

Reading Subjects, The Problematic and The Outcasts:
A Semiotic Model of Ideology & The Ideo-Material Subject

by

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Acknowledgments

I want to start off these acknowledgements by stating that this work was developed and written on unseeded Algonquin territories. It seems abundantly necessary for this work to acknowledge this, as it is an attempt to understand the formations of the subject, yet this work has been written in a space from which wholly different systems of thought have been violently removed, and the inscription of this thought within that space without any consultation of those excluded systems of thought threatens to erase them. This acknowledgement is both a reminder to reader, and myself as a writer and theorists, so that I will move forward by acknowledging, addressing, and incorporating these systems of thought which have been violently excluded.

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Abstract

Are we just products of our conditions? Are we masters of our reality? Or, perhaps, we are active in our production, but neither product nor master? Up until now most, if not all, models of ideology and discourse produce an over-determination of subjectivity or materiality. On the one hand, the subject is inserted as an inert abstraction of their actions or position within a larger relationship of power or production. On the other, they are the holders of a subjectivity from which all of our social reality is materialized. This work will address this issue of overdetermination by bringing together five authors who are often critiqued on this question: Althusser, Foucault, Žižek, and Laclau & Mouffe. In doing so, this work will run a semiotic model of ideology through a general theory of discourse and will analyze two case studies of Dystopian works published in the early twentieth century to show how the subject interacts with their own conditions of existence. In this way, the thesis will simultaneously expand on the models of discourse produced by Laclau & Mouffe, and Foucault, transform the models of ideology produced by Althusser and Žižek, and present a model for moving past overdetermination. Through a discourse analysis of a semiotic model of ideology, the thesis will show how the 'Ideo-Material' model identifies and understands the components which are produced from, and mediate the flow of, material and ideological forces.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Overview

The first goal of this work is to reformulate ideology into a semiotic model, and the second is to do so within the framework of a general theory of discourse. The former of these goals has been done rarely. While Laclau and Mouffe do include ideology within their general theory of discourse the “concept of ideology is practically empty”¹. On the one hand, in pursuing these goals this work will move the over-determination² of subjectivity by materiality often critiqued in the works of Foucault, Althusser, and Laclau & Mouffe. On the other hand, the thesis will challenge the over-determination of materiality by subjectivity often critiqued in Žižek’s work. The thesis interrogates, not only *how* a subject is formed and by what processes but how that subject *interacts* with their own constitutive conditions: often shaping them, but also shaped by them.

Three main theoretical moves will be accomplished in this work: 1. The expansion of Foucault’s power-discourse model, which includes the local centers and over-all strategy, to include a ‘micro center’ of power-discourse. This will be discussed as a single subject position, separated into its components, which operate as its own system containing potentially unique organizations. 2. By replacing the subject position within the work of Laclau & Mouffe with the ‘subject triangle’, which is a triple point law of proximity constituted by, and constitutive of, the subject as a micro center. 3. The analysis of ideology as the mediation and pivoting of material

¹ Phillips, Louise. & Jorgenson, W. Marianne. *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, (London and Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, SAGE Publications, 2006), 18.

² While there is the use of the term by Althusser (critiqued by Laclau & Mouffe) as the determination of economics by its own internal logics. Over-determination, in this work, is used to identify the determination of variable by single (or few) causalities. Hence, when I say ‘over-determination of subjectivity by materiality’, it is to identify when *subjectivity* comes to be formed by material process entirely, and the uni-directional movement of abstraction which forms from this *over-determined model*.

and ideological forces, which works within a dynamic system of constant flows and momentum within, and between, the subject and their surrounding conditions. 4. Finally, the use of symbolics within Žižek's work will be replaced with semiotics, and a more in-depth use of signifying and signified relationships.

The Problem

Over the course of research, this project changed from its original conception. It began as a way to prime the concept of ideology for my later readings into post-structuralism and was a part of a much larger goal to breath new life into the long-discarded concept of ideology within post-structuralism. This was to be done by rethinking ideology into an ideopolitical system and was to be a sort of flip side to Foucault's biopolitics. The early thinking of this system was the globalization of an ever-abstracting center, something which formed through the production and study of population, and I had attempted to first read this through a globalized and unifying subjectivity. However, as I began to read deeper into the past theory, research, and the research objects for this work, I quickly focused on a more specific component of the original project, and eventually changed the direction of the work altogether. It moved into a reading of ideology through discourse theory, focussing on the general theory of discourse outlined by Foucault and Laclau & Mouffe. This shift caused me to lean more on Foucault's earlier work when I had originally intended to focus on Foucault's middle and later works.

As mentioned above, the major problem addressed in this work is the question of over-determination immanent within the works of the theorists under examination namely Žižek, Althusser, Foucault, and Laclau & Mouffe. While the more traditional critiques of these works (especially critiques of Foucault) often use the critique to distance the critic from the model in question, instead this work intends to use each model to address the problematics within each

author's work, and will be accomplished by utilizing the theoretical framework of each theorist to off-set the over-determination mentioned earlier. Additionally, I³ should note that due to time and length restraints Roland Barthes is not included within this analysis, but he is present in the discussion on the role of the author⁴. Despite producing a semiotic model of ideology, Barthes focuses on linguistics, writing, and speech, and does not contain a position which is grounded in a foundation of practice and discourse. Here, Roland Barthes, while not discussed in-depth, can be viewed as a gap which is indirectly filled and spoken around, and is in an indirect relationship with the discussion of this work.

Argument

The thesis has two goals and therefore has two starting points of inquiry: 1. How does a subject interact with its own conditions of existence? 2. How can we develop a form of analysis which does not produce either material conditions or subjectivity as passive in this relationship? Together, these questions feed into the primary research question: How does the process of subjectification take place? Subjectification is the process by which a subject is formed. It is not the practices the subject takes part in, but rather is the base formation which makes these practices possible⁵. These questions produce the base argument of this work. The process of subjectification is active and *reciprocal*. It contains determining relationships but relationships with enough complexity that no component is over-determined by one specific variable or cause.

³ There are times where *I* will use the authorial 'I'. When I do this it will be to reflect on the thought processes of the subject typing these words and producing this model, inserting myself within with my own line of reasoning to point out problematics, or to comment on what has been done and through the voice of the one who has done such things.

⁴ See Chapter 3.

⁵ The which marks 'the subject' as a potential site of power and focus.

I illustrate this argument through a discourse analysis of two case studies from classical dystopian literature: *WE* by Yevgeny Zamyatin and *Brave New World* by Aldous Huxley. Due to the theoretical nature of a general theory of discourse, the specific methods will be uniquely formulated for this work and outlined in the methods section. These methods will operate with the focus of practice, identifying antagonisms⁶, and avoiding the tendency to dissect the work into its parts. Rather, the methods used will avoid a genealogical analysis of the genre, authors, or languages use, and will focus on an attempt to understand the events within the internal logics of the novels. These two specific works were chosen because of the original intention of this thesis, to view an ideopolitical system through the lens of some of the first dystopian works to formulate a *global citizen* and a global subjectivity. Additionally, these works were chosen due to the situated era of their production in the early twentieth century in the aftermath of the First World War and the development, and failure, of the League of Nations. These novels were actively developing then notion of a global subjectivity in a period of time in this concept's time of appearance.

It is with this in mind that I began to look at the components, practices, and *constituting necessities* of this globalized, or unified, subject formation. In doing so, this work identified the necessary mediation and control of two primary components within the process of subjectification required for sustaining the relationship of power, including control over both the production, or management, of bodies and material forces. This thesis points out that in both works *WE* and *Brave New World*, there is a concentrated control over knowledge and thought, and a consistent targeting of what is said and done, when and how, in practice and thought. However, it is only in the work of *Brave New World* that there is a sustained control over the

⁶ See Chapter 3, Page 44.

production of bodies and their capacities. This control is key to the eventual failure of the totalitarian relations of power within *WE*'s OneState and used to cement the argument of the subject triangle as containing the production of the subject through the body-force interaction, which produces three points that operate in a dynamic and reciprocal capacity.

WE and *Brave New World* were also chosen because the subjects in the novels⁷ are in an antagonistic⁸ relationship with the relations of power. That antagonism distinguishes these works from past utopian works that had already produced a setting containing global subjectivities. This was done because the analysis of antagonisms, and the formation of subjects before and after the (partial) (re)articulation of these antagonisms, will act as the primary point of analysis for this work in identifying the process of subjectification. In other words, within utopian works the Foucauldian and Althusserian problematics of power-discourse and ideology are less visible, because each subject would behave merely as an abstraction of their material conditions due to a lack of antagonistic relations between the two. However, within antagonistic relationships, one will better view the interaction between the subject and their conditions due to the actions and alterations of that subject, and their formations. To be brief, the main method of analysis is not always accessible in utopian works because past utopian works were not written in a time in which a global subjectivity was beginning to form in practice⁹. Consequently, they do not contain enough instances of reorganization and difference to offer relevant data for this work.

Chapter Breakdown

⁷ Bernard in *Brave New World* and D-503 in *WE*. See Chapter 3.

⁸ See Chapter 3.

⁹ Meaning a lack of practices and organizations with the outcome of uniting the globe as one subjectivity or citizenry.

The first chapter focuses on the operationalization of a semiotic model of ideology through a discussion of the works of Althusser and Žižek. The works of these authors contain a binary set of over-determinations, the over-determination of subjectivity by material process in the former, and, in the latter, an over-determination of materiality by processes of subjectivity and ideology. The chapter lays the groundwork for the initial understanding of what will be called the ideo-material semiotic model of ideology and will outline its various stages including specific moments of contact and movement. This chapter will also outline key mechanisms within the process including material and ideological forces, and Ideostructs.

The second chapter sets out methodological considerations with four distinct sections including ontological rupture, methodological break, methods, and object summary. The four sections have distinct but connected goals: 1. To create an argument through the performance of a comparative analysis of two academic analytical works. This will include the ontological position established in these works, and the subsequent methods utilized. 2. To outline the use of a general theory of discourse as a methodological basis through the comparative analysis and critique of the theorization and operationalization of discourse within Foucault and Laclau & Mouffe. 3. To outline the methods that will be used based on the ontological and methodological position outline in the prior sections. 4. Finally, this chapter will contain a brief summary of each novel to contextualize the analysis chapters for the reader. Within this section key moments which will be (re)visited throughout the analysis chapters will be identified to better guide the reader.

The third chapter of this work will contain the first analysis chapter focusing on the concepts of the subject triangle, ideostructs, Ideostems, and discourse. This chapter will set out the conceptualization and operationalization of these concepts through a mixture of theory and

analytical observation¹⁰. In doing so, this chapter will identify and discuss these concepts, and utilize them, in conversation with the works of Foucault and Laclau & Mouffe. I expand upon Foucault's discussion of the power-discourse relationship by adding what will be called a 'micro center'. This will be paired with the expansion of Laclau & Mouffe's general theory of discourse by replacing the individual subject position with the subject triangle. In doing so this chapter identifies and addresses the mechanical and functional basis of these concepts.

Finally, the fifth chapter is the second and final analysis chapter, focusing on the concepts of the designated object and proxima. This chapter will contain a full mobilization of everything discussed in previous chapter to expand upon relational functions and products, and will be achieved mainly through the analytical observation of the research objects. Primarily, the product and relational functions that are discussed include: 1. How the designated object is formed and consumed. 2. The function, place, and tendencies of the proxima force within the discourse analysis of this semiotic model of ideology. 3. The subsequent expansion of the process of ideology outlined in chapter two. In doing so, this chapter will create further depth into a discourse analysis of a semiotic model of ideology.

¹⁰ Primarily the latter.

Chapter 2: A Brief Genealogy & Theory of Ideology

Introduction

This chapter will begin by outlining a brief history of the concept of ideology, beginning with Marx and his conceptualization of ideology as a repressive apparatus and an inversion of real life processes and will be followed by the works of Althusser and Žižek. Following this, the chapter will outline the core of ideology as both productive and relational, and also outline key concepts and contributions by both authors. Finally, the chapter will explore the process of ideology separated into three distinct sections beginning with *The Inward Motion of Material Forces and Deconstruction of the Marks*, followed by *The Pivot of Material Forces and the (De)Centering of the Subject*, and, finally, ending with *The Outward Movement of Ideological Forces and the Restructured Ideostruct*. Each section will contain key moments in the process of ideology which consists of various moments of contact and movement, and which operate under the body-force relationship. In doing so, this chapter will formulate a theory of the ideo-material subject, which is a model of subjectification that approaches both subjectivity and materiality as active in the production of the subject. This semiotic model of ideology will produce a more dynamic form of subjectification, in which a body becomes a subject, and attempts to reconcile the problematics which arise from the materialist and idealist models used by this chapter's authors.

Ideology and the Shift from Repression to Production

We must first begin the genealogy of ideology within sociology today with Marx¹¹, whose initial and primary theories of ideology can be identified within his work *The German Ideology*, in which Marx developed a positivist-mechanistic theory of ideology¹². It is within this work which Marx would identify ideology as an inversion of human nature, “a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of the objects on the retina does from the physical life-process”¹³. Marx would move to identify ideology in the division of labour by exchange in “the rise of manufacturers, branches of production which had outgrown the guild-system”¹⁴, and in doing so identified a shift from “natural instruments of production and those created by civilisation”¹⁵. In doing so, Marx would hinge his identification of the inversion of human consciousness on the change in relationships, “the first case [natural instruments] presupposes that the individuals are united by some bond: family, tribe, and land itself, etc.; the second [societal instruments], that are independent of one another and are held together by exchange”¹⁶.

This inversion of the human subject occurred through his brief writings on ideology that he called the camera obscura, which operates as mere “representation of the practical activity... of men”¹⁷. For Marx, a focus or encapsulation of meaning within ideology contained a property of the camera obscura in that “men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas”¹⁸. It is in this

¹¹ I realize the concept of ideology can be traced to ancient Greece, but this work has neither the time nor the focus to approach a genealogy of this extent. However, Marx’s conceptualization of ideology remains as a foundational point in popular understanding of ideology.

¹² Althusser, Louis. *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, (London and New York, Verso, 2014), 173.

¹³ Marx, Karl. *A Critique of The German Ideology*, (Marxist Internet Archive, 1932), 9.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 27.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 24.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 24.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 9.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 9.

way he would claim that ideology has no history¹⁹, but is rather “ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process”²⁰, and, according to Althusser in doing so Marx “reduces the action of ideology to the action of repression pure and simple”²¹. As through an inversion from the realization that “life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life”²², it is ideology then which “is the system of ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man or social group”²³. To be brief, Marx begins the concept of ideology as a repressive instance in which the ideas and representations of the workers come to dominate their minds through an inversion of the real conditions of existence and their representations, and always of the ruling class²⁴.

In contrast Althusser attempts a bold move with an alteration of ideology from a repressive process into a productive one, as “*indispensable in any society if men are to be formed,*”²⁵, and as a process which occurs “by the subject and for the subject”²⁶. He achieves this by repositioning two major statements by Marx, and stating that “*ideology is eternal*”²⁷, and “above all the (imaginary) relationship of individuals to the relations of production and the relations that derive from them”²⁸. In other words, Althusser posits ideology not as a repressive state produced by the ruling class, which inverts the minds of men to interact with the representations of their real conditions of existence, but rather a key process which produces an imaginary relationship *to* their real conditions of existence. In doing so, Althusser would forward

¹⁹ Marx. *A Critique of German Ideology*, 9.

²⁰ Ibid, 9.

²¹ Althusser. *On the Reproduction of Capitalism*, 178.

²² Marx. *The German Ideology*, 9.

²³ Althusser, Louis. *Lenin and Philosophy, and other essays*, (London, New Left Books, 1971), 104.

²⁴ Althusser. *On the Reproduction of Capitalism*, 173.

²⁵ Althusser, Louis. *For Marx*, (London and New York, Verso, 2005), 235.

²⁶ Althusser. *On the Reproduction of Capitalism*, 188.

²⁷ Ibid, 176.

²⁸ Althusser. *Lenin and Philosophy*, 109.

the claim that “*all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as subjects*”²⁹, and in doing so “*constituting ‘concrete individuals as subjects’*”³⁰. In this action, Althusser takes on, what he calls, “the project of theory of ideology *in general*”³¹.

For Althusser, this process of *interpellation* is the primary and core component to ideology, as it is a process by which individuals abstract³². The process of interpellation identifies a primary connection which Althusser still has to Marx, and which his theory supports, namely that “Ideology has a material existence”³³. As an individual becomes a subject through the abstraction of their relationship to their real conditions of existence as Althusser states if a subject believes in God they will act in corresponding ways³⁴. In other words, “if her believes in God, he goes to Church to attend Mass, Kneels, prays, confesses, does penance”³⁵ and will do anything else a good catholic does. It is in this way, then, that an “individual is always-already a subject, even before he is born, is nevertheless the plain reality”³⁶. This status of subjectification relies upon two processes: 1. That the process of interpellation “presupposes the ‘existence’ of a unique and central other Subject”³⁷. 2. That there is an “ideological *recognition* function”³⁸.

It must be understood that it is through this process of interpellation which ideology becomes centered³⁹ upon an abstract Subject⁴⁰, and it is toward that Subject that the subject act

²⁹ Althusser. *On the Reproduction of Capitalism*, 190.

³⁰ Althusser. *Lenin and Philosophy*, 113.

³¹ Ibid, 105.

³² Althusser. *On the Reproduction of Capitalism*, 192.

³³ Althusser. *Lenin and Philosophy*, 109.

³⁴ Althusser. *On the Reproduction of Capitalism*, 185.

³⁵ Althusser. *Lenin and Philosophy*, 110.

³⁶ Ibid, 116.

³⁷ Althusser. *On the Reproduction of Capitalism*, 195.

³⁸ Althusser. *Lenin and Philosophy*, 113.

³⁹ Althusser. *On the Reproduction of Capitalism*, 197.

⁴⁰ Althusser comes to identify this as the capitol ‘S’ Subject.

as his *mirrors*, his *reflections*”⁴¹. It is then towards this center which the actions of the subjects are given meaning. In this sense, the interpellation of the subject comes to bring them to exist within a mirror-structure⁴², and it is one which the subject comes to recognise itself as a subject in relationship to the Subject. This mechanism of recognition also contains a triple effect wherein “the mutual recognition of the subjects and Subject, the subjects’ recognitions of each other, and final the subject’s recognition of himself”⁴³ occurs. It is within Althusser’s work that recognition becomes the most important mechanism of his theory of ideology⁴⁴, as “one of the two basic functions of ideology (the other is the function of *misrecognition*)”⁴⁵, and it is misrecognition which covers the true process of ideology from the subject. In doing so Althusser outlines his famous example of hailing on the street and the subsequent 180° turn at the sound⁴⁶, which successfully achieves full recognition of themselves as a subject, at the other as a subject, and thus as always-already a subject. Recognition of the self, then, is the key component that works within Althusser’s process of ideology, as it is recognition which places the subject in relationship to the Subject, within their imaginary relationship to their real conditions of existence, and other subjects.

However, in doing so Althusser enters a new problematic immanent within his theory of ideology which is more totalizing and inescapable than before. The question becomes: if we are interpellated as capitalist subjects by our conditions of existence, then how do we escape this subjectivity? Althusser’s answer is inferred by the theory, which is that ideology is a productive

⁴¹ Althusser. *Lenin and Philosophy*, 118.

⁴² Althusser. *On the Reproduction of Capitalism*, 197.

⁴³ Althusser. *Lenin and Philosophy*, 120.

⁴⁴ Whether or not he approaches it as such.

⁴⁵ Althusser. *On the Reproduction of Capitalism*, 189.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 191.

process that makes the subject 'go'⁴⁷ by which the subject is interpellated by their conditions, then subjectivity and by extension the actions of the subject, are immanent within the mode of production. In other words, a capitalist subject will always behave as a capitalist subject, and its actions are over-determined by the mode of production in which they are interpellated.

Žižek attempts to address the missing question of Althusser's work, namely how does the subject *go*? His answer is through the injection of duty and pleasure, and in the insertion of Lacan's model of the human universe⁴⁸ into the process of interpellation. In doing so, Žižek forwards the notion of imaginary relations to the real conditions of existence into a model of fantasy and makes two major points: 1. That the unconscious is outside of the subject⁴⁹, within the world around them. 2. It is the very substance with which the subject interacts. By doing so, Žižek posits that the fundamental function of ideology is not mediative⁵⁰, but, instead, it is the realm of ideology which cannot be pierced to see 'the real thing', as it would then dissolve entirely⁵¹. In other words, his primary departure from Althusser is that ideology is not a mediative process between the subject and their conditions, but rather an unconscious structuring of social reality⁵².

The fantasy, as forwarded by Žižek, operates as that which "constitutes our desire... and teaches us how to desire"⁵³, through "the belief... belief supports the fantasy which regulates social reality"⁵⁴. It is through this "connection between the recognition of desire, and the desire

⁴⁷ Althusser. *On the Reproduction of Capitalism*, 191.

⁴⁸ Žižek, Slavoj. *The Plague of Fantasies*, (London and New York, Verso, 2008), 223. Here Žižek outlines the model I reference in which he injects this 'abstraction' of the subject.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 1.

⁵⁰ As it operates within Althusser, as the mediation of the subject to their real conditions of existence.

⁵¹ Žižek, Slavoj. *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, (London and New York, Verso, 2008), 15.

⁵² *Ibid*, 30.

⁵³ Žižek. *The Plague of Fantasies*, 7.

⁵⁴ Žižek. *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 33.

of recognition”⁵⁵, in which the subject comes to recognize subjects, and thus comes to *want* to be recognized as a subject. However, Žižek identifies the exteriorization of this process of ideology as not something inherently of just the subject as “it would be wrong... to conceive of it as ‘thought-abstraction’, as a process taking place in the ‘interior’ of the thinking subject”⁵⁶. So, one can understand the fantasy is the unconscious structuring of reality through the repetition of their existence upon the basis of belief, in which the recognition of the belief pre-supposes the belief recognized within the subject, and in which the subject learns first that they do believe; followed by the belief itself⁵⁷. In other words, if you kneel down in prayer you will believe⁵⁸, or as Žižek phrases it in his example of the fantasy of eating a strawberry cake: “what the fantasy of eating a strawberry cake is really about is attempting to form an identity”⁵⁹.

However, this is not the entire role of the fantasy, and in-fact the fantasy operates in the masking or control of jouissance as “the abyss traumatic/excessive enjoyment”⁶⁰. Žižek’s use of jouissance is, of course, heavily influenced by the Lacanian use of it in which an encounter is always traumatic⁶¹. However, it can also be understood otherwise as an enjoyment, “the substances of enjoyment, the real kernel around which this signifying interplay is structured”⁶², and as a surplus⁶³ from which the subject derives a pleasure from the action. Therefore, the role of the fantasy is “to conceal the surplus-enjoyment proper to the ideological form as such”⁶⁴. In other words, every action by the subject produces a surplus-enjoyment which is masked within

⁵⁵ Žižek. *The Plague of Fantasies*, 8.

⁵⁶ Žižek. *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 13.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 25. As seen here Žižek outlines *cynical ideology*, in which the subject must contain a certain distance from the true belief in that ideology.

⁵⁸ Althusser. *On the Reproduction of Capitalism*, 186.

⁵⁹ Žižek. *The Plague of Fantasies*, 10.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 223.

⁶¹ Ibid, 61.

⁶² Žižek. *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 78.

⁶³ Žižek. *The Plague of Fantasies*, 72.

⁶⁴ Žižek. *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 91.

the fantasy, and in doing so allows the subject to acquire and identity through the recognition and repetition of belief which constitutes the subject itself. Žižek offers an example to understand this: “*acting as if money, in its material reality, is the immediate embodiment of wealth as such*”⁶⁵. The subject is capable of recognizing the belief in money as wealth, re-enacting the social reality of money as wealth, and releasing a surplus-enjoyment of the purchase, which is then masked within the fantasy. Thus, the subject recognizes the belief of money as wealth within the self⁶⁶.

To fully grasp this process a major point is missing, which is that of the big other, that “decenters the subject from within”⁶⁷, as “there is no symptom without transference... the symptom implies the field of the big other”⁶⁸. In this way Žižek aligns with Althusser, in the production of a big ‘other’ Subject, the ‘big other’, the artificial center, and “the symbolic institutions, who acts through him”⁶⁹, which gives the actions of the subject its meaning. The big other presents the illusion of a consistent and complete quality⁷⁰ which the subject cannot acquire, and so acts in accordance as to the perfection placed within the big other. In other words, the big other is the illusionary center which allows the subject to transfer the surplus-enjoyment within the field of the big other, which otherwise threaten to disrupt the ideological field; in which the subject still believes.

⁶⁵ Žižek. *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 28.

⁶⁶ However, this example of wealth brings us closer to the original premise laid out by Marx which threatens a regression to an old form of ideology. This primarily being the inversion of the real thing, in which the subject is no longer acting with money, but the idea of wealth. This issue cannot be fully reconciled here, but it is rooted in Žižek’s reliance on the symbolic and relationships of signification. In the later analysis chapter, *Proxima and the Designated Object*, this work will be able to more fully approach and attempt to address this problematic.

⁶⁷ Žižek. *The Plague of Fantasies*, 142.

⁶⁸ Žižek. *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 79.

⁶⁹ Žižek. *The Plague of Fantasies*, 80.

⁷⁰ Žižek. *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 79.

The role of the big other does not end here, as it achieves one final function, which is the externalization or ‘out-sourcing’ of the subject’s actions and enjoyments, allowing the big other to laugh for the subject, believe for the subject, and act for the subject⁷¹. Žižek outlines this function in the laugh track in television shows, as something which is “relieving us of our duty to laugh”⁷², and in this way outlines a new dynamic missing with Althusser’s model of the Subject. This moves beyond the mere reflection of one another, but in the dichotomous relation of action, and it is one which the subject and the big other exist within a constant state of activity-inactivity. In other words, when the big other is inactive, the subject is active, and vice-versa, and can be recognized in the protestor who stand against their state who will not act on an issue, or the subject who signs a petition to set the wheels in motion within the big other so that they may continue to be inactive.⁷³

Finally, within the Lacanian structure of the human universe, which Žižek injects into ideology, there is the realm of the imaginary and the symbolic. It is this relationship which identifies the abstraction of the individual into that of a subject, as it is the mobility of the subject’s real conditions of existence through the imaginary “the domain of images with which we identify, and which capture our attention”⁷⁴, and into the symbolic “the field of language, of symbolic structure and communication”⁷⁵. This movement brings together the fantasy, big other, and jouissance, as real conditions are abstracted through the image and the imaginary, producing a surplus-enjoyment in cannot capture. Thus, this surplus-enjoyment is transferred into the field of the big other in the symbolic offering the false quality of consistency and completeness. In

⁷¹ Žižek. *The Plague of Fantasies*, 159.

⁷² Žižek. *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 33.

⁷³ If the state acting in my interests, then I do not need to act in my own interests, but if the state fails to act in my own interest then must act against this inactive big other.

⁷⁴ Žižek. *The Plague of Fantasies*, 223-224.

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 223.

this transference, the fantasy acquires the illusionary quality of stability, as without a transference of this surplus-enjoyment the ideological field of the subject would begin to unravel.

Žižek answers the question intentionally left out of Althusser's work, asking: what does ideology do *for the subject*? By bringing both Althusser and Žižek together the model of the ideo-material subject can answer both: 1. What is the role of ideology in materiality. 2. What is the role of materiality in subjectivity. The ideo-material subject is that which promotes the reproduction of the material conditions of existence, and, additionally, the subject with the stability and recognition of an identity, which occurs through the abstraction of their actions within their material conditions of existence. However, this same process, which relies upon the transference of a surplus-enjoyment that would threaten to unravel the ideological reproduction of the subject also contains the potential of a new production of materiality.

The False Origin of the Subject

Before continuing, we must first approach a major problematic within these conceptualizations of ideology, which comes in question of the origin of the subject. Despite Althusser's critique of humanism within conceptualizations of ideology, he too falls into the trap of identifying the origin of the subject. Althusser attempts to cross this dilemma with the interpellation of the subject as always-already a subject⁷⁶, which he posits as not a retro-active process but rather that the subject is interpellated by the act of hailing⁷⁷ which interpellates the subject as always-already existing as the subject, and it is this process which occurs *without succession*. However, despite this attempt to eliminate an origin Althusser's theory of the origin is built into the very concept itself, as originating in the interpellation of the subject by the

⁷⁶ Althusser. *On the Reproduction of Capitalism*, 189.

⁷⁷ Althusser. *Lenin and Philosophy*, 115.

individual's real conditions of existence, as is demanded within the unidirectional model of ideology Althusser produces. In other words, by positing that the subject is interpellated into being solely through the interpellation of their real conditions of existence, the theory that the subject is always-already a subject is an attempt to reconcile the process of interpellation within a temporal space against the conceptual mechanisms of his own theory.

Althusser's primary mistake is to attempt to answer the question at all, as the question is in-fact self-evident⁷⁸. So, while Althusser's answer to the question does challenge the temporal order of events, he still attempts to answer the question with a temporal lineage. The subject's capacity to ask, 'When did I become a subject?' is itself at the core of the process of subjectification. Only once the subject answers the question, do they place themselves along a chronological succession of events which only exists within the organization of the symbolic. Therefore, the question of the ideo-material subject cannot be, 'When are they a subject?', but rather, 'How do they operate as a subject?'; and, more importantly, 'How, and *why*, does the subject *act* within and upon their conditions of existence?'

The Inward Motion of Material Forces and Deconstruction of the Marks

The first point of contact of this analysis, then, is that of the first point of contact the subject has with their material world, which is the point of *sensual contact*. This point of contact must be understood as not the subject's interaction with the object, but rather as the body-force interaction which will come to constitute the subject itself. Through contact with the body, which releases a surplus-enjoyment that is not contained within either point, and thus triggers an event of transference and reorganization of the symbolic structures by the organization systems within

⁷⁸ If one were to ask, "when did you become a subject?". The only answer could be, "When I was subjected!"

the process of ideology. It is in this section that the process of the deconstruction of the inward movement of material forces within the process of ideology will be outlined.

Before continuing, the term ‘symbolic structure’ must first be defined and located in terms of its usage in Žižek’s work. Žižek uses ‘symbolic structures’ when he addresses the *big other* and the representational function of the imaginary. It is important to state that, unlike the symbolic structures of Žižek’s work, what I will call *Ideostructs* do not operate through the representation of the real, the placement of the representative image, or the subject’s relationship to a *big other*. Instead, Ideostructs make up the organization, grouping, partial fixation, and collection of nodal points of meaning within the ideological process which constitute, not only what the subject *can know*, but the very subject itself. These grouped nodal points of meaning will also act as that which gives the material stability within the process of ideology, as will be addressed shortly, and come to structure the subject, the subject’s knowledge, and the subject’s surrounding reality.

After coming into contact with the body at the point of sensual contact the force is now deconstructed and must travel to the next point of contact within ideology, which occurs through what will be called *abstractive movement*; the inward pull of incoming material forces which are pushing apart by difference within the organizational systems. Abstractive movement is the process through which the deconstructed components of the material travel along the inward momentum as an incoming force, deconstructed by difference, and containing a surplus which is unaccounted for with the, soon to be (re)organized, Ideostructs. But where is it moving? It travels along the nervous system of the body, but the components and surplus-enjoyment move inward through ideology, as a still incoming material force.

The Pivot of Material Forces and the (De)Centering of the Subject

It is at this stage of what will be called *abstractive contact*, that the model of the ideomaterial subject disrupts the image of consistency and separation required for the field of ideology to remain hidden to the subject. Instead, it is the abstraction of the body-force relationship, and a setting introduced so that, eventually (and not at this stage), the subject may recognize the traits of surplus-enjoyment. It is the relationship that the interaction of the subject and materiality through the mediation of the body allows for the designation of traits⁷⁹ produced through the interaction, and functions as misrecognition. This abstraction of the body-force relation sets the stage for the mirror-structure relationship of Subject and subject in Althusser's work, or the big other and the subject in Žižek's work. In the ideomaterial subject this relationship will be identified as the *big subject* and *the subject*, it can be recognized that the big subject contains the qualities and functions of the abstract center discussed in both authors so far. These traits include the artificial and abstract center of ideology, decentering of the subject, both of which produce the big subject's appearance of consistency and completeness.

The big subject-subject relationship is the fragmentation of the one system of forces to facilitate the subject-object relationship, and it is this relationship that the subject will come to identify itself with as one particular perspective.⁸⁰ Here words fail us since the abstract space does not contain the qualities of material space. So, the statement that the incoming forces pivot upon the center and alter their flow into outgoing *ideological forces* (pushed outward and pulled together) does not contain a continuous center. However, the false image of consistency presents the big subject position as never changing as it changes its shape from moment to moment, interaction to interaction, and organization of the subject to organization of the subject. It is the

⁷⁹ These traits range from a blanket being fuzzy, to another person being attractive, or walls being smooth. It is the designation of meaning upon materiality, the subject, and the incoming forces.

⁸⁰ This identification has not yet occurred at this stage of abstractive contact, but merely the *capacity* for this identification has formed at this point.

quality of the big subject position *as a center*⁸¹ that gives it consistency, as it is the act of being centered, or to be more precise, being marked as a center, that installs this point as an eternal center *for the subject*. In other words, there is no external gaze looking upon the subject from their internal abstraction, but merely a point of pivoting momentum of forces which allow for the situating of the abstracted relationship of body-force. Both gazes and positions *are* the subject but are yet to be recognized as different.

The process in which these material forces, pivoted and now ideological, begin to move *outward*, and will eventually find their way into materiality through the ideological field. This stage of movement is called *proximal movement*. In the pivot of material forces into ideological forces the surplus-enjoyment (which had set this entire process in motion) begins to be captured within the now reorganizing ideofields⁸². It is this continuous restructuring of subject constituting ideofields which contain the transformative capacity in the ideo-material model ideology. By transformative it is not meant in the terms of an inherently moralistic perspective of the subject becoming ‘freed’ or in some way ‘released’ from symbolic structures⁸³. Rather, the productive capacity to (re)produce the material conditions of existence through the production and recognition of the big subject-subject mirror-structure also contains the capacity to alter these material conditions through the transference of surplus-enjoyment that puts into motion the restructuring of ideofields. In other words, the process which reproduces materiality contains a moment in which these systems and structures are opened and change and may be altered in a

⁸¹ Whether or not the *position* of that center is always changing.

⁸² It is in this way that the actions to come may point to an origin, no matter how false, as “the subject (Paul) did that.”

⁸³ Which, in a Marx’s understanding of ideology, would be ideology itself, or ideologies specific in a purely Althusserian analysis.

way that threatens the reproduction of the material conditions of existence, as well as threatening the reproduction of *that* subject itself.

It is in this movement that the ideostructs become reconstituted and take on a new shape, and it is the inconsistencies of the ideostructs (through this continuous transformation) that are masked in the object's static form as it is rendered immobile within the space of ideology; made visible as to be presented in a state of stability that the subject comes to experience. The stage of proximal movement marks the end of, and the primary moment, in what Foucault identified as the *savoir*, "the knowledge... of a society, which provides the background for both the 'material practices' and 'ideological forms'"⁸⁴. This is the space where the organizational systems are tucked away, and organize the ideostructs of thought which material actions are directed. Now, the subject is ready to be identified as itself.

The Outward Movement of Ideological Forces and the Restructured Ideostructs

It is this point of contact in the process of ideology which will be called *ideo contact*, and is the final stage of contact before the material forces (now pivoted outward as ideological forces) will exit out the body and into materiality. The organizational systems have reorganized the ideostructs to accommodate the surplus-enjoyment which had set this process in motion, a force pulled in comparison has successfully pulled the deconstructed marks of the force together, and now, within the mechanism of proximity, the subject may identify with the ideostructs in their new shape. It is at this point that one may be tempted to identify these as ideologies⁸⁵, but this would be detrimental as it is now clear that ideology is the process by the which the subject

⁸⁴ Lemke, Thomas. *Foucault's Analysis of Modern Governmentality: A Critique of Political Reason*, (London and New York, Verso, 2019), 34.

⁸⁵ Namely being that of religious, economic, political, and sexual ideologies; to name a few.

comes into being. It is here that Althusser's theory of ideology stops, as the individual, through interpellation, recognition, misrecognition, and all within a mirror-reflection relationship, has become a concrete subject. However, the ideo-material subject does not end here, as it must be a place of escape for the outgoing ideological forces.

At this point we have entered into the realm of *connaissance*, which indicates the relationship between the subject and the object⁸⁶, as it is through the stage of ideo contact which the subject *comes to recognize* the surplus-enjoyment as either of the object, body, or subject. It is at this stage after the subject has looked at a shirt (for example) that the subject may be inclined to proclaim, 'this is a *men's* shirt', as it is this *masculine* quality (that of the surplus-enjoyment of touching/seeing the shirt, which is neither body, object, or subject) which now constitutes the subject. It is in ideo contact that the ideostructs acquires its quality, as it is here that the quality of masculinity becomes a part of the subject. It is here that the subject recognize itself as these ideostructs⁸⁷, and finally as a subject facing the big subject. The subject is no longer *of the state*, but is a subject *within a state*; the big subject adopts the identity of the other, it's mirror, and it constitutes opposite potential in action.

These ideological forces must find an escape within the state which will be called *physical movement*. It is in this stage that the ideological forces move through the body, and enter into materiality⁸⁸. It is here that the subject, now fully constructed and recognized through this process, acts, but it is also clear that the actions do not derive from the subject. To avoid a claim of origin, it must be made clear that the ideo-material subject exists in an active

⁸⁶ Lemke. *A Critique of Political Reason*, 34.

⁸⁷ I (the subject) identify myself as male, gender fluid, Buddhist, a gamer, white, and so on. In the example of the shirt, the subject is buy/wear the shirt whether or not they identify as male or not.

⁸⁸ Which will, once again, pivot these into material forces at some point.

relationship of materiality and subjectivity, in a constant state of movement, transference, and redirection of material and ideological forces within ideology, and ideological into material forces within materiality – a reciprocal and unending process. A search for where these forces started would be paradoxical to the model. It is in this way the subject identifies itself as the source of this motivation, of identity, but this would then be a misrecognition of ideology and discourse. The subject acts as a redirection of material forces and also as a redirection of ideological forces, and comes to identify the origin of action with the temporal construction of time within the ideological organizational systems operating behind the ideostruct.

Through this movement the subject is identified internally, now distinctly identified from the big subject, the ideostructs have been reorganized (but the subject is unaware due to the false consistency of the fantast), and now the ideological forces make their way out of ideology and into materiality, though these actions are recognized as originating in the subject. The action of the subject through the body, and of power through the body, highlight the mediative quality of the body; which is itself subject to both ideological and material forces. In this way a triple point relationship has become identified of subject, body, and object, which allows for the action upon one point through the interaction of its opposing two. However, the body is the point of contact and exit for ideological and material forces.

Summary

The ideo-material subject answers the problematic of material over-determination of ideology without rendering materiality passive, as it is the incoming material forces that put the process of ideology into motion. It is this process that moves these forces back into materiality. At the point of sensual contact, the force is deconstructed into its collection of parts. This deconstructed force is pushed apart by difference and pulled inward as a *material force*, through the

process of *abstractive movement* and enters the abstraction of the subject. These inward moving material forces then find a point to pivot within the moment of *abstractive contact*, and, in doing so, they mark the abstract center which marks the abstraction⁸⁹ of the body-force relationship and produce the mirror-structure which will come to be recognized as the big subject-subject relationship. Through the process of *proximal movement*, these forces begin their movement outward as *ideological forces*, the deconstructed force is now pulled together, and the ideostructs are reorganized. In the stage of ideo contact organizational systems have reorganized the ideostructs, and the subject is now capable of recognizing itself as itself which is constituted by the ideostructs with which it is misrecognizing. Finally, these ideological forces now move out of the body, misrecognized as originating from the subject out into the material space through *physical movement*, and completing the reciprocal ideo-material subject. This is the process that produces the reciprocal movement of materiality and ideology.

⁸⁹ Here abstraction is not representation. It is not an untold amount of physical space between materiality and subjectivity, but rather it is the interaction of ideological signs and forces.

Chapter 3: Discourse, Methodology, and Methods

Introduction

This chapter will outline the methods used in this work and is divided into three sections. First, it begins with *The Ontological and Epistemological Rupture* where the role of the author will be identified as a nodal point within a discursive formation. This will be accomplished by interrogating the common trend within Narrative and Discourse Analysis to analyze fiction texts as an author-centric commentary on society, that operates as a reflection of society while being situated outside of it. Second, this chapter discusses *The Methodological Break*, exploring discourse theory through Foucault and Laclau & Mouffe, situating texts as propositions within discourse. Third, the section entitled *Methods* will outline how the methodological position will be mobilized in concrete methods and practices. Finally, *Object Summary* section of this chapter will give a brief summary of the context and main narrative events of *WE* and *Brave New World*.

The Ontological and Epistemological Rupture

“Truth has the structure of a fiction”⁹⁰. This statement has evolved in use from its inception as the thesis of Lacan to the use of Žižek, but throughout its evolution it contains a persistent message: that reality and fiction have an inescapably similar structure. In this section, the works of *Dark Horizons* (a touchstone edited collection of dystopian literary analysis) and *Living in the End Times* (Žižek’s analysis of the fictive and the real in late-stage capitalism) will outline the primary rupture in the analysis of fiction literature. In this rupture there are two key distinctions, namely the role of the author and the distance between the ‘reality’ and ‘fiction’. On the one hand there is a narrative analysis of literature which focuses on its utility to an agentic

⁹⁰ Žižek, Slavoj. *Living in the End Times*, (London and New York, Verso, 2018), 95.

writer and reader, or producer and consumer. On the other hand, there is psychoanalytic and discourse theory analysis of fiction that highlights the space of literature as a mapping to social relations. In other words, the epistemological rupture this section addresses is focussed on the place and capacity of literature to act within discourse rather than through the agency of an author. To understand this rupture, it is first important to explore the texts themselves, which will begin with *Dark Horizons* and end with *Living in the End Times*.

Dark Horizons is a collection of essays and letters, as well as analytical conversations, which cover narrative analysis and science fiction as a genre with each chapter containing a look at more focused disciplines and questions such as feminist dystopia and posthumanism (to name a few). In doing so, it marks itself as a key text which offers a broad overview of narrative analysis and science fiction as a whole, and develops a broad methodological examination of science fiction narrative rather than a genealogy of the field. As a central text in the field, *Dark Horizons* offers key insights into the epistemological function of science fiction narrative analysis, which operates through a process containing four moments of study⁹¹: 1. The authors situate the novel and its genre within the common structuring of that narrative genre, and, in doing so, relay the text to its surrounding narrative field⁹². 2. The authors situate the relevance of specific topics to a theoretical field⁹³. 3. The authors give a summary of the entire text. This is achieved by going over, and briefly describing, each moment within the story and plot⁹⁴, restructuring and presenting the narrative of the novel to the reader. 4. The authors dissect the

⁹¹ With exception to the first chapter, which is a discussion over letter mail, and does not read as a standard academic work.

⁹² Baccolini, Raffaella. & Moylan, Tom. *Dark Horizons: Science Fiction and the Dystopian Imagination*, (London and New York, Routledge, 2003), 91-92. This is not stated, but this trend I am describing is visible here.

⁹³ Ibid, 92-96. Once again, this is never explicitly stated, but it is instead visible.

⁹⁴ Ibid, 97-102. Once again, this is never explicitly stated, but it is instead visible.

narrative meaning of some events, but primarily focus on larger, over-arching plotlines; in order to super-impose this upon the author's own position.

Living in the End Times is a psychoanalytic theoretical work focused on the 'regression' of the capitalist psychology through an in-depth analysis of various topics and subjects, ranging from real world events, to fiction, and even to architecture. While this work may not contain the same direct connection to narrative analysis as *Dark Horizons*⁹⁵, it still asserts itself as a key text due to its unorthodox use of critical literature studies and psychoanalysis, its challenging of more traditional positions (such as those found in *Dark Horizons*), and interpretations of current events at the time of publication. The resulting analytical process is much more sporadic than that of *Dark Horizons*, but the initial 'inconsistency' one may observe is inherently relevant to the method of study immanent in the text. First, the text's focus always remains on either the object of analysis⁹⁶ or the theoretical concept being expanded upon. Second, the analytical process of the work moves between different analytical tools⁹⁷ without hesitation and, rather than focussing on a summary of one entire text at one time, it instead jumps from one key moment of a text to another. In this way, Žižek allows for the focus to remain on the initial object of analysis, and allows the literature examined to operate as a method of analysis. As Žižek stated clearly, "one of the best ways to detect shift in the ideological constellation is to compare consecutive remakes of the same story"⁹⁸.

Allow me, for a moment, to illustrate the use of fiction literature analysis to directly analyse the social achieved in *Living in the End Times* versus the indirect analysis of the social as

⁹⁵ Being the general view of an entire field of study.

⁹⁶ Being an event, social symptom, or individual.

⁹⁷ Be it moments in a work of fiction, a real-world event covered within the news, or a direct conversation with another theorist.

⁹⁸ Žižek. *Living in the End Times*, 61.

seen in *Dark Horizons* by providing an example from *Cinematic Urbanism* by Nezar AlSayyad, a work that falls into the same ontological and epistemological field as *Dark Horizons*. AlSayyad states: “Science fiction, in a general sense, may help us to understand state-induced modernity, since it allows the depiction of non-realistic ‘future’ space, and features ‘spectacular environmental changes’”⁹⁹. To highlight the point of rupture, this statement can be revised as follows: “News clips, in a general sense, may help us understand state-induced violence, since they allow the depiction of non-real violence, and feature ‘spectacular reconstructions of reality’”. Of course, the latter statement seems ridiculous, as news clips are perceived as a capturing of *the real thing*. However, for the process of subjectification, there is no difference, as each example is a part of the same process in which: 1. Material forces come into contact with the body as a body-force interaction¹⁰⁰. 2. This force is pivoted within abstractive contact upon the artificial center of the bug subject point, (de)centering the subject, and altering the material force into an ideological force. 3. This ideological force leaves the body through the physical movement stage, and eventually comes into contact with another subject position¹⁰¹ as a material force. Additionally, if the narrative telling of the text is impacted by the author’s subject position, so too is the journalist’s¹⁰² and so an argument which creates an uneven terrain immanent within its theoretical foundation is ill-equipped to explain the role, place, and mechanisms of texts and media.

⁹⁹ AlSayyad, Nezar. *Cinematic Urbanism: A History of the Modern from Reel to Real*, (London and New York, Routledge, 2006), 91.

¹⁰⁰ Here being the author or the journalist.

¹⁰¹ The reader or viewer.

¹⁰² At a very basic level the journalist impacts the story which is worth telling, the time, word choices (as is relevant in critical discourse theory), and general access via level of language used. These all impact the accessibility and orientation of the story, effectively (re)creating the reality it is perceived to represent, and in-fact operates upon similar lines as fiction.

At first glance¹⁰³, the issue appears to be a mere situating of these texts as either *inside* or *outside* of the social, and as positioning texts as either commentaries by authors to society or as primary mechanisms of social production and mapping. However, there is a primary ontological assumption in place in both *Dark Horizons* and *Cinematic Urbanism* that is not present in Žižek's work¹⁰⁴. This ontological mechanism is perhaps accidentally identified in *Dark Horizons* as “[t]he key, I think, is in agency”¹⁰⁵. It is this classical notion of agency as existing in a pre-social subject with a set of behaviours, qualities, and beliefs which can act in an autonomous manner if the bindings of the social are removed, which renders the analysis of fiction texts or film, in and for itself, as impossible. This is because, to do so, would be to bypass the author and create a direct connection between novel and social, thereby undermining the pre-supposed agency of the author. It is this same notion of agency critiqued by Althusser, Foucault, and Laclau & Mouffe. This classical notion of agency fails to render visible the false presence of the subject origin, and causes any analysis of fiction to collapse into the misrecognition of ideology and discourse. As a result any analysis fails to look beyond the newly (re)constituted subject, and is unable to look (with any real depth) into the forces that both constitute and animate the very telling and structuring of these stories. As can be seen in the previous chapter and the operationalization of ideology, this notion of agency obstructs the capacity to focus on fiction as the true object of analysis; any analysis reverts to an analysis of the author.

However, the reality of the obstructing effect of studying literature through the author can be better highlighted by covering, briefly, the role of the author within the process of ideology¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ And how I started my analysis on this section.

¹⁰⁴ Whether or not it is in-fact still there, it carries far less weight.

¹⁰⁵ Baccolini, & Moylan. *Dark Horizons*, 17. Again, this quote is in discussion of something else, but it highlights the weight placed on agency in these authors' analysis of these texts.

¹⁰⁶ As operationalized in Chapter 2.

and the sign¹⁰⁷. First, it can be understood that the narration of a ‘fact’ within a piece of literature obliterates that which it attempts to represent as it is subverted by the sign which severs it from its origin¹⁰⁸. In other words, the author is disconnected as the point of origin due to the transfer of meaning into a sign system which, within a discursive field, “designates nothing but itself”¹⁰⁹. This can be driven further into the heart of the point, through an examination of the name, and the predicate that “differences may result from the fact that an author’s name is not simply an element of discourse (capable of being either subject or object, of being replaced by a pronoun, and the like); it performs a certain role with regard to narrative discourse, assuring classificatory function”¹¹⁰. This occurs due to the disconnect of the subject, author, and text within a field of difference; a symptom of the (de)centered subject which transfers meaning to a sign system of words on the page¹¹¹. In short, the author operates as a nodal point within discourse that binds specific texts, narratives, and meaning.

The position of the subject as a constituted construction within a system of constituted constructs is set out in chapter two of this work. The ideo-material model moves fiction from the position as an artifact produced as an expression of an autonomous agent’s will to a comment on, or warn, society at large¹¹², into a position where in literary works are products of the semiotic body-force relationship with constitutes the subject¹¹³. In other words, through the process of the pivot of incoming material forces into ideological forces through the process of ideology (which

¹⁰⁷ A more in-depth conceptualization of signs and discourse is to come later in this chapter.

¹⁰⁸ Barthes, Roland. *Image/Music/Text*, (London, Fontana, 1977), 142.

¹⁰⁹ Foucault, Michel. *The Order of Things*, (London and New York, Routledge Classics, 2002), 331.

¹¹⁰ Foucault, Michel. *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984: Volume Two*, (New York, The New York Press, 1998), 210.

¹¹¹ Additionally, as outlined in *What is an Author?*, the name of the author contains specific mechanisms of unification and relationality. The totality of which cannot be covered in full.

¹¹² Within a traditional humanist analysis of fiction.

¹¹³ Within the ideo-material semiotic conceptualization of ideology.

constitutes the subject) once can see the production of the book and the subject.; the book writes the subject as the subject writes the book¹¹⁴. In this model, the statement that a subject writes a book with the *intention* to comment on society, is also true, but it is the ideo-material model which avoids the misrecognition of the *subject* as the identified origin of this motivation, position, opinion, and identifies the break between intention and effect. The misrecognition of ideology claims that these thoughts and feeling in the novel are in fact the *author's*, originating from within the recesses of the author's psyche, and the author is expressing these originating from the subject. However, it is the operation of the subject as an ideological subject and discursive system which present itself, to itself, as the center of the process which constitute it.

The minimal distance between the 'real' and the 'fiction' produced within the epistemological assumption of agency within *Dark Horizons* and *Cinematic Urbanism* must be addressed. It is the space through which meaning is transferred from fiction to subject, and includes the adoption of fiction narratives within the minds and lives as real subjects. This produces a model which introduces transfer of meaning from fiction to reality. This approach is challenged by *Living in the End Times* as the fantasy already exists as a fictitious world in which the imaginary masks the inconsistencies of the fantasy and guards the subject from the traumatic real and jouissance or, in Althusser's terms, the imaginary relationship to their real conditions of existence. In other words, it is a transfer of meaning between fiction, author, and reader. The text, then, is the space between fictions. Both approaches necessitate spatial order between author-text and text-reader relationships, the ideo-material subject collapses the space, and instead views a movement of forces through semiotic process with alter and shift the flow of these forces through material and ideological forms, constituting bodies, subject, and materiality

¹¹⁴ This, perhaps, an over-simplification, but points to the processes I have outlined in Chapter 2.

in difference. The traditionally viewed field of heterogenous, distinctly separate, spaces of materiality and subjectivity collapse into a material field of processes that mediates the flow of material and ideological forces through a sign system containing various signified meanings to a single signifier.

The epistemological rupture within the study of fiction, then, is rooted in the question of agency as the obstructing notion of an in-depth analysis of these works and separates the field into initial positions reflected by *Dark Horizons* and *Living in the End Times*. This separation stems from the humanist ascription of agency within the author, and exists in comparison to the deconstruction of, or transference from, the author through the production of a narrative within a discursive field. This manifests within epistemological positions shared with *Dark Horizons* as while containing a *proposed* object of study (the text), it actually focuses on the author as the *true* object of analysis. This ends with a conceptualization of a minimal distance between text and subject necessitated by the distinction of the ‘real’ and fiction’, author and text, and text and reader. The ideo-material subject, through the analytical process, must collapse this space and, instead, look to observe the movement of forces both within and around the text.

The Methodological Break

“[T]ruth is not something external to social conditions”¹¹⁵. This position has remained controversial since raised by Foucault and is a key starting point within the methodological portion of this work, and it is one that runs along the axis of a key break within the social sciences and theory. Far from entering a relativistic position, one in which truth becomes immanent within the subject’s ideals and beliefs, it opens a point of analysis to study the truth of

¹¹⁵ Lemke, Thomas. *Foucault’s Analysis of Modern Governmentality: A Critique of Political Reason*, (London and New York, Verso, 2019), 344.

the subject within the conditions of that truth, and the full construction of its reality. To remain true to the position outlined in the previous section, and to produce a methodological basis within a general theory of discourse, this work must analyse these texts not as a product of a conscious actor, but, rather, as a component within a discursive formation¹¹⁶. To do so this section will focus on two foundational texts to a theory of general discourse, and will compare the works of Foucault in *The Order of Things* and Laclau & Mouffe in *Hegemony and the Socialist Strategy*.

A key starting point is with Foucault and the quadrilaterals of language articulation, derivation, designation, and proposition. Foucault describes them as follows: “Articulation gives content to the pure and still empty verbal form of the propositions... designation reveals the point of attachment of all the nominal forms cut out by articulation... derivation indicates the continuous movement of words from their source origin... the proposition unfolds in obedience to a sequential and linear order”¹¹⁷. The quadrilaterals of language, then, demarcate the processes of discourse which “name, part by part, what is given to representation”¹¹⁸, “permits the substitution of the sign for that which is indicated”¹¹⁹, and so “[signs] can be combined together in the same way as ideas, and ideas can be linked together and disjoined just like the letters of the alphabet”¹²⁰. It is in this way that the possible utterances within an infinite potential field make up the basis for Foucault’s study of discourse within which the subject operates, and through which it is constituted.

¹¹⁶ To be brief, these works are propositions within a discursive formation of moments, containing a select and rarified collection of utterances, statements, and actions in an infinite field of possibilities, and, so, it is the signs within the hegemonic formation, as well as those elements which remain with the field of discursivity, which are of utmost importance to study to understand the process of subjectification along the ideo-material semiotic conceptualization of ideology.

¹¹⁷ Foucault. *The Order of Things*, 127.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 107.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, 115.

¹²⁰ Ibid, 124.

However, this is not all, as, for Foucault, there is a shift into the analytics of finitude. For Foucault, the modern episteme operates in two folds: 1. The isolation and disjoining of knowledge's pure form from empirical knowledge, which creates endless formulations to constitute it within a formal structure. 2. The connection of empirical knowledge to subjectivities¹²¹. The analytics of finitude operates upon the distinction and isolation of the metaphysical and empirical, between that which can be observed and measured and that which cannot and is where the entire field of thought¹²² has inverted and become self-referential¹²³. It is a finitude that rests upon nothing other than the fact of its own existence¹²⁴, and "the *appearance* of an order that now belongs to things themselves and to their interior law"¹²⁵. It is in this way that fictional texts contain as much truth in the process of subjectification as the empirical study of the 'real'. In Foucauldian terms, it is discourse which is determined immanently within the interior of the empirical, endlessly proliferated signs and meanings, and then *designating* them as subversion of the representation by the sign. It is texts which contain the discursive subjectification of the subject in their 'authentic'¹²⁶ form as there is as much disconnection between the discursive formations and the text as there is between the former and the subject.

However, it is not here that the exploration of discourse theory can end, since Foucault's theory of discourse in *The Order of Things* "still lies within the analysis of linguistic analysis"¹²⁷.

¹²¹ Foucault. *The Order of Things*, 270.

¹²² Which is isolated along the lines of the empirical.

¹²³ Foucault. *The Order of Things*, 345.

¹²⁴ *Ibid*, 343.

¹²⁵ *Ibid*, 341. Italics added for emphasis.

¹²⁶ I use this word cautiously, as a deep interrogation of the words runs counter to a discourse analysis's internal logics, as it denotes that there is a 'truth' hidden beneath something, which is now being uncovered as a transcendental. Rather, I wish to underline that discursive formations do not alter from 'fiction' to 'reality', and, in a way, a study of subjectification and discursive formations within fiction texts frees discourse from the need to demarcate itself within that which is given to representation. Yet, somehow, it continues to operate under strictly finite scope of potentialities as *if* it must still designate itself, and this opens a whole other point of analysis I cannot entertain in this piece.

¹²⁷ Lemke. *A Critique of Political Reason*, 40.

As a result, Foucault finds his discourse theory trapped within negative terms, because “discourses causes a narrowing of one’s own field of vision”¹²⁸, which, inevitably, “distinguishes between relations that are *discursive... primary* or ‘real’... and ‘*reflexive*’”¹²⁹. It is in this way that Foucault’s discourse theory returns to the structuralist theory of discourse that he had attempted to critique in the first place. It does so because the inability of Foucault’s theory of discourse to attribute a purely *productive* function to discourse threatens a return of transcendentals and does so by attributing, at least partially, a *repressive* function to discourse. This occurs because, in *The Order of Things*, discourse is operationalized as a mechanism which limits an infinite field of possibilities, which (while outlining the production of ‘man’ as an object within discourse), the reliance on the negative narrowing of possibilities within discourse an infinite and ‘pre-discursive’ subject.

It is at this point that we shift focus to Laclau & Mouffe, who would argue that “Foucault... has maintained a distinction – in our opinion ‘inconsistent’ – between discursive and non-discursive practices”¹³⁰, and would bridge this gap by stating “a) that every object is constituted as an object of discourse, insofar as no object is given outside of every discursive condition of emergence; and b) that any distinction between what are usually called the linguistic and behavioural aspects of a social practice, either an incorrect distinction or ought to find its place as a differentiation within the social production of meaning, which is structured under the form of a discursive totalities”¹³¹. This conceptualization of discourse separates the term from its original linguistic orientation, and instead places it within a field containing unending practices

¹²⁸ Mills, Sara. *Discourse: The New Critical Idiom*, (London and New York, Routledge, 2004), 46.

¹²⁹ Lemke. *A Critique of Political Reason*, 42.

¹³⁰ Laclau, Ernesto. & Mouffe, Chantal. *Hegemony and the Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, (London and New York, Verso, 2014), 93.

¹³¹ *Ibid*, 93.

by associating what they call *elements* through *articulatory practices* into *moments* creating a *discourse*, and this placing the unused elements into what they call the *field of discursivity*.

Laclau & Mouffe's general theory of discourse contains four primary components: 1. Elements, which are "signs whose meaning have not yet been fixed"¹³². 2. Articulation, "any practice establishing a relation among elements such as their identity is modified as a result"¹³³. 3. Moments, which are all signs or elements fixed¹³⁴ (however temporarily) by articulatory practices. 4. Discourse, "[t]he structured totality resulting from the articulatory practices"¹³⁵. In their terms, "[a]ny discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity"¹³⁶, demarcated as "[a]ll the possibilities that discourse excludes... [or] a reservoir for the 'surplus of meaning' produced by the articulatory practice"¹³⁷. In other words, discourse's main goal is to encapsulate all elements into moments through articulatory practices, but it is this field of discursivity which is simultaneously produced in the attempt. However, for a discourse to retain partial fixation, there must be a constructed center which Laclau & Mouffe identify the "discursive points of this fixation, [as] *nodal points*"¹³⁸. This conceptualization incorporates Foucault's analytics of finitude, but positions it as a purely productive process, in which discourse does not 'reduce' the field of possibilities, but produces, not only this limited field, but also the 'infinite' anterior of discourse.

¹³² Phillips, Louise. & Jorgenson, W. Marianne. *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, (London and Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, SAGE Publications, 2006), 27.

¹³³ Laclau & Mouffe. *Hegemony and the Socialist Strategy*, 91.

¹³⁴ Phillips & Jorgenson. *Discourse Analysis*, 26.

¹³⁵ Laclau & Mouffe. *Hegemony and the Socialist Strategy*, 91.

¹³⁶ *Ibid*, 98.

¹³⁷ Phillips & Jorgenson. *Discourse Analysis*, 27.

¹³⁸ Laclau & Mouffe. *Hegemony and the Socialist Strategy*, 99.

Laclau & Mouffe also introduce a reconceptualization of hegemony and antagonisms within this work. First, the note that “antagonisms cannot be a *real* opposition”¹³⁹, but rather serve as a contradiction which “occurs in the terrain of the proposition”¹⁴⁰, and manifests itself such as “the presence of the ‘Other’ prevents me from being totally myself. The relation arises not from full totalities, but from the impossibilities of their constitution”¹⁴¹. Finally, it “is because hegemony supposes the incomplete and open character of the social, that it can take place only in a field dominated by articulatory practice”¹⁴². In other words, antagonisms occur within the logics of discourse and its propositions in which two moments within a discursive formation inhibit each other from being fully articulated, and so it is through hegemonic articulatory practices that the logical contradiction between moments is re-articulated into a new discursive formation that simultaneously transforms the discourse and the field of discursivity.

To mobilize this methodological operationalization of discourse theory, it must operate upon specific grounds. Strictly viewed as texts, fiction novels operate as propositions: “to language what representation is to thought... as soon as it is broken down we can no longer encounter the discourse but only its elements, in the form of so much scattered raw material”¹⁴³, or linguistic operations and laws which refer to the larger discursive structure within which they operate. If the proposition is the statement within the word¹⁴⁴, then the text contains the discursive structures, and it is through the breakdown of its linguistic properties that discourse distracts the subject’s gaze, and functions as a mechanism for misrecognition as is found in ideology. It is only appropriate to seek out the hegemonic solving of antagonisms within

¹³⁹ Laclau & Mouffe. *Hegemony and the Socialist Strategy*, 109.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, 109.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, 111.

¹⁴² Ibid, 120.

¹⁴³ Ibid, 101-102.

¹⁴⁴ Foucault. *The Order of Things*, 102.

articulatory practices, and to approach the shifting of signs from elements to moments and back again. This happens to and by the subjects in these objects of analysis that exist, active and alive, within the text before us. It is up to use to find, not the linguistic structures and flow nor the rationality or intention of the author, but, rather, internal mechanisms that disrupt logical antagonisms in subjects.

However, because the texts engaging discourse theory either reject or undervalue ideology within their models and view the subject as merely “subject positions within a discursive structure... [and] cannot, therefore, be the origin of social relations”¹⁴⁵, the role of the subject must be expanded. To be clear, the ideo-material semiotic model of ideology is in agreement with the statement above, as, if the subject is constituted by the (de)centering of the subject, who is constituted by ideostructs along discursive lines and is initiated by the pivoting of internally flowing material forces into externally flowing ideological forces on the basis of body-force interactions, then they, by necessity, cannot themselves be the origin of social relations. However, a distinction to be made is the potential for propositional antagonisms to undergo hegemonic reformulation (at least partially) within individual subject positions and as an effect of the proximal movement of ideological forces. In this sense, then, we must watch for the hegemonic reformulations of antagonisms, not only between subject positions, but also *within* subject positions. This can be accomplished by viewing how the articulation of signs, as moments and elements, occur within material discourse, within and between subject positions, and, finally, inconsistencies within this process.

Methods

¹⁴⁵ Laclau & Mouffe. *Hegemony and the Socialist Strategy*, 101.

If truth and fiction contain the same structure, then¹⁴⁶ it stands that neither (or even, perhaps, an object that is both a truth and fiction at once) can only be understood within the constitution of its own conditions of existence. However, if it is true that “[t]o secure a condition of existence is to fill a logical requirement of an object’s existence, but [is not constitutive of] a *relation of existence* between two objects”¹⁴⁷, then the methods of this analysis must do more than just look at the discursive conditions of existence of the subject, but, instead, must look at the subject’s *relationship* with their conditions of existence. To do so raises two points of inquiry: 1. How does a subject interact with its own conditions of existence? 2/ How can we develop a form of analysis that does not produce either material conditions or subjectivity as passive in this relationship? These two points of inquiry will act as preliminary questions to set the stage for the primary goal of this work which is *to see the process of subjectification* as active and *reciprocal*, containing determinant relationship, but relationships with enough complexity that no component is over-determined by one specific causality or origin. In this section I will attempt to outline how I will approach this research object along the lines of the two starting points of inquiry.

To address this, it is first important to reiterate some of the more *theoretical* elements of this chapter in a more research ‘practice’ friendly manner. Earlier I stated that, in a purely linguistic analysis, these texts would be read as *propositions*, by which I mean that a linguistic analysis would break down the text into chapters, paragraphs, sentences, words, and even syllables. Doing so would deconstruct the *discursive formations* immanent within the text into their parts, which risks losing a portion of their meaning when disconnected from their context,

¹⁴⁶ Due to the collapsed space between the two that I have attempted to present within this chapter.

¹⁴⁷ Laclau & Mouffe. *Hegemony and the Socialist Strategy*, 89.

conditions, and structure. This would be ineffective for a study of discourse, as the fundamental laws and mechanisms of a theory of *general discourse* are lost once broken down into their parts. The text is a product of the relationship of power and discourse as the subject is who is writing the text. Each body exists, inseparable, from its conditions, and contains the discursive conditions of existence immanently within it. In other words, a text (fiction or not) contains the structures and systems of power-discourse in partial fixity, just as a subject. It is this foundation of boundaries and capacities which contain *within them* the proposition of the social; an arrow pointing to the hear of power. The text is the artifact that stands between fictions, collapses them, binds them, bridges fantasies upon the connection of narrative and story which operates upon the laws of discourse, and it is these texts (as incoming material forces all the same) which shape the subject. The texts, in a way, are a window to the *truth* of the subject's world as it is there discourses, power structures, and understandings are unbound from their time, but bound only by their imagination of possibility; the boundaries of knowledge, and power.

The rationality that a text is a proposition to discourse as a subject is to power comes to the practices of articulation, in which discursive patterns and formations exist at a material level of practice and behaviour. In other words, the mechanisms of misrecognition within ideology and discourse will blind the subject, or subjects, to the processes of subjectification, but will continue to recognise the articulatory practise as conventional. What this means is, in recreating what are perceived to be everyday normal activities, or as acceptable responses and perceptions, the processes of subjectification will be reconstructed in-text through articulatory practises rendered unrecognizable as these processes. It is not up to the researcher to deconstruct a text into its parts, but to take in experiences of the text as they are presented (under their own logics and conditions *within* the text) and to look to the interactions, processes, and mechanisms in

place as they *are* these discursive structures and relationships of power¹⁴⁸, and are categorized through *authorship* in which the author functions as a nodal point to a specific discursive formation.

Now that the plain reiteration of the role of the texts within this work has been outlined the primary objects of study can now be presented and approached. Many objects of analysis would therefore be *antagonisms* within the text, “which is only possible to enter into contradictions at a logic-conceptual level... [as] an antagonism cannot be a *real* opposition”¹⁴⁹. In other words, I will be looking for logical contradictions within and between materiality, characters, interactions, and discursive moments. To give a brief example, Bernard (a main character in *Brave New World*) has a stunted body, one that resembles a ‘low-caste’, and so lives in a constant antagonism with his subject position as ‘high-caste’. This contradiction gives a clear indication as to “where discursive objects and practices are made ‘problematic’ and therefore visible and knowable”¹⁵⁰. Therefore, how these antagonisms are re-articulated, even partially, is a primary point of entry to understand the ideo-material semiotic model of ideology and the process of subjectification rooted in a methodology bread in a general theory of discourse because it will allow insight into the specific point of ideology I identified as proximal movement, in which the ideostructs of the subject are reconstructed, and this produce new actions and ideological forces.

¹⁴⁸ To be clear. They are not representations or reconstructions, this produces an epistemological distance between the real and fiction, something which has been collapsed earlier in this chapter. Instead, it must be recognized that these discursive formations are the discursive formations we wish to study in the world, as a proposition to discourse, and this containing it as, and within, that discourse.

¹⁴⁹ Laclau & Mouffe. *Hegemony and the Socialist Strategy*, 109.

¹⁵⁰ Arribas-Ayllon, Michael. & Walkerdine, Valerie. “Foucauldian Discourse Analysis” in *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research in Psychology*, (London, SAGE Publications, 2011), 10.

To achieve this, I will outline a specific research method that can be easily followed and re-created. This process will be repeated with each text individually and sequentially. First, I will read through the text, start to finish, and will take notes for: 1. Key moments that may be relevant to specific research questions and concepts. 2. Primary discursive formations and mechanisms within the materiality of the text¹⁵¹. Second, I will order the collected instances and moments across the concepts or antagonisms with which they relate. An example would be compiling each moment with both works that demonstrate a subject-body antagonism. Third, and finally, I will approach key aspects and traits of the analyzed moments and interactions for key shifts, changes, and alterations which include: 1. The state of antagonisms, signs, and moments, prior to the interaction or event, and the state of the antagonisms, signs, and moments post-interaction or event. 2. Individual character re-articulations of visible antagonisms, which may require contextualization or inter-interaction analysis. 3. The material formation and mobilization of discursive antagonisms and discourse in general¹⁵². 4. Permanent or long-term subject (re)organizations. Using the collected information, I will then analyse the findings by means of the semiotic theory of ideology outlined in chapter two, and in doing so analyze ideology through a general theory of discourse.

Object Summary

This section will begin by summarizing the text *WE* written by Yevgeny Zamyatin. This text is presented through the journal entries of D-503. Each person in this world is referred to as

¹⁵¹ In other words, I will look for specific discursive formations and articulations. An example would be the formation of sexuality in *Brave New World*, as an open sexuality in-which individual intimacy and monogamous relationships are articulated with filth and barbarism. A more in-depth analysis of this articulations is to come in the analytical chapters.

¹⁵² For example, the moment Lenina wakes up during her sleep conditioning. This moment will be of specific interest.

a number (rather than a person or human) and is named as such. D-503 has a female companion, named O-90, whom he is paired. Taking place in the dominating entity known as OneState, every aspect of these numbers' lives is controlled and pre-planned to a Taylorist perfection. Each number wakes up, eats, gets dressed, goes to work, and so on, in perfect synchrony, all at the same time, and no number contains a sense of individual identity, so much so that the words 'I' or 'me' are alien and unused. OneState is an all-encompassing bureaucratic apparatus which mediates sexual encounters through a sex table and pink tickets. The sex table is a pre-planned timetable in which each number is given a scheduled day of sexual encounters with another suitable number based on the study of their sexual hormones. The pink ticket is a necessary component of sexual encounters (and will be relevant for a portion of the analysis) as a number must bring and have their pink ticket 'punched' by the other number who had requested them and with whom they will have sex.

The work begins with D-503's first entry explaining the INTEGRAL, a ship OneState plans to send into space. OneState wants to fill the INTEGRAL with as many examples of its greatness with the intention of colonizing alien civilizations. Shortly after, D-503 meets I-330 and, through a series of events, I-330 begins to pull D-503 away from his love of OneState. First, she brings him to a pre-OneState complex and acts, as D-503 would call it, uniquely. Second, she requests D-503 as a sexual partner, but never has sex with D-503 during their pink ticket meetings. Third, I-330 has sex with D-503, but not on a pink ticket meeting¹⁵³. After this sexual encounter I-330 stops meeting with D-503 despite officially still filing pink ticket meetings. Eventually D-503 begins to slip away from OneState. He begins to dream, which is recognized as an illness in OneState, registered as ill accordingly, and informed that he is developing a

¹⁵³ This event will be visited a few times throughout the analysis chapters.

'soul'. Eventually, D-503 meets with I-330 once more, during which she brings D-503 beyond the wall (the wall is a structure built around OneState which separates it from the ruins of the pre-OneState conflicts), and it is there that D-503 meets with humans who do not live within OneState. This fact comes as a shock for D-503, as OneState had taught its subjects that nothing had survived the conflicts of pre-OneState, and thus nothing could exist beyond the wall. While outside the wall, D-503 and I-330 hatch a plan to take the INTEGRAL on its maiden voyage, and hope to stop OneState's spread into space. After this attempt fails, OneState begins to accelerate its plans to mobilize the Great Operation (an advanced form of lobotomy administered on the population to remove people's 'creativity') by rounding up its populace in waves. At this point, I-330's rebellion begins to attack OneState from within by refusing to adhere to its timetables for sex, sleep, and eating. However, in the end, D-503 undergoes the Great Operation and is 'cured' of his creativity and dreams. It is not stated whether OneState succeeds in its Great Operation over the population.

The second text under consideration, *Brave New World* (BNW) written by Aldous Huxley, follows the lives of Bernard Marx, Lenina Crowne, and Helmholtz Watson, but includes other major characters such as the world controller Mustapha Mond and the Director of Hatcheries and Conditions (DHC), Thomas. The controlling bureaucratic apparatus is never given an explicit name but is referred to as 'London', because there is no single ruler but are rather a collection of ten world controllers London may be the central component to Mustapha Mond's area of bureaucratic control. The primary mode of social stabilization utilized in BNW is the use of hatcheries, conditions, and soma. Soma is a psychopharmaceutical substance freely offered to the population in large amounts and is used universally as medication (similar to Prozac and Valium) and for recreational purposes (as alcohol would be used, and containing

visual effects similar to LSD but without consciousness changing properties). The population does not reproduce but is grown in facilities, often as bokanofsky groups for lower castes, such as Epsilon, Gamma, and Delta. This growth is carefully monitored and controlled, creating specific bokanofsky groups with specific measurements and capacities depending on intended caste. The subjects are conditioned through the methods shock therapy and sleep conditioning.

The text begins with the DHC giving medical students a tour of the hatchery and conditioning facility, and cuts between the tour, Bernard, and Lenina. Bernard is a stunted Alpha, many rumours surround why he has the body of a Delta, but none are ever substantiated. Bernard is deeply infatuated with Lenina and, on a date, attempts to break away from the sexual norms of society with intimacy and isolation which is quite upsetting for Lenina. Bernard then brings Lenina to a 'savage reserve'¹⁵⁴ where they meet John, who turns out to be the son of the DHC Thomas, and was born in the reserve after the impregnated partner of the DHC was lost on the trip the two shared years earlier. John immediately falls in love with Lenina, but continues to distance himself from her in his belief that he is not good enough¹⁵⁵. Knowing he will be exiled to Iceland upon his return, Bernard brings John to London, has Thomas humiliated, and becomes incredibly famous due to his ability to control access to John. Throughout this time Lenina becomes increasingly infatuated with John, who continues to avoid her advances, and Helmholtz begins to share poetry with John; despite poetry being strictly forbidden by the bureaucratic

¹⁵⁴ I want to take a moment here to address this term. This text was published in 1932 by an English author, and while the language is obviously inappropriate and racist, the language used must be placed within its historical context. Additionally, as is stated in a footnote in another chapter, the savage reserves contain no real Indigenous culture, but a hybrid of a fictionalized Indigenous culture and Christianity. It should be noted, that the use of a fictionalized Indigeneity hybridised with Christianity, points to the use of Indigeneity as a conduit for a more 'natural' existence. The reserve is primarily used to compare London to (what was likely) a more modern existence for the time of publication, including a focus on monogamous relationships, an aging population, marriage, and a decreased level of hygiene. So, while the language and misunderstanding of Indigeneity is not excused, it must be taken within the historical context of its use (including available and conventional language) and understood within the frame of this work along with the rest of it.

¹⁵⁵ This relationship will be continually revisited throughout the analysis chapters.

entity of BNW. Eventually, Bernard and Helmholtz are banished due to a public outburst which followed the death of John's mother, and John develops a hate for Lenina after she throws herself on him. John proceeds to live in isolation, where he is bombarded by London reporters and, eventually, following a great 'feelies' film¹⁵⁶ produced about his experience, he is overwhelmed by the daily encroachment of thousands of London citizens. John eventually hangs himself in the lighthouse in which he attempted to isolate himself from London, and it is assumed that the world is left unaffected by these events.

Summary

This chapter approached the ontological and epistemological rupture within literature studies with a limited comparative analysis of two key text, and, in doing so, has approached the role of the author in discourse theory, compared to the role of the author to authorship, and addressed the notion of agency. Additionally, is has given a comparative analysis, and presentation, of discourse from two primary texts within the development of the *generally theory of discourse*, and presented key mechanisms, functions, and developments within the methodological break of discourse theory from linguistics. Finally, the chapter presents, in concrete steps, the practice that will be mobilized in the theoretical analysis of the fiction texts which make-up the objects of analysis. In doing so, the analytical chapters can now be approached with a clear development of theory and praxis, which can be fused into one process during this work.

¹⁵⁶ These are films containing virtually no story, but are experienced through all the major empirical senses of the viewer.

Chapter 4: Subject Triangle and the Law of Proximity

Introduction

This chapter will begin the application of analytical data compiled during the analysis of the two works *Brave New World* and *WE*. I don't so, it will require the development of components of the semiotic theory of ideology which were not addressed in chapter two and will expand upon the discussion *The Order of Things*. This chapter has two points of inquiry: 1. How does a subject interact with their own conditions of existence? 2. How can one develop a form of analysis which does not produce either materiality or subjectivity as passive in this relationship? This will be accomplished by addressing material over-determination within the theoretical models of discourse theory and ideology discussed so far and will do so by: 1. Replacing the subject point within a general theory of discourse with the *subject triangle* and the *law of proximity*. 2. Conceptualizing the subject triangle as a *micro center* of power-discourse, which will be achieved by: 1. Expanding on active systems within the semiotic process of ideology in the *Ideostructs and Ideostems* section. 2. Expanding upon the mechanistic and functional differences between *Ideostems* and discourse in the section *Sign Scarcity and Sign Displacement*. 3. Laying out the concept of the subject triangle in the section *Subject Triangle*. 4. Finally, this chapter will push into a final thrust of its argument by bringing together all concepts discussed so far in the *Triangulating Relationship* section.

Ideostructs and Ideostems

This section will outline and describe the function and mechanisms of the ideostruct and ideostem in detail using findings through the observations gathered from the research object *Brave New World* and *WE*. This will be done by clarifying a theoretical problematic created

within chapter two of this work, specifically, the reconceptualization of ideostucts as organized *sign systems* rather than symbolic structures. Additionally, this section will address the theoretical differences between discourse and ideostems, primarily as material discourse and ideostuct constituting unfixed sign systems and will operate upon the mechanisms of sign scarcity and sign displacement. Finally, this section will outline the relationship between the two.

Ideostucts were referred to as symbolic structures in chapter two for simplicity in describing the functional basis for the semiotic process of ideology. However, this reference to symbolic structures produces two problematics which must be addressed: 1. The term ‘symbolic structures’ risks one returning to the realm of Žižek and Lacan’s Symbolic, which rests upon the process of representation and inversion of the image. In the example given in chapter two¹⁵⁷ of the inversion of the material representation of money as wealth, it is the abstracted image of money *as* wealth given to the symbolic which, in-turn, is inverted for the subject. 2. The conceptualization of symbolics does not attribute enough malleability to the subject, body, or object, and, therefore, is not as cohesive within a methodological or theoretical foundation rooted in a general theory of discourse. Instead, ideostucts must be addressed as organized sign systems that operate as the primary constitution of the subject point. These ideostucts are organized meaning clusters which remain partially fixed around a nodal point¹⁵⁸ until the process of reorganization is initiated within the semiotic process of ideology¹⁵⁹. It is the ideostem that creates the parameters of possible ideostuct (re)organization as it is the ideostem which is the limited field of rarified articulatory practises and utterances, under a conditions of sign scarcity, which offer the ideostucts their resources from which they may find partial fixation.

¹⁵⁷ See Chapter 2, page 21.

¹⁵⁸ See Chapter 3.

¹⁵⁹ Rather than working off the organization of representations.

To understand what is meant by organizing and organized sign systems it is first important to return, for a moment, to Foucault who conceptualized the sign¹⁶⁰ containing three primary qualities of the relation: 1. Certainty of Relation, being “a sign may be so constant that one can be sure of its accuracy... but it may also be simply probable”¹⁶¹. 2. Type of Relation, being “a sign may belong to the whole that it denotes... or be separate from it”¹⁶². 3. Origin of the Relation, being “a sign may be natural (in the sense that a reflection in a mirror denotes that which it reflects) or conventional (in the sense that a word may signify an idea to a given group of men)¹⁶³. Finally, it is important to note that “[the sign] can be constituted only by the act of knowing”¹⁶⁴. However, if one takes into account the quadrilaterals of language and the analytics of finitude¹⁶⁵, then it is the sign that is constructed with discourse, formulated with meaning, and “simultaneously an insertion in that which it signifies”¹⁶⁶. It is the function of discourse to formulate a system of signs, and then to *designate*¹⁶⁷ those signs upon the materiality that it is misrecognized as always-already the transcendental of meaning as a lost mark waiting to be ‘discovered’. This disrupts the signifier-signified relationship because the signified comes to be the signification of the representation it is misrecognised to be which comes to fill the space of signified, or, as Foucault puts it, “the picture has no other content in fact than that which it

¹⁶⁰ Of course, the concept of the sign has gone through many alterations since the revolutionary use by Saussure, but this work, unfortunately, does not contain the space to do such a genealogical approach to understanding the sign.

¹⁶¹ Foucault, Michel. *The Order of Things*, (London and New York, Routledge Classics, 2002), 64.

¹⁶² Ibid, 64-65.

¹⁶³ Ibid, 65.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, 65.

¹⁶⁵ See Chapter 3.

¹⁶⁶ Foucault. *The Order of Things*, 67.

¹⁶⁷ This word is chosen carefully, for it is the mechanism of designation which will come to be illustrated as a primary mechanism of the *designated object* in Chapter 5.

represents, and yet that content is made visible only because it is represented by a representation”¹⁶⁸.

However, there is a problem in Foucault’s statement, and this is the inversion of signifier and signified risks a return to the inversion of representation prominent in Žižek, Lacan, and Marx. It is in *WE* that this problematic can be addressed. In a key moment in the text D-503 has sexual intercourse with I-330, and does so spontaneously: “There was no pink ticket, no accounting, no *OneState*, there was no *me*”¹⁶⁹. To understand the impact of this moment it is important to recognize that the material discursive formations and articulatory practices of sex in *OneState* required: 1. An open sexuality in which “[a]ny number has the right of access to any other Number as sexual product”¹⁷⁰. 2. They give you a careful going-over in the Sexual Bureau labs and determine the exact content of the sexual hormones in your blood and work out your correct Table of Sex Days”¹⁷¹. 3. From there the subject is ascribed a regular sexual partner which is clarified by O-90 who states “[h]e’s assigned to me”¹⁷² when D-503 and I-330 first meet. What is expressed by D-503 during his intercourse and ejaculation with I-330 is that the articulatory sexual practice had removed *OneState* as the nodal point in his ideostructuring, as the reorganization of the subject-object relationship forced the ideostemic organization to alter his constituting ideostructuring. This reorganization also de-constituted the subject which *was* D-503, as his constituting base had altered.

¹⁶⁸ Foucault. *The Order of Things*, 71.

¹⁶⁹ Zamyatin, Yvgeny. *WE*, (New York, Penguin Books, 1993), 73. Italics added for emphasis.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 22.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid*, 22.

¹⁷² *Ibid*, 9. What this presents is the sexual discursive antagonism within *OneState*, in which the plural sexual relationships contain a logical contradiction to the primarily assigned relationship which operates as a monogamous relationship. This creates the space for jealousy and possession, something O-90 is presenting, and is another reason for the failure of *OneState*.

This malleable quality is also visible in *Brave New World* in which, during a tour of students through the Hatchery and Conditioning lab led by the Director of Hatcheries and Conditioning¹⁷³ (DHC), a student is asked by Mustapha Mond (a world controller) if he had ever had an “insurmountable obstacle”¹⁷⁴, to which the student answered that he “had to wait nearly four weeks before a girl I wanted would let me have her... [it was] horrible”¹⁷⁵. However, John (a resident from the ‘savage reserves’¹⁷⁶ brought back to London by Bernard and Lenina who are residents of London) experiences a horror when Lenina presents a sexual advance that is too early for him¹⁷⁷. In the case of John and the student in *Brave New World*, and the sexual encounter between D-503 and I-330, the larger material discourse is, at that moment, unchanged, and it is rather an individual subject position which contains an antagonism within their *constituting systems*. This antagonism troubles the general theory of discourse as covered so far¹⁷⁸, as it is not only an antagonism which exists *between* subject positions, also finding an antagonistic route *within a singular subject position*, and compounds pre-existing internal antagonisms present in the subject. In each case the subject is completely undone, and both moments become and anchor for a great upheaval of identity formation for D-503 and John.

¹⁷³ Huxley, Aldous. *Brave New World*, (Toronto, Vintage Canada, 2007), 1.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 38.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 39-39. While the language presented suggest a purely patriarchal sexist formation of femininity as an object to be had by men, it is important to note that the language of ‘having’ the other is also used by women, and present a discursive formation of bodies as shared property of the social body. Something that points to totalitarian discursive formations rather than strictly unilineal sexist ones.

¹⁷⁶ It is important to note, but outside the scale of this work, that the ‘savage reserves’ are fictional communities loosely based upon a hybridization of a fictional Indigenous culture and a Catholic culture. It is worth noting that these reserves are less a comment on Indigeneity, and, instead, operate as a medium for a naturalisation of liberalist discursive formations. It is important to note that any and all attempts to utilize Indigenous practices should be taken within the context of colonial racism at the time of publication.

¹⁷⁷ Huxley. *Brave New World*, 170-171. This moment will be discussed in Chapter 5 in the *Designated Object* section in more depth.

¹⁷⁸ See Chapter 3.

At this point a reader may ask: ‘How does this show internal antagonisms? There are multiple subject positions in play, and it is an antagonism which is formed through the articulatory practices of at least two subject positions!’ The constitution of a single subject position is dependant upon the interactions with the surrounding materiality and other subject positions; an immanent necessity with a semiotic model of ideology. It is important to note that, in both cases, the *other* (in the case of D-503 it is I-330, and in the case of John it is Lenina) is rarely (if ever) interacted with again. In the case of *WE*, D-503 finds himself spending most of his time waiting for I-330 due to recurring sex days she had registered with him¹⁷⁹, and during which they never meet¹⁸⁰. In the case of *Brave New World* John leaves London entirely and sets up a tiny farm outside of a lighthouse¹⁸¹. In each case the individual subject is altered through the inter-subject (position) interaction. The ideostem is reorganized through the subject-object interaction, guided by the limited field of the ideostem, and remains reorganized and antagonistic even when separated from the object that initiated the alteration. Additionally, the altered subject remains altered even if immersed with the now antagonistic material discourse¹⁸², or separated from any material discourse¹⁸³. This alteration remains *internal* to the individual subject position, and can also contain internal antagonisms, and may produce necessary antagonisms between subject positions.

Sign Scarcity and Sign Displacement

Ideostems and discourse are not two separate processes or mechanisms, but rather operate similarly and as one scaling process. In other words, an ideostem may not be referred to as

¹⁷⁹ Zamyatin. *WE*, 105.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, 114.

¹⁸¹ Huxley. *Brave New World*, 215-229.

¹⁸² In the case of D-503.

¹⁸³ In the case of John who lives in isolation after the events.

something separate from discourse which appropriates its effects, function, and goals, but rather operates as a “micro center” within power-discourse. This micro center of power-discourse operates as the most focused point, pinpointed on the discursive formation of a single subject, but still connected to larger discursive formations; a holistic single aggregate system rendered impossible without all of its components. This section will outline the scaling system of discourse and power¹⁸⁴ with observed data from the objects of analysis.

However, to begin I must address the claim of “scaling” discourse within Foucault’s work, and how a theoretical foundation incorporating Laclau & Mouffe’s general theory of discourse operates in this relationship. First, Foucault, identified “what might be called ‘local centers of power-knowledge’¹⁸⁵, in which a minimum¹⁸⁶ of two subject positions “were the vehicle of a kind of incessant back-and-forth movement of forms of subjugation and schemas of knowledge”¹⁸⁷. Secondly, he outlined that “[n]o ‘local center’, no ‘pattern of transformation’ could function if, through a series of sequences, it did not eventually enter into an over-all strategy”¹⁸⁸. The primary vehicle of movement and connection in this relationship is power, as “simply the over-all effect that rests on each of them and seeks in turn to arrest their movement”¹⁸⁹. It is power, then, that operates as both effect and process in the “attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre”¹⁹⁰. The connection between power and discourse, while being addressed, cannot be discussed in great length, but it is important to note that the power-discourse relationship must operate along the

¹⁸⁴ The latter will not be given much focus as it deserves due to the restraints on this work.

¹⁸⁵ Foucault, Michel. *The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction*, (New York, Vintage Books, 1990), 98.

¹⁸⁶ Implicitly.

¹⁸⁷ Foucault. *The History of Sexuality*, 98.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, 99.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid, 93.

¹⁹⁰ Laclau, Ernesto. & Mouffe, Chantal. *Hegemony and the Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, (London and New York, Verso, 2014), 98-99.

conditions created by discursivity, as it is discourse which gives meaning to forces and, thus, the capacity to be ordered. It is power that arises from this capacity¹⁹¹.

Discourse sets and alters boundaries of reality and possibility, and is clearly visible in *Brave New World* during the tour of students led by the DHC, when they come across the sleep conditioning of Beta children. Here one can see the use of utterances to create a limited field of thought and possibility¹⁹². However, the depth and effect of the discursive limitation of possibilities comes earlier, when the students becomes incredibly confused, disgusted, and uncomfortable by the words ‘born’ and ‘mother’, to which the DHC comments: “These are unpleasant facts; I know it”¹⁹³. Additionally, in the final meeting between Mustapha Mond, John, and Helmholtz when they are discussing art, it’s loss in the name of stability, and the attempt to incorporate art (specifically *Othello*) into the modern society of BNW, Mustapha states: “if it were really like *Othello* nobody could understand it, however new it might be. And if it were new, it couldn’t possibly be like *Othello*”¹⁹⁴.

Discourse operates with the same capacities within *WE*. The first example is visible in the first meeting between D-503 and I-330 during which D-503 describes an experience of ‘mental cross-over’ as the experience that “she said almost in my very words exactly what I’d been writing before going to walk”¹⁹⁵. This would only be possible if either the subjects are so similar

¹⁹¹ For an understanding of these forms of power see “*Essential Works of Foucault*” 332-336 for Pastoral Power (which is likely the primary form of power which *connects* the micro centers with the local centers), and “*Society Must Be Defended*” 239-245 for Sovereign Power, Disciplinary Power, and Biopower in that order (which can be linked to epistemic shifts found in *The Order of Things*). An in-depth analysis or genealogy is unfortunately outside the scale of this work but can be understood as an effect created through the conditions created by discourse, operating within it, in relationship to it, but neither being directly over-determined by one another for the means of this work.

¹⁹² Huxley. *Brave New World*, 22-23.

¹⁹³ *Ibid*, 19.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 193.

¹⁹⁵ Zamyatin. *WE*, 8.

they literally have the same thoughts or the discursive field is so fixed that the options to write *are so limited* that subjects cannot help but write and say the same things¹⁹⁶. However, it is not just the realm of action or *connaissance* that is affected by the limiting field of discourse, it is most importantly that of *savoir* which is visible in the moment D-503 begins to dream. For D-503 (and other OneState subjects), the dream is understood as a symptom of sickness: “It was clear; I was sick... in the old days it was the most normal thing to the world to have dreams... but today we *know* that dreams point to serious mental illness... up to now my brain has checked out chronometrically perfect”¹⁹⁷.

In both works it is in these moments that the ‘natural’ is opened up and one can see that the artificial becomes natural (dreams as illness and birth as unnatural)¹⁹⁸. To be more precise, the discursive formation of these subjects contain a recognition of nature that is so vastly different from what we would recognise as natural they we may perceive it as an ‘inversion’ of natural states, but there is no inversion or corruption; only a specific formation. This, as is known, is the primary function of discourse, the production and fixation of meanings, but there are two laws that have not been addressed: 1. *Sign displacement* of the over-all strategy of power-discourse. 2. The different effects discourse has upon the subject if they are *conscious* or *pre-conscious* of the events or effect. The effect of pre-conscious contact of discourse and body is prevalent in Lenina’s memory of waking up during her sleep conditioning as a child. The memory is triggered by her conversation with Henry Foster in which they are repeating common conditioned utterances to one another, but “Lenina suddenly remembered an occasion when...

¹⁹⁶ The subtle difference between these two will be addressed in a moment.

¹⁹⁷ Zamyatin. *WE*, 33. Italics added for emphasis on always-already mechanism.

¹⁹⁸ One may even insert taking of soma in BNW into the account, as the manufacturing and consumption of this artificial substance as a natural practice and state of existence.

she had woken up in the middle of the night and become aware, for the first time, of the whispering that had haunted all her sleeps... her first shock of fear and surprise”¹⁹⁹.

Sign displacement is visible by way of the totalitarian slogan introduced at the beginning of *Brave New World*, being: “Community, Identity, Stability”²⁰⁰. This phrase acts as the proposition²⁰¹ of discourse, as each word points to a primary discursive formation or set of articulatory practices relevant to those objects²⁰². 1. Community- the discursive formation of collectivity over individuality and the articulatory practices of socialization over solitude. 2. Identity – the discursive formation of each subject as is the primary target of totalitarian relationships of power and the discourse of each subject that occurs with the social body as the nodal point and ‘central other’ within the space set out in abstractive contact and the point misrecognized in ideo contact²⁰³. 3. Stability – the primary goal of fixity within discourse. The law of sign displacement takes effect in the reality that these discursive formations and articulatory practices are not *immediately present* for the subject, and that the distance between the proposition and *the rest of the material discourse’s totality* creates a moment in which the subject must rely on their own ideostemic field to connect²⁰⁴. In other words, each sign proposes a connection to another that may not be immediately present, and in the condition that *it is not* the connection between signs must be made within the ideostemic formation of the micro center of power-discourse.

¹⁹⁹ Huxley. *Brave New World*, 64. While relevant, the discussion regarding conscious versus pre-conscious relation to discourse and forces will be discussed in greater depth in the *Proxima* section of Chapter 5.

²⁰⁰ Ibid, 1.

²⁰¹ See Chapter 3.

²⁰² There are, of course, more complex ways to break down this slogan, but the point is to present the relationship between the slogan and the larger discourse.

²⁰³ See Chapter 2.

²⁰⁴ A good example in my own life is when I explained to my students that a hand sign that used to mean “a-okay” or “that’s good” is now incorporated into alt-right groups as sign for white power. Something that, while connected to a larger material discourse, finds itself relying upon the subject’s own ideostem to connect.

Conversely, the ideostem operates under the law of *sign scarcity*, and (as may be expected) exists in a differently organized state than its over-all strategy as it cannot contain the totality of discourse²⁰⁵. To ground this in an example, one must look no further than the moment in *Brave New World* when a little boy refuses to join in erotic play during the hatchery's outdoor playtime, and is brought to the attention of the DHC by a nurse who finds him²⁰⁶. It is at this moment that the name sign scarcity may initially misdirect the reader, as it is not necessarily that this boy has *fewer* signs in its ideostemic field regarding sex and sexuality than the girl, but that the scarcity of signs at the subject's disposal creates the conditions for the ideostructuring to differ due to the ideostemic field containing differing limitations and parameters than the larger discourse²⁰⁷. Sex and sexuality have taken on a new organization with which the subject of the boy misrecognizes, one in which erotic play (an articulatory practice proposed by *Community*) is experienced through the process of ideology and (once run through the ideostruct) experienced as negative²⁰⁸; and, thus, produces a different response in the physical movement²⁰⁹ stage.

By incorporating ideostems and ideostructs into ideology and a general theory of discourse two effects emerge: 1. The over-determination of individual subject positions by discourse is eliminated. 2. The over-determination of either subjectivity or materiality is eliminated due to the interactive and inter-dependant relationship that exists between the two. Firstly, in both works there's an over-all strategy²¹⁰, the never directly named social body

²⁰⁵ To put it plainly, as an English speaker I do not know every word, grammatical law, or use of English, and so my individual capacity to formulate connections will never *the exact same* as that of discourse's over-all strategy.

²⁰⁶ Huxley. *Brave New World*, 26.

²⁰⁷ However, the ideostruct and ideostem have the capacity to be just as complex.

²⁰⁸ It must be addressed that I cannot answer *why* this boy's ideostructuring is different, but this stems from the fact that the boy is presented very briefly; and that the experiences leading to this moment are never shown.

²⁰⁹ See Chapter 2.

²¹⁰ Often existing in a totalitarian organization, something which this works does not have the scope to fully explore.

controlled by the World Controllers in *Brave New World* and the OneState in *WE*. Secondly, there are micro centers of power-discourse, subject positions that operate as three relational points (subject, body, and object) rather than a single point, and, thus, contain mechanisms which produces a function far more complex than being a direct ‘abstraction’ of power-discourse. Thirdly, there are the local centers of discourse that bridge the gap and can operate as a single institution to a small clustering of subjects. These are witnessed in the works as the hatcher and conditioning labs in *Brave New World*, and sexual bureau labs in *WE*²¹¹.

In summary, the over-all strategy must operate upon the connection of sign and formation through the proposition, but this connection must be made *through* individual micro centers which create the conditions for variance and reorganization and destabilization. Finally, it is the role of the local centers to mediate this relationship, and it is the entire process which operates towards a final fixity. In short, the discursive formation varies from the micro center to the over-all strategy due to the differing constituting laws of sign scarcity and sign displacement, and the mediating local centers are the point in which sign variance is addressed between ideostems and discourse in the final goal of fixity.

The Subject Triangle

It is in this section, finally, that I can not approach the primary point which has been developed throughout this chapter, and that is the reconceptualization of the subject position within the general theory of discourse. The subject position must be understood as a micro center of power-discourse which contains its own function, mechanisms, and laws, and is organized into a relationship between three points. These three points are the subject, body, and

²¹¹ This list is not complete, but just examples of ‘enclosed’ local centers of power-discourse.

object/force; and it is a relationship which is mediated through the body. To do this I must also address a problematic existing in my language so far, being the use of ‘external-internal’. Since I have suggested that the semiotic process of ideology does not contain the subject, but merely facilitates its constitution, it is important to address what is meant by internal and external to the subject. To be brief, for an external force to act upon the subject it must use the body as its first point of contact (as is demanded by the moment of sensual contact²¹²), and, conversely, if the subject is to act upon materiality it must do so through the body (as is shown in the moment of physical movement²¹³). It is the body, then, which must act as the threshold of the ‘internal-external’ dichotomy, and this demands that the subject be internal to the body²¹⁴.

It is at this moment that one may be tempted to ask: ‘If the subject is internal to the body, then is it not a rational step to presume it is *of* the body, that the body is merely *disciplined* (as Foucault would argue), and the subject becomes the discursive artifact?’. To this I would reply, yes and no: 1. Yes because, as Foucault identified, “disciplinary techniques exercised upon the body have a double effect: a ‘soul’ to be known”²¹⁵. 2. No because, if the ‘soul’ or *subject* were in-fact an invert product of power-discourse then the over-determination of the subject would create conditions in which there would never be any diversion from the over-all strategy. This is a problematic Foucault tries to address by means of introducing resistance, but due to the return to material over-determination of subject formulation by power-discourse “it amounts to reaction

²¹² See Chapter 2.

²¹³ See Chapter 2.

²¹⁴ A sort of storage container, to be more precise, the subject acts as a sort of software. A filter which gives external forces meaning, limits the field of potentiality, and perceives itself as ‘pre-discursive’ and autonomous.

²¹⁵ Foucault, Michel. *Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, (New York, Vintage Books, 1995), 295. The primary critique I would like to raise to this point is that Cartesian Dualism (a separation of the soul and body) had already existed in social imagination almost 200 years before the shift into the new form of the prison and the Disciplinary power Foucault outlines in the 19th century. However, I do not have the space in this work to enter into a full critique of Foucault’s theory of power in-depth as there are differences between these two formulations of the ‘soul’.

more than action... worst case, it serves as a dynamic instance – a catalyst – for refining and improving the mechanisms of power”²¹⁶. For the semiotic process of ideology and the subject triangle is visible and, in this instance, it is the formulation of the subject through the body-force interaction. However, it is only possible for power to act *upon the subject* by obeying two laws: First, by acting upon the body and presuming that there is a ‘soul’ (or subject) to act upon, therefore producing the conditions for that which it presumes transcendental. Secondly, in the critique of Foucault’s over-determination of subject formation by power-discourse there is evidence of a need to address this over-determination. This may be accomplished through the ideo-material subject model and the subversion of the subject point with the subject triangle.

The relationship of the two laws outlined in relations to power’s attempt to act upon the subject can be illustrated by revisiting a moment in *Brave New World* that has already been mentioned: sleep conditioning. After the children and bokanofsky group made within the hatchery and conditioning facilities reach a suitable age they are brought, in their sleep, into labs playing repetitive normalizing statements to the sleeping children. The example presented to the reader is the conditioning statements use on Beta caste children which include utterances such as: “Epsilons are still worse. They’re too stupid to be able to read or write. Besides, they wear black... I’m *so* glad I’m a Beta”²¹⁷. This moment shows the body-force²¹⁸ relationship at work, but also abides by the laws of the subject triangle. One can see that, to act upon the subject, the external force must first make contact with the body, in the instance of sensual contact, and in

²¹⁶ Lemke, Thomas. *A Critique of Political Reason: Foucault’s Analysis of Modern Governmentality*, (London and New York, Verso, 2019), 116. Unfortunately, I cannot explore, in any real depth, a full analysis and critique of Foucault’s power process, but 109-118 of the cited material outlines a general critique which I am addressing in short.

²¹⁷ Huxley. *Brave New World*, 22.

²¹⁸ This example will be expanded further in Chapter 5, Page 95.

doing so constitute the subject²¹⁹. However, this action can only be achieved *if it is first targeting the subject* which is *presumed transcendental and already present*, as is visible when the DHC informs the students: “Til at last the child’s mind *is* these suggestions”²²⁰. His statement presumes that there is a ‘mind of the subject’ before discourse, when it *is* the subject which is the ‘internalization’ of discourse into the ideostemic organization of their constituting ideostructs, and discourse, in turn, is the ‘externalization’ of aggregate micro center ideostructs. It follows that the mind is *always-already* the discursive ‘suggestions’ presented in whatever form.

Discourse does not need to be so pointed, or, at the very least, utilized in such a way that it is administered in a laboratory in order for it to have a constituting effect. An instance of this in *WE*, where-in (during their first one-on-one interaction) I-330 takes D-503 to an old pre-OneState apartment building. Here, they take time exploring the ‘backwards’ lives before OneState, and it is during this interaction that two note-worthy instances take place. First, I-330 states that she loves the elderly women who they meet when entering the building, and follows by stating “one shouldn’t love ‘just because’ but ‘because of’”²²¹ which points to two things: 1. The ideostemic organization of the ideostruct of love within the micro center of the subject triangle. 2. The over-all strategy of the material discourse. I-330 does in-fact love ‘just because’, but is also aware of the antagonistic relationship this shares with discourse²²². This points to a discursive antagonism between the micro center and the over-all strategy. Additionally, when I-330 begins to act seductively without a ‘pink ticket’ D-503 begins to state, but is interrupted by

²¹⁹ Of course, this can be taken further, and I would argue for the material discourse to be constituted requires the physical movement portion of ideology to pivot outward ideological forces; a cyclical process without origin or end. However, that expansion of this work must be put on pause for another piece.

²²⁰ Huxley. *Brave New World*, 23.

²²¹ Zamyatin. *WE*, 27.

²²² However, notice that the awareness is not of discourse formulating the relationship, but an awareness the *she ought to* love ‘because of’.

I-330 who finishes the statement: “to be original means to distinguish yourself from others... to be original is to violate the principle of equality”²²³. This moment is an indication of a key component of the *subject triangle* which is lost with Foucault’s *The Order of Things* and Laclau & Mouffe’s *Hegemony and the Socialist Strategy*. This is due to the over-determination of materiality (or, at the very least, under-conceptualization of subjectivity). The *same* limited field of utterances can have a *different* effect upon various micro centers.

It is important to move beyond body-force relation and the subsequent constitution of the subject²²⁴. The subject triangle is a dynamic relationship of three points, rather than the unidirectional movement of constitution²²⁵, but the function of the body as mediator must be maintained. The first step is to outline the subject’s effect *on materiality*. Almost immediately following the interaction between I-330 and D-503 just discussed, D-503 is struggling to come to terms with his duty to report the actions of I-330²²⁶, and it is at this moment he is met by O-90 who becomes upset when he turns down her offer to go on their customary walks. D-503 reacts angrily:

Take your lily-of-the-valley, okay? Have a smell. Nice, right? Lily-of-the-valley smells nice... agreed. But you cannot say about smell – I’m talking about the concept of *smell* – that it is good or bad, right? That you cannot, repeat NOT, do, right? There’s the smell of Lily-of-the-valley, and there’s the nasty smell of henbane: They’re both of them smells.²²⁷

One can see an antagonism present in the micro center to which this rant indirectly gestures. The antagonism *internal* to the subject triangle has led to the subject to act upon the external

²²³ Zamyatin. *WE*, 30.

²²⁴ Althusser would call this interpellation.

²²⁵ As I have critiqued Althusser’s model of ideology. See Chapter 2.

²²⁶ Which he never does.

²²⁷ Zamyatin. *WE*, 37. While the contents of his rant are an interesting area of analysis, they contain little relevance to the subject triangle, and it is merely the fact *that he does become angry* in doing something so customary which are of relevance to the current discussion in this work.

materiality in a different way. D-503 rejects the walk he takes on a routine basis, and shots at O-90 for something that would now have bothered him before. The new external flows of ideological forces through physical movement are consequential of the body-force interaction being run through reorganized ideostructs in the proximal movement²²⁸ stage.

A clearer example of the subject-object interaction would be that of Helmholtz Watson in *Brave New World*. Helmholtz as emotional engineer²²⁹ (someone who writes statements to be used in sleep conditioning, ads, or film) who develops a growing need to express “a queer feeling I sometimes get, a feeling that I’ve got something important to say and the power to say it – only I don’t know what it is”²³⁰. This ‘queer feeling’ leads Helmholtz to eventually write poetry²³¹. Here two laws must once again be noted: 1. In order for the subject to act upon materiality it must do so through the body. 2. A subject triangle relationship, if constituted by the same discursive conditions, can act in an antagonistic²³² matter with the ‘external’ materiality. In other words, for the micro center of power-discourse to act upon the over-all strategy it must be done through the body and a local center. The antagonistic micro center ends in a different ideostemic organization of ideostructs from the external material discourse and, so, the process of ideology pivots material forces into ideological forces which²³³ then have continuous effects in materiality.

²²⁸ See Chapter 2.

²²⁹ Huxley. *Brave New World*, 194.

²³⁰ *Ibid*, 59.

²³¹ *Ibid*, 157.

²³² This must be antagonistically as, discussed in Chapter 3, antagonisms are the contradictions within the discursive meaning (logical) while oppositions exist as binaries in discourse. In other words, oppositions are actually *necessary* for discourse as it points to total discursive cohesion (right versus left) and uniform meaning, while contradictions produce logical malfunctions within discourse itself.

²³³ Would eventually be pivoted into material forces within materiality.

There is a single direction of action with the subject triangle which has not been discussed, being the subject-body interaction. This direction is exemplified by John when he lives alone at the lighthouse. For context, John is haunted by thoughts of Lenina's seduction attempt, and regularly experiences flashes of memories of that moment²³⁴, and in response to these memories John whips himself repeatedly on his back. It is important to note that, in order for the subject to act upon the body the body must be used as an active mediator. This has the complex relationship as, by the subject using an object (either an external object or a portion of the body such as a hand) there is a subsequent body-force interaction, which must run through the semiotic process of ideology, and in doing so potentially causes a reorganization of the subject's idestructuring. One might be tempted here to say: 'This sounds like a complicated way of saying the body acts upon itself, that this is all body-force interactions constituting a subject!' This would be a simplification in order to return to Foucault's original conceptualization of the subject of discourse, or Althusser's interpellation and ideology. There is a subject-object interaction mediated by the body, and a body-force²³⁵ interaction which is subsequently initiated by a force making contact with the body and initiating ideology with sensual contact.

Triangulating Relationship

Up until this moment, this chapter has discussed each concept as more or less separate and independent operations which, at times interact, but this is not the proper function of these concepts. It is in this final section that the observations surrounding the concepts subject triangle,

²³⁴ Huxley. *Brave New World*, 222-223. There is importance to this revelation that will be discussed in the next chapter during the section of the Designated Object.

²³⁵ The relevance to the distinction between subject-object and body-force relationships will be addressed in the designated object section in Chapter 5.

ideostem, ideostruct, and ideology will be brought together to be analyzed in motion with one another. In doing so, the inter-dependant relationships will be illustrated, and I will confirm that the categorical effect of separateness between ideostruct, ideostem, and subject triangle must be collapsed into one coherent process and flow. In other words, the ideostem and ideostruct must not be seen as two separate objects (one that organizes the other), but two states of the same sign reservoir. The ideostruct, then, is a sign system that has become partially fixed, while an ideostem is a sign system attempting *to fix itself along a new formation*, and the subject triangle, being a *law of proximity* between three necessary components of the micro center of power-discourse within the semiotic process of ideology.

The antagonism in a single point disrupts the entire subject triangle, and, thus, there is an antagonistic relationship between the micro center, local center, and over-all strategy. Once such example has already been noted in the last section, with the instance of Helmholtz writing poetry. The primary antagonism within the micro center that is Helmholtz is within the body, as he is larger and more agile than his other Alpha-Plus peers and has led to him being described as “a little *too* capable”²³⁶. With a single point of the subject triangle containing an antagonism the entire subject triangle subsequently exists in an antagonistic state (be it subject-body, subject-object, or body-force), and so Helmholtz acts upon materiality in an overtly antagonistic way and writes poetry²³⁷. A single antagonistic point within the subject triangle leads each relationship to operate antagonistically and with this new antagonism, which only exists within the micro center, the ideostemic organization finds the ideostructuring in a partial fixity that: 1. Differs from the local centers and over-all strategy. 2. *Contains* an antagonism which can be re-

²³⁶ Huxley. *Brave New World*, 57.

²³⁷ *Ibid*, 158. Here we can see Helmholtz reciting the written work to Bernard, and the two discussing the repercussions of the action.

articulated at the level of micro center and can be partially determined by inter-micro center relationships.

A notable quality of the subject triangle is that, while an antagonism throws the entire micro center into antagonistic relations, the original antagonism does not need to be altered or re-articulated. Instead, the articulation of any other two points alleviates the antagonism or can completely rid the micro center of the antagonism *without* altering the original state that triggered the antagonism. An example of this can be found in *WE*. D-503 has an antagonism at the point of his body in the form of his hands, which are large and hairy, that he describes as “some kind of stupid throwback”²³⁸. This produces an internally antagonistic subject triangle which gives I-330 access to reconfigure later in the text²³⁹. The antagonism is alleviated, or re-articulated, not by altering his hands, but by altering the ideostructuring of meaning of his hands. This is achieved when I-330 states that he “probably [has] a drop or two of that sunny forest blood”²⁴⁰, which reorganizes the ideostemic organization of meaning with regard to the visual sign of his hands registered through his constituting ideostructure in the movement of proximal movement²⁴¹. In other words, it is the subject-object relationship that mitigates the antagonism and occurs doubly through the body-force relationship which alters the subject point²⁴² at its constitutional level.

The re-articulation of D-503, while initiated between micro centers, is able to persist without those same micro centers, as it is a reorganization of the constituting ideostructuring of

²³⁸ Zamyatin. *WE*, 9. As the novel progresses it becomes clear that his ‘throwback’ is meant as ‘uncivilised’ or pre-OneState.

²³⁹ This will be discussed more in detail in Chapter 5.

²⁴⁰ Zamyatin. *WE*, 157.

²⁴¹ See Chapter 2.

²⁴² The dual effect mentioned here will be discussed in more depth in the *Proxima* section of chapter 5.

the subject point which mitigates the antagonism of the body point, and can be carried on independently. However, as can be seen with Bernard in *Brave New World*, this is not always the case, and sometimes the subject triangle re-articulation is dependant upon other micro centers. Bernard's body antagonism consists of being too short and slender for his Alpha position in society: "He stood eight centimeters short of the standard Alpha height and was slender in proportion. Contact with members of the lower castes always reminded him painfully of his physical inadequacy"²⁴³. Instead of correcting the body, or giving it new meaning as was the case with D-503, Bernard overcomes this antagonism through his relationship with John²⁴⁴ which constitutes him as a central figure²⁴⁵. The antagonistic subject triangle is only mitigated in relation to other micro centers, as it is Bernard as the external object²⁴⁶ in other subject triangle relationships which has acquired a new meaning, so, Bernard is dependant on John and their subsequent subject-object relationships to maintain the re-articulation of his subject triangle antagonisms.

At this moment, allow me to quickly note a finding which has been mentioned in this chapter but never addressed; the effect of an antagonism within the body, the mediating point of the subject triangle. The body antagonism of Helmholtz is a body too capable for its social role. D-503 has hairy hands. And Bernard's body is inadequate for its social role. These antagonisms have different effects on the subject point. On the one hand, Helmholtz and D-503 feel that *it is they* who are not right, and thus do not belong in the society in-which they live and otherwise deem as Utopian. On the other hand, Bernard feels that *it is he who does not belong and the other*

²⁴³ Huxley. *Brave New World*, 55.

²⁴⁴ The member of the savage reserve mentioned earlier in this chapter.

²⁴⁵ Huxley. *Brave New World*, 136. While it is not stated, it is witnessed as Bernard boasts about his sexual exploits to Helmholtz.

²⁴⁶ This external object is the *designated object* which will be outlined in Chapter 5.

*who is not correct*²⁴⁷, and it is he who lives (truly) in a dystopian world. The effect can be understood as a result of abstractive contact and ideo contact²⁴⁸ in ideology. When the body-as-object²⁴⁹ the subject becomes (de)centered towards the big subject, but the irregularity of Helmholtz and D-503 *distances* them from the artificial center producing an experience of not belonging.

One may question whether Bernard's experience is different since he also contains a distancing body antagonism like Helmholtz and D-503: 'Shouldn't he feel the same as them?'. This would be true, except the disassociated re-articulatory capacity of the subject triangle contains the same effect on the antagonising of articulatory practices. In other words, ideostructuring of the subject point, which may otherwise re-articulate the antagonism of another point, can also be inhibited by antagonisms of another point as well. For Bernard, it is the antagonistic ideostructuring of the subject point. As a member of the Psychology Bureau²⁵⁰, Bernard creates and implements the conditioning statements that are used in the sleep conditioning of children. This is illustrated when Lenina utters a sleep conditioned statement, as Bernard interrupts with the period of time and regularity which she has heard that utterance in her sleep²⁵¹. To be brief, the ideostructuring of Bernard's subject point brings him too close to the big subject thereby obliterating it. Consequently, the re-articulation necessary for the body antagonism against the artificial center is inhibited by the obliteration of the big subject inhabiting the center. In other words, Bernard's body antagonism distances him from the artificial center in abstractive contact but any attempt to re-articulate this antagonism is disrupted

²⁴⁷ Here one can insert Henry Foster, Benito Hoover, the DHC, or any other subject that 'belongs' in the society Bernard deems as wrong.

²⁴⁸ See Chapter 2.

²⁴⁹ In this moment the body is a *designated object*, a concept to be discussed in Chapter 5.

²⁵⁰ Huxley. *Brave New World*, 28.

²⁵¹ *Ibid*, 81.

by the obliteration of the big subject due to the extreme proximity determined in the idea contact²⁵² stage due to his subject idestructuring. The fixity of the ideostem as ideostem is disrupted through the conscious knowledge of the components of its ideostemic organization. This creates the experience ‘*I do not belong*’ (similar to Helmholtz and D-503) and ‘*the other is wrong*’. Therefore, when Bernard’s gloating about his newfound sexual exploits does not amaze Helmholtz, he returns to his body antagonism and, so too, his inadequacies.

One must not think that Bernard has somehow stepped outside of discourse or ideology, and must not be fooled into thinking that this proximity or ‘awareness’ of the artificial center somehow disrupts the *constituting capacity* of discourse and ideology. Despite being aware of the specific utterances involved, Bernard still misrecognizes the ideostemic organization of signs either natural or external to his ‘pre-social’ self. In other words, despite being aware of the utterances within discourse and his own constituting ideostems, he is still impacted by its effects. For example, when getting his travel permission for the ‘savage reserve’ signed, the DHC begins to speak inappropriately by talking about the remote past, to which “Bernard felt extremely uncomfortable”²⁵³ and is even able to identify *what* is making him feel discomfort²⁵⁴. In this moment, the ideostem is inhibited from achieving partial fixity as ideostem, which would otherwise give the subject-object interaction its constituting meaning by its restructuring of the ideostem, but is instead disassembled and turned inward upon the ideostem. Rather than feeling nothing or the same *kind* of discomfort a non-antagonistic subject would experience, Bernard’s experience is still mediated by the ideostemic organization, and *yet another* antagonism arises in which he becomes aware of his inability to ‘move beyond’ the experience. In fact, Bernard

²⁵² See Chapter 2.

²⁵³ Huxley. *Brave New World*, 82.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 83.

comes close to identifying free will as an illusion, as his entire identity formed and framed by the very phrasing he produces, but this would far too traumatic for the subject, and, instead, he is made uncomfortable by the DHC's actions *and* by the experience of his own discomfort. This all amounts to the inability to re-articulate his subject and body antagonisms due to the extreme oppositional distances of proximity from the center and its obliterated big subject; against which articulatory practices require to formulate meaning.

The constituting capacity of the ideostruct can be examined in both antagonistic subjects (Bernard) and non-antagonistic²⁵⁵ subjects (Lenina), despite the difference in awareness of the exact utterances and statements within discourse and ideostems, It is visible in the interaction between Bernard and Lenina on their first date, and is summarized by Lenina's continued need for reassurance that she isn't too 'plump' or 'pneumatic'. Which causes Bernard to internally comment on how she views herself as meat²⁵⁶. In fact, Bernard's irritation about the description of Lenina as 'plump' is something that bothers him from the start²⁵⁷. Here Bernard falls into the same ideological trap as Marx did: He views himself as somehow 'outside' ideology and believes he can 'rescue' Lenina from viewing herself in such a way. In fact, he attempts to do so on their first date by parking them²⁵⁸, in his flying car, over the ocean and attempting to pressure Lenina into doing an activity against her conditioning²⁵⁹. What is important to note²⁶⁰ is that Lenina does not view herself *as* meat, but instead as one *ought* to view a human according to her

²⁵⁵ This is not to be confused with compliance. As compliance is to denote a subject that acts *in accordance* with power, but this requires a subject that exists in cohesion (non-antagonistically) with their surrounding discursive environment. If Lenina is *compliance* it is first because the **does not** contains antagonisms which is what allows for her as micro center of power to act through *non-antagonistic* articulatory practices.

²⁵⁶ Huxley. *Brave New World*, 80.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 39

²⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 78.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 78-79. Here he attempts to make her do nothing, wait for sex, and try to get to know him on a deeper emotional level. All things which Lenina experiences as terrible and alarming.

²⁶⁰ For what the current topic of discussion is concerned.

ideostemic organization of her constituting idestructuring of sexuality and its close similarity to the material discourse of London. There is a disconnection between the two, primarily in the organization of their idestructuring. However, Bernard, despite knowledge of the condition statements, misrecognizes the constituting function of the ideostruc as a *masking* of Lenina's 'pre-social' self, and, instead, attempts to 'free' Lenina from this perspective. The reality is that freeing Lenina from this ideostemic organization of her constituting idestructuring would entail a total deconstruction of Lenina as a subject, and, as such, Lenina would no longer be 'Lenina'. The very subject she *is* is constituted on the foundation of the very thing from which he is trying to 'free' her.

Conclusion

Through the application of analytical data compiled through readings of the research objects *Brave New World* and *WE*, this chapter has approached its two primary points of inquiry by addressing critiquing, and expanding on the works on Foucault and Laclau & Mouffe. The points of inquiry addressed were: 1. How does a subject interact with its own conditions of existence? 2/ How can one develop a form of analysis which does not produce either materiality or subjectivity as passive in this relationship? This was approached through the reduction of over-determination found within the works of Althusser, Foucault, and Laclau & Mouffe by replacing the subject position with the subject triangle within the general theory of discourse and observing its operations through the law of proximity, and by expanding the subject into micro center of power-discourse within the work of Foucault.

Chapter 5: The Designated Object, Proxima, and Multi-Directional Movement of Ideology

Introduction

It is at this point that I will engage in the final thrust of my argument, being the observation of proxima and the multi-directional movement of ideology. To begin, this chapter will outline the *designated object* through various sections and will come to inhabit the object component of the object/force point within the subject triangle but, as will be seen, it is also a constituted product of each point. Afterwards, this chapter will address the concept of *proxima*, and will outline it as an a-signifying force with a specific set of tendencies and behaviours due to the discursive conditions it inhabits. It will be outline, in more depth, as that which gives discourse its movement. Afterward, this chapter will address a necessary additional stage of ideology, *interpretive movement*, and will outline it as the separation of the object/force point. Finally, this chapter will bring these elements together to outline the complex interweaving of stages and movements, the pivoting of material forces, and the definition of ‘force’. In doing so, this chapter will ultimately challenge the uni-directional movement of ideology as abstractive or materializing, defining it, instead, as a complex web of movements and contacts which make-up on system proliferated endlessly in an attempt to fix itself.

The Designated Object

To understand this, we must first return to Althusser and his theory of generalities, as well as to Žižek’s concept of the positive object. Althusser outline how something²⁶¹ comes through the elaboration of ideological facts (Generality I), through a system of knowledge production (Generality II), which produces it as knowledge (Generality III)²⁶², and thus produces

²⁶¹ Object, fact, practice, or anything else held within knowledge.

²⁶² Althusser, Louis. *For Marx*, (London and New York, Verso, 2005), 184.

knowledge through systemic work upon the ideological fact²⁶³. With this understanding, one can see that the self-evident quality of the fact is what allows this system to work into accepted knowledge. This is posited by Althusser as a move, through Generality II, from the abstract (Generality I) and to the concrete (Generality III)²⁶⁴. In other words, for an abstract force contained as an ideological fact to shift into a concrete object of knowledge, there must be a productive system to transform that object into knowledge. For Althusser, this separation of object and knowledge is the origin of ideologies²⁶⁵. As Althusser states, “[t]his break leaves intact the objective social domain occupied by ideologies”²⁶⁶.

Žižek discusses the positive object as the ideologically imbued object that operates with specific traits as to render the object immobile and thus visible²⁶⁷. There is a minimal gap between the real and the mode of symbolization²⁶⁸, it is due to this that these objects are pre-imbued with ideological meaning, and thereby serving as a mechanism of the fantasy. Positive objects conceal the inconsistencies of the fantasy²⁶⁹, since they present themselves to the subject as if to say ‘I have always been this way’, and alleviate any potential ruptures in the schism as the fantasy shifts with the unconscious subject. This positions an important shift for the ideomaterial subject as it challenges the unilateral movement of objects through generalities and contests the notion of the ‘pre-ideological’ nature of objects and conditions of existence.

The *designated object* operates in the following way: First, it is deconstructed upon sensual contact. Second, it is run through the process of ideology, where-in it may acquire new

²⁶³ Althusser. *For Marx*, 185.

²⁶⁴ Ibid, 186.

²⁶⁵ This opens discussion into his distinction between *General Ideology* and *ideologies*, but this work lacks the space to explore this distinction.

²⁶⁶ Althusser. *For Marx*, 13.

²⁶⁷ Žižek, Slavoj. *The Plague of Fantasies*, (London and New York, Verso, 2008), 110.

²⁶⁸ Ibid, 119.

²⁶⁹ Žižek, Slavoj. *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, (London and New York, Verso, 2008), 137.

structure once run through the subject's ideofields. Third, its shape is held as artificially static due to the Generality III of the object rendering it immobile and visible for the subject as its Generality I is deconstructed and reconstructed through the process of ideology. This artificial fixity contains two functions: 1. It prevents the subject from becoming disoriented through the constant (de)construction of everything within the body's sensory field. 2. It creates the necessary misrecognition of ideology and discourse, and so the subject mistakes the 'new' shape of the designated object as the pre-existing (newly 'discovered') shape. This can be seen when D-503 runs into S-4711²⁷⁰ and, only once noticing the 'S' on S-4711's badge does he realize "why from the very first he was connected in my mind with the letter S"²⁷¹. Of course, this is the 'retro-active' always-already function of ideology as described by Althusser²⁷² in which the Generality III of the designated object functions as to hold the object (S-4711) in static (in knowledge) as it is (de)constructed through the semiotic process of ideology, and renders the constantly changing and shifting object as static.

The designated object is not a solid object that exists separately in the material world, nor is it a purely metaphysical force which shapes the materiality by or for the subject. Instead, it must be recognized as the meeting point of the subject triangle since the designated object is a relational construction of the subject-body-force. A physical condition which the body produces alongside the qualities of an external material force which acts upon the body, and is then designated signified meaning by the subject. The impact had upon the subject by the designated object, then, contains a cooperative and dual importance for these three points as its shape depends on the specific traits and conditions of each point equally, and the outcome equally

²⁷⁰ In this instance the 'S' is a special alphabetic identification as a subject of OneState who is also a 'guardian'; being their form of police and state enforcement.

²⁷¹ Zamyatin, Yvgeny. *WE*, (New York, Penguin Books, 1993), 35.

²⁷² See Chapter 2.

shapes each point. In other words, upon the moment of sensual contact, when the external force is deconstructed by the points of bodily senses and the marks sent through the process of ideology the designated object acquires a shape dependant upon all three points of the subject triangle: 1. The subject's ideostructuring. 2. The body's capacity to interpret stimuli²⁷³. 3. The external force²⁷⁴.

For Althusser, the relationship of generalities is a more or less unidirectional process by which the 'abstract' of Generality I is transformed into the 'concrete' of Generality III²⁷⁵, and is accomplished through Generality II, the system of knowledge production, and produces the boundaries of its study²⁷⁶. This model can be brought into the field of discourse to better understand when Foucault states "language exists in the *gap* that representation creates for itself"²⁷⁷, a process that becomes inverted within the epistemic transformation from classical to modern²⁷⁸. The movement from Generality I to Generality III is not just a unidirectional movement of the abstract through Generality II to concrete, but is, rather, a relationship of signification that exists wholly at the same time. In other words, the designated object exists all at once in the state of Generality I and Generality III, and it is the former which exists as a collection of paradigmatic signifiers and the latter which is the collection of designated signs. The dual signification is a necessary outcome of the relationship of sign scarcity and sign displacement within the micro center and local centers of power-discourse.

²⁷³ If two subjects hear the same stimuli, but one body contains a lowered capacity to interpret audible stimuli, the result is that the same external force will have different effects upon these two bodies.

²⁷⁴ Including intensity, vigour, and the general abstract shape which cannot be approached outside of discursive formations or as anything other than a designated object.

²⁷⁵ Althusser, *For Marx*, 187.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid*, 184. This includes purpose of study, the surrounding scientific field which designates a specific range of possible findings and researcher preconception, and the presupposed end which is determined by the two.

²⁷⁷ Foucault, Michel. *The Order of Things*, (London and New York, Routledge Classics, 2002), 87. Italics added for emphasis.

²⁷⁸ See Chapter 3.

Subversion, Alteration, and Multi-Signification

The first mechanism of the designated object, the subversion (designation) of the abstract, raw, incoming material force (Generality I) by its sign cluster of concrete static shape (Generality III) is a necessity constituted by the law of interaction within the ideo-material subject model: 1. The subject cannot interact with anything other than designated objects, as they exist *discursively*. 2. The body cannot interact with anything other than raw forces, as they exist as *a-signifying systems*. 3. The designated object's shape is dictated by the ideostructuring of the subject which is determined by the sign scarcity immanent within its ideostems. There is a moment in *WE* when D-503 goes to an auditorium to meet I-330 who is a part of a presentation on music which existed before OneState²⁷⁹, and during which she plays a grand piano. It is the change in D-503's reaction to the music, to be covered in more depth momentarily, that is most relevant to the concept of the designated object. Additionally, just prior to *Brave New World's* key scene in which Lenina attempts to seduce John, John tells Lenina "[o]h, you so perfect so perfect and so peerless are created of every creature's best. That's why I wanted to do something first, I mean, to show I was worthy of you"²⁸⁰.

In each instance one can see the subversion of incoming material forces as designated object, first in the grand piano (in the case of D-503) and Lenina (in the case of John). In the case of the grand piano the pre-designation of the material force as a designated object is accomplished in two ways: First, the relationship between the micro center and over-all strategy is mediated through the inter-micro center articulations that aggregate the local center mediation. In this case, it emerges through the announcer's description:

²⁷⁹ Zamyatin. *WE*, 17-19.

²⁸⁰ Huxley, Aldous. *Brave New World*, (Toronto, Vintage Canada, 2007), 166.

... Simply by turning this handle, any one of you can produce up to three sonatas per hour. And how much labor such a thing cost you ancestors! They could create only by whipping themselves up to attacks of ‘inspiration’ – some unknown form of epilepsy. And here I have for you a most amusing example of what they got for their trouble – the music of Scriabin, twentieth century. This black box... was called a ‘grand piano’, or even a ‘Royal Grand’ which is merely one more proof, if any were needed, of the degree to which all their music...”²⁸¹

Second, D-503 must rely upon the idestructuring of ‘his’ subject point to understand *what it is* he is seeing and hearing²⁸². In the case of John and Lenina, John’s reaction is elicited by a special *quality* contained by the designated object known as Lenina in John’s subject point and highlights to mechanisms: 1. Sign Scarcity²⁸³, which is visible as Lenina is not particularly beautiful or incredible as according to London standards (a standard Beta), but it is through the registration of Lenina as the designated object for John that she becomes something *else*²⁸⁴. 2. The sight of Lenina, her smell “scent in his nostrils of musky dust – her real presence. ‘Lenina,’ he whispered. ‘Lenina!’”²⁸⁵, and other signifiers deconstructed in sensual contact are clustered as the designated object.

In both these examples the designated object alters drastically²⁸⁶, which will highlight the second shifting quality of the designated object as well as the function of Generality III in keeping the object static for the subject through its (de)construction. When D-503, surrounded by the other members of OneState, receive the presentation of the grand piano by a “phonelecturer... with his golden loudspeaker”²⁸⁷, D-503 finds “it suddenly struck me that

²⁸¹ Zamyatin. *WE*, 17-18. This is the complete quote, D-503 loses focus at the end.

²⁸² The importance of this will be illustrated in a moment.

²⁸³ See Chapter 4.

²⁸⁴ Perhaps to be more precise, Lenina is *designated* a quality possible only due to John’s subject point ideostemic state. This quality is moving to desire, but the designated object and desire will be outline in more depth later in this chapter.

²⁸⁵ Huxley. *Brave New World*, 124.

²⁸⁶ As will be illustrated shortly.

²⁸⁷ Zamyatin. *WE*, 17.

everything was empty, an empty shell”²⁸⁸. In this moment the subject point of D-503 is altered, and, so, when he begins to hear the sound of the piano played by I-330 he finds that he does not laugh at the sounds of the music as a majority of the surrounding population does²⁸⁹. It is not until D-503 witnesses a spit bubble pop on the mouth of another number that he is ‘snapped’ into the appropriate subjective position, at which point he too begins to laugh at the music played by the piano²⁹⁰. In *Brave New World* Lenina, wearing a seductive outfit, throws herself at John, and attempts to initiate sex which, for her, is a conventional practice. The effect this action has is to alter the designated object of Lenina for John, shifting her from pure into a “whore... impudent strumpet”²⁹¹. In both cases the designated object has changed, but, for the subject, it is a ‘(re)discovery’ of a state which it had always-already been. This is the primary function of the designated object as the Generality III binds the shifting meaning of the Generality I in an artificially stable form for the subject.

Designated Object and Desire

This section will outline the formulation of desire for the designated object as shared coordinates between the ideostemic organization of the subject idestructuring and the organization of the designated object in its partial fixity. In other words, the subject finds the designated object desirable due to *shared sign coordinates* between the subject point fixity and the designated object’s fixity²⁹². This section will show that the subject’s desire for the designated object arises from the idestructuring within the micro center and the partial fixity of

²⁸⁸ Zamyatin. *WE*, 17. It is important to note that this sudden experience follows an interaction with I-330 which has already begun to later the state of D-503’s subject point.

²⁸⁹ Ibid, 18.

²⁹⁰ Ibid, 19.

²⁹¹ Ibid, 170-172.

²⁹² A man desires a woman as that designated object ‘links up’ with the idestructuring of the observer’s sexual ideostruct, and creates the image of a ‘proper’ or ‘perfected’ feminine body/behaviour.

the designated object through the relationships between: John and Lenina in *Brave New World*. D-503 and I-330 in *WE*. Furthermore, due to the many conceptualizations of desire within extensive debates regarding it, desire is operationalized for analytical purposes in this work as the *subject's identified origin of motivation for action within the physical movement stage of ideology*. Desire is often pre-identified in the ideo contact stage.

As has been discussed, John had fallen in love with Lenina from the moment he had met her in the 'savage reserves' and it was not until he had found her unconscious in the rest house that the prohibition of *his* desire takes effect²⁹³. This is not because it is the natural state of desire but *because John had been ideostemically primed around desire as prohibition*²⁹⁴. However, as Lenina states, this prohibition of desire by John, which troubles her articulatory practices regarding sexuality does create intense infatuation: "he's the one I want... I can't help it"²⁹⁵. Lenina's intensifying desire for John may seem linked to its prohibition, but the primary underpinning of both John's *and* Lenina's desire is the experience of *new desires* when in contact with *new external forces* which neither had come in contact with until that point. In the case of John, he had never come into contact with a white woman created to fit a certain high standard of beauty, and in the case of Lenina, she had never come in contact with practices of *waiting* before.

John, a micro center which has ideostructures and practices of sexuality as monogamous and restrictive, which imposes the prohibition on himself *only after* he acquires desire for Lenina, because *this is the ideostructuring of his desire*. It is true that Lenina developed an intensified desire for John because of his prohibition; this type of restriction is something is non-

²⁹³ Huxley. *Brave New World*, 124-126.

²⁹⁴ Ibid, 113-115. Here we see John discover Shakespeare, and it is around Shakespeare that John's ideostructuring are formed, and it is a poetic language of love *which is always prohibited and never acquired*.

²⁹⁵ Ibid, 164-165. There is more within the conversation, but it is too long to fit within the body of this work. However, one can see that Lenina is experiencing an intensification of desire for John.

existent and unbearable for *this specific subject formation*²⁹⁶. However, that amplification of desire may have two explanations: 1. A new set of incoming material forces from a novel designated object drenched in exoticism creates *new effects* in the micro center and in the physical movement stage of ideology. 2. Lenina is already structured as a subject who desires those who exist in a distant proximity from the center²⁹⁷, and so John as a designated object would be desirable. After all, it must be noted how John's sexual exploits are never addressed within *Brave New World*, which suggests (due to his idestructuring) that there may be others who would wish to have sex with him and that he simply would not. Others are not shown to have the same obsession as Lenina²⁹⁸.

As was shown in chapter four, the sexual encounter between D-503 and I-330 *precedes* the prohibition of the encounter between them. The effect of the sexual encounter is in the removal of OneState as the nodal point of the ideostemic organization of his idestructuring, and is accomplished through the removal of the 'pink ticket' in the sexual articulatory practice. The reorganization of D-503's constituting ideostemata reformulates around a new nodal point of OneState into an ideostructured state of sexuality of partial fixity around the nodal point of OneState into an ideostructured state of sexuality partially fixed around I-330, because of this he does not desire O-90 simply because of his ideostemic reorganization and O-90's sexual connection with OneState. In both cases, Lenina and I-330 are not abstracted representations of the real, but are organized sign clusters which subvert the incoming material forces. This is how I-330 changes from an object of hate into an object of desire for D-503. This occurs because of

²⁹⁶ Huxley. *Brave New World*, 35 & 38.

²⁹⁷ Ibid, 38. Here Lenina voices the option to go on a date with Bernard, and Fanny's reaction of how terrible that is.

²⁹⁸ This experience is never explored, but is the only logical extrapolation of events when understanding John as a subject.

the shifting quality of the designated object and changes in the idestructuring of D-503. It is the same for Lenina's shift from object of desire to an object of hate for John.

Proxima

At this point I can now begin to consolidate everything discussed so far into the final argument of this thesis regarding proxima. What I will call proxima is a force that finds itself as an underpinning force in discourse as the tendency of movement within discourse. It is a force that has visible tendencies within very model of discourse and ideology discusses so far, and its inescapable outcome due to the constituting basis of the field of difference; which now constitutes its own reproduction. These tendencies are two-fold: 1. To bring everything that is captured within knowledge to a single point, a universal sign and, 2. The proliferation of signs through the categorization of knowledge. This occurs due to its foundation of the field of difference. As an attempt to bring all that can be together as *that which is*, it proliferates knowledge as *those which are*. If discourse contains object of meaning, proxima is what gives these objects within discourse *movement*.

To begin I will outline proxima on its own terms, before it is worked into everything discussed so far, by discussing where I had originally noticed this tendency in action. I began the development of the concept proxima as a force during a reading of Foucault and Laclau & Mouffe. In the work *The Order of Things*, Foucault outlines the workings of similitude in the classical episteme²⁹⁹, which contained tendencies to bring all things to a single point, ordered knowledge through orientation and proximity, and produce mobility. This tendency continues through *The Order of Things* in two ways: First, the quadrilaterals of language³⁰⁰ act s the

²⁹⁹ Foucault. *The Order of Things*, 19-27. This contains Foucault's primary breakdown of similitude.

³⁰⁰ See Chapter 3, page 41.

driving force that both disrupts and reconfigures the signs it will come to name. It then circulates the signs around a center, the point which is targeted by the proposition. 2. The analytics of Finitude³⁰¹ attempts to bring all that can be observed into a single process of observation which pulls the empirical together out of its difference from the metaphysical but proliferates the observable through differences observed. This trend is also observable in his later works, specifically in the relationship between biopower³⁰², disciplinary power³⁰³, and pastoral power³⁰⁴, as the attempt to bring all life together into a single observable point and sign, population. This organizes the proliferation of bodies and subjectivities.

Proxima is also prevalent in the thought of Laclau & Mouffe in *Hegemony and the Socialist Strategy*³⁰⁵, and is the intention to bring all signs into moment through articulation while displacing these signs as elements into the field of discursivity. In other words, proxima is visible in discourse as the constituting *intention* to bring all signs together as moments into a fixity, but it contains the tendency to displace these signs into the field of discursivity due to the subsequent antagonisms form the field of difference in which the signs exists. Accordingly, the intention and tendency of proxima gives discourse its movement and *capacity* of fixation, but it also eliminates any possibility of success. In a way, one can see the currents of the oceans at work as, if discourse is the physical conditions in place, then it is proxima that attempts to bring

³⁰¹ See Chapter 3, page 42.

³⁰² Foucault, Michel. *Society Must be Defended*, (New York, Picador, 1976), 239-255. The former half of this short piece outlines the underlying logics of Foucault's thought on biopower.

³⁰³ Foucault, Michel. *Discipline & Punish*, (New York, Vintage Books, 1995), 135-194. This section contains Foucault's primary focus on disciplinary power.

³⁰⁴ Foucault, Michel. *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984: Volume Three*, (New York, The New York Press, 2000), 326-336. The former half of this piece discusses pastoral power in its most important components.

³⁰⁵ Laclau, Ernesto. & Mouffe, Chantal. *Hegemony and the Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, (London and New York, Verso, 2014), 97-132. The chapter 3 of this work contains the bulk of their theory of general discourse.

together hot and cold, high and low, and which displaces itself in constant motion in the attempt and it is that motion which forms momentums that, now, constitute themselves.

This tendency can be found in models of ideology as well. Proxima may be understood as the attempt to bring the subject closer to their artificial center, from which it is none-the-less distanced because of its difference from that center³⁰⁶. Ideology contains a center to which all subjectivities strive to bring themselves into closer proximity only to find themselves further from it than before due to their necessary difference from that center. For ideology, proxima is the inescapable tendency produced when the self and the other are identified as *separate entities* within one process of constitution and formation, as the distinction of concrete from abstract and the origin from the force. It is the fantasy turned nightmare as it is the subject runs toward to the center, trapped in place, and only to watch the center become further, more obscure, with time. Once the *'I is separated from 'us'*, the conditions of difference and proximity set in motion an unstoppable force which contains a gravity pulling all things towards a center, a force which disrupted upon the formation of the subject and away from which meaning is pulled towards either the self or other.

Proxima simultaneously produces the capacity for the totalitarian subjectivities found within *Brave New World* and *WE* and also that which hinders the ultimate perfection and fixation of this subjectivities. In *Brave New World*, the social body is presented as collapsing difference since "all men are physico-chemically equal"³⁰⁷. However, this attempt of proxima (within the conditions offered by discourse) to bring the entirety of the social collective into a single equal

³⁰⁶ This can be the 'capital S subject' for Althusser, or the 'Big Other' for Žižek.

³⁰⁷ Huxley. *Brave New World*, 63.

point is antagonistic towards articulatory practices of growth stunting³⁰⁸ and sleep conditioning³⁰⁹, which operate on the basis of separation by difference manifested in the designed qualities of the caste system held in knowledge. It is this same force which would produce the conditions for Bernard's dual proximity to the artificial center, and is one that other forms of power (such as in Foucault's work) would begin to make manifest. If discourse is the condition for signs themselves, proxima is the mobility of these signs that produce discursive object. It is power that operates *upon those discursive objects*. It is the force which renders Bernard's attempt to find *resemblance* to the social body in the solidarity service³¹⁰ (a ritual in which a group attempt to dissolve their individual identity through soma and music) possible in action. But it also renders it impossible in finality due to the inevitable difference upon which any notion of resemblance is based. Even if all people are physio-chemically equal, they are not all *actually* equal. Even though Morgana is physio-chemically equal to Fifi and Joanna³¹¹, it was "Morgana! Ford! Those black eyebrows of hers – that *eyebrow*"³¹², what marked her as different. In principle they are equal, pulled to the center, but separated in difference. They are pushed apart by the field of differences upon which their identity stands.

Proxima offers D-503 the capacity to be "[not] *one* but only *one of*"³¹³. His distance from the one is established by the difference of his "monkey's hands"³¹⁴. What constitutes the social body of OneState is its capacity to act as one: "we get up, millions as one, *as though* we were

³⁰⁸ Huxley. *Brave New World*, 10-11. Here Henry Foster describes the process of restricting oxygen levels to lower caste and heat conditioning of specific would-be workers.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 16-17.

³¹⁰ Huxley. *Brave New World*, 67-74.

³¹¹ *Ibid*, 69. Here Bernard is contemplating the differences in the women around him, and his regret as to where he decided to seat himself.

³¹² *Ibid*, 69. Italics added for emphasis.

³¹³ Zamyatin. *WE*, 8.

³¹⁴ *Ibid*, 9.

one". This statement contains the key to misrecognition within ideology and discourse. The unending centripetal force within the discursive conditions continuously is stemmed by separation and distinction of each as separate. Each body in that population targeted by power³¹⁵. Proxima is visible in the contradictory attempt by OneState to reduce individuality by replacing names with numbers, but then requiring unique *individual* numbers for each body. This is the contradictory movement of power between micro center, local center, and over-all strategy that tried to homogenize discourse into a total fixity and the ultimate obliteration of it as it reaches further into the depths of discursivity to find, and assemble, its separate components into a universal and homogenous structure.

However, proxima does not operate as one force along the entirety of discourse. Rather, as a force constituted by discourse, and fragments into separate forces in the micro center, local center, and over-all strategy. Each micro center, each subject triangle, containing *the* proxima force, but not as one; not *a* proxima force. This is because of the polysemy quality of the designated object, the sign scarcity of the ideostem, the sign displacement of discourse, and the enclosure of discourse and power in separate centers and concentrations³¹⁶. Within each micro center ideology contains points of contact, but it is proxima that offers the breath of movement through each other. Each stage of contact within ideology opens up capacities offered by the conditions of discourse, but it is proxima that offers the *mobility* of the signs to *move* from on stage and formation to the next. When one states that signs move from abstractive contact and

³¹⁵ Discourse, here, is the conditions by which forces are given meaning. It is proxima, then, which gives these meanings their *mobility* allowing them to be reorganized and fixed (giving the body the *capacity* to be timetabled). It is power which produces, disciplines, and limits the field of possibilities along that timetable.

³¹⁶ Here being the micro/local center and over-all strategy.

brought together through proximal movement it is due to the immanent proxima that his simultaneously can, and must, occur.

Additional Stages of Ideology

There is one continuous problematic within the model of ideology, including my own, as discussed so far. This problematic is the *unidirectional movement* of ideology (and discourse³¹⁷) and the over-determined models that follow from it. For Althusser, interpellation operates as a single movement of abstraction to produce subjects by action. For Žižek, it is the abstraction of the real as image, the inversion of the representation, and the subsequent materialization of the fantasy. For Foucault, there is the abstraction of subjectivity by practice. Laclau & Mouffe present a model in which subject positions are always determined by their surrounding subject positions and discursive field. These over-determinants must be addressed within my semiotic model of ideology. The ideo-material subject model works toward eliminating the over-determination of subjectivity by materiality, discourse, and power, and materiality by subjectivity; but one cannot rest at utility.

There is a moment in *Brave New World* in which Lenina remembers when she woke up during her sleep conditioning as a child. Henry's repetition of the utterances summons forth the memory of waking up during the conditioning in that exact phrase, which, interestingly, regards to the role of Epsilons (orienting her Beta role towards Epsilon subjects). The effect this has on her conditioning may also be the route of an antagonism that leads her to find Bernard (an Alpha who bears a physique of the lower castes) desirable, unlike everyone else in her caste level.

³¹⁷ See Chapter 4. This has already been addressed, as it was conceptualized as the distillation of the over-all strategy into disciplining bodies in local center, the theorization as subjects as the abstraction of power-discourse, and the subsequent over-determination.

However, what her fear and subsequent antagonistic behavior following this moment suggests is the differing effect discourse has upon the subject, either consciously or pre-consciously.

It is here that one can come to address a stage of ideology not yet discussed, being *interpretive movement*, that runs counter to proximal movement. The proximal movement stage describes the movement of ideological forces (recently pivoted against the constituted center of abstractive contact). Interpretive movement moves signs (and only discursive material) from the sensual contact stage to the ideo contact stage. In other words, interpretive movement describes the movement of signs which the subject is *consciously aware* from sensual to ideo contact, as it is the movement of signs from its initial contact with the body to the *already constituted* subject that then run through proximal movement (and potentially reorganize ideostructs) into abstractive contact. It is a sort of shortcut. Rather than signs moving from sensual contact through abstractive movement, they move directly from sensual contact to ideo contact. The *constituted subject* comes to *consciously integrate* the signs offered into their ideostructuring. This may alter their artificial center or misrecognized identity. Of course, this operates within a great deal of misrecognition, and, rather than the subject thinking “how is the basis of my identity being altered by this at the fundamental level of knowledge and experience?”, instead it asks, “what do *I* think of this?”. It is that illusionary ‘I’ which perceives itself as *in control* of the restructuring capacity of the incoming signs, but instead is in *full experience* of the process. However, ideology *masks its process* through misrecognition as being *in the subject’s control* because awareness that the subject is merely *aware of the process of their own remaking* would be catastrophic to the subject.

It is here I must address something stated earlier³¹⁸ in that Lenina's experience with sleep conditioning was body-force. With interpretive movement introduced I can now correct this problematic introduced earlier. The use of interpretive movement illustrates the immediate dual movement of ideology as the separation of the *words spoken* from the speakers as being run from sensual to ideo contact as a subject-object interaction, and *the sounds of the voice* from the speaker being run from sensual to abstractive contact as a body-force interaction. Both occurring at the same time, the interaction of forces and body constitute Lenina as a subject in relation to a center and setting, but it is the signs run through interpretive movement that target Lenina (as an *already* constituted subject) directly.

Revisiting re-articulation of D-503's hands by I-330³¹⁹ illustrates this point. In that moment D-503 is not *just* interacting with the designated object of I-330, the apartment, or any other force in his vicinity designated as object, but neither is he *just* experiencing the body-force relationship of I-330's voice. It is an active movement within ideology along each axis of the subject triangle. First, there is the body-force interaction (the sensual contact deconstruction of each force's mark and containing that constituting surplus-enjoyment). Second, there is the additional interpretive movement of I-330's *words* (not her voice, but the signs) which impact D-503 as an *already constituted subject* but which *still contain reorganizing capacity* of proximal movement. However, it is in this moment that D-503 comes to believe that *he* has changed *his own mind* on his hands based on what he has learned. This highlights the misrecognition of ideology. It is the interpretive movement of ideology through which D-503 misrecognizes the active reorganization of his ideostructs as an active conscious 'rationalization' of the words of I-

³¹⁸ See Chapter 4, page 67.

³¹⁹ See Chapter 4.

330. However, there is an additional effect (as mentioned earlier), and this is the body-force interaction of D-503 and I-330's voice; the sign of which comes designated as a portion of I-330 as designated object.

It is here that one may view another, much deeper process, and it is one that also alleviates the initial problematic of the object/force point in the subject triangle. To view this one must look no further than the self-whipping performed by John near the end of *Brave New World*: "The whip hanging on a nail by the door... In a frenzy [John] ran back to the house, seized it, whirled it. The knotted cords bite into his flesh"³²⁰. This is a dual event occurring simultaneously as subject-object and body-force, both of which are mediated through the body. In this moment John is acting as a point of power as he uses an object to act upon himself through the body (once again power must act upon the body *presupposing there is a subject to act upon*), but at the same time the body breaks down the sensation in sensual contact to settle the surplus-enjoyment which is neither whip nor body. So, there are two relationships within the subject triangle that initiate two difference movements in ideology. But there's also a sort of 'hanging stage' of physical movement. In this scenario physical movement is directing the momentum of the ideological forces back towards the body, from ideo contact to sensual contact (rather than connecting ideo contact and materiality). This is experienced (by the body) as incoming material forces but is also directed towards the subject and experienced as *contained ideological forces*. In this situation, there is a charging of ideological forces *due to its inability to escape the micro center*, a sort of intensification of force related to a designated object (in this case it is Lenina), which further transforms the quality of the designated object and the

³²⁰ Huxley. *Brave New World*, 223. What is most interesting, and the problem for the writing of this event, is that using language to describe this relationship *designates* the force as object (within discourse), and dissolves the raw *force* I am trying to express.

subsequent desire for that object. Therefore, when John sees Lenina one last time, he attacks her. The trapped ideological forces explode forth into materiality with explosive intensity once finally allowed a release from its closed circuit within the micro center.

Ideology and Forces

Force is best explained through an example given by Laclau & Mouffe:

An earthquake or falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether there specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomenon’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’, depends upon the structuring of a discursive field³²¹

This describes what is meant by ‘material force’ in this thesis. It is the ‘raw material’ with which discursive meaning is *designated*. In other words, a material force is an event or *effect* which is yet to be contained and mediated through discourse and is yet to contain meaning for the subject. However, these forces contain ‘marks’, a kind of *access point for discursive meaning*, and it is these marks which come to be articulated as signs both within action and thought, within practices and within subject’s (re)organization of ideostructs and subsequent *designation* as a designated object.

This then raises the question of ideological forces. It might even to a question regarding the proxima force. An ideological force is the same as a material force, but is different in *its orientation from its point of cause and the point of effect*. What I mean by this is to highlight the subsequent pivoting of ideological forces *in materiality into materiality forces*. This operates in a similar capacity as the abstractive contact stage *as it initiates the pivoting of ideological forces into material forces which are then sent towards micro centers*. In other words, material and ideological forces are one and the same. What marks them as distinct is the orientation and

³²¹ Laclau & Mouffe. *Hegemony and the Socialist Strategy*, 94.

direction they have in social, discursive, and ideological relationship. To provide an example, consider when John was reading poetry to Helmholtz: “[John] was reading *Romeo and Juliet* aloud – reading... with an intense and quivering passion. Helmholtz had listened”³²². The response from Helmholtz is one that John had not anticipated:

Juliet cried out: ‘Is there no pity sitting in the clouds, That sees into the bottom of my grief? O, sweet my mother, cast me not away! Delay this marriage for a month, a week; Or, if you do not, make the bridal bed... In that dim monument where Tybalt lies... when Juliet said this, Helmholtz broke out into an explosion of uncontrollable guffawing’³²³

What one is viewing here is the active expression of outgoing ideological forces from John through physical movement, and the active breakdown of ideological forces in sensual contact *as material forces*.

Up until this point I have discussed the pivoting of material forces into ideological forces within the process of ideology. However, I have yet to discuss the pivoting of ideological forces. This transition occurs within the abstract space between (at least two) micro centers (here John and Helmholtz). In that unidentifiable externality between the two, the emptiness of deep space that falls just outside the gravity well of discourse and subjectivity, that John’s externalized ideological force (manifest through reading) is pivoted into a material force that Helmholtz is *hearing*. Helmholtz, is hearing and initiating two processes at once: 1. The abstractive movement of this incoming material force from sensual contact to abstractive contact (the marks of John’s *voice*) as body-force interaction. 2. The interpretive movement of the *signs* from sensual contact to ideo contact (the words John is speaking) as subject-object interaction. All at once what is occurring is a reaction to signifying signs while be constituted by relationship with that raw material force; by a subject *that is conscious of them*.

³²² Huxley. *Brave New World*, 160.

³²³ *Ibid*, 161.

This leads me to the proxima force, a concept pointing to a problematic. If a force is ‘pre-discursive’ ‘raw material’, and event that comes to be designated according to its marks, then what is proxima if it is *constituted by and extent within discourse*? To understand this is to understand that proxima is *not discourse* but is merely what *gives discourse its movement*. In other words, proxima is the inescapable movement and tendencies within the discursive condition in which it presides. In a way, proxima ‘fills the gaps’ between signs, moments, and elements, and gives the *energy behind* their articulation and practice. It is an a-signifying force which gives the signifying conditions of discourse its capacity to change: the dark matter to the matter of discourse. Therefore, proxima *itself* does not impact the subject. The subject is never *aware* of this force and its tendencies, unlike material forces, which contain marks to be articulated into signs within ideology and practice. The subject does not ‘sense’ this force, nor can proxima be articulated through practice. Proxima underlines the tendency, capacity, and *necessity* for discourse to mold and change, but it is a force the subject *can never* interpret, experience, or articulate in practice.

Multi-Directional Movement of Ideology

Ideology breaks from its commonly unidirectional conceptualization and moves beyond a dual movement into a multi-movement of compounding causes and effects. By revisiting the moments of John reading poetry to Helmholtz, I-330 re-articulating D-503’s hands, Lenina seducing John, Bernard attempting to change Lenina’s sexual practices, I-330 and D-503 have sex without a pink ticket, and so on³²⁴, it is possible to see that the subject triangle, multi-directional movement in ideology, and more than one pivoting force. At any moment the subject

³²⁴ Any moment discussed so far.

is bombarded by incoming material forces that both constitute the subject as body-force and are interpreted as subject-object. However, there is more, as these interactions span, not only the interaction of which the subject is *conscious*, but also the incoming forces that span the *pre-conscious* field of sense and interpretation. These effects produce a movement of ideological forces both outward and inward, pivoted in materiality or ‘building up’ within a micro center’s closed circuit. The a-signifying force of proxima gives movement and tendencies but does not thereby *determine* the outcome of any interaction. When D-503 had sex with I-330 without a pink ticket, there was the conscious action of subject-object intercourse, the simultaneously dual masturbation of either subject with the designated object, but, additionally, the sensual contact of material forces that determine the (yet to be articulated) surplus-enjoyment of physical biological systems³²⁵. It is somewhere in the abstract nether between the bodies that the ideological forces of either is pivoted as material forces and there are numerous per-conscious forces left unmentioned *due to the conscious unawareness of the subject* and, as a result, the voice of ideology (D-503’s inner voice, the narrator of *Brave New World*, and so on) is unusable to present these as experience.

If I were to attempt to recap my analysis in its entirety in only a few sentence I would state: it is the compounding interactions between points constituted by the discursive separation which begin to work upon on another, on themselves, and on the conditions which render them possible. These processes and interactions produce an intense proliferation of perspectives, orientations, directions, and points due to the tendency to further distinguish and separate in an attempt to bring itself back to the homogeneity found within the ‘pre-existing’ or ‘pre-discursive’

³²⁵ It is here the body point within the subject triangle can be broken down, dissolved into individual processes to be targeted by power, and an area in which, outside of the experience of the subject point, two bodies become one organic system of a-signifying forces and processes. But it is this scope of analysis which falls far outside the frame of this work.

conditions which both never existed and can never be found *once the conditions are put in place*. Each point of the subject triangle exists in a law of proximity *due to the false pre-supposed existence* as separate sphere. However, they are real inasmuch as power targets them as separate. This gives these points the capacity to act and to be acted upon despite being distinctions of a boundless process imbued with boundaries and mediated by its own foundations of existence. The subject interacts with, affects, and molds its own conditions because it *is those very conditions, only given a name*. The subject, a point produced through the separation of reality into a law of proximity containing three points, given constituting processes that are externalized as discourse, internalized as ideostem, and mediate the incoming and outgoing forces under the tendency of an a-signifying force; proxima. It is the outcome of a process that buries its origin and constitutes its own (re)production in practice but not in form. The subject interacts with its conditions of existence through an intense interplay and overlapping of conscious and preconscious, signifying and a-signifying processes.

Conclusion

This chapter has incorporated all the concepts discussed in this thesis to develop the final necessary concepts of the designated object, proxima, and interpretive movement using observations from the research object *Brave New World* and *WE*. In doing so, this chapter has outlined the effect of the designated object as an organized sign cluster designated upon material forces, constituting the object portion of the subject-object interaction, and the effects this has upon the subject triangle. It also adds complexity to the concept of ideology and discourse. Additionally, this chapter outlined the newly conceptualized proxima force as a force that offers to the conditions made by discourse the mobility and capacity of alteration, and does so as an a-signifying force that is not of discourse and cannot be directly experienced by the subject. This

chapter has also outlined the necessity of disrupting the unidirectional movement of ideology and discourse, and has done so by introducing the interpretive movement stage of ideology, addressing the malleability in the direction of physical movement, and the effects of conscious and pre-conscious interaction.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Summary

To briefly reiterate the purpose of this work, the problems addressed were two-fold: 1. To operationalize the hidden semiotic tendency in past models of ideology, and to prime that model for the incorporation of post-structuralist thought. 2. To overcome the over-determination within primary structuralist models related to ideology and subjectivity. The latter of the two being the primary problem approached throughout the majority of this thesis, specifically within the analysis chapters, and focussed on utilizing the foundational authors to ‘fill in the cracks’ of the authors Althusser, Laclau & Mouffe, Foucault, and Žižek. While this work could not include an in-depth comparison to Roland Barthe’s semiotic model of ideology, this work would attempt to remain within the methodological approach of a general theory of discourse rather than linguistics, and in this way would remain in an indirect relationship with his work.

This argument was produced by utilizing a case study of two works of dystopian literature dated in the early twentieth century. As has been said, these works were originally chosen for a study on the emergence of what would have been called the ideopolitical subject, but due to a shift in focus, remained relevant for this work because of the activities oriented around subjectivities: 1. Subjects existed antagonistically with their conditions of existence. 2. Material power systems had placed the mediation and controlled production of subjectivity as their primary aim. The observations of these works did not focus on the socio-political conditions of the production and circulation of the works specifically but rather, focussed on the systems, processes, and interactions which existed *within* the works; looking at specific moments and interactions as they were presented, rather than deconstructing them along linguistic or authorship axis. Finally, these dystopian works were chosen over past utopian works because, despite past utopian works

conceptualizing a global subjectivity before these works, these dystopian works contained primary characters who had antagonistic relationship with their condition of existence. Due to this, the observations of these works proved to produce greater yield in research regarding individual subjectivity, its organization, and rearticulation.

Conclusion

The initial theoretical findings, which form the template for the analytical observations of these thesis produces a model of ideology which contains the following stages of movement and contact: Sensual contact, abstractive movement, abstractive contact, proximal movement, interpretive movement, ideo contact, and physical movement. Interpretive movement was identified as a necessary addition to challenge the problematic uni-directional models of ideology produced and used within this work, and allowed for the ideo-material semiotic model of ideology to address the different impact conscious and pre-conscious interactions has on the subject. These sages outline a process mediated by two primary components, identification (in contacts) and the mediation of forces (in movements). Additionally, within this template the analysis chapters outlined the law of proximity within the subject triangle, which replaced Laclau & Mouffe's subject position, and produced the conceptualization of a micro center of power-discourse, which expanded Foucault's relationship between local centers and the over-all strategy. Within this system, ideostructs and ideostems were identified as organizing sign systems operating under the conditions of sign scarcity in the latter, and a partially fixed sign structure in the former. Finally, he 'object' which the subject interacts with was identified as the designated object, and the proxima force was identified as the movement and organizational tendency of discourse due to its field of difference.

Chapter two of this work primarily focussed on the works of Althusser and Žižek, and was focused on the expansion of the process of ideology. This chapter largely aims to counter the over-determination within Althusser's and Žižek's work, and does so by first outlining a semiotic model of ideology which hinges on the abstraction of the subject due to the surplus-enjoyment produced through the body-force interaction and the necessary misrecognition to assign components of the experience. This chapter outlines two key moments. The first is the Subject-subject relationship of abstractive contact in which: 1. The capacity for the subject to identify a separation between what would come to be the self, and the 'other' object, body, or person. 2. The point at which the momentum of material forces become pivoted as ideological forces, i.e., when the production of effect becomes tied to the subject rather than materiality within the misrecognition of the origin. This is followed by the second key moment in ideo contact in which the subject comes to identify *as* its constituting ideostructs, which would come to be conceptualized as sign structures of partial fixity in chapter four.

Chapter three begins the move to a methodological foundation in discourse theory, and in doing so comes to focus on Foucault and Laclau & Mouffe. This chapter outlines the ontological rupture in study between two methods. This rupture was identified through the comparative analysis of Žižek's *Living in the End Times* and Baccolini & Moylan's *Dark Horizons*. This chapter outlines the author as, not an agent separated from and speaking to society, but rather as a micro center of power-discourse as outline in this work. This chapter also takes a comparative analysis of conceptualizations of discourse in the works of Foucault and Laclau & Mouffe, and attempts to reconcile the separation between a focus on thought (in the former) and a focus on practice (in the latter). I do so to provide the ground for an ideo-material semiotic model of ideology that contains the organization and production of ideostems that comes to produce

subject constituting ideostucts, but also relies on the practices of these subjects to continue the reciprocal mediation of force momentum that pivots between materiality and subjectivity.

Chapter four of this work begins the move away from a focus on the theoretical foundations, and into further theoretical expansion of the ideo-material semiotic model of ideology through the analytical observations of the object within each case study. This chapter contains the primary thrust toward the expansion and alleviation of over-determination in the works of Foucault and Laclau & Mouffe. It shows the necessary law of proximity within the subject triangle and outlines this triple point relationship as containing the subject, body, and object/force³²⁶. The subject triangle relationship necessitated the formation of the micro center of power-discourse. This chapter also explores the mechanisms and function of ideostucts and ideostems, and it is here that this work explains the ideostuct as a partially fixed sign system. The ideostem operates as discourse under the conditions of sign scarcity, while discourse operates under the conditions of sign displacement and conceptualizes ideostems as the organizing sign system with each micro center.

Finally, chapter five utilizes the findings from each previous chapter to produce the concept of the designated object. In this chapter, the designated object is operationalized as that with which the subject interacts, and, rather than being an inert or pre-existing body it is conceptualized as a partially fixed sign structure which contains mechanisms of Althusser's Generalities I and III³²⁷. Additionally, the concept of proxima is introduced and outlined as the necessary tendency of the movement, mediation, and organization of meaning due to the field of

³²⁶ However, the last of these three points is dependant upon the point with which it is interacting. This ambiguity is expanded in Chapter 5.

³²⁷ However, this is expanded as a cooperative state between the fixation of the abstract (Generality I) by its concrete formation in knowledge (Generality III), as to give the constantly altering ideo-material object a static quality for the subject (as outlined by Žižek).

difference. This tendency is the attempt to bring all of discourse to an artificial center or universal sign, but proliferates categorizations and positions through the field of difference. Finally, this chapter incorporates an additional stage of ideology, known as interpretive movement, which moves signifiers from sensual contact to ideo contact. With this additional stage of movement the ideo-material semiotic model of ideology is able to account for the differing effects of conscious, pre-conscious, discursive, and non-discursive interactions.

Moving Forward

One major point of analysis that was left out of this thesis due to space limitations concerned totalitarianism and liberalism. Primarily, there are two trends in totalitarianism which I was unable to discuss. These are: 1. The discussion of totalitarian sexualities (which was not monogamous or private) as infantile or childlike³²⁸. 2. Approaching the dichotomy between utopia and totalitarianism as (potentially) false. This is premised on the finding that totalitarianism is focused on the controlled production of subjectivities, while liberalism is premised on the precise inability to do so. Additionally, Žižek claims that liberalism cannot impose a universal ideal, and this problematizes liberalism's ability to create a uniform subjectivity, something which is continually shown as necessary for utopian societies.

Additionally, I would have liked to approach drugs (such as psychoactive substances or alcohol), as they are neither purely external material force or body, neither are they strictly signifying or a-signifying objects. I would like to outline the historical incorporation of substances throughout past societies and other species (if given the time), and the use of soma in *Brave New World* (which saw a successful totalitarian project) and the lack of controlled

³²⁸ This is outright stated by Bernard Marx in *Brave New World*, and is more shown in *WE* by D-503's consistent description of O-90 using infantile qualities and sometimes even directly comparing her to children and toddlers.

substances used in *WE*'s OneState (which failed as a totalitarian project). My initial thoughts on this are a potential fourth in proximity (perhaps a subject quadrilateral) but this produces a rather bold and homogenous claim on the subjectification of all living things. However, the most immediate use of this would be to begin opening this model with a more in-depth use of *a-signifying systems* by beginning to look at the body in a more in-depth analysis.

This model creates logical outcomes that have ramifications for both theory and practices regarding struggle. It is relevant for theorizing movements of struggle due to the logical ramifications it has on the theoretical foundations of these movements. Mainly, movements based on Foucauldian, Althusserian, Marxist, or Žižekian basis of thought also necessitate the loves of over-determination which are challenged in this work. Primarily, movements tend to focus on either the rearticulation of practice to form new subjects or attempt to shift the production of thought as to abstract subjects by new necessitated practices. However, by focussing on one or the other, each movement fails to account for its 'ignored variable', and it is by incorporating the ideo-material semiotic model of ideology that one can account for the subversion of these movement. Finally, this work accomplishes the undertaking of a *theoretical* reworking of discourse and ideology. The use and importance of theory must be given emphasis, as Althusser would agree, it is being without theory when research, and progress stagnate.

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