NAME OF AUTHOR: Mr. Blair Williams

TITLE OF THESIS: The Canadian Federation of Agriculture: The Problems of a General Political Interest Group

UNIVERSITY: Carleton University

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED: Ph.D.

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED: 1974

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PERMANENT ADDRESS:

152 Main Street
Aylmer, P.Q.

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THE CANADIAN FEDERATION OF AGRICULTURE:

THE PROBLEMS OF A GENERAL POLITICAL

INTEREST GROUP

by

Blair Williams, B.A., M.A.

In two volumes

Volume I

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy.

Department of Political Science

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

April 30, 1974
The undersigned recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies acceptance of the thesis

THE CANADIAN FEDERATION OF AGRICULTURE:
THE PROBLEMS OF A GENERAL POLITICAL INTEREST GROUP

submitted by Blair Williams, M.A.,
in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

[Signature]
Thesis Supervisor

[Signature]
Chairman, Department of Political Science

Carleton University
May 15, 1974
ABSTRACT

The subject matter of this dissertation is the Canadian Federation of Agriculture, a general farm interest group. The aim of the study is to describe, to explain, and occasionally to prescribe. The time span that is encompassed is fairly narrow and relatively recent. The study focuses primarily on the development of the CFA since the mid-1960's, with special emphasis on the period from 1968 to the present, 1974.

Canadian farm interest groups have not been extensively described and analyzed in academic literature. A major thrust of this work, therefore, has been to simply gather and organize available materials which give a clear picture of the nature and operation of the CFA. Beyond this I have sought to come to terms with the elements that explain the strengths and weaknesses of the CFA and the extent to which it might be judged to be failing or succeeding. In attempting to delineate these aspects I have, for comparative purposes, sketched out the organizational structure and characteristics of the National Farmers Union.

This thesis does not contain any grand theories or any particularly new or novel ways of perceiving Canadian interest groups. It does however go beyond simple surface answers to focus on causal factors which provide some basic answers concerning the behavior of the CFA. The Federation is seen to be
a very loosely integrated organization which is trapped between its own goals and the desires of its leaders on the one hand, and available resources and its organizational realities on the other. The CPA's dilemma is that it is a highly diffused federated organization within a nation that has similar characteristics; one of the results is that the Federation is robbed of much of the influence that it might otherwise have. An overall objective of this study is to bring these difficulties into clear perspective in the hope that it might contribute to the greater good of the CFA and the Canadian farmers that it is intended to serve.
PREFACE

In the preparation of this study it was exceedingly difficult, indeed often impossible, to derive accurate answers from the written record as to how CPA activities were carried on, and decisions were made. A substantial part of the most important business of the Federation is ad hoc and informal; a good deal of vital information is never recorded on paper. In studying the role of commodity groups within the CPA, for example, it was essential to talk in depth with Dave Kirk, Executive Secretary, and Bill Hamilton, Associate Secretary. Time and again it was abundantly clear to me that the greatest single source of information was Dave Kirk's mind. In many respects personal contacts and coffee room conversations were more important to the substance of this study than were formal submissions, letters and articles.

The offices of the CPA, which were my base of operation for a number of months, overlook Ottawa's Sparks Street mall at one end and Parliament Hill at the other. The view of the Center Block, which is the seat of federal government power, is bordered on one side by the Rideau Club and by the American Embassy on the other. It is a setting which has always seemed to me to be both fitting and ironic, inasmuch as the interests
of Canadian farmers seem so often to be sandwiched between American needs and policies and the perceptions of the Ottawa establishment.

In the preparation of this Thesis I am especially grateful to the Canadian Federation of Agriculture which readily opened its files and willingly made facilities available to me. In particular I would like to mention the contribution of Dave Kirk, Executive Secretary of the CFA, who is a perfectly delightful and stimulating individual.

I am most appreciative of the support of one of the finest of Canadian institutions—the Canada Council. The Council provided the needed financial resources during the critical time when the material for this study was being gathered and organized.

Finally, having reserved my most fulsome praise until last, I wish to express my thanks to Professor Khayyam Paltiel of Carleton University. Although I did not use his facilities I fully utilized his talents. Professor Paltiel gave many hours of his time in discussions of the subject matter of this thesis as well as numerous other related topics—in the process he proved that criticism is creative.

Blair Williams

May, 1974
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CHAPTER I

INTEREST GROUPS IN CANADIAN SOCIETY

Interest groups have been variously defined in terms of "shared human activity", \(^1\) "shared attitudes", \(^2\) and more recently in terms of "interest articulation." \(^3\) These and other defining characteristics, which are now considered to be part of the classic literature on interest groups, have proven to be helpful in the steady development of interest group theory. Through the rigours of logical and empirical analysis political scientists have developed a reasonable body of knowledge and a fairly high degree of precision using the concept of political interest groups.


For the purposes of this study a political interest group is an organized aggregate which, on the basis of shared attitudes, articulates particular demands and attempts to influence governmental decisions without actively seeking to achieve formal government office. This study focuses on precisely such a political interest group, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture.

In this preliminary chapter I intend to provide the reader with an overview of the interest group life and process of which the CFA is a part. This will include a brief look at the main categories or types of interest groups that exist in Canada and the functions that they perform or are intended to perform. The factors which affect the success of interest groups in fulfilling these objectives will be considered in terms of the characteristics possessed by interest groups, the politico-governmental environment within which they operate, and the methods and techniques that are employed by such groups.

1. Interest Group Types and Functions

There are innumerable ways of categorizing the interest groups that pervade modern democratic societies such as Canada. Observers tend to agree that the most universal, and universally important type, is the economic interest group—
comprising the so-called "big three"—business, labour, and agriculture.

Business interest groups may be further subdivided according to those groups which claim to speak on behalf of the business community as a whole, and those which represent a particular segment of that community. Leading examples of the general, all-inclusive business interest group are the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and the Canadian Manufacturers Association. Particular interest groups are those representing the views of bankers, retail druggists, insurance agents, and so on.

In Canada, as in most other modern democratic nations, labour union activity permeates nearly all levels where individuals are employed by institutions or by other individuals. The primary function of labour unions is to deal with employers in an attempt to achieve a higher standard of life for union members. Unions tend to band together into federations, and it is at this level that the major political interests are articulated. The two most prominent trade union federations in Canada are the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), and the Quebec-based Confederation of National Trade Unions (CNTU).
In agriculture, as in business, political interest groups can be separated into two categories—those that claim to speak for agriculture as a whole, and those that represent particular segments of the industry. The leading example of the former is the Canadian Federation of Agriculture. The only other political interest group which claims the total welfare of Canadian agriculture as its raison d'être is the Saskatchewan-based National Farmers Union. There are a myriad of interest groups (mostly agricultural commodity groups) which represent particular sectors of the agricultural industry. Dairy Farmers of Canada, Western Canada Stock Growers, Canadian Wool Growers Association, Ontario Tobacco Growers Association, and the Alberta Sugar Beet Growers Association are but a few examples.

Of the remaining political interest groups Engelmann and Schwartz discuss nine categories which seem to be exhaustive, with a minimum amount of overlapping.¹ There is, first, a well-recognized cluster of professional interest groups, like the Canadian Bar Association, the Canadian Medical Association, the Canadian Association of Chartered Accountants, and so on.

¹F. C. Engelmann and M. A. Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure, (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall Ltd., 1967), pp. 95 ff.
Second, there are veterans organizations like the Royal Canadian Legion, and the Army, Navy and Air Force Veterans of Canada.

Third, in a country as heterogeneous as Canada there is a multitude of ethnic organizations. This includes such groups as the National Indian Brotherhood, the Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire, Ukrainian Canadian Organizations, and various French Canadian associations across Canada.

There are, for a fourth category, a variety of religious interest groups. Examples are the Anglican Church Women, the Student Christian Movement, Knights of Columbus, and the Canadian Council of Churches.

Fifth, there are a number of organized groups intended to specifically serve the interests of Canadian women. These are groups like the Canadian Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, the Women's Canadian Club, and the National Council of Women of Canada.

A sixth category includes social action or reform groups which are motivated by a cause or by ideological considerations. Some examples might be Moral Re-Armament, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, the Women's Christian Temperance Union, the Royal Canadian Humane Association, and the John Howard Society.
Finally, in addition to these Engelmann and Schwartz set down three non-professional, catch-all categories in the areas of public administration, communications, and education. Included in this classification are such groups as the Civil Service Federation of Canada, the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, the Canadian Association of Broadcasters, and the Canadian Association of Universities and Colleges.

Functions

In the following discussion of interest, group functions or roles there are at least two "incidental" arguments that I intend to avoid. First, I do not plan to review or revive the debate respecting the "group struggle" as the key concept by which all political activity is explained. The notion that group conflict might be the single unifying concept which would allow political scientists to develop a general theory of political behavior got its initial impetus from Arthur Bentley and later from Earl Latham and writers like Charles Hagan.

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1 Ibid., p. 95.

2 Bentley, Process.

who interpreted Bentley.¹

A number of political thinkers, notably Harry Eckstein,² have effectively demonstrated that the theory of a group struggle is not a panacea, but is simply one more important step along the road toward a general political theory. For my purposes it will suffice to say that interest groups per se are important elements in an explanation of political behavior, but in terms of total understanding they cannot be divorced from other factors like government structure, policies, political culture, and parties, which are of equal significance.

Second, I do not intend to dwell on a discussion of whether interest groups are inherently "good" or "bad" for democracy. In this study I begin with the assumption that in a modern, pluralistic democracy the articulation of interests by organized groups is beneficial to the health and development of the body politic. This will be borne out by much of


the material that follows, showing interest-group functions
to be both supportive and supplementary to the role played by
other democratic institutions.

I propose here to review the functions of political
interest groups according to a scale of decreasing generality.
That is, I will begin with the broadest, most generalized
functions that are attributed to interest groups and proceed
to the least general, most specific kinds of functions.

As my definition suggests, the over-all goal of
political interest groups is to influence—"to affect govern-
ment outputs."¹ In their attempts to influence governmental
activity organized groups articulate interests and make claims
on behalf of their members. In the words of Gabriel Almond,
"Interest groups articulate political demands in the society,
seek support for these demands among other groups by advocacy
and bargaining, and attempt to transform these demands into
authoritative public policy by influencing the choice of
political personnel, and the various processes of public
policy-making and enforcement."²

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¹Engelmann and Schwartz, Political Parties, p. 96.
²Almond, "Interest Groups and the Political Process," p. 401.
Almond makes a sharp distinction between the functions of political parties which "aggregate" political interests and organized groups which "articulate" political interests. This is a useful way to differentiate between political parties and political interest groups, but it is a mistake to regard these as iron clad differences. Many organized interest groups perform an aggregative function as well as an articulative function. This seems to be particularly true of federated groups like the CFA which spend substantial amounts of time and energy in attempts to reconcile diffuse and often conflicting claims articulated by affiliated member units.

Eckstein makes a telling point when he asserts that any "responsive" political system is dependent upon "integrative" and "aggregative" functions being performed. This, he concedes, is the pre-eminent function of political parties, but it is also a very important function for organized political interest groups. "Parties, in their very nature, tend to aggregate opinion on a very broad scale, rather infrequently, and for limited purposes, such as elections... Pressure groups, on the other hand, constantly define opinion for

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government and do so on a level upon which parties only infrequently touch.¹ This observation is particularly apt for the Canadian political system which has two dominant broker parties that are not required to define their policies and positions on a regular and continuing basis.²

V. O. Key makes a related point when he discusses the "representative function" of political interest groups.

¹Ibid.

²It has always seemed to me to be more appropriate to view the aggregative functions of Canadian parties in terms of their attempts to attract particular people, rather than in terms of their willingness to adopt and pursue particular policies. Party deliberations on policy invariably have an air of unreality about them, stemming largely from the widely accepted conviction that party leaders need not accept party policy decisions in whole or in part. Policy conferences—like the National Liberal Conference at Harrison Hot Springs, B.C., in 1969—do attempt to aggregate points of view, but as often as not the real effect of these efforts is strictly cosmetic, serving to reassure the party faithful and the public at large. On the other hand, when it comes to elections a significant part of party strategy involves the attempt to attract individual candidates who represent the broad spectrum of Canadian interests. It is here that parties perform their most genuine aggregative functions. Samuel Eldersveld arrives at a similar position by a somewhat different route. He detects trends in the interest group process which have removed the "aggregative" function from political parties leaving them primarily responsible for the recruitment of government personnel. See Samuel Eldersveld, "American Interest Groups: A Survey of Research and Some Implications for Theory and Method," in H. W. Ehrmann (ed.), Interest Groups On Four Continents, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1958), p. 195.
He says, "The reconciliation of differences within interest groups facilitates the work of legislatures and of Congress by reducing the number of conflicts with which they have to deal, as well as by giving the government an authoritative statement of the group position." ¹

There is one additional general function that is worth mentioning. It is what Eckstein calls the "disjunctive" function.² The disjunctive function of interest groups may be important in areas where political integration is too incomplete. In developed two-party systems, for example, articulated interests may be integrated and changed by parties far more than they are simply aggregated in their original form. In their desire to appeal to a mass electorate broker parties may distort or "water down" the demands of organized groups and this could lead to serious disaffection among these groups. The disjunctive function performed by organized groups could therefore be "important to prevent the alienation of groups from systems which persistently distort their goals; in that sense they are an indispensable element of stability in such systems."³

²Eckstein, Pressure Group Politics, p. 162.
³Ibid., pp. 162-163.
In performing their general functions of articulating and, to a lesser extent, aggregating and integrating political interests, organized groups engage in more particular functions that generally serve to strengthen the democratic system. In today's complex societies which are characterized by ever greater degrees of government involvement interest groups fulfill a representative role which is beyond the capacity of individual legislators. Key makes the point that parliamentarians are elected by geographical areas, and it is important that this type of representation be supplemented by the representation of group interests cutting across regions.¹

In seeking to influence governmental activity political interest groups amass and disseminate information relevant to their particular goals. In this respect interest groups are performing an educational function both for their own members, for the public at large, and for the decision-makers themselves. Information produced by those who share an intense interest will usually help to clarify issues for those who are less directly concerned. It is sometimes said that interest group "propaganda" tends to distort issues in

¹Key, Political Parties, p. 159. The increased significance of interest groups in modernized states is also discussed in a slightly different context by Eckstein, "Group Theory and the Comparative Study of Pressure Groups," p. 395.
favour of the group, but in a system where there are usually competing group interests, and under the watchful eye of "public" officials (elected, non-elected, and media-employed) the danger of serious misrepresentation is minimized. Also, in an increasingly sophisticated society the punishment for outright distortion might be a loss of public credibility for the group.¹

Finally, political interest groups perform a motivational function. They stimulate participation in the political process. By encouraging the pursuit of shared interests in a united and organized fashion interest groups cause people to become more involved in political life. Thus, inadvertently perhaps, interest groups stimulate citizen participation.²

Perhaps the best summary statement on the functions of political interest groups was set down by Harry Eckstein at the conclusion of his study of the British Medical Association.

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¹This might involve the loss of what Kwavnick calls "mandate", or the groups right to speak on behalf of a legitimate interest. See D. Kwavnick, Organized Labour and Pressure Politics: The Canadian Labour Congress 1956-1968, (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972).

He said:

"... in democratic systems parties must perform simultaneously two functions which are, on the evidence, irreconcilable: to furnish efficient decision-makers and to represent accurately opinions. The best way to reconcile these functions in practice is to supplement the parties with an alternative set of representative organizations which can affect decisions without affecting the position of the decision-makers. This is the pre-eminent function of pressure groups in effective democratic systems, as the competition for power is the pre-eminent function of the parties."  

2. The Effectiveness of Political Interest Groups

David Truman tells us that all political interest groups have as a "basic objective" the achievement of "access" to the key points of decision in the governmental system.² Access is the most revealing single concept in explaining the relative success or lack of success of political interest groups. Yet access alone does not guarantee effectiveness.³ Mere access without commensurate leadership and political skill, knowledge and appropriate techniques, will probably be ineffective. Equally, access to seemingly powerful, but wholly inappropriate levels of government will also probably be ineffective. In the following pages I will attempt to

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¹Eckstein, Pressure Group Politics, p. 163.
²Truman, Process, pp. 264 ff.
cast some light upon the factors which bear upon groups access
and, ultimately, the success of political interest groups.

Interest Group Characteristics

One broad, general characteristic that must exist
before any interest group can hope to be effective is
legitimacy—legitimacy at the societal level and at the group
level. First, the interest area within which a group operates
must be accepted as legitimate within the society. The Cana-
dian Federation of Agriculture, for example, functions within
a society that accepts the legitimacy of interest group activ-
ity in general, and the legitimacy of particular interests,
like those of agricultural producers, being articulated.
Without this sort of broad acceptance the efforts of political
interest groups are doomed from the outset.

Second, if a political interest group is to be effec-
tive it must be regarded as a legitimate organized entity that
has a right to speak for an already legitimated interest area.
An interest group must have a "mandate" to articulate those
interests with which it is concerned. In this respect organ-
ized groups will devote considerable resources to building and

1David Kwavnick anchors his study of the Canadian
Labour Congress on the two concepts of "legitimacy" and
"mandate". See Kwavnick, Organized Labour and Pressure
Politics, Chapter I.
reinforcing their own legitimacy as spokesmen for particular interests. Part of the CFA's activities, for example, can be explained in terms of that organization's desire to defend its mandate, whereas the National Farmers Union strives persistently to increase its legitimacy with agricultural producers, political decision-makers, and the public at large.

The success of interest groups is influenced by other more finite characteristics. The size of a political interest group is an obviously important characteristic in assessing its actual or potential effectiveness. If interest groups were equal in all other respects, the groups with the largest memberships (and therefore the largest number of potential votes) would consistently be most influential in their efforts. In these circumstances the CFA which claims a membership in excess of 400,000 would be immensely powerful relative to most other groups.

The strength of political interest groups, of course, can never be measured in terms of size alone. Other factors, like a group's physical resources can have a bearing on the nature and intensity of its efforts to influence decision-makers. Group resources include not only financial wealth, but also such things as special facilities, and members with particular qualifications or skills.
The socio-economic status of group members can be an important determinant of interest group influence. Certain professional groups are accorded a much higher degree of deference than are other low status groups which may have much larger memberships. One example often used to illustrate this point is the post-war struggle in the United States over national compulsory health insurance. Here the American Medical Association (membership 180,000) consistently seemed to be more influential than other groups led by the AFL-CIO (membership over 15 million). There were, of course, other factors at play, but one important element in the continuing success of the AMA is the high socio-economic status of doctors compared to most other groups in American society.

Just as social status can be of great assistance to interest groups that are numerically weak, so also is group cohesion. Cohesiveness is undoubtedly the pre-eminent internal goal of political interest groups. Groups which have a high degree of cohesion are consistently able to exercise influence beyond what their size, status and resources would

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1See, for example, Austin Ranney, "The Governing of Men" (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston Inc., 1965), p. 38.

2For a wide ranging discussion of this concept see Truman, Process, Chapters 6 and 7.
seem to allow. "Cohesion," says Truman, "is the crucial
determinant of the effectiveness with which the group may
assert its claims."\(^1\)

There are a multitude of factors which can affect
group cohesion. Perhaps the best known is overlapping group
memberships.\(^2\) Interest groups are most cohesive when they
command the complete and undivided allegiance of their mem-
bers. The extent of overlapping can be strongly influenced
by the objectives of particular interest groups. Some groups
are organized around a single issue which is of intense con-
cern to its members, while others, like the CFA, are liter-
ally built upon a foundation of overlapping groups pursuing
a multitude of issues and goals.\(^3\) In a later section I will
demonstrate that the lack of internal cohesion is a matter of
urgent and continuing concern to CFA leaders and personnel.

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 159.

\(^2\)These are discussed at length by Truman, Ibid.,
pp. 157 ff.

\(^3\)Eckstein makes a distinction between the intensity
of "self-interest" groups in which the members direct eco-
nomic well being is involved, and so-called "promotional
groups" which hold less personal involvement and therefore
less intensity than the former. Eckstein, Pressure Group
Politics, p. 35.
Interest group cohesion can also be affected by the attitudes, habits, and physical location of its members. If members have attitudes that militate against the development of close associations—as Eckstein claims is the case with British doctors who have a strong tradition of individual practice— a high degree of group cohesiveness is difficult to achieve. Group cohesiveness can be strengthened by patterns of activity or habits which tend to reinforce group relations. Cohesion is strengthened, for example, by group members belonging to the same clubs and taking part in the same recreational activities.

The physical proximity of interest group members can also exert considerable influence on cohesion. Group members who are in daily contact through their work or recreation have a far greater capacity for cohesiveness than have those that are physically separated by great distances. Modern developments in communication and transportation have greatly facilitated interaction and cohesion within organized interest groups. However, technology has been an uneven blessing for these groups, being of great benefit to those who have the resources—professional economists, doctors, dentists and the

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1 Ibid.
like— but of much less use to large, heterogeneous and dispersed groups like the Canadian Federation of Agriculture. For national farm interest groups physical separation remains very much of a problem in trying to build group cohesion.

A final characteristic which bears heavily upon interest group effectiveness is the quality and political skill of group leadership. Interest group leaders fulfill roles which pervade virtually all other functions of the group. Leadership talents are crucial in building and maintaining group cohesion. "The maximization of cohesion," says Truman, "whether to perpetuate the tenure of leaders or to achieve goals, is the continuing and primary task of leadership in the internal politics of interest groups."¹

The qualifications and experience possessed by interest group leaders has a great deal to do with the groups access to decision-making points in the government. Ottawa interest groups, for example, put a high premium upon personnel who "know their way around" federal government circles. It is not unnatural that some of the most successful interest group leaders are retired politicians (Senators, for example) or former government employees.

¹Truman, Process, p. 164.
It is important to realize, however, that leadership is only one element of a complex set of factors that explain group behavior and encourage group effectiveness. The leadership phenomenon, whether it involves fairly small face-to-face aggregates or a nation-wide community can best be understood in terms of what leadership theorists call "interactional theory." F. H. Sanford suggests that "there are three basic and delineable factors in any leadership phenomenon: (a) the leader, (b) the situation, and (c) the follower . . . (and) we must ultimately deal—and deal simultaneously—with each of these general factors." C. A. Gibb writes:

"Any comprehensive theory of leadership must incorporate and integrate all the major variables which are now known to be involved, namely, (1) the personality of the leader, (2) the followers with their attitudes, needs, and problems, (3) the group itself both as regards (a) structure of interpersonal relations and (b) syntality characteristics, (4) the


situation as determined by physical setting, nature of task, etc.\textsuperscript{1}

Much of what has already been said pertains to the characteristics of groups and group members, and a good deal of what follows in the latter part of this chapter will pertain to the observable situation or environment of which they are a part.

**The Techniques of Influence**

The methods and techniques that are utilized by political interest groups in their efforts to influence decision-makers are subject to what Truman calls the "rules of the game," or a system of beliefs and attitudes that prevail within the political culture.\textsuperscript{2} These "rules" are what determines the legitimacy of political interest groups, referred to in the preceding section. They are widely shared beliefs that are necessarily murky and ill-defined. They are, nevertheless, an important factor in assessing the effectiveness or potential effectiveness of political interest groups.

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\textsuperscript{1}Gibb, "Leadership", p. 914. "Syntality characteristics" are inferred behavioral tendencies of a group acting as a group—characteristics which correspond to personality in an individual.

Canadians live within a democratic system that places a high value on democratic practices and notions of fair play and justice. These and other features of the prevailing political ethos define the limits and opportunities that are open to interest groups in the pursuit of their goals. Interest groups which violate the "rules of the game" run the risk of losing their legitimacy and, as a result, their capacity to effectively articulate interests and influence government can be seriously impaired.

It is worth noting that the prevailing attitudes and norms which govern the techniques of interest groups are ever changing, although these changes may not always be readily apparent. It is possible for interest groups themselves to affect societal attitudes through education, propaganda, new eye-catching techniques, and so on. Organized groups may pursue tactics which create conflicts in the attitudes and belief system of Canadians, and thereby force a change in the range of techniques that are acceptable under the "rules of the game." For example, civil disobedience by Indian and Metis groups in recent years directly conflicts with a Canadian belief in the rule of law and the basic freedom of others who are inconvenienced by such tactics. However, given a population which is increasingly aware and well informed, and given the ever
greater capacity of native groups to effectively communicate their grievances, it seems clear that in situations like this the belief in justice and equality for a suppressed minority over-rides the concern for rule of law. Hence, civil disobedience has become not only acceptable but a positive tool. It has become a technique which is legitimate for other groups that wish to demonstrate that their grievances are serious—serious enough to violate cherished traditional tenets like the rule of law.

On the other hand, at all stages of societal development there are real, yet undefined, constraints that are placed upon the activities of interest groups. The ability of interest group leaders to recognize and observe these constraints has a great deal to do with the success or lack of success of the group.

There are a number of techniques or methods by which political interest groups seek to influence authoritative decisions. I will discuss these under five loose categories. The first, which is a technique in the very broadest sense, is organization itself. Effective organization is, of course, an important variable in the achievement of access.\(^1\) Organization

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 269.
is never absolute; there are various stages involved in "being organized," and this will affect the way in which tasks are assigned, resources are utilized, and so on. Moreover, there are various forms of organization, such as "unitary" and "federated," which may or may not be functional within various political cultures having particular governmental systems.¹

A second general technique and the technique which is most widely utilized is interest-group lobbying. The key to successful lobbying, as I have suggested in the preceding section, is access to the crucial points where authoritative decisions are made. Effective lobbying is also dependent upon the full utilization of the resources that are at the disposal of a particular interest group.

Lobbying activities are carried on with varying degrees of intensity at a number of levels: at the legislative level with the Members of Parliament; at the executive level with Cabinet Ministers; at the administrative level with members of the public service; and on an inter-group basis where the support of other interest groups is actively sought. The techniques of lobbying are many, ranging from offers of

¹Ranney, Governing, p. 273.
political support—perhaps in terms of money, votes, or public endorsement—to simple persuasion and the provision of information. Valued information can be of a detailed factual nature, or of a more judgemental political nature respecting public attitudes and reactions toward government policies.

Manipulating public opinion is a third technique that interest groups employ in seeking to acquire influence. In these days of instant communication with the almost total pervasiveness of television, the technique of influencing public attitudes has gained in importance relative to other more traditional lobbying practices. There are, broadly speaking, two kinds of public relations campaigns that are used by political interest groups.¹ One is the short-term intensive kind of promotion which is geared to either curb or accelerate government action. The alternative approach is to engage in a long-range effort to create a favourable climate of opinion within which particular interests may be favourably received.

A fourth technique that is available to interest groups involves overt partisan activity. This can mean working within political parties either in the area of party policy or in the promotion of particular candidates for the

¹Key, Political Parties, p. 145.
party. Or it can mean that the interest group assists the party at election time through the provision of money, workers, campaign assistance, and so on. In Canada, generally, interest groups tend to place a high premium on "keeping out of politics." The only obvious exceptions are the labour unions which have developed close ties with the New Democratic Party, and a more obscure alliance between the National Farmers Union and the NDP. Groups which choose to become involved in partisan activity run the risk of becoming politically isolated if the party which they support is unsuccessful, and they run the risk of having group cohesion eroded if members are divided along partisan lines.¹ These feelings, combined with the simple conviction that it is improper for genuine interest groups to "take sides" with one party or another, have led nearly all interest groups in Canada to formally disavow partisan involvement.

Finally, interest groups may engage in acts of protest in their efforts to gain access and wield influence. Such acts of protest include strikes, civil disobedience, demonstration and outright violence. The right to strike or to enforce a work stoppage has long been accepted as one of the legitimate weapons

¹Truman, Process, pp. 297 ff.
used by labour unions in their bargaining with employers. In recent years, however, it has gained much wider application as a means to influence governments. Likewise, non-violent demonstrations and acts of disobedience have become increasingly prominent techniques.

Protest tactics, which occasionally lead to violence, seem to be used most often to counteract widespread inertia in the public and in government. Disobedience, protests, and to a certain extent violence, stand in testimony to the gravity of the interest that is being expressed. Violence as a technique is not condoned in Canadian society. However, when violence occurs it is taken seriously and it does result in action—either of a remedial nature, or punitive nature, or both. Thus, although raw violence is not acceptable under the "rules", in circumstances of complete frustration where other techniques have been tried and failed, it can be an effective tool for organized groups.

**Politico-Governmental Environment**

The extent to which political interest groups succeed in influencing authoritative decisions is affected by structural features that are a part of the political system, and geo-political features that reflect the nature of the country.
The structural characteristics of the Canadian political system are largely a result of a decision taken by the Fathers of Confederation to attempt to mesh British parliamentary democracy with the federal system of government.

The Parliamentary System

The parliamentary or cabinet system of government has certain features which have direct implications for the interest group process. In comparison to other political systems, like the American separation of power system where effective decision-making is dispersed, the Canadian system is more centralized and effective points of interest group access are restricted. (I am leaving aside for the moment the effect of the Canadian federal system.) In the American system interest groups are offered a range of points where they can expect to influence governmental activity. Alternative points of access include the President, his Cabinet, senior officials, powerful congressional committee chairmen, individual Senators, the federal courts, and so on. The Canadian decision-making process, on the other hand, is executive dominated—organized, that is, to give effective and final authority to the Cabinet and senior officials. Since, as Truman allows, access is the common denominator of interest group tactics and groups
invariably seek to achieve access in the key decision-making areas, it is not unnatural that in the Canadian system attention is focused on the Cabinet and senior administrators.\footnote{Truman, 
\textit{Process, Passim}, pp. 264 ff, and 322 ff.}

The functioning of the Canadian governmental system depends upon the Prime Minister and his Cabinet regularly receiving majority support in the House of Commons from the Members of Parliament. Under normal circumstances the party of which the Prime Minister is leader holds more than half the seats in the House of Commons and provides a consistent majority in support of the government. The cabinet system requires a high degree of discipline and solidarity from the parliamentary parties, particularly from the governing party. A breakdown of discipline can mean defeat in parliament, dissolution, an election, and the possible loss of power for both the governing party and individual politicians. The requirement of party discipline and conformity gives further power and appeal to party leaders as sources of access and potential influence, very much to the detriment of back-bench Members of Parliament.

In spite of this imbalance, the parliamentary wings of Canada's major parties are much more important to interest groups than is the party apparatus as a whole. Interest groups
will spend some time trying to influence party caucuses and informal committees of caucus, but they tend to completely ignore party conferences, task forces, etc. The major exception to this is the New Democratic Party which has close affiliations with labour unions, but has not yet succeeded in displacing either of the dominant political parties. ¹

"Where the power is there the pressure will be applied. Where we see the pressure being applied, therefore, we shall probably find the seat of power." ² According to this test the dominant Canadian parties are simply not important as sources of access and influence for interest groups. In Great Britain the parliamentary parties are quite significant to interest groups, whereas in the United States groups will tend to concentrate on party conventions and assemblies. ³ In Canada the party system, as represented by the two dominant parties, would seem to be of less significance to interest groups than

¹This is discussed in detail in Engelmann and Schwartz, Political Parties, pp. 109 ff.


³Ibid.
in either Britain or the United States. Engelmann and Schwartz's general conclusion about the situation in Canada is that "The articulators of demands tend to turn to the governmental structure itself, and not to parties." However, before we simply accept the irrelevance of the dominant political parties to the interest group process, two caveats ought to be registered. First, it is often difficult to tell when a political party is being used as a vehicle for interest articulation and access. As a general rule, active party supporters are also active "joiners" and belong to a number of interest groups. From a distance it is sometimes difficult to determine whether individuals seeking access to points of influence are wearing their "political party hats" or their "interest group hats." The importance of political party "connections" in the give and take of the interest group process may be greater than is commonly assumed.

An interesting example of this phenomenon occurred in the fall of 1968 when a delegation representing the potato growers' organizations of western Canada went to Ottawa to seek government protection from low priced American potatoes coming into their market. One of the "unofficial" leaders of the

Engelmann and Schwartz, Political Parties, p. 107.
delegation was Pat Shimbashi, a close friend and political ally of the newly appointed Minister of Agriculture, Hon. H. A. Olson. Shimbashi was a potato grower, and a member of the Southern Alberta Potato Growers Association, but he was not an elected leader in that organization, and his role in trying to influence the Minister (successful as it turned out) could only be explained in terms of his being a strong Liberal Party supporter.

Second, the central party administration and extra-parliamentary leadership may be a more important point of influence than appears on the surface. This would seem to be particularly true for the party in power which has won the right to control and direct the decision-making and policy-making apparatus of government. The National Director and the National President of Canada's dominant parties interact on a daily, personal basis with the parliamentary leaders of their parties. In the case of the governing party this means that these extra-parliamentary leaders are in frequent contact with the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. The magnitude and significance of these contacts will, of course, vary depending upon the individuals and issues involved, but under normal circumstances there is no question but that these interactions are
frequent and important. The bond between Cabinet and extra-
parliamentary leaders of the party in power is strengthened
by the device known as "political Cabinet." Political Cabin-
et meetings are held on a regular (usually monthly) basis
and they are attended by top party personnel. The agenda for
these meetings can cover any number of items—from party
organization to issues of the day—which are of clear politi-
cal relevance to the government.

Many observers have pointed out that governmental
structures can have an effect on the nature and direction of
interest group activities. The dispersed separation of power
system, for example, is ready-made for negative tactics of
veto and delay. Solid access and influence at one crucial
point within the system, say within a key congressional com-
mittee, will afford a political interest group the opportunity

1There are obvious areas where party personnel need to
be consulted, like in the calling of an election, the general
planning of ministerial and Prime Ministerial tours, and so on.
Very often, however, the degree of consultation goes much fur-
ther to include substantive issues, policies, and even the
choice of Cabinet Ministers. Prime Minister Trudeau, for exam-
ple, consulted directly with Torrance Wylie, National Director
of the Liberal Party, on more than one occasion immediately
prior to making a Cabinet shuffle early in 1972.

2Eckstein and Truman, Process, Pressure Group Politics,
p. 37, p. 519.
to ward off a repugnant policy ad infinitum. This may be possible in spite of widespread support for the policy in other groups and in other centers of governmental authority. Within the cabinet system, on the other hand, the facilities for defensive and dilatory tactics do not exist to a comparable extent. Once a particular policy has been accepted by the executive, interest groups do not normally have the means at hand to prevent the policy from being enacted. What they will tend to do is shift their attention from the content of the policy to the administration of the policy by the government bureaucracy.¹

In recent years governments have attempted to ascribe a greater role to Standing Committees of the House of Commons. This has been done largely in the name of efficiency, to relieve the legislative burden on the Committee of the whole House. However, as Standing Committee activities evolve, it may be that they will become increasingly significant as points of access for defensive interest group tactics.

¹For a good example of this see Helen Jones Dawson, "The Canadian Federation of Agriculture," Canadian Public Administration, III, (June, 1960), 145-146. Having lost their fight to defeat the government's Stabilization Bill, the CFA leaders shifted their attention to the administration of the Act.
The civil service is an element of the Canadian governmental environment that has an important bearing on the effectiveness of political interest groups. There are two points that are particularly relevant here. The first, already alluded to, is that the cohesive characteristics of the parliamentary system give Canadian civil servants a good deal more power and importance than is common in more dispersed systems. Since Cabinet policies cannot normally be successfully challenged, and since most (indeed, nearly all) Cabinet policies are formulated within the bureaucracy, the time to influence or curb such policies is usually at the formulation stage, within the civil service. This places a high premium on effective access to the middle and upper levels of government departments.

The second pertinent point is that the Canadian public service operates on the principle of permanency and personnel does not change when the government changes. Most modern countries have a degree of permanence in their public service, particularly in the administration of on-going government agencies. However, many, like the United States, have a full-scale change in personnel at the senior policy-making level (and to some extent at other levels) when the chief executive
changes. Successive Canadian governments, following the traditions and principles of the British cabinet system, have adopted the practice of not changing public servants except when it is necessary according to some criteria other than the electoral success of their "masters." This system gives the Canadian public service a certain stability and continuity, not to mention raw power, that further increases its value as a point of access for political interest groups.

**Canadian Federalism and Regional Expression**

In some respects the centralizing tendencies of the parliamentary system are counterbalanced by Canadian federalism. Within the federal system there are ten provincial governments which are simultaneously in partnership with, autonomous from, and in competition with the federal government. Insofar as interest group effectiveness is concerned, these contradictory roles mean that the significance of provincial centers of power varies greatly and is dependent upon the particular issue area, the interest groups involved, and the constitutional position of the two levels of government. A few general observations need to be made, however.

The existence of autonomous provincial governments provides political interest groups with a source of influence
beyond the fairly restricted structures of the national government. Given the increased complexity and regularity of federal-provincial relations, it is possible for interest groups to utilize their access to provincial governments to exercise influence beyond provincial boundaries. In many areas of public policy the most persistent demands that are made upon the federal government come from the leaders of provincial governments.\(^1\) It follows, therefore, that in particular circumstances a useful strategy for political interest groups is to pressure provincial decision-makers even when the main target is at the federal level.

The significance of provincial governments as sources of influence would seem to be particularly great in areas of concurrent constitutional jurisdiction, like agriculture.\(^2\) Since both the federal and provincial governments share the responsibility for agriculture the degrees of administrative interdependence and the extent to which there is liaison on policy matters is greater than in other areas where jurisdictions are specified for one level of government or the other.

\(^1\)Engelman and Schwartz, *Political Parties*, pp. 128 ff.

\(^2\)British North America Act, Section 95 which states “In each Province the Legislature may make Laws in relation to Agriculture in the Province and . . . the Parliament of Canada may from Time to Time make Laws in relation to Agriculture in all or any of the Provinces . . . .”
As an example, the Small Farm Development Program which is entirely the creature of the federal government is dependent upon provincial agreement and cooperation. Provincial concurrence is necessary because field and extension services, which are essential to the scheme, have developed under provincial jurisdiction. This federal program was delayed for more than a year by recalcitrant provincial governments which insisted that certain changes be made. This undoubtedly indicates that under certain circumstances provincial administrations are particularly suited to interest group tactics of defense and delay.

There are other ways in which Canadian federalism affects the governing process and through it interest group behavior. A very strong constitutional tradition has developed in Canada whereby the federal Cabinet is chosen not by competence alone, but also according to geographic representation. It is assumed that every province, with the possible exception of Prince Edward Island, should have a Minister in the federal government at all times.\(^1\) In addition, there is

\(^1\)There are numerous examples of the lengths to which Canadian Prime Ministers have been willing to go to enshrine this principle of provincial representation. See R. M. Dawson, *The Government of Canada*, 3rd ed., (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), pp. 211-12. Also, Engelmann and Schwätz, *Political Parties*, p. 127.
a somewhat less entrenched conviction that there should be a reasonable balance between other geo-political entities like Quebec and Ontario, Toronto and Montreal.

The significance of regional Cabinet Ministers to the effectiveness of political interest groups varies considerably depending upon the Minister and the interest that is involved. However, some interest groups that are regionally based, or are pursuing regional issues, can gain effective access through Ministers who represent a particular province or region. It is true, for example, that the sizeable staff of the Hon. Otto Lang, Minister of Justice and Minister responsible for the Canadian Wheat Board, spends a significant amount of time assisting interest groups that are relevant to Saskatchewan but have nothing whatever to do with Mr. Lang's portfolio. Quite frequently a Minister will become involved himself by either articulating the regional interest directly, or "opening the necessary doors" for the group that is involved.

It is often a failure of interest groups that they do not recognize the importance of regional representation in Cabinet. Group leaders tend to get in the habit of dealing with a particular Minister whose portfolio pertains to their interest. Thus when that Minister is unaccommodating they
may think that all is lost without realizing that the Minister shares the Cabinet table with other powerful colleagues who can often be influenced on the basis of their regional allegiances.

As it was originally constituted the Senate was intended to fulfill the need for regional expression at the national level. However, largely as a result of the method of appointment, the major role of the Senate has been the perpetuation of the dominant two-party system. "Often, Senators from the provinces are agents of the governing party in Ottawa; they may handle its finances in their home province, or conduct its campaigns. In such cases their function is to attempt to bring the provincial electorate in line with the nationally favoured party."¹ This is not to say that Senators have no role to play with respect to interest group activities. Far from it. Many Senators articulate the interests of organized groups, both within the party hierarchy and at the governmental level. However, the most meaningful way to view the Canadian Senate is as an adjunct to the party system.

¹Ibid., p. 126.
Many analysts have noted the fact that the policies of government have a direct influence on interest group development and the nature of their activities.¹ The point is often made that when the government invades a new interest area with controls or regulations it stimulates the creation of an organized group or it encourages existing groups to become more cohesive and aggressive. What is seen to be a great proliferation of interest groups in recent decades is, therefore, partly a result of the positive state and persistent government encroachment.

In Canada the diverse, federal nature of the country has led to policies which have had direct implications for the interest group process. In his brilliant analysis of the roots and nature of regional interest articulation J. E. Hodgetts compares the Canadian experience to that of the United States. "It would appear", says Hodgetts, "that Americans have long become accustomed to thinking of a region as something more than a state but something less than a whole nation."² This is primarily a result of the American


system of government which does not enforce a high degree of party discipline either in the houses of Congress, where legislators can freely vote according to regional interests, or in the nation as a whole, where the people can split their vote between legislative representatives of one party and the chief executive representing the other. American voters, it seems, have the best of both worlds—they can vote for the congressional or senatorial candidate who best represents their local and regional concerns, and they can vote for the man who will best serve the national interest as President. Thus, a characteristic of the American system has been the development of "blocs" in which regional interests are represented both within and outside of the legislative halls.

In Canada, on the other hand, the natural articulation of regional interests is not encouraged except through provincial units whose boundaries, in most instances, do not encompass the totality of the interest being expressed. "In Canada the rigour of party discipline imposed on M.P.'s virtually eliminates the possibility of bloc voting in the name of the Prairies, the Maritimes, or any other region of trans-provincial dimensions."¹ Occasionally provincial

¹Ibid., p. 9.
governments will act in concert to give voice to a regional concern.\(^1\) and periodically federal Cabinet Ministers will break out of their provincial molds to articulate distinctly regional demands.\(^2\) Regional demands, and the machinery through which such demands are channeled, are as much a creature of government policy as they are the creator of such policy. In its attempt to ameliorate regional disparities and to solve problems that are less than national but more than provincial in scope, the federal government has created agencies which assume the role of aggregating and articulating regional requirements. Examples are the Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Administration (PFRA) and the Maritime Marshland Rehabilitation Administration (MMRA), both of which

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\(^1\) An example of this is the Saskatchewan-Nelson River Basin Project which is concerned with the orderly development and conservation of the Saskatchewan and Nelson river basins covering the three prairie provinces. The Project was initiated by the prairie provinces whose Premiers sit on the Project Committee along with two federal Cabinet Ministers—currently the Ministers of Energy Mines and Resources and Agriculture.

\(^2\) In many respects the Canadian Cabinet seems to function in a similar fashion (apart from its secretive nature) to the American Senate. Within the Cabinet there are endless permutations and combinations involving regional and departmental "trade-offs", "favours owed", "obligations repaid", and so on. In this give and take situation regional need is one of the dominant factors on which to base a coalition, or on which to consciously or unconsciously "make a deal".
serve as the "operational arm" of the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Act (ARDA). ARDA was intended specifically to identify regional problems and to initiate projects to meet those problems.\(^1\) A more recent example is the "designated area" concept of the Department of Regional and Economic Expansion. Here again in the absence of spontaneously expressed regional needs public officials who have been charged with the responsibility of lessening regional disparities, are required to seek out and service disadvantaged areas.

There is in Canada a growing recognition of regions but it is "basically an artifact of administrators who, working within the political system, play a creative role in constructing regions appropriate to the functions entrusted to them . . . ."\(^2\) Hodgetts' fairly optimistic conclusion is that "once over the present formative stage, the genuine need for a regional approach to policy-formulation and implementation will in itself begin to create self-generating demand and support inputs which will no longer be bureaucratically inspired."\(^3\)

\(^1\)Hodgetts, "Regional Interests", pp. 10-11.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 13.

\(^3\)Ibid., pp. 13, 14.
What, then, is the relevance of regionalism and regional policy-making to political interest groups? First, the government in pursuing its policies has directly or indirectly influenced the organization of political interest groups. There are numerous examples. Early in this century the Department of Agriculture sponsored the initial meeting of the Canadian National Livestock Association, and in 1914 assisted in the financing of the Sheep Breeders Association. "H. H. Hannam, once President of the Canadian Federation of Agriculture, claimed that the Federation was brought into being because the first Bank of Canada Act called upon "organized agriculture (then non-existent) to nominate members to the bank's board of directors." In a more recent example, late in 1969 the Hon. H. A. Olson, federal Minister of Agriculture, responded to the demands of honey producers by following a policy designed to help them help themselves by strengthening their national organization. In this instance he lent his personal support to their efforts to increase honey consumption, and in lieu of an outright grant he offered the services of his department to augment the efforts of the national organization.

\[1\] Ibid., p. 12.
A second, somewhat more pertinent point is that interest groups are subject to the same kinds of pressures and restraints as are other elements of the political process. Others who have analyzed British and American interest groups have found that they are very much a reflection of the society and political system of which they are a part.¹ A centralized, cohesive social and political structure usually signals the same qualities in interest groups, just as a loose federated political environment will normally lead to the opposite characteristics. "Wherever the political governmental organization is cohesive and power concentrated in certain well established centers the pressure groups become well organized with a similar concentration of power and vice versa."² Interest groups, no less than parties or the government itself, are trapped by the formal system and political environment of which they are a part.³

¹Beer, "Group Representation", pp. 146 ff.


³For an analysis of the effects of regional cleavages on the Canadian party system see Engelmann and Schwartz, Political Parties, p. 43.
Canadian interest groups must be able to cope organizationally with "artificial" political boundaries which create independent power structures, usually in the form of affiliated members, within each province. This is of particular importance to groups whose interest area is general throughout the country, spanning all provinces and regions. Such groups, of which the Canadian Federation of Agriculture is an outstanding example, find it most difficult to maintain sufficient fluidity to accommodate and articulate regional demands. Canada combines remarkable diversity, through the centrifugal federal system, with the centripetal British parliamentary system and the result is inherently incongruous. The result is dysfunctional insofar as the articulation of regional demands is concerned. This has certain implications for national interest groups in their efforts to organize effectively to pursue their objectives.
CHAPTER II

THE NATURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE CANADIAN FEDERATION OF AGRICULTURE

The Canadian Federation of Agriculture was born from the ashes of the defunct Canadian Council of Agriculture. The Council, which came into being in 1907, represented the first attempt in Canada to amalgamate diverse farm organizations into a coherent rational voice.\(^1\) By 1926 the Council had faltered, and by 1931 it had withered away, largely because the foundations upon which it was built—the United Farmers movement in the provinces, and latterly the Progressive Movement nationally—had become highly politicized. The United Farmers achieved power in Alberta and Ontario, and the Progressives held the balance of power nationally after the federal election of 1921.\(^2\) However, when this

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political power waned, so did the fortunes of the Canadian Council of Agriculture and it was never able to regain the organizational strength it had built up prior to 1920.

Partly as a product of the calamitous depression years, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture was first organized in 1935 as the Canadian Chamber of Agriculture. The initial impetus for the organization of the Chamber came from the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool which was the dominant farm organization in Saskatchewan at that time. "Distress conditions prompted farmers to place the desire for unity uppermost; and it was agreed that all organizations of bona fide farmers whether organized as direct member associations, as co-operatives or as commodity or rural associations, should be welcome..."¹ They chose as President J. H. Wesson, (Vice-President of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool), and as First Vice-President, H. H. Hannam, (Secretary of the United Farmers of Ontario).

In 1940 the name of the Chamber was changed to the Canadian Federation of Agriculture, which more accurately reflects its nature and organizational structure. Also in that year J. H. Wesson and H. H. Hannam switched positions

¹"The Canadian Federation of Agriculture" (background paper prepared by CFA), March 2, 1970, p. 2.
and Mr. Hannam took over as President, a position which he retained for the following twenty-three years.

1. The CFA Structure

Objectives

The over-all objectives of the CFA were first enunciated by the President in 1940. He said:

"It is hoped that through the Federation of Agriculture the farmers of Canada will have officials equipped to represent them in all places and at all conferences where policies affecting agriculture are being formulated. The organization should be in a position to watch all legislation; to present briefs before all commissions where agriculture’s interests are at stake; to watch markets both at home and abroad and interpret statistics; to advise governments when contracts are being entered into for farm products, when trade agreements are under negotiation; when quotas on farm products are being set; when currency exchange rates are to be controlled and when general production, marketing or export programs are under consideration; to recommend representatives to boards, commissions or enquiries when agriculture should be represented and to keep businessmen, the press, governments and the people generally informed on farm problems and farm policies."

It was clear from the outset, therefore, that the CFA would act as a lobbying group, making demands upon government, and

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expecting some official recognition and role as the spokesman for Canadian agriculture.

The specific objects of the Federation as set out in the constitution are as follows:

"(a) To co-ordinate the efforts of Agricultural Producer Organizations throughout the Dominion, for the purpose of promoting their common interest through collective action.

(b) To promote and advance the social and economic conditions of, and to render such services to, those engaged in agricultural pursuits and conditions may justify.

(c) To assist in formulating and promoting national agricultural policies to meet changing national and international conditions; and to collaborate and (or) co-operate with other organized groups of producers, within or without the British Empire, for the furtherance of the said objective."

Thus, the constitutional aims and objectives of the Federation are sufficiently all-encompassing to include virtually all activities that in any way affect agriculture or rural life. As a national organization the Federation claims to view matters from a national or international perspective, rather than from a local or provincial point of view.

Departing from its predecessors, the CPA has clung to the principle that it should not be affiliated with

1CPA Constitution, Article 2, Appendix A.
political parties. This policy, which stems from bitter political experience early in the twentieth century, elevates non-partisanship to the status of an avowed objective. The Constitution states:

"The Federation shall not be, nor become a political organization, nor shall the federation, or any Committee thereof, deal with any matter from a partisan viewpoint. It shall be the duty of the Board of Directors at all times to preserve the non-partisan nature of the Federation, and to give immediate attention to, and deal with as they see fit, any action by any officer or director which in their opinion is prejudicial to that status."¹

Membership

The CFA is exactly what its name indicates—a federation of provincial, inter-provincial, and national farm organizations representing several hundred autonomous groups from coast to coast.² Nearly all of these are organized into

¹CFA Constitution, Article 3, Appendix A.

²It is nearly impossible to calculate the total number of groups since some provincial affiliates like Uniform in Alberta and the Ontario Federation have a myriad of direct-member locals, and a national affiliate like the Canadian Horticultural Council has dozens of affiliated members who are also affiliated with provincial Federations. See Appendix B for a complete list of CFA membership units and affiliates.
Federations or some similar general farm organization at the provincial level. In addition to these provincial units there are two national affiliates, the Dairy Farmers of Canada and the Canadian Horticultural Council, and one inter-provincial affiliate, United Grain Growers, which derives all of its members from the four western provinces.\(^1\) It is not possible for individuals to hold direct membership in the CFA. In 1966 the CFA estimated the aggregate membership of all its affiliates to be approximately 735,000. However, this clearly represents considerable duplication, the CFA consistently claiming to have an actual farm membership of approximately 400,000.

The CFA Constitution stipulates that membership shall be open to the following:

"(a) One representative agricultural organization from each province or group of provinces in the Dominion, now known as provincial or regional Federations of Agriculture.

(b) Where no provincial Federation of Agriculture exists, any organized group of producers that is representative of any major agricultural interest of the province in which it is located, subject to the decision of the Board of Directors on this point."

\(^1\) Infra, "CFA Under Stress," p. 92.
(c) Any interprovincial or national body representing producers in a specific branch of agriculture, in the Dominion, which may establish its claim, in the opinion of the Board of Directors of the Federation, to be representative of primary producers engaged in that branch of agriculture. Provided, however, that such interprovincial or national bodies shall be confined to one each of the following branches of the industry, namely: grain, livestock, dairying, fruit and vegetables.¹

These provisions are quite straightforward except perhaps for the second (b) which has been employed to permit three provincial organizations in Quebec to be directly affiliated with the CFA. These are the Cooperative Fédérée de Quebec, representing some 230 agricultural cooperatives; L'Union Catholique des Cultivateurs (UCC) representing about 580 producer locals; and the Quebec Farmers Association representing a very small number of English speaking farmers.²

¹CFA Constitution, Article 5, Appendix A.

²The Quebec Farmers Association has been maintained largely as an extension branch of MacDonald College which is an agricultural school affiliated with McGill University in Montreal. In CFA documentation the Quebec Farmers Association is treated as a separate entity even though it has become increasingly disorganized and represents only a few thousand farmers. L'UCC has apparently succeeded in freezing the Quebec Farmers Association out of the action in recent years--partly as a result of the CFA tendency to channel all communications and information through the UCC. Quebec members on the CFA Board of Directors are now decided within Quebec, with the Coop-Fédérée and UCC splitting the posts between them and excluding the Quebec Farmers Association.
In 1970 the Federation made special arrangements for the Canadian Swine Council to affiliate nationally on an "Advisory Committee" basis.¹ The Swine Council is a national federation of hog producer organizations which are also members of the provincial affiliates of the CFA. By permitting the Swine Council to affiliate on an advisory basis the Federation gained the advantage of expertise in the hog industry in return for providing staff and secretarial services at the national level. The Advisory Committee idea was adopted in order not to unduly interfere with the provincial affiliates of the CFA and their relations with the local hog boards. By adopting this approach the Federation attempted to balance two conflicting requirements: (1) the need to coopt the hog industry and relate its demands to general farmer interests; and (2) the need to maintain strong provincial affiliates by not depriving them of their responsibilities in the hog policy area. Under these arrangements the Swine Council gained the right to have its representatives take part not only in Annual Meetings of the Federation but to

¹See "Memorandum of Agreement," CFA files, October 1, 1970. For a detailed discussion of advisory Committee affiliations see Section 3 of this Chapter, dealing with national commodity groups. Since 1970 the Canadian Egg Producers Council has also affiliated on an Advisory Committee basis.
participate as well in Board and Executive Meetings, although their representatives would not have voting privileges in the latter two bodies.

Most of the affiliates of the CPA have a "federated" structure as well. The main exception is the Union Catholique des Cultivateurs de Quebec which is made up of direct dues-paying members who are organized into locals. Other provincial affiliates, like the Saskatchewan Federation of Agriculture (SFA) and the British Columbia Federation of Agriculture (BCFA), are wholly federated in structure and consist of an aggregate of independent commodity and rural associations. Individuals are not allowed to join these federations directly. Some provincial affiliates, like Uniform of Alberta and the Ontario Federation of Agriculture (OFA), have federated structures but also allow for the direct membership of individuals. Thus Uniform, for example, has a massive number of dues-paying members who are organized into locals, but it also represents nearly all of the rural cooperatives, commodity associations, etc., which are formally affiliated with it.

It would be in order here to add a brief comment about the role of farm women in the CPA. Traditionally, women have played an exceedingly minor role in the activities
and policy-making functions of the Federation. They are not mentioned in the Constitution prior to the 1964 edition—it was apparently in that year specific provision was made for women representatives on the Board of Directors.

The CFA is composed primarily of commercially oriented, male dominated affiliates. Thus, in 1970 when the two women Directors of the CFA recommended larger women's representation at Annual Meetings, the Federation Executive responded by noting that the size of delegations had already been expanded, and asking that the provinces "consider including more women in the enlarged delegations in the future." 1

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1 Memorandum from William Hamilton, Associate Secretary of CFA, to the Secretaries of the Member Bodies, September 30, 1970, CFA files. See also the original recommendations of the women Directors, "Role of Women in the CFA", paper prepared for Board of Directors Meeting, Winnipeg, January 30, 1970, CFA files. It is interesting to contrast the CFA attitude with that of the National Farmers Union which guarantees in its Constitution that "Men and women shall have equal status." See Constitution of the National Farmers Union, Item No. 6, Appendix D. Also, in 1971 the Vice-President of the NFU was a woman—a situation which even the wildest women's liberationists could not envisage in the CFA.
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**Composition of the Canadian Federation of Agriculture**
Executive Officers and Representative Bodies

The CFA Constitution provides for a Board of Directors consisting of three directors from each province or group of provinces (in the case of the Maritimes); one director from each national or interprovincial affiliate; two women, one from east of Manitoba and one from west of Ontario; plus the national President and two Vice-Presidents.¹ There are, therefore twenty-nine members on the CFA Board of Directors, all of whom are chosen for a one-year term.

The Board is charged with the responsibility of managing the on-going affairs and activities of the Federation between Annual Meetings. The Board meets each year following the Annual Meeting where it plans the activities for the coming year based on resolutions passed by the delegate body. Also, a tradition has developed whereby there is a Semi-Annual Board Meeting in the summer, usually alternating between eastern and western Canada. In addition, the President has the power to call Board meetings at any time provided two weeks notice has been given or there is unanimous

¹CFA Constitution, Article 6, Appendix A. Also, see the table, page 59, which gives some indication of the structure of the CPA.
agreement to the meeting.¹

Between meetings of the Board of Directors, complete powers are vested in the Executive Committee of the CFA. The Executive consists of ten members of the board of directors plus the President of the CFA and the two Vice-Presidents. The Constitution specifies that the Executive shall consist of one member from the Maritime region, one from each of the other six provinces, and one from each of the three national and interprovincial affiliates.² Executive meetings can be called at the discretion of the President provided, again, that two weeks notice is given or that all executive members agree to a meeting on shorter notice.

The President and Vice-Presidents of the CFA are elected annually by the delegates attending the general Annual Meeting.³ At the 1970 Annual Meeting an effort was made to democratize the CFA constitution in certain respects.

¹CFA Constitution, Article 8, Appendix A.

²CFA Constitution, Article 7, Appendix A. Note that Newfoundland does not have representation in the CFA since farming in that province has not advanced to the stage where a general farm organization is feasible.

³CFA Constitution, "Procedure for Nomination and Election of President and Vice-Presidents," Appendix A.
and a decision was taken to elect the President and Vice-Presidents directly from the delegate body rather than leave it to the Board of Directors as had previously been the case.

The move to have the three senior members of the Executive elected annually by the delegate body was clearly an attempt to keep the leadership more in touch with, and responsive to, the needs of the constituent members of the CFA. General farm organizations have had a problem in generating fresh and dynamic leadership as a multitude of observers and analysts have testified.\(^1\) In a large amorphous organization like the Federation any aspiring leader must gain the support of a myriad of entrenched groups if he is to succeed. Leadership of a modern farm organization demands more time and effort than most young progressive farmers are able to contribute. One result is that leaders of farm organizations tend to be older, somewhat conservative, and likely to hold office for long periods.

Since 1940 the Canadian Federation of Agriculture has had only three Presidents. H. H. Hannam from southern Ontario was President from 1940 to 1963 and Managing-Director (from 1943); J. M. Bentley of Edmonton was President from 1963 to 1969; since 1969 Charles Munro of Embro, Ontario has been the President.

The death of Dr. Hannam in 1963 marked the end of an era for the Federation. He had been in control of the organization for more than twenty years during which time the Federation had passed from being a fledgling somewhat irrelevant collection of individuals and groups to a fully integrated and respected instrument of farm policy. Hannam came from a farm background, although for most of his life he served as a professional farm organization man. Prior to becoming Managing-Director of the CFA Dr. Hannam had been the full-time salaried Secretary to the United Farmers of Ontario. His successors, Bentley and Munro, were both full-time farmers prior to their involvement with the CFA.

In 1969 the special Committee on Function and Structure of the CFA recommended that the office of President become a full-time paid position.¹ Up until this time the

¹Report of the Committee on CFA Function and Structure, August 22, 1969, CFA files.
office of President had not been salaried and had not been considered as a full-time position—no doubt largely a result of Dr. Hannam’s having occupied the dual role of President and paid Managing-Director. This recommendation was accepted by the Executive and carried forward to the Board of Directors later that year. Some Board Members were reluctant to endorse such a policy on the grounds that it might curb the number of available candidates since they would have to abandon active farm operations. In addition, the opinion was expressed, by the United Grain Growers for example, that such a policy might tend to render the senior members of the Executive even further removed from the grass roots of the organization.¹ As a result the idea of the presidency being a full-time job was accepted in principle without requiring the President to cease farming and to become a full-time employee.²

In addition to electing the senior members of the Executive the Annual Meeting has the “authority to determine policy for the Federation in all respects, to appoint

¹Report of the Committee on CPA Function and Structure, prepared for the Board of Directors Meeting, Quebec City, January 27, 1969, CPA files.

²Ibid.
auditors, and generally direct the affairs of the Federation."¹ As one might expect in a federation, policy formulation involves a series of stages; resolutions are proposed at the local level, and are finally accepted or rejected at the Annual Meeting. However, this does not mean that effective power resides with the Annual Meeting. Although the Constitution invests the Annual Meeting with the primary policy-making function, the CFA has traditionally not felt compelled to adhere to decisions taken at the Annual Meeting. Over the years the Federation leaders have taken the position that it would be unacceptable for the Executive and the Board of Directors to not be able to change policy positions throughout the year.² This, incidentally, is diametrically opposed to the philosophy of certain other farm leaders and farm organizations in Canada. The Farmers Union of Alberta, which was the forerunner of Unifarm, held that the policy decisions of the annual meeting were paramount, and could only be seriously altered under the most

¹CFA Constitution, Article 8, Appendix A.

²This was confirmed in an interview with Dave Kirk, Executive Secretary of the CFA, July 8, 1971.
The Annual Meeting of the CFA is intended to bring together diverse national interests in the area of production and marketing for the following purposes:

"(1) Reviewing progress made in the year toward attaining the organization's objectives.

(2) Reviewing the current national and international environment and making plans for pursuing in the light of those circumstances, either present programs and policies, and/or devising new or amended policies and programs.

(3) Reviewing the organization— that is, its form and financing to perform the functions required to meet its objectives.

(4) Providing opportunity for delegates from various areas of Canada to become better acquainted with the whole policy environment in the country. The educational and experience value of participation in a national meeting of this nature should not be underestimated and the

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1Interview with Paul Babey, former President of Uniform, June 28, 1971. Babey was upset by the apparent departure from this principle by Uniform in March 1971. At that time the Uniform Board of Directors disregarded a pro-marketing decision taken at their Annual Meeting some four months earlier, and requested that the federal government make substantial changes in their national marketing Bill C-176. See more detailed reference to this issue in Section 4 of this chapter.
annual meeting planning and conduct should have regard for the range of levels of understanding represented in the group."

Prior to 1970 the CFA Annual Meeting consisted of the Board of Directors plus two delegates appointed by the Board from each of the affiliated bodies—a total of about seventy people. In 1970, in a move to expand and democratize the base of the CFA, representation at the Annual Meeting was broadened to include approximately 130 delegates. These changes came as a result of the deliberations of the "Committee on CFA Function and Structure." This committee, which was created in 1969 was the successor to an earlier "Committee on Annual Meeting Procedures." There was considerable overlap in the personnel in the two committees, and as might be expected substantial continuity in the policy recommendations and directions resulted.


2See the chart showing total numbers of delegates by region, supra, p. 59.

3Paul Babey, President of Uniform, and Charles Munro, President of CFA, plus David Kirk, Executive Secretary, and Bill Hamilton, Associate Secretary of the national office, took part in both of the committees.
The original Committee on Annual Meeting Procedures brought forward recommendations that were geared to make the Annual Meeting into more of a "working conference."\(^1\) It was suggested, for example, that ways should be found to develop a more "unstructured" meeting, more of an "open forum" for general policy discussion, which envisaged a free-wheeling debate of over-all policy positions, less controlled and restricted than had characteristically been the case with the CFA. A recommendation that each province circulate general policy papers for open discussion was accepted. In total, the thrust of the committee recommendations was for a more active, meaningful policy-making role for the Annual Meeting.

The Committee on CFA Function and Structure accepted the general direction of its predecessor, but it went on to make several quite significant recommendations for change.\(^2\) It was proposed, for example, that the President and two Vice-Presidents be elected directly from the delegate body

\(^1\)Report of the Committee on Annual Meeting Procedures, Board of Directors Meeting, Quebec City, January 27, 1969, CFA files.

\(^2\)Report of the Committee on CFA Function and Structure, August 22, 1969, CFA files.
at the Annual Meeting, which was accepted. The aim of the Committee report was clearly to democratize the CFA structure. A recommendation that delegations be doubled in size in order to increase grass roots involvement in the Annual Meeting was also accepted. The Committee also favoured an expanded role for direct-member organizations in the CFA and suggested that provincial units should move to encourage more direct-member locals, and that more delegates to Annual Meetings should be drawn from these sources than from the established commodity groups.

The intent and substance of the committee report was agreed to by the Federation Executive. The opinions of the member units of the Federation were canvassed. As one might expect, certain bodies, namely the Coop Fédérée and the United Grain Growers, were opposed to the enhancement of direct-member organizations at the expense of their own representation. Although most of the CFA affiliates, with the clear exception of Alberta, indicated that for one reason or another they were not interested in sending more delegates to the Annual Meeting,¹ the number of delegates

¹Some groups, like ECFA and Coop Fédérée objected to the increased financial burden. In fact, many provinces did not send the full contingent to which they were entitled to the 1971 Annual Meeting. The exception of Alberta is
was expanded. Direct-member organizations have secured separate mention in revisions to the constitution but the new wording is ambiguous and ensures that such organizations do not enjoy any real ascendancy over commodity and cooperative based organizations.¹

The CFA Bureaucracy

The CFA Constitution makes provision for full-time paid officials who are a part of the national office. The Constitution outlines the role and functions of a Managing-Director, Secretary, and Treasurer. However, the Federation has not had a Managing-Director since the death of Dr. H. H. Hannam in 1963. The full complement of the CFA national office at the present time, 1973, consists of ten people including: an Executive Secretary, an Associate Secretary, an Assistant Secretary (Dairy), a Senior Economist, a Junior Economist, a Junior Executive Assistant, and a clerical

interesting in that Paul Babey was the dominant figure in farm organization in Alberta and was a key man on both committees studying the CFA structure. Babey has consistently claimed that one of his major objectives in national circles was to broaden the sweep of the CFA to make it more responsive and in touch with ordinary farm sentiment. Interview with Paul Babey, November 6, 1970.

¹CFA Constitution, Article 8, Appendix A.
staff of four. At the time of writing the position of Senior Economist and one of the clerical staff positions were vacant and plans for filling them had not been finalized. The Executive Secretary of the Federation (Dave Kirk) also serves as Executive Secretary to Dairy Farmers of Canada, since the DFC, despite its autonomous organization, is fully integrated with the CFA at the staff level.

In 1971 an attempt was made to establish formal consultations at the staff level between the Federation and the affiliates following Annual and Semi-Annual Meetings of the Federation.¹ The proposal was that permanent staff personnel from the national office and from the member bodies would meet formally to discuss mutual problems, communications, co-ordination of policies, etc. At the outset this would probably have comprised a group of 15 to 20 secretaries and managers. In view of the quite significant costs that would accrue to some of the smaller organizations in outlying regions, it was proposed that in order to enable permanent staff people to attend, the CFA pay travel expenses in excess of $200.² It was assumed that if none of the

¹Letter from Charles Munro, President of CFA, to all Directors and Secretaries, June 16, 1971, CFA files.

²Ibid., p. 2.
major components of the Federation objected to the proposal it could be implemented forthwith. However, the Coop Fédérée objected on the grounds that this staff group might tend to make policy—it might become an institution within the parent Federation and thereby remove an element of control from the elected leaders. Kirk and other members of the national office acknowledged the dangers in extensive staff discussions which excluded elected representatives, but believed that the benefits derived from more solid liaison would easily offset the problems.\(^1\)

The plan to further refine and develop the CPA structure remains in limbo in the face of opposition from the Coop Fédérée de Quebec.

The CPA national office functions in a way that is quite different from what is envisaged in the Constitution. In reality, the functions of the three positions set out in the Constitution—Managing-Director, Secretary, and Treasurer—are embodied in one person, namely the Executive Secretary, David Kirk. The position of Managing-Director was created specifically for Dr. H. H. Hannam who was both a full-time employee of the Federation and its President. However, since Hannam's death successive presidents have chosen not to

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\(^1\) Interview with Dave Kirk, Executive Secretary of CPA, July 8, 1971.
maintain a full-time presence in the national office. The Federation leaders tend to feel uncomfortable applying the term Managing-Director to a full-time paid official who is not, strictly speaking, a Director of the organization.\footnote{1}
The Executive Secretary therefore presently directs the on-going operations of the national office. A very important factor in maintaining the constitutional anomaly of three functions vested in one man is the powerful personality of Kirk himself. The Federation seems to require a strong personality at the center—for years it was Dr. Hannam, and now it is David Kirk. The Executive Secretary has effectively concentrated nearly all of the executive powers in himself and the system works largely because he is able to make it work. The Executive Secretary, however, is subject to direction from the President and the Executive, just as they, informally, are subject to direction from him. Kirk maintains his position partly because of his own skills and partly because of the inherent problems of the CPA organization. \textquote{It is the aim of this study in the following pages to identify and explain precisely these kinds of factors.}

\footnote{1Interview with Dave Kirk, Executive Secretary of CPA, June 22, 1971.}
2. CFA Finances

Revenue

In order to meet its financial requirements the Constitution of the CFA provides for the following:

"Membership fees shall be paid quarterly in advance, on such basis as may be specified by the Board of Directors. Membership organizations which neglect to pay their dues in advance are liable to forfeiture of their rights to representation on the Board of Directors until all fees and arrears have been paid." \(^1\)

Thus each year the CFA provincial affiliates are assessed fees according to a "budget formula" which is intended to apply the burden equitably across the country. The budget formula takes into account the number of commercial farmers in each province (according to the most recent census), and the ten year moving average of net farm income in each province. Equal weight is assigned to these two factors in calculating annual assessments.

The assessments of the national and inter-provincial affiliates, such as the Dairy Farmers of Canada, are established through annual negotiations with the CFA. Most of the assessment for Dairy Farmers of Canada represents staff

\(^1\)CFA Constitution, Article 5, Section 3, Appendix A.
and service costs which become a part of the CFA budget when the two organizations amalgamated. In arriving at fees for these organizations account is taken of the existence of overlapping memberships and indirect contributions to the CFA.

The UGG, for example, makes substantial contributions to the Federations of the four western provinces and these Federations also pay dues directly to the national Federation of Agriculture. Moreover, virtually all of the members of the Canadian Horticultural Council contribute to the CFA through other channels.

CFA Financial Assessments—1970

Prince Edward Island .................. $ 1,612*
Maritimes (Nova Scotia and New Brunswick) ... 4,118*
Quebec ........................................ 20,342**
Ontario ....................................... 44,687
Manitoba .................................... 16,385
Saskatchewan .................................. 45,476
Alberta ...................................... 32,367
British Columbia ........................... 7,255
Dairy Farmers of Canada ................ 56,022***
United Grain Growers .................. 17,940
Canadian Horticultural Council ........ 510
TOTAL .................................. $246,714
The Maritime Federation of Agriculture is the co-ordination organization for the Federations of Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and New Brunswick, and although P.E.I. is a part of this regional Federation it has chosen, since 1941, to deal separately with the CFA on the grounds that it has needs that are peculiar to that province. It is for this reason that Prince Edward Island appears separately in CFA statements.

**$3,000 is deducted from the total Quebec assessment to cover the cost of French language translation of CFA documents in that province. This deduction is made in recognition of the fact that the CFA functions primarily (virtually exclusively) in English and this represents considerable inconvenience to the French-speaking organizations of Quebec. Also, the total Quebec assessment is divided among three farm organizations with the Coop Fédérée and the UCC sharing the majority of the expense on an equal basis and a much smaller proportion being levied on the English speaking Quebec Farmers Association.**

***In 1970 it was assumed that the administrative costs for Dairy Farmers of Canada was $51,000. This means that the additional $5,022 might be properly regarded as the DFC fee for membership in the Federation.

The CFA budget has expanded phenomenally in its thirty five year history. In 1935 the Federation (then the Chamber of Agriculture) survived on $1300; in 1950 it budgeted for $55,530; and in 1970, $246,714.

In the early years it was not uncommon for CFA affiliates to volunteer more money than they had been asked for by the Directors. For example, "in 1946 the assessments of all member bodies were raised by 40%. Yet, in 1947 the secretary reported that the Alberta Federation and the Dairy,
Farmers of Canada actually paid more than had been agreed upon. At the same meeting the B.C. Federation which had been asked to contribute $1,800 offered to give $2,000.¹ With the advent of huge modern-day assessments, often in the tens of thousands, this voluntary spirit of giving seems to have been dampened. Although provincial organizations normally meet their fee requirements, there is very little evidence to suggest that they are prepared voluntarily to go beyond this.

Special assessments are often levied to finance new ventures and activities within the CFA. Once the new activity is established as a regular part of CFA activities it tends to become a normal budgetary item. For example, when the National Farm Radio Forum was begun in 1941, each provincial unit was assessed $150 toward its support, but in 1945 $5,000 was set aside in the regular CFA budget for this purpose. When, in 1946, the Federation became involved in the International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP) funds were first obtained by making provincial assessments on an equal percentage basis, involving a 40% increase

in contributions.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 71 ff.} A recent example of an attempt to levy special fees on member units involved a proposed research project on farm unity in 1968; $15,000 was required and each provincial affiliate was asked to assume a proportionate share of the cost. When it became clear that a significant number of the member bodies were not prepared to support the proposal the research project was dropped.

Although this assessment method has become the most common means of raising additional money, periodically the Federation has attempted to have special projects funds on hand for use as the need arises rather than having to turn "cap in hand" to the member units. However, the establishment of reserve funds presents serious difficulties. If the Federation is in a position where it has surplus funds it is virtually impossible to extract additional money from the member units even though that money may be required for overall operations.\footnote{Interview with Dave Kirk, July 13, 1971.} If the Federation wishes to regularly expand its budget it appears necessary to work on a very fine margin or perhaps to remain in a year by year deficit position.
Expenditures

As a rule, more than half of the annual CFA budget is spent on staff salaries. The next largest portion is devoted to executive and staff travel to and from meetings. Other major expenditures include an annual contribution of $15,000 to the International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP) and yearly support of the Agriculture Economics Research Council (AERC) in the amount of $15,000.¹

There are persistent pressures from within the CFA to expand the budget in order to provide for upgraded standards of service. In 1969 for example, the Standing Finance Committee recommended to the Board of Directors that Federation expenditures be increased by one third in order to provide for "steadily rising levels of costs, an expansion of senior staff by two members, expansion in the information program, plus some funds for special projects all very much necessary."² This proposal would have effectively raised CFA revenues from less than $230,000 to nearly $300,000, involving an increase in membership assessments of about 50%, or

¹The AERC is an independent research institution located in Ottawa and is supported by farm organizations with matching grants from the federal government.

some $70,000 in total. Although the recommendation was accepted by the Semi-Annual meeting of the Board in 1969, it became clear at the January 1970 Board Meeting that there was not an inexhaustible supply of provincial funds and member units would not likely accept such a massive increase in fees. It was agreed therefore that total assessments should be raised by a more modest $25,000 and this was accepted by the Annual Meeting.¹

**CFA Budgeted Expenditures - 1970**

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In 1970 actual CFA expenditures were $4,376 over income. Most of this was accounted for by a $17,000

¹Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the CFA, Ottawa, January 22; 1970, CFA files.
expenditure for translation and interpretation services.\footnote{1}

As with many organizations' personal expenses incurred by individuals have periodically been a problem for the Federation. Generally speaking, when there is some difficulty with respect to who is responsible for expenses incurred it is settled by negotiation between the CFA national office and the member unit involved. There are a number of fairly complex letters on file in which respective secretaries and managers have tried to establish who should be responsible for paying what.\footnote{2}

In 1969 CFA expense policy was liberalized to cover virtually all out-of-pocket expenses incurred by Directors and representatives of affiliates while on Federation business.\footnote{3} The CFA has a long-standing policy of trying to average out travel expenses for Directors and officials who live in the outlying regions of the country. For years the

\footnote{1See Treasurers Report, CFA Annual Meeting, Ottawa, January 25, 1971. In recent years the CFA has made a genuine (and expensive) effort to improve its bilingual services at meetings, conferences and in its documentation.}

\footnote{2See for example, the lengthy letter from Bill Hamilton, Associate Secretary of the CFA, to Freda Sargion of the Cooperative Development Association, October 19, 1967, CFA files.}

\footnote{3"CFA Expense Account Policy," CFA Memorandum, September 8, 1969, CFA files.}
Federation tried to have its meetings in as central a location as possible—usually Winnipeg. In 1942 when it became clear that travel expense was deterring attendance by Directors from distant points, the CFA adopted a pooling policy in which total travelling costs were shared amongst member units. Subsequently, the Federation adopted a policy in which the CFA itself paid for travel expenses minus $50 which, it was expected, would be picked up by the member body. In a further extension of this policy of expense sharing the Federation has since agreed to pay all expenses over $20.

With respect to ordinary delegates attending the CFA Annual Meeting each member unit is expected to contribute to a travel pool which is used to help defray expenses for delegates from outlying regions. The calculation and administration of the pool is done annually by the CFA national office.

The Effects of CFA Financial Arrangements

Although the CFA budget has expanded over the past twenty years—increasing more than four fold from 1950 to 1970—it is still pitifully small in comparison to the resources of farm organizations in other advanced countries.

In 1967 the British National Farmers Union with a membership
of about 185,000 had a budget of $1,846,185 and an administrative staff of 100. In comparison the CFA which claims to represent about 400,000 farmers had a budget of $103,000 and an administrative staff of four.\(^1\) Several of the CFA member units—L'UCC and Uniform, for example—have traditionally had budgets that are substantially larger than that of the parent Federation. In spite of this, however, and taking into account the importance of agriculture to the Canadian economy, the difference in resources between Canadian organizations and those of Great Britain is striking.

Similarly, in the United States which does have a federated form of government and federated farm groups, the resources of national farm organizations go far beyond those of their Canadian counterparts. In 1968 the CFA had a budget of about $120,000 and the Canadian NFU spent about $20,000.

\(^1\)Helen Jones Dawson, "Relations between Organizations and the Civil Service in Canada and Great Britain," *Canadian Public Administration*, (December, 1967), p. 453. Britain has approximately one-half as many farmers as Canada. Yet in 1967 the three British farm organizations (NFU, County Landowners Association, and the National Union of Agricultural Workers) spent twenty-five times as much as the two Canadian national farm organizations, the CFA and NFU, combined. It must be remembered however, that Great Britain is not a federation like Canada, and therefore does not have well developed regional farm organizations providing services as is the case in Canada.
"By comparison, the National Farmers' Union in the U.S. has annual expenditures of $625,000."¹ It is true that there are more farmers in the United States and their farm organizations are larger, but the fact remains that American farmers are paying about twice as much in support of their national organizations as are Canadian farmers.

Professor Clay Gilson, a thoughtful and respected observer of the Canadian agricultural scene, points out that one of the "realities" which must be faced by farm organizations is their need for financial independence and secure sources of income. Farmers and farm organizations, he says, "are so preoccupied with membership drives, fee collections, by-laws and constitutional problems, that they no longer have the capacity to think creatively about farm policy matters."²

There seems to be widespread agreement that the two main general farm organizations in this country both suffer from inherent financial instability. For example, the chief

¹Dave Suderman, "The Real Problem is the Penny-Pinching Membership," Family Herald, No. 3 (February 8, 1968), p. 11.

²Clay Gilson, "Can Farm Organizations Face Up to Realities," a paper prepared in the Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Manitoba, 1968. (Mimeographed.) p. 5.
difficulty confronting the NFU, a direct-member unitary organization, is that ordinary farmers are simply unwilling to give voluntary financial support to the organizations which try to represent them.\(^1\) Thus an organization like the NFU has a chronic shortage of money and has to expend a good deal of its resources trying to get enough funds to get along.

The Canadian Federation of Agriculture is considerably better off than the NFU because it derives more funds from its affiliates. The affiliates obtain their funds from member bodies which represent various cooperatives, commercially-based commodity groups, rural associations, and so on.\(^2\) Many of these organizations are well off financially and can readily afford to support their provincial federations and, indirectly, the CFA.

Allen Des Champs in his comparative study of the American Farm Bureau Federation and the Canadian Federation of Agriculture advocates better financing for the Canadian organization. "A recommendation which the Canadian Federation of Agriculture might seriously consider attempting to bring

\(^1\)Suderman, "The Real Problem," p. 11.

\(^2\)Ibid. Suderman gives a very good account of the way in which money is collected by the various affiliates of the CFA.
about is a more adequate and definite system of financing.¹

Having gone this far, however, Des Champs, like many others, does not offer any more specific guidance as to how the Federation might ease its financial problems.

Suderman cites the Ontario Federation of Agriculture as an example of the difficulties confronting federated farm organizations.² In 1966 the OFA levied a membership fee of $4,000 on the Ontario Turkey Grower's Association. By the end of the fiscal year the Turkey Growers had only paid $1,000 to the Federation, and this contributed to a shortfall of $14,000 in the OFA budget for that year.

Helen Jones Dawson, as long ago as 1960, cited fluctuating and unstable finances is one of the most important weaknesses of the Canadian Federation of Agriculture.³ An example of this is the Ontario Federation which was assessed national dues by the CFA in 1969 totalling $39,403


²Suderman, "The Real Problem," p. 11.

The CFA Under Stress

The CFA was founded on the dual principle of strong provincial affiliates and limited affiliation with national commodity organizations. ¹ The regional "federations" were intended to be the main vehicles through which agricultural interests could be aggregated and articulated at the provincial level. Similarly it was intended that these interests be articulated at the national level by the parent federation, the CFA.

The early attempt to accommodate national commodity groups was largely a result of the stated policy of the Chamber of Agriculture, the CFA’s predecessor. ² In 1936, one year after it was created, the Chamber issued invitations to six interprovincial and national commodity groups to affiliate. As a result of this, three groups--Dairy Farmers of Canada, United Grain Growers, and the Canadian Horticultural Council--became directly affiliated with the Chamber, and later the Federation. The CFA Constitution reflects this provision by

¹See supra, "Membership," p. 52.

but during that year the OFA paid only half of this assessment because of heavy commitment to the General Farm Organization campaign in Ontario.\(^1\) Due to the inability of the OFA to pay the balance, some $19,701, the CFA was short nearly $20,000 which it had budgeted for in 1969. Two years later this particular problem had not yet been resolved, the item having been written off in the OFA books, yet appearing in the CFA financial statement as a "Members Assessment receivable."\(^2\)

Although the CFA is dependent upon its provincial affiliates, there is evidence that once an affiliated member becomes committed to a certain level of support for the Federation it is not likely, except in extreme circumstances, to fail in that commitment. But the general shortage of available funds is a serious problem for the CFA. Although the over-all financial position of the Federation has improved noticeably in recent years, its effectiveness as a

\(^1\)For a full account of the involvement of the OFA in this campaign see *infra*, Chapter IV, section entitled "The Attempt to Establish a General Farm Organization in Ontario."

\(^2\)Financial Statements for the Canadian Federation of Agriculture, George A. Welch and Co., Chartered Accountants, (Ottawa, 1971), CFA files.
political interest group is hampered by a lack of financial resources. The Federation is seriously impeded because it lacks the money to hire sufficient researchers, experts and general personnel. Since the CFA has no independent source of funds apart from its affiliates, those member bodies exercise considerable power over the parent Federation. The CFA elite may have the freedom to use Federation resources as it sees fit, but it is restrained in the long run by the affiliated members who control the purse strings and exercise their power through the Board of Directors and the Annual Meeting.


The Agricultural Environment

Changing technology since World War Two has had a tremendous impact on the agricultural industry in Canada. The efficiency of food production has multiplied many times over. Farms have become larger, highly mechanized, with proportionately fewer workers employed in production. In two decades, from 1946 to 1967, the farm labour force declined by 55%.¹ At the same time national agriculture has undergone

intense specialization. A higher volume of farm products is being produced on relatively fewer farms that are more commercial and highly specialized than ever before. The speedy advance of agricultural technology has widened the gap in farm income and individual farm output. Of the 430,000 farms in Canada in 1966, 55% produced only 14% of the total sales. Yet this 55% employed about half of the total farm labour force.¹ This is some indication of the extent of technological advancement, not to mention the rural social problems that have ensued.

This rapid transition in the agricultural industry has had a number of consequences which, directly or indirectly, influence the nature and bearing of general farm organizations. Modern production techniques and advanced communications and transportation methods have increased the probability of cycles of over-production, and have increased the national ramifications of such surpluses. It has become possible within the various regions of the country to produce virtually all commodities in excess of the traditional domestic and export market requirements. The factors which placed limits on agricultural output—factors like climate, limited manpower,

¹Ibid., p. 20
posts and diseases--have largely been overcome by production technology.

When overproduction within a specific region occurs it very often results in inter-provincial dumping of the produce at excessively low prices, thereby ruining the market of similar producers in the recipient region.¹ For example, it is relatively easy for Ontario vegetable producers to produce five or ten percent more than their traditional market requires. Rather than destroy these surplus vegetables Ontario growers will have a tendency to ship them to another province, say Alberta, where they will have a serious disruptive effect on the local markets and prices realized by growers in that province.² Cyclical overproduction and the freedom to move surpluses from one region of Canada to another has been part

¹ For an excellent discussion of some specific examples of these cycles of overproduction and the inter-provincial problems that ensue, see Michael Moore, "Farm Groups Enthusiasm Wanes for National Marketing Program," Globe and Mail, Toronto, March 12, 1970.

² In most cases the province is not the "natural" market for agricultural produce but it is the "controlled" market for such produce. The Constitution grants the provinces control over marketing within their own borders. However, this control does not extend to products coming in from other provinces. Thus provincial marketing boards which are set up to achieve price stability by regulating production and marketing, are frustrated when inter-provincial dumping occurs.
of the cause of price instability and insecurity that has afflicted the farming community in recent years.

Another and perhaps more pertinent example is the confliction over eggs and broilers which came to a climax in 1970 and reached the Supreme Court of Canada in 1971.¹ Certain provinces, particularly Manitoba, have the capacity to produce eggs far in excess of their own requirements and in excess of their normal markets outside of the province. Although Quebec has a significant number of egg producers, that province is traditionally deficient in eggs. However, with the unrestricted entry of surplus eggs from Manitoba and Ontario the prices received by Quebec growers were highly unstable and subject to control by unregulated forces outside of their province. As a result the Quebec marketing agency (Fedco) which had been established to control eggs produced within the province moved to also control eggs coming into the province from outside. One result of this was that other provinces, particularly Ontario, passed retaliatory regulations to limit the import of broiler chickens, which Quebec produced in abundance. The over-all result was the celebrated "chicken and egg war."

¹Michael Moore, "Supreme Court Gets Chicken and Egg War," Globe and Mail, Toronto, June 1, 1971.
The salient point to be made here is that in recent years some sort of national regulation of the production and marketing of agricultural commodities has become a central part of the thoughts and actions of farm and government leaders. To a greater extent than at any time in the past producers of specific commodities have come together on a national basis to seek joint solutions to their problems.¹ Provincial marketing controls have been helpful but inadequate, and this has led to the demand for national marketing boards. Provincial commodity associations have recognized that their problems are trans-provincial and they have turned to the federal government for remedial policies. In most instances the demand for national marketing regulation has come from aggrieved provincial commodity groups. There has thus been an increasing tendency for regional groups to band together into national commodity associations to articulate their specific interest at the federal level. In their search for a vehicle through which to articulate demands these groups have turned first to the only established national farm interest group, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture.

¹Other observers of the Canadian agricultural scene have also taken note of this increased role for commodity and marketing groups. See for example, "Farmers Turn to Commodity Groups," Country Guide, Editorial, May, 1970, p. 6.
The CFA Under Stress

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¹See supra, "Membership," p. 52.

permitting direct representation of "major branches" of the industry, "grain, livestock, dairying, fruit and vegetables." 1 Along with this initial concern with commodity organizations there has been a strong desire, developed primarily in the 1940's, to build and preserve healthy and viable provincial units within the CFA. The Federation has consistently sought to pursue a policy whereby communications and program development has been channelled through its provincial affiliates. Moreover, this tendency to favour provincial units over commodity groups increased as the CFA evolved. 2

Over the years such groups as the Farm Women and Junior Farmers have been encouraged to affiliate with provincial member units and contribute through them. Similarly, certain commodity organizations like the Canadian Beekeepers Council, the Western Stock Growers' Association, and the Canadian Sugar Beet Producers have been refused direct admission to the CFA and have been advised to affiliate at the provincial level.

The CFA has tended to favour strong provincial units over commodity organizations because its leaders have regarded

1 CFA Constitution, Article 5, Section 1 (C), Appendix A.

the federated pyramidal structure based upon solid provincial members as the "most democratic" system, and most in touch with ordinary producers. The Federation has always been sensitive about the criticism that it is out of touch, too commercially oriented, and too far removed from the farmers. Many of those commodity organizations which expressed an interest in affiliating would have lent credibility to this charge if they had been granted membership in the CFA. Moreover, because of its dependence on the provincial Federations, to weaken the provincial units by allowing increased numbers of commodity affiliates might have done irreparable damage to the fragile financial framework of the national Federation.

There is little doubt that the provincial Federations felt threatened by the development of national commodity organizations and felt the CFA itself was threatened. National commodity groups have their own resources; they share an

1Ibid., p. 34. Jones discusses the attitude of Dr. Hannam, former President of CFA, on this matter. It may be that Federation leaders who talk about the "democratic" aspects of the CFA arrangements are guilty of rhetorical flourishes. But there is no questioning the fact that CFA leaders have been constantly aware and concerned about the Federation's lack of direct contact with farmers through direct memberships. In their intergroup rivalry this has been a frequent and quite effective criticism levelled by the NFU against the CFA. See infra, "The National Unity Discussions," Chapter IV.
intense interest in a single agricultural commodity; and they possess their own leaders and experts who might attempt to by-pass the CFA. Thus the Federation was under steady pressure to reinforce its own provincial Federations. For example, in 1944 the Secretary of the Alberta Federation of Agriculture wrote that its directors were "greatly concerned with the present tendency to create national organizations outside of the Canadian Federation of Agriculture. The present move toward some type of poultry council, and the growing demand for a national livestock body, are two examples of this."¹ However, the AFA did not suggest that these commodity groups be either opposed or simply ignored, but rather that they be subsumed within specific departments of the Canadian Federation. This suggestion bears some resemblance to contemporary developments.

Finally, there has been a tendency in the past for the CFA to avoid commodity affiliations in favour of provincial links because this offered the path of least resistance and least risks. There has been a practical recognition in the Federation that it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to modify policies that have been agreed on by

¹Letter from E. W. Brunsden, Secretary of AFA, to Colin Graff, Secretary of CFA, November 29, 1944, CFA files.
commodity organizations at the national level. If, however, these organizations are not affiliated it is possible for the CFA to remain uninvolved, thereby avoiding conflict with the commodity group. In the words of a Federation working paper, "it is easier for the national office to 'opt out' of supporting national commodity demands if it feels it does not have a policy mandate, or that there are conflicts of interest. It also means of course that the CFA, to a considerable extent, tends not to become involved in the first place."¹ This, of course, says a good deal about the nature and weaknesses of the CFA which permitted the rapid rise of commodity groups. It points also to a central theme of this study—that the predominant problem of a federated, peak organization is lack of organizational cohesion and the inability to effectively aggregate conflicting policy positions.

The CFA position in this regard seems to indicate three things. First, affiliation with national commodity groups can lead to policy conflicts which might not be resolved in the CFA's favour and could be damaging to its legitimacy and organizational fabric. Second, commodity

affiliation almost certainly would result in inter-group 
struggles between affiliates which the Federation would be 
powerless to resolve. Third, the risk of being by-passed 
or of sharing its mandate by not permitting commodity group 
affiliation was less important to the Federation than the 
first two considerations. The CFA was prepared to ignore 
national commodity groups as long as they were loosely or-
organized, internally divided, relatively powerless, and ir-
relevant to the governing process. However, the realities 
of modern-day agriculture have gradually overtaken the CFA 
and have forced a change in its attitude toward relations 
with national commodity organizations. The main period of 
stress and re-assessment came in the mid-1960's. The pro-
blems of commodity groups' affiliation in relation to the 
needs of the CFA were broadly discussed in two working mem-
oranda prepared under the direction of Dave Kirk, Executive 
Secretary. It was recognized first, that policy-making

1 Kwavnick discusses similar points in his analysis 
of inter-group rivalries within the Canadian Labour Congress. 
See Kwavnick, Organized Labour, pp. 55 ff. Also infra, sec-
tion dealing with "Organizational Solidarity."

2"Relations of the National Commodity Groups to the 
Canadian Federation of Agriculture," prepared for the Semi-
Annual Meeting, Ottawa, July 23, 1963. And "The CFA and the 
Relationship of National Commodity Organizations To It," pre-
pared for the Semi-Annual Meeting, Dartmouth, N.S., July 26, 
1966.
Itself is a dilemma for affiliated national organizations. The CFA has followed a long established principle that it has the right to "consider, adopt, amend or defeat resolutions" presented at its Annual Meeting by any member unit.\(^1\) However, it is recognized that any disagreement at the level of annual meetings presents very real difficulties for both organizations. On the other hand, there is the second recognized need for "convinced agreement" between various sectors on matters of general agricultural policy. In other words, the CFA as a general farm interest group must accept the need to build a consensus to serve as an aggregator, in the area of farm policy. In the words of the 1963 memorandum, "in the final analysis farmers will stand or fall together--their interests should not be, and are not, in conflict. This belief is at the root of the Federation principle . . . "\(^2\) What is required on the part of the CFA is the achievement of a unified agricultural policy into which all of the parts, all of the specific demands, can be expected to fit.

A third and closely related point is that an integrated national agricultural policy depends to a considerable


\(^2\)Ibid., p. 2.
extent upon the input of specialized commodity groups. Conflict can perhaps be minimized, and an agreed-upon national policy achieved, if farmers are fully informed of the problems that prevail in commodities other than their own. Moreover, the central organization can only function effectively if it has access to the kind of specialized knowledge that is possessed by marketing agencies and commodity organizations. These factors had the effect of propelling the CFA in the direction of closer ties with national commodity groups. It became increasingly clear that what was envisaged and desired was a national organization which was a two-way clearing house, absorbing and assimilating specialized knowledge on the one hand, and advancing the general interest and general policy needs of Canadian producers on the other.¹

There is one further general factor which caused CFA leaders to look critically at the organization's *modus operandi* and relations with national commodity groups. For a number of years the CFA had lived in a world of generalities, simple compromises, and "motherhood" policy statements on agriculture. During the 1960s there was a gradual

realization that this approach was increasingly out of tune with a more sophisticated agricultural industry. This reinforced the CFA's inclination to become more directly involved with highly specialized commodity groups. S. B. Williams, the federal Deputy Minister of Agriculture, has observed that in terms of real accomplishments the CFA has failed by being too general in its approach. By using a broad brush--by talking about the "plight of farmers" and the need for a "national agricultural policy"--the Federation has accomplished very little that is tangible. However, Williams also detected some encouraging changes in this respect--the CFA was beginning to zero in on particular commodity areas.\footnote{Interview with S. B. Williams, federal Deputy Minister of Agriculture, November 7, 1970.}

There are four specific reasons why the concern for national commodity affiliates had become more pertinent during the mid-1960's than at any previous time. First, membership of the Canadian Turkey Federation in the CFA was being widely discussed. Second, there had been a formal request from the Canadian Sugar Beet Producers for membership in the CFA. Third, a wide-ranging concern with hog improvement had led to suggestions that a Canadian Swine Council be established and that it be affiliated with the CFA. Fourth, the
Canadian Cattlemen's Association had tentatively raised the possibility of affiliation with the Federation.\(^1\)

The possibility of affiliation on the part of the Canadian Turkey Federation remains as an open question and a matter to be resolved at the time of writing. The request of the Canadian Sugar Beet Producers was considered by the Board of the CFA and it was rejected on the grounds that traditional Federation policy was to encourage such producer groups to affiliate at the provincial level. The Canadian Sugar Beet Producers were not truly national in scope inasmuch as they were concentrated in certain regions. In the mid-1960's the industry was closed down in Ontario, leaving Alberta and Manitoba with the only substantial sugar beet interests in Canada. In these provinces the sugar beet grower associations were affiliated at the provincial level and represented in the CFA by this means.

The case of the Canadian Cattlemen's Association is unique in the development of Federation-commodity group relations and it rates somewhat closer scrutiny. So also with the Canadian Swine Council which is perhaps, the most suggestive of the future direction these relationships are likely to take.

\(^1\)"The CFA and the Relationship of National Commodity Organizations," 1966, pp. 3-4.
The Accommodation of Commodity Groups

In 1966 the Canadian Federation of Agriculture and the Canadian Cattlemen's Association jointly sponsored a Beef Improvement Conference in which all aspects of the beef industry and its future development were discussed. The Conference, which was held in Winnipeg, was widely praised for its far-sighted conclusions and recommendations pertaining to testing, grading, breeding performance, and so on. At the same time the CCA had applied to become affiliated with the CFA. In considering the applications the Federation observed that a national beef cattle organization, to be affiliated with the CFA, should broadly represent the industry throughout Canada. It was the view of the Federation that the CCA had not yet achieved that position, and it was therefore not accepted for affiliation.\(^1\) Rather than debate the representative nature of the CCA further, the two organizations shifted their attention to the recently concluded Beef

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\(^1\)Report of Meeting on CFA Affiliation of National Commodity Organizations, CFA files, December 16, 1966, p. 2. In a letter to Fred Newcombe, Secretary Manager of the CCA, David Kirk made it clear that the CFA believed that the CCA did not have a broad enough base of producer, not industry representations.) Letter from Dave Kirk, Executive Secretary of the CFA, to Fred Newcombe, Secretary Manager of the CCA, January 3, 1967.
Improvement Conference and follow-up activities that they might jointly undertake. It was agreed that a Ways and Means Committee consisting of three representatives from each organization should be established. This Committee was to have the responsibility for pursuing and implementing the recommendations of the conference. Early in their proceedings the Committee established an eleven man industry committee on grading and quality, which had been recommended by the Conference.

At the outset a two-year life was envisaged for the CCA-CFA Ways and Means Committee, and its estimated financial requirements for that period was set at $20,000. In order to raise this money a special appeal was made to affiliated members who had a direct interest in beef improvement. As a result nearly $10,000 was raised to cover the cost of the first year of operation. The three main contributors were the Ontario Beef Improvement Association ($3,000), Saskatchewan Wheat Pool ($2,000), and the Western Stock Growers Association ($1,500). After the first year no more money was collected by this method, and the fund which had been established was gradually dissipated through ad hoc expenditures by the Committee.¹ The Committee which was originally

¹Interview with Bill Hamilton, Associate Secretary of the CFA, July 7, 1971.
established as a two year project had survived some storms and was still functioning some five years later. The secretarial and housekeeping responsibilities, which were somewhat confused at the outset, have tended to be shared by the staffs of the CCA and CFA. Although the present arrangement is that Fred Newcombe, Secretary Manager of the CCA, has assumed full responsibility as Secretary.\(^1\) It seems likely that the CCA-CFA Ways and Means Committee will carry on as an ad hoc arrangement until such time as the Cattlemen agree to some basis of affiliation with the CFA. The CCA-CFA Ways and Means Committee is an interesting example of an ad hoc arrangement which meets many of the consultative needs of both organizations without requiring formal affiliation. Nevertheless, the subject matter which was assigned to the Committee was primarily technical and administrative in nature, concerned specifically with beef improvement. This arrangement avoided the "political" issues, involving livestock and agricultural policy, that are a part of full-fledged affiliation. This was not the case with the Canadian Swine Council, however.

\(^1\) Ibid.
The Canadian Swine Council (CSC) was the first national commodity organization to become affiliated with the CFA on anything other than a regular, direct membership basis. The arrangements for this affiliation were completed in the summer of 1971, and the formal agreement was signed in the fall. It provides for CSC affiliation on an "Advisory Committee" basis. It is, in effect, an attempt to reach some middle ground between full-fledged membership in the CFA on the one hand, and complete isolation and non-involvement on the other.¹ Federation leaders fully realized that the type of relationship established with the Swine Council would set a precedent and shape the kind of links that would soon be forged with other national commodity groups. In a working document prepared for the CFA Board the full ramifications of the CSC affiliation were considered.² It was suggested that the hog industry in Canada has a dual need: (1) effective involvement of the CFA and its provincial member units

¹At Executive, Board, and Annual Meetings, Advisory Committee affiliates are involved to the extent that they are invited to take part in meetings but they are strictly ex officio, non-voting. See table, supra, p. 59.

in hog policy, considered from the point of view of over-all Canadian agricultural policy and, (2) access to an effective, functioning, and representative national organization of swine producers.

In the view of the national office two alternative methods of affiliation were possible—full-fledged membership in the normal fashion, or loose affiliation on an advisory committee basis.¹ In either case what was envisaged was integrated secretarial services and increased responsibility for the CFA staff. It was assumed, following the example of Dave Kirk who doubles as Executive Secretary for both the CFA and Dairy Farmers of Canada, that permanent CFA personnel would be appointed to provide administrative services for any national commodity group affiliate. The national office paper goes some length to emphasize that CSC swine policy will have to fit within broad CFA policy, with the secretariat involved owing its major allegiance to the parent Federation.

It was suggested that an Advisory Committee structure with a joint secretariat would consist of the following basic elements:

"1. The Council would undertake, on a negotiated basis, to pay to the CFA a contribution for

¹Ibid., pp. 3 ff.
carrying out secretarial functions for the Council. Depending on the support through provincial member channels, it might also provide support for the carrying on of the Federation's program in the field of swine policy.

2. The CFA secretariat would be recognized as having, as its senior, over-riding responsibility, the implementation of CFA policy and programs respecting swine. It would provide the staff services required for the work of the council.

3. The CFA would recognize the Council as the organization through which continuing action, policy implementation and policy-making (within the over-all context of CFA policy) would be conducted in the swine industry nationally.

4. The Council would recognize the necessity of its work proceeding in a manner consistent with and co-ordinated with, over-all CFA policy guidelines and objectives, and would undertake to work with the CFA and its members, at national and provincial level, to achieve a consistent and integrated policy approach.

5. The CFA would undertake to carry out a regular process of review of swine policy and programs, in closest consultation and liaison with the Council, so that it also can properly exercise its responsibilities vis-a-vis the goal of policy integration and consistency. It would also co-operate in its publicity and extension work at all levels to further the Council's, and the CFA's work and objectives."

1Ibid., pp. 5-6.
These five points represent the position that was consistently followed by the CFA in its move toward affiliation with the Swine Council and later, other commodity representatives. Moreover, they essentially represent the ground rules that were agreed upon when affiliation was realized, both with the CSC and other commodity groups.

Thus, it was agreed that the Canadian Swine Council should function as a "special Advisory Committee to the CFA" and it would be "the operative agency which will initiate and undertake national programs to further the interests of the hog industry in Canada."¹ The CFA was to provide secretarial and staff services that would be paid for on a negotiated basis by the Swine Council.² The formal affiliation agreement between the CFA and CSC specifies that there shall be maximum communication and involvement between the organizations, including regular contact between the Swine Council President and the CFA Board and executive, and Council representatives at the CFA Annual Meeting.³ The end result was intended to be

¹"Memorandum of Agreement--Affiliation of the Canadian Swine Council with the Canadian Federation of Agriculture," October 1, 1970, CFA files.

²Bill Hamilton, Associate Secretary of the CFA was designated Secretary of the CSC.

a more enlightened Canadian swine policy fully integrated and in tune with the Federation's general agricultural policy.

The obvious question is, what happens when there is a conflict in policy between the CFA and the affiliated commodity groups? Precisely this problem arose when the strength of the CFA-CSC affiliation was tested less than a year after it was struck.

At a meeting of the Swine Council in March, 1971, the newly elected Chairman and Director of the Alberta Hog Producers Marketing Board took their seats on the Council. The Alberta Chairman, Mr. Stan Berg, was violently opposed to the proposed federal marketing legislation, Bill C-176, and of course, he was equally opposed to the position of the Swine Council which had gone on record as favouring the Bill. In the face of the Alberta challenge, with support from Manitoba and Saskatchewan representatives, the Council was obliged to retreat from its former position and to declare that it henceforth had no position at all—that, essentially, it was neither for nor against the Bill. ¹

to a much broader discussion of the CSC Constitution and affiliation arrangements with the CFA. Berg of Alberta objected to his organization being subject to the original Swine Council decision to support Bill C-176, and to an equal extent he objected to the Council being subject to the policy positions of the CFA. In this instance the Federation also had been lending strong support to the passage of the Marketing Bill. Berg proposed, therefore, to amend the CSC Constitution in a way that would have emasculated the CFA in its relations with the Swine Council. For example, he proposed:

"(i) that on issues specific only to the interests of hog producers in Canada, Canadian Swine Council will make the decision which must be accepted and approved by such national general farm organization.

(ii) that on issues where other commodities are related (eg. feed grain and hogs, hogs and cattle, etc.) the Canadian Swine Council will appoint a representative, or representatives, to negotiate the terms of the policy with those other commodities which are affected. The policy thus generated will become the policy supported by such national general farm organization." ¹

This, clearly, would have reversed the fundamental principle of the CFA that Swine Council policy must fit

¹Ibid., pp. 3-4.
within the framework of broad Federation policy, and if adopted, these amendments would undoubtedly have spelled the end of the affiliation. In a wide ranging discussion, however, other Council members opposed the Berg amendments, and in the end they were not accepted. In its place they approved a general motion which simply stated that the Council would not become a "member" of a general national farm organization.¹ This broad resolution apparently satisfied everyone in that it allowed for an exceedingly loose affiliation in which both organizations could maintain flexibility and freedom of action. It has been suggested that in proposing his amendments Berg was trying to put the CFA in the same inferior position respecting policy as had been achieved with the Unifarm organization in Alberta.² He was attempting to make the voice of the swine organizations supreme over that of general farm organizations in matters concerning hogs. Although the Alberta Hog Marketing Board under Berg was affiliated with Unifarm, it had succeeded in intimidating Unifarm Directors to the extent that they effectively reversed decisions taken at their Annual

¹Interview with Bill Hamilton, Associate Secretary of the CFA, July 7, 1971.

²Ibid.
Meeting only a few months earlier. The Convention had given its full, nearly unanimous, support to the federal Marketing Bill, but under renewed pressure from the Hog Board, Uniform softened its support and asked that cattle and hogs be exempted from the effects of the Bill.

One conclusion to be drawn from these examples is that in the face of determined opposition from affiliated commodity groups the general farm organization, be it CFA or Uniform, is virtually powerless. CFA leaders simply do not have the tools to enforce loyalty or to enforce their policy in a situation like this. They could threaten to terminate the affiliation, but this seems to be as much, or more, of a tool in the hands of the commodity affiliate.

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1 Interview with Paul Babey, former President of Uniform, June 28, 1971.

2 "Uniform Asks Cattle, Hogs Be Exempt from the Bill," Organized Farmer, Vol. 23, No. 4, April, 1971. For a more complete discussion of the position of Uniform and CFA respecting Bill C-176 see infra, section on "Organizational Solidarity."

3 Cf., Kwavnick, Organized Labour, pp. 44-45, on jurisdictional disputes.

4 David Truman discusses the techniques of leadership and the means of enforcing loyalty, very few of which seem applicable to the CFA. See Truman, Process, pp. 193 ff.

5 Ibid., p. 118. Truman's description of the "subcenters of power" which characterize federated interest groups is highly apropos of the CFA and its problems in this regard.
In September, 1970, Charles Munro, President of CFA, sent a memorandum to the Canadian Broiler Council, the Canadian Turkey Federation, Canadian Egg Producers Council, and the Canadian Cattlemen's Association outlining the new advisory committee system of affiliation and inviting them to take part in discussions leading to such affiliation if they so desired.¹ In fact, informal ad hoc discussions had been going on with the leaders of these groups for some time. In the summer of 1971, formal affiliation agreement was reached with the Canadian Egg Producers Council and it seems that a similar model will be applied to bring about the affiliation of broiler and turkey producers.

The response of the CCA to Munro's invitation to affiliate is interesting. In a somewhat emotional reply the manager of the Cattlemen's Association advised the Federation that affiliation on an advisory committee basis as outlined was not acceptable. It was not that the advisory committee idea itself was faulty, but rather that the CCA wished to preserve its complete autonomy in the policy field.

¹Memorandum from Charles Munro, President of CFA, to the Secretaries of the Canadian Broiler Council, the Canadian Turkey Federation, the Canadian Egg Producers Council, and the Canadian Cattlemen's Association, September 1, 1970, CFA files.
"The Canadian Cattlemen's Association and its several affiliate Provincial Producer Organizations feel very intensely toward their responsibility to represent and speak for the beef production industry and are not prepared to subjugate their responsibilities in this area to any other organization. The Executive therefore could not accept the many implications of the domains of the CFA in establishing policy effecting the beef industry."¹

Some Lessons and Conclusions

Throughout its history the CFA has favoured provincial member units over commodity groups. However, with the tremendous changes that have taken place in the agricultural industry, and with the subsequent increased concern for nation-wide marketing, national commodity groups have become much more significant than in the past. In some respects the Federation's tendency to cling to the general provincial affiliate has become a little outdated, and it is a recognition of this fact that is causing a shift in CFA organizational structure and techniques.² The way in which the CFA

¹Letter from Charles Gracie, Managing-Director of CCA, to Charles Munro, President of CFA, October 23, 1970. At the root of the CCA's displeasure with the Federation was a single issue—the federal government's proposed Marketing Bill, C-176. For a complete discussion see infra, "Organization Solidarity," "The Issue of National Marketing."

²There is evidence that farm leaders continue to think of "farming as a way of life", whereas more dispassionate observers tend to regard "farming as an industry", more in economic terms, as a business. See, for example, the Report of the Federal Task Force on Agriculture, Canadian Agriculture in the Seventies, which recommends the establishment of a Department of Agricultural Industry, p. 301.
has sought to accommodate national commodity groups tells a good deal about the nature of that organization. The Federation has steadfastly avoided going all the way toward complete affiliation with these organizations. Instead, it has endeavored to find a compromise solution, a middle ground between regular affiliation and non-involvement. The CFA is a broker organization with a substantial aggregative function.

It may be that in its moves to accommodate national commodity groups, the Federation is merely reacting reflexively, its leaders realizing that they are in danger of being by-passed and frozen out of the main-stream of agricultural policy-making. The CFA may, to use Kwynick's terminology, be reacting to protect its "legitimacy" and "mandate" as the "official spokesman" for Canadian agriculture. National commodity organizations are becoming well financed, highly

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1It is worth noting that the CFA seems never to have regarded the Constitution to be particularly restrictive in the admission of affiliates. The point is often made in documentation that if the Federation wanted to have commodity affiliates it would be a simple matter to change the Constitution to permit it. See "Relation of National Commodity Groups," and "The CFA and the Relationship," prepared for meetings of the Board of Directors in July 1963, and July 1966 respectively.

2Kwaynick, *Organized Labour*, especially Chapters 4 and 5.
sophisticated reservoirs of expertise and experience. To an ever increasing extent they are having to deal with the federal government on a regular, on-going basis. Under these circumstances commodity groups require an "Ottawa voice" and if the CFA is unable or unwilling to fill this role such groups are likely to develop their own lobbying facilities or turn to professional lobbyists and consultants.¹

The assumption on the part of CFA leaders that their general agricultural policy can be fairly easily and peace-fully integrated with specific commodity policy seems to be a trifle naive. The Federation is trapped between the requirement that it aggregate various interests and demands on the one hand, and that it strongly articulate and represent those interests on the other. In its attempt to maintain a relatively cohesive federated organization, the CFA must "water down" its policies and actions within specific commodity areas—but in diluting its policies the Federation

¹Although this has not happened to any significant extent to date, the way may have been shown by the Canadian Tobacco Growers who engaged the services of Clyde Batten, an independent public relations man and lobbyist in Ottawa. There is some evidence that certain commodity groups have approached professional lobbyists, but up until now they have found the fee to be prohibitive. Interview with Mike Barry, employee of Executive Consultants Ltd., a well known Ottawa lobbying firm, July 8, 1971.
will tend to destroy the basic reason for commodity group support and affiliation. It is unrealistic to assume that in the case of conflict CFA policy will be supreme. From the experience of the Canadian Cattlemen's Association and the Canadian Swine Council there are extreme difficulties in trying to develop fully integrated policies which are meaningful and are at the same time acceptable to a general farm organization. Once a national commodity association has gone through all of the stages and has developed a policy position it is exceedingly difficult to have it change that policy to conform to over-all CFA positions. In view of this, one of the most significant results of the CFA's growing involvement with national commodity groups is the onus that it places on the shoulders of the Federation's professional staff. The real efforts toward harmony, compromise and integrated policies are shifted away from the Annual Meetings, from large Board meetings, and public confrontations into the "back rooms." It becomes increasingly necessary for CFA personnel, and particularly permanent Federation staff like Dave Kirk and Bill Hamilton, to represent the CFA point of view and explain CFA policies so that commodity policies might be formulated to mesh with the general policies and vice-versa.1

1Interview with Dave Kirk, June 22, 1971.
Since it is the CFA staff people who become the secretariat for commodity groups when they affiliate, they are in attendance at every meeting and are at the center of ongoing activities with respect to that commodity. In addition, it is these people who fully understand the range, content and direction of general CFA policy positions. What is evolving, therefore, is ever greater responsibilities for national office personnel as integrators of CFA and commodity organization policies.¹

To a very considerable extent the nature of the CFA commodity group relationship and the ultimate direction that relationship takes will be determined by the political and administrative skill of the CFA permanent staff.² The lion's share of this responsibility presently falls on the shoulders of Dave Kirk, the Executive Secretary, with assistance from Bill Hamilton, the Associate Secretary.

¹In essence, both Hamilton and Kirk confirm these observations, but Hamilton goes further to stress the importance of the two-way communications process as a means of raising the level of understanding and thereby facilitating a more integrated policy. There is no doubt that affiliation results in vastly improved communication of information, between the Federation and the CSC for example, and Hamilton's point that this will lead to more enlightened policy positions seems to be well taken. Interview with Bill Hamilton, Associate Secretary of CFA, July 7, 1971.

²In his classic study of political interest groups David Truman reviewed the elements which contribute to the
4. Organizational Solidarity: A Persistent Challenge

In Chapter I I indicated that group cohesion is one of the paramount internal objectives of all political interest groups. Cohesion is one component in the network of factors that determine interest group effectiveness. However, it is the one element which can over-ride all others and either gives a group influence, or robs it of its influence, in spite of other strengths or weaknesses.¹

Organizational solidarity, or cohesion, is of special significance to the CFA because most of the factors that militate against a strong, close knit organization seem to be present in the Federation. The CFA is part of a geo-political environment which is diverse, federated, and not conducive to group cohesion, particularly in the aggregation of interests as extensive as in agriculture.²

concentration of power in an active minority. Moreover, he implies what the evidence here seems to suggest—that a large, heterogeneous, federated organization like the CFA is more likely to encourage and rely upon an active minority than are more cohesive, unitary types of organizations. See Truman, Process, pp. 139 ff., and especially pp. 140-41.

¹Truman, Process, Chapter 6.

²Engelmann and Schwartz, Political Parties, Chapter 2.
The organizational problems of the CFA are exaggerated by the nature of its membership. There is extensive overlapping of members between CFA affiliates; there are divided loyalties, conflicts and contradiction, which are fodder for instability and group disunity. A good deal of the argument on the following pages is intended to illustrate this fact.

Inter-group rivalry and conflict within the CFA is kindled by the kinds of policies and issues that are raised by government in the agricultural sphere. Governmental activities in this area generally have a direct effect on farmers' income and/or the farmers' freedom as an individual. Marketing boards, stabilization programs, freight assistance, export tariffs, acreage subsidies all have a direct and observable bearing on the life of the individual farmer. It is usually the case therefore, that opinions respecting agricultural policy are intensely held by the farm interest groups most directly involved.

Finally, the leaders of the CFA do not possess many of the tools that can be used to enforce loyalty and build group cohesion. "Selective inducements" which are utilized

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1See Appendix B.


by many of the provincial affiliates and commodity organizations are simply not available to the parent Federation.⁴

This has meant that certain techniques of leadership and administration have come to be of central importance to the continued existence of the CFA. It has meant also that the responsibility of maintaining group solidarity rests largely on the shoulders of the CFA bureaucracy.

In the following pages I will attempt to illuminate and enlarge upon these factors by considering two issues, the margarine sales tax issue and the national marketing issue, and by looking at the political skill of CFA personnel and their means of internal communication.

The Margarine Sales Tax Issue

The struggle over sales tax on margarine affords a good example of organizational stress within the CFA.⁵ In 1920 when the federal sales tax was introduced, margarine, like butter and butter substitutes, was exempted.

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²David Truman uses the same example in the United States to illustrate the internal difficulties of farm interest groups. See Truman, Process, pp. 161-62 and pp. 185-86.
However, in 1931 this exemption for margarine was lifted because it was not "manufactured from milk or cream," and it became subject to the 12% tax.¹ Margarine remained taxable until 1971 when it was once again exempted by the Hon. E. J. Benson's Budget.²

Over the years dairy farmers and their organizations have sought to protect the dairy industry by supporting laws and regulations which work to the disadvantage of such competitive products as margarine and dairy substitutes. At the provincial level this protective action has involved interfering with the colour of margarine being marketed. For some time many provinces imposed a complete prohibition on the manufacture of coloured margarine, and even today all provinces except B.C. and Newfoundland prevent the marketing of margarine which is the same colour as butter.³

¹Letter from R. W. Oxley, Department of National Revenue, to Wilson Freeman, Economist with CFA, June 22, 1971.

²Hon. E. J. Benson, "Budget Speech," June 18, 1971, p. 34. Newfoundland is an exception here in that one of the conditions of that province's entry into confederation was that margarine be exempted from federal sales tax. Thus margarine consumed in the province of Newfoundland has been free of federal tax. Letter from Oxley to Freeman, p. 2.

The federal government, under pressure from the dairy industry, had gone as far as to attempt to ban the manufacture of margarine, but this action was declared to be ultra vires by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1948.\(^1\) Since then the dairy interest has been content at the national level to support the 12% federal sales tax plus a national policy of tariffs on vegetable oils and oil seeds entering Canada from other countries.\(^2\) The total government income from the sales tax on margarine averaged about $5,000,000 per year in the late 1960's.\(^3\) It was not, therefore, a tremendously significant source of income for the government.

Certain groups like the Canadian Consumer Council and the Institute of Edible Oil Foods made repeated appeals to government and to the public to have the tax removed. These were counterbalanced on the other side by a myriad of dairy industry groups, represented at the national level primarily by the Dairy Farmers of Canada (DFC) and the CFA. This

\(^1\)Canada Law Reports - Supreme Court of Canada
Vol. I, 1949, p. 89. The decision of the Supreme Court was made on December 14, 1948.


\(^3\)Letter from Hon. Herb Gray, Minister of National Revenue, to Wilson Freeman, Economist with CFA, June 17, 1971.
controversy placed the CFA on the horns of a dilemma stemming from the fact that a growing number of its members had a direct interest in seeing the sales tax on margarine removed.

Margarine is manufactured from a variety of edible oils and two of the key producer groups of this product are the Rapeseed Association of Canada, and the Ontario Soya-Bean Growers Marketing Board. Both of these commodity organizations are also affiliated with the CFA through their provincial member bodies. In recent years there has been a rapidly expanding domestic and foreign market for Canadian edible oils, and this has meant that the number of oil seed growers has increased dramatically. This development has been accompanied, of course, by a commensurate expansion in the power of their producer organizations. Also, the added commercial importance of oil seeds and the greater number of oil seed growers has caused other well established farm groups, like the powerful western Wheat Pools, to look more seriously and more sympathetically at their problems, and specifically at the margarine sales tax issue.¹ The upshot of this was an

¹By 1971, for example, in certain provinces the issue had clearly been resolved in favour of the oil seeds representatives. At that time Mr. John Monkhouse, a long-time employee of DPC, was advised by the Directors of the Saskatchewan Federation of Agriculture that in that province, within the SPA, the dairy interests did not have a chance of winning a vote on the sales tax issue. Interview with John Monkhouse, Associate Secretary (Dairy) of the CFA, July 14, 1971.
ever widening gap within the CFA between the traditional dairy interests on the one hand and the oil seed representatives on the other.

On the margarene issue the dairy industry traditionally had the upper hand within the CFA. However, at the 1971 Annual Meeting of the Federation representatives of the oil seeds industry presented a motion calling for the removal of the 12% sales tax on margarene, and made it clear that in view of their strength they were prepared to fight this matter through. In the face of this Bill Wolfrey, President of DFC, moved a tabling motion which had the effect of neither supporting nor rejecting the tax, but simply delayed consideration until some future date.¹ The tendency of the majority of delegates, who were not "directly" involved in the confrontation between oil seed and dairy interests, when confronted with a threat to the solidarity of the Federation was to give priority to the immediate needs of the organization by accepting a compromise solution. The severe strain which had threatened to rupture the organization was temporarily alleviated.

In the event, the Federation was saved from a permanent public rift by the government which exempted margarene

¹Interview with Bill Wolfrey, President of DFC, July 16, 1971.
from the tax without waiting for agreement by the national farm organization. The acceptance of the government’s action was facilitated by a split within the DFC organization itself. The difficulties at the CFA Annual Meeting had brought the issue into even sharper focus for the Dairy Farmers of Canada. At a meeting of the Directors of DFC in June, 1971, a group of dairy organizations led by George McLaughlin, Chairman of the Ontario Milk Marketing Board, tried to reverse the stand of DFC by recommending discontinuance of the 12% sales tax on margarene. Under enlightened leadership in Ontario the dairy industry had become highly rationalized, promotion oriented, and public relations conscious. It was increasingly embarrassing for a man like McLaughlin to be associated with organizations which continued to support artificial and inequitable barriers to competition, like the sales tax on margarene. On the other hand, those segments of the dairy industry which felt the threat of real financial loss if margarene was made more competitive continued to oppose any lifting of the tax. When the issue finally came to a vote in the Directors meeting of the DFC there was only one vote separating the two sides.  

1 Interview with Wilson Freeman, Economist with CFA, June 28, 1971.

2 Interview with Bill Wolfrey, President of DFC, July 6, 1971.
The organization was at an impasse on the issue. In President Wolfrey’s view the vote was too close to indicate anything. His official position was that the policy of DPC had not been changed nor had it been re-affirmed—it was simply “under review”.  

This issue is indicative of the kinds of cross pressures and conflicting demands which face a federated, general organization like the CYA. The Federation was largely immobilized; it reacted in a cautious and dilatory manner which left the government free to step in and exempt margarine from the tax, thus resolving the issue. This is a classic example of the organizational problems that are caused by overlapping group membership within one large umbrella organization. And it reinforces the conclusions of other observers. V. O. Key, for example, suggests that “Overlapping membership may do more than dull the sharpness of group demands; it may immobilize a group on some issues.” In discussing the reaction of the American Farm Bureau Federation to this same issue in the United States, Truman points out that “... to avoid an open split, to avoid making members choose between the federation...”  

1Ibid.  

2Key, Political Parties, p. 167.
and these commodity groups (i.e.: dairying and oilseed groups), the Farm Bureau . . . took no stand on the proposed repeal of the taxes. The same holds true for both the Canadian Federation of Agriculture and Dairy Farmers of Canada.

The Issue of National Marketing Legislation

In the words of David Kirk, Executive Secretary of the Federation, "The struggle over Bill C-176 is the best case study to have come along in the history of the farm movement in Canada. . . . All aspects of the farm movement are involved--regionalism, commodity interest, economic conflicts, leadership, etc., etc." In other words Bill C-176, the debate surrounding federal government's Farm Products Marketing Agencies Act, involves those elements that are central to the life of a general, federated farm organization like the CFA. The factors which are mentioned by Kirk are those that are involved in what I have chosen to call the "solidarity" of the organization. They either serve to weld the organization together into a viable and effective instrument, or they corrode the foundations on which the organization rests, thereby rendering it less effective. It is these kinds of factors.

1 Truman, Process, p. 186.

2 Interview with Dave Kirk, Executive Secretary of CFA, May 27, 1971.
that cause the struggle to shift from issues to organizational cohesion.

Elsewhere in this study I have alluded to the forces that are at work in society and in the agricultural industry which in recent years have stimulated the desire for supply management and commodity marketing agencies.\(^1\) Suffice it to say here that within the last decade orderly marketing of farm produce has become one of the central concerns of governments, farm leaders, and agricultural policy analysts. A full explanation of the current federal marketing legislation and its implications would run into hundreds of pages, not to mention the thought and activity that has gone on at the provincial level. However, I am concerned here with the organizational ramifications in the evolution of this legislation, and I will, therefore, largely ignore the Bill’s substance, except where it is necessary to the understanding of the group process.

The CFA has been wedded to the concept of national marketing boards since at least 1963, at which time provincial government policies themselves were unclear, and provincial agencies in the most advanced provinces were still

\(^1\) *Supra*, Section 3 of this Chapter, "National Commodity Groups."
in their formative stages. The ultimate goal of these national marketing policies is, of course, a greater degree of price stability and a higher net return to farmers for their produce.

Due to the nature of the country, our constitution, and the competitive, diverse features of the agricultural economy, it has been exceedingly difficult to work toward orderly marketing on a national scale. However, by the summer of 1968 consideration of a national egg marketing agency was quite far advanced, and agreement among egg producers was sufficiently widespread that the establishment of such an agency was a genuine possibility. Implementation of a nationwide egg marketing scheme would have required federal legislation making it the first organization of its kind in Canada. (I am excepting the Canadian Wheat Board which does have powers extending beyond provincial boundaries, but only with respect to the four western provinces, not nationally.) When the newly appointed Minister of Agriculture, the Hon. H. A. Olson, took office in July 1968 he was confronted with strong representations from the CFA and egg producing groups advocating immediate action to establish a national egg marketing

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1See "CFA statement to the Federal-Provincial Agricultural Conference," December 17, 1963, CFA files.
agency. In its first letter to the Minister the CFA raised the matter of egg policy and "the desirability of a very early announcement by the federal government of its willingness to move in the establishment of a Canadian Egg Commission."¹

In June of 1968 the CFA and the Canadian Egg Producers Council jointly sponsored a Canadian Conference of Egg Producers which attracted egg and poultry men from across the country and from both levels of government. Emerging from this Conference was a consensus that some sort of national egg marketing agency should be instituted as quickly as possible.²

During the period from June to October 1968 the respective federal Ministers of Agriculture, Mr. J. J. Greene and Mr. H. A. Olson, had been meeting periodically with their provincial counterparts to discuss the egg marketing situation. In these meetings, as in the producer discussions, Manitoba was generally a reluctant participant. That province produces eggs far in excess of its own requirements and feared that a

¹Letter from Dave Kirk of CFA to Hon. H. A. Olson, Minister of Agriculture, July 15, 1968.

²See reference in a letter from Dave Kirk of CFA to Hon. J. J. Greene, Minister of Agriculture, July 2, 1968.
n national marketing scheme might eventually interfere with
the Manitoba egg market throughout the country. Indeed it
was largely the allegations that Manitoba eggs were being
"dumped" in other provinces at depressed prices that lent
some urgency, in the eyes of non-Manitobans, to the need
for national regulation of egg marketing.

By November 1968 the Minister of Agriculture was
able to report "near unanimous agreement" on the principle
of establishing a National Egg Marketing Agency.\footnote{1} Following
this the CFA and the Egg Producers Council impressed upon
the government the need for immediate and intensive discus-
sions of the details of a proposed egg marketing plan.\footnote{2} The
federal government for its part developed a fairly specific
proposal for "A Canadian Egg Marketing Agency,"\footnote{3} which was
to serve as a working document in the preparation of appro-
priate legislation. At this point in time, beginning in the
new year, 1969, that curious, indeed mysterious, process

\footnote{1}"National Egg Marketing Agency," Canadian Depart-

\footnote{2}Letter from Dave Kirk of CFA to Hon. H. A. Olson,
December 10, 1968.

\footnote{3}Files of the Minister of Agriculture.
known as "governmental policy-making" took over. Virtually all of the communication between the government, the CPA, and the Egg Producer Council seems to have been terminated. Within a few months after the egg marketing plan had nearly come to fruition the government (meaning the Minister of Agriculture and his officials) had decided to drop the egg scheme and proceed with enabling legislation covering all commodities. Although the process by which the general marketing plan was brought forward is beyond the bounds of this study, it appears that the decision to proceed with a general proposal rather than the specific egg marketing scheme came about as a result of a series of informal face-to-face discussions between the Minister and his top advisors—-in this case principally S. B. Williams, the Deputy Minister of Agriculture, and Esmond Jarvis, Assistant Deputy Minister in charge of Production and Marketing.

During this incubation period when new omnibus federal legislation was being considered other producer groups were indicating their desire for national marketing schemes. Late in 1969 the Canadian Broiler Council prepared a draft "Canadian Chicken Marketing Council Act," for government consideration, and early in 1970 the Manitoba Turkey Producers' Marketing Board came forward with a proposed "Canadian
Chicken and Turkey Marketing Council Act.\(^1\) These proposals coupled with informal indications that other commodity groups like the potato growers, would soon want similar legislation caused the authorities in the Department of Agriculture to become more firm in their belief that broad enabling legislation was the best solution.\(^2\)

Farm organizations had virtually no role in the debate over the omnibus bill. The first mention of the change in national marketing policy insofar as the farm organizations were concerned came in a letter written to the Minister on behalf of the CFA and the Canadian Egg Producers Council.

\(^1\) Fences of the Minister of Agriculture.

\(^2\) In an interview on July 17, 1971, S. B. Williams, Deputy Minister of Agriculture, indicated he and a few others from industry and the provinces tended to favour a gradual step-by-step approach involving the establishment of an egg plan first, to be followed by general legislation. However, he submits, the balance of the argument was in favour of immediate enabiling legislation, and in the face of this he voiced no strong objections. The Deputy Minister, Mr. Williams, is a very powerful and persuasive individual, and it seems clear from the evidence that although he favoured gradual implementation of the egg plan first, he did not hold intense views on the matter. He was prepared to be influenced by the strongly held views of his own advisors in the Production and Marketing Branch of CDA.
It states:

"... We appreciate that there have been periodic indications that the government may be contemplating broad federal legislation rather than specific legislation for national marketing of each commodity. We do not know what present government thinking is on this, but regardless, we submit legislation for a national egg marketing plan, could and should be developed forthwith along the lines already agreed to in our discussions with your department, and that if general marketing legislation is to be forthcoming, the egg plan could be subsequently tailored into it."¹

In spite of these misgivings and predictions of a worsening situation in the national egg markets, the government proceeded with its plan to draft the general Farm Products Marketing Agencies Act. This item was introduced in the House of Commons on March 17, 1970, as Bill C-197. When it failed to secure passage in that session of parliament it was re-introduced in the fall of 1970 as Bill C-176.²

Very briefly, the bill was intended to remove the legal roadblocks to national marketing boards insofar as it was within the power of the federal government to do so.²

¹Letter from Dave Kirk of CPA to Hon. H. A. Olsen, July 20, 1969, Files of the Minister of Agriculture.

²Under the present Constitution, the BNA Act as interpreted by the Courts, the provincial governments have jurisdiction over intra-provincial trade while the federal
It was drafted as enabling legislation which would permit groups representing commodities across the nation to band together to regulate the production and marketing of that product without governmental or judicial interference. The legislation would establish a National Marketing Council to oversee, guide and assist in the creation of national commodity agencies. In short, the proposed legislation would place the onus squarely on the shoulders of provincial governments and commodity groups to get together and agree, for there would be no remaining federal impediment to such agreement.

Once Bill C-197 was introduced and circulated the farm organizations responded by giving it their overwhelming support. By May 1970, they were expressing dissatisfaction that the bill was not being advanced more quickly through Second Reading so that it might be discussed in the House Agriculture Committee. On May 11, 1970, David Kirk sent a government has authority over interprovincial trade. It is in this latter area that national marketing agencies would require federal authority. See the British North America Act, Sections 91.2 and 92.13. Also, Dawson, Government of Canada, pp. 83-84.

At this early stage there was not a consistent effort on the part of the opposition to defeat the bill on matters of principle as developed later on. Lack of progress for the bill at this stage can be attributed to Mr. Olson's failure to get the government to assign a sufficiently high priority to the bill, and normal opposition tactics of delay, while the issues clarified.
telegram to all CFA members indicating that the Federation was upset with opposition amendments which were delaying the Bill in the House of Commons, and he suggested that member bodies wire the relevant parties in an attempt to expedite the movement of the Bill into the Standing Committee. On May 12 Charles Munro, President of CFA, sent a telegram to the Minister of Agriculture and to the leaders of the three opposition parties suggesting that "Canadian producers are very anxious to see passage of Bill C-197 in this session. The Bill has their basic and strong support . . . See no purpose in prolonged debate on Second Reading and would urge quick passage so Committee can proceed with job and get it completed at an early date."  

Following the lead of the CFA national office a number of member bodies—namely, the Saskatchewan Federation of Agriculture, Unifarm, the Nova Scotia Chicken Marketing Board, L'UCC, and the UGG—sent telegrams to the appropriate authorities in Ottawa. On June 2, 1970, following a meeting of his Executive, Mr. Munro again petitioned the leaders of

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1Night Message, Dave Kirk to all provincial affiliates, May 11, 1970, CFA files.

2Telegram from Charles Munro, President of CFA, May 12, 1970, CFA files.
all parties "urgently requesting" that Bill C-197 be adopted on Second Reading. At the same time, although quite indepen-
dently from the CFA, the National Farmers Union wired the
Minister of Agriculture requesting that the Bill be expedited.

All of the representations followed the same tack—that the
Bill should be quickly advanced through its second stage so
that it might go to Committee where formal submissions from
interested groups might be heard. In taking this line the
farm organizations were encouraged by the Minister of Agri-
culture who adopted the same approach, promising to consider
amendments and producer suggestions once the Bill was before
the Standing Committee.

However, in June 1970, the first rumblings of dis-
content and outright opposition to the Bill were voiced by
representatives of the beef industry. Both the Saskatchewan

1Telegram from Charles Munro, President of CFA, to
Messrs. Olson, Minister of Agriculture, Douglas, Leader of
the NDP, Caouette, Leader of Ralliement de Creditiste,
Stanfield, Leader of the Progressive Conservatives, Prime
Minister Trudeau, McDonald, Government House Leader, and
B. Beer, Chairman of the Standing Committee on Agriculture,
June 2, 1970, CFA files.

2Telegram from Stuart Thiessen, Secretary Manager
of the NFU, to Hon. H. A. Olson, May 6, 1970. Files of the
Minister of Agriculture.
Stock Grower's Association and the Canadian Cattlemen's Association registered their opposition on the grounds that the Bill was unnecessary and harmful to the interests of the beef producers they represented.¹

The Saskatchewan Stock Growers are affiliated with the Saskatchewan Federation of Agriculture, and on this issue their policy was diametrically opposed to that of the SFA. This divergence at the provincial level is an excellent example of the organizational problems that were later to plague the CFA. In commenting on the Stock Growers position, Gary Carlson of the Saskatchewan Federation wrote:

"SFA member policies do not always agree with SFA policies and vice-versa, since SFA members are autonomous and have every right to pursue policies alone, where disagreement exists . . . . However, the beef industry, if not in support of C-197, should at least respect the policy position of other commodity groups desiring national marketing legislation for Canada. . . . Just because marketing legislation is repulsive to the beef industry is an insufficient basis for rejecting marketing legislation for all agricultural commodities."²


²Letter from G. C. Carlson, Secretary of SFA, to D. J. Perrin of SSGA, June 4, 1970, CFA files.
These are strong and straightforward words, which in a sense, tend to obscure the fact that this was an issue which could provoke deep and disturbing rifts within the structure of a federated organization.

Although Bill C-197 was sent to the Standing Commit-tee in the early summer of 1970 it was not returned to the House for final passage before the session ended. During the summer the opposition of the beef industry to the federal marketing legislation intensified,\(^1\) while in other commodities the marketing situation became increasingly chaotic. Quebec Superior Court upheld the authority of the Quebec Egg Marketing Board (FEDCO) to control eggs imported into the province.\(^2\) This accelerated development of the infamous "chicken and egg war" in which a number of provinces imposed restrictions on the import of eggs and broiler chickens from other provinces. There was, therefore, increasing tension within the CFA between those segments.

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\(^2\)The decision of the Quebec Superior Court was upheld by the Quebec Court of Appeal. For details on both decisions, see Quebec Court of Appeal Record, 1972, p. 882.
Federation of Agriculture opposes us," they said, "their ranks are divided for we have the stated support of the Nova Scotia Federation of Agriculture, the B.C. Federation of Agriculture and Uniform in Alberta and most of the Provincial Ministers of Agriculture.¹ There is scant evidence to indicate that the Cattlemen's Association did command the full support of these groups, but it is true that division over the marketing issue was posing a mounting threat to the internal cohesion and well-being of the CFA organization as well as some of its provincial affiliates.²

The nature and ramifications of the national marketing controversy were brought sharply into focus by the development of an intense nation-wide anti-C-176 campaign. The campaign was spearheaded in parliament and in Standing Committee by Jack Hörner, Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament for Crowfoot in southern Alberta. Outside of parliament the major impetus for the anti-C-176 drive came from western Canadian commodity groups, chiefly cattle producers, and a group of eastern farmers who were generally

¹"A Further Submission Respecting Bill C-176 to the Standing Committee on Agriculture," Canadian Cattlemen's Association, March 12, 1971, CFA files.

²The situation with Uniform of Alberta is a good example. See infra, p. 145.
that the appeals of cattlemen had had some effect. He said:
"I am prepared to accept amendments to this Bill respecting
the provisions in the clause which deals with the definition
of agricultural products to the extent that cattle and calves
would be excluded from the provisions of the Bill."¹ It should
be noted that Mr. Olson, a rancher himself, represented the
Medicine Hat constituency in which cattle interests are of
substantial importance. In his decision to exempt cattle from
the provisions of the Bill, private and informal communications
and the realities of his own political situation were at least
as important, or perhaps more important, than the formal ap-
peals of beef organizations. With this decision there
appeared to be universal harmony among the affected commodity
groups and sufficient agreement among the legislators that
speedy passage of the Bill could reasonably be expected. The
Minister of Agriculture, by reversing himself on the matter
of beef cattle, saved the Canadian Federation of Agriculture
from a potentially serious internal rupture caused by the
disagreement between a majority of its members and represen-
tatives of the beef industry.

¹Hon. H. A. Olson, "Statement to the House of Commons,"
CFA solidarity on the national marketing issue reached a crest at the Second Agricultural Congress held in Ottawa in November 1970. At this time the Bill was before the House of Commons, and it was the favorite topic of conversation among farm organization leaders attending the Congress. There was scarcely a ripple of dissent with respect to the national marketing plan. Dave Kirk testified as to the organizational tranquility and solidarity that prevailed within the CFA at this time. "There was," he said, "near unanimity on marketing and everyone was getting along beautifully. Then, after the Congress, cracks started to appear in their support for Bill C-176. Then, all hell broke loose."  

Throughout the winter of 1970-71 it became clear to the Minister of Agriculture and members of the Standing Committee on Agriculture that to exempt beef cattle from the Act would simply lead to demands from other groups—hog and

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1 The Congress was sponsored by the federal government and was attended by about 400 delegates from both levels of government, the agricultural industry, and farm organizations. For more detail see infra, Chapter V, Section 1, "The Consultation Fixation."

2 Interview with Dave Kirk of CFA, May 27, 1971.
apple growers, for example— for a similar exemption. Some commodity groups which were export oriented and did not immediately have the problems of massive cycles of over-production, depressed prices and interprovincial dumping began to share the cattleman's view that national marketing legislation was unnecessary and might indeed be threatening. Therefore, over a period of time it was decided that the amendment to exclude cattle would not be supported by the government. This conformed to the view taken by the Federation. At a session of the Standing Committee on Agriculture, Cliff Downey, Conservative Member of Parliament from Alberta, asked the Federation spokesmen what they thought of the Minister's plan to delete cattle from the Bill. Replying on behalf of the CPA, Dave Kirk said: "We think it should stay in because we think this is legislation to provide a capability of doing something if the producers decide to . . . When farmers see a need to do something and the agency is the right way to do it, then we think the capability should be there." The gist of the


Federation's position was that although the cattlemen did not apparently need the legislation at this time, the possibility of using it at some future time should not be eliminated.

In a second appearance before the Committee on this issue Mr. Roland Pigeon, Vice-President of the CFA, said as one of the main points in the CFA brief, "we do regret the proposal to exclude cattle and beef from the legislation."¹ He reiterated the point that cattle growers should not be excluded from future benefits under the proposed Act. And he went on to assert that there are "a great many producers of cattle represented through this Federation who do not share the views on this issue of the organizations opposing inclusion of these products."² This was a direct reference to the Canadian Cattlemen's Association which was becoming increasingly exercised over the stance taken by the CFA on this issue.

The decision not to exclude cattle from the Bill, and CFA support of this position, reopened and further


²Ibid.
aggravated the rift between national farm organizations and within the CFA itself. A few days after Pigeon's testimony before the Standing Committee the CCA voiced its "grave concern" that the "... CFA spokesmen once more expressed the view and indeed recommended that cattle and beef not be excluded from the provisions of this Bill ..."\(^1\) The CCA pointed out that most of the beef groups who favoured exclusion of cattle from the Bill were joint members of both the Cattlemen's Association and the CFA. "Let me emphasize again," said the Cattlemen's spokesman, "that the heart of our concern is the apparent disregard of the CFA for the views of the commodity organizations."\(^2\)

It was not so much that the CFA leaders were unaware or unconcerned with the views of the relevant commodity groups as it was a case where the Federation organization itself was under considerable strain as a result of the divergent needs and opinions of its component groups. The CCA pointed to the CFA dilemma in their third formal appearance before the Standing Committee. "While the Canadian

\(^1\) Letter from Charles Gracey of CCA to Charles Munro of CFA, January 18, 1971, CFA files.

\(^2\) Ibid.
Federation of Agriculture opposes us," they said, "their ranks are divided for we have the stated support of the Nova Scotia Federation of Agriculture, the B.C. Federation of Agriculture and Uniform in Alberta and most of the Provinicial Ministers of Agriculture."¹ There is scant evidence to indicate that the Cattlemen's Association did command the full support of these groups, but it is true that division over the marketing issue was posing a mounting threat to the internal cohesion and well-being of the CFA organization as well as some of its provincial affiliates.²

The nature and ramifications of the national marketing controversy were brought sharply into focus by the development of an intense nation-wide anti-C-176 campaign. The campaign was spearheaded in parliament and in Standing Committee by Jack Hörner, Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament for Crowfoot in southern Alberta. Outside of parliament the major impetus for the anti-C-176 drive came from western Canadian commodity groups, chiefly cattle producers, and a group of eastern farmers who were generally

¹"A Further Submission Respecting Bill C-176 to the Standing Committee on Agriculture," Canadian Cattlemen's Association, March 12, 1971, CFA files.

²The situation with Uniform of Alberta is a good example. See infra, p. 145.
opposed to the principles of organized marketing. This latter group was led in Ontario by Joe Hudson, a large egg producer who had been very effective in organizing producers to defeat the Ontario General Farm Organization vote in 1969. Hudson's strategy was to engage in a massive propaganda campaign which would lead large numbers of people to contact their M.P.'s in order to register opposition to the Bill. "That's the way we beat the General Farm Organization vote in Ontario," he said. "We learned that when you go bear hunting you take a lot of little dogs." In this instance the ammunition was to be provided by a series of newspaper advertisements during April, 1971, in all major dailies and farm papers across the country. Each advertisement contained two coupons which were to be clipped out and sent in—one to the local M.P. and the other to either Mr. Stanfield, Leader of the Official Opposition, or Mr. Jack Horner, M.P.

As a result of this campaign the debate on marketing reached new heights of emotionalism, and the divisions

1See more detailed reference to this in the case study on the General Farm Organization (GFO) in Ontario, infra, Chapter III.

between opposing interests were magnified. The newspaper
advertisements were written in such a way that they empha-
sized those issues which would make maximum impact within
particular regions. In Ontario they stressed "total
arbitrary government control," "cheap food policy," "farmers
forced out of business," and "farmer riots in Europe because
of a similar marketing system." In the west the key items
were "reduced freedoms," "Eastern domination," "corporate
control," "lower feed grain prices," and "less livestock
production."

It was claimed that Mr. Stanfield received 35,000
coupons protesting the Bill,\(^1\) while Mr. Olson, the Minister
responsible, received about 1500 from his own constituency.\(^2\)

Mr. Horner and some of his western colleagues saw the cam-
paign as sufficient justification to delay the legislation
and prevent its passage prior to the summer recess of the
House on June 30, 1971.

The organizational problems that were posed by the
conflict over this Bill are exemplified in the vacillating

\(^1\)See picture and capsule comments, The Western

\(^2\)This is according to the estimate of Harvey Pudwell,
Executive Assistant to the Minister of Agriculture.
behavior of Unifarm in Alberta. Unifarm's position with respect to this Bill was perhaps more significant than for any other regional farm organization. Aside from being a large and important component of the CFA, Unifarm represents the province where opposition to C-176 was strongest. Moreover, Alberta was represented in the Cabinet and in parliament by the Minister of Agriculture, and under these circumstances the policies of this single general farm organization tended to be politically more relevant than was the case for most similar farm organizations in the country.

In its original brief to the Standing Committee on Agriculture, Unifarm stood squarely behind the concept of orderly national marketing. It therefore supported the Bill subject to certain amendments being made—to guarantee greater producer control of the proposed Marketing Council, for example.1 In this and other statements Unifarm consistently supported the strong pro-C-176 stand taken by the CFA. In a press release intended to curb the fears in some quarters that support for C-176 was softening, Dobson Lea, President of Unifarm, said that his organization was neither

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1 Unifarm, "Submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Agriculture Regarding Bill C-176," February 4, 1971, CFA files.
"cautious" nor "conditional" in its support for Bill C-176. "On the contrary," he said, "Unifarm wholeheartedly supports the principle of orderly marketing provided for in Bill C-176." ¹

A month later Mr. Lea was accusing those groups who were seeking to delay the marketing legislation of being "grossly unfair to producers who need that legislation immediately." ² At the same time Lea challenged the accuracy of statements made by hog and cattle organizations in the advertising campaign that was being waged to stop Bill C-176. This was the last firm statement that was favourable to C-176 to be issued by Unifarm. It came at the height of the anti-C-176 advertising campaign, and at a time when there was a general furor both in the House of Commons and in the nation's press concerning the Bill. It was also at this time (April 19) that Premier Harry Strom of Alberta withdrew his support of the legislation and demanded that cattle and hogs be exempted from it. ³

¹ Unifarm Press Release, March 16, 1971, Files of the Minister of Agriculture.

² Unifarm Press Release, April 26, 1971, Files of the Minister of Agriculture.

³ Telegram from Premier H. Strom to Prime Minister Trudeau, April 19, 1971. See also "Stall C-176 Campaign Mounts Across Canada," Manitoba Co-operator, April 22, 1971.
On May 3, after a special weekend meeting of the executive, Unifarm withdrew its unqualified support of C-176 and asked that both cattle and hogs be exempted from the Bill. President Lea spoke about the "grave reservations expressed during the past week by our cattle and hog producing members."¹ In spite of the near unanimous support given for the inclusion of all commodities at the Unifarm Annual Meeting, some four months earlier, Lea and his executive felt compelled to reverse themselves in the case of cattle and hogs.

The organizational problems facing Unifarm at this time were almost exactly the same as those confronting the CFA. The powerful cattle organizations who were a part of Unifarm had been applying heavy pressure in opposition to the Bill. Then they were joined by the Alberta Hog Producers Marketing Board under its new chairman, Mr. Stan Berg. In the spring elections to the Hog Board Unifarm had been "somewhat derelict in its political duties" and allowed a majority to be elected who were opposed to national marketing boards.² Thus, when confronted with a united front from two

¹Unifarm Press Release, May 3, 1971, Files of the Minister of Agriculture.

²The men who were supported by Unifarm were narrowly defeated by others who were backed by the fledgling National Farmers Union. This does not mean, however, that the NFU was opposed to marketing boards. It is probable that the
important province-wide livestock commodity groups, Unifarm leaders felt that in order to maintain the solidarity of their organization it was necessary to change their position on C-176, and they advised the federal government accordingly.

The Unifarm decision served only to exacerbate the organizational difficulties of the CFA. A very significant part of the anti-C-176 campaign was the claim that the legislation would tend to further eastern agriculture (particularly livestock) to the detriment of the west. Bill C-176 was portrayed in the west as another in a long list of examples of how eastern interests have sought to dominate and exploit other regions of the country.¹

In the east the CFA could safely afford to ignore the Joe Hudson group and a similar group in the Maritimes, for

defeat of Unifarm backed candidates was more important to NFU leaders than was the particular stand of the individuals they were supporting. It seems that Unifarm leaders underestimated the threat and did not, therefore, make sufficient efforts. This was confirmed in interviews with Paul Babey, former President of Unifarm, Ken Williams, member of the Alberta Products Marketing Council, and Bill Hamilton, Associate Secretary of CFA.

¹These claims were supported by vitriolic editorials in the Cattlemen magazine, see in particular, "C-176 Will Destroy our Beef Industry," Cattlemen, April, 1971; and "C-176—How Can They Do It?" Cattlemen, June, 1971.
although they might ultimately be able to defeat the marketing Bill, they could not pose a serious threat to the CFA organization itself. They simply did not control any important organizational components within the CFA structure. In the west however, the anti-marketing campaign was being sponsored by groups that were also important affiliates of the Federation. The newspaper advertisements in western Canada were sponsored by the Western Stock Growers Association (Alberta), Manitoba Stock Growers Association, Saskatchewan Stock Growers Association, Alberta Hog Producers Marketing Board, Saskatchewan Swine Breeders Association, Saskatchewan Hog Producers Association, Manitoba Pork Producers, Manitoba Egg, Poulet Producers Association, and, of course, the Canadian Cattlemen's Association.

In the face of such an imposing division within its own ranks there was little more that the CFA could do other than despair at its predicament. Some of the CFA leaders like Gordon Hill, President of the Ontario Federation of Agriculture, wanted to take a vigorous stand in favour of the marketing Bill and in opposition to those groups who were advertising against it. In an executive meeting at the

1Indeed, as often as not during this period the reaction of Dave Kirk, Executive Secretary, was one of despair.
height of the controversy, Hill exhorted his colleagues to be more aggressive, to decide what was right and fight for the farmer's interests. Hill emphasized that the traditional problem with the Federation, both at the national and provincial level was that they failed to take clear positions in favour of ordinary farmers and they therefore failed to gain grassroots support. The problem for the CFA, however, was that it was caught in a trap—the sort of trap that plagues federated organizations when they are confronted with issues of consequence. Strong and clear articulation of the issues involved in the marketing legislation was needed for the CFA to strengthen its mandate to speak on behalf of farmers. However, articulation threatened cohesion. In its attempts to perform an aggregative function on behalf of its affiliates, and in response to government, the CFA was hindered by a lack of cohesion. It was a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" situation, where the price of organizational solidarity was to encourage division.

1Notes from CFA Executive Meeting, May 3, 1971. Most observers would agree that under Hill's vigorous leadership the CFA had regained ground lost to the Ontario Farmers Union during the General Farm Organization campaign in Ontario. Hill himself asserted that the only way to curb Farm Union influence was to represent farmers better—to be more aggressive in support of their interests. For details on the struggle over GFO see infra, Chapter III, Section 3.
Hill was not strongly supported at the Executive Meeting because other members were either divided in their own minds on the issue, or they were subject to similar cross pressures from the groups they represented. The dilemma, stated most succinctly by CPA Associate Secretary Bill Hamilton, was that "the Federation was put in a position where strong action would run the risk of a serious breach within the national organization." As in the case of the federal sales tax on margarine, the parent organization was immobilized by division and discord within its own ranks.

The May 1971 Executive Meeting indicated a clear concern for the unity of the national organization and an equal concern to give leadership in the support for Bill C-176. These, of course, were conflicting desires and were left, in the end, to be shouldered by the national office and Dave Kirk. As Executive Secretary, Kirk owes his primary allegiance to the national Federation and in recent years it has been his responsibility, more than any other, to maintain the solidarity and cohesion of the CPA. In this instance, following the Executive Meeting, Kirk used the

\[1\] \text{Interview with Bill Hamilton of CPA, May 18, 1971.}\]
telephone to communicate with Federation leaders to hammer out a compromise which would do least damage to the CFA organization. The resulting course of action involved a letter from President Munro to all M.P.'s challenging the accuracy of the anti-C-176 advertisement campaign, and questioning the tactics and ethics of those who were opposing the Bill in this way. But the CFA did not come down forcefully on the side of the Bill, as Gordon Hill would have had them do.

On the issue of national marketing it is possible to see, once again, the strong disposition in the Federation to hand "political" problems to the permanent staff, and in particular, the Executive Secretary. This is not an uncommon phenomenon in political interest groups where long tenure in office and a firm working knowledge of the organizations affairs gives paid officials a crucial role in group policy-making. The CFA experience confirms the findings of

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1 Ibid.

2 For his part, Hill journeyed to Arnprior, Ontario, following the CFA Executive Meeting to take on the anti-C-176 group directly. As a result of his straightforward tactics, Joe Hudson threatened to sue Hill "for his remarks about less-than-honest ads." "National Marketing Bill Will Help," Farm and Country, May 25, 1971, p. 17.
David Truman with respect to the "active minorities" within a variety of interest groups in business, labour and agriculture.\(^1\) The leaders of the CFA were immobilized because they were caught in a situation of conflict in which they were trying to achieve contradictory goals. On the one hand they were seeking to achieve a compromise, and minimize group alienation, thereby preserving the solidarity of the organization and their place in it.\(^2\) On the other hand, they felt the need to show strong leadership and determination to enhance the position of the CFA as the legitimate spokesman for Canadian farmers. To the limited extent that these requirements were reconciled it was as a result of a considerable degree of political judgement and skill on the part of the Federation's staff. The reconciliation was successful inasmuch as the organization did not suffer any permanent and deep seated rupture. However, the price of harmony and surface unity was immobility, and the CFA was effectively removed as a significant actor in the struggle

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\(^1\)Truman, *Process*, pp. 143 ff.

\(^2\)Oligarchic tendencies in the CFA are treated in detail elsewhere in this study. *Infra*, Chapter IV, Section 1, "The Consultation Fixation." Also see Kwavnick, *Organized Labour and Pressure Politics*, passim.
over Bill C-176. From the spring of 1971 until the passage of the Bill on January 12, 1972, the government, in the person of the Minister of Agriculture, promoted the legislation on behalf of those commodity groups that desired it and defended the Bill against those who were opposed.¹

Before leaving the national marketing issue it would be appropriate to make a few general observations about the interest group process as it applied to the relationship between, and behavior of, the CFA, other groups and governmental decision-makers. Under "normal" circumstances a proposed government law or regulation will be promoted and supported by the interest it is intended to serve. This interest group support will be offset and balanced by other organized interests which regard the same government activity as detrimental. In the words of one well-known analyst, "Organization begets counter-organization."² Often, however, organized interest groups are not balanced and checked by others. The intensity of feeling and interest articulation in one group may be so great that it cannot be counter-balanced by any opposing organized group.


²Key, Political Parties, p. 143.
Perhaps the clearest examples of this imbalance in the group struggle can be found in areas where the government seeks to regulate professionals, like medical doctors, or takes measures to protect consumers. In these instances highly cohesive, well endowed interest groups may find that they are opposed by little more than an inarticulate mass of individuals who share an interest, but little more. "The representation of these unorganized sectors of society becomes the task of politicians who, bedeviled by the group spokesmen on the ground, may succumb to the immediate and tangible pressures."¹ On the other hand, politicians, if they are strong and self-confident, may articulate the demands and defend the unorganized interests and be rewarded by broad indications of support. Ultimately this support may be translated into votes during elections.

This process was partially enacted during the controversy surrounding the national marketing bill. The legislation was intensely opposed by well organized cattle interests. Other interests that supported the bill, like poultry, egg, and vegetable commodity groups, were not as cohesive and well organized, partly because of competitive

¹Ibid., p. 166.
factors within the various commodity sectors. Nor was their desire for the Bill as intense as the negative feelings of the opposition forces. Neither were they encouraged by the fact that the marketing issue had ruptured the parent Federation and rendered it largely impotent.

In these circumstances the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Olson, did act in some measure as a counter-balance to opposition groups by rallying the interests of weak and dis-jointed groups. The Minister could have gone further in a campaign to discredit the cattle organizations, but he was restrained for two apparent reasons. First, the Minister's personality and style inclined him toward compromise and mediation rather than decisiveness and initiative in the face of strongly articulated interests. Second, Mr. Olson shared certain interests with the Western Canadian cattle organizations and they were an influential segment of his own constituency.\(^1\) The Minister's "low key" approach and his willingness at one point to exclude cattle and calves from the legislation are explained in part by overlapping group membership which, as Truman points out, can have a real influence on the attitudes and behavior of legislators as well as

\(^1\) *Supra*, p. 138.
ordinary group members. Mr. Olson who is an active cattle rancher had at one time been a member of the Western Canada Stock Grower's Association, and as Minister he would have to be considered, at the very least, as a "fellow traveller" in that organization. It is interesting to note that in his attempt to compromise by exempting cattle and calves from the legislation, Olson was opposed by fellow Liberal caucus members who, to a man, did not share the same overlapping group allegiances as did the Minister. It is also noteworthy that by pursuing the Bill without any exemptions, for what he perceived to be the common good of the agricultural industry, the Minister alienated significant elements within his own riding, and this may have contributed to his subsequent defeat at the polls. In the 1972 general election Mr. Olson was opposed by Bert Hargrave who was President of the Canadian Cattlemen's Association. Hargrave was so incensed with the Minister's stand on the Marketing Bill that he resigned from the Liberal Party, of which he had been a lifelong member, joined the Progressive Conservatives, and subsequently ran successfully as a candidate against the Minister.

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1 Truman, Process, p. 343.
Political Skill and Communications

"The federated type of farm organization requires the 'skill of compromise' that Canadian farmers in general have neither learned to master nor appreciate."¹ Generally speaking, however, although ordinary farmers may not appreciate it, the skill of compromise is something that is learned by CFA leaders in their climb to power. It is necessary to be "a compromiser" to rise to positions of leadership in the Federation. Some look upon this tendency— to be all things to all people—with regret, and they point out that CFA leaders are necessarily bland and ineffective because they "have had all the rough edges knocked off" on their way to power.² This, it must be admitted, is at least partly true, but like most generalizations it cannot be carried too far. What is perhaps of greater importance to the functioning and ultimate effectiveness of the CFA is the political skill and ability to compromise that is needed in

¹J. C. Gilson, "The Importance and Implications of Alternative Types of Farm Organizations," a paper prepared for the Farm Organization Conference, University of Manitoba, June 3, 1960, p. 23, CFA files.

managing the on-going affairs of the Federation. There are numerous examples where the skill, judgement and finesse of the national office, principally the Executive Secretary, Dave Kirk, have been crucial to the maintenance of a healthy organization and the achievement of certain desired objectives. It is often the case that potentially explosive issues have been nipped in the bud by a well phrased letter or a phone call from Kirk which prevents the fractious issue from ever reaching the Boardroom of the Federation.

In several places throughout this study I have taken note of the recent strained relations between the Federation and the Canadian Cattlemen's Association. The issue of the proposed federal marketing plan and relations between their respective organizations was the subject of two bitterly critical letters from the CCA to the Federation.\(^1\) Although the CFA had a genuine disagreement with the Cattlemen they did not wish to see this develop to the point where there was a complete severance of relations. For one thing, the two organizations were carrying on joint efforts in the interest of improving the beef industry through the Ways and

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\(^1\)Letters from Charles Gracey, Managing Director of CCA, to Charles Munro, President of CFA, October 23, 1970, and January 18, 1971.
Means Committee.\textsuperscript{1} For another, virtually all of the members of the CCA were also affiliates of the CPA, and the Federation was eager to do nothing that would further divide and weaken the organization. In the light of these needs, the Federation’s response to the CCA allegations was of considerable importance. The CPA rejoinder demonstrated a high degree of sound political judgement and attempted to restore good will between the two organizations without capitulating on matters of principle. The CPA reply was in the form of two related letters which were a healthy mixture of courtesy, firmness, apology, explanation and positive suggestion.\textsuperscript{2}

A similar example of the importance of political skill in maintaining the solidarity of the CPA organization involves a brief exchange of correspondence between Dave Kirk, Executive Secretary of the Federation, and Donald Middleton, Secretary to the Ontario Federation. Middleton wrote to Kirk protesting a letter pertaining to grain which had gone from the CPA to the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. J. J. Green. In the view of the OFA, the CPA letter

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{Supra}, pp. 102 ff.

completely overlooked the needs of Ontario grain producers.\footnote{Letter from Don Middleton, Secretary of OFA, to Dave Kirk, July 22, 1968.} Middleton's letter was vitriolic, in fact rude, in its castigation of the CFA attitude and action. The OFA protested in "as strong a terms as possible" the CFA's "complete oversight" in this "particularly sensitive" area. "We trust," said Middleton, "that this general reminder will encourage you to show the right amount of deference for the interests of Ontario agriculture in future communications from the CFA office."\footnote{Ibid.} Kirk's letter of reply is a masterpiece of diplomacy.\footnote{Letter from Dave Kirk to Don Middleton, September 23, 1968.} In referring to his letter to the Minister, Kirk says he regrets using the word "western" insofar as it might indicate a somewhat narrower concern than was intended. He explains that in this particular instance the CFA was in no position to engage in a general discussion of Ontario grains problems. Finally, he assured Middleton that he, Kirk, respects and tries to serve not only the farmers of Ontario, but all Canadian farmers, and in his attempts to do this he submits that he is pleased to have the benefit of the views
of the OFA executive. Kirk's letter is calm, logical and reassuring, serving to heal the breach rather than create further animosity and division by replying in the tone that characterized Middleton's letter. The effect of Kirk's letter was to smooth the ruffled feathers of the Ontario Federation leaders. The OFA Executive instructed Middleton to write to Kirk and give a further explanation of their position on this matter. Middleton's second letter is placid and reasonable in comparison to his first.\footnote{Letter from Don Middleton to Dave Kirk, October 29, 1968. CFA files.} At the end he apologizes for what he claims was a mistake in wording that made his letter sound more harsh than was intended. The fundamental point here is that a potentially serious clash of personalities and policies was avoided by the skillful attention of the Executive Secretary of the CFA. A less sensitive, more heavy-handed approach might have damaged OFA-CFA relation in ways that are difficult to foresee.

The organizational solidarity of the CFA is also facilitated by on-going relationships and regular communications between the national office and individuals from affiliated organizations. Dave Kirk, and to a lesser extent
the Associate Secretary, Bill Hamilton, seems to have developed a friendly, easy-going rapport with most of the Federation personnel across the country. Kirk is the sort of person who encourages others to sit down and write, or perhaps call, when they have something on their mind. Moreover, he always replies in a way that is friendly, personal and has some substance or point to be made. Perhaps one should not exaggerate the importance of this kind of in-house interaction, but it does represent a certain awareness that political fences have to be periodically mended and regularly maintained if the organization is to function as a cohesive unit.

One of the chief concerns of the CPA is to remain at the hub of national agricultural policy and federal government involvement in the agricultural sphere. The Federation, quite naturally, is constantly seeking to expand and enhance its "legitimacy" and "mandate" as the accepted voice for Canadian agriculture. This desire to remain in the center

1A good cross section of this kind of communication can be found in Kirk's letters to Bill Parker of the Manitoba Wheat Pool, December 29, 1967; Roy Grant of the New Brunswick Federation of Agriculture, August 5, 1969; and Waldo Walsh of the Nova Scotia Federation of Agriculture, March 2, 1971. CPA files.

2Krawnick, Organized Labour and Pressure Politics, pp. 3 ff. and pp. 12 ff.
and relevant at the national level is, of course, very closely linked with the desire to maintain a cohesive organization. The extent to which these related needs are realized is influenced by the kinds of factors I have been discussing here—political skill and ease of communications.

The tendency of provincial organizations to circumvent the CFA increases under certain circumstances, when particular combinations of factors exist. For example, during the wheat crisis which reached its peak in 1969, the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool which is the largest grain handling organization in Canada, regularly by-passed the CFA to interact directly with the federal government. This inclination was encouraged and supported by the fact that the Hon. Otto Lang, Minister responsible for the Canadian Wheat Board, was the sole cabinet Minister and one of only two Liberals elected from the province of Saskatchewan. The Saskatchewan Pool was, therefore much more relevant to Lang’s political existence than the CFA organization could ever hope to be. Federation leaders and officials were clearly quite aware of this situation and the way in which it posed a threat to the well-being of the CFA organization.¹ They were aware too that

¹Interview with Bill Hamilton, Associate Secretary of the CFA, October 2, 1970.
part of the problem was that the CFA national office staff and most of the Federation's elected leaders were simply out of touch with the western grain situation. Federation leaders who were primarily located in regions other than Western Canada did not fully appreciate the magnitude of the recession that was occurring in the grains industry, and the effect this was having on the lives of prairie people. In the winter of 1969-70 the CFA reacted in an effort to protect the organization at the federal level. A revitalized CFA Grains Committee was created with membership drawn heavily from the Western Wheat Pools. Strenuous efforts were made to build new consultative procedures with the federal government using the Federation as the focal point.¹

There are other examples of the problem of provincial circumvention of the CFA organization. The former Minister of Agriculture, the Hon. H. A. Olson, attached somewhat more importance to the views and wishes of Uniform than might otherwise have been the case if he were not the Minister from the province of Alberta. From the point of view of the CFA organization this was a disturbing tendency.

¹These efforts and the tactics employed are discussed in depth, infra, Chapter V, Section 1, "Grains Policy: A Pilot Case."
but there was very little they could do about it other than maintain maximum communications and encourage UniFarm to interact through the national Federation. To some extent the Federation may have failed to face the fact that Ministers have political interests and it is possible to use these interests to advance CFA purposes.

L'UCC de Quebec has also been disposed to deal directly with the federal government, partly because of a problem it has had in communicating with the CFA in French.

The CFA national office is wholly unilingual English, whereas federal civil servants and members of the office of the Minister of Agriculture are prepared to communicate with the UCC in French. In the spring of 1970 Lionel Sorel, President of L'UCC, was replaced by Albert Allain who was unilingual French speaking. One might expect Allain to try to get in touch with government personnel directly when it was impossible to communicate verbally with the national office of the Federation.\(^1\) In an attempt to offset this and keep L'UCC

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\(^1\) There is ample evidence that on matters of federal government policy M. Allain did deal directly with federal officials and ministerial aides. Interview with André Pigeon, Special Assistant to the Minister of Agriculture, June 6, 1971.
solidly within the fold the Federation has moved to vastly improve its French language services in recent years.¹

The solidarity of an organization like the CFA is inextricably linked to the internal communications process. The national office attempts to keep the various component organizations informed by sending out a continuous stream of documents and memoranda pertaining to Executive and Board decisions, pertinent correspondence, new policies, and so on. Under normal circumstances current information is passed from the national office to regional secretaries and Board members every few days. This flow of material is increased dramatically immediately prior to Annual and Semi-Annual Meetings of the Federation. The documentation for the 1971 Semi-Annual Meeting, for example, ran to several hundred pages covering virtually all current topics of agricultural policy.

¹The concern for bilingual services is also a result of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Research done for the Commission under the direction of John Meisel of Queen's University pointed up some of the shortcomings of voluntary organizations like the CFA. For a more complete view of the issues involved see the exchange of correspondence between John Meisel and Dave Kirk in August, 1969. In particular, the lengthy letter from Kirk to Meisel, August 29, 1969, is of value.
In the normal flow of information between the component organizations and the parent Federation there seems to be considerable variation from one commodity affiliate to another. For example, the regular exchange of information between Bill Hamilton of the CFA and the elected leaders of the Canadian Swine Council is very extensive, whereas in other commodity areas, like vegetables, the flow is almost negligible. This, of course, has a great deal to do with the fact that the Swine Council is affiliated on an Advisory Committee basis, and as Secretary Hamilton has a direct responsibility for the relations between the two organizations.

Aside from the flow of information on substantive issues there are also a significant number of communications from the national office which pertain strictly to the well-being of the CFA organization. At virtually every Annual and Semi-Annual Meeting of the Federation some of the time—often a good deal of the time—is spent introspectively, examining the operations and role of the organization. These discussions and the documentation that is prepared in

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1 Interview with Claudia Norminton, Executive Assistant in CFA office, July 21, 1971.
conjunction with them, are intended to build the vitality of the organization and make it into a more cohesive functioning unit. An example of this kind of communication is the documentation done in the middle and late 1960's on the relationship between the CFA and commodity groups.\(^1\) In addition, periodically the national office prepares material intended to elevate the CFA organization in the eyes of its own members.\(^2\) These intermittent "pep talks" are often supplemented at meetings by verbal appeals from the CFA leaders. They are also reinforced by annual CFA "achievement" sheets which list all of the areas in which the CFA can claim to have advanced the cause of Canadian Agriculture. Achievement propaganda is, of course, intended to serve the dual purpose of reinforcing the membership and winning public support.

In the late 1960's the Federation made an effort to expand and update its approach to communications and information.\(^3\) Claudia Norminton, Executive Assistant, was put

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\(^1\)These were referred to in some detail in the section on commodity groups. *Supra*, pp. 96 ff.


\(^3\)Letter from Bill Hamilton of the CFA to J. O. Wright, Manager of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, April 21, 1969, CFA files.
in charge of the information processes. A plan was devised whereby all aspects of information dissemination would be upgraded.¹ Of particular importance to the solidarity of the CPA organization was the plan to implement a semi-monthly "Newsletter" which would communicate day-to-day activities of the organization and information on current agriculture to the member bodies of the CPA. In this general proposal to expand information services this is the only project that had, after two years, been carried out.

Conclusion

The evidence presented here reaffirms the assumptions that were made in the preliminary pages of this section. Organizational cohesion is the most persistent problem that confronts the CPA in its efforts to achieve particular goals. Divisions within the Federation are a result of organizational diversity, overlapping group memberships, and conflicts of interest between affiliated groups. These conflicts are exacerbated by government policies that relate directly to the economic well-being of agricultural group members.

When there is serious division within, the CFA ceases to perform either an aggregative or articulative function. Instead the organization will tend to become inert, leaving the most important functions to the groups most directly involved. Conflict of interest within the CFA is often resolved by doing nothing until such time as government action removes the reason for the conflict. This was the case with the margarene sales tax issue. There is a strong tendency for elected leaders of the CFA to pass a substantial amount of their responsibility, in terms of conflict resolution, on to the shoulders of the paid staff. There were examples of this during the dispute over national marketing legislation. In the routine functioning of the Federation the paid staff, particularly the Executive Secretary, play a crucial role in achieving and maintaining harmony among the multifarious factions. In this capacity they have developed the essential political and organizational skills.

The organizational well-being of the CFA is also affected by external factors which have a bearing on the actions of decision-makers. For example, the regional allegiances of Cabinet Ministers will tend to encourage particular interest groups to by-pass the Federation and
interact directly with the federal government. This will usually be seen as a direct threat to the mandate and internal cohesion of the CFA, and it will make structural and procedural adjustments to compensate for such a threat. Government decision-makers are themselves subject to the pressures of overlapping group membership, as was the case with Agriculture Minister Olson, who shared a good deal with the cattle interests who were opposing his marketing legislation. In this instance, however, the "influence of office" was perhaps greater than any shared interest, and the Minister acted according to what he perceived to be the "general interest" of the farming community.¹

¹Truman, Process, pp. 347 ff.
CHAPTER III

SEEKING AFTER UNITY: A THREE PRONGED CASE STUDY

ILLUSTRATING THE PROBLEMS OF GENERAL FARM ORGANIZATIONS

1. Introduction

The aim of this Chapter is to elucidate some of the problems that confront general farm organizations and to cast further light on the nature of these organizations through three related case studies pertaining to organizational unity. Specifically this analysis will contribute to the understanding of the impediments to organizational unity. It may also be possible to make some small contribution to the "general good" of Canadian agriculture by pointing to the ingredients that are necessary for unified, healthy farm organizations.

There are distinctive features which we identify with the agricultural industry, and the rural way of life, that are important elements in the achievement of unified farm organizations.
Farmers tend by nature to be self reliant, individualistic, "their own boss". Traditionally they have not held the same kind of rational attitudes toward their occupations as have their counterparts in labour and business. Farmers share even less with members of professional associations. The point is made in the Report of the Task Force on Agriculture that farm organizations do not possess a degree of control or discipline over their members that is in any sense comparable to medical, legal associations, etc.¹ With the possible exception of marketing boards which allocate quotas, farm groups cannot restrict entry and discipline members of the farming community. In this sense farming is not a profession.

Farmers are physically separated from each other and from other institutions that are important to their economic well-being. Thus, farmers have difficulties at virtually all levels in their attempts to build cohesive organizations. At the level of the individual there is relative isolation, little communication, and a degree of alienation. Between their organizations there are great gulfs which are the result of

physical separation, conflicting economic interests, personalities, and conflicting ideologies. Like businessmen, farmers are in competition with one another. However, businessmen comprise a relatively small group, relatively well off and well informed, relatively cohesive with considerable similarity in attitudes. Farmers, unfortunately, do not seem to possess many of these cohesive features. They are a large group with relatively low individual incomes. However, unlike industrial workers, farmers do not share common working places and the forces which control their lives and economic well-being are not as simple and discernable as in industry.

A consistent theme among Canadian farmers and farm leaders has been the need for organizational unity. This is not a need that is unique to farmers—other major economic groups also have stressed the importance of coming together to act in unison. Nor is this in any sense exclusive to the farmers of this country. Farmers and farm organizations from other nations are no less persistent than Canadians in pursuing the strength that comes from unity. In Britain a high degree of unity and cohesion has been achieved through the National Farmers Union. In more heterogeneous countries like the United States, unity is less complete.
Professor Clay Gilson of the University of Manitoba, one of the most knowledgeable and widely respected authorities on the problems of Canadian farm organizations, places "the need for unity" at the top of the list of "realities" facing farm organizations in this country.

"Perhaps, we need 420 separate farm organizations in Canada but I have yet to be convinced. Any industry highly fractured by an excessive number of organizations professing to speak for the same group cannot possibly present a very articulate picture of its problems and its needs. A babble of voices must inevitably lead to a babble of policies. No wonder many are asking the question—but what is it that Canadian farmers really want? No farm leader genuinely interested in finding solutions for agriculture's problems, no agricultural legislator confronted with the task of persuading tax payers of the need for certain types of farm programs, can possibly present a good or convincing case for agriculture if his case rests on conflicting and contradictory evidence. As one wit observed 'Either we hang together or we hang alone.'"

As a member of the Manitoba Commission on Farm Organizations, Gilson consistently argued in favour of stronger, more united,

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Clay Gilson, "Can Farm Organizations Face up to Realities," unpublished paper, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, 1968, p. 6. (Mimeographed)

farmer groups. However, in 1968, although he recognized the need he was less convinced than ever that unity is likely, or even possible. In Gilson's words,

"... I have gradually come to the conclusion that unity within the farm organizations in Canada may never be possible. Maybe the philosophic and economic differences among the various farm groups in Canada are irreconcilable. Perhaps, it is impossible to find a consensus among farmers with respect to agricultural policy matters. Possibly we shouldn't be shocked when we hear diametrically opposed views from farmers on agricultural policy issues. It is certain, however, that the non-farm citizens of Canada are becoming impatient with farmers and their organizations."

The unity of organized farmers is, in Gilson's mind, a matter of primary importance, but it is also, clearly, such a complex and difficult matter that it is not easy for him to be optimistic.

Farm leaders and analysts, like Gilson, have always assumed that a fragmented voice for Canadian agriculture means weakness and a united voice would bring strength. In bargaining with governments and in promoting the farmers' case with other groups it is assumed that divided farm organizations

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1 Gilson, "Realities", p. 6.

2 For further evidence on this point see George McLaughlin, "A Major Overhaul is Long Overdue," Family Herald, June 21, 1962. Also infra pp. 201 ff.
present a confused image, and insofar as they tend to be contradictory they are likely to be played off, one organization against the other. It is argued that the producer's interest is lost when those who purport to represent him are quarelling amongst themselves. There is, in fact, ample evidence that this is a serious drawback for farm groups in Canada—that in dealing with governments and other institutions their hand is weakened when they are divided. Perhaps an example will help to point up the problem.

In the spring of 1969 the federal government was host to a National Conference on Agriculture. The purpose of the Conference was to bring together all relevant elements of the industry to assess the future of Canadian agriculture. More than 400 delegates were invited from all segments of the agricultural industry and from the federal and provincial governments. Most of the planning was done by federal officials under the direction of Dr. Roland Poirier, Assistant Deputy Minister in the Department of Agriculture. However, Poirier and his secretariat were to receive assistance and advice from a four man steering committee, two senior officials from government and two non-governmental people—one from agribusiness and one representing producers.\(^1\) In October, 1968, the then

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\(^1\) One might question the soundness of government strategy in allowing for only one producer representative—it was clear that this was to be government initiated and government controlled Conference.
During the 1950's and into the 1960's most of the provincial Farm Unions were affiliated with the provincial federations of Agriculture and were, therefore, indirectly members of the CFA. This, however, was not a particularly happy relationship except in the case of Alberta where a tradition of amicable relations between farm organizations seemed to have developed. At its Annual Convention in 1960 the SPV decided to launch a National Farmers Union. The Interprovincial Farm Union Council came to be called the National Farmers Union Council, comprised of the Farmers Unions from the four western provinces plus Ontario. The NFU Council functioned on a very modest budget of from $15,000 to $30,000 ¹ which was derived from assessments on the provincial unions. Under the leadership first of Alf Gleave and then of Roy Atkinson the NFU became the dominant Canadian farm organization outside of the CFA.

¹NFU financial statements are hard to come by. In 1967 Helen Dawson estimates the NFU budget at $15,000 while certain Farm Union documents suggest an expenditure of about $30,000. Helen Jones Dawson, "Relations Between Farm Organizations and the Civil Service in Canada and Great Britain," Canadian Public Administration, December, 1967, p. 453, and Minutes, National Farmers Union Council, July 27, 1968, Uniform files, Edmonton. See also infra, p. 201.
By failing to agree on a nominee to the Steering Committee the two national organizations greatly strengthened the hand of the federal government. The Minister of Agriculture was able to by-pass both organizations and appoint a man of his own choosing—Mr. W. E. Burton, an Ottawa area farmer. Because the producer voice was divided into two organizations at the national level the Minister was able to ignore both groups with impunity. ¹

This incident came to the attention of Paul Babey, President of the Farmers Union of Alberta, who mentioned it in a debate on farm organization at their 1968 Annual Convention. "It seems to me when a minister of the Crown decides to ignore both groups the problem is serious," he said.

"They are not strong enough to matter. How long can we continue in this way?" ²

¹What was perhaps equally indicative of the government's strengthened position vis-a-vis the national farm organizations was the procedure followed in organizing the Second Agricultural Congress in 1970. In this instance the government did not feel it was necessary to have any producer representatives on the Steering Committee. However, the CPA and NFU were asked for suggestions about the Congress well in advance of any organizational meetings. Interview with Dr. Roland Poirier, Assistant Deputy Minister, Canada Dept. of Agriculture, Nov. 20, 1970.

There are many more lessons to be learned from this incident, and these will be discussed elsewhere in this study. (For example, one should inquire as to the motives of the Minister of Agriculture in proceeding the way he did; and, since the CFA seems to have had the most to lose in this matter by being ignored, one needs to seriously question the political skill of the Federation leaders, particularly the President, Mr. Bentley.)\(^1\) The important point to be made here is that disunity between general organizations is a genuine problem inasmuch as there would be tangible results if the farmer's interests at the national level were articulated by one organization rather than two or more.

One cannot overstate the problems that confront farm leaders in trying to achieve an organized and unified voice for Canadian agriculture. The same disjunctive forces that erode the cohesion of the CFA are at work in a broader context, preventing general farm organizations from coming

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\(^1\) Kwavnick has dealt with a somewhat related problem in his discussion of the appointment of a Commissioner to administer the Unemployment Insurance Act. In this case the government appointed Commissioner McArthur against the advice of the Canadian Labour Congress. The CLC leaders retaliated by refusing to deal with the new appointee, but they were very careful not to go so far that the government could justify by-passing their organization altogether. See Kwavnick, Organized Labour, p. 121.
together in a single, coherent, credible voice. Other general interest groups, in labour and business for example, have similar difficulties but there are special elements in agricultural groups that make their problems loom larger.

In the course of these case studies I will be attempting to test and verify the following set of hypotheses:

(1) There is a genuine need for unity among general farm organizations in Canada. Unity is a goal which is constantly espoused by farm leaders, and it is an objective which has wide appeal for ordinary farmers. Governments, as a rule, will pay less attention to organizations and their leaders when they are divided and speak with more than one voice.

(2) The basic factor keeping Canadian farm organizations apart is a difference in approach on organizational theory, represented on the one hand by the unitary, union-type structure, and on the other by the federated structure. At the core of this dispute is a basic disagreement as to how farmer's interests may be legitimately represented; whether the real needs of farmers can best be satisfied in a union organization involving individual dues-paying members or through a federation with substantial fee-paying cooperatives and commodity groups.
(3) Harmony between farm organizations is highest when there is a clearly understood and generally accepted division of functions between them. A high degree of overlap in policy and functional areas will lead to competition and this will result in heightened organizational friction. On the other hand, an extensive overlapping of membership may promote harmony and encourage unity.

(4) An appreciation of strictly organizational goals is crucial to an understanding of group relations and actions. A group's attitude toward organizational unity, for example, will be affected by the extent to which the group feels threatened as an organization.

(5) Similarly, the internal political goals of group leaders are very important in assessing group behavior. A frequent hurdle to organizational unity involves the leader's desire to maintain power, preserve his position and perpetuate the organization.

(6) In the achievement of organizational unity where two autonomous structures are replaced by a single structure, it is desirable to have strong creative leadership on one side, and leaders who are more passive and willing to step back on the other side. Also, organizational unity may be seriously impeded if there is more than one ambitious leader on either side.
(7) It is easier for a group leader to step aside and give up his position if he has some other source of power to fall back on, and if he is not interested in going on to higher political and organizational goals.

(8) The leaders of direct membership union-type farm organizations have a higher sense of legitimacy than do their counterparts in the federations. Those who feel they have a direct mandate from the farmers will tend to feel less threatened when dealing with other groups. To a degree, therefore, they will tend to be less defensive than federation leaders, less likely to delegate responsibility to professionals, and generally less organization oriented.

(9) Group harmony and the possibility of unity depends to some extent upon the conditions that prevail and the kind of situation or environment that has evolved over a period of time within a given region.

Within the last decade there have been three notable attempts to achieve unity among general farm organizations in Canada. Two of these attempts have been on the provincial level, the other at the national level. The circumstances surrounding the efforts to achieve organizational unity in these three instances were quite different and, each in its own way, quite instructive. The effort to achieve national
unity came as a result of a direct initiative on the part of the Canadian Federation of Agriculture which resulted in a direct confrontation and dialogue between that organization and the National Farmers Union. In the move to establish a General Farm Organization in Ontario the government was the initiator, and the two main farm organizations (The Ontario Farmers Union and the Ontario Federation of Agriculture) were the chief combatants. The establishment of Unifarm in Alberta is noteworthy if for no other reason than it was the only attempt that succeeded.

The National Farmers Union: An Explanatory Note

The purpose of this note is to help clarify the nature and organizational structure of the National Farmers Union. The NFU has particular characteristics which are quite distinct from the CFA and these differences are shared by Farm Unions and Federations at the provincial level. Moreover, these are distinctions that are a central part of the struggle for unity among general farm organizations. This will become clear in the case studies that follow, but at the outset, to avoid confusion, it is necessary to sketch a rough picture of the NFU.
The roots of the NFU can be traced back as far as 1908 with the founding of the Interprovincial Council of Grain Growers, later renamed the Canadian Council of Agriculture. However, the modern-day NFU received its initial stimulus in the late 1940's and early 1950's when it replaced the defunct United Farmers of Canada (UFC) as the only viable non-commercial farm organization based on direct farmer membership.

The coming of the Great Depression in the early 1930's put all existing farm organizations into a shaky position and the only ones which survived relatively unscathed were the prairie wheat pools. The pools had developed at the outset through the initiative of the United Farmers of Canada but by the late 1920's they had become virtually totally independent from the parent UFC organization. With the severe economic situation in the West in the 1930's bankruptcy faced those farm organizations which survived on the basis of individual farmer memberships. The United Farmers of Canada sank into dormancy for nearly fifteen years but the wheat pools continued to function because they had assumed a major role in grain handling and marketing. Even then it was necessary for the federal and provincial governments to come to the assistance of
the wheat pools with long-term financial aid.¹

During the 1940's a number of attempts were made to rebuild the UFC into a viable farm organization. Most notable was a move to institute a check-off system whereby funds would be obtained from rural municipalities which joined the Union. For awhile the program enjoyed considerable success with 103 municipalities and over 100,000 members incorporated by 1946. But three years later in 1949 the revived United Farmers' movement was, for all intents and purposes, dead.² With the end of the United Farmers of Canada the only major farm organization in Canada aside from the pools was the Canadian Federation of Agriculture. Although as we have seen the Federation was a fairly comprehensive organization that included practically all aspects of agriculture, it was unable to cope with several problems because it lacked a grass-roots background.

The economic conditions in Canada in the post-war years and particularly in the early 1950's pointed up this obvious weakness in the CFA and at the same time prompted the growth of a new Farmers' Union. The farm economic situation,

¹J. Shulz, Rise and Fall of Canadian Farm Organizations, Winnipeg: Evans Printing & Stationery Ltd., 1959, p. 86.
²Ibid., p. 88.
which had been relatively satisfactory through the 1940's, deteriorated rapidly in 1950 and 1951 with the advent of Korean War inflation. Farm costs increased massively while prices for agricultural commodities stayed constant and, actually fell in 1952. "The result was that some farmers came to the conclusion that an organization like the Federation of Agriculture, with an indirect membership and indirect leaders, could only have an indirect interest in the farmer's problems."¹

The main thrust of the new union movement was on the prairies. In 1948 the remnants of the Alberta Farmers Union and the United Farmers of Alberta joined forces to form the Farmer's Union of Alberta; Carl Stimpfel was elected president. The following year the UFC (Saskatchewan section) became the Saskatchewan Farmer's Union with J. L. Phelps as president. In 1951 the Manitoba Farmer's Union was formed with Jake Shulz as president.

It was not until the early 1950's when the economic problems became apparent that the Farmers' Union became an important force. In 1955 there were over 2,000 Farmers' Union locals organized in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta.

¹Ibid., p. 105.
with an estimated membership of about 164,000 farm men and women.\textsuperscript{1} The activities of the Unions were coordinated by the Interprovincial Farm Union Council. Under the general leadership of Phelps of the SFU, the movement spread into Ontario and in 1952 the Ontario Farmers' Union was set up. In 1955 the Farmers' Union of British Columbia was organized and by the end of that year the Interprovincial Council claimed an affiliated membership of 185,000.\textsuperscript{2}

The chief policies of the provincial Farmers' Unions were economic; the principal demand in the 1950's was for a parity price system for agricultural commodities where prices of farm products would maintain their relationship to those of other goods. Generally speaking, the Unions called for a greater degree of government involvement in the maintenance of the agricultural industry. They managed a strong activist position without being caught in the "trap" of politics as had been the fate of popular farm movements earlier in the century and without succumbing to the evils of commercialism as they believed the CFA had done.

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 106-107.

\textsuperscript{2}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 109.
During the 1950's and into the 1960's most of the provincial Farm Unions were affiliated with the provincial Federations of Agriculture and were, therefore, indirectly members of the CFA. This, however, was not a particularly happy relationship except in the case of Alberta where a tradition of amicable relations between farm organizations seemed to have developed. At its Annual Convention in 1960 the SFU decided to launch a National Farmers Union. The Interprovincial Farm Union Council came to be called the National Farmers Union Council, comprised of the Farmers Unions from the four western provinces plus Ontario. The NFU Council functioned on a very modest budget of from $15,000 to $30,000¹ which was derived from assessments on the provincial unions. Under the leadership first of Alf Gleave and then of Roy Atkinson the NFU became the dominant Canadian farm organization outside of the CFA.

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In the summer of 1969 the Founding Convention of the National Farmers Union was held in Winnipeg. Delegates from all regions of Canada, with the exception of Quebec, chose Roy Atkinson of Saskatchewan as their president. The new constitution embodied all of the cherished principles of farm unionism and was intended to make the NFU a direct nation-wide grass-roots voice for Canadian farmers.¹

The Nature of the NFU

The National Farmers Union is organized in a pyramidal fashion into regions, districts and locals. The formation of a local, which is the basic organizational unit of the Union, requires a minimum of fifty members. Each local is required to elect an executive which is responsible for on-going affairs and the calling of meetings. Locals are entitled to elect one delegate for each fifty members to the Annual Convention of the NFU. For annual district conventions each local is entitled to one delegate for every ten of its members. There are, at the time of writing, approximately two hundred and fifty NFU locals in Canada.

¹See Appendix D, Constitution and Bylaws of The National Farmers Union.
NFU districts are defined by its Board of Directors in accordance with what they deem to be fair and balanced divisions within each region. There are presently thirty-eight NFU districts in Canada. The district annual convention chooses a District Director, Women's Director and Junior Director all of whom constitute the district executive and have the responsibility of overseeing locals within that district. The district executive members are entitled to be voting delegates at the Annual Convention of the NFU.

The largest organizational unit of the NFU is the region, the boundaries of which are defined by the Board of Directors of the Union. The regions as presently determined correspond to the provincial boundaries, with a few exceptions. The Maritimes, for example, constitute one region rather than three or four; the Manitoba region extends into Ontario as far as the Lakehead; and part of northwestern Alberta is combined with part of northeastern B.C. to constitute the Peace River region. Although the condition of the NFU organization varies from one region to another, all provinces except Quebec are a part of a legitimate region. Quebec has been excluded from NFU plans partly because that province already has a

\[1\text{Ibid.}\]
strong grass-roots farm organization, L'UCC, and partly because the province is largely French speaking. The NFU which is a western-based organization does not wish to face up to the difficulties of translation and communication with French speaking farmers of Quebec.¹

Each region in the NFU structure has a coordinator who is appointed by the Union executive and is a member of the Board of Directors. The regional coordinators have general responsibility for the districts within their regions and for assisting in the organization of the regional annual meeting. The NFU is obligated to provide offices within each region for the on-going administration of the regions. The Board of Directors of the NFU is the policy making body of the Union between conventions. The Board consists of the national executive—the president, vice-president, women's president, women's vice-president, junior president and junior vice-president, all of whom are elected at the Annual Convention—plus at least one elected director from each of the regions.

The key to understanding the organization of the NFU, as opposed to other farm groups, is what Union leaders proudly refer to as its "direct-membership" structure. The individual

¹Ibid.
farmer is intended to be the cornerstone of the Farm Union organization. The total membership of the NFU in 1972 was approximately 25,000.\textsuperscript{1} Union policy is intended to be formulated by members at the local level and advanced through the district and regional levels to the NFU Annual Convention where it is voted on by delegates who are themselves elected directly from the locals.

It would be an interesting historical exercise to contrast the modern-day NFU, its leaders and structure, with the attitudes and dreams that derived from early agrarian reform movements. For example, early in the century progressives and farm leaders were advocating "delegate democracy," "direct legislation," "referendum," "recall," and so on.\textsuperscript{2} These genuine deep-rooted elements of western populism would seem to bear much closer affinity to the NFU structure and attitudes of Farm Union leaders than is the case with the CFA.

Farmers who join the NFU take out membership directly rather than through some subsidiary organization, as in the case of the CFA. NFU members invest their own dollars

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{2}For a quick concise view of these strains, see W. L. Morton,, The Progressive Party in Canada,, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950, pp. 15 ff.
directly in the Union. Many observers have noted that this is both a blessing and a curse because although it binds members closely to their Union and gives it independence from commercial organizations, it is also the case that farmers are notorious for not supporting their organizations financially.\(^1\) This has contributed to a considerable degree of financial instability for the NFU over the years. The annual individual membership fee for the NFU is set at $25.00. This is paid directly to NFU national headquarters, but the Board has adopted a procedure whereby specified amounts are refunded to the district offices for their maintenance. This rebate is currently set at $5.00 per membership unit. In addition, both districts and locals have the right to levy additional assessments on their members to help defray their costs. The NFU, according to its leaders, is in a perpetual deficit position, with revenue never seeming to quite come up to budgeted expenditures.\(^2\) Expenditures for 1972 were estimated at $625,000. However, not all of this came from membership fees; the NFU performs certain services for its members for which it is


\(^2\)Interview with Stuart Thiesson, November 23, 1972.
reimbursed. For example, the Union has an Income Tax Service which turned over approximately $100,000 in 1972. 1

Finally, some brief mention should be made of Farm Union ideology. The constitution and by-laws of the NFU give no hint of any preponderant ideological commitment. The Union eschews direct partisan political involvement; its objectives are consistently stated in terms of what will be "for the benefit of farmers." These, however, are characteristics that can easily be attributed to any general farm organization, including the CFA. However, in the words and actions of the NFU leaders there is distinct ideological content which stems from a distrust of the political and economic system of which the farmer is a disadvantaged part. The NFU has spearheaded the fight to preserve the family farm from being taken over by corporate farmers and the forces of agribusiness. In his rhetoric and in his analysis of the farm situation Roy Atkinson, President of NFU, consistently displays a strong bias against "centralized authority," the "industrial machine,"

1Ibid. It is interesting to note that the NFU offers "selective inducements" to its members whereas organizations like the CFA do not. In this respect see R. Manzer, "Selective Inducements and the Development of Pressure Groups: The Case of the Canadian Teachers' Association," in Kruhlak et al., The Canadian Political Process. (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 284 ff.
and "city-dwelling bureaucrats who shape farm policy." The root of the problem is the economic system which permits, indeed encourages, the exploitation of individual farmers who are on the bottom rung of the political and economic ladder.

A good example of the ideological content in Farm Union thinking came from the president of the NFU, Roy Atkinson, when the Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities (SARM), in 1971, proposed a government-backed single farm organization for Saskatchewan. "This proposal," said Atkinson, "amounts to nothing less than an attack on the NFU direct-membership structure in Saskatchewan by agribusiness, acting through the executive of the SARM and the SFA." In his view the motives and needs of commercial agricultural groups are diametrically opposed to those of farmers and they cannot be expected to both fit within the same general organization. "In fact," says Atkinson, "agribusiness lives off the sweat of farmers and farmers must organize not with them, but to deal with them, to bargain with them." These

1John Schreiner, "This Man Wants to Save The Rural Way of Life," Financial Post, July 24, 1971.

2"SFA - SARM Link Arms to Scuttle Farm Union," Union Farmer, April, 1971, p. 1.

3Ibid., (Emphasis are mine)
statements reflect a deep seated resentment of the existing economic structure of society. It is an indication, moreover, of one of the fundamental differences separating Farmers' Unions and Federations of Agriculture in Canada.

The strong ideological beliefs of the NFU have been paralleled and supplemented by dramatic radical actions. Tractor marches on Ottawa, the dumping of rotten wheat on the steps of the Prime Minister's hotel in Regina and the release of flocks of chickens in the Alberta legislative chambers are examples of the protest tactics of the NFU. These actions and attitudes on the part of the Farm Union stand in contrast to those of the CFA, and, as such, they will be further elaborated in the ensuing pages.

2. The National Unity Discussions 1962-63

In the early 1960's the question of unity between farm organizations was being actively, sometimes heatedly debated in Ontario, Manitoba and Alberta. In each instance the dispute centered around the provincial Farmers Union and the Federation of Agriculture. In each instance the arguments that were advanced in favour of unity were essentially the same. Farm leaders from all three provinces recognized that disharmony and outright competition between general
farm organizations worked to the disadvantage of farm interests. In Manitoba the concern for better organization led to the convening of a Conference on Farm Organization attended by eighteen Manitoba farm organizations in February, 1961. This conference agreed to sponsor the Tyler Commission on Farm Organization which filed its report in 1962. Similarly, in Alberta, a committee was established under the chairmanship of Donald Cameron to investigate farm organization in that province and a report was produced in 1963. This lively debate at the provincial level had a considerable spill-over effect at the national level. At the height of the conflict between the Manitoba Federation of Agriculture and the Manitoba Farmers Union Dr. H. H. Hannam, President of CFA, spoke on the issue of farm unity in Winnipeg.

Dr. Hannam, who had always advocated a single voice for Canadian farmers, stressed the need for organizational unity at all levels, and he

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attributed a large part of farmer apathy to the kinds of divisions that exist in farm organizations across the country.

It was this kind of thinking that was displayed at the national level at the Annual Meeting of the CFA in 1962. The resolution passed at that meeting went as follows:

"WHEREAS two farm organizations mean higher administration costs for farm people; and WHEREAS the Farmers Union and the Federation of Agriculture are both working to the same end and for the same purpose; RESOLVED that we take steps to bring agriculture in Canada under one united and stronger organization to speak with one voice not two; and FURTHER, that all farm organizations work toward this end; and FURTHER RESOLVED that this delegate meeting authorize the Board of the Canadian Federation of Agriculture to work with the National Farmers Union in studying the possibility of ways and means being found to provide opportunity for Farm Unions to participate in the CFA on the national level either through the respective provincial Federations or directly."

This initiative on the part of the Canadian Federation of Agriculture was the first explicit move by either of the national organizations to try to come to grips with the farm unity problem. Immediately following the 1962 Annual Meeting, the Board of the CFA passed a motion which further

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emphasized the need for unity and instructed the executive to look into the causes of disunity and advance specific proposals. Subsequently, the executive instructed the staff of the national office to study the question of conflict with the NPU and report back as soon as possible. This task fell to Dr. W. C. Hopper, economist with the Canadian Federation of Agriculture. Dr. Hopper toured the country and consulted with officials of both national organizations. His report was completed and presented to the executive meeting of the Federation on May 7, 1962, in Ottawa.¹

Reactions and Support For The CFA Initiative

Alf Gleave, President of the National Farmers Union, expressed support for the principle of greater farm unity. In a statement released from his head office in Saskatoon, Mr. Gleave ignored the CFA suggestion that the Farmers Unions might wish to "participate in the CFA on the national level," and he went on to suggest that perhaps the CFA should consider a merger with the Cooperative Union of Canada.² Mr. Gleave.

¹Dr. W. C. Hopper, "Existing Conflicts in Farm Organizations," CFA Executive Meeting, Ottawa, May 7-8, 1962.

²National Farmers Union Release, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, January 26, 1962.
stressed that in his view both the CFA and the Cooperative Union represented the same cooperative and commercial groups and it was "natural" that they should become one. He made it quite clear that he envisaged a role for the CFA which was largely commercial, once removed from direct contact with the farmer, and a role for the NFU which was akin to a "professional association." Under this scheme the NFU would be the ultimate voice of the farmers on matters of policy. The contrast between the CFA resolution and the NFU reaction to it is indicative of the root problem that had traditionally separated these two organizations.

A few months later the Ontario Farmers Union issued a statement which echoed and elaborated the position of the senior Farm Union. The OFU asserted that the Federation proposal of finding a way to allow the Farmers Union to participate in CFA was simply not acceptable since it would perpetuate the CFA structure and do nothing to meet the real needs of farmers. "When the Federation are ready to build an organization, by merger, that will be completely autonomous of other empire building commodity groups, then the farm unions will be in a position to work towards this end, they said."¹ The OFU stressed again that the Federation is a

¹Ontario Farmers Union Publicity Release, April 19, 1962.
"conglomeration" of organizations, the majority of which represent commercial interests. It reiterated the point that the OFA ought to amalgamate with the Cooperative Union to better represent commercial agriculture, thereby leaving the policy-making field open to direct membership organizations—namely, the Farmers Union.

On May 4th, 1962, the Ontario Federation of Agriculture, which had been advocating and working toward a general farm organization in Ontario, reacted to the OFU press release. The Federation followed what had become a familiar pattern in its attempts to refute union allegations. The OFA claimed that as an organization, it did have solid grassroots support since more than 50,000 farmers paid direct dues to various organizations, part of which went to maintain the Federation. It asserted that the Federation executive structure was wholly democratic and not subject to control by narrow selfish interests. The OFA categorically denied that a farmer loses his concern for fellow farmers once he accepts a position in a cooperative or a commodity organization. Finally, the OFA struck back at the OFU by claiming that the latter had no right to masquerade as a major farm organization when it represented no more than 3,000 farm operators as
compared to 100,000 affiliated with the CFA.¹

The initial move to seek discussions with the National Farmers Union prompted at least one interesting reaction from within the CFA itself. In a memorandum sent to the provincial secretaries and Maritime Directors of the CFA, Mr. Roy Grant, secretary of the Maritime Federation of Agriculture, saw the disharmony between the two national organizations as primarily a prairie problem. Grant did not see the Farmers Union as being a serious factor outside of the prairie region. He believed there was a problem in the West, partly because the structure of the Federation, which included the cooperative grain companies like the pools, did not allow sufficient outlet for opinions and aspirations of rising farm leaders. On the other hand, he asserted, the Maritime Federation allowed sufficient latitude for direct membership and variety of expression. "We have our troubles, and our fights right within the one organization."² The problem as he saw it was that on the prairies the pools in


particular claim to speak for all farmers and this leads to the frustration that is at the root of the Farm Union movement. In the end, Grant advised Federations in other parts of Canada to clean their own houses before they got the entire country involved in unity discussions.

The CFA decision to seek discussions on unity prompted considerable reaction from the farm press. There seemed to be universal agreement between editors and readers that moves toward greater organizational unity were both necessary and desirable. In a lead editorial the Country Guide extolled the virtues of farm unity and commended the CFA for its initiative.

"The road to unity may be a rocky one. We firmly believe it is worth the effort. The things that divide the Federation and the farm unions are much fewer in number than they used to be, and are relatively insignificant when compared to the size of the task ahead and the views they hold in common. As witness to this, the things they sought in their separate presentations to the Federal Cabinet within recent days, with two or three exceptions, were almost identical."[1]

In a similar vein the Barrie Examiner commented on the CFA move.

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"Organized farmers in Canada may be finally on the road to speaking with one voice at the national level at least. . . . This is welcome news at any time, but particularly now with many changes in the agricultural industry in recent years . . . the industries that service farming, and process the production of the farm, are becoming larger and fewer in number, and this is forming an imbalance of bargaining power in the marketplace. . . . This has resulted in a growing realization that farm people have a great need of one strong, well-informed and united voice to speak on their behalf in the councils of our nation."

This sentiment was reflected in the editorials of other farm papers. Most of these commentators concentrated on what was to become the central issue of the unity debate—that is, the function or role of direct membership or unitary type organizations as opposed to the federated type which included cooperatives and commodity groups. The Western Producer saw the Canadian Federation of Agriculture as a "strong sure voice" that melds diverse Canadian views into one.

"We agree less than ever with those who maintain that the CFA should be tossed out of the field of policy-making. . . . To weaken that voice would be nothing short of tragic."  

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Farm union papers reacted favourably to the principle of unity but they made it very clear that only a direct membership union type of general organization should be permitted to speak for farmers on policy matters. **The Voice of the Farmer**, which is in effect, the tool of the Manitoba Farmers Union, lamented the way in which the farmers' voice was divided and diffused in the province of Manitoba—particularly under the umbrella of the Manitoba Federation of Agriculture. An editorial pointed out that the Manitoba Farmers Union had some 20,000 direct members with "locals" in 300 communities, and it asked the rhetorical question "who is more in line to establish farm policy and to speak for farmers than the MFU."

Similarly, **The Union Farmer**, the spokesman of the Farmers Union in Ontario, agreed with the principle of having one voice, but asked "whose voice?" "Farm Union members... say that it should be a 'grassroots' organization with direct membership in which farmers meet as farmers... to discuss their common problems and then decide on action... Considering that the CFA is a federation whose membership is largely made up of federations of organizations in which

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commercial cooperatives hold a major place, it is difficult to conceive that the voice of the grassroots farmer would be heard at the top.\(^1\) These arguments which are representative of the kind of debate that was going on in the farm press, were later carried into the discussions between the CFA and the NFU and eventually, since they were not reconciled, led to suspension of the talks.

It should be noted that this public discussion of the problem of organizational unity was not confined to editorialists and commentators. In the early months of 1962 farm journals were full of letters from their subscribers on the issue. As one might expect, there was no opposition to the concept of organizational unity, but most of the correspondents supported one side or the other in the unitary versus federated, or NFU versus CFA debate.

A clear and penetrating analysis from a producer came from Mr. George McLaughlin, an eminently successful dairy farmer from southern Ontario.\(^2\) McLaughlin pointed out that

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\(^{1}\) "Whose Voice?" *Union Farmer*, February, 1962.

\(^{2}\) McLaughlin has become one of the most respected farm leaders in Canada. In 1966 he was elected president of the Dairy Farmers of Canada. The same year he was appointed Chairman of the newly created Ontario Milk Marketing Board, which has subsequently become one of the most successful marketing organizations in the country.
although farmers have a multiplicity of organizations—probably surpassing any other economic group in total number—farmers' grievances and demands are not effectively expressed.¹ Nor, in his view, do farmers exercise effective control over the leaders of these organizations who purport to speak for them. The core problem is that Canada has a multitude of farm organizations, and in McLaughlin's view, "experience has already shown that with so many splinter groups, farm organizations cannot help but work at cross purposes and expend their energies in needless bickering among themselves."² This problem is compounded by the fact that multifarious farm organizations have created a "nucleus of professional elected organization people" who are really only interested in perpetuating the organization and their place in it. "We have too many people running our too many farm organizations who have no interest in reducing this number because they fear they would no longer be in the picture if a change were brought about. Neither do these people have any desire to bring in new people—young farmers whose


² Ibid.
enthusiasm might upset their comfortable apple carts.\footnote{1}

McLaughlin lent strength to the view that one of the continuing problems with general interest groups is that the leaders tend to adopt organizational goals or objectives even when they are expressing other goals.

McLaughlin, who could not in any sense be regarded as a fanatic or a militant farm union supporter, seriously questioned the value of the federated structure in a general farm organization. This kind of structure, which is represented in Canada by the Canadian Federation of Agriculture and the provincial Federations, in his view, lacks coordination, has virtually no communications with its grassroots, and as a result is characterized by "a lethargic and indifferent membership." The farmer suffers because he is many times removed from his head office and leaders by a chain of delegates and overlapping organizations.

"There are advantages to a delegate system. I suppose, but I doubt if a strong organization can be built—one with strong farm support—on a system which insulates it from the people it purports to represent. And all too often the delegate system becomes a technique whereby people can maintain themselves in office."\footnote{2}

\footnote{1}Ibid.

\footnote{2}Ibid.
Thus, McLaughlin concluded, the weakness in farm organizations comes from structural faults, and it is the structures which have to be revamped. McLaughlin's views parallel those of David Kirk, presented to the CFA Board some five years later, and are very similar to the philosophy behind Uniform, the single instance where real organizational unity has been achieved in Canada.¹

In his brief analysis of the problems of Canadian farm organizations McLaughlin focused on aspects which have much broader implications, and which this study will analyze in greater depth. His contention, for example, that the prime goal of farm organization leaders is to perpetuate their own power and the existence of their own organizations is worthy of much broader examination. Likewise his assertions concerning the oligarchic tendencies of "federated" organizations with "delegate systems" must be looked at more closely. The question must be asked to what degree these characteristics apply to a particular type of organization, like the CFA, and to what degree they are universal features of organized

¹David Kirk, "The Issue of Farm Organization Unity in Canada," July, 1967, CFA files. The establishment of Uniform in Alberta is treated in detail in the third section of this chapter.
interest groups which apply, in this case, just as readily to
direct-member organizations like the National Farmers Union.
The broad question of oligarchy and democracy in organized
groups has been discussed and analyzed for decades, receiving
its greatest initial thrust in 1911 in Robert Michel's classic
study of political parties.¹ These are concerns which will
receive a fuller examination in later stages of this study.

One might expect that those farmers who make their
views known in print or at meetings are the highly motivated
ones—the opinion leaders or the actual leaders of
existing farm organizations. But, of course, the question
arises as to whether these expressions represent a real desire
for farm unity among ordinary producers. There is not a great
deal of reliable evidence to indicate the attitudes of ordinary
farmers on this issue. Probably the best general survey of
farmer's attitudes toward organization was done in the prov-
ince of Alberta in 1964.² In this study a group of 2,000

²L. B. Doscher, "Survey on Farmers' Attitudes,"
Edmonton: Farmers Union and Cooperative Development Association, 1964. This study was commissioned by the FUA so that they might
better understand how to communicate with and serve the farmers
of Alberta.
farmers, chosen at random, were interviewed in depth by trained interviewers. Of the 2,000 farmers surveyed, about 1,700 gave answers that were valid and useful for the purposes of the study. On the question of farmer unity the results indicate a high level of agreement. Each interviewer posed the following question: "There was a quote in the paper that said: 'Farmers need to get together and speak with one voice.' Is that what you think?"¹ In response to this, 98% of those interviewed said "yes", with only 6% replying in the negative.

By phrasing the question in this way it sounds something like the proverbial "Are you in favour of motherhood?" query—not likely to elicit a negative response. In a similar, but somewhat less elaborate survey done by the Ontario Federation of Agriculture, 2,296 farmers were questioned about their attitudes toward farm organization.² In this study 49% of the respondents felt that one organization should serve all of agriculture. When asked if there were too many farm

¹Ibid., p. 25.
²Ontario Federation of Agriculture, "The 3,000," November 1966, (mimeographed). This was a survey of 3,000 Ontario farmers using a random sample drawn from the mailing list of Farm and Country magazine.
organizations only 42% replied that there were. However, 81% of those surveyed felt that membership in a general farm organization was beneficial and a good thing. It seems probable that farmers, like their leaders, are almost unanimously in favour of the principle of "one voice," or general farm unity, but when it comes to more specific considerations like reducing organizations in which they themselves are involved, there is much less agreement.

The CFA-NFU Discussions

The CPA Executive, meeting in Ottawa on May 7, 1962, received a fourteen page report from the Federation's economist, Dr. W. C. Hopper, on the causes and extent of disunity within Canadian farm organizations. Dr. Hopper concentrated on the three prairie provinces and Ontario, and in the brief period that was at his disposal he did not discover a great deal that was new. He believed, quite correctly as it turned out, that unity was most feasible in Alberta where a high degree of cooperation already existed between the Federation and the Union. He pointed out that the problems were greatest in Saskatchewan and Manitoba where certain cooperative

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1Hopper, "Existing Conflicts in Farm Organizations," CPA Executive Meeting, Ottawa, May 7-8, 1962.
Commodity groups (like the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool) were deeply suspect, and conflicting personalities militated against organizational union. Throughout Dr. Hopper's report it is clear that the area of most serious disagreement concerned the way in which the organizations were constituted (that is, direct or indirect membership), and the extent to which either of these legitimately represented the interests of producers.

At the direction of the CFA Board Dr. Hannam wrote to Mr. Alf Gleave, President of the National Farmers Union, suggesting that the two organizations meet at the executive level. Dr. Hannam intimated that the discussions might be "exploratory in nature and flexible in their approach...and would examine the relations between our respective organizations in a frank and broad way, looking of course to the possibilities of action which would contribute to the objective of farm organization unity in the various provinces of Canada and nationally."¹

On August 14, 1962, Mr. Gleave responded on behalf of the NFU and accepted the CFA invitation to meet. He suggested also that the agenda might be broadened somewhat

¹Letter from H. H. Hannam to Alf Gleave, July 25, 1962, CFA files.
to include the following four items:

"(1) The type and kind of organization structure which is needed to serve the interests of farmers in Canada locally, provincially, and nationally.

(2) The desired aims and objectives

(3) The respective roles of cooperatives and the direct membership organizations

(4) Methods of financing."^1

As a result of this exchange it was decided to hold a joint CFA-NFU meeting in Saskatoon on October 2nd, 1962.~^2

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^1Letter from Alf Gleave to H. H. Hannam, August 14, 1962, CFA files.

^2Essentially the same people attended this and the later meeting on April 1, 1963. They were:

(1) Alf Gleave, National Farmers Union
(2) H. H. Hannam, Canadian Federation of Agriculture
(3) Ed Nelson, Farmers Union of Alberta
(4) J. M. Bentley, Alberta Federation of Agriculture
(5) Lionel Sorel, Union Catholique des Cultivateurs
(6) Roy Atkinson, Saskatchewan Farmers Union
(7) Charles Wall, British Columbia Federation of Agriculture
(8) R. Bobier, Saskatchewan Federation of Agriculture
(9) R. Usick, Manitoba Farmers Union
(10) W. Parker, Manitoba Wheat Pool
(11) A. M. Runciman, United Grain Growers
(12) G. Harrold, Alberta Wheat Pool
(13) C. Anderson, Farmer’s Union of Alberta
(14) M. Tebbutt, Ontario Farmers Union
(15) C. Searle, Maritime Federation of Agriculture
(16) E. Morden, Ontario Farmers Union
(17) G. Driediger, Farmers Union of British Columbia
(18) D. Young, Saskatchewan Farmers Union
(19) P. Voh Pilus, Saskatchewan Farmers Union
(20) H. M. Arbuckle, Ontario Federation of Agriculture
At this joint meeting the following aims and objectives for a unified farm organization were agreed upon:

"(1) Strong, effective, united voice for Canadian farmers.

(2) To improve the economic and social position of farm people.

(3) To give constructive leadership in farm policy.

(4) An effort be made to provide the kind of machinery whereby a farmer can participate in decision-making and education and policy.

(5) To provide effective means of communication between farmer and farm organization.

(6) That such organization be non-partisan, free from racial discrimination and non-sectarian."¹

Agreement was less attainable, however, when the discussion moved from high-minded principles to a consideration of organizational alternatives. The nub of the organizational disagreement was summed up well in the words of Mr. M. Tebbutt of the Ontario Farmers Union.

(21) M. L. Perreault, Coop-Fédérée de Quebec
(22) Tilden, Ontario Federation of Agriculture
(23) D. Kirk, Canadian Federation of Agriculture, Secretary
(24) S. Thiessen, National Farmers Union, Secretary

¹ CPA-MEU Meeting, Saskatoon, October 2, 1962, verbatim report, p. 7, CPA files.
"It seems to me that each side (CFA and NFU) can see the shortcomings of the other. The CFA feels that the Farm Union method of finance is not satisfactory to finance a national organization. Our feeling is that the CFA relies on the commodity structure for finance and that is not in the interests of agriculture and the farmer. What we are attempting to do I think is come up with something that is better than either one has got, in doing something for the farmer. We should have adequate finance relying on neither one—commodity groups nor direct from the farmer."1

Throughout the discussions these issues of finance and legitimate farmer representation were paramount. The Farm Union representatives were aware of their problem in financing their direct membership organizations and they conceded that this had been overcome, at least in part, by the CFA when it accepted commodity affiliations. They were insistent, however, that in exchange for a degree of financial stability the CFA had effectively transferred power to commodity groups and commercial interests, very much to the detriment of the interests of individual farmers. At the same time, the CFA recognized—albeit reluctantly—that it did have a problem in communicating with and representing the grassroots farmer, and that perhaps there was some

1Ibid., p. 24.
validity to direct membership structures: There was, then, some mutual recognition of the major problem areas presenting the greatest obstacles to organizational unity.

At this meeting the practical problems associated with organizational unity were also recognized. In discussing unity at the local level the question was asked: "How do we do away with local organizations that have already been built, in areas where many locals have been created?"

In the words of Ted Bobier of the Saskatchewan Federation of Agriculture, "I can't see where the commodity groups are going to step aside . . . and say we are going to turn over our destiny to some other organization." 1 Charles Wall of the British Columbia Federation of Agriculture saw the problem of trying to unify a host of diffused locals as being virtually insurmountable. He favoured leaving the locals loosely defined and multifarious while imposing unity at the top—at the provincial and federal level. The problem for him was not so much to unify the grassroots farmers as to unify the voice at the top that was speaking to government and to other groups. Farm Union delegates, on the other hand, could not visualize a solution from above—in their eyes one

1Ibid., p. 33.
One of the overriding realities of the CPA-NFU discussions was the fact that if the two organizations with competing elites were actually unified some individuals stood to gain while others stood to lose. Representatives at this initial high level meeting put it in terms of displacement at the local level, but it was very much a concern to them at the national and provincial levels as well. Whether or not it was stated, farm leaders realized that effective unity meant increased power for some members of the elite and loss of power for some others. Moreover, the achievement of unity, as in Alberta with the creation of Unifarm, depended upon certain members of the elite stepping back and willingly accepting a loss of power and prestige. Throughout all of the arguments about structure, objectives and procedures there was no evidence to indicate that the elite of either organization was willing to allow their personal roles to be dramatically modified in the interest of national farm unity.

On the second day of the joint CPA-NFU meeting it became clear that in the areas of organizational structure and methods of financing of a general farm organization agreement would not be forthcoming. Some members,
particularly Ed Nelson of the Farmers Union of Alberta, tried to advance a concept whereby all commodity and direct locals would be unified and brought together at one annual meeting. Several people testified that this could be done without undue domination by one or two powerful groups and organizations. On the matter of financing, the meeting was confronted with a dilemma in that they shared a very real desire for direct farmer involvement, and at the same time they recognized the hard reality that farmers were unwilling by and large, to support general farm organizations from their own pockets. Most of the Farm Union representatives argued for direct producer support either through deductions from produce sold or municipal tax arrangements. All seemed to recognize the difficulties involved in yearly voluntary contributions. No one in the meeting was unalterably opposed to grants from commodity groups and cooperatives, but the consensus seemed to be that farmers have to feel they are directly involved—they have to make a direct input from which they can see direct results.

Gleave, Usick and Nelson of the Farmers Union argued persuasively in favour of joint action to establish more suitable structures and implement better means of direct financing. Gleave exhorted the participants:
"... I think if the full weight of the cooperatives, the commodity groups and the unions was placed on governments in various provinces—if all the groups in a given province were to go to government and say, 'This is the need. This is what has to be done,' you might even get the cooperation of governments. We haven't done this up to now. The Farm Union has gone to the provincial government in Saskatchewan and said: 'We want certain legislation.' They have complied to a limited degree. But we haven't had other organizations go to the government at the same time and say, 'We agree this should be done!'\(^1\)

When confronted with this kind of thinking and direct talk it seemed to be mainly the Federation people who began to back away. Both Bentley from Alberta and Bobier from Saskatchewan entered appeals for more time—they did not wish to rush into anything. Generally speaking, when it came to additional meetings, or further action with some substance, the transcript seems to indicate that it was the representatives of the CFA who were most reluctant.

The evidence leads one to conclude that those who had a position in farm organizations, like the CFA, which was not buttressed by direct-member locals felt most threatened and felt they had the most to lose. In this instance some members of the Federation felt less "politically" secure

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 52.
than their counterparts in the Farmers Union because they did not have a genuine grassroots constituency, and were, therefore not directly representative of farmers. Farm Union leaders, although they are not wholly free of oligarchic tendencies, seemed to be less reliant on the organization per se and their place in it than was the case with the CFA.¹

Thus, when it came time to move forward with firm proposals and solid commitments which would have put the credibility and relevance of each organization to the test, it was the group whose leaders were not directly elected by farmers that was most resistant. CFA leaders, in comparison to those of the Farm Unions, seemed to feel less legitimate as voices for farm people and were, therefore, less likely to be able to rely upon acceptance by the farm population.

¹There is no reason to assume that the NFU feels more secure as an organization than the CFA. Quite the contrary. It is conceivable, however, that NFU leaders themselves feel more secure when confronted by change. To the extent that the Farm Union system is more democratic than the Federation’s, Union leaders must live with insecurity. To the extent that the Federation’s system is more oligarchic its leaders have learned to achieve security by minimizing challenges from below. This may breed a special kind of insecurity for leaders of the Federation when it is suggested that the rules by which they gain and maintain power be changed. Further light is shed on these notions by S. M. Lipset et al., Union Democracy, Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1956, pp. 9 ff.
Thus any change which would have put the two organizations on a relatively equal footing—such as Gleave's proposal for a new direct financing formula—was seen by Federation leaders as working to their ultimate disadvantage.

It is ironical that it was the CFA which, with considerable pride, took the initiative in the unity discussions and took pains to portray itself as the farsighted progressive element of Canadian agriculture. But in the private meeting it was the CFA members who tended to be most defensive and resistant to meaningful change. At the close of this most revealing meeting it was agreed that all involved should try to meet again in February or March of the following year, 1963.

The next meeting to consider farm organization unity was slated for April 1st, 1963, in Winnipeg. At the suggestion of the NFU each organization undertook to come forward with firm proposals for action.¹

The CFA considered eight possible options:

(1) further joint study of the problem by a smaller committee;

(2) further consideration of Farmers Union participation in the Federation at the provincial level;

¹Letter from S. Thiessen of the NFU to D. Kirk of CFA, March 15, 1963, CFA files.
(3) further study of provincial Federation structures with a view to reorganization to take greater account of direct member locals along Farm Union lines;

(4) to provide for the NFU to become a national member of the CFA;

(5) to provide for assured Farm Union representation in provincial Federations in return for dissolution of the NFU as a separate national farm organization;

(6) propose no further changes, but further study of a division of functions at the provincial level;

(7) propose joint activities to promote better relations and understanding—for example, a joint seminar, joint committees for study of farm problems, research, etc;

(8) ask in advance that the Farmers Union take the initiative with some specific proposals.\(^1\)

Of these alternatives the Federation settled on a combination of numbers one (1) and seven (7), which seems clearly to have been the least meaningful choice open to them. The CFA proposed therefore "that a joint committee be established to explore alternatives for action and set them out in a report," and further that "the Canadian Federation of Agriculture and the National Farmers Union might usefully work together on special projects of mutual interest" in the

\(^1\)CFA Document for Executive Meeting, February 4-5, 1963, CFA files.
hope that this might facilitate "greater mutual understanding and agreement on policy ..." Here again the CFA struck a compromise position which did not in any way encroach upon or threaten its own organizational arrangements. Nor did the CFA position face up to the central problem of organizational components and direct membership locals. Perhaps the most that can be said for the CFA position is that it was less patronizing than the earlier initiative since the Federation did not choose alternative four (4) which suggested that the NFU should simply dissolve and join the CFA.  

CFA pragmatism and caution was countered by NFU boldness and directness. The NFU made three key proposals:

(1) that Farm Unions be recognized as the general farm organization in those provinces where they existed, and that where these were overlapped with other direct membership groups a restructuring take place to bring about a single organization;

(2) that local organization structures be established in those provinces where these do not exist, irrespective of other organizations that may be in operation;

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2Cf. supra, p. 206.
(3) that an annual national meeting be held consisting of delegates from all provincial direct membership organizations.\(^1\)

The NFU further proposed that the national organization be officially bilingual and that it share a designation with the provincial units—a "name such as 'Farmers Union' so that the farm population will achieve a feeling of unity and singleness of purpose.\(^2\) With respect to the cooperatives, the NFU advocated that these either be represented through the Cooperative Union of Canada, or that the Federations of Agriculture be transformed into federations of agricultural cooperatives representing all rural coops.

Clearly the proposals advanced at this second high level meeting demonstrated that a basis for agreement and action in the direction of unity did not exist. The CFA took a position which simply put off action pending further study and communication, but did not try to impose Federation values and structures on the Union. The NFU, on the other hand, took a stand which would have done away with the Federation as it was then constituted. Union strategy may have

\(^1\)"Proposal by the NFU to the Joint Meeting of CFA-NFU," Winnipeg, April 1, 1963, CFA files.

\(^2\)Ibid.
been to begin from a rather extreme position so that it
could soften and reach a compromise in the meeting. This,
however, seems unlikely since the principle of direct farmer
locals aligned with a central cohesive organization lies at
the core of Farm Union thinking.

No verbatim transcript of the joint executive meet-
ing of April 1 exists but the official minutes indicate that
agreement was reached on two motions:

"That the organizations in the provinces and
the Maritime region attempt within the coming
year to reach an understanding with respect
to achieving unity of action within their
provinces and regions, provided that no action
taken will contravene the by-laws of either of
the parent national organizations."

"That a joint committee on agricultural problems
and organization be established to examine the
fundamental challenges and problems facing farmers,
and the ways in which farm organization is equipped,
or might be equipped, to best meet these problems,
and
That the committee report to the Boards of the CFA
and NFU on its findings." ¹

The tenor of the first joint meeting of the executives
in October, 1962 was to favour referral of the whole problem
back to the provincial organizations, but it was not until

¹ "Minutes of a Joint Meeting of Representatives of the
National Farmers Union and the Canadian Federation of Agricul-
ture," Winnipeg, April 1, 1963, CFA files.
this April, 1963 meeting that this step was actually taken.

The decision to establish a smaller joint committee to study farm policy and organization led to further analysis and exchange between the two groups, but it did not produce agreement. Prior to the convening of this joint policy committee the CFA and NFU were unable to agree on the exact approach and format their meeting should take. The NFU favoured further discussion of "organizational structure and member participation," while the CFA advocated an analysis of farm policy and problems on the grounds that it was "a new approach that might take us closer to unity by a different path." ¹

The joint policy committee met for the first and last time on July 19, 1963. Both sides again disagreed as to what would be the most desirable and workable structure upon which to build a unified national farm organization. The committee's report to the respective boards frankly states that there is "no resolution in sight and recommends, for the moment, further consideration by the CFA and NFU separately." ²

¹Letter from A. Gleave to D. Kirk, April 22, 1963 and letter from D. Kirk to A. Gleave, April 26, 1963. Also in this respect see Kirk's initial letter to Gleave, April 17, 1963, CFA files.

With this policy committee report the joint efforts aimed at farm organization unity at the national level were brought to a close.

Aftermath and Conclusions

The 1962-63 discussions of organizational unity clarified and articulated the problems involved. David Kirk, Executive Secretary of the CFA was revealed as a firm realist of what is possible in Canadian farm organizations, and demonstrating considerable understanding of the attitudes and position of the NFU.\(^1\) Kirk consistently sought to nudge his own reluctant organization in a direction more accommodating for the NFU and more likely also to enhance the credibility of the CFA. In a letter to Keith Dryden of the Western Producer, Kirk made the point (missing in much of the discussion about farm unity) that strictly speaking it was not possible to "amalgamate" a federation like the CFA and a unitary organization like the NFU. "You can change the structure of the Federation to admit the unitary organization

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\(^1\)In the 1962-63 discussions Kirk's opinions on the unity issue are not often revealed as part of the official record. However, given the nature of the man and his position within the Federation it is reasonable to assume that his attitudes were influencing what was being said. Moreover, notwithstanding the official record, Kirk's role in the on-going process between the CFA and NFU was constantly expanding. See infra, p. 242.
to the federation on a certain basis. You can change names.
You can scrap the federation principle and substitute a uni-
tary Farm Union form of organization. But you cannot
amalgamate in the proper sense of the word."¹

Kirk doubted if a workable solution could be found
in "amalgamation"—which, in effect, meant absorption of the
NFU by the CFA. He stated the fundamental problem with great
clarity:

"To be fair to the Unions, their quarrel with
the Federation, and they have a quarrel, is at
bottom a profound one. They think only a uni-
tary structure of general farm organization
from local to national level can be properly
and adequately responsive to the needs of
farmers in the policy field. There is a strong
case to be made here—and a strong case to be
made in the actual context of Canadian farm
organization, for the Federation principle too."²

For Kirk the dilemma of farm organizations was wrapped up in
two compelling, but seemingly contradictory forces:

(1) the ideal of a farmer-based organization deriving its
strength and vitality from below; and, (2) the practical
requirements of this nation with its diversity reflected
perhaps more in agriculture than in any other occupational

¹Letter from D. Kirk to Keith Dryden, March 18, 1963,
CFA files.

²Ibid.
group. There was, said Kirk, "no worthwhile solution that does not involve organic changes in structure, and especially in function, in farm organization provincially and locally. Real unity is not top-level patching."¹

In February, 1967, at the request of the Executive Committee of the Federation, Kirk prepared a confidential memorandum on the issue of farm organization unity. This document gives clear expression to the issues involved and actions that might be contemplated in a move toward unity. The gist of the CFA memorandum may be summarized as follows:²

(1) There is a present and vital need for farm organization unity to give farmers an opportunity to participate in decisions affecting their lives, and to give leadership to farmers in meeting ever expanding and complex problems.

(2) The achievement of organizational unity requires bold and imaginative initiatives at the national level—no "mere organizational reshuffle."

¹Ibid.

(3) In the achievement of eventual unity it is not desirable to have more than one general membership organization operating at the same level.

(4) Where two general organizations exist at the same level, unity is hampered if there is not a division of functions or role that is fairly clearly understood and accepted. In Saskatchewan, which is offered as an example, there is considerable conflict between the Wheat Pool which tends to regard itself as a general policy organization, and the Saskatchewan Federation of Agriculture, which has exactly the same self-image. In Alberta, on the other hand, functions were more clearly divided between the Union and commodity sectors, and greater harmony prevailed.

(5) The conflict between direct-member, union-type organizations and federated cooperative-commodity type organizations is central to the farm unity problem in Canada.

(6) The fundamentally correct pattern to follow if unity is to be achieved is to create a single general farm organization in which both union locals composed of fee-paying farmers and commodity and cooperative groups have a place.

Kirk took the position that only a fundamental structural change that would accommodate the requirements of both types of organizations was likely to achieve a workable
unity. It is significant that such a crisp and far-reaching
document should have been made available to the Directors of
the CFA. Although nothing of real substance resulted from
the memo it was a great leap forward in its analysis and
grasp of the realities of the situation. A consideration of
the creation of Unifarm in Alberta demonstrates the accuracy
of Kirk’s assessment of what had to be done.

In 1967, after Kirk’s working document had been pre-
presented to the CFA Board, a Steering Committee consisting of
Charles Munro (Ontario Federation of Agriculture), Charles
Gibbings (Saskatchewan Wheat Pool), Lionel Sorel (Union
Catholique des Cultivateurs), and Paul Babey (Farmers Union
of Alberta), was established to guide and direct future unity
discussions. However, when this committee requested funds
to carry out specific research into farm organization and
unity the CFA affiliates balked, the project was dropped and
the Committee disintegrated. In spite of their professed
views about the desirability of organizational unity, CFA
leaders would not finance activities which might lead to
their own speedy demise.

1967 was, in Kirk’s view, the last time there was
even a remote hope of achieving national, organizational
unity—after that, attention and efforts shifted once again
to the provincial level. The question of farm unity at the national level was finally and officially laid to rest by the CFA Board in July, 1969. A paper prepared for a meeting of Directors makes the following observations:

"On the whole, it would appear that the goal of farm unity... is not in sight for the immediate future. This is not to say that unity is not desirable. It is indeed, and even urgent as long as the resources and efforts of farmers in their own behalf are inadequate, fragmented, and to some degree wasted... If there is a real chance for unity, of course, we should go after it, but an energy-consuming exercise carried on with little or no hope of resolution would be worse than useless."2

The implications of the Federation paper are clear: the CFA had recognized the need, had made an honest effort, but there was no hope of working successfully with the NBU. It was suggested, therefore, that the thrust of the CFA effort should be in the direction of improving its own organization.

"The real immediate issue is to improve the working effectiveness of the organization in making policy, promoting policy and informing the farmer about policy."3

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1Interview with Dave Kirk, June 7, 1971.


3Ibid.
In conclusion, it is instructive to observe the interrelationships and functions of the central participants and the way in which their roles evolved as the CFA-NFU dialogue developed. At the outset of the unity talks communications were carried on almost exclusively between the two Presidents—Gleave of the NFU and Hannam of the CFA. However, as intercourse developed and communications were regularized Gleave remained the major spokesman for the NFU, but David Kirk, Executive Secretary of the CFA, became the chief correspondent for the Federation. This can be explained in part by Kirk's personality—he is exuberant, knowledgeable, and a very good "organization man". However, there is an important difference here in the tendency of these two organizations to assign quite different roles to their personnel. Kirk was a permanent paid official of the CFA and in the continuing discussions on unity he played a much more central role than did Stuart Thiessen, his counterpart in the NFU. Gleave who was the political head of the Farmers Union remained in control of the details and on-going arrangements rather than delegate them to Thiessen, his Secretary-Treasurer. It is clear that the CFA was more prone to the processes of bureaucratization and dependence on permanent paid staff than was the case with the NFU.
This tendency is confirmed in other parts of this study which examine and compare various aspects of the behaviour of these two organizations.  

The claim of NFU leaders that they directly represent the needs and wishes of farmers is more than a mere political ploy. This belief in their representational role is something that carries through and affects the behaviour of NFU leaders. The fact that elected leaders like Gleave remain in control and at the center of on-going proceedings lends credibility to their claim that they are the real voice of Canadian producers. Most CFA leaders, on the other hand, are in fact once removed from the farmers and they demonstrate a willingness to allow considerable powers and many functions to gravitate into the hands of staff personnel.  

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1 Paul Babey, past-president of the Farmers Union of Alberta and Unifarm, confirms that federated farm organizations do have a tendency to rely on professionals. This, in his view, is particularly true of a large and diverse organization like the CFA where executive members are quite often unable to agree and therefore leave it up to the permanent staff to make the necessary compromises. Interview with Paul Babey, June 28, 1971.

2 Another example of this tendency involves the consultations that took place prior to the 1970 Agricultural Congress. Dr. Roland Poirier, who was in charge of arrangements, indicated that both national organizations were consulted before procedures for the Congress were established. Here again the NFU position was advanced and represented by their elected president, Roy Atkinson, whereas the CFA spokesman was Dave Kirk, the Executive Secretary.
would be more accurate to say that CFA leaders are simply less able, or less inclined, to resist the tendency to bureaucratization and concentration of authority in the formal organization. In spite of protests to the contrary, this may be further evidence the Federation leaders feel politically less "legitimate" than their counterparts in the NFU who feel they have a mandate directly from the people.¹

Obviously narrow organizational values and goals are at play also and contributed to the breakdown of unity talks. It was pointed out earlier that George McLaughlin, a respected farm leader, generally condemned other leaders for being self-centered and concerned primarily with their own survival and perpetuation of the organization rather than the good of Canadian farmers.² There is no question but that this has been a major impediment to farm organization unity in Canada.

In his final missive on the subject of farm organization unity, David Kirk prefaced his observations with an appeal that "there should be no misunderstanding, after so many years of working together, of the writer's basic

¹ Cf. supra., p. 229.

² supra., p. 215.
sympathy with and loyalty to all parts of the CFA organization."¹ He went on to say, in effect, "the NFU has a point," "the CFA structure is not perfect," and "we in the CFA may have to give ground." Once the unity issue had been effectively shelved Kirk could well afford to take this position—to "speak the truth." The actions of the farm leaders, on both sides of the debate, had made it clear that neither organization was prepared to lose its identity as a result of the discussions because no one was ready to abandon positions of influence.

It must be recalled that the CFA repeatedly allows effective power to rest in the hands of permanent staff members, like Kirk, and as a general rule it is the paid personnel, the bureaucracy, that have the most to lose if an organization deteriorates and the most to gain if it flourishes and expands. Kirk undoubtedly had his own thinking broadened as a result of face-to-face discussion with the NFU. But Kirk, like other farm leaders, could only feel secure in adopting a high-minded conciliatory approach toward opposing viewpoints and principles once it was clearly understood that unity, which implied serious organizational sacrifices, was not possible.

3. The Attempt To Establish A General Farm Organization In Ontario. Background: The Role of the Government and Farm Organizations in Ontario

The idea of one General Farm Organization (G.F.O.) for Ontario was actively promoted by certain key individuals within the provincial government, and it eventually became part of stated government policy. One of the early and most influential exponents of a single farm organization was Everett Biggs who was Deputy Minister in the Ontario Department of Agriculture and Food when the GFO issue reached its climax in 1969. Speaking to the Annual Meeting of the Grey County District Farmers Union in February, 1962, Biggs, who was then Assistant Deputy Minister, stressed the need for a single farm voice so that the two existing general organizations (the OFA and the OFU) would not be played against each other to the disadvantage of the farmer. Speaking later that year to the Renfrew County Farmers Union, Biggs again emphasized that a single voice coming from the Farmers Union and the Federation of Agriculture could be a vital link between the government and the farmer in solving the marketing

1 The Ontario Union Farmer, February, 1962.
problems of the industry. The motives of the government in promoting and supporting a GFO seemed to be twofold. First, government leaders believed that a single voice would genuinely improve the lot of the farming community. Second, the creation of an effective, united farm organization in Ontario would serve as a broker and an aggregator of farm demands, thereby relieving the government of the consequences of compelling compromises.

In October, 1966, the Ontario Minister of Agriculture and Food, Mr. Stewart, convened a province-wide conference on Agriculture in Vineland, Ontario. The Conference, which attracted representatives from virtually all agricultural groups within the province, was called to consider the state and prospects for Ontario agriculture. The most significant accomplishment of the Conference was the passage of the following resolution:

"That a committee be set up to study the idea proposed by the OFA Marketing Committee and also other techniques for improving and maintaining farm income. The Committee would report to all organizations represented here with copies of the report distributed to all Conference delegates. Therefore, be it resolved that the delegates to this Conference recommend to the Minister of Agriculture and Food that:

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1The Ontario Union Farmer, October, 1962.
(1) a study be undertaken of various ways of achieving income incentive payments or other techniques, to farmers

(2) he name a Committee to conduct this study, and

(3) the Committee be instructed to recommend a program by which this can be accomplished.1

Immediately following the Vineland Conference the Minister moved to implement the major recommendation of the Conference by establishing a Special Committee on Farm Income. He chose six people to sit on the Special Committee, and designated his Deputy Minister, Everett Biggs, as chairman. Other members were Thomas Tobson (farmer), Gordon Hill (farmer), Malcolm Davidson (farmer), John Phillips (Editor of Farm and Country magazine), and Mrs. K. E. MacIntosh. The Special Committee was given a one year time limit within which to complete its deliberations and present a report to the Minister. In 1967 the life of the Committee was extended for an additional year and it was in this later period that its members manifested a concern for the possibility of greater unity among farm organizations in Ontario. The

Special Committee organized meetings with representatives of government, the Ontario Farmers Union and the Ontario Federation of Agriculture, and from these meetings there evolved a series of committees—first a sixteen man committee and then a smaller six man committee—which were to study the details of farm organization in the province. The concept of a single farm organization was advanced and discussed in all of its ramifications during the summer of 1968.

When the Special Committee released its report, late in 1968, it included a strong recommendation for the establishment of a General Farm Organization in Ontario. To quote the report:

"At present the influence of farmers is paralyzed by the failure to present a unified front. No clear statement of position or focus emerges from the rivalry of the two organizations. What is needed is the coordination of the action of all farmers in one General Farm Organization, to develop policy positions on issues affecting the farm population and to press for government action in line with these policies."¹

The Committee envisaged an all encompassing organization to maximize farm income and generally serve the interest of those engaged in farming. The GFO would

¹Biggs, et al., The Challenge of Abundance, p. 155.
negotiate with other groups and governments on behalf of Ontario farmers; it would provide expertise and professional services for producers; and it would "become the provincial arm of one national General Farm Organization." The Committee saw the GFO as a direct membership organization based on farm locals at the county level. Commodity sectors would be involved in GFO through an elaborate committee structure. The organization would be financed through voluntary fees and by means of a check-off system based on the value of all farm produce sold. To perform its functions satisfactorily the Committee foresaw an annual GFO budget in excess of 2.5 million dollars.

Finally, the Committee set out in fairly explicit terms the steps that should be taken in implementing the GFO plan in Ontario. "Our Committee recommends that if farmers indicate clearly to the Minister their desire for a GFO as outlined in this report, he should proceed to conduct a producer vote." It suggested that a 60% majority of those

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1Ibid., p. 156.
2Ibid., p. 159.
3Ibid., p. 159.
voting should be regarded as sufficient to establish a GFO and implement a system of compulsory producer check-offs. This procedure, advocated by the Committee, was later followed by the government and by farm leaders in seeking to build a General Farm Organization.

Everett Biggs, the second most powerful individual in the Ontario Agricultural Department, was a strong supporter of organizational unity, and this is undoubtedly reflected in the report of the Special Committee. However, it was the promising developments in the attitudes and activities of Ontario farm organizations in the middle 1960's that spurred the Special Committee on to consideration of GFO: A number of Ontario farm leaders were strongly disposed to favour a united farm organization to represent rural interests. Gordon Hill, for example, who was a past president of the OFU and a member of the Special Committee on Farm Income, was known as a strong advocate of a general farm organization. At the 1962 Annual Meeting of the Holmeville Local of the Farmers Union, Hill "urged the Ontario Farmers Union and the Ontario Federation of Agriculture (to) merge to speak with a single voice." In his view wastefulness

and duplication could be further reduced by getting rid of separate commodity organizations in favour of commodity committees within a new general farm organization.

In the summer, immediately prior to the establishment of the Special Committee on Farm Income, there was a highly successful farmer "March on Ottawa," jointly organized in Ontario by the Farmers Union and the Federation of Agriculture. This cooperative venture, which was intended to underline the grievances of Canadian dairy producers, demonstrated the value of united action and kindled the desire for a single farm organization in Ontario.\(^1\) As a result, joint discussions pertaining to organizational unity between the OFU and OFA were begun and carried on in 1967-68 while the Special Committee was meeting. By the time the Farm Income Report was released the Ontario Federation of Agriculture was solidly wedded to the concept of a single farm organization for Ontario. A strong continuing connection between the Special Committee on Farm Income and the

\(^1\)See "Report of the President," OFA Annual Convention, November 4-6, 1968. This was also confirmed in interviews with Jim Rusk (Toronto Globe and Mail), Grant Wallace (in charge of field services for the OFA), and Ellard Powers who was a member of the OFU in 1966 and was Chairman of the Joint Committee which planned the "march".
Federation existed in that most of the members of the Committee were also ranking members of the OFA. The theme of the OFA Annual Convention in November, 1968, just prior to the release of the Income Report, was a "Single Farm Organization in '69."¹ The report of the President and the various committee chairmen and the content of the resolutions brought forward clearly indicate that the OFA was committing its full resources to the achievement of a General Farm Organization.

At the same time, however, resistance to the GFO idea was rising in the Ontario Farmers Union. In February, 1969, about a month after the Farm Income Report had been received, the joint OFA-OPU talks on farm unity broke down and were suspended. These difficulties were partly a result of the Farmers Union having lost some of its most capable moderate leaders, like Gordon Hill. After having served on the Special Committee on Farm Income for the Ontario government, Hill, who was a progressive but not radical, leader of the OFU, went on to become president of the OFA. A classic technique employed in the interest group struggle is the

¹“Single Farm Organization in '69,” Ontario Federation of Agriculture, Annual Convention, Toronto, November 4-6, 1968, CFA files.
cooptation of rival leaders, and in this instance the OFA was assisted by the Ontario government with which it had a common front. Similarly, Ellard Powers, who was a youthful and rising force in the Farm Union gradually withdrew after he helped organize the 1966 joint "March on Ottawa," and in 1970 he was appointed to the Canadian Dairy Commission by the Federal Minister of Agriculture.

The GFO Campaign

Both the Ontario government and the OFA were quick to move in support of a GFO. Less than a month after the publication of the Income Report Mr. Charles Munro, President of OFA, indicated that the Federation had already gone on record with the Ontario Minister of Agriculture in support of a single farm organization of the type proposed in the report. The government, having satisfied itself that sufficient producers did desire a GFO, introduced the General Farm Organization Act in the Ontario legislature.


2A petition asking for appropriate legislation was circulated and about 15,000 producers signed in support of government action. The petition was circulated by supporters of GFO who were also affiliated with OFA and, directly or indirectly, with the Special Committee on Farm Incomes.
The Act which was introduced on April 28, 1969 and passed on June 6, 1969 proposed the establishment of a GFO along lines recommended in the report.\(^1\)

The Act required that there be a producer majority of 60% in favour if the single organization supported by compulsory check-offs was to become a reality.\(^2\) Virtually all other OFA activities were suspended in order to promote and win the GFO vote. A youthful hog farmer, Mr. Malcolm Davidson, was chosen to head the committee which organized the pro-GFO campaign. Davidson was both a member of the Special Committee on Farm Income and a member of the OFA executive. The campaign to build a GFO became, therefore, a struggle between the OFA, with implicit governmental support, and the Ontario Farmers Union.

\(^1\) Government of Ontario Statutes, Bill 140, Volume 2.

\(^2\) The 60% figure is the one suggested in the Income Report. The OFA suggested that only 50% should be required and this is one of the few areas where there is some difference between Federation thinking and that of the Special Committee. However, it is not an important difference and it may be one that was preserved more for cosmetic, or political purposes than for anything else. Also, it is clear that at the outset there was general confidence, particularly among OFA leaders, that the 60% favourable vote would not be too difficult to achieve.
The leader of the anti-GFO campaign was the militant, charismatic president of the OFU, Walter Miller. Miller fought against the GFO on the grounds that it "was manipulation by the Ontario government, and particularly by Everett Biggs, the Deputy Minister of Agriculture."¹ The attempt to establish a General Farm Organization was portrayed by the Farmers Union as a dark and sinister plot planned over a long period of time by the government and a few privileged leaders. Moreover, it was a plot that was intended not only to subvert the interests of all farmers, but to discredit and ruin the Farmers Union at the same time.

Miller and his associates used the Farm Income Report itself to help fight against GFO. One of the key recommendations of the report was that the government should assist small marginal farmers to adjust out of the industry to make possible the consolidation of larger and more efficient units. This proposal was made in the light of long standing economic forces which have favoured larger farm holdings and have tended to force smaller farmers to leave the land. The Farm Union leaders seized upon the proposal as a tool to frighten

the farmers, telling them that two-thirds of Ontario producers would be compelled to leave their land if Farm Income Committee recommendations were heeded. "'They've taken away your schools, they've taken away your local government, now they want to take away your farm organizations and your farms.' That's what we're telling them, said a leader of the OFU campaign."¹ Holding before farmers the spectre of autocratic government control and coercive policies, Miller and his colleagues were also able to depend upon the pro-GFO forces to make many of the moves that would lend credibility to Farm Union charges. For example, those favouring a single farm organization chose the specific proposals of the Farm Income Report rather than some other variation that might have been less suspect. Malcolm Davidson, a member of the Farm Income Committee, was appointed chairman of the GFO campaign committee; and Gordon Hill, another member of the Income Committee, was permitted to campaign widely on behalf of the General Farm Organization concept. Also John Phillips, editor of Farm and Country and a member of the Income Committee, was given a free rein and was quite vociferous in his

editorial support of GFO. Combined with the scare tactics of the OFU, these factors gave added credence to theories of conspiracy and wrong-doing.

An interesting alliance was forged between the Ontario Farmers Union and a group of well-to-do farmers who regarded themselves as free enterprisers, opposed to any kind of farm organization. This group was headed by men like Joe Hudson, a large and successful egg producer from Lyn in eastern Ontario. They reinforced the anti-GFO campaign with a volley of advertisements just prior to the vote. The roots of this opposition from a non-OFU group seemed to involve a dislike of interference, government inspired or otherwise, with the "natural" economic forces that influence production, prices, markets, etc. It should be noted that many of the persons who entered this "marriage of convenience" to defeat GFO in 1969 were once again allied nearly two years later in an attempt to defeat the federal marketing bill--C-176. Moreover, some of the same techniques, using massive advertising and scare tactics were again used in the drive to

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1 Many of these points are reinforced by Michael Moore who observed the GFO campaign at close range. Ibid.

prevent a national marketing scheme.¹

On June 23, 1968, Ontario farmers voted against a General Farm Organization. The vote in favour of GFO was slightly less than 40%, significantly short of the 60% that was required if the new organizational structure was to be adopted. Miller and the OFU leaders interpreted the negative vote as widespread support for the Farmers Union and tried to capitalize on this success by launching a membership drive and drumming up support for the upcoming NFU Founding Convention in Winnipeg.² However, in view of the nature of the GFO campaign, it would appear that it would be more realistic to regard the anti-GFO vote as a vote against the perceived evils of government control and manipulation rather than as signifying support for the OFU.³

¹These aspects of the battle over Bill C-176 are discussed in detail elsewhere in this study. Supra, Chapter II, pp. 129 ff.

²The Founding Convention was held in August, 1969, with a healthy contingent of Ontario Farmers Union delegates in attendance. The Ontario delegation was led by Walter Miller and included a total of 230 people, second only in size to the delegation from the Saskatchewan Farmers Union, who had 382 delegates. Interview with Stuart Thiessen, June 24, 1971. Also, supra, p. 196.

³This point is substantiated by Jim Rusk, former Special Assistant to the federal Minister of Agriculture and Agricultural Editor for the Toronto Globe and Mail. Rusk interview, September 20, 1971. See also Michael Moore, "Farm Vote Called Rebuff."
Explanatory Factors

What, then, are the lessons to be learned from the struggle over GFO in Ontario? What are the elements that help explain the behavior of Ontario farm organizations in this episode? The answers to these questions are to be found in a mixture of strictly organizational factors, leadership aspirations, and ideological beliefs.

Perhaps the most instructive aspects of the struggle over GFO were those that pertained to the organizational ends and objectives of the two main protagonists—the OFA and the OFU. Part of the reason why the OFA supported the GFO idea from the outset was that the Federation was beginning to feel threatened by the OFU. For example, the Farmers Union was beginning to experience some moderate success in electing its supporters to Ontario Marketing Boards.¹ Since the OFA was dependent to a considerable extent upon these Boards for its finances, it quite naturally viewed any such change in their composition with alarm. This, however, was not a situation that had slipped beyond the Federation’s control; it was not a struggle that the OFA had lost or necessarily had to lose.

It was, rather, more of an annoyance and a potential threat than a real danger with any likelihood of destroying the OFA. What seems to have been more important to OFA leaders was the possibility of establishing a GFO within which they themselves would be the central participants. There is a tendency for interest group leaders to try to normalize their environment, to make it secure and predictable, and in the case of the Ontario Federation, GFO was viewed as an excellent means to this end. The check-off formula which was proposed as part of the GFO plan would have yielded about 2.5 million dollars per year according to Farm Income Committee calculations. These resources would have been of great benefit to GFO leaders who wished to maintain themselves in office, even long after they had ceased to be effective in serving the interests of producers. The GFO concept appealed to OFA leaders not only because it would provide for a strong, well-heeled organization to serve farmer's needs, but also because it offered the promise of stability and security as opposed to instability and constant challenges from other organizations. OFA leaders saw in the GFO proposal a means whereby their individual positions could be solidified and preserved. The OPU, on the other hand, stood to lose everything with the creation of a powerful GFO.
The tendency for organized interest groups to become rigid and entrenched is offset somewhat by maintaining an environment within which other groups and individuals are free to rise and challenge the prevailing elite. This kind of atmosphere is essential to the internal workings of organized groups that wish to preserve a semblance of democracy,¹ and it is essential in the broader context if organized groups are going to remain responsive to those interests they claim to represent. It is an open question whether a single farm organization, like the proposed GFO, would resist oligarchic tendencies and remain responsive without the presence of other competing groups. One of the genuine values of the Farmers Union in Ontario was that it "had an impact on farm affairs in Ontario because it could remind the dominant OFA that dominance does not insure immortality."²

The Ontario Federation of Agriculture suffered considerable hardship when the GFO proposal was voted down by producers. The extent to which OFA leaders had expected to

¹As with the International Typographical Union which has built and maintained a functioning, internal two-party system. Lipset, et al, Union Democracy (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 7 ff.

²Moore: "New Organization is OFA's Hope."
win the day was evident in the fact that in 1968 the Membership and Organization Committee of the Federation lay quite dormant except that it "produced a working paper for a single farm organization." Even the normal yearly functions of grooming the organization and replenishing the membership seem to have been suspended. Don Middleton, Secretary of the Ontario Federation, advised the parent Federation in Ottawa that the OFA "is encountering considerable difficulty in keeping its ship afloat since the defeat of the GFO vote but we are attempting to have commodity boards assume responsibility for a greater share of the CFA affiliation fees."  

Perhaps the key question here is: "Why should the OFA have wished to 'keep its ship afloat' at all?" In part the answer was that for an entrenched executive with paid people carrying on the daily functions, the perpetuation of the organization became the major factor determining the attitudes and behavior of those who were guiding the OFA.

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1 Committee Reports, OFA Annual Convention, November 4-6, 1968, p. 27.

2 Letter from Don Middleton to William Hamilton of CFA, October 20, 1969, CFA files.

3 Truman, Process, p. 145.
The Ontario Federation became subject to the forces that are contained in Michel's classic Iron Law of Oligarchy—"At the outset leaders arise SPONTANEOUSLY; their functions are ACCESSORY and GRATUITOUS. Soon, however, they become PROFESSIONAL leaders, and in this second stage of development they are STABLE and IRREMOVABLE."¹ Michael Moore accurately described the attitudes and motives of the OFA leadership:

"The prime concern of this group (was) preservation of the organization, and programs (were) developed to build member support for the organization, rather than for the membership as a whole."² Leaders of the Ontario Farmers Union were also motivated by organizational aims in their efforts to defeat GFO. Walter Miller, in particular, tried to interpret the GFO vote in a way that would strengthen the OFU and reinforce his own hold on that organization.³ During and after the GFO campaign Miller and his colleagues were often accused of opposing a unified farm organization for narrow "political" reasons.⁴

¹Michels, Political Parties, pp. 400-401, (Emphasis in the original).
²Moore: "Farm Organizations often Rebuffed."
³Supra, p. 256.
⁴Interview with Grant Wallace, Head of Field Services
In *Union Democracy* Lipset and his co-authors point out that a leadership position in a trade union brings with it a certain amount of status and prestige over the ordinary union member.\textsuperscript{1} The economic and social status associated with a position of authority makes it difficult for a leader to accept relegation to the common ranks—and, of course, the greater the distinction in terms of status the greater are the problems associated with moving back to an ordinary member role. The importance of the status factor was evidenced in the activities and attitudes of the OFU hierarchy. As the GFO discussions evolved, Farm Union leaders felt increasingly threatened and concerned that they could lose their status—their "positions" as farm leaders—and this was an important factor in their decision to oppose GFO.\textsuperscript{2} OFU president, Walter Miller, openly claimed to be fighting to preserve the Farmers Union, but of course in his public statements the interests of the Union were always shown to

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\textsuperscript{1}Lipset, et al: *Union Democracy*, pp. 9 ff. and p. 453.

\textsuperscript{2}Interview with Grant Wallace, June 10, 1971.
be synonymous with the common interest of the farmers.¹

There was never any hint from the Farmers Union, however, that their goals might be primarily organizational, or intended to serve the need for power of Miller himself.

The GFO idea might have succeeded in Ontario if the leaders who were in control of the Farmers Union in the early 1960's had remained in positions of power. However, these men who looked favourably upon GFO left the Farm Union in favour of the OFA, leaving a gap in the Union to be filled by others who were eager opponents like Walter Miller. Early Farm Union leaders--Gordon Hill, for example--were not about to retire from farm politics, and since GFO was clearly envisaged as a fortified replacement for the OFA, future political possibilities clearly lay in that direction. Walter Miller was even less inclined than his predecessors to accept political obscurity, and since it was apparent that there would be no place for Miller in a new GFO, it was necessary for him to preserve and buttress his existing power base. Whatever power and prestige Miller did possess could only be preserved by his strengthening the OFU.

¹ Of course, one goal need not preclude the other, and to some extent the public interest of farmers is being represented when organizational well-being is the goal being sought after. Cf. Lipset, et al., Union Democracy, p. 458.
For both the OFA and the OFU organizational factors were a major determinant of farm organization behavior. However, in the case of the Farmers Union one cannot overlook the motivation that derived from genuine ideological beliefs. When members of the Farmers Union railed against the Federation they did it not only because the Federation was a rival organization, but also because they believed it was a "bad" organization, subject to control by economic forces that work against the genuine interest of farmers. When Walter Miller and other leaders of the OFU referred to the unholy alliance between government and agribusiness they were reflecting an ideological concern as well as an organizational concern.¹

The conditions necessary for organizational unity did not exist in Ontario in 1969. Relations between the OFA and the OFU were still far less than fraternal; the two organizations did not have a good functional relationship. Both regarded themselves as general, policy oriented farm groups. Both claimed to be direct membership farmer-based organizations, although the federation derived substantial support from commodity groups. It is clear that neither of

¹Miller shared, and consistently expressed, the same ideological point of view that was present in NFU material, and in the public statements of its leader, Roy Atkinson. Supra, pp. 202 ff.
the organizations had leaders who were willing to step aside and accept a lesser, or perhaps non-existent role. Miller's assessment of his own position and that of his organization was probably quite accurate. If the GFO vote had been favourable the OFU would almost certainly have vanished and Walter Miller and his fellow Union leaders would have been left with nothing.

4. The Establishment of Unifarm in Alberta

In March 1970, the Alberta Federation of Agriculture and the Farmers Union of Alberta held a joint Founding Convention in which they officially amalgamated into a single farm organization called Unifarm. This marked the first time in Canada that two general farm organizations—one a direct membership type and the other a federated type—had succeeded in coming together into one unit.

The question is: "Why Alberta?"—"Why was the experience in Alberta different than elsewhere?" Two central hypotheses come to mind: (1) that the proper mix of leadership traits involving an active role on the one hand and a passive role on the other is a necessary condition for organizational unity; (2) that the definitive features, functions, and traditional interrelationships of the organizations involved must
be complementary and compatible rather than contradictory and competitive if organizational unity is to succeed.

Prelude to Unity: People, Events, and Issues

The most prominent personalities in the gradual move toward organizational unity were two successive presidents of the Farmers Union of Alberta, Ed Nelson and Paul Babey. Mr. Nelson was president of the Farmers Union from 1958 to 1963, and he was followed by Mr. Babey who was president until 1970 when he became the first president of Unifarm. Together Nelson and Babey provided Alberta farmers with more than a decade of strong unbroken leadership in the direction of farm unity. They shared a faith in the value of a single farm organization which communicates with farmers, and speaks to government and other groups on the farmers behalf. As president of the FUA, Nelson had been one of the most prominent figures in the 1962-63 unity discussions between the CFA and NFU.¹ Four years later, in 1967, Paul Babey was the driving force behind the CFA Steering Committee which made a last ditch effort to achieve the basis for a working unity at the national level.² Both leaders believed

¹Supra, p. 227.
²Supra, p. 240.
in the preservation of strong provincially-based farm organizations where their primary allegiance lay. It was toward unity at the provincial level that their major efforts were directed.

Nelson and Babey subscribed to the cherished Farm Union tenet that a farm organization draws its vitality and strength from direct links with the grassroots producers, which they believed is too often lost by cooperatives and farm commodity groups which allow economic goals to become paramount. Nelson sought to demonstrate how the interests of the individual farmer are lost in the evolution of organizations and the rise of business interests within our economic system. In particular he pointed out how the original rationale behind the great western cooperatives like the United Grain Growers and the Alberta Wheat Pool became distorted. These organizations in seeking new objectives and new roles tended to lose sight of the plight of their individual members. In the end the individual farmer was left in a lonely position, confronted with forces and organizations which seemed unable to address themselves to the major problems with which he was faced.
"The answers will not come from these organizations (i.e.: the cooperatives), because each will be too busy perpetuating itself and pleading for the loyalty of the membership. The answers can only come from individual farmers who are free to analyze the situation and so recognize the implications to themselves of unplanned competition among their cooperatives."¹

Like Nelson, Babey deplored the competition between groups that purported to represent the interests of the producers. "I am concerned," said Babey, "with the competition that has developed among cooperatives and other such organizations. Competition exists not only in the practical handling and disposal of farm commodities, but also in the purchasing of inputs and seeking of loyalty and support of members."² Babey also referred to these organizations which were set up to serve the farmer's interest as "perpetuating themselves," and "pleading for the support of each others membership." His solution to this problem lay with the individual farmer using his judgement and retaining a membership in one unified farm organization.

¹President's Report, FUA Annual Convention, Calgary, December, 1963, p. 10, Uniform files. This was Ed Nelson's final report as President.

However, in spite of their commitment to the Farm Union approach and their dislike of certain developments in farm cooperatives and commodity groups, both Nelson and Babey were pragmatists, fully aware that ideal types of organization rarely exist and other organizations with other characteristics have a contribution to make. At the end of his career as president of the FUA, Nelson appealed for a practical realization that unity with agricultural cooperatives is essential. He asked his members to accept the recommendations of the Alberta Commission on Farm Organization which advocated a joint organization with the best features of both the unitary and federated types.¹ This he believed was a practical and workable solution which would build and maintain farmer strength.

"I believe it (the Committee recommendation) can be a pattern for a general farm organization that would enable farmers to take part in all decision-making and make it possible for them to support those decisions whether they are social or economic. It could make farmers a force to be reckoned with in spite of their dwindling percentage of the total population, and it would place...

¹D. Cameron, L. D. Nesbitt, and A. W. Platt, Report of the Commission on Farm Organization to the Board of Directors of the Alberta Federation of Agriculture, November 1, 1963. This forty page study was commissioned by the AFA in 1962, and made a substantial contribution to the debate on farm unity in Alberta.
them in a position from which they, as individuals could be responsible for the basic role of making decisions acceptable to the people of a democratic society."¹

Babey recognized, as did his predecessor, that a general farm organization cannot exist separate from other farm organizations. A general farm organization removed from other existing farm organizations in the province could not achieve the support of a majority of farmers and it would, therefore, be less effective than it should be. "In view of this" said Babey, "I cannot, in good conscience, support the idea of a national farm organization completely separated from other farm organizations."² In his speech to the 1969 Annual Convention, Babey harked back to the report of the Commission on Farm Organization which had strongly endorsed a united provincial organization with cooperatives included. He reviewed for his audience the importance of cooperative movements like the Wheat Pool, Cooperative Canadian Industries Ltd. (CCIL), United Grain Growers (UGG), and others, all of which were created to advance the welfare of Alberta farmers.

¹President's Report, FFA Annual Convention, Calgary, December, 1963, p. 11. Unifarm files.


He spoke about the important contributions made by specialized commodity groups in particular areas with which they were concerned. This practical ability to see both sides of the farm organization debate was a key to Babey's success in bringing farm unity, through Unifarm, to fruition.

During the 1960's there was, in Alberta as elsewhere, a serious division of opinion as to which type of general farm organization was most desirable. Members of the Farmers Union held that the federated farm organization, dependent upon secondary institutions rather than producers directly, was undesirable from the point of view of policy-making, communications, and finance. Those who were favourably inclined toward the AFA contended that the federation structure was both desirable and workable, and the only likely way in which unity could be achieved. These divisions, however, were not as deep and intensely held as in other regions of Canada, and they were moderated to a considerable degree in Alberta by enlightened leaders.

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2 The Farmers Union in Alberta, unlike its counterpart in certain other provinces, had a large, stable membership which constituted a solid financial base.
The possibility of achieving a general organization that was workable but did not alienate any major factions was considerably enhanced by the relations that existed between and within Alberta farm organizations. Of particular importance were the amicable relations between the Farmers Union and the Alberta Federation; the product of years of participation by the FUA in APA affairs. The 1963 Committee on Farm Organization observed that "the relationship of the general farm organization to the producer cooperative movement has generally been harmonious and free from the sometimes bitter quarrels that have taken place in other provinces."\(^1\) When he was president of the Alberta Farmers Union, Ed Nelson would take every opportunity to stress the fact that from its inception in 1948 the FUA had been a functioning part of the Alberta Federation of Agriculture, and the two groups had worked in cooperation, not as competitors.\(^2\)

The achievement of unity in Alberta was influenced by the attitudes and activities of the NFU. The FUA had

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\(^2\) See, for example, the President's Report, FUA Annual Convention, Calgary, December, 1963, Uniform Files.
traditionally maintained dual affiliation with both the CPA, through its participation in the Alberta Federation, and the NFU, through the Interprovincial Farm Union Council. The FUA had a natural, favourable inclination toward the NFU because the two groups had the same type of organization and they shared similar attitudes toward the principles of farm representation. In the mid-1960's the NFU became more vocal on the need for a national union of farmers. Thus complete integration with the NFU became a central concern for the FUA leaders and any movement toward unity on the provincial level had to await consideration of the possibility of complete integration within the National Farmers Union. The Farmers Union of Alberta was the largest, best organized and most solidly financed farm union in Canada, with the possible exception of the Union Catholique des Cultivateurs de Quebec which was also organized along direct union lines. For this reason the Alberta organization was very attractive to the

1Prior to 1969 Paul Babey, President of the FUA, had served as Vice-Chairman of the Interprovincial Farm Union Council.

2In his Annual Reports to the 1967 and 1968 Annual Conventions of the FUA Babey was completely silent on the question of organizational unity. The reason was that relations with the NFU had intensified and the possible bases for a complete union were being examined. Interview with Paul Babey, Edmonton, November 6, 1970.
NFU which was attempting to build a credible national organization. For the same reason FUA leaders were reluctant to join the fledgeling National Union unless they were sure where it was headed. As one FUA delegate remarked at the 1968 Annual Convention, "If we agree to this resolution (to join the NFU) the best organization in Canada would be dragged into oblivion."  

The Founding Convention of the NFU in 1969 brought the question of FUA-NFU relations to a head. The results of the Convention were a good deal less than satisfactory for Babey and the FUA delegates who were considering the possibility of integration with the NFU. "For the eighty Albertans attending the convention," writes Tom Campbell, "the formation of the NFU was very painful. The Albertans saw their President, Paul Babey, slighted by NFU leaders, their delegates denied directorships on the new union, and their illusions shattered."  

The newly elected President of the NFU was Roy Atkinson, President of the Saskatchewan Farmers Union. Atkinson had long dreamed of a national union of farmers under

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his leadership. He and the SFU had been the main driving force behind the NFU Founding Convention, and he was not about to see his leadership challenged either by another person or a rival organization. Of those who attended the Convention only Babey could have been regarded as a serious potential threat to Atkinson's leadership.\footnote{Babey's own view was that they were worried or perhaps "afraid" of his organization. Also it was his opinion that the NFU Convention was set up and stage managed from start to finish by Roy Atkinson. Interview with Paul Babey, June 28, 1971.} The Farmers Union of Alberta which had a membership of approximately 29,000 was reputed by many to be larger and better off than the entire NFU organization.\footnote{There seems to be little reason to doubt the FUA's superiority in this respect. Until recently (1972) Atkinson has consistently refused to reveal actual NFU membership, calling it "classified" information. This, of course, had the effect of fanning the flames of suspicion in many quarters. See Nick Van Ryan, "Alberta Farmers Urged to Join NFU," Lethbridge Herald, December 9, 1969.} Furthermore, Babey was a young and articulate leader who was gaining considerable influence in farm and governmental circles. It was these factors of competition and personal rivalry which terminated any possibility of complete integration between the NFU and FUA. The Founding Convention capitalized on the serious discontent among farmers--particularly western wheat producers. But it
did not strengthen the hand of the NFU within the Farmers Union of Alberta—on the contrary, it was weakened. Thus, when Roy Atkinson, the new president of the NFU, came to the Annual Convention of the FUA in December, 1969, much of his appeal fell on deaf ears.

It was at this Annual Convention of the FUA in 1969, that Babey decided to seize the initiative and moved to resolve the question of relations between farm organizations. In his mind the Alberta farm movement had come to the crossroads; a decision had to be taken. Babey came out strongly in favour of a move to establish organizational unity within the province, rather than accept absorption into the NFU organization. He argued that provincial unity was both desirable and possible and that he was the man to guide it to fruition. In this he asked for the support of his Union and it was forthcoming. In March, 1970, provincial farm union did come about when Unifarm was born.

The Conditions of Unity

The establishment of Unifarm can be attributed to a curious mixture of conditions involving organizational relations and environment, and the activities, motives, and

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beliefs of leaders. The most interesting and instructive elements of the Alberta experience pertain to the roles and relations between the members of the farm organization elites. It is the relative position of the group leaders that goes furthest in distinguishing the Alberta experience from earlier attempts to achieve unity nationally and in Ontario.

In Alberta, as elsewhere, farm unity had been impeded by self-perpetuating leadership in existing organizations. This fact was recognized by the joint AFA-FUA Committee which drew up the basic plans for Uniform.1 "In the past," they said, "discord has been partly due to the rivalry of strong personalities in leadership positions who were inclined to foster divergent opinion, more for the sake of prestige in personal combat than for the soundness of their proposals."2 The significance of this problem was, of course, communicated by the Committee to the leaders of the AFA and FUA.

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1The Joint Committee was established at the Annual Meeting of the AFA in January, 1969. It was a five man committee consisting of two farmers with organizational backgrounds, two agricultural experts, and one paid employee of the AFA.

There is evidence, however, that Alberta farm leaders themselves were quite aware of the importance of leadership and the extent to which leader goals could inhibit effective unity. Paul Babey, for example, showed that he was fully appreciative of Truman's point that one of the two main types of leaders were those who "directly serve to perpetuate the existing active minority." Babey suggested that in the creation of new farm organizations and in the attempt to unify farmers behind one organization the greatest obstacles are the persons in positions of leadership within the existing organizations. He understood the lesson which is clear in the two previous case studies on unity, that farm interest group leaders tended to see their own functions as a direct reflection of the functions of their organizations, and any lesser role for the organization automatically meant a lesser role for them personally. In the minds of those in charge of the organization their own internal political goals became indistinguishable from the goals of the organization.

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1Truman: Governmental Process, p. 195.

2Interview with Paul Babey, Edmonton, November 6, 1970.

3Cf., Supra, pp. 210 ff., and pp. 242 ff.
The creation of Unifarm in Alberta was made possible by the aggressive leadership of Paul Babey on the one hand, and the willingness of other farm leaders to step down and assume lesser roles, or perhaps no role at all, in the newly formed organization. The unification of the AFA and FUFA was only achieved because some of the people in control—chiefly Nelson Malm, President of the AFA—were willing to step into the background. Babey realized that this kind of willingness, which most farm leaders would regard as a curious, foolhardy spirit of self-sacrifice, is most difficult to achieve.  

The obvious question is why was the president of the AFA, Nelson Malm, prepared to retreat to allow Babey, his apparent rival, to emerge as head of a new and powerful unified farm organization? The answer in part is that Malm, in addition to being president of the AFA, was also Vice-President of the Alberta Wheat Pool. He enjoyed a position of power and prestige within Alberta's most influential farmer cooperative. Thus when Malm relinquished the leadership of a general farm organization, the Alberta Federation, it did not constitute a step into oblivion. He was not in the same position as his predecessor, Jim Bentley, who was a

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1 Interview with Paul Babey, November 6, 1970.
farmer from the Edmonton region, or Walter Miller, president of the Ontario Farmers Union, who farmed near Tara, Ontario. Without their positions of leadership both of these men would be little more than ordinary farmers—deprived of the satisfying fruits of power. Malm, on the other hand, derived "status security" from sources apart from the AFA and this made it less difficult for him to step back from positions of leadership.¹

One might inquire into what would have happened had Nelson Malm not become president of the Alberta Federation—if, for example, Jim Bentley had stayed on at the head of AFA rather than going on to become president of CFA.² Bentley consistently paid lip service to the principle of organizational unity but in his public statements and private meetings he was highly defensive about the federation structure, and he did not show any particular appreciation for the positive aspects of the Farm Union position. In a widely quoted speech to the Annual Convention of the AFA in Calgary in 1962 Bentley said:


²Bentley gave up the presidency of the AFA in 1963 to become president of the CFA, a position which he held until 1969 when he was replaced by Charles Munro. Malm succeeded Bentley as president of AFA in 1963 and held that position until 1970 when the organization became a part of Unffa.
"It is inconceivable to me that because a farmer has become a director or an official of a commercial cooperative that he should be no longer concerned with the welfare of his fellow farmers. On the other hand, because of his experiences in the cooperative, he would be better able to speak for farmers generally, and certainly should be of great assistance in the formation of national policies for agriculture."\(^1\)

Bentley, thus, became closely associated in the public mind with defense of the Federation structure and the part played by cooperatives and commodity groups within that structure. Malm, on the other hand, was not identified in quite the same way, although he did take pains to ensure that the legitimate role of cooperatives and commodity groups was safe-guarded when new organization structures were being debated.\(^2\) The important point is that Malm remained in a position of flexibility (some might say weakness) from which he could make a graceful retreat.\(^3\)

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\(^3\) These general conclusions concerning Bentley and Malm were supported by Paul Babey in an interview, June 28, 1971. Babey also made the point that several individuals in his own organization, the FUA, had to give up positions of influence to see Unifarm through.
which overlapped and contradicted the Union locals—nor did the Alberta Wheat Pool which was the main component of the Federation. Thus the animosity which existed in Saskatchewan between the Wheat Pool and the Farmers Union, for example, did not exist in Alberta. The Saskatchewan Pool not only maintained complete locals which were active and directly competitive to Farm Union locals, but they also defined a policy role for them which was in direct conflict with the SFU.¹ In Alberta the distinctive functions of each organization were tacitly understood, largely through highly communicative elites, and mutual resentment was minimized. In those areas where the FUA and AFA seemed to have equal responsibility—in areas where divergent opinions from the two organizations could arouse ill-will and division—the leaders tended to tread softly. In 1963 the Cameron Committee on Farm organization observed that “there appears to be general understanding of the roles that each occupy and a desire and willingness to work together such as rarely existed in past years.”²

¹For further evidence on these points see papers done by Dave Kirk, "The Issue of Farm Organization Unity in Canada," Canadian Federation of Agriculture, July, 1967, and W. C. Hopper, "Existing Conflicts in Farm Organizations," CFA Executive Meeting, May 7 - 8, 1962, CFA files.

thereby winning the support of the Alberta Union. The fact remains however, that both of these men had high aspirations and neither was willing to step aside into an uncertain future for the sake of the National Farmers Union. As has been already recounted, Baley and his colleagues returned to Edmonton where Unifarm was hatched, and the NFU with Atkinson at the helm stormed on without the Albertans.

Apart from personal ambition and a desire to achieve particular goals, farm leaders are motivated by ideological beliefs and principles. As has been indicated elsewhere throughout this study ideology is an important component in the behavior and attitudes of the Canadian Farm Unions. Stuart Thiessen, Secretary-Treasurer of the NFU, who refers to the CFA as the "Canadian Federation of Agribusiness," expressed the view that the establishment of Unifarm in Alberta was a perfect example of farmers having been deceived and "taken for a ride" by the commercial interests of the CFA. "For the agribusiness interests within the CFA to compromise their corporate interests when there is a choice to make between what's good for the empire or what's good for the farmer, the farmer will come off second best every time."

There is no evidence to support the contention that Unifarm was a sellout to commercial interests, to the ultimate detriment of the farmer. However, the Alberta experience demonstrates that one of the conditions that facilitated unity was the absence of intense ideological beliefs in the FUA elite and rank and file. Farm Union leaders in Alberta were characterized more by pragmatism and less by ideological zealouslyness than was the case in unions from other regions of the country. Leaders like Babey were prepared to be flexible, to make some compromises and take some risks in the interest of achieving organizational unity. An excellent illustration of the variation in ideological content in the thinking of Farm Union leaders from Alberta and elsewhere was evidenced in a meeting between these leaders on July 27, 1968. Farm Union leaders were discussing the merits of a beef check-off system in which the government would deduct a few cents per head from cattle sold and turn the money over to producer organizations for research and promotion of beef. Babey's reaction to the proposal was positive and practical—he accepted the intent of the plan and suggested a number of ways it could be made to work effectively. The reaction of leaders from other branches of the Farmers Union was largely ideological. NFU president Roy Atkinson complained that the
research would be made available to industrialists "who are out to get control of production." Ken Singleton, President of the Manitoba Farmers Union felt the money would simply be used by government "to finance another organization." OFU president, Walter Miller, expressed the belief that the scheme in Ontario was simply intended to promote "a front organization for the Ontario government." The record indicates consistently that the positions of the FUA were based less on ideological considerations than was the case for any of its union counterparts in other provinces.

In the establishment of Uniarm in 1970 an attempt was made to strike a balance between the organizational types in the more contentious areas like organizational make-up, financing, and the role of cooperative and commodity groups. Full recognition was given to both the direct membership principle and the participation of commodity groups; delegates to the Annual Convention of Uniarm were to be drawn equally from direct membership locals and specialized groups. The original proposal called for a Convention of 300 delegates derived equally from direct member locals and commodity

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1 Minutes of a meeting of the National Farmers Union Council, Edmonton, July 27, 1968, p. 5, NFU files.

cooperative groups. However, at the insistence of Paul Babey who wanted to see more people involved in the Annual Convention, the number of delegates was doubled to 600.\(^1\) In the matter of financing the value of direct dues-paying members was recognized, and at the same time the idea of commodity group and cooperative fees was accepted. The Committee which drew up the preliminary plans for Unifarm recommended a government legislated check-off system whereby the new organization would be financed through automatic deductions from all agricultural sales within the province. However, in the interest of getting the organization going, the Committee opted for a combined system of direct-member and commodity fees, and recommended that Unifarm, once established, undertake an immediate investigation of the possibility of financing through check-off.\(^2\) The particular needs and interests of commodity groups and marketing organizations were to be served by a system of commodity committees established by, and responsible to, the Board of the new unified organization. Thus, Unifarm represented an attempt to both ensure democratic

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\(^1\)Minutes of a Special Farm Organization Meeting, AFA, Red Deer, August 15, 1969. Unifarm files.

control and full participation through direct memberships and to safeguard and enhance the interests of specialty producer groups whose members had come together to promote their own well-being.

There were two broad reasons for the high degree of accord and harmony between the FUA and AFA in the formation of Uniform. First, there was substantial sharing of ordinary members and members of the leadership elite between the two organizations. Second, both groups developed and maintained separate roles, and attitudes toward their roles, which minimized conflicts.

The president of the FUA consistently held a senior position on the executive of the Alberta Federation, and similarly, the president of the AFA was usually deeply involved in the commodity structure of the FUA. This kind of interlinkage carried through to the general membership, with the FUA traditionally having as members, strong spokesmen from the cooperatives and commodity groups—the sort of people who were the backbone of the AFA.

On the other hand, Alberta's two general farm organizations were separate in their basic organizational structure and the kinds of functions each performed. The Alberta Federation of Agriculture did not have direct membership locals
which overlapped and contradicted the Union locals—nor did the Alberta Wheat Pool which was the main component of the Federation. Thus the animosity which existed in Saskatchewan between the Wheat Pool and the Farmers Union, for example, did not exist in Alberta. The Saskatchewan Pool not only maintained complete locals which were active and directly competitive to Farm Union locals, but they also defined a policy role for them which was in direct conflict with the SFU.\(^1\) In Alberta the distinctive functions of each organization were tacitly understood, largely through highly communicative elites, and mutual resentment was minimized. In those areas where the FUA and AFA seemed to have equal responsibility—in areas where divergent opinions from the two organizations could arouse ill-will and division—the leaders tended to tread softly. In 1963 the Cameron Committee on Farm organization observed that "there appears to be general understanding of the roles that each occupy and a desire and willingness to work together such as rarely existed in past years."\(^2\)

\(^1\)For further evidence on these points see papers done by Dave Kirk, "The Issue of Farm Organization Unity in Canada," Canadian Federation of Agriculture, July, 1967, and W. C. Hopper, "Existing Conflicts in Farm Organizations," CFA Executive Meeting, May 7 - 8, 1962, CFA files.

Finally, it is important to recognize that Alberta has a long tradition of cooperation and compatibility among its farm groups. The moderate, non-ideological stance of the FUA had deep roots within that province. From Alberta's original and unrivalled farm spokesman, Henry Wise Wood, down to the modern-day presidents of the FUA, like Nelson and Babey, the province has enjoyed wise and popular farm leadership. Henry Wise Wood expounded the theory of two contending principles, "competition and cooperation," of which cooperation is immeasurably more satisfying and rewarding. In the clash between the conflicting doctrines of competition and cooperation the well-being of individuals could best be achieved through an "equilibrium of interests." Wood was the originator of many of the democratic and cooperative attitudes that prevailed throughout the history of the farm movement in Alberta. These same ideals were brought to bear in the creation of Unifarm and were subsequently built into its constitution.

Prior to Unifarm, Alberta had long been regarded as the province in which organizational unity was most plausible.

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One reason for this, in the view of the Cameron Committee on Farm Organization, was that "there has been a continuous history of general farm organization since 1903 and only for brief periods has there been competing general organizations."¹ This kind of environment nurtured the attitudes and conditions that were required for the development of the farm movement and the ultimate achievement of organizational unity through Uniform.

5. Conclusion

The achievement of organizational unity in Alberta depended upon the creative leadership of a powerful personality, Paul Babey. He was, in a sense, allowed to succeed by other leaders, primarily within the APA, who were willing to accept a loss of power by relinquishing positions of leadership. Unity in Alberta was also made possible by the organizational mix, the environment, and the existence of cooperative, rather than competitive, attitudes. These conditions which facilitated unity in Alberta stand in contrast to the conditions that prevailed nationally and in the province of Ontario where earlier attempts at unity failed.

¹Cameron, et al., Report of the Committee on Farm Organizations, p. 6.
A desire for unity among general farm organizations in Canada is apparent in the opinions of the farm elite and of ordinary producers. This is not simply an idle desire; clearly it is a definite need inasmuch as farmers would be demonstrably better off in terms of their influence if general farm organizations were strong and united. However, despite the desire and need, unity has only been achieved in one instance.

General farm organizations in Canada are of two structural types, the unitary-unions and federations, and the basic characteristics and components of these two types have sharply divided Canadian farm leaders. This was most clearly demonstrated in the early 1960's in the unity discussions between the NFU and CFA. Leaders of the Farmers Union simply did not believe that a federated organization, which derived its leadership and financial base from commercial cooperatives and commodity groups, could represent the genuine policy needs of farmers. Federation leaders took the opposite view, that the agricultural industry flourished when the interests of all segments of the industry were taken into account and reflected through farm organizations.

The Ontario GFO campaign and the development of Uniform in Alberta illustrated that farm-group harmony and
compatibility is greatest when there is a generally accepted
division and definition of functions for each organization.
Contradictions and quarrels result when organizations over-
lap in the roles they have set for themselves or when they
have parallel competing structural arrangements like direct-
member locals.

The extent to which the professed goal of farm unity
is realized is seriously affected by strictly organizational
objectives. The probability of organizational unity being
attained is often adversely affected by a group simply feel-
ing threatened as an organization. In the Ontario GFO cam-
paign, for example, the OFU reacted against the notion of
unity partly because it was seen as an underhanded plot to
rid the province of the Farm Union organization. In the same
vein, the political goals of the group elite are very much a
part of the desire to perpetuate and preserve the organization.
The evidence clearly demonstrates that the aspirations of
group leaders and the desire to preserve and enhance their
positions were crucial determinants of the success or failure
of unity efforts.

The creation of Unifarm in Alberta reveals that the
achievement of unity is greatly facilitated if, in the two
contending factions, the leaders hold appropriate attitudes
as to what their roles should be. In Alberta, farm unity was in large part the result of strong, creative leadership on one side, and a readiness to accept a non-leader status on the other side. Nelson Malm of the AFA was prepared to step aside and relinquish his leadership position in favour of Paul Babey of the FUA, a step made easier by the fact that Malm did not have higher political aspirations, and had a moderately prestigious and influential position in the Alberta Wheat Pool to fall back on.

There is some evidence which indicates that despite ideological blind spots, Farm Union leaders are less encumbered with oligarchic tendencies than are their counterparts in the Federations. In the 1962-63 national unity discussions for example, NFU representatives tended to be more open to creative thought and direct solutions than were the CFA delegates. NFU leaders seemed to derive security from the conviction that they were directly endorsed by the farmers through the direct-member structure. They revealed a sense of legitimacy, a mandate to speak on behalf of farmers, that was often missing from CFA spokesmen.

The milieu or environment in which organizations develop also has a bearing on the likelihood of achieving unity. The establishment of a united general farm organization
in Alberta was to some extent assisted by attitudes and relations that were part of a carefully nurtured cooperative spirit that derived from generations of organizational tradition and wise leadership. In other regions, like Saskatchewan and Ontario, a traditional deep rooted animosity between farm organization's has poisoned attempts to secure unity.
THE CANADIAN FEDERATION OF AGRICULTURE:

THE PROBLEMS OF A GENERAL POLITICAL INTEREST GROUP

by

Blair Williams, B.A., M.A.

In two volumes

Volume II

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Department of Political Science

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

April 30, 1974
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IV. METHODS, TECHNIQUES AND INFLUENCE

The evolution of modern-day democratic government has had considerable impact on the potential influence of organized interest groups and the ways in which they attempt to make that influence felt. Harry Eckstein makes the point that one of the factors affecting the development and significance of organized interest groups has been the rapid growth of the "social service state" or "positive government." This trend toward government planning, direction and regulation has, according to Eckstein, "given social groups a greater stake in policies and therefore mobilized them to a much greater extent, while making government itself increasingly dependent on the collaboration and advice, technical or otherwise, of the groups."¹

In the Canadian experience there would seem to be no question but that increased government involvement in all sectors of our society has stimulated and mobilized organized

interest groups. However, it is an open question whether this growth in governmental activity renders organized groups more important to government and gives them more of a role in both administration and policy-making. In the area of Canadian agriculture, as an example, government pervasiveness has steadily increased and with it there has been a dramatic proliferation of government boards, commissions, councils, regular departmental employees, and so on. The net effect of expanded government activity has been the creation of governmental pools of talent which provide advice and services that might otherwise be derived from farm groups like the Canadian Federation of Agriculture.

This relates closely to the reasons the CFA has attempted to expand its consultations with government and the problems it has encountered in doing so. One might hypothesize that while the development of big modern government has stimulated interest group concern and activity, it has also worked against organized groups by creating reservoirs of expertise that negate interest group roles and outstrip interest group resources.
1. The Consultation Fixation

Writing in the late 1950's, Samuel Eldersveld detected a change in the "goal orientations" of political interest groups.¹ Group objectives were seen to have become something more than mere "representation" or "articulation" of shared interests; something more than simple "access" to decision-makers. Eldersveld suggests that the term to describe what interest groups seek is "consideration." Consideration assumes importance because the

"shift in objectives has led to groups concerned with ongoing political and social relationships, desiring to penetrate deeper into the political and social structure, not periodically and intermittently, but continuously and for the purpose of developing and sustaining contact and influence with the significant opinion and action leadership of the community. The group perspectives are no longer merely specific and limited, but long-range and comprehensive."²

Eldersveld's observations are particularly pertinent to the CFA which has sought to give more depth and meaning to its on-going relations with government. In seeking consideration


²Ibid., p. 192.
the Federation leaders have pursued what they refer to as full and frank "consultation" concerning government policy and administration.

The concept of consultation has become increasingly central to an understanding of the policies and actions of the Canadian Federation of Agriculture. As the relations between government and the Federation evolved, the notion of consultation underwent an interesting transformation and development which is highly instructive both from the point of view of the changing face of the governmental process and from the point of view of the maturation of CFA thinking.

The concern of the CFA for improved consultative procedures is not something wholly new—there has not been a sudden awakening to the need for more in-depth interaction. Consultation between the CFA and government—that is, the exchange of information, ideas, and opinions on subjects that are of concern to both—has gone on at various levels and to varying degrees since the Federation was founded. However, it is in the latter years, since the early 1960's, that the expressed concern for the consultation process itself has greatly intensified. The heightened desire for more meaningful consultative procedures can be linked to a number of more general factors that affect the relations between government
and general farm organizations. There has been a tendency in recent years to favour a more open society, involving broader participation, in which issues and policies are discussed outside of the confines of governmental officialdom. A better appreciation of how the governmental processes actually work has stimulated the desire of groups outside of government to be involved in policy formulation and law-making, rather than merely being subject to the effects of laws passed down from above. Furthermore, with groups like the CFA there is a desire to not only be consulted, but to be seen to be consulted. This, as I shall endeavor to illustrate, has led to a certain dissatisfaction with the traditional methods of past years.

There are certain methodological difficulties in considering the concept of consultation apart from the detailed discussions of methods, techniques and influence that follow in this section. Consultation is a broad, obscure concept that is closely linked with interest group techniques such as Cabinet submissions, advisory committee inputs, parliamentary involvement, and so on. Nevertheless, "consultation" per se has become a very significant part of the CFA vocabulary, and in conjunction with this it necessarily becomes a central concern in any analysis of the nature and direction of the CFA
organization. As it is used here, and in Federation terminology, consultation refers to the on-going communication and exchange of information, ideas and views between farm organizations and governments on all subjects which pertain to those objectives that are shared by government and farm groups. For the CFA, then, consultation means joint consideration of any or all agricultural policies between that organization and the relevant departments of government.

In the early years of the CFA—indeed, for the first two decades of its existence—the consultative arrangements were for the most part ad hoc and informal. They were, moreover, quite closely related to the principal personalities involved in government and the Federation. Dr. Hannam who was President and Managing-Director of the CFA for more than twenty years believed in the art of quiet diplomacy and personal contact with government officials. The spirit of cooperation and mutual confidence which was apparently established during the 1940's and 1950's was also facilitated by Mr. J. C. Taggart, who was the Federal Deputy Minister of Agriculture from January 1, 1949, to the end of 1959. Mr. Taggart had been Minister of Agriculture in Saskatchewan and had developed extensive connections with farm organizations prior to moving to Ottawa. There is evidence that meaningful
consultations with the Ministers of Agriculture were extremely limited during this period, but it is commonly assumed that the CFA fully appreciated the importance of contacts with the civil service, irrespective of their own relations with the Minister.¹

Helen Dawson often makes the point that the CFA has succeeded in maintaining considerable influence in the agricultural sphere by creating and preserving a spirit of trust and cooperation with the officials of the Federal Department of Agriculture.² In Dawson's view, consultations between the Federation and government were genuine and extensive. Mrs. Dawson even goes as far as to say that there was "considerable consultation while bills are still in the draft stage."³ However, a good many of the specific instances that she points to as examples of either direct consultation or consultation


³Dawson: "Relations Between Farm Organizations and the Civil Service in Canada and Great Britain," p. 466.
through the committee system are more involved with regulations and policy implementation than they are with policy-making.¹

Two or three salient, though perhaps not conclusive points ought to be borne in mind in the consideration of the notion of consultation. The first, already cited, is that consultative relations in the first two decades of the Federation's development may have been wholly dependent upon the combination of personalities involved, and once those personalities were gone, a useful system of consultation had to find a new modus operandi. Second, some of the most important interactions have been, and have tended to remain informal, based on personal contacts, telephone communications, and so on. This, of course, makes such interactions extremely difficult to document and analyze—particularly when it involves past behavior. Finally, the extent to which genuine policy consultations took place between the government and the CFA may be overestimated. If we can use contemporary practices as a guide-post it is certainly not the case that "considerable

consultation" takes place at the drafting stage of federal legislation.¹

Consultation in the past pertained more to administration than to policy—an hypothesis that is reinforced by the fact that Mr. Gardiner, the Minister of Agriculture from 1935 to 1957, did not have a continuous and direct involvement in consultations.² It may be that the CFA was simply being used by the government without having any real input into the policy-making process. The contemporary search for better consultative procedures, involving not only civil servants but Ministers as well, might well be a reaction to these former methods which were recognized to be unsatisfactory and less than fruitful.

Apart from regular ad hoc communications at the official level, certain formal institutions developed which facilitated contact between government and farm organizations.

¹There is of course some variation here, and some problem with terminology in deciding exactly when consultations are genuine, but these factors will perhaps become clearer as I proceed.

²However, Mrs. Dawson illustrates that after 1938, and the incident she describes as the "Battle of London," Mr. Gardiner did not completely ignore the CFA. See Dawson: "The Canadian Federation," Canadian Public Administration, pp. 143 ff.
The annual Federal-Provincial Agricultural Conference, for example, was originally established as a means for assessing agricultural production in the light of food requirements for the Second World War. At the outset it involved mainly technical governmental people concerned with economic analysis and forecasting. However, as it evolved in the post-war years it became more concerned with such matters as pricing and marketing, and attendance at the Conference was broadened to include farm organization representatives as well as federal-provincial Ministers of Agriculture and officials. But as the Federal-Provincial Agricultural Conference became more formalized it came to be less meaningful for the participants. It eventually developed a format which involved an opening statement by the Federal Minister of Agriculture, competitive briefs from the CFA and NFU, followed by closing statements from the Ministers.¹ The entire "Conference" came to occupy less than half a day in time, and as a useful forum for consultation, it was clearly inadequate. The technical part of this annual meeting came to be known as the Agricultural Outlook Conference in which experts, primarily from the government, presented forecasts and prospects for the coming year.

¹See the lengthy explanatory letter from Dave Kirk of CFA to George Hutton, Minister of Agriculture for Manitoba, June 7, 1965, CFA files.
At the same time, and perhaps as a result of these shortcomings, a procedure developed whereby farm organizations held a one half day in-camera meeting with federal and provincial Ministers of Agriculture. This was intended as a means by which organizations and government leaders could have an honest discussion and exchange of views on all matters pertaining to agricultural policy without the attendant glare of publicity. The meeting was scheduled at the same time as the Outlook Conference and the Federal-Provincial Agricultural Conference—normally late in the autumn.

The real concern about consultative procedures on the part of the Federation began in the mid-1960's—specifically, 1965. From that time to the present the problem has been discussed every year at Annual and Semi-Annual meetings of the CFA. In the summer of 1965 the Federation wrote to the relevant Ministers suggesting that the Annual Federal-Provincial Agricultural Conference be abandoned.1 Although the CFA appreciated the value of both the Outlook Conference and the in-camera meetings with Ministers—and were prepared to see these institutions expanded—they had come to the conclusion

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1See identical letters from Dave Kirk of CFA to Hon. Harry Hays, federal Minister of Agriculture, and Hon. George Hutton, Minister of Agriculture for Manitoba, June 7, 1965, CFA files.
that the Conference as such was not profitable. The Conference gave the illusion of consultation without any real substance or meaning. Within a year the government formally acceded to CFA wishes and the Federal Provincial Agricultural Conferences were ended by mutual consent.¹

A CFA working document, prepared in 1965, raised two related questions pertaining to consultation: (1) the "need for increasingly close and intimate consultation with government in the working out of agricultural policy;" and (2) the need to find "some common ground with the government on what the facts are that are relevant to any particular field of policy."² At the July semi-annual meeting of the CFA in 1965 a resolution was passed which supported the principle of closer consultative arrangements with the government and a greater sharing of statistical material to facilitate agreement on the facts. The resolution advocated a procedure whereby there would be an exchange of information and preliminary discussions at the staff level between CFA personnel and government officials, prior to formal meetings between

¹Letter from S. C. Barry, Deputy Minister of Agriculture, to Dave Kirk of CFA, August 4, 1966, CFA files.

the Board and the Minister to discuss policy.\(^1\) This, it was suggested, would be the most efficient and least fractious way of improving consultations. The resolution went on to discuss the two most difficult areas of confidentiality and responsibility pertaining to policy discussions. It postulated that successful consultations hinge upon three conditions being met: (1) recognition by producers that by entering into discussions the government is not necessarily undertaking to reach full agreement or accede to producer demands; (2) recognition by government that a willingness of producer representatives to discuss alternatives and compromise positions cannot be regarded as committing them to those new positions; and (3) producer representatives must have some freedom to discuss policy issues with other farm leaders and not be completely muzzled by the requirements of confidentiality. It was put most succinctly in the final paragraph of the resolution.

"It would be understood that charges of bad faith would not be made of the Minister in the event of failure to later agree on any particular proposition. It would also be understood that it would not be an act of bad faith on the part of producers to

\(^1\)Resolutions, 1965 Semi-Annual Board Meeting, CPA Files, p. 5.
criticize final government decisions publicly at the end of the discussions. To repeat, the process of consultation does not represent a prior undertaking to agree on either side.\textsuperscript{1}

Thus, at the 1965 meeting the CFA touched upon one of the most delicate aspects of government-interest group consultative arrangements. The possibility of meaningful policy consultations were seen to be closely linked to the extent and means by which the government maintains its right to deliberate and decide in its own way according to its own criteria, and the extent to which interest groups preserve their right to dissent and publicly criticize government positions.

Dave Kirk of the CFA tried to place things in perspective when he said, "I do not see how we can develop a satisfactory democracy in this day and age unless we can work out techniques for the responsible involvement of non-governmental individuals and groups in the development of thinking on public policy issues, based upon an adequate examination not only of the facts but of intelligent analysis and assessment of those facts."\textsuperscript{2} This mutual involvement of governmental and

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., p. 6.

non-governmental people is subject to what Kirk calls "the rules of the game," but he does not see any reason why these rules should not be intelligently interpreted to work for the benefit of all. At this point, in the mid-1960's, Kirk was not clear on how the rules and responsibilities of expanded consultations would apply to farm groups, but he was very explicit as to the government's responsibilities in this matter.

"The idea that such an institution (consultative meetings, advisory committees, and so on) need be fundamentally embarassing to the government is in my opinion nonsense. A government will simply have to grow up and say when it agrees and when it disagrees and why. The quality of public debate would be vastly improved and everyone would win: the government, Members of Parliament, non-governmental organizations, the press and the public generally."

In 1966 the CFA pursued the idea of expanded consultations on a regular basis between farm organization leaders and Ministers of Agriculture. In part, the CFA proposal to the federal Minister went as follows:

"The ground rules for such meetings would have to be very carefully worked out. We do not conceive of them as negotiations, or policy-making meetings, in the sense that either Ministers or farm organizations

1Ibid., p. 3.
would be faced with pressure to reach conclusions. If the discussions led to the emergence on certain points of consensus or recognition of the need for action, well and good. But such consensus would only be recorded if it was the clear wish of the meeting that this be done. In principle, the meetings would be confidential and exploratory, but they would over the years acquire a continuity that should be very valuable.  \(^1\)

The entire matter of expanded ministerial consultations was raised at the November, 1966 meetings between Ministers and farm organizations with no apparent (or recorded) conclusions being reached.  \(^2\)

In the spring of 1967 the farm organizations of Ontario and Quebec staged a highly successful march on Ottawa to protest, in particular, federal dairy policies. Subsequently the committee which organized and led the march met with members of the Standing Committee on Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development. The meeting which lasted more than four

\(^1\)Letter from Dave Kirk of CFA to Hon. J. J. Greene, Minister of Agriculture, November 3, 1966, CFA files.

\(^2\)This same proposition had been advanced in 1965 when it was suggested that formal consultations might be staged each year in April rather than in the fall. However, this proposal was turned down on the grounds that April was an exceedingly difficult month for all Ministers involved. See letter from Dave Kirk of CFA to Hon. Harry Hays, Minister of Agriculture, June 5, 1965, and letter from S. C. Barry, Deputy Minister of Agriculture, to Dave Kirk of CFA, August 4, 1966, p. 2, CFA files.
hours is interesting in that it added some new elements to the idea of consultation. The meeting made it clear that the M.P.'s themselves were less than satisfied with their own role and the extent to which they were consulted and involved in the formulation of agricultural policy. CFA observers at the meeting made the following comment:

"What appeared to be emerging was the suggestion that there is need for parliamentary committees to be more articulate and sophisticated in their approach to parliament, underlying which would appear to be the suggestion that the backbench M.P.'s are searching for 'power blocks' in which to be specialists, 'countervailing powers' to the cabinet within the parliament as a whole."¹

Some of the M.P.'s, in fact, went on to question whether the entire parliamentary system should not be revised to give them a more significant role, rather than their accepted function as mere critics. The Standing Committee on Agriculture supported the farm organizations in their desire for increased consultation.

¹"Observations and Impressions of the March Committee Meeting with the Standing Committee on Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development," CPA Semi-Annual Meeting, July 25, 1967, p. 1. These observations were the work of either Dave Kirk or Bill Hamilton of the CFA national office, both of whom attended the meeting with M.P.'s.
"M.P.'s expressed the opinion that there appeared to be inadequate consultation between government and farm organizations in the development of policy and raised the question as to whether or not the Standing committee should recommend to government that there be a permanent liaison committee between the government and farm organizations, and moreover, as to whether there ought to be a responsibility on governmental officials to meet with farm organizations to explain the rationale and detail on government programmes which impinge on farmers, eg. trade negotiations and arrangements, etc."\(^1\)

The result of this meeting between rural members of parliament and farm organization leaders seems to have been a greater appreciation of each others problems--most of which were shared problems in the area of consultation. Moreover, the CFA concluded that increased contacts might work to the benefit of both the Standing Committee and the Federation. "While committee function is an internal question to parliament, it does appear that more adequate communication with such a committee would facilitate not only the efforts of the M.P.'s but also would strengthen the hand of organizations consulting with government on the development of policy."\(^2\)

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 2.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 3.
In recent years the role of Standing Committees of the House of Commons has been enlarged with somewhat greater emphasis being placed on their deliberations than was the case in the past. This has provided a greater opportunity for farm groups to advance their views during the legislative process, but there is no solid evidence to indicate that this has satisfied such groups as the CFA in their desire for a more meaningful role in policy-making. Although the role of legislative committees has expanded, basic policy continues to be formulated elsewhere.

During 1967-68, three important events influenced the CFA's continued examination and elaboration of the consultation concept: first in September, 1967, the Federal Task Force on Agriculture was appointed;¹ second, in June, 1968 a general federal election resulted in a majority Liberal government and a new Minister of Agriculture; and third, late in the summer of 1968 the federal government began planning for a National Agricultural Congress. The Federation wished to

¹The Federal Task Force on Agriculture was appointed in 1967 "to analyze the problems of the Canadian agricultural industry and to make recommendations to government with respect to public policy." The five-man Task Force consisted of four academics and one chartered accountant. See Canadian Agriculture in the Seventies, pp. iii ff.
contribute to the Task Force studies;\(^1\) it sought quite early to establish communications and understanding with the new federal government and Minister;\(^2\) and it indicated its desire to play a full part in the planning and implementation of the National Congress.\(^3\)

A National Agricultural Congress involving several hundred people from all segments of the industry had been proposed on two or three occasions by the CFA and certain provincial governments—namely Ontario and Manitoba. The desire for this kind of a national meeting was given considerable impetus by the immensely successful Ontario Agricultural Conference held at Vineland in 1966. Although it was envisaged as a "one shot" affair the CFA saw in the proposed National Congress renewed possibilities for consultation with government. With substantial representation from producers, industry and government, and with solid documentation provided by the federal Task Force, the Federation foresaw consultative

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\(^3\)"Conference on Canadian Agriculture," 1968, CFA files.
needs being fulfilled in a way that was never possible under the earlier format of the recently defunct Federal-Provincial Agricultural Conferences. However, the Federation's promising visions were soon dispelled when it was denied representation on the Congress Steering Committee\(^1\) and the federal authorities made it clear that the conference was and would remain a creature of the government.

The 1969 Agricultural Congress concerned itself primarily with "bread and butter" issues like commodity policies, marketing problems, and so on. Most of the organizational and procedural issues, such as the relations between farm organizations and government, were left over for the Second Agricultural Congress held in the fall of 1970.\(^2\) Thus the concept of "consultation" became the dominant item in the Second Agricultural Congress.

In the meantime, however, Federation leaders had gone a considerable distance in their thinking with respect to the proper relationship between government and farm groups. David Kirk linked the need for better forms of consultation to the

\(^1\)See supra, pp. 184 ff.

\(^2\)The CPA statement to the first Congress did, however, include a quite significant section on the meaning of consultation.
slogan of "participatory democracy" which had been adopted by Prime Minister Trudeau and the Liberal Party in 1968.¹ Kirk expressed the view that the principal obstacle preventing the improvement of democratic processes is manipulation. He stated, "I define manipulation as seeming to give people a real say in their own affairs and to inform more fully about problems and issues, while at the same time not giving them any real say in the substance of what is decided, and substituting propaganda for information."² This tendency, in Kirk's view, did not spring from any inherent evil or sinister plot on the part of bureaucrats or decision-makers but is honestly maintained as a means of "facing up to realities," and "moving ahead to get the job done." "My quarrel with it," said Kirk, "is that it leaves people unhappy and above all it doesn't work well. In the end, we don't gain time—we lose it."³

Whenever Kirk addressed himself to this matter on behalf of the CPA he opted in favor of open, frank, public


²Ibid.

³Ibid.
debate with a full and adequate flow of information. He said, "It is my general view that to far too great an extent government is more impressed with the risks of information giving than with the benefits of it."\(^1\) The problem is that too many people in government share "conspiratorial" or "manipulative" attitudes. Too many people believe "a little knowledge is a dangerous thing;" too many people are second guessing others as to "what information it is safe or politic for others to have;" too many are concerned with "the ability of the public or some section of it to 'understand' the information given to it;" and finally, too many are involved in the "judicious release of information (which) will best serve the ends they seek."\(^2\) To Kirk, the problems surrounding open discussion of public issues were a sign of immaturity in our social relations, of which government is a part. In analyzing the proper place of information, particularly in the balance of governmental-non-governmental relations, Kirk started from the following general proposition:

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\(^2\)Ibid.
"In principle, when a problem or a question of policy affecting the public interest is being examined, at every stage of this examination, however early and preliminary, information assembled in the process of consideration of the problem should, simultaneously with its availability to the officials, officers or institutions which require it, be also made available to the public by effective processes of dissemination." ¹

Kirk's view was that although it may sound idealistic, even naive, there must exist an overriding common interest in making democracy work better, and that is the justification for improving this process. ²

Kirk's thoughts on the subject provided most of the theoretical underpinning for the Federation's position on governmental consultation. By 1970 the improvement of consultative processes had come to be central in the thinking of most of the elected leaders of the CFA. There is evidence, in fact, that strong voices were being raised in favour of the CFA "going beyond" mere consultation to some stronger form of interaction—perhaps "negotiation." ³ Consultation

¹Ibid.

²See Kirk: "Agricultural Policy vs. The Role of Organizations."

was, nevertheless, a nebulous concept and it is certain that few, if any, of the elected leaders had elaborated their views as far as Kirk had. It was the subject of an "extended and unresolved debate" at the Semi-Annual Board Meeting in 1970, and in an effort to settle the muddy waters, Kirk prepared a paper which represented the most advanced analysis of the concept to that time.¹

At the outset the CFA paper sought a more precise definition of three central terms: "advisory," "consultative," and "negotiation." The advisory function was conceived as a one way communication not involving any commitments. The advisory process is normally confidential, and "In such a case advisors in principle lose their status as direct representatives of their organizations, since they do not report back."² Consultation on the other hand involves a two-way process between two interested or committed parties who subsequently report back to their principals. "In short, in consultation both (or all) parties are actively involved in constructive and responsible discussion on behalf of those they represent, but these discussions fall short of reaching firm commitment

¹Ibid.
²Ibid., p. 1.
by the principals of either side."¹ Negotiation goes beyond
the non-committing status of consultative discussions insofar
as both sides have authority to make commitments—that is, to
bargain. Furthermore, both sides have the power to take
specific action (for example, to strike) if agreement is not
reached. The important distinction involves the authority of
both parties to make commitments. As Harry Eckstein declares
in his discussions of these concepts: "Negotiations take
place when a governmental body makes a decision hinge upon
the actual approval of organizations interested in it, giving
the organizations a veto over the decision; consultations
occur when the views of the organizations are solicited and
taken into account but not considered to be in any sense
decisive."²

For the CFA the distinction between consultation and
negotiation is important because it goes to the heart of the
disagreement or misunderstanding that has characterized the
interactions between government and the Federation. In re-
sponse to the Federation's appeal for intensified consulta-
tions the government had regularly asserted that it could

¹Ibid., p. 2.
²Eckstein: Pressure Group Politics, p. 23.
not delegate or abrogate its responsibility to make final decisions and to stand behind them. At the 1969 Congress the Minister of Agriculture made it very clear that although it was possible for him to delegate authority it simply was not possible to delegate responsibility.¹ According to Kirk, the government is not in a position to negotiate in the true sense and this should be appreciated by farm organizations. The point made in his paper and which has been accepted by the CFA is that the government should not be pushed to the point where consultation becomes a form of negotiation in which the government effectively relinquishes part of its responsibility to govern to the farm organizations.

The CFA has sought to avoid the pitfall of expecting to share with the government the responsibility for making binding decisions. In his statement to the 1969 Congress Mr. Munro of the CFA stressed that what was desired was improved consultation procedures before final decision-making.² However, Munro says, this is "much more than receiving the views of farmers on a subject and then retiring into private deliberations of which the farmers will be informed of the results

² Quoted by Kirk, Ibid., p. 5.
in due course . . . the idea that government processes of
discussion and examination must take place strictly in secret
until the gestation is over and the birth takes place must be
modified."¹

The second National Agricultural Congress was held in
Ottawa from November 25 to 27, 1970. It was planned to elicit
reactions and stimulate discussion of the Federal Task Force
on Agriculture which had been published less than a year
earlier.² The Congress provided an opportunity for farm and
industry leaders to exchange views and clarify their thinking
on nearly all aspects of Canadian agriculture which were
covered in the report. It also provided a forum for the most
free-wheeling and far-reaching discussions of the concept of
consultation that had yet taken place.

In order to facilitate producer consultations and
advice in policy-making the Federal Task Force advocated the
creation of a National Agricultural Advisory Council (N.A.A.C.).
The specific recommendation went as follows:

"A new National Agricultural Advisory Council
should be created by the Minister of Agricul-
tural Industry. It should have the following
functions:

¹Ibid.

²Canadian Agriculture in the Seventies, Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, December, 1969.
(a) to act as the highest level farmer and agribusiness council, providing a forum for discussion and providing advice both to the Minister of Agricultural Industry and to the N.A.M. Board (National Agricultural Marketing Board).

(b) to organize and sponsor an annual Policy Evaluation Conference based upon intensive studies by independent researchers of a small number of existing programs of the Federal Government or of joint Federal-Provincial programs. . . .

This recommendation provided ample scope for a thorough discussion of advisory and consultative procedures.

In his opening remarks to the 1970 Congress, Charles Munro, President of CFA, asked the government for a commitment above all else to improved consultation with farm organizations. In Munro's view, the search for better methods of policy consultation should have been the central issue of the Congress. The CFA President argued forcefully that the government was doing things which seriously affect the lives of all farmers, and it is these farmers who have the most to lose and must therefore have the opportunity to participate in decision-making.

1Ibid., p. 302. The reference to a Department of Agricultural Industry is indicative of a general agribusiness orientation that characterized much of the Federal Task Force Report.

2Author's notes from the Congress, November 25, 1970.
The idea of a National Agricultural Advisory Council was strongly opposed by virtually all of the producer groups in attendance at the Congress. CFA spokesmen, like Munro, were particularly trenchant in their opposition to N.A.A.C. It should be noted that both Munro of CFA and Babey of Uni-farm again stressed the need for increased producer participation in their closing remarks to the Congress. Moreover, both re-affirmed their opposition to the N.A.A.C. concept.
Roy Atkinson of the NFU, on the other hand, tended to concentrate on the economic and ideological aspects of the Task Force Report rather than on consultation which was a relatively minor part of the total study. Atkinson criticized the report's assumptions, business bias, laissez faire ideas, emphasis on efficiency, suppression of the individual, and support of corporate control geared to serve the interests of "American economic imperialism."\footnote{Author's notes, November 27, 1970.} Munro made it clear that in his view improved consultative and advisory procedures must be channeled through existing farm organization structures, not through some new government-centered device. He ventured his personal view that real progress in agricultural policymaking and the advancement of the farmer's interest could only
be made if two conditions prevailed. (1) Farmers have to accept the "national organization" as the legitimate and effective voice of Canadian farmers, and agree to act through it. (2) The government must give credence to the organization and agree to interact and consult with it as the legitimate voice of Canadian producers.\(^1\) Munro conceived of greater consultation in organizational terms—which meant a larger and more meaningful role for his organization, the CFA. He defined what was "good" for Canadian agriculture in terms of what he saw as being "good" for the CFA.\(^2\)

The idea of N.A.A.C. was opposed by all farm organizations in the smaller more informal discussion groups at the Agricultural Congress. The only exceptions to this were a few agribusiness organizations like the Canadian Fertilizer Association.\(^3\) The representative of the Western Wheat Pools seriously questioned the value of an advisory group which might tend to become more and more removed from the producers. The Canadian Cattlemen's Association opposed NAAAC because it would add to the "group bureaucracy", would dilute the

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\(^1\) Interview with Charles Munro, President of CFA, Ottawa, November 25, 1970.

\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) Author's notes from discussion group sessions.
producers voice and slow down action. A consensus emerged among producer representatives that the Advisory Council would serve no useful purpose that was not already being fulfilled by farm organizations and commodity groups. Every producer group representative felt that direct liaison with the government was possible and a majority made it clear that this liaison was being carried on in what they regarded as a satisfactory manner—this, in spite of complaints about inadequate consultation.

It was clear from the discussion groups that agricultural leaders did not discriminate between strictly organizational goals and the goal of rural policy-making. The ultimate argument for nearly all of the representatives was that there was no need for another institution which would place the government at a further remove from the real will of the producers—one more buffer between the government and farmers. Producer representatives did not have a clear idea of the supposed requirements of long-range policy-making which the NAAC concept was intended to serve. If they had to accept a National Advisory Council in order to be fruitfully involved in policy the delegates preferred to maintain ad hoc contacts

\[1\] Ibid.
between government and their own organizations. This was their position in spite of the governments tendency toward "brush fire policy-making" that certain farm leaders had been critical of in recent years.¹ Producer groups were extremely reticent to accept any proposal, like NAAC, which might threaten the lines of communication which they felt were open to them. However, in seeking to protect their own organizations and positions of assumed access, producer representatives may have deprived themselves of the means by which producer voices might be made more effective in that process. On the other hand, quite the opposite might have occurred; an Agricultural Advisory Committee might have served as a means of sidetracking issues rather than as an effective policy mechanism.

The only producer voice that seems to have been raised in support of the NAAC idea was that of the Ontario Fresh Grape Grower's Marketing Board. A letter from the President of this organization made the following observation:

¹For example, this was a criticism levelled by E. A. Boden, Vice-President of CFA, when he was in Ottawa in 1969 for special meetings with Ministers and officials to discuss grains policy. Boden, who was also Vice-President of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, claimed that the extreme difficulties of the Canadian grain industry and the urgent consultations that went on with respect to those problems provided an excellent example of the government's tendency to adopt a "crisis-to-crisis" approach to policy-making and producer consultation. From author's notes, June 2, 1969.
"It seems to me that the task force handed farm leaders a powerful tool to influence the direction of Federal agricultural policy, in the proposed NAAC. I strongly regret the rejection of this concept by the Agricultural Congress. The demand for negotiating power is understandable, but wholly impractical politically. Farm leaders should have seen the value of the NAAC as a compromise solution acceptable to the government." ¹

The Grape Grower's Marketing Board felt that through joint efforts within the NAAC, producer groups would have had the necessary resources and the means to make truly effective contributions to general agricultural policy-making. Clearly, however, this view was not shared by other farm group leaders.

A further observation based on the deliberations at the Congress is pertinent to the consultation issue. Everett Biggs, Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Food for Ontario, opposed the NAAC idea on the grounds that the working of government is such that decisions must be made behind closed doors.² He made the point that government must weigh the desires of groups representing producers and balance these with other priorities the government may have, then take the


²Author's notes from Agricultural Congress, November 26, 1970.
responsibility for the final policy. This view that representative groups can never really share in the inner workings is held by many people in government, but it is not often stated openly as it was by Biggs. Charles Munro of the CFA disagreed with Biggs' contention that farmers cannot be meaningfully involved in policy-making. Munro did not, however, attack the inherently undemocratic elements of what Biggs was saying, as Dave Kirk might have done. Instead he simply agreed with Biggs, that the NAAC was an unsatisfactory concept—unsatisfactory not because consultation was impossible or undesirable as Biggs thought, but because the CPA was there to fulfill the role and it was, in Munro's opinion, the fault of government if the Federation was denied that role.

Early in 1971 the CFA came forward with an elaborate working document which was intended to proceed in the direction of a "systematized" and "formalized" process of consultation with the government.¹ The paper re-affirmed in somewhat more specific terms, the CFA's rejection of the NAAC proposal. Furthermore, it suggested a set of procedures that might be followed in the attempt to implement more adequate consultative

arrangements. In his response to these proposals the Minister of Agriculture expressed interest and moderate encouragement, with certain minor reservations. By the summer of 1971 both the CFA and the federal government had reached a point where they realized that increased consultations were at least possible, even though federal agricultural officials were not fully reconciled as to the desirability of such a step. However, it has become evident that the probability of vastly expanded participation by farm leaders in the policy-making process may depend more upon the Federation than upon the federal government. The CFA has reached the stage where it must face up to the ramifications of its requests including the need to assess, accumulate, and devote the necessary resources if full-fledged consultation with government is to become a reality.

In this respect the CFA has a problem which seems to be fully appreciated by the national office. According to David Kirk, many of the advocates of farm organization

1 See letters from Hon. H. A. Olson to Charles Munro, January 18, 1971, and April 29, 1971, and also a letter from Mr. Olson to Dave Kirk, March 23, 1971, files of the Minister of Agriculture, Ottawa.

2 Interview with Hon. H. A. Olson, federal Minister of Agriculture, August 18, 1971.
participation in policy-making do not know what is involved—and if they did fully understand they would not be in favour of expanded involvement. For example he contends that when certain of the most dynamic and progressive of the CFA leaders advocate full governmental consultation they do so without realizing the extent of administrative and technical commitment that is required in such participation. Under the present organizational and financial arrangements it is Kirk's fear that the Federation would become hopelessly bogged down if it were to become involved with in-depth consideration of agricultural policy. Kirk makes the point that to become a fully participating member of CASCC (Canadian Agricultural Services Co-ordinating Committee) the Federation would have to employ a full-time scientist. Similarly to make meaningful contributions to the on-going administration and policy of the Dairy Commission they would need the full-time assistance of a computer expert. These are but two of the areas where vastly expanded resources would be required.

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1Interview with Dave Kirk, July 16, 1971.

2CASCC is a national association of professional agrologists drawn from government, universities and private professional circles, which meets annually for in-depth examination of highly technical and advanced aspects of agricultural policy and the needs of the Canadian agricultural industry.
In other countries where there is evidence of direct policy consultation between government and agricultural interest groups the necessary skills and resources have been developed and are employed by those groups. In the United Kingdom, for example, all three of the major farm organizations (the National Farmers' Union, County Landowners' Association, and the National Union of Agricultural Workers) "have more active members, more money, and larger, more expert staffs" than is the case in Canada.\(^1\)

Genuine in-depth policy participation by the CFA is not possible with the limited resources available, and without these resources a full acceptance of the participation-consultation principle is not desirable. By continuing to press for expanded consultations the Federation may become involved in technical policy areas where, through insufficient knowledge and lack of depth, consultations will backfire and the organization will be robbed of its flexibility. There is a risk that the CFA will be obliged to simply go along and accept government policies because of its inability to match the technical knowledge and expertise of the huge government bureaucracy. In such a situation the Federation risks

\(^1\text{Dawson, "Farm Organizations and the Civil Service," p. 453.}\)
becoming committed to policies its leaders do not fully comprehend.

It seems clear, therefore, given the nature of the Federation, that the only feasible course is to follow ad hoc and sporadic levels of consultation and involvement. The nature and extent of such participation will vary from issue to issue and depend to a considerable extent upon the personalities involved.

Grains Policy: A Pilot Case

An excellent example of an attempt to establish ad hoc consultative arrangements within a specialized area was provided in 1969 when the CFA sought to become more deeply involved in federal grains policy. During the winter and spring of 1969 the prairie agricultural economy was in the depths of a recession the likes of which that region had not experienced for over two decades.\(^1\) When the western grain crisis was at its peak the CFA launched a major initiative

\(^1\) The magnitude of the problem at that time cannot be exaggerated. Prairie farm cash receipts from grains were $740 million in 1969, which was down $446 million from the average of $1,186 million for the preceding five years. There was an unprecedented surplus of wheat estimated to be slightly less than one billion bushels in 1969. Because of the wheat glut feed grain prices were depressed to half or, in some cases, less than half, of their normal level.
to become more deeply involved in prairie grains policy.
This was not the first time that the CFA had focussed its
attention on the specific area of grains. Four years earlier,
for example, the Executive Committee of the Federation had
developed a comprehensive statement on grains policy which it
presented to the Agricultural Committee of the Cabinet and,
simultaneously, to the public.¹

The CFA effort in 1969 is of special significance
here for two reasons: (1) it came at the height of the CFA's
concern for improved consultative arrangements and a major
aspect of the Federation's proposal to government was aimed
at over-all consultative procedures; (2) in the Federation's
attempt to consult with relevant Ministers and officials we
have a superb example of the conflicting pressures that are
operative when a farm interest group uses various techniques
in its endeavor to influence government.

There is no question that by the spring of 1969 farm
organizations on the prairies were feeling the full weight of
the problems confronting grain producers. The most influen-
tial of these organizations, like the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool,
had an increasing tendency to bypass the parent CFA

¹"Wheat Policy For Canada," March 25, 1965, files of
the Minister of Agriculture.
organization and this, of course, lent a certain urgency to the subsequent actions of the Federation leaders. Increasingly the Saskatchewan-based NFU was emerging as the strongest voice representing the misery and discontent of the western grain farmers. To some extent the CFA and a number of its strongest affiliates on the prairies seemed to have been lulled into a false sense of security by the new and highly touted Canada Grains Council, on which the Federation and its major western affiliates sat as members.

In the light of these internal and external pressures, heightened activity on the part of the NFU, the constant worsening of the farmer's situation and the resultant demands for massive government aid, the CFA felt that as a producer organization it had to become more directly involved. The decision to actually pursue streamlined procedures of consultation was taken by the Executive of the Federation after it had been raised in the annual submission to the Cabinet.\(^1\) The matter was first informally broached on the telephone, after which formal letters were sent to the Ministers

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\(^1\)See "Statement to the Government of Canada and Members of Parliament," April 28, 1969, pp. 4-5, files of the Minister of Agriculture, Ottawa. See also the CFA Press Release, April 28, 1969, where consultation was made the lead item, CFA files.
directly responsible for Canadian grains policy. The letter to Mr. Olson stressed the need for "more intensive consultation with government, on a national basis, on all aspects of grains policy"—"on urgent short term, as well as long term, policy needs"—and the desirability of reaching an "understanding with the government on continuing consultative arrangements and procedures." It was suggested, therefore, that a meeting be held between the Federation leaders and the relevant Ministers of government.

The meeting to begin the consultative process was agreed to and scheduled for May 28, 1969. The Federation appeared at the meeting, which was in camera, with an impressive delegation of twenty five people consisting of most of the Executive members and a number of directors including the top executives of the Western Wheat Pools and the United Grain Growers. If in-depth consultations were going to take place, it was clear that the Federation would not be restrained by a lack of expertise in grains policy. The government delegation was headed by three Ministers: Mr. Pepin, Industry Trade and

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1 See Memorandum to the Minister of Agriculture from Blair Williams, Executive Assistant, May 5, 1969, and a letter from Dave Kirk of CPA to Hon. H. A. Olson, May 6, 1969, files of the Minister of Agriculture, Ottawa.

2 Ibid.
Commerce; Mr. Olson, Agriculture; and Mr. Lang, who at the time was assuming increasing responsibilities as Minister Without Portfolio concerned with grains policy. In addition, there were a number of senior officials from the Department of Agriculture and the Grains Division of the Department of Industry Trade and Commerce.

The Federation advanced three key recommendations to the meeting: (1) that some form of immediate cash assistance be made available to prairie grain producers; (2) that a comprehensive farm policy for Canada's grain industry be developed by the end of 1969; (3) that a system be implemented whereby the Federation and the government engage in formal in-depth consultations on grain on a regular and continuing basis.\(^1\) Although these issues were discussed and to some extent resolved, the real value of this meeting was in the lessons it provided to assist in understanding the CFA organization and the dynamics of the interest group process. From what transpired before, during, and after the meeting it is clear that the CFA leaders had decided to make a conscious effort to strengthen their image as spokesmen for the western grain industry. A working paper was prepared which explored

all of the possible ways in which the Federation might take follow-up action to impress producers, the government, Parliament, and the general public. One result of this was the publication of a document outlining in simplified and appealing language the "Farmer's Appeal to Government at a Time of Crisis."^2

From the point of view of organizational ends and relations with government, what happened in the meeting on grains was perhaps less important than what happened outside of the meeting. Prior to the meeting the key people in the CFA were not entirely sure how many Ministers would be in attendance and how long the meeting would last. Nevertheless, they seemed to assume that the meeting would be fairly straightforward and would not be taken too seriously by whichever Ministers decided to show up.^4

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^1"May 29 Meeting With CFA Grains Delegates," CFA files.


^3There seemed to be some last minute confusion in spite of the fact that Mr. Pepin had advised the Federation in writing which Ministers would attend and for how long. See letter from Hon. J. L. Pepin to Dave Kirk, May 23, 1969, CFA files.

^4Based on author's notes from the meeting.
The Federation wanted to ensure that the public knew about their concern with the grain situation and wanted their organization and its leaders to receive maximum exposure insofar as the meeting and its contents were concerned. Federation organizers decided therefore to schedule a national press conference to follow as closely as possible on the heels of the meeting with Ministers. To guarantee maximum exposure the press conference was slated for 11:00 a.m., and it was to involve three key individuals from the CFA team—Mr. Munro, the President, Mr. Boden from the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, and Mr. Dave Kirk, the Executive Secretary of the CFA. However, as the meeting with government representatives got underway it gradually became clear not only that there was greater ministerial interest and participation than had been anticipated, but also that things were not proceeding in a purely formal fashion as Federation organizers thought they might. As the time for the scheduled press conference drew near CFA officials were confronted with an unhappy choice: (1) their key personnel could leave the meeting and risk incurring the wrath or, at best, the suspicions of the three Ministers present; or (2) they could cancel the press conference and risk upsetting the media representatives and, more importantly, risk not getting their story across to the public.
and their own grassroots supporters.

It was a clear case in which organizational goals and the desire to reinforce CFA leadership were in conflict with the avowed goal of the Federation to consult with the government, to hammer home the terrible plight of the prairie grain producers, and to suggest policies that were needed to alleviate this situation.\(^1\) The Federation chose to opt for the organization and its leaders. Mr. Munro announced to the meeting that he and Mr. Boden and Mr. Kirk had a press conference to attend; he thanked the Ministers for their presence and understanding; and he expressed the hope that the meeting could go on in their absence, or at least until their return. Needless to say, the meeting involving the Ministers broke up very soon after the departure of the Federation’s executive members—although later in the afternoon there were additional meetings between the CFA group and officials from the various departments.

The immediate reaction of the Ministers to the sudden departure of the three Federation spokesmen was one of mild surprise. But more meaningful responses to this action were

\(^1\) It can be argued that to some extent legitimacy and mandate are reinforced by successful consultation and image, but in this particular context the element of conflict is the most significant.
registered later when the meeting disbanded, and for months to come. Mr. Olson and some of his senior advisors took this as an indication of what the real motives of the CFA were. The calling of the press conference in the middle of what was supposed to be a frank and intimate discussion of the grains problem was, as far as the Minister of Agriculture was concerned, a blatant example of farm organization leaders wishing to advance the ends of the organization, and their own political ends, rather than discuss the substance of the problem.¹ This action on the part of the Federation confirmed a view that is widely shared among Ministers and government officials that an understanding of the organizational ends and the political goals of farm organizations are of the utmost importance in trying to decide how to deal with those organizations. This episode tended to vindicate suspicions that were already present in the minds of many of the government policy-makers and administrators. Although Ministers never chose to make this a public issue, it affected the government's decisions in dealing with later requests for meetings, special considerations, and new policies from the Federation.

¹Author's notes from extensive discussions with the Minister of Agriculture, June, 1969.
Those people in government (both politicians and officials) who were inclined to look favourably upon expanded inputs and increased consultations with the Federation found that their arguments were less heeded, and their value as erstwhile allies of the Federation was significantly eroded. Conversely, those officials who regarded the CFA as a competitive or perhaps threatening force found that they could deal more firmly with the Federation without running the risk of having their actions repudiated by the Minister.\(^1\)

Following this meeting the Federation persevered in its attempts to establish reliable procedures for consultations on grains policy. In early June, 1969, the Federation wrote to the three relevant federal Ministers proposing a meeting between the CFA and senior officials to further consider the matter of regular grains consultation.\(^2\) Later that same month a meeting was held, this time at a lower level, between leaders of the CFA and Assistant Deputy Ministers.

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\(^1\)There is a strong tendency for government officials to be jealous of what they regard to be their own jurisdiction and prerogatives. This is true both within and without government departments where senior officials "have the Minister's ear," and believe this is their right by virtue of superior wisdom and their position within the hierarchy. Intrusions into these privileged advisory positions are usually deeply resented and resisted as long as the Minister permits it.

\(^2\)Letter from Dave Kirk of CFA to Hon. H. A. Olson, June 4, 1969, files of the Minister of Agriculture, Ottawa.
from the Departments of Agriculture and Industry Trade and Commerce. The CFA proposal at this meeting was for a continuing committee on grains policy consisting of representatives from Agriculture, Industry Trade and Commerce and perhaps ten or fifteen representatives from the Federation.\textsuperscript{1} The committee would have a joint secretariat, would develop grains policy documentation jointly, and would meet twice a year for one and a half days.\textsuperscript{2} The committee was not conceived as a channel for making policy recommendations to government—rather it was to be a means for joint consideration of proposed policy and policy needs, respecting confidentiality where required, with a view to improving the flow of information to producers and the public. This process envisaged a much closer liaison and interaction between staff personnel from both government departments and the CFA than had been the case in the past.\textsuperscript{3} Here, as elsewhere, improved consultative arrangements implied a need for greater commitment and expertise on the part of the national office of the Federation.

\textsuperscript{1} "Notes Regarding CFA Proposal for Consultation on Grains," June 20, 1969, CFA files.

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 1-3.

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 2.
Following the meeting at the official level a slightly revised CFA proposal was submitted to the Ministers of Agriculture and Industry Trade and Commerce. The response of the two Ministers was the same as in the past; they would not commit their departments to continuing consultations, but suggested a further meeting between CFA and departmental officials sometime in the fall. Mr. Olson's letter was indicative.

"May I suggest that rather than undertaking any commitment at this point in time . . . for formal and regular consultations . . . that we undertake to arrange a meeting, perhaps one day in length, to be held this fall between officials of the two Departments and your organization. The purpose of this meeting would be to review the position and outlook of the grain industry and to consider some of the issues which we would jointly identify and that we withhold judgement on continuing meetings of this kind until after that meeting."2

Government strategy with respect to CFA consultations on grain had been thoroughly discussed before it reached the ministerial level. For example, the two Assistant Deputy Ministers who had met with the Federation, Esmond Jarvis from

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2Letter from Hon. H. A. Olson to Dave Kirk of CFA, July 9, 1969. Also a letter from Hon. Jean-Luc Pepin to Dave Kirk, July 9, 1969, CFA files.
the Department of Agriculture and Andrew Kniewasser from IT&C, had been in regular and frequent contact on this matter, as had the two Deputy Ministers, Syd Williams from Agriculture and Jake Warren from IT&C. Civil servants, as a rule, are not eager to share what they regard as their own privileges and responsibilities with other groups or with the public. In this case the senior officials of both departments worked out a fairly hard line strategy which was recommended to, and accepted by, the two Ministers. It should be noted, also, that the Ministers themselves, irrespective of the influence of their advisors, were not averse to a fairly firm stand being taken. This was in part, a result of their earlier experience where the CFA bolted a meeting in order to bolster public relations.

David Kirk's assessment is a fairly accurate indication of the government position on this latest initiative and the feeling of the CFA about it. He wrote:

"I really am at somewhat of a loss to understand the attitude of the Ministers and presumably of the Departments. The important point, procedurally, as with Mr. Olson's letter is that Mr. Pepin is recommending that the whole thing be shifted to the departmental level and that he be left out of further discussions. It was precisely this recommendation that we did not accept in our Board meeting."

1Letters from Dave Kirk to Lionel Sorel and E. A. Boden, Vice-Presidents of CFA, July 30, 1969, p. 1, CFA files.
Kirk also concluded that the major difficulty in trying to make headway on this issue lay with the Department of Industry Trade and Commerce. "Mr. Pepin's letter shows even less patience with or understanding of our proposal than did that of Mr. Olson," he said.¹

A few comments are in order concerning this perceived difference in the approach of the two Ministers. The Federation was actually mistaken in its view that Mr. Olson was more favorably disposed toward consultation than was Mr. Pepin.² The reasons why the Federation was more impressed with the position of Mr. Olson than that of Mr. Pepin are interesting. First, the senior government officers who were involved in the consultations issue looked more favourably upon expanded group contact in the Department of Agriculture than they did in the Department of IT&C. There was a contrast in this respect, for example, between Esmond Jarvis of Agriculture and A. G. Kneiwasser of IT&C. Second, the letter from Mr. Olson, which was drafted by Esmond Jarvis, was more "politic" than the one from Mr. Pepin which was drafted by either Kneiwasser or Jake Warren, the Deputy Minister. Both letters said

¹Ibid.

²Based upon the author's experience and discussions with officials and Ministers.
essentially the same thing and represented a putdown for the CFA, but Mr. Olson's was done with less heavy-handedness.

With a less than enthusiastic reaction from the Ministers the CFA leaders felt they were losing ground and they proposed a meeting between their senior executive members and the Minister of Agriculture.\(^1\) Through a series of intensive telephone communications between Mr. Olson's office and the Federation it was eventually agreed that the meeting should be expanded to include Mr. Pepin, Mr. Lang, and senior government officials. Thus, a "summit" meeting was held on September 10, 1969, to discuss the grains consultation issue.\(^2\) The meeting was something of a re-run of previous confrontations, with both sides stating the principles and fears which determined their attitudes on this matter.\(^3\) The end result was something of a compromise. The governmental representatives agreed to take part in the first genuine consultative meeting within two or three months rather than merely have

\(^1\)Letter from Dave Kirk of CPA to Hon. H. A. Olson, July 22, 1969, files of the Minister of Agriculture, Ottawa.
\(^2\)See the letter from Charles Munro of CPA to Hon. H. A. Olson, September 4, 1969, files of the Minister of Agriculture, Ottawa.
\(^3\)Author's notes from the meeting.
another meeting, as they had originally proposed, to discuss the issue of consultation. The Ministers therefore tacitly agreed to some form of continuing, formal consultation on grain matters. However, the Ministers did manage to shift the consultations to the departmental level by stipulating that such meetings would involve officials from IT&C, Agriculture, and members of the Federation, with Ministers sitting in only when it seemed possible and appropriate to do so.

From the point of view of the CFA another very significant shift occurred in government thinking prior to this meeting. Although the CFA had received some recognition for stimulating activity respecting grains consultation, the government began to bypass the Federation in order to contact farm leaders independently concerning the continuing consultative meetings. Here again the CFA was plagued by its traditional problem of being too heterogeneous and not being recognized as the national office for agricultural producer representation. In this instance the government advised the Federation that it would be regarded as one farm organization along with a number of others. The government corresponded directly with Mr. Turner (Saskatchewan Wheat Pool), Mr. Harrold (Alberta Wheat Pool), Mr. Sneath (Manitoba Wheat Pool),
Mr. Runciman (United Grain Growers), Mr. Babey (Unifarm), and Mr. Atkinson (National Farmers Union). All of these organizations, with the exception of the NFU, are affiliated with the CFA.

Most of these organizations were represented in the parent Federation by a Vice-President, and the government's view was that if there were going to be meaningful high level consultations it would prefer to deal with the top men rather than with a bevy of Vice-Presidents. There is no question that had the CFA been the exclusive contact point, a number of the top executives of western farm organizations would have been excluded from the discussions.

In addition, the government was confronted with the fact that the CFA had not established itself as the sole legitimate voice of Canadian producers, the NFU was clearly a significant force. The Ministers were reluctant under these circumstances to give full recognition to one organization to the exclusion of the other. The difficulties here, however, were often exaggerated by the government and served as much as a convenient smoke screen as a legitimate argument. Furthermore, by working with individual farm groups and leaders the government probably ensured that the motivating force and energy on the producer side would be sapped away, and in
the end this is what killed the consultative procedures on grain.

The first consultative meeting on grain policy was held on December 18, 1969.\footnote{See letters from Dave Kirk to Jake Warren of IT&C, and S. B. Williams of Agriculture, November 16, 1969, CFA files.} The consultative procedures were developed further in a series of communications exchanged between the CFA national office and the Deputy Minister's offices—particularly the Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Williams.\footnote{See "Grains Consultation and Policy Development," CFA Board Meeting, January 26, 1970, CFA files.} Through these channels a second and last consultative meeting dealing specifically with feed grains policy was arranged for June 2, 1970.

Within a year of agreement on the grains consultation arrangement, trends were discernable that do not reflect favourably on the probable success of such efforts in the long run. First, communications between the Deputy Ministers and the CFA indicated that consultations were increasingly of an \textit{ad hoc} nature—geared to particular problems to the detriment of long-range policy considerations. Second, there were persistent rumblings in the ranks of senior government officials to the effect that the meetings were not of sufficient
value to justify the time and effort that went into them.¹ Third, by this time the government had established its inter-
departmental "Grains Group" under the direction of Hon. Otto Lang, then Minister of Manpower and Immigration and in charge of the Canadian Wheat Board. The Grains Group was created specifically to devise new policies to alleviate the grain crisis, and both Mr. Lang and his officials had their own ideas about consultation, which included, incidentally, other farm groups like the NFU as well as the CFA. Finally, the CFA itself began to express fears that the newly established procedure might be premature without the "determined backing of its members."²

This last concern exhibits an element of irony in that one of the reasons the Federation felt secure in pressing for in-depth policy involvement was that it had the expertise and the required knowledge lodged in the giant western grain organizations which are a part of CFA. One of the restraints upon Federation involvement has been the lack of experienced and technically competent people. However, in developing this grains policy procedure the Federation was


²Ibid.
becoming dependent upon people who, although they possessed these desirable qualities, held other allegiances and responsibilities which were very strong. The willingness of these people to make a substantial effort under the auspices of the CFA was not sufficient to keep the consultative arrangements viable. Thus, after slightly more than six months (and only two formal sessions) these consultative arrangements lapsed into disuse. Although the grains policy project may itself be judged to be a failure, in the eyes of David Kirk there were compensating factors in that for the first time the federal government had accepted the legitimacy of formal policy consultations with the CFA.¹

¹Interview with David Kirk of CFA, August 9, 1971.
2. **Agricultural Endeavors**

The concern in the previous section for consultative procedures involved efforts on the part of the CFA to exercise influence within the agricultural sphere. The CFA has not sought to be consulted, in the broad sense, on policy matters that do not relate directly to agriculture. In these fields the Federation has been content to function along lines traditionally associated with interest groups, without devoting any significant amount of energy to developing new procedures and techniques.

However, the fact that consultation itself, as it is conceived and set out in the previous section, is the major technique or method that the CFA has sought to pursue is very significant in understanding the modus operandi of this organization. Unlike the NFU, the CFA has not pursued a policy of confrontation involving strikes, boycotts, protests, and so on. Rather it has tried to develop an atmosphere of confidence and cooperation in which it will be well received by government and will at the same time be seen by its constituents to be achieving basic objectives.

It is possible to rate farm interest groups according to the weight they attach to various techniques and methods.
The NFU, for example, places heavy emphasis on its appeal to the public at large and the political pressures that result from public activities. Farm Union leaders place little stock in quiet diplomacy, informal contacts with public servants, their role on advisory committees, and so on. The CPA, on the other hand, seems to have consistently striven to achieve a balanced approach in its efforts. It is primarily a pragmatic organization, intent on holding all channels open, and intent on retaining maximum freedom in whatever area it might wish to exert pressure.

The CPA is essentially a "broker" organization, founded and built upon the elements of compromise. It is a "peak" organization which seeks to aggregate the multifarious demands made by its constituents. In those areas and activities where there has been greatest consistency in Federation techniques and methods -- for example, the annual submission to Cabinet and the constant effort to maintain cordial and beneficial relations with the government -- the brokerage nature of the organization is clearest. NFU techniques, on the other hand, have tended to be influenced primarily by ideological factors. One of the prevailing principles that governs the attitudes and activities of the NFU is the belief that Canadian citizens are subject to an economic system which
is fundamentally unjust, operates to the advantage of certain privileged groups, and to the disadvantage of certain others -- namely the farmers. As a result of this hostile view of the society of which they are a part, Farm Union leaders tend to resort to confrontation tactics and are most reluctant to become involved with, or perhaps led astray by, other groups or "establishment" interests.

In the Canadian parliamentary system interest groups direct their major efforts toward the Cabinet. The CPA has traditionally sought to preserve its right to approach the Cabinet collectively on general agricultural policy matters, or to deal individually with Ministers according to specific problems within their jurisdiction. Of the individual cabinet ministers the Minister of Agriculture is by far the most significant from the point of view of on-going CPA functions and behavior. In 1941 the practice began of an annual submission by the CPA to the federal Cabinet. Originally dubbed the "Manifesto of the Canadian Farmers," it subsequently came to be called "Farmers meet the Cabinet."

1 Obviously, the ideological content will vary from one leader to another, but there is ample evidence of this element in the public statement of NFU leaders. See, for example, Roy Atkinson's opening remarks to the Canadian Congress on Agriculture, November 25, 1970, NFU files.
and within the last decade has been given the simple designation of a "Presentation" or "Statement" to the Prime Minister and his Cabinet.  

As a rule the annual submission has tended to cover the gamut of agricultural policy problems that are relevant at the time. Certain commodity areas and specific policy areas are covered each year as a matter of routine, as in the cases of dairy policy, grain and feed grain policy, farm credit and taxation. In addition there are other particular areas that are included with a fairly high degree of frequency, like marketing boards, farm labor and trade policy. Also, the annual presentation to Cabinet has traditionally been used by the CFA as an opportunity to briefly review the national agricultural scene and give some capsule comments on the importance of farming in Canada.

It is an open question as to whether formal submissions to Cabinet have any real value in terms of increasing the level of understanding of either party, and in terms of

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1 The CFA national office maintains a complete file of these annual submissions.
a more enlightened agricultural policy. The annual meeting with the Cabinet is, of course, one of the means by which the CFA seeks to enhance its legitimacy and mandate. Each year the Federation publishes a brochure -- often with a picture on the front page showing the president of the CFA shaking hands with the Prime Minister in the presence of the Minister of Agriculture -- which is intended to strengthen its image as a clear legitimate spokesman on behalf of Canadian producers. In recent years it has become established practice to invite the press to be present for CFA annual submissions and this has increased the potential for reinforcing the CFA organization.

In comparison with other techniques, like direct communications with the Minister of Agriculture and informal consultations with government officials, formal Cabinet briefs rate far down the line in terms of actual results. Moreover, whatever value there is in these submissions may

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1 Helen Dawson seems to feel that the Annual Submission to Cabinet is of considerable importance, especially when it is complemented with follow-up action in the administration. But today this is open to serious question when follow-up activities are virtually non-existent. It may be that the Cabinet presentation today is much more of an exercise in public relations than was the case in the past. See Dawson, "The Canadian Federation of Agriculture," Canadian Public Administration, III, 2, June 1960, p. 146
have been further diluted by the CFA's tendency to be too general in its approach. As was noted in the section on commodity groups the CFA has had a problem focusing in on fairly specific topics or policy areas; there has been a tendency to use a broad brush which says all and therefore accomplishes little.¹

Syd Williams, the federal Deputy Minister of Agriculture, tells a story which is indicative of the problems the CFA has had in being too general and all-encompassing in its approach to government.² It concerns the first official meeting of the CFA with the Hon. Harry Hays after his appointment as Minister of Agriculture in 1963. The meeting also involved a number of his senior officials and a fairly sizeable delegation from the CFA.

The President of the Federation, Mr. Bentley, began to read the traditional comprehensive brief covering every conceivable problem that had anything at all to do with Canadian agriculture. As the President's reading of the CFA document droned on the Minister, Mr. Hays, became noticeably more restless and ill at ease. When he was halfway through

¹See section on commodity groups, supra, pp. 99 ff.

²Interview with S. B. Williams, Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Ottawa, November 5, 1970.
the reading of the submission Mr. Bentley's voice failed and Mr. Kirk, the Executive Secretary of the Federation, took over and completed the presentation. When they had finished the lengthy and somewhat complex document Mr. Hays, who had long since lost track of the central content of the paper, leaned forward in his chair and looked the delegates in the eye, and in his first official words as Minister of Agriculture said, "well, you certainly gave me the whole bloody forkfull in one bundle, didn't you?" This comment from a novice Minister seems to epitomize a problem the CFA has had in first trying to narrow the scope of its appeal to government, and second, in failing to make its presentations meaningful to Ministers and their officials.¹

Since 1968 the annual submission to Cabinet has undergone an interesting transformation in style if not in actual content. It has become the practice in recent years for the Federation to make a less lengthy and ponderous presentation

¹When David Kirk of CFA was asked about this incident he said that it was essentially accurate. However, in this particular case Kirk felt that there was justification in the Federation's actions in that Mr. Hays was a new Minister and the CFA wanted to lay their policy positions before him in a fairly comprehensive form. Apart from this, Kirk does not deny that the CFA has had a problem in the form and style of their presentations. Interview with Dave Kirk, August 11, 1971.
in favour of a "discussion" format with a mutual exchange of views by both sides. This shift seems to have been initiated under the leadership of Prime Minister Pearson and has been further developed and regularized during the Trudeau regime.

The instructions from the Prime Minister's office are typical of the style that the Trudeau administration expects in formal meetings between Cabinet and interest groups.

"The meeting has been scheduled to last for one hour, and therefore it is hoped that your formal presentation will not last more than five or ten minutes. If it does, there will be much less opportunity for dialogue which is the reason for the meeting."²

The emphasis is on dialogue rather than the monologue which had characterized past presentations to Cabinet. In recent years the CFA verbal presentation to Cabinet has been very brief and concise -- usually ranging from 1,000 to 1,500 words in length. However, members of the Cabinet receive a fairly comprehensive document outlining CFA policies in the areas which were traditionally a part of the CFA brief. In addition, this document takes account of the policy resolutions which

¹See, for example, a letter from Torrance Wylie, Secretary to the Prime Minister, to Dave Kirk of CFA, January 20, 1967, CFA files.

²Letter from Gordon Gibson, Executive Assistant to the Prime Minister, to Dave Kirk of the CFA, April 2, 1969, CFA files.
were passed by the CFA Annual Meeting for the current year.

The Trudeau government has sought to alter relations between Cabinet and agricultural interest groups in at least one other respect. Since its inception the NFU has successfully claimed the same right as the CFA to make an annual appeal to the Canadian Cabinet. Thus, in each year since about 1950, the Cabinet has heard presentations on separate occasions and often of a contradictory nature, from the two national farm organizations concerning the same subject areas.

However, with its emphasis on something constructive being done at the meetings it has appeared to the government to make decreasing sense in terms of overall accomplishment and efficiency to continue to have separate meetings with each of the national farm organizations. The first hint that the government wished to change its procedures and hold a joint meeting with the two farm organizations came through informal communications from the Prime Minister's office (PMO) to the CPA early in 1969. The CPA responded at that time to the effect that although it was agreeable that such a procedure be considered there was not sufficient time to effectively do so in the current year.¹ However, in view

¹Letter from Charles Munro of CPA to Prime Minister Trudeau, April 1, 1969. CPA files.
of the insistence of the PMO, the CFA did contact the NFU about the possibility of a joint submission. The CFA letter stated, in part:

"We are ourselves frankly sceptical, first of all, of the feasibility or desirability of preparation of a joint NFU-CFA submission. We are each responsible to our members and are not in a good position to negotiate differences at this level. We do not think such a negotiating procedure would, in any case, give additional meaning and depth to our representations. Perhaps the contrary. Therefore our tentative view, but subject to discussions with yourselves, is that we might well meet with the Cabinet at the same time, if the Cabinet wished it, but we would quite simply each make our own submission......"¹

The NFU response was equally sceptical. The major problem, in President Atkinson's view, "relates to the government itself, in which it might use the technique as a way of continuing the waffling that it has been engaged in," and carry on with its system of "government by public relations."² However, Atkinson promised to present the request to his Board for further consideration. This, it seems is as far as

¹Letter from Dave Kirk of CFA to Roy Atkinson of NFU, August 6, 1969, CFA files.

²Letter from Roy Atkinson of NFU to Dave Kirk of CFA, August 14, 1969, CFA files.
matters advanced. Mr. Atkinson never offered further views
on the subject, and although the PMO wrote further urging
procedural changes,\(^1\) nothing was done to accommodate its
wishes.

In its attempt to advance the agricultural interests
which it represents the CFA concentrates a good deal of its
efforts on particular Ministers. In this respect the Minister
of Agriculture rates first, followed at some considerable
distance by the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce. In
recent years a novel situation has developed where yet another
Minister, the Hon. Otto Lang, has been given responsibility
for grain policy matters, and as a result the CFA has had
extensive dealings with his office on matters pertaining to
grain and the western economy.

Normally CFA relations with pertinent Ministers are
friendly and cordial. Representations from the Federation
are, generally speaking, well received. Mrs. Dawson reports
that in the early days the Federation was either ignored by
the Minister, the Hon. J. G. Gardiner, or was received with

\(^1\)Letter from Gordon Gibson, Executive Assistant to
the Prime Minister, to Charles Munro of CFA, November 6, 1969,
CFA files.
"coolness or hostility."¹ However, in 1941 relations between the Federation and the Minister took a dramatic turn when Mr. Gardiner journeyed to London, Ontario, to meet with a large contingent of farmers.

"...This occasion has become known in the Federation as the 'Battle of London.' Mr. Gardiner was treated to an especially scathing address by Dr. Hannam with the vocal support of 2,000 extremely angry farmers from all over Canada who made no bones about the fact that they thought Dr. Hannam's speech was a very mild expression of their feelings. Dr. Hannam concluded his address by saying that farm people had lost confidence in Mr. Gardiner and that this confidence would not be restored until he assured them that he would fight vigorously for their interests before the Cabinet. Mr. Gardiner met their challenge. He explained departmental policies and defended his decisions. Meanwhile the farmers present became even more enraged and hurled further accusations at him. They refused to allow him to leave the meeting until they had extracted some concessions from him in the early hours of the next morning. Ever since then the Federation has been recognized by the federal Department of Agriculture and by the entire Cabinet. It can hardly be accidental that it was first asked to submit a brief to the Cabinet two weeks after the 'Battle of London'...²"

The CPA has not often resorted to impetuous protest tinged with violence. When the Federation has engaged in such

²Ibid.
behavior it seems to have had two related objectives in mind: (1) to attract the attention and recognition of the government; and (2) to reinforce its own membership and demonstrate the solidarity of farmer support.

In 1967, for example, Ottawa was the scene of a massive protest march of from 12,000 to 20,000 angry farmers. The march was initiated largely under the auspices of the Ontario Federation, although the Ontario Farmers Union and the Union Catholique des Cultivateurs were invited to take part and a joint coordinating committee was established. The protest arose directly from farmer discontent with dairy prices, dairy policies and the remoteness of the Canadian Dairy Commission and government policy-makers. In addition, in a meeting called at the request of the farm organizations prior to the march, the then Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Greene, had accused the OFA of not being representative of producer opinion.¹ This accusation when combined with the distant, self-centered attitude of government policy-makers was sufficient stimulus for the march.

From the organizers point of view the march on Ottawa was a tremendous success, and the most immediate result was

that the Minister of Agriculture and his officials began to pay more attention to the views of the farm organizations. In the words of Charles Munro, who was President of the OFA at the time, "We simply had to create a situation where opportunities for consultation with the government were possible." Subsequent to this confrontation consultative procedures between the CDC and Dairy Farmers of Canada were begun on a formal and regular basis. The success of the march did a good deal for OFA morale and was a major contributing factor to the euphoric atmosphere which caused the organization to rush headlong in the direction of a General Farm Organization — only to see its hopes dashed in the GFO vote of 1969.

In contrast to the CFA, the NFU uses protest actions as a regular tool in its effort to influence the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. Within a period of slightly less than a year for example, the Farmer's Union staged two highly publicized tractor parades to protest against federal agricultural policies. The first, in 1968, was organized by the OFU to protest prices received by Ontario corn growers as a result.

1 Ibid.

2 See the section on the establishment of GFO, supra, pp. 234 ff.
of surplus American corn flooding the Canadian market. The protest, involving some two hundred tractors and operators culminated in a confrontation with the Minister of Agriculture on Parliament Hill. The other tractor parade was aimed at the Prime Minister as he toured the western provinces early in 1969. To protest the worsening western grain situation and what they saw as federal government indifference, members of the NFU in Saskatchewan drove their tractors to Regina where they dumped quantities of rotting wheat on the steps of the Prime Minister's hotel. These examples are only two of many in which the NFU has resorted to radical protest as a means of attracting the attention of federal Cabinet Ministers.

Protest activities are primarily organization-building techniques and there is evidence that this is more the case with the NFU than with the CFA. The 1968 tractor march on Ottawa was disbanded when the Farm Union leaders were convinced that they had received maximum exposure and organizational benefits even though no substantive changes in federal policy were achieved.¹ Similarly, although the 1969 tractor protest

¹Michael Moore indicates that there was considerable resentment among the Farm Union rank and file when the tractor protest was called off without extracting any promises from the Minister of Agriculture. See Moore, M., "Farm Organizations Often Rebuffed," Globe and Mail, August 19, 1969.
in Saskatchewan did achieve a meeting between the NFU and the Prime Minister, the importance of this was not to be found in new policies or new insights. The most important result seemed to be that the NFU leaders could use this to demonstrate the power and significance of their own organization. Through these means the NFU had achieved a meeting with the Prime Minister whereas other CPA aligned groups, like Paul Babey's FUA in Alberta, were unable to do so.¹

On those rare occasions when the CPA has used protest methods they have been employed as much to reinforce other techniques, like government consultation, as they have to bolster the organization. To this extent CPA protests have probably had a greater over-all impact on agricultural policy than has similar activities on the part of the NFU. For the Farmer's Union the protest activity tends to be the end, whereas the CPA has shown a willingness to adopt other techniques once the protest has set the stage. The CPA approach is something like that illustrated in a Herblock cartoon several years ago. It shows former President Eisenhower bashing the U.S. Congress over the head with an immense club, and the caption reads, "First you get their attention."

The relationship between government Ministers and farm organization leaders varies with the personalities involved on each side. This is a particularly difficult area to document since it involves an assessment of personal characteristics that are quite intangible. Dawson suggests that the way in which farm groups are received has more to do with the personality of the Minister of Agriculture than with his party label.\(^1\) The only probable future exception to this observation might be in the event of the election of a federal NDP government. There is an ideological and political affinity between the NDP and the NFU which would probably ensure that the Farmer's Union received more attention and credibility than has been normal under the two old-line parties. At the same time the CPA might expect to be received with a higher degree of coolness because of its corporate and agri-business connections. If, to carry this conjecture a bit further, there were a federal NDP government today Alf Gleave, M.P. from Biggar, Saskatchewan, would almost certainly be the Minister of Agriculture; Gleave was President of the NFU for a number of years before he entered federal politics. Such a develop-  

the producers even though, in reality, the organization itself is not meaningfully involved.¹

In its continuing efforts to influence agricultural policy-making and administration the Federation has been aware of the need for close relations with the federal civil service. This pertains almost exclusively to the officials of the Department of Agriculture which administers the bulk of the legislation and programs that apply to agriculture. Nearly all national agricultural policy is developed in the senior levels of this department.

Helen Dawson asserts that the Federation has had a "constant and continuous" relationship with officials of the Department of Agriculture. "All parties concerned," she says, "admit that the relationship is both close and cordial."² This she attributes largely to the presence of a highly sympathetic Deputy Minister, then Mr. J. G. Taggart, and to the fact that the Federation was both free with its information and was prepared to readily advise its members

¹David Kirk asserts that the CFA was asked for suggestions when most of these advisory committees were first established. However, he admits that once these agencies were launched the matter was effectively taken out of the hands of the Federation.

The personal factors that affect relations between Ministers and farm groups are very often subtle and difficult to assess. In 1968-69 when the prairie grains crisis was reaching its peak the two ministers most involved with farm organizations were Mr. Pepin, Industry, Trade and Commerce, and Mr. Olson, Agriculture. Mr. Pepin is, of course, a French Canadian, an easterner, and an academician by profession. His personal credibility with western grain farmers was, as one might expect, virtually non-existent. Mr. Olson, on the other hand, was himself a grain farmer with deep roots in the rural west. One might expect under these conditions that farm organizations would not only feel a close affinity with Mr. Olson, but that these groups would command particular attention from that Minister.

However, there were other factors that had a bearing on the reception that farm groups received and the extent to which they were able to influence these Ministers. The fact that Mr. Olson had extensive links and experience with western grain producers gave him more credibility and confidence in dealing with farm leaders on grain matters. Because of his knowledge of the grain industry and the extent to which he felt attuned to western farmer sentiment, Mr. Olson felt secure and independent in his relations with farm group
leaders. Mr. Pepin, on the other hand, did not enjoy these same feelings of security and confidence. He was a complete novice in western grain matters, and of course he did not have that surface credibility and political strength on the prairies that Mr. Olson possessed. To a very real extent, therefore, Mr. Pepin was dependent upon -- or at least he could not safely ignore -- the advice of western farm leaders.¹

During his tenure as Minister under the Liberal regime from 1968 to 1972, Mr. Olson had far more extensive dealings with farm organizations than had Mr. Pepin -- but this was primarily due to the fact that Mr. Olson was Minister of Agriculture and his portfolio was more relevant to these organizations than that of Mr. Pepin. Some observers and farm leaders were inclined to believe that because of his background and experience Mr. Olson would be more liable than Mr. Pepin to meet with farm groups and be influenced by their

¹It should be noted here that Mr. Pepin's responsibility for grain was of considerable symbolic importance to him and other members of the Trudeau government. He was a French Canadian Minister trying to deal with what was an exclusively western regional problem. His capacity to do this was emblematic of the new nation-building aura and the desire of French Canadian federalists to reach out beyond Quebec, that characterized the early Trudeau regime. Thus, the fact that Pepin was alien to the west and the grain industry seemed to make him try harder. These conclusions are based upon the author's personal observations and conversations with Ministers and public servants during this period.
views. However, as suggested above, this need not be the case. Mr. Olson's position in the government was that of a western agrarian expert, and he shared his rural constituency (in a broad, regional sense) with the farm leaders who attempted to influence him. Under these circumstances Mr. Pepin, who had to work diligently to build his credibility in western farm matters, tended to be the most attentive to the demands of farm organizations.

The same reasoning, using the 1969-70 grain crisis as the example, can also be applied to Mr. Lang who, as Minister Without Portfolio, eventually took over Mr. Pepin's responsibility for the Canadian Wheat Board. Although Mr. Lang was the Minister from Saskatchewan he had spent his life in university serving as Dean of Law at the University of Saskatchewan prior to his election to parliament in 1968. In assuming Cabinet responsibility for the grains area Mr. Lang did not appear as attuned to grass roots sentiment as did his colleague, Mr. Olson. Here again, partly as a result of this lack of political confidence, Mr. Lang was led to consult more extensively with farm group leaders than was normally the case with Mr. Olson.

There are two interesting sidelights that ought to be mentioned here: (1) whatever the Hon. Otto Lang may have
lacked in political confidence and credibility was more than compensated by his own personal confidence and courage. This goes some distance in explaining his rapid ascendance from Minister Without Portfolio, to Minister in charge of the Wheat Board, to Minister of Manpower and Immigration, to Minister of Justice. (2) Both Mr. Lang and his advisors regarded it as simply "good politics" to keep farm organization leaders informed and involved. His receptivity to the views of western farm leaders was not, therefore, simply a reflex action caused by a lack of political credibility. It is something he would have advocated for any Minister as sound political strategy.

Thus, prior to the implementation of Operation LIFT, (Lower Inventory For Tomorrow), which was Mr. Lang's program to ameliorate the massive western grain surplus in 1969-70, Lang himself took the initiative in consulting with the most significant farm organizations before the program was finalized. In this case he consulted with the NFU, the CPA, and the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, all of which were asked to keep the plan a secret until the government was prepared to announce it. This is an interesting example not only for the reasons which caused Lang to consult, but also because it is a rare instance of a Minister taking the initiative to involve groups prior to
the completion of a policy.

One of the chief tenets of the CFA is that it shall be a non-partisan organization. The nearest the Federation comes to any on-going relationship with political parties is in its annual presentation to the parliamentary caucuses. This takes place each year following the submission to Cabinet, and the material presented to the M.P.'s is essentially the same as that presented to the Ministers. The same CFA delegation, about fifteen or twenty people, meet with party caucuses and the Cabinet. Generally speaking the meetings between the Federation and party M.P.'s are quite free-wheeling covering a full range of agricultural topics, and are of somewhat longer duration than the meeting with Cabinet.

Aside from the annual meetings with party caucuses the CFA seeks to influence elected M.P.'s in its testimony before the House Standing Committee on Agriculture. The attempt in recent years to streamline the legislative process has had the effect of increasing the activity and responsibility of Standing Committees, making them a much more relevant point of access and influence than was the case in the past. The record shows that from 1960 to 1970 the bulk

Supra. p. 51.
of the CFA submissions to Standing Committees concerned matters other than agricultural policy.¹ The implication clearly is that agricultural policy inputs were being made in places other than the Standing Committee on Agriculture. However, in 1970 the Federation appeared before the Committee three times with formal prepared testimony respecting agricultural policy. During the hearings on the most recent, highly controversial agricultural Bills, the National Marketing Bill and the Prairie Grain Stabilization Bill, the Federation kept a close daily watch on the activities of the Agriculture Standing Committee.²

The CFA has not tried to encourage agricultural blocs in the Canadian legislature as has been the practice in the United States. This, of course, is largely a result of our parliamentary system which is not conducive to special interest groupings within the House of Commons. Also it is a reflection of the non-partisan nature of the Federation and its reluctance to become involved with individual M.P.'s on a continuing basis. Apart from the Standing Committee on

¹Formal CFA Submissions, Appendix C.
²The CFA appeared once concerning the national marketing bill, and twice to deal with feed grains policy. Ibid.
Agriculture, the CFA employs a fairly uniform approach to Members of Parliament and it seems to be given more or less equal recognition and status by all parties in the House.

The CFA also tries to influence agricultural policy by appearing before relevant Royal Commissions and Task Forces. For example, in 1968 the Federation made a substantial presentation to the Royal Commission on Farm Machinery (the Barber Commission). In 1967 the CFA executive officers met for four full days with the newly appointed members of the federal Task Force on Agriculture.\(^1\) In addition, dozens of the Federation's affiliates presented briefs to the Task Force over a two year period.\(^2\)

Most observers point to a collective of agricultural advisory committees as an important source of contact and influence for the CFA. For example, Mrs. Dawson makes reference to the Federation's constant efforts in gaining and maintaining membership on such committees.\(^3\) Engelmann and Schwartz take note of this and refer to the CFA as being

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\(^1\) *Canadian Agriculture in the Seventies*, Queen's Printer, Ottawa, December, 1969, p. 465.


particularly influential in regard to appointments to agricultural boards and committees. There is no doubt that the CFA places some importance in its members being a part of the extensive advisory committee system. In 1971 the Executive Secretary of the Federation reported that the CFA had members on the advisory committees to the following very important bodies: the Canadian Dairy Commission; the Agricultural Stabilization Board; the Farm Credit Corporation; and the Canadian Livestock Feed Board.

However, one ought not to accept at face value the contention that the Federation has a central role in making these appointments and that CFA influence is augmented by such appointments. All of the positions on the above mentioned advisory committees are filled by ministerial appointment. In filling the positions the Minister is guided to a considerable extent by the advice of the Board or Commission.

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3. Cf. Kwavnick: Organized Labour, pp. 112ff. The evidence presented by Kwavnick indicates that governmental appointments are taken much more seriously by the Canadian Labour Congress in the "protection of its mandate" than is the case with the CFA.
the advisory committee is intended to serve. He is informed, for example, whether a particular individual has made a valuable contribution in the case of a re-appointment, and he is advised of the qualities that might be desired in making new appointments. Very often the government agency that is involved suggests a list of names for the Minister's consideration. Other criteria also apply in making such appointments. In the case of the Dairy Commission for example, a balance is maintained between dairy industry and producer representatives. On nearly all advisory committees balanced regional representation is an important factor. Moreover, new appointees must not be "politically objectionable". On this last point the unwritten rule is that prospective appointees to these committees must either be politically neutral or sympathetic to the party in power — it is crucial that they not be actively working to overthrow the governing party. The importance of political affiliation in these appointments varies from position to position and according to the Minister that is involved. Some appointments are wholly political while others are not. There is, however, a carefully maintained system whereby all such appointments are checked to ensure that they are not actively and overtly opposed to the party in power.
The overriding point to be made here is that membership in the CFA is not of great significance in deciding most appointments to agricultural advisory bodies. The CFA network of affiliations is so extensive that there is a very high probability that any appointee, either industry or producer, can properly be regarded as a member of the Federation. In other words, CFA membership on these advisory boards is more incidental, or perhaps accidental, than it is central and deliberate.

Given the fact that CFA representation on agricultural advisory committees tends to be something less than direct and overt is should not be surprising that the extent to which the Federation, as an organization, is able to influence agricultural policy through these channels is not very great. In addition there is the natural hesitancy on the part of the Federation to become fully committed to government policies for fear that this will hamper the CFA's critical role.¹ Membership on agricultural advisory committees is an important talking point; it is another way in which the CFA seeks to strengthen its mandate. It is one more way in which CFA leaders can claim to be working and involved on behalf of

¹See Dawson, "The Canadian Federation of Agriculture," p. 147.
the producers even though, in reality, the organization itself is not meaningfully involved.¹

In its continuing efforts to influence agricultural policy-making and administration the Federation has been aware of the need for close relations with the federal civil service. This pertains almost exclusively to the officials of the Department of Agriculture which administers the bulk of the legislation and programs that apply to agriculture. Nearly all national agricultural policy is developed in the senior levels of this department.

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¹David Kirk asserts that the CFA was asked for suggestions when most of these advisory committees were first established. However, he admits that once these agencies were launched the matter was effectively taken out of the hands of the Federation.

to cooperate with the government. Mrs. Dawson describes what she thinks is a two-way exchange of information and advice which is a "daily occurrence ...... at all administrative levels." In her analysis Dawson concentrated on the formative years of the CPA -- the 1940's and early 1950's. It may be that at that time under the leadership of Dr. Hannam and with the sympathetic ear of the Deputy Minister, the Federation did establish the sort of two-way communication that Mrs. Dawson describes. However, more recently this mutual involvement and interaction simply is non-existent.

It may be, as suggested in the previous section on consultation, that Mrs. Dawson has mistaken a flurry of peripheral activity respecting routine administration for meaningful involvement and a source of genuine CPA influence. It is possible that the modern-day desire for consultation is in part a reaction to earlier procedures in which the Federation was used to advance the administrative ends of the government but was not given any effective influence or weight in the direction of government policy.

The sections of this study which deal with the national marketing bill (C-176 and later C-194) and with

1Ibid.
consultative procedures, have provided a glimpse of some of the problems pertaining to relations between the Federation and officials of the federal Department of Agriculture.\footnote{See in particular supra, pp. 130ff on national marketing and pp. 279ff. and pp. 287ff. on the consultative process.}

Generally speaking, interaction between the two is strictly ad hoc, highly irregular, and almost exclusively one-way -- that is, from the Federation to government. Departmental officials do not regularly check with the Federation to ascertain its opinion on new or proposed policies, programs or regulations. As a rule the Federation contacts government officials only to secure information that is not readily at hand, and this is done on an ad hoc basis, usually when some sort of crisis has arisen. For example when U.S. President Nixon announced his dramatic new economic policies on August 16, 1971, the CFA made contact with government officials to request information so that they would be able to plan their public reaction.

The apparent deterioration in relations between the CFA and governmental officials may be in part a result of a change in leadership in the Federation. This is the opinion of the current federal Deputy Minister of Agriculture, S. B. Williams, for example. He feels that the general outlook
and attitudes that are held by CFA Presidents are important in understanding why certain courses are followed, why certain techniques seem to be preferred, and perhaps why the Federation is more successful at particular times in its history. It is the view of the Deputy Minister of Agriculture and that of many civil servants that the quiet diplomacy of Dr. Hannam was more advantageous for the CFA than have been the techniques of some of his successors. Here again, however, one wonders whether the Federation was actually more effective during its first twenty-five years, or whether government officials thought it was so because it accepted a subservient role.

In recent years the CFA has shown an intermittent desire to increase the contacts and interaction between the organization and members of the public service. In 1969 Dr. Glen Purnell, Director General of the CDA Economics Branch, was invited to explain the expanded Outlook Conferences to Federation Board members. At an Executive Meeting in May, 1971, Dr. Bert Migicovsky, Director General of the Research Branch, was invited by the Federation to discuss agricultural research within the CDA. After his meeting with

1Interview with S. B. Williams, Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Ottawa, November 5, 1970.
the CFA Dr. Migicovsky expressed surprise at the lack of contact between government officials and farm organizations like the Federation. Migicovsky referred to his own Branch which, he said, "spends in excess of fifty million dollars per year on agricultural research and has never been called in or questioned by the CFA."¹

Many of the middle to upper range public servants, like Migicovsky, are eager to increase their contacts with concerned groups and individuals outside of government.² There is, it would seem, fertile ground here which could give the Federation a greater role in both the on-going administration of rural programs and the development of policy for agriculture. In addition, accelerated contacts at this level might help to offset the serious lack of technical and expert staff within the CFA.

The CFA has not made a concerted effort to influence the federal government by interacting directly with provincial governments. However, the Federation has undoubtedly had an

¹Interview with Dr. Bert Migicovsky, Ottawa, May 6, 1971.

²This was the view of both Dr. Purnell and Dr. Migicovsky, and has been confirmed by numerous conversations between the author and middle range public servants in CDA.
indirect effect on federal agricultural policies through the activities of its affiliates in the provincial sphere. One of the surest methods of attracting the attention of the federal Minister of Agriculture is through his provincial counterparts. Provincial Ministers have immediate access to the federal Minister and his senior officials, and it is quite often the case that these provincial ministers are spurred into action by provincial farm organizations that are affiliated with the CFA. On several occasions during the 1969-70 grains crisis the Minister of Agriculture from Saskatchewan, Hon. Douglas MacFarlane, was successfully persuaded by the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool to apply pressure to his federal counterpart, Mr. Olson.

On a number of occasions the parent Federation has asked its provincial members to apply pressure to provincial governments in order to secure an expanded role for the CFA in agricultural policy matters. The Federation has sought, for example, to use this means to expand its function in those extensive areas where federal-provincial negotiations are involved. Invariably, however, provincial member bodies have failed to assist the national Federation in this way. Rather they have been content to make whatever input they thought appropriate themselves at the provincial level
without any real concern for expanding the role of the CPA.

3. Non-Agricultural Involvement

The major thrust of CPA efforts is, of course, in the agricultural sphere -- in the Federation's desire to influence over-all policy and specific programs. However, Federation activities are not limited to agricultural matters. The CPA is involved in a number of other areas where it seeks to speak on behalf of agricultural producers and represent their interests. In the broad sense these too are agricultural concerns, but they are not specifically directed at rural programs and policies and they are, therefore, somewhat more peripheral in the totality of CPA activities. Outside of the federal Department of Agriculture, and to a lesser extent Industry, Trade and Commerce, CPA contacts with departmental public servants are virtually non-existent. In non-agricultural areas the Federation tries to make its weight felt through parliamentary institutions; through submissions to, and membership on, various councils, boards, and commissions; and through direct approaches to government at the Cabinet level.

In the eleven year period from 1960 to 1970 the Canadian Federation of Agriculture prepared eighty-eight
formal submissions which were presented to the federal government, agencies of the government, or independent groups which reported directly to the government. Excluding the annual policy statement to Cabinet, this represents an average of ten submissions per year. Half of the CFA presentations related directly to national agricultural policy and of these the majority -- some 20 out of 33 -- were addressed to the members of the federal Cabinet. Nearly all of the Cabinet level appeals respecting agricultural policy were directed at the Minister of Agriculture. However, the subject matter sometimes warranted the involvement of other Ministers and occasionally the petition was directed at two or more Ministers simultaneously. Other Ministers who received submissions periodically were the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce in the case of grains policy; in earlier years the Minister of Forestry and Rural Development, concerning feed freight assistance; and the Minister of Finance respecting agricultural tariffs.

Apart from the Cabinet the CFA aimed most of its formal policy appeals in the direction of government boards, commissions and councils. The Agricultural Stabilization

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1See Appendix C, "Formal CFA Submissions, 1960-1970, Excluding Annual Presentations to Cabinet."
Board, for example, rates continuous attention from the Federation in its attempts to achieve both short and long range objectives in farm policy. In recent years the same can be said of the Canadian Dairy Commission which regularly receives formal recommendations from the CFA. The Canadian parliament and parliamentary institutions have not been of very great significance in the CFA's attempts to advance agricultural policy interests. It is only on very rare occasions that CFA opinions on farm policy are expressed through special or joint committees of the House of Commons or the Senate. Moreover, as I have pointed out elsewhere, it is only in recent years that the Standing Committee on Agriculture has assumed any real importance for the CFA as a point of access on agricultural matters.

In areas other than pure agricultural policy parliamentary institutions rate considerably more attention from the CFA than is the case with strictly agricultural matters. In the years 1960 to 1970 the CFA prepared forty-five formal submissions in non-agricultural policy areas. Of these about 35 per cent, some sixteen submissions, were directed at parliamentary groups.¹ Slightly less than half of these

¹See Appendix C.
presentations were submitted to standing Committees of the House, such as Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs, and so on. The other formal statements involved testimony before Joint Committees of the Senate and the House of Commons (as with consumer credit in 1966); special committees of either institution (as with the Senate Committee on Poverty in 1970); and special investigatory committees of the House of Commons (as with drug and chemical contamination of food in 1963). ¹

Most of the non-agricultural policy submissions prepared by the CFA have been used in testimony before government boards, commissions and regulatory bodies. In fact, this accounts for nearly 50 percent of the briefs in this area. This includes numerous appearances before the Tariff Board, testimony before Royal Commissions or Committees on automotives, taxation, health, broadcasting, and so on. The Federation has also occasionally given evidence before special commissions of inquiry set up by the government.

There seem to be two predominant factors which influence the CFA's decision to appeal to particular governmental agencies rather than others. First, if it is clear that the farmers' interest should be represented, an effort to prepare

¹See Appendix C.
material will probably be made. Second, CFA representations are most likely in those areas where Federation personnel hold a special interest or have special competence. This helps to explain why, for example, the Federation has maintained an interest in broadcasting policy and has made a number of formal appeals over the years to various Royal Commissions, Advisory Committee, and the Board of Broadcast Governors (now the CRTC). Apart from Farm Radio Forum which was an important experiment in Canadian Broadcasting, ¹ Dave Kirk has had long standing links with Graham Spry and the Canadian Broadcasting League. Kirk's deep interest and involvement in Canadian broadcasting has to some extent spilled over to become a CFA involvement.

In considering the quantity and nature of formal submissions by the CFA it is important to not attach too much significance to this type of interest articulation. Informal communications, correspondence, and ad hoc meetings at various levels are of greater importance to the Federation in terms of achieving desired objectives. Also, it is misleading to consider formal presentations in straight quanti-

tative terms insofar as this does not account for qualitative differences between what seems to be identical approaches at different levels. Thus, the fact that in the non-agricultural sphere the Federation has made twice as many formal presentations to such bodies as commissions and boards\(^1\) as it has to members of the federal Cabinet does not indicate that the former method is twice as useful or twice as rewarding as the latter. On the contrary, irrespective of the fact that in the eleven year period 1960 to 1970 there is a heavy imbalance in favour of submissions to boards, commissions and councils rather than Cabinet, other factors tend to offset and downplay the importance of these numbers.

Two important factors seem to be clear: (1) many of the presentations made to government agencies and other bodies pertain to regulations and administration and not basic policy, or if it does relate to policy the agency is essentially one stage removed and will re-work or reject all or parts of the CFA proposals before passing them on to the actual decision-makers; and (2) on issues that are regarded as crucial to the interests of the farming community, but not dealing specifically with farm policy, the Federation

\(^1\)See Appendix C for a list of such submissions.
usually tries an approach at the Cabinet level. Although the CFA tries to advance the most important issues through the Cabinet, quite often the formal presentation to political leaders is less significant than the interaction that surrounds the presentation -- both before and after. A specific instance illustrates CFA attempts to achieve its objectives through such a formal appeal to a Cabinet Minister. This example involved a concerted effort to influence government postal-rate policy and provides some excellent insights into the dynamics of the group process.

The Attempt to Influence Postal Policy

In the fall of 1968 the then Postmaster General, the Hon. Eric Kierans, brought forward legislation which was intended to modernize operations and place the Post Office on more of a paying basis. For years the Post Office had been operating at a substantial deficit, estimated for the 1969-70 fiscal year to be approximately $130 million. Kierans' avowed objective was to revise postal procedures and regulations in such a way that the Post Office would be placed on

at least a break-even basis. Throughout the year-long postal debate the Minister repeated time and again his belief that those who utilize the Post Office and receive its services should bear the cost rather than be subsidized out of general taxation revenues.

According to the Kierans' proposal most of the revenue needed to offset the postal deficit could be obtained by increasing the mailing rates for newspapers, periodicals, and specialized publications which serve specialized professions and minority group interests, and which had for years benefitted from subsidized postal rates. In Mr. Kierans' view, "if a periodical is worthwhile its subscribers will be willing to bear the cost of increased rates."¹

The impact of the revised postal rates on the Canadian farm press was immediate and serious. Nearly all of the farm papers in Canada were affiliated with the CFA through the cooperatives, associations, or federations which they represented and served. Since this was a matter of vital concern to these groups it became an issue for the CFA at the national level. The postal rates issue was raised and widely debated at the Annual Meeting of the Federation in January, 1969. The problem insofar as the farm press was

¹Ibid.
concerned, had three basic elements. First, the over-all poundage rates were raised from 1.75 to 5 cents for the first two ounces and 3 cents for each two ounces after that, with some slight variation for publications with more than ten thousand circulation. Second, a two cent minimum charge per publication was implemented. Third, second class mailing privileges and poundage rates were denied to those professional publications which served a highly restricted clientele. This principle was being extended to cover nearly all of the farm papers since they were all associated with what might be regarded as specialized associations.

Like other major interest groups the CPA stood opposed to the general raise in postal charges, but in the face of Mr. Kierans' declared objective to move in the direction of greater fiscal equilibrium the Federation accepted the fact that some increase in rates was inevitable. It was decided therefore that the CPA effort should be concentrated on achieving second class mailing privileges and on getting the two cent minimum rate changed.

The Federation's first step in seeking to further these objectives was to attempt to elicit the understanding and support of the Minister of Agriculture. In a lengthy letter to Mr. Olson, David Kirk argued that this was not
merely a matter of postal policy, but also had serious implications for the long-run furtherance of agricultural policy. Kirk advised the Minister that the postal hikes represented increased in cost from 230% to as much as 2,000% for Canadian farm papers. This, he submitted, was unacceptable in a society such as Canada’s where farm papers are the vital link between producers themselves and between farmers and the government. "We do not know exactly what action should be taken," said Kirk. "We look to your advice and judgement on this matter. We do know that some form of confrontation on, and examination of, the issue is urgently necessary."2 Kirk sent copies of his letter to Mr. Olson with short covering letters to both the Prime Minister and Mr. Kierans.

The attempt to involve the Minister of Agriculture and possibly enlist his support in an area which is wholly within the jurisdiction of another department is typical of the CFA in matters which are of importance to that organization and to the rural community. In this instance the Federation could make a convincing case that the well-being of the diverse agricultural industry was at stake since a significant number

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1 Letter from D. Kirk to Hon. H. A. Olson, February 11, 1969. Files of the Minister of Agriculture.

2 Ibid., p. 3.
of rural papers had indicated that they would be forced to cease publication under the new rates.

Also this was a telling issue insofar as the CFA organization itself was concerned. Not only are most of the farm papers associated with important CFA affiliates, but the Federation is dependent to a considerable extent upon the national farm press to build and maintain its image in rural Canada. The CFA could be assured that its efforts, if successful, would be amply rewarded through the news and editorial pages of the farm press. On issues of lesser organizational importance -- health policy and broadcast policy, for example -- where the stakes were not so high nor the rewards so promising, the CFA has been content to simply "go through the motions" with a formal submission to the agency or authority involved.

The Minister of Agriculture reacted cautiously to the Federation's overtures concerning postal policy and the farm press. He was caught in a difficult, conflicting, yet familiar position between the demands of a major interest group and the rural publishers -- which, after all, had considerable importance for him as well as the Federation -- and the program of his Cabinet colleague whom he was obliged to support. Under these circumstances Mr. Olson was reluctant to become
the focal point for the CFA lobby.

One of the closest collaborators with the CFA at the time of the postal rates issue was John Phillips, Managing Editor of Farm and Country magazine. Phillips, whose magazine would, as a result of the two cents minimum charge, have had to bear a 1,500% increase in postal costs\(^1\) was one of the key motivating forces behind the campaign to reduce postal charges. Phillips expended considerable energy gathering facts and figures to illustrate the disastrous impact that the new postal rates would have on most publications. This data was made available to the CFA to buttress their case.\(^2\) When Mr. Olson, the Minister of Agriculture, did not respond to the original CFA letter and indicated that he would resist informal attempts to set up a meeting to discuss postal rates, Dave Kirk of the Federation contacted John Phillips by telephone to discuss ways in which pressure might be brought to bear on the Minister.\(^3\) As a result letters went forward from

\(^1\)See the letter from John Phillips to Mr. and Mrs. Brian Greggain, September 3, 1969, CFA files.

\(^2\)See, for example, letters to John Phillips from G. E. Crodon, Manager of Cash Crop Farming Publications Ltd., February 13, 1969, and Jack Davis, Editor of The Grower, February 13, 1969, CFA files.

\(^3\)See the letter from John Phillips to Dave Kirk, February 21, 1969, CFA files.
John Phillips to twelve leading Ontario and Quebec-based farm publications.\(^1\) Phillips indicated that Mr. Olson was "showing reluctance" in their attempts to meet with him to discuss the postal rates issue. He suggested therefore that all rural publications send an immediate telegram to the Minister stressing the urgency of a meeting to discuss the position of the farm press.\(^2\)

Mr. Olson responded to these pressures by stepping up his efforts to have Mr. Kierans deal directly with representatives of the CFA and the farm publications. Early in March Kierans replied to the CFA's original letter addressed to Mr. Olson by reiterating his desire to end the massive postal deficit. He pointed out that by looking at their postal costs in percentage terms the farm publications were making their problems look worse than they really were. He cited as an example Farm and Country which claimed a 1500% rise in postal costs under the new rates. These additional costs could, in Kierans' view, have been covered by an additional thirty-five cents per subscriber. And he clearly regarded

\(^1\)Letter from John Phillips, Editor of Farm and Country, February 21, 1969, CFA files.

\(^2\)Phillips even suggested in fairly specific terms what the telegrams should say, but he advised each editor to re-word the wire so they would not be uniform.
this as a reasonable price for farmers receiving Farm and Country to pay.¹

During this same period of time Mr. Olson and members of his staff were in frequent contact with Mr. Kierans in an effort to arrange a meeting to discuss the postal rates issue. Such a meeting was finally agreed to for March 7, 1969. On the government side the meeting was attended by Mr. Kierans and a couple of his senior officials. Also in attendance was Mr. Olson who, although he had been instrumental in setting the meeting up, had followed a strategy of non-involvement and was now content to meet with the dissatisfied farm leaders as an observer rather than a participant. The farm press delegation which was led by Charles Munro and Dave Kirk of the Federation, consisted of fifteen editors and publishers from across the country.²

The President of the CFA, Mr. Munro, read a short, concise brief on behalf of the aggrieved delegation outlining the major features of the new postal policy which were causing hardship for the farm press. Mr. Kierans replied in


his characteristic tough and outspoken fashion, re-affirming his position with respect to the financial stability of the Post Office and the responsibility of those who use this service to pay the cost.\footnote{From author's notes taken during the meeting, March 7, 1969.} It seemed for a time that the meeting was going nowhere and would accomplish little more than a deepening of the gap that already separated Mr. Kierans from the farm leaders on this issue. Over the previous months Kierans had vigorously defended the new postal rates in the House of Commons, in private meetings, and in public confrontations, and he was not about to make a major exception for the sake of the farming community.

On the matter of general postal rates and the two cent minimum charge Kierans was unyielding, but on the question of second class mailing privileges it soon became clear that there was the possibility of some measure of agreement. The Minister was not fully aware of the nature of the subscription practices for many farm papers, and in this area there was room for some discretion as to whether a publication was strictly professional in its content or whether it appealed to a broader clientele. After much
discussion Mr. Kierans concluded that the Post Office might be able to assist the farm press in the matter of classifications. He instructed his Director of Postal Rates and Classification, Mr. P. Pageau, to consult with each representative of the farm papers to see if some of their problems could be resolved through ré-classification. The Minister in effect gave Pageau the necessary authority to interpret the regulations in such a way that it would work as much as possible to the benefit of the farm publications.

Pageau began his meetings with farm press representatives as soon as the ministerial session was concluded, and within two days all of the publications had received second class mailing privileges. For some of the more bulky farm publications second class rates were all they could reasonably expect from the government, and they were effectively satisfied by this move. Other papers, like Farm and Country, were helped by the second class rating but they still found that the over-all rates and the two cent minimum charge worked very much to their disadvantage. Nevertheless, the change in postal classification represented a substantial achievement for the CPA as an interest group. The national office of the Federation received a tide of laudatory letters expressing the farm publishers appreciation for the efforts
of Munro and Kirk.¹

Throughout the debate on general postal rates Kierans consistently maintained that it was not the responsibility of his department to subsidize fledgling publications. He argued that if farm papers were worthy of continuation but could not meet their legitimate costs they should make their case to government requesting public support rather than expect indirect subsidization through the Post Office. When the farm leaders were thus rebuffed in their meeting with Ministers Kierans and Olson -- notwithstanding their success in achieving second class postal services -- they turned their attention to the government as a whole and to the institution of Parliament. One week after the meeting with Mr. Kierans the CFA sent a memorandum to all M.P.'s along with copies of the original letter appealing to Mr. Olson and the brief which they had submitted to Mr. Kierans. The covering memo to the parliamentarians briefly mentioned the difficulties faced by farm publications and concluded by saying "Any renewed consideration of these problems that you could achieve, with a view

¹See, for example, letters to Dave Kirk from G. H. Donovan, Donovan Publications, March 10, J. R. Armstrong, Country Life, March 14, J. E. Bowes, Bowes Publishing, March 10, CFA files.
to gaining some relief, would be very much appreciated."¹

Three members of the Opposition responded to the CFA memo, indicating that they would add this to their ammunition store to be used in the House of Commons against government postal policies.² One member of the governing Liberal Party wrote to the Federation asking, in effect, if it was fair for Canadians to be subsidizing through their taxes, publications which they did not receive or necessarily benefit from.³ In reply to this letter David Kirk argued that the value to the community of extensive communication and enlightened understanding did justify this sort of subsidization. His view was that although the nature and source of the support was indirect and imperfect, the cause was just and worthy of continuation.

The important point to be noted here is that M.P.'s

¹Memorandum from the CFA to Members of Parliament, March 14, 1969, CFA files.


⁴Letter from Dave Kirk to H. G. Chappell, M.P., April 8, 1969, CFA files.
were brought into the act only after the appeal at the cabinet level had largely failed to win major concessions. The CPA like other interest groups in this country, will only switch its lobbying efforts to Members of Parliament when other more potentially fruitful channels have been closed.\(^1\) CPA attempts to lobby individual M.P.'s did not go beyond this preliminary letter writing stage. Instead the Federation turned its attention to the possibility of some sort of joint action with other affected interest groups who wished to change the postal regulations. In the summer of 1969 the CPA sent a memo to all affiliated members indicating that the Federation was considering joining in some wider effort to influence postal policy.\(^2\) What Dave Kirk had in mind was a group which came to be known as the "Committee For Fair Postal Rates." This was conceived as a federated super interest group representing all of the organizations and associations that were adversely affected by the new postal rates.

The Committee For Fair Postal Rates was largely a

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\(^1\) This point is reinforced by other observers like Engelmann and Schwartz, *Political Parties*, p. 105.

\(^2\) Memorandum from Dave Kirk to all CPA member bodies, June 24, 1969, CPA files.
result of the efforts of the Canadian Labour Congress and its Secretary Treasurer, William Dodge, who became chairman of the newly formed Committee. The Committee arose out of a meeting initiated by Dodge and attended by representatives of the CLC, CFA, Canadian Welfare Council, and the Cooperative Union of Canada. Once the Committee had been established these four organizations were joined by ten other national interest groups, all of whom acted as sponsors.

For its part the CFA agreed from the outset to be one of the sponsors and a full participating member of the Committee. John Phillips of *Farm and Country* indicated his interest in the Committee and his desire to be involved.\(^2\) Phillips, whose magazine continued to feel considerable adverse effect from the postal rates, had become one of the most knowledgeable and highly motivated allies of the CFA national office. Dave Kirk and Bill Hamilton were satisfied therefore to share their responsibilities on the Committee For Fair Postal Rates with Phillips. The Committee planned a massive national

\(^1\)The list included such groups as Boy Scouts of Canada, Canadian Teacher's Federation, Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada. See "What is the Committee For Fair Postal Rates?" CFA files.

\(^2\)Letter from John Phillips of *Farm and Country* to Dave Kirk, October 28, 1969, CFA files.
campaign which was to include virtually every group in Canada that had any kind of publication. Its strategy was to mount an attack which would have a simultaneous effect on the public, Parliament, and members of the government. On November 12-13, 1969, it scheduled a National Conference on Fair Postal Rates which attracted delegates from ninety five organized interest groups and was endorsed by ninety seven others.\(^1\) The Conference elected Mrs. Francis Balls of the Consumer's Association of Canada as chairman of the campaign to win concessions from the Post Office department. Under the direction of Mrs. Balls and key personnel from the CLC a host of public relations and lobbying tactics were developed and brought forward for action.\(^2\)

The Committee For Fair Postal Rates concentrated most of its fire on individual Members of Parliament. It conducted what was regarded as "the most representative canvass of Members of Parliament in Canadian history."\(^3\) During the November Conference delegates representing the ninety five

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\(^1\)See "Participants and Sponsors -- Conference on Fair Postal Rates," November 12-13, 1969, CFA files.


\(^3\)"Statement from the Committee For Fair Postal Rates," November 27, 1969, CFA files.
contributing organizations were divided into four-man teams, with each team being assigned a small number of M.P.'s to contact. Each parliamentarian was pressurized verbally and was given a quantity of printed material to bolster the Committee's case. The Committee received unanimous support from the Conservative and NDP Members of Parliament, and although it was somewhat less visible, it claimed unanimous support from the Creditistes. According to Committee statements many Liberal M.P.'s took steps to ensure that they would not have to meet with the lobbyists, and a number of others agreed privately with Committee objectives although they would not publicly violate party solidarity on the issue.

The November Conference and the related canvass of Members of Parliament marked the apex of the activities of the short-lived Committee For Fair Postal Rates. It also represented the turning point in the CFA's enthusiasm for this method of trying to influence the government. The Committee For Fair Postal Rates lost the support of the CFA and ultimately failed to achieve its over-all objectives for three reasons: (1) the Committee was too blunt an instrument, too large and unwieldy; (2) the Committee did not have strong enough leadership and did not command the full talents of those individuals and organizations that were capable of
giving it direction; (3) for a variety of reasons the Committee concentrated its efforts on individual M.P.'s rather than government Ministers and administrators.

These problems were underlined by John Phillips who was deeply involved in all phases of the postal controversy. He said, for example, that the November meeting was a failure because "people were ill-informed and the kit was worse than useless since some of the material contained downright distortions and untruths."¹ Phillips complained about the "amateurish tactics" of leaders who were not knowledgeable about their subjects. He recognized that Kierans was the man who had to be influenced. "We would," he said, "do far more harm than good if we endorsed the scatter gun tactics currently used."²

It is interesting -- perhaps ironical -- to note that the Committee For Fair Postal Rates suffered from some of the same problems that plague the CFA. The Committee could not count on a high degree of commitment and concerted effort from its constituent parts of which the CFA was one. The Federation is confronted with a similar dilemma when its various affiliates refuse to fully support the national

¹Letter from John Phillips to Bill Hamilton of CFA, December 19, 1969, CFA files.
²Ibid.
organization and, in fact, often undermine it by bypassing the
parent group. Bill Hamilton's response to the despairing
remarks of John Phillips might just as easily have been
written by one of the CFA affiliates. He said, in part:

"....what is needed is an injection of the
leadership you suggest and at this stage in
the game we're not prepared to give it that
leadership and research input. This is not
to say however that we wouldn't be quite
prepared to take on just such an exercise
for our own people and those who might choose
to associate with a more in depth and narrow-
ly defined approach. However for the moment
we will not be taking any action because as
you are well aware we have more on the plat-
ter between now and mid-February than we
can reasonably cope with and certainly any
activities from this area will be as directed
by and in service for our member organizations."

In short, in its final attempt to influence government
policy respecting postal rates the CFA also failed. The
limited success the CFA enjoyed came as a result of a careful,
integrated effort at the ministerial level. The postal case
demonstrates that when a multitude of like minded groups band
loosely together to try to achieve a specific objective at the
parliamentary level the odds are not in their favour and
success is not assured.

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1 Letters from Bill Hamilton to John Phillips,
December 23, 1969, CFA files.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The aims of this study have been to describe, to explain, and occasionally to prescribe. The findings of this dissertation fall roughly into three categories: (1) its contribution to the total state of knowledge of political interest groups and the Canadian political system; (2) its contribution to our understanding of Canadian farm interest groups, the CFA in particular; and, (3) its contribution to the general development and over-all good of rural interest groups and the Canadian agricultural community. In terms of the general state of our knowledge of Canadian political interest groups it would be appropriate to look at two very different yet very relevant authors: Robert Presthus, author of *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics*, ¹ and Helen Jones Dawson, author of a number of articles on Canadian political

interest groups but best known for her analysis of the Canadian Federation of Agriculture.¹ In his book Presthus adopts an overview through which he attempts to apply a general theory to the Canadian political system. His development of a general theoretical framework is one of the most exciting recent approaches in Canadian political science, and to the extent that it is possible, his assertions are worth testing. Helen Dawson is important because, apart from her work, virtually nothing has been written on Canadian farm interest groups. Nearly all of the general texts dealing with Canadian politics rely completely upon Dawson for their material with respect to farm interest groups.² It is important, therefore, to have some assessment of her findings and the extent to which they have endured over time.


Presthus' findings are derived from evidence provided by a random sample of 1,124 legislators, civil servants, and directors of interest groups in Ottawa, Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia. According to the "theory of elite accommodation" which Presthus applies to the Canadian political system "major decisions regarding national socioeconomic policy are worked out through interactions between governmental (i.e. legislative and bureaucratic) elites and interest group elites." Presthus describes Canada as a "politically fragmented but stable democracy". The disintegrative tendencies in the Canadian system are countered and alleviated by cooperation at the elite level. He accepts elite leadership as a fact of life in modern political systems but in the theory of elite accommodation the activities and interactions of such leaders are of central and overriding importance. Elite accommodation is facilitated by common attitudes that are shared by both the mass of Canadians and by the Canadian elites. Presthus describes Canadians as having a "mass distrust" of government, especially the federal government which has a fairly weak claim to legitimacy. Canadians also share a deferential attitude toward leadership and authority, a willingness to

1 Presthus, Elite Accommodation, p. 21.
delegate, a moderate level of nationalism, a fairly low desire for public participation, and a high degree of social polarization through which groups remain relatively isolated from one another. "Not only do individuals tend to restrict themselves to groups that have similar values, but such exclusivity encourages political stability."¹ Within each isolated group Presthus posits a fairly high degree of cohesion and solidarity which in turn assists the leaders in having a relatively free hand in negotiating with other elites. Canada has in total a very low level of political integration and this facilitates accommodation at the elite level."²

According to Presthus, the factors which shape our political system and which result in a system of elite accommodation are to be found in the Canadian political culture. The chief elements that make up this political culture are "a pragmatic appreciation of government's role in the economy; an underlying corporatist theory of societal life; traditional and deferential patterns of authority; and a quasi-participative political culture insofar as the ordinary citizen is concerned."² The acceptance of the

¹ Ibid., p. 16.
² Ibid., p. 20.
government's role in the economy simply means that Canadians have a widely shared belief that government has the right, if not a duty, to interfere in the private economy. Corporatism as it is used by Presthus means that there is a wide variety of groups representing all conceivable interests that are accepted by society and by the elites as being both legitimate and essential to the functioning of the system. Presthus detects a fairly high degree of deference on the part of both English Canadians and French Canadians --- although deferential patterns may be somewhat stronger in Quebec due to such factors as a higher degree of social stratification. Canadians share a lower degree of political efficacy than do other societies such as the United States. They tend to believe they are powerless to influence government apart perhaps from voting. There are, therefore, both attitudinal and structural features within the Canadian political system that discourage rank and file participation in government. These factors contribute to the process of elite accommodation and the acceptance of that process by ordinary Canadians. The end result is a political system which encourages interest groups whose leaders are engaged in a constant process of consultation and negotiation with the political elites. The extent of public participation in this process is through
periodic general elections; in between elections the give and take of elite accommodation is the norm. Presthus' observations have profound implications for our understanding of the interest group process in Canada --- some of these observations ought to be tested against the findings presented in this study.

Presthus ascribes a very large role to private interest groups. He says, for example, that a condition of a consociational political system is that it tends "to increase the bargaining power of articulate interest groups at the expense of government elites, who are constrained both operationally and symbolically by the need to sustain the precarious equilibrium among their divergent subcultures."¹ Not only is there a continuous interaction between the three levels of elites --- political, bureaucratic and private --- but, according to Presthus, there is a distinct fluidity between the elites in which the "interchanges of roles" allows elite members to shift freely from one level to another. The expansion of government involvement in the private sectors of Canadian life leads, in Presthus' opinion, to a proliferation of interest groups which are

¹ Ibid., pp. 8-9
interested in competing for the benefits which flow from this government intrusion. In total, Presthus paints a picture of a kind of self-generating and self-perpetuating system in which expanding government involvement is matched by expanded interest group behavior, all of which is accepted through the prevailing norms of our political culture.

Because of Canadians’ deferential attitude toward authority and a relatively low level of political involvement the interest group and governmental elites are left free to work out the compromises that are necessary to govern the society and these are accepted by the people.

Although there is a large element of truth in Presthus’ contentions he tends to exaggerate the magnitude and importance of Canadian interest groups. With respect to agricultural interests and the Canadian Federation of Agriculture in particular, his theory of Elite accommodation is in some ways too simple and cannot be pressed too far. I find, for example, that far from developing and encouraging articulate interest groups in some respects government elites are taking over the functions that might normally be expected to lie within the interest group domain. In the agricultural sphere political and bureaucratic elites tend very often to see interest group elites as competitive with themselves and
they will do what they can to ensure that they rather than
the interest group elites are the legitimate representatives
of rural interests. There was evidence of this, for example,
in the government's handling of the national marketing
legislation, and in the planning of the first and second
Agricultural Congress, where farm organization participation
was largely ineffectual. This tendency is reinforced in the
governmental elite by its realization of the organizational
and "political" goals of interest group leaders\(^1\) and by the
"influence of office" which causes senior politicians and
civil servants to regard themselves as the guardian of the
public interest. Presthus' claim that the government is
restrained because of its desire to establish a balance or
equilibrium between interest groups would seem to be a trifle
naive or perhaps, again, over simplified. Throughout this
study there have been illustrations of the government having
done precisely the opposite --- it has played one group off
against another in such a way as to render each impotent,
thereby strengthening the government's hand in dealing

\(^1\) An example of where this "realization" was reinforced was
in the preliminary consultative discussions between the CFA
and the government respecting grains policy. See supra,
Chapter IV, Section 1, "Grains Policy: A Pilot Case."
directly with the issue involved. Interest group elites are in no sense equal partners with the political and bureaucratic elites, as Presthus would have us believe.

In addition Presthus' contention that there are extensive interchanges and a continuous two-way flow between governmental and private elites ought to be critically examined. Certainly within Canada and in the agricultural arena there is some evidence to substantiate Presthus' contention. For example, Paul Babey, past president of Uniform, was appointed the chairman of the newly created Farm Products Marketing Council; Ellard Powers, who was a leader in the Ontario Farmers Union in the 1960's, was promoted in 1973 to Chairman of the Canadian Dairy Commission. These are cases where leading members of the private elite have been taken in as members of the bureaucratic elite. However, there is not a great deal of evidence to indicate that this practice is the rule or to indicate that it is a two-way interchange involving private and governmental elites. I would argue that the vast majority of people holding elite positions within the bureaucracy are generated from within the bureaucracy itself.¹ Moreover, there would seem to be

¹ In the senior echelons of the Canada Department of Agriculture, for example, there is no one who is known to have achieved prominence as an interest group leader prior to achieving a responsible position within the department.
a very low incidence of these people moving from the public
service into positions with private interest groups. This is,
of course, in large part a result of our public service system
which has a high degree of permanency and rigidity. There is
some mobility from the private elites to the political elites,
largely as a result of the fact that it is most difficult to
be elected if one is uninvolved in the community that is to
become one's constituency. Here again, however, there is
little evidence of a two-way flow of elites; there would seem
to be precious few members of the elected elite who return to
become members of the private elite.\(^1\) Presthus' contention
that there is this kind of elite interchange would not seem
to be well supported, at least within the agricultural
sector.

Two final points. Presthus talks about the tendency
of interest groups to form coalitions to hammer out compro-
mises or common positions before approaching government. He
describes this kind of behavior as being a "functional
necessity" in the process of elite accommodation. My

\(^1\) Two immediate examples that come to mind are two former
federal Ministers of Agriculture, Hon. Harry Hays and
Hon. H. A. Olson. Both were defeated somewhat prematurely
in terms of their ministerial careers; both had been
engaged primarily in agriculture prior to politics; and
neither returned to the agricultural interest group elite
after his defeat.
findings indicate that this kind of interest group accommodation is extremely difficult to achieve and indeed is only rarely achieved. One of the results of the failure of interest groups to develop a common front is that the government's hand is immeasurably strengthened. The CFA is itself a living test of the process which Presthus claims is a part of Canadian society. As was demonstrated in the margarine sales tax issue and the national marketing issue, far from achieving a viable coalition the CFA is often immobilized and rendered impotent, thereby vacating the policy field to the government. The findings of this study also cast doubt on Presthus' assertions concerning the role of interest groups in providing information and technical expertise. Presthus ascribes a good deal of importance to the traditional assumption that governments tend to utilize and rely upon interest groups for data and information upon which decisions are made. This role tends to give power and legitimacy to the interest group elites which operate as co-equals with the government elites. However, again within the sphere of agriculture, I would argue that more often than not the government will ensure its own sources of information and

1 Presthus, pp. 62-63
technical expertise rather than rely upon particular interest
groups. The government has in fact developed its fact
finding and data gathering capacity that it has far out-
strapped organizations like the CFA, and this further impedes
the CFA from functioning as a co-equal with government.

My purpose in these concluding comments has not been
to seriously attempt to dissect and analyse Presthus' theory
of elite accommodation. It has been rather to simply raise
some questions about the way in which his observations apply
to some of the conclusions reached in this study. Presthus
has developed a framework which has exciting implications and
is capable of bringing together many of the truths about the
Canadian political system that were otherwise unrelated and
dispersed. However, the results of my analysis of the CFA
indicates that some caution is warranted; that Presthus may
have applied too broad a brush and may be guilty of over-
simplification.

Helen Jones Dawson has been amply dealt with through-
out this study, but perhaps in summary some of the main
points that separate her conclusion from mine ought to be
reviewed. Mrs. Dawson did her original research in the
early 1950's in the preparation of an M.A. Thesis on the
Canadian Federation of Agriculture. Since that time she has updated and expanded her material and it has been widely utilized for reference purposes in Canadian political writing.

In general the findings of this study reinforce and build upon a very solid foundation that was established by Mrs. Dawson. Much of the material that I have presented here simply strengthens and elaborates general points that she had advanced somewhat earlier. However, there are a number of instances where my findings are at variance with hers.

Mrs. Dawson attributes more influence and policy involvement to the CFA than my findings would seem to justify. She lays considerable stress upon the close working relationships between officials of the CFA and federal Department of Agriculture personnel. I have already indicated that this is a most difficult area to observe and measure since it is primarily the result of informal, inter-personal relationships. These relationships which, according to Dawson, gave the CFA a

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1 Helen Jones, "The Canadian Federation of Agriculture," (M.A. Thesis, Department of Political Science, Queens University, Kingston, 1954).

2 Helen Dawson has also published some material on other interest groups. See her article "The Consumer Association of Canada," Canadian Public Administration, VI, No. 1, March, 1963.
central position in policy making may have existed in full
flower two decades ago and may have subsequently deteriorated
over time. This would account for my conclusion, contrary to
Mrs. Dawson, that the CFA is not of particular significance
in policy consultation, the drafting of government bills, and
so on. Also it is conceivable that Mrs. Dawson was too
reliant for her evidence on the testimony of the leaders and
employees of farm interest groups. Participants in the world
of politics tend to see themselves and their roles in some-
what more glowing terms than the hard evidence can sometimes
support. In some instances therefore interest group leaders
might claim a role for themselves which is less than justified
by the facts --- their description might bear more resemblance
to what they believe their role ought to be than what it is.
Also as I have indicated earlier it is possible that Mrs.
Dawson may have confused genuine consultation on policy
matters with simple exchanges of information on regulations
and the implementation of government programmes.1
I have noted earlier that Mrs. Dawson has tended to
attach somewhat more importance to formal CFA submissions to
Cabinet than my observations would seem to justify.2 Here

1 Supra., p. 304.
2 Supra., p. 360.
again it may be that we have witnessed a gradual deterioration in the significance of this activity. This might particularly be the case in view of the fact that in recent years there has been virtually no follow-up by the government on CFA submissions. In Mrs. Dawson's judgement the government's preparatory and follow-up activities, which she observed, added weight to the importance of the formal submissions to Cabinet by the CFA.  

My conclusion given modern day practices is that the submission to Cabinet is much more of a ritualistic public relations device through which both the government and the farm organization gain in stature in the eyes of their constituents. The government is aware of CFA policy positions well in advance of the Cabinet submission and only rarely do such meetings produce any new ideas or fresh initiatives.

In a similar vein I question the importance that Mrs. Dawson attaches to CFA involvement in appointments to agricultural advisory committees. There is some evidence to indicate that the CFA is not consistently consulted on such

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2 Supra., p. 381.
appointments; nor should we conclude that membership in the CFA is an important criteria or prerequisite for such appointments. I have suggested in this study that CFA membership on advisory boards may be more accidental, or incidental, than it is a deliberate criterion for board membership. To simply accept the CFA's impressive list of members on governmental advisory boards may be somewhat misleading inasmuch as it may cause one to attach more importance to these memberships than is warranted.

Finally I would submit that the "close and cordial" relationship that Mrs. Dawson detected between CFA leaders and Department of Agriculture officials simply does not exist in recent times. This is not to suggest that relationships between the Federation and the government are hostile --- quite the contrary. It does mean however that there is not a daily interchange on salient agricultural issues. What Mrs. Dawson observed as a "constant and continuous" and "close" relationship has to some extent been eroded and replaced by a mutual sense of suspicion, competitiveness and remoteness. This is in part due to the fact that the government has taken over many of the traditional responsibilities of interest groups and the partnership is therefore unequal. These are factors which to some extent have
evolved over time, and what may have been a close relationship at the time when Mrs. Dawson engaged in her research may now have deteriorated into something a good deal less.

At the outset of this study I delineated the factors according to which Canadian interest group behavior might be described and analyzed. I mentioned the types of interest groups, the characteristics they display, the techniques they use to achieve objectives, and the politico-governmental environment of which they are a part. The elements which comprise these categories are of course inter-mingled and inter-dependent. The political environment has an effect on interest group characteristics and these in turn influence the methods that are employed in setting and pursuing interest group goals, and so on.

Throughout this study I have made constant reference to the diverse heterogenous nature of the CFA. It is a federation in the true sense of the word --- it is a league of more or less autonomous agricultural organizations that have come together to seek common objectives at the national level. It is in a sense a microcosm of the Canadian governmental system itself, sharing most of its weaknesses and inefficiencies and too few of its strengths. The overriding concern of the Canadian Federation of Agriculture is
a desire for "unity", "cohesion", "solidarity". Government policies and structures militate against a unified and strong CPA. Numerous observers have pointed out that the federal system of government will tend not only to effect the channel of action for interest groups but will actually impede the development of national groups.¹ In a country like Canada this is done in part by the creation of "artificial" political boundaries such as those that constitute the provinces.

The federal constitution, the tendency toward / cooperative federalism, and the traditional "extension" functions of provincial governments tends to concentrate operational responsibility for many ongoing government policies in the provinces. Examples of this are national marketing schemes and the small farms development program. These are federally initiated schemes, substantially financed by the national government, but they are administered by the provinces in the field. This tends to nullify any role for the CPA in new programmes except at the highest policy making level. It is the provincial affiliates that become the focal point for activity respecting ongoing projects.

¹ See, for example, Harry Eckstein, Pressure Group Politics, p. 21, with reference to the American federal system.
On policies and programmes for which the federal government retains its control over administration --- the Farm Credit Corporation and the Canadian Dairy Commission, for example --- the CFA quite naturally finds more fertile ground for continuous involvement. The FCC which is headquartered in Ottawa has its own field offices and personnel in direct contact with farmers, quite apart from provincial government facilities and services. This acts as an encouragement for farm groups and individuals to interact through the CFA if they wish to influence FCC policies.

Thus the greatest single determinant of CFA characteristics and behavior is the Canadian context within which it operates. The Federation is, above all else, a captive of the politico-governmental environment of which it is a part. Interest groups are one element within a larger governmental system which they influence, and are influenced by. The group process in Canada has a close affinity to the governmental process, the party process, and so on. The problems that confront political parties for example are similar to those of interest groups --- parties tend to be plagued by internal divisions, lack of unity, and regionally

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dispersed foci of power. The problems of organizational
unity have been a major concern of this study, having been
discussed and analyzed on two somewhat related levels:
(1) internal unity or what we call cohesion and organizational
solidarity; and (2) organizational unity in the broader con-
text as between two or more general political interest groups.

Since the CFA is a federation it tries to span
virtually all of the interests that exist in the exceedingly
diverse agricultural industry and in this the problems of
internal unity are inherent. Disagreements or variations in
the policies of the CFA affiliates are the rule rather than
the exception. This is especially the case with respect to
policies and issues that are of far reaching significance to
the agricultural industry. When there is conflict and
disunity within the Federation the CFA tends to abandon its
function as an aggregator and articulator of particular
demands, and the national organization becomes immobilized
as in the case of the margarene sales tax issue. In these
situations the aggregative functions are often taken over
by the Minister of Agriculture and the CFA's significance
in terms of influencing either the decision or the timing
of decisions is completely eroded. An example of this sort
of development was the debate over the national Farm Products
Marketing Act. The maintenance of internal cohesion within the CFA is one of the major tasks that befalls the Federation's national office, and it is one which makes heavy demands upon the resources and skills of the permanent paid staff.

The establishment of unity between general farm organizations has been a consistent goal for both leaders and ordinary members of the farming community. Although unity of this sort has been the subject of protracted negotiations on a number of occasions the creation of a united farm organization has only come to fruition in one instance in Canada--in the case of Unifarm in Alberta. Here, more than with the achievement of internal cohesion, leadership is of central importance. The organizational objectives which often hinder internal cohesion and prevent organizations like the CFA from being effective are also present when the matter of general farm organization unity is being considered.

Given the federal nature of the country, the CFA has concluded over the years that its most plausible role is at the highest policy making level--that is in helping to establish general agricultural policy for the nation--and in the administration of on-going federal government programs that emanate and are controlled from Ottawa. It
is with respect to these two roles that the Federation has developed an overriding concern for the consultative process. Since its inception the CFA has been obliged to rely upon consultative arrangements with government that are ad hoc and which vary tremendously according to the personalities of individuals in key positions. Although the desire for expanded more formalized consultation has been uppermost in the minds of Federation leaders for the past decade, it is clear that genuine ongoing consultation has been hampered by certain prevailing interrelated conditions.

First, the Federation has been frustrated in its attempts to engage in meaningful consultations with the federal government by its own lack of technical expertise and research capacity. This is of course partly a result of scarce financial resources within the CFA. There is no evidence to indicate that the CFA's role and capacity is increasing automatically as a result of expanded government involvement in the agricultural economy. Big government has undoubtedly stimulated interest group activity in recent years but in the case of the Federation this has not resulted in a more effective role or increased government reliance on that organization. Second, in its attempts to become a full consultative partner with the government the CFA has suffered
from the most damaging aspects of regionalism and diversity — aspects which cause the national Federation to be bypassed and undermined. Third, in this regard the CFA has not been assisted by Cabinet Ministers having an open and positive attitude toward consultation and transmitting this attitude to the bureaucracy. Rather than adopt a positive attitude which would give organizations like the CFA more legitimacy as representatives of rural interests Ministers have too often been content to play one organization off against another for the sake of keeping them all weak. Fourth, Federation leaders have on occasion been unable to tread the fine line between a genuine political mandate in terms of support from the producers and political credibility in the eyes of the decision-makers. CFA leaders have sometimes failed to appreciate that they must be seen by the government to be serious, trustworthy, cognizant of the fact that they are consulting, not negotiating, and that the government has the ultimate responsibility for decision in the public sphere. Fifth, Federation leaders often fail to distinguish between strictly organizational ends and the professed objectives of the organization. It is not widely understood that government leaders and senior officials are fully aware of the political and organizational ends that motivate interest group leaders,
and this affects the government's attitude toward consultation. When organizational goals are being blatantly pursued in the name of genuine policy concern the result will most often be counterproductive.

In its attempts to influence government and to represent the interests of Canadian producers the CFA employs a full range of interest group techniques. The extent to which these techniques are used varies in accordance with what the Federation perceives to be their effectiveness. The CFA does not for example employ protest tactics except in extreme circumstances and usually as a means of gaining access to key decision-makers. Traditionally the Federation has tended to emphasize quiet diplomacy and the establishment of regular working relationships with government rather than dramatic public appeals. CFA leaders have therefore concentrated their attention on individual Cabinet Ministers, principally the Ministre of Agriculture, and senior officials within the public service. In its efforts to build firm consultative arrangements the Federation has been most persistent in its desire to involve Ministers who are seen as the chief policy making agents. Also, as I indicated earlier in my discussion of Mrs. Dawson's findings, although the Federation has consistently sought to establish close
relationships with public service personnel, the extent to which these contacts have been fruitful varies according to the personalities involved. There is some evidence to indicate that in the early years of the CFA these relationships were somewhat more cordial than they have been in recent years.

The CFA approaches the Prime Minister and his Cabinet as a group through its annual submission to Cabinet. This is partly intended to focus the attention of the Cabinet on the problems of rural Canada, but it also serves to strengthen the mandate and demonstrate the legitimacy of the organization. A similar approach is made to Members of Parliament through the parliamentary caucuses. Beyond this MPs are dealt with individually, on an informal ad hoc basis, or through Standing Committees of the House of Commons. The significance of these Committees has increased in recent years and it is partly as a result of this -- although partly no doubt also as a result of certain frustrations in dealing with Cabinet Ministers and public servants -- that organizations like the CFA have been devoting more time and energy to them. Still, although the CFA will occasionally utilize Members of Parliament and their Committees for defensive and dilatory purposes, on matters that are judged to be of crucial importance the approach of the Federation invariably is to
the federal Cabinet and to the senior public service.

The Federation has not attempted to gain access or wield influence through political parties --- it has remained true to the non-partisan principle. On a few occasions there have been attempts to utilize the federal system --- that is to gain access at the national level by exerting pressure through the provincial governments. This, however, is rare and has a very low probability of success since it depends upon the good will and assistance of the CFA provincial affiliates. What ought to be a highly useful technique through which to influence federal government actions is once again nullified by the CFA's diversity and lack of cohesion.

Finally, what does the future hold for general farm organizations in Canada? What, in particular, can we conclude about the overall direction and future development of the Canadian Federation of Agriculture?

As the agricultural industry advances there is increased emphasis on commercial farming and specialized commodities. There has been a commensurate rise in the level of expertise and understanding among the leaders of the specialized commodity groups.\(^1\) With this overall development

\(^1\) In this respect see *Supra*, Chapter II, Section 3.
considerable stress is placed upon a general farm organization like the CFA to remain informed and fully competent in each of the specialized fields. For the Federation in recent years this has meant an ever increasing strain on David Kirk, the Executive Secretary and to a lesser extent on William Hamilton, the Associate Secretary. It has become increasingly difficult for policy generalists to be fully up to date in each commodity area and to maintain their function as the connecting link between sophisticated commodity needs and policies and the general policy needs of the Federation. This problem becomes particularly acute when one takes into account the tremendous proliferation of government boards and agencies and the resultant expertise that has been developed within the government and with which farm organization leaders must cope.

Under these circumstances it seems the Federation may proceed in either of two directions. First, the CFA can become more of a normal lobby and consultative group, based in Ottawa and performing lobbying and political services for the various commodity groups. If this role is to become dominant the Federation will have to build and refine its contacts with politicians, government officials, and other political interest groups. Internally it will have to
concentrate more on "political" personnel who are capable of lobbying, rather than "technical" personnel who are intended to analyse and develop agricultural policy. If it developed in this direction the CFA would become much more of a service organization, selling information and contacts for a fee rather than being involved in the substantive issues of Canadian agricultural policy.

As a second option the Federation could develop into a more effective general policy organization. It could become a genuine vehicle for melding specialized commodity interests and needs with the overall priorities of Canadian agriculture. In other words, the CFA could become truly effective in what it claims to be doing, and in fairness is trying to do, at the present time. A fully effective role in the commodity field and in consultative policy making would require a significant expansion of staff --- high quality staff. To the extent that the Federation has succeeded in performing this role today it is due, in large part, to David Kirk's amazing ability to switch roles and to cover all fields. However, as the industry progresses these functions concentrated largely in one man are being strained. Real progress will require specialized people in each commodity area, but they must also be people who are
capable of generalizing, are articulate, and can conceptualise the industry as a whole and in relation to its parts. In addition they will have to have some appreciable measure of political skill.

If this is to be the goal of the Federation it will require that the commodity groups and provincial affiliates clearly recognize the need and commit themselves to a stronger more relevant national agricultural organization. Once the need is recognized and the commitment is made both in terms of attitude and resources, the problems will become less evident and the benefits will become more visible. Competent, full-time individuals in the national office of the CPA would very quickly prove their worth to the emerging national commodity groups with which they would be associated. At present, however, the Federation is trapped, suspended in limbo between two concepts. Its future is uncertain and inextricably linked to the personalities now in control. Without some creative thinking, realistic appraisal, and regeneration there is a danger that the CPA will be completely bypassed and ad hoc unplanned structures will be created, formally and informally, which will be less satisfactory than if the Federation were developed to its full potential.

Overriding all of these concerns is the question of
whether in this highly fragmented and heterogeneous nation there is, or ever can be, a common denominator which will cement a federated farm organization together.¹ The fortunes of farm organizations, like the agricultural economy itself, seem to flourish in cycles. When times are prosperous and the farmers’ problems are few, organizations become atrophied, stagnant and out of touch. However, in times of crisis when the farmers are experiencing great difficulties, their organizations thrive, they recruit new people, and they make their voices heard. National farm organizations like the country itself need a unifying force, a raison d’être. Insofar as the CFA is concerned this is a problem that is exacerbated by the changing face of Canadian agriculture. To some considerable extent the CFA has not kept pace with the dramatic shift to specialized agriculture and the subsequent growth of agribusiness in Canada. The specialized commodity groups which I have referred to as the "wave of the future"² have moved to center stage, but the CFA has not yet moved to join them. The Federation has a problem in defining its role. It is caught between

¹Clay Gilson, "The Importance and Implications of Alternative Types of Farm Organization," Papers Submitted to the Farm Organization Conference, (Winnipeg: Faculty of Agriculture, University of Manitoba, June 3, 1960), p. 23.

²Ibid., pp. 66 ff.
being a direct, legitimate representative of ordinary farmers—a role which the NFU comfortably adheres to because of its ideology and structure—and a full fledged representative of modern commodity forces. In this respect the CFA either needs to be reborn in terms of its basic goals and ideological content, or it needs to be rapidly modernized—or both.
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APPENDIX A

CONSTITUTION

OF THE

CANADIAN FEDERATION OF AGRICULTURE

ARTICLE 1 - Name

1. This organization shall be known as the Canadian Federation of Agriculture, hereinafter referred to as the "Federation".

ARTICLE 2 - Objects

1. The objects of the Federation shall be:

   (a) To co-ordinate the efforts of Agricultural Producer Organizations throughout the Dominion, for the purpose of promoting their common interest through collective action.

   (b) To promote and advance the social and economic conditions of, and to render such services to, those engaged in agricultural pursuits as conditions may justify.

   (c) To assist in formulating and promoting national agricultural policies to meet changing national and international economic conditions, and to collaborate and (or) co-operate with other organized groups of producers, within or without the British Empire, for the furtherance of the said objective.

ARTICLE 3 - Non-Political Status

1. The Federation shall not be, nor become a political organization, nor shall the Federation, or any Committee thereof, deal with any matter from a partizan viewpoint. It shall be the duty of the Board of Directors at all times to preserve the non-partisan status of the Federation, and to give immediate attention to, and deal with as they see fit, any action by any officer or director which in their opinion is prejudicial to that status.
ARTICLE 4 - Head Office

1. The Head Office of the Federation shall be situated at such place as the Board of Directors may from time to time decide.

ARTICLE 5 - Membership

1. Membership in the Federation shall be open to:

(a) One representative agricultural organization from each province or group of provinces in the Dominion, now known as Provincial or Regional Federations of Agriculture.

(b) Where no Provincial Federation of Agriculture exists, any organized group of producers that is representative of any major agricultural interest of the province in which it is located, subject to the decision of the Board of Directors on this point.

(c) Any interprovincial or national body, representing producers in a specific branch of agriculture, in the Dominion, which may establish its claim, in the opinion of the Board of Directors of the Federation, to be representative of primary producers engaged in that branch of agriculture. Provided, however, that such inter-provincial or national bodies shall be confined to one each of the following major branches of the industry, namely: grain, livestock, dairying, fruit and vegetables.

2. Applications for membership shall be made to the secretary of the Federation and shall include such information concerning the applicant body as the Board of Directors may require.

3. Membership fees shall be paid quarterly in advance, on such basis as may be specified by the Board of Directors. Membership organizations which neglect to pay their dues in advance are liable to forfeiture of their rights to representation on the Board of Directors until all fees and arrears have been paid.
4. Member organizations may withdraw from the Federation at any time by notice in writing to the President or Secretary of the Federation but in the event of such withdrawal the organization shall remain liable for payment of the dues up to the end of the current year.

5. A member organization which fails to pay its dues, or which ceases to fulfill the conditions and functions under which its application for membership was granted, may be dropped from membership by a majority vote at any regular meeting of the Board.

ARTICLE 6 - Board of Directors

1. The Board of Directors of the Federation shall be constituted as follows:

   (aa) The President and First Vice-President and Second Vice-President elected by and from the delegates in annual meeting. These Directors shall be additional to the nominees to the Board from member units or organizations.

   (a) Each member unit representing a province or group of provinces as provided in Sub-section (a) Section 1, Article 5, shall have the right to nominate three (3) Directors.

   (b) Each Member Unit admitted to membership under Sub-section (b), Section 1, Article 5, may have such representation on the Board of Directors as the Board may decide; provided that not more than three (3) Directors in all may be appointed within any province concerned.

   (c) Each inter-provincial or national organization admitted to membership under Sub-section (c) Section 1, Article 5, shall have the right to nominate one (1) Director.

   (d) In the event that any member of the Board of Directors is also appointed to the position of Managing-Director of the Federation, the member unit or body which he represents as Director, shall be entitled to nominate an additional Director.
(e) That member organizations in Ontario, Quebec and the Maritime provinces shall be entitled jointly to nominate one woman member to the Board, and that member bodies in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba be entitled jointly to nominate one woman member to the Board.

2. Nominations for Directors, with the exception of the President and two Vice-Presidents shall be made in each succeeding year and placed in the hands of the Secretary prior to the Annual Meeting. In the event that members' nominees have been elected as President or Vice-President prior to the election of the Directors from member units as provided for in clause 1 above, the member units shall make the necessary other nominations and file same with the Secretary prior to the election of Directors from member units. At the final session of the Annual Meeting, Directors from the member units or organizations for the ensuing year shall be elected and shall assume office immediately.

3. Nominations for the offices of President, First Vice-President and Second Vice-President shall be made from the official list of delegates, and shall be made by secret ballot, and the election conducted by secret ballot. Detailed procedures for election of these officers shall be established by the Annual Meeting of delegates and appended as regulations to this constitution.

4. The term of office of Directors shall be one year, or until such time as their successors are elected.

5. In the event of a vacancy occurring in the Board of Directors, other than the President, First or Second Vice-Presidents, during the year, the Member Unit concerned shall, at the earliest possible date, nominate a new Director to fill the vacancy, and so advise the Secretary of the Federation, who shall submit the nomination to the next succeeding meeting of the Board of Directors for approval or otherwise. The term of office of the Director so appointed shall be the balance of the term of the Director being replaced.

6. In the event of a vacancy occurring in either the Presidency or the First Vice-Presidency during the year the office shall automatically be assumed by the officer next in
line; and if the Second Vice-Presidency becomes vacant it shall be filled by the Board of Directors from among their numbers.

7. Each Member Unit shall have the right to name a substitute to attend and act in the place of any of its regularly appointed Directors at any meeting of the Board, but such substitute shall not be eligible for office.

Powers of the Board

8. The Board of Directors shall have the management and regulation of all business of the Federation and the supervision and direction of all officers and employees, including the right of appointment and dismissal of such officers and employees:

9. The Board of Directors may delegate any or all of its powers to any committee of its members, with full power to act, and may require any person who receives or has control of property or funds of the Federation, to furnish suitable bonds. Unless otherwise provided, between meetings of the Board of Directors, the Executive Committee shall have the full powers of the Board of Directors.

ARTICLE 7 - Officers and Executive Committee

1. The Executive Committee shall include a President, First and Second Vice-Presidents, and ten other Directors. Immediately upon their election the Board of Directors for the ensuing year shall meet and elect 10 of their numbers who in addition to the President, First Vice-President, Second Vice-President shall constitute the Executive Committee. There shall be one Executive member representing each province except that there shall be one member representing the Maritime Provinces and three members representing organizations admitted to membership pursuant to Sub-section C of Section 1 of Article 5 of the Constitution.

2. Each member organization represented on the Executive Committee shall have the right to appoint one of their other Directors as an alternate if and when it is found necessary to do so.

3. The Board of Directors may appoint a Managing-Director who may be a full-time officer of the Federation.
4. The Board shall appoint a Secretary who shall be a full-time officer of the Federation; and a Treasurer who may or may not be a full-time officer of the Federation; or they may combine the offices of Secretary and Treasurer when it is expedient to do so. The Secretary and Treasurer, or the Secretary alone, Treasurer may or may not be members of the Board of Directors.

ARTICLE 8 - Meetings

1. (a) The annual general meeting of the Federation shall be a meeting of delegates, such delegates to be composed of:

(i) the Board of Directors, or substitutes as provided in Article 6, Section 7.

(ii) a further number who shall be named by member bodies in the same manner, and on the same conditions as are provided for nominations of members of the Board of Directors excepting the President and First and Second Vice-Presidents and that (a) two such delegates be named for each Board member representing a Member Unit as defined in Article 6 1(a) (b) (c) and (e); and (b) a further number may be named by member bodies who are general farm organizations with direct members who shall qualify to elect two delegates for each Board member; and (c) in a province where there is not a direct member organization in the membership of a provincial federation, the existing member organizations of that provincial organization shall be permitted six (6) additional delegates.

(iii) where a member organization of the Federation does not nominate a Director or Directors to the Board two persons who shall be named by that organization.

(b) Names of Annual Meeting delegates appointed under (a) (ii) shall be placed in the hands of the Secretary of the Federation prior to the Annual Meeting. Amendments to the list of delegates may be made, to the Secretary, at any time during the meeting and such amendments shall be reported to the meeting.
(c) The Annual Meeting shall have authority to determine policy for the Federation in all respects, to appoint auditors, and generally direct the affairs of the Federation.

(d) Unless otherwise provided, between Annual Meetings, the Board of Directors shall have full powers exercised by delegates to the Annual Meeting.

(e) Annual Meetings shall be held at such time and place as the Board of Directors may determine.

(f) A special meeting of delegates may be held upon the call of the President, the Executive Committee, or upon requisition of ten (10) Directors, upon giving the usual notice.

(g) The Secretary shall give not less than 30 days' notice in writing to each member organization of the date and place of all Annual and special meetings of the Federation.

(h) All individual members of the member bodies of the Federation shall have the right to attend Annual or special meetings of the Federation, and participate in the discussions, but shall not have the right to vote unless accredited delegates.

2. Meetings of the Board of Directors shall be held as follows:

(a) There shall be a meeting of the Board of Directors at the close of each Annual Meeting of the Federation. At this meeting such business as may be necessary to the initiation of the ensuing year's work of the national office shall be dealt with.

(b) Other meetings of the Board of Directors may be held during the year at such time and places as the President may decide; provided that at least two weeks' notice has been given; or if called on shorter notice provided that all Directors agree.

(c) At all meetings of the Board of Directors a quorum shall consist of one-third of those entitled to attend.
Meetings of the Executive Committee may be held at such times and places as the President deems advisable.

(a) Provided that at least two weeks' notice of such meetings has been given by the President, or if called on shorter notice, provided that all members agree.

(b) At any such meetings of the Executive Committee a quorum shall consist of a majority of those entitled to attend.

4. At any meeting of the Federation or of the Board of Directors or of the Executive Committee, the President, when also holding the position of Managing-Director of the Federation, shall not exercise his vote except when necessary to break a tie.

5. All meetings of the Federation, or any Committee thereof, shall be subject to the ordinary rules of debate, according to the type of meeting.

6. The President may invite, at his discretion, representatives of other organizations, or other persons, to attend annual or special meetings of the Federation, or meetings of the Board of Directors, or of the Executive Committee.

ARTICLE 9 - Duties of Member Organizations

1. Each member organization shall forward to the Federation, without undue delay:

(a) A copy of its constitution and important amendments thereto as these may be made from time to time.

(b) A copy of its annual report and financial statement.

(c) A copy of all resolutions passed by it concerning matters of interprovincial or national importance to agriculture.
ARTICLE 10 - Duties of Officers, etc.

1. **PRESIDENT:** The President shall exercise all the duties usually pertaining to such office. He shall preside at all meetings of the Federation and of the Executive Committee. In his absence his duties shall be assumed by the First or Second Vice-President, or in their absence, by such person as the meeting concerned may elect.

2. **MANAGING-DIRECTOR:** The Managing-Director shall be responsible to the Board of Directors. He shall have general direction of the activities of the national office, and shall have full authority and responsibility in the carrying out of the policies of the Federation as set forth from time to time by the Board of Directors, and for making of decisions in respect to these policies in the course of his duties. He shall report at each meeting of the Board of Directors upon the work of the national office, and respecting action taken on policies and recommendations of the Federation. In the event that there is no Managing-Director the Board of Directors shall designate the official who is to carry on the duties of the Managing-Director.

3. **SECRETARY:** The Secretary shall be responsible to the Managing-Director, and through him to the Board of Directors. He shall perform all the duties usually pertaining to the office of Secretary, and, next to the Managing-Director, shall be responsible for the activities of the national office. He shall also perform such other duties as may be prescribed from time to time by the Managing-Director or the Board of Directors. He shall attend and keep accurate record of all proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Federation and of the Executive and Board of Directors.

4. **TREASURER:** The Treasurer shall have the charge and custody of all funds of the Federation and shall deposit all funds received on behalf of the Federation in a chartered bank in the name of the Federation. He shall keep an accurate statement of the receipts and
disbursements and shall make a full and detailed report thereof, together with an accurate statement of the financial affairs of the Federation to the Annual Meeting. We shall render to the Board of Directors full reports with respect to the finances of the Federation, as the Directors or President may require. The books and records of the Treasurer shall be open at all times to the inspection and examination of the Directors or their duly accredited representatives. The Directors shall bond the Treasurer for such an amount as they may determine.

5. **AUDITORS**: An auditor shall be appointed by the Board who shall have access at all times to the financial books and records of the Federation and present an annual financial statement to the Board of Directors, in such form as they may direct, which statement shall disclose the financial position of the Federation.

6. **FISCAL YEAR**: The Fiscal Year of the Federation shall be the Calendar Year.

**ARTICLE 11 - Amendments to the Constitution**

1. Amendments to this constitution may be made only on a motion of an Annual Meeting of Delegates. Notice of motion may be given by a member or requested by the Board or Annual Meeting, but such notice must be in the hands of the Secretary at least 45 days prior to the Annual Meeting of Delegates at which the amendment is to be considered, and must be forwarded by the Secretary to all members at least thirty days prior to that Annual Meeting. An amendment shall become effective by a majority vote of the Annual Meeting of Delegates.

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Procedure for Nomination and Election of President & Vice-Presidents

(Regulations as Passed by the Canadian Federation of Agriculture Annual Meeting, January, 1970)
Amendments to the by-laws provide for the election of a President, First Vice-President and Second Vice-President directly by and from the delegates in Annual Meeting. The following principles prescribe procedures for these elections:

1. All delegates formally listed with the Secretary by the member units or organizations are eligible for election.

2. Nominations for each of these three positions shall be made by secret ballot. Each delegate shall nominate not more than one (1) candidate on each nominating ballot.

3. Nominees shall have the opportunity to withdraw their names after all nominations have been listed and made public.

4. Election of each of the President and First and Second Vice-Presidents will require the winning candidate to obtain more than 50% of the votes cast.

To provide for individual independent elections for each of the President and First and Second Vice-Presidents and have them concluded before noon of the last day of the convention the following procedure is suggested:

Procedure

A chairman to conduct the elections, and scrutineers for the election shall be appointed by the delegates. The chairman of elections shall be responsible for the conduct of the nominations and elections of the offices of President, First Vice-President and Second Vice-President, and shall conduct them as follows:

Nomination and Election of President

1. A nomination ballot for the office of President shall be conducted as the first order of business following the noon adjournment on the first full day of the meeting.

2. The list of nominees shall be presented to the meeting as the last order of business prior to adjournment at the end of the first day and copies of the listing of
candidates, ranged alphabetically, shall be distributed. Names shall be accompanied only with an indication of the CFA member affiliation.

(3) As the first order of business on the succeeding day, candidates listed will have opportunity to withdraw from nomination, if they so desire.

Election

(1) Election of the President will be by secret ballot and will be taken as the last order of business before noon of the second day. If on any ballot no candidate receives more than 50%, the candidate receiving the lowest number of votes will be dropped from the list and balloting continued until the successful candidate has more than 50% of the total votes cast. In the event of ties for candidates with the fewest number of votes on the ballot those tied will be deleted simultaneously unless they each have 20% of the total vote, and unless such deletion results in election of the top ranked candidate with less than 50% of the votes, and in which instances all candidates on the ballot at this point would again be in nomination.

Nomination and Election of Vice-Presidents

First Vice-President

(1) Nominating ballot for the First Vice-Presidency will be taken immediately after lunch on the second day of the meeting, and the meeting advised as soon as possible of the candidates.

(2) The election will be conducted as the last item of business prior to adjournment of that day, and candidates will have the opportunity to withdraw just prior to the ballot being taken.

Second Vice-President

(1) The nomination ballot will be conducted as the first order of business on the third full day of the meeting with the list of candidates announced to the meeting as soon as is practicable.
(2) The election shall be conducted as the last order of business prior to noon adjournment, and candidates may have the opportunity to withdraw just prior to the ballot being taken.
APPENDIX B

MEMBERSHIP OF CANADIAN FEDERATION OF AGRICULTURE

B.C. FEDERATION OF AGRICULTURE

GENERAL MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATIONS

There are five Districts of Farmers' Institutes each comprising several local institutes, which have B.C.F.A. membership. In addition, outside of these districts there are nine local Farmers' Institutes which are members of the B.C. Federation of Agriculture.

COMMODITY ASSOCIATIONS

B.C. Baby Chick Association
B.C. Beef Cattle Growers' Association
B.C. Bulb Growers' Federation
B.C. Broiler Growers' Association
B.C. Certified Seed Potato Growers' Association
B.C. Coast Vegetable Co-op Association
B.C. Commercial Beekeepers' Association
B.C. Egg Producers' Association
Okanagan-Mainline Egg Producers' Association
Vancouver Island Egg Producers' Association
B.C. Broiler Hatching Egg Producers' Association
B.C. Forage Crop Dehydrators' Association
B.C. Fruit Growers' Association
B.C. Lower Mainland Farmers' Co-op Association
B.C. Mink Producers' Association
B.C. Nursery Trades' Association
B.C. Sheep Breeders' Association
B.C. Swine Breeders' Association
B.C. Turkey Association
Columbia Dairymen's Association
Columbia Potato Growers' Association
Creston Valley Dairymen's Association
Fraser Valley Greenhouse Growers' Association
Fraser Valley Mushroom Growers' Association
Fraser Valley Pea Growers' Association
Fraser Valley Fruit & Vegetable Growers' Association
Georgia Potato Growers' Association
Kamloops-Okanagan Dairymen's Association
Mainland Dairymen's Association
Northern Interior Dairymen's Association
Saanich Fruit Growers' Association
United Commercial Rabbit Growers' Association of B.C.
Vancouver Island Dairymen's Association
Vancouver Island Regional B.C. Bulb Growers' Federation

MARKETING ORGANIZATIONS

Marketing Boards

B.C. Interior Vegetable Marketing Board

Marketing Co-operatives

B.C. Blueberry Co-operative Association
Fraser Valley Milk Producers' Association
Island Farms Dairies' Co-operative Association
Island Vegetable Co-operative Association
Pacific Co-operative Union
Shuswap-Okanagan Dairies Industries Co-operative Association
United Flower Growers' Co-operative Association
United Grain Growers

SERVICE CO-OPERATIVES

Federated Co-operatives Ltd.
Cowichan Co-operative Services
East Chilliwack Fruit Growers Co-operative Association
Surrey Co-operative Association

Other Service Co-operatives

B.C. Artificial Insemination Centre
UNIFARM

GENERAL MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATIONS

Farmers can become direct members of Unifarm by joining locals in the 14 districts in Alberta.

COMMODITY ASSOCIATIONS

Alberta Milk Producers Association
Alberta Broiler Growers Association
Alberta Poultry Industry Council
Alberta Turkey Association
Western Stock Growers Association
Alberta Potato Growers Association
Alberta Sugar Beet Growers Association
Alberta Vegetable Marketing Board

MARKETING ASSOCIATIONS

Marketing Boards

Alberta Broiler Growers Marketing Board
Alberta Turkey Marketing Board
Alberta Provincial Swine Board

Marketing Co-operatives

Alberta Honey Producers
Alberta Wheat Pool
United Grain Growers
Central Alberta Dairy Pool
Northern Alberta Dairy Pool
Alberta Livestock Co-operative
Blindman Valley Co-operative
Bow Slope Shipping Association
Brooks Central Feeders
Buffalo Lake Farmers Co-operative
Coronation Livestock
Mountain View Livestock
Peace River Livestock
Pembina Livestock
Ponoka Livestock
Southern Alberta Sheep
Vauxhall Feeder Co-operative

SERVICE CO-OPERATIVES

- United Farmers of Alberta Co-operative
  Pâmbina U.F.A.
- Pincher Creek Co-operative
- Southern Alberta Cooperative
- Vauxhall Co-operative Petroleum

OTHER ASSOCIATIONS

Alberta Association of Municipal Districts
SAKatchewan Federation of Agriculture

Commodity Organizations

Rapeseed Growers' Association of Saskatchewan
Saskatchewan Cattle Breeders' Association
Saskatchewan Hog Producers' Association
Saskatchewan Milk Producers' Association
Saskatchewan Poultry Association
Saskatchewan Stock Growers' Association
Saskatchewan Swine Breeders' Association

Marketing Organizations

Marketing Boards

Saskatchewan Broiler Chicken Producers' Marketing Board
Saskatchewan Commercial Egg Producers' Marketing Board
Saskatchewan Turkey Producers' Marketing Board

Marketing Co-operatives

Saskatchewan Co-operative Creamery Association
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool
United Grain Growers

Service Co-operatives

Canadian Co-operative Implements Ltd.
Co-operative Hail Insurance Company Ltd.
Federated Co-operatives Ltd.

Associations

Co-operative Development Association
Saskatchewan Agricultural Societies Association
Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities
Saskatchewan Conservation & Development Association
MANIToba FARM BUREAU

COMmodity ASSOCIATIONS

Hog Producers Association of Manitoba
Manitoba Beet Growers Association
Manitoba Branch Canadian Seed Growers Association
Manitoba Egg and Pullet Product Association
Manitoba Hatchery Association
Manitoba Stock Growers Association
Manitoba Turkey Association
Vegetable Growers Association of Manitoba
Winnipeg District Milk Producers Co-operative Association

MARKETING ASSOCIATIONS

Marketing Boards

Manitoba Chicken Broiler Marketing Board

Marketing Co-operatives

Manitoba Pool Elevators
United Grain Growers Limited

SERVICE CO-OPERATIVES

Canadian Co-operative Implements Ltd.
Federated Co-operatives Ltd.

EDUCATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

Diploma Agricultural Graduates Association

WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION

Manitoba Women's Institute
GENERAL MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATIONS

Farmers can be direct members of the OPA. In addition they can participate in the local county federation of agriculture which are further grouped into eight zones in the province.

COMMODITY ASSOCIATIONS.

Burley Tobacco Marketing Association of Ontario
Ontario Beef Improvement Association
Ontario Beekeepers' Association
Ontario Fruit and Vegetables Growers Association
Ontario Hog Producers Association

MARKETING ORGANIZATIONS

Marketing Boards

Ontario Asparagus Growers' Marketing Board
Ontario Bean Producers' Marketing Board
Ontario Broiler Chicken Producers' Marketing Board
Ontario Cream Producers' Marketing Board
Ontario Egg and Fowl Producers' Marketing Board
Ontario Flue-Cured Tobacco Growers' Marketing Board
Ontario Fresh Fruit Growers' Marketing Board
Ontario Fresh Grape Growers' Marketing Board
Ontario Grape Growers Marketing Board
Ontario Greenhouse Vegetable Producers' Marketing Board
Ontario Hog Producers' Marketing Board
Ontario Seed Corn Growers' Marketing Board
Ontario Tender Fruit Growers' Marketing Board
Ontario Turkey Producers' Marketing Board
Ontario Vegetable Growers' Marketing Board

Marketing Co-operatives

United Co-operatives of Ontario
United Dairy Producers' Co-operative Ltd.
SERVICE CO-OPERATIVES

Co-operative Health Services of Ontario

EDUCATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

Christian Farmers' Federation
Junior Farmers Association of Ontario
L'Union des Cultivateurs franco-ontariens
Ontario Poultry Council
CO-OPERATIVE FÉDÉRÉE DE QUÉBEC

A Federation of 230 agricultural co-operatives of the Province of Quebec, with a directorate drawn from 18 districts.

L'UNION CATHOLIQUE DES CULTIVATEURS

ORGANISATION GÉNÉRAL DE CULTIVATEURS

L'U.C.C. constituée de 580 syndicats locaux regroupés en 16 fédérations régionales.

FÉDÉRATION SPEZIALISEES

La Fédération des Syndicats de Producteurs de lait de la Province de Québec
La Fédération des Producteurs de Lait Industriel du Québec
La Fédération des Producteurs de Pommes de terre du Québec
La Fédération des Producteurs de Sucre et Sirop d’Erbal du Québec
La Fédération des Producteurs d’Oeufs de Consommation du Québec
La Fédération des Propriétaires de Porcs du Québec
La Fédération des Propriétaires de Volailles du Québec
La Fédération des Propriétaires de Bois du Québec
La Fédération des Travailleurs Forestiers du Québec
Le Comité des Associations Co-opératives Forestières du Québec (40 associations co-opératives forestières et chantiers co-opératifs)

QUEBEC FARMERS' ASSOCIATION

GENERAL MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATIONS

The Quebec Farmers' Association is an Association for English speaking farmers in Quebec. Its directorate is drawn from 5 zones in the province.

COMMODITY ASSOCIATIONS

Dairy Group

OTHER MEMBER ASSOCIATIONS

Quebec Young Farmers
NEW BRUNSWICK FEDERATION OF AGRICULTURE

GENERAL MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATIONS

Farmers can become members of the federations in Central Carleton, Moncton (French) Forge, Madawaska, Miramichi, Victoria, Wake, the Southern District and La Fédération Acadienne.

COMMODITY ASSOCIATIONS

New Brunswick Beef Producers
New Brunswick Broiler Producers
New Brunswick Egg Producers
New Brunswick Fruit Growers
New Brunswick Milk Producers
New Brunswick Sheep Producers
New Brunswick Swine Producers

MARKETING ORGANIZATIONS

Marketing Boards

New Brunswick Cheese Board
New Brunswick Cream Board
GENERAL MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATIONS

The Nova Scotia Federation of Agriculture has local federations in fifteen counties in the province.

COMMODITY ASSOCIATIONS

Nova Scotia Chicken Producers' Association
Nova Scotia Hog Producers' Association
Nova Scotia Milk and Cream Producers' Association
Nova Scotia Tobacco Growers' Association
Nova Scotia Strawberry Growers Association
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND FEDERATION OF AGRICULTURE

GENERAL MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATIONS

Farmers can become direct members of the Prince Edward Island Federation of Agriculture. The directorate is drawn from 5 districts.

COMMODITY ORGANIZATIONS

Prince Edward Island Beef Producers' Association
Prince Edward Island Approved Flock Association
Prince Edward Island Dairymen's Association
Prince Edward Island Fluid Milk Association
Prince Edward Island Potato Producers' Association
Prince Edward Island Sheep Breeders' Association
Prince Edward Island Swine Breeders' Association

SERVICE CO-OPERATIVES

Central Farmers' Co-operative Association Ltd.
Co-operative Union of Prince Edward Island Limited
Prince Edward Island Mutual Life Insurance
Agro Co-operative Association

OTHER ASSOCIATIONS

Artificial Breeders' Association

WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION

Prince Edward Island Women's Institutes
MARITIME FEDERATION OF AGRICULTURE

The Maritime Federation of Agriculture is the coordinating organization of the Prince Edward Island Federation, the Nova Scotia Federation of Agriculture, the New Brunswick Federation of Agriculture and the Maritime Co-operative Services Ltd.

The Maritime Co-operative Services is a wholesaling service co-operative active in the Atlantic region with some marketing functions and some feed manufacturing.
Canadian Horticultural Council

ACTIVE

British Columbia

B.C. Coast Vegetable Marketing Board
B.C. Fruit Board
B.C. Fruit Growers' Association
B.C. Interior Vegetable Marketing Board
B.C. Tree Fruit Ltd.
Okanagan Federated Shippers Association

Alberta

Alberta Fresh Vegetable Growers Association
Alberta Potato Commission
Alberta Potato Growers' Association
Alberta Vegetable Marketing Board

Manitoba

Manitoba Vegetable Marketing Commission
Vegetable Growers Association of Manitoba

Ontario

Ontario Apple Marketing Commission
Ontario Asparagus Growers' Marketing Board
Ontario Fresh Fruit Growers Marketing Board
Ontario Fruit & Vegetable Growers Association
Ontario Fresh Grape Growers Marketing Board
Ontario Vegetable Growers Marketing Board

Quebec

Co-operative Fédérée de Québec
Quebec Apple Packers Association
Quebec Federation of Vegetable Growers
Greater Montréal Central Market
New Brunswick

New Brunswick Fruit Growers Association
New Brunswick Potato Producers Association
New Brunswick Potato Shippers Association

Nova Scotia

Nova Scotia Fruit Growers Association
Scotian Gold Co-operative Limited
Vegetable & Potato Growers Association of Nova Scotia

Prince Edward Island

Prince Edward Island Potato Marketing Board

National

Canadian Beekeepers' Council
Canadian Food Processors Association
Canadian Fruit Wholesalers' Association
Canadian Mushroom Growers Association
Canadian Nursery Trades Association
Canadian Ornamental Plant Foundation
Canadian Potato Chip Association
Canadian Wine Institute
Flowers Canada

Provincial

P.E.I. Department of Agriculture
Nova Scotia Department of Agriculture
New Brunswick Department of Agriculture
Quebec Department of Agriculture
Ontario Department of Agriculture
Manitoba Department of Agriculture
Alberta Department of Agriculture
British Columbia Department of Agriculture
ASSOCIATE

T. G. Bright & Company Limited
B. C. Federation of Agriculture
Campbell Soup Company
Canadian Canners Limited,
Chateau-Cai Wines Limited
Co-operative des Pomiculteurs de Québec
Jordan Wines Limited
Niagara Peninsula Fruit & Vegetable Growers Association
Quebec Wholesale Fruit & Vegetable Association
Terres Noires Limitée
Toronto Wholesale Fruit & Produce Merchants Association
Ontario Greenhouse Vegetable Producers Marketing Board
DAIRY FARMERS OF CANADA

British Columbia

GENERAL FARM ORGANIZATIONS

B.C. Federation of Agriculture

COMMODITY ORGANIZATIONS

Mainland Dairymen's Association

CO-OPERATIVES

Fraser Valley Milk Producers' Association

Alberta

COMMODITY ORGANIZATIONS

Alberta Dairymen's Association
Alberta Milk Producers' Association

CO-OPERATIVES

Central Alberta Dairy Pool
Northern Alberta Dairy Pool

Saskatchewan

COMMODITY ORGANIZATIONS

Saskatchewan Dairy Association
Saskatchewan Milk Producers' Association

CO-OPERATIVES

'Saskatchewan Co-operative Creamery Association Ltd.
The Dairy Pool, Saskatoon
Manitoba

COMMODITY ORGANIZATIONS

Brandon Milk Producers' Association
Dauphin Milk Producers' Association
Manitoba Dairy Association
Portage Milk Producers' Association
Winnipeg District Milk Producers' Association

CO-OPERATIVES

Bothwell Co-operative Dairy Society
Manitoba Dairy & Poultry Co-operative Ltd.
North Star Co-operative Creamery Association Ltd.
Winkler Co-operative Creamery Ltd.

Ontario

CO-OPERATIVES

Kimberley District Co-operative Limited
New Dundee Co-operative Creamery Limited
United Dairy Producers Co-operative
Villa Nova Milk Products Co-operative

MARKETING BOARDS

Ontario Cream Producers' Marketing Board
Ontario Milk Marketing Board

Quebec

GENERAL FARM ORGANIZATIONS

L'Union Catholique des Cultivateurs

COMMODITY ORGANIZATIONS

La Fédération des producteurs de lait industriel du Québec
CO-OPERATIVES

Co-operative Fédérée de Québec

MARKETING BOARDS

Co-operative des producteurs de lait de Montréal

New Brunswick

COMMODITY ORGANIZATIONS

New Brunswick Milk Producers' Association

MARKETING BOARDS

New Brunswick Cream Producers' Marketing Board

Nova Scotia

COMMODITY ORGANIZATIONS

Nova Scotia Milk & Cream Producers' Association

Prince Edward Island

COMMODITY ORGANIZATIONS

Prince Edward Island Dairymen's Association

Other Associations

Ayrshire Breeders Association of Canada
Canadian Guernsey Breeders Association
Canadian Jersey Cattle Club
Holstein-Friesian Association of Canada
UNITED GRAIN GROWERS

United Grain Growers Limited while having affiliation with the British Columbia Federation of Agriculture, Unifarm (Alberta), the Saskatchewan Federation of Agriculture and the Manitoba Farm Bureau, the U.G.C. also maintains direct membership as an inter-provincial marketing co-operative with the CFA. Its membership in the Western Provinces consists of more than 50,000 co-operative members, and a total of more than 800 local elevators at over 540 marketing points.

Note re Special Affiliated Relationships

1. Dairy Farmers of Canada, a member of the CFA, is also administered by the National Office of the CFA under a special arrangement.

2. The Canadian Swine Council, while not a member organization of the CFA, nevertheless is administered by the National Office of the CFA and has by agreement been constituted an Advisory Committee on Swine to the CFA to further integration of policy and action.
APPENDIX C

FORMAL CFA SUBMISSIONS 1960-1970, EXCLUDING ANNUAL PRESENTATIONS TO CABINET

1970

September 25 - Submission of proposals for amendment to Bill C-197 - "The Farm Products Marketing Agencies Act."

May 15 - Submission on Taxation Policy to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, Trade & Economic Affairs & to the Minister of Agriculture.

May 5 - Submission on Non-Quota Feed Grain Marketing to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Agriculture.

March 17 - Notes for discussion of feed grains with the Standing Committee on Agriculture of the House of Commons.

February 17 - Submission to the Special Senate Committee on Poverty.

1969

October 16 - Statement to the Standing Committee on Finance, Trade & Economic Affairs of the House of Commons re: interest rates.


March - Statement regarding Postal Rate Policy presented to the Postmaster General of Canada.
1968

November
- Submission to the Standing Committee of the House of Commons on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs re: anti-dumping.

October 28
- Submission to the Tariff Board on Binder Twine & Twine for Baling Farm Products (REF. 142) by the CFA, Interprovincial Cooperatives, United Grain Growers, United Farmers of Alberta.

January 18
- Statement to the Royal Commission on Farm Machinery.

1967

December
- Submission to the Government of Canada on Expropriation Policy.

November 6
- Submission to the Minister of Finance re: the report of Royal Commission on Taxation.

November
- Submission to the Minister of Finance respecting the application of the GATT Convention on Anti-Dumping Duties in Canadian Law.

October 30
- Submission to the Agricultural Stabilization Board and the Minister of Agriculture regarding the need for a price stabilization program for corn by the CFA in association with the Ontario Federation of Agriculture.

June 16
- Statement to the Minister of Agriculture by the Canadian Egg Producers Organizations and the CFA.

May 5
- Statement to the Minister of Agriculture by Dairy Farmers of Canada regarding 1967-68 Dairy Policy.

April 7
- Statement to the Minister of Agriculture by the CFA regarding 1967-68 Federal Dairy Policy.
April 6 - Statement to the Hon. J. L. Pepin, Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources by the Middlesex County Federation of Agriculture, the OFA and the CPA.

March 15 - Statement to the Study Group on Agricultural Research of the Science Secretariat of the Privy Council.

January 12 - Submission to the Standing Committee on Finance, Trade & Economic Affairs of the House of Commons re: Bankruptcy and Interest Rates.

1966

November 29 - Submission by the CFA to the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Consumer Credit with special reference to trends in the cost of living.

June 14 - Statement to the Chairman of the Commission of Enquiry into the costs of farm machinery and repair parts.

May - Joint Statement of the Canadian Turkey Federation and the CFA to the Government of Canada re: the need for U.S.-Canada-Mexico agreements on conditions of trade in turkeys.

May 20 - Memorandum to the Government of Canada concerning the extension of Canadian Wheat Board jurisdiction to the marketing of rye, flax and rapeseed by the Western Agricultural Conference of the CFA.

February 11 - Submission to the Minister of Finance re: customs tariffs and sales taxes on goods entering into farmers' costs.

1965

December 29 - Statement to the Hon. J. J. Greene, Minister of Agriculture.
June 8 - Submission to the Agricultural Committee of the Federal Cabinet on farm policy requirements in Canada.

March 25 - Statement to the Minister of Trade and Commerce regarding wheat policy for Canada.

February 18 - Statement of the House of Commons Committee on Agriculture and Colonization regarding feed grains policy.

January 2 - Resolution passed by the CPA Annual Meeting re: feed freight assistance policy.

January 18 - Statement to the Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons regarding the Canada Pension Plan.

1964

November 23 - Statement to the Federal-Provincial Conference on Agriculture.

August - Statement in support of "The Health Charter of Canadians" recommended by the Royal Commission on Health Services.

August 21 - Statement to the Minister of Forestry regarding feed freight assistance and feed grains.

August - Submission to the Broadcasting Committee.

July 16 - Submission to the Hon. Harry Hays, Minister of Agriculture by the Ontario and Quebec Dairy Farm Organizations on recent changes affecting dairy policies.

July 7 - Submission to the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Consumer Credit.

June 25 - Submission to the Special Senate Committee on Aging.
January 31 - Submission to the Minister of Finance re: Customs Tariff and Sales Taxes on goods entering into Farmers' costs.

1963

December 17 - Statement to the Federal-Provincial Conference on Agriculture.

December 10 - Submission to the House of Commons Committee on Agriculture and Colonization on feed grains.

December 9 - Submission to the Royal Commission on Taxation.

November 14 - Submission to the Special Committee of the House of Commons on drug and chemical contamination of food.

November 8 - Statement to the Tariff Board re: reference 132-wire and wire products.

October 22 - Submission to the Minister of Agriculture re: farm credit.

October 18 - Submission to the Standing Committee on Banking and Commerce of the House of Commons in support of Bill C-5; an act to amend the bankruptcy act.

August 15 - A proposal to the Minister of Trade and Commerce for a special meeting on Canada's negotiations with special reference to grains.

August 7 - Memorandum to the Minister of Trade and Commerce re: feed grain prices.

May 8 - Submission to the Hon. Harry Hays and Hon. R. Tremblay.

1962

November 20 - Statement to the Federal-Provincial Agricultural Conference.
November 19 - Submission to the Tariff Board respecting Reference 120 - Chemicals general submission on the reference and in particular pesticides.

November 9 - Petition to the Governor-in-Council re: rail line abandonment.

September 24 - Submission to the Tariff Board under Reference 120 for end-use hearings.

September 21 - Submission to the Royal Commission on Banking & Finance.

May 28 - Submission to the Tariff Board re: Reference 120 Chemicals specifically fertilizers and related goods.

March 19 - Submission to the Royal Commission on Health Services.

March 9 - Submission to the Senate of Canada respecting Bill S-2 Finance Charge (disclosures) Bill.

January - Memorandum regarding amendments to the Customs Tariff and Excise Tax Acts for presentation to the Minister of Finance, the Hon. D. M. Fleming.

1961

October 16 - Submission to the Committee of Inquiry into the Unemployment Insurance Act.


July 25 - Memorandum to the Provincial Ministers of Agriculture regarding the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Act (ARDA).

May 3 - Submission to the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission regarding an inquiry in connection with the manufacture, distribution and sale of drugs.
April 14 - Supplementary comment to the House of Commons, on Agriculture and Colonization re: farm machinery.

April 4 - Memorandum regarding amendments to the Custom Tariff and Excise Tax Acts for presentation to the Hon. D. M. Fleming, Minister of Finance.

February 9 - Submission to the Special Committee of the Senate on Manpower and Employment.

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December 14 - Submission to the Board of Transport Commissioners for Canada re: export grain freight rates by the CFA, UGG, Alberta Wheat Pool, Saskatchewan Wheat Pool and Manitoba Pool Elevators.

October 28 - Statement of the hearings of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Canadian automotive industry.

September 16 - Submission to the Royal Commission for Inquiry into the Canadian automotive industry.

September 14 - Submission to the Tariff Board on Chemicals—Reference no. 120 by the CFA, the Canadian Metal Mining Assoc., Plywood Manufacturers Association of B.C., B.C. Lumber Manufacturers Association and B.C. Loggers Association.

August 17 - Memorandum to the Minister of Finance respecting tariffs on live cattle, oil seeds and poultry.

August 15 - Statement to the Board of Broadcast Governors regarding television networks.

July 29 - Submission to the House of Commons Committee on Broadcasting.
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<td>July 13</td>
<td>the Senate Committee on Banking and Commerce regarding Bill S-25, the finance charges (disclosures) act.</td>
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<td>the Standing Committee on Banking and Commerce of the House of Commons re: Bill C-58 an Act to amend the Combines Investigation Act and the Criminal Code.</td>
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APPENDIX D

CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE NATIONAL FARMERS UNION

Name and Head Office

1. The name of the organization is the National Farmers Union and the head office is to be situated in such place as the Board of Directors shall from time to time determine.

Interpretation

2. (1) In these bylaws, unless the context otherwise requires, the expression:

(a) "Union" shall mean the National Farmers Union as incorporated by an Act of the Parliament of Canada, being chapter ___ of the Statutes of Canada, 19___;

(b) "Board" shall mean the Board of Directors of the National Farmers Union;

(c) "Central Office" shall mean the Head Office of the National Farmers Union;

(d) "Executive" shall mean the executive committee of the National Farmers Union as constituted by its bylaws;

(e) "Convention" shall mean any meeting of the Union composed of such members as are entitled to attend the same and vote thereat;

(f) "Local" shall mean a local established under section 63 hereof.
(2) Whenever the singular and masculine are used in these bylaws, they shall be construed as if the plural or feminine had been used, where the context or the party or parties referred to so require, and the remainder of the sentence shall be construed as if the grammatical and terminological changes thereby rendered necessary had been made.

Objects

3. The objects of the union shall be:

(a) To promote the betterment of farmers in the attainment of their economic and social goals;

(b) To conduct projects for the benefit of farmers in the development of markets for and marketing of farm products;

(c) To achieve the reduction of costs and other measures designed to increase the economic benefits of farming;

(d) To conduct educational and research projects for the benefit of farmers;

(e) To promote and secure legislation and other forms of government action for the benefit of farmers;

(f) To promote a higher standard of community life in agriculture;

(g) To provide services for its members consistent with its objects and work jointly with any other persons or organizations for the attainment of its objects.

4. The Union shall not have any political affiliation, and shall be non-partisan in politics and free from racial or religious discrimination.

Status of Members

5. Men and women shall have equal status.
Membership and Dues

6. Any person who meets the qualifications for membership may become a member of the Union by being duly accepted into membership of any Local and paying the annual membership fee; or may become a member of the Union by applying directly to the Executive, and paying the annual membership fee and being duly accepted by the Executive.

Qualification for Membership

7. The following persons shall be eligible for membership in the Union:

(a) Any person, including the spouse or children of that person residing with him, engaged in farming in Canada.

(b) Any retired farmer who has not acquired any other full-time occupation.

8. (a) Membership in the Union shall be based on a family unit.

(b) Dependent children of each family unit between the ages of 14 and 21 shall be regarded as junior members of the Union.

Form of Application

9. All applications for membership shall be in such form as shall be from time to time determined by the Executive.

Membership Cards

10. Each member shall, upon being accepted into membership receive a membership card from the Central Office, in such form and in such manner as may from time to time be determined by the Executive.

Membership Dues

11. (1) All persons applying for membership in the union shall pay an annual membership fee of $25.00.
(2) Membership dues shall be divided between the local, the district and the central office, as may from time to time be determined by the board.

**Life Members**

12. (1) Any person otherwise qualified to become a member of the union may, upon the payment of the sum of $500.00, become a member of the union during his lifetime, and be known as a "Life Member".

(2) Life Members shall be entitled to the same rights and privileges, and be subject to the same duties, obligations and limitations as members.

(3) The surviving spouse of a married couple who were Life Members shall, upon the death of one of them, continue to be a Life Member.

(4) The Life Membership fees shall be paid into a special fund to be known as the Life Membership Fund, and shall be invested into such interest-bearing securities as the executive may determine. The interest on the said fund shall be available for use by the union in carrying on its activities.

**Honorary Life Members**

13. Any member, upon reaching the age of 65 years, who has been a member in good standing of a farmers union for the previous twenty years, may, upon the recommendation of a local, be awarded an Honorary Life Membership during his lifetime by the board, without payment of any membership fee. An Honorary Life Member shall receive an Honorary Life Membership card from central office, and shall be entitled to attend meetings of members of the union, but shall have no vote thereat.

**Local and District Funds**

14. The locals and districts may raise additional amounts of money by any means permitted by the Act, the Constitution and the Canadian Corporations Act.
Suspension of Members

15. A member acting contrary to the constitution may have his membership suspended by the executive acting on its own initiative, or upon the recommendation of a local, until the next meeting of the board, provided, however, that before any motion of suspension is put to a meeting, written notice shall have been forwarded by prepaid registered mail to the member concerned at least seven days prior to the date of the meeting where the motion is to be considered, and the motion is carried by a 2/3 vote of members present and voting at the meeting.

Expulsion of Members

16. A member acting contrary to the constitution and bylaws may be expelled from membership by the board, provided, however, that before any motion of expulsion is put to a meeting that written notice shall have been forwarded by prepaid registered mail to the member concerned at least seven days prior to the date of the meeting where the motion is to be considered, and the motion is carried by a 2/3 vote of the directors present and voting at the meeting.

Appeal Against Expulsion

17. Any member so expelled from membership by the board may appeal to the next annual convention of the union. The convention shall establish a committee of three persons, who are not directors of the union, who shall investigate the cause of such expulsion and shall confirm such expulsion or reinstate such member on such terms as they deem just.

Collection of Fees

18. It shall be the duty of every local secretary-treasurer to assist in the collection of membership fees, and to forward same to central office in such manner as may from time to time be determined by the executive.
Membership Period

19. The membership period shall be one year from the date of the person becoming a member, provided, however, that the executive may initiate a longer period of membership, subject to the approval of the board.

Expiry of Membership

20. Any member who fails to pay his dues within 60 days of the expiration of his membership shall cease to be a member forthwith.

Conventions of the Union

21. Annual and special conventions of the union shall be the governing body of the union and shall outline the policies to be followed by the executive, the board and the locals.

Annual Convention

22. The annual convention of the union shall be held on such date and in such place as the executive may determine.

Who May Attend Conventions

23. (1) Members of the Board of Directors, members of the women's advisory committee, members of the junior advisory committee, district directors, district women directors, and district junior directors, shall be entitled to attend and vote at the convention.

(2) Duly elected delegates of the locals, as provided by Section 71 shall be entitled to attend and vote at conventions.

Who May Be a Delegate

24. No person shall act as a delegate at conventions of the union unless he be a member of the union.
Special Conventions

25. Special conventions of the union may be called by the executive for the transaction of special business at such time and place as the executive may decide.

Convention, How Called

26. Conventions of the union shall be called by written notice mailed by the secretary to those entitled to attend the convention as defined in Section 23 (1) and to the secretary-treasurer of each local, at least three weeks prior to the date of the convention, stating the time, date and place thereof. Notice of special conventions shall state the special business to be considered thereat.

Convention to Elect Officers

27. The annual convention shall elect from among the members of the union:

(a) One president;
(b) One vice-president;
(c) One women's president;
(d) One women's vice-president;
(e) One junior president;
(f) One junior vice-president.

Delegates from Regions to Meet

28. Delegates attending the annual convention from each region shall meet separately for a time during the convention and shall elect from among the members residing in the region:

(a) One member, or such other number of members as may be assigned to the region, to the board;
(b) One woman to the women's advisory committee;
(c) One junior member to the junior advisory committee.
Registration

29. Delegates to the convention and visiting members shall pay a registration fee to assist in paying the expenses of the convention, the amount of such fees to be determined by the executive.

Pooling of Transportation

30. (a) Transportation costs of all delegates attending the convention, and such other persons who are entitled to attend, shall be paid by central office if deemed feasible by the executive.

   (b) If the executive considers it not feasible to pay the transportation costs referred to in 30 (a), transportation costs of all those attending the convention shall be pooled in such manner as may be determined by the executive.

Credentials Committee

31. The executive shall appoint a credentials committee to examine into and report to the convention on all credentials of delegates attending the convention.

Call to Order

32. (1) The convention shall be called to order by the president and its first order of business shall be the election of a chairman for the convention.

   (2) Delegates assembled in annual convention shall determine the status of visitors.

Resolutions Committee

33. The convention shall elect to the resolutions committee members in the number it may determine, and these persons, together with the resolutions committee of the board, shall constitute the resolutions committee of the convention. It shall be the duty of this committee to co-ordinate the resolutions sent in for consideration of the convention, and to determine the order in which resolutions should be considered by the convention.
Other Committees

34. The convention may elect such other committees as it may deem necessary for the proper conduct of the business of the convention.

Resolutions to Convention

35. (a) All resolutions approved by the board, a regional meeting or a district convention, shall be eligible for presentation at the convention.

(b) Any resolution may be presented to the convention if 2/3 majority of those voting at the convention approve that it be presented.

Adoption of Resolutions

36. Except as herein otherwise provided, all resolutions put to the vote of any meeting of members of the union shall be decided by a majority of those voting.

Appointment of Auditor

37. The convention shall appoint an auditor to make a yearly audit of the books of the union. The auditor shall make a report to the next convention, or whenever called upon to do so.

REGIONS

Regions—How Established

38. The board shall divide Canada into regions in such manner as they may from time to time determine.

Regional Meetings

39. A meeting of members residing in each region shall be held annually. The purpose of such meetings shall be to consider:
(a) Matters concerning the members residing in
the region;
(b) Services provided through the regional office;
(c) Policies and programs to be recommended to the
annual convention of the union.

Meetings—How Called

40. The executive shall publicize among the members
residing in the region the date and place of such
meeting in such manner as it may determine.

Regional Offices

41. The executive shall establish an office or offices
in each region for the purposes of administration,
and to provide such services to the members as may
be from time to time determined by the board.

Appointment of Regional Co-ordinator

42. The executive shall appoint a member of the board
from each region as the regional co-ordinator for
that region.

Duties of the Regional Co-ordinator

43. It shall be the duty of the regional co-ordinator
to perform such duties as may be assigned to him
by the executive, and to convene meetings from time
to time of the district executive officers within
his region, to inform them and co-ordinate their
activities into the general program of the union.

DISTRICTS

Districts—How Constituted

44. The board shall divide the regions into districts
and adjust the boundaries of said districts as they
may from time to time determine.
District Conventions

45. A convention shall be held annually in each district of its officers and delegates elected as hereinafter provided. The date and place of such convention shall be determined by the district executive, in consultation with the regional co-ordinator.

Conventions--How Called

46. The annual district convention shall be called by the secretary of the union, who shall mail a written notice of same to the district officers, the members of the district board, and the secretary of each local in the district, such notice to be mailed at least three weeks prior to the date set for the convention, and shall state the time, date and place of same.

Who May Attend Conventions

47. Members of the district board and duly elected delegates shall be entitled to attend the convention and to vote at same. (See Sec. 72)

Call to Order

48. (1) The annual district convention shall be called to order by the district director, and its first order of business shall be the election of a chairman.

(2) Delegates assembled at district conventions shall determine status of attending visitors.

Resolutions to Convention

49. (a) All resolutions approved by a local within a district, or approved by the district board shall be eligible for presentation to a district convention.

(b) Any resolution may be presented to a district convention if 2/3 majority of those voting at the convention approve that it be presented.
Appointments of Auditor

50. The annual district convention shall appoint an auditor to make a yearly audit of the books of the district, and prepare a report for presentation to the next annual district convention.

Election of Officers

51. The annual district convention shall elect from among the members residing in the district:

(a) A district director;
(b) A district women's director;
(c) A district junior director.

District Executive

52. Those persons elected under Section 51 hereof shall become the district executive, and the district board is hereby empowered to add to the district executive from among its members in such manner as it may from time to time determine.

Vacancies—How Filled

53. Vacancies in the district executive may be filled by the district board.

Duties of District Executive

54. (a) The management of the business and the property of the district and of its affairs shall be entrusted to the district executive, subject to the policies and decisions of the district convention, the district board and the constitution or bylaws of the union.

(b) The district executive shall appoint a secretary-treasurer for the district.
Duties of District Directors

55. The district director shall, immediately following his election, assume and be responsible for the supervision and direction of the activities of the locals within his district, and shall report to his district board and annual convention of his district.

Duties of District Women Directors

56. The district women's director shall immediately following her election, assist in district work, encourage participation of women in the activities of the union, and shall be the district director if the office of district director becomes vacant for any cause.

Duties of District Junior Directors

57. The district junior director shall, immediately following his election, be responsible for the supervision and direction of programs within his district that are of specific interest to youth.

Directors to Act as Delegates

58. District directors, district women directors, district junior directors shall be entitled to attend the annual or special conventions of the union as voting delegates.

Duties of District Secretary-Treasurer

59. It shall be the duty of the district secretary-treasurer to attend all conventions of the district; attend all meetings of the district executive and district board, to keep proper records of proceedings of meetings, to conduct all correspondence on behalf of the district, to receive all monies and disburse same, to issue and receive receipts, to present an audited financial statement to the annual district convention, and to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the district executive.

Bonding of District Secretary-Treasurer

60. The district secretary-treasurer may enter into a bond, at the expense of the district, for the proper fulfillment of his duties. Such bond shall be in such amount and in such form as the district executive shall determine.
District Board

61. Members of the district executive together with the presidents of locals within the district shall constitute the district board.

Duties of District Board

62. The district board shall:
   (a) Elect one of its members to be chairman of the board;
   (b) Recommend a program of activities to their district convention and assist the district executive in carrying out the program in their district.

LOCALS

Locals—How Constituted

63. Members of the union shall be organized into locals of the union and for this purpose any 50 units of membership may request the executive to constitute a local of the union.

Chartering of Locals

64. Every local so constituted shall have a distinctive name and/or number approved by the executive, and shall thereafter be known by such name and/or number, and shall receive a charter of authority from the executive under the seal of the union and signed by the president and secretary thereof.

Annual Meeting

65. Each local shall hold an annual meeting of its members not later than the first day of April in each year.

Election of Officers

66. The annual meeting of each local shall elect from among its members:
(a) A president;
(b) A vice-president;
(c) Three directors;

and those persons so elected shall constitute the local executive.

Duties of Local Executive

67. It shall be the duty of the local executive to:

(a) Appoint a secretary-treasurer for the local;
(b) Establish such committees as it deems necessary to properly fulfill the functions of the local;
(c) Manage the business and property of the local and its affairs subject to the policies and decisions of the members of the local, and its charter of authority under the seal of the union.

Bonding of Local Secretary-Treasurer or Secretary and Treasurer

68. The local secretary-treasurer or secretary and treasurer may enter into a bond at the expense of the local for the proper fulfillment of his duties. Such bond shall be in such amount and in such form as the local executive shall determine.

Appointment of Auditor

69. The annual meeting of each local shall appoint an auditor. It shall be the duty of the auditor to audit the books of the local and to prepare a report for presentation to the next annual meeting of the local.

Meetings—How Called

70. (a) Meetings of the local shall be held at the call of the president or the secretary, or of two directors at such time and in such manner as each local shall determine.
Delegates to Conventions

71. Every local shall be entitled to elect from among its members delegates to the annual convention of the union, and for this purpose shall be entitled of one delegate or one delegate for each 50 of its units of membership or major fraction thereof as shown by the record of the local thirty days before the date fixed for such convention.

72. Every local shall be entitled to elect from among its members delegates to the annual district convention, and for this purpose shall be entitled to one delegate for each 10 of its units of membership as shown by the record of the local thirty days before the date fixed for the convention.

Duties of President

73. The president of each local, or in his absence the vice-president, shall preside at all meetings of the local.

Duties of Secretary-Treasurer

74. It shall be the duty of the secretary-treasurer of the local to attend all meetings of the local and of the executive of the local and to keep proper records of proceedings of the meetings, to conduct all correspondence on behalf of the local, to assist in the collection of membership fees, to receive all monies and disburse same, to issue and receive receipts for all monies, to maintain a record of membership of the local, to present an audited financial statement to the annual meeting of the local, and to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the executive of the local.

75. Notwithstanding anything in Section 67 above, the executive of the local may divide the duties of secretary-treasurer between a secretary and a treasurer as it may see fit.
Suspension of Locals

76. The executive may suspend any local for any cause it may deem sufficient including the non-payment of dues to the union, and such local shall thereupon cease to operate, and shall, until reinstated, have no right to be represented at any convention or district convention of the union.

Notice of Suspension

77. The executive shall cause every suspended local to be notified of its suspension by prepaid registered mail sent to its secretary as recorded in the books of the union, and such local may, within thirty days from the mailing of said notice, appeal to the board of directors against its suspension.

Appeal to Board

78. The board shall, upon receipt of an appeal from a local against its suspension, investigate the matter in any manner it may in its absolute discretion consider sufficient and proper, and either cancel the suspension order, and reinstate such local, or affirm the suspension order and cancel the local's warrant of authority.

Assets of Suspended Local

79. All money, property and records of a suspended local shall, during the period of suspension, be retained by the officers of the local as trustees for the union, and shall, upon the warrant of authority being cancelled, become and be the property of the union, and all persons having any moneys, property or records in their possession belonging to such local shall deliver up the same to the central office of the union.

Disbandment

80. A local may be disbanded. A special meeting shall be called to consider any motion to disband. Notice in writing setting out the purpose of the meeting, the
date and time when, and place where it will be held shall be sent to every member of the local at least two weeks before the date fixed for the meeting. The secretary shall prepare a financial statement of the affairs of the local for such meeting and present it at the meeting. No motion to disband shall be entertained until such a statement is presented to the meeting. If the secretary fails to present such a statement then the meeting shall appoint some person or persons to prepare the same, then the meeting shall be adjourned to such time and place as the members present may by majority vote decide to enable such a statement to be prepared and presented: Upon the presentation of the statement, arrangements should be made for the payment of all outstanding accounts, and the disposition of any funds or property of the local. Thereafter a motion to disband may be adopted, and if adopted, a certified copy of it shall be sent to the central office, and upon receipt of same by the central office, the local shall be disbanded.

Union Executive May Disband Locals

81. If a local disbands without complying with the provisions of the preceding section hereof, or fails to remit to the central office the annual membership fees for at least 50 units of memberships or is suspended under the provisions of section 76 hereof, the executive may notify each person who has been a paid-up member of such local during the preceding two years by registered mail of its intention to disband the said local, and by such notice shall state the reason for the proposed disbandment; and if the reason for the proposed disbandment is not within three months from the date of the notice removed to the satisfaction of the executive, the executive may by resolution declare such local to be disbanded, and thereupon all property of the said local, whether real or personal, shall become the property of the union.
OFFICERS

Officers

82. All candidates for elected offices of the union and of any district shall be nominated in open convention and be elected by secret ballot. The form and procedure to be followed in connection with each election shall be determined by the convention.

Term of Office

83. No elected officer of the union, or director of the union, or district director shall hold the same office continuously for more than ten consecutive years.

84. All elected officers of the union shall assume office upon election and shall hold office until their successors are elected.

Oath of Office

85. Each elected officer shall, before taking office, sign a declaration pledging himself to faithfully discharge the duties of his office, to abide by the constitution, and to loyally support and further the interests of the union.

Duties of the President

86. The president shall be the chief executive officer and an ex-officio member of all committees. It shall be the duty of the president to preside at all meetings of the executive.

Duties of Vice-President

87. The vice-president shall assist the president in his duties and shall be the president in the event the office of President becomes vacant for any cause.

Duties of Women's President

88. The women's president, through her involvement on the executive, shall provide leadership to facilitate participation of women at all levels of the union.
Duties of Women's Vice-President

89. The women's vice-president shall assist the women's president in her duties and shall be the women's president in the event the office of women's president becomes vacant from any cause.

Duties of Junior President

90. The junior president shall be in charge of youth programs and shall co-ordinate such programs within the general program of the union.

Duties of Junior Vice-President

91. The junior vice-president shall assist the junior president in his duties and shall be the junior president in the event the office of junior president becomes vacant from any cause.

Reports to Convention

92. It shall be the duty of the president to present to the annual convention a report of the board on the affairs of the union.

93. It shall be the duty of the women's president to present to the annual convention a report on her work.

94. It shall be the duty of the junior president to present to the annual convention a report on his work.

Duties of Secretary

95. It shall be the duty of the secretary to attend all meetings of the union, of the board and of the executive, and to keep proper minutes of the same and to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the executive.

Duties of Treasurer

96. It shall be the duty of the treasurer to receive all funds of the union, and to deposit same in such bank or credit union as the executive may direct. He shall keep proper books of account, and furnish full and
complete information on all matters dealt with by him whenever called upon to do so by the executive. He shall present a duly audited statement of the financial affairs of the union to the annual convention of the union, and shall perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the executive.

Bonding

97. The secretary, the treasurer and such other officials as the executive may determine, shall enter into a bond, at the expense of the union, for the proper fulfillment of their respective duties. Such bond shall be in such amount and in such form as the executive may determine.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

How Constituted

98. (a) The president, vice-president, women's president, women's vice-president, junior president, junior vice-president, and the directors elected under Sec. 28(a), shall constitute the board of directors of the union.

(b) Vacancies occurring on the board may be filled by the board.

99. The board of directors shall consist of a maximum of 25 members.

100. The number of directors to be elected from each region shall be determined annually by the board; the board shall take into consideration the number of members in each region.

Quorum

101. A quorum of the board shall consist of not less than two-thirds of their number.
Meetings—How Called

102. The secretary of the union shall call a meeting of the board whenever requested to do so by the president or by the executive or by a majority of the directors. Such meeting shall be called by forwarding to each member of the board a written notice giving the time, date and place of the meeting and such notice shall be mailed at least ten days before the date fixed for the meeting.

Waiver of Notice

103. A meeting of the board may be held at any time without prior notice thereof, providing at least two-thirds of the members are present at such meeting, and sign a consent to the holding of the same before the commencement of the meeting.

Duties of the Board

104. The board of directors shall be the policy-making body of the union between conventions. It shall be the duty of the board to interpret into action decisions made by the convention.

105. The board shall, after each annual convention, appoint a resolutions committee, representative of the regions. It shall be the duty of the resolutions committee to examine into all resolutions sent into the central office between conventions, edit and revise same, and prepare them for presentation to the board, district conventions, regional meetings or annual conventions as the resolutions may require.

106. The board shall elect from among their number three of their members to the executive committee of the union, and these persons so elected, together with the president, vice-president, women's president and junior president shall constitute the executive of the union.

107. The board may elect from among its members such other committees as it may deem necessary to properly fulfill the functions of the union, provided, however, that the decisions of such committees shall be subject to the approval of the board.
108. The board shall, after each annual convention, fix the remuneration to be paid to the elected officers and directors of the union during their term of office.

109. The board shall consider general policies on such matters as finance, expenditure, organization, regional development, and such other policy matters as it may, from time to time, determine.

Banking and Borrowing

110. (1) The directors of the union may, and they are hereby authorized, from time to time to:

   (a) Borrow money upon the credit of the union in such amounts and upon such terms as they may think proper for the purposes of carrying out the objects of the union;

   (b) Hypothecate, pledge or mortgage the real and personal property of the union;

   (c) Issue bonds, debentures or debenture stock secured by mortgage or otherwise;

   (d) Sign bills, notes, contracts and other evidences of or securities for money borrowed or to be borrowed for the purpose aforesaid;

   (e) Pledge bonds, debentures or debenture stock as security for temporary loans.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section 1, the executive may exercise the powers given to the directors in this section on their behalf by resolution.

Executive

Meetings—How Called
111. The executive shall meet at the call of the president, and the president shall call a meeting of the executive whenever requested to do so by a majority of the executive.

Quorum

112. Four members of the executive shall constitute a quorum, and at least one of the four shall be elected to the executive by the board.

Duties of Executive

113. The management of the business and property of the union and of its affairs shall be entrusted to the executive, subject to the rules, policy, decisions and regulations of the union in convention assembled, and of the board.

114. The executive shall appoint a secretary and treasurer or secretary-treasurer, and such other staff members as it may deem necessary for the proper conduct of the affairs of the union, and shall fix their remuneration.

115. The executive may appoint such committees as it sees fit and entrust to such committees the carrying out of any particular duty that it may assign to it.

116. The executive shall publish a paper and it shall be the official publication of the union. The executive shall mail a copy of each edition to each unit of membership, and to such other persons who may subscribe to it.

117. The executive shall provide such other services as may be from time to time determined by the union.

118. The executive shall maintain a record of members in such manner as it may from time to time determine.

Seal, How Affixed

119. The corporate seal of the union shall not be affixed
to any instrument except by the authority of a resolution of the executive and in the presence of two directors, or such other person or persons as the executive may appoint for the purpose; and such directors or other person or persons as aforesaid shall sign every instrument to which the seal of the union is so affixed in their presence.

ADVISORY COMMITTEES

Women's Advisory Committee

120. It shall be the duty of the women's advisory committee to advise the women's president, to assist her in her duties, and encourage participation of women within the general program of the union.

Junior Advisory Committee

121. (a) All members elected to hold junior offices shall not exceed the age of twenty-five years.

(b) It shall be the duty of the junior advisory committee to advise the junior president, to assist him in developing programs that are of particular interest to youth, and co-ordinate such activities within the general program of the union.

GENERAL

Political Candidates, etc., Disqualified from Office

122. Any elected officer of the union, or of any district, or any member of the board who announces himself to be, or allows himself to be announced as a candidate for election as a member of any provincial legislature, or of the House of Commons, or accepts appointment as a member of the Senate of Canada, shall, ipso facto, cease to hold such elected office; and shall, as long
as he is such candidate, or a member of such Legislature or of the House of Commons or of the Senate of Canada, be ineligible for election to any office in the union or of any district of the union.

123. Any elected officer of the union, or of any district, or any local, or any member of the board who is elected to any other office of the union, or of any district, or any local, or the board, shall cease to hold the office previously held by him.

Fiscal Year

124. The fiscal year of the union shall be from November 1 to October 31 of each year.

Amending Constitution

125. The constitution of the union may be amended at any convention of the union in the following manner:

(a) The board, any district convention, any regional meeting, may propose an amendment to the constitution.

(b) A copy of every proposed amendment shall be sent to central office at least 60 days before the date of the convention at which it is to be proposed.

(c) The central office shall, at least 30 days before the date set for the convention, mail to each person entitled to attend the convention, as defined in Section 23 (1), and to the secretary of each local, a copy of the proposed amendment.

(d) Twenty-four hours' advance notice shall be given to delegates attending convention before presentation of any motion for constitutional amendment.

(e) Every amendment shall be adopted if notice thereof has been given as provided by (b), (c) and (d) hereof and if two-thirds of the delegates voting at the convention vote in favor of it.
126. The executive shall be empowered to:

(a) Prepare and arrange for the publication of these bylaws.

(b) Omit from time to time all sections and parts thereof which have been repealed by the convention.

(c) Alter the numbers of the sections of the by-laws.

(d) Add additional sections that have been approved by the convention.

(e) Alter the wording of sections in accordance with amendments by the conventions.

(f) Prepare and arrange for publication from time to time of a revised copy of these by-laws.

127. Upon coming into force of these by-laws the union shall assume the assets and liabilities transferred to it by any provincial farm union whose members have voted to become members of the union.
APPENDIX E

CONSTITUTION FOR
ONE FARM ORGANIZATION IN ALBERTA

Section 1 - Title and Interpretation

This association shall be called Unifarm and shall consist of membership as hereinafter provided.

A. Association shall mean Unifarm.

B. Convention shall mean a meeting of accredited delegates and officials of the association as provided in Section 7 hereof.

C. Board shall mean the 33 member board elected as set out in Section 8, 9 and 13, hereof.

D. Directors shall mean directors elected as provided in section 9, hereof.

E. Executive shall mean the 9 member executive committee as elected under section 8 and 10 hereof.

F. President shall mean the president of the association as provided in section 8 hereof.

G. Executive Secretary shall mean the executive secretary of the association unless otherwise specified.

H. District organization shall mean that unit as provided under section 6 hereof.

I. Region shall mean that unit as defined in section 6-G hereof.

J. Local shall mean units within a District as recognized in section 6 hereof and the By-Laws.

K. Women's organization shall mean the women's organization as provided for in section 13 hereof.
Section 2 - Purposes

A. To advance on all possible occasions, the interest of farmers, farmers' co-operative organizations and specialized producer commodity groups.

B. To preserve and encourage economic family farm units.

C. To co-ordinate and promote the interests, and efforts of the various types of agriculture through collective action.

D. To persistently study and protect the interests of the membership in relation to existing legislation and to legislation under consideration by Provincial and Federal Government and to assist in formulating and promoting provincial and national policies for agriculture.

E. To achieve farm commodity prices which will ensure to agriculture its fair share of the national income (in relation to production and investment).

F. To contribute to a high standard of living for all citizens by encouraging adequate production over a long-term period, commensurate with sound agricultural practices.

G. To promote a high standard of community life through the study of economic and social questions related to agriculture and democratic citizenship.

H. To promote the fullest possible participation and use of co-operatives and credit unions.

I. To provide members with as many direct services related to the business of farming as is practical.

J. To assist member organizations in the preparation of statements, briefs or other materials dealing with their problems and present same jointly with the member organizations.

K. To publish such pamphlets, magazines, newspapers, or such other literature as may be deemed advisable.

L. To carry out an active public relations program with all sectors of society.
M. To co-operate with similar bodies in other provinces, and when desirable, to co-ordinate efforts with such bodies in serving the above purposes.

N. To encourage the active participation and involvement of women and youth on all possible occasions.

Section 3 - Policy

A. The policy of the association shall be determined by delegates in annual conventions or special conventions, if so required.

B. The association shall be non-partisan in politics but shall exert pressure upon any or all political parties to secure its objectives.

C. The association shall use all ethical and legal means to achieve its objectives.

D. The association shall, where practical, co-operate with other groups having similar aims and objectives.

E. The association shall seek legislation that will permit a check-off on the sale of all agricultural products for the purpose of future financing.

Section 4 - Membership

Membership in the association shall consist of:

A. Direct unit membership

1. All active farmers and ranchers shall be eligible for membership and shall be entitled to all membership services and privileges including the right to vote, hold an official position or be a delegate.

2. Retired farmers and ranchers and persons in related occupations shall be eligible for associate membership and shall be entitled to member services but shall not have the right to vote, accept an official position, or be a delegate.
3. All such membership is contingent upon payment of a unit membership fee as stipulated by delegates in annual convention.

B. Organizational membership shall include:

1. Farm co-operatives, commodity groups, and marketing boards, that have been organized and are controlled by producers, and whose objectives are to serve the needs and interests of farm producers.

2. The membership fee for organization members shall be a fee based on membership as determined by a finance committee and approved by the Board.

C. Membership Year:

The membership year for both classes of membership shall end on October 31st. in each year.

D. New Organizational Members:

Application for membership by farm co-operatives, marketing boards or commodity groups must be approved by a three-fourth vote of the Board of Directors.

Section 5 - Financing

The operating revenue shall be derived as nearly as possible in equal amounts from:

A. Direct Membership - which funds shall be apportioned, as determined by annual Convention as between central office and District organizations.

B. Dues from member co-operatives, marketing boards and commodity groups with a relationship to their membership. The portion of the budget raised by organizational membership shall equal the amount of the previous years direct membership that is retained by central office. Payment of organizational membership may be quarterly, semi-annually or annually with first or total payment to be made within the first three months of the fiscal year of the association.
C. Whenever a check-off or similar method of financing is implemented, there shall continue to be a voluntary membership fee for direct and organizational members. This membership fee would entitle the member to vote on policy matters and in elections, or to hold office in the Association. This voluntary membership fee may or may not be the major source of finance for the Association. In any event, the principle of obtaining approximately equal amounts of revenue from fees from the direct membership and from the organizational members shall be continued.

Section 6 - District Organization

A. The District organization shall be the working unit for the direct membership under the provincial organization.

B. The District organization shall be administered by a council made up of a Chairman, Vice-Chairman and not more than 10 elected Directors, (male or female).

C. All direct members shall be considered members of the District organization, (in the county, M.D., I.D. or special areas in which they reside) as well as the provincial body.

D. Function and responsibility:

1. To take on all local matters pertaining to the welfare of farm people in the district.

2. To be responsible for organizational activities, including the collection of direct membership fees.

3. To promote self-help projects, especially co-operative activities.

4. To be responsible for assisting with member education.

5. To give assistance and support to co-operatives and commodity groups.

6. To give assistance to locals when requested.

7. To be autonomous in local affairs.
8. To prepare, discuss, and forward to the provincial annual convention resolutions pertaining to the welfare of farmers on provincial, national, or international level.

9. Elect delegates to the annual provincial convention as designated under section 7.

E. District Meetings

All members residing within the boundaries of a District shall be eligible to attend all general or annual meetings of the District organization.

F. District Annual Meetings

Scope of district annual meetings be:

1. To receive the financial report and appoint auditors for ensuing year.

2. To receive and discuss reports from the board and its committees on the year's activities.

3. To propose and debate resolutions to go before the Region and or the provincial annual convention.

4. To elect officers and board members, and delegates to the provincial annual convention.

G. Regional Organization

1. For the purpose of electing Directors to the provincial board, and for the discussion of resolutions, the province shall be divided into regions the boundaries of which shall be determined from time to time by the Board.

2. In each region there shall be a committee consisting of the Chairman of the District Organizations and the Régional Director. Their major responsibility will be the organizing and holding of the Regional meeting which should be held prior to October 31st. At which meeting the Regional Director shall be elected.
3. Districts within an area designated as a Region and who have not held a Regional meeting may hold a meeting of Delegates during the annual convention for the purpose of electing a Director.

Section 7 - Annual Provincial Convention

A. At least once a year a convention of the delegates elected as hereinafter provided and of the officers of the association shall be held and shall be deemed to be the annual meeting of the association.

B. The convention shall be held between November 1st and December 15th at such place as may be determined by the Board of Directors.

C. The annual convention of the organization shall be the governing body and shall pass or deal with the activities of the association and shall outline the policy and activities for the board and association.

D. Delegate representation at the annual meeting shall be approximately 607 and shall include:

1. The Board of Directors - 33 members

2. Direct Membership

(a) The District Organizations shall elect a total of 280 delegates to the Convention.

(b) The 280 delegates shall be divided among the District Organizations in proportion to the membership in each. However, each district organization shall be entitled to at least one delegate.

(c) In each District Organization the District Chairman or his representative shall be a delegate. Any remaining delegates the District Organization is entitled to, shall be elected from a District Organization meeting called for the purpose of holding delegate elections.
(d) All delegates to the Convention from the District Organizations must be current members of that District Organization at the time of the Convention.

(e) The Board shall each year prior to the annual or special convention cause to be prepared, a schedule showing the number of delegates each District Organization is entitled to on the basis of the past year's membership.

3. Women's Organization - 14 delegates

4. Organizational Membership - Co-operatives, marketing boards, and commodity groups shall be granted delegate representation to the annual or special conventions on the basis of their membership as recorded at central office. The board shall each year prior to the annual or special convention cause to be prepared, a schedule showing the number of delegates each organization is entitled to at the annual or special convention on the basis of the past years recorded membership. The total of such delegates shall be 280 delegates.

E. The convention shall have authority to require the payment of a registration fee from all delegates for the purpose of defraying expenses of the convention.

F. The travel expenses of all accredited delegates, as determined by the Board; shall be pooled.

G. All officers and directors of the Central Board shall have full delegate standing at all conventions of the association.

Section 8 - Election at Convention

The convention annually shall elect:

A. A President - nominated and elected by all accredited delegates.

B. A Vice-President - nominated and elected by all delegates representing District Organizations.
C. A Vice-President — nominated and elected by all delegates representing organizational members.

D. The annual convention program will provide times for the nominations and elections of the above officers. Nominations shall be in writing, on official forms, and be signed by the nominee and endorsed by (5) five accredited delegates. Voting shall be by preferential ballot.

Section 9 — Board of Directors

A. The Board of Directors shall consist of the President, two Vice-Presidents, two representatives of the women's organization, 14 Directors elected from the direct membership through Regional meeting or special district meeting. Fourteen directors elected at the annual meeting by commodity groups as follows:

Grain Division — 3 Directors
Dairy Division — 2 Directors
Poultry Division — 1 Director
Farm Supplies Division — 2 Directors
Livestock Division — 3 Directors
Sugar Beet Division — 1 Director
Vegetables and Potato Division — 1 Director
Municipal Districts Division — 1 Director

B. Directors' term of office shall be for one year or until their successors are elected. The Directors shall assume office at the close of the meeting or convention at which they were elected.

C. The remuneration of the Directors and Executive shall be set from time to time by the Board.

D. The Board of Directors shall:

1. Meet at least once every six months and at such other times as the business of the Association requires or the Executive shall determine.

2. Work at all times in the interest of the Association and the members who form the Association.

3. Strive for the achievement of the objectives of the Association.
4. Support the policies of the Association as laid down by the annual convention and the Board.

5. Appoint an auditor of the Association. At the close of each fiscal year, prior to the holding of the annual meeting, the auditor shall examine and verify the books and accounts of the Association. The report of the auditor shall be presented at the annual meeting.

6. Make such arrangements with any chartered bank or banks or other recognized financial institution for the financing and banking accommodation required by the Association as they may deem necessary from time to time.

7. The Board shall cause to have prepared a job description for all elected officials of the Association.

8. In the event the office of President becomes vacant for any reason, the Executive Secretary shall cause a meeting of the Board to be called and the Board shall elect one of the Vice-Presidents as President. Should the office of a Vice-President become vacant for the above or any other reason, the members of the Board representing that membership which the vacating Vice-President represented shall meet and elect from among their own number a Vice-President.

E. Members of the Board shall:

1. Attend the annual convention and all meetings of the Board.

2. Exercise control over expenditures.

3. Maintain a close contact as possible with county officials, or officials of commodity organizations that they represent.
Section 10 - Provincial Executive

A. The Executive shall consist of: The President
   Two Vice-Presidents
   Six Members elected by
   and from the Board of Directors

B. The Executive shall:

1. Be responsible for its actions to the Board of Directors.

2. Carry out the directions and policies as set out by the Board and the Convention.

3. Meet as frequently as the affairs of the Association may require, on the call of the President, or on the written request to the President of any two members of the Executive.

4. Appoint the Executive Secretary.

5. Protect the funds of the Association by securing adequate bonds for employees.

6. Take notice of, and act upon all matters brought to their attention relating to the furtherance of the aims and objectives of the Association.

7. Generally and individually, assist in the building of the Association by attending meetings, or gatherings when requested to do so, having in mind the interest of the Association and necessary expenditures to be incurred.

Section 11 - Committees

The Board should appoint standing or ad hoc committees to study and deal with special topics and commodities. Such committees would be chaired by members of the provincial board. Other members could be appointed on basis of interest from within or without the provincial board. All committees would report to the board and to the annual meeting if so directed.
Section 12 - Head Office Organization

The administration of the Association shall be under the direction of an Executive Secretary who shall be appointed by and be responsible to the Executive and who shall employ such other staff as authorized by the Executive. The Executive shall prepare the job description and terms of reference for the Executive Secretary.

Section 13 - Women's Organization

1. There may be an affiliated women's organization (which shall be the present FWUA). The women's organization shall have delegates to the annual convention as determined from time to time by the Board of the Association; in no case shall there be less than 14 delegates from the women's organization.

2. The women's organization, each year, elect two board members to the Board of the association.

3. A woman included in a direct unit membership of the Association may be designated as a member of the women's organization by indicating her desire to be so designated.

4. The women's section shall receive grants from the association as determined by the board of the association.

Section 14 - General

A. The seal of the Association shall be in such form as may be determined by the Directors and shall only be affixed to the instruments and documents by the President or Vice-Presidents, the Executive Secretary or such other person as the Directors may from time to time appoint.

B. No one can act as an official of the Association who is not a member of the Association.
C. Any member who leaves the Province of Alberta with the intention of permanently residing elsewhere shall resign any official position held at that time.

D. Any delegates or member of the Board of Directors shall automatically vacate his or her office if he or she accepts a permanent position in any department or central office other than on executive work. Permanent employees of member organizations shall not be eligible to be a delegate or be an official in the Association.

E. Any member of the provincial boards shall cease to hold office immediately if he or she becomes a candidate, or an organizer for any political party.

F. No person shall be eligible to be or become an officer or Director of the Association or official of the District organization who accepts an official position in any other organization whose activities, in the opinion of the Board, are prejudicial to the objectives or activities of the Association.

G. Contravention of the 'Oath of Office' shall automatically terminate that official's term of office.

H. An official or Director whose term of office has been terminated subject to the previous clauses shall have the right to appeal to the Board and show cause why his or her term of office should not be terminated. A two-thirds majority of the Board shall be required to terminate a term of office.

I. All Board members of the Association shall be required to take an 'Oath of Office' as prescribed by the Board.

Section 15 - Amending the Constitution and By-Laws

A. This constitution may be amended by a two-thirds majority of the delegates present and voting at any annual or special convention, provided that a proper notice of motion of such amendment is given by any official body of the Association, and received at central office not less than thirty days before the convention. Notification of such amendments to be printed in the official organ of the Association prior to the annual or special convention.
B. The By-Laws of the Association may be amended by resolution and passed by a majority of those delegates present and voting at any annual or special convention.

Section 16 - Provision for dissolving the Association

A. Dissolving the Association shall require a two-thirds majority vote by delegates at annual or special convention as per section 15.

B. In the event of dissolution, the assets contributed at the time of forming this Association shall, as nearly as possible, be returned to the contributing groups. The balance of accrued assets of the Association shall be returned on the basis of the group percentage of contribution.
BY-LAWS OF UNIFARM

Section 1 - Interpretation

The interpretation in the constitution also applies to these by-laws.

Section 2 - Membership

A. Members are individuals who have an active interest in farming or ranching by:

1. Actually operating a farm or ranch or being a producer of agricultural products who receives income from the sale of same.

B. An Associate Member is one who is:

1. A person retired from farming or ranching who maintains an interest in the affairs and activities of the association.

2. A person in a related occupation who is interested in the affairs and activities of the association.

C. The direct unit membership may consist of the member, of associate member, and his or her spouse and any wholly dependent children 16 years of age or over, who are either living with their parents or attending school, or university.

D. All members of the Farmers' Union of Alberta at the time of the Founding Convention shall have their membership transferred to the Association.

E. All life members of the Farmers' Union of Alberta shall be life members of the Association.

F. All organizational members who are members of the Alberta Federation of Agriculture at the time of the Founding Convention shall have their organizational membership transferred to the Association.
Section 3 – Locals

A. Not less than ten unit members may organize as a local subscribing to this constitution and by-laws and making due reports to the district organization.

B. Any person who becomes a member according to Section 4, sub-section A, of the constitution shall be eligible to join a local at the same time.

C. Membership in the Association does not necessarily constitute membership in the local.

D. A local may serve as the basis for group services.

E. A local may assist the District Organization in the collection of Association membership.

F. A local may present resolutions to the District Organization.

G. A local may collect a local fee.

H. A recommended structure that locals may use:

1. The local annual meeting shall elect the following officials:

   (a) Local President
   (b) Vice-President of the Local
   (c) May elect not more than 5 local directors
   (d) The local secretary-treasurer may be elected by the local annual meeting or appointed by the local board
   (e) The annual meeting shall be held not later than January 31 in each year.

2. Local President, Vice-Presidents and Directors should:

   (a) Attend all local meetings
   (b) Manage the affairs of the local
   (c) Administer the funds of the local
   (d) Keep the members informed on Association activities.
3. Local Secretaries, Treasurers or Secretary-Treasurer should:

(a) Attend all meetings of the local and keep correct minutes of them.

(b) Keep an accurate record of all funds of the local and safeguard them by depositing the funds in a bank account in the name of the local.

(c) Prior to the local meeting have the books of the local audited by a committee selected by the local and prepare a financial statement for presentation at the local annual meeting.

(d) On instructions of the local president or board call meetings of the local.

(e) Be responsible for all correspondence.

Section 4 - District Organization

A. District Organization boundaries shall be co-terminous with County, M.D., I.D., or Special Areas boundaries except where the Board finds it practical to use other boundaries.

B. The District Council shall assist locals in carrying out progressive and constructive programs. The District Council shall be responsible for the necessary expense incurred in such work.

C. The District Council shall appoint a Secretary-Treasurer who shall be responsible to the Council.

D. The district organization may make provisions for a Junior branch in the district organization which may consist of persons included in the unit membership who are under 20 years of age and who wish to participate in a Junior Branch.

E. Duties of District Council officials:

1. The District Chairman shall:
(a) Attend the District Council.
(b) Call and attend annual District meetings.
(c) Call meetings of the District Council as deemed advisable by himself or the Council or at the written request of two members of the Council.
(d) Supervise expenditures of District funds.
(e) Assist the District in promoting the aims of the Association in the District.

2. The Vice-Chairman shall:

(a) Assist the District Chairman in carrying out his or her duties.
(b) In case the office of Chairman becomes vacant, take over and discharge all his or her duties until the next annual District meeting.

3. The District Secretary-Treasurer shall:

(a) Attend all Council or District meetings.
(b) Keep proper minutes of all such meetings.
(c) Protect the funds of the District organization by depositing them in a bank in the name of the District organization.
(d) Forward copies of required reports, minutes and financial statements to the Central Office of the Association.
(e) Prepare or cause to be prepared an audited financial statement annually, which shall be presented at the District annual meeting.
(f) Be responsible for all correspondence.
(g) Perform other duties as the District Council may determine.
(h) To forward to all locals information that comes from the Association Central Office.

Section 5 - Regional Organization

A. The Region will have two distinct functions:

1. It provides a designated area for representation of a Regional Director and also provides a medium whereby he could be elected.
2. Offers provision for discussion of resolutions at the Regional meeting comprising of District organization.

B. Structure:

1. Wherever possible, the Regional boundaries shall be coterminous with natural divisions, or administrative boundaries of municipalities, counties or I.D.'s.

2. A Region will be formed of several counties, municipalities, I.D.'s or other administrative areas such as a Special Area, as determined by the Board.

3. To provide uniform distribution of representation at the Regional meeting, all the members of the District Councils, plus delegates from the District organization on the basis of one delegate per twenty unit members shall have voting privileges at the Regional meeting.

C. Organization:

1. A Region will be a non-administrative entity.

2. A Regional Director shall be elected by the accredited delegates of the membership of the Districts of the region.

3. There will be no Regional boards or alternative director.

4. The Region will not have a treasury. Necessary financing shall be paid by the District organization or the Central office, depending upon the activity.

5. In the event of the Regional Director resigning or being otherwise unable to carry out the duties of the Director, the executives of the District Organizations in the Region shall meet and appoint a Director who shall carry on until the next annual meeting of the Region.

6. The District organization chairmen shall form a committee which shall assist the Regional Director when necessary. Their main duty shall be the organization of and holding of the Regional annual meeting.
7. The Regional annual meeting shall be for the purpose of electing the Regional Director, discussing policy placed before it by the members of the District organizations, hearing reports, or other business brought before it.

8. Members of the District Councils will have delegate standing and are expected to attend the annual Regional meeting.

9. Deliberations at the Regional annual meeting shall be recorded by a recorder appointed by the meeting and the minutes shall be forwarded to Central Office.

10. The cost of the Regional annual meeting shall be borne by the District organizations.

D. The Regional Director

1. The Regional Director shall serve his designated Region and represent it on the Provincial Board.

2. The Regional Director shall attend the annual meetings of the District organizations within his Region.

3. He shall attend all meetings of the Provincial Board and the Annual Provincial Convention.

4. When requested to work in the Region by the Provincial Board, or for attending annual District meetings, the remuneration shall come from the Central Office.

5. When requested by the District Council to do work or attend their special meetings, the Regional Director shall be paid by the District Council.

Section 6 - Meetings of Directors

A. The Board of Directors shall meet as soon as convenient or not later than thirty (30) days following the annual meeting of delegates to elect the provincial executive, and conduct such other business as required by the constitution.
NDP .... New Democratic Party

NPU ..... National Farmers Union

NSPA ..... Nova Scotia Federation of Agriculture

OMMB ..... Ontario Milk Marketing Board

OFA ..... Ontario Federation of Agriculture

OFU ..... Ontario Farmers Union

PEIFA ..... Prince Edward Island Federation of Agriculture

PMO ..... Prime Minister's Office

SARM ..... Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities

SFA ..... Saskatchewan Federation of Agriculture

SPU ..... Saskatchewan Farmers Union

SWP ..... Saskatchewan Wheat Pool

TGGA ..... Territorial Grain Growers Association

UCC ..... Union Catholique des Cultivateurs

UCO ..... United Cooperatives of Ontario

UFA ..... United Farmers of Alberta

UFC ..... United Farmers of Canada

UFM ..... United Farmers of Manitoba

UFO ..... United Farmers of Ontario

UGG ..... United Grain Growers

WAC ..... Western Agricultural Conference

WSGA ..... Western Stock Growers Association
APPENDIX F

MINISTERS OF AGRICULTURE

SINCE

CONFEDERATION

First Ministry (Liberal-Conservative)
July 1st, 1867 to November 5th, 1873,
Prime Minister, the Hon. Sir John A. Macdonald

Senator Jean Charles Chapais July 1, 1867 - Nov. 15, 1869
Hon. Christopher Dunkin Nov. 16, 1869 - Oct. 24, 1871
Hon. John Henry Pope Oct. 25, 1871 - Nov. 5, 1873

Second Ministry (Liberal)
November 7th, 1873 to October 9th, 1878,
Prime Minister, the Hon. Alexander MacKenzie

Senator Luc Letellier de St. Just Nov. 7, 1873 - Dec. 14, 1876
Hon. Isaac Burpee (Acting Minister) Dec. 15, 1876 - Jan. 25, 1877
Hon. Charles Alphonse Pantaleon Pelletier Jan. 26, 1877 - Oct. 9, 1878

Third Ministry (Liberal-Conservative)
October 17th, 1878 to June 6th, 1891
Prime Minister, the Hon. Sir John A. Macdonald

Hon. John Henry Pope Oct. 17, 1878 - Sept 24, 1885
Hon. John Carling Sept 25, 1885 - June 6, 1891

Fourth Ministry (Liberal-Conservative)
June 16th, 1891 to November 24th, 1892
Prime Minister, the Hon. Sir John Joseph Caldwell Abbott (Senator)

Senator John Carling June 16, 1891 - Nov. 24, 1892
(Carling resigned from Senate
Feb. 17, 1892 to contest a by-election
and was elected Feb. 28, 1892)

Fifth Ministry (Liberal-Conservative)
December 5th, 1892 to December 12th, 1894,
Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Sir Sparrow David Thompson

Senator Auguste Réal Angers Dec. 5, 1892 - Dec. 12, 1894
Sixth Ministry (Liberal-Conservative)
December 21st, 1894 to April 27th, 1896,
Prime Minister, the Hon. Sir Mackenzie Bowell

Senator Auguste Réal Angers Dec. 21, 1894 – July 11, 1895
Hon. Joseph Aldric Ouimet July 12, 1895 – Dec. 20, 1895
(Acting Minister)
Hon. Walter Humphries Montague Dec. 21, 1895 – Jan. 6, 1896
(Acting Minister)

Seventh Ministry (Liberal-Conservative)
May 1st, 1896 to July 8th, 1896,
Prime Minister, the Hon. Sir Charles Tupper

Hon. Walter Humphries Montague May 1, 1896 – July 8, 1896

Eighth Ministry (Liberal)
July 11th, 1896 to October 6th, 1911,
Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Sir Wilfrid Laurier

Hon. Sydney Arthur Fisher July 13, 1896 – Oct. 6, 1911

Ninth Ministry (Conservative)
October 10th, 1911 to October 12th, 1917,
Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Laird Borden


Tenth Ministry (Unionist)
October 12th, 1917 to July 10th, 1920,
Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Laird Borden

Vacant June 11, 1919 – June 17, 1919
Hon. James Alexander Calder (L) June 18, 1919 – Aug. 1, 1919
(Acting Minister)
Hon. Simon Fraser Tolmie (C) Aug. 2, 1919 – July 10, 1920

Eleventh Ministry (Unionist "National Liberal and Conservative Party")
July 10th, 1920 to December 29th, 1921,
Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Arthur Meighen

Hon. Simon Fraser Tolmie July 10, 1920 – Dec. 29, 1921

Twelfth Ministry (Liberal)
December 29th, 1921 to June 28th, 1926,
Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. William Lyon Mackenzie King

Hon. William Richard Motherwell Dec. 29, 1921 – June 28, 1926
Thirteenth Ministry (Conservative)
June 29th to September 25th, 1926.
Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Arthur Meighen
Hon. Henry Herbert Stevens  June 29, 1926 - July 12, 1926
(Acting Minister)
Hon. Simon Fraser Tolmie  July 13, 1926 - Sept 25, 1926

Fourteenth Ministry (Liberal)
September 25th, 1926 to August 6th, 1930,
Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. William Lyon Mackenzie King
Hon. William Richard Motherwell  Sept 25, 1926 - Aug. 6, 1930

Fifteenth Ministry (Conservative)
August 7th, 1930 to October 23rd, 1935,
Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Richard Bedford Bennett

Sixteenth Ministry (Liberal)
October 23rd, 1935 to November 15th, 1948
Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. William Lyon Mackenzie King
(Acting Minister)

Seventeenth Ministry (Liberal)
November 15th, 1948 to June 21, 1957,
Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Louis Stephen St. Laurent
Rt. Hon. James Garfield Gardiner  Nov. 15, 1948 - June 21, 1957

Eighteenth Ministry (Conservative)
June 21st, 1957 to April 22nd, 1963
Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. John George Diefenbaker
(Acting Minister)

Nineteenth Ministry (Liberal)
April 22nd, 1963 - June 1968
Prime Minister, Rt. Hon. Lester Bowles Pearson
Twentieth Ministry (Liberal)
Prime Minister, Rt. Hon. Pierre Elliott Trudeau
Hon. Horace A. Olson  July 6, 1968 - Nov. 27, 1972
Hon. Eugene Whelam  Nov. 27, 1972 -

Chapais
born - Rivière Quelle, Lower Canada 1811-1851-57 - represented Kamouraska

Dunkin
born - London, England 1858-61 represented Drummond and Arthabaska 1862-71 member for Bromp

Pope
born - Eastern Townships, Lower Canada (Compton)

Letellier de St. Just
born - Rivière Quelle, Lower Canada 1851-52 represented Kamouraska 1860 Legislative Council for "Granville" division

Burpee
born - Sheffield, N.B. 1825 1848 - moved to St. John, N.B.

Pelletier
born - Rivière Quelle, Lower Canada 1860 educated - Collège Ste. Anne de la Pocatière and Laval University

Carling
born and educated - London, Middlesex County, Upper Canada

Angers
born Quebec, Lower Canada

Ouimet
born - St. Eustache, Lower Canada  St. Mary's Jesuit College and College of Montreal, practised law in Montreal for a number of years

Montague
born - Adelaide, Middlesex County, Ontario  School of Medicine, Toronto and Victoria University, Cobourg, practised medicine in Dunnville, Ontario

Ferguson
born - Marshfield, P.E.I.
Fisher

born - Montreal, Lower Canada

Burrell

born - Faringdon, Berks., England 1858
engaged in horticulture, Niagara Peninsula, 1886 - 1900, after 1900 - engaged in fruit growing in B.C., mayor Grand Forks, B.C. 1903

Crerar

born - Molesworth, Ont.
educ. - Manitoba

Calder

born - Ingersoll, Ont. 1868
moved to Manitoba 1882
later - Regina, Sask.

Tolmie

born - Victoria, B.C. 1867
educ. - Ontario Veterinary College, Toronto
1917 - 28 represented Victoria

Motherwell

born - Perth, Ont. 1860
went West 1881
farmed at Abernethy
sat for Qu'Appelle (local) 1905-08
after 1908 - Humboldt

Stevens

born - Bristol, Eng.
educ. - England, Peterboro, Ont., Univ. of B.C.
resided in Vancouver from about 1910 on

Weir

born - Wingham, Ont. 1882
educ. - Clinton, Ont., London, Ont., Toronto, Ont.
farmed in Weldon, Sask.

Gardiner

born - Farquhar, Ont.
farmed - Limburg, Sask.

Harkness

born - Toronto, Ont.
resided in Calgary

Hamilton

born - Kenora, Ont.
represented Rosetown, Saskatoon, Sask.

Hays

born - Carstairs, Alta.
represented Calgary South, Alberta

Greene

born - Toronto, Ont.
represented Renfrew South
Olson

born - Iddesleigh, Alta.
represented Medicine Hat, Alta.

Whelan

born - Amherstburg, Ont.
represents Essex, Ont.
APPENDIX G

AN INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS STUDY

AERC .... Agricultural Economics Research Council

APA .... Alberta Federation of Agriculture

APBF .... American Farm Bureau Federation

AWP .... Alberta Wheat Pool

BCPA .... British Columbia Federation of Agriculture

BCFU .... British Columbia Farmers Union

BGC .... Board of Grain Commissioners

CAC .... Consumers Association of Canada

CASCC ... Canadian Agriculture Services Co-ordinating Committee

CBC .... Canadian Broiler Council

CBC .... Canadian Broadcasting Corporation

CCA .... Canadian Cattlemen's Association

CCA .... Canadian Council of Agriculture (defunct)

CDA .... Canada Department of Agriculture

CDC .... Canadian Dairy Commission

CPEPC .... Canadian Egg Producers Council

CFA .... Canadian Federation of Agriculture

CGC .... Canada Grain Council

CGC .... Canadian Geographic Council
CLC ........ Canadian Labour Congress
CLFB ........ Canadian Livestock Feed Board
Coop Fédérée Cooperative Fédérée de Québec
CWB ........ Canadian Wheat Board
CRTC ........ Canadian Radio and Television Commission
CSC ........ Canadian Swine Council
CUC ........ Canadian Union of Cooperatives
DFC ........ Dairy Farmers of Canada
EAC ........ Eastern Agricultural Conference
FAC ........ Food and Agricultural Organization (United Nations)
FUA ........ Farmers Union of Alberta
GFO ........ General Farm Organization
IFAP ........ International Federation of Agricultural Producers
MCS ........ Maritime Cooperative Services, Ltd.
MPA ........ Maritime Federation of Agriculture
MFB ........ Manitoba Farm Bureau
MPU ........ Manitoba Farmers Union
MGGA ........ Manitoba Grain Growers Association
MWP ........ Manitoba Wheat Pool
NAAC ........ National Agricultural Advisory Council
NBFA ........ New Brunswick Federation of Agriculture
NDP .......... New Democratic Party
NFU .......... National Farmers Union
NSFA .......... Nova Scotia Federation of Agriculture
OMMB .......... Ontario Milk Marketing Board
OFA .......... Ontario Federation of Agriculture
OFU .......... Ontario Farmers Union
PEIPA .......... Prince Edward Island Federation of Agriculture
PMO .......... Prime Minister's Office
SARM .......... Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities
SFA .......... Saskatchewan Federation of Agriculture
SPU .......... Saskatchewan Farmers Union
SWP .......... Saskatchewan Wheat Pool
TGGA .......... Territorial Grain Growers Association
UCC .......... Union Catholique des Cultivateurs
UCO .......... United Cooperatives of Ontario
UPA .......... United Farmers of Alberta
UFC .......... United Farmers of Canada
UFM .......... United Farmers of Manitoba
UFO .......... United Farmers of Ontario
UGG .......... United Grain Growers
WAC .......... Western Agricultural Conference
WSGA .......... Western Stock Growers Association
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