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THE ROLE OF CANADA IN THE UNESCO COMMUNICATION PROGRAM

by

KONDAKAMRLA RAMESH, M.C.J

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements of

Master of Journalism

School of Journalism

**Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario**

8 Jan. 1992

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ISBN 0-315-76017-6

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**The Undersigned recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and
Research acceptance of the thesis**

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Submitted by Kondakamra Ramesh

**in partial fulfilment of the requirements of
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Thesis Supervisor

Chair, School of Journalism

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ABSTRACT

A crisis occurred in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in the 1980s when both the United States and United Kingdom withdrew, depriving the organization of 30 per cent of its total budget. Displeasure over UNESCO involvement in communication issues was cited as one of the main reasons for the withdrawal of both countries. UNESCO exists today mainly due to the efforts of member states like Canada.

This study is an issue-oriented analysis. It will be argued that the communication issues and problems confronting Canada are largely due to the domination of U.S. cultural products. Taking some of these problems as a backdrop, an attempt is made to understand the role of Canada in the UNESCO communication program.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to all those who helped me to complete this thesis.

I owe a great debt of gratitude to Professors Vincent Mosco and Peter Johansen for their incisive and judicious advice throughout the organization and writing of this thesis.

I appreciate the efforts of Professors Stuart Adam, Chris Dornan and Catherine McKercher, who helped me in their capacity as graduate supervisors to get financial assistance from the University.

I owe a special debt of appreciation to, Louis Patenaude, Associate Secretary-General, Canadian Commission for UNESCO; Betty Zimmerman, former Director of Radio Canada International and Member of the MacBride Commission; and Charles Morrow, Chief, Development Communications, CIDA (Retired) for sharing their views and for offering valuable information on many issues pertinent to this thesis.

I am also thankful to the following people for their co-operation in completing this work:

Barbara Harris, Coordinator, St.Patrick's Resource Centre; the Secretarial staff, School of Journalism, Carleton University; Clyde Sanger, North South Institute; the Staff of the Macodrum Library, Carleton University, CCU Library, CIDA Library, Department of Communication Library; and Hiten Dhanani, Paul Upadhayaya, Joshua James and G.Narayana Rao.

This thesis is dedicated to my aunt, P.L.Sarojini.

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INTRODUCTION

A crisis occurred in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in the 1980s when both the United States and United Kingdom withdrew, depriving the organization of 30 per cent of its total budget. Displeasure over UNESCO involvement in communication issues was cited as one of the main reasons for the withdrawal of both countries. As a result, UNESCO was pushed to the brink of collapse. UNESCO exists today mainly due to the efforts of a few member states of the West who decided to remain within the organization and fight for reforms. Canada is one of them.

Despite being a close ally of both the U.S. and U.K., Canada did not join them in their withdrawal from UNESCO. Its decision to stay at a very crucial time not only proved Canada's commitment to multilateralism, but also increased the prestige of Canada in the eyes of the Third World. Canada had also justified its role as a middle power and as a mediator between the South and the North, by staying within UNESCO and working for reforms.

Canada, like other Western states, believes in the free flow of information, and a free press, independent of state control. But as Thomas McPhail puts it:

Canada has tried to protect and support its domestic cultural industries. The protection is from U.S. cultural domination for the most part...The history of Canadian broadcasting has been a story of countering U.S. radio, television, film, and magazine influence; the writings of Canadians like Harold Innis and Marshall McLuhan are based on the crucial relationship of culture and communication.¹

Some of the legislation enacted by Canada to protect its cultural industries appears to contradict the notion of the free flow of information. These contradictions offer an interesting

case study for the ongoing debates on international communication issues. William Melody, commenting in 1977 on Canadian communication, said that "today, Canada finds itself in the anomalous position of being the world's most modern developing country...it is an advanced industrial society, pioneering in the development of telecommunications-space-biased technologies that encourage the extension of empires. But it also has all the problems of developing nations."² The basic aim of this study is to examine Canada's participation and role in the UNESCO communication program, taking into consideration Canada's own communication issues. Before going into the details of the structure and organization of the study, it would be relevant to discuss briefly (1) the role and importance of UNESCO in international communications and (2) Canada's communication scene and its relevance to international communication.

UNESCO AND COMMUNICATION

UNESCO was created on the "assumption that the resources of education, science, and culture could usefully contribute to international peace and security by complementing the work of the United Nations."³ The preamble to the UNESCO constitution states that "since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed."⁴ After World War II, the war-weary nations created UNESCO to foster international intellectual cooperation and promote through the educational, scientific and cultural relations of the peoples of the world the objectives of international peace and the common welfare of mankind. But from the beginning, differences of opinion among the member states

always stood in the way of the Organization's progress. Comments William Preston Jr.:

However, almost before the ink had dried on UNESCO'S constitution, some of its founding members threatened the organization with their discordant national interests and political ideologies. The utopian launching of this magnificent venture sent it forward, not fatally flawed, but tainted by the very human weaknesses it was designed to forestall and correct. The world, as always, would have to lift itself by its own bootstraps, yet UNESCO could and would provide an essential leverage for that effort, when and if the world was willing to let it.⁵

FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION

Article I, clause 2, of the UNESCO Constitution outlining Purpose and Functions, states that the organization will:

Collaborate in the work of advancing the mutual knowledge and understanding of peoples, through all means of mass communication and to that end recommend such international agreements as may be necessary to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image.⁶

In pursuit of this ideal, UNESCO strived for the removal of many barriers to the free flow of information. It has helped member states arrive at a series of international agreements like the Universal Copyright Convention, adopted in Geneva in 1952 by the Intergovernmental Copyright Conference, which standardizes international copyright procedure for literary, scientific, and artistic works; the Agreement on Importation of Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Materials in 1950, which eliminates duties on books, newspapers, magazines, educational films and recordings, works of art, certain kinds of scientific equipment, and articles; and the Agreement for Facilitating the International Circulation of Visual and Auditory Materials of 1954, which calls for elimination of tariffs, quotas, licensing systems and other

import regulations. Fourteen countries which participated in the 1956 Geneva Conference of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) seem to have acted on the suggestion of the Director General of UNESCO and reduced import duties on educational, scientific and cultural materials.⁷ UNESCO also proposed the reduction of postal, freight, and telegraph rates at the 1952 Congress of the Universal Postal Union, and the proposal was adopted.

However, it was a UNESCO survey, carried out over five years in 152 countries and territories, which showed for the first time the pitiful state of communication infrastructure in developing countries.⁸ These reports were further revised and enlarged to cover 170 states and territories, and were published in a single volume, World Communications.⁹ "The report showed that two-thirds of the world's population, 2,000 million people, lacked even minimum access to information and to the general education which mass media can provide."¹⁰ This prompted UNESCO to suggest a minimum of ten copies of a daily newspaper, five radio sets, two cinema seats and two television receivers per 100 habitants. Wilbur Schramm, using the 1962 figures as a baseline and taking the average annual growth rate, calculated the time that the developing countries needed to achieve UNESCO minima of mass media requirements:

- To reach the standard of ten copies of daily newspapers for each 100 persons would take Africa until 2035, Asia until 1992;
- To reach the standard of five radio receivers for each 100 persons would take Africa until 1968, Asia until 1970;
- To reach the standard of two cinema seats for each 100 persons would take Africa until 2042, Asia until 1981.¹¹

Many countries in the Third World are yet to achieve these minimum standards. Gonzalez Manet points out that "as of 1984, during the period referred to by some Western theorists as 'the age of informatics,' some 40 countries still lacked television and 35 nations lacked

newspapers."¹²

Apart from the above-mentioned reports, during the 1950s UNESCO published three books which dealt with the free flow of information: (1) Transmitting World News (1953),¹³ (2) The Problems of Transmitting Press Messages (1956)¹⁴ and (3) Broadcasting Without Barriers (1959).¹⁵ In 1952 UNESCO started publishing a series of monographs entitled "Reports and Papers on Mass Communication," which deal with every aspect of communication. Monographs are still being published under this series. These studies are perhaps the only source of knowledge about mass communication in many Third World countries in the early '50s and '60s.

UNESCO had also concentrated on the upgrading of the profession of mass media in collaboration with universities in the developing world, as it was found that many countries in the Third World lacked training facilities. For example, the Centre for Higher Education in Journalism was established in 1957 with UNESCO help at the University of Strasbourg with the aim in particular of promoting exchange of curricula and methods and experiences in teaching research. By the time UNESCO assistance to it was phased out in 1975, the centre had held twenty-eight international meetings with more than 1,200 participants and trained more than 100 journalists, primarily from African countries.¹⁶ UNESCO supported the University of Quito from 1959-73, to establish a centre which trained teachers in journalism from Latin American countries. Assistance was also extended to start a training program for African journalists in 1963 at the University of Dakar, to establish a Mass Communication Institute at the University of Philippines in 1964, to start a journalism school at Nairobi, to create the Institute of Mass Communication at the University of West Indies in 1974 (as a joint venture of the University

of West Indies, the Jamaican Government and the UNDP/UNESCO Communications Project), and to establish an Institute of Mass Communication in 1973 at the University of Lagos.

If not for the efforts of UNESCO, many of the Third World countries would not have mass media training institutes to train their media professionals. Unfortunately UNESCO achievements in this direction are overlooked by the West when they accuse it of activities which run against the free flow of information. During the '60s many developing countries, freed from colonial ties, joined UNESCO. The '60s was declared the Development Decade by the United Nations. During this period it was realised that mass media have a very powerful role to play in the socio-economic aspects of the developing countries which were riddled with problems like illiteracy, poverty and other social evils. UNESCO was asked by the Economic and Social Council to look into ways and means of providing assistance to developing countries in information media. UNESCO carried out a study to this effect by holding three meetings: in Bangkok, 1960, for the Asian region;¹⁷ Santiago, Chile in 1961 for Latin America,¹⁸ and in Paris, 1962, covering African countries.¹⁹ These deliberations led to the landmark study of Wilbur Schramm entitled Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information in Developing Countries,²⁰ which for the first time offered insight into many of the problems the developing countries are facing in the mass communication field.

These regional meetings suggested that national and regional news agencies be set up to allow the flow of information within the neighbouring countries and regions. Acting on these suggestions, UNESCO assisted many countries, such as Somalia, Libya, United Republic of Cameroon and Nepal, to set up their own news agencies. Today, as a result of UNESCO initiatives, there are many regional and national agencies catering to the information needs of

the Third World. But once the regional agencies were set up, an argument about imbalances in the flow of information began to surface, particularly in the '70s. Many intergovernmental meetings, summits and conferences discussed the issue of the imbalances in the flow of information between the developed and developing countries. The 'Non-aligned Symposium of Information', held in March, 1976 in Tunis, is very important, as in this conference the phrase 'international information order' was first used. The developing countries began to demand the establishment of a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) to reduce the imbalances in the flow of information. The NWICO demand of Third World Countries encompassed many issues-- such as the Western domination of news flows, threats to cultural sovereignty and national identity due to the infiltration of alien cultural products, etc.-- which irritated the West.

Meanwhile the rapidly emerging communication technologies and electronic miniaturisation of electronic equipment brought renewed concerns on a global scale. For example, direct satellite broadcasting and transborder data flow not only bothered the Third World but also created problems among the developed countries. Though some of these issues are outside the realm of UNESCO today, its intervention was sought during the '60s and '70s. For example, in 1964 UNESCO was invited to define the principles and main lines of a long-term programme to promote the use of space communication for the free flow of information, the rapid spread of education and greater cultural exchange'.²¹ With the East lending support to the Third World demand for NWICO, the West began to denounce the concept even more. UNESCO became the forum for discussing communication issues and the centre stage for projecting differing ideological and political views by the East and the West. The "Declaration

of Fundamental Principles concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racism, Apartheid and Incitement to War"²² (popularly known as the Mass Media Declaration) and the appointment of the "International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems"²³ (MacBride Commission) further intensified the debates on communication. This study begins with the attempt to examine Canada's involvement and its views on both the Mass Media Declaration and the MacBride Commission Report.

WHY CANADA

In a statement during the 21st UNESCO General Conference in 1980, Canadian delegate Gabriel Warren, quoting the Canadian Minister of Communications, said:

Like many other countries, Canada is a crucible of the key communications issues...We in Canada occupy an immense land mass with both developed urban and rural regions as well as vast stretches of isolated and still developing areas. While we are a sophisticated country in terms of new communications technologies and applications, we also share with developing countries many concerns related to political, cultural and economic sovereignty...As a developed country, we have introduced new communications technology of our own since the beginning of the era...As a nation which is still developing, we are concerned that our national sovereignty and identity not be eroded as a thoughtless application of technologies without regard for their implications for the economic and social fabric of the country...We are and will remain committed to the freest possible flow of information.²⁴

The above quotation amply explains why Canada's communication is worth examining in the context of global communication issues. The study also tries to find out how Canada can

benefit by participating in UNESCO's communication program. The move towards deregulation and privatization in communications in the U.S. and to a certain extent in the European countries will have an effect on Canada's communication policy. Also the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the proposed Trilateral Free Trade Agreement between Canada the U.S. and Mexico, are bound to have far-reaching effects on Canada's cultural industries, which will in turn reflect on global communications. The public sector services in Canada are already on a slide. Some of the communication issues confronting Canada today are close to global communication issues. This study tries to explore some of these issues.

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The study is more or less an issue-oriented analysis. It will be argued that the communication issues and problems confronting Canada are largely due to the domination of U.S. cultural products. Taking these problems as a backdrop, an attempt is made to understand the role of Canada in the UNESCO communication program. The study is divided into four chapters, each dealing with a specific issue or issues.

In chapter one, we look at Canada and the Report of the MacBride Commission. The intense communication debates in the '70s at UNESCO resulted in adopting a Mass Media Declaration and the appointment of the MacBride Commission. The deliberations in adopting the Declaration were centred around the issue of state intervention in mass communications, unacceptable to the West and highly favoured by the East. The MacBride Commission was appointed to examine problems besetting world communications and suggest ways and means to overcome these problems.

The West had serious reservations about the Third World demand for NWICO, which involved such issues as "national communication policies", "national sovereignty over information" and "democratisation" of communication at the global level. The West thinks that these issues lead towards increased control of the state in media affairs. However, these issues were given due consideration in the deliberations of the MacBride Commission Report. This chapter will focus its attention on the MacBride Commission's Report, Canada's participation in it, and this country's reaction to the final report. Canada had reservations about the Report, the reasons for which will be examined. This exercise will help in understanding Canada's opinion on certain key international communications issues like protection for journalists, the role of governments in mass media, domination of transnational corporation, (TNCs), etc.

Chapter 2 examines Canada's role in the International Program for the Development of Communications (IPDC). The Western countries concluded by the end of the '70s that the solution to the Third World's communication problems lies in the improvement of domestic communications infrastructure, and they convinced the Third World to this effect. This belief led to the establishment of the International Program for the Development of Communication (IPDC), to increase cooperation and assistance for the development of communication infrastructures and reduce the gap between various countries in the communication field. The United States took the initiative in establishing the IPDC, but later lost interest in it. IPDC is hailed as a highly pragmatic and useful program by the West and the Third World alike, but it is not receiving the kind of encouragement it ought to receive. IPDC is principally a fund-raising program, but the Western nations are not making a sufficiently significant contribution for it to carry on with its task. Canada showed keen enthusiasm in IPDC in the beginning and made

impressive donations. Today IPDC is not receiving much patronage from Canada. The reasons for Canada's lack of interest are examined.

Chapter 3 attempts to trace the reasons, from the communications point of view, for Canada's decision to stay within UNESCO, in spite of the withdrawal of the U.S., its major trade partner. (There may be political reasons behind the decision, but those are not probed here.) It could also be well established that Canada gains more by staying within UNESCO than by withdrawing, particularly in the area of communication. Some of the communication issues that confront the Canada-United States relationship assume international importance, and a few of them are examined in this chapter.

The last chapter tries to explore the implications of recent trends in international communications for Canada's communication policy. An attempt is also made to examine whether Canada's communication has anything to offer Eastern European and Third World countries who are trying to apply the free market economy principle in communications. Canada's desire to play the middle power role and a mediator role between the North and South in the international communication context is also discussed. These situations reflect on Canada's participation in the UNESCO communication program.

A FEW CLARIFICATIONS...

Though the UNESCO communication program includes every medium of mass communication, attention here has been paid basically to issues concerned with the print, broadcasting and film media. It is beyond the scope of this study to deal with every aspect of mass communication in which UNESCO is involved. Issues pertaining to telecommunications,

informatics and satellite communications are not discussed in great depth-- mention is made of them only when it was felt that discussion would help to reinforce an argument or point out a conflicting issue.

Debates on communication issues during the '70s mostly revolved around such issues as licensing journalists, press censorship, bias in reporting, etc. These issues are no longer being discussed in the international fora like UNESCO and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), partly because of the political reforms taking place in Eastern Europe and other places. For example, acting on a recommendation adopted at an informal East-West press meeting held in February 1990, UNESCO helped establish an Eastern European Media Centre in Warsaw; its main objectives are to promote sustainable media freedom and independence and to foster cooperation in exchanging information between the East and West.

At a 1948 United Nations conference, it was proclaimed that freedom of information was the touchstone of all freedom to which the UN is dedicated. The concept of freedom of information became an ideal of both the UN and UNESCO. A booklet distributed by UNESCO explains the different roles that the organizations were expected to play as follows:

Gradually a logical division of task has been established between the two organizations. UNESCO took on the technical pedagogical tasks, plus, later, the preparatory work in the field of communication economics, while the United Nations itself assumed the main responsibility for the intricate political and legal questions that arose from the preparation of first a Convention on Freedom of Information and later a proposed Universal Declaration of Information.²⁵

Unfortunately UNESCO was turned into a battleground on which the developed and developing countries confronted each other over the political and legal aspects of international communication; this ought to have been discussed in the United Nations. Both the West and the

East tried to inject their respective ideologies into the communication debates, leaving the Third World in a state of confusion. Now the situation has literally turned around. The world is talking in terms of free-market and Western ideologies. How things are going to shape up in the near future is anybody's guess.

UNESCO, since its beginning, played a key role in developing the mass communication infrastructure in developing countries. In this age of co-operation, UNESCO should continue such endeavour with more vigour, to suggest ways and means to bridge the wide gulf existing in communication between the developed and developing countries. The data given in the tables at the end of this introduction will show the imbalances existing in world mass communications. Canada's knowledge and experiences gained through its experiments with communication, the various Committees and Commissions appointed to look into the matters of mass media and the communication policy decisions taken during the past and present can all contribute to enhancing UNESCO's communication program. Canada can also benefit a lot by participating in the UNESCO program.

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TABLE 1

Distribution of Book Production (in No. of Titles) by Continents and Major Areas: Estimated Percentage 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1988

Data prior to 1980 do not include China

* Excluding Arab States

Source: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1990

TABLE 2

**Distribution of Circulation of Daily Newspapers by Continents and Major Areas:
Estimated Percentage 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975 and 1988**

Source: **UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1990**

TABLE 3

**Distribution of Newsprint Consumption by Continents and Major Areas:
Estimated Percentage 1965, 1970, 1975 and 1988**

* Excluding Arab States

Source: **UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1990**

TABLE 4

Distribution of Radio Receivers by Continent and Major Areas: Estimated Percentage 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1988

Source: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1990

TABLE 5

**Distribution of Television by Continents and Major Areas: Estimated Percentage
1970, 1975, 1980 and 1988**

* Excluding Arab States

Source: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1990

TABLE 6

**Estimated Annual Cinema Attendance by Continents and Major Areas
1965, 1970, 1980 and 1987**

Excluding Arab States

Data do not include China

Source: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1990

TABLE 7

Estimated Cinema Seating Capacity Per 1,000 Inhabitants by Continents and Major Areas: 1960, 1965, 1979, 1975, 1980 and 1987

Source: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1990

TABLE 8
NUMBER OF BOOK TITLES PUBLISHED

Continents and major areas and groups of countries	Book Production: Number of Titles						
	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1988
World total	332,000	426,000	521,000	572,000	715,500	798,500	834,500
Africa	5,000	7,000	8,000	11,000	12,000	13,000	12,000
America	35,000	77,000	105,000	121,000	142,000	154,000	154,000
Asia	51,000	61,000	75,000	88,000	138,000	189,000	200,000
Europe (Inc. USSR)	239,000	260,000	317,000	343,000	411,000	430,000	456,000
Oceania	2,000	5,000	7,000	9,000	12,500	12,000	12,000
Developed Countries	285,000	366,000	451,000	484,000	570,000	585,500	613,000
Developing Countries	47,000	60,000	70,000	88,000	145,500	213,000	221,500
Africa (Exc. Arab States)	2,400	4,300	4,600	8,300	9,000	10,000	9,200
Asia (Exc. Arab States)	49,900	59,700	73,700	85,800	134,500	186,000	196,000
Arab States	3,700	4,000	4,700	4,900	6,500	6,400	6,700
Northern America	18,000	58,000	83,000	92,000	99,000	104,000	106,000
Latin America and the Caribbean	17,000	19,000	22,000	29,000	43,000	50,000	48,000

Source: World Communication Report, (Paris: UNESCO, 1989)

TABLE 9
NUMBER OF BOOK TITLES PER MILLION INHABITANTS

Continents, major areas, and groups of countries	Number of titles per million inhabitants						
	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1988
World total	144	168	187	184	161	164	164
Africa	19	23	23	27	25	24	20
America	84	167	206	216	231	231	220
Asia	53	57	62	65	54	67	68
Europe (Inc. USSR)	374	385	464	471	548	558	584
Oceania	121	286	361	428	543	480	462
Developed Countries	296	357	420	431	497	493	507
Developing Countries	35	40	41	45	44	59	57
Africa (Exc. Arab States)	12	18	17	27	25	24	20
Asia (Exc. Arab States)	53	58	63	65	54	68	68
Arab States	40	38	38	35	39	33	32
Northern America	91	271	367	389	393	392	390
Latin America and the Caribbean	79	77	78	89	119	125	122

Source: World Communication Report, 1989.

TABLE 10
NUMBER AND CIRCULATION OF DAILY NEWSPAPERS

Continents, major areas and groups of countries	Number of dailies		Estimated Circulation			
			Total (Millions)		Per 1,000 inhabitants	
	1975	1988	1975	1988	1975	1988
World Total	7,900	8,590	451	575	110	113
Africa	180	210	6	11	14	17
America	3,010	2,980	90	108	160	154
Asia	2,210	2,960	128	192	54	64
Europe (Incl. USSR)	2,380	2,330	220	259	302	333
Oceania	120	110	7	6	308	226
Developed Countries	4,600	4,390	355	406	316	337
Developing Countries	3,200	4,200	96	169	32	43
Africa (Exc. Arab States)	150	160	4	7	12	14
Asia (Exc. Arab States)	2,130	2,880	127	189	55	64
Arab States	110	130	3	7	23	32
Northern America	1,900	1,780	66	68	275	252
Latin America and the Caribbean	1,110	1,200	24	40	75	92

Source: World Communication Report, 1989.

TABLE 11
NUMBER OF RADIO BROADCASTING TRANSMITTERS

Continents, major areas and groups of countries	Total number of radio broadcasting transmitters				
	1965	1970	1975	1980	1987
World Total	16,400	22,100	25,800	28,480	37,850
Africa	500	680	730	900	1,450
America	9,640	10,910	12,730	14,300	17,000
Asia	1,390	1,930	2,730	2,950	4,650
Europe (including USSR)	4,580	8,270	9,280	9,900	14,160
Oceania	290	310	330	430	590
Developed countries	11,670	16,200	19,100	21,000	25,850
Developing countries	4,730	5,900	6,700	7,480	12,000
Africa (excluding Arab states)	400	560	580	680	1,140
Asia (excluding Arab states)	160	220	250	360	640
Arab States	160	220	250	360	640
Northern America	6,170	6,770	8,530	9,700	10,670
Latin America and the Caribbean	3,470	4,140	4,200	4,600	6,330

Source: World Communication Report, 1989.

TABLE 12
NUMBER OF RADIO BROADCASTING RECEIVERS

Continents, major areas and groups of countries	Number of radio broadcasting receivers					per 1000 inhabitants				
	1970	1975	1980	1985	1988	1970	1975	1980	1985	1988
World Total	735	1,036	1,293	1,598	1,891	197	225	292	330	370
Africa	16	28	49	77	101	44	68	102	138	166
America	357	505	571	655	691	698	900	930	981	985
Asia	70	138	245	408	543	33	58	95	144	181
Europe (including USSR)	283	348	409	434	531	403	478	545	564	683
Oceania	9	17	19	24	25	474	818	823	958	984
Developed countries	623	845	986	1,081	1,215	590	766	861	911	1,008
Developing countries	112	191	307	517	676	43	66	93	141	173
Africa (excluding Arab states)	8	17	31	48	66	31	55	86	113	142
Asia (excluding Arab states)	68	132	235	394	527	33	57	93	143	180
Arab states	10	17	28	43	51	81	121	172	228	245
Northern America	306	424	471	522	545	1,353	1,777	1,869	1,973	2,008
Latin America and the Caribbean	51	81	100	133	133	180	251	276	328	339
Arab States	10	17	28	43	51	81	121	172	228	245

Source: World Communication Report, 1989.

TABLE 13
NUMBER OF TELEVISION TRANSMITTERS

Continents, major areas and groups of countries	Number of regular television transmitters				
	1965	1970	1975	1980	1987
World Total	8,550	17,700	29,000	38,800	87,810
Africa	100	140	230	270	1,200
America	3,070	4,310	5,000	5,400	8,000
Asia	1,100	3,780	6,700	11,600	25,000
Europe (Inc. USSR)	4,200	9,240	16,700	21,000	52,450
Oceania	80	230	370	500	1,600
Developed countries	8,100	16,900	27,580	36,800	74,000
Developing countries	450	800	1,420	2,000	13,810
Africa (Exc. Arab States)	55	70	120	160	400
Asia (Exc. Arab States)	1,070	3,730	6,630	11,100	24,600
Arab States	75	120	180	310	610
Northern America	2,820	3,850	4,360	4,700	6,410
Latin America and the Caribbean	250	460	640	700	1,590

General Note: Data prior to 1985 do not include China.

Source: World Communication Report, 1989.

TABLE 14
PRODUCTION OF LONG FILMS

Continents, major areas and groups of countries	Estimated production of long films				
	1965	1970	1975	1980	1987
World total	3,850	4,170	3,920	3,630	4,040
Africa	50	60	100	70	80
America	360	480	530	530	840
Asia	2,300	2,315	2,000	1,930	2,100
Europe (inc. USSR)	1,140	1,300	1,250	1,060	980
Oceania	-	15	40	40	40
Developed countries	1,840	2,000	1,860	1,750	1,900
Developing countries	2,010	2,170	2,060	1,880	2,140
Africa (Exc. Arab States)	-	5	5	15	10
Asia (Exc. Arab States)	2,280	2,300	1,990	1,920	2,090
Arab States	70	70	105	65	80
Northern America	200	250	220	300	610
Latin America and the Caribbean	160	230	310	230	230

General Note: Data prior to 1987 do not include China.

Source: World Communication Report, 1989.

CHAPTER I

THE MacBRIDE REPORT: CANADA'S PARTICIPATION AND REACTIONS

Despite everything, the end product of the MacBride Commission's final report--imperfect, insufficient, and with its gross omissions--is, generally speaking, positive. It reveals more than it conceals. It encourages reflection on rarely-examined subjects and provides a more realistic dimension to the causes of dependency and inequality.¹

The Report is an excellent illustration of the dilemma of eclecticism; you try to be comprehensive but lose the totality of which you are supposed to discover. In this respect the Report could well be called 'mission impossible'.²

We are left therefore, in Many Voices One World, with several cutting phrases, some acute insights and quite a bit of cautionary comment about the lurking dangers of the new communications technology. These cannot do more than thinly cover a great gap in the Report-- the absence of any comprehensive analysis of, as well as a regrettable unwillingness to confront, a powerful transnational business system which is, as we write this using every means and technique to do what the Report warns against.³

It could have been worse. That is the best that can be said about the Report last week by UNESCO's controversial MacBride Commission on international communications. When will UNESCO decide to stay inside its educational and cultural bounds and abandon the politically explosive issue of news and the press? UNESCO's General Conference would probably do best to bury the MacBride Report in Belgrade.⁴

Whether you have read it or not, the IPI(International Press Institute), ANPA (American Newspaper Publishers Association), IAPA (Inter-American Press Association), the World Press Freedom Committee believe there is enough wrong with it to constitute a threat to the existence of a free press everywhere.⁵

Generally, the Commission has brought together a great deal of useful and relevant information on world communication problems. Unfortunately, no guiding model, such as Canada's Instant World, was adopted to structure the diverse material presented.⁶

The above are some of the remarks and comments of communications experts on the Report of the International Commission for the Study of Communications Problems⁷ (popularly

known as the MacBride Report, after the Commission's President Sean MacBride). The Report was subjected to harsh criticism both by the media and the governments of the member states of UNESCO. The Western media saw it as a threat to a free press, the Soviet Union did not appreciate some of the issues examined by the Commission (particularly those which dealt with the role of mass media), and the Third World countries felt that it did not go far enough to meet their demands for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). The Report failed to satisfy either the East or the West, the North or the South.

After a review of communication the world over, the Report concluded⁸ that utmost importance should be given to eliminate imbalances and disparities in communication and its structures, particularly in information flows, and that steps be taken by all nations towards democratization of communication at national and international levels. The Report also suggested that developing countries should evolve comprehensive national communication policies linked to social, cultural and economic development objectives.

This chapter will deal with a brief background of the circumstances which led to the appointment of the MacBride Commission; the reactions of the East, the West and the developing countries; Canada's participation in and opinion on the Report; and the relevance of the Report in wake of the recent changes taking place in Europe. An in-depth analysis of the Report is beyond the scope of this research and is too complicated in view of the different opinions held by member states including Canada.

The developing countries, the East and the West, reacted to the Report in a different manner. The criticism directed at specific issues by the member states of UNESCO was not uniform. The Report was itself a much compromised consensus document⁹ with each of the 16

members disagreeing on many issues, and their comments are recorded in the footnotes of the unabridged version of Many Voices One World. In the appendices of the above mentioned book, general comments by four members of the Commission are also presented.

Sergei Losev, a Commissioner from the Soviet Union, pointed out that the Report did not properly define the terms "information" and "communication", felt it did not give importance to the notion of cultural invasion,¹⁰ said that importance was given to age-old notions like "free flow of information", and argued that the achievements of the socialist and developing countries in developing mass communication systems were not taken into consideration by the Commission.¹¹

Mustapha Masmoudhi, another member, felt that the Report should have been titled, "For a New World Information and Communication Order."¹² Gabriel Garcia Marquez and Juan Somavia issued a joint statement, saying that "there is a tendency in different parts of the Report to 'glorify' technological solution to contemporary communication problems."¹³ The issues examined by the Commission did not go uncriticized by one member or the other.

George Beebe, in his introduction to the book, The Media Crisis, published by the World Press Freedom Committee, highlights the positive and negative aspects of the Report as follows:

Positive

Censorship in all forms is condemned.

The right of access applies to private as well as public sources.

Journalists should have no special protection; they will be protected when the rights of all citizens are guaranteed.

Licensing of journalists is rejected because it would require

stipulation by some authority as to who is eligible and on what basis.

Employment of journalists by intelligence agencies of any country is condemned.

Negative

A proposed International Centre for Study and Planning of information and Communications to be established within UNESCO. This appears the most troublesome of proposals to the Western world, for the centre not only would monitor and establish standards for the global media, but would serve as a training centre as well.

A consistent advocacy of pressuring if not requiring news media (including "transnational", or the international news agencies) to promote government-set "social, cultural, economic and political goals."

A bias against private ownership of news media and communication facilities.

A bias against "problems created in a society by advertising."

A suggestion that transnationals might be taxed "for the benefit of developing countries."

Unqualified criticism of concentration of media ownership without acknowledging this sometimes is inevitable and/or desirable in a free, private enterprise society.¹⁴

In principle these comments reflect a general view of the North American and other developed countries' opinions on the Report. Of course there were certain issues on which Canada differed from other developed countries, taking into consideration its own communications practices and policies.

SHIFTS IN IDEOLOGIES?

At the outset it is necessary to assess the relevance of the MacBride Report in the contemporary international communication scene. Talking to a group of communications experts, the Director General of UNESCO, Fredrico Mayor, "pointed out that the MacBride Commission was a Report to UNESCO and not a Report by UNESCO, but that it lead to the creation of NWICO and added to the resulting difficulties".¹⁵ Does this mean that the MacBride Report has lost its credibility even at UNESCO? The developing countries' demand for NWICO existed even prior to the appointment of the Commission.¹⁶ In fact, one of the objectives set before the Commission was to suggest steps towards the establishment of a NWICO. However, according to Betty Zimmerman (one of the members of the Commission from Canada), the Commission failed to do anything about it.¹⁷ It would have been more appropriate for Fredrico Mayor to describe the difficulties which the Report created for his organization. The last thing one would expect of UNESCO is that it turn itself into a critic of the MacBride Report which, with all its shortcomings, still remains a significant document, providing for the first time a global view of communication problems.

A decade has passed since the MacBride Commission came out with its Report. During this time, the world has witnessed enormous changes in the global socio-economic and political spheres. Perhaps the appointment of such a Commission would have been more relevant and purposeful now than a decade ago, in view of these rapid changes taking place in the world-- particularly those taking place in Europe.

First, the ideological differences regarding the role of mass media between the East and West are slowly disappearing. Canadian Ambassador William Bauer, addressing a 35-country

conference, in London, in April 1989, accused Rumania, East Germany, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia of violating a new East-West accord on press freedom.¹⁸ He felt some of the signatory countries were "locked in a dark age of information where the only 'correct' facts are those put out by the ruling party".¹⁹ Reacting to the accusations of the West, Rumania's chief delegate, Ian Mitann, "accused Western critics of deplorable attempts at flagrant interference in the internal affairs of other countries".²⁰

The situation is somewhat different now. For example, during an informal East-West Press Meeting, organized by UNESCO's Office of Public Information and the Division of Communication Development and Free Flow of Information on Feb.27-28, 1990, the Western media responded positively to the requests of their contemporaries of the East by offering training facilities and other material support. In this meeting Katarzyna Z. Kolodziejczyk, representing the Polish Journalists Association, proposed the creation of a Centre for Communication for Eastern and Central Europe, which would provide European journalists with training and research facilities and database linkages with the West.²¹ Her proposal was accepted immediately by the Western media organizations and drew pledges of financial support. Such a proposal-- say at the beginning of this decade-- would not have been put forth by an Eastern European delegate and would not have been appreciated by the Western media.

Second, the Eastern European countries which are undergoing a political metamorphosis are showing keen enthusiasm to adopt a "market economy". This may have some impact on other countries, too. Recent developments in the field of telecommunications in some Latin American countries, at least, indicate so.²² The Eastern European countries, which hitherto kept Western media at arm's length, are slowly opening up. For example, former Soviet

President Mikhail Gorbachev himself "proposed the 'joint East-West production of cinema and television films and videos' which promote national cultural achievements and the best examples of artistic creation of the past and today".²³ In 1989 Turner Broadcasting negotiated an agreement with the Russian authorities to extend regular CNN global news broadcasts to subscription customers in the Soviet Union.²⁴ Though these few examples cannot be considered as definitive indicators of a radical change in the media scene in Eastern Europe, at least a shift in the ideologies can be sensed.

Third, technological developments in communications are bringing renewed concerns. For example, informatics--the interface between computers and communication satellites that facilitates the storage and transmission of data at a rapid speed-- is creating problems like transborder data flows (TBDF). (This issue is discussed in Chapter III.) And from an economic point of view, information is fast becoming an important resource and those countries that have access to these advanced information and communication technologies will be in an advantageous position. In his optimistic book, Power, the Press and the Technology of Freedom, Leonard Sussman says, "directly ahead is the creation of the Integrated Systems of Digital Network (ISDN). ISDN will provide diverse kinds of information and varied forms of deliveries such as we can now begin to imagine, and imagining, create."²⁵ He predicts that this technology will facilitate universal access to communication channels.²⁶ But elsewhere in the book he explains that it will take many years for the developing countries to catch up with this technology. Meanwhile, the Western countries (and to some extent the Soviet Union) will be using this technology effectively.²⁷ As such the gap in terms of communication technology between the developed and developing countries will continue to widen.

THE MEDIA DEBATE & THE MACBRIDE COMMISSION

The MacBride Commission was appointed to take some of the steam away from the intense debate, which was going on in UNESCO (and also in the various non-aligned meetings) in the '70s, on the role of mass media in the society. UNESCO's activities in the mass communications field during this period were causing displeasure to the Western countries and their media, and they began to follow the ongoing communication debates more closely.

The meeting which attracted the Western media's attention was a regional conference on communications organized by UNESCO in San Jose, Costa Rica, in 1976. The "Declaration of San Jose" and Recommendations of the Intergovernmental Conference on Communication Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean have neither binding legal force nor global backing.²⁸ The conference brought together about 20 Latin American and Caribbean ministers and delegates from Western countries who were given observer status but no voting rights. The conference came up with several recommendations. The principal ones centred round the need for a balanced flow of information, the right to communicate at national and international levels; the duties, legal and social responsibilities of professional communicators; etc.²⁹ The recommendations also dealt with the differing media ideologies among the states of the region, and "explicitly questioned the implications of the 'free flow of information' in a context of unequal technological and political power as between generators of flows."³⁰ The Western delegates were mere observers in the whole debate and were not in a position to interfere, though some of the issues were objectionable from their point of view. However, this meeting caught the attention of the Western media and they began to take keen interest in the

ongoing communication debates in the various UNESCO meetings which followed.

The major issue that injected conflicting views and ideologies into the communication debate in UNESCO was the "Draft Declaration on the Mass Media." The Western media and information system, which is largely in the hands of private free enterprise, believes in the notions of free flow of information and freedom of expression, and it is opposed to interference on the part of the state. Quite contrary to this, the Communist bloc nations developed media systems which were directly under the control of the state. The developing countries incorporated the elements employed both by the West and the East, and began to aim at "development oriented media."

During the '70s developing countries started to discuss communications imbalances at the various non-aligned meetings, and criticised the West for what Mankekar calls "one way free flow of information."³¹ The non-aligned leaders attacked the so-called Western attitude of imposing neo-colonialism and cultural imperialism through mass communications. These issues culminated in a broader demand of the developing countries for a New International Information Order. "The term New International Information Order came about in allusion to the term New International Economic Order used in Resolution 3201, by which the United Nations in May 1974 demanded a new order in the economic relations between developing and industrial countries."³²

A "Symposium on Communication Policies" organized in Tunis in March, 1976, by the non-aligned states adopted a resolution which states:

Since information in the world shows disequilibrium favouring some ignoring others, it is the duty of the Non-Aligned countries and the other developing countries to change this situation and obtain the decolonization of information and initiate a new

international order in information.³³

The term New International Information Order seems to have been officially introduced for the first time at this symposium.³⁴ The demand for a new order was primarily considered as a notion which goes against the free flow of information by the West. The "Mass Media Declaration," discussed at a great length, intensified the participation of the Western media in UNESCO's deliberations on communications.³⁵

In spite of the many differences of opinion, the "Declaration of Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racism, Apartheid and Incitement to War"³⁶ was adopted by acclamation in 1973 by the UNESCO delegates. This Mass Media Declaration was the outcome of several years of debate on the role of mass media, with each faction holding on firmly to its convictions and ideologies for a long time. The early drafts, as pointed out by Clare Wells, were drawn up between 1972 and 1975 by Hilding Eek, a Swedish lawyer who was well acquainted with information debates on information policy matters in the United Nations; these drafts spoke of the "use", "duties" and "responsibilities" of mass media and of the state in relation to the latter.³⁷

The first official draft was tabled at the 18th General Conference in 1974, and it met the ire of the Western states. There was one particular article to which they took severe objection. It states:

The responsibility of the State in the international sphere for the activities of mass media under its jurisdiction is governed by customary international law and relevant international agreements.³⁸

This argument was first introduced at UNESCO by the Soviet delegation, in "a draft

declaration to govern the use of the mass media and enlist them in the struggle for peace and international understanding, and against such ills as racism, apartheid and war propaganda."³⁹

As such the draft declaration was considered a Soviet ploy against the Western media.

The developing countries, on the other hand, were more concerned about the imbalances in global information flows and communications technologies. Thus the debate on the declaration was centred around three different ideological viewpoints: the Soviet bloc argued for state control over the media; the West was more interested in unrestrained media flow, putting freedom before responsibility; and the developing countries demanded provision for a balanced flow and elimination of ^{gap in} communication technology between the developed and developing countries.

Despite the many differences of opinion, the final draft tabled during the 19th session was approved, but with many changes. Upon Western delegates' urging and much to the chagrin of the Soviet contingent, every reference to the "responsibilities" or "duties" of states, of media organizations and of individual practitioners with regard to media content was deleted.⁴⁰

Following the vote, Yvon Beaulne, Ambassador and Canadian permanent delegate, stated:

The text we have adopted still contains ambiguities and uncertainties. However, the present version is free of the paternalism and controls which made the previous drafts objectionable to the Canadian delegation. It is no longer tainted with the error which consists in looking to governments to guard against the deficiencies of the media by means of laws, regulations and directives, which are the bane of the newsmen.⁴¹

Parallel to the deliberations on the Mass Media Declaration was the demand of the non-aligned for a structural change in global communications.⁴² The demand for a NWICO began to be heard loud and clear. The Communist bloc was none too happy with the discussions on

the Mass Media Declaration and had to be content with the credit of initiating the whole discussion. The West, however, began to admit that imbalances existed⁴³ in global communications, but did not appreciate the demand for NWICO, which they considered to be primarily an attack on transnational corporations and an obstacle to the free flow of information.⁴⁴ To pacify all the groups, the Director-General of UNESCO appointed a 16-member Commission headed by Sean MacBride, former UN Commissioner in Namibia and winner of both the Lenin and Nobel prizes, to review "the totality of the problems of communication in modern society." Thus the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems came into existence in 1977.⁴⁵

Its mandate, as explained by Canada's Betty Zimmerman, one of the Commission members, was as follows:

First--The commission was to be concerned with identifying national communication problems and adapting some over-all approach to communication at the international level that takes into account the diversity of socio-economic conditions and levels of development in the world.

Second--It was to be concerned with the problems relating to the free and balanced flow of information in the world, with special attention to the specific needs of developing countries.

Third--It was to do all this within the perspective of establishing a new international economic order as described by the General Assembly of the United Nations, setting out measures which could be taken to foster the creation of a "new world information and communication order".

Fourth--It was to define the role which communication might play in alerting global public opinion to the major problems besetting the world, and by sensitizing the world to these problems, help gradually to solve them by concerted action at the national and international levels.⁴⁶

CRITICISM OF THE MACBRIDE COMMISSION

The MacBride Report is not just based on the views of its members. It is the result of the efforts of over 1000 individuals and international organizations in more than 100 countries, and 100 background papers were prepared to provide the Commission an insight into the diverse problems being faced in the international communication field. The backgrounders were prepared by academicians, experts in communications, statesmen acquainted with communications, journalists and media people of different ideological backgrounds.⁴⁷ As such the Commission had an opportunity to examine the rationale behind the ideological perspectives of various groups. The Commission was expected to come out with recommendations that could help resolve the conflicting views of the developing countries regarding imbalances in the flow of information, but the report satisfied neither the Third World nor the developed countries.

There was an adverse reaction to the MacBride Report particularly in the Western press. The general tendency was to somehow link the MacBride Report to the issue of 'licensing the journalists' and creating on the whole an impression that UNESCO in general was against the idea of free flow of information and in favour of the Soviet bloc view of 'government control of media'. The muckraking of the Western press has indeed gone a long way in tarnishing the image of UNESCO. This campaign was spearheaded by a number of media organizations, like the World Press Freedom Committee (WPFC), the American Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA), the International Press Institute (IPI), and the Inter American Press Association (IAPA). "The ANPA, a trade organization whose 1,300-odd member newspapers account for more than 90 per cent of U.S. daily and Sunday newspaper circulation, and more than 85 percent of Canadian daily circulation, has been particularly active in resisting efforts to impose

government control over the news media."⁴⁸

When questioned as to why the Commission's Report has failed to impress the United States government and media, Sean MacBride said:

That is a difficult question to answer, because the criticism of the United States was obviously made by people who had never read the Report. It criticized things that the Report never said. It invented recommendations which the Commission never made...recommendations which were made in the opposite sense to the recommendations that were made.⁴⁹

Comments on the composition of the commission members by communication experts would give some idea as to how the report was received. Stevenson comments that the "Latin Americans were too leftist; the Asians too rightist"⁵⁰ and feels that Britain, whose contribution to a Western philosophy of liberty was immense, should have been represented. Tunstall describes the Commission's key members as "a Tunisian, a Yugoslav, and an Irishman, a typical Left Bank trio."⁵¹ Manet claims that 12 of the 16 members "supported--to one degree or another--Western business interests and only four were inclined toward a structural analysis of information dependency"⁵² (Sergei Losev, U.S.S.R; Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Colombia; Juan Somavia, Chile; and Mustapha Masmoudi, Tunisia; according to Manet, the latter two held ambiguous positions at times). Kusum Sing and Bertram Gross, offering their comments on the composition of the members, point out that Garcia Marquez and Somavia are refugees from their own countries living in Mexico and "with the possible exception of India and Tunisia, the Third World countries represented are those strongly tilted toward the First World."⁵³ Betty Zimmerman from Canada felt that broadcast media were under represented. Though 11 of the 16 Commissioners claimed to be journalists, she happened to be the only broadcaster and also the only woman.⁵⁴

The general theme in this criticism is apparently to point out that members from different countries and ideological backgrounds may approach the issues based on that background and hence may not be able to offer constructive recommendations.

The Secretariat attached to the MacBride Commission seems to have played an active role in preparing the report. Its role in the process was subject to a lot of criticism by the Commissioners. Comments Betty Zimmerman, "That Secretariat was incredibly active. It didn't just act as the place where they took the material and sorted it out and checked with everybody. It was playing a very active role, and it is hard to see exactly what it was doing. And it was very concerned about pushing the idea of NWICO, because it was the idea of M'Bow, the Director General of UNESCO."⁵⁵ According to Leonard Sussman, the "drafts produced by the Secretariat at the request of the commission included ideas not approved by the Commissioners."⁵⁶ Zimmerman felt that the Secretariat was trying to give a direction to the report without understanding the implication of international communication. "They wanted to please the majority and the majority was non-aligned."⁵⁷

The Commission's Report was not submitted to the General Conference; instead the Commission presented its findings to the Director General. The Director General, in turn, presented an account of the Commission's findings to the Conference. The Report was not formally voted upon. "Any call for a formal vote would no doubt have produced a great deal of rhetoric from all sides, and the findings and recommendations of the commission might have been lost in dirty verbiage."⁵⁸ Towards the end of the 21st UNESCO General Conference at Belgrade, a resolution was adopted proclaiming the final report a valuable contribution to the study of the problems of communication, and requesting the member states to go through the

study and offer their comments.⁵⁹

The report was not acknowledged with total unanimity. The developing countries persistently argued in favour of including a section in the resolution to describe NWICO, which was not defined by the MacBride Commission.⁶⁰ The Western countries felt uncomfortable with some of the remarks on transnational corporations, private ownership of media, commercialisation of media, etc., and the "Soviet bloc were determined that references to freedom of journalists would indicate freedom as inseparable from responsibility".⁶¹

Western media reaction to the report (and also to the Mass Media Declaration and NWICO) is reflected in the "Talloires Declaration" on press freedom, a concerted effort of journalists, scholars, and officials from over 60 organizations, including the Big Four news agencies (AP, UPI, Reuters and AFP.)⁶² The declaration supported "the free flow of information and ideas, opposed any "any international code of ethics" and rejected any plan to licence journalists or to promote any formal system for protection of journalists". Some of the reflections of communication scholars on the report can also be found in Communication in the Eighties: A Reader on the MacBride Report, edited by Cees J.Hamelink.⁶³

CANADA'S PARTICIPATION AND COMMENTS ON THE REPORT

Canada's involvement with the MacBride Commission began when the Director General of UNESCO, M'Bow appointed Marshall McLuhan as one of its members in 1977. Later on Betty Zimmerman, then Director of Radio Canada International (RCI), the external broadcasting service of Canada, replaced McLuhan who was indisposed.

Zimmerman did not agree with other commissioners on a number of issues (individual

viewpoints of hers and other commissioners are given as footnotes in the report) particularly those concerning broadcast media. She refuted the commission's comment that television broadcasters tend to produce programs which appeal to the widest possible audience and which often lack quality. She said, "Much programming done in the field of public broadcasting, even in competitive situations, is specifically planned for appeal to special interest, 'minority' audiences, as part of the service provided by such broadcasting organizations."⁶⁴

On the issue of the protection of journalists, Zimmerman pointed out that, unlike a print journalist who can pass unnoticed while covering a story, a broadcast journalist must carry bulky audio-visual equipment. "Despite the more overt danger they encounter, electronic journalists are not seeking any special protection which could lead to diminution of press freedom,"⁶⁵ she told the commission. Zimmerman also differed with the commission on the suggestion that the "power" of the media be used for constructive purposes. She said:

The Report is accusing the media of exerting too much power, while at the same time advocating the exertion of power for other (valuable) purposes. In both cases, however, the situation is being viewed from the standpoint of "using" the media, which is an unacceptable concept.⁶⁶

The Commission's proceedings were followed keenly by both the government and media organizations in Canada. (The Betty Zimmerman collection at Carleton University, primarily a compilation of the reports, documents, studies and papers presented to the Commission, has several documents which throw light on Canada's participation in the proceedings. Zimmerman has also been interviewed during the course of this research and her comments are quoted throughout this chapter.)

Pierre Juneau, then Deputy Minister of Communication, said in a speech:

Although neither the U.S. nor Canadian government and private sectors would agree with all perceptions and recommendations in the MacBride Report, it is a tribute to the U.S. and Canadian members that so many Western concepts ring through loud and clear. For example, the Soviet member had to dissociate himself from the recommendation that "censorship or arbitrary control of information should be abolished." And the proposal that identity cards should be issued to foreign journalists to protect them in the exercise of their profession was rejected since a number of members had a sneaking suspicion that any licensing system could be used to control, rather than facilitate, the activities of journalists.⁶⁷

The so-called licensing issue, which is more a myth than reality associated with MacBride, had also figured prominently in the discussions on that issue in Canada. Expressing his apprehension on the Commission's enquiry, John Walker wrote in the Ottawa Citizen:

Their Report, if approved by a general UNESCO conference late this fall, could by 1980 become the moral guideline for a majority of the Third World and one-party countries in the UN, therefore by extension the imposed rule for foreign correspondents and travelling Western writers.⁶⁸

Some of the issues-- like protection of journalists, setting a code of ethics and censorship-- were discussed in a Roundtable on the report, organized by the Canadian Commission for UNESCO, in Ottawa, on September 17, 1980. This conference was chaired by J.G. Gignac, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. Several academicians and journalists were invited to participate. After a briefing about the Commission and the report by Betty Zimmerman, the floor was thrown open for discussion. Reacting to a comment in the report which says "the media should contribute to promoting the just cause of people struggling for freedom and independence, and their right to live in peace and equality without foreign interference,"⁶⁹ journalist Jack Best, said, "I think there is a suggestion running through this whole report that the communications media are somehow to be mobilized to lead an attack on

such ills as racialism, apartheid, incitement to war."⁷⁰

Mr. Best felt that it is the responsibility of the politicians and statesmen to resolve the issues of war and peace and that the communication media "have a responsibility for faithful and objective reporting."⁷¹

The issue of providing "protection to journalists" brought forth mixed reactions from the Roundtable participants. While the majority thought journalists need no protection of law beyond that of an ordinary citizen, Richard Gwyn (Toronto Star) felt that some protection is needed for journalists. Pointing out the small number of Canadian foreign correspondents, he said that reporters are often sent to other countries whenever something newsworthy is taking place. A foreign journalist not familiar with the situations in other countries may encounter trouble, in which case protective measures may offer him some safety. It would also encourage the Western media to send their reporters to Third World countries which are often subjected to catastrophes, he contended.

The report also gave considerable thought to information technologies and their impact on the socio-economic and cultural aspects of a nation.⁷² Apprehensions regarding the impact of information technology have long figured in the speeches of Canadian communication ministers and bureaucrats.

However, these statements are usually made to clarify the Canada-United States relationship. Canada considers the invasion of cultural products from south of the border as a threat not only to Canada's cultural sovereignty but also to its economy in that sector. For example, Pierre Juneau, Deputy Minister of Communication, told a Harvard University audience in 1980:

Information technology is creating world markets for books, records, movies, television programs, magazines, even newspapers. United States producers, with their huge domestic market, were the first to take advantage of the great economics of scale which characterize the media, and are creating a global culture which often enriches, always challenges, and sometimes threatens the economic viability of national cultures of the world. Nations fear that their own freedom of expression will be lost, their freedom of opportunity to participate in the cultural market place constrained.⁷³

Compare this with an excerpt from a note prepared by an official of the federal Department of Communications on the final report of the Commission:

Given Canada's vulnerability relative to the United States, the World's most powerful communicating entity, we, ourselves, despite a very highly developed communication system, are not unfamiliar with the impact of certain disparities. We must not ignore the Commission's findings in this area in view of our own efforts to protect the country's cultural integrity and in recognition of our capacity to play an important role internationally in working to narrow the communication gap between the world's privileged and under-served communities.⁷⁴

Canadian cultural industries are in a constant battle to over-come the domination of United States cultural products. There are certain instances when the government has intervened and offered protection to the cultural industries, such as Bill 52,⁷⁵ which was introduced to protect the Canadian magazine industry, and exemption of cultural industries from the Free Trade Agreement with the United States.⁷⁶ These protective measures are not considered to go against the notion of free flow of information by those who stand to gain by such measures, particularly the print media industry. However, the private TV broadcasters are of the opinion that such measures go against free flow. Their argument has got to do more with economics than anything. The private TV broadcasters rely heavily on American TV programs and would not like to have any restrictions in importing them. Protective measures are deemed necessary to maintain a distinctive national cultural identity by Canadian communication policy makers.

Perhaps the MacBride Commission recommendations are similar in respect of every nation.

Quite implicit is the fact that the influx of U.S. cultural products in Canada is not without by choice. The oft-stated reason for this is that the domestic market in Canada is too small to support quality indigenous programming. If Canada, despite being a developed country with advanced communication technologies, is unable to overcome the influence of U.S. cultural products, how can the developing countries with fewer communication facilities avoid the influence of alien cultures without taking protective measures? "We understand the need for a nation to have its own culture and forms of communication, while drawing on the rich resources of the rest of the world,"⁷⁷ Canadian delegate Gabriel Warren said at UNESCO's 21st General Conference, quoting the President of the Canadian Daily Newspaper Publishers Association.

A common North American language and to some extent culture helps Canada and the U.S. establish a cordial relationship in many spheres, including communication. But the overwhelming influence of the U.S. cultural product creates a situation where regulatory mechanisms seem essential to preserve a distinct Canadian identity. Canada's concerns about foreign cultural influences are different from those of developing countries. What type of role Canada can play to narrow the communication gap between the developed and developing countries is not clearly outlined. When it comes to cultural domination, Canada is a crusader; when it comes to free flow of information, it is a champion of freedom. Gabriel Warren, Canadian Delegate to UNESCO, told the 21st General Conference in Belgrade:

Each country must, of course, decide for itself what is the most appropriate mix of communication policies and objectives. Canadians know from their own experience that communications is essential for development and in preserving our national identity. Underlying this commitment to development is the fundamental principle of freedom of opinion, expression and information which cannot be sacrificed even in the name of other goals.⁷⁸

The many protective measures Canada has taken in the past to counter the influence of U.S. cultural products seems to contradict the position Canada has taken regarding such international communication issues as NWICO. Thus Canada's position seems ambiguous, a conclusion which is also evident from the few comments available on the MacBride Commission report. Here, for example, is another excerpt from a note prepared by the Department of Communication:

Fundamental to the Commission's logic on the question of the regretful role of multinationals in communication is its premise that the "circulation of messages cannot be disassociated from ethical and social norms, spiritual and cultural values"(part II, para 375, p.124) Canada has long been aware of the intrinsic importance of communication to its own evolving cultural expression and therefore shares, to some degree, the Commission's concern with transnational dominance and resulting cultural and economic dependence.⁷⁹

The transnational dominance is of great concern to Canada as it is to developing countries. But the issue has to be seen in a different perspective or rather with a distinct Canadian perspective. In developing countries the dominance of transnational corporations in the field of mass communications means increased dependency and cultural erosion. But in Canada's case it has to do more with economics than cultural threat. The Canadian cultural industries cannot compete and produce cultural products on par with the U.S. cultural industries due to the small size of Canada's domestic market. The large domestic market enables the United States cultural industries to recover most of their production costs within the U.S. and the revenues accrued through exports help them to consolidate their position in the international market. Canada can't do the same. Dallas Smythe tries to explain this situation:

In Canada our principal contradiction in relation to our identity is that of the interest of the Canadian people vs transnational capital. In the global society, the principal contradiction, is between people, especially in the Third World, and

transnational capital. In both, transnational capital is now the dominant aspect of the contradictions. For Canada the two are linked by the fact that we are simultaneously the most dependent on the U.S. of all capitalistically advanced countries, and an American neo-colony among many Third World neo-colonies.⁸⁰

The MacBride Report more or less lays down a comprehensive communication policy for the developing countries. This is reflected in such recommendations as evolving national communication policies to meet the socio-economic needs of the people, use of traditional modes of communication, the fostering of regional cooperation, adoption of appropriate technologies, etc.--all directed to developing countries. To this extent the Report is well received and even commended both by the developed and developing countries. But when it touches upon sensitive topics like cultural implications which arise due to the imbalances in the flow of information and cultural products, or the domination of transnational corporations, or the role of mass media in the society (or the NWICO demand which incorporates many of these issues), numerous disagreements crop up, with the East and the West (or sometimes the South and the North) trying to drive their respective points home. Perhaps in all this melee the report lost its sense of importance.

An obvious question is whether or not the Commission was able to fulfil the mandate it was given. When Betty Zimmerman was asked the question, she said:

As a study of communication problems, I think it served the purpose. It did collect points of views of the Third World and it collected the points of view in some ways of the other parts--East and West, and put them in some juxtaposition and tried to do what it was set up to do. But one of the things it was supposed to do was that, to set steps to what we call NWICO. The Commission failed to do anything about it.⁸¹

She felt the Commission greatly helped stimulate research on international

communications, which in turn offered some understanding of the imbalances in international communications. Though the selection of members was based on geographical considerations, Canada surely stands to credit for sending not only a very experienced broadcast journalist but also the only woman on the Commission (even though the first Canadian appointed to the Commission was no less than Marshall McLuhan, a communication scholar par excellence). It is due to Zimmerman's initiative that issues pertaining to women were discussed by the Commission. "The commissioners were sometimes simply reluctant to discuss issues pertaining to women and communication."⁸² She felt that the Report failed to examine women and communication in a proper perspective. She said:

I am disappointed that a much stronger section on the concerns of women wasn't in the report. But some of the strongest wording is there: '... of all the violations of human rights, the most systematic, widespread and entrenched is the denial of equality to women...' (page 189 of the report). The wording is fine; it's just the space which the section on Equal Rights for Women takes up--two pages. References should have been in nearly every chapter, and indeed they were written for every chapter by me. The section almost ended up in the wrong place entirely, such as 'We must be more concerned about the generally handicapped'! It needed women at all levels of the Commission to get these points across, and UNESCO itself at that time was totally male-dominated, so there was nowhere to appeal."⁸³

The deliberations of the Commission were followed with quite some interest by the Canadian government, media, and other organizations involved with communications. For example, there is in the Betty Zimmerman's Collection a note which has comments of a group of educational communication experts on both the interim report of the MacBride Commission and on the Mass Media Declaration.⁸⁴ The notes prepared and circulated by the Department of Communications, the Round Table Conferences, organized by the Canadian Commission for UNESCO, and the media coverage given to the proceedings of the Commission indicate that the

Commission's report was taken quite seriously. The material available from these sources helps one to understand the Canadian position on the report to some extent.

CONCLUSIONS

Most of the time Canada expressed solidarity with other developed countries on many issues, such as unwillingness to compromise with the free flow of information, to the role of multinationals or private media ownership, the licensing of journalists and evolving a code of ethics for journalists. But Canadian views (gathered from the comments of ministers, officials of the Department of Communication and other involved with communications) tended to differ slightly with other developed countries-- when it came to the retention of cultural identity of nations in the wake of the invasion of alien cultural products. This issue was, however, viewed from the United States-Canada context and not from the developing countries' perspective, and involved the question of economics more than of cultural threat.

Canada justifies the protection offered to its cultural industries, considering them necessary for maintaining a distinct Canadian identity. Such protective measures are not viewed as impediments to the notion of a free flow of information. Canada's position in this regard appears ambiguous, as explained before.

The MacBride Report was declared to be the father of the International Program for the Development of Communication (IPDC). Following its release, the Western countries, particularly the United States, came to the conclusion that the developing countries' communications problems are due to the lack of appropriate communication technologies and expertise;⁴⁵ hence, the suggestion of creating a program which is based on a practical approach

and devoid of any ideological bias. Holding similar opinions, Canada took an active part --at least during the early stage-- in the IPDC; in fact it sought a seat on the 35-nation Intergovernmental Advisory Council, apart from making a sizeable donation to the Program. IPDC was created to provide training and also financial assistance to media personnel and organizations of the developing countries (the origin and growth of IPDC will be discussed in chapter II).

With respect to NWICO, the MacBride Commission could not do much. The concept has been referred to as "an evolving and continuous process" since the 1983 UNESCO General Conference, acceptable to all Western states including Canada (Canada's position with respect to NWICO will be discussed elsewhere in this research).

Thus it is evident that the report drew mixed reactions from Canada, which refused to accept anything contrary to the free flow of information or anything that restricts the freedom of journalists, but at the same time cast some apprehension when it came to cultural products and national identities. In a broad sense the report pointed out the imbalances existing in communications between the developed and developing countries. To that extent it was appreciated--by Canada too. Gabriel Warren in a statement at the 21st General Conference, said, "It is obvious that the implications of new technological developments need much more study than was possible in the time available to the MacBride Commission", and he added, "we are indebted to the Report of the International Commission for emphasizing the dimensions of the task that remains".⁸⁶

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4. The Economist, March 1, 1980, quoted in Manet, Hidden War of Information (1988) 31.
5. See "The MacBride Report", Editor and Publisher, May 17, 1980, quoted in Ellen Ray and William Schaap, in their introduction to Hope and Folly, William Preston Jr., Edward S. Herman, and Herbert I. Schiller (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989) xiii.
6. See the memorandum prepared by the Department of Communications, Canada on the "Final Report of the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems," Jan. 1980, File No.421, Betty Zimmerman Collection, St. Patrick's Resource Centre, Carleton University, Ottawa.
7. The Commission's Report was published in book form as Many Voices One World (Paris: UNESCO, 1980).
8. See Part V "Communication Tomorrow," Many Voices (1980) 253-72.
9. Sean MacBride in his preface to Many Voices One World (1980) xx.
10. See Appendix I, General Comments, Sergei Losev, Many Voices One World (1980) 279-80.
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12. See Appendix I, General Comments, Mustapha Masmoudhi, Many Voices One World (1980) 281-82.
13. See Appendix I, General Comments, Gabriel Garcia Marquez and Juan Somavia, Many Voices One World (1980) 281-82.
14. George Beebe, in his introduction to The Media Crisis (Miami, Florida: World Press Freedom Committee, undated) viii-ix.

15. See the notes prepared by Thomas. L. McPhail on the meeting with Fredrico Mayor, Director General of UNESCO, Paris, Sept. 4, 1989.

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16. The demand for a "New World Information and Communication Order" was shaping up in the non-aligned meetings in the '70s. The focus of the "Non-Aligned Symposium on Information," March 30, 1976, at Tunis and the "Declaration of the Ministerial Conference of Non-Aligned Countries on Decolonization of Information," July 13, 1976, at New Delhi, was on NWICO.

17. Personal interview with Betty Zimmerman, Member of the MacBride Commission and former Director of Radio Canada International, Jan. 10, 1991.

18. See "Canadian envoy accuses East European countries of violation of press accord," The Gazette (Montreal), Apr. 21, 1989.

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28. For San Jose Declaration, see UNESCO Doc. COM/MD/38 (undated) 155-6.

29. See UNESCO Doc. COM/MD/38 (undated) 25-45.

30. Clare Wells, The UN, UNESCO and the Politics of Knowledge (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987) 84.

31. See D.R. Mankekar, One Way Free Flow: Neo-Colonialism Via the News Media (New Delhi: Clarion, 1978).

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33. See "Information in the Non-Aligned Countries," Vol 1, Final Resolutions, Speeches and Messages and Working papers, Secretariat of State for Information, Tunis (mimo) 30 (paragraph 26 of the resolution of the first Commission) quoted in Kaarle Nordenstreng and Lauric Hannikainen, The Mass Media Declaration of UNESCO (Norwood; New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1984).

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35. See A.H. Ruskin, "Report on News Coverage of Belgrade UNESCO Conference," (New York: The National News Council, March, 1981) and also Clare Wells, The UN, UNESCO... (1987) 92.

36. See "Declaration on Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racism, Apartheid and Incitement to War," UNESCO, 20/20 Rev. Nov. 21, 1978.

37. See "Draft Declaration of Fundamental Principles Governing the Use of the Mass Media," first draft prepared by Hilding Eck, UNESCO, Doc.COM-74\CONF-66\3\ Jan. 23, 1974.

38. See UNESCO Doc. 18C\35(1974) Art.X, quoted in Clare Wells, The UN, UNESCO... (1987) 86.

39. See "Declaration on Fundamental Principles on the Role of the Mass Media in Strengthening Peace and International Understanding and in Combating War Propaganda, Racism and Apartheid," UNESCO Doc. 18C\35, July 12, 1974.

40. See "Declaration on Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racism, Apartheid and Incitement to War," UNESCO Doc. 20C\Res4\93\2, of Nov. 28, 1978 and also Records of the UNESCO General Conference, Twentieth Session Vol II: Reports, Paris 1979.

41. Statement made by Yvon Beaulne, Ambassador, Canadian Permanent Delegate, after the adoption of the "Mass Media Declaration," by acclamation, UNESCO, Paris, Nov. 22, 1978.

42. Communications issues in the regional and international context were being discussed in various non-aligned meetings which eventually led to the demand for NWICO. The call for NWICO was first heard in the non-aligned symposium in Tunis, March, 1976, and later in the ministerial conference of non-aligned countries on Decolonization of Information in July, 1976, in New Delhi, which resulted in the landmark statement "The New Delhi Declaration." In the Fifth Conference of State or Governments of the Non-Aligned countries, in Colombo the members came to a conclusion that "a New International Order in the Field of Information and Mass Communications is as vital as a New International Economic Order."

43. For example the Head of the U.S. Delegation to UNESCO, Ambassador John E. Reinhardt, address in Paris, Nov. 5, 1978 (also reproduced in Records of the UNESCO, General Conference Twentieth Session, Paris, Oct. 24 to Nov. 28, 1978,) discusses the advantages of advanced communication technologies which could help developing countries needs and willingness of U.S. to offer any assistance in that direction.

44. For instance William Harley, in a briefing document prepared for the members of the U.S. Department of State, wrote, "the tendency to view critically the role of private commercial institutions is especially evident in the Report's attitude towards Transnational Corporations (TNCs) whose practices are seemingly regarded as having only negative consequences," condensed version, Communications and the Future, ed., Howard F. Dilsbury, Jr., (Maryland: 1982) 317.

45. Delegates of Western countries during the 19th Session of the General Conference in 1976, suggested the review of the "totality of the problems of communications." At the initiative of the Director General M'Bow it was agreed upon to entrust this task to a panel of counsellors.

46. See the note on "MacBride Commission Report," Betty Zimmerman Collection, File No. F 406, and also Many Voices One World (1980).

47. See Sean MacBride's introduction to Many Voices One World (1980) xix.

48. Anthony Giffard, UNESCO and the Media (New York: Longman, 1989) 28.

49. Quoted by Ellen Ray and William Schaap, in their introduction to Hope and Folly, William Preston Jr., et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989) xiv.

50. Robert L. Stevenson, Communication, Development and the Third World: The Global Politics of Information (New York & London: Longman, 1988) 47.

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52. Manet, Hidden War of Information (1988) 37.
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60. See the note on "UNESCO, the MacBride Commission and the New World Information and Communication Order," Betty Zimmerman Collection, File No. 406.
61. Betty Zimmerman's explanation of the debate in the note mentioned above.
62. For full text of the Declaration of Talloires (Voices of Freedom Conference, May 17, 1981) see Doc. 71, Kaarle Nordenstreng et al., New International Information and Communication Order Source Book (Prague: IOJ, 1986).
63. Cees J. Hamelink, ed., Communication in the Eighties: A Reader on the MacBride Report (Rome: IDOC, 1980).
64. See the footnote (3) on page 153, Many Voices One World (1980).
65. See the footnote (1) on page 235, Many Voices One World (1980).
66. See the footnote (1) in page 177, Many Voices One World (1980).
67. Pierre Juneau, Deputy Minister, DOC, Ottawa, addressing Harvard University Program on Information Resources Policy during a Workshop on "Strategic Implications of the Changing Telecommunications Environment of Newspapers," Nov. 11, 1980.
68. John Walker, "UNESCO paper may sanction news censorship," Ottawa Citizen April 26, 1979.
69. See Many Voices One World (1980) 265.

70. See verbatim transcript on the Roundtable discussion on "Many Voices One World," held by CCU, Ottawa, Sept. 17, 1980, File No. 421, Betty Zimmerman Collection.

71. See verbatim transcript on the Roundtable, Sept. 17, 1980.

72. See Part III, Chapter 2, Many Voices One World (1980) 166-74.

73. See Pierre Juneau's speech to the Harvard University Program, Ottawa, Nov. 11, 1980.

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77. Statement made on Oct. 13, 1980 by Gabriel Warren in Commission IV (Culture and Communication) at UNESCO 21st General Conference in Belgrade. For full text see "Canadian statements at various UNESCO and UN conferences expressing the position of the government of Canada on NWICO and IPDC," File No. 420, Betty Zimmerman Collection.

78. Gabriel Warren, making a statement at UNESCO 21st General Conference, Sept. 17, 1980.

79. See the memorandum on "Many Voices One World", prepared by DOC, Ottawa, Sept. 17, 1980.

80. Dallas Smythe, delivering the 1986 Southam Lecture on "Culture, Communication 'Technology' and Canadian Policy," Canadian Journal of Communication 12(2) (1986) : 1.

81. Personal interview with Betty Zimmerman.

82. Personal interview with Betty Zimmerman, Jan. 10, 1991. Clyde Sanger, in his book Canadians and the United Nations (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, 1988) wrote, "She also wanted to get Sean MacBride... and his colleagues to focus on some other subjects, in particular, the profound issues surrounding communications and women, stemming from the fact that girls' education usually ends before that of boys and that two-thirds of the illiterates in the world are women. She also stressed the importance of professional training and of entertainment" (p. 80).

83. Sanger, Canadians and the United Nations (1988) 183-84.

84. See the note on "Canadian Comments on the Interim Report of the UNESCO International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems," File No.411, Betty Zimmerman Collection.

85. William G. Harley, writing on "UNESCO and the International Program for the Development of Communication," in Voices of Freedom: A World Conference of Independent News Media (Edward R. Murrow Centre of Public Diplomacy) (New York: World Freedom Committee, 1981) 55, comments, "The way to redress imbalances is not by restricting communications but by raising the communications capacities of the developing countries. The IPDC was designed as a mechanism to implement that philosophy."

86. See the intervention of the Canadian delegate during the first Intergovernmental Session of the IPDC, June 18, 1981 (original in French).

CHAPTER II

CANADA AND THE IPDC

A decade-long confrontation on communication issues between the developed and developing countries in UNESCO gave birth to the International Program for the Development of Communication (IPDC). Its aims and objectives were set to help create proper communication infrastructures in developing countries-- primarily to act as an aid disbursement agency to communication projects in developing countries, such as establishing news agencies, training journalists, etc., and to interact with the various governmental and nongovernmental agencies involved with communication projects at national and international levels. The Third Medium-Term Plan of UNESCO (1990-1995) states that the IPDC is to be:

The main instrument for building up (communication) infrastructures in the developing countries, for training personnel to operate them, (and) for providing consultative services on request, which will enable the countries concerned to decide on the selection of suitable communication technologies and their adaptation to local conditions.¹

In principle, IPDC is an excellent way to resolve many conflicting communication issues in the world; in practice, it falls short of all expectations due to the West's indifferent attitude toward it. It appears as if the IPDC, mainly a Western initiative, was created to divert attention from the developing countries' demand for a New World Information and Communication Order in the early '80s; once the ideological rhetoric was toned down, the West left IPDC to its fate. The whole exercise in creating IPDC appears to be a tactical and manipulative effort of the Western nations. Canadian attitude towards the IPDC program appears to fall in line with those of the other Western nations, particularly the United States.

Explaining the relevance of IPDC to the United Nations system, Gunnar Garbo, journalist and Chairman of IPDC, said:

It seems to me that the most important contribution which the IPDC can render to the promotion of international peace is simply to continue to provide a convincing example of the potential of a genuine multilateral decision making. Such a demonstration is doubly needed in a situation where UNESCO, one of the leading agencies of the UN system, is being eroded by unilateralist tendencies.²

The IPDC has been applauded both by the developed and developing countries as a pragmatic and useful program, instrumental in creating communication infrastructure in the Third World and a good example of multilateral participation. A close examination, however, reveals that the IPDC is yet another multilateral program whose existence depends on the tender mercies of the developed countries. IPDC, essentially a fund-raising program, has never received enough financial assistance from the developed countries to carry on with its tasks since its inception a decade ago (see Table 15 for a breakdown of IPDC funds allocation). Except for Canada, Norway and France, no Western country contributed to IPDC's special account (one of its three funding mechanisms) in the beginning. This situation definitely throws into question the multilateral nature of the IPDC.

Despite obliging the whims and fancies of the developed countries, the IPDC is yet to receive the support it ought to get. The 35-member Intergovernmental council has never got involved with ideological arguments,³ adopted a pragmatic approach to communication issues, the decisions reached so far are by consensus, provisions were made for the participation of other specialised UN agencies like UNDP, ITU and more importantly for

TABLE 15**Classification of IPDC funds allocations from the Second to the Ninth Session by Media and Region (\$ thousands)**

Region	Planning		News agency newspapers		Radio, TV broadcasting audio-visual, film		Training research centres	
	Number of projects	Funds allocated	Number of projects	Funds allocated	Number of projects	Funds allocated	Number of projects	Funds allocated
Africa	6	270	31	1,306	21	717	15	600
Arab States	4	218	6	282	4	180	19	997
Asia and the Pacific	1	30	11	620	17	812	16	666
Latin American and the Caribbean	13	430	12	207	34	1,129	16	948
Europe	-	-	1	30	-	-	-	-
Inter-regional	5	157	5	65	3	90	3	140
Total	29	1,105	66	2,510	79	2,928	69	3,351

Region	Training programmes (seminars, workshops)		Books		Tele-communication		Total	
	Number of projects	Funds allocated	Number of projects	Funds allocated	Number of projects	Funds allocated	Number of projects	Funds allocated
Africa	18	804	10	419	1	40	102	4,156
Arab States	9	392	-	-	1	50	43	2,119
Asia and the Pacific	17	715	3	101	-	-	65	2,944
Latin American and the Caribbean	14	521	5	190	1	25	95	3,450
Europe	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	30
Inter regional	6	318	-	-	4	254	26	1,024
Total	64	2,750	16	710	7	369	332	13,723

Source: World Communication Report

the involvement of private enterprise--all that the developed countries asked for had been implemented. Yet the desired financial support from the developed countries is not

forthcoming. Unlike other Western nations, Canada took a keen interest in the IPDC when it was created. Canada has contributed to the special account, and was a member of the IPDC's Intergovernmental Council three times.⁴ The last Canadian donation to the IPDC special account was made during 1986-87.⁵ Since then there are no indications of direct Canadian involvement in IPDC activities, monetary or otherwise.

The diminishing Canadian interest in the IPDC program cannot be explained by a single reason. Canada's views on multilateralism, international aid policy, political and bureaucratic bickering, and the interest evinced in communications both by trade and academic institutions all have to be examined in order to understand the lacklustre attitude shown towards this small but significant IPDC program. An attempt is made in this chapter to study these interrelated issues to understand Canada's role in the IPDC. Before doing that, it is necessary to study the origin and background of the IPDC.

WHY IPDC ?

During the 1970s, the quest to avert the penetration of Western ideology through mass media was much evident from the stance taken over communication issues both by the developing countries and the Eastern bloc. This aggravated the feelings of the West which began to see themselves as a minority in UNESCO. Nonetheless the communication debates within UNESCO were steered towards accepting a compromise position with no single bloc getting totally what it wanted. In many cases the Western nations had their way; the Mass Media Declaration is a good example.

While that Declaration failed to offer any solution to the communication problems

besetting the world, the MacBride Commission Report, apart from successfully pointing out the imbalances existing in global communications, was considered too impractical and unsatisfactory by all blocs (as the previous chapter noted). The developing countries considered that Western domination of communications had relegated them to the status of mere consumers of information sold as a commodity like any other.⁶ It was felt that this type of hegemony had far-reaching repercussions on the socio-economic and cultural aspects of the developing countries.⁷ The Western bloc considered the protests of the developing countries as ideological rhetoric. The Eastern bloc arguments were dubbed political.

Strengthening of the endogenous communication capacities of developing countries was considered an ideal solution by the West. The Western nations thought that creating more channels of communications in the developing countries could help improve flows of information within the South and also between North-South. This could be done not only on a multilateral but also on a bilateral basis, by inviting intergovernmental, nongovernmental and other United Nations agencies to participate in such a endeavour. The IPDC program was on its way.

IPDC: AN AMERICAN INITIATIVE

A formal proposal in 1978 by the U.S. and others⁸ to convene a planning meeting of government representatives to develop a proposal for "institutional arrangements to systematize collaborative consultation on communications development activities, needs, and plans" was adopted as a resolution by Director General M'Bow.⁹ A preparatory meeting was called by UNESCO in Washington in 1979. Two specific proposals were on the agenda. "Both were amplifications of draft resolutions introduced by UNESCO's 20th General

Conference the preceding year by Roland Homet (U.S.) and Mustapha Masmoudi (Tunisia)."¹⁰

The United States proposed a Communications Development Consultative Group to encourage and emphasize self reliance, leading to fruitful partnership of technical collaboration between the developed and developing countries. Masmoudi's proposal suggested the establishment of an International Institute for Information and Communication Planning within UNESCO, which would "combine the concepts of an international fund, a body for planning, implementation, and training, and a centre for applied research on communication development."¹¹ A marked difference between the two proposals was that Tunisia sought the centrality of UNESCO in running the proposed Institute, while the American proposal called for multi-agency sponsorship. The meeting ended without endorsing either of the proposal.

Discussion of an international collaborative effort continued in the UNESCO Intergovernmental Conference for Cooperation on Activities, Needs and Programs for Communication Development (DEVCOM), which took place in April, 1980, in Paris. This meeting was attended by 122 member states.¹² The United States found that its proposal of an autonomous operation was not going to be approved even by the other Western nations.¹³ It realised that UNESCO should be made the centre for an international cooperative mechanism in communications.¹⁴

Meanwhile, at the final meeting of the MacBride Commission in November, 1979, Commissioner Masmoudi suggested establishment of an International Centre for the Study and Planning of Information and Communication within UNESCO (somewhat similar to

the proposal he introduced at the Washington meeting convened in Washington). It was adopted as Recommendation 78 in the Commission's report.

Extensive DEVCOM¹⁵ deliberations and the MacBride recommendation resulted in a request to UNESCO to establish an International Program for Development of Communications. This request was heeded by the 21st session of the General Conference and the IPDC was founded. The IPDC resolution states that:

This international program, aiming to increase co-operation and assistance for the development of communication infrastructures and to reduce the gap between various countries in the communication field, must form part of the efforts for the establishment of a new, more just and more effective world information and communication order.¹⁶

Differences of opinion on IPDC's functioning surfaced in its second Intergovernmental meeting, held at Acapulco in January, 1982. The debate was centred on funding mechanisms. The Western states "preferred to treat the IPDC as a clearing house or improved source of data for aid programs of an essentially bilateral character".¹⁷ The model advocated by the United States from the beginning was to have an advisory group (with members of all industrialized countries willing to finance communication projects and a few members from the developing world) which would co-ordinate bilateral aid in communication. Donor countries could finance a communication project within the framework of their own policies. Such financial assistance would amount to tied aid: "The affluent countries would retain the power to determine what was to be carried out, how it was to be carried out and whom it was to benefit."¹⁸

On the other hand, the developing countries insisted on creating an international fund for communication development which would be managed by an organ composed of

members elected proportionally, representing all geographic regions, with equal vote. The developing countries would thus have a say in the implementation of the program. This proposal was summarily rejected by the developed countries.

These issues were duly discussed while creating the IPDC. It was decided during the General Conference (based on the recommendations of DEVCOM) that the IPDC would be governed by an Intergovernmental Council whose members would be elected on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, with every member carrying equal vote. It was also decided that the decisions taken within IPDC should be arrived at by consensus rather than a formal vote. Canada was very much in favour of consensus. So far all the decisions taken by the IPDC Intergovernmental Council had been arrived at by consensus.

The developing countries' plea for the IPDC to be established within UNESCO had been heeded. The expenses for the Council and Secretariat are provided from the UNESCO general budget. The Director-General of UNESCO will provide secretarial assistance. But the 35-member Intergovernmental Council was to be responsible for planning and implementing the programme.¹⁹ The Council elects an internal working committee to assist it. Thus the developed countries to some extent were successful in keeping the IPDC outside the influence of UNESCO.

Issues pertaining to funding mechanisms were subjected to a lot of discussion. The arguments revolved around whether the nature of funding should be bilateral or multilateral. The IPDC was originally conceived as a fund-raising programme to try to mobilise funds from the developed countries. The Director-General of UNESCO proposed a council that would administer all the contributions made to the IPDC. This type of

funding mechanism would be purely multilateral. The funds thus received would not be earmarked for any specific projects; disbursement would be based on decisions taken by a council whose membership would rotate among all the member states. The Western countries, particularly the U.S., Canada and France, insisted that there should be another window built in allowing bilateral funding. The Western nations felt that they would have more control over the actual expenditure of funds and the choice of projects if they could contribute both to the earmarked funds and also to specific projects. A few other countries, which have much to contribute in the form of technical assistance, since one of the objectives of the IPDC was to encourage transfer of technology, suggested that there should be a third form of contribution, through goods and services. This issue was resolved by permitting all three mechanisms. The special account respects the rules of multilateralism with no strings attached and is administered by the Intergovernmental Council. The second funding mechanism, funds-in-trust, receives voluntary contributions for a specific project (in other words, bilateral aid). The third mechanism allows developed countries to offer training facilities and technical expertise to developing countries.

OBJECTIVES OF THE IPDC

The objectives of the IPDC²⁰ set forth at UNESCO's 21st General Conference by Gunnar Garbo, Chairman of IPDC, are as follows:

1. Assistance. The IPDC is to assist developing countries, at their request, with analysis of their communication needs and with planning and development of their capacity in the field of communication, in particular concerning the contribution of communications to endogenous economic, social and cultural development. The IPDC is also to promote reciprocal

consultations among institutions in the developing countries.

2. Co-ordination. The IPDC is to strengthen co-operation among all the parties which are engaged in international communication development, both within and outside the UN system. The IPDC is also to encourage contact between those who require and those who can offer the needed assistance.

3. Information. The IPDC is to gather information on global needs and resources, study the experience which is gained on international co-operation in the field of communication development, and contribute to increased awareness as to the significance of communication for the development process.

4. Financing. The IPDC is to seek to encourage contributions to communication projects from all available sources and to mobilize the resources which are needed to carry out the first three tasks.²¹

CANADA AND IPDC

With this background, we can examine the role of Canada, which took keen interest in the formation of the IPDC. It was one of the three Western countries which have contributed to the special account (the others being France and Norway) when the program was started. A high-power delegation was sent by Ottawa to the Second Intergovernmental Council meeting at Acapulco, in January, 1982; it included an Under-Secretary of State from External Affairs, a senior representative from the Department of Communications and a mid-level representative from CIDA. Comments Charles Morrow, Special Officer, Development Communications, CIDA:

The fact that External Affairs had a very senior level representative there communicated the political sensitivity of the issue seen in Canada at that time. I think Canada felt that we have an important role to play in trying to resolve the very strident debate surrounding the NWICO, a debate which was

beginning to threaten the relations between the United States and Great Britain and UNESCO even then although it was several years before the U.S. actually decided to pull out of UNESCO. I think Canada saw the IPDC as an important practical and pragmatic means of addressing the legitimate grievances of developing countries that had been expressed during the debates on NWICO.²²

During the Third Session of the Intergovernmental Council of the IPDC, Canadian representative Gabriel Warren said:

The IPDC seems to be proceeding in a positive, pragmatic and effective manner. As confirmed this week and in the work in the communication field at the recent Extraordinary General Conference, we are not getting hung up on ideological issues, which we would not be able to resolve. We are operating on the basis of consensus and the highest common denominator. There were things that most of us hoped for and now seem to be happening.²³

A clear endorsement of the Program is very much evident from the statements made by the Canadian delegates attending the IPDC meetings. Even concerns regarding the poor response of the contributions were explicitly expressed. Commenting on the situation, Gabriel Warren said:

Some would tell us it's a slippery slope--it's going to require a major mobilization of human and financial resources. Yet, when we look at the total amount of contributions pledged so far, we are tempted to say: is this relatively small total going to make any real differences? My conclusion--and I don't consider that I am being naive or merely trying to force-feed the facts to fit my theory--is that we have made a very useful and responsible start.²⁴

The reasons for the lack of interest on the part of the developed countries to contribute to the IPDC are many. The IPDC was a U.S. initiative. But the United States did not pay enough attention to the program. Two reasons can be singled out here. First, there

was a change of government in the U.S. two weeks after the UNESCO General Conference. The new Republican Party introduced many changes to U.S. foreign policy. Comments William Preston Jr. in the book Hope and Folly, "If the United States relationship with UNESCO had often been characterized more by pretence than by effective support, the Reagan administration stripped that pretence away and offered fanaticism instead."²⁵ So between the UNESCO General Conference, when the program was created, and the IPDC First Intergovernmental Council meeting, the attitude of the U.S. government was radically different. If the Democratic Party had been re-elected in 1980, the fate of the IPDC may have been different. "Because the U.S. then might have made substantial contribution to the program right at the beginning of 1981-82 and through that would have set the example. All the Western countries would have followed. In such case Canada would have made a much better contribution, leading to a very generous policy towards the Program at the very beginning."²⁶

Second, there was a notion in the West that encouraging the developing countries to establish their own news networks might discourage some of them from subscribing to international news agencies and might in some cases lead to total government control. During a roundtable discussion, "Towards a Canadian Perspective on International Communication Issues," held in Ottawa in 1982, the editor of The London Free Press said, "If the IPDC gets large enough, it will drive out AP, Reuters and all the others that are providing information, and dictatorships will drive out all points of view."²⁷ A report²⁸ released by the U.S. State Department on 17 April 1990 cites IPDC's exclusive focus on governmental communications rather than free private media as one of the problems

hampering its effectiveness.

Many of the projects submitted to IPDC are aimed at strengthening or creating national news agencies. The West feel uncomfortable when such proposals came from countries which have leftist leanings. For example, the Western nations were much against financing a news agency project in Ethiopia as they thought that it may become a mouthpiece for the Ethiopian Marxist government. "However the project was accepted because to speak against it invoked the support for that project by all other African nations--Black African countries in the sense of solidarity--and it was a Marxist regime, and a number of other Marxist countries were heavily in support of that project."²⁹

This was the situation in the early stages of the programme when political arguments between the East and West were pitted against the projects submitted to IPDC. CIDA's Charles Morrow, who attended the IPDC meetings, recalls some of the debates: "In the spirit of multilateralism, we in Canada dig our heels into some of these projects. The Americans would get very uptight on these projects and argue vociferously, and we tried to work behind the scene to agree and in fact got a few projects which would be offensive to the concept of free press disapproved, before they came to the council or before the vote."³⁰ Commenting on the role Canada played as a middle power and as a member of the Intergovernmental Council, he said, "If at all Canada had done anything when it was in the council, it was to act as a mediator within the Western group in the international meetings and among various blocs to meet among themselves to arrive at a consensus."³¹ With the withdrawal of the United States and Britain, discussions on communication issues at UNESCO have slackened. The NWICO demand is not being heard much today. Though

it cannot be conclusively said that these withdrawals have a direct bearing on the IPDC, a retrospective effect may not be ruled out. This is one way of understanding the current disinterestedness of Canada in the IPDC--a mood reflective of the West in general. Another way of looking into Canada's diminishing interest is to examine the roles played by the key players--External Affairs, Department of Communications, CIDA, and the Canadian Commission for UNESCO. It should be realised that Canada's participation in IPDC depends on the close coordination of these departments but according to Louis Patenaude, "There is a misunderstanding about IPDC within the Canadian government--a disagreement rather."³² The conflict of views is principally between External Affairs and CIDA.

IS THE IPDC A POLITICAL PROGRAM ?

The circumstances which led to the creation of IPDC are more or less political. The IPDC was created to pacify the developing countries' grievances over communication inequalities and turn their attention away from NWICO.³³ Strictly speaking, then, it was not perceived as a developmental program set up under the aegis of an international organization and fully complying with the notions of multilateralism. However, the mandate of the program displays fully the characteristics of a developmental program. The energies of the program are geared towards the development of communication infrastructures in the developing countries. It is not the program's fault if countries under authoritarian regimes approach it with requests for assistance.

Lack of communication facilities is partly responsible for the underdevelopment of many developing nations. In many of them a principal way of gathering information is

through the mass media, even given the fact that they might be owned by government. If these channels are to be cut off, then there is a substantial information blockade.

After creating the IPDC, there is some sort of subdued compliance on the part of the developing countries who are still expecting some action from the developed countries addressing their communication problems. The IPDC is one way to keep the communication issue from flaring up in UNESCO, as the program helps in reducing the communication gap between developed and developing countries. External Affairs should endorse the IPDC and insist on providing funds to it. But CIDA states many reasons for its reluctance to support the IPDC, the merits of which are none too cogent.

CANADIAN POLICY TOWARDS MULTILATERAL AGENCIES

Before examining this aspect, it is necessary to grasp the essence of the Western argument about funding specialised agencies of the United Nations. UNESCO, like most of the other specialized UN agencies, is set up to have a coordinating role, a research role and a dissemination of information role in education, scientific and cultural fields. It was not originally established to provide technical assistance in terms of projects to developing countries. The Western view is that the multilateral technical assistance should essentially flow through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The same line of argument is taken up by CIDA regarding the financing of IPDC. In a letter addressed to Professor Thomas McPhail, then of the University of Calgary and Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Communications for Canadian Commission for UNESCO, a CIDA official wrote:

CIDA is unable to offer regular support to the special account because of Canada's commitment to maintaining a policy of central funding for the technical cooperation activities of the United Nations system. Canada has long maintained that substantial funding of the central development funds in the system (UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA) is preferable to piecemeal support of small special purpose funds. This policy is based on two considerations. The first is our belief that the development priorities of the recipients can be addressed more comprehensively by projects developed in the framework of country programming exercises rather than through a series of unrelated UN interventions. The second consideration is our concern with the coherence and manageability of the UN as a whole. Both in policy statements and in funding practices, Canada has resisted the tendency of the UN to mushroom into a collection of relatively small organizations and programmes each competing with the others for funding from a finite source.³⁴

If Canada wanted to adhere to the policy of central funding for technical co-operation through UNDP, it should not have contributed to the special account nor sought membership in IPDC's Intergovernmental Council. By contributing to the special account, Canada acknowledged the multilateral character of the Program; by sitting on the Intergovernmental Council, not once but three times, Canada approved the IPDC's activities, as all council decisions were through consensus. In a Roundtable conference organized by CCU, Gabriel Warren, Director-General of International Relations for the Department of Communications, highlighted Canada's first donation of \$250,000 to the IPDC special account saying, "We're enlightened; other countries have to become more enlightened."³⁵ That enlightenment did not last long.

The only way of encouraging the IPDC is by offering generous donations to finance its projects. The contributions made to the special account reaffirm a country's faith in multilateralism, while contributions to the other two funds would help IPDC to attain its

goals.

CIDA's INVOLVEMENT IN COMMUNICATIONS

International communication development is not given a high priority by CIDA while disbursing aid. A sectoral breakdown of CIDA funding reveals that it has been preoccupied with what are called the mainstream development sectors, such as agriculture, education, transportation, hydro electric power generation, etc. The annual amount allotted to social communications is about \$40 million out of a total expenditure of \$2 billion.³⁶ Telecommunications receives about \$250 million. There are just a half-time specialist working on social communications and three specialists involved with telecommunications.

Apparently the country programme managers, who negotiate what CIDA should be doing bilaterally, feel that supporting mass media projects in developing countries may have far reaching political ramifications. Any program in the mass communication area should be fully acceptable to the recipient country. The problem is with the countries whose mass media are fully controlled by the governments. It would be more difficult to implement programs in those countries where there is opposition between mass media and governments.

Even in the communication sector CIDA's interest lies in what is known as developmental support communications or project support communication essentially a component of the major bilateral programs. Most of the projects thus supported by CIDA in the communication field involve the development of communication methodologies or use of radio and television technology, to disseminate information about subjects like health, agricultural or fisheries projects, to a larger audience. About \$30 million of the \$40 million

allocated to communications goes to development support communications. A list of on-going CIDA development communication projects is given in Table 17.

TABLE 16

Students and trainees supported by CIDA in the field of communications

Year	Students			Trainees			Total		
	Men	Women	Total	Women	Men	total	Women	Men	Total
1985	3	26	29	33	209	242	36	235	271
1986	5	22	27	27	119	146	32	141	173
1987	10	25	35	3	25	28	13	50	63
1988	14	49	63	9	84	93	23	133	156
1989	10	25	35	37	192	229	47	217	264

Source: CIDA Annual Reports

A background paper prepared for CIDA's Development Communication Sector states:

It is recognized that increasing the outlets and channels for communication is not enough. This must be accompanied by policies fostering people's access to media and, concomitantly, the development of skilled staff in the Third World capable of maintaining and re-creating media forms to respond to their culture and needs. Canadian assistance tends to focus on this latter aspect of human resource development, through which institutions are also strengthened. For CIDA, the development of human resources is a major priority.³⁷

The idea behind supporting development communication is to encourage the use of little media, such as video and other audio-visual techniques, which are relatively inexpensive and make it possible to produce programs aimed at specific audiences for specific purposes. These projects may form part of a larger program. For example, in Ghana, CIDA has found that sinking tube-wells to provide safe drinking water does not help in

controlling water-borne diseases unless the people are made to understand the relationship between safe water and health. This has been achieved with the help of radio.

CIDA has shown some interest in training journalists in the Third World (see Table 16). CIDA has provided funding for a journalism training program in francophone countries. "The special reason there was that" explains Charles Morrow of CIDA, "there was a strong request which come to us from Senegal originally. All of their foreign teachers there were from France and they wanted an alternative and fresh ideas. Canada had a strategic interest in this regard. Canada wanted to be involved in the communications sector in francophone Africa, because of cultural and commercial interests."³⁸

The support for development communication should not necessarily mean that CIDA stop contributing to the IPDC programme. Communication is an important component of any development program; mass media will help achieve set objectives. But such attempts will not help in building up communication infrastructure at a national or regional level. IPDC projects are aimed at doing so.³⁹ For example, IPDC funds were made available for improving the conditions of small publishing and printing firms in Colombia, enabling an independent newspaper to continue in Botswana, and supporting a communication experiment that encourages peasant farmers to influence the shaping of agricultural policies in Venezuela. These are projects which allow the effective use of mass media to promote practical development and they are very close to CIDA's interests (supporting development communication). The basic difference is that these projects help in achieving national goals using mass communications. They help to increase the channels of communication and have a multiplier effect. If this is to be achieved, countries like Canada should take the initiative

and set an example for other countries. It did that to a certain extent in the early stages of the IPDC program.

TABLE 17

CIDA on-going development communication projects (C\$ thousands)

Region	Country	Project title	Total budget	1986 budget ¹
Africa (Francophone)	Regional	Technical Assistance in Development Communication	10,000	1,643
Africa	Ghana	Water Utilization Project	1,500	750
Asia	Regional	Ryerson/AIBD Development of Broadcasting	4,975	1,242
Asia	Pakistan	Communication/Motivation Support Immunization	3,268	1,215
Asia	Thailand	Extension Activities Fisheries Sub-Project	2,000	800
Latin America	Brazil	Development of A/V Communication	1,900	517

¹ Canadian fiscal year: 1 April to 31 March.

Source: Canadian International Development Agency.

Another complaint of CIDA against the IPDC is its scattershot approach when it comes to funding. This is a constant complaint of not only Canada but also of the other developed countries. They feel that the IPDC projects are too small and insignificant. "The IPDC must not be exploited as a 'pork barrel' to curry favour with nations by passing around little grants for everyone, regardless of priority needs,"⁴⁰ warned William Harley, U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, and delegate to the initial meeting of the IPDC Intergovernmental council.

The small projects include seminars and symposia, which Western nations felt might again give rise to calls for NWICO. The developed countries were of the opinion that the

scarce resources of the IPDC should be allotted to fewer but more useful projects. But the big question is: what are the useful projects? Strengthening of national news agencies is viewed as a threat to the Big Four newsagencies. Western governments feel that these projects which receive IPDC support may turn into government mouthpieces. Satellite and telecommunication development projects are beyond the scope of the IPDC as they require huge investment.

An official of CIDA says, "In practical terms, we have often found that IPDC projects are either too small or not sufficiently developed to receive serious consideration for bilateral funding."⁴¹ A \$30,000 (U.S.) grant for the revival of Radio Kara in Togo, or a \$35,000 contribution to Guinea to launch a rural radio network may appear as small projects, but at the same time they show the pitiable condition of the mass media in those countries. These small projects are bound to make a lot of difference to people, particularly in the rural areas. It is true that these projects are administratively cumbersome for CIDA, particularly when it comes to evaluating them. But one of the functions of the IPDC is to evaluate its projects and maybe this would provide CIDA with feedback on project implementation.

The IPDC program is useful to both developed and developing countries. The voluntary contributions to the IPDC help in creating a certain amount of goodwill among the developing countries, a political advantage. The tendency of the developed countries, particularly the United States, was to contribute more to the funds-in-trust program than to the special account. There are a few inherent advantages in doing so. The funds-in-trust projects are picked up by donor countries, which gives them some control over

implementation. By their participation the donor countries will be able to create trade opportunities for their industrial enterprises. For example, the United States offered a scholarship fund to bring telecommunications personnel to the U.S. to see its telecommunication industry and technology. This IPDC project, done under the funds-in-trust, would have been carried out anyway because it favoured American commercial and industrial strategies. France and Germany are also leading producers in communications hardware so their interest in IPDC participation through funds-in-trust is quite understandable, too.

The question is whether it is proper to implement projects which involve commercial interests under the flagship of IPDC. If project funding displays too much of a commercial interest, there is a danger that the developed countries will lose their credibility in the developing world.

COMMERCIAL INTERESTS

Canada does not produce much technology employed by the press. However, it has much to offer in telecommunications. Canadian has a leading edge in telecommunication technology over other developed countries. The Department of Communications seems to have recognised the economic benefits which can accrue by participating in the IPDC. "The Communications Department view from the beginning was that the IPDC might be a door opener to larger contracts for Canadian businessmen in the third world and also the use of Canadian communication technology, and that we should remain in the council and we should in fact support it financially."⁴²

The DOC thinks that there could be more networking if Canadians are involved in the IPDC and also that Canadian goods and services may be put to use in communication projects. The mandate of the DOC is to assist Canadian business, and there is nothing new in seeking some commercial benefits by participating in the IPDC. But again-- unlike the French, Germans, Norwegian or Dutch-- Canada does not produce a lot of equipment for mass media. Hence there is virtually no push from the Canadian communications industry to participate in the IPDC. Maybe if the industry shows some interest in the IPDC, CIDA might take a more generous funding approach.

THE UNCONCERNED

There is little evidence of strong support for the IPDC either by the mass media or the faculties of communications and journalism in Canada. In the U.S. independent organizations like the Heritage Foundation⁴³ and communication scholars participated actively in the international communication debates. Like news of the United Nations generally, the reports which appear in the Canadian press on the discussions on communication issues taking place in United Nations bodies usually originate from the Big Four news agencies. Except for a few editorial comments during the MacBride Commission and Mass Media Declaration deliberations, nothing much concerning international communication issues appears in Canadian media.

Recently a survey of human resources in the field of international communications in Canada has been carried out with the help of the Canadian Commission for UNESCO. The survey lists many universities and other institutions which are involved in international

communications. However, there is not much evidence of strong scholarly interest in the developing countries' communication issues. For example, the Canadian Journal of Communication has not carried even a single article on the UNESCO communication issues and Canadian participation (except for a 1971 report on the 20th General Conference). The reason is simple. Canadian communication scholars are obsessed with U.S.-Canada communication relations. What goes beyond that seems to be of very little interest to Canadians. Anna Stahmer, of the Ryerson International Development Centre, said in a development communication strategy paper for CIDA:

A decade ago a clearing house on communications information was established within the context of the CCU, for UNESCO, but has since ceased to function. There is no one place in Canada where expertise, experience and information resides regarding development communications, either in the Canadian context or overseas. In addition, Canadian projects do not always pay attention to research or evaluation so that only limited evaluative documentation exists upon which to build future programs.⁴⁴

One can safely conclude that there is not a critical mass of concerned individuals in Canada who can influence CIDA to change its funding policy regarding the IPDC.

CCU AND THE IPDC

The other key player in this whole issue is the Canadian Commission for UNESCO. CCU serves as an agency of liaison between organizations, institutes and individuals in Canada interested in the activities of UNESCO, its Secretariat and the National Commissions or other co-operating agencies of member states. It also carries out activities in Canada in support of UNESCO objectives and programs. Within CCU, an Advisory

Committee is set up to deal with communication issues, and advise the government on the same from time to time. That advisory committee recommended that CIDA provide funding on a regular basis to the IPDC. Comments Louis Patenaude:

The Advisory Committee on Communications is very much in favour of IPDC and we have been trying hard to change this policy and pressuring CIDA and the government to change the policy. So far we have not succeeded. It is true that Canada could do a lot of things, that is why precisely the DOC sought a mandate on the Intergovernmental Council of the IPDC-because communication is extremely important to Canada and we have a great deal of experience. This experience is part of our Canadian identity.⁴⁵

CONCLUSIONS

It is difficult to foresee a defined Canadian policy towards the IPDC. If anything, Canada's participation in the IPDC appears to be ambiguous. Addressing a plenary session of UNESCO's General Conference⁴⁶ in October, 1989. External Relations Minister Monique Laundry said:

There is not a gap, but a gulf between the communication resources of the industrialized countries and those of the other nations. It was precisely because of this situation that the instigators of the IPDC decided to place the emphasis not on argument over theories but on specific activities and projects. Canada notes with satisfaction the progress achieved in the procedure to select projects that the modest resources of this international program are supposed to finance.

The Minister for External Relations added, "Looking toward the next General Conference in 1991, Canada will study the possibility of again seeking election to the intergovernmental Council of the IPDC. In the meantime, we are prepared to examine

closely some particularly valid projects in this international program."⁴⁷

While acknowledging the usefulness of the IPDC, Canada is not able to come to terms with the Program fully. IPDC is a fund-raising program and a genuine participation in the program is reflected through untied financial contributions. Canada's ad hoc contributions to the IPDC do not indicate a true commitment towards it. At the same time there is a clear endorsement of the Program by Canada on a political plane. Conflict of views between various departments of the Canadian government is largely responsible for this peculiar situation.

The Department of Communications and the Canadian Commission for UNESCO have approved the usefulness of the IPDC and recommended liberal financial assistance. External Affairs, also showed some interest in the IPDC when it was started. Each has its own reason for doing so. External Affairs sees the IPDC as the only way to keep the lid on the NWICO demand of the Third World, a strictly political interest. The DOC interests are commercial. It would like to enhance trade links with developing countries by participating in the IPDC projects. The CCU would like to see things continue on the same note at UNESCO.

But CIDA, the Canadian aid disbursement agency, does not fully acknowledge the importance of the IPDC. It has its own reasons for doing so. CIDA refuses to recognize the IPDC as a genuine developmental program. Its contention is that the IPDC program is political. The agency is of the opinion that financing the IPDC projects which deal with the establishment of national media systems might have far reaching political ramifications and may defeat the original purpose of the Program. Development of national media

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systems does not fit into CIDA's priorities.

CIDA tends to see communications as an overall component of its many development programs. Its emphasis is on project development communications or social communications. Within this, priority is given to the development of human resources. This type of approach to communication by CIDA is not compatible with the goals of the IPDC which are aimed at achieving national or regional interests.

The attitude of CIDA towards the IPDC could change if there is some external pressure, particularly from the mass media, academic circles and non-governmental agencies, etc. Unfortunately there is very little interest being evinced by the mass media and academicians in the IPDC or in developing countries communication issues.

In a way, Canada has much to lose by not participating actively in the IPDC. The IPDC projects will enable Canadians to understand Third World communication aspects. Such knowledge can be gainfully employed to achieve commercial interests. But then again the argument is that Canada is not a major producer of equipment needed in mass media. In that case one can argue that with very little to gain commercially by participating in the IPDC programs, Canada can be truly called a middle power and a country which believes in multilateralism.

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1. See International Programme for the Development of Communication: Guide to Project Preparation July 1990 (Paris: UNESCO, 1990) 6.
2. Report of Gunnar Garbo, Chairman to IPDC Intergovernmental Council on the activities of the Bureau, Sixth Session of the Council, Annexe V, 1985.
3. The debates on communication issues at UNESCO prior to the establishment of the IPDC were based on divisive ideologies. The establishment of IPDC was considered as a pragmatic approach to the communication problems of the Third World by the member states of UNESCO, particularly the Western states. For example, William Harley, US National Commission for UNESCO, Washington and delegate to the initial meeting of the IPDC, explaining the goals of the IPDC, said, "If the IPDC is to avoid being stymied by UNESCO's attachment to political objectives, it must exclude any mandate for normative activities. There must be no provision for media accountability to the state or to international organizations. In particular, it should not undertake research or other programs that can lead to establishing by UNESCO of a code of journalistic ethics, measures for protection or licensing of journalists, or any form of monitoring or judging behaviour in any aspect of the communications sector." See William G. Harley, "UNESCO and the International Program for the Development of Communications," World Communications: A Handbook, George Gerbner and Marsha Siefert (eds), (New York, London:1984) 470.
4. Canada was a member of the Intergovernmental Council from 1980 to 1986. The members of the Intergovernmental Council are elected for a two year term.
5. Canada contributed \$250 thousand (Can) to the Special Account, in the year 1981 and another \$150 thousand over the next five years.
6. See Mustapha Masmoudi, "The New World Information Order," in World Communications: A Handbook, George Gerbner and Marsha Siefert (eds), (New York, London:1984) 14-28.
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9. UNESCO 20 C/Res.4/9.4/2 of 28 November 1976 (UNESCO 20 C/Resolutions at 104).
10. Harley, "UNESCO and the International Program..." (1984) 468.
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13. See Harley, "UNESCO and International Program...", (1984).
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17. Clare Wells, The UN, UNESCO and the Politics of Knowledge (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987) 103.
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24. Gabriel Warren, 14 December 1982.
25. William Preston Jr. et al, Hope and Folly (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989) 151.
26. Personal interview with Louis Patenaude, Associate Secretary-General, Canadian Commission for UNESCO, Ottawa, 28 June 1990.

27. See the Report on the Round Table Conference, "Towards a Canadian Perspective on International Communication Issues," April 26 and 27, 1982 (Ottawa: CCU).
28. See the Report released by the US State Department on 17 April 1990, on "UNESCO: US Decision not to Rejoin."
29. Personal interview with Charles Morrow, 12 Apr. 1991.
30. Interview with Charles Morrow, 12 Apr. 1991.
31. Interview with Charles Morrow, 12 Apr. 1991.
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33. See Achal Mehra, "International Program for the Development of Communication: The trouble with meteors is that they die fast," Gazette, 30.1 (1983) 3-12.
34. For a complete text of the letter see file no. F127, Betty Zimmerman Collection, St. Patrick's Resource Centre, Carleton University, Ottawa.
35. See the Report on the Round Table Conference, "Towards a Canadian Perspective..." (1982).
36. Rough figures given by CIDA officials.
37. Marcela Tapia, in a background paper prepared for the Development Communication Sector, Professional Services Branch, CIDA, (Last update: March 1991).
38. Interview with Charles Morrow, 12 Apr. 1991.
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40. Harley, "UNESCO and the International Program...", (1984) 472.
41. See the letter addressed to Thomas McPhail from Claus Spoerel, dt. July 18, 1988, file No. F127, Betty Zimmerman Collection, St. Patrick's Resource Centre, Carleton University, Ottawa.
42. Charles Morrow, CIDA in a personal interview, 12 Apr. 1991.
43. For example the Heritage Foundation, US, brought out a backgrounder entitled UNESCO Vs The Free Press (No. 253). Though it denounces the IPDC, at least there is some indication of independent bodies involvement in the communication debate.

44. This extract is taken from "Development Communication Strategy Paper" (Draft) prepared for CIDA, by Anna Stahmer, Senior Associate and Hedwing Ng, Research Officer, Ryerson International Development Centre, (1987).

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46. See notes for remarks by the Minister for External Relations and International Development, Monique Laundry, at the Plenary Session of the UNESCO, General Conference, 24 October 1989.

47. Monique Laundry, Minister for External Relations, 24 October 1989.

CHAPTER III

THE U.S. WITHDRAWS : THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA

On December 28, 1983 the United States government announced its intention to withdraw from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), through a letter¹ from George Shultz, U.S. Secretary of State, to Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow then Director-General of UNESCO. The U.S. cited several reasons for withdrawing from UNESCO; these included mismanagement, over-sized budget and the organization's involvement in several ideological and political debates which the U.S. considered to be outside UNESCO's realm. The U.S. withdrew from the organization officially on December 31, 1984, after the obligatory² twelve-month waiting period from the date of initial notification. The United Kingdom announced its intention to withdraw from UNESCO on November 22, 1984 citing more or less the same reasons.³ UNESCO not only lost two of its prominent member states but was also deprived of 30 per cent of its total budget (the U.S. contribution was 25 per cent and the United Kingdom 5 per cent of UNESCO's total budget).

Thus a major crisis set in within UNESCO, posing problems for the entire United Nations system. Comments Roger Coate, in his book Unilateralism, Ideology, and U.S. Foreign Policy:

This state of affairs, however, should not be viewed as an isolated phenomenon. As such events were occurring in UNESCO, there were mounting signs that financial and other problems were rapidly approaching crisis proportions in

numerous institutions of international cooperation, including the United Nations (UN), itself.⁴

Leonard Sussman, in a private conversation with a key government official of the U.S., seems to have been told that the U.S. withdrawal would be "a shot across the bow of the whole UN system."⁵ The U.S. withdrawal can be called an acid test for the survival of the entire United Nations system and for the notion of multilateralism. If other Western countries had followed the U.S., considerable damage would have been done to the entire UN system. Viewed from this perspective, Canada's decision to stay within UNESCO assumes immense significance, particularly considering its close economic and political relations with the United States and United Kingdom. Canada was in fact one of 23 countries-- along with the United States-- which submitted an informal list of proposals for major reform to Director General M'Bow, entitled "The crisis in UNESCO."⁶ Anthony Giffard states that though this paper was not officially made public, it was deliberately leaked to the press.⁷

Though the United States government did not cite unhappiness about communications activities in UNESCO as the principal reason for withdrawal, its displeasure over communications issues had been made quite obvious at every stage. A memorandum prepared by William G. Harley, a communications consultant, for the U.S. Department of State, states:

It is true, however, that more publicity has been accorded to the communications area than any other sector of UNESCO affairs. This attention has been provoked by vitriolic attacks in UNESCO on Western domination of news and information flow and by attempts to develop normative standards that would impose restraints on Western media and restrict activities of

transnational corporations. Press vigilance in reporting every move in UNESCO of an anti-free press nature has heightened an awareness of these issues in the U.S. public and the Congress (Beard Amendment). Widespread publicity in recent years has helped make communications one of the hottest issues on the international agenda, with UNESCO at the epicentre.⁸

A document prepared by Gregory J. Newell, assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs, recommends U.S. withdrawal and argues that endemic hostility toward basic institutions of a free society, especially a free market and a free press⁹, prevails in the organization. U.S. reluctance to recognise the New World Information and Communication Order and the developing countries' persistence over it made UNESCO a battleground of ideological conflicts much to the displeasure of the Western nations.

Communication issues played a significant role in the withdrawal of the United States. That assumption is not merely hypothetical, but has solid evidence¹⁰ in the form of backgrounders prepared by United States officials and by other organizations like the Heritage Foundation, World Freedom House and the United States National Commission for UNESCO. Other Western nations were expected to follow the U.S. in its withdrawal. The Western bloc unanimity on communication issues at UNESCO is much evident from the deliberations of the Mass Media Declaration. Except for the United Kingdom (and Singapore from the Asian region) better sense prevailed; the rest of the West chose to remain in UNESCO and fight for reforms.

The purpose of this chapter is not to discuss the withdrawal of the U.S. from UNESCO in great length, but to take this as background and try to see how Canada was

affected by the communication issues being debated at UNESCO, from an ideological, political and economic point of view. Before doing so, however, it is worth pointing out that Canada's decision to stay in UNESCO is not directly related to communications issues. It has more to do with Canada's foreign policy and its involvement in other UNESCO programs. Ian Clark, Canadian Ambassador to the UN, said, "Canada's support of UNESCO must be seen as an extension of our foreign aid program and ultimately it will be judged in pragmatic terms on how successfully, even indispensably, it performs its catalytic North/South role in the areas of its mandate."¹¹

The Canadian Commission for UNESCO (CCU) published a 1985 document, Canada and UNESCO- A Working Partnership, explaining the role and functions of UNESCO and Canadian involvement. The document carries comments of a few Canadians who are aware of UNESCO activities. These reveal a deep sense of admiration for UNESCO and foresee an important role for Canada to play. Garnet T. Page, Chairman, Canadian Committee for the Man and Biosphere (MAB) Program, Calgary, Alberta, aptly writes:

The record of success established by UNESCO since 1946 with the full support of the Government of Canada and a multitude of Canadians, together with its unique potential for the future, should not be negated by a decision by Canada to reduce or withdraw its support. Such action would be much more devastating than the removal of financial support alone, it would deny the many Canadian organizations and individual citizens the opportunity to participate in UNESCO's task of achieving its basic goals of mutual understanding and respect among the peoples of the world through a broad range of well-conceived and well-executed programs in education, science and culture. It would also prevent Canada from playing an important role in correcting an imperfect, but potentially very useful international situation.¹²

Highlighting the importance of UNESCO to Canada, Vivian F. Launay, executive director of the Canadian Federation for the Humanities, points out:

UNESCO is the only body to provide regular and extensive liaison for experts in all areas of intellectual, cultural and scientific concern from all over the world. Its publications are of use to many Canadians, both academic and non-academic. Despite problems which inevitably have to be solved, it, like its parent body, remains our last, best hope.¹³

Several others felt that UNESCO acts as an important body where views from different quarters of the world can be exchanged. Guy Sylvestre, former member, Intergovernmental Council for the General Information Program, UNESCO, comments, "with UNESCO's demise would disappear the only world-wide forum where the three worlds --East, West and Least Developed Countries--can pursue their dialogue on so many issues affecting the future and the quality of life. An imperfect UNESCO--with all its shortcomings--is still much better than no UNESCO at all."¹⁴

A few articles urging the Canadian government to support UNESCO appeared in newspapers. A piece by Ian Morrison, executive director of the Canadian Association for Adult Education, which appeared on May 28 1985 in the Globe and Mail, is not only interesting but also quite objective.¹⁵ He suggests that Canada should consider the cost-benefit analysis of membership and should not resort to a hasty retreat like the UK, which ignored the fact that its universities used to receive contracts worth more than its annual membership fee of \$15 million Canadian from UNESCO. He points out that the total UNESCO budget of \$300 million is about the same as the budget of the University of Toronto. And Canada's annual membership fee of \$9 million is not significant when

compared to the benefits Canada could derive by staying. Above all, with the withdrawal of the United States and Great Britain, Canada's position as a contributor has been elevated to sixth position.¹⁶ "In UNESCO all its employees must be bilingual. Canada is the only country with this special reason for encouraging and supporting UNESCO."¹⁷

As a middle power, one can say, Canada played its cards right when it decided to stay. UN ambassador Clark, addressing students, at the University of Toronto, said, "We are not a country that is seen to be an honest broker--what Canada is is a country that takes a lead among the Western nations."¹⁸ Being a major trading partner of the United States and also a member of the Commonwealth, Canada certainly assumes a key role in UNESCO affairs in the absence of the U.S. and UK.

How can Canada benefit from the UNESCO communication program considering that it is a country with top communication technology and communication facilities? John Cairns, former Director of the Centre for International Programs, University of Guelph, explained:

In the area of communication and information systems, the General Information Programme facilitates general access to and the free flow of information. Since 95% of the scientific and technical information we require is generated abroad, this program is of particular value to Canadians. Advanced communications technology is a field in which Canada has established a strong reputation, and UNESCO's programs, by which our experts and technology can become even more widely known, have the obvious potential of benefitting Canadian international trade.¹⁹

In a way the debate over NWICO is central to the withdrawal of U.S. An examination of the views held by the U.S. and Canada on this would make it easier to

understand the Canadian position on the communication issues being discussed in UNESCO. But before doing this, let us briefly touch upon the growth and intensification of the NWICO debate.

NWICO has by now become more or less a scholarly debate among academicians of the developed and developing countries. Ever since the U.S. withdrawal, very little has been discussed on NWICO in international political forums.

The NWICO debate is full of contradictions since it was initiated in 1973. Like the free flow advocates some of the NWICO proponents have vested interests in promoting it. Achal Mehra, a journalist associated with the Chinese news agency Xinhua, examining the pros and cons of this situation wrote:

NIIO (New International Information Order), like free flow of information, is a product of greed and selfishness, but also of principled concern. To be sure, it draws from tinpot despots who find in it a convenient smoke screen for camouflaging their draconian abuses of human rights and freedoms. But it also includes the genuine concerns of many individuals and societies who share genuine yearnings for freedom. Just as the selfishness and greed of those who bandy free flow of information for their personal economic and political aggrandizement are to be deplored, so too should similar hypocrisy of many of the NIIO protagonists be condemned.²⁰

According to Lent and Gunter, conceptually the NWICO debate involves five basic issues:²¹ news flow, cultural imperialism, national sovereignty, technology transfer and communication rights. In the beginning, when the demand for NWICO by developing countries was taking shape, imbalance in the international flow of news was its main theme.²² The grievance of the developing countries was that this news flow was controlled

by the big four news agencies (AP, UPI, Reuters and AFP),²³ and it tended to concentrate on disaster reporting about floods, famines²⁴ and-- as the title of Rosenbaum's book reads-- "coups and earthquakes."²⁵ The developing countries criticized the Western press for failing to report the development taking place in those countries.²⁶ The focus later shifted from news flow issue to other aspects of NWICO.

Raquel Salinas Bascur, a communication scholar from Chile, describes the three stages during which NWICO evolved as a full debate as follows:

The first stage, from 1973 to 1976, entailed 'politico-ideological confrontation', to stir up the ideas, starting from the theoretical work of researcher. and with the political support of the poor countries.

The second stage in this process, from 1976 to 1979, consisted in accumulating data, much of it empirical evidence, in order to demonstrate that the political and ideological arguments were based on reality. In other words, it was a matter of presenting data in such a way that cultural and informational domination became evident.

The third stage followed the publications of the MacBride Report in 1980.²⁷

NWICO evolved from an initial concern over the imbalance in news flow to a major concern of communication and information inequalities. The one-way free flow of cultural products, from developed to developing countries also began to be viewed as a threat to individual nations' cultural sovereignty.²⁸ During the '80s, the developing countries also began to realise that information is a major economic input which plays a vital role in the overall development of a state. Slowly such issues as the regulation of direct broadcast and remote sensing satellites, allocation of electromagnetic frequency spectrum and transborder data flows (TBDF) became part of the NWICO debate. Though UNESCO is the main

forum of debate for NWICO, it also figures prominently in other United Nations bodies such as International Telecommunications Union (ITU), Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), World Amateur Radio Conference (WAARC) and in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) meetings.

With the withdrawal of the U.S. and Britain from UNESCO, a kind of passivity descended upon the Third World countries in their demand for NWICO. In the early '80s, UNESCO decided to organize "NWICO Round Tables" in order to invigorate discussions on it, in accordance with a General Assembly resolution.²⁹ The first Round Table with 26 experts took place in Iglis, Australia, in 1983. "Many, if not all, participants and observers viewed the Iglis round table as a commendable exercise in cross-cultural understanding, the manifestation of a spirit of consensus, a commitment to identifying areas of agreement and a valuable testimony to international solidarity."³⁰ The second Round Table (scheduled in 1984 but postponed) was held in 1986 at Copenhagen. It focused on the issues of endogenous communication development in Third World countries and concluded that this could be achieved through co-operative efforts in the production of communication software and in training of communication personnel.³¹ A third Round Table proposed at the Copenhagen meet did not take place, but the fourth Round Table was held in Harare in 1989.³² Drowned in diplomatic jargon the summary of the deliberations of these Round Tables emphasises the need for a "co-operative" effort to reduce the inequalities existing in the field of information and communication between the developed and developing countries.

Frankly speaking, the NWICO movement is in a state of limbo--particularly when the

much compromised "Mass Media Declaration" and the MacBride Report, both discussed in the previous chapter, failed to give further impetus to the NWICO demand. The present Director-General of UNESCO, Fredrico Mayor, has been advocating the principle of free flow of information as the mainstay of UNESCO's communication program, in a bid to get the United States to rejoin the organization. A story in the Washington Post reports: "UNESCO must guarantee the free flow of information full stop--said Mayor...He said plans for the NWICO 'no longer exist' at UNESCO, adding that they had violated human rights clauses in UNESCO's charter."³³

But when Tom McPhail, chairman of the advisory committee on communications for the Canadian Commission of UNESCO, asked Mayor at a 1989 UNESCO meeting in Paris, whether NWICO was dead, Mayor told him that NWICO was a "hot subject" and not "dead'."³⁴What a contradiction!

However, the NWICO debate has made mass communications a critical issue, bringing to the fore not only an ideological perspective (freedom of the press, role of journalists, etc.) but also an economic perspective (the role of transnational corporations) and a political one (cultural identity, the free flow of information, sovereignty of individual states, etc.). Some of these issues address the grievances not just of the developing countries, but also tend to perpetuate to a certain extent those of developed ones like Canada. That is why it is important to understand Canada's views on NWICO.

Many developed countries, particularly the United States and Great Britain, see NWICO as a threat to capitalism and a socialist ploy which will eventually allow government control over the mass media. So NWICO was seen as an impediment to the doctrine of the

free flow of information. This belief was said to be one of the reasons for the withdrawal of both the United States and Great Britain. Canada is also one of the Western nations that strongly emphasize the free flow of information.

It is believed that "the first seeds of the proposal for a New World Information and Communication Order were planted in Canada,"³⁵ during a UNESCO meeting of experts on mass communications and society held in Montreal in 1969. The importance of communications and information flow to cultural development was discussed during this meeting. The report of the meeting concluded that one-way flow of news and information is unjustified and it stressed the need to safeguard cultural integrity against programmes carrying alien values.

Delivering a speech during the first session of the Round Table on "Canada's perspective on international communication issues," Hamdy Kandil, Director of UNESCO's Division of Free Flow of Information and Communications Policies, commented:

This somehow confirms my feeling that because of the cultural vulnerability of this country and its concerns about Canadian technological sovereignty, the call for a new order, perhaps under different circumstances, could well have come from Canada... and further added, that I believe that Canada can play a more aggressive role as an honest broker in the necessary negotiations for furthering the objectives of such an order".³⁶

Canada could play an important role in the NWICO debate as it also faces some of the problems of developing countries, particularly its constant struggle to maintain a distinct cultural identity. However, an examination of the various statements issued by communication ministers and Canadian delegates attending international communications fora reveals that Canada doesn't have a clear-cut approach to the NWICO debate. On one

hand it advocates the free flow of information; on the other, its government interferes with media affairs. In the early '80, when the debate on NWICO was being intensified, Canada had expressed views which fall in line with NWICO. For example, Pierre Juneau, federal Deputy Minister of Communication, commenting on the NWICO debate on Nov. 11, 1980, said:

Some Western commentators have tended to dismiss this initiative as an attempt by socialist countries and authoritarian developing countries to legitimize government control over media content, and no doubt there is a basis for this view but perhaps it's also more complicated than that. There are obviously some things which governments should not do-- they should not, for example, interfere with freedom of the press. But there are certain things governments think they must do if their citizens are going to prosper and feel free.³⁷

Perhaps these "certain things" may find some explanation a decade later in a speech of communications minister Marcel Masse, delivered to communication students at the University of Ottawa in 1990:

The government of Canada is conscious of the socio-economic risks which the free circulation of cultural products can bring. Our market is small and we are face to face with an invasion of foreign products, notably American, in the areas of publishing, film, recorded sound and in television. If not corrected, such a situation could take our own culture out of the mainstream even in Canada.³⁸

Doesn't this argument appear very close to the NWICO demand of developing countries? He further feels:

As the United States constantly searches out new markets for its entertainment products, which constitute its second largest export category, the access of Canadians to their own cultural products is threatened more and more. English Canada now understands that it is a cultural minority and is therefore now turning to the only authority it deems able to defend and

promote its cultural identity: the federal government.³⁹

Thus far we can see that there is a divided opinion on the NWICO debate between Third World countries and some of the developed countries. This brief summary of the NWICO debate is a prologue to understanding a somewhat inconsistent position of Canada on it. Canada neither denounces NWICO, as the United States does, nor recognises it in principle. It fully believes in the doctrine of a free flow of information; at the same time, it endorses government interference when it comes to the protection of cultural sovereignty of a nation (as reflected in the many legislative measures it has introduced in the past such as Bill C-52, to ensure the stable existence of its cultural industries).

Canada has all along been struggling to develop national communication policies to strike a balance between international dependence and self reliance in the field of communications. Canada is swamped with the cultural products of the United States, which always pose a threat to its own cultural industries.

The Canada-United States communications relationship is, without exaggeration, the most complex such relationship between any two countries in the world. It is certainly a mutually enriching relationship. However, as a nation sharing a border with another whose population and economy are about ten times the size of our own, we have found that 'letting problems take care of themselves' is a luxury we usually cannot afford."⁴⁰

That is why Canada has taken several legislative measures which may appear contradictory to the notion of free flow of information. As aptly put by Melody and Samarajiwa:

Therein lies the ambivalence and the contradiction in Canada's position with respect to the NIO and the free flow of information. In its relations to the U.S., Canadian communication policies emphasize the importance of

restrictions and controls necessary to maintain balance, equality, diversity, and participation by both the more and less powerful. But with respect to international communication and information flows, Canada sees that lucrative markets, including extensive Third World markets, can be best exploited under conditions of unrestrained access to world markets.⁴¹

The free flow of information doctrine is considered to be the yardstick for all Western countries in developing their communication policies. While fully advocating the free flow philosophy, both Canada and the United States have violated it several times to maintain their status quo. In fact the two countries were locked in a battle of wits--with Canada trying to protect its cultural industries from the onslaught of U.S. cultural products and the United States trying to capture the Canadian market. Starting with Bill C-52, protecting Canadian magazine revenue, to the exemption of cultural industries from the Free Trade Agreement, the struggle to maintain a distinctive cultural identity through mass communications continues. The pressure from the U.S. to break these restrictive policies is always on. For its part, the United States government has proposed new immigration regulations, which would reduce the number of visas for foreign performers. Only 25,000 visas will be granted to performing artists, if the new immigration bill is passed. These steps are being taken by the U.S. government to safeguard domestic entertainers' job prospects. "Fundamentally our job is to protect the domestic interest," said Duke Austin, an immigration department spokesman.⁴² Derek Burney, Canadian Ambassador to the U.S., felt that this would block "fair and open cultural exchanges."⁴³ He seems to have protested to U.S. officials about the proposed rules. "Canadian performing arts organizations are worried that their ability to perform in the United States could be jeopardized."⁴⁴

I would like to present a few situations where Canada chose to overrule the principle

of free flow to protect its national interests. Ironically these measures were taken to overcome the influence of U.S. cultural products.

THE FREE FLOW DOCTRINE & CULTURAL SOVEREIGNTY

"The dilemma Canada faces in broadcasting illustrates the basic paradox of a major industrialized nation which is torn between a search for self-identity and a yearning for larger-than nation identity, between nationalism and pan-Americanism, as well as between protectionism and liberalism," comments Chin Chaun Lee, in his book, Media Imperialism Reconsidered.⁴⁵ The quest to seek a distinct national identity through cultural products, particularly through broadcasting, has been an integral part of Canadian communication policy. This notion comes quite close to the Third World countries' claim that alien cultures have undesirable effects on their own culture. Lack of proper indigenous communication facilities in the Third World is cited as one of the main reasons for the West to exploit this situation. This dependency syndrome is leading towards what McPhail calls "electronic colonialism,"⁴⁶ the Third World countries claim. However, in Canada's case it is not a lack of communication facilities that is creating problems of dependence and the fear of losing cultural identity. If anything, an abundance of communication technology in Canada can be attributed to this state of dependency. The implications of satellite technology (explained later in this chapter), the fact of being the second most cabled nation in the world coupled with a small domestic market, common language and geographical proximity to the United States, are often-cited reasons for this cultural dependency. Laments Bernard Ostry, former chairman of TVOntario, "Canadianization is the word Europeans and others use to describe

loss of cultural sovereignty in television production and distribution."⁴⁷

There are two distinctive features of the Canadian broadcasting system, as pointed out by Dorothy Zolf: "first the existence of a strong publicly-owned component in Canadian broadcasting, and second, regulations applicable to both public and private broadcasters that require a specified minimum proportion of Canadian programming content."⁴⁸ The public broadcasting system is basically there to maintain a distinctive cultural identity for the nation. The minimum Canadian content rule offers Canadian artists the opportunity to demonstrate their talents and in the process create a distinct cultural identity for the nation.

The intervention of national governments in the area of mass media, particularly broadcasting, is considered important in developing countries in order to attain nationalistic goals like distance education and conveyance of social messages (for example, family planning) along with local entertainment. Though not totally undesirable, the developing countries try to limit the flow of alien cultural products from the West, in order to nurture and give enough time for their cultures to adopt the newly emerging media, particularly television. Canada too uses communication technology to inform and entertain the people living in the north. In the name of "free flow" the developed countries (particularly the United States) want to market their cultural products to other countries. Perhaps this is where Canada begins to sympathise with the developing countries' demand for NWICO. John Meisel, a political scientist at Queen's University, said at the 28th annual meeting of the Canadian Commission for UNESCO, Canada "is as culturally threatened as many countries which are less richly endowed economically; we have a foot, as it were, in both

camps. We can listen to both sides and, when we speak, tend to be listened to."⁴⁹

THE DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE (DBS) ISSUE

A complete analysis of the DBS issue and Canada's position is beyond the scope of this study. However, I would like to point out that Canadian views on the DBS issue differ from those of the U.S. The latter insists on the free flow argument, whereas Canada generally agrees that there should not be any obstacles to free flow but talks about prior consent and the international responsibility of individual nations regarding the content transmitted through satellites. Bilateral negotiations between nations is cited as a possible solution to this issue by Canada. This line of argument is connected to the flow of television signals into Canada from south of its border.

The Canadian government has taken keen interest in developing technology which facilitates the reception of direct broadcasting television signals through systems using smaller antennas. This is to enable tiny northern communities to receive television transmissions. "That same technology has made it easier for Canadians, in violation of Canadian law, to tune in on the private television services intended for reception within the United States--a new transboundary problem."⁵⁰ Despite several attempts, in 1984 the Canadian government abandoned its bans on satellite receiving antennas, stating that only cable business company could not receive and utilize such signals.⁵¹

Canada's concerns about the flow of television programmes from the United States and the so-called threat to its cultural identity were intensified by the illegal reception of Direct Television Broadcasting Signals (DTBS). Furthermore, U.S. commercial broadcast organizations were keen in providing their DBS services to Canada, but for a price.

Commenting on the satellite technology, a Task Force on Broadcasting Policy warned, "we are not naive about the potential consequences of new satellite technology. We are under no illusion as to its capacity to flood our country (and the rest of the world) with more and more American programs obliterating cultural distinctions between countries."⁵² Canada's attempts to gain some control over the influx of American television programs, by seeking an international law which would allow individual nations to restrict DBS operations, were evident in various international communication fora.

A good example is the 1979-80 Canada-Sweden joint proposal at the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. They formulated their own version of Draft Principles to Govern the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for Direct Television Broadcasting.⁵³ "It appealed to the advocates of sovereignty by including an article stating that 'each nation should bear international responsibility for television broadcasting whether carried out by state entities or private broadcasters under their jurisdiction.'"⁵⁴

Of particular interest is that these articles were limited to direct television broadcasting and not the mass media overall. Until 1982, the United States managed to stall any UN action to limit the use of space satellites for transmitting television signals into countries that do not want to receive them.⁵⁵

This DBS issue had been a part of the NWICO demands. As Paul Laskin and Abram Chayes⁵⁶ have pointed out, the messages transmitted through DBS could not only have a bearing on local programming and culture, but could also be used for political propaganda. DBS could have far reaching ramifications then on the socio-economic and political situations of a country. As far as the DBS relationship between Canada and the

U.S. is concerned, there is scope for settling it through bilateral negotiations. But considering its close relationship with the U.S., Canada would rather seek to settle the issue through internationally approved strictures. Such international laws can take shape only in UN bodies.

Back in 1972, UNESCO had adopted a Declaration of Guiding Principles on the Uses of Satellite Broadcasting for the Free Flow of Information, the Spread of Education, and Greater Cultural Exchange.⁵⁷ "The UNESCO declaration basically represented a rejection by many developing countries of the 'excessively laissez-faire nature' of the Canada-Sweden compromise and was more a regulatory approach that prescribed general and specific principles to govern direct broadcasting."⁵⁸ In spite of the many attacks from the West, UNESCO is determined to promote DBS for educational purposes.⁵⁹ UNESCO has also undertaken a project for the development of a "small low-cost receiving earth station for eventual endogenous production" to be used for the redistribution of direct satellite broadcasting signals to individual receivers.⁶⁰ Canada, which has been involved in developing systems of small antennas to receive DBS signals, could extend the fruits of its research to such UNESCO projects. In this process a monetary gain is not ruled out. Sharing the technological knowledge on a mutual basis is one important aspect in the relationship between UNESCO and its member states.

THE TRANSBORDER DATA FLOW (TBDF) ISSUE

Transborder data flow is an issue which concerns developed and developing countries alike. The U.S. would like to see the free flow of information doctrine extended

to transborder data flows, for the simple reason (as Manet points out) that between "60 and 80 percent of the profits of large North American businesses originate abroad. It can be said accurately that 'free flow', transborder data flows, and integrated global telecommunications networks are vital for the policies of U.S. economic, financial, and military hegemony."⁶¹ Anthony Smith, former Director of the British Film Institute, pointed out a decade ago that Canadian mining, insurance, oil, gas, credit and other companies stored their data in the U.S. and that "Canada could create a viable market of its own but only on the basis of a considerable amount of national and governmental direction, which runs counter to the doctrine of free flow".⁶²

Alarmed by the situation, the Canadian government began to give serious thought to this issue. For example, the Consultative Committee on the Implications of Telecommunications for Canadian Sovereignty (the Clyne Committee) recommended that the "government...should act immediately to regulate transborder data flows so that we do not lose control of information vital to the maintenance of national sovereignty."⁶³ In a 1980 speech on behalf of Communications Minister David MacDonald, MP Scott Fennel said:

The government is particularly concerned by the implications of the assimilation, storage, and processing of vital information about Canada, our commerce and people in and by computers operating on foreign soil. Such information is subject to foreign laws and values systems. As a result, so much that is vital to Canadians goes beyond the reach of our laws, priorities and policies. This trend is already costing us jobs and threatens our very ability to control our own economic and political destinies.⁶⁴

As of 1980, Anthony Smith records a Canadian minister claiming that the country has

been losing information processing business to the tune of \$150-300 million per year, in addition to 30-40,000 jobs, simply as a result of the outflow of Canadian data into the United States.⁶⁵ In order to rectify this problem, several provinces in Canada passed laws preventing the movement of data beyond provincial jurisdiction. The Canadian perspective on TBDF was explained by W.H. Montgomery, Director-General of DOC's International Relations Branch, in a keynote address to an OECD Symposium on Transborder Data Flow, at London in November, 1983. He clearly tried to explain how TBDS should be viewed from the free flow concept:

We do not believe that, in general, "flow" per se is an issue. Instead, what we are dealing with is the right of access to data, information, and related services and the circumstances or conditions which may apply to limit access. We are concerned with individual access, corporate access and multi-national corporate access. The emphasis which I wish to make is that by approaching transborder data flow from the perspective of access as opposed to more doctrinal consideration of "free flow", one highlights the requirement of the user data, information, and related services, as opposed to placing emphasis on the "free flow" of data, information, or related services, themselves. In our view, "user access" - or denial of that access - is an overriding element in any discussion on transborder data flow.⁶⁶

Issues concerning TBDF were part of the NWICO movement and figured in the United Nations and UNESCO deliberations and later moved on to OECD and GATT meetings.

FREE FLOW: A CORPORATE DICTUM ?

At times the free flow of information can stall the attempts of a government to enforce legislation to protect the interests of citizens. Taking the example of tobacco

advertising, Herbert Schiller tries to explain how the U.S. First Amendment is being used (or abused) by the corporate world to serve its own interests. For a long time, the medical and legal professions have tried to persuade governments (particularly in North America) to ban the advertising of tobacco products. Though such pleas have met with little success in the United States, the Canadian government banned all tobacco products advertising in most media in the year 1988 and by 1993 even billboard and other outdoor advertising will also be prohibited.⁶⁷ "The Canadian laws will also ban use of tobacco brand names in connection with cultural and sporting events which have become a major promotional vehicle for the tobacco industry."⁶⁸

In the U.S. the Philip Morris Company (a multinational manufacturer of tobacco and other consumer goods) sponsored an essay contest, "Is Liberty Worth Writing For?", in 1987. Using academic and literary publications to announce it, the company also placed ads which explained that a ban on tobacco advertising, then under consideration by Congress, was an infringement of free expression.⁶⁹ Schiller questions the rationale in granting a serious health hazard constitutional sanction in the name of free expression.

What happens if such an argument is put forth by the tobacco companies in Canada? Will the government lift the ban on constitutional grounds, subjugating citizen welfare to market forces in the name of free flow of information?

When market forces, piggy-backing onto constitutional rights, threaten to override national interests, only universal principles and guidelines set forth by a multilateral organization like UNESCO would be the last resort to enforce some discipline. For example, the MacBride Commission has specifically mentioned that the advertising budgets

of tobacco companies dwarf the sum spent by governments to warn people of the ill consequences of smoking.⁷⁰ In its recommendations the Commission suggests that "guidelines with respect to advertising content and the values and attitudes it fosters, in accordance with national standards and practices,"⁷¹ should be introduced.

IMPOVERISHED FOREIGN NEWS COVERAGE?

In spite of being a developed country, Canada is like developing nations in its reliance on the big four news agencies for international news. Wrote Elaine Waisglass a decade ago: "It would be a challenge to find a journalist, editor or journalism school professor who is not a harsh critic of Canadian foreign news coverage; almost none of the foreign news we read in our 117 daily newspapers, watch on our 1,109 television stations or hear on our 915 radio stations is reported by Canadians."⁷²

This opinion was also expressed in a different context by Ian Clark, Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations. He commented that two-thirds of the articles which appeared in the Canadian press and which were clipped by the CCU on the UNESCO crisis emanated from the four major agencies, and that Canadians were forming their opinions based on information perceived by foreign eyes.⁷³

The reason for this situation is mainly economic. The Canadian press, largely under private ownership, cannot afford to station international correspondents abroad on a large scale, a situation akin to that of the developing countries. The Kent Royal Commission on Newspapers suggested that the national news service, Canadian Press (CP), should be offered money to subsidize more foreign news coverage, but the directors of CP flatly

refused any such proposal.⁷⁴ The recommendations of the Kent Commission, which was appointed by the Canadian government to examine the ever-increasing concentration of newspaper ownership, was compared with the UNESCO debates on related issues.⁷⁵ The Kent Report was misread as widely as the MacBride Report (claiming that it be suggestive of government intervention and editorial control). The report also caught the attention of media organizations abroad, when delegates from 20 countries at a Commonwealth Press Union (CPU) meeting passed a resolution protesting against "dangerous and unprecedented" editorial proposals made by the Kent Commission.⁷⁶ Ironically, as pointed out by Senator Keith Davey, chairman of the 1970 Senate Committee on Mass Media, "the fact is that the commission proposed no interference by government, no control over editorial content...what was proposed is affirmative legislation to support the real freedom of the press."⁷⁷ Refuting the criticism of the newspaper publishers on the report, the multiculturalism minister Jim Fleming snapped, "Surely Parliament has the right to set some boundaries for a free press, not just free against government but free against corporate control, too."⁷⁸ Fleming himself had been a newspaper and radio reporter and hence was quite familiar with press notions.

Many situations like these prevailing in the mass communications scene of Canada abound in UNESCO, too.

THE SILVER SCREEN SAGA

The Canadian film industry is one of the worst victims of the gamesmanship of U.S. media conglomerates. The political economy of the Canadian film industry has been well

documented by Manjunath Pendakur in his book, Canadian Dreams & American Control.⁷⁹ Not only is 97 percent of the theatre screen time in Canada occupied by imported films (mostly Hollywood productions), but 90 per cent of the \$1 billion annual revenue from film and video markets in Canada is controlled by U.S. transnational corporations.⁸⁰ Meanwhile the Canadian film industry continues its struggle for existence with the support of government subsidies. Former CBC president Pierre Juneau, criticized U.S. trade practices in 1986:

Though Americans tend to use terms such as "freedom of choice" and "free exchange" for cultural products,...the United States strongly protects its own cultural industries from foreign competition while expecting no resistance to American films and TV programs in other countries.⁸¹

The arm-twisting tactics of U.S. transnationals to soften the federal film distribution bill⁸², proposed in 1985 by communications minister Flora Macdonald, classically demonstrates that Canada has to look beyond bilateral negotiations to free itself from the U.S. corporate media empire. The bill, based on the task force report, "Canadian Cinema: A Solid Base,"⁸³ was expected to give more control to Canadian film distributors and discourage the American film industry's practice of treating Canada as part of its domestic market. But the Hollywood movie moguls did not take kindly to such proposals. Jack Valenti, the president of the Motion Picture Export Association of America, flew to Ottawa to discuss the effects of the bill with Flora MacDonald. He seems to have suggested a tax at the box office to generate revenues for domestic film making, which MacDonald brushed off.⁸⁴ Valenti went home and lobbied the U.S. President and various departments of the U.S. government. The film distribution bill became a part of the discussion between

President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney during the annual economic summit on April 5, 1987. "It was reported that Mulroney and his officials were taken aback when Reagan launched into a denunciation of MacDonald's bill and anxiously inquired whether Mulroney agreed with such plans. The Canadian Prime Minister apparently assured Reagan that the bill would in no way reduce Hollywood's freedom to do business in Canada."⁸⁵ Not satisfied, the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate sent a letter signed by 54 members to Prime Minister Mulroney, on June 2, 1987, expressing their anguish over the proposed bill.⁸⁶ They couldn't have found a better time to do this, for the Free Trade Agreement was very much in the cards at that time. Thus the media merchants got what they wanted.

FREE FLOW AND THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

The Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States has had a bearing on the global economy in two ways. One, it facilitates powerful nations to come together to form an economic power bloc (another example of this is the move of European countries towards a common market). Such increased co-operative efforts between two developed countries will enable them to achieve an economy of scale in every field, including communications. As a result, the inequalities in the field of communications are bound to increase between developed and developing countries. Two, as Vincent Mosco has pointed out, both the Canadian and U.S. governments are pressing for the global trade organization, GATT, to adopt some of the FTA provisions.⁸⁷

Delivering the 1986 Southam Lecture on "Culture, Communication 'Technology' and

Canadian Policy", Dallas Smythe said:

A spin-off from the slogan of free trade, which is particularly relevant to Canada's communication and cultural policy is the "free flow of information". Like its cousin, "free trade", the free flow of information policy assumes that in the real world there is substantially perfect competition.⁸⁸

Canada sought exemption of cultural industries from the provisions of the FTA. This is a protective measure. How effective it will be in offering scope for a healthy growth of the cultural industries in Canada depends on the overall implementation of the agreement. For example, if either of the two parties feels that an industry is receiving government support and considers it unfair, it can retaliate by imposing curbs on other areas, according to Article 2005(2). Mosco, analyzing the implications of FTA on Canadian cultural industries, comments:

Rather than exempt culture, the FTA makes it a specific target of retaliation. More importantly, by including culture in a section that permits retaliation to equivalent commercial effect, as Cameron observes, "Canada has accepted the American definition of culture: a commodity to be bought and sold for profit."⁸⁹

CONCLUSION

UNESCO had been an important forum for discussing international communication issues. In the early '60s, the focus was on the utilization of the mass media to spread literacy in the developing world. By the '70s, UNESCO had become a platform for the developing countries to launch their attack on Western media imperialism. The concept of NWICO was nurtured. Developing and developed countries have since then been locked in intense

debates on mass communications. Deliberations over The Mass Media Declaration and the MacBride Commission generated a tremendous amount of research on global communication flows and flaws. At the same time, political, economic and ideological differences among the East, West and Third World countries began to show up prominently in the communication debates. The withdrawal of the United States slowed down these discussions. UNESCO is trying to lure the United States to join the organization again. A compromise terminology is being used by Director General Fredrico Mayor, who states that plans for NWICO don't exist at UNESCO, and that the free flow of information is basic to UNESCO's communication programs.

Postulating that communication issues at UNESCO were largely responsible for the withdrawal of the U.S. and UK, the basic aim of this chapter was to see whether Canada's decision to stay within UNESCO is influenced by the same issues.

Taking a few Canadian communication issues, I have tried to point out four things. First, some of the priorities accorded to communications, like the search for national identity through mass media and attempts to protect Canada's cultural industries, come close to NWICO concepts. But unlike the developing countries, the Canadian situation can be described as "scarcity amidst plenty".

Second, Canada's commitment to a free flow of information has proved to be a disincentive for its cultural industries. This is due to many things, but the main reason is that it has a powerful neighbour whose transnational corporations have spread their roots firmly in the Canadian market. In order to restrict the flow of cultural products from the U.S., Canada has resorted to restrictive measures, which go against the notion of free flow.

However, the feeble attempts to provide legislated safeguards for a stable cultural industry are nullified to a great extent by the shrewd tactics of the American media conglomerates.

Third, the position taken by Canada on several international issues-- for example, DBS-- is based on Canada-U.S. communication relations.

Fourth, the attempts made by Canada to free itself of the domination of the U.S. communication conglomerates have proven to be very difficult because of their trade relations and their belief in a free flow doctrine. Canada has to look beyond bilateralism to solve some of its communication problems. As such, Canada has a stake in the UNESCO communication debates since they lead to the adoption of standard international laws on communications.

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CHAPTER IV

RECENT TRENDS IN GLOBAL COMMUNICATION: THEIR IMPACT ON CANADA'S PARTICIPATION IN UNESCO'S COMMUNICATION PROGRAM

Coupled with the development of new technologies, the increasing trend towards privatization and deregulation in the U.S. and in Europe is bringing rapid changes to the field of communications. Economic interests are the main reasons for these changes. The communications gap between the developed and developing countries is widening instead of narrowing due to these new trends. As pointed out by Kaarle Nordenstreng and Wolfgang Kleinwachter, this is more evident in the broadcast media, radio and television (see Tables 18 & 19).¹ "Some 30 countries in Asia and Africa lack newspapers and another 15 have newspapers with a circulation of only five issues for every 1,000 inhabitants. In 40 African nations, the number of radio receivers is less than the minimum UNESCO level. In 12 Asian countries, there are less than 100 newspapers per 1,000 individuals."² If we take the revenues generated by the information and communication economy around the world, the enormous difference between the developed countries and the developing countries is seen to be more profound. According to the World Communication Report, the information and communication industries had a total turnover³ of \$1,185 billion. Of this the United States contributed \$515 billion; Japan, \$250 billion; and the EEC, \$267 billion. Information and communication industries in the rest of the world, including Canada, had a turnover of about \$150 billion (see table 20).

Three principal reasons can be outlined for Canada's participation in UNESCO's communication program. First, Canada considers itself a middle power and a mediator

between the Third World and the West. It assumes this role by virtue of its political, economic and social relationship with the U.S. and, to a certain extent, Great Britain, whose policies tend to influence global communications. Canada is an important member of the Commonwealth countries.

TABLE 18

The gap between developed and developing countries in the field of television broadcasting

	Television Broadcasting			
	Transmitters		Receivers	
	1970	1987	1970	1988
Developed Countries	16,900	74,000	267 millions	585 millions
Developing Countries	800	13,810	23 millions	171 millions
Difference	16,100	60,190	244 millions	414 millions

Source: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1990 (Paris: 1990, VI 8-9)

The second reason is that, as an advocate of pluralism and the free flow of information, Canada has a pivotal role to play in helping developing countries establish democratic media institutions, without sacrificing national interests. Canada's communication policy is based on this principle. The communication debates during the early '70s in UNESCO and in various non-governmental and intergovernmental meetings were mainly based on these principles.⁴

Third, Canada's communication scene is full of contrasts-- abundance on one side, dependence on the other. The quest to achieve a national and distinctive cultural identity through mass media institutions (both private and public) by Canada will continue to be of considerable interest to the rest of the world. The policy decisions taken to encourage the domestic cultural industries by Canada-- and the successes and failures in this endeavour-- provide an opportunity

to the Third World to examine and balance their communication policies against national interests and market forces.

TABLE 19

The gap between developed and developing countries in the field of radio broadcasting

	Radio Broadcasting			
	Transmitters		Receivers	
	1970	1987	1970	1988
Developed Countries	16,200	25,850	623 millions	1215 millions
Developing Countries	5,900	12,000	112 millions	676 millions
Difference	10,300	13,850	511 millions	539 millions

Source: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1990 (Paris: 1990, VI 8-9)

MULTILATERALISM AND CANADA

Addressing the UNESCO General Conference in 1985, Canadian external relations minister Monique Vezina said:

The multilateral system has an essential and critical place in Canada's foreign policy. It complements our bilateral relations and gives a middle power like Canada the opportunity to enlarge its scope and influence. We support multilateralism strongly. We have an interest in its efficiency and its effectiveness. We are constantly seeking ways to help renew it and ensure that progress in the UN reflects the changing demands of its members. Mr. President, Canada's commitment to the ideals and the message of UNESCO is unaltered. We need a UNESCO. The world needs a UNESCO. It represents a key element in the UN system.⁵

Canada has strongly demonstrated its interest in multilateralism and the UN system. Ian Clark, former Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations, clearly stated the reason in a speech

delivered before the members of Canadian Commission for UNESCO. Explaining two facets of the Canadian approach to the UN system, he said, "First is the long-standing Canadian attraction to multilateral machinery to provide support in overcoming the difficulties we sometimes encounter in our relationships with our powerful friends."⁶ This view is highly relevant in the context of the communication relationship between Canada and the United States. "The second facet has to do with what Ambassador Bill Barton calls the knight-in-shining-armour component of our policy."⁷ This role has been amply demonstrated by Canada when it decided to stay in UNESCO following the U.S.-UK withdrawals. There was a general world feeling that Canada would follow suit, because it was demanding the same radical reforms in the organization.⁸ Canada chose to fight for the reforms within UNESCO, however, reaffirming its faith in multilateralism. Ian Clark feels in this regard that "an element of idealism is important to Canadians in our relationships with the rest of the world."⁹ Another indication to this effect is Canada's increase in contributions to the UN over the years while U.S. contributions declined. This gesture helps Canada to consolidate its position as a middle power.

Gerard Pelletier, commenting on Canada's multilateralist role as the middle power, wrote:

Middle should not be confused with middling; nor is Canada by any stretch of the imagination a superpower on the scale of the United States or the Soviet Union. It has probably not yet achieved status in that category of major powers which lies between the super and middle powers; France, West Germany, Japan, China and the United Kingdom. We Canadians are too modest to place ourselves in the same league with those countries whose economies, military might and populations are at least twice our own, even if our territory and natural resources may be equal to theirs.¹⁰

According to Pelletier, Canada can be compared with other middle powers like Australia,

Brazil, India, Italy and Mexico. He adds:

What makes Canada's participation in world affairs so different from that of other middle powers is largely due to this unique condition of Canada's place in the international firmament. The application of Canadian foreign policy by successive governments has been largely an exercise in skilful exploitation of the possibilities and constraints inherent in Canada's special situation.¹¹

This is precisely what Canada is trying to do as a middle power vis-a-vis UNESCO's communication program. For example, Canada did not react to the Third World demand for NWICO in the same way as the U.S. or Great Britain, which struck it down as mere ideological rhetoric and a threat to the free flow of information. Though Canada does not agree totally with NWICO, it sympathises with Third World concerns, such as the threat to national cultures. Canada's continued participation in the UNESCO communication program, however, depends on emerging trends in international communications.

Table 20**Information and communication economy by sectors, 1986 (\$ billions)**

	World Total	United States	Japan	EEC	Others
Press, publishing	250	110	55	55	30
TV, radio, motion pictures	65	30	10	15	10
Total media	315	140	65	70	40
Information processing	77	40	9	20	8
Postal services	53	26	7	10	10
Telecommunications services	250	114	34	60	42
Total services	380	180	50	90	60
Consumers equipment	70	20	30	10	10
Telecommunications equipment	65	25	15	20	5
Data processing	120	60	23	27	10
Electronics and others	145	60	40	35	10
Total equipment	400	165	108	92	35
Components	90	30	30	15	15
Total information and communication	1,185	515	253	267	150

Source: IDATE, contribution to World Communication Report, 1987.

DEREGULATION AND PRIVATIZATION

The deregulation going on in the United States is being keenly followed by the rest of the world. The private sector in the U.S. has been instrumental in developing the bulk of new communications technology. However, much of this technological research, as pointed out by Vincent Mosco,¹² is developed to meet U.S. military needs. Communication technology is being put to use to produce sophisticated defence equipment, as demonstrated during the Gulf War, when the U.S. armed forces fired with great precision missiles fitted with communication gadgetry. The amount spent on the communication equipment of just one missile could finance one IPDC project.

The U.S. corporate sector would like to see privatization extended throughout the world. "The unilateral withdrawal of the United States from UNESCO in 1984, in this perspective, can be seen as the American government's encouragement of deregulation and privatization in the international arena and in the poorer countries especially."¹³ The collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe further strengthens the American concepts of deregulation and privatization. These governments are going all out for the American market economy model.

In the field of communication, deregulation is aimed at breaking down public sector services in telecommunication and broadcasting.¹⁴ That transnational corporations lobby against public sector establishments is understandable. They want to see the developing countries do away with their public broadcasting and other media systems, so that they can export their own hardware and software to them. The developing countries' opposition to such moves is heard in UNESCO and other fora. Colleen Roach, an ardent follower of the communication debates in UNESCO, wrote:

The imperative for U.S. transnational telecommunications business interests is correctly reflected in the 'deregulatory fever', and the move toward the privatization of the public sector. This coupling of the deregulatory and privatization movements necessarily undermines a strong public sector of the economy whether on a national or international basis.¹⁵

This is already happening in Canada. The public sector is subjected to a lot of pressure from private industry, much evident in telecommunications. In his recent study on Canadian telecommunication policy, Vincent Mosco observes:

With its low rates and near universal service, Canada enjoys one of the best telecommunications systems in the world. Nevertheless, pressures within and outside of Canada, mainly from large business users, are transforming the system and threatening Canada's traditional commitment to widespread access and stable employment in the industry. Much of this pressure draws on the rhetoric of the market and competition predominant in the U.S. and UK.¹⁶

Criticizing the U.S. telecommunications system, Mosco warns Canadian policy makers against imitating its deregulation.¹⁷ Instead telecommunications should be placed under public control and short term economic interests should be "replaced with strong social regulation directed against abuses of market power, particularly as the telephone and cable industries converge, and the abuses of privacy that grow with powerful technologies."¹⁸

As Robert Babe pointed out, the "media of communication in Canada have been seldom controlled within the country."¹⁹ Both the telegraph and telephone industries were integrated through cartel arrangements or under U.S. ownership and remained like that for many years. Only during the '70s did the Canadian telephone industry come into Canadian hands. The decisions taken by Canadian telecommunications policy makers will be closely monitored by the developing countries, which appreciate successive Canadian governments' attempts to provide

communication links to a widely dispersed population, particularly in the territories where private ventures cannot operate successfully. They will look towards Canada for leadership and continued support for the public sector services in forums like UNESCO and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU).

DE-MONOPOLISATION OF PUBLIC SERVICES AND CONGLOMERATION OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES

Deregulation in the U.S. and Western Europe is leading towards conglomeration. During the past few years, media organizations are grouping together to increase economic strength, particularly in the U.S. Media organizations in Canada are doing the same. For example, when Time Inc. and Warner Communications Inc., two major media organizations, merged to form the world's largest media empire, valued at \$28 billion, Canada's Lord Thomson merged his two huge media operations into the world's fourth-biggest communications conglomerate.²⁰

Bernard Ostry, former Chairman of TVOntario, comments:

Such mergers reflect growing awareness among private operators that market and competition in telecommunications are now global in nature. At the same time, revenues from advertising are falling in real terms, and profits with them. Only the few financially strongest corporations, assisted by market-oriented governments, can hope to survive and profit from the new technologies and from the massive inventory of programs available only from the United States.²¹

These recent trends are not confined to telecommunication and broadcasting. Print media are doing more or less the same thing. Every day newspapers in the West are bought and sold like any other commercial commodity.²² A handful of newspaper chains are increasingly gaining control over international markets.²³ In Canada this type of situation led to the

appointment in 1980 of the Royal Commission on Newspapers, which came down heavily on the big media organizations resorting to predatory practices.²⁴ Though it is beyond the scope of this study to go into the detailed effects of media conglomeration, two things need to be emphasized. This type of monopolistic or oligopolistic control runs counter to libertarian notions, restricting diversity of opinions. Second, "as the newspaper business also became corporate and more oligopolistic, free flow and free market became the ideological bulwarks of the producers of information whose immense resources gave them a highly preferred position within the market."²⁵ Under these circumstances, how effectively can the agenda-setting and watchdog roles be performed by the press? A few press barons will be able to mould public opinion and set the agenda of discussions to suit their requirements.

If we take stock of the world media situation, it can be seen that Western news agencies dominate international news flows. Modern communication technology has further consolidated their position by increasing their capacity to gather and disseminate information at a very rapid rate. CNN coverage of the Gulf War is one example.

Canada is also witnessing massive oligopolistic concentration in its cultural industries. "According to the latest available figures, 77 per cent of the newspaper circulation in Canada is in the hands of the four largest publishing companies; 80 per cent of the movie attendance is at theatres owned by the two largest chains; over 80 per cent of radio stations are group-owned; 57 per cent of cable-TV subscriptions are controlled by six companies; and four major publishers share at least 90 per cent of the total ad revenues earned by Canadian consumer magazines."²⁶ This type of vertical integration of media organizations within Canada is felt necessary in order to face the stiff competition from the U.S. cultural industries, and is due to the small domestic

market. This is happening in spite of the government's protection of cultural industries.²⁷ Is there a lesson to be learned by the Second and Third World in this regard?

CANADA'S PUBLIC BROADCASTING: A TEST CASE?

"In contrast with the traditions of print journalism, the public sector has played a large role in the development of electronic journalism in Canada."²⁸ The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) is the chief carrier of national and international electronic journalism in Canada, while the small commercial stations cater to local news and entertainment. One of the major conflicts at UNESCO was centred on government-controlled media. It is true that in a number of developing countries, broadcasting is totally under the control of government. However, the degree of control over content depends on the political ideology of individual nations. Priorities are set based on the socio-economic needs of the countries.

In the West public broadcasting networks like the CBC or the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) are given an autonomous stature which allows them to be free of government control. Issuing a statement, Irene Pelletier M.P. and delegate in the UN Special Political Committee, said:

In the Canadian view, governments should facilitate the conditions so that information and communication systems and the cultural and economic material which flows through them, can flourish. But governments should not be allowed to interfere with the content of the mass media because we believe that it is contrary to basic human rights and freedoms, and hinders the professional responsibility of journalists to promote understanding and cooperation among nations and to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security.²⁹

Western public broadcasting organizations like the CBC and BBC, which receive liberal

government financing, can serve as models for Third World broadcasting-- provided they remain free of commercial interest and strive to achieve national goals. Commercial viability has all along been a weak point in public broadcasting. That is why government support is important. But there is an ever-increasing threat to these organizations from many quarters. Canadian private broadcasting has criticized the CBC for competing with them for the advertising dollar.³⁰ This is yet another example where Canadian broadcasting policy can offer an insight into the controversial issue of whether accepting commercial support weakens public broadcasting's commitment to nation building. But one thing is true. Many developing countries are allowing private enterprise to convey commercial messages through public broadcasting media channels. A good example in this case is India's Doordarshan (Television), which permits private enterprise sponsorship of programs.

After examining the problems of public service broadcasting, Willard Rowland and Michael Tracey conclude that these organizations are giving away to commercial systems. They identify three reasons:

Ideologically, the New Right was questioning the very idea of public culture, and the New Left was calling the national broadcasters elitist, statist, unaccountable, divisive, and exclusive. Economically, the financial basis was being eroded by diminishing support from public funds, increasing disparities in income between public and commercially funded broadcasters, escalating costs, and questions of equity. Technologically, new forms of distribution via cable, satellite, and video heralded the fragmentation of the public audience; they also portended the destruction of audiovisual communication policies, which had been predicated on a scarce and important natural resource being a "social good."³¹

The recent budget cuts to CBC³² and Radio Canada International,³³ the latter forcing RCI to close nine of its 14 foreign language broadcasting services,³⁴ are none too encouraging

for the public service broadcasting in Canada. Numerous federal commissions have looked into the various aspects of broadcasting, starting from the Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting, chaired by Sir John Aird in 1929, to the Caplan-Sauvageau Task Force.³⁵ The Task Force, appointed in 1985, was asked to look into various aspects of Canadian broadcasting including the challenges and opportunities in the increasingly competitive broadcasting environment presented by ongoing technological developments. The Task Force concluded that the public broadcasting service is necessary and dismissed the argument that deregulation is inevitable in the wake of the new technologies. "If anything, the decades old responsibility of the Canadian broadcasting system to help Canadians to remain Canadian is more crucial than ever."³⁶ The Task Force suggested the creation of another public service satellite-to-cable channel, TV Canada, to complement the CBC. It also called for regulation to balance the commercial and public interests of the broadcasting organizations. "This brave attempt signals an important area of political discussion as Western society shifts from the economic ethos of recent years to a re-establishment of questions of national sovereignty, cultural identity, and collective values at the heart of public debate."³⁷

Can Canada's mixed broadcasting policy be adopted as a model by the Third World in evolving their communication policy? Today many countries in both the Second and Third Worlds are looking around for media systems which can guarantee freedom of expression and also help in achieving national goals with minimal government interference.

For example, UNESCO has helped establish a Central and Eastern European Media Centre in Warsaw. This regional mechanism is to respond to such urgent needs in Eastern Europe as the training of journalists, facilitating the exchange of news and documentaries among

Eastern European countries and between Eastern and Western countries, and introducing "the principles and practices prevailing in societies with independent and pluralist media."³⁸ Western Europe is planning for a television without frontiers³⁹ that may jeopardize the present public broadcasting services. The policy decisions taken by Canada have a lesson for public broadcasting internationally.

The few public broadcasting organizations in the developed countries, including the CBC, are operating under severe constraints, facing stiff competition from private media organizations, and experiencing budget constraints. They have the responsibility of not only informing and entertaining the public, but also of educating them on various issues. They are established to foster a feeling of togetherness amongst a diverse citizenry, to maintain national traditions and customs that are giving way to the popular entertainment offered by private media. An example is the preservation of native Indian culture. If not for the public broadcasting service, is it possible for government to take any initiative in this direction? But again the question: is how long can governments continue to support public broadcasting services? This situation was aptly summarized by Marc Raboy in the context of Caplan-Sauvageau Task Force. He wrote:

By 1985, major public broadcasting institutions in all the western countries-- creatures of an earlier technological and socio-political context-- were also suffering an identity crisis as they became less and less able to satisfy their publics, increasingly fragmented and self-identifying by interest group rather than national collectivity. Finally, the technical impossibility of governments maintaining their monopolies (in the case of many European countries, for example) undermined the political usefulness of the media in their eyes, when combined with the other factors to favour a shift towards privatization.⁴⁰

Eastern Europe, undergoing a sea change, is looking for the West to help rejuvenate its

ailing economies. Communication has a key role to play in this process of change. The Eastern bloc countries have historically argued, during past UNESCO debates, that people's information and entertainment needs can best be satisfied if mass media are under state control.

That type of argument is not being heard any more. Many Eastern European nations are expressing their willingness to adopt Western views and ideologies. Now the question is what type of communication model will suit the Second World? Will it be communication policy driven by market forces, mostly in private hands, as in the U.S.? Or will it be a policy with both private and public institutions, as in Canada? Many Eastern European countries lack a strong private sector base, and virtually all the mass media have hitherto been under the State. A development communication model, so often cited as the solution for many communication problems of the Third World, may also be considered; in this case, however, more emphasis should be laid on establishing public services.

The West, including Canada, is suspicious of developing countries' aspirations to support public broadcasting; they fear such institutions would become the mouthpieces of authoritarian governments. In the wake of recent change, what course will the communication policies take on a global scale? Will private institutions be allowed to cater to the information and communications needs of the people, or will governments play a key role through regulatory bodies and public ownership?

MASS COMMUNICATION - CULTURAL IDENTITY

The quest for a distinct cultural identity through mass media institutions is not a recent phenomenon in Canada. As early as 1932, the then Prime Minister, R.B. Bennett, introducing

Bill 94 on broadcasting, declared, "This country must be assured of complete Canadian control of broadcasting from Canadian sources. Without such control broadcasting can never be the agency by which national consciousness may be fostered and sustained and national unity still further strengthened."⁴¹ Many Third World countries are under the same belief.

In his book Culture Communication & National Identity, Richard Collins has studied Canadian television from a socio-economic and political point of view. He argues that television is becoming an increasingly transnational medium, and that the North American situation is forcing West European broadcasting to adopt more of a market ideology.⁴² He feels that the Canada-U.S. television experience may be considered by Western Europe in realising their "television without frontiers." He further comments:

Given that broadcasting across the world is being 'Canadianized', Canada's prior experience of this condition offers its economic opportunities. Increasingly programming is demanded that is of interest to different language and cultural communities. Canada has, in its bilingual and multicultural audience, a perfect laboratory in which to conduct research and develop new products.⁴³

A Canadian policy document on cultural industries mentions that "the concern is not with the ease of access to the products of other cultures. It is rather with the difficulty of access to our own products, a difficulty that is primarily a function of the economics of the cultural industries, which place the cheaper, mass-marketed, imported products at such a distinct advantage."⁴⁴ Many Latin American countries are facing this situation. U.S. television programs are popular in these countries, much to the chagrin of the governments there. The fear that these programs may have an adverse effect on local culture is prevalent in the Third World. In the Canadian case, this fear is focused internally as well as externally. That is, while the anglophone population is obsessed with U.S. cultural products-- their immense popularity

bears testimony to that-- the minority francophone population of Quebec is passionate about maintaining a distinct French Canadian culture, and there is the native Canadian Indian population whose needs have to be taken care of. Without the government's support these minorities would not have many communication channels for their cultural expression.

The bilingual and multicultural social dimensions of Canada provide an immense opportunity for its cultural industries.

POTENTIAL FOR TRADE ?

If the concepts of Marshall McLuhan and Daniel Bell become a reality, the world will become a global village by virtue of mass communication technologies and will experience a post-industrial revolution transforming industrial society into a service-oriented society. In other words, communication is going to become a key economic resource. A federal government document, Communications for the Twenty-First Century, states:

Canada, like every other industrialized nation, is going through a major shift in the structure of its economy and its culture. This shift involves the movement towards a more information-based society, driven and enabled by the emergence of an integrated technology that has resulted from the merger of computing and communications. This new information technology is a "transformative" technology that will radically change the way we work and live.⁴⁵

The prophecies of McLuhan and Bell may become a reality in the case of a handful of Western countries, including Canada. But the majority of humanity, living in the developing world, will not be able to afford the simple facilities that modern communication technology can provide.

Commenting on the Canada- U.S. trade relationship, Brian Mulroney said, "Supplier of

fully one-third of the world's newsprint, Canada is the source of 90 per cent of the New York Times newspaper, while most of the New York Daily News derives from my home town of Baie-Comeau, Quebec."⁴⁶ It is also true that books printed on Canadian newsprint make their way into Canada and pose a threat to its own cultural industries.⁴⁷

The Canadian economy depends largely on the trade relationship with the U.S. Its branch plant economy largely depends on the transnational corporation (TNCs) of the U.S. Canada's economy, like that of the Third World, appears to be a victim of TNCs. In a 1980 report on the implications of the information revolution for Canada, Shirley Serafini and Michel Andrieu cautioned that, though the expansion of TNCs has stimulated economic growth and technical progress, "they have also been able on occasion to take advantage of weak international agreements and international rivalries between countries to evade national legislation and pursue independent policies, sometimes in conflict with the host countries."⁴⁸

There are very few information and communication groups in Canada which can be compared to the giants of the U.S., Japan or Europe. In fact there are only 11 major information and communication groups in Canada that figure in a selected list provided by the World Communication Report.⁴⁹

Canada is not a major producer of communication hardware or software, nor a major player in the international market (unlike the Americans, Japanese, French, Germans and British). If anything it is one of the major importers of cultural products, mostly from the U.S. and France. The reason is simple: there is not a big enough domestic market to support cultural industries. Commented Marcel Masse, then Minister of Communications:

The francophone market in Canada is one seventh of France's market and the Anglophone market is just one-quarter of Great

Britain's and one-sixteenth that of the United States. Under these circumstances, the cultural industries of these countries can achieve economies of scale and thus create and distribute products in their own countries and in Canada at a much lower cost than our own industries can.⁵⁰

That is why Canada has legislated protection for its cultural industries over the years. Though every country has to decide for itself the extent of protection that can be accorded to cultural industries, the Canadian experience may come in handy for policy makers of the Third World.

Even though Canada is not a major producer of mass communications equipment, it is capable of providing technological assistance to Third World countries. Canada has great strengths in certain aspects of the new information technology. It is now-- and has been for nearly a century-- a world leader in communications. Its broadcasting, cable and telecommunications networks are second to none. Canada is a world leader in digital switching and radio technologies, and its communications and engineering systems consulting firms are among the most competitive. Much of Canada's technological achievement was developed to provide communication links to its scattered population, and to match the technological capabilities of its powerful neighbour.

Canada's communication policy is aimed at integrating the technologies to provide better citizen access. Often the government itself takes the initiative in developing new communication technology to give its business community a competitive edge in the international market.

An example is the development of Telidon. Canada tried to beat the European and American videotex services by introducing Telidon, which proved to be superior to the other

services, particularly in creating high resolution graphics. Was this technology developed to cater to Canadian needs or to prove itself an innovator in the international market?

The most common practice in discussing Telidon (as it will always be thought in popular parlance) is to describe it as "a solution looking for a problem", or "technology looking for a market". The Senior official at the DOC at that time of Telidon said in 1986 that the problem with Telidon was a failure of imagination on the part of the Canadian business community.⁵¹

Such government attempts to provide a stimulus for the communication industry continue, with the financing of projects developing HDTV and fibre optics. These are highly expensive technologies which are yet to be standardized.

Canada has tended to view the Third World as a potential market for its communication equipment. Although much of the technology is developed to cater Canada's own needs, a desire to compete with other countries is much evident.

CANADA'S SATELLITE EXPERIMENTS

One area in which Canadian communication experience could be of great help to Third World lies in satellites. Canada has the credit of being the first country to own a domestic geostationary communication satellite, Anik-1, launched in 1972.⁵² Canada's experimental satellites have been put to multiple uses, to achieve commercial as well social goals.⁵³

Satellite experimentation is expensive. Even among industrialised countries, only a few can afford to carry on research. Perhaps this is the only area in international communication in which collaborative efforts among nations is seen on a large scale.⁵⁴

The Canadian government has expressed its desire to capture a fair share of the international satellite market. For example, former communication minister Marcel Masse said:

I believe that Canada has significant international opportunities in the field of satellite communications. Not many countries are as advanced as we are. We must capitalize on this advantage so that we get our share of international business and thus contribute to the ongoing costs of continuing the development cycle. International market development is one of my strongest personal priorities. While we must compete with industry from other countries, we should not lose sight of the fact that collaboration and cooperation can also be routes for advancing technology, and capturing markets. This has worked for us in the past. We should endeavour to make it work for us in the future.⁵⁵

Canada cannot aspire to market its satellite technology either to Western Europe, which has developed its own indigenous technology, or to its major trade partner, the U.S. In fact, most of the Canadian experiments with satellites are carried out jointly with the U.S.⁵⁶ The lucrative markets are with the Third World and the newly industrialised countries. One way of reaching these markets is through increased participation in the UNESCO communication program, particularly the IPDC. Though participation in these programs will not necessarily open doors to Third World markets, such attempts can be considered public relations efforts. Above all, Canada has a stake in the debates on communication satellites which figure prominently in UNESCO and the UN Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (COPOUS). Canada's argument on obtaining prior consent⁵⁷ (mentioned in the second chapter) is one such example.

COMMUNICATION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

We live in an interdependent world. Many of the problems the Third World is facing today--such as overpopulation, illiteracy, pollution, malnutrition, floods, famines, etc.--could be addressed well if the proper communication infrastructure exists. There is an immediate need

to address some of these problems, for the backwardness of the Third World reflects on the overall wellbeing of humanity. For example, environmental issues are universal. A lot of awareness about the environment is being created among citizens of the developed countries through mass media. Not much attention is being paid to these issues in the Third World, due to the lack of communication infrastructure and expertise among media personnel.

Proper communication facilities can help a lot in solving many Third World problems. For example, mass media have been instrumental in propagating social messages about birth control and improved agriculture methods among Third World people living in remote areas. This type of national priority can be best achieved through public broadcasting services. Hence communication policies have to take into consideration national goals rather than individual interest. As Cees Hamelink points out, "Development in Third World countries cannot be an imitation of Western models; the purpose is not to catch up with the rich countries. The development in the Third World that must take place will respect national sovereignty and limit the influence of decisions taken elsewhere."⁵⁸ That is why many developing countries are trying to avoid the Western communication ideology, with commercial interest as a basic tenet. The MacBride Commission, in its recommendations, stated that:

In expanding communication systems, preference should be given to non-commercial forms of mass communication. Promotion of such types of communication should be integrated with the traditions, culture, development objectives and socio-political system of each country. As in the field of education, public funds might be made available for this purpose.⁵⁹

The Commission further cautioned that "while acknowledging the need of the media for revenues, ways and means should be considered to reduce the negative effects that the influence of market and commercial considerations have in organization and content of national and

international communication flows."⁶⁰ The deregulation pitch in the developed countries is moving exactly in the opposite direction. Communication policy guidelines there are increasingly being set by a few transnational corporations, which do not "recognize the validity of the autonomous national state or national culture."⁶¹ The fight within Canada to maintain a distinct national culture is a prime example of this situation. "Transnational firms consider national boundaries politically, economically, and culturally obsolete and unable to define business requirements or consumer trends. The world is one market place and the world customer is essential for that market."⁶² Doesn't the free flow of information philosophy, propounded by most Western, states aid the transnational corporations in spreading their roots firmly all over the world? They are in a position to control international news flows. That is why the developing countries as early as the '70s started criticizing the role of transnationals in communication.⁶³

As earlier stated, the emerging communication technologies (particularly in microelectronics and satellite telecommunications) are bringing renewed concerns on a global scale. These technological developments involve large scale investments, which only developed countries can afford. This situation is again contributing to the enormous disparities in the resources between the developed and developing countries. The growth in computerization, telecommunications, and audiovisual mass media is increasingly leading towards economic imbalance.⁶⁴ Taking stock of this situation Gonzalez-Manet wrote:

Most Third World countries have not yet articulated national communication, information, education, or cultural policies, let alone implemented them in any comprehensive fashion. They are unprepared to meet the current and future challenges. Third World nations have only recently realized the political, social, and economic meaning of technological "modernization."⁶⁵

In the 70s, much of the communications controversy at UNESCO was centred on information flows between the South and the North. Communication scholars like Wilbur Schramm⁶⁶, Tapio Varis,⁶⁷ Jim Richstad⁶⁸ and others examined this issue from various perspectives. Some attributed newsflow imbalances to the monopoly of the Western-based international news agencies; others argued that the Western agencies gather and distribute more information on the Third World than critics claim. The emphasis since then has shifted to the distributive mechanisms. This shift is the outcome of both the Mass Media Declaration and the MacBride Commission Report. They led to the formation of the IPDC, created to help developing countries develop their own communication infrastructure. But the West, apprehensive of the political subtleties over establishing national media systems in developing countries, tends to ignore them.

Since the withdrawal of the U.S. and Britain, UNESCO's present Director-General, Fredrico Mayor, is parroting the Western concept of free flow of information. According to him, plans for NWICO do not exist any more. A new strategy has been adopted with a precondition of guaranteeing the free flow of information, both at the national and international levels, come what may. Many debates-- licensing of journalists and government control over media-- are off the agenda, much to the relief of both developed and developing countries. But some issues, such as those concerning DBS, TBDF, outcomes of modern technologies, are yet to be resolved. Basic issues-- the imbalances in news flow; the enormous gap in the communication technology between developed and developing countries; cultural domination by a few developed countries, particularly the U.S.; the increasing threat to public services posed by Western deregulation and privatization-- also remain to be resolved. Whether UNESCO will

be the centre for such discussions or whether they will be transferred to other specialized agencies remains to be seen. At present General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) is witnessing a stormy discussion on treating information as a commodity, a proposal of the U.S.

The halls of UNESCO in the '70s and '80s reverberated with the developing countries' concerns over communication issues. The NWICO demand, initiated over imbalances in news flow, came to encompass many of the other communication issues. But the NWICO demand, eventually accepted as a continuing and evolving process,⁶⁹ is now declared dead.⁷⁰ The Third World voice has been silenced with the lure of the IPDC. The only communication debate alive today is the U.S. move to extend the GATT to include "trade" in information, making it like any other tradable commodity. In her article on "Trade and Information Policy" Sandra Braman, points out that, "the focus on information as a commodity by the U.S. is part of an overall rejection of cultural, social or political valuation of international information flows that is embedded in background studies for policy-makers, congressional hearings and policy statements in a quite self-conscious way."⁷¹ The FTA agreement between Canada and the U.S. is considered by the latter as a model for GATT.⁷² Braman feels that the NWICO debate has moved from UNESCO to GATT. This is the present situation.

DOES CANADA NEED UNESCO ?

Apart from its interest in multilateralism, the desire to play an important middle power role, and a deep commitment to human rights and freedom, Canada has a great stake in the communication debates in UNESCO. It is true that the Third World demand for NWICO is hibernating and, as such, not many ideological outbursts are being evinced in UNESCO. The

principal reasons for this silence are many. First, the developing countries are too busy coping with their failing economies (including India, a leader in the Non-Aligned group).

Second, a number of notable developments are causing a shift in the global economy. These include the reunification of Germany, the political changes in Eastern Europe, the recent Gulf crisis, the European move towards a common market, and the free trade agreements between nations. During this process of re-adjustment, little interest is being shown in international communication issues.

Third, emerging communication technologies, such as satellites, fibre optics, cable TV and interactive communication, HDTV, and the Integrated Service Digital Network (ISDN)-- some of which are still in experimental stages-- are giving communication a new perspective. Many of these technologies are being developed in the West, and the Third World is unable to assess their impact on their own socio-economic and political conditions.

The main lines of action in UNESCO's communication program are directed to facilitating unhindered free flow of information on a national and international level and helping the developing countries improve their communication infrastructure through IPDC. This is the kind of action the West was expecting from the UNESCO communication program.

Canada has a lot to offer in this direction. It is in a perfect position to play the middle power role in UNESCO's communication program: it has less commercial interest in information and communication than the U.S., Germany, France, UK and Japan, and it shares some of the developing countries' traits, particularly in the Northern regions, where communication facilities are being provided mostly through public service systems. Some of the issues discussed in UNESCO may also help Canada justify its support to its own cultural industries.

CONCLUSIONS

The problems faced by Canadian communication policy makers over the years are still around; if anything, the emerging communication technologies are creating situations which have far-reaching repercussions on Canada's national and international relationship. On the altar are the public sector and national goals. Issues related to these concepts cannot be resolved by entering into bilateral treaties, for some issues transcend the international borders.

A few developments in Canadian communication policy may have a bearing on global communication. Long-time Canadian communication policy-- its national goals, mixed broadcasting system, public telephone services, regulatory mechanisms and legislative measures safeguarding cultural industries-- are slowly giving away to the increasing pressure of deregulation and privatization.

A small domestic market, the proximity of most Canadians to the U.S. border, and a common language and culture are often cited as reasons for Canadian dependency on the U.S. for cultural products. If Canadians accept these as inevitable and are content to share popular U.S. tastes, then there is little need to talk about communication in Canada and its policies would not be of interest to other countries. But the efforts of government and the private sector here are always geared to putting up a formidable challenge to U.S. infiltration. This effort continued with the cultural industries exemption in Canada's Free Trade Agreement with the U.S.

The importance of official bilingualism, multiculturalism, and retention native Indian culture are other factors that make review of communication policy a must for Canada.

Canada needs UNESCO as much as UNESCO needs Canada. Canada's renewed interest

in multilateralism has been amply demonstrated when it decided to remain with UNESCO following the departure of two close allies. The communication issues raised in UNESCO are to some extent applicable to Canadian communication. Hence it would be in Canada's own interest that it should continue to take active part in the UNESCO communication program.

Finally, participation in the UNESCO communication program will allow Canada to expand its trade relationship with the Third World.

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2. Quoted in Enrique Gonzalez-Manet, The Hidden War of Information (Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1988) 26.
3. The World Communications Report states that out of a total turnover of \$1,100 billion of the information and communication industries (which is roughly 8 to 9 percent of the world output), the media in the strict sense accounted for only 1 to 2.5 per cent of this output (0.5 per cent audio-visual industry and 1.9 for press and publishing) and the media and information services together accounted for about 5 per cent.
4. For example the First Intergovernmental Conference on Communication Policies in Asia and Oceania, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 5-14, February 1979, Doc.CC/MD/42, (Paris: UNESCO, 1979).
5. Monique Vezina, Minister for External Relations, addressing the UNESCO General Conference, 21 October 1985. For a full text of the speech, see Notes on Speeches (1985) circulated by the DOC.
6. Ian Christie Clark, Ambassador and Permanent Delegate of Canada to UNESCO, addressing the 26th Annual Meeting of the CCU in St. John's, Newfoundland, 6 June 1984. See Behind the Crisis at UNESCO (Ottawa: CCU, 1984) 31.
7. Ian Clark, Behind the Crisis (1984) 31.
8. Canada was one of the 23 nations which submitted a list of proposals for major reforms entitled, "The Crisis in UNESCO," to the UNESCO Director-General, M'Bow on 14 March 1985. For details see, C. Anthony Giffard, UNESCO and the Media (New York & London, 1989) 74-75, and Washington Post 15 March 1984.
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10. Gerard Pelletier, "The Multilateralist Role of the Middle Power," in Friends So Different: Essays on Canada and the United States in the 1980s, Lansing Lamont and J. Duncan Edmonds (eds), (Ottawa, London, Paris: Published for the Americas Society by University of Ottawa Press, 1989) 226.
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12. See Vincent Mosco, The Pay-Per Society: Computers & Communication in the Information Age (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1989) 131-72.

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21. Bernard Ostry, "Can culture Survive," June 5 1989.
22. See Ben H. Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly (Boston: Beacon, 1983).
23. Ben Bagdikian, "The 26 Corporations That Own the Media," Extra! the newsletter of F.A.I.R (Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting) 1-1: (May 12, 1986).
24. See Royal Commission on Newspapers (Kent Report), (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1981).
25. William Preston Jr., Hope and Folly (1989) 19.
26. Mary Vipond, The Mass Media In Canada (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, Publishers, 1989) 78-79.
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29. For a complete text of the statement see the document distributed by the CCU on the Statements issued by Canadian delegates on the communication issues in the UN.

30. For example a five member group which studied the economic health of television, suggested the CRTC that it should reduce CBC's commercial limit to eight minutes an hour from 12 minutes. See "CBC Urged to Bail Private TV," The Toronto Star 10 May 1991, C1.

31. Willard D. Rowland, Jr., and Michael Tracey, "World wide Challenges to Public Broadcasting," Journal of Communication 40.2 (1990) 8-9.

32. The CBC experienced a budget cut of \$140 million during the first term of Mulroney Government, and an equal amount is likely to be cut between 1990 and 1994, (quoted in Mary Vipond, Mass Media in Canada (1989) 150.

33. See Pauline Couture, "Cutting Canada's Voice to Whisper," The Globe & Mail 10 April 1991, A15.

34. Stephen Godfrey, "RCI Slashed by Nearly Half," The Globe & Mail 23 March 1991, A7.

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CONCLUSIONS

This thesis shows that UNESCO has been an important multilateral forum for discussing international communication issues and that Canada derives multiple benefits by participating in its communication programs. It also points out that Canada has to look beyond bilateral agreements to resolve some of the communication issues confronting it.

It has been argued in this thesis that the problems confronting Canada are largely due to the domination of United States cultural products. A small domestic market, the proximity of most Canadians to the U.S. border, and a common language and culture are often cited as reasons for a state of cultural dependency.

Canada has taken many legislative measures to safeguard its cultural industries from the onslaught of the U.S. cultural products. However, Canada doesn't perceive such protective measures as impediments to the free flow of information but considers them necessary to retain cultural sovereignty and to maintain a distinct national identity. Canada's quest to retain its cultural sovereignty continues by seeking exemption for its cultural industries from the Free Trade Agreement.

In the first chapter of this thesis Canada's views on NWICO and its opinion on the MacBride Commission report were examined. It has been found that most of the time Canada expressed its solidarity with other developed countries on many issues, such as an unwillingness to compromise with the free flow of information; the role of multinationals or private media ownership; the licensing of journalists or evolving a code of ethics for journalists. However,

Canada's protective measures to safeguard its communication industries goes against the notion of free flow of information.

The examination of Canada's participation in the International Program for the Development of communication reveals that Canada can play a very effective role in its implementation but it is not paying much attention to it. Canada took keen interest in the Program when it was first started in the early '80s and made good contributions to its special account. IPDC is principally a fund raising program. The program can be best encouraged by pledging donations to its special account (a multilateral funding mechanism.) Most of the Western Countries, particularly the U.S., prefer to donate to the funds-in-trust, a bilateral tied aid mechanism. This helps them to establish trade links with the aid recipient countries. Canada is not a major producer of mass communication equipment, though it is a pioneer in certain areas of telecommunication technology, and hence it can participate in the program in a true multilateral spirit devoid of any vested interests. Research on this issue shows that the Canadian International Development Agency is not too keen on providing funds to the IPDC. CIDA is of the opinion that the IPDC projects are too small and proper evaluation of their implementation can not be done. In principle, IPDC is an excellent way to resolve many conflicting communication issues but is not able to fulfil its obligations due to lack of funds.

This thesis also points out that Canada's communication scene is also being affected by the increasing trend to privatization and de-regulation, particularly in the United States. Public broadcasting in Canada is already suffering from budget cuts. On the other hand, there is an increasing oligopolistic concentration in the private media. The policy decisions taken by Canada will be closely monitored by countries which have public broadcasting and telecommunication

systems.

With the withdrawal of the U.S. and U.K. from UNESCO, not much is being heard about NWICO either in UNESCO or in other international fora such as the non-aligned meetings. The Director-General of UNESCO, Fredrico Mayor, has declared that there is no place for NWICO in UNESCO any longer and that its mission is now to promote the idea of free flow of information.

It is true that NWCIO is in a state of limbo, mainly due to the political changes taking place in the Eastern Europe. It is also true that UNESCO's membership is going to swell with the independent member states of the old Soviet Union. At present the Eastern European countries are trying to follow the market economy of the developed countries. This study notes that UNESCO has already helped the Central and Eastern Europe to establish a Media Centre. This move further reinforces the need for multilateral co-operation in the area of mass communications.

Both Canada and the United States are pressing the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade to include "trade" in information making it like any other tradable commodity. The FTA agreement between Canada and the U.S. is being considered by the latter as a model for GATT.

Renewed concerns over mass communication issues are bound to reappear sooner or later. There is a need for an international forum like UNESCO to provide an opportunity for intellectual exchange.

A lot of research is being done on communication issues confronting Canada-United States relationship. But not much thought is being given to communication issues of the

developing countries and their impact on Canada. This research is one attempt to rectify this deficiency.

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The "Betty Zimmerman Collection", at St. Patrick's Resource Centre, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, has provided many of the primary sources for this research. The Collection has all the background papers submitted to the MacBride Commission,; deliberations of the UNESCO General Conferences,; papers and reports published on mass communications by UNESCO; papers presented in various seminars, news clippings and reports of various commissions, etc. The Collection also holds the documents published by the Canadian Commission for UNESCO, Ottawa.

Details of the UNESCO documents referred in this research are given at the end of each chapter.

Statements issued by the Canadian delegates attending the UNESCO meetings are compiled by the CCU and are made available on request.

The excerpts from the speeches delivered by the Ministers' and other officials of Communication are taken from the Notes for an Address, circulated by the Department of Communication, Ottawa.

The following persons were interviewed during the research:

Betty Zimmerman, former Director, Radio Canada International and a member of the MacBride Commission, 10 Jan. 1991.

Louis Patenaude, Associate Secretary-General, Canadian Commission of UNESCO, Ottawa, 28 June 1990.

Charles Morrow, Chief, Development Communications (Retd.) CIDA, 12 Apr. 1991.

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