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An Assessment of the Utility of Power Cycle Theory in Understanding the Escalation
Of Tensions in the Russo-American Relationship, 1991-2000

By Helen Belopolsky, B.A. (Hons.)

A Thesis Submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

Institute of European and Russian Studies

Carleton University
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The undersigned hereby recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research acceptance of this thesis, submitted by Helen Belopolsky, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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Abstract

This thesis determines the viability of the power cycle theoretical model in explaining increasing tensions in relations between the United States and the Russian Federation. This model addresses the disequilibria existing in Russia's power-role equation, and American perceptions of Russia's geopolitical role and capabilities. Russia's geostrategic behaviours result from ongoing discordances in its conceptions of its capabilities versus its international position. Furthermore, America's incursion into Russia's historical sphere of influence and Russia's construction of strategic alliances evidence the practical manifestations of conflict in Russo-American relations. Power cycle theory is of great utility in assessing both current bilateral relations and in projecting future interaction. Conflict between the United States and Russia is likely to persist as a result of structural realities in the international system. Only if Russian capabilities begin to converge with Russia's international role will conflictual interaction in this bilateral relationship likely cease.

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I would like to express my gratitude to all those who made the completion of this work possible. This thesis is especially dedicated to my mother, who has stood by me through everything and has faithfully listened to every complaint and dilemma. I would also like to thank everyone who has given me much needed support and advice throughout the process: my family, Paul, all of my friends. Moreover, this thesis would never have been completed without the thoughtful and insightful comments of Professors Joan DeBardeleben and Andrea Chandler. With heart-felt appreciation, to all of you, I am indebted for your patience and assistance.

Transliteration

The transliteration system employed in this thesis followed the guidelines set by the journal '*Soviet Geography*'.

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Introduction

Though the end of the Cold War brought about the cessation of a bipolar international political order and the ascension of the United States as the hegemonic leader of the global system, the international arena continues to change. We are now faced with nebulous systemic structures and a lack of regulations in patterns of behaviour, in contrast to the seemingly more structured international environment that existed throughout the Cold War. It is in this context that this thesis will examine the evolving nature of relations between the Russian Federation and the United States of America.

Although Russia has lost its place as a superpower, it remains an extremely important actor in geopolitical relations. Therefore, analysis and greater understanding of Russo-American relations will continue to represent a vital area of study as we enter the new millennium. Both America's and Russia's sizes, geopolitical positions and geostrategic interests will have an impact in shaping the new international order.

Numerous authors describe the emerging Russo-American relationship as changing from a situation of Cold War into one of Cold Peace.¹ It would seem that with the cessation of Cold War tensions, ideological, political, and military disagreements would soon abate. Initially this idea of peaceful relations held true. The Charter on US-Russian Partnership and Friendship signed on 17 June 1992 exemplified this conception. Furthermore, the principles upon which this treaty was undertaken were reaffirmed at subsequent presidential summits in Vancouver in April 1993 and in Moscow in January

¹ Nicolai N. Petro. Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation-State. (New York: Longman Publishing, 1997) p. 38 and Michael Mandelbaum. The New Russian Foreign Policy. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), p. 28.

1994.² However, bilateral relations between the United States and the Russian Federation have worsened in recent times.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin's statement in early 1993 signaled a resurrection of tensions. He purported that the time for Russia's concentration on partnership with the West had come and gone, noting that "the recent series of visits to South Korea, China and now India is indicative of the fact that we are moving away from a Western emphasis" in Russian diplomacy.³ However, American policy decisions have also served to intensify disagreements between the two states. There have been major differences over NATO enlargement, missile defense systems, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and Caspian Sea oil. Russia's rhetoric increasingly portrays the sense that Russia perceives its power in its own sphere of influence as being undermined.⁴ Furthermore, relations have become strained to a point where a number of security arrangements are now threatened. The aforementioned controversies have become intertwined with the ratification of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) and new agreements over the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM).⁵ Therefore, tensions continue to increase in Russo-American relations and it will be the goal of this study to investigate the causes of the deteriorating relationship.

This thesis will determine the viability of the power cycle model in explaining increasing tensions in relations between the United States and the Russian Federation.

² Nicolai N. Petro, *Russian Foreign Policy* op. cit., p. 38

³ ITAR-TASS, 30 January 1993.

⁴ Sherle R. Schwenninger "World Order Lost: American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World," in *World Policy Review*, Summer 1999, p. 58.

⁵ Andrei Georgievich Arbatov. *Russian Security After the Cold War: Seven Views from Moscow*. (Washington: Brassey's Publishing, Inc., 1994) p. 103.

Though this model has traditionally been utilized to explain causes for major war, in this study, power cycle theory's causal determinants for major war are employed to explain increasing tension and hostility. This investigation addresses the puzzle of whether the anxieties in relations between these two states can be explained by structural factors existing within the international system. It argues that tensions between the United States and the Russian Federation will continue to increase as a result of Russia's relative power-role disequilibria in the developing international structure.

Russia's relations with the West, particularly the United States, have important ramifications for the international system. As a result, there is an abundant amount of literature on the subject of the changing nature of Russo-American relations following the end of the Cold War in the media, academic literature and government statements. Moreover, a growing body of literature is emerging on the nature of Russia's changing security and foreign policy. However, there is a distinct lack of work on the application of theoretical models towards the development of a greater understanding of the utility of these theories in explaining and predicting relations between states.

The subject of study has been chosen in response to the failure of many political scientists to utilize structural theories to anticipate the fall of the Soviet Union and the dramatic changes in the international system which followed this event. The field of international relations is moving away from predictive analyses of the global geopolitical order towards more prescriptive research. I maintain that the ability to anticipate and prevent international disorder should be a central tenet of study, and this goal can best be achieved through the employment of systemic theoretical models of the geopolitical

system. However, the practical application of potentially useful theoretical constructs is a rarity.

Robert Keohane stated that “systemic theory is important because we must understand the context of action before we can understand the action itself...structural theory... is important because it provides an irreplaceable component for a thorough analysis of action, by states or non-state actors in world politics.”⁶ It must be added that systemic theory and structural theory can only be important if they are employed practically in the explanation of world affairs. If they are only used in hindsight, their worth is negligible to the field of political science. Thus, this thesis will breach the divide between theory and practice, conception and reality, inefficaciousness and utility. Rather than merely studying the relations and policy practices of these countries, this thesis delves into the factors propelling Russo-American interaction, and the geopolitical ramifications of these relations.

This study can serve a number of purposes. Firstly, it can elucidate the capacity for future understanding and amicable interaction between the Russian Federation and the United States. The potential utility of a framework for geopolitical interaction to understand relations between these major powers is significant. Secondly, it could serve as an empirically testable attempt at employing a structural theoretical model for predictive purposes. It could encourage others to strive towards the employment of theory for anticipatory rather than explanatory purposes. Finally, this thesis has the capacity to shed light on increasing tensions which have the potential to become destabilizing for the international system. The identification of these key points of tension is extremely

⁶ Robert O. Keohane. Power and Interdependence, 2nd Edition. (Glenview: HarperCollins, 1989) p. 61.

important for their eventual resolution. Moreover, placing emphasis on the disparate perceptions held by the United States and the Russian Federation is also vital in eradicating disputes.

Chapter Outline

The first chapter sets the context for the rest of the thesis. It outlines a theoretical framework on which to base an analysis of Russo-American relations. It introduces Charles F. Doran's power cycle theory, which explains the conditions underlying structural disequilibria, and asserts that these sources of threat have their greatest causal impact at certain unique times in the power cycle dynamic. Power cycle theory explains the evolution of the systemic structure through the cyclical dynamic of the rise and decline of states. The most important aspect of a state's process of rise and decline as a major power is that it contains critical times at which the state's perception of its future suddenly changes. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the inception of a 'new world order' was just such a time for the Russian Federation and the United States. As a result of a disequilibria vis-à-vis the power and role equation of a major actor in the system, the system suffers from an unstable disequilibrium, and increased inelasticities regarding future role and security, which inevitably leads to an inversion of force expectations throughout the system. The utility of this theory in explaining and predicting the increasing tensions in Russo-American relations is assessed in the following chapters.

The second chapter employs the power cycle theoretical model to address the disequilibria existing in Russia's power-role equation itself, as well as external perceptions of the Russian role and capabilities. The chapter is divided into two parts: Russia's

conception of its position in the new international order, juxtaposed with America's view of Russia's place in the new geopolitical realities.

Russia is shown to be experiencing disequilibria in its relative national capabilities versus its current international role. The first part of the chapter evidences the fact that Russian behaviour corresponds with power cycle theory's prediction which states that in a system composed of two states, a decline in State A's (in this case Russian) interests may lag behind a decline in its relative power. This lag results perhaps because governing elites in State A are reluctant to move over and to allow State B (in this case the United States) to adopt a larger systemic role. But, eventually, as the power of State A declines and that of B increases, the global interests of State A will begin to contract and those of State B will begin to expand.

The second part of the chapter investigates America's position as hegemon in the international system and its relationship with the declining superpower. American rhetoric has been quite supportive of Russia regaining its economic and political position as a major geopolitical actor. However, its foreign policy behaviour is shown to demonstrate far different goals. American foreign policy has increasingly demonstrated a disregard for, if not active indifference to, Russian national interests. According to power cycle theory, a state in the position of the United States, at this point in its power cycle, would be free to make adjustments accordingly in the scope and magnitude of its own interests to make them consonant with its own relatively larger capability. Though the United States is rhetorically not undertaking these kinds of policies, its foreign policy actions have

evidenced this type of behaviour. These actions are posing a threat to Russian interests, increasing the potential for conflict.

In order to properly assess the utility of power cycle theory, it is necessary to evidence manifestations of Russia's power-role disequilibria, which is serving to increase tensions in bilateral relations. Thus, the third and fourth chapters examine the manifestations of conflict in Russo-American relations. The third chapter discusses Russia's historical sphere of influence on the territories of the former Soviet Union, specifically the Commonwealth of Independent States. It demonstrates that the Russian Federation is unwilling to cede its interests in neighbouring countries as a result of its decreasing of economic, military, and political influence. Moreover, it shows an increase in tensions in American-Russian relations due to a divergence between the United States and Russia in perceptions of Russia's legitimate realm of influence. Russia is once again attempting to bring these states into its sphere of influence. Furthermore, Russia is unwilling to permit the intrusion of foreign states into territories it believes to be historically and strategically vital. Both Russian political rhetoric and foreign policy raise issues of historical connections and familial ties with these states in order to support the legitimacy of Russia's interest in, and at some times control over, the area which has been its legitimate sphere of influence for decades.

The United States views the area of the former Soviet Union as one in which it can attain geostrategic and economic gains. There has been an ever-increasing incursion by the United States into the former Soviet republics. Growing American economic involvement in the Caspian Sea region, in addition to the Eastward expansion of NATO,

and military exercises in Ukraine and Georgia have increased perceptions of threat on the part of the Russian Federation. This chapter addresses these conceptions in an actual area of potentially serious conflict, in the context of the disequilibria existing in Russia's role-capability ratio, in an area of potentially serious conflict.

The fourth chapter also investigates a significant area of tension between the United States and Russia. It delves into one of Russia's responses to its decreasing geopolitical role and national capabilities. This chapter assesses Russia's pursuit of a variety of strategic alliances. It demonstrates the active pursuit of a multiplicity of partnerships with such states as China, India and Iran. Moreover, it shows the potential destabilizing effects these actions may have. Russia may be attempting to create a new international order based upon the principle of multipolarity by forging strategic alliances to balance American hegemony. In this way, a growing amount of tension is emerging in the Russo-American relationship. This chapter employs a practical international dilemma to determine the utility and accuracy of power cycle theory as a predictor of international behaviour.

The methodological approach that must be utilized in such a systemic level analysis is fairly broad. Thus, the research for this thesis has used a wide-range of resources to accomplish this task.

Methodology

In order to link the theoretical and practical aspects of this project, it has been necessary to employ a combined methodological approach. The methodology of the project involves an examination of a plethora of different literatures. There were three

stages to the research process. The first of these stages was an assessment of the theoretical literature on hegemonic decline and power cycle theory. This served as the basis for a framework on which to judge the utility of this particular model in understanding the increasing tensions in the Russo-American relationship. Moreover, an extensive reading of the literature on disparate structural models of international affairs gave a broad overview of the universe of theoretical modeling. It also permitted me to gain a greater understanding of the variations in systemic theory and the utility of using the power cycle model.

The second stage of the research was premised on an analysis of past and present security positions in the United States and Russia, in addition to emerging streams of thought. This was accomplished by utilizing both Russian and American academic literature to gain a broader perspective into these issues. This served to develop a greater understanding of the evolving perceptions within the foreign policy-making communities of the respective states. A study of the academic writings in both countries provided the basis for the analysis of the emerging perceptions and developments in each country. Moreover, as the authors of a number of the articles examined participate in the foreign policy-making process, the utility of their observations of potential changes and developments in the nature of relations is extremely high. One academic journal has been surveyed from each country from the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union until March 2000. Both these journals are written and edited by scholars and foreign policy-makers in the respective countries. The American journal examined was '*Foreign Affairs*'. The

Russian scholarly journal examined was *'Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya'*.

These journals were chosen because they offer a range of opinions and perspectives on foreign policy issues. They include the views of foreign policy makers, politicians, political pundits, and academics. Moreover, they include articles from foreign authors and scholars. This permits a broader scope of ideas and conceptions to arise. However, the possibility exists for bias in these sources. *'Foreign Affairs'* tends to include a disproportionate number of articles based on mainstream foreign policy thinking. Furthermore, in *'Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya'*, many articles are written by academics from the Institute of World Economics and International Politics, thereby potentially introducing a bias. Notwithstanding, these journals prove vital to this study. The academics and policy makers writing for these journals impact upon the perceptions and actions of the foreign policy making elite. In this manner, the ideas and conceptions they introduce are important in gaining a greater understanding of the complexities and nuances of foreign policy making.

The third stage of research entailed a study of the security doctrines and policy statements of the Russian Federation and the United States. It sought to place the theoretical construct within an empirically measurable political context. In assessing the political doctrines, speeches, and rhetoric, this research gave insight into the actual areas of conflict and the intricacies of political relations between the United States and Russia. The research searched for areas of divergence between these two states over perceptions of Russia's capabilities and interests. Therefore, in investigating political statements, it

was necessary to locate areas of tension with regard to Russia's sphere of influence and the forging of new strategic alliances. Moreover, it was imperative to determine whether the tensions that arose over these issues resulted from disparities in the conceptualization of Russia's power versus its role in the international system.

Limiting the Scope of the Topic

In order to limit the breadth of the research, the time frame of this study is from the collapse of the Soviet Union until March 2000. Though an analysis of the utility of structural and systemic theory prior to the end of Communism would be extremely enlightening, it falls outside the scope of this study. Furthermore, an investigation of the developments following the election of Russian President Vladimir Putin could prove invaluable to this study, but will have to be left to other researchers. As the new world order began with the fall of the Soviet Union, the end of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's reign and the election of President Vladimir Putin also signified the end of an era, these seemed rational start and end points for this study.

This thesis is also limited in the number of variables that can be assessed in determining the causal factors that influence increasing tensions in Russo-American relations. The Russian Federation and the United States do not exist within an isolated international environment. Rather, many external and internal factors have the capacity to influence foreign policy. Therefore, such factors as other actors in the international system and non-governmental organizations in the formulation of policy were omitted.

In order to limit the scope of this thesis, it is also necessary to look at only one systemic theory to determine its utility in explaining and predicting the nature of Russo-

American relations. It would be extremely efficacious for other researchers to employ this work as a steppingstone for the testing of other structural theories, in search of explanations of political behaviour.

Chapter One

Theories of Systemic Change: The Utility of Power Cycle Theory

A new world order has come into existence with the collapse of the bipolar international system, upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union.⁷ The dynamics of this new order are as yet unsettled. Therefore, interactions within the developing geopolitical system have yet to be adequately understood. This chapter will provide an overview of the theoretical approaches focusing on the study of world order. Moreover, it will set the context for the rest of this thesis. It will give a working framework on which to understand the developing relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation. This chapter will be divided into three distinct yet related parts. Initially it is necessary to set out a basic explanation of the bases of world system analysis. Following this, the first section of the chapter will examine a number of divergent streams of thought in the study of the world system. It will provide a glimpse at the debates in the area of world system analysis (which falls within the boundaries of both political theory and international relations) and the different approaches to the resolution of the complex issues of international leadership and geopolitical and geoeconomic interaction. Though the theories examined in this section will not be utilized in the examination of Russo-American relations, they have set the basis for the development of power cycle theory and are, thus, important. The second part of the chapter will analyze the power cycle theory created by Charles F. Doran of Johns Hopkins University. It is this theory's utility which will be tested throughout the remaining chapters of this thesis. The final section of the chapter

⁷ Joseph S. Nye. Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History. (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1993) p. 189

will address the applicability and strength of this theoretical model in assessing the nature of Russo-American relations. Moreover, it will demonstrate the utility of exploring this particular theory over others in explaining current and anticipating future interaction between the Russian Federation and the United States.

The Nature of World System Analysis

World system analysis enables researchers to discover patterns of international behaviour and the nature of geopolitical leadership. It represents a definitive advance on the various ways in which analysts have attempted to account for international political and economic behaviour in the past.⁸ However, world system analysis is not a unified conceptual construct. Rather, the variations among and between theorists are sufficiently large that a single definition of the world system becomes problematic to develop. However, it is possible to identify at least three commonalities delineating the basic nature of world system analysis.

Firstly, all world system theorists assert that a world system exists, that the system is characterized by more or less interdependent political, economic, and cultural subsystems, and that the modern or contemporary world system began to take definitive shape in approximately the late fifteenth century.⁹ From this time on, the international system and its subsystems have continued to expand in geographic breadth and to evolve functionally. Moreover, the systemic structures have also maintained a strong element of continuity over several centuries.¹⁰ Rather than merely examining the systemic

⁸ William R. Thompson, ed. Contending Approaches to World System Analysis. (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1983) p. 9

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 9

¹⁰ Joseph S. Nye. *op. cit.*, p. 1

continuities throughout history, world system analysis investigates the structures and processes of the current time period as they reflect the most recent alterations and modifications of the same structures and processes found in earlier centuries.¹¹

A second major assumption of this subject area is that behaviour within the system can best be explained in terms of world system structure and its critical processes. Notwithstanding this, other levels of analysis including the individual, group, nation, or societal are not ignored. On the contrary, the operating assumption is that analysts must at some point decipher the pervasive structural context within which all behaviour is conducted, regardless of the level of interaction. Kenneth Waltz distinguishes three levels of causation in explaining what occurs in international politics, which he describes as images: the individual, the state, and the international system. He maintains that explanations at the level of the individual are rarely sufficient because the very nature of international politics implies a focus on states rather than individuals. Moreover, disproportionate focus on an individual's intentions may blind us to the unintended consequences of individual acts caused by the larger systems in which the individuals operate.¹²

A third common feature of world system analysis is its willingness to cross traditional disciplinary frontiers. Rather than merely employing a single discipline, world system analysis entails a cross-disciplinary approach to the study of international relations. In this respect, it might be described as an historical-sociological approach to political

¹¹ Ibid. p.11

¹² Kenneth Waltz. Man, State and War. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959) p. 7

economy with an emphasis on the systemic level of analysis as the principal point of view.¹³

Though all of the following theories vary in their methodology, databases, and general approaches, they all conclude that the ultimate source of war is differential capability growth rates among the major powers.¹⁴ It is with this understanding and context in mind that it is possible to better comprehend the nature of differing approaches to world system analysis, which is to follow.

Divergent Approaches to World System Analysis

Apart from power cycle theory, which is the newest of the world system approaches, there are three world system schools of thought which can be said to predominate this analytical area of study: the world-economy perspective; the long cycle of world leadership perspective; and the hegemonic stability perspective.

The world-economy perspective is most closely associated with the work of Immanuel Wallerstein. The world-economy assumes that “there exists an economy wherever there is an ongoing extensive and relatively complete social division of labour with an integrated set of production processes which relate to each other through a market...”¹⁵ The political superstructure of the capitalist world-economy is an interstate system within which and through which political structures called sovereign states are legitimized and constrained.¹⁶ Three central processes are stressed in this theory: the

¹³ Ibid. p.10

¹⁴ William R. Thompson, ed. op. cit., p. 8

¹⁵ Immanuel Wallerstein. “Patterns and Perspectives of the Capitalist World-Economy” in International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism by Viotti, Paul R and Mark V. Kauppi (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1987) p. 507

¹⁶ Ibid. p. 508

historical development of a core-periphery division of labour; the episodic rise and fall of hegemonic powers; and the gradual geographic expansion, coupled with the periodic growth and stagnation, of the world-economy.¹⁷ At the root of these processes lie the more fundamental processes of capitalism.

The first central feature of this theory is the existence of a core and periphery within the international system. This is a result of the exchange of products containing unequal amounts of social labour constituting the core/periphery relationship.¹⁸ The core of the world-economy consists of those states in which agro-industrial production is the most efficient and where the complexity of economic activities and the level of capital accumulation is the greatest. As a consequence, the core receives the most favourable proportion of the system's economic surplus through its exploitation of the periphery, which in turn, is compelled to specialize in the supply of less well-rewarded raw materials and labour. However, the position of any given state in the capitalist world-economy is not constant: what makes a production process core-like or periphery-like is the degree to which it incorporates labour-value, is mechanized, and is highly profitable. All of these characteristics shift over time for any given product because of product cycles.

Wallerstein has identified four cycles of the world-economy. During what he describes as the first stage of the modern world-economy's development (1425-1650), the conjuncture of feudal disintegration, changes in population and technology, the economic need for geographic expansion, and the political multicentricity of Europe facilitated the movement away from the traditional Mediterranean locus toward the establishment of the

¹⁷ Immanuel Wallerstein. The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) p. 14

¹⁸ *Ibid.* p.16

system's core in northwestern Europe. System-wide stagnation during the second stage (1650 - 1750), however, forced a general consolidation and retrenchment in an economy still predominantly agrarian. The emphasis on industrial production became more salient in a third stage (1750/1815 - 1917). In turn, the increased need for raw materials and markets led to the further geographical expansion of the world-economy and the peripheral incorporation of much of the rest of the world. After 1917, the third stage was superseded by the fourth and ongoing stage characterized primarily by a consolidation of the world-economy's industrial base.¹⁹

In addition to the core-periphery division of labour and the persistent political multicentricity of the interstate system, a third important source of systemic structure is attributed to the ascent and decline of hegemonic core powers. Hegemony refers to,

“that situation in which the ongoing rivalry between the so-called great powers is so unbalanced that one power is truly *primu inter pares*; that is, one power can largely impose its rules and its wishes...in the economic, political, military, diplomatic, and even cultural arenas.”²⁰

The world-economy framework usually identifies three periods of hegemonic power: the United Provinces of Netherlands (1625-1672/75), Great Britain (1763-1815/c.1850-1873), and the United States (1945-1965/67).²¹

These periods of unusually high levels of systemic dominance are based on the short-lived concentration of superiority in agro-industrial productivity, commerce, and finance/investment within a single state. The brevity of dominance is explained largely in terms of the high costs of hegemony, the diffusion of capital, and the strong probability of

¹⁹ Ibid. p.17

²⁰ Ibid. p.38

²¹ William R. Thompson, ed. op. cit., p. 9

relative improvements in the economic capabilities of rival core states. The cyclical decline of hegemonic control is given responsibility for ushering in a period of power diffusion, increased freedom of maneuver for the core states, and increased exploitation of the periphery.²² Attempts to restructure the world market in each core actor's interest leads to acute competition and conflict and, eventually world war between the core powers.²³ Thus, the supremacy of a hegemonic power in the world-economy creates a certain level of stability within the international economic and political systems.

A second approach to world system analysis is that of the long cycle of world leadership perspective, which is most readily associated with the work of George Modelski. As with the world-economy perspective, hegemonic stability theory, and power cycle theory, the long cycle emphasizes the fact that the global political system goes through distinct and identifiable historical cycles or recurrent patterns of behaviour.²⁴ The long cycle approach stems from the observation that global problem management is neither constant nor random. It has been characterized instead by a regular rhythm, the long cycle of world leadership for nearly 500 years.²⁵

The rhythm of the long cycle is predicated in large part on interrelated fluctuations in the systemic concentration of power and major bouts of global warfare. It maintains that there exist four phases within each long cycle (100 to 120 years): global war, world

²² Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds. The Age of Transition: Trajectory of the World-System, 1945 - 2025. (London: Zed Books, Ltd., 1996) p. 9

²³ Immanuel Wallerstein. The Politics of the World-Economy p. 46

²⁴ George Modelski. "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State," in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* v. 20 n.2 April 1978 p. 215

²⁵ George Modelski and William R. Thompson, "Testing Cobweb Models" in Modelski, George, ed. Exploring Long Cycles. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987), p. 86

power, de-legitimation, and de-concentration.²⁶ At the end of a war fought to determine the constitution of the global political system (1494-1516, 1586-1608, 1689-1713, 1793-1815, and 1914-1918/1939-1945), a single state, the world power, emerges with monopoly control over the sea power capabilities essential to the capacity for global reach and order keeping.²⁷ Enjoying the advantages of the system's lead economy and legitimized by postwar peace settlements, the world power becomes the system's primary supplier of security and assumes the responsibility for crafting the institutional frameworks of order as exemplified by international organizations and the rules of international economic exchanges.

The leaders of the international system, the world powers, "...produce and supply the political goods of order and justice, and others consume them."²⁸ According to Modelski, Portugal, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and the United States, each one corresponding to a long cycle, have played these leadership roles since 1500.²⁹ As in the case of Gilpin's, Doran's, and Wallerstein's analyses, war tends to mark the end of one cycle and the beginning of another.³⁰

Two conditions are critical in the production of these cycles of hegemonic leadership: (i) the urge of a power to create a global order, and (ii) particular properties and weaknesses of the global system.³¹ Over time, the initial preponderance of the world

²⁶ Shumpei Kumon. "Theory of Long Cycles Examined" in Modelski, George, ed. Exploring Long Cycles. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987) p. 60

²⁷ Ibid. p. 100

²⁸ Ibid. p. 86

²⁹ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism. (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1987), p. 59

³⁰ Robert Gilpin. War and Change in World Politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) p.3

³¹ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, op. cit., p. 60

leader erodes as the relative capability shares of the system's other most significant actors, the global powers, improve. Consequently, the unipolar power structure of the system is transformed gradually into a multipolar distribution, just as monopolistic leadership gives way to oligopolistic competition and rivalry.

These fluctuations in the global political system also have important implications for alterations in the world economy. Since political and economic activities must by and largely draw on the same population and resource base, it is difficult to focus attention and resources in both spheres simultaneously and to the same extent. Thus, periods of intense political preoccupation alternate with periods of economic growth and expansion. Accordingly, rising prices, resource scarcities, and relatively few economic innovations are expected in the second (de-legitimation) and third (de-concentration) quarters.³²

The third world system theory to be explored is that of hegemonic stability. Those scholars most often associated with hegemonic stability theory are Charles Kindleberger, Robert Gilpin and Stephen Krasner. This theoretical construct posits that changes in the relative power resources available to major states will explain changes in international regimes. Much of this capability versus role disequilibria is incorporated in power cycle theory. It argues that the world economic system will become more open when the hegemon is ascending and conversely, less open as the hegemon declines.³³ Therefore, strong international economic regimes depend on hegemonic power. Furthermore, fragmentation of power between competing countries leads to fragmentation of the international economic regime.

³² William R. Thompson. ed. op. cit., p.14

³³ Robert Gilpin. op. cit., p. 170

Two basic hypotheses are pursued within this theory. The first maintains that a rising hegemonic power is associated with the creation of international regimes, a decline in international conflict, and an expansion of international trade. Thus, it is the most stable ordering principle for the international system. Conversely, a declining hegemonic power is associated with the reverse trends of the destruction of international regimes, an increase in international tension, and a contraction of international trade. It holds that hegemonic structures of power, dominated by a single country, are the most conducive to the development of strong international regimes whose rules are relatively precise and well obeyed.³⁴

Both hegemonic powers and the smaller states may have incentives to collaborate in maintaining an international regime: the hegemonic power gains the ability to shape and dominate its international environment, while providing a sufficient flow of benefits to small and middle powers to persuade them to acquiesce. Some international regimes can be seen partially as collective goods, whose benefits can be consumed by all participants without detracting from others' enjoyment of them. Insofar as this is the case, one would expect that extremely large, dominant countries will be particularly willing to provide these goods, while relatively small participants will attempt to secure 'free rides' by avoiding proportionate shares of payment. International systems with highly skewed distributions of capabilities will therefore tend to be more amply supplied with such collective goods than systems characterized by equality among actors.³⁵

³⁴ Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes" in Change in the International System, Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson and Alexander L. George, eds. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980) p. 132

³⁵ Charles P. Kinleberger. The World in Depression, 1929 - 1939. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974) Chapter 12

Hegemonic stability theory views sources of erosion of the international order in changes in the relative capabilities of states.³⁶ As the distribution of tangible resources, especially economic resources of the hegemonic leader, move closer to those of other major powers, international regimes should weaken. Over the long term, liberal order diffuses the advantages formerly enjoyed by the hegemonic state, leading to more uneven development as non-hegemonic states begin to catch up. This uneven development, the relative decline of the formerly hegemonic state, political challenges from rising rivals, and wavering commitment of domestic political groups to goals of liberal world order lead to hegemonic decline.³⁷ As the hegemonic state's margin of resource superiority over its partners declines, the costs of leadership will become more burdensome.³⁸ Therefore, there is a regression toward the baseline condition of anarchy.

None of the aforementioned theories will be assessed in their ability to assist with a better comprehension of Russo-American relations. Though they are all empirically strong and analytically well founded, they lack the utility that power cycle theory provides. These theories will not be employed for three main reasons. Firstly, they each focus on the existence of hegemonic behaviour rather than great power behaviour. They simply do not address the nature of great power action and interaction. Secondly, these theories do not analyze expectations for the foreign policy action of powers. Rather they investigate the systemic consequences of policy-making, global regimes, and the stability of the international order. Thirdly, a number of these theoretical constructs put emphasis on the

³⁶ Mark R. Brawley. Liberal Leadership: Great Powers and their Challengers in Peace and War. (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1993) p. 1

³⁷ Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory." in *International Organization* v.39 n.4, Autumn 1985.

³⁸ Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes" op. cit., p. 136

economic nature of hegemony and decline rather than the political aspects of behaviour. Therefore, though in and of themselves these theories are extremely thought provoking and enlightening, they prove to have little utility in assessing Russo-American relations.

Power cycle has also succeeded in incorporating a number of the factors in these previous models, thereby building upon past research. Thus, it would prove most adept at addressing the puzzle posed by this thesis. Moreover, power cycle theory tends to look towards anticipating future occurrences of the rise and decline of hegemony rather than merely looking to explain historical occurrences in international leadership.

Power Cycle Theory

Power cycle theory is most closely associated with Charles F. Doran. In comparison with other theories of the world system it has been described as having an “increased understanding of the etiology of war and through that, a reasonable set of probabilities of what we might expect in the future.”³⁹ Doran’s theory explains the evolution of systemic structure via the cyclical dynamic of ascendance, maturation, and decline. As power is such an ephemeral term, Doran operationalizes it in a more concrete manner. He views it in terms of the capability of a state. Capability itself is composed of two principal dimensions: size, which is most often indexed by GNP, territory, armed forces, military spending, and population; and development, which includes such variables as per capita income, urbanization, and technological sophistication. With the exception of territorial size, most of the power variables register in the absolute sense some form of exponential growth. The path reflecting the capacity of a state to assume a major role in

³⁹ K. J. Holsti. Change in the International System: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Relations. Brookfield: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1991. p. 204

systemic affairs is termed the cycle of relative capability.⁴⁰ The theory of relative capability holds that the capacity of the state to influence international politics and to adopt a principal foreign policy role is determined in large part by its position on the relative capability cycle.⁴¹ Gilpin maintains that:

“the fundamental problem of international relations in the contemporary world is the problem of peaceful adjustment to the consequences of the uneven growth of power among states, just as it was in the past.”⁴²

System transformation is the process whereby one type of mature international system disappears and another emerges.

“As a nation gains in power relative to others, its capacity to exercise leadership grows; as it falls behind, the capacity to influence international politics wanes.”⁴³

Modes and mechanisms of change underlie the transformation process. Modes of system transformation are anticipatory, productive, interventionary, and strategic. These modes are the substance of change, that which is being acted upon during transformation.

The anticipatory mode reflects the projections of governments about where they expect to be in terms of power relationships and security in the future. The productive mode is next to anticipate change in the international system. It reflects changes in competitiveness, commercial behaviour, trade flows, and international financial considerations. The interventionary mode involves the use of force outside the borders of a state for various purposes. Finally, the strategic mode is the last to show characteristics of system transformation both because the dominant polities have a decisive lead in the

⁴⁰ Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons. “War and the Cycle of Relative Power,” in *The American Political Science Review* v. 74 (1980) p. 947.

⁴¹ Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons. “War and the Cycle of Relative Power,” op. cit., p. 947.

⁴² Charles F. Doran. *Systems in Crisis* op. cit., p. 230.

⁴³ Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons. “War and the Cycle of Relative Power,” op. cit., p. 947.

innovation and deployment of weapons technology, and because they place a high priority on retaining that lead.⁴⁴

Mechanisms of system transformation act upon and condition the various modes of transformation. Moreover, they determine the rate of change that occurs. One of the most important mechanisms of transformation is that which accounts for the past association between critical system transformation and major war. This mechanism is the inversion of force expectations which helps explain the manner in which a normally functioning international system is suddenly beset with cataclysm. The inversion of force expectations leads to a situation of international systemic collapse.⁴⁵

Inverted expectations are the short-term response to the uncertainty created by inversions in the trend of prior projections of power and role, which occur at critical points on the power cycle.⁴⁶ They occur in answer to a loss of normalcy in the environment, to a situation in which seemingly rational behaviour leads to responses that afterwards appear irrational. According to power cycle theory, this abnormal environment is the period of critical systemic transformation. At the heart of this breakdown of normal response are disequilibria between achieved and ascribed power.⁴⁷

Internal conceptions of capability versus role have the ability to create systemic disequilibria to the same extent as diminishing actual capabilities. Rank disequilibrium occurs when government needs and aspirations are allowed to get out of line with their

⁴⁴ Charles F. Doran. Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century's End. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) p. 41

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 41

⁴⁶ Charles F. Doran. "Systemic Disequilibrium, Foreign Policy Role, and the Power Cycle" in *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, v.33 n.3, September 1989 p. 374

⁴⁷ Charles F. Doran. Systems in Crisis op. cit., p. 41

actual capability and become a source of grievance and threat to the disequilibrated country, and thus a source of threat to other countries in the system as well. These pose the greatest risk at certain unique times in the power cycle dynamic.⁴⁸ The state either perceives this new world view to be threatening, or in response to changing foreign policy circumstances, acts in ways that threaten others.⁴⁹

Power cycle theory asserts that war breaks out at a critical point on a state's power cycle because a state is confronted with a totally new foreign policy world view and future security situation.⁵⁰ The danger of extensive war precipitation is greatest at four critical points on the cycle, given a suitable lag for awareness to register; that is, the two inflection points occurring on either side of the cycle and the lower and upper turning points. These critical points are the source of an entirely new set of options and responsibilities for the actor, having far reaching significance for the country itself and potentially for the system.⁵¹

At these critical points, or shortly thereafter, the country comes to the realization that most of the assumptions it has made about its future power base and its future role in the system are altered. Its rivals are viewed in a far different way. Its options and obligations appear transformed, and it may go from follower and ally to leader or from preponderant actor to merely one actor among equals. Adjustment does not guarantee misperception, overreaction, or outright aggression.⁵² However, it significantly increases

⁴⁸ Charles F. Doran. *Systems in Crisis* op. cit., p. 33

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 36

⁵⁰ Charles F. Doran. Kim Quaile Hill and Kenneth Mladenka. "Threat, Status Disequilibrium and National Power," in *International Journal of Group Tensions* v. 4 (1980) p. 57.

⁵¹ Charles F. Doran. "Systemic Disequilibrium, Foreign Policy Role, and the Power Cycle" op. cit., p. 376

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 377

the probability that judgment may go awry. While it may take two or more actors to fight a war, a single actor by its misperception and aggressiveness can become the chief stimulus to that war.⁵³

In terms of a change in capability-role perception, it is imperative to consider the dynamic of the power cycle itself and the likely demands adjustment to new systemic roles will put on the decision-makers forced to confront shifts in power and systemic position. Doran maintains that the literature on perception and misperception in foreign policy largely relates that surprises and unanticipated events can cause dangerous overreaction or miscalculation in foreign policy conduct. As used in power cycle theory, foreign policy role reflects the goal aspirations and expectations underlying the state's demands on the one hand, and the extent to which the system accepts these demands as legitimate on the other.⁵⁴

According to power cycle theory, a state experiencing movement through the power cycle is faced with non-linear changes in its power and its foreign policy role even though the government decision-maker applies a linear conception of reality to the foreign policy situation. Normative expectations of the members of the system, regularized by social and political tradition and shaped by the realities of capability, determine a nation's role. Accordingly, for the policy-maker, the principal dichotomy in conceptualizing foreign policy roles is between the leader nation whose security is in large part internally provided, and the follower nation whose security must, for the most part, be externally obtained.⁵⁵

⁵³ Charles F. Doran. "Power Cycle Theory and the Contemporary State System." op. cit., p. 169.

⁵⁴ Charles F. Doran. Systems in Crisis op. cit., p. 30

⁵⁵ Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons. "War and the Cycle of Relative Power," op. cit., p. 949.

Failure on the part of decision-makers, and of others in the elite to make the adjustments to new conditions and realities is what is responsible for substantially increased vulnerability to involvement in and initiation of war.⁵⁶ Such war causation may occur because the government overreacts to external events, becomes paranoid and excessively defensive about foreign policy initiatives, or simply becomes strident and bent upon altering its situation through the use of force before further change in its position eliminates all opportunity.⁵⁷ In the extreme, misperception can precipitate crisis and war.

World order is a measure of the extent to which competitive relations are replaced by more cooperative relations, in a more relaxed and productive international political atmosphere, still marked by the struggle over the distribution and management of scarce resources. World order at a minimum means the absence of major war. The essence of the management of systems transformation is that rapid structural change must be allowed to proceed without an increase in the likelihood of major war.⁵⁸

Reasoning for the Utilization of Power Cycle Theory

The utility of the power cycle theory in gaining a greater understanding of the deteriorating Russo-American relationship can be evidenced in a number of ways. Whereas, the previous theories employ systemic analyses for the purpose of attaining a greater understanding of systemic interaction, power cycle theory addresses these concerns and more. As a result of the fact that power cycle theory analyses perceptions of role and capability as a central tenet of the theoretical construct, it permits a rather more

⁵⁶ Charles F. Doran. "Systemic Disequilibrium, Foreign Policy Role, and the Power Cycle" op. cit., p.374.

⁵⁷ Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons. "War and the Cycle of Relative Power," op. cit., p. 951.

⁵⁸ Charles F. Doran. Systems in Crisis op. cit., p. 167

complete and complex analysis of the behaviour and perceptions of state decision-makers and their actions. It hypothesizes as to the potential options and behaviours for a declining and hegemonic power within the international system. It successfully integrates both the systemic and individual levels of analysis in this manner. This proves vital in understanding the political interactions of the Russian Federation and the United States.

The utility of this theory in this particular study lies in three factors: its emphasis on the role of perceptions in a state's foreign policy; its assessment of the behavioural patterns of a major power in decline; and its analysis of the policy options for a hegemonic power. These empirically testable facets of the theory will be analyzed throughout the remainder of this thesis. This thesis will seek to ascertain whether the actual foreign policy of a state corresponds to what the theory would anticipate.

Power cycle theory addresses foreign policy role, which is the encompassing notion that sets the foreign policy behaviour of the state over time. Furthermore, it responds to incremental changes in power, yet it is conceptually distinct, and it, in fact, acts as a guide to the exercise of state power.⁵⁹ The power-role gaps, addressed previously, express the degree to which adjustment is required for each state.

Foreign policy threat, according to power cycle theory, can stem from any of six factors: i) the shock of abrupt, unanticipated change in relative power; ii) the nature and ineluctability of the associated change in the projection of role; iii) the high stakes involved; iv) the increase in uncertainty associated with decision-making; v) the raw

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 32

military strength at the disposal of major rivals, and vi) the presence of power-role gaps now suddenly the focus of foreign policy attention.⁶⁰

The Russian Federation is potentially experiencing foreign policy threat as it has indeed undergone a number of the aforementioned changes. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was as unexpected as was the loss of much of the prestige and influence previously associated with its empire. Moreover, the collapse also brought about a change in the basic decision-making entities within the Russian government thereby creating uncertainty within the processes of foreign policy making. In addition, there was a level of unpredictability as to the new role that Russia was to play in the international system with the end of bipolarity. Finally, the collapse of the Russian economy was not followed by an extensive contraction of many of their foreign policy interests. In accordance with power cycle theory, the Russian Federation was suddenly forced to view its future security with uncertainty and fear.⁶¹ It will be demonstrated in the following chapters that Russia is experiencing a power-role gap that is proving detrimental to its relations with the West.

Power cycle theory argues that the state is dissatisfied during transition and that this evidences the potential for escalation in conflict between the major powers in the international system during this period of transformation.⁶² However, because states make projections and plans for the future, both sides can theoretically prepare for a transition and develop less violent ways of dealing with it unless the transition occurs in an environment of such unexpected yet definitive structural change that these past projections become uncertain or wrong.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 33

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 36

⁶² Ibid., p. 30

The second aspect of power cycle theory, which is especially valuable in assessing relations between the United States and Russia, is that it is able to make predictions as to the potential behaviour of a major power in decline. The theory suggests that a declining power will likely overextend itself, thereby fueling further decline. It maintains that changes in foreign policy role lag behind alterations in actual capabilities. Moreover, elites within the state are likely to oppose the contraction of interests and the attendant loss of prestige. This lag of interest behind relative power causes a gap to emerge between a state's relative power position and its foreign policy role. Disequilibrium of power and interests for a state occurs when a large gap emerges between its relative power and attained role in foreign policy.⁶³

International political equilibrium involves dual adjustment: adjustment internal to the state and adjustment external to it between states. External pressure for adjustment may occur first. The state sees that its power is decreasing or potentially other states in the system by various initiatives may remind it of this fact. The recognition of the declining power of the state is the first stage of the adjustment process. Other states may challenge the declining state and probe for tactical weakness, and it may find that it is no longer able to live up to its obligations. Western attempts to involve themselves in Russia's historical sphere of influence and to temper Russia's behaviour domestically (in the case of Chechnya) have resulted in a backlash within Russia and have fuelled the desire in Russia to regain past glories. Moreover, the integration of former Russian satellites into Western economic and military organizations such as the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are being viewed as a potential threat to Russian power and

⁶³ Charles F. Doran. "Systemic Disequilibrium, Foreign Policy Role, and the Power Cycle" *op. cit.*, p. 377

influence. Thus, as might be expected according to power cycle theory, external pressure is being placed on Russia to contract its international interests to better align them with Russia's current capabilities.

Power cycle theory maintains that domestic foreign policy elites within the state must either decide to seek accommodation through a contraction in the scope and magnitude of the state interests abroad or attempt to deal with the consequences of inaction for their own security. When the state brings its interests into alignment with its power, another stage of the adjustment process has been completed. The Russian Federation has yet to accomplish or even near this stage of adjustment.

Doran maintains that at this point the ascending power or hegemon and other states would be free to make adjustments in the magnitude of their own interests to make them consonant with their own relatively larger capability. This would constitute the third adjustment stage. Power and interest would now be balanced internal to each state and externally, and general equilibrium would once again prevail throughout the system.⁶⁴

As will be evidenced in the case of the Russian Federation the adjustments required for maintaining such equilibrium are not so easily effected. Power cycle theory states that either the declining state or the rising state may not want to yield to necessity. The declining state may refuse to acknowledge the disparity between its surplus of ends and paucity of means. It may instead attempt to hang on to vestiges of past prestige and systemic responsibility until other countries on the ascendant attempt to wrench part of that process away, perhaps by armed force.

⁶⁴ Charles F. Doran. Systems in Crisis op. cit., p. 170

Power balancing will likely occur as a result of a declining power attempting to maintain its international role. Power balancing is a term used for short-term strategic power considerations. Power is balanced in essentially two ways, internally via a mobilization of forces and other capabilities, or externally via the formation of coalitions and formal alliances.⁶⁵ The glaring gap between power and interest for the declining state cannot be artificially bolstered through alliance arrangements either. Other more powerful actors must take over the leadership roles in the system, or the responsibilities of leadership must be adequately redistributed among several actors. An assessment of the Russian Federation's attempts at balancing American hegemony will come in chapters three and four.

Power cycle maintains that redistribution of interests may not go smoothly or evenly since there is no arbitrator or other authority to manage the process (as the international system is anarchic), and since rules are ambiguous as to who should assume what position. Indeed, regarding vital interests such as territorial sovereignty, no massive peaceful adjustment has ever occurred historically except after the wars fought over them, through the peace conferences at the end of major wars. Important incremental redistribution of non-vital foreign policy interests, however, can and must occur at other times so as to prevent disequilibria from amounting and to prevent these other interests from becoming confused with vital interests. These judgments are made on the basis of a re-conceptualization of the interests and capabilities of the state in decline.

Power cycle theory argues that equilibrium deals with the rights of states, individually and collectively, as members of the global political community to possess a

⁶⁵ Charles F. Doran. Systems in Crisis op. cit., p. 168

role commensurate with their power. When the power of a state increases substantially over time, the state has a right to expect greater leadership and order-maintenance functions. Conversely, if power is in decline, the declining state has an obligation to acknowledge this relative decline by ceding some of its interests to other states in the system and by yielding some of its status and salience.⁶⁶

Power cycle theory posits a method of rectifying the growing tensions between the leading states and reestablishing systemic equilibria. It posits that the members of the central system, threatened by a challenger have two choices: (i) they can oppose the challenger by force, and can seek to balance the challenger by forming a coalition against it or (ii) they can seek to adjust their own foreign policy behaviour so as to appease the challenger and to make greater room for it in the councils of the central system through adaptation. The basic thrust of the former is to constrain the actions of the challenger by opposition; the latter is to yield a place for the challenger so as to create a larger role for it in regime and order maintenance.⁶⁷

Whether systems transformation is peaceful is a direct result of how it is managed by the leading states. When a balance of power approach to challenge is worked out and attuned to the disposition of the declining actor, keeping it within proper territorial limits, peace is likely to prevail despite tension and turbulence. Systems transformation from one condition of structural equilibrium to another will occur regardless of the purposeful actions of statesmen. Hence, the time to do something about disequilibrium is when the first structural flaws appear, not when the structure of the system is nearing collapse under

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 171

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 179

the additional weight of fear and divergent understanding accompanying critical change.⁶⁸

Power cycle theory states that only by eliminating or curbing the emergent disparity of means and ends within the international system can this breakdown of the norms of world order be averted.⁶⁹

The utility of the power cycle theory in gaining a greater understanding of the Russo-American relationship will be tested in the following chapters of this thesis. In order to adequately assess its uses, it is necessary to delve deeper into Russia's power-role disequilibria, which has served to increase tensions in the Russo-American relationship.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 172

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 176

Chapter Two

Changing Perceptions of Russia's Role in the International System

The relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation is showing signs of increasing strain. A number of theorists maintain that after a ten-year period of more or less stable relations, these states are on the edge of confrontation.⁷⁰ Alexei Arbatov has stated that the priorities of Washington and Moscow are so different that they “understand the concerns, motives, and goals of one another in the field of international security to a much lesser extent than they did in the epoch of severe conflict.”⁷¹

The development of the new world order has yet to create the basis for stable perceptions of geopolitical realities among the major international actors. The changing nature of relations has set the stage for nebulous patterns of interaction. The character of interaction is, to an extent, governed by the perceptions of individual leaders and national administrations. Perceptions play an integral role in the initiation of conflict in Doran's power cycle theory, thus, an analysis of the nature of perceptions and misperceptions of the international system, in the United States and the Russian Federation, would prove enlightening in ascertaining the utility of this theory.

Methodology

This chapter is divided into two parts: Russian perceptions and American perceptions. In order to assess the differences in conceptions of geopolitical realities,

⁷⁰ N. Zagladin. “Noviy mirovoy besporyadok i vneshnyaya politika Rossii,” in *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* n.1, 2000, p.14. and Sherle R. Schwenninger. “World Order Lost” op. cit., p.42. and Nicolai N. Petro. “Legacy of Containment: Reshaping US Foreign Policy Toward Russia,” in *Harvard International Review*, Fall 1997, p.38 and S. Kortunov. “Rossiya - Ssha: put' k partnerstvu,” in *MEMO* n.1, 1996, p. 70.

⁷¹ D. Trenin. “Rossiya i Amerika: pora nevelikikh ozhidanii,” in *MEMO* n.1, 1999, p.56.

three fundamental areas of disagreement between these states will be addressed: differing perceptions of the end of the Cold War; discontinuity in perceptions of Russia's position in the geopolitical order, and disparities in views of the international system itself.

Divergences in these underlying conceptions have and will continue to constitute the basis for conflictual interaction⁷², specific incidents of which will be evidenced in the following chapters.

Though the issues to be addressed in assessing American and Russian perceptions are similar, the approaches employed in each case will differ. This is a result of the distinctive and idiosyncratic natures of the development of their foreign policies. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian foreign policy has evidenced a rather linear progression from an overtly pro-Western stance to an increasingly Eurasian inclination, based upon the national interests of the Russian Federation. Though lapses, uncertainties, and disagreements have characterized the foreign policy of the Russian Federation since 1991, it is possible to identify the direction in which Russian foreign policy has been moving.

American foreign policy cannot be assessed in a similar manner. No such pattern of development is visible. American rhetoric has largely remained consistent from the end of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe until the present day. Thus, it proves futile to investigate any sort of progression. However, a development can be witnessed in the manner in which American rhetoric and policy have become increasingly divergent over time. Whereas the rhetoric has remained the same, policies have moved

⁷² Ibid., p.53

further and further apart from stated goals. Therefore, a more accurate assessment of American foreign policy would entail an analysis of its paradoxical nature.

As a result of the differing characters of foreign policy development within these states, the two methods of analysis utilized have been employed in different ways. The first part of the research involved the assessment of policy statements, security policies, and speeches. These documents, in the Russian case, serve to demonstrate the development and progression of Russian foreign policy over time. Thus, they are instrumental in delving into the perceptions underlying Russian foreign policy. In the American case, the official documents and rhetorical statements are employed largely in juxtaposition with actual foreign policy. They have been used to demonstrate the growing disparities between the rhetoric and the policies implemented. Therefore, the importance of the official statements will be mitigated in the American section and emphasized in the Russian section.

The second type of analysis focused on political and academic critiques. This study entailed an assessment of academic journals and critiques of foreign policy. The employment of these sources differed between the American and Russian cases in this area as well. As a relative foreign policy consensus has emerged within the foreign policy elite of the Russian Federation, academic writings tend not to drastically oppose or challenge the official policies of the state.

However, the case of the United States is far different. Foreign policy pundits, academics, and theorists frequently note the disparity between the rhetoric and the policies of the American government. Thus, academic journals and critiques of American foreign

policy proved much more vital in this case. They permit a greater understanding of the nature of the divergence between rhetoric and policy as well as the range of thinking about foreign policy issues. The journal '*Foreign Affairs*' permits the views and opinions of a number of extremely important foreign policy pundits and individuals with much influence in foreign policy circles to express their views. Individuals with significant influence on the American foreign policy making process including Henry Kissinger, Strobe Talbott (Deputy Secretary of State), Jack F. Matlock Jr. (American Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1987 to 1991), Bill Bradley (Democratic Senator from New Jersey), Richard Holbrooke (Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs) are all contributors to this journal. Therefore, an emphasis on academic works and critiques of foreign policy proves instrumental in gaining a greater understanding of the policies themselves, their impacts, and the perceptions of foreign policy-makers and of the larger public discourse in the context of decision-making.

It is necessary to state emphatically that this thesis in no way attempts to cover the entirety of American or Russian foreign policy agendas. This would prove beyond the scope of this work. Rather it seeks to gain insight into the perceptions underlying the foreign policy positions and behaviours of these states. As perceptions play such an integral role in power cycle theory, it is necessary to isolate these factors in order to test the uses of this theory in this particular bilateral relationship.

Another factor, which must be taken into consideration, is the changing nature of the domestic political realities within these states. The Russian Federation has very recently elected a new President. Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, the potential for

changes in foreign policy seem highly likely. The brevity of President Putin's time in office makes any sort of accurate analysis of his foreign policy position dubious and open to inaccuracies. At this point, it is impossible to discern whether the rhetoric and the policies of his administration will correspond and whether they will reflect continuity or change. Thus, this thesis will only address his administration to a limited degree.

The upcoming Presidential election in the United States also has the potential to bring a very different government to power. However, the utility of Doran's theoretical construct will rest not simply upon an individual but rather upon a cyclical process of power relations. Thus, it is possible to recognize the dynamism and contextuality of the international system without ceding the capacity to identify patterns of interaction. Moreover, this thesis contends that trends in foreign policy behaviour are not simply a result of the eccentricities of individual leaders but also of ingrained value systems and historic expectations. In this context it is possible to begin assessing the diverging perceptions of contextual international realities held by these states.

I. Russian Perceptions

Who Won the Cold War?

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international environment created in the post-World War II era ceased to exist. With the end of the long-established order there occurred a re-evaluation and re-conceptualization of both the international structure itself and the geostrategic priorities of the states within the global system. It is the variations in the conceptions that have emerged which form one of the bases for conflictual interaction between the Russian Federation and the United States.

The circumstances surrounding the end of the Cold War are an arena of dispute between Russia and the United States. A number of influential American politicians and academics have spoken of American victory in the Cold War.⁷³ Within numerous Russian academic and political circles the conclusion of the Cold War is most definitely not seen as a defeat for the Russian Federation.⁷⁴ These individuals avow that Russia has made an immense sacrifice in the name of general human interests, a new civilized and humane world order and a common European home. This sacrifice was the peaceful abandonment of the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union itself.⁷⁵

A number of these Russian scholars also contend that the American political elite has supported the idea of American victory in the Cold War in order to encourage the development of the idea of American global leadership and dominance.⁷⁶ National Security Adviser to the Russian President, Sergey Kortunov concedes that the possibility exists that since the end of bipolarity there were more than a few American politicians honestly believing that they had instigated and achieved the collapse of the 'evil empire'. However, he argues, this has only led to attempts at institutionalizing their alleged victory and consolidating a geopolitical order beneficial to the United States.⁷⁷

In the international press and publications, theses have arisen noting that America and the free world it leads won a decisive victory in the Cold War against a powerful enemy in the face of Soviet totalitarian imperialism. Some Russian scholars argue that this

⁷³ Ibid., p.55.

⁷⁴ Anatol Lieven. "Ham-Fisted Hegemon: the Clinton Administration and Russia," in *Current History* October 1999. p.312 and D. Trenin. "Rossiya i Amerika: pora nevelikikh ozhidanii," op. cit., p.55.

⁷⁵ Anatol Lieven. "Ham-Fisted Hegemon" op. cit., p.312

⁷⁶ D. Trenin. "Rossiya i Amerika: pora nevelikikh ozhidanii," op. cit., p.55.

⁷⁷ S. Kortunov. "Rossiya - Ssha: put' k partnyorstvu," op. cit., p. 71.

theory ignores many intricacies of the unique set of circumstances existing at the time.⁷⁸

They maintain that it is impossible to deny that America and the West, on the whole, finished in the role of victors in the historical race with the Soviet Union and the Communist system. However, it would be entirely inaccurate to view the Soviet Union as having surrendered itself to the mercy of its enemy, and as a result is surrendering its geopolitical superpowerhood and military strength.⁷⁹

Russian Conceptions of Russia's Role in the Geopolitical System

It would be inaccurate as well as misleading to describe Russian foreign policy since the collapse of the Soviet Union as either fluid or clearly delineated. Rather, foreign policy has been an arena for a multiplicity of actors with very disparate perceptions of Russia's true path. With the end of empire, internal arguments in Russia about the state's proper role in world affairs had an impact on Russia's comportment in international politics. A variety of groups attempted and succeeded in pushing Russia's foreign policy in contradictory directions. The initial foreign policy tensions began in 1992 with a strong and idealistic inclination toward the West. This was largely a continuation of the 'New Political Thinking' and the priority on international accommodation brought forward under Mikhail Gorbachev.⁸⁰

In this period the Russian Foreign Ministry was seeking the goals of abandoning most efforts to achieve military-strategic parity with the United States, pursuing broad political cooperation with its newly found partners in the United Nations Security Council,

⁷⁸ K. Gadzhiev. "Ot bipolyarnoy k novoy konfiguratsii geopoliticheskikh sil," in *MEMO* n.1, 1993, p.64. and N. Kosolapov. "Novaya Rossiya i strategiya zapada," in *MEMO* n.1, 1994, p.5.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 5.

⁸⁰ Franklyn Griffiths. "From Situations of Weakness: Foreign Policy of the New Russia," in the *International Journal* v. 49 n.4, 1994, p.704.

and attempting to gain full participation in international economic institutions such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the International Monetary Fund. Yeltsin's visits to Germany, Italy, France, Britain, Canada, the United States, the United Nations Security Council, and his participation in the G-7 economic summit in Munich, accurately mirrored the new objectives in 1992 and early 1993. The Western inclination of Russian foreign policy was also evident in its policies on a number of important issues, including support for United Nations sanctions against Russia's old allies Serbia, Iraq, and Libya, and the negotiation of the START II agreement.⁸¹

In August 1992, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev was receiving ever-increasing pressure for being too liberal and too pro-Western. Some went so far as to describe the first Russian Federation foreign policy line implemented in 1992 as resembling, particularly at the outset, the posture of a country defeated in war and forced to sue for peace on unfavorable terms.⁸² Kozyrev took much of the blame for this pursuit of a strictly Atlanticist foreign policy position. He was a great supporter of the idea that Russia's future lay in its ability to be incorporated into Europe. He wrote that

"the way was clear once again for Russia to reclaim its status as a normal country and to become a reliable partner in the community of civilized states."⁸³

Kozyrev argued that the anti-Western ideas of his opponents were based on a besieged-fortress mentality and a psychology of mistrust of the United States. An ardent critic '*Komsomol'skaya Pravda*' journalist Alexander Vasilev contended that Russia was

⁸¹ Hannes Adomeit. *Russian National Security Interests*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 34.

⁸² Coit D. Blacker. *Russia and the West*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) p. 173.

⁸³ George Rouper and P. Van Ham. "Zapadnaya politika Rossii," in *MEMO* n.1, 1994, p. 81

pursuing an almost exclusively pro-Western and pro-American foreign policy line because it lacked an overall concept of foreign relations.⁸⁴ In response to strong criticism of Kozyrev's lack of a focused foreign policy, on 1 December 1992, the Foreign Ministry issued the first foreign policy concept for the independent Russia, describing the main principles guiding Russian foreign policy. The basic premise of the concept was

“that Russia's foreign policy must meet fundamental national interests...to strengthen its security in every respect, revive Russia as a free, democratic country, provide favourable conditions for the formation of an efficient market economy in keeping with the status of a great power and for the entry of the Russian Federation into the world community.”⁸⁵

Though the document proved too broad and Western-oriented for Kozyrev's critics, it also marked the beginning of a trend, which was to continue in all of the following Russian national security documents to the present day, namely the assertion of Russia's position as a major power in the international system. A consensus had emerged as to Russia's necessary geopolitical status. A number of Russian academics have maintained that “it has become evident that there is a problem with the current state of the system of international relations. Russia demands a new role in them.”⁸⁶

With the beginning of the third year of Russian independence Russian foreign policy became more robust and deliberate. There occurred a reorientation away from a Western- and America-oriented stance. An argument cited frequently in the Russian press to explain the redirection of foreign policy held that Russia had for too long played the role of junior partner to the West, especially the United States, and that it had finally shed

⁸⁴ Suzanne Crow. “Competing Blueprints for Russian Foreign Policy,” in *RFE/RL Research Reports* v.1 n.50, 18 December 1992, p.47.

⁸⁵ “Russia's Foreign Policy Concept 1992,” in *International Affairs (Moscow)* n.1, January 1993, p.1.

⁸⁶ N. Zagladin. “Noviy mirovoy besporyadok,” op. cit., p.14. and N. Kosolapov. “Novaya Rossiya i strategiya zapada,” op. cit., p.5.

this role in favour of pursuing an independent foreign policy based on its own national interests.⁸⁷ Yeltsin spoke with increasing frequency of Western discrimination against Russia and attempts to force Russia into the role of a junior partner.⁸⁸ Moreover, as Vladimir Lukin, Russia's former ambassador to the United States, remarked:

“In recent times there seem to have been two images of my country ingrained in the American political mind. One is of the global Cold War rival. The other is of a democratic, westernized country playing the role of America's junior partner. Unfortunately, this oversimplified view causes many Americans to conclude that if Russia ceases to be the latter, it has to become once again the former.”⁸⁹

The consensus that emerged was and continues to be the desire to maintain Russia's status as one of the world's great powers and not merely in relation to its formal status in the United Nations.⁹⁰ Rather, it desires an international recognition of its influence and might. Great powerhood is one of those ephemeral terms frequently heard but rarely operationalized. The nature of the great powers in the new world order may be far different from those that existed within the context of the Cold War. In the past, great powerhood resulted from military might and territorial expansion. It would seem that great power status in this present and near future will likely rest upon economic and technological bases. However, it remains unclear whether the great power status sought by Russian foreign policy makers and pundits alike will rest upon the historic or the more recent meaning of the term.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p.1.

⁸⁸ Suzanne Crow. “Why Has Russian Foreign Policy Changed?” in *RFE/RL Research Report* v.3 n.18, 6 May 1994, p.1.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p.4

⁹⁰ A. Arbatov. “Rossiya: natsional'naya bezopasnost' v 90-e godi,” in *MEMO* n.1, 1994, p.5.

The following chapters will demonstrate the foreign policy directives undertaken toward this end. These policies have sought to re-establish Russian power not merely rhetorically but through the reinvigoration of Russia's role in the area of the former Soviet Union and the building of a number of strategic alliances. Policies regarding Russian national interests and the strategic goals of national security were institutionalized by Andrei Kozyrev, Pavel Grachev, the Defense Minister, and Evgeny Ambarsumov, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in Parliament, all of whom endorsed a compromise Foreign Policy Concept, which was adopted by the Security Council in April 1993. This policy focused on three fundamental objectives of national consensus: Russia as a regional superpower, Russia as a nuclear superpower, and Russia as a world great power.⁹¹ The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, in the very first paragraphs, underscores the utility of Russian foreign policy in formulating

“the conditions for the equal and natural inclusion of the Russian Federation in the world community as a great power with many centuries of history, a unique geopolitical position, adequate military might, and considerable technological, intellectual, and ethnic potential.”⁹²

Russian politicians and academics alike contend that Russia cannot fail to be a great power as it occupies a vital place in the geostrategic structure of the world, its enormous territory connecting Europe and Asia into a single Eurasian continent. They purport that it is impossible not to acknowledge that Russia remains one of the only global

⁹¹ Leon Aron and Kenneth M. Jensens, eds. *The Russian Foreign Policy Concept*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1994, p. 23.

⁹² *Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs Concept Document, No. 1615/IS*, “Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation,” FBIS-USR-93-037. 25 March 1993, p.1-58.

powers with the capabilities to destroy the United States. These, in addition to other factors, constituted and continue to form the basis for Russia's truly great power role.⁹³

Press spokesman Vyacheslav Kostikov's comments during Yeltsin's December 1993 visit to Brussels characterized Russia's developing position quite aptly: "Russia considers itself to be a great power and the successor to the Soviet Union and all its might. Everybody clearly understands that Russia cannot and does not want to wait in the foyer of the 'European house' and to ask permission to enter."⁹⁴

In a move designed to signal the end of one era and the opening of another, on 5 January 1996, the Kremlin announced Kozyrev's resignation and Primakov's appointment as Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation.⁹⁵ However, the hardening of the Russian line toward the West began well in advance of Primakov's elevation to Foreign Minister.⁹⁶ In his first press conference on 12 January 1996 Russia's new Foreign Minister placed great emphasis on the key themes that were to become associated with his stewardship. At the center of his vision was Primakov's contention that despite the country's current travails

"Russia...remains a great power... The Russian Federation's foreign policy should correspond to that status."⁹⁷

It is in this context that Russian foreign policy continued to move in the direction of demanding the maintenance of its role as one of the most influential states in the international system. The next foreign policy concept emerged in late 1997. The Russian

⁹³ K. Gadzhiev, op. cit., p.72.

⁹⁴ Suzanne Crow. "Russia Asserts its Strategic Agenda," in *RFE/RL Research Report* v.2 n.50, 17 December 1993. p.2.

⁹⁵ Suzanne Crow. "Why Has Russian Foreign Policy Changed?" op. cit., p.3.

⁹⁶ Coit D. Blacker. op. cit., p. 178.

⁹⁷ Coit D. Blacker. op. cit., p. 183.

National Security Blueprint was a political document reflecting the aggregate of officially accepted views regarding goals and state strategy, in the sphere of ensuring state security. The emphasis on preserving Russia's geopolitical and geostrategic position as a great power continued to be a central tenet of Russian foreign policy. This document conceded that:

“Russia's influence on resolving cardinal questions of international life which affect the state's interests has decreased significantly...in these conditions the desire of a number of states to weaken Russia's positions in the political, economic, and military spheres has increased. All of this is unacceptable to it as an influential European-Asian power. The Russian Federation's national interests in the international sphere require the implementation of an active foreign policy course aimed at consolidating Russia's positions as a great power...”⁹⁸

With the ascension of Vladimir Putin to the presidency of the Russian Federation, it remains yet unclear how this administration will address the question of Russia's great power status. However, it is possible to briefly outline the nature of the new defense policy of the Russian Federation, adopted on 10 January 2000, which corresponds with existing patterns of development in Russian foreign policy.

The hallmarks of the new defense policy are threefold: firstly, the perception that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization uses force freely and will not hesitate to use it against Russia over political disagreements. Secondly, a realistic appreciation of how Russia's weakened conventional forces are unable to resist a large-scale conventional attack by NATO. Thirdly, nuclear weapons are seen as the only reliable means to dissuade NATO from using force against Russia. The harsh language of recent official

⁹⁸ Ibid., p.4-5

documents appear to be intended to ward off this perceived threat.⁹⁹ Though it is possible to witness the continuation of the pattern of foreign policy development, at the current time it would be unwise to attempt to assess the nature of Russian foreign policy under new leadership. It is necessary to wait until a sufficient time period has elapsed, to give greater insight into Putin's administration.

It is the developing consensus as to the non-compromisable desire of Russian foreign policy makers and foreign policy pundits on the maintenance and consolidation of Russia's major power status, which sets the context for future Russian foreign policy developments. The desire for the maintenance of a vital position in geopolitical relations is one of the bases for Russia's interpretation of the nature of the international order.

Russia's Perception of the Structure of the International Order

The end of the Cold War initiated the question of a new configuration of geopolitical power. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and thus one pole of power, the exact form of this new order was undefined. As has been demonstrated above, the Russian Federation seeks to maintain itself as a great power with significant influence in the new world order. In order to accomplish this task it has been essential for Russia to develop a conception of its own national interests. Therefore, the character of national interest and the policies commensurate with the maintenance of the status of great power have become central themes in the Russian foreign policy debate.

Two key factors in the attainment of Russian foreign policy interests and thereby interests in and of themselves are the creation and consolidation of a multipolar

⁹⁹ Nikolai Sokov. "Russia's New Security Concept: the Nuclear Angle." <http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nuclear/Gazeta012400.html>. Accessed 26 May 2000.

geopolitical order and the prevention of a unipolar hegemonic world order led by the United States. Andrei Kozyrev, former Russian Foreign Minister supported this notion when he stated in 1994:

“one thing is sufficiently clear: the international order in the twenty-first century will not be a Pax Americana or any other version of unipolar...dominance.”¹⁰⁰

Numerous Russian academics and political actors deny the hegemony of the United States following the end of the Cold War. They maintain that though it is true that America is a strong economic and military power, it is a power that heavily relies and depends upon its allies.¹⁰¹ Thus, it cannot deem itself to be an independent center of global power and leadership.

As foreign policy positions have developed and evolved, the Russian Federation’s foreign policy has sought the multipolarization of world politics more and more vociferously. This foreign policy direction seeks to institute a geopolitical system comprised of regional hegemonies and international cooperation. As early as the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept, the Russian Federation emphasized one of the main characteristics of contemporary world developments as being

“a change in the pattern of the world balance of influence; the disappearance of bipolarity in its global dimension; and the intensification of regional trends towards forming power centers.”¹⁰²

With the backlash against the Western-oriented policies of Foreign Minister Kozyrev, the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation served to reinforce the desire for the creation of a multipolar order more beneficial to the Russian Federation’s

¹⁰⁰ Andrey Kozyrev. “The Lagging Partnership,” in *Foreign Affairs* v.73 n.3, May/June 1994, p. 60.

¹⁰¹ K. Gadzhiev. op. cit., p.67.

¹⁰² “Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept,” op. cit., p. 2.

national interests. This behaviour was not simply a matter of the Russian foreign policy establishment attempting to forge an international role for itself more commensurate with its capabilities. Rather, it was an active attempt to weaken and realign the developing geopolitical order.

The 1993 Foreign Policy Concept contends that one of the characteristic traits of world politics in the coming years will be the “struggle between the polycentrism of world politics with Europe, Japan, and other states aspiring to the role of regional centers.”¹⁰³ In addition, this movement would entail attempts by the United States to retain its leadership. This document consistently reinforces the “emergence of regional central power relations” and the fact that “Russia...as a great power is responsible together with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council for maintaining world peace and security...”¹⁰⁴ On an even more assertive note the policy states that:

“We must firmly oppose any possible recurrences of imperialist manifestations in Washington’s policy, or any efforts to realize the policy of turning the United States into the ‘only superpower’.”¹⁰⁵

The 1997 Russian National Security Blueprint reinforces the idea of the creation of a multipolar international order. It contends that the international arena is characterized by strengthening trends toward the formation of a multipolar world.

“The Russian Federation’s national interests in the international sphere requires the implementation of an active foreign policy course aimed at consolidating Russia’s positions as a great power...”¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Ibid., p.2

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p.2

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p.2

¹⁰⁶ *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, “Russian National Security Blueprint” 26 December 1997, FBIS-SOV-97-364, 30 December 1997, p.4-5

These changes are manifested in the improvement of the economic and political positions of a considerable number of states and their integration-oriented associations, and in the improvement of mechanisms for multilateral control of international politics, economic, financial, and informational processes. This document also shows a more overtly negative stance with regard to the existence of a unipolar order. It states that “relapses into attempts to create a structure of international relations based on one-sided solutions of the key problems of world politics, including solutions based on military force, are still strong at the present stage of the process.”¹⁰⁷

This 1997 Foreign Policy Blueprint advocates attaining a multipolar geopolitical system and delineates the sources of threat a hegemonic system would perpetuate. It maintains that “threats to the Russian Federation’s national security in the international sphere are manifested via the attempts of other states to counter Russia’s consolidation as an influential center of the multipolar world that is taking shape. Through these policies, these states are seeking to reduce the Russian Federation’s importance in the solution of key problems of the world community and in the activity of international organizations.”¹⁰⁸ In an overt desire to maintain a multipolar system and prevent the emergence of a unipolar international order, Yeltsin stated in late 1999 that:

“There hasn’t existed nor will there exist a time when Bill Clinton unilaterally dictates to the entire world how to live, how to work, and how to rest.”¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 4-5.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 4-5

¹⁰⁹ Dmitrii Gornostayev. “Yeltsin napomnil klintonu i miru Rossiya ostaetsya yadernoy derzhavoy,” in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, Friday 10 December 1999, No. 232 (2048), p. A2

The Yeltsin administration also underscored the calls for a greater level of pluralism in the international system through speeches as well as policy statements. In a summit with China held in December 1999, Yeltsin expressed the view that both China and Russia are to be held profoundly responsible for pushing forward multipolarization and maintaining the global strategic balance and stability. He stressed that his country firmly stands for establishing a multipolar world, saying that global issues cannot be determined by a single country, but rather, must be decided by all countries in the world. He emphatically noted that:

“Major issues concerning the future and destiny of the world can only be determined with extensive participation by the entire international community.”¹¹⁰

This policy of the multipolarization of the geopolitical order has continued into the new administration of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The newest foreign policy document to emerge is even more explicit in its demands for a multipolar order. The Russian National Security Concept of 2000 states that Russia will facilitate the development of the creation of a multipolar world. It also recognizes the opposition to this policy.

“There is an attempt by developed Western countries, led by the USA, to create a structure of international relations based on their domination and providing for unilateral solution of the key problems of global politics. This would be accomplished, above all, with the use of military force, in violation of the fundamental norms of international law.”¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ Zhao Yingxin. “China, Russia Advance Strategic Partnership,” in *Beijing Review*, 20 December 1999

¹¹¹ “National Security Concept of the Russian Federation” <http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nuclear/Gazeta012400.html>. Full English translation from *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 18 January 2000. Accessed 26 May 2000.

Some Russian academics maintain that the United States has not changed its role as a result of the end of the Cold War and the development of the new world order. They contend that through inertia America has continued to play the role of defender of the free world, in essence acting as the world's policeman.¹¹² Perhaps, this is one of the reasons that the Russian Federation so vehemently opposes the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. According to Russia's 2000 National Security Blueprint:

“NATO's expansion to the East and its transformation into a dominant military-political force in Europe creates the threat of a new split in the continent which would be extremely dangerous given the preservation in Europe of mobile strike groupings of troops and nuclear weapons and also the inadequate effectiveness of multilateral mechanisms for maintaining peace...the conservation or creation by major powers (and their coalitions) of powerful groupings of armed forces in regions adjacent to Russia's territory remains a threat to Russia's national security in the defense sphere even when there are no aggressive intentions with regard to Russia, these groupings present a potential military danger.”¹¹³

The above section has demonstrated that there exist two foci of the Russian Federation's foreign policy, which have been overarching themes in Russo-American geopolitical relations. Both Russian rhetoric and policy evidence the desire to maintain the Russian role as a global power with far-reaching influence. The nature of their interests is subsumed in this conception. The second tenet of Russian foreign policy is the desire to create and maintain a multipolar global arena in which Russia will continue to play a central role as a result of its history, vital geographic location, and potential military and political influence. The Russian conception of the world order and its position in it is far different than the views held by the United States as will be evidenced in the next

¹¹² N. Zagladin. “Nekotorie aspekty novogo geostrategicheskogo polozheniya Rossii,” in *MEMO* n. 1, 1993, p.7. and K. Gadzhiev. op. cit., p.67.

¹¹³ *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, “Russian National Security Blueprint” op. cit., p.4-5.

section. Thus, it is necessary to assess the nature of the contentions purported by the United States in order to gain a greater understanding of the nature of conflictual relations.

II. American Perceptions

Who Won the Cold War?

Throughout the American rhetoric and literature there is largely a consensus on the victory of the United States in the Cold War and its ascent to a position of international hegemony, with the demise of its rival superpower.¹¹⁴ Now that the Russian perceptions have been addressed it is necessary to investigate the other side of the bilateral relationship. The following section demonstrates the character of American foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. It shows that perceptions in America and Russia diverge with regard to both Russia's role in the new world order as well as the nature of the order itself.

This section will look, not so much at the chronological development of American foreign policy, as at the dichotomies in the rhetoric versus policies. This is because only in the recent past have policies begun to change as a result of the weakening of bilateral relations. Up until this point the American foreign policy orientation was largely consistent over time. What has increasingly occurred is a growing disparity between American rhetoric and American foreign policy. The nature of American foreign policy toward the Russian Federation will be assessed along three dimensions: integration of Russia into the world community; strengthening of Russian democracy and economy; and

¹¹⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski. "A Geostrategy for Eurasia," in *Foreign Affairs* v.76 n.5, September/October 1997, p.52 and Bill Bradley. "Eurasia Letter: a Misguided Russia Policy," in *Foreign Policy* n.101, Winter 1995/1996, p.91.

potential for a true US-Russian alliance. Each of these policies has been central to the foreign policy of the United States with regard to the Russian Federation.

America's Conception of Russia's Role in the Geopolitical Order

With the end of the Cold War the possibility for the cessation of hostilities and the creation of a strategic alliance between the United States and the Russian Federation was thought to be possible. However, it seems as though we may now be standing on the brink of major complications in relations between the United States and Russia. A number of American foreign policy pundits contend that one of the most serious blemishes in Clinton's record is America's deteriorating relationship with Russia. They maintain that by almost any measure, the state of Russo-American relations has declined significantly during Clinton's presidency.¹¹⁵ Tensions in the bilateral relationship have been fueled by NATO expansion, the American desire to alter the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and American indifference to Russian interests in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Caspian basin.¹¹⁶

American foreign policy statements and policies, since the fall of the Soviet Union, have supported the notion that Russia remains an extremely geopolitically important actor. Bush's National Security Strategy of August 1991 stated that, "the Soviet Union is and will remain a military super-power."¹¹⁷ Moreover, President Bush held three summit meetings with President Yeltsin within a period of 13 months. In February 1992 at Camp David the two presidents agreed that their countries would not regard one another as

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 51. and Anatol Lieven, op. cit., p. 308. and Stephen M. Walt. "Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy," in *Foreign Affairs* v.79 n.2, March/April 2000, p. 70.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 70.

¹¹⁷ "National Security Strategy of the United States," August 1991, <http://www.fas.org/man/docs/918015-nss.htm>. Accessed May 16, 2000.

potential enemies, a step forward from the 1989 Malta accord with Gorbachev, which agreed to the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union would not regard each other as actual enemies. In June 1992 in Washington they signed a Charter on Russian-American relations. Finally, in January 1993 in Moscow another major strategic arms reduction treaty (START II) was signed.¹¹⁸

Bush's successor Democratic President Bill Clinton also sought to vocally emphasize the partnership between the Russian Federation and the United States. He maintained in a speech, early in his presidency that "nothing could contribute more to global freedom, security, and prosperity than the peaceful progression of Russia's rebirth."¹¹⁹ Furthermore, at the Vancouver Summit between Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton in April 1993, President Clinton declared a desire to give "fresh impetus to development of the US-Russian relationship in all its dimensions."¹²⁰

In September 1994, at the opening of a Russian exhibit at the Library of Congress, President Clinton's address demonstrated a continued emphasis on cooperation between these two states. He argued that "as we remember the ties between Russia and America of two centuries ago, let us welcome our new ties and the new spirit of cooperation and a new century of partnership that lies ahead..."¹²¹

¹¹⁸ Raymond L. Garthoff. "US Relations with Russia: the First Five Years," in *Current History Online*, October 1997. <http://www.brookings.org/views/articles/garthoff/1997CH.HTM/> Accessed 20 June 2000.

¹¹⁹ White House Office of the Press Secretary, Prepared Remarks of President William J. Clinton to the American Society of Newspaper Editors. April 1 1993, "A Strategic Alliance with Russian Reform," <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1993/4/1/6.text.1>. Accessed 20 June 2000.

¹²⁰ White House Office of the Press Secretary, April 4 1993, "Joint Statement by President Clinton and President Yeltsin at the Summit in Vancouver," <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1993/4/4/2.text.2>, Accessed June 19, 2000.

¹²¹ White House Office of the Press Secretary, 28 September 1994. "Remarks by the President at the Opening of an Exhibit on Russian Settlements," Washington DC. <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1994/9/28/18.text.1>. Accessed June 19, 2000.

Clinton's policies have vocally maintained that despite its weaknesses, Russia remains a vital strategic and security interest of the United States and Europe.¹²² This is largely a result of three factors: Russia is the world's largest source of poorly guarded nuclear weapons and technology, as well as chemical and biological arms; Russia's geopolitical location in the heartland of Eurasia makes it both a European and an Asian power and thus a key player in Central Asia and to a lesser degree the Middle East and South Asia; and finally Russia contains the largest deposits of oil and gas in the world - the combined reserves of the former Soviet states are larger than those of Saudi Arabia.¹²³

Critics of the Clinton administration's Russia policy since 1995, including former policy advisers Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, began to argue that it was wrong to presume a consonance of values between Russia and the United States. These individuals proposed that accepting Russia as the dominant force in its region served only to encourage imperialism and weaken democracy. Instead, they maintained that the United States should do all that it could to preserve the independence of the former Soviet states from Moscow, weaken Russia, and make her a less formidable opponent for the United States in the future.¹²⁴

These pundits contend that it is not prudent to deny or forget a thousand years of Russian history, a history replete with wars of imperial aggrandizement, the Russification of ethnic minorities, absolutist and totalitarian rule. American policy toward Russia, they argue, should be based on engaged realism, aimed at defending Western interests and

¹²² Ariel Cohen. "Engaged Realism: US Foreign Policy Toward the New Russia," in *Harvard International Review*, Winter 1996/1997, p.35.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p.33.

¹²⁴ Nicolai N. Petro. "Legacy of Containment" *op. cit.*, p.38.

securing a peaceful and productive long-term relationship with the largest country in the world.¹²⁵ As will be demonstrated later in this chapter, these criticisms may be moot. In fact, the policies that these critics advocate are ingrained in American foreign policy, if not in rhetoric.

In order to gain a greater understanding of American foreign policy, it is vital to assess the precise cases in which there exist divergences between rhetoric and policy. An in-depth study of the character of American foreign policy towards the Russian Federation is beyond the capacity of this thesis. Rather, it will serve to discover general patterns of behaviour and provide an overview of foreign policy actions. The following section will address three different areas of disparity between American rhetoric and American foreign policy: strengthening the Russian state; Russian integration into the world community; and Russia as a potential ally.

Strengthening the Russian State

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it appeared as if the United States had very specific goals in mind for the Russian Federation. The Bush and Clinton administrations sought a democratically strong and economically prosperous Russia, according to rhetoric. Bush's National Security Strategy of the United States in 1991 underscored that the: "positive common basis of our alliance -- the defense of democratic values -- must be reaffirmed and strengthened."¹²⁶ At a summit held between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in Vancouver on 3 September 1993, the Presidents agreed on a new package of bilateral economic programs and measures to address Russia's immediate

¹²⁵ Ariel Cohen, *op. cit.*, p.33.

¹²⁶ "National Security Strategy of the United States," *op. cit.*

human needs and contribute to the building of necessary structures for the successful transition to a market economy.¹²⁷ On 28 September 1994 President Clinton and President Yeltsin signed a joint statement setting forth a framework for expanding bilateral trade, economic cooperation, and investment between the United States and Russia.¹²⁸

In President Clinton's speech on the record of his accomplishments on the two-year anniversary of his inauguration in January 1995, he maintained that one of his major accomplishments was "making the promotion of democracy a foreign aid priority especially in the Newly Independent States and Russia."¹²⁹ The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement of February 1996 served to reinforce the theme of American investment in the building of democracy and the creation of stability in Russia.

"President Clinton has given strong and consistent support to this unprecedented reform effort and has mobilized the international community to provide structural economic assistance; for example, by securing agreement by the G-7 to make available four billion dollars in grants and loans to Russia and the Ukraine. Through the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, the United States is working closely with Russia in priority areas, including defense, trade and science and technology."¹³⁰

The May 1997 National Security Strategy for a New Century served to further underscore the ideas of cooperation and the support of the reform processes occurring in the Russian Federation.

¹²⁷ White House Office of the Press Secretary, April 4 1993, "Joint Statement by President Clinton and President Yeltsin at the Summit in Vancouver," op. cit.

¹²⁸ White House Office of the Press Secretary, September 28 1994, "Partnership for Economic Progress, Joint Statement on Principles and Objectives for the Development of Trade, Economic Cooperation and Investment between the United States of America and the Russian Federation " <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1994/9/29/1.text.1>. Accessed 20 June 2000.

¹²⁹ White House Office of the Press Secretary, January 19 1995, "President Clinton's Record of Accomplishment on the Two Year Anniversary of his Inauguration" <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1995/1/22/2.text.1>. Accessed 20 June 2000.

¹³⁰ "National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement of the United States," (White House: Washington, February 1996). <http://www.fas.org/man/docs/918272-nss.htm>. Accessed May 16, 2000

“At the Helsinki Summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin defined an ambitious reform agenda covering key tax, energy and commercial laws crucial for Russia to realize its potential for attracting foreign investment. Further, the Presidents outlined steps that would accelerate Russian membership, on commercial terms, in key economic organizations such as the World Trade Organization and the Paris Club. It is in both Russia's interest and ours that we work with the Russian government toward passage of key economic and commercial legislation, as we continue to support...Russia's integration into various international economic institutions.”¹³¹

Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in October 1997, contended that “in Europe, we are helping the newly free nations develop their market democracies; and forging a constructive partnership with a democratic Russia”¹³² The rhetoric with regard to the support of Russian democracy and economic development continued into January 2000 when the National Security Strategy for a New Century was set forth. It maintained that, “American leadership will remain indispensable...in the coming year in helping Russia strengthen its economy and fight corruption as it heads toward its first democratic transfer of power.”¹³³

Though it appears as though the conflictual relations of the past have been put to rest, this may only be a matter of official statements and rhetoric. Some would argue that the United States has been moved primarily by security considerations, that the approach if not the strategy, of the West is to seek practical limitations on Russia's potentialities. The

¹³¹ “National Security Strategy for a New Century,” (White House: Washington, May 1997). <http://www.fas.org/man/docs/918331-nss.htm>. Accessed May 16, 2000

¹³² White House Office of the Press Secretary, October 31 1997, “Remarks by Samuel R. Berger to the NSC 50th Anniversary Symposium.” <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1997/11/17/2.text.1>. Accessed 20 June 2000.

¹³³ White House Office of the Press Secretary, 5 January 2000, “A National Security Strategy for a New Century” <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/2000/1/7/1.text.1>. Accessed 20 June 2000.

aim would be to guard against an evolution of foreign policy in Russia, which yields a renewed posture of confrontation with the West.¹³⁴

Specifically, a number of Russian academics perceive a trend in the West which seeks to weaken Russia and is associated with vigorous support for the former Soviet republics; nuclear arms control is to reduce Russia's strategic potential; Eastern Europe is to be separated from Russia; any possibility of the rebirth of Communism through the Commonwealth of Independent States is to be undone; and all means are to be used to urge a pro-Western stance upon Russia.¹³⁵

The manifestations of these intentions have been far different policies than those voiced in American rhetoric and public statements. Some theorists and foreign policy-makers contend that as a result of the strength of the United States and the weakness of Russia, Clinton has been able to ignore Russian sensitivities.¹³⁶ The United States has undertaken two significant policies, which serve to undermine Russian power and prestige.

The first of these initiatives was the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization into East Central Europe. On 12 March 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were welcomed into the Alliance. These states had been within the Russian sphere of influence since the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1918. The expansion of a military alliance, historically antagonistic to Russia, served as a reminder of Russia's current weakness. Moreover, it permitted the integration of these states, with which Russia has had historical ties, into the western bloc and away from Russian influence. As

¹³⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski. "The Premature Partnership." in *Foreign Affairs* v.73 n. 2, March/April 1994, p.76 and Sherle R. Schwenninger, op. cit., p. 51

¹³⁵ Franklyn Griffiths, op. cit., p.717. and Anatol Lieven, op. cit., p. 308.

¹³⁶ Stephen M. Walt, op. cit., p. 78.

it is very unlikely that the Russian Federation will ever accede to membership in this organization, its continued existence and expansion poses a potential military and strategic threat to Russia. Though the United States has frequently spoken of strengthening the Russian state, the expansion of NATO serves to weaken the position of this nation in a geostrategic context. This will be addressed in more detail in the following chapter.

The second instance of American foreign policy, which serves to undermine Russia's geostrategic position, is that of Clinton's commitment to a ballistic missile defense system. The Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program's objective is to: first, develop and deploy increasingly capable theater missile defenses to meet the existing missile threat to US and allied forces; second, as a hedge against the emergence of long-range ballistic missile threats, develop options to deploy a National Missile Defense for the United States; and third, continue to support research on more advanced ballistic missile defense technologies to keep pace with the threat and improve the performance of theater and NMD systems.¹³⁷ The development of a missile defense system counteracts the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty acceded to by both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Russia has been alarmed by US plans to set up a national anti-missile shield against potential attacks by 'rogue states' and has rejected American offers to amend the ABM treaty, which bans the creation of such systems. Russia's United Nations Ambassador Sergei Lavrov, in November 1999 rejected the amendments proposed by Washington, stating that:

“I want to make very clear that amendments to the ABM treaty, which would allow limited national anti-missile defense, would be against the core

¹³⁷ Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. “Making Ballistic Missile Defense a Reality,” <http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html>. Accessed 20 June 2000.

of the treaty, which prohibits such a defense and which also prohibits the creation of a basis for such defense.”¹³⁸

President Boris Yeltsin warned President Clinton in early November 1999 that American plans to build a missile defense system could have extremely dangerous consequences for three decades of arms control accords. At the same time, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman said Moscow was becoming increasingly frustrated by a series of negative signals from Washington over its commitment to reducing the number of nuclear weapons across the world. He maintained that, “the United States is attempting to violate the ABM treaty. We believe the treaty of 1972 is necessary for world security.”¹³⁹

American rhetoric regarding the desire to strengthen Russia seems to be incompatible with desires to strengthen the American geopolitical and geostrategic position at Russia’s expense. American contentions have been undermined by attempts to expand an offensive military alliance closer to Russian borders and to negate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. These acts have the potential to spawn a greater level of hostility and tensions in the Russo-American relationship.

Russian Integration into the World Community

A second area which evidences the dichotomous nature of American rhetoric and policies is that of the integration of Russia into the European and international communities. American foreign policy suggests that the United States is attempting to

¹³⁸ BMD Newswire. “Russia: US Concerns May be Met in Current ABM Pact,” Reuters 11/22/99. <http://www.clw.org/ef/bmdnews/abmdealswiththreat.html>. Accessed 20 June 2000.

¹³⁹ Elizabeth Piper. “Yeltsin Warns US Over Missile Defense Plan,” Reuters 11/22/99. <http://www.clw.org/ef/bmdnews/yeltsinletter.html>. Accessed 20 June 2000.

shape a political context that is congenial to Russia's assimilation into a larger framework of European cooperation.¹⁴⁰

Bush's 1991 National Security Strategy lauds the "expansion of commerce and the growing acceptance of market principles, which have accelerated the movement toward the interdependence and the integration of economies."¹⁴¹ His successor President Clinton has also placed great emphasis on cooperation and integration. During the Vancouver summit between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin held in April 1993, both leaders agreed that,

"Russia's harmonious integration into the community of democratic nations and the world economy is essential. They therefore called for accelerated G-7 development of substantial and effective new economic initiatives to support political and economic reform in Russia."¹⁴²

In September 1994, a senior White House administrative official stated, prior to Yeltsin's visit to the United States, that

"discussions with the Presidents in the summit of that year would be very much about integration -- Russia's economic integration with the West, which means market access on our side and on theirs; their new relationship with the European Union. It's about political integration. We have taken the step to make Russia, in effect, part of a G-8 for political issues, for global political issues. And it's very much about security integration -- NATO and Partnership for Peace."¹⁴³

Later that year President Clinton further verbalized this view when he stated that:

"Now, we must continue to reach out to Russia, and include this great nation in the fabric of Europe's emerging community of democracies. We must open the doors of Europe's institutions that nurtured peace,

¹⁴⁰ Richard Holbrooke. "America: A European Power." in *Foreign Affairs* v. 74 n. 2, March/April 1995, p.49.

¹⁴¹ "National Security Strategy of the United States," op. cit.

¹⁴² White House Office of the Press Secretary, April 4 1993, "Joint Statement by President Clinton and President Yeltsin at the Summit in Vancouver." op. cit.

¹⁴³ White House Office of the Press Secretary, September 21 1994, "Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials." <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1994/9/21/3.text.1>. Accessed 20 June 2000.

prosperity and security throughout the Cold War to Europe's new democracies, excluding no nation that shares our values and is willing and able to shoulder our common responsibilities.”¹⁴⁴

The official Western policy, as outlined by Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State for the United States in 1996, spoke of the overarching American objective of the integration of Russia into Western political, economic, and security institutions. The rhetoric has remained largely consistent over time.

Some theorists argue that, in actuality, Washington has given only lip service to the goal of integrating Russia into the Western community but in practice has repeatedly subordinated this goal to other foreign policy considerations.¹⁴⁵ However, it is necessary to note that the goal of integrating Russia into the Western community faced many difficult, if not insurmountable, obstacles. From the very beginning, it has been plagued by the fact that Russia does not fit easily into any of the Western institutions. Because of its size and geopolitical interests, it was never regarded as a serious candidate for North Atlantic Treaty Organization or European Union membership. Moreover, given its economic weakness, its partial inclusion in the G-7 was always contrived; a modest face-saving gesture to Boris Yeltsin but one that only highlighted Russia's marginal importance.¹⁴⁶ Perhaps, this was made even clearer when a White House senior administrative official spoke of Russia's position in the G-7. He maintained that:

“It's the G-7. And then think of it as the G-7 and then that page closes, and you open a new page, and it's the G-7 plus one.”¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴ White House Office of the Press Secretary, January 19 1995, “President Clinton's Record of Accomplishment on the Two Year Anniversary of his Inauguration” op. cit.

¹⁴⁵ Sherle R. Schwenninger, op. cit., p. 51. and Bill Bradley, op. cit., p.83.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 57.

¹⁴⁷ White House Office of the Press Secretary, June 21 1994, “Background Briefing by Senior Administration Official.” op. cit.

Critics of Clinton's foreign policy maintain that while acknowledging Russia as a democracy, in practice, the United States has been reluctant to treat it as such. Russia's full participation in European security structures has been delayed, while that of her neighbours has been facilitated.¹⁴⁸ Moreover, Russia was demonstratively excluded from consultations over United Nations air strikes over Bosnia, which as former Russian Ambassador to the United States Vladimir Lukin has pointed out, effectively divided the Security Council into "first- and second-class members."¹⁴⁹ Russian exclusion from Western clubs might not have been so serious, had not Washington simultaneously downgraded the multilateral organizations, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations Security Council, in which Russia plays a more prominent role.¹⁵⁰

A number of American analysts and foreign policy pundits contend that from Washington's viewpoint, the integration of Russia into the Western community was never really a serious goal, for it would have required changes in American foreign policy and existing Western institutions that Washington was unwilling to make. As a result, Washington's rhetoric toward Russia was never matched by a serious commitment to integration.¹⁵¹

Potential Ally or Eternal Enemy?

The third area in which American rhetoric diverges from its actual behaviour is in its desire to create a mutually beneficial alliance between the Russian Federation and the

¹⁴⁸ Nicolai N. Petro. "Legacy of Containment," *op. cit.*, p.63.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p.63.

¹⁵⁰ Sherle R. Schwenninger, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 51. and Bill Bradley, *op. cit.*, p.83.

United States. There were gestures made at creating a lasting partnership for the sake of a peaceful and prosperous geopolitical environment, however, these appear to be largely unsubstantiated in political action.

The United States responded to efforts by Russia to form a partnership with a mixture of wariness and excitement. President Bush's National Security Strategy, composed in August 1991, evidenced the fact that the United States was unwilling to entirely cede all Cold War notions to the developing geostrategic and geopolitical realities. The tone of this document demonstrated the fact that the United States would not chance placing too much faith in the potential of Russian democracy. It stated that America would

“promote democratic change in the Soviet Union, while maintaining firm policies that discourage any temptation to new quests for military advantage.”¹⁵²

President Clinton endorsed many of the principles of a strategic partnership by signing the Charter on US-Russian Partnership and Friendship on 17 June 1992. The convictions, reaffirmed at subsequent presidential summits in Vancouver in April 1993 and in Moscow in January 1994, declared the relationship one of mature strategic partnership based on equality, mutual advantage and recognition of each other's national interests.¹⁵³ However, some have argued that Clinton has cloaked American policy in the rhetoric of world order and general global interests, but its defining essence remains the unilateral exercise of sovereign power.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵² “National Security Strategy of the United States,” op. cit.

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 47.

¹⁵⁴ Stephen M. Walt, op. cit., p. 78.

A number of theorists contend that the patterns of the past have proved fairly resilient in American foreign policy-making.¹⁵⁵ Deputy Secretary of State in 1996, Strobe Talbott contends that as recently as the beginning of 1996 the prospects for American-Russian cooperation could hardly have been bleaker. He maintains that throughout Clinton's administration,

“it has become increasingly apparent that the United State's is not pursuing a policy of alliance, but rather one of renewed containment under a new guise.”¹⁵⁶

Some American foreign policy pundits argue that America's policy-makers, comfortable in the Cold War strategic setting, are attempting to recreate a watered-down version of the Cold War. With the election of a new Republican majority in the Congress, the new Cold War gained bipartisan support. A senior Republican staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in 1997, told the *‘Washington Post’* that the United States should hasten

“the expansion of NATO in order to promote the encirclement of Russia with democracies and free market economies. We should start acting like victors in the Cold War, not apologists.”¹⁵⁷

Thus, it is possible to witness once again that American rhetoric and foreign policy do not necessarily correspond. Rather, it is possible to view a disparity in the foreign policy behaviour while foreign policy rhetoric remains constant.

¹⁵⁵ Nicolai N. Petro. “Legacy of Containment,” op. cit., p.62. and Bill Bradley, op. cit., p.83. and Erik Beukel. “America Approaching the Soviet Successor States: Between Idealism and Realism. (*Political Science Publications from the Department of Commercial Law and Political Science*. n.1, 1995). p.31.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p.32

¹⁵⁷ Nicolai N. Petro. “Legacy of Containment,” op. cit., p.38

America's Perception of the Structure of the International Order

In his first inaugural address in 1993, President Clinton embraced one of the most prominent ideas of American foreign policy throughout the years, the notion of America leading the world.¹⁵⁸ American policy and foreign policy-makers maintain that the United States now finds itself in a position of unprecedented preponderance. Moreover, they theorize that this extraordinary position of power will endure well into this century.¹⁵⁹

As a result of this superiority in the military, economic, and political fields American leaders can pursue a wide range of goals without concerning themselves with how other states will respond. The unipolar conditions of the post-Cold War world, they argue, were uniquely ideal for the United States to adopt a posture of benevolent and purposeful hegemony. However, a number of foreign policy thinkers in both the Russian Federation and the United States argue that there are pronounced tendencies in American political culture toward unilateralism and moralism.¹⁶⁰ Clinton's National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement of the United States of 1996 reinforces these ideas. It states that:

“First and foremost, we must exercise global leadership...as the world's premier economic and military power, and with the strength of our democratic values, US engagement is indispensable to the forging of stable political relations and open trade...”¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁸ Erik Beukel, op. cit., p.31. and Samuel P. Huntington “The Lonely Superpower,” in *Foreign Affairs* v.78 n.2, March/April 1999. p.40

¹⁵⁹ Stephen M. Walt, op. cit., p. 64; and Josef Joffe. “How America Does It,” in *Foreign Affairs* v. 76 n. 5, September/October 1997, p. 13.

¹⁶⁰ Sherle R. Schwenninger, op. cit., p. 43. and Zbigniew Brzezinski. “A Geostrategy for Eurasia,” op. cit., p.52. and Samuel P. Huntington, op. cit., p.43 and N. Zagladin, “Noviy mirovoy besporyadok,” op. cit., p.20.

¹⁶¹ “National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement of the United States,” op. cit.

The United States, under the Clinton administration, has attempted to build an American world order. They sought: American led and directed collective security; a democratic Russia as a peaceful adjunct to the West; the de-nuclearization of great power politics; and neo-liberalism as the guiding political and economic model of world development. Underpinning these policies would be the foundation of American power and leadership, the base of which rested on American dominance, not just militarily and economically but culturally and politically as well.¹⁶²

Some theorists argue that in the eyes of many countries the United States is becoming the rogue superpower. In the international arena, the White House has pursued potential world order-shaping initiatives, the expansion of free trade and the deregulation of world capital markets globally as well as regionally, the enlargement and globalization of NATO, and the ridding of the world of rogue states.¹⁶³

Conclusion

The Russian Federation and the United States have been shown to view international realities from very disparate perspectives. The Russian Federation's foreign policy making has undergone a re-conceptualization based upon a re-evaluation of Russian national interests and needs. However, this has not entailed a contraction in its international role. On the contrary, the consensus that has emerged in Russian foreign policy has been one based upon the maintenance of its great power status and the formation of a world order facilitating this goal. Russia has increasingly demonstrated its desire to retain the position of major power in the international system as a matter of both

¹⁶² Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁶³ Zbigniew Brzezinski. "A Geostrategy for Eurasia," op. cit., p.52.

national interests and historical legacy. Whereas American foreign policy makers often speak of Russia's inherent strategic importance, they frequently behave in ways, which serve to weaken the geopolitical and geostrategic position of the Russian Federation.

The second area of disagreement between these two states is in the notion of conceptions of the international order that has emerged since the end of the Cold War. Russian foreign policy makers vociferously advocate the multipolarization of the geopolitical system. They support an international system in which Russia's territorial expanse, military might, and human and economic potential make it a regional superpower and an international great power. Moreover, this is not merely an acceptance of the loss of capabilities it has endured since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Rather, this is a calculated and proactive attempt to maintain the Russian international role and alter the structure of the developing world system. American foreign policy is premised upon a conception of the international order which is unipolar, with "American leadership being essential -- to navigate the shoals of the world's new dangers and to capitalize on its opportunities."¹⁶⁴ This dichotomy is likely to result in very different foreign policy pursuits in the coming years. Furthermore, tensions may result from the interaction between these disparate conceptions.

If Russia is to occupy the role of a major international power and a regional superpower, agreements will have to be reached. A great power must have states over which it has a great degree of influence. It appears that the United States, the victor in the Cold War, and now forging an identity as the world's policeman, will be reluctant to permit the expansion of Russian influence into the states of the former Soviet Union.

¹⁶⁴ "National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement of the United States," *op. cit.*

Whether this is a result of a belief in the inviolability of sovereignty or an interest in the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia, the point is moot. The foreign policy results would be the same: conflictual bilateral interaction into the coming decades.

Chapter Three

Russia and Her Historical Sphere of Influence

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, some would say, Russia lost not only an empire but also an essential attribute of its identity.¹⁶⁴ The new Russian identity will likely be influenced by an historical political culture based in traditions of empire building and reliance on military power for stature as well as security. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the implementation of democratic principles, Russia has shown itself not entirely capable of throwing off the ties that bound her with her nearest neighbours.¹⁶⁵

The first chapter of this thesis presents power cycle theory's analysis of the behaviour of a great power in decline. It noted that such a state will likely attempt to maintain its role and influence in the international system despite its decreasing relative systemic capabilities. The second chapter demonstrated Russia's desire and willingness to maintain its great power status in the geopolitical system. This chapter will employ these conceptions as a basis in order to show Russia's practical attempts to sustain its geopolitical position as a regional hegemon. Moreover, it will also address the tensions, which have arisen between Russia and the United States as a result of these actions.

This chapter will be divided into three sections. The first part will focus on Russia's historical sphere of influence and the developing assessment of this area's geopolitical and geostrategic role. The second section will address the Russian government's attempts since 1991 to consolidate the Commonwealth of Independent States into a cohesive and viable organization. The final section will outline the threats

¹⁶⁴ Franklyn Griffiths. op. cit., p. 716.

¹⁶⁵ Richard Pipes. "Is Russia Still an Enemy?" in *Foreign Affairs* v.76 n.5, September/October 1997, p.67.

perceived by Russia as a result of the American incursion into its historical sphere of influence. These factors together illustrate two things. Firstly, Russia is unwilling to cede its extraterritorial interests as a result of the dramatic decline in its relative economic, and military, and political capabilities. Secondly, it demonstrates a manifestation of the conflictual interaction between the United States and the Russian Federation.

Furthermore, efforts by the United States, a hegemonic power, to gain greater influence over the territories formerly within Russia's zone of influence aptly exhibits the behaviour of a hegemonic state according to power cycle theory.

It is necessary to take into consideration the integral role of perceptions in the power cycle theory. Russian perceptions of their sphere of influence cannot easily be ascertained, neither by territorial delineations nor by diplomatic alliances. Rather, what Russia considers to be its historical zone of interest is a matter of perception and opinion. The ties that have historically bound these states together have not disintegrated upon the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moreover, whether American actions have in actuality served to overstep and transgress Russian national security needs is also open to interpretation. However, what proves not to be questionable are the perceptions held by some Russian policy-makers and academics that Russian national interests are threatened by the incursion of foreign states into the territories of the former Soviet Union.

It is necessary to distinguish between two separate concepts in the analysis of the former Soviet space: imperialism and sphere of influence. Imperialism entails the domination or attempted domination of another country's economic, political, or cultural institutions, without actually seizing governmental control.¹⁶⁷ It is not the contention of

¹⁶⁷ Canadian Oxford Dictionary, 1998. "Imperialism," p.709.

this thesis that the Russian Federation seeks territorial control over its neighbours. Rather, when referring to the consolidation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, this process is viewed in terms of a re-establishment of a sphere of influence. This would involve Russia extending her influence over less developed countries through trade, and diplomacy. Moreover, an internationally legitimated sphere of influence would enable Russian to fulfill a desire for international recognition of its interests in the area.

I. Russia's Historical Sphere of Influence

Russian expansion has differed historically from European imperialism in that it has not crossed oceans but has taken the form of the conquest, control, and annexation of adjacent territories or borderlands, a process described by Russian historians as the "gathering of the Russian lands."¹⁶⁸ Furthermore, in contrast with Western states, which acquired empires after forming nation-states, in Russia nation-building and empire building proceeded concurrently. Since the seventeenth century, when Russia was already the world's largest state, the immensity of their domain has served an important role in the formation of the Russian identity.¹⁶⁹ The 1997 Russian Foreign Policy Blueprint states that,

"Russia is drawn together specifically with the former Soviet states by a common understanding of basic values of world civilization and commonality of interests in key questions of development of the global situation..."¹⁷⁰

Some would argue that if Russia has any identity today, it is its historical identity and that self-conception is authoritarian and expansionist in nature. It would come as no

¹⁶⁸ Richard Pipes, op. cit., p.68.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid. p.68

¹⁷⁰ *Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs Concept Document, No. 1615/1S* op. cit., p.1-58.

surprise then that, in its quest for a new statehood, nostalgia for the past, for the glorious pages in Russian history, has proved desirable for many of its citizens.¹⁷¹ As the Russian empire was premised upon the incorporation of its nearest neighbours, with the loss of these territories, thoughts of international influence and defense remain in the Russian psyche.¹⁷² There is no question that Russia has legitimate, though not necessarily vital and exclusive, interests in the near abroad.¹⁷³

The term 'near abroad' (*blizhnoe zarubezh'e*) was coined by Russians in 1992 to refer to the fourteen states that were once Russia's fellow republics in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This terminology had crept into the Russian political vocabulary, denoting a peculiar status for and special relationship with the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.¹⁷⁴ The term 'near abroad' highlights the difficulty experienced by many Russians in accepting the notion of former fellow republics as foreign countries. Some of the republics, in particular Ukraine and Belarus, are viewed by many Russians as not merely former family members but in fact as indivisible from the concept of Russia itself. Russian politicians, even the democrats, continue to have great difficulty in accepting the independence of the near abroad.

In an address to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1994, Yeltsin stated:

"Russia's economic and foreign policy priorities lie in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States...Russia's ties with the near abroad

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p. 69.

¹⁷² Rolf H. W. Theen. "Russia After the Elections: the New Look in its Foreign Policy: Imperialism on the March," in *the World and I*, September 1994, p. 424.

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 423.

¹⁷⁴ Franklyn Griffiths. op. cit., p. 716.

exceed those of mere neighbourliness. This is rather a blood relationship.”¹⁷⁵

It must be acknowledged that most Russians distinguish quite sharply between the near and far abroad. They regard it as natural that Moscow should exercise special supervision over an area, which lies next to Russia’s borders and in which twenty-five million Russians still live, and this attitude is influencing government policy.¹⁷⁶ Moscow prefers that these states turn to Russia for economic, political, and strategic partnership rather than to the west.¹⁷⁷

The Development of Russian Foreign Policy Towards the Soviet Successor States

The following section will show that Russia’s leaders have moved clearly to mark out the near abroad as within the zone of Russia’s national security. As the largest and strongest country of the former Soviet Union, and the one that has benefited most from the institutional inheritance of the Soviet state, Russia has enormous comparative advantage. Moreover, because of the relative weakness of most of the new states, the Russian Federation is able to exert a great amount of leverage with relatively little effort.¹⁷⁸

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian foreign policy placed little emphasis on the former Soviet states. In the period from the end of 1991 to mid-1992, the objectives of the new Russia were solidly based on a European, transatlantic or

¹⁷⁵ Hans-Georg Ehrhart, et. al., eds. Crisis Management in the CIS: Whither Russia?, (Munich: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden, 1995), p.93.

¹⁷⁶ Neil Malcolm. “The New Russian Foreign Policy,” in *The World Today*, February 1994, p. 32.

¹⁷⁷ Suzanne Crow. “Russia Asserts Its Strategic Agenda,” in *RFE/RL Research Report*, v.2 n.50, 17 December 1993, p.2.

¹⁷⁸ Karen Dawisha. “Russian Foreign Policy in the Near Abroad and Beyond,” in *Current History*, October 1996, v.95 n.603, p.331.

Western orientation.¹⁷⁹ The focus of Russian foreign policy, at this time, was directed towards rejoining European civilization. This was accomplished through Russian inclusion in a number of international organizations and the signing of a variety of bi- and multi-lateral agreements. Russia's relations with its closest neighbours, the near abroad, scarcely figured at all in the plans of policy makers in Moscow.¹⁸⁰

The importance of the near abroad to the geostrategic concerns of the Russian Federation became more acute in late 1992.¹⁸¹ The picture that emerges suggests a significant shift in direction for Russian foreign policy towards the summer of 1992.¹⁸² The de-emphasis on Russia's Atlanticist foreign policy was accompanied by the emergence of a consensus, supporting the exertion of a greater degree of Russian influence over the territory of the former Soviet Union.¹⁸³ Momentum was gathering, notably in the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, for the creation of a separate ministry to deal with Russian-Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) relations, to be headed by State Counselor and Special Presidential Adviser Sergey Stankevich. He emphatically stated that

“it is apparent that the CIS calls for a special and independent sphere of Russian foreign policy. The CIS must be dealt with on a daily basis, and not in between trips to London and Paris.”¹⁸⁴

In the summer of 1992 the Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of the near abroad began work on a new, more active strategy for the region, in response to harsh criticism

¹⁷⁹ J. L. Black. Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts Or Bearing Arms? (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), p. 8. and Karen Dawisha, op. cit., p. 330.

¹⁸⁰ M. Jane Davis. Security Issues in the Post Cold War World. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press, 1997), p.43.

¹⁸¹ Dzh. Rouper and P. Van Kham, op. cit., p. 86.

¹⁸² Franklyn Griffiths, op. cit., p. 710

¹⁸³ Ibid., p.49.

¹⁸⁴ Suzanne Crow. “Russia Prepares to Take a Hard Line on the Near Abroad,” in *RFE/RL Research Report*, v.1 n.32, 14 August 1992.

from the Security Council and from President Yeltsin himself. His report argued that Russia must win international recognition for its role as the leading force in ensuring stability and military security on the entire territory of the former Soviet Union. In February 1993, President Yeltsin chose the occasion of an address to an assembly of the Industrialists' Civic Union to announce that Russia was going to push for greater integration in the CIS.¹⁸⁵ However, in the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, an emphasis on the countries of the former Soviet Union was still lacking. It stated

“Russia must take a decisive course toward developing relations with those countries whose cooperation may be a help in resolving first-priority tasks of national rebirth, primarily...with economically strong and technologically developed Western states...”¹⁸⁶

In late November 1993 Kozyrev, in an interview with *‘Nezavisimaya gazeta’*, responded to questions on Russia's motivations for increasing involvement in the Commonwealth of Independent States. He highlighted the two paths that Russia faced when the Soviet Union collapsed: either to try to hold the former Soviet Union together as a centralized state or to pull out completely. Kozyrev termed the first option hopeless and the second an unwarranted loss because Russia had won influence in these areas over centuries.¹⁸⁷

On 18 January 1994, at a meeting of all of Russia's ambassadors to the former Soviet republics (including the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Baltic countries), Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev noted,

¹⁸⁵ Neil Malcolm, op. cit., p. 23.

¹⁸⁶ *Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs Concept Document, No. 1615/1S*, op. cit., p.4

¹⁸⁷ Sherle R. Schwenninger, op. cit., p. 42.

“the CIS and Baltic countries are the region where Russia’s paramount vital interests are concentrated. It is from there that the main threat to those interests stem. Russia must preserve its military presence in regions which have been spheres of its military interest for centuries.”¹⁸⁸

In the same year, he went on to make a plea for the understanding of Russia’s special role and responsibilities within the former Soviet Union. “What is wrong with Russia having as its goal the gradual reintegration, primarily economic reintegration, of the post-Soviet space on a voluntary and equal basis?”¹⁸⁹

Russia’s key concerns in the near abroad can be grouped into four categories. They are, in order of importance, nuclear instability (that is, incomplete Russian control of the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet territory); the future of Soviet conventional weapons and the Russian troops outside Russia (including their legal status, withdrawal, peacekeeping operations, and involvement in local political warfare); the political and human rights of ethnic Russians; and territorial and border disputes with neighbouring states.¹⁹⁰

Russia’s foreign policy strategy since late 1993 has consisted of a set of closely related goals: to ensure that the territory of the former Soviet Union is recognized as Russia’s sphere of influence; to prevent the use of these areas as platforms for threats to Russian security; and to ensure that these territories act as bridges from Russia outward rather than as firebreaks isolating Russia from the outside world.¹⁹¹

The policies that Russia has used to support these strategic goals can be broadly described in the following manner. In the Commonwealth of Independent States, Russia

¹⁸⁸ Rolf H. W. Theen, op. cit., p. 408.

¹⁸⁹ Franklyn Griffiths, op. cit., p. 714

¹⁹⁰ Leon Aron and Kenneth M. Jansens, eds., op. cit., p. 22.

¹⁹¹ A. Mikhailenko. “Rossiya i SNG: kak zhit’ dalshe?” in *MEMO*, 1999, n.1, p. 57.

wishes to assert what it considers its special rights and responsibilities as the largest military, political, and economic power in the region; to assert what it considers its special rights and responsibilities as a defender of ethnic Russians in the region; and to play the role of intermediary both among the other former Soviet republics and between the Commonwealth of Independent States and other countries, groups of countries, and international organizations.¹⁹²

Moscow is currently achieving influence not by force, which entails a much larger political and economic expenditure, but by geopolitical maneuvering. In the current international climate the former Soviet republics are being drawn into Moscow's orbit because of Russia's political weight in the region. Such a situation grants Moscow all of the benefits and none of the responsibilities typically associated with a hegemonic status.¹⁹³

Russia's attempts to renew ties with the former Soviet states has largely taken two forms: the Commonwealth of Independent States and peacekeeping responsibilities in the region. Both of these tactics have served the purpose of maintaining a special place in the region for the Russian Federation as well as creating a greater level of dependence on Russia. The government is conducting a foreign policy that moves with confidence and determination to fill the power vacuum created by the disintegration of the Soviet Union.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹² Suzanne Crow. "Russia Asserts Its Strategic Agenda," *op. cit.*, p.2.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, p.1.

¹⁹⁴ Rolf H. W. Theen, *op. cit.*, p. 421.

I. The Restoration of Russia's Historical Sphere of Influence

The Commonwealth of Independent States

In December 1991, immediately after the dissolution of the USSR, Moscow created the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), ostensibly to enable the former Soviet republics to resolve common problems by common consent and to provide a coordinating mechanism for the territory of the former Soviet Union. In time, eleven of the fifteen republics joined the CIS, some enrolling of their own free will, others under duress. Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan have at one time or another refused or renounced membership in the CIS. Eleven of the non-Russian states including Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan are currently CIS members.

Many of Moscow's actions toward the Near Abroad since independence have met a stern rebuff. Indeed, it could be said that a central feature in the national identity of many of the new states is the imperative of resistance to any renewed Russian drive to infringe upon their sovereignty. This resistance to Russian control is especially apparent in Latvia and Estonia, western Ukraine, western Moldova, Azerbaijan, and within Russia itself in the North Caucasus (Chechnya).¹⁹⁵ In these areas there is a solid consensus among the elites and the population that independence means independence from Russia. Especially for the latter group, the situation is not so clear. Historic memories of Russia as a savior of local populations, common Slavic and Orthodox roots, an economic infrastructure still centered in Moscow, and Russophone elites or large numbers of

¹⁹⁵ Karen Dawisha. "Russian Foreign Policy in the Near Abroad and Beyond," op. cit., p.331.

Russian nationals settled in and intermarried with the local population all lend themselves to Russia's continued coexistence with these countries.¹⁹⁶

Given the speed and circumstances of the Soviet collapse, the initial unpreparedness of so many elites and populations for independence is historically unique.¹⁹⁷ With the passage of time their countries have come to value independence more particularly since they have been able to enjoy its economic, security, psychological, and cultural benefits. Yet many of these new states, however hostile to Russia, are weaker and more fragile than Russia and will therefore remain dependent on it. Consequently, Russia is unlikely to recede as an economic or geopolitical presence in the area, and the temptation to empire will have to be contained in some manner.¹⁹⁸

Russian approaches to relations with the CIS in 1992 and 1993 revealed that Moscow steadily drifted away from its original liberal orientation. Initially, Russia offered declarations of its respect for these countries' newfound sovereignty and a disavowal of interference in these states internal affairs.¹⁹⁹

“The Russian Federation sees the optimal means of resolving the problem of forming a belt of security and good neighbourly relations along the perimeter of its borders in the comprehensive stabilization of the situation in the geopolitical space surrounding Russia, and in the creation of zones of constructive regional cooperation there.”²⁰⁰

The success of nationalists in the October 1993 parliamentary elections accelerated the process towards achieving a different role for Russia in the CIS. The new ascendancy of the Communists and their allies in the Russian parliament was evident following the

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p.332.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., p.334.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., p.334.

¹⁹⁹ Suzanne Crow. “Russia Asserts Its Strategic Agenda,” op. cit., p.6.

²⁰⁰ Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs Concept Document, No. 1615/IS, op. cit., p.4

December 1995 elections.²⁰¹ Communist and nationalist parties—deeply divided on some domestic issues but united in the idea that Russia must be restored as a great international power—significantly strengthened their position, from 39% in the old Duma to 62% in the new one.²⁰²

On 15 March 1996, by a vote of 250-98, the State Duma passed a Communist-sponsored resolution that renounced the Supreme Soviet's decision of 12 December 1991 to abrogate the Soviet Union. They then passed, by a vote of 252-33, a resolution affirming the legal force of the 17 March 1991 vote to preserve the USSR (71% of the population voted to retain the Union at the time). Furthermore, the resolution asserted that the Soviet Union continues to exist.²⁰³

There was an international renunciation of this action. The leaders of the former Soviet republics denounced the Duma's behaviour. President Yeltsin's reaction was unexpected. Rather than entirely condemn the actions of the Duma, he argued that he could not be blamed for the dissolution of the Soviet Union. He pointed out that

“I voted for the USSR in the 1991 referendum and rather it was other republics that scuttled the Union...The Communists are ignoring my latest successes in reintegrating the ex-Soviet republics. One only has to look at the documents due for signing shortly, envisaging a Russia-Belarus confederation, which Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan will also be invited to join.”²⁰⁴

²⁰¹ Thomas F. Remington. “The Balance of Forces in the Newly Elected Russian Parliament,” in *CSIS Post Soviet Prospectus*, v. IV, 7, May 1996. <http://www.csis.org/ruseura/psp/pspiv7.html>. Accessed 24 June 2000.

²⁰² Jim Brusstar and Ellen Jones. “Great Power Restorationists Make Gains in the Russian Duma,” in *Strategic Forum (Institute for National Strategic Studies)* n. 65, March 1996. <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum65.html>. Accessed 5 July 2000.

²⁰³ Mathew Lantz. “SDI: Russian Election Watch, 8 April 1996,” *SDI Project BCSIA, Harvard, 1996*. <http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/pubs/RE18>. Accessed 5 July 2000.

²⁰⁴ “Yeltsin Reacts to Duma Move to Re-Legalize USSR,” in *Monitor: A Daily Briefing on the Post-Soviet States*, v.2 i.52, 15 March 1996. http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon_002_052_000.htm#011. Accessed 5 July 2000.

The official strategic course of the Russian Federation with the CIS countries is a clear statement of Russia's assertion of great power status over the other states. It asserts that Russia's main objective toward the CIS is the creation of "an economically and politically integrated association of states capable of claiming its proper place in the world community"; that Russia should be "the leading force in the formation of a new system of interstate political and economic relations"; and that when working with the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on peacekeeping in the CIS, "it is necessary to seek their agreement that this region is primarily a zone of Russian interests."²⁰⁵

The Commonwealth has suffered from a lack of consensus on most issues, with a number of member states routinely refusing to sign agreements intended to encompass the whole of the CIS. The 15 May 1992 Treaty on Collective Security is a case in point. Although it formally created a mutual defense treaty, more than one-third of the members of the CIS (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Azerbaijan) have refused to participate in it. CIS agreements and relations have therefore had to be augmented on many issues by bilateral treaties, usually between Russia and one of the other former Soviet states.

Early attempts were made to establish joint control over strategic forces in the Commonwealth, but they were short-lived. A CIS joint armed forces command was created and the last Soviet Minister of Defense, General Yevgeni Shaposhnikov, was appointed as its chief. Strategic nuclear forces were to be maintained under the CIS command, with any decision to use them to be taken by the four nuclear weapons states (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan), after consultation with the other members of

²⁰⁵ Karen Dawisha. "Russian Foreign Policy in the Near Abroad and Beyond," *op. cit.*, p.332.

the Commonwealth.²⁰⁶ Security integration has proceeded steadily, with the creation in August 1993 of the Collective Security Council and the permanent headquarters under the CIS Council of Defense Ministers.²⁰⁷ Russia is to enter such arrangements via the regional structures of security among the states of the near abroad, or at least, through cooperation with them. In this manner Russia is attempting to cement its position and legitimize its interests and influence in the CIS.

A presidential order, issued on 14 September 1995, confirmed Russia's national interest in and strategic course towards the CIS. The goals to be achieved by the Strategic Policy of the Russian Federation toward CIS Member States, among others, were deemed to be the enhancement of integration processes and the strengthening of Russia as the leading force in the creation of a new system of interstate political and economic relations. The decree on 'Affirming the Strategic Course of the Russian Federation with the Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States' maintains that

"Russia's relations with the states of the CIS are an important factor for including Russia in world political and economic structures...Russia's relationship with the states of the CIS is a priority because on the territory of the CIS all our main vital interests are concentrated."²⁰⁸

This document constitutes a comprehensive plan of action for the reconstruction of Russian dominance within the CIS, systematizing the use of the wide array of diplomatic, military, economic, ethnic, and international levers that Russia has available to it.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁶ Jennifer G. Mathers. "Russian National Security Policy After the Cold War," in M. Jane Davis, ed Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers, 1996), p. 50.

²⁰⁷ Leon Aron and Kenneth M. Jensens, eds. op. cit., p. 26.

²⁰⁸ Sherman W. Garnett. "The Present Problems and Future Transformation of Post-Soviet Space," in *Institute for National Strategic Studies Journal*. <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/usrp8.html>. Accessed 5 July 2000.

²⁰⁹ Stephen Foye. "Russia and the Near Abroad," in *CSIS Post Soviet Prospectus*, v. III, 12, December 1995. <http://www.csis.org/ruseura/psp/pspiii12.html>. Accessed 24 June 2000.

Bilateral relations with the CIS states have also proven vital in maintaining ties and relations between Russia and the post-Soviet states. Inside the CIS, economic leverage and sometimes overt military force have been used quite vigorously to gain political and strategic advantages for Russia. Bringing to bear its military and economic superiority in a coordinated way, Russia has been able to drive hard bargains with its other CIS partners. In November 1993, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were forced into deciding to introduce their own currencies after Moscow had set what they described as impossibly difficult conditions for participation in the ruble zone.²¹⁰ Moreover, in negotiations over the Black Sea Fleet in 1996 between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, Russia employed economic pressures in order to attain diplomatic and geostrategic leverage. During negotiations, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin noted that

“Ukraine’s biggest creditor is Russia, not the International Monetary Fund. The Ukraine owes Russia about 6 billion American dollars. We try to convince our Ukrainian partners and at the same time we are helping Ukraine with fuel so that people there should not be freezing.”²¹¹

The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine prepared by Moscow on 31 May 1997 envisions a strengthening of bilateral ties. Among other things, it enables Russia’s armed forces to use installations and territories in the Ukraine. Moreover, it guarantees the inviolability of the current border between Russia and Ukraine. However, under the treaty, Russia is to rent fleet facilities in and around the Crimean port of Sevastopol for 20 years, paying Ukraine by

²¹⁰ Neil Malcolm. “The New Russian Foreign Policy.” in *The World Today*, February 1994, p. 31.

²¹¹ Gennadiy Yezhov. “Chernomyrdin Noted that Russia is Ukraine’s Biggest Creditor,” FBIS-SOV-96-214, *Moscow Interfax*, 01 November 1996.

writing off part of Kiev's mounting debt.²¹² In this manner, the Russian Federation is able to gain a strategic and military foothold in this former Soviet republic. Furthermore, Russia has also sought to influence the political maneuverings within Ukraine. Yuri Maksimov, the Commander-in-Chief of CIS Strategic Forces, warned that if Ukraine attempted to take

“administrative control of the nuclear weapons on its territory, that Russia and Ukraine were headed for a struggle that would make the Black Sea Fleet dispute look like child’s play.”²¹³

Internal dissent within the Russian Federation has also served to complicate relations with the post-Soviet states. Duma actions have included calls for military-basing agreements with all countries on Russia’s borders; promotion of dual citizenship agreements with Russia’s neighbours; and the denunciation of preferences for the titular nationality in neighbouring citizenship laws.²¹⁴ Other branches of the Russian government at times, supported these policies. At a press conference on 27 January 1994, V. I. Churkin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, was asked about the Ministry’s attitude toward dual citizenship. He stated

“Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes a positive view of dual citizenship. We worked for a long time with the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation to adopt such a law. Now we have a law on dual citizenship. Our task consists of pursuing corresponding state negotiations with countries that are ready to engage in the establishment of dual citizenship and on the basis of agreements on dual citizenship to use this institution which is popular in

²¹² Steve Gutterman. “Russia and Ukraine Set to Sign Treaty,” in *The Associated Press*, 1997, http://www.nandosearch.com/newsroom/ntn/world/053097/world16_6120.html. Accessed 24 June 2000.

²¹³ Tyler Felgenhauer. “Ukraine, Russia and the Black Sea Fleet Accords,” in *Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Case Study 2/99*, <http://www.wilson.princeton.edu/~cases/papers/ukraine.html>. Accessed 5 July 2000.

²¹⁴ Karen Dawisha. “Russian Foreign Policy in the Near Abroad and Beyond,” op. cit., p.331.

international practice.”²¹⁵

At other times, the executive level of government vehemently opposed the Duma's actions. For example, On 23 October 1994, the Russian State Duma approved, on its second reading, a resolution ordering the unilateral suspension of the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the strengthening of the combat readiness of 'the Hero City of Sevastopol'. Its nearly unanimous vote (334 to 1 against and 1 abstention) produced shock and outrage in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Primakov issued a swift rebuff to the National Security Council Secretary, Aleksandr Lebed, who claimed that international law recognized Sevastopol as a Russian city.²¹⁶

For these and a multiplicity of other reasons, the development of the CIS has been remarkably uneven, proceeding in fits and starts and hampered by widely differing conceptions of its purpose.²¹⁷ From the very beginning there has been a divergence between Russian and Ukrainian views of the Commonwealth. Kiev has argued for a loosely organized association, purely to smooth the transition to true independence and, in the words of one analyst, to be no more than a temporary mechanism for civilized divorce.²¹⁸ Moscow, however, has favoured a permanent and much more tightly integrated organization, and one in which Russia takes the lead. There is a growing realization in a number of newly independent post-Soviet states that by the sheer weight of its geostrategic assets, Russia is destined to dominate the post-Soviet space.²¹⁹

²¹⁵ George Ginsburgs. "The Question of Dual Citizenship in Russia's Relations with the Successor States in Central Asia," *Central Asia Monitor*, no. 4-5, 1994. <http://www.chalidze.com/cam/44,4,4.htm>. Accessed 5 July 2000.

²¹⁶ James Sherr. "A New Storm Over the Black Sea Fleet," in *the Euro-Atlantic Foundation Journal*. <http://www.eaf.org/papers/blacksea.htm>. Accessed 5 July 2000.

²¹⁷ Kh. Timmermann. "Protsessi dezintegratsii i reorganizatsii SNG," in *MEMO*, 1998, n.1, p. 41.

²¹⁸ Leon Aron and Kenneth M. Jensens, eds. op. cit., p. 27.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

That Russia has been willing to provide substantial energy and trade subsidies makes clear the extent to which it is concerned about not de-stabilizing and gaining greater influence in the newly independent countries. According to International Monetary Fund estimates, Russia provided \$17 billion in goods at concessionary and subsidized prices in 1993 alone, making it the single largest aid donor to the other newly independent states in that year. Furthermore, in February 1996 Russia and Belarus, signed an agreement renouncing mutual debts, including the \$600 million (plus millions in penalties) Belarus owed the Russian natural gas monopoly Gazprom.²²⁰ These behaviours seek to maintain the dependence of the states of the former Soviet Union on Russia as well as preventing other states from gaining a foothold in this area. Moreover, at the same time, Russia is serving to preserve stability in the region in order to prevent conflict from spreading from the border regions into the territory of the Russian Federation.

The rationale for emphasis on relations with the near abroad becomes clearer when one examines a list of what the Russian leadership regards as national security concerns: virtually all the threats to Russia's vital interests are perceived as emanating from the near abroad. The 1997 Russian National Security Blueprint considers one the most serious threats to Russian national interest in the international sphere to be:

“the threat of the emergence or aggravation in the CIS states of political, ethnic, and economic crises capable of delaying or destroying the integration process...an important manner in which to ensure Russian national security is to assist in the settlement of regional and local conflicts through peacekeeping activity.”²²¹

²²⁰ Karen Dawisha. “Russian Foreign Policy in the Near Abroad and Beyond,” op. cit., p.332.

²²¹ *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, “Russian National Security Blueprint” op. cit., p.4-5.

The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation in 2000 continues along the same lines arguing that Russian national interests can be achieved by “contributing to the settlement of conflicts, including through the peacekeeping efforts...”²²²

The CIS has defied all predictions of its withering away, and new plans for economic and military cooperation are being discussed. Azerbaijan has agreed to reactivate its membership in the organization and Georgia has joined for the first time. In public statements by officials in Moscow, justifications of interventions in the former Soviet area, which refer to peacekeeping as protecting the interests of Russians outside Russia, and to safeguard Russia’s interests are used more and more interchangeably.

The desire of the Russian Federation to maintain control and influence over the area of the former Soviet Union vis-à-vis the Commonwealth of Independent States has become increasingly clear. Another area in which Russia is attempting to attain greater dominance over its historical sphere of influence is through peacekeeping in these territories. It is this issue that we must address next.

Peacekeeping

In September 1993, sounding the central theme of his subsequent speech at the United Nations’ General Assembly, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev wrote in

‘Nezavisimaya gazeta’:

“Naturally, Russia is not going to abandon her neighbours and friends in the near abroad despite anything. If we do not master the political will and practical means, that is, to be blunt, troops and equipment, to conduct peacekeeping missions in the zone of the former Soviet Union, this vacuum will be filled by other forces, first of all, by the forces of political extremism, which, ultimately, threaten Russia herself.”²²³

²²² “National Security Concept of the Russian Federation” op. cit.

²²³ Leon Aron and Kenneth M. Jensens, eds. op. cit., p. 28.

On 28 February 1993, in an address to members of the Civic Union coalition, Yeltsin made the first in a series of statements by the Russian government on the subject of peacekeeping in the former Soviet Union.

“Russia continues to have a vital interest in the cessation of all armed conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Moreover, the international community is increasingly coming to realize our country’s special responsibility in this difficult matter. I believe the time has come for authoritative international organizations including the United Nations, to grant Russia special powers as guarantor of peace and stability in this region.”²²⁴

Yeltsin’s remarks served as an indication that his government sought to adopt an interventionist policy toward the other states of the former Soviet Union and also introduced a new theme into Russian foreign policy. This was Russia’s desire to win the international community’s approval for such a move.

In early March 1993, the Russian government presented a document to the United Nations discussing Moscow’s role in peacekeeping in the former Soviet Union. The paper outlined, in detail, existing peacekeeping agreements and operations in the region; it also made a case for taking urgent practical steps to resolve the conflicts in this area. The same day Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov held a news conference at the UN’s headquarters in New York at which he gave assurances that Russia had no neo-imperialist aims.

“Russia seeks international support for its operations and proposed that the UN underwrite them by passing resolutions on individual issues that gave Russia the right to act.”²²⁵

²²⁴ ITAR-TASS, 8 December 1993. from Suzanne Crow. “Russia Asserts Its Strategic Agenda,” op. cit., p. 2.

²²⁵ Ibid., p.3.

A few days later, during a meeting of the committee responsible for reviewing the UN Charter, Lavrov outlined Russian thinking on the possibility of using ideas inherent in the UN Charter to deal with the new generation of conflicts facing the world. He argued that there was a need to adapt the UN Charter to address an entirely new set of challenges, citing in particular the emergence of aggressive nationalism, the clashing of state sovereignty with countries' rights of self-determination, economic breakdowns between regions and the threat of nuclear proliferation.²²⁶

In order to start the process of adapting the UN Charter, Russia presented a draft declaration to the committee listing specific measures that it believed should be taken. The main thrust of the draft was that the UN should use regional organizations to manage peacekeeping operations. The document stated that

“the UN Security Council’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security should be preserved...but regional organizations could lighten the Security Council’s load...the use of such organizations would allow the special features of different parts of the world to be taken into account...”²²⁷

The Commonwealth of Independent States was given as an example of a regional organization, capable of dealing with conflicts under the auspices of the UN.²²⁸

Russia’s diplomatic initiative continued on 17 March 1993 with an appeal by Yeltsin to the leaders of the CIS. On the subject of peacekeeping, a topic that figured prominently in his speech, Yeltsin stated:

“First of all, we need real instruments to eliminate hot spots and the means to prevent the buildup of new tension. In my opinion, we should strive to set up an effective security system within the structures of the CIS, which

²²⁶ Ibid., p.3.

²²⁷ Ibid., p.3.

²²⁸ Ibid., p.3.

would become an important factor in sustaining peace in the entire Eurasian region.”²²⁹

In the appeal reference was made to Russia’s recognition of its responsibility for ensuring the security and stability in their common geographical space.²³⁰

Russia’s campaign to acquire responsibility for peacekeeping in the former Soviet Union continued with Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev’s visit to the United Nations in the fall of 1993. In a speech on 28 September to the UN General Assembly, Kozyrev dismissed the problems posed by the unconventional methods in Russia’s peacekeeping efforts, namely, the involvement of contingents from the conflicting parties in the peacekeeping operations and of mediators from neighbouring states. Here Kozyrev was referring to Russia’s involvement in peacekeeping contingents and in the mediation of conflicts to which it was far from indifferent. He was also addressing the use of other non-neutral contingents in peacekeeping operations, such as Georgians in Georgia, Moldovans in Moldova, and so forth.²³¹

Kozyrev maintained that no international organization or group of states could replace Russian peace-making efforts in the post-Soviet space. Previously, he had on occasion paid lip service to the idea of involving other groups, but here he explicitly dismissed the notion of Russia’s deferring to neutral parties.²³² He further supported his advocacy of Russian leadership of peacekeeping in the CIS by referring to the inability of the UN to deal with all of the peacekeeping operations that might be needed around the

²²⁹ Ibid., p.4.

²³⁰ Ibid., p.4.

²³¹ Ibid., p.5.

²³² Ibid., p.5

world. The logical rejoinder to this assertion, in Kozyrev's view, is that some of the authority should devolve from the UN either directly to Russia or to Russia via the CIS.²³³

“The most important foreign policy problems which require coordinated and persistent efforts by all state structures of the country are the cessation of armed clashes and the settling of conflicts around Russia, the inadmissibility of their spreading onto our territory, and the provision of strict adherence to human and minority rights in the nearby foreign countries and especially the rights of ethnic Russians and the Russian-speaking population.”²³⁴

The most frequently cited justification for greater Russian influence in the near abroad has been the need to protect the rights of ethnic Russians living outside the Russian Federation. The existence of approximately 25 million Russians in the other former Soviet states has become an emotional issue, which many Russian politicians have been willing to exploit. The first attempt to introduce a concrete policy was the document ‘The Guidelines of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation’, developed by the Security Council and endorsed by Yeltsin in early May 1993. It adopted a far-reaching approach according to which Russian minorities should be considered not only as a priority problem, but also as an important asset for Russia's foreign policy.²³⁵ Furthermore, the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, as well as the 1993 military doctrine stressed the importance of the rights of Russians outside Russia and asserted that, “the violation of such rights is a legitimate reason for military action.”²³⁶ Moreover, the Military Doctrine, approved by Yeltsin's decree on 2 November 1993, underscored Russia's threat perceptions as including the

²³³ Ibid., p.4.

²³⁴ *Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs Concept Document, No. 1615/IS* op. cit., p.1-58.

²³⁵ Pavel Baev and Pel Kostw. “Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Union,” in *International Peace Research Institute, Oslo*. <http://www.prio.no/html/osce-russianminorities.htm>. Accessed 5 July 2000.

²³⁶ Jennifer G. Mathers. op. cit., p. 51.

“suppression of the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states.”²³⁷

The Russian citizenship law allows all former Soviet citizens who feel ethnically or emotionally attached to Russia to apply for Russian citizenship. Moreover, under international law, a state has a right to protect its citizens abroad, and Russian authorities have on numerous occasions insisted that they will indeed defend the rights of Russians in the former Soviet Union.²³⁸

In at least one case of Russia’s military involvement in territorial disputes in the near abroad, the protection of the rights of ethnic Russians was the ostensible motive. A group of ethnic Russians in the Transdnestr region of Moldova sought to secede from Moldova, fearing that the leaders of that country intended integration with Romania. Conflict then erupted between the Transdnestr Republic and Moldovan forces in 1992. The former Soviet 14th army, stationed in the area, reportedly intervened on behalf of the Russian separatists, and by some accounts actively incited the Russians to rebel against Moldova’s authority. This is but one example of Russia’s use of ethnic Russians to gain leverage in the former Soviet republics.

Presidential National Security Adviser Yuri Baturin told Western journalists in February 1994 that although the US treats Russia like a “developing country,” Russia has a duty as a great power to protect Russians in the near abroad.²³⁹ Later in the fall of 1993, Russian officials began explicitly to link the use of Russian peacekeeping forces in the

²³⁷ Pavel Baev and Pel Kostw, op. cit.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Wynne Russell. “Russian Relations with the Near Abroad,” in Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990. Peter Sherman, ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 66.

territory of the former Soviet Union with the preservation of Russia's influence in the region.

In an interview on 8 October 1993, Kozyrev explicitly linked the conduct of peacekeeping operations in the near abroad with Russian national interest. He stated that

“peacekeeping is connected with the defense of Russia's traditional interests and the preservation of its authority in the region...Russia will create effective peacekeeping forces not only to deal with regional conflicts in the former Soviet Union, but also to prevent the loss of geopolitical positions that it took centuries to conquer...It is imperative to prepare to conduct military actions designed not only to support peace but to establish peace within the zones of our traditional geopolitical interests.”²⁴⁰

Russia may have embarked on a determined drive to gain international recognition as the gendarme of the former Soviet Union.²⁴¹

Russia had expressed alarm at the suggestion that the United States would take part in peacekeeping operations in the former Soviet Union.²⁴² A putative White House initiative centered around a draft of ‘Directive 13,’ was prepared for President Clinton's signature in August 1993. Directive 13 outlined a more activist role for the United States and the United Nations in peacekeeping operations in the near abroad. It also foresaw certain restrictions on the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in the near abroad, as well as, reportedly, “US-Russian policy differences over the mandate, scope and advisability of peacekeeping operations.”²⁴³

²⁴⁰ John Erickson. “Russia Will Not Be Trifled With: Geopolitical Facts and Fantasies,” in *the Journal of Strategic Studies*, v. 22 n. 2/3, 1 June 1999, p. 254. And Rolf H. W. Theen, op. cit., p. 420.

²⁴¹ Byelorussia Foreign Minister Valery V. Tsepka. “The Remaking of Eurasia,” in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 77 n.2, March/April 1998, p.125.

²⁴² J. L. Black, op. cit., p. 13.

²⁴³ Leon Aron and Kenneth M. Jansens, eds. op. cit., p. 28.

In response to these documents leaked in Washington during the summer of 1993 that outlined an American interest in such involvement, Moscow quickly put Washington on notice that the United States had no role to play in the region. The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement on 13 August 1993 stating that the US “would not be allowed to become involved in peacekeeping in the area.”²⁴⁴ Directive 13 was unanimously deplored not only by the neo-patriots on the left but also by the Russian democratic and foreign policy establishment. The pro-Yeltsin *Moscow News*’ decried the “American arrogance of power” and “pressure” placed on Russia. The Russian Ambassador to the United States at the time, moderate Vladimir Lukin, while far more diplomatic in expression, was just as negative in principle.²⁴⁵

The presence of Russian troops in Latvia and Estonia, the participation of Russian military units, with or without Moscow’s permission, in ethnic and political conflicts in the near abroad, or Russian peacekeeping there have already caused US-Russian tension.

Kozyrev has hinted at as much:

“As regards international problems in our interaction with the United States, the foreground is most likely to be occupied by the conflicts along the perimeter of the Russian borders. One cannot exclude attempts by the United States to displace Russia from her traditional spheres of influence under the guise of mediating or peacemaking efforts.”²⁴⁶

He urged the West to extend understanding and support for Russian peacekeeping operations in the former Soviet Union by providing international observers, material

²⁴⁴ Suzanne Crow. “Russia Asserts Its Strategic Agenda,” op. cit., p.5.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 28.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 31.

assistance, and cooperation in the development of a peacekeeping partnership with Russia rather than actual peacekeepers.²⁴⁷

The development of Russian foreign policy to encompass the security and stability of the states of the former Soviet Union evidences an attempt to bring this region once again within the Russian sphere of influence. Peacekeeping is a manner in which to retain control of this region, at the same time precluding other powers from becoming engaged. Moreover, attempts by the Russian government to institutionalize regional solutions to peacekeeping under the auspices of the United Nations demonstrates a desire for international recognition of the Russian role in the near abroad. As has been proven above, Russia is unwilling to permit other states influence in an area it considers to be of vital interest to its national security and great power status.

“A familiar confluence of the ‘Russian Idea’ and national security was reached when a presidential aide used the term ‘red line’ in reference to an area into which Russia cannot allow NATO expansion, that is former Soviet republics.”²⁴⁸

The final topic to be addressed in this chapter is the threat that Russia perceives resulting from American incursion into its historical sphere of interest. This is one of the areas in which the potential for direct conflict with the United States is most likely. The area of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is identified as a jurisdiction historically belonging to Russia’s sphere of influence. Though Russia’s capabilities are shrinking, it appears unwilling to cede its interests to other states.

²⁴⁷ Franklyn Griffiths, *op. cit.*, p. 714.

²⁴⁸ ITAR-TASS, 18 August 1998. J. L. Black, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

American Incursion into the Russian Historical Sphere of Influence

The United States anticipated Russia developing a new identity, following the Cold War. Some American theorists argue that Russia was supposed to decisively and finally turn away from its imperial legacy and be reborn as a modern national government.²⁴⁹ Zbigniew Brzezinski called for a complete Russian withdrawal from the near abroad, as a requirement for the fulfillment of all the preconditions for the discarding of a Russian 'military-bureaucratic dictatorship'.²⁵⁰ Thus, these territories should have been open to international influence. However, as evidenced above, the Russian Federation is vehemently opposing the loss of its sphere of influence and is unwilling to give up its interests in the region to the United States. The movement of America into this region is seen as a threat to Russian national interests.

The most significant American involvement in the near abroad and East Central Europe has been observed in two areas: American military expansion vis-à-vis the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and American economic interests in the Caspian Sea Basin. These will be addressed in an attempt to gain a greater understanding of the unwillingness of Russia to cede its hegemony in the former Soviet Union.

From Russia's point of view, the desire of NATO's leaders to expand their alliance right up to the borders of the former Soviet Union, and perhaps even to the borders of Russia itself, if the Baltic states and Ukraine were to be considered as potential members, indicates that, at the very least, NATO continues to distrust Russia and Russian

²⁴⁹ D. Trenin, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

²⁵⁰ Franklyn Griffiths, *op. cit.*, p. 718.

motives.²⁵¹ As one official of the Russian Foreign Ministry put it “...preserving NATO in its present form means that it needs an enemy to contain, and Russia is the only realistic candidate.”²⁵²

The 1992 Russian foreign policy concept states that:

“The strategic task is to prevent Eastern Europe from becoming a kind of buffer zone isolating us from the west. At the same time western powers must not be allowed to force Russia out of the Eastern European region.”²⁵³

The development of Russia’s position on NATO can be traced to early 1993, when Foreign Minister Kozyrev went on record as opposing the expansion of NATO eastward. In an article published in the February 1993 issue of ‘*NATO Review*’ he implied that he was opposed to East European membership in the organization:

“The future of Eastern Europe lies in its transformation, not into some kind of buffer zone, but into a bridge linking the east and west of the continent.”²⁵⁴

Kozyrev’s views on prospective European security arrangements had become even clearer by August 1993, just prior to Yeltsin’s visit to Poland. He argued then that Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia should not be admitted into NATO, stressing that these states should be a bridge between Russia and Germany. Kozyrev warned that acting as a buffer zone was not in the best course for these states, since such a buffer “could be crushed in any situation.”²⁵⁵

²⁵¹ A. Voronov. “Rossiya v severoatlanticheskom regione: tsena sblizheniya,” in *MEMO*, 1997, No.3, p. 32. and Kosolapov, N. “Novaya Rossiya i strategiya zapada,” op. cit., p. 12.

²⁵² Jennifer G. Mathers, op. cit., p. 47.

²⁵³ “Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept,” op. cit.

²⁵⁴ Suzanne Crow. “Russia Asserts Its Strategic Agenda,” op. cit., p.5.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p.5.

Other Russian officials shared the Foreign Minister's opposition to East European entry into NATO. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin stated during a visit to the United States in August 1993, "I believe that we have reached the time when there is no need for military blocs. We need other blocs, in order to prospect jointly for deposits, for example."²⁵⁶ Defense Minister Pavel Grachev also voiced skepticism about the advantages of the NATO alliance. Marshal Evgenii Shaposhnikov, the former Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS, and onetime Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council, had expressed more fervent opposition. On several occasions Shaposhnikov voiced his great concern about NATO's enlargement.²⁵⁷ He stated "... we must firmly oppose any possible recurrences of imperialist manifestations in Washington's policy..."²⁵⁸ Russian Duma opposition to NATO expansion was also vocal. Gennadiy Seleznev, Speaker of the State Duma argued that,

"the Federal Assembly considers it illegitimate and not permissible to make NATO-centrism the basis of security and to turn NATO into the foundation of the future European architecture."²⁵⁹

Opposition has also been registered among Yeltsin's advisers, Sergey Karaganov, Deputy Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Europe and a member of Yeltsin's Presidential Council. He argued that while Polish, Hungarian, or Czech membership in NATO would not pose a direct military threat to Russia, it would cause Russia political and psychological problems. Moreover, such an expansion of NATO

²⁵⁶ Suzanne Crow. "Russia Asserts Its Strategic Agenda," op. cit., p.6.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., p.6.

²⁵⁸ *Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs Concept Document, No. 1615/IS*, op. cit., p.9.

²⁵⁹ "Seleznev: NATO Must Not Become Europe's Foundation," FBIS-SOV-97-189, Moscow ITAR-TASS, 8 July 1997.

would spark a reaction from the Russian military elite, whose influence over Russian society was growing.²⁶⁰

“We are not allergic to NATO...But we don’t understand the discussions to the effect that NATO must give security guarantees to the countries of Central Europe and in the long term accept them as members of the alliance. How are those states threatened and by whom?”²⁶¹

Speaking on Russian foreign policy at a strategic studies center in Egypt, Primakov said, “we do not want the old bloc divisions to be replaced with new ones that would divide the world into two parts. That is why Russia is against NATO expansion...we have the right to protect our national interests, and if NATO advances to our territory, we will take adequate measures in terms of military construction and will try to remedy the geopolitical situation...in order to find new partners and allies.”²⁶²

The desire was to maintain the Russian sphere of influence and preclude other powers from gaining a foothold in either Eastern Europe or the near abroad. The Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation of 1993 overtly stated that

“as a priority task, we intend to keep the Americans in positions of recognizing Russia’s leading role as the engine of market reforms and the guarantor of democratic transformations in the space of the former USSR....”²⁶³

The compromise put forward by NATO in January 1994, the Partnership for Peace (PfP), was given a cool reception by Russia’s leaders. Membership of the Partnership for Peace is open to all the former Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Soviet successor states, and provides a range of cooperative activities on

²⁶⁰ Suzanne Crow. “Russia Asserts Its Strategic Agenda,” op. cit., p.6.

²⁶¹ Ibid., p.5

²⁶² IITAR-TASS, 30 October 1996). J. L. Black, op. cit., p. 21.

²⁶³ *Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs Concept Document, No. 1615/1S*, op. cit., p.9.

military matters. But although there is no promise of NATO membership included in the package, Russia was quick to condemn the program as merely the first step in the expansion of the Western alliance.

On 1 December 1994 Kozyrev balked at the signing of the draft Partnership for Peace agreement between Russia and NATO that had been in the works for months, citing as his reason the endorsement of enlargement contained in the North Atlantic Council communiqué released earlier. Four days later, at a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Heads-of-State session in Budapest, a clearly agitated Yeltsin cautioned against efforts “from a single capital to determine the destinies of whole continents and the world community as a whole” and warned darkly of Europe’s “plunging into a cold peace.”²⁶⁴

Rather than a further expansion of NATO, which continues to leave Russia on the outside, Russia would prefer any future security alliance in Europe to be created and conducted under the auspices of a much larger, international or multinational organization, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe or the United Nations.²⁶⁵

Suffice it to say, it is no longer important whether or not NATO expansion actually represents a threat to Russia. What is important is that there is now a broad political consensus in Russia that NATO expansion is not only against Russian foreign and security interests but would also violates some accepted rules by which the Cold War was ended with the voluntary consent of the USSR.²⁶⁶

²⁶⁴ Coit D. Blacker, op. cit., p. 180.

²⁶⁵ Jennifer G. Mathers, op. cit., p. 48.

²⁶⁶ Alexei Arbatov. “Eurasia Letter: A Russian-US Security Agenda,” in *Foreign Policy* n.104, Fall 1996, p. 104.

Russia viewed NATO expansion to the east, unprovoked by any visible threat from Russia toward Poland or the other Visegrad states (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia), are seen as the consummation of a 'grand design' to destroy Russia as a European power or to take advantage of its current weakness.²⁶⁷ Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Relations in 1996 stated,

"We are prepared to cooperate with an organization which takes account of our interests. However, NATO's expansion runs counter to Russia's basic interests."²⁶⁸

The leader of the anti-NATO group in the Russian Duma in 1997, Sergey Glotov stated that "Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joining NATO exacerbates Russia's concerns."²⁶⁹

NATO expansion to include Central European states has been perceived in Russia as a threat as well as the first step of a major geopolitical offensive, and has incited Russian responses in foreign, defense, and arms control policies.²⁷⁰ These responses may, in turn, be perceived as threatening by Russia's neighbours in Eastern, Central, and possibly Western Europe. By way of self-fulfilling prophecy, these Russian defensive actions will perhaps provide justification for the initial NATO expansion. The actuality of the threat was noted in the 1997 Foreign Policy Blueprint of the Russian Federation.

"The conservation or creation by major powers (and their coalitions) of powerful groupings of armed forces in regions adjacent to Russia's territory remains a threat to Russia's national security in the defense sphere. NATO's expansion to the East and its transformation into a dominant military-political force in Europe creates the threat of a new split

²⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 104.

²⁶⁸ "Lukin Reminds NATO Leaders of Opposition to Expansion," FBIS-SOV-96-131, 5 July 1996, Moscow ITAR-TASS.

²⁶⁹ "State Duma Leader Says NATO Expansion Threatens Russia," in FBIS-SOV-97-358, 24 December 1997, Moscow ITAR-TASS.

²⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 105

in the continent, which would be extremely dangerous given the preservation in Europe of mobile strike groupings of troops and nuclear weapons and also the inadequate effectiveness of multilateral mechanisms for maintaining peace.”²⁷¹

Moreover, the official Russian doctrine of nuclear first-use and extended nuclear deterrence, approved in the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation in 2000, may have been partially motivated by this expectation.²⁷²

Another area in which the Russian Federation perceives a threat is with regard to American ambitions to become a defender and patron of the near abroad. The fear is that the United States is attempting to strengthen Russia’s enemies in the region in order to reap both economic and geopolitical benefits. Some argue that there is no clear understanding about Russia’s role in the world, or even about its role within its own immediate region. The expansive area stretching from the Baltic states and Ukraine, through the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia is increasingly a contested space.²⁷³

A real danger from Russia’s point of view is that NATO’s eastward expansion will lead it to become embroiled in post-Soviet disputes, and on the opposing side to that of Russia. Potential conflicts on Russia’s borders abound, although none of them (with the exception of Chechnya and the Georgian republic of Abkhazia) looks explosive in the short term. Although the chance of the United States becoming involved in these conflicts is small, it cannot be ignored: Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova have suggested NATO’s role in Kosovo as a possible model for NATO intervention in their own disputes with

²⁷¹ *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, “Russian National Security Blueprint” op. cit., p.4-5.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 105.

²⁷³ Sherle R. Schwenninger, op. cit., p. 51.

separatist regions. State Duma Expert on Security in 1997, Colonel Aleksey Gordeychuk stated

“If an American peace force is moved to the Caucasus...this would weaken Russia’s position in the region and inflict damage on Russia’s national interest.”²⁷⁴

The original scenario for the United States-Ukrainian “Sea Breeze” joint exercise of August 1997 was precisely that of the dispatch of United States troops to help Ukraine defeat a regional (that is, Crimean Russian) rebellion backed by a neighbouring power (that is, Russia). This scenario was changed to a ‘humanitarian mission’ after vehement protests by Russia and the Crimean Russian population, and a realization in Washington of the great danger of making this kind of implicit promise without a real commitment to fulfill it. It is hardly surprising that Sea Breeze left a legacy of strong distrust in Moscow.²⁷⁵ In October 1997, the Russian Duma adopted a statement “on NATO Military Maneuvers near Russian Federation Borders”. It stated

“there is no doubt that the US Army is intensively exploring new potential theaters of military operations in direct proximity to Russian Federation borders under the cover of statements regarding the peacekeeping nature of such maneuvers. The State Duma voices profound concern at the clearly manifested tendency to use the Partnership for Peace and bilateral military cooperation between NATO member states, particularly the United States and members of the Commonwealth of Independent States and Baltic states in NATO military structures but also to conduct maneuvers near Russian Federation borders.”²⁷⁶

The Duma Defense Committee Chief in 1997 put forward a draft program on defense stating, “NATO openly shows its force: large scale NATO exercises held in the

²⁷⁴ Anatoliy Yurkin. “US Involvement in Caucasus Would Weaken Russia’s Position,” in FBIS-UMA-91-157, 6 June 1997, *Moscow ITAR-TASS*.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

²⁷⁶ “Duma Statement on NATO Military Maneuvers Near Russian Federation Borders,” in FBIS-UMA-97-281, 8 October 1997, *Moscow Rossiyskaya gazeta*.

Black Sea, the Baltic Sea and Central Kazakhstan.”²⁷⁷ Moreover, the anti-NATO group in the Russian State Duma in 1998, represented by Chairman Sergey Baburin stated that

“under the pretext of training for peacekeeping actions, the troops are training for offensive operations by NATO in the zone of Russia’s vital national interests.”²⁷⁸

Russians, thus, have reason to fear that in many cases, they or the side they back in a dispute would not get a fair hearing in Washington, and that they would automatically be treated as the enemy.²⁷⁹ This trend is openly acknowledged by American diplomats, and has been made explicit by United States sponsorship of the Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (GUAM) consultative group, which informally links the members of the CIS whose interests are most opposed to those of Russia. GUAM is intended to function as a kind of counter-CIS. American backing for GUAM became clear when the agreement by which Uzbekistan joined the group was signed in Washington in April 1999, a date coinciding with NATO’s fiftieth-anniversary summit in the same city.²⁸⁰

America is not only attempting to support the territories of the former Soviet Union, but is also encouraging Russia’s competitors in the region. Most worrying for Russia is American support for increased Turkish influence in the area. In 1998, Washington dropped its more neutral posture of favouring multiple pipeline routes, and aggressively lobbied the Azerbaijan Independent Oil Consortium, a group of oil companies developing Caspian Basin oil reserves, for the adoption of the pipeline route from

²⁷⁷ “Army Reform Leader Rokhlin Warns Against NATO Expansion,” FBIS-SOV-97-351, Moscow InterFax, 17 December 1997.

²⁷⁸ Vladimir Gvozdev. “NATO Promoting Idea of Peacekeeping Forces in Caucasus,” in FBIS-UMA-98-195, 14 July 1998, *Moscow Rossiyskaya gazeta*.

²⁷⁹ Anatol Lieven, op. cit., p. 308

²⁸⁰ Sherle R. Schwenninger, op. cit., p. 57.

Azerbaijan across Georgia and Turkey to the Mediterranean (known as the Baku-Ceyhan route). This route makes no economic sense and is vulnerable to Kurdish attacks.

However, it would serve a number of American geopolitical objectives, pulling Azerbaijan and Georgia out of the Russian sphere of influence and bolstering America's ally, Turkey, in the region. If built, it would also undercut the viability of existing pipelines that cross Russia, reducing Russian transit fees as well as Russian control of the transport of Caspian oil to Central and Eastern Europe.²⁸¹

The Russian State Duma's Expert on Security in 1997, Colonel Aleksey Gordeychuk stated that

“The struggle for Caspian oil is acquiring tough forms and the appearance of troops of the NATO member states in the Transcaucasian region is a definitive danger. The activation of actions according to the principle ‘where there is oil...there are troops’ will force Russia to take adequate measures.”²⁸²

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser, mentor of Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and a behind-the-scenes architect of the current policy stated that “the strategic value of the Caspian has been there from the beginning - it never was just about oil.”²⁸³

President Yeltsin has warned directly of expanding US interests in the Caucasus:

“As our influence is fading, the United States, on the contrary, is making moves to penetrate into this zone and is openly speaking about this.”²⁸⁴

Some would say that the United States has committed itself in earnest to pipeline geopolitics, challenging Russia's claims to an energy monopoly to sustain ‘energy

²⁸¹ Ibid., p. 59.

²⁸² Anatoliy Yurkin, op. cit.

²⁸³ Paul Starobin. “The New Great Game,” in *the National Journal*, 3/13/99, p.667.

²⁸⁴ Sherman W. Garnett, op. cit.

security', and implanting a presence in defense of its oil interests in Kazakhstan. It is pursuing a policy designed to draw the Caspian region westwards and wean it away from overwhelming Russian influence.²⁸⁵ There lies the quest to control the production and transportation of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea region and Central Asia.²⁸⁶ The geopolitical and geostrategic calculations of this are intensified by the fact that a Russian Security Council report maintains that by 2005 Russian dependence on CIS energy and raw material resources will increase, making Russian access to these reserves and to markets a vital interest.²⁸⁷

American Energy Secretary Bill Richardson has stated an American intent to

“prevent strategic inroads by those who don't share our values into the hugely energy-rich Caspian region; the pipeline map and politics must come out right.”²⁸⁸

For almost a century, during the 1800s, the Russian and British empires fought, with money, arms, and men over the Caspian area. This was described as the Great Game. America has pursued an increasingly ambitious global oil policy, seeking to expand America's control over the world's oil resources by dictating oil investments and pipeline politics not only in the Persian Gulf but also in the Caspian Sea as well.²⁸⁹ Some describe the current major power competition for influence in the post-Soviet space in terms of a 'new great game'.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁵ John Erickson, op. cit., p. 261.

²⁸⁶ Ariel Cohen, op. cit. and S. Kolchin. “Neft i gaz kaspiya: strategicheskiye interesi Rossii,” in *MEMO*, 1998, No.2, p. 97.

²⁸⁷ John Erickson, op. cit., p. 262.

²⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 260.

²⁸⁹ Sherle R. Schwenninger, op. cit., p. 44.

²⁹⁰ Paul Starobin, op. cit., p.667.

American policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia suggests that the Clinton administration has adopted a modified version of the program advocated by Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and others of containing and isolating Russia by creating a ring of buffer states around its borders.²⁹¹ The policy of rolling back Russian influence and replacing it with that of the United States risks drawing America into local conflicts in the former Soviet Union. As a result of these and other actions, Russia's leaders are highly suspicious of American ambitions, which they view as a naked power grab in a region, which Russia ruled for more than 100 years.²⁹²

Conclusion

Conceptions of the geopolitical and geostrategic configurations of the new world order appear to be quite disparate between the Russian Federation and the United States. Russia seeks to continue to try to consolidate its influence over its historical sphere of influence regardless of its loss of relative capabilities in the international system. It is achieving these goals vis-à-vis the Commonwealth of Independent States and the management of conflict along its borders through peacekeeping. The United States is increasingly coming into conflict with the Russian Federation in this region. Russia is unwilling to accept the increase of influence of any foreign powers in a zone it considers to be its zone of vital interests. American security interests through the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and through its increasing involvement in the former Soviet Union and East Central Europe is proving a threat to Russian interests. Therefore,

²⁹¹ Anatol Lieven, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

²⁹² Sherle R. Schwenninger, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

unless overt changes occur in these states' behaviour, it would be a reasonable proposition to assume that conflict should continue into the future.

Chapter Four

Creating a Balance: Russia's New Strategic Partners

This chapter employs a practical international dilemma to determine the utility and accuracy of power cycle theory as a predictor of international behaviour. It delves into Russia's response to a perceived decrease in its geopolitical role. As Russia's capabilities decrease, as a result of its diminishing economic and military capacity, the Russian Federation persists in attempts to maintain its geopolitical and geostrategic role in the international system. The previous chapter demonstrated one manner in which the Russian Federation sought to pursue this strategy of expanding its geopolitical influence; this was accomplished vis-à-vis the maintenance of its historical sphere of influence. In undertaking this policy, the Russian Federation came into conflict with the existing hegemonic power, the United States.

This chapter exhibits yet another arena of potential conflict between Russia and the United States. The goal of the maintenance and expansion of its international role is the same; however, the strategy that has been undertaken differs from that mentioned in the previous chapter. The Russian Federation is holding on to the vestiges of its international role through the creation of a number of strategic alliances with neighbouring states.

With the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the alliances upon which Russia had relied for decades, such as COMECON and the Warsaw Pact, ceased to exist. No longer could Russia unquestionably rely upon the states of the Communist bloc for economic, political, or security cooperation. Russia was set adrift alone into a new era of geopolitical relations. However, with developments and

adaptations in Russian foreign policy, this situation has changed. The Russian Federation has pursued a policy of the arranging a variety of strategic and political alliances.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section outlines the basic reasoning for the creation of strategic alliances for the Russian Federation. The second section elucidates the developing relations between two vital allies with whom Russia has steadily normalized relations: China and India. Moreover, it outlines the rhetoric, which has recently arisen with regard to the potential for the creation of a Sino-Russo-Indian axis. The final section addresses the strengthening of Russian relations with a state commonly referred to in the United States and in western rhetoric as a 'rogue state', Iran. This pariah state has been deemed by the United States and many western nations as posing a threat to the existing geopolitical order. Iran will be employed as a representative of rogue states, as Russian relations continue to deepen with such states as North Korea and Iraq as well. The strengthening of relations between Russia and these states has already and will continue to pose a threat to Russo-American relations.

Reasoning for the Creation of Strategic Alliances by Russia

Russia is attempting to accomplish two goals in expanding its web of strategic alliances. Firstly, it seeks to create a system of alliances independent of the Western alliance structure. As the Russian Federation is unlikely to join such Western organizations as the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization²⁹³, it has attempted to create alliances, which benefit Russia's national interest and at the same time stand independently of Western groupings. This is not to say that the Russian Federation has been precluded from allying with Western states. Russia continues to participate in

²⁹³ Ibid., p. 59.

the United Nations Security Council, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the G-8. Connections have not been severed. Rather, the development of anti-Western and Eurasian sentiments in Russian foreign policy circles has led to a greater emphasis on other centers of power as well. Secondly, by creating strategic partnerships with states such as China and India, Russia has the capability of creating a separate axis of power of which it can be a leader.

It must be noted that the relationships that Russia is developing with China, India, and 'rogue states' such as Iran are far from smooth and idyllic. Rather, they are complex and possess a multitude of facets. An example of this is Russia's relationship with Iran. Russia simultaneously seeks to ally with Iran while limiting Iran's power in Central Asia. Thus, the relationships are not as stable and constructive as they may appear. However, they are serving certain purposes that the Russian government sees as vital.

By later 1993, the Russian Federation has begun to gain a greater consensus on the direction of foreign policy and national goals. The 1993 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation states that

"the course toward interaction must lead to the elevation of our own status....Cooperation with anyone must be developed in that measure and in those forms which correspond to Russia's own long-range interests."²⁹⁴

A number of changes have occurred in the international system, which have served to clarify Russia's position on the building of strategic alliances. NATO expansion has changed Russia's calculations of its own interests. It has potentially threatened to turn Russia from an active partner with the United States in dealing with China and 'rogue' states like Iraq and Iran to a potential leader of a coalition opposing American hegemony

²⁹⁴ *Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs Concept Document, No. 1615/1S, op. cit., p.1-58.*

that includes both Iran and China.²⁹⁵ As a result of NATO expansion, Moscow now has much less incentive to heed American concerns in the development of its relations with Iran, Iraq, China, or India. Indeed, expanding its ties with these countries may be the key to balancing NATO's power in the future.²⁹⁶ Numerous individuals in the foreign policy making circles of the Russian Federation have demonstrated their opposition to NATO expansion. President Yeltsin's press secretary, Sergei Yastrzhembaky, stated that

“if NATO expansion is going to continue under a scenario that is the toughest and most negative one from our standpoint, Russia will be confronted with a need to reconsider its foreign policy priorities. Our relations with China, India and, where certain issues are concerned, Iran are developing well.”²⁹⁷

A larger lesson that Moscow may have drawn from NATO expansion is that it too must organize its own sphere of influence to balance NATO. This would enable it, in the future, to have any agreement be an agreement between rough equals: a Washington-led NATO alliance and a Moscow-led Commonwealth of Independent States, bolstered by a larger counter-hegemonic triad of itself, China, and India.²⁹⁸ Some Russian foreign policy pundits such as Alexei Arbatov maintain that

“NATO expansion will plant a permanent seed of mistrust between the United States and Russia. It will worsen existing differences on everything from nuclear-arms control to policies in Iraq and Iran. It will push Moscow into alliances with China, India and rogue regimes. It will push Moscow into various endeavors with China, India, with anti-Western agendas and rogue regimes. And it will move the United States towards unilateral actions, disregarding interests and positions of other states and towards

²⁹⁵ Sherle R. Schwenninger, op. cit., p. 45.

²⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 45.

²⁹⁷ Nikolai Rakukin “Border Between PRC and Russia Shrouded in Fog,” in *Kommersant Daily*, 25 March 1997, p.4.

²⁹⁸ Sherle R. Schwenninger, op. cit., p. 58.

arbitrary use of force in the world.”²⁹⁹

On any number of issues, from what many saw as the less than respectful treatment of Russia’s interests in the former Yugoslavia to Washington’s unremitting pressure to accelerate the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic republics, critics began to charge that the Russian government had been too pliant in its dealings with the West and in so doing had compromised important and long-standing foreign policy interests.³⁰⁰

Some analysts have contended that, as a result of the aforementioned events, Russia needs leverage, in the form of a credible threat to defect from the existing geopolitical system, so as to strengthen Russia’s bargaining position, extract better terms and more resources from the West, and thereby accelerate the process of economic and political recovery.³⁰¹

According to individuals like Vladimir Lukin, former Russian Ambassador to the United States, the only resolution would be to balance Russia’s relations with the West by intensifying ties with such important regional actors as China and India.

“The purpose of cultivating better relations with Russia’s other neighbours is, of course, to realize such direct benefits as mutual gains from trade; it could also, however, provide us with much-needed leverage in its dealing with the West by demonstrating our willingness to look elsewhere for friends.”³⁰²

The official foreign policy soon began to reflect these ideas. In early 1993, at the time of a Presidential state visit to India, Yeltsin stated that, “the time for Russia’s concentration on partnership with the West has come and gone. The recent series of visits

²⁹⁹ Alexei Arbatov. “Bad for Russia, Bad for the World,” in *Global Beat*, 3 March 1998, <http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nato/arbato030398.html>. Accessed 25 June 2000.

³⁰⁰ Coit Blacker, op. cit., p. 177.

³⁰¹ Ibid., p. 178.

³⁰² Ibid., p. 177.

to South Korea, China, and now India is indicative of the fact that we are moving away from a Western emphasis in Russian diplomacy.”³⁰³

In 1994, the Yeltsin government began in a serious way to play the ‘Eurasian’ card by seeking to cultivate closer relations with various non-Western actors. The strategy also, and more alarmingly from Washington’s perspective, involved the intensification of relations with Iran, to which Russia was already supplying several kinds of conventional military equipment, including, as of January 1995, two Kilo-class attack submarines.³⁰⁴

With the ascension of Foreign Minister Primakov to power in early 1996, he wasted little time in setting out his vision for Russian foreign policy. Primakov argued that Russia, like any great power, needed a diverse foreign policy, one that in addition to promoting good relations with the United States and the countries of Europe, could also seek to cultivate strong ties with “China, India, Japan, and the countries of the Near and Middle East.”³⁰⁵

Primakov’s pursuit of a greater balance in Russian foreign policy is intimately connected to the concept of leverage, which in Moscow’s case means the ability to improve one’s relative standing in the international system by setting up a kind of bidding war between or among rival suitors. Perhaps, this is also why Primakov had gone out of his way to depict the international system within which these tasks may be accomplished as multipolar rather than unipolar in character.³⁰⁶

³⁰³ Suzanne Crow. “Why Has Russian Foreign Policy Changed?” *op. cit.*, p. 1.

³⁰⁴ Coit Blacker, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

A second reason for the Russia's creation of a variety of strategic alliances is a result of Moscow's attempt to assist in the creation of a multipolar geopolitical order. By creating strategic partnerships with states such as China and India, Russia has the capability of creating a separate axis of power, independent of that existing in the West. As has been evidenced in chapter two, Russia has strongly endorsed the policy of the multipolarization of the international political order and vehemently opposed the existence of an American hegemonic regime capable of determining the destinies of states.

The 1997 Russian National Security Blueprint stated that one of the major issues of concern in the developing international environment is

“relapses into attempts to create a structure of international relations based on one-sided solutions of the key problems of world politics.”³⁰⁷

In seeking the creation of a multipolar world, Russia is essentially pursuing a policy of creating a balance to the power of the United States. The strategic partnership between Russia and China, as will be shown, has entailed a great amount of opposition to the existence of a unipolar world dominated by hegemonism and power politics. A tenuous Russo-Indian-Chinese alliance could itself be an encouragement to further global diversity, all without presenting an outright challenge to the hegemonism of the United States, rather outflanking it.³⁰⁸

It is necessary to investigate the creation of Russia's foreign policy with regard to the forging of strategic alliances, to understand the development of bilateral relations, which serve to both create a niche for Russia in the new geopolitical realities as well as

³⁰⁷ *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, “Russian National Security Blueprint” op. cit., p.4-5.

³⁰⁸ John Erickson, op. cit., p. 264.

balance American hegemony. Thus, this chapter will now turn to the development of the Sino-Russian relationship.

Strategic Partnership with China

After several decades of hostility toward Beijing, Moscow now considers improved relations with China a major achievement in its foreign policy.³⁰⁹ Russo-Chinese relations are, to a large extent, a function of both countries' attitudes toward the West, in particular the United States. Beijing publicly sided with Moscow regarding the expansion of NATO. Both Russia and China branded the NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia as acts of aggression. Russia and China have a number of interests in common including the desire of these states to limit American influence in regions important to Moscow and Beijing. Moreover, both states are interested in stability in Central Asia and on the Korean peninsula.³¹⁰

On 31 January 1992 Chinese Premier Li Peng held talks with President Boris Yeltsin during a summit of the United Nations Security Council. Yeltsin stated that Russia highly valued good relations with China and sought expanded economic cooperation.³¹¹ During 1992, Russia provided other signals of interest in fostering this relationship. Foreign Minister Kozyrev's first official visit to China occurred in March 1992. He stated that

³⁰⁹ Dmitri Trenin, "The China Factor: Challenge and Chance for Russia," in Sherman W. Garnett, ed. Rapprochement or Rivalry? Russia-China Relations in a Changing Asia. (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), p. 40.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

³¹¹ Li Jingjie, "From Good Neighbours to Strategic Partners," in Sherman W. Garnett, ed. Rapprochement or Rivalry? Russia-China Relations in a Changing Asia. (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), p. 74.

“we must move from a full normalization of relations to constructive partnership.”³¹²

On 14 July, Yeltsin stated that Russia was “firmly and unmovably heading to the East” and would “establish closer relations” with Eastern countries, including China.³¹³ The Russian Foreign Ministry, at the same time, declared that China was included in the preferential position of the near abroad in Russian foreign policy, that is, countries that held the highest priority for Russian foreign policy.³¹⁴

On 2 to 6 September 1994, Chinese President Jiang Zemin paid an official visit to Russia and joined Russian President Boris Yeltsin in signing a number of important documents. The visit ended with President Jiang Zemin’s call for the development of a Sino-Russian partnership.³¹⁵ He summed up this discussion in describing the strategic and national bases for Sino-Russian partnership and its future development:

“Only if we establish good-neighbour relations and mutually cooperative relations on the foundation of the five principles of peaceful coexistence will we satisfy the fundamental interests of the two countries and peoples.”³¹⁶

Relations proved to be more than merely rhetorical in nature. During 1995 to 1996, interaction was characterized by two main features: the institutionalization of the relationship, including the expansion of the frequency and range of contacts; and the internationalization of the foci of bilateral ties, with both sides turning for the first time to issues of global significance.

³¹² Robert Legvold. “Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle,” in Michael Mandelbaum, ed. the Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1995), p. 49.

³¹³ Li Jingjie, op. cit., p. 75.

³¹⁴ Ibid., p. 75.

³¹⁵ Coit Blacker, op. cit., p. 181.

³¹⁶ Li Jingjie, op. cit., p. 82

With an increase in the number of high level exchanges, mutual trust was advanced. On 8 May 1995 Chinese and Russian leaders expressed their commitment to developing closer relations, when Chairman Jiang Zemin visited Moscow for the fiftieth anniversary of Russia's victory in World War II. On 5-8 June 1995, Chinese Premier Li Peng visited Russia, where he met with Yeltsin. The leaders resolved to place greater emphasis on bilateral trade and scientific and technological cooperation, pursuing mutual investments, establishing a new model of long-term cooperation in border areas, and realizing cooperation in large-scale production and scientific projects.³¹⁷

Important meetings have occurred between Russian and Chinese officials in the area of trade and technology. The Chinese Minister in charge of the State Development Planning Commission, Zeng Peiyan; the Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC), Shi Guangsheng; the Minister in charge of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), Liu Jibin; and the Minister of Railways, Fu Zhihuan have visited Russia in recent years. Official discussions have centered on expanding trade and economic cooperation between the two countries. Agreements have also focused on the development of the type now underway in China's Shandong Province, where an experimental base for Sino-Russian cooperation in industrializing technology has been established. The facility, located in the Yantai high-tech Industrial Development Zone, will have apartments for Russian experts, and Russian

³¹⁷ Ibid., p. 88.

enterprises at the base will be entitled to preferential policies that the PRC affords to national-level high-tech development zones.³¹⁸

With the ascent of Primakov to the Foreign Ministry, Russia pressed hard to build up relations with a host of non-Western partners, most notably China. In April 1996, a summit was held in China between President Yeltsin and President Jiang Zemin. The Sino-Russian Joint Declaration issued after the summit declared that the two sides would resolutely “develop an equal and trustworthy strategic partnership aimed at the 21st century.” They also agreed to establish regularly scheduled summits of the countries’ leaders, to create a special telephone communications line between Beijing and Moscow, and to establish a Sino-Russian Friendship, Peace, and Development Committee of representatives from various circles in the two societies.³¹⁹

During the summit, Zemin stated that

“the relationship has been developing healthily and in a stable manner on the track of partnership, and is progressing into the new century smoothly. Meanwhile, we have reached agreements on confidence-building and disarmament along the border areas, creating a brand new border security model in Asia. That will benefit regional stability and peace.”³²⁰

Yeltsin offered an equally high evaluation of achievements made in resolving issues of dispute. He stated that, “efforts from both sides will help build a long-term, peaceful and stable border.”³²¹

³¹⁸ “China and Russia Seek Cooperation in Trade and Technology,” in *PRC Information Technology Review* v.1 n.8, 26 February 1999. http://prcitr.work.upi.com/html/Issue_08/story2_i8.html. Accessed 4 July 2000.

³¹⁹ Li Jingjie, *op. cit.*, p. 82

³²⁰ “Jiang, Yeltsin Satisfied with the Relationship,” Chinese Embassy in Washington. November 1998. <http://www.chinaembassy.ru/english/eng.china/eng.chi.jiang/eng.china.jian.199803.htm>. Accessed 25 June 2000.

³²¹ *Ibid.*

On this official visit, Zemin also met with a number of other Russian officials.

During his meeting with Gennady Seleznyov, Chairman of the Russian Duma, Jiang noted that the new relationship with Russia

“will continue developing despite the world situation. Cooperation between the countries is not only in the interest of the nations, but also regional and global peace and development”.³²²

Jiang Zemin also emphasized that China has been supporting the development of friendly relations between the countries' congresses, which is an important part of their relationship. Seleznyov, who visited China last October, spoke highly of China's tremendous achievements in the past two decades. “Seeing is believing,” Seleznyov said, adding that “Russia can learn from China's experience in its reforms, although it cannot apply China's practices mechanically.”³²³ At the end of 1996, Jiang Zemin summarized China's long-term aims toward Russia as “good neighbours, equality and trust, mutual advantage and cooperation, joint development.”³²⁴

During 1997 to 1998, the nature of the Sino-Russian strategic, cooperative partnership solidified and developed. In this period, summits of the countries' leaders became more frequent. In 1997, during the course of one year, the heads of the two countries conducted two summits: one in April when Jiang Zemin visited Russia, and one in November when Yeltsin visited China. Barely one day into the April 1997 meetings, the two governments released a joint statement in which they characterized the world as multipolar and expressed their opposition to any country seeking to practice power politics or to monopolize international affairs.

³²² Ibid.

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ Li Jingjie, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

“It is necessary to put an end to the Cold War mentality and oppose the bloc policy”³²⁵

It was during this period, that the development of bilateral relations realized a major breakthrough. The decision to take the relationship to another level was initiated with the emphasis on the resolution of historical border disputes. The bilateral border question had proven a source of tension for many years in Sino-Russian relations. In November 1998, China and Russia issued the Joint Declaration Concerning the Sino-Russian Border Question, indicating that “the open field work on demarcating the Sino-Russian western border is already completed. With this, for the first time in the history of bilateral relations, the border demarcation in the two eastern and western sections had been exactly marked out on the spot.”³²⁶

Both in China and in Russia, there is much support for developing a strategic partnership. Factors influencing the desire for closer relations with China are a common border of 4300 kilometers, economic complementarity, a tradition of friendship, the common task of internal reform, and a common need for a peaceful international environment. Recently, some analysts have stressed an additional factor, the need to counterbalance the United States: “The demand for Sino-Russian strategic cooperation arises because China and Russia feel increased pressure from the United States.”³²⁷ These analysts go on to state that “Moscow must lean on Sino-Russian relations to contain the

³²⁵ “Russia, China Pledge New Era,” *Associated Press*, 24 June 1997, <http://www.thonline.com/th/news/042497/National/55744.htm>. Accessed 25 June 2000.

³²⁶ Li Jingjie, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

US and Japan. Simultaneously, Russia also must rely on China's position and influence to gain a place in Asia-Pacific affairs."³²⁸

In November 1998, China and Russia issued a joint statement on Sino-Russian Relations at the turn of the century. The statement noted that, "the two countries are coordinating their stands on the basic trend of global social developments as the turn of the century approaches and have reached a consensus on the prospects for the promotion of a long-term strategy of bilateral cooperation."³²⁹ Russian and Chinese officials speak of the relationship between the People's Republic of China and Russia as "a new kind of strategic partnership aimed to the next century."³³⁰

The two sides agreed to enhance their partnership based on the following key principles: a constructive world multipolarization which would assist in the building of a balanced, stable, democratic and non-confrontational new world order, and which would benefit the principal interests of all countries. Secondly, an essential condition and objective requirement for the establishment of a new world order in politics and economics is to respect and recognize the diversity of world civilization.³³¹ This theme of mutual cooperation in order to achieve the multipolarization of the geopolitical order was further underlined in Russian foreign policy.

³²⁸ Ibid., p. 96 and Alexei D. Voskressenski, "Russia's Evolving Grand Strategy Toward China," in Sherman W. Garnett, ed. *Rapprochement or Rivalry?: Russia-China Relations in a Changing Asia*. (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), p. 118.

³²⁹ "China and Russia Issue a Joint Statement on Sino-Russian Relations at the Turn of the Century," Chinese Embassy in Washington. November 1998. <http://www.chinaembassy.ru/english/eng.china/eng.chi.jiang/eng.china.jian.199805.htm>. Accessed 25 June 2000

³³⁰ Sherman W. Garnett, ed. *op. cit.*, p. 117.

³³¹ "China and Russia Issue a Joint Statement," *op. cit.*

Presidents Jiang Zemin and Yeltsin reached an agreement during an informal meeting on 9 December 1999. They agreed that China and Russia “will work together to further develop the Sino-Russian strategic and cooperative partnership in the new century.”³³² Jiang maintained that “bilateral relations have been moving forward tangibly in recent years, and have reached a new high”.³³³ Furthermore, he expressed satisfaction with bilateral cooperation on international issues. He stated that

“both China and Russia are held profoundly responsible for pushing forward multipolarization and maintaining the global strategic balance and stability.”³³⁴

Yeltsin concurred with this conception. He stressed that his country firmly stands for establishing a multipolar world, saying that global issues cannot be determined by a single country, but rather, must be decided by all countries of the world. Moreover, he went on to state that

“major issues concerning the future and destiny of the world can only be determined with extensive participation by the entire international community.”³³⁵

Anti-Western and anti-hegemonic rhetoric in the relationship between Russia and China has become quite pronounced. In Yeltsin’s last summit as President of Russia, in December 1999, he stated that

“Yesterday Bill Clinton permitted himself to put pressure on Russia. He evidently forgot, for a second, for a minute, for a half minute what Russia is, that Russia controls a full arsenal of nuclear arms and for this reason decided to play a muscleman.”³³⁶

³³² Zhao Yingxin. “China, Russia Advance Strategic Partnership,” in *the Beijing Review*, 20 December 1999, p. 4.

³³³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³³⁶ Dmitrii Gornostayev, *op. cit.*, p. A2

Boris Yeltsin issued this phrase with the silent agreement of his Chinese counterpart Jiang Zemin.

Yeltsin once again employed a common foreign policy refrain, during the 1999 summit, which is now a focus of the Sino-Russian bilateral partnership. Russia and China agreed that a multipolar world is a basis of their agreement and “we will dictate to the world how to live, not just him [Clinton].”³³⁷

Russia and China have also found a commonality and mutual understanding in the manner in which they view the sovereignty and integrity of their respective states. In response to the negative reaction from the West with regard to Russia’s most recent Chechan campaign in late 1999, President Yeltsin vociferously advocated a multipolar world. Yeltsin's outburst, delivered in front of reporters, came after he secured Chinese backing for Russia's campaign to crush separatists in Chechnya.³³⁸ In a meeting with Chinese legislative chairman Li Peng, Yeltsin maintained that

“it seems Mr. Clinton has forgotten Russia is a great power that possesses a nuclear arsenal. We aren't afraid at all of Clinton's anti-Russian position. I want to tell President Clinton that he alone cannot dictate how the world should live, work and play. It is us who will dictate.”³³⁹

At the same summit, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue supported Russia’s position, when she stated that

“the Chinese side understands and supports the efforts made by Russia to maintain its national unity and territorial integrity. China's stand is very clear. China has always been opposed to interference in other

³³⁷ Ibid., p. A2

³³⁸ “Yeltsin Blasts Clinton,” in *Associated Press*, 12 October 1999.

<http://www.thonline.com/th/news/12101999/front/186372.htm>. Accessed 25 June 2000.

³³⁹ Ibid.

countries' internal affairs by any country in any name. We think that the Chechnya issue is the internal affair of Russia."³⁴⁰

During the 1999 summit, Yeltsin also met with Premier Zhu Ronghi. Zhu noted that "under the current international situation, cooperation between China and Russia in all fields is in the fundamental interests of the two countries and has influence on world peace and development."³⁴¹ During Yeltsin's visit, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and his Russian counterpart Igor Ivanov signed three inter-governmental documents, including statements on the demarcation of borders.³⁴²

Among the intergovernmental agreements signed in 1999 was a protocol on trade and economic cooperation for 1999 (an annual document to fix mutually agreed reciprocal supplies under intergovernmental agreements) and a protocol on the principles of protection and distribution of intellectual property rights. Interregional agreements on trade and other economic contacts were made between the governments and administrations of the Republic of Bashkortostan and the Liaoning province, the Altai Territory and the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomy, the Maritime Territory and Jilin Province, and the Amur Region and Shanghai. As they establish direct economic contacts, the regions will proceed from mutual interests, local situations and the available potential to set up joint bodies to coordinate and extend contacts.³⁴³

Of crucial importance among corporate understandings was a general agreement for feasibility studies on a pipeline to link the Kovykta gas condensate deposit in the

³⁴⁰ "China Backs Russia Move on Chechnya," in *Associated Press*, 7 December 1999. <http://www.thonline.com/th/news/12071999/1207b.htm>. Accessed 25 June 2000.

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 6

³⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 12

³⁴³ "China," in *Polpred* (Polpred Analytical Center), <http://www.polpred.com/english/china.htm>. Accessed 4 July 2000.

Irkutsk Region and China (the two countries are starting the studies according to an approved construction schedule). The line is to pump up to 20 billion cubic meters of natural gas for 30 years or longer. Moreover, also extremely important was a contract between the YUKOS petroleum company and the Chinese National Oil and Gas Corporation for major supplies of crude oil and petroleum products to China—up to 1.5 million tons in 1999 later to rise to 2-2.5 million, including supplies via the Russian Far East to replace Chinese-drilled oil in Kazakhstan.³⁴⁴

Trade has proven to be another area in which Sino-Russian relations are strengthening. During the November 1999 summit, President Yeltsin promoted trade and played up Russia's historic ties with China in addition to proclaiming their strategic partnership during talks with his Chinese counterpart. Yeltsin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin made boosting economic ties a crucial goal of the summit in Beijing. There are no publicly available figures on the arms trade, but *'The Economist'* newspaper suggested that between 1991 and 1996 China may have spent US \$5 billion on arms deals with Russia, which would amount to 2% of all Russian exports in that period. They included anti-aircraft missiles, radar, command and control equipment, surface vessels and some weapons for ground forces.³⁴⁵

The most recent visit to Moscow earlier this year by the Chinese Defense Minister, Liu Huaqing, saw contracts signed worth \$100 million. Reportedly Russia has now agreed to allow China to manufacture SU-27s under license in Shenyang. The Chinese army has

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ Peter Ferdinand. "China and Russia: A Strategic Partnership?" in *China Review: the Magazine of the Great-Britain China Center*. Autumn/Winter 1997, issue 8, <http://www.gbcc.org.uk/ferdinan.htm>. Accessed 4 July 2000.

again begun sending officers to train in Russian military academies. There are regular meetings alternating between Moscow and Beijing for the respective Defense Ministers and Chiefs of General Staff. Furthermore, although the details remain extremely cloudy, it appears that significant numbers of unemployed Russian defense scientists and technologists have gone to work for the arms industry in China.³⁴⁶

What is significant today is that the Sino-Russian relationship has survived the collapse of the Soviet Union and produced a multifaceted transformation in Russian-Chinese relations. Leaders in both countries now speak openly of a strategic partnership. Their relationship is best characterized as one of strategic convergence, involving many-sided cooperation and a convergence of views and interests on important questions of international security. It is sustained not simply by trust and goodwill but also by calculated self-interest and a desire for leverage vis-à-vis third parties, especially the United States.³⁴⁷

The Russian Federation's political and strategic relations with China are increasing, as are economic ties. In this manner they are accomplishing both goals of their foreign policy with regard to the forging of strategic alliances. They are creating an alliance, which is independent of western clubs and groupings. Moreover, they are finding allies that support the idea of a multipolar geopolitical system. The Russian Federation is serving to maintain its international role in the geopolitical system despite its decreasing economic and political capabilities. The creation of strategic alliances is but one of a

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ Rajan Menon. "The Strategic Convergence Between Russia and China," in *Survival*, V.39 n.2, Summer 1997, p.101.

number of approaches that Russia is undertaking to preserve its declining international political position. Russia has also found other allies in its attempts to achieve these goals.

The Russian Federation's Relations with India

Primakov was instrumental in re-energizing relations between Russia and India, which had fallen into disrepair following the collapse of the Soviet Union.³⁴⁸ In the early days of the Russian Federation, India and other Eastern countries were given a rather low place in the Russian order of priorities. It was a period of uncertainty in Indo-Russian relations. The 1993 Russian Foreign Policy Concept ranked India and South Asia seventh on its list of regional priorities.³⁴⁹

President Yeltsin's New Delhi visit in January 1993 removed the uncertainty with regard to Indo-Russian relations. It showed a decision had been finally taken in the Kremlin in favour of according priority to relations with India in the South Asian context. During Yeltsin's visit, the two countries signed a new twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. While in India, Yeltsin played up the theme of friendship and cooperation between the three great Asian powers, Russia, India and China, for peace and stability in the region.³⁵⁰

Indian Prime Minister Rao's visit to Moscow from 29 June to 2 July 1994 provided an opportunity to further cement ties between the two countries. Several agreements were signed between them to expand cooperation in the economic field and in science and technology. India agreed to participate in the modernization of Novorossisk port and

³⁴⁸ Coit Blacker, op. cit., p. 184.

³⁴⁹ Jyotsna Bakshi. "India in Russia's Strategic Thinking," IDSA. <http://www.idsa-india.org/an-jan-6.html>. Accessed 28 June 2000.

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

build warehouses there in return for priority berthing facilities. It was stressed during the visit that the two countries would remain in the first circle of priorities for each other.³⁵¹

The two leaders signed the “Moscow Declaration on the Protection of the Interests of Pluralistic States” which underscored their growing conceptual unity and adherence to common values in the post-Cold War world. Both countries subscribe to “internationally accepted standards of democracy and the rule of law. Both are following market-oriented economic reforms and are seeking integration into the world economy on the basis of equal rights and responsibilities.”³⁵² Moreover, it was decided to set up a joint venture in military aviation in India to service all types of Russian military aircraft in operation around the Third World. The joint venture symbolized a new type of defense relationship between India and Russia from buyer-seller to participation and interaction.³⁵³

Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin visited India from 22 to 24 December 1994. The visit testified to the growing importance of India in Russian foreign policy calculations. The Russian officials enthusiastically talked of a “Russian-Indian partnership” and referred to India as their “biggest partner” in the region. Agreements were reached during the visit to streamline economic cooperation.³⁵⁴

Russian Foreign Minister Primakov visited India in March 1996. His predecessor Andrei Kozyrev had accompanied Yeltsin during the latter's India visit in January 1993, but had not independently visited New Delhi throughout his long tenure as the country's Foreign Minister. Primakov successfully placed India back on the Russian foreign policy

³⁵¹ Ibid.

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ Ibid.

³⁵⁴ Ibid.

agenda. He spoke of India as a “global power” and a “priority partner of Russia.”³⁵⁵

India’s relations with Russia also began to increase in importance. The Annual Report of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs in 1996 stated

“based on continuity, trust and confidences, relations with the Russian Federation are an important foreign policy priority for India.”³⁵⁶

There is a revival of talk of an Indo-Russian “strategic partnership.” President Yeltsin met on 25 March 1997 with Indian Prime Minister Deve Gowda in Moscow. During the meeting, they discussed prospects for establishing a strategic partnership. The Russian Federation President’s Press Secretary, Sergey Yastrzhembsky, stated that the “relationship between New Delhi and Moscow is of a strategic nature.”³⁵⁷ Moreover, President Yeltsin and India’s Defense Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav, during the latter’s Moscow visit in October 1997 reaffirmed their countries’ intentions to develop a strategic partnership.³⁵⁸

Military-technical cooperation is the backbone of their bilateral relations. India is the largest buyer of Russian military hardware. It is the only country in the world with which Russia has a long-term program of military-technical cooperation, worth more than \$10 billion. During the Indian Defense Minister’s 1997 visit to Moscow, the two sides agreed to prolong such cooperation until the year 2012.³⁵⁹ A Defense Ministry spokesman

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ Aleksandr Reutov. “Moscow is Prepared to Forge Strategic Partnership with New Delhi and Beijing,” in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 26 March 1997, p. 1.

³⁵⁸ Jyotsna Bakshi, op. cit.

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

said the agreement emerged between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Indian Defense Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav at the Kremlin.³⁶⁰

Yevgeni Primakov went in search of a new strategic partnership pursuing the geostrategic imperative of a Moscow-New Delhi-Beijing axis. During his visit to India in late December 1998, Primakov entered into a draft strategic agreement with India. Extensive military aid for India, including 300 T-90 main battle tanks, was agreed between Colonel General Yuri Bukreev and Indian Chief of Staff General Malik. The Indian Navy also agreed to purchase the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, plus aircraft.³⁶¹

Primakov's successor, Foreign Minister Ivanov, in late 1999, made a declaration laying out a new strategic relationship between Russia and India. Indian Foreign Minister Singh, stated that his talks with Yeltsin took place in the "friendliest atmosphere and were extremely productive." Commenting on his talks with leaders in the Kremlin, Singh said India favours expansion of its strategic relationship with Russia. Singh met with Moscow's Mayor Luzhkov. Luzhkov stated "the Indo-Russian friendship is a gift of history for mankind."³⁶²

An emphasis on Indo-Russian partnership has remained an important aspect of Russian foreign policy. Foreign Minister Ivanov in his report to the President, outlining priorities for Russian foreign policy during 1999, mentioned India among only a few other countries.³⁶³ In May 1999, India's Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh began talks in Moscow

³⁶⁰ "India, Russia Extend Defense Treaty to 2010," in *ReDiff On the Net*, 7 October 1999, <http://www.rediff.com/news/oct/07def.htm>. Accessed 25 June 2000.

³⁶¹ John Erickson, op. cit., p. 264.

³⁶² "India, Russia Hold Talks to Finalize Treaty," in *ReDiff On the Net*, 25 May 1999, <http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/may/25rus.htm>. Accessed 25 June 2000.

³⁶³ H.E. Ambassador Mr. S.K. Lambah. "A Vision on Indo-Russian Relations," in the *Indian Embassy in Moscow*. <http://www.indianembassy.ru/en/people423.html>. Accessed 28 June 2000.

with his Russian counterpart Igor Ivanov and Russian Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin on finalizing a treaty between the two countries concerning long-term collaboration in defense, trade and economic affairs.³⁶⁴ Moreover, the Indo-Russian relationship has also served to promote the multipolarity of the geopolitical arena. On several occasions, Russian leaders have publicly articulated the importance attached to relations with India including efforts to promote multipolarity in international relations.³⁶⁵

The Russian Federation and India are moving towards strategic partnership. This will be a step forward in the cooperation envisaged in the agreements of Friendship and Cooperation of 28 January 1993, the Declaration on further Development and Enhancement of Cooperation of 30 June 1994 and the Moscow Declaration on the Protection of Interests of Pluralistic States of 30 June 1994. The concept of strategic partnership will further strengthen bilateral relations in the political, economic and cultural fields.³⁶⁶

In this way, Russia has begun to place greater emphasis on its Asian neighbours. Furthermore, it is constructing an alternate axis in opposition to that existing in the West. The Russian Federation has also undertaken relationships, which are highly criticized by the United States and Western nations. These partnerships have been advanced with states that have been considered pariahs and rogues in the international community. It is to these relationships that we now turn.

³⁶⁴ "India, Russia Begin Talks on Crucial Treaty," in *ReDiff On the Net*, 24 May 1999, <http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/may/24jas.htm>. Accessed 25 June 2000.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

The Russian Federation's Alliance with Iran

Russia's relations with Iran have varied greatly over the years, from cordiality, even friendship, to hostility. In the recent past, Russia's interests in Iran have been relatively consistent. However, the priorities placed upon these interests and the policies adopted to achieve them have varied. The most persistent Russian interests in Iran have derived from its geostrategic position. As it formed much of the southern border of the Soviet Union, Iran was situated on the landmass, which linked Russia to warm-water ports in the Persian Gulf, leading on to the open seas of the Indian Ocean. Traditional interests with regard to Iran were to keep this border secure, stable and quiet.³⁶⁷

Russia's interests in Iran have a long history, manifested in a relatively friendly form in the twentieth century. There are abiding geopolitical interests which, barring drastic changes in either country or in the international arena, promise to sustain the positive relationship that has developed. Russia and Iran have pragmatically chosen the path of engagement over that of hostility as a means of overcoming problems between them and minimizing real or perceived threats.³⁶⁸

Russia no longer has a common border with Iran. However, post-Soviet Russia continues to place great value on the former border with Iran. A second interest that has remained relatively constant is that of economic relations. Apart from the ever hoped-for access to its warm-water ports on the Gulf, Tehran has offered a large and potentially lucrative market for Soviet and now Russian goods unable to compete in Western markets. Moreover, Moscow is Tehran's main arms purveyor. Russia sold more than US

³⁶⁷ Galia Golan. Russia and Iran: A Strategic Partnership? (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998), p. 3.

³⁶⁸ Ibid. p. 54.

\$6 billion of armaments, including MIG 29 fighters, missiles, submarines, radar systems, T-72 tanks, and MI-17 combat helicopters.³⁶⁹

In 1993, during his visit to Tehran, Foreign Minister Kozyrev referred to Iran for the first time as a strategic partner. He brought with him a “Treaty on Basic Relations and Principles of Good Neighbourliness,” the draft of which was signed during the visit. There have certainly been further references to a strategic partnership as a characterization of the relations between them. The Russian Ambassador to Tehran has frequently spoken in these terms.³⁷⁰ Anatolii Chubais, Yeltsin’s adviser stated that Russia needed to expand relations with Iran. In May 1995, Deputy Speaker of the Duma, Aleksandr Vengerovskii commented that a “Moscow-Bonn-Tehran axis would be of great geopolitical importance.”³⁷¹ Furthermore, Minister for Foreign Economic Relations Oleg Davydov after a 1995 visit to Tehran, stated that:

“Russia considers Iran a strategic partner, a friend, a neighbor, and the outlook in the field of bilateral economic and technical cooperation including the implementation of joint projects, is excellent.”³⁷²

By the summer of 1995, the Russian Ambassador to Tehran was describing Russian-Iranian relations as a strategic relationship. During his 1996 trip to Iran, Primakov joined Tehran in a number of critical comments regarding the US military presence in the Gulf.³⁷³ Primakov was instrumental in pressing ahead with relations with Iran, despite intense US pressure to cease and desist.³⁷⁴ With the war raging in Chechnya and the

³⁶⁹ “Iran and Russia Sign New Military Deals,” in *Iran Press Service*, 14 May 1999. http://iran-press-service.com/articles/iran_russia_14100.htm. Accessed 4 July 2000.

³⁷⁰ Galia Golan, op. cit., p. 50.

³⁷¹ Ibid., p. 50.

³⁷² Robert O. Freedman. “Russia and Iran: A Tactical Alliance,” in the *Jewish World Review*. 23 February 1998. <http://www.jewishworldreview.com/0298/freedman2.htm>. Accessed 29 June 2000

³⁷³ Galia Golan, op. cit., p. 52.

³⁷⁴ Coit Blacker, op. cit., p. 184.

United States pushing for NATO expansion, Russian nationalists looked to a closer relationship with Iran as a counterbalance. An article in the newspaper '*Segodnya*' noted:

“Cooperation with Iran is more than just a question of money and orders for the Russian atomic industry...A friendly Iran could become an important strategic ally in the future. NATO's expansion eastward is making Russia look around hurriedly for at least some kind of strategic allies. In this situation, the anti-Western and anti-American regime in Iran would be a natural and very important partner.”³⁷⁵

The Russian-Iranian relationship hit another high point in March 1996 when Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati visited Moscow, where he stated that Iranian-Russian relations were “at their highest level in contemporary history.” While there, Velayati joined Primakov in opposing the Eastward expansion of NATO and emphasized that Iran wished to prolong the recently concluded truce in Tajikistan and cooperate in developing the Caspian oil shelf zone.³⁷⁶ Defense Minister, Igor Sergeyev stated that the

“provocation of the US and NATO in the Caucasus and in Central Asia are to undermine the role of Iran and Russia in the region....cooperation between Iran, Russia, India, and China is very significant to confront the hegemonic policy of the United States.”³⁷⁷

Yeltsin has praised the ever closer relationship, and Primakov sent a similar message of support to Tehran. This visit was also the occasion for the signing of a number of new accords with Tehran, including the Agreement on Military-Technological Cooperation.³⁷⁸ One month later, in a radio broadcast to Iran, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Albert Chernyshev reaffirmed Russia's willingness to stand with Iran against the United States, noting:

³⁷⁵ “Russia-Iran Relations,” in *Iran Review*, February 1999, http://www.salamiran.org/Media/IranReview/Main_bulk_February_99.htm, Accessed 29 June 2000.

³⁷⁶ Robert O. Freedman, op. cit.

³⁷⁷ “Russia-Iran Relations,” op. cit.

³⁷⁸ Galia Golan, op. cit., p. 53

“our country opposes the isolation of Iran in the system of international relations that America demands. We believe we can cooperate with Iran. We are doing that now and will continue to do so.”³⁷⁹

Meanwhile, Russian-Iranian economic and military relations continued to develop with the announcement in November 1997, that Russia was planning to sell Iran \$4 billion in military and other equipment between 1997 and 2007, provided Iran met its financial obligations.³⁸⁰ The nuclear power plant Russia is building at Bushehr, on the Gulf, illustrates the burgeoning strength of Iran’s relationship with Russia. Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) has entered into a long-term arrangement with the corresponding ministry in Iran to complete the construction of at least one, and possibly two, 1000-megawatt, light-water nuclear reactors and to begin work on two smaller 440-megawatt reactors at some future date.³⁸¹

The agreement made by the Kremlin deeply alarmed US policy makers on the grounds that such an agreement, which also provided for the extensive training of Iranian scientists and technicians in Russia, would facilitate Tehran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.³⁸² Washington has threatened Moscow with sanctions and withdrawal of aid, but to no avail. Ties between the two states are increasing, encouraged by growing mutual interests, both strategic and economic, and the perceived need of both to stand up to the United States.³⁸³

³⁷⁹ Robert O. Freedman, op. cit.

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

³⁸¹ Coit Blacker, op. cit., p. 181

³⁸² Ibid., p. 181

³⁸³ Baed Berzin. “Arm in Arm with Moscow,” in *Middle East International*, n. 620, 10 March 2000, p.18.

Despite the extent of Russian-Iranian cooperation between 1992 and the present, the relationship is not without problems. As the Iranian economy has deteriorated, due to US pressure to curb foreign investment in Iran, Tehran has faced increasing difficulties in repaying its debt to Moscow. This has led to a drop in Russian military and civilian exports to Iran in 1995, pushing trade between the two countries down to \$276 million. Nonetheless, at the end of 1995, Moscow agreed to reschedule the Iranian debt as political relations with Tehran continued to improve.³⁸⁴

Conclusion

In conclusion, Russian relations with non-Western states continue to increase and prosper. This chapter has proven that Russia is unwilling to cede its influence or power as a result of its decreasing capabilities. There are a number of consequences, which could result from Russia's pursuit of these strategic alliances. Firstly, though the likelihood of building a Moscow-Beijing-Delhi axis is still limited, growing economic and strategic ties continue to pull these countries together. The construction of an alternate axis in opposition to the West is not entirely unforeseeable. Moreover, the forging of a multitude of bi- and tri-lateral arrangements could position the Russian Federation well to be a leader of this axis.

Secondly, the creation of strategic alliances by the Russian Federation is one of the methods by which Russia seeks to preserve its position in the international arena. It is forging a niche for itself in the geopolitical system. Though the Russian Federation may not be a welcome or desired partner in a number of Western alliances, including the

³⁸⁴ Robert O. Freedman, op. cit.

European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it is showing itself fully capable of finding other allies.

Thirdly, the Russian Federation is fulfilling the goal of the multipolarization of the geopolitical system. It is supporting potential future great powers in their quest for international influence. In forming a coalition of states with like interests and perspectives, it is helping to forge possible poles of power in the future.

Fourthly, the formation of partnerships external to Western alliances provides Russia with a more credible threat of defection. Though the Russian Federation has no intention of severing ties with Western states, the creation of reliable partnerships gives Russia more flexibility in international diplomacy. Thus, they are proving that they have the potential to turn to allies other than those in the West.

Fifthly, the creation of strategic alliances has permitted Russia to stabilize relations with its neighbours. By creating a zone of friendship in its own region, Russia has the capacity to focus on more pressing foreign and domestic concerns. Moreover, these alliances also serve to assist in the prevention of offensive coalitions being formed against Russia in the region.

Sixthly, Russia is opening up new markets and new economic partnerships for itself. In this way it can begin to develop economic policies based on a new position for itself in the international economic system. Moreover, this could facilitate the transition to a wholly independent economic policy, independent of the International Monetary Fund and foreign indebtedness.

The forging of a variety of partnerships also has potentially negative consequences. The United States adamantly opposes the relations Russia is building with nations the United States considers to be rogue states, seeking to undermine the status quo. American opposition to Russian alliance with such states as North Korea, Iran, Cuba, and Iraq could further weaken the Russo-American relationship. This, in turn, could serve to push Russia into increasing ties with states outside the West.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has assessed the utility of Charles F. Doran's power cycle theory in gaining a greater understanding of the developments and changes in Russo-American relations during the period 1991 to 2000. It has demonstrated that the times of indiscriminate Westernism in Russian foreign policy, which were evident in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, no longer exist and that increasing signs of strain are emerging in bilateral relations. It has addressed the question of whether tensions in bilateral relations can be comprehended through structural factors existing within the international system. This study has indeed shed light on the structural nature of Russo-American relations. Moreover, in concluding, this thesis seeks to opine on some areas of relations, which may lead to conflictual interaction in the future.

I. Overview of Chapter Conclusions

The first chapter provided the theoretical context for the remainder of the thesis. It introduces the theoretical framework on which the Russo-American relationship was to be assessed. Doran's power cycle theory demonstrates that the conditions underlying structural disequilibria in the international system relate to the relative power-role disequilibria existing within major powers.

The second chapter employed this theoretical construct as a basis and sought to investigate whether disequilibria exists in the Russian Federation's power-role equation. An analysis of Russian foreign policy perceptions was undertaken in three specific areas: how the Cold War was concluded; Russia's position in the international system; and the structure of the geopolitical order. The study exhibits that Russia has not ceded its role in

the international system as a result of a steady erosion of its capability base. Rather, Russia is attempting to change the rules of the international game, vis-à-vis the multipolarization of geopolitical relations, in order to gain greater influence internationally. Therefore, Russia is, indeed, experiencing power-role disequilibria, according to power cycle theory. Russian perceptions were juxtaposed with those of the reigning American hegemon. The United States was shown to have disparate conceptions from those of the Russian Federation in all three areas studied. Now that disequilibria had been identified in Russia's power-role equation, it was necessary to evidence areas in which this imbalance has practical manifestations. This was a significant manner in which power cycle theory could be proven or disproven.

Evidence of power-role disequilibria could be found from an investigation of certain facets of Russian foreign policy that demonstrated an inconsistency between Russian national capabilities and the Russian international role. The third and fourth chapters delved into areas in which the Russian Federation seeks to broaden its international influence, though its capabilities continue to decrease.

The third chapter analyzed Russia's historical sphere of influence on the territories of the former Soviet Union, specifically the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. It demonstrated Russian attempts to consolidate and maintain an inviolable sphere of influence in areas, which have historically belonged to or been under the Russian sway. Though Russia has seen the loss of much of its economic and political power base, it views the area of the Commonwealth of Independent States as uncompromisingly within its sphere of vital interests. Moreover, through the

consolidation of political, economic, and military ties with these countries, in addition to a monopoly on peacekeeping, the Russian Federation seeks to maintain its international power and role.

As Russia has not sought to limit its role as a result of its declining capabilities, power cycle theory posits that tension with the existing hegemon should ensue from attempts by the declining power to maintain its international role. In this manner, these actions have brought the Russian Federation into increasingly confrontational situations with the United States. American support for the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, military maneuvers in former Soviet republics, and American interest in Caspian oil have proved a threat to Russia's domination of its historical sphere of influence. These issues should only become more evident in the future as the Russian capability to maintain supremacy in this area decreases.

The fourth chapter also investigated attempts by the Russian Federation to maintain and increase its power in the international arena. This chapter assessed Russia's pursuit of a variety of strategic alliances. As evidenced in chapter two and reinforced in chapter four, Russia has vociferously advocated the construction of a multipolar international system, where regional powers have a greater amount of influence. With the end of a largely Western orientation in Russian foreign policy in late 1993 and early 1994, Russia turned Eastward in searching for its allies. It began making economic, military, and political alliances with its Eastern neighbours. However, Russia's development of a strategic alliance system and the restructuring of old ties with China and Iran are proving destabilizing to Russo-American relations. In forging alliances with certain states that are

considered by the United States to be rogue nations, Russia is, in effect, threatening to actively counterbalance American hegemony. The Russian Federation is in no way passively renouncing its historically internationalist foreign policy. Rather, it is expanding its ties with the East to maintain its influence and position in geopolitical relations. Ironically, Russia and not the United States has begun to play the 'China card'.

It is in this context that this thesis has attempted to determine the utility of power cycle theory in the Russo-American relationship. The effectiveness of this theory will be outlined in the following section.

II. The Utility of Power Cycle Theory in Assessing the Russo-American Relationship

Power cycle theory has shown itself to have great utility in gaining a greater understanding of the Russo-American relationship and increasing tensions in relations. Its effectiveness lies in its ability to accurately explain the behaviour of states in the declining period of their power cycle. The study of Russian and American foreign policy from 1991 through 2000 demonstrated a remarkable resemblance to the behaviours predicted in the power cycle theory.

Power cycle theory maintains that a state in decline will likely experience rank disequilibrium. Rank disequilibrium occurs when a government's needs and aspirations are allowed to get out of line with their actual capability, and become a source of grievance and threat to the disequilibrated country. There occurs a lag between the time when capabilities deteriorate and the alteration of foreign policy. This lag of interest behind relative power causes a gap to emerge between a state's relative power position

and its foreign policy role.³⁸⁵ According to power cycle theory, a declining state may not want to yield to necessity. It may attempt to hang on to vestiges of past prestige and systemic responsibility until other countries on the ascendant attempt to wrench part of that position away.

With the evidence provided in the proceeding chapters, power cycle theory aptly describes the current state of Russian foreign policy. The Soviet Union's economy had been in decline for decades. The Russian Federation, which emerged as the successor to the Soviet Union, was far weaker economically, militarily, and politically than its predecessor had been. However, though Russia can no longer claim the capabilities it possessed in the past, the Russian foreign policy making elite has proved unwilling or unable to accept a diminished position for the Russian Federation within the geopolitical system. This thesis has provided three areas in which a significant disparity exists between Russia's capabilities and the role it seeks to attain the international arena.

The first area in which Russia demonstrates its perceptions of the international system as being quite disparate from those of the United States is in its conception of the structure of the international system. Both Russian rhetoric and foreign policy statements support the multipolarization of the geopolitical order. Chapter four displays the fact that Russia has undertaken a number of steps, including the conclusion of a variety of strategic alliances with states such as China, Iran, North Korea, which seek to advance this goal. It vehemently rejects the idea of a unipolar order, led by an American hegemonic power in international relations.

³⁸⁵ Charles F. Doran. "Systemic Disequilibrium, Foreign Policy Role, and the Power Cycle" *op. cit.*, p. 377

The United States views these international developments from a far different perspective. The rhetoric and the foreign policy of the United States, since the fall of the Soviet Union, demonstrates its conception of the international system as being unipolar, with the United States occupying the position of hegemon. In none of the major American foreign policy strategies since 1991 does the conception of a multipolar world order arise. Rather, it seems that there exists a belief in American foreign policy making circles, that the American victory in the Cold War facilitated the current unipolar world order.

The second area in which Russia's rank disequilibrium is visible is in the area of its historic sphere of influence. With the redirection of Russian foreign policy in late 1993, towards a greater emphasis on the near abroad, there has been a re-conceptualization of Russia's sphere of vital interests. The Russian Federation is attempting, once again, to carve out a territory on its borders, over which it can have supremacy. Through the consolidation of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the drive for a monopoly on peacekeeping within the region, Russia is attempting to reclaim its regional hegemony.

However, with the fall of the Communist bloc, this area is no longer considered by other powers to fall solely within Russia's sphere of vital interest. Rather, a competition has ensued between a number of powers over influence in the region. Recent American military operations in areas of the former Soviet Union, in addition to the Eastward expansion of NATO, and American interest in Caspian oil have all posed a threat to Russian regional hegemony. Moreover, these have served to insight tension in the Russo-American relationship.

A third area of power cycle theory, which has closely corresponded to the realities of Russian foreign policy, is in the notion of power balancing. Power cycle theory states that a declining power may attempt to maintain its international role through the act of power balancing. Power is balanced in essentially two ways, internally via a mobilization of forces and other capabilities, or externally via the formation of coalitions and formal alliances. The key in each case is to aggregate power in the short run.³⁸⁶ However, power cycle theory demonstrates that, the glaring gap between power and interest for the declining state cannot be artificially bolstered through alliance arrangements. Other more powerful actors must take over the leadership roles in the system, or the responsibilities of leadership must be adequately redistributed among several actors.

Russia has increasingly sought to balance American hegemony through the act of building strategic partnerships outside the Western alliance structure. In its drive for the multipolarization of the geopolitical system, it has sought allies. The creation of strategic partnerships with China, India, and Iran serve two distinct functions. They act as a balance to American supremacy in the international system. The formation of an alternate axis of interaction, independent, and at times opposing the West poses a threat to American hegemony. Secondly, the creation of strategic alliances serves the function of creating a niche for Russian diplomacy and power. Strategic alliances permit Russia to use limited capabilities to greater effect.

A fourth area in which power cycle theory closely corresponds with the realities of the Russo-American relationship is in explaining the behaviour of a power which is gaining a greater role in the international system. Power cycle theory maintains that a rising or

³⁸⁶ Charles F. Doran. Systems in Crisis op. cit., p. 168

hegemonic power has two options in dealing with a power in decline. It may challenge the declining state and probe for tactical weakness. The basic thrust of this option is to constrain the actions of the challenger by opposition. Moreover, the ascending hegemon and other states would be free to make adjustments in the magnitude of their own interests to make them consonant with their own relatively larger capability.³⁸⁷ An alternative to this option would entail the ascendant power adjusting their own foreign policy behaviour so as to appease the challenger and to make greater room for it in the councils of the central system through adaptation.³⁸⁸

Whether systems transformation is peaceful is a direct result of how it is managed by the leading states. When a balance of power approach to challenge is worked out and attuned to the disposition of the declining actor, keeping it within proper territorial limits, peace is likely to prevail despite tension and turbulence.³⁸⁹ Power cycle theory argues that the aggregation of power by the rising state to offset growing aggressiveness on the part of a recently more powerful declining state is not appropriate as a long-term strategy. If such a balance-of-power mode is pursued over long periods, the only consequence is the ever more strained attempt by the declining state to augment a smaller and smaller relative base of national capability while attempting to hold on to the same role and responsibilities in the international system.³⁹⁰

This thesis has demonstrated that the United States has been pursuing a policy in which its rhetoric does not correspond with its foreign policy behaviour. In rhetoric, the

³⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 170

³⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 186

³⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 172

³⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 168

United States has supported a policy of the integration of the Russian Federation into the world community. It has welcomed Russia into such organizations as the G-8, the Partnership for Peace, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Simultaneously, it has also taken foreign policy actions, which seek tactical and strategic advancements at Russia's expense. It has been demonstrated that the United States has engaged in military maneuvers on the territories of the states of the former Soviet Union, increased economic involvement in the Caspian Sea basin, and thereby carved into what have historically been Russian domains. Moreover, the United States has unswervingly supported the Eastward expansion of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which are integrating former allies and satellites of Russia.

Though the likelihood of direct conflict remains limited in the bilateral relationship, external pressure is being placed on Russia to contract its international interests to better align them with its current capabilities. However, the Russian Federation, seems unlikely to undertake such an action in the near future. Thus, the probability of tensions remains high.

III. Problems with Power Cycle Theory

Though power cycle theory is extremely apt in general in gaining a greater understanding of the increase in tensions in the Russo-American relationship, a problem arises which power cycle theory has difficulty in addressing. Therefore, it must be taken into account when assessing the theory's utility in this study.

Doran's theory maintains that eventually a declining power will bring its interests into alignment with its capabilities. It argues that an important incremental redistribution

of non-vital foreign policy interests can and must occur so as to prevent disequilibrium from amounting and to prevent other interests from becoming confused with true vital interests. These judgments are made on the basis of a re-conceptualization of the interests and capabilities of the state in decline. However, this conception may be overly optimistic and not take into consideration the vagaries of political life.

Doran himself admits to the difficulties in decision-making in times of change and extreme pressure. The Russian Federation is experiencing an enormous amount of change. Thus, the ability to discern between vital and non-vital interests is far from clear. Moreover, the ability to make the changes required in power cycle theory is limited by the strength of politicians and the vehemence of public opinion. Politicians within the Russian Federation desiring to contract Russian power and influence would be engaging in political suicide.

The leading presidential candidates in the 2000 elections, Zyuganov and Putin, both supported the expansion of Russian influence and power internationally, rather than the contraction of Russian power. The capacity of a Russian politician to advocate the limitation of Russian influence in geopolitics is minimal at this time, and it could be posited for the near future.

IV. Major Themes Emerging from this Study

Two main themes have emerged in the conduct of this investigation. Firstly, there exists a disequilibria in Russian capabilities versus Russia's international role. Russia is no longer an industrial, political, or military superpower. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's territory, population, and power base have shrunk. However, the desire

to maintain the international role it has possessed has not receded commensurably with its capabilities. Its behaviours have evidenced a desire not merely to maintain a major international role similar to that possessed by the Soviet Union but to increase its role through the formation of an alternate axis of power and a re-conceptualization of the international system itself.

The second theme, which has been observed, is that of Russian actions seeking to maintain and expand the Russian role internationally. The maintenance of an inviolable sphere of vital interests and the creation of strategic alliances with a number of rogue states has brought the Russian Federation increasingly into conflict with the United States. As the United States seeks to expand its role internationally, filling the vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, tensions and cracks in relations are increasingly arising. It is these two themes that set the basis for the entirety of this thesis

V. Prospects for the Future

This thesis has the potential to serve a multiplicity of purposes. Firstly, it has the ability to demonstrate the utility of a framework for geopolitical interaction to better understand relations between major powers. Secondly, it can serve as an empirically testable attempt at employing a structural model for predictive purposes. Finally, this thesis has the capacity to shed light on increasing tensions, which have the capability of becoming destabilizing for the international system. Perhaps this thesis can serve as a starting point for further assessments of the utility of theoretical constructs in eradicating certain conflicts in international relations.

This study does not mean to place the future of Russo-American relations in a dim light. The possibility for reconciliation and partnership has not passed. Notwithstanding this, both states must undertake concerted efforts to re-invigorate relations. The character of bilateral relations has evidently deteriorated since 1991. The facade of peaceful coexistence is crumbling under the weight of Russia's economic collapse, political chaos, and international marginalization. However, this need not be the case in the coming years. The development of American and Russian foreign policies may lead to the reconfiguration of national goals, which could bode well for bilateral relations. Changes will not occur immediately. Progress and transition will only occur over time.

The methods employed by the United States to deal with Russia in the interim are vitally important in determining the shape of relations when Russia eventually achieves rank equilibrium. There are two options with regard to American foreign policy toward Russia. The first is to continue a policy, which has been in place for the past fifty years. The Western nations can re-ignite past hostilities and marginalize the Russian Federation. However, this would only result in antipathy and bitterness in both camps. A second option would be the genuine inclusion of the Russian Federation into Western society. This alternative would facilitate an easier transition for Russia to its new place in geopolitical relations.

Russia is facing a difficult and traumatic time in its historical path. For the Western powers to contemplate taking strategic advantage of the situation of weakness in Russia could set the stage for the rise of ultra-nationalism and chauvinism in Russia. The Russian Federation is already displaying the behaviour of a besieged fortress. The

consolidation of a sphere of influence and the arrangement of a variety of strategic alliances with Eastern states shows the wariness with which they approach the United States and Western nations.

This thesis has demonstrated a number of areas in which Russian and American perceptions vary. Moreover, it has shown areas where tensions are increasing. These will persist if changes are not undertaken in Western relations with the Russian Federation. As Russia views its international role shrinking and its continued exclusion from Western clubs, it will likely take on greater antipathy for the West. This will lead to increasing attempts to retain the vestiges of past power and influence.

If current political realities remain, a number of other areas in this bilateral relationship have the potential to see the outbreak of tensions. The Russian Federation and the United States are currently coming into greater conflict over international arms sales. Disputes in the relationship results from two factors. Firstly, the American arms industry is vying for the same international arms contracts for which the Russian Federation is now competing. Secondly, the United States vehemently opposes the transfer of nuclear technology and weapons of mass destruction, especially if this is being precipitated by Russia. The Russian Federation, however, has found itself with a wealth of knowledge in this field and a need for funds. Thus, this area in bilateral relations has the potential for destabilizing the relationship.

Another area in which Russia comes into growing conflict with the United States is in the area of nuclear parity. As was briefly discussed in chapter two, the United States is pursuing the development of a Ballistic Missile Defense system, which would countervene

the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, to which it is a party. Moreover, it would undermine Russia's strategic position, as Russia is not currently in a position to undertake large-scale research and development in the arms industry. Therefore, this area of relations also has the potential for escalation.

In conclusion, relations between the Russian Federation and the United States continue to evidence growing tensions in a number of fields of bilateral relations. However, this is not a foregone conclusion. Two things must occur for the stabilization of this bilateral relationship. Russia's power-role equation needs to reach a greater level of equilibrium. Its international role must contract to fall into greater alignment with its decreasing capabilities. A second factor, which would assist in the improvement of relations, is a more genuine attempt by the United States to integrate Russia into the international system. If a state with such an enormous territorial expanse, economic potential, and geostrategic position is to remain internationally marginalized, international stability will be only an ephemeral ideal.

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