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**"OBJECTIVE", "NEUTRAL" AND "NATURAL" PHALLACIES:
FEMINISM(S) AND THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF
SCIENCE AND THE "PRO-FAMILY" MOVEMENT**

by

Cheryl Storey, B.A. Hons.

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

August, 1987

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ISBN 0-315-39408-0

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Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
acceptance of the thesis

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FEMINISM(S) AND THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL CRITIQUE
OF SCIENCE AND THE "PRO-FAMILY" MOVEMENT

submitted by Cheryl Storey, B.A. Hons.,
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts

Carol Dwyer David Kent
Thesis Supervisors

Joe Vinn
Chairman, Department of
Sociology and Anthropology
Carleton University

August, 1987

ABSTRACT

This thesis is an exploration in feminist epistemology by way of a critique of the "sex/gender system". In this thesis we will examine the relationship between the controlling assumptions underlying the establishment of scientific thought and the thought of the "pro-family" movement. It is shown how the epistemological base in both are but interconnected manifestations of the "sex/gender system".

The feminist perspective taken in this thesis is expressive of the multiplicity of feminist Voices as denoted by the term "feminism(s)". It is shown how "feminism(s)" embodies a revolutionary epistemology which directly challenges the one Voice or "the Voice that knows" contained in the appeal to an "objective" knowledge in scientific thought and an appeal to the "natural" in the thought of the "pro-family" movement.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my profound gratitude to my thesis supervisors, Dr. Caryll Steffens and Dr. Jared Keil for their guidance, critiques, patience, and trust in my endeavours to work through and complete this work. They have been integral to this process as has their friendship.

I would also like to express my many thanks to Karen Fox of the School of Social Work at Carleton and to Professor David Howes and Michelle Coutu of Concordia University. Without their suggestions and support I might not have had the courage to take on this project.

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is about epistemology; about how we come to think and act on the world. "Epistemology" is a grandiose label, but it is an important tool. It allows us to explore "patterns of assumptions" informing thought and practice. Patterns of thought are socially constructed, imposed on the world, and come about, at least in part, through the process of "naming". Naming is the means whereby we order the world, impose a pattern on it, to make sense of, and manipulate it (Spender, 1980).

The purpose of this thesis is to expose how the dominant Western way of thinking and acting on the world, especially as it relates to women's lives, is oppressive. It will be shown that this mode of thought is premised on relations of dualism, hierarchy, and control. These premises can be seen as motivated and held in place by the "sex/gender system". The "sex/gender system" necessitates and precipitates asymmetrical power relations between women and men, production and reproduction, and between the so-called "private" and the so-called "public" or "political" realms: it is constitutive of the "deepest division of humanity within itself and from itself" (Miles, 1982; Flax, 1983).

The importance of the epistemological critique of science and the "pro-family" movement as manifestations of the sex/gender system is twofold. First, it is my

personal/political endeavour to enucleate and deconstruct the "phallacy" that there is something "objective" and/or "natural" about the exclusion and devaluation of women's experiences of the (social) world. I shall argue that all knowledge is socially constructed, and that as such it reflects the bias of those doing the naming in our society, most notably men. Yet the "maleness" or masculinist bias in knowledge constructions has remained virtually invisible. It is the "norm" from which counter knowledge constructions are evaluated and devalued. This situation makes it that much more vital to recognize that there is nothing inevitable about the asymmetrical way of ordering the world, where the public sphere, production, and men are valued over against the private sphere, reproduction and women - an ordering which purports to be "objective" in science, and "natural" in the thought of the so-called "pro-family" movement, but is in fact quite the reverse.

Second, the analysis to be undertaken in this thesis is intended to illustrate the multiplicity of feminist Voices, as denoted by my use of the term "feminism(s)". "Feminism(s)" is to be read as both singular and plural, which, on the one hand, points to the revolutionary epistemology embodied in this notion. On the other hand, it enables us to see the intimate relationship between the controlling assumptions in the historical development of "science" and the thought of the "pro-family" movement. I

shall argue that both science and the "pro-family" movement are but different manifestations of the sex/gender system, hence, androcentric at their core.

I have placed the discussion of "feminism(s)" before the chapters on "science" and the "pro-family" movement deliberately, as it reflects thoughts/questions which (in)form the basis of this thesis. More over, feminism(s) provides us with analytic/practical tools to overcome the social and psychic "splits" that the sex/gender system engenders.

It must be emphasized that the relationship I wish to expose between science and the thought of the "pro-family" movement is of an epistemological order, and, therefore, revealed through an exploration of the controlling assumptions in each. I will demonstrate how women have traditionally been perceived as being somehow "closer to nature" and how nature is identified as female (Merchant, 1980), where both "nature" and "female" are subordinated and devalued in relation to that which denotes "culture" and "male". In the process of examining the historical development of "modern science" we will discover how science can be described as that which sets out to control (female) nature as a necessary condition for its ostensibly "objective" claims to knowledge of "reality".

Similarly, the most basic assumption underlying the thought of the "pro-family" movement will be shown to be that

asymmetrical power relations between women and men are somehow "natural" which is most exemplified in the writings of Phyllis Schlafly and George Gilder. Upon reviewing many analyses of the new right, I have chosen to focus on the work of these two "pro-family" advocates, because they are among the leading spokes-persons for the New Right and both are prime exponents of "pro-family" ideology. As we shall see, the thought and practice underpinning the "pro-family" movement's politics necessitates the repression/oppression of women and achieves this objective by appealing to the "natural".

Thus, whereas science can be described as that which sets out to control nature (identified as female), the "pro-family" movement can be described as that which sets out to control women. In this way, I will argue that the controlling assumptions underpinning both "scientific" and "pro-family" thought are but interconnected manifestations of the sex/gender system - a system which necessitates the asymmetrical ordering of all that which is associated as Masculine (i.e., culture and men), over and against that which is Other (most notably, nature and women).

Chapter One will introduce the reader to how I understand feminism(s) as a series of interconnecting perspectives which take our experience of the sex/gender system to be the "object" of our inquiry. Chapter One thus both constitutes a literature review and establishes the general theoretical and

methodological framework from which my analysis proceeds. Chapter Two shows how feminism(s) directly challenges (physical) science's claim to an objective, neutral and universal knowledge of "reality" by exposing the subjective, deeply interested, partial and male assumptions on which this body of scientific thought is erected. Chapter Three shows how the thought of the "pro-family" movement attempts to justify the subordination of women by men by claiming that this is "natural" while in fact, politicizing the very same assumptions already shown to underlie the "scientific" worldview. In both instances the assumptions are shown to yield knowledge constructs that are the opposite of what they pretend to be; i.e., subjective as opposed to "objective", artificial as opposed to "natural" and, in both cases, in the interests of (some) men and oppressive to (all) women.. Chapter Four shows how these phallacies are but interconnected manifestations of the sex/gender system, which always purports to speak as "the Voice that knows". In this chapter the controlling assumptions underpinning the physical sciences and the thought of the "pro-family" movement will be situated within a sociological paradigmatic grid. Finally, I will point to some of the implications for a feminist social science which arise out of the discussions in the preceding chapters.

CHAPTER ONE: FEMINISM(S)

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to my understanding of feminism(s) as a series of interconnecting perspectives which take our experience of the "sex/gender system" as our "object" of analysis. I will attempt to weave my theoretical and methodological framework through a series of discussions to make my own presumptions about the nature and revolutionary character of feminism(s) clear.

Feminist Herstory: Interruptions and Silences

Feminism is all too often presented in the popular media as a contemporary "fad", a homogenous group of "men-haters", and/or as a myth propagated in the name of "post-feminism":

There can be no doubt: feminism has fallen on evil days. It's suffering from two things at the same time: immaturity and old age (Chatelaine, September, 1986: 59).

But feminism is neither a contemporary fad, a monolithic "organization", nor an historically insignificant and dying phenomenon.

Feminism has always existed (O'Brien cited in Randall, 1985: 2), as a resistance to subordination (Jaggar, 1983: 3) and as a set of ideas and beliefs (Pierson, cited in Randall 1985: 2). Feminism as a visible movement, however, is argued to have emerged in the last two to four hundred years notably

in England, France, and then America. With the rise of an industrialized economy came an increased isolation of women, increased dependency on husband's/father's wages, and the institutionalization of liberal ideals — one of the bases for challenging gender inequality (Jaggar, 1983: 3-14). Even so,

"our existence, our tradition, is one of interruptions and silences: the entire history of women's struggle for self-determination has been muffled in silence over and over... [E]ach feminist work has tended to be received as if it emerged from nowhere; as if each one of us had lived, thought, worked, without any historical past or contextual present (Rich cited in Spender, 1983: 14).

In this way much of women's work, writing, thinking, questioning, and suffering has been made to seem "sporadic", emerging out of a social and historical vacuum, "orphaned of any tradition of its own" (Ibid: 14).

Situating the feminist movement historically is not, therefore, an easy task. This project is especially challenging in view of the repeated interruptions and silencing of those women who have personally and collectively voiced the need to change the situation of women. For example, why did I never learn about the burning of thousands of women as witches in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in my history classes (Merchant, 1980: 127-148; Daly, 1978: 178-222)? Why did I never study the works of Aphra Behn, who wrote and produced seventeen plays in England in the late sixteen hundreds (cited in Spender, 1983: 32-42)?

Those of us who have had access to the realm of knowledge production and transmission have been required to question

the assumptions, models, metaphors, and theories of established traditions of thought within their own parameters. (cf. Smith, 1975: 353; 1979: 135-139). But when we consciously question the parameters themselves - exposing their androcentric (male-centered) bias, we are called radical, we are tortured and burned, we are dismissed or provoked to resign from our "privileged" positions within the academy (like Luce Irigaray or Sheila McIntyre).¹

In questioning knowledge and the knowledge constructs that continue to define the nature and limits of our "place" and "position" in society, we expose the androcentric bias which informs traditional Western theories and practices. We have identified these as reflections and reinforcements of "male-stream thought" (O'Brien, 1981) and have explained this in varying degrees and forms from our differentiated feminist standpoints.

Feminism(s) assumes/experiences that the oppression of women and the forms of our resistance to that oppression arise out of socially constructed activities, a process in which knowledge production, transmission and acquisition are inextricably interrelated and interdependent. A feminist critique of knowledge then, is inseparable from the feminist

1. Luce Irigaray dared to question the authority of Jacques Lacan and was fired from her position at Vincennes and expelled from the Freudian School in France. Sheila McIntyre dared to expose the gender bias in law at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario and, after drawing national media attention, is still teaching.

critique of power (MacKinnon, 1978: 636). In this way feminists argue that "male" and "female" connote much more than biologically differentiated members of the same species.

The "names" or typologies of "male and female" connote a particular system of power relations wherein the notion of "maleness" refers to that which is valued and dominant over that which is named "female". The category "female" includes all that which is devalued and subordinated to "male" (McIntyre, n.d.). "The female represents all that is either not civilized and/or not rational or moral. In turn, the denial becomes a justification for relegating women to the private sphere and devaluing what women are allowed to do and be" (Flax, 1983: 268). These notions, O'Brien (1981: 117) argues, have "a material base in lived male lives". But, for the most part, the notions of "male" and "female", which we learn and internalize to become properly engendered in our gendered society (Flax, 1983) are so historically entrenched and reinforced that they come to appear as "natural". For this reason, among others, feminism(s) faces tremendous opposition. As Helen Levine (1982: 176) suggests:

There is tremendous opposition to even considering women, a sex, as an oppressed group. The definition intrudes on every woman's and man's existence. The oppression of women in its various forms is so rampant and so old that it is seen by men and some women as normal and natural.

But if women's social position/condition is indeed somehow "naturally" subordinate to men's, then how do we explain (a) the existence of feminism and (b) this tremendous opposition?

And why do certain social ideologies and practices exist to shape and mold us into exclusionary, and differentially valued "genders" with so much effort. The social institutions and practices that serve to reinforce our "natural" subordination include among others: "the" family which keeps and expects women to be economically, psychologically, and politically dependent on men; pornography which functions to "influence [our] consciousness"; the segregation of women in low-paying service jobs, which even if functional to capitalism, doesn't explain why "such persons must be biologically female"; and the "rape-paradigm - where the victim of sexual assault is held responsible for her own victimization" (Rich, 1980: 643). Simply put: "people do not revolt against what is natural" (Delphy, 1984: 211).

Knowledge is Power

Knowledge is not produced, transmitted, or acquired in a social, cultural, historical, political, economic or gender-free vacuum. Knowledge is socially constructed and therefore reflective of the bias of those doing the naming in our society, most notably men (Flax, 1983; O'Brien, 1981; Keller, 1985; and Spender, 1980):

Naming is the means whereby we attempt to order and structure the chaos and flux of existence which would otherwise be an undifferentiated mass. By assigning names we impose a pattern and a meaning which allows us to manipulate the world (Spender, 1980: 163).

Spender (1980: 63) documents how (some) men exercise a monopoly over "naming the world". Both the process of "naming" and its "meanings" are thus "man-made and man-governed" to the systematic exclusion and repression of women's encoding of experience. In naming the world, a particular understanding of difference is put forward, exaggerated and institutionalized, necessarily obviating any alternatives in the process (cf., Bleir 1986: 6). Any engagement in the process of naming is thus essentially biased. If all persons or even areas of academic inquiry were given equal opportunity to name and organize the world, there might be recognition of the multiplicity of perspectives. But the power to name is not accessible to the masses. The power to name is held by (some) men. Choices must be made in terms of how we name, what we name, what we exclude and whom we exclude - i.e., women (Spender, 1980: 163-164).

Feminists have come to critically question the extent to which all knowledge constructions are gendered and the processes by which the "maleness" of knowledge has remained virtually invisible. Moreover, feminists such as Dale Spender (1980) and Dorothy Smith (1975; 1979) have documented how, and the extent to which, the construction, dissemination, transmission and expression of knowledge serves to re-enforce/re-create social women's inferior position to social men's. Both feminists argue that one of

the major historical aspects of this dynamic of domination and subordination is the systematic silencing and exclusion of women's meanings from the production of cultural forms and meanings. Women's meanings derive from their differentiated social position and life experience in relation to men, and their differentiated social positions and life experiences in relation to each other, including differentiated experiences of class, race, and sexual orientation. But in a gendered social system like our own, where gender is an exclusionary category (Flax, 1983: 246), and only one gender has the power to name the world, women's meanings are not encoded as women themselves may have experienced them because they are encoded by (some) men and thus understood only in relation to Man.

Consider the example of the meaning of motherhood in our culture as critiqued by Spender (1980: 54): "[Motherhood] means feminine fulfillment... something beautiful, that leaves women consumed and replete with joy". However, even for women for whom this description feels "right", it was probably not all they experienced in the birthing and/or rearing of children. The notion that the experience of "motherhood" is "something beautiful" is a partial expression of this experience, as it has been experienced by some women. In the above quotation, the notion of "feminine fulfillment" through motherhood which is "replete with joy" refers to the experience of motherhood as an institution. It is a partial experience, and yet it is the definition or "meaning" which

is propagated to the repression of alternative and/or conflicting experiences of the notion of "motherhood". Thus, women who challenge the equation of "motherhood" with "feminine fulfillment" and/or this experience supposedly "replete with joy":

"risk being labelled unnatural [or abnormal] so [that many women] may elect not to transmit their experience and their version of motherhood to the next generation. They may even withhold such information from their daughters. And so the chain [of women's meanings] is broken (Spender, 1980: 55).

In this way, Dorothy Smith (1979: 135) argues, women (potentially) experience a "rupture" between our experiences as women and the social forms of expression available to us, and which we must engage in order to communicate our experiences in a "man-made world":

The forms of thought, the means of expression which we had available to us to formulate our experience were made or controlled by men. From that center women appeared as objects..... [Women] could share in this circle only by receiving its terms and its relevances. These have been and still are the terms and relevances of a discourse among men (Smith, 1979: 137).

* Specificity and Difference

It is through our conscious desire to understand/question and ultimately overcome the limits/contradictions of our own personal/collective position(s)/experience(s) of Other-ness in a "man-made world" that has made many feminists recognize the need to engage masculinist knowledge constructions in order to transcend them (Daly, 1978). As O'Brien (1981: 13) stresses, we must critique the theories of traditional

Western thought and "conserve what is valid and transcend what is not" from our intersecting and differentiating feminist standpoints.

Many feminists, such as Christine Delphy (1984: 212), emphasize the importance of engaging oppressive ways of thinking and acting on the world in order to explain (and explain to transcend) the oppression of women. Thus, in our struggles to take hold of masculinist knowledge constructions, we are not suggesting that feminists just replace the present order with one other way of thinking and acting on the world. Rather, we are suggesting that by speaking "as women" as opposed to "would-be-men" (Miles, 1982a: 23) - "acting consciously against this domination and fragmentation" (Miles: 9) - we are already beginning to transform the masculinist knowledge construction, which depends on our silence for its internal consistency and meaning. Irigaray (1985: 68) reminds us that:

[W]hat is important is to disconcert the staging of representation according to exclusively "masculine" parameters, that is, according to a phallographic social order. It is not a matter of toppling that order so as to replace it - that amounts to the same thing in the end - but of disrupting and modifying it.

Thus in taking the standpoint of the oppressed, that is, of women's experience of the "sex/gender system", we do not assume, as androcentric knowledge constructors do, that our experience(s) of the world is all there is:

I know that I am a product of a particular group in a particular culture and that I am being critical of another group that has presumed to treat its particular

and limited experience as the whole. I would not wish to make the same mistake as those of who I am critical. I do not assume that my experience of the world is all that there is (Spender, 1983: 18).

Moreover, most feminists do not assume that to take hold of women, in our specificity, would be to deny our differences (Miles, 1982b; 1985) in terms of our oppressive experiences of classism, racism, homophobia and daily lived realities. At the same time, however, under the sex/gender system we come to understand (and struggle to overcome) our experience(s)/position(s) in relation to men. This is our common experience as women:

We share the experience of oppression by men: we share our exclusion from the male frames of reference, our lack of knowledge of a past, invisibility, our deviancy, our wrongness. Now as in the past, we have been on the receiving end of male power, we have been obliged to obtain access to the world's resources, through men, as owners, fathers, husbands, employers. This is the common frame of reference which we share (Spender, 1983: 18).

This "common frame of reference which we share" is one of a condition of exclusion, "Otherness", and "lack" from the standpoint of those doing the "naming" in our society. This standpoint or position which both excludes and devalues us, presupposes and perpetuates the "sex/gender system" (Harding, 1983; 1986).

The Sex/Gender System

The "sex/gender system" (Rubin, 1975) can be defined as that system which organizes the world according to gender. According to Harding (1986: 18) "gendered" social life is produced in three ways:

[1] it is the result of assigning dualistic gender metaphors to various perceived dichotomies that rarely have anything to do with sex differences; [2] it is the consequence of appealing to these gender dualisms to organize social activity, of dividing necessary social activities between different groups of humans; [3] it is a form of socially constructed individual identity only imperfectly correlated with either the "reality" or the perception of sex differences.

The magnitude and analytic potential of Harding's understanding of gender is illustrated in the following table of asymmetrical oppositions which typify Western thought and action. Many feminists have noted these dualisms (among others, Keller, 1985; O'Brien, 1981; Finn, 1984):

Table 1

nature	culture
female	male
non-European	European
animal	human
working-class	upper/middle class
reproduction	production
private	public
family	economy

The above table is a modified version of the one cited in a discussion on "women and nature" by British feminist Lynda Birke (1986: 110). One set of terms, or column, is always privileged over and against the other in modern Western society. This table, therefore is a material manifestation

of the sex/gender system. This system organizes our perceptions of the world in a determinate manner, by positing hierarchy in duality, or, in fact, in any instance of difference. By taking our experience of the sex/gender system as our "object" of analysis, we can therefore see how "gender" signifies far more than the biologically differentiated species. Gender refers to "an asymmetrical category of thought, social organization, and individual identity and behaviour" (Harding, 1986: 55). The material effects of this way of organizing the world cannot be overemphasized.

Feminists are questioning/struggling and vision-ing, from the standpoint of the "Other". The "Other" refers to that which is devalued in patriarchal society; it refers to an oppressed group within many oppressions, namely women. Thinking back to the above table, we notice that not only are women categorically situated in the position of the devalued, but that they constitute the majority of living persons within the Other-Other categories as well (working-class people, non-European, etc.). In other words, it is predominantly white upper/middle class western men who both create and employ the positions with the power to name in our society. All Other groups of persons and their experiences of the social world are devalued (cf. Harding, 1986).

As Dorothy Smith (1979: 137) explains, from this circle, from the position of those doing the naming, everyone outside the circle comes to be seen as an object, as Other. Yet everyone outside the circle must still employ the terms of reference constructed by those within the circle to be recognized at all, assuming of course, that all those outside the circle have the resources to do so, and, not least, the desire.

By speaking/struggling "as women rather than would-be-men" (Miles, 1982a: 23) from a multiplicity of perspectives, feminists have been able to define that system which defines "us" differentially in relation to "men". By so naming us "Woman" (as opposed to creative, thinking, imaginative persons), the sex/gender system simultaneously names the nature, the function, the role, and the social sphere for all women, in terms of her capacity to reproduce. Then it appropriates that capacity:

Sex/gender is a system of male dominance made possible by men's control of women's productive and reproductive labour, where "reproduction" is construed to include sexuality, family life and kinship formations, as well as the birthing which biologically reproduces the species (Harding, 1983: 311).

So both by naming women "Woman" (cf. Morgan, 1984) that is, solely in terms of her reproductive capacity (and in opposition to Man), the sex/gender system depends upon the oppression/repression of women for its continuity.

We can now re-examine the discussion of how the notions or typologies of "male" and "female" refer to a particular

system of power relations. Each of these terms only gains its cultural meaning in relation to the other. Male means dominant over female, and female means subordinate to male. Within these typologies, females, "it is decided" (meaning by men (cf. Griffin, 1978: xv-xvii)) are somehow situated closer to nature (Birke, 1986: 107):

Anthropologists have pointed out that nature and women are both perceived to be on a lower level than culture, which has been associated symbolically and historically with men. Because women's physiological functions of reproduction, nurture, and childrearing are viewed as closer to nature, their social role is lower on the cultural scale than that of the male. Women are devalued by their tasks and roles, by their exclusion from community functions whence power is derived, and through symbolism (Merchant, 1980: 144).

At the same time that women are seen as being closer to nature, to the earth, to the animals, and therefore, more distanced from "civilized" man, women are seen as having only this one nature. On the other hand, men are said to have two natures. For example, O'Brien (1981: 118) states that "while men have two natures, however great their difficulties in getting them together, women have only one". Hence, second nature, associated with the public or political realm is seen as the domain of men (O'Brien, 1981: 118). Mary O'Brien shows how men's definition of self, that is, the cultural prescription to strive toward "maleness" or "genderic superiority", has always been contingent upon the repression of that which is understood to be female or "feminine". She goes on to say that "[w]omen have been perceived as integrated with first nature so completely that they do not

need a second nature". But since second nature is associated with the public, or political realm, of "ethical" man, this division is another way in which "Man has found his assurance of genderic superiority" (O'Brien: 119): that is, excluding women from the realm of the "public", defines the parameters of women's "natural" sphere as the "private realm".

Through these kinds of questions/recognitions, feminists have for hundreds of years questioned any and all justifications for positioning women, and valuing women only in relation to men. Our questions emerge from our conscious recognition of the "rupture" between our experiences as women and the social forms of expression available to us. These social forms (posing as universal) have not considered our experiences as we have lived them within the constraints of masculinist reality. In this way, our questions arise from our day to day experience(s) of power politics:

Feminism is the only revolutionary movement centrally concerned with the enactment of power politics in daily relations between women and men, in family, paid workforce and society. There can be no authentic feminist practice without this dimension (Levine, 1982: 207).

It can be said that as feminists our questions are best described as starting even before we ask our questions.

Feminism(s), in other words, starts or emerges out of our "non-questions":

Non-questions are those which so fundamentally challenge or question the philosophical structure of a society or civilization (in this case patriarchy) that they cannot be understood as questions at all by those who work entirely from within an established tradition

of thought. Further, they cannot even be asked very clearly by the questioner, whose mind has been trained within and is therefore occupied by the thought of the dominant tradition (Vickers, 1982: 28; cf. also Daly, 1978).

Our recognition and "naming" of "non-questions" further demonstrates our experiences as Other in Western, patriarchal society, while simultaneously revealing alternative ways of coming to know and act within the world, systematically devalued as those ways may be.

The Formation of Subjects

If only in "embryonic" form, we are beginning to understand and to explain our oppression "across class, culture and time" (Miles, 1982a: 9) while simultaneously taking our specificity and different life experiences into account:

[W]e know that this oppression is the most profound condition of alienation, the deepest division of humanity within itself and from itself, upon which all other fragmentation and domination has been built.

In Western societies we are born into a particular system of social relations, relations which typify the sex/gender system. That is, in our society, the sex/gender system necessitates an evaluative categorization of the sexes. Male and female human beings are not only differentiated but a fundamental hierarchy is posited between them, such that the sexes are stratified. "Gender" is a must in patriarchal society (Flax, 1983). Moreover, and as noted above, knowledge constructions reflect the biases of those doing the

naming in our society, most notably men (Spender, 1980; Smith, 1975; 1979). This suggests that our knowledge about the world would necessarily reflect the structures of consciousness of those doing the naming.

Before moving on to explore specific instances of knowledge constructions, showing how the sex/gender system pervades them, I am first concerned to explore the formation of subjects under the sex/gender system. I will argue that our experience of self and society is mediated by this system premised on relations of domination and fragmentation, and that the knowledge these subjects go on to produce reflects and reinforces the operation of the sex/gender system.

In the following discussion of feminist scholarship represented in the works of Mary O'Brien (1981), Jane Flax (1983), feminist Lacanians [such as Lemaire (1977), Urwin (1984), Mitchell (1985), Rose (1985) and Steffens (n.d.)] and finally Mary Daly (1978), I wish to draw attention to three specific themes already established in our general framework. That is, after presenting my reading of these feminist scholars, I wish to use their intersecting and differentiating analyses of women's oppression to show: (1) the systematic exclusion and devaluation of women's experience(s) of the social world; (2) how the sex/gender system is internalized (to a certain extent) and mediates our experience of Self; and (3) how the creative tension which emerges in and between these feminisms and their

differentiating attempts to best explain the oppression of women is a necessary and fruitful guiding principle in all feminist inquiry and practice.

These analyses, then, both alone and together, represent, at least in part, feminism's attempt to best explain in order to transcend the oppression of women from our differentiating experience(s) of the sex/gender system. The following descriptions of feminist scholarship also show how feminism(s), unlike the masculinist construction of reality, do not presume to speak as "the Voice that knows", but rather as a multiplicity of Voices. It is in this recognition of the partiality of our analyses and the creative tension that arise in and between those Voices that we are brought continually to reflect on and question the assumptions and limitations of our own individual and collective analyses of our experience(s)/explanations of the sex/gender system.

In so doing, our analyses are grounded in our personal/collective experiences of oppression and yet elastic in that the "maps" that we create continually unfold to reveal new directions/questions enfolded in our experiences/struggles. The works of O'Brien (1981), Flax (1983), Daly (1978) and the feminist Lacanians expose and critique the androcentric/phallogocentric bias which, feminists argue, informs Western thought and actions on the world. Moreover, these contributions to feminist scholarship (among many others) weave an ever-rooted/rooting and ever-

'transformative web of feminist theory and practice on multiple planes of explanation and experience.

Genderically Differentiated Structures of Consciousness

O'Brien (1981: 18) posits that feminist theory "starts within the process of reproduction". She argues that there is a dialectical relationship (1) between the processes of production and reproduction, (2) between productive labour and consciousness and (3) between reproductive labour and consciousness. It differs for women and men. She examines how 'genderically differentiated structures' of male and female consciousness (by women's absence) are reflected in Western theories of human nature. O'Brien argues that 'genderically differentiated structures of consciousness' have a material history and emerge at least in part, through the differentiating experiences of those who labour involuntarily and for those who don't (O'Brien, 1981).

O'Brien begins her analysis by standing both Hegel and Marx on their heads (Miles, 1985: 26). From Hegel, O'Brien takes the idea that the process of reproduction is dialectically structured; from Marx, the notion that human consciousness is transformed as people continually transform nature (society). O'Brien argues that the labour process and the process of reproduction are poles in opposition to one another and "whose mediation cannot be left to the workings of subjective consciousness but must be worked out in terms

of real live people, living a conscious life in a world which they continually transform" (O'Brien: 35). The poles do not have to be set in a relationship of opposition. The relationship could be otherwise. But O'Brien argues that it is only by historically situating how we have come to know and neglect this dialectical relation, that we have a basis from which to transcend this opposition.

O'Brien's critiques of Hegel and Marx provide the framework within which she is able to analyze the "dialectical genderically differentiated" structures of female and male consciousness in terms of the reproductive process. O'Brien posits that genderically differentiated structures of consciousness differ for those who labour reproductively and those who don't (O'Brien: 36). This is discussed in terms of a maternal consciousness: i.e., one of immediate knowing through involuntary labour, such as the acts of menstruation, child-birth, lactation, etcetera. In contradistinction to the maternal consciousness, the paternal consciousness is described as the dialectical relationship between the act of copulation (or loss of the male seed) and the social acts designed to reappropriate it (i.e., patrilineal inheritance rights, men's control over the design and management of reproductive technologies, etc.). "When we speak of appropriation, we speak of a relationship of dominance and control. Clearly, there is much more to

reproduction than meets a narrow physiological eye" (O'Brien: 48).

O'Brien locates two "world historical events" which provoked a transformation in reproductive consciousness, namely the "discovery" of physiological paternity and the new contraceptive technologies.

First is the discovery of physiological paternity or, in other words, the emergence of socially constructed forms of "certainty" in the form of property rights. O'Brien demonstrates that there is both anthropological and linguistic evidence which historically situates the social birth of paternity. Before the "discovery" of paternity, it can be argued, men may not have recognized the relationship between the act of copulation and child-birth:

Paternity is the conceptualization of a cause and effect relationship, the relationship between copulation and child-birth, and the idea of paternity must await the development of a certain level of human intellectual development before it can be discovered (O'Brien: 30).

O'Brien argues that male-stream philosophical thought has not analyzed the "shadows between the conception and the creation" (O'Brien: 30).

O'Brien (1981) argues that what gets theorized in traditional Western theories of male-stream thought is that men alienate their seed. What is not theorized is women's experience of reproductive labour. For example, "women alienate the unified and transformed form of the originally opposing seeds [as Hegel described them] in the act of giving

birth... [Therefore, c]hildren evidently arrive without any theoretically important assistance from their mothers" (O'Brien: 31).

The second great "world historical event" discussed by O'Brien (1981: 21) is a change in reproductive praxis. This is brought about by new contraceptive technology, even in its imperfect form:

[T]he freedom for women to choose parenthood is a historical development as significant as the discovery of physiological paternity. Both create a transformation in human consciousness of human relations with the natural world which must, as it were, be re-negotiated... [or] mediated. It is precisely because of this world historical event that we are now able to begin to look at the process of reproduction in a different way (O'Brien: 22).

O'Brien, from her feminist standpoint, demonstrates that changes in social practices reinforce and reflect changes in structures of consciousness and vice versa.

In this way, she identifies some of the problems underlying traditional Western philosophical thought and political theories which take possible understandings about the relationship between women and men, and women and women, for granted. She identifies these problematic and oppressive tendencies as the general problem of dualism:

We have tentatively identified these as problems of alienation and separation of man from nature and [man] from continuous time... [T]hey are problems of the dualism which is the persistent motif of male philosophy. Under this general category, we find a whole series of oppositions which haunt the male philosophical imagination: mind and body, subject and object, past and present, spirit and matter, individual and social and so forth... We are entitled to wonder, if the two are not connected, if the masculine

reproductive consciousness is not a possible basis for the dualistic pre-occupation of male-stream thought (O'Brien: 34).

The "problems of alienation and separation of man from nature and from continuous time" of which O'Brien speaks springs from a tendency which other feminists (from intersecting and yet very different standpoints) have also pointed out. This tendency is that which reveals itself under critical scrutiny from the standpoint of the sex/gender system as the marked valorization of phenomena associated with the phallus, and the marked devaluation of phenomena perceived to "lack" this association - in short, phenomena perceived as Other.

The Patriarchal Unconscious

Jane Flax (1983), like O'Brien, also draws our attention to "the problems of alienation and separation" inherent in western male-stream philosophical thought. But unlike O'Brien's Hegelian-like analysis of man's alienation from his seed, Flax examines these problems in the form of the introduction of a split between Self and Other.

Jane Flax is an exponent of the Kleinian tradition in psychoanalysis. She argues that human beings emerge out of the interaction between physical and mental processes in the first three years of life. This interaction is constitutive of the most intense psychic experiences we ever encounter; but they remain in the unconscious. Central to her argument

is the idea that "human beings are created in and through relations with other human beings" (Flax, 1983: 256).

All human beings are dependent on others for the first three years of their lives regardless of the particular social formation into which they are born. But in our society where "gender" is a must, the subject is constituted differentially for males and females. "Patriarchal society depends upon the proper engendering of persons since gender is one of the bases of social organization" (Flax: 246). An evaluative categorization of the sexes is thus part of the fibre of our society.

Within the framework of Object Relations Theory, "psychological birth" stands in contradistinction to "physical birth". Psychological birth denotes the dependency of an infant for the first three years of her/his life on the relation with her/his caretaker (usually the mother in patriarchal society). Psychological birth is characterized by the processes of "symbiosis", "separation" and "individuation".

In the first six months of those initial three years, the infant cannot differentiate between "I" and "not-I". That is, in patriarchal societies, where the primary caretakers of infants are women, the infant cannot distinguish between her or himself and the mother. Around the age of six months, the "separation-individuation" stage occurs, wherein the infant begins to become aware of bodily boundaries, and her or his

own unique skills. "Separation" and "individuation" are not, Flax (1983: 251) argues, "identical, but they can reinforce or impede on each other". By the end of the third year the child will have established a core identity. In our society, this identity is gendered.

Within Flax's application of Object Relations Theory, this process of separation-individuation is not experienced in the same way for girls and boys, and it is never complete. The continuing state of ambivalence is never fully resolved in girls, and must be repressed in boys. The boy must learn to become "not-female", to repress his once female self (experienced in the state of symbiosis). He must also learn to become male since, under patriarchy, gender is an exclusionary category. "This denial of having experienced symbiosis with the mother caretaker is generalized to body, feelings, nature, etcetera, and expressed in the attempts to devalue and depower the object (other) with whom they were once merged" (Flax: 260):

Gender is a central element of... core identity. The child's sense of gender is firmly established by one and one and a half to two years of age and has little to do with an understanding of sexuality or reproduction. Under patriarchy, this sense of gender is not neutral. Becoming aware of gender means recognizing that men and women are not valued equally, that in fact, men are socially more esteemed than women. Being engendered, therefore entails a coming to awareness of and to some extent internalizing asymmetries of power and esteem. (Flax: 251).

The implication of Flax's analysis vis-a-vis Harding's (cf. supra, p. 16) understanding of how "gendered" social

life is produced is that we will have learned to perceive the social world through gendered lenses, at a very, very ~~early~~ age. That is, in terms of Harding's three themes, we will already be primed by the age of two or three to (1) "assign dualistic gender metaphors to various perceived dichotomies", (2) to "appeal to these gender dualisms to organize social activity" and (3) to internalize to a certain extent, this "form of socially constructed individual identity and behaviour".

Lack in the Place of the Other (The Lacanian Tradition)

In the quest for the phallus the subject moves from being it to having it. It is here that is that last Spaltung [split] by which the subject articulates himself to the Logos.

Lacan

cited in Lemaire, 1977: 166.

Like the Kleinians, the Lacanians can help us understand how particular social systems are mediated in and through the psychological make-up of the individual. Like Flax, "Lacan assumes that immediately after birth the infant is unable to distinguish between things associated with his or her own body and the external world" (Urwin, 1984: 276). Thus, it takes time for the infant to constitute her/himself as a subject.

The following discussion of the similarities between Lacan's position [as interpreted by Lemaire (1977), Urwin (1984), Mitchell (1985), Rose (1985) and Steffens (n.d.)] and

Flax's position is intended to demonstrate both the multiplicity of Voices in feminist analysis and to make clear our discussion of how the sex/gender system mediates our experience of Self, even in our formation as subjects.

A parallel can be drawn between Lacan's account of the "mirror stage", the "birth into language", and the eventual resolution of the Oedipus Complex on the one hand, and the idea of "psychological birth" in Object Relations Theory on the other. The mirror stage, which occurs at six to eight months, involves the child catching sight of her/himself and identifying with that "image of a complete unified body" (Urwin, 1984: 276). This stage is "the primordial form of the symbolic mastery, situating the ego in a fictional presentation as an integrated entity separate from its helplessness, its motor incoordination, its dependence" (Steffens, n.d.: 1). This stage may be seen as corresponding to the stage of separation and individuation in Object Relations Theory. As noted above, this stage presents a paradox to the child since there is a euphoric discovery of sense of self (i.e. my skills and possibilities) but paralleling my euphoria is the fear of separating from one whom I have identified as my "once self" (the caretaker mother in patriarchal societies).

This anxiety provoking separation is what underlies the child's birth into language, symbolized in the cotton-reel (or Fort-da) game, wherein the child tries to cope with and

control his mother's appearance and disappearance through language. The mother is objectified by, and in, the cotton-reel and controlled at the same time, not really but symbolically. What the cotton-reel game illustrates, according to Urwin (1984: 277) is:

how language allows the child some detachment from immediate sensation and the pain of separation, providing a relative increase in autonomy. But at first children's use of language is still bounded by the imaginary identifications of the mirror stage. This tendency is illustrated by young children's tendency to confuse the pronouns "I", "you", and "she" or "he", to refer to themselves by their own names, as they reproduce the language which their parents use to talk about them, and from which they are still excluded. For Lacan, it is only through the resolution of the Oedipus Complex, when children resolve problems associated with desire for the mother or father by identifying with the same-sexed parent [which is of course expected of them in our gendered society], that they are able to communicate within the same terms of reference as adults.

That is, when they come to use "I" and "you", or "he" and "she" appropriately because: "Any speaking being whatever... must line up on one or other side of the divide" (Rose, cited in Lacan, 1982: 42).

Diagram 1

"One must take up a position as either a man or a woman" (Mitchell, cited in Lacan 1982: 6).

When Lacanians refer to "taking up a position" they are referring to the process Flax describes as developing a "core identity". In neither theory is maleness or femaleness a pre-given fact; it is constructed out of an underlying "bisexuality" (Ibid, 1982: 12). However, while Flax focuses on interaction in the context of the mother-child relationship, and sees this interaction as the source of subjectivity, Lacanians focus on language. And where Flax speaks of the desire/fear of returning to the sybiotic stage, Lacanians talk in terms of castration complex and desire. Lacanians thus place more emphasis on awareness of reproduction than Flax does, but the position of the father in both theories is identical: he is conspicuous by his absence. According to Rose (cited in Lacan 1982: 38):

Castration means first of all this - that the child's desire for the mother does not refer to her but beyond her, to an object, the phallus, whose status is first imaginary (the object presumed to satisfy her desire) and then symbolic (recognition that desire cannot be satisfied).

Thus, the first stage of the Oedipus Complex involves identification with the object which the mother desires, the phallus which she lacks. In the Second stage, which represents the rupture of the imaginary mother-child relationship and the accession to the "symbolic":

The father intervenes as the privative agent in two ways: he deprives the child of the object of its desire and he deprives the mother of the phallic object... The child [thus] comes up against the Forbidden (the power of heterogeneity, the basis of the symbolic order [in patriarchal society]), He encounters the Law of the Father. This encounter

shakes the very foundations of the child's position. This second stage, both transitory and of capital importance, is what permits the third stage of identification with the father and registration of the self through relativization (Lemaire, 1977: 82-83).

This relativization of the self may be explained in much the same terms Flax uses, as a reflection of the asymmetries of power and esteem under patriarchy. According to Object Relations Theory it is frustration with the caretaker (mother), that engenders the splitting (relativization) of the subject. According to Lacanians, it is the symbolic castration, the process by which "the father castrates the child by separating it from its mother", that splits the subject and at the same time enables the infant to "have access to the 'Name-of-the-Father' or 'paternal metaphor'... which gives the symbolic law of the family its basis" (Lemaire, 1977: 83).

What both the first and third stages of the castration complex show is that desire always arises out of a lack, an absence, just as the function of words is to stand in for objects that are absent. Thus, we are born into language (beginning with the symbolic cotton reel game) in an attempt to compensate for a lack which is always present. According to Lacanians, it is essential for the subject to recognize this fact if he or she is going to develop into a mature man or woman.

The subject has to recognize that there is desire, or lack in the place of the Other, that there is no ultimate certainty or truth, and that the status of

the phallus is a fraud....The phallus can only take up its place by indicating the precariousness of any identity assumed by the subject on the basis of its token (Rose, cited in Lacan 1982: 40).

In our view, the main value of Lacanian psychoanalysis, at least as it is related in feminist analyses, is that it enables us to see how the symbolic order of the sex/gender system is reproduced in small in the structure of the individual un/consciousness.

However, it must be recognized that the sex/gender system is not merely a "symbolic" order. It is also a social order, a real order with harsh social, economic, political, and of course psychic effects on women. In closing, let us consider the social order that accompanies the psychic order described in the preceding paragraphs. Both orders can be seen as structured by "phallogratic law".

The "phallogratic social order" (Irigaray, 1985: 68) is premised on relations of domination and subordination (the sex/gender system). These relations are determined by a division of humanity into two groups without remainder: those associated with the phallus and those whose condition is defined as one of "lack". "One must take up a position as either a man or a woman" (Mitchell, in Lacan 1982: 6).

The "phallus" symbolizes and is internalized as the pillar of wisdom in Western society. The "phallus" represents a type of standard or quality against which all other phenomena are evaluated. Phenomena characterized as "masculine", as endowed with a phallus, are privileged in

relation to phenomena characterized as "feminine", as lacking this endowment - in short, not measuring up. The application of that "law" involves "naming" the world from a particular standpoint or position which both presupposes and perpetuates the sex/gender system (Harding, 1983: 1986). Among other conditions of our existence in a gendered society, is the application of this law which is reflected in and reinforces patriarchal language and myth.

De-Internalizing Patriarchal Language and Myth

Mary Daly's (1978) discussion of how our experience(s) of Self is mediated by the sex/gender system is addressed specifically to women. Daly, (un)like the aforementioned scholars, starts her analysis of women's oppression from her/(our) experience(s) as Other and the brutality with which women and women's meanings have been repressed in patriarchal societies. She starts from the inside, out.

Daly provides extensive and painful descriptions of such romanticized and justified social ideologies and practices as: Chinese foot-binding; African genital mutilation; the torturing and burning of thousands of women as witches in Europe and America; Indian suttee; and the establishmen/t of American gyn/ecology where, among other atrocities, "doctors frequently bully women into believing that they "need" a hysterectomy, failing to tell their patients that the death rate for the hysterectomy itself, is, in fact, higher than

the death rate for uterine/cervical cancer'" (Wright cited in Daly, 1978: 338).

Daly's focus is on the "methods of mystification" which underpin and legitimate patriarchal language and myth. She is concerned with unmasking the extent to which patriarchal language and myth is internalized by women in their formation as subjects and with showing how these patriarchal methods of mystification are premised on the psychological and physical devaluation of women at the expense of women's sense of Selves. By so doing, Daly provides her women-readers with "tools" through which they can identify and re-claim/re-name the experiences/questions which patriarchal language and myth deny them.

Daly's Gyn/Ecology (1978) is an exercise in unraveling patriarchal language and myth while at the same time moving beyond it. Her differential discourse, developed in the process of unmasking patriarchal language, re-introduces and re-creates words that denote various experiences and lifestyles, but as women may themselves experience them in relation to each other (and not as "would-be-men"):

The words 'gynocentric', 'be-ing' and 'Lesbian' imply separation. This 'is' what this book is about, but not in a simple way: For those who are threatened, the presence of women to each other is experienced as absence... The primary intention of women who choose to be present to each other, however, is not an invitation to men. It is an invitation to our Selves... The Spinsters, Lesbians, Hags, Harpies, Crones, Fries who are Voyagers of Gyn/Ecology know that we choose to accept this invitation for our

Selves. This, our Self-acceptance, is in no way contingent upon male approval (Daly, 1978: xii).

Daly's differential discourse is about how we come to know, and how we can come to know the world differently, by representing it in a different language which emerges in the process of unmasking or deconstructing the dominant patriarchal languages and myths. She argues that "patriarchy is designed not only to possess women, but to prepossess/preoccupy us... [which inspires] women with false selves which anesthetize the Self... [To Re-Awaken, we] must not only know the works of the Masters [we] must go further" (Daly, 1978: 322; xiv).

She attempts to demonstrate that in this process of Re-Awakening (or consciousness-raising), there is not one kind of tactic or strategy for organizing "for economic, physical, and psychological survival. To do this, we have had to go deep inside our Selves" (Daly, 1978: xi). Hence, Daly, like O'Brien and Flax and the feminist Lacanians, and yet very much unlike the aforementioned feminists, considers the extent to which we internalize the sex/gender system as manifested in patriarchal language and myth, focusing specifically on how it has woven through all the levels and underlying structures of consciousness in varying degrees and forms.

Daly sees the principles of domination and fragmentation as crucial conditions in the oppression of women. She is primarily concerned with "the mind/spirit/body pollution through patriarchal myth and language on all levels...

Gyn/Ecology is by and about women a-mazing all the male-authored sciences of womankind, and weaving world tapestries of our own kind" (Daly, 1978: 10). In the continuous process of coming to know or in Daly's language, "Journey-ing", we must "confront old models/modes of question-asking... [in] an Other way of thinking /speaking... [This] will be invisible to those who fetishize old questions - who drone that it does not "deal with" their questions" (Daly, 1978: xiii).

The crux of her argument is that the dualistic, hierarchical expressions of difference characteristic of patriarchy prevent women from coming to know them Selves. Gyn/Ecology is a mapping of Daly's own feminist process of coming to know and to question, which she shares in an attempt to elucidate the extent to which the sex/gender system is internalized. The reader is therefore implicated in a critical awareness/confusion on the level of language and myth, and is invited to begin Journey-ing:

Journey-ing centerward is Self-centering movement in all directions. It erases implanted pseudo-dichotomies between the Self and "other" reality; while it unmask the unreality of both "self" and "world" as these are portrayed, betrayed, in the language of the father's foreground" (Daly, 1978: 6).

Journey-ing inward (spiral-ing) is Daly's point of departure in the process of personal/political change through which women may come to ask themselves and other women new questions, that continually unmask the personal costs that the sex/gender system demands of women in their experience(s) of Self and in relation to other women.

Feminism(s): In Summary

We have now traced some feminist analyses of the sex/gender system and the formation of the subject. We have seen how the sex/gender system pervades our experience of Self and excludes and devalues women's experiences and those "names" and meanings ascribed to women, which are systematically appropriated.

O'Brien (1981) discussed this in terms of the exclusion of any theoretical importance of women's experience of the reproductive process in Western male-stream thought, especially as it pertains to theories of human nature. This systematic exclusion, she argues, both reflects and reinforces "Man's assurance of genderic superiority" with respect to the notions of separation, loss, and appropriation (male vs. female) - a partial experience claiming universality (O'Brien, 1981: 119).

Flax (1983) pointed to how the formation of the subject is mediated by the sex/gender system in terms of the institutionalization of a particular set of social arrangements, namely, the patriarchal family which perpetuates the proper engendering of subjects as children internalize the asymmetry of power relations and self esteem. Boys learn to become not-female, to become male, and thus to repress their experience of symbiosis with the primary caretaker, the mother, the once-female-self. This repressed objectification of their once-female self, gets generalized

onto all other phenomena associated with the female - feelings, women, nature, etcetera.

In the feminist discussions of Lacanian psychoanalysis the formation of the subject is mediated by the sex/gender system in terms of the desire for the phallus, through the mother, the "object" of her desire wherein the child experiences "castration" in the sense that this desire always arises out of a lack, an absence. Girls, they argue, will "desire to have the phallus and the boy will struggle to represent it" (Mitchell, 1985: 6-7) since the phallus represents that which is valued in patriarchal society and thus internalized, at least "symbolically", through the birth into language wherein the child must "take up a position" or establish her/his "core identity".

And, finally, Daly (1978) describes how the sex/gender system pervades women's sense of Selves, by unmasking the extent to which it is embedded in, internalized by, and distorts women's sense of Selves.

The preceding discussions of the sex/gender system and the formation of subjects from a multiplicity of feminist voices, which differentiate as much as they overlap, all point to how the sex/gender system requires the oppression/repression of women for its continuity. Moreover, some of these subjects, notably (white upper/middle class) men will go on to produce knowledge that both reflects and reinforces the operation of the sex/gender system.

Chapter Two will explore specific instances of how the sex/gender system pervades and therefore biases even that knowledge which is premised on and privileged by its claims to objectivity and universality. As we shall see, feminism(s) directly challenges the physical science's claim to an objective, neutral, and universal knowledge of the world, and exposes this to be subjective, deeply interested, partial and male.

CHAPTER TWO

UN-MASKING SCIENCE'S "OBJECTIVE" AND "NEUTRAL" PHALLACIES

Introduction

Perhaps the best-known name in the history of science is that of Thomas Kuhn. The importance of Kuhn's contributions lies in his exposure of the twin myths of "empiricism" and "open-mindedness". These myths are very dear to the scientific establishment, which prides itself on the idea of arriving at objective, value-free descriptions and theories of "reality".

But as Kuhn points out: "strongly held convictions that are prior to research often seem to be a precondition for success in the sciences" (Kuhn (1970b: 357). In other words, "productive research" is dependent on "commitment" to a given paradigm and not "concern for facts" as such.

Kuhn (1970b: 363) defines a "paradigm" as "a fundamental scientific achievement and one which includes both a theory and some exemplary applications to the results of experiment and observation". It is also essential to Kuhn's definition of a paradigm that it have been "received by a group whose members no longer try to rival it or to create alternatives for it" but seek instead to apply it (Kuhn: 363). Pre-paradigmatic or "revolutionary science" is distinguished by Kuhn from paradigm-based "normal science" by the fact that under the former there is still "debate over fundamentals"

whereas under the latter scientists "strive with all their might and skill to bring [the paradigm] into closer and closer agreement with nature" (Kuhn: 363-365). This "agreement", however, is qualified by the fact that "we can have no recourse to notions like the "truth" or "validity" of paradigms in our attempt to understand the special efficacy of the research which their reception permits" (Kuhn: 364). That is, there can be no judging one paradigm from within the framework of another, according to Kuhn.

The latter point has been made in even stronger terms by Mary Hesse in her essay on "The Strong Thesis of Sociology of Science". According to Hesse (1980: 56), "rational norms and true beliefs in natural science are just as much explananda of the sociology of science as are non-rationality and error". Hesse's argument is "stronger" than Kuhn's in that she would insist that the "special efficacy" of the paradigm calls for as sociological an explanation as the errors it engenders. Kuhn seems to shy away from this implication (cf. Harding, 1986: 199). But, there is another sense in which Hesse's approach goes beyond that of Kuhn; she does not confine her analyses to the theories and practices of the scientific community alone. That is, whereas Kuhn (1970a: 3) would ask "about the relationship between [a scientist's] views and those of his group, i.e. his teachers, contemporaries, and immediate successors in the sciences", Hesse (1980: 15) would inquire into the non-scientific

metaphors (or models) in circulation in the larger society to which the scientist's group belongs; she would also be attentive to "the changing conceptions of rationality" itself.

Some would object to Hesse's approach, arguing that the history or sociology of science ought to be written from "within" rather than from "without". The opposition between the internalist and externalist "programs" in the history of science has been summarized by Sandra Harding (1986).

According to Harding (1986: 209-210) those who subscribe to the internalist programme analyze "the development of modern science as a cognitive transformation in the history of the endogenous development of intellectual structures", whereas those who believe in the externalist programme seek "the reasons for this transformation in the technical, economic and cultural conditions of society".

Hesse (1980: 14) defends her position against the internalist programme as follows:

It is clear that any proposal to try to make a logical distinction between atemporal rational explanation, and hence internal history, and causal explanation in terms of the rationality of a particular period will not stand up to a moment's investigation...

What for example, in terms of this proposal, could we make of Copernicus' inference that the sun is at the centre of the planetary system because it is analogous to the king at the center of his court, or to God as the still centre of the universe?

As the example of Copernicus' analytical (or metaphorical) reasoning makes clear, a purely "internal" account of the

revolution his thinking precipitated would be unable to explain where he got his model of the universe from - namely, his (un)conscious experience of the structure of his society.

While Hesse (1980) thus focusses on how scientists elaborate their models on the basis of metaphors provided for them by the larger society to which they belong, David Bloor (1984), who also subscribes to the "strong thesis of sociology of science", pushes her analysis one step further.

Deriving his inspiration from the anthropologist Mary Douglas, Bloor (1984: 61) argues that the "coherence" of a given scientific theory may be dictated by the political and economic interests of those who invent and/or seek to apply the theory. Bloor's idea of "commitment" to a given paradigm is thus, like Hesse's, stronger than Kuhn's, for he is concerned to show how "nature" is often "put to social use" as well as practical use. The "special efficacy" of a particular theory of nature is not for him, as it is for Kuhn, to be measured in terms of its research results alone, but also in terms of its perceived effectiveness as a mechanism of social control. Bloor (1984: 60) explains:

The anthropologist Mary Douglas has suggested that metaphysical principles and conceptions of nature are used as polemical weapons in the attempt to control our fellows. Nature and its workings provide us with a repertoire of legitimations and justifications, sources of danger for threatening and blaming, and images of order around which we can muster support. In the pursuit of our social goals it is expedient to deploy nature in this way as a symbol, and within any given context certain natural laws will be especially appropriate for the task. The wish being the father to the thought, these laws will be invested with high

a priori probability and treated as if they are self-evident or necessary.

Bloor's approach is valuable for the way in which it exposes the political underpinnings of the scientific enterprise.

But as feminists we are able to go even further, or add yet another dimension to the study of the history and sociology of science. As Evelyn Fox Keller (1985:43) has pointed out, "if modern science evolved in, and helped to shape, a particular social and political context, by the same token it evolved in conjunction with, and helped to shape, a particular ideology of gender". The theme of the present chapter follows from this insight. My intention is to show how "metaphors of gender politics were used to make morally and politically attractive the new conceptions of nature and inquiry required by experimental methods and the emerging technologies of the period [1500-1700]" (Harding, 1986: 113). This thesis will be explored with particular reference to the thought of Sir Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, Sir Issac Newton and Sir Robert Boyle. That is, the men who assisted at the "birth" of "modern science".

While the primary emphasis of this chapter is on showing "the value of using gender as a category to analyze science" (Harding, 1986: 48), I am also concerned to reconstruct the alternative cognitive programme that informed the practice of "witchcraft" (meaning the theory and practice of women healers) in the period 1500-1700. As we shall see, the rise of "modern science" and the repression of women's knowledge-

able experiences were intimately related - indeed, it was only by suppressing the latter cognitive programme that "science" was able to achieve the exalted status and hegemony as "the Voice that knows", that it enjoys today.

We will begin by briefly examining the structure of the worldview that formed the background to the emergence of "modern science".

The Construction of (Female) Nature as Object

Women and nature have an age old association, an affiliation that has persisted throughout culture, language, and history (Merchant, 1980: xv).

Carolyn Merchant (1980), in her widely acclaimed book, The Death of Nature shows how the changing gender ideology and practices of the 16th and 17th centuries, contributed to western culture becoming increasingly mechanized as the image of a female earth and virgin earth-spirit came to be supplanted by the idea of nature as machine. The latter view paved the way for the manipulation of nature, whereas under the former view:

The image of the earth as a living organism and nurturing mother served as a cultural constraint restricting the actions of human beings. One does not readily slay a mother, dig into her entrails for gold, or mutilate her body... As long as the earth was considered to be alive and sensitive, it could be considered a breach of human ethical behaviour to carry out destructive acts against it (Merchant, 1980: 3).

This view of (female) nature as a living organism, that is, as an "organic unity, growing and developing from within,

in an integrated unity of structure and function" (Merchant: 100), was more than a philosophy of nature, for it implied a theory of society as well. As Merchant (1980: xx) relates:

Organismic theory emphasized interdependence among the parts of the human body, subordination of the individual to communal purposes in family, community and state and vital life permeating the cosmos to the lowliest stone (Merchant, 1980: xx).

Lynda Birke (1986: 107-109) has also shown how the Medieval notion of the earth as "a living, sentient being with which humans could co-exist rather than dominate" had important sociological implications. What distinguishes the organismic view of nature/society is its emphasis on the "reciprocity of nature and culture". This reciprocity is absent from the view of nature that would come to prevail in the aftermath of the Scientific Revolution:

'Nature' is often regarded as somehow disorderly, chaotic and intractable, by contrast, our concept of 'culture' has come to include the capacity for human mastery (Birke: 107).

Birke's analysis concentrates on the idea of nature as a "Great Chain of Being". Although this idea co-existed with other ways of conceptualizing nature, the "Great Chain" informed the dominant theological view for many centuries. Like Merchant, Birke (1986: 109-112) argues that the emerging opposition of nature and culture was already associated with gender and already contained in the notion of the Great Chain of Being. She points out that linear scales can always be broken. The scale or "chain" was "by definition, hierarchical" which "in effect creates a division into a

higher and lower part" and "men could be portrayed as nearer to God, while women were closer to brute creation (i.e. nature)" (Birke: 109).

According to this [organic view of nature as a "Great Chain of Being"], creation was arranged such that God was at the top of the chain, below him were the angels and other heavenly beings, then European man, then woman, and then the various species of animals known at the time, followed by the plants and animals known at the time, and so on, in a linear hierarchy. As Europeans spread out from the center of the world that they knew, other human races that they discovered had to be fitted into the Chain - but always below European man who thought of himself as the pinnacle of earthly perfection (Birke, 1986: 109).

Keller (1985) also argues that to understand the development of modern science we must pay particular attention to "the role played by metaphors of gender in the formation of the particular set of values, aims, and goals embodied in the scientific enterprise" (Keller: 43). Keller examines the contending visions of the new science that were debated at the beginning of the "modern" era, namely the competition between the hermetic and mechanical philosophies. From Keller we learn that according to the hermetic² tradition, nature was suffused with spirit, and the

2 "The hermetic writings were a group of gnostic texts actually dating from the second and third centuries A.D., but believed in the sixteenth century to be contemporary with or prior to Moses, and originating in Egypt. They consequently carried all the ancient authority so much revered in the Renaissance; they were quite non-Aristotelian in spirit and hence reinforced the anti-scholastic tendencies of Renaissance thought; and since they were in fact written in the Christian era, they contained some elements of Judaism and Christianity which were regarded as prophetic and so enhanced still further their authority" (Hesse, 1980: 9).

interconnections and integrated effort of "heart, hand, and mind" (1985: 44).

In contradistinction to Birke's focus on the Great Chain of Being, Keller looks at the seventeenth century alchemists associated with the hermetic tradition. These men, who exercised a major influences over chemistry and medicine, placed much emphasis "on illumination derived from direct experience (available to anyone who pursues the art)" an emphasis which "accorded well with the [enthusiastic] religious and [egalitarian] political ambitions of the times" (Keller, 1985: 46). But by the 1650's this notion of "private illumination" was seen as a danger by the authorities of both Church and State and would come to be repressed (Rattansi cited in Keller, 1985: 47).

What is most interesting about alchemical thought is its assertion of the "principle of symmetry", that is, "allegorical if not actual cooperation between male and female" (Keller: 52-53). This was an abomination from the perspective of the emerging class of "men of science". It is significant that the alchemists, while they "were not feminists", nevertheless were concerned with the definition of gender and its place in the new definitions of knowledge as opposed to the "realpolitik of sexual domination" (Keller, 1985: 53). But their vision of the place of gender in the new definitions of knowledge contrasts sharply with that espoused by the likes of Francis Bacon:

It can be safely said that none of the participants in this dispute [over which view of science should prevail, the alchemical or the empirical] was addressing issues of actual relations between the sexes; on the other hand, I suggest that they were concerned with the definition of gender, especially of what it meant to be a man, and what it meant to 'raise a Masculine philosophy'..... In many ways, they shared in the general contempt for women of their time. But for them, women's procreative powers remained a matter of reverence, awe, and even envy'

(Keller, 1985: 53).

In her examination of the "contending visions of the new science" Keller analyzes the prevailing gender ideology and practices that helped inform the "choice" for one vision of the "new science" over the other. In her analysis she discusses how this precipitated a shift to a vision of inquiry based on a mechanized view of female nature, and goes on to trace the consequences thereof for women and contemporary science. She, like Merchant (1980), shows how women were the scapegoats of the intellectual debates between the advocates of the hermetic tradition and the mechanists, who were concerned with erecting a purely "masculine" science.

But "[a]fter 1660 the scales had tipped; by the late 1670's the rivalry was over. The Royal Society, established in 1662 and marking the institutionalization of the new science, was seen by many of its members as a realization of the Baconian program" which we will explore below. Keller cites the example of Henry Oldenburg, Secretary of the Royal Society, who announced "that the intention of that society

was 'to raise a Masculine Philosophy whereby the Mind of Man may be ennobled with the knowledge of Solid Truths'" (Easlea, in Keller: 52).

Our inquiry confirms that neither the equations between mind, reason, and masculinity, nor the dichotomies between mind and nature, reason and feeling, masculine and feminine, are historically, invariant. Even though the roots of both the equations and the dichotomies may be ancient, the seventeenth century witnessed a marked polarization of all the terms involved - with consequences as crucial for science as for our understanding of gender (Keller: 44).

Merchant, Birke and Keller (1985) all argue in similar and yet contradistinctive ways that "if modern science evolved in, and helped to shape, a particular social and political context, by the same token it evolved in conjunction with, and helped to shape, a particular ideology of gender" (Keller: 43)

The Transition From Organism to Mechanism: Another Look

As we have seen, prevailing gender ideologies reflected and reinforced changes in social thought and experience in the 17th century. The Scientific Revolution (1500-1700) marks an unprecedented juncture in Western history wherein the ancient dichotomies posited between mind and body, and particularly male and female, became a conscious social organizing principle.

In considering the increasing implantation of the dualisms characteristic of Western thought and actions on the world, Harding (1986: 116) suggests that "women's increased

the apparent objectivity of science. This "choice" which appears to have been underpinned by the desire to master the "inherent disorder and chaos" in both women and nature, resulted in the brutal repression and exclusion of women and women's experience of the social world (Smith, 1975). Keller (1985: 61) too points out that the scope of women's activities and roles, which had been shifting for over 200 years, was dramatically reduced by the end of the 17th century.

As the family structure became more authoritarian and patriarchal in the 16th and 17th centuries, both women's roles and status declined dramatically. With changes in the economy, came increasing geographic mobility, brought on by the developing market economy. Moreover, as the authority of the secular powers came to impede on that of the Church, and as "the cult of the Virgin Mary paled" across Europe, the authority of the male as the head of the household was emphasized in the nuclear family form. "Kinship ties which had been economically and religiously important in the Middle Ages, were weakened..." (Merchant: 172).

It is against this background that, as Keller (1985: 59) argues, the association of the "early proponent's of rational science, with the belief in witchcraft is consistent and even historically appropriate":

From the usual modern standpoint, the association of these early proponents of rational science with the belief in witchcraft, and hence with the persecution of witches, appears anomalous if not somewhat

woman getting her hair cropped at a barber's'; she is accompanied by another woman wearing a man's "plumed hat" (Merchant, 1980: 167). What the "controversy over women" reveals to us is an attempt on the part of various women to reduce the polarization of the sexes by adopting men's clothing (perhaps one kind of uni-sex). But, according to the principles of the sex/gender system which depends upon the dualistic and hierarchical opposition between male and female, men and women, the men in those social positions with the power to name in society, denounced these actions on the part of women. We, on the other hand, can see the clothing controversy as a symbolic gesture on the part of women, an attempt to reduce the polarity that was becoming increasingly institutionalized. Their gestures may also have been motivated by the desire to keep and/or regain some of the power that was being denied them in the economy, home and church.

Summarizing Merchant, Harding (1986: 114-116) tells us that the Copernican theory had already replaced the female earth centered one. And the active power of the Platonic organism, associated with the alive, nurturing mother earth was replaced by the Aristotelian organism which associated masculinity with activity and passivity with womanliness. "Science's" notion of the new universe feared disorder both in the heavens as well as on earth:

The sightings of the new star of 1572 and the comet of 1577 by Tycho Brahe had provided evidence of the

corruptibility of the unchanging heavens [characteristic of the Ptolemaic "two-world view"] above the moon. The telescope observations of Galileo Galilei in 1609-10 of craters on the moon, spots on the sun, moons around Jupiter, the phases of Venus, and the multitudes of stars in the Milky Way had further strengthened the belief that the frame of nature was blemished (Merchant, 1980: 129).

Harding (1986: 115) points out that because these changes in the heavens strongly suggested that nature's order might break down, Renaissance and Elizabethan writers believed that "man's fate [was] in chaos".

Central to the organic theory was the identification of nature, especially the earth, with a nurturing mother: a kind and beneficent female who profited for the needs of mankind in an ordered, planned universe. But another opposing image of nature was that she could render violence, storms, droughts, and general chaos. Both were identified with the female sex and were projections of human perceptions onto the external world (Merchant, 1980: 2).

The images of both women and nature were perceived to be two-sided (Merchant: 127). Merchant argues that the age-old association of female nature's double-sided character paved the way for the change of focus from contemplating nature's temper, to the efforts to subdue and control her, by those men with the power/position(s) to do so.

The mechanical tradition ushered in by the institutionalization of the "new experimental science" severed all the connections which the organic view had regarded as vital or sacred. And, based on the association of nature and the female, those men with the power to name [like the social theorist of a different persuasion, Machiavelli], began to appeal to sexual metaphors to describe

the need for "Man" to rise up and control his fate in his quest for maximizing the power of the Prince.

Machiavelli appealed to sexual metaphors in his proposition that the potential violence of fate could be mastered: "Fortune is a woman and it is necessary if you wish to master her to conquer her by force; and it can be seen that she lets herself be overcome by the bold rather than by those who proceed coldly, and therefore, like a woman, she is always a friend to the young because they are less cautious, fiercer, and master her with greater audacity" (Harding, 1986: 115; cf. also, Merchant, 1980: 130).

Another change in "social thought and experience in Europe during the 16th to 17th centuries that contributed to the distinctive gender symbolism of the subsequent world view", is the desire to control "man's" fate in social life as well as in the physical universe (Harding, 1986: 114-115). Harding (1986: 116) explains:

Prepared by the organic view's association of wild and violent nature with one aspect of the womanly, and by the absence of clear distinctions between the physical and the social, the Renaissance imagination required no great leap to associate all disorder, natural and social, with women... fully articulated in the witchcraft doctrines.

The "Brutal" Repression of Women: Witches and Science

As Bleir (1986: 6) has pointed out:

17th century science made a choice for the institutionalization of a positivist science, objective and neutral, to the exclusion of alternative cognitive programs of knowledge, of nature, as well as alternative social structures of science.

The "fear and devaluation of women, and of the female" (Flax, 1983), appears to be intrinsically woven throughout

the apparent objectivity of science. This "choice" which appears to have been underpinned by the desire to master the "inherent disorder and chaos" in both women and nature, resulted in the brutal repression and exclusion of women and women's experience of the social world (Smith, 1975). Keller (1985: 61) too points out that the scope of women's activities and roles, which had been shifting for over 200 years, was dramatically reduced by the end of the 17th century.

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It is against this background that, as Keller (1985: 59) argues, the association of the "early proponent's of rational science, with the belief in witchcraft is consistent and even historically appropriate":

From the usual modern standpoint, the association of these early proponents of rational science with the belief in witchcraft, and hence with the persecution of witches, appears anomalous if not somewhat

embarrassing..... But what is in question here is the particular character of [these early proponents'] ideological commitments - especially the relevance of the commitment, voiced by so many of the early Fellows of the Royal Society, to an unambiguously 'masculine science'..... The witch, taken seriously as having effective powers, provided a natural focus for anxiety (Keller, 1985: 59).

In order for us to get a sense of the "gynophobic" characteristics of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, from women's perspectives, consider the following series of examples. These illustrations are intended to point to the kinds and numbers of instances of the inquisition of women as witches, and to the atrocities experienced by these women.

they don't have to lynch the women
very often anymore, although
they used to - the lord and his men
went through the villages at night, beating and
killing every woman caught
outdoors.
the European witch trials took away
the independent people; two different villages
after the trials were through that year -
had left in them, each -
one living woman:
one.

Judy Grahn,
from *A Woman is Talking to Death*
(in Daly, 1978: 178)

The year the poet speaks of was 1585. In 1589 Francis Bacon was made "clerk of the Star Chamber" while simultaneously arguing that "nature must be examined" (in Griffin, 1978: 15). And, poet Robin Morgan (cited in Daly, 1978: 178) writes:

Repeat the syllables
 before the lesson hemorrhages through the brain:
 Margaret Barclay, crushed to death with stones, 1618.
 Mary Midgely, beaten to death, 1646
 Peronette, seated on a hot iron as torture
 and then burned alive, 1462.
 Sister Maria Renata Sanger, sub-prioress
 of the Premonstratensian Convent of Unter-Zell,
 accused of being a lesbian;
 the document certifying her torture
 is inscribed with the seal of the Jesuits,
 and the words Ad Majorem Dei Gloriam -
 To the Greater Glory.

What have they done to us?

Susan Griffin in Woman and Nature: The Roaring Inside Her (1978: 15-19) provides more herstory of witches, a story that has been all but erased by male historians. In androcentric accounts, the "witch" is normally portrayed as someone possessed with satanic powers. But as we shall see, these so-called "witches" were actually women who were interested in helping people, not harming them.

First, however, it is instructive to contemplate the scope of the atrocities experienced by women who challenged their "natural" position in society, and to glimpse the interrelationship with the "birth of modern science".

- 1431 Joan of Arc, aged 22, "placed on the fire so
 the flames would reach her slowly", dies
 (She is asked why she wears male costume.)
- 1468 The Pope defines witchcraft as *crimen exceptum*,
 removing all legal limit to torture
- 1523 One thousand witches burn in a single year in
 the diocese of Como
- 1603 [The physician] William Harvey assists at the
 examination of witches.

powers, and witches with the latter. For example, the witches used "ergot", a type of herb that reduces the pain of labour, at a time when "the Church held that pain in labour was the Lord's just punishment for Eve's original sin" (ibid: 14). Moreover, the witch was "accused" of being an "empiricist":

The witch-healers methods were as great a threat (to the Catholic Church, if not the Protestant) as her results, for the witch was an empiricist: She relied on her senses rather than on faith or doctrine, she believed in trial and error and cause and effect. Her attitude was not religiously passive, but actively inquiring. She trusted her ability to find ways to deal with disease, pregnancy and childbirth - whether through medications or charms. In short, her magic was the science of her time (ibid: 14).

But the Church was "deeply anti-empirical" as a result of the widespread belief that: "The senses are the devil's playground, the arena into which he will try to lure men away from Faith and into the conceits of the intellect or the delusions of carnality" (Ehrenreich and English: 15). This deep distrust of the senses was, of course, turned around in Bacon's programme, but as we will see, his "inductive method" was still directed against the female.

While the Church was "deeply anti-empirical", it was not completely against medical care, providing it defined the conditions under which medical knowledge was formulated, and to "whom" it was applied. "For eight long centuries from the fifth to the thirteenth", the Church had stood in the way of any advances in medicine; this changed only with contact with the Arab world in the thirteenth century (Ehrenreich and

hundred year period, and peaking in the 16th and 17th centuries, indicates that it was a "deep-seated social phenomenon" whose "locale and timing" corresponds to that historical moment we have identified above as the "birth" of modern science (1500 - 1700) and as the transition period from the organic (female) image of nature to a mechanistic one. Ehrenreich and English describe this historical moment as one:

associated with periods of great social upheaval shaking feudalism at its roots - mass peasant uprisings and conspiracies, the beginnings of capitalism and the rise of Protestantism.

They also point out that the witch-hunts were both financed and organized by the authorities of Church and State. What this suggests is that the "witches" were what we would recognize today as a feminist movement. Indeed, Ehrenreich and English propose that "in some areas witchcraft [may have] represented a female-led peasant rebellion" (ibid: 8). But as these women and the peasant class to which they belonged were denied educational and monetary resources, "the witch herself - poor and illiterate - did not leave us her story", no herstory. Thus we can only un-cover her story through the "eyes of her persecutors", that is, his-story.

It must be emphasized that the witch-hunts and trials were neither "sporadic" nor a "mass suicide" of "hysterical women" as some his-torians have suggested. "Rather [they] followed well-ordered, legalistic procedures". These were described and discussed in detail in the Malleus Maleficarum

or Hammer of Witches written in 1484. The authors were the Reverends Kramèr and Sprenger, described as the "beloved sons" of Pope Innocent VIII (Ibid: 9). The main purpose of the Malleus Maleficarum was to provide judges and priests with explicit and detailed instructions on how to conduct a witch-trial and "[f]or three centuries this sadistic book lay on the bench of every judge [and] every witch-hunter" (ibid: 9).

The "crimes" of the witches that aroused the most vicious suppression on the part of the upper class, included accusations of "female sexuality", of "organizing", and of having "magical powers affecting health - of harming, but also of healing" (ibid: 10).

With regard to the first charge, according to the Church, witches' powers were derived from their sexuality (ibid: 11). The justification for this association of evil powers with female sexuality was found in the Bible: the "Fall of Man", blamed on Eve. Women were thus "accused" of being "female", and the devil was thought to work through females:

Witches were supposed to have gotten pleasure from copulation with the devil (despite the icy cold organ he was reputed to possess) and they in turn infected men. Lust in either man or wife, then, was blamed on the female. On the other hand, witches were accused of making men impotent and of causing their penises to disappear. As for female sexuality witches were accused, in effect, of giving contraceptive aid and of performing abortions (ibid: 11).

The second charge directed at witches was that they "seemed to be organized into an enormous secret society"

(ibid: 12). Unlike the sexual fantasies that informed the first charge, this charge seems to have had some basis in reality. There is evidence which suggests that witches may have come together on festival occasions, for religious worship, including pagan worship, and to exchange herbal lore. Moreover, despite the fragmented evidence about the political significance of such meetings, Ehrenreich and English point out that it is difficult to imagine these women were not somehow connected to the peasant rebellions of the time. It is to be noted that: "Any peasant organization, just by being an organization, would attract dissidents, increase communication between villages and build a spirit of collectivity and autonomy among the peasants" (ibid: 12). The real issue underlying the charge of "witches organizing" may therefore have arisen out of the desire to subdue the peasant rebellions and make scapegoats of the witches, while at the same time repressing and appropriating their knowledge of healing.

The last "accusation" is the most ludicrous accusation of all. "The witch is accused not only of murdering and poisoning, sex crimes and conspiracy - but of helping and healing". In other words, women were "accused" of possessing effective knowledge. This knowledge had to be repressed, for the Church distinguished "God's cures" from those of the "devil" in order to maintain the Church's position/power in society. Priests and doctors were associated with the former

powers, and witches with the latter. For example, the witches used "ergot", a type of herb that reduces the pain of labour, at a time when "the Church held that pain in labour was the Lord's just punishment for Eve's original sin" (ibid: 14). Moreover, the witch was "accused" of being an "empiricist":

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English: 15). When medical schools began to be established in universities, no experimentation of any kind was taught:

Confronted with a sick person, the university trained physician had little to go on but superstition [since the healing knowledge of the witches was associated with the devil]. Bleeding was a common practice especially in the case of wounds. Leeches were applied according to the time, the hour, the air, and other similar consideration..... The physician to Edward II, who held a bachelor's degree in theology and a doctorate in medicine from Oxford, prescribed for a toothache writing on the jaws of the patient, "In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, Amen" or touching a needle to a caterpillar and then to the tooth (Ehrenreich and English: 17).

The establishment of the medical profession required university training and women were already banned from higher education.

Women's knowledge of healing was therefore turned into a criminal charge not because she was incompetent, or even harmed people, but because her knowledge, and the effectiveness of her knowledge, threatened those in power. Witches were challenging their "natural" position in society. Indeed by the 17th century witches were so discredited "among the emerging middle class... [that] it was possible for male practitioners to make serious inroads into the last preserve of female healing -- midwifery" (ibid: 20). Women in England organized against this take-over, charging the practitioners with "commercialism" and "dangerous misuse of the forceps"; but they were, of course, dismissed as ignorant "old wives".

The series of historical instances cited above, and Ehrenreich and English's discussion, demonstrate, in Smith's

words (1975: 354), how women's exclusion from the creation of social forms of expression and meaning has been an active and often "brutal" process. She (1975: 354) reminds us that:

In our society, men, to a large extent, appropriate the positions that govern, administer and manage the community. Men hold the positions from which the work of organizing the society is initiated and controlled.

The proponents of the mechanistic or experimental philosophy proposed by Bacon, and institutionalized and developed by Descartes, Boyle and Newton, among others, were the ones who occupied those positions "from which the work of organizing the society initiated". Thus, the association between these "early proponents of rational science with the[ir] belief in witchcraft and hence, with the persecution of witches" was a reflection and reinforcement of their ideological commitments (Keller, 1985: 59). Part of their commitment, voiced by so many of the early "Fellows of the Royal Society", marking the "institutionalization" of "modern science", was their commitment to an "unambiguously masculine science".

The Baconian Programme

The man widely regarded as the "father" of modern science, Francis Bacon (1561-1626), designed a programme to "hound nature in her wanderings" so that "you will be able when you like to lead and drive her afterward to the same place again" (in Merchant, 1980: 168). The whole objective of Bacon's programme was "to recover Man's rightful dominion

over nature [supposed to have been] lost in the Fall" (Merchant: 185). In order to inaugurate "a male resurrection", or what Bacon called The Masculine Birth of Time, he argued that scientists must deploy his experimental philosophy; only this method had the power to enable "mankind to bind [nature] to your service and make her your slave" (Spedding, in Brocke-Utne, 1985: 112). As Bleir (1986: 6) points out:

Continuing a process begun at least in the 16th century, Bacon elaborated the metaphors of science in sexual and gendered terms, with science as male and nature as female, a mystery to be unveiled and penetrated. Woman as the irrational: man as a thinker epitomized objectivity, rationality, culture and control.

Lynda Birke and Evelyn Fox Keller also point to the gendered associations which underlie contemporary notions of "science", "objectivity", "rationality", "culture" and "control". Birke (1986: 107) shows how the association of nature with female, and as somehow "disorderly, chaotic and intractable" stands in sharp contrast to the association of male with culture. "[O]ur concept of 'culture' has come to include the capacity for mastery over nature". Hence, she argues, "science" is also involved in enforcing the distinction between nature and culture (read female and male) because of its promise of mastering nature, a promise that continues to inform contemporary concepts of "progress" and "culture" which are viturally "synonymous with those of science and technology" (Birke: 107).

In her analysis of Bacon's use of sexual imagery, Keller (1985: 33-42) argues that it reveals a "sexual dialectic". She finds that the imagery of "submission" associated with (female) nature stands in sharp contrast to the scientific (male) imagery of "mastery".

Far from the image of science as the knowledge which "objectively" and "universally" mirrors "the way nature is and the way to arrive at mirrorlike descriptions and explanations..." (Harding, 1986: 112), we can see how the scientific enterprise has been influenced by and perpetuates the prevailing gender ideology and social practice. As Norwegian feminist Brocke-Utne (1985: 113) has pointed out:

the men behind the seventeenth century Scientific Revolution saw nature as a woman passively awaiting the subsequent birth of a series of inventions and machines that would in Bacon's words "conquer and subdue her and (even) shake her to her foundations".

This quotation demonstrates, at least in part, the relationship between the ideology and practice of science and the organizing principles of the sex/gender system; i.e., the naming, appropriation and subsequent devaluation of that which is categorized as female.

As we now know, Bacon was very much influenced by, and participated in, the on-going trials of many so-called witches. Indeed, as Carolyn Merchant (1980: 167) argues, Bacon's "scientific objectives and method derived from the courtroom... [and] the mechanical devices used to torture [women as] witches". The fact that nature is portrayed as

female in his treatises, and that she is to be tortured through mechanical inventions, takes on a deep and somewhat sinister meaning in view of Bacon's enthusiastic participation in the interrogations of the witch trials (Merchant, 1980; Keller, 1985). Consider the following extended passage composed by Bacon and written to King James the First of England (an ardent supporter of anti-feminist and anti-witchcraft legislation):

For you have but to follow and as it were hound nature in her wanderings, and you will be able when you like to lead and drive her afterward to the same place again. Neither am I of opinion in this history of marvels that superstitious narratives of sorceries, witchcrafts, charms, dreams, divinations, and the like, where there is an assurance and clear evidence of the fact, should be altogether excluded... howsoever the use and practice of such arts is to be condemned, yet from the speculation and consideration of them... a useful light may be gained, not only for a true judgement of the offenses of persons charged with such practices, but likewise for the further disclosing of the secrets of nature. Neither ought a man to make scruple of entering and penetrating into these holes and corners, when the inquisition of truth is his whole objective - as your majesty has shown in your own example (Bacon, in Merchant, 1980: 168).

In view of this history of "modern science" Harding argues that we need to be concerned:

when we think about how from its very beginning, misogynous and defensive gender politics and the abstraction we think of as scientific method have provided resources for each other..... Nature and inquiry appear conceptualized in ways modelled on rape and torture - on men's worst violent and misogynist relationships to women - and this modelling is advanced as a reason to value science (Harding: 116).

points". These "mass points" are thought to be "small, solid and indestructable objects out of which all matter is made" (Ibid: 63). And, finally, the "force of gravity" is what Newton believed moved between particles, according to their mass and mutual distance from each other. For Newton, the particles and forces of gravity between them, were thought to be created by God and as such, needed no further analysis (Ibid: 61). These "scientific" conceptions of "time" and of "space" are interrelated to the "mechanistic" ideas and applications of social organization and social control, as we shall see below.

"Mechanism" or the image of the cosmos as a great machine, the image of the Newtonian model of both the universe and science, is based on the assumption that matter is dead and passive. One of the consequences of this view is the belief that matter can be controlled and re-arranged for the benefit of "man"-kind. This view of nature also contains the idea that knowledge of the world can be certain and consistent, and that the "laws" of nature have been imposed on creation by God. These "laws", it is supposed, can be uncovered by "Man" through the application of mathematical laws and identities (Merchant, 1980: 103). Newton's mechanical philosophy can thus be briefly summarized as follows:

Force was external to matter rather than immanent within it. Matter was corpuscular, passive and inert; change was simply the re-arrangement of particles of motion and was transmitted from one part

in terms of the institutionalization of a particular set of social arrangements, namely, the patriarchal family structure. This particular set of social arrangements, she argues, perpetuates the proper engendering of subjects, a process which involves children internalizing the asymmetry of power relations and self esteem: boys have to learn to become not-female, to become male, and thus to repress their experience of symbiosis of the primary caretaker, the mother, the once-female self. She argues that this repressed objectification of their once-female self, gets generalized onto all other phenomena associated with the female.

Similarly, Bordo (1983) focuses on these categories of separation-individuation not from the individual caretaker, mother, but from the (androcentric) culture's separation-individuation from its interconnected location in Mother Nature. In view of the dramatic changes associated with both women and nature discussed above by Merchant, Birke, Keller and Harding, Bordo (1986) stresses the importance of adding a "psycho-cultural dimension" to our analysis of science.

Bordo (1986: 441) suggests in her analysis that "we view the Great Cartesian anxiety [over the distance between self and the world]... as anxiety over separation". This "anxiety" and an increase in self-consciousness arose with the institutionalization of the polarities characteristic of Western thought. Hence, Bordo analyzes the psycho-cultural anxiety of separation from the image of the Mother World. In

this way she describes the "Cartesian era" as "drama of parturition" and as a "flight from the feminine"³ (Bordo, 1986: 441). This is culturally expressed with a new concern about the "disastrously fragmented and discontinuous mental life" reflected in Descartes' Meditations (Bordo: 441).

"This profound Cartesian experience of self inwardness ('I think, therefore, I am') and its corollary, the heightened sense of distance from the 'not-I'", is what motivates Bordo (1986: 444) to add a psycho-cultural dimension to our analysis of science. Correspondingly she analyzes the metaphorical description of the transition from the organic world to the mechanistic world as a "drama of parturition" beginning in 1400 and ending in 1650 (Bordo: 444).

Bordo (1986: 440) reads Descartes' Meditations "as a mirror of that culture, a reflection both of its anxieties and its responses to those anxieties". Her analysis of this "flight from the feminine" is distinct from how others have "chronicled" it, in that she explores its philosophical expression using the terms of separation-individuation applied to the culture of men's minds, similar to Flax's analysis of the individual:

Descartes' writings are important because of the model of knowledge he "bequeathed to modern science". This model of

³ The terms "drama of parturition" and the "flight from the feminine" have been used by others, but Bordo utilizes them in a new context.

knowledge is based on "clarity", "dispassion" and "detachment" (Bordo: 440). Bordo points out that what is identified with the new Cartesian sense of the world is the "strong sense of the fragility of human cognitive relations with the object world" (Bordo: 440).

The Cartesian notion of "the inwardness of mental life", as opposed to the separate and detached object world, summed up in the phrase "I think therefore I am", emerged at a specific historical moment. This was not always the case, as Stephen Toulmin (cited in Bordo, 442) states:

When we think casually, we think of consciousness situated at some point in space... even those who achieve the intellectual contortionism of denying that there is such thing as a consciousness, feel that this denial comes from inside their skins... This was not the background picture before the scientific revolution. The background picture then was of man [sic] as a microcosm within the macrocosm. It is clear that he did not feel himself isolated by his skin from the world outside to quite the same extent that we do. He was integrated or mortised into it, each different part of him being united to a different part of it by some invisible thread. In his relation to his environment, the man of the middle ages was rather less like an island, rather more like an embryo.

By contrast, as Bordo (1986: 443) reveals in her analysis of Descartes' Meditations:

Descartes provides the first real phenomenology of the mind, and one of the central results of that phenomenology is the disclosure of the deep epistemological alienation that attends the sense of mental interiority: the enormous gulf that must separate what is conceived as occurring "in here" from that which, correspondingly, must lie "out there".

This deep "epistemological gulf", can be seen as an effect of the process of separation-individuation from the female, living relational view of nature to a "detached" mechanistic world knowable through methods of "torture" and "rape" (c.f. Harding, 1986: 116); and this process parallels the stages of "psychological birth" in a gendered culture for the individual male, as described by Flax (1983). Thus, the repressed ambiguity for boys in terms of their experience of their caretaker, their once-female self, at the individual level is mirrored in Bordo's work (1986: 444) as the "eternal longing" the child experiences for this "ideal state of self", which reverberates on the cultural level.

Similar to Merchant, Birke, Keller, and Harding, Bordo's analysis supports the notion that the institutionalization of the prevailing gender dualisms, their erection as the conscious social organizing principles in science as well as in the larger social structure, had manifold consequences for the "psychology" of the culture. It is telling that in Descartes' Meditations:

Neither the self nor objects are stable, and the lack of stability in the object world is, indeed, experienced as concern over the whereabouts of the world. Reunion with the (mother) world is, however, impossible; only God the father can now provide the (external) reassurance Descartes needs (Bordo: 447).

The Cartesian experience of the "self-confronting world", in Bordo's analysis, reveals another aspect of the historical emergence of socially constructed activities designed to mediate the anxiety of repressing what Flax called separation

of "I" from "not-I" (the once-female self), and in Bordo's analysis, the separation of self from the (mother) world. Thus, by approaching the Cartesian era as an enactment of the "drama of parturition", we are able to expose another of the subjective and deeply interested fibres woven through the experiences of those in the position to name the "choice" for the institutionalization of the "modern science", inaugurated by Francis Bacon.

What Bacon "inaugurated" according to Bordo (1986: 451) was "a truly masculine birth of time" where "masculine", denotes "not a biological category but a cognitive style, an epistemological stance". We have already identified this style, as one deeply concerned with "mastery" and "domination" over nature, and Bordo from a psychocultural perspective defines the key term of "modern science's" programme as one of "detachment". To master and dominate (female) nature, men must first "detach" nature from their experience of the (mother) world on the cultural level.

As Bordo also notes:

the years between 1550 and 1650 [were] a particularly gynophobic century because of the increased perception of both nature and women as possessors of untamed natural power of female generativity and a dedication to bringing it under forceful cultural control. Nightmare fantasies of female power over reproduction and birth run throughout the era, from Kramer and Sprenger's Malleus Maleficarum which accuses witches of every known crime involving conception and birth, to Boyle's characterization of nature as "God's pregnant Automaton" (Bordo, 1986: 453, emphasis added).

Thus, in the change from organism to mechanism, "she" becomes the reminder in the psychocultural dimension of men's experience of all that is "outside" the grasp of Man. "She" is "other": and "'otherness' itself becomes dreadful - particularly the otherness of the female whose powers have always been mysterious to men and evocative of the mystery of existence itself" (Bordo, 1986: 454).

Again from an overlapping feminist perspective, we can see through Bordo's analysis how the sex/gender system depends upon the repression/oppression of the female, and of women, for its continuity, which takes on new and far reaching consequences for people-kind as a whole in the Cartesian era. "The dialectics of separation and individuation offer a way of seeing the Cartesian era empathetically and impressionistically" (Bordo: 444). Furthermore, it adds another dimension to our analysis of science and to those men who held the power/position within this socio-cultural framework to define, not only a new world, or rather, a new conception of the world, but also the methods of inquiry, and how those methods were to be applied.

The Newtonian Programme: Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton

Issac Newton has been described as the man who realized the Cartesian Dream (Capra, 1982: 63-64):

Going beyond Bacon in his systematic experimentation and beyond Descartes in his mathematical analysis,

Newton unified the two trends and developed the methodology upon which natural science has been based ever since.

What is the methodology "upon which natural science has been based ever since"? Newton's "mechanical" model of the universe is the "classical" model of science:

This model constituted the solid framework of classical physics. It was indeed a most formidable foundation supporting, like a mighty rock, all of science and providing a firm basis for natural philosophy for almost three centuries (Capra, 1975: 63).

In The Tao of Physics, Fritjof Capra describes Newton's "stage" or universe as consisting of "absolute time" and "absolute space". In Newton's conception of the universe, all physical phenomena take place in the three-dimensional (stage) space of Euclidean geometry. "In Newton's own words, 'Absolute space, in its own nature, without regard to anything external, remains always similar and immovable'" (Capra, 1982: 63). The changes of the physical world were thought to take place in another dimension called "time".

"Absolute time" is described in the Newtonian framework as having no effect on the physical world. It moves in a smooth flow from the past to the future. "Absolute, true, mathematical time" said Newton, 'of itself and by its own nature, flows uniformly without regard to anything external'" (Capra, 1982: 63). Material particles are the elements or "building blocks" which are treated in the mathematical equations representative of the Newtonian world, as "mass

points". These "mass points" are thought to be "small, solid and indestructable objects out of which all matter is made" (Ibid: 63). And, finally, the "force of gravity" is what Newton believed moved between particles, according to their mass and mutual distance from each other. For Newton, the particles and forces of gravity between them, were thought to be created by God and as such, needed no further analysis (Ibid: 61). These "scientific" conceptions of "time" and of "space" are interrelated to the "mechanistic" ideas and applications of social organization and social control, as we shall see below.

"Mechanism" or the image of the cosmos as a great machine, the image of the Newtonian model of both the universe and science, is based on the assumption that matter is dead and passive. One of the consequences of this view is the belief that matter can be controlled and re-arranged for the benefit of "man"-kind. This view of nature also contains the idea that knowledge of the world can be certain and consistent, and that the "laws" of nature have been imposed on creation by God. These "laws", it is supposed, can be uncovered by "Man" through the application of mathematical laws and identities (Merchant, 1980: 103). Newton's mechanical philosophy can thus be briefly summarized as follows:

Force was external to matter rather than immanent within it. Matter was corpuscular, passive and inert; change was simply the re-arrangement of particles of motion and was transmitted from one part

to another in a causal nexus. Because it viewed nature as dead and matter as passive, mechanism could function as a subtle sanction for the exploitation of nature and its resources (Merchant: 102).

The mechanical image of nature thus expressed an idea that "the giant cosmic machine" was completely causal, determinate and predictable. "The philosophical basis of the rigorous determinism", as Capra (1975: 65) suggests, was the "fundamental division between the I and the world introduced by Descartes" and discussed in detail above.

The establishment of a totally reductionist and atomistic view of the constitution of the universe as understood by Newton was also advocated, but for political reasons, by Robert Boyle of the Royal Society of London.

David Bloor (1984: 62-64) points out, as we have had abundant opportunity to see, that the 17th century was a time of dramatic social change and upheaval. In this time frame, "England experienced a breakdown in the machinery of social control", as shown in Robert Boyle's comment that there were "... no less than 200 several opinions in points of religion" (cited in Bloor: 62). The "radical" religious sects to which Robert Boyle referred, were claiming social and political autonomy using theological justifications premised on the notion of the immanence of God - i.e. that matter (individuals) was infused with spirit: "Divinity, they preached, was potentially within all men and women and within nature" (Bloor, 1984: 62).

Robert Boyle, however, had other social goals in mind. And he used the mechanical philosophy of nature, which proposed that matter is inert and irrational and controlled by external forces, to "bolster up the social and political policies" that his circle, The Royal Society espoused (Bloor, 1984: 63). It will be appreciated how the "200 several opinions in points of religion" posed a threat to the establishment of the "mechanistic" conception of the universe, and its proposed reflection in the social order, because of the way these religious sects arranged the cosmos. Such arrangements "provided no role for professional mediators or interpreter's of God's will" (Bloor, 1980: 64). In other words, the alternative points of view, represented by such religious sects as the "Diggers" and the "Ranters", threatened the power/position of those doing the "naming" in 17th century society:

By making reality directly accessible through the experience of the senses, and the experience provided by revelation, they provided themselves with all the knowledge and guidance they needed. And the assertion of self-activity in nature reinforced the claim to autonomy because it put all the sources of activity in the world where they could grasp them. It put activity so, to speak, at the bottom rather than at the top, collapsing social hierarchies (Bloor, 1984: 64).

It was in reaction to this vitalist conception of nature and society that Robert Boyle and Issac Newton arrived at an "atomistic" view of the constitution of the universe, namely, a view premised on total reductionism. These two men had a

vested interest in viewing the universe as constituted like a machine, for only the mechanistic, atomistic conception of the universe was congruent with their political views as members of a privileged elite. Bloor (1984: 65) points out that through money provided in Boyle's will, Newton's followers financed a series of lectures whose aim was "to press the corpuscular [or atomistic] philosophy into service". The substance of these lectures was that:

nature was to be understood in terms of particles of inert matter blindly obeying laws of motion and operated on by forces such as gravity [explained in terms of the action of an external God]. The point insisted on by these theorists was that particles of matter did not contain within themselves the active principle of motion. Matter was brute, inanimate and irrational, and could neither move nor organize itself... The corpuscular philosophy was an answer to the vulgar or received views of nature (Bloor, 1984: 61).

Common to Bacon's, Descartes' and Newton's vision of the new science, for their theories to attain/retain internal and external consistency, is the prominent place of God. Bloor points out that Newton, for example, "insisted that God is the Lord of Creation, not the soul of the world" as believed by the organismic philosophers. What Newton's argument reveals is that the "naming" of God, arises and changes in historically specific moments, and emerges out of socially constructed activities. Writing about the "proper" definition of the place of "God" in the "natural" order of things, Newton states in the General Scholium (cited in Bloor: 65):

The word God is a relative Term, and has Reference to Servants, and Deity is the Dominion of God not (as a soul has) over a Body of its own, which is the notion of those who make God the Soul of the World; but (such as a Governor has) over Servants.

From the above quotation, we can see how changing interpretations of the place of God in the "natural" order of things influenced the transition from the organismic to the mechanistic conception of nature, premised on "detachment" and "domination". God becomes external, in order to justify and unite the space or as Descartes called it, "the enormous gulf", "between "men" and the cosmos.

Bloor (1984: 65) also points to how the new mechanistic philosophy was developed in such a way so as to correspond and "come to terms with the increasingly influential men [sic] of 'business and dispatch' - the rising capitalist class".

Particularly interesting is the effort extended by Newton to purposely avoid attributing matter with any agency: "he sought one means after another to avoid attributing activity and agency to matter" (Bloor: 65). Bloor (19895: 66) also notes how Newton and his followers would never have admitted to their deeply interested and subjective endeavours, but would have appealed to "experience, reason or the Bible" to back up their mechanistic pursuits (Bloor, 1984: 66). Finally, Bloor (1984: 66) argues that the political context in which Boyle and Newton were immersed, was used to reinforce and exploit these "different pictures of the

physical world, and the resources of the new laws". We can now see how the establishment of the "modern" scientific enterprise which informs contemporary science, has been subjective and deeply interested from the beginning as opposed to objective and neutral as it pretends in the Baconian, Cartesian and Newtonian programmes of science, all of which are woven through contemporary images and assumptions of the "natural" order of things.

The forms, degrees, manifestations and contours of the mechanistic picture of science and the cosmos have changed much over the past 300 years, but it still remains the "mighty rock", supporting all of science. It would, however, be misleading to assume that even the mightiest of mountains and rocks, don't erode, changing the pictures of both the universe and science, yet again.

The New Physics and Feminism(s)

In this section, I will sum up what has gone before by listing some of the main features of the epistemology of "classical science". I shall be particularly concerned to elucidate the "crisis" in classical science when it found itself, or came up against the fact that the same event could, and indeed had to, be described in at least two mutually exclusive languages. It was out of this moment that the "New Physics" emerged.

This epistemological revolution in physics, coheres in an interesting and informative way with feminism(s), notably with the emphases on consciousness and multiple perspectives. These are just a couple of points of convergence among others, which I will present, for two reasons. The first reason, concerns the impact that feminism(s) and the new physics have had, and continue to have, on my own thinking. The second points to the dangerous choice made in the 17th century:

for the institutionalization of a positivist science, objective and neutral, to the exclusion of alternative cognitive programs of knowledge of nature as well as alternative social structures of science, such as those that would at least institutionally and normatively be associated with the requirements of human progress, enlightenment and emancipation (Bleir, 1987: 6).

In the previous sections, we have seen how the institutionalization of the classical programme of science, "modern science", has been implicitly and even explicitly involved in the brutal oppression/repression of women (e.g. the witch trials) and women's knowledge-able experiences of the social world (Smith, 1975). In other words we have seen how the sex/gender system informed scientific thought and practice, and vice versa.

Classical science, as we have seen, is underpinned by the view of nature as a machine (wherein the female was constituted as object), pieced together by atomistic or particularistic groupings of matter which are distinguished and opposed to "qualities" of spirit. This mighty machine is

thought to be dead, passive and inert. It is without flexibility (Bateson, 1972). The structure of assumptions underpinning classical science can be described as technology as a way of knowing (Caley, 1985: 3).

Classical science is a way of knowing and acting on the world premised on the same relations of domination and subordination that we have seen to underlie the sex/gender system. It is a way of knowing and acting on the world that is expressed in the radical disjuncture between mind and body, perceived, developed, applied and defended in "either/or" categories. A common thread that runs through the various applications, interpretations, disagreements, and discoveries within the classical paradigm of science is that it is premised on "dualism". Dichotomies as we have seen, are characteristic of Western thought but were institutionalized in the 17th century as never before.

Geraldine Finn (1984: 45) argues that, at its most primitive, dualism is expressed in the belief that "man" consists of mind and body, where mind is articulated through reason. This ability by "men" to reason distinguishes "man" from the animals but entitles him to control and dominate the latter as well. The will to dominate, however, is not directed exclusively at other species, for dualism also divides members of the same species into opposed categories as Table 1 (cf. supra, p. 16) illustrates: i.e, men over and against women, Europeans over and against non-Europeans,

middle/upper-class over and against working class. As Finn (1984: 46) points out:

Dualistic thinking can justify any social hierarchy, for it enables the knower to objectify and reify the "other", the known - and thus to act upon it, control, dominate and violate it as mere object, as a threat to order, reason and right rule, as that which conflicts with and contradicts 'humanity's' higher interests.

Concurrent then, with the disjunction between spirit and matter, mind and body, subject and object, within the mechanical conception of the nature of things, is the division of the forms of knowledge into objective and subjective (Fox Keller, 1985). And because, as Birke (1986) and Finn (1984) have argued, hierarchy is always posited in Western dichotomies, one finds that objective knowledge is valued over and against subjective knowledge (the latter being "tainted" somehow, and so devalued). The esteem in which objective knowledge is held is reflected in the appeal which the methodology of the physical sciences has for traditional or conventional social scientists (Harding, 1986, Smith, 1975; 1979; Finn, 1984 and Morgan, 1984). (This question will be explored further in the final chapter). But the mechanistic world of "either/or", shown to be phallacious in the feminist critiques of science, has been shaken to its very foundations ever since Einstein proposed his "Special Theory of Relativity" in physics more than 75 year ago (Morgan, 1984: 246). Since that time physicists have been forced to question the mechanistic and dualistic assumptions

on which their models of inquiry were based, particularly since the discovery that light could be both waves and particles at the same time (Capra, 1975; 1980, Morgan, 1984: 245).

Because of this apparent contradiction, physicists like Fritjof Capra claim: "We cannot speak of nature without at the same time speaking about ourselves... [T]he properties of matter depend on the apparatus we use to investigate it: if we ask a particle question, we will get a particle answer, if we ask a wave question we will get a wave answer" (Capra, in Jaggar, 1983: 367). Capra (1975: 77) explains:

The apparent contradiction between the particle and the wave picture was solved in a completely unexpected way which called into question the very foundation of the mechanistic world view - the concept of the reality of matter. [For it was found that at] the sub-atomic level, matter does not exist with certainty at definite places, but rather shows "tendencies to exist", and atomic events do not occur with certainty at definite times and in definite ways, but rather show "tendencies to occur".

Indeed, as feminist Robin Morgan (1984:246), points out:

the question isn't matter and energy (since matter is energy; there is nothing but energy). The question isn't even about a field dense with particles resonating the 'tendencies to exist'. The field, the particles, the resonances, the tendencies, and the energy are all the same thing (Morgan: 246).

What does all of this mean? In part, we can already see that the above descriptions have moved us nicely away from the constructed world of "either/or", away from dualisms.

What the relativity view means is that:

the classical ideal of an objective description of nature is no longer valid. The Cartesian partition

between the I and the world, between the observer and the observed, cannot be made when dealing with atomic matter. In atomic physics, we can never speak about nature without, at the same time, speaking about ourselves (Capra, 1975: 78).

And, from a feminist standpoint, we can go further, and say that this "scientific revelation" sounds very much like our attempts to articulate our experience(s) as Other, the "objects" whose experiences have been reified, repressed, and dominated, as a condition for the phallacy of an "objective" (masculinist and dualistic) world view (Finn, 1984; Rose, 1986; among others).

In other words, we can see that: (1) if, as the New Physics argues, the rigid separation of the "Cartesian partition between the I and the world, between the observer and the observed cannot be made" in physics (Capra, 1975: 78); and (2) we place this alongside feminism(s) critical recognition of our specific/differentiated experiences as women living in a "man-made, man-governed" world (like the particle/wave); then, (3) we can see that the world of "either/or" (which justifies any social hierarchy, in "enabling the knower to objectify and reify the 'other'" - nature, matter or the female (Finn, 1984: 46)) is socially constructed. Thus, there is nothing inevitable about it and it could be Other-Wise once we become critically aware of this (cf. Morgan, 1984: 247).

In Feminism(s) we refer to this "awareness" as the feminist notion of consciousness-raising; that process

whereby we realize that our experience(s), of "personal" problems have social and "political" bases and solutions, namely, that the "personal and political" are interconnected and interdependent (Stanley and Wise, 1983: 66). This process or awareness of our "be-ing" (as verb, Daly, 1978), is described by Robin Morgan (1977: 300) as "the dialectical expression of personal drama". Morgan (1977: 219) characterizes this process as the attempt "to synchronize [the] interior landscape with exterior "reality" and thus discover a synthesis which can teach us something about each, and about the third thing they constitute anew, together". This "process description of experience", also coheres with the "process description of reality" as the latter has been developed in recent scientific writings:

Of particular interest among recent developments within science is the growing interest among physicists in a process description of reality..... In [their] descriptions object reality acquires a dynamic character (Keller, 1985: 203).

Gerri Perrault has also commented on this overlap between feminism(s) and the New Physics:

[T]he world view of contemporary radical feminists bears striking resemblances to the relational world view of modern, post-Newtonian physics" (cited in Jaggar, 1983: 368).

New Physicists, and some social scientists, who have explored the implications of all that we have pointed to above, in and across the various disciplines, and the implications for social thought, and practice, have also described this awareness of the interconnectedness and

interdependence between subject and object as a "perspective view of reality":

...If objectivity is an illusion, is subjectivity the only alternative? We suggest that perspective is a more useful concept. Perspective connotes a view at a distance from a particular focus. Where we look from affects what we see. This means that any one focus of observation gives only a partial result; no single discipline ever gives a complete picture. A whole picture is an image generated morphogenetically from multiple perspectives (Schwartz and Ogilvie, 1979: 15).

This notion of "multiple perspectives" is, as we have shown (in chapter one), characteristic of feminism(s) as a series of interconnecting perspectives. A feminist perspective overlaps with the "perspective view of reality" of the new physics, while at the same time being unique from the latter, in that women's experiences and agency are central in feminist inquiry and practice, which necessitates our political responsibility. In other words, feminism(s) can be described as participation in a series of interconnecting perspectives which take our experience(s) of the "sex/gender system" to be our "object" of analysis:

all research is 'grounded' in consciousness, because it isn't possible to do research (or life) in such a way that we can separate ourselves from experiencing what we experience as people (and researchers) involved in a situation. There is no way we can avoid deriving theoretical constructs from experience, because we necessarily attempt to understand what is going on as we experience it. The research experience itself, like all other experiences, is necessarily subject to on-going 'theorizing', on-going attempts to understand, explain, and re-explain, what is going on. This is what consciousness is all about; this is what people do in new situations and researchers do no differently from anyone else (Stanley and Wise, 1983: 161).

We can sum up all of what has been said by suggesting that the claim to an "objective" perspective in the sciences is really a "perspective view of reality" which is not acknowledged as such. Where one stands or is situated within society affects what one sees, and how one will proceed to investigate: and the scientific enterprise is situated in society. The "perspective view of reality", however, points to the partiality of observations and interpretations, and acknowledges that 'meaning is context dependent' and relational: hence, the rigid distinction between subject and object dissolves under critical scrutiny. In this way, we are forced to recognize the multiplicity of perspectives which are seen to be interconnected and interdependent. And in this view, we get a "morphogenetically" generated picture or shape arising out of this picture of the whole (Schwartz and Ogilvy, 1979: 15). This idea of the multiplicity of perspectives overlaps with feminism(s).

But whereas a "perspective view" implies an ethic of application on the world, feminism(s) demands it. Consequently, this expectation stands in sharp contradistinction to the present ethics of the scientific enterprise. For example:

[S]cientists who retreat behind the screen of pure science are passively abandoning their social responsibility; those who choose to become actively involved risk being seen as no longer "objective". Here, the notion of "objectivity" becomes merely a code word for the political passivity of those scientists who have tacitly agreed to accept a

privileged social position and freedom in inquiry within the laboratory in return for their silence in not questioning the social uses of science or the power relations that determines its directions (Fee, in Birke, 1986: 158).

Will those "radical" scientists of the New Physics acknowledge their privileged position(s)? Feminists argue that we must always be conscious of how the results of our research might affect women, and that this forces us to strive toward a science which is grounded "in the participatory values of anti-classism, anti-racism and anti-sexism" (Harding, 1986: back cover; Stanley and Wise, 1983: 150-175). Moreover, Stanley and Wise explain, in a discussion of Canadian feminist Dorothy Smith's work, that our experience must be acknowledged and (in)form the basis of our inquiries:

[Smith] argues that the situated nature of the researcher should form the very beginning and basis of social science work. This would require a thorough examination of where the social scientist is actually situated; and then making her direct experience of the world, and the research process, the basis of her knowledge as a social scientist (Stanley and Wise, 1983: 165).

For these reasons among others, Harding (1986: 40) argues "that a critical and self-reflective social science should be the model for all science". And, Lynda Birke (1986: 145) points out that science "does not so much have to change its commitments, as change the balance between them", meaning that scientists must recognize and take hold of their personal/political (social) responsibility. The balance of commitments in science to which she refers are:

commitments to the kind of relationship with nature that feminists have envisaged [and which] are already there in the history of science [-discussed in the previous sections of this chapter] - even if this is hard to see in the face of current scientific orthodoxy (Birke, 1986: 145).

It must be emphasized that "current scientific orthodoxy", or the world of classical physics, is "our Western commonsense reality...; twentieth century advances in relativity and quantum theory notwithstanding" (Merchant, 1980: 275).

As we have seen, images of nature have changed dramatically, and with those changes, came the choice for a particular programme of knowledge of nature and of the social structure of science, to the exclusion of alternatives and to the systematic exclusion of women's experiences of the social world (Bleir, 1986: 6; Smith, 1975; 1979).

Let me conclude this chapter with a passage drawn from Schwartz and Ogilvie (1979: 2):

The world is round: a true description of reality, but once such a statement would have been false, foolish, and heretical. Our beliefs about what is true and real undergo fundamental shifts from time to time. And when our perception of the nature of things shifts, the complex system of human life also shifts.

The "flat" did not metamorphose into a "whirling sphere"; only our knowledge about the world and hence our relationship to it changed. But what has not changed, except in degree and form, is the oppression of women. Women's position came to be "managed" in new ways, with new knowledge, and with new ways of justifying her "place" in subordination to "Man".

The order of the universe has changed dramatically as the above quotation, and the substance of this chapter illustrates, but the order and naming of "Woman's" position in relation to "Man's" has not. Women are still defined in relation to men.

The thought of the "pro-family movement", as we shall see in the next chapter, seeks to justify this oppressive ordering between women and men by politicizing all of the same masculinist assumptions found in the classical science paradigm, which our feminist inquiry has shown to be phallacious (that is, in the interests of some men and socially constructed). By so doing, the agents of the "pro-family" movement appeal to "the natural order" in much the same way scientists appeal to "objectivity".

CHAPTER THREE

The "Natural" Phallacy: The Pro-Family Movement

Introduction

In this chapter we will explore the thought of the "pro-family" movement. It will be shown how this style of thought (like the "science" discussed in Chapter 2) is a direct manifestation of the sex/gender system. As we have already made clear, this system precipitates and enforces the devaluation and exclusion of women's experience(s) of the social world, and hence, women's encoding of our experiences. It is the principles of this system that form the controlling structure of assumptions which underlies the thought and practice of the "pro-family movement".

It cannot be too heavily emphasized that the so-called "pro-family movement" arose in response to feminists making women's specificity central to political debate, and that in the "pro-family" literature feminists are portrayed as a threat to the very fibre of "Western society", a society which entails, as we have seen, an asymmetrical power relation between women and men specifically, and all that characterized as Being "feminine" and "masculine" generally.

The principles of the sex/gender system as exemplified in the thought of the "pro-family" movement include: the "reification" and "devaluation" of women's experience of the social world; the dualistic naming of "difference"; the

positing of hierarchy in duality; the idea of "women" as a unitary concept, defined only in opposition to "man" and all that is characterized as "Being Masculine"; the equation of a "woman's essence" with her capacity to reproduce; and the positing of these principles as "natural" and transhistorical "facts".

The emergence of the "pro-family movement" in reaction to feminism(s) is also part of a much larger social phenomenon, the emergence of the so-called New Right.

The "Pro-Family Movement: What is Womanhood and Its Meaning?

In Abortion and Women's Choice, Rosalind Petchesky (1984: 224-225) identifies a number of ways in which new right thought is grounded in "pro-family" issues. Her substantive approach coupled with Angela Miles (1982) analysis, provide us with a framework to begin to tackle the underlying assumptions of "pro-family movement" thought as they relate to women's lives.

Angela Miles (1982) argues that the "ground" or ideological springboard from which the so-called new right has launched its political rhetoric is the very "ground" that feminists identified in making the personal political through our understanding of gender domination (Miles, 1982: 219). Miles (1982: 219) argues that feminists have opened up this ground for political debate, most notably by making women's specificity central to political discussion: "To shirk the

question of women's specificity is to avoid the central ground of struggle altogether. It would be an attempt to build a politics without the substance to engage the "enemy" [the new right] on the new political ground that we ourselves have opened up" (Miles: 219).

Miles makes clear that the "political ploy" of the new right has been to justify a specific and oppressive social and political programme by moving discussion "to ground where tradition and emotion and people's needs and fears are far more elemental than in the narrow political sphere [the traditional domain of right wing activity] which has historically been far removed from people's everyday lives" (Miles: 219). The "pro-family movement arises out of the 'attempt to structure political debate around the theme of 'What is womanhood and its meaning'?" (Miles: 219). This is a political ploy because the so-called New Right is still interested in big-business, militarism, world anti-communism and pro-American policies and practices (Petchesky, 1984; Gross, 1980; Dubinsky, 1987).

The so-called "pro-family" movement can also be identified in many other ways. The most blatant characteristic is their focussing of energies on "issues related to the family and sexuality" (Petchesky, 1984: 258). This political agenda is inseparable from their focus on "economic" issues such as the dismantling of social welfare programmes (Petchesky, 1984: 256-258). Canadian feminist

Karen Dubinsky (1987:5) has observed that the "economic" and "social" right wing cannot be separated because they are representative of the same phenomena and, in many instances, made up of the same people.

Some of the issues or political concerns captured under new right banners are: "pro-family" (i.e. anti-families), "pro-life" (i.e. anti-choice), "the right to work" (i.e. anti-union), "anti-equal rights" (i.e. pro-"natural" hierarchy), "anti-gay rights" (i.e. pro-discrimination), "pro-God" (anti-"isms", e.g. humanism, liberalism, feminism, socialism, and communism), and "pro-morality" (i.e. anti-sex education, anti-contraception) (Eichler, 1985; Petchesky, 1984). These kinds of political concerns reveal their "targeting of every [conceivable] conservative single issue cause" (Petchesky, 1984: 257-258).

The purpose of this targeting is to amalgamate those who respond positively to these (so-called single issue) causes into "broad based coalitions that can be mobilized politically in support of right wing candidates and causes", whether or not respondents are aware of or informed of this political strategy" (Petchesky, 1984: 255). . . To achieve this goal involves propagating what Conway and Siegelman (1984) call an "ideological fundamentalism": namely establishing an ideological monopoly over how people are to "think" and act. Eichler (1985:1) also points out that this process involves the appropriation of some of the language of feminism but

without its scope or content of analysis, as in the case of the idea that one has the right to "choose" to be "anti-choice". (This is a prime example of what Mary Daly would call a "patriarchal reversal"). The "pro-family" movement, therefore, manipulates the feminist principle that the personal is political, in particular by making "politics" personally threatening; for example it is said that feminists are out to destroy, not simply "the" family, but "your" family.

Conway and Siegelman distinguish "ideological fundamentalism" from "fundamentalist ideology" (a particular and literal interpretation of the Bible), because the latter, they argue, is just one of the ways through which the former is achieved, or at least attempted. Moreover, "ideological fundamentalism" is what Conway and Siegelman define as the particular "mind-set" that the new Right's "Holy Terror" engenders. Holy Terror is defined by Conway and Siegelman as:

the exploitation of religion as the vehicle for a larger social and political movement, a drive for power, not only at the national level, but in every domain of public concern, in the most intimate areas of our private lives, and in the volatile arena of world affairs. It is this broad programme of intimidation, manipulation and control in the name of religion that we call Holy Terror (Conway and Siegelman, 1984: 4).

The particular religion to which the "pro-family" movement subscribes is the Judeo-Christian religion, or rather a highly selective interpretation of that religion. Consider,

for example, the claim put forward by Phyllis Schlafly, one of the spokespersons of the pro-family movement:

American women are... especially fortunate to be the beneficiaries of the Judeo-Christian tradition, which accords a status to women unknown in the rest of the world. Our Judeo-Christian civilization has developed laws and customs that since women must bear the consequences of the sex act, require men to assume other consequences. These laws and customs decree that a man must carry his share by physical protection and financial support of his children and of the woman who bears his children, and also by a code of behaviour that benefits and protects both the woman and the children (Schlafly, 1977: 33).

As we will explore in greater detail below, Schlafly's claims are revealing of how the thought of the pro-family movement can be seen as a manifestation of the sex/gender system.

Ehrenreich, Hess, and Jacobs (1986: 46), in an article called "Unbuckling The Bible Belt", provide us with another example of the curious constructions placed on female sexuality by right wing thought:

According to the sex experts of the religious new right, women must take responsibility for the way men treat them because men can't control themselves. They are victims of what one conservative Christian book calls the 'Y chromosome factor', something in the male genes that makes 'sexual arousal much more quickly stimulated through eye contact'.

In both quotations cited above, we find that women are:

- (1) defined as a unitary concept based on their capacity to reproduce, (2) seen as responsible for their (male-defined) female sexuality, (3) defined in relation to men, that is, dualistically, where the man is presumed to be responsible for and in control of his wife, and his children. All this despite the fact that women must "bear the consequences" of

the very conditions over which she has no power! It will be observed that the justification for this asymmetry of power relations based on gender is given through a decontextualized mixture of Biblical citations, and the always reliable, sociobiological or "genetic" justifications of the principles of domination and hierarchy. We will be exploring each of these themes in further detail below.

This brings us to the third theme of "new right/pro-family" movement thought noted by Petchesky, namely the attempt to cut across major political party lines (e.g. Republican/Democrat or Conservative/Liberal) and thereby win elections, change and initiate legislation, and direct policy toward the eventual domination and control of the state (Petchesky: 257). In other words, new right candidates or advocates tell voters that a vote for Candidate "X" is a vote for God, morality, and/or the protection of "the" family. Voters are advised above all to check out the "moral" record of their political candidates (his or her political record being of second importance) (cf. Conway and Siegelman, 1984; or simply "tune in" to television's "electronic church" shows, such as the American "700 Club" or Canada's own "101 Huntley Street").

It has been strategic for the new right to hook into both fundamentalist and evangelical churches as well as the anti-abortion movement in terms of their principal organizing base and model. These organizations provide the groups grounded

under new right banners with "ideological coherence and legitimacy"; "constituents and organized networks"; and "money", notably through Richard Vigurie's direct mail computer network (Petchesky: 258).

Some of the new right organizations where we find this conglomeration of oppressive justifications at work in Canada include: "Real, Equal, Active for Life" or "R.E.A.L Women", "Renaissance Ontario", the "Coalition for Family Values", "Morality of the Nation", and the "National Citizens Coalition" (Waxman, 1987: 3).

A provisional list of such organizations in the United States would include: the "Eagle Forum" (with Phyllis Schlafly as president), "Stop-ERA" (with Phyllis Schlafly as founder and president), the "Moral Majority", the "National Conservative Political Action Committee", and others like the "Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress", the "Committee for Responsible Youth Politics", and the "Young Americans for Freedom/The Fund for a Conservative Tradition". Many of these organizations are "PACs" or "Political Action Committees" (cf. Conway and Siegelman, 1984; Gross, 1980; Petchesky, 1984).

Petchesky also notes that many of the people involved in these organizations, people like Phyllis Schlafly, Paul Weyrich, Richard Vigurie, George Gilder, the Reverend Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, and Senator Jesse Helms, among others, are the "same speakers and leaders appearing

continually on th[e] rosters" of many single issue groups organized "under the rubric of the pro-family movement" (Petchesky, 256). Both their purpose and their strategy is, as Petchesky notes: "to consolidate 'groups devoted to the preservation of the traditional social roles of the family, the churches, and the schools' into a single coalition organized around four main planks: 'pro-life', 'pro-family', 'pro-moral' and 'pro-American', with 'family' as the keystone" (Petchesky: 256).

In what follows, we will explore the five principles of the sex/gender system as set out on the first and second pages of this chapter in an effort to show that: (1) there is a relationship between the epistemological assumptions of "modern science" and "new right/pro-family movement" thought; and (2) that both bodies of thought are manifestations of the sex/gender system. The relationship we seek to expose is as follows: women have traditionally been perceived as somehow "closer to nature", and nature has been identified as female. "Female" and "nature" are the negative poles of their dualistic counterpoints, "male" and "culture", under the sex/gender system. In Chapter Two, we described science's historical development as that which sets out to control (female) nature. In this chapter, we will argue that the "pro-family movement" is that which sets out to control women by harnessing them to their capacity to reproduce on masculinist terms. Both "science" (in terms of its claim to

an "objective" and neutral knowledge) and the "pro-family movement" (in terms of its appeal to the "natural" asymmetrical power relations between women and men) are implicitly and explicitly involved in oppressive ways of thinking and acting on the world which are (advertently and) inadvertently involved in the oppression of women. These are but some of the conditions necessary to the maintenance of the sex/gender system, a system which feminists seek to challenge and transcend. We have seen how this pattern of thinking underpinned the establishment of "modern science" in the 17th century, and we will now see how the sex/gender system is manifested in the thought of the so-called "pro-family" movement.

The Reification and Devaluation of Women's Experiences

As a result of the ways feminists have questioned their experiences of the sex/gender system, and hence, politicized it, feminists are portrayed in the literature of the "pro-family" movement as having no "morals", or at least no morals that are consistent with those of the New Right. Indeed, "morality" does seem to stand in contradistinction to "ethics". But any notions of feminist ethics are completely repressed in this discourse, and feminism is portrayed instead as advocating "moral neutrality":

The women's liberation movement pushes its proposals on the premise that everything must be neutral as between morality and immorality, and as between the institution of the family and alternative lifestyles:

for example, that homosexuals and lesbians should have just as much right to teach in the schools and to adopt children as anyone else; and that illegitimate babies and abortions by married or single mothers should be accepted as normal behaviour for teachers and funded by public money (Schlafly, 1977: 25).

We don't get a sense of what feminist ethics may mean in the above quotation, but we do get a clear picture of what the so-called "pro-morality" stance of the "pro-family movement" means - the denial of "other" people's experience of the social world. We have references to a proper expression of sexuality, namely heterosexuality, valued in the context of marriage, notably in the form of "the" family, and a lack of recognition for children born outside of the patriarchal family form. In place of the consideration of experience, the "concept of roles" based on gender is advanced as both a "moral" and a "natural" expression of men's and women's differentiated physiologies.

In fact, as noted above, the "pro-family movement" positions itself in opposition to feminism, and the latter is made responsible for an extraordinary array of social ills, ranging from pornography and child abuse to the "breakdown of the family" (Eichler, 1985: 1-3). Indeed, the "pro-family movement" not only positions feminism against families, but positions feminists against women (Eichler: 3). This positioning can be understood as a reaction to the fact that feminism(s) advance women's experience(s) of the social world, whereas these thinkers are interested in maintaining a

rigid concept of gender roles. "Experience" and "Roles" are diametrically opposed.

In the thought of the "pro-family movement", the multiple and multi-faceted (un)conscious experiences of women and men in everyday life are reduced to a particular, rigid, internally divided and hierarchical set of functions and roles. As a result of our making visible the contradictions between the concept of so-called "natural" gender roles and our experience of these social constructions as they are presently "Named" and ordered under the sex/gender system, feminists have been targeted, not only as "immoral", but "unnatural":

The women's liberation movement has positioned itself in total opposition to the entire concept of "roles", but in so doing, they are opposing Mother Nature herself (Schflafly, 1977: 71).

Thus, as a result of our struggles to make visible the value of women's experience/knowledge of day to day power politics, we are perceived negatively by the gate-keepers of the sex/gender system. Within this system women's experience/knowledge is valuable only in relation to the needs of men, and there, contained and controlled.

Women's experience/knowledge within the sex /gender system is a form of resistance, once we attempt to articulate our experience/knowledge within and between, and beyond other women. In so doing, we are transforming those boundaries where we are silenced, and have value or are valued solely in relation to Man: i.e. His wife, His daughter, His "X", His

widow, His employee. In resisting this framework for thinking and acting feminists are attempting to bring the "inside, out". That is, feminists are struggling to share our experiences of being women in a "man-made", "man-governed" world, with other women, based on the recognition of this as valuable and necessary knowledge. In so doing, feminists are bringing our specific/differentiating experiences outside of the so-called private sphere into the so-called public or political sphere which at present both excludes our knowledge-able experiences and defines the only lawful context within which our experiences can e-merge.

The sex/gender system, as we have seen, requires this silencing and devaluation of women's voice(s), and the corresponding split of humanity and human psyches into "two", in order to perpetuate itself. So women's experiences are completely invalidated within the structure of assumptions informing "pro-family" thought, which favour the "concept of roles" as expressed by Schlafly: "everyone's own problems always seem the most momentous, the most insoluble, and the most unjust" (Schlafly, 1977: 52; emphasis mine).

What we find, then, in the underlying assumptions of this way of thinking, is that people are required to objectify their experiences as human beings. As women potentially become critically aware of the contradictions between their experiences and the particular "concept of roles" prescribed them, they are simply told: "Don't be yourself. Be the

person you would like to be [and, what you want to be is, of course] a cheerful person who sheds a little sunshine in an otherwise gloomy day, who sees the silver lining in every cloud and who keeps a sense of humour in the face of every reverse" (Schlafly, 1977: 58). Thus, there is recognition of the contradiction between women's experiences and the demands of their "roles", but what Schlafly's advice comes to is simply: split your Self up, become "the role", but above all, "don't be yourself".

This application of a "patriarchal reversal" or "male method of mystification" (Daly, 1978; Vickers, 1982) is typical of the thought of the pro-family movement. In this case, the reversal suggests that not being yourself is "natural". We, however, can see that this prescription is not natural; rather it is but one of the preconditions for the continuity of the sex/gender system, a fact clearly illustrated in George Gildner's definition of, and plea for, the necessity of the oppressive concept of roles. He claims:

Just as important as th[e] biological differences [between men and women] are differences in familial roles.... Because of the long evolutionary experience of the race in hunting societies, the provider role accords with the deepest instincts of men. When they are providing for women and protecting them men feel masculine and sexual; when they cannot perform these roles, as in the welfare culture, they often prefer the company of the all-male group at the bar or on the street. Here they find an atmosphere that does not make the larger and deeper claims of familial and sexual love, which are hard for men to meet without a sense of masculine dominance (Gilder, 1981: 136).

The intimate connection between "biological" and social "role" differences evoked by this quotation, where a "REAL" man needs to dominate a woman (within the context of the patriarchal family form of course) is typical of the thought of the "pro-family movement". Like Gilder, they pretend that "biological" and "social role differences" contain some sort of inherent meaning structure; the two being equally important or primal. Before one has had time to think, therefore, one finds oneself inside a logic - the logic of a kind of social zoology, or evolutionary biology of roles - where there is no room for reflection, let alone critical reflection. There is no recourse to question these assumptions, they are presented as self evident: what is, is. And "what is", is of course intimately bound up with an apparent desire to uncover further justifications for the oppression of women.

We can observe that women's experiences are completely excluded from Gilder's explanation of man's need to recognize the primacy of "biological differences" as the basis for oppressing women in the home. The only mention of women is in relation to the needs of men, as Gilder defines those needs from his particular set of assumptions of what it means to be a "REAL" man: the patriarch of a heterosexual marriage, premised on "masculine dominance". "The" family he argues, is the basic building block of society, particularly the society characteristic of the "free enterprise system",

which necessitates asymmetrical relations not only between women and men, production and reproduction, but between Wealth and Poverty (the title of Gilder's book).

Gilder's main thesis in Wealth and Poverty (1980) is that the central cause of poverty is the breakdown of the traditional patriarchal family form; the "natural" model of male/female and capitalist relations involves:

A married man..., spurred by the claims of family to channel his otherwise disruptive male aggressions into his performance as a provider for a wife and children. These sexual differences alone, which, manifest themselves in all societies known to anthropology, dictate that the first priority of any serious program against poverty is to strengthen the male role in poor families (Gilder, 1980: 69; emphasis, mine).

The solution to poverty, then, is not to advocate social welfare programmes but to return women to their "maternal horizons" and harness men's aggressive "sexual energies" by way of dominating women, because "sexual energies [are] directly tied to economic growth" (Gilder, 1980: 71).

The "rational" scholar may be tempted to ignore Gilder's seemingly preposterous thesis, but the above quotations were drawn from his book Wealth and Poverty, the same one that U.S. President Ronald Reagan distributed to cabinet upon assuming office (cf. Eisenstein, 1984: 53). This latter bit of information suggests that sociologists need also critically scrutinize the "irrational" thought and practices of movements like those grouped under the new right.

Clearly, "women's specificity" is now a key political issue as is the new right's violent responses to feminism(s) having opened up this ground for political debate. As we have seen, by critically examining/articulating our experiences of oppression(s) under the sex/gender system feminists have come to be perceived as a threat to the "moral fibre" of Western civilization - a way of thinking which the new right seeks to further entrench. The reason, then, that feminism (with our focussing of energies on articulating/validating women's experiences) is positioned against the concept of biologically deterministic roles, and thus, against women, in new right thinking, is that the various movements grouped under the new right banner all wish to defend all that feminism(s) challenges; most notably, the reification of women's experiences and the "limiting divisions which currently shape our existence" (Miles, 1982: 218). These divisions, as clearly illustrated by the above quotations from Gilder's book, are situated:

between reproduction and production, private and public life, leisure and work, and male and female. Domination is built on and institutionalized in this fragmentation of human life. This fragmentation extends even beyond the alienation of the people's productive powers to the alienation and division of aspects of their being into separate and opposed male and female halves of humanity (Miles: 218).

To maintain the primacy of women's biology as a justification for their oppression, experience is submerged, devalued, and ultimately "split". In this regard, as Mary Daly (1973: 127) makes clear:

[D]ivision by socialization into sex roles divides the human psyche itself..... The idea that these realities [namely, the private order and the public order] can be separated and still be real is, of course, a mirage. Women's movement theorists have shown that "the personal is political", that the power structures get into the fabric of one's own psyche and personal relationships: this is "sexual politics". Power split off from love makes an obscenity out of what we call love, forcing us unwillingly to destroy ourselves and each other.

And, despite all this, as Eisenstein (1984: 175) observes, new right thinkers, "never explain why this natural order must be enforced or reinforced by society".

To the extent that the "pro-family" movement's framework for thinking and acting on the world requires the systematic silencing and exclusion of women's meanings as women themselves experience their relationships with them Selves, others, and their social world, it is a manifestation of the sex/gender system.

The Dualistic and Hierarchical Naming of "Difference"

The dualistic thinking of the pro-family movement cannot be separated from the socio-biology of roles discussed above, given how men's and women's different biologies/roles are opposed to each other within this body of thought.

Furthermore, because this dualistic way of thinking and ordering the social world in terms of "roles", cannot be separated from the hierarchy posited between them, we find that "[d]ualistic thinking can justify any social hierarchy" as it is expressed in both science and the thought of the

"pro-family movement". As Finn (1984: 47) argues, dualistic thinking:

enables the knower to objectify and reify the "other", the known - and thus to act upon it, control, dominate and violate it as mere object, as a threat to order, reason and right rule, as that which conflicts with and contradicts "humanity's" higher interests. To perceive nature and women as other is to objectify them and legitimize intrusion into them and their manipulation in the service of what can only be men's interests: for if they are other, they can be appropriated and possessed and they must be "mastered".

Dualistic thinking, as we have shown, is characteristic of the sex/gender system and underlies the historical development of scientific thought. It is also crucial to "pro-family" politics.

In The Power of the Positive Woman Phyllis Schlafly (1977) takes hold of dualistic thinking in attributing the "Positive Woman's" power to her capacity to reproduce. Women's power, she argues, is derived entirely from her (male-defined) "female sexuality", or reproductive capacity:

The first requirement for the acquisition of power by the Positive Woman is to understand the differences between men and women (Schlafly, 1977: 11; emphasis added).

But to "require", "acquire" and "understand" implies that a certain set of preconditions must be constructed and put in place so that these potentialities of "power", based on a particular naming of "difference", can be actualized. There is nothing inevitable about them as they must be socially constructed. In this regard, Schlafly is clever when she points out: "Your outlook on life, your faith, your

behaviour, your potential for fulfillment are all determined by your original premises" (Schlafly: 11; emphasis added).

The original premise, of course, is that you accept a pre-programmed ordering of "differences" which are premised on opposition and hierarchy, and that you take on the phallacy of something "natural", or "traditional", if you don't question that original premise:

The Positive Woman recognizes the fact that, when it comes to sex, women are simply not the equal of men. The sexual drive of men is much stronger than that of women. That is how the human race was designed in order that it might perpetuate itself (Schlafly, 1977: 17).

Within this body of thought the dualistic and hierarchical power relations posited between men and women under the sex/gender have necessitated the oppression of women as a necessary condition for the survival and perpetuation of the human race.

In this way, Schlafly believes that the Positive Woman:

acquired the key to her power when she erected that first pillar - admiration and appreciation of her husband as a man, as provider and protector, as the father of her children, and yes even as head of the household (Schlafly: 57).

What we find revealed in this example of pro-family movement thought, is that women "acquire the key" to their power by accepting their role as Other, as the dominated and controlled. In other words, women must accept the asymmetry of both power relations and esteem as "natural" in order to "acquire" the power supposedly inherent in female sexuality, which thus uncovers yet another "patriarchal reversal": if

she must "acquire" this power through certain patterns of social acts, like "admiring" and "appreciating" her husband's position of power over and above her own, then she cannot "naturally" embody what she must "learn" to "acquire". Indeed, this disposition is not natural, but arises out of socially constructed activities.

Dualism, and the hierarchy posited therein is not only socially constructed it must be maintained through social actions on the world, as the "pro-family" movement's opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment illustrates:

ERA will be tremendously hurtful to the overwhelming majority of men who are decent, law-abiding, moral, and family oriented. It will cost them higher taxes, loss of jobs for which they are qualified, loss of personal fulfillment as providers and protectors of their families, and loss of the essential rights of husbands to establish homes and name their children..... If he is deprived of this role, he tends to drop out of the family and revert to the primitive masculine role of hunter and fighter (Schlafly, 1977: 95).

In the above example of pro-family thought, women are completely absent. The justification for the maintenance of the dualistic and hierarchical division between men and women, production and reproduction, and public and private life is discussed solely in relation to men, and in defense of these "splits".

Women are required in new right thinking to assume that this system of power relations is natural despite the fact that they must be told how to conform to it: "The Positive Woman recognizes this fundamental difference [between women

and men] and builds her male/female relationship accordingly" (Schlafly, 1977: 54; emphasis added). Thus:

The woman who goes into marriage thinking she can make it a mathematically equal fifty-fifty partnership in every decision and activity will come out on the short end every time (Schlafly: 57).

The dualism posited between women and men in the thought of the "pro-family movement" also constitutes the division between sexuality and intelligence, so that "sexual intelligence" is replaced with "sexual fundamentalism" (Morgan, 1984: 103-107; Dworkin, cited in Morgan, 1984).

Morgan (1984:147) argues that because "desire" and "curiosity" are the components of "sexual intelligence", such intelligence is dangerous to the status quo and, therefore, degraded, devalued, ignored and disowned. And because the components of "sexual intelligence" include curiosity and desire as expressions/manifestations of experience, "sexual intelligence" is viewed as "anarchic, destructive, blasphemous, unnatural, treasonable - and non-existent". Consider the following passage by "pro-family" agent Midge Decter, which captures Morgan's distinction between "sexual intelligence" and "sexual fundamentalism". Decter (1972: 91) espouses the latter view:

No longer expecting or expected to be chaste, and yet without the active force of lust to guide her [as is the case with males], she finds herself without natural boundaries to set the term to her complicity.She is left, in short, without any orderly or persuasive terms, save those she devises for herself, by which to arrive at any decisions about her conduct as a sexual being.

It will be recalled that "experience" and "roles" are diametrically opposed so that the emphasis on "sexual fundamentalism" (also revealed in violence and pornography), can replace "sexual intelligence", from which it follows that women won't "find themselves without natural boundaries". This process, as clearly shown in the above passage, requires that women split themselves in two. We must suppress that knowledge which arises through experience in favour of "complicit" participation in the separation and objectification of our own sexuality from our desires, curiosity and experience.

In view of this, Morgan (1984: 143) writes: "It's both a tragedy and an irony that Man has labelled Woman primarily as a sexual (and reproductive) being - and has stripped women of sexuality itself".

The Idea of "Women" as a Unitary Concept

[A]ll women exist. But women exist in all shapes, colors, configurations, sizes, humours, classes, ages, states of, and attitudes toward fecundity. Men do, too, of course. The only thing men truly share, in fact, is, their commonly conceived and perpetuated definition -by men- of Woman..... [So] we are told that we must give up being women in order to gain our Womanliness, and the forms of exchange are clear, rigid and ingenious (Morgan, 1984: 6; 8).

Women are defined in terms of an idea of "Woman" and this idea is understood best by "its absence, its lack, its negative: 'Woman' is non-Man" (Morgan: 2).

The first and "most obvious" justification for this dualistic and hierarchical ordering of "differences" is that "women can breastfeed babies and men cannot... [This is] another feature of her natural role" (Schlafly, 1977: 13; emphasis added). The equation of women's physiology with her "place" and "purpose" in society, namely, her social roles, is a matter of interpretation, which Schlafly (like Gilder, and the "pro-family movement" in general), can justify because she pretends that "biological differences" contain some sort of inherent meaning structure. In this meaning structure, "men's" physiologies contain the "norm" from which "women's" physiologies, and hence, "nature", "role", and "function" are differentiated, and evaluated.

All women, therefore, are defined as Other, in terms of their capacity to reproduce, and they are supposed to rejoice in their "Other-ness", not question it. Women, within new right thought, are required to accept that "original premise" of understanding the supposedly self-evident (social/psychic) "differences between women and men" and to view those women who we think of as scholars, scientists, artists, and writers, as "exceptions" to the norm, to the natural-ness of "Woman" (Morgan, 1984: 4).

Indeed, "[t]he woman liberationist", according to Schlafly, is "so imprisoned by her own negative view of herself and her world" that she resents her breasts, and her

reproductive capacity. This projected attitude is in turn portrayed as "unnatural", therefore "immoral":

The second dogma of the women's liberationist is that, of all the injustices perpetrated upon women through the centuries, the most oppressive is the cruel fact that women have babies and men do not (Schlafly, 1977: 12).

But the Positive Woman knows this is just "another feature of her natural role":

This functional role was not imposed by conspiratorial males seeking to burden women with confining chores, but must be recognized as part of the plan of the Divine Architect for the survival of the human race through the centuries and in the countries that know no pasteurization of milk or sterilization of bottles (Schlafly: 13).

What does Schlafly's statement say about the "pro-family movement's" concept of the "natural", and "Woman"?

First, Schlafly does mention alternatives to breastfeeding, such as the use of bottles. We would go on to note that bottles can be used by both males and females, and that work schedules could be arranged to accommodate breastfeeding. But neither of these options are taken seriously by Schlafly, or even discussed. Still, the fact that these "observations" are made at all makes clear that all women do not necessarily experience their capacity to reproduce in the same manner, or to the same degrees. Obviously, the appeal to "the natural" and to the idea of "Woman" as a unitary concept is recognized as relative even within right wing thought, that is, "dependent on the priorities of men in given areas at a particular time" (Morgan, 1984: 6).

Meaning is not self-evident, which is why women's differentiating experiences are reduced to a particular set of social values based on their capacity to reproduce. This reduction is justified in the new right thinkers appeal to the "natural". It is not difficult for these thinkers to do so, since this principle of reduction and objectification is already a manifestation of the sex/gender system, as Andrea Dworkin makes clear:

For women, life is in the uterus; and the well-being of women - economic, social, sexual - depends on what the value of the uterus is, how it will be used and by whom, whether or not it will be protected and why. Whatever her race or class - however much she is privileged or hated for one or both - a woman is reducible to her uterus (Dworkin, 1978: 150).

This reduction/objectification of women's imaginations, desires, curiosities, intelligence, and ambitions, is justified in the new right attempt to defend the sex/gender system by appealing to some kind of ("natural") social biology.

But if these asymmetrical power relations between men and women, production and reproduction and the public and private spheres were natural, then surely they would not require contemporary forms of socially constructed laws, policies, and justifications to maintain the illusion that the oppression of women, and 'the division of humanity within and between itself' (Miles, 1982: 218) is "natural". "People do not revolt against what is natural" (Delphy, 1984).

The Principles of the Sex/Gender System as "Natural"

The asymmetrical power relations between women and men, production and reproduction and public and private are said to be necessary to the evolution and perpetuation of the human race by new right thinkers. The "natural" institution in which these power relations are "naturally" expressed and maintained is the patriarchal family form. This reveals a molecular, fragmented, rigid, reductionist, and oppressive way of thinking and acting on the world. Pro-family movement thought denies "other" people's experience of the social world and in its place the "concept of roles" is advanced as both a "moral" and a "natural" expression of men's and women's differentiated physiologies in a rigid, inflexible discourse.

The absolutism embodied in "pro-family" movement thought is systematically advanced throughout Schlafly's The Power of the Positive Woman. The silencing and devaluation of women's experiences is accomplished by advancing a discourse where the reification of experience is to appear as self-evident, as "natural" and can be observed in the systematic usage of phrases such as: "The Positive Woman knows..."; "The Positive Woman recognizes..."; "The Positive Woman opposes..."; "The Positive Woman starts from the premise..."; "The Positive Woman will never..." and "The Positive Woman accepts her obligation..." (Schlafly, 1977). In other words, women

are required to blindly accept this one way of thinking and acting on the world.

To maintain the phallacy that her oppression and subordination to men is "natural", women are advised not to expose themselves to situations where this may be called into question. Notably, women are advised not to engage themselves with other women who do not adhere to this one way of thinking: The "worst thing" a woman can possibly do, is to "take a 'women's studies' or some other sociology or psychology course in college, because some of these courses should be called 'How to Break Up a Marriage' (Schlafly, 1977: 59). And, as we have seen, the patriarchal heterosexual marriage is the "natural" context for the expression of female sexuality, at least according to the "Divine Architect" within this framework for thinking.

The principles of the sex/gender system which associate women, reproduction and the private sphere in opposition and subordination to men, production and the public sphere also purpor to reflect the "natural" order of the universe. But history renders this transhistorical truth false. For example, in Aries' Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life (1962), we find that the household characteristic of the Middle Ages, was not divided into rooms, each with a specialized function: kitchen, bedroom, bathroom, etc., but rather a large undifferentiated space. What is more, this space was as much the locus of

professional (or public) activities, as of personal (private) ones. That is, there were no such institutions as banks, offices, or legal firms. All such professional or "public" activities were carried out in the house. Hence, Aries aptly calls the households of the Middle Ages, "public houses" (Aries, 1962: 393-395). He also points to a general decline in sociability between people with the increasing distance or space posited between "public" and "private" activities and locales. Thus, the rigid separation between public life and private life, as they are presently identified in relation to gender and gender roles, is not transhistorical, but, in fact arises in historically specific moments (as did "modern science").

Jessie Bernard points out that these kinds of rigid divisions as they are expressed in the gendered division of labour necessitated by "the traditional patriarchal family form", lasted about one hundred and fifty years, notably "from the 1830's to 1980 when the U.S. Census no longer automatically denoted the male as head of the household" (1983: 155).

Like Aries, Bernard (1983: 157) also makes clear that the association of gender with work site is historically specific. Commenting on the 18th century American household, she argues, that "it was taken for granted that women provided for the family along with men". She describes a typical household as a "little factory that produced

clothing, furniture, bedding, candles..." and other such commodities (Bernard: 157).

But the equation of one's physiology with one's social function and role and "natural" social sphere with one particular and supposedly transhistorical expression of family life and organization, is what Robin Morgan calls "a newfangled experiment masquerading as the Way It Always Was" (1984: 184). Moreover, the patriarchal family structure, advanced in new right thought as an expression of the "natural order" of things, has a minority standing in both Canada and the U.S.A. (Eichler, 1985, Eisenstein, 1984).

So, despite the fact that we are living in a time of rapid social change, the "pro-family" movement conjures up an image of "the contemporary patriarchal family unit" as though it were as old and unchanging as the New Testament if not the Book of Genesis.

But, as Margrit Eichler (1983: 1) makes clear, it would be unreasonable to think and to expect people to think that the contours and shape of family life, where most people spend a majority of their lives, would remain unchanged when:

We are living in a time of rapid social change. In the field of medicine, for example, we are witnessing the creation of new life forms in laboratories, conception outside the uterus, organ transplants from living and dead donors, the establishment of sperm banks, the birth of a child from the sperm of a dead donor. Advances in microelectronics have started to create a revolution - in the workplace and in individual living habits - that can only be compared with the industrial revolution. Wives and mothers are joining the work force, thereby redefining the

roles of males and females, adults and children
(Eicher, 1983: 1).

And alongside these "external" changes, informing individual and social patterns of thought and experience are the "internal" changes undergone by families. Of these, Eichler points out:

Until fairly recently, marriage was seen as a lifelong commitment. Now, it has become a volitional union, rather than an automatic one. Likewise, it is now often a conscious decision for couples to have children, rather than an automatic consequence of fertility. The prevalence of divorce affects in a fundamental sense all families, whether or not they experience divorce themselves (Eichler, 1983: 1).

As we have seen however, "experience" (hence, consciousness) and "roles" have been diametrically opposed in pro-family movement thought, in order to defend the divisions and hierarchies between men and women, production and reproduction, and between the so-called public and private realms which they claim are natural, and therefore beyond criticism.

Indeed, present changes in family life are seen as "unnatural", deviant and "immoral" in the thought of the "pro-family" movement. But as we have shown, there is nothing natural to the claim that there is but "one" true expression of "reality", and the ordering of relations therein. There is nothing inevitable about the asymmetrical power relations advanced in new right thinking, as the existence/resistance of feminists and Other-Others to this system of di-visions and hierarchies clearly demonstrates.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION: TRANSCENDING THE PHALLACIES

Introduction

The purpose of the preceeding two chapters has been to show how feminism(s) directly challenge: (1) science's claim to an objective, neutral and universal knowledge by way of a herstorical analysis, which exposes this claim to be the subjective, deeply interested and partial claim it is; and (2) the so-called "pro-family" ideology of the New Right by revealing that its appeal to "the natural" personal/political relations between women and men is in fact an attempt to further institutionalize those same assumptions in science which feminists have demonstrated to be phallacious. Thus, the appeal to an "objective" knowledge in science, and to some "natural" ordering of difference based on gender in "new right/pro-family" ideology, are but interconnected manifestations of the sex/gender system: in the interests of (some) men, and oppressive to (all) women. That is, it is impossible to have disinterested (social) theory be it in the guise of "objectivity" or an appeal to "the natural".

Linking the Phallacies: Science and the Pro-Family Movement

We started out in Chapter One by demonstrating an understanding of feminism(s) as a series of interconnecting perspectives which take women's experiences of the sex/gender

system as the "object" of analysis in all theoretical and practical inquiry. Following this herstory of feminism(s), we have questioned the parameters of the assumptions, models, metaphors and theories in the establishment of the choice for a positivistic, mechanistic rigid and "objective" science in Chapter Two, and in the anti-feminist so-called "pro-family" ideology of the New Right in Chapter Three with its appeal to the "natural", to show the androcentrism at their core(s).

In our exploration of the history of the establishment of "modern science" we demonstrated how, for example, scientists and philosophers have tended to ignore or treat as irrelevant gender metaphors, and the reflection and reinforcement of gender ideology in the establishment of the mechanistic view of classical science. This was uncovered in the various feminist critiques discussed above (Merchant, 1980; Birke, 1986; Keller, 1985 and Harding, 1986). Scientists and philosophers have tended to treat the metaphors associated with the transition from the organismic to the mechanistic world view (namely nature as a living being as opposed to nature as a machine), as the only ones relevant to the real meanings and referents of scientific inquiry and design, and failed to explore gender (Harding, 1986).

The choice for an "objective", and mechanistic science not only reflected and reinforced prevailing gender ideology but helped to shape it as the gendered dualisms already characteristic of Western thought came to be a conscious

social organizing principle (Keller, 1985). This "choice" was underpinned by the desire to master what was perceived as the "inherent disorder and chaos associated with both women and nature", and further revealed how, from the beginning, science has been subjective and deeply interested, as opposed to objective and neutral as it pretends.

Perhaps the most blatant example, of the androcentrism at the core of science is the commitment espoused by Bacon, and many of the members of the "Royal Society", for an unambiguously "masculine" science (Keller, 1985, Merchant, 1980), in order to design, develop and apply a way of thinking and acting upon the world premised on relations of domination and subordination. This way of thinking and acting on the world is, as we have shown, characteristic of Western male-stream thought and the sex/gender system generally.

Similarly, from our critical standpoint as analysts of the sex/gender system, we saw how the programme advanced by the "new right/pro-family" movement has attempted to defend this system "built on the fragmentation of life and the division between and within people" (Miles, 1982b) by claiming that it is "natural", or the "plan of the Divine Architect" despite the historical and personal evidence to the contrary. The main focus on issues pertaining to "the" family and sexuality perhaps reveals the androcentrism/anti-feminism at the core of the "pro-family" movement's politics.

These are two realms of human experience where women have been most oppressed, controlled, and (de)valued under the sex/gender system. Yet, these are two crucial realms of experience which feminists are attempting to re-claim and re-name. By so doing feminism(s) is a powerful source(s) of resistance to the sex/gender system which defines the fragmented and oppressive social/psychic contexts in which women have continued to survive and which feminists have named, deconstructed, and explained in order to transcend. Thus the reactionary response to feminism(s) making visible women's specificity and diversity of experience and the phallacy of the image of "Woman" entrenched in male-stream thought, demonstrates the revolutionary potential of feminism(s) revealing the patriarchal myth that all women constitute one homogenous group because of their capacity (and expectation) to reproduce, which the New Right are seeking to further institutionalize.

The latter myth is that condition or premise which the New Right requires women to blindly accept, and it is a premise which is not problematized in order to maintain the image of there being only one true conception/expression of reality, a reality which is, of course, premised on dualism, hierarchy, fragmentation and control. The belief in one "true" or "certain" way of naming, and hence, ordering the world and the relations therein, is most characteristic of a masculinist view of reality as we have shown above.

Both the social phenomenon of the establishment of "modern science", and the rise of the New Right, are differentiating manifestations of the sex/gender system. As such, contradistinctive appeals to some kind of "true", monolithic, and universal knowledge, which exists outside of the social, historical, political, economic, gendered, and cultural, contexts in which it emerges and is applied - in the form of (1) an "objective" knowledge by way of "scientific rationality" and (2) a "natural" knowledge via "biblical or traditional morality" - is clearly characteristic of Western "male-stream" thought. We have argued that male-stream thought excludes and devalues women's knowledge-able experiences in order to masquerade as "One Truth" or "The Way It's Always Been". Moreover, these are but different explanations/justifications for the belief that subjectively acquired knowledge is not "scientific" in the case of the scientific enterprise, or it is "morally" spiteful, and even unnatural, according to "new right/pro-family" ideology.

We, however, have shown these claims of "one real truth", be it in the form of an objective, or of a natural way of thinking and acting on the world, to be socially constructed, historically specific, deeply interested, subjective, and oppressive to all women within many oppressions.

The phallacy of there being one "objective" or "natural" expression of reality is premised on the cultural

internalization/externalization of the asymmetrical relations of power and esteem, characteristic of the sex/gender system. Both Keller (1985) and Benston (1982) for example, show how scientific "ideology" equates science with power. And just as "science" is characterized as male, and masculine, the proponents of New Right ideology equate men - notably white, upper/middle class heterosexual men - with power in the form of the "natural protectors" of women, "the" family, and the free enterprise system. But as Christine Delphy (1984: 211) points out:

People do not revolt against what is natural, therefore inevitable, or inevitable and therefore natural. Since what is resistable is not inevitable and could be otherwise - it is arbitrary, therefore social.

Oppression and resistance to oppression arise out of socially constructed activities. As we have shown, knowledge production, transmission, and acquisition are inextricably interrelated and interdependent, and reflect and reinforce the conditions of patriarchy. The absolutism espoused and embodied in science's claim to an "objective" knowledge and in an "ideological fundamentalism" (as well as fundamentalist ideology) embodied in "pro-family" movement thought, are illustrative of Geraldine Finn's definition of patriarchy and her view that science and the new right are but different manifestations of the sex/gender system:

By patriarchy I mean the following: a system of ownership and control of progeny, whereby men establish their rights over children and women.... It entails male ownership of children and women. For

if paternity is to be assured, women's sexuality must be controlled; in fact 'all' women must be collectively controlled by 'all' men. The ideology of science is historically, materially, formally, structurally and logically inseparable from the ideology, practice and discourse of patriarchy; science grew up along with patriarchy, they nurtured each other and they share the same structures of male-dominance. Science, for example, is equated with knowledge, knowledge with power, and power with dominance and that is why it is pursued (Finn, 1984: 42).

Clearly, the feminist critiques of knowledge are inseparable from feminist critiques of power (MacKinnon, 1979).

As we have shown throughout, the "names" or typologies of "male and female" are at once personal and political terms. They connote much more than the visual appeal to biologically differentiated members of the same species. These "names" are played out, enacted, internalized/externalized and refer to a particular system of power relations where male means dominant over female, and female means subordinated to male. For example, female can refer to women and male to men where "men are identified with culture, with rational thought and with science; women are identified with nature" (Benston, 1982). To resist this particular "naming" and ordering of difference is to oppose nature herself as Schlafly argued above. It is "evil" as the Church and the State in the 17th century alleged of the women healers, namely, the witches.

Under the sex/gender system, women are valued in terms of their (our) reproductive capacity which is defined, evaluated and controlled in relation to the structures and needs of the realm of production, associated with men and their

experiences of the social world" (O'Brien, 1981). In other words, under the sex/gender system:

These structures which are structures of both production and reproduction are essentially structures of violence; they consist of some men violating others and violating nature. Women are violated as both other and nature. While only some men, in some historical periods have been violated as nature (Finn, 1984: 43).

Within this social context, women's capacity for imaginative, creative, intelligent and much needed social and political thought is excluded, devalued and controlled through the application of "phallogocratic law". That is to say, that the sex/gender system pervades the construction, design, management, transmission and acquisition of knowledge: there is an anti-Other bias written into knowledge which reflects "the fundamental fear and devaluation of women characteristic of patriarchal attitudes" and practices (Flax, 1983: 268). The "Other" is the devalued; i.e., all that which is not recognized as Being Masculine.

We have seen that because knowledge is socially constructed it reflects the masculinist bias of those doing the naming in our society, most notably men where "meanings" are man-made and man-governed. However, these same "meanings" are internalized by all women and men, of various colour, classes, and sexual orientations, to the systematic exclusion and repression of Other's encoding of experience. The Other(s) as we have seen refers to all that which is not characterized as Being Masculine; most notably, it refers to

all women who constitute an oppressed group within many differentiated experiences of oppressions. What feminists are doing then is re-claiming, re-naming, re-valuing and re-introducing those very "names" and "meanings" ascribed to women which have continuously defined our condition as one of "lack", and which remain a necessary condition for the continuity of the sex/gender system.

As the notion of feminism(s) is intended to convey, most feminists do not assume that to take hold of women's experiences, in our specificity, would be to deny our differences in our "Other-Other" experiences of manifold oppressions as non-European women, working class women, women of colour, and/or lesbian women. We do not presume, as androcentric knowledge constructors do, that there is one true, certain, or rigid experience of the world for all women, let alone all feminists. For example, we have seen how O'Brien, Flax, Daly and the Feminist Lacanians provide us with a web of feminist tools and visions in their attempts to best explain the oppression of women, in order to transcend it.

Feminism(s) is a struggle/vision to speak out "as women rather than would-be men" from a multiplicity of perspectives. We have begun to do this by naming, and deconstructing "the sex/gender system", which defines and devalues women in the name of Woman. At the same time, we are not only revealing the interconnected and interdependent

conditions/expressions of our oppression and of domination in general, we are also elucidating feminist sign-posts toward a life-affirming movement/politic. To do this we have had to come to recognize, take hold of, value, and articulate the contradictions and discontinuities within and between the various expressions of feminism as well as those that arise within and between our diverse and yet overlapping experiences of being women, living in a "man-made and man-governed" world.

Recent feminist scholarship has increasingly pointed toward the revolutionary epistemology embodied in the notion of feminism(s), the multiplicity of Feminist Voices: "[I]t's time we comprehended feminism in its full holographic nature" (Morgan, 1984: 1). What Robin Morgan means by this statement is, like the vision/politic embodied in feminism(s):

[O]ne cannot understand a holograph by settling down to view it; on the contrary, a willingness to shift perspectives repeatedly is necessary for such understanding. This in turn requires of us that we relinquish our positions as passive observers and instead become active participants: we must move around the holograph to see its different sides, to discern its multifaceted realities, to understand its depths (Morgan, 1984: 2).

Of course all visions/politics, are accompanied by tensions, instabilities, discontinuities and contradictions reflective of the multiplicity and complexity of experience:

These considerations lead us to the observation that stable and coherent theories are not always the ones to be most highly desired; there are important understandings to be gained in seeking the social origins of instabilities and inconsistencies in our thoughts and practices - understandings that we

cannot arrive at if we repress recognition of instabilities and tensions in our thought (Harding, 1986: 244).

As feminists, we will continue in our vision/struggle to deconstruct the prevailing phallocratic social order, and at the same time attempt to weave the fibre of a new (meta-) paradigm premised on a life-affirming power/politic as opposed to one advanced on principles of domination and fragmentation.

I shall provide a sketch of the contours of this new (meta-) paradigm in the final section of this chapter. In the next section, however, I wish to expose the parallels between the structure of natural scientific and "pro-family" movement thought and the dominant school of thought in sociology, namely functionalism. With these parallels in mind, we shall be in a better position to grasp the radical departure from "male-stream" thought that feminist sociologies represent, and thus have laid the groundwork for the discussion in the final section.

Sociological Paradigms

In Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis

Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan (1979) use the notion of a "paradigm" to refer to the model or framework of assumptions which social scientists use implicitly for the most part and explicitly in more "radical" sociological approaches. Burrell and Morgan identify four paradigms in sociological analyses: functionalist, interpretive, conflict and radical humanist. They regard their "four paradigms as being defined by very basic meta-theoretical assumptions which underwrite the frame of reference, mode of theorizing and modus operandi of the social theorists who operate within them" (Burrell and Morgan: 23). The purpose of this discussion is to plot the controlling assumptions of "science" (in its social and natural varieties) and New Right ideology on Burrell and Morgan's grid.

Burrell and Morgan demonstrate that social science can be conceptualized in terms of four sets of assumptions. These assumptions are related to ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology. "Ontological" refers to assumptions about the nature of the actual phenomenon under investigation: is "reality" out there, "external to the individual - imposing itself on individual consciousness from without - or the product of individual consciousness" (Burrell and Morgan: 1). "Epistemological" issues reveal

social scientists' assumptions about the nature of knowledge, and of science in particular. Most broadly, the authors explain that epistemological assumptions "determine extreme positions on the issue of whether knowledge is something which can be acquired on the one hand, or is something which has to be personally experienced on the other" (Burrell and Morgan: 2). Associated with these assumptions, yet conceptually distinct, are those pertaining to issues about human nature and methodology. The issues pertaining to human nature reveal assumptions that human beings are conditioned by their external environment, the creators of it, or in a dialectical relationship with it. All of these ontological, epistemological and "naturalistic" assumptions inform or have implications of a "methodological nature": "Different ontologies, epistemologies and models of human nature are likely to incline social scientists towards different methodologies" (Ibid: 2). Notwithstanding this wide range of possible social theoretical choices, the authors make clear that one of these paradigms remains dominant and privileged over and against the other "alternatives", namely functionalism. Consider the author's (ibid: 22) conceptualization of the four paradigms which characterize sociological inquiry and which enable social theorists to further analyze contradistinctive social theories:

In explanation of the above diagram Burrell and Morgan (1979: 23) state:

It will be clear from the diagram that each of the paradigms shares a common set of features with its neighbours on the horizontal and vertical axes in terms of one of the two dimensions but is differentiated on the other dimension. For this reason they should be viewed as contiguous but separate - contiguous because of the shared characteristics, but separate because the differentiation is, as we shall demonstrate later, of sufficient importance to warrant treatment of the paradigms as four distinct entities. The four paradigms define fundamentally different perspectives for the analysis of social phenomena. They approach this endeavour from contrasting standpoints and generate quite different concepts and analytical tools.

The functionalist paradigm is characterized by those schools of thought concerned with providing explanations of "the status quo, social order, consensus, social integration, solidarity, need satisfaction and actuality" (Burrell and Morgan: 26). We can restate the concerns of the

functionalist paradigm in the form of a question: What are the mechanisms by which we maintain social integration and regulation? The various schools of thought within this sociological paradigm have "approached these general sociological concerns from a standpoint which tends to be **realist, positivist, determinist and nomothetic**". The functionalist schools of thought which embrace Durkheimian and Parsonian perspectives for example, are those which most closely mimic what was thought to be the certainty of the natural sciences. They are above all characterized by the assumption of a "single society", and by the attempt to look for universal laws or generalizations. They are further characterized on one level by treatment of people and social phenomena as "objects" or "social facts", and on a second level by the assumption that social scientists must stand back and observe people and social phenomena "objectively", or from some "value-neutral" standpoint.

The "interpretive" paradigm is consonant with the functionalist one as a "sociology of regulation", but distinct because of its "subjectivist" approach (Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 28). This paradigm "is informed by a concern to understand the world as it is, to understand the fundamental nature of the social world at the level of subjective experience" (ibid: 28). It tends to be "**nominalist, anti-positivist, voluntarist and ideographic**" in its approach (ibid: 28). These schools of thought which have Schutz,

Husserl, Weber and Dilthey among their members, further tends to view society in terms of "intersubjectively shared meanings" and a "network of assumptions". In other words, within the interpretative paradigm, social scientists pose questions like: How is the appearance of "normality" and "commonality" constructed; How do people "invent" and "make sense of" social reality?

The "radical humanist" paradigm is characterized by its concern to "develop a 'sociology of radical change' from a 'subjectivist' standpoint" (Burrell and Morgan: 32). In this regard this particular paradigm most closely parallels the ambitions of feminism(s), described above with its emphasis on "the importance of over-throwing or transcending the limitations of existing social arrangements". This paradigm tends to be "nominalist, anti-positivist, voluntarist, and ideographic" and includes such schools of thought as the Frankfurt School and Existentialism. "[T]he radical humanist places most emphasis upon radical change, modes of domination, emancipation, deprivation and potentiality" (Burrell and Morgan: 32).

Finally, the "radical structuralist" paradigm is characterized by its "objectivist" approach (which it shares with the functionalist standpoint), but is distinguished by its concerns with a "sociology of radical change", as opposed to "regulation".

Radical structuralism is most closely associated with Marxist social analyses, "committed to radical change, emancipation, and potentiality, in an analysis which emphasises structural conflict, modes of domination, contradiction and deprivation". Because of its "objectivist" approach to social science, the thinkers within this paradigm, like Marx, Althusser, Poulantzas and Miliband, tend to be realist, positivist, determinist and nomothetic" (Burrell and Morgan, 1984: 34). In question form these theorists might ask: How do those in power create and control social tensions?; How do we understand these intrinsic social tensions?

Burrell and Morgan's definition of "paradigm" goes far beyond Kuhn's in that they show how different and even opposing paradigms or "world views" can and do exist simultaneously, but certain paradigms are chosen and privileged over and against others because of certain historical controlling sets of assumptions. We have seen how, for example, the controlling sets of assumptions advanced at least since the period marking the "Scientific Revolution" (1500-1700) are premised on a gendered system of domination, fragmentation and control which pretends to be "objective" and/or "natural". And, the controlling sets of assumptions are shaped by those in control in our society, notably some men.

The dominant framework in sociology is functionalist (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The controlling assumptions underwriting the functionalist view of one single society (an androcentric view) as distinctly "out there", are supposedly discernable from observation in some concretized form embodying "systematic natural laws" or "generalizations". The Sociology of Regulation in the Functionalist Paradigm outlined above through its desire to "maintain" a particular system of social regulation and integration for the purpose of social control, therefore arises out of the same desire to control nature (and human nature) by discovering stable and universally applicable laws that we found in the natural sciences. This desire to maintain a particular system of social regulation and integration is based on some inherent meaning structure supposedly embodied in women's and men's different physiologies also finds expression in the New Right's appeal to some "natural" plan of the "Divine Architect". Moreover, the assumptions about the nature of knowledge in the functionalist paradigm are positivistic. In other words, social scientists located in the "Functionalist" quadrant attempt to explain and predict social phenomena ("social facts") by looking for causal relationships (in particular, generalizable patterns), from an "objective" perspective, or at least an approach where the knower and the known are thought to be distinctly separate. This particular epistemology is taken directly from the natural sciences,

which feminists have shown to be phallacious, and which the New Physicists have radically problematized from another androcentric standpoint.

The belief that knowledge is imposed on us, over and against experience, also corresponds to the New Right's assumptions about the nature of knowledge as found outside the experience of individuals in the form of "the Bible" or some transhistorical social structure thought to be encoded in the difference between men and women, where "men" and "women" are perceived as universal and monolithic "biological facts". In other words, these assumptions about the nature of society and the nature of knowledge within the natural sciences and in New Right ideology can be plotted onto the Functionalist quadrant of the paradigmatic grid conceptualized above by Burrell and Morgan. In all three cases, namely, "normal" or functionalist sociology, natural science models, and New Right ideology, we are taught to mistrust and devalue experience. As British feminist sociologists Stanley and Wise (1983: 154) make clear:

Researchers work within a 'normal science paradigm' and the world view embodied within this provides us with the categories through which experience is gained. In other words, frequently we fail to report or discuss the contradictions between experience, consciousness and theory, because the paradigm we work within tells us that these are unimportant or non-existent.

Even the early feminist critiques of sociology suggested that "sociology has focused on public, official, visible, and/or dramatic role players and definitions of the

situation" (Millman and Kanter, 1975: x). What is often neglected in much sociological inquiry is the "unofficial, supportive, less dramatic, private, and invisible spheres of social life and organization [which] may be equally important" (ibid: x). But this latter tendency in sociological inquiry extends beyond the functionalist paradigm on Burrell and Morgan's grid and includes the "alternative" perspectives as they are still designed and applied within the context of the sex/gender system. That is, these alternatives are also androcentric in that the sex/gender system is not problematized because feminism is not included in the vast array of "perspectives" embodied within each of the four paradigms discussed.

Many feminists such as Helen Roberts, for example, observe that "in a subject purporting to be concerned with social structure and social relations, an enormous amount of emphasis has been given to those areas from which women have normally been excluded" - i.e. the sociology of work which usually means "men's work" and even in class analyses (Roberts, 1981: 74-75). She points out that in sociology:

The core of the discipline, and the high status areas of study have been theoretical and methodological issues, largely based around analyses of power, class, conflict, and the problem of order. There is nothing about the concepts as such, of course, which excludes either women or a feminist analysis. Indeed, one could well see the issue of gender differentiation as being crucial to these areas, but traditionally, studies of sexual divisions have been accorded somewhat low status and certainly seen as peripheral to the central concerns of the subject (Roberts: 75).

Thus, women, gender, and sexism, as issues of sociological inquiry tend to be excluded from or subsumed by other sociological categories, like stratification. The one area where they are not excluded is in the sociology of the family: "the sociology of the family is one of the few areas where the visibility of women is extraordinarily high; and one might add that that of men is extraordinarily low" (Roberts: 75). This tendency in the discipline of sociology reflects and reinforces the asymmetrical relations and practices of the sex/gender system, where men are associated with work and the public sphere more generally and women with family and the private sphere.

When women do appear in sociological inquiry it is in relation to man-made and man-governed principles and interests. And: "To the extent that women sociologists accept that perspective, they are alienated from their own personal experience. They speak a language, use theories, and select methods in which they are excluded or ignored" (Roberts: 78; cf. also Eichler, 1983; Spender, 1980; 1981; Smith, 1975; 1979). This is what Dorothy Smith (1979) has described as the "circle effect":

In relation to men (of the ruling class) women's consciousness did not, and most probably generally still does not, appear as an autonomous source of knowledge, experience, relevance, and imagination. Women's experience did not appear as the source of an authoritative general expression of the world. Women did not appear to men as men do to one another, as persons who might share in the common construction of a social reality where that is essentially an ideological construction. There was, we discovered,

a circle effect - men tend to treat as significant what men say and have said. The circle of men whose writing and talk has been significant to one another extends back in time as far as our records reach. What men were doing has been relevant to men, was written by men about men for men (Smith: 137).

In view of such explanations, French feminist Christine Delphy (1984) argues that:

Having a feminist approach is... not just a matter of applying the unchanged premises of the established sciences to the study of women, with good political intent. It is useless for feminists to try to develop such studies when their premises are nullified in each particular discipline. The premises of sociology, for example, deny the oppression of women, and in consequence the discipline (1) cannot account for it - cannot find at the end what it denied at the beginning and (2) can only mask the oppression, and to that extent contribute to its perpetuation (Delphy: 212).

In other words, the study of women is one matter, but beginning our inquiries with the oppression of women, and notably women's experience(s) of the sex/gender system, is quite another matter. The latter constitutes an epistemological revolution. For to begin with: "It is only from the point of view and life experiences of women that their condition can be seen as oppression" and women's consciousness of being oppressed simultaneously transforms the definition of oppression itself (Delphy, 1984: 215; 218).

Moreover, this revolutionary epistemology which also arises out of the recognition of the creative tension within and between feminisms further challenges the definition of "objectivity" itself. Sandra Harding makes this clear:

Objectivity is not maximized through value-neutrality - at least not in the way the traditional

science discourses have construed these concepts. I have argued that it is only coercive values - racism, classism, sexism - that deteriorate objectivity; it is participatory values - antiracism, anticlassism, antisexism - that decrease the distortions and mystifications in our culture's explanations and understandings. One can think of these participatory values as preconditions, constituents, or a reconception of objectivity... This strategy colonizes the notion of objectivity, leaving only "objectivism" for the "natives" meanings of the term (Harding, 1986: 249).

To portray participatory values premised on anti-racism, anti-classism and anti-sexism as a precondition for any notion of objectivity is indeed revolutionary, in contrast to the present notion of objectivity as separation, domination and control.

Burrell and Morgan's discussion of the four paradigms in sociology has allowed us to locate mainstream sociological assumptions, natural science's assumptions and the New Right's assumptions about the nature of society (nature) and knowledge as the dominant ones, in spite of existing alternatives. Their conceptualization of sociological analyses as four contradistinctive paradigms existing simultaneously whether all sociologists are aware of them or not, also enables us to visualize the feasibility of what Robin Morgan (1984: 2) described as the "willingness to shift perspectives repeatedly" which in turn "requires of us that we relinquish our positions as passive observers and instead become active participants", characteristic of feminism(s).

Conclusion: Toward a Feminist Social Science

My understanding of feminism(s) follows from Angela Miles (1985) articulation of "integrative feminism". Miles argues that Integrative Feminism takes hold of "integrative feminist values" (i.e. "continuity, creativity, birth, cooperation, nurture, daily life, the body and nature" (Miles: 25)) in the process of articulating an integrative feminist vision — an end to a world view/practice premised on principles of domination, fragmentation, and an anti-Other bias.

This theory/practice involves the radical transformation and integration of public and private life as opposed to a one-sided focus on integrating women into the present structure of the public sphere. This latter tendency within feminism has as Miles (1985: 26) argues, "taken precedence over the need to destroy collectively the artificial barriers between public and private". Miles goes on to explain that integrative feminism celebrates women's specificity or commonality (under the sex/gender system) as well as our diversity:

It seems today, that the articulation of increasing types and levels of difference has not narrowed self-defined groups of women but revealed ever richer networks of cross-cutting specificities. As black, disabled, lesbian, old, Jewish and working-class feminists find their voices women are discovering the richness of their shared specificities. It is becoming much more difficult for political groupings to build high walls between insiders and outsiders based on single reified characteristics of their participants. Because deep-going links with "outsiders" who share other important aspects of self are becoming more clearly evident. This has meant that, unlike earlier periods, the current exploration

of diversity has not, in general, been phrased in vanguard terms or in terms of mere tolerance (Miles, 1985: 26).

The kind of feminist perspective or meta-paradigm espoused by Miles, complement, and overlap with, Sandra Harding's (1986) discussion of "feminist post-modernism". Both these particular "namings" of feminism(s) recognize women's specificity and diversity and the complexities and flexibility that such a "perspective" or "world view" engenders. As Miles explains: "The integrative set of values and broad general analyses provide no immediate blueprint or programme of action, and indeed they cannot for the 'future is not the product of the mind but the product of praxis, the product of theory and action'" (Miles, 1985: 26). In this way then, Harding (1986: 194) asks: "Why not explore the new possibilities opened up by recognition of the permanent partiality of the feminist point of view"?

[The feminist post-modernist] approach requires embracing as a fruitful grounding for inquiry the fractured identities modern life creates: Black-feminist, socialist-feminist, women-of-colour and so on. It requires seeking a solidarity in our oppositions to the dangerous fiction of the naturalized, essentialized, uniquely "human" (read "manly") and to the distortion and exploitation perpetuated on behalf of this fiction..... From this perspective, feminist claims are plausible and less distorting only insofar as they are grounded in a solidarity between these modern fractured identities and between the politics they create.

The principles for the "solidarity" between women's "fractured identities", described by Harding and Miles, are of course women's overlapping experiences of being women in a

man-made, man-governed world, principles which "celebrate[s] [difference] as a source of creative tension in the necessary struggle to redefine unity beyond sameness" (Miles: 27).

The implications for scientific and social scientific theory and practice embraced by integrative feminism, feminist post-modernism and feminism(s) embody what Morgan (1984:2) would refer to as the "willingness to shift perspectives repeatedly". This framework "allow[s] us to pursue the necessary analytical-synthesis of the individual and collective, psychological and social, economic and cultural, class and gender, but the task has only begun" (Miles, 1985: 24). Harding points this out in her analysis of both feminism(s) and science, by moving the reader from "the Woman Question in science to the more radical Science Question in feminism". Harding (1986: 36) states:

Where the Woman Question critiques still conceptualize the scientific enterprise we have as redeemable, as reformable, the Science Question critiques appear skeptical that we can locate anything morally and politically worth redeeming or reforming in the scientific world view, its underlying epistemology, or the practices these legitimate.

As the reader will have surmised, I am of the latter feminist persuasion. That is, I am both sceptical and critical of present science, in that it is premised on relations of domination and control which I believe can and should be Other-wise, where the Other refers to all that which is presently devalued and oppressed within present-day relations of domination and control. Because women are

constitutive of that which is not considered "Masculine", within and across all of the fractured identities characteristic of modern society (women of colour, lesbian women, working class women, Third world women, and so on), I can only surmise that feminism(s) does indeed hold the potential/principles to challenge and transcend all these forms of domination and control, as they are not separate, but interconnected and interdependent. Moreover, many social scientific inquiries point to this, at least by implication:

Studies of the social construction of what we count as real — both inside and outside the history of science — make it highly implausible to believe that there can be any kind of value-free descriptions of immediate experience to which our knowledge claims can be "reduced" or thought equivalent..... Facts cannot be separated from their meanings (Harding, 1996: 37; emphasis added).

The idea that facts cannot be separated from their meanings is at the core of feminist theory and practice; experience is the medium through which all those within and outside science must work. As such our experiences and the locations of our experiences in the social and scientific contexts within which we learn and communicate should be at the forefront of our research; it should be made explicit, rather than implicit behind the guise of "objectivity". British social scientists Liz Stanley and Sue Wise make this clear:

We have tried to say that as we are women and people who will be researchers; that research and life are not separate and divisible but one and the same and must be shown to be so. And we have also tried to show how and why, from some of our experiences, 'the personal' is involved in the construction and assessment of theory and so consciousness.

'Consciousness' is, in a sense all we have. It is the entirety of what we know and do and how we know and do it. And so it must be, visibly rather than invisibly, not only the focus of feminist research, but also the medium through which all research is conducted (Stanley and Wise: 189).

A research that arises out of this doubly reflexive consciousness would be a participatory research (in)formed by conscience. Such a research process, of necessity, would be life-affirming and hence feminist - politically and personally accountable.

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