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international alliances: a study of NATO and WTO from 1964 to 1973.UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITÉ Carleton UniversityDEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/
GRADE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE Master of ArtsYEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DE CE DEGRÉ 1978NAME OF SUPERVISOR/NOM DU DIRECTEUR DE THÈSE Professor H. von Riekhoff

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The Effect of Prolonged Non-crisis Upon Alliance Cohesion in
International Alliances: A Study of NATO and WTO From 1964 to 1973

by Peter Marwitz

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs.

The Norman Patterson School of International Affairs

Carleton University

Ottawa, Canada

May, 1978

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The undersigned hereby recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research acceptance of this thesis, submitted by Gustav Peter Axel Marwitz, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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Supervisor

To Agnes

without your sacrifice over the years of the development of this thesis
and without your attentiveness during the many revisions preceding the
final product, this work would never have been completed.

Abstract

The aim of this study was to examine the effect of detente upon alliance cohesion for a pluralistic alliance (NATO) and an organizationally directive alliance (WTO) during a period of prolonged non-crisis between these two sub-systems. More specifically, the thesis advanced the following three hypotheses: that cooperation between the alliance leaders and the members would diminish in a pluralistic alliance during detente, (2) that cooperation among sub-hierarchical actors of a pluralistic alliance would increase, and (3) that in the long run cooperation between the alliance leader and the other members in an organizationally directive alliance would not diminish.

A survey of the state of pre-theory on alliance cohesion was done which assisted in developing our hypotheses. This was followed by a review of the historical trend of events plus a development of indicators to test the three principal hypotheses. Throughout, this thesis attempted to combine empirical analysis with historical narrative.

It was found that in a pluralistic alliance like NATO, cooperation between the superpower and the sub-hierarchical actors was reduced during a prolonged period of detente while cooperation among the sub-hierarchical actors themselves tended to increase under the same circumstances. In a directive alliance like WTO, behavior between the superpower and the other members initially tended to vary but once the superpower demonstrated its resolve to repress challenges from the alliance members,

then cooperation with the various sub-hierarchical actors either remained at the same level as previously, or increased. Therefore, our hypotheses were confirmed for the period examined.

A separate chapter on cross-alliance behavior supported the proposition that during a prolonged period of non-crisis inter-alliance transactions will tend to intensify and behavior will change from conflict toward cooperation.

A detailed description of the events concerning the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by forces of the Warsaw Pact was included in the thesis in order to show how this directive sub-system resolved intra-alliance conflict and how inter-alliance relations responded to an internal bloc crisis of this kind.

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Introduction

The central aim of this thesis is to examine the effect of detente upon alliance cohesion in two different types of alliances, a pluralistic alliance as exemplified by NATO and an organizationally directive alliance like the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The analysis will cover the period from 1964 to 1973 which constitutes the first decade of detente in relations between the two alliance systems. This should be long enough to depict trends, at the same time, it allows us to explore certain developments in greater detail than would be possible if a longer period had been chosen. In addition, this thesis also examines the effect of detente on the pattern of relations between the two adversary alliances. Throughout, this thesis attempts to proceed in as rigorous an empirical mode as possible, using hypotheses and testing these on hand of empirical data. At the same time, the limitations of the available data will be critically evaluated and a more detailed historical-descriptive narrative will be introduced in places to complement and broaden the analysis of available data rather than to offer this as an alternative or a rival approach.

Chapter One is intended to survey the state of current pre-theory on alliance cohesion and on hand of the available literature. In addition, it will serve to introduce the three central hypotheses of this thesis concerning the effect of prolonged international detente on alliance cohesion in two types of alliance systems. Finally, it will

include a discussion of the effect of detente on transactions and behavior between the two rival alliances.

Chapter Two will review the historical trend of events for each of the two alliances from 1964 to 1973. This is intended as a brief background to the subsequent data analysis. Chapter Three sets out the principal design for empirical research, develops the relevant indicators and discusses their validity.

Five indicators will be selected to test alliance cohesion and to assess the effect of detente on transactions between the two rival alliances. First, we will collect data on events interaction of selected alliance members on both an intra-alliance basis and cross-alliance as well in order to determine the trend in behavior over time. Second, we will use data on UN voting as an indirect assessment of the attitude compatibility of members in an alliance which will suggest the degree of harmony among actors in the sub-system. Third, we will obtain data on the relative military burden of the members in each alliance in order to determine each member-state's commitment to defence sharing that would complement the defence burden of the alliance as a whole. Fourth, we will obtain data based on foreign trade transactions of the members in WTO as this is more meaningful to assessing this sub-system's cohesion than is the case of NATO. Additionally, foreign trade transactions will be used to assess the cross-alliance behavior of each of the selected actors of both alliances. Fifth, we will obtain data on the distances of nations in both alliances in order to assess their degree of openness

toward organizations outside of their own sub-system and thereby suggest their propensity to behave favourably toward members of the rival alliance.

The fourth chapter will report the findings from the empirical analysis and assess the extent to which they confirm the stated hypotheses concerning the effect of detente on alliance cohesion. Chapter Five will concern itself with a related consequence of detente, namely its effect on the level of transactions and the type of behavior between adversary alliance systems.

The sixth chapter will provide a detailed review of the historical events surrounding the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. We have singled out this event for more detailed analysis because it offers a situation which is equally relevant to all of the central hypotheses of this thesis, for it differentiates the manner in which detente affects the behavior of subordinate alliance members in the two systems, it distinguishes how the two alliances cope with internal conflict, and it furthermore throws light on the effect of internal alliance crises on relations between rival alliances under conditions of detente.

Chapter 1

Theoretical Aspects of Alliance Cohesion

The period of 1964 to 1973 has been relatively free of crisis situations in inter-alliance relations between the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). For instance, the type of crisis that previously resulted in East-West confrontations over Berlin occurred in 1948-1949 and 1957-1958 and 1961. The relations between NATO and WTO during the decade following the early 1960's can be characterized as having occurred in a period of non-crisis. It is also in this timeframe that the non-crisis in inter-alliance relations led to a reduction of international tension, or a state of detente to apply a common term. The objective of this thesis is to examine alliance cohesion as a dependent variable and the effect upon it of detente as an independent variable.

It would be useful to cite briefly some examples of cohesion. Cohesion is a term used to denote the concept of shared attitudes and behavior among actors in an alliance. For instance, one attitude that would be shared to some degree among the actors is that of mutual identification with issues and problems affecting the alliance as a whole. Attitudes are also linked to behavior among actors in the alliance. For example, behavior that would promote cohesion includes mutual responsiveness toward each other's needs, a degree of consultation

on a variety of common issues; an attempt to share burdens among the group, and some degree of joint decision-making in the military sphere. Often there are variances among the shared attitudes and behavior patterns of the group and this problem is important in exploring the concept of alliance cohesion.

It is hoped that an exploration of cohesion during a period of prolonged non-crisis will enhance our understanding of alliances. As Burgess and Moore have pointed out, very little research on alliance theory meets the scientific standards of explicitness, visibility and repeatability and very few intersections can be found among theoretical ideas in the study of inter-nation alliances.¹ Although some progress has been made particularly in the last decade, the author of this thesis agrees with that assessment. It is expected that an examination of alliance cohesion in its theoretical context, with empirical evidence to support or refute some selected hypotheses in this thesis, would be a contribution to the development of a theory of international alliances.

Let us commence by suggesting that the concept of an aggregation, a system, and a coalition are three social entities useful for analytical definitions preparatory to defining an international alliance. An aggregation is viewed as a set of entities or individuals that satisfy a minimal criteria of inclusion. Other than the criteria of inclusion, there need not be common characteristics among members of an aggregation. Aggregations are found within systems or sub-systems. A system or sub-

system consists of entities manifesting a modicum of interdependence or common fate. When there is sufficient organization to coordinate their behavior, then the aggregation is called a coalition.² A coalition may be formed to lobby a given interest or to oppose another coalition's interest or existence. An international alliance can be defined as a type of coalition which brings nations together to represent more or less some type of collectively perceived interests or to oppose more or less a collectively perceived threat. Alliances are coalitions based normally on a written agreement, purporting voluntary membership for the purpose of coordinating their behavior in the event of certain specified contingencies, normally of a military nature.³ The above definition of alliance fits the case of NATO and WTO.

Other definitions of military alliances include the following concepts: latent war communities; general coordination between states that goes beyond mere cooperation; natural clusters of entities in the phenomena of a complex international system; an institutionalized mechanism for pooling resources in order to gain mutual advantage, and so on.⁴ For instance, the WTO has been described as a method of collaboration within a coalition which has a higher political purpose, that of loyalty to proletarian internationalism and the defence of the socialist system.⁵ These elements may be interpreted as expressed policy objectives of that particular alliance. However in the management of Soviet foreign policy, it can also be asserted that the WTO serves as one of several instruments available for the continuation of Soviet

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foreign policy by various means. In itself, this implies a definition of WTO as an alliance which acts as an instrument or agent for broader purposes: it does not serve only the collective defence of its alliance members.⁶ In essence, the concept of an alliance in marxist dialectics lends a greater ideological and policy dimension to an alliance such as WTO than is the case for NATO.

Burgess and Moore asserted that at the international level an alliance occurs under conditions where (1) there are three or more states interacting; (2) relationships must be competitive so that no single state is able to determine outcomes unilaterally; (3) a state can gain more by acting jointly with another than it can by acting alone. An alliance takes effect with the execution of an instrument that (1) commits two or more states to joint development of resources and capabilities to obtain a valued outcome; (2) defines the circumstances under which the promise of assistance is to become effective.⁷ In the case of NATO and WTO, the original casus foederis was collective defence of each set of nations in the alliance for the purpose of defending against attack from the opposing coalition. Also both NATO and WTO laid claim to being communities of nations rather than just alliances of nations. A key proposition in alliance theory points out that alliances are formed to develop greater resources and capabilities for the whole coalition than would otherwise be likely for any of the separate states were they to try to achieve similar resources and capabilities on their own. This is applicable to NATO and WTO. For instance, both alliances are featured

by the pooling of resources and capabilities such as: common command structures in the military; agreed areas of jurisdiction of the alliance's authority over its member-states in crisis situations requiring joint action that has been predetermined; procedural format for member-states in the alliance to seek redress should a given policy become less acceptable to a particular member-state; and some mechanism for member-states to develop agreement on objectives of the alliance and the allocation of resources to fulfill those requirements. The organizational processes in these alliances are there to aid the ongoing evolution of each alliance from its inception. For either NATO or WTO, the nature of these organizational processes also manifests the degree of alliance cohesion in the respective alliance.

George Liska states that alliances perform their several functions through movement within the sub-system. The main movements are alignment and realignment which are instrumental in structuring a state sub-system if not also transforming it. The state sub-system denotes the factual interaction of its actors while the structure of the sub-system refers to the number and configuration of great power actors and lesser power actors. Conflict among actors in the international system is the primary determinant of alignments which may foster an alliance. Cooperation in alliances is largely the consequence of conflicts with perceived adversaries and may submerge only temporarily the extant conflicts among the allied member-states themselves. "Alliances are against, and only derivatively for, someone or something." On this

impressionistic basis, let us review cohesion as a major concept in theoretical statements about alliances.

A useful examination of alliance norms and behavior leading to a realization of alliance cohesion appears in Holsti, Hopmann and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances. This study points out that alliance norms and behavior operate in a context wherein member-states of a given alliance choose to act in either a relatively cooperative or less cooperative manner. There remains always a potential conflict between national policy and alliance policy. Hence, it may be asserted that the terms cohesion or deviation are descriptive aspects of a set of relations among members of an alliance wherein national policy choice is either conducive or detrimental to common alliance policy, objectives and goals.

Behavioral definitions of group cohesion emphasize the nature of relations among the group members. The emphasis would lie in the information flow between members of the group who are collaborating in, such a way as to coordinate their individual behavior within some sort of group or organizational context. It is also asserted that coordinating behavior in a cohesive group does not necessarily represent similarity of behavior among all of these actors. For instance, alliance leaders perform a specialized role in NATO and WTO respectively, as do some of their other key partners in alliance. Although alliance policy, objectives and goals may be largely decided by the superpower, the development of the policy, objectives and goals is frequently difficult requiring much

consultation in order to maintain agreement. This is particularly true for NATO. Additionally, where some member-states have specialized roles this underlines a division of labour in the alliance.⁹ Each of these are functional aspects which affect alliance cohesion in terms of behavior on an intra-alliance level.

Some aspects of behavior in alliance cohesion are tied in with the attitudinal component as well. The attitudinal component of cohesion may be defined as shared attractions or consensus among the group that would lead members to be attracted toward the alliance.¹⁰ However, the degree of member-state attraction toward the alliance would vary between its members. Therefore, cohesion in alliances would reflect generally a situation in which "... perceived interests are held in common, their attitudes will tend to be friendly and their behavior will tend to be collaborative."¹¹

Alliance cohesion is also the ability of the coalition to survive and to achieve its goals. Hence, cohesion can be defined as the ability of the alliance members to agree upon goals, strategy, tactics and to coordinate activities toward those ends.¹² However between any two actors, or coalition of actors, tension among them exists to the extent that they expect conflict behavior to occur sometime among them. Tension in this vein is a psychological phenomenon reflecting the feelings, expectations and perceptions of the various national actors.¹³ For instance, tension may be present in a two actor relationship even if that relationship is considered to be usually

cooperative with a good degree of coordination of effort. As Terrence Hopmann has suggested, "If cohesion is defined in terms of a coordination toward salient external objects or events, then symmetry of orientations may be assumed to be a valid indicator of cohesion."¹⁴ Reflecting on Newcombe's A-B-X model, Hopmann indicated that the degree of communication between two or more states is reflective of higher versus lower levels of tension or cooperation and that a balance between two or more actors would reflect not only the differences in their orientations but also their relative distance. The greater the distances, the more likely the A-B relation will be negative or conflictual.

The norm of equality among members in an alliance (sovereign nation-states) cannot be assumed to accurately describe the realities of intra-alliance politics.¹⁵ Holsti's study alerts us to the proposition that alliances can remain cohesive only if they are able to maintain a favourable balance of gains to liabilities for their own members.¹⁶ Nations prefer to join alliances that offer them an effective role in determining goals, strategy, and tactics; that provide a fair share of the rewards without undue costs; and that offer the maximum probability of success in achieving their goals.¹⁷ In essence, Holsti's study supports Liska's proposition that alliances are formed primarily against something and only secondarily for something. So, member-states of an alliance tend to reflect a shared interest in the outcome of a specific situation rather than a sense of shared community

values or cultures.

At one time or another in the existence of an alliance, one or more of its member-states may attempt to assert its sovereignty. The idea of political sovereignty is based on the rationalization that member-states of an alliance may individually choose their own national policies within the framework of the alliance. The Holsti study points out that, other things being equal, national decision-makers would prefer to act independently since collaboration inevitably involves a number of liabilities by virtue of policy concessions of a given member-state toward the group as a whole. For instance, a major liability is the restriction on their latitude for decision-making on a given policy issue.- However the case for alignment by a member-state becomes a reasonable choice when an external force threatens the nation with greater liabilities than those entailed by collaboration within a

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group. It would seem that in the relationship of member-states of an alliance during non-crisis periods, differentiation between the member-states implies an inverse relationship as follows: the stronger alliance partner is in a proportionately weaker bargaining position within the alliance because it is usually the keener of the two to maintain the alliance. Small nations usually have disproportionate power in intra-alliance bargaining because (1) it is hard for a large nation to threaten credibly to reduce its contribution to the alliance and (2) a large nation has less to gain by bargaining hard than does a

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small nation.

Alliance cohesion can be viewed as an internally generated factor in the sense of aggregation of member-states behavior and attitudes toward fulfilling alliance goals and objectives over time. It is asserted that foreign policy-makers of nation-states act in a political-entrepreneur consumer fashion dispensing or consuming private or public goods depending upon who is a donor and who is a recipient of the good. In this vein, foreign policy-makers are most often concerned with the manipulation of behavior of other target nations and seldom, in practice, think of the international system as such. Thereby, decision-makers of a given nation-state see their own foreign policy objectives as involving changes in behavior or at least influencing behavior of another state, even if the target nation is a member of the same alliance.

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Additionally, the alliance itself acts as a conveyor of public and private goods. Public goods go to all members and are beneficial on a collective basis regardless of the extent of contribution of each national actor. Indeed this may induce a lack of contribution by one or more actors, which is referred to as the free-rider problem. Therefore, the alliance conveys private benefits to one or more actors in order to encourage them to abandon their free-rider position. This distribution of public and private benefits has an impact on individual member-states in terms of the relative cost of participation in the alliance versus the actual military, political and economic benefits or disutilities accrued over time. This is an integral part of the life of an alliance.

Holsti's study and other literature have not really differentiated between cohesion being either an input of alliance decision-making or an output. For instance, the Holsti study points out it is sufficient if members maintain similar attitudes and behave in a collaborative manner, then alliance cohesion originates from these forms of consensus. ²³

However, available literature has not established whether alliance cohesion is derived either from voluntary consensus of national actors toward the alliance sub-system or from enforced cohesion in a group context. Enforced cohesion would be defined as imposition of consensus by the bloc leader, or by the majority of the group, where otherwise no consensus would be achieved if left to voluntary means only. It would seem that the impetus for cohesion in an alliance is closely associated with alliance agreement. More precisely, cohesion is part of the input and output of alliance decision-making over time.

Heretofore, an attempt has been made to examine cohesion at a general theoretical level. However, to get closer to the concept of cohesion in relation to the two long established alliances of NATO and WTO, it is necessary to review previous literature to bring together propositions which either intuitively or empirically explain alliance cohesion relative to behavior patterns and attitudes. A review of selected propositions will be presented below in order to concentrate our effort to examine cohesion in a specified context as much as current perspectives permit. The reader will discover propositions on some key topics such as: the effect of the external

environment; the effect of internal structure; the effect of national attributes; and the effect of alliance efficacy.

Let us review the effect of the external environment upon alliances. It seems that tension-producing relationships are conducive to change in alignments in the international system. Occasionally, there are attempts by some actors to rearrange their existing relations with other actors in the international system.²⁴

Alliance sub-systems are not immune to such attempts to change alignments. Michael Haas stated that types of power distributions are related to the incidence of international conflict.²⁵

In a study where polarity was an independent variable and stability was a dependent variable, it was found that if a group of states is willing to accept long wars that could be won by aggressor states then bipolarity in the international system provides an escape from the more war-prone character of historical multipolar systems. The same finding cautioned that while multipolarity entails more periodic violence with more countries at war and with more casualties, bipolarity may bring fewer wars but of much longer duration.²⁶

States in an alliance behave toward one another as a function of their respective orientation toward such outside elements. One study showed that for NATO, high tension periods led to high intra-bloc cooperation, whereas low tension periods showed low intra-bloc cooperation. However for WTO, high tension periods also reflected high intra-bloc cooperation but low tension periods showed high intra-bloc cooperation as well.²⁷

External threat relative to alliance cohesion is a multi-faceted phenomenon wherein situational factors play a part. For instance, in a situation where there is a clear and present danger to the safety of all members in an alliance, then the actors tend to rally around the alliance leaders.²⁸ Similarly, over the longer term a commonly perceived threat

is likely also to overcome other incompatibilities among alliance members.²⁹ However, should a threat be made to one alliance member over a disputed matter that would seem to be of a bilateral nature, e.g. a disputed frontier or a disputed fishing ground or mineral/mining rights on the seabed, then the character of the threat would be seen in a different light. As Arnold Wolfers stated there are discrepancies in the variety of external conflict faced by alliance members over time which may reduce alliance unity.³⁰ This phenomenon of erosion of

alliance unity has been described in another dimension as well. George Liska stated that when an external threat is directed at only a few alliance members rather than the alliance as a whole, then alliance decision-making becomes more difficult.³¹ The diminuation of the will by the group to meet external threat will tend to undermine alliance cohesion.³² It is also believed that for NATO especially, the

diminuation of the will to meet external threat over time will tend to increase the competition of policy elites in open societies.³³ This will undermine alliance cohesion because the less extensive the external threat, the more likely are members in a pluralistic coalition to risk

intra-alliance friction³⁴ accompanied by a reduction of concern among
 the members about each other's capabilities.³⁵ Should the perceived
 enemy maintain a low threat profile over time as would occur during a
 prolonged period of non-crisis, the result for a pluralistic alliance
 would be a failure to clarify the scope and conditions of commitment
 thereby impeding the cohesion of the alliance and its chances for
 evolving effective strategy.³⁶ The opposite phenomenon should be true
 for an organizationally directive coalition such as WTO. Such an
 autocratic bloc maintains its group objectives in a more coherent and
 stable manner. It also controls its total resources and over the
 short-run can more readily commit its resources to respond to external
 threat or external opportunities.³⁷

Let us review next the effect of the internal environment of an
 alliance. An alliance of short duration in a bipolar international
 system should be cohesive due to its short lifespan indicating a vigorous
 beginning. However, given sufficient time both the pluralistic and the
 autocratic alliances will experience considerable strain at some point
 in their evolution.³⁸ For a pluralistic coalition such as NATO, one
 may expect the strains to be displayed somewhat overtly without undue
 strain on its cohesion.³⁹ Fred Ikle stated that a pluralistic alliance
 that is not characterized by doctrinal unity will more easily resolve its
 own internal conflicts without disrupting the alliance as a whole.⁴⁰
 This last proposition seems to have been borne out by empirical evidence

reported by Terrence Hopmann concerning France as an alliance deviant. ⁴¹

In the case of WTO on the other hand, it seems that there is a tendency in a hegemonic alliance to repress strains under the supremacy of the leading member and that the capability of that ally would count the most in determining the degree of conformity. ⁴²

The likelihood of conflict erupting into a major disruption for the alliance as a whole has been supported by empirical evidence in Hopmann's study of the People's Republic of China as an alliance maverick. ⁴³ We will also refer to this phenomenon again in Chapter Six concerning the case of the WTO and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Let us review next the effect of national attributes upon alliances. The national attributes of constituent members of an alliance can reflect the basic inequities of a given sub-system. Russett stated that the power of an alliance is not equal to the sum of the power of its constituent members. ⁴⁴ For instance, the domestic instability of an alliance member, e.g. Canada in NATO from 1976 onward, may be a source of weakness to an alliance. Also, alliances among democratic governments may be less stable because elite stability of those in power is not

⁴⁵ assured. This could lead to an uncertainty of purpose in the group when one or more members of a pluralistic alliance are in disequilibrium. On the other hand for a hegemonic alliance such as WTO, elite stability represents party stability with only occasional shuffles at the top of the leadership. This type of national attribute lends itself to greater

consistency of purpose in the group as a whole with a disposition to carry on objectives of the group regardless of the occasional leadership shuffle. The case of Czechoslovakia in 1968 is an exception to the rule as will be noted in Chapter Six. For other national actors such as the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany in NATO and the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic in WTO, the more highly valued a country views an alliance, then the more it will contribute to maintain it. ⁴⁶

From the above it is quite clear that national attributes of constituent members have a varied effect on the alliance. On the other hand, Olson and Zeckhauser suggested that differences in purposes between the member-states and their extent of resource commitment to the collective defense of the group may improve alliance effectiveness in that they increase the private, non-collective benefits throughout the alliance. ⁴⁷

Let us review next the effect of alliance efficacy. Alliance efficacy may be defined as the ability of the alliance to achieve its policy, objectives and goals over time. It seems that the keys to alliance efficacy are continuous consultation and adjustment of policies more for NATO than WTO. ⁴⁸ The difference for each type of alliance is the style by which this process is carried out, i.e. a pluralistic process for NATO but an organizationally directive one for WTO. It would seem that ideology has some role to play in alliance efficacy. In pluralistic coalitions such as NATO, there tend to be some

ideological and institutional dissimilarities which affect the operation
 of the alliance but not unduly so. ⁴⁹ Therefore, ideology would be a
 minor factor in the cohesiveness of a coalition such as NATO. It is
 incapable by itself of making or breaking the sub-system. ⁵⁰ However,
 in the case of a hegemonic alliance such as WTO, the ideological factor
 might be superimposed upon a community of interest. ⁵¹ In so doing,
 WTO leaders could add strength to the alliance, for at least the short-
 term, by marshalling moral conviction and increasing emotional support.

We have reviewed literature and concepts pertaining to external
 environment, internal environment, national attributes and efficacy in
 the context of alliance cohesion. It is timely now to turn to a
 description of detente, our independent variable. What is this concept
 of detente?

There are several impressionistic attitudes toward detente
 prevalent in East-West relations. Essentially, detente may be defined
 as a relaxation of international tension. This, in operative terms,
 means that in a loosening bipolar system from 1964 to 1973 the
 relaxation of tension that has taken place is largely seen as desirable
 by the two superpowers in their own relationships with apparent spin-off
 effects on their respective alliance partners. Inductive reasoning
 would suggest that detente, as a description of relations, could be
 placed somewhere between the two opposites of enmity/confrontation and
 amity/cooperation. During the period of 1964 to 1973 the West tended

to regard detente, as compared to the Cold War, in positive terms regarding it as an opportunity for an improvement of relations and relaxation from tension with a process of accommodation of both sides on

commercial, political, and cultural levels of interaction. ⁵² On the

other hand, the Soviet view of detente stemmed from different sociopolitical and economic premises. They viewed officially the process of detente in dialectical terms: detente is defined as a discharging of a given state of international relations from confrontation toward highly selective and piecemeal cooperation within an evolutionary and historic framework of transition in relations between the socialist camp and the

capitalist camp. ⁵³ The Soviet view now appears to interchange detente with peaceful coexistence and seems to be a lot more cynical and conditional in terms of policy than is the Western concept of detente.

Despite the two separate views of the meaning and intent of detente, there has been a general relaxation of tension in East-West relations largely at the level of diplomatic interaction and public rhetoric with some actual improvement in trade relations.

To summarize the foregoing review of alliance pre-theory statements concerning the three aspects of (1) the nature of an alliance, (2) the definitions and propositional inventory on alliance cohesion, and (3) the nature of detente and the propositional inventory on alliance behavior in non-crisis situation, it is now germane to link selectively key features of current theory in order to set out the hypotheses to be tested in this thesis.

Alliances such as NATO or WTO are originally based on a written agreement or international instrument bringing together in coalition those nations who, to one extent or another, perceived collective interests in forming a defensive alliance in order to oppose a collectively perceived threat. Once the alliance was formed, its evolution depended primarily upon the extent of military, economic, and socio-political interests of its major power in influencing the interests of other lesser powers to form either an autocratic, organizationally directive institution, e.g. WTO, or a pluralistic, less formally directive institution, e.g. NATO. ⁵⁴ In both examples, the institutionalization process in the alliance came after the original alliance formation in the manner of a de facto development over time of alliance policy, objectives, and goals. The manner of institutionalizing and consolidating actual perceived policy, objectives and goals of each alliance through the 1950's, 1960's to the present day took on distinctive aspects bearing upon many of the subtle interactions of variables for either NATO or WTO. These aspects included attributes, motivational factors, actual pattern of behavior, and environmental conditions over time relative to the coalition collectively and individually. To restate Liska, conflict among actors in the system is the primary determinant of alignments or realignments and cooperation in alliances is largely the consequence of conflicts with perceived adversaries submerging perhaps only temporarily the extant conflicts among allied nations themselves. ⁵⁵

Furthermore, the study by Raymond Tanter in Modelling and Managing International Conflicts, supports the notion that WTO is characterized by a structurally centralized infrastructure that is sub-system dominant, but that NATO tends to reflect the individualism of its member-states in a pluralistic and less directive infrastructure during non-crisis periods.

In this thesis one dependent variable, called alliance cohesion, is being singled out for analysis under a prolonged non-crisis situation during which detente evolved, in order to see the trends over time in intra-alliance and inter-alliance behavior. The assumption is that for each alliance at the beginning of the ten year time frame the superpower's relations on an intra-alliance and inter-alliance basis generally set the trend for relations of member-states at the sub-hierarchical levels of the alliance.

Over a prolonged period of non-crisis it would be reasonable to expect modifications of relations among member-states in a given alliance and toward the alliance as a whole. Such expectations would depend largely on 1) whether or not the alliance itself is organizationally directive as in WTO or if it is pluralistic as in NATO and 2) the relative policy choices over time which may be pursued by particular member-states in either type of alliance. Such modification in relations may represent for the alliance as a whole either a net increase in the level of cooperation, or a continuation at the same level, or a reduction in cooperation that may or may not result in conflict be-

havior between two or more member-states in an alliance. It is believed that if a key alliance member pursued national policy which also indirectly had a bearing upon an issue area common to other member-states in a manner that was detrimental toward established alliance policy, then one might expect a spillover of such behavior to other member-states of the alliance which may affect their own bilateral and group activities as well. It is expected that only major allies in a given alliance, or allies aspiring to fulfill their own national goals above other alliance considerations, could cause such a phenomenon and might challenge alliance cohesion at the group level. An examination of a selected member-state's relations should reveal a behavior trend over time.

From the foregoing, three hypotheses have been constructed to test for changes in alliance cohesion. The hypotheses to be tested in this thesis concerning alliance-cohesion in a pluralistic coalition like NATO are as follows:

- H1 The longer the period of non-crisis, the less will be the cooperative behavior between the bloc leader and the non-deviant sub-hierarchical members.
- H2 The longer the period of non-crisis, the greater will be the cooperative behavior between the sub-hierarchical members and the deviant member.

In comparison to the above hypotheses, the undernoted hypothesis for an organisationally directive coalition must take into account the reduced potential or latitude for national actors to pursue their own

rational policies compared to actors in a pluralistic coalition. This would result in alliance policies appearing to have greater support within the group itself. The hypothesis to be tested in this thesis concerning alliance cohesion in an organizationally directive coalition like WTO is as follows:

- H3   The longer the period of non-crisis, the level of cooperation between the bloc leader and the sub-hierarchical members will remain the same or intensify.

Due to the importance of the WTO crisis concerning Czechoslovakia in 1968 in understanding the manner in which this alliance resolves internal conflict, a separate chapter will be provided to explain what occurred and what this implies as to alliance cohesion and heterogeneity in this sub-system.

This study would not be complete without examining cross-alliance behavior during prolonged non-crisis. Therefore, a separate chapter on this aspect will be proposed in order to confirm if the inter-alliance transactions of the members in one alliance toward members in the opposite alliance tend to intensify and change from conflict toward cooperation.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter 1

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Chapter 2

Historical Trend of Events for NATO and WTO from 1964 to 1973

The trend of events which affected NATO and WTO during this period seemed at times to occur primarily on a national interest basis for the superpowers or on a regional interest basis for the lesser European members in the two alliances. No particular event which generally affected NATO actors or WTO actors occurred without repercussions in the international system as a whole. An American observer stated that the litany of systemic changes are now familiar and have entered common wisdom: for instance, the fading of US nuclear superiority; the necessary limitations on the use of nuclear destructive force in a world of great change; the decline of US credibility over time arising not only from the increasing vulnerability of the US to Soviet nuclear bombardment but also from the results of the War in Indochina and the malaise in leadership peculiar to the US born of the Watergate scandals; the growth and/or reassertion of alternative centers of political-economic power, e.g. China, Japan, West Europe; the upsurge of social divisions and political conflicts in developing countries. "The combined and dialectical impact of these new forces is seen ... to have ended the postwar world and to have emptied of meaning the institutions devised to meet the challenges of that world." ¹ While it appears that the original forms of NATO and

WTO have been questioned in the 1960's and 1970's, the resolve to amend these two alliances has not been identical for NATO as for WTO. Indeed, as noted below, it may be that WTO has adjusted more readily to modifications than has NATO.

The events when related specifically to the changes in the Soviet area, the changes in the United States, or the changes in West Europe during this period had significant input for the evolution of the international system from a relatively tight bipolar system to a system based on political multipolarity with a mainly bipolar nuclear military capability in the hands of the superpowers. It appears that the Soviet influence in the international system, and, therefore, upon nation-states in WTO and NATO has increased during the period of 1964 to 1973. The changes that brought about such an increase in influence on the part of the Soviets are of several origins having basic roots in the domestic, political, economic and social nature of the USSR and its historic interests in the European sub-system.

In reference to the WTO itself, the changes in the military relationship within WTO were accompanied by other changes at the economic level, i.e. the revitalization of COMECON in the early 1970's. Additionally reinforcement of the political and social environment of East Europe occurred via preparations for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) from 1969 onward. All of these factors tended to reinforce the system in East Europe which had been dominated to various degrees since 1945 by the USSR in its bilateral

relationship with each current nation-state that has become a member of WTO/COMECON.

While the relationship of each member-state to other actors in WTO/COMECON may have had differences from time to time, there has seldom been an overt display of differing points of view. For instance, the dispute between Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the USSR became a demonstrative matter which then appeared to challenge the authority of other communist parties in power, especially the authority of the USSR parent party, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Therefore, historic eruption periods of East Germany in 1953, Hungary and Poland in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in 1970 have had systemic effects in WTO/COMECON relations that temporarily exceed the level of violence of any differences that have occurred, for example, among actors in NATO. While alliance disagreements are less frequently known in WTO than in NATO, it is apparent that when such disagreements have surfaced they tended to take on a much more extreme form than has been the case for NATO. In effect, the inability to openly agree to disagree among national actors in this alliance system prevents differences from being raised, examined and discussed in public without causing great potential repercussions to the overall framework of the WTO.

Therefore, a scholar attempting to examine cohesion in WTO and having to rely on overt information actually can expect to obtain only a partial view of the otherwise veiled processes at work. The only

valid exception to this rule is the case of Rumania since 1964 in WTO. Rumania has expressed since the mid-1960's broad economic and political aims which were not necessarily in keeping with the intentions of the USSR. For instance, in having pursued its national goals in terms of economic development and political objectives which were intended to make Rumania less dependent on the USSR and COMECON, this ally in effect pursued intensely a particular national policy on bilateral levels with diverse states in the West and in Asia especially in trade transactions. Such pursuit of national policy objectives occurred in the mid-1960's and onward without the overt approval of the USSR itself and of the WTO as a diplomatic entity. Rumania also pursued those objectives in two issue areas that other sub-hierarchical member-states may have covertly wanted to do as well but did not for restrictions of existing bilateral relations with the USSR, their geographic location in East Europe, and the requirement to rely on Soviet support for existing or planned economic and social programs in the 1960's and 1970's.

Therefore, Rumania's role in WTO and COMECON has evolved into a unique relationship in that this nation-state is a formal member in those organizations but is less dependent than the other sub-hierarchical national actors in the system. Rumania's bilateral and group relations in WTO/COMECON have both been modified significantly by this state's efforts in the ten year timeframe.

In the area of defence cooperation within WTO, the Soviet armed forces and Soviet foreign policy, objectives and goals have predominated

in the WTO military command system and in the decision-making aspect of this alliance. Premier Nikita Khrushchev had had mercurial relations with the Soviet military elite during the 1960's and, upon his ouster in 1964, the military elite had need of rejuvenation. With the advent in the USSR of the collective leadership under Brezhnev it did not take long for changes to commence in the structure of the Soviet military.

The reshaping of the Soviet military command commenced in 1965 with a process of rejuvenating the senior ranks of the Officer Corps. Also, the structure of the Officer Corps was adjusted in order to better accommodate new operational concepts such as the Strategic Missile Command. Such modifications imposed some degree of radical alteration to the previous structure of the Soviet armed forces. ² In September, 1965 the Secretary General of the CPSU, Leonid I. Brezhnev, informed the Central Committee of impending changes in the WTO:

With a view to improving the activity of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, it is necessary to establish within the framework of this pact a permanent and operational mechanism for the evaluation of current problems. The complex international situation forces us to pay special attention to problems of military collaboration with the [other] countries of socialism. A great effort is taking place according to the following plan: standardization of equipment is being implemented, exchange of combat training experience [has been developed] and joint maneuvers are being conducted. ³

These alliance modifications took place in the 1960's primarily at the level of Soviet forces in WTO with increasing attention placed only later concerning non-Soviet forces in WTO. WTO strategic planning, having swung toward a higher preparedness for offensive counterattack

in the latter half of the 1960's, was becoming more instrumental and institutionalized in the form of centralized command and coordination in the pursuit of alliance military objectives. In 1967 the WTO Commander, Marshal Grechko, stated officially

... One must above all note the uniform military doctrine of the socialist countries united in the Warsaw Pact ... In case of aggression, our armies are ready not to conduct a passive defense but to engage in active military operations, which would be immediately transferred to the territory of the enemy. The armies of the Warsaw Pact countries also adhere to a uniform tactic of battleground action. As to armament, it has been standardized to a considerable degree ... Consistently, the methods of army training have been almost identical. 4

However, the previously entrenched outlooks of the most senior Soviet officers remained safeguarded to a degree by the presence of Marshal Malinovskii as the Soviet Defence Minister. When Malinovskii died in March, 1967 a reconstitution of the leadership of the military was then inevitable. Marshal Grechko moved from command of WTO forces to the position of Soviet Defence Minister. Then, the role of the Defence Minister became a focal point of personnel selection for command positions plus a point of impetus for new policies on military command structures and the continuation of high levels of military procurement. 5

At the same time Marshal Yakubovskii became the new commander of the WTO forces. The appointments of Grechko and Yakubovskii, amongst other appointments in this period as well, confirmed that the search for diversification in Soviet military capabilities would be continued and eventually consolidated. For instance, rigorous training programs plus

insistence on combat readiness in the Soviet military allowed by 1967-1968 for the development of a Soviet and WTO force capable of entering into routine overt military exercises and maneuvers which could immediately be expanded into operational deployment as occurred in August, 1968 when Czechoslovakia was invaded by WTO forces.⁶

By 1970, the revitalizing of the Soviet military structure in addition to procurement and deployment of more modern weapon systems encouraged the Soviet military to formalize the changes and at the same time to re-emphasize the primacy of the CPSU. In 1970, an agreement was entered into by Chairman Brezhnev and Defence Minister Grechko to the effect that the military would support the CPSU stance on strategic issues and on the expanded role of the political agencies and political officers in military affairs. On its part, the CPSU underwrote the Soviet military's interest in training activities and emphasized defence requirements when formulating internal policies.⁷

WTO has been formally administered by the Joint High Command and the Political Consultative Committee which are located in Moscow. The Joint Command consisted of a Soviet Commander-in-Chief, a Defence Committee consisting of six national Defence Ministers, a Soviet Chief of Staff and a main staff to which senior non-Soviet officers were attached. Integration of selected units of East European forces into the Soviet Command System occurred in the 1970's with increases in manpower and firepower. For administrative, operational and logistical purposes the WTO was being organized to a certain degree along the lines

of a Soviet Military District.

John Erickson has pointed out that the very nature of the WTO suggests that it is geared as a military organization toward Soviet defence policy per se and, as a political entity, acts as a diplomatic vehicle concerned with aspects of on-going East-West relationships. Soviet interests in East Europe remain of the highest priority. These interests in East Europe appear to be part of a general objective of attaining political dominance over Europe as a whole. This objective could only have been furthered through the attainment by the USSR of strategic parity and political status with the US as acknowledged by the SALT agreements of 1972 and the continuation of Soviet influence in West Europe generally. John Erickson states that the Soviet priorities for Europe appear to include the development of increased European support for Soviet policies, adjustment of the European balance in favour of the USSR, recognition of Soviet predominance in Europe, reduction of Western military posture, erosion of the trans-Atlantic link, and eroding of existing Western economic and military integration in the form of NATO or the Common Market.

For the Soviets, detente (or razryadka) does not mean any cessation of the ideological or political confrontation between the two systems. Instead it is understood historically as a period for consolidation of power and is not equated with any lowering of military preparedness. It is apparent that detente is consistent with the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence. Peaceful coexistence to the

Soviets is a basic form of class struggle in the world arena that expresses an international norm of relations between states. Peaceful coexistence appears to have become institutionalized and permanent as a state of relations between the socialist commonwealth and the capitalist states.¹¹

It is upon such premises that the Soviets have pursued their policies in reference to security and cooperation in Europe.

Throughout the 1960's and up to the early 1970's, the WTO acted as the primary vehicle for general integrative designs of a socialist commonwealth with the USSR. While the WTO had been a relatively effective integrative mechanism in the sphere of military defence, it had also been cumbersome in reacting to increasingly sophisticated political and economic change in East Europe generally. It seemed that the only way policy differences in East Europe could be settled via WTO was by the threat or actual use of naked force to prevent the on-going process of political and economic modifications among the alliance member-states. Those same modifications tended to imply reforms would re-orient economies toward national objectives by countries such as Czechoslovakia within a historically rigid hierarchical East European system that had been dominated by the USSR. Change had to come in East Europe and WTO when the diplomatic and integrative vehicle, turned out to be inadequate by the late 1960's and early 1970's. For instance, the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia had exposed the insufficiency of naked military force and the problem that the entire sub-system required a new emphasis on cohesion with viability.¹² No doubt this meant that institutional reorganization would occur in the East European sub-system. The two basic organizations

that would be used were WTO and COMECON.

Military changes affecting integration of the East European subsystem had already occurred to some degree by the late 1960's. For instance, in 1961 and thereafter joint military maneuvers of WTO forces occurred regularly at a rate of between two and seven exercises per annum. Also, starting in 1965 and thereafter, WTO meetings of military staff and Defence Ministers occurred frequently. The development in the late 1960's of integrated forces in the Northern Tier of WTO included principally Soviet, Polish, and East German units involved in a core area of the WTO looked upon by the Soviets as the forward defence zone of the USSR. Soviet forces became recognized by the East Europeans in 1969 as permanently stationed in that zone. In the less strategically crucial Southern Tier of WTO, Bulgaria was evidently the staunchest ally yet was not required to commit her forces heavily to WTO activities as compared to other member-states. Also, largely due to political differences and her geographic proximity in the Southern Tier, Rumania was allowed to be skeptical of the increasing trend in the 1960's toward WTO maneuvers. For example, the Rumanian forces did not participate in WTO joint exercises from September, 1964 to August, 1967 and again from summer, 1968 (including the Czech invasion period) until October, 1970.

It is probable that the WTO meeting in Budapest in March, 1969 was very important to the evolution of WTO. This short meeting established officially the Committee of Defence Ministers and a Statute on the Combined Forces and Combined Command which were intended to improve the organization of WTO forces. Carl Jacobsen asserted that this could

mean the USSR now felt obliged to agree to a Rumanian and Czech demand for greater sharing of WTO command and policy authority. It was also speculated that, similar to the NATO approach on this matter, the creation of a WTO joint staff may have reflected the desire that participation in the joint staff would be in proportion to member-state contribution to WTO. However, it was to be expected that Soviet authority would remain paramount in any such staff group or committee development.

The main duty of Soviet forces in the 1970's was to defend the socialist fatherland and socialism's and communism's victories, and to halt any potential spread of counter-revolution. Interventions previously in East Germany, Hungary and later in Czechoslovakia had been deemed by the Soviets to be legal and necessary. By the late 1960's, with new bilateral treaties signed with all WTO member-states, the forces of WTO that were being integrated were conceived to protect the boundaries of the socialist states as component parts of the boundaries of the whole camp. The idea of fellowship in arms ran like a red thread through all those treaties, declared Pravda in May, 1970.

It was evident that the reorganization of COMECON under the Comprehensive Program of 1971 marked an institutional change from WTO to COMECON in order to achieve a method of sustaining cohesion in the matter of non-military and non-external affairs affecting the regional interests of the East Europe states. WTO was still left with an important role. For instance, Krasnaya Zvezda stated in 1972 that the WTO had become the main centre for the coordination of foreign policy activities of member-states.

Carl Jacobsen points out that a pos-

sible underlying explanation for such a degree of member-state integration is reflected in part by a military writer's comment in Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No. 1, 1969. Therein, the author of the article drew a parallel lesson drawn from post-revolutionary separatism in the Baltic states, Belorussia and the Ukraine which was overcome by eventual unity forged through the instrument of military alliance and political integration over the ensuing decades. The author argued, with regard to the socialist community, that this method was applicable for counteracting other points of separatism in East Europe which had been encouraged by pro forma political independence.¹⁷ This ominous argument from the Soviet side is conservative and elitist but can be related to the post 1968 events in East Europe, for instance the May, 1970 Polish uprising. Perhaps this type of thinking led to the use of WTO and COMECON as vehicles for regional integration which has become de rigueur since 1971. Obviously for some conservative elite segments of Soviet society, the notion of pseudo-empire is part of the historic development of Soviet regional acquisitions and aspirations with roots of this process extending even earlier than 1917. Hence, this type of explanation for military and related integrative activities in the last decade holds some small measure of value in understanding the historic and current thinking of the Soviets relative to East Europe and WTO.

After the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968 there followed a new policy subsequently referred to as the Brezhnev Doctrine. This doctrine stated that the general interests of the collective socialist commonwealth should have a priority higher than that of any

particular national interest of each member-state. Specific interests mentioned were those referring to interparty, interstate, cultural and all other relations. The doctrine called on member-states of WTO to support, strengthen, and defend the socialist achievement of each nation and that this constituted the general international obligation of all socialist countries. The Brezhnev Doctrine thereby set the bottom line for WTO unity through this redefinition of the role of the socialist state within the overall socialist community.¹⁸ Should a WTO member fail to fulfill this obligation, the Brezhnev Doctrine might be used to justify invasion of such a member-state.

In general then, there seems to be in effect among all member-states, even Rumania to a certain degree, a doctrine of limited sovereignty. Membership in the Socialist Commonwealth carries joint responsibility and none of these states may pursue policies independent of the whole.¹⁹ Carl Jacobsen properly pointed to the original twenty-one conditions of Comintern membership as a means of doctrinal explanation of this policy attitude. The twenty-one conditions clearly allowed creation of communist parties everywhere, but, with the proviso that each party organ participate in furthering, as a whole, the communist international, or movement.²⁰ All member-states currently in the WTO have communist parties in power who, to one degree or another, still owe some form of allegiance to its parent body, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union since it is still primary in the communist movement today.²¹ Obviously, the real politics of integration of the East

European states with the USSR into a veritable Socialist Commonwealth leaves room to maneuver for a state such as Rumania, who has the will to defy some Soviet aims in the context of their own national foreign policy.

22

In comparison to WTO, NATO has not exhibited the same type of restraint within the coalition on particular disputes among its member-states that either directly or indirectly engendered conflict which reflected on its cohesion. For instance, a dispute over NATO integration in the 1960's with undertones of American preponderant influence in West Europe was pursued by Charles de Gaulle. This eventually led to France in 1966 remaining in the alliance politically but taking a more indirect military role by opting out of alliance integration of the various armed forces. This was a direct challenge to the management, role and objectives of NATO with a United States Supreme Commander having all NATO forces under his disposition in the event of war. The dispute itself actually caused a lot of soul-searching in the mid-1960's as to whether NATO was still necessary and, if so, what future form would it take as a defensive military alliance. The decision period of 1966-1967 saw adjustments such as France remaining in the alliance as an interested but independent defender of West Europe maintaining both formal and informal consultative and strategic planning links with NATO Headquarters which had moved out of Paris to Brussels. Examples of conflict between national actors of NATO which indirectly affected NATO were the continuing dispute by Greece and Turkey over the Cyprus question and the dispute in the 1970's

between Iceland and Great Britain over territorial limits and fishing rights in the North Atlantic. These disputes were indirectly affecting NATO because the national actors were each in the same alliance. The dispute primarily affected their level of cooperation on a bilateral basis. Secondly, it related to the role of US forces stationed in Iceland who did not respond to the defence of Icelandic interests. These exchanges of confrontation in the examples of conflict either directly or indirectly affecting NATO reflect the pluralistic nature of this alliance. NATO exhibits a tendency among its member-states to agree to disagree more than WTO does.

It does not appear, however, that such conflicts have ever caused NATO as a whole to actually contemplate or prepare for an invasion of one or more of its member-states for behaving in a manner that may have been unacceptable to the overall policy, objectives and goals of this alliance. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that NATO could invade a member-state of the alliance without the unanimous consent of the other participating members. Although the US remains the corner-stone of the alliance, this superpower does not have the same role within NATO that the USSR appears to sustain in literally exercising a control function over WTO participants. Instead, NATO appears to rely on diplomatic procedures to try to resolve differences among its members.

It appears that attitudinal changes have occurred in NATO between the superpower and its sub-hierarchical allied member-states and among the sub-hierarchical member-states themselves. The change at the

superpower level appears to be one of accepting that an Atlantic Community is not a viable objective for NATO. The change at the sub-hierarchical member-state level appears to be one of increasing awareness of its unique European character and its potential within a regional integrative concept. The trends in NATO will be described hereunder relative to a) US attitude and behavior toward NATO and b) European attitude and behavior toward NATO.

It has been stated that two related lines of reasoning have been pursued in the West to demonstrate that the character of NATO is undergoing an inevitable transformation which renders the French example of 1965-1966 much less of an abnormality. First is the radical change in the international political-strategic conditions since the inception of NATO which signalled fundamental alterations in NATO relations among its participating member-states. Second is that the American perspective on alliance relations among nations in NATO became unsustainable as the stark political bipolarity of the Cold War era became muted and was replaced by political multipolarity, and as the nuclear superiority of the US over the USSR gradually disappeared. 23

While such conventional wisdom appears to represent the general trend for NATO, the US had its own reasons for changing how it regarded the alliance, as did the sub-hierarchical actors in Europe.

The interaction of the United States and of Western Europe in the 1950's and early 60's was once referred to as the Atlantic Community wherein broad consensus of defence-sharing, trade links and the

redevelopment of western political institutions in Europe would somehow evolve toward some form of community integration. The latter idea of evolution of West Europe into at least a regional integration system, of supranationalism, now in retrospect seemed to have been an illusory prospect. The American perception of West European integration was different from that of the Europeans themselves. The generous but unrealistic view of Europe by America was most likely based on two aspects. First, the US had to justify its alliance treaty and military commitment to Europe to the American public opinion at home. Second, Europe at the beginning of the development of NATO and the idea of Atlantic Community was still hard pressed by the post-war disruption and instability that required American defence commitment, required massive economic assistance for re-development, and needed time to regain its strength and ability to handle its own affairs. As Harland Cleveland stated, NATO was essentially a transatlantic bargain in which the interaction of political and military collaboration mixed, adapted and shifted according to the requirements of its total membership.²⁴ The alliance, more than the community idea, was bonded by a consensus or shared perception that was twofold. First, the military threat to West Europe may increase or decrease but the sine qua non of Atlantic security was their alliance. Second, while solutions to outstanding economic, social and political problems might be occasionally sought within national compartments, or in broader European confines, in the security area there was no alternative to that Atlantic bargain: the

US commitment to defend Europe against any Soviet threat.²⁵ Therefore the NATO alliance was a loose framework for a pluralistic security community in which, to use Karl Deutsch's reference, the national actors could establish a mutual relevance through similar evaluations about salient external objects and events in order to maintain some degree of symmetry of orientation and responsiveness.²⁶ In the 1960's and onward the symmetry of orientation and response came into question. Henry Kissinger in the mid-1960's stated that some leaders and groups in NATO who were the most responsible and making a serious defence effort were also the ones who were developing views on strategy that now challenged American concepts.²⁷ Therefore the changes in the structure of relations between West Europe and the US became more evident as European prosperity and self-confidence increased. The vision of a broader Atlantic Community incorporating the existing NATO members could only have been maintained while Europe was suffering the aftermath of World War II.

During the same time period of the mid-1960's, decision-making in the US appeared to be more concentrated on the Vietnam War than on Europe and the diplomatic-philosophical issues affecting US-Europe relations appear to have been deferred until well after the Nixon Administration took over in 1969.²⁸ Moreover, the economic difficulties of the United States and its other internal problems, as well as the divergences between American perspectives on policy and that of many European member-states meant that, for the US, confident assump-

tions of consensus and convergence were being called into question in the late 1960's and the early 1970's.²⁹ NATO would not become an object of community integration with the US but would remain merely an alliance in the traditional sense of the term. This is basically what President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger elaborated in their perspective of international relations for the 1970's.

Wood stated that the line of distinction between ally and enemy was to become muted during the 1970's in policy perspective and that NATO would remain not an end in itself but become an element in a grander strategy of Soviet-American relations. Under Nixon and Kissinger, the newly established philosophical principles of external action in the European sphere appear to have been adjusted to coincide somewhat with the "legitimate" aspirations of the USSR in Europe.³⁰ Hence, as Ian Smart pointed out, the essence of the CSCE proposals was that, while the several security interests of the two parts of Europe remained distinct and important, general security could be discussed and pursued as a quality of the European situation as a whole.³¹ This interpretation of the objective of security in Europe was conceptualized as a legitimate aspiration within the framework of Soviet-American relations but not necessarily pursued in the specific interest of the US in relation to NATO.

• For instance, Peyton Lyon wrote in 1970 that the perceived Soviet danger had changed to such an extent that it seemed reasonable that a number of NATO members such as Canada, Denmark, and the Benelux

countries might believe it possible to leave the alliance without thereby incurring a significant increase in vulnerability to Soviet attack.³²

Thus, the nuclear balance between the two superpowers appeared to be generating political multipolarity in Europe in the sense that weaker allies might more readily contemplate their own national goals having "... good reason to believe that their defense is [and would remain] in the overwhelming interest of their senior partner. Hence, they see no need to purchase [superpower] support by acquiescence in its policies."³³

Therefore, grand designs by a superpower became more difficult to enforce with its alliance partners. The paradox in contemporary military strength, for instance the armed might of the USA as compared to anyone of its alliance partners, was that "... a gargantuan increase in power has eroded its relationship to policy [among alliance members]".³⁴ Kissinger stated that for alliances to remain effective they must retain a common objective, maintain a degree of joint policy, at least sufficient to define the casus belli, have some technical means of cooperation to effect common action, and be able to penalize non-cooperation. Protection must not be taken for granted and the mutuality of obligation among alliance members must be reinforced.³⁵

Yet the states in Europe were themselves undergoing major transition largely of an economic and political variety. In the 1960's and 1970's, European allies in NATO no longer made the defense effort of which they were capable. Almost everywhere domestic politics had come to dominate national security policy, thus yielding frustrations in

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the relationship among allied members. European states were now basically regional in their foreign policy perspective to the point that burden-sharing could be regarded only on the basis of national need. "A nation assumes responsibilities not only because it has resources but because it has a certain view of its own destiny." ³⁷ This was a viewpoint satisfactory to a superpower such as the US. However, each alliance member showed an increasing tendency to define its own national interests first and, if convenient, match some of its foreign policy objectives with those of the existing alliance while pursuing its own overall interests in the manner deemed necessary.

In retrospect, concerning NATO's sub-hierarchical actors in Europe, it seems that the challenge of President de Gaulle's views in 1965-1966 was directly aimed at the American vision of international relations and the role that was being projected for the US in NATO.

The structure of the argument laid down by France was actually in keeping with a more classical view of international politics as real politik and of alliances such as NATO being limited in purpose and character. Also, France believed it could challenge the dominant position of the US in Europe by independently pursuing its own improved power role in the nuclear field and by setting up its own unique relations with other states, especially in Europe, concerning economic and political exchange. In so doing France apparently believed it would still be, in the final analysis, receiving US nuclear protection while stimulating relations with states on either side of the divided Europe and,

in the end, transforming the international structure of power along multi-
polar lines. 38

Not only did France pursue such links but so did West Germany. Until the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, West Germany was gradually building up relations piecemeal with East European states and tended to isolate East Germany in so doing. After the invasion, Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik pursued agreements through Moscow with the East European states. Normalization of relations between FRG and the East European states had to include recognition of East Germany as a separate state, the status quo of the boundaries of East Europe, and the primacy of the USSR in East Europe. 39

The European member-states in NATO, particularly France and West Germany, were acquiring by the 1960's the wherewithal to undertake within the European sub-system their own political maneuvers and negotiations with other European actors that suggested some degree of independent action despite the continued security need for overall alliance protection of West Europe from the potential threat of WTO forces. The American notion of an Atlantic Community came to be discussed even less by the Europeans in the 1960's as a future option for West European states in NATO. Indeed, it may be that the original idea of an Atlantic Community was an American way of interpreting their own alliance intentions and of justifying their commitment to NATO for domestic political considerations. However, it seems that once West Europe regained its political and economic strength, there was little reason to maintain

such a facade. West Europe could start to pursue regional European objectives separate from American ones.

Generally the Soviet intra-alliance initiatives with WTO members between 1964 to 1973 suggested that differences of a nature causing disturbance to the alliance were still occurring up to 1968. In subsequent years, the USSR appeared to have altered the integrative role of WTO and allowed a revitalized COMECON to keep in check sophisticated economic and political issues in the region. On an inter-alliance basis, the USSR appeared to have consolidated the status quo in East Europe via negotiations with West Germany and through preparations for a general CSCE agreement in Europe. At the same time the USSR and its allies increased their trade levels with the West in order to assist their technical requirements in industry and to purchase foodstuffs for the marketplace. It appears that among WTO actors Rumania was in the forefront until the USSR led the way in these diplomatic and trade ventures then the other sub-hierarchical member-states followed suit.

For the West, initiatives were taken under a general lull of East-West tension to try to establish permanent links with East Europe especially by the FRG and the US. While doing this, it appears that actors in NATO, including the US itself, were actually pursuing national goals first with security interests of NATO remaining in the background. Such pursuit of national interest by several parties of a given alliance could not have enhanced cohesion among the alliance members.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter 2

1. Robert S. Wood, "NATO: From Atlantic Community to Atlantic Alliance", Proceedings of the Second National Security Affairs Conference, (Washington, November, 1975), pp. 100-101.
2. John Erickson, Soviet Military Power, USSI Report 73-1, (Washington, 1973), p. 7.
3. Krasnaya Zvezda, September 30, 1965 reprinted in Staar, p. 219. Also see T.W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, pp. 489-496 for a review of military issues prior to the WTO agreement of March 19, 1969.
4. Richard F. Staar, The Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, revised edition, (Stanford, 1971), p. 222. See also C.G. Jacobsen, Soviet Strategy - Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 84.
5. Soviet military doctrine appears to have been consistent from the early 1960's onward. An interesting review of Soviet strategy and weapons procurement may be found in William F. Scott, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy: Realities and Misunderstandings", in Strategic Review, vol. 3 no. 3, (Summer, 1975), pp. 57-66.
6. Erickson, Soviet Military Power, p. 20.
7. Ibid., p. 18.
8. Ibid., pp. 115-117.
9. John Erickson, "European Security: Soviet Preferences and Priorities", in Strategic Review, vol. 4 no. 1, (Winter, 1976), p. 37.
10. Ibid., p. 38.
11. Ibid., p. 38. See also (Andrew Gordon, pseudonym), "Soviet Westpolitik: Motivation and Aims", in Strategic Review, vol. 2 no. 3, (Summer, 1974), pp. 22-29 for a survey of Soviet ideological reasoning on European security, peaceful coexistence

and detente.

12. J.F. Brown, "Detente and Soviet Policy in East Europe", Survey, vol. 20 no. 2 and 3, (Spring and Summer, 1974), p. 46.
13. C.G. Jacobsen, Soviet Strategy-Soviet Foreign Policy, (Glasgow, 1972), pp. 218-219.
14. Ibid., p. 218.
15. Ibid., p. 220.
16. Krasnaya Zvezda, July 30, 1970 reprinted in Jacobsen, Soviet Strategy-Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 222. An earlier, less precise, observation on this aspect was made in Raymond Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy, (New York, 1966), p. 154.
17. Jacobsen, (Glasgow, 1972), p. 227.
18. W.W. Kulski, The Soviet Union in World Politics, (Syracuse, 1973), pp. 294-297 and 315.
19. Jacobsen, (Glasgow, 1972), p. 222.
20. The original twenty-one points may be found in the thesis adopted by the Second Congress of the Communist International (Moscow, August, 1920) entitled, The Role of the Communist Party in the Proletarian Revolution.
21. This remark was made by Suslov and reported in Kommunist, No.5, 1969.
22. See Jacobsen, (Glasgow, 1972), pp. 223-226 for a more detailed accounting on integration and the doctrine of limited sovereignty.
23. Wood, "NATO: From Atlantic Community to Atlantic Alliance", p. 100.
24. Harlan Cleveland, NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain, (New York, 1970), p. 5.
25. Walter F. Hahn, "NATO's Quiet Crisis", in Strategic Review, (Summer, 1977), p. 27.
26. Karl Deutsch, "Communications Theory and Political Integration", in Philip Jacob and James Toscano, eds., The Integration of Political Communities, (Philadelphia, 1964), pp. 66-70.
27. Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, (New York, 1965),

- p. 41.
28. Wood, "NATO: From Atlantic Community to Atlantic Alliance", p. 115.
  29. Ibid., pp. 108-109.
  30. Ibid., pp. 109 and 115.
  31. Ibid., p. 114 reprinted from Ian Smart, "Perspectives from Europe", in SALT - The Moscow Agreements and Beyond, (New York, 1974), pp. 204-205.
  32. Peyton V. Lyon, NATO as a Diplomatic Instrument, (Toronto, 1970), p. 3.
  33. Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, (New York, 1969), p. 56.
  34. Ibid., p. 59.
  35. Ibid., pp. 65-66.
  36. Ibid., pp. 68-70.
  37. Ibid., p. 71.
  38. Wood, "NATO: From Atlantic Community to Atlantic Alliance", p. 109.
  39. Ibid., pp. 114-115.

Chapter 3

A Design for Empirical Research

Alliance cohesion will be operationalized by referring to five indicators as follows: voting of members in alliance in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA); the relative military burden of the members in alliance; the foreign trade transactions (in WTO only for reasons to be explained later in this chapter); the interaction of alliance members; and the extent of membership in other international governmental organizations (IGO) or international non-governmental organizations (NGO) which will provide for the distances of nations.

The member-states selected for NATO include the US, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), France and Great Britain (UK). The member-states selected for WTO include the USSR, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Czechoslovakia (CSSR), and Rumania.

The use of UN voting as an indicator of alliance cohesion can be viewed only as an indirect assessment of attitude compatibility of members in an alliance. Holsti has stated that the attitudinal component of group cohesion often has been defined in social-psychological studies¹ as the shared attractions or consensus among the members of a group. It is proper to continue this line of argument by stating that cohesion in an alliance may also be defined as a minimum level of attitudinal consensus or compatibility among the constituent member-states. There-

fore, attitude compatibility among member-states in a given alliance ought to be a factor that is conducive to indicating levels of collaboration and cooperation that may suggest something about alliance cohesion. However, in practice we can see that when members of NATO or WTO are voting in the UNGA their attitudes reflected in the voting may hinge more on each issue being voted upon but less on how their alliance partners intend to vote on the same issues. This last statement may be more accurate in the case of NATO than WTO. Of course, if attitudes of alliance members in the UN tend to be the same over time, then indirectly their attitudes toward one another would tend to be compatible.

These UNGA roll calls tend to show attitudes of UN members on issues placed before the General Assembly based on the assumption that they are supposed to be voting in a responsible manner. However, many of the issues at UNGA between 1964 and 1973 have had little to do with the alliance activities per se of NATO or WTO. Instead, votes taken on UNGA resolutions and other decisions of the General Assembly reflect a low per centage of issues which may affect generally the European continent or NATO and WTO activities. A validity test was applied to the resolutions and other decisions of UNGA at the 25th Session of 1970 and the 27th Session of 1972 to find the frequency of issues that were voted upon by UNGA and that reflected categories of a) basic UN administrative matters, b) matters that appear to have had a bearing on defence alliances

such as NATO and WTO or on Europe per se and c) all other matters pertaining to any issues bearing upon areas such as the Third World. The frequency of issues in these three categories for 1970 and 1972 was as follows:

Frequency Spread of UNGA Roll Calls based on Issues

Issue Category:	UN Administrative issues		Direct Europe or NATO or WTO issues		All other issues i.e. Third World	
Frequency:	Resolutions	29%	Resolutions	18%	Resolutions	53%
	Other UNGA	56%	Other UNGA	6%	Other UNGA	38%

The frequency spread suggests that only 18% of the UNGA resolutions and 6% of other UNGA decisions were directly of importance to NATO or WTO members in this period. There is a high potential for NATO or WTO members to deal with 4 out of 5 issues in UNGA with little or no direct policy impact on themselves from these particular decisions of UNGA. Therefore, the nature of issues before the UN allows bloc solidarity with matters especially affecting Third World issues to carry greater potential political significance than issues which have policy impact on NATO or WTO actors. It may be assumed that a decision to vote more often than not may merely reflect attitudes and preferences. Empirically, the use of UNGA roll calls cannot be regarded as anything other than a very general rating of attitudinal compatibility of alliance members.

Those trends which were ascertained over a period of time concern general group association and thereby a causal link is possible between attitudinal consensus and approximate group cohesion. Since we are interested in group attitudinal trends over time it would be useful to use the Lijphart Agreement Index. The Lijphart Index can be used to determine approximate group cohesion by showing attitudinal consensus based on

$$\text{Index} = 100 \times \left(\frac{\text{number of agreements}}{\text{number of mutually registered positions}} \right)$$

wherein,

- a) every voter on a UN bill must have taken one of four possible positions: yes, no, abstain or absent.
- b) position scale: yes = 2, abstain = 1, no = 0, absent = blank entry.
- c) the index is a per centage expression of agreement among any two indicated national actors who were present to take a position on UN bills.

UNGA roll calls were acquired for the years 1966, 1968, 1970, 1972 and 1973 in order to test for change over time in the index ratings of selected actors. Voting patterns could be ascertained for the US, UK, France and FRG in NATO. Also voting was ascertained for the USSR, CSSR,

Rumania and GDR in WTO. However, it must be noted that the FRG and GDR were not members of the UN until 1973. These voting patterns will be grouped to rate the attitudinal compatibility of members on an intra-alliance basis on all UN resolutions in those selected years. This will provide a trend on UN voting by the members of each alliance on all varieties of issues brought forth in UNGA.

A slightly more meaningful rating of attitudinal compatibility of members on an intra-alliance basis would be provided by selecting the issues in UNGA that were germane to the group interests of NATO and WTO, or affecting the European continent generally. This has been provided from 1965 to 1973 inclusive for each of the selected alliance actors.

The minimum level of attitudinal consensus or compatibility among alliance members reflecting cohesion will be an index reading of fifty per cent or more per annum on issues voted upon in UNGA. It is to be stressed that although the use of UNGA roll calls and Lijphart Agreement Index is a very limited indicator of alliance cohesion it can be a supplement to other indicators that may be applied to this thesis.

Another aspect of activity of member-states in alliance that may affect collaboration concerns foreign trade transactions that are intra-alliance and cross-alliance in their direction. It is believed that foreign trade transactions of key members of an alliance will

the FRG, France and UK. The decision by the author, to include these actors was based on the fact that these nations had the greatest number of intra-alliance and inter-alliance events within the data sets that were acquired. Another reason for selecting these actors was the general belief that each set of these particular member-states included a super-power, two member-states in alliance that were assumed to be relatively cohesive, such as the UK and FRG in NATO or CSSR and GDR in WTO, and an apparently less cohesive member-state in its alliance, such as France in NATO and Rumania in WTO.

The data required to measure cohesion would have to include the years 1964 to 1973 for the chosen actors. The data originally acquired by Holsti, Hopmann and Sullivan in Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances was considered a useful starting point because it covered the years from 1964 to the end of 1970.

The research design in Holsti used a data set derived by T. Hopmann and J. Sullivan from the content analysis of Keessing's Contemporary Archives. The Holsti study defined alliance cohesion as behavioral collaboration among members. ¹⁴ Therefore, the behavior component was the main focus in measuring interactions among alliance members. It was also asserted by Holsti that cohesion of an alliance may be measured on the basis of the mean proportion of cooperation relative to conflict in all dyads connecting alliance members. However, it would be necessary in any such study to determine the proportion of the total interactions among all members of either NATO or WTO which

US rose from 0.3% in 1966 to 3.5% in 1973 (see Appendix E). These two national actors experienced the most significant change in foreign trade transactions of any of the actors in NATO specifically, or even the Common Market generally. In effect most foreign trade transactions of the West with COMECON showed only marginal percentage increases in the period of 1964 to 1973. This was due largely to the bulk of Western trade remaining within North America/West Europe or the Third World. Increases in trade with COMECON were additional to other continuing market demands that were being satisfied by the West. For instance, in 1970 less than 3.5% of the total foreign trade by NATO members occurred with COMECON.² Even after 1970, the increase of COMECON targetted trading by the West tended to concentrate on certain countries like the US and FRG, yet the total impact on trade remained quite marginal up to 1973 and beyond.

Having suggested the minimal impact the COMECON had on foreign trade transactions by the West, it is now timely to introduce another dimension for NATO members, that of the political dimension.

It is not normally a major political decision for a given developed country in the West who may be a member of NATO or of the Common Market to decide to increase its trade flow toward COMECON. This is so largely because western countries tend to trade primarily under favourable market conditions and, thereby, treat buyers and sellers of non-strategic goods in the international market place more

as interested trade partners and less as political actors in the international system. Only trade in restricted or strategic goods appears to be an activity in foreign trade with COMECON that may have some basis upon which to discover an indicator for NATO countries that would be useful to examine collaboration and to test for alliance cohesion.

At this point, a brief digression is required. The reason there are restricted or strategic goods that are prevented from trade transactions to COMECON appears to be rationalized on three factors. First, the inability of the USSR to keep up in technological innovative fields especially in electronics, computers and chemicals stands in sharp contrast to its enormous emphasis on the importance of science and the link of such science to Soviet research and development in military weapons systems in the 1960's and 1970's. Second, as long as the Soviets are able to use the state monopoly on USSR foreign trade to obtain competitive bids from companies or multinational corporations in the West and are able to finance purchases in the West with sufficiently low credit terms and/or foreign exchange currency on hand, the USSR tends not to invest in research and development in these areas of technology related to its industrial economy. Instead they seem to prefer to purchase available industrial goods in the West at reasonable prices. ³ Third, this leaves the Soviet technological investment in terms of money and scientific manpower to be given to other priority areas including

sophisticated development in weaponry and so on which can be increasingly disadvantageous to the West. For instance, Soviet imports of machinery from the US in 1969 were valued at nine million dollars and multiplied thereafter up to the level of 226 million dollars in 1973. In 1973 alone, the imports of machinery by the Soviets from six industrial countries in the West totalled 1,460 million dollars while exports of Soviet machinery to those same countries totalled only 70 million dollars. ⁴ As suggested below, the tendency to revise and downgrade the size of restricted and strategic goods embargo lists by the West has had a direct bearing upon the above ability of the Soviets to plug-in to our economic production in a highly selective manner that allows the Soviets to purchase many goods to satisfy major industrial demands of its own economy without incurring research and development costs. Otherwise these latter costs would have been necessary expenditures by the Soviets to improve and intensify their economic infrastructure ⁵ had the West maintained a very tight grip on embargoed trade in the latter half of the 1960's and into the 1970's.

The notion of embargoing the trade of selected goods from NATO countries to COMECON goes back to the original formation of NATO in the period of 1949-1950. Basically, NATO does not act in the role of a qualified economic affairs institution for its constituent member-states. It leaves such a role to outside economic agencies that may be used by NATO and other countries. NATO prefers to exert influence in this sphere only. Article 2 of the NATO Treaty stipulates, among other

matters, that NATO countries will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies. The economic function of NATO consists of trying a) to provide detailed information on the economies of COMECON countries and b) to chart the trend of economic relations between East and West.⁶ Consultation was supposed to take place in NATO when

economic issues arose which were of special political or strategic importance. As the "Report of the Committee of Three" pointed out in 1956, "Political cooperation and economic conflict are not

reconcilable."⁷ Collaboration among NATO members was supposed to be reinforced especially whenever economic issues of special interest to the alliance were involved in the realm of political or defence implications which may affect the security of NATO. The procedure for settling such differences was to a) bring issues which may threaten the solidarity or effectiveness of NATO to the North Atlantic Council, b) use these good offices informally and c) reaffirm the obligation of NATO members to settle the dispute by peaceful means.⁸

There is little evidence that this procedure has been used by NATO members. It is certain that such procedures are not normally used in the embargoing of strategic goods. Instead COCOM (the coordinating committee of all NATO countries excluding Iceland but including Japan) is the principal actor in this regard.

COCOM is an ad hoc committee which was originally created as an informal body on the insistence of the US while NATO was being formed in the 1949-1950 period. Although it was first established in 1950, it

only really was functioning, as intended, by 1952. The most active member-states of COCOM are the US, UK, FRG, France, Japan, Italy and Canada with all other NATO members, except Iceland, taking low profile roles. In addition, other industrial western countries such as Switzerland and Sweden or Australia and New Zealand adhere to the COCOM lists of embargoed goods although they are not members of COCOM. The US instigated the founding of COCOM in order to coordinate sales to communist countries where some items may affect the security of the West. Since then, all COCOM members have remained in this ad hoc committee under the principle of having originally undertaken this international obligation and find it useful to remain in it.

COCOM does not control the export of goods by members who adhere to this body. Instead it acts in a coordinating function under standards already set under a system of listing embargoed goods. Every 2 to 3 years COCOM reviews four lists of embargoed goods to see a) if they are adequate for the purpose intended, b) if new equipment should be added to the list and c) if equipment already on the lists has been superseded by technological advances and thereby make such goods less strategic from a technology viewpoint. Individual members of COCOM may propose additions to or deletions from the lists and when the final revised COCOM lists are available the member-states amend their own national lists accordingly. In addition to meeting every 2 to 3 years for an overall review, COCOM meets weekly to assess cases brought before it by member-states to see if a proposed trade deal affected by current

COCOM lists may be treated as an exemption. In the latter situation, the end use of the product that has been declared by the recipient country is considered by COCOM. Also, considered in an application is whether or not the use of such a product is reasonable, or if the export of the product would harm security aspects. Only then may a request be concurred with by COCOM. However, all member-states of COCOM retain the right to veto a decision by COCOM.

The four COCOM lists consist of a large international list of products, a military or munitions list, an atomic energy list and a watch list. The international list for Canada contains about 100 high technology machinery items to do with metal rolling mills, gas refinement, microwave, sonar, cypher machines, electronic measuring equipment, specialty alloys, etc. Of those 100 items, about 20 items are additional to the COCOM list. The military list by COCOM contains about 20 items such as toxic gases and military electronics. The atomic energy list also contains about 20 items pertaining to heat exchangers, atomic reactors, uranium, plutonium and fine nickel powders. The last list which consisted of less sensitive equipment than the above, but still was regarded as needing to be restricted, was withdrawn by agreement of COCOM members before 1970. The revision of the list has occurred mainly to reduce the size of the lists. For instance, the military and the atomic energy lists remain quite steady. The international list on the other hand has undergone modification in 1968 and 1971 so as to specify particular types of machinery which may not be exported. For example,

certain computers with special functions are not exportable whereas other computers may be exportable. Therefore, the revised COCOM list remains meaningful through the use of improved specification of items to be embargoed.

Changes in the list over time have been effected in some instances largely by the separate wishes of national actors experiencing certain types of national economic ills from time to time. In other instances, just plain old-fashioned business competition in the West appears to have been the factor in the desire to expand sales into a large and interesting trade area, the COMECON group. Other competing factors playing upon the COCOM list include a) declining interest over time in sustaining embargoes on any but the most obvious items, b) the evolution of multi-national corporations which in part give the Soviets ways and means to beat the system through the use of third countries that are non-NATO, c) many restricted items which can be purchased by the Soviets through other non-NATO countries that are sufficiently industrialized and d) the evolution of US attitude toward trade with COMECON from 1969 onward. ⁹ For instance, the original U.S. Export Control Act of 1949 prohibited goods of military or strategic significance from being exported to communist countries. Then in 1962, this act was extended further to include goods of economic significance as well. However, by 1972 the trend reversed dramatically when the US amended the Export Administration Act of 1969 to provide for the abolition of US export controls on all goods which could be purchased

from other industrial countries in the West or Japan unless such sale would threaten directly US national security. At one time the US Department of Commerce had about 1,000 items considered to be of a strategic nature and normally not exportable to communist countries. As of July, 1973 the US reduced its export restrictions of embargoed strategic goods to 73 items.

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There is every suggestion that COCOM continues to function as the coordinator of queries as to whether or not a given trade request would be a breach of the agreed rules by member-states. Therein lies a potential indicator of alliance cohesion for NATO members in COCOM. COCOM's role and continuous activity in embargoed strategic goods would allow hypothetically for a) an empiricist to compare the list of strategic goods in effect for each year over a period of time with the number of requests by member-states to have an export permit concurred;

b) the number of agreements or rejections by COCOM to be accumulated and c) the tabulation of the number of individual sales that were concluded either with or without COCOM approval. This would provide a tendency over time to agree or disagree with one small area of alliance objectives, that is the prevention of trade that may affect the security interests of NATO. The problem with this indicator is that the COCOM list is secret and it is highly unlikely that companies or multinational corporations and/or the national government involved would open their files on such trade transactions. Therefore, the potential of this indicator is not likely to be available to open academic

research and it will have to remain outside the scope of this thesis.

For WTO, the level of trade of individual COMECON countries with the West occurs at a relatively much higher rate with enough change over time to suggest trends. As Arpad Abonyi pointed out in his paper of May, 1975, "From The Warsaw Treaty Organization to COMECON: A Changing Pattern of Integration in East Europe", one can see that cohesion of states in the socialist commonwealth takes on political, social, economic, and military connotations of the highest type. Accordingly, it is believed the norm for trade is that COMECON members ought to conduct at least fifty per cent (50%) of their foreign trade within COMECON in order to consider themselves maintaining acceptable trade relations within that group.

Such an economic relationship within WTO/COMECON is directly indicative of the level of inter-play among the actors in a sub-system that is dominated by the Soviets. It is believed under this procedure that as long as the Soviets exhibit a cross-alliance trading trend over time which has not been superseded by any other actor in the sub-system in terms of cross-alliance trading, then all other national actors are behaving in a cohesive manner concerning their foreign trade transactions. When one or more national actors lead the rest in cross-alliance trading at levels exceeding that of the USSR and, concomitantly is also breaking the 50% norm, then conflict is apparent. To paraphrase the NATO report of the Committee of Three, in any alliance political

cooperation and economic conflict are not reconcilable. Therefore unacceptable behavior by a WTO member-state in its foreign trade transactions leading towards lower cooperation or even conflict is indicative of the lack of collaboration.

To summarize, the use of WTO/COMECON foreign trade transactions, levels in trade within COMECON, to the West and to the Third World, will be checked to determine the significance of change and the trend over time to see if the 50% trade barrier is broken and if the member-state is exceeding the per centage set by the USSR in its own foreign trade transactions. Therefore foreign trade transactions should suggest an additional indication of alliance cooperation particularly for WTO, less so for NATO. This would assist in predicting cohesion in WTO along with other activities.

An aspect of alliance activity which is amenable to empirical analysis is that of defence sharing of member-states in an alliance such as NATO or WTO. Defence sharing can be defined as the extent to which a member-state in an alliance commits annually some of its national resources to defence activities as compared to the total of its resource capability. For instance, in NATO the annual cost-sharing formulae are based on three criteria. First, the contributive capacity of each member is calculated on a proportion of its gross national product devoted to defence. This is used as an indicator of the wealth of the member and its capacity to pay. In addition other aspects are reviewed including the member-state's per capita income, its balance of pay-

ments, its manpower resources, its margin of unused industrial capacity, the levels of domestic taxation, plus national investment requirements. Second, there is the advantage accruing to the user country or countries of an installation requiring expenditure. Third, there is the economic benefit accruing to the host country of the installation such as an influx of foreign exchange, employment of local manpower, local or national improvement of services tending to strengthen the national economy.¹¹

In WTO, it would be safe to assume that similar considerations affect cost-sharing as indicated above for NATO. Specifically for WTO it is known that cost-sharing has also included support costs in the 1960's and 1970's paid by East European members for Soviet forces stationed in selected states of the Northern Tier zone. This continues despite the status of forces agreement of 1957 which should have resolved such an additional burden. Also, after 1967 there was Soviet pressure to ensure greater cost-sharing of the planned defence effort¹² for the late 1960's and 1970's. Generally, for both NATO and WTO, defence sharing costs as part of the total national budget are additional burdens on national budgets and resources. The willingness by individual member-states to incur such burdens over time is indicative of the level of cooperative behavior contributing toward group goals of the alliance and hence defence sharing can be utilized as an indicator of alliance cohesion.

The relative burden of defence spending is most commonly meas-

ured in Western literature by its proportion to the Gross National Product (GNP). This is usually adjusted to approximate a GNP value as is the case in various reports of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or in The Military Balance. For defence sharing in NATO and WTO respectively, three measurements will be utilized. One measurement will be the relative burden of defence spending utilizing annual military expenditures as a per centage of the GNP from 1964-1973 for each of the selected actors in NATO and WTO. This measurement will indicate the extent of resource allocation. Another measurement of defence spending will be the annual military expenditure per capita which will indicate from 1964 to 1973 the annual change in dollar value of military expenditure compared to total population of the member-state. A third measurement of defence sharing will be the extent a member-state of an alliance has committed its manpower resources between the ages of 18-45 to regular duty in the armed forces. This measurement of defence sharing will be expressed as a per centage of total personnel in regular armed forces of each selected member-state compared to the national population of military age defined by the International Institute for Strategic Studies as being between 18 and 45 years old. The latter measurement is as useful as those of per capita spending or resource allocation to defence largely because the extent to which a nation commits to regular forces its population of 18-45 year olds, as compared to possible alternative utilities of such manpower, must be important as a measurement

indicating the level of cooperation in alliance defence.

By comparing trends in the three major measurements cited above it should be possible to determine the member-state's commitment to defence sharing in a way that would complement the defence burden of the alliance as a whole. ¹³ Since both NATO and WTO are already established sub-systems, it is useful to acknowledge continued maintenance of military commitment by national actors as the base level of collaborative behavior concerning this indicator. Alliance cohesion can be operationalized by stating that members of an alliance are behaving cohesively when they maintain or increase their complement of the defence burden of the alliance and continue to participate in the military consultation of the alliance.

Activities relating to decision-making and the effects of organisational structure of NATO and WTO would be dissimilar for the two alliances. The component features of organisational structure and decision-making activities in each alliance would reflect to some degree the requirement to accommodate national objectives of the member-states to the group objectives of each alliance. A description of each alliance would aid at this point in explaining activities related to decision-making and the effects of organisational structure in each alliance.

Basically NATO comprises an alliance that is composed of fifteen sovereign and distinct member-states with each government feeling its national objectives to be paramount in terms of domestic and foreign policy as compared to other national actors in this sub-system. Largely

out of fear of Soviet power in Europe after World War II these national actors coalesced to form a common defence of West Europe with the assistance of the United States and Canada. It is commonly recognized that although the United States did dominate over NATO in its early years, it relented slowly from the mid-1960's onward. The alliance has many national components that from time to time do not allow group objectives of the alliance to supersede national objectives where a) there is a clear conflict among the alliance objectives compared to national objectives for a given member-state and b) a private gain may be obtained by acting bilaterally without severely damaging the overall security interests of NATO. This trend of piecemeal type of encroachment of national objectives over alliance objectives is a phenomenon that may be described as pluralistic in terms of suggesting the common feature of competitive national wills among this group of member-states.

On the other hand, the domination of the USSR over the other six national actors now active in WTO is based on a) Soviet military and economic links to these states established after World War II, b) a series of bilateral treaties between the USSR and these national actors reinforcing the Warsaw Treaty of 1955, c) strong ideological and political party links between the national governments in power, d) the institutionalisation process of reinforcing and integrating the foreign policy, military, economic and social environment through WTO and COMECON plus e) the ideological domination of fraternal parties and their alliance in East Europe by the Soviets. Therefore, it is useful to de-

scribe this sub-system as an organizationally directive alliance dominated by the USSR wherein member-states of WTO do not normally allow their existing national objectives in foreign and domestic policy to supersede group objectives of the alliance without conferring with and seeking the consent of at least the USSR. Of course it is possible that conflicts such as the situation of Rumania do exist among the various member-states in WTO. However, these conflicts are also normally constrained by intra-alliance handling at party/government levels of issues that are in dispute. Thereby accommodation of group objectives is more likely within this alliance; an exception is Czechoslovakia in 1968 (see Chapter 6). For instance, if the latitude of sovereignty to pursue policy by a national actor on a given issue is held within bounds by WTO, then this process of intra-alliance constraint would be determined mainly by the Soviets. It is also possible that if the same issue is felt strongly enough by other national actors in the alliance, then the latter may choose to a) take a position on that issue within the alliance or b) remain aloof from a particular involvement depending on the attitude and behavior it wishes to convey about a particular salient issue that is under consideration.

Such dissimilarities in the organizational structure of NATO and WTO lend themselves much more to descriptive and explanatory value than to quantifiable indicators suggesting alliance cohesion. Although not strictly empirical in form, these descriptive assessments of the organizational structure are useful in suggesting attitudes and behavior patterns within the alliance and cross-alliance. For instance, the

organizational assessments of the two alliances were quite useful in preparing the propositions in this thesis that have been developed in the manner shown in Chapter 1 because a pluralistic alliance such as NATO has intrinsically different relationships among its member-states that link national goals with alliance goals over time than does an organizationally directive alliance such as WTO. Therefore, whenever valid, the explanation of activities relating to decision-making and the effects of organizational structure will be applied in our findings.

The intra-coalition and inter-coalition interactions of selected member-states will be examined in reference to the leading superpower in each alliance in order to find a trend in changing levels of cooperation or conflict over time. Changing levels of cooperative or conflictive actions in the behavior of selected member-states may be examined by the use of dyadic events data pertaining to national actors in NATO and WTO. The changes in behavior of selected member-states should show compatibility or relative dissatisfaction with the key alliance member which is predictive toward the state of alliance cohesion when one regards the overall changes represented by dyadic interactions among various alliance members. Therefore using dyadic events as an indicator of the dependent variable, alliance cohesion may be tested for changes in levels of cooperation over time in dyadic relationships of member-states on an intra-alliance and inter-alliance basis.

The member-states chosen for WTO include the USSR, the GDR, CSSR and Rumania. The member-states chosen for NATO include the US,

the FRG, France and UK. The decision by the author, to include these actors was based on the fact that these nations had the greatest number of intra-alliance and inter-alliance events within the data sets that were acquired. Another reason for selecting these actors was the general belief that each set of these particular member-states included a super-power, two member-states in alliance that were assumed to be relatively cohesive, such as the UK and FRG in NATO or CSSR and GDR in WTO, and an apparently less cohesive member-state in its alliance, such as France in NATO and Rumania in WTO.

The data required to measure cohesion would have to include the years 1964 to 1973 for the chosen actors. The data originally acquired by Holsti, Hopmann and Sullivan in Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances was considered a useful starting point because it covered the years from 1964 to the end of 1970.

The research design in Holsti used a data set derived by T. Hopmann and J. Sullivan from the content analysis of Keessing's Contemporary Archives. The Holsti study defined alliance cohesion as behavioral collaboration among members. ¹⁴ Therefore, the behavior component was the main focus in measuring interactions among alliance members. It was also asserted by Holsti that cohesion of an alliance may be measured on the basis of the mean proportion of cooperation relative to conflict in all dyads connecting alliance members. However, it would be necessary in any such study to determine the proportion of the total interactions among all members of either NATO or WTO which

were characterized by cooperative behavior as compared to neutral or non-cooperative behavior. However, there are problems in using dyadic interaction data. In the Holsti study, the events interaction data used non-directional dyads so that the actor nation was specified on an individual case basis but the target nation was not specified. Also, in dyadic interaction data one could find cooperation per actor dropping due only to bilateral friction but it does not necessarily follow that alliance cohesion has also suffered. This latter validity problem may not be a large handicap because, given a large number of events (5,020) over a ten year period, every actor could have experienced negative bilateral relations with a target nation and the possibility is that the total events would balance out given the number of them and the long time period.

Using events interaction data sets can resolve some quantitative research problems provided one recognizes the obvious limitations of this approach. For instance, the Holsti study used Keesing's Contemporary Archives over a 19 $\frac{1}{2}$ year period, up to December 31, 1967, to code approximately 9,000 bilateral and multilateral interactions. ¹⁵ Keesing's is considered to be a good source of information as it codes interaction events data from more than one source of reports. However, relying on one primary source as a collector of interaction events data infers that selectivity of coded data may be a problem in the data set. Therefore, one may not presume total coverage of policy behavior per member-state in alliance in this content analysis format.

Also content analysis in the Holsti study used the General Inquirer Program consisting of a dictionary, a set of dimension names, coded documents and so on. ¹⁶ In the end, one must ensure reasonable inter-coder reliability, as was done in the Holsti study. However, the natural limitation of using a political dictionary as a standard for coding, with additional words for analysis of various foreign documents, would suggest to an independent analyst that there are differences in semantics in terms used and in meaning actually intended by certain words by national actors in the international system as compared to the interpretive coding of the event done by a set of coders. Also, deliberate distortion by national leaders in official communication often occurs in the real world. This difficulty is common to any research model using documentation. Therefore, content analysis of overt reports yielding events interaction data may be considered a reasonable and acceptable research method as long as one does not overlook the potential limitations of data sets, such as World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) and Pulse. The Pulse data set was also acquired for this thesis as indicated further on.

It is interesting to note at this point the symmetrical concerns expressed by Raymond Tanter toward the WEIS Project's use of the New York Times as a source as compared to my own remarks above pertaining to reservations on events interaction data used by Holsti, Hopmann and Sullivan. ¹⁷ Tanter is concerned about the validity of the Western press as a source for coding international conflictive events into data

and that event coding schemes rely on mass media for non-random reporting. In brief he states that 1) the NYT neither reports every official action which crosses national boundaries nor, when it does report, necessarily provide a systematic relationship between its news article and the actual news release, and 2) the NYT reports only those actions deemed by it to be newsworthy. However, Tanter alerts us to the Gamson and Modigliani finding that the NYT is strong on reporting publicly known actions of the WTO and NATO toward each other compared to other major media resources.

The acquisition of events data for this thesis from 1964 to 1973 was a problem that was solved eventually. A set named Dyadic and Multilateral Events Data (D.A.M.E.D.) covered only the period of January 1964 to December 1970 and had been prepared by T. Hopmann and B. Hughes. It was available at Carleton University. As this data set does not cover the entire period that is investigated here it was necessary to search for a second data set as a supplement to D.A.M.E.D. The second data set named Pulse was acquired through the International Affairs Center of Consolidated Analysis Centers Incorporated (C.A.C.I.). This second set used Professor McClelland's World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) Project with additions up to the end of 1973. The resource for the Pulse data was the daily NYT. The term event interaction has been defined by Prof. McClelland as actions and responses that are both official and non-routine. Official referred to those actions initiated and received by governmental representatives while non-routine referred to actions that

are of sufficient importance that they attracted attention and were
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 reported.

One must be alert to a problem in the D.A.M.E.D. and Pulse (WEIS) data sets that is present largely because these two sets used Keesing's and NYT respectively as single resources in the development of a data set. Selectivity of reporting has already been alluded to in a general sense in the previous commentary. Specifically, it is believed that selectivity of reporting can mean solely the manner of selecting reportable and newsworthy events in either Keesing's, or NYT or other major resources. However, selectivity can also refer to the manner in which an event is originally reported and recorded in a major resource such as NYT. It appears to the author of this thesis that D.A.M.E.D. and Pulse neither truly report all interaction events for member-states in NATO and especially WTO nor does every reported event in the resource base necessarily represent the precise context in which the event occurred. The latter point is raised only as a cautionary statement and as a prelude to examining the practice present in D.A.M.E.D. and Pulse and other sets concerning the coding and compiling of events interaction data from only one resource base such as Keesing's or NYT.

It appears to the author that data sets under development which rely on only one resource base assume that coverage is good and fairly representative in that resource area. It would appear that by using one resource base, the chance that the chosen resource has been selective itself in either reporting or not reporting a given event, or not

continuing to report an ongoing event, may be quite high. A suggestion is in order: coding and compiling events interaction in the future should be more comprehensive so that 1) a wider topic area be coded; 2) that more than one resource base be used with cross-referencing to prevent coding the same events twice due to the presence in the data set of multiple resource bases; and 3) that coders be instructed accordingly. For instance, if Pulse had used the NYT plus supplementary news coverage such as Le Monde of Paris, Times of London, plus obtained selected official documents and communiqués from countries in a given interest area such as NATO and WTO, then one could be relatively certain of obtaining a data set that is much more representative of the actual totality of events in a given interest area. Thereby, a data set would likely be more replete with a greater number of events per actor in a dyad representing a more accurate picture of the state of interaction at dyadic and multilateral ~~that~~ levels. It can also be asserted that if a data set was prepared so as to allow events, for instance, relating only to alliance matters to be recorded as one category of coded data, then an analyst could be even more specific as to the ebb and flow of, say, cooperation among alliance member-states.

Despite such deficiencies alluded to above being present in most currently available data sets including Pulse and D.A.M.E.D., one must accept for the time being the general premise that all public events which were worthy of being reported have been recorded in the data sets. This is acceptable provided that the analyst does not assert more than

tentative conclusions in his findings. This type of analysis of events between any two actors in an alliance should reflect to a general degree the trend of positive, neutral and negative policy responses over time and thereby contribute toward indicating generally the changes in levels of cooperation or conflict.

It was decided that three aspects pertaining to the use of these two data sets would have to be considered to try to ensure the two data sets were compatible and that there be comparable interaction events data covering the desired ten year period. First, every interaction event was acquired from the original D.A.M.E.D. set for the period of January 1, 1964 to December 31, 1970. There was no attempt to supplement D.A.M.E.D. by coding Keesing's from 1971 to 1973 separately. Second, the Pulse data set that was acquired by the author from C.A.C.I. covered the period from January 1, 1966 to December 31, 1973. Therefore these two data sets had a period of overlap from 1966 through 1970. This overlap period was used as a validity test in order to discover the relative degree of comparability in the two sets of cooperative, neutral or negative events for a selected pair of dyads on an intra-alliance basis and on an inter-alliance basis. On an intra-alliance basis, the US and UK dyads were selected and the per centage of cooperative or neutral or negative events was found to be very similar. The D.A.M.E.D. set showed for the US and UK that 39% of all events were cooperative, 55% were neutral and 6% were negative over the period of 1966-1970. The Pulse set showed 36% of all events were cooperative, 56% were neutral and

8% were negative. On an inter-alliance basis, the same test was applied to the UK and USSR dyads and to the US and USSR dyads respectively. It was discovered that the UK and USSR dyads had a very similar per centage for each category in each data set. The D.A.M.E.D. set showed for the UK and USSR that 13% of all events were cooperative, 48% were neutral and 39% were negative over the period of 1966-1970. The Pulse set showed 15% were cooperative, 47% were neutral and 37% were negative. The US and USSR dyads were dissimilar in comparative per centages of categorized events and this is believed to be caused by Pulse using the NYT as a resource which would have a greater tendency to concentrate on US-Soviet relations than other resources. The D.A.M.E.D. set showed that 30% of the US and USSR events were cooperative, 30% were neutral and 39% were negative. The Pulse set showed that 19% were cooperative, 31% were neutral and 50% were negative. It is believed that the overall validity test indicates a degree of comparability between the two sets sufficient to assume that general comparability representing continuity of interaction events data is available in the two sets from 1964 to 1973. This comparability appears to stand up despite the fact that the total number of events of each dyadic pair of actors is greater for Pulse than it is for D.A.M.E.D. For instance, the US and USSR pair in Pulse provided for 1,098 events for 1966 to 1970 but the D.A.M.E.D. set for these two actors in the same period is 43. The UK and USSR pair included 173 events in Pulse but 38 events in D.A.M.E.D. The US and UK pair provided for 194 events in Pulse but 18 events in D.A.M.E.D. Since we are interested in

examining trends in behavior it is believed necessary that mainly the trends in each data set be comparable rather than the total of event occurrences per dyadic pair in either set. However, it is interesting to note the large difference in the number of events in each of the two data sets during the same period of time.

A related validity test to the one above is the per centage of total events falling in the cooperative, neutral and negative group categories for D.A.M.E.D. compared to Pulse. As Appendix "D" will indicate, D.A.M.E.D. events in these three groups were 27% cooperative, 39% neutral, and 34% negative while Pulse events were 28% cooperative, 38% neutral and 34% negative which suggests a general degree of congruence between the two sets.

Scaling techniques were used in both data sets in order to measure the degree of positivism or negativism for each event. The D.A.M.E.D. set uses a coding scale which is similar in group categories but not identical to the coding scale used in Pulse. Subsequently, the interpretation of cooperative, neutral and uncooperative behavior for D.A.M.E.D. appears to be similar to the interpretation of positive, neutral, and negative behavior in Pulse (See Appendix "A" for detailed explanation). There has been no attempt to make one coding scale fit exactly to the other but the range of description of the types of behavior for cooperative-positive, neutral, and uncooperative-negative categories in D.A.M.E.D. roughly is approximate with the scale in Pulse. The Pulse coding scale appears to be more refined than the D.A.M.E.D. coding scale in that it is structured

better with more divisions in each category of behavior. A more detailed explanation of the two coding scales and their behavior group values will be found in Appendix "A".

On an intra-alliance basis 100% of all dyads are available for NATO in that events data exists from 1964 to 1973 inclusive. However in WTO only 50% of the dyads meet this standard and these are the dyads exclusively between the USSR and each of the actors indicated as GDR, CSSR and Rumania. The dyads exclusively between the GDR, CSSP and Rumania have partial coverage or no coverage at all in terms of the available data in D.A.M.E.D. and Pulse and these latter types of dyads will not be utilized in this thesis.

On an inter-alliance basis, out of 14 possible dyads between the four NATO actors and the four WTO actors, 57% of the dyads (or 8 out of 14) are complete. These available dyads include US-USSR, US-GDR, US-CSSR, US-Rumania, USSR-UK, USSR-FRG, USSR-France, and GDR-FRG. All other dyads have partial coverage or no coverage at all in these two data sets. These latter dyads will not be utilized in the analysis section of this thesis.

It is believed that the event scores of each data set should be methodologically evaluated on an acceptable basis. To do this one must apply a more scientific standard to these sets. In effect, the designation of cooperative-positive, neutral, and uncooperative-negative in behavior between two actors in the international system represents a form of communication between them. When one acquires events inter-

action data which are arranged in behavior groupings such as these, one obtains a classification of expressed relationships between two actors that can be analysed quantitatively. This can be done, as Irving L. Janis and Raymond Fadner pointed out, by using a general formula which may be applied to classified content data in order to present an overall degree of imbalance in a set of interaction events. All units of events classified as favourable may be placed in a single category with the value of plus one (+1) while all events classified as neutral may be given a value of zero (0) and all events classified as unfavourable may be likewise categorized with a value of minus one (-1).²⁰

That is to say, a coefficient of imbalance may be used for both data sets to find out the extent to which nation A has behaved cooperatively, neutrally, or uncooperatively toward nation B. The Janis and Fadner coefficient of imbalance is applicable to the coded events in both D.A.M.E.D. and Pulse. The coefficient formulae provide a precise definition of imbalance:²¹

$$C = \frac{\text{Positive}^2 - \text{Positive} \times \text{Negative}}{(\text{Positive} + \text{Negative} + \text{Neutral})^2} \quad \text{where } P > N$$

$$\text{and } C = \frac{\text{Positive} \times \text{Negative} - \text{Negative}^2}{(\text{Positive} + \text{Negative} + \text{Neutral})^2} \quad \text{where } P < N$$

Once the coefficient of imbalance has been determined for each dyad in the two data sets, one would wish to investigate whether or not

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the dyadic behavior expressed in the coefficient for each year has shown an upward or downward change over the period of time covered by each data set. In so doing, one will be able to estimate the relative trend of change in policy between dyadic actors within one alliance and across the alliances.

A regression coefficient will be used in the measurement of association in order to indicate the change or trend related to time. A regression coefficient is the slope of a regression line which best summarizes random events in a scatter diagram. The formula of the line is represented by $y = bx + c$.²² Therefore, since we are looking for changes over time in alliance cohesion expressed in the data sets generally, we should be able to see a trend in publicly reported interactions between any two selected actors. Also, the purpose of the formula in this thesis is merely to use an acceptable methodological tool to assist in examining the change in cooperation levels per dyad over time and to provide thereby a summary relationship. To do this, the regression coefficient will be provided along with the standard error of regression plus the intercept and a T test. These will be provided in the appendix for all selected dyads. Only those dyads will be relied upon where the regression coefficient is more than twice the standard error of regression.

When members in an alliance establish themselves with other IGOs or NGOs they are establishing links that cut across the alliance's sub-system and thereby enter into other points of contact exterior to

their own sub-system and reduce the distance between those actors. The points of contact would include not only IGOs and NGOs as entities in their own right but other national actors who are members of those bodies as well. Thereby the opportunity to establish cross-alliance links increases with the potential of more temperate relations developing with adversary nations. The higher the number of cross-cutting links of one alliance compared to the other, the more likely there might be a residual effect on the internal collaborative structure of the alliance. This would induce the possibility of less intra-group cooperation over time as the unit membership in one alliance develops its own relations and experience with other non-alliance members. As to their effect on inter-alliance relations, it must be stated that cross-cutting links do not by themselves succeed in reducing the likelihood of war unless the previously existing military ties in the two opposing alliances are rearranged or dismantled.²³ For the purpose of comprehending cross-alliance behavior, it would be valuable to establish the pattern of shared IGO and NGO memberships between actors in NATO and WTO and to establish the distances of nations for each alliance.

James Caporaso reported in 1976 on a study based on the distribution of memberships of European countries in IGOs and NGOs. He divided thirty nations of the European state-system into four groupings as follows: the European Economic Community (EEC); the European Free Trade Association (EFTA); the COMECON; and Residuals comprising neutral states and other states not members of the other

three regional groups. The study by Caporaso was interested in the impact of each of these four regional groups on the entire system of thirty states from 1945 to 1973. Caporaso focused especially on the patterns of shared memberships with a view to determine (a) the inequality or concentration of preference for partners from different regions and (b) the relative dominance of each region as a source for partners from the other regions. The study showed that the EEC was highest in its shared memberships with the four regions. This meant that the EEC forms more co-memberships with countries from its own region and that nations from the other three regions likewise preferred EEC to their own group. EFTA came out second, the Residuals third and COMECON was fourth. In fact, COMECON countries not only were lowest in their salience for countries in the other three regions but COMECON countries also had more shared memberships with the EEC than they had within their own group itself. Caporaso provided a proportional matrix for 1945 as follows:

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	<u>EEC</u>	<u>EFTA</u>	<u>COMECON</u>	<u>Residuals</u>
EEC	.524	.274	.086	.116
EFTA	.404	.345	.105	.147
COMECON	.316	.261	.251	.172
Residuals	.375	.321	.151	.153

(Cell values are expressed as a proportion of row totals.)

To bring this more up to date, Caporaso provided a summary of concentration scores of shared memberships from thirty states to EEC, EFTA and COMECON between 1964 and 1973 as follows: EEC (47%), EFTA (32%), COMECON (14%).²⁵

These results suggest that members in NATO tend not to be very dependent upon IGOs and NGOs associated with the COMECON group whereas the converse is true concerning members in WTO being highly dependent upon IGOs and NGOs associated with the EEC and EFTA groups. On the other hand, a study by Michael Wallace on the configuration of clusters of nations associated with IGOs in the international system indicated that countries in Western Europe and the North Atlantic rim tended to have memberships in fifty per cent or more of all IGOs whereas the USSR tended to have membership in less than fifty per cent of IGOs. The other members of COMECON/WTO²⁶ tended also to have limited contact in all IGOs.

Wallace's study suggests the distribution of memberships in IGOs favours NATO actors more than it favours WTO actors. Combining the implications of Wallace's findings on distribution of membership with Caporaso's findings on dependence, the following can be asserted: for NATO actors, they experience a greater variety and number of memberships in the various IGOs and NGOs but because there is lesser dependence on links with those organizations associated with the COMECON group, the presence of cross-cutting links with WTO actors is comparatively less significant; for WTO actors, they lack the comparatively broader variety of memberships in the various IGOs and NGOs but there is a real dependency upon those IGOs and NGOs associated with EEC and EFTA so that the presence of

cross-cutting links with NATO actors is comparatively more significant. Therefore utilizing data on distance for NATO actors is not very significant although this will be reported because it is available. On the other hand utilizing data on distance is more significant for WTO and this will be reported accordingly.

Since the Caporaso study established that new membership in the four regional groups stabilized during 1958-1962 and remained stable up to at least 1973, it would be appropriate to use Wallace's data on distance of nations in the international system for 1960.²⁷ The Wallace measurement of distance was an index based on the number of IGOs to which a given pair of nations both belonged.²⁸ From Wallace's data, the mean distance for NATO actors in 1960 was determined to be .407 whereas for WTO actors it was .680. It is proposed that we use the propensity of alliance actors to establish cross-cutting links with groups outside of their own sub-system as an indirect indicator of their openness toward establishing cross-alliance relations. Although we will utilize data on distance for actors in both alliances, this indicator is comparatively less meaningful for NATO than it is for WTO.

This indirect indicator will be operationalized by establishing the baseline of flexibility in cross-alliance relations at .407 for NATO and .680 for WTO. Those actors who have lower scores compared to the alliance as a whole would be inclined to be more flexible toward cross-alliance relationships.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter 3

1. Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies, (New York, 1973), p. 94.
2. NATO Facts and Figures, NATO Information Service, (Brussels, 1971), p. 119.
3. Marshall Goldman, Detente and Dollars, Basic Books, (New York, 1975), pp. 32-33.
4. Ibid., p. 28.
5. Norton T. Dodge, ed., Analysis of the USSR 24th Party Congress and the Ninth Five Year Plan, pp. 47-69.
6. NATO Facts and Figures, pp. 117-121.
7. Ibid., p. 346.
8. Ibid., pp. 344-347.
9. Dennis Evans, Chief of Export-Import Permits Control Division, the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Ottawa. Interviewed by the author on April 20, 1976.
10. Marshall Goldman, Detente and Dollars, pp. 289-290.
11. NATO Facts and Figures, pp. 119 and 139-141.
12. John Erickson, Soviet Military Power, USSI Report 73-1, (Washington, 1973), p. 116.
13. Some nations may change their degree of defence burden relative to their perception of external or internal threats that are not necessarily associated with threats to the alliance as a whole. For instance, in NATO the redeployment of military resources by the UK after 1969 was related to the continuing crisis in Northern Ireland. In NATO, the increase in defence burden for Rumania following August, 1968 was related to fear

of a similar Soviet-backed invasion of Rumanian territory. This fear abated somewhat after 1971. Therefore, where defence burdens are maintained or increased for reasons particular to that member-state, such behavior cannot be complementary to the defence burden of the alliance as a whole. In such instances this could not be included as a positive outcome relative to alliance cohesion.

14. Holsti, (1973), p. 101.
15. Ibid., p. 109.
16. Ibid., p. 243.
17. Raymond Tanter, Modelling and Managing International Conflicts, (Beverly Hills, 1974), p. 83.
18. Ibid., pp. 83-84.
19. Pulse User's Manual, C.A.C.I. version B1.0, (January, 1975), p. 3.
20. Harold D. Lasswell, et al., Language of Politics, (New York, 1949), pp. 153-159.
21. Ibid., p. 169.
22. G. David Garson, Handbook of Political Science Methods, (Boston, 1971), pp. 191-194.
23. Michael D. Wallace, "Alliance Polarization, Cross-Cutting and International War, 1815-1964", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 17 no. 4, (December, 1973), pp. 602-603. See also, M.D. Wallace, "Clusters of Nations in the Global System, 1815-1964", in International Studies Quarterly, vol. 19, (March, 1975), and James A. Caporaso, "The External Consequences of Regional Integration for Pan-European Relations", in International Studies Quarterly, vol. 20, (September, 1976).
24. James A. Caporaso, (1976), pp. 372 and 378.
25. Ibid., p. 377.
26. Michael D. Wallace, (1975), p. 82.
27. Ibid., pp. 108-109. Unfortunately Wallace's partial findings on cross-cutting links relative to the associations of groups of

nations and the incidence of international conflict were incomplete due to the need to cover such a vast universe of observations over a considerable span of time. His data on distance of nations however is a handy reference indeed.

28. Michael D. Wallace, (1975), p. 71. No less than five criteria were used to govern the decision to include or exclude an organization from the list of IGOs in Wallace's study (see Wallace, p. 72).

Chapter 4

Findings on Alliance Cohesion at the Intra-Alliance Level of Analysis for NATO and WTO

This chapter will examine the results obtained when the indicators discussed in Chapter Three were applied to the selected actors to test our hypotheses for NATO and WTO separately. Recall that we are exploring two variables through the passage of time: How the independent variable of detente affects the dependent variable alliance cohesion in NATO and WTO over the period of 1964-1973. We will examine the data findings and provide below a summary description on each of the actors relative to the specified hypotheses for NATO and WTO separately.

The indicators applicable to a test of intra-alliance cohesion were explained in Chapter Three. Of those which are based on available data, we now provide a summary of the bottom line of each indicator. In UN voting, the attitude of the alliance member is at a minimum compatibility level in a given year when the index shows at least fifty per cent agreement with other alliance members on the issues. In foreign trade transactions for WTO actors the behavior of the alliance member is at a minimum cooperative level in a given year when that actor is trading fifty per cent or more within COMECON or does not trade at a level lower than the rate of the USSR within COMECON in a given year when the fifty per cent factor is broken by the bloc leader. In defence sharing, the

bottom line is apparent retention over time of the burden of defence by national actors and regular participation in the military consultation process of the alliance. In events interaction among members of the alliance, the minimum of cooperation is at the neutral level of interaction in a given year.

Let us review now the effects of prolonged non-crisis on a pluralistic alliance. The two selected hypotheses on NATO are:

H1 The longer the period of non-crisis, the less will be the cooperative behavior between the bloc leader and the non-deviant sub-hierarchical members.

Hypothesis (1) suggests that the level of cooperation between the bloc leader and the sub-hierarchical actors will be reduced although their national commitment militarily to the alliance may be sustained or even increased. This hypothesis designates a deviant actor as being a sub-hierarchical member-state whose behavior with the bloc leader was an exception to the earlier behavior patterns experienced by the other sub-hierarchical actors when cooperation with the bloc leader would have been higher. This leads us to the second hypothesis.

H2 The longer the period of non-crisis, the greater will be the cooperative behavior between the sub-hierarchical members and the deviant member.

Hypothesis (2) suggests that the sub-hierarchical actors other than the deviant actor are in a cooperative relationship with the bloc leader at the beginning of the period. However as prolonged non-crisis continues

and the level of cooperation with the bloc leader is reduced then the behavior of the deviant actor becomes less repugnant to the others. Therefore the sub-hierarchical actors at large find themselves becoming more accommodating to each other's interests.

The appendices of this thesis contain the data results obtained from the use of the Lijphart Index applied to UNGA roll calls, the Janis and Fadder coefficient of imbalance applied to the interaction events, and the three types of defence sharing for each of the selected actors of NATO. Occasionally, the original events interaction data in some dyads reported only a few events per annum. This complicates our objective of analysis. For instance, only in a few dyads were we able to report a reliable regression coefficient. However, there is enough data to provide reportable results as noted below for each selected actor.

The US to UK behavioral data for this ten year period commenced with a relatively high level of cooperation toward the UK (a high of .31 in 1965). Commencing in 1968 a decline occurred in cooperative interaction with the UK which continued through to 1973 even though the interaction events remained at a low net cooperative level. A reportable coefficient provided us with an intercept of 15.29 and a regression coefficient of -2.29.

The US harmony of interests with the UK reflected in UNGA roll calls suggests a high degree of compatibility for most of the period under review except for the years 1965 and 1966 when lower scores of 63% and 50% were noted on specific resolutions that affected the

alliances or Europe generally.

The US to FRG behavioral data indicated a relatively high level of cooperative interaction toward the FRG from 1964 to 1967 (ranging from .33 to .29). In 1968, the level of behavior toward FRG dipped to a level of low net cooperation and this continued through 1970. In 1971, interaction with the FRG rose to higher levels of cooperation (.43) only to fall to low net cooperation for 1972 and 1973 (ending at .02).

The US harmony of interests with the FRG was reflected in UNGA roll calls in 1973 when lower levels of agreement were scored (62% of agreement on all UNGA resolutions but 58% on resolutions affecting the alliances or Europe generally).

The US to France dyad suggests net negative interaction from 1964 to 1967 with one break during these years in 1966 (.00). This break in trend in negative behavior is suspected to be related to 1966 being the year of decision for France relative to NATO, and to avoid a possible backlash from other NATO actors the US would not have wanted to openly maintain negative behavior during this year toward France. The years of 1968 to 1972 indicated that the US was behaving toward France at a low net cooperative level (ranging from .12 to .04). This change of behavior might be attributed to two reasons. First, the US-Viet Cong, North Vietnam talks on the war in Southeast Asia commenced in 1968 at Paris using the good offices of the French government as an initial intermediary. Second, US policy toward Asia, and China specifically, was under continuous review from 1969 to 1972 and the changing views of the US probably had a salutary effect on US behavior toward France

which had its own previous experiences in that area of the globe. In 1973, US interaction with France fell into a net negative level of behavior (-.04). This was most likely due to the end of the utility of France in revising the US policy and position in Asia and the declared intention of the US in 1973 to pay more attention to European affairs generally which used to be an issue when de Gaulle was in power.

The US harmony of interests with France which was reflected in UNGA roll calls suggests that their compatibility was consistently in the lower levels throughout the period with some instances of less than 50% agreement on the resolutions in the UN. For instance, in 1966 they were in agreement on only 49% of all the resolutions. Concerning the 1967 war in the Middle East, they were in agreement on only one out of fifteen resolutions passed. On issues affecting the alliances or Europe generally, the US and France disagreed on more than half such resolutions in 1965, 1967 and 1968 with the years 1969 onward rising to low levels of agreement in the approximate 50% to 60% range.

The US military commitments for the ten year period showed that the years of highest outlay were 1966 to 1969, most of the increase probably attributable to the war in Southeast Asia. By comparing the years 1964 to 1965 against 1970 to 1973, one finds a decline in the percentage of GNP committed to US military expenditure but this is counter-balanced by the large growth of GNP in those years and the unmistakable increase of expenditure per capita. There was a reduction in the size of US armed forces after 1969 which is reflected in the per centage of

US male population at service age in the armed forces declining from 8.5% in 1970 to 5.8% in 1973. These mixed results for US military commitment to self-defense and to NATO are attributable to a combination of factors. The US was under pressure from 1969 onward to demobilize, to abandon the armed forces draft system, and to substitute that system with a higher paid, volunteer army. US costs were also subject to inflationary pressures from 1972 onward. Generally, though, the US remained committed to NATO and did not reduce its alliance contribution despite detente.

US behavior toward the UK, FRG, and France both satisfied our expectations of this superpower's relations with these sub-hierarchical actors and toward NATO military commitment. The military commitment of the US to NATO remained steadfast. US behavior from 1964 to 1973 seems to have been consistent with the expectations of hypothesis (1).

The UK to US behavioral data suggests that interaction toward the US remained at a level of net cooperation from 1964 to 1970 and from 1972 to 1973. The only break in this pattern occurred in 1971 when behavior toward the US fell to a low net negative level (-.05). This break in UK behavior toward the US reflects their response toward President Nixon's economic policies in 1971. The British were not only experiencing economic problems but were generally in the final stages of a global retreat in colonial and military affairs. The latter issues may have indirectly caused the UK to find fault with the US on bilateral matters and global issues.

The UK harmony of interests with the US that was reflected in UNGA roll calls suggested a high degree of agreement for most of the period under review except for the years 1965 and 1966 when lower scores of 63% and 50% were recorded on resolutions affecting the alliance or Europe generally.

The UK to FRG behavioral data suggests that there were fluctuating levels of good cooperation throughout the period of 1964 to 1973. The only exception was 1967 (.04) when a low net cooperative level was recorded.

The UNGA roll calls suggest that in 1973 the UK harmony of interests with the FRG was in the lower agreement range of 67% on all resolutions and 64% affecting the alliances or Europe generally.

The UK to France behavioral data suggests the years 1964 to 1966 were a period of net cooperation although there were few events recorded. In 1967 behavior toward France sank to a net negative level (-.14) but returned to net cooperation from 1968 to 1973. It is believed that the UK negative behavior toward France in 1967 would be similar to the US venting its wrath concerning French partial involvement in NATO.

Additionally, the persistence of de Gaulle having played down the UK role in Europe could have been a factor, especially on the question of the UK being a possible member of the Common Market.

The UK harmony of interests with France reflected in the UNGA roll calls suggests that on all resolutions they were generally agreeable with the lowest score (55%) occurring in 1968. On alliance resolutions

or those affecting Europe generally, the UK seemed to be in disagreement from 1965 to 1968 but in agreement from 1969 onward.

The UK military commitments in self-defense and on behalf of NATO also underwent some modifications. The military expenditure as a percentage of GNP for the UK declined slowly from 6.0% in 1964 to 4.8% in 1970. It then increased temporarily in 1971 and 1972 due probably to commitments in Northern Ireland and pressures in NATO after the Czechoslovakian invasion. This was followed by a general decrease to 4.9% in 1973. UK military expenditure per capita reflects a generally steady outlay ranging from 97 US dollars to 110 US dollars per annum from 1964 to 1971 followed in 1972 by 141 and in 1973 by 161. Most, if not all of this per capita outlay may be attributed to inflationary pressures on the British pound sterling and on military costs per se. Looking at the percentage of UK population in the armed forces, one views a slow decline from 4.0% in 1968 to 3.3% in 1973 during a period of relatively stable population size. Bearing in mind the redeployment of British primary forces from the European theatre to Northern Ireland and the lack of sustained commitment toward self-defense and NATO generally, it appears that the UK either barely maintained their commitment to NATO or may even have allowed it to decline.

The above results suggest that the UK's behavior as a sub-hierarchical member of NATO indicated no reduced cooperation with the US but sustained and/or increased cooperation with the other sub-hierarchical actors. Militarily the UK's commitment to NATO remained

strong, even if slightly reduced. This means that the UK does not satisfy the expectations of hypothesis (1) but does fulfill the expectation of hypothesis (2).

The FRG to US behavioral data suggests that interaction with the US occurred at a relatively high level of cooperation in 1964. However, from 1964 to 1973 a decline set in toward lower levels of cooperation with even one year of net negative behavior (-.04) in 1970. This trend from 1966 onward might have been occasioned at first by the declining attention of the US toward European affairs. Later, with the advent of the government led by the Social Democrats and their initiative of an Ostpolitik, a decline might have been expected in 1969-1970 in FRG-US relations because the FRG was behaving as an important actor concerning issues in Central and East Europe.

UNGA roll calls in 1973 suggest that the FRG's harmony of interests with the US reflected a low range of agreement with 62% on all resolutions and 58% on resolutions affecting the alliances or Europe generally.

The FRG to UK dyad suggests that its behavior fluctuated annually from 1964 to 1973 between high levels of cooperation (.21 in 1966) to low net cooperation (.04 in 1967). However, cooperation was never in doubt concerning FRG to UK during the ten year period.

The UNGA roll calls indicated that the FRG's harmony of interests with the UK in 1973 was in agreement with 67% on all resolutions and 64% on resolutions affecting the alliances or Europe generally.

The FRG to France behavioral data suggests that from 1964 to 1968 interaction occurred at levels that were fluctuating from low net cooperation in 1964 (.05) to low net negative behavior in 1965 (-.05) and back to low net cooperation from 1966 to 1968. FRG behavior toward France increased to high levels of cooperation from 1969 to 1972 but declined again to low cooperation level (.09) in 1973. It is probable that the lower levels of cooperation from 1964 to 1968 were occasioned by the negative policies of General de Gaulle concerning the influence of the US in the EEC which resulted in friction between FRG and France. FRG behavior toward France in 1969 to 1972 was more cooperative and occurred during a period of high expectations among EEC members prior to the bust year of 1973.

UNGA roll calls in 1973 suggest that the FRG's harmony of interests with France on all resolutions was quite agreeable (73%) but on issues affecting the alliances or Europe generally a lower agreement score of 56% was evident.

The FRG's military commitment is a special case in NATO. The per centage of GNP decreased slightly over the years from 4.7% in 1964 to 4.2% in 1966, increased temporarily in 1967 and decreased steadily from 3.6% in 1968 to 3.3% in 1971. In 1972 and 1973, 3.4% of GNP was committed to military expenditure by FRG during a period when its economy was booming. The military expenditure per capita also fluctuated slightly along the same lines at approximately 100 US dollars per annum until 1971. In 1972 the outlay was 146 US dollars and in 1973 it was

215 US dollars, an increase that is not attributable only to inflationary pressure on the Deutschmark or on FRG military costs. Instead, it would seem that the FRG made a concerted effort to renew its commitment to defense. This growth in the 1972-1973 period is also reflected in the FRG's per centage of national population in their armed forces; the 1968 figure of 3.9% increased steadily to 4.2% in 1972. The figure of 4.0% in 1973 is most likely due to the maintenance of 1972 force levels while the population of FRG expanded. It would seem that the FRG maintained and/or expanded its military commitment to self-defence and to NATO during the period of prolonged non-crisis.

The results above suggest that the FRG fulfills the expectations of hypotheses (1) and (2). The FRG's military commitment to NATO was steadfast.

The France to US behavioral data suggests that from 1964 to 1968 relations remained generally negative although there was some improvement in the range from -.24 in 1965 to -.01 in 1968. The level of behavior toward the US continued to improve (.12) in 1969 but settled back toward low net cooperation (.03) in 1970. Behavior toward the US returned to net negative levels in 1971 and lasted through to 1973. It is probable that French behavior toward the US from 1967 to 1972 was being conditioned mainly by its discreet role as intermediary on the Vietnam issue which tended to overcome temporarily the antagonism of France toward the US, especially concerning European security and the Common Market economy.

An explanation of the phenomenon of a deviant actor in an

alliance responding to the immediate practical needs of the superpower, may be suggested by stating that despite the deviant member's preference for independence there are other considerations as well. The neutral or even uncooperative behavior between the bloc leader and a deviant member-state may be improved during prolonged non-crisis as the bloc leader's behavior is required to moderate over time within the context of leading a pluralistic group in alliance. During this period, the military commitment of the deviant member toward the alliance was allowed to adjust from dependence on the alliance structure toward independent status. This shift also reflects a process of accommodation within the alliance of the behavior preferences of a deviant actor in a pluralistic coalition during a period of low threat and prolonged non-crisis.

France's harmony of interests with the US reflected in UNGA roll calls suggest that their level of agreement was consistently in the lower levels throughout the period with some instances of less than 50% agreement on resolutions in the UN. For instance, in 1966 they were in agreement on only 49% of all resolutions. Concerning the 1967 War in the Middle East they were in agreement on only one out of fifteen resolutions. On issues affecting the alliances or Europe generally, France and the US agreed on less than half of those resolutions in 1965, 1967 and 1968 with the remaining years from 1969 onward reflecting low levels of agreement.

The France to UK behavioral data suggests that interaction occurred at the level of net cooperation from 1964 to 1966 followed by

net negative behavior from 1967 (-.14) to 1970 (-.04). It is most likely that French behavior toward the UK was centering somewhat on its partial commitment toward NATO from 1967 onward but more importantly on the question of Britain joining the Common Market. From 1971 through to 1973 the behavior of France toward the UK improved to a level of good cooperation, for example (.11) in 1973.

France's harmony of interests with the UK reflected in the UNGA roll calls suggests that on all resolutions they were generally in agreement with the lowest score (55%) occurring in 1968. On alliance issues or issues affecting Europe generally, France seemed to disagree with the UK from 1965 to 1968 but was more agreeable from 1969 onward.

The France to FRG behavioral data suggests fluctuation from low net cooperation in 1964 (.05) to low net negative behavior in 1965 (-.05) followed by a return to levels of low net cooperation from 1966 to 1968. In 1969, France seemed to behave even more positively toward the FRG and continued to behave at good levels of cooperation through to 1972. In 1973, the level of cooperation dropped to a low level (.09) due probably to the question of a common European energy policy during the energy crisis of October, 1973 onward.

UNGA roll calls in 1973 suggest that France's harmony of interests with the FRG on all resolutions was quite agreeable but on issues affecting the alliances or Europe generally, a lower agreement score of 56% was evident.

The French military commitment to NATO, especially since its decision of 1966 to maintain only partial involvement, is a special case that can be meaningful to NATO only in a clear and present danger to the security of West Europe as a whole. The military expenditure as a percentage of the GNP of France decreased slowly from 5.6% in 1964 to 3.5% in 1973. The military expenditure per capita increased very gradually from 102 US dollars in 1964 to 123 in 1969. Then a per capita decrease occurred during 1970 and 1971 followed by a resurgence of expenditure in 1972 (142 US dollars) and 1973 (183 US dollars). The willingness of France to commit manpower to armed forces rose slightly from 4.9% in 1968 to 5.2% in 1970. It would seem that the force level of 1970 was sustained throughout 1971 to 1973. This is meaningful to France's own self-defense because since 1966 it maintains that only France may decide when the nation is at war. Therefore, sustained though the French armed forces are, only a test of France's commitment under war conditions to the defense of West Europe will prove anything. In the meanwhile, NATO forces cannot automatically count on the French forces and the military commitment of France to NATO must remain in question.

The results above for France suggests its behavior satisfies the expectations of hypotheses (1) and (2). The military commitment of France to NATO moved from organizational dependence on the alliance to that of independent force readiness whose commitment to defend the collective security of NATO can only be tested under a crisis situation.

The hypothesis on WTO is:

H3 The longer the period of non-crisis, the level of cooperation between the bloc leader and the sub-hierarchical members will remain the same or intensify.

Hypothesis (3) suggests that the bloc leader in an organizationally directive alliance may experience varied behavior patterns at the neutral or low cooperation level with Northern Tier sub-hierarchical members. At the same time the relationship of the bloc leader with a consistently deviant Southern Tier member exists at the level of sub-neutral or even negative behavior. In such a situation, the bloc leader is demonstrating a degree of constraint and will tolerate such behavior only until there occurs a similar manifestation among one of the Northern Tier sub-hierarchical members. Once the bloc leader demonstrates forcefully its intent to maintain the alliance, for example the invasion of the CSSR in 1968 by the armies of five WTO actors, then gradually both the Northern Tier sub-hierarchical actors and the original deviant actor will tend to be more cooperative with the bloc leader.

The appendices of this thesis contain the detailed data results concerning the four indicators applicable to WTO that were pointed out previously in Chapter Three: These are the behavioral data on interaction events, the three types of data on military commitment per actor, the import/export trade data for those actors in COMECON, and the Lijphart Agreement Index.

In reference to the behavioral data, similar to NATO results, the Janis and Fadder coefficient of imbalance will be utilized again as

a descriptive aid as will any reportable regression coefficients. Additionally, the reader should take note that only the main dyads between the superpower and the three chosen sub-hierarchical actors are available. This is due to insufficient reporting on WTO actors in Western media resources. Therefore, the reader should note that the number of events per annum recorded for each WTO dyad frequently is quite low.

The USSR to the GDR behavioral data occurs at an event frequency per annum that would advise caution in assessing the behavior trend over time. The behavior of the USSR toward the GDR appears to have occurred at levels of net cooperation throughout the ten year period with lower cooperation levels (.06 and .02) occurring only during the period of 1969-1970. This lower cooperation coincided with the era of improving relations of the FRG and the USSR, and the FRG and Poland. This development would have indirectly affected the behavior of the USSR toward its ally, the GDR, who was showing reservations about the FRG's activities with its WTO allies and tried to block them.

The UNGA roll calls in 1973 reflect a very high harmony of interests of the USSR and GDR on the resolutions in the UN.

The frequency of reported events in USSR relations toward the CSSR is so low as to caution us in any assessment of the behavior trend. For instance, the year 1965 reflected no events recorded in this dyad. The behavior of the USSR toward the CSSR in 1964 seemed to occur in the low net cooperation level (.04) which was followed by nearly neutral

interaction in the 1966-1967 period. Of course, the behavior of the USSR toward the CSSR in 1968 was negative (-.17) with many events (128) recorded for this year's activity. Thereafter, the behavior of the USSR toward the CSSR increased into the low cooperative level in 1969 (.08) and remained generally quite cooperative up to 1973.

The UNGA roll calls suggested a high degree of harmony of interests of the USSR and the CSSR on resolutions except in 1968 (66%) and 1972 (68%) when lower scores were recorded.

The data of USSR behavior to Rumania also occurred at an event frequency per annum that would necessitate restrictions in assessing the behavior trend over time. The period of 1964 to 1967 inclusive suggests that a neutral level of behavior of the USSR toward Rumania was occurring. In 1968, USSR behavior toward Rumania became quite negative (-.36), which reflected the identification of Rumania with the situation of the CSSR in this critical year for WTO. The behavior of the USSR toward Rumania improved in 1969 but seems to have remained in the net negative behavior level (-.04). It seems that in 1970 a return to approximate neutral to low net cooperation behavior occurred once again. There are no events recorded for 1971 or 1973 in this dyad. One neutral event was recorded in 1972 for the USSR to Rumania.

The USSR's harmony of interests with Rumania reflected in the UNGA roll calls on all resolutions showed a gradual decline from a high level of 97% in 1966 to scores of 71% in 1972 and 75% in 1973. Concerning voting of the two actors on issues affecting the alliances or

Europe generally, the scores varied with good harmony in 1965-1967. The exception was the 1967 War in the Middle East. Then the scores suggest poor harmony up to 1968-1969 (33% and 50% respectively) and good harmony in 1970-1972 ending up with a lower score in 1973 (54%).

The USSR's military commitment has always been the centerpiece of the WTO. The military expenditure as a per centage of the USSR's GNP rose from 5.7% in 1964 to 9.0% in 1965. This sharp increase probably occurred for two reasons. First, the USSR's new leaders at that time undertook to improve Soviet military capability and that of the WTO generally from 1965 onward. Second, the war in Vietnam required on the communist side large-scale support in military aid from the USSR. The military outlay remained high as a proportion of GNP until 1968. In 1969, the proportion fell to 8.4% and in 1970 to 7.9%. Renewed expenditure levels from 1971 to 1973 inclusive exceeded 10.3% of the GNP per annum. The Soviet's military expenditure per capita also reflects these modifications in increasing outlay. For instance, the per capita cost in 1969 was 169 US dollars and this rose continuously each year to a level of 356 US dollars in 1973. The per centage of national population of the USSR committed to armed forces ranged from 7.0% in 1968, to 7.2% in 1972, and 6.8% in 1973. There is no question that the commitment of the USSR toward self-defense and toward WTO remained unabated from 1964 to 1973.

The USSR import trade within COMECON never once fell below the fifty per cent factor during this decade. However, the USSR export

trade within COMECON did fall finally in 1973 to 46.4%, which was a reduction of 6.5% from the export level in 1972. It is likely that the USSR was below fifty per cent in the export area in order to compensate for the expenses incurred during the great increase in expensive technological imports from the West in 1972 and 1973. Being the bloc leader, it could have rationalized this trade program as a temporary expediency to improve its own economic infrastructure and thereby assure the future economies of COMECON.

The behavior of the USSR within WTO toward its sub-hierarchical actors tends to be supportive of the expectations of hypothesis (3). The military commitment of the USSR to WTO remains unquestionable.

The data of the GDR behavior to the USSR also reflected event frequencies per annum that would cause restrictions in assessing the behavior trend over time. It would seem that the GDR's behavior toward the USSR from 1964 to 1967 occurred generally at a low net cooperation level. In 1968, cooperation of the GDR with the USSR increased (.16) due primarily to the GDR's reaction and activity relative to the situation of the CSSR. However in 1969 the GDR's behavior toward the USSR returned to the low net cooperation level (.04) probably as a result of the aforementioned interaction of the FRG with the USSR and Poland. In 1970, cooperative behavior toward the USSR started to increase (.11) and behavior remained quite cooperative through to 1973. A regression coefficient for this dyad from 1966 to 1973 indicated an intercept of 9.39 and a regression coefficient of 6.06.

The UNGA roll calls in 1973 suggest a very high degree of harmony of interests of the GDR toward the USSR.

The GDR's import and export trade within COMECON remained consistently well above the fifty per cent. factor throughout 1964-1973.

The GDR's military commitment to WTO shows mixed results. Military expenditure as a percentage of GNP increased gradually from 3.9% in 1964 to 4.2% in 1967. In 1968, due to a revised WTO payment policy concerning Soviet troops stationed in East Germany, the outlay by the GDR increased to 6.4% and continued to increase until 1970 (6.8%). From 1971-1973, the percentage figures fell to 5.2% in 1972 and 5.4% in 1973. The military expenditure per capita rose annually up to 1971 (123 US dollars), and dropped to 109 US dollars in 1972 and 119 US dollars in 1973. The percentage of national population of the GDR in the armed forces shows an increase from 4.4% in 1968 to 4.8% in 1969 but, thereafter, the figures fell to 4.1% in 1970. Slight increases occurred in 1971 and 1972 (4.4%) but in 1973 a reduction to 4.1% occurred. The GDR military commitment showed mixed results suggesting that it was being asked to commit economic resources to WTO but that the level of GDR manpower in self-defense and in WTO was of some matter. Perhaps two issues affect the supply of GDR manpower, namely that the Soviets may still have psychological hang-ups about German militarism and the GDR economy has been booming since the mid-1960's thereby causing a clear competition for its limited workforce size compared to military service.

The results concerning the GDR's behavior within WTO over the

ten year period suggest that it fulfills the expectations of hypothesis (3). The military commitment of the GDR to WTO is sustained.

The data of the CSSR behavior to the USSR also reflected an event frequency per annum that would cause restrictions in assessing the behavior trend. For instance, there was no event recorded for 1965. During the period of 1964 and 1966 to 1967, the behavior of the CSSR toward the USSR suggests low net cooperation levels. As to be expected, the year 1968 was one of net negative behavior $(-.01)$ with a high number of interactions (77). In 1969, behavior toward the USSR increased again to the level of low cooperation $(.12)$ and interaction from 1971 to 1973 suggests net cooperative behavior.

The UNGA roll calls suggest a high degree of harmony of interests of the CSSR toward the USSR. The lower scores of 66% in 1968 and 68% in 1972 were the exception to the rule.

The CSSR's military commitment to self-defense and to WTO showed mixed results. The military expenditure as a per centage of GNP for the CSSR reduced slowly from a high of 6.3% in 1964 to 6.0% in 1967. In 1968 a sharper reduction to 5.5% was made followed in 1969 and 1970 by rates of 5.4%. The 1971-1973 period suggests further reductions. Comparatively, the military expenditure per capita suggests that the level of spending was sustained and increased right up to 1971 (127 US dollars) thereby indicating the economy was expanding rapidly which accounts for the smaller per centage of GNP. However, the per capita rate fell to 88 US dollars in 1972 and 93 US dollars in 1973 signifying a true reduction

in the last two years of the period in question. The CSSR's commitment in manpower to its armed forces in 1968 was 7.1% and this was reduced to 6.0% in 1970. Then, increases in manpower in armed forces rose slowly to 6.3% in 1973. The net results of the CSSR's military commitment to self-defense and WTO suggests that it was quite positive until 1968. From 1969 to 1973, economic resources committed to military demands remained fairly constant until the last two years while it adjusted its manpower commitment to lower levels.

The CSSR's import and export trade flows within COMECON remained well above the fifty per cent factor throughout the ten year period.

The results above for CSSR behavior in WTO suggest that it was acting cooperatively until 1968 when the brief period of hostility within the context of its relations with the other WTO actors precipitated the invasion. Thereafter, the CSSR nominally improved its cooperation with the USSR while carefully sustaining its resource commitment to the alliance as a whole. The CSSR seems to represent a sub-hierarchical actor who feels obliged by its circumstances to remain cooperative in WTO but only marginally so. It meets the expectation of hypothesis (3).

The data of Rumanian behavior toward the USSR also reflected an event frequency per annum that would demand caution in assessing its behavior. The period of 1964 to 1965 suggests that the behavior of Rumania toward the USSR occurred primarily at the neutral level of interaction. This was the period when the Ceausescu regime was advocating stridently a policy based on the principles of equal rights among nations,

national independence, sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. Rumanian behavior toward the USSR was reduced to the net negative level (-.06) during 1966 and 1967. This period was when Rumania was starting to develop greater trade links beyond COMECON and differed somewhat from WTO in its view of the June, 1967 crisis in the Middle East. In 1968, Rumania's behavior toward the USSR fell toward even more negative levels (-.30) likely due to Rumania's open support of the Dubcek regime in the CSSR. In 1969 however, the behavior of Rumania toward the USSR rose to a low net negative level (-.03) as it likely felt the pressure to reassess its position relative to the mainstream of WTO/COMECON affairs: Rumania continued to develop its own policy positions but now took more care in enunciating them. From 1969 to 1971 it seems that Rumania's behavior toward the USSR remained at the low net negative level as it negotiated its rights (including the right of veto) concerning common investment projects in COMECON. Also, Rumania seemed to want to retain as much freedom of action as possible within the WTO/COMECON framework despite Soviet pressure to conform. In 1972, the level of interaction suggests a return to neutral behavior of Rumania toward the USSR. There were no interaction events recorded for 1973 in this dyad.

Rumania's harmony of interests with the USSR in UNGA roll calls on all resolutions showed a gradual decline from a high score of 97% in 1966 to scores of 71% in 1972 and 75% in 1973. On resolutions affecting the alliances or Europe generally, the scores suggested good harmony in the 1965-1967 period with the exception of the 1967 War in the Middle

East. The scores suggest disharmony (33%) in 1968 and minimum harmony (50%) in 1969. This was followed by good scores in 1970-1972 ending up with a low score (54%) in 1973.

The military commitment of Rumania to its own self-defence as compared to its complement of the defence burden of WTO reflects a steady defence commitment due mainly to WTO requirements from 1964 through to 1968. The slight increases of 1969 to approximately 1971 must be attributed to its fear of a Soviet-backed invasion reflecting what had happened earlier to the CSSR. Rumanian self-defence requirements at this time would have been more meaningful to domestic pressures than an effect counter to Soviet might. Rumania abstained from participation in WTO maneuvers from the spring of 1968 through to October, 1970 when it conceded under group pressure to supply a small military contingent. Since 1970, Rumania has reintegrated militarily into WTO and has committed itself to defend East Europe against an attack from the West. The data on the above indicates that the military expenditure as a per centage of GNP for Rumania ranged from 2.5% to 2.7% in the years of 1964 to 1970. This was followed by a per centage decline after 1970. In military expenditure per capita there was a slow but constant increase ranging from 17 US dollars in 1964 to 39 US dollars in 1971 followed by a decline to 25 US dollars from 1972 to 1973. The commitment of Rumanian manpower to armed forces increased from 3.9% of the population in 1968 to 4.4% in 1970. However a decrease to 4.0% occurred by 1973. We cannot confirm or reject the hypothesis on the basis of the results of this indicator.

The Rumanian import trade within COMECON fell below the fifty per cent factor as early as 1967 and did not rise to that level again. The Rumanian export trade within COMECON fell below the fifty per cent factor in 1971 and did not rise to that level again. However, it is evident that from 1971 onward Rumania made an effort to strike a balance of trade beyond COMECON that would give an increasing portion of its trade to the Third World and not just the West.

The results for Rumania require caution. Once the bloc leader proved to the alliance as a whole that it was determined to maintain the sub-system, this deviant actor increased wisely its level of cooperation to the neutral or possibly even low cooperation level. Under group pressure it even reentered joint maneuvers of the alliance in 1970. Toward the end of the period, this deviant actor had muted its posture of independence and had reaccepted in a limited way its role in the collective defense of the sub-system. The combination of those points of behavior for Rumania suggests that this actor fulfills marginally the behavior expectations of hypothesis (3) and it was tenuously reintegrated into the WTO military system.

Generally, the results relative to hypotheses (1), (2) and (3) are encouraging. The following summary is provided for hypotheses (1) and (2) applicable to NATO:

<u>Hypothesis</u>	<u>Affirmative results per actor</u>	<u>Negative results per actor</u>
(1)	US, FRG	UK
(2)	FRG, France, UK	Nil

Hypothesis (1) showed affirmative results for 2 out of 3 applicable actors with the exception being the behavior of the UK toward the US. The UK to US dyad showed a good cooperative behavior level which is due probably to the long-standing relationship of the UK to the US that existed well before NATO was formed. Hypothesis (2) showed affirmative results for the applicable actors.

Similarly, the following summary is applicable to WTO and hypothesis (3).

<u>Hypothesis</u>	<u>Affirmative results per actor</u>	<u>Negative results per actor</u>
(3)	USSR, GDR, CSSR, Rumania (marginal)	Nil

It would seem that hypothesis (3) showed affirmative results for the applicable actors.

Chapter 5

Alliance Behavior as reflected through inter-alliance relations

This chapter will examine the results obtained when some of the indicators discussed in Chapter Three were applied to the selected actors concerning their inter-alliance behavior. The purpose of this chapter is to confirm the proposition that during a prolonged period of non-crisis inter-alliance transactions will tend to intensify and behavior will change from conflict toward cooperation.

Such a proposition would suggest that the effect of prolonged non-crisis on the behavior of member-states in rival alliances is to ameliorate their relationship over time. The expectation is that negative interaction between members of rival alliances moves toward less conflictive behavior allowing in some instances neutral or even low cooperative levels to occur. While the possibility of neutral or low cooperative interaction may not occur for every actor in each sub-system, the likelihood of less conflictive behavior is probable for the majority of actors in both alliances.

The three indicators that were applicable to cross-alliance behavior were as follows: the relative distance of the members in an alliance that would suggest their propensity to establish cross-cutting links; interaction between members of the rival alliances; and the

improvement of trade by one alliance member with the opposing alliance members represented in their respective trade group. For instance NATO actors trading with COMECON as a whole or WTO actors trading with the West as a whole (including EEC, EFTA plus the US and Canada).

A summary description will be provided for each of the selected actors. The suggested bottom line of the relative distance indicator is .407 or less among NATO actors but .680 or less among WTO actors. The bottom line which would establish non-conflictive cross-alliance behavior by an actor is a neutral level of interaction with adversary nations. The bottom line in the improvement of trade by an actor is any incremental increase that is sustained consecutively in the last two years (1972-1973) and equals or exceeds previous trade records with the opposite trade group.

For the US, we find that this actor's relative distance was .545, thereby suggesting a below average propensity to establish cross-cutting links. This is expected to be the finding for this bloc leader compared to the less restricted actions with IGOs and NGOs by the other actors in a pluralistic alliance such as NATO.

US behavior data toward the USSR indicated neutral level interaction in 1964 as a result of the post 1962 Cuban crisis followed by a period of less strident behavior. However with President Johnson committing massive US forces to the Vietnam conflict, there followed a

period of negative behavior in 1965-1966 nurtured by a US resentment of indirect Soviet involvement in aid of North Vietnam. Later on this Soviet activity was to be referred to as war by proxy. In 1967, President Johnson commenced a diplomatic initiative toward Eastern Europe referred to as bridge-building. During this period the behavior of the US toward the USSR returned to neutral. It was in 1967 also that the two super-powers acted in consort to prevent an escalation of the war in the Middle East. However, due to Soviet suspicion of the US bridge-building initiative and following the invasion of the CSSR by WTO, the Johnson administration reacted adversely. Accordingly, the behavior of the US toward the USSR fell to a net negative behavior level in 1968. In 1969, with the ascent to power of President Nixon accompanied by a new National Security advisor, Henry Kissinger, some new initiatives were being planned using cautionary diplomacy to encourage negotiation with the Soviets on global issues. This took time to develop while the war in Vietnam dragged on. As a result, US behavior toward the USSR remained at a fairly consistent net negative level from 1969 to 1971 (-.09). In May, 1971 Chairman Brezhnev signalled a readiness to negotiate in his speech at the 24th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Nixon and Kissinger's basic strategy and response to Brezhnev in the next few months was to consider negotiations on a broad front of problems using a principle of linkage whereby progress on one front was necessary, or helpful, to progress on other fronts. By May, 1972, a US delegation headed by Nixon travelled to Moscow for a summit conference and the

signing of a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. In 1972, US behavior toward the USSR rose to a net cooperative level (.06) which was maintained in 1973 (.09) by the ending of US involvement in Vietnam, and by continuing diplomatic and trade-related exchanges. However, with the occurrence of yet another Middle East War in October, 1973, followed by a Soviet threat to intervene when the Israelis were obtaining their objectives, the US called into question the nature of detente and Kissinger's plan for a structure of peace.

The low number of events in the US behavior data toward the GDR makes assessment difficult. From what data is available it would seem that US behavior toward the GDR was negative from 1964 to 1969. There might have been a slight improvement of behavior in 1970 indirectly related to the FRG's negotiation activities with the GDR, but this was followed by negative behavior in 1971 (-.25) and 1972 (-.19). In 1973, US behavior toward the GDR seemed to have improved to the neutral level similar to US behavior improving generally with other East European actors.

The low number of events in the US behavior data toward the CSSR also causes assessment to be difficult. With the data available it appears that US behavior toward the CSSR was negative from 1964 until at least 1969. There were no events recorded from 1970 to 1972. However, in 1973 US behavior toward the CSSR seemed to increase to the low net cooperation level (.06) as was similar for US behavior toward other actors in this region.

The low number of events in the US behavior data toward Rumania also causes difficulties in assessment. The US behavior toward Rumania was mainly at the neutral level from 1964 to 1967 as a response to Rumania's initial attempts to assert its independence. This behavior of the US changed after Rumania's willingness to act as an intermediary in East Europe for Israel following the 1967 Middle East War. The US also responded to Rumania's continuing drive to establish solid trade links with the West and the Third World. US behavior increased into the cooperative levels from 1968 to 1973 ending up with scores of .51 in 1972 and .53 in 1973.

US trade with COMECON remained generally steady up to 1971. In 1971-1972 the US amended its export restrictions to Communist countries. Incremental increases in trade occurred in 1972 and 1973 thereby suggesting a US response to trade demands from members of WTO/COMECON.

Generally, the behavior of the US toward members of WTO satisfies the expectations of our proposition.

For the UK, we find that this actor's relative distance was .337, thereby suggesting an above average propensity to establish cross-cutting links. This is consistent with the membership of the UK in EFTA up to 1973 at which time this member entered the EEC. The finding underlines also the UK's interest in European regional activities.

UK behavior toward the USSR in 1964 to 1967 commenced at the neutral level and fell to the low net negative level which seemed to mirror the position of the US. From 1968 onward the behavior of the UK

toward the USSR fell to a more negative level (-.09) over the Czechoslovak crisis sinking to -.22 by 1971 when over one hundred Soviet diplomats were expelled by the UK. As is normal after such events, the UK and the USSR continued to dispute with one another in 1972 and the behavior of the UK toward the USSR remained at the negative level. However, as a result of earlier initiatives with the Soviets by other actors in NATO, for instance the FRG and the US, the UK responded as well in 1973 and its behavior toward the USSR rose to the low net cooperative level (.07).

There was insufficient data to provide an assessment of the UK's behavior toward the GDR, CSSR or Rumania from 1964 to 1973.

UK trade with COMECON represented varied changes from year to year. The annual per centage for the UK of imports from COMECON fell from 4.1% in 1966 to 3.6% in 1971 but rose incrementally in 1972 (3.9%) and in 1973 (4.0%). The annual per centage for the UK of exports to COMECON rose from 2.8% in 1966 to 3.6% in 1968 but fell thereafter to 2.8% by 1971. In 1972 exports rose to 3.3% and in 1973 to 3.4%. Generally, the UK does not satisfy the bottom line of trade with COMECON. Although the UK did increase its proportion of trade with members in the opposing alliance in the last two years of the period under review, the increase registered did not exceed the level attained in 1968 and this fact cannot be overlooked.

Generally, the UK seems not to have satisfied our expectations.

For the FRG, we find that this actor's relative distance was

.455, thereby suggesting a below average propensity to establish cross-cutting links. This would have been consistent with its membership in the EEC and NATO and also reflected its frontline position in Central Europe. There would have been a degree of conservatism up to the advent to power of the Social Democratic government and its Ostpolitik which commenced in the 1968-1969 period. It was the FRG which initiated so many of the changed relationships among the Central and East European states that were to occur especially in the period of 1970 to 1972.

The FRG's behavior toward the USSR was generally at a negative level from 1964 to 1968. In 1969 the level of behavior rose to the neutral level (-.01) and from 1970 onward it was cooperative ending at .10 in 1973.

The FRG's behavior toward the GDR was negative from 1964 (-.44) to 1966 (-.32) followed in 1967 by neutral interaction. The level of behavior fell to low negative interaction in 1968 (-.10) and 1969 (-.06) but rose in 1970 to neutral level. This was followed by increasingly cooperative behavior in 1971 (.05) and 1972 (.22) as both actors negotiated and signed a Basic Treaty which was supposed to set their affairs in order. In 1973 however the behavior of the FRG toward the GDR plummeted to the negative level (-.40). Following the signing of their bilateral treaty, both governments started to interpret the Basic Treaty their own way thereby setting the conditions for a return to their pre-1970 mutual antagonism.

The low number of events in the FRG behavior data toward the

CSSR causes assessment to be difficult. It would seem that the FRG's behavior toward the CSSR was mainly neutral from 1964 to 1966. The level of behavior became somewhat cooperative from 1967 to 1970. (There was very poor data for 1971 and 1972.) In 1973, the FRG's behavior toward the CSSR was quite cooperative (.39) as the FRG commenced a diplomatic initiative.

There was no behavior data available to assess the interaction of the FRG with Rumania.

FRG trade with COMECON remained generally steady up to 1971. Incremental increases occurred in 1971 up to 1973 thereby suggesting an improvement of trade through expansion of imports and exports with members of the opposing alliance. Despite political differences, the FRG and the GDR maintained strong trade links.

The FRG satisfies our expectations with the sole exception of its political relationship to the GDR which is unique to these two countries. This cannot be held against this actor.

For France, we find that this actor's relative distance was .178, thereby suggesting a high propensity to establish cross-cutting links. This is consistent with the continental role of France in Europe and its role in the EEC particularly.

France's behavior toward the USSR was mildly negative in 1964 increasing in 1965 and 1966 to a cooperative level (.25) at the same time that France was redefining its role in NATO and was being encouraged to do so by the USSR. Having been encouraged by the Soviets previously

concerning France's role in West European affairs, the French in 1967 turned their attention eastward to develop improved relations with individual members of WTO. The Soviets discouraged quietly de Gaulle's initiatives which lasted right up to the summer of 1968. The Soviet handling of the crisis in the CSSR and the subsequent invasion of Czechoslovakia by the armies of five WTO members were events that affected France more than the other West European powers. Relations of France toward WTO members never quite recovered their earlier form. The data suggests that in 1967 and 1968 the behavior of France toward the USSR dropped to the negative level. In 1969 with the advent to power of President Pompidou and a fresh start at leadership in the grand style of the Gaullist Party, France's behavior toward the USSR rose to a low net cooperative level (.02) and remained at the low cooperative level thereafter until 1971. In 1972 and 1973 a neutral level of behavior toward the USSR was evident as France turned its attention increasingly to problems within the EEC itself.

There was insufficient data to assess France's behavior toward the GDR or CSSR during this period.

The low number of events in France's behavior data toward Rumania causes assessment to be difficult and is limited to the years 1964-1968. France's behavior seems to have been at the neutral level in 1964 and to have increased to the low cooperative level from 1965 to 1968. President de Gaulle visited Bucharest in April, 1968 on a goodwill tour. No trend is available for 1969 to 1973.

The trade of France with COMECON represented varied changes from year to year. The annual per centage for France of imports from COMECON decreased from 2.9% in 1966 to 2.6% in 1967. Incremental increases in French imports from COMECON occurred annually from 1971 to 1973 rising to 3.2%. The annual per centage for France of exports to COMECON increased from 3.6% in 1966 to 4.4% in 1968 but reduced in subsequent years to 3.5% in 1971. The per centage of French exports to COMECON increased in 1972 (4.0%) and 1973 (4.1%) thereby indicating an improving trade outlook with members in the opposing alliance. France partially satisfies the bottom line of trade with COMECON. Even though an increase did occur in 1972 and 1973, the increase registered in exports did not exceed the level set in 1968 although the increase in imports was sufficient to exceed preceding years.

Generally, France seems to have satisfied our expectations except for its level of export trade with COMECON.

For the USSR, we find that this actor's relative distance was .752 thereby suggesting a below average propensity to establish cross-cutting links. This is consistent with the USSR being the bloc leader of WTO and the leading partner of COMECON.

The USSR's behavior toward the US suggests a neutral level in 1964 as a result of Chairman Khrushchev's less strident behavior in the period following the 1962 Cuban crisis. After deposing Khrushchev in October, 1964 the new collective leadership of Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin continued the low-keyed interaction with the US up until the

US decision to commit its forces to the Vietnam conflict in April, 1965. From 1965 through to 1968 the behavior of the USSR fell to negative levels with a score of $-.36$ by 1968. The Soviets were now committed to supply arms to North Vietnam, required to compete with the PRC in Southeast Asia over the Vietnam issue and to reject any US diplomatic initiatives in the European section. In 1969, with the advent of President Nixon to power in the US, who had based his election win on a negotiated settlement of the war, the Soviets expected a settlement to come about eventually by negotiation. Accordingly, the behavior of the USSR toward the US improved somewhat but only to a low net negative level ($-.09$): In 1970 and 1971 with the Vietnam conflict drawn out beyond previous expectations, the USSR's behavior toward the US fell to very negative levels again ($-.27$ and $-.39$). By 1971, the Soviets believed they had achieved near parity in their nuclear arsenal compared to the US. This is one of the reasons Chairman Brezhnev announced in May, 1971 a willingness to negotiate global issues with the US. In July, 1971 President Nixon made a surprise announcement that he had obtained an invitation to go to Peking for talks with PRC leaders to take place early in 1972. The impact of this must have had great repercussions in the Kremlin due to the new likelihood of non-isolation between Peking and Washington. So despite Soviet preference to have Vietnam settled first, the pressure was great on the Soviets to continue the intent to negotiate with the US despite the war.

Therefore, with pre-meeting diplomatic exchanges and related behavior it is hardly surprising to note that the USSR's behavior toward

the US in 1972 indicated an improved score of $-.09$ despite Vietnam. For instance President Nixon visited Moscow in May, 1972 with a series of agreements to sign. However, these positive actions were offset by the Vietnam war still going on which terminated shortly after massive US bombing of Hanoi in December, 1972. With the Vietnam war issue removed and with US trade exports to the USSR increasing dramatically, the behavior of the USSR toward the US rose to a low net cooperation ($.05$) level in 1973. Of course the events concerning the October, 1973 Middle East War detracted significantly from the positive behavior that existed earlier in 1973, for example the visit of Chairman Brezhnev to the US in June, 1973.

The USSR's behavior data toward the UK seemed to mirror its similar behavior toward the US during this period. For instance, the USSR's behavior toward the UK commenced at the neutral level in 1964 and fell to the low net negative level from 1965 through to 1967 in reaction to the UK's refusal to condemn US involvement in Vietnam. Defending its handling of the crisis over the CSSR in 1968, the USSR's behavior to the UK was very negative ($-.35$) but ameliorated to $-.06$ in 1969. Behavior toward the UK declined from 1970 through to 1972 ($-.66$) while the Soviets and the British quarrelled in 1971-1972 over their diplomatic missions. In 1973, the USSR's behavior toward the UK rose to the low net negative level ($-.05$) but seems not to have crossed the threshold of neutral activity.

The USSR's behavior toward the FRG seems to have been distinctly

negative from 1964 through to 1968 (-.36) as a result primarily of the political value in East Europe of pointing at successive German governments as revanchists of the status quo following World War II. With the advent to power of a Social Democratic government in the FRG headed by Chancellor Willy Brandt who proposed a new policy of conciliation toward the East and recognition of the status quo, this preempted any continuing use of the revanchism theory. Accordingly, as Brandt sought the good offices of Moscow in 1969 to settle border questions with Poland there came an improvement to -.04 followed by cooperative behavior (.13) in 1970. In 1971, the USSR's behavior toward the FRG fell temporarily to a low net negative level (-.08) due largely to a lull in the previous pattern of regional agreements involving the FRG. However, in 1972 the USSR's behavior toward the FRG rose to the neutral level followed by a low net cooperation (.08) score as the FRG continued its positive action in negotiation with the GDR and other states.

The USSR's behavior data toward France was mildly negative in 1964 increasing in 1965 and 1966 to a cooperative level (.25) at the same time that France was redefining its role in NATO and was being encouraged to do so by the USSR. From 1967 to 1968 the level of behavior reduced to a low net negative level (-.08) but reversed to neutral behavior in 1969. Increased cooperation continued in 1970 through to 1973 ending at .17. The USSR's responses to France during the period were indicated earlier in this chapter.

USSR trade with the West was generally varied up to 1968 but

from 1971 through to 1973 there was an annual incremental increase in the per centage of trade with dramatic changes occurring in 1972 and 1973.

With the sole exception of the USSR's behavior toward the UK, the USSR's behavior toward the other selected NATO actors satisfies our expectations.

For the GDR, we find that this actor's relative distance was .970, thereby suggesting a below average propensity to establish cross-cutting links. This finding is consistent with the historical relative isolation of the GDR in the international system and with its membership in COMECON.

The low number of events in the GDR behavior data toward the US causes assessment to be difficult. It would seem that the GDR's behavior toward the US was negative from 1964 to 1966 followed in 1967 and 1968 by approximate neutral behavior. In 1969 to 1972 the behavior reverted to negative interaction followed in 1973 by low net negative behavior (-.02) resembling almost neutral activity. It is believed likely that the GDR's conservative behavior toward the US is a factor not to be discounted in the lower scores above.

There was insufficient data available to assess the behavior of the GDR toward either the UK or France.

Under Walter Ulbricht, the GDR's behavior data toward the FRG showed a consistently negative level from 1964 through to 1969 (-.25) reflecting the political antagonism of the two governments.

An improvement to $-.08$ occurred in 1970 under the urging of the USSR and the advent to power of Honecker. This was followed by neutral behavior in 1971 and low cooperation ($.10$) in 1972 during which time the Basic Treaty was signed with the FRG. In 1973, the GDR's behavior toward the FRG fell to a negative level ($-.18$) which would reflect a return to their earlier mutual political antagonism following their different interpretations of their bilateral treaty.

The GDR's trade with the West was varied up to 1968 but from 1971 to 1973 there were incremental increases per annum that reflected favourably on the GDR's per centage of trade with members of the opposing alliance. Despite political differences, the GDR and FRG retained strong trade links.

The GDR seems to satisfy our expectations with the sole exception of its political relationship to the FRG. The GDR cannot be faulted for this situation.

For the CSSR, we find that this actor's relative distance was $.604$, suggesting thereby an above average propensity to establish cross-cutting links. This finding suggests that the CSSR's role in COMECON is less restrictive due to its concomitant presence in the central part of Europe, highlighted by its historical relationship to the many countries in that core area of Europe.

The low number of events in the CSSR behavior data toward the US causes assessment to be difficult. It seems that the behavior of the CSSR toward the US was largely in the negative range from 1964 to 1972

but neutral in 1973 following the lead of the USSR's relations with the US.

There was insufficient data to assess the behavior of the CSSR toward either the UK or France.

The CSSR behavior data toward the FRG seems to have been in the low net negative level from 1964 through to 1969 followed by cooperative behavior (.16) in 1970. Undoubtedly the CSSR would have been favourable toward negotiation initiatives of the FRG. From 1971 to 1972, the CSSR's behavior toward the FRG seems to have been neutral followed by low net cooperative behavior (.08) in 1973 as these two countries commenced their own diplomatic negotiations on a bilateral treaty.

CSSR trade with the West was generally varied up to 1968 but from 1971 through to 1973 there was an annual incremental increase in the percentage of trade with members in the opposing alliance.

The CSSR's behavior seems to have generally satisfied our expectations.

For Rumania, we find that this actor's relative distance was .644, thereby suggesting an above average propensity to establish cross-cutting links. This is consistent with Rumania's role in COMECON and its own view of independent policy-making concerning especially its economic and social affairs on a domestic and an international level.

The low number of events in the Rumanian behavior data toward the US causes assessment to be difficult. It seems that the behavior of Rumania toward the US was mainly at the neutral level from 1964 to 1967.

as it would have been wary of going too far in exerting its independence at that point in time. In 1968 the level of behavior increased to cooperation but reacted by falling to a net negative level in 1969 and 1970, probably due to its disappointment about US behavior during the WTO invasion of the CSSR in 1968. However, starting in 1971 the neutral behavior of Rumania toward the US led to cooperative behavior in 1972 and 1973 which was assisted by the corresponding behavior of the US and the USSR.

There was insufficient data to assess the behavior of Rumania toward the UK or the FRG.

The low number of events in Rumania's behavior data toward France causes assessment to be difficult and to be limited to the years 1964-1968. Rumania's behavior seems to have been at the neutral level in 1964 and to have increased to a low cooperative level from 1965 to 1968 as a result of agreement with President de Gaulle's policies and initiatives. No trend is available for 1969 to 1973.

Rumania's trade with the West must be viewed as part of its total policy of expanding trade with the West and the Third World generally from 1966 onward at the expense of COMECON. In fact, Rumanian imports from the West rose to 39.7% in 1966 and to 48.8% in 1967 and levelled off in 1968. It would seem that a cautionary reassessment by Rumania occurred about a year after the WTO crisis of 1968 because Rumania started to switch to Third World imports when possible even though its imports from the West remained consistently high ending at 35.1% in 1973.

In Rumanian exports, the dramatic increase of 1967 to 33.4% was sustained around that level up to the 1972-1973 period when the export per centage tapered off slightly ending at 30.2%. However Rumanian exports remained consistently much higher than the pre-1967 era. Due to Rumania's early increase in trade as a matter of policy which was sustained beyond 1973, we can credit this actor with having expanded its trade with the West even though there were adjustments by 1972-1973. Those adjustments by Rumania may have been in part politically motivated by group pressure from other WTO/COMECON actors following the 1968 crisis period. To the credit of Rumania, the pressure was resisted until at least 1969 and beyond.

Generally, Rumania seems to have satisfied our expectations.

<u>Proposition</u>	<u>Affirmative results per actor</u>	<u>Negative results per actor</u>
	US	UK
	FRG (except in relation to the GDR)	
	France (except in relation to its export trade with COMECON)	
	USSR (except in relation to the UK)	
	GDR (except in relation to the FRG)	
	CSSR	
	Rumania	

The evidence showed mainly affirmative results for every actor except the UK. Perhaps insufficient data on the UK to GDR, CSSR or Rumania suggests that our assessment is imbalanced by the UK to USSR behavior dyad and by the UK's low-keyed trade interest in COMECON as a result of her greater interest in entering the EEC and establishing her new trade link in 1973. Nonetheless the proposition seems to have stood the test.

Chapter 6

The WTO Crisis and the Invasion of the CSSR in 1968

We have referred earlier to the structure of the WTO being system-dominant with the role of the USSR as the superpower in this alliance. The political process between national actors of WTO would represent a balance predicated largely upon the collective policies of the WTO nations, especially in areas of foreign policy and defense policy. However, policy differences that arise in a system-dominant alliance between the group and one of its principal member-states tend to spill over to other issue areas and affect the alliance as a whole. One empirical study on non-conforming alliance partners confirmed this proposition.¹ Therefore, if a member of WTO were to insist that it pursue its own domestic or foreign policies without regard to the wishes or demands of the alliance group, then this challenges the general policy and stability of the whole group. The resolution of conflict in the face of this type of challenge leads to either failure of the non-conforming national actor or the acceptance of that behavior and consequent modification of the sub-system as a whole. The failure of the political challenge of the CSSR within WTO is common knowledge. Let us review the relationship to examine the change in levels of cooperative behavior

during this period within WTO itself and between NATO and WTO.

The review will use a three period breakdown along the lines ascribed to Ivan Svitak, a Czech intellectual who was involved closely with the events in the CSSR. Svitak referred to three periods in the changes of policy in the CSSR. The Winter period commenced with the Plenum in early January, 1968 and continued to the removal of official censorship in March and was characterized as a period of internal experimentation in the CSSR. The Spring period commenced with the removal of censorship and the expulsion of Anton Novotny from party membership around late May. The Summer period commenced with the events of June and lasted until the invasion of the CSSR during August 20-21, 1968.

To provide a short background to the first period it should be recalled that in December, 1967 an internal struggle for political power commenced among stalwart party types against the regime of Anton Novotny which had been accused of losing touch with the masses. For instance, the Novotny regime had failed to redress a division between the current government and the students or intellectuals. Also, there were unresolved political and economic grievances especially in the Slovak part of the CSSR. Most of all, there was dissatisfaction generally with the halting progress of current economic programs. To summarize, the regime had not only become unpopular among the masses it had also not remained representative of attitudes and interests of the party cadre in the

CSSR in the late 1960's. In mid-December, 1967 CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev visited Prague on a party-to-party basis to hold discussions with the Novotny regime and to stress Soviet interests during the internal debate within the communist party of Czechoslovakia. Around December 20, 1967 the internal debate came into the open due to publicity concerning a CSSR central committee plenum. At this point in time, Novotny was still in control of two roles of party secretary and President of the CSSR.

The Winter period was not only a period of experimentation but also an adjustment of the party from the leadership of the Novotny regime towards a regime which would try to become somewhat more representative of the popular mood. In another plenum held during January 3-5, 1968, Novotny was replaced as party secretary by Alexander Dubcek although Novotny remained President of the CSSR. During January, 1968 there commenced intense activity to develop and to elaborate new domestic policies concerning political, economic and cultural activity for the CSSR. February, 1968 was the Twentieth Anniversary of the death of Jan Masaryk. Popular and public homage was paid to Masaryk's memory and embarrassing questions were raised publicly concerning Soviet complicity in that death. On March 21, 1968 President Novotny was removed from office and replaced by a popular hero, Ludvig Svoboda. Heretofore, any feelings of foreboding by the Soviets in CSSR affairs and events were generally expressed via normal channels in order to try to let the domestic situation find its own equilibrium and to avoid

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open confrontation. However, with the dismissal of Novotny and his protégés during the time frame of January to March, 1968 the USSR had lost most of its direct personal influence within the highest ruling circles of the party in the CSSR.

What did the Winter period represent generally? From a domestic relations aspect, this was a period of soul-searching on the part of the party and of the people generally so that a more adequate program could be enunciated and then carried out through the party and the government. From an intra-alliance relations aspect, this period also was one where the Dubcek regime was under great pressure to change policies and programs but to achieve this in a way so as to avoid the possible wrath of the USSR and its allies for making exemplary changes that the other parties and governments might find unacceptable due to their own particular internal situations and reluctance to undergo major changes. D.A.M.E.D. data on the crisis period showed that the WTO remained cooperative throughout this period whereas behavior on a cross-alliance basis showed conflict levels of interaction between NATO and WTO (see diagram A).

The Spring period of 1968 included events from March 22 to May 26 which indicated two main developments, each of which centered upon the evolution of policy in the Dubcek regime. One influence was the increasing pressure from the masses at large and from the party cadres in the CSSR to cause change in policy to occur. Another trend was the emergence of the allies of the CSSR from covert opposition to

the changes of CSSR policy. The expression of resentment toward the CSSR was emanating from the USSR via various Soviet foreign policy elites⁴ but formulated generally in a somewhat restrained manner. The hostility of the GDR and Poland toward the CSSR was also self-evident during this period although not all of the WTO actors in late March, 1968 were expressing identical positions of hostility toward the developments in the CSSR. For instance, Rumania seemed to be favourable toward the CSSR and some observers of East Europe thought that this WTO actor might soon consider emulating some of the policy behavior of the CSSR. At that point in time, it was apparent that Hungary and Bulgaria were refraining from overt disapproval of developments in the CSSR. However, Poland was slightly more publicly concerned about the CSSR in that it had experienced internally its own March crisis and was officially alarmed at the apparent solidarity of students in Poland with the student activists in the CSSR. Only the GDR and the USSR were now expressing official and open hostility toward developments in the CSSR.⁵ For example, on March 22, 1968 the Soviet press attacked the CSSR following the dismissal of Novotny as President. On March 23, the WTO leaders met in Dresden and engaged the new CSSR leaders in a mild arm-twisting session in order to try to influence their policy attitudes and future behavior which were still in the formative stage concerning modifications within the CSSR.

On April 5, 1968 Dubcek announced a new Action Program despite WTO opposition to the CSSR that seemed to be picking up momentum. This

program included several items: there would be leadership changes within the party and the government; there would be new guarantees of freedom of speech; broader electoral laws would be implemented; the party would move some powers from the party apparatus to parliament and government; allowance would be made for a greater scope of activity for non-communist groups in political activities in the CSSR, plus the party might allow other political and economic reforms to evolve as well. ⁶ The announcement of the Action Program triggered two reactions to its content. Within the CSSR, party moderates perceived these reforms as being still quite conservative and the program was viewed as an attempt to shore-up the role of the party in the state. Within the USSR, the Soviet party leaders saw these reforms as revisionist and a dangerous departure from orthodoxy that ultimately might threaten the basis of existing Soviet-modelled leadership everywhere in East Europe. ⁷ For instance, such a reaction was indicated by the meeting of the Soviet plenum from April 5-12 wherein they denounced new threats of subversion from the West and expressed condemnation of rightist excesses in Prague.

Meanwhile, from late March through to at least June, the GDR was overtly denouncing CSSR revisionism. One might wonder if these GDR denouncements represented to a certain degree criticism-by-proxy of the USSR to the CSSR.

During May 3-6, Dubcek travelled to Moscow to confer with Soviet leaders who conversely were quite cool toward him. On May 9, the more reliable WTO leaders met in Moscow to discuss the Czech situation. At

the same time, the Soviet press attacked the CSSR on the grounds that (activities by anti-socialist elements in the CSSR were allowing themselves to be exploited by the West in order to sow discord within WTO. ⁸

During May 17-27, Premier Kosygin went to the WTO meeting at Karlovy Vary while, at the same time, a Soviet military delegation under WTO Commander Marshal Grechko conferred directly with the CSSR defense officials. On May 29, the CSSR and USSR jointly announced military maneuvers to be held in June, 1968 on CSSR territory. ⁹

The D.A.M.E.D. data indicates that the level of cooperation within WTO remained intact during the Spring period up to May, 1968 when a short term period of hostility was recorded. Also there was an improvement in cross-alliance behavior between NATO and WTO although their interaction remained in the range of potential hostility.

The Summer period was decisive in the relationship of the CSSR to its WTO partners. The covert and overt opposition by particular WTO actors to the process of reform in the CSSR had remained unheeded from approximately March, 1968 through to late May, 1968 and the tempo of deteriorating relations within WTO seemed unabated. In fact, the Action Program of April, 1968 was about to be given a party mandate or endorsement by virtue of an extraordinary CSSR Party Congress. The Party Congress indicated for September 9, 1968 would be the authoritative stamp. Once such a mandate was given, the other WTO actors would have difficulty in finding political excuses to have the Action Program reversed. Therein lay the pressure for the Soviet Union to act toward achieving a reversal before September, 1968. ¹⁰

During May 27-30, the CSSR Central Committee plenum met in Prague in order to weigh its reaction to Soviet propositions to settle the conflict. The Plenum decided: that the Action Program proceed ^{with-} out further delay; that no formal opposition parties would be tolerated in the CSSR; and announced publicly that an extraordinary 14th Party Congress would be advanced two years to be convened on September 9, 1968.¹¹

The WTO reaction followed soon afterward. On June 14, 1968 the USSR openly attacked the CSSR Plenum's announcement and Czechoslovak revisionism. The GDR and Poland repeated these criticisms.

On June 27, 1968 the National Assembly of the CSSR abolished media censorship. On that same day, intellectuals published a political essay, "2000 Words", which suggested reform by grass roots action. Unfortunately for this heresy within the CSSR, Dubcek was obliged to deplore such suggestions.¹²

Generally, the period of June 29 to July 31, 1968 represented a broad attack by the Soviets against the CSSR in the form of a war of political and diplomatic nerves accompanied by military moves indicating the continuing retention of Soviet troops from the June maneuvers on CSSR soil plus military maneuvers by WTO forces near CSSR border areas. Due to this form of pressure, Dubcek refused to go to a WTO meeting in Poland concerning the situation of the CSSR in relation to WTO.

Accordingly on July 15, 1968 the communist parties of the USSR, GDR, Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary jointly demanded that Dubcek mend his ways or face the consequences of his inaction in the face of opposi-

tion from those other WTO actors. More specifically, they demanded: that censorship be reimposed; that the CSSR suppress all anti-socialist forces or groups; and that the CSSR observe the principles of Marxism-Leninism and democratic centralism common to the actors listed above. Also, these parties appealed to "healthy" forces in Czechoslovakia, including the CSSR's People's Militia, to mobilize. ¹³ These demands by WTO actors who were closer to the USSR represented an orchestrated threat to the CSSR. On July 16, 1968 the Soviets demanded an immediate meeting of the full Soviet Politburo and the CSSR Presidium on Soviet soil. On July 19, the Soviets announced they had discovered an arms cache plus secret documents proving US and FRG conspiracy to subvert the CSSR along with domestic counterrevolutionary elements. In addition, on July 23, WTO forces were maneuvering all along the Czech-Soviet border plus border areas of the GDR and Poland adjacent to the CSSR. ¹⁴ Such pressure tactics by the Soviets in particular, and other WTO actors in general, produced a concession by Dubcek. He agreed to a conference but insisted, successfully, that WTO-CSSR talks at the highest level be held on CSSR soil, specifically at Cierna on July 29, 1968.

At the Cierna conference, a confrontation among WTO members took place. Dubcek was backed solidly by the CSSR party. Meanwhile Rumania, Yugoslavia and communist parties in West Europe warned the Soviets about interference. On August 2, 1968 the Soviets finally withdrew their remaining forces from the CSSR. This was a matter that had been a bone of contention since June. The Soviets also reduced their threatening

demands of July 15. On August 3 and 4, a meeting of six WTO members took place at Bratislava which endorsed the agreement made at Cierna. A lull in hostilities represented by an absence of overt criticism lasted briefly following the Cierna-Bratislava meetings. The WTO maneuvers, code named "Nemen", continued just outside of the CSSR throughout July and early August. These maneuvers halted temporarily on August 10 and 11 while Soviet military leaders visited the GDR, Poland and Hungary for unspecified consultation.

On August 14, a renewed media campaign of abuse against the CSSR was started by the Soviets. This was followed on the 15th by allegations of a plot by the FRG against the GDR and CSSR. On August 16, the Soviets alleged that the Czech press had printed slanderous information about the USSR. From August 17-20, the Soviet press repeatedly charged that Dubcek had not acted vigorously enough to suppress subversive activities by anti-socialist forces within the CSSR. This week-long campaign of invective was followed on the night of August 20-21 by full-scale invasion of the CSSR by Soviet and other WTO forces.

The D.A.M.E.D. data for the Spring and Summer of 1968 show that interaction within WTO plunged into deep conflict. During the same period, the cross-alliance interaction between WTO and NATO increased toward the neutral/positive zone. This phenomenon can be attributed to two competing interpretations. First, with the US committed heavily to Vietnam at this point in time it would have been foolhardy to allow NATO to even remotely antagonize the Soviets and other WTO members over

the Czechoslovak crisis. Therefore any scenario depicting NATO as ready to assist the CSSR should a request have been anticipated by NATO in the event of invasion of that country by other forces was out of the question. No contingency plan by NATO to prepare to assist the CSSR in the event of invasion has ever been considered seriously. Second, the WTO would have preferred to behave neutrally or even cooperatively toward NATO while it determined in what manner it may reverse the political developments in the CSSR during the period of May-August, 1968. The rationale for this explanation is that the Soviets preferred to keep the crisis as an in-house affair while it dealt harshly with one of its non-conforming members. In so doing, the Soviets did not encourage any escalation beyond the boundaries of WTO itself. Both explanations compete with each other but are not mutually exclusive. They tend to explain the phenomenon of negative behavior within WTO itself but neutral/positive behavior on a cross-alliance basis during this crisis.

The follow-up of the Czech crisis represented several important events such as the arrest of Dubcek and Cernik, and the extraordinary situation of President Svoboda demanding the release of Dubcek and Cernik so that all three leaders might then negotiate a compromise with the Soviets. This was followed by a lengthy search by the Soviets for a suitable replacement for Dubcek, et al. in the ensuing months of 1968 and 1969. However, due to the invasion of August 20-21 and the continued presence of Soviet forces in the CSSR, the post-invasion period represented not a continuation of alliance crisis but a continuation of

domestic unease about the method of Soviet interference in the CSSR. This has had subdued conflict repercussions of a long-lasting nature within the CSSR itself and possibly in WTO generally.

Another actor in WTO that came under great pressure prior to 1968 and during the Czechoslovakian crisis period itself was Rumania. Due to Rumania's independent policy-making, especially in the economic sphere plus its international behavior prior to 1968, there had been Soviet pressure to get this deviant member to conform. For instance, at a world conference of the communist parties in March, 1968 at Budapest, the Rumanian delegation pulled out due to orchestrated criticism emanating from the Soviet hardliners. Later during the Czech Spring, Rumania openly supported the reform plans of the CSSR as did Yugoslavia. Indeed, when the WTO maneuvers were announced for 1968 Rumania withheld its own armed forces from participation. Clearly Rumania in 1968 readily identified against Soviet attempts to isolate the CSSR. When the WTO invasion took place in August this action by the Soviets caused alarm in Rumania which did not subside for at least two years afterward. For instance, it was not until October, 1970 that Rumania agreed to allow its armed forces to join WTO maneuvers again. Meanwhile from 1968 onward Rumania continued to experience attempts by the Soviets to isolate it in WTO and COMECON by various means. For instance, the Soviets seemed to disregard Rumania's self-interest via COMECON's new regional integration plans that were being developed from 1969 onward. This type of pressure on a small economy must have been quite a burden to Rumania for its

independent views. Also when Rumania refused again in 1969 and early 1970 to go to joint maneuvers with WTO forces, the Soviets proved unwilling to supply up-to-date arms to Rumania when it was in the throes of modernization of its small armed forces.

The question remains as to why Rumania faced only limited sanctions from WTO/COMECON. First, it should be recalled that Rumania is a Southern Tier member in the alliance with a particular geographical proximity to the USSR that would make it an easy victim of invasion at anytime the Soviets would choose to take such action. Second, the USSR has never seriously viewed the reforms represented by the Ceausescu regime as equating a liberalization of the closed polity of Rumania. After all, Rumanian domestic policies remained conservative in their socialist form compared to the liberal socialism of the Dubcek era in the CSSR. Therefore the reforms represented by the Ceausescu regime were basically in the field of foreign affairs — national independence, sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs — and in its pattern of trade depending less on COMECON and more on trade links with the West and the Third World. Last, taking into account the type of reform represented by the Rumanian regime the Soviets viewed this behavior as non-conformist to the alliance as a whole and reprehensible requiring some form of countermeasures to keep Rumania within WTO. However, the range of such potential countermeasures by the Soviets against Rumania in 1969-1970 probably did not include invasion once the experience with the CSSR was over. After all, the invasion of the CSSR in 1968 had been

a high price to pay for Soviet foreign policy and it set back potential negotiation with the West and the potential for improvement in trade by at least a year and a half if not longer.

The question as to why WTO would find it less difficult to invade a non-conforming member such as the CSSR compared to Rumania is likely related to the type of domestic reform advocated by the Dubcek regime and to its position as a Northern Tier member of the alliance. As Hopmann and Sullivan have suggested, the ability in a monolithic alliance to influence goals, strategy, and tactics would be highly concentrated and unequally distributed among members of the group. A bloc that operates in many issue-areas has more potential sources of conflict than one with more limited functions. Holsti offered two solutions to the problem of maintaining alliance cohesion in such a sub-system: a reduction in heterogeneity among alliance members as was to be the situation for the CSSR or a reduction in bloc membership.¹⁷ The CSSR was too important to WTO to allow it the possibility of leaving WTO, hence the invasion of 1968. Rumania, on the other hand, was neither a member who required such a drastic countermeasure to reduce its independence within WTO nor was such a countermeasure desirable in 1969 or afterward.

Positive   Neutral   Negative

Diagram of 1968 WTO Crisis
(events within WTO and across NATO/WTO In D.A.M.E.D.)

Code
— denotes WTO intra-alliance events only
== denotes NATO/WTO inter-alliance events only

7.

8

9 Cultural treaty

10 Agree to attend meeting

11 Invitation to attend meeting

12 Initiate military training

13 Increase forces

14 Extend military aid to
enemy of "B"

15 Tariffs

16 Halt refugees

17 Oral protest

18 Maneuvers near frontier

19 Threaten to take issue to int'l body

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

June

July

Aug

Sept

Oct

Nov

Dec

FOOTNOTESChapter 6

1. Ole R. Holsti, et al., p. 160.
2. David W. Paul, "Soviet Foreign Policy and the Invasion of Czechoslovakia", in International Studies Quarterly, vol. 15, (1971), pp. 178-179.
3. Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970, (Baltimore, 1970), pp. 364-365.
4. David W. Paul, pp. 166-190.
5. Thomas W. Wolfe, pp. 364-365.
6. Ibid., p. 365.
7. Ibid., pp. 365 and 369.
8. Ibid., p. 370.
9. Ibid., p. 370.
10. Ibid., p. 371.
11. Ibid., p. 371.
12. Ibid., p. 372.
13. Ibid., p. 374.
14. Ibid., pp. 375-376.
15. Ibid., p. 379.
16. Ibid., pp. 378-379.
17. Ole R. Holsti, et al., pp. 166-167.

Chapter 7

Conclusions

On the whole, the empirical evidence which emerged in the course of the thesis tended to confirm the three principal hypotheses. It was found that in pluralistic alliances like NATO cooperation between the alliance leader and rank-and-file members declined during a prolonged period of detente, while cooperative relations among the other alliance members tended to increase, even where this involved maverick members who challenged the policies of the alliance leader. It is obvious therefore that such deviant behavior is not only tolerated in pluralistic alliances under conditions of international detente but that it does not isolate the challenger from the other members of his group. In an organizationally directive alliance such as the Warsaw Pact, detente, too, has the effect of promoting challenges to the policies of the leader by members, but unlike NATO, such a challenge has prompted military sanctions against the deviant, with the result that the overall level of cooperation between bloc leader and members has not diminished over time. Finally, detente is accompanied by an increase of transaction between members of rival alliance systems and by a decrease of conflict in their relations. This trend was sufficiently strong to withstand the emotional trauma which accompanied discrete dramatic events like the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Despite this general fit between the central hypotheses and empirical evidence, we have been careful throughout this study to avoid any finality of statements which would allow definitive or even firm conclusions to be drawn from the available evidence. The empirical evidence for this study has been collected from a number of sources and has taken various forms: aggregate data, voting behavior, transaction flows, and events data. The most important single input for the analysis came from two comparable foreign policy events data sets, D.A.M.E.D. and Pulse. In addition to the general limitations inherent in events data, we encountered specific problems which compounded the problems of analysis. The sample of events per dyad were often too small to be sensitive to all relevant changes in behavior. For instance, in some of the dyads the total events per annum was below five and in some dyads there were no reportable events at all for some years. This was particularly true with respect to the relations among some of the smaller members of an alliance, especially those in WTO. Such under-reporting led to serious data gaps in some dyads. Other situations of the inavailability of data applied solely to the WTO. In this reference, we are referring to the total lack of events for intra-alliance dyads between the GDR, the CSSR and Rumania which explains why we cannot statistically account for the relations among those sub-hierarchical members themselves. The poor data in the WTO resulted in the appearance of less varied relationships between the bloc leader and the sub-hierarchical actors. Another result was that when the two compatible data sets overlapped from

1966 to 1970, it was possible to interchange to fill a gap in the available WTO dyads only in a few instances.

There was still an additional problem with the events data sets. Once the sets were acquired we had events reported solely in statistical form using code values without the benefit of cross-references to the actual events that had been coded. Therefore the author had to resort to ad hoc explanation of the events relating to the scores due to a lack of precise cross-referencing. This led to some uncertainty in reporting the findings. This problem was a direct result of a decision at the start of the research to utilize previously prepared data sets for evidence. It is a problem that should be weighed carefully by others in the future before commencing their theses. The author feels that there is too much risk in providing a historical narrative that is supposed to correspond to the scored data without precise cross-references for each of the events that were recorded. I feel that some of the value of assessing the data by historical narrative was lost.

The findings that confirmed the hypotheses in this thesis tended to be based on more reliable evidence for NATO actors than was the case for WTO. The only year during which numerous events were available for WTO actors was in 1968 — the year of the Czech Spring, the crisis in the alliance and the invasion of the CSSR — which was hardly a reflection of the usual pattern of relations among WTO members. (It seems, unfortunately that the only regular attention paid by the western media towards the WTO is during times of crisis.) The point that these types of events are

reported more regularly by the western media than routine relations is in itself not surprising. It merely serves to underline the disinterest of western media resources in the normal day-to-day interactions of the various WTO actors. Let it serve as a caution to those who would use media sources for events data and other types of analysis on WTO actors.

Having tested and confirmed the three hypotheses, it is useful to make some tentative remarks as to their implications on alliance cohesion. There seem to be two different developments which distinguish the cohesion of NATO from that of WTO during detente.

First, in a pluralistic alliance such as NATO, the bloc leader's role seems to become diffused as to its position of leadership resulting in lower levels of cooperation. Alternatively, the sub-hierarchical actors, including a previously deviant actor, find greater accommodation among themselves. Therefore it seems that the cooperative dimension of cohesive behavior declines with respect to vertical relations between the bloc leader and the other members. To some extent, however, this decline of cohesion is compensated by an increase in cooperative horizontal relations among the sub-hierarchical actors themselves, regardless of whether the latter display more deviant or compliant forms of alliance behavior.

Second, in an organizationally directive alliance such as WTO, the bloc leader's role may, from time to time, suffer a serious challenge to its leadership but with overwhelming forces on its side it can maintain the sub-system and demand compliance by threat or actual use of

military sanctions. Therefore it would seem that the cooperative dimension of cohesive alliance behavior in its vertical relationship between the bloc leader and the various sub-hierarchical members does not decline during the period as a whole although temporary disturbances can be observed. Unfortunately for the reasons stated above our events data sets did not assist us in describing the behavior of the WTO sub-hierarchical members among themselves.

A main thread found throughout the thesis is the extent to which alliance cohesion is derived from the style of collaboration or cooperation within the two types of alliances we have studied. Let us compare NATO's style with that of WTO to note the differences.

In NATO, the pluralistic dimensions of this sub-system allow it to use its good offices to aid in constraining disputes among two or more of its members, e.g. the fishing rights dispute between Iceland and the UK with the US playing the role of an involved third party. Another example was the ongoing dispute over Cyprus between Greece and Turkey with the US as an involved third party again: NATO's role was not very successful as the conflict needed UN peacekeeping when the US and NATO efforts failed. Another example was the decision by France in 1966 to remain politically a member of NATO but to leave the military organization of the alliance. In the latter case, a deviant member was allowed to adjust its military commitment from dependence on the integrated alliance structure toward a more independent status. This adjustment represents a process of accommodation within this pluralistic alliance of the behavior

preferences of a deviant actor. Indeed, this type of alliance system seems to allow behavior to decline to the neutral and even the negative range without triggering collective enforcement measures by the rest of the group under the instigation of the alliance leader.

In WTO, the hegemonic structure is characterized by a fairly stable and homogenous elite which produces not only consistency of purpose but also shows a disposition to carry out the superordinate objectives of the group at the expense, if necessary, of any one of its members. Where any two or more actors are in dispute, the alliance as a whole tends to be involved in the dispute. Two examples of this phenomenon are Rumania from 1961 to 1970 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Both examples reflect a failure by the USSR in particular and the alliance as an appendage to accommodate deviation in foreign relations without resorting to acute pressure from the sub-system in the case of Rumania or the use of forces in the case of Czechoslovakia.

Why then has WTO's cooperation appeared to remain the same or even increase in the relationships among the selected actors? Perhaps the following helps to answer the question. First, with prolonged non-crisis leading to détente this provided diplomatic, political and economic advantages in 1970-1973 that were perceived positively by the WTO actors. Second, the WTO had commenced in the 1960's a program of conventional military renewal and buildup that was sustained into the 1970's largely by the resources of the USSR. Third, the USSR achieved nuclear parity with the US in the period of roughly 1971-1972 thereby

reassuring this aspect of the security of the WTO member-states. The point made was stated well by Liska. "The best thing for cohesion is an even and moderate rise in capability rather than risk extreme failure or excessive success in increasing capabilities."¹ Fourth, there is the clear deterrent effect provided by the example of the invasion of Czechoslovakia and consequently the desire to make a virtue of necessity. As long as the sub-hierarchical actors in WTO view membership in this alliance as being on the positive side, there is little reason to believe that they are going to disrupt the collaboration within the sub-system by placing more weight on national policies rather than the policies of the group as a whole if there is a conflict between the two. In the case of Czechoslovakia, we have a member collaborating with the alliance somewhat reluctantly.

This leads us into a suggestion for future research on alliance cohesion. A comprehensive study should be undertaken of the conflict of the policy, objectives and goals of the nation-state compared to those of the alliance to which it belongs. The study should concentrate on both economic and political aspects of national policy versus alliance policy but reflect the three types of actors in an alliance: the superpower, the normal sub-hierarchical actor and the deviant actor. These three categories are not exclusive of one another in the sub-system but they each entail different reasons for behaving as they do within an alliance. This is an important dimension of alliance cohesion which is not well understood in current literature.

FOOTNOTEChapter 7

1. George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore, 1962), p. 89.

Appendices

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Appendix "A"Events Coding Modifications

This appendix indicates which element of inter-nation behavior activity was evaluated and its constituent cooperative, neutral and uncooperative actions. The D.A.M.E.D. set and the Pulse data set are treated below as distinct evaluation formats even though the terms cooperative, neutral and uncooperative behavior actions may have a similar connotation to positive, neutral and negative behavior actions.

The D.A.M.E.D. Set:

This data set used Moses, et al., code values associated with a given event derived from scale B in Lincoln E. Moses, Richard A. Brody, Ole R. Holsti, Joseph B. Kadane and Jeffrey S. Milstein, "Scaling Data on Inter-Nation Action," Science, volume CLVI (May 26, 1967), pp. 1054-1059. All events in the D.A.M.E.D. were value coded in sequence as follows:

1. Member Nations A, B...n of an international organization agree to allow the executive of the organization to tax them in order to raise funds.
2. Member Nations A, B...n create an international executive organization which can make decisions with the approval of a majority of the legislatures of the member nations.

3. Nation A engages in joint military maneuvers with Nation B, but identity of each national unit is preserved.
4. International organization of member Nations A, B...n controls production of some non-military materials in Nations A, B...n.
5. Nation A's legislature votes funds to support an international military organization.
6. Nations A, B...n create and join a mutual defense organization in which aid is not automatic in case of an attack.
7. Nations A, B...n form new governmental agencies concerned with international and internal security.
8. Nation A extends military aid to Nation B.
9. Nations A and B conclude a cultural exchange treaty.
10. Nation A agrees to attend an international meeting with Nation B.
11. Nation A invites Nation B to an international meeting.
12. Nation A initiates universal military training.
13. Nation A increases the size of its armed forces.
14. Nation A extends military aid to an enemy of Nation B.
15. Nation A imposes selective tariff increases which are aimed at Nation B.
16. Nation A halts the flow of refugees from Nation A into lands under the control of Nation B.
17. Nation A makes an oral protest to the ambassador of Nation B concerning a specific action of Nation B.

18. Nation A holds maneuvers near its frontier with Nation B.
19. Nation A threatens Nation B that it (Nation A) will take a particular issue it has with Nation B to an international body.
- (recoded to 8 - 20. Nation A calls military staff conference on short notice.
when event is
intra-alliance
only) 21. Nation A initiates subversion in Nation B.
22. Nation A places a partial censorship on all outgoing communications.
23. Nation A moves its troops toward its frontier with Nation B in transportation units.
24. Nation A confines its military units to their barrack areas until further notice.
25. Nation A militarizes its transportation systems.
26. Nation A moves a large number of its troops from one post to another, both posts being within Nation A.
27. Nation A stops Nation B's ships at sea.
28. Nation A makes frontier intrusions which are not clearly attacks against Nation B.
29. Nation A begins a general offensive against Nation B.
30. Nation A executes prisoners of war of Nation B.

Values 1 to 30 were intentionally collapsed by the author into three groups of behavior types designated as cooperative, neutral and uncooperative behavior. To do this, a computer run requested the absolute frequency and relative percentage of values 1 to 30 in the total data found in more than 8,000 cases.

Code	1.	5.	6.	7.	8.
Absolute frequency	1	8	117	67	210
Relative frequency (%)	.0	.1	1.4	.8	2.7

Code	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.
Absolute frequency	1780	2427	732	169	275
Relative frequency (%)	22.0	30.1	9.1	2.1	3.4

Code	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.
Absolute frequency	293	315	781	298	138
Relative frequency (%)	3.6	3.9	9.7	3.7	1.7

Code	19.	20.	21.	22.	23.
Absolute frequency	123	165	20	16	9
Relative frequency (%)	1.5	2.0	.2	.2	.1

Code	24.	25.	26.	27.	28.
Absolute frequency	28	17	11	28	33
Relative frequency (%)	.3	.2	.1	.3	.4

It is interesting to note that event codes 2 to 4 and 29 to 30 do not occur in these 8,000 cases. It is also significant that most events fall somewhere between codes 6 to 20 with a very high proportion of events being in codes 9, 10 and 11.

By cross checking the event frequency spread across all codes and intuitively assessing the corresponding types of coded behavior, it was found that it would be more manageable and useful for this thesis to collapse the event codes into three groups as follows:

	Positive		Neutral		Negative	
Event codes	1	9	10	11	12	30
Relative % of events per group	(27%)		(39%)		(34%)	

Accordingly, all coded events falling into these three groups have been designated as positive, neutral, or negative actions as the case may be.

The Pulse Data Set:

No attempt has been made by the author to modify the coding of events already grouped in the Pulse data. The Pulse User's Manual states that, in developing aggregate event indicators, it was desirable from a conceptual viewpoint to reduce an array of more than sixty categories of events to a more manageable number. The C.A.C.I. did considerable testing to ensure that while reducing the overall number of different behaviors, certain crucial distinctions were maintained between types of behavior. The Pulse data set is based on positive, neutral, and negative coded events as follows:

FEIS Event CategoriesAppropriate Group

Yield position, retreat, evacuate -

Military disarmament

Surrender, yield to order -

Release or return persons or property -

Reconciliation

Suspend negative sanctions, truce -

Express regret, apologize -

Admit wrongdoing, retract statement -

Agree to future action or procedure -

Support/Agreement

Make substantive agreement -

Extend other assistance -

Extend military aid -

Extend economic aid -

Grant privilege, diplomatic recognition,
etc. -

Assure or reassure -

Promise other future support -

Promise material support -

Promise own policy support -

Endorse other's policy or position -

Praise, hail -

Make or suggest action or policy -

Communication/Consultation

Offer proposal -

Request or call for action -

Ask for information -

Give state invitation -

Receive visit, host -

Visit, go to -

Meet at neutral site, send note -

Explain policy or future position -

Halt negotiations -

Pressure

Reduce or halt aid -

Reduce routine international activity -

Cancel or postpone planned event -

Deny an attributed policy, action, or position -

Deny an accusation -

Formal complaint or protest -

Informal complaint -

Denounce, denigrate, abuse -

Charge, criticize, blame -

Refuse, oppose, refuse to allow -

Turn down proposal, reject protest -

Military Incidents

The above event groups form a rough progression from friendly to hostile behavior. Groups aggregated as military disengagement, reconciliation, and support/agreement were evaluated and coded as positive behavior. The group aggregated as communication/consultation was evaluated and coded as neutral behavior. The groups aggregated as pressure, coercion, and military incidents were evaluated and coded as negative behavior.

Having accepted the positive, neutral, and negative event codes provided by Pulse, it was decided it would be useful to check the event frequency spread in these three categories. There were, from 1966 to 1973, a total of 5,325 events affecting the four actors in NATO and the four actors in WTO on an intra-alliance and inter-alliance basis. The event frequency in the three categories was as follows:

Positive	Neutral	Negative
28%	38%	34%

This event frequency spread for Pulse compares favourably to the event frequency spread reported for D.A.M.E.D. above.

It is to be noted that Pulse does not use a scaling procedure between coded events as did D.A.M.E.D. Although it would have been an additional credit to the Pulse system to have scaled their events, it is not fully necessary in this data set and this thesis that they should have done so. For instance, scaling events data can be an aid to study characteristics of cooperation or conflict between nations. As Azar and Sloan have pointed out in Dimensions of Interaction, A Source Book for the Study of the Behavior of 31 Nations from 1948 through 1973, scaling events data does not automatically ensure accuracy. It merely acts as a form of partition based on insight provided by psychophysicists and social statisticians. It is useful to scale events codes but not absolutely necessary in a thesis such as this one which is more concerned with a broader conception of category event groups designated as positive, neutral, and negative. In the latter situation, the broad cat-

egories provided by D.A.M.F.D. and Pulse are similar in scope and are acceptable especially when one compares the similar spread of event frequency in each of the three categories for D.A.M.F.D. and Pulse as provided above.

Appendix "B"D.A.M.E.D. Data SetNATO Dyads

US ↔ UK

	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1964	1	6	4	.10
1965	0	4	5	.31
1966	0	1	4	.64
1967	0	0	2	1.00
1968	1	3	0	-.06
1969	0	4	1	.04
1970	0	2	0	.00

US ↔ FRG

1964	1	4	8	.33
1965	Nil	Nil	Nil	—
1966	0	3	1	.06
1967	0	3	2	.16
1968	0	3	2	.16
1969	0	2	3	.36
1970	0	4	0	.00

UK ↔ FRG

	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1964	0	2	5	.51
1965	0	3	3	.25
1966	0	4	3	.18
1967	0	3	1	.06
1968	0	2	4	.44
1969	2	3	1	-.06
1970	0	4	0	.00

US ↔ France

	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1964	3	0	0	-1.00
1965	3	1	1	-.24
1966	4	4	1	-.15
1967	1	1	0	-.25
1968	1	1	0	-.25
1969	0	1	0	.00
1970	0	1	0	.00

UK ↔ France

	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1964	1	0	3	.38
1965	0	2	0	.00
1966	1	5	0	-.03
1967	1	3	6	.30
1968	0	0	1	1.00
1969	6	4	0	-.36
1970	Nil	Nil	Nil	—

FRG ↔ France

	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1964	2	3	3	.05
1965	3	3	2	-.05
1966	2	6	4	.06
1967	2	2	0	.00
1968	0	1	2	.44
1969	1	3	1	.00
1970	0	4	1	.04

D.A.M.E.D. Data SetWTO Dyads

USSR ↔ GDR

	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1964	0	4	1	.04
1965	1	0	0	-1.00
1966	0	3	0	.00
1967	Nil	Nil	Nil	—
1968	0	0	1	1.00
1969	1	2	0	-.11
1970	0	1	0	.00

USSR ↔ CSSR

1964	0	3	1	.06
1965	Nil	Nil	Nil	—
1966	0	3	0	.00
1967	0	1	0	.00
1968	2	6	5	.09
1969	1	5	2	.03
1970	0	4	0	.00

USSR ↔ Rumania

	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1964	0	9	1	.01
1965	0	0	1	1.00
1966	2	7	0	-.05
1967	Nil	Nil	Nil	—
1968	2	1	0	-.44
1969	2	2	0	-.25
1970	0	1	1	.25

Rumania ↔ CSSR

1964	Nil	Nil	Nil	—
1965	Nil	Nil	Nil	—
1966	0	2	0	.00
1967	Nil	Nil	Nil	—
1968	0	1	1	.25
1969	Nil	Nil	Nil	—
1970	Nil	Nil	Nil	—

Rumania ↔ US

	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1964	1	1	1	.00
1965	1	0	0	-1.00
1966	1	2	0	-.11
1967	Nil	Nil	Nil	—
1968	0	0	1	1.00
1969	0	2	1	.11
1970	Nil	Nil	Nil	—

Rumania ↔ France

	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1964	1	2	1	.00
1965	1	1	2	.12
1966	1	4	4	.15
1967	Nil	Nil	Nil	—
1968	0	2	2	.25
1969	Nil	Nil	Nil	—
1970	Nil	Nil	Nil	—

GDP ↔ CSSR

	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1964	N11	N11	N11	—
1965	N11	N11	N11	—
1966	N11	N11	N11	—
1967	0	1	1	.25
1968	2	1	0	-.44
1969	0	1	0	.00
1970	N11	N11	N11	—

D.A.M.E.D. Data SetNATO and WTO Cross-alliance Dyads

US ↔ USSR

	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1964	7	2	10	.08
1965	6	0	0	-1.00
1966	4	0	6	.12
1967	3	3	0	-.25
1968	4	4	2	-.08
1969	3	3	3	.00
1970	3	3	2	-.05

UK ↔ USSR

	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1964	3	3	3	.00
1965	3	8	2	-.02
1966	2	7	0	-.05
1967	3	7	2	-.02
1968	6	2	1	-.37
1969	4	2	2	-.13
1970	N11	N11	N11	—

3 3

OF/DE

FRG ↔ USSR

	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1964	3	3	0	-.25
1965	2	0	0	-1.00
1966	2	0	0	-1.00
1967	2	4	0	-.11
1968	2	7	0	-.05
1969	6	8	0	-.18
1970	0	10	1	.01

GDR ↔ FRG

	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1964	2	1	0	-.44
1965	1	1	0	-.25
1966	2	1	1	-.13
1967	0	1	0	.00
1968	7	5	1	-.25
1969	4	7	0	-.13
1970	0	12	2	.02

France ↔ USSR

	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1964	2	0	0	-1.00
1965	0	4	1	.04
1966	0	8	11	.34
1967	3	2	1	-.17
1968	4	2	0	-.44
1969	3	4	4	.03
1970	0	4	3	.18

GDR ↔ France

1964	N11	N11	N11	—
1965	N11	N11	N11	—
1966	N11	N11	N11	—
1967	N11	N11	N11	—
1968	1	0	0	-1.00
1969	1	0	0	-1.00
1970	N11	N11	N11	—

D.A.M.E.D. Data Set1968, Events within WTO and Across NATO/WTO

	M Code *
USSR to US, UK, France	12
USSR to FRG	13
US, UK, France to USSR	19
CSSR and UK	9
CSSR and UK	10
GDR to FRG	17
US to USSR	19
UK to USSR	19
France to USSR	19
US, UK, France to USSR	16
Bulgaria and CSSR	10
Bulgaria and CSSR	10
USSR to US	11
GDR to France	11
France to Rumania	11
France and Rumania	9
France to Rumania	11
Hungary and Poland	10
Hungary and Poland	10

* See Appendix "A" for identification of Moses Code values, pp. 168-170.

	M Code
GDR and USSR	9
FRG to GDR	28
US to USSR	11
FRG and USSR	13
GDR to all NATO actors	13
All NATO Conference	13
GDR to FRG	13
FRG to GDR	13
FRG to GDR	17
USSR to Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, GDR	13
CSSR to USSR, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, GDR	16
Yugoslavia to USSR, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, GDR	13
Albania to Bulgaria	19
CSSR and USSR	10
USSR and CSSR	10
CSSR and USSR	9
CSSR to USSR, Poland, GDR, Hungary, Bulgaria	9
CSSR to USSR, Poland, GDR, Hungary, Bulgaria	10
UK and Hungary	9
UK and Hungary	10
CSSR to Yugoslavia, GDR, Rumania	10
CSSR and Rumania	9
Rumania to USSR	13

	M Code
CSSR and USSR	10
CSSR and USSR	10
Rumania to USSR	13
CSSR and USSR	10
CSSR and USSR	10
CSSR to USSR, GDR, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria	19
Albania to CSSR, USSR, Poland, Hungary, GDR, Bulgaria	14
CSSR and USSR	10
CSSR and USSR	10
CSSR and USSR	9
CSSR and USSR	9
CSSR and USSR	9
CSSR and USSR	9
USSR to UK	16
CSSR to US	19
FRG to USSR	16
FRG and USSR	10

Appendix "C"Pulse Data SetNATO Dyads within alliance

	US to UK				UK to US			
	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1966	1	13	14	.23	2	12	11	.16
1967	2	12	7	.08	1	11	6	.09
1968	3	9	5	.03	2	7	6	.11
1969	1	7	1	.00	0	4	6	.36
1970	2	17	4	.02	2	17	9	.08
1971	2	10	4	.03	8	9	5	-.05
1972	2	4	2	.00	2	4	5	.12
1973	4	12	5	.01	5	16	12	.08

	US to FRG				FRG to US			
	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1966	1	12	14	.25	3	12	6	.04
1967	1	9	13	.29	6	9	10	.06
1968	3	12	7	.06	5	15	7	.02
1969	2	13	11	.15	4	13	7	.04
1970	0	8	4	.11	3	9	1	-.04
1971	1	4	11	.43	3	6	5	.05
1972	1	7	3	.05	0	6	2	.06
1973	7	18	9	.02	12	20	21	.07

	US to France				France to US			
	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1966	10	10	10	.00	10	12	2	-.14
1967	5	6	3	-.05	6	8	3	-.06
1968	2	6	6	.12	7	10	6	-.01
1969	0	15	5	.06	2	14	10	.12
1970	3	9	7	.08	8	12	11	.03
1971	1	4	2	.04	4	5	2	-.07
1972	5	6	8	.07	5	8	2	-.07
1973	10	17	6	-.04	21	15	9	-.12

	France to UK				UK to France			
	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1966	1	2	4	.25	1	2	4	.25
1967	6	5	2	-.14	6	5	2	-.14
1968	3	3	1	-.12	0	0	1	1.00
1969	3	2	2	-.06	2	3	2	.00
1970	2	4	1	-.04	1	1	2	.13
1971	1	5	5	.17	1	2	5	.31
1972	1	0	1	.00	0	0	3	1.00
1973	0	4	2	.11	0	6	1	.02

	France to FRG				FRG to France			
	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1966	4	8	8	.08	4	10	8	.07
1967	3	0	5	.16	4	0	5	.06
1968	3	7	5	.04	1	9	5	.09
1969	0	4	7	.40	0	5	7	.34
1970	0	0	2	1.00	0	1	0	.00
1971	0	2	5	.51	1	3	7	.35
1972	0	3	2	.16	0	2	3	.36
1973	4	4	7	.09	3	8	7	.09

UK to FRG

FRG to UK

	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1966	1	6	7	.21	0	6	5	.21
1967	2	4	3	.04	0	3	6	.44
1968	1	1	3	.24	0	2	4	.44
1969	2	2	5	.19	2	4	3	.04
1970	2	2	6	.24	0	2	6	.56
1971	0	2	1	.11	0	2	3	.36
1972	0	1	1	.25	0	1	3	.56
1973	0	4	2	.11	0	5	2	.08

Pulse Data SetWTO Dyads within alliance

	USSR to CDP				GDP to USSR			
	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1966	0	3	3	.25	0	3	1	.06
1967	0	1	1	.25	1	0	1	.00
1968	0	3	2	.16	0	3	2	.16
1969	0	6	2	.06	0	4	1	.04
1970	0	6	1	.02	0	6	3	.11
1971	0	3	4	.33	0	3	3	.25
1972	0	1	0	.00	1	1	1	.25
1973	0	1	3	.56	0	1	3	.56

	USSR to CSSP				CSSP to USSR			
	N11	N11	N11	—	N11	N11	N11	—
1966	0	1	0	.00	0	1	1	.25
1967	66	39	23	-.17	22	36	19	-.01
1968	8	11	14	.08	3	9	9	.12
1969	0	1	2	.44	0	1	3	.56
1970	1	0	2	.22	0	0	4	1.00
1971	0	1	0	.00	0	1	0	.00
1972	0	1	2	.44	0	1	1	.25
1973	0	1	2	.44	0	1	1	.25

	USSR to Rumania				Rumania to USSR			
	N11	N11	N11	—	N11	N11	N11	—
1966	0	1	0	.00	2	1	0	-.44
1967	1	2	1	.00	2	3	1	-.06
1968	6	4	0	-.36	6	3	1	-.30
1969	2	4	1	-.04	4	4	3	-.03
1970	0	1	1	.25	2	1	1	-.13
1971	N11	N11	N11	—	1	0	0	-1.00
1972	0	1	0	.00	0	2	0	.00
1973	N11	N11	N11	—	N11	N11	N11	—

Pulse Data SetNATO and WTO Cross-alliance Dyads

	US to USSR				USSR to US			
	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1966	36	25	26	-.05	83	16	20	-.37
1967	22	25	25	.01	65	20	15	-.33
1968	42	28	18	-.13	70	19	15	-.36
1969	29	46	24	-.02	50	42	25	-.09
1970	49	67	21	-.07	102	52	21	-.27
1971	43	32	23	-.09	93	32	13	-.39
1972	28	43	45	.06	73	43	43	-.09
1973	45	74	91	.09	67	76	95	.05

	UK to USSR				USSR to UK			
	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1966	3	12	2	-.01	6	8	2	-.09
1967	5	7	5	-.00	5	6	4	-.02
1968	12	11	6	-.09	14	4	3	-.25
1969	6	5	3	-.09	5	9	2	-.06
1970	5	8	1	-.10	6	11	0	-.12
1971	10	7	2	-.22	14	6	0	-.49
1972	3	2	0	-.36	7	0	1	-.66
1973	1	5	3	.07	6	6	4	-.05

	FRG to USSR				USSR to FRG			
	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1966	3	3	2	-.05	10	0	2	-.56
1967	5	3	1	-.25	8	1	0	-.79
1968	16	8	3	-.29	22	11	2	-.36
1969	4	11	3	-.01	12	21	7	-.04
1970	0	15	12	.20	6	13	16	.13
1971	1	3	3	.12	6	6	3	-.08
1972	0	3	3	.25	3	2	3	.00
1973	2	5	5	.10	3	6	6	.08

France to USSR

USSR to France

	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1966	0	10	10	.25	1	7	9	.25
1967	3	3	0	-.25	2	5	0	-.08
1968	8	10	3	-.09	4	6	2	-.08
1969	4	8	5	.02	3	0	4	.02
1970	4	11	8	.06	3	11	8	.08
1971	5	3	7	.06	0	4	0	.48
1972	1	2	1	.00	0	2	2	.25
1973	8	7	8	.00	1	0	8	.17

US to Rumania

Rumania to US

	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1966	1	2	1	.00	1	2	1	.00
1967	1	4	1	.00	0	5	0	.00
1968	0	1	4	.64	1	0	2	.22
1969	0	1	1	.25	1	2	0	-.11
1970	0	1	2	.44	2	1	0	-.44
1971	0	0	1	1.00	1	0	1	.00
1972	0	2	5	.51	0	3	2	.16
1973	0	3	8	.53	0	4	8	.44

US to GDP

GDP to US

	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1966	4	0	1	-.48	4	1	2	-.16
1967	1	0	0	-1.00	0	1	1	.25
1968	6	0	1	-.61	1	1	2	.13
1969	6	0	1	-.61	2	0	1	-.22
1970	0	0	1	1.00	2	1	0	-.22
1971	1	1	0	-.25	1	0	1	.00
1972	3	1	0	-.19	3	5	1	-.07
1973	1	9	1	.00	2	7	1	-.02

US to CSSE

CSSE to US

	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Co.
1966	4	2	0	-.44	4	1	1	-.33
1967	2	1	1	-.13	3	1	2	.00
1968	1	3	0	-.06	4	5	2	-.07
1969	2	1	0	-.44	2	2	1	-.24
1970	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	3	0	0	-1.00
1971	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	5	0	1	-.56
1972	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	2	0	0	-1.00
1973	0	3	1	.06	1	3	1	.00

FRG to CSSE

CSSE to FRG

1966	0	1	0	.00	Nil	Nil	Nil	—
1967	0	2	1	.11	2	2	1	-.08
1968	2	1	3	.08	3	3	2	-.05
1969	1	1	2	.13	4	2	2	-.13
1970	0	0	2	1.00	0	3	2	.16
1971	0	1	0	.00	0	1	0	.00
1972	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	0	1	0	.00
1973	1	3	8	.39	0	3	8	.07

FRG to GDR

GDR to FRG

1966	9	1	3	-.32	10	4	3	-.24
1967	2	5	2	.00	13	11	1	-.25
1968	5	5	2	-.10	22	5	2	-.52
1969	7	8	4	-.06	24	14	5	-.25
1970	6	8	7	.01	22	19	12	-.08
1971	6	13	10	.05	10	18	9	-.01
1972	3	5	10	.22	6	7	11	.10
1973	8	1	2	-.40	9	3	4	-.18

Appendix "D"Regression Coefficients per DyadNATO (intra-alliance)

<u>Dyad</u>	<u>Intercept</u>	<u>Regression Co.</u>	<u>t Test</u>	<u>Std. Error</u>
US ↔ UK	38.71429	-5.60714	-1.30285	4.30374
US to UK	15.28571	-2.28571	-2.58799	0.88320 *
UK to US	18.14286	-1.39286	-0.76227	1.82725
US ↔ FRG	12.00000	-0.32928	-0.10293	3.81669
US to FRG	27.32143	-2.23810	-1.00930	2.21746
FRG to US	2.57143	0.26190	0.45741	0.57258
US ↔ France	-23.85714	2.42857	1.18733	2.04540
US to France	1.78571	0.29762	0.26958	1.10402
France to US	-2.92857	-0.32143	-0.22343	1.43861
UK ↔ France	29.71429	-2.75000	-0.31460	8.74140
France to UK	-1.14286	0.72619	0.31160	2.33055
UK to France	20.60714	2.55952	0.35069	7.29854
France ↔ FRG	1.85714	1.53571	0.46125	3.32948
France to FRG	19.35714	2.47619	0.46408	5.33574
FRG to France	5.85714	2.47619	1.06807	2.31838
UK ↔ FRG	46.71429	-6.75000	-2.02103	3.33989
UK to FRG	17.32143	0.01190	0.00920	1.29386
FRG to UK	33.78571	-0.03571	-0.01050	3.40158

Asterisk indicates the standard error is less than one-half of the regression coefficient.

Based on data from 1964 to 1973.

Regression Coefficients per DyadWTO (intra-alliance)

<u>Dyad</u>	<u>Intercept</u>	<u>Regression Co.</u>	<u>t Test</u>	<u>Std. Error</u>
USSR ↔ GDR	-39.00000	9.50000	0.84722	11.21319
USSR to GDR	12.92857	1.65476	0.54363	3.04390
GDR to USSR	9.39286	6.05952	3.59304	1.68646 *
USSR ↔ CSSR	3.00000	-0.10714	-0.14228	0.75306
CSSR to USSR	5.85714	4.72619	0.85463	5.53012
USSR to CSSR	-11.78571	5.45238	1.87678	2.90518
USSR ↔ Rumania	38.42857	-7.75000	-0.86865	8.92187
USSR to Rumania	-9.21429	1.63095	0.61073	2.67050
Rumania to USSR	-30.82143	1.40476	0.24679	5.69221

Asterisk indicates the standard error is less than one-half of the regression coefficient.

Based on data from 1964 to 1973.

Regression Coefficients per DyadNATO/WTG (cross-alliance)

<u>Dyad</u>	<u>Intercept</u>	<u>Regression Co.</u>	<u>t Test</u>	<u>Std. Error</u>
US ↔ USSR	-37.00000	5.03571	0.65707	7.66384
US to USSR	-9.46429	1.54762	1.42941	1.08270
USSR to US	-43.85714	4.60714	2.28842	2.01324 *
UK ↔ USSR	-47.71429	5.03571	0.49886	10.09444
UK to USSR	-1.21429	-1.95238	-0.92121	2.11936
USSR to UK	-4.78571	-4.04762	-1.10982	3.64708
FRG ↔ USSR	-87.00000	12.03571	1.70518	7.05834
FRG to USSR	-26.00000	5.91667	2.69837	2.19269 *
USSR to FRG	-70.82143	11.23810	3.64071	3.08679 *
France ↔ USSR	-62.85714	10.92857	1.58346	6.90172
France to USSR	0.67857	-0.01190	0.00504	2.36028
USSR to France	-11.39286	7.72619	1.52166	5.07747
Rumania ↔ US	9.85714	2.10714	0.27999	7.52572
Rumania to US	-28.00000	4.50000	0.61987	7.25964
US to Rumania	1.78571	8.96429	2.12232	4.22381 *
GDR ↔ FRG	-38.28571	5.35714	2.33759	2.29173 *
GDR to FRG	-38.60714	4.60714	1.84497	2.49714
FRG to GDR	-5.32143	0.40476	0.11421	3.54401
US to GDR	-80.85714	12.02381	1.38709	8.66838
GDR to US	1.53571	-1.20238	-0.43903	2.73872
US to CSSR	-38.17857	5.67857	2.34040	2.42632 *
CSSR to US	-12.21429	-5.95238	-0.90615	6.56890
CSSR to FRG	-7.50000	1.58333	1.17629	1.34605
FRG to CSSR	6.32143	3.34524	0.60323	5.54558

Asterisk indicates the standard error is less than one-half of the regression coefficient.

Based on data from 1964 to 1973.

Appendix "E"Annual Percentage of Import Trade from Comecon

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
US from Comecon	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.8
UK from Comecon	4.1	3.8	4.0	3.6	3.9	4.0
FRG from #Comecon (a)	3.6	3.8	3.7	3.7	4.1	4.6
Comecon (b)	---	---	---	5.6	6.0	6.5
France from Comecon	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.7	3.2	3.2

#Comecon (a) based on data available for all Comecon countries except GDR.

Comecon (b) based on data available for all Comecon countries including GDR.

1971 figure represents actual trade percentage; trade levels of 1972 and 1973 were projected at 1.8% on exports and 1.9% on imports respectively. All per centages were based on total trade of designated actor.

Based on current U.S. dollars.

Source: I.M.F., Direction of Trade, vols. 5-9.

Annual Percentage of Export Trade with Comecon

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
US to Comecon	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.9	1.8	3.5
UK to Comecon	2.8	3.6	3.2	2.8	3.3	3.4
FRG to #Comecon (a)	3.5	3.8	3.8	3.9	5.2	6.1
Comecon (b)	---	---	---	5.7	7.0	7.9
France to Comecon	3.6	4.4	3.7	3.5	4.0	4.1

#Comecon (a) based on data available for all Comecon countries except GDR.

Comecon (b) based on data available for all Comecon countries including GDR.

1971 figure represents actual trade percentage; trade levels of 1972 and 1973 were projected at 1.8% on exports and 1.9% on imports respectively. All per centages were based on total trade of designated actor.

Based on current U.S. dollars.

Source: I.M.F., Direction of Trade, vols. 5-9.

U.S. Exports to the USSR by Major Categories, 1971-1974

	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>
Chemicals	38	21	16	28
Manufactured Materials	10	10	25	27
Non-electric machinery	54	53	182	} 225
Electric machinery	6	7	14	
Transport equipment	3	1	8	
Miscellaneous manufacturing	7	9	9	14
Total of manufactured products	<u>118</u>	<u>101</u>	<u>254</u>	<u>294</u>
Food	17	366	843	292
Unprocessed materials	27	71	73	25
Oil and Fats	<u>—</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>—</u>
Total of Agricultural Products	<u>44</u>	<u>439</u>	<u>922</u>	<u>317</u>
Combined total	162	540	1176	611
Adjusted total including unspecified incidentals	162	542	1190	612

a) All figures are in millions of current U.S. dollars.

b) Source: The Bureau of East-West Trade, U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Trade Statistics, (Washington, February: 1975), pp. 59-63, reprinted in M. Goldman, Detente and Dollars, Doing Business with the Soviets, p. 268.

c) In the summer of 1972 following the Moscow summit, the U.S. and the USSR negotiated a wheat and feed grain deal valued at \$750 million over three years combined with U.S. trade credits and most-favoured-nation status for the USSR. By August, 1974 the USSR had obtained nearly \$1 billion in U.S. government credits and U.S. private bank credits at very low interest rates.
Source: NYT, October 20, 1974.

Annual Percentage of Import Trade from Indicated Economic Group Area

	<u>1961</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
USSR from #West	20.1	21.1	25.1	24.3	26.0	25.7	31.4	40.5
Comecon	52.6	59.0	56.4	59.7	60.1	58.2	57.7	54.0
CSSR from West	21.5	18.0	24.1	22.7	23.0	27.4	28.0	30.1
Comecon	63.9	69.1	64.1	67.5	68.1	63.9	65.8	63.6
GDR from West	22.0	20.2	26.3	25.2	23.1	29.0	33.5	34.5
Comecon	71.9	72.9	67.3	68.4	71.0	65.2	62.7	60.9
Rumania from West	29.5	28.0	39.7	48.8	46.0	41.7	33.0	35.1
Comecon	62.6	63.9	52.7	44.6	46.0	46.3	44.7	43.0

Includes all of Western Europe and North America.

Source: U.N. Economic Bulletin for Europe, vols. 19-24, (1967-73).

Based on current U.S. dollars.

All per centages were based on total trade of designated actor.

Annual Percentage of Export Trade with Indicated Economic Group Area

	<u>1961</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
USSR to #West	18.9	19.0	22.6	23.2	22.1	22.7	24.7	29.4
Comecon	56.7	57.1	53.1	52.2	53.0	52.4	52.9	46.4
CSSR to West	18.9	17.0	22.3	22.9	23.0	24.4	25.2	30.7
Comecon	65.8	70.1	63.6	65.4	65.1	64.0	66.7	65.8
GDR to West	21.3	20.1	22.9	22.0	20.9	23.7	24.1	27.5
Comecon	70.0	74.9	68.7	69.9	71.0	69.1	71.0	68.7
Rumania to West	15.3	24.9	20.1	33.4	32.1	36.9	31.0	30.2
Comecon	65.6	65.0	55.9	50.3	52.0	47.9	48.1	47.1

Includes all of Western Europe and North America.

Source: U.N. Economic Bulletin for Europe, vols. 19-24, (1967-73).

Based on current U.S. dollars.

All percentages were based on total trade of designated actor.

Appendix "F"Military Expenditure as % of GNP from 1964-73

<u>NATO</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
US	8.8	8.0	9.2	9.8	9.2	8.4	7.4	7.1	6.7	6.1
UK	#6.0	5.9	5.7	5.7	5.4	5.0	4.8	5.0	5.2	4.9
FRG	#4.7	4.4	4.2	4.4	3.6	3.7	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.4
France	#5.6	5.5	5.3	5.1	4.8	4.4	4.0	3.9	3.4	3.5

Military Expenditure as % of GNP from 1964-73

<u>WTO</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
USSR	5.7	9.0	8.9	9.6	9.3	8.4	7.9	10.3	10.8	10.5
GDR	#3.9	4.1	4.0	4.2	6.4	6.6	6.8	5.2	5.2	5.4
CSSR	#6.3	6.2	5.7	6.0	5.5	5.4	5.4	3.7	3.8	3.8
Rumania	#2.7	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.0	1.9	1.7

Military Expenditure Per Capita from 1964-73

<u>NATO</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
US	\$ 275	275	331	368	396	393	373	378	372	372
UK	\$ 104	108	110	97	98	100	107	109	141	161
FRG	\$ 84	84	84	104	101	103	104	100	146	215
France	\$ 102	105	111	106	121	123	118	101	142	189

Source: I.I.S.S., The Military Balance (1969-1976)

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures (1971)

* The years 1964-1966 were calculated on the basis of available figures from The Military Balance for national population and military expenditure in each year.

Based on current U.S. dollars.

Military Expenditure Per Capita from 1964-73

<u>WTO</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
USSR	*222	195	197	147	169	164	222	224	342	356
GDR	*46	54	56	62	100	116	116	124	109	119
CSSR	*84	86	86	100	105	109	122	127	88	93
Rumania	*17	18	20	27	28	29	37	39	25	25

% of National Population in Armed Forces (18-45 years of Age)

<u>NATO</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>#1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
US	8.9	8.7	8.5	[7.3]	6.1	5.8
UK	4.0	3.8	3.8	[3.6]	3.4	3.3
FRG	3.9	4.0	4.1	[4.1]	4.2	4.0
France	4.9	4.7	5.2	[5.1]	5.1	5.0

WTO

USSR	7.0	7.0	6.9	[7.0]	7.2	6.8
GDR	4.4	4.8	4.1	[4.2]	4.4	4.1
CSSR	7.1	7.2	6.0	[6.1]	6.2	6.3
Rumania	3.9	4.3	4.4	[4.3]	4.3	4.0

Source: I.I.S.S., The Military Balance, (1969-1976).

* The years 1964-1966 were calculated on the basis of available figures from The Military Balance for national population and military expenditure in each year.

Figures for 1971 were not available, therefore calculation based on extrapolation between 1970 and 1972.

Also, figures for 1964-1967 were not available.

Based on current U.S. dollars.

Appendix "G"

Index of UNGA Roll Calls

All Resolutions		Resolutions of NATO-WTO Direct Interest or Europe Generally														
No. of Resolutions	(54)	(53)	(67)	(110)	(96)	(8)	(4)	(15)	(10)	(6)	(6)	(14)	(13)	(23)	(17)	
Year	1966	1968	1970	1972	1973	1965	1966	1967	1967	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
	(a)										(b)					
US and UK	92	81	81	80	89	63	50	87	100	66	83	78	100	87	94	
US and France	72	49	67	60	75	25	50	7	60	33	50	50	62	62	62	
US and FRG	—	—	—	—	62	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	58	
UK and France	74	55	72	73	84	13	0	20	60	33	66	86	62	78	69	
UK and FRG	—	—	—	—	67	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	64	
France and FRG	—	—	—	—	73	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	56	
USSR and CSSR	100	96	100	97	100	88	100	100	100	66	100	100	100	68	100	
USSR and Rumania	97	89	84	71	75	75	75	53	90	33	50	71	77	65	54	
USSR and GDR	—	—	—	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	100	
CSSR and Rumania	97	89	84	71	75	63	75	53	90	50	50	71	77	65	68	
CSSR and GDR	—	—	—	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	100	
Rumania and GDR	—	—	—	—	75	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	54	

Figures based on the Lijphart Agreement Index.

Source: Lynn Schopen, Hanna Newcombe, Chris Young and Chris Evert, Nations on Record:

United Nations General Assembly Roll-Call Votes 1946-1973, Canadian Peace Research Institute, (Oakville, 1975).

Column 1967 (a) refers to the Emergency Special Session of the UN concerning the Six Day War in the Middle East.

Column 1967 (b) refers to the XXII Session of the UN.

Appendix "H"NATO Actor Distances in 1960

US	.545
UK	.337
FRG	.455
France	.178

WTO Actor Distances in 1960

USSR	.752
GDR	.970
CSSR	.604
Rumania	.644

Average for all of NATO: .407

Average for all of WTO: .680

Source: Michael D. Wallace, "Clusters of Nations in the Global System, 1815-1964", in International Studies Quarterly, vol. 19, (March, 1975), pp. 108 and 109.

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