The paper declared editorially in 1964 as follows:

Apartheid means nothing of any real value if it does not mean the geographical separation of the races and the Nationalists are forever trying to create this separation. Ever since he became Prime Minister Dr. Verwoerd has been creating "homelands" at least on paper, imposing stricter controls on the movement of Africans, begging Whites to use less black labour, encouraging border industries, weeding out "foreign Africans." And yet in less than a decade the Whites find a million more Africans in their midst...If there is to be no geographical separation of the races, then apartheid is exposed for what it really is - a shoddy device for perpetuating baasskap [white domination] under another name.⁴⁷

Y

What was to be the attitudes of the African states towards the South African regime, given those states' pre-occupation with issues of anti-colonialism in their foreign policies?⁴⁸ The apartheid ideology was basically anti-thetical to those anti-colonial aspirations, yet South Africa was a legally-independent or sovereign member of the international state system. It could not be regarded merely as

⁴⁷Rand Daily Mail, January 6, 1964.

⁴⁸For some evidence on this see chapter I above.

another colony which could be expected in the course of time to achieve "independence" in the same way that the rest of the African states themselves had acquired that status.

African states' attitudes towards South Africa seem to have passed through two relatively distinct phases, at least during the period of interest in the present chapter, i.e., from the mid-1950's to about the mid-1960's. These phases may be characterized as: (a) an initial conciliatory phase, and (b) a confrontation phase.

During the conciliatory phase,⁴⁹ African states, while opposing the apartheid system, preferred to deal with South Africa as a normally independent state the solution to whose political problems might be facilitated by African diplomatic initiatives undertaken without hostility. Hence, for example, South Africa was invited and was able to send a delegation to the Ghanaian independence celebrations in Accra in March, 1957. In the same year Eric Louw began negotiations with the Ghana government over a possible exchange of diplomatic representation but the proposal was dropped when it

⁴⁹The terms conciliatory and confrontation phases refer more to attitudinal factors than to any specific time dimension. In general however, the conciliatory phase predates the confrontation.

became evident there would be too many difficulties facing the Ghanaian diplomats assigned to South Africa as a consequence of apartheid and racial segregation in that country.⁵⁰

In 1958 when Ghana sponsored the first conference of independent African states South Africa was also invited though the invitation was turned down on the argument that European colonial powers with "responsibilities" in Africa should also have been invited.⁵¹ The Ghana government seemed then to believe that political changes could be brought about in South Africa by processes of peaceful dialogue conducted with South African government leaders. Thus, at the end of 1959 Ghana invited South African foreign minister Louw to visit that country on his way from the U.N. General Assembly of the same year.⁵² Similarly, the Balewa and Kaunda initiatives already referred to above seem to have been inspired by the desire to engage South African authorities

⁵⁰Richard P. Stevens, "South Africa and Independent Black Africa," unpublished paper delivered at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, March 10, 1969; pp. 9-10.

⁵¹Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Unity (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 26.

⁵²Keessing's Contemporary Archives (London: Keessing's Publications, 1959/1960), p. 17478. Louw in fact failed to go to Ghana as expected. The Ghana government subsequently cancelled the invitation, saying it would "serve no useful purpose." Ibid.

in discussions which might lead to changes in the apartheid policy.⁵³

The conciliatory phase could not however lead to the processes the African states had apparently expected to attend their efforts at opening discussions with the South African government. That government either merely snubbed the African initiatives or postponed taking immediate positive steps in accordance with the African expectations. Conciliation was thus superceded by the confrontation phase. During this phase African states no longer sought peaceful dialogue with South Africa. The emphasis was placed on efforts to induce political changes in that country by a policy of constantly attacking its government and seeking to isolate it as completely as possible from the international community. These efforts heightened as South Africa moved through periods of crisis domestically, particularly during and immediately after the March, 1960 African political demonstrations that culminated with the massacre of some 83

⁵³A government backbencher in the South African parliament, a certain Dr. De Wet, commenting on the proposed visit to South Africa by Balewa, spoke heatedly about a statement the Nigerian prime minister had allegedly made at a press conference. The Nigerian leader had **apparently** stated in part: "My visit will help to make the South African government to change its policy of apartheid." See Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 3 (1962), col. 3700.

Africans by the police at Sharpeville near Johannesburg, and Langa near Cape Town.⁵⁴

African actions against the South African government were centred mainly in the United Nations and the Commonwealth, as well as within the framework of Pan-African politics. At the level of the United Nations system the African states, in addition to sponsoring numerous anti-South African resolutions most of which were carried by large majorities in the General Assembly,⁵⁵ also agreed in 1960 to help defray the costs of the legal action Ethiopia and Liberia were due to bring against South Africa at the International Court of Justice at the Hague.⁵⁶ Of the political actions at the United Nations, perhaps the most significant took place in 1963 when the African states as a whole (some 32) were instrumental in the convening of a special Security Council meeting on South Africa. This resulted in the passage of a resolution introduced

⁵⁴See Bunting, op. cit., pp. 208-209 et passim.

⁵⁵A summary of U.N. actions against South Africa between 1946 and 1967 is provided in United Nations, Review of United Nations Consideration of Apartheid, ST/PSCA/SER.A/2; New York, 1967.

⁵⁶The action sought to have South Africa's League of Nations Mandate over South West Africa invalidated. See Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 41-42; Segal and First, op. cit., pp. 16, 288-346.

by Ghana, Morocco and the Philippines; the most important provision of the resolution called on all states to "cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa."⁵⁷

In addition to the constant diplomatic harassment of South Africa through the sponsorship of resolutions at the U.N., African states also sought to exclude that country from membership and participation in all U.N. agencies. Hence in 1963 and 1964 South Africa was expelled, on the initiative of the African states, from the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), and the African activities of the World Health Organization (WHO).⁵⁸

One of the more significant of the expulsion measures directed against South Africa had occurred in 1961 when, due

⁵⁷United Nations, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

⁵⁸See Rand Daily Mail, July 27, 1964; Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

largely to African pressure, the country was forced to withdraw from the Commonwealth.⁵⁹ Perhaps the most powerful attack on South African policies during the decisive Commonwealth meeting of 1961 came from an article published in a British newspaper by Mr. Julius Nyerere, then chief minister of self-governing Tanganyika.⁶⁰ Nyerere pointed out that his country could not, on achieving its independence later in the year, join the Commonwealth if South Africa were re-admitted to that body under its new republican constitution. He admitted that his country was very poor and was likely to suffer further hardships by failing to take up Commonwealth membership. There was however a principle, namely the ideal of non-racialism for both Tanganyika and

⁵⁹The role of non-African Commonwealth states in the diplomatic attack on South Africa should not however be overlooked. In particular Malaya under the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman and Canada under prime minister John Diefenbaker, seem to have exerted as much pressure against South Africa as the African states themselves. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XIII (1961/1962), pp. 17987-17989.

⁶⁰Nyerere's article was published in The Observer (London), March 12, 1961. (The conference, held March 8-17, was then in session and considering the question of South Africa.)

Nyerere's attitudes and views regarding South Africa and other colonial regimes in southern Africa are of critical importance in the context of the political conflicts of the subcontinent as will be shown subsequently.

the Commonwealth, which was too important to be compromised through seeming condonation of apartheid in South Africa.

Nyerere went on:

The systematic attempt to degrade the non-European population in South Africa is not - as South Africa claims - an internal affair and thus no concern of other Commonwealth members. Every country in Africa feels the effects of South African policies in its own life. Political and social pressures working against our aim of non-racialism are greatly strengthened by events in South Africa. It is not that we fear a resurgence of discrimination against Africans in Tanganyika; what we fear are the evils of racialism and its results on the minds of majorities and minorities alike ... We believe that the dignity of man is the idea which can defeat racialism; but we know that any action of ours which appears to compromise with the evil we fight must weaken the execution of our own policies.

This means that we cannot join any "association of friends" which includes a State deliberately and ruthlessly pursuing a racialist policy. To do so would be to confuse the minds of our people and to jeopardize our own purposes.⁶¹

Nyerere's threat not to join, coupled with a Ghanaian threat to withdraw from, the Commonwealth are widely credited with having spurred South Africa's withdrawal from that

⁶¹Ibid.

body.⁶²

Within Africa itself the African states also took a variety of measures against South Africa. These included a complete ban on all commercial relations with that country and the channelling of aid to movements fighting colonial regimes in southern Africa including South Africa itself.⁶³

VI

The African states' increasingly intense pressure against South Africa before and during the early 1960's resulted in

⁶²Ali A. Mazrui, The Anglo-African Commonwealth: Political Friction and Cultural Fusion (New York: Pergamon Press, 1967), pp. 3, 33-41; J. D. B. Miller, "South Africa's Departure," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (November 1961), pp. 56-74; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XIII (1961/1962), pp. 17988-17989 wherein Verwoerd specifically singles out Ghana together with the "Afro-Asian-Canadian bloc" as having forced his country's withdrawal.

⁶³In August 1960 Ghana instituted a complete ban on all trade with South Africa, banned South African planes and ships from using Ghanaian airports and ports, and disallowed visits to Ghana by South African nationals except those who could agree to sign a statement repudiating apartheid and racism. (In 1959 Ghana's exports to South Africa were worth £1 million against imports worth £1 1/2 million.) Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XII (1959/1960), pp. 17576, 17766.

Measures similar to the Ghanaian ones were later adopted by other African states individually as well as collectively at the founding of the OAU. In addition an African Liberation Committee was set up to channel aid to liberation movements. See OAU, Basic Documents of the OAU (Addis Ababa: OAU Provisional Secretariat of the OAU, 1963), Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 71-153.

two notable achievements in terms of those states' confrontation policy, viz., (a) The growing isolation of South Africa especially in Africa itself, and (b) The legitimization of the use of international machinery for the pursuit of politico-ideological and moral ends.

As already indicated above, it was African pressure which forced South Africa into a growing isolation as reflected by her withdrawal from the Commonwealth and her expulsion from several international bodies especially those affiliated with the U.N. South Africa's isolation was not however reflected only in the boycott measures instituted against her or in the expulsions referred to. It was also apparent in her failure to play any meaningful role within an Africa that had become increasingly hostile. Her expectations of a leadership role in the continent could not be realized; indeed she increasingly found herself conducting an essentially reactive-defensive policy that concentrated on countering the actions and initiatives of the African states. Forced into isolation by the nature of her political system and official ideology, South Africa could only fall back on the economic and other links between her and the major powers of the Western world. It is those ties that South African leaders increasingly emphasized as more than adequate compensation for any material and

psychological deprivations the sustained African opposition had generated.⁶⁴

The second result of the concerted African pressure against South Africa was increasingly to legitimize the use of international machinery - U.N. or Commonwealth - for the pursuit of politico-ideological and moral ends. African pressure was important in this regard not so much because it led to widespread international condemnations of apartheid - those condemnations had after all been voiced from the very inception of the U.N. - but in that it led to specific actions of a punitive character being taken against South Africa. These actions, such as the trade boycotts and arms embargo mentioned above, were not taken because South Africa had violated some code of international law, but because her official ideology and policies violated certain principles and practices of a mainly political and moral character to

⁶⁴After noting that friendly relations existed between his country and such Western countries as France, Britain, and the United States, Verwoerd told parliament in 1962: "I do not allow myself to be told that the strategists of the United States will adopt the attitude that South Africa can ...be thrown to the wolves or be swallowed up in the fluctuating ideological streams which, inspired partly by Communism, flow across Africa, rather than to accept her as being by nature a safe and secure and permanent friend and a force in this strategical position." House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 3 (1962), col. 3451.

which the African states assigned particular importance in their international diplomacy.⁶⁵ In particular the apartheid system was unacceptable to the African states since it constituted a negation of the principles on which their own independence was founded, viz., the principles of majority rule and national self-determination.⁶⁶ Acceptance of apartheid in South Africa would amount to at least a partial repudiation or de-legitimization of those principles, or even an imputation of a merely relative value to them.

International legitimization of the struggle against apartheid also enabled African states to some extent to harness the resources of more powerful states for that struggle. To the extent that the African states were successful in this,

⁶⁵See Nyerere's statement cited under footnotes 60 and 61 above.

⁶⁶It is of course true, as has been noted, that the Bantustans are supposed to be guided towards "self-government" for their peoples. Indeed, Die Burger (Cape Town), January 28, 1964, could even argue editorially as follows: "Just like the countries of the West, we too have accepted the principle of decolonization ...[Yet South Africa will show the world] how we apply the principle of decolonization, with the object of achieving full maturity for our 'colonial peoples.'"

As has been argued above however, the "decolonization" to which the editor of Die Burger refers seems to consist of little more than the application of the term "Bantu homelands" to the old "Native Reserves" in South Africa.

they made South Africa's isolation something more than a merely African phenomenon.⁶⁷

Yet in spite of the foregoing considerations the policy of confrontation could not produce the main object the African states sought, i.e., South Africa's abandonment of apartheid and racial discrimination in favour of the extension of political rights to the Africans of that country. In fact, the apartheid system was further strengthened during the very period of intense African opposition to it.⁶⁸ What explains

⁶⁷It should be noted that African states have not been very successful in achieving binding international agreement to institute effective measures against South Africa. Verwoerd's statement, cited in footnote 64 above, reflects Pretoria's confidence that an effective international boycott is unlikely to be instituted. See also Denis Austin, Britain and South Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 12-20 et passim.

⁶⁸For example, South Africa moved to extend the Bantustan system to South West Africa in 1962 in spite of the fact that the legal action by Ethiopia and Liberia at the International Court, with regard to the disposition of the territory, was still sub judice. The decision to partition South West Africa into 12 "states" - 10 African and one each for the Coloureds and Whites in the territory - was based on the findings of the so-called Odendaal Commission. See Republic of South Africa, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into South West African Affairs, 1962-1963 (Pretoria: R.P. No. 12/1964). See also Republic of South Africa, South West African Survey, 1967 (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1967); Absalom L. Vilakazi, "The Odendaal Report," in Ronald Segal and Ruth First, eds., South West Africa (London: Andre Deutsch, 1967), pp. 222-241.

the apparent failure of confrontation? Some explanations may be suggested.

First, it appears the African states underestimated the magnitude of the problem they faced over the question of South Africa. The decision of some African leaders - within the framework of what has been referred to as the conciliatory phase - to engage responsible South African politicians in discussions geared to achieving changes in the apartheid system, could only have arisen from a considerable misconception of South African political realities. As already noted, white South Africans were quite determined to maintain their positions of social privilege and political dominance over the black South Africans. Those same whites were unlikely to be persuaded to abandon their privileges and monopoly of political power as a result of negotiations initiated by states whose recently acquired sovereign status South African policy-makers often denigrated.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ The approach of independence in many African colonial territories appeared to foreign minister Eric Louw little short of disaster. Thus in 1959 he registered his fears as follows: "For better or worse the emergent states of Africa are becoming independentIt can be truly said that one by one the lights of European colonial rule in Africa are going out. The guiding hand and the judgment of the colonial Powers ...will no longer be there." Fact Paper No. 70, April 1959, p. 6.

(continued)

When the African states finally chose to institute more openly hostile measures against the South African government they sometimes acted as if they had not seriously "thought through" the implications, or indeed the crucial aspects, of their own policies and actions. For example, the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth, while it constituted a notable defeat for South African diplomacy, could not but remain a largely symbolic act particularly since Britain - herself the "founder" of the Commonwealth and its leading member - continued as South Africa's leading supplier of both investment capital and imports. Britain continued as chief supplier of both, that is, notwithstanding any African displeasure.⁷⁰ Expulsion of South Africa was thus

⁶⁹(Continued) On yet another occasion, Louw thought that for African states such as Ghana to boycott his country was itself a sign of "political immaturity ...the sort of behaviour that could be expected from small boys or a certain type of teenager." Cited in a report in Keessing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XII (1959/1960), p. 17576.

⁷⁰See Austin, op. cit., especially Chapter II.

On the question of Anglo-South African investment ties a special U.N. study - Foreign Investment in the Republic of South Africa; ST/PSCA/SER.A/6: New York, 1968 - shows that as of 1966 British investment in South Africa (both equity investment and loans) amounted to U.S. \$3,042,000,000, or about three-fifths of all foreign investment in that country (pp. 2, 3, and 5).

(continued)

something of a pyrrhic victory as long as African states in the Commonwealth either could not or would not see that the main value of the Commonwealth from South Africa's point of view was her relationship with Britain, at least as expressed in economic and commercial terms. But even if Britain had reduced her ties with South Africa, the strategy of the African states in respect of South Africa, would have lacked complete perception of the realities involved; for South Africa could find in Western Europe itself, alternative sources of supply for virtually all the material Britain could deny her; to wit, in France.⁷¹ Yet the African states have tended to be selective in their attacks on "friends of South Africa," concentrating to some extent on Britain while ignoring states such as France. The failure to exert

⁷⁰(Continued) In the same year (1966) South African exports to Britain amounted to R403.6 million (about U.S. \$565.6 million), or one-third of the country's total exports; imports from Britain amounted in the same period to R448.9 (or about U.S. \$628.8 million), or just under 1/4 of total imports. Source for the commercial data: Republic of South Africa, South African Prospects and Progress (New York: Information Service of South Africa, 1968), pp. 63-64. (The value of gold sales is not reflected in the trade statistics.)

⁷¹When Britain stopped certain categories of arms deliveries to South Africa in 1964, France readily moved in to take up much of the slack. See the data in United Nations, Military and Police Forces in the Republic of South Africa, ST/PSCA/SER.A/3, A/AC.115/L.203-204; New York, 1967; pp. 6 and 7.

pressure on France was and is most poignantly reflected in the consistently pro-French policies of African states in the so-called Francophone zone with the exception of Guinea and, until 1969, Mali.⁷²

At yet another level, the African states' campaign against apartheid was a "failure." While the campaign helped partially to isolate that country diplomatically and in other ways, it gave the South African government further cause to launch a programme of re-armament and general defense spending the objective of which was to achieve a level of military preparedness sufficient for any conceivable contingency, whether of domestic or general Pan-African origin.⁷³ South African State President C. R. Swart was indeed sounding what had become for his country a familiar alarm when, in opening

⁷²The subservience of these states to French foreign policy is most lucidly brought out in Albert Tevoedjre's Pan-Africanism in Action: An Account of the U.A.M. (Cambridge: Harvard University, Centre for International Studies, 1965), pp. 3-6, 19, et passim. (Tevoedjre himself was a minister in the government of Dahomey and later secretary-general of the Union Africaine et Malgache (U.A.M.) prior to writing his critical "account.")

⁷³Between 1960 and 1967 South African expenditure for defense rose by almost 600%, from R44 million to R255 million. See United Nations, Military and Police Forces in the Republic of South Africa, p. iii, (A fuller discussion of these questions occurs in chapter V below.)

parliament in 1961, he noted that African states were increasingly becoming so hostile that South Africa had to "mobilize all our material and moral resources to meet the greatest challenge of our time."⁷⁴ Unable in certain critical respects to match their threats with performance,⁷⁵ the African states had thus provoked a reaction which gradually enhanced the confidence of the threatened regime that it could surmount any external challenges, at least within the context of collective

⁷⁴House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 1 (1961), col. 7331. For similar warnings by other government officials, see ibid., Vol. 3 (1962), cols. 3446-3447; ibid., Vol. 6 (1963), cols. 5142-5214.

⁷⁵Of some relevance in this regard is the information contained in an anonymously published document - which however appears to bear a Ghanaian imprint - revealing, for example, that six months after its establishment, the OAU's African Liberation Committee (ALC) had received from member states only £120,000 sterling. This amount was to be available for setting up the administrative machinery of the ALC in Dar-es-Salaam as well as for financing, as of that date, the activities of liberation movements from some five major territories, mostly in southern Africa. See Anon., Committee of Nine: Critical Analysis of the Programme of the Liberation Committee of Nine Appointed by the OAU, 1964, p. 5. (The information in this pamphlet cannot of course be authenticated. From interviews with Zimbabwean nationalist leaders that the present writer undertook in 1964, however, it appears the general conclusion of the statement cited above is valid, namely that the resources then available to ALC for distribution to liberation movements were quite inadequate.)

action by the African states.⁷⁶ As Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, then president of Ghana, put it:

By raising a threat at Addis Ababa [at the founding of the OAU] and not being able to take effective action against apartheid and colonialism, we have worsened the plight of our kinsmen in Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. We have frightened the imperialists sufficiently to strengthen their defenses and repression in southern Africa, but we have not frightened them enough to abandon apartheid supremacy ~~to~~ its ill-fated doom.⁷⁷

One might conclude from the above considerations that states tend to invest less effort and fewer resources in pursuit of moral principles than they do in the defense of their regime systems. In terms of such a hypothesis one might then conclude that the African states could not be expected to have done more than they did in their campaign against apartheid. They were pursuing mainly moral ends against an opponent whose determination to resist was all the greater for being directed to the defense and preservation of a socio-political order that conferred direct benefits to the ruling whites.

⁷⁶Again Eric Louw: "One has to remember that the great majority of African states are underdeveloped and that most of them are living on 'handouts' from the United States, France and the United NationsThese are the people who are threatening South Africa!" House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 7 (1963) col. 7312.

⁷⁷Republic of Ghana, Ghana Today (London: High Commission of the Republic of Ghana, July 1964), p. 4.

The foregoing hypothesis, while certainly arguable and to some extent valid in accounting for the problem under review, nonetheless considerably oversimplifies the issue. The African states did not in general lack motivation in their campaign against apartheid; indeed some of them pursued the campaign with great determination as is evident from the description of the confrontation phase in the preceding section. What these states lacked were material resources to enable them to launch a successful campaign. But precisely because they did not have the means themselves to launch effective action against South Africa, these states sought to exploit fully the few "resources" at their command - their access to channels of Commonwealth diplomacy, the fact of their considerable numbers (together with the Asian states) at the United Nations, their pronounced readiness to resort to moral suasion in international political interactions. In short, they sought to exploit "resources" that in essence were of a moral kind; it was logical that states that lacked sufficient military and other forms of power to promote their goals should resort to policies that emphasize the validity and centrality of moral principles. This commitment to moral and ideological principles is to be particularly noted. It became an important variable in the relations between the

African states and South Africa. In spite of its evident shortcomings that commitment was at least likely to limit the extent to which an apartheid South Africa could achieve peaceful coexistence with - let alone assume the leadership of - the African states.

South Africa's adoption of its own variant of a "conciliatory" posture beginning in 1964 was itself a recognition of the seriousness of the country's isolation in Africa. This led to the formulation of the so-called "outward-looking policy". The assumptions and scope of that policy in its initial stages of implementation provide the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

THE OUTWARD-LOOKING POLICY: UNDERLYING PERSPECTIVES

South Africa's order and stability must be based on the strong economy and the strong defense forces of South Africa.

P. W. Botha, South African Minister of Defense, in Die Transvaler, May 6, 1969.

I

On September 2, 1966, four days before his death at the hands of an assassin, Dr. Verwoerd met Chief Leabua Jonathan, prime minister of Lesotho, in Pretoria for discussions on relations between their countries. In January 1967, Mr. John Vorster, Verwoerd's successor, met Jonathan in his turn in Cape Town. Two months later a delegation of senior civil servants from Botswana visited South Africa reportedly to obtain information on the number of Botswana nationals in South Africa. On March 12 a Malawian delegation of three cabinet ministers and four high-ranking civil servants, headed by minister of trade and industries Jeremy Kumbweza arrived in Cape Town for a week's tour of South Africa that would include the signing of a Malawi-South Africa trade agreement. By the end of the year Malawi and South Africa had exchanged diplomatic missions -

the first such exchange between the latter and a newly independent African state.¹

These and similar developments are regarded by some observers as striking evidence of the successful application of South Africa's new verligte (enlightened) foreign policy, commonly referred to as the outward-looking policy.²

The outward-looking policy is seen by the South African government as a move to secure relations of "peaceful coexistence" with the African states to the north. To foreign minister Hilgard Muller, for example, the said visit to South Africa by Malawian ministers was an event of "historic significance and should serve as an example to others that peaceful coexistence is possible in Southern Africa between nations whose internal policies may not necessarily be the same."³ Indeed, two months before

¹Reports of these events were of course carried extensively in the South African as well as the foreign press. See, for example, Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), September 1, 2, 3, 1966; Cape Times (Cape Town), March 7, 8, 13-15, 1967; Die Burger (Cape Town), March 13, 1967; The Times (London), March 13, 1967.

²See for example, Tertius Meyburgh, "In South Africa: Hints of Change," The New York Times, September 6, 1969; Edwin S. Munger, "South Africa: Are There Silver Linings?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 2 (January 1969), pp. 375-386; Derek Ingram, "South Africa's Master Plan", The Ottawa Citizen, November 21, 1968.

³Anti-Apartheid News (London), April 1967.

Muller's statement of welcome to the Malawian delegation, the South African parliament had passed a resolution praising the government for its policy of seeking "friendly coexistence with countries in Africa ..."⁴ Thus, the outward-looking policy is officially proclaimed as an attempt to normalize relations between South Africa and the rest of the new African states, particularly those in southern and central Africa. Viewed in this way, the outward-looking policy is a South African counter-thrust to the Pan-African world's confrontation policy discussed in the previous chapter.

This chapter seeks to analyze the outward-looking policy with particular reference to the objectives of the policy and some of the initial moves already undertaken in pursuit of the policy. The aim here is to attempt to gain a fuller appreciation of the policy by isolating the interests that the policy would appear directed to safeguarding or promoting. It is argued that the interests that present South African policy-makers seek to promote are mainly of a strategic, economic and political nature. It is further argued that the realization of these goals would most likely conduce to the emergence of a South African hegemony, particularly in the region of southern Africa. Put differently, the successful

⁴House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 19 (1967), col. 412.

application of the outward-looking policy to the region of southern Africa is likely to lead to the political satellization of those countries that prove receptive to South African overtures. On the other hand, countries rejecting such overtures - i.e., those that continue the policy of confrontation - may be expected to become objects of increasingly hostile pressure from South Africa.

Before the objectives of the outward-looking policy and the implications of their realization can be analyzed, it is necessary to outline some of the factors that have facilitated the launching of the policy at this time. It seems pertinent to explore this aspect to some extent since it has a bearing on the sort of conditions or factors that it has become easier for South African policy-makers to exploit now than hitherto.

II

The launching of the outward-looking policy in the mid-1960's was facilitated by factors internal and external to South Africa itself. Within South Africa itself there was a growing realization that although the country was relatively immune from external military attack, yet its political and diplomatic isolation from the rest of Africa was incompatible with the long-term security and other interests of the regime or of the ruling white minority as a whole. Externally, the

growing evidence of regime weaknesses, political instability and disunity in the Pan-African world seemed to furnish opportunities for manoeuvre previously not available to the government in Pretoria. These two main factors may now be discussed in some detail.

Although the South African government had, by the mid-1960's, successfully resisted efforts by its domestic and external opponents to have the policy of apartheid abandoned, yet the country's diplomatic isolation in Africa and elsewhere had begun to cause concern to the regime. The main consideration in this respect was that isolation meant in effect that South Africa was deprived of the possibility of directly influencing developments elsewhere in Africa, including those that might be related to the country's own future. Awareness of this fact was evinced in a government propaganda publication as far back as 1959, when it was urged that a wide range of contacts between South Africa and the new African states be established as otherwise South Africa might become "something like a political lagoon at the southernmost point of the continent."⁵ Five years later a pro-government newspaper argued editorially that the spread of "communism" in

⁵Fact Paper No. 72 (May 1959), p. 5.

most of the newly-independent African countries was a development which would necessarily affect South Africa and that, in consequence, the country should seriously assess its role in Africa so as not to be overtaken by events.⁶ In a similar vein, a leading member of the opposition United party - himself a former Nationalist party member - called for more determined South African involvement in African affairs in order that the country might contribute to the curbing of the "pressing ambitions of Sovietism."⁷ In February 1965, the House of Assembly passed a motion calling upon Western powers to cooperate with South Africa "with a view to averting the increasing communistic threat in Africa."⁸

Such statements as those cited above sustain the point being made here, namely, that the outward-looking policy was developed in part as a result of the growing realization in South Africa that isolation had to be transcended. Earlier

⁶Die Transvaler (Johannesburg), January 11, 14, 1964.

⁷Japie Du P. Basson, "Africa Our Workshop," in Hildgarde Spottiswoode, ed., South Africa: The Road Ahead (London: Bailey Brothers and Swinfen, 1960), p. 31.

⁸House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 13 (1965), col. 430.

claims by Dr. Verwoerd, for example, that isolation furnished "strength" to South Africa,⁹ began to lose their appeal. For South Africa to remain a "political lagoon" was now seen as tantamount to sacrificing vital interests which should be safeguarded or pursued within the framework of a more activist African policy.

The second factor facilitating the implementation of the outward-looking policy was the pattern of events unfolding in much of newly-independent Africa in the mid-1960's. Political turmoil and instability in a number of African countries¹⁰ beginning especially in 1964 provided South African policy-makers with unprecedented opportunities for launching the policy merely by capitalizing on the said political difficulties. Thus, when in August 1964 Congolese prime minister Moise Tshombe appealed to South Africa for aid in his efforts to curb the serious revolt in the northeastern provinces of his country, South Africa immediately responded by dispatching

⁹Ibid., Vol. 3 (1962), col. 3453.

¹⁰Examples are: the Zanzibar revolution of 1964; army mutinies in Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda the same year; rebellions in the northeastern provinces of the Congo soon after the withdrawal of U.N. troops that had maintained relative order in the country since independence in 1960; the cabinet crisis in Malawi in September 1964 leading to political clashes and the dismissal from office of six prominent members of the government; and the general weakening of the one-year old OAU as the African states began to pay greater attention to the security of their political systems in the face of challenges to domestic political stability.

a planeload of supplies as well as by allowing scores of white South African mercenaries to join Tshombe's forces fighting the anti-government insurgents.¹¹

The significance of South Africa's involvement in the Congo lay in the fact that it opened for the first time the possibility of that country's establishing a beach-head in the very heart of the African continent as a result of her timely assistance to a regime in distress. To the extent that such penetration into the Congo was successful, it would both breach South Africa's isolation and help win for that country new allies. Since South Africa already maintained close and friendly relations with the Portuguese colonialists in Mozambique and Angola, the white settler government of Southern Rhodesia and the governments of the then British High Commission Territories of southern Africa, the addition of the Congo would leave only Malawi and Zambia as the only other potential allies to be actively cultivated in the region of southern-central Africa.

¹¹The Star (Johannesburg), August 24, 1964. According to this report the plane involved, a South African Air Force Hercules C130, carried 15 tons of medicines and food. It is, however, likely that the shipment consisted in the main of weapons and ammunition for use by South African mercenaries serving with Mr. Tshombe's army.

Apart from Tshombe's Congo, another potentially friendly gesture towards South Africa was to come from newly-independent Malawi. At the July 1964 OAU Heads of State Conference in Cairo, Malawian prime minister Hastings Kamuzu Banda pointed out that while he supported the idea of the total liberation of all colonial territories in Africa, his own country could not, for economic and geographical reasons, take any hostile action against southern African colonial regimes, particularly the Portuguese regime in Mozambique.¹²

Both Tshombe's appeal for aid and Banda's confirmation of his readiness to maintain his country's colonially-derived patterns of economic and commercial relationships with colonial southern Africa were well received in South Africa. Press comment was generally favourable in regard to the new developments. Two pro-government newspapers, for example, expressed the hope that the friendly gestures from the north could be exploited to South Africa's advantage.¹³ The Cape Argus, a Cape Town daily, urged the government to exploit

¹²See John G. Pike, Malawi: A Political and Economic History (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 161-172. (A fuller discussion of Malawian policy toward South Africa follows in the next chapter.)

¹³Die Transvaler (Johannesburg), August 26, 27, 1964; Die Volksblad (Bloemfontein), July 21, 1964.

Banda's overture and to use such diplomacy as would help to bring to South Africa's side such pivotal states as the Congo (Kinshasa) and Zambia.¹⁴ If the spirit underlying Banda's policy "can permeate Zambia and the Congo ...then South Africa will have a buffer between itself and a more northerly and hostile states [sic] of Africa."¹⁵

Premier Verwoerd did not lose sight of the opportunities that the press was urging him to seize. Speaking at the Cape provincial congress of the Nationalist party in August 1964, he observed that the time had come for the establishment of a "Southern African Common Market" in which Black and White states would cooperate on the basis of equality.¹⁶ A common market that included South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia and Malawi, would, according to a Natal newspaper, give South Africa "an economic hegemony" since she was the most industrialized country in the region.¹⁷

¹⁴July 21, 1964.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶The Star (Johannesburg), August 25, 1964.

¹⁷The Natal Mercury (Durban), August 29, 1964.

Three years later a Nationalist member of parliament, a Mr. J. J. Engelbrecht, was able to declare with satisfaction that South Africa's close ties with Malawi gave evidence of the fact that the country was now poised "for the outward movement," and that what now remained was the consolidation of a southern African common market within which South Africa would constitute the essential "steadying factor."¹⁸

It is now necessary to analyze the major objectives of the outward-looking policy.

III

As already stated, the objectives of the outward-looking policy appear in the main to be political, strategic and economic in character. Politically and strategically, the South African government seeks the consolidation of the system of domestic colonialism by the development of military and paramilitary forces capable of defeating or neutralizing both internal and external challenges to the system. Additionally, South Africa sees its own security and political interests as inseparable from those of other colonial regimes in southern Africa to the end that the elaboration and consolidation of a multi-purpose alliance system involving these regimes has become an integral part of verligte policy. Then,

¹⁸House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 22 (1968), cols. 2696-2697.

too, from an economic, strategic, and political point of view, the establishment of friendly relations between the regime in Pretoria and the new African states would reap commercial and other advantages for South Africa; help neutralize southern African liberation movements that rely on assistance and cooperation from independent African states; and help carve out for South Africa a position of dominance among the African states.

The aims of the verligte policy may, for convenience, be conceptualized as involving: (a) consolidation; (b) collaboration; (c) penetration; and (d) satellization. Consolidation refers to the strengthening and safeguarding of the domestic colonial system by means of the build-up of the state's security and defense apparatus. Collaboration refers to South Africa's identification and cooperation - at all feasible levels - with the Portuguese colonial regimes in Angola and Mozambique and the illegal white settler regime of Southern Rhodesia. Penetration may be seen in terms of the development of inter-state relations between South Africa and the new African states such that the latter become politically beholden to the former in consequence of the power disparities involved. To the extent that this penetration is realized, a process of satellization of the "penetrated"

state is likely to ensue.¹⁹

(a) In Quest of Consolidation

As part of the desire to consolidate and safeguard the system of domestic colonialism and in response to internal and external challenges to that system, South Africa has found it imperative to launch a programme aimed at achieving a high degree of military-security preparedness. Indeed military preparedness seems to have been regarded in South Africa as an essential pre-condition for the development of relations with the new African states.²⁰

Persistent African criticism of apartheid and the general confrontation between the African states and South Africa described in the previous chapter, convinced the South African government that the African states might in time launch an armed attack on the country. Even if the African

¹⁹Satellization is here understood to mean the situation that arises as one state comes to depend on another to any significant degree, economically, commercially and/or militarily. A high degree of dependence would entail subordination politically. Hence, a satellized state is one whose political policies are determined significantly by the fact of its dependence on another state in the areas indicated. For a fuller definition of this concept see Footnotes 38 and 39 in Chapter I above.

²⁰According to government Fact Paper No. 72 (May 1959), relations between South Africa and the African states could only be initiated after South Africa's strength had been "consolidated into a firmer and more permanent form."

states themselves do not appear to have made any serious preparations to initiate such an attack, the belief remained firmly held in South Africa that political and diplomatic confrontation might one day issue in an actual invasion from the north. Hence, Verwoerd's 1962 contention to the effect that even if the African states were themselves too weak militarily to attempt an invasion of South Africa, there nonetheless remained the possibility that those states would use "communist" military assistance to undertake "irresponsible" actions against South Africa.²¹ It was therefore imperative, he felt, that South Africa take precautions to counter military threats from the north.²²

Fears of external invasion and of domestic uprisings have furnished the justification for the rapid expansion of military and paramilitary forces in South Africa. The expansion of the armed forces is strikingly evident in: budgetary allotments to the military; the type of items on which expenditure has been heaviest; the expansion of the security or intelligence apparatus of the state; and the diversification and rate of increase of the said military forces. The

²¹House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 3 (1962), cols. 3446-3447.

²²Ibid., col. 3447.

following tables, partly based on a United Nations study,²³ illustrate the main features of South Africa's military posture.

Table 2

South Africa: Gross Budget Estimates for Defence, 1960-1969 (In millions of rand)
(R1 = \$1.40)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Defence Budget</u>	<u>Defence Budget as a percentage of Total Budgetary Expenditure</u>
1960/1961	44	6.7
1961/1962	72	10.0
1962/1963	129	16.0
1963/1964	157	18.4
1964/1965	210	20.6
1965/1966	229	21.0
1966/1967	255	20.3
1967/1968	256	18.2
1968/1969	268	19.1

Sources: U.N., Military and Police Forces, p.1; S.H. Steinberg, ed., The Statesman's Yearbook 1965/1966 (New York: St. Martins Press, 1966), p.130; Ibid., 1969/1970, p.1290; Ibid., 1970/1971, p.1289; Defence and Aid Fund, Rhodesia: Why Minority Rule Survives (London: Christian Action Publications, 1969), p.28.

²³ United Nations, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, Military and Police Forces in the Republic of South Africa, ST/PSCA/SER.A/3 - A/AC.115/L.203-204, New York, 1967. Hereafter referred to as U.N., Military and Police Forces. (Other sources of data are cited fully in the usual way.)

Table 3

South Africa: Major Items Absorbing Increases in Defense Expenditure

<u>Item</u>	<u>1960/1961 Expenditure (Rand)</u>	<u>1966/1967 Expenditure (Rand)</u>
Army stores, services	2,620,000	11,241,000
Aircraft, equipment, stores	2,626,000	29,232,000
Naval stores, equipment	2,339,000	11,804,000
Mechanical transport	1,648,000	15,310,000
Reserves of stocks	4,500,000	45,750,000
Manufacture of munitions	368,000	44,900,000

Source: U.N., Military and Police Forces, p. 1.²⁴

²⁴ It should also be noted that on the basis of other reports expenditure on espionage-related activities has increased remarkably. Thus in 1964/1965 this item is estimated to have required R335,000. The following year, 1965/1966 the amount involved had gone up to R1,200,000 of which R312,000 was allotted to the internal secret service; R367,000 to military intelligence; and R500,000 to foreign intelligence activities. Contact (Cape Town), Vol. 10, No. 1 (1967), p. 8. See also the Cape Argus (Cape Town), March 14, 1967.

By 1969 the sum allotted for "secret services" in the budget had grown to some R5,300,000. See The Star (Johannesburg), May 5, 1969.

It is of course not possible to indicate amounts set aside for Africa-related intelligence activities. However, a recent propaganda publication of the South African government asserts flatly that South African "intelligence men are building a chain of listening posts across the continent." See Republic of South Africa, South Africa in World Strategy (London: Embassy of the Republic of South Africa, 1969), p. 8.

Table 4

South Africa: Strength of the Defense Force 1960/1961-1966/1967

Sector of Defense Force	Strength at 1960/61 (all ranks)	Strength at 1966/67 (all ranks)	Percent Increase 1966/67 over 1960/61
Permanent Force (Army, Navy, Air Force)	7,721	17,276	143
Citizen Force (annual intake of draftees)	2,000	16,527	800
Commando Force (Irregulars)	48,281	60,000	25
Special Task Force	(a multi-purpose emergency force whose size has not been disclosed) **		

Source: U.N., Military and Police Forces, pp. 1-3.²⁵

** In Republic of South Africa, South Africa in World Strategy, mention is made of a 500-man "fire-brigade force" which may well be the Task Force referred to here (p. 7).

²⁵This table does not include the Air Commando force established in 1964. Then too, the figures for the Citizen Force refer only to the number of white youths drafted for military training in the particular year indicated. (Compulsory military training for white males between the ages of 17 and 50 years was instituted in 1967. Prior to this date, induction into the armed forces - again for whites only - had been on a "selective-service-by-lottery basis.")

Training for conscripts of the Citizen Force is stretched over a consecutive series of nine periods, viz.: 12 months during the first period; 26 days during each of the following ~~three~~ periods; and 12 days during the remaining five periods. Those who complete their training in this way then join the Citizen Force reserve. Already by 1966 there were some 55,000 such reservists. See U.N., Military and Police Forces, p. 2 et passim; South Africa Today (an annual publication

(Continued)

The above data give some indication of the level and rate of military preparations undertaken in South Africa between 1960 and 1967. Defense expenditure has risen from a level of nearly 7 percent of total ordinary budgetary expenditure to a level around 20 percent of total expenditure per annum. As shown in Table 3, considerable attention has been paid to the procurement of military aircraft and stores, the stock-piling of strategic stores or materials such as oil fuels, and the bolstering of domestic weapons and munitions manufacturing processes. Then too, the strength of the armed forces has been spectacularly boosted, as shown, for example, by the 143 percent increase in the size of the Permanent Force

²⁵(Cont'd.) of the Johannesburg Financial Times), 1966, p. 113. Commandant Rudolph Hiemstra, Chief of the Defense Force, declared in 1967 that his objective was to be able in ten years to mobilize 100,000 for the Force almost instantly to meet any emergency. Cape Times (Cape Town), March 31, 1967.

It should also be noted that these data have not included the police force which also plays a crucial role as an adjunct of the armed forces in maintaining "security." In 1966 the force was some 29,000 men strong, roughly equally divided racially as between white and black officers. There were also some 15,000 white police reservists. The police budget has grown from R36 million in 1960 to R56 million in 1966. U.N., Military and Police Forces, pp. 10-15; South Africa Today, 1966, p. 113.

It should further be noted with regard to the police that only white members of the force are allowed to carry firearms, as well as to advance to positions of command within the force.

in the period 1960 to 1967.²⁶ Satisfaction with these and similar developments was reflected in the 1967 government "Defense White Paper" wherein it was noted:

The operational readiness of the South African Defense Force has increased considerably in the past two years ...The numerical strength and efficiency of the forces has been enhanced, the quality and availability of equipment improved, strategic supplies stock-piled, and a firm foundation towards self-sufficiency in ...essential supplies established.²⁷

²⁶Three other developments of military-security significance should also be noted: (a) the launching by the government of a defense industry which already manufactures rifles, ammunition, armoured cars and jet trainer aircraft. To further strengthen this industry - which was established partly with a view to making the country independent of potentially politically-sensitive European and North American arms supplies - the government established an Armaments Development and Production Corporation, initially capitalized at R120 million, to research and undertake the production of a wide range of weaponry, from naval vessels to large aircraft; (b) the purchase, mainly from France, of sophisticated aircraft such as Mirage bombers and fighters and a new "Cactus" all-weather, ground-to-air missile system designed for low-level, fast-flying aircraft - the delivery of which system is expected in 1971; (c) the establishment in 1969 of a super-secret agency - the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) - which, in its activities, was to be answerable only to the prime minister. (Under the law setting up the BOSS, any person divulging information relating to the activities of the Bureau is liable to a fine of R1,500 and/or seven years imprisonment - the onus being on such person to prove his own innocence.) On these aspects, see U.N., Military and Police Forces, pp. 3-9; Republic of South Africa, South Africa in World Strategy, pp. 14-16; Abdul S. Minty, South Africa's Defense Strategy (London: Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1970).

²⁷Contact (Cape Town), Vol. 10, No. 1 (1967), p. 7; Cape Times, June 6, 1967.

These military and paramilitary preparations have, as already stated, been directed in the first instance to combating any domestic opposition to the regime, particularly opposition by the domestically-colonized African majority. An extensive police system and an apparently equally extensive "informer" system have been established to spy on the activities of would-be anti-government activists.²⁸ Moreover, the police have virtually been given a complete free hand over the arrest, indefinite detention without trial, of any individual the authorities suspect of being "dangerous" to security.²⁹ The apparent effectiveness of these measures suggests that the system of domestic colonialism has been further strengthened. Equally importantly, the relative domestic tranquillity thus

²⁸See for example, Mary Benson, "Political Life in South Africa," in Irving L. Markovitz, ed., African Politics and Society (New York: The Free Press, 1970), pp. 353-367; and a report by Cyril Dunn on the security-police-informer network in The Observer (London), July 20, 1969.

²⁹See for example, A. B. Sachs, The Violence of Apartheid (London: Christian Action Publications, 1969). Reports indicate that suspects held under these laws are often tortured during interrogation by the police. Indeed, between 1963 and 1969 some eleven persons have died during periods of such interrogation. Police have mostly claimed that these cases were suicides. See The New York Times, February 21, June 28, 1970; and International Defense and Aid Fund, eds., South Africa: The BOSS Law (London: Christian Action Publications, 1970), p. 11.

obtained has provided the requisite atmosphere for the pursuit of the outward-looking policy. Such tranquillity has provided the leaders of the regime with the confidence that they can achieve their purposes in spite of what might otherwise have appeared as heavy odds, namely, the numerically-superior African population that chafes under a multi-faceted system of oppression.³⁰

Military preparations have, in the second instance, been intended to deter, and if need be, to resist any invasion of South Africa undertaken by the African states on their own or in combination with some other power.³¹ However, as the possibility of such an invasion has receded - and this partly due to the factors analyzed in Section II above - increasing attention has been paid to shoring up other southern African colonial regimes whose stability South African policy-makers see increasingly tied up with the survival of their own system

³⁰Vorster himself has recently reflected such confidence in stating:

We are thankful that we have no class struggle like other countries, and no religious, language or colour struggle. It could so easily have been different because we have all the potential in the world for it.

The Star (Johannesburg), May 10, 1969.

³¹See citations under footnotes 20-22 above. This question is further discussed under sub-section (c) and Chapter V below, this being done in the context of South Africa's policy towards "recalcitrant" countries such as Zambia and her allies.

of government. Hence "collaboration" has become an important adjunct of "consolidation."

(b) Achieving Collaboration

Full collaboration with the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique and the Southern Rhodesian settlers has become an important part of the outward-looking policy. Since South Africa apparently regards her own security and economic interests as inseparable from those of the Portuguese and the Southern Rhodesian settlers, collaboration has become an axiom of the verligte policy.³²

The forms that collaboration has taken are multiple. The present analysis will focus on the strategic and economic aspects of this collaboration; however, it is the strategic aspect which is given greater attention since the general economic relationships in southern Africa are discussed in the next section.

In terms of South African perspectives, Mozambique, Angola

³²As far back as 1961 the late Dr. Verwoerd pointed out that South Africa's relations with the Portuguese colonies and the now defunct Central African Federation could not but be very close in view of geographical factors, "traditional friendships," and a multiplicity of other interests which made cooperation among these countries inevitable. The Star (Johannesburg), July 8, 1961.

and Southern Rhodesia constitute an essential part of a developing southern African security zone. The strategic and geopolitical considerations underlying South Africa's support of the Portuguese colonialists and Southern Rhodesian settlers are of course readily apparent. If, for example, any one of these territories were to fall into the hands of African nationalists, some part of South Africa's and/or of South West Africa's frontiers would be opened up to new regimes of whose friendly propensities the government in Pretoria could not be certain in advance. This being so, South Africa is hardly likely to wish to abandon the present colonial regimes of southern Africa as a political ploy to induce or to reinforce friendly attitudes on the part of any successor African-controlled governments in the area.³³ South Africa's

³³In his article, "Foreign Relations in Southern Africa," in South Africa Today, 1966, Theo Greyling of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) argues relative to Southern Rhodesia: "It must be accepted that under White rule Rhodesian cooperation with South Africa will probably be better than under Black rule - it will be less complicated at any rate." (p. 171) Suggestions to the effect that the imposition of U.N. economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in consequence of her illegal unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) might lead South Africa to prefer a "complaisant Black government" in that country to continued UDI, seem unsustainable. (For such a suggestion see Richard Hall, The High Price of Principles: Kaunda and the White South; London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1969, p. 237.) It is true that South Africa may wish for an early legal settlement of the UDI dispute in an effort to minimize critical international attention focused on her as the chief violator of U.N. sanctions directed

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political and military collaboration with Mozambique, Angola, and Southern Rhodesia stems precisely from her desire to freeze the political status quo in those territories as is shown below.

The readiness to defend the Rhodesian settler regime is reflected in recent South African military assistance to that regime during the latter's periodic operations against guerrilla units of either of the Zimbabwean liberation movements, namely the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).³⁴ For example, when in August

³³(Cont'd.) against Rhodesia. But, a "legal" settlement of the Rhodesian problem, as seen from Pretoria, is not one that countenances the political eclipse of the minority Rhodesian white settlers. If anything, it is one that can be regarded as most likely to guarantee the political hegemony that the said settlers presently exercise over that country. In this respect, see Minty, op. cit., p. 9 et passim.

³⁴The existence of a military alliance between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (as well as the Portuguese colonies) seems highly probable. This can be attested to, for example, by the existence of a so-called Council of Three, a committee consisting of top-level military personnel from the countries involved. The Council meets every month to coordinate military plans and to exchange intelligence information, particularly with regard to guerrilla movements and activities. See The Times (London), March 12, 1968; International Defense and Aid Funds, eds., Rhodesia: Why Minority Rule Survives (London: Christian Action Publications, 1969), pp. 27-28 et passim.

Military coordination seems to have become an axiom of the policies of the southern African colonial regimes. Vorster himself, for example, acknowledged in 1968 that his government had to come to the assistance of the Rhodesian settlers and the Portuguese colonialists since: "We are good friends and good friends do not need an agreement to combat murderers [guerrillas]." Cited in Patrick O'Meara, "Tensions in the Nationalist Party," Africa Report, February 1969, p. 44. See also William R. Frye, In Whitest Africa: The Dynamics of Apartheid (Englewood

(Continued)

and September of 1967, ZAPU, in alliance with the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa launched guerrilla operations against Rhodesian forces in the Zambesi valley in the northwestern corner of the territory, the guerrilla units had to face a combined Rhodesian-South African force.³⁵ The South African units in Rhodesia included a number of armed reconnaissance and other aircraft of the South African Police Airwing, operating from Rhodesian bases at Kariba and Gwelo. In addition an armoured car unit was stationed at Bulawayo, Rhodesia's second largest city and an important commercial-industrial centre which also commands the country's

³⁴(Cont'd.) Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1968) in which foreign minister Muller is reported as having admitted during an interview that his government had entered into mutual defense arrangements with the other white-ruled southern African countries as well as the African regimes of Botswana, Lesotho, and Malawi. (p. 71)

³⁵The number of South African troops in Rhodesia is estimated at between 2,700 and 7,000. See Russell Warren Howe, "War in Southern Africa," in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 1 (October 1969), p. 155; Paul M. Whitaker, "The Revolutions of Portuguese Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (April 1970), p. 32.

On guerrilla movements generally in southern Africa see, for example, ibid.; Howe, op. cit.; Fred G. Burke, et al., "Guerrillas and the National Liberation Movements," Africa Today (Denver), Vol. 14, No. 4 (August 1967); Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Unity (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 158-171 et passim; Eduardo C. Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969); Basil Davidson, The Liberation of Guinea (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969), especially Ch. 8; John Marcum, et al., "The Three Revolutions: Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea," Africa Report (Special Issue), Vol. 12, No. 8 (1967).

rail connection to Botswana and South Africa. At the same time, an unspecified number of South African police "Special Branch" officers joined the troops in the field to "interrogate" captured guerrillas.³⁶ Premier Vorster pointed out that his troops would remain in Rhodesia for as long as they were needed; it was his government's policy to fight the African guerrillas "in any territory where it is allowed to act ... South Africa must protect its interests in the manner it deems fit."³⁷

It is thus evident that South Africa is prepared to invest considerable resources in defending the Rhodesian regime. The assistance extended to the Rhodesian settlers should not, however, be seen simply as a kind of "one-shot" or fire-brigade action. It should rather be seen in the context of South Africa's rapidly unfolding conception of herself as a neo-imperial power in southern Africa, and as the guarantor of the stability of the region. It is in the light of this perspective that Vorster has declared that South Africa will not allow anyone to interfere with the status quo or the stability of southern Africa.³⁸ Defense

³⁶Contact, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1967), p. 5.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸The Star (Johannesburg), September 9, 1967; Minty, op. cit., p. 9.

minister P. W. Botha stated recently that South Africa's armed forces were making "a great contribution to guarantee the economic and political stability of southern Africa."³⁹ Thus, not only is South Africa's own security seen as inseparable from that of other colonial regimes in southern Africa, the government in Pretoria also increasingly sees itself as having the power and the responsibility to oversee the general political evolution of the sub-continent.

As part of both "consolidation" and "collaboration" processes South Africa has also established an air base in the so-called Caprivi Strip, the narrow tongue-like portion of South West Africa that lies between Botswana and Zambia.⁴⁰ This base, the initial cost of which was claimed by Zambian President Kaunda to be some R16 million,⁴¹ is situated at Mpacha, only 15 miles from the Zambian border. At the time of construction in 1965, the main runway at Mpacha was reported already to measure almost one mile in length and some 50 feet in width, indicating that it could be used by

³⁹Keessing's Contemporary Archives (London), Vol. 17 (1969/1970), p. 23676.

⁴⁰See map of southern Africa in Appendix A below.

⁴¹Kaunda's claim is cited in Richard Gott, "The [South African] Defense Position," in Ronald Segal and Ruth First, eds., South West Africa: Travesty of Trust (London: Andre Deutsch, 1967), p. 254.

heavy military jets such as the Canberra bombers of the South African Air Force.⁴²

The Mpacha base was supplemented by a newly-built, large police station 16 miles up the Zambesi River at Katima Mulilo, just across the river from Zambia's Western province (formerly Barotseland). Opening the station in 1967, Mr. Vorster declared that it would serve "as a refuge for all people who seek refuge from evil-doers and terrorists."⁴³

The Caprivi Strip is of immense strategic value to South Africa. Bordering on Botswana, Southern Rhodesia, Zambia and Angola, the Strip provides South Africa with easy access by land and air to all these territories. The Mpacha and Katima Mulilo bases can be used as staging points by troops operating against guerrillas attempting to penetrate South West Africa or Southern Rhodesia, from the Zambian side of the Zambesi. Aircraft flying out of Mpacha can be used to support the anti-guerrilla operations of Rhodesian forces deployed along the Zambesi and those of the Portuguese in Angola. Moreover, the

⁴²Ibid. Zambian protests against the building of the base were largely ignored by the South African government which merely asserted that Mpacha was an emergency landing strip for aircraft of the South African Airways flying between Africa and Europe. Ibid., pp. 254-255.

⁴³Natal Mercury (Durban), July 4, 1967.

base can be used by planes flying photographic and reconnaissance missions over Zambia and, if need be, by planes involved in actual military operations against Zambia or particular targets in that country: South Africa might, for example, choose to attack such obvious targets located within Zambia as nationalist guerrilla camps.⁴⁴ Mpacha is thus important to South Africa's strategic posture both as a forward position from which the country can defend itself against its enemies far away from its own borders and as a point from which assistance can easily and expeditiously be extended to South Africa's Portuguese and Rhodesian allies. Above all, Mpacha signifies South Africa's determination to establish a position of political dominance in southern Africa based on unchallengeable military superiority. As the London Times, commenting on the siting of Mpacha, observed:

For a defensive nation fearing black invasion, it is a curious location [hundreds of miles from South Africa's boundaries] for an expensive and immovable military asset. For a confident State

⁴⁴In his book, The High Price of Principles: Kaunda and the White South, Hall reports that at one time during 1968 South Africa considered making "pre-emptive airstrikes" against guerrilla facilities in Zambia (p. 186). In April the same year defense minister Botha drew a parallel between possible South African operations against guerrilla camps in Zambia and Israeli raids against Palestinian guerrillas in Jordan. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), April 4, 1968. While Botha did not refer to Zambia by name, it obviously is that country that he had in mind.)

bent on a forward military policy, it is an ideal location from which to conduct it.⁴⁵

With regard to the Portuguese colonies, South African involvement in their affairs is perhaps best attested to by that country's participation in the construction of major capital projects recently promoted by the Portuguese colonialists, ostensibly for the economic development of both Angola and Mozambique. This participation is particularly evident in the two major dam building projects the Portuguese have launched on the Kunene River which forms ^{part of} the border between Angola and South West Africa, and on the lower Zambesi River at Cabora Bassa.⁴⁶ The hydro-electric power from the Kunene scheme will be available to users in northern South West Africa.⁴⁷ Of greater importance, however, is the fact that the dam lies in an area considered vital to South Africa's strategic interests. Indeed, South Africa's military presence in the area has recently been bolstered both in order to contain any guerrilla penetrations into South West

⁴⁵The Times, March 12, 1968.

⁴⁶Shown on map in Appendix A. This map provides full information on other place names subsequently to be referred to in this and succeeding chapters.

⁴⁷Gott, op. cit., p. 257.

Africa and in order to provide convenient bases or positions from which military assistance can be given to the Portuguese who themselves are fighting African nationalist guerrillas in eastern and northeastern Angola. South African forces in this area are already cooperating with the Portuguese in such spheres of military activity as the sharing of intelligence information and the strafing, by air, of suspected guerrilla positions.⁴⁸

It is, however, the Cabora Bassa project which provides fuller testimony to the seriousness with which collaboration is being pursued by the regime in Pretoria. Apart from any economic considerations, South African participation in Cabora Bassa stems from strategic considerations important to the authorities in Pretoria.⁴⁹ The area in which the dam is to be built is already threatened by the incursions of the forces of the Mozambican national liberation group, the Frente de

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 257-258; Defense and Aid Fund, Rhodesia: Why Minority Rule Survives (London: Christian Action Publications, 1969), p. 29.

⁴⁹The dam will span the Zambesi in West Central Mozambique some 80 miles upstream from the town of Tete. This is in an area which, if taken by Mozambican guerrillas, would not only render vulnerable the Portuguese position in the rest of the territory, but would also open up for Zimbabwean guerrilla movements an important section of the Mozambican-Rhodesian border.

Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO).⁵⁰ South Africa's involvement on the side of the Portuguese colonialists is attested to by her dispatch in 1968 of two battallions of troops to help guard the dam site.⁵¹

South African involvement in the **C**abora Bassa project is, from a strategic point of view, astute. For, in the first place, the completion of the dam will create a large lake which, taken together with the massive Kariba Lake further up the Zambesi, will make for easier patrolling of a sensitive region. In the second place, should the Portuguese succeed in settling the one million white colonists they are

⁵⁰FRELIMO, which already controls much of the two northern Mozambique provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado, is engaged in a southward push into the Tete and Zambezia districts. See Paul M. Whitaker, "The Revolutions of Portuguese Africa," The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1 (April 1970), p. 30.

⁵¹Anti-Apartheid News (London), November 1968, p. 3. In light of this, the claim by William A. Hance (in his article: "Cahora Bassa [sic] Hydro-Project," Africa Report, Vol. 15, No. 5, May 1970, p. 21) to the effect that South Africa has no military or "security" objective in participating in the dam project seems far-fetched and rather naive. The naivete is further attested to by Hance's own admission that Cabora Bassa power to be pumped into the South African power grid is likely to be more costly per unit than the power from South Africa's own carbo-electric power plants. Ibid.

reported to want to send to the area by 1990,⁵² South Africa would gain an additional number of potential allies permanently settled in this vital region.⁵³ Thirdly, the Cabora Bassa project provides South Africa and her allies with an opportunity to induce Zambia to join the South African dominated southern African "alliance" system. The Portuguese have already offered Zambia not only Cabora Bassa power but also the river-transportation facilities that the creation of the dam will make possible.⁵⁴ Zambian acceptance of this offer would make more or less complete that country's dependence on routes passing through Portuguese-controlled areas.⁵⁵ The political consequences of such dependence seem clear. As the Johannesburg Star has observed:

If Zambia decided to make use of these [Cabora Bassa transportation facilities] it will further increase that country's dependence on outlets through Portugal's African colonies and will considerably

⁵²Anti-Apartheid News, November 1968, p. 3; South Africa Today (Johannesburg), 1969, p. 183.

⁵³Such settlers would also of course provide a considerable market for South African goods.

⁵⁴The Zambesi is expected to become navigable from the dam site to the mouth of the river. This new inland waterway would be valuable to land-locked Zambia - all things being equal. See Anti-Apartheid News, November 1968, p. 3.

⁵⁵Zambia already uses the Portuguese ports of Lobito (Angola) and Beira (Mozambique) access to both of which is by rail.

add to the pressure Portugal is able to bring to bear on President Kaunda in connection with terrorist training bases in his country.⁵⁶

While economic considerations have partly influenced South African participation in the Cabora Bassa venture,⁵⁷ it thus appears that strategic factors have been of even greater importance. As the pro-South African London magazine, Southern Africa, has put it: South Africa's participation derives from a desire to,

stabilise a highly sensitive area of southern Africa vulnerable to attacks by rebel guerrillas ... South Africa's participation in the project is not prompted by needs of more power output ... South Africa's vital interest is in economic development

⁵⁶This part of a Star editorial is cited in Anti-Apartheid News, November 1968, p. 3.

⁵⁷The main contract for the project was awarded to Zambeze Consorcio Hidro-Electrico (ZAMCO) - a consortium of contracting companies from South Africa, France, West Germany and Portugal itself. ZAMCO is headed by LTA Construction and Shaft Sinkers (Pty.), Ltd., a subsidiary of South Africa's giant mining and industrial corporation - the Anglo-American Corporation (AAC). Another important South African company involved in Cabora Bassa work is Vekor Projects and Powerlines Ltd. LTA Construction will have a 35 percent share in damming the Zambesi and, together with Vekor Projects, will carry out 75 percent of the construction work on an 865-mile powerline to Pretoria at which point Cabora Bassa power will be fed into the South African grid. See Sheila Camerer, "Trading: Review of Retailing and Exports," in South Africa Today (Johannesburg), 1969, p. 183; Hance, op. cit., pp. 20-21; Southern Africa (London), September 13, 1969, p. 140.

that will promote stability in Mozambique, an important buffer area for the Republic's outward-looking policy aimed at developing sound, reliable neighbours in southern Africa.⁵⁸

IV

(a) In Quest of Penetration

South Africa's interests in developing normal inter-state relations with the new African states has already been noted. Indeed these states constitute the principal target of the outward-looking policy. South Africa is particularly interested in developing close ties with the African states located in southern Africa. In this regard, apart from the former British High Commission Territories, Zambia and Malawi have become important targets of the policy.⁵⁹

The importance assigned to countries such as Malawi and Zambia as targets of the outward-looking policy derives from strategic and economic considerations. South Africa's interest in penetrating such countries is in part based on the desire to deny southern African liberation movements

⁵⁸Ibid. Foreign minister Hilgard Muller, in a speech to the South African Senate, made an oblique reference to this objective in 1967. See Republic of South Africa, Senate Debates, Vol. 2 (1967), col. 3751.

⁵⁹See statement by the late Verwoerd in Cape Times, June 1, 1966. Cf. footnote 17 above.

any sanctuary or base facilities in these newly-independent countries. South African defense minister P. W. Botha recently had occasion to "advise" Zambian President Kaunda - whose government rejects the verligte policy and supports liberation movements - to the effect that Kaunda,

should ...expell the terrorists from his country and together with the rest of Southern Africa build up a strong force against communism, which aims to subject Zambia and other countries in Southern Africa to slavery. Kaunda is looking for his friends in the wrong places.⁶⁰

This statement enunciates clearly South Africa's desire to neutralize nationalist guerrilla movements that seek to destroy the political status quo in colonial southern Africa. The South African expectation - and it seems justified - is that once a country has established close diplomatic and other ties with Pretoria it could not subsequently assist forces hostile to South Africa and her allies. For example, Malawian President Banda, whose country has accepted South African penetration, has emphasized that the Malawian diplomatic mission in South Africa "is not intended for the Trojan horses of subversion."⁶¹ "Penetrated" African countries are also of

⁶⁰Cited in David R. Smock, "The Forgotten Rhodesians," in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 3 (April 1969), p. 540.

⁶¹Cited in Minty, op. cit., p. 13. (Malawian South African relations are further analyzed in Chapter V below.)

strategic importance in that they provide "listening posts" for South African intelligence organizations such as the BOSS; they may also provide military base facilities.⁶² On the other hand, African countries that resist South African penetration and provide assistance to liberation movements are likely to be subjected to increasing pressure by the government in Pretoria, as will be indicated in the next chapter.

⁶² On the intelligence aspect, see the information provided under footnotes 24 and 26 above as well as under Chapter VI below.

It may also be noted here that South Africa has posted a high ranking military attache to its diplomatic mission in Malawi. It is this officer who, presumably, directs and coordinates South Africa's intelligence operations in Malawi and surrounding territories.

Regarding the question of South Africa obtaining military bases in friendly African countries, no conclusive evidence is as yet at hand. There are, however, some suggestions that South Africa may have been offered the use of Lilongwe airport by the government of Malawi. See Southern Africa (published by the New York Southern African Committee), Vol.4, No.2, February 1971, p.22; Times of Zambia (Ndola), June 8, 1970.

Dr Banda has denounced reports that he has offered South Africa use of Lilongwe airport. It is interesting to note that he has at the same time asserted that South Africa harbours "no ill feeling against any African state," and that the military preparations that South Africa has undertaken are for "defence" against those who threaten her security. See Malawi News (Blantyre), July 10, 1970.

In general, it seems that South Africa's military penetration of Malawi is confined to intelligence-gathering activities. It is conceivable, however, that the involvement could become greater. If, for example, Banda's exiled opponents were to attempt military actions in order to seize power in Malawi, South Africa may well come to the assistance of the Banda regime.

Apart from strategic considerations, penetration of African states has also been pursued with the expectation of political and economic gains. These are discussed in the context of the process of satellization analyzed below.

(b) Satellization: Some Possibilities

Inasmuch as South African military involvement in Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia and Malawi is already perceptibly conducing to a process of satellization of these countries, successful South African economic and commercial penetration into countries like Malawi would considerably boost that process. South African leaders have themselves expressed both their interest in, and confidence in achieving, the leadership of the African states. This can only imply the consequent satellization of these states, assuming that the said leadership aspiration is in fact realized. In terms of the aspiration itself, Vorster declared in 1968:

We are of Africa, we understand Africa ...and nothing is going to prevent us from becoming the leaders of Africa in every field.⁶³

Dr. Sieg Kuschke, managing director of the South African Industrial Development Cooperation has also recently observed

⁶³Cited in Bunting, op. cit., p. 426.

that, "On the continent of Africa, South Africa had to take the same leading role the United States was taking in the world today."⁶⁴

The forms of economic penetration of African countries potentially available to South Africa include the extension of official economic and technical aid; South African private investment in African countries; the promotion of trade ties; and the facilitation of labour movements from the African countries to South Africa.

South African government officials have regularly asserted their country's willingness to aid the economic development of the new African states.⁶⁵ These declarations of intent

⁶⁴News from South Africa, No. 9 (March 4, 1970), p. 3. This is a propaganda publication of the South African Information Service, New York. See also statement by Vorster in U.S. News and World Report, November 14, 1966.

⁶⁵For some evidence on this see Chapter III above. More recently foreign minister Muller told parliament South Africa was "pre-eminently able to render assistance" to African states seeking it. House of Assembly Debates, Vols. 17 and 18 (1966), col. 2802. In 1967 the House of Assembly passed a private member's motion that read:

That this House approves of the policy pursued by the Government for friendly coexistence and fruitful cooperation with countries in Africa with special emphasis on the Republic's ability to contribute to economic and technical development and the raising of the standard of living in Africa.

House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 19 (1967), col. 412. The debate on the motion itself is covered in cols. 413-444.

have begun to be translated into practice, most notably in respect of Malawi. The various forms of aid extended to Malawi include: R11 million loan for the construction of a 62-mile rail link from Balaka in Malawi to Nova Freixo in Mozambique to join the Mozambican rail system to the port of Nacala;⁶⁶ an R8 million loan for initial work on Malawi's new capital at Lilongwe;⁶⁷ a loan for the building of a R7 million sugar refinery and the possible participation of South African capital in the exploitation of bauxite deposits known to exist in the area of Mount M'lanje in southern Malawi.⁶⁸

It is as yet too early to indicate precisely what the economic impact of South African aid - official and private - might be on Malawi's development. It may be granted, at least preliminarily, that the economic impact is likely to be positive. From the point of view of this study, however, the relevant question relates mainly to the political implications of the aid, itself already considerable, that Malawi has received from South Africa. The probability of political

⁶⁶The main contractors for the job were Roberts Construction and Dorman Long, both South African.

⁶⁷The contract for the work was awarded to IMEX (Pty.) of South Africa.

⁶⁸See The Times (London), July 10, 1969.

satellization of Malawi seems high. Several factors indicate this.

First, in their own thinking on the political consequences of economic aid South African Nationalist party leaders have often hinted at satellization as an inevitable consequence. For example, Mr. Eric Louw in 1959 warned the new African states against any reliance on external aid, especially aid from governmental sources, for, "if assistance is given by a foreign government, a political quid pro quo will be demanded (or at least expected)."⁶⁹ He further speculated that those African states which were, in his view, winning independence without "adequate preparation" and with weak, undeveloped economies, were destined to become "the prey of a neighbouring and stronger state."⁷⁰ A process of "re-colonisation" would, he felt, have to be initiated and only whites could carry out such re-colonisation at all effectively.⁷¹ In a somewhat different, though related, vein, Verwoerd observed that if South Africa's quest for friendly relations with the African

⁶⁹Eric H. Louw, "The Union and the Emergent States of Africa," in SABRA, eds., South Africa in the African Continent (Stellenbosch: SABRA, 1959), p. 12.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Ibid.

states could not be achieved by normal diplomatic means, recourse would have to be had to "scientific, economic and other [means] ...by which the main objective, the gaining of friendship, can be achieved."⁷²

Indeed, it appears that South Africa's conception of its relations with African states that depend on it for aid and trade, corresponds to the anticipated nature of the relations between that country (i.e., "white South Africa") and the projected "Bantu homelands." As already pointed out in Chapter III above, those "homelands" are likely to be virtually perpetually dependent on "white South Africa" not only politically but also, and fundamentally, economically as well. On this point the SABRA, the organization of Afrikaner academic theories of apartheid, has spoken with unmistakable clarity. Addressing itself to the question whether in the event of their becoming fully self-governing, the "Bantu homelands" might not develop political and other policies in conflict with "white South Africa's" interests, SABRA noted:

It is more probable that relations [between the "Bantu homelands" and "white South Africa"] would become better and friendlier in the course of time, given the necessary statemanship and

⁷²H. F. Verwoerd, Verwoerd Speaks (Johannesburg: APB Publishers, 1966), p. 247.

the judicious use of various influencing factors, such as Christianity, education, radio, press, etc., and the mere fact of the economic interdependence of the various territories.⁷³

This means, in other words, that even if the "Bantu homelands" were to achieve some form of political independence, their satellization would be assured by the fact of their economic dependence on "white South Africa," as well as by religious, cultural and political propaganda directed to them by "white South Africa."

It does not appear that South African attempts at the satellization of the African states accepting the outward-looking policy can be resisted successfully. Yet this question cannot be disposed of so easily. The responses and reactions of states that are targets of the outward-looking policy have to be examined before it more or less confidently could be asserted that penetration is likely to lead to satellization.⁷⁴

⁷³SABRA, Integration or Separate Development? (Stellenbosch: SABRA, 1952), p. 35. See also a statement to the same effect by Verwoerd in Cape Times, June 6, 1964.

⁷⁴The responses to South African policy of states such as Malawi and Zambia are dealt with in Chapter V below.

Other types of economic relationships between South Africa and the new Africa states, and relationships that are likely to help promote the aims of the outward-looking policy generally, are in the sphere of South African private investment in the African states. Of particular importance in this respect may be mentioned the interests and activities of the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa (AAC) headed by Harry Oppenheimer. These interests are principally centered in Zambia, the Congo and Botswana.⁷⁵ The other notable private group is the Rembrandt Tobacco Corporation headed by Afrikaner millionaire Anton Rupert.⁷⁶

⁷⁵On the AAC's African operations see Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last State of Imperialism (London: Nelson, 1965), pp. 110-161. The extent of the AAC's Zambian operations will have been reduced considerably by the Zambian government's recent takeover of 51 percent of the shares of that country's two copper mining companies - the AAC itself and Roan Selection Trust (RST). See The Times (London), August 12, 13, 1969; The Observer (London), August 17, 1969.

⁷⁶The Rembrandt group is represented - in East and Central Africa - by Rothmans Tobacco Company. In Kenya, Rothmans' managing director is former Kenyan vice-president Joseph Murumbi while in Zambia the company is headed by Thomas Mtine, a friend of President Kaunda's. Rothmans is also reputed to control 50 percent of the Zambian cigarette market.

It may also be noted that Rupert himself is honorary economic adviser to the government of Lesotho.

On these and related aspects see South Africa Today, 1967, pp. 23-25, 125; Cape Times, June 20, 1966.

Both Oppenheimer and Rupert - though they differ politically in South Africa⁷⁷ - are in agreement with the outward-looking policy. Politically, this support for the policy is based on different suppositions and expectations. Oppenheimer believes that the more interaction there is between South Africa and the African states the greater the chance for the erosion of apartheid in South Africa.⁷⁸ Rupert's view is that the promotion of economic well-being among Africans in South Africa and in the new African states is likely to lead to a de-emphasis of revolutionary impulses. He has argued as follows:

If Afrikaners were to learn from their own experience, they would help Africans in their own areas to become workers with good earnings, to have a share in the productive means of the country and finally to obtain control or joint control. We would then speedily have more and more people who could not afford to be revolutionaries.⁷⁹

⁷⁷Oppenheimer is a leading member of the miniscule Progressive Party which urges gradual extension of political rights to black South Africans. Rupert supports the ruling Nationalist party.

⁷⁸Cape Times, June 4, 1964. Oppenheimer feels that the isolation of South Africa through boycotts and embargoes could lead to chaos in that country, with the effect that the "parliamentary democracy" that South Africa allegedly presently enjoys might be replaced by a "dictatorship." Ibid.

⁷⁹South Africa Today, 1967, p. 23.

Thus for Oppenheimer, the outward-looking policy will make South Africa more liberal; Rupert thinks the policy will make the African states less "revolutionary." What both of them are most concerned about, however, is the existence of peaceful and stable conditions that would facilitate their business undertakings both in South Africa itself and in the African states. Experienced businessmen that they are, they seek profitable investment opportunities in the African states as well as additionally guaranteeing the security of operations already underway in those countries. In short, the search for profit by private interests is here joined to the South African regime's quest for strategic and political dominance and stabilization in southern Africa.⁸⁰

One of the aims of the outward-looking policy has been the creation of a "South African common market." The market would include as core members, apart from South West Africa and South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland - all of which are already linked within a common market arrangement; Southern

⁸⁰ So-called "whole projects" engineering is one way in which the government encourages private investment in friendly countries. "Whole project" engineering, as in the case of the Malawian railway development, encourages exports since "capital projects supplies [are] tied to a great extent to the financing country." Camerer, op. cit., p. 182.

Rhodesia, Malawi - both of which individually have trade agreements with South Africa; Mozambique, Angola and Zambia.⁸¹

The establishment of such a market would create a significant economic unit bringing together 45 million people.⁸² South Africa, as the most highly industrialized country in the subcontinent would easily dominate such a market.⁸³ Apart from its security and strategic advantages of the sort already referred to in the preceding sections, a South African common market would broaden and consolidate South Africa's economic domination of the entire region. The dominating position of South Africa in terms of regional trade is reflected in the data in the following tables in which South Africa clearly emerges with a consistent pattern of favourable

⁸¹For further evidence of South African interest in this project see, Republic of South Africa, Focus on South Africa (New York: Information Service of South Africa, 1969(?)), pp. 44-47, et passim; D. V. Cowen, "Towards a Common Market in Southern Africa," Optima (Johannesburg), Vol. 17, No. 2 (June 1967), pp. 43-51; D. F. C. Cronje, "Can a Free Trade Association be Created in Southern Africa?" ibid., Vol. 15, No. 3 (September 1965), pp. 114-119.

⁸²See Appendix B below.

⁸³In an economy in which manufacturing industry contributes 31.4% to GDP (services, mining, and agriculture contribute 47.8%, 11.3% and 9.5% respectively), the need for markets seems obvious. These data are taken from J. J. Williams, "Commercial South Africa," in D. J. Greyling, ed., South African Progress 1969 (Pretoria: Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, 1969), p. 95.

trade balances with each of its northern neighbours. It may be noted that in both Tables 5 and 6 "South Africa" refers to the Republic of South Africa proper, together with South West Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana.

Table 5

South Africa: Imports From Southern African Territories, 1964-1968

(In millions of Rand)

<u>Country of Origin</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
Southern Rhodesia	17.8	25.0	?	112.0	?
Zambia	23.3	24.8	28.2	25.4	26.1
Malawi	1.2	1.1	0.9	0.9	1.0
Mozambique and Angola (see below)					
Total Exports:					
Southern Rhodesia	236	284	178	176	182
Zambia	335	375	480	467	500
Malawi	22	25	26	32	33

Sources: See p.194.

Table 6

South Africa: Exports to Southern African Territories, 1964-1968

(In millions of Rand)

<u>Country of Destination</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
Southern Rhodesia	53.2	84.2	?	?	?
Zambia	32.4	41.3	37.0	72.1	78.0
Malawi	1.7	2.2	3.9	4.0	4.5
Mozambique and Angola (see below)					
Total Exports: South Africa (excluding gold)	1,042	1,056	1,202	1,362	1,430

Sources and Notes for Tables 5 and 6:

These data have been compiled from various sources since integrated statistical data relating to South Africa's regional trade do not exist; indeed, since 1964 South Africa has not published any detailed country-by-country breakdowns of its trade with Africa. Then too, Rhodesian data for periods after 1965 are even harder to obtain. The indicated value of Rhodesian exports to South Africa in 1967 only represents a rough order of magnitude and is based on U.N. estimates.

Sources used include: Republic of South Africa, Economic. Financial and Statistical Yearbook, 1969 (Johannesburg: Da Gama Publishers, 1969), pp. 252-253; Republic of Malawi, Economic Report, 1968 (Zomba: Government Press, 1968), p. 59; Republic of Zambia, Annual Statement of External Trade, 1965 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1966), pp. 7-8; United Nations, Security Council, Second Report of the Committee Established in Pursuance of Security Council Resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968, S/9252/Add. 1; New York, 1969, p. 1 et passim; South Africa Today (Johannesburg), 1967, p. 115 and ibid., 1969, p. 182; John de St. Jorre, "Zambia's Economy; Progress and Perils," Africa Report, Vol. 12, No. 9 (December 1967), p. 38; John Paxton, ed., The Statesman's Yearbook 1970/71 (London: St. Martins Press, 1970), pp.476-477, 518, 1293.

No comparable statistics for Angola and Mozambique are readily available. However, trade between those territories and South Africa appears to reflect the same pattern as in the case of the other southern African territories, i.e., the terms of trade favour South Africa uniformly. For example, in 1968 South Africa imported goods worth R8.8 million and R2.2 million from Mozambique and Angola respectively. Her exports to them, however, were consistently higher in value, viz., R24.0 million and R3.0 million respectively. See South Africa Today, 1969, p. 182.

It is evident from the data in these tables that were a southern African common market to be established South Africa's dominant economic position in the region would be strengthened. South Africa's call for the establishment of such a market is thus, from the point of view of economic

self-interest, sound policy. The establishment of the market would lead to her exercising an economic stranglehold on the region. Politically, the actualization of the common market idea, would facilitate the satellization of the economically weaker members of the market by South Africa. That the South African government would seek such an outcome would seem highly probable from the evidence presented in preceding sections on other aspects of the outward-looking policy.

V

South Africa's strategic, economic and political perspectives vis-a-vis the rest of southern Africa seem relatively clear. Principally, she seeks to contain any developments that might threaten the viability of the political status quo in colonial southern Africa. South African security interests have, in the eyes of the authorities in Pretoria, become inseparable from those of the Portuguese colonialists and the white minority regime of Southern Rhodesia.

Economically, southern Africa is seen by South African policy makers as an area of great potential for private South African investment, as well as for the intensification of trade ties, rationalized through the mechanism of the proposed southern African common market.

While pursuit of the outward-looking policy has been attended with some success, notably in Malawi,⁸⁴ yet several obstacles to the further implementation of the policy should not be overlooked. First, South Africa has in effect committed herself to the defense of regimes that appear endemically unstable. Her support of Mozambique, Angola, Southern Rhodesia and Malawi - all of which face disruptive guerrilla activity - may result in a commitment of South African resources to a point dangerous to South Africa's own position or to a point not acceptable to the white electorate.⁸⁵ Closely related to

⁸⁴Some South African commentators are themselves not particularly impressed by the "winning" of Malawi, pointing out that this was always a foregone conclusion. South African Broadcasting Corporation official Theo Greyling, puts it thus: Malawi is a poor country with little prospect of major development so that she is largely tied to her nearest neighbours. [The Government of Malawi] has little bargaining power in the formation of new alliances and will probably have no alternative but to adapt itself to whatever situation emerges.

Greyling, "Foreign Relations in Southern Africa," South Africa Today, 1966, p. 173.

⁸⁵For the present, the regime seems secure electorally. The ruling Nationalist party, for example, survived the challenge from the anti-outward-looking policy splinter Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) which failed to win a single seat in the elections of April 1970. For fuller treatment of the split in the Nationalist party which led to the formation of the HNP, see, for example, Edwin S. Munger, "South Africa: Are There Silver Linings?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 2 (January 1969), pp. 375-378; Patrick O'Meara, "Tensions in the Nationalist Party," Africa Report (February 1969), pp. 41-44; David Welsh, "Urbanization and the Solidarity of Afrikaner Nationalism," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (July 1969), especially pp. 272-274. A fuller discussion of the 1970 elections occurs in Chapter VI below.

this point is the fact that South Africa does not have adequate manpower resources to deploy in the entire region of southern Africa in the event of stepped-up guerrilla activities in Angola, Mozambique, and Southern Rhodesia. As Basil Davidson has noted:

[Guerrilla] wars ...are always won or lost by the strength and determination of troops in the field. The white South Africans may have plenty of economic strength; they have precious little manpower. As against a total of 29 million Africans in South Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola, there are fewer than 4 million whites, an imbalance in manpower that is concealed for the time being by the effort of a further 10 million whites in Portugal. Subtract that effort, and what would South Africa's position then be?⁸⁶

While the bulk of the African population of southern Africa to which Davidson refers is not presently engaged in the struggle against existing regimes, the continued denial of opportunities for meaningful citizenship to that population can only further alienate it and contribute to the heightening of the revolutionary potential in the area.

Thirdly, South Africa has failed so far to win the cooperation of Zambia, a fact attested to by various attempts - to be dealt with more fully in the next chapter - to intimidate the Zambian government into an acceptance of the verligte

⁸⁶Basil Davidson, The Liberation of Guine (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 155.

policy. Zambia is of course important to both the economic and strategic aspects of that policy. Zambian support of the southern African liberation movements is of concern to South Africa. Then too, in light of the data in Table 6 above Zambia trade⁸⁷ is over 15 times more valuable to South Africa than trade with Malawi. Moreover, opportunities for profitable investment in Zambia by South African companies are probably more attractive than elsewhere in the region.

Fourthly, the question may also be posed as to whether the government in Pretoria will have the resources to expend in "winning" allies in Africa in the face of domestic dissatisfactions, particularly in the face of the economic problems of the so-called Bantu homelands. In other words, the regime's attempt to "stabilize" the region of southern Africa by its extension of economic aid, may merely redound to the neglect of the said homelands, thus contributing to the intensification of conditions of "instability" within South Africa itself. Above all, however, the realization of the aims of the outward-looking policy seems likely to continue to be a particular difficulty for South African policy makers, and this due to politico-ideological factors. This point is further explored in the next chapter which deals with some African responses and reactions to the verligte policy.

⁸⁷That is, South African exports to Zambia.

CHAPTER V

THE OUTWARD-LOOKING POLICY: RESPONSES AND REACTIONS

You and I, your country and mine, are pioneers
and explorers in a new way of international
relations and inter-racial relations.

President H. K. Banda on the occasion of the
visit to Malawi of South African Prime
Minister John Vorster - Malawi News (Blantyre),
May 22, 1970.

I

This chapter examines the responses and reactions of
the new African states to the outward-looking policy.
Particular attention is given to the responses of Malawi and
Zambia, two countries which due to geographical and historical
factors, are crucial targets of the outward-looking policy.¹

Malawi and Zambia offer contrasting responses and
reactions to the verligte policy. It is therefore necessary
to account for this contrast. Further, one must explore the
actual and probable implications of the contrasting policies

¹ This is in part the burden of the preceding chapter.
See also Denis Austin, "White Power?" Journal of Commonwealth
Political Studies, Vol. VI, No. 2 (July, 1968), pp. 99-105.
(Though in this chapter we pay particular attention to Malawian
and Zambian policies, a brief review of Botswana's policy
towards South Africa is undertaken).

for the two countries, and - with less force - for other African countries. The argument advanced in this chapter is that acceptance of the outward-looking policy - as in the case of Malawi - is likely to lead to the satellization of the "accepting" state. Such satellization in part may be attested to by the emergence of "integrative" ideological patterns as between the initiating and target states.²

Resistance to South African overtures, at least in the case of Zambia, is likely to lead to an increasing amount of hostility between the two countries and to a Zambian policy of extensive "alliance" building.

II

(a) Malawi and South Africa

Malawian leaders' present attitudes toward South Africa seem to have crystallized only just before their country's independence and at that point this came as something of a volte-face. These leaders had been active in the various Pan-African anti-colonialist movements such as the All-African People's Conference and the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa, both of which, like the successor OAU, regularly took positions strongly critical of South Africa.

² See Chapter I for discussion of these and related concepts.

The President of Malawi, Dr. Hastings Banda, whilst on a visit to the United States in 1960 (i.e., before Malawi became independent) made a special point of attacking the South African government on at least two occasions. Speaking before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., and later at the Manhattan Town Hall in New York City on the occasion of Africa Freedom Day - April 15 - Banda attacked "businessmen" in the United States and elsewhere who, by their involvement in South Africa were backing "the wrong horse in Africa". He further warned that those who helped the oppression of Africans in South Africa in this way could not expect Africans elsewhere to ignore this.³

As independence approached, however, a considerable shift in some Malawian leaders attitudes towards South Africa became discernible. Revealing in this respect are the replies given by a Malawi government official to questions asked of him by a leading South African newspaper in a telephone interview on the eve of Malawian independence. The official - his name and rank were not revealed - rather strongly intimated that the government of Malawi, far from contemplating any actions against South Africa, was anxious to preserve existing links with that

³ Report in Anti-Apartheid News (London), May 1967, P. 3.

country. Tourists from South Africa would be welcomed in Malawi, South Africa would be free to establish an embassy in Zomba; trade between the two countries would continue, if not expand.⁴ This, and more, is of course what has since happened. As already noted, Malawi signed a trade agreement with South Africa in 1967 and the two countries exchanged diplomatic missions the same year.⁵ More recently Malawi has welcomed a host of official visitors from South Africa including foreign minister Hilgard Muller in 1968, a six-man parliamentary delegation headed by the speaker of South African House of Assembly in 1969, and prime minister John Vorster himself in May, 1970.⁶

In light of the above it becomes necessary to account for Malawi's readiness to actively seek normalization of relations with South Africa thus helping to contribute^{to} a partial success of South Africa's outward-looking policy.

⁴ The conversation is reported in the Cape Times (Cape Town), June 13, 1964.

⁵ A white official of the Malawian government initially headed the country's legation in South Africa. He had an African first secretary of the legation, a Mr. Joe Kachingwe.

⁶ Reports on these activities may be gleaned in, Republic of South Africa, Focus on Southern Africa (New York: Information Service of South Africa, 1969), p. 46; The Star (Johannesburg), June 13, 1969, Times of Zambia (Ndola), June 8, 9, 10, 1970; Malawi News, May 22, July 3, 10, 1970.

In discussions of this question, economic factors can be held as fundamentally responsible for Malawi's close relations with South Africa. Basically, the argument is that the economic situation of Malawi is so perilously weak that for the government of that country to have abjured economic links with South Africa and similar countries in southern Africa would have been suicidal.⁷ It seems, however, that Malawi's policy was also influenced by domestic political considerations as well as by political factors of an ideological character. Before this hypothesis can be explored, it is necessary briefly to evaluate the economic argument referred to above.

Dr. Banda himself was among the first to state explicitly that his government's attitude and policy towards South Africa and other southern African colonial regimes was guided principally by economic considerations. He stated this position bluntly at the first ordinary session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State held in Cairo, July 17 - 21, 1964, eleven days after Malawi's accession to sovereign statehood.

⁷ See for example Denis Austin, "White Power?" Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. VI, No. 2 (July, 1968), p.99; Pike, Malawi: A Political and Economic History, pp. 163, 171-172, and Chapter 6; Henry Richardson, "Malawi: Between Black and White Africa," Africa Report, Vol. 15, No. 2 (February, 1970), p. 18.

Speaking on Malawi's relations with Mozambique - and, by extension, Malawi's relations with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia - Banda told his audience:

I believe in the liberation of the whole of our continent ...There should be not an inch of African soil under colonial rule. But I want the Conference to realize that while all of us want Africa liberated ... not every African country is in a position to do what is right in the way of helping our brothers still under colonial rule and intrusion. In my own state of Malawi, geography makes it impossible for me to cut off all relations with Portugal, diplomatic, commercial, cultural [sic] and otherwise, because colonial history and colonial geography denied it a port of its own. Everything we sell abroad ...has to go through Beira [Mozambique] which is plagued by a power of Europe.⁸

In terms of the above formulation, economic and geographical factors were thus singled out by the Malawi leader as determining his government's policies towards the colonial south. Malawi was in no position to choose its policy in this instance: colonial history and colonial geography imposed the parameters of Malawian policy vis-a-vis the south.⁹

What however was the extent of Malawi's economic involvement with South Africa? To what extent could such

⁸ Cited in Pike, op.cit., p. 164. Banda has since restated this position on several occasions. See, for example, Malawi News (Blantyre), September 11, 1970.

⁹ Die Burger, has articulated this same view in an editorial quoted in the Cape Times, March 8, 1967.

involvement account for her policies? Of considerable importance in this regard is the fact that Malawi "exports" labour to South Africa (and other neighbouring countries) and she is herself unable to provide adequate employment opportunities for her adult population. Malawian migration patterns are reflected in the following tables. Table 7 shows the estimated territorial distribution of migrant Malawians from the adult population. Table 8 shows the estimated number of Malawians actually employed in South Africa, and the sectors of ^{the} South African economy in which they are mostly employed. For comparative purposes, figures of African workers from other territories employed in South Africa have been included.

Table 7

Estimated Number of Adult Malawians in Neighbouring Territories

<u>Host Country</u>	<u>Number of Malawians</u>
Southern Rhodesia	200,000
South Africa	80,000**
Zambia	25,000
Kenya & Tanzania	4,000
TOTAL	309,000

TOTAL ADULT POPULATION OF MALAWI	1,055,000

Source: Nathan Shamuyarira, "Dr. Banda's Lonely Road", in The Institute of Race Relations Newsletter (London), October/November, 1967, pp. 402-403.

**In 1961 the South African Census Bureau estimated the number of Malawians in that country at 73,000. See Cape Times, June 5, 1964.

Table 8

South Africa: Estimated Total Employment
of Africans from Neighbouring Countries as
of June 30, 1964 (in thousands)

<u>Country of Birth</u>	<u>Sector of Employment in South Africa</u>			
	<u>Agriculture</u>	<u>Mining</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>
Lesotho	63	74	27	164
Botswana	20	23	9	52
Swaziland	7	7	4	18
Sub-total	90	104	40	234
Southern Rhodesia	8	14	5	27
Zambia	3	8	2	13
Malawi	15	26	8	49
Mozambique	25	106	4	135
Other countries	3	36	-	39
Sub-total	54	190	19	263
GRAND TOTAL	144	294	59	497

Source: G.M.E. Leistner, "Foreign Bantu Workers in South Africa: Their Present Position in the Economy," The South African Journal of Economics, Vol. 35, No. 1 (March 1967), p. 49.

It is clear from the data in Table 7 that up to 30% of the adult population of Malawi may at any one time be residing outside the territory due mainly to economic reasons. Of the number abroad, some 26% are resident in South Africa. Put differently, almost 7% of the adult population of Malawi

may be found in South Africa, and a further 20% in Southern Rhodesia, an ally of South Africa's. Moreover these migrants¹⁰ are of considerable importance to Malawi's economy.

The value of the migrant labour system to Malawi consists not only in the work opportunities available to otherwise jobless citizens, but also in the infusion into the Malawi economy of an estimated £1 million sterling annually in the form of money the migrants remit back home from South Africa.¹¹ This amount is by no means inconsiderable for a country in which the annual per capita GDP is £13, among the lowest in Africa.¹²

The second aspect of Malawi's economic relations with South Africa relates to commercial factors.¹³ The pattern of Malawi's international trade shows South Africa as the third of the top four of the country's trading partners. The following tables illustrate this situation.

¹⁰ The term migrants as used here refers both to workers who travel to host countries in search of work on their own initiative and those who are formally recruited by such agencies as the South African Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA).

¹¹ Shamuyarira, op.cit., p. 403; Leistner, op.cit., p. 52.

¹² Pike, op.cit., p. 218

¹³ The third aspect, covered in Chapter IV, relates to South African capital investment activities in Malawi.

Table 9

Malawi: Exports by Country
of Final Destination (top 4 countries)
(£,000 f.o.b.)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Country of Destination</u>			
	<u>United Kingdom</u>	<u>Southern Rhodesia</u>	<u>So.Africa</u>	<u>Zambia</u>
1964	5,477	1,604	577	80
1965	6,417	1,383	564	107
1966	6,669	780	477	224
1967	9,107	635	457	388

Table 10

Malawi: Imports by Country
of Origin (top 4 countries)
(£,000 f.o.b.)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Country of Origin</u>			
	<u>United Kingdom</u>	<u>Southern Rhodesia</u>	<u>So.Africa</u>	<u>Zambia</u>
1964	3,346	5,601	857	486
1965	5,169	7,430	1,126	361
1966	8,420	6,167	1,964	2,615
1967	7,233	5,427	1,960	1,766

Source for Tables 9 and 10: Republic of Malawi, Economic Report 1968 (Zomba: Government Press, 1968), p. 59.

From the data cited in the above tables and having regard to Malawi's geographical position, it seems clear that that country's relations with colonial southern Africa are subject to some very powerful constraints.

Granted that economic factors are important in influencing Malawian policy towards the south, additional factors seem equally important in accounting for the present Malawi government's policy towards South Africa in particular. After all, it might be argued that had Malawi followed the OAU policy on South Africa her links with that country would not in any case have had to be terminated as abruptly as Banda implies would be the case, in the statement cited above. Zambia, Malawi's south-western neighbour, maintains substantial commercial and other links with South Africa, yet, as is indicated below, has sought progressively to reverse those links. The Zambian government has proceeded relatively cautiously in reversing inherited patterns of trade and communications both because of the desire not to disrupt the national economy unduly and, presumably also, because the Zambian regime's political self-interest dictated the policy.

It might however be argued that Zambia, in contrast to Malawi, has the resources (copper) to be able to reverse inherited patterns of economic relationships. This, of course, is largely true. But the question here is not whether Malawi should have cancelled existing economic ties with the colonial south. Rather, the question is why it was decided in Zomba to establish full diplomatic - and indeed "friendly" - relations

with Pretoria in spite of apparent politico-ideological incompatibilities. After all, by establishing these relations the Malawian leaders must have been aware that they were providing the apartheid regime in South Africa a sort of "certificate of respectability"¹⁴ after the latter had suffered a period of confrontation and isolation as indicated in Chapter III above.

It seems pertinent to compare Malawi's readiness to provide South Africa with a diplomatic "certificate of respectability" with Botswana's attitude regarding political and diplomatic relations with Pretoria. Botswana is, after all, even more economically dependent on South Africa than Malawi is: she belongs to the South African currency and customs union; over 50,000 of her nationals work in South Africa as shown in Table 8 above, and the Rhodesian-South African rail link which passes through her territory provides her lifeline to the sea and to the important South African market. Here then is a country which, from a geographic and economic point of view, might have been expected to have readily chosen to establish close diplomatic ties with South Africa as a matter of course.

¹⁴ The phrase is from Breyten Breytenbach, "An Afrikaner Against Apartheid", in Southern Africa (New York), Vol. 3, No. 8 (October, 1970), p. 4.

Yet Botswana's attitude towards South Africa differs radically from that of Malawi. Botswana's policy combines a realistic recognition of that country's military and economic vulnerability in relation to South Africa with a determination not to give the appearance of condoning the system of apartheid in South Africa. As Sir Seretse Khama, the Botswana president has observed:

We recognise that there is very little Botswana can do to produce a change of heart among South Africa's white population other than by force of persuasion or example. Yet we are determined that no word or deed on Botswana's part will give comfort to the advocates of race supremacy. We have unequivocally condemned the theory and practice of apartheid and in particular the extension of the full apparatus of apartheid to the international trust territory of Namibia or South West Africa. Nevertheless we do not attempt to conceal that for obvious reasons Botswana must maintain diplomatic contacts with South Africa. For equally obvious reasons ...we decline to consider the exchange of diplomatic representatives with South Africa until we are confident that South Africa can fully guarantee that Botswana's representatives will in all respects, at all times and in all places be treated in the same way as diplomats from other countries ...Human dignity is indivisible and we are not prepared to compromise our non-racial principles.¹⁵

¹⁵ Republic of Botswana, Botswana's Foreign Policy (Gaborone: Government Printer, 1970), p. 5.

In addition to her refusal to exchange diplomatic representatives with South Africa,¹⁶ Botswana has sought to diversify her political and other contacts with other African states. For example, the government has completed plans to link the country by road and ferry with Zambia at the narrow point of the two countries' common border. Khama explains that this link will facilitate trade between Botswana and countries to the north of the Zambesi, and will enable Botswana to "diversify [her] political relations".¹⁷ In Khama's view, Botswana will "never accept the role that the late Dr. Verwoerd ...envisaged for us, which was essentially that of a Bantustan."¹⁸ Rather, she will develop as a non-racial democracy and as an active partner of those African countries "that share our commitment to democracy [such as] Tanzania and Zambia".¹⁹

¹⁶ It is interesting to note that Botswana has agreed to establish diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. "in defiance of South African pressures". See John Sackur, "South Africa; Behind the Outward-Looking Strategy", African Development (London) October, 1970, p. 9.

¹⁷ Newsweek, October 26, 1970, p. 46. See also, Botswana and Southern Africa: an Africa Bureau (London) reprint of a speech by President Khama to the Danish Foreign Policy Society, Copenhagen, November 13, 1970; para. 7.

¹⁸ Ibid., para. 5.

¹⁹ Republic of Botswana, Botswana's Foreign Policy, p. 2.

The government of Botswana thus seems clearly opposed to the idea of establishing full diplomatic relations with Pretoria. According to Khama, such relations cannot be established until there has been considerable modification, if not actual abandonment, of racial segregation in South Africa, though he is careful to couch this demand in terms of the need for Botswana diplomats to function without restraints in South Africa.²⁰

If political and ideological considerations explain Botswana's diplomatic "coolness" towards South Africa, what, if any, politico-ideological factors influence Malawi's contrary policies?

²⁰ Dr. Banda has however argued that one way of demolishing "the Wall of Jericho of apartheid" is precisely by the development of close contacts between new African states and South Africa (Africa Report, Vol. 12, No. 7, 1967, p. 34). He has recently claimed some success in this regard pointing out that Malawian officials in South Africa have been well treated and that South African officials visiting Malawi have mingled freely with Africans: "They ate at the same tables with Africans at public functions. [Some South Africans] not only ate at the same tables with Africans, but even more, they ate African food." Malawi News, September 11, 1970.

These sentiments betray a somewhat naive view of the realities of the apartheid system in South Africa. In any case Banda has himself acknowledged - during Vorster's visit to Malawi in May, 1970 - that South Africa developed "a way of life" suited to its own circumstances and history. Vorster agreed. See Malawi News, May 22, 1970.

Since in Malawi it is President Banda himself who pre-eminently decides on national policy,²¹ it seems pertinent to inquire into Banda's political orientation particularly as this relates to foreign policy.

The values that the Banda regime stresses in the context of Malawian foreign policy are, of course, related to the regime's conception of the national interests of Malawi. In this connection the Malawian leader's orientation may be characterized as one of emergent conservatism. It is an orientation the main elements of which seem to indicate firstly a preference for stability in Africa against any disturbances to the status quo irrespective of the source of disturbance; and secondly, a pronounced antipathy towards "communism" (anti-communism).

²¹ Banda himself has described his regime as a "dictatorship" although qualifying this to say it is "a dictatorship by consent." Cited in Donald Trelford, "High Hopes Beyond the Zambezi," Cape Times, June 1, 1964. Banda is not only (executive) president of Malawi, he is also his own foreign minister, minister of justice and works, life president of the ruling Malawi Congress Party (M.C.P.), commander-in-chief of the army and possesses vast constitutional powers to detain or imprison anyone without trial. When six ministers either resigned or were dismissed from the cabinet in September 1964, one of their complaints was that Banda insisted on making all major policy decisions for them. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XIV (1963/64), p. 20331.

Placing a premium on stability, as this term is used here, means above all, rejection of the anti-colonialism of those Pan-African ideologists who have insisted that independence in one African country must necessarily mean the outlawing of colonialism elsewhere in Africa and that independent African states have a responsibility towards those still under colonial rule.²² The "stability" - conscious Banda regime, however, rejects such assumptions since they must lead to a foreign policy of support to groups seeking the violent overthrow of existing colonial regimes - a development with profound "disturbing" implications for the status quo. Thus, Banda has advised the Africans of Southern Rhodesia:

My advice to my brothers in Rhodesia is not to plan to kill Europeans, blow up bridges or violence of that sort. Instead they should try to get into parliament.²³

²² The Zambian government is among those that adhere to this view as is shown below. A recent statement of this position comes from Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere who told the U.N.'s 25th General Assembly:

For Africa there is no choice. We have to support the [Southern African] Freedom Fighters. Theirs is merely a continuation of the freedom struggle which has already resulted in 41 African nations [gaining their independence]. Muhammad Speaks (Chicago), November 20, 1970.

²³ News report in Africa Report, Vol. II, No. 6 (June, 1966), p. 33.

In offering this "advice" Banda must have been aware of the near-impossibility of the African majority in Southern Rhodesia gaining power by parliamentary means, especially given the fact that the Rhodesian settlers had had to seize independence illegally to secure their complete domination of that majority.²⁴ It is interesting to note that in his own campaign against the Rhodesian settler-dominated Central African Federation, Banda denounced African attempts to get into the Federal Parliament as a way of gaining power. But all this is perhaps beside the point, which is that Banda is now, in the context of an independent Malawi, opposed to violent revolutionary upheavals in Southern Africa since this would have destabilizing effects on the status quo. Such upheavals would also obviously adversely affect established political and economic patterns and relationships within and among countries in the region. On the other hand if African nationalists in Rhodesia would "try to get into parliament" for whatever it is worth, greater stability would be likely to be achieved both in that country and in the region as a whole.

²⁴ Later developments have simply confirmed the determination of the settlers to secure the said domination. For a concise up to date analysis of political developments in Rhodesia see, for example, International Defense and Aid Fund, ed., Rhodesia: Why Minority Rule Survives (London: Christian Action Publications, 1969).

It could be argued, however, that Banda's position does not denote so much a preference for stability as it argues for peaceful change. In this sense it could be said that Banda simply prescribes the parliamentary road to Zimbabwean (Rhodesian) majority rule irrespective of the difficulties. This interpretation does not appear sound since Banda has also opposed violent action in the case of both South Africa and the Portuguese colonies, territories in which Africans do not possess even the theoretical right to vote, let alone the right to "get into parliament." On these countries Banda has declared his position as follows:

I believe in good neighbourliness ...All our neighbours are our friends - to the north, the south, the east and the west ...whether these neighbouring countries are ruled by Africans or not.²⁵

Such declarations seem to point to the fact the Malawian leader places a premium on stability - the stability of the status quo in southern Africa - above all else.

The Malawian quest for stability has not only partly influenced the country's policies on diplomatic relations

²⁵ The Star (Johannesburg), May 15, 1969 (Emphasis added).

Recently the President gave the name "Bandaism" to his ideology defining this as a philosophy of: "Live and let live in peace among all races; cooperation among all neighbours." Malawi News, July 10, 1970.

with South Africa, it has led to the search for allies among ideologically like-minded African leaders. Malawi has sought the friendship of the regimes of Swaziland, Kenya, Malagasy and Lesotho - among the more prominent.²⁶ This development is, of course, welcomed in South Africa where the government has been keen to end its political and diplomatic isolation in Africa. Thus in a statement to parliament in 1967 foreign minister Muller denounced "extremist" African leaders whose anti-South African attitudes he contrasted with the statemanship of "moderates in Africa" such as Chief Jonathan.²⁷

Apart from the high value placed on stability in the context of colonial southern Africa particularly, the second element of emergent conservatism is "anti-communism." This anti-communism does not appear in the case of Malawi to arise from any reasoned critique of Marxist assumptions or formulations.²⁸

²⁶ As if to proclaim his leadership of a new pro-South African conservative coalition, Banda told visiting Chief Leabua Jonathan of Lesotho in May, 1967, that he (Banda) was, "Africa's unpopular leader number one," while Jonathan could consider himself "Africa's unpopular leader number two." News report in Africa Report, Vol. 12, No. 7 (October, 1967), p. 34.

Outside of Africa Banda has sought the friendship of conservatively inclined regimes in, for example, Taiwan and Thailand. See *ibid.*

²⁷ House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 19 (1967), Col. 435.

²⁸ For some sophisticated philosophical critiques of communism by African leaders, see for example, Leopold Senghor, African Socialism (New York: Praeger, 1964), Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).

Rather it is based primarily in the belief that communist states are a greater threat to Africa than^{is} the west. This position is also consistent with the status quo orientation described above for, since the communist ideology and communist states must be adjudged "revolutionary," they both constitute a danger to stability wherever their ascendancy has not yet been achieved. In any event, Banda appears to view the situation in this way. He has for example accepted the current British government's view that South Africa has to buy British weapons to defend the Cape sea route and part of the Indian Ocean. In his own words:

There was Russian ambition to spread communist rule to countries in Africa. And today the Russians were [sic] in the Middle East and even as far as down to Mogadishu in Somalia. They had even warships in the Mediterranean Sea.²⁹

On communist China Banda is equally precise:

I must admit Peking frightens me. As far as I can see someone in Peking is thinking of the old Empire of Gengis Khan, and a lot more. I am not afraid of the Russians as I am of the Chinese.³⁰

Banda has also urged Western powers to strengthen their defenses in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean areas since otherwise a "power vacuum" would exist in those areas to tempt Soviet

²⁹ Malawi News, August 4, 1970.

³⁰ Africa Report, Vol. 11, No. 2 (February, 1966), p. 23.

or Chinese intervention.³¹ On the other hand he has praised the peaceful intentions of South African policy and activities in Africa.³²

Banda's fear of possible communist subversion came to the fore at the time of the 1964 cabinet "revolt" against him. When some of the ministers started questioning both Banda's alleged high-handedness in running the government and the substance of specific policies he was promoting including collaboration with the southern African regimes, his reaction was to assume that the Chinese communists had inspired the ministerial revolt. He argued that the Chinese People's Republic had offered Malawian foreign minister Kanyama Chiume some £18,000,000 in a plot to topple ^{the} Banda-led Malawi government. Chiume admitted that the Chinese had made an offer of aid; but this aid was for Malawi's developmental needs and, besides, Banda himself had been fully notified of the offer by the foreign minister.³³ Nonetheless Banda believed that

³¹ Malawi News, July 3, 1970. It is interesting to note that in April, 1969, Prime Minister Vorster told his parliament that South Africa was negotiating with certain powers to help fill "the power vacuum" in the Indian Ocean. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London), Vol XVII (1969/1970), p. 23676.

³² Malawi News, July 10, 1970.

³³ See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol XIV (1963/1964), p. 20331; Rhodesia Herald (Salisbury), September 8, 1964. Chiume's statement was made in the course of a debate on the ministerial revolt. In spite of his earlier accusations against the Chinese Banda did not contest Chiume's claim that he had been notified of the Chinese offer of development aid.

communism in general and the Chinese brand of it in particular had become a great threat to the sovereignty and tranquillity of the African states as a whole.

From the point of view of its influence on Malawi foreign policy, Banda's anti-communism can only mean that, for example, Malawi could not support southern African liberation movements and this not simply because to do so would be to invite possible retaliation from the colonial regimes, but also because those movements receive communist arms and military training. It is plausible at least to assume that these movements are seen by Banda - as by Vorster and his other white allies - as instruments of "communist" penetration in southern Africa. Another possible implication of "anti-communism" for Malawian policy may well be that the Banda regime will become increasingly hostile to Tanzania and Zambia both of which have - in addition to sheltering Banda's opponents - received communist assistance, particularly Chinese aid for the TANZAM (Tanzania-Zambia) railway project. The hostility would arise from the same considerations as presumably underlie, in part, Malawian attitudes towards liberation movements.

In terms of Malawian relations with the neighbouring colonial territories, the anti-communist outlook corresponds

in every way with South Africa's own obsessive preoccupation with "the communist threat" which means in fact any threat to the existing socio-political order in that country.³⁴ In South Africa such events as the 1964 Zanzibar Revolution and the subsequent East African army mutinies were seen principally as evidence of communist encroachments into the continent.³⁵

³⁴ Anti-communism in South Africa often expresses itself as little more than a rejection of African nationalism. In a debate on foreign affairs in the South African House of Assembly in 1965, for example, a government supporter, a Mr. P. S. van der Merwe, could expound on the process of decolonization in Africa as follows: "Of course a so-called liberation movement has arisen in Africa. Uhuru did not come from Africa; it was born in Russia." House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 13 (1965), col. 445. It may be of interest to note that foreign minister Hilgard Muller praised van der Merwe's speech on the dangers of communism in Africa as showing "evidence of study, insight and objective approach ..." Ibid., col. 453.

For a more recent discussion of anti-communism in South Africa see Newell M. Stultz, "The Politics of Security: South Africa Under Verwoerd," in The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (April, 1969) especially pp. 11-13.

³⁵ See, for example, Die Transvaler (Johannesburg), January 11, 1964; Die Volksblad (Bloemfontein), January 27, 1964. The former paper commented editorially: "When the Communists achieve victory in Zanzibar it is a matter which must in no way be considered irresponsibly, because it is an event which may greatly influence the position of the white community in the near future."

Regarding the East African mutinies, some of the English-language newspapers in South Africa tended to disagree with the conclusions of the pro-government papers cited above. For example, The Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), January 15, 1964, argued that most African states were so closely linked with the former metropolitan powers in the West that communists could not be said to have established much of a foothold on the continent. The Mail went on to observe that if communism were ever to triumph in Africa, "South Africa's abhorrent race policies" would at least be partly accountable for the development.

The above discussion has sought to make two main points. First, it has been argued that Malawi's approaches to the colonial territories of southern Africa, although based on economic considerations to a large extent, nonetheless derive considerably also from political orientations characteristic and specific to the Banda regime. Second, it has been suggested that as expressed in its two aspects of preference for stability and anti-communism, the conservatism of the Banda regime leads to a foreign policy that coincides with the aims of South Africa's outward-looking policy. To a large extent, the ideological factors underlying South African foreign policy - especially "anti-communism" - have become "integrative" or congruent with those that underlie Malawian policy. Fundamentally, therefore, Malawi has accepted South Africa on her own terms,³⁶ i.e., South Africa has not had, for example to abandon apartheid

³⁶ The Nationalist newspaper, Die Burger, has even boasted that Malawian leaders befriended South Africa because they had "learnt to attach high value to the guidance, knowledge, and ingenuity which we ...have exported to their country." The statement occurs as part of a reprint of an editorial of the Burger appearing in the Cape Times, March 8, 1967. (Emphasis added.)

It seems more accurate to say that Banda sees the survival of his own regime as inextricably bound with a policy of "business-as usual" with respect to colonial southern Africa. The fact that thousands of Malawians can go to work in Rhodesia and South Africa lessens the potential for domestic revolt on the part of jobless and discontented young men. See also news report by Frederic Hunter in The Christian Science Monitor, March 11, 1970.

in order to develop relations with Malawi. For while the government in Pretoria has accorded Malawian diplomats the status of "honorary whites" such that they are not subject to officially-enforced racial discrimination, as are black South Africans, such adjustments are too insignificant to be seen as steps leading to the abandonment of apartheid. The relevant question - already discussed - is why South Africa has sought to establish close ties with African states such as Malawi and Zambia.

(b) Zambia and South Africa

Zambia has become a particular target of the outward-looking policy. Indeed the conclusion seems warranted that if the policy cannot succeed in Zambia its further prospects may well be jeopardized, particularly in the East and Central African region which, as noted, is of especial importance to South African policy-makers.

That Zambia had become an important target of the outward-looking policy became apparent in mid-1966 when the late Dr. Verwoerd invited that country and other African states close to South Africa to join the latter in relations of friendship and cooperation in various fields.³⁷ The

³⁷ Cape Times, June 1, 1966.

question may, however, be raised why Verwoerd could not feel free to invite Zambia to cooperate with South Africa when two years earlier he had rejected a Zambian proposal for an establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.³⁸

Verwoerd's change from the intransigence of 1964 to the "softening up" of 1966 vis-a-vis Zambia may partly be explained in terms of the onset and general perspective of the outward-looking policy. These factors have already been noted. The second explanation to account for the Verwoerd volte-face on Zambia relates to the Southern Rhodesian crisis of 1965 and South African involvement therein. The Rhodesian settlers' illegal unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) posed major policy problems for South Africa.³⁹ The relevance of this issue for South African-Zambian relations justifies the slight digression that follows.

³⁸See Chapter III above.

³⁹On UDI, consult, inter alia, Nathan Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia (London: Andre Deutsch, 1965); B. Vulindlela Mtshali, Rhodesia: Background to Conflict (New York: Hawthorn, 1967); James Barber, Rhodesia: Road to Rebellion (London: Oxford University Press, 1968); Sir Robert Tredgold, The Rhodesia That was My Life (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968); United Nations, A Principle in Torment: The United Nations and Southern Rhodesia (New York: United Nations, 1969).

The South African government seems to have had two policy options over UDI. Either it could recognize the illegal regime of Ian Smith and thus incur a great deal of opposition from the OAU and at the United Nations. This option appears to have been discounted since it would likely have wrecked any prospects the outward-looking policy might have had. The second option - and the one chosen - was to grant the Rhodesian regime not de jure but de facto recognition, together with massive amounts of aid to offset the effects of the international sanctions imposed against the rebellious colony by the United Nations.⁴⁰ South Africa's Rhodesian policy thus consisted of the following elements: maintenance of existing relations with Rhodesia; extension of essential aid to the beleaguered colony by, for example, providing convenient facilities for Rhodesian importers and exporters to evade sanctions, and supplying vitally-needed oil to Rhodesia; and publicly insisting that the question of UDI was one for Britain

⁴⁰ For strategic and political reasons South Africa was unlikely to abandon the Rhodesian settlers. For further discussion of this point see my "U. N. Sanctions Do Not Help Zimbabwe," Negro Digest (Chicago), Vol. 18, No. 1 (November, 1968), pp. 36-41; and "Zimbabwe: Exploitation and Liberation," published under the pen name "Mwana Wevu" in Monthly Review (New York), Vol. 20, No. 10 (March 1969), pp. 30-38.

and settlers to solve rather than a subject meriting U.N. intervention.⁴¹

The African states' reaction to UDI⁴² became an important aspect in South Africa's policy calculations as will be indicated below. Of even greater relevance to South African policy was the reaction of Zambia to UDI. Zambian policy itself rapidly crystallized as consisting of an unrelenting criticism of UDI, an insistence that Britain use military force to dislodge the Smith regime, support for anti-Smith Zimbabwean (Rhodesian) nationalist organizations, and a determination to find alternatives to Zambia's extensive economic, commercial and communications links with Southern Rhodesia.⁴³ The

⁴¹See statements by Verwoerd and Vorster in respectively Cape Times, January 26, 1966; House of Assembly Debates, Vols. 17 and 18 (1966), cols. 2554 and 2600-2601.

⁴²For critical assessments of OAU policies and actions vis-a-vis UDI, see Mtshali, op. cit., pp. 168-169 et passim; Vincent Bakpetu Thompson, "A Catalogue of Betrayal," in Africa and the World (London), Vol. 2, No. 17 (February 1966), pp. 15-22; and the same author's "A Catalogue of Betrayal: U.N. and OAU in the African Crisis," in ibid., Vol. 2, No. 18 (March 1966), pp. 19-26.

⁴³On post-UDI Zambian-Rhodesian relations see, for example, Kenneth Kaunda, "Crisis in Southern Africa," African Forum (New York), Winter, 1967; R. B. Sutcliffe, "Zambia and the Strains of UDI," World Today (London), December, 1967; Richard Sklar, "Zambia and UDI," Mawazo (Kampala), June, 1968. A more extended discussion of this subject occurs in Richard Hall, The High Price of Principles: Kaunda and the White South (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1969), especially Part III.

implementation of this policy produced considerable, and in some instances, severe strains in the Zambian economy and governmental apparatus as attempts were made to redirect the country's communication lines northwards to East Africa and especially Tanzania in order to reduce dependence on Southern Rhodesia.⁴⁴

As already pointed out above, South Africa's policy on UDI had been designed such that it might attract no more world and Pan-African hostility than could be avoided.⁴⁵ Zambia's stand against UDI fortuitously gave South Africa an added opportunity both to blunt any international criticism of her UDI policy and to seek diplomatic accommodation with Zambia. For as she reduced her trade with Southern Rhodesia, Zambia correspondingly increased her trade with South Africa,

⁴⁴ On these aspects, see especially ibid., and Sklar, op.cit.

⁴⁵ As Die Burger put it: "South Africa must avoid anything that could assist [an international] movement against Southern Africa not only in its own interests, but also in those of Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories." Cited in the Cape Times, January 27, 1966. On January 14, 1966, ^{the} English language South African Financial Gazette (Johannesburg), commented as follows:

To side with Ian Smith by committing ourselves in any way to more than normal relations with a friendly neighbour ... would not only weaken the hitherto unassailable logic of our case, but also provide that long looked-for excuse for our detractors to attack us.

especially imports from that country.⁴⁶ South Africa was only too willing to take up the Zambian market Rhodesia was being forced to give up. The implications of these developments for South African-Zambian relations were not lost on premier Verwoerd. Thus, when early in 1966 Zambia became embroiled in a controversy with the Rhodesian regime over the method of payment for her purchases of Rhodesian coal - vitally needed on the Copperbelt - Verwoerd publicly offered to send coal to Zambia.⁴⁷ He hinted that other vital supplies the Zambians might require could be made available to them since it was South African policy - he noted - to help neighbouring states and to avoid any policy of boycotting other states on political and ideological grounds.⁴⁸

⁴⁶In 1965 Zambian imports from Southern Rhodesia amounted to U.S. \$99.5 million. By 1967 they had fallen by more than half to U.S. \$45.1 million. On the other hand Zambian imports from South Africa rose from U.S. \$57.9 million in 1965 to U.S. \$100.9 million in 1967. These statistics are culled from Republic of Zambia, Annual Statement of External Trade (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1966) p. 7; United Nations, Security Council, Second Report of the Committee Established in Pursuance of Security Council Resolution 253 (1968) of May 29, 1968 S/9252/Add. 1; New York, June 13, 1969; p. 3; South Africa Today (Johannesburg), 1969, p. 182.

For fuller analysis of southern African trade patterns and trends, see Tables 5 and 6 above.

⁴⁷Cape Times, January 27, 1966.

⁴⁸Ibid. This remark was also obviously intended as a criticism of Zambia's anti-UDI policies, for Zambian moves to boycott Rhodesia stemmed largely from politico-ideological considerations.

In spite of South African offers of friendship and cooperation, the Zambian government has, since UDI shown itself increasingly determined to reduce to the minimum all its links with Southern Rhodesia in particular and with South Africa as well.⁴⁹

Zambian policy towards South Africa springs from a number of factors of a largely ideological character. Of particular importance in this regard are the political and social beliefs of Zambian President Kaunda himself. Kaunda's political thought and outlook seem to stem from deeply-held religious beliefs. In particular, the Zambian leader profoundly believes in a type of Christian humanism which stresses

⁴⁹Professor M. A. Hough, formerly of the University of Zambia, has also recently observed: "The Zambian Government has steadily placed increasing trade controls on routes coming through Rhodesia and the most recent restrictions are likely to further cut imports from South Africa very severely." The Star (Johannesburg), May 1, 1969. The same newspaper also noted editorially that "South Africa's new outgoing [sic] policy was unlikely to change Zambia's determination to free itself economically from the White regimes in Southern Africa."

Opening the new TAZAMA Oil Pipeline between Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania and Ndola in Zambia, Kaunda himself pointed out:

We are land-locked; we are surrounded on the east, south and west by regimes basically opposed ...to the fundamental principles upon which our policies are based; our communications to the north and north-east, which provide the only reliable lifeline (are still inadequate). The pipeline therefore removes one of our greatest sources of hardship.

News report in Africa Report. Vol. 13, No. 8 (November 1968), pp. 26-27.

the brotherhood of all men irrespective of race. In terms of this belief, all forms of racial discrimination or policies that promote such discrimination, become morally reprehensible and subject to condemnation.⁵⁰ Kaunda has also been an ardent supporter of Pan-African aspirations for total continental liberation from colonial and racist domination. He has in consequence sought as vigorously as possible to align Zambia's foreign policy with the more actively anti-colonial forces in Africa in particular and in the world in general. In his own words:

We feel that it is our duty to make such sacrifices as are necessary to win freedom for those men everywhere who are not free men todayOur non-alignment [policy] is not a withdrawal from world problems - indeed it cannot be; for our geographical position as a landlocked country brings us into direct contact with eight neighbouring states whose policies and actions are of immense concern to us. [In terms of its own policy] Zambia stands ...for abolition of colonialism and neo-colonialism in all forms.⁵¹

⁵⁰For an appreciation of Kaunda's socio-political and moral beliefs, see, for example, Kenneth D. Kaunda, Zambia Shall Be Free (London: Andre Deutsch, 1962); and also his Humanism in Zambia; and a Guide to its Implementation (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1967). See also Hall, op. cit., especially ch. 3; Colin Legum, ed., Zambia: Independence and Beyond - the Speeches of Kenneth Kaunda (London: Nelson, 1966).

⁵¹Cited in Africa and the World, Vol. 3, No. 26 (December 1966), p. 32.

The second factor influencing Zambia's attitude towards the colonial regimes of Southern Africa is the Zambian realization that the country's political options would be considerably reduced to the extent that it was dependent economically on the regimes to the south, east and west.⁵² The improvement of road connections with Tanzania, the completion of the TAZAMA Pipeline, the building of the planned Tanzania-Zambia (TANZAM) railway and similar projects will help progressively to achieve Zambia's disengagement from the south.

Thus Zambian policy stands in contrast to that of Malawi. While still maintaining considerable economic and commercial ties with the south, Zambia is nonetheless divesting herself of these gradually as she develops closer relations with Tanzania and other East African countries. In short, Zambian leaders have sought to enlarge the area of political policy choice available to themselves by reducing the very ties with colonial southern Africa which would have acted as a powerful constraint on Zambia's foreign policy. As they divest themselves of ties to the south, the Zambians are free to stipulate or at least to indicate on what terms they can agree to

⁵²On this point, see also B. V. Mitshali, "Zambia's Foreign Policy," in Current History, Vol. 58, No. 343 (March 1970), p. 149, et passim.

establishing friendly relations with South Africa. Since apartheid is "isolative" in terms of ^{the} _^ Zambian leadership's own politico-ideological outlook, the Zambian government has thus insisted that friendly relations with South Africa could only be established if the latter can abandon the theory and practice of race discrimination. Kaunda expressed himself on this as follows in October, 1968:

In South Africa the Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, has of late consistently declared that he favoured friendship with Zambia. This declaration is welcome, but I have to say quite clearly that nothing stands between South Africa and Zambia in fostering friendship and cooperation except that Government's policy of apartheid which, is the policy of oppression and exploitation Let Afrikaners show respect to Africans in South Africa and manifest genuinely the spirit of cooperation among all sections of the South African community including the African majority. Then I will be more than ready to extend in full my hand of friendship on the basis of true equality and for mutual advantage.

In South African leaders' view, Kaunda's rejection of the outward-looking policy stems from his ignorance of conditions in that country. Foreign Minister Muller volunteered the opinion that had Kaunda lived and worked in South Africa - as did Malawi's Banda - his view of apartheid would have been

53Cited in David R. Smock, "The forgotten Rhodesians," Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol. 47, No. 3 (April, 1969), p.540.

more "informed" and, ipso facto, more favourable.⁵⁴ This type of condescending evaluation of the basis of Zambian foreign policy is hardly likely to be appealing to Zambian policy-makers themselves.

Apart from aspects of policy already referred to, another index of Zambian determination to divest herself of links with colonial southern Africa, is that country's active involvement in the five-year old Conference of East and Central African States. The Conference brings together 14 states⁵⁵ such that they can discuss and provide solutions for regional problems. One of its major concerns is the problem of African territories still under colonial or white settler rule in southern Africa. The group's 1969 conference in the Zambian capital of Lusaka was perhaps the most notable in terms of the position that was taken on the Southern African issue. That conference issued a Manifesto on Southern Africa⁵⁶ which, but for the

⁵⁴See House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 22 (1968), col. 2725.

⁵⁵Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Somalia, the Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. (The Conference meets annually.)

⁵⁶See Republic of Zambia, Fifth Summit of East and Central African States: Manifesto on Southern Africa (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of Zambia, 1969). The manifesto is reproduced in Appendix C below.

equivocation of the Malawian delegation, would have been unanimously agreed to.

The manifesto, which appears to bear the imprint of Tanzanian President Nyerere and Kaunda himself, asserts the following: the signatory states' belief in fundamental human rights; the essential dignity of man everywhere and the idea of human social and political equality; the consequent need for territories still under colonial rule to be liberated to the point where their peoples could enjoy unsullied human dignity, and full political rights.⁵⁷ The manifesto then briefly critically discusses the problems of Portuguese African colonies, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa itself. On the latter the manifesto condemns apartheid policy as being based on a "rejection of man's humanity ...[within a system] maintained by a ruthless denial of the human rights of the majority of the population"⁵⁸ The manifesto then calls for international economic and trade sanctions against South Africa and the expulsion of that country from international organizations including the U.N.⁵⁹

⁵⁷Ibid., pp. 1-4. (Cf. Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia, ch. 1; Julius K. Nyerere, "Rhodesia in the Context of Southern Africa," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 3 (April 1966).

⁵⁸Manifesto on Southern Africa.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 7.

In general the manifesto is conciliatory though firm in its insistence that human rights be accorded to majorities in southern Africa.⁶⁰ It is essentially an appeal to the colonial regimes to respond positively to African political demands in the interests of all. It makes no threats to any of the said regimes and even urges the use of non-violent means by southern African liberation movements, if the ruling whites are prepared to negotiate with them.⁶¹

The isolative nature of the apartheid ideology as seen from a Zambian perspective leaves South Africa very few options over the extension of the outward-looking policy to Zambia.

Indeed, the probability seems high that South Africa may already have begun to despair of winning over the present Zambian government.⁶² This would not of course mean that the

⁶⁰"On the objective of liberation ...we can neither surrender nor compromise," Ibid., p. 3.

⁶¹Ibid., pp. 3-4.

⁶²Foreign minister Muller has declared as follows:
I think it's high time that [President Kaunda] begins to realise he is sounding a discordant note in Southern Africa, where good neighbourliness is being practised ...If Dr. Kaunda wants to play the role of a statesman in Southern Africa ...he should abandon the methods of [Dr. Kwame] Nkrumah and should take his cue from other African leaders who are in cooperation with us.

The Observer (London), August 17, 1969.

former would give up efforts to influence Zambian developments. Signs already exist pointing to the fact of South Africa's determination to use various forms of pressure in order to undermine or eliminate Zambian actions deemed unfavourable to South African interests.

The forms of pressure available to South Africa and her allies range from espionage; the sabotage of Zambian facilities; support of groups within Zambia opposed to the Kaunda government; limited forms of military action against particular targets in Zambia; up to, all-out war.

With regard to espionage and sabotage, one means readily available to South Africa and her allies are the 70,000 whites resident in Zambia. This group is largely:

politically, as well as ethnically, related to [white] Rhodesia and South Africa. They stay on in Zambia only because it is profitable for them to do so; and, for the time being, Zambia keeps them because it needs the 5,000 key technicians to operate its mines.⁶³

This means in fact that the strategic section of the Zambian economy, namely, the copper industry, is crucially dependent

⁶³News report by Colin Legum in The Observer (London), August 17, 1969. Legum further notes that only 600 whites have chosen to take out Zambian citizenship papers.

for its functioning on the skills of those whose political sympathies are, in the words of one South African newspaper, "with Mr. Ian Smith all the way."⁶⁴ Actual espionage by Rhodesian and South African agents has taken place on a wide scale and several spies have been caught by Zambian authorities, and these have often freely admitted to their activities.⁶⁵ On another level, South African Air Force planes have, since 1968, flown regular photographic and reconnaissance missions over Zambia, with guerrilla facilities as their apparent primary target.⁶⁶

Several sabotage attempts have been made against Zambia by South African, Rhodesian or Portuguese agents. One incident may be cited. In June 1968 a vital Zambian bridge across the Luangwa River was destroyed by saboteurs. Patrick Keatley of the Guardian (Manchester) reported from Lusaka that the sabotage bid had probably been perpetrated by Rhodesian or Portuguese agents "With a further possibility that South Africans were

⁶⁴The South African Financial Gazette (Johannesburg), December 17, 1965. In 1967 white miners on the Copperbelt went on strike apparently due to influences from the Southern Rhodesian regime. See Hall, op. cit., pp. 183-184.

⁶⁵For a revealing description of these incidents see ibid., especially Ch. 12 entitled: "White Friends and White Spies."

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 186, et passim.

involved since they are now serving on attachment with the security forces of both Rhodesia and Mozambique."⁶⁷

On the military front the Portuguese bombed Zambian villages along the border between Zambia and Angola, while allegedly pursuing Angolan nationalist guerrillas.⁶⁸ On his part, South African prime minister Vorster has threatened to "hit the Zambians so hard they would not forget it" because of Zambian support of guerrilla movements.⁶⁹ For South Africa military actions against Zambia would be relatively easy to launch given the availability of South African air bases in the nearby Caprivi Strip, Southern Rhodesia and, possibly also, in Angola, Mozambique and Malawi.

The point seems clear: with hostile neighbours along

⁶⁷The Guardian, June 11, 1968. In 1968 five South African police officers were arrested near Livingstone in southern Zambia. They presumably were engaged in spying activities or were attempting to perpetrate some act of sabotage. It may also be noted that the new Tanzania-Zambia oil pipeline has already been blown up once, halting the flow of oil to Zambia for a week in December 1969. See news report by Martin Meredith in Africa Report, February 1970.

⁶⁸Hall, op. cit., p. 187. In November 1968 Kaunda accused Portuguese authorities in Angola of arming members of the opposition African National Congress who were perpetrating acts of violence against government supporters in northwest Zambia. The Times (London), November 29, 1968.

⁶⁹Hall, op. cit., p. 24, et passim.

her borders except in the north; with her fledgling 6,000-man army and practically no air defense; and with a sizable white population whose political sympathies are in many cases with the country's enemies, Zambia is quite obviously highly vulnerable. And of course there is little doubt that Zambia would collapse in the wake of a determined South African military onslaught.⁷⁰ However, it seems South Africa will desist from such action as long as she judges other less costly forms of pressure on Zambia to be efficacious, or as long as southern African liberation groups operating from Zambia do not appear to threaten more than marginally the security of South Africa's Portuguese and Rhodesian allies.

Yet, even in the face of the numerous threats to her security, indeed to her survival as an independent state, Zambia appears firmly committed to terminating her ties with colonial southern African and to forging new ones with her northern neighbours, while rendering whatever aid she can to movements ranged against the colonial south.

III

The preceding discussion illustrates some of the responses

⁷⁰In Banda's characteristically dramatic language, the South African Air Force "could reduce the capitals of black Africa to ashes within 24 hours." Africa Report, Vol. 11, No. 6 (June 1966), p. 33.

and reactions to the moves South Africa has undertaken to put into effect its outward-looking policy. The political and economic factors underlying the contrasting responses of Malawi and Zambia in particular have been noted. The implications for the two countries of their respective policies vis-a-vis South Africa have been indicated.

Malawian policies derive from economic imperatives in the first instance. In the second instance, these policies have their derivation and assume their particular mould and significance, from the ideological proclivities and personal idiosyncrasies of Dr. Banda. In terms of Banda's political orientation - described here as an "emergent conservatism" that stresses "stability" and "anti-communism" as the pivots of policy - South African penetration of Malawi has been facilitated. It is important to stress this ideological aspect since economic factors alone cannot account for Malawian policies. Had economic factors alone been responsible for those policies, one might have expected Malawian diplomacy in Africa to be used primarily in explaining her special position vis-a-vis colonial southern Africa (as the Botswana government is doing), rather than in the efforts to split Pan-African ranks by the creation of a new group of pro-South African

states in Africa.⁷¹

At the level of foreign policy Malawian conservatism coincides with the ideological perspectives of the verligte policy which itself places a premium on "stability" in southern Africa, while emphasizing the danger that "communism" poses for all African countries. Since, as already indicated, "communism" is interpreted in South Africa to mean all forces or actions opposing the existing system of domestic colonialism, the espousal of the standpoint of "anti-communism" by the Malawian regime in its foreign policy can only be seen in South Africa as a standpoint of support for South Africa's regime system and its domestic policies. To the extent that new African states such as Malawi evince such support or appear to evince it, the South African regime will feel more confident that the ideology and political system of apartheid can receive international legitimation. Foreign minister Muller, for example, observed in 1968:

⁷¹ Apart from evidence already cited in preceding sections, one may also refer here to Malawian Finance and Information Minister Aleke Banda's call in 1970 for the establishment of a "New Africa" based on a partnership between the African states and the white-ruled countries of southern Africa. Malawi News (Blantyre), August 7, 1970. (Banda was speaking in Blantyre at a conference discussing tourism in Southern Africa. The conference was attended by delegates from South Africa, Swaziland, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Angola and Malawi itself. Ibid.)

As the West becomes aware of our fruitful cooperation with other African states, their attitude towards us improves. I believe it will happen to an increasing degree because we must simply accept that our relations with the rest of the world are largely determined by our relations with the African states. In this connection we are giving the world considerable food for thought.⁷²

In terms of one of the hypotheses developed in Chapter I of this study, it may therefore be asserted that in the sphere of foreign policy, Malawian and South African ideological perspectives coincide to the point of constituting an "integrative" system of politico-ideological values.⁷³ From another standpoint, and one that is based on power considerations, Malawi may well be said to have begun its career as a South African satellite. With South African penetration of the Malawian economy on a large scale, and South African military penetration of Malawi; and given the fact that already South African personnel hold prominent positions in the Malawian governmental institutions of

⁷²Cited in Abdul S. Minty, South Africa's Defense Strategy (London: The Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1969), p. 15.

⁷³In a slightly different vein one may even argue that the triumph of emergent conservatism in Malawi - even if initially occurring independently of South African influence - parallels South Africa's own promotion of conservative chiefly elements as leaders of the Africans in the so-called "Bantu homelands."

information and propaganda,⁷⁴ the probability that South Africa already exerts appreciable influence over Malawian policies and actions seems high.

Beyond Malawi and the former British High Commission Territories of southern Africa, the outward-looking policy has made a successful penetration into conservative Malagasy and is likely to achieve similar success in similarly conservative Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Upper Volta, the leaders of which countries have recently called for "dialogue" between OAU members and South Africa.⁷⁵ Such

⁷⁴Of considerable significance in this connection is the fact that several South Africans have moved into positions of control in certain institutions of the Malawi government particularly in the information field. For example, David van der Spuy, a former official of the South African embassies in London and Washington, served for a time as the Director of Information in Malawi. In 1969 South African broadcaster Henry Tourien was seconded to Malawi as programme manager for Radio Malawi; and other South African personnel have held senior positions within Malawi's broadcasting and information institutions. Then too, Malawian broadcasters have been sent to South Africa for further training under a scheme arranged with the government-owned South African Broadcasting Corporation. Further, a Mr. J. L. Pretorius, a minister of the South African Dutch Reformed Church - which itself provides scriptural justification for apartheid in South Africa - is now chairman of Malawi's Board of Censors. The Board decides on the suitability or otherwise of written or pictorial materials before it is made available to the Malawi public. On these aspects see, for example, The Times (London), May 1, 1968; Anti-Apartheid News, pp. 449-450.

⁷⁵Anti-Apartheid News (London), December 1970-January 1971; The Legon Observer (Accra), May 22, 1970; Africa and the World (London), January 1971.

success would testify to the continued disarray of the OAU as well as to the brittleness of foreign - as indeed also domestic - policies in new Africa since such policies are, as in the case of Ghana, so dependent on the "political complexion" of regimes which themselves are apt to change rapidly. The emergence of conservatively-inclined regimes would tend to provide opportunities for South Africa to gain new friends. The important factor here is not so much the rapidity or incidence of regime changes as the political orientations of the elites in control of any given African country. In this connection it may be that while South Africa can profit from regime changes in some African countries, such success could not be presumed to be enduring, given the unstable character of all African regimes.

The most notable failure of the outward-looking policy has been in Zambia. Had the policy been successful in penetrating that country, it might already have been termed a triumph of South African diplomacy. Effective penetration of Zambia would have meant that South Africa had won the friendship of countries spanning the southern African sub-continent, from Angola on the Atlantic coast to Mozambique on the Indian Ocean in the east. This result would have considerably blunted the edge of the southern African liberation

movements that have had to rely in part on Zambian aid and encouragement.

Zambian policy towards colonial southern Africa assumes wider significance in the present context not only because of the strategic position of that country between black-ruled Africa and the colonial south, but also because Zambia has demonstrated the powerfully-determining character of politico-ideological factors even in instances where economic factors might have been assumed to hold sway. Given Zambian commitment to the cause of liberation in southern Africa, and given the continued viability of the Conference of East and Central African States, prospects for the outward-looking policy in this region would appear marginal at best. To the extent that penetration eludes South African policy makers in this region, any friends that South Africa may win elsewhere in Africa, say in far-away Upper Volta, could not compensate for the failure to realize the strategic, economic and political objectives which it is the aim of South African policy to achieve in east and central Africa.

The determination of the Zambians to disengage from colonial southern Africa has of course not been passively acquiesced in by the South African government. The strategic

position of Zambia is too crucial for South Africa to ignore what happens in and to that country. Thus, South Africa may be expected to exert increasingly hostile pressure on Zambia such that the latter either "conforms" or its security is placed in jeopardy. It is therefore quite evident that worsening confrontation between Pan-African and colonial forces across the Zambesi-divide is indicated for the future.

CHAPTER VI

FOREIGN POLICY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

We dare not now abandon the fight against the powers which threaten the continued existence of the White man.

Dr. Albert Hertzog, leader of the Herstigte Nasionale party (HNP), The New York Times, October 6, 1969.

I

This chapter briefly examines the political saliency and impact on domestic politics of the outward-looking policy. Questions dealt with include: the domestic political repercussions of the policy among white South Africans,¹ and the extent to which policy makers are subject to domestic political constraints in formulating and implementing their policies. In this connection the general conclusions reached are: that the outward-looking policy is of relatively low saliency as an issue in domestic political conflict; that there is a general consensus among white South Africans, particularly leaders of interest groups, that the government is pursuing a correct line

¹Non-white South Africans do not of course play any direct part in influencing the content and direction of national policy.

of policy; and that policy makers consequently have a great deal of latitude in prosecuting their goals. In addition, it is observed that the policy making powers of prime minister Vorster have been greatly enhanced both by reason of his party's continued electoral ascendancy and in consequence of institutional innovations he has introduced to bolster those powers.

II

How do white South Africans view the verligte policy? In answering this question, one should ideally utilize several types of indices to measure the extent of support for, or opposition or perhaps even indifference to, the outward-looking policy. Such indices include opinion surveys; analysis of expressions of public opinion through the press or through organized group activity oriented to the policy; and election data.

A sample survey of white South African opinions on, or attitudes to, the outward-looking policy cannot, unfortunately, be undertaken within the compass and the circumstances of this study. In addition, there do not appear to be any detailed published surveys of expressions of opinion on the policy. Yet fragmentary survey data that bear on the policy have been published. In 1969, an organization called the Media and

Communications Research of Johannesburg, conducted a sample survey of 1,000 whites living in South Africa's principal cities on foreign policy-related issues.² The survey appears to have focussed the attention of the respondents - whose method of selection was not indicated - on two main questions:

- (a) "What do you feel are the major dangers and threats to South Africa?"
- (b) "What do you feel makes South Africa strong and prepared for the future?"

On the first question, some 55 percent of the respondents were roughly evenly divided in their identification of four "dangers" to South Africa, namely, "Communism," "the Afro-Asian states," "internal African uprisings" in South Africa, and "external intervention."³ This result would appear to be partly accountable by the fact the categories of possible "dangers" to South Africa used in the questionnaire were not precisely distinguishable from each other. Nonetheless, if one assumes, as seems justified, that among white South Africans, "Afro-Asian" pressure, "external intervention" and "internal

²The results of the survey are reported by Patrick Laurence in The Star (Johannesburg), May 13, 14, 1969.

³Ibid. The rest of the respondents were divided among such other possible answers as: the state of the economy or relations among Afrikaners and English-speaking white South Africans.

African uprisings" are all regarded as manifestations of "Communism," the significance of the above result would be that the South African government's 'anti-communist' stance in its foreign policy receives notable (55 percent) white popular backing.

In answer to the second question, well over 70 percent of the respondents agreed that "armed force" or military strength was the best guarantee of South Africa's future; less importance was given to such other possible answers as the unity of the white minority (16 percent), the existence of a "strong government and prime minister" (11 percent), and trust and belief in God (1 percent.)⁴

Even if these data cannot be taken as at all conclusive, it seems evident that the policy of the government in bolstering South Africa's military posture is largely in accord with white South African popular estimates of appropriate responses to perceived dangers. Put differently, this means that the government does not have to fear that the continued expansion of the defence apparatus might be opposed by the electorate as

⁴Ibid.

an intolerable burden.⁵ Indeed reliance on military strength seems to be such that even "good relations" with the new African states are not accepted as any sort of substitute for such strength: "less than two in every 100 respondents mentioned 'good relations with Black African states' (as likely to ensure South Africa's security)."⁶ This result may simply mean that the regime, in "selling" its policy domestically, has emphasized the strategic and security objectives of its policy rather than any desire on its part merely to establish "good relations" with the African states.

Among organized interest groups there does not appear to be any that concerns itself to any appreciable extent with advocating or opposing the outward-looking policy. Nonetheless, individuals who may be regarded as spokesmen for particular interest groups have occasionally issued statements supporting the policy. The views of such leading industrialists as Mr. Harry Oppenheimer and Dr. Anton Rupert have already been

⁵A government Defence White Paper published in April 1969 discloses a total defence expenditure programme of R1,647,000,000 over the five year period, 1969-1974. Much of this expenditure is earmarked for the acquisition of new aircraft, rockets, naval and communication facilities, and further weapons research and development. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 17 (1969-1970), p. 23676.

⁶Laurence in The Star, May 13, 1969.

noted in Chapter IV.⁷ They fully support the policy. It may reasonably be assumed that other industrialists and businessmen support the policy, since its successful application would create for South Africa new markets and investment opportunities in the rest of the continent. For example, Mr. J.J. Williams, director of the South African Foreign Trade Organization, has expressed his satisfaction at the fact that South African manufacturers have begun to adopt "a more outward looking policy [of seeking export markets in Africa and elsewhere] in strong contrast with the pre-1965 period."⁸ Similar sentiments have been expressed by others including prominent members of the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) and of the South African Foundation.⁹

⁷Dr. Rupert has recently established a so-called National Development Management Foundation, the objective of which will be to offer financial and technical aid for training in management techniques to African countries that accept the outward-looking policy. The Rhodesia Herald (Salisbury), September 25, 1969.

⁸J.J. Williams, "Commercial South Africa," in D.J. Greyling, ed., South African Progress 1969 (Pretoria: Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, 1969), p. 99.

⁹Cape Times, June 29, 1966. A leading member of SABRA, Professor G.C. Olivier of the University of Pretoria, has forcefully argued that South Africa's economic and military power will lead to her acceptance by the African states, apartheid notwithstanding. The Star, May 2, 1969.

Sir Francis de Guingand, president of the latter organization - which itself groups together prominent white businessmen irrespective of party affiliation and seeks to project a 'better image' of South Africa abroad - has emphasized that the outward-looking policy is of great importance to South Africa since its success will safeguard the country's economic and security interests in southern Africa.¹⁰

South African press comment on the outward-looking policy has generally been favourable, at times even laudatory. The Afrikaans press in particular has, as might have been expected, been enthusiastic. For example, Die Burger (Cape Town) observed that the establishment of diplomatic relations with Malawi meant that:

We are at the start of a promising breakthrough in the relations with Black Africa, to them [sic] fully as significant as to us. Now the wisdom of [South African resistance to Pan-African pressure] has been proved in practice: it has become possible for a Black state to have liaison with South Africa at a high level before the whole world.¹¹

The English-language press, while raising some questions about South Africa's developing relations with the African

¹⁰Sir Francis de Guingand, "International South Africa," in Greyling, op.cit., pp. 33-34.

¹¹This Die Burger editorial opinion is cited in the Cape Times, March 8, 1967.

states,¹² has, it would appear, on the whole supported government policy. To the extent that the press as a whole is favourable to the verligte policy, white public opinion and attitudes relative to that policy may have been considerably influenced into a position of support or at least acquiescence.

It appears from the foregoing discussion that there is an appreciable amount of support for the verligte policy among white South Africans. The only notable opposition to that policy has come from the Herstigte Nasionale party (HNP), a party formed in October 1969 by dissident members of the ruling Nationalist party (NP), led by former minister of posts and communications Dr. Albert Hertzog.

Hertzog does not reject pursuit of the strategic and other objectives that the outward-looking policy is directed to achieving. His criticism of present government policy in the foreign affairs area stems basically from his apprehension

¹²For example the Cape Times (June 13, 1966) raised the question as to how much political independence would be allowable to Lesotho in view of South African interest and involvement in that country. The paper strongly hinted that if "radical nationalists" were ever to be in the position of threatening the regime of the pro-South African Chief Leabua Jonathan, South Africa would intervene.

On the South African press generally, see Morris Broughton, Press And Politics of South Africa (Cape Town: Purnell, 1961), Leonard M. Thompson, Politics in the Republic of South Africa (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), especially pp. 121-133.

that the theory and practice of strict segregation of the races at every level of South African life will be eroded if African states start establishing embassies in South Africa. In his view, to allow black diplomats and officials into "white" hotels and "white" residential areas spells disaster for white South Africa; it is, he argues, contrary to NP doctrine and to the Afrikaner's "Calvinistic Creed," so that the encouragement of such infractions of segregation by Vorster testifies to the fact that under him the NP is "stricken with sickness and lameness."¹³

¹³Cape Times, February 4, 1970.

Hertzog's views are typical of the so-called verkrampes (the inward-looking or unenlightened ones) among Afrikaner politicians. The verkrampes stress the importance of the maintenance of Afrikaner political and cultural solidarity rather than the fusion of Afrikaners and English-speaking white South Africans to form one "white nation," which appears to be the current programme of the NP leadership. On this point Hertzog has simply noted that fusion is undesirable since the English-speaking whites are prone to "liberalistic" tendencies and would therefore dilute the Afrikaner's values and way of life. Ibid. The verkrampes also emphasize that strict racial segregation must be maintained at all costs in South Africa and that the suppression of Africans - rather than any schemes of "Bantu self-government" - provides the best guarantee of white domination in South Africa. See The Star (Johannesburg), May 2, 5, 1969.

The Star (May 2, 1969) cites a reader's letter to the Afrikaans language daily, the Transvaler, which seems to sum up neatly the basic philosophy of the verkrampes. The letter states the position as follows:

My policy as a Verkrampte is South Africa first. Because South Africa cannot exist without the Afrikaner, and is in fact synonymous with him, every deed of the Government and its every decision should have as its

/cont'd.

How serious a challenge to the NP regime is Hertzog's HNP? This question can only be answered preliminarily since the HNP has not yet, presumably, exploited whatever potential exists for its consolidation as a force in the politics of white South Africa. The evidence so far indicates that the party is unlikely to pose any real difficulty to the Vorster regime. One significant index in this regard are the results of the general election of April 1970. In that election the HNP put up 78 candidates. Not only were all 78 defeated, 75 of them, including Hertzog himself, lost their deposits.¹⁴

Clearly, for the present the white electorate has repudiated the HNP. Even although the NP itself lost 9 seats to

13 (cont'd.)

objective the promotion of the interests of South Africa and this should be without regard to the interests of those whose loyalty and culture clash with the existence, striving and ideals of South Africa. [English-speaking whites should be assimilated within 25 years so that] there should be no question any more of two peoples, nations or language groups.

¹⁴In his own Transvaal constituency of Ermelo which he had represented for 22 years, Hertzog could only muster 926 votes as against 5,495 and 2,739 for the NP and United party (UP) candidates respectively. Cape Times, April 24, 1970. (This issue of the Cape Times gives a detailed report of the results of the election.)

the UP, the party's parliamentary supremacy remains.¹⁵ The unusual 'swing' to the UP can only be linked to foreign policy issues tangentially, that is, if one argues that the "anti-English" rhetoric of the HNP drove "English" voters away from the two Afrikaner-dominated parties.¹⁶ However this reasoning is unconvincing. After all, the UP itself agrees with the outward-looking policy;¹⁷ much of the party's electoral campaign effort was directed to domestic policy issues,¹⁸ partly

¹⁵The final state of the parties in parliament was as follows (figures in parenthesis refer to party strength in the previous parliament):

Nationalist party	:	117 (123)	for 54.4% of popular vote
United party	:	47 (38)	for 37.2% of popular vote
Progressive party	:	1 (1)	for 3.4% of popular vote
Herstigte Nasionale party	:	0 (4)	for 3.6% of popular vote
Other	:	0 (0)	for 1.4% of popular vote.

(There were altogether 11 uncontested seats, 6 United party and 5 Nationalist party. In one constituency the contest was postponed due to the death of a Nationalist party candidate a few days before the voting.) Ibid.

¹⁶Of the 9 NP losses referred to above, 3 were in the heavily "English" Natal province. Ibid.

¹⁷UP foreign policy spokesman, W. Vause Raw, a member of the House of Assembly representing a constituency in Durban, has for example suggested that the government create a South African "Peace Corps" along the lines of the U.S. Peace Corps, to supplement its other efforts at developing close ties with the African states. House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 19 (1967), col. 443.

¹⁸See Cape Times, February 3, 1970 and subsequent reports on the campaign, up to April 21, 1970.

presumably because the party had no quarrel with the government's foreign policy.

From this brief account of the 1970 election, three conclusions relating to foreign policy may be drawn. First, the election showed that foreign policy issues, such as relations with the African states, were of relatively low saliency as campaign issues. This may be explained by the fact that the main opposition party (the UP) basically agrees with the verligte policy and therefore had no alternative suggestions to offer the voters such that a clear-cut choice between verligte policy and UP ideas would have been made. Second, the only party which seriously challenged government policy, the HNP, was itself heavily defeated, thus indicating that its own policies were generally unacceptable. Third, the defeat of the HNP was not only a rejection of verkrampste policies, it may also be taken as a general approval by the electorate of verligte policies.¹⁹

III

The outward-looking policy may be expected to be continued in the future both because it appears to have the general approval or acquiescence of white South Africans, and

¹⁹This same point is also advanced editorially by The Star (Johannesburg), April 23, 1970.

also because its leading exponent, premier Vorster himself, has recently established institutional mechanisms that will strengthen his hand in the foreign policy making field.

The question as to who makes foreign policy in South Africa has been dealt with at some length by Edwin Munger.²⁰ Munger argues that foreign policy in South Africa has tended largely to be the province of the prime minister, this being notably so under the premiership of Dr. Verwoerd. Other institutions of government, including the foreign ministry, play a relatively restricted or limited role, according to Munger.²¹ He further argues that organized group activity oriented to foreign policy matters is very rare and that in any case interest group influence on policy making is minimal.²²

Although Munger has described the policy making process under Verwoerd and previous prime ministers, his assessment seems to be borne out by the practice under Vorster. While no detailed description of the policy making process under

²⁰Edwin S. Munger, Notes On the Formation of South African Foreign Policy (Pasadena, California: The Castle Press, 1965).

²¹Ibid., pp. 23-28, 85.

²²Ibid., pp. 34-45, 51ff.

Vorster can be attempted - and this due to the inevitable paucity of data on such questions - reference may nonetheless be made to some indicators of the role Vorster is performing in the sphere of foreign policy.

Vorster's involvement and interest in the outward-looking policy has been dramatized by his meetings with such African leaders as Lesotho's Chief Jonathan and Botswana's Sir Seretse Khama. In particular, the South African leader's visit to Malawi in May 1970 was highly significant in indicating his personal interest in promoting the policy.

Apart from the acts of overt and personal diplomacy cited above, Vorster has moved to strengthen his hand in policy making by the creation of the super-secret Bureau of State Security (BOSS) - an agency that is charged with coordinating all official intelligence within the government of South Africa. In terms of the official statement announcing its establishment, BOSS will have the authority to:

- (a) investigate all matters affecting the security of the State, to correlate and evaluate the information collected and, where necessary, to inform and advise the Government, interested Government departments and other bodies in regard thereto; and

- b) perform such other functions and responsibilities as may be determined from time to time.²³

Several points may be noted regarding the BOSS. First the Bureau is solely responsible, under law, to the prime minister.²⁴ Hence, it is he who will have full access to domestic and foreign intelligence information on which much policy making is obviously based.²⁵ Second, BOSS is headed by a life-long personal and political friend of Vorster, General Hendrick J. van den Bergh.²⁶ This means that the Bureau's

²³Public notice in Republic of South Africa, Government Gazette No. 2397 of May 16, 1969: reprinted in International Defense and Aid Fund, eds., South Africa: The BOSS Law (London: Christian Action Publications, 1970), p. 12.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵The activities of BOSS cannot be disclosed by any "un-authorised" person or be divulged in any court of law. Any person divulging the Bureau's activities in any form is liable to imprisonment for up to 7 years and/or a fine of R1,500. Ibid., p. 2.

²⁶During World War II van den Bergh and Vorster were put in detention by the then prime minister Jan Smuts for the pro-NAZI activities of their paramilitary organization - the Ossewa Brandwag (Ox-Wagon Guard). Ibid., pp. 5 -6.

Van den Bergh's rise to power has been rapid and owes much to Vorster's patronage. He has risen from police captain (1959), to police lieutenant-colonel in 1962 (the year Vorster became minister of justice with police-security responsibilities). He has subsequently risen to full colonel in charge of the security branch of the police (1963), to deputy-commissioner of police with the rank of major-general (1966). In 1968 van den Bergh was promoted full general and was given a new post as "security adviser" to the prime minister. In 1969 he of course became the director of BOSS. Ibid., p. 6.

operations are under the direction of an individual whose loyalty to Vorster would appear to be unassailable and one whose views are apparently in complete accord with those of the prime minister.²⁷ Third, BOSS will have considerable resources to conduct its operations on a wide scale, including the conduct of espionage activities in the new African states to the north.²⁸ In the 1969/1970 estimates of expenditure of the government, of a total of R5,320,000 set aside for "secret services", R4,063,000 came under the "Prime Minister's Department."²⁹ This was evidently the sum set aside for BOSS in its first year of activity.³⁰

²⁷Van den Bergh is impatient of liberal-minded South African whites whom he accuses of suffering from a "sickly sentimentalism" which, he feels, has its origin in the "subtle influencing and persuasion by secret members of the Communist party." Ibid., and Brian Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 76.

²⁸Vorster himself has stated that the government has acquired a wide variety of sophisticated intelligence-gathering devices to be used inside and outside South Africa to "listen in" on the activities of such enemies of South Africa as African "terrorists." Information obtained by use of these devices, he points out, "may mean the difference between life and death for a Portuguese soldier, or a Rhodesian soldier and a South African policeman." Cape Times, February 6, 1970.

²⁹Defense and Aid Fund, South Africa: The BOSS Law, p. 1.

³⁰Dr. Hertzog of the HNP has however asserted that the expenditure on BOSS will be closer to R50 million than the amount the government announced in parliament. Ibid., p. 11.

It appears then that Mr. Vorster has considerably bolstered his own power in the field of foreign policy making. He has not only inherited the power over foreign policy formulation that Munger has argued previous prime ministers enjoyed, he has also created an intelligence apparatus that will further boost that power. More importantly from the point of view of this study, the establishment of BOSS, the wide powers given to the Bureau, the size of its budget, all underscore the central importance assigned by the South African regime to the strategic and security objectives of the outward-looking policy.

Together with his centralization of the decision making function in the foreign policy field, Vorster has introduced a new style to the conduct of South Africa's foreign policy. It is a style that combines a certain flexibility and shrewdness. The flexibility is reflected in the fact that while in domestic matters Vorster continues to devise and enforce apartheid laws as rigorously as his predecessors,³¹ he has, for the sake of his foreign policy, suspended the application

³¹Indeed his own reputation as a tough defender of the existing order was earned when, as minister of justice (1962-1966), he successfully introduced and ruthlessly enforced a series of security measures to deal with any attempts to change that order.

of these same laws to African diplomats and political leaders visiting South Africa. He has, in other words, chosen to risk some unpopularity among die-hard racialists such as those represented in the HNP, for the sake of pursuing the verligte policy. He obviously feels that the advantages to be gained from according representatives of African states appropriate diplomatic courtesies far outweigh any electoral losses the Nationalists might conceivably incur as a result of such practices.

In the context of African politics generally, South Africa is a status quo power. She sees her interests as best served if the status quo in southern Africa is maintained. But since the bulk of the African states seek the termination of southern African colonialism, South African diplomacy under Vorster is directed to deflecting the African states from this course of action. One way of effectively achieving this deflection is by South Africa's working out some sort of modus vivendi with the new African states. The Vorster government apparently calculates that African states are likely to cooperate with South Africa if it is made clear to them that such cooperation would be more beneficial to them than any policy of confrontation. It is a kind of stick-and-carrot policy. Thus the strengthening of South Africa's military,

paramilitary and espionage capabilities is in part intended to deter any hostile actions by other countries by making it evident that those who perpetrate or contemplate such actions would stand to lose more than they could hope to gain.³²

However, a military posture per se has its own drawbacks. It may deter enemies. It does not convert enemies into friends. African states cannot be attracted to a South Africa which threatens their existence. As one South African commentator has noted:

We [in South Africa] cannot ...seek security by concentrating solely or even mainly on measures of military defence ...We must in the long run have a working arrangement with other African states.³³

In an attempt to achieve "a working arrangement with other African states," the Vorster government has placed emphasis on

³²See the discussion of South Africa's relations with Zambia in Chapter V above. The Nationalist daily, Die Burger, in an editorial cited in the Cape Times (September 1, 1966) condemned Zambia for refusing to cooperate with South Africa and especially for being the southernmost spearhead of "Black hostility and even aggression against the existing orders of southern Africa." The editorial further warned that Zambia's confrontation policy was causing an "anxiety in South Africa which the true leaders in Zambia should share."

³³Ronald B. Ballinger, "South Africa and the Wider World," in South African Institute of Race Relations, eds., Looking Outwards: Three South African Viewpoints (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1961), p. 24.

the contribution it can make to African economic development if the African states are willing to cooperate. This is the "carrot" aspect. The regime in Pretoria clearly realizes that the new African states have a strong interest in economic development both because it helps to raise the living standard of their peoples and because such development is likely also to contribute to the political stability of the African states themselves. Dr. Hilgard Muller, Vorster's foreign minister, put this point across in this way:

The only way in which true lasting political and economic stability will be achieved in Africa is through the closest cooperation of the African states in the fields of politics and economics in a spirit of true confidence in each other and on the basis of friendly coexistence.³⁴

Thus, the promise is held out to the African states that cooperation with South Africa can be of benefit to them, both economically and politically. To the extent that ruling elites in such African states as Malawi and Malagasy believe this, the possibility of South African penetration of the OAU

³⁴House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 19 (1967), col. 413. (Emphasis added.)

Muller was speaking in a debate on a private member's motion praising the government's outward-looking policy. The motion's wording placed particular emphasis on South Africa's "ability to contribute to economic and technical development and the raising of the standard of living in Africa." Ibid., col. 412.

world has become reality. Yet there are some doubts on the extent to which this can be done. Muller himself has admitted that the economic and other problems of the African continent are so immense they will take "centuries to solve" and that therefore South Africa's contribution can only be a limited one.³⁵ This limitation has several implications for the outward-looking policy: (a) it probably will force South Africa to concentrate her aid and diplomatic effort on selected African countries. We argue that geopolitical and security considerations will compel a concentration on the countries of southern Africa as well as those of east and central Africa; (b) it clearly reduces the incentive for African states to seek cooperation with South Africa; and, (c) it also means that political confrontation with the bulk of the African states is likely to continue since, by her own admission, South Africa is without any substantial inducement to offer the bulk of the African states to offset the isolative nature of her apartheid policies.³⁶

³⁵Ibid., col. 413.

³⁶See also Leo Marquard, Our Foreign Policy (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1969), pp. 18-25; and a statement by J. D. du P. Basson, U. P. member of parliament, in House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 22 (1968), cols. 2702-2709.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter an attempt is made to assemble the main findings of this study. Before this can be done, it is necessary briefly to restate the set of problems to which the study has been addressed.

The main task of the study has been to investigate the nature, extent and significance of the relations between the Republic of South Africa on the one hand and the newly-independent African states¹ on the other. Particular attention has been focused on the South African ^{government's} / extra-territorial policies. These policies have been regarded as crucial for purposes of the study in that they define and help to clarify the types of interaction processes that the present South African regime seeks to promote vis-a-vis the OAU states. In this connection an attempt has been made to:

- (a) place in some historical perspective South Africa's changing attitudes towards the rest of Africa;
- (b) indicate South Africa's reactions and responses to the emergence of independent states elsewhere in Africa, as well as those states' attitudes towards

¹ Hereafter referred to as the OAU states.

South Africa. Further, an attempt has been made to isolate the major variable underlying South Africa's interactions with the OAU states;

- (c) analyze South Africa's current extra-territorial policies, particularly as they refer to and affect the countries of southern Africa, with a view to isolating the main objectives to which the policies are addressed;
- (d) indicate the actual and probable consequences arising from South Africa's pursuit of the said objectives.

In addition, another set of issues is explored briefly in this chapter, namely:

- (e) the likely "futures" of South Africa. These are explored both in the context of inter-African relations generally and from a consideration of likely political and other developments in South Africa itself.

II

Having failed in her attempt to dissuade the colonial powers from granting independence to their colonial territories in Africa, South Africa had, by the end of the 1950's, begun to explore possibilities for her interacting with the new states on a more or less normal interstate basis. However, these earlier explorations proved unsuccessful until the

mid-1960's. South Africa's failure to articulate a viable extra-territorial policy at this time may simply be due to the fact that the regime in Pretoria assigned relatively low priority to the task of developing normal relations with the new states.² Then too, the fact that prior to 1964 all of the neighbouring territories were still under colonial rule may have contributed to the notable lack of urgency in South Africa's initial attempts at developing policies directed to the new states. In this study, emphasis has been placed on three other factors that help to explain why South Africa's ~~attempt to develop~~ viable extra-territorial policies was not, initially, as successful as might have been expected. First, South Africa's apparent ignorance of African realities initially led her to formulate or proclaim goals which had a minimal chance of realization. An example of this is the idea, often proclaimed by South African policy makers in the 1950's, that South Africa might serve as a link between the new African states and the major Western powers. Since the ex-colonial territories already enjoyed extensive relations with the West, the South African offer to serve as a "link" was obviously superfluous. Moreover, the

² Having denounced the granting of independence to African territories as premature and ill-advised, the South African government may even have expected African independence to fail. Indeed, the government's own Fact Paper No. 5 of February 1956 declared: "In most of Africa's territories the mere disappearance of white leadership.....would mean a return to barbarism," p.8.

idea of South Africa serving as a link implied that African states were unequipped to handle their own external relations and therefore needed some sort of spokesman to represent them in any dealings with the Western powers. Such a conception could only prove unpromising as a ploy to win the friendship of states which, following upon their people's victory over colonialism, were intent on asserting their new sovereign status. Second, South African failure to develop a viable policy towards ex-colonial Africa was due to misgivings in the Nationalist party governments of premiers Strijdom and Verwoerd regarding the domestic political impact of establishing any close ties - especially diplomatic ones- with the African states.³ African diplomats in South Africa would obviously have to be accorded treatment similar to that given to diplomats from other countries. Yet this might have proved unacceptable to white South Africans, since it would have been contrary to established racial practices.

³ Indeed, even Vorster, Verwoerd's successor, evinced such misgivings at the start of his premiership. On September 21, 1966, he told parliament that an exchange of diplomatic representation with the African states was unnecessary. He went on:

I want to adopt the attitude that there are other and perhaps more suitable methods of establishing contact with one another than by the stereotyped method of exchanging diplomatic representation.

House of Assembly Debates, Vols. 17 and 18 (1966), col. 2602.

Finally, South African efforts at developing policies towards the African states must be seen in the context of general African opposition to South Africa's domestic racial policies. As more African states gained independence, the ranks of South Africa's critics in every international forum - including the U.N., the Commonwealth and the OAU - were constantly augmented. Confrontation became the dominant mode of interaction between the new states and South Africa. The latter was forced on to the defensive. Her policy pronouncements began to assume a contradictory character. On the one hand the government in Pretoria declared its interest in establishing friendly relations with other African states and in aiding their economic development; on the other hand, government officials, the Afrikaans press, and the state-owned radio regularly attacked the African states as undeserving of their independence or as dupes of communism.⁴ This again could only limit the chances of more friendly responses coming from the leaders of the new African states.

III

It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that significant

⁴ Some South African politicians themselves seemed aware of these contradictions. See statement by W. V. Raw in Ibid., Vol. 19 (1967), Cols. 441-444.

constraints have affected South African attempts at establishing normal interstate relations with the OAU states. Yet, circumstances have also provided South Africa with exploitable opportunities for extending her influence beyond her own borders. These constraints and opportunities may be viewed analytically as constituting the main variables underlying South Africa's interactions with the OAU states. These variables may be categorized as:

- (a) the ideological factor;
- (b) the capability factor;
- (c) the domestic political factor.

In terms of the ideological factor, it has been argued that ideology affects both the way in which the policy maker perceives and defines reality, and furnishes a more or less coherent set of values that the policy maker is likely to seek to promote. It follows that ideological factors affect any interactions or attempted interactions between any two or more states. It has been argued that the ideologies of states involved in an interaction process affect such interactions. The likely outcomes of these interactions, seen from the point of view of the ideologies involved, may be either "isolative", "integrative", or "neutral". In the "isolative" case, ideological values diverge to the point of significantly limiting the possibilities

of positive interaction among the states involved. In such a situation interaction will often assume the form of conflict or will be undertaken in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion.⁵

In an integrative ideological situation, the states concerned espouse a broad range of compatible ideological values. This situation increases the probability of positive interaction among the states concerned. Finally, in a situation of ideological neutrality the states concerned choose to de-emphasize ideological differences in deference to the pursuit of interests considered more important.

Applied to South Africa's relations with the OAU states, these formulations suggest that the ideology of apartheid can only be isolative in terms of South Africa's situation in the general African context. For while the OAU states seek the termination of colonialism everywhere, South Africa has moved to consolidate a system of government which in essence is colonialist in spite of all the official rhetoric about "separate development". The general OAU view on South Africa and other southern African colonial regimes has been stated as follows:

⁵Relations among major powers during the so-called Cold War best approximate this model.

The negation by colonialist and racist regimes of the right to self-determination and independence of African peoples and its resort [sic] to force and violence to crush down liberation movements is no doubt the reason behind the present tension in Africa. This negation poses a threat to world peace and security, impedes international cooperation and hinders the economic development of African states, since an atmosphere of security and peace is a prerequisite for such development.⁶

However, whilst the OAU states have generally been very vocal in their condemnation of apartheid, they have not shown much evidence of a serious commitment to its termination.⁷ More recently they have differed over their role in bringing about political change in South Africa. Whilst the bulk of these

⁶ Organization of African Unity, Council of Ministers, Resolutions and Declarations of the Fifteenth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers (Addis Ababa: OAU Secretariat, 1970), CM/St. 4 (XV).

⁷ Since its founding, the OAU has regularly passed lengthy resolutions condemning apartheid and colonialism. It has also however frequently regretted the fact that many of its members do not pay their contributions to the African Liberation Committee based in Dar-es-Salaam. See Organization of African Unity, Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Resolutions and Declarations of Ordinary and Extraordinary Sessions, 1963-1969 (Addis Ababa: General Secretariat of the OAU, n.d.) pp. 50-51; Organization of African Unity, Council of Ministers, Resolutions of Ordinary and Extraordinary Sessions, 1963-1969 (Addis Ababa: General Secretariat of the OAU, n.d.), passim. For a concise and illuminating discussion of the OAU's role in the liberation struggle, see Jon Woronoff, Organizing African Unity (Metuchen, New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, 1970), especially Ch. III.

states continue to pursue a policy of confrontation, others - most notably, Malawi - now insist that such change can be brought about through engaging the South African government in a peaceful "dialogue."

It appears quite unlikely that the South African government will abandon its policies in deference to the sensibilities and representations of those African leaders who wish to engage that government in a dialogue about apartheid. Peaceful pressure has been exerted on the South African government before, without producing the results sought.⁸

The second variable of importance insofar as relations between South Africa and the OAU states are concerned is the capability factor. Capability may be understood as a state's capacity to effect desired changes or to achieve desired outcomes in the international environment or situation to which its policies are directed. In essence the term refers to the means available to a state, enabling it to carry out its purposes in the international environment.⁹ Such means enable a state

⁸ The proposal for dialogue reflects a tendency prevalent among those whose countries achieved independence through peaceful dialogue with the colonial powers to assume that similar procedures might be suitable also in the circumstances of colonial southern Africa.

⁹ See also Charles O. Lerche and Abdul a Said, Concepts of International Politics, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentic Hall), (1970), p. 60.

either to influence the behaviour of other states or to coerce them to adopt forms of behaviour deemed desirable by the former. Influence may be achieved through persuasion, the offer of rewards and in many other ways.¹⁰ The coercion aspect of capability can assume many forms including the issuance of threats, resort to such non-violent punitive actions as the imposition of economic sanctions, and, finally, the use of various forms or types of physical force including all-out war.

The capacity to influence or coerce, and, conversely, the probability that a state will be influenced and coerced, derive from the resources or other advantages available to the states involved in an interaction process. Such resources and advantages include geographical location, natural resource endowment, industrial and agricultural productive capacity, and military power.¹¹

In terms of her interactions with the OAU states South Africa has a clear capability advantage. She enjoys a high potential to shape developments beyond her own borders, especially

¹⁰ See also Christian P. Potholm, "Transaction Flows and Policy Formation: The Limits of Choice for Swaziland in the Southern African Complex", unpublished paper delivered at the African Studies Association annual meeting, Boston, October 1970; pp. 22-28.

¹¹ Lerche and Said, op. cit., pp. 68-76.

in the region of southern Africa. Conversely, the other states in the area enjoy fewer options. Thus, from a geographic, economic and military point of view, the former British High Commission Territories find it prudent to refrain from actions that might be regarded in Pretoria as subversive of South African interests: the granting of assistance to southern African guerrilla movements clearly belongs to this category of actions. Further to the north, Malawi finds herself in the same position as the said Territories. On the other hand, Zambia, with a more substantial resource base than Malawi enjoys more choices in terms of the orientation of her foreign policy. Yet the economic element cannot alone account for Zambian behaviour nor, for that matter, can it fully account for Malawian behaviour.

While Zambia's copper-derived wealth enables the country to carry out its declared intention to re-orient its relations northwards, a notable feature of the Zambian economy which should not be lost sight of is its vulnerability. As at present, the country is heavily dependent on routes passing through "enemy" territory - Angola, Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and South Africa itself. Moreover, since the Zambian economy is almost entirely based on the exploitation of one resource - copper - which itself is subject to a fluctuating international price

structure, the country's economic vulnerability is obviously very high.¹² Given the fact of this vulnerability, Zambian policy towards colonial southern Africa might have been expected to have been more conciliatory and accomodating than it has turned out to be. Therefore to be able to fully account for Zambian policies, this study has emphasised the importance of the politico-ideological preferences of the present Zambian leadership. In the view of the latter, southern African colonialism is illegitimate as a political phenomenon: it violates the principles underlying the granting of independence to former colonial territories elsewhere; it consolidates and perpetuates racial patterns that reduce the African majority to a status of inferiority in every sphere of social life; it constitutes a danger to the independence of other African countries. In the Zambian view, which is shared by the bulk of the OAU states, the fact that the South African regime is an ~~oppressive~~ oligarchy precludes the possibility that normal inter-state relations can be established between the OAU states and that regime. However, as already indicated, this view is not shared by all the OAU states. We have argued that the conservatism of the ruling elites in countries like Malawi and the Malagasy Republic makes

¹² See also, Zambia Six Years Later: An Economic Survey; a supplement of African Development (London), October 1970.

possible these countries' readiness to effect political accomodations with South Africa.

To return to the capability factor: From South Africa's point of view, capability is expressed primarily in terms of economic capacity and military power. Militarily, the regime in Pretoria has strengthened its position to a point where it becomes too risky for the OAU states - singly or jointly - to attempt to launch military actions against South Africa itself or its Portuguese and Rhodesian settler allies. Then too, military power has become an adjunct of South Africa's foreign policy vis-a-vis the OAU states. The existence of such power testifies to South Africa's ability to undertake coercive actions against states she judges guilty of endangering her own security and other interests. Further, it increases the credibility of South African threats to undertake such actions. While the extreme coercive action, namely warfare, has not yet been resorted to in South Africa's dealings with the OAU states, its possible future use tends to limit the options or courses of action available to these states in the context of the conflict in southern Africa.

In the economic sphere South Africa has declared her willingness to assist the economic development of the African states. This promise has been followed through most notably

in the case of South African economic and technical aid to Malawi. Indeed, Malawi is probably regarded in Pretoria as a sort of laboratory to test the viability of the outward-looking policy in terms of which Pretoria is attempting to establish close ties with the OAU states. As Frederick Hunter has put it:

If the outward policy [sic] can prove itself here [in Malawi], if it can make solid, visible contributions to Malawi's development and well-being without endangering the country's sovereignty, it could help pave the way to broader, mutually beneficial contacts between white-ruled southern Africa and the black-ruled nations to the north - nations which regard South Africa with hostility and suspicion.

13

From a political point of view, the key phrase in this quotation is: "...without impairing the country's sovereignty." This study has argued that South Africa's readiness to assist the economic development of the OAU states is premised upon the expectation of a political quid pro quo. Such a quid pro quo may be in the form of a refusal to participate in actions that damage South African interests; it may be expressed more positively, involving, for example, political support of South African policies and actions and the offer to South Africa of intelligence-gathering and military facilities that help to

¹³ Hunter, writing from Blantyre, Malawi, in The Christian Science Monitor, (Boston), March 18, 1970.

strengthen her general security situation.¹⁴ Put differently, South Africa's capacity and willingness to assist other African states economically and in other ways carries with it the possibility of the satellization of such states. This question is explored further below.

The third variable that affects South Africa's interactions with the OAU states is the domestic political factor. This refers to the domestic political parameters of foreign policy formulation both in South Africa itself and in the OAU states. In South Africa the regime's ability to pursue the outward-looking policy has been premised upon its ability to achieve the following:

- (a) the "political unification of the white oligarchy"¹⁵ which provides the necessary political base for an activist foreign policy; and,
- (b) the neutralization of all effective internal opposition to the regime; for the existence of such opposition attracts unwelcome international attention

¹⁴ See Chapters IV and V above.

¹⁵ The phrase is borrowed from Edwin S. Munger, "New White Politics," in W. A. Hance, ed., Southern African and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 35.

and diverts the regime from foreign policy pursuits to a concentration on defending its existence domestically. Taken together, the liquidation of the domestic opposition and the unification of the white oligarchy in support of the present government, have aided the latter's pursuit of the outward-looking policy.

As regards the OAU states, the domestic political factor may be viewed from the point of view of the factors that facilitate South African penetration of these states. Political instability in the African states has provided South Africa with diplomatically exploitable opportunities. In states riven by internal splits or divisions, South Africa has occasionally found it possible and desirable to "step in" on the side of one or another of the contending factions. To the extent that some African regimes come to base their own survival partly on South African assistance, as in the cases of Tshombe's Congo in 1964, Lesotho and Malawi today, South African influence must necessarily become a significant aspect of the "domestic" politics of some OAU states.

Of the three factors that affect South Africa's relations with the OAU states, we have in this study, given particular emphasis to the ideological one. It is this which in the main

limits South Africa's ability to penetrate the OAU states. Even in the few cases in which South Africa has been successful in effecting such penetration, ideological factors have remained important in the sense that the affected African states have either accepted the legitimacy of South Africa's domestic political system or have proclaimed it as their political aim to try to change that system through "dialogue" with the regime in Pretoria. However, from the perspective of the latter, it is the capability and domestic political factors which are given particular importance as pivots of the outward-looking policy. In terms of the capability factor, South Africa is to some extent able to use her considerable wealth to penetrate and exert influence on some OAU states, while her military-strategic advantages can be used to deter the OAU and the liberation movements from undertaking hostile actions. The domestic political factor defines the political conditions that facilitate South African penetration of the OAU world. It is convenient to pursue further consideration of this question in the context of the analysis of the goals of South Africa's extra-territorial policies.

IV

South Africa's outward-looking policy appears designed to achieving four main goals, namely;

- (a) the consolidation of white rule or domestic colonialism in South Africa itself;
- (b) the achievement of collaboration with the colonial regimes in Angola, Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia;
- (c) the penetration of the OAU states, particularly those situated geographically closer to South Africa itself. Then too, South Africa appears to seek
- (d) the satellization of the states she manages to penetrate.¹⁶

The consolidation of the system of domestic colonialism has been pursued largely through suppression of all expressions of opposition, particularly any opposition which in any way threatens existing political arrangements. Military, para-military and police forces have been bolstered in numbers, modernized in terms of training, equipment, and operational readiness and efficiency. These forces have so far proved themselves fully able to defend the regime. Consolidation has

¹⁶ Even if such satellization were not an aim of policy, we have asserted that it is likely to ensue, given South Africa's military and economic superiority vis-a-vis those African states that have chosen or been forced to establish close relations with her. It would seem reasonable to assume that the favourable political consequences of the permeability of such African states is something that Pretoria welcomes and seeks to promote.

also taken the form of the "unification of the white oligarchy" already referred to.

In terms of the outward-looking policy, consolidation of domestic colonialism is important in at least three senses. Firstly, it helps to bring about an atmosphere of domestic tranquillity which enables the regime to devote energies to the attempt to influence developments elsewhere in Africa. Secondly, the neutralization of opposition at home eliminates or reduces to a minimum the possibility that the country's economic and political viability might be impaired to a point where this might tempt active foreign intervention. Thirdly, by silencing all effective opposition, the regime can attempt, seemingly plausibly, to convince its foreign critics, including the OAU states, that South Africa is undeserving of their attacks since the fact of its being a "peaceful" country reflects its people's satisfaction with the conditions under which they live. Hence, for example, premier Vorster's flat assertion:

The relations between white and non-white are good and are improving constantly. The striking absence of tension in South Africa is the best proof of this.....I attribute the

absence of tension to the practical application and acceptance of the policy of separate development by the various race groups.¹⁷

¹⁷ B. J. Vorster, prefatory "Message", in D. J. Greyling, ed., South African Progress, 1969 (Pretoria: Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, 1969), p.4.

The claim that South Africa is a country without tension is hardly credible. It is belied by the fact that crime is at such a high rate that the country enjoys the dubious distinction of being in the position of carrying out 47% of all known judicial executions in the world. This crime, most of which is committed by Africans and mostly against other Africans, is in a large part explainable by reference to the conditions under which Africans are forced to live. As Progressive party member of the South African parliament, Mrs. Helen Suzman, has observed, for most black South Africans life in that country is characterized by: "social dislocations, poverty, low wages, hopelessness, bad living conditions, and that cancer of [South African society] - migratory labour." See Muriel Horrell, ed., A Survey of Race Relations, 1969 (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1969): The reference to executions is taken from p. 53, while Mrs. Suzman's statement is cited at p. 54.

In addition to the question of crime in South Africa, it is pertinent to note that as of 1968 over 1,000 persons - all but 4% of them black South Africans - were serving terms of imprisonment for political offenses. These offenses were mostly infringements of the stringent provisions of such "security laws" as the Suppression of Communism Act (1950); the General Law Amendment Act or Sabotage Act (1962); the Unlawful Organizations Act (1960); and the Terrorism Act (1967). Ibid., pp. 62, 63, et passim. (It is important to note in this connection that the regime refuses to disclose the number of persons held without trial under various provisions of these security laws. See ibid., pp. 63 - 71.)

In short, the facts of South African crime; the enactment by the government of laws which deny the possibility of its being criticized or challenged openly and freely; and the actual imprisonment with or without trial of thousands of South Africans: these and similar facts tend to belie Vorster's claims about the absence of tension in South Africa.

The second objective of the outward-looking policy has been the attempt to achieve a high degree of collaboration with the colonial regimes in Angola, Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia. By developing close economic, political and military ties with these regimes, South Africa has succeeded in extending her security frontier northwards beyond her own actual borders. This enables her to fight her enemies - mainly the liberation movements - in Angola, Mozambique or Rhodesia rather than within her own frontiers. Then too, the use of South African troops to assist Rhodesian forces fighting African guerrillas enables the former to acclimatize themselves to actual anti-guerrilla combat situations against the day when such operations might have to be conducted both in South Africa itself or in South West Africa. Collaboration also provides South Africa with opportunities to share military intelligence information with the Portuguese and the Rhodesian regimes, as well as providing her with convenient launching pads for possible military actions against hostile OAU states such as Zambia and Tanzania. It is also apparent that collaboration provides South Africa with increased economic and commercial opportunities in the rest of colonial southern Africa. Such opportunities are in the form of private capital investment opportunities, raw materials supplies, water and power supplies such as those

from the Kunene River and Cabora Bassa dam projects.¹⁸ Thus South African willingness to assist other southern African colonial regimes does not derive from mere altruism. It stems primarily from prudential calculations of what is likely to serve the interests of the white minority in South Africa best.

The third and fourth goals of the outward-looking policy - penetration and satellization - may be considered together. Penetration, as already noted, involves attempts by South Africa to establish friendly relations with the other African states. South African policy makers have expressed their interest in promoting this goal since the mid-1950's.¹⁹ A constant theme in the government's pronouncements regarding the rest of Africa has been that South Africa is able and willing to assist the economic, technical and scientific development of other African countries provided the latter accept the permanent nature of white rule in South Africa. Although the outward-looking policy has come to be closely

¹⁸ See Chapter IV above. Consult also John Sackur, "South Africa: Behind the Outward-Looking Strategy" in African Development (London), October 1970, pp. 7-9.

¹⁹ Consult Chapters I and III above and the South African government's own Fact Papers, especially No. 5 (1956), and Nos. 70, 72 and 77 (1959).

identified with the regime of B. J. Vorster, there is an element of continuity of policy from earlier Nationalist party governments particularly that of Verwoerd. It was under Verwoerd that South Africa briefly intervened in the Congo crisis of 1964; and it was Verwoerd who sought to demonstrate that the South African government would accord appropriate treatment to leaders of independent African states by conferring personally with Chief Leabua Jonathan of Lesotho in September 1966.

However, it is premier Vorster who has been more systematic and assiduous in the quest for close contacts with the OAU states. He has successfully cultivated the friendship of Malawi and Malagasy, aside from that of Lesotho and Swaziland.²⁰ Moreover, his government is likely to make a breakthrough in the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, the Central African Republic, Gabon and Ghana.

The advantages to South Africa of successful penetration of the OAU states are considerable. They include: (a) the possibility of limiting the effectiveness, or of threatening the viability, of southern African liberation movements that use training and supply facilities in a number of OAU states; (b) the extension of a South African economic "empire" into

²⁰ Botswana has so far proved difficult to win politically.

the rest of the continent or some part of it; (c) the ability to exacerbate discord and division in the OAU and thus helping to promote the political decline of the Organization; (d) the probability of improving South Africa's international image by the silencing - in whole or in part - of the principal source of international criticism of apartheid, namely, the OAU states themselves.

Insofar as those OAU states accepting South African penetration are concerned, it has been argued that one likely consequence of such acceptance is the political satellization of these states. Acceptance of South African economic, commercial and/or military penetration, must, at a minimum, be predicated upon a willingness to desist from actions that adversely affect South African interests, particularly security interests. Moreover, by increasing its economic ties with South Africa, a country like Malawi necessarily increases South Africa's capacity to influence Malawian policies. For example, the use of South African personnel as key advisers, technicians or administrators²¹ must obviously have some impact

²¹ Russell W. Howe has asserted, though unfortunately without adducing any evidence, that South Africa's "agreement with Malawi to build a \$42 million capital at Lilongwe ... is predicated upon acceptance of senior South African administrators in key posts throughout the country ..." Howe, "War In Southern Africa." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 1 (October, 1969), p. 162.

on the direction and substance of those policies. Finally, it seems clear that the more substantial and extensive become the economic and other ties linking South Africa and an OAU state, the greater the range of possible reprisal actions available to South Africa should the given African state decide to change its policies vis-a-vis the government in Pretoria. This means, for example, that a successor to Banda in Malawi is unlikely to reverse Banda's policies regarding South Africa since this might lead to the expulsion of 80,000 Malawians in the latter country or to the termination of projects already underway, such as the financing and construction of the new capital at Lilongwe.²² South Africa's capability advantages over most of the OAU states are such that a penetrated state is likely substantially to be beholden to South Africa in terms of its political choices or policies.

With regard to those OAU states which reject South African overtures and pursue a policy of active support for southern African liberation movements, South Africa's response has already manifested itself as hostile and threatening. She has already undertaken a number of coercive actions against

²² See also James Mayall, "Malawi's Foreign Policy" The World Today (London), Vol. 26, No. 10 (October 1970), p. 439.

Zambia as indicated in Chapter V above. Coercive actions have included the issuance of threats and the perpetration of acts of sabotage. Indeed, Pretoria's military superiority is itself a constant reminder to unfriendly OAU states that acts of hostility will invite severe retaliation.

Threats and the use of force are hardly likely to induce friendly attitudes on the part of the threatened African states. Indeed, resort to coercive actions, is itself an indication of the failure of South African diplomacy. It also underlines the seriousness of the political and racial confrontation developing in southern Africa.

V

What of the future? What probable lines of future development are indicated for South Africa, both internally and in the context of her relations with African countries beyond her borders? Answers to these questions can only be formulated as speculative rather than assertive statements. At best, such answers assume the character of probabilistic statements, although no numerical value can be assigned to them. Moreover, in drawing up "scenarios" for the future, one is hampered by the impossibility of conceiving all probable future contingencies. This is not to deny the value of "scenarios"; it is merely to draw attention to the pitfalls involved.

In terms of external developments that are of interest to South Africa, at least three are conceivable:

- (a) the successful application of the outward-looking policy to the African countries generally and to Zambia and Tanzania in particular;
- (b) the continuation, with South African support, of the status quo in Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia;
- (c) the increase in the scale of effectiveness of guerrilla activity in Southern Africa leading to the eventual collapse of the colonial regimes in Angola, Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia.

Were the outward-looking policy to be successfully extended to Zambia and Tanzania, South Africa would thereby realize some of her major aims: the extension of her "security zone" northwards beyond the Zambezi, the dispersal and neutralization of southern African liberation movements that use Zambia and Tanzania for bases and sanctuary; and the further extension and/or consolidation of South Africa's economic and political stranglehold in the region.

Under the present circumstances, and for reasons indicated elsewhere in this study, the possibility of a rapprochement between South Africa and Zambia/Tanzania seems remote.

However, one should emphasize the point that our speculation about the improbability of South Africa making a diplomatic breakthrough in Zambia and Tanzania - as indeed elsewhere in Africa - can hold only if it is assumed that present leaders such as Nyerere and Kaunda remain in power. Changes of regime or leadership in these countries might conceivably improve South Africa's chances of making a breakthrough.²³

Insofar as colonial Mozambique, Angola and Southern Rhodesia are concerned, South Africa is likely to favour the continuation of the status quo in these countries for an indefinite period. Yet the continuance of the status quo is likely to be predicated upon the ability of the Rhodesian and Portuguese colonialists to stave off African nationalist pressures against their domination. In turn, the ability of these colonial regimes to survive the said pressures may come to require increasing inputs of South African assistance in the form of men, money and materials. Yet it seems evident that the willingness and capacity of South Africa to extend such assistance can only be of a limited character. Although South Africa has hitherto fully cooperated with the Portuguese and

²³ It would be beyond the scope of this study to attempt an assessment of possible future changes of regime in Zambia, Tanzania or any other OAU state for that matter.

Rhodesian settlers, the real test of her willingness and capacity to defend the latter may come at the point when southern African liberation movements become both operationally effective and strategically sophisticated enough to be able, for example, to systematically coordinate and synchronize their activities throughout the region. When that happens, South African forces aiding the Rhodesians and the Portuguese would likely find themselves "spread too thin on the ground". Moreover, the financial and manpower cost to South Africa might well prove unacceptably high. Then too, the regime in Pretoria is hardly likely to attempt full-scale military involvement in neighbouring territories to the point where this weakens its capacity to deal with the subject black population in South Africa itself. The extension of military and other forms of aid to other southern African colonial regimes cannot obviously be undertaken to the point where this threatens the viability of the system of domestic colonialism at home. In light of such considerations, South African commitment to the Rhodesian and Portuguese colonialists can only be a contingent rather than an absolute one.

Assuming the collapse of Rhodesian settler rule and Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique, what is the likely character of the relations to be established between

South Africa and the successor regimes in the above territories? These relations would, of course, depend on the attitude towards South Africa of the new regimes themselves. Hostility or policies of confrontation would invite South African retaliation, whereas more friendly attitudes would obviously be welcomed in Pretoria.

It may well be that the African regimes to emerge from the ruins of Rhodesian and Portuguese colonialism will be more circumspect in their dealings with South Africa. That is, they might seek to avoid confrontation, judging that it would be too risky a policy since it would endanger national survival. Thus, prospects for a "Banda-type" posture on the part of future African regimes in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe cannot altogether be discounted. Yet such prospects may be limited or negated by two other factors. First, there is the tendency of revolutionary regimes on the morrow of victory to promote the diffusion of revolutionary impulses beyond the area of their own immediate control. An Angolan, Mozambican or Zimbabwean regime coming to power on the crest of successful guerrilla warfare is likely to be favourably disposed to helping anti-regime forces in South Africa. The example of the contemporary Cubans and North Vietnamese in diffusing a culture of revolution in their surrounding areas

seems pertinent. Second, successful revolution in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe is likely to encourage revolts by the African majority in South Africa. The collapse of colonialism in these countries would be inspirational to the South Africans. One might also expect that an influx of refugees from South Africa into the liberated territories would take place on a scale that would exacerbate relations between Pretoria and the new regimes in the neighbouring territories. In such circumstances, even a Banda-type regime in, say, Zimbabwe, might find itself caught in the vortex of a situation not entirely within its control..

In general, it appears that South Africa will continue to take a leading role in the defense of the status quo in southern Africa. However, this role will be abandoned if it should subsequently entail the impairment of white South Africa's security interests. In such an eventuality, the alternative policy for South Africa would probably be to try to achieve a modus vivendi with the post-colonial regimes of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. This, it is hypothesized here, will prove difficult; it is more likely that heightened confrontation will constitute the dominant motif in South Africa's relations with post-colonial southern Africa. Elsewhere in Africa hostility towards apartheid in South Africa may be expected to remain

strong even if the form of expression of such hostility is likely to continue to be primarily declaratory.

VI

Insofar as likely political developments within South Africa itself are concerned, the range of possibilities includes:

- (a) continuation of the status quo together with an acceleration of the groot apartheid programme (territorial separation scheme);
- (b) pragmatic readjustment and modification of the apartheid policy with an insistence on continued white political hegemony;
- (c) the peaceful or negotiated abandonment of apartheid and the inauguration of racial equality in every sphere of South African life; and,
- (d) the violent overthrow of the South African regime by the African majority.

The first possibility, i.e., the attempt to achieve full apartheid in the sense of complete territorial separation of the races with full political autonomy for each of the officially designated "nations" would appear to be an unrealizable goal. This point has already been argued at length in Chapter III above. Economic, demographic, military and political factors clearly militate against the attainment of groot apartheid.

The second possibility, namely, the modification of the programme of apartheid together with an insistence on continued white rule in South Africa seems likely to hold for the foreseeable future. This means that while the Nationalist party regime continues to proclaim its adherence to the apartheid ideal, it will not move to expel Africans from the so-called white areas to the point of threatening the functioning of the economy. Indeed, as a result of the white manpower shortage Africans in the urban areas may even be granted limited opportunities to perform some jobs previously set aside for "whites only".²⁴ In other words, economic realities will in practice compel some modification of the apartheid programme. It should be noted, however, that the extension of some economic opportunities to Africans in the urban areas arises from the need to maintain the viability and expansive momentum of the South African economy rather than from any policy aimed at a general relaxation of apartheid. In particular, racial integration in the economic sphere should not be expected to lead to policies

²⁴ In February 1969 minister of labour M. Viljoen pointed out that South Africa's high rate of economic growth required that more non-whites should fill skilled and semi-skilled jobs since "it would be sheer idiocy to hold back South Africa's development by not allowing non-whites into the trades". (Mr. Viljoen was, however, careful to stress that only those job categories for which there were no whites available would be open to the non-whites). Cited in Horrell, op. cit., p. 88.

of liberalization at the social and political levels. Indeed, South African government leaders are careful to dispel any illusions on this point. Vorster himself has declared that those Africans who find themselves in the white areas should not expect at any time to share political power with the whites since the Africans in the cities are resident aliens whose political rights are available in their own "homelands".²⁵

Put in more general terms, the point here is simply that there is not a one-to-one correspondence between the modification of racial patterns in the economic sphere and the modification of racial patterns elsewhere in the social system of a given racially-stratified society. As McKay has observed:

Although it seems logical to expect that the contacts, efficiency, mobility and secularism of industry would modify the racial pattern, the fact is that the deep-seated passions behind the racial order in societies such as South Africa and the American South act so powerfully upon the industrializing process that the pull of its gravity is largely counteracted... The effects of industrialization on a rigid racial pattern are only marginal and indirect; to the extent that it results in economic advancement it makes Africans more conscious of their capacity to advance and therefore may lead them to try to step up their political action to end racial discrimination.²⁶

²⁵ House of Assembly Debates, Vols. 17 and 18 (1966), cols. 2653-2654.

²⁶ Vernon McKay "Southern Africa and Its Implications for American Policy", in Hance, op.cit., pp. 31-32.

If there are to be any changes in the overall racial patterns of South Africa, these can only come about as a result of conscious political initiative and decision. This brings us to the third of the possible "futures" of South Africa, namely the possibility of a peaceful transition from current political patterns to a more non-racial social and political climate in South Africa. A peaceful resolution of the "present discontents" in South Africa would of course have many advantages;²⁷ including: release of the energies of the people of South Africa such that they participate freely in the country's development; facilitation of the political and social integration of the country as a whole by the removal of the legal barriers that now impede such a development; the

²⁷ It should be noted that we are not here concerned to spell out specific proposals or constitutional arrangements for South Africa. The purpose here is rather to assess briefly the probability that certain broad courses of action might or might not be taken in the future given the current realities of South African society and politics.

For a discussion by some South African intellectuals of possible peaceful solutions to the country's problems - solutions which hinge especially on the establishment of a federal system or a racially-equitable partition of the country, see, for example, Jordan Ngubane, An African Explains Apartheid (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1965); Leo Marquard, Our Foreign Policy (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1969); N.J. Rhodie, Apartheid en Partnership (Pretoria: Academica Press, 1966) as reviewed in the English language Cape Times, June 21, 1966, by G. E. Shaw.

Consult also E. D. Tiryakian, "Sociological Realism: Partition for South Africa?" Social Forces, December 1967; and A. Turk, "The Futures of South Africa", in ibid., March 1967.

amelioration, if not elimination, of the built-in conflicts of South Africa that arise from the officially-designed entrenchment of privilege and political power as the preserve of a racial minority.

The probability that peaceful processes might be the means of bringing about political change in South Africa seems low. The present rulers of that country have shown every evidence of a determination to preserve and consolidate their hold on political power. Non-white South Africans continue to be denied meaningful participation in the political life of the country; their political organizations have been proscribed; those who oppose apartheid continue to be imprisoned, detained, placed under house arrest or exiled; racially-discriminatory laws such as the "pass laws" continue to be rigorously enforced by the regime.²⁸ In short, all indications point to the further strengthening of the system of domestic colonialism; all developments and tendencies to the contrary have not only been denied any legitimacy officially, they are also ipso facto illegal and punishable. The peaceful path to a non-racial future thus seems effectively blocked.

²⁸ Almost 1,000 are arrested daily on pass law violations. See Horrell, op.cit., p. 51.

A fourth possible source of change in the South African system is violent revolution initiated and carried out by the African majority.²⁹ Under existing circumstances this possibility seems a limited one. Attempts to precipitate violent uprisings must contend with the advantages the government enjoys. Firstly, the military and police forces, as already indicated, will likely for a long time provide an effective defense against any forces hostile to the status quo. Secondly, the physical dispersal of the African population into ethnic "homelands" - even if only partial - together with the cultural and political dispersal of that population into a refurbished tribalism should further intensify the divisions in the African population lending to its easier control. Thirdly, Western capital investment, and commercial relations with South Africa as well as Western arms sales to the regime will continue to play a part in strengthening the latter by bolstering the country's economy and therewith the regime's ability to defend

²⁹ The possibility of external military intervention is quite negligible. The African states do not pose any such threat (see Ch. III above). The major world powers are either too deeply involved economically and commercially in South Africa to wish to alter the political status quo, or they assign less importance to conflicts in Africa than those in other areas of the world such as the Middle East and South East Asia. See also, Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Unity (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 243-248; Denis Austin, Britain and South Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1966, F. A. Praeger, 1968), passim; McKay, op.cit., pp. 25-27.

the status quo. Fourthly, the strength of the regime must remain considerable as long as the nearly four million white South Africans remain united in their support of the existing political system. This support appears unlikely to diminish.³⁰

On their part, the Africans in South Africa do have some advantages in terms of their ability to influence change in the political system. One such advantage is the African population's numerical superiority in the society. To the extent that the government is unwilling or unable to satisfy the economic, social, and political needs and aspirations of the African majority, the possibilities for African uprisings - whether organized or spontaneous - must increase. Such uprisings need not necessarily lead to the sudden collapse of the regime; they will however tend to limit the long-term viability of the latter by forcing it to dissipate resources in unproductive activities such as security and defense. Moreover, internal

³⁰ Dr. E. G. Malherbe, former principal of Natal University in Durban, has argued that white South African society increasingly manifests a widespread form of "docility" the quintessence of which is the tendency to accept authority on its own valuation. What the government does or says, he argues, is automatically accepted since it is felt that there must be justification for its every act, no matter how apparently unreasonable or oppressive such an act may be. This docility is further strengthened by the government's ability to manipulate the system of rewards and deprivations; manipulate the socialization processes; isolate, and if necessary, punish deviants from the established norms of the regime. Malherbe, The Nemesis of Docility (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1968), passim.

political instability would tend to discourage foreign investment and to encourage an outflow of foreign capital.³¹

It appears, however, that the possibility of a **successful** African revolt or revolution in South Africa will depend to a large extent on the prior liberation of the other African colonial territories. The liberation of Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia and Angola would open up for South African liberation movements improved opportunities for operations against the forces of the regime in Pretoria.

In general, the possibilities for change in the South African system are rather limited and circumscribed. Of the four possibilities for change posed above, two may be discounted as having a low probability of occurrence, namely the achievement of groot apartheid and the peaceful, negotiated transition to a non-racial South Africa. Regarding the other two, violent revolution seems a long-term prospect which should nonetheless ultimately come about in consequence of the built-in inequities of the South African system and the impact of external events such as the liberation struggles in surrounding colonial

³¹ Following the Sharpeville massacre of March 1960, South Africa's foreign currency reserves declined rapidly from an amount of U.S. \$437 million before the massacre to an amount of U.S. \$198 million by June 1961. Kenneth Carstens, "Comments", in Philip W. Quigg, South Africa: Problems and Prospects (New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1965), p. 38.

territories. The fourth possibility, and the one that is likely to characterize South Africa's immediate future, will involve pragmatic modifications of the apartheid system particularly in the economic sphere, but without any alteration of the monopoly of political power presently enjoyed by the white minority.

We would thus conclude that until conditions become more favourable for a serious and coordinated African attempt at winning political power violently, present patterns of South African politics will continue with little modification. Sporadic African revolts may be expected. They will however be met with severe penalties and repression by the regime. Novelist Doris Lessing's assessment of the prospects for political change in South Africa, although written over ten years ago, remains essentially accurate today and is likely to hold for some time yet:

The present regime in South Africa will last a very long time.....It is a state which is designed on every level to prevent the Africans from rebelling; to keep them as helots...South Africa will become poorer, more backward, intellectually and morally corrupt, a place of sporadic race riots, violence, crime, prisons, internment camps, fear. [Even with considerable economic dislocation] the Nationalists would prefer to become backveld peasant farmers...rather than give up their dream of racial purity.³²

³² Doris Lessing, Going Home (London: Michael Joseph, 1957), pp. 87-88.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

SOUTHERN AFRICA

ATLANTIC OCEAN

- MAIN AREAS OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY
- TANZANIA-ZAMBIA OIL-PIPELINE
- TANZANIA RAILWAY (Being built by Chinese)
- RAILWAYS
- MILITARY STRENGTH: No. approx.
- MEN UNDER ARMS... No. approx.
- PRIMARY TARGET AREA OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY
- OTHER AREAS OF MAJOR INTEREST TO SOUTH AFRICA

APPENDIX B

SOUTHERN AFRICA: ESTIMATED DE FACTO POPULATION (IN THOUSANDS)

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>AFRICANS</u>	(1968)		<u>WHITES</u>	<u>WHITES AS % OF TOTAL</u>
			<u>ASIANS & COLOURED</u>			
Republic of South Africa	18,733	12,750	2,420		3,563	18.4
South West Africa	589	475	27		87	14.7
Lesotho	976	973	1		2	0.2
Botswana	559	551	4		4	0.7
Swaziland	400	388	3		9	2.5
Southern Rhodesia	4,260	4,020	21		219	5.0
Zambia	4,054	3,972	12		70	1.8
Malawi	4,000	3,979	12		9	0.2
Angola	5,215	5,005	30		180	3.5
Mozambique	7,000	6,878	50		72	1.0

TOTAL	45,786	38,991	2,580		4,215	8.7

Sources: Republic of South Africa, South African Prospects and Progress (New York: Information Service of South Africa, 1968), p.4; Kingdom of Lesotho, Bureau of Statistics, 1966 Census: Preliminary Results, mimeographed and cited in R.F. Weisfelder, Lesotho: An Irritant Within South Africa, unpublished paper delivered at the annual meeting of the African Studies Association, Boston, October 1970, p.9; Republic of Zambia, Zambia in Brief (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services, n.d.), p.4; G.M.E. Leistner, "Foreign Bantu Workers in South Africa," South African Journal of Economics (Johannesburg), Vol.35, No.1 (March 1967), p.53.

APPENDIX C

FIFTH SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICAN STATESHELD IN LUSAKA, ZAMBIA -- APRIL 14TH - 16TH, 1969MANIFESTO ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

1. When the purpose and the basis of States' international policies are misunderstood, there is introduced into the world a new and unnecessary disharmony, disagreements, conflicts of interest, or different assessments of human priorities, which provoke an excess of tension in the world, and disastrously divide mankind, at a time when united action is necessary to control modern technology and put it to the service of man. It is for this reason that, discovering widespread misapprehension of our attitudes and purposes in relation to Southern Africa, we the leaders of East and Central African States meeting in Lusaka, 16th April, 1969, have agreed to issue this Manifesto.
2. By this Manifesto we wish to make clear, beyond all shadow of doubt, our acceptance of the belief that all men are equal, and have equal rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of colour, race, religion, or sex. We believe that all men have the right and the duty to participate, as equal members of the society, in their own government. We do not accept that any individual or group has any right to govern any group of sane adults, without their consent, and we affirm that only the people of a society, acting together as equals, can determine what is, for them, a good society and a good social, economic, or political organisation.
3. On the basis of these beliefs we do not accept that any one group within a society has the right to rule any society without the continuing consent of all the citizens. We recognise that at any one time there will be, within every society, failures in the implementation of these ideals. We recognise that for the sake of order in human affairs, there may be transitional arrangements while a transformation from group inequalities to individual equality is being effected. But we affirm that without an acceptance of these ideals - without a commitment to these principles of human equality and self-determination - there can be no basis for peace and justice in the world.

4. None of us would claim that within our own States we have achieved that perfect social, economic and political organisation which would ensure a reasonable standard of living for all our people and establish individual security against avoidable hardship or miscarriage of justice. On the contrary, we acknowledge that within our own States the struggle towards human brotherhood and unchallenged human dignity is only beginning. It is on the basis of our commitment to human equality and human dignity, not on the basis of achieved perfection, that we take our stand of hostility towards the colonialism and racial discrimination which is being practised in Southern Africa. It is on the basis of their commitment to these universal principles that we appeal to other members of the human race for support.

5. If the commitment to these principles existed among the States holding power in Southern Africa, any disagreements we might have about the rate of implementation, or about isolated acts of policy, would be matters affecting only our individual relationships with the States concerned. If these commitments existed, our States would not be justified in the expressed and active hostility towards the regimes of Southern Africa such as we have proclaimed and continue to propagate.

6. The truth is, however, that in Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia, South-West Africa, and the Union of South Africa, there is an open and continued denial of the principles of human equality and national self-determination. This is not a matter of failure in the implementation of accepted human principles. The effective Administration in all these territories are not struggling towards these difficult goals. They are fighting the principles; they are deliberately organising their societies so as to try to destroy the hold of these principles in the minds of men. It is for this reason that we believe the rest of the world must be interested. For the principle of human equality, and all that flows from it, is either universal or it does not exist. The dignity of all men is destroyed when the manhood of any human being is denied.

7. Our objectives in Southern Africa stem from our commitment to this principle of human equality. We are not hostile to the Administrations in these States because they are manned and controlled by white people. We are hostile to them because they are systems of minority control which exist as a result of, and in the pursuance of, doctrines of human inequality. What we are working for is the right of self-determination for the people of these territories. We are working for a rule in those countries which is based on the will of all the people, and an acceptance of the equality of every citizen.

8. Our stand towards Southern Africa thus involves a rejection of racialism, not a reversal of the existing racial domination. We believe that all the peoples who have made their homes in the countries

of Southern Africa are Africans, regardless of colour of their skins; and we would oppose a racist majority government which adopted a philosophy of deliberate and permanent discrimination between its citizens on grounds of racial origin. We are not talking racialism when we reject the colonialism and apartheid policies now operating in those areas; we are demanding an opportunity for all the people of these States, working together as equal individual citizens, to work out for themselves the institutions and the system of government under which they will, by general consent, live together and work together to build a harmonious society.

9. As an aftermath of the present policies it is likely that different groups within these societies will be self-conscious and fearful. The initial political and economic organisations may well take account of these fears, and this group self-consciousness. But how this is to be done must be a matter exclusively for the peoples of the country concerned, working together. No other nation will have a right to interfere in such affairs. All that the rest of the world has a right to demand is just what we are now asserting - that the arrangements within any State which wishes to be accepted into the community of nations must be based on an acceptance of the principles of human dignity and equality.

10. To talk of the liberation of Africa is thus to say two things. First, that the peoples in the territories still under colonial rule shall be free to determine for themselves their own institutions of self-government. Secondly, that the individuals in Southern Africa shall be freed from an environment poisoned by the propaganda of racialism, and given an opportunity to be men - not white men, brown men, yellow men, or black men.

11. Thus the liberation of Africa for which we are struggling does not mean a reverse racialism. Nor is it an aspect of African Imperialism. As far as we are concerned the present boundaries of the States of Southern Africa are the boundaries of what will be free and independent African States. There is no question of our seeking or accepting any alterations to our own boundaries at the expense of these future free African nations.

12. On the objective of liberation as thus defined, we can neither surrender nor compromise. We have always preferred, and we still prefer, to achieve it without physical violence. We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence; we advocate an end to the violence against human dignity which is now being perpetrated by the oppressors of Africa. If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would

urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change. But while peaceful progress is blocked by actions of those at present in power in the States of Southern Africa, we have no choice but to give to the peoples of those territories all the support of which we are capable in their struggle against their oppressors. This is why the signatory states participate in the movement for the liberation of Africa under the aegis of the Organisation of African Unity. However, the obstacle to change is not the same in all the countries of Southern Africa, and it follows therefore, that the possibility of continuing the struggle through peaceful means varies from one country to another.

13. In Mozambique and Angola, and in the so-called Portuguese Guinea, the basic problem is not racialism but a pretence that Portugal exist in Africa. Portugal is situated in Europe, the fact that it is a dictatorship is a matter for the Portuguese to settle. But no decree of the Portuguese dictator, nor legislation passed by any Parliament in Portugal, can make Africa part of Europe. The only thing which could convert a part of Africa into a constituent unit in a union which also includes a European State would be the freely expressed will of the people of that part of Africa. There is no such popular will in the Portuguese colonies. On the contrary, in the absence of any opportunity to negotiate a road to freedom, the peoples of all three territories have taken up arms against the colonial power. They have done this despite the heavy odds against them, and despite the great suffering they know to be involved.

14. Portugal, as a European State, has naturally its own allies in the context of the ideological conflict between West and East. However, in our context, the effect of this is that Portugal is enabled to use her resources to pursue the most heinous war and degradation of man in Africa. The present Manifesto must, therefore, lay bare the fact that the inhuman commitment of Portugal in Africa and her ruthless subjugation of the people of Mozambique, Angola and the so-called Portuguese Guinea, is not only irrelevant to the ideological conflict of power-politics, but it is also diametrically opposed to the policies, the philosophies and the doctrines practised by her Allies in the conduct of their own affairs at home. The peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea are not interested in Communism or Capitalism; they are interested in their freedom. They are demanding an acceptance of the principles of independence on the basis of majority rule, and for many years they called for discussions on this issue. Only when their demand for talks was continually ignored did they begin to fight. Even now, if Portugal should change her policy and accept the principle of self-determination, we would urge the Liberation Movements to desist from their armed struggle and to co-operate in the mechanics of a peaceful transfer of power from Portugal to the peoples of the African territories.

15. The fact that many Portuguese citizens have immigrated to these African countries does not affect this issue. Future immigration policy will be a matter for the independent Governments when these are established. In the meantime, we would urge the Liberation Movements to reiterate their statements that all those Portuguese people who have made their homes in Mozambique, Angola or Portuguese Guinea, and who are willing to give their future loyalty to those states, will be accepted as citizens. And an independent Mozambique, Angola or Portuguese Guinea may choose to be as friendly with Portugal as Brazil is. That would be the free choice of a free people.

16. In Rhodesia the situation is different insofar as the metropolitan power has acknowledged the colonial status of the territory. Unfortunately, however, it has failed to take adequate measures to re-assert its authority against the minority which has seized power with the declared intention of maintaining white domination. The matter cannot rest there. Rhodesia, like the rest of Africa, must be free, and its independence must be on the basis of majority rule. If the colonial power is unwilling or unable to effect such a transfer of power to the people, then the people themselves will have no alternative but to capture it as and when they can. And Africa has no alternative but to support them. The question which remains in Rhodesia is therefore whether Britain will re-assert her authority in Rhodesia and then negotiate the peaceful progress to majority rule before independence. Insofar as Britain is willing to make this second commitment, Africa will co-operate in her attempts to re-assert her authority. This is the method of progress which we would prefer: it could involve less suffering for all the peoples of Rhodesia; both black and white. But until there is some firm evidence that Britain accepts the principles of independence on the basis of majority rule, and is prepared to take whatever steps are necessary to make it a reality, then Africa has no choice but to support the struggle for the people's freedom by whatever means are open to her.

17. Just as a settlement of the Rhodesian problem with a minimum of violence is a British responsibility, so a settlement in South West Africa with a minimum of violence is a United Nations responsibility. By every canon of international law, and by every precedent, South West Africa should by now have been a sovereign, independent State with a Government based on majority rule. South West Africa was a German colony until 1919, just as Tanganyika, Rwanda and Burundi, Togoland and Cameroon were German colonies. It was a matter of European politics that when the Mandatory System was established after Germany had been defeated, the administration of South West Africa was given to the white minority government of South Africa, while the other ex-German colonies in Africa were put into the hands of the British, Belgian, or French Governments. After the Second World War every mandated territory except South West Africa was converted into a Trusteeship Territory and has subsequently gained independence. South Africa, on the other hand has persistently refused to honour even the international obligation it accepted in 1919, and has increasingly applied to South West Africa the inhuman doctrines and organisation of apartheid.

18. The United Nations General Assembly has ruled against this action and in 1966 terminated the Mandate under which South Africa had a legal basis for its occupation and domination of South West Africa. The General Assembly declared that the territory is now the direct responsibility of the United Nations and set up an ad hoc Committee to recommend practical means by which South West Africa would be administered, and the people enabled to exercise self-determination and to achieve independence.

19. Nothing could be clearer than this decision - which no permanent member of the Security Council voted against. Yet, since that time no effective measures have been taken to enforce it. South West Africa remains in the clutches of the most ruthless minority Government in Africa. Its people continue to be oppressed and those who advocate even peaceful progress to independence continue to be persecuted. The world has no obligation to use its strength to enforce the decision which all the countries co-operated in making. If they do this there is hope that the change can be effected without great violence. If they fail, then sooner or later the people of South West Africa will take the law into their own hands. The people have been patient beyond belief, but one day their patience will be exhausted. Africa, at least, will then be unable to deny their call for help.

20. The Union of South Africa is itself an independent sovereign State and a Member of the United Nations. It is more highly developed and richer than any other nation in Africa. On every legal basis its internal affairs are a matter exclusively for the people of South Africa. Yet the purpose of law is people and we assert that the actions of the South African Government are such that the rest of the world has a responsibility to take some action in defence of humanity.

21. There is one thing about South African oppression which distinguishes it from other oppressive regimes. The apartheid policy adopted by its Government, and supported to a greater or lesser extent by almost all its white citizens, is based on a rejection of man's humanity. A position of privilege or the experience of oppression in South African society depends on the one thing which it is beyond the power of any man to change. It depends upon a man's colour, his parentage, and his ancestors. If you are black you cannot escape this categorisation; nor can you escape it if you are white. If you are a black millionaire and a brilliant political scientist, you are still subject to the pass laws and still excluded from political activity. If you are white, even protests against the system and an attempt to reject segregation, will lead you only to the segregated and the comparative comfort of a white jail. Beliefs, abilities and behaviour are all irrelevant to a man's status; everything depends upon race. Manhood is irrelevant. The whole system of government and society in South Africa is based on the denial of human equality. And the system is maintained by a ruthless denial of the human rights of the majority of the population - and thus, inevitably of all.

22. These things are known and are regularly condemned in the Councils of the United Nations and elsewhere. But it appears that to many countries international law takes precedence over humanity; therefore no action follows the words. Yet even if international law is held to exclude active assistance to the South African opponents of apartheid, it does not demand that the comfort and support of human and commercial intercourse should be given to a government which rejects the manhood of most of humanity. South Africa should be excluded from the United Nations Agencies, and even from the United Nations itself. It should be ostracised by the world community until it accepts the implications of man's common humanity. It should be isolated from world trade patterns and left to be self-sufficient if it can. The South African Government cannot be allowed both to reject the very concept of mankind's unity, and to benefit by the strength given through friendly international relations. And certainly Africa cannot acquiesce in the maintenance of the present policies against people of African descent.

23. The signatories of this Manifesto assert that the validity of the principles of human equality and dignity extend to the Union of South Africa just as they extend to the colonial territories of Southern Africa. Before a basis for peaceful development can be established in this continent, these principles must be acknowledged by every nation, and in every State there must be a deliberate attempt to implement them.

24. We re-affirm our commitment to these principles of human equality and human dignity, and to the doctrines of self-determination and non-racialism. We shall work for their extension within our own nations and throughout the continent of Africa.